

## INFORMATION TO USERS

This reproduction was made from a copy of a document sent to us for microfilming. While the most advanced technology has been used to photograph and reproduce this document, the quality of the reproduction is heavily dependent upon the quality of the material submitted.

The following explanation of techniques is provided to help clarify markings or notations which may appear on this reproduction.

1. The sign or "target" for pages apparently lacking from the document photographed is "Missing Page(s)". If it was possible to obtain the missing page(s) or section, they are spliced into the film along with adjacent pages. This may have necessitated cutting through an image and duplicating adjacent pages to assure complete continuity.
2. When an image on the film is obliterated with a round black mark, it is an indication of either blurred copy because of movement during exposure, duplicate copy, or copyrighted materials that should not have been filmed. For blurred pages, a good image of the page can be found in the adjacent frame. If copyrighted materials were deleted, a target note will appear listing the pages in the adjacent frame.
3. When a map, drawing or chart, etc., is part of the material being photographed, a definite method of "sectioning" the material has been followed. It is customary to begin filming at the upper left hand corner of a large sheet and to continue from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps. If necessary, sectioning is continued again—beginning below the first row and continuing on until complete.
4. For illustrations that cannot be satisfactorily reproduced by xerographic means, photographic prints can be purchased at additional cost and inserted into your xerographic copy. These prints are available upon request from the Dissertations Customer Services Department.
5. Some pages in any document may have indistinct print. In all cases the best available copy has been filmed.

**University  
Microfilms  
International**

300 N. Zeeb Road  
Ann Arbor, MI 48106



Sedghi, Hamideh

WOMEN AND CLASS IN IRAN 1900-1978

*City University of New York*

Ph.D. 1982

University  
Microfilms  
International 300 N. Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, MI 48106

Copyright 1982  
by  
Sedghi, Hamideh  
All Rights Reserved





WOMEN AND CLASS IN IRAN 1900-1978

by

HAMIDEH SEDGHI

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate  
Faculty in Political Science in partial  
fulfillment of the requirements for the  
degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City  
University of New York.

1982

© COPYRIGHT BY  
HAMIDEH SEDGHI  
1982

This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Political Science in satisfaction of the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

May 14, 1982  
date

Dankwart A. Rustow  
Chairman of Examining Committee

May 14, 1982  
date

Edward S. Jentsch  
Executive Officer

Professor Dankwart A. Rustow

Professor Irving Leonard Markovitz

Supervisory Committee

The City University of New York

## Abstract

## WOMEN AND CLASS IN IRAN 1900-1978

by

Hamideh Sedghi

Sponsor: Professor Dankwart A. Rustow

By presenting for the first time much material gathered in Iran, this study attempts to elucidate an integrated analysis of class and gender relations within the context of Iran's capitalist transformation.

Why women were "emancipated" and what effects capitalism and state policies had on their subordination are the issues at the core of this study. The hypothesis is that changes in the legal position of women were reflections of their changing work (inside and outside the household) position to the extent that they facilitated the growth of dependent capitalism and sharpened class and gender inequalities. This was tested through an analysis of the division of labor by sex, class, marital status, life cycle, and ideology in urban areas and in the communications industry. The project, moreover, examined the consequences of laws on class and gender relations.

The major findings of the study are: (1) subordination of women took different forms during different periods. As such, it was more influenced by the existing form of the sexual division of labor than by cultural values. (2) Women's entry in the labor force, as a result of the rapid capitalist accumulation, marked the beginning of the double day. This meant a degree of independence for middle class women, but it also indicated a new form of subordination for working class and middle class women.

Women became crowded in the service sectors. Unlike other societies, women's labor force participation was highest among those between the ages of 20-29. Married working class women could work because of their maintenance of traditional ties. Married middle class women relied on relatives and maids to facilitate their work. Overall, as women moved into wage work, they experienced subordination: As wage laborers by capital, as women by men, and as women by women in positions of power.

(3) The subordination of women was also reinforced by the state. Laws restricting women's mobility and autonomy were liberalized and demand for women's labor increased. The laws left untouched the sexual division of labor in the household. Patriarchal relations remained but varied across class lines. The state, thus, constructed class and gender hierarchies corresponding to those developed by the economy.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

As the deadline nears for the turning in of "Women and Class in Iran 1900-1978," pressures mount. These anxieties make it difficult to express how this work could not have come about without the tremendous help and support I received in Iran and the U.S.

My big debt is to Christian Bay of the University of Toronto, a longtime friend who encouraged me from the very beginning of my graduate training. His generosity in reading, commenting, and criticizing several chapters helped a great deal. Willi Semmler of the New School of Social Research spent many long hours helping me organize mountains of confusing statistics and tables. His vast knowledge of political economy contributed enormously to the shaping and development of my arguments. With his continuous support and great sense of humor, he did much "to reproduce the labor power" needed to complete this dissertation.

A writer with a special gift for editing, Lynn Garafola, came to my aid in reorganizing a couple of difficult chapters. Putting aside her own work, she generously made herself available -- both intellectually and emotionally -- in helping me over the "dissertation crisis." With Eric Foner of Columbia University, she lent her support throughout with jokes and her "multinational" cuisine.

Thanks also go to Nancy Breen who patiently read four chapters. Our all night discussions contributed tremendously to strengthening and clarifying my arguments. The URPE

Women's Caucus and the New York Women and Development Group provided both intellectual incentives and support too. Ann-Marie Paley, with her intelligence and sensitivity, helped me weather the ordeal. Carol Stock and Pat Maher generously gave up their time to complete the final typing as did Madeleine Tress, who not only pointed out inconsistencies in the text that slipped by me, but also remained patient throughout the typing of the tables. To the many other friends and colleagues who contributed in numerous ways to this dissertation, I would like to express my heart-felt gratitude.

I owe a special word of thanks to Professor Dankwart Rustow who encouraged me to pursue graduate training at CUNY and who has helped me throughout both as an advisor and as the sponsor of this dissertation. His stimulating intellect and sharp insights have inspired me to strive for the highest standards of scholarship. My great debt of gratitude is to Professor Irving Leonard Markovitz, who, almost always, "gave me a hard time" with his tough, substantive questions. As a scholar and also as a superlative human being, he helped me get through the many hurdles and crises of graduate school. I am also grateful to Professors Ervand Abrahamian, Benjamin Rivlin, and Stuart Schaar, members of my dissertation defense committee, for their helpful comments and criticisms.

Many Iranians contributed to the making of this dissertation. For various reasons, I cannot mention their

viii  
names. Nevertheless, I acknowledge here my greatest appreciation. My mother, my sister Haideh, and my brothers, especially Mamal, have stood by me with steadfast loyalty, particularly in the last six months when the going was hardest.

More than anyone else, the spirit that lies behind this work is that of my father, who from my earliest days encouraged my scholarly, feminist, and political commitments. Unfortunately, he did not survive to see this work. To him I dedicate "Women and Class in Iran 1900-1978."



## TABLE OF CONTENTS

|                  |                                                                |     |
|------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------|-----|
| ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS |                                                                | vi  |
| LIST OF TABLES   |                                                                | xii |
| CHAPTER I        | INTRODUCTION . . . . .                                         | 1   |
|                  | A. The Nature and Scope of the Study                           |     |
|                  | B. The Relevant Literature                                     |     |
|                  | C. Organization of the Study                                   |     |
|                  | D. The Method of Transliteration                               |     |
| CHAPTER II       | WOMEN IN A PREDOMINANTLY AGRICULTURAL . .                      | 53  |
|                  | ECONOMY                                                        |     |
|                  | A. Women's Position in Production and Reproduction             |     |
|                  | B. The Political and Feminist Activities of Women              |     |
|                  | C. The Position of Women Under the Reiligious and Secular Laws |     |
|                  | D. The Economic Structure and the Position of Women            |     |
| CHAPTER III      | WOMEN AND LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION IN THE .                   | 114 |
|                  | AGE OF IMPERIALISM                                             |     |
|                  | A. Iran's Integration Into the World Capitalist Market         |     |
|                  | B. Capitalism and the Labor Force                              |     |
|                  | 1. Agents of Capitalism                                        |     |
|                  | 2. Oil Revenues, Investments, and Capital Formation            |     |
|                  | 3. GNP (Aggregate and Sectoral) and Production                 |     |
|                  | 4. Labor Force: the Employed and Unemployed by Sex             |     |
|                  | C. Urbanization                                                |     |
| CHAPTER IV       | DIVISION OF LABOR AND GENDER ROLES IN . .                      | 163 |
|                  | URBAN AREAS                                                    |     |
|                  | A. The Household and Division of Labor                         |     |
|                  | B. Division of Labor by Major Economic Sectors                 |     |

- C. Division of Labor by Specific Occupations, Class, and Ideology
- D. Division of Labor by Marital Status, and Life Cycle

CHAPTER V DIVISION OF LABOR AND GENDER ROLES WITHIN . . 220  
 THE COMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY: THE NATIONAL  
 IRANIAN RADIO AND TELEVISION (NIRT) SYSTEM  
 AND ITS SUBSIDIARY UNIT, THE CENTRAL OFFICE  
 OF NEWS AND INFORMATION (CONI) AS CASE  
 STUDIES

- A. The Communications Industry and the Reproduction of Social Relations and and Repression
- B. Labor Force Participation and Sex Division of Labor in NIRT and CONI
  - 1. Exclusion of Women From High Level Positions
  - 2. Inclusion of Women in Middle Level Positions
  - 3. Absence of Women From Low Level Positions

CHAPTER VI WOMEN AND LEGAL REFORMS: THE STATE MEETS . . 274  
 THE ECONOMY

- A. Women and the Family Protection Laws
- B. Women and the Criminal Code
- C. Women and the Labor Legislation
- D. Suffrage and Political Participation of Women
- E. Assessment of Legal Codes and Their Relationship to Women's Work and Economic Changes

CHAPTER VII CONCLUSION . . . . . 334

- A. Findings of the Research in Perspective
  - 1. Women, Work, and Class
  - 2. Women's Work and Economic Changes
  - 3. Women and the State
  - 4. Division of Labor, Class, and Gender Relations
- B. Unresolved Questions
- C. Future Contradictions in the Political Economy of Women

|                    |     |
|--------------------|-----|
| APPENDIX . . . . . | 374 |
|--------------------|-----|

General Notes and Statistical Tables

|                                 |     |
|---------------------------------|-----|
| SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . | 443 |
|---------------------------------|-----|

List of Tables

|                                                                                                         |     |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|
| 1. Employed Population by Major Industry (1956)                                                         | 377 |
| 2. School Enrollment by Sex in Iran (1947 and 1955)                                                     | 378 |
| 3. University Enrollment by Sex in Tehran (1956)                                                        | 379 |
| 4. Gross Domestic Capital Formation (1953-75)                                                           | 380 |
| 5. Gross National Product by Economic Sectors (1959-76)                                                 | 381 |
| 6. Industry ( Number of Factories) (1953-77)                                                            | 384 |
| 7. Industry (Production Output) (1953-77)                                                               | 385 |
| 8. Population 10 Years of Age and Over, by Sex and Economic Activity in Iran and Urban Areas (1956-77)  | 386 |
| 9. Labor Force Participation by Sex in Iran (1956-76)                                                   | 390 |
| 10. Labor Force Participation of the Population 10 Years of Age and Over by Sex in Urban Iran (1956-76) | 391 |
| 11. Changes in Labor Force Participation by Sex in Urban Iran (1956-76)                                 | 392 |
| 12. Unemployment by Sex in Iran and Urban Areas (1956-76)                                               | 393 |
| 13. Population by Sex (1956-76)                                                                         | 394 |
| 14. Growth of Population (1956-76)                                                                      | 395 |
| 15. Distribution of Items Utilized by Households in Urban Iran (1971-74)                                | 396 |
| 16. Average Annual Household Income in Urban Iran (1969-74)                                             | 397 |
| 17. Share of Productivity Factors in Domestic Value Added (1972-74)                                     | 399 |
| 18. Wholesale Price Index                                                                               | 400 |
| 19. Changes in Wholesale Price Index (1961-67)                                                          | 401 |
| 20. Consumer Price Index in Urban Iran(1969-76)                                                         | 402 |

|                                                                                                                |     |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|
| 21. Consumer Price Index in Urban Areas in Iran in March 1976 and Precent Changes from Previous Years          | 403 |
| 22. Cost of Living Index (1959-76)                                                                             | 404 |
| 23. Distribution of Labor Force in Major Economic Sectors by Sex and Industry Group in Urban Iran (1956-76)    | 405 |
| 24. Distribution of Labor Force in Major Occupations by Sex and Major Occupation Group in Urban Iran (1956-76) | 407 |
| 25. Main Occupation of Women in Iran (1966)                                                                    | 409 |
| 26. Women's Occupation as a Percentage of Total Labor Force in Urban Iran (1966)                               | 410 |
| 27. Percent of Urban Female Employed 12 Years of Age and Over by Skill (1972)                                  | 411 |
| 28. Male Factory Workers' Reasons for Disapproving Wives to Wage Work                                          | 412 |
| 29. Labor Force Participation of Women by Marital Status in Urban Iran (1966)                                  | 413 |
| 30. Labor Force Participation of Women 10 Years of Age and Over by Age in Urban Iran (1976)                    | 414 |
| 31. Female Population 10 Years of Age and Over by Age and Marital Status in Urban Iran (1976)                  | 415 |
| 32. Employed Population by Sex, NIRT, 1973                                                                     | 417 |
| 33. Employed Population by Sex, NIRT, 1977                                                                     | 418 |
| 34. Employed Population by Sex, CONI, 1975                                                                     | 419 |
| 35. Occupational Distribution by Sex, CONI, Tehran                                                             | 420 |
| 36. Socio-economic Background: Directors, CONI, NIRT, Tehran, 1977                                             | 423 |
| 37. Socio-economic Background: Female Analysts, CONI, NIRT, Tehran, 1977                                       | 424 |
| 38. Socio-economic Background: Male Analysts, CONI, NIRT, Tehran, 1977                                         | 426 |
| 39. Socio-economic Background: Male News Personnel, CONI, NIRT, Tehran, 1977                                   | 427 |
| 40. Socio-economic Background: Female News Personnel, CONI, NIRT, Tehran, 1977                                 | 428 |

|                                                                                        |     |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|
|                                                                                        | xiv |
| 41. Socio-economic Background: Male Typists, CONI, NIRT, Tehran, 1977                  | 429 |
| 42. Socio-economic Background: Female Typists, CONI, NIRT, Tehran, 1977                | 430 |
| 43. Marriages by Age and Sex in Greater Tehran, 2533/1974                              | 431 |
| 44. Reasons for Divorce in Greater Tehran, 2533/1974                                   | 432 |
| 45. Distribution of Divorces by Economic Activity and Age in Greater Tehran, 2533/1974 | 433 |
| 46. Reasons for Seeking Assistance From WOI on Marital Problems, Selected Urban Areas  | 434 |
| 47. Reasons Leading to Divorce, Selected Urban Areas                                   | 435 |
| 48. Daily Wages of Female Industrial Workers, Isfahan                                  | 436 |
| 49. Members of the Majlis and Senate                                                   | 437 |
| 50. Ministerial Representation, Tehran, 1975 and 1977                                  | 438 |
| 51. Department Representation, Tehran, 1975 and 1977                                   | 440 |
| 52. Provincial Government Representation, 1975 and 1977                                | 442 |

## INTRODUCTION

"Women and Class in Iran 1900-1978" attempts to explore new territory. It negates what I have been led to believe: that women are unimportant because they have contributed little to the history of "mankind." This history has recently been challenged by the rapidly growing literature and theoretical works on political and economic development, particularly with regard to the diverse effects of capitalist and socialist development on women. Little systematic work, however, has focused on women in the developing countries of the third world, and only a few studies have delved into women and capitalist development in Iran.\*

As the question of "emancipation" and women's participation in the political, social and economic processes of Iran became increasingly important under the Pahlavi dynasty, the study of dynamics of their changing social position, the conditions that fostered such changes and the consequences of those changes for the social position of women gained considerable significance. Why women were "emancipated" in Iran and what effects capitalist development and state policies had on their changing position are the issues at the core of this study.

---

\*See the following discussion of literature on this subject.

From the turn of the century to early 1978, legislation brought many changes in the position of Iranian women. In the early 1900's urban Iranian women were primarily confined to the andaruni (the private world of family).<sup>1</sup> In 1905, they were categorized in the Constitution as non-voting citizens, along with convicted criminals.<sup>2</sup> Until the 1930's, almost no change occurred in the position of women. In 1936 a decree to unveil women was promulgated and enforced at gun-point.<sup>3</sup> In matters of marriage and family relationships, subsequent years saw the gradual replacement of religious laws by secular criminal and civil codes.<sup>4</sup> It was not until the 1960's that major changes in the position of Iranian women took place--first in law and more slowly in practice. In 1963 women were granted the suffrage as well as the right to be elected to the national legislative bodies and to provincial and other elective councils all across the country.<sup>5</sup> In 1967, and subsequently in 1975, the Family Protection Laws made significant alterations in the Civil Codes, especially in matters of temporary and permanent marriages, divorce, child custody and employment of women.<sup>6</sup> What factors accounted for these legislative changes regarding women in the period of 1960-78?

To deal with that question, this study investigates the interrelationship between two sets of factors: (1) economic changes, such as capitalist industrialization, labor



force participation and urbanization; and (2) political reforms, such as changes in suffrage and marriage laws, and labor legislation. It attempts a comparative analysis of women's work--inside and outside the household--and legal position in urban Iran in two periods--the early 1900's and the period of 1960-78.

This study will investigate changes in the legal position of women which were promoted by:

- (1) economic changes (transformation of a predominantly agricultural economy to a dependent capitalist economy)<sup>7</sup> that:
  - (a) created capital-intensive and import-substitution industries and allowed agriculture to wither;
  - (b) separated producers from their means of production, caused migration, created a pull of wage laborers, petty commodity producers, and a reserve army of unemployed people;
  - (c) concentrated capital in cities, caused urbanization and created increased as well as new kinds of occupations in cities, especially in the services and industries;
  - (d) created a more consumer-oriented society by substituting imported and manufactured for home-produced goods;
  - (e) created an increased need for cash income especially for urban households which pushed both the

- wife and husband to work for a wage;
- (2) political reforms including laws conferring the franchise on women, preventing one-sided divorce at the husband's whim, restricting polygamy, and encouraging female employment while constructing legal, class as well as sex bias; and
  - (3) the interrelationship between the two; that is, the degree of legal change was a reflection of the changing work position of women--inside and outside the household--to the extent that it facilitated the growth of dependent capitalism and sharpened class and gender inequalities.

Hence, this is a study in social causality, emphasizing the relationship between economic changes and political reforms pertaining to women in urban Iran.

This study also investigates a number of factors that caused the subordination of women in Iran. My contention is that the subordinated position of women took different forms during different historical periods. As such, it was more influenced by the existing form of the sexual division of labor implicit in the nature of the state and mode of production than the role played by other factors such as cultural values. Women have historically experienced subordination. The form and degree of their subordination, however, varies in different periods.

In early twentieth century Iran with the prevalence of

the Koranic division of labor, the weak government, and the subsistence economy, women were confined more to home work and the household remained the focal point of patriarchal control. The subordinated position of women was, thus, consistent with religious values. With the centralization of the state under Reza Shah, the traditional division of labor was modified: The state assumed a partial patriarchal role, and it paved the way for the employment of a small number of women in the slow but growing economy. Again, with changes in the sexual division of labor and in the nature of the state, the subordination of women took a different form. Women became subordinated by the state as well.

As the rapid capitalist transformation of Iran under the Shah developed along with the repressive state apparatus and the institutionalization of secular and Western values, there came a relatively sharp rise in women's employment. In this way, while the Shah altered the sexual division of labor in the market, he did not interfere with the sexual division of labor in the household. The subordinate position of women in this period, paralleled their entry into the sex-segregated labor market which marked the beginning of the double day in the capitalist society, not in the subsistence one. The double day was also accompanied by new forms of class relations among women. Consequently, with changes in the division of labor, women experienced subordination at three levels: as wage laborers by capital, as

women by men, and as women by women in positions of power. Hence, to the extent that this study focuses on the investigation of the subordinated position of women in the capitalist labor market and the household within the context of the interaction of the state and economy, I believe that the emphasis on the division of labor serves as the most fruitful starting point.

In addition, my focus is on the impact of Iran's capitalism on the work of women (both as wage laborers and unpaid domestic workers in the household of various social classes in urban Iran. The importance of this subject is noted by Nikki Keddie and Lois Beck. They point out that "Thus far, there has been little scholarly discussion of the impact of capitalism and imperialism on women of different social classes..." in the Middle East.<sup>8</sup> The study of women's work also warrants a thorough investigation of the division of labor based on class, sex, marital status, age and ideology. In addition, as a case study, I attempt to link women's work to a detailed analysis of the sexual division of labor by class and gender in the communications industry. Thus, this dissertation embarks on a systematic analysis of women's work by class, marital status, life cycle and ideology in urban Iran and in the context of a specific work place.

This study also investigates the impact of state legislation on the position of various classes of women. The focus is on the consequences of laws on class and gender re-

lations in Iran. It is my contention that the capitalist transformation of Iran paralleled the entry of women into paid production. In this process, a dialectical tension was created for women. On the one hand, laws restricting women's mobility and autonomy were liberalized and the demand for entry of some women into wage work increased. On the other hand, laws maintaining patriarchy and women's activities in the reproduction of the labor force denied most women full equality and participation relative to men. Hence, women, formally emancipated by law, became subordinated not only by class but also by gender contradictions.

This dissertation analyzes legal and economic changes regarding Iranian women from 1900 to 1978. It concentrates on the period from the mid-1950's to early 1978 when Iran increasingly adopted a western capitalist model of development. In that period, "the resumption and rapid increase in oil revenues...followed by the growth of small industries, foreign capital investments, private banking enterprise, transportation firms, local and foreign trade"<sup>9</sup> not only brought about changes in the economy and society, but also increased Iran's dependency on the world capitalist market. These developments, in turn, produced significant changes in the nature of women's work. The years 1960-78, moreover, constituted the period when the most notable changes in the legal position of women took place; the state introduced new legislation within the context of political reforms. There-

fore, the main body of this dissertation deals with women's work and the legal position of women up to the September 1978 upheavals. A brief portion of the concluding chapter touches on some of the contradictions women have faced since the downfall of the Shah. The Iranian revolution of 1978-79 continues. The changes in work and in the legal position of women under the revolution requires a separate study.

My intention is to explore the changes that have taken place in the work and legal position of urban women only. I briefly discuss the impact of capitalism on the rural structure but refrain from investigating changes in the position of rural, tribal, ethnic, or religious minority women. Given the differences between urban, rural, tribal, ethnic and religious communities, the selection of urban Iran was based upon an attempt to achieve a measure of precision. It should be noted that urban Iran had more similarities in culture and language (for example, in large cities such as Abadan the majority of people speak Farsi while its rural hinterland speaks Arabic, Luri, or Kurdish) than the rural areas. Also, according to Ervand Abrahamian, urban Iran was more homogeneous in the polarization of the class structure than the countryside.<sup>10</sup>

Finally, this is a single case study of development in Iran, despite Arend Lijphart's warning against the "ambiguous" status of such a study. He contends that "a single case study can constitute neither the basis for a valid generalization

nor the ground for disproving an established generalization."<sup>11</sup> Lijphart, however, underestimates various advantages gained by single case studies. First, a single case study can throw light on areas that have been hitherto inadequately studied or not studied at all. Second, the utility of data-gathering operations such as the one proposed for this study lies in the testing of previous propositions developed in other area studies and/or the refining of more general theories, or in the building of new ones. Third, a single case study allows the researcher to examine and analyze a particular area in far greater detail. Since this dissertation attempts to make a contribution to our knowledge of Iran and Iranian women as well as to evaluate some existing relevant propositions, I believe the single case study to offer the most fruitful approach.

#### B. The Relevant Literature and Its Relation To This Study

There are essentially two bodies of literature<sup>12</sup> which this study addresses and upon which it attempts to build: literature on development and women in Iran; and literature and general theoretical works on economic development, particularly with regard to the diverse effects of western capitalist, socialist and third world capitalist development on women. In the following, I will briefly discuss this literature in order to show the gap this dissertation intends to fill. I will then proceed with a detailed analysis

of a few works that are germane to the examination of a number of propositions specific to this study.

Most of the literature written in English on modern Iran contributes valuable information on the subjects of history, politics, economy, culture and religion. Almost always, however, women are excluded from purview of such studies.<sup>13</sup> Specialists on Iran have generally ignored the contributions and experiences of Iranian women. What little has been written, like most of the literature on Iran, suffers from a lack of theoretical analysis: the treatment of women is mainly descriptive, statistical and legalistic. In addition to these foreign language studies by scholars of Iran, a considerable literature on the subject of women exists in Farsi. These works, however, comprise superficial inquiries into the status of urban, middle, and upper class women and fail to provide insights on the specific position of women within the context of capitalist development.

Following is a brief assessment of the works on modern Iran and Iranian women in Farsi and in English. I have divided my discussion of the literature into two sections, one dealing with general works on Iran and the other, works on Iranian women. Within each section, I have grouped works according to approach, e.g. historical, economic, etc.

Historical works (Browne, Shuster, Curzon, Upton, Avery, Armajani, and Wilber)<sup>14</sup> provide considerable information on recent Iranian history. They offer, however, few in-



sights on the position of women.

Works in comparative politics (Binder's entire book on political development in Iran; Lerner's exploration of Iran in "a Bipolar World," and Huntington's analysis of "the King's Dilemma")<sup>15</sup> have dealt with "developmental" questions and used Iran in their studies. In their approach to the study of social change, these scholars have directed attention to what is perceived as a "shift in teleological emphasis through which democracy as a goal for developing politics has been gradually displaced by another ideal, that of institutional order."<sup>16</sup> Because this dissertation rests on the investigation of the position of various classes of women within the context of development of a third world capitalist society, these works remain inapplicable to my objective.

Other samples of political science texts cover a broad range of subjects: Cottam's study of nationalism; Zonis' analysis of the political elite; Nirumand's exploration of the effect of imperialism and Bill's analysis of social change in Iran in terms of group and class relations.<sup>17</sup> Bill provides significant insights into the Iranian reform under the Shah, viewing it as "the politics of system preservation"<sup>18</sup> in one study and calling it "the politics of emanation"<sup>19</sup> in another. Bill, however, does not systematically analyze Iran's dependency on the United States,<sup>20</sup> a subject essential to the study of Iranian capitalism. On the whole,

these works are informative despite the fact that they paid little attention to the subject of women.

Other studies such as Issawi, Entner, Baldwin, Amuzegar, Amuzegar and Fekrat and Bharier<sup>21</sup> have unquestionably contributed to the field of economic development in Iran from the nineteenth century to the fall of the Shah. In general, this literature examines economic development in terms of aggregate and sectoral changes in the GNP, capital formation, output, and occasionally with reference to changes in labor force participation. My intention, however, is to study these changes as a process intrinsic to the capitalist accumulation affecting class and gender relations in Iran.

Cultural works (Gibbs, Coon, and Patai)<sup>22</sup> are informative on the subject of religion in the Middle East. These works view religion and culture as determining factors affecting development in the area. But as Rosenfeld states, these approaches are descriptive rather than analytical<sup>23</sup> and hardly address the question which I am attempting to investigate: Do culture and religion in and of themselves dictate change, particularly as it concerns women?

Autobiography, memoirs and accounts of Court life (Arfa, Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi, and H. I. H. Soraya)<sup>24</sup> comprise another category of literature. These are accounts by and for members of the ruling classes and constitute subjective historical documents.

There are also monographic studies of Iranian develop-

ment (Algar, Kazemzadeh, Banani, Zabih, Elwell-Sutton, Keddle's work on Afghani, Lenczowski, Yeselson, Fatemi, Ramazani, and Abrahamian).<sup>25</sup> These works are the best available studies of a number of subjects such as the various reforms, policies and social issues in Iran from the early twentieth century to the end of the Shah period. In general, however, because these studies are monographic in character, dealing with specific subjects, they do not contain an analysis of the overall picture of Iranian development, nor do they provide much information on women.

In summary, while the literature outlined above represents a number of approaches and perspectives to the study of Iran, it has not tackled the study of women. Except for the occasional reference or royal biography, the role of women in Iranian society continues to lie outside the scope and interest of such studies. This neglect within the field of Iranian studies has been partially corrected by the literature on Iranian women. Whereas male-oriented Iranian scholarship excludes women from its scope, works specifically devoted to women investigate their subject matter in isolation from transformational processes.

Historical works on Iranian women (Sykes, Yohannan, Rice, Filmer, Woodsmall, and Keddle and Beck)<sup>26</sup> are informative. With the exception of Keddle and Beck, however, these studies generally invince an ethnocentric bias against women. Despite this shortcoming, I have utilized these descriptive

accounts but have attempted to place them within the context of Iranian development.

Historical overviews of Iranian women in Farsi (Esfanpour, Parsa, Parivar, Mehrin, Rozoni, Amuzegar, and Bamdad<sup>27</sup> represent a body of work by recent Iranian writers. These studies are based on the assumption that motherhood is the "natural" function of women in the society. For example, in describing the changing social position of women from the early twentieth century to 1968, Bamdad states since the White Revolution, "envy" has disappeared from class and gender relationships<sup>28</sup>--an assertion she does not support and which contradicts the findings of this study.

There are also a number of political works and speeches on the status of women made by the members of the old ruling class (Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi, Empress Farah and H.I.H. Princess Ashraf Pahlavi).<sup>29</sup> These stand as official proclamations and exemplify the attitudes of ruling class women and men toward other classes of women in Iran. These accounts, however, are useful in illustrating class bias in laws that affected class and gender relations in Iran.

Studies of the legislation pertaining to women (Naseri, Hegazi, Women's Organization of Iran or W.O.I., Payman, Manouchehrian, Fateriyun, Mazlouman, Mo'ini-Araqi, and Naqavi)<sup>30</sup> have elucidated legal changes in the family, criminal and labor codes during the era of the Shah. These studies of legal change will be placed within the context of

capitalist development in order to assess the interrelationship between political reforms and economic changes.

In addition, there are a number of statistical accounts of women's employment in urban Iran (Touba, Mahdavi et al., Rastkar, W.O.I., Shahlapour, Vaziri and Kahyan Research Associates).<sup>31</sup> These works provide knowledge of statistical analysis and attitudinal surveys on the employed female population. In this dissertation, these studies will be complemented by my own analysis of women's work inside and outside the household during the period of Iran's industrialization.

There also exists a body of literature in Farsi that is based on apriori religious assumptions about women (Zamani, Taj-Langaroudi, Motahhari and Sadr).<sup>32</sup> These works, written primarily by clergymen, offer traditional religious views on women in Iran.

Cultural studies in English (Beck and Good)<sup>33</sup> have concentrated on women in tribal Iran and in the province of Azerbaijan. Although interesting in themselves, such works are narrowly-conceived and fall outside urban sectors.

Other works dealing with women comprise biographies written in Farsi (Qavami and Sheikholeslami).<sup>34</sup> While these works provide insights on activities of famous and mostly upper class women, they offer little information on other classes of women in Iran. By contrast, this dissertation attempts to examine the work of women of various social

classes by relying on statistical, sociological and economic studies as well as my own interviews and observations.

Finally, in a class of its own, is a pamphlet in Farsi published in the United States by a group of female Iranian activists.<sup>35</sup> This work is a critical account of the socioeconomic position of women in modern Iran. Despite the paucity of substantial data on the exploitation of working class women--the main focus of the study--this work provides interesting insights on gender relations under the Shah.

In all, the literature on women in Iran is still in an embryonic stage. These works examine their subject matter in isolation from developmental processes in Iran. They lack systematic analysis of class and gender relations and also fail to deal with the relationship of women's work in the household to the labor market. Hence, in order to bridge the gap between Iranian development and women in Iran, this study aims at presenting an integrated investigation of class and gender relations within the context of Iran's capitalist transformation during the period of 1960-78.

This study not only endeavors to contribute to the body of knowledge on Iran, but also strives to broaden the scope of the growing literature in the field of women's studies. The literature on women has mainly concentrated on theoretical issues, stressing the diverse effects on women of western capitalist and socialist development, and more recent-

ly, of development in the third world. Little systematic work, however, has delved into the position of Iranian women. For example, there are a number of theoretical works on the question of women's position in western capitalist societies. Liberal feminists (Firestone, Millet and Figes)<sup>36</sup> stress the patriarchal system as the cause of women's subordination. The Marxist feminists (Rowbotham, Mitchell, Della Costa, Zaretshy, and Fee)<sup>37</sup> emphasize class and gender subordination of women. The most significant contribution of the latter is the light they shed on women's role in production and reproduction, especially the oppressive nature of household work (through the role of women in the reproduction of labor power via procreation, daily maintenance of the family, and socialization), the economic exploitation of women (Secombe, Zaretshy, Rowbotham, Della Costa, and Gardiner),<sup>38</sup> and the discriminatory position of women in the labor market (Bentson, Rowbotham, Della Costa, and Fee).<sup>39</sup> Drawing on the contribution of Marxist-feminist studies, this dissertation will embark on an analysis of women's work (in the household and the labor market) by class in Iran.

This study also rests on those empirical works which have analyzed the effects of the capitalist economy on the participation of women in the labor force (Oppenheimer, Lloyed, and Hartman).<sup>40</sup> The general conclusion to be drawn from the work of these as well as other scholars (Porter and Venning) writing on Italy, (Juliard) France, (Merkl)

West Germany, (Gubbles) Western Europe, (Ross) Britain and (Lansing) the U.S. is that women continue to be discriminated against in the economic, legal and political structures of those societies.<sup>41</sup> The discussion of labor force participation of women in Iran will draw specific attention to Lloyd's illustration of crowded occupations and Hartman's analysis of patriarchy in the work force. Hence, while this dissertation builds upon a number of studies on women's position in western capitalist societies, it also attempts to widen the scope of the literature in the area of women's studies.

Such a contribution is particularly significant when a broader view is given to the field of women's studies. The literature in this area has also produced important works on the impact of socialist developments on women, but again, its coverage has yet to reach Iran. For example, there are a number of works that have concentrated on the effect of socialist development on women. Most discussion of this subject includes the conceptualization of Marx and Engles<sup>42</sup> which establishes the theoretical parameters of debate and draws on the considerable body of literature by Marxist feminist scholars. Weinbaum<sup>43</sup> finds difficulty in applying Engel's discussion of the oppression of women to Chinese society after the revolution. She analyzes Chinese achievements in eradicating past legacies, but suggests that definite limits exist to the liberation of women in that society.



Also, other scholars (Rowbotham, Sidel, Hinton, S-T Lin, and Holly and Bransfield)<sup>44</sup> contend that while the Chinese revolution has secured women economic independence, equality within the family, social welfare, improved working conditions and a voice in the society, there still exists discrimination based on sexual division of labor, underrepresentation of women in the central power structure as well as certain additional notions concerning women's social position.

The situation is somewhat analogous in other socialist countries as shown by Rowbotham.<sup>45</sup> Women have been greatly freed from housework by the government's creation of nurseries and child care centers. Also, female employment in the U.S.S.R. (Jancar, Mandel and Lapidus), Poland (Solowski), and Cuba (Rowbotham and Randell)<sup>46</sup> is very high, probably higher than anywhere else in the world. However, in sectors where women predominate (public health and educational sectors) they are found in low status jobs with lower pay. In these countries, women still have a very low rate of participation in decision-making elites. In short, both western capitalist and socialist experiences indicate the limitations (in a variety of forms and degrees) to women's liberation. What is then the effect on women of third world capitalist development? What factors define the parameters of women's subordinated position in the third world?

Until recently, most developmental studies paid little systematic attention to the topic of women's position in the

the third world. This inattention is being challenged by a few studies on third world women, the range of which is still to be extended to Iran. Broadly speaking, studies of women in the third world can be subdivided into two categories: literature on the impact of imperialism and neo-colonialism on internal development and its corresponding effect on women; and works on the impact of internal forces on the position of women.

Studies on the impact of imperialism and neo-colonialism on the position of third world women ranges from approaches centering on the effect of international, monopolistic finance capital on Latin American women (de Miranda on Brazil and Chinchella on Guatemala)<sup>47</sup> to dependency models in Africa (Pala and Van Allen)<sup>48</sup> and a world market approach in the Middle East (Gran, Tucker and Samad).<sup>49</sup> These studies see the position of women in terms of the impact of external forces on internal ones. These approaches have broken new ground in women's studies by concentrating on the link between social change in the third world and the process of capital accumulation on a world-wide scale. Since a portion of this dissertation attempts to investigate the labor force participation of women within the context of Iran's integration into the world capitalist market, it adds a new case to the growing body of literature of the subject.

The literature on the impact of internal forces on women's position in the third world ranges from Latin Ameri-

can studies (Safa on the class composition of the female labor force in Latin America, Crummett and Andreas on the mobilization of women in Chile, Marini on the impact of ideology on Argentinian women, and finally, Schmidt, Riddell and Jacquette on the political participation of women in Colombia, Mexico and Latin America respectively)<sup>50</sup> to works on Africa (Clignet on the Ivory Coast and Callaway on Ghana),<sup>51</sup> and to surveys on the Middle East (Maher on Morocco, Kantdiyoti on Turkey, Fernea on Iraq, Lahav on Israel and Papanek on Pakistan).<sup>52</sup> Through empirical investigations, these studies show the subordination of women by examining one or a number of factors (e.g. economic, political, legal, educational, etc.). In spite of their insights, these studies pose a question: How does one factor shape or respond to the other and what consequences might their interaction have on the social position of women?

In its attempt to broaden the scope of women's studies generally and the study of third world women in particular, this dissertation utilizes and builds upon three comprehensive studies which posit relationships between economic, political, legal and cultural factors. Fatima Mernissi in Beyond the Veil<sup>53</sup> studies women's position in Morocco. To her, "existing inequality does not rest on an ideological or biological theory of women's inferiority, but is the outcome of specific social institutions designed to restrain her power, namely segregation and legal subordination of the

woman to the man in the family structure."<sup>54</sup> In emphasizing the subordination of women to the legal structures of the state, Mernissi provides valuable insights on that aspect of my main proposition which posits the limited effect of legal reforms in Iran on women in Iran. Mernissi's emphasis, however, is primarily on family laws, whereas my focus is considerably broader and includes legislation of an economic, social, and political order as well.

In addition, Mernissi sheds light on the effect of development on women by examining the relationship between economic and political factors. She suggests that "the government is supporting traditional ideology and enforcing it as law, while its economic plans and programs promote a different reality"<sup>55</sup> which "has stripped the traditionally powerful head of the family of his privileges and placed him in a subordinate position vis à vis the economic structure of Morocco.

But how significant is economic analysis in understanding the position of women in Middle Eastern societies? What roles do tradition and Islam play in influencing women's status in these societies? Is there a relationship between economic and cultural factors? Nadia Youssef in Women and Work in Developing Societies examines the factors that influence "the extent to which women participate in economic activities"<sup>57</sup> of urban Middle Eastern and Latin American societies. Youssef's main theme is that economic development has

a negative influence on the participation of women in the labor force.<sup>58</sup> The determinant factors for female labor force participation are due to systems of social control, most important of which are traditional restrictions, the role of the family, and the seclusion of women.<sup>60</sup> Although Youssef provides knowledge on the position of women in societies with strong religious dominance, nevertheless, the application of her theory to the case of women in Iran poses certain difficulties when the following questions are asked. Did Islam under the period of study in and of itself dictate inferior roles to women in Iran? To what extent did Islamic culture explain the seclusion of women at the turn of the century and their revolutionary role during the Iranian Constitutional Revolution of 1905-11? Was religion responsible for the exclusively male-dominated labor force in the Iranian urban economy during the early twentieth century and simultaneously for the sexually segregated division of labor in the expanding economy of 1960-78?

In contrast to Youssef, Ester Boserup in Women's Role in Economic Development discusses the importance of economic factors on the position of women in Latin American, African and Asian societies.<sup>61</sup> In her study, Boserup introduces the thesis that economic development has an adverse effect on female as compared to male labor by marginalizing or excluding women from the more modern sectors of the economy. In distinguishing between women and men in her analysis, Boserup

challenges neoclassical economics. However, is she correct in asserting that women are virtually excluded from the modern sectors of the economy when economic development occurs? Does the subordination of women come about because of economic development resulting in a new sexual division of labor?

Boserup views economic development "as a gradual movement of the population from the village to town, accompanied by a fundamental change in the domestic activities of women."<sup>62</sup> She sees economic development "as a gradual movement of the population from agricultural to non-agricultural occupations."<sup>63</sup> By so viewing economic development, Boserup fails to answer questions such as: why and under what circumstances do these changes in the movement of population and division of labor take place? What role does capital accumulation play in the occurrence of these movements? Marx, in Capital, explained these changes in the following manner:

As soon as capitalist production takes possession of agriculture...the demand for an agricultural labouring population falls absolutely, while the accumulation of the capital employed in agriculture advances, without this repulsion being, as in non-agricultural industries, compensated by a greater attraction. Part of the agricultural population is therefore constantly on the point of passing over into an urban...and on the look out for circumstances favourable to this transformation.<sup>64</sup>

In contrast to Marx, Boserup undertakes to analyze separately the agricultural (traditional) and non-agricultural (modern) sectors of societies. By doing so, however, Boserup fails to recognize that changes in the division of labor are not

arbitrary by-products of "modernity." Rather, such changes are both simultaneous with and a consequence of process of change indicated by the penetration of capital into traditional economies.

Boserup not only overlooks the reasons for which economic development took place in the societies she studies, but by analyzing the two sectors (agricultural and non-agricultural) as separate entities instead of considering their interaction, she also fails adequately to explain how women are marginalized in the process of development. Thus, she attributes changes in the division of labor, and hence, women's exclusion from modern sectors to "modernity"; whereas the changes she documents in the division of labor are, indeed, the consequence of a specific mode of development, that of capitalism. More specifically, Boserup ascribes the reasons for the marginalization of women to the following causes: (1) the gradual movement from home industry to factory production and the consequent replacing of home-made by factory-made products produced by a labor force composed of many more men than women;<sup>65</sup> (2) with the exception of skilled and educated women, most women lose out because if they are "hired at all in the modern sector, it is usually for the unskilled [and] low-wage jobs....";<sup>66</sup> "...men are quicker than women to change over from traditional to modern type of occupations."<sup>67</sup> Hence, the main consequence of economic development on the urban economy is the "polarization and

hierarchization of men's and women's work roles" with men being preferred for "skilled and supervisory" jobs and women the "unskilled and subservient"<sup>68</sup> ones.

Why does a transformation in the sexual division of labor take place? To what extent does this transformation correspond to occupational segregation and to the formation of hierarchy? By restricting her analysis to a categorical examination of women and men, Boserup dismisses the integral relationship of the sexual division of labor to the overall process of change due to capital accumulation. In other words, by assuming that sexual division causes polarization and hierarchization in the modern sector of the labor force, Boserup is unable to explain the reasons for the new sexual division of labor. Furthermore, when Boserup asserts that women lose out in the process of economic development, she never addresses the questions which I attempt to explore in this study of Iran: what were the changing conditions that created changes in the sexual division of labor; how did women become absorbed into the workforce in positions inferior to men; and what impact did women's role in reproduction have on their work in the market?

To deal with those questions, this study utilizes the most recent body of the literature that deals with the analysis of sexual division of labor and women's position in production and reproduction. This literature builds upon Marx's analysis of production, labor and capital.<sup>69</sup> It



recognizes Marx's acknowledgement of the inequality between the sexes in the family, but delves into the subordination of women within the gender-related division of labor that was not studied by him. In addition, this body of work utilizes Engel's work but goes beyond his study of women's social position. Engels related women's oppression to the development of the inheritance system, the introduction of private property, monogamous marriage, and class society.<sup>70</sup> He saw the sexual division of labor as determined by child rearing activities of women and their separation from social production. He did not discuss the oppressive nature of this division assigning to women the task of child rearing, and hence, their separation from social production. Rather, he viewed emancipation in terms of the integration of women into social production and the elimination of private property and class society. By doing so, Engels failed to link the subordination of women to the oppressive nature of the sexual division of labor both in the market and in the household.

In recent years, a number of feminists have analyzed the specific subordination of women arising from the sexual division of labor, and their position in production and reproduction. Meillsassoux ties subordination of women to their reproductive role and bases his work on the interrelationship of production and reproduction.<sup>71</sup> Criticizing his functionalist and static view, Edholm, Harris and Young distinguish between three aspects of reproduction which correspond to

different levels of theoretical abstraction: social reproduction which refers to the "reproduction of the conditions of social production in their totality."<sup>72</sup> In this case, the fundamental question is: "What structures have to be reproduced in order that social reproduction as a whole can take place?"<sup>73</sup> Second, they examine reproduction of the labor force "in the here and now, [and]...allocation of agents to positions within the labor process over time."<sup>74</sup> Third, they consider human or biological reproduction which refers to procreation, or childbearing.<sup>75</sup>

Beneria studied the basis of the sexual division of labor in women's reproductive and productive activities. She elaborates on the thesis that "the focal point of women's economic activities is provided by their special role in the reproduction of the labor force."<sup>76</sup> She argues that women's role in reproduction "is at the root of the different forms taken by the subordination of women in different societies; women's participation in production, the nature of their work, and the division of labor between the sexes are then viewed as the result of women's reproductive activities, and as being conditioned by the nature of the productive process and the requirements of a given process of growth and accumulation."<sup>77</sup>

For Beneria, the concept of reproduction refers to "a dynamic process of change linked with the perpetuation of social systems."<sup>78</sup> It includes physical reproduction (bio-

logical and reproduction of the labor force) and social reproduction (transmission of control of resources from one generation to the next), Women's role in biological reproduction is, thus, the underlying reason for distinct tasks performed by women compared to men in social reproduction.<sup>79</sup>

Depending on class or class segments in different societies, the subordination of women comes as a result of the control exercised over their reproductive activities. As such, it has two basic consequences. First, "the focal point of women's work becomes the household...[and] the household becomes the very root of patriarchy and the traditional division of labor becomes its most immediate manifestation."<sup>80</sup> Male domination, Beneria argues, "develops around the need to control reproduction in its different aspects."<sup>81</sup> The second consequence is the restriction of women's mobility.<sup>82</sup>

Summing up her arguments, Beneria writes that because of the primary concentration of women in reproduction,

The division of labor by sex in non-domestic production tends to reproduce gender hierarchies at the household level and to create mechanisms of female subordination. It also reinforces this subordination whenever the structure of production is hierarchial and exploitative--as is the case under capitalist production.<sup>83</sup>

A major advance which this literature makes is to refute the sexual division of labor as an explanation for women's subordination. These authors distinguish the link between production and reproduction (in its different forms). They recognize the significance of biological reproduction but

emphasize social reproduction as the basis of women's subordination. They observe that reproduction in capitalist society is reproduction of relations of production, or allocation of labor to positions within the accumulation process. Finally, by demonstrating that domestic labor reproduces the labor force, they directly link domestic work (which is in most cases women's unpaid work) to the market (especially through the production of use values, the purchase of commodities, and reproduction of commodity labor power which is exchanged for a wage).<sup>84</sup> Since this dissertation focuses on the relationship of capitalist accumulation and sexual division of labor in the marketplace and in the household, the Marxist feminist analysis to the sexual division of labor, production and reproduction offers most the most fruitful approach.

This study, then, attempts to elucidate the effects on women brought about by the transformation of a third world society from a predominantly agricultural to a rapidly developing capitalist economy. Second, this dissertation offers an in-depth analysis of the productive activities of women, their role in reproduction,<sup>85</sup> and the interaction of these activities with changes in their legal position. Third, this project intends to bridge the gap between the fields of development, women and Iranian scholarship.

The case of Iran under the period under study illuminates the understanding of the dynamics of rapid dependent

capitalist industrialization in the third world. As one of the world's principal exporters of oil and natural gas, Iran built one of the largest economies of all the OPEC countries. In the 1960's, the real Gross National Product (GNP) grew at an average rate of eight percent per annum. This rate went up to 41.5 percent in 1974-75.<sup>87</sup> By its control of oil revenues from the world market, Iran witnessed an unprecedented growth of capital accumulation by the late 1960's and early 1970's. In a little more than two decades, the domestic economy maintained by the repressive apparatus of the state had become based on capital-intensive, and import-substitution industries and services imported from abroad. Thanks to oil, a politics of repression, and dependence on the United States and, to a lesser degree, Western European and Japanese economies, Iran's impetus for capital accumulation was made to rest on outside forces and not on internal domestic production.<sup>87</sup> Hence, as a model of rapid capitalist development in a relatively short period of time, Iran represents a unique case in third world developmental studies.

One of the salient features of capitalist transformation is the creation of wage-laborers--women as well as men. In this process, women emerge as major influences in the economy by their role in production and reproduction. Despite this general characteristic, the pattern of labor force participation of women varies in accordance with the specific nature of capitalist transformation subject to historical circum-

stances and a particular cultural context.

In Iran, the unique character of women's participation in the labor force during this period lies in the concentration of middle class and some working class women in the service rather than other sectors of the economy. In addition, the typical pattern of wage work was reversed in Iran. Labor force participation was highest among married women between the ages of 20 and 29 years old.<sup>88</sup> This study, then, acquires broad significance by demonstrating the specific class and demographic factors affecting women's work in urban Iran as well as its in-depth case of the communications industry.

Another important characteristic of capitalist transformation is the emancipation of women. It is of paramount importance to investigate the interaction between changes in the legal and work status of women in order to elucidate how one factor shapes or responds to the other as well as the kind of influences they exerted on the position of women. In the case of Iran, changes in capitalist relations of production reverberated throughout the political and social structure. These changes not only responded to shifts in governmental policy, but were themselves generated by policies addressing problems in social and cultural area as well as economics. In the case of women, this tension was revealed, on the one hand, by the opening of the economy to women, and on the other, by governmental measures which conferred

limited legal status on women but refrained from weakening class and gender contradictions. This disparity between economic imperatives and class and gender inequalities is a theme neglected in the literature on women in Iran.

Finally, what this study purports to do is to bridge the gap between developmental and women's studies--a field of Iranian scholarship hitherto neglected. The literature on women has mainly concentrated on theoretical issues, and on the diverse effects of capitalist and socialist development on women. Until recently, most developmental studies paid little systematic attention to women in the third world. Except for a few studies that have delved into specific aspects of women's position, Iranian specialists have failed to undertake a thorough and in-depth investigation of the political economy of women in Iran. Therefore, the significance of this dissertation lies in its interdisciplinary nature in expanding the horizons of traditional work undertaken in developmental, women and Iranian studies.

### C. Organization of the Study

The point of departure is an examination of the position of women in the predominantly agricultural economy of Iran from the early 1900's to the early 1950's. This section investigates women's activities in production, reproduction, political and social movements. In addition, it looks at the position of women under the Islamic and secular codes. The

chapter concludes with a discussion of the integration of Iran into world capitalism and its effects on changes in the structure of economy, division of labor and women's work.

Chapter III studies the development of the labor force as a result of Iran's increasing integration into world capitalism and domestic changes in the structure of production. A detailed analysis of Iran's dependent capitalism and especially employment and unemployment by sex is undertaken in order to identify the contradictory position of women in the urban labor market.

Chapter IV systematically explores changes in the division of labor as a result of capitalist development in Iran. This analysis includes a detailed study of changes in the division of labor by class, gender, ideology, marital status and life cycle. In this connection, the study examines changes in household activities and the relationship of such changes to labor force participation as well as the contribution of women's unpaid and paid work to the expansion of the economy.

To illustrate the points raised in the previous discussion, Chapter V analyzes the sexual division of labor and gender roles in a modern Iranian organization, the communications industry. This investigation is directed toward examining the link between occupational segregation by class and gender and the larger issue of the maintenance and reproduction of capitalist social relations in a state con-



trolled ideological apparatus.

In Chapter VI class and gender analyses are extended to specific government legal policies. The effect of legal changes on class and gender relations, contradictions in the theory and application of specific laws are probed with a view to establishing the interrelationship of economic changes and political reforms as they pertain to the position of women. The chapter ends with a discussion of the relationship between women's work and legal emancipation. The concluding section, Chapter VII, poses questions about the position of women that remained unresolved under the Pahlavi state. It also briefly deals with a number of contradictions that women faced from the fall of the Shah on January 16, 1979.

#### D. The Data

The data presented in this study draws on primary materials in Farsi. A number of these sources are translated into English. These materials include the following: census statistics; Annual Report and Balance Sheet of Bank Markazi Iran; legal documents; speeches and declarations relating to Iranian women; newspaper and journal reports; governmental and private studies; my interviews with employers, employees, and women; economic studies and reports; political-historical studies; manpower statistics; labor statistics; biographies; novels, and proverbs.

Considerable data was available on economic changes and employment of women in Iran. These resources are as follows: Sar Shomari-ye Amari-ye Keshvar va Ostanha [National and Provincial Census Statistics] (in Farsi and English) (two vols.) 1335 [1956] and 1345 [1966], (Tehran: Ministry of Interior, 1341/1962, and Statistical Center of Iran, 1346/1966); Natavej-e Amargiri-ye Niru-ye Ensani [The Results of Manpower Statistics] (three vols.), (Tehran: Statistical Center of Iran, 1349/1970, 1350/1971 and 1351/1972); Sal Nameh-e Amari-ye Keshvar [The Year Book of National Statistics] (three vols.), (Tehran: Statistical Center of Iran, 1351/1973, 1352/1973 and 2535/1976); Bar-resi-ye Masa'le-ye Niru-ye Ensani [The Investigation of Manpower Statistics] (three vols.), (Tehran: The Ministry of Labor, 1343/1964, 1344/1965 and 1344/1965); Gozarash-e Salaneh va Taraz-Nameh-ye Bank-e Markazi-ye Iran [Bank Markazi Iran: Annual Report and Balance Sheet] (thirteen vols.), (Tehran: Bank Markazi Iran, 1344/1964-1355/1976); and National Income of Iran: 1338-1350/1950-1972 (Tehran: Bank Markazi Iran, 1353/1975). These materials contain statistics on the employed and unemployed population by type of industry, by type of workers, by sex and by education; by demographic changes; by consumer price index; and by household consumption.

Legal documents that were gathered include: The Iranian Constitution: With Amendments (1906-1909), Supplement No. 189, (Tehran: Echo Publications, 1972); The Civil Codes

of Iran (Parts I and II) Supplement No. 148, (Tehran: Echo Publications, 1968); Qavanin-e Madani [The Civil Codes] (three vols.), (Tehran: Amir Kabir, 1353/1974); A. Kamangar, Majmue'-ye Qavanin-e Asasi va Kayfari [The Collection of Constitutional and Criminal Law], No. 2 (Tehran: Javadian, n.d.); Majmue'-ye Qavanin-e Hemayat-e Khanevadeh [The Collection of Family Protection Laws] (Tehran: Farrokhi, 1349/1970); and Qavanin va Mogarrart-e Kar va Ta'min-e Ejtema'i [Labor Laws and Regulations and Social Insurance] (three vols.), (Tehran: The Ministry of Labor, 1352/1973 and 2535/1976).

Another set of data includes statistics on election returns of the Majlis (The National Consultative Assembly) and of the Sena (the Senate). Other resources contain official speeches and declarations which were obtained from official organizations. Available newspapers in Farsi such as Kayhan, Ettela-at, Zane-e Ruz [Women of Today] and Ettela-at-e Baro-van [Women's Information] provided occasional documents on legislation and its effects on women.

In addition, I conducted open-ended interviews with female and male officials, employers and employees of various organizations and occupations in 1974, 1975 and 1977. This was done most extensively in the communications industry in 1977. From the National Iranian Radio and Television (NIRT), I also gathered much useful information. I also collected whatever data I could on the structure of employment and the socio-economic background of employers and employees.

The above sources as well as those mentioned in the text of the study were all gathered on four trips to Iran for field research: each for a period of three months in the years 1974, 1975, 1977 and 1979. In the course of these trips, data was gathered from the following sources:

- (1) official organizations indicated above;
- (2) National Radio and Television of Iran;
- (3) various bookstores in Tehran, Shiraz and northern cities;
- (4) local newspaper stands;
- (5) Women's Organization of Iran;
- (6) political activists on the streets;
- (7) various universities;
- (8) published and unpublished materials written by Iranian scholars, political activists, officials and female employees that were obtained through various local and regional bodies.

Other sources supplementing the aforementioned data consist of secondary economic, political and historical studies which are partially listed and discussed in the literature section of this chapter.

As students of developing countries are all too well aware, statistics raise many problems. In general, the statistics used in this dissertation are no less precise than those of other developing countries. Census and statistical returns undoubtedly contain errors because of under or over enumeration. A concerted effort has been made in this work to recalculate the returns by converting them to a specific year base, and/or by re-estimating the results in accordance with previous trends subject to historical events.

Quantitative sources on the participation of Iranian women in the labor force are not without bias. First, women's

work in the household is excluded from the labor force categories, because it is wageless and is regarded as unproductive. Second, employment data does not take into account the hidden, unrecorded, unemployed\* and underemployed. Third, due to the tradition of preserving the honor of the male head of the household which regards women's work as unethical, the labor force participation of many women goes unreported. For these reasons, this study utilizes the category of "economically active population" which has higher figures for labor force participation than the "employment" data.

Other important aspects of labor force participation remain unreported as well. For example, statistics correlating labor force participation and number of children are missing from census returns as well as documents compiled by various international agencies. Taking all these concerns into account, it should be pointed out here that statistics are not taken as given, nor are they used as an absolute representation of the "truth" or a precise description of the actual situation. Rather, statistics are used as a tool to indicate certain trends over a specific period of time. Hence, both data and conclusions are subject to certain imperfections. Had other studies been available, they would have enabled me to evaluate the data more critically. This limitation has been compensated for, in part, by my person-

---

\*See Chapter III for a discussion of the relationship of employment to unemployment.

al experience: Iran is the country where I was born, lived for many years, and continued to visit frequently.

#### E. Method of Transliteration

In this study, the transliteration of Iranian and Arabic words so widely used in Farsi generally follows the system suggested by the International Journal of the Middle East. For reasons of simplicity, I have eliminated diacritical signs with the exception of those standing for Farsi glottal stops represented by hamze and 'ain. For these exceptions as well as more precise transliteration of Farsi diphthongs, I have consulted L. P. Elwell-Sutton's Elementary Persian Grammar.<sup>89</sup>

Translations and transliterations of Iranian titles, words, names and concepts are given in parenthesis (e.g., zan, meaning woman), in the text, notes, and bibliography. Familiar names follow the spellings indicated in the Webster's Biographical Dictionary (e.g., Musaddiq) or as they have been used by the individuals in question (e.g., Mohammed Reza Shah). In the case of dual language, I have followed their own method of transliteration (e.g., Kayhan). Iranian and Arabic words commonly used in English are spelled as they appear in Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary (e.g., Koran), except when they appear differently in citations (e.g., Qur'an). Nevertheless, when references are general, the English term, like "clergy," is used for convenience.

- <sup>1</sup> Badr el-Moluk Bamdad, Zan'e Irani az Engelab-e Mashrutiyat ta Engelab-e Sefid [Iranian Women From the Constitutional Revolution to the White Revolution] (Tehran: Ebn-e Sina, 1347/1968).
- <sup>2</sup> E. G. Browne, The Persian Revolution of 1905-1909 (Cambridge: Cambridge U. Press, 1910), p. 365.
- <sup>3</sup> Az, "The Women's Struggle in Iran," Monthly Review XXXII: 10 (March 1981).
- <sup>4</sup> Amin Banani, The Modernization of Iran: 1921-1941 (Calif.: Standford U. Press, 1961).
- <sup>5</sup> Hamideh Sedghi and Ahmad Ashraf, "Dynamics of Women's Condition in Iran," in Iran: Past, Present and Future, ed. J. Jaqz (N.Y.: Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies, 1976).
- <sup>6</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>7</sup> For a detailed discussion of this concept and its application to Iran, see Bizhan Jazani, Capitalism and Revolution in Iran: Selected Writings of Bizhan Jazani (London: Zed Press, trans. by the Iran Committee, 1980).
- <sup>8</sup> Lois Beck and Nikki Keddie, eds., Women in the Muslim World (Cambridge: Harvard U. Press, 1978), p. 13.
- <sup>9</sup> Ahmad Ashraf, "Historical Obstacles to the Development of Bourgeoisie in Iran," in Studies in the Economic History of the Middle East, ed. M. Cook (Oxford: Oxford U. Press, 1973), p. 331.
- <sup>10</sup> This note is based on a 1978 discussion with Ervand Abraniamian, an Iranian specialist at Baruch College, for which I am grateful.
- <sup>11</sup> Arend Lijphart, "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method," American Political Science Review XVI:5 (September 1971); 691.
- <sup>12</sup> The discussion of literature in this chapter covers those works that were published by 1978, the time of the completion of research for this chapter. A number of more recent works will be discussed in subsequent chapters.
- <sup>13</sup> This part of the discussion is based on Hamideh Sedghi, "An Assessment of Works in Farsi and English on Iran and Iranian

Women: 1900-1977," The Review of Radical Political Economics XII:2 (Summer 1980).

- 14 E. G. Browne, A literary History of Persia Vol. 4 (Cambridge, Cambridge U. Press, 1924; Reprinted in 1964). Also see his A Year Amongst Persians (London, Adam and Charles Black, 1893; new edition, London, 1950). In addition, see Morgan Shuster, The Strangling of Persia: Story of European Diplomacy and Oriental Intrigue that resulted in the Denationalization of Twelve Million Mohammedans; A Personal Narrative (New York: The Century Co., 1912); George N. Curzon, Persia and the Persian Question (second printing, London: Frank Cass and Co., 1966); Joseph Upton, The History of Modern Iran: An Interpretation (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard U. Press, 1961); Peter Avery, Modern Iran (London: Ernest Benn, 1965); Yahya Armajani, Iran (Englewood Cliff, N.Y.: Prentice Hall, 1972); and Donald Wilber, Iran: Past and Present (Princeton, Princeton U. Press, 1948; eighth edition, Princeton, 1976).
- 15 Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society (N.Y.: The Free Press, 1958); Leonard Binder, Iran (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1962); and Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1968).
- 16 Donal Cruise O'Brien, "Modernization, Order and the Erosion of a Democratic Ideal: American Political Science 1960-70," Journal of Development Studies VIII:4 (1972): 352. Also see Mark Kesselman, "Order or Movement? The Literature of Political Development as Ideology," in World Politics 26 (October 1973): 18. See also Norman Miller and Roderick Aya, eds., National Liberation: Revolution in the Third World (N.Y.: The Free Press, 1971), pp. xxiii-xxxiv, note 12. For another critique of this literature, see Andre Gundar Frank, Latin America: Underdevelopment or Revolution (N.Y. and London: Monthly Review Press, 1969).
- 17 Richard Cottam, Nationalism in Iran (Pittsburgh: U. of Pittsburgh Press, 1964 and 1979); Marvin Zonis, The Political Elite of Iran (Princeton: Princeton U. Press, 1971); Bahman Nirumand, Iran: The New Imperialism in Action (N.Y.: Monthly Review Press, 1969); and James Bill, The Politics of Iran: Groups, Classes and Modernization (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Co., 1972).
- 18 Bill, The Politics of Iran.
- 19 James Bill and Carl Leiden, The Middle East: Politics and Power (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1974), p. 75.
- 20 Stuart Schaar, "Orientalism at the Service of Imperialism," Race and Class XXI:1 (Summer 1979): 75.



- 21 Charles Issawi, The Economic History of Iran, 1800-1914 (Chicago: The Chicago U. Press, 1971); Marvin Entner, Russo-Persian Commercial Relations, 1822-1914 (Gainesville: U. of Florida Press, 1965); George Baldwin, Planning and Development in Iran (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1967); Jahangir Amuzegar, Technical Assistance in Theory and Practice: The Case of Iran (N.Y.: Praeger, 1966); J. Amuzegar and M. Pekrat, Iran: Economic Development Under Dualistic Conditions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971); and Julian Bhahrier, Economic Development in Iran 1900-1970 (London: Oxford U. Press, 1971).
- 22 H.R. Gibbs, Mohammedanism (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), C. Coon, Caravan: The Story of The Middle East (N.Y.: Holt, 1961) and Rafael Patai, Society, Culture and Change in the Middle East (Philadelphia: U. Of Pennsylvania Press, 1971).
- 23 Henry Rosenfeld "An Overview and Critique of the Literature on Rural Political and Social Change," in R. Antoun and I. Harik, eds, Rural Politics and Social Change in the Middle East (Bloomington/London: Indiana U. Press, 1972).
- 24 Hassan Arfa, Under Five Shahs (London: John Murray, n.d.); Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi Shahanshah of Iran, Mission For My Country (N.Y., Toronto and London: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1961); and H.I.H. Soraya Pahlavi, The Autobiography of H.I.H. Princess Soraya (Trans. from the German by C. Fitzgibbon) (London: Arther Baker, 1963).
- 25 Hamid Algar, Religion and State in Iran: The Role of Ulama in the Qajar Period, (Berkeley and Los Angeles, U. of California Press, 1969); Firuz Kazemzadeh, Russia and Britain in Persia, 1864-1914: A Study in Imperialism (New Haven and London: Yale U. Press, 1968); Amin Banani, The Modernization of Iran, 1921-1941 (Stanford: Stanford U. Press, 1961); Sepehr Zabih, The Communist Movement in Iran (Berkeley and Los Angeles: U. of California Press, 1966); L. P. Elwell-Sutton, Persian Oil: A Study in Power Politics (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1955); Nikki Keddie, An Islamic Response to Imperialism: Political and Religious Writings of Sayyid Jamal al-Din 'al-Afghani (Berkeley and Los Angeles: U. of California Press, 1968); also see her Sayyid Jamal al-Din al-Afghani: A Political Biography (Berkeley and Los Angeles: U. of California Press, 1972); George Lenczowski, Russia and the West in Iran: 1918-1948 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell, 1949); Abraham Yesselson, United States-Persian Diplomatic Relations (New Brunswick: Rutgers U. Press, 1956); N.S. Fatemi, Diplomatic History of Persia, 1917-1923 (N.Y.: Russell Moore, 1952); and see his Oil Diplomacy (N.Y.: Whittier Books, 1957); and R.K. Ramazani, The Foreign Policy of Iran 1500-1941: A Developing Nation

- in World Affairs (Charlottesville: U. Press of Virginia, 1966); Ervand Abrahamian, "The Crowd in Iranian Politics: 1905-1953," Past and Present 41 (December 1968); his "Kasravi: The Integrative Nationalist of Iran," Middle Eastern Studies 9 (October 1973); his "Oriental Despotism: The Case of Qajar Iran," International Journal of Middle East Studies 5 (January 1974); and his "Euro-pean Feudalism and Middle Eastern Despotism," Science and Society 39 (Summer 1975).
- 26 Ella Sykes, "Persia," in T.A. Joyce, ed., Women of All Nations, Vol. 4 (N.Y.: Funk and Wagnalls, 1915), pp. 663-845; Jacob Baba Yohannan, Woman in the Orient (St. Louis: A.R. Fleming, 1901); Collier C. Rice, Persian Women and Their Ways (London: Seely, Service and Co., Ltd., 1923); H. Filmer, The Pageant of Persia (Indianapolis and N.Y.: The Bobbs-Ferrill Co., 1934); Ruth Francis Woodsmall, Women and The New East (Washington, D.C.: The Middle East Institute, 1960); and Serin, "La femme persane," Civilisations 1, no. 47 (1951): 41-44; Keddie and Beck, Women in The Muslim World.
- 27 Gholamreza Esfanpour, Huquq va Maqam-e Zan: az Agaz ta Islam dar Iran [The Rights and Status of Woman in Iran: From the Beginning to Islam] (Tehran: Mihan, 1348/1969); F. Parsa, H. Ahi and M. Taleqani, Zan dar Iran-e Bastan [Woman in Ancient Iran] (Tehran: Bisto-panj-e Shahrvivar, 1346/1969); Ali Parivar, Honar-e Zan Boudan [The Art of Being Woman] (Tehran: Enteshar, n.d.); Mehrdad Mehrin, Zan va Naqsh-e u [Woman and Her Role] (Tehran: Ata'i, 1342/1963); Abu Torab Razani, Zan dar Doran-e Shahan-shahi-ye Iran [Woman in Iranian Monarchical Periods] (Tehran: Madreseh-e 'Ali-ye Dokhtaran, 1350/1971); Habibollah Amuzegar, Maqam-e Zan dar Afarinesh [The Status of Woman in the World] (Tehran: Iqbal, 1344/1966); and Bamdad, Zan-e Irani az Engalab-e Mashrutiyyat.
- 28 Bamdad, Zan-e Irani as Engalab-e Mashrutiyyat, p. 25.
- 29 "HIM Mohammed Reza Shah's Address to the Congress: Iranian Women Face Vital Roles," Kayhan International, (January 1, 1975); Mansureh Pirnia, "Ollahazrat Farmudand: Hich Zan-e Ba-arzesh-e Maheri Bikar Nemimanad" [The Empress Baded: No Worthwhile and Skillful Woman Remains Jobless], Kayhan, (October 13, 1354/1976); and "Declaration Presented by HIM Princess Ashraf Pahlavi to the Secretary General of the U.N.," (Tehran: Women's Organization of Iran's or W.O.I.'s publications, December 10, 1974).
- 30 Farajollah Naseri, "Refah-e Zanan Taht-e Hemayat-e Qanun" [Women's Welfare Under the Protection of Law], paper prepared for the National and Social Seminar, Tehran, published by W.O.I., 1352/1973; Qodsiyyeh Hejazi, Bar-resi-ye Jara-

'm-e Zan dar Iran [Investigation of Women's Crime in Iran] (Tehran: Enteshar, 1341/1962); "Moqayeseh-e Qanun-e Hemayat-e Khanevadeh-e 1346 ba 1354" [Comparison of the Family Protection Law of 1967 With the 1975], paper published by W.O.I., Tehran, n.d.; Ketab-e Seminar-e Bar-resi-ye Natayej-e Ejrai'-ye Qanun-e Hemayat-e Khanevadeh [The Book of Investigating Seminar on the Consequences of the Enactment of the Family Protection Law] (Tehran: W.O.I., 1350/1971); Habibollah Payman, "Taq'ir-e Sharayet-e Ezdevaj dar Iran" [The Changing of Marital Conditions in Iran], paper published by the University of Tehran, the Institute for Social Studies and Research, no. 4, 1349/1970; Mehrangiz Manouchehrian, Entegad-e Qavanin-e Asasi va Madani va Kayfari-ye Iran az Nazar-e Huquq-e Zan [A Critique of the Constitutional, Civil and Criminal Codes Pertaining to Women's Rights] (Tehran: Khoushes, 1342/1963); also see her Vaz'-e Huquqi-ye Zan dar Jahan va Tarh-e Qanun-e Khanevadeh [Legal Status of Women in the World and the Draft of the Family Laws] (Tehran: the Union of Iranian Female Lawyers, 1342/1963); Khosro Fateriyun, "Bar-resi va Tahlil-e Madh-e Chaharom-e E'lamiyyeh-e Jahani-ye Raf'-e Tabi'z az Zan va Moqayeseh-e an ba Moqararat-e Qanuni-ye Iran" [An investigation and Analysis of the World Declaration for the Prevention of Discrimination Against Women and its Comparison With the Iranian Laws] (Tehran: W.O.I., n.d.); Reza Maslouman, "Zan Koshi dar Lava-ye Qanun" [The murdering of Women Under the Law] (Tehran: W.O.I., 1353/1974); Mahmoud Mo'ini-Araqi, "Bar-resi va Tahlil-e Madh-e Sheshom-e E'lamiyyeh-e Jahani Raf'-e Tabi'z az Zan va Moqayeseh-e an ba Moqararat-e Qanuni-ye Iran" [An Investigation and Analysis of Article Six of the World Declaration for the Prevention of Discrimination Against Women and its Comparison With the Iranian Laws] (Tehran: W.O.I., n.d.); and Mohsen Naqavi, Eshq va Ezdevaj Taht-e Qanun [Love and Marriage Under the Law], (Isfahan: Nesh'at, 1349/1970).

