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**TOWARD A THEORY OF GUERRILLA WARFARE: A CASE STUDY OF THE
UKRAINIAN NATIONALIST UNDERGROUND IN THE SOVIET UNION AND
COMMUNIST POLAND**

City University of New York

Ph.D. 1984

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TOWARD A THEORY OF GUERRILLA WARFARE:
A CASE STUDY OF THE UKRAINIAN NATIONALIST UNDERGROUND
IN THE SOVIET UNION AND COMMUNIST POLAND

by

ALEXANDER BUCHSBAJEV

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate
Faculty in Political Science in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
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1984

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Abstract

TOWARD A THEORY OF GUERRILLA WARFARE:
A CASE STUDY OF THE UKRAINIAN NATIONALIST UNDERGROUND
IN THE SOVIET UNION AND COMMUNIST POLAND

by

Alexander Buchsbajew

Adviser: Professor I.L. Markowitz

The purpose of this dissertation is to determine under which circumstances the guerrilla movements fail or emerge victorious. The armed struggle of the Ukrainian Nationalists against the Soviet and Polish Communist regimes, between 1944 and 1948, was chosen as a case-study. Three levels of analysis were conducted. The first one deals with the insurgent structure itself: its leadership, equipment, training, morale and so forth. The second set of factors concerns the incumbent regime, particularly the cohesion and determination of its rulers as well as the size and quality of its coercive apparatus. Finally, the international environment in which both protagonists operate and its influence on the outcome is examined. It appears that the most important factor in the struggle is the state itself. We conclude that contrary to widely held belief, even the popularly backed, well-armed or highly motivated insurgents cannot succeed against a modern totalitarian state. Their

greatest chance of success is against weak liberal democracies or anachronistic authoritarian regimes. They cannot defeat a modern Soviet-style government; a government whose rulers can insulate them effectively from international or domestic public opinion, who firmly control mass media and means of coercion and who are willing and able to employ terror on a wide scale, without being hindered by legal, diplomatic or moral considerations. Their only chance to win is when such a state disintegrates due to a catastrophic international or domestic crisis. However, this seems unlikely in peacetime.

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CHAPTER I Introduction and Framework
 of Analysis

Introduction:

The word insurgency has many synonyms, including terms like revolutionary war, guerrilla war, partisan war, unconventional war, people's war and so forth.¹ The number of definitions is staggering and confusing. In this essay all mean a violent, protracted conflict in which small, self-contained, lightly-armed units of irregular fighters challenge the existing political authority. This form of warfare enables a numerically weaker side to offset the enemy's qualitative superiority.² According to Col. T.E. Lawrence, the guerrilla's assets are his "speed and time, not hitting power...in Arabia range was more than force, space greater than the power of armies." In addition to speed and stratagem, the revolutionary employs, in Douglas Pike's words, "the judo principle and turns the weight of the enemy's philosophic system against itself."³

Being so widespread a form of conflict in the Twentieth Century, guerrilla warfare has attracted the interest of numerous scholars and thinkers.⁴ No other social phenomenon, however, has been surrounded

by so many myths and misconceptions as insurgency. To dispel some of those, this dissertation presents a detailed analysis of one particular case - the partisan war waged by the Organization of the Ukrainian Nationalists and its armed component - the Ukrainian Insurgent Army against the Soviet Union and Communist Poland, between 1944 and 1948. It was fought in the area known as Western Ukraine or Galicia, which, before 1939, formed a part of Poland and before 1918, of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire. In September 1939 its 110,000 square kilometers and seven million inhabitants were annexed by the Soviet Russia and forcefully "reunited" with the Soviet or Eastern Ukraine and her 40 million people. A small part of Galicia remained within post-war Polish borders.

Two major questions posed by this study are:

- 1) Why do insurgent movements succeed or fail?
- 2) How can this case-study of the Ukraine help us to understand the origins, conduct and outcome of other insurgencies? More specifically, we ask under what circumstances can insurgency erupt in a Communist totalitarian state. We will try to determine what are the special circumstances influencing its success or failure; what are the similarities and differences between this and other insurgencies.

We ask why insurgencies in Communist systems are so infrequent; how does the Communist "setting" affect guerrilla and counter guerrilla strategy and tactics; what role do international crisis or environment play in such an insurgency.

The success or failure of an insurgency is the result of the interplay of many factors. What we need, therefore, is a framework for the analysis and organization of data which will enable us to distinguish the more significant from the less important variables and to present the reasons why guerrillas fail or succeed in a systematic fashion. Various authors emphasize different variables, usually a single one, as the determinants of victory or defeat. They include:- the availability or absence of foreign aid, the presence or lack of indigenous popular support, the competence and confidence of the ruling elite and the qualitative or quantitative strength of the opposing forces. The objective of this study is not to generate new propositions or hypotheses. It is rather to test the existing ones against an original case study. The operations of the Ukrainian nationalists against the Soviet and Polish communist regimes constitute, in our opinion, such a case. This is one of the very few examples of a popular, nationalist, anti-Communist, protracted anti-colonial

and rural-based insurgency against a modern industrial communist state.⁵

The novelty of this study is thus twofold:-
it demonstrates that not all mass anti-imperialist rebellions are "radical" or "progressive" in nature (in Marxist or Leftist sense) and that not all popular insurgencies succeed, particularly when confronted by a regime which employs force efficiently, ruthlessly and vigorously.

This work is the result of dissatisfaction felt by this writer about a view held by many experts, regardless of their ideological orientation. In short, it is widely believed that the so called people's war is invincible. It is maintained that the revolutionary insurgents, enjoying wide popular sympathy are destined to win, irrespective of the odds. The best the incumbent could do to survive is to win the "hearts and minds" of the masses away from the insurgents and so deprive them of popular support. This is to be accomplished by government sponsored reforms like democratization of political process, land-reform, civic works, improvement of public health, education and social services and so forth. This is the opinion of many Western counter-insurgency experts. On the other hand, many

Marxist authorities on revolution maintain that bourgeois-state inspired reforms are at best half-measures which will not prevent, perhaps only delay, the people's victory, especially that their cause is always right.

The Ukrainian insurgency disproves this contention however. We submit instead the following thesis:- An anti-imperialist insurgency is not invincible, even if well led, well organized and backed by the masses. It can be defeated decisively if two major conditions are met:- a) the incumbent is a modern, thoroughly organized system, led by a competent and determined political elite in full control of mass media and apparatus of coercion, and b) if the international balance of power (and thus of possible support) decisively favors the incumbent, provided, however, that his political controls are not weakened either by exhausting war or by debilitating conflict within the system's center of political power. If these two conditions are met, all the contributory factors such as emotional nationalism, relative deprivation of the people, the quality of the insurgent leadership, popular support and other variables become secondary.

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Having the best cause in the world will be of no avail to the insurgent if the incumbent is ready, willing and able to wield the instruments of power fully, efficiently and ruthlessly. When employed by competent, confident and determined rulers, terror really becomes effective, especially if there are no diplomatic, legal or cultural obstacles preventing its use. To paraphrase Thomas Paine, modern, technologically advanced "tyranny, like hell, is not easily", if ever, conquered. This dissertation seeks to document this point.

The reason why the importance of effective and efficient state repression has been downplayed by the existing works in the field is because, according to Walter Laqueur, "the facts of guerrilla warfare have been covered by a vast overgrowth of mythology."⁶ Therefore, when conducting an analysis, the important deficiencies in the publications on the subject must be noted.

Literature:

The works in the field contain, in our opinion, several major weaknesses. First, regardless of their ideological preferences, most authorities emphasize so called revolutionary or progressive wars, which

have a definite Marxist ideological orientation. Insurgencies which are not progressive or revolutionary in nature, however ambiguous these terms may be, are ignored. In fact, a certain ideological bias appears in the majority of works on irregular warfare. The villain, usually a predatory capitalist western power like the United States, seeks to subjugate and exploit mercilessly the Wretched of the Earth, denying them freedom, dignity and livelihood. The fact that national-liberation struggle may be waged against the so called "progressive, peace-loving, classless" states, like the Soviet Union, is not usually mentioned. Apparently such states by their very nature cannot behave in a predatory fashion. Capitalist imperialism, on the other hand, inherently does.⁷ As Michael T. Klare puts it, "Expansionism is not a matter of choice for capitalist America:- it is the way of life of this society."⁸

It is not an accident therefore, that almost all studies in the West focus on the Third World area, disregarding, by and large, anti-Communist insurgencies in Eastern Europe. Books on Indochina, Algeria or Malaya abound. Within the immense bibliography on guerrilla warfare in English, however, one looks in vain for any reference to the

Ukrainian Insurgent Army. There is no mention of it in comprehensive monographs written by Roger Asprey, T. Bowyer Bell, Brian Crozier or Walter Laqueur.⁹ This is unfortunate, considering that some data exist. Taking into account the intensity of fighting, the number of participants or casualties, its activities equal or even exceed those of the insurgents in Malaya.¹⁰ Yet, the Ukrainian case received very little attention from the Western, particularly American, scholars, with the possible exception of John A. Armstrong and Yaroslav Bilinsky (himself of Ukrainian origin).¹¹ Armstrong emphasizes, however, the evolution of the Ukrainian nationalism prior to 1945, paying little attention to the Western Ukraine and the operations of the Ukrainian insurgents there. He concentrates instead on the activities of the Ukrainian nationalists in the German-held Eastern Ukraine during World War II. Similarly, Bilinsky focuses on the post-war Eastern Ukraine, devoting one chapter to the Nationalist guerrillas in Galicia. One could criticize both authors for not utilizing more fully the sources which were available in America in the early 1960s. The situation of the historiography in the Ukrainian language is not much better. While there are many books and articles on the subject, according to a noted Ukrainian emigre historian Prof. Lev Shankovsky,

most of them are not "even worth talking about."¹²

Similarly, an immense interest in counter-insurgency planning and technique in the 1960s has generated an avalanche of publications digesting the lessons of Malaya, Algeria or Indochina. No comparable study, to our knowledge, has been made in the West of the Soviet counter-insurgency experience.

Third, the bulk of publications emphasizes the etiology of the insurgency, disregarding, on the whole the determinants of its success or failure. Such factors as the international situation, the government's determination and political skill, the strength and efficiency of its coercive apparatus are, on the whole, overlooked by students of irregular warfare. Nevertheless, these variables decisively influence its outcome. According to Harry Eckstein, "...in regard to etiology, to 'causes', we are absolutely inundated with print...little is available on the determinants of success or failure in internal wars." Similarly, Walter Laqueur criticizes students of partisan war for "...invariably concentrating on insurgents rather than incumbents, on forces which propel societies toward violence, rather than those which inhibit it."¹³

As mentioned earlier, the reason why the aforementioned factors tend to be under-played may be the widely-held assumption of the "historical inevitability of people's victory", the expectation that revolutionary popular forces with a just cause on their side are invincible. This is uniformly believed by rightists and leftists. Thus, according to Mao, "...in the final analysis, their (reactionaries' - A.B.) persecution of the revolutionary people only serves to accelerate the people's revolutions on a broader and more intense scale."

The French Army's Colonel Nemo and Commandant Hogard agree, maintaining that "regular armies have almost never succeeded in gaining ascendancy over guerrilla operations of any importance." This opinion extends to academic scholars of conflict as well.

Prof. Ted Robert Gurr believes that "...the regime that responds to their (rebels - A.B.) demands only with suppression will intensify their hostility, and is likely thus to speed its own destruction."

Gerald Bender argues similarly that "over the past decades, from Algeria to Vietnam to the Middle East, it has been demonstrated that a well organized and sufficiently financed insurgency is nearly impossible to defeat."¹⁴

In reality, however, more often than not the

insurgents fail to win, irrespective of how good a cause they have, how well financed and organized they are and how popular they are. The defeat of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army is a case in point.

Finally, irregular warfare is treated as a generic type of conflict. In our opinion, however, there are at least six varieties, although the borderlines between them are not always clear-cut.

1) Insurgency may be an auxiliary military effort, assisting the operations of a regular army. The Soviet partisans in World War II could be mentioned as an example.

2) In an interstate war, insurgency may take the form of armed resistance by the population of a subjugated country to an occupying power. Spain's resistance to Napoleon's invasion could be considered an example of a defensive partisan war.

3) In international relations, guerrilla war could be regarded as an instrument of foreign policy, as a means of subversion. This resort to "surrogate" war became quite common in our century because of the precarious nuclear stalemate. A war by "proxy" is a low-risk and low-cost war, which can be instigated without fear of nuclear retaliation. It is easy to disentangle from; it is cheap to conduct and it

strains the enemy's resources considerably. As an example, the case of Che Guevara in Bolivia could be mentioned.

4) Guerrilla war could be a form of internal war, in which one political faction, by resorting to violence attempts to change the constitution, rulers or policies within a political system.

5) The insurgency could be either urban or rural. This dissertation deals exclusively with rural guerrilla war.

Finally, guerrilla war may be presented as an anti-colonial or national liberation war. This, in turn, could be divided into:

a) Revolutionary guerrilla war, in which the indigenous population seeks simultaneously to overthrow foreign colonial rule and to effect radical changes in the traditional, political, social and economic structures of the society. By revolution, itself a very ambiguous and controversial term, is meant a "...rapid, fundamental and violent domestic change in the dominant values and myths of a society, in its political institutions, social structures, leadership and government activity and policies..."¹⁵ French Indochina (1946-1954) and China (1937-1948) exemplify such wars.

b) Pure anti-colonial wars, which seek termination

of alien colonial rule but which do not necessarily attempt to institutionalize extensive political and social reforms. In fact, they may erupt precisely because of the native people's resentment of changes imposed by a colonial power and of their desire to restore status-quo ante. In a sense, allowing for the relativity and ambiguity of the term, these are counter-revolutionary as well as anti-colonial insurgencies because, according to Prof. Mostafa Rejai, they aim "...at returning to power a political group or regime, whether domestic or foreign, and to restore a pre-existing state of affairs in its entirety."¹⁶

The Mau-Mau Insurgency in Kenya and the Ukrainian case could be assigned to this category. Predictably, some Marxist theorists believe that the terms like guerrilla and counterrevolutionary are inherently contradictory. According to Mao, "the essence of guerrilla warfare is...revolutionary in character... in a war of counter-revolutionary nature, there is no place for guerrilla hostilities." Of course, by revolutionary wars they mean those led by real or self-proclaimed Marxists. The obvious question is whether other ideological orientations, such as Fascism, militant Islam, Anarchism or Ukrainian Nationalism should not be viewed as inherently revolutionary, since they all advocate radical transformation of the governmental process and of the idea

of social order.¹⁷

Brief History of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army:

This study seeks to fill some of the gaps encountered, while perusing the works in the field, by emphasizing the experience of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army. A brief historical outline of its origins is, therefore, in order for this is a subject totally unfamiliar to even an informed American reader.

The Western Ukraine, often referred to as Galicia, comprised in 1939 seven provinces, (in Polish - województwo, in Russian - oblast) about 110,600 square kilometers (1 square mile equals 2.6 square kilometers) and seven million inhabitants, the majority of them Ukrainians. After World War II, 89,800 square kilometers and 6 million people were incorporated into the USSR, the balance being annexed by Communist Poland.

Galicia constitutes only a part of the Ukraine, that is 17.5 percent and 18 percent of its total territory and population respectively. It also differs historically and culturally from the Eastern Ukraine. First, the great majority of the Western Ukrainians adhere to the Uniate (or Greek Catholic) and to the Roman Catholic Churches. In contrast, the majority of the Eastern Ukrainians are of the

Greek Orthodox faith. Second, the area had never formed a part of Tsarist Russia. Until the First Partition it was ruled by Poland, between 1772 and 1918 by Austria-Hungary, and after 1918 by reborn Poland. In September 1939 the Soviet Union "reunited" Galicia with the rest of the Ukraine, as a result of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact. Russia lost it in June 1941 to the invading Nazis and reoccupied it in Summer, 1944.

The fact that Galicia throughout the 19th Century belonged to Austria-Hungary was of great historical importance. First, the Galicians were exposed to and influenced, to a much greater extent than their Eastern kin, by the contemporary Western intellectual currents, particularly Nationalism. Second, Austria encouraged Ukrainian nationalism as a counterweight against both the Polish element in Galicia and pro-Russian pan-Slavic campaign directed against her multinational Empire. Austria-Hungary permitted, therefore, the establishment of the numerous Ukrainian schools, press, voluntary sport, cultural and political associations. The chairs of the Ukrainian language and theology at the Lvov and Cracow Universities were established, forging future spiritual and political leaders of the Ukrainian people. The second half of the 19th Century witnessed an unprecedented literary and cultural revival in Galicia.

Lvov became the cultural capital not only of Galicia but also of the Russian-held Eastern Ukraine. By 1914, the Galician Ukrainian nationalism was a potent force and Galicia a fully crystallized national community.¹⁸

The Eastern Ukraine had never attained such a level of cultural and political autonomy as Galicia. On the contrary, any manifestation of national or cultural aspirations had been suppressed by the Tsarist Regime. After 1878, no Ukrainian associations, publications or schools were allowed in the Tsarist Empire. Between 1828 and 1839, the Uniate Church was forcefully incorporated into the Russian Orthodox Church, anticipating by many years a similar move by the Soviet authorities. Thus, unlike in Galicia, national consciousness hardly affected the Eastern Ukrainian masses before 1917.

After the Austro-Hungarian and Tsarist Empires collapsed, two Ukrainian states emerged briefly. In the East, the Ukrainian National Republic was proclaimed in January, 1918 and in Galicia the Western Ukrainian Republic was established. Both collapsed within two years, the former reconquered by Soviet Russia and the latter by Poland. The Ukrainian national idea did not die, however. It re-emerged in pre-war Poland in

the form of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (Orhanizatziya Ukrain's'kykh Natsionalistiv - OUN).

The immediate predecessors of the OUN were the Ukrainian Military Organization (Ukrains'ka Viis'kova Orhanizatziya - UVO, in short) and the Union of the Ukrainian Nationalist Youth (Soiuz Ukrain's'koi Natsionalistichnoi Molodi - SUNM). The UVO was founded in July, 1920 in Poland by the former Sichovi Strlitsi (Sich Marksmen - a unit which fought alongside the Austrian Army in World War I and which was led by Colonel Evhen Konovalets) and former soldiers of the Ukrainian Galician Army. The SUNM was formed in 1921 by the Ukrainian students in Poland and headed by Dmytro Dontsov, a major theoretician of the Ukrainian Nationalism. Both organizations were formed in response to Poland's brutal mistreatment of her Ukrainian minority. At the same time, in the early 1920s, the Bolsheviks in the East were ruthlessly liquidating any manifestations of national, cultural or religious autonomy.

The UVO and SUNM regarded, therefore, themselves as "revolutionary armed resistance movements". They sought an independent Ukrainian state within the Polish-held Galicia, hoping eventually to extend political sovereignty to the whole of the Ukraine.

In Chapter II their ideology will be discussed in greater detail. Here it suffices to state that they emphasized force, especially terrorism, as the main weapon in the struggle for independence. They denied the possibility of an open, political struggle and violently opposed those who counted on diplomatic intervention or those who favored any accommodation with Poland. The more moderate Ukrainians were regarded by them as collaborators, any compromise as a sell-out. No manifestations of Russophilism, Polonophilism or Communism were tolerated. An uncompromising, fanatical loyalty to the national idea was required.

On February 3, 1929 in Prague, both groups merged and formed the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists. While an illegal organization, the OUN won over almost all active political elements in Galicia, attaining considerable strength of about 30,000 active members. Its influence on the Western Ukrainian youth was undeniable: possibly 50 percent of the Ukrainian students in Poland belonged to it.

The OUN was organized along military lines: severe discipline, tight organization and hierarchy, strictest conspiracy. It conducted numerous mili-

tary training courses. Many of its organizational or ideological features and many of its activists were incorporated after 1942 into the Ukrainian Insurgent Army. Among the latter was Roman Shukhevych, its future Commander-in-Chief, who in 1933 planned terrorist actions as head of the OUN's Combat Section.

The OUN continued the UVC's tradition of terrorism and assassinations. Among its chief victims was Polish Minister of the Interior, Boleslaw Pieracki. It acted according to the principle, "the worse, the better". Terror, it was hoped, would lead to more severe state reprisals against the Ukrainians, increasing in turn their national and revolutionary consciousness, ending ultimately in an armed uprising. In short, the OUN became a major driving force behind the Western Ukrainian national aspirations.¹⁹

It ought to be noted that the emergence of militant Ukrainian nationalism was possible only in pre-war Poland. While strongly authoritarian, Poland was not a police state. Although the Ukrainians were discriminated against and oppressed, they were still able to retain considerable cultural and political autonomy, with relatively little interference from the state. The powerful Uniate Church

functioned as a symbol of the Ukrainian national consciousness. There existed legally, Ukrainian trade unions, strong cooperatives, large political parties, numerous cultural and educational establishments, outspoken publishing houses and periodicals. Therefore, a competent political leadership, active intellectual class and vigorous political life developed, facilitating the evolution of nationalism.

In contrast, in the Soviet-held Eastern Ukraine, the nationalist intelligentsia was physically eliminated as early as the 1920s. The liquidation of Communist adherents of Ukrainian cultural autonomy, like Alexander Shumskyi and Mikola Skrypnyk in the 1930s, deprived the Eastern Ukrainians of any potential leaders. Not even the slightest manifestation of national or cultural autonomy was tolerated there.

No wonder that the OUN considered Galicia as the Ukrainian Piedmont, around which the unification of the whole country would eventually occur. Not being exposed to the heritage of spirit-crushing Soviet rule, the Galicians were more willing to display initiative and take greater risks. This is true even today. The majority of contemporary Ukrainian dissenters, like V. Chornovil, I. Dzyuba,

V. Moroz hail from the Western Ukraine.

In sum, the UVO and the OUN laid the foundations for the subsequent evolution of the Ukrainian insurgent force. Their major contribution was the creation of the future cadres. The Ukrainian Insurgent Army itself has been a product of amalgamation of many Ukrainian para-military formations, some emerging spontaneously, some planned, in the beginning stages of World War II.

In preparation for the anticipated Polish-German war, the OUN began to organize guerrilla units which in September 1939 during that campaign, harassed the retreating Polish Army. In April, 1941 the so called Ukrainian Legion, also known as Druzhyny Ukrains'kykh Natsionalistiv (Ukrainian Nationalist Squads, in short DUN) was formed. Consisting of two battalions, it was organized in April, 1941 with the cooperation of the Abwehr and fought alongside the Wehrmacht against the Red Army. The major objective of the Ukrainian-German cooperation was to obtain military training and experience, which only a Regular Army could provide. The Legion was dissolved in May, 1942 when the Nazis began cracking down on the radical wing of the OUN led by Stefan Bandera, which unilaterally declared "independ-

ence" of the Ukraine on June 30, 1941. The majority of its members, among them Roman Shukhevych, joined the UPA.

The third organized formation was the so called Pokhidne Grupy of the OUN (mobile groups) 95 percent composed of Bandera followers. These followed in the wake of the advance of the victorious Wehrmacht to spread the gospel of nationalism in the Soviet Ukraine and to organize local Ukrainian administration, in anticipation of the declaration of sovereign Ukraine.

There were three such groups, numbering about 4,000 men. They were liquidated after the proclamation of "independence". Bandera, his brother and 138 other OUN leaders were arrested and many were shot. Moreover, 1,571 Ukrainians were executed for being Bandera sympathizers. No wonder that the issue of whether to continue cooperation with the Nazis led to a split within the OUN. One faction, the OUN-B composed of Bandera's followers, was against it, another led by Colonel Melnyk, the OUN-M, was for it.

The Nazi persecutions, as well as the activities of the Soviet and Polish nationalist guerrillas led to the spontaneous forming of local self-defense units. The largest of these were the Poliska Sich,

founded in February, 1942, the Ukrains'ka Narodova Samooborona (Ukrainian National Self-Defense) created in May/June, 1942 and the Front Ukrains'koi Revolutzii (Front of the Ukrainian Revolution). All of these were eventually absorbed into the UPA.

In the meantime, the OUN's Military Department began on October 14, 1942 to form the Country Military Staff (Kraiovy Shtab Voiskovy) and the military units in Polissia, which took under its wing all the local self-defense units. Its initial cadre consisted of the former members of the DUN and of the Mobile Groups. The UPA itself was officially created by the Third Conference of the OUN on February 21, 1943 when the decision was made to adopt the name Ukrains'ka Povstans'ka Armiya for all the constituent groups. The OUN-B being the strongest, the most dedicated and best organized, disarmed and incorporated all these formations, including the units formed by the OUN-M.

In June, 1943 the Country Military Staff, renamed Supreme Staff of the UPA (Holovnyi Shtab), decided to transform the Carpathian Mountains into a major training base, incorporating one officer, two NCC schools and two training battalions. By Fall, 1944 just before the arrival of the Red Army into the Western Ukraine, the UPA's organizational and command struct-

ures were fully developed.^{19A}

Similarities and Differences with Other Case Studies:

As stated before, this study centers on the Ukrainian experience. Thus it is not a comparative study. However, illustrative points from Malaya, French Indochina, South Vietnam or Algeria will be utilized, since they have certain features in common with our case.

First, all were protracted insurgencies, fought mainly in the countryside. In all of them the peasantry led by native intelligentsia constituted the bulk of the fighting force.

Second, in all of these countries ethnicity has been identified not only with national but also with class consciousness, that is "a given degree of sharing of attitudes of isolation, solidarity, and collective purpose, within a national subgroup, most of whose members share a common skill, relations to the means of production and styles of life".²⁰ Thus the peasantry in Galicia consisted almost entirely of the Ukrainians, the middle classes being mainly of Polish, Jewish or German origin and the landowning class being mostly Polish. In Malaya, the insurgents were composed almost entirely of Chinese squatters. In Indochina,

the peasantry was almost totally Vietnamese in ancestry, a considerable part of the middle class was of Chinese or Indian origin and large numbers of landowners were French.^{20A}

Third, all of the aforementioned societies were undergoing severe socio-economic dislocations inflicted by World War II. Moreover, all were experiencing tremendous pressure on land caused by the demographic explosion and by the disruption of traditional rural life either through progressive commercialization of agriculture (as in Malaya, French Indochina, pre-war Poland) or by forced collectivization when the Soviet Union annexed Galicia. This deprived the peasant of the fruits of his labor, depressing even further his already low standard of living.

Finally, all of these were cases of anti-imperialist wars, imperialism being the "forcible aggregation of territorial communities against their will" and "...the extension of sovereignty or control, whether direct or indirect, whether political or economic, of one nation over another."²¹ While the Ukraine is not an overseas possession, expansion overland is not of course less imperialistic than expansion overseas. Anti-colonialism stems from strong nationalist feeling, from resentment of being ruled and exploited by ethnically and culturally alien people. Nationalism is

consciousness of membership in an historically, linguistically and culturally distinct entity. It is the idea that members of such an entity should constitute a politically sovereign state. As will be demonstrated in greater detail later on, emotional intensity of Ukrainian nationalism reflected brutal Polonization campaigns, enforced closings and burnings of Greek Catholic (Uniate) churches and of the Ukrainian schools; the so called pacifications, that is, forced displacement of the Ukrainian peasants by Polish colonists; highly discriminatory practices in employment of the Ukrainian intelligentsia in pre-war Poland; alien ownership of land, as for instance in Galicia, where the Ukrainian peasants constituted eighty percent of the population but owned only one-third of the land. All this deprived the Western Ukrainians of opportunity, upward mobility, plain livelihood and dignity.

Between 1939 and 1941, and again after 1944, when the Soviets took over Galicia, similar policies continued, like enforced Russification, mass immigration of the ethnic Russians, religious persecutions, mass deportations to Siberia and brutal collectivization of agriculture. As seen by the Western Ukrainians, it was just a continuation of colonial oppression under a new flag. Similar stories have already been told about Algeria, French Indochina and other European colonial possessions.

Despite the similarities between the Western Ukraine and other colonies, there were important differences as well. First and most important, unlike any other guerrilla organization, with the possible exception of the Basmachi, the fundamentalist Moslem anti-Soviet nationalist guerrillas in Soviet Central Asia in the 1920s, the Ukrainian nationalists fought against a modern, totalitarian communist state - Stalinist Russia.

It is conceded that totalitarianism is a very complex, relative, controversial and emotion-laden word. It has been much discussed and much abused as a term. It has different meanings to different people. As wryly noted by William Safire in his Political Dictionary, "friendly dictators are considered paternalistic and totalitarian regimes considered necessary to the defense of the free world are called authoritarian." Nevertheless, there are differences between traditional or military dictatorship or autocracy and modern totalitarian regimes. Briefly, as Jeane J. Kirkpatrick puts it, "a totalitarian regime is distinguished by its rulers' determination to transform society, culture and personality through the use of coercive state power. Non-totalitarian systems - whether autocracies or democracies - do not use power for such broad purposes." In such a system the whole of society, economy, culture and personality are appropriate fields for state regulation. The distinction between state and society is obliterated. No aspect

of human life or behavior is immune to the ultimate definition and control by the state, which is fully prepared to employ coercion to change radically economic and social relations, beliefs, values, cultural and psychological predispositions of its citizens. Stalin's Russia was, in our opinion, such a state.

The Ukrainian Nationalists confronted thus a special and unique regime; the system capable of marshalling ruthlessly and efficiently all the necessary resources for a counter-guerrilla campaign; the political machine unencumbered by any conventional moral or legal consideration. It must be noted here that even parliamentary democracies (or rather, their officials) have employed utmost brutality or cruelty against their enemies; just to mention the Indian Wars in the 19th Century America or the Algerian War. However, this has not usually been an officially sanctioned or deliberately planned policy. There has generally been considerable opposition to such policies by the public opinion or even within the government itself. Also, the governmental attitude has been influenced considerably by international pressure. Therefore, such activities usually could not be carried on persistently, consistently or for long periods of time. In Stalin's Russia

the destruction of arbitrarily defined class or "people's enemies" was the officially proclaimed policy, which was very consistently carried out. Moreover, the intensity or scope of terror conducted by a totalitarian government as opposed to one which is authoritarian or democratic, measured in numbers of victims, whether absolute numbers or per capita, may differ considerably.^{22A}

Thus no guerrillas, with the possible exception of the Yugoslavs and the French Maquis in World War II faced a similar adversary. Even so, they engaged the enemy involved in the global war, whose resources were spread thin, who was exhausted, to whom the guerrilla problem was of secondary importance. In contrast, the Ukrainians had to face a triumphant, confident Russia of 1944-1945. Moreover, the Yugoslavs and the French had received extensive material, diplomatic, military and moral support from the Allies.^{23A}

Secondly, therefore, the Ukrainian Nationalists had fought in total isolation, without any external aid. In fact, the USSR, Poland and Czechoslovakia cooperated in the operations against them. They confronted three foes simultaneously.

Finally, unlike the other cases mentioned, the Ukrainian nationalist movement was not Communist or

Marxist dominated. On the contrary, it remains one of the few major anti-colonial insurgencies that was staunchly anti-Communist and anti-Marxist in orientation.