31. Jacqueline Rudolph Toubia, "The Relationship Between Urbanization and the Changing Status of Women in Iran, 1956-1966," *Iranian Studies* V:1 (Winter 1973): 25-36; S. Mahdavi, Z. Tofiq, P. Modir-Patemi, G. Binder and Z. Qazi-Nour, "Tahqiq dar Bareh-e Zan-e Karmand-e Doulat" [A Research on Governmental Female Employees], (Tehran: Plan and Budget Organization, 1349/1970); Ezzatollah Rastkar, "Sokhanrani," [A Lecture], paper presented at the National Labor Conference, Tehran, Iran, April 1354/1976; also see his "Tos'-ye Eshtegal-e Zanan" [Development of Female Employment] (Tehran: The Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, n.d.); "Naqsh-e Zan dar Barnameh-e Sheshom-e Tose'-ye Mellii" [The Role of Women in the Sixth National Plan] (Tehran: W.O.I., 2535/1976); Moira Moser-Khalili, "Urban Design and Women's Lives," (Tehran: W.O.I., 1975); Parvin Shahlapour, "Tos'-ye

- Maqam va Vaz'-e Zan dar Kar" [Development of Women's Status in Work] (Tehran: the University of Tehran, the Institute for Social Studies and Research, 1349/1970); Fershteh Vaziri, "Tahavvol-e Fa'liyatha-ye Eqtesadi-ye Zanan dar Iran" [Changes in Economic Activities of Women in Iran] (Tehran: the University of Tehran, the Institute for Social Studies and Research, 1349/1971); Kayhan Research Associates, "The Employment of Women in the Higher Echelons of the Public and Private Sectors," (Tehran: W.O.I., 1975); Degarguniha-ye Ejtema'i va Eqtesadi-ye Zanan-e Iran [Social and Economic Changes in the Position of Iranian Women] (Tehran: Plan and Budget Organization/Statistical Center of Iran, 1352/19730; "Bar-resi-ye Amari-ye Ezdevaj va Talaq dar Tehran-e Bozorg" [A Statistical Investigation of Marriage and Divorce in Greater Tehran] (Tehran: The Ministry of Justice/Statistical Center of Iran, 2536/1977)/ and Vida Nasehi, "Motaleh'-e Vaz'e Zanan-e Motaleqqeh-e Shahri-ye Tehran" [A Study of the Position of Widows in the City of Tehran] (Tehran: the University of Tehran, the Institute for Social Studies and Research, 2536/1977).
- <sup>32</sup> Mostafa Zamani, Payman-e Zanashu'i [Matrimonial Treaty] (Qom: Payman, 1350/1971); Mohammed Mehdi Taj (Langaroudi), Dastan-e Zanan [The Story of Women] (Tehran: Zohreh, 1394/1971; Morteza Motahhari, Nezam-e Huquq-e Zan Islam [The System of Woman's Rights in Islam] (Tehran: Ziba, 1353/1974); and Hasan Sadr, Huquq-e Zan Islam va Urupa [Woman's Rights in Islam and Europe] (Tehran: Mousavi, 1347/1968).
- <sup>33</sup> Lois Grant Beck, "Theoretical Perspectives on the Position of Women in Iran," paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Middle East Studies Association, Boston, Mass. November, 1974; and Mary-Jo DelVecchio Good, "A Comparative Perspective on Women in Provincial Iran and Turkey," in Beck and Keddie, eds, Women in the Muslim World.
- <sup>34</sup> Fakhri Qavimi (Khashayar-Vaziri), Karnam-e Zanan-e Mash-hour-e Iran, az Qabl az Islam ta Asr-e Hazer [The Record of Famous Iranian Women From Pre-Islamic to the Present Time] (Tehran: Sekkeh, 1352/1973); and Pari Shaikholeslami, Zanan-e Rouznameh Negar va Andishmand-e Iran [The Iranian Female Journalists and Intellectuals] (Tehran: Mazgrafi, 1351/1972).
- <sup>35</sup> Setam Keshidegi-ye Zan dar Iran [The Oppression of Women in Iran] (N.Y.: Fanous, 1351/1972). According to one of its authors, this pamphlet was written by Trotskyists.
- <sup>36</sup> Shulamith Firestone, The Dialectic Sex (N.Y.: Bantam Books, 1972); Kate Millet, Sexual Politics, (N.Y.: Equinox Books/Avon, 1969); and Eva Figgs, Patriarchal Attitudes (Green-

wich, Conn.: Fawcett Premier Books, 1970).

- 37 Sheila Rowbotham, Woman's Consciousness, Man's World (N.Y.: Penguin Books, 1973); Juliet Mitchell, Woman's Estate (N.Y.: Penguin Books, 1971); Maria Della Costa and Selma James, The Power of Women and the Subversion of the Community (England: Falling Wall Press, 1972; third ed., Falling Wall, 1975); Eli Zaretsky, Capitalism, the Family and Personal Life (N.Y.: Harper Colophon Books, 1976); and Terry Fee, "Domestic Labor: An Analysis of Housework And Its Relation to the Production Process," The Review of Radical Political Economics IX:3 (Fall 1977).
- 38 Wally Secombe, "The Housewife and Her Labor Under Capitalism," New Left Review (January-February 1974); Zaretsky, Capitalism, 1976; Rowbotham, Woman's Consciousness, 1973; Della Costa and James, The Power of Women, 1975; and Jean Gardiner, "Women's Domestic Labor," New Left Review 89 (January-February 1975).
- 39 Margaret Benson, "The Political Economy of Women's Liberation," Monthly Review XXI:4 (1969); Rowbotham, Women's Consciousness, 1973; Della Costa and James, The Power of Women, 1975; and Fee, "Domestic Labor," 1977.
- 40 Cynthia B. Lloyd, "The Division of Labor Between the Sexes: A Review" in Sex, Discrimination, and the Division of Labor, ed. C. B. Lloyd (New York: Columbia University Press, 1975); Valerie Oppenheimer, The Female Labor Force in the United States (Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1970); and Heidi Hartmann, "Patriarchy, Capitalism, and Job Segregation by Sex," in Capitalist Patriarchy: The Case for Socialist Feminism.
- 41 M. C. Porter and C. Venning, "Catholicism and Women's Role in Italy and Ireland," in L. Iglitzin and R. Russ, eds., Women in the World: A Comparative Study (Calif.: ABC CLIO Press, 1976); C. Bielli, "Some Aspects of the Condition of Women in Italy," trans. from Italian by B. Springer, in Iglitzin and Ross, eds., Ibid.; J. R. Julliard, "Women in France," in Iglitzin and Ross, eds., Women in the World; R. Merkl, "The Female Labor Force In Western Europe," in Women in the World, ed. Iglitzin and Ross, R. Ross, "Tradition and the Role of Women in Great Britain," in Iglitzin and Ross, eds., Women in the World, 1976; M. Lansing, "Political Change for the American Women," in Iglitzin and Ross, eds., Women in the World, 1976.
- 42 In the "Preface to a Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy," published in 1859, Marx elaborated the basic material position:

In the social production of their life, men enter

into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will, relations of production that correspond to a definite stage of development of their material productive forces. The sum total of these relations of production constitute the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which rises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond particular forms of social consciousness.

See Karl Marx, "Preface to a Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy," in K. Marx and F. Engels, Selected Works (N.Y.: International Publishers, 1968), p. 182. Following this analysis, in The Origins of the Family, Private Property and the State, published in 1884, Engels added the key notion--that the reproduction of human beings constituted an integral part of the relations of production:

According to the materialist conception, the determining factor in history is, in the last resort, the production and reproduction of immediate life. But this itself is of a two-fold character. On the one hand, the production of the means of subsistence, of food, clothing, and shelter and the tools requisite therefore; on the other, the production of human beings themselves, the propagation of the species.

See Frederick Engels, The Origins of the Family, Private Property, and the State (N.Y.: Pathfinder Press, printed in 1972), pp. 25-26 and Ch. 2. It should be noted, however, for Engels, the oppression of the working class (which has no private property) was related to their subjugation by men. He thus explained the oppression of women as being caused by the system of primogeniture, the introduction of private property, and monogamous marriage.

Central to Marxist feminist critique of socialism's founding fathers are the key notions that, first, women's work inside the home fosters the accumulation of capital, and second, women have contributed to the economy through free labor performed in the household. For further elaboration of these points refer to the following section on reproduction.

<sup>43</sup> Bayta Weinbaum, "Women in Transition to Socialism: Perspectives on the Chinese Case," The Review of Radical Political Economics VIII:1 (Spring 1976); also see her "Refining the Question of Revolution," The Review of Radical Political Economics IX:3 (Fall 1977).

- 44 Sheila Rowbotham, Women, Resistance and Revolution, (N.Y.: Vintage Books edition, 1974); Ruth Sidel, Families of Fengsheng: Urban Life in China (London: Penguin Books, 1974); William Hinton, New Women in New China (New York: 1961); S.-T. Lin, "Chinese Women on the Road to Complete Emancipation," in Iglitzin and Ross, eds., Women in the World, 1976; A. Holly and C. T. Bransfield, "The Marriage Law: Basis of Change for China's Women," in Iglitzin and Ross, eds., Women in the World, 1976.
- 45 S. Rowbotham, Women, Resistance, 1974.
- 46 Jancar Barbara, "Women Under Communism," in Jane S. Jaquet-te, ed., Women in Politics (N.Y.: John Wiley and Sons, 1974); William Mandel, Soviet Women (N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1975), esp. Ch.10 and pp. 204-223; Gail Lapidus, "Changing Women's Roles in the U.S.S.R.," in Iglitzin and Ross, eds., Women in the World, 1976; and Magdalena Sololowski, "Changing Roles and Status of Women in Poland," in Janet Z. Giele and Audry C. Smock, eds., Women and Society: International and Comparative Perspective (N.Y.: Wiley-Interscience).
- 47 Glaura Vazquez de Miranda, "Women's Labor Force Participation in a Developing Society: The Case of Brazil," Signs III:1 (Autumn 1977); Norma Chinchilla, "Industrialization, Monopoly Capitalism and Women's Work," Ibid.
- 48 Achola Pala, "Definitions of Women and Development: An African Perspective," Ibid.; and Judith Van Allen, "African Women, 'Modernization,' and National Liberation," in Iglitzin and Ross, eds., Women in the World, 1976
- 49 Judith Gran, "The Impact of the World Market on Women in Egypt: Two Segments of the Middle Class." Paper presented at the American Political Science Association, Chicago, Illinois, 1976; Judith Tucker, "Egyptian Women in the Work Force," Middle East Research and Information Project 50 (August 1976); and Amal Samad, "The Proletarianization of Palestinian Women in Israel," Middle East Research and Information Project Reports, Ibid.
- 50 Helen Icken Safa, "The Changing Class Composition of Female Labor Force in Latin America," Latin American Perspectives IV:4 (Fall 1977); Mari'a de los Angeles Crummett, "El Poder Feminio: The Mobilization of Women Against Socialism in Chile," Ibid.; Carol Andreas, "The Chilean Woman: Reform, Reaction and Resistance," Ibid.; Ana Maria Marini, "Women in Contemporary Argentina," Ibid.; S. Schmidt, "Women's Changing Roles in Colombia," in Iglitzin and Ross, eds., Women in the World, 1976; A. S. Riddell, "Female Political Elites in Mexico: 1974," in Iglitzin and Ross, eds., Ibid.

- J. Jaquette, "Female Political Participation in Latin America," in Iglitzin and Ross, eds., Ibid.
- <sup>51</sup>Remi Clignet, "Social Change and Sexual Differentiation in the Cameroun and the Ivory Coast," Signs III:1; and Barbara Callaway, "Women in Ghana," in Women in the World, ed. Iglitzin and Ross.
- <sup>52</sup>Vanessa Maher, Women and Property in Morocco: Their Changing Relations to the Process of Social Stratification in the Middle East (Cambridge Studies in Social Anthropology, 10. London: Cambridge U. Press, 1975); Deniz Kandiyoti, "Sex Roles and Social Change: A Comparative Appraisal of Turkey's Women," Signs III:1; W. Fernea, Guests of the Sheik (New York: Anchor Books, 1969); Pnia Lahav, "Raising the Status of Women Through Law: The Case of Israel," Signs III:1; and Hanna Papanek, "Purdeh in Pakistan: Seclusion and Modern Occupations for Women," Journal of Marriage and the Family XXXIII (1971).
- <sup>53</sup>Fatima Mernissi, Beyond the Veil: Male-Female Dynamics in a Modern Muslim Society (N.Y., London, Sydney and Toronto: Schenkman Publishing Co., Halsted Press Division, John Wiley and Sons, 1975).
- <sup>54</sup>Ibid., p. 16.    <sup>55</sup>Ibid., p. 103.    <sup>56</sup>Ibid., p. 105.
- <sup>57</sup>Nadia Youssef, Social Structure and Female Labor Force Participation in Developing Countries (Ph.D. Dissertation in Sociology and U.C. Berkeley, 1970); reprinted later as Women and Work in Developing Societies (Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1976), p. 120.
- <sup>58</sup>Ibid., p. 120, 124 and Ch. 2.    <sup>59</sup>Ibid., p. 6.
- <sup>60</sup>Ibid., Chs. 6 and 7.
- <sup>61</sup>Ester Doserup, Women's Role in Economic Development (N.Y.: St. Martins Press, 1970).
- <sup>62</sup>Ibid., p. 174.    <sup>63</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>64</sup>Karl Marx, Capital: A Critical Analysis of Capitalist Production (N.Y.: International Publishers, 1975), Vol. 1, p. 642.
- <sup>65</sup>Boserup, Women's Role, 1970, p. 111. Here, Boserup ignores how women are separated from their means of production and became consumers under capitalism.
- <sup>66</sup>Ibid., p. 139. Here, Boserup fails to discuss labor market



segmentation and its impact on occupational segregation of sexes. On this point, see D. Gordon, M. Reich et al., Labor Market Segmentation.

- 67 Boserup, Women's Role, 1970, p. 140. In this discussion, Boserup dismisses the fact that the traditional role of women, especially child bearing and child rearing, do not allow them the mobility that men have in the society.
- 68 Ibid., p. 140.
- 69 See for example, Marx's discussion in Capital, p. 395, note 2 and p. 461.
- 70 Engels, The Origins of the Family, 1972.
- 71 As referred to in Felicity Edholm, Olivia Harris and Kate Young, "Conceptualizing Women," Critique of Anthropology III:9 and 10 (1977).
- 72 Ibid., p. 105. 73 Ibid. 74 Ibid. 75 Ibid.
- 76 Lourdes Beneria, "Reproduction, Production and Sexual Division of Labor," Cambridge Journal of Economics 3 (1979): p. 203.
- 77 Ibid. 78 Ibid., p. 205. 79 Ibid., p. 207. 80 Ibid., p. 209.
- 81 Ibid., p. 205. 82 Ibid., p. 209. 83 Ibid., p. 222.
- 84 For a more detailed elaboration of these discussions, see Fee, "Domestic Labor," 1977; M. Mackintosh, "Domestic Labor and the Household," in S. Burman, ed., Fit Work For Women (London: Croom Helm, 1979) and S. Himmelwit and S. Mohun, "Domestic Labor and Capital," Cambridge Journal of Economics 1 (1977).
- 85 In this study, as it concerns women, the concept of reproduction always refers to both physical and social reproduction.
- 86 Frederic Langer and editors, "Iran: Oil Money and the Ambitions of a Nation," prepared by Hudson Europe and published by the International Herald Tribune (March 1975).
- 87 For a more detailed elaboration of these points, see Ch. III of this study.
- 88 These points will be discussed in detail in Ch. IV of this study.

<sup>89</sup>L. P. Elwell-Sutton, Elementary Persian Grammar (Cambridge: Cambridge U. Press, 1972).

## WOMEN IN A PREDOMINANTLY AGRICULTURAL ECONOMY

The participation of urban Iranian women in production, in politics, and the social sphere from 1900 to the early 1950's is often ignored by the scholars of Iranian history. In the area of economics, this inattention is due in part to narrow methodological approaches that neglect women's domestic work in the household since it is wageless and contains no exchange value.<sup>1</sup> Moreover, the scattered economic data for the same period offers aggregated information on labor force participation as a whole; and, thereby, fails to provide concrete knowledge on work activities of women and men.<sup>2</sup> Because of these factors, women's contribution to paid production is vastly underestimated.

The social and political roles of women have also been insufficiently recognized, with the exception of a few studies on the tradition of the veil and women in Islam.<sup>3</sup> Most specialists have investigated Iran as though men were the sole makers of history and women had no stake in the reproduction of social relations in that society.<sup>4</sup>

The purpose of this chapter is to study the economic, political, Islamic and secular position of women by class, marital status, and age in urban Iran in the period of the early 1900's to the mid 1950's. I will argue that changes in the work position of women--both inside and outside the household--were related to the transformation of the economy

from a subsistence to a market economy. In this period, subordination by gender did not constitute subordination by class for all women involved in production and reproduction; however, the dual subordination of class and gender did constrain women's political activities. In this context, institutionalization of religion provided support to inequalities by gender, but religion in and of itself did not determine the subordinated position of women by class.

In what follows, I will study women's activities in production and reproduction. The role of women in political and social movements will also be examined. In addition, the status of women under Islam and the secular legal system will be studied. Finally, the last part of this chapter will be devoted to the study of the relationship between the structure of production and the position of women in early twentieth century urban Iran.

#### A. Women's Position in Production and Reproduction

Writing on early twentieth century Iran, S. M. Jamalzadeh noted that "no women can be seen in this country of men ...but strangely, half of the walking population in the streets is wrapped in black bags from head to the toe without even an opening to breathe"<sup>5</sup> (emphasis added). C. Rice had similar comments on the invisibility of women in urban Iran. She stated that in the traditional urban Iranian work force, "most trades are in the hands of men, such as pottery-

making, calico printing, felt-hat making and confectionery. All shops are kept by men...there is no profession open to women. Art, music and literature may be said to be closed doors to them. All occupations followed by them [women] call for work rather than brain-work."<sup>6</sup> These comments are only a partial account of the sexual division of labor in early twentieth century urban Iran. In spite of veiling women and the invisibility of them in the urban work force, a thorough examination of women's position in production and reproduction, in relationship to class structure, will render different conclusions concerning the participation of women in the traditional urban economy. Therefore, what was the contribution of Iranian women to production and reproduction in that period? What kinds of work did women do? Which classes of women participated in production and reproduction and how were they affected by class and gender relations?

At the turn of the century, the majority of poor women worked as carpet weavers, vendors, domestic laborers and seamstresses. Quantitative data on the actual number of these women is unavailable. However, scattered sources are informative on the participation of these women in production outside the home.

The work of Iranian female carpet weavers is well credited not only in the country but also in the world.<sup>7</sup> The Iranian carpets, so famous for their fine and miniaturized knits, have been traditionally the products of small-handed

weavers, namely, women, children and some men. In the nineteenth century, in order to maximize and return profits to the West, "European firms set up organizations [in cities] for the systematic collection of Persian carpets,"<sup>8</sup> In this period, the carpet industry not only helped the domestic economy, but in part, it "counterbalanced the deindustrialization that took place in those areas of the economy which came into direct competition with imports from the West,"<sup>9</sup> Thus, the participation of women in production was significant, as R. McDaniel stated that "the growth of carpet industry in this period was fortuitous for the economy,"<sup>10</sup>

Despite high productivity, the working conditions of many women in the carpet industry was deplorable. The factories, according to F. Woodsmall were:

damp and cold; with the looms crowded in back to back, and the workers crouched on a wooden plank shelf or scaffolding. The scaffold is more or less typical picture of a number of small factories, which average from six to fourteen looms with five workers at a loom. Some of the factories are doubtless even worse.<sup>11</sup>

The actual earnings of female carpet weavers is hardly mentioned in the available sources. However, one report indicates that some women received a net wage of not more than two qerans (\$.02) per working day.<sup>12</sup> According to my information based on interviews, others received services, especially for the benefit of male members of their family, in return for the work performed in carpet factories. As it is indicated in one personal biography, there is a brief account

of some Kashani young girls who weaved days and nights for wealthy relatives in order to support the cost of schooling and business training of their brothers.<sup>13</sup> In this way, the carpet weavers worked hard and received little, but even then, they experienced no control over the products of their work.

The work of women in carpet factories was not only confined to weaving; it was also an extension of their reproductive roles. Specifically, responsibility for the care of children rested with the working mothers at their place of work. Woodsmall states that "Many of the children have spent most of their lives in the factory, brought in as infants and 'parked' all day by the mothers' looms. In order not to interfere with the speed of the mother, since her wage depends on her speed, the child is usually half-drugged."<sup>14</sup> The upbringing of children in factories not only doubled the work load of working mothers, but also benefitted the owners of the carpet industries. Being raised in the work atmosphere, the children were taught the skill of weaving. Indeed, many children, both girls and boys, at ages five, six and seven were forced by the owners to work in these factories. Finer weaves, or usually the work of children were qualitatively superior than others (except those of the master-weavers'); and hence, more profitable to the owners of establishments. One observer stated that in some factories, perhaps one-fifth or more of the workers were under ten years of age.<sup>16</sup> Another report

from the city of Kerman concluded that children;

work from sunrise till sunset, week in, week out, with but a half day on Friday for holiday. The work is carried out in ill-ventilated hovels, warmed in the cold winter only by the heat of their bodies, and over-heated in summer by sheer want of air and space. Thus many fall victims to a very crippling form of late rickets, which affects not only the bones of the arms and legs, but those of the skeleton of the body also. One result is a gross form of knock-knee which renders walking difficult or impossible, so that many children have had to be carried by their parents to or from their homes.<sup>17</sup>

Another result of child labor in carpet factories was the severe damage to the health of girls as they grew older. According to Rice, there was usually a risk of severe injury or death.<sup>18</sup> Thus, for the poor women, the struggle against poverty constituted serious health hazards, if not loss of life of themselves or their children. The work of poor women, moreover, involved both exploitation as cheap laborers and as caretakers of children at work under deplorable conditions.

As regards the age and marital status of female workers, it is possible that both single and married women of all ages participated in paid production. Rice states that as a rule Iranian men disfavored factory work for their womenfolk. Although this comment alludes to the pressure on women by men, it nevertheless dismisses the point that the work of poor women, regardless of their marital status, was essential for the survival and maintenance of the household in a subsistence economy. At the Oriental Carpet Factory in the city of Hamedan, many female workers were married and many were



over twenty years of age.<sup>19</sup> As has been mentioned, many little girls worked, too. These cases, therefore, indicate that indeed both single and married women of different ages worked in the carpet industry, despite the fact that the participation of married women in production constituted an inseparable sphere from their reproductive activities, especially the care of children at the work place. These women experienced subordination by men, too: in the family, by husbands, brothers, fathers and sons; and at work, by the male owners of the means of production.

In addition to the female carpet weavers, large numbers of women worked as vendors at the bazaar, the locus of commercial and financial activities of the Iranian cities at the turn of the century. Many female vendors appeared in the Bazaar of the cities of Isfahan and Tehran.<sup>20</sup> Some were seamstresses, making garments, men's shirts, loose trousers, and men's clothing<sup>21</sup> at home, before taking them for sale. The exchange of these commodities took place at the bazaar. Rice states that these women would "sit on the ground in rows, in their black chadors [veils] and with their veils down, almost under the feet of horses and donkeys and men, with their goods for sale in front of them."<sup>22</sup> These women did not receive much surplus for the exchange of their commodities. Indeed, as it is described, it could happen that one female vendor sold only one shirt in the whole day.<sup>23</sup> The work of these women was primarily to help to support their

husbands, or other members of their households.<sup>24</sup>

Besides the weavers and the vendors, other women produced goods at home but were employed by merchants with capital. These women had superior skills in needle, embroidery, and hand-crafted shoes. Another category of women in large numbers worked as cheap domestic laborers at city residences of wealthy families, particularly in Tehran and Tabriz.<sup>25</sup> These women received only food and shelter in return for their services.<sup>26</sup>

The above data indicates several points concerning the participation of women in production. First, it challenges the assumption that Iran was the "country of men." While it is true that in the early twentieth century the veil exemplified the invisibility of women in public, this symbol of seclusion hardly constituted an impediment to the mobility and work activities of women engaged in the struggle for survival. The veil, therefore, did not restrain the work of poor women; rather, it further manifested men's control over women.

Second, the participation of women in production outside the home suggests that its performance was on the one hand co-existent with their reproductive tasks, especially the care of children, and on the other, complementary to the expansion of the economy. This is more applicable in the case of carpet weavers than the vendors, seamstresses, and domestic workers. The products of the carpet weavers, vendors,

and seamstresses were prepared in conjunction with their reproductive duties. However, the relationship between their work and the economy differed. The carpet industry needed not only the labor of women but also the labor of children and, hence, their skills for the market; whereas the goods that were produced by other women--for example, by seamstresses rather than weavers--though seldom exchanged, hardly contributed to the expansion of the economy. Thus, while the participation of different categories of female workers in production was associated with reproductive tasks, the utility of the products of their labor varied significantly with the needs of the economy at large.

Third, the participation of women in production, as an extension of reproduction, especially household duties, is a distinctive feature of pre-capitalist social relationships. In contrast to the sharp division between work in the household and in the world of commodity production in capitalist societies,<sup>27</sup> the two constituted a united existence in this phase of Iranian development. As exemplified by the cases of carpet weavers, vendors, domestic workers and seamstresses, no clear distinction between in- and out-of-home work activities was made. However, the work of women in production (though limited and minimal in earnings) and reproduction of labor necessary for the maintenance of life can hardly be regarded as activities existing outside the sphere of economy. Hence, in traditional Iran, the work of poor women was

parallel to the integration of the sphere of production with reproductive activities that took place in the household.

Fourth, traditional patriarchal forms required women to perform certain tasks, and reinforced inequality between the sexes. The work of both women and men, though different, constituted a joint struggle against poverty. The work of women, however, was controlled and held in check by men. Thus, in that phase of Iranian development, the subordination of poor women was, in the one hand, related to derogatory work, lack of control over the means of production and over their products and, on the other, to the inequality between the sexes.

In contrast to the working women, the majority of the better-off women had less problems with survival and subsistence. For them, that problem was solved through dependence on their menfolk, who constituted the privileged strata of the society. Dependency on men, however, limited the participation of these women in production to domestic work, which received neither an exchange value, nor was it exchanged through the market or any other form of exchange mechanism. Domestic work, therefore, became the focal point of each household's own production for the relatively privileged women.

The tasks women performed in these families included the care of the children, the cleaning of the grain, the breaking of sugar into lumps, the milling of salt and spices, the making of the bread, cooking, sewing, and cleaning.<sup>28</sup>

However, in wealthier families, the main duties of some women consisted of sewing embroideries, making sweetmeats and sherbets, while others practiced the piano, harmonious or tar.<sup>29</sup> In these families, household activities were mainly performed by the staff of servants.<sup>30</sup> Thus, for the privileged women, confinement to household work through dependency on men provided a basis for patriarchal control.

In addition to household work, seclusion served as another means for patriarchal control over the well-to-do women. The term seclusion is usually associated with the separation of sexes in highly traditional societies. In this regard, Haas states that "the Persian woman ...lived in the andarun (the Persian equivalent of the 'harem') with other legitimate wives or concubines, children and servants,"<sup>31</sup> in separation from their men. This description is, however, grossly generalized, for the harem--not the andarun--was the luxury of the rich families and not of all classes. Through seclusion, the mobility of women was also held in check. These women had to be in the company of eunuchs when they left their quarters.<sup>32</sup> Hence, reproductive tasks, seclusion, and restriction of mobility continued as specific mechanisms for the sexual subordination of the well-off and wealthy women in traditional urban Iran.

In sum, then, a clear relationship between class, participation in production, and sexual oppression can be delineated. To recapitulate, the higher women went up the social

scale, the more they were secluded, the less they were mobile, and the more they were confined to reproductive tasks. The well-to-do women were not subject to subsistence problems but experienced patriarchal control by their dependence on men and hence, they were constrained to reproductive tasks.

In contrast, the poor working women were less secluded and more mobile. Seclusion, being a luxury of the privileged without economic worries, was not a problem for working class women who were both mobile and active in production inside and outside the home. However, in waging the struggle against poverty, the working women combined reproductive tasks with work in production. In this way, patriarchal control over working women manifested itself in a twofold way: it subjugated them to male owners of the means of production, and at the same time it constrained them to the influence of their own menfolk.

In all, given the fact that women were in a variety of degrees involved in production and reproduction, we can stress that women as members of a specific sex and a specific class did not experience similar restraints. In other words, in the case of early twentieth century urban Iran, gender inequalities did not subjugate all women to class inequalities.

#### B. The Political and Feminist Activities of Women

What was the effect of class and gender inequalities on

political activities of women in Iran of the early twentieth century? Did class and gender inequalities bar women from involvement in politics?

The first recorded modern political activity in which urban Iranian women participated occurred between 1891 and 1892.<sup>33</sup> Women participated visibly in protest against the tobacco concession granted by the Gajar Shah to a British company. The political participation of women was also prominent during the Constitutional Revolution of 1905-11. In that period, political participation of women was often accompanied by religious fervor. M. Shuster writes that in 1906, masses of Iranian women, who were demonstrating in Tehran, stopped the carriage of the Shah and chanted:

We want the masters and leaders of our religion!  
We are Muslims, and believe in obeying their  
[mullah's] command! The masters have taken care  
of our properties! All our affairs are in the  
masters' hands! How could we accept your banish-  
ing them to exile? O, King of the Muslims,  
respect the command of the Muslim leaders. O, King  
of the Muslims, do not hold in contempt the ulama  
of Islam! O, King of Islam, if Russia and England  
come to your support, upon the masters' command,  
millions of Iranians will declare Jihad.<sup>34</sup>

Religious fervor, however, was not accompanied by conservative motives. Malekzadeh, the Iranian historian, states that in Tehran's Maydan-e Tupkhaneh, when a mullah was delivering a speech denouncing the Revolution, "suddenly, from among the group of women, a woman got up, took out a gun from under her chador [veil] and shot the mullah. The woman was immediately arrested and killed on the spot."<sup>35</sup> Therefore, through

their political activities, as Shuster points out, women "did much to keep the spirit of liberty alive. Having themselves suffered from a double form of oppression, political and social, they were the more eager to forment the Nationalist movement for the adoption of constitutional forms of government...."<sup>36</sup>

Women also exerted influence on the men involved in the Revolution. Supporting this contention, Woodsmall states that: "Behind the mosque curtains mass meetings of women were held, where fiery speeches were delivered on Iranian independence. The men read these documents later in the Majlis and said: 'the women teach us how to love our country',"<sup>37</sup>

A small number of women also resorted to armed struggle. After one of the battles in Azerbaijan, "twenty female bodies, clad in men's clothes, were found among the dead."<sup>38</sup> In Tehran, the veiled women, all armed, forced the Majlis deputies not to yield to Russia's demands. Witnessing this situation, Shuster writes that:

Out from their walled courtyards and harems marched three hundred of that weak sex, with the flush of undying determination in their cheeks. They were clad in their robes with the white nets of their veils dropped over their faces. Many held pistols under their skirts or in the folds of their sleeves. Straight to the Majlis they went, and, gathered there, demanded of the President that he admit them all.... In this [President's] reception-hall they confronted him and lest he and his colleagues should doubt their meaning, these cloistered Persian mothers, wives and daughters exhibited threateningly their revolvers, tore aside their veils, and confessed their decision to kill their own husbands and sons, and leave behind their own



dead bodies, if the deputies wavered in their duty to uphold the liberty and dignity of the Persian people and nation.<sup>39</sup>

Shuster further comments that "the Persian women since 1907 have become almost at a bound the most progressive, not to say radical, in the world. That this statement upsets the ideas of centuries makes no difference. It is a fact."<sup>40</sup>

Such data indicates that, despite the persistence of seclusion, religion and the veil, a number of women continued their political and nationalist activities in Iran of the early twentieth century. However, what was the class position of these female political activists? There is no hard evidence on the socio-economic background of these women. Nevertheless, by describing the intention of female demonstrators to kill their sons and husbands in the Majlis, it is likely that Shuster was referring to mothers and wives of deputies, who constituted the more privileged strata of the urban society. Moreover, in encountering female activists and nationalists, Shuster had identified some of them as princesses and mothers of clerks in the Treasury Department<sup>41</sup> over which he presided. Furthermore, in making similar references, Sultanzadeh, the leader of the 1920's Iranian Communist Party, stated that the women's movement consisted of well-to-dos without participants from the proletariat.<sup>42</sup>

On the basis of this scattered information it is plausible to conclude that, on the whole, female activists came from well-to-do families. This is not surprising since Iran

was highly inegalitarian in the early twentieth century. One of the privileges of the well-to-do women was their prerogatives in receiving education. Haas states that "For women of high society the knowledge of reading and writing, a thorough understanding of Persian literature and the art of writing poems were customary, if not the rule; knowledge of a foreign language, particularly French, had become common,"<sup>43</sup> Here, a direct relationship between class and the participation of women can be established, in that the higher the socio-economic background of women, the wider their political participation; and conversely, the lower the class position of women, the less likely their political participation.

The third phase of women's political activities took a different form from the previous ones. With the granting of the Constitution in August, 1906, the women's movement culminated in what may be called a liberal feminist direction.<sup>44</sup> It concentrated on the promotion of education and the development of political rights for women. As a result, in 1907, the first school for girls (Namus) was established in Tehran. In 1908 another French girls' school (Ecole Franco-Persane) was founded. By 1910, more than fifty girls' schools existed in Tehran.<sup>45</sup> It should be noted that the opening of these schools was not primarily due to the women's movement, but insofar as women were willing to spend energy in this area, their efforts must be credited.

These new feminist efforts encountered serious obstacles by hostile men and conservative members of the religious community.<sup>46</sup> Reacting to this situation, a group of women marched in Tehran and shouted: "Long live the Constitution, Long live freedom. The Constitution has given us freedom. We must free ourselves from the religious obligations to live in the way we want!"<sup>47</sup> Consistent with patriarchal controls, the constitutionalists denied "any connection with this 'ill-famed' women."<sup>48</sup> And, "They conveniently claimed that this 'ugly scene' was a plot arranged by the reactionaries who had bribed these 'prostitutes' to discredit the revolution in the people's eyes."<sup>49</sup>

Despite strong public opposition, women continued their emancipatory activities. From 1910 to 1927, women used journalistic channels to promote their cause. In this period, at least thirteen journals were published and edited by women.<sup>58</sup> The first feminist journal, Danesh [Knowledge] was established and edited by Qamari Khanun. The purpose of the journal was "to awaken Iranian women" through its coverage of issues relating to women's affairs.<sup>51</sup> Another important journal was called Zaban-e Zanan [The Tongue of Women]. It was established and edited by Banu Sadiqeh Doulatabadi in the city of Isfahan in 1919. This was the first journal which had the word "Women" in its title and carried articles written by female writers and others who were interested in promoting women's affairs.<sup>52</sup> Jahan-e Zanan [The World of Women] was another

feminist journal under the responsibility of Fakhr-Afaq Parsa. This one was established in Mashad in 1920. The aim of this journal was to enlighten and educate women on issues relating to their own lives.<sup>53</sup>

These emancipatory struggles were, however, short lived. Due to the fanatic antagonism of Isfahan residents, the publishing house of Zaban-e Zanan was stoned several times. Doulatabadi, the editor, fled to Tehran and attempted to republish the journal there.<sup>54</sup> Jahan-e Zanan faced considerable opposition in Tehran, too. In that city the journal and its editor were denounced as anti-religious. In 1921, Parsa and her husband were deported from Tehran and sent to exile in Arak.<sup>55</sup> After the closing of this journal, the post-constitutional women's activities experienced a crippling setback when the reactionary forces banned, arrested and sent into exile all of the most progressive leaders of the feminist cause in Iran.

But who were these liberal feminists? Similar to female constitutionalists, the liberal feminists were the product of well-to-do and traditionally educated families. For example, Doulatabadi was greatly influenced by her educated father. In accordance with her family's privileged status, she received schooling and tutorial training. Interestingly, in order to overcome male opposition to her schooling, she dressed as a boy and attended a boy's school. At the age of fourteen, she opened her own school in Isfahan and established

a "Kanune-e Banovan" (Women's Club), Parsa, too, received a high school education and became a teacher.<sup>56</sup> Here, the argument is not that education determined the political activities of well-to-do women. Rather, that as a class-related phenomenon, education counted considerably in the political participation of women of high socio-economic status. This is significant in view of the fact that these women had to receive domestic help in order to become available for political and intellectual activities. In this connection, Woodsmall states that "Servants are easily found, and the wet nurse, an ancient institution among wealthy people, is always available, so that the outside life of a married teacher has not made a reconstruction of her home life necessary."<sup>57</sup>

By the late 1930's and 1940's the activities of Iranian women took a new form. The state became not only the prime intervener in women's affairs, but it also made an attempt at "modernization," "westernization," and "secularization" of the national economy, judiciary, military apparatus, and education.<sup>58</sup> As a result, the veil was forcibly outlawed in 1936. Moreover, a number of charity organizations, namely the "Vatan Khahan" Club (Well Wishers of the Fatherland), "The Women's Section of the Red Lion and The Sun," and "The Women's Club"<sup>59</sup> were established by the state, under the leadership of royal and upper class women. In addition, a feminist journal, Ayandeh [Future] was published.<sup>60</sup> Some middle and upper class women were also assigned to teaching,

medicine, nursing and midwifery professions. Finally, the state modified some of the Islamic laws and altered a number of family laws. (These will be discussed below.) In this way, men's direct control and ownership of women was slowly modified by the new family legislation, with the state's influence greatly expanded.

In all, in contrast to the nationalist, anti-imperialist and liberal feminist activities of women at the turn of the century, the period of the 1930's to the 1940's marks the state's intervention in the promotion of the ideology of "liberalization," corresponding to those of "modernization" and "secularization." Hence, in order to partially legitimize its modernization efforts, the state took an active role in ideologizing feminism. Well-to-do women became the most manifest symbol of this ideology. By so doing, women experienced a new form of control and subordination, not only under their own menfolk, but also under the secularizing and modernizing state. In this way, the state assumed the role of the patriarch, in the sense that it assumed an active role in family matters, as we shall discuss later in this chapter.

#### C. The Position of Women Under the Religious and Secular Laws

If class and gender inequalities constrained the economic and political activities of women, then what effect did religious ideas have on the social position of women in a highly traditional society? Did religion confirm or discour-

age the subjugated position of women? Did institutionalization of religion and secularization of the state validate pre-established doctrines concerning the position of women?

Writing on the social position of women in the Middle East, many scholars have referred to Islam as a male-dominated religion.<sup>61</sup> For example, R. Patai describes the region as the "culture continent" in which Islam is the "total way of life, and religion is...the fundamental motivating force behind most aspects of culture and has its way in practically every act and moment in life."<sup>62</sup> Such statements must be placed in historical perspective, however.

Islamic cultural values and social norms concerning the societal position of women must be traced back to the pre-Islamic practices of the ancient Arabian tribes. The burial of unwanted female children and the denigration of women were among courses of conduct. With the advent of Islam, the Prophet Mohammed introduced fundamental and profound changes in tribal practices concerning the position of women. These changes were in accord with the Islamic notion of "justice"<sup>63</sup> which received a prominent place in religious doctrine.

Among the most revolutionary instructions of the Mohammedan era were the principle of women's right to life. Mohammed forbade and sought to end the practice of the burial of unwanted female children and in a Koranic revelation, he ordered the followers of Islam that "...you must not kill your children...."<sup>64</sup> Moreover, in upgrading the status of

women, the Prophet Mohammed stated that "Heaven is under the mother's feet: and the Koran emphasized that: "We have charged men to be kind to their parents--their mothers bore them with hardship and painfully gave birth to them..."<sup>65</sup> Islam also granted women private property rights. The Koran permits married and divorced women to keep their dowries,<sup>66</sup> Accordingly, men must "...give women a share of their property--be it small or large--, support and food..."<sup>67</sup> Similar instructions were granted with respect to the earnings of both sexes, for "...to men and women, there is a right in what they have earned."<sup>68</sup> In addition, Islam allowed women's participation in public affairs. Prominent women like Fatimah, Khadijeh, Zaynab, and Ayisheh performed important public roles.

The aforementioned passages indicate Islamic concerns with the humanitarian treatment of women in society. Theoretically and practically, however, the position of women and men seems to be incompatible with the Islamic notion of justice. For instance, monogamy is prescribed as a rule for women, but polygamy is a practice for men. In Islam, polygamy was restricted to four permanent wives, but in Shi'a Islam, polygamy was to be combined with the institution of mote'h or sigh (temporary marriage). The main element of mote'h was the designation of price and time. As such, it actually differs little from legal prostitution. Polygamy was allowed under certain circumstances only. Referring to this matter,



the Koran commanded men to "Marry women who seem to be good, just, and proper to you, two or three or four (not more); and if you fear that you cannot do justice to them, then marry one only...."<sup>69</sup> However, on the treatment of women in a polygamous situation, the Koran told men: "Keep women honorably until divorce or set them free with kindness. But do not keep them to injure or to harm them...."<sup>70</sup> Thus, referring to the difficulty of practicing justice among various wives, the Koran pointed out to men: "...God is well aware of your actions. If you are unable to behave with women justly--for it is beyond your control not to admire more beautiful and younger women--even if it is your ardent wish, then, do not discriminate among them. Give your wives equal allowances...."<sup>71</sup> Hence, by granting men the right of polygamy, though conditional, the religious doctrines endorsed the restriction of women's choices in ways similar to men as well as the establishment of marriage as a just conduct. The concept of marriage as an inequalitarian gender-based contract remained unquestioned, however.

In general, nikah (marriage), as a term in Arabic, denotes sexual intercourse of a male with a female. This concept has been the subject of various interpretations in the Shari'ah (Islamic Law). It is pointed out that nikah is a contract with the purpose of domination over the female sexual organ without its ownership. It is also said that nikah is an oral contract which realizes the ownership of inter-

ship at the outset, not like the purchase of a female slave, according to which intercourse follows by ownership of the slave's body. Five types of nikah are recognized, according to the five types of normative order in Islamic fiqh: Vajeb (obligation) such as the marriage of a male with a female who is scared of adultery (especially, before marriage); Mostahab (desireable) such as the marriage of a married man with another woman; Makruh (disapproved, but not prohibited) like marriage with an adulterous woman; and, finally, Haram (prohibited and illegitimate) like marriage of a man who is unable to engage in sexual intercourse, such as a eunuch.<sup>72</sup>

Marriage is a common core of contract in Islamic Law "and [has] shown traces of having developed out of the purchase of the bride; bridegroom concludes the contract with the wali [legal guardian] of the bride, and he undertakes to pay the sadaq [nuptial gift]...not to the wali as was customary in the pre-Islamic period, but to the wife herself."<sup>73</sup> Thus, marriage is analogous to a commercial transaction, in which the woman is the object of a transaction to be exchanged for the Mahr (bride price).

The Mahr is one of the main pillars of the marriage contract. Mahr is defined as saman-e boz'e (price for the bride's sexual organ).<sup>74</sup> In this context, the marriage contract approximates the sale contract in the Islamic Law. The sale contract is based on the exchange of saman (price) for the mabi'e (sale object). In the marriage contract, the

price is called mahr and the sale object is the sexual organ of the bride. That is why mahr is an indispensable element in the marriage contract and is considered as the distinct claim of the wife over her husband. It should also be noted that if divorce occurred before intercourse, the bride could only claim one-half of the mahr; otherwise, she is entitled to all of the mahr. Thus, depending on the occurrence of intercourse, the bride has a legal right to receive and keep all or one-half of the mahr for herself. Though this legal sale is contracted and enacted between two men, the woman receives possession over her own economic value. In this way, marriage is a process of transference of authority from the father to the husband over the woman. The contract reinforces male domination and sexual objectification of women.

Divorce, too, is the man's privilege. It is permitted to the husband by the pronouncement (three times) of the formula of divorce.<sup>75</sup> This right is not accorded to women. Only under specific and complicated circumstances a woman is allowed to dissolve her marriage. These circumstances are subject to proving impotence of the husband, long abstention by him, or his failure to provide economic support for his wife. Besides divorce, inheritance rights, too, are in favor of the man. A daughter receives a share half as large as her brother's, and a mother a share one-eighth as large as her son's.

Men are permitted to be judges, while women are barred from such a position (allegedly due to their inability of judgement, resulting from psychological and physiological weaknesses accompanying menstruation). Indeed, witnesses of who women is equivalent to that of one man's.

In addition, public appearance and behavior of women is to be regulated and controlled. The Koran commands women to be modest. It prescribes to them to "cover yourself in the veil so as to be honorably protected from passion-seekers.. .."<sup>76</sup> Likewise, in emphasizing "feminine modesty," the Prophet Mohammed advised women to:

Cover your eyes and bodies and not display ornaments and beauty except those that ordinarily appear. Draw veils over face, shoulders and bosoms. Do not reveal ornaments and beauty except to your own husbands, fathers,...sons, brothers,...women... and children unaware of your nakedness.... Do not take steps in ways to show your hidden beauties of legs and feet....<sup>77</sup>

Women are also said to be created for the purpose of arousing and gratifying men's sexual desires. According to the Koran, "God created all from a single soul, and He created his spouse so that he may enjoy affection and relaxation in her company."<sup>78</sup> Likewise, women are to be subjugated to men, for:

Men have dominating and protecting rights over women because they provide subsidy. Therefore, tamed and worthy wives must guard their husbands' rights in their absence,..and those women who mismanage their allowance, [husbands] admonish them first. If they are not tamed, avoid copulation. If they still refuse to obey, scourge them, Then if they comply, seek not against them.<sup>79</sup>

The aforementioned passages indicate that although Islam upgraded the status of women, the relative position of the sexes remained contradictory in the religious doctrine. However, did Islam in and of itself dictate a subjugated position to women and did it reinforce pre-existing pagan mores? To what extent did institutionalization of Islamic ideas and secularization of the state have any effect on women's position?

The secularization of the state had the effect of changing women's legal position. Noticeable changes in the legal position of women came with the Constitutional Revolution of 1905-11. Briefly, the main body of the Constitution was a translation of the Belgian Constitution of 1830.<sup>80</sup> The Iranian Constitution set out to establish a western liberal democracy with secular institutions, but without the separation of religion and state.<sup>81</sup> In this sense, as Banani claims, the idea of a constitutional government was a thoroughly western importation which in principle "ran counter to the fiber of political thought implicit in Islam."<sup>82</sup>

Before the 1920's, there were three systems of law: the Shari'ah based on the Koran and interpretation of the Mujtahids (the highly learned men of Islam), the urf or adat (secular laws concerning water rights and land disputes), and the Qanun (primarily edicts of the Shah relating to foreign affairs, taxes, public security, etc.). While the Constitution created several civil courts such as the criminal court

and the court of appeals, it did not establish codes or procedures. Hence, the Shari'ah dominated these courts.<sup>83</sup> Before Reza Shah's reign began in 1925, a temporary civil code and a commercial code were established, and by 1928 a civil code based primarily on the French civil code was approved by the Majlis.<sup>84</sup> Subsequently, other laws challenged the Shari'ah and "by 1940 the courts became mere advisory bodies."<sup>85</sup> Consequently, institutionalization of the new legal system became a mixture of two contradictory traditions, a western one completely departed from Islam, and a religious one in strict conformity to the Shari'ah. It is, therefore, within these two contradictory traditions that the legal status of women must be looked upon.

The Iranian Constitution of 1906 guarantees equal rights and protection to all Iranians. Hence, Article Nine (9) of the Supplementary Fundamental Laws of October 7, 1907 to the Constitution stated that "All individuals are protected and safeguarded in respect to their lives, property, homes, and honour..."<sup>86</sup> Equal rights were, however, extended to men only for, according to Article One (1) of the Electoral Law of September 9, 1906 supplemented to the Constitution, "The electors of the nation in the well-protected realms of Persia in the Provinces and Departments shall be of the following classes: (I) Princes and the Qajar Tribes; (II) Doctors of Divinity and Students; (III) Nobles and Notables;

(IV) Merchants; (V) Landed Proprietors and Peasants; (VI) Trade-guilds."<sup>87</sup> These groups were further modified by those who had the "right" to elect and be elected. These modifications, however, excluded women from these rights. Article Three (3) of the above Electoral Law stated that:

The persons who are entirely deprived of electoral rights are as follows: (I) Women; (II) Persons not within years of discretion, and those who stand in need of a legal guardian; (III) Foreigners; (IV) Persons whose age falls short of twenty-five years; (V) Persons notorious for mischievous opinions; (VI) Bankrupts who failed to prove that they were not fraudulent; (VII) Murderers, Thieves, Criminals, and Persons who have undergone punishment according to The Islamic Law, as well as persons suspected of murder or theft, and the like, who have not legally exculpated themselves; (VIII) Persons actually serving in the land or sea forces [emphasis added].<sup>88</sup>

Hence, women along with criminals were deprived from electoral rights.

Similarly, Article Five (5) of the aforementioned Electoral Law excluded certain categories of people, including women, from the rights to be elected. According to this law:

Those persons who are debarred from being elected are: (I) Women; (II) Foreign subjects; (III) Those who are actually serving in the land or sea forces; (IV) Fraudulent bankrupts; (V) Persons who have been guilty of Murder or Theft; Criminals; Persons who have undergone punishment conformably with the Islamic Law; and Persons suspected of Murder, Theft and the like, who have not legally exculpated themselves; (VI) Those whose age falls short of thirty; (VII) Those who are notorious for evil doctrine, or live in open sin [emphasis added].<sup>89</sup>

Hence, women along with criminals were debarred from being elected.

The above passages indicate that first, women were entirely deprived of electoral rights; second, they were deprived of being elected; third, they were equal only to foreigners, minors, fraudulents, murderers, thieves, and criminals. Therefore, in contrast to Article Five (5) of the supplementary Fundamental Laws of October 7, 1907, in which "The people of the Persian Empire are to enjoy equal rights before the law,"<sup>90</sup> women were neither considered as "people" of Persia, nor were they granted equal rights by the Electoral Law of September 9, 1906. Both of these laws prevailed after they were legislated.<sup>91</sup>

In addition, while the Constitution guaranteed representation of the whole nation in the Majlis, it failed to extend this right to women. Thus, Article Thirty (30) of the Electoral Law of September 1906 stated that "The deputies of the National Consultative Assembly and of the Senate represent the whole nation, and not only the particular Classes, Provinces, Departments or Districts which have elected them [emphasis is added]."<sup>92</sup> Further, Article Two (2) of The Fundamental Laws of December 30, 1906 specified the former article in that "The National Consultative Assembly represents the whole of the people of Persia, who [thus] participate in the economic and political affairs of the country."<sup>93</sup> By so stating, Articles Thirty (30) and Two (2) remained contradictory, for women were both prohibited from



political rights and discounted as economically active people. In this way, The Constitution failed to guarantee the representation of women in the legislative branch of the government.

The exclusion of women from the affairs of the country was also extended to the Executive branch. The Constitution barred women from rights to rule, or succession to the throne. Article Thirty-seven (37) of the Electoral Law of September 1906 stated that:

The succession to the throne, in case of there being more than one son, passes to the eldest son of the King whose mother is a Princess and of Persian race. In case the King should have no male issue, the eldest male of the Royal Family who is next of kin shall rank next in succession to the throne. If, however, in the case supposed above, male heirs should subsequently be born to the King, the succession will de jure revert to such heir.<sup>94</sup>

While the above laws came after the 1906 Constitution, the marriage laws were either derived from or conformed to the Shari'ah. The Shari'ah recognized the age of puberty of women as nine and that of men as fifteen. The new law of 1931 prescribed a marriage contract based upon possession of a "physical aptitude" for it.<sup>95</sup> In 1935, a new marriage law broadened the basis of the former by promulgating the legal age for women as fifteen and for men as eighteen.<sup>96</sup> In addition, contrary to the Shari'ah Articles 1062, 1064 and 1070 of the new marriage law recognized an agreement between the bride and groom as prerequisite for marriage; Article

1035 permitted the cancellation of an engagement even after the arrangement of the mahr; and Article 1060 forbade women to marry aliens except with government permission.<sup>97</sup>

In contrast to the aforementioned changes, other provisions of the civil code concerning marriage followed the Shari'ah closely, or else remained in strict conformity with it. Thus, Articles 1056-1057 legalized temporary marriage; Articles 1050-1051 forbade polyandry; Articles 942, 1046, and 1048-1049 allowed men four permanent wives as well as unlimited numbers of temporary wives; Articles 1042-1043 required father's permission for marriage of daughters (not of sons); and Articles 1075-1077 allowed Muslim men to marry aliens who were not idolators.<sup>98</sup>

In addition, in conformity with the Shari'ah, Articles 1102-1118 divided the rights and obligations of married couples into two categories; marital and non-marital.<sup>99</sup> The marital rights of the wife consisted of the right to own property in accordance to her need. The material obligation of the husband consisted of duties to provide support to his wife with food, clothing, and home. This was to be done only for permanent wives. In contrast, the material obligation of the wife to her husband constituted the "wifely duties," and "the husband's rights of sexual gratification at times of his choosing."<sup>100</sup> Thus, while the law gave women private property rights, it privatized them as the property of their

husbands.<sup>101</sup> Besides these, the non-material rights and obligations were defined as "the foundation of the family [as] based upon [the] harmonious coexistence of husband and wife."<sup>102</sup> The notion of "harmonious coexistence" did not, however, challenge the dominant and patriarchal role of the husband in the family. Hence, women were once again subjugated to the will and whim of their husbands.

The oppressive laws of the Constitution were also extended to divorce regulations. Although rights on a minor scale were granted to women, such as "permission" to institute divorce proceedings, by contrast, in conformity with the Shari'ah, the husband received an absolute authority to divorce his wife(ves). Article 1133 stated that a "husband may divorce his wife at any time he wishes."<sup>103</sup> Divorce was, therefore, considered a natural and unconditional right of the man; whereas, for women, it became conditional upon a cause and subject to court approval under the Constitution. Also Articles 1057-1058 in conformity with the Shari'ah specified causes of divorce by including the provision of "triple divorce."<sup>104</sup> However, in translating the Shari'ah and in order to make it certain that a woman was not pregnant at the time of the divorce, Articles 1150-1156 specified a waiting period for the woman's remarriage after the divorce or death of her husband.<sup>105</sup>

In a similar vein, other provisions of the civil codes established male supremacy. Thus, child custody rights were

given to men only. Children, according to the law, belonged to their fathers and, in cases of separation, custody was still to be the right of the father. Also, inheritance laws as well as the use of name and guardianship were all codified in conformity with Islamic Law. In matters of employment, the husband's permission was essential to women's work. Article 1117 of the civil code stated that a "husband may forbid his wife to accept a job that is degrading to him or her."<sup>106</sup>

In addition to the civil codes, the penal codes contained discriminatory provisions against women. Article 180 of the 1925 Penal Code stated that:

If a man kills his wife and/or her accomplice while in the act of adultery, he is exempt from punishment; if he kills his daughter or sister and/or their accomplices under the same circumstances, he is punishable by one to six months' imprisonment.<sup>107</sup>

Under these circumstances, wives, daughters, and sisters remained unprotected. They also received unequal treatment compared to men for the conduct of the same action. Worst of all, the possession of women with the right over their life and death was exclusively granted to men by the laws of the state.

Despite the new provisions and those derived from the Islamic Laws, as indicated above, a number of Constitutional Articles remained in strict conformity with the Shari'ah. Hence, to the extent that religious laws were incorporated

in the state laws, the degree of their institutionalization within the "secular" structure of the state can be witnessed. However, what factors explain the dynamics of the coexistence of religious and secular laws? perhaps the key element lies in the contradiction between the state and the religious community of the ulama. Hamid Algar states that the Iranian Shi'a state is self-contradictory: In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, the Iranian monarchs received support from "parasitical clergy who in turn were sustained by the rulers,"<sup>108</sup> In this way, the ruling strata often used religious endorsement for their conservative ideas. At the same time, the clergy maintained its legitimacy as the Iranian Constitution remained subject to conformity with the Shari'ah and the approval of the ulama.

This political contradiction also extended to women's position in the society. In spite of the separation of the sexes and the unequal status of women and men under Islam, Reza Shah Pahlavi attempted desegregation not only through legal reforms but also through force. This is best exemplified by his unveiling act of 1936 and its enforcement. The state promoted the "westernization" image through the ideology of women's liberation and, at the same time, it undermined the anti-women's liberation forces such as the ulama, who had increasingly antagonized the Pahlavi regime in Iran.

However, as a prelude to these events, in 1928 Reza Shah had struck at the Islamic mullahs when they admonished

the Queen for exposing her face in the mosque of Qum.<sup>109</sup> In the same year, the government issued police regulations concerning the "liberation" of women. Thereafter, as Filmer notes,

Women were admitted to cinemas, restaurants and other public places. They were granted the right to speak to men in the streets and to ride with men in carriages (of course, with the hood down). Police protection was also authorized for those Moslem women who might choose to appear unveiled in public.<sup>110</sup>

Most of the women who immediately took advantage of the new regulations came from upper-class backgrounds. These women, according to Filmer, had already resided abroad and had abandoned the chador in favor of European dress.<sup>111</sup> These "liberated" women were, however, representative of the upper classes, promoting the enforcement of policies promulgated by their governing menfolk. Thus, in 1935, the Shah's daughters opened women's cultural centers in Tehran and, in the same year, the wives of high officials and cabinet members appeared unveiled in a tea party given by the Prime Minister.<sup>112</sup> Soon after, through the order of the state, school girls paraded in the streets in athletic costumes, unveiled female teachers attended classes, and female teachers were accepted in medical and law schools.<sup>113</sup>

In sum, then, the enforcement of the unveiling act had a twofold purpose: it was an attempt to undermine the power of clergy and at the same time, it served as an ideological tool to enhance the "modernized" and "westernized" image of

the state. In other words, the liberation of women served as a policy for "modernization" and "westernization" of the state, through which the power of the ulama, who were both anti-emancipation and anti-westernization, could be broken down. Indeed, Reza Shah's main aim was first the establishment of a centralized state. This objective required the undermining by the state of the power of independent groups, including the ulama, which was achieved by 1936. In this way, the liberation of women under Reza Shah served on the one hand, to promote the ideology of "modernization" and "westernization," and on the other, it provided the state with legitimate policies to undermine the ulama's power. The clergy not only opposed the regime but also adhered to traditional views on the sexes' position in the society. The state sought to become the dominant patriarch in the society. However, in order to compromise and prevent religious antagonists from unrest, Reza Shah sought not to abrogate certain features of the Islamic Law such as the position of the sexes in marriage, divorce, child custody, inheritance and other relevant laws. On the other hand, in contrast to the Shari'ah, he modified terms of the marriage contract, age for marriage, and other related laws.

Clearly, without institutional support, the combination of both secular and religious ideas could not become pervasive and enforced. In that respect, religion did not determine in and of itself the social reality of women's existence

in the Iranian society under Reza Shah. Rather, in that period, it was the institutionalization of religion by means of the legal structure of the state that in part provided support to religion's ideas concerning the position of women and men in society. These institutionalized norms along with secular ideas were, indeed, parallel to changes in the structure of the economy and in the sexual division of labor.

#### D. The Economic Structure and Women's Position

In discussing the social position of women within the context of changes in the structure of production, the transformation, though slow, started in the mid-nineteenth century with the Iranian dependency on foreign capital. In that period, as a result of devastating wars with Russia and Britain, Iran was pushed into a semi-colonial situation. At the same time, the Russian and British rivalry in Iran not only caused the collapse of the political community, but also allowed for the merging of political goals with economic interests.<sup>114</sup> Subsequently, due to the growth of trade with these powers, Iran witnessed a decay in her local manufactures. As Keddie, Ashraf and others<sup>115</sup> point out, the decay in local manufacturing was due to imported foreign manufactured goods superceding Iranian local products on the one hand, and on the other, the export of raw materials replacing manufactured materials. Meanwhile, as Keddie contends, the British and Russians encouraged exports of cotton,



dried fruits and nuts, opium and carpets. They promoted these through low tariffs and Iranian imports of their own manufactures.<sup>116</sup> Hence, they undermined Iranian handicrafts and weakened the competitive position of Iranian merchants vis-à-vis foreign products and commercial agents.

In addition, foreign banks were established by the British and the Russians. The purpose of these banks was to take control of the financial system of Iran. As Keddie states, "The British Imperial Bank of Persia had exclusive rights to issue paper money; the Russian Bank was barely less powerful; and the British and Russian nationals controlled other major economic institutions."<sup>117</sup> The impact of these forces on Iranian Society is well noted by Ashraf and Abdullaev.<sup>118</sup> It is sufficient, however, to note here that these interventions adversely affected Iran's economy by placing it in a dependent position on foreign capital. The tobacco concession of 1891-92 and the Constitutional Revolution of 1905-11 were the results of successful popular revolts against western imperialism and the oppressive governments of the Qajar dynasty.

The discovery of oil at the turn of the century and the formation of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (AIOC) in 1908 added another catastrophe to Iranian history. The exploitation of the country and high profits by the West from Iranian oil are well documented.<sup>119</sup> The British government through the purchase of most of the shares in AIOC made it

essentially a British enterprise. It was very profitable. But for Iran's economy, between 1909 and 1921, despite high productivity and a growing export of oil, as Julien Bharier points out, a deficit occurred in the crude balance of visible trade.<sup>120</sup>

In the 1920's, in order to reverse these policies, Reza Shah Pahlavi increased the oil income and made planned governmental use of it. For the purpose of centralizing the state, Reza Shah used the oil income to purchase arms and build a strong army to control the tribes, religious groups, the landlords, the petty bourgeoisie, and other social groups. It should be noted that in the Qajar period, all these groups had a degree of relative autonomy and, specifically, that religious groups, or the ulama, enjoyed a significant political, ideological and financial independence.<sup>121</sup> It was not, therefore, surprising that centralization of the state required the breakdown and suppression of the independent power of the ulama and other groups. It was in this context of antagonism between the state and religious ilama that women's issues received ideological credence in the subsequent years of Reza Shah's rule.

In 1931, in response to the world-wide economic depression which had adversely affected Iranian exports, Reza Shah introduced the Foreign Trade Monopoly Policy. Through this policy, he enabled the state to intervene and control foreign trade as well as to possess the largest trade companies

in the country.<sup>122</sup> As a result, in his attempt to reverse the Qajar's foreign policies, Reza Shah ended capitulations, regained tariff autonomy, and used protective tariffs. However, he encouraged foreign capital investment in the mines, and to construct dams and irrigation.<sup>123</sup> In addition, Reza Shah built up the state in such a way that it became the dominant key in private initiatives in the fields of banking, transportation, and construction.<sup>124</sup> The state also provided various protective devices for privately owned plants.<sup>125</sup> Many other new projects were introduced too. These included roads, telephones, a railroad, automobiles, modern schools, a university in Tehran, some schooling for women, and new legal measures against the veil. In short, between 1931 and 1941, as Ashraf notes, the state was established, and it became the main intervenor in most aspects of Iranian society and economy.<sup>126</sup>

In this period, the structure of production underwent rapid changes. This is exemplified by the fact that agriculture received little attention, and industrialization was encouraged. The strategy of industrialization was based upon the view that "more factories are better than fewer factories; that state factories are better than private factories; that big plants are better than small plants; and that capital-intensive products are preferable to labor intensive products."<sup>127</sup> Based upon this strategy, between 1934 and 1938 the founding of new plants accelerated, and so did the move

toward larger factories. The number of workers employed was increased by 250 percent. However, as Bharier points out, all the 64 plants that were set up by the state in this period were a drain on the economy, due to administration and accounting inefficiencies.<sup>128</sup> Despite these problems, the share of capital formation in the GNP climbed from 8-9 percent in the first quarter of the century to 15-20 percent during the 1930's and 1940's.<sup>128</sup>

During WWII, the allied occupation of Iran reduced the ability of the Tehran government to manage the state and economy. By the end of the war, the currency had depreciated by 600 percent.<sup>130</sup> From this period on until 1951, the year of the nationalization of oil, the Iranian economy went from bad to worse.<sup>131</sup> Dr. Mohammed Musaddiq, Iran's prime minister, regarded nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company as the key to the development of the country. The enactment of the Nationalization Law under Musaddiq's administration, however, led to an economic and oil boycott by the West of Iran. Between 1951 and 1953, in spite of the fact that the balance of trade was positive, the western blockade resulted in a shortage of foreign exchange and a decline in governmental revenue. In 1953, with the overthrow of the nationalist government of Musaddiq by the CIA,<sup>132</sup> and the elimination of Britain's preferential position in Iran, the road was open for America's participation in exporting Iran's oil resources and for the incorporation of Iran into the U.S. sphere of influence.<sup>132</sup>

The 1953 CIA-organized coup was followed by a total of \$127.3 million of U.S. aid to Iran.<sup>134</sup> Aid specialists and U.S. military experts arrived in Tehran to build up the army.<sup>134</sup> The new oil contract between the National Iranian Oil Company and an international consortium by members of the cartel was ratified. Foreign investments as well as large scale projects were constructed and banks were established. By the mid 1950's Iran appeared to be well on the road of integration into the world capitalist system. Iran was established to become a large exporter of goods produced by modern capitalist enterprises with high productivity, namely oil and minerals. In this way Iran's economy, like that of any other third world country, as noted by Samir Amin, was not destroyed but was transferred and became subject to that more of production which predominated on a world scale: the capitalist mode of production.<sup>136</sup>

The integration of Iran into the orbit of world capitalism had the effect of bringing certain structural features of capitalism to the country. First, Iran increasingly became an urban society. Between 1900 and 1950, the number of urban localities grew from 100 to 186, a net increase of 86 towns. Urbanization was parallel to population growth. In 1900, the total population was 9.86 million, and in 1956 it was 20.38 million, a growth rate of 2.20 percent. Corresponding to these changes was a relatively higher growth of

the urban population compared to the rural population. The urban population grew from 2.07 million in 1900 to 14.06 in 1956; and the rural population from 7.79 million to 14.06 for the same years. These figures show that the compound rate of population growth from 1900 to 1956 was 4.40 percent for the urban and 1.40 percent for the rural areas.<sup>137</sup>

Julien Bharier relates migration between 1900 and 1950 to pull factors; that is, to the attraction of rural people to urban areas, due to the concentration of large-scale manufacturing industry in towns and the expansion of urban construction activities.<sup>138</sup> However, why and under what changing circumstances in rural and urban areas did the movement of population take place? As noted above, since the 1930's the state had become increasingly concerned with industrialization while it gave a low priority to agricultural development. Statistically, as Bharier shows, in 1900 agriculture constituted 80 to 90 percent of the GNP, whereas it fell to about 50 percent in the 1930's and 1940's, and dropped further to 33 percent in the 1950's.<sup>139</sup> Such a relative decline in agricultural productivity pushed to the cities those agricultural workers who had become stripped of their means of production. At the same time, the pull of the cities was related to the fact that urban areas had increasingly become centers of production due to capital accumulation.

Imported capital goods had penetrated all towns and regions of Iran since foreign goods were exempted from internal duties and taxes.<sup>140</sup> In point of fact, during the 1930's the import of capital goods rose between one-fourth to one-third.<sup>141</sup> Consequently, migration between 1900 and 1950 was related, on the one hand, to the displacement of the agricultural productivity and, on the other hand, to the attraction of the agricultural population to cities as centers of capital accumulation.

The changing structure of industry was another feature of this period. In the early 1900's manufacturing activity was confined to small workshops. Although a wide range of commodities was produced, only carpets, shawls, woolen and cotton fabrics, silk stuffs, and leather products were important in volume or value terms.<sup>142</sup> There was no state industry, and the chief productive classes of the cities remained the bazaar merchants and artisans. The tertiary activities in this period made up 10 to 20 percent of the GNP.<sup>143</sup> By the end of the first quarter of the century, the share of the industrial sector in the GNP was still negligible.<sup>144</sup> Between 1934 and 1938 the manufacturing industry was expanded, but it operated at substantial losses during World War II.<sup>145</sup> Consequently, by the early 1950's, little change occurred in the total industrial production, or in the size of the manufacturing industry. However, in this period services grew substantially, due to the growth of

banking, power supply, communications, transportation, and a series of other private and public services<sup>146</sup> to which we shall return below.

Another result of the changing structure of the economy was the alteration of the sexual division of labor. In the industrial sector, for the period under study, the data is based on aggregated information. The data shows that between 1900 and 1925, only eight large scale factories had been established (cotton, textile plants, saw mills, match factories, knitting plants, and soap factories); they employed a total of 3,500 workers.<sup>147</sup> In 1947, with a move toward new and larger factories, the total employment in all industry reached about 100,000.<sup>148</sup> In 1956, 20 percent of the population worked in this sector. Data for the same year shows that urban women accounted for 16 percent of all employed workers in industry. This means that 40 percent of all working women in urban areas were employed in the secondary or industrial sector.<sup>149</sup> Thus, while in the 1930's the decline in the number of male factory workers had been substituted by child labor instead of female workers,<sup>150</sup> in the mid 1950's the significant change in the division of labor exemplified a higher proportion of female workers in the industrial sector. As mentioned earlier, the data for the period under study encompasses aggregate information on the work force; and thereby fails to shed light on the sexual division of labor. We are, hence, unable to know whether women worked



in factories prior to the 1950's. Our discussion of the participation of women in factory production is, therefore, limited to women's work in the carpet industries, as illustrated above.

In contrast to the industrial sector, agriculture witnessed a significant decline in its labor force. In 1900, 90 percent of the population worked in agriculture; in 1930, 85 percent; in 1946, 75 percent; and in 1956, 56 percent.<sup>150</sup> According to official statistics, in 1956, only 4 percent of all working women in urban areas were employed in the primary or agricultural sector.<sup>152</sup> Agricultural activities in urban sectors included work in gardens, farms and fields located in towns. It should be noted that the data used for this study is insufficient to provide concrete knowledge on the sexual division of labor, or work activities of women and men in the agricultural sector. Similar to household activities, women's labor in agriculture is underestimated since it contains no exchange value. Moreover, despite the fact that women in agriculture carry more than half of the burden of agricultural work, they are not considered to be independent wage earners. These women are excluded from official statistics and are categorized as "economically inactive population."<sup>153</sup> These women are defined as those whose economic activities (agricultural work, gathering of products, cleaning of grains, picking up and cleaning of fruits, milking and making dairy products, planting rice, teas, making baskets,

carpets, spinning, feeding animals, and making bread) are combined with house work for the family.<sup>154</sup> My own observation of women's and men's agricultural activities, particularly in rural areas, suggests that wageless and "inactive" women are more productive than waged and "active" male workers.

In the service sector of the economy for this period of study, there is a significant upward shift in the sexual division of labor. In 1900, less than 10 percent of the population was engaged in distributive trades or public and private services.<sup>155</sup> In contrast, by 1956, 24 percent of the population worked in this sector.<sup>156</sup> Quantitative data for the same year shows that urban women accounted for 23 percent of all employed workers in the service sector. The same data indicates that approximately 52 percent of all working women in urban areas or the tertiary sector were employed in services.<sup>157</sup> The latter figure is comparatively much higher than corresponding ones in industry and agriculture, disclosed as 40 percent and 4 percent, respectively.<sup>158</sup> Because of this relative but significant increase in labor force participation of women in the service sector, we may ask, why were women in relatively large numbers being employed in this sphere of the economy?

The entrance of women into the tertiary sector was concomitant to the expansion of the capitalist state in the services. Unlike France and England, where industrialization

started with private capital without the interference of the state, in Iran, by depending on foreign capital, the state capital (through the control of oil), together with western technology, took the main initiative in promoting industrialization and the growth of public projects. In addition to small and large factories, the Iranian state created a large bureaucracy, established banks and enterprises in trade, commerce, communication, and transportation, and built schools, universities, hospitals and other public projects. The growth of the service sector, however, required the reproduction of the labor force not only for its maintenance but also for the allocation of labor for employment in this sector. The absorption of particularly cheap and available labor, namely that of women, served as a means to fulfill the expanding needs of the capitalist state.

To recapitulate, Reza Shah's interest was first and foremost in the achievement of a centralized state. Subsequently, however, he became increasingly involved in the establishment of state capitalism. As it concerned the centralization of the state, women's liberation meant "modernization" and the breakdown of the ulama's power. With respect to the building and expanding of capitalism, women's issues signified their slow absorption into the economy. Hence, the inclusion of this reserve army of women could provide a cheap labor supply for the expanding industrial and especially service sectors of the state. Indeed, Reza

Shah gave numerous speeches on the importance of "work" for "modernization" of the state. Nevertheless, it should be emphasized that it was in the post-Reza Shah period that women in relatively larger numbers became absorbed in the economy, particularly in the areas of teaching and nursing and other services. In this way, women's work became essential for the reproduction of the labor force necessary for the expansion and maintenance of capitalism to which we shall return in the subsequent chapter.

Here, schooling can be used as an illustration of the state's need to reproduce the labor force in this area of the service sector. What is meant by "reproduction of the labor force is not only its maintenance but also, the allocation of agents to position with the labour process."<sup>159</sup> Schooling serves as an important factor in the reproduction of labor force. In Iran, the move toward building schools and the encouragement of education that had started during Reza Shah reached a high level in subsequent years. Hence, the number of schools increased from 3,573 in 1947-48 to 6,791 in 1955-56. In the same period, girls' enrollment went up from 104,209 to 334,815 and that of boys advanced from 319,923 to 587,573.<sup>160</sup> These figures suggest that the rising number of schools in Iran was related to the opening of education to women as well as to their training as teachers in this field. This implies that the growth of the educational sphere was related to the beginning of a

process by which new and educated skills were to be transmitted from generation to generation.<sup>161</sup> This was indeed a fundamental aspect of reproduction. In this fashion, then, in order to fulfill its labor requirement in the educational area of the services, the state utilized the reserve army of women's labor that had been hitherto unused.

In sum, as Iran moved into the orbit of world capitalism, contradictions between the traditional and the modern state widened. As the modern state underwent centralization, women's issues received ideological credence against the ulama's power in the traditional state. One effect on women of this contradiction was some liberalization of their position. Another was the slow transfer of some of the power of the patriarch to the state. In this way, women's condition became liberalized but became subjected to a new patriarchal power, that of the state.

The state also interfered in the accumulation of capital and the reproduction of the labor force necessary for its maintenance and expansion. This process was an opening to the growing absorption of female labor in the sphere of paid production. Throughout the period of 1900-56, a shift had developed in the special division of labor. This gradual shift, in part, can be explained by a slow change in women's labor from home-production to factories and, more increasingly to the service sector of the economy; though not by any

significant change in the reproductive activities of women. This process was also concomitant with changes in the structure of economy exemplified by the relative decline in the contribution of agriculture, and by an increase in the sphere of industry and service sectors in the national product, as well as a growth in the urbanization of the society.

On this basis we may conclude that, at the turn of the century, the participation of urban Iranian women in production and reproduction was related to a subsistence and traditional economy; and conversely, that the relative increase in the labor force participation of women in later decades was related to the growth of the capitalist economy toward the industrialized and service sectors. In this period, while subordination by gender did not constitute class inequalities for all women involved in production and reproduction, the dual inequalities of class and gender did constrain women's political activities. However, the role that religion assigned to women in and of itself did not determine their social position. It was the institutionalization of religion by means of the legal structure of the state that provided support to religious ideas concerning the position of women. Therefore, to what extent did the position of women change in the growing capitalist society of Iran during the period of the 1950's to the 1970's? This will be the subject of the subsequent chapters.

# NOTES

- <sup>1</sup>See note 2 of Ch. I.
- <sup>2</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>3</sup>See notes 22 and 27 of Ch. I.
- <sup>4</sup>See notes 15, 17 and 21 of Ch. I.
- <sup>5</sup>Seyyed Mohammed Jamalzadeh, Yeki Bud Yeki Nabud [Once Upon A time] (Tehran: Ebn-e Sina, 1333/1954, Fifth printing), pp. 106-107.
- <sup>6</sup>Rice, Persian Women (1923) p. 219.
- <sup>7</sup>H. E. Wulff, The Traditional Craft of Persia (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1966); and Arthur Cecil Edwards, The Persian Carpet (London: Duckwork, 1953).
- <sup>8</sup>Robert A. McDaniel, "Economic Change and Resiliency in Nineteenth Century Persia," Iranian Studies IV:1 (Winter 1971): 41.
- <sup>9</sup>Ibid., p. 42.
- <sup>10</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>11</sup>Ruth Francis Woodsmall, Moslem Women Enter A New World (N.Y.: Round Table Press Inc., 1936), p. 268.
- <sup>12</sup>Rice, Persian Women (1923) p. 224. Rice does not mention the source of her information. It is, however, possible that her information is based on interviews or discussions with women she knew and had met in Iran.
- <sup>13</sup>This information is based on a private diary that I studied in Iran.
- <sup>14</sup>Woodsmall, Moslem Women, p. 267.
- <sup>15</sup>Ibid., p. 267.    <sup>16</sup>Ibid.    <sup>17</sup>Rice, Persian Women, p. 256.
- <sup>18</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>19</sup>Woodsmall, Moslem Women, p. 217.
- <sup>20</sup>Rice, Persian Women (1923) p. 91.
- <sup>21</sup>Ibid., p. 219.    <sup>22</sup>Ibid., p. 91,    <sup>23</sup>Ibid., p. 113

- <sup>24</sup>For a further elaboration of this point, see note 19 of this chapter.
- <sup>25</sup>Sultanzadeh, "Moqe'yyat-e Zan-e Irani," [The Status of Iranian Women] in his Asnad-e Tarikhi: Jonbesh-e Kargari, Soshel Demokrasi va Komonisti-ye Iran [Historical Documents: The Worker, Social Democratic and Communist Movements of Iran] (Italy: Mazdak, 1975, Vol. IV, translated from the 1922 German version), pp. 105-106. Sultanzadeh mentions that some of the wealthy landlords had over 400 servants, half of whom were women.
- <sup>26</sup>This statement is based on my own interviews.
- <sup>27</sup>For a further elaboration of this point, see Zaretsky, Capitalism, The Family (1976).
- <sup>28</sup>Sykes, "Persia" (1915) pp. 96-97.
- <sup>29</sup>Rice, Persian Women (1923) p. 198.
- <sup>30</sup>William Haas, Iran (N.Y.: AMS Press Inc., 1966), p. 165
- <sup>31</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>32</sup>Rice, Persian Women (1923) p. 193. She notes that most places visited by these women were European shops and public baths. Also see Haas, Iran (1966) p. 165 in which he mentions that "to the public each woman accompanied by a servant carrying the bathing accessories, food supply, and musical instruments, for she used to spend at least half a day, if not the whole day, in the bath, going through all the complicated procedures of toilet cleaning eating and enjoying music."
- <sup>33</sup>Mangol Bayat-Philipp, "Women and Revolution in Iran, 1905-11," in Women in the Muslim World, eds. Beck and Keddie, pp. 296-298. She also refers to significant feminist roles played by Babi women in the mid and late nineteenth century Iran.
- <sup>34</sup>As cited in Ibid., p. 298.
- <sup>35</sup>M. Malikzada, Tarikh-i inqilab-i Mashrutiyat [The History of the Constitutional Revolution] (Tehran, 1328/1949, Vol. III), p. 62 as cited in Bayat-Philipp, "Women and Revolution," p. 306.
- <sup>36</sup>Shuster, The Strangling of Persia (1912) p. 192.



- 37 Woodsmall, Moslem Women, p. 364.
- 38 Shakiholeslami, Zanan-e [Iranian Female], p. 85.
- 39 Shuster, The Strangling, p. 198. For a related point, see Rice, Persian Women, p. 27.
- 40 Shuster, The Strangling, p. 191.
- 41 Ibid., pp. 193-197.
- 42 Sultanzadeh, "Mogeiyyat-e" [The Status of], p. 106.
- 43 Haas, Iran, p. 116.
- 44 Rice mentions the existence of a number of female secret societies at the turn of the century. For example, she refers to the Anglo-Persian Sisters Union which was established in Isfahan and was concerned with social problems. Another, the Iron Society of Persia, had both female and male members. The objective of this organization was to purify Iran, to strengthen it politically, and to bring social democracy to the country. The female members of this organization were all veiled; they rode horses in veil to carry messages from one city to another. Rice also refers to a dozen of other secret societies among women which all had central organizations in Tehran. Rice does not discuss any of these organizations in detail. But her remarks open up a starting point for the students of women's organizations in the history of Iran. See Rice, Persian Women, p. 193, and especially, pp. 271-272.
- 45 Bayat-Philipp, "Women and Revolution," p. 300.
- 46 Ibid.
- 47 Malekzade, "Tarikh-i inqilab-i" [The History of], p. 62.
- 48 Bayat-Philipp, "Women and Revolution," p. 302.
- 49 Malekzade, "Tarikh-i inqilab-i" [The History of], p. 62.
- 50 Mohammed Sadr-Hashemi, Tarikh-e Jarayed va Majallat-e Iran [The History of Iranian Newspapers and Journals], vols. I-III (Isfahan: 1327/1948). Also, see note 34 of Ch. I.

- <sup>51</sup>Ibid., vol. I, pp. 266-267.
- <sup>52</sup>Ibid., p. 7.      <sup>53</sup>Ibid., p. 181.
- <sup>54</sup>Ibid., pp. 6-10 and p. 267.      <sup>55</sup>Ibid., pp. 181-185.
- <sup>56</sup>Woodsmall, Moslem Women, p. 146.      <sup>57</sup>Ibid., p. 36.
- <sup>58</sup>Banani, The Modernization.
- <sup>59</sup>Ibid., pp. 356-357. Woodsmall notes that the Women's Club was the first women's organization in Iran. However, prior to that note, she mentions two other women's organizations which presumably preceded the aforementioned one. These two were Paymen-e Sa'dati-ye Nesvan [The Prosperous Treaty of Women] as cited on p. 92 and Jam'iyyat-e Nesvan-e Vatanhahan [The Society of Nationalist Women] as cited on pp. 169-170. Confusion, nevertheless, remains as to which one of the above organizations was created first.
- <sup>60</sup>Based on scattered documents, I found that between 1910-49 there were at least thirteen women's journals that were written and edited by women. These were: Danesh [Knowledge], Shokufeh [Blossom], Zaban-e Zanan [Women's Tongue], Alam-e Zanan [Women's World], Nomeh-e Banovan [Women's Letter], Jahan-e Zanan [Women's World], Majalleh-e Nesvan [Women's Journal], Majalleh-e Sa'adat [The Journal of Prosperity], Nesvan-e Sharq [Women of the East], Dokhtaran-e Iran [The Daughters of Iran], Zana-e Iran [The Women of Iran], Peyk-e Sa'adat-e Nesvan [The Messenger of Women's Prosperity], and Jami-yyat-e Nesvan-e Vatanhahan [The Society of Nationalist Women].
- <sup>61</sup>See note 3 of this chapter.      <sup>62</sup>Patai, Society, Culture.
- <sup>63</sup>The Islamic notion of justice is based upon the idea that all Muslims are equal before God.
- <sup>64</sup>Reuben Levy, The Social Structure of Islam (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1957), p. 92. Also see Qoran-e Majid [The Koran], in Arabic with Farsi interpretation by Haj Sheikh Medhi Elahi Qamshahi (Tehran: Iran Publications, n.d.), 6<sub>141</sub>.
- <sup>65</sup>Qoran [The Koran], 46<sub>15</sub>.      <sup>66</sup>Ibid., 4<sub>4</sub> and 2<sub>232</sub>.

- <sup>67</sup>Ibid., 4<sub>4</sub> and 5.      <sup>68</sup>Ibid., 4<sub>32</sub>.      <sup>69</sup>Ibid., 4<sub>3</sub>.
- <sup>70</sup>Ibid., 2<sub>231</sub>.      <sup>71</sup>Ibid., 4<sub>127</sub> and 128.
- <sup>72</sup>This part is taken from the opening section of the 400-paged chapter on Nikah [marriage] in Mohaqqueq-e Helli, Sharay'-e al-Islam [Islamic Laws], vol. 2 (Tehran: University of Tehran, 1347/1968). See especially p. 428.
- <sup>73</sup>Joseph Shacht, An Introduction to Islamic Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967), p. 161.
- <sup>74</sup>Helli, Sharay'-e [Islamic].
- <sup>75</sup>Qoran [The Koran], 2<sub>228</sub> and 229.      <sup>76</sup>Ibid., 33<sub>59</sub>.
- <sup>77</sup>Ibid., 4<sub>31</sub>.      <sup>78</sup>Ibid., 7<sub>189</sub>.      <sup>79</sup>Ibid., 4<sub>34</sub>.
- <sup>80</sup>Banani, The Modernization, p. 17.
- <sup>81</sup>Ibid.      <sup>82</sup>Ibid., p. 15.
- <sup>83</sup>Richard Frye, Persia (New York: Schocken Books, 1969), p. 94.
- <sup>84</sup>Ibid., pp. 94-95.      <sup>85</sup>Ibid., p. 98.
- <sup>86</sup>Browne, The Persian Revolution, p. 374.
- <sup>87</sup>Ibid., p. 356.      <sup>88</sup>Ibid.      <sup>89</sup>Ibid.      <sup>90</sup>Ibid., pp. 322-324.
- <sup>91</sup>Under Islam, women were granted private property rights in the seventh century. The Iranian Constitution of 1906, however, deprived Muslim women (as well as those from other religious groups) of electoral rights. In contrast, the time span between the granting of private property rights and the enfranchisement of French and American women in the first half of the twentieth century was considerably shorter than it was in Iran.
- <sup>92</sup>Browne, The Persian Revolution, p. 376.      <sup>93</sup>Ibid., p. 363.
- <sup>94</sup>Ibid., p. 377.
- <sup>95</sup>Filmer, The Pageant, pp. 370-371.

- <sup>96</sup>Ibid., p. 374.
- <sup>97</sup>Banani, The Modernization, pp. 81-82.
- <sup>98</sup>Ibid., pp. 82-83.   <sup>99</sup>Ibid., p. 83.   <sup>100</sup>Ibid., pp. 83-84.
- <sup>101</sup>Sedghi, "Women."
- <sup>102</sup>Banani, The Modernization, p. 84. He also states that Article 1104 confirming the dominant role of the husband is in conformity with Article 160 of the Swiss Civil Code, Article 213 of the French Civil Code and Article 1354 of the German Civil Code.
- <sup>103</sup>Ibid., p. 82 as referred to in his note 52.
- <sup>104</sup>A triple divorced couple may not remarry unless the woman entered the consummated marriage with another man first. Then, after divorcing the second husband, she can remarry her first husband. In reality, as it is noted by Banani, The Modernization, p. 83, note 51, "mohallel" (or the second husband) who marries a triple divorced woman, consummates the marriage and then divorces her for a fee so that she can remarry her original husband. This is also referred to in Qoran [The Koran], 2229 and 230.
- <sup>105</sup>Ibid., 2234.
- <sup>106</sup>Banani, The Modernization, p. 84.
- <sup>107</sup>Ibid., pp. 80-90. Banani states that Articles 207-2107 define penalties for "adultery, polyandry, homosexuality, statutory rape, rape, prostitution, and conspiracy to promote prostitution."
- <sup>108</sup>Hamid Algar, Religion and State in Iran (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969).
- <sup>109</sup>Filmer, The Pageant, p. 367, and Frye, Persia, p. 6.
- <sup>110</sup>Filmer, The Pageant, pp. 367-368.
- <sup>111</sup>Ibid., pp. 377-378.   <sup>112</sup>Ibid., pp. 378-379.
- <sup>113</sup>Ibid., p. 378.   <sup>114</sup>Ashraf, Historical Obstacles, p. 322.

- 115 Nikki R. Keddle, "The Economic History of Iran, 1800-1914, and its Political Impact: An Overview," Iranian Studies V:2-3 (Spring-Summer 1972), p. 71; Ashraf, "Historical Obstacles," pp. 325-327; and Bhahrier, Economic Development, pp. 9-11.
- 116 Nikki R. Keddle, "Oil, Economic Policy and Social Conflict in Iran," Race and Class XXI:I (Summer 1979), p. 15.
- 117 Ibid.
- 118 Ashraf, "Historical Obstacles"; Z. Z. Abdullaev, "Promyshlennost i Zarozhdenie rabocheho klassa Irana v knotse XIX-nachale XX vv," [Bourgeoisie and Working Class, 1900s] in The Economic History of Iran, 1800-1914, ed. Charles Issawi (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971), p. 46.
- 119 Nirumand, Iran; and Cottam, Nationalism.
- 120 Bhahrier, Economic Development, p. 113.
- 121 Keddle, "Oil," p. 328.
- 122 Ashraf, "Historical Obstacles," p. 328; Donald Wilber, Riza Shah Pahlavi: The Resurrection and Reconstruction of Iran 1878-1944 (New York: Exposition Press, 1975); and Bhahrier, Economic Development, p. 53.
- 123 Wilber, Riza Shah, p. 141.
- 124 Ashraf, "Historical Obstacles," p. 330.
- 125 Bhahrier, Economic Development, p. 87.
- 126 Ashraf, "Historical Obstacles," entire article.
- 127 Bhahrier, Economic Development, p. 87.
- 128 Ibid. Despite the emphasis on state factories, it should be noted that ventures in private factories were encouraged as well. Indeed, in that period, the rate of productivity and growth of private factories was considerably high.
- 129 Ibid. 130 Nirumand, Iran, p. 35.

- 131 Ibid., p. 43. Due to the shortage of space and the inappropriateness of the subject for this study, I will not discuss changes in Iran's history from WWII to 1951. For a detailed coverage of this period, see works listed in note 15 of Ch. I of this study.
- 132 Ibid.; also see David Wise and Thomas B. Ross, The Invisible Government (New York: Random House, 1964).
- 133 Nirumand, Iran, pp. 78-79.
- 134 Ibid., p. 93. 135 Ibid., pp. 93-94 and p. 100.
- 136 Samir Amin, Accumulation on the World Scale, part I (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1974), Introduction, especially p. 38.
- 137 For all these figures see Bharier, Economic Development, pp. 27-28.
- 138 Ibid., p. 31. 139 Ibid., pp. 59-61.
- 140 Abdullaev, "Promyshlennost" (Bourgeoisie], p. 47.
- 141 Bharier, Economic Development, p. 108.
- 142 Ibid., p. 170. 143 Ibid., p. 7. 144 Ibid., p. 172.
- 145 Ibid., p. 174-176. 146 Ibid., p. 61.
- 147 Ibid., p. 171. Bharier defines large factories as those establishments that employed 10 or more workers. See ibid., p. 173.
- 148 Ibid., p. 181. 149 See Table I of Ch. II.
- 150 Bharier, Economic Development, p. 178.
- 151 Ibid., p. 131. 152 See Table I of Ch. II.
- 153 Selected Statistics (Tehran: Plan and Budget Organization and the Statistical Center of Iran, 1972/1973).
- 154 Deqargunihay-e, p. 54.

- 155 Bharier, Economic Development, p. 5.
- 156 Salanmeh-e Amari-ye 1351 Keshvar [1972 Annual Statistics of the Country] (Tehran: The Statistical Center of Iran, 1352/1973), p. 64; also see sources that are cited in Table I of Ch. II.
- 157 See Table 1 of Ch. II.
- 158 Ibid. 159 Beneria, "Reproduction."
- 160 See Tables II and III of Ch. II.
- 161 For a detailed elaboration of these points, see Beneria, "Reproduction."

### CHAPTER III

#### WOMEN AND LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION IN THE AGE OF IMPERIALISM

The preceding discussion considered changes in the position of women within the context of the integration of Iran into world capitalism. Subsequent changes in women's position, particularly in their participation in paid production and in household activities, corresponded to significant industrialization which had swept Iran by the early 1960's and 1970's. In a little more than two decades, Iran had witnessed an unprecedented growth of capital accumulation, primarily based on oil reserves from the world market. However, the domestic economy had become based on import-substitution and not internal production. Moreover, it relied on capital-intensive rather than labor-intensive industries. Urban communities had grown to house recent migrants and employees in the non-agricultural sectors of the urban economy.

These rapid changes in the 1960's and 1970's led to the emergence of a number of perspectives on Iranian development. Abol-Hassan Banisadr and Paul Vielle<sup>1</sup> saw Iran's development in terms of its integration within the world capitalist market. They considered Iran as an integrated social formation within the world economy



due to the export of oil and the import of goods produced by the industrial nations. Through this, they argued, the Iranian economy had become even more a "tributary of foreign economies in that an increasing part of its gross national product was dependent on the activity of establishments that were part of the multinational firms."<sup>2</sup> In this way, interdependence between Iran and the West was based on trade in oil. As Banisadr and Vielle put it, "oil gives the industrial world the possibility of increased products, and so the possibility of exporting more manufactured goods . . . and thus offers the dominant economies the possibility of finding expanding markets in Iran."<sup>3</sup>

Fred Halliday called Iran a "dependent" state whose capitalist development had "been premised on changes in the major capitalist countries and on changes in the economic relations between advanced and less advanced capitalist states."<sup>4</sup> He viewed oil as the basis, and at the same time, as the retarding element in the Iranian development; the flow of oil revenues provided Iran with a substantial income,<sup>5</sup> but "an increasing proportion of the oil income has been spent in ways which have not contributed to developing Iran's productive capabilities."<sup>6</sup> Amin Saikal also noted Iran's increasing dependence on world capitalism and the unprecedented

"political, economic and social influence" exercised by the United States in the 1970's.<sup>7</sup>

While these authors shed light on the increasing integration of Iran into the orbit of world capitalism and impact of the world market on Iranian development, their accounts fall short of analyzing the development of the labor force, particularly that of women. Labor as productive capital is as equally important a factor as money capital in any capitalist development.<sup>8</sup> The purpose of this chapter is to study the development of the labor force, both female and male, within the context of changes in the economic structure of Iran in the period of 1956 to the 1970's. I will argue that the development of the labor force was related to internal changes in the structure of production, which in turn was heavily influenced by the world capitalist market and by foreign national firms.

In what follows, I will briefly study the history of the integration of Iran into world capitalism since the mid-1950's. I will then proceed with the analysis of structural changes in Iranian production. Included in this part will be a discussion of capitalist development in terms of capital formation, aggregate and sectoral changes in the Gross National Product (GNP) and output, as well as employment and unemployment by sex and urbanization.

## A. Iran's Integration Into the World

### Capitalist Market

In this section, I will briefly outline the history of Iran's integration into the world capitalist market in order to discuss Iran's capitalist development and the development of its labor force. As stated in the previous chapter, Iran's integration into world capitalism began slowly after the CIA coup of 1953 and continued more rapidly throughout the 1960's and 1970's. I will argue that Iran's capitalist development was contingent on the goals of multinational corporations in their search for raw materials, cheap labor, and markets for their manufactured commodities. In addition, Iran served as a vital military and political base for U.S. regional control of the area.

A. Saikal viewed the West's relation to Iran in terms of "the West's desire to keep the Communist bloc from having any share in Iranian oil resources. . . ." <sup>9</sup> He saw America's interest in Iran only in terms of competition with the Soviet bloc. Bahman Nirumand saw British and American interests in Iran as "[d]eveloping and ensuring the raw materials and mineral resources required for . . . expansion . . . opening up new markets, which also presupposes the restructuring of society . . . [and] the dependence . . . on the industrial

nations."<sup>10</sup> Nirumand also discussed the activities of the newly formed oil consortium of 1954 in terms of the profit it gained from Iran's cheap labor and oil.<sup>11</sup>

The interest and profit of the oil companies remained high even when Iran achieved some measure of political and economic independence through the Organization of Petroleum for Exporting Countries (OPEC) in the late 1960's. From 1971-75, as Dankwart Rustow and John Mugno have indicated, oil company profits increased since "they now handle a far more expensive product, so that even a smaller profit margin is likely to yield larger absolute amounts--and the profitability of their 'down-stream' operations (transporting, refining, retailing) is undiminished."<sup>12</sup> By 1977, as Nikki Keddie stated, the several American oil companies "who together marketed 40 percent of the large consortium sales of Iran . . . profited increasingly from Iran. . . ."<sup>13</sup> Iran's position vis-à-vis western capitalist countries remained vulnerable.

In addition to their interests in the extraction of raw materials, western capitalists promoted a market for their manufactured goods in Iran. During the period of study, Iran's imports from the West grew to high levels almost without precedent among developing countries.<sup>14</sup> Showing the import-GNP ratio, Robert Looney

concluded that imports increased from 15.8 percent in 1961 to 24.4 percent in 1972, and to over 25 percent in 1974.<sup>15</sup> Imports included heavy industries such as machinery and transport equipment, and food and live animals. If we exclude the military items, the remaining list of imports counted for over 89 percent of Iran's total imports.<sup>16</sup> The International Labor Office (ILO) reported that as a result of high imports, Iran's industrialization became heavily oriented toward consumer goods.<sup>17</sup> In short, the import of productive and commodity capital not only represented Iran's dependency on the world market, but also indicated a certain degree of capitalist industrialization based on import-substitution industries.

Writing on the "new imperialism," Harry Magdoff stated that in order "to sustain and enhance control of raw material sources and of markets," imperialism extends economic and military aid to third world countries.<sup>18</sup> After the downfall of Musaddiq in 1953, in addition to foreign aid, U.S. officials and advisors and technical experts as well as private investors entered Iran in large numbers. American investors stimulated the development of the Iranian banking system; and economic and technical experts helped draft Iran's Second Development Plan (1955-62). The Iranian government drafted the 1955 law of Attraction and Protection of Foreign

Investment in order "to encourage foreign participation in economic development . . . safeguard the interests of foreign firms . . . and upgrade investors to an equal status with private domestic investors."<sup>19</sup> "Through its system of incentives (not available to local firms) for foreign investment," wrote Looney, "the government [of Iran] has allowed U.S. and Western European firms to preempt markets that local firms could have supplied."<sup>20</sup>

Hence, according to the U.S. Department of Commerce report, American direct private investment in Iran exceeded from \$200 million in the early 1960's to \$98 million in 1975 to \$125 million in 1976 to \$700 million in 1977.<sup>21</sup> Consequently, foreign economic activity took the form of inflows of external capital and transfers of technology. As such, it greatly "enlarged access to foreign markets via the export capabilities of international firms."<sup>22</sup>

It should be noted, however, that while the U.S. became a dominant foreign economic power in Iran after 1953, Iran's integration into the world capitalist economy reflected a diverse pattern of economic ties with Western European and Japanese firms, primarily in capital-intensive, rather than labor-intensive industries. In oil production, a highly sophisticated capital-intensive industry, the American and to a lesser extent British companies became dominant after 1953. In non-oil production, modern

capital-intensive industries were established with 50 percent national ownership. Japan established a strong presence in petrochemicals; France in nuclear and car industry; England and West Germany in automobile production; and West Germany in cement and steel. Both West Germany and Japan retained a competitive position with the U.S. in exporting commodities to Iran.<sup>23</sup> In this way, Iran became even more dependent on the world capitalist market since the impetus for the accumulation process lay outside of the country, and there remained little domestic manufacture and technological base upon which to build the economy and develop Iran's genuine productive capabilities.

Control over raw materials and foreign markets requires imperialist powers to provide military support to resource-rich third world societies.<sup>24</sup> After the 1953 CIA coup, massive American military aid followed U.S. economic assistance.<sup>25</sup> Later, in 1955, the British and American governments encouraged Iran to join the Baghdad Pact (later CENTO).<sup>26</sup> In a similar move, in 1959, a bilateral military treaty was concluded between Iran and the U.S. Through this treaty, "Washington committed itself to take, in case of aggression against Iran, 'such appropriate action including the use of armed forces as may be mutually agreed upon.'"<sup>27</sup> This meant that the U.S. was given the right to land troops

in Iran "directly and indirectly" in the case of outside aggression.<sup>28</sup> This treaty resulted in Iran becoming a military and strategic base of the U.S.<sup>29</sup> against potential aggression by the Soviet Union. As a report to the Joint Economic Committee of Congress stated, "American support of Iran, whether political or in the form of military assistance, is not a new development. Rather that policy spans six American Presidential administrations, going back to early 1946. . . ."<sup>30</sup>

In subsequent years, this consistent program of support for Iran and the Shah was articulated in the Nixon Doctrine. J. C. Hurewitz stated that President Nixon and Henry Kissinger "agreed to sell him [the Shah] virtually any conventional military hardware he wanted."<sup>31</sup> Later, P. C. Habib's testimony to a U.S. Committee on International Relations pointed out that "our military sales to Iran . . . continue to carry out a policy on which we . . . agree. . . ."<sup>32</sup> Hence, the U.S. strategic and economic interests, coupled with the Shah's fear of the "communist danger" and his desire for revitalization of the Persian Empire, led Iran to expend huge sums of money on the purchase and establishment of military equipment and forces from the American government.

Over the years, U.S. foreign military sales to Iran, according to the Department of Defense, expanded enormously: \$800 million in 1950-70; \$354 million in



1971; \$455 million in 1972; \$2.1 billion in 1973; \$3.9 billion in 1974; \$1.3 billion in 1975; \$1.5 billion in 1976; and \$2.8 billion in 1977.<sup>33</sup> Figures from the International Institute of Peace and Research are considerably higher: over \$15 billion on the sale of arms by the U.S. to Iran in 1973-77.<sup>34</sup> In this way, the U.S. not only extended its military control, but it also created a market in Iran for U.S. military commodities. Under the 1973-78 Five Year Plan, Iran devoted 31 percent of all its monies for national development on military and intelligence expenditure.<sup>35</sup>

In sum, in their search for raw materials and markets, as well as their pursuit of political and strategic interests, the western powers promoted both arms sales and foreign capital investment in Iran. They also fostered Iran's increasing integration into the world capitalist economy. In this way, Iran's economy became, on the one hand, heavily influenced by the capitalist mode of production and, on the other, significantly altered by import-substitution and capital-intensive industries.

#### B. Capitalism and the Labor Force

What were the consequences of Iran's integration into the world capitalist market for changes in the

internal structure of production? What effect did these changes have on the labor force, particularly on the participation of women in paid production? In dealing with these questions, I will first discuss the agents of capitalist development in Iran. I will, then, analyze changes in the structure of the economy in terms of capital, production, labor force participation of women as well as men, and the development of urban centers as the loci for capital accumulation and employment opportunities.

### 1. Agents of Capitalism

So far I have argued that Iran's integration into world capitalism transferred Iran's economy into the capitalist mode of production based on import-substitution and capital-intensive industries. In this section, I will show that Iran's capitalist development was also a result of internal forces that, in turn, were influenced by external factors.

Internal forces included the state represented by the Shah at the top, and his bourgeois allies.<sup>36</sup> The Shah's interest in industrialization and "modernization" of Iran was expressed in terms of "westernization": "Westernization is our ideal."<sup>37</sup> The Shah juxtaposed his ideology of "positive nationalism" with that of Musaddiq's "negative nationalism" or nationalism which

sought Soviet political assistance and British influence in Iran.<sup>38</sup> Indeed, the Shah's "mission" for Iran was in his "vision" of a "Great Civilization" that would ultimately revitalize the ancient Persian Empire. For him, like his father, the goal was "modernization." But unlike Reza Shah, the Shah saw "modernization" as effecting the vast majority of Iranians, and not only the urban administrative and military apparatus and economic infrastructure. The Shah actively fomented the process of primitive accumulation; he built a capitalist state of Iran "dependent" on Western capitalism; and sought through the formal emancipation of women their right to labor within the capitalist social structure.

The Shah's attempt to industrialize Iran was inseparable from his politics of repression,<sup>39</sup> the economic crisis of the early 1960's, and the White Revolution of 1962. In 1953, after replacing the popular leader Mossaddiq with the help of the CIA, the Shah used repression to maintain the stability of his rule. His repressive state crushed popular movements of religious and secular origins.<sup>40</sup> He confronted the clergy and banned political parties and trade unions. He became increasingly dependent on the government security organs—

the army, the gendarmeries, the police, and SAVAK--to consolidate his power.

Such policies were clearly linked to American needs. The "Dictatorship of the Free World" necessitated a stable Iran for the U.S. to realize its economic, political and strategic interests.<sup>41</sup> By the same token, the consolidation of the Shah's power turned out to be contingent upon U.S. support. "As Washington support of the pro-Shah forces was largely responsible for the overthrow of Mossadegh's government," wrote Saikal, "the Shah's regime became dependent on the United States for its immediate survival and continuity. . . . the Shah was provided the necessary security and the economic and military leverage to achieve his prime objective: the consolidation of his rule. . . ."<sup>42</sup>

This period of consolidation was followed by the social, economic, and political crisis of the early 1960's.<sup>43</sup> Inflation was rampant; a stagnant economy had resulted in high unemployment; and the country faced a huge balance of payments deficit. Popular dissatisfaction with military rule led to strikes, peasant rebellions and demonstrations against the regime by students, teachers, and urban intellectuals. Despite the strong measures taken by the Shah to repress all the opposition, the situation was alarming, not only to the Shah, but

also to the Kennedy administration which saw Iran on "the road to social chaos."<sup>44</sup>

The U.S. government was committed to safeguarding its military and corporate interests in Iran, whose "socio-economic development and foreign policy objectives [had become] . . . closely tied to the interests of the capitalist world."<sup>45</sup> At this point, in order to protect its interest in Iran and in other third world countries, the Kennedy administration urged its allies in developing countries to carry out the necessary reforms to "stave off" popular unrest.<sup>46</sup> This was the background to both the Alliance for Progress in Latin America and the Iranian White Revolution--the backbone of its capitalist development in the 1960's and 1970's.

The White Revolution called by the Pahlavi monarch as the "revolution of the Shah and People" was launched in 1962. Politically, it aimed not only at the suppression of dissidents but also at providing long-term stability. It attempted to achieve the latter aim by gaining the support of the peasantry, the inarticulate majority of the population. Thus, the White Revolution was considered as an instrument to preserve the system through the promotion of land-reform.<sup>47</sup>

Socially and economically, the White Revolution was to promote the growth of capitalist social relations<sup>48</sup>

and the expansion of the means of production in agriculture along capitalist lines. The first six tenets of the White Revolution were: land reform; the nationalization of forest land; sale of state-owned industries to the private sector; profit-sharing in industry; enfranchisement of women; and the establishment of an education corps for literacy programs in the villages.<sup>49</sup>

The immediate impact of the White Revolution in Iran was an intensification of oppositional activities.<sup>50</sup> Ayatollah Khomeini, revolted against the Shah and his reforms, including the granting of legal immunity to U.S. citizens in Iran. This June 1963 revolt was brutally crushed by the army. Khomeini was exiled--first to Turkey and then to Iraq. The defusion of this potentially revolutionary situation paved the way for the implementation of the reform program. The White Revolution was not only to transform the Iranian economy, but was also to provide the grounds for the active pursuit of markets and raw materials by America, West Europeans and Japanese interests. The reform program also brought into existence an industrial bourgeoisie willing to participate in the transformation of the society.

In his Mission For My Country, the Shah stated his intention to gradually shift state industrial establishments to the country's underdeveloped private

sector.<sup>51</sup> During the Reza Shah period, state capitalism had subordinated entrepreneurial initiative in the areas of trade and industry. By contrast, the Shah's reign saw rapid growth of bourgeois activity.<sup>52</sup> The state provided loans and credit to private entrepreneurs to finance new industrial plants and equipment. The bourgeoisie concentrated on investments in housing, automobile assembly plants, large-scale retailing, tire and rubber production, and cottage industries.<sup>53</sup> By 1973, according to Looney, public investment was still much higher than private investment: it made up nearly 60 percent of annual total.<sup>54</sup> Private capitalists, thus, remained dependent on the state. Such dependence, however, should not minimize the role played by the bourgeoisie in Iran's industrialization. Indeed, the activities of the bourgeoisie, coupled with government initiatives as well as foreign capital, contributed successfully to the implementation of the White Revolution and capitalist industrialization in Iran.<sup>55</sup>

## 2. Oil Revenues, Investments and Capital Formation

As we have seen, the increasing export of raw materials and the import of productive and commodity capital, as well as the White Revolution, generated profound changes in the

economic structure of Iran. With the surplus revenues derived from oil and the flow of foreign capital, considerable investments were made by the state, the bourgeoisie, and foreign capital in development projects.

Iran's development since 1953 was possible largely due to rapidly increasing oil revenues. In 1950, oil revenues totalled \$91 million; in 1960, \$285 million; in 1970, \$1.13 billion; in 1974, they rose to \$20.6 billion, after quadrupling of world oil prices. In the period of 1973-77, the cumulative oil income reached over \$71 billion.<sup>56</sup>

With increasing oil revenues, considerable investments were made in economic growth.<sup>57</sup> The highest priority was given to the growth of industry and services at the expense of the bazaars and agriculture. Most of state investment went into heavy industry--steel mills, gas pipelines, automobile, petrochemical, and oil plants--and development banks. The government also undertook primary responsibility for building roads, ports, dams, power, and communications systems.

As a result of these investments, the rate of capital or domestic capital formation at constant prices rose tremendously.<sup>58</sup> In the high accumulation period of 1955-61, growth was due to foreign aid and investment; it continued with increasing attempts by major industrial



societies to integrate Iran into world capitalism. The second high period of accumulation came by 1964 as a result of the White Revolution, the purpose of which was to transform Iran into the capitalist mode of production. Based on my own calculations,<sup>59</sup> the rate of capital formation at 1965 constant prices grew at an average annual 10-15 percent from 1955 to 1977 (Table 4).

### 3. GNP (Aggregate and Sectoral) and Production

As a result of oil revenues and the high growth rate of capital formation, the economy evidenced dynamic growth. In this way, the increasing rate of the GNP contributed significantly to upward changes in capital accumulation. My own calculation (Table 5) shows that in the period of 1959-75, the aggregate GNP at constant prices rose at a tremendous rate. The GNP grew from 277 billion rials in 1959-60 to 338 billion rials in 1963-64 to 2,249 billion rials in 1975-76. In terms of constant prices, GNP thus rose by 8 percent per year in the 1960's, by 14.2 percent in 1972-73, by 33.8 percent in 1973-74, and by 41.9 percent in 1974-75. This rate of economic growth was unprecedented.

With the growth of the GNP, there was also an impressive change in the structure and distribution of the GNP. Industry enjoyed spectacular growth. The growth rate of services was impressive too. In this period as well, there was an absolute increase in the

agricultural sector. Yet due to land reform, imports of agricultural products increased rapidly, and this sector became more dependent on foreign imports and commodities.<sup>60</sup> Thus, there was a decline in the agricultural sector relative to the rest of the economy. While agriculture constituted 80-90 percent of the GNP at the beginning of the century, its contribution was about 33 percent by 1959. It declined to 27 percent by 1965 and had fallen to 10 percent in 1975.

Conversely, industry (including manufacturing and mining, construction, and water and power), which made only a slight contribution in 1900, accounted for about 14 percent of the GNP in 1959. It increased to 19 percent in 1965 and enjoyed spectacular growth to 22.9 percent in 1975. Tables 6 and 7 indicate the great dynamism of industrial growth both in terms of production and number of factories.

In this period, service sector growth was very high too. This sector accounted for only 10-20 percent at the beginning of the century. It increased to 38.3 percent in 1959 and rose to 39.5 percent in 1965 and continued its high share by 1975. It should be noted that while the contribution of oil was minimal at the turn of the century, by 1959 it accounted for 10.8 percent of the GNP. In 1965, its share increased to 14.5 percent,

and by 1975 it showed a spectacular increase, to 38 percent. In this way, from a primarily agricultural economy, Iran had been transformed into one in which the oil, service and industrial sectors had become predominant.

Despite the large supply of capital and high rate of growth, Iranian industrialization encountered serious obstacles. First, industrial production was of the assembly type, producing finished goods in the petrochemical, electronic, automotive, and consumer areas. Using imported goods, such activity encouraged little domestic manufacture or the formation of domestic technology. Rising imports, moreover, contributed to the failure of the economy to develop an independent technological base.

The second problem in Iran's industrialization was the relatively high growth of the service sector (banking, insurance, transportation, communications, etc.).<sup>61</sup> Although this sector attracted (as will be discussed below) a large portion of the labor force, its "expansion has above all reflected the expansion of an inflated state employment and of services catering to the consumption requirements of the better off; the import component of the latter form of demand is, of course, high."<sup>62</sup> The expansion of this sector, together with high armament expenditures, had a negative effect

on the development of the independent productive capabilities of the country.

Finally, agricultural and land reform policies led to grave setbacks for Iran's development.<sup>63</sup> New land distribution policies brought about changes in property relations in the countryside and the introduction of capitalist market relations. Land reform, moreover, failed to provide sufficient food production for the country and thus increased the need to import food. In 1977, Iran spent \$2.6 billion on food imports. Lastly, with the change of class relations in Iran's rural areas and the increasing activities of agribusiness, agricultural employment fell. Already, unemployment in rural areas was about 40 percent. Consequently, rural laborers migrated to the cities for employment. Rural-urban migration, in turn, increased urban unemployment.

Overall, the spread of capitalist relations in the country-side did not link agriculture to the industrial and service sectors. Such a link is essential to autonomous national development--as is articulated in the advanced capitalist countries. Iran's integration into the world capitalist market led to the development of a "dual economy"<sup>64</sup> in which two sectors (industry and service) became heavily subjugated to imperialist penetration and profits while the agricultural sector was allowed to

with. Such a pattern of uneven development had a tremendous impact on the development of the labor force, and particularly on women's participation in the labor market.

#### 4. Labor Force: Employed and Unemployed

##### Population by Sex

A major component of any industrializing country is the changing of its working population. In Iran, industrialization was accompanied by the spread of capitalist relations which had major implications on labor force participation. Marx's notion that capitalist development separates workers from their means of subsistence meant that a majority of Iranian workers became in one form or another wage earners.<sup>65</sup> His analysis of changes in the labor force brought about by capitalist production also has direct relevance to Iran. Industrialization created "new branches of production" and "new fields of labour."<sup>66</sup> It encouraged the entry of large numbers of unemployed workers--particularly women and rural laborers--into the market while at the same time creating new divisions of labor through technology and differential patterns of employment and unemployment.<sup>67</sup> Changes in labor force participation and, in particular, differences in the way women

and men were absorbed into Iran's industrializing economy, reflected the process of capitalist development.

In Iran, during the period under study, the increasing rate of capital formation and industrial production, as well as the relative decline in agricultural productivity, were all parallel to the expansion of the labor market. The labor force grew significantly, as a percentage of the total population and urban residents. According to census statistics, in 1956 six million residents, ten years of age and over, were reported as economically active, compared to seven and a half million in 1966 and almost ten million in 1976 (Table 8). The absolute number of male workers increased from 5,491 million in 1956 to 6,584 million in 1966 and to 8,288 million in 1976. In contrast, the absolute number of female workers rose from 576,000 in 1956 to 999,000 in 1966 to 1,452 million in 1976.

With the expansion of the labor market, there was a decline in the number of male laborers as a percentage of the working male population as a whole. In 1956, male workers accounted for 83 percent of the total working male population, whereas in 1966 they accounted for 77 percent, and in 1976 for 70 percent. In contrast, there was an increase in the number of female workers as percentage of the total working female population. In 1956, 9.2 percent of all working age women were

participants in the labor force, whereas in 1966 this figure rose to 12 percent, and in 1976 to 13 percent (Table 9). Hence, in the period of 1956-76, the labor market experienced a sharp rise in the labor force participation of both women and men. However, the percentage of male laborers declined whereas that of the female working population rose. Despite this growth, the disparity between the labor force participation of women and men remained wide, and the wage labor force continued to be predominantly male.

With slight variation, this pattern prevailed in urban Iran. During the period under study, the urban labor force composed of the population ten years of age and over grew from 1,893 million (45.2 percent of the urban population) in 1956 to 2,768 million in 1966 (41 percent of the urban population) and to 4,294 million (37.6 percent of the urban population) in 1976 (Table 10). The expanding urban labor force included an increase in the absolute number of both female and male workers. As my own calculations show, there was a high growth in the labor force participation of both men and women in urban areas. The total urban labor force grew from 46 percent in 1956-66 to 55 percent in 1966-76 (Table 11). The absolute number of male laborers increased from 1,705 million in 1956 to 2,449

million in 1966, and almost to a three-fold expansion of 3,807 in 1976. In comparison, the absolute number of urban female workers rose from 187,000 in 1956 to 300,000 in 1966 to almost 500,000 in 1976 (Table 10).

However, in contrast to the pattern predominant in the total country, the urban labor force witnessed a dramatic increase in the number of male workers as a percentage of the urban male population with the 1956-66 growth of 43 percent jumping to 55 percent in 1966-76 (Table 11). At the same time, however, there was a decrease in urban female workers as a percentage of the urban female population. Thus, in 1956 the labor force participation of urban male workers accounted for 78.5 percent of the urban male population and that of women for 9.3 percent of all urban female population. In 1966, the corresponding figures were 69.2 percent for men and 9.9 percent for women, while in 1976 it was 63.2 percent for men but 9 percent for women (Table 10). In terms of growth rates, the disparity is even sharper as the urban female labor force contracted from 70 percent in 1956-66 to 53 percent in 1966-76 (Table 11). Thus, while the period of 1956-76 witnessed a decrease in the participation of women in the urban labor market as participation of total female population, it also experienced a rise in the participation of



men in the urban labor market as a percentage of the total male population.

Such trends corresponded to the percent share of the urban labor force participation of men and women to the total urban labor force. In 1956, men accounted for 90 percent of the labor force; in 1966 their share fell to 88.5 percent, while in 1976 it rose slightly to 88.7 percent. By comparison, women's labor force participation accounted for 9.8 percent of the labor force in 1956; it increased to 11.5 percent in 1966 and remained almost constant (11.3 percent) in 1976 (Table 10). In short, then, while the growth rate of the urban male labor force was higher over the decades, the share of the urban female labor force in the total urban labor force grew more quickly than that of men. On the whole, in the two decades of change, despite the expansion of the labor force and the high increase in participation of both women and men, a wide gap remained in the active labor force of women as compared with men.

These changes in the structure of the labor force contrast sharply with the labor force that existed at the turn of the century. In the early twentieth century, the labor force was not only small but almost exclusively male-dominated. By 1976, it had been markedly altered by the rapid entry of women into particular

sectors of paid production. The new division of labor by sex will be discussed in the next chapter.

Although capitalist industrialization creates a demand for particular forms of labor, as Marx pointed out, "the absolute increase of capital is accompanied by no corresponding rise in the general demand for labor."<sup>68</sup> Industrial growth, he wrote, is "constantly interrupted by the technical progress that at one time virtually supplies the place of new workmen, at another, actually displaces old ones."<sup>69</sup> Thus, implicit in capitalist development is not only increasing employment but increasing unemployment<sup>70</sup>--a contradiction borne out by employment statistics for Iran during its period of economic expansion.

Table 12 illustrates the relationship of unemployment and employment. In 1956, of the total population of working age, almost 3 percent were unemployed. Corresponding figures show an increase in unemployment to 9.6 percent in 1966 and 9.7 percent in 1976.<sup>71</sup> The same data shows that the relationship of unemployed men to the total economically active population went up from 2.6 percent in 1956 to 8.4 percent in 1966, but decreased to 7.1 percent in 1976. By contrast, similar figures for women's unemployment indicate a steady increase from .03 percent in 1956 to 1.2 percent in 1966 and to 2.5 percent in 1976. In short, then,

despite the higher rate of male unemployment, that of female unemployment tended to grow at a higher rate over the twenty-year period.

In addition, this data also indicates that the percentage of unemployed women as compared to economically active women increased at a much higher rate than that of men. In 1956, unemployment in relation to the economically active male population increased from 2.3 percent to 9.7 percent in 1966, but slightly decreased to 8.4 percent in 1976. Corresponding figures, however, show a much higher growth rate of unemployment for women. Compared to the total of economically active women, female unemployment jumped from .4 percent in 1956 to 9 percent in 1966 to 17 percent in 1976. Hence, as unemployment grew steadily, the gap between unemployment by sex grew too. Put differently, as unemployment grew higher, more women than men became rejected by the market. This indicated that despite their absorption into paid production, women continued to remain in a disadvantageous position in the labor market.

In urban areas, unemployment was much less than in the country as a whole. As Table 12 indicates, the pattern of urban unemployment remained somewhat stable during the 1956-76 period. Whereas unemployment

accounted for 4.5 percent of the economically active population in 1956, it increased to 5.7 percent in 1966, but slightly decreased to 4.5 percent in 1976. The pattern of stability in urban unemployment and its slight decrease in 1976 points to the greater capacity of the urban economy--and particularly, the labor intensive service sector--to absorb the labor power of both urban residents and rural migrants displaced by the creation of capitalist economy in the countryside.

Despite the lower level of urban unemployment, women were less often employed by the market than men. As a percentage of the economically active population, male unemployment went down whereas that of women increased. In 1956, as a percentage of the economically active population, male unemployment went up from 4.9 percent to 5.3 percent in 1966, but declined to 3.8 percent in 1976. By contrast, similar figures for women indicate a steady increase from .07 percent in 1956 to .4 percent in 1966 to .7 percent in 1976 (Table 12). It can be suggested that the recruitment of men by the army and SAVAK accounted for their higher absorption into the labor market.<sup>72</sup>

Moreover, the statistics indicate that female unemployment as a percentage of the economically active population not only increased, but also continued to

increase as a percentage of the economically active population. Thus, female unemployment in relation to economically active women jumped from .7 percent in 1956 to 3.7 percent in 1966 to 6.1 percent in 1976. By contrast, unemployed men as a percentage of the economically active male population increased from 4.9 percent in 1956 to 6 percent in 1966, but decreased to 4.2 percent in 1976. In this way, while unemployment grew at a slower rate in urban areas than in the whole country, the gap between male and female unemployment remained the same. Such a pattern not only indicates the greater rejection of women (even more so than statistically calculated) than men by the capitalist marketplace, but underscores their status as a reserve army of labor.

What factors explain the growing rate of female unemployment despite the expansion of the labor market and the high growth rate of the economy? Neoclassical economists such as Solow and Meade argue that unemployment arises when the growth rate of the population exceeds the ability of the market to provide work opportunities.<sup>73</sup> Between 1956-1976, Iran's total urban population grew tremendously, indeed, at a rate far exceeding the growth rate of capital accumulation. Since the rise in unemployment paralleled a

corresponding increase in population, neoclassical economists would argue, the economy was unable to create enough jobs for the growing population. Despite the plausibility of this argument, other factors must be taken into account. In particular, one must consider whether the creation of a growing, permanent reserve of unemployed was not linked to the very process of capitalist industrialization.

In Chapter XXV of Capital,<sup>74</sup> Marx discussed the relationship of the population "problem" to unemployment. For him, the unemployed portion of the population comprised a reserve army of labor which served to maintain competition in the labor market and the low wages necessary to insure rapid accumulation. Hence, from the capitalist's point of view, unemployment is desirable. At some point, however, the number of unemployed exceeds the demands of accumulation, posing a political threat or becoming an unprofitable tax burden. At this point, capitalism creates a new division of labor enlisting women and unskilled workers in the ranks of cheap labor relative to men and skilled workers. Marx wrote,

. . . the development of the capitalist mode of production and of the productive power of labour--at once the cause and effect of accumulation--enables the capitalist . . . to set in action more labor by greater exploitation (extensive or intensive) of each individual's labour-power . . . the capitalist buys with the same capital a greater mass of labour-power, as he progressively replaces

skilled labourers by less skilled, mature labour-power by immature, male by female, that of adults by that of young persons or children.<sup>75</sup>

Thus, Marx pointed to a displacement of labor power under capitalism. As capitalists set more machinery to provide more commodities with the same or less labor power, changes are effected not only in the composition of the labor force but in the creation of a new hierarchy based on skills reflecting age and sex differences. (This point will be elaborated in the following chapter). Specifically, relations of domination and subordination are reconstituted according to skill, age and sex.

On this basis, then, it can be suggested that with the growth of capital accumulation in Iran, women experienced a contradictory position in the labor market. Women formed a larger proportion of the unemployed surplus population than men in the reserve army of labor. When women were employed in the market, it was as cheaper laborers than men selling their labor power to the owners of the means of production. Thus, labor market competition was greater among women than men, a situation which tended to maintain lower wages for women and to reduce their bargaining position relative to men.

At this point, a further consideration of the relationship of employment/unemployment to the nature of capitalist production is in order.<sup>76</sup> In Iran, the existence of an economy heavily oriented toward capital-intensive and import-substitution industries retarded the ability of the market to absorb the supply of available labor. Hence, capital-intensive economic growth created fewer jobs than would have been the case had growth taken place in labor-intensive industry. At the same time, the new service sector jobs did erode unemployment--as evidenced by the 3 percent employed by the army and SAVAK.<sup>77</sup> On this basis, then, it can be argued that if the population growth rate is higher than the growth rate of capital accumulation in capital-intensive industry, unemployment will not be reduced; rather, it will increase. Unemployment in Iran in the period of 1956-76 attests to the validity of this concept.

During the period of 1956-76, then, the development of the labor force came as a response not only to internal changes in the structure of production, but to the impact of world capitalism on those changes. Iran's capitalist development created a new social force of wage-earners. At the same time, it led to a growing population of the unemployed. Women thus



found themselves in a contradictory position in the labor force: on the one hand, they had become part of the labor force as cheap laborers relative to men, and on the other, they formed the bulk of labor's reserve army, particularly in urban areas.

### C. Urbanization

The rapid development of urban centers is another significant phenomenon of a fast-industrializing country. Since development in Iran was accompanied by the spread of capitalist social relations, as major centers of capitalist production, cities became the loci of work for the dislocated rural population and the newly crystallizing labor force. An important question to be examined, therefore, is what impact changes in the structure of production had on demographic makeup and urbanization. To do this, I shall first deal with the demographic transition in Iran--the large-scale internal migration from rural to urban areas. I will then discuss the concentration of capital in cities, its relationship to urban expansion, and the creation of employment opportunities for town residents as well as displaced migrant workers--both men and women.

In the period following the reinstatement of the Shah in 1953, Iran experienced tremendous rural-urban

migration (Table 13). Iran's population was almost 18 million in 1956. A decade later, the population had reached 25 million, and by 1976, it had further increased to 33 million. Thus, in the period of 1956-76, Iran's population grew by 32 percent and between 1966-76 by 34 percent. Despite high population growth in the country as a whole, urban population growth was much higher than in rural areas. In 1956, the urban population was almost 6 million; it rose to 9 million in 1966 and 15 million in 1976. Corresponding figures for rural areas were 13 million, 15 million, and 17 million respectively. In the period of 1956-66, urban population growth was 64 percent and in 1966-76, 61 percent. By contrast, rural population growth was 17 percent in 1956-66 and 16 percent in 1966-76 (Table 14).

The tremendous growth of the urban compared to rural population not only indicates a relatively higher growth rate of the urban population, but also reflects a heavy rural-urban migration. In addition, despite governmental restrictions, economic pressures pushed a large portion of the nomadic population (2 million, or 6 percent of the total population in 1976) toward the towns and cities.<sup>78</sup> Commenting on Iran's migration, the ILO reported that this was "a normal trend" in a

rapidly growing and industrializing country. However, it was "perhaps more rapid than was economically necessary and socially desirable."<sup>79</sup>

What factors explain the rural-urban migration in Iran? First and foremost, the land reform programs of the White Revolution and rapid capitalist development must be held accountable for the displacement of much of the rural population and its migration to cities. The consequences of land reform for the capitalist transformation of the countryside have already been discussed. It suffices here to note the impact of the economic failings of the reform program on rural-urban migration. The relative decrease in rural as compared to urban income is a case in point. According to the ILO report, the ratio of urban-rural income per head "increased from 4.6:1 in 1959 to 5.1:1 in 1969."<sup>80</sup> The ILO observed that "the accuracy of these figures may be questioned but the reality of the gap and the direction of the move are not widely disputed."<sup>81</sup> Hence, the relative decrease in rural income coupled with the increase in urban employment opportunities provided an impetus for migration to cities.

Displacement of agricultural workers was another factor in the rural exodus. In part, as discussed earlier, this was due to the class transformation of

the countryside and the relative decrease in agricultural productivity and rural employment. The policies of farm and agri-business companies also contributed to the displacement of agricultural workers. The Hudson Report dealt with the failure of these policies in the agricultural sector.<sup>82</sup> In addition, the ILO reported the impact of these policies on migration. It pointed out that "although modern agricultural enterprises do not at present cultivate more than 111,000 hectares (270,000 acres), the establishment of those enterprises over the last few years may have accelerated rural migration. On the average, farm and agri-business companies employ only between 40 and 50 percent of the economically active population of the areas they cover. Those already in operation may have caused [migration] . . . to the towns."<sup>83</sup>

Capitalism not only displaces agricultural populations, but it also concentrates capital in cities.

By so doing, it creates the material conditions for urban expansion and development of employment opportunities in non-agricultural sectors. From 1956-76, urban development in Iran accelerated tremendously. Tehran became the largest political, administrative and cultural center of the country. It also became the locus of the industrial and service sectors of the new capitalist economy. By the mid-1970's, Tehran's industrial capacity

accounted for 51 percent of all manufactured goods (i.e., shoes, automobiles, plastics, textiles, rubber, and electronics, etc.).<sup>84</sup>

The kind of expansion which took place in Tehran was reproduced in most of Iran's major cities which, increasingly, became productive centers as well. These cities included Isfahan (steel industry, petrochemical and refining installations, and military establishments), Shiraz (army and air force bases and electronics productions), Abadan and Ahvaz (centers of the huge oil industry), and Tabriz (engineering center). Consequently, the production of heavy machinery and intermediate commodities in the cities provided an opportunity for the expansion of the labor force. Capital investments in cities increased the number of jobs in capital-intensive industry and in the vast service sector which created new employment not only for the growing urban population, but also for rural migrants. Nevertheless, a higher rate of population growth and migration relative to capital's ability to absorb it formed a pool of surplus labor. This was reflected in urban unemployment and increasing unemployment in the countryside. The latent pool of unemployed laborers in the countryside along with the urban unemployed reduced the bargaining power of employed workers in the cities. In the following

chapter, I will discuss the role of women in that process.

In sum, then, the development of Iran's labor force, particularly as it involved women, was not only related to internal changes in the structure of production, but also to the impact of the world capitalist market on those changes. The creation of the labor force was, thus, one component of Iran's capitalist industrialization. Through the import of capital-intensive industries, the creation of a market for foreign commodities, and the export of oil and raw materials, Iran became increasingly integrated into the world capitalist market. At the same time, in order to maintain control over Iran's raw materials and markets, Americans, Western Europeans, and the Japanese extended considerable economic and military support to the Shah's regime. In addition, with the Shah's support, they invested heavily in capital-intensive industries and decisively influenced the development of an import-substitution economy. In this way, Iran became ever more dependent on the world capitalist market since the impetus for accumulation lay outside the country.

Iran's capitalist development was also a result of internal forces (the state represented by the Shah and his bourgeoisie allies), which in turn were influenced by external ones. Hence, in promoting capitalism and

and consolidating his power, the Shah relied not only on state security organs like the infamous and foreign-trained SAVAK, but also on a politics of repression which brutalized the democratic forces within Iranian society.<sup>85</sup> Nowhere is the link between capitalist development and repression more clearly demonstrated than in the dual thrust of the White Revolution which sought both to expand the means of production along capitalist lines and repress dissidents.

Capitalist industrialization in Iran thus promoted high levels of growth through oil revenues. It led to investment, capital formation, and increased output. Industry and services grew at the expense of agricultural productivity while a capital-intensive and import-substitution approach to industrialization retarded the development of a labor-intensive economy. Urban centers became loci of capital accumulation, and a new wage-earning labor force of city dwellers and displaced agricultural workers came into being, transformed by the same forces that swept Iran's economy and society. The new labor market was marked by a tremendous disparity in the labor force participation of women and men. Women entered the market, but as cheap laborers. At the same time, they formed the backbone of the reserve army of labor created by capitalism from the rising

numbers of Iran's unemployed workers. Thus, the very nature of capitalism and its system of exploitation placed women in a contradictory position--they were both the most exploited workers of the economy and its reserve army of labor maintaining competition among "have-nots" of Iran's expanding cities. The impact of capitalist development on the relations of production for women both in the marketplace and in the household will be the subject of the following chapter.



## NOTES

- <sup>1</sup>Abol-Hassan Banisadr and Paule Vielle, "Iran and the Multi-nationals," in Iran Erupts, ed. Ali-Reza Nobari (Stanford: Iran-American Documentation Group, Stanford University, 1978).
- <sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 24.      <sup>3</sup>Ibid., p. 25.
- <sup>4</sup>Fred Halliday, Iran: Dictatorship and Development (New York: Penguin Books, 1979), p. 45.
- <sup>5</sup>Ibid., p. 139.      <sup>6</sup>Ibid., p. 158.
- <sup>7</sup>Amin Saikal, The Rise and Fall of the Shah (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), p. 20.
- <sup>8</sup>Marx, Capital.
- <sup>9</sup>Saikal, The Rise.
- <sup>10</sup>Nirumand, Iran, p. 135.
- <sup>11</sup>Ibid., p. 147 and the entire book.
- <sup>12</sup>Dankwart A. Rustow and John F. Mugno, OPEC Success and Prospects (New York: New York University Press, 1976), p. 32.
- <sup>13</sup>Nikki R. Keddie, Roots of Revolution (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1981), p. 178. Also see Joe Stork, Middle East Oil and the Energy Crisis (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1975), pp. 54-55.
- <sup>14</sup>Charles Issawi, "The Economy: An Assessment of Performance," in Iran Faces Seventies ed. E. Yar-Shater (New York: Praeger, 1971), pp. 48-50; and Robert Looney, A Developmental Strategy for Iran Through the 1980's (New York: Praeger, 1977), p. 58.
- <sup>15</sup>Ibid.      <sup>16</sup>Ibid., p. 56.
- <sup>17</sup>Employment and Income Policies for Iran (Geneva: International Labor Office, 1973), p. 50.

18. Harry Magdoff, The Age of Imperialism (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1956, 1966, 1968, 1969), p. 115; in addition, see V. I. Lenin Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism (New York: International Publishers, 1939 and 1969; originally published 1917); J. A. Hobson, Imperialism (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1902, reprint ed., 1965); Paul Baran, The Political Economy of Growth (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1965); and various selections in Studies in the Theory of Imperialism, ed. Roger Owen and Bob Sutcliffe (London: Longman, 1972), and Bill Warren "The Myth of Underdevelopment," New Left Review 81 (September-October 1973): 3-45.
19. Saikal, The Rise, p. 52.
20. Robert Looney, Income Distribution Policies and Economic Growth in Semi-Industrialized Countries: A Comparative Study of Iran, Mexico, Brazil and South Korea (New York: Praeger, 1975), p. 152.
21. The figure for the 1960's is from U.S. International Commerce Overseas Business Reports (Washington, D.C.: Department of Commerce, May 1966), p. 10. The figure for 1975 comes from U.S. International Commerce Overseas Business Reports (Washington, D.C.: Department of Commerce, October 1977), p. 6. For the 1976 figure, consult the previous source as well as U.S. International Commerce Overseas Business Reports (Washington, D.C.: Department of Commerce, October 1978), p. 7. For the 1977 figure, see U.S. International Commerce Overseas Business Reports (Washington, D.C.: Department of Commerce, September 1978), p. 7. Other studies on this subject include the works of Richard Falk, "Iran and," p. 43; and Halliday, Iran, p. 255.
22. Looney, A Developmental Strategy, p. 34.
23. M. S. Ivonof, Tarikh-e Novin-e Iran [The Contemporary History of Iran], trans. H. Tizani and H. n.p., n.d.), p. 247. Also see U.S. International Commerce, 1977, p. 3 and Halliday, Iran, pp. 255-256. This author does not discuss French investments in Iran. According to various reports from Iran, the French had large contracts with Iran for investments in the Peugeot automobile factory in the city of Mashad, Renault in Tehran, contracts for building the Tehran subway system, and other contracts for building nuclear power plants in Iran.
24. Magdoff, The Age. 25. Nirumand, Iran.