The Ukrainian Nationalist Organization and its military branch - the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, referred to from now on as OUN and UPA respectively, strived for a return to the past, in this case, the restoration of the non-Communist, sovereign, Ukrainian state, which emerged briefly between 1917 and 1920. (In fact there were two independent Ukrainian Republics - the Ukrainian National Republic in the Eastern Ukraine and the Western Ukrainian Republic in the former Austrian-Hungarian held Galicia). They envisaged a state reflecting and encompassing the traditions and institutions of the glorious Cossack past, that is, the Golden Era of the Cossack SICH (Host) which existed in the Dniepr River Basin between the 15th and 17th Centuries. Thus in Marxist terms, they were hardly "progressive" in orientation. It is not within the province of this study to determine why given movements acquire a particular ideology, however. This requires a separate study. The mandate of this dissertation is to determine why they win or lose.

Briefly, Ukrainian Nationalism could, to some extent, be characterized as integral nationalism, not very much different from Nazism. Integral nationalism, according

to Louis M. Snyder, regards the nation as the supreme good to which all other values ought to be subordinated. It defies the concept of a nation. It appeals to mystically conceived ideas of solidarity of all the individuals making up the nation, based on the assumption that common biological features, like blood and common historical experience, welds them into the organic whole. It insists on subordination of rational analytical thought to intuitively correct emotion. It glorifies and romanticizes violence. It is strongly anti-semitic. It idealizes war, death and heroism, irrespective of their illegality or brutality, as an expression of the nation's biological vitality. There is little intellectual content in integral nationalism. It centers around crude social Darwinism. It adheres to the Fuhrerprinzip, the Supreme Leader being regarded as the embodiment of the national will. It insists on the totalitarian concept of the Party's purity and unity, sanctioning no factionalism or dissent. Absolute obedience to the leaders and total adherence to the Party credo is demanded. The latter is often expressed in shrill, suicidal-romantic and emotional terms. The OUN leaders have been strongly influenced by Italian Fascism and German National Socialism, many having spent some years of exile in Italy and Nazi Germany. That they rejected vehemently the Soviet Communist Party program is quite evident in their publications and proclamations; they differ significantly on such crucial issues as

private property, the land question and the state system. In sum, integral nationalism was revolutionary in its desire to change the economic and political structures of pre-war Poland and the USSR. Yet its planned revolution was more of a return to the old national values rather than a new departure.²⁴

Government Repression and Control:

The role of government repression has not been given adequate attention in the literature on guerrilla warfare. Yet coercion is the major factor affecting an insurgency's success or failure. The reason why the impact of coercion has been downplayed is two-fold: First, as stated earlier, there is a prevailing belief, especially in radical leftist circles, in the historical inevitability of a "people's" victory, irrespective of any obstacle. The incumbent is usually relegated to a secondary role, since in history's view he is bound to lose anyway. Second, as noted by Charles Tilly and Lawrence Stone, many historians and social scientists, especially those brought up in the Western Liberal tradition, are reluctant to admit that ruthless, efficient repression, which also involves the physical liquidation of revolutionaries and effective control of mass media, works.²⁵ Research and experience demonstrate, however, that an intensive, persistent and all-inclusive terror campaign may indeed prevent and/or discourage a potential rebellion.²⁶ Furthermore, histor-

ical evidence suggests that if an insurgency or revolt are to succeed, authorities at some level - the top level, the regional level, possibly the troops themselves - must be either unable or unwilling to enforce their authority effectively and resolutely. Denis Brogan perceptively notes that in the majority of cases the incumbent authority is aware well in advance of the impending dangers - the direction from which the insurgents intend to strike, the means they intend to employ and their strategy. Yet in many instances governments do not act to counter the threat, and if they do, they do so half-heartedly and ineptly.²⁷ Kerensky's Government in October 1917, is a case in point.

Hence if the ruling elite has the will to employ force efficiently and decisively, if it is able to control or retain the loyalty of its army and police, particularly of the officer and NCO corps, then no revolution or insurgency stands a chance of success. Such prominent students of revolution as Katherine Chorley and Chalmers Johnson come to the same conclusion. States Chorley, "...Insurrections cannot be permanently won against a professional army operating its resources at full strength. They can be won only when the introduction of some extraneous factor cripples the striking power of the professional fighting forces..."²⁸ It must be pointed out, however, that army and police reflect accurately, the morale, competence

and leadership of the government they defend. Factionalism within the government usually results in split loyalties within the armed forces, as is often the case in Latin America. The performance of the coercive apparatus ultimately depends on the nature of the political system itself, particularly its leadership.

The argument that state-initiated repression invariably benefits the rebel in the long run, applies only to archaic autocracies, like the Shah's Iran, and to liberal democratic regimes, like pre-1968 Uruguay, the coercive powers of which are restricted by a number of technological, moral or constitutional considerations. It does not hold true as far as modern, technologically advanced totalitarian, or to use Allen Massoff's term "administered" societies are concerned.²⁹

We submit, therefore, that the government which is prepared to employ repression efficiently, without scruples and on a vast scale, which is determined to carry on the struggle indefinitely, which is able to control its media and indoctrinate its public opinion, which manages to isolate the insurgents from the international forum - will invariably succeed. The fate of the Ukrainian Nationalist underground documents this point.

We maintain, moreover, that the state's ability or inability to defeat the insurgency is mainly a function of its morale, its political competence, its will, its unity, its coercive resources and its international position.

Three Levels of Analysis:

The three levels of analysis in this study are interconnected. The first one will examine under which conditions insurgencies erupt, especially their timing and a nation's cultural predisposition to revolt. At a second level, this essay will examine the guerrilla movement itself as an important variable affecting the outcome of an insurgency. More specifically it will deal with its international position, its domestic and foreign support, the quantity and quality of its human and material resources, and with its strategy and tactics, which are shaped by the above. Finally, the third level will analyze the environment in which the incumbent operates: His real and his perceived international position; his ability to control and manipulate domestic and foreign public opinion; his unity and operational code; his perception of the danger which the adversary represents; the quality, strength and loyalty of his coercive apparatus, his counterguerrilla strategy and operations. Underlying all three levels and serving, so to speak, as a unifying thread, is the concept of political culture, that is, "attitudes toward the polit-

ical system and its various parts, and attitudes toward the role of the self in the system." National political culture affects profoundly the behavior of the insurgent and incumbent, particularly their policies, strategies and operations. Such cultural traits as national predisposition to revolt, the tradition of revolt, the habit of compliance to authority, the intensity of normative justification of violence as well as the society's traditional perception of violence for its political effectiveness, the society's idea of law and justice - all of which could explain why certain societies rebel more readily than others and the different ways with which various governments cope with insurgencies. It may explain the fact that some societies with very high levels of socio-economic deprivation, like Haiti, did not revolt, while pre-war Cuba, with the third highest standard of living in Latin America, overthrew Batista.

Methodological Problems:

Several research problems ought to be mentioned. First, some essential variables are very difficult, if not impossible, to quantify. For instance, such crucial considerations as a regime's will or morale defy measurement. A gifted leader's or a demagogue's ability to whip up mass enthusiasm for ill-defined causes cannot be predicted. Rigorous scientific procedures are difficult to apply; public surveys cannot be administered in combat situations. The events exam-

ined cannot be replicated under controlled conditions. Quantitative methodology is, therefore, of little use in understanding the phenomenon of insurgency because some of its essential ingredients cannot be measured or duplicated. Moreover, the differences between various insurgencies may be so great that even measurable factors become meaningless when added up or multiplied. Hence, a traditional, "non-scientific" historical approach, which is adopted here, is as suitable, in our opinion, as any other method. It is primarily based on inference, on an educated guess.³⁰

This is mainly due to the fact that very few documents issued by the Ukrainian underground have reached the West. For security reasons, the UPA's own record-keeping has been reduced to the barest possible level. The nature of partisan warfare does not lend itself to continuous collection and safeguarding documents. Hence, many documents were destroyed intentionally after having served their purpose and only those deemed most essential were hidden. Of course, most fell into the Polish and Soviet hands and are thus unavailable. Only a fraction of the records is available in the West.

Similarly, the evidence concerning the Soviet intentions toward and perceptions of the Ukrainian nationalist insurgency are largely unavailable and can be only inferred.

Moreover, the period between 1945 and 1953 is the least known in Soviet history. General Walter Bedell Smith's dictum that "there are no experts on the Soviet Union. There are only various degrees of ignorance" applies in this case. Therefore, one is compelled to reconstruct the Soviet intentions from the actual events. This, in turn, paves the way for personal biases and misconceptions. Nevertheless, the informed guess based on personal interpretation of events and decyphering the Aesopian language, so often employed by Soviet publications, is better than none at all.³²

The Framework of Analysis. The Determinants of Success and Failure in Guerrilla War:

All the factors pertinent to the outcome of guerrilla warfare could be grouped into four broad yet intricately interwoven categories:

- 1) The society's predisposition to revolt and revolutionary "staying power".
- 2) The "authority vacuum", created by internal or external crises, providing an opportunity to rebel.
- 3) The qualitative and quantitative strength, strategy and operations of the insurgent force.
- 4) The incumbent government's determination, skill and capacity to resist.

The important question is not merely why people rebel but why do they continue the struggle, often against enormous odds. The resolve and ability to maintain revolution may be defined here as staying power. This, in turn, is the result of two intertwined factors:

a) A cultural trait such as the predisposition to revolt and the opportunity to revolt, which is created by what is termed here as b) an authority vacuum. Both items will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter II.

I. As stated earlier, national political culture may influence the predisposition of some societies to resort to political violence more readily than others. Thus, the tradition of romantic brigandage and rebellion figures prominently in the Ukrainian history. The memories of the resistance had implanted themselves firmly upon the national psychology, resulting in a strong spirit of independence.

II. International crisis affects the insurgency in several ways. First, such a crisis or war creates social, economic and administrative disorganization. It weakens the incumbent's administrative controls. The resulting power or authority vacuum enables a disaffected political group to consolidate and organize itself, to obtain arms, to train cadres. Between 1941 and 1944, the Ukrainian Nationalists, utilizing a power vacuum created by the temporary absence of the Red Army and Police, did just that. Without such

an absence, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army could not have been created. Similarly, in Indochina, the enforced absence of the French authorities between 1945 and 1946, had presented the Communists with an excellent opportunity to enter the fray. Thus, the "authority gap" created by World War II undoubtedly affected the insurgent's perception of the situation, encouraging him to commence or to continue the resistance.

Second, apart from the authority vacuum, the war resulted in, what could be termed, "a breakdown of the incumbent's prestige". The confidence of the Ukrainian Nationalists, and thus their expectation of victory, was enhanced by the Polish and Russian defeats at the hands of the Germans. This convinced them that the respective regimes were not invincible after all. Similarly, in Indochina the humiliating defeat of the French by the Japanese during the takeover in March, 1945 shattered the myth of the white man's invincibility, encouraging the Vietminh to commence the operations.

Third, the international crisis can create models that the dissaffected groups want to imitate. For instance, the achievements of the Yugoslav and the Chinese Partisans gave the UPA leaders certain encouragement. The consequent attitude of "if they could win, so can we" was significant.

Needless to add that domestic problems of the incumbent may also influence the insurgent's decision to commence or to continue the struggle. Between 1945 and 1948, the Soviet Union experienced a severe economic crisis resulting from the wartime ravages. This might have convinced the UPA High Command that the Soviet regime would not be able to commit all of its available resources to the suppression of the insurgency and, therefore, they would have a fighting chance. In addition, when the Cold War began, the CUN leaders expected a war between the West and the USSR. The expectation of a new war gave them hope and rationale for pursuing the struggle. Hence, an international or domestic crisis confronted by the incumbent affects the rebel's perception of an opportunity to rise and continue the struggle; it provides the latter with an attitude of "it is either now or never".

To conclude, the guerrilla's resolve to act depends on a combination of factors, such as his predisposition to revolt, the opportunity available and his perceptions of the domestic and international scenes, all of which are reflected in his politico-military strategy.

III. The quantitative and qualitative strength, strategy and operations of the insurgent will be examined in more detail in Chapter V. The variables to be considered are:

- 1) Guerrilla strategy and timing

- 2) External aid and popular support
- 3) Morale, unity and cohesion of the movement
- 4) Leadership, training and cadres
- 5) Guerrilla tactics
- 6) Organization, equipment and mobilization
- 7) Intelligence, security and communication
- 8) Propaganda and publicity
- 9) Terrain and climate.

IV. As far as the incumbent is concerned, it is his will to resist that the insurgent seeks to break by creating a climate of inevitable collapse. Several factors will condition this most crucial factor - the government's resolve to resist. These include: Its perception of a contested area as vital, history of past successes, experience of victorious counter guerrilla campaigns, unity and cohesion of the political elite, the incumbent's political culture, the nature of his coercive apparatus, domestic and international opinion, the counter guerrilla strategy and tactics, and the government's coercive resources.

a) The incumbent's perception of a contested area as absolutely crucial to his security or survival will undoubtedly affect his policies. For example, heavy financial burden, severe domestic divisions, being treated as an outcast by the international community - all of this made the price of

France's Algerian venture exorbitant and unacceptable. The French could, however, afford to withdraw from Algeria without losing their independence and without seriously weakening their strategic position in Europe. In fact, France's withdrawal from Algeria had proven beneficial to her subsequent development and international prestige. Could the Soviets have withdrawn from the Western Ukraine without weakening their multinational state? They could not. The stakes were too high, as will be argued later on.

b) History of past successes. The incumbent's resolve to resist the insurgent is not only influenced by the "cost-benefit" analysis. His "moral fiber" is conditioned by the history of past achievements. Thus the Soviet regime was victorious in World War II. It carried through such grandiose projects as the collectivization of agriculture and the very rapid industrialization of the country, maintaining at the same time strict control over vast masses of dissatisfied peasants. Its confidence was, therefore, rather high. In contrast, the French leaders during the Indochina war still smarted from the humiliating defeat and the subsequent Nazi occupation in World War II. Their confidence was further sapped by a spiritual and political "immobilisme" then gripping the country.

c) Experience of victorious counter-insurgencies. It is

certain that Soviet confidence was also enhanced by a series of successful counterguerrilla operations against Nestor Makhno's Ukrainian Anarchists, against peasant rebellions led by Atamans (Cossack Generals) Zelenyi and Antonov during the Russian Civil War of 1918/1920, and against the aforementioned Basmachi. The Soviet regime had, therefore, at its disposal a highly experienced cadre of counter-insurgency experts, capable of dealing with large-scale resistance movements.

d) Unity and ideological cohesion of the Political leadership. Experience demonstrates that a relatively cohesive elite is willing and able to employ force to counter threats against itself, whereas a fragmented elite often is not. Its will to rule may be based on ideology, translated into what Nathan Leites calls an operational code. The Soviet Politburo's operational code contains the general rules of political conduct, particularly the relationship between means and ends. The Soviet operational code advises the Soviet leaders to adopt the most ruthless action if the "cause" requires it, regardless of any moral and legal scruples or personal loyalties. It provides directions and justifications for such measures as the launching of full-scale terror, mass executions and deportations of whole nationalities. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Nathan Leites and Alexander George contend that Soviet ideology provides the Soviet rulers with a guide for action,

a sense of purpose, a sense of reality and, as Brzezinski notes, "a sense of consistency and certainty that is very often absent among those who have been brought up in the tradition of short-range pragmatism and empiricism."

While Communism often led the Communists into dogmatic stands, according to Brzezinski, "it had also given them a keen appreciation of contemporary social and political dynamics, an appreciation often lacking among their dogmatically undogmatic Western opponents."³³ Thus the Soviet operational code is not a set of recipes for political action that an elite applies mechanically in its decision-making. It must be noted that even if the Communist operational code were a blueprint for decision and action, it would lend itself, of course, to varying personal interpretations by the various leaders such as Lenin, Stalin, Malenkov, Khrushchev and Brezhnev.

e) The incumbent's political culture. Besides the operational code, the political tradition of the incumbent, especially his handling of the opposition in the past, usually conditions his counter-insurgency style. This may either preclude or sanction the use of all-encompassing, indiscriminate and intensive pattern of state repression. The Russian and Soviet history abounds with examples of pitiless liquidation of the opposition: Ivan the Terrible's Oprichnina, Peter the Great's mass execution of rebellious Streltsi, the mass deportations of the Kulaks during the

collectivization and of the whole nationalities during World War II, the Great Purge of 1936-1939 and so forth.

On the other hand, in Algeria the French military advocates of mass terror or torture had always encountered powerful legal, moral and political opposition, even within the army itself.

The word repression, no matter how discriminately used, usually evokes deep-seated guilt feelings in the Western European, especially the intellectual mind. This reflex, detrimental to single-minded resolve, has probably stood many rebels in better stead than their guns.

Similarly, American political culture makes it very difficult to utilize the methods sanctioned by the Soviet political tradition, or at least not as persistently, not as steadily and not for so long. Waging a protracted and merciless counter guerrilla campaign is generally incompatible with the values and temperament of the Americans, such as: A respect for an individual person's freedom and dignity, the concept of fair play and of a fair fight. One has only to recall the mass revulsion and protests over the My Lai massacre in South Vietnam. Moreover, even among some American and Western scholars there often emerges a naive view that counterinsurgency must be fought according to the rules of law and abstract morality.³⁴

In contrast, the Soviet and especially Stalinist attitudes toward waging of counter guerrilla warfare are very different, as will be elaborated upon in Chapters VI and VII. The NKVD then and the KGB now have not been concerned with 'bourgeois' morality or the finer points of international law. The notion of "prophylactic" justice has been very strongly reflected in writings of Stalinist jurists, particularly of Andrei Vyshinski and in the famous article 58 of the 1927 USSR Criminal Code, which deals with the so called "counter-revolutionary crimes". The latter contains a deliberately vaguely-worded clause, under which terms anything could be interpreted as a counter-revolutionary crime. Conventional or bourgeois-liberal morality does not apply in the case of, what the Communists call, class struggle; class morality, revolutionary conscience and political expediency should be the only criteria. In Lenin's words, "we say that our morality is entirely subordinated to the interests of the proletariat's class struggle... Morality is what serves to destroy the old exploiting society...we do not believe in an external morality, and we expose the falseness of all the fables about morality."³⁵ In practice this view has been translated into hostage-taking, mass-retributions, mass deportations and mass executions, in the case of Stalin's Russia, at least.

Thus, compared with the Soviet Union, the Americans

and the Western Europeans are definitely disadvantaged when it comes to the suppression of insurgencies. Political leaders or police officials in our society are constrained in the use of stark and unbridled terror. The importance of political culture as a factor in suppression of insurgencies should not be therefore underestimated. As T. Bowyer Bell puts it, "...future rebels, if they are wise and daring, should contemplate not only the...record of their chosen opponents, but also the nature of the national character reflected in the response to revolt."³⁶

f) The nature of the coercive apparatus, that is, the size, quality, operating procedures of the Army and security police as well as their responsiveness to the political leadership, represent another cluster of factors determining the outcome of counter-insurgency. In many ways, the coercive apparatus reflects the morale, competence and determination of the political leadership. For instance, in Batista's Cuba the morale and effectiveness of the Army and the Police collapsed precisely when those of the Government collapsed. Similarly, low morale divisions and conflicts within the French forces in Indochina and Algeria mirrored accurately those of the Government. The direction of these wars was diffuse, negligent and contradictory. Continuous and acrimonious parliamentary debates, constant public quarrels among the cabinet ministers, fourteen changes of government during the Indochina War, the opposition to the

war within the Government itself, resulting in many top-secret information leaks to the press - all indicated a fragmented, inept and weak government. This could not but affect its ability to control the Army, as evidenced by the latter's revolts in 1958 and 1961.

The low morale and divisions within the Army reflected those within the French government and society. The French Army during the Indochina and Algerian wars was a patchwork establishment, torn by conflicts between Gaullists versus Petainists; the Resistance fighters versus regulars; the Reservists versus professionals; the colonials versus the metropolitans; the paratroopers versus infantry and so forth. It had to contend with weak and incompetent government, an indifferent and hostile public, low prestige, low salaries and living standards. It still smarted from the humiliating defeat and from its image as a loser in World War II. All these factors affected adversely its morale and performance. The "immobilisme" of the Government and society was reflected in the Maginot Line mentality of the French Army in Indochina.

In contrast, in the Soviet Union the system of highly intricate and interlocking controls, by the Party, the Security Police or the State Administration, as well as by the processes, nowadays called Party verifications or Purges, assures the Politburo's strong control and direction of the

Armed Forces. The Politburo was able to do so even during such crises as World War II reverses, the collectivization, the Civil War and so forth. (The Army was purged periodically to assure control. The potential Bonapartism was checked during the Great Purge, 1937/1938, when the Soviet High Command was decimated. After the war, such popular commanders as Marshal Zhukov were transferred to obscure posts.)

In sum, history demonstrates that as long as the Army and the Police remain loyal to the regime, cohesive, disciplined, motivated, competent - the insurgents cannot win. But such a force requires strong government to control and direct it. The Soviet Government was such a regime; the French during the Indochina conflict was not. Moreover, the Soviet regime had at its disposal huge counter-guerrilla forces of 1.5 million especially selected and trained internal security soldiers. The Soviets also had a huge, experienced, ubiquitous internal intelligence network, employing hundreds of thousands of informers. They possessed ready-made counter-insurgency plans and tactical methods evolved during the operations against the Basmachi, the Anarchists and the Kulak rebels in the 1920s and 1930s. This gigantic machine was directed by competent functionaries who gained their experience during the aforementioned operations.

It ought to be mentioned that in no other country had

the secret Police played such a prominent role in national life or enjoyed such official glorification. The Secret Police, called the "vanguard of the vanguard", receives the Regime's accolades even today, as evident in the publicity campaign between 1968 and 1970, when the avalanche of novels, articles and memoirs glorifying the Chekists (honorific name for security policemen) appeared.

g) Domestic and International Public Opinion. The morale of the rulers affects and is affected by, what we call, national morale. National morale is the degree of determination with which a nation supports the foreign or domestic policies of its government in peace and war. A nation's support or disapproval may influence either combatant's policies, confidence or resolve; it may present or deny political respectability to either side; it could provide or withdraw material or moral support from each adversary. National morale appears in the form of public opinion, often measured by polls. For example, the pressure of international and American public opinion undoubtedly influenced the United States' decision to withdraw from South Vietnam.

Domestic public opinion determines therefore directly either opponent's decision to pursue or abandon the struggle. Guerrilla war is, in essence, a battle over minds; it is a war of public relations. The Viet Cong real-

ized this. Its operations, like the 1968 Tet Offensive, were mainly psycho-military in nature, launched primarily to influence America's climate of public opinion, molded largely by the media. As a result, the American anti-war movement was more instrumental in the United States' withdrawal from Vietnam than purely military considerations.

A distinction therefore must be made between the public's role in a democracy as opposed to an authoritarian or totalitarian state. A totalitarian state, for example, is much more resistant to pressures of either domestic or international public opinion than a liberal-parliamentary democracy. (That is not to say that even the most dictatorial regimes ignore completely public opinion. The fact that Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union have established a powerful propaganda and agitation apparatus proves the opposite). By having a total monopoly and control over the media, especially over their content, by imposing travel restrictions on foreigners (especially diplomats and newsmen), Stalinist Russia was able to bar most of the news about the Ukrainian Nationalist Underground from reaching the rest of the country and the outside world. The tightly censored Communist newspapers and radio paid almost no attention to the events in the Western Ukraine, apart from some local periodicals. Neither did the major Western newspapers. As a result, in terms of press coverage,

the UPA almost was non-existent.

The internal or external climate of opinion is undoubtedly influenced by the extent to which the hostilities directly involve the public. One could argue that the British did not, on the whole, express negative interest in the Malayan "Emergency" because it was fought mainly by professional soldiers. In contrast, the Vietnam conflict could not have been ignored by the American society. With the advent of television, horror and brutality in this war could be seen right in the family living room. Also, the Vietnam War was fought mainly by young conscripts, each having a concerned family. On the other hand, as stated previously, the struggle against the GUN/UPA was not publicized in Soviet Russia. Similarly, the extent of the Russian operations in Afghanistan is, by and large, unknown in Russia at this moment, despite considerable losses in human lives.

The public image of the insurgent or the incumbent influences to a considerable degree the support they are accorded by the society. For example, one of the reasons why the Vietnam War was so unpopular in America was the tendency of many Americans to identify instinctively with the underdog, who in this case matched a bamboo stick against the awesome military machine. This was contradicting the American sense of a fair fight, especially since

the fight was conducted against the corrupt and inept dictatorship.

Conversely, the great majority of the Poles and Russians viewed the Ukrainian Nationalists as Nazi collaborators and, as such, mortal enemies. The fact that they also fought against the Nazis did not matter. This belief was reinforced by the fact that tens of thousands of the Ukrainians joined such infamous Nazi formations as the Auxiliary Police, battalion Nachtigall, and the SS Division Galizien - all of which slaughtered thousands of Poles, Russians and Jews. The official Communist propaganda thus pictured the OUN/UPA members as Nazi war criminals. Combined with the traditional Great Russian and Polish contempt and dislike for the Ukrainians, this was the factor precluding any support for the Ukrainian Nationalist cause by the Polish or Soviet public, even if the opportunity to do so existed.

b) External Material Support. The sympathy felt for the insurgent's cause by foreign people and governments may be converted into material aid, including food, weapons, volunteers, training and sanctuaries.

The possession of a sanctuary abroad by the insurgent is a very important determinant of his success or failure. Being off limits to the incumbent, it enables him to rest,

to train, to gather supplies, to conduct world-wide publicity and diplomatic campaigns. While neither Mao, nor Che Guevara nor Giap gloss too much over the fact, the proximity to a sympathetic neighbor had contributed significantly to their victories. The Ukrainian Nationalists, on the other hand, had neither foreign sanctuary nor received any assistance worth mentioning. They were isolated geographically and diplomatically. Without foreign material and diplomatic support, any insurgent force stands a great chance to fail.³⁷

This leads to another question: What impels foreign governments to extend or deny support to insurgents? Why did the West fail to support the Ukrainian Nationalists against the Soviet Union? Conversely, what makes states like Libya aid the IRA, which is so remote geographically and ideologically?

Hence, three clusters of major determinants to be discussed in Chapter IV are:

- 1) Strategic and economic interests or the expected utility of intervention.
- 2) Cultural, ideological and ethnic affinity with either adversary. Geographic proximity ought to be included here. Undoubtedly this can influence the ruling elite's perception of a rebel territory being an integral part of the national domain. As a Russian views it, the Ukraine constitutes a

direct, territorial extension of the Russian Republic. Algeria, Vietnam, Korea were far away from the metropolis. This undoubtedly affected the feeling of kinship with the area.

3) Physical capacity and will to intervene.

i) Counter guerrilla Strategy. As was stated earlier, the political system, the social organization, the political culture and tradition will not merely influence the incumbent's resolve; they will also shape his policy and conduct of operations. This dissertation deals with the similarities and differences between the Soviet and Western, particularly the British and American, counter guerrilla strategy and tactics. It ought to be noted that while the British campaign in Malaya, between 1948 and 1956, has been hailed as a perfect model, the Soviets had utilized very similar procedures, such as strategic hamlets and resettlement of the population, much earlier and perhaps more successfully. It had taken them only four years to suppress the GUN/UPA as compared with eight years which it had taken the British in Malaya. The insurgents had reappeared in Malaya, but not in Poland and the Soviet Union. Chapter VII will examine such variables as:

- 1) The control of the population movement and supplies.
- 2) The resettlement of hostile population and "protected hamlets".
- 3) The use of counter-bands.

4) Psychological warfare and intelligence.

Conclusion:

To conclude, our central argument is that, in confrontation with the guerrillas, the military balance of power always favors the state. The outcome, ultimately, depends on the incumbent's will and ability to apply force at his disposal. Under normal conditions, a reasonably confident and efficient army and police have always been able to defeat the guerrillas. It is the government's inability or unwillingness to fully use the power at its disposal, caused by diplomatic, moral, legal and cultural constraints - which keeps the insurgent going. Most of these restrictions on the use of force, however, are applicable only to the liberal-democratic or old-fashioned, ineffectual authoritarian regimes, like pre-1968 Uruguay, Batista's Cuba or the Shah's Iran. This study will demonstrate, it is hoped convincingly, that a modern totalitarian state will destroy an armed rebellion easily. Often, it will prevent the insurgency from getting under way or spreading by nipping it in the bud. It is only under special circumstances, like war, that an insurgency can erupt in a totalitarian system. In peace-time, strong, confident, efficient modern dictatorship, whether Communist or other, has little to fear. This is even true of moderately repressive systems. For instance, the Uruguayan Tupamaros, by digging the grave of liberal-parliamentary democracy, spelled their own doom.

Contrary to the popular myth, cultivated assiduously by Marxist theorists and Western counter-insurgency experts, the guerrilla's indestructability remains what it always was - a myth.

Footnotes to Chapter I.

1. Samuel P. Huntington has noted that in this field "...semantics has perhaps overstripped theory". In "Guerrilla Warfare in Theory and Practice", Franklin Mark Osanka, editor, Modern Guerrilla Movements:- Fighting Communist Guerrilla Movements (New York: The Free Press, 1962) pp. xv/xxii (p. xi)
2. To Huntington, guerrilla warfare is a form of warfare in which the "strategically weaker side assumes the tactical offensive in selected forms, times and places." Ibid., of course, there are as many definitions of guerrilla warfare as there are synonyms.
3. T.E. Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom (New York: Dell, 1962) p. 199.
Douglas Pike, Guerrilla Warfare in Asia (The Hague: The International Documentation and Information Center, 1971) pp. 54/55.
4. Out of 164 "internationally significant" conflicts between 1958 and 1966, prolonged insurgencies numbered 76, brief revolts, coups and uprisings - 73; overt conventional military conflict - 15; in a memorandum by Colonel David R. Hughes to Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, Adelphi Papers, No. 46 (March, 1968) p. 15.
Samuel P. Huntington notes that in 1958 there were 28 protracted insurgencies in the world, in 1960 - 30; in 1962 - 34; in 1965 - 42; in Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, Ct.: Yale University Press, 1968) p. 4.
Not all of these were communist-inspired. According to Robert McClintock, out of 40 guerrilla wars between 1945 and 1967, Communists participated in 23; in The Meaning of Limited War (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin & Co., 1967) pp. 197/198. Similarly, Sir Robert Thompson notes that out of 149 serious outbreaks of violence between 1958 and 1966, the Communists were involved in only 58. In seven cases, they themselves were the targets, Revolutionary War in World Strategy (New York: Taplinger, 1972) p. 2. Hence not all insurgencies are so called people's wars.
The proliferation of guerrilla warfare in the 20th Century is the result of many factors, like: ideological polarization and the emergence of two hostile ideological, social and political systems; the field of battle extends now over a vast area, making it more susceptible to guerrilla penetration; the nuclear stalemate making conventional war a risky proposition; the absolute dependency of the

modern armies on industrial and economic bases in the rear and on lines of transportation, increasing thus their vulnerability to guerrilla warfare; the development of air lift and radio as means of communication and supply to irregular troops in the enemy's rear. See:

George A. Kelly and Linda B. Miller, "Internal War and International System", in George A. Kelly and Clifford W. Brown, editors, Struggles in the State. Sources and Patterns of World Revolution (New York: John Wiley & Sons Inc., 1965) pp. 226/257.

5. One could mention the Basmachi Movement in Soviet Central Asia in the 1920s and 1930s, consisting of nationalist Turkic people; Chinese Tibet in the 1950s and of course, Afghanistan after 1980.

6. Walter Laqueur, Guerrilla. A Critical and Historical Study (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1976) p. viii.

7. Such double standards are characteristic of some prominent New Left or revisionist historians, among them:

Gabriel Kolko, The Politics of War: The World and the United States Foreign Policy, 1943-1945 (New York: Random House, 1968) pp. 106, 584.

To discover the reason why falls outside the province of this study. However, for some astute and pertinent observations, see:

Arthur Koestler, in Encounter, Vol. 1 #2 (November, 1953) cited by Geoffrey Fairbairn, Revolutionary Guerrilla Warfare. The Countryside Version (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1974) p. 288 note.

Jean Francois Revel, The Totalitarian Temptation (translated from the French by David Hapgood, Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1978) especially chapters 2, 3, 6.

8. Michael T. Klare, War Without End. American Planning for the Next Vietnam (New York: Vintage Books, 1972) p. 13. This statement typifies a widely held sentiment.

9. Roger Asprey, War in the Shadows. Guerrilla in History Vol. 1, 2 (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1975).

T. Bowyer Bell, The Myth of the Guerrilla: The Revolutionary Theory and Malpractice (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1971).

Brian Crozier, The Rebels. A Study of Post-War Insurrections (London: Chatto and Windus, 1960).

Walter Laqueur, Guerrilla. A Critical and Historical Study (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1976).

Eric R. Wolf, Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century (New York: Harper & Row, Publ., 1973).

10. For example, The Ukrainian Insurgent Army, in short,

UPA, numbered at its peak between 30 to 40,000 fighters, according to most reliable estimates, of whom 6,000 operated in South-Eastern Poland.

Lev Shankovs'kiy, "Trinadzat' Let. Dii UPA ii Zbroynoho Pidpillia OUN na Tereni Viis'kovoi Okruhi Nr. 4 "Hoverlia", 1943-1956", in Shevchenko Scientific Society. Almanakh Stanislavs'koi Zemli. Zbirnyk Materialiv (New York: The Shevchenko Scientific Society, 1975) pp. 163/193 (p. 185 note 33).

Its losses are estimated, between 1947 and 1950, at about 6,000 killed and 14,000 imprisoned in the Soviet area, see: Anatol Kamins'kiy, "Statystyka Zhertv i ii Politichni Implikatzii" in Suchasnist', No. 4 (April, 1978) pp. 30/36 (p. 33). This excludes hundreds of thousands of potential sympathizers among the Western Ukrainians who were deported to Siberia, many never to return.

In Poland, the UPA lost about 1,500 killed and 2,500 imprisoned.

According to the official Polish communist sources, the Polish Government employed between 150,000 to 180,000 soldiers, policemen and security agents against the UPA, see:

Leszek Grot, "Dzialania Ludowego Wojska Polskiego przeciwko Zgrojtnemu Podziemiu w Latyach 1944-1947", in Maria Turlejska, editor, W Walce ze Zbrojnym Podziemiem, 1945-1947 (Warsaw: Wyd. M.O.N., 1972) pp. 11/33 (p. 27).

In Poland alone, 2,705 soldiers, 3,895 officials of the Security Service and the Police, 1,049 Communist Party activists and 8,927 Polish civilians were killed by the Reactionary Armed Underground, between 1944-1948, the majority of them by the UPA, see:

General Ignacy Blum, "Udzial Wojska Polskiego w Walce o Utrwalenie Wladzy Ludowej: Walki z Bandami UPA", Wojskowy Przegląd Historyczny, Vol. 4 #1 (January/March, 1959) pp. 3/29 (p. 9).

The Soviet Union fielded 585,000 soldiers and policemen against the UPA, according to Prof. Lev Shankovs'kiy. He is the most reliable Ukrainian historian and he checks his data carefully. See his "Ukrains'ka Povstans'ka Armiya" in Myron Levits'kyi, editor, Istoriya Ukrains'koho Viis'ka (sec. ed.) (Winnepeg: Ivan Tyktor, 1953) pp. 635/820 (p. 763). The number of Soviet casualties is hard to ascertain. Some Ukrainians estimate that between 1945 and 1949, the UPA killed over 35,000 MVD and MGB personnel.

Vasyl' Kryshko, Experience with Russia (New York: Ukrainian Congress of America, Inc., 1956) p. 29. This seems more likely.

In contrast, the Malayan Emergency seems a smaller affair. There almost 85,000 British, Commonwealth and Native soldiers and policemen confronted 8 to 10,000 guerrillas. The casualties included: 6,215 Communists killed between 1948 and 1956 (in 8 years) 2,445 civilians

and 1,843 members of the security forces, see:

Geoffrey Fairbairn, Revolutionary Guerrilla Warfare
p. 153 note, p. 164 table.

11. John A. Armstrong, Ukrainian Nationalism (rev. ed)
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1963).

Jaroslav Bilinsky, The Second Soviet Republic.
The Ukraine After World War II (New Brunswick, N.J.:
Rutgers Univ. Press, 1964).

12. Lev Shankovs'kiy, "Trinadzat' Let..." Ibid., p. 164.

As the example of such "publications" one could mention
Juriy Tys-Khrokhmaluk's book, UPA Warfare in the Ukraine
(translated from the Ukrainian) (New York: The Society of
Veterans of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, 1973) This
work, poorly researched and written, exemplifies the
majority of the Ukrainian language publications on the
subject.

13. Harry Eckstein, "On the Etiology of Internal War",
in George Armstrong Kelly and Clifford W. Brown, editors.
Struggles in the State. Sources and Patterns of World
Revolution (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1965)
pp. 171/195 (p. 172).

Walter Laqueur, Guerrilla, 389.

For every comprehensive listing of the publications in
the field of irregular warfare, see: Michael T. Kelly and
Thomas H. Mitchell, Violence, Internal War and Revolution.
A Select Bibliography. A Monograph No. 3 (Ottawa, Canada:
The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs/Carleton
University, April 1976).

Harry Bienen, Violence and Social Change. A Review of
Current Literature (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1968)
Chapter 2, pp. 40/65.

Neither of these contains any reference to the Ukraine.

14. Mao quoted in Stuart R. Schram, editor. Quotations
from Chairman Mao Tse-Tung (New York: Bantam Books, 1967)
p. 41.

Ted Robert Curr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton, N.J.: Prince-
ton Univ. Press, 1970) p. 358.

Some other quotes: Prof. C. Wright Mills "...It is a
moment of military truth. The truth is that guerrilla bands,
led by determined men, with peasants alongside them, and a
mountain nearby, can defeat organized battalions of tyrants
equipped with everything up to the atom bomb". In Listen
Yankee. The Revolution in Cuba (New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc.,
1960) p. 114.

General Giap believes that "...relying on our political
superiority, on the righteousness of our cause, and on our
people's unity in struggle, it is possible to use what is
weak to fight what is strong, to defeat the most modern
weapons with a revolutionary spirit..."

Vo Nguyen Giap, The Military Art of People's War. Selected Writings of General Vo Nguyen Giap, edited by Russell Statler (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1970) p. 95.

Colonel Nemo, in Revue Militaire Generale (January, 1957) quoted by W. Laqueur, Guerrilla, p. 390.

Commandant T. Hogard, "Guerre Revolutionnaire et Pacification", Revue Militaire d'Information (January, 1957) quoted by Peter Paret, French Revolutionary Warfare from Indochina to Algeria (New York: Praeger, 1964) p. 22.

Gerald T. Bender, "The Limits of Counterinsurgency. An African Case", Comparative Politics, Vol. 4 #3 (October, 1971) pp. 333/360 (p. 331).

It must be pointed out that concepts like leftist, rightist, progressive, reactionary, radical, conservative and so forth are all very imprecise, ambiguous, relative, meaning different things to different people.

15. Defined by Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, 1968) p. 264.

16. Mostafa Rejai, The Strategy of Political Revolution (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Press/Doubleday & Co., 1973) p. 20.

17. Mao Tse-Tung, "Mao's Primer on Guerrilla War", translated by Brigadier General Samuel E. Griffith, in Lt. Col. T.M. Green, editor, The Guerrilla and How to Fight Him. Selections from the Marine Corps Gazette (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962) pp. 5/10 (p. 5).

18. On the history of Galicia, see:

Michael Yaremko, Galicia-Halychyna. From Separation to Unity (Toronto: Shevchenko Scientific Society, 1967)

Adam Zoltowski, Border of Europe. A Study of the Polish Eastern Provinces (London: Hollis and Carter, 1950).

On the fate of independent Ukrainian states, see:

John S. Reshetar, Jr., The Ukrainian Revolution, 1917-1923, Vol.s 1, 2, 3 (New York: Shevchenko Scientific Society, 1969/1971).

I. Nahayevs'kiy, History of the Modern Ukrainian State, 1917-1923 (Munich: Ukrainian Free University, 1966).

By Galicia is meant the area incorporating the Eastern Galicia (Lvov, Stanislawow, Tarnopol Provinces), Volhynia, Kholm, Polissia, Carpathian Mountains.

19. On the origins and the pre-war activities of the OUN see:

Petro Mirchuk, Narys Istorii Orhanizatsii Ukrains'kykh Natsionalistiv, Vol. 1, 1920-1939 (Munich: Ukrains'ke Vydavnistvo, 1968) pp. 1/24.

The OUN also cooperated with the Abwehr against Poland and the USSR. Roman Shukhevych attended a course run by the Abwehr in 1930 in Germany.

Ibid., p. 256.

Heinz Hohne Canaris (transl. from the German by I. Maxwell Brownjohn) (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1979) pp. 315/327, 354/359, 451/452.

General Mykola Kapustians'kiy "Viis'kova Pidhotovka OUN", in Orhanizatziya Ukrains'kykh Natzionalistiv, 1929-1954. Zibirnyk Statei u 25 - Littia OUN (n.p.: Na Chuzhyni, 1955) pp. 115/140.

19A. On guerrilla war against Poland, see: Petro Mirchuk, Narys Istorii OUN, Vol. 1, pp. 459, 586/587.

Druzhyny Ukrains'kykh Natzionalistiv v 1941-1942 Rokakh (n.p.: Masha Knigozbirnia, 1953).

Lev Shankovs'kiy, Pokhidne Grupy OUN. Frichinki do Istorii Pokidnykh Grup OUN na Tsentral'nykh ii Skhidnykh Zemliakh Ukraini v 1941-1943 rr. (Munich: Vid-vo Ukrains'kiy Samostiynik, 1958).

Col. M. Omelusiuk, "UPA na Volyni v 1943 rotzi", Litopys UPA. Vol. volyn ii Polissia (Toronto: Litopys UPA, 1977).

20. Alfred de Grazia, A Dictionary of the Social Sciences Julian Gould and William Kolb, editors (New York: The Free Press/UNESCO, 1964) p. 95.

20A. On socio-economic study of the respective societies, see:

Joseph Buttinger, Vietnam: A Dragon Embattled, Vol. 1 (London: Pall Mall Press, 1967).

Janusz Tarnowski, Spoleczenstwo Drugiej Rzeczpospolitej, 1918-1939 (Warsaw: P.P.N., 1973).

21. Ivo D. Duchacek, Comparative Federalism: The Territorial Dimension of Politics (New York: Holt, Rinehart, Winston, 1970) p. 149.

Benjamin I. Cohen, The Question of Imperialism: The Political Economy of Dominance and Dependence (New York: Basic Books, 1973) p. 16.

22. In contrast, at the risk of oversimplification and being polemical, in traditional authoritarian systems or in a military dictatorship (such as Chile, Argentina, The Shah's Iran or Salvador) usually only the political aspect of a citizen's life is of interest to the authorities. His private or family life, the way he earns a living, his cultural tastes, his religious affiliations, are very much his own affair. There is usually considerable religious and cultural diversity. Some freedom of the press and limited room for oppositional political activity exist. This is a valid point only if one compares Chile or Argentina

or Salvador to the contemporary Soviet Union, not to mention Stalin's Russia. Moreover, the arbitrary power of the state in old-fashioned autocracies, like Austria-Hungary, is often limited by its own inefficiency, by corruption and even by old-fashioned moral values or scruples held by political rulers. That has not been the case with the modern, technologically advanced totalitarian regimes, ruled by "new" Soviet, Bolshevik men or Nazi "supermen".

William Safire, Political Dictionary (New York: Random House, 1978) p. 736.

For a quite comprehensive discussion of the problem of defining totalitarianism, see:

Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, "Reflections on Totalitarianism", pp. 96/138 (quote p. 99) and "Dictatorships and Double Standards", pp. 23/52 both in Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, Dictatorships and Double Standards. Rationalism and Reason in Politics (New York: American Enterprise Institute/Simon & Schuster Publ., 1982).

Another thorough discussion is in Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy (sec. rev. ed.) (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1965) pp. 22ff. They regard totalitarian states as those which include:

a) an all-encompassing ideology covering all aspects of human existence; b) a single party committed to this ideology, led by one dictator; c) a fully developed secret police; d) full monopoly of mass communication; e) total control of all instruments of violence and of f) economy. This model closely resembles Soviet Russia between 1926 and 1953. The best definition of dictatorship was provided several times by Lenin himself. To him, "Dictatorship means unlimited power based on force, and not on law"; "...Authority-unlimited, outside the law, and based on force in the most direct sense of the word - is dictatorship." The scientific term 'dictatorship' means nothing more nor less than authority untrammelled by any laws, absolutely unrestricted by any rules whatever, and based directly on violence. The term 'dictatorship' has no other meaning but this - mark this well, cadet gentlemen."

V.I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 10 (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1960-1970) pp. 216, 244, 246.

Quoted in Leszek Kolakowski, Main Currents of Marxism. Its Origins, Growth and Dissolution. Vol. 2. The Golden Age (translated from Polish by P.S. Falla) (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1981) p. 498.

22A. Just try to compare the number of victims in Communist Cambodia to 5 to 7,000 victims of military dictatorship in Chile or 6 to 10,000 dead in Argentina.

On the terror in Chile, see:

John Dinwies and Saul Landau, Assassination on Embassy

Row (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980).

Comparison with El Salvador comes to mind. There is a rather brutal guerrilla war being fought there. However, should its government be considered totalitarian? Powerful opposition in the form of the Catholic Church exists, relatively free elections were held, political parties are not proscribed, the foreign public opinion puts a certain brake on the policies of the Government, the war is quite extensively covered by the foreign press. How does it compare with the Stalinist Soviet Union?

On the way political opponents were treated in Stalin's Russia, see, for example:

Robert Conquest, Kolyma, the Arctic Death Camps (New York: The Viking Press, 1978).

23. The reason why a given ethnic group becomes anti-Communist is simple: R.V. Burks points out that numerically weak ethnic minorities in Eastern Europe produced disproportionately large number of Communists, provided that these groups had a traditionally strong pro-Russian cultural and ethnic ties. A traditionally strong anti-Russian attitude, on the other hand, results in a lower than average susceptibility to Communism and the traditional enmity can offset any ethnic bond. This applies to the Ukrainians who are moreover, anything but weak numerically. They obviously could not adopt the doctrine perceived as hostile to them.

R.V. Burks, The Dynamics of Communism in Eastern Europe (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1961) p. 188.

23A. On that subject, see: M.R.D. Foot, Resistance. European Resistance to Nazism, 1940-1945 (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1977).

24. By ideology is meant "...an emotion-laden, myth-saturated, action-related set of beliefs and values." Ideology instills zeal, commitment to the cause, a sense of purpose, a sense of unity and cohesion of ranks, and so forth.

Mostafa Rejai, The Strategy of Revolution, p. 33.

For a definition of "integral nationalism", see:

Louis M. Snyder, The New Nationalism (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press, 1968) p. 52.

For a detailed discussion of the concept as pertinent to the Ukrainian case, see:

John A. Armstrong, Ukrainian Nationalism.

25. Charles Tilly and Richard Tilly, Louise Tilly, The Rebellious Century, 1830-1930 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1975) p. 285.

Lawrence Stone, "Theories of Revolution", in

Sam C. Sarkesian, editor, Revolutionary Guerrilla Warfare (Chicago: Precedent Publishing Co., 1975) pp. 27/46 (p. 35).

26. For example, Neil J. Smelser, Theory of Collective Behavior (New York: The Free Press, 1971) p. 366.

Stanley M. Elkins, "Slavery and Personality", in James C. Davies, editor, Why Men Revolt and Why.

And by: Eugene Victor Walter, Terror and Resistance. A Study of Political Violence (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1969).

27. Dennis Brogan, The Price of Revolution (London: Pamish Hamilton, 1951) p. 66.

28. Katherine Chorley, Armies and the Art of Revolution (Boston: Beacon Press, 1973) p. 243.

Chalmers Johnson similarly concludes that "...the application of science to warfare has created armed forces that are invincible to any force other than a similarly equipped and trained armed force. Regardless of the amount of dysfunctions in a system, armed insurrection is futile against a modern army if the army can or will exploit its capabilities to the full."

Revolution and the Social System (Stanford, Ca.: Stanford Univ. Press/Hoover Institution, 1964) p. 100.

29. Allen Kasso, "The Administered Society. Totalitarianism without Terror", Frederick J. Fleron, Jr., Communist Studies and the Social Science (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1969) pp. 153/169.

30. Harry Eckstein remarks that "social sciences in general has been too much concerned with fashioning tools...too little with the direct processing of concrete experiences."

"Introduction" to Harry Eckstein, editor, Internal War (New York: The Free Press, 1964) p. 6.

Also on methodology, see: Stanislaw Andreski, Social Sciences as Sorcery (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1972) Chapter 9, "Hiding behind Methodology".

On the problem of evaluating historical evidence, see delightful Robin W. Winks, editor, The Historian as a Detective. Essays on Evidence (New York: Harper & Row, Publ., 1970) On a definition of "political culture", see: Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture. Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1965) p. 12.

31. For example, Rudolf Tokes notes that even statistical data supplied by the Soviet dissenters tends to be unreliable or distorted to suit the author's purpose.

Dissent in the USSR. Politics, Ideology and People (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1975) p. 9.

32. On the problems of divining the Soviet Government's

intentions and on the gentle art of Kremlinology, see: Articles by Robert Conquest, Alec Nove and T.H. Rigby, all in Walter Z. Laqueur and Leopold Labedz, editors, The State of Soviet Studies (Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 1965) pp. 115/155.

Kremlinology is frowned upon by this collection of articles: Frederick J. Fleron, editor, Communist Studies and the Social Sciences. Essays on Methodology and Empirical Theory (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1969).

33. Nathan Leites, The Operational Code of the Politbureau (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press Publ., 1972) a reprint from 1951 McGraw Hill edition, incorporated into Leites' A Study of Bolshevism (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1953); also his "Panic and Defenses against Panic in the Bolshevik View of Politics", Psychoanalysis and the Social Sciences, Vol. 4 (1955) pp. 135/144.

Alexander L. George, "The Operational Code: A neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision-Making", in Erik P. Hoffman and Frederick J. Fleron, Jr., editors, The Conduct of Soviet Foreign Policy (Chicago: Aldine/Atherton, 1972) pp. 165/190.

George defines the Operational Code as: "The maxims of political strategy that comprise the 'operational code' take on the character of rules of conduct held out for good Bolsheviks and norms of behavior that, ideally, are internalized by the individuals who thereby acquires a new and different character-structure - that of reliable, 'hard-core' Bolshevik." (George, Ibid., p. 168). Warns George, however, that "This term is a misnomer insofar as it implies incorrectly, a set of recipes of repertoires for political action that an elite applies mechanically in its decision-making."

Zbigniew K. Brezinski, Ideology and Power in Soviet Politics (rev. ed., New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publ., 1967) pp. 5/6.

34. For example, Morris Greenspan, a noted international law expert, maintains that unconventional warfare is "...governed by international law". He rejects the notion that "necessity knows no law".

Morris Greenspan, "International Law and Its Protection for Participants in Unconventional Warfare", American Academy of Political and Social Science: Annals (May, 1962) pp. 30/41 (especially p. 31).

Richard Falk, also a noted legal scholar, contends that "...the methods and tactics of a large-scale counter-insurgent effort, especially if carried out with high technology weaponry, necessarily violates these rules of law and amounts to crimes under international law."

In Peter D. Trooboff, editor, Law and Responsibility in Warfare. The Vietnam Experience (Chapel Hill, N.C.: The University of North Carolina Press, 1975) pp. 37/53 (p. 37).

35. For the typical Stalinist Soviet description of the so called Operational Code, see:

Andrei V. Vyshinsky, Teoriya Gosudarstva i Prava (Moscow: Akademiya Nauk SSSR/Institut Prava, 1949).

Also his: The Law of the Soviet State (translated from the Russian by Hugh W. Babb) (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1978) pp. 153/154.

Vyshinsky regards "pitiless repression as one of the basic tasks of the proletarian dictatorship". He is scornful of the "false humanitarianism", "sentimentalism", and the excessive preoccupation with formal, procedural side of the law, operating in the liberal-bourgeois democracy.

V.I. Lenin, Selected Works, Vol. 9 (New York: International Publishers,) pp. 475/479.

On the Operational Code in action, about the illegalities of the Stalinist Regime, see:

Robert Conquest, The Great Purge (New York: Macmillan, 1968).

Alexander I. Solzhenitsyn, The Gulag Archipelago, 1918-1956, Vol.s 1, 2, 3 (New York: Harper & Row, 1973/1978).

36. J. Bowyer Bell, "Revolts Against the Crown: The British Response to Imperial Emergency", in Russell T. Wigley, editor, New Dimensions of Military History. An Anthology (San Rafael, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1975) pp. 359/384 (p. 381).

Lenin quoted in Leszek Kolakowski, Main Currents of Marxism, Vol. 2, The Golden Age (transl. from the Polish by P.S. Falla) (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1981) p. 516.

37. But foreign support or assistance is not enough:- Che Guevara's adventure in Bolivia failed despite considerable support extended to it by the Cuban Government - about 20 million dollars and guerrilla cadres.

Herbert L. Matthews, Revolution in Cuba. An Essay in Understanding (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1975) p. 274.

CHAPTER II The Social Origins of Nationalist Insurgency in the Western Ukraine

Theories of Revolution:

What has propelled the Ukrainian Nationalists toward an open armed revolt which, unlike so many other national-liberation movements, was so strongly anti-Communist in orientation? There is no dearth or why men rebel theories. Just to list some of these:- Some blame rapid economic development, with subsequent social dislocations, for "a revolution of rising expectations."¹ Others regard the inequality of wealth, especially of land distribution, as the major cause of political violence.² There are those who discern a link between political violence and public perception of foreign domination, particularly in the economic sphere.³ Rural rebellions of the 20th Century could be viewed as "the parochial reactions" to major social dislocations, like population explosion, concomitant pressure on land and the weakening of traditional social bonds, caused by the commercialization of agriculture.⁴ Some scholars explain the outbreak of violence by "rapid social change and rapid mobilization of new groups into politics coupled with slow development or underdevelopment of political institutions."⁵ Some observers argue that participation in a revolt satisfies certain psychological cravings of a rebel, such as desire for comradeship, for adventure, for a sense of purpose and glory.⁶ Some

maintain that deprivation, resulting in frustration, is the crucial variable in the outbreak of violence, and "the more widespread and intense deprivation is among members of a population, the greater is the magnitude of strife in one or another form."⁷

Finally, there is a comprehensive Soviet theory of why men rebel, succinctly stated by Lenin and J.V. Stalin. According to them, there are four pre-conditions for a revolution:-

- a) When the lower classes do not want the old way and demand changes;
- b) When the exploiting classes cannot carry on in the old way due to a severe national crisis;
- c) When such a crisis creates uncertainty, confusion and disintegration within the ruling elite, when the masses of petty urban and rural bourgeoisie begin to turn away from rulers and seek alliance with the proletariat;
- d) When a sufficiently favorable interbalance of potential outside aid for revolution as against potential outside aid for counterrevolution exists.⁸

All the aforementioned theories are relevant to our case. However, they do not answer all the questions. First, is there a direct link between social and economic deprivation and the actual eruption of political violence? Not always. Poverty may create a rebellious frame of mind

but this will not guarantee any action. Some authorities, like Edward T. Mitchell, even discern a positive correlation between the inequality of land tenure and the strength of governmental control in South Vietnam. The provinces where land redistribution has not been carried out, where the size of land holdings has been highly unequal - were the areas with the greatest level of severity and governmental control.⁹ In pre-war Poland, little peasant unrest had taken place in Belorussia, where the peasant's lot has been even more miserable than in Galicia. Egypt still has one of the most intensive rural overcrowding, labor surplus and poverty in the world. Yet, no serious peasant unrest has ever taken place there. More examples could be found. How to explain the fact that at one time a major grievance may be fatalistically accepted, whereas at another time a relatively minor grievance may result in a violent explosion (like the Boston Tea Party). In fact, it could be argued that, sometimes, the population's extreme poverty effectively lowers its political awareness and even its physical vitality. Those who spend days struggling just to stay alive, have no time or strength to rebel.

Industrialization or commercialization of agriculture may indeed set in motion major social dislocations; they may indeed be accompanied by, what Chalmers Johnson terms, major "dysfunctions" or "accelerators".¹⁰ However, these may be checked at the beginning by a political leadership

determined to apply terror ruthlessly and on a vast scale. For example, during the Soviet collectivization, between 1928 and 1932, severe dislocations were present, yet the campaign was accomplished without major unrest. Even a moderately authoritarian regime, led by a moderately competent and determined elite, possessing even moderately efficient police and being relatively restrained by legal, moral and diplomatic factors - will effectively discourage or eliminate many a revolt, regardless of the seriousness of existing injustices. In peacetime it can prevent any insurgency from developing into a protracted one. Indeed, Poles in the 1930s effectively neutralized the Ukrainian Nationalists. Between 1934 and 1939, they did not play any important role. Only the war presented them with such an opportunity.¹¹

Indeed, research demonstrates that an intensive and persistent pattern of repression may prevent or discourage any "value-oriented movement", as Neil J. Smelser puts it.¹² Moreover, as noted by D.E.H. Russell, "...even when social structural factors are considered important, these factors tend to be regarded as relevant to the rebel rather than to the regime." Similarly, Harry Eckstein notes that most propositions about internal war are structural rather than behavioral, that is, the conditions which generate aggression are emphasized instead of attitude patterns conducive to violent behavior, which nevertheless, seem independent

of objective conditions. Eckstein calls for paying more attention to voluntaristic factors in the etiology of political violence, rather than seeing a given behavior as more or less automatic, mechanic response to certain set social- nomic conditions.¹³

Industrialization may indeed contribute to social dislocations and thus to social unrest. However, it is ignored that industrialization may also increase the regime's coercive capability. It contributes to more efficient communication or transportation networks; it produces improved hardware like helicopters; it creates computerized records and electronic surveillance devices. All this ensures greater governmental control over even the remotest areas of the country. Our case study, in conjunction with other recent cases, indicates that automatic, similar response to particular social situations should not be expected. It will be influenced by a given society, time, place and particularly culture.

The aforementioned theories, including the frustration thesis, discount such cultural traits as: national pre-disposition to and tradition of revolt, the habit of compliance to authority, the society's traditional perception of violence for its political effectiveness - all of which could explain why certain societies, whose poverty level had been higher than that of the Ukrainians in pre-war

Poland or the post-war Soviet Union, had not risen up in revolt.¹⁴

Moreover, psychological explanations assume that there is a direct connection between alienation and individuals acting in concert. However, many factors may intervene between the individual's feeling of deprivation or frustration and his actually joining a social movement. A frustrated individual will not automatically rebel, as Idi Amin's Uganda case attests. He may need leadership, ideology, opportunity and so forth. His culture may or may not predispose him toward violence.¹⁵

Most of the existing explanations also ignore such an important variable as an international crisis, like a war, and the subsequent social and administrative disorganization. Such dislocations create, what could be termed, a power vacuum, which enables dissatisfied counter-elites to obtain arms, to train cadres, to recruit new members and to consolidate their organization. The forced withdrawal of the Red Army from the Western Ukraine in 1941, enabled the Ukrainian nationalists to accomplish just that.

Finally, as stated earlier, the existing theories are usually based on the Third World cases. The dynamics of peasant unrest in the Communist world has been, on the whole, ignored.¹⁶

While all the aforementioned theses are relevant to our case study, here we will adopt a slightly modified and more comprehensive approach, which will take into account the objections voiced earlier. We maintain that the population's will to revolt is influenced by three considerations: a) the social-economic condition of the people - the environment of revolt; b) cultural tradition of revolt, which may actually propel the dissatisfied individuals toward violent solution; and c) the opportunity to do so, which is caused by, what we call, the authority gap.

Social-Economic Conditions in the Western Ukraine Between 1939 and 1948:

For the proponents of deprivation theories, the Western Ukraine provides a fertile field. Before 1939, under the Polish rule, Galicia was a very poor peasant province: 75 percent of its production was agricultural. There was little industry and a huge surplus of rural labor - 50.1 percent, as compared to 29.4 percent in Poland as a whole, which in itself was excessive. Before 1939, 88.1 percent of all farms in the area were 5 hectares or less.¹⁷ The pressure on land was severe. The natural increase was very high. In 1931 there were almost 150 people per 100 hectares of cultivated land, compared to 106 in Poland as a whole, 63 in Germany or 48 in France. This could be compared only to the land pressure of contemporary Latin

America. The rural overpopulation could not have been relieved by emigration, rural reform or industrialization.¹⁸ The plight of the Galician peasant was made even worse by alien ownership of land. The Ukrainians in Galicia constituted 80 percent of the inhabitants, but owned only one-third of the land. The Ukrainian peasant was brutally squeezed out of his land by the Polish Government's program of colonization.¹⁹

Needless to say, the Ukrainian peasant's standard of living was very low, possibly four times lower than that of his English or German counterpart. His average daily intake of food was estimated at 2,200-2,500 calories; from 3,500-4,000 calories were recommended by the League of Nations. In Poland in 1929, the peasants, comprising roughly two-thirds of the population, accounted for only 12 percent of the total market demand for manufactured consumer goods.

The Depression and the war depressed his already miserable standard of living. For example, income per head of farm population in Poland declined by 60 percent between 1928 and 1935, while real wages in the cities increased by 36.2 percent during the same period. The index of prices received by the farmers for crops was 100 in 1928, 48 in 1932, 35 in 1936. His purchasing power declined accordingly. Galicia was hit even harder than the rest of

the country, since over-population problem was the most acutely felt there.²⁰

The ravages of World War II made the life of the Galicians even more miserable. The Nazis deported 400,000 young people from the Western Ukraine. The urban population decreased by about 50 percent of its pre-war level. The cultivated area diminished by 35 percent, the number of cattle by 48 percent, the number of horses by 44 percent. Moreover, right after the war, there was a terrible famine in the Ukraine; as noted by N.S. Khrushchev, there were cases of cannibalism.²¹

Apart from economic troubles, the Ukrainians in Galicia were victimized by persistent political persecution and social discrimination. The Polish rule in Galicia, between the wars, was a continuous story of forced colonization, forced Polonization, brutal pacifications and extensive discrimination, as attested to by Polish communist and non-communist sources.

For example: In 1921, Volhynia and Polissia regions of Galicia had 656 Ukrainian schools; in 1936 not even one. In 1925, 18,000 soldiers of the Border Protection Corps (K.O.P.) and 7,000 policemen were stationed in the Western Ukraine. By 1939, this force was increased three-fold. Sixty percent of 3,303 political prisoners in Poland in

1938 were Ukrainian. About 800 Ukrainian villages were burned in 1930, during the so called pacifications. Between 1918 and 1929, the Greek Orthodox Ukrainians in Polissia and Kholm regions of Galicia lost 342 churches out of 370.²²

The Ukrainians were systematically excluded from the civil service, Army, teaching and industrial jobs.²³ Especially affected was the Ukrainian intelligentsia. Better educated persons in Eastern Europe, as everywhere else, expect to be accorded social deference and thus be influential in the traditional social order. Lucian Pye's observation about Chinese university graduates in Malaya that "...their faith in the superiority of the educated person became the basis of their deepest frustration," sounds particularly true in our case.