- 26 Saikal, The Rise, pp. 53-55, and Ivanoff, Tarikh-e [The Contemporary], p. 187.
- 27 Saikal, The Rise, p. 57.
- 28 Ivanof, Tarikh-e [The Contemporary]; Saikal, The Rise, p. 318 and note 33; and John K. Cooley, "U.S. Faces Sticky Question of Backing the Shah of Iran," Christian Science Monitor, November 1978, p. 10.
- 29 Referring to Section 3 of this treaty, President Carter expressed America's interest in Iran by announcing that "he would use force, if necessary, to repel an assault on the Persian Gulf region." See Anthony Parisi, "Hormoz: America's Economic Interest," The New York Times, 27 January 1980.
- 30 Alvin Contrell and Robert Hanks, "The Future Role of Iran," in The U.S. Role In a Changing World Political Economy: Major Issues for the 96th Congress (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979), p. 547.
- 31 J. C. Hurewitz, "The Persian Gulf: After Iran's Revolution" Headline Series 244 (April 1979), p. 45; and Falk "Iran and," p. 45.
- 32 State Department (Habib) testimony before House Subcommittee, Department of State Bulletin (Washington, D.C.: Department of State, 11 October 1976), p. 448.
- 33 Department of Defense, Security Assistance Agency, Foreign Military Sales and Military Assistance Facts (Washington, D.C.: Data Management Division, Comptroller, DSAA, December 1980), pp. 1-2; U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants and Assistance from International Organizations (Washington, D.C.: The Agency for International Development, July 1945-September 1977), p. 17; and Falk, "Iran and," p. 46.
- 34 U.S. Military Sales to Iran, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Yearbook of World Armaments and Disarmaments, 1976-77 (New York: Humanities Press, 1977), pp. 16, 21, and 27.
- 35 Saikal, The Rise, p. 157; and Halliday, Iran, p. 94.
- 36 In Iran under the Shah, especially since the early 1960's, the bourgeoisie was not a uniform and totally independent force. Its activities and relations to the power structure

of the state varied in accordance to the position it occupied vertically in the bourgeois class as a whole. For a study of the various layers of this class and their interrelationships, see B. Jazani, Capitalism and Iran: The Socio-Economic Analysis of a Dependent Capitalist State trans. the Iran Committee (London: The Iran Committee, 1973); An Introduction to the Contemporary History of Iran trans. the Iran Committee (London: The Iran Committee, n.d.); Vagay-e Si Saleh-e dar Iran [The Events of Thirty Years in Iran] (Tehran: n.p., n.d.); Tarikh-e Si Saleh-e Iran [The History of Thirty Years in Iran] (Tehran: n.p., n.d.); Robert Graham, Iran: The Illusion of Power (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979); and Bill, The Politics of Iran. On the concept of the state as it applies to Iran, see Halliday, Iran, pp. 20-63.

<sup>37</sup> Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi, Mission.

<sup>38</sup> Cottam, Nationalism.

<sup>39</sup> Mohammed Reza Sodagar, Roshd-e Ravabet-e Sarmayeh-dari dar Iran, Marhaleh-e Entegali 1304-1340 [The Growth of Capitalist Relations in Iran, Transformation Process, 1925-1961] (Tehran: The Institute for Social and Economic Research, Pazand, Ofsat-e Golshan Publishers, n.d.).

<sup>40</sup> Nirumand, Iran. <sup>41</sup> Ibid., p. 99.

<sup>42</sup> Saikal, The Rise, p. 35.

<sup>43</sup> Farhad Daftari, "The Balance of Payments Deficit and the Problem of Inflation in Iran, 1955-1962," Iranian Studies I:1 (Winter 1973), pp. 2-25; Hafez Farmayan, "Politics During Sixties: A Historical Analysis," in Iran Faces Seventies, ed. Ehsan Yar-Shater (New York: Praeger, 1971), p. 88.

<sup>44</sup> Saikal, The Rise, p. 75. <sup>45</sup> Ibid.

<sup>46</sup> Halliday, Iran. <sup>47</sup> Bill, The Politics of Iran.

<sup>48</sup> Farhad Khamisi, "Land Reform in Iran," Monthly Review XXI:2 (June 1969).

<sup>49</sup> R. Sanghvi, et al., eds., The Revolution.

<sup>50</sup> Bill, The Politics of Iran, and Halliday, Iran, p. 27.

63. Khamssi, "Land Reform"; Nikki Keddie, "Stratification, Social Control and Capitalism in Iranian Villages: Before and After Reform," in Rural Politics and Social Change in the Middle East, ed. Richard Antoun and I. Harik (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1972); Ehsan Tabari, "Reaction or Revolutionary Change in Iran," in Political and Social Thought in the Contemporary Middle East ed. Kemal Karpat (New York: Praeger, 1968); Doreen Warriner, Land Reform in Principle and Practice (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969); Jahangir Amuzegar and M. Ali Fekrat, Iran: Economic Development Under Dualistic Conditions (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1971); Ann Lambton, Landlord and Peasant in Persia (London: Oxford University Press, 1953); The Persian Land Reform: 1962-1966 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969); and "Some Reflections on the Question of Rural Development: Land Reform in Iran," Economic Research III:9 and 10 (August 1965).

64. Amuzegar and Fekrat, Iran.

65. Marx, Capital, p. 578. 66. Ibid., p. 445.

67. Ibid., p. 484. 68. Ibid., p. 639. 69. Ibid., p. 454.

70. Ibid. Marx, hence, points out that the workers are "continually both repelled and attracted, hustled from pillar to post, while, at the same time, constant changes take place in the sex, age, and skill of the levies."

71. It should be noted that unemployment data is much under-numerated in Iran. This data does not include invisible unemployment. Unemployment registration was ill-practiced. Data collectors were not always efficient. In addition, many people failed to report their employment status due to their resistance to publicize private information or their antagonism against stage officials. Moreover, in their attempt to avoid governmental restraints, a large number of employers did not provide accurate information, especially on their hourly or seasonal workers. Therefore, because of underenumeration, we must assume a higher rate of unemployment than what actually appeared in the data.

72. There are no precise figures for the number of men employed by the army and SAVAK. Scattered sources, however, estimate the employment of 400,000 to 500,000 men by the military, and a figure of roughly 50,000-60,000 full-time male employees (or about 3 percent of the employed) as well as 3,000,000 part-time male informers for SAVAK. For relevant

sources, see Eric Rouleau, "The Shah's Dreams of Glory," in Iran Erupts; Lynne Shivers, "Inside the Iranian Revolution," in Tell the American People: Perspectives on the Iranian Revolution, ed. David Albert (Philadelphia: Movement for a New Society, 1980), p. 59; and Schapour Rava-sani, Iran (Stuttgart: Alektor-Verland, 1978), Ch. IV.

- 73 J. E. Meade, A Neo-Classical Theory of Economic Growth (London: Unwin U. Books, 1968); Robert M. Solow, Growth Theory (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970); and Paul Samuelson, Economics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1980).
- 74 Marx, Capital. In his elaboration of capitalism and its relationship to employment and unemployment, Marx discussed the population problem in general and the population of the employed and the reserve army of labor. For him, the unemployed portion of the population comprised the reserve army of labor, characterized by two kinds of unemployed labor: a surplus population (or the industrial reserve army created by capitalist development itself) and an excess population (created by a higher growth rate of population than the growth rate of capital). The former serves to maintain competition in the labor market, a necessity for low wages to insure rapid accumulation. Hence, a proportion of unemployed workers are desired. At some point, however, the number of unemployed exceeds those desirable for accumulation, in that it may become a political threat or a tax burden which may diminish investments and hence, drain profits. In this connection, it would be interesting to investigate the employment positions of most of the city demonstrators in Iran during the contemporary revolution which led to the downfall of the Shah. Such a study, however, has yet to be accomplished.
- 75 Ibid., pps. 635 and 461. This passage refers to the notion of surplus population.
- 76 Ibid., Ch. XXV. Here a useful point may be a brief comparison of several approaches to the issue of economic growth in order to demonstrate the relevance of the Marxist perspective to the case of Iran. Neoclassical economic theorists such as J. E. Meade see economic growth in terms of an increase in capital stock, growth of the labor force, and more output. For example, Meade states that an economy can grow for three reasons: because "net savings are made out of current income so that the stock of capital instruments of production is growing; . . . because the working population is growing; and . . . because technical progress allows more and more output to be produced by a given amount of resources as time passes." See Meade, A Neo-Classical Theory, p. 1.

51. Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi, Mission.
52. Ashraf, "Historical Obstacles," p. 313.
53. Halliday, Iran, p. 51, and Graham, Iran, pp. 47-49.
54. Robert Looney, The Economic Development of Iran: A Recent Survey With Projections 1981 (New York: Praeger, 1973), p. 20.
55. For a more detailed discussion of this point, see Halliday, Iran, pp. 151-152.
56. For 1950-70 figures, see Rustow and Mugno, OPEC Success, p. 131. The 1974 figure is based on Annual Report and Balance Sheet 1353, p. 14. The 1973-77 figures are from the aforementioned source as well as Annual Report and Balance Sheet 2534, p. 10 and U.S. Department of Commerce, 1977, p. 6.
57. Looney, The Economic Development, pp. 16-18.
58. Capital formation in simple terms is investment by another name. In essence, capital formation is the amount of investment that is added to the old capital stock. The latter is the sum total investment of the past. Over a period of time, capital stock (K) produces GNP which, in turn, generates more consumption (C) and investment (I). The formula for this conversion is:
- $$K \longrightarrow \text{GNP} \begin{cases} \nearrow C \\ \searrow I \end{cases} .$$
59. Generally speaking, the following elements are included in the calculation of capital accumulation: growth rate of capital (domestic capital formation); growth rate of GNP (national income); employment/unemployment; investment quota (investment share, or relation or investment to national income); wage share (can be based on the consumer price index); profit share; growth rate of consumption; and import and export. This discussion is based on a lecture by Professor Willi Semmler, Economics Department, The New School for Social Research, 1980. It should be noted that due to the limited scope of this study, I deal with capital accumulation in this study in terms of capital formation, GNP, and employment/unemployment.
60. Annual Report and Balance Sheet, pp. 6-8.
61. Langer, "Iran." 62. Halliday, Iran, p. 158.

Similarly, post-Keynesian theorists such as N. Kaldor stress the same characteristics for economic development. For instance, Kaldor contends that economic development is due to "the growth of population, the progress of technology (resulting in a rise of productivity per man), and the accumulation of capital. . ." See Nicholas Kaldor, Essays on Economic Stability and Growth (London: Gerald Duckworth and Company, Ltd., 1964), p. 232.

While both Meade and Kaldor argue for similar determinants of economic growth, they differ on the following issue: Meade sees the cause of growth in three factors, whereas Kaldor views growth in terms of technical progress which is incorporated in capital accumulation. In addition, both authors see the growth of population as indications of economic growth noting that a higher growth of population than economy may lead to the occurrence of unemployed population.

The Marxist argument is somewhat different. Marx analyzed accumulation in terms of the nature of the economy as being capital-or-labor intensive. Hence, he recognized the value of labor power as well as the composition of capital. Marx stressed that if an economy is capital intensive, it will cause unemployment. In the case of Iran, with the import of capital and technology, especially in the oil sector, as well as the import of skilled labor, much unemployment was created. The high level of unemployment in Iran can, therefore, be explained not only in terms of the level of growth vis-à-vis the level of population growth, but also because of the capital intensive and import-substitutive nature of its development.

<sup>77</sup> See note 72 of this chapter.

<sup>78</sup> Halliday, Iran, pp. 11-12.

<sup>79</sup> Employment and Income Policies, p. 24.

<sup>80</sup> Ibid., p. 25. <sup>81</sup> Ibid.

<sup>82</sup> Langer, "Iran," p. 13.

<sup>83</sup> Employment and Income Policies, p. 25.

<sup>84</sup> As cited in Graham, Iran, p. 24.

<sup>85</sup> Sodagar, Roshd-e [The Growth].



## CHAPTER IV

### DIVISION OF LABOR AND GENDER ROLES IN URBAN AREAS: 1956-1976

The previous chapter emphasized the relationship of the development of Iran's labor force, particularly that of women, to internal changes in the structure of production and to the impact of the world capitalist market on those changes. It considered women's contradictory position in the labor force. On the one hand, women became part of the labor force as cheap laborers relative to men, and on the other hand they formed the bulk of the reserve army of the labor force, especially in urban areas. More concretely, the subordinated position of women in the labor force corresponded to changes in the division of labor and their role in the household. The new division of labor was based on sex, class, marital status, age, and ideology. Changes in the household contributed greatly to women's subordination in both production and reproduction.

These changes are not addressed in the available literature in Farsi and English.<sup>1</sup> Indeed, these works have failed to offer a critical analysis of capitalist development in Iran and of the links between women's

subordinated position in the division of labor, production, and reproduction. The literature on the changing position of Iranian women since the 1950's refers to their increasing participation in the economy.<sup>2</sup> These studies are mainly statistical and point to statistical differentials in the labor force participation of women from the 1950's to the 1970's. Using a similar approach, other works appraise the state and economy which under the Shah's "modernization" program had generously "opened doors" to the "entrance" of women into the society.<sup>3</sup> In general, these studies are descriptive and a-theoretical.<sup>4</sup> They lack analyses of changes in the sexual division of labor and production within the context of capitalist development in Iran. In this way, the specific subordination of various classes of women specific to Iranian development remained outside the scope of these works.

Not only were these studies of labor force participation unanalytical, but like the literature on early twentieth century Iran, they overlooked the importance of the woman's role in household activities--their focal point of subordination. Hence, women's contribution to the production and reproduction of the labor force was neglected. In the same fashion, the separation of women from the means of production at home, their increasing performance of the function of consumption

of capitalist products and their household activities remained uninvestigated.

Three interrelated questions arise from the above points. First, what changes have occurred in the work position of various classes of urban women in and outside the home with the growth of capitalism in Iran? Second, what conditions caused changes in the division of labor? Third, what were the consequences of changes in the division of labor for the subordination of women both at home and in the market? In short, what form did the dual oppression of women by class and sex take as a result of changes in the division of labor in the growing capitalist development in Iran? The purpose of this chapter is to study changes in the participation of Iranian women in production and reproduction, especially in urban areas from 1956 to 1976. I will argue that the new form of subordination of women under Iran's capitalist development was related to changes in the division of labor by sex, class, marital status, life cycle and ideology, and by their role in the reproduction of the labor force.

In the following, I will briefly discuss the subordination of women in terms of their position in the division of labor, production and reproduction. I will investigate the impact of certain capitalist

forces (e.g., separation of producers from their means of production, separation of household production from consumption, class and income inequalities, etc.) on women's decisions to move to the sphere of paid production. I will also study the participation of men and women in the sphere of capitalist production in the country as well as in the urban areas from 1956 to 1976. This will include an analysis of division of labor by class, gender, marital status, life cycle and ideology. Later, I will discuss the sex-segregated labor market and its development within the framework of capitalist development in Iran. Throughout these discussions, the subordination of women by class and gender will be linked to their role in reproduction and capitalist development in Iran.

#### A. The Household and Division of Labor

As indicated in the previous chapter, throughout the 1950's but especially during the following decade, rapid economic growth in Iran was accompanied by a fundamental change in the structure of the economy and the labor market.<sup>5</sup> Despite the contradictory position of women in the labor force, economic growth had a positive effect on the absorption of women into the work force. Therefore, what were the concrete

conditions under which women were freed from some household labor and became available for work outside the home? To deal with this question, in this section I will focus on changes within the household and their impact on labor force participation of women in the market. Factors such as consumption, the wage rate and inflation will also be examined as additional forces affecting women's work in paid production.

The absorption of women into the economy paralleled demands for their labor and official proclamations for elevation of their status.<sup>6</sup> This was illustrated by the Shah in that "to meet part of this demand [for labor], greater use must be made of the enormous existing pool of women."<sup>7</sup> He further point out that

[M]ore facilities for part-time work . . . will permit fuller use of housewives and provide them with the opportunity to play a worthy role in the work of social reconstruction even while administering and supervising the home. . . .

Women . . . make up a great force whose effective participation in activities is an essential requirement for all development and progress.<sup>8</sup> [Emphasis added]

Hence, while "the mobilization of women to the fullest extent of their abilities"<sup>9</sup> was to be done in the market, women would continue to perform their full time unpaid work at home. This in reality meant a degree of financial independence for women, while at the same time, it indicated a new form of subordination for

them because women now had two jobs: wage laborers in the capitalist sex-segregated labor market, and domestic laborers under patriarchy and capitalism.

This new form of subordination of women corresponded to changes in the nature of household work. Discussing the changing nature of household work as one of the tendencies of capitalist transformation, L. Tilly and J. Scott point out that prior to capitalism, the household was the unit of production and consumption, and within it, women adjusted their time to meet the demands of production and domestic activities.<sup>10</sup> Under capitalism, "The work done within the household is the work of consumption--the purchase of commodities and their processing into use values . . . this is largely, though not exclusively women's work, done by wives, daughters, and old female relatives."<sup>11</sup> This means that under capitalism, the household as the center of production is increasingly separated from consumption. The household itself now turns into the center of consumption.<sup>12</sup> Within the household, domestic workers--women in many cases--perform a new function, that of consumption of capitalist commodities. In this way, domestic work (the unpaid work of women) consists of the production of use values (child care, washing, cooking, cleaning, etc.) through the purchase of commodities and the expenditure of domestic labor

time. Domestic work in the household is, therefore, linked to the market by the performance of the function of consumption and by the reproduction of the labor force.<sup>13</sup>

In Iran, under the period of study, working and middle class women continued to spend time and labor in the household. Some middle and upper class women bought labor for domestic work. Except for paid male domestic workers, most men paid homage to their patriarchal status and remained free of household work but dominant over women's sexuality. The subordination of women in the household and the performance of unpaid work indeed played a crucial role for the functioning of the economy. The reproduction of the labor force and its daily maintenance depends not only on women's domestic work, but also on the consumption of commodities purchased from the market.

Urban Iranian women purchased food (mostly imported)<sup>14</sup> and clothing. Before the advent of capitalism, these goods were produced by direct producers--women and men--for the household's own consumption, for money income or barter. As Iran was increasingly moving toward consumerism, the consumption of hygienic water, electricity, and radios (Table 15) was increasing among the residents of non-slum, working, middle and upper class people in larger urban centers. In

addition, the usage of television and labor-saving devices such as gas and electric stoves, dishwashers, laundry and drying machines, and freezers formed the household consumption of the relatively privileged classes. Luxurious and modern commodities like cooling and heating systems and cars began to be increasingly used by the better-off families.

The consumption of these commodities not only created new tasks for women within the household, but also linked domestic work to the market. Moreover, consumption of capitalist commodities intensified class divisions because consumption was now contingent upon income. Therefore, the nature of the household set in motion sharper class divisions among women through the consumption of capitalist goods and services. Furthermore, it often led to a new position for women, that of the double day.

The changing function of women as consumption workers whose means of production are capitalist commodities has been acknowledged as being the root of the increase in women's participation in the sphere of paid production.<sup>15</sup> Since this premise cannot be taken as given, I wish to suggest viewing the relationship of consumption to labor force participation in terms of the wage rate. Here, there is an apparent contradiction: the higher the level of wages relative to



consumption, the higher is women's incentives to join the labor market. However, the lower the level of wages relative to consumption and expenditure, the more women are compelled to work for a wage. This is especially true when the profit and inflation rates are higher than the wage rate. In this situation, the relatively lower wages cannot compensate for the relatively higher rate of consumption. Hence, in order to maintain the family, more members of the household, namely women, will have to seek out work.

Women's wage work, thus, depends on their class position. For middle class women, if wages are higher than costs of child care and household maintenance, they have the option of seeking employment outside the home. However, working class women have to seek employment to maintain the survival of the family. In this case, more members of the household than the male wage earner will be forced to seek waged work. Therefore, women also seek wages, as a necessity to maintain household subsistence. In this way, capitalism forces women to sell their labor power for a wage. Hence, there are two reasons why women sell their labor power for a wage. These two reasons depend on women's class position. Both classes do so despite the presence of cultural and religious constraints against women's work outside the home.

Table 16 shows a substantial increase in the total urban income in Iran from 1969 to 1975. The same data, however, indicates a significant decrease in the share of wage in the total income. The total average household income from monetary to non-monetary sources in urban Iran increased from 126,521 rials in 1969 to 296,941 rials in 1974-75. Similarly, the average income of household from monetary sources rose from 105,071 rials to 235,115 rials in the same period. The highest source of household income came from the wages which almost counted for 80 percent of income in 1974-75. Between 1969-70 and 1974-75 the absolute wage income increased from 59,000 rials to 116,000 rials. However, the share of the wage in the total household income decreased from 46 percent to 39 percent in the same period. This means that income from other sources grew faster in this time span.<sup>16</sup>

Consequently, as the level of consumption in cities went up, the relative income from wage (as percent of total income) went down. As such, it indicates that the level of consumption and expenditure was not compensated by the wage rate in urban areas. Hence, the higher the level of consumption and the relatively lower wages compelled more members of urban families, namely women, to enter the labor market, for the economic

costs of remaining in the home was increasing as well. Put differently, when the wage rate on male heads of household proves insufficient for family maintenance, women enter the paid labor market in order to compensate for the worsening of their income position.

The observed tendency for the wage share to fall is related to the observed relative rise in property and capital income, especially the profit share in value added<sup>17</sup> (Table 17). According to Bank Markazi Reports, "the distribution of income by factors of production indicates that as a result of the increase in the share of profits in the total value added, the share of all factors have declined."<sup>18</sup> Hence, despite the high growth rate of the economy, the share of profits increased considerably, while the share of wages fell significantly. As such, it indicates the relative worsening position of earners of wage income in the economy. It also shows that while capitalist industrialization expands the labor market, it also sharpens class divisions and intensifies income inequalities.

In addition to the profit share, the worsening of the relative income position of wage earners might have been caused by the high rate of inflation for the period of 1969-75,<sup>19</sup> especially after 1973, when the oil income was quadrupled. For example, the Wholesale

Price Index (Table 18), its percent changes (Table 19), and the Consumer Price Index (Tables 20 and 21), show a tremendous rise in domestic and imported goods. Based on my own calculations (Table 22), I arrived at a tremendous annual rate of increase in the inflation rate, particularly after 1973.

As shown, the comparison of the wage and profit share and the CPI charts indicate the increase in profit share was accompanied by high price increases. In this way, the increase in profit and inflation rate--both of which are the vehicle of the rich and the problems of labor--explain the relative decline of the wage rate and, hence, the higher need of women to work for a wage in paid production.

Overall, the above study showed that the participation of women in the labor force was not only related to the development of capitalism, but also to changes brought about by this process in the nature of household work. Capitalism pulled unemployed agricultural workers to cities. The increasing rate of population growth, as well as the rise in the number of migrants, created a surplus labor in urban locales. City unemployment indicates that migrants added to surplus laborers grew faster than what the capitalist production sector could absorb. Consequently, the bargaining position

of families was reduced not only because they lost their capacity to produce, but also because of their integration into the capitalist sphere.

Moreover, the transformation of the society into a consumer one brought about a shift in the nature of the household which made it more vulnerable to capitalist needs. At the same time, the relative decrease in the wage rate of the male head of household compared to the high increase in the profit rate further reduced the bargaining position of the labor. Meanwhile, inflation showed the poor bargaining position of the laborers not only because their wages did not keep up with higher prices, but also because their needs had become monetized under the growing capitalist system. Given the nature of the capital intensive and import-substitution economy which reduced the bargaining position of labor, more members of the household--namely women--were pressured to work for a wage in order to provide support for the survival and maintenance of the family. In this way, women's participation in non-home production was intensified, and their double day work was created in the society which absorbed them in the market as cheap laborers and as bulk of the reserve army of laborers.

## B. Division of Labor by Major

### Economic Sectors

In previous sections, I showed the growth of the labor market from 1956 to 1976. I also discussed the impact of capitalism on the sexual division of labor in the market and in the household. In order to develop a more specific insight into the subjugation of women in modern urban Iran, this part will concentrate on the sexual division of labor by major economic sectors, namely, the industries, the services, and agriculture.<sup>20</sup> Emphasis will be placed on changes in the distribution of sexes in each sector, and finally, the degree of the concentration of sexes in each sector.

Census data shows that in the period of 1956-76, the absorption of women was highest in the services, industry, and agriculture, respectively. In contrast, the concentration of men was highest not only in the services and industries, but also in construction, commerce and transportation (Table 23). In 1956, 52.1 percent of the female labor force worked in the service sector. Such a high concentration declined to 45.6 percent in 1966, but it jumped to 58.6 percent in 1976. The industrial sector also absorbed a large number of female workers. In 1956, 39 percent of the total female labor force worked in this sector.

In 1966, the absorption of women in industries increased to 45.6 percent but it decreased to 31 percent in 1976. In contrast to the service and industrial sectors, agriculture witnessed a sharp decline in the absorption of women's labor power. In short, in the period of two decades, while the relative participation of women in industries had declined, their labor activities in the services had increased tremendously.

Changes in labor force participation of men by major economic sectors had similar patterns to that of women. Compared to women, men's absorption by agricultural and industrial sectors declined. However, in contrast to women, men's participation in the services increased slightly. Interestingly, the sharp rise in the labor force participation of men accounted for their activities in construction, commerce, and transportation, or the most exclusively dominated sphere by male workers in the wage work. In this way, the period of 1956-76 witnessed the development of a sex-segregated labor market. In this light then, while in the early 1900's, women's work was heavily concentrated in the household, from the 1950's, part of their labor was transformed into the sex-segregated labor market, especially into the service sector.<sup>21</sup>

Why did the high absorption of female labor power take place in the services and not in other sectors

of the economy? During the early stages of industrialization in the West, the highest concentration of women took place in industry due to higher investment and capital accumulation in this sector as well as the scarcity of men's labor.<sup>22</sup> Ester Boserup explains third world women's absorption by the services in terms of the relatively higher expansion of this sector.<sup>23</sup> Lourdes Arespe sees women's entry into the services as a result of insufficient demand for their labor in the manufacturing sector.<sup>24</sup> These authors make no attempt to reconcile their insights with the nature of capitalist development.

In Iran, the relatively higher absorption of female labor in the services related to the relatively higher expansion of this sector due to the increasing penetration of foreign capital and Iran's developmental strategy which I discussed in Chapter III. Because of Iran's large imports as well as its increasing commercial and financial transactions with the West, and the opportunity that it provided to foreign investors, many jobs in the service sector such as secretarial, clerical, and cleaning in hotels, cinemas, theaters, and restaurants were opened up to women. In this way, the expansion of the services served as an impetus for capital accumulation and profit needs of foreign as well as Iranian capital. As such, it had the effect



of placing women in the labor process imported from abroad. In this way, the absorption of women in the services not only served the expansion of dependent capitalism in Iran, but it also assigned to women a crucial role in Iran's development.

In addition, female labor meets the needs of capital since the cost of their labor is relatively cheap, and their work is efficient. Ruth Milkman views women's work in the services as bearing some structural resemblance to household activities. She contends that

. . . white collar occupations, as secretaries, teachers, waitresses, nurses, and so forth, women perform such wifery and motherly functions as schedule management, ego building, child socialization, cleaning up, caring for the ill, and serving as a sexual object. Even in instances where such structural resemblance to the traditional female role is absent, more often than not women's paid labor activity is sex-typed and set apart from that of men.<sup>25</sup>

While Milkman's remarks are illuminating in linking women's work to sexist ideologies, I would like to suggest here that cheaper costs of labor and higher work efficiency are more significant factors explaining the absorption of female's labor in the services.

First, because of similarities between service jobs and household activities, women are not required to undergo costly and long-term training. As such, it has the effect of lowering the overall cost of female labor relative to male work. Moreover, due to their

low bargaining position in the market (as the bulk of the reserve army of labor), women tend to accept relatively lower wages. Furthermore, as it is pointed out by Elson and Pearson, female labor meets the needs of the international capital in the third world and it searches for a disciplined and low cost labor supply.<sup>26</sup> Second, household experiences provide women with the care and attention necessary for efficient work performances even when the job is demeaning and degrading.

In sum, then, through empirical evidence, I showed above that the expansion of the labor market in Iran was parallel to the creation of a new form of subordination for women. The examination of the sexual division of labor by major economic sectors indicated that in contrast to men, women were predominantly concentrated in the services. The relatively higher absorption of women in the services was related to the expansion of this sector as a result of dependent capitalism in Iran. Second the concentration of women in the services was not only related to the ideology of sexism, but also to the efficiency of women's work and the low cost of women's labor.

C. Division of Labor by Specific Occupations,Class, and Ideology

If women were predominantly absorbed by the service sector, what specific positions did they have in the occupational structure? As it can be discerned from the census statistics, since the 1950's an increasing number of women entered professional-technical, managerial-administrative-clerical, sales, and production occupations (Table 24). This growth represents a shift from 15,000 female professional and technical workers in 1956 to 170,000 in 1976; from 7,000 managers, administrators and clerical workers in 1956 to 66,000 in 1976; from 3,000 sales workers in 1956 to 6,000 in 1976; and from 83,000 production workers in 1956 to 140,000 in 1976. Other occupations held by women range from traditional positions such as carpet weaving to the more modern ones like textiles, the food industry and sales work (Table 25).

As a percentage of the total urban labor force, women's participation was highest in nursing, secretarial, work, teaching, medicine, reporting, operating, engineering, architecture, and law, respectively (Table 26). Of these occupations, women accounted for more than half of the urban labor force in nursing and secretarial

positions. If female jobs are defined as those in which 50.1 percent or more than half of workers are women,<sup>27</sup> then over 50 percent of urban Iranian women worked in female jobs. The number of female teachers is also significant for 34 percent of workers in that field were women.

Despite women's occupations in "feminine jobs," as Tables 9, 10 and 11 show, the majority of the rest of women were either crowded into low-paying, traditional positions such as carpet weaving, spinning, knitting, tailoring, health services, washing, housekeeping and cleaning, or in modern or Western imported jobs<sup>28</sup> like industrial and service jobs. A few women were found in professional, technical and managerial fields. According to the "crowding hypothesis," "women are systematically excluded from certain occupations (masculine occupations) and crowded into other occupations (feminine occupations)."<sup>29</sup> But why were most women crowded into feminine occupations? And why were they marginalized in the process of development in Iran?

Boserup sees marginalization of women in terms of their exclusion from the modern sectors of the economy when economic development occurs. She contends that the gradual movement from home industry to factory production results in the replacement of home-made

by factory-made products which are produced by a labor force composed of many more men than women.<sup>30</sup> However, she ignores how women become separated from their means of production and become consumers under capitalism. As has been discussed in the above section, women's work in the household became isolated and personal consumption preparations dependent on commodity production. In the market, women, like men, sell their labor power as a commodity, but in the household, unlike men, they are on call twenty-four hours a day to maintain and reproduce the labor force. Hence, it is not men per se who take over the work outside the home, rather it is capitalism that causes a double day and creates the new sexual division of labor that corresponds to occupational segregation and the formation of a hierarchy. (See the following chapter for a more concrete discussion of this point.) Thus, by restricting her analysis of the marginalization of women to a categorical examination of sexes, Boserup dismisses the integral relationship of the sexual division of labor to the overall process of change due to capitalist accumulation.

Another reason for marginalization of women, according to Boserup, is that with the exception of skilled and educated women, most women lose out because if

they are "hired at all in the modern sector, it is usually for the unskilled and low-wage jobs. . . ." <sup>31</sup> Hence, she states, the main consequence of economic development on the urban economy is the "polarization and hierarchialization of men's and women's work roles" with men being preferred for "skilled and supervisory" jobs and women for the "unskilled and subservient" ones. <sup>32</sup>

In the case of Iran, as Table 27 shows, the majority of urban women workers are "skilled." However, as a percentage of the total urban labor force, the proportion of unskilled women is very low. Thus, 60 percent of the female labor force is skilled as opposed to 22 percent that is non-skilled. However, as a proportion of the total labor force classified by skill, the rate is much higher in the non-skilled than the skilled ones. In other words, the number of unskilled jobs is greater than the number of skilled jobs in sectors where women work. The women's labor force is distinguished from the total (women and men) labor force inasmuch as the relationship is reversed. It is unknown to me, of course, if it reversed for men as well. A relevant point, on which one may digress, is an explanation of the concept of skill. First, as it is shown here, depending on one's choice of figures,

the notion of skill assumes different meaning, and hence fails to be universally applicable. In this regard, Boserup's usage of the term skill becomes unclear.

Second, Boserup assumes that men are more skilled than women. How does she define skill? And how does skill come about? Does one's skill guarantee one's access to a desired job? Are there other factors besides skill in promoting one into the occupational ladder? Boserup is silent on these questions. Indeed, her notion of skilled and unskilled workers is obfuscating.

In general, the notion of skill refers to the usage of one's developed aptitude or ability or expertise in a given area. In that respect, skill is an objective assessment of one's abilities and knowledge. However, when applied to occupational categories, the notion of skill becomes distorted because the labor market in capitalist societies is inherently class and sex biased. For in Iran, most owners of carpet industries are men, yet compared to their employed female carpet weavers, they are unskilled. Here, the skilled carpet weavers are more susceptible to marginalization than owners, not because they are less skilled or unskilled, but because they are less powerful and are poor. In another instance, the former Princess Ashraf, the

twin sister of the Shah, was the owner and a major shareholder of several industries and corporations.<sup>35</sup> She never worked in any of those enterprises. Ashraf was unskilled as a worker and she was a woman, yet she was never marginalized until the revolution of 1978-79. Indeed, class position may override marginalization by sex in Iranian society. Since Boserup's notion of skill is both class and sex biased, I wish to suggest that a coherent analysis of marginalization of women (and by skill) must be seen within the framework of class relations, gender relations,<sup>34</sup> and power relations in the process of capital accumulation.

In Iran, as in other class-based societies, one's place in the occupational structure relates strongly to her/his class position. Because of the unavailability of quantitative or historical sources, there are definite problems in rigidly typologizing class by occupation in Iran. James Bill<sup>35</sup> has adopted this approach in his writings on Iran. But his analysis not only lacks the criteria of gender but also fails to shed light on the class structure in terms of people's relations to production and the power structure in the society. Considering the factors of gender, class and power relations in Iran, I wish to delineate the following typology of women's occupations.



Working class women were primarily composed of domestic, carpet, sexual<sup>34</sup> and industrial workers. Female domestic workers were mostly part-time maids, washers and cleaners. Industrial workers worked in State and private enterprises. They worked as food and beverage processors, tobacco preparers, weavers, knitters and dyers, tailors, dressmakers, wood and cork industrial workers, printers, chemical processors, oil product producers, non-mineral workers, steel product preparators, machinery workers, electric machine workers, and assemblers.<sup>36</sup>

These urban women worked for a wage because of the severe economic hardship created by capitalism. Interviews suggest that working class women participated in the labor force in order to increase their family income and keep it out of urban poverty. According to Moser-Khalili, these women "help to support the household when the husband's income alone is not sufficient."<sup>37</sup> Often their paid work time includes six days a week which averages with unpaid commuting time to 12½ to 13½ hours a day. These women were exploited not only because of their class position, but also because of expenditure of long hours of labor, most of which was unpaid.

The expenditure of long hours of labor time did not necessarily lead to lower earnings of wives compared to husbands. Indeed, Moser-Khalili points out that working class women "frequently earn more than their husbands by working longer hours."<sup>39</sup> Sometimes these women sell their labor power (not reported in official statistics) very cheaply to

middle and upper class women as part-time maids, baby-sitters, laundresses, seamstresses, knitters, cooks, band-andaz (hair removing workers), or dallaks (body washers).<sup>40</sup> In this way, the wage labor of women not only helps production and reproduction in middle and upper class families, but it also compensates for the lower wages of their husbands.

What do husbands of these women do? My own observations suggest that working class men with relatively lower wages than their wives work as peddlers selling cigarettes and fruits. Others work as porters or as daily but temporary wage laborers in restaurants, as gatekeepers, or as servants in the tea houses of various offices and organizations. The wives of a number of temporary wage laborers often work as domestic workers or as prostitutes in slum sections of cities like Tehran. Men work as servants, too. Interestingly, factory workers who have been integrated into industrial wage labor are only interested in "masculine work"--e.g., work in wood, brick and other similar factories--and not in maid's work, which constitutes "feminine work" in Western capitalist societies, but which can be either women's or men's work in Iran. (Perhaps, this kind of sexism is related to the level by which women and men have become integrated within the capitalist work ethic.) Cotton and textile workers--part of the industrial labor force--are exclusively women workers.

On the whole, the working class women were distinguished as propertyless wage earners. The case of

servants is a pre-capitalist occupation and there seems to be no sex-typing. In the case of capitalist factory labor, there appears a definite sex-typing of factory jobs. In this way, the working class women were subjugated by their class. In addition, they were subordinated by their position as women relative to male employers, male co-workers (which will be discussed below), husbands and fathers. As women, they also experienced subjugation both by their double day, caused by their non-paid economic activities at home, and by their inferior position relative to men as heads of the households.

Middle class women had occupations like beauticians, sale workers, teachers, nurses, secretaries, reporters, operators, physicians (particularly gynecologists), lawyers, architects and a few as engineers.<sup>42</sup> The participation of these women in the labor force was motivated less by economic needs than by their desire to maintain and secure their own class standard of living. Moser-Khalili's interviews show the importance of economic security for middle class women engaged in wage work. She quotes an interviewee as saying that: "I'd like to stay at home but I have twelve years government employment credit toward my retirement. . . . I can make it a total of 30 years and then get

the full retirement of income."<sup>43</sup> This is not surprising in view of the fact that modern middle class women have become greater consumers of capitalist commodities than working class women and thus need a higher income for the material accessories necessary to maintain their class life-style.<sup>44</sup>

In general, the higher the professional level of this class, the more income these women had. From this perspective, then, unlike the working class, the middle class women experienced a greater luxury and comfort due to higher level of earnings. However, high income without social power is insufficient for the shaping of the parameters of the power structure and for implementing the policies and decisions in society.<sup>45</sup> Like the majority of women in Iran, middle class women obtain their social status from their relationship to men: as married women, from their husbands; as single women, from their brothers or fathers. The subordinated position of middle class women was, therefore, related less to their class situation and more to specific sex-roles as women.

The work of ruling class women was mainly composed of high managerial, official and non-official political positions, as well as those in charity and related matters.<sup>46</sup> The wage, however, was not a relevant factor influencing the class position of these women in the

society. Rather, their class position stemmed from private property: owning lands and industries, and holding large corporate shares. Moreover, the class position of these women was derived from their relations to men. For example, Ashraf Pahlavi's from her father, the founder of the Pahlavi dynasty, and her brother, the Shah, and her own personality as well: Farah Pahlavi obtained her status from her husband, the Shah.<sup>47</sup> Because of their class and their special kin relation to ruling class men, these women influenced political and economic decision-making within the society.<sup>48</sup> As large property owners, with access to social power, the ruling class women became subjugators both in the society and at home: in the society, because of their high influence in political and economic decision-making; and at home, because of their employment of women and men of other classes for the reproduction of their own class.

It should also be noted that occupational categories did not always correspond with class factors. Personal observations attest to the existence of a few female secretaries who worked for pleasure and for a low wage. Meanwhile, a number of professional occupations such as medicine and law were occupied by women from working or lower middle class backgrounds.<sup>49</sup> Education made

available to a few working and lower middle class women reflects the mobility of moving to a higher occupational level than their parents. In that sense, Boserup's assertion of the influence of educational skill on women's occupational positions<sup>50</sup> is valid. However, as I showed above, the majority of cases negate this point and suggest that class, gender, and power are the determining factors effecting women's work position under capitalist development.

Not only does Boserup neglect these factors, but she relates the marginalization of women to their biology as women. She asserts that in the process of modernization men are quicker than women in taking over modern jobs.<sup>51</sup> Is this an innate characteristic of women and men, or are there other forces in the capitalist market which cause this differentiation? Can occupational segregation be explained in terms of "divide and rule" strategies of capitalists against workers? What roles might sexist ideologies and cultural factors play? How and to what extent does women's role in reproduction contribute to their marginalized position in the labor market?

To shed light on these questions, I will utilize in this section the findings of a recent Farsi study on the position of women in a number of factories, and

then in the following chapter I will discuss these issues at greater length.

In his study of thirteen factories with 1,083 female and 15,367 male workers, Ezzatollah Rastkar<sup>52</sup> interviewed fifty female and fifty male workers as well as thirteen employers, presumably all male, and owners of these establishments. In these factories, employers refrained from offering certain jobs to women such as: a) heavy occupations; b) those that need training like electricity, steel, repair of parts, work on textile machines, plumbing, tool making, and printing cloth, etc.<sup>53</sup> The reasons, according to employers, for not offering these jobs to women were as follows:

- a) the physical weakness of women;
- b) their inability;
- c) their lack of skill;
- d) their lack of demand for the above-mentioned jobs; and
- e) the employer's lack of interest in making investments in women since they leave jobs when they get married.<sup>54</sup>

In addition, according to employers, the hiring of women workers was disadvantageous because of:

- a) their physical weakness;
- b) their low level of learning and technical intelligence;
- c) their main interest as being in household matters as opposed to wage work;

- d) their disturbance of work discipline due to pregnancy, child delivery, and menstruation;<sup>55</sup>
- e) their further interruption of work due to talks and contacts with male workers; and
- f) their lack of participation in night shifts.<sup>56</sup>

In contrast, the employers saw certain advantages in hiring women. They said that women were:

- a) careful and disciplined, especially in precise and elegant work;
- b) patient and cooperative;
- c) obedient;
- d) uncritical about the wage; and
- e) women as co-workers produce a better psychological environment for male workers.<sup>57</sup>

Several points can be discerned from the above interviews. First, the material costs of hiring women seem to be contrary to the interest of the employers. The latter's unwillingness to invest in women is a case in point. Women workers, on the other hand, had asserted in the interview that despite preoccupations with household work, they would be prepared to undergo training and would even change work place for better work conditions and higher wage.<sup>58</sup> The employer's concern with the lack of female participation in night shifts constitutes another extra cost (such as providing and financing transportation services) against hiring women. Moreover, the work disturbance of women explained by employers in terms of child-rearing and child-bearing activities



foreshadow another level of finances (e.g., nurseries, day care centers, and absence for child delivery) for owners of work establishments. This, of course, does not mean that because of the relatively high cost of hiring women and maintaining them at the job, women become marginalized in the work force. On the contrary, the lower wages of women relative to men<sup>59</sup> makes it more profitable for employers to hire women as cheap laborers. And, indeed, as it has been argued, job segregation by sex "is the primary mechanism in capitalist society that maintains the superiority of men over women, because it enforces lower wages for women in the labor market."<sup>60</sup> The point that I wish to make here is that the hiring of women, especially married ones, and keeping them in jobs requires certain initial costs; in the long run, the lower cost of their labor power is more profitable to owners of establishments. Women as cheap laborers fulfill such tasks more profitably than men. Rationalization based on the high cost of female labor may serve as a mechanism to reinforce the marginalized and inferior position of women in the work force.

In addition to material issues, the second point to draw from the above interview is a high level of sexist ideologies by the employers and male workers that operate against the employment and position of women in the labor market. The employers' sexism is

reflected in their views of women as physically weak, unable, and less intelligent than men. As such, it designates a discriminatory bias based on sex. The arbitrary classification of jobs by "light" and "heavy" resembles another artificial category that attributes superior qualities to men and inferior ones to women. This is even more substantiated in light of the employers' view that even if women had equal jobs with men, they would still be less productive since their technical knowledge and intelligence was lower.<sup>61</sup> Furthermore, sexism is manifested in the use of adjectives describing women as careful, patient, obedient, and the like, which would primarily relate women to the world of intersubjectivity connected to their role as homemakers.

Not only did the employers have sexist ideologies, but they shared them with the male workers, as well.

Rastkar found that from 39 married male workers, only three approved of their wives working in the labor market; the rest disapproved.<sup>62</sup> The reasons for their disapproval are shown in Table 28. Clearly, like the employers, the male workers saw household work as the responsibility of women, not men. Since women are socially responsible for taking care of the household work, their position in the heirarchical capitalist organizations tend to be hampered by their domestic work.

The above data also indicates that the male worker's religious beliefs and views on skill counted as reasons for disagreement with women's work outside the home. Significantly, male workers related their superior position in factories to higher work productivity as a result of their higher physical strength.<sup>63</sup> In this regard, then, similar to the employers' views, male workers attributed their greater capabilities to physical strength from which women would be biologically and naturally disqualified.

A serious problem with these views and similar ones<sup>64</sup> is that instead of providing a more historical explanation, they use general categories stated in functional terms like biology<sup>65</sup> to disqualify women. It is true that biology assigns to women the role of childbearing. But biology does not determine women's work in the household. Nor does biology explain the sex division of labor. In essence, these views base social contradictions on biology to explain the sexual division of labor. Put differently, by resorting to such functional explanations, they simply and readily locate social contradictions into biology for which there is no historical substantiation. By so doing, however, the position of male and female workers at a specific historical time in space remains

unclarified. Moreover, since productivity is the result of labor applied to tools or machinery to produce goods, a more likely cause of men's higher productivity is men's use of machinery. Boserup suggests this in her analysis of three continents.

Nevertheless, the importance of biological explanation in sexist ideologies must not be dismissed. Sexist ideologies--insofar as they continue to operate--allow women to experience antagonism from a variety of sources. Sexism partially explains (according to Boserup) why men are quicker than women in taking over jobs when development takes place.<sup>66</sup> Without identifying and seeing these antagonistic obstacles and their effect on the labor force participation of women, Boserup's statement is apt to fall into a biological explanation, and hence, far from objective and historical reality.

Heidi Hartmann states that "male workers have played and continue to play a crucial role in maintaining sexual divisions in the labor process."<sup>67</sup> The male workers and capitalists, Hartman argues, share an interest in subordinating women through the division of labor. It is, however, difficult to prove that a patriarchal pact between capitalists and male workers overrides class contradictions between the two. In other words, insofar as capitalists use divide and rule

strategies to divide workers, they may also resort to sexist ideologies which they share with male workers against women. But as such, sex can never bring a class alliance between the capitalists and male workers. The crucial point, therefore, is the need for historical substantiation to document the extent to which divisive strategies and sexist ideologies bring alliances at a given time and space between capitalists and male workers against female laborers.

In sum, while in the foregoing an attempt was made to identify and discuss those factors that facilitate marginalization of women in the labor force, it was argued that contrary to Bosefup's assertion, it was neither automatic that men were quicker than women in taking over jobs during the process of development, nor was it an innate characteristic of men to be more productive than women. Rather, there are concrete and definite explanations (women's work in the household, sexist ideologies, and to a lesser extent cultural factors, and divide and rule strategies of employers) for marginalization of women in the labor market. Moreover, it was suggested that marginalization of women cannot be taken as a given phenomenon. An analysis of women's position in wage labor must account for class relations in the process of growth and capital accumulation. To be more concrete, the analysis of women's position

in the labor market must also include the marital status and age of women. I will deal with this topic in the following section.

D. Division of Labor by Marital Status  
and by Life Cycle

So far, I have shown the subordination of women by examining their position in reproduction and production. I also discussed the sexual division of labor by major economic sectors, by specific occupations, class and ideology. In order to develop a more concrete insight into the subordination of women, this section will focus on the sexual division of labor by marital status and age. Included in this analysis will be an emphasis on class and women's role in reproduction as factors influencing participation of women by marital status and age.

The division of labor is not only based on sex, but also on marital status.<sup>68</sup> During the early stages of capital accumulation in the western hemisphere, the participation of single women has been the highest.<sup>69</sup> In this respect, Gita Sen contends that with the advent of capitalist production, women's wage work outside the home tends to be highest when she is single. Marriage and the birth of children, however, cause a

decline in the labor force participation which lasts as long as there are younger children in the house.<sup>70</sup>

In the case of Mexico, Arizpe states that "divorced, widowed or separated women work whether employment is expanding or not, while single women stay home until industry offers them adequate jobs."<sup>71</sup>

In Iran, as the data indicates, the participation of married women was higher than single, widowed or divorced women (Table 29). Of the total urban female workers, 131,000 were married, 122,000 were single, 47,000 were widowed and 16,000 were divorced. As a proportion of the total urban female labor force, married women counted for 41 percent, single women for 38.6 percent, widowed women for 14.8 percent and divorced women for 5 percent.

Also, married women laborers counted for a higher proportion of the total urban female population than the single, widowed and divorced women. As a proportion of the total urban female population, married female laborers counted for 4.1 percent, single women for 3.8 percent, widowed women for 1.4 percent and divorced women for .5 percent.

However, as a percentage of married, single, widowed and divorced women, the participation of married female workers (7.2 percent) was less than single female

workers (12.7 percent), widowed female workers (12.9) and widowed female workers (35.5 percent), respectively. The relatively lower percentage of married female workers in this figure means that due to the tradition of early marriage in Iran, there were more married than single, widowed or divorced women in the total population. As such, it does not indicate that there were less married female workers in the labor force.

Taken together in terms of the absolute number as well as a percentage of total female labor force, and of the total female population, the participation of married women was highest in Iran. Hence, in urban areas, the relatively higher participation of married women in the labor force makes the case of Iran different from other societies in a somewhat similar stage of development. Unlike the early periods of industrialization in the west, married women, not single, had the highest participation in the labor force. In the case of Iran, therefore, the typical pattern of female wage work by marital status is reversed.

The division of labor under capitalist production is not only based on sex, class and marital status, but also on life cycle patterns.<sup>72</sup> Boserup points to age as one of the main criteria for the division of labor.<sup>73</sup> In the case of Latin America, Arizpe suggests that "women's participation in formal employment



declines with age while it increases in informal activities."<sup>74</sup> In Latin America, therefore, the labor force participation of women declines steadily after the age of 25. In contrast, according to Nadia Youssef, female employment rises in Morocco, Pakistan, Turkey and Libya after the age of 35.<sup>75</sup>

The case of Iran, however, demonstrates an untypical pattern of female employment by age. In urban Iran, women's wage work tends to be highest among those between 20 and 29 years old. These women tend to be married.

Quantitatively, it is possible to illustrate this point whole bearing in mind that precise data on labor force participation of women by both marital status and age in urban Iran is unavailable.<sup>76</sup> Based on the figures for labor force participation by age and population, by marital status and age, inferences about labor force participation by age and marital status can be made.

In 1976, the labor force participation of urban women was highest in the age group of 20-24 and 25-29, respectively (Table 20). Similarly, as can be seen from Table 31, women between ages 20-24 and 25-29 years old rank highest among the married group. Table 30 suggests that labor force participation of urban Iranian women is highest among women between the ages 20 to 29. Table 31 indicates that 20 to 29 year-old women

have the highest number within the category of married ones. Taken together, Tables 30 and 31 show that labor force participation of women in urban Iran appears highest for married women ages 20-29.<sup>77</sup> This means that, contrary to typical cases of labor force participation by marital status and life cycle, marriage and child-rearing activities do not tend to adversely affect women's wage work in urban Iran. Therefore, Iran provides a specific case of capitalist development in which the sexual division of labor corresponds: a woman's wage work is highest when she is married, young and going through child-rearing phases of her life, that is around the ages of 20 to 30.

What factors make the case of Iran different and specific? What factors make it possible for married women to combine their tasks in production and reproduction? What are the consequences of these tasks for the subordination of women in wage and domestic work?

In dealing with these questions, I would like to suggest marriage at early ages (from 15 years old, sometimes less) among urban working class women increases their availability for wage work outside the home. In their early 20's, these women have already passed their child-rearing phase and, hence, are able to utilize the labor of the oldest daughters for the care of younger children

and some household work. For these women, then, entrance into wage labor is facilitated by personal and traditional relations. The participation of middle class women, in contrast, is accomplished through reliance on traditional and personal relations (e.g., relative) as well as their commodity relations to outside help for household work (e.g., buying the labor power of servants).

The work of married working class women in the household--as an important aspect of their role in reproduction--and their social relations in the household is crucial in understanding their subordination. Household work--unpaid--continues to be women's sole responsibility in Iran. Whereas working class husbands may work as paid domestic workers, they do not do so in their own households. The women, therefore, must take the burden of spending unpaid time on working, maintaining and managing the household activities. They shop for meals, prepare the meal, clean the residence and wash clothes by hand. Most of all, they take care of the children in the event that they have medical problems.

The maintenance of the household is possible for these women because of their non-capitalist ties or traditional ties with their older daughters. Some

household work and the care of younger children is the responsibility of older daughters. In the northern towns and cities of Iran, I saw girls between the ages of six and older fastening their younger brothers or sisters to their backs while doing household work. Indeed, without the help of older daughters, working class women encounter tremendous difficulties in working for a wage. Moser-Khalili states that "the mother manages to do the shopping somewhere on her way home from work, prepares the meals after she arrives at night and squeezes the washing and cleaning into odd moments. . . ." <sup>78</sup> In the absence of an older daughter, the mother either takes the younger children to work or makes arrangements with her mother or relatives or neighbors to look after the children. Thus, in order to become wage laborers, married working class women enter into traditional and personal network relationships for the maintenance and survival of their families. This is indispensable for them. In urban capitalist settings, subsistence is based upon the wage. Domestic work uses the wage in the household for reproduction.

In short, then, despite the struggle against survival as well as the traditional responsibility for the care of household matters, the married working class woman is compelled to mesh domestic work with child care and

wage labor. Hence, in contrast to other societies in their early stages of capitalist development, this is possible for the Iranian working class married woman because of her early marriage and, later in life, because of the availability of older children to take care of the younger ones. In this way, unlike her Iranian predecessors, the modern Iranian working class woman experiences a new form of oppression as a wage laborer (and, indeed, as a cheap one), and as a caretaker and unpaid laborer in the household.

The participation of middle class women in wage labor is facilitated through the management of their households by paid part-time or live-in maids. Because of financial abilities, these women send their children to nursery schools. In the absence of bus service, however, mothers assume responsibility for the transportation of children. In the event that maids or nurseries are inaccessible, these women rely on traditional networks--mostly relatives--for child care and babysitting. The expenditure of labor time on shopping and food preparation (approximately 3-1/2 hours daily) are other concerns of these women.<sup>79</sup> Husbands of these women are sometimes helpful with shopping for food and transportation of children to schools. They might even take their younger sons (but not daughters) to work.

For the most part, however, husbands remain free of other household tasks. In this way, the subordination of working middle class women is related by the sex division of labor which specifies women as the manager of the household. Moreover, due to their specific economic needs, determined by their own class standards, these women are subjugated to the capitalist labor market.

In short, then, the participation of middle class women in wage labor is facilitated not so much because of early marriage or availability of older daughters, but because of accessibility to maids or other helpers.

Thus, the wage labor of middle class women requires their entrance into capitalist commodity relations (buying the labor power of maids) and traditional relations (using labor power of relatives). For the working class women, however, entrance into wage labor is facilitated by non-capitalist relations such as traditional personal networks. Hence, the higher the class position of women, the higher is their integration into capitalist social relations.

In sum, then, this chapter was an attempt to investigate the impact of Iran's capitalist development on the position of urban women in the division of labor, production and reproduction. With its powerful tendency, capitalism separated producers from their direct means

of production and thus integrated them into the sphere of capitalist production. Capitalism also changed the nature of the household by separating production from consumption. Domestic work--the unpaid work of working and middle class women--contributed to the functioning of the economy through the purchase and consumption of commodities and performance of domestic labor time for family maintenance and reproduction of the labor force. In short, domestic work linked the household to the market by purchasing goods and reproducing labor force. The exchange of the latter for a wage in the market, in turn, allowed domestic work to transform the wage into use values consumed in the household.

Hence, domestic labor, women's unpaid work, insofar as it reproduces the commodity labor power it continues to contribute to social reproduction. As such, it signifies the link between women's paid and unpaid work and its relation to growth and capital accumulation.

In Iran, capitalism not only changed the nature of the household, but it also made it more dependent on capitalist commodities. Due to its tendency to decrease the wage rate and increase the profit and inflation rates, capitalism widened the class and income gap. In this process, the bargaining position of labor, particularly the male head of household, was reduced. In order to provide support for the survival and

maintenance of the family, women's participation in wage labor was intensified--though the value of her labor in the household remained unrecognized and unpaid. In this way, women's double day work was begun.

By absorbing women into the sphere of production, capitalism created a division of labor by sex, class, marital status, and age. The examination of women's position in the labor market demonstrated untypical patterns of female employment. First, unlike any society in similar process of transformation, I found that women's wage labor was highest in the service industries. Second, in contrast to the prevalent pattern in developing societies, particularly those of Latin America and the Middle East, Iran provided a specific case of capitalist development in which labor force participation of married and young (between the ages of 20 to 29) women was the highest.

The relatively higher absorption of women in the services was explained in terms of the expansion of this sector due to the increasing internationalization of capital and its impact on the dependent capitalist development of Iran. The concentration of women in the services was also related to their low cost of labor and the efficiency of their work which resembled their activities in the household.



The entrance of young and married women into the labor market varied with their class position and the extent to which they were able to utilize help for domestic work. Working class women used non-capitalist personal relations, such as the labor of their older daughters for household work. Middle class women, however, relied on both personal relations and capitalist commodity relations, such as the purchase of the labor power of maids and servants for household work. Despite these variations, the household division of labor continued to remain within the women's sphere of activity, not the men's. As such, it contributed to women's subordination not only in the household but also in the market.

The subordination of women into the labor process of capitalist society was also due to their marginalization in the process of capital accumulation. Women's marginalization in the labor market was not necessarily related to their level of skill or their biology. Rather, the marginalization of Iranian women was the result of class relations, gender relations and power relations in the process of capital accumulation in a dependent fashion.

More concretely, the divide and rule strategies of employers and sexist ideologies contributed sharply to the subordinated position of women.

Finally, women's primary role in reproduction--biological and social reproduction--not only reinforced

their subordination in the hierarchial structure of production, but it also maintained gender hierarchy in the household. The examination of the division of labor and gender roles within a "modern" Iranian industry--the communications industry--will reveal more insights into the specific subordination of women. As such, it will be the subject of the next chapter.

## NOTES

- <sup>1</sup> Sedghi, "An Assessment."
- <sup>2</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>3</sup> Bamdad, Zan-e Irani [Iranian Women].
- <sup>4</sup> Sedghi, "An Assessment."
- <sup>5</sup> Employment and Income Policies.
- <sup>6</sup> This is related to the Shah's interest (like his father's) in producing a "democratic" and "modernized" image of the state, in particular, to western capitalist countries.
- <sup>7</sup> For a further elaboration of this point, see Moser-Khalili, "Urban Design," p. 6.
- <sup>8</sup> Ibid., p. 7.      <sup>9</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>10</sup> Louise Tilly and Joan Scott, Women, Work, and Family (New York: Rinehart and Winston, 1978), Ch. I and Conclusion as well as pp. 14, 21, 29, and 227-228.
- <sup>11</sup> Gita Sen, "The Sexual Division," p. 81.
- <sup>12</sup> As one of the pioneer scholars who pointed out this observation, Marx stated that:  
  

Since certain family functions such as nursing and suckling children cannot be entirely suppressed, the mothers confiscated by capital must try substitutes of some sort. Domestic work, such as sewing and mending, must be replaced by the purchase of ready-made articles. Hence, the diminished expenditure of labour in the house is accompanied by an increased expenditure of money. The cost of keeping the family increases, and balances the greater income. In addition to this, economy and judgment in the consumption and preparation of the means of subsistence becomes impossible.

See Marx, Capital, p. 395, note 2.

- 13 For a detailed discussion of these points, see Fee, "Domestic Labor"; and M. Mackintosh, "Domestic Labor."
- 14 See Ch. III of this study, and especially the section on the negative impact of the land reform on agricultural productivity and the resulting need of the economy to import tremendous amounts of food.
- 15 See Lourdes Beneria, "Women's Participation."
- 16 See Natayej-e Bar-resi-ye Bujeh-e Khanevar-ha-ye, Sec. II.
- 17 There is no available data for the relative income position of wage and salary earners in urban areas; therefore, instead, I will take data for the whole economy (urban and rural). As such, it indicates the relative income position of wage and salary earners compared with income from property and capital (e.g., profit, interest, and rent) for the period of 1972-75. On this note, see Table 17.
- 18 Annual Report and Balance Sheet, p. 20.
- 19 A more direct conclusion about changes in the real wage could have been made if more reliable data on money wage income were available.
- 20 According to the National Census of Population and Housing, November 1976, p. i, the service sector includes financing, insurance, real estate, and business services. In the same source, on p. g, "service workers" are classified as managers (catering and lodging services), housekeeping supervisors, cooks, waiters, bartenders, maids, building caretakers, cleaners, launderers, dry-cleaners and pressers, hairdressers, barbers, beauticians, and protective service workers (e.g., firefighters and the police). In this study, the aforementioned classifications are adopted by expanded to include teachers, clerical, sales, and related workers as well as petty commodity producers, such as those working in the home making a product and taking it to the market for sale.
- 21 Factors explaining the relatively higher expansion of the services and the absorption of the labor of women by this sector will be discussed below.

- 22 Sheila Rowbotham, Hidden From History (New York: Vintage, 1976); Alice Clark, The Working Life of Women in the Seventeenth Century (New York: A. M. Kelley, 1968); and Edith Abbott, Women in Industry: A Study in American History (New York: Arno, 1969).
- 23 E. Boserup explained this point to me in a conversation at the Wellesley Conference on Women and Development, Wellesley, Mass., June 1976.
- 24 Lourdes Arizpe, "Women and the Informal Labor Sector: The Case of Mexico City," Signs III:1 (Autumn 1977), pp. 26-28.
- 25 Ruth Milkman, "Women's Work," pp. 76-78.
- 26 D. Elson and R. Pearson, "The Latest Phase of the Internationalization of Capital and Its Implication for Women in the Third World," in The Subordination of Women and the Development Process (Sussex: Institute of Development Studies, forthcoming).
- 27 Lloyd, "The Discrimination of Labor."
- 28 Not only were jobs imported, but sexist ideologies that accompanied these jobs in the West came to Iran as well.
- 29 Lloyd, "The Discrimination of Labor," p. 16. Crowding not only guarantees higher profits, but also increases competition among workers.
- 30 Boserup, Women's Role, p. 111. 31 Ibid., p. 136.
- 32 Ibid., p. 140.
- 33 On the holdings of the Pahlavis, see the report provided by a financial reporter, Ann Crittenden, that was published in The New York Times, 10 January 1979.
- 34 For a detailed discussion of these concepts, see L. Ben-eria and G. Sen, "Accumulation, Reproduction and Women's Role in Economic Development: Boserup Revisited," a paper prepared for the Burg Waten-Stein Symposium, Austria, 2-10 August 1980 which has been subsequently revised and is being published in Signs, forthcoming.
- 35 Bill, The Politics. 36 See Setam Keshidegi-ye.

- 37 Rastkar, "Sokhanrani."
- 38 Moser-Khalili, "Urban Design," p. 20.
- 39 Ibid., p. 30; and "Bar-resi-ye Ijmali-ye Sharayet-e Zanan-e Kargar" [A Detailed Investigation of the Work Situation of Women Workers] (Tehran: Women's Organization of Iran, 1348/1969).
- 40 Moser-Khalili, "Urban Design," p. 33.
- 41 These remarks are based on my own observations.
- 42 This classification is based on my own observations.
- 43 Moser-Khalili, "Urban Design," p. 32.
- 44 Some of these material accessories include the ownership of two cars at a time, the luxuries of entertainment, and holiday vacations. Also see Moser-Khalili, "Urban Design," p. 42. It should be noted that not all the middle class women work for material purposes. A small portion of them are university and/or western-educated and work for their own "self-fulfillment." See Moser-Khalili, "Urban Design," p. 40.
- 45 On the notion of power, see C. B. MacPherson, The Real World of Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972).
- 46 The most well-known women of this class are former Princess Ashraf and the former Shahbanou Farah. While not holding any offices formally, these women participated informally in politics and headed many cultural, educational, and charity organizations. For example, former Empress Farah turned several old gardens into cultural centers (e.g., the old Bag-e Ferdos in Tehran), converted several houses in Kerman and Shiraz to museums, set up the Shiraz cultural festivals, headed many conferences, headed Farabi University in Tehran, and became an honorary head of the University of Tehran. In addition, she built the Carpet Museum, Negarestan Museum, and Farah Pahlavi Foundation in Tehran. I have been told that all the activities of Farah Pahlavi are recorded in a book that was printed by the Private Secretariat Office of Farah before the Revolution. On the socio-economic background and activities of ruling class women, see Iran Who's Who; Ashraf Pahlavi, Faces in a Mirror: Memoirs from Exile (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1980), and Chs. V and VI of this study.

- <sup>47</sup> It should be noted that Farah Diba, the daughter of a sergeant, not only became the Queen but also, by the proclamation of her husband the Shah, the Regent of Iran. This is a general rule for most married women in Iran in that the status of single women stems from their fathers or brothers and that of the widows from their late husbands.
- <sup>48</sup> The former Iranian Queen Soraya's book is enlightening on this point. See H.H. Soraya Pahlavi, The Autobiography.
- <sup>49</sup> A case in point is the female lawyer whom I met on one of the streets of Tehran. In need of cash, she almost begged me to buy some copies of her published books and pamphlets.
- <sup>50</sup> Boserup, Women's Role, Ch. 7. <sup>51</sup> Ibid., p. 174.
- <sup>52</sup> Rastkar, "Sokhanrani."
- <sup>53</sup> Ibid., p. 4. <sup>54</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>55</sup> This is a widespread belief in Iran: that menstruation causes much weakness in women, both in their minds and their bodies. As such, it is a major distinguishing factor that characterizes women as inferior to men and incapable of performing public duties. This view has an Islamic root too, See Mernissi, Beyond the Veil.
- <sup>56</sup> Rastkar, "Sokhanrani," p. 50.
- <sup>57</sup> Ibid., p. 50. <sup>58</sup> Ibid., pp. 14-15.
- <sup>59</sup> In the above study, some female interviewees had attested to discrimination based on their wages. See ibid., p. 13.
- <sup>60</sup> Heidi, Hartmann, "Capitalism, Patriarchy and Job Segregation by Sex," in Capitalist Patriarchy: The Case for Socialist-Feminism ed. Zillah R. Eisenstein (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1979), p. 208.
- <sup>61</sup> Rastkar, "Sokhanrani," pp. 4-6.
- <sup>62</sup> Ibid., p. 16. <sup>63</sup> Ibid., p. 14.

- <sup>64</sup> Similar views have been advanced by modern Iranian writers in the "motherhood thesis." The most typical representative of this approach is Habibollah Amuzegar. See his The Status of Women in the World.
- <sup>65</sup> For a provocative discussion of this point, see Rayna R. Reiter, ed., Toward an Anthropology of Women (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1975), and M. Z. Rosaldo and L. Lamphere, eds., Women, Culture and Society (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1974).
- <sup>66</sup> Boserup, Women's Role, p. 140.
- <sup>67</sup> Hartmann, "Capitalism, Patriarchy," p. 208.
- <sup>68</sup> Abbott, Women in Industry.
- <sup>69</sup> Rowbotham, Hidden; and Scott and Tilly, Women, Work.
- <sup>70</sup> See "The Sexual Division of Labor," p. 82.
- <sup>71</sup> Arizpe, "Women and," p. 29.
- <sup>72</sup> Scott and Tilly, Women, Work.
- <sup>73</sup> Boserup, Women's Role, p. 15.
- <sup>74</sup> Arizpe, "Women and," p. 29.
- <sup>75</sup> Youssef, "Women and Work," p. 75.
- <sup>76</sup> For the most recent and reliable data on marriage and divorce, see "Bar-resi-ye Amari-ye Ezderaj."
- <sup>77</sup> My own observation suggests that after the age of 30, a large number of married women leave the labor force. Tables 15 and 16 provide such information too. Leaving the labor force, however, does not mean that these women stop working for money. Indeed, some of these women are able to earn an income by taking orders from the middle and lower middle classes to make home-made food such as jams and pickles. Other women buy a sewing or knitting machine and make clothes for sale. In this way, while these women fail to be included in the labor force categories, they nevertheless continue to work at home both as housewives and earners of income.



<sup>78</sup> Moser-Khalili, "Urban Design," p. 37.

<sup>79</sup> Ibid., p. 40.

## CHAPTER V

### DIVISION OF LABOR AND GENDER ROLES WITHIN THE COMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY: THE NATIONAL IRANIAN RADIO AND TELEVISION AS A CASE STUDY

The preceding chapter focused on the impact of capitalist development on the position of urban Iranian women in the division of labor, production and reproduction. It considered subordination of women as a result of the continuation of women's paid and unpaid work and its relation to growth and capital accumulation. More concretely, the specific subordination of women in the labor force was not only related to class, gender and power relations, but also to the specific nature of the work place in terms of its significance to the reproduction of social relations in Iran.