Poland, like the rest of Eastern Europe during the Depression, suffered from an over-production of intellectuals, particularly in law and the humanities. The Ukrainians, because of the officially-sanctioned discrimination, suffered even more than their Polish colleagues. A class of intellectual "lumpenproletariat" was thus created. The young Ukrainian intellectuals - unable to find employment commensurate with their education and social aspirations, compelled to take humiliatingly menial, low-status jobs - became highly susceptible to nationalistic

appeal. Violent politics became a way to elite status. The anti-Soviet scholar, Professor Roman Smal-Stocki, estimates that more than half of the Ukrainian youth by 1939 actively supported the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists. The majority of them were university students and unemployed professionals, who felt that their social or economic advancement was retarded by, what they regarded, a colonial regime.²⁴

In sum, to quote a Polish communist scholar, Stanislaw Wronski, "the cited facts make it obvious that the Ukrainian Nationalism had fertile ground to operate on and the Polish Government has been mainly responsible for its development." Similarly, W. Fobos-Malinowski, a highly nationalistic pro-Pilsudski historian, admits many "irregularities" committed by the pre-war Polish Government toward the Ukrainians.²⁵

The nationalistic appeal was further enhanced in September, 1939, when the Russians, in accordance with the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, took over the area, and again after 1944, when Galicia was reoccupied and made a part of the Soviet Ukraine. Under the new rule, persecution and discrimination against the Western Ukrainians continued.

For example, between September, 1939 and June, 1941,

according to Harvard historian Dziewanowski, the Soviet authorities deported about 1.5 million people from the Western Ukraine and Belorussia to Siberia; at least half of those were Ukrainians. Right after the war, between 1946 and 1949, according to a noted Ukrainian in exile, V. Holubnychy, an additional 500,00 Ukrainians were deported to Siberia from Galicia.²⁶ This out of a population of 7.5 million. The Uniate Church, the national Church of the Galicians, was forcefully dissolved, its clergy decimated, its buildings confiscated.²⁷

The worst experiences were the collectivization campaigns of 1939-1941 and 1944-1950. It must be emphasized that the Ukrainian peasants were affected by these far more severely than their Russian kin. Not ever having had the institution of mir, the traditional Russian peasant commune, this for them represented a radical departure from tradition and, as such, highly unacceptable. Being more individualistic and more enterprising, having attained a higher cultural level and more efficient agricultural techniques than his Russian counterpart, the Galician peasant was much better off materially.²⁸ (In comparison with other regions of pre-war Poland, he was worse off, however) Kolkhoz could promise him less than to the Russian muzhik; he had more to lose. Collectivization not merely decreased his standard of living; the peasant was practically reduced to slavery for the right to use

his plot.²⁹

The collectivization was accompanied by a heavy influx of 302,000 ethnic Russians, who captured most of the responsible and lucrative positions, displacing the natives. For instance, in 1946 the percentage of the locally-born officials in the responsible or nomenklatura jobs in the Lvov Province was 23, in Volhynia - 14.8, in Drohobycz - 16.8. In addition, between 1944 and 1951, the Western Ukraine received 19,000 agricultural experts, 27,200 medical workers and 44,000 teachers from the East, who displaced many of the native-born.³⁰

Moreover, Stalinist domination of the Ukraine, both in the East and the West, had been characterized by genocide, by colonial economic exploitation and by discriminatory linguistic and educational practices.³¹

As a result of the Soviet policies in Galicia, the Ukrainian nationalist, anti-Communist appeal increased. For example, Prof. Lev Shankovsky estimates that 80 percent of the Ukrainian youth, between 17 and 24 years of age, joined the anti-Soviet Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists in the Stanislaw Province on the eve of Soviet re-occupation of the area in Spring 1944. The memories of the earlier so called "liberation from the Polish yoke" in 1939 were still strong. One could assume that the number

of hidden nationalist sympathizers, as opposed to active ones, did not decrease as the years went by.³²

The Soviet authorities themselves acknowledge certain "irregularities", which might have driven some youth to join the OUN. One such admission was made public on June 13, 1953 when the First Secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party Leonid G. Melnikov was dismissed from his post for "mismanaging" the establishment of kolkhozes in Galicia and for "perverting the Leninist-Stalinist nationality policy" by appointing too many comrades from the East to the "responsible" posts and by forcing the Western Ukrainian institutions of higher learning to change their language of instruction to Russian.³³

Cultural Predisposition to Revolt:

As stated earlier, the popular perception of social-economic deprivation or injustices perhaps predisposes toward but does not necessarily trigger a violent revolt. It is national political culture which either favors or discourages political violence. By political culture is meant "the pattern of individual attitudes and orientations toward politics among the members of a political system." It is, as Almond and Powell put it, "the subjective realm which underlies and gives meaning to political actions."³⁴ Political culture does involve factors like tradition of revolt, the habit of compliance to authority, the intensity

of normative justification of violence for its effectiveness. This may explain why some societies are inclined to be more violent than others. It is obvious that any discussion of such cultural traits is based on the amateurish "commonsense observations" and on largely journalistic, superficial, elusive and imprecise stereotypes or generalizations. Nevertheless, it is also a fact that some societies tend, at some time, to be more violent than others, as confirmed by many scholars.³⁵ It is also true that a national system of attitudes, values and beliefs may affect a given incumbent's counter-insurgency policies.

The tradition of romantic brigandage figures prominently in our case. Like the Latin Americans, the Ukrainians have always been fascinated by, what I.L. Horowitz terms the "guerrilla mystique", by death and violence as expressions of human spirit and self-assertiveness.³⁶ They have a very rich tradition of rebellion, particularly in the 16th, 17th and 18th Centuries. Their folklore, belles-lettres and historical literature glorify the exploits of the noble highway-robbers of Haidamaks and of the Zaporozhan Cossacks. The deeds of the Cossack leaders, called atamans, and famous freebooters like Mazepa, Kochubei, Gonta, Zalizniak, Khmelnitzki, have been implanted deeply into the national psyche, forming ideals widely regarded worthy of emulating by future generations. The continuous wars waged by the Zaporozhan Sich (Host - bachelor military

association) against the Turks, the Tartars, the Poles and the Russians, had created an image of a knightly Cossack defending steadfastly and intrepidly his honor, his freedom and his way of life, regardless of the odds. The Cossack used to think and sing of himself as of a free, audacious and noble fellow. In his own eyes, he was a freedom-fighter, the "knight of the frontier", the chivalrous and noble savage. (The Ukraine itself means edge, frontier, borderline.)

The Cossack became the peasant's hero and the poet's inspiration. As such he contributed mightily to the Ukrainian national mythology and influenced deeply the national psyche. The Cossack frontier mystique had been reinforced and glorified by prominent Ukrainian writers like H. Gogol (Taras Bul'ba), Taras Shevchenko (Kob'zar), Ivan Franko (My-Haidamaki). It had been extolled by influential Ukrainian nationalist historians like Hrushevs'ky and Dorochenko. The legends of free-spirited Haidamaks and Cossacks have become an integral part of the Ukrainian folk tales (dumki), which preserved the consciousness of the Ukrainian nationhood, especially epics like Bayda, Moroz and others.^{36A} In addition, it could be said that the Ukrainians, just like the Poles, have been thoroughly permeated by, what we term here, suicidal or cavalry-charge romanticism. The Ukrainian's almost morbid fascination

with the Cossack ethos had undoubtedly influenced his predilection to revolt, regardless of outcome, whenever there was an opportunity to do so, partly to live up to the Cossack image as a fighter for freedom, dignity and glory. Indeed, there were many disastrous and bloody uprisings in Ukrainian history, just to mention the Khmelnitski's uprising in the 1640s against the Polish rule and in 1769, 1773 and 1798 against the Russian domination.³⁷

There probably is no accident that during the Russian Civil War, the Southern Ukraine, the area where the Cossacks settled in the 18th Century, became the center of the peasant anarchist armies led by Nestor I. Makhno and by Atamans Zelonyi and Struk. A historian of Ukrainian nationalism, Ivan Rudnytsky notes that, "...the modern nationalistic movement started in those areas of the Ukraine where the Cossack traditions are the strongest, and originally most of the leaders came from the descendants of the former Cossack officers' (starchyny) class." Similarly, Peter Kenez concludes that, "the anarchists had more success in the Ukraine than elsewhere because the tradition of rebelliousness was still alive there." This was the area around Kharkov, and that was probably one of the reasons why the Soviets transferred the Ukraine's capital to Kiev in 1934.³⁸

Modern nationalist symbols and ideals derive also from the Cossack past. For example, the UPA Commanders adopted their pseudonyms after the Cossack folk heroes such as, "Zalizniak", "Gonta", "Hromenko". Their military ranks like "Sotnyk" (captain), Bulavnyi (sergeant), Khorunzhiy (sub-lieutenant); designations of military units such as Kurin (battalion), Sotnia (company); staff positions like Kharchovyi (supply officer); officers collectively being called Starshyny - all of these were traditional Cossack terms.

Whether a myth or a reality, history becomes a "social memory" to which people can turn, hoping that it will provide justification for their actions or beliefs. Thus the activities of the Ukrainian Nationalists could be understood or interpreted as a continuation of, what was in their eyes, the glorious Cossack past. They regarded themselves as the Cossack heirs.³⁹

The cultural propensity to revolt has been reinforced by, what is termed here, the authority gap, which provided the opportunity for all the pent up frustrations and rebellious impulses to break into the open.

The Authority Gap:

The major effect of World War II has been, what may be

called, "a breakdown of the incumbent's prestige". The confidence of the OUN's leaders had been enhanced by the defeats inflicted by the Nazis on the Poles and the Russians in the beginning of the war. This convinced them that neither enemy was invincible. Right after the war when the "Cold War" began, they expected an imminent clash between the former Allies, recognizing this as a golden opportunity to regain independence for the Western Ukraine.⁴⁰

Hence, a potential rebel may take up arms if he perceives a favorable international configuration of forces. However, the wartime chaos itself may strengthen the insurgent's decision to act. The war seriously weakens or eliminates the incumbent's administrative controls, creating a "power" or "authority" vacuum.⁴¹

Such a vacuum provided the OUN, between 1941 and 1944, in the German-occupied Western Ukraine, with an opportunity to obtain arms, prepare plans, to train cadres and with a ready guerrilla army to await the arrival of the Red Army. Without such an authority vacuum, created by the enforced absence of the Soviet Army and police from the area, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army would never have been created. Needless to add, that the UFA had received, quite inadvertently, some assistance in its formative phase. The Nazis trained the so called Ukrainian Auxiliary Police and military formations, like the SS Division "Galizien". Naturally,

this helped the UFA to obtain some badly needed military expertise and weapons.

The chaos, brutality and terror of war and occupation destroy moderate, traditional social groups. Only those with nothing to lose are left. Social dislocations create large masses of uprooted people with no past to return to; people who will willingly join any organized group just for the sake of self-preservation. Moreover, it is a well known fact that war brutalizes individuals, weakens their moral restraints and makes them more willing to resort to violence. In sum, the destruction of old moral, social and political commitments facilitates social mobilization; the social dislocation and brutalization of the masses caused by war helps the guerrilla's recruiting agent.

The international crisis also creates certain precedents which the contenders for power may want to emulate. Thus, the successes of other insurgencies may produce, what Walter Laqueur terms, an "echo effect". In the era of electronic communications, the echo effect is particularly magnified. For example, the victories of the Yugoslav and Chinese partisans gave the UFA certain encouragement. "If they could win, so can we" attitude was a significant one, especially since the advent of the Cold War gave the UFA leaders the impression that a clash between

the Superpowers was imminent. Moreover, a successful insurgency may provide certain organizational features which other insurgents may want to emulate. For instance, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army copying, as it was put, the "Red Chinese example", decided in 1944 to organize the so called self-defense village units (Samooboronne Pushchove Viddily - in short, SKV). This was an irregular, locally-recruited, part-time militia assisting the regular UPA units.⁴²

In short, international crisis affects the prospective insurgent's perception of the opportunity to rise; it provides him with an attitude of "it is either now or never". His evaluation of the enemy's strength or weakness also influences his willingness or disinclination to fight. For example, domestic problems facing the incumbent may influence the rebel's decision to act. Between 1944 and 1948, the Soviet Union experienced severe economic crisis, the result of the wartime ravages. This, one may plausibly assume, might have convinced the UPA High Command that the Soviet regime would not be able to commit all of its resources to the suppression of their organization, that it would lose its will to act. In addition, the Soviets were, at the time, involved in such foreign ventures as the Persian Azerbaijan, the consolidation of their rule in Eastern Europe and the Berlin Blockade. The OUN leaders assumed that the Soviets were spreading themselves "too thin", in

too many places at the same time, to be effective. Unfortunately, the literature on the subject discounts, on the whole, the effect of the insurgent's perception of the international and domestic environments on his resolve to act and hence on his strategy. Yet, his estimate of reality may either favor or mitigate against large-scale political violence.

To conclude, the insurgency, as demonstrated by our case-study, results mainly because of the cultural tradition of rebellion combined with a national memory of past and present colonial exploitation or humiliation and because of the insurgent's perception of international and domestic environments as favorable to him. As we will demonstrate in the next chapter, the GVN's view of the post-war world contributed mightily to its decision to rise and continue the struggle for independence.

Footnotes to Chapter II.

1. Mancur Olson, Jr., "Rapid Growth as a Destabilizing Force", in James C. Davies, editor, When Men Rebel and Why. A Reader in Political Violence and Revolution (New York: The Free Press, 1971) pp. 215/227.
2. Bruce M. Russett, "Inequality and Instability:- The Relation of Land Tenure to Politics", in James C. Davies, editor, When Men Rebel and Why, pp. 205/213.
3. Merle Kling, "Toward a Theory of Power and Political Instability in Latin America", James Petras and Maurice Zeitlin, editors, Latin America. Reform or Revolution? A Reader (New York: Fawcett Premier books, 1968) pp. 76/93.
4. Eric R. Wolf, "Peasant Rebellions and Revolutions", in Norman Miller and Roderick Aya, editors, National Liberation Revolution in the Third World (New York: The Free Press, 1971) pp. 48/67.
5. Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, Ct.: Yale University Press, 1968) pp. 4/5. pp. 265/267.
6. Eric Hoffer, The True Believer. Thoughts on Mass Movements (New York: Mentor Books, 1958) p. 44.
Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (translated from the French by Constance Farrington) (New York: Grove Press, 1963) pp. 86, 93/94.
7. John Dollard, Leonard Doob, et al., Frustration and Aggression (New Haven, Ct.: Yale Univ. Press, 1967) p. 1.
James C. Davies, "Toward a Theory of Revolution", in James C. Davies, editor, When Men Rebel and Why, pp. 134/147 (p. 136).
Ted Robert Gurr, "Psychological Factors in Civil Violence", World Politics, Vol. 20 #1 (January, 1968) pp. 245/278.
8. Translated and stated by Historicus, "Stalin on Revolution", Foreign Affairs (January, 1949).
9. Edward J. Mitchell, "Insurgency and Inequality. A Statistical Analysis of South Vietnam", World Politics, Vol. 20 #3 (April, 1968) pp. 421/433.
Paul Kecskemeti asserts also that the actual number of insurgencies observed in our times fails to reveal correlation with the gravity of social economic ills.
Insurgency as a Strategic Problem (Santa Monica, Ca.: Rand

Corp., 1967) p. 15 and so does Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, pp. 42/43.

10. Chalmers Johnson, Revolution and the Social System (Stanford, Ca.: Hoover Institution, 1964).

11. A former Ukrainian nationalist leader, Lev Rebet asserts that in 1934 the OUN was almost totally destroyed by the Polish political police Defensywa, which infiltrated successfully its highest echelons. It had taken several years to rebuild it.

Lev Rebet, Svitla i Tini OUN (Munich: Ukrains'kiy Samostiynyk, 1964) pp. 59/64.

12. As noted by Neil J. Smelser, "...a value-oriented movement under conditions of continuous and sustained repression tends to become moribund. It evolves progressively toward the most passive and least politically threatening form of organization. Sometime, the movement disappears altogether."

Theory of Collective Behavior (New York: The Free Press, 1971) p. 366.

This thesis is confirmed by Stanley M. Elkins "Slavery and Personality", in James C. Davies, ed., When Men Rebel and Why and by: Eugene Victor Walter, Terror and Resistance. A Study of Political Violence (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1969).

13. D.E. Russell, Rebellions, Revolutions and Armed Forces (New York: Academic Press, 1974) p. 3.

Harry Eckstein, "Internal War: The Problem of Anticipation", Ithiel de Sola Pool et. al., Social Science Research and National Security.

14. For example, the Belorussians in pre-war Poland, who, despite terrible economic plight, brutal Polonization and Catholicization campaigns, did not resort to underground terrorism, like the Ukrainians. After the war, the Belorussians did not resist the Soviet encroachment as well.

Nicholas P. Vakar, Belorussia. The Making of a Nation (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1966) pp. 119/136, 196.

15. Despite incredible terror, the Ugandans did not resist. Cultural tradition of obedience and fealty ingrained from the subservience to the ancient kings, some of whom celebrated their ascension to the throne by slaughtering hundreds of people.

See: John Darnton's article "Idi Amin", New York Times, April 30, 1979, pp. A 1, A 10.

Arnold S. Feldman similarly concludes that there is not necessarily a direct connection between the level of social tension and the outbreak of social violence; there

is nothing inevitable about the relationship between potential and actual and even high societies do not necessarily explode.

Arnold S. Feldman, "Violence and Volatility. The Likelihood of Revolution" in Harry Eckstein, editor, Internal War. Problems and Approaches (New York: The Free Press, 1964) pp. 111/129 (pp. 114, 126).

16. On Eastern European unrest, especially that in Galicia and on its ideological antecedents, I could only locate one book and three articles in English:

Alexander J. Motyl, "The Rural Origins of the Communist and Nationalist Movements in Wolyn Wojewodztwo, 1921-1939", Slavic Review, Vol. 37 #3 (September, 1978) pp. 412/420.

Roman Solchanyk, "The Foundations of the Communist Movement in Eastern Galicia, 1919-1921", Slavic Review, Vol. 30 #4 (December, 1971) pp. 774/794.

Steven L. Guthrie, "The Popular Base of Ukrainian Nationalism in 1917", Slavic Review, Vol. 38 #1 (March, 1979) pp. 30/47.

Paul Robert Magocsi, The Shaping of a National Identity. Subcarpathian Rus', 1848-1948 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1978).

17. David Mitrany considers the farm size of 5 hectares as barely adequate to sustain a family.

"The Agrarian Question in Eastern Europe: Not Capitalism, not Socialism", in Stephen Ficher Galati, editor, Man, State and Society in Eastern European History (New York: Praeger Publ., 1970) pp. 293/307 (p. 295).

Data in George D. Jackson, Jr., Comintern and Peasants in Eastern Europe, 1919-1930 (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1966) pp. 9, 12/13, table 8 on p. 183; 54.9 percent of farms in Central Poland, 31.9 percent in Western Poland, 64.2 in Poland as a whole were less than 5 hectares.

Wladyslaw Pobog-Malinowski, Najnowsza Historia Polityczna Polski (sec. rev. ed.) Vol. 2, 1914-1939 (London: B. Swiderski, 1967) p. 195, note 22.

However, while the average area of the Polish peasant household in the Volhynia region of Galicia was 6.9 hectares, that of the Ukrainian was 4.3 hectares.

Stanislaw Wronski, "Introduction" to Henryk Cybulski, Czerwone Noce (Warsaw: M.C.N., 1974) pp. 1/16 (p. 9).

18. The industry could employ only 20 percent of Poland's working population. It could absorb annually only 75,000 people, while the annual increase of employable population in the country was 215,000. The industrial sector was growing too slowly. If 1913 equals 100, then the index of manufacturing in Poland in 1920 was 35.1; in 1925 - 63.1; in 1930 - 75.8, 1931/33 - 63.8; in 1936/38 - 65.4.

The population of Poland grew by 230 percent between 1830 and 1930, 2.3 percent per annum. During the same period the population of Germany increased by 140 percent, that of the Low Countries by 135 percent.

Samuel L. Sharp, Poland. White Eagle on a Red Field (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1953) pp. 103/104.

Pobog-Malinowski, Najnowsza Historia, p. 19, note 63.

The Agricultural reforms redistributed only 6.1 percent of arable land or 20 percent of the total land, in holdings over 50 hectares.

Andrzej Korbonski, Politics of Socialist Agriculture in Poland: 1945-1960 (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1965) p. 29.

Out of the cultivated land in the Volhynia, 50 percent belonged to several big Polish landowners.

But even if the agricultural reforms were conscientiously carried out, there was a shortage of available land. Poland had under cultivation 49 percent of the total land area, only Denmark cultivated proportionately more land in Europe. Even if all the arable land, including forests, in excess of 50 hectares had been confiscated, it would have satisfied the immediate needs of two-thirds of the dwarf-holders and landless peasants, this without taking into account the effects of natural increase. Of course, the Ukrainians would have been the last to receive anything anyway.

19. In Volhynia and Podolia provinces, where the pressure on land was the most intense, 7,047 Polish settlers obtained, on the average of 10 hectares of land each.

Stanislaw Wronski, "Introduction" to Henryk Cybulski, Czerwone Noce (Warsaw: M.C.N., 1974) pp. 1/16 (p. 9).

The Ukrainian nationalist scholar, Petro Kirchuk estimates the number of the Polish military colonists at 20,000.

Narys Istorii OUN, Vol. 1, p. 232.

They, however, cultivated only 4 percent of expropriated land.

Szczesniak and Szota, Droga do Nikajd, p. 17.

The plans were made in 1937 to settle 6 million Poles in the East, to remove the Ukrainians either by assimilation or by forcing them to emigrate. The war interrupted the implementation of this "project".

S. Wronski, "Introduction" to Cz. Warchocki, Pieczpos-polita Partyzancka, p. ix.

20. Ferdinand Zweig, Poland Between Two Wars (London: Secker and Warburg, 1944) pp. 57, 87/88.

On food intake see: S.L. Sharp, Poland. White Eagle, p. 106.

21. On war destruction, see: Adademia Nauk USSR. Institut Istorii. Istoriiia Ukrain's'koi SSR, Vol. 2 (Kiev: Naukova

Dumka, 1969) pp. 599/606.

On the famine in the Ukraine, see: N.S. Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers (trans. from the Russian by Strobe Talbot) (New York: Bantam Books, 1970) pp. 247/250.

22. On that point, see: Piotr Stawecki, Następcy Komendanta. Wojsko a Polityka Wewnętrzna Drugiej Rzeczypospolitej w Latach 1935-1939 (Warsaw: M.O.N., 1969) pp. 133/201, note 83 on p. 193. Appendixes 6 and 7, "Pacifications" pp. 279/288.

On the pacifications from the Ukrainian point of view, see: Petro Mirchuk, Narys Istorii Orhanizatsii Ukrains'kykh Natsionalistiv, Vol. I, 1920-1939 (Munich: Ukrains'ke Vydavnytstvo, 1968) pp. 251/258.

23. The Civil Service was the major employer for university and high school graduates in Poland before the war. Thus, out of 103 heads of villages (soltys) in Volhynia, where 70.4 percent of the population was Ukrainian, 81 were Poles and 19 were Ukrainians. In the village administrations (gmina) in Volhynia, the Poles numbered 69 percent and the Ukrainians, 26 percent. In the county administrations (powiat), the Ukrainians comprised merely 16 percent and the Poles 75 percent of the personnel.

Stanislaw Wronski, "Introduction" to Czeslaw Warchocki, Rzeczpospolita Partyzancka, p. xiv.

Teaching jobs were also hard to get, because the Ukrainian schools were constantly closed by the authorities, e.g. out of 2,435 Ukrainian schools in L'vov Province in 1922/23, only 457 remained in 1934/35.

A. Szczesniak and W. Szota, Druga do Nika, d, pp. 16/17.

The uneducated classes did not fare better. Jobs in industry were unobtainable for the Ukrainian youth. There were only 250,000 Ukrainian industrial workers, employed mostly in light industry, out of a population of 7 million. Only 1.2 percent of the Greek Orthodox and 1.1 percent of the Greek Catholics were employed as office workers, as Janusz Zarnowski, Spoleczenstwo Drugiej Rzeczypospolitej, 1919-1939 (Warsaw: Panstwowe Wydawnictwo Nauk, 1973) p. 334, p. 378 table 62. Rzeczpospolita, 1917-1922 (Warsaw: Panstwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1973) p. 334, p. 378 table 62.

24. Lucian W. Pye, Guerrilla Communism in Malaya (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1956) pp. 152/153.

Virginia Thompson noted, referring to French Indochina, that "three hundred law school graduates for a country of 23 million was a menace to social equilibrium". French Indochina (New York: Octagon Books, 1968, a reprint of a 1937 Macmillan edition) p. 297. Poland had many more unemployed Ukrainian lawyers.

Prof. Roman Smal-Stocki in a letter to Yaroslav Bilinsky The Second Soviet Republic. Ukraine after World War II

(New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers Univ. Press, 1964) cited on p. 87.

Petro Mirchuk estimates that about half of the members of the Ukrainian student association joined the OUN. Narys Istorii OUN, Vol. 1, p. 328.

The OUN leader Lev Rebet in Svitla i Tini OUN estimates that in truly free elections, the OUN could have obtained in the 1930s, between 80 to 90 percent of the votes among the Ukrainian electorate in Poland.

25. Stanislaw Wronski, "Introduction" to Henryk Cybulski, Czerwone Noce, p. xiii.

Wladyslaw Pobog-Malinowski, Najnowsza Historia Polityczna Polski, Vol. 2 pp. 800/805.

26. M.K. Dziewanowski, The Communist Party of Poland. An Outline of History (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1959) p. 340 note 6.

Volodymyr Holubnychy, "Ukraine Since World War II", The Ukraine. A Concise Encyclopedia, Vol. 1 (Toronto: Ukrainian National Association/Univ. of Toronto Press, 1963) pp. 894/911 (p. 911).

The Soviet Ukrainian Samizdat Press estimates the number of deported Galicians at 2 million, between 1939 and 1950.

"Etnocid Ukraintsiv v SSSR", in Ukrains'kyi Visnyk (a reprint of Samizdat Press from the Soviet Ukraine) (Paris: Smoloskyp, 1975).

27. On persecution of the Uniate Church, see:

Bohdan R. Bociuriw, "The Uniate Church in the Soviet Union: A Case Study in Soviet Church Policy", Canadian Slavonic Papers, No. 7 (1965) pp. 89/113.

Walter Kolarz, Religion in the Soviet Union (London: Macmillan, 1962) pp. 227/244.

28. For example, in 1935 in the Soviet Ukraine there were 7.1 horses per 100 hectares of tilled land, whereas in the Western Ukraine there were 16.

Nicholas I. Poppe, "Soviet Agricultural Policy and the Nationalities Problem in the USSR", Report on the Soviet Union in 1956 (Munich: by the Institute of the Soviet Union, 1956) pp. 31/50 (p. 43).

29. The intensity and speed of collectivization was terrific. For example, on January 1, 1948 only 9.6 percent of all farms were collectivized, 49 percent on January 1, 1949, 95½ percent by July 1, 1952.

Jaroslav Bilinsky, The Second Soviet Republic, pp. 84/110.

After all, Stalin was determined to make the Soviet peasant pay for the post-war reconstruction. Taxes on

private plots and kolkhoz taxes were highly increased in August, 1948. The compulsory bond buying, the permanent procurement quotas, compulsory planting of vast forest-shelter belts, the "currency reform" of 1947 which virtually wiped out all the cash savings hoarded by the peasants during the war - all of this reduced the peasant to the level of a serf.

On the post-war pauperization of the peasant see:

Roy A. Medvedev, Let History Judge. The Origins and Consequences of Stalinism (New York: Vintage Books, 1973) Chapter 13.

Alec Nove, An Economic History of the USSR (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1975) pp. 276/277, 296, 301.

Jerzy F. Karcz, "From Stalin to Brezhnev: Soviet Agricultural Policy in Historical Perspective", in James R. Millar, editor, The Soviet Rural Community. A Symposium (Urbana, Ill.: Univ. of Illinois Press, 1971) pp. 36/72 (p. 62).

30. On the migration of the Russians and Eastern Ukrainians into the area, see:

John A. Armstrong, The Soviet Bureaucratic Elite. A Case Study of the Ukrainian Apparatus (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publ., 1959) table 16, p. 121.

Istoriya Ukrainy SSR, Vol. 2, p. 609.

31. Clarence A. Manning places the Ukrainians who died from hunger during the Collectivization at 4,800,000 by 1932.

Clarence A. Manning, Ukraine Under the Soviets (New York: Bookman Associates, 1953) p. 95.

Dmytro Solovei claims 7.5 million dead in his Lyudnist' Ukrainy za Sorok Rokiv Vlady TsK KPSS v Svitli Pepepysiv (Detroit, Mich.: Vil'na Ukraina, 1961) p. 12.

On the economic exploitation of the Ukraine:

Prof. Holubnychy notes that the agricultural prices paid for obligatory deliveries in the Ukraine are 25 to 75 percent lower than the prices for the same goods produced in Central Russia. Also, the balance of fiscal transactions has been unfavorable to the Ukraine: In 1959/1961, revenues received by the Ukraine from the USSR budget were 126 billion less than those collected. There were disproportionate regional allocations of capital investments. The gross volume of output of Ukrainian industry increased only 27 times between 1913 and 1960, and 42 times in the RSFSR within the same period. Indeed, until the 1950s, certain crucial sectors, like that of machine-building, were neglected, giving the Ukrainian industry a somewhat lopsided character, reminiscent of typical colonial economies, with their emphasis on extractive industries. In 1951, only 3.3 percent of the total industrial capital in the Ukraine had been invested into machine-

building, as compared with 27.7 percent for the USSR as a whole.

V. Holubnychy, "The Ukrainian Economy After World War II" and his "The Soviet Economic System in the Ukraine", both in The Ukrainian Encyclopedia, Vol. 2, pp. 702/733 (pp. 722/723).

On linguistic and educational discrimination and Russification, see:

John Kolasky, Education in the Soviet Ukraine (Toronto: Peter Martin Assoc., 1968).

Jacob Ornstein, "Soviet Language Policy: Theory and Practice", Slavic and Eastern European Journal, Vol. 17 #1 (Spring, 1959) pp. 1/24.

32. Thus, if before 1939 the GUN membership in the Stanislaw Province was 1,200, then in 1940, during the first Soviet occupation, there were 9,600, in 1934 - 23,870. Most of them were between the ages of 17 and 24 (19,096) of whom 6,880 joined the UPA and the rest were either in the GUN underground or in the territorial village defense forces (SKV). Probably 50 percent of the UPA fighters were simultaneously members of the GUN.

Lev Shankovs'kiy, "Trinadzat' Let. Dii UPA ii Zbroynoho Pidpillia GUN na Tereni Viis'kovoi Okruhi No. 4 'Hovorlia', 1943-1956 rr.", in Almanakh Stanislavschiny, pp. 163/193 (p. 186 note).

The hostility of the Western Ukrainians to the Soviet troops, even before the Nazi invasion, has been noted by many Soviet observers, especially those in the military stationed there.

General of the Army Ivan I. Fediuninskii, Podniatye Po Trevoze (sec. rev. ed., Moscow: Voennoe Izdatelstvo, 1964) p. 7.

According to the official Soviet history, right after the war, "The reestablishment of agriculture and institutionalizing of the socialist changes in the Western areas had encountered some difficulties...due to subversive activities of the kulaks, who, wanting to safeguard their class domination, with the help of the Ukrainian nationalist-bourgeois bands, supported by foreign imperialists... began to terrorize working peasantry and killing activists."

Istoriya Ukrain's'koi SSR, Vol. 2, p. 608.

33. Pravda, June 13, 1953, p. 2. Quoted by Frederick C. Barabooorn, Soviet Russian Nationalism (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1956) p. 45.

34. Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bringham Powell, Jr., Comparative Politics. A Developmental Approach (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1966) p. 50.

35. For example, Norman Raymond Humphrey asserts that in

Latin America. "Men are expected to behave like...muy hombre...He acquires a sensitive shell to protect dignity and is expected to respond aggressively to threats to 'dignidad'. Response to an affront must be immediate, direct, and normally violent."

"Ethnic Images and Stereotypes of Mexican and Americans", The American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Vol. 14 #3 (April, 1955) pp. 303/310.

36. Irving Louis Horowitz, "Cuban Communism", Trans-Action, Vol. 4 (October, 1967) p. 9.

36A. On literature and culture as affecting the Cossack legend, see:

Istoriya Ukrain's'koi Kultury, Vol. 1: Mytologiya, Pobut, Pismennitstvo (sec. rev. ed., Winnipeg: Ivan Tyktor, 1964).

Akademiya Nauk URSR. Instytut Mystetstvoznavstva, Folkloru, ta Etnografii. Ukrain's'ki Narodni Dumy ta Istorichni Pisni (Kiev: Akademiya Nauk URSR, 1955).

Volofymyr Lutsiv, "Kobzar Bandura and 'Dumy' and their significance in the History of the Ukrainian People", Ukrainian Review, Vol. 13 #1 (Spring, 1966) pp. 53/70.

As Theodor Shanin puts it, "there are subjective determinants of military action generally labeled morale, the resistance of which to quantitative analysis does not limit their importance in the shaping of reality. Peasant revolts all over the world display common cultural features which, in all their complexity seem to be better grasped by the synthetic expression of the arts than by the analytical tools of the social sciences. The leader hero, the legends which surround him and his personal charisma, take to a large extent the place of ideology and organization as a uniting factor. The picturesque image of the young peasant rebel challenges the mundane nature of everyday peasant life..."

Theodor Shanin, "The Peasantry as a Political Factor", in Sam O. Sarkessian, ed., Revolutionary Guerrilla Warfare (Chicago: Precedent Publ. Co., 1975) pp. 267/289 (p. 295).

37. Philip Longworth, The Cossacks (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1969).

B.A. Golubitzkiy, Zaporozhskoe Kazachestvo (Kiev: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoi Literatury, 1957).

Dr. Petro Mirchuk, Koliivschyna. Haidamatzke Povstania 1768 Roku (London: Shevchenko Scientific Society, 1973).

On the Ukrainian national character, see:

Ivan D. Rudnytsky, "The Role of the Ukraine in Modern Society", in Donald W. Threadgold, editor, The Development of the USSR. An Exchange of Views (Seattle, Wash.: Univ. of Washington Press, 1964) pp. 211/228.

Ivan Kultchysky, "The Basic Traits of the Ukrainian People", The Ukraine. Concise Encyclopedia, Vol. 1,

pp. 946/953.

38. Ivan L. Rudnytsky, "The Intellectual Origins of Modern Ukraine", The Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences, Vol. 6 #4, pp. 1381/1405 (p. 1383).

Peter Kenez, Civil War in South Russia, 1919-1920. The Defeat of the Whites (Berkeley, Ca.: The Univ. of Calif. Press, 1977) pp. 140/177 (p. 162).

Michael Palij concludes that Makhno and his followers were the products of the specific environment of South-Eastern Ukraine, the area with strong traditions of rebellions, going back to the Zaporozhan Sich. The descendants of the Zaporozhan Cossacks had never known serfdom and had always displayed a spirit of self-reliance and enterprise. The peasant anarchism found its base there. Also such prominent nationalist leaders as Hetman P. Skoropadsky and Simon Petliura were the descendants of the Cossacks.

Michael Palij, The Anarchism of Nestor Makhno, 1918-1920. An Aspect of the Ukrainian Revolution (Seattle, Wash.: Univ. of Washington Press, 1976).

Frank Sysyn, "Nestor Makhno and Ukrainian Revolution", Taras Hunczak, editor, The Ukraine, 1917-1921: A Study in Revolution (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1977) pp. 271/304.

The tradition of revolt is evident even in the modern era. For example, Dmytro Solovei estimates that between April 1 and June 19, 1919 there were 328 peasant uprisings in the Bolshevik-held Ukraine.

Dmytro Solovei, Holhota Ukrainy (Winnepeg: Ukrains'ky Holos, 1953) Vol. 1, p. 22.

Arthur A. Adams, "The Great Ukrainian Jacqueries", Taras Hunczak, editor, The Ukraine, 1917-1921: A Study in Revolution, pp. 247/270.

39. It ought to be noted that the Zaporozhan Cossacks were masters of guerrilla warfare. Undoubtedly, this indirectly influenced the UPA's tactics. This way a direct link with the military tradition was established. The UPA fighters regarded themselves heirs to the Cossack traditions. This was evident in their songs or in their military ranks. "The Order of the Supreme Headquarters of the UPA about the Introduction of Military Ranks of August 27, 1943" states that; "...to establish a link with the military traditions of our glorious past...all soldiers of the UPA will be called Cossacks. Cossack is an esteemed title of a fighter for the Ukrainian state..."

The Order is reproduced in Litopys UPA, Vol. 1 (Toronto: Litopys UPA, 1976) pp. 133/135.

On the influence of history on Dmytro Dontsov, one of the major theorists of the Ukrainian nationalism, see his:

Pravda Pradidiv Velykykh (Philadelphia, Pa.: Organizatsiya Oborony Chotyriokh Svobid, 1952).

De Shukaty Nashykh Istorichnykh Traditziy (Lviv: Knigozbirnia Visnyka, 1938).

40. For example, "Dekliaratsiya Providu OUN Pislia Zakonchenhennia II Svitovoi Viini, Mai, 1945" in OUN v Svitli Postanov Velykykh Zboriv, Konferentsiy Ta Inshykh Dokumentiv Borot'by, 1939-1955 (Munich: Zakordonne Chastyny OUN, 1955) pp. 121/142.

41. Some criminologists, like Morris Janowitz and Allen Grimshaw also have noted that "...in every case where major rioting occurred, the social structure of the community has been characterized by weak patterns of external control."

Morris Janowitz, Social Control of Escalated Riots (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1967) p. 7.

Allen Grimshaw, "Police Agencies and the Prevention of Racial Violence", Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Sciences No. 54 (March, 1963) pp. 110/113.

The term "power vacuum" was first used by Bohdan Denitch, "Violence and Social Change in the Yugoslav Revolution. Lessons for the Third World", Comparative Politics (New York), Vol. 8 #3 (April, 1976) pp. 465/478 (p. 469).

Denitch notes that the violent Nazi reprisals helped to speed up the process of social uprooting. Without this, massive recruiting into Tito's Army would have been difficult. Terror had destroyed the traditional associations, institutions and attitudes fostering the peasant's parochialism and political indifference. The old rural elites were either annihilated, run away or were discredited by collaborating with the Nazis. The personal danger made the peasant more ready to identify with the national cause. The "leadership gap" was filled by the Communists as the most effective, the most credible resistance fighters in the peasant's eyes. War, moreover, increases economic hardships of the population, thus increasing its resentment of the authority even more.

42. The relevant document is cited in Antoni B. Szczesniak and Wieslaw Z. Szota, Droga do Nikajd (Warsaw: M.O.K., 1973) p. 259.

CHAPTER III Ukrainian Nationalism
and the International Environment

Introduction:

The fate of all guerrilla movements depends, in part, on the international balance of forces and on international opinion at a given point in time. The international climate was highly unfavorable to the Ukrainian Nationalists. They, for all practical purposes, remained isolated from and ignored by the international community. This helped to seal their doom.

In 1945, three major actors were present on the European scene: 1) The USSR/Poland (the incumbent); 2) the UNR/UPA (the insurgent); and 3) the Anglo-Americans. Their action or inaction depended on their respective views of the international situation and of each other.¹

The incumbent's perception of the international scene, whether realistic or imaginary, influences strongly his internal policies. For instance, the perception of an external threat strengthens the state's resolve to eliminate any real or potential source of subversion and thus secure its rear in the event of war. This often results in a crackdown on dissidence, in a ban on any opposition, in greater insistence on internal vigilance, ideological uniformity and social unity. Such was the position of the

Soviet Union at the beginning of the Cold War.²

On the side of the insurgent, on the other hand, the belief that the international balance of interest and/or power favors him, is bound to strengthen his resolve to "hang on", to continue fighting despite the odds. Undoubtedly, this was one of the reasons for the dogged determination of the Algerian FLN and the Vietcong to persevere in their struggle, regardless of huge losses.

The perception and actions on the part of the potential "interventionist" members of the international community toward the adversaries in the internal war, is a third factor that may determine its outcome. For example, the British and American assistance to the Royal Greek Government during the Greek Civil War assured the latter's victory.

The attitude of the "intervening" state results from many factors. Set arbitrarily, these are: 1) Perceived strategic and economic interests in the area or the expected utility of intervention; its effect on trade, fiscal balance, political stability and strategic posture.

2) Cultural, historical, geographic and ethnic affinity or empathy with either side. This often results in the presence or absence of emotional involvement in the conflict. The closer geographically an affected territory is, the more important it is regarded to be by the ruling

elite. But this does not merely involve geographic proximity to a rebel territory; this involves also the dominant elite's perception of the affected territory as an integral part of the national domain. As a Russian sees it, the Ukraine is Slavic, speaks a similar language and has played a part in Russian history for many centuries. It is seen as more part of the Russian Empire than, say, Algeria ever was to France.

3) Physical capacity and will to intervene. This category includes the availability, size, morale and readiness of the Armed Forces or intelligence agencies and the willingness of the government to employ them. While this was not an issue in our case, it must be noted that the will to intervene is shaped in part by memories of previous successful or disastrous interventions. For example, an apparent inability of the United States to check the Communist encroachment in Africa or Afghanistan by force, has undoubtedly been influenced by bitter memories of Vietnam and the desire to avoid another prolonged, costly and divisive involvement.³

4) Structural characteristics of decision-making process. These, according to James N. Rosenau, either inhibit or promote bias or misperceptions, affecting thus, an accurate assessment of the situation by statesmen. The efficiency, experience and skill of the decision-making apparatus also ought to be included. The decision-maker's attitudes or perceptions may also be shaped by such factors as internal

political constellation, the prevailing social norms, "checks and balances" of the decision-making process, by racial and cultural diversity or homogeneity and so forth. All of these variables tend to mold the statesmen's "anticipatory perception".

A certain methodological problem must be noted when considering perceptions or images. This analysis is based on statements made by public officials. However, did they mean or believe what they said? Were they aware of possible exaggerations, falsehoods, or omissions? Thus, divining the real motives may be inaccurate. It must be also noted that the period under discussion, between 1945 and 1953, is the least known in Soviet history. What went on in the Kremlin at that time must be, therefore, subject to tentative, even if informed, speculation.

The Soviet Perception of the International
Scene and the position of the Ukraine in it:

In general, the more unfavorable the perception of the external setting by a regime confronted with internal rebellion, the more determined and ruthless measures will be adopted.

Some authorities, notably George F. Kennan and Adam Ulam, maintain that between 1945 and 1953, the Kremlin had a "neurotic" view of the world caused by "the traditional

and instinctive Russian sense of insecurity", by the belief that there could never be a permanent modus vivendi with the United States and the West. Indeed, Frederick C. Barghoorn notes that the Soviet image of the United States became negative long before June, 1941. America was cast in the role of the world's chief warmonger as early as 1925 by Stalin, speaking to the 14th Party Congress. During this speech Stalin noted that "two chief but opposed centers of gravity are being formed...Anglo-American and the Soviet Union", preceding Andrei Zhdanov's celebrated "two-camps" speech of November, 1946 by 21 years.⁴ Such a neurotic or possibly paranoid view led to a "projection" which, reflecting their own indoctrination, denotes the tendency to regard the policies and institutions of other countries in terms far more applicable to the Soviet Union itself than to the West. The aspirations, intentions and methods so typical of the Soviet Union leaders were ascribed to the Western statesmen. The Soviets officially expressed the belief that America and her allies will sooner or later attack Russia, taking advantage of the terrible economic and social havoc caused by war. After all, in the past the Russian statesmen had always taken advantage of their neighbors' weakness, for example, Poland, Turkey, Sweden and China. They expected the same treatment from the West in 1945.

The anticipated aggression by the West was unavoid-

able, according to the official position, because capitalism is inherently expansionist. According to a leading Soviet economist and statesman of the period, Nikolai Voznesensky, "American imperialist expansion spearheaded by monopoly capitalism, is aimed at unleashing a new war as a means to win world domination, to strangle democracy, and to prevent an economic crisis and the resistance of the working class at home". According to him, for American giant capitalist monopolies, war has been a highly profitable activity as well as a means of preventing an unavoidable post-war crisis, with the concomitant unemployment, depression, inflation and social unrest. Voznesensky's was just a typical opinion, repeated countless times by Stalin, Molotov, Zhdanov and others. They firmly believed that another Great Depression would overrun America, enhancing desperation and thus the aggressiveness of her ruling circles. So long as the capitalist encirclement remains, so does the danger of war. The people and leaders of the Soviet Union, therefore, must "keep their powder dry", to display an unrelenting vigilance, preparedness and firm unity.⁵

The Soviet leaders were not merely wary of what they regarded as the inherently predatory nature of capitalism. As they saw it, their ideological assumptions seemed to be confirmed by such events as: Allen Dulles' secret negotia-

tions with the Wehrmacht in Italy in April, 1945; a sudden termination of Lend-Lease in June, 1945 (Truman called this his greatest mistake); the "misplacing" of a Soviet request for a one billion dollar loan; and most important, the acquisition of the atomic bomb by the Americans and its employment against Japan, which was interpreted as a veiled warning to the Soviet Union. Other developments, between 1945 and 1947, contributing to Russian paranoia, were: Overflights by American or British aircraft of the Soviet territory (40 shot down); diplomatic set-backs in the Persian Azerbaijan and Yugoslavia; Churchill's "Iron Curtain" speech in Fulton; the Truman Doctrine of July, 1947; and the Marshall Plan. The latter was regarded and officially labelled as an attempt to rebuild Germany's economy and her armed forces. The fear of Germany shaped to a great extent the Soviet attitude toward the West. For example, Stalin remarked to Dillias that, "...the Germans will recover and very quickly...Give them twelve to fifteen years and they'll be on their feet again... then we will have another go at it". Terrible memories of two World Wars, fears of German "revanchism" and a fear of a capitalist "cordon sanitaire" were quickly revived.⁶

To sum up, the Soviet leaders basically perceived a bipolar world in which, of all the capitalist powers, only America emerged much stronger militarily and economically. Faced with a potential economic crisis and the "natural"

desire of the great capitalist monopolies to retain the markets which had absorbed American production during the war and to acquire untapped markets in Eastern Europe, America, according to Russia's chief ideologue Andrei Zhdanov, launched a "predatory and expansionist course... to establish the world supremacy of American imperialism." This is also the view held by American "revisionist" historians, namely Gabriel Kolko, Gar Alperovitz and William A. Williams.⁷

Fear of Soviet Nationalities:

Besides foreign policy considerations, the Soviet attitude toward the West was bound to be strongly affected by internal considerations. The most important and most pertinent to this case was the growth of nationalism during the war, especially among the second largest Soviet nationality - the Ukrainians. The nationalist "cancer" had also penetrated the Baltic republics, the Caucasian people and the Jews.⁸ In a multinational state, like the Soviet Union, which is dominated by one ethnic group to the detriment of the other 14 major ones, the National question has always been and will remain a crucial one. As Pravda put it in 1968, "The national question is one of the most acute questions of social development. It has taken on special acuteness in the contemporary era, the era of socialism and capitalism."^{8A}

The issue of nationalism has plagued the Communists since the founding of the Soviet state. Initially, the Bolsheviks proclaimed the right of any nationality opposing Imperial Russia to secede. Despite their primary emphasis on class struggle, they used nationalism as a destabilizing force which could be used against the Tsarist Regime. After 1917, however, they quickly realized that the breakup of the former Tsarist Empire into a league of national independent states would undermine the economic and strategic foundations of the young Soviet state itself. As Stalin frankly admitted, "...Central Russia, the heart of world revolution cannot hold out long without the assistance of the Border regions, which abound in raw materials, fuels and foodstuffs."^{8E} A typical imperialist viewpoint. The principle of self-determination quickly became an empty phrase. The rationale used was that national self-determination could not be permitted to serve as a cloak for "counterrevolution", that is for a possible secession from the "Socialist" state, and accession to the capitalist world. The underlying assumption was that no toilers in their right mind would consider secession from the first proletarian state in history. Both Lenin and Stalin very openly, in accordance with their world-view, maintained that the right of self-determination must always be subordinated, in Stalin's words, to "the right of the working class to consolidate its power, its right to exercise dictatorship." Similarly, to Lenin, "...the interests of

socialism are above the interests of the right of nations to self-determination."⁸⁰ Of course, the working class or the interests of socialism were to be defined in any way suitable to the Soviet leaders.

Nationalism, combined with the adjective "bourgeois" became a dirty word in Soviet Communist phraseology very early. It has been defined as "the ideology and policy of the bourgeois, defending its class exploiting interests which it presents as those of the whole nation." In the same vein, "bourgeois-nationalists", the term bourgeois being used rather loosely, were described as, "...despised traitors of the motherland", as "hirelings of the imperialist intelligence services", as "weapons of international imperialism", as "class enemies", as "remnants of the past." According to still another authoritative definition, "...Bourgeois nationalism reflects class antagonisms of the capitalist society. When private ownership for the means of production disappears so will nationalism."⁸¹

In practice such an assertion is premature, to say the least. Nationalism remains a potent force. The existence of a powerful nationalist trend in the Ukraine was tacitly acknowledged by Stalin's insistence at Yalta on the Ukraine's voting membership in the United Nations. However false the window-dressing, its presence could have been due to Stalin's desire not merely to obtain two add-

itional votes in the U.N. General Assembly, but perhaps to conciliate the Ukrainians, both Eastern and Western, whose suffering during World War II was the greatest. Perhaps he wanted, by this small gesture, to satisfy the resurrected Ukrainian nationalist pride, to give them a semblance of sovereignty.

By the annexation of Galicia itself, Stalin could appear as a unifier of the Ukrainian people and as protector of the territorial integrity of the Ukrainian state. The economic importance of Galicia is slight. The only real economic asset in the area used to be oil, the production of which fell from 1,047,000 tons in 1913 to 325,000 in 1950. Its importance is mainly geopolitical. Its possession secures Russia's access to the Danube Basin, into the Balkans, Rumania and Hungary. The geopolitical reasons evidently underlined also the Soviet annexation of Transcarpathian Ukraine, the so called Ruthenia, which was Czechoslovakia's easternmost province before World War II. The Soviet Union incorporated this province in January, 1945, a few days before the Yalta meeting. While strategic reasons were probably the decisive ones, several observers have also raised the question whether the addition of Ruthenia was not one of the Russian gestures aimed at satisfying an all-Ukrainian Nationalism, reinvigorated during World War II.

What is more important, however, the incorporating, securing and pacifying Galicia has enabled the Soviets to liquidate a potentially contagious and explosive source of nationalism and separatism among the Soviet's most important non-Russian nationality and one of their most vital economic areas. For example, before World War II, the Eastern Ukraine supplied 60 percent of Soviet iron and cast iron, 50 percent of steel, 70 percent of sugar beets, 50 percent of coal, 40 percent of winter wheat, 72.1 percent of coke, and 35 percent of manganese. Its economic importance is undeniable. Without its resources, the economic development and post-war reconstruction of Russia proper could not have taken place.^{9A}

This factor combined with the fear of capitalist encirclement and the need to maintain a unified front against a perceived threat, explains the harsh attitude taken after 1945 against any, however minor, manifestations of "bourgeois" nationalism. There was apparently a fear that the West might use nationalism as a destabilizing force against the Bolsheviks. After all, they themselves had used it skillfully to overthrow the Tsarist Empire. It explains the increased emphasis on Soviet, that is "supraethnic", patriotism, which was the major theme of Andrei Zhdanov's notorious "anti-Cosmopolitan" campaign.^{9B} This theme began with Stalin's famous toast to the Russian people on May 24, 1945, during the Victory Banquet, when he

praised the Russians as "the most eminent of all nations belonging to the Soviet Union", "the leading people, marching in the vanguard of humanity."⁹⁰ The desire to preserve the cohesion of the multi-ethnic state in the event of another crisis is clear in Stalin's remark during the Election Speech of February 9, 1946, "...as you know, prominent foreign pressmen have more than once gone on record to the effect that the Soviet multi-national state was an 'artificial', 'non-viable' structure, that in the event of any complication...the fate of Austria-Hungary awaited the Soviet Union..."¹⁰

To prevent such a fate, the Soviet leaders decided to suppress any nationalist manifestations or deviations. Of these, the Ukrainian Nationalism, being the largest and best organized, was deemed the most dangerous. In the past, according to Adam Ulam, "the Ukrainian problem has been...one of the most persistent worries of the Soviet leaders in the 1930s and this worry, one of the main keys to their foreign policy...In any possible war, the Ukraine was felt to be the critical element in any internal danger within the internal part of the Soviet Union."^{10A} The Soviet leaders could not forget the powerful, nationalistically oriented movements in the Ukraine during the Revolution and Civil War. Between 1917 and 1926, the Soviet Ukraine witnessed the early emergence of the so called "national communism", which after all was but

an imitation of the Russian grafting of communism onto the Russian national interests and pride. Known also as Borot'bism (Borot'ba meaning struggle in both Ukrainian and Russian). It was espoused by such Communist notables as Skrypnyk, and Hrynko, (Commissars of Education and Finance, respectively).¹¹ In the Ukraine, the manifestations of nationalized or even chauvinized Communism appeared earlier than elsewhere, long before the 1948 rift between Tito and Stalin. The collaboration of a considerable number of the Eastern Ukrainians, including many former Communists, with the Nazis during the war gave the Russian leaders additional cause for concern.

Hence, the eradication of Ukrainian nationalism had always been considered crucial, even today. If the Ukrainians, the largest non-Russian nationality, were successfully assimilated, pressures from other minorities would be of lesser importance. Furthermore, the Eastern Ukraine, as stated earlier, is one of the most important industrial raw material and agricultural regions in the country. Its separation would mean possibly the dissolution of the Soviet Union as a state.

All these considerations, reinforced by the anticipation of another world war, account for the intensity, ruthlessness, urgency and huge resources committed in the campaign against the insurgents in Galicia. The Western

Ukrainians were the most staunchly anti-communist, anti-Russian and anti-Soviet element in the Soviet Union. Being so numerous, they were difficult to control. Their territory was the firm base of a strong partisan movement and they spread highly contagious nationalistic nationalistic propaganda aimed at the Eastern Ukraine and the rest of Russia. As such, they could have been exploited by the Anglo-Americans in their subversive campaign against Soviet Russia, resulting in a possible secession in the event of war. The Ukrainian nationalism had, as Moscow perceived it, to be eliminated as soon as and as completely as possible.

Another domestic factor shaping the Soviet foreign policy stand was the leadership's desire to reduce the discontent and frustrated expectations of the Soviet people, especially the intellectuals, for a better and more relaxed life after the war. The knowledge that the Soviet people gained about American prosperity, technological strength and cultural achievements during the war, through the Lend-Lease programs, had led to many unfavorable comparisons with Russia. Furthermore, what millions of Soviet soldiers and deported civilians had seen in Germany, Austria or even Poland, could not but have convinced them of the superiority of the Western style of living. The demoralizing effect of this has been confirmed by virulent public Soviet denunciations of "servility" and "cowtowing" to foreign culture,

the major theme of A. Zhdanov's infamous "anti-Cosmopolitan" campaign launched on November 6, 1946. Disillusionment with Soviet reality caused a decline in Party zeal, a tremendous turnover in the Party membership and the lowering of its morale. For example, the head of the Komsomol, M.M. Mikhailov lamented about a mood of "demobilization" among the Soviet youth, the "future" of the country, asserting that this "opens the door to the infection of youth by bourgeois ideology which is foreign to us and leads to a situation in which the feeling for the new and the enthusiasm threatens to wither."¹² To arrest this development, the propaganda machine attempted to persuade them that Russian or Soviet culture and way of life were superior to that of the "decadent, decaying, bourgeois" West. Even more effective was the theme of a predatory, capitalist, aggressive encirclement and the need to maintain a united front, discipline and eternal vigilance against this threat. The United States and the West were blamed for the miserably low standard of living, since all the available funds had to be allocated for defense. Hence the West was a convenient bogey, deflecting popular discontent and prompting Churchill's celebrated phrase that the Kremlin "feared the friendship of the West far more than its enmity."¹³

The CUN and the International Scene:

The second actor on the scene was the organization of

Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and its military arm, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA). Its leadership displayed, at least at the end of the war, a fatally unrealistic, greatly distorted and oversimplified view of the emerging international situation. This misperception may have resulted in the decision to resist the Soviet occupation of Galicia, causing large and needless casualties.¹⁴

As it appears on the basis of documents and minutes of the OUN conferences, held between 1941 and 1946, and books and pamphlets authored by the OUN leaders (Bandera, Poltava, Shukhevych), there were two periods in the reasoning of the OUN leadership regarding foreign affairs: from 1941 to 1945; and from 1945 to 1950. Between 1941 and 1945, the OUN High Command believed in, or hoped for, a protracted war from which the Nazis and the Bolsheviks would emerge so weakened that they would give up their rule of the Ukraine. They also reasoned that America and Britain, in accordance with the Atlantic Charter and the principles of the balance of power, would attempt to prevent the complete subjugation of the area by Russia. After the anticipated collapse of Russia and Germany, a period of anarchy in the area was expected, just like in 1918. A power vacuum would be created, which would be filled by a nation with an organized military force and ready-made administrative network. The "habit" of underground struggle would crystallize such a force, namely the OUN/UPA. Another

variation of the same view was that Galicia constitutes the base of the movement for independence, the Ukrainian Piedmont. The Soviet Army, after defeating Germany, would be utterly exhausted, providing an opportunity for a general uprising against the Stalinist tyranny. Huge losses inflicted on the Soviets during the war would take away any desire on the part of the Red Army soldiers to prolong fighting. So instead of confronting the Nationalists, they would withdraw voluntarily. It was also assumed that the Anglo-Americans and the Russians would clash immediately after the war. During the war they were not really allies, but just co-belligerents thrown accidentally into an incompatible alliance, which would disintegrate as soon as disagreements over the post-war organization of the world would surface. These disagreements would culminate in a new world war, which the Soviets would lose. Utilizing such a "golden opportunity", the UFA would move in to fill the political vacuum in the Ukraine. The sooner and the more it was prepared for such a contingency, the better the chance for independence. It was hoped that the post World War I situation would not be repeated and that the Anglo-Americans would, in accordance with the Atlantic Charter, the United Nations Charter and their national interests, recognize a sovereign Ukrainian state.

However, right after the war, when the Soviet Union did not collapse militarily, the perception of the internat-

ional situation changed somewhat. After 1945, the political constellation of the world was seen by the CUN leaders as consisting of two "irreconcilably hostile" camps - Anglo-American and Russian-Bolshevik. There were three major bones of contention between them: The Pacific Ocean (China, Korea, Japan); the Middle East (Iran, Turkey, Palestine); and South-Eastern Europe (Germany, Poland, Italy, Greece). Conflicts over these regions would first take the form of an open "political-diplomatic warfare". Any diplomatic intercourse would be characterized by an "utter inability to solve anything". Any possible agreements would be of a "temporary and unstable character" and designed to "play for time", in order to prepare militarily, economically and psychologically for an unavoidable war. Russia would be forced to launch an adventurist and expansionist course of foreign policy in order to sway her population's attention away from its difficult economic plight and the inability of the ruling circles to do anything about it. The Soviet Communist Party and Government were, in the CUN Command's view, unable to satisfy even the most elementary needs of the working masses. Increasing taxation, compulsory buying of governmental bonds, progressively lower salaries, longer working hours, siphoning off the last savings from the masses through the revaluation of currency, shortages of the most basic consumer goods, the lack of housing, poor food supply and the resulting famines - all of these would create mass discontent, which,

in turn, would lead to the intensification of police terror. The end result would be mass uprisings, perhaps revolution. Hence, the Soviet leaders had no choice; they must pursue an aggressive foreign policy to deflect or defuse any possible mass discontent. Such a policy would result in an unavoidable war with the West. The diplomatic conflicts over Persian Azerbaijan, Berlin, Korea, Greece and Poland were only the first moves in the approaching hostilities. The Soviet occupation of Galicia, therefore, was regarded by the OUN leadership as temporary. Until World War III erupted, the guerrilla struggle should be continued in order to maintain a "psychological beachhead" and to develop the necessary administrative, political and military cadres.¹⁵ Such, in a nutshell, was the position of the OUN's High Command.

It was underlined by the memories of the Nazi lightning victories that had demonstrated the weakness of the Soviet Union. The illusion, however, was that such a crushing defeat could happen again, despite the Soviet victories on the Eastern Front. The Soviet occupation was seen as temporary. The nature of the Soviet system, its remarkable resiliency, its sophisticated, all-encompassing and efficient system of control, the policies of the Western Alliance and its attitude, if there was any, toward the Ukrainian cause - were misjudged, misread and misunderstood by the Ukrainian nationalist leaders. It is hard to explain

why. One could submit two possible explanations. The first one is the Ukrainian suicidal-romanticism or cavalry-charge romanticism encouraging a struggle for glory alone, irrespective of sacrifices or odds. Many years of close cultural intercourse with Poland could not have but left a mark on the Western Ukrainian elite, making it somewhat similar to the Polish one in outlook. The Ukrainian history, just like the Polish, has been full of tragic uprisings and martyrs, just to mention Haliwajko, Mazepa, Khmelnicki and so forth. As was stated before, "suicidal-romanticism" and resistance for the sake of glory, reflecting the Cossack ethos, have been the main themes in the Ukrainian literature. These themes also have been strongly emphasized in the contemporary Nationalist writings. For example, O. Zhdanovich, a contemporary Ukrainian Nationalist writer in exile, maintains that the insurgency against Russia, regardless of its chance of success, has been intended to strengthen the Ukrainian people's faith in themselves, to enhance their own self-esteem and their pride. According to Zhdanovich, "Nobody can deny that our greatest enemy is a sense of inferiority developed throughout the Ages of Slavery." Not unlike Frantz Fanon, he claims that only armed struggle could remedy such an inferiority complex.¹⁶ The conviction that it is "better to die fighting than live on one's knees" is continually emphasized in the works of such prominent nationalist activists as D. Dontzov, P. Poltava and S. Bandera. The "Ten Commandments of the

"Ukrainian Nationalist" or Dekalog, states among other things: "You will conquer Free Ukraine or die fighting for it."