The literature on labor force participation of Iranian women deals with statistical changes in six areas of employment for the period of 1956-76. First, it points out that as workers in industry, women were employed in large numbers in traditionally "female occupations" such as textiles, electronics, food

packaging and clothing industries, tea factories, and cottage industries such as carpets, gelim weaving, needlework of various types and certain handicrafts. Second, as teachers of primary and secondary schools and third, as nurses, the number of women in the work force significantly increased. This feature of female employment can be viewed as a continuation of traditional roles performed by women in female dominated fields. Fourth, in areas of "modern" and "mixed" jobs, urban women became primarily occupants of service-based positions such as secretarial and clerical workers. Fifth, a small number of women became involved in the arts, cinema, theatre, journalism and television. Sixth, insofar as professional and "top jobs" were concerned, less than eight percent of high level positions in Iranian industries, ministries, provincial governments, insurance companies, hospitals, universities and banks were held by women.<sup>1</sup> Commenting on women's employment, one Farsi study points out that although "the distribution of women in the job market is changing, the over-all structure is not changing very dramatically."<sup>2</sup> Beyond this emphasis on the distribution of women in the labor market, however, the literature devotes no discussion to factors that caused the sexual division of labor by class and its result for the maintenance and reproduction of capitalist social relations in Iran.

The purpose of this chapter is to study sex division of labor and gender roles in a modern organization, namely the National Iranian Radio and Television (NIRT) and its subsidiary unit, the Central Office of News and Information (CONI). The selection of NIRT was based upon an attempt to study class and gender relations in a modern Iranian organization. The occupational structure at NIRT had more similarities with other modern governmental organizations such as the Plan and Budget Organization than the more traditional ones, such as the State Organization for Employment and Administrative Affairs and the General Department of Civil Registration. The examination of the position of women in the more traditional organizations would render different conclusions since there seemed to be a much lower ratio of female employment and a higher degree of sex-typing occupations compared to the modern organizations. Conversely, because of the relatively higher labor force participation of women at different levels of the occupational structures and the prevalence of discrimination against women in modern organizations, the study of NIRT can shed light on the impact of capitalism on the position of women.

In addition, by performing its unique ideological function, the Iranian communications industry provides

a significant case study for the link between occupational segregation by class and gender and the larger issue of the maintenance and reproduction of capitalist social relations. Since women were segregated into specific jobs at NIRT, we may ask why were women segregated into specific jobs at NIRT? Why were they included in certain occupations and barred from other positions?

what extent did class and gender relations affect women's subordinated position? To what extent was occupational segregation by class and gender related to the specific nature of the communications industry in terms of its contribution to the maintenance and reproduction of social relations?

Hence, in the following, I will argue that the subordination of women at different levels of occupational structure was less significantly related to factors such as education, work experience, promotional matters, salary, the issues of capability and sexism than class and gender relations generated by the reproduction of capitalist relations of production and of repression. Thus, I will briefly examine the ideological role of the NIRT and its connection to the ruling class and state apparatus. I will, then, link this investigation to a detailed analysis of sex division of labor by class and gender in the NIRT and

CONI. Included in this analysis will be a study of the relevance of factors such as promotional matters, work experience, wages, and the issues of capability and sexism to occupational segregation in the NIRT and the CONI.

A portion of the data for this chapter will be based on interviews that I conducted in 1977 with employees and employers in various offices within the NIRT complex. A larger part of the study will be drawn from the data I gathered, computed, organized and translated from personnel files of a number of offices in NIRT. Data was also organized according to socio-economic background of female and male employees in high, middle and low level positions at CONI and NIRT. These data will serve as the basis of the analysis of occupational structure in the organization.

#### A. The Communications Industry and the Reproduction of Social Relations and Repression

In this section, I will focus on the role of the NIRT in reproduction of social relations and repression in order to proceed with the analysis of women's position in the occupational structure of the organization.

In discussing the process of reproduction, Marx concentrated on the reproduction of social relations in

capitalist societies.<sup>3</sup> Nicos Poulantzas linked reproduction of relations of production (labor processes and productive forces) to those of political and ideological relations.<sup>4</sup> Louis Althusser related the concept of reproduction to repression as an ideological tool of the state apparatus.<sup>5</sup> Based on these discussions, in this dissertation, repression will refer to a process of ideological reproduction aimed at the preservation and reproduction of social relations at a specific time and space. Hence, the communications industry will be used as an ideological apparatus of the state for the reproduction of repression and the maintenance of capitalist social relationships in Iran. As such, it contributed sharply to subordination of women in this organization.

The NIRT was established in 1971 when the National Radio (established in 1926) and the National Television (established in 1966) were merged. The NIRT was a state controlled organization. It was suggested to me that the NIRT programs were formed, organized and screened by the state and SAVAK. Moreover, the upper echelons in the organization were directly appointed by the Shah, his wife, their trustees or those approved by SAVAK. The head of the NIRT was Shahbanou Farah's cousin. A number of high level personnel in the NIRT

served as high officials in the Shah's Rastakhiz (Resurgence) Party--the only legal political party in the 1970's. The same high officials collaborated with SAVAK, the Rastakhiz Party, the Office of the Prime Minister and other powerful political organizations. In short, high level appointees in the NIRT served as linkages between the state, its security organs and other high public offices.

In this way, the NIRT contributed not only to the reproduction of capitalist social relations but also to those (relations) of repression. James Bill linked class relations to the preservation of power relations in Iran.<sup>6</sup> In order to keep the class structure intact, members of the political elite were placed in key positions. However, through a process of "conquest and cooption," the Shah and the political elite carefully chose those people who accepted "the prevailing methodology of power" for key political posts.<sup>7</sup> Hence, "mobility, especially into the ranks of the ruling class, has been directed from above."<sup>8</sup> In this way, "The Iran Novin Party and the Secret Police became especially significant in the 1960's as bureaucratic mobility channels through which numerous lower-to-middle class individuals were pulled to positions in the ruling class and political elite."<sup>9</sup> Bill contributed toward



illustrating the process of cooption as a mechanism of "system preservation," but he left untouched the role of ideology and specifically, that which was played by the mass media in the reproduction of repression.

The ideological role of the communications industry can best be understood from The NIRT Annual Report.<sup>10</sup> This source reveals that the main purpose of the NIRT was its "indispensible" role in "national development."<sup>11</sup> This meant that political, economic, cultural and educational issues were to be covered in accordance with "national aims." The success of this role lay in the fact that more than any Iranian medium "the NIRT influenced and addressed a large number of people."<sup>12</sup> Hence, the main purpose of the NIRT as spelled out in this report was to manipulate a great portion of the population with national developmental ideologies.

The CONI, a news service subsidiary of the NIRT, was greatly responsible for the performance of the ideological function of the organization. As such, it played a significant role in "political education"<sup>13</sup> programs. It also carried out many discussion programs on "the Resurgence of the Iranian People" (or the Shah's single Rastakhiz Party) that explained "ideological trends" as well as the meaning of "national unity" in Iran. In addition, it covered a large number of

programs devoted to book reviews and political discussions with the "purpose of explaining the inadequacies of communist systems; contradictions between Marxism in theory and practice; and . . . Communism within the context of world totalitarianism." In short, the CONI as a major subsidiary unit of the NIRT attempted to manipulate and reproduce the ideology of "national development,"<sup>14</sup> or capitalism, for the purpose of "public participation in the destiny of the Rastakhiz Party (upon the Shah's request)."<sup>15</sup> In addition, the industry attempted to discredit and destroy alternative ideologies which stood in contradiction to capitalist ideologies which accompanied western development.<sup>16</sup>

In this way, the Iranian communications industry received initial financial support from the World Bank. According to the World Bank Annual Reports, the World Bank helped finance Iran's telecommunications programs during the first and second years of the Fifth Plan (1973-78). It made a loan of \$82 million to improve telecommunication connections between Tehran and 60 provincial centers and 80 towns and villages en route. The total cost was \$194 million, of which Iran was to be responsible for \$82 million.<sup>17</sup> These large loans suggest that western capitalism was inseparable from the NIRT and the shaping of the Iranian communications industry.

Ahmad Faroughy spelled out the link between Iranian radio and television as an ideological repressive mechanism, and imperialist and capitalist ideologies. He stated that<sup>18</sup>

[The] Iranian mass media have become one giant translating machine, its press swamped by American articles chosen from conformist American papers, its radio and television feeding off American programs, whether news, documentary, fiction or (carefully selected) theatrical works. For it must be clear that the Western cultural penetration in Iran is a carefully censored one: only those cultural endeavors which help to uphold imperialist and capitalist ideology are permitted to enter.  
 . . . [Emphasis added.]

Faroughy, thus, relates Iranian repression through the media to imperialism. How and why relations of repression were reproduced in the media remains to be studied. To elucidate this point, I wish to suggest studying these relations within the context of the sexual division of labor and gender relations in the organization. As such, it will be the discussion of the subsequent section.

#### B. Labor Force Participation and Sex Division of Labor in the NIRT and the CONI

In the previous section I discussed the role of the communications industry on the reproduction of class and power relations in Iran. I also showed the

role of the NIRT in the reproduction of capitalism and ideological repression. As such, it was linked to Western imperialist ideologies which were themselves parallel to Iran's integration within the world capitalist market. In order to develop a more concrete insight into the factors which contributed to the reproduction of these relations in the NIRT, in this section I will focus on labor force participation in the organization. Subsequently, I will discuss the division of labor in the CONI.

As the available data show, in 1973 the employment pattern at the NIRT was as follows<sup>19</sup>: in Tehran, the largest NIRT center, the total employed population consisted of 2,729 personnel. Of these, there were 2,127 males and 592 females. In other city centers of NIRT the total employed population was 1,343, of whom 1,153 were men and 190 women. The total of the NIRT employed population (in Tehran and other cities) was therefore 4,072, comprised of 3,280 men and 782 women, or 4.5 times more men than women.

The aforementioned figures indicate that at the NIRT in 1973, the number of employed males was much higher than that of females. This disparity was 3.7 to 1 in Tehran, 6 to 1 in other cities, and 4 to 1 in the entire NIRT (Table 32).

What factors explain this unequal ratio of male to female employment at the NIRT in 1973? Some interviews suggested that the nature of the organization was the main reason for this disparity. Some said that prior to the merger, the National Radio was considered a "traditional" organization, not inclined to hire many women except professionals such as announcers, musicians, singers, and a few others. The National Television, on the other hand, was regarded as a "modern" organization more receptive to the employment of women. After the merger, however, the National Television, which had a high number of employed females, influenced the NIRT to increase the number of its female personnel. Some interviewees thought that in 1973 the number of employed women seemed relatively much less than men. Yet such a disparity was considered a step forward toward increasing women's activities at the NIRT, especially compared to the employment pattern of either of the organizations prior to the merger.<sup>20</sup> In other words, since the National Television was more open to equal employment opportunity than the National Radio, the newer organization had passed onto the combined NIRT its modern policies. This explains why occupational segregation at the NIRT in 1973 seemed to be declining in comparison to the years prior to the merger.

If the NIRT, because of its modern orientation, was promoting higher opportunity for female employment, how did the employment pattern look in the following years? In mid 1977,<sup>21</sup> in Tehran, the NIRT employed a total of 4,885 people. Of these, 3,715 were men and 1,170 women. In other cities the total employed NIRT population was 2,979 at this time, composed of 2,621 males and 358 females. The total employed NIRT population (Tehran and other cities combined) was 7,854, of whom 6,336 were men and 1,478 women. The ratio of the employed male to female population in Tehran, other cities, and NIRT as a whole were 3:1, 8:1, and 4:1 respectively. This ratio indicates that in 1977, six years after the inauguration of the NIRT, the number of employed males remained four times the number of the employed female population in the organization (Table 35). Thus, while the total employed male to female population at NIRT had been doubled from 1973 to 1977, the ratio of the employed male to female population had remained constant for the same period. This pattern, however, varied regionally. In Tehran the ratio of employed males to females declined by almost .7 percent, reaching 3:1 in 1977 against 3.7:1 in 1973. This means that while in the period of four years (1973-77), female employment had almost doubled,

male employment had not risen as much in Tehran. In contrast, in other cities, the ratio of employed males to females rose by almost 2 percent, reaching 8:1 in 1977 against 6:1 in 1973. This indicates that while in this period of four years female employment in other cities had risen only .5 percent, male employment had grown 2.3 percent.

Consequently, in spite of the fact that the number of personnel had been doubled at NIRT in this period, the pattern of occupational segregation had remained constant. The number of the employed female population at NIRT had become higher and the ratio of the employed male to female population at NIRT had remained intact. Therefore, what factors explain unequal labor force participation of women and men as well as its continuation at NIRT? Did this pattern prevail in other organizational units of NIRT? If so, why and how?

To investigate these questions, I consulted a survey that was conducted in CONI within the larger unit of Tehran NIRT. In 1975, CONI had 515 employees.<sup>22</sup> Of these, 365 were men and 150 women. This indicates that in 1975, at CONI, the ratio of employed men to women was 2.5:1. In other words, there were more than twice as many men as women at CONI in 1975 (Table 34).

The ratio of males to females at CONI was nearly identical with that of Tehran NIRT in the same year. The ratio of male to female representation for the former was 2.5:1 and for the latter 3:1.<sup>23</sup> The similar ratio of male to female employees in these cases remains indicative of a representation of sexes in either of the units of the organization. Indeed, this observation suggests that, while both Tehran NIRT and CONI had a proportionally larger number of female employees than the entire NIRT, there was yet a continuation of occupational segregation from the larger to the smaller unit of the organization. Occupational aggregation is not only an indication of a disproportionate number of men to women employees in this case, it is also a demonstration of women's exclusion<sup>24</sup> from certain positions and their inclusion in others.<sup>25</sup> As demonstrated by data on occupational distribution, the CONI positions closed to women were located at the very high and very low ranks.<sup>26</sup> The former consisted of positions such as director, chief of the Secretariat, supervisors and division heads. The latter, also exhibiting lack of female personnel were: xeroxers, storekeepers, drivers and mail personnel. All positions occupied by the female employees at CONI were middle level ranks. Women were among the analysts, monitors,



assistant sound producers, secretaries, new correspondents, translators, assistant translators, assistant graphic artists, assistant analysts, assistant film directors, operators, operators-telex, news personnel, announcers, administrative personnel, accounting personnel, stage secretaries, other secretaries and typists. Among the middle level positions, women were crowded into several ranks which showed no female personnel. These ranks were sound producers, graphic assistants, photographers, and calligraphers (Table 35).

What factors explain women's exclusion from high and low level positions, and their inclusion in middle level ones? To begin with, the selection of the employees at CONI was based upon NIRT rules of employment. This selection was dependent on examination scores, sometimes accompanied by interviews. Thereafter, employees were evaluated in accordance to "the salary evaluation sheet"<sup>27</sup> for the purpose of rank determination, salary and promotions. The salary evaluation sheet consisted of the following provisions: "personal evaluation," which ranked individual's academic background, non-academic experiences and expertise in Farsi and foreign languages. The employees were also ranked in accordance to "work evaluation" which was based on work experiences. Third, "exceptional characteristics" were evaluations applied

to those with special qualifications. Finally, "extra-ordinaries" applied to those who were ranked for special privileges in housing and salaries.

The salary evaluation sheet, as observed, was inadequate to clarify two points. On the one hand, as shown in the personnel files, the salary evaluation sheet was mainly applied to positions below the rank of directors. In this way, it failed to demonstrate selection criteria for those who obtained positions as directors and above. On the other hand, the salary evaluation sheet contained universal rules for promotional procedures only at certain occupational levels: middle and lower ranks. It thus lacked standards on which decisions regarding promotions to high level positions might be based. On the whole, employment policies at CONI and NIRT were based on the salary evaluation sheet, though they seemed to be dependent upon achievement scores--at least for positions below the rank of directors--they did not reflect equal promotion policies to higher level positions. Therefore, what factors influenced promotion policies to high level positions at CONI? Specifically, to what extent was occupational segregation at the high levels reflective of promotional policies? To what extent did it relate to education, work experience, salary, the issues of capability and

sexism? What roles did class, gender and power-based inequalities play? To what extent did these inequalities relate to the nature of communications industry as a mechanism for the reproduction of social relations and of repression in the society? In order to deal with these issues I will analyze, in the following section, the division of labor at various levels of occupational categories at CONI.

### 1. Exclusion of Women from High Level

#### Positions

In an attempt to study the exclusion of women from high level positions at CONI, I first gathered socio-economic data on the background of personnel at this unit. The data included variables such as rank, education, duration of work at NIRT, marital status, age and salary. I separated the socio-economic data into ranks of directors (the highest position of men at CONI), and analysts (occupying a much lower position than the directors, but holding the highest rank for women at CONI). I designated males as X and females as Y.

The socio-economic data organized by the sequence of salary, reveals that the educational background of male directors at CONI includes eleventh grade ( $X_2$ ), Bachelor's Degree ( $X_1$ ), and Master's Degree ( $X_3$ ).

In contrast, the educational background of the female analysts ranges from Master's Degree ( $Y_4$ ) to two doctorates ( $Y_1$  and  $Y_2$ ). Female analysts were better educated than male directors. In terms of work experience at NIRT, however, one director served for 22 years ( $X_1$ ), another for seven years ( $X_2$ ), and the third for six years ( $X_3$ ). The analysts had the work background of six years ( $Y_4$ ), three years ( $Y_1$ ), and three years ( $Y_2$ ). Men had more experience than women. This was also reflected in the different salaries. The range of salary for directors is from 62,100 rials ( $X_1$ ) to 72,300 rials ( $X_2$ ) to 90,000 rials ( $X_3$ ). For the analysts, the salaries range from 51,800 rials ( $Y_4$ ) to 57,000 rials ( $Y_2$ ) to 59,850 rials ( $Y_1$ ). The ages of the directors ranged from 44 ( $X_1$ ) to 38 ( $X_3$ ) to 30 ( $X_2$ ). The age range of the analysts was from 39 ( $Y_1$ ) to 31 ( $Y_2$ ) with one case not reported. Differentials in age show that the directors were older than the analysts and had a longer experience on the job market. All the directors and the analysts were married. Given the sexual division of labor in the Iranian households, this latter point indicates that while the directors had responsibility for one job, the analysts had a double load of work (inside and outside of the home). Moreover, the fact that the female analysts

were married and had children indicate that household activities did not necessarily prevent women from working outside the home. Overall, the above analysis shows that the males promoted to the rank of directors were, in general, less educated, older, and earned more than the female analysts at CONI. However, the directors had a much longer work experience than the female analysts (Tables 36 and 37).

A number of points can be discerned from the above analysis. First, as the data indicates, there is no necessary relationship between the wage, education and promotion to high level positions. The evidence shows that highly educated Iranian women had lower ranks and received lower wages than men. In this case, wages were inversely related to education but positively correlated with experience. Higher wages tended to be concentrated among men with more experience. Women tended to be more educated than men while men had more experience than women. Thus, higher wages are an indication of sex-typing occupations related to gender inequalities. Second, the data fails to point out a positive relationship between education and promotion. This stands in contradiction to the modernization approach to problems of Third World women as pioneered by Boserup.

In discussing marginalization of women in the process of development, Boserup states that marginalization through "polarization and hierarchization of men's and women's work roles is only found in the modern, urban economy."<sup>29</sup> Boserup's solution to this problem is education of women, a solution which was shared by Iranian planners and policy-makers whom I interviewed. As the Iranian case shows, women at CONI were not promoted to ranks obtained by less educated men. In addition, as it is suggested by the above data, women with doctoral degrees were not granted positions equal to those given to men of lower educational background. It, therefore, seems that higher education is not a satisfactory factor guaranteeing women equal pay and promotion to high level ranks.

If education is not a significant factor, can work experience explain women's exclusion from promotion to high positions? According to the above socio-economic data, one director ( $X_1$ ) with 22 years experience started as a director of NIRT in one of the provinces and continued as a news director, until he became the director of the T.V. news. The second director ( $X_2$ ), with seven years of experience, started as an economic correspondent for News and Information, continued as a news correspondent, and later as a supervisor of

the Internal News Group before he became director of the First Program of T.V. News. The third director ( $X_3$ ), with six years experience, started as a member of the Research Group, and continued as director of the Research Group until he became the director of CONI and the Research Group. In contrast to all the male directors who started from lower positions before reaching the higher posts, all the female analysts started as analysts and continued to remain analysts. These observations suggest that, since directors served for a longer time than the analysts, they obtained promotion to higher positions. Nevertheless, as Tables 36 and 37 show, there is one exception to this pattern. In one case, a female analyst ( $Y_4$ ) had the same amount of work background as one of the directors ( $X_3$ ); yet she was not promoted as were men with more experience. It seems, therefore, that work background does not guarantee women equal rank to men in the occupational structure.

In the course of the interviewing, the inability of women to attain leadership positions was referred to as an important factor causing them to be excluded from promotion to high level ranks. One male respondent asserted that, in order to be capable, women had to "prove" themselves and their potentials before promotion

to higher ranks. What criteria were used to measure the capability of female personnel? Education, as it has been stated, did not appear to be universally applicable, particularly in the case of a female analyst ( $Y_2$ ) who had a short work experience but was a head analyst supervising and leading a group of other female and male analysts. In spite of ambiguities, the example of the female head analyst suggests that when opportunities are granted, women are capable of leadership positions. This means that performance on a given job can be best measured after, not necessarily before, opportunities for high level positions are made.

If issues of education, work experience and capabilities are equivocal in clarifying conditions for promotion to high level positions, then to what extent is women's exclusion from high ranks related to practices of sexism? Sexism is defined as "inferiorization (actual and attitudinal) on one sex by the other."<sup>30</sup> In this study, sexism is referred to as inferiorization of women by men. It connotes a mode of power relationship prevalent in social structures from the family to the organization of the society as a whole. The form of sexism, however, varies from one society to another.

Can sexism in a "modern" male-dominated organization prevent women from moving up to higher ranks? CONI



being an example of a social organization, does not seem to embody an exceptional pattern. Some of the women I interviewed at CONI perceived sexist practices in the job environment. A highly influential male interviewee at CONI implicitly denied the existence of sexism. However, he showed his definite preference for giving priority to the employment of male personnel over female with the same qualifications applying for similar positions. His reason for such a preference assumed the superior reliability and availability of the male applicant.

Perhaps the prevalence of this assumption is not isolated from the problem of unavailability of women for positions requiring extra office time. All the female and male respondents concurred on this point. This was also confirmed in an attitudinal study conducted by NIRT in 1976. In that study, most of the male and female interviewees had regarded household duties as the most important problem facing Iranian women. Therefore, what is the relationship of woman's work outside the home to her responsibilities and work in the home? To what extent is the low status of women at work related to her household activities?

Gender roles cannot be analyzed in isolation from work processes within a specific context. On the

other hand, it is fruitful to study women's work as an integrated and related phenomenon within the totality of society. In Iran, the woman's role has been primarily defined in terms of housework and motherhood. Habiballah Amuzegar, in The Status of women in the World<sup>31</sup> spelled out this position. He stated that "The most characteristic and main reason for woman's being lies in her naturally prescribed maternal and child-rearing activities."<sup>32</sup> The reasons for this argument are that women are less intelligent than men;<sup>33</sup> women lack scientific talent;<sup>34</sup> women are not attentive to ideas and public issues such as social cooperation, equality, humanity and social welfare;<sup>35</sup> women are not nationalists;<sup>36</sup> and finally, women are not interested in power.<sup>37</sup>

As opposed to these qualities that women do not have, Amuzegar postulates a number of "female" characteristics: women are more patient and exert more self control than men;<sup>38</sup> women are more selfish than men because they have less qualitative and quantitative needs than men;<sup>39</sup> women are more jealous than men;<sup>40</sup> women's main interest in power is power over the husband's heart;<sup>41</sup> women are tricky creatures;<sup>42</sup> women have strong will power but it is not mixed with wisdom;<sup>43</sup> women are weak, fearful, feeble, revengeful, competitive, dependent and emotional;<sup>44</sup> and finally, women are fit for work

at home because they are moody, weak and physically unable to do hard work. Women must, therefore, stay home<sup>45</sup> to take care of the husband and children. Housework, as Amuzegar states, is the work of women who must not be replaced by men, for men are incapable of doing housework.<sup>46</sup> Moreover, because women are more inclined toward love and friendship, they are better fit for the home than men. Finally, because the basis of all women's pleasure is love, she does not enjoy anything but that which is related to love: children, husband and household matters.<sup>47</sup>

Amuzegar's perspectives on the position of women, though scientifically unsubstantiated and historically inaccurate, are but one expression of male hegemony at the expense of the subordination of women in Iran. The historically rooted ideology of male superiority and the actual assignment of women to the home deprived them of the social knowledge and social education which were monopolized by the world of men outside of the home. It is not, therefore, surprising to experience that "the isolation from which women have suffered has confirmed to society and to themselves the myth of female incapacity<sup>48</sup> and unavailability; hence, the detachment from serious responsibilities created and controlled by men. Despite this detachment, Iran's capitalist market absorbed the labor of women. Never-

theless, this process assigned to women dual responsibilities composed of two positions: one as an unpaid domestic laborer and the other as an employee experiencing subjugation by both class and gender inequalities. In this way, the assertion of the CONI official regarding the preference of the male applicant due to the unavailability of women not only reflects sexism but also ignores patriarchal relations which enable men a high degree of mobility and availability compared to women. As such, however, it fails to make women available for paid work, especially under the economic pressures of capitalism which was discussed in the previous chapter. Clearly, then, women's lack of promotion to high level positions at CONI was linked to work experience; the possibility of gaining this experience, however, was generally denied to women as a sex, compared to men.

To confirm these issues, it was important to have the opinion of the highest ranking women at CONI. Thus, an attempt was made to conduct an interview with a few female analysts whose educational status was at least equivalent to that of male directors at CONI.<sup>49</sup>

These educated women at CONI identified themselves as middle class. They disagreed with the two male interviewees on most of the issues. They believed

that their exclusion from high level administrative positions were due to:

- a) the prevalence of sexism in the office;
- b) the lack of promotional opportunities to women;
- c) the lack of connections to authorities in higher echelons;
- d) the lack of incentives to push for promotion since they were not seriously attended;
- e) the performance of a more qualitative work than men in similar positions (this had kept women in their posts, but had helped less qualified men to be promoted to higher positions); and finally
- f) the lack of availability for extra office work time due to family responsibilities [emphasis added].

In the above interview, "the lack of connections to authorities," in the Iranian context, refers to the lack of class connections; hence, to subordination of women by class. Other remarks are also in accord with a more comprehensive study conducted by the Women's Organization of Iran. In that study, the female respondents had remarked that, compared to men, "opportunities are never equal" for them and, moreover, "it is always more difficult for a woman;" and it takes longer for them to be recognized on the job. These respondents had also stated that women have to work much harder to prove their competence.<sup>50</sup> Furthermore, many of them were concerned with the fact they were not taken

seriously on the job<sup>51</sup> and, for that reason, they encountered many difficulties in gaining men's cooperation. Clearly, then, the subordinated position of these women was related to their place in class and gender-based hierarchies. As such, it was reinforced by the performance of domestic labor in the household which prevented them from spending extra time on office work.

In order to have a wider range of data, a male director from NIRT who was in a position to make decisions, to set policy, and to hire staff, was interviewed, too. This director believed that in general Iranian women had made significant progress in the job market over the past few years. But he attributed the lack of female personnel in high positions to:

- a) unavailability of women for serious, responsible and time consuming positions;
- b) women's lack of devotion;
- c) their lack of discipline;
- d) their lack of incentive to push for progress and promotion;
- e) their inability to make right decisions at the right time;
- f) their lack of belief in professionalism which is related to women's preoccupation with the family; and
- g) the undesirability of having to make the investment in single as well as married women--the former quits her job once she

is married and the latter is always thinking of children and household matters.

The same respondent attributed the success of the three NIRT women as directors to the following reasons:

- a) individual's capability;
- b) work experience;
- c) social background and situation;
- d) education; and
- e) extenuating circumstances [emphasis added].

The director was also of the opinion that women must actually "prove" their competence before a high ranking post is offered to them. He seemed to be concerned with the case of a female minister who had been replaced due to alleged misconduct. However, he remained silent about the Iranian battle against corruption in offices held by men. At any rate, the implication of his view on demonstration of competence prior to promotion is that there is an underlying assumption that women are not considered equal to men and that there is an implicit assumption that men were assumed to be competent while women still had to show their competence. Such a view reflects a functional view based on biology which I discussed in the previous chapter.

Significantly, the male director's views on the reasons for the success of female directors in terms of "extenuating circumstances" is more indicative of the class background of these women rather than any other factors.<sup>52</sup> According to personnel files, the level of educational background of these women ranged from high school diplomas to bachelors degrees. They all had long work experiences. They were, moreover, described by interviewees as disciplined and hard working women. The only differentiating factor which contributed to the position of female directors as opposed to female analysts seemed to be their class background. According to interviewees, these women were married to men in high public offices. More specifically, one of these female directors was related to the royal family. It appeared, then, that class background was a crucial factor determining the high level position of women at NIRT.

It should be borne in mind that my focus on class background is not to ignore the significance of the work experience and the capability factor in the attainment of high positions by women. Clearly, these women were qualified for the high level positions they held. Without their class background, however, these women would not have obtained their positions. The educated



and capable analysts "without connections" did not certainly advance to similar positions. This means that both the class background and the factor of competence counted for the position of these women. Put differently, capable women from a ruling class background performed similar functions as men at high levels. Ability was necessary but not sufficient to allow women to advance in the ranks of NIRT. A ruling class background was also required for women to attain higher ranks.

For men, on the other hand, experience alone might have been sufficient. Most men in high level positions, in contrast to women in similar ranks, came from lower and middle class background. In discussing mobility of lower and middle class individuals to high level positions in Iran, Bill referred to the process of cooptation.<sup>53</sup> Such a policy continued throughout the 1970's. By then, "The Shah and the political elite [had] developed a policy of offering incentives, particularly of an economic nature, to those who challenged the system."<sup>54</sup> Data showed that a number of male directors came from lower and middle class backgrounds. These men, according to interviewees, had strong connections to SAVAK and the Rastakhiz Party. Hence, through direction from "above," the male

directors joined the ruling class and political elite by their place in key positions.

The attainment of membership in the ruling class apparatus involved the attainment of a position in the power structure apparatus of the society. The communications industry was a state apparatus for the reproduction of social relations and of repression. The lower and middle class men who joined the ruling class through their positions at NIRT became directly involved in making decisions concerning the shaping of the parameters of the society. Therefore, the attainment of high level positions by male directors was not related to class background inasmuch as it was due to their ability to integrate the specific functions of CONI to reinforce repression dictated by the ruling class. Thus, lower and middle class men joined female directors from ruling class backgrounds at high level positions. In this way, sex division of labor by class was constituted and reproduction of the social relations and those of repression was maintained.

To further delve into sex division of labor by class and gender roles in the organization, I conducted an interview with a female director at NIRT. The interview proceeded as follows:

- Q. Why is it that in Iran, and specifically at the NIRT, the relative number of women to men in high posts is so low?

- A. Because of governmental policies and lack of opportunities for women.
- Q. Under what circumstances are women appointed as directors at the NIRT?
- A. Personal skill and qualifications such as higher education, executive competence, and ability to plan for short and long-term policies.
- Q. What factors at the NIRT prevent women from progressing to higher positions?
- A. Women themselves. Women have a lower resistance than men. They are close minded and they have not been able to separate outside of home activities from family responsibilities. Women must, therefore, be aggressive, prove their competence, continuously educate themselves and persistently stand behind their jobs.
- Q. Are men at the NIRT prejudiced against women's employment, and especially against their appointment to high level ranks?
- A. All societies are patriarchal and Iran is no exception.
- Q. Should the NIRT increase the number of its female employees? Are there vacancies for women?
- A. It is not necessary to employ women simply because they are women. The organization needs qualified people be they male or female. Capable women are yet to be seen at the NIRT.
- Q. How do you perceive your job?
- A. Very time consuming and much underpaid.
- Q. If your job is time consuming, do you manage your household activities? If so, how?
- A. To look after children and to have two responsibilities is very difficult. I am

lucky to have help with the house-work.

Q. What of those women employees who are not so priveleged?

Q. True. They do have problems.

The significance of this interview lies in its similarities with the previous one. Both the male and female directors appeared to be in agreement on questions of prerequisites of women's appointment to high level positions, obstacles to women's progress, and the issue of widening opportunities to women. They both concurred on the issues of competence, capability, and preferentials. Such moderate similarities of views implies that an upper class female in a high position might mirror attitudes that are encountered by men in parallel posts. Obviously, wider interviews with women might reveal a greater range of opinion. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy to see the extent to which upper class women in high positions may perceive themselves as part of the male establishment and consequently separate from other women--to which we shall return in the following chapter.

The work position which allies upper class women with the male establishment against other women indicates a sharper division among women by class and, hence, their further subordination. Bearing a resemblance to this proposition is the finding of a study on the

employment of women. In a more extensive interview with women in the higher echelons of the public and private sectors in Iran, the study had concluded that those women considered their achievements as a personal triumph. They, moreover, had regarded themselves closer to their male counterparts "rather than seeing themselves [as] a larger part of the female community."<sup>55</sup> These women preferred to deal with men because men were said to make decisions more rapidly and to be more inclined to respect women's professional competence.<sup>56</sup> The study had also found that these women regarded themselves "in a class apart from other females,"<sup>57</sup> for they had stated that the "girl packers are satisfied to remain packers and the girl clerks are satisfied remaining clerks."<sup>58</sup> However, the study pointed out that "the professional struggle to "make it", or the desire to shed the traditional female image, seemed to be sufficiently preoccupying to leave little room for wider concerns. Among women of the upper middle class, there was rarely a reference to working class women."<sup>59</sup> The study concluded that "The chasm between the two remains considerable." Such remarks show the sharpening of divisions among women by class in a society that was increasingly integrating into world capitalism.

In all, the exclusion of women from high level positions at NIRT and CONI represents a negative relationship between promotional procedures and the wider issue of reproduction of social relations. In the Iranian communications industry, better educated women received lower wages than men. Despite their relatively low work experience, these women demonstrated their capability and availability. However, they failed to be promoted to higher positions. Only women from the upper classes with competence and lower education were appointed to high level positions. In this way, a class division was created among women. In addition, by performing similar functions as men, a small number of upper class women joined the male establishment in reproducing social relations. However, these women were generally from a higher class than men in this occupation of repression. As such, sex and class differences among directors functioned to reproduce repression at NIRT at middle level positions.

## 2. Inclusion of Women in Middle Level Positions

In contrast to the demonstration of women's virtual exclusion from high level positions at CONI, the data on occupational distribution showed women in the middle level ranks. If women were barred from

high level positions at CONI, how and why were they represented at middle level occupations? And, what factors account for their inclusion within the middle strata?

To investigate these questions, an attempt was made to study the socio-economic background of the middle level personnel at CONI. Similar data, such as those on personnel in high ranks, were gathered. The data was organized in such a way that, using three different samples, data was drawn from three different ranks in accordance to the correspondances of the employees in their educational status and work background at CONI. In this fashion, then, an attempt was made to organize the data based on the following ranks: analysts with mainly doctorate and master's degrees; news personnel with Bachelor's degrees, and typists with only high school education.<sup>60</sup>

Among the selected analysts (Tables 37 and 38), in one comparison-pair ( $X_1$  and  $Y_1$ ), both the male and the female personnel have an almost identical background in terms of the number of years worked at the office and educational status. The male analyst, however, has a salary higher than that of the female. In the second comparison-pair ( $X_4$  and  $Y_3$ ), the work backgrounds of the male and the female analysts are similar. Nevertheless, the salary of the male is higher, although

his level of education is lower than that of the female counterpart. In the third instance ( $X_3$  and  $Y_4$ ), both the analysts have the same work background. However, the salary of the female analyst is slightly higher and her educational status is superior to the male analyst's. In the fourth example ( $X_2$  and  $Y_2$ ), the female has one year less work background but higher salary and educational status than the male analyst. Hence, given identical work experiences, the women received lower salaries than men unless they had superior education. In this case, the wage is an indication of gender inequality in the labor market.

The data also shows that the age range of the female analysts is between 32 and 40. This means that highly educated women, because of the time they spend on educational attainment, enter the labor market at later ages than those who obtain lower schooling. The data, moreover, indicates that all the female analysts were married. This is, again, a manifestation of women's dual responsibility: one as unpaid housewife and the other as paid employee. The data source does not shed much light on the marital status of men. However, to be married or unmarried would not critically affect the work load of men, for their primary responsibility is a paid job located outside the home.



Furthermore, the above indicated that higher education has been a significant factor in securing women their positions as analysts. Education, on the other hand, has not guaranteed women equal salary with men. In the case of the men, however, higher education does not appear to be a prominent factor in explaining their positions as analysts or their higher salary relative to those of women. Therefore, based upon the fact that the female analysts were not promoted to higher positions since the inception of their jobs, the point can be made that, insofar as middle level positions are concerned, higher education is a significant factor that guarantees specific positions at the time of entrance into the organization. But, as exemplified in the top ranks, higher education is not a sufficient factor in securing women promotion to higher levels. Conversely, for male analysts and most of the male directors, work experience tends to compensate for higher education in promotional matters.

Among the selected News Personnel (Tables 39 and 40), in one comparison-pair ( $X_1$  and  $Y_1$ ), both the male and female have identical educational levels. They vary, however, in their work background and salaries. The female has served a longer time and receives a slightly higher salary than the male. In the second

instance ( $X_2$  and  $Y_2$ ), both the male and female have the same educational and work background. They differ, however, in salary. The female receives a much higher salary. In the third sample ( $X_3$  and  $Y_4$ ), both the male and female have equal status in education, work experience and salary. The final comparison-pair ( $X_4$  and ( $Y_4$ ), shows diversities in all the variables. The male is much less educated but has a much longer work background and makes a higher salary. In addition, all the female news personnel are single as opposed to only one unmarried male news-person. The age range of the females is between 28 to 29; the age range of the men is between 30 and 38.

The news personnel data indicates that while the educational background of both males and females are somewhat the same, they diverge in work experience and salary. The females, on the whole, have a longer work experience and higher salary than the males. Therefore, in a fashion similar to the situation of the analysts, the role of education seems to be important for the news personnel in obtaining positions at the time of entrance into the organization. However, by itself, education does not appear to be influential in defining the present position ( $X_4$ ) or salaries ( $Y_1$  and  $Y_2$ ) of the news personnel.

In the third sample, among the selected typists (Tables 41 and 42), in one comparison-pair ( $X_1$  and  $Y_1$ ), both the male and female have identical educational degrees and work experience: the female, however, has a slightly higher salary because of her specialization in typing in two languages. In the second instance ( $X_2$  and  $Y_2$ ), the female is better educated and makes a higher salary, but her work experience is less than her male counterpart's. The final example ( $X_4$  and  $Y_4$ ) shows diversities in all the variables. The male is much less educated but has a much longer work experience and a much higher salary than the female.

Not much information is available regarding the marital status of the female typists (except the personal knowledge I gathered on one who was single at the time of her entrance, but retained her position in the organization after her marriage). This example contrasts to the assertion of the male director interviewed who implied that, though not universally, single women on the job do not stay after marriage. With respect to the age of the typists, the data shows a range of 23 to 29 for the female and 30 to 60 for the male. This data demonstrates the relatively younger age of the females than males in lower-middle levels of NIRT positions. Hence, as the case of typists shows, age

differences are an indication of sex-typing occupations related to gender inequalities.

Overall, the socio-economic data on the typists shows that all the female typists are better educated but have shorter work experience than their male counterparts. However, all the selected female typists have higher salaries than the males, except in one case where the work experience of the male is much longer than that of the female. Hence, in a manner similar to the situation of the analysts and news personnel, education seems to play a significant role in securing a specific position and salary at the time of entrance into the organization but, by itself, education does not appear to guarantee promotion to higher ranks. The work experience, however, becomes an important factor substituting education as a criteria for advancement to higher levels.

On the whole, the analysis of the middle level positions suggests three points. First, unlike the high level positions, the issues of capability and sexism do not seem to constitute obstacles to the promotion of women within middle level occupations.

To recall, the criteria used for the selection and promotion of all middle level employees fall within the standards of the salary evaluation sheet. Nevertheless, as it was stated, such criteria are not

universally applicable to the ranks of director and above. On this basis, due to the fact that women at middle level ranks are not easily promoted to high levels, they seem to be immune from discriminatory channels in existence for the promotion of female personnel to high level positions. Middle level positions, in contrast to high level ranks are, thus, more gender than class based.

Second, the fact that middle level women are relatively better educated but less experienced in work background than men shows that while the former obtain their skills and qualifications for a position through education, the latter acquire them through work experience. This means that in the long run, the cost of hiring women is lower than men. Women spend time and money to acquire education and skills before joining the labor market. Men enter the labor force with relatively lower education and acquire skills through work experience which obtains them a salary equivalent to educated women, or higher. In this way, skilled female workers benefit employers by the quality of their labor power which was paid for by the women themselves and not the owners of the organization. As such, it suggests a possibility of a reverse correlation between education and skill as a prerequisite

for job attainment; and hence a possibility for the negation of views that relate women's lack of participation in the job market to their lack of education and skill. On the whole, skill does not seem to be intrinsically dependent upon education. Certainly, the case of men proves this and the case of women contradicts it. Moreover, men's socialization for the workforce occurs primarily at the workplace; women's, however, takes place in formal school settings, when they are among the statistically small number of women who work a paid job outside the home.

Third, the inclusion of women in middle level positions suggests a further insight into the pattern of sex division of labor by class within the overall structure of occupations at CONI and NIRT. This is exemplified by the occupational distribution data (Table 35) which shows that the representation of women is lower, the higher the level of position in CONI. Conversely, the representation of women is highest in lower-middle levels. This point can be shown by the proportional number of male to female personnel from the high to low ranks at the middle level positions. At the highest middle level rank, the analysts are represented by 7 males and 4 females, at the middle rank, the news personnel are composed of 50 males and 25 females, and at the lowest, the typists, there are 13 males

and 20 females. In short, the closer occupational ranks were to high level positions, the lower was the degree of representation of women at CONI. Conversely, the closer occupational ranks were to the levels responsible for the reproduction of social relations and of repression, the higher was the degree of male representation.

In all, the inclusion of women in middle level positions and their exclusion from high ranks offer further explanations to the understanding of occupational segregation by class and gender at CONI. To the extent that, due to "modernization" processes, some organizations were expanding, new vacancies were created for additional personnel, preferably skilled. This process, on the one hand, pulled both men and women into the organization. On the other hand, new responsibilities were created for promotions to higher levels. At middle level positions these promotions were gender related and primarily granted to men, who had entered the organization much earlier than women. Women, as new participants in the paid market, though educated, became crowded into the middle level positions since they lacked class connections. Upper class women, however, obtained positions at high levels. In this process, therefore, women without a link to the ruling circles

of the society became absorbed into sex-typing occupations. In contrast, women directly tied to and representatives of the ruling class became occupants of high level ranks. In this way, these women, due to their class interests in common with men of the same class, helped reproduction of social relation of repression through their occupations at high levels. At low level positions, women neither experienced sex-typing nor participated in the reproduction of repression. They were completely absent from these positions.

### 3. Absence of Women from Low Level Positions

So far this study has been exploring the sex division of labor and gender roles in NIRT and CONI, at high and middle level positions. In contrast to other levels, women were completely absent from low level ranks. Why? To shed some light on this issue, I conducted an interview with one of the division heads (male), who was in charge of low-level personnel at CONI. The interviewee believed that women are incapable of holding certain jobs because they lacked "proper knowledge." Those jobs were: xeroxing, driving, mail delivery, calligraphy, assistant film techniques, and religious workers. In contrast, he thought that women were fit for other positions such as typing and secretarial work. Such assertions not only reinforce sexism



but also indicate the practice of sex-typing occupations at the lower ranks of the organization.

Not only CONI, but also NIRT job advertising office<sup>61</sup> exercised similar preferentials based on sex in various occupational categories. The classification of job advertisement at NIRT reflected occupational priorities by sex. The advertisements showed the following positions for men: guards, information personnel, stage directors, drivers, and labor work. On the other hand, the positions that were solely advertised for female personnel reflected traditional "female occupations" such as secretaries, assistant nurses, nurses, stage secretaries, and children's teachers.

These differentials and discriminatory attitudes and practices are manifestations of sex-related taboos regarding people's social positions and legitimate opportunities. Women in Iran have been traditionally restricted from certain positions due to the myth of incapability and other discriminatory biases. They have been pushed and absorbed into other positions accepted by traditional norms as feminine occupations, and have been kept away from mixed jobs. Indeed, a recent study by the Plan and Budget Organization explains this point by stating that statistical figures concerning the increase or decrease "in the relative number

of women in various areas of employment [are] considered to be 'women's jobs' and [are] not shifting away from these type of jobs."<sup>62</sup> Such a cultural bias against hiring women in certain sectors is consistent with the capitalist tendency of creating a large supply of the reserved army of unemployed women.

As it concerns CONI and NIRT, the point to emphasize is not why women are excluded from low level positions --taking into account the shortage of empirical data for further substantiation. Instead, the point to be discerned from the study of low level positions is to shed some light on discrimination that exists more generally against women in the labor market. As such, it indicates that women's exclusion from low level positions reinforces the myth of incapability and the practice of discrimination in the employment of women in the traditionally feminine positions. In other words, the low level positions at CONI show that the further jobs are from high ranks, the higher is the practice of sex-typing occupations in the organization.

In sum, then, this chapter was an attempt to study sex division of labor and gender roles in a modern organization, namely NIRT and its subsidiary unit, CONI. As a state ideological instrument of repression,

NIRT provided a case study for the link between sex division of labor by class and the issue of reproduction of social relations. The analysis of high level positions in the organization showed that exclusion of women from these ranks was not necessarily related to promotional matters, factors of education, work experience, the wage and sexism. The contribution of these factors to the subordination of women were less significant than those stemming from class and gender based inequalities. Connections to the ruling class determined the participation of only a small number of women in the high level positions. In this way, ruling class women --though small in number--joined men of other classes at high ranks in the organization. By so doing, these women contributed to the reproduction of social relations and that of repression. They also created sharper divisions by class and sex among women.

In contrast, the crowding of women into middle level positions marked their disassociation with ruling class women and men who were directly involved in the reproduction process. This was exemplified by the fact that the closer the occupational ranks were to high level positions, the lower became the degree of representation of women. In this way, as opposed to high level positions, occupational structure at middle level ranks were more gender than class based. Education

and, hence, the low cost of hiring of women for middle level positions guaranteed these women similar ranks and salaries with men.

The lower the occupational position at NIRT, the greater the discrimination which existed against women as members of a specific sex. Indeed, gender based inequalities became more visible at lower level positions of the organization where women were completely absent. Given the analysis of occupational segregation based on gender and class relations in a specific State organization as outlined above, we may ask what role did the State play in constructing and reinforcing the subordinated position of women despite its needs for their labor? As such, it will be the subject of the next chapter.

## NOTES

- <sup>1</sup>Kayhan Research, "The Employment of Women," pp. 10-14.
- <sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 11.
- <sup>3</sup>Karl Marx, Pre-Capitalist Economic Formations (New York: International Publishers, 1969).
- <sup>4</sup>Nicos Poulantzas, Classes in Contemporary Capitalism (London: Verso, 1978), pp. 13-35.
- <sup>5</sup>Louis Althusser, "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatus," in Lenin and Philosophy (London: New Left Books, 1971), pp. 121-137.
- <sup>6</sup>Bill, The Politics, p. 101.      <sup>7</sup>Ibid.      <sup>8</sup>Ibid., p. 30.
- <sup>9</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>10</sup>Gozarash-e Salane-ye Sazeman-e Radio Televizion-e Melli-ye Iran dar Sal-e 1353 [The NIRT Annual Report, 1974] (Tehran: NIRT, n.d.).
- <sup>11</sup>Ibid., section on "Seeing the Future," p. 7.
- <sup>12</sup>Ibid.      <sup>13</sup>Ibid., section on "CONI," p. 17.      <sup>14</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>15</sup>Ibid., p. 18.      <sup>16</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>17</sup>World Bank Annual Reports (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 3 March 1973).
- <sup>18</sup>Ahmad Farougy, "Repression in Iran: An Historical Survey of Censorship and Cultural Repression from the 7th Century to the Present Day," in Iran Erupts, ed. Ali Reza Nobari, p. 66. It should be noted that while in this study the main emphasis has been on the reproduction of the state and the communications industry as part of its ideological hegemony, nevertheless, this reproduction permeated the workplace in industry on a day-to-day basis. For example, there was very little evidence of trade union organizing and workers communicating with each other. Such activities, due to the presence of SAVAK, would have involved risks most employees would be unwilling to take.

19. Administrative Affairs, The Report of Personnel's Statistics of National Iranian Radio and Television (Tehran: NIRT, 1971), pp. 35 and 52.
20. Unfortunately, the available data is inadequate on the employment patterns of sexes prior to the merger. Therefore, for more substantiative purposes, the responses of the interviewees cannot be checked against a different set of data.
21. Personnel's Files located at the Record's Section of the Office of Administrative Affairs, NIRT, Tehran, 1977.
22. Personnel's Files located at the Record's Section, CONI, NIRT, Tehran, 1977.
23. It should be noted that although this comparison is based on two different years (1975 and 1977), the ratio of the employed male to female population does not significantly vary from one period to another.
24. The President and four Vice Presidents of the NIRT were all men. In Tehran NIRT, of all the 28 directors, there were 27 men and only 1 woman (who was part-time). In other centers of the NIRT (located in Iran), of a total of 16 directors, there were 15 men and 2 women. See Personnel's Files, Administrative Affairs.
25. Personnel's Files, CONI. Such data was gathered by the above office in 1975.
26. Here the ranking of the level of the personnel is based on ranks starting from and ending with female employees. This is arbitrary but it suits the purpose of the analysis insofar as it sheds some light on the position of women at the CONI.
27. This information was obtained from the Office of the Administrative Affairs, NIRT, Tehran, 1977.
28. Personnel's Files, CONI, and the Section of Mechanized Information, the Office of the Administrative Affairs, NIRT, Tehran, 1977.
29. Boserup, Women's Role, p. 140.
30. Mitchell, Woman's Estate, p. 64.

- 31 Amuzegar, Magam-e Zan [The Status of Women]. See Ch. I, Section B, and in particular, notes 29 and 30.
- 32 Ibid., pp. 367-416. 33 Ibid., p. 390. 34 Ibid., p. 398.
- 35 Ibid., p. 373. 36 Ibid., p. 374. 37 Ibid., p. 362.
- 38 Ibid., pp. 346-348. 39 Ibid., p. 354. 40 Ibid.
- 41 Ibid., p. 362-363. 42 Ibid., p. 381. 43 Ibid., p. 398.
- 44 Ibid., p. 406. 45 Ibid., p. 409. 46 Ibid., pp. 432-442.
- 47 Ibid., p. 362.
- 48 Dalla Costa and James, The Power of Women, p. 70.
- 49 See the following tables for further information on this point.
- 50 Kayhan Research, "The Employment of Women," p. 25.
- 51 Ibid. 52 Personnel's Files.
- 53 Bill, The Politics, p. 30. 54 Ibid., p. 140.
- 55 Kayhan Research, "The Employment of Women," p. 29.
- 56 Ibid. 57 Ibid., p. 28. 58 Ibid. 59 Ibid., p. 29.
- 60 Ibid., p. 26.
- 61 The Placement and Advertising Section, the Office of the Administrative Affairs, NIRT, Tehran, 1977.
- 62 Plan and Budget Organization, The Investigation of Educational Aspects of Women's Employment, cited in Kayhan Research, "The Employment of Women," p. 7.

## CHAPTER VI

### WOMEN AND LEGAL REFORMS: THE STATE MEETS THE ECONOMY

So far I have shown that concomitant with changes in the structure of Iran's economy from primarily agricultural to dependent capitalism, there occurred a gradual shift in women's labor from home production to paid production. In this process, women were placed in a contradictory position: on the one hand, they formed the bulk of the reserve army of labor and, on the other, they became cheaper laborers relative to men. In this way, women became subordinated not only by their place in the social division of labor, but also by their position in production and reproduction. More concretely, in a modern state apparatus (NIRT), the subordination of women was related to class and gender contradictions at different levels of the occupational structure. As such, they were generated by capitalist social relations on the one hand, and those of repression on the other. These contradictions were reinforced by the policies of the capitalist state which contained a class as well as a gender bias. Consequently, a dialectical tension for women was



created. On the one hand, laws restricting women's mobility and autonomy were liberalized and demand for women's labor increased relative to past participation by women; on the other hand, women were denied full equality and participation relative to men.

A number of legal studies in Farsi and English deal with legal reforms under the Shah pertaining to women. These include works of F. Naseri, G. Hegazi, the Women's Organization of Iran, H. Payman, M. Manouchehrian, K. Fateriyun, R. Mazlouman, M. Mo'ini-Araqi, M. Nagavi, F. Bagely and B. Pakizegi.<sup>1</sup> These works have contributed to the field of legal studies on Iranian women. They do not, however, analyze legal changes within the context of Iran's capitalism. Hence, these works fail to focus on the impact of state policies as laws on the position of women in terms of class and gender relations in capitalist Iran.

The purpose of this chapter is to study the impact of state legislation on the position of women in Iran.

The focus will be on Iranian laws enacted in the 1960's and 1970's and their consequences for class and gender relations within the context of capitalist development in Iran. Therefore, to what extent did legal changes as state policies have any effect on class and gender relations in Iran? How consistent and/or contradictory were these official proclamations of change with their

implementation? To what extent did legal changes promote equality or inequality between the sexes in the family, society, the labor market, and political offices?

Hence, in the following, I will argue that through its legal policies, the state played a significant role in shaping class and gender relations in Iran. Put differently, the subordinated position of women not only reflected the state's policies of patriarchy and class hierarchy, but also the growing needs of capitalism in Iran. Most of the data for this chapter will be based on primary sources such as the Iranian civil and criminal codes, labor legislation, and census statistics. I gathered this data in Iran from 1974 to 1979. I will also rely on a number of interviews that I conducted with women of various social classes during several trips that I made to Iran. In addition, I will use biographical data recorded in the Iran Who's Who 1976,<sup>2</sup> and other written sources, for the analysis of socio-economic backgrounds of women in public positions.

#### A. Women and the Family Protection

##### Laws (FPL)

Throughout the 1960's and most of the 1970's, the Iranian economy shifted toward an increasing integration with the economies of the more advanced capitalist

countries, particularly those of the Western hemisphere. The inauguration of the White Revolution of 1963 represented a turning point in Iranian industrial development and the expansion of its labor market. This growth paralleled the enactment of laws to emancipate women and to facilitate their entry into paid production. One of these policies was the Family Protection Law of 1967 which was subsequently revised in 1975. In this section, I will analyze some aspects of the Family Protection Law such as age limitation for marriage, divorce, child custody, and polygamy laws and the impact on class and gender relations in Iran.

K. Dolbeare and M. Edelman<sup>3</sup> suggest that law is politics by another name. J. Petras<sup>4</sup> argues that state policies are rooted in the class structure of a society. In Iran state policies, especially those pertaining to women, were initiated from above. Former Princess Ashraf, in praising her brother's role in promoting the emancipation of women, stated: "Equality between women and men has been truly realized under laws of my King brother . . . we expect the Shahanshah . . . [to] provide the framework of social and economic activities of women by his . . . orders" (emphasis added).<sup>5</sup> The Shah gave certain responsibilities for the emancipation of women to the Women's Organization of Iran (WOI).<sup>6</sup> In a speech, he maintained that "I expect

the Women's Organization of Iran in achieving its progressive aims, prepare women maximally for the advancement of Iran."<sup>7</sup> Ashraf headed WOI. This organization, according to F. R. C. Bagely,<sup>8</sup> played an instrumental role in the drafting of the FPL. Hence, through the initiative of the state represented by the ruling class, not by women at large, the FPL of 1967 was encoded in Iran. In this way, the state constructed three kinds of hierarchies based on the subordination of women by their class, gender, and relationship to each other.<sup>9</sup>

Michele Barrett<sup>9</sup> contends that the state, through its laws, plays a significant role in constructing and regulating women's subordination. Fatima Mernissi<sup>10</sup> argues that laws and customs, especially family laws that are based on male authority, insure that women's status remains one of subjugation. In the case of Iran, I would like to suggest that through the FPL the state attempted to restrict some of men's powers in marital relations. In practice, however, the majority of women remained subjugated since the main beneficiaries of this law became the relatively better off female members of urban areas. A case in point is the FPL provision of age limitation for marriage.

The FPL of 1975 set an age limitation for marriage.

It changed the 1967 FPL age requirements for marriage from 15 to 18 for girls and from 18 to 21 for men with exceptions granted to women above 15 or above 13<sup>11</sup> through reference to Article 1031 of the Civil Code.<sup>12</sup> My own observations suggest the occurrence of many early marriages for girls below 18 and even at 15 after the promulgation of FPL 1975. One study<sup>13</sup> documents earlier marriages after the enactment of FPL 1967. It points out that in 1971, .8 percent of the total women between the ages of ten and 14 were married, with a higher frequency in the rural than urban areas. Another study by the Ministry of Justice for Greater Tehran (Table 43) shows that 41 percent of married women aged less than 18, of which almost 66 percent were below 16 and 18 years of age. These figures elucidate trends in early marital arrangements despite the promulgation of FPL.

In most parts of Iran, the age of marrying women reflected their class backgrounds and social customs, not the state laws. In general, the higher the class position of women, the older they were at marriage. Most well-to-do and some middle class women postponed marriage to study or work. The traditional middle class women followed social custom and married at an early age. The majority of women, those of working class and rural residents, married young, too. These

women, unlike those of other classes, did so because of their poverty stricken families who were unable to finance their stay at home or pay for their education. Perhaps this was also the main reason for the higher participation of these women in the labor force as discussed in Chapter IV. In short, then, the point to emphasize here is that despite the change in the age limitation for the marriage law, the bulk of women, i.e., the impoverished ones, failed to benefit from their new status ordained by the WOI as an organization instrument of the ruling class.

The divorce provision of the FPL was a step forward toward equality in relations of sexes. This law required that all divorces be decided by the Family Protection Courts. Men had to have valid reasons when petitioning for divorce.<sup>14</sup> Women had equal rights in submitting requests for divorce. Data indicates that in 1971, out of the total of 18,000 divorces that were done, according to the FPL, 15,000 took place in cities and 3,000 in villages.<sup>15</sup> Table 44 shows that most divorces in Greater Tehran occurred because couples were incompatible or the wives hated their husbands. My own observations suggest that most of Tehran divorces were from middle or upper middle classes. A few working women, mostly domestic workers,

also benefitted from the divorce laws. These women received divorce related information from their female middle and upper class employers. The rest of the working class women who wished to divorce remained either uninformed or too dependent on the wages of their husbands to obtain divorces. Hence, despite its relatively wide usage, the application of divorce laws tended to be more class based and urban oriented.

The utilization of divorce laws was also occupationally related. As Table 45 shows, among female workers in Tehran most divorcees were clerical, technical, and professional and service workers, respectively. As indicated in Chapter III, capital investments in cities created new employment for the growing urban labor force. Moreover, the expansion of services greatly absorbed the labor of women in this sector. It is, therefore, possible that the FPL divorce laws, mostly used by middle class women, were to be more congruent with the needs of the growing capitalist market, especially in the services. In this way, the main beneficiaries of the divorce laws were well-to-do women who had the economic means to take advantage of their new legal rights<sup>16</sup> and those women who fulfilled the need of the capitalist market in the services and related sectors.

The FPL of 1967 improved child custody laws by granting the Family Protection Courts the right to decide on the issue.<sup>17</sup> A number of divorced working and lower middle class female interviewees told me of the bias of male judges against settlements of reasonable financial expenses for them and for their children. Some women complained about their husbands' refusal to make payments despite the Court's injunction. Due to financial inabilities to pursue their cases, these women had to seek additional wage work and intensify their double day. Those women who received a small amount from their husbands spoke of their financial dependence on men despite freedom from marriage. For these women, economic dependence meant subordination not through marriage but through divorce.

These problems were nonexistent for well-to-do women. The children of these women were either sent abroad to boarding schools or taken care of by nurses or governesses. Hence, through the implementation of the child custody law, the state tended to reflect its class bias, on the one hand and, on the other, it cultivated a new form of patriarchal control over women, namely, the bias of male judges and women's dependence on male wage earners.

Theoretically, both the FPL of 1967 and 1975 attempted to discourage polygamy--permanent marriage



of one man with four women and/or sigeh (temporary marriage) of one man with unlimited number of women. The first law required men to obtain legal permission for remarriage. The second law held that "when possible, [the man] has to consult the first wife for evidence of the man's financial capacity and his ability to do justice to his consorts."<sup>18</sup> In this way, then, polygamy was restricted but not prohibited.<sup>19</sup> Evidence testifies to the empirical validity of this point. For example, in a study of 64 cities in 1973, 7.4 percent of 1,164 women (or 86 women) had problems in marital relations due to polygamy (see Table 46). In the same study, 9.1 percent of 262 responding women (24 women), obtained divorce because of polygamy (Table 47).

Several studies have dealt with polygamy and the reasons for its existence. For example, E. Boserup<sup>20</sup> analyzed the economic bases of polygamy in Africa in which wives represented additional economic resources to the man. In the case of Morocco, F. Mernissi<sup>21</sup> pointed to polygamy as an institution for the containment of women's power. L. Beneria and G. Sen<sup>22</sup> discussed polygamy in relation to control of social reproduction in Middle Eastern countries where women (presumably from the upper class) were secluded. In

the case of modern urban Iran, I would like to suggest that polygamy was primarily a working class phenomenon. My own observations of urban Iran indicate no polygamy among the upper and middle classes. The men of these classes chose to have mistresses, not additional wives --a practice which they adopted as Western-intoxicated males. A small number of wealthy traditional men, however, engaged in polygamy. Despite the high costs, a large number of working class men with steady but low incomes married two or three women for pleasure.

The effect of polygamy on women, despite its legal restrictions, was to reinforce Iranian women's dependency on male wage earners and men's control of the females. This is well illustrated by B. Pakizegi in her study of the FPL. In her analysis of the impact of changes in polygamy laws on women, she states that although the FPL of 1975

. . . is an improvement over the past . . . it is not as effective as it could be. Owing primarily to financial and social dependency the first wife often feels that she has no choice but to consent. Through various threats and pressures, the husband often gets his way. The worst threat is often that he will divorce her to marry the other, and few women want to be divorced, left unsupported, and suffer the resulting social stigma.<sup>23</sup>

In this way, polygamy continues to be practiced, not under the Shari'ah but under the secular legal reforms.

In sum, then, in this section I showed that parallel to the increasing growth of Iran's capitalist development and the expansion of its labor market came promulgation of emancipatory laws such as the FPL. This was initiated by the ruling class, not by women at large. Theoretically, this law was to restrict some but not all of the patriarchal power in marital relations. Practically, however, the law reflected the class nature of society and mostly restricted governmental power, in marriages of well-to-do women.

More concretely, the provisions of age limitation for marriage, divorce, child custody, and polygamy indicated improvements over the previous laws. Nevertheless, in reality, impoverished and traditional women continued to marry at early ages while women of other classes postponed marriage to study or to enter the labor market. I will not belabor here the relationship of married women by age and class to the labor market since I discussed this topic in Chapter IV. It suffices to note that the consequences of state policies on women through the age limitations law for marriage corresponded with subordination of women in the division of labor by class, age, and marital status.

Divorce law, too, despite its relatively wide usage, was class based and urban oriented. The fact that most of the employed Tehran divorcees were service

related workers suggests a strong link between the needs of the economy and the emancipation of specific kinds of female labor for the urban market. In this way, while the divorce law led to the subordination of women in paid production, the implementation of both child custody and polygamy laws resulted in women's subordinated position in social reproduction. Hence, the enactment of child custody laws fulfilled another requirement of the economy. It reinforced women's dependency on the male wage earner for the purpose of maintaining women's role in child upbringing until the age when they would be productive laborers for the market. Seen from this perspective, polygamy represented another mechanism for the control of females by their husbands.

In short, the effects of the FPL varied with the specific class position of women. Upper class women, most instrumental in the drafting of the FPL, were the greatest beneficiaries of this law. They were able to postpone marriage, to obtain divorce and child custody. They also experienced no polygamy. These laws were also advantageous to middle class women, though to a lesser degree than they were to upper class women. As was the case with upper class women, the age limitation law enabled middle class women to put

off marriage. An increasing number of middle class women, especially those in the services and related work, used the divorce law. In contrast to the upper class women, due to their financial needs, not all middle class women directly benefitted from the child custody laws without additional wage work. The polygamy law was almost ineffective for these women, since their husbands refrained from polygamy.

Working class women, on the other hand, were much less effected by the FPL than other classes of women. Due to the poor condition of their families, these women were forced to marry at younger ages than was required by the law. Early marriage and poverty, however, intensified labor force participation of these women. A few of these women, however, through their links with upper and middle class women as their domestic workers, benefitted from divorce laws. However, these women obtained divorce at the expense of the bias of male judges and without reasonable financial settlement. Polygamy laws were ineffective for some of these women. Indeed, working class men exerted a higher degree of patriarchy on women from this class background. This is, in fact, more illustrative in the study of the Criminal Code and its effect on women.

### B. Women and the Criminal Code

In the previous section, I analyzed some aspects of the FPL in theory and practice and their effect on class and gender relations in Iran. In order to develop more insights into state policies on women, I will discuss a number of Criminal Code Articles as they pertained to class and gender relations. I will then analyze the impact of these articles on the position of women in the economy and society. My argument will be that the Criminal Code not only supported sexual relations of domination and subordination, but it also served as a control mechanism for capitalist relations of production and reproduction in the society.

M. Barrett<sup>24</sup> states that the state, through its laws, encodes fundamental assumptions about gender distinctions. This is valid with respect to Article 179 of the Iranian Criminal Code. This Article upheld the power of men over women's lives in adultery situations. It stated that "whenever a husband sees his wife with a strange man in a compromising position, and thereby murders or injures one of the parties, he is exempt from punishment."<sup>25</sup> Article 207 of the Criminal Code modified Article 179 by stating that "if the woman is not murdered [in case of being found

in a compromising position], she is liable from one to five years imprisonment."<sup>26</sup>

The effect of Article 179 on women varied with their class backgrounds. Working class women were usually murdered by their husbands when they engaged in adultery. This is evident from the "Havades" [Accidents] section of the Iranian daily, Ettele-at.<sup>27</sup> According to this source, in one incident a suspicious man tore open the stomach of his wife with a sword, ripped her chest and drank her blood.<sup>28</sup> In another instance, the man not only cut off his wife's head but also those of his children.<sup>29</sup> In a third case, the man cut open the stomach of his pregnant wife, cut off her head and those of his two children.<sup>30</sup> In a fourth case, a 46 year old man killed his wife with a nail.<sup>31</sup> The daily Kayhan reports that another man shot his wife and her companion to death.<sup>32</sup> It should be noted that although the data include only a small sample, it still elucidates the bias of the state and patriarchy against women--a bias which is observed in Iran. At any rate, under Article 179 of the Criminal Code, all these working class men were freely exempted from punishment when they murdered their wives and all the women were forcibly from life.<sup>33</sup> In contrast to the working class, middle class men

usually divorced their wives in adultery situations. Upper class men, to maintain social prestige, refrained from divorce.

The equivalent of Article 179 was, however, non-existent for women. In point of fact, revengeful wives of adulterous husbands were assigned long-term imprisonment. For example, a woman who had murdered the companion of her husband received 15 years imprisonment. Had she also murdered her "master" or husband, according to R. Mazlouman, she would have received life imprisonment.<sup>34</sup> The bias of the state against women and in support of patriarchy is revealed by the kind of sentence that adulterous men received. Article 212 of the Criminal Code stated that "if a man is engaged in adultery, if proven, he is subject from six months to three years prison sentence" (emphasis added).<sup>35</sup> In reality, however, due to the fear of abandonment in a patriarchal society, fear of physical punishment by the husband's relatives, dependency on the male wage earner, and the keeping of family honor, few women testified against their adulterous husbands.

In addition to the husband, the state granted fathers and brothers the right to control a woman's life and sexuality. Section B-1 (B) of Article 179 of the Criminal Code stated that "if a man sees his



daughter or sister with a strange man in a compromising position, and thereby murders one of the parties, he is punishable from one month to six months imprisonment, but if he injures them, he is entitled to eleven days to two months of imprisonment."<sup>36</sup> This law was practiced among working class families and a few of the traditional middle classes. The daily Kayhan contains many examples of incidents where women were murdered by their brothers and fathers due to their failure to honor these men's namous (honor). As a case in point, a suspicious brother who had cut his sister into pieces with a knife "proudly" underwent five months imprisonment as the price for the preservation of his namous.<sup>37</sup> In the case of middle class men, they resorted to threats of death, but they mostly ended with restricting the mobility of their daughters or sisters in public. Therefore, while in theory anti-women laws recognized and upheld privatization of women by men, in practice they reinforced patriarchal control in the working class and some middle class families.

How was adultery justified? R. Mazlouman suggests that law-makers defended Article 179 of the Criminal Code because it justified men's "natural" response to causes that injured their "pride, compassion, chastity, honor, and prejudice."<sup>38</sup> As such, as Mazlouman points out, it implies lack of similar responses by women

under similar situations and, hence, inequalities assumptions concerning human nature based on sex.

M. Manouchehrian, an Iranian lawyer, criticizes defenders of Article 179, too. She states that:

In defense of Article 179, some say that men have freedom while women have husbands. Thus, if women are disappointed by their husbands, they have no option but to become old until they die.

Others say that women are kinder than men and are more interested in the well-being of their children. And, these are their reasons for asserting that women cannot mix their hands with the blood of their men-folk. But we say, women's kindness must not like chains fasten their hands and feet. On the other hand, if lawmakers can only think of women as kind individuals, how could they even conceive of women as murderers, much less execute them?<sup>39</sup>

Mazlouman's and Manouchehrian's comments on adultery laws are enlightening in understanding the bias of the state against women. Yet the relationship of state policies to women can better be illustrated through its link with the economy.

First, by upholding adultery laws, the state maintained privatization of women as property of men and the ownership of women's bodies by men. Women's existence, thus, became a function of men's compassion. In this regard, S. Rowbotham explains the relationship between class and sexual oppression and capitalism. She states that:

. . . capitalism brought new relationships of property and domination. . . . It started to dissolve all previous forms of ownership. But men still owned their women body and soul long after they themselves ceased to be the property of other men. Men continued to own and control female creative capacity in the family and to assume that the subordination of women in society was just and natural--though the consequences of this for women from different classes were not the same. Patriarchy . . . had a direct and simple relationship to class exploitation.<sup>40</sup>

Hence, Rowbotham alludes to sexual divisions of domination and subordination under capitalism. In Iran, as discussed in Chapter IV, women played a significant role in the economy through their role in the reproduction of the labor force. In this sense, the state's commitment to patriarchy served to maintain the control of women's reproductive activities as they associated with their role in the reproduction of the labor force.

Second, subjugation of women by the state adultery laws had the consequence of breaking down families, depending on their class position. For working class families murdering a wife reduced the bargaining position of her husband in the labor market because husbands were left responsible for the double day themselves. In addition, as the only wage earner in the household, the husbands had to settle for low waged jobs in order to feed their children. As a consequence, with children to care for and no wife to do it, a father was restricted in the hours of labor and thus, the kind of work he

could do. As was true for women with child care responsibilities, the result for men with child care responsibilities was jobs with low wages.

Hence, adultery laws worked in two contradictory and opposing directions. On the one hand, these laws set working class men against women. On the other, men's exercise of patriarchy, by taking advantage of adultery laws and actually killing their wives, weakened their own position vis-à-vis capital. By killing their wives, men tended to cheapen their own labor power and capital benefitted from men's cheap labor. Adultery laws had another effect on working class men. As workers, the working class male had no authority in the workplace. Nor did he have authority as an unemployed male. These men exercised authority lacking in the workplace or as being unemployed against their wives--even to the extent of murdering them. Thus, while ruling class men exercised political authority and middle class men did so on their jobs, working class men who had neither political nor managerial authority over other men displaced authority onto women--specifically, their own "adulterous" wives.

In contrast, the effect of state adultery laws were less drastic on other classes. Indeed, the higher the social class of women, the less was the impact of these laws on their position. As mentioned earlier

adulterous middle class women were divorced by their husbands. Hence, the breakup of middle class families was less devastating to middle class women than to working class women since the capitalist market needed and paid for the skills of these women. Moreover, as opposed to the working class women, those of the middle class did not lose their lives. They lost material support and personal reputation. Materially, through various pressures from their husbands, middle class women lost their nafaqeh (alimony). Personally, these women were frowned upon since they became "second hand commodities." Hence, state adultery laws tended to cause a breakdown in family relations. In this process, the subjugation of women by men varied with the social class; however, the result in each case was a more profitable and secure domination of labor. Put differently, the adultery laws tended to cause working class men's and women's labor to be available except when working class women were murdered. These laws had a similar effect on middle class men's labor. However, adultery laws had a different impact on middle class women. These laws freed up the labor power of middle class women in particular.

In this way, as middle class women's labor was freed for employment, the state, through its Criminal Code, played a significant role in maintaining

inequalities by class and gender. It controlled social reproduction on the one hand, and on the other, it regulated the supply of labor. The way this worked varied with different social classes. Specifically, middle class women were made available as a supply of service sector labor. The way the adultery law was played out corresponded to this need for a supply of middle class female labor. That is, the adultery law became more suitable for working class laborers while the divorce law grew to be more beneficial to the middle classes. While this reduced the supply of working class female labor, a supply which included a reserve army of labor, it did not interfere with the supply of middle class female labor, a labor force which was in short supply. In both cases, however, families disintegrated and the state maintained control over women's sexuality through their husbands. In this respect, a discussion of state policies regarding labor, particularly that of women, the topic of the next section will be useful.

### C. Women and Labor Legislation (LL)

Concomitant with the expansion of the economy and the emancipatory policies of the 1960's and 1970's,

the state promulgated additional legislation to liberalize labor laws. In order to analyze the impact of these labor policies on the position of women, in this section, I will focus on a few selected labor laws and will further examine contradictions between them in theory and practice. I will argue that by regulating conditions and terms of payment, the state played a significant role in the subordination of women. In so doing, the state reinforced class subordination of female workers and strengthened legal sex bias and male domination.

The labor laws of the 1960's and 1970's facilitated women's entry into the labor market by loosening certain legal restrictions against their work outside the home. Before the 1960's, husbands had the legal power to prevent their wives from wage work if they recognized women's work as un reputable or inappropriate to the husband's or wife's status or honor or to the welfare of the family (Article 1117 of the Civil Code).<sup>41</sup> The FPL of 1967 (Article 16) modified the above by making it more difficult for the man to stop his wife from working.<sup>42</sup> It only authorized the husband to prohibit his wife from "un reputable" work if he had obtained an injunction from the Family Protection Courts. The wife, however, was not granted a similar legal power to prevent her husband from similar works.

The FPL of 1975 (Article 18) changed the previous law by giving equal privileges to the woman, but added "that court will grant woman's request only if it decides that man's cessation of work will not interfere with the income and affairs of the family."<sup>43</sup> The special conditions of Article 18 of the 1975 code made it unlikely for women to be able to actually use these rights as specified in Article 16 of the 1967 code. In addition, the Civil Code (Article 1105) had legalized the husband as the head of the household,<sup>44</sup> and as the financial supporter of the family. Moreover, because of the relatively higher proportion of men in the labor force and the relatively lower wages of women, the chances for women to attain secure jobs which paid wages adequate to support the entire family remained minimal.

The significance of these legislative reforms were twofold. At one level, these laws strongly challenged the tradition of society toward women's work outside the home. Socially and psychologically, many men frowned on the idea of women's work outside the home. For them, women's work constituted a threat to the family's (or men's) honor, to the extent that female workers were regarded as prostitutes. In reality, however, women's work for a wage was a direct denunciation of men's ability to earn a sufficient income--even when



that was not the case. Women, too, took pride in not having to work for a wage, for their main task as it was socially defined was to be subordinated as wives and good mothers. These attitudes were mainly prevalent among middle and upper class women, for working class women always worked out of economic necessity.

At another level, these legislative reforms reinforced patriarchy both in the family and in the labor market: in the family, because of women's subordination to men as the head of household; and in the labor market because of their inferior position. In this way, while labor laws facilitated women's entry into the market economy, they strengthened legal sex bias against women.

Similar trends existed in other provisions of labor laws despite their statutory implication of sexual equality in the labor market. The case in point is the law of 1959 (Article 23) which provided for equal pay for equal work regardless of sex.<sup>45</sup> In contrast to the law's liberal appearance, the enforcement of this law varied with the nature of the work. For example, it is documented that female machine workers in some modern factories, like textile, shoe, and clothes, received equal wages with men doing similar work.<sup>46</sup> In this case, it is possible that the price of labor power expended on machinery or capitalist productive force corresponded to the law of equal wages regardless of sex.

Not all the modern factories exerted a similar pattern. In discussing the wage discrimination by sex, a female interviewee who was a treasurer at the Pars Electric Factory in Tehran stated that:

. . . women workers have equivalent jobs with men while they fail to receive equal wages. Employers justify wage discrimination by saying that due to family obligations to wives and children, men have higher expenses. Is this legal? At the time of hiring, a single male worker is classified at rank three, four and five, whereas women are assigned to rank one, and therefore receive the minimum wage for a year.<sup>47</sup>

Other modern factories practiced similar discriminatory actions.<sup>48</sup> For example, in 1974 in the city of Rasht, at a lightbulb factory, women went on strike demanding higher wages. They succeeded and received a wage raise from 55 rials a day to 80 rials. Men's wages for similar work was 130 rials. Thus, while the militancy of women won them a wage raise, they still continued to receive less wages than men.<sup>49</sup> It should be noted that although these data include only a small sample, they still elucidate contradictions between labor laws in theory and practice as they concern equal wages for equal work based on sex.

Subordination of women by the wage is also reflected in another contradiction between the LL and its enforcement. The case in point is Article 4-A which adjusted

the minimum wage with the standard of living.<sup>50</sup> Given the rising trends in CPI as discussed in Chapter IV, Table 48 shows the exploitation of women by their tremendously low wages in several factories in Isfahan. In this data, women's wage plus additional work hours ranged between 35 rials and 74 rials, much below the approximate minimum wage of 200 rials a day. This source does not provide similar information for men's wages. However, it suffices here to point out that insofar as women's wages were concerned, the minimum wage law failed to be applicable in factories. Middle class occupations such as those in governmental and private offices tended to abide by the laws more often. Hence, it is possible that the wage law in its implementation had sex as well as class bias.

Inconsistencies between the LL in theory and practice were also existent with regard to the law of minimum age of workers. Article 16 of LL forbade workers' employment below the age of 12.<sup>51</sup> Article 59 of LL assigned severe sentences for those who failed to observe the law.<sup>52</sup> In reality, however, both of these laws failed to be practiced in a number of factories and workshops. In an examination of a few traditional workers in Isfahan, one study pointed out that "most workers are girls between the ages of nine and ten."<sup>53</sup>

These children received very low wages relative to other workers. Factory owners justified this situation by saying that "these children live with their families and have no need for money."<sup>54</sup> Similar practices are documented for workers in environmentally unhealthy factories like wool, color, intestine cleaning (for making threads), and carpet workshops. For example, in the Moft-Abad section of Isfahan, in 15 carpet workshops, all workers were girls between the ages of 5 and 12. These girls worked from sunrise to sunset. Their wages often varied with their age. They received three to ten rials a day. Their wages would go to their parents.<sup>55</sup>

The exploitation of female labor at early ages has other far reaching implications besides material ones for their subordination in life. At one level, not only the owners of establishments, but also parents, exercise authority on women as their property. As such, it makes it difficult, if not impossible, for women to develop any degree of independence. Women are thus brought up as dependent individuals whose lives are determined by outside authorities. At another level, women's socialization into a subordinated position from early ages may severely hamper the articulation of their struggles against social injustice. Perhaps this explains why

the state failed to enforce the minimum age law in working class establishments. By making working class women dependent on authority, the state not only allies itself with capitalists, but it also socializes women into a subordinated and non-militant position. As it concerns men, their dependency arises from their subordination to capital. Whether or not these different kinds of dependency lead into different kinds of struggle against the state is a subject which is beyond the scope of this dissertation.

In contrast to the above laws that theoretically appeared as egalitarian and/or unexploitative but practically proved the opposite, other provisions of LL reflected gender inequality in the text. A case in point is Article 17 of LL which prohibited night shifts (from 10:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m.) to women, except in the case of traditionally recognized "female" occupations such as nursing.<sup>6</sup> Nursing is a 24 hour job. In addition, ✓ nursing was a woman's job. Therefore, women nurses had to work at night. As was discussed earlier, since nursing was an extension of household work, Article 17 was an encouragement of sex-typing occupations. By so doing, however, this law promoted wage differentials by sex, since Article 21 of LL assigned 35 percent wage increase for night shift workers who were mostly men.<sup>57</sup>

While the capitalists disobeyed the law or continued to discriminate against women, they tended to obey the law by excluding them from night work. Capitalists excluded women because of the relatively higher cost of female employment for night shifts. My interviews with a number of factory owners validated this point.

These capitalists thought that even if they could legally justify their need of women workers for night shifts, they would still be unwilling to hire them because of high costs. The largest cost included the establishment of nurseries which Article 10 of LL required.<sup>58</sup> Moreover, Article 19 of LL mandated the creation of nurseries when the number of infants exceeded ten.<sup>59</sup> The same law entitled women to a one-half hour break with pay for every three hours of working so that they could nurse their infants.<sup>60</sup> Hence, given the high cost of nurseries, their maintenance and the wage paid to women for nursing, capitalists found it more profitable and less troublesome to observe rather than break the night shift laws.

The night shift law benefitted the state in regulating the reproduction of the labor force through its control of women's role in the maintenance of the household. As it has been stated, unpaid household work in Iran, like in many other societies, was the woman's responsibility. Women's presence was, thus, indispensable in the household, especially at night when the

husband and children were at home. If women were working at night, they would not be available to their husbands for sexual services. In this way, the function of the night shift law prohibiting women from work was not only to preserve the family structure as Pakizegi points out;<sup>61</sup> this law also served to control women's role in the reproduction of the labor force. In this way, the interest of both the capitalists and the state coincided.

It is noteworthy to point out that where the availability and productivity of male labor for night shifts was low, the capitalist did not hesitate to break the law. Similarly, the state did not interfere by enforcing its laws. For example, in a large textile factory in Isfahan, because of the lower productivity and unavailability of male workers, women were hired for night shifts. Men were less productive in this factory because, as the owner acknowledged, these men had other jobs to which the factory work took a secondary importance.<sup>62</sup> Moreover, male laborers had work in other factories such as the steel mill, military, and other establishments that played significant roles in the reproduction of Isfahan and the national economy and of the repressive apparatus of the state. It is, therefore, possible that when the interest of the state and the economy called for the absorption of male labor, women as the reserve

army of labor fulfilled labor shortages despite its illegality.

Gender inequality was also spelled out in other provisions of the LL. Article 20 of the LL restricted women from "difficult"<sup>63</sup> and "harmful" as opposed to "light" jobs. Clearly, this law allowed discriminatory sexism in its classification of "difficult" in contrast to "light" jobs. It reflected, moreover, the sexual division of labor in "masculine type" of factories like brick and wood (see Chapter IV). As such, it had the effect of crowding women into "feminine" jobs and hence, restricting their mobility into other kinds of occupations.

In sum, then, while labor legislation legalized women's right to work without much restriction from the male heads of household, it reinforced subordination of women by both class and gender. Hence, capitalism subjugated women through the laws of the state. These laws contradicted each other in theory. In practice, they reinforced class and gender bias. On the whole, these laws maintained working class women's position as cheap laborers and freed middle class women for wage labor while keeping the commitment of the state to patriarchal values. The reforms, thus, changed labor legislation. In so doing, they increased middle class women's option but also strengthened legal sex bias and



male hegemonic institutions. Reform, therefore, liberalized labor legislation while it reinforced male domination and subordination of working class women. This was also the trend in the Suffrage, both in theory and practice, as we shall see next.

D. Suffrage and the Political  
Participation of Women<sup>63</sup>

Jane Jaquett states that in Latin America there is "no clear correlation between suffrage on the one hand, and economic development . . . on the other."<sup>65</sup> In the case of the Muslim Middle East, Nadia Youssef argues that public roles of women cannot be attributed to the economy, but rather to the culture of a society which defines "the type of work deemed appropriate for women."<sup>66</sup> In the case of Iran, I would like to suggest that both the suffrage and the increasing public roles of Iranian women directly paralleled capitalist transformation of the country. Enfranchisement law legitimized all women's new political rights within the established parameters of the repressive political environment. This law, however, like other reformist policies of the state, was beneficial to the well-to-do women and harmful for the working class and the majority of middle class women. Consequently, the female beneficiaries of suffrage became

the Iranian "Queen Bees"<sup>67</sup> or upper class women in high political offices. These women represented the interest of upper class men in power and represented neither the interests of women or men of other social classes. In this way, the "Queen Bees" who had been formally emancipated to attain political positions represented class interests, specifically ruling class interests.

At the same time, they failed to develop female solidarity interests across class lines.

One of the principles of the White Revolution of 1962 was the enfranchisement of women. It granted women suffrage rights as well as the rights to run for and be elected to the national legislative bodies, and to the provincial and elective councils across the country. The purpose of the White Revolution and its consequences for capitalist transformation of Iran and specifically for development of the labor force and consolidation of the Shah's power has been discussed in Chapter III. It suffices to note here that suffrage corresponded to the decreasing power of the clergy and secular opposition forces and simultaneously to the increasing integration of Iran into world capitalism.

The supporters of the Shah viewed enfranchisement as a democratic move to recognize women's rights both

politically and economically. They stated that the Shah

. . . introduced as the Fifth principle of the Sixth of Bahman Reforms (the White Revolution), a scheme to impart a new life to Iran's democracy within the defined framework of constitutional amendments . . . the enfranchisement of women. . . . The Shah believed that in a society in which the work done by every individual forms part of the gross national product, enlightened monarchy cannot accept that half the work force of the country be deprived of its legitimate [political] rights [emphasis added].<sup>68</sup>

In point of fact, the Shah's contempt for democracy and especially for women's rights is well demonstrated in his interview with Oriana Fallaci. She quoted him as saying

[Women] may be equal in the eyes of the law, but not . . . in ability [Women have] never produced a great cook . . . have produced nothing great . . . When they are in power [women] are much harsher than men. Much more cruel. Much more blood thirsty. . . . [Women are] hear when [they]'re rulers . . . schemers . . . evil. Every one . . .<sup>69</sup>

Despite his comments, suffrage was a politically expedient act for the Shah. It represented the Shah's victory over the clergy; and it symbolized "democracy" in Iran. It actually extended gender and class inequalities to political offices by rallying "Queen Bees" behind the throne.

According to Shahrogh Akhavi and others,<sup>70</sup> Prior to the early 1960's, the suffrage of women was one of

the splintering issues among the various clerical groups, between them and the various secular groups, and among all these groups and the Shah. In his attempt to consolidate his power against all these groups and restore dependent capitalism, the Shah called for women's enfranchisement in 1962. However, at the time, in order not to antagonize sharply the opposition forces, separate ballot boxes were used for women voters on a public referendum. Thus, the state managed to tabulate women's votes but without figuring them in the national totalling of ballots.<sup>71</sup> By late 1963, after the consolidation of the Shah's power, a number of women became visible in national political offices. When women received legitimacy to participate in the kind of politics that were established by the Pahlavi monarch, the Shah won his temporary victory over the dissident clergy and secular groups. Thus, the Shah, in part, consolidated his power by allowing ruling class women into the state apparatus without letting in working class women or working class women and men who would disturb the power relations.

A number of studies have concluded that elections under the Shah were increasingly rigged and nearly all of the Majlis or Sena (the Senate) members were appointed and/or approved by the Shah and SAVAK.<sup>72</sup> Because of these assertions I will not belabor on voting behavior.

Rather, in order to assess contradictions between laws in theory and practice, I will only deal with sexual representation in political offices. Later I will examine the socio-economic backgrounds of women in those institutions.

By the end of 1963, of the total 197 members elected to the Majlis, six were women. Of the total of 60 senators, two were women. In comparison, in the 1975 elections, of the total of 268 members, 20 women were elected to the Majlis and of the total of 60 senators, two were women. Thus, as compared with the 1963 elections, 1975 electoral politics witnessed an increase of fourteen female deputies and the same number of female senators in the legislative bodies.<sup>73</sup> These figures, while exemplifying some changes, are nevertheless indications of a continuing unequal representation of women compared to men. In 1963 the representation of men compared to women was 191 to six; in 1975 it counted for 268 to 20. This pattern of unequal representation of sexes is even higher in the Senate with the constant ratio of 58 males to two females from 1963 to 1975 (Table 49).

The low representation of women was not unique to the legislative branches of the government. There were only a few female judges and diplomats as well as a small

number of female members of various Urban Arbitration Councils, Rural Houses of Equity, Provincial, District and City Councils.<sup>74</sup> At the ministerial level, women were badly represented. There had never been a female Prime Minister. Of the two female ministers, one was replaced and the other, appointed in 1975, was a minister without portfolio. Of 106 undersecretaries, only two women were appointed in 1975. In 1977, there were three female undersecretaries in addition to five female assistant ministers (Table 50).

As departmental directors, female representation was quite insignificant.<sup>75</sup> In 1975, as opposed to 447 male directors, there were only 18 females.<sup>76</sup> Their posts had heavier concentration at the Ministry of Education and none at the Ministries of Economic Affairs and Finance, Foreign Affairs, Commerce, PTT, Justice, Roads, Welfare, Industries and Mines, Labor, Interior, Housing, Energy, and Agriculture.<sup>77</sup> In 1977 there were 39 female directors<sup>78</sup> (Table 51).

Insofar as the provincial government was concerned,<sup>79</sup> women's representation was also low. There were no women among Iran's 23 ostandar-e kol ya farmandar-e kol (governors general), and none among its 154 farmandars (governors). Only two out of 393 bakhshdar (district) governors, and only two out of 438 mayors were women. The figures for 1977 show an increase of four female district governors (Table 52).

structures. They do not change the structure or process. They change themselves to fit the structures and processes which already predominate and are male dominated. By the same process, they also develop contemptuous attitudes toward other women who did not "make it." Therefore, while women in high positions become highly removed from the community of women, they become closer to representing male interests and values associated with similar positions and status.<sup>81</sup> In short, many women in positions of power

. . . relish the fact that they are "special", that they have unique qualifications that allow them to get high ranking positions normally denied to women. Non-discriminatory policies become threatening: Queen Bees do not want competition for their jobs any more than the men do. . . . The Queen Bee thereby disassociates herself from the fundamental issues of equality for women . . . [However,] the irony of it all is that the Queen Bee, because of her access to power and male favor, is in the best position to advance the cause of women, but is the least inclined to do so. Instead, she aligns herself with the establishment and proselytizes for the status quo. Those in power apply the classic divide and conquer rule with women as with other out-groups; they accept certain antifeminists and spokeswomen for their sex, and point to female "disunity."<sup>82</sup>

The formation of attitudes and behavior of high ranking women as stated in the "Queen Bee Syndrome" and shown in the cases of NIRT and high political offices in Iran cannot be fully separated from the class background of women. This is a perspective neglected by the authors

values of men in similar ranks. Like most of their male counterparts, these women had contemptuous and condescending attitudes toward women of lower echelons. They tended to attribute the myth of incapability to women who had not "made it" to their rank.

They, moreover, viewed themselves as aggressive and even more active and hard working than men in similar positions. Interestingly, a couple of these women--so proud of their western intoxication--preferred to conduct talks in English and not in Farsi. In other instances, some of these women regarded themselves as the carriers of the orders of the higher echelon males. One of them said that she "would do whatever she is ordered to do." Another would not take actions independently unless she received orders from "a man with superior powers." In a different instance, the woman said she would leave her position if her male boss was replaced.

These kinds of attitudes and behavior might be better understood through "the Queen Bee Syndrome" thesis according to this thesis, women in the position of power spend a great deal of time on their work, and sometimes work much harder than their male counterparts. Since these women work much closer to these men than to other women, they learn to incorporate and practice the prevalent interests and values of male dominated



Finally, at the Rastakhiz Party level, the representation of women, particularly at high echelons, was not very significant. The 1977 figures show female representation as follows: two members of the Office of the Political Party, four members of the Executive Committee, and no Undersecretaries.<sup>80</sup> In short, taking the overall pattern of female representation at the Majlis, the Senate, the Ministries, the Provincial Government, and the Rastakhiz Party, the point can be made that their formal participation, though increasing, remained quite low compared with men.

However, to what degree did female participation in high governmental posts represent the interests or aspirations of female communities as a whole? To what extent did high level female political participants represent the interests and values of men in power? Did the visible political participation of a few women relate to any specific social class? In dealing with the behavior and attitudes of women in governmental posts, I conducted brief conversations with a few female officers--an executive director, an undersecretary, and two departmental directors. Though inadequate as a basis for a thorough investigation, these attitudes expressed by them suggest some tentative basis for generalizations. On the whole, these Iranian women in high political positions seemed to share interests and

of the paper just cited. Therefore, in order to place attitudes within a wider social context, an attempt was made in this study to examine the socio-economic background of some of the Iranian women who had obtained high positions in governmental offices.

According to a study conducted in Iran in 1975,<sup>83</sup> most of the Iranian women who had "made it" to high positions had the advantage of personal connections to high authorities. These women were highly educated and came from upper and middle class backgrounds. I found similar findings in a survey that I conducted in 1977. I originally based the survey upon socio-economic data which included variable such as family connections, income, post, education, age, and marital status. Later, due to a lack of substantiated evidence on connections and income, I omitted these variables. However, I used informal knowledge of these variables based upon personal findings. I drew other variables for this study, mainly from the Iran Who's Who 1976, and a few governmental offices.<sup>84</sup>

At the ministerial level, the socio-economic data show that a female Minister closely associated with Ashraf Pahlavi was 37 years old, married, and had a Master's degree in linguistics and English literature from the United States. Next to her, a female Chief Director, also a close friend of Farah Pahlavi, was 38 years old,

married, and had a Master's degree in library science from the U.S. Among the female senators, one had served twice, was 69 years old, married, and had a Bachelor's degree from a teachers' training school in Iran. The second female senator had also served twice, was 65 years old, married, and had a Ph.D. in Educational Sciences from the U.S. Of the Majlis members, the number of years served by female deputies ranged from one to three, and their age ranged from 33 to 63. All the female deputies were married and their educational degrees ranged from high school diplomas to Ph.D.s from Iran and abroad. Of the female judges, the age range was between 37 and 61 years; all were married and the education range was between Bachelor's and Ph.D., from Iran or abroad. Of departmental directors, the age range of these women was between 34 and 55 and most of them (perhaps all) were married. Their educational backgrounds ranged from high school diplomas to Ph.D.s from Iran or abroad.

The aforementioned data shed information on the socio-economic backgrounds of some Iranians in high governmental posts. In general, it seems that these female political participants come from the upper middle and upper classes. In some cases, the variable connection is advantageous to the acquiring of high posts.

In a few others, women of older age with long work experience but little education fulfilled requirements for top political offices. In other instances, higher education with younger age but little or no work experience may demonstrate capabilities for political offices. As a whole, it appeared that the variables --personal or family connections (though not systematically investigated), education, age, work experience, and marital status compensated each other in partially securing for some women high level positions in the Shah's government. It should, however, be noted that except for the connection factor none of the other variables was unique to women in top posts. Indeed, there were many women there who possessed qualifications similar to those in higher positions, yet women were hardly represented at all in the top ranks.

In contrast, among the many complicated factors considered in connection with my NIRT study, the nature of the household in a highly repressive political system was another factor which created an obstacle to wider representation of women in political offices. It is argued by some political scientists that the structure of the institution of the family shapes to a great extent women's resistance toward political involvement.<sup>85</sup> This is applicable to all societies where women have particularly close ties to the family. On the one hand,

the strong association of women to the family, their significant role in the management of the household and in the upbringing of the children, consume their labor and much of their time in the home. This is true above all for lower and middle class women who are financially unable to obtain domestic help. For these women, however, the time spent earning a living outside the home to obtain additional cash needed by the household severely limits their opportunity for participation in national offices.

On the other hand, the household as a social unit is a decision-making apparatus in which women may exercise considerable influence and authority. This is particularly the case in societies with male dominated institutions which restrict women from visible decision-making positions. In this situation, women tend to play a passive role in public institutions, especially in repressive states, while preserving their informal authority within the walls of the households. In other words, for women who face powerlessness in social institutions, the maintenance of traditional roles in the household serves an alternate choice. Viewed from this perspective, then, the household, the class, the male dominated institutions and the repressive political system all create obstacles to wider participation of many women in social affairs.

These impediments, however, might not have been restricting to the public involvement of the more well-to-do women, for they generally have the advantage of domestic help. These women enjoy a greater amount of free time, as well as knowledge and expertise in participating in social institutions. Indeed, as the "Queen Bee Syndrome" indicated, these women may be able to spend long hours at their jobs and struggle very hard to "make it" in male dominated structures. Having come from similar class backgrounds and having developed attitudes similar to those of men in top positions, these women are able to exert authority. Of course, this is not to say that these women isolate themselves from defined "female" roles in the household. On the contrary, as the "Queen Bee Syndrome" shows, a woman from this background "may strive to succeed in the wife-mother role as a way of reassuring herself about her femininity, to resolve the conflict over success in a masculine world."<sup>86</sup> In this way, in contrast to lower and middle class women, the politically participating women may not necessarily lose all the informal authority available to them at home. They may also transform the location of their power from the household to larger institutions in the society. In this way, the enfranchisement law created an opportunity for well-to-do women to transform

their power location from the household to political institutions. By so doing, the Iranian Queen Bees became visible women participants in politics while women of other classes became formally enfranchised but informally disenfranchised.

In short, then, the promulgation of the enfranchise-ment law came with the Shah's White Revolution which aimed at consolidation of his power and increasing the transformation of Iran into world capitalism. The implementation of this law was reflected by well-to-do women holding political offices. As such, it accompanied occupational segregation of women. It is to be sure that women became representatives of the state to Ministries, the Majlis, the Sena, the Rastakhiz Party, the Ministerial Departments. Nevertheless, there still existed wide disparities between the sexes' representation to high governmental offices. Moreover, as interviews with a few female participants in high governmental offices suggested, the attitudes, values, and work practices of these women symbolized the "Queen Bee Syndrome," applying the classic "divide and conquer" rule to women who had not "made it to the top." However, in placing these attitudes in a wider social context, it was discerned that connection to authorities--though not systematically investigated--as well as education, age, work experience, and marital status complemented each other in partially securing these women high level

positions in the government or the Rastakhiz Party.

In contrast to the aforementioned female participants in political office, obstacles to wider involvement of women were found to be related to the structure of the household in a highly repressive political system with class inequalities. The structure of the institution of the household greatly affected the resistance of lower and middle class women against formal political involvement. Specifically, women's role in reproduction created limitations on their participation in political institutions. On the other hand, the household as a place for the exertion of women's informal influence and authority reinforced passivity, especially when other institutional channels for such a purpose were closed to women. These conditions were, however, somewhat different for the well-to-do women. These women, integrated into the ruling class and its values, cooperated with men to reproduce social relations in society. They, moreover, enjoyed a wider degree of freedom from household responsibilities because they had servants. They had more knowledge and expertise. They were, additionally, more prone to transfer the formal power location from the household to larger institutions of the society. Because they had servants doing their domestic labor, the well-to-do women had the time to participate in governmental offices. This was, however, the only acceptable form which women's political participation could



take. But the perspectives of these upper class women on other women and work tended to be determined by their class rather than their sex, and their political impact did nothing to strengthen the position of the economy of women of other classes.

E. Assessment of the Modern Legal Codes  
and their Relationship to Women's  
Work and Economic Changes

Concomitant with rapid economic changes of the 1960's and 1970's and, consequently, women's absorption into the labor market, came changes in state policies pertaining to women. These policies addressed women's position in the family, in society, labor market, and politics in a legalistic form. Hence, economic changes reverberating in politics had the effect of formally emancipating women. In this process, the state acted in a contradictory fashion. On the one hand, it passed a number of laws that facilitated some women's entry into wage work and political offices. On the other, it promulgated other laws that maintained patriarchy and women's activities in the reproduction of the labor force. In this way, while the state conferred limited legal status on women, it also prompted their subordination by class and gender inequalities.

The subordination of working class women stemmed in part from inconsistencies between promulgation and implementation of laws and from unequal application of legal reforms. The provision of age limitations for marriage as spelled out in the FPL was hardly advantageous to impoverished families without economic means to support their young daughters. Early marriage as the only feasible means of survival subordinated young girls to the will of their fathers and husbands as the heads of the households. As wives, these women remained the property of men as state adultery laws upheld its commitment to patriarchy. As married workers, they had unequal privileges relative to their husbands in determining their right to work. Although the state changed this provision of the Labor Law, it still made it conditional and impossible for women to have similar rights as men. In this way, the state through its laws reinforced the subordination of working class women to men.

The promulgation of laws added another level of subordination to working class women's lives, namely, their subordination to capital. The law of equal pay for equal work regardless of sex was not universally enforced. Working class women not only received lower wages than the minimum but also their wage was much less than men's for similar kinds of work. In addition, the state failed to enforce the minimum age law, the

consequences of which was a further exploitation of young women in wage work and their socialization into subordinated and dependent positions on men as symbols of authority. Moreover, through the promulgation of night shift laws, the state not only encouraged sex-typing occupations but also restricted women's choice for the control of their roles in the reproduction of the labor force. However, when the supply of male workers for night shifts was inadequate due to their absorption by more profitable establishments or capital-intensive industries, the state did not interfere with women's work at night. Therefore, when the interest of capital and the state coincided, the night shift law was broken and women received employment in the usual fashion of the reserve army of labor.

Hence, working class women were formally granted emancipation. Others, like domestic workers, prostitutes, and petty commodity producers, obtained no legal or illegal status. Those formally emancipated were not affected by reformist laws, including those of divorce and enfranchisement, in the same way women wage workers in the economy were. In this way, working class women became ever more subjugated not only to secular legal male bias, but also to capitalist exploitation in wage work.

In contrast to the working class, middle class women benefitted from emancipatory laws in a limited fashion. Divorce laws were mainly used by middle class women who had the economic means of taking advantage of their legal rights. However, through the mediation of male judges, the state overpowered the husbands' control of women. In this sense, middle class women remained more protected from the consequences of male domination in the household and their overwhelming power from state adultery laws. Capital, too, benefitted from divorce laws. The wide usage of the divorce law by service and related workers indicated a degree of congruency between capital and divorce. This was exemplified by the fact that the state fulfilled the needs of domestic and international capital by expanding the service sector. At the same time, women in large numbers were absorbed by the services. The promulgation of divorce laws and their usage by middle class women helped to release the labor of these women from the household to the service sector. In this process, middle class women benefitted from the state divorce law while they lost support from their husbands and their personal reputations. They gained economic independence through employment but at the cost of being subordinated to capital. Accumulation took a more secure and profitable shape as a result of women's divorce and wage work.

In contrast to working and middle class women, ruling class women or the "Queen Bees" became the greatest beneficiaries of state laws, particularly the suffrage law. This is not surprising, in view of the fact that nearly all state policies were formulated by ruling class men. This is not to say that all "Queen Bees" were immune from sexism. On the contrary, women in high political offices counted for a small percentage of those who held power. Though few in power, these women represented the interests of ruling class men and did not represent the interests of other social classes. In this way, the "Queen Bees" formally emancipated to obtain power failed to develop female solidarity interests across class lines. Hence, through its legal policies, the state constructed three kinds of hierarchies based on class, gender, and especially women to capital; women to men; and women to women. As such, it manifested the contradictions of dependent capitalism in Iran.

## NOTES

- <sup>1</sup> See note 32 of Ch. I; F. R. C. Bagley, "The Iranian Family Protection Law of 1967. A Milestone in the Advance of Women's Rights," in Iran and Islam, ed. C. E. Bosworth (Edinburgh University Press, 1971); and Behnaz Pakizegi, "Legal and Social Positions of Iranian Women," in Beck and Keddie, eds., Women in the Muslim World.
- <sup>2</sup> Iran Who's Who 1976.
- <sup>3</sup> K. Dolbeare and M. Edelman, American Politics: Policies, Power and Change (Boston: D. C. Heath and Company, 1981).
- <sup>4</sup> James Petras, "The Crisis of the Market, Socialist and Populist Regimes: Puerto Rico, Jamaica and Cuba," a paper presented at the seminar on "The Development of Pre-Industrial Areas," Columbia University, New York, 19 March 1981.
- <sup>5</sup> "Notq-e vala Hazrat Shahdokht Ashraf Pahlavi" [The Speech Her Majesty Princess Ashraf Pahlavi] in Kongereh-e Bozorg-dasht-e Chehelomin Salrouz-e Azadi-ye Ejtemai-ye Zanan [The Congress of Celebration of the Fortieth Day of Social Emancipation of Women] (Tehran: Women's Organization of Iran, 1353/1974), p. 16.
- <sup>6</sup> See the Research Group of the Department of Science of Social Communication, University of Tehran, Tarikh-cheh va Fa'aliyatha-ye Sazeman-e Zanan-e Iran [The History and Activities of the Women's Organization of Iran] (Tehran: Oft, n.d.).
- <sup>7</sup> "Farmayeshat-e Shahanshah Aryamehr" [The Speeches of the Shah] in Kongereh-e, pp. 11-12.
- <sup>8</sup> Bagley, "The Iranian," p. 57.
- <sup>9</sup> Michele Barrett, Women's Oppression Today: Problems in Marxist-Feminist Analysis (New York: Schocken Books, 1980), p. 236.
- <sup>10</sup> Mernissi, Beyond the Veil.
- <sup>11</sup> Pakizegi, "Legal and," p. 219.
- <sup>12</sup> Mo'ini-Araqi, "Bar-resi" [An Investigation], p. 41.

- 13 General Department of Civil Registration, appearing in Selected Statistics (Tehran: Plan and Budget Organization, Statistical Center of Iran, 1972/1973), p. 14.
- 14 Sedghi, "Women."
- 15 General Department of Civil Registration, p. 14.
- 16 On general divorces, see ibid.
- 17 Bagley, "The Iranian," p. 58, and pp. 60-64.
- 18 Pakizegi, "Legal and," p. 22.
- 19 Noel Coulson and Doreen Hinchcliffe, "Women and Law Reform in Contemporary Islam," in Women in the Muslim World, p. 50.
- 20 Boserup, Women's Role.
- 21 Mernissi, Beyond the Veil, p. xvi.
- 22 Beneria and Sen, "Accumulation, Reproduction," pp. 18-19.
- 23 Pakizegi, "Legal and," p. 221.
- 24 Barrett, Women's Oppression, p. 236.
- 25 Mazlouman, "Zan Koshi" [The Murdering], pp. 45-47.
- 26 Ibid., p. 43. <sup>27</sup> As cited in ibid.
- 28 Ettela-at 14039, 1351/1972, p. 22, as cited in ibid., p. 15, note 1.
- 29 Ettela-at 14230, 1352/1973, p. 18, as cited in ibid., p. 15, note 2.
- 30 Ettela-at 14275, 1352/1972, p. 13, as cited in ibid., p. 15, note 3.
- 31 Ettela-at 13945, 1351/1972, p. 78, as cited in ibid., p. 27, note 2.

32. Kayhan 8522, 1350/1971, p. 22, as cited in ibid., p. 27 and note 1.
33. Ibid., p. 62.    34. Ibid., p. 32-33.    35. Ibid., p. 22.
36. Ibid., p. 36. Also see Fateriyun, "Bar-resi" [An Investigation], pp. 38-42, and Manouchehrian, Entegad-e [A Critique].
37. As cited in Mazlouman, "Zan Koshi" [The Murdering], p. 62, and pp. 41-42.
38. Ibid., p. 29, and note 29.
39. Manouchehrian, Entegad-e [A Critique], p. 99.
40. Rowbotham, Hidden From, p. 94.
41. Mo'ini-Araqi, "Bar-resi" [An Investigation], p. 46; and Naseri, "Motale-ye" [A Study of], p. 94.
42. Bagely, "The Iranian," p. 58, and p. 63.
43. Pakizegi, "Legal and," p. 222.
44. Mo'ini Araqi, "Bar-resi" [An Investigation], p. 35; and Naseri, "Motale-ye" [A Study of], p. 94.
45. Qavanin va Moqarrarat-e Kar va Ta'min-e Ejtema'i, vol. I, p. 23. For a general critique of labor laws as applied to women, see A. Ansarian et al., Naqsh-e Zanan dar Barnameh-e Omrani-ye Sheshom-e Keshvar [Women's Role in the Sixth National Development Plan] (Tehran: Women's Organization of Iran,
46. Bar-resi-ye Ejmal-i-ye Sharayet-e Kar-e Zanan-e Kargar [Brief Investigation of the Work Condition of Working Women], (Tehran: Women's Organization of Iran, 1348/1969), pp. 14-15.
47. Rastakhiz-e Kargaran [The Resurgence of Workers], 17th of Azar, 1354/1975, as cited in Artesh-e Azim-e Zanan be Maydan Miyad [The Great Army of Women is Coming to the Front] (Tehran: n.d.), p. 17.



48. Zafar-Dokht Ardalan, Bar-resi va Tahlil-e Madh-e Dahom-e E'jamiyeh-e Jahani Raf'-e Tabi'z az Zan [An Investigation and Analysis of Article Ten of the World Declaration for the Prevention of Discrimination Against Women] (Tehran: Women's Organization of Iran, 1354/1971).
49. Shokuh Tavaf-Chian and Vafa Jasemi, Dar Bareh-e Masa'leh-e Zan [About the Women's Problem] (Tehran: 1357/1978), p. 21. Women's militancy, insofar as it did not create a threat to the existing capital-labor relationships and state hegemony, remained immune from SAVAK's repression.
50. Ministry of Labor, Qavanin, vol. 1, p. 109.
51. Ibid., p. 20.      52. Ibid., p. 23.
53. Bar-resi-ye Ejmali, p. 16.      54. Ibid.      55. Ibid., pp. 24-25.
56. Ministry of Labor, Qavanin, vol. 1, p. 20.
57. Ibid., pp. 22-23. It should also be noted that the data on the ratio of males and females in night shift nursing is unavailable.
58. Ibid., pp. 20-21.      59. Ibid.      60. Ibid.
61. Pakizegi, "Legal and," p. 223.
62. Bar-resi-ye Ejmali, pp. 15-16.
63. Ministry of Labor, Qavanin, vol. 1, p. 21.
64. Due to the shortage of time and scarcity of data, in this section I will not deal with underground political activities of women. A more concrete investigation of contemporary political participation of women must encompass legal as well as "illegal" political activities of this group.
65. Jane J. Jaquette, "Female Political Participation in Latin America" in Women in the World, p. 56.
66. Nadia Youssef, "Social Structure and the Female Labor Force: The Case of Women Workers in Muslim Middle Eastern Countries," Demography 8:4 (1971), p. 431.

- 67 This phrase is borrowed from G. Stains, C. Tavis, and T. Jayarante, "The Queen Bee Syndrome," Psychology Today (January 1974), pp. 55-60.
- 68 Sanghvi, et al., The Revolution, pp. 3-17.
- 69 Oriana Fallaci, "A Shah's Eye View of the World," New York Post (19 December 1973), pp. 22-24.
- 70 Shahrough Akhavi, Religion and Politics in Contemporary Iran: Clergy-State Relations in the Pahlavi Period (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1980), Ch. 3, pp. 63-65, 67, and 95; Bill, The Politics, especially Ch. 6; and Cottam, Nationalism.
- 71 Farmayan, "Politics During the Sixties," p. 105.
- 72 Nirumand, Iran; and Cottam, Nationalism.
- 73 Ministry of Information (Tehran, 1974 and 1975) and Women's Organization of Iran (Tehran, 1974 and 1977).
- 74 Women's Organization of Iran, Tehran, 1975.
- 75 Kayhan Research, "The Employment of Women," p. 49.
- 76 Ibid., p. 10. 77 Ibid.
- 78 Women's Organization of Iran, 1977.
- 79 Kayhan Research, "The Employment of Women," p. 50.
- 80 This data was calculated by the Women's Organization of Iran, Tehran, February 1977.
- 81 Stains, et al., "The Queen Bee Syndrome," pp. 55-60.
- 82 Ibid., pp. 57-58.
- 83 Kayhan Research, "The Employment of Women," pp. 24-30.
- 84 Iran Who's Who 1976.

<sup>85</sup>For example, see Jacquette, "Female Political Participation," pp. 57-76. In contrast, one may also argue that despite these structural restraints, women can be politically involved, not of course within the legal parameters of the state, but "illegally" and against the state. The history of many politically active Iranian women in the late 1960's and 1970's against the Shah testifies to the validity of this point. For a more detailed discussion of this point, see Hamideh Sedghi, "Back to the Veil and Home or the Struggle Against Subordination? Women in the Iranian Revolution," a paper presented at the Columbia University Conference on Revolution in Iran, New York, 8 March 1979.

<sup>86</sup>Stains, et al., "The Queen Bee Syndrome," p. 58.

## CHAPTER VII

### CONCLUSION

The purpose of this dissertation was to analyze the changes that had taken place in women's work--inside and outside the household--and legal positions in urban Iran, 1900-78. The focus of the study was on state emancipatory policies of the 1960's and early 1970's. The hypothesis was that legal changes pertaining to women reflected their changing work position which had not only facilitated the growth of dependent capitalism, but also sharpened class and gender inequalities. This hypothesis was tested through a systematic analysis of changes in women's work as a significant component of capitalist transformation of Iran. In addition, the project interpreted the impact of state policies on the legal position of women and the extent to which these reforms corresponded to alterations in women's work.

#### A. Findings of the Research in Perspective

In my attempt to investigate the hypothesis, I have found that four issues are of paramount importance:

- 1) women's work relates to their class position;

2) changes in women's work relates to changes in the structure of the economy; 3) the state plays a significant role in shaping class and gender relations; and 4) the sexual division of labor causes the subordination of women.

#### 1. Women, Work and Class

Here I was concerned with the changing work position of urban Iranian women from 1900 to 1978. I found striking differences in women's work between the early twentieth century and later decades. In looking at the division of labor at the turn of the century, what was most notable was the sharp distinction between the type and place of women's and of men's work activities. Women's work was primarily confined to the household, whereas men worked in shops, in the bazaars and in trade. Thus, the urban Iranian world of labor and work outside the household appeared to be exclusively male dominated. In reality, however, women's work remained invisible since it was located in the household.

Women's work in the household varied with their class position. The work of poor women was confined to subsistence activities and reproduction. They performed domestic labor for the maintenance of the household and the household's own reproduction. In addition, they

did carpet weaving, seamstressing, needlecraft, embroidery, and domestic labor for the rich. These women worked in their own households or those that belonged to the rich, or in small family workshops, or in carpet factories. Another group of women, small in number, worked as vendors. They produced goods in their own households and exchanged them in the bazaar. All these women worked regardless of their marital status and age. They were all mobile and veiled. Despite invisibility, for women struggling for survival, marital status, age and the veil hardly constituted an impediment to their work.

In contrast, the more privileged women not subject to subsistence problems were less mobile, more secluded and more confined to the household. In wealthier families, household activities were performed by the staff of servants under female sub-management. In general, the well-to-do women relied on men for economic support. Dependency on men, however, limited their activities to household's own production. Thus, confinement to the household and some household work through dependency on men provided a basis for patriarchal control in richer families.

Overall, in early twentieth century Iran, despite the appearance of the exclusively male dominated division of labor, women in a variety of degrees were involved in production and reproduction in the household. As

members of a specific sex and specific class, women did not experience similar restraints. The work of poor women and men, though differentiated, constituted a joint struggle against poverty. The work of women was, however, controlled and held in check by men. The subordinated position of poor women was related to derogatory work, and to extreme inequality between the sexes. For the more privileged woman, though confined to the household and/or to the andarun, dependency on men, seclusion and restriction of mobility accounted as specific mechanisms for her sexual oppression. Hence, the lower the class position of woman, the less was their subjugation as women and, conversely, the higher the class position of women, the more was their subjugation as women. In short, in Iran of the early twentieth century, women's invisible participation in production and reproduction created gender contradictions that did not serve to subjugate all women to class contradictions.

During the following decades, however, Iran witnessed a gradual but significant change in the work position of women. From the late 1930's until the mid-1950's, small but growing numbers of women joined the seemingly male-dominated labor market by entering the labor force in the areas of nursing, medicine and teaching. Larger numbers of women had been joining the

market by two decades later. In 1976, of the total labor force of ten million, women's participation was counted as 13 percent of the total labor force. In urban areas, the labor force participation of women accounted for 11.3 percent of the total urban labor force. Thus, in contrast to the situation at the turn of the century, when most women were confined to household tasks, in two decades of change, in the 1960's and 1970's, their increased work activities in the urban labor market brought their integration into the wage labor force up to 11 percent of the total urban employed population.

The absorption of women in the sphere of paid production had the effect of altering the exclusively male-dominated workforce of the early twentieth century. The newly formed labor force became a sex-segregated one. While the general growth of the urban labor force was high, the share of the urban female labor force in the total urban labor force grew higher than that of the men.

Labor force participation of women was highest in the service industries and not in other sectors of the economy. Data indicates that 58.6 percent of the urban female labor force worked in the services. Men's participation in the service industries increased slightly, but their activities in other sectors grew



more significantly. The concentration of women in the services showed the development of a sex-segregated labor market based on sex-typing occupations.

Labor force participation of women was also based on their class position. Working class women worked in large numbers as industrial laborers and carpet weavers. They expended long working hours of labor time to keep their families out of urban poverty. Another segment of working class women worked illegally or as petty commodity producers. Others worked as low-paid domestics or other related workers for upper and middle class women. These women not only helped production and reproduction in upper and middle class families, but they also compensated for the low wages of their own husbands.

The absorption of working class women as wage laborers in the capitalist production sector often involved sex-typing occupations. Data indicated that female industrial laborers often worked in sex-segregated factories. Work in cotton and textile factories was considered a "feminine" job and was exclusively female dominated. Male industrial laborers worked primarily in "masculine" type factories like brick, wood, etc. In the case of capitalist labor, there appeared a definite sex-typing of factory jobs. In contrast,

domestic labor as a precapitalist job involved no sex-typing. Both women and men worked as maids, despite the latter's lack of interest in that occupation. Sex-segregated occupations were, therefore, related to the level by which women and men had become integrated with capitalist work ethics.

On the other hand, sexually mixed occupations in factories reflected wage differentials and ideological discrimination against women. Sexist ideologies based on biological-functional views reinforced the myth of women's "natural" role in the household, their lower level of productivity and capability relative to men, their lack of skill and their "physical weakness." As such, they justified women's lower wages relative to men. These gender contradictions, however, benefitted the capitalists in dividing male from female workers.

On the whole, the exploitation of working class women was due to the sale of their labor power to the owners of the means of production, their low wages, and the expenditure of long hours of labor time. As female laborers, they were more exploited than men since they received lower wages. In addition, as women, they experienced control and domination by their husbands, fathers, brothers and by their tasks in household reproduction. Hence, working class women burdened by

a double day, were exploited by class as well as gender inequalities.

Middle class women were mainly concentrated in the service industries and related professional occupations. A number of working class women worked in the service sector, too. Women's work in service jobs had structural resemblances to their work in the household. These jobs had the effect of lowering the cost of female labor as opposed to men, who were required to undergo costly training. Women also accepted low wages because of their low bargaining position in the labor market, as bulk of the reserve army of labor. Moreover, the ideology of women as homemakers subjected these women to similar pressures in service occupations as in the household. Hence, the relatively higher absorption of female labor in the services not only led to the formation of sex-segregated occupations, but also caused women's subordination to low wages and sexist ideologies in the market.

Most middle class women participated in the labor force in order to secure their own standard of living. In general, the higher the professional level of this class, the more income these women had. Due to their own higher level of earnings and their husbands', middle class women experienced a greater luxury and comfort than the working class women. Like the majority of women

in Iran, the middle class women obtained their social position from their relation to men: as married women, from their husbands; as single women, from their brothers or fathers. The subordinated position of middle class women was, therefore, related less to their earnings and more to market mechanisms and specific sex roles as women in connection to their menfolk.

The work of ruling class women was not based upon the wage. Their work and class position stemmed from the ownership of the means of production. The class position of these women was derived from their relations to men as brothers, fathers and husbands. As large property owners with access to social power, ruling class women became subjugators both in the society and at home: in the society, because of their high influence in politics and economic decision-making; at home, because of the employment of women and men of other classes for the reproduction of their own class. In the case of these women, class position overrode "marginalization" by sex. Viewed from this perspective, a coherent analysis of subordination of women was suggested to be seen within the framework of class relations, gender relations and power relations in the process of capital accumulation within a specific political and cultural context.

Labor force participation of women under Iran's capitalism was also based on marital status and life

cycle. One of the main findings of this study was that the typical pattern of female wage work by marital status was reversed in Iran. Women's wage work was highest among married women between 20 and 29 years old. Early marriages among urban working class women increased their availability for wage work outside the home. In their early twenties, these women utilized the labor of the oldest daughters for the care of young children and some household work. For these women, then, entrance into the wage labor market was facilitated by personal and traditional relations. In contrast, the participation of middle class women was accomplished through reliance on traditional and personal relations (e.g., relatives), as well as their commodity relations to outside help (e.g., the purchase of the labor power of servants). Hence, depending on their class position, young married women entered into personal and commodity relations in order to become available for wage work. By so doing, these women became subordinated by a double day.

Specifics of labor force participation of women were studied through the analysis of the sexual division of labor in the communications industry, namely NIRT and its subsidiary unit, CONI. This organization was a state controlled apparatus. In this organization, while all the employees were to be selected on a universal basis,

the highly placed personnel were directly appointed from above.

The investigation of employment policies showed a consistent pattern of discrimination against the employment and promotion of women. Women were excluded from high level positions (rank of directors and above) at CONI, but not at NIRT, at large. The exclusion of women did not reflect their failure to meet promotional requirements as laid out in the rules. Nor did it seem to relate to high educational standards generally required for "de-marginalization" of women in the third world workforce. Indeed, better educated women held lower wages than men in higher ranks with lower education. Wages were inversely related to education but positively correlated with experience. Higher wages were concentrated among men with more experience who were older while lower wages were focused on women with better education who were older. Higher wages was an indication of sex-typing occupations related to gender inequalities. Better education was a mark of advancement but not to the level of promotion to high ranking positions. As such, it stood in contradiction to modernization approaches to problems of women in the third world--that lack of inadequate education was one of the main causes of marginalization of women--as pioneered by Ester Boserup.

One element that constrained women's promotion to high positions was the sexism of men in positions of power who regarded women's primary place as being in the household, not in serious positions in the labor market. Women, too, accepted this historically rooted ideology which they had not challenged but internalized as the myth of incapability and subordination to male hegemony. Lack of class connection was another factor that accounted for exclusion of capable women from high level positions at CONI. At NIRT, however, a very small number of women from ruling class backgrounds had obtained high ranking positions. Despite sexism, without their class background, these women would not have obtained their high level positions. Hence, class position may override sexist ideologies for women in high level jobs.

On the other hand, for men, experience alone might have been sufficient for occupational mobility. Most men in high level positions, in contrast to women, came from low and middle class backgrounds. However, the attainment of high level positions by men was related to their ability to integrate CONI functions to representative state policies. In this way, low and middle class men, together with capable ruling class women, obtained positions at high levels in NIRT.

In contrast to the exclusion of women from high level positions at CONI, women were crowded into middle

level positions. This pattern marked their disassociation with ruling class women and men who were directly involved in the reproduction process. Indeed, the closer the occupational ranks became to high level positions, the lower became the degree of representation of women. In this way, as opposed to high level positions, occupational categories at middle level ranks were more gender than class based.

In gender based positions, women acquired similar ranks and wages with men. Rank and wage were determined by skill. Women acquired their skill through education, men obtained it through work experience. As such, it indicated that men entered the labor force with relatively lower education and acquired skills through work experience which obtained them a salary equivalent to educated women. On the other hand, women spent time and money to acquire education and skills before joining the labor market. In this way, the long run cost of hiring women was lower than men which benefitted employers while it prolonged women's participation in the labor force. Thus, there appeared a possibility of a reverse correlation between education and skill as prerequisite for job attainment; and hence, a possibility for the negation of developmental views that relate women's lack of participation in the job market to their lack of education and skill. In general, skill did not seem to be



intrinsically dependent upon education. Certainly, the case of men approved this and the case of women contradicted it.

Such a pattern was non-existent for lower level positions in which women were totally excluded. As such, it indicated the practice of discrimination and the myth of incapability in the employment of women. Put differently, the exclusion of women from low level positions at CONI suggested that the further jobs were from high ranks, the higher was the practice of sex-typing occupations in the organization, and the more discrimination existed against women as members of a specific sex.

Overall, women's entry in the work force marked their segregation in the labor market. While women became crowded in the services, they experienced sharp class and gender based inequalities. Working class women in sex-typed and sexually mixed occupations earned lower wages than men. Middle class women in gender based positions acquired similar wages and ranks with men but at the expense of the higher cost of better education and prolonged participation in the labor market. Ruling class women, because of their class position, overrode marginalization by sex created cleavages among women by class and sex. Women's wage work depended upon their marital status and age too. Despite preoccupation

with household activities, labor force participation of married women was highest. For married working class women, wage work became possible because of their maintenance of personal and traditional relations. For married middle class women, entrance into both personal and commodity relations facilitated their labor force participation. Women's participation in production and reproduction did not gain social recognition, for their social position continued to be derived from their relation to men. Hence, as women moved into the wage work of the 1960's and 1970's, they experienced subjugation at three levels: as wage laborers by capital, as women by men, and as women by women.

## 2. Women's Work and Economic Changes

Here I was concerned with economic conditions that existed under the Shah but absent in the beginning of the century that may have counted for the significant changes in women's work. In the early 1900's Iran was a precapitalist social formation described as "an almost isolated state [and] barely distinguishable as an economic entity."<sup>1</sup> In that period, agriculture was the primary occupation and industry was sparse. Twenty-one percent of the population lived in urban areas, 55 percent in rural, and 24 percent of the population consisted of nomadic tribes.<sup>2</sup> Agricultural activities occupied

ninety percent of the labor force, with the rest engaged in distributive trades or in public and private services.<sup>3</sup>

In contrast, by the mid-1970's, the economic structure of Iran had become radically different. From the early 1960's to 1970's, Iran had witnessed an unprecedented growth rate of capital accumulation. The domestic economy had become based on import-substitution industries and not on internal production. It relied on capital-intensive rather than labor-intensive industry. It allowed industries and services to grow at the expense of agricultural productivity. Urban communities had grown to house recent migrants and employers in the non-agricultural sectors of the economy.

These changes paralleled Iran's increasing integration into the world capitalist market. Iran imported capitalist industries and services, created markets for foreign commodities and exported raw materials, mainly oil. At the same time, in order to sustain control over Iran's raw materials, markets and strategic position, Western Europe, Japan, and to a great extent, the U.S. extended considerable economic and military support to the Shah's regime, without which Iran's capitalist transformation would not have accelerated so rapidly. In addition, these countries made high investments in capital-intensive industries and heavily influenced the

import-substitution economy in Iran. Hence, Iran became ever more dependent on the world capitalist market since the impetus for its accumulation process lay outside the country.

Iran's capitalist development was also a result of internal forces (the State represented by the Shah and his bourgeoisie allies), which in turn were influenced by external ones. The Shah promoted capitalism by relying on repression. His specific instrument for achieving these policies was the White Revolution program which was supported by the Kennedy Administration. The White Revolution aimed at the suppression of religious and secular dissidents, as well as Iran's capitalist development.

Capitalism created the wage labor force in Iran, as it did elsewhere in the world. The structure of the labor force was heavily influenced by the expansion of the market in areas which served Iran's capitalist development and the profit needs of Western imperialism. Hence, the formation of the labor market in Iran paralleled the creation of capital intensive-industries, assembly-type industries and import-substitution industries. As such, it had the effect of placing women in the labor process imported from the Western capitalist states. Women, thus, became absorbed in the labor force,

especially in the growing service industries which were expanded by the increasing activities of multinational firms. Women's concentration in the service sector not only fulfilled Iran's capitalist needs for cheap and efficient labor, but also allowed for further exploitation by the Western capitalist states of Iran by subjugating women to foreign capital and foreign ideologies.

Capitalism created a large force of unemployed population as well. Capital-intensive and import-substitution industries and services retarded the development of a labor-intensive economy. Among the unemployed, women in particular served as the reserve army of labor. This was surely consistent with sexist ideologies. Some unemployment maintained competition in the labor market, especially between the male and female laborers. In addition, unemployment lowered the bargaining position of laborers, particularly those of women. Hence, due to the nature of capitalism and capitalist exploitation, women experienced subordination in the labor market. They became part of the labor force as cheap laborers, relative to men, and they formed the bulk of the reserve army of labor in Iran, particularly in urban Iran.

Hence, by the mid-1970's, the economic structure of Iran and its labor force had become radically different from the early 1900's when the economy was stagnant and

production processes outside the home were exclusively male-dominated. In contrast, in the 1940's and the mid-1950's, a period of small and uneven economic growth, there emerged a small increase in the number of women entering the labor market. By the mid-1950's, after the nationalization of the oil industry, the major policy of the Iranian government became the development of private enterprise. This period was extended to two decades of economic growth and capital accumulation, accounting for a larger participation of women in the urban labor force. It can, therefore, be suggested that women's lack of work participation outside the household at the turn of the century was related to the stagnant precapitalist urban economy and, conversely, that the relative increase in labor force participation of urban women in later decades was related to the growing capitalist economy.

What were the conditions under which women were freed from some household work and became available for production activities in the paid labor market? A partial reply was that capitalism tended to separate producers from their means of production. In this process, the agricultural workers, displaced by land reform, migrated to the centers of capital accumulation, the cities, in search of jobs and new occupations. In the cities,

however, the increasing rate of population growth as well as the rise in numbers of migrants, created surplus labor in urban locales. City unemployment indicated that migrants added to surplus laborers grew faster than the capitalist production sector could absorb. Consequently, the bargaining position of families were reduced because they lost their capacity to produce. In this way, more members of the household, namely women, joined the labor force in the usual fashion of the reserve army. Women's wage work was to foster the main finances of urban household.

In addition, capitalism tended to change the nature of household work from the center of both production and consumption to the locus of consumption. This meant that production for sale became increasingly prevalent and the purchase of commodities replaced subsistence activities in the household. Within the household, domestic workers--women in most cases--had to perform a new function, that of consumption of capitalist commodities. Domestic work in the household was, therefore, linked to the market by the performance of the function of consumption and by the reproduction of the labor force. Domestic work, however, led to further subordination of women only because it consisted of the production of use values (child care, cooking, etc.), through the expenditure of domestic labor time, but also because

of the purchase and consumption of capitalist commodities.

The changing function of women as consumption workers whose means of production were capitalist commodities intensified class divisions because consumption was now contingent upon income. As such, it often led to a new position for women, that of the double day. Thus, household consumption not only created new tasks for women within the household, but also pushed women from the household to the labor market. In this way, capitalism forced women to sell their labor power for a wage. Women did so despite the presence of cultural and religious constraints against their work outside the home.

Women's participation in the labor force can also be explained in terms of the relationship of consumption to the wage rate. Here, I found an apparent contradiction: the higher the level of wages relative to consumption, the higher was women's incentives to join the market. However, the lower the level of wages relative to consumption and expenditure, the more women were compelled to work for a wage. This was especially true when the profit and inflation rates were higher than the wage rate. Under this situation, the relatively lower wages could not compensate for the relatively



higher rate of consumption. Hence, depending on their class position, more women entered the workforce. Working class women did so as a necessity for the maintenance of household subsistence, whereas middle class women sought employment as an option for household maintenance.

Overall, changes in women's productive activities and reproduction came as a result of rapid capitalist development in Iran. Capitalism, with its capacity to free laborers from subsistence levels, simultaneously enslaves them by subjugating them as wage laborers to capital. In this way, subordination of women is not an arbitrary by-product of "modernity" as calimed by Boserup. Rather, subordination of women is due to contradictions based on class, gender and power relations in the process of capital accumulation in a dependent fashion. It is within the context of these developments that I found why the Iranian state introduced emancipatory policies in the 1960's and 1970's.

### 3. Women and the State

Capitalist development in Iran generated profound changes in the economic structure and women's work. It also produced changes in state policies in order to accommodate those alterations in the economy. Specifically, with the change in the nature of women's work and sex relations, the authorities saw a necessity for

legislative changes affecting women's position in the new social order. Emancipatory policies, thus, paralleled the increasing absorption of women in the capitalist market.

The most notable changes concerning the legal position of women came in the 1960's. The Suffrage Law of 1962 was one of the programs of the White Revolution. Other laws such as the Family Protection Law, and various labor legislation, were subsequently promulgated. These laws were rooted in the class structure of Iran and its tradition of patriarchy. These laws were not legislated through demands by women at large. Rather, they were initiated by the Shah and his sister, Ashraf. They created the Women's Organization of Iran to carry certain responsibilities for the promotion of women's rights in Iran. Ashraf was appointed as the head of the WOI.

The Suffrage Law that enfranchised women was a theoretical challenge to Article 10 of the franchise section of the Constitution of 1906, which had placed women in the same category of non-voters--along with murderers, thieves and other criminals. In reality, however, a small number of educated and well-to-do women achieved National Offices. This practice resembled occupational segregation of women by class. These women symbolized the "Queen Bee Syndrome," applying the classic

"divide and conquer" rule to women who had not "made it to the top." These women, integrated into the ruling class and its values cooperated with men, like those in NIRT, to reproduce social relations in society. In this way, their perspectives on women and work tended to be determined by their class rather than their sex, and their impact did little to strengthen the position in the economy of women of other classes. Consequently, while the Suffrage Law granted women equal enfranchisement rights, the implementation of the law promoted under-representation of women compared to men, on the one hand, and representation of the Queen Bees, on the other.

Other emancipatory laws such as those introduced in 1967 provided alterations in the Civil Code. The FPL of 1967 which was subsequently revised in 1975 required age limitation for marriage. The majority of women or those of the working class and rural residents failed to benefit from their new status drawn by the ruling class. The former categories of women married young because their poor families were unable to finance their stay at home. This was one reason for the high participation of improverished young married women in the labor force. Similarly, the FPL modified divorce laws by allowing the courts to decide on divorce cases

required by women as well as by men. Despite its relatively wide usage, the divorce law was more prevalent among women in the services than among any other sector of the economy. It is, therefore, possible that the divorce law was more congruent with the needs of the growing capitalist market, especially in the services. In addition to service workers, other beneficiaries of divorce laws were well-to-do women who had the economic means to take advantage of their new legal rights in defense of their bourgeoisie femininism.

The FPL of 1967 improved child custody law by granting the courts the right to decide on the issue. Practically, however, the law reflected its class bias as well as a new form of patriarchal control, namely, the bias of male judges and women's economic dependence on former husbands: economic dependence not through marriage but through divorce and child custody. FPL also attempted to change polygamy laws. Theoretically, it restricted polygamy but did not prohibit it. In this way, polygamy was practiced by mostly working class and a few traditional middle class men, while Western-intoxicated men from other classes resorted to adultery.

Adultery laws under various provisions of criminal codes served as further control mechanisms to subordinate women to men, to disintegrate families and to subjugate

labor to capital. In general, the law assigned to adulterous men a light sentence while it allowed the murdering of adulterous women by their menfolk as the price for the preservation of their names. Male usage of the adultery law against women varied by the class background. As such, it was mainly practiced by working class men and some traditional middle classes. In contrast, middle class men usually divorced their wives in adultery situations whereas upper class men, due to their interest in maintaining social prestige, refrained from divorce. Thus, by upholding adultery laws, the state maintained the privatization of women as the property of men and the ownership of women's bodies by men. In addition, the murdering of women led to the disintegration of working class families, and hence to the lowering of the working class men in the labor market. On the other hand, the reinforcement of patriarchal power benefitted the capitalists since their purchase of labor power accompanied the low bargaining position of labor.

The exploitation of labor in general and that of women in particular was intensified by contradictions in labor legislation in theory and practice. Through its labor laws, the state not only regulated conditions and terms of employment, but also played a significant

role in the subordination of women. The labor laws facilitated women's entry into the labor market by loosening certain legal powers that men previously had to restrict their wives from work outside the home. Labor laws, however, were not without strong male bias. The husband could legally prohibit his wife from "unreputable" work, whereas the wife was not granted a similar legal power to prevent her husband from similar work. Subsequent changes in the law granted equal privileges to women provided that women earned sufficient income to support the entire family. In reality, due to the relatively lower participation of women in the labor force and their lower wages relative to men, as well as the legalized position of men as the head of the household, the law made it unlikely for women to have similar rights as men. In this way, while the labor law facilitated women's entry into the market economy, it strengthened the legal sex bias against women.

Labor legislation provided for equal pay for equal work regardless of sex. The enforcement of this law varied with the nature of the work. In some factories the law was upheld while in most others men's wages superceded women's. Subordination of women by wage was also reflected in the promulgation of the minimum wage law which was to be adjusted by the standard of living.

This law failed to be applicable in factories, but tended to be observed in middle class occupations such as those in governmental and private offices. Hence, the wage law in its implementation was both sex and well as class biased.

The exploitation of women as wage laborers was most severe under the law of the minimum age for workers. Labor legislation forbade workers employment below the age of twelve and assigned severe sentences for law breakers. Despite this, the labor of many female children continued to be used very cheaply in a number of factories and workshops. The exploitation of female child labor had far reaching implications besides material ones. The early socialization of women under the authority of parents and owners of establishments not only made women dependent on men, but also severely hampered the women's struggle against men and the patriarchal state.

Labor Legislation encouraged sex-typing occupations as well. It prohibited night shifts to women, except in the case of traditionally "female" occupations such as nursing. By so doing, the law also promoted wage differential by sex since another provision of the law assigned a 35 percent wage increase for night shift workers, or men. The observance of the night shift law

was beneficial to capitalists in contrast to other laws that they broke. This was due to the fact that female employment for night shifts was more costly, since another law required the establishment of nurseries. On the other hand, it is noteworthy to point out that where availability and productivity of male labor for night shifts was low, primarily due to their absorption in capital-intensive sectors, the capitalists broke the law and the state did not interfere to enforce its laws. In both cases, however, the state benefitted. In the latter case, the state fulfilled the needs of dependent capitalism. In the former, the state maintained its control of women's role in the reproduction of labor force, since it made women available to their husbands for sexual services. Women's presence was, therefore, indispensable in the household at night when the husbands and children were present.