Another possible explanation is that the Western Ukrainian intelligentsia, constituting the leadership of the OUN, was educated in the West, in the universities of Warsaw, Cracow, Prague, Vienna, Berlin and so forth. As such, it was very strongly anti-Russian and anti-Soviet, regarding the Western Ukraine as an integral part of the Western world. After all, before 1918, Galicia was a part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and before 1939, a part of Poland. Just as to the Polish intelligentsia before 1945, it seemed preposterous to them that the West should abandon the Ukrainians to the Kremlin. During the war, such a suggestion was regarded as Nazi or Soviet propaganda.¹⁷ Desperate, idealistic, politically unsophisticated, the Ukrainian Nationalists placed an excessive trust in the Atlantic Charter and the logic of the balance of power, at the expense of a realistic assessment of the international scene. This resulted in a lot of needless casualties.

Their case was, however, unimportant to the West, particularly to the United States. In all the available memoirs of World War II statesmen and the transcripts of the international conferences, the issue of Ukrainian independence is not even mentioned. The West was totally unwill-

ing and unprepared to intervene on behalf of the Ukrainian or any other Eastern European nationalism. Even disregarding the fact that the Soviets, by and large, succeeded in isolating physically the Ukrainian insurgents, there was no chance before an international forum, as will be demonstrated later.¹⁸ It is difficult to win a guerrilla war if its cause does not make the headlines in the major newspapers.^{18A}

As was stated earlier, the party which succeeds in isolating the other has a better chance of winning the conflict. Foreign support is particularly valuable to the insurgent, especially since he is usually the weaker opponent. The international "climate of opinion" may strengthen the incumbent, bolster his confidence, justify sanctions against the insurgents, deprive them of material support, deny them respectability, isolate them and thus help to suppress them.

Conversely, the "climate of opinion" may favor the insurgent, boost his morale, feed his hope, facilitate the flow of supplies and funds, provide sanctuaries, isolate, ostracize and demoralize the incumbent. This has been understood very well by major theorists of guerrilla warfare.¹⁹ It is important to have allies. The Ukrainian Nationalists did not have any. Contrary to Communist propa-

ganda, portraying them as "Nazi lackeys", even the Nazis were reluctant to have anything to do with them.²⁰

A corollary to the support of the international public opinion is the possession of a sanctuary or common border with a sympathetic government, as discussed in Chapter I. This is a very important co-determinant of the insurgent's success. The sanctuary off limits to the incumbent, enables the guerrilla to rest, to re-equip and to conduct worldwide publicity campaigns. A proximity to a friendly country played an important role in the insurgent victories in China, Indochina, Algeria and Cuba. The GUN/NPA did not have a sanctuary or any foreign assistance to speak of. The Ukrainian Nationalists were isolated not only diplomatically but also geographically.²¹ In addition, time is also a very important factor. The longer even an isolated conflict lasts in a given society, the greater the likelihood of foreign governments becoming finally involved.²² The Soviet authorities obviously did everything possible to prevent the Ukrainians from "internationalizing" their case, to deprive them of time, to preclude them from obtaining external aid. In this they succeeded.

It may be argued, of course, that between 1945 and 1948, the United States (and to a much lesser extent, Britain) could have extended assistance to the Ukrainian Nationalists. Why did they fail to do so?²³

The United States and the Ukraine:-

Strategic and Economic Interest:

The potential American intervention was precluded by a lack of strategic and economic interests in the area. The allegations of revisionist historians that the Cold War was the inevitable result of the corporate structure's need for economic expansion and the desire to get an "Open Door" in Eastern Europe are not backed by strong evidence. Neither, as the Ukrainian case demonstrates, until 1950, would America "join any groups in those countries in hostile intrigue against the Soviet Union", such as the CUN. If anything, at least until 1947, America did her best to avoid the conflict. For example: The American troops were stopped on the Elbe River in April 1945, to await the Russians, although they could have easily taken Berlin. The Armed Forces were rapidly demobilized; the OSS was dissolved in September 1945; the Selective Service Act was allowed to lapse in March 1947. To prove their good faith, the Allies deported to the Soviets two million Vlasovites (former Soviet POW's who joined the German Armed Forces and were led by a former Soviet Lt. Gen. Vlasov) and Displaced Persons, against their will not to return to the USSR. The atomic threat was not used to blackmail the Russians to make any concessions. On the contrary, a thought of sharing the atomic secrets and the Ultra intelligence with the Russians was seriously entertained by the Cabinet, particularly by Vice President Henry Wallace,

Bernard Baruch and Secretary of War Henry Stimson. In 1946 America also seriously entertained the idea of sharing and control of atomic energy by the United Nations.^{23A} The United States was quite amenable on the issue of German reparations. A serious effort was made to avoid even minor irritants. Until 1945/1946, nothing was done to check Soviet espionage in America. Another example: An American officer who presented evidence to the War Department concerning Russia's complicity in the Katyn Massacre, during which 10,000 Polish officers were executed, was ordered not to discuss or mention the matter to anyone. The Americans did not even have an intelligence resident at their Embassy in Moscow. When the Russians, on May 10, 1945 arrested 15 Polish pro-London Home Army Commanders, President Truman wanted to "make no statements that will in any way embarrass the Russian Government."²⁴ All these facts hardly signify an aggressive policy by the United States.

In truth, before 1947, there was no policy to speak of. In particular, the United States policy makers have never resolved the issue whether the Russian state should be rendered inoffensive by friendship or by undermining its multinational basis at the expense of the dominant ethnic group, the Great Russians. Neither was there any post-war planning. The doctrine of Containment, which is not the same as "Roll-back", dominated America's policy between March

1947 and 1952. Characterized by such initiatives as the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, it was essentially defensive in character, designed to retain the status quo. The idea of "liberation of the captive people" of Eastern Europe and the "roll-back" of Communism began to figure prominently only after 1952, with the advent of John Foster Dulles, who became a Secretary of State just before Stalin's death. Even then it was "liberation by declamation only, as the United States' passivity in the 1956 Hungarian crisis demonstrated. Eisenhower's policy was not any different from Kennan's containment. It sounded like "roll-back", but was not. The so called Kersten Amendment to the Mutual Security Act, which allocated 100 million dollars to form Special Forces was approved in 1951, but remained unimplemented. The Special Forces were formed only in 1952. The British and American intelligence agencies established contact with the UPA only in 1949, when it was in reality destroyed.²⁵ Thus, for all practical purposes, the contacts with the West were non-existent. In reality, as the fate of the Hungarian revolution in 1956 demonstrated, the Eisenhower policy of liberation remained a policy of "liberation by declamation", without any serious consideration of an armed involvement in Eastern Europe. To imply, therefore, as the Communist sources do, that the "Western imperialist intelligence services cooperated" with the OUN/UPA, is inaccurate, to say the least.²⁶

The Ukraine, in fact, occupied no place in Western post-war plans. There has never been any suggestion that the Western Ukraine ought to be made an independent state. On the contrary, there is ample evidence that the Curzon Line and the Soviet view that Russia had the right to have a "friendly government" in Poland were explicitly and sympathetically accepted in Teheran, Yalta and in Churchill's famous proposal on the "spheres of influence" in Moscow on October 9, 1944. President Roosevelt made it very clear to Stalin that he was in close sympathy with the Soviet territorial demands in Eastern Poland, that Galicia should be incorporated into the Soviet Union.

Russia's right to possess Galicia has never been questioned. Churchill, on November 29, 1943 declared in Teheran that, he "was not prepared to make a great squawk about Lvov...I was not going to break my heart about Lvov." Elsewhere, Churchill reminded the House of Commons on February 22, 1944 that since 1918 the British position has always been that the Curzon Line (present Eastern border of Poland - A.B.) is the proper frontier between Poland and Russia. He declared that the USSR had a legitimate strategic interest in the area. Twice attacked by Germany and suffering horrible devastation, Russia, in Churchill's words, "has the right to reassurance against the future attacks from the West, and we are going all the way with her to see that she gets it, not only by the might of her arms but

by approval and assent of the United Nations...I cannot feel that the Russian demand for reassurance about her frontier goes beyond the limits of what is reasonable and just." Similarly, as late as October 31, 1945, U.S. Secretary of State James Byrnes openly supported the Russian demand for a sphere of influence in Eastern Europe and denied any American opposition to it.²⁷

In truth, there are no indications that any major Western statesman was ever aware that the Ukrainian problem even existed. It never figured in any calculations or plans. Even if it did, the Soviet friendship was considered more important. For example, the influential liberal New Republic summed it up well in its editorial of February 20, 1943 that, "however forceful or dubious Russian legal claims, the crux of the problem must not be sought in legal genealogies but in the need of an enduring friendship between Russia and America." Some influential American statesmen concurred, recognizing the existence of a Soviet "Monroe Doctrine". For example, former Vice President and then Secretary of Commerce, Henry A. Wallace declared on October 1, 1946 that, "...Enemies of yesterday and false friends of today continuously try to provoke war between the United States and Russia...On our part we should recognize that we have no more business in the political affairs of Latin America." Many prominent individuals like influential presidential adviser Joseph Davies, Senator

Claude Pepper, Justice Felix Frankfurter and Walter Lipman, expressed similar opinions. Many influential middle-level officials in the State Department and the Pentagon, like Alger Hiss and Harry Dexter White, also strongly opposed U.S. involvement in the internal affairs of the Eastern European countries.²⁸ The military particularly, as noted by such an anti-war critic as Richard T. Barnet, were opposed to any intervention. For example, in 1946 the Joint Chiefs cooled down the State Department's enthusiasm for sending an ultimatum to Yugoslavia for downing a U.S. plane.³⁰

American leaders expressed little strategic interest in the area. One of the reasons, as stated previously, was that since World War I, the United States has never favored undermining the multinational base of the Russian state. Such a perceptive student of American foreign policy as Walter Lippman noted that traditionally, since the 19th century, "regardless of Bolshevism, the American policy was firmly opposed to the dismemberment of Russia", which precluded American support of Ukrainian separation. On September 21, 1918, for example, Secretary of State Robert Lansing prepared a memorandum for President Wilson in which he recommended that the Ukraine become a "state of the Russian Confederation, to which should be annexed that portion of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, in which the Ruthenians predominate", that is Galicia.³¹ This view was similar to that of the Soviet Government.

Still another dimension, was an understandable need for the Soviet alliance and cooperation in the common struggle against Nazi Germany and, given America's overestimation of Japan and underestimation of her atomic potential, the need for Soviet support in the final phase of war against Japan. In Spring 1945, it was thought that a fully fledged and very costly invasion of Japan was necessary in 1946. One million casualties were anticipated by General Marshall. Hence, planning for victory over Japan by conventional means, necessitating Soviet support in Manchuria agreed upon in Potsdam, could be held responsible for the detached United States view toward Eastern Europe.

Similarly, America's economic stake in Eastern Europe was minimal. The trade with Eastern Europe, especially Poland and her Eastern Provinces, did not amount to much. For example, between 1936 and 1940 the average annual exports to the area amounted to US\$3,219,518,000, of which the Polish share, including Danzig, was US\$17,474,000 (or half percent of the total exports). Imports during the same period totalled US\$2,482,030,000 per annum, of which Poland's share was US\$11,346,000 (less than one half percent of the total). Hence, Poland, and therefore Galicia, was much less important a commercial partner of the United States than Norway (US\$21,419,000 exports and US\$18,576,000 imports), not to mention the United Kingdom (10 percent), France (7 percent), Germany, Canada and Mexico. Before

1939 2 percent of U.S. exports went to Eastern Europe, 3.5 percent of imports came from that area. American assets in the whole world were US\$13,542,200,000 in 1937, of which the entire European share was US\$4,418,300,000. Poland, including Galicia and Danzig, had US\$2,224,000 or roughly one-fifth of one percent. It is evident from the above that Eastern European countries and particularly Poland, were of marginal economic importance to the United States, contrary to what such revisionist historians as William A. Williams or Lloyd Gardner maintain. Harry Hopkins, hence, was quite truthful when he told Stalin that America had no substantial economic interests in Poland (not to mention Galicia). After all, devastated Western Europe and Japan represented much easier, more accessible, more substantial and more lucrative markets.³²

Emotional Affinity or Empathy:

The absence of economic and strategic interest coincided with the absence of cultural or emotional empathy for the area. It could be argued that American or British general public were not, on the whole, particularly interested in or cared for Eastern European people and their concerns. They were too remote, too small, too different culturally. Relatively little was known about them, especially before 1939. (The area studies programs in the universities was, after all, a post World War II development). Many Americans knew about the area only indirectly

through the intermediary of often unrepresentative immigrants from this region: often poor, uneducated, backward and in a word, truly alien.

Hence the fate of Eastern Europe in general and of the Ukrainians in particular was of little consequence to the majority of the American public, especially to those of British, Irish, German and Scandinavian descent. Therefore, the impact of the Slavic ethnic bloc on U.S. foreign policy, particularly during and immediately after World War II, has been insignificant despite the fact that there were 8 million Americans of Slavic origin in the United States in 1930. (It is true that after World War I, America actively supported the establishment of sovereign Poland and Czechoslovakia, but it is not clear whether President Wilson was influenced more by political strength of the Slavic voting bloc than by the powerful and persuasive charismatic personalities of Thomas Masaryk and Ignacy Paderewski). Of those, not more than 300,000 were Uniates or Greek Catholics. (There are probably not more than 1.5 million Ukrainian Greek Catholics in the Free World today). It is clear that size is an important but not decisive factor. The Jews in America are probably less numerous than the Polish-Americans, yet one hardly ever hears of a Polish lobby. The American Jews, on the other hand, have played a significant role in the Palestine Question and the United States policy toward Israel and the

Middle East in general. This points to a lesser ability of the Slavic "ethnics" to organize, to exert their pressure, to influence the media and the general public. Such an impact depends on the ethnic group's social-economic status, the influence exerted on opinion-forming segments of the society, a penetration of the media and the press, an involvement in the political process, solidarity as a voting bloc and so forth. The majority of Americans of Slavic origin, at that time at least, belonged to either the blue-collar or farming sectors, which adversely affected their ability to operate as an effective pressure group. Stephen A. Garret concludes that "the evidence is that Americans of Eastern European background have had little success as a conscious ethnic lobby."³³

There is thus no evidence that the American or British public at large were even aware of the Ukrainian problem.³⁴ Moreover, the American political ethos propels them to support, in theory but not always in practice, so called democratic national-liberation movements. The OUN's program, however, smacked too much of totalitarian Nazism. It was impossible, so soon after the War with all its horrible memories, to extend American support to a quasi-fascist movement. Such a policy might have proven highly unpopular with the public.

The cause of Ukrainian independence would have also

proven highly unpopular with Churchill and Roosevelt, during the war at least. To them the Allied unity was sacrosanct. Their quarrels with the Polish Government-in-exile in London were triggered, among other things, by the stubborn desire of the Poles to retain their Eastern provinces, by their opposition to the Curzon Line. This attitude prompted Roosevelt to remark that the Poles are a "quarrelsome people not only at home but also abroad". Churchill told Polish Prime Minister in Exile Stanislaw Mikolajczyk that the Poles are "callous people who want to wreck Europe" and who "have no sense of responsibility". He added that, "we are not going to wreck the peace of Europe" because of the Poles. Under the circumstances, it is clear that the British could hardly have approved of the sovereign state in Galicia, which was destined to join the Soviet Union.³⁵

In a word, there was little concern and interest about Eastern Europe in general and the Ukraine in particular, among the American and English public and statesmen. The Russians, on the other hand, being much bigger and powerful, were the exception. It must be noted that American and British attitudes toward Russia have been very complex. Since the beginning of the 19th century they encompassed a spectrum of opinions ranging from the highly critical comments of George Kennan,³⁶ Isaac Don Levine, William H. Chamberlin; to the highly admiring comments of Alexander

Werth or Sidney and Beatrice Webbs.³⁷ The point here, however, is that the Russians and their country have always fascinated the Americans and the British, considering the huge number of books written about them, whether critical or laudatory. Many of these become bestsellers, especially those written by John Reed, William Chamberlin, Alexander Werth, Eugene Lyons, Walter Duranty and others. (One could not list many popular books or bestsellers on Poland or Czechoslovakia, not to mention the Ukraine). There has always been a great admiration for Russian literature, music and ballet, even among those Americans who otherwise abhor the Soviet system of government or policy. (As evident in the memoirs of Charles Bohlen or George Kennan). The Russians have been surrounded by a certain aura in American eyes. They have been portrayed positively, unlike their governments, as likeable, good natured, romantic, hospitable, sympathetic to America. This was evident, for instance, in some Hollywood productions, like Silk Stockings, Armoured Attack, Mission to Moscow, produced either before or right after the war. Many opinion-forming upper class Americans and Britons regarded Russia with admiration. For example, Lincoln Steffens exclaimed, after his visit to Russia in the 1920s, "I have been over into the future, and it works." As documented extensively by Professor Allen Weinstein, John Diggins, Daniel Aron, many New Deal sympathizers admired the way the Soviet Union tackled the problems so familiar to them: Unemployment, hunger, poverty, disease,

illiteracy. Many influential Americans and Britons regarded Russia with a great deal of respect and, before 1945, Communism as a harmless eccentricity. This included such prominent British and American intellectuals as H.G. Wells, S. and B. Webbs, Max Eastman, John Dos Passos, Edmund Wilson.³⁸

This sympathy and interest toward Russia was partially responsible for a tremendous outpouring of admiration toward the Soviet Union during the War by the intellectual community and the general public in America and Britain. Such an astute social observer as Harold Nicholson remarked in 1942 that, "how sad it is that the British public are wholly unaware of the true state of Russia, and imagine that it is some worker's utopia. Anyone who makes even the slightest critical remark...is branded as 'an enemy of the Soviet'". Similarly Ambassador Charles F. Bohlen stated that, "in those days I found it almost impossible to convince others that admiration for the extraordinary valor of the Russian troops and the unquestioned valor of the Russian people was blinding Americans to the dangers of the Bolshevik leaders." What George Orwell was to criticize as the "Russian Mythos" was very influential in America as well.³⁹ The public opinion polls taken in 1945 and 1946 consistently reveal an overwhelming public good will toward Russia. For example, Fortune's famous "Survey of Opinion on Russia" of September 1945, revealed that 72% of Americans wanted

America to be either "friendly" or "very friendly" toward Russia. What is more significant, however, the businessmen were even more favorable disposed toward the Soviet Union than the general public, the fact conveniently overlooked by the Revisionist historians.^{39A}

As stated before, toward Russia, the British and American leaders harbored friendly intentions, being influenced undoubtedly by a tremendous outpouring of public sympathy toward the Soviet Union. Their statements reveal, at times, naive or overoptimistic illusions about Russia's leaders and her foreign policy. Winston Churchill, that paragon of a political realist, stated on February 27, 1945, "...the impression I brought back from the Crimea, and from all my other contacts, is that Marshal Stalin and the Soviet leaders wish to live in honorable friendship and equality with the Western democracies. I feel also that their word is their bond. I know of no government which stands to its obligations, even in its own despite, more solidly than the Russian Soviet Government. I decline absolutely to embark here on a discussion about Russian good faith." In fact, assuming that even if the British and American statesmen deliberately sought conflict with Russia and wished to intervene openly on behalf of the Poles or the Ukrainians, they should have had to contend with powerful pro-Soviet feelings in their own countries. It would have been very hard to make a drastic about face,

especially since their own war propaganda contributed to an unrealistically idealized popular picture of the USSR. The image of an honorable, brave, sincere and virtuous ally, so thoroughly developed by Hollywood and the press, was not easy to discard at a moment's notice. For example, Life magazine of March 1943, described the Russians as a "hell of a people who look like Americans, dress like Americans, and think like Americans." Such articles were numerous. The myth of folk solidarity between the Russian and American people was vigorously promoted. The image of Stalin, "Good Old Uncle Joe", a benevolent, paternal, wise, somewhat autocratic leader was widely shared by the American public and statesmen alike. Roosevelt remarked to William Bullitt about Stalin, "I think, if I give him everything I possibly can and ask him nothing in return, 'noblesse oblige', he won't try to annex anything, and will work with us for a world of democracy and peace." Elsewhere, he remarked in December 1943, "...I may say that I got along fine with Marshal Stalin...I believe he is truly representative of the heart and soul of Russia; and I believe that we are going to get along very well with him and the Russian people - very well indeed."⁴⁰ As stated earlier, a great number of highly influential Americans like Ambassadors Joseph E. Davies, William Bullitt, Justice Felix Frankfurter and Vice President Henry A. Wallace shared the above attitude, some even long after the war. No wonder that the wartime Polish Ambassador to Washington, Jan Ciechanowski

and his military attache, Colonel Leon Mitkiewicz, constantly encountered a strong pro-Russian bias by high and middle rank officials at the State Department, Treasury and the Pentagon.^{40A} Some of these, like Alger Hiss (Asst. to the Secretary of State), Harry Dexter White (Asst. to the Secretary of the Treasury), Lauchlin Currie (Asst. to the President) were later strongly suspected of spying for the Soviet Union (although none was convicted for this offense).

Institutional or Structural

Characteristics of American Policy-making:

Lynn Etheridge Davis expressed this state of affairs succinctly; "a general lack of interest or knowledge about conditions in Eastern Europe permeated the American public and Government."⁴¹ According to Davis, one-third of a national cross-section of public opinion in a poll commissioned by the State Department in February 1944, had not even heard of the disputes over the Polish-Soviet frontier. Moreover, the American government was ill-equipped to deal with the problem, particularly its major foreign policy-making agency, the State Department. This was noted by such informed observers as G. Kennan, D. Acheson and Charles Bohlen. According to Dean Acheson, the Department "had no ideas, plans, or methods for collecting the information or dealing with the problems that this situation presented. With some brilliant exceptions, the bureaucracy was unequipped for appraisals of capability based on quantitative and

technical judgements and of intentions by painstaking and exhaustive collection and correlation of intelligence."

In fact, no high governmental official attempted to monitor Eastern European problems; the policy planning, if there was any, and its execution rested with middle-rank officials in the State Department, most of whom lacked expertise in the area. The State Department contained perhaps only a half dozen Russian speaking experts; there were probably none who specialized in Poland or the Ukraine. The Division of Eastern European Affairs, dealing with the area and employing only two officials, was abolished in 1937 for economic reasons, its functions transferred to the European and later to the Near Eastern Division, its library turned over to the Library of Congress and its files ordered destroyed. This was symptomatic of the lack of interest in Eastern Europe. In George Kennan's words, "the drift was not to take Russia (and Eastern Europe - A.B.) too seriously". Moreover, during the Yalta and Potsdam Conferences, no specialists in Polish or Ukrainian Affairs accompanied the American delegations.^{42A} Possible intelligence monitoring was made harder by the abolition of the Office of Strategic Services on September 20, 1945. While the CIA was recreated in July 1947, by then it was too late to close the information gap. The problem was not merely that the United States Government had no qualified personnel to monitor and advise it on Eastern European developments; it had no means to effect its policy either.

Means or Physical Capacity to Intervene:

Intervention is not only a matter of will or interest; it also depends on the availability of the means or capability to intervene. Even if the Allies were willing to intervene militarily on behalf of the Western Ukrainians, they had no means to do so. The United States Army was reduced, in a very chaotic, improvised and rapid manner, from 6 million men in June 1945, to 670,000 in July 1947. By 1948, its active strength was 554,030 men. The defense expenditures dropped from 81 billion dollars in 1945 to 11.8 billion in 1947.

Russia, on the other hand, did not reduce its armed forces considerably. In the post-war period she had under arms five million men, mostly battle-hardened men. In Eastern Europe there were 40 Soviet divisions, with readily accessible reserves of 200 or more. They were opposed by a total of two under-strength American, plus nine British and French divisions, the last two countries in the throes of incapacitating economic and political crises. Regarding the production of major military equipment, the Joint Intelligence Committee thought that Russia produced in 1947/1948 more aircraft, motor vehicles, tanks and guns than America, Britain, Canada and France combined. In certain categories of weapons, like tanks and aircraft, the Western powers were outclassed.

The American public was unwilling to support the employment of available troops right after the war and to back whatever policy (or more precisely, non-policy) its government had in mind toward Eastern Europe. In 1945 there was a powerful public demand for the immediate return of the troops back home. The public pressure on Congress was relentless. The Congressional action took the form of curtailing military appropriations. The discipline of the overseas troops was weak; the soldiers demonstrated and rioted against any delay. The Administration was perhaps without choice in the matter of demobilization. After demobilization, the bulk of the post-war Army consisted of newly inducted, inexperienced and badly trained replacements. The combat efficiency of those was less than 50 percent of the wartime standards. This small and untested Army was widely scattered around Europe and Asia. Of 218 combat Air Groups in 1945, only two remained in 1947, manned by inefficient and inexperienced personnel. That the U.S. Army was totally unprepared, either operationally, logistically or morally was evident by its initial performance in the Korean War. It could not fight competently even against a third-rate power.⁴³

In addition to a shortage of troops to back any diplomatic action, there were no plans how to employ them. For example, Plan Dropshot, this country's plan for war with the Soviet Union, was prepared by a committee of the Joint Chiefs

of Staff only in 1949 (testifying again to the lack of aggressive design on the part of the United States).⁴⁴

Thus, except for the atomic weapons, the United States had no military means or plans to back or pursue a bold diplomatic course. This was expressed well by General Marshall, who, recalling his experiences as a Secretary of State, noted, "I remember...I was being pressed constantly, particularly when in Moscow, by radio messages to give the Russians hell...At that time, the facilities for giving them hell...was one and one-third divisions over the entire United States. That is quite a proposition when you deal with somebody with over 260 and you have one and one-third."⁴⁵ The British and American demobilizations were likened by Marshall to a "rout".

There was no covert capability to intervene either. In September 1945, President Truman dissolved the Office of Strategic Services, claiming that he did not want an "American Gestapo" and that there was no need for an intelligence agency in time of peace. A few military attaches was all that remained. The Central Intelligence Group (CIG) established on January 22, 1946 employed only 100 people; it was, in the words of Thomas Powers, "feeble, indeed something of a joke". It had neither authority nor the capacity to conduct covert operations. The quality of information which was brought in was on the whole of a very low quality,

according to veteran intelligence officer Ray Cline.⁴⁶ The CIA was established in July 1947. Initially, it was given only the task of "co-ordinating" America's other unimpressive intelligence agencies. It was not until Summer 1948, that the National Security Council in NSCMO/2 directive, gave the CIA the authority "to carry through clandestine operations which the NSC directed". The Office of Policy Coordination (OPC) was created to plan and execute such operations.⁴⁷ The British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS or MI-6) was withdrawn from Eastern Europe in 1945 by its head, Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin, and the Americans could not fill the gap. (At any rate its effectiveness was debatable, since the head of the SIS Soviet Section, Kim Philby, was a Soviet agent himself). By the time the Americans could fill the gap in 1948, the Ukrainian Nationalists were effectively neutralized.⁴⁸

In sum, there was nothing the United States could do in Eastern Europe. As George Kennan put it, "...the matter of fact is that we do not have power in Eastern Europe to do anything but talk...It seems to me this issue is a theoretical one. There is no real action we can take except to state our case."⁴⁹ However, no brief on behalf of the Ukrainian nationalist cause was ever entered.

Conclusion:

It follows from this brief discussion that the Ukrainian Nationalists have been totally isolated in the international arena. The United States, the leader of the Western World, was not willing and capable of intervening on their behalf. It had no strategic or economic interest to uphold in the area. Its population and political leadership felt no cultural or emotional empathy with the Ukrainians; the Americans were little informed and perhaps disoriented about the issues or stakes involved. But even if this country wanted to get involved, it had no means to do so. Finally, the structural characteristics of the American foreign policy-making further precluded the possibility of American intervention.

All of this should have been obvious at the time. However, the OUN's leaders had totally misread the situation. Initially they placed excessive hope on the Atlantic Charter's promise of self-determination. Demonstrating a deplorable lack of realism, the OUN leaders expected an imminent war between the Superpowers.

The Atlantic Charter has been taken much too seriously by the Eastern Europeans, who regarded this as a genuine commitment to a just and popularly based settlement. In reality, however, the Anglo-Americans regarded it more as a propaganda device than a blueprint committing them to a

direct intervention on behalf of such principles as the right of people to self-determination and to religious and cultural freedom. For example, on March 7, 1942 Churchill wrote to Roosevelt that "the increasing gravity of the war has led me to feel that the principles of the Atlantic Charter ought not to be construed so as to deny Russia the frontiers she occupied when Germany attacked her", the frontiers which included Galicia.⁵⁰ The Allied unity in the war against Germany and Japan was perceived as far more important than the fate of Poland's eastern lands. The preference of the indigenous population did not matter. Expediency pre-ordained total isolation of the Ukrainian Nationalists on the international scene and without any international support they were totally doomed.

Footnotes to Chapter III.

1. On the international environment and the internal war, see:

George Modelski, "The International Relations of Internal War", in James N. Rosenau, editor, International Aspects of Civil Strife (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1964) pp. 14/44 (p. 31).

James N. Rosenau, "Internal War as an International Event", *Ibid.*, pp. 60 ff.

George A. Kelly and Linda B. Miller, "Internal War and International System", in George A. Kelly and Clifford W. Brown, editors, Struggles in the State. Sources and Patterns of World Revolution (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1965) pp. 226/257.

2. On the period of McCarthyism in America, see:

David Cate, The Great Fear: The Anti-Communist Purge under Truman and Eisenhower (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1978).

3. The decision-making, especially in foreign field, is a very complex process. It involves perceptions, attitudinal prisms, expertise of leaders - the concepts which cannot be quantified. Some outstanding works in the field are:

Richard W. Cottam, Foreign Policy Motivation. A General Theory and Case Study (Pittsburgh, Pa.: Univ. of Pittsburgh Press, 1977) Chapters 3, 4, 5.

Joseph H. De Rivera, The Psychological Dimensions of Foreign Policy (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Publ. Co., 1968).

On "interventionary" style, see:

Stanley Hoffman, Gulliver's Troubles or Setting of American Foreign Policy (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1968) pp. 201/202.

4. George F. Kennan, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct", in American Diplomacy, 1900-1950 (New York: Mentor Books, 1951) pp. 89/106.

Frederick C. Barnhoorn, The Soviet Image of the United States. A Study in Distortion (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1950) Chapters 6, 7.

Joseph V. Stalin, Strategy and Tactics of Proletarian Revolution (New York: International Publishers, 1936) pp. 28/29.

Adam B. Ulam thinks Stalin really suffered from "...an ideology-induced paranoia, no different in its essence from that which characterizes the thinking of every devotee of a rigid doctrinal system."

Adam B. Ulam, Stalin. The Man and His Era (New York:

The Viking Press, 1973) p. 685.

5. N.A. Voznesensky, Soviet Economy During the Second World War (New York: International Publishers, 1949) pp. 9, 144.

Andrei Zhdanov, The International Situation (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1947) reprinted in Alvin Z. Rubinstein, editor, The Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union (3rd. rev. ed.) (New York: Random House, 1972) pp. 204/206.