Labor legislation reflected gender inequality in its other provisions. It restricted women from "difficult" as opposed to "light" jobs. As such, it allowed discriminatory sexism in its classification of "difficult" as compared to "light" occupations. In addition, it cultivated capitalist work ethics in male workers who preferred "masculine" jobs rather than jobs that women were assigned to. In this way, the law effectively



mediated to crowd women into "feminine" jobs and, hence, restricted their mobility into other kinds of occupations. In sum, then, labor legislation increased some women's options but it also strengthened legal sex bias as well as class contradictions. Reform, thus, liberalized the labor law while it also reinforced class and gender inequalities.

On the whole, these policy proclamations, though significantly different from earlier codes, remained discriminatory in both theory and practice. Women were freed from some traditional restrictions, while the patriarchal power of men's dominance over women remained in the workplace, in the family and in society as a whole. The degree of patriarchal dominance, however, varied with the class position of women. The higher the class position of women, the less was their control by men and, conversely, the lower the class position of women, and the more was the exercise of patriarchy.

Given the contradictions between the degree of emancipation granted to women under the laws of the state, and the actual condition of women, this study suggested that state reforms emancipated women only to the extent that they changed the form of women's subordination. Through its legal policies, based on class and gender inequalities, the state constructed three kinds of

hierarchies corresponding to those developed by the economy. These hierarchies included those between women and capital, women and men, and women and women. As such, they accounted for women's subordination in capitalist Iran.

#### 4. Division of Labor, Class and Gender Relations

The above findings are in sharp contrast to views that relate the subjugation of women to the force of Islam in Middle Eastern societies.<sup>4</sup> Alternatively, this study showed that the subordinated position of women took different forms during different historical periods. In the early twentieth century Iran, with the prevalence of the subsistence economy, the position of women corresponded to that which was defined by the Koranic division of labor. As a result, women were more confined to household labor than to paid production. The direct impact of patriarchy was significant, though its degree varied by class. Patriarchal relations in this traditional economy reflected the dominant cultural values.

With the slow development of capitalism under Reza Shah the division of labor was modified. The state paved the way for the employment of a very small number of women in the growing economy. The state also assumed a partial patriarchal role: it institutionalized certain

features of the religious laws, while it enforced unveiling at gunpoint (in contrast to forced veiling by the present Islamic state). The role, therefore, the religion assigned to women in and of itself did not determine their social positions. Rather, the subordination of women was caused by changes in the division of labor accompanied by the specific form of the state that was becoming centralized and claiming new relationships of property and domination over women.

The subordination of women under the Shah took a different form. This study suggested the view that a coherent investigation of the subordination of women be based on social and economic contradictions within a specific historical context in time and space. With the development of rapid capitalist transformation of Iran under the Shah along with the repressive state apparatus and the institutionalization of secular and western values, there came a relatively sharp rise in women's employment. In response to the increase in the labor force participation of women in the 1960's and 1970's, emancipatory laws, though, biased against women, were promulgated. Economic changes, which reverberated in politics and culture, had the effect of formally emancipating women.

The state promulgated legislation that facilitated some women's entry into wage work and political offices. It also constructed other laws that maintained patriarchy and kept women's activities confined to the reproduction of the labor force. In this way, while the state conferred limited legal status on women, it also prompted their subordination by class and gender inequalities. In addition, the Shah altered the sexual division of labor in the market. He did not, however, interfere with the sexual division of labor in the household. The subordinate position of women in this period paralleled their entry into the sex-segregated labor market which marked the beginning of the double day in the capitalist society, not in the subsistence one. The double day was also accompanied by new forms of class relations among women.

Consequently, as women moved into the workforce outside the home, the contradictions between the traditional legal system and the requirements of a rapidly growing capitalist economy widened. The enfranchisement law became effective for the Queen Bees despite its legitimization of women's new political rights and roles in the society. The Family Protection Laws in some ways loosened traditional family ties, but they reinforced the subordination of women by class and gender. Labor

legislation became more liberalized while sex-segregated jobs and wage exploitation became prevalent. In other words, when the traditional division of labor broke down and the absorption of women took place in the labor market, the modification of sex laws became necessary. The household division of labor, however, remained untouched by the state. Traditional prejudices against women continued, although they varied across class lines. The subordinated position of women, both in the labor market and in their ability to take advantage of the new set of laws dependent on their relationship to the class structure. "Emancipation," in short, worsened the position of women: it facilitated the growth of dependent capitalism and sharpened class and gender inequalities. This was the main contradiction between women's work and legal position in modern Iran prior to the 1978-79 revolutionary upheavals.

#### B. Unresolved Questions

The findings of this study allude to two unresolved questions that women faced under the Shah's rule. First, women's "emancipation" was a reform from above which served the interest of capitalism and its repressive state apparatus. As such, it failed to be addressed by the opposition and underground leftist organizations

of various sorts. Women leftists, too, remained unattended to gender inequalities that were intertwined with class contradictions in Iran.<sup>5</sup> Therefore, why did a genuine movement aimed at the erosion of class as well as gender inequalities fail to form in Iran?

Second, capitalism as one of the most powerful forces of history changed the lives of many Iranian women, as did elsewhere in the world. Many Iranian women became wage-earners. A large number of women grew to be increasingly visible participants in paid production. Capitalism and repression attempted to undermine Islam too. They could not, however, abolish some features of the old society, namely the Islamic heritage. Therefore, to what extent did the coexistence of Islam and capitalism contribute to the lack of feminist consciousness across class lines in Iran? Conversely, to what extent did the control of women serve the reproduction of Islamic and capitalist relations in Iran? These questions remain uninvestigated. Their study may provide significant insights into subordination of women not only under the Shah but also under the succeeding Islamic Republic of Iran.

### C. Future Contradictions in the Political

#### Economy of Women

The revolutionary upsurge of 1977-79 which came as a result of the contradiction between dependent capitalism and the repressive state, led to the fall of the 2,500 year old monarchial system in Iran. Similar to their participation in the nationalist and anti-imperialist struggles of the tobacco concession of 1891- 92, the constitutional revolution of 1905- 11, and the oil strike of early 1951, women took an active part in this modern revolution.

Unlike their previous political activities, millions of women of various classes participated in both peaceful and armed struggle. Their goal was inseparable from men's during the stage of the mass movement (late 1978 to early 1979) which ultimately led to the downfall of the Shah. Women and men wanted an end to the Shah's regime. Hardly any cleavage existed among the female and male revolutionaries. Religion, not institution-alized yet, was not a divisive force. Veiled and unveiled women raised similar concerns as men's. Class and ideological splits were invisible, too. Socialist and communist women and men supported the Muslim Shi'ite forces in defense of future deomcracy. In short, the mass movement era witnessed an unprecedented unity of

class, gender, religious and secular forces against the Shah and imperialism. As such, it gave birth to an intense politicization of women, culminating in active political participation of women of various class backgrounds, age groups and marital status.

The new regime sought to mobilize the politicized women. It only succeeded with veiled women, many of whom were working class members. These women were organized and led by men in support of Khomeini. These women lent support to the aspirations of their Islamic brothers, sons and husbands, not their own objectives as women. In contrast, a large number of educated middle class women who ranged from unorganized dissidents to nationalists, Marxists, and other groups, voiced independent positions. By late 1979, these secular women edited at least eleven weeklies, monthlies and quarterlies. Unlike the Women's Organization of Iran, which was organized by the ruling class for its own interest, the various organizations of secular women expressed a definite but vague allusion to socialism and feminism. These organizations were, however, short lived. By early 1980, all socialist feminist organizations had withered away, and women were sent back to their homes and became subject to severe social and legal control by men.



Does the Iranian experience suggest that once the initial stages of revolution are over in a predominantly Islamic society meshed with capitalism, women will be sent back to their homes to be severely subjugated to the control, will, and whims of men? The analyses undertaken in this study may shed light on this question. The consolidation of state power through the institutionalization of religion accompanied by collapse of the economy has the effect of minimizing women's activities in paid production, while intensifying their role in household reproduction. In Iran, this trend may likely accelerate with the continuation of the war with Iraq, the result of which would be a shortage of male labor and the stagnation of the economy.

Future contradictions may not be so different from the past. The contradictory forces of capitalism and repression that crushed the Shah remain unresolved. It is unlikely that capitalism could be eroded or stopped. It is possible that Iran will enter a new phase that will pass with Ayatollah Khomeini. Contradictions and divisions among and between clerical and leftist forces, and others, will intensify. The women's "question" will likely receive the lowest priority by all these forces since they have not hitherto addressed gender based inequalities as a fundamental aspect of class inequalities.

It is, however, probable that those Iranian women who struggled against the Shah and marched in the streets of Tehran in March 1979 and 1980 against the government's edicts on women, may re-emerge as a new force. Authentic changes in the position of women will greatly depend on the success of organized women in concentrating on specific demands concerning patriarchy and household work. By conceptualizing patriarchy and reproduction as the roots of oppression for the majority of women, women will have a better chance of mobilizing the unorganized women of various classes. Meanwhile, by viewing gender contradictions as a fundamental aspect of class contradictions, women can succeed in mobilizing men not only on behalf of class but also on behalf of and the liberation of men. In this way, the women's struggle will be aimed at both liberation of class, men, and oppressed women at the same time. Hence, there may come a resolution to class as well as gender contradictions in Iran.

NOTES

<sup>1</sup>Bharier, Economic Development, pp. 19-20.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 5.      <sup>3</sup>Ibid.

<sup>4</sup>As representatives of this view, see Patai, Society, Culture; and Bullough, The Subordinated.

<sup>5</sup>See, for example, Ashraf Dehqani, Hamase-ye Mogavemat [The Epic of Resistance] (United States: The Organization of Middle East National Front, 1354/1975; Tehran: The Organization of Iranian Fedaii Guerrillas, 1357/1978). Deqani was one of the founders of the Organization of Iranian Fedaii Guerillas.

## APPENDIX

APPENDIX  
STATISTICAL TABLES

General Notes and Tables

Throughout the tables and this study, for the purpose of English writing, the hyphenated dates account for the translation of the Iranian calendar into the Christian one. The Iranian new year starts with the first day of spring, on March 20 or 21.

The present Iranian solar calendar was originally adopted in 1925 to replace the Arab lunar calendar. The Shah banned the solar calendar and substituted it with the Monarchial calendar in 1976, which he subsequently, during the Revolution in late 1978, abandoned in favor of the former. Whereas, the origin of the solar calendar is in Mohammed's Hijra from Mecca to Medina, the root of the Monarchial calendar was sought in the first Persian monarchial dynasty, the Medes in 558 B.C., plus 50 years of Pahlavi rule (which was miscalculated by three years). Hence, the solar calendar of 1335 was replaced with the Monarchial calendar of 2535. Each of those calendars equalled the 1976-77 Christian calendar.

\* \* \* \* \*

For the rate of exchange of the rial, this study uses the calculations of the Statistical Center of Iran, unless stated otherwise.

The rate of rial has fluctuated tremendously since the early 1940's. The rate of exchange was 32.5 rials to the American dollar in 1945-54 which went up almost to 75-79

rials in 1955-75 and then went down slightly to almost 67  
rials from 1976 to early 1978. Since then, there has been  
an upward trend in the rate of exchange for the rial.

TABLE 1: EMPLOYED POPULATION BY MAJOR INDUSTRY (1956)

| Major<br>Industry<br>Group | Iran     |      | Urban         |                           |
|----------------------------|----------|------|---------------|---------------------------|
|                            | Employed |      | %<br>Employed | Women As %<br>Of Employed |
|                            | - 000's  | %    |               |                           |
| Agriculture                | 3,325    | 56.3 | 3.47          | 4.07                      |
| Industry                   | 1,187    | 20.1 | 15.57         | 39.67                     |
| Service                    | 1,394    | 23.6 | 22.73         | 52.47                     |

SOURCES: Figures for total urban-rural employed working population come for Statistical Center of Iran, Sainameh-e Amari-ye 1351 Keshvar [Annual National Statistics, 1972] (Tehran, 1352/1973), p. 64.

The rest of the data is from the Ministry of Interior (Sar Shomari-ye Amari 1335) [Census Statistics 1956], p. 26.

TABLE 2: SCHOOL ENROLLMENT BY SEX IN IRAN (1947 AND 1955)

| Kinds Of Schools           | Number<br>Of Schools |       | Enrollment |         |         |         |
|----------------------------|----------------------|-------|------------|---------|---------|---------|
|                            |                      |       | Boys       |         | Girls   |         |
|                            | 1947                 | 1955  | 1947       | 1955    | 1947    | 1955    |
| Kindergarten               | -                    | 98    | -          | 3,878   | -       | 3,181   |
| Elementary                 | 3,229                | 5,977 | 290,397    | 501,329 | 95,887  | 309,200 |
| Secondary                  | 314                  | 639   | 38,483     | 77,802  | 7,870   | 21,603  |
| Normal Schools             | 30                   | 25    | 1,061      | 1,297   | 452     | 143     |
| Rural Agricultural Schools | -                    | 28    | -          | 2,032   | -       | -       |
| Industrial Schools         | -                    | 9     | -          | 1,225   | -       | -       |
| Home Economics             | -                    | 11    | -          | -       | -       | 688     |
| Tribal Schools             | -                    | 4     | -          | 112     | -       | -       |
| Total                      | 3,573                | 6,791 | 319,923    | 587,573 | 101,209 | 334,815 |

SOURCES: USOM-Educational Division, Tehran, 1956, as cited in R. Woodsmall, Women and the Near East, p. 84.

NOTES: - indicates no data is available.



TABLE 3: UNIVERSITY ENROLLMENT BY SEX IN TEHRAN (1956)

| University of Tehran:<br>Schools | Enrollment |        |
|----------------------------------|------------|--------|
|                                  | Male       | Female |
| Literature                       | 774        | 420    |
| Medical                          | 2,050      | 150    |
| Law                              | 2,013      | 39     |
| Science and Teachers College     | 743        | 101    |
| Engineering                      | 594        | 11     |
| Agriculture                      | 239        | -      |
| Theology                         | 283        | -      |
| Fine Arts                        | 262        | 41     |
| Veterinary                       | 149        | 16     |
| Teachers College                 | 192        | 23     |
| Ashraf Pahlavi Nursing School    | -          | -      |
| Total                            | 7,299      | 801    |

SOURCE: USOM-Education Division, p. 85.

TABLE 4: GROSS DOMESTIC FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION (1953-1975)  
(AT CONSTANT PRICES -- IN BILLION RIALS)

| Year                     | Amount | Growth<br>Rate<br>% | Share<br>In GNP<br>% |
|--------------------------|--------|---------------------|----------------------|
| 1332 <sup>a</sup> (1953) | 24.4   | -                   | -                    |
| 1334 (1955)              | 39.8   | 36.3                | -                    |
| 1336 (1957)              | 50.3   | 14.8                | -                    |
| 1338 (1959)              | 76.8   | 17.4                | -                    |
| 1340 (1961)              | 71.3   | - 5.6               | -                    |
| 1342 (1963)              | 60.1   | - 9.7               | 14.9                 |
| 1344 (1965)              | 84.6   | 6.9                 | 18.8                 |
| 1351 (1972)              | 204.8  | 14.5                | 23.8                 |
| 1352 (1973)              | 246.3  | 18.2                | 19.8                 |
| 1353 (1974)              | 294.4  | 19                  | 18.1                 |
| 1354 (1975)              | 350    | 19                  | 29.8                 |

SOURCES: Figures for the amount and growth of GDFCF come from the following: 1953-65 are from Bhahrier, Economic Development, pp. 50-51; 1972-75 figures are calculated from Bank Markazi, Annual Report and Balance Sheet, 1351 (1972), p. 141; 1352 (1973), p. 139; 1353 (1974), p. 143; and 2534 (1975), p. 50 (each published within a time span of one year).

NOTE: <sup>a</sup>Years beginning March 21 by years indicated.

TABLE 5: GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT BY ECONOMIC SECTORS  
(AT CONSTANT PRICES: BILLION RIALS)

|                         | 1338<br>(1959)          |      | 1340 <sup>a</sup><br>(1961) |      | 1342 <sup>a</sup><br>(1963) |      | 1344<br>(1965)      |    | 1351<br>(1972)          |       |
|-------------------------|-------------------------|------|-----------------------------|------|-----------------------------|------|---------------------|----|-------------------------|-------|
|                         | %<br>Share<br>In<br>GNP |      | %<br>Growth<br>Rate         |      | %<br>Growth<br>Rate         |      | %<br>Growth<br>Rate |    | %<br>Share<br>In<br>GNP |       |
| Agriculture             | 85.1                    | 33.3 | 87.0                        | .2   | 89.9                        | 1.8  | 99.0                | 6  | 27.4                    | 134.4 |
| Industry                | 41.5                    | 14.5 | 49.5                        | 8.0  | 61.7                        | 13.2 | 75.8                | 15 | 88.3                    | 195.9 |
| Services                | 106.5                   | 38.3 | 111.8                       | .7   | 122.6                       | 3.9  | 149.8               | 12 | 39.5                    | 363.9 |
| Oil                     | 48.0                    | 10.7 | 59.0                        | 11.3 | 74.0                        | 3.8  | 88.0                | 13 | 14.5                    | 163.7 |
| GNP (at market<br>cost) | 277.6                   |      | 304.4                       | 4.7  | 338.9                       | 5.4  | 402.2               | 9  |                         | 889.0 |

TABLE 5 -- continued

|                         | 1351<br>(1972)      |                         | 1352<br>(1973)      |                         | 1353<br>(1974)      |                         | 1354<br>(1975)      |                         |         |        |      |
|-------------------------|---------------------|-------------------------|---------------------|-------------------------|---------------------|-------------------------|---------------------|-------------------------|---------|--------|------|
|                         | %<br>Growth<br>Rate | %<br>Share<br>In<br>GNP | %<br>Growth<br>Rate | %<br>Share<br>In<br>GNP | %<br>Growth<br>Rate | %<br>Share<br>In<br>GNP | %<br>Growth<br>Rate | %<br>Share<br>In<br>GNP |         |        |      |
| Agriculture             | 8.0                 | 16.0                    | 213.6               | 5.8                     | 15.3                | 226.4                   | 6.0                 | 14.3                    | 324.0   | 6.8    | 10.0 |
| Industry                | 14.8                | 23.4                    | 287.9               | 18.0                    | 20.9                | 344.0                   | 19.5                | 21.7                    | 582.1   | 22.6   | 18.0 |
| Services                | 17.2                | 43.5                    | 504.7               | 14.8                    | 36.6                | 622.8                   | 23.4                | 39.4                    | 1,101.6 | 20.0   | 33.0 |
| Oil                     | 13.3                | 19.5                    | 388.5               | 15.6                    | 27.2                | 388.5                   | 0                   | 24.6                    | 1,233.9 | - 11.1 | 38.1 |
| GNP (at market<br>cost) | 14.2                |                         | 963.5               | 33.8                    |                     | 1,631.3                 | 41.6                |                         | 2,249.0 | 4.9    |      |

SOURCES: Figures for GNP and its components are calculated from the following: 1959-75 are from Bank Markazi, 1349 [1960], p. 117; 1351 [1972], p. 143; 1353 [1974], p. 143; 2534 [1975], p. 48

The percent growth of GNP is calculated from the following sources: 1972-75 is from Bank Markazi, 1351 [1972], p. 144; 1353 [1974], p. 142; 2534 [1975], p. 48.

The share of components in GNP is calculated from the following sources: 1959 and 1965 are from Bank Markazi Iran, National Income of Iran 1338-1344 [1959-1965] (Tehran: Bank Markazi Iran, Economic Research Department, 1347/1968), p. 21; 1972-75 are from Bank Markazi, 1351 [1972], p. 143; 1353 [1974], p. 142; and 2534 [1975], p. 48.

TABLE 5 -- continued

NOTE: GNP figures are adjusted to 1959 Bank Markazi renumerations.

<sup>a</sup>No data is available for the share in GNP for those years.

TABLE 6: INDUSTRY (NO. OF FACTORIES)  
(1953 AND 1977)

| Factories                | 1953               | 1977               |
|--------------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
|                          | less than<br>1,000 | more than<br>7,000 |
| Small (10-49 workers)    |                    |                    |
| Medium (50-500 workers)  | 300                | 830                |
| Large (over 500 workers) | 19                 | 159                |

SOURCE: Ervand Abrahamian, "Structural Causes of the Iranian Revolution," MERIP Reports 87 (May 1980), p. 22.

TABLE 7: INDUSTRY (PRODUCTION OUTPUT)  
(1953 AND 1977)

| Kind Of Industry                                     | 1953    | 1977      |
|------------------------------------------------------|---------|-----------|
| Coal (in tons)                                       | 200,000 | 900,000   |
| Steel and aluminum (in tons)                         | 0       | 275,000   |
| Cement (in tons)                                     | 53,000  | 4,300,000 |
| Sugar (in tons)                                      | 70,000  | 527,000   |
| Electricity (in billion<br>kilowatt hours)           | .2      | 14        |
| Cotton and synthetic<br>textiles (in million meters) | 110     | 533       |
| Tractors                                             | 0       | 7,700     |
| Motor vehicles (including<br>buses and trucks)       | 0       | 109,000   |

SOURCE: Ibid.

TABLE 8: POPULATION 10 YEARS OF AGE AND OVER, BY SEX AND ECONOMIC ACTIVITY IN IRAN AND URBAN AREAS (IN THOUSANDS)

| Area<br>And Sex   | 1956                |                   |          |            |       |             |                     |         |       |
|-------------------|---------------------|-------------------|----------|------------|-------|-------------|---------------------|---------|-------|
|                   | Total<br>Population | Economic Activity |          |            |       | %<br>Active | Economic Inactivity |         |       |
|                   |                     | Total             | Employed | Unemployed | Total |             | Homemaker           | Student | Other |
|                   |                     |                   |          |            |       |             |                     |         |       |
| <u>Iran</u>       |                     |                   |          |            |       |             |                     |         |       |
| Both sexes        | 12,784              | 6,067             | 5,908    | 159        | 47.5  | 6,717       | 4,964               | 685     | 1,068 |
| Male              | 6,542               | 5,491             | 5,334    | 157        | 83.9  | 1,051       | 0                   | 499     | 552   |
| Female            | 6,242               | 576               | 573      | 2          | 9.2   | 5,666       | 4,964               | 186     | 516   |
| <u>Urban Iran</u> |                     |                   |          |            |       |             |                     |         |       |
| Both sexes        | 4,187               | 1,893             | 1,807    | 86         | 45.2  | 2,294       | 1,551               | 519     | 224   |
| Male              | 2,172               | 1,706             | 1,621    | 84         | 78.5  | 467         | 0                   | 350     | 117   |
| Female            | 2,014               | 187               | 186      | 1          | 9.3   | 1,827       | 1,551               | 169     | 107   |



Table 8 -- continued

| Area<br>And Sex   | 1966                |                   |          |            |        |       |                     |           |         |
|-------------------|---------------------|-------------------|----------|------------|--------|-------|---------------------|-----------|---------|
|                   | Total<br>Population | Economic Activity |          |            |        | %     | Economic Inactivity |           |         |
|                   |                     | Total             | Employed | Unemployed | Active |       | Total               | Homemaker | Student |
| <u>Iran</u>       |                     |                   |          |            |        |       |                     |           |         |
| Both sexes        | 16,536              | 7,584             | 6,858    | 726        | 45.9   | 8,951 | 5,844               | 1,932     | 1,176   |
| Male              | 8,546               | 6,584             | 5,948    | 636        | 77.0   | 1,962 | 0                   | 1,323     | 639     |
| Female            | 7,990               | 1,000             | 910      | 90         | 12.5   | 6,989 | 5,844               | 610       | 482     |
| <u>Urban Iran</u> |                     |                   |          |            |        |       |                     |           |         |
| Both sexes        | 6,746               | 2,768             | 2,610    | 158        | 41.0   | 3,978 | 2,185               | 1,364     | 482     |
| Male              | 3,537               | 2,449             | 2,303    | 146        | 69.2   | 1,088 | 0                   | 838       | 250     |
| Female            | 3,209               | 319               | 307      | 12         | 9.9    | 2,890 | 2,185               | 526       | 178     |

TABLE 8 -- continued

| Area<br>And Sex   | Total<br>Population | 1976              |          |            |        |        |                   |           |         |                    |
|-------------------|---------------------|-------------------|----------|------------|--------|--------|-------------------|-----------|---------|--------------------|
|                   |                     | Economic Activity |          |            |        | %      | Economic Activity |           |         |                    |
|                   |                     | Total             | Employed | Unemployed | Active |        | Total             | Homemaker | Student | Other <sup>a</sup> |
| <u>Iran</u>       |                     |                   |          |            |        |        |                   |           |         |                    |
| Both sexes        | 23,606              | 9,733             | 8,789    | 944        | 42.3   | 13,273 | 7,578             | 4,479     | 1,215   |                    |
| Male              | 11,811              | 8,280             | 7,584    | 696        | 70.1   | 3,530  | 0                 | 2,790     | 740     |                    |
| Female            | 11,195              | 1,452             | 1,205    | 248        | 13.0   | 9,742  | 7,578             | 1,689     | 475     |                    |
| <u>Urban Iran</u> |                     |                   |          |            |        |        |                   |           |         |                    |
| Both sexes        | 11,411              | 4,295             | 4,103    | 192        | 33.4   | 7,117  | 3,409             | 3,094     | 613     |                    |
| Male              | 6,016               | 3,807             | 3,646    | 162        | 63.3   | 2,209  |                   |           |         |                    |
| Female            | 5,395               | 488               | 458      | 30         | 9.0    | 4,908  |                   |           |         |                    |

TABLE 8 -- continued

SOURCES: Figures for 1956 are from Ministry of Interior, Sar Shomari-ye 1335 [Census Statistics, 1956], pp. 207-208; 1966 are from Statistical Center, Sar Shomari-ye 1345 [Census Statistics, 1966], pp. 34-35; and 1976 are from Statistical Center of Iran, Nata-yej-e Sar Shomari-ye Omumi-ye Nofus va Maskan Abanmah-e 2535 [National Census of Population and Housing, November 1976], (Tehran: Statistical Center of Iran, n.d.), pp. 52-53. This latter census is based on a 5% sample.

NOTE: <sup>a</sup>Refers to "other" which includes trade as well as those unable to work and income recipients.

TABLE 9: LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION BY SEX IN IRAN  
(1956-1976)

| Sex    | 1956             |      | 1966             |      | 1976             |      |
|--------|------------------|------|------------------|------|------------------|------|
|        | Total<br>- 000's | %    | Total<br>- 000's | %    | Total<br>- 000's | %    |
| Total  | 6,066            | 47.5 | 7,584            | 45.9 | 9,732            | 42.3 |
| Male   | 5,491            | 83.9 | 6,584            | 77.0 | 8,280            | 70.1 |
| Female | 575              | 9.2  | 999              | 12.5 | 1,452            | 13.0 |

SOURCES: Figures for this table are based on similar sources as Table 8. Indeed, Table 9 is a summary of Table 8.

TABLE 10: LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION OF THE POPULATION 10 YEARS OF AGE AND OVER BY SEX IN URBAN IRAN (1956-1976)

| Year<br>&<br>Sex | Total<br>Pop.<br>10<br>Years/<br>Over<br>- 000's | Economically Active |                 |                              | Employed         |                              |
|------------------|--------------------------------------------------|---------------------|-----------------|------------------------------|------------------|------------------------------|
|                  |                                                  | Total<br>- 000's    | As %<br>Of Pop. | As<br>% Of<br>Active<br>Pop. | Total<br>- 000's | As<br>% Of<br>Active<br>Pop. |
| <u>1956</u>      |                                                  |                     |                 |                              |                  |                              |
| Both             | 4,186                                            | 1,893               | 45.2            | 100.0                        | 1,807            | 95.4                         |
| Male             | 2,172                                            | 1,705               | 78.5            | 90.1                         | 1,621            | 95.0                         |
| Female           | 2,014                                            | 187                 | 9.3             | 9.9                          | 186              | 99.7                         |
| <u>1966</u>      |                                                  |                     |                 |                              |                  |                              |
| Both             | 6,746                                            | 2,768               | 41.0            | 100.0                        | 2,610            | 94.3                         |
| Male             | 3,537                                            | 2,449               | 69.2            | 88.5                         | 2,302            | 94.0                         |
| Female           | 3,209                                            | 319                 | 9.9             | 11.5                         | 307              | 96.2                         |
| <u>1976</u>      |                                                  |                     |                 |                              |                  |                              |
| Both             | 11,411                                           | 4,294               | 37.6            | 100.0                        | 4,103            | 95.5                         |
| Male             | 6,016                                            | 3,807               | 63.3            | 88.7                         | 3,645            | 95.7                         |
| Female           | 5,395                                            | 487                 | 9.0             | 11.3                         | 457              | 93.8                         |

SOURCES: Figures for this table are based on similar sources as Table 8, above.

TABLE 11: CHANGES IN LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION  
BY SEX IN URBAN IRAN (1956-76)

| Sex        | Labor Force<br>- 000's |       |       | Growth Rate<br>-% |         |
|------------|------------------------|-------|-------|-------------------|---------|
|            | 1956                   | 1966  | 1976  | 1956-66           | 1966-76 |
| Both sexes | 1,893                  | 2,768 | 4,294 | .46               | .55     |
| Male       | 1,705                  | 2,449 | 3,807 | .43               | .55     |
| Female     | 187                    | 319   | 487   | .70               | .53     |

SOURCE: Figures for this table are calculated from Table 8, above.

TABLE 12: UNEMPLOYMENT BY SEX IN IRAN AND URBAN AREAS (1956-76)

| Year<br>And<br>Area | Unemployed Women As % Of |                                               |                                 | Unemployed Men As % Of            |                                               |                               |
|---------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|---------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|-------------------------------|
|                     | %<br>Unemployed          | Total<br>Economically<br>Active<br>Population | Economically<br>Active<br>Women | Total<br>Unemployed<br>Population | Total<br>Economically<br>Active<br>Population | Economically<br>Active<br>Men |
| <u>1956</u>         |                          |                                               |                                 |                                   |                                               |                               |
| Iran                | 2.62                     | .03                                           | .39                             | 1.44                              | 2.58                                          | 2.85                          |
| Urban               | 4.53                     | .07                                           | .75                             | 1.64                              | 4.94                                          | 4.94                          |
| <u>1966</u>         |                          |                                               |                                 |                                   |                                               |                               |
| Iran                | 9.56                     | 1.18                                          | 8.98                            | 12.38                             | 8.38                                          | 9.65                          |
| Urban               | 5.70                     | .42                                           | 3.66                            | 7.38                              | 5.28                                          | 5.97                          |
| <u>1976</u>         |                          |                                               |                                 |                                   |                                               |                               |
| Iran                | 9.69                     | 2.54                                          | 17.05                           | 26.24                             | 7.15                                          | 8.40                          |
| Urban               | 4.46                     | .69                                           | 6.11                            | 15.56                             | 3.76                                          | 4.24                          |

SOURCES: Figures for this table are calculated from Table 5, above.

TABLE 13: POPULATION BY SEX (1956-76) (IN THOUSANDS)

| Area  | 1956   |       |        | 1966   |        |        | 1976   |        |        |
|-------|--------|-------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
|       | Total  | Male  | Female | Total  | Male   | Female | Total  | Male   | Female |
| Iran  | 19,000 | 9,645 | 9,310  | 25,078 | 12,982 | 12,017 | 33,662 | 17,337 | 16,325 |
| Urban | 5,953  | 3,070 | 2,883  | 9,754  | 5,097  | 4,697  | 15,797 | 8,272  | 7,525  |
| Rural | 13,001 | 6,575 | 6,426  | 15,285 | 7,885  | 7,320  | 17,865 | 9,065  | 8,880  |

SOURCES: Figures for 1956 are from Ministry of Interior, Sar Shomari-ye 1335 [Census Statistics 1956], p. 5; 1966 are from Statistical Center of Iran, Sar Shomari-ye 1345 [Census Statistics, 1966], p. 1; and for 1976 are from Statistical Center of Iran, Natayej-e Sar Shomari-ye 1355 [Census Statistics, 1976], pp. 1-2.



TABLE 14: GROWTH OF POPULATION (1956-76)

| Area  | 1956-66 | 1966-76 |
|-------|---------|---------|
| Iran  | .32     | .34     |
| Urban | .64     | .61     |
| Rural | .17     | .16     |

SOURCES: This table is calculated from population figures as they appear in Table 11, above.

TABLE 15: DISTRIBUTION OF ITEMS UTILIZED BY HOUSEHOLDS  
IN URBAN IRAN (1971-74)

| Items           | 1971 | 1972 | 1973 | 1974 |
|-----------------|------|------|------|------|
| Pipeline water  | 64.4 | 64.9 | 75.7 | 78.9 |
| Electricity     | 84.1 | 79.2 | 88.1 | 90.7 |
| Car             | 7.2  | 8.9  | 12.0 | 13.4 |
| Radio           | 66.2 | 65.6 | 74.5 | 77.4 |
| TV              | 20.2 | 28.3 | 35.6 | 41.9 |
| Refrigerator    | 36.3 | 42.7 | 50.5 | 57.6 |
| Gas stove       | 32.4 | 41.8 | 48.1 | 54.9 |
| Bath            | 18.3 | 24.2 | 26.0 | 28.9 |
| Telephone       | 9.6  | 14.2 | 14.9 | 16.2 |
| Cooling system  | 9.0  | 11.5 | 13.2 | 16.0 |
| Heating system  | -    | 4.8  | 1.8  | 1.6  |
| Laundry machine | -    | 8.7  | 7.7  | 9.4  |
| Dishwasher      | -    | 3.0  | .4   | .7   |
| Electric broom  | 3.3  | 4.7  | 4.2  | 4.7  |
| Radiators       | -    | 4.8  | 1.8  | 1.6  |
| Air conditioner | -    | 2.9  | .4   | .4   |

SOURCE: Bank Markazi, Natayeje-e Bar-resi-ye Bujeh-e Khanevar-ha-ye Shahri-ye Iran dar sal-e Biste panj-e-sio-seh [The Results of the Investigation of Family Budget in Urban Iran in 1974] (Tehran: Economic Statistics Department, 2533/1974), Sec. I, table 18.

NOTE: These figures indicate the trends in the utilization of ready-made articles and labor-saving devices by urban households.

TABLE 16: AVERAGE HOUSEHOLD INCOME IN URBAN IRAN: 1969-74  
(IN 1,000 RIALS)

| Income<br>Source             | 2528<br>(1969) |       | 2529<br>(1970) |       | 2530<br>(1971) |       |
|------------------------------|----------------|-------|----------------|-------|----------------|-------|
|                              | Average        | %     | Average        | %     | Average        | %     |
| <u>Total Income:</u>         |                |       |                |       |                |       |
| Monetary and                 |                |       |                |       |                |       |
|                              | 126,521        | 100.0 | 142,143        | 100.0 | 164,491        | 100.0 |
| Monetary<br>income           | 105,071        | 83.1  | 117,860        | 82.9  | 133,647        | 81.2  |
| Wage and<br>salary<br>income | 58,745         | 46.4  | 62,763         | 44.2  | 69,129         | 42.0  |

TABLE 16 -- continued

| 2531<br>(1972) |       | 2532<br>(1973) |       | 2533<br>(1974) |       |
|----------------|-------|----------------|-------|----------------|-------|
| Average        | %     | Average        | %     | Average        | %     |
| 201,961        | 100.0 | 238,212        | 100.0 | 296,941        | 100.0 |
| 163,735        | 81.1  | 191,695        | 80.5  | 235,115        | 100.0 |
| 81,475         | 40.3  | 100,663        | 42.3  | 115,845        | 39.1  |

SOURCE: Ibid., Sec. II, p. 70.

NOTE: "Monetary" income includes income from wages, from free-lance work, from retirement benefits and related services as well as income from the sale of commodities produced in the household. "Nonmonetary" income consists of the rent value of a private house, the rent value of residence against service, the rent value of residence financed by the government, the value of commodities received instead of the wages, the value of commodities distributed for free by the government, the value of commodities and services produced in the household, objects used from the workplace, and income from annual interest rate from mortgage.

TABLE 17: SHARE OF PRODUCTIVE FACTORS IN  
DOMESTIC VALUE ADDED (1972-74)

| Items              | With Oil       |                |                | Without Oil    |                |                |
|--------------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|
|                    | 1351<br>(1972) | 1352<br>(1973) | 1353<br>(1974) | 1351<br>(1972) | 1352<br>(1973) | 1353<br>(1974) |
| Wages and salaries | 28.1           | 20.8           | 18.4           | 38.6           | 34.4           | 35.5           |
| Rents              | 12.0           | 12.1           | 10.9           | 16.4           | 19.9           | 20.0           |
| Interests          | 6.8            | 5.6            | 4.1            | 9.4            | 9.1            | 7.1            |
| Profits            | 53.1           | 61.6           | 66.6           | 35.6           | 36.6           | 36.4           |
| Total              | 100.0          | 100.0          | 100.0          | 100.0          | 100.0          | 100.0          |

SOURCE: Bank Markazi, 1353 [1974], p. 20.

NOTE: Due to the increase in the share of profits in the total domestic value added, the share of all other factors has decreased. For example, as profits increased highly, the share of wages in the value added declined tremendously. Hence, with industrialization and higher productivity, income distribution was worsened.

TABLE 18: WHOLESALE PRICE INDEX (1969 = 100)

| Items                             | Relative Weight | 1351<br>(1972) | 1352<br>(1973) | 1353<br>(1974) | 1354<br>(1975) |
|-----------------------------------|-----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|
| General index                     | 100.0           | 117.0          | 143.3          | 153.4          | 159.4          |
| Home produced and consumed goods  | 78.1            | 116.8          | 130.0          | 152.7          | 159.1          |
| Imported goods                    | 17.2            | 115.7          | 131.4          | 147.0          | 152.3          |
| Exported goods                    | 4.7             | 126.0          | 173.0          | 187.6          | 189.0          |
| Food and live animals             | 36.8            | 121.9          | 131.5          | 162.6          | 169.3          |
| Industrial raw materials          | 6.1             | 137.6          | 158.3          | 169.1          | 155.8          |
| Textiles and clothing             | 12.7            | 120.2          | 156.2          | 166.0          | 171.0          |
| Building materials                | 7.9             | 106.8          | 129.7          | 165.5          | 172.4          |
| Machinery and road motor vehicles | 12.6            | 114.3          | 124.5          | 131.4          | 143.3          |
| Other groups                      | 23.9            | 107.2          | 119.1          | 136.1          | 142.6          |

SOURCES: Bank Markazi, 1352 [1973], p. 171; and 2534 [1975], p. 7.

TABLE 19: CHANGES IN WHOLESALE PRICE INDEX (1961-67)

| Items                                           | 1340<br>(1961) | 1342<br>(1963) | 1344<br>(1965) | 1346<br>(1967) |
|-------------------------------------------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|
| General index                                   | .2             | .4             | .9             | .2             |
| Home produced goods                             | - .4           | - 1.0          | 1.4            | - .1           |
| Imported goods                                  | 3.2            | 2.9            | .5             | 1.2            |
| Exported goods                                  | - 1.2          | 1.5            | - .3           | .2             |
| Raw materials of animal<br>and vegetable origin | 3.3            | 1.1            | 2.6            | - 5.2          |
| Agricultural produce                            | .3             | - 1.0          | 1.3            | - 1.1          |
| Food                                            | 1.7            | .1             | .9             | .3             |
| Others                                          | - 12.0         | - 9.1          | 6.5            | 7.5            |

SOURCES: Bank Markazi, 1344 [1966], p. 122; and 1348 [1969], p. 144.

NOTE: By 1977 the annual average price index for home produced goods went down. Meanwhile, the price of food and imported foods went up. These trends show the degree of Iran's integration into the world capitalist market as well as the degree of changes in women's work in the household: from producers to consumption workers.

TABLE 20: CONSUMER PRICE INDEX IN URBAN IRAN (1969-76)  
(1974 = 100)

| Items                       | 2528<br>(1969) | 2530<br>(1971) | 2532<br>(1973) | 2534<br>(1975) | 2535<br>(1976) |
|-----------------------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|
| All items                   | 68.4           | 73.3           | 86.6           | 109.9          | 128.1          |
| Food                        | 66.1           | 72.8           | 83.9           | 105.7          | 118.6          |
| Clothing                    | 68.7           | 72.6           | 88.9           | 108.9          | 121.1          |
| Housing                     | 60.9           | 65.6           | 83.7           | 118.7          | 159.2          |
| Household<br>operations     | 58.4           | 59.5           | 84.1           | 115.3          | 128.3          |
| Transportation              | 87.4           | 88.5           | 95.1           | 108.3          | 123.0          |
| Medical care                | 79.0           | 81.2           | 90.4           | 113.6          | 122.4          |
| Recreation and<br>education | 81.9           | 87.9           | 98.2           | 88.0           | 82.4           |
| Others                      | 74.1           | 78.2           | 91.7           | 106.3          | 110.2          |

SOURCES: Bank Markazi, "Consumer Price Index in Urban Areas of Iran Ordibehesht 2536," [1976] (Tehran: Economic and Statistics Department, 1977), p. 2, t. 2.

NOTE: Food includes beverage and tobacco as well. The sharpest price rise by 1976 was in food items, housing and related areas.



TABLE 21: CONSUMER PRICE INDEX IN URBAN  
AREAS OF IRAN IN MARCH 1976 AND PERCENT CHANGES  
FROM PREVIOUS YEARS (1969 = 100)

| Group                       | Weight | Index<br>1976 | % Change<br>March 1975<br>To<br>March 1976 | % Change<br>March 1974<br>To<br>March 1975 |
|-----------------------------|--------|---------------|--------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------|
| All items                   | 100.00 | 172.5         | 4.5                                        | 19.7                                       |
| Food                        | 43.24  | 179.8         | .1                                         | 25.5                                       |
| Clothing and<br>foot wear   | 12.50  | 158.6         | 1.3                                        | 14.3                                       |
| Housing                     | 12.06  | 225.1         | 19.6                                       | 25.4                                       |
| House furnishings           | 6.37   | 219.4         | 13.3                                       | 24.0                                       |
| Household<br>operations     | 6.87   | 131.4         | 1.9                                        | 13.4                                       |
| Transportation              | 5.08   | 127.9         | 5.4                                        | 7.6                                        |
| Medical care                | 4.84   | 149.9         | 9.3                                        | 15.8                                       |
| Personal care               | 3.29   | 146.6         | 2.5                                        | 9.9                                        |
| Other goods<br>and services | 5.76   | 107.2         | - 4.8                                      | - 11.0                                     |

SOURCE: Bank Markazi Iran, Bulletin XIV, 79 (Tehran: Spring 1976), p. 72.

TABLE 22: COST OF LIVING INDEX  
(1959-76)

| Year | Rate  |
|------|-------|
| 1959 | 100.0 |
| 1960 | 107.9 |
| 1961 | 109.6 |
| 1962 | 110.6 |
| 1963 | 111.7 |
| 1964 | 116.7 |
| 1965 | 117.0 |
| 1966 | 117.9 |
| 1967 | 118.9 |
| 1968 | 120.7 |
| 1969 | 125.0 |
| 1970 | 128.4 |
| 1971 | 135.7 |
| 1972 | 142.0 |
| 1973 | 157.3 |
| 1974 | 178.4 |
| 1975 | 184.6 |

SOURCES: 1959-69 are calculated from Bhahrier, p. 48. 1970-75 figures are calculated from the general index of Table 18, above.

TABLE 23: DISTRIBUTION OF LABOR FORCE IN MAJOR ECONOMIC SECTORS  
BY SEX AND INDUSTRY GROUP IN URBAN IRAN (IN THOUSANDS), (1956-76)

| Year and Sex            | Total<br>Employed <sup>a</sup><br>- 000's | Agriculture<br>- 000's % |      | Manufacturing<br>- 000's % |      | Services<br>- 000's % |      |
|-------------------------|-------------------------------------------|--------------------------|------|----------------------------|------|-----------------------|------|
|                         |                                           |                          |      |                            |      |                       |      |
| <u>1956</u>             |                                           |                          |      |                            |      |                       |      |
| Both sexes              | 1,807                                     | 217                      | 12.0 | 437                        | 8.07 | 429                   | 23.7 |
| Male                    | 1,621                                     | 210                      | 12.9 | 399                        | 8.90 | 331                   | 20.4 |
| Female                  | 186                                       | 7                        | 3.7  | 73                         | .50  | 97                    | 52.1 |
| <u>1966<sup>b</sup></u> |                                           |                          |      |                            |      |                       |      |
| Both sexes              | 2,610                                     | 197                      | 7.5  | 722                        | 6.40 | 714                   | 27.3 |
| Male                    | 2,302                                     | 188                      | 8.1  | 582                        | 7.20 | 574                   | 25.0 |
| Female                  | 307                                       | 9                        | 2.9  | 140                        | .60  | 140                   | 45.6 |

TABLE 23 -- continued

| Year and Sex | Total<br>Employed <sup>a</sup><br>- 000's | Agriculture<br>- 000's % |     | Manufacturing<br>- 000's % |     | Services<br>- 000's % |      |
|--------------|-------------------------------------------|--------------------------|-----|----------------------------|-----|-----------------------|------|
|              |                                           |                          |     |                            |     |                       |      |
| <u>1976</u>  |                                           |                          |     |                            |     |                       |      |
| Both sexes   | 4,103                                     | 229                      | 5.5 | 882                        | 8.1 | 1,405                 | 34.2 |
| Male         | 3,645                                     | 219                      | 6.0 | 739                        | 8.9 | 1,137                 | 31.1 |
| Female       | 458                                       | 9                        | 1.9 | 142                        | 1.7 | 268                   | 58.6 |

SOURCES: Figures for 1965 are from Ministry of Interior, Sar Shomari-ye 1335 [Census Statistics 1956], pp. 314-320; for 1966, Statistical Center of Iran, Sar Shomari-ye 1345 [Census Statistics, 1966], p. 54; and for 1976, Statistical Center of Iran, Natayej-e Sar Shomari-ye 1355 [Census Statistics, 1976], p. 68.

NOTES: <sup>a</sup>Indicates that included in the total labor force are workers in construction, electricity, commerce, and transportation.

<sup>b</sup>Indicates that in 1966, the services included transportation and insurance employees.

TABLE 24: DISTRIBUTION OF LABOR FORCE IN MAJOR  
OCCUPATIONS BY SEX AND MAJOR OCCUPATION GROUP  
IN URBAN IRAN (IN THOUSANDS)

| Year & Sex  | Professional & Technical |     |      | Management & Administrative |     | Clerical |      |
|-------------|--------------------------|-----|------|-----------------------------|-----|----------|------|
|             | Total                    | #   | %    | #                           | %   | #        | %    |
| <u>1956</u> |                          |     |      |                             |     |          |      |
| Both        | 1,807                    | 67  | 3.7  | 134                         | 7.4 | d        | a    |
| Male        | 1,621                    | 52  | 3.2  | 127                         | 7.8 | d        | a    |
| Female      | 186                      | 15  | 8.0  | 7                           | 3.2 | a        | a    |
| <u>1966</u> |                          |     |      |                             |     |          |      |
| Both        | 2,610                    | 162 | 6.2  | 11                          | .4  | 186      | 7.1  |
| Male        | 2,303                    | 114 | 4.9  | 10                          | .4  | 172      | 7.5  |
| Female      | 307                      | 48  | 15.6 | 376 <sup>c</sup>            | .1  | 14       | 4.6  |
| <u>1976</u> |                          |     |      |                             |     |          |      |
| Both        | 4,103                    | 452 | 11.0 | 43                          | 1.0 | 407      | 9.9  |
| Male        | 3,645                    | 282 | 7.7  | 41                          | 1.1 | 343      | 9.4  |
| Female      | 457                      | 170 | 37.1 | 2                           | .4  | 64       | 14.0 |

SOURCES: Figures for 1956 are from Ministry of Interior, Sar Shomari-ye 1335 [Census Statistics 1956], p. 388; 1966 are from Statistical Center of Iran, Sar Shomari-ye 1345 [Census Statistics 1966], p. 69; and 1976 are from Statistical Center of Iran, Nataye-i-e Sar Shomari-ye 2535 [National Census 1976], pp. 85-87.

TABLE 24 -- continued

| Sales |      | Agriculture |      | Production |      | Services |      | NR <sup>b</sup> |      |
|-------|------|-------------|------|------------|------|----------|------|-----------------|------|
| #     | %    | #           | %    | #          | %    | #        | %    | #               | %    |
| 255   | 14.1 | 236         | 13.0 | 744        | 41.1 | 251      | 13.9 | 116             | 6.4  |
| 252   | 15.5 | 229         | 14.1 | 660        | 40.7 | 182      | 11.2 | 115             | 7.0  |
| 3     | 1.6  | 7           | 3.7  | 84         | 44.6 | 68       | 36.5 | 1               | .5   |
| 374   | 14.3 | 197         | 7.5  | 1,143      | 43.8 | 1,340    | 13.0 | 193             | 7.4  |
| 370   | 16.0 | 189         | 8.2  | 1,005      | 43.6 | 255      | 11.0 | 185             | 8.0  |
| 4     | 1.3  | 8           | 2.6  | 138        | 44.9 | 85       | 27.7 | 8               | 2.6  |
| 480   | 11.7 | 223         | 5.7  | 1,767      | 43.0 | 334      | 8.1  | 384             | 9.3  |
| 474   | 13.0 | 224         | 6.1  | 1,627      | 44.6 | 279      | 7.6  | 372             | 10.2 |
| 6     | 1.3  | 9           | 2.0  | 140        | 30.6 | 55       | 12.0 | 12              | 2.6  |

NOTES: <sup>a</sup>Indicates that in 1956 manufacturing and clerical workers were all reported in the category of administrative workers.

<sup>b</sup>Indicates that in 1956 the category of NR included armed forces workers as well.

<sup>c</sup>Shows absolute number, not thousands.

<sup>d</sup>Shows that in 1956 the production category included crafts too. In order to make the 1956 categories consistent with the others, I have included transportation and mining in the production category of that year.

TABLE 25: MAIN OCCUPATION OF WOMEN IN IRAN, 1966  
(IN THOUSANDS)

| Occupation                                               | Number<br>Of<br>Workers |
|----------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------|
| Carpet weaving                                           | 342                     |
| Agriculture and husbandry                                | 201                     |
| Spinning, knitting, and<br>givehbafi (traditional shoes) | 96                      |
| Homemaking and related services                          | 85                      |
| Teaching                                                 | 38                      |
| Tailoring                                                | 26                      |
| Food, soft drink and<br>related processing               | 17                      |
| Other industrial workers                                 | 16                      |
| Health services                                          | 11                      |
| Secretaries and typists                                  | 11                      |
| Washing, dry cleaning, and ironing                       | 10                      |
| Beauticians and hair stylists                            | 9                       |
| Cleaners, maids, and porters                             | 9                       |
| TOTAL                                                    | 872                     |

SOURCE: With the exception of the figures on secretaries and typists which are based on personal calculations, this table is from the Plan and Budget Organization, Degarquniha-ye [The Social and Economic], p. 79.

TABLE 26: WOMEN'S OCCUPATION AS A PERCENTAGE  
OF URBAN LABOR FORCE, 1966

| Occupation                               | Women As<br>%<br>Of Workers |
|------------------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| Nurses                                   | 64.7                        |
| Secretaries and typists                  | 50.1                        |
| Telephone operators and telegram workers | 7.0                         |
| Reporters                                | 7.0                         |
| Teachers                                 | 33.9                        |
| Physicians                               | 11.0                        |
| Lawyers                                  | .6                          |
| Architects                               | 1.3                         |
| Engineers                                | 3.3                         |

SOURCE: Ibid., p. 81.



TABLE 27: PERCENT OF URBAN FEMALE EMPLOYED 12 YEARS  
OF AGE AND OVER BY SKILL, 1972

| Skill       | %<br>Employed<br>Women | Employed Women<br>As % Of Total<br>Employed Women<br>And Men |
|-------------|------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------|
| Cultivator  | .80                    | 1.34                                                         |
| Nonskilled  | 22.03                  | 12.14                                                        |
| Skilled     | 60.86                  | .81                                                          |
| Forewoman   | 11.84                  | 13.96                                                        |
| Specialists | 4.47                   | 15.83                                                        |
| TOTAL       | 100.0                  | 10.25                                                        |

SOURCE: Statistical Center of Iran, Manpower Statistics 1972, p. 18.

TABLE 28: MALE FACTORY WORKERS' REASONS  
FOR DISAPPROVING OF WIVES' WAGE WORK

| Reasons                                    | Number<br>Of Male<br>Workers |
|--------------------------------------------|------------------------------|
| Household and child care responsibilities  | 17                           |
| Religious beliefs                          | 11                           |
| Lack of skill                              | 6                            |
| Illness of wife and men's feeling of guilt | 2                            |

SOURCE: Ratkar, Tose'-ye [The Development], p. 15.

TABLE 29: LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION OF WOMEN  
BY MARITAL STATUS IN URBAN IRAN, 1966

| Marital Status | Women<br>10 Years<br>And<br>Older | Thereof<br>Employed |     | Employed<br>Women In Marital<br>Categories As % Of |                                   |
|----------------|-----------------------------------|---------------------|-----|----------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
|                | - 000's                           | - 000's             | %   | Total<br>Employed<br>Women                         | Women<br>In Marital<br>Categories |
| Total          | 3,186                             | 316                 | 9.9 | 100.0                                              | 100.0                             |
| Married        | 1,818                             | 131                 | 4.1 | 41.4                                               | 7.2                               |
| Widowed        | 364                               | 47                  | 1.4 | 14.8                                               | 12.9                              |
| Divorced       | 45                                | 16                  | .5  | 5.0                                                | 35.5                              |
| Single         | 959                               | 122                 | 3.8 | 38.6                                               | 12.7                              |

SOURCES: The Plan and Budget Organization, Degarguniha-  
ye [The Social and Economic], p. 62. The third and fourth  
categories have been calculated independently.

TABLE 30: LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION OF WOMEN 10 YEARS  
AND OVER BY AGE IN URBAN IRAN, 1976

| Age         | Number<br>In The<br>Labor Force | Rank |
|-------------|---------------------------------|------|
| Total       | 457,727                         |      |
| 10 - 11     | 9,609                           | 10   |
| 12 - 14     | 24,735                          | 7    |
| 15 - 19     | 60,270                          | 3    |
| 20 - 24     | 107,365                         | 1    |
| 25 - 29     | 85,333                          | 2    |
| 30 - 34     | 51,198                          | 4    |
| 35 - 39     | 34,794                          | 5    |
| 40 - 44     | 25,535                          | 6    |
| 45 - 49     | 19,840                          | 8    |
| 50 - 54     | 17,313                          | 9    |
| 55 - 59     | 7,409                           | 12   |
| 60 - 64     | 6,638                           | 13   |
| 65 and over | 7,388                           | 11   |

SOURCE: Statistical Center of Iran, Natayej-e Sar Shomari-ye 2535 [Census Statistics, 1976], p. 53.

TABLE 31: FEMALE POPULATION 10 YEARS OF AGE AND OVER BY AGE AND MARITAL STATUS IN URBAN IRAN, 1976

| Age     | Marital Status |           |       |          |                   |
|---------|----------------|-----------|-------|----------|-------------------|
|         | Total          | Married   | %     | Widowed* | Divorced* Single* |
| Total   | 5,395,319      | 3,022,583 | 100.0 | 443,033  | 50,763 1,878,940  |
| 10 - 14 | 971,329        | 5,521     | .6    | 0        | 0 965,808         |
| 15 - 19 | 893,885        | 265,182   | 29.7  | 786      | 2,020 625,897     |
| 20 - 24 | 737,259        | 536,097   | 72.7  | 2,771    | 4,893 193,498     |
| 25 - 29 | 546,281        | 484,065   | 88.6  | 5,219    | 5,090 51,907      |
| 30 - 34 | 421,338        | 392,700   | 93.2  | 7,214    | 5,252 16,222      |
| 35 - 39 | 375,056        | 349,189   | 93.1  | 13,122   | 5,419 7,326       |
| 40 - 44 | 349,340        | 313,322   | 89.7  | 25,576   | 5,306 5,136       |
| 45 - 49 | 292,470        | 246,725   | 84.4  | 37,561   | 5,124 3,060       |
| 50 - 54 | 268,610        | 197,375   | 73.5  | 62,166   | 5,974 3,095       |
| 55 - 59 | 149,675        | 95,032    | 63.5  | 49,511   | 3,598 1,534       |

TABLE 31 -- continued

| Age         | Total   | Marital Status |      |          |           |         |
|-------------|---------|----------------|------|----------|-----------|---------|
|             |         | Married        | %    | Widowed* | Divorced* | Single* |
| 60 - 64     | 126,834 | 59,352         | 46.8 | 62,460   | 3,172     | 1,850   |
| 65 and over | 263,192 | 78,023         | 29.6 | 176,647  | 4,915     | 3,607   |

SOURCE: Ibid., p. 20.

NOTE: \* represents categories whose percentages did not need to be calculated for this study.

TABLE 32: EMPLOYED POPULATION BY SEX, NIRT, 1973<sup>a</sup>

| Area         | Males | Females | Total<br>Employed | Ratio Of<br>Employed<br>Males To<br>Females |
|--------------|-------|---------|-------------------|---------------------------------------------|
| Tehran       | 2,127 | 592     | 2,729             | 3.7:1                                       |
| Other cities | 1,153 | 190     | 1,343             | 6:1                                         |
| Total NIRT   | 3,280 | 782     | 4,072             | 4:1                                         |

SOURCE: Administrative Affairs, The Report of Personnel's Statistics of the National Iranian Radio and Television (Tehran: NIRT), p. 35 and 52.

NOTE: <sup>a</sup>Includes the employed NIRT population which is drawn from those with education from primary school to those with doctorate degrees.

TABLE 33: EMPLOYED POPULATION BY SEX, NIRT, 1977

| Area         | Males | Females | Total<br>Employed | Ratio Of<br>Employed<br>Males To<br>Females |
|--------------|-------|---------|-------------------|---------------------------------------------|
| Tehran       | 3,715 | 1,170   | 4,885             | 3:1                                         |
| Other cities | 2,621 | 308     | 2,979             | 8:1                                         |
| Total NIRT   | 6,336 | 1,478   | 7,854             | 4:1                                         |

SOURCE: NIRT, Bayegani-ye Karmandan [Personnel's Files]  
 (Tehran: NIRT, Record's Section, Office of the Administrative Affairs, 1977).



TABLE 34: EMPLOYED POPULATION BY SEX AT CONI, 1975

| Area   | Males | Females | Total<br>Employed | Ratio Of<br>Employed<br>Males To<br>Females |
|--------|-------|---------|-------------------|---------------------------------------------|
| Tehran | 365   | 150     | 515               | 2.5:1                                       |

SOURCE: Bayegani-ye Karmandan [Personnel's Files]  
 (Tehran: CONI, Record's Section, Office of the Administrative Affairs, 1977).

TABLE 35: OCCUPATIONAL DISTRIBUTION  
BY SEX AT THE CONI, TEHRAN, 1975

| Occupational Categories               | Number<br>Of<br>Employed<br>Males | Number<br>Of<br>Employed<br>Females |
|---------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| Director                              | 3                                 | 0 <sup>e</sup>                      |
| Chief Secretariat                     | 2                                 | 0                                   |
| Supervisor                            | 4                                 | 0                                   |
| Division Head <sup>b</sup>            | 5                                 | 0                                   |
| Analyst (3, 2, 1)                     | 7                                 | 4                                   |
| Film Maker                            | 25                                | 2                                   |
| Monteur                               | 4                                 | 7                                   |
| Assistant Sound Producer              | 7                                 | 0                                   |
| Secretariat (3, 2, 1)                 | 17                                | 2                                   |
| News Correspondent                    | 6                                 | 2                                   |
| Translator (3, 2, 1)                  | 45                                | 5                                   |
| Assistant Secretary                   | 27                                | 11                                  |
| Assistant Correspondent               | 9                                 | 5                                   |
| Assistant Translator                  | 8                                 | 6                                   |
| Graphic Designer                      | 3                                 | 0                                   |
| Film Director (3, 2, 1)               | 2                                 | 0                                   |
| Operator                              | 7                                 | 1                                   |
| Operator-Telex                        | 11                                | 27                                  |
| Laboratory Operator                   | 5                                 | 0                                   |
| News Personnel (3, 2, 1) <sup>c</sup> | 50                                | 25                                  |
| Announcer                             | 18                                | 10                                  |

TABLE 35 -- continued

| Occupational Categories                   | Number<br>Of<br>Employed<br>Males | Number<br>Of<br>Employed<br>Females |
|-------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| Administrative Personnel (3, 2, 1)        | 9                                 | 6                                   |
| Accounting Personnel (3, 2, 1)            | 5                                 | 2                                   |
| Photographer                              | 2                                 | 0                                   |
| Personnel in Charge of Archives (3, 2, 1) | 0                                 | 2                                   |
| Calligraphist                             | 2                                 | 0                                   |
| Broadcaster                               | 1                                 | 1                                   |
| Stage Secretary/Secretary                 | 0                                 | 9                                   |
| Typist (3, 2, 1)                          | 13                                | 20                                  |
| Personnel in Charge of Xeroxing           | 4                                 | 0                                   |
| Storekeeper                               | 1                                 | 0                                   |
| Driver                                    | 54                                | 0                                   |
| Mail Deliverer                            | 6                                 | 0                                   |
| TOTAL <sup>d</sup> 515                    | 365                               | 150                                 |

SOURCES: This data is put together, organized and calculated from a mass of files and information from CONI, Bayegani-ye Karmandan [Personnel's Files] (Tehran: CONI, The Files Section, Administrative Affairs, 1977).

NOTES: <sup>a</sup>Indicates that due to the lack of personnel in several positions, the listing of them has been eliminated from this table. These positions from top to the bottom are as follows: Chief Correspondent, Chief Translator, Researcher, Chief Film Director, Coordinator, Administrative Personnel (3, 2, 1), Personnel in Charge of Records, Business Personnel, Assistant Film Technician, and Assistant in Charge of Transportation. I was informed that there were,

TABLE 35 -- continued

in fact, some coordinators, but no information was available on them in the files.

<sup>b</sup>Indicates that some positions are overlapping, e.g., one of the male analysts is also a director and one of the female analysts is also a Head-Analyst.

<sup>c</sup>Means that in this table, News Personnel consist of Reporters, News Delegates (3, 2, 1), New Interpreters, News-women and men as well as those personnel in charge of the News Office.

<sup>d</sup>Indicates that due to the lack of organized and consistent data, reliability for this table may be graded as fair.

<sup>e</sup>Shows that despite the lack of female directors at the CONI, there was one part-time female director at Tehran NIRT, and two other ones at the country-wide organization.

TABLE 36: SOCIO-ECONOMIC BACKGROUND:  
DIRECTORS, CONI, NIRT, TEHRAN, 1977

| Male<br>Directors | Educational<br>Degree | Starting<br>Date Of<br>Work At<br>The NIRT | Salary<br>In<br>Rials <sup>a</sup> | Birthday | Marital<br>Status |
|-------------------|-----------------------|--------------------------------------------|------------------------------------|----------|-------------------|
| X <sub>1</sub>    | B.A.                  | 1959                                       | 62,100                             | 1933     | M <sup>b</sup>    |
| X <sub>2</sub>    | 11th Grade            | 1970                                       | 72,300                             | 1945     | M                 |
| X <sub>3</sub>    | Masters               | 1971                                       | 90,000                             | 1939     | M                 |

SOURCES: Interviews conducted by myself as well as information gathered from NIRT, Ettela-at-e Mekanizeh [Mechanized Information] (Tehran, NIRT, the Mechanized Information Section, Administrative Affairs, 1977); and CONI, Orag-e Arzyabi-ye Huquq [The Salary Evaluation Sheet] (Tehran, CONI, The Files Section, Administrative Affairs, 1977).

NOTES: <sup>a</sup>Indicates that at the time of the gathering of this data, the rate of exchange was 78 rials to one dollar.

<sup>b</sup>Refers to married people.

TABLE 37: SOCIO-ECONOMIC BACKGROUND, FEMALE ANALYSTS  
CONI, NIRT, TEHRAN, 1977

| Female Analysts | Rank <sup>a</sup> | Educational Degree                | Starting Date Of Work At The NIRT | Salary In Rials | Birthday        | Marital Status              |
|-----------------|-------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------------------|
| Y <sub>1</sub>  | Analyst           | Ph.D.<br>(Political Science)      | 1974                              | 59,850          | 1938            | M <sub>1</sub> <sup>b</sup> |
| Y <sub>2</sub>  | Head Analyst      | Dr.<br>(International Law)        | 1975                              | 57,000          | 1946            | M <sub>1</sub>              |
| Y <sub>3</sub>  | Assistant Analyst | M.A.<br>(International Relations) | 1973                              | 37,450          | 1945            | M <sub>1</sub>              |
| Y <sub>4</sub>  | Analyst           | M.A.<br>(Economics)               | 1971                              | 51,800          | NI <sup>c</sup> | M                           |

SOURCES: The same as Table 36, above.

NOTES: <sup>a</sup>Rank and order of analysts from top to bottom, according to NIRT rules were as follows: Research Analyst, Analyst 3, 2, 1, and Assistant Analyst. The rank of the above Ph.D. Analyst was 3, that of the Head Analyst was 1, and the M.A. Analyst was 1 as well.

TABLE 37 -- continued

<sup>b</sup>Refers to the number of children.

<sup>c</sup>Means no data is available.

TABLE 38: SOCIO-ECONOMIC BACKGROUND: MALE ANALYSTS  
CONI, NIRT, TEHRAN, 1977

| Male<br>Analysts | Rank                 | Educational<br>Degree | Starting<br>Date Of<br>Work At<br>The NIRT | Salary<br>In<br>Rials | Birthday | Marital<br>Status |
|------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|--------------------------------------------|-----------------------|----------|-------------------|
| X <sub>1</sub>   | Research<br>Analyst  | Ph.D.                 | 1974                                       | 63,250                | NI       | NI                |
| X <sub>2</sub>   | Assistant<br>Analyst | M.A.                  | 1974                                       | 37,000                | 1948     | NI                |
| X <sub>3</sub>   | NI                   | Diploma               | 1971                                       | 45,640                | NI       | M <sub>4</sub>    |
| X <sub>4</sub>   | NI                   | Twelfth<br>Grade      | 1972                                       | 40,000                | NI       | NI                |

SOURCES: The same as Table 36, above.



TABLE 39: SOCIO-ECONOMIC BACKGROUND: MALE NEWS PERSONNEL  
CONI, NIRT, TEHRAN, 1977

| Male News<br>Personnel | Rank <sup>a</sup> | Educational<br>Degree | Starting<br>Date Of<br>Work At<br>The NIRT | Salary<br>In<br>Rials | Birthday | Marital<br>Status |
|------------------------|-------------------|-----------------------|--------------------------------------------|-----------------------|----------|-------------------|
| X <sub>1</sub>         | 3                 | B.A.                  | 1972                                       | 33,150                | 1942     | S <sup>b</sup>    |
| X <sub>2</sub>         | 3                 | B.A.                  | 1973                                       | 34,100                | 1945     | M                 |
| X <sub>3</sub>         | 3                 | B.A.                  | 1974                                       | 31,000                | 1947     | M                 |
| X <sub>4</sub>         | 2                 | Sixth<br>Grade        | 1971                                       | 20,950                | 1939     | NI                |

SOURCES: The same as Table 36, above.

NOTES: <sup>a</sup> Means that the higher the grade of the news personnel, the higher is his/her position. The grades range from 1 to 3.

<sup>b</sup> Means the person is single.

TABLE 40: SOCIO-ECONOMIC BACKGROUND: FEMALE NEWS PERSONNEL  
CONI, NIRT, TEHRAN, 1977

| Female<br>News<br>Personnel | Rank | Educational<br>Degree | Starting<br>Date Of<br>Work At<br>The NIRT | Salary<br>In<br>Rials | Birthday | Marital<br>Status |
|-----------------------------|------|-----------------------|--------------------------------------------|-----------------------|----------|-------------------|
| Y <sub>1</sub>              | 3    | B.A.                  | 1969                                       | 35,150                | 1949     | S                 |
| Y <sub>2</sub>              | 3    | B.A.                  | 1973                                       | 44,200                | 1948     | S                 |
| Y <sub>3</sub>              | 3    | B.A.                  | 1974                                       | 31,000                | 1950     | S                 |
| Y <sub>4</sub>              | 2    | Twelfth<br>Grade      | 1969                                       | 35,250                | 1949     | S                 |

SOURCES: The same as Table 36, above.

TABLE 41: SOCIO-ECONOMIC BACKGROUND: MALE TYPISTS,  
CONI, NIRT, TEHRAN, 1977

| Male<br>Typists | Rank    | Educational<br>Degree | Starting<br>Date Of<br>Work At<br>The NIRT | Salary<br>In<br>Rials | Birthday | Marital<br>Status           |
|-----------------|---------|-----------------------|--------------------------------------------|-----------------------|----------|-----------------------------|
| X <sub>1</sub>  | 1       | Twelfth<br>Grade      | 1971                                       | 19,550                | 1947     | S                           |
| X <sub>2</sub>  |         | Ninth<br>Grade        | 1971                                       | 13,200                | 1944     | M <sub>2</sub> <sup>a</sup> |
| X <sub>3</sub>  |         | Sixth<br>Grade        | 1969                                       | 13,800                | 1932     | M                           |
| X <sub>4</sub>  | Special | Sixth<br>Grade        | 1960                                       | 28,400                | 1914     | M                           |

SOURCES: The same as Table 36, above.

NOTE: <sup>a</sup>M indicates married and number 2 represents the number of children.

TABLE 42: SOCIO-ECONOMIC BACKGROUND: FEMALE TYPISTS  
CONI, NIRT, TEHRAN, 1977

| Female<br>Typists | Rank                          | Educational<br>Degree | Starting<br>Date Of<br>Work At<br>The NIRT | Salary<br>In<br>Rials | Birthday | Marital<br>Status |
|-------------------|-------------------------------|-----------------------|--------------------------------------------|-----------------------|----------|-------------------|
| Y <sub>1</sub>    | Two<br>Languages <sup>a</sup> | Diploma               | 1971                                       | 22,250                | 1951     | M                 |
| Y <sub>2</sub>    |                               | Eleventh<br>Grade     | 1972                                       | 15,600                | 1949     | NI                |
| Y <sub>3</sub>    |                               | Twelfth<br>Grade      | 1972                                       | 19,700                | 1948     | NI                |
| Y <sub>4</sub>    |                               | Twelfth<br>Grade      | 1975                                       | 15,250                | 1954     | NI                |

SOURCES: The same as Table 36, above.

NOTE: <sup>a</sup>Most of the typists were trained in one language, either in Farsi or in English. There were only a few who were trained to type in two languages.

TABLE 43: MARRIAGES BY AGE AND SEX IN GREATER TEHRAN,  
2533/1974

| Age          | Male   |        | Female              |        |
|--------------|--------|--------|---------------------|--------|
|              | #      | %      | #                   | %      |
| Total        | 29,915 | 100.00 | 29,915              | 100.00 |
| Less than 18 | 99     | .30    | 12,266 <sup>a</sup> | 41.00  |
| 19 - 22      | 6,365  | 21.30  | 8,307               | 27.80  |
| 23 - 26      | 9,354  | 31.30  | 4,738               | 15.80  |
| 27 - 30      | 6,618  | 22.10  | 2,001               | 6.70   |
| 31 - 35      | 3,214  | 10.70  | 978                 | 3.30   |
| 36 - 40      | 2,251  | 7.50   | 544                 | 1.80   |
| 41 - 45      | 687    | 2.30   | 400                 | 1.30   |
| 46 - 50      | 487    | 1.60   | 267                 | .90    |
| 51 - 60      | 382    | 1.30   | 304                 | 1.00   |
| 60 and over  | 459    | 1.50   | 110                 | .40    |
| Mean         | -      | 28.26  | -                   | 22.02  |

SOURCE: The Ministry of Justice, Bar-resi-ye Amari-ye Ezdevaj [A Statistical Investigation of Marriage], p. 2, t. 1.

NOTE: <sup>a</sup>Of this figure, 2,928 married women were below the age of 16, and 9,338 women were between 16 and 18 years of age.

TABLE 44: REASONS FOR DIVORCE IN GREATER TEHRAN,  
2533/1974

| Reasons                  | #     | %      |
|--------------------------|-------|--------|
| Total                    | 5,901 | 100.00 |
| Incompatibility          | 4,258 | 72.20  |
| Woman's hatred           | 1,063 | 18.00  |
| Man's hatred             | 550   | 9.30   |
| Polygamy                 | 4     | .07    |
| Man's failure to support | 7     | .10    |
| Family problems          | 2     | .03    |
| Age differences          | 5     | .08    |
| Unfaithfulness           | 2     | .03    |
| Barren                   | 6     | .10    |
| Man's illness            | 4     | .07    |
| No answer                | 1     | .02    |

SOURCES: Ibid., p. 12, t. 8.

TABLE 45: DISTRIBUTION OF DIVORCES BY ECONOMIC  
ACTIVITY AND AGE IN GREATER TEHRAN, 2533/1974

| Economic Activity                              | Male  |        | Female            |        |
|------------------------------------------------|-------|--------|-------------------|--------|
|                                                | #     | %      | #                 | %      |
| Total                                          | 5,901 | 100.00 | 5,901             | 100.00 |
| Technical, Professional,<br>and Related        | 351   | 6.0    | 126               | 2.10   |
| Administrative, Cleri-<br>cal and Related      | 1,232 | 20.9   | 539               | 9.10   |
| Sales and Related                              | 635   | 10.8   | 4                 | .07    |
| Agricultural, Forestry,<br>Hunting and Fishing | 86    | 1.5    | 0                 | 0      |
| Mining                                         | 48    | .8     | 0                 | 0      |
| Industry and Production                        | 440   | 7.5    | 25                | .40    |
| Services                                       | 841   | 14.3   | 90                | 1.50   |
| Military Services                              | 794   | 13.5   | 21                | .40    |
| Unemployed and<br>Economically Inactive        | 877   | 14.9   | 5.95 <sup>a</sup> | 86.30  |

SOURCE: Ibid., p. 12, t. 12.

NOTE: <sup>a</sup>Most of these women were housewives.

TABLE 46: REASONS FOR SEEKING ASSISTANCE FROM WOI  
ON MARITAL PROBLEMS, SELECTED URBAN AREAS

| Reasons                                                  | #     | %     |
|----------------------------------------------------------|-------|-------|
| Total                                                    | 1,164 | 100.0 |
| Lack of economic support by man                          | 283   | 24.3  |
| Incompatibility                                          | 249   | 21.4  |
| Polygamy                                                 | 86    | 7.4   |
| Wife beating                                             | 82    | 7.0   |
| Woman leaving home                                       | 58    | 5.0   |
| Woman not getting along and<br>her mother's interference | 53    | 4.6   |
| Man's addiction and gambling                             | 25    | 2.1   |
| Illness                                                  | 20    | 1.7   |
| Woman's work outside home                                | 10    | .9    |
| Lack of children                                         | 8     | .7    |
| Age difference                                           | 4     | .3    |
| Other reasons                                            | 188   | 16.2  |
| Unclear                                                  | 98    | 8.4   |

SOURCE: WOI, Bar-resi-ye Masa'l va Moshkelat-e Khanevadeh [An Investigation of Family Problems and Issues], p. 30, t. 26.

NOTE: This data is based on an investigation of family problems in 64 cities from different provinces all across the country. The organization of the study is based on 1,164 questionnaires that were given to people who went to the WOI for consultation on marital problems.



TABLE 47: REASONS LEADING TO DIVORCE,  
SELECTED URBAN AREAS

| Reasons                                    | #   | %     |
|--------------------------------------------|-----|-------|
| Total                                      | 262 | 100.0 |
| Incompatibility                            | 110 | 42.0  |
| Polygamy                                   | 24  | 9.1   |
| Lack of financial support by man           | 21  | 8.1   |
| Wife beating                               | 15  | 5.7   |
| Man's drinking, gambling,<br>and addiction | 14  | 5.3   |
| Woman leaving the family                   | 12  | 4.6   |
| Other reasons                              | 66  | 25.2  |

SOURCE: Ibid., p. 32, t. 29.

TABLE 48: DAILY WAGES OF FEMALE INDUSTRIAL WORKERS, ISFAHAN

| Industry          | Minimum Wage<br>(Assigned)<br>In Rials | Minimum Wage<br>And Extra<br>Wage For<br>Extra Work<br>(Received)<br>In Rials |
|-------------------|----------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Textile           | 35                                     | 55                                                                            |
| Food              | 45                                     | 52                                                                            |
| Chemical          | 45                                     | 61                                                                            |
| Electricity       | 50                                     | 74                                                                            |
| Cigarette         | 45                                     | 60                                                                            |
| Shoes and clothes | 35                                     | 50                                                                            |
| Paper and glass   | 25                                     | 35                                                                            |

SOURCE: WOI, Bar-resi-ye Ejmali-ye Sharayet-e Kar-e Zanan-e Kargar [Brief Investigation of the Work Condition of Working Class Women], p. 17, t.5.

TABLE 49: MEMBERS OF THE MAJLIS AND THE SENATE

| Year                 | The Majlis |       |         |           | The Senate <sup>a</sup> |       |         |           |
|----------------------|------------|-------|---------|-----------|-------------------------|-------|---------|-----------|
|                      | Total      | Males | Females | % Females | Total                   | Males | Females | % Females |
| 1963-67              | 197        | 191   | 6       | 3.0       | 60                      | 58    | 2       | 3         |
| 1967-71 <sup>b</sup> | 220        | 214   | 6       | 2.7       | 60                      | 58    | 2       | 3         |
| 1971-75              | 268        | 250   | 18      | 6.7       | 60                      | 58    | 2       | 3         |
| 1975-                | 268        | 248   | 20      | 7.5       | 60                      | 58    | 2       | 3         |

SOURCES: This is based on interviews conducted at the Women's Organization of Iran, Tehran, 1975 and 1977.

NOTES: <sup>a</sup>Senatorial elections and appointments took place every four years.

<sup>b</sup>Since 1971, Majlis elections took place every four years instead of every two years.

TABLE 50: MINISTERIAL REPRESENTATION, TEHRAN, 1975 AND 1977

| Ministries                   | Minister |         | Undersecretary |         | Advisor<br>To Minister |         |
|------------------------------|----------|---------|----------------|---------|------------------------|---------|
|                              | Males    | Females | Males          | Females | Males                  | Females |
| Economic Affairs and Finance | 1        | -       | 7              | -       | 11                     | -       |
| Information                  | 1        | -       | 6              | -       | 15                     | -       |
| Education                    | 1        | -       | 7              | -       | 9                      | 2       |
| Foreign Affairs              | 1        | -       | 4              | -       | 5                      | -       |
| Health                       | 1        | -       | 5              | -       | 3                      | -       |
| Commerce                     | 1        | -       | 5              | -       | 8                      | -       |
| PTT                          | 1        | -       | 3              | -       | 3                      | -       |
| Cooperatives                 | 1        | -       | 8              | -       | 10                     | 1       |
| Justice                      | 1        | -       | 5              | -       | -                      | -       |
| Roads                        | 1        | -       | 7              | -       | 13                     | -       |
| Welfare                      | 1        | -       | 4              | 1       | 1                      | -       |
| Industries and Mines         | 1        | -       | 4              | -       | 3                      | -       |

TABLE 50 -- continued

| Ministries       | <u>Minister</u> |         | <u>Undersecretary</u> |         | <u>Advisor<br/>To Minister</u> |         |
|------------------|-----------------|---------|-----------------------|---------|--------------------------------|---------|
|                  | Males           | Females | Males                 | Females | Males                          | Females |
| Higher Education | 1               | -       | 6                     | -       | 7                              | 1       |
| Culture and Arts | 1               | -       | 6                     | -       | 10                             | -       |
| Labour           | 1               | -       | 5                     | 1       | 10                             | -       |
| Interior         | 1               | -       | 6                     | -       | 10                             | -       |
| Housing          | 1               | -       | 4                     | -       | 4                              | -       |
| Energy           | 1               | -       | 4                     | -       | 5                              | -       |
| Agriculture      | 1               | -       | 8                     | -       | 29                             | -       |
| TOTAL 19         | 19              | -       | 104                   | 2       | 156                            | 4       |

SOURCE: Kayhan Research Associates, The Employment of Women, p. 49.

TABLE 51: DEPARTMENTAL REPRESENTATION, TEHRAN, 1975 AND 1977

| Ministries                   | Department Director |         | Assistant Department Director |         | Expert |         |
|------------------------------|---------------------|---------|-------------------------------|---------|--------|---------|
|                              | Males               | Females | Males                         | Females | Males  | Females |
| Economic Affairs and Finance | 30                  | 1       | 65                            | -       | 294    | 37      |
| Information                  | 30                  | 1       | 45                            | 1       | 2,000  | 103     |
| Education                    | 29                  | 7       | 62                            | 8       | -      | -       |
| Foreign Affairs              | 8                   | -       | 44                            | -       | 4      | 1       |
| Health                       | 34                  | 2       | 68                            | 2       | -      | -       |
| Commerce                     | 11                  | -       | 13                            | -       | 12     | 3       |
| PTT                          | 27                  | -       | 35                            | 1       | -      | -       |
| Cooperatives                 | 12                  | 3       | 18                            | -       | -      | -       |
| Justice                      | 12                  | -       | 12                            | -       | 6      | 1       |
| Roads                        | 35                  | -       | 41                            | 2       | 55     | 10      |
| Welfare                      | 9                   | -       | 3                             | 1       | 270    | 50      |
| Industries and Mines         | 34                  | -       | 41                            | 2       | 219    | 53      |

TABLE 51 -- continued

| Ministries       | Department<br>Director |         | Assistant Depart-<br>ment Director |         | Expert |         |
|------------------|------------------------|---------|------------------------------------|---------|--------|---------|
|                  | Males                  | Females | Males                              | Females | Males  | Females |
| Higher Education | 20                     | 3       | 23                                 | 8       | 45     | 48      |
| Culture and Arts | 24                     | 2       | 31                                 | 1       | 203    | 51      |
| Labour           | 40                     | -       | 31                                 | 7       | 127    | 50      |
| Interior         | 16                     | -       | 17                                 | 4       | 87     | 25      |
| Housing          | 15                     | -       | 18                                 | 3       | 134    | 40      |
| Energy           | 15                     | -       | 11                                 | -       | 100    | 26      |
| Agriculture      | 46                     | -       | 101                                | -       | -      | -       |
| TOTAL 19         | 447                    | 18      | 678                                | 41      | 3,556  | 498     |

SOURCE: Ibid.

TABLE 52: PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATION  
1975 AND 1977

| Provincial Administration     | Males | Females |
|-------------------------------|-------|---------|
| Governor General              | 23    | -       |
| Governor (Farmandar)          | 154   | -       |
| District Governor (Bakhshdar) | 391   | 12      |
| Mayor                         | 436   | 2       |

SOURCES: Ibid., p. 50.



#### SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

## SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

### FARSI SOURCES

#### Interviews

Open-ended interviews were conducted with female and male officials, employers, and employees of various public and private organizations in 1974, 1975, 1977, and 1979. Because of their request for anonymity the names and titles of these individuals will not be given. Interviews were conducted as follows: Department of Manpower Statistics; Economic Statistics Department, Bank Markazi Iran; Iranian National Radio and Television and its various subsidiary units; Ministry of Economy; Ministry of Industry and Mining; Ministry of Information; Ministry of Justice; Ministry of Labor; peasant women; Plan and Budget Organization; political activists of various organizations; State Organization for Employment and Administrative Affairs; Statistical Center of Iran; the Senate; university members; various factories, feminist organizations, and households; and Women's Organization of Iran.

#### Documents

Bank Markazi Iran. Gozarash-e Salaneh va Taraz-nameh-e Bank-e Markazi-ye Iran [Bank Markazi Iran: Annual Report and Balance Sheet], 13 vols. Tehran: Bank Markazi Iran, in Farsi and English, 1344/1964-1355/1976.

\_\_\_\_\_. Natayej-e Bar-resi-ye Bujeh-e Khanevar-ha-ye Shahri-e Iran dar sal-e Bisto-panj-e-sio-seh [The Results of the Investigation of Family Budget in Urban Iran in 1974-74], Section I and II. Tehran: Bank Markazi Iran, Economic Statistics Department, 2533/1974.

Central Office of News and Information. Bayegani-ye Karmandan [Personnel's Files]. Tehran: National Iranian Radio and Television, Central Office of News and Information, Office of the Administrative Affairs, Records Section, 1977.

\_\_\_\_\_. Oraq-e Arzyabi-ye Huguq [The Salary Evaluation Sheet]. Tehran: National Iranian Radio and Television, Central Office of News and Information, the Record's Section, 1977.

Economic Statistics Department. Gozarash-e Shakhes-e Baha-ye Kalaha va Khadamat-e Masrafi dar Manateq-e Shahri-ye Iran dar Sale 2535 [A Report of Consumer Price Index in Urban Iran, 1976]. Tehran: Statistical Center of Iran, 2535/1976. .

. Natayej-e Bar-resi-ye Bujeh-e Khanevarha-ye Shahri-ye Iran dar Sale 2535 [The Results of the Investigation in Urban Iran, 1974], 2 sections. Tehran: Statistical Center of Iran, 2535/1976.

Ministry of Information. Omur-e Parlomani va Entekhabat, Ha'zin-e Aksariyyat-e Ara'-e Entekhabat-e Nuzdahomin, Bisto-Dovvomin, [and] Bisto-Sevvomin Doureh-e Majles-e Shoraye-e Melli [Parliamentary Procedures and Elections, the Winner of the 19th, 21st, [and] 22nd, [and] 23rd Majlis]. Tehran: Ministry of Information, 1354/1975.

Ministry of Interior. Sar Shomari-ye Amari-ye Keshvar va Ostanha Aban Mah-e 1335 [National and Provincial Statistics of the First Census of Iran, November 1956]. Tehran: Ministry of Interior, 1341/1962.

Ministry of Justice. Salnameh-e Amar-e Qaza'i [The Judicial Statistics Yearbook]. Tehran: Ministry of Justice, 1352/1972.

. Bar-resi-ye Amari-ye Ezdevaj va Talaq dar Tehran-e Bozorg [A Statistical Investigation of Marriage and Divorce in Greater Tehran]. Tehran: Ministry of Justice, Statistical Center of Iran, 2536/1977.

Ministry of Labor. Bar-resi-ye Masa'le-ye Niru-ye Ensani [The Investigation of Manpower Statistics], 3 vols. Tehran: Ministry of Labor, 1343/1964, 1344/1965, and 1344/1965.

. Qavanin va Moqarrart-e Kar va Ta'min-e Ejtema'i [Labor Laws and Regulations and Social Insurance], 3 vols. Tehran: Ministry of Labor, 1352/1973 and 2535/1976.

National Iranian Radio and Television. Gozarash-e Salnameh-e Sazaman-e Radio Television-e Melli-ye Iran dar Sal-e 1353 [The National Iranian Radio and Television Annual Report, 1974]. Tehran: National Iranian Radio and Television, n.d.

- \_\_\_\_\_. Bayegani-ye Karmandan [Personnel's Files]. Tehran: National Iranian Radio and Television, Office of Administrative Affairs, Records Section, 1977.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Ettela-at-e Mekanizeh [Mechanized Information]. Tehran: National Iranian Radio and Television, Office of Administrative Affairs, Records Section, Personnel's Files, 1977.
- \_\_\_\_\_. [Advertisements]. Tehran: National Iranian Radio and Television, Office of Administrative Affairs, Placement and Advertising Section, 1977.
- Plan and Budget Organization. Degarguniha-ye Ejtema'i va Eqtesadi-ye Zanan-e Iran [Social and Economic Changes in the Position of Iranian Women]. Tehran: Plan and Budget Organization, Statistical Center of Iran, 1352/1973.
- Statistical Center of Iran. Bayan-e Amari Tahavvolat-e Eqtesadi va Ejtem'i-ye Iran dar Doran-e Por az Eftekhar-e Dudman-e Pahlavi [Statistical Talks, Economic and Social Changes in Iran during the Pahlavi Era Full of Glory], 2 vols. Tehran: Statistical Center of Iran, Volume 1, n.d., Volume 2, 2535/1976.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Natayej-e Amargiri-ye Niru-ye Ensani [The Results of Manpower Statistics], 3 vols. Tehran: Statistical Center of Iran, 1349/1970, 1350/1971, and 1351/1972.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Natayej-e Sar Shomari-ye Omumi-ye Nofus va Maskan Aban Mah-e 1355 [National Census of Population and Housing, November 1976]. Tehran: Statistical Center of Iran, 2535/1976.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Sal Nameh-e Amari-ye Keshvar [The Year Book of National Statistics], 3 vols. Tehran: Statistical Center of Iran, 1351/1973, 1352/1973, and 2535/1976.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Sar Shomari-ye Omumi-ye Nofus va Maskan Aban Mah-e 1345 [National Census of Population and Housing, November 1966]. Tehran: Statistical Center of Iran, 1345/1966.
- Women's Organization of Iran. "Notq-e vala Hazrat Shahdokht Ashraf Pahlavi" [The Speech of Her Majesty Princess Ashraf Pahlavi]. In Kongere-ye Bozorgdasht-e Chehelomin Salrouz-e Azadi-ye Ejtemai-ye Zanan [The Congress of Celebration of the Fortieth Day of Social Emancipation of Women]. Tehran: Women's Organization of Iran, 1353/1974.

Articles

Ardalan, Zafar-Dokht. "Bar-resi va Tahlil-e Madh-e Dahom-e E'lamiyyeh-e Jahani Raf'-e Tabi'z az Zan" [An Investigation and Analysis of Article Ten of the World Declaration for Prevention of Discrimination Against Women]. Tehran: Women's Organization of Iran, 1354/1971.

Ettela-at, Nos. 13945, 1351/1972; 14039, 1351/1972; 14275, 1352/1972; 14230, 1352/1973 as cited in Reza Mazlouman, "Zan Koshi dar Lava-ye Qanun" [The Murdering of Women Under the Law]. Tehran: Women's Organization of Iran, 1353/1974.

Ettela-at-e Banovan [Women's Information]. Various issues from 1962 to 1979.

Fateriyun, Khosro. "Bar-resi va Tahlil-e Madh-e Chaharom-e E'lamiyyeh-e Jahani-ye Raf'-e Tabi'z az Zan va Moqayeseh-e an ba Moqararat-e Qanuni-ye Iran" [An Investigation and Analysis of the World Declaration for the Prevention of Discrimination Against Women and its Comparison with Iranian Laws]. Tehran: Women's Organization of Iran, n.d.

Kayhan, No. 8522, 1350/1971 as cited in Reza Mazlouman, "Zan Koshi dar Lava-ye Qanun" [The Murdering of Women Under the Law]. Tehran: Women's Organization of Iran, 1354/1974.

Mahdavi, S., Tofiq, Z., Modir-Fatemi, P., Binder, G., and Qazi-Nour, Z. "Tahqiq dar Bareh-e Zan-e Karmand-e Doulat" [A Research on Governmental Female Employees]. Tehran: Plan and Budget Organization, 1349/1970.

Mazlouman, Reza. "Zan Koshi dar Lava-ye Qanun" [The Murdering of Women Under the Law]. Tehran: Women's Organization of Iran, 1353/1974.

Mo'ini-Araqi, Mahmoud. "Bar-resi va Tahlil-e Madh-e Sheshom-e E'lamiyyeh-e Jahani Raf'-e Tabi'z az Zan va Moqayesh-e an ba Moqararat-e Qanuni-ye Iran" [An Investigation and Analysis of Article Six of the World Declaration for the Prevention of Discrimination Against Women and its Comparison with the Iranian Laws]. Tehran: Women's Organization of Iran, n.d.

Nasehi, Vida. "Motale'ye Vaz'e Zanan-e Motaleqqeh-e Shahri-ye Tehran" [A Study of the Position of Widows in the City of Tehran]. Tehran: the University of Tehran, the Institute for Social Studies and Research, 2536/1977.

- Naseri, Farajollah. "Refah-e Zanan Taht-e Hemayat-e Qanun" [Women's Welfare Under the Protection of Law]. Paper prepared for the National and Social Seminar, Tehran, published by Women's Organization of Iran, 1352/1973.
- Payman, Habibollah. "Taq'ir-e Sharayet-e Ezdevaj dar Iran" [The Changing of Marital Conditions in Iran]. Paper published by the University of Tehran, the Institute for Social Studies and Research, No. 4, 1349/1970.
- Pirnia, Mansureh. "Oliahazrat Farmudand: Hich Zan-e Baarzesh-e Maheri Bikar Nemimanad" [The Empress Baded: No Worthwhile and Skillful Woman Remains Jobless]. Kayhan, 13 October 1354/1976.
- Rastkar, Ezzatollah. "Sokhanrani" [A Lecture]. Paper presented at the National Labor Conference, Tehran, Iran, 1354/1976.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Tose'-ye Eshtegal-e Zanan" [Development of Female Employment]. Tehran: The Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, n.d.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Naqsh-e Zan dar Barnameh-e Sheshom-e Tose'-ye Melli" [The Role of Women in the Sixth National Plan]. Tehran: Women's Organization of Iran, 2535/1976.
- Rastakhiz-e Kargaran [The Resurgence of Workers] as cited in Artesh-e Azim-e Zanan be Maydan Miayad [The Women's Army is Coming to the Front]. Tehran: n.p., 1354/1975.
- Sedghi, Hamideh, and Ashraf, Ahmad. "Moqe'-iyyat-e Zan dar Iran" [The Condition of Women in Iran]. Tehran: Plan and Budget Organization, 1354/1975.
- Sultanzadeh. "Moqe'iyyat-e Zan-e Irani" [The Status of Iranian Women] in his Asnad-e Tarikhi: Jonbesh-e Kargari, Soshel Demokrasi va Komonisti-ye [Historical Documents: The Worker, Social Democratic, and Communist Movements of Iran], vol. IV. Italy: Mazdak, 1975, translated from the 1922 German version.
- Vaziri, Fereshteh. "Tahavvol-e Fa'liyatha-ye Eqtesadi-ye Zanan dar Iran" [Changes in Economic Activities of Women in Iran]. Tehran: The University of Tehran, The Institute for Social Studies and Research, 1349/1971.
- Women's Organization of Iran. "Bar-resi-ye Ejmal-i-ye Shariyat-e Zanan-e Kargar" [A Detailed Investigation of the Work Situation of Women Workers]. Tehran: Women's Organization of Iran, 1348/1969.

\_\_\_\_\_. "Mogayeseh-e Qanun-e Hemayat-e Khanevadeh-e 1346 ba 1354" [Comparison of the Family Protection Law of 1967 with the Law of 1975]. Paper published by Women's Organization of Iran, Tehran, n.d.

Zanan-e Iran [Women of Iran]. Various issues, 1975.

Zane-e Ruz [Women of Today]. Various issues, 1970-1978.

### Books

Al-e Ahmad, Jalal. Qarb Zadegi [Western Intoxication]. Tehran: Mo'tarezeh, 1343/1974.

Amuzegar, Habibollah. Maqam-e Zan dar Afarinesh [The Status of Women in the World]. Tehran: Iqbal, 1344/1966.

Artesh-e Azim-e Zanan be Maydan Miayad [The Women's Army is Coming to the Front]. Tehran: n.p., n.d. (between 1975-1977).

Bamdad, Badr el-Moluk. Zan-e Irani az Eng-elab-e Mashrutiyyat ta Eng-elab-e Sefid [Iranian Women from the Constitutional Revolution to the White Revolution]. Tehran: Ebn-e Sina, 1347/1968.

Behranghi, Samad. Kendo Kav dar Masa'el-e Tarbiyati-ye Iran [Delving into the Training Problems of Iran]. Tehran: Bamdad, n.d.

Dar Bareh-e Mas'leh-e Zan [About Women's Problem]. Tehran: Sazeman-e Eng-elabi, 1355/1976.

Dehqani, Ashraf. Hamase-ye Mogavemat [The Epic of Resistance]. United States: The Organization of Middle East National Front, 1354/1975; Tehran: The Organization of the Iranian Fedaii Guerillas, 1357/1978.

Esfanpour, Gholamreza. Huquq va Maqam-e Zan: az Agaz ta Islam dar Iran [The Rights and Status of Women in Iran: From the Beginning to Islam]. Tehran: Mihan, 1348/1969.

Farrokh-Zad, Furuq. Furuq Farrokh-Zad Bargozideh-e Ash-ar [Selected Poems of Furuq Farrokh-Zad]. Tehran: Mor-varid, 1343/1964 and 1350/1971.

Haim, S. Zarbolmasalha-ye Farsi va Ingilisi [Farsi and English Proverbs]. Tehran: Beroukhim, 1334/1955 (bilingual).

- Haq-Ju, Mohammed Hosein. Eslam va Maqam-e Madar [Islam and the Status of Mother]. Mashad: Khorasan, n.d.
- Hejazi, Qodsiyyeh. Bar-resi-ye Jara'm-e Zan dar Iran [Investigation of Women's Crime in Iran]. Tehran: Enteshar, 1341/1962.
- Helli, Mohaqqueq-e. Sharay'e al-Islam [Islamic Laws], Vol. 2. Tehran: University of Tehran, 1347/1968.
- Ivonof, M.S. Tarikh-e Novin-e Iran [The Contemporary History of Iran]. Translated by H. Tizani and H. Gam'pananh. Tehran: n.p., n.d.
- Jamalzadeh, Seyyed Mohammed. Yeki Bud Yeki Nabud [Once Upon A Time]. 5th Printing. Tehran: Ebn-e Sina, 1333/1954.
- Jazani, Bizhan. Vaqay'-e Si Saleh-e dar Iran [The Events of Thirty Years in Iran]. Tehran: n.p., n.d.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Tarikh-e Si Saleh-e Iran [The History of Thirty Years in Iran]. Tehran: n.p., n.d.
- Kamangar, A. Majmue'-ye Qavanin-e Asasi va Kayfari [The Collection of Constitutional and Criminal Law], No. 2. Tehran: Javadian, n.d.
- Langaroudi, Mohammed Ja'far J. Daneshnameh-e Huguqi [The Encyclopedia of Law]. Tehran: Ibn-e Sina, 1352/1973.
- Majmue'-ye Qavanin-e Hemayat-e Khanevadeh [The Collection of Family Protection Laws]. Tehran: Farrokhi, 1349/1970.
- Manouchehrian, Mehrangiz. Entegad-e Qavanin-e Asasi va Madani va Kayfari-ye Iran az Nazar-e Huquq-e Zan [A Critique of the Constitutional, Civil, and Criminal Codes Pertaining to Women's Rights]. Tehran: Khoushes, 1342/1963.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Vaz'-e Huquqi-ye Zan dar Jahan va Tarh-e Qanun-e Khanevadeh [The Legal Status of Women in the World and the Draft of the Family Laws]. Tehran: The Union of Iranian Female Lawyers, 1342/1963.
- Mehdi, Ali Akbar. Dar Jame'eh Shenasi-ye Khanevadeh-e Irani [The Sociology of Iranian Families]. Tehran: Payam, 1354/1975.
- Mehrin, Mehrdad. Zan va Nagsh-e u [Women and Her Role]. Tehran: Ata'i, 1342/1963.



- Ministry of Information. Bar-resi-ye Ta'sir-e Nehzat-e Azadi-ye Zanan dar Engalab-e Ejtima'i-ye Iran [An Investigation of the Impact of the Emancipation of Women on the Iranian Social Revolution]. Tehran: Ministry of Information, Records Section, 1349/1970.
- Motahari, Morteza. Nezam-e Huguq-e Zan Islam [The System of Woman's Rights in Islam]. Tehran: Ziba, 1353/1974.
- Naqavi, Mohsen. Eshq va Ezdevaj Taht-e Qanun [Love and Marriage Under the Law]. Isfahan: Nesh'at, 1349/1970.
- Pahlavi University. Barnameh-e Tanzim-e Khanevar va Ertebat-e an ba Maqam-e Zan [A Plan for the Coordination of the Family and its Relationship with the Status of Women]. Shiraz: Pahlavi University, The Office of Social Study and Research, 1350/1971.
- Parivar, Ali. Honar-e Zan Boudan [The Art of Being a Woman]. Tehran: Enteshar, n.d.
- Parsa, F., Ahi, H., and Taleqani, M. Zan dar Iran-e Bastan [Women in Ancient Iran]. Tehran: Bisto-Panj-e Shahri-var, 1346/1969.
- Plan and Budget Organization. Seminar-e Melli-ye Refah-e Ejtima'i 1352 [The National Seminar of Social Development, 1973]. Tehran: Plan and Budget Organization, 1352/1973.
- Qavanin-e Madani [The Civil Codes], 3 vols. Tehran: Amir Kabir, 1353/1974.
- Qavimi, Fakhri. (Khashayar-Vaziri). Karnameh-e Zanan-e Mash-hour-e Iran, az Qabl az Islam ta Asr-e Hazer [The Record of Famous Iranian Women from Pre-Islamic to the Present Time]. Tehran: Sekkeh, 1352/1973.
- Qoran-e Majid [The Koran]. In Arabic with Farsi interpretation by Haj Sheikh Medhi Elahi Qamshahi. Tehran: Iran Publications, n.d.
- Rabani. Parvin E'tesami [Parvin E'tesami's Poetry]. Shiraz: n.p., n.d.
- Razani, Abu Torab. Zan dar Doran-e Shahanshahi-ye Iran [Women in Iranian Monarchical Periods]. Tehran: Mad-reseh-e 'Ali-ye Dokhtaran, 1350/1971.

- Research Group, Department of Social Communication, University of Tehran. Tarikh-cheh va Fa'aliyatha-ye Sazeman-e Zanan-e Iran [The History and Activities of the Women's Organization of Iran]. Tehran: Ofst Publications, n.d.
- Sadr, Hasan. Huquq-e Zan dar Islam va Urupa [Women's Rights in Islam and Europe]. Tehran: Mousavi, 1347/1968.
- Sadr-Hashemi, Mohammed. Tarikh-e Jarayed va Majallat-e Iran [The History of Iranian Newspapers and Journals], Vols. I-III. Isfahan: n.p., 1327/1948.
- Setam Keshidegi-ye Zan dar Iran [The Oppression of Women in Iran]. New York: Fanous, 1351/1972.
- Shaikholeslami, Pari. Zanan-e Rouznameh Negar va Andish-mand-e Iran [The Iranian Female Journalists and Intellectuals]. Tehran: Mazgrafi, 1351/1972.
- Sodagar, Mohammed Reza. Roshd-e Ravabet-e Sarmayeh-dari dar Iran, Marhaleh-e Entegali 1304-1340 [The Growth of Capitalist Relations in Iran, Transformation Process, 1925-1961]. Tehran: The Institute for Social and Economic Research, Pazand, Ofsat-e Golshan publishers, n.d.
- Taj, Mohammed Mehdi (Langaroudi). Dastan-e Zanan [The Story of Women]. Tehran: Zohreh, 1349/1971.
- Tarrafcian, Shokuh, and Vafa, Jasemi. Dar Ba-reh-e Mas'leh-e Zanan [About the Women's Problem]. Tehran: n.p., 1357/1978.
- Women's Organization of Iran. Bar-resi-ye Ejmal-ye Shara-yet-e Zanan-e Kargar [A Brief Investigation of the Work Condition of Working Class Women]. Tehran: Women's Organization of Iran, 1348/1969.
- 
- . Bar-resi-ye Masa'l va Moshkelat-e Khanevadeh [An Investigation of Family Problems and Issues]. Tehran: Ofst Publications, n.d.
- 
- . Gozarash-e Fa'aliyyatha-ye Sazeman-e Zanan-e Iran [A Report on the Activities of the Women's Organization of Iran]. Tehran: Women's Organization of Iran, 2535/1976.
- 
- . Ketab-e Seminar-e Bar-resi-ye Natayej-e Ejrai'-ye Qanun-e Hemayat-e Khanevadeh [The Book of Investigating Seminar on the Consequences of the Enactment of the Family Protection Law]. Tehran: Women's Organization of Iran, 1350/1971.

- \_\_\_\_\_. Nagsh-e Zanan dar Barnameh-e Omrani-ye Sheshom-e Keshvar [Women's Role in the Sixth Development Plan]. Tehran: Women's Organization of Iran, 2535/1976.
- \_\_\_\_\_, ed. Nagsh-e Zan dar Farhang va Tamaddon-e Iran [Women's Role in the Culture and Civilization of Iran]. Tehran: Ofst Publications, 1350/1971.
- Zamani, Mostafa. Payman-e Zanushu'i [Matrimonial Treaty]. Qom: Payman, 1350/1971.

#### WESTERN SOURCES

##### Documents

- Bank Markazi Iran. Bulletin XIV:79. Tehran: Bank Markazi, 1976.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Consumer Price Index in Urban Areas of Iran Ordibehesh 2536." Tehran: Bank Markazi, Economic Statistics Department, 2536/1977.
- \_\_\_\_\_. National Income of Iran, 1338-1344 (1959-1965) and 1338-1350 (1959-1972), 2 vols. Tehran: Bank Markazi Iran, 1347/1968 and 1353/1974.
- Contrell, Alvin J., and Hanks, Robert J. "The Future Role of Iran" in The U.S. Role in a Changing World Political Economy: Major Issues for the 96th Congress. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979.
- Department of Commerce. U.S. International Commerce Overseas Business Reports. Washington, D.C.: Department of Commerce, May 1966, October 1978, June 1978, October 1977, March 1978, September 1978, September 1977, December 1977, and April 1979.
- Department of Defense, Security Assistance Agency. Foreign Military Sales and Military Assistance Facts. Washington, D.C.: Data Management Division, Comptroller, Department of Defense, Security Assistance Agency, December 1980.
- Employment and Income Policies for Iran. Geneva: International Labor Office, 1973.
- Iran Who's Who 1976, Third Edition. Tehran: Echo of Iran, 1976.

- Office of Program and Information Analysis Services, the Agency for International Development. U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants and Assistance from International Organizations, July 1945-September 1977. Washington, D.C.: The Agency for International Development, n.d.
- Plan and Budget Organization. The Investigation of Educational Aspects of Women's Employment. Tehran: Plan and Budget Organization, 1975.
- Plan and Budget Organization and the Statistical Center of Iran. Selected Statistics. Tehran: Plan and Budget Organization and the Statistical Center of Iran, 1972-1973.
- Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Yearbook of World Armaments and Disarmament, 1976-77, U.S. Military Sales to Iran. New York: Humanities Press, 1977.
- The Civil Codes of Iran, Parts I and II, Supplement No. 148. Tehran: Echo Publications, 1968.
- The International Institute for Strategic Studies. Strategic Survey 1977. London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1978.
- The Iranian Constitution: With Amendments, 1906-1909, Supplement Number 189. Tehran: Echo Publications, 1972.
- Women's Organization of Iran. Declaration Presented by HH Princess Ashraf Pahlavi to the Secretary General of the UN, December 10, 1974. Tehran: Women's Organization of Iran, 1974.
- World Bank. World Bank Annual Reports. Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1973.

### Articles

- Abdullaev, Z. Z. "Promyshlennost i Zorozdenie rabocheho klassa Irana v kontse XIX-nachale XX vv" [Bourgeoisie and Working Class, 1900s]. In The Economic History of Iran. Edited by Charles Issawi. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971.
- Abrahamian, Ervand. "The Crowd in Iranian Politics: 1905-1953." Past and Present 41 (December 1968).
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Kasravi: The Integrative Nationalist of Iran." Middle Eastern Studies 9 (October 1973).

- \_\_\_\_\_. "Oriental Despotism: The Case of Qajar Iran." International Journal of Middle East Studies 5 (January 1974).
- \_\_\_\_\_. "European Feudalism and Middle Eastern Despotism." Science and Society 39 (Summer 1975).
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Structural Causes of the Iran Revolution." MERIP Reports 87 (May 1980).
- Alavi, Bozorg. "The Lead Soldier." In New Writing from the Middle East. Edited by Leo Hamalian and John D. Yohannan. New York: New American Library, 1978.
- Althusser, Louis. "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatus." In Lenin and Philosophy. London: New Left Books, 1971.
- Andreas, Carol. "The Chilean Woman: Reform, Reaction and Resistance." Latin American Perspectives IV:4 (Fall 1977): 121-125.
- Arizpe, Lourdes. "Women in the Informal Labor Sector: The Case of Mexico City." Signs III:1 (Autumn 1977): 25-37.
- Ashraf, Ahmad. "Historical Obstacles to the Development of the Bourgeoisie in Iran." In Studies in the Economic History of the Middle East. Edited by M. Cook. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973.
- Az. "The Women's Struggle in Iran." Monthly Review XXXII:10 (March 1981): 22-30.
- Bagely, F. R. C. "The Iranian Family Protection Law of 1967. A Milestone in the Advance of Women's Rights." In Iran and Islam. Edited by C. E. Bosworth. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1971.
- Banisadr, Abol-Hassan, and Vielle, Paul. "Iran and the Multinationals." In Iran Erupts. Edited by Ali Reza Nobari. Stanford: Iran-American Documentation Group, Stanford University, 1978.
- Bayat-Philipp, Mangol. "Women and Revolution in Iran, 1905-11." In Women in the Muslim World. Edited by Lois Beck and Nikki Keddie. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978.
- Beck, Lois Grant. "Theoretical Perspectives on the Position of Women in Iran." Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Middle East Studies Association, Boston, Massachusetts, November 1974.

- Beneria, Lourdes. "Reproduction, Production and Sexual Division of Labor." Cambridge Journal of Economics 3 (1979).
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Women's Participation in Paid Production Under Capitalism: The Spanish Experience." The Review of Radical Political Economics VIII:1 (Spring 1976): 18-33.
- Beneria, Lourdes, and Sen, Gita. "Accumulation, Reproduction and Women's Role in Economic Development: Boserup Revisited." Paper presented at Burg Waten-Stein Symposium, Austria, 2-10 August 1980.
- Bentson, Margaret. "The Political Economy of Women's Liberation." Monthly Review XXI:4 (1969).
- Bielli, C. "Some Aspects of the Condition of Women in Italy." Translated by B. Springer. In Women in the World: A Comparative Study. Edited by Lynn Iglitzin and Ruth Ross. Santa Barbara: CLIO Books, 1976.
- Bill, J. "Iran and the Crisis of 78." Foreign Affairs 57:2 (Winter 1978-79).
- Callaway, Barbara. "Women in Ghana." In Women in the World: A Comparative Study. Edited by Lynn Iglitzin and Ruth Ross. Santa Barbara: CLIO Books, 1976.
- Chinchilla, Norma. "Industrialization, Monopoly Capitalism and Women's Work." Signs III:1 (Autumn 1977): 38-56.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Mobilizing Women: Revolution in the Revolution." Latin American Perspectives IV:4 (Fall 1977): 83-102.
- Clignet, Remi. "Social Change and Sexual Differentiation in the Cameroun and the Ivory Coast." Signs III:1 (Autumn 1977): 244-260.
- Cooley, John K. "U.S. Faces Sticky Question of Backing the Shah of Iran." Christian Science Monitor, November 1978, p. 10.
- Crittenden, Ann. The New York Times, 10 January 1979.
- Crummett, Maria de los Angeles. "El Poder Feminio: The Mobilization of Women Against Socialism in Chile." Latin American Perspectives IV:4 (Fall 1977): 103-113.
- Daftari, Farhad. "The Balance of Payments Deficit and the Problem of Inflation in Iran, 1955-1962." Iranian Studies I:1 (Winter 1973): 2-25.

- Del Vecchio, Mary Jo. "A Comparative Perspective on Women in Provincial Iran and Turkey." In Women in the Muslim World. Edited by Lois Beck and Nikki Keddie. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978.
- Edholm, Felicity, Harris, Olivia, and Young, Kate. "Conceptualizing Women." Critique of Anthropology III:9 and 10 (1977): 101-130.
- Elson, D., and Pearson, R. "The Latest Phase of the Internationalization of Capital and Its Implications for Women in the Third World." In The Subordination of Women and the Development Process. Sussex: Institute of Development Studies, forthcoming.
- Falk, Richard. "Iran and American Geopolitics in the Gulf." Race and Class XXI:1 (Summer 1979): 41-56.
- Fallaci, Oriana. "A Shah's Eye View of the World." New York Post, 19 December 1973, pp. 22-24.
- Farmayan, Hafez. "Politics During Sixties: A Historical Analysis." In Iran Faces Seventies. Edited by Ehsan Yar-Shater. New York: Praeger, 1971.
- Faroughy, Ahmad. "Repression in Iran: An Historical Survey of Censorship and Cultural Repression from the 7th Century to the Present Day." In Iran Erupts. Edited by Ali Reza Nobari. Stanford: Iran-America Documentation Group, Stanford University, 1978.
- Farzan, Massud. "The Plane Reservation." In New Writing From the Middle East. Edited by Leo Hamalian and John D. Yohannan. New York: New American Library, 1978.
- Fee, Terry. "Domestic Labor: An Analysis of Housework and Its Relation to the Production Process." The Review of Radical Political Economics IX:3 (Fall 1977): 1-8.
- Gardiner, Jean. "Women's Domestic Labor." New Left Review 89 (January-February 1975).
- Gran, Judith. "The Impact of the World Market on Women in Egypt: Two Segments of the Middle Class." Paper presented at the American Political Science Association, Chicago, Illinois, 1976.
- Hartmann, Heidi. "Capitalism, Patriarchy and Job Segregation in Sex." In Capitalist Patriarchy: The Case for Socialist Feminism. Edited by Zillah R. Eisenstein. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1979.

- "HIM Mohammed Reza Shah's Address to the Congress: Iranian Women Face Vital Roles." Kayhan International, 1 January 1975.
- Himmelwit, S., and Mohun, S. "Domestic Labor and Capital." Cambridge Journal of Economics 1 (1977).
- Holly, A., and Bransfield, C. T. "The Marriage Law: Basis of Change for China's Women." In Women in the World: A Comparative Study. Edited by Lynn Iglitzin and Ruth Ross. Santa Barbara: CLIO Books, 1976.
- Hurewitz, J. C. "The Persian Gulf: After Iran's Revolution." Headline Series 244 (April 1979).
- Issawi, Charles. "The Economy: An Assessment of Performance." In Iran Faces Seventies. Edited by E. Yar-Shater. New York: Praeger, 1971.
- Jancar, Barbara. "Women under Communism." In Women in Politics. Edited by Jane Jaquette. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1974.
- Jaquette, Jane. "Female Political Participation in Latin America." In Women in the World: A Comparative Study. Edited by Lynn Iglitzin and Ruth Ross. Santa Barbara: CLIO Books, 1976.
- Julliard, J. R. "Women in France." In Women in the World: A Comparative Study. Edited by Lynn Iglitzin and Ruth Ross. Santa Barbara: CLIO Books, 1976.
- Kandiyoti, Deniz. "Sex Roles and Social Change: A Comparative Appraisal of Turkey's Women." Signs III:1 (Autumn 1977): 57-73.
- Kayhan Research Associates. "The Employment of Women in the Higher Echelons of the Public and Private Sectors." Tehran: Women's Organization of Iran, 1975.
- Keddie, Nikki. "Stratification, Social Control and Capitalism in Iranian Villages: Before and After Reform: In Rural Politics and Social Change in the Middle East. Edited by Richard Antoun and I. Harik. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1972.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "The Economic History of Iran, 1800-1914, and its Political Impact: An Overview: Iranian Studies V:2-3 (Spring-Summer 1972).
- Kesselman, Mark. "Order or Movement? The Literature of Political Development as Ideology." World Politics XXVI:1 (October 1973): 139-154.



- Khamisi, Farhad. "Land Reform in Iran." Monthly Review XXI:2 (June 1969): 20-28.
- Lahav, Pnia. "Raising the Status of Women Through Law: The Case of Israel." Signs III:1 (Autumn 1977): 193-209.
- Lambton, Ann. "Some Reflections on the Question of Rural Development: Land Reform in Iran." Economic Research III:9 and 10 (August 1965).
- Langer, Frederic, and Editors. "Iran: Oil Money and the Ambitions of a Nation." International Herald Tribune, March 1975.
- Lansing, M. "Political Change for the American Women." In Women in the World: A Comparative Study. Edited by Lynn Iglitzin and Ruth Ross. Santa Barbara: CLIO Books, 1976.
- Lapidus, Gail. "Changing Women's Roles in the USSR." In Women in the World: A Comparative Study. Edited by Lynn Iglitzin and Ruth Ross. Santa Barbara: CLIO Books, 1976.
- Lijphart, Arend. "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method." American Political Science Review LXV:5 (September 1971).
- Lin, S. T. "Chinese Women on the Road to Complete Emancipation." In Women in the World: A Comparative Study. Edited by Lynn Iglitzin and Ruth Ross. Santa Barbara: CLIO Books, 1976.
- Lloyd, Cynthia B. "The Division of Labor Between the Sexes: A Review." In Sex, Discrimination, and the Division of Labor. Edited by C. B. Lloyd. New York: Columbia University Press, 1975.
- Mackintosh, M. "Domestic Labor and the Household." In Fit Work for Women. Edited by S. Burman. London: Croom Helm, 1979.
- Malikzada, M. "Tarikh-i inqilab-i Mashrutiyyat" [The History of the Constitutional Revolution] as cited in Mangol Bayat-Philipp, "Women and Revolution in Iran, 1905-11." In Women in the Muslim World. Edited by Lois Beck and Nikki Keddie. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978.
- Marini, Ana Maria. "Women in Contemporary Argentina." Latin American Perspectives IV:4 (Fall 1977): 114-120.

- McDaniel, Robert A. "Economic Change and Resiliency in Nineteenth Century Persia." Iranian Studies IV:1 (Winter 1971).
- Merkel, P. "The Female Labor Force in Western Europe." In Women in the World: A Comparative Study. Edited by Lynn Iglitzin and Ruth Ross. Santa Barbara: CLIO Books, 1976.
- Milkman, Ruth. "Women's Work and the Economic Crisis: Some Lessons from the Great Depression." The Review of Radical Political Economics VIII:1 (Spring 1976): 73-97.
- Moser-Khalili, Moira. "Urban Design and Women's Lives." Tehran: Women's Organization of Iran, 1975.
- O'Brien, Donald Cruise. "Modernization, Order, and the Erosion of a Democratic Ideal: American Political Science 1960-70." Journal of Development Studies VIII:4 (July 1972).
- Pakizegi, Behnaz. "Legal and Social Positions of Iranian Women." In Women in the Muslim World. Edited by Lois Beck and Nikki Keddie. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978.
- Pala, Achola. "Definitions of Women and Development: An African Perspective." Signs III:1 (Autumn 1977): 9-13.
- Papanek, Hanna. "Purdeh in Pakistan: Seclusion and Modern Occupations for Women." Journal of Marriage and the Family XXXIII (1971).
- Parisi, Anthony. "Hormoz: America's Economic Interest." The New York Times, 27 January 1980.
- Petrus, James. "The Crisis of the Market, Socialist and Populist Regimes: Puerto Rico, Jamaica, and Cuba." Paper presented at the seminar on The Development of Pre-Industrial Areas, Columbia University, New York, 19 March 1981.
- Porter, M. C., and Venning, C. "Catholicism and Women's Role in Italy and Ireland." In Women in the World: A Comparative Study. Edited by Lynne Iglitzin and Ruth Ross. Santa Barbara: CLIO Press, 1976.
- Riddell, A. S. "Female Political Elites in Mexico: 1974." In Women in the World: A Comparative Study. Edited by Lynne Iglitzin and Ruth Ross. Santa Barbara: CLIO Press, 1976.

- Rosenfeld, Henry. "An Overview and Critique of the Literature on Rural Politics and Social Change." In Rural Politics and Social Change in the Middle East. Edited by R. Antoun and I. Harik. Bloomington and London: Indiana University Press, 1972.
- Ross, R. "Tradition and the Role of Women in Great Britain." In Women in the World: A Comparative Study. Edited by Lynne Iglitzin and Ruth Ross. Santa Barbara: CLIO Press, 1976.
- Rouleau, Eric. "The Shah's Dreams of Glory." In Iran Erupts. Edited by Ali Reza Nobari. Stanford: Iran-American Documentation Group, Stanford University, 1978.
- Rustow, Dankwart A. "Modernization and Comparative Politics." Comparative Politics I:1 (October 1978): 37-51.
- Saedi, Gholamhosein. "The Game is Over." In New Writing from the Middle East. Edited by Leo Hamalian and John D. Yohannan. New York: New American Library, 1978.
- Safa, Helen Icken. "The Changing Class Composition of Female Labor Force in Latin America." Latin American Perspectives IV:4 (Fall 1977): 126-136.
- Samed, Amal. "The Proletarianization of Palestinian Women in Israel." MERIP Reports 50 (August 1976).
- Schaar, Stuart. "Orientalism at the Service of Imperialism." Race and Class XXI:1 (Summer 1979): 67-80.
- Schmidt, S. "Women's Changing Roles in Colombia." In Women in the World: A Comparative Study. Edited by Lynne Iglitzin and Ruth Ross. Santa Barbara: CLIO Press, 1976.
- Secombe, Wally. "The Housewife and Her Labor Under Capitalism." New Left Review (January-February 1974).
- Sedghi, Hamideh. "Women in Iran." In Women in the World: A Comparative Study. Edited by Lynne Iglitzin and Ruth Ross. Santa Barbara: CLIO Press, 1976.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Back the the Veil and Home, or the Struggle Against Subordination? Women in the Iranian Revolution." Paper delivered at Columbia University Conference on the Revolution in Iran, New York, 8 March 1979.

- \_\_\_\_\_. "An Assessment of Works in Farsi and English on Iran and Iranian Women: 1900-1977." The Review of Radical Political Economics XII:2 (Summer 1980): 37-41.
- Sedghi, Hamideh, and Ashraf, Ahmad. "Dynamics of Women's Condition in Iran." In Iran: Past, Present and Future. Edited by J. Jacqz. New York: Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies, 1976.
- Sen, Gita. "The Sexual Division of Labor and the Working-Class Family: Towards a Conceptual Synthesis of Class Relations and the Subordination of Women." The Review of Radical Political Economics XII:2 (Summer 1980): 76-86.
- Serin. "La Femme Persane." Civilisations I:47 (1951).
- Shamlu, Ahmad. "Elegy for Forough." In New Writing from the Middle East. Edited by Leo Hamalian and John D. Yohannan. New York: New American Library, 1978.
- Shivers, Lynne. "Inside the Iranian Revolution." In Tell the American People: Perspectives on the Iranian Revolution. Edited by David Albert. Philadelphia: Movement for a New Society, 1980.
- Sohrab, Sepehri. "From the Sound of Water's Footsteps." In New Writing From the Middle East. Edited by Leo Hamalian and John D. Yohannan. New York: New American Library, 1978.
- Sololowski, Magdalena. "Changing Roles and Status of Women in Poland." In Women and Society: International and Comparative Perspectives. Edited by Janet Z. Giele and Audrey C. Smock. New York: Wiley-Interscience, n.d.
- Stains, G., Tavis, C., and Jayarante, T. "The Queen Bee Syndrome." Psychology Today, January 1974.
- Sykes, Ella. "Persia." In Women of All Nations, vol. 4. Edited by T. A. Joyce. New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1915.
- Tabari, Ehsan. "Reaction or Revolutionary Change in Iran." In Political and Social Thought in the Contemporary Middle East. Edited by Kemal Karpat. New York: Praeger, 1968.
- Touba, Jacqueline Rudolph. "The Relationship between Urbanization and the Changing Status of Women in Iran, 1956-1966." Iranian Studies V:1 (Winter 1973): 25-36.

- Tucker, Judith. "Egyptian Women in the Work Force." MERIP Reports 50 (August 1976).
- Van Allen, Judith. "African Women, 'Modernization,' and National Liberation." In Women in the World: A Comparative Study. Edited by Lynne Iglitzin and Ruth Ross. Santa Barbara: CLIO Press, 1976.
- Wasquez de Miranda, Glauro. "Women's Labor Force Participation in a Developing Society: The Case of Brazil." Signs III:1 (Autumn 1977): 261-274.
- Warren, Bill. "The Myth of Underdevelopment." New Left Review 81 (September-October 1973): 3-45.
- Weinbaum, Bayta. "Women in the Transition to Socialism: Perspectives on the Chinese Case." The Review of Radical Political Economics VIII:1 (Spring 1976): 34-58.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Redefining the Question of Revolution." The Review of Radical Political Economics IX:3 (Fall 1977): 54-78.
- Youssef, Nadia. "Social Structure and the Female Labor Force: The Case of Women Workers in Muslim Middle Eastern Countries." Demography 8:4 (1971).

### Books

- Abbott, Edith. Women in Industry: A Study in American History. New York: Arno, 1969.
- Administrative Affairs. The Report of Personnel's Statistics of the National Iranian Radio and Television. Tehran: National Iranian Radio and Television, 1971.
- Akhavi, Shahrough. Religion and Politics in Contemporary Iran: Clergy-State Relations in the Pahlavi Period. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1980.
- Alexander, Yonah, and Nanes, Allan, eds. The United States and Iran: A Documentary History. Maryland: University Publications of America, 1980.
- Algar, Hamid. Religion and State in Iran: The Role of Ulama in the Qajar Period. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969.

- Amin, Samir. Accumulation on the World Scale. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1974.
- Amuzegar, Jahangir. Technical Assistance in Theory and Practice: The Case of Iran. New York: Praeger, 1966.
- Amuzegar, J., and Fekrat, M. Iran: Economic Development under Dualistic Conditions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971.
- Arfa, Hassan. Under Five Shahs. London: John Murray, n.d.
- Armajani, Yahya. Iran. Englewood-Cliffs and New York: Prentice-Hall, 1972.
- Avery, Peter. Modern Iran. London: Ernest Benn, 1965.
- Baldwin, George. Planning and Development in Iran. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1967.
- Banani, Amin. The Modernization of Iran, 1921-1941. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961.
- Baraheni, Reza. The Crowned Cannibals: Writings on Repression in Iran. New York: Vintage Books, 1977.
- Baran, Paul. The Political Economy of Growth. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1957.
- Beck, Lois, and Keddle, Nikki, eds. Women in the Muslim World. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978.
- Bhahrier, Julian. Economic Development in Iran 1900-1970. London: Oxford University Press, 1971.
- Bill, James. The Politics of Iran: Groups, Classes and Modernization. Columbus: Charles E. Merrill Company, 1972.
- Bill, James, and Leiden, Carl. The Middle East: Politics and Power. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1974.
- Binder, Leonard. Iran: Political Development in a Changing Society. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1962.
- Boserup, Ester. Women's Role in Economic Development. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1970.
- Browne, E. G. A Year amongst Persians. London: Adam and Charles Black, 1893; reprint ed., London: 1950.

- \_\_\_\_\_. The Persian Revolution of 1905-1909. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1910.
- \_\_\_\_\_. A Literary History of Persia, vol. IV. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1924; reprint ed., 1964.
- Clark, Alice. The Working Life of Women in the Seventeenth Century. New York: A. M. Kelley, 1968.
- Coon, Carleton S. Caravan: The Story of the Middle East. New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1961.
- Cottam, Richard. Nationalism in Iran. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1964 and 1969.
- Curzon, George N. Persia and the Persian Question. London: Frank Cass and Company, 1966.
- Dalla Costa, Maria, and James, Selma. The Power of Women and the Subversion of the Community. England: Falling Wall Press, 1972 and 1975.
- Dolbeare, K., and Edelman, M. American Politics: Politics, Power and Challenge. Boston: D. C. Heath and Company, 1981.
- Edwards, Arthur Cecil. The Persian Carpet. London: Duckwork, 1953.
- Edwards, Richard C., Reich, Michael, and Gorder, David M., eds. Labor Market Segmentation. Boston: D. C. Heath and Company, 1975.
- Elwell-Sutton, L. P. Persian Oil: A Study in Power Politics. London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1955.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Elementary Persian Grammar. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972.
- Engels, Frederick. The Origins of the Family, Private Property, and the State. New York: Pathfinder Press, reprint ed., 1972.
- Entner, Marvin. Russo-Persian Commercial Relations, 1822-1914. Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1965.
- Fatemi, N. S. Diplomatic History of Persia, 1917-1923. New York: Russell Moore, 1952.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Oil Diplomacy. New York: Whittier Books, 1957.

- Ferne, E. Guests of the Sheik. New York: Anchor Books, 1969.
- Figgs, Eva. Patriarchal Attitudes. Greenwich: Fawcett Premier Books, 1970.
- Filmer, H. The Pageant of Persia. Indianapolis and New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1936.
- Finkle, Jason L., and Gable, Richard W., eds. Political Development and Social Change. New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1966 and 1971.
- Firestone, Shulamith. The Dialectic of Sex. New York: Bantam Books, 1972.
- Frank, Andre Gundar. Latin America: Underdevelopment or Revolution. New York and London: Monthly Review Press, 1969.
- Frye, Richard. Persia. New York: Schocken Books, 1969.
- Gibbs, H. R. Mohammedanism. London: Oxford University Press, 1969.
- Graham, Robert. Iran: The Illusion of Power. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979.
- Halliday, Fred. Iran: Dictatorship and Development. New York: Penguin Books, 1979.
- Hedayat, Sadeq. The Blind Owl. Translated by D. P. Cos-tello. New York: Evergreen, 1959.
- Hobson, J. A. Imperialism. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1902, reprint ed., 1965.
- Huntington, Samuel P. Political Order in Changing Societies. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1968.
- Issawi, Charles. The Economic History of Iran, 1800-1914. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971.
- Jazani, Bizhan. An Introduction to the Contemporary History of Iran. Translated by the Iran Committee. London: The Iran Committee, n.d.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Iran: The Socio-Economic Analysis of a Dependent Capitalist State. Translated by the Iran Committee. London: The Iran Committee, 1973.



- \_\_\_\_\_. Capitalism and Revolution in Iran: Selected Writings of Bizhan Jazani. Translated by the Iran Committee. London: Zed Press, 1980.
- Kaldor, Nicholas. Essays on Economic Stability and Growth. London: Gerald Duckworth and Company, Ltd., 1964.
- Katouzian, Homa. The Political Economy of Modern Iran. London: Macmillan, 1981.
- Kazemzadeh, Firuz. Russia and Britain in Persia, 1864-1914: A Study in Imperialism. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1968.
- Keddie, Nikki. An Islamic Response to Imperialism: Political and Religious Writings of Sayyid Jamal al-Din al-Afghani. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1968.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Sayyid Jamal al-Din al-Afghani: A Political Biography. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1972.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Roots of Revolution. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1981.
- \_\_\_\_\_, ed. Scholars, Saints and Sufis: Muslim Religious Institutions Since 1500. Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 1972.
- Lambton, Ann. Landlord and Peasant in Persia. London: Oxford University Press, 1953.
- \_\_\_\_\_. The Persian Land Reform: 1962-1966. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969.
- Lenczowski, George. Russia and the West in Iran: 1918-1948. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1949.
- Lenin, V. I. Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism. New York: International Publishers, 1939 and 1969; originally published 1917.
- Lerner, Daniel. The Passing of Traditional Society. New York: The Free Press, 1958.
- Levy, Rueben. The Social Structure of Islam. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1957.
- Looney, Robert. The Economic Development of Iran: A Recent Survey with Projections 1981. New York: Praeger, 1973.

- \_\_\_\_\_. Income Distribution Policies and Economic Growth in Semi-industrialized Countries: A Comparative Study of Iran, Mexico, Brazil and South Korea. New York: Praeger, 1975.
- \_\_\_\_\_. A Developmental Strategy for Iran through the 1980s. New York: Praeger, 1977.
- MacPherson, C. B. The Real World of Democracy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972.
- Magdoff, Harry. The Age of Imperialism. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1966, 1968, and 1969.
- Maher, Vanessa. Women and Property in Morocco: Their Changing Relation to the Process of Social Stratification in the Middle East. London: Cambridge University Press, 1975.
- Malthus, Thomas Robert. An Essay on Population. New York: Dutton, 1914 and 1933.
- Mandel, William. Soviet Women. New York: Anchor Books, 1975.
- Markovitz, Irving Leonard. Power and Class in Africa: An Introduction to Change and Conflict in African Politics. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1977.
- Marx, Karl. Capital: A Critical Analysis of Capitalist Production, vol. I. New York: International Publishers, 1975.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Pre-Capitalist Economic Formations. New York: International Publishers, 1969.
- Marx, Karl, and Engels, Frederick. Selected Works. New York: International Publishers, 1968.
- Meade, J. E. A Neo-Classical Theory of Economic Growth. London: Unwin U. Books, 1968.
- Mernissi, Fatima. Beyond the Veil: Male-Female Dynamics in a Modern Muslim Society. New York, London, Sydney, and Toronto: Schenkman Publishing Company, 1975.
- Miller, Norman, and Aya, Roderick, eds. National Liberation: Revolution in the Third World. New York: The Free Press, 1971.
- Millet, Kate. Sexual Politics. New York: Equinox Books/Avon, 1969.

- Mitchell, Juliet. Woman's Estate. New York: Penguin Books, 1971.
- Moore, Barrington, Jr. Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. Boston: Beacon Press, 1970.
- New Women in China. Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1972.
- Nirumand, Bahman. Iran: The New Imperialism in Action. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969.
- Oppenheimer, Valerie. The Female Labor Force in the United States. Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1970.
- Owen, Roger, and Sutcliffe, Bob, eds. Studies in the Theory of Imperialism. London: Longman, 1972.
- Pahlavi, Ashraf. Faces in a Mirror. Memoirs from Exile. New York: Prentice Hall, 1980.
- Pahlavi, Mohammed Reza Shah Shahanshah of Iran. Mission for my Country. New York, Toronto, and London: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1961.
- Pahlavi, H.H. Soraya. The Autobiography of H.H. Princess Soraya. Translated by C. Fitzgibbon. London: Arthen Baker, 1963.
- Patai, Rafael. Society, Culture and Change in the Middle East. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971.
- Poulantzas, Nicos. Classes in Contemporary Capitalism. London: Verso, 1978.
- Ramazani, R. K. The Foreign Policy of Iran, 1500-1941: A Developing Nation in World Affairs. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1966.
- Ravasani, Schapour. Iran. Stuttgart: Alektor-Verlang, 1978.
- Reiter, Rayna R., ed. Toward an Anthropology of Women. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1975.
- Ricardo, David. The Principles of Political Economy and Taxation. New York: Dutton, 1977.
- Rice, Collier C. Persian Women and their Ways. London: Seely, Service and Company, Limited, 1923.
- Rivlin, Benjamin, and Szyliowicz, Joseph, eds. The Contemporary Middle East. New York: Random House, 1965.

- Roosevelt, Kermit. Countercoup: The Struggle for the Control of Iran. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979, 1980.
- Rosaldo, M. Z., and Lamphere, L., eds. Women, Culture and Society. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1974.
- Rostow, Walt W. The Stages of Economic Development: A Non-Communist Manifesto. Cambridge: The University Press, 1960.
- Rowbotham, Sheila. Woman's Consciousness, Man's World. New York: Penguin Books, 1973.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Women, Resistance and Revolution. New York: Vintage Books, 1974.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Hidden from History. New York: Vintage Books, 1976.
- Rustow, Dankwart A. A World of Nations: Problems of Political Modernization. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1967.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Middle Eastern Political Systems. New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1971.
- Rustow, Dankwart, and Mugno, John. OPEC Success and Prospects. New York: New York University Press, 1976.
- Said, Edward. Covering Islam. New York: Pantheon, 1981.
- Saikal, Amin. The Rise and Fall of the Shah. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980.
- Sampson, Anthony. The Arms Bazaar, the Companies, the Dealers, the Bribes: From Victors to Lockheed. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1977.
- Samuelson, Paul. Economics. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1980.
- Sanghvi, R., German, C., and Missen, D., eds. The Revolution of the Shah and the People. London: Transorient, 1967.
- Shacht, Joseph. An Introduction to Islamic Law. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967.
- Shuster, Morgan. The Strangling of Persia: Story of European Diplomacy and Oriental Intrigue that Resulted in the Denationalization of Twelve Million Mohammedans: A Personal Narrative. New York: The Century Company, 1912.

- Sidel, Ruth. Families of Fengsheng: Urban Life in China. London: Penguin Books, 1974.
- Smith, Adam. The Wealth of Nations. New York: Penguin Books, 1977.
- Solow, Robert M. Growth Theory. New York: Oxford University Press, 1970.
- Stork, Joe. Middle East Oil and the Energy Crisis. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1975.
- Sweezy, Paul. The Theory of Capitalist Development. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1970.
- The Cambridge History of Iran. Cambridge: The University Press, 1968 and 1975.
- Tilly, Louise, and Scott, Joan. Women, Work and Family. New York: Rinehart and Winston, 1978.
- Upton, Joseph. The History of Modern Iran: An Interpretation. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961.
- Warriner, Doreen. Land Reform in Principle and Practice. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969.
- Wilber, Charles K., ed. The Political Economy of Development and Underdevelopment. New York: Random House, 1973.
- Wilber, Donald. Iran: Past and Present. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1948, eighth edition, 1976.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Riza Shah Pahlavi: The Resurrection and Reconstruction of Iran, 1878-1944. New York: Exposition Press, 1975.
- Wise, David, and Ross, Thomas B. The Invisible Government. New York: Random House, 1964.
- Woodsmall, Ruth Francis. Moslem Women Enter a New World. New York: Round Table Press Inc., 1938.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Women and the New East. Washington, D.C., The Middle East Institute, 1960.
- Wulff, H. E. The Traditional Crafts of Persia. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1966.
- Yeselson, Abraham. United States-Persian Diplomatic Relations. New Brunswick: Cambridge University Press, 1956.

- Yohannan, Jacob Baba. Women in the Orient. St. Louis:  
A. R. Flaming, 1901.
- Youssef, Nadia. Women and Work in the Developing Societies.  
Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1976.
- Zabih, Sepehr. The Communist Movement in Iran. Berkeley  
and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1966.
- Zaretsky, Eli. Capitalism, the Family and Personal Life.  
New York: Harper Colophon Books, 1976.
- Ziadeh, F. J., and Winder, R. B. An Introduction to Modern  
Arabic. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966.
- Zonis, Marvin. The Political Elite of Iran. Princeton:  
Princeton University Press, 1971.