Joseph Stalin, The Soviet Union and World Peace (New York: New Century Publishers, 1946).

On the Soviet view:

William Taubman, Stalin's American Policy from Entente to Cold War (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1982) Chapters 6, 7.

6. Milovan Djilas, Conversations with Stalin (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1962) pp. 106, 114.

To Stanislaw Mikolajczyk Stalin said, on August 9, 1945, "The Germans will rise again. They are a strong nation...It is our conviction that the danger from Germany repeats itself...They may rise again. Therefore we have to keep the sword ready."

Poland. Official Government Documents. Vol. 64. Document 13.

Truman's quote in Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation (New York: New American Library, 1970) p. 54.

7. Andrei Zhdanov, "The International Situation", reprinted in Alvin Z. Rubinstein, ed., The Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union, pp. 204/206.

Some major "revisionist" works:

Gar Alperovitz, Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam (New York: Vintage Books, 1967).

Gabriel and Joyce Kolko, The Limits of Power (New York: Harper & Row, 1972).

William A. Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy (rev. ed.) (New York: World Publishing Co., 1962).

On the critical discussion of revisionist or radical-leftist interpretations of the Cold War history, see:

Joseph M. Siracuse, New Left Diplomatic Histories and Historians. The American Revisionists (Port Washington, N.Y.: Kennikat Press, 1973).

8. On nationalism as a grave problem facing the Soviet leaders, see:

Stanley Vardys, "The Partisan Movement in Post-War Lithuania", in Stanley Vardys, editor, Lithuania Under the Soviets (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965) pp. 85/108.

Yehoshua A. Gilboa, The Black Years of Soviet Jewry (translated from the Hebrew by Y. Shanto and D. Ben Abba) (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1977).

On Soviet concern with the rise of nationalism, and its possible subversive implications, in the immediate post-war period, see:

Frederick C. Barghoorn, Soviet Russian Nationalism (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1956) pp. 60/65.

8A. Pravda, November 26, 1968 quoted in Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, "The Dilemma of Nationalism in the Soviet Union", Chapter 8 in John W. Strong, ed., The Soviet Union Under Brezhnev and Kosygin: The Transition Years (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Co., 1971) pp. 115 ff (p. 311).

8B. I.V. Stalin, Sochinenia, Vol. 4 (Moscow: Politizdat, 1946) p. 363.

Also: Solomon M. Schwartz, "Self-Determination Under the Communist Regime", Problems of Communism Vol. 2 #5 (Sept./Oct. 1953) pp. 28/34.

8C. Stalin, Sochinenia, Vol. 5 (Moscow: Politizdat, 1946) p. 270.

V.I. Lenin, Sochinenia, Vol. 26, p. 408.

9. Slovar 'Inostrannykh Sloz (Moscow: Sotsetsk'keia Entziklopedia, 1948) p. 435, quoted by Frederick C. Barghoorn Soviet Russian Nationalism (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1956) p. 10.

9A. On economic and strategic importance of the Ukraine to the Soviet Union, see:

J. Bilinsky, The Second Soviet Republic, Chapters 1, 2.

Andriy Mykulin, Ukraina V. Militarno-Ekonomichnomu Potentzialu SSSR. Informatsivnyi Narys (Munich: Ukrains'kyi Tekhnichno-Hospodars'kyi Institut, 1962).

W.E.B. Allen, The Ukraine, pp. 365/367; Roman Smal-Stocki, "Ukraine as Geopolitical Basis of the Russian Imperialism", Ukrainian Quarterly, Vol. 8 #2 (Spring, 1952) pp. 116/122.

9B. Soviet patriotism, as opposed to bourgeois Nationalism, is "a new and higher type of patriotism". It is "the fusion of the progressive national tradition of the peoples with the common vital interest of all the toilers of the USSR..." It denotes, "...boundless love of the Soviet people for the Socialist motherland, the unity of all the fraternal peoples around the Party of Lenin and Stalin and the Soviet Government..." Soviet patriotism denotes an "ardent feeling of unlimited love and devotion to the Motherland, of profound responsibility for its defense and destiny." It is synonymous with "proletarian internationalism".

Slovar 'Inostrannykh Sloz, quoted in F. Barghoorn, Soviet Russian Nationalism, p. 9.

9C. For the full text of the speech see:

I.V. Stalin, Works, Vol. 15, edited by Robert M. McNeal (Stanford, Conn.: The Hoover Institution, 1967) pp. 203/204.

10. Joseph V. Stalin, The Soviet Union and World Peace (New York: New Century Publishers, 1976) p. 9.

10A. Adam B. Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence. The History of Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-1967 (New York: Praeger Publ. 1968) pp. 299/300, 325.

The fact that the Soviets had attached great importance to the destruction of the Ukrainian Nationalism is well illustrated by the following exchange between Polish General Wladyslaw Anders and Stalin in 1941:

Anders: "Many Ukrainians were and have remained Germanophiles. We, and later you, had, therefore, many troubles."

Stalin: "Yes, but those were your Ukrainians, not ours. We shall destroy them jointly."

Wladyslaw Anders, Bez Ostatniego Rozdzialu. Wspomnienia z Lat 1939-1945 (Second edition; Newton, Wales: No Publ., 1950) p. 125.

Also quoted in Y. Bilinsky's The Second Soviet Republic, pp. 88/89.

The Soviet authorities had ample evidence that nationalism emanating from Galicia had been very contagious in the Eastern or Soviet Ukraine in the 1930s.

For example, see:

Yuriy Boiko, "Natzionalizm na Skhidno-Ukrains'kikh Zemliakh v Dobi Konovaletsia", in Evhen Konovalet's Ta Ioho Doba (Munich: Evhen Konovalets' Foundation, 1974) pp. 577/653.

Vasyl Fliushch, Borot'ba Za Ukrains'ku Derzhavu Pid Sovets'koi Vladoiu (London: Ukrainian Publishers, 1970).

Myroslaw Prokop, Ukraina ii Ukrains'ka Politika Moskvy Vol. 1 (Munich: Suchasna Ukraina, 1966) pp. 59/60.

11. Vasyl Hryshko, "Ukrains'kiy Natzional-Komunizm na Istorichniy Probi Dobi Ukrainizatsii, 1923-1931", Suchasnist', No. 12 (December, 1978) pp. 56/81.

Lowell Tillet, The Great Friendship. Soviet Historians on the Soviet Nationalities (Chapel Hill, N.C.: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1969).

12. Bolshevik, No. 23/24 (1946) cited in Barhoorn's The Soviet Image of the United States, p. 268.

13. This idea of a Russian moral, spiritual and cultural superiority is not new. The belief in a Russian mission to reunite the Slavs, in Russia as the Third Rome - virile, moral, brave and opposed by decadent, corrupt West, dates

from the 19th century. The Soviet expansionism and hatred of the West is a continuation of Slavophilism or Dostoyevsky, Tyutchev, Katkov, Tkachev, Aksakov.

For example, Hans Kohn, Pan-Slavism, Its History and Ideology (sec. rev. ed.) (New York: Vintage Books, 1960).

James H. Billington, The Icon and the Axe. An Interpretative History of Russian Culture (New York: Vintage Books/Random House, 1970) pp. 395/399.

14. Such a lack of realism fits perfectly into Ralph K. White's typology of the factors producing misperception:

- a) Virile Self-Image (the Ukrainian is a better soldier than the Russian or the Pole).
- b) Moral Self-Image (our cause is just, theirs is not).
- c) Selective Inattention (narrow time and space perspective).
- d) Absence of Empathy (overlooking or ignoring the reaction of other countries and the enemy).
- e) Military Overconfidence.
- f) Diabolical Enemy Image.

Ralph K. White, Nobody Wanted War. Misperception in Vietnam and Other Wars (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books/Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1970).

Without going into too much detail, essays, articles, poems, stories, editorials published by the Ukrainian Nationalists fit splendidly into this typology. For example, such a periodical of the UPA as Chorniy Lis, reprinted fully in Litopys UPA, Vols. 3, 4 (Toronto: Litopys UPA, 1979).

15. The OUN leadership's perception of the world is evident in such documents as:

"Postanovi Konferentsii Providu OUN na Ukrain's'kykh Zemliakh, June 1946", in OUN V Svitli Postanov Velykykh Zboriv, Konferentsiy ta Inshykh Dokumentiv Borot'by..., pp. 143/155.

"Postanovi Tret'ei Konferentsii Orhanizatsii Ukrain's'kykh Natsionalistiv-Samostiynykh", February 17/21, 1943. Ibid., pp. 74/89.

"Dekliaratsiya Providu OUN Pislia Zakinchennia ii Svitovoi Viini", May 1945, Ibid., pp. 48/57.

"Postanovi Druhoi Konferentsii OUN, April 1942", Ibid., pp. 61/74.

Order of General Taras Chuprynka, The Supreme Commander of the UPA - "Biytsi ii Komandiry Ukrain's'koy Povstanskoy Armii" of May 1945, in Ukrains'ka Povstans'ka Armia. Zbirka Dokumentiv za 1940-1945 rr., pp. 133/135.

"Vidozva Holvnoho Komandira do UPA", of July 1946, Ibid..

Articles:

Pavlo Poltava, "Pidhotovka Tret'ei Svitovoi Viini ta Zavdannia Ukrain's'koho Narodu", in Ukrains'ka Holovna Byzvol'na Rada. Zbirka Dokumentiv za 1944-1950 rr. (n.p.:

OUN Zakordonni Chastyny, 1956) pp. 325/353.

Pavlo Poltava, "Pro Nash Plan Borot'by za Vizvolennia Ukrainy v Teperishnei Obstanovtsi", Zbirnyk Fid'pilnykh Pisan'.

Poltava was the major ideologue of the OUN/UPA.

Stepan Bandera, "Tret'ia Svitova Viina ii Vizvol'na Borot'ba", in Stepan Bandera, Perspektyvy Ukrains'koi Revoliutsii (Munich: Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, 1978) pp. 207/238.

That all of the aforementioned attitudes were reflected in the beliefs of ordinary officers and enlisted men of the UPA, see:

Maksym Skorupskiy, "Maks", V Nastupakh i Vidstupakh. Spohady, pp. 205/206.

16. C. Zhdanovich, "Na Partizanskomu Fronti" in Orhanyzatsiya Ukrains'kykh Natsionalistiv, 1929-1945. Zbirnyk Statei u 25-Littia OUN (n.p.: na Chuzhyni, 1955) pp. 405/420 (p. 418).

For example, on the interaction between Polish and Ukrainian literature, see:

Czeslaw Milosz, The History of Polish Literature (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1969) pp. 247/249 on the so called "Ukrainian school" in Polish literature.

17. This point made, among other by Lev Rebet, Svitla i Tini OUN and by such former guerrilla fighters as:

Stepan Fedoriv's'kyi, Notatky Povstantzia (New York: Prometei, 1962).

The hope that the West would not abandon the Galicians is expressed in "Z Khronik Podiy na Ukrains'kykh Zemliakh - Rik 1943", a compilation of reports by UPA District Commands. Reprinted in Litopys UPA, Vol. 2 Volyn (Toronto: Litopys UPA, 1977) pp. 177/184.

18. "The diplomatic universe is like an echo chamber: noises of men and things are amplified to infinity."

Raymond Aron, Peace and War (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1966).

However, the Ukrainian case demonstrates that a totalitarian government and unfriendly international environment could transform it into a noiseless chamber.

The Soviets and the Poles did not want, by publicizing the Ukrainian case, to encourage other "National deviations", to encourage "the reactionary elements" to conclude any alliance with the UPA or to encourage other nationalities or hostile elements to follow the Ukrainian example. They had to be kept in the dark. This was possible in Russia through a highly sophisticated media and press censorship.

On the Soviet control of public opinion and media, see:

Gayle Durham Hollander, Soviet Political Indoctrination (New York: Praeger Publ., 1972).

Alex Inkeles, Public Opinion in Soviet Russia (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1962).

Compare this with the United States:

Bruce Andrews, Public Constraints and American Policy in Vietnam (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publ., 1976).

18A. For example, The New York Times in 1946 mentioned clashes with the UPA five times, all rather short notices on back pages:

January 11, 1946, p. 4; February 12, 1946, p. 4;
April 29, 1946, p. 7; September 18, 1946, p. 16.

In 1944, 1945, 1948 the paper did not mention the UPA at all. The Ukrainian separatists thus, never made the first page of the major Western newspapers. Their struggle was lost even before it began.

This fact was noted by the OUN/UPA's major ideologue, Pavlo Poltava, in "Kilka Zavvag Schodo to ho Iaki Povinni Buti Radyoperedachi Holosu Ameriki'klia Sovets'koho Soiuzu", UHVR. Zbirka Dokumentiv, pp. 312/325.

Just compare this with the amount, visibility, prominence and notoriety of reports about guerrillas in Palestine, Greece, Malaya, Cuba or even Cyprus. In Northern Ireland, between 1969 and 1975, 1,200 people died as a result of civil strife. This is much less than in our case. Nevertheless, the Irish situation made the headlines of the world's major periodicals, enabling the IRA to reach international forums. In democratic countries like Britain and Ireland, it is extremely difficult or even impossible for the Government to prevent the news from getting abroad.

19. Such strategist as General Giap have valued the support of the French public opinion very highly. For example, the French Communist agents had conducted effective propaganda within the French Army against the "Dirty War", undermining thus its morale and combat effectiveness. There were repeated mutinies of the units shipped to Indochina. The French longshoremen, inspired undoubtedly by the Communists, sabotaged the arms supply to Indochina - about 40 percent of the consignments of military equipment sent to Indochina were sabotaged before they reached that country. This in itself was very demoralizing. Such support was what Giap had in mind when he stated that, "...efforts had to be made to win over the support of progressive people throughout the world, particularly to coordinate with the struggle of the French people and those in the French colonies against the dirty war."

Vo Nguen Giap, People's War, People's Army, p. 97.

Vo Nguen Giap, The Military Art of People's War. Selected Writings of General Vo Nguen Giap, edited by Russell Statler (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1970) p. 160.

Giap acknowledges, of course indirectly, the importance of such an ally as Communist China. According to him,

"...the birth of the People's Republic of China...this great historical event, which altered events in Asia and throughout the world, exerted a considerable influence on the war of liberation of the Vietnamese people. Vietnam was no longer in the grip of enemy encirclement and was henceforth geographically linked to the socialist bloc."

The Military Art of People's War, p. 88.

Such support boosts the insurgent's morale immensely as evident in the case of the U.S. cutting arms delivery to Batista in 1958.

20. Initially, the OUN (Bandera's Faction) was quite ready to cooperate with the Nazis and establish an independent state with their sponsorship. For example, Bandera's letter to Reich Minister Rosenberg of August 14, 1941, or a letter by Vladimir Stahiv, "Ambassador-designate" to Germany, of June 23, 1941 to the Fuhrer.

Both letters in Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-1945, Series D (1937-1945), Vol. 13. The War Years, June 23-December 11, 1941 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964) pp. 6/7, 315/316, 156/157.

The Nazis decided not to accept and instead cracked down on the Bandera followers. Their attitude is reflected in a memo by Grosskopf, a senior official in the Reich Ministry of Internal Affairs, who counseled against recognition of Bandera. Ibid., pp. 198/201.

21. The importance of the sanctuary is demonstrated by the fact that Stalin's decision to deny supplies to the Greek insurgents and Tito's decision to deny them a sanctuary, contributed decisively to their defeat. The Insurgency in Malaya also failed because this country has no common land border with China and Vietnam, only with Thailand. The British and the Thais concluded an agreement about common action against the Communist guerrillas and closing the border. This agreement has been very similar to the one concluded between the USSR, Poland and Czechoslovakia in 1947 for the common action against the UPA.

22. The view held by Samuel P. Huntington, "Patterns of Violence in World Politics", in Samuel P. Huntington, editor, Changing Patterns of Military Politics (New York: The Free Press, 1962) p. 44.

23. On why the U.S. intervenes, see:

Herbert K. Tillema, Appeal to Force. American Military Intervention in the Era of Containment (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1973).

23A. Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation (New York: New American Library, 1970) pp. 209/215; on the Baruch Plan.

24. Martin F. Herz, Beginnings of the Cold War (Bloomington.

Ind.: Indiana Univ. Press, 1966) p. 9; on the officer's case.

Truman quoted in Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, Vol. 2 (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1948) pp. 535/536.

On the deportation of the Vlasovites, see:

Nicholas Bethell, The Last Secret. The Delivery to Stalin of Over Two Million Russians by Britain and the United States (New York: Basic Books, 1974).

On the joint control of U.S. atomic energy, see:

James F. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly (New York: Harper and Brothers, Publ., 1947) pp. 257/276.

The U.S. intelligence forecast of Russia's post-war position in Europe concluded that the Soviet Union would be the dominant power in Europe: "...With Germany crushed, there is no power in Europe to oppose her tremendous military forces...The conclusions from the foregoing are obvious. Since Russia is the decisive factor in the war, she must be given every assistance, and every effort must be made to obtain her friendship. Likewise, since without question she will dominate Europe on the defeat of the Axis, it is even more essential to develop and maintain the most friendly relations with Russia" - this estimates reflects fairly accurately American expectations about the future. The American policy-makers were apparently unable to conceive of Russia as a grave threat to Europe.

Quoted in John Spanier, American Foreign Policy Since World War II (7th ed.) (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1977) p. 22. On the unwillingness to check Soviet espionage, see:

David C. Martin, Wilderness of Mirrors (New York: Ballentine Books, 1980).

When Peer de Silva, in charge of security for the Manhattan Project, noted the Soviet penetration of the Atomic establishment, he was told to do nothing. David C. Martin, Wilderness of Mirrors, p. 12.

Also: Gregg Herken, The Winning Weapon. The Atomic Bomb in the Cold War, 1945-1950 (New York: Vintage Books, 1982) p. 99 on Stimson's views on atomic energy.

25. Harry Rositzke, a former high CIA official claims that the Agency first established contact with the UPA in the Fall of 1949, when the latter was already defeated. Even so, it continued to maintain contact at irregular intervals by radio and couriers until the end of organized resistance. Only a large-scale military supply effort would have been of any use to the Ukrainian Nationalists and that the military planners were not prepared to carry out. It was decided that since the UPA could not play any important military role, no material help should be given.

Harry Rositzke, CIA's Special Operations, Espionage, Counterespionage and Covert Actions (New York: Reader's

Digest Press, 1977) pp. 168/169.

Also: Thomas Powers, The Man Who Kept the Secrets. Richard Helms and the CIA (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1970) pp. 39/43.

This is confirmed by such an "impeccable" source as Kim Philby, My Secret War (London: Granada Publ. Ltd., 1979) pp. 145/146.

Another high CIA official, Peer de Silva, confirmed this fact. He also claims that every one of these agents was under Soviet control. SubRosa. The CIA and the Uses of Intelligence (New York: Times Books, 1978) pp. 55/56.

According to Philby, the Americans nursed serious doubts about the OUN's usefulness to the West. The CIA officials were repelled by Bandera's extreme nationalism with its fascist overtones and by his strong anti-Americanism. Apart from parachuting a couple of radio-teams in, in 1949, nothing was done. The British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) sent three teams into the Ukraine in 1949 and three more in 1951. All "disappeared"; with Kim Philby in charge of the SIS Soviet Section, it is not surprising.

The aforementioned statements are confirmed, indirectly by the Communist sources. The contacts between the OUN in Poland and American Embassy in Warsaw were initiated by the Chief of the OUN's Intelligence Service in January 1946. The OUN wanted to transmit some propaganda material abroad. In October/November, 1946 and June 1947, the material was delivered, the OUN emissaries received by an Assistant Naval Attache. But there is no hard evidence that the U.S. Embassy actually transmitted these materials anywhere.

Still another recorded contact was the visit by the U.S. Vice-Consul, accompanied by the correspondent of the Associated Press accredited in Prague, to the local UPA headquarters in Presovo in Slovakia on May 15, 1947 to "familiarize themselves with the actual situation of the Ukrainian Nationalist Underground."

Szczesniak and Szota, Droga do Nika, d. pp. 277/278, note 132 on p. 278, p. 472.

On the policy of "rollback" or "liberation" during the Eisenhower/Dulles years, see:

Townsend Hoopes, The Devil and John Foster Dulles (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1973).

26. This was stated in Khrushchev Remembers. Droga do Nika, d. Pogranichnyi Zbornik.

27. Said Byrnes, "...I was impressed by the repeated statements made by Stalin, Molotov, and others that the Soviet Union sought security. Ever since Yalta, when Marshal Stalin recounted how Poland twice within twenty-five years has been used as a corridor for invading Russia, this fear kept cropping up in Russian policy. It was present in Molotov's demand that governments wholly subservient to Russia should be maintained in Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary.

Therefore, I thought that if we could give them assurance on that score perhaps the obstacle blocking the Conference could be removed...."

James F. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1947) pp. 100, 190/192.

Winston Churchill, quoted in Winston S. Churchill, Closing the Ring (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1951) pp. 394/397.

For example, Roosevelt's position stated in U.S. Dept. of State, Foreign Relations of the United States. Diplomatic Papers of Conferences at Cairo and Teheran (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961) pp. 510/512.

Also in U.S. Dept. of State Bulletin, No. 13 (November 4, 1945) pp. 709/710, quoted in Lisle A. Rose, After Yalta (New York: Scribner's Sons, 1973) p. 147.

28. New Republic, quoted in Erik von Kuehnert-Leddihn, Leftism. From de Sade to Hitler and Marcuse (New Rochelle, N.Y.: Arlington House, 1974) p. 575, note 90; the same journal's editorial of February 21, 1944 took the same position. Reprinted as: "Russia's Sphere of Influence" in Peter G. Filene, editor, American View of Soviet Russia (Homewood, Ill.: The Dorsey Press, 1968) pp. 151/153.

The same sentiment was expressed by The New York Times, London Times, Manchester Guardian.

H. Wallace's speech in Filene, ed., American View of Soviet Russia, pp. 167/172.

Also see: Richard J. Walton, Henry Wallace, Harry Truman and the Cold War (New York: Viking Press, 1976).

Wartime Polish Ambassador in Washington, Jan Ciechanowski, Defeat in Victory (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1947) reported consistently that a hostile anti-Polish lobby within the U.S. Government was very influential, particularly within the State Department, where the Soviet position was strongly supported. Also his dispatch in Poland, Official Government Documents, Vol. 7, Document 15.

29. For an evaluation of the minimal strategic importance of Eastern Europe for the United States, see:

Walt W. Rostow, The United States in World Arena. An Essay in Recent History (New York: Praeger, 1960) pp. 178/179.

The quote by Lynn Etheridge Davis, The Cold War Begins. Soviet-American Conflict over Eastern Europe (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1974) pp. 373/374.

The literature on the origins of the Cold War and Eastern Europe's place in it is vast. Some other books consulted are:

Edward J. Rozek, Allied Wartime Diplomacy. A Pattern in Poland (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1958).

Arthur Lane, I Saw Poland Betrayed (Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs Merrill, 1948).

Vojtech Mastny, Russia's Road to the Cold War. Diplomacy and the Politics of Communism, 1941-1945 (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1979).

Lisle A. Rose, After Yalta (New York: Charles A. Scribner's Sons, 1973).

John A. Lucacs, The Great Powers and Eastern Europe (New York: American Book Co., 1953).

Bennett Kovrig, The Myth of Liberation. East-Central Europe in U.S. Diplomacy and Politics Since 1941 (Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1973).

Erik Lundestad, The American Non-Policy Towards Eastern Europe, 1943-1947 (Tromsø, Norway: Universitets-forlaget, 1975).

John L. Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947 (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1972).

Herbert Druks, Harry S. Truman and the Russians, 1945-1953 (New York: Robert Speller, 1966).

30. Richard J. Barnet, The Economy of Death (New York: Atheneum, 1969) p. 83.

The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff proclaimed in mid-1944 that, "...our basic national policy...should seek to maintain solidarity of the three great powers and in all other respects to establish conditions calculated to assure a long period of peace, during which it may be hoped, arrangements will be perfected for the prevention of future world conflicts." Hardly a militarist attitude.

Dept. of State. Foreign Relations of the United States: The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1955) pp. 106/107.

31. Walter Lippman, U.S. Foreign Policy. Shield of the Republic (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1943) pp. 141/142.

Robert Lansing, The Peace Negotiations: A Personal Narrative (Boston, 1921) p. 194.

Also, in Paris on June 30, 1919, Secretary Lansing "...stated definitely that the United States was not in favor of independence for the Ukrainians." He was "unable to perceive an adequate ethnical basis for erecting a separate state and is not convinced that there is a real popular demand for anything more than such greater measure of local autonomy as will naturally result from the establishment in Russia of a modern democratic government whether federative or not."

"Lansing to the Commission to Negotiate Peace, October 29, 1919". U.S. Dept. of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1919 (Russia) (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1937) pp. 783/784.

Lansing also believed that the Galician Ukrainians were "unfit for self-government". Ibid.

32. Statistical Abstracts of the United States, 1950 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Dept. of Commerce, 1950) pp. 859/861.

Cleona Lewis, America's Stake in International Investments (Washington, D.C.: Bookings Institution, 1938).

Robert H. Ferrell, "The United States and East-Central Europe before 1941", in Stephen D. Kertesz, editor, The Fate of East Central Europe. Hopes and Failures of American Foreign Policy (Notre Dame, Ind.: Univ. of Notre Dame Press, 1956) pp. 21/50 (p. 46).

Gottfried Haberler, "Economic Consequences of a Divided World", Ibid., pp. 377/395.

Robert Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, Vol. 2, pp. 535/536.

33. Stephen A. Garrett, "The Ties that Bind: Immigrant Influence on U.S. Policy Toward Eastern Europe", in Abdul Aziz Said, editor, Ethnicity and Foreign Policy (New York: Praeger Publ., 1977) pp. 59/92 (p. 64).

Lawrence H. Fuchs, "Minority Groups Foreign Policy", in Lawrence H. Fuchs, editor, American Ethnic Politics (New York: Harper & Row, 1968).

For example, the American Jews, forming 3 percent of the population, form 4 percent of active voters, provide 60 percent of all campaign funds for Democratic candidates and 40 percent of Republican campaign funds. The Jews also form a considerable element within opinion-forming segments of the society such as the academic profession, media, intellectual community.

Stephen D. Isaacs, Jews and American Politics (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1974).

34. On the negligible international importance of the Ukraine since 1917 and the Western disinterest in her, see:

Vasyl' Markus, "Spolucheni Shtati Ameriki ii Ukrainskaya Problema", Suchasnist' (Munich) No. 10 (March, 1976) pp. 62/68.

Bohdan Budorowycz, "The Ukrainian Problem in International Politics, October 1938 to March 1939", Canadian Slavonic Papers, Vol. 3 (1958) pp. 59/75.

Laurence J. Orzell, "A Hotly Disputed Issue: Eastern Galicia at the Paris Peace Conference, 1919", The Polish Review, Vol. 25#1 (1980) pp. 49/62

Konstantin Zelenko, "Velikobritania ii Ukraina", in Fundatzia im. Konovaltsia, Evhen Konovalets' Ia Ioho Doba (Munich: Evhen Konovalets Foundation, 1974) pp. 883/906.

Constantine Warvariv, "America and the Ukrainian National Cause, 1917-1920", in Taras Hunczak, editor, The Ukraine, 1917-1921: A Study in Revolution (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1977) pp. 352/381.

Arnold Margolin, Ukraina ii Politika Antanty (Berlin, 1922).

The Soviet view:

Viktor S. Koval', Mizhnarodnyi Imperialism ii Ukraina, 1941-1945 (Kiev: Naukova Dumka, 1966).

Viktor S. Koval, V Roky Fashysts'koi Navaly. Ukraina V Mizhnarodnykh Vidnosinakh V Period Velykoi Vitchizniannoï Viiny (Kiev: Izdatelstvo Politychnoi Literatury, 1963).

35. Roosevelt quoted in U.S. Dept. of State, Foreign Relations. The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, p. 848.

Churchill quoted in Poland. Official Government Documents, Vol. 21, Documents 303; Vol. 7, Documents 5 and 6.

While Churchill never said anything about the Ukrainians, his mentor Lloyd George did. George did not like the Ukrainians. In Paris, during the Council of Four, he declared: "...I only saw a Ukrainian once. The only Ukrainian I have seen in the flesh...was upstairs. I have'nt seen another...and I am not sure that I want to see any more. That is all I know about it." (June 5, 1919 meeting. Quoted by Laurence Orzell, "A Hotly Debated Issue...", The Polish Review, Vol. 25 #11 (1980) p. 58, note 23.

Another British member of the delegation, Sir Esme W. Howard, in Theatre of Life, Vol. 2 (Boston, 1936), commented about English and American indifference to and ignorance of the whole problem. Quoted, Ibid., pp. 52/53, note 9.

Robert Lansing, The Peace Negotiation. A Personal Narrative (Port Wash., N.Y.: Kennikat Press, 1969) (a reprint of 1921) pp. 99/100, 191. U.S. supported the policy of "undivided Russia", because Wilson had the case of the Southern secession in mind.

36. George Kennan was actually a cousin of Ambassador George F. Kennan's grandfather, who wrote a book about Tsarist Russia at the beginning of the 20th century: Siberia and the Exile System (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1958).

See: George I. Kennan, Memoirs 1925-1950 (New York: Bantam Books, 1967) pp. 76/77.

On history see:

Thomas A. Bailey, America Faces Russia. Russian-American Relations from Early Times to Our Day (Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1964).

37. For example, Sidney and Beatrice Webb, Soviet Communism: A New Civilization? (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1936).

Alexander Werth, Leningrad (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1944) - laudatory books.

38. Richard H. Fells, Radical Visions and American Dreams. Culture and Social Thought in the Depression Years (New York: Harper & Row, 1973) pp. 61/79.

On the extent to which influential intellectuals initially admired the Soviet Union:

John P. Diggins, Up From Communism. Conservative Odysseys in American Intellectual History (New York:

Harper & Row, Publ., 1975).

David Caute, The Great Fear. The Anti-Communist Purge under Truman and Eisenhower (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1978) contains an extensive bibliography.

Daniel Aaron, Writers on the Left (New York: Avon Books, 1965).

Allen Weinstein, Perjury. The Hiss-Chambers Case (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978).

Richard Crossman, editor, The God that Failed (New York: Bantam Books, 1965).

William L. O'Neill, A Better World. The Great Schism: Stalinism and the American Intellectuals (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1982).

39. Harold Nicolson, Diaries and Letters 1939-1945 (London, 1967) p. 250; quoted in Nikolai Tolstoy, Stalin's Secret War (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1981) p. 278.

Just to read a laudatory book by Joseph Davies, Mission to Moscow, which even Stalin considered exaggerated; or

Wallace Carroll's, We're in this with Russia (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Co., 1942).

Charles E. Bohlen, Witness to History 1929-1969 (New York: N.W. Norton Co., Inc., 1973) pp. 125/126. One of his friends remarked to him, "There are people in this town who think that the defense of Stalingrad proves there is no GPU."

39A A poll in Fortune, Vol. 32 (September, 1945) pp. 233/238 reprinted in Peter G. Filene, editor, American Views of Soviet Russia (Homewood, Ill.: The Dorsey Press, 1968) pp. 161/165.

Also: Ralph B. Levering, American Opinion and the Russian Alliance, 1939-1945 (Chapel Hill, N.C.: The Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1976).

40. Churchill quoted in Winston Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, pp. 400/401; on the picture of a benevolent Stalin as depicted by Harry Hopkins in Robert Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, Vol. 1, pp. 417/419; Pres. Roosevelt quoted by William C. Bullitt, "How We Won the War and Lost the Peace", Life, Vol. 25, (August 30, 1948) p. 94. Cited in Kovrig, The Myth of Liberation, p. 8; and in Robert A. Devine, Roosevelt and World War II (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, Ltd., 1979) p. 72.

The statement from December, 1943, in James MacGregor Burns, Roosevelt. The Soldier of Freedom, 1940-1945 (New York: Harvest Books, Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1970) p. 416.

After the Yalta Conference, Harry Hopkins told R. Sherwood, "...the Russians had proved that they could be reasonable and far seeing and there wasn't any doubt in the mind of the President or any of us that we could not live with them and get along with them peacefully as far into the future as any of us could imagine...", R. Sherwood, Roosevelt

and Hopkins, Vol. 2, p. 870.

40A. For example, see Joseph E. Davies' laudatory, "What We Didn't Know about Russia", Vol. 40 (March 1942) Reader's Digest. Henry A. Wallace's speech, "Peace and How to get Peace". A speech at the Madison Square Garden Rally on September 12, 1946, both reprinted in Peter G. Filene, editor, American Views of Soviet Russia (Homewood, Ill.: The Dorsey Press, 1968) pp. 161/165, 167/172.

In fact, the United States Intelligence Agency, the O.S.S., was quite ready to exchange the top secret information with NKVD. Bradley Smith, The Shadow Warriors. OSS and the Origins of the CIA (New York: Basic Books, Publ., 1983) Chapter 7, "The OSS and Ideology. The NKVD Connection", pp. 330/359.

Jan Ciechanowski, Defeat in Victory, Col. Leon Mitkiewicz, Z Generalem Sikorskim Na Obczyz nie. Fragmenty Wspomnien (Paris: Instytut Literacki Kultury, 1968) pp. 41, 131, 315/317, 381/383.

Piotr S. Wandycz, The United States and Poland (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1980) Chapter 5.

Noted Mitkiewicz, the Poles were treated as "poor relatives" and "inferior ally", "...The Americans so far do not know much about Poland" and "neither do they care". Moreover, some, like Alger Hiss or H. Dexter White, were possibly the agents of the Soviet Government and could not be sympathetic.

For example, one of those such middle-rank, yet influential officials, Alger Hiss, did prepare a draft of the "Declaration of Liberated Europe" and actively participated in the crucial negotiations with the Russians over the future of Eastern Europe, when America made a number of damaging concessions to the Russians.

Allen Weinstein, Perjury. The Hiss-Chambers Case (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978) p. 353. Weinstein, initially sympathetic to Hiss, concludes that Hiss was indeed a Soviet agent. There were possibly 27 of them in the U.S. Government.

One additional proof of the lack of any hostile U.S. intentions toward the Soviet Union was the fact that our government, until 1945, did little to counteract massive Soviet espionage, even atomic espionage, in this country. Only three agents in the FBI were targeted against Soviet spies. Nothing was done, despite defections and revelations of such high Soviet spies as W. Krivitsky and A. Orlov. The U.S. Security agents were told to do nothing.

See: David C. Martin, Wilderness of Mirrors (New York: Ballentine Books, 1980) p. 29.

It is possible that many of the Soviet agents or sympathizers in the U.S. Government simply sabotaged the policy, weakening further structural characteristics of American policy-making.

Also to the degree to which the highest U.S. officials were sympathetic to Russia, see:

Anthony Cave Brown and Charles B. MacDonald, On a Field of Red (New York: G.B. Putnam, 1981) pp. 618/631. Also:

Jan Nowak, Courier from Warsaw (Detroit: Wayne State Univ., 1982) on the attitude of highly placed Britons, like Churchill's intimate advisor, Major Desmond Morton.

41. Lynn Etheridge Davis, The Cold War Begins, p. 378.

42. Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation. My Years in the State Department (New York: The New American Library, 1970) p. 39. Also p. 63, on the impotence of the State Department.

George F. Kennan, Memoirs, 1925-1950 (New York: Bantam Books, 1967) p. 88.

Charles E. Bohlen, Witness to History, 1929-1969 (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1973) particularly the Russian section in the Division of European Affairs was increased to 4 (p. 121). This is a highly important book, particularly its description of American foreign policy-making during and immediately after the war.

42A. Point made by Hamilton Fish Armstrong, Tito and Goliath (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1951) pp. 169/170.

43. On unpreparedness, see:

T.R. Fehrenbach, This Kind of War. Korea - A Study in Unpreparedness (New York: Pocket Books, 1964).

Also: Russell F. Weighley, History of the United States Army (New York: Macmillan Publ. Co., 1967) pp. 500/504.

44. Anthony Cave Brown, editor, Drop Shot. The United States Plan for War with the Soviet Union in 1957 (New York: The Dial Press/James Wade, 1978).

The document shows quite pessimistically, that America might have lost World War III, Russia would probably have succeeded in occupying all of Western Europe in twenty days, etc.

45. Marshall quoted in John C. Sparrow, History of Personal Demobilization in the United States Army (Washington, D.C.: U.S.G.P.O., 1951) p. 282.

Most of the bargaining points had been surrendered long before Potsdam, when in Yalta, Roosevelt declared that, "he did not believe that American troops would stay in Europe much longer than two years."

(U.S. Dept. of State) Foreign Relations of the United States. The Conferences at Malta and Yalta (Washington, D.C.: U.S.G.P.O., 1955) p. 617.

At any rate, the decisive U.S. policy might not have found public support, not as far as Eastern Europe was concerned.

A series of public opinion polls conducted in April/June 1946, revealed that 71 percent of those questioned disapproved of Soviet post-war policies. However, only 50 percent favored a firm policy of opposition to further Kremlin encroachment.

Public Opinion Quarterly, No. 10 (Summer 1946) pp. 264/265 quoted in Lisle A. Rose, After Yalta, p. 174 note.

It is a very interesting question whether the leaders of the Soviet Union were really terrified of American aggressive intentions. If so, how was it that 1945-1949 was the period of extensive demobilization of Russia's armed forces, from 11,360,000 in 1945 to 2,874,000 in 1948 (this exclusive of the Internal Security Forces which numbered an additional 1.5 million)? This hardly suggests a fear of imminent attack. Only after Stalin's death, were the Soviet Armed Forces doubled in size.

Khrushchev's statement in Pravda, January 15, 1960, quoted in Adam Ulam's Expansion and Co-existence, pp. 403/404, note 36.

46. Thomas Powers, The Man Who Kept Secrets, Richard Helms and the CIA (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1979) pp. 26/46 (p. 27).

Ray S. Cline, Secrets, Spies and Scholars (Washington, D.C.: Acropolis Books, 1976) pp. 89/104 (p. 92).

Truman's full statement was that, "this country wanted no Gestapo under any guise or for any reason".

Harry S. Truman, Memoirs. Vol. 2, Years of Trial and Hope (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1956) p. 58.

Characteristically, the military opposed the creation of the CIA. Admiral King told Navy Secretary Forrestal that he "questioned whether such an agency could be considered consistent with our ideas of government".

Walter Millis, editor, The Forrestal Diaries (New York: The Dial Press/James Wade, 1977) Chapters 5 and 6.

Stephen E. Ambrose, Ike's Spies. Eisenhower and the Espionage Establishment (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1981) pp. 162/176.

Dean Acheson told the House Appropriations Committee in November 1945, that the State Department's technique of gathering information "differed only by reason of the typewriter and the telegraph from the techniques which John Quincy Adams was using in St. Petersburg and Benjamin Franklin was using in Paris". Present at the Creation, p. 216, 383.

47. On the NSC 10/2 of June 18, 1948 directive, see: W. Corson, The Armies of Ignorance, pp. 303/307.

48. Stephen Stewart, Operation 'Splinter Factor' (Philadelphia, Pa.: J.B. Lippincott Co., 1974) pp. 54/55, note on p. 55.

Peer de Silva, SubRosa. The CIA and the Uses of Intelligence (New York: Times Books, 1978).

In 1945 the U.S. had no intelligence structure of any kind at work in the USSR. The U.S. Embassy in Moscow was not organized or staffed to carry out such work (p. 5). Until 1953, the CIA's Clandestine Service had no representative at the American Embassy (p. 71). All the Russian-speaking agents parachuted into the Soviet Union were under Soviet control. "We therefore had almost no assets, in terms of agents, within the borders of the USSR..." (p. 56).

49. Kennan quoted in Daniel Yergin, Shattered Peace (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1977) p. 255.

50. Churchill, The Hinge of Fate, p. 327.

CHAPTER IV The Ukrainian Armed Underground: Its Strategy, Tactics and Organization

Mao, Guevara, Giap and Debray all recognize the importance of correct strategy and tactics, proper organization, adequate training and equipment, competent leadership, high morale and strong cohesion within the insurgent's ranks. They all maintain that a well organized and well led guerrilla army, which enjoys overwhelming popular support, cannot fail.

The Ukrainian case demonstrates the reverse. Even a well led, trained, equipped and motivated force like the UPA, possessing overwhelming indigenous support, will be defeated if confronted by a tenacious, ruthless and competent totalitarian state, like Stalinist Russia. It is even more likely to fail if it is effectively isolated from the international forum.

The Ukrainian Insurgent Army was a first-rate guerrilla army, which could be compared at least favorably with such organizations as the Greek ELAS, the Algerian FLN and the Vietminh. Yet it lost totally. The most decisive factor seems to be the incumbent himself: His morale, his aptitude, his tenacity. This element has been either overlooked or downplayed by many Marxist experts on insurgency. Such a de-emphasis is probably due to the fact that the victorious

insurgents usually confronted an enemy in an advanced state of decay, in which the Soviet Union certainly was not between 1944 and 1950. If the incumbent is in "good shape", the aforementioned factors could only prolong the struggle; in themselves they cannot guarantee victory.

We will examine the following arbitrarily selected variables which, in addition, to the incumbent himself and the international scene, co-determine the outcome of a guerrilla war:

- a) Strategy (including timing)
- b) Tactics
- c) Organization (including propaganda, publicity and morale)

We conclude that the two most important factors determining the outcome of a guerrilla war are the counterinsurgent's organization, ruthlessness and determination and an international balance of power favorable to him. The other variables, though significant, are more difficult to classify in their order of importance. Even their grouping into related clusters will not be of much value. The problem of determining the weight of each cluster and its components is further complicated by the fact that some factors like morale, charismatic leadership or historical conflict defy measurement or prediction.

Guerrilla Warfare - A Psychological Warfare:

The Political considerations are paramount in guerrilla warfare. It is truly "a continuation of politics by other means", to use Clausewitz's dictum. As Mao puts it, "...politics is bloodless war, while war is the politics of bloodshed..." Similarly, General Giap notes that in the Indochina war, "political activities were more important than propaganda; armed activity was used to safeguard, consolidate and develop political bases."¹

The major objective of a guerrilla is to paralyze the ruling elite's will and capacity to govern. He attempts to weaken considerably its administrative control, to destroy its image of stability and prestige and to demonstrate to the society the Government's inability to provide livelihood and order. The insurgency is not a competition in popularity; it is a contest for authority. The insurgent seeks to destroy the incumbent's ability to administer and thus to create a political and administrative vacuum. At the same time, he wants to gain time, space and the opportunity to evolve his own political, administrative and military infrastructures, displacing eventually those of the government.² This is his psychomilitary strategy. Revolutionary guerrilla warfare is, after all, guerrilla warfare combined with psychological warfare.³

In sum, the insurgent's grand strategic design is to

create the climate of collapse. His military operations are subordinated to this goal. For instance, the Tet Offensive in South Vietnam was a military disaster for the Viet Cong. After January 1968, it ceased to be an important military factor. However, to Americans the Tet was a "psychological Dien Bien Phu", since it succeeded in creating the impression of impending collapse in South Vietnam. It was nothing but an exercise in armed propaganda where the main target was the American public. The American electronic media and press portrayed it as an American defeat, although in a military sense, the U.S. Army won decisively. The Tet Offensive succeeded in convincing the American leaders, public, press and Congress that the war could not be won. The public, already tired of war, wary of costs, disillusioned and impatient, clamored to end this venture. The anti-war movement began in earnest then. Hence to the guerrilla, the ability to manipulate the enemy's news media and public opinion is more important than his proficiency in arms.⁴

Terror and sabotage are the most potent weapons in psychomilitary strategy. The uses of terror are manifold. It demonstrates to the citizens the inability of the government to protect them. It incites the rulers to resort to rash, indiscriminate and brutal reprisals, which, by hurting many innocents, weaken the public's allegiance to the government. It contributes to the climate of general chaos,

anarchy, and anxiety, further alienating the people from the government. Terror advertizes the cause and the movement; it is propaganda by deed. As an "advertizing medium" it is particularly effective in societies with wide-spread and influential press. A noted Brazilian terrorist, Carlos Marichella, has noted that while a bank robbery netted him \$9,500, the value of coverage he got in mass media was much greater, each segment worth \$400,000 if paid in the form of advertisement. It is the most effective, if sordid, way of getting the message across.

On the other hand, terror enhances the insurgent's morale, cohesion and confidence. It shocks and numbs the public, compelling it to pressure the government to give in, to compromise for the sake of the relaxation of terror and return to "normalcy". The killing of carefully selected targets follows an ancient Chinese maxim, "kill one, frighten ten thousand". The terrorist wants a lot of people watching rather than a lot of people dead.⁵ Finally, terror and sabotage make the theater of war more conducive to partisan operations by disrupting the enemy's transportation and communication networks. By being so elusive, the terrorists increase attrition and the dispersal of the adversary's manpower and materiel.

However, the use of terror is a fine art. It cannot be too indiscriminate or excessive. It must be applied with

almost surgical precision by focusing on the right targets only, without involving innocent bystanders. Otherwise the insurgent may drive the frightened and disgusted public right back into the arms of the government. The society may accept a temporary curtailment of civil rights and even may tolerate police excesses if it regards the insurgent as a villain, as a ruthless and irresponsible enemy of public order. For example, the excesses of the "Red Brigades" in Italy and the Communist guerrillas in Malaya, led to the public pressure for more stringent anti-terrorist policies.

Terror is also a double-edged weapon. For example, during the Greek Civil War, 700,000 peasants were driven by terror into the cities, compounding greatly the political, economic and social burdens of the Royal Government. At the same time, however, the ELAS deprived itself of potential recruits and operational bases.

To conclude, a revolutionary guerrilla seeks not so much to outfight as to out-administer the enemy. Hence, the supremacy of the political or human factor is stressed. However, as the Ukrainian case demonstrates, popular support as the key to victory does not suffice. The record demonstrates that even overwhelmingly backed movements have been defeated and coups d'etats without a public support have been victorious. For example, the HUKs in the Philippines had mass support, yet were crushed; the Bolsheviki in Russia could

only count on a quarter of the electorate, as the elections to the First Constitutional Assembly demonstrated, yet they seized and retained power.

Moreover, the superiority of the human factor, so strongly emphasized by Mao, Giap or Guevara and some idealistic Western scholars, is a fallacy. Desperation, hatred for the enemy, courage and dedication to the cause are not enough to win. The incumbent's overwhelming brute force, effectively and efficiently employed, will prevail, as the Ukrainian case demonstrates.

Still another fallacy is that the insurgent has, in Taber's words, "the freedom of poverty". He owns nothing, he has no territory to hold, no cumbersome equipment to maintain, no vulnerable transportation networks to protect.⁶

This "freedom" is rather debatable. The victory still belongs to bigger, better led, better motivated and trained battalions, directed by the governments which are competent, confident and able to isolate the insurgents from publicity and external support.

The Strategy of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army:

The strategic thinking of the UPA High Command falls into two stages. The first one, between 1944 and 1946, was the armed resistance in the open, in anticipation of the

imminent war between the blocks. The second, between 1946 and 1950, was the conspiratorial phase. As elaborated upon in Chapter III, the basis for the UPA's strategy was provided by its Command's perception of the international and Soviet domestic developments. Initially, right after the collapse of Nazi Germany, the UPA High Command expected the imminent outbreak of war between the East and West. In the event of such a war, the "historical task" of the Ukrainian people was to seek "full national liberation from the Muscovite-Bolshevik rule". That is why the Ukrainian liberation force had to be fully mobilized and ready to strike at, what was expected to be, a crumbling Soviet giant. Therefore, before 1946, the UPA in the Soviet Union operated in large units like battalions (kurins) and task forces (zagrins) comprising several battalions.⁷

In June 1946, however, the OUN Conference recognized that, unlike in China, there was no possibility of a protracted, large-scale war in the Western Ukraine. The UPA was simply in no position to "trade space for time", as Mao did. The terrain was much too limited and too accessible, with few natural obstacles. There was, moreover, no possibility to establish sanctuaries outside Galicia, which was surrounded on all sides by pro-Soviet countries. The massive Soviet anti-partisan offensive in the winter of 1945/1946 had inflicted huge losses on the Ukrainian insurgents. The armed conflict between the East and West, while still

deemed possible, did not materialize. Soviet reprisals, involving mass blockades, deportations, artificially created famines and epidemics, imposed untold hardships upon the Ukrainian people. A more realistic approach was called for.

To save the cadres and to spare the civilians needless suffering, the decision was made to go "underground", into "deep conspiracy". An essentially "defensive" approach was adopted as the "only correct and purposeful form of long-term struggle". Most of the UPA fighters in the USSR were demobilized. The rest were ordered not to operate in larger units than platoons. The activities of "political-propaganda" character, that is terror, were to be emphasized. Needless to add, the theoreticians of the Ukrainian Nationalist Movement wholeheartedly supported the employment of terror as a political weapon. All military operations were to be shaped by political or propaganda considerations, not the other way around. Under the conditions of "deep underground", they must acquire "propaganda by deed" character and aim at - a) publicity; b) retribution; c) liquidation of particularly obnoxious enemy officials and collaborators; d) obtaining resources and intelligence. The overall purpose was to demonstrate to the Ukrainian people the will for further struggle; to maintain among them, figuratively speaking, "a psychological bridgehead" of resistance; to establish in the Western Ukraine a "revolutionary base" or "Piedmont".⁸

The hopelessness of military struggle was recognized after 1946. The OUN/UPA Command maintained, however, that the resistance, while fruitless from the military standpoint, was necessary in the long run. Thus, the OUN Country Leader (Kraiovy Providnyk) in South-Eastern Poland (Zakierzonski Krai), code-named "Stiah", argued that if one million people, resettled by the Soviets from the Western to the Eastern Ukraine, have not resisted actively, their presence there would have no effect. On the other hand, even if half a million Galicians resettled there, they would bring with them their experience of resistance and fresh memories of heroism and sacrifice, they would spark a feeling of national pride among forty million Eastern Ukrainians. The Galicians would become a catalyst, stimulating among all the Ukrainians a spirit of resistance, of solidarity and of sacrifice. They would form a kernel of national revolutionary liberation struggle in the entire Ukraine and perhaps among other Soviet minorities as well.⁹

A contemporary nationalist Ukrainian scholar concurs, claiming that the conditions of Soviet occupation were such that had it not been for the Armed underground's activities, in five to ten years after the events discussed it would have been too late to talk about the Ukraine's independence. The younger generations would have forgotten about her glorious past. Deprived of any memories or pride about national resistance, lacking any national heroes worth emulating

they would have lost national identity and would have become Russianized (or Sovietized).¹⁰ Indeed, the majority of contemporary Ukrainian Nationalists hail from Galicia. The psychological bridgehead, in a sense of a potential source of national revival, is still not regarded as liquidated by the Soviet officials. On the contrary, judging by the number of arrests, trials, novels and articles on the subject of Ukrainian nationalism, it remains a potent issue, even though the guerrilla base as such is no more.

Hence, the armed resistance, regardless of its chances of success, would enable, according to the UPA's chief ideologist Major Pavlo Poltava, the preservation of the "national-moral" values of the people, to safeguard their memories of armed resistance and their faith in eventual liberation. Therefore, the "Bridgehead of National Revolution" must be held in the Western Ukraine under any circumstances and at any price. In this the OUN partly succeeded.

The question arises, however, whether the guerrilla operations were worth such tremendous casualties and sacrifice. In retrospect, it is obvious that the Ukrainian Nationalists had no chance to gain independence in the late 1940s. As stated in Chapter III, the OUN assumptions regarding the possibility of external support or the chances for outbreak of World War III were unrealistic. Perhaps the proper course of action was not to resist, in view of such overwhelming

Soviet qualitative and quantitative superiority. But even if the OUN leaders had assessed the situation correctly, it is doubtful whether they would have been able to refrain from armed resistance. The public pressure was just too great. An astute observer, the former high-ranking official of the Nazi Secret Service (SD) in Galicia during the war, noted that by Spring 1944, the idea of organized resistance "... caught the fancy of the local population and efforts to curtail it had little chance of success...The will to resist, which could no longer be forced into the mold of the OUN or UPA ideologies, literally imbued the whole population. Organized resistance became a movement of the whole people."¹²

Similarities between
the UPA's and Marxist Strategies:

There are many similarities between the UPA's and "Marxist-Leninist" strategic positions, especially those pertaining to the emphasis on the primacy of politics, the use of terror, the attitude toward the indigenous population, and so forth. The practical, objective requirements of the guerrilla warfare tend to impose certain uniformities. For example, the primacy of the political over the military element is emphasized by all the examined insurgent movements. Terror is the main instrument in the guerrilla's political arsenal. Hence, the main objective of the Vietcong in the early 1960s was to destroy the governmental infrastructure. The highly successful policy of "aggravating contradictions"

sought to create social unrest by means of selective terror, increasing thus the peasantry's level of revolutionary consciousness and catalyzing it into action. The government emerged appearing as inept, corrupt and unable to protect its wards from violence. Furthermore, the Vietcong's stated objective was to escalate the war to the point when America's involvement would become unjustifiable and unprofitable. The aim was to create in the public eye an image of a bloody, expensive and intractable stalemate.

Similarly, the OUN/UPA emphasized the primacy of a political factor. In the article written in 1946, "Ratnik", an instructor in the UPA's officer candidate school, stresses, very much like the Vietnamese and Chinese revolutionary theorists, the importance of terror. To him, the purpose of frequent terrorist attacks and ambushes is to create a state of uncertainty and nervous tension within the occupier's ranks; it is to stimulate or catalyze potential supporters into action, it is to popularize the nationalist cause. He holds, like Debray or Guevara, that the revolutionary presence enhances the morale and social consciousness of the colonial society. The image of the insurgent harassing and destroying the enemy gives the population the incentive to cement its ranks and join the struggle. The presence of the underground provides the Ukrainian people with a feeling of protection, both physical and spiritual; it strengthens their national consciousness and activates their spirit of

resistance. Finally, the presence of the indigenous Ukrainian armed forces undermines the occupier's moral fibre.

Like Mao, Debray and Giap, Ratnik maintains that the insurgents must, above all, seek to destroy the enemy's political-administrative infrastructure and his transportation and communication networks. In other words, the foe's operational base must be liquidated as thoroughly as possible, so that its restoration would be difficult.^{12A}

The Ukrainian nationalist leaders regard terror, along with political indoctrination, as the major ways of preventing the native population from collaborating with the Soviet authorities. Some prominent collaborators, like playwright Yaroslav Halan, have been assassinated.

Like the Marxist theorists, Ratnik believes in the superiority of human over material factor. According to him, the enemy's superiority in materiel and manpower can be nullified or "equalized" by, what he terms, "moral superiority" of the guerrilla fighter, motivated by the "idea for which he fights", by his courage and resourcefulness and by the maximum utilization of scarce material resources at his disposal.

Like other experts on guerrilla war, Ratnik maintains that to deprive the enemy of his numerical and technological

superiority, the insurgent must resort to "strategic dispersion". This presents the adversary with too small a target for his tanks, artillery and airplanes, and forces him to disperse as well, in order to locate the guerrilla. However, because the insurgent always maintains the initiative, he can strike at any weak link of the thinly spread enemy line. As Debray similarly puts it, "...the government must, since it is the government, protect everywhere the interests of property owners. The guerrillas don't have to protect anything anywhere...Therefore, the relation of forces cannot be measured in purely arithmetical terms."¹³ The dispersion must be, however, combined, paradoxically, with the concentration of forces, or in Mao's expression, strategic dispersion must be maintained alongside tactical concentration. The enemy must be outnumbered at a decisive point. That is why the UPA's basic operational units, companies (sotnias) were instructed to combine into battalions (kurins) and battalions into brigades (zacrins) if the situation required it, the commanders being designated in advance. This ensured the maintenance of tactical flexibility.

There are other doctrinal similarities of a strategic nature. Ratnik, like Mao, Giap or Guevara, stresses the need for the considerate treatment of the local population. Like them, he emphasizes the necessity for continuous political education of the fighters and the civilians. The correct behavior toward the local population is indispensable

for obtaining its support. That is why the UPA often released its soldiers on furlough for harvest, to help the civilians.

Like Guevara, Ratnik maintains that while the local inhabitants must be decently treated, they should not be trusted, mainly for security reasons. He enjoins the UPA commanders to always maintain the strictest conspiracy and never talk in the presence of the local people about plans, personnel and equipment.

To sum up, the strategic doctrine of the UPA bears a considerable similarity to those of other insurgent movements. The fundamental objective is to "aggravate contradictions", that is, by means of selective terror create chaos, to undermine state authority, to enhance thus the masses' revolutionary consciousness and to mobilize them into action. To achieve this goal, the OUN leaders wanted to adopt the following measures:

- 1) To maintain in the USSR an underground organization, to preserve a "revolutionary bridgehead".
- 2) To conduct through this organization an extensive educational, propaganda and political work among the Ukrainian people and the occupying troops.
- 3) To organize and maintain the spirit of resistance of the Ukrainians, and if possible, of other Soviet ethnic minorities, against the Bolshevism in all aspects of life. The political struggle was to be all-encompassing. For

example, the attempts were made to persuade or compel the peasants to hide or destroy food surpluses in order to create hunger among the Soviet troops in the area.¹⁴

4) To conduct terrorist acts against the Soviet officials, to prevent them from consolidating their hold on the captive people, not to allow them to execute such plans as collectivization or deportations.

Timing:

Timing is an essential aspect of guerrilla strategy. It involves three considerations:

a) When to establish a guerrilla force; b) when to commence the operations; c) when to evolve from an irregular into a conventional military formation (or vice versa).

The best time to create a guerrilla force is when a friendly side is still in control of the area, in order to pass on initial supplies, set up stores, organize cadres and organizational framework, as the retreating Red Army did in the Eastern Ukraine and Belorussia during World War II. If no such ally exists, the incipient insurgent forces are in a precarious position because they cannot be supplied by air without giving their position away, at the time when they are particularly ill-equipped to defend themselves and are thus very vulnerable. The UPA had no assistance by any power; it never operated on the terrain held by a friendly force. The Nazis, who occupied Galicia between 1941 and

1944, were reluctant to support armed, though anti-Soviet, bands operating behind their lines. This aspect of timing, therefore, need not concern us.

The second problem concerns the commencement of the operations. Clearly, to start fighting before one is ready may speed up one's destruction. Premature "deconspiracy" may result in needless and irreplaceable losses. This strategic error was made twice by the Ukrainian nationalists. First, they unilaterally proclaimed their independence on June 30, 1941 provoking the Nazis into decimating their leading cadres. Second, the Soviet authority was challenged much too early. It is true that the efforts of large Soviet partisan raiding formations (led by Kovpak, or Vershinina) to attract popular support in the Western Ukraine failed dismally. It is possible, nevertheless, that these raids contributed considerably to the eventual success of the Soviet counter-guerrilla campaign, after the area was reoccupied. The Soviet partisans succeeded in provoking the Nationalists into full-scale fighting, to abandon their covert activity. The OUN was induced to form permanent partisan detachments to protect the local population from the depredations by the Soviets. This coming into the open certainly made it easier for the Soviet intelligence, later on, to pinpoint the location and strength of the UPA units, enabling the authorities to counter this threat more effectively. (Before they withdrew, the Soviet partisans also

succeeded in setting up an informer network monitoring the Nationalists).¹⁵

The third aspect of timing is the transition from an irregular into a conventional form of organization and fighting. Historical experience demonstrates that only a guerrilla force which transforms itself into a regular army, fighting in a conventional way, can emerge victorious. The Yugoslav Army of 1944, the Vietminh at Dien Bien Phu, the Chinese People's Liberation Army in 1949 were all, by that time, regular forces.

If such a transition is premature, however, the outcome is disastrous, as the fate of the ELAS in the Greek Civil War demonstrates. In 1948, its command decided to become a regular army. Eight divisions were formed. Understrength and underequipped, these divisions were too large and too cumbersome for irregular operations, yet too small for conventional fighting. Thus, the decision to hold the poorly fortified line in the Vitsi and Grammos areas in 1949 was a grave strategic error. Faced by a 182,000 strong regular Greek Army and Air Force, 23,000 fighters of the ELAS stood little chance in static defense.¹⁶

Exactly the same mistake was made by the UPA between 1944 and 1946, when it confronted the Nazis and the Soviets by employing large, brigade-sized units in static defense,

in an open terrain. As a result, it suffered considerable losses of irreplaceable cadres. It should have stayed underground instead.

The change from an irregular into a regular armed formation is, of course, not an entirely military-strategic decision: Politics and prestige considerations often enter into such calculations. A regular, visible army is expected to be viewed by local and international public opinion as a clear step toward the formation of a rival government with a territorial jurisdiction and its own security establishment.

The regular army is also expected to decide the issue soon, finally and decisively. One problem with the guerrilla strategy of attrition is that it wastes time, that it precludes the element of surprise. There is always sufficient time to enable the enemy to learn from his mistakes and to improve his security techniques, as the memoranda of the Polish General Staff, written between 1945 and 1948, eloquently demonstrate. The accepted conventional view, represented by a Vietnamese revolutionary, Truong Chinh, states, "Time works for us. Time will be our best strategist...To protract the war is the key to victory..."¹⁷ Of course, the question is why time cannot work for the counter-insurgent as well. The Ukrainian case-study demonstrates that it did.

External Support:

Besides timing, the availability or lack of external support also forms an important part of the insurgent's strategy. As stated earlier, external assistance such as sanctuaries, equipment, military advice, diplomatic support, constitutes vital, if not a decisive, factor. At the very least, the foreign aid helps to prolong the struggle; at the most, it assures the insurgent's victory. The external aid does not only improve the insurgent's morale or his strategic position; it often decides about the quality and quantity of his arms, about the state of his training, about the quality of his staff work.

The importance of having a friendly neighbor is demonstrated well in the case of the Greek Civil War. Tito's closing of the Greek-Yugoslav border cut a considerable number of the Greek Communist fighters, about 40 percent, in Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Macedonia from the main operational area in Central Greece. The ELAS was also effectively deprived of its weapons supplies and sanctuaries, sealing thus its defeat.¹⁸

Similarly, as argued in Chapter III, the absence of foreign aid was one of the major factors contributing to the UPA's downfall. The Communist sources, like Droga do Nika,d and Pogranichnyi Zbornik, in order to discredit the Ukrainian Nationalists, maintain that there has been close

collaboration between the Nazis, particularly their Security Service (RSHA) and the OUN, especially after Spring 1944. The RSHA, in exchange for intelligence about the Communist partisans, allegedly offered weapons and assistance in recruitment into the UPA. However, the available evidence suggests that at most those were local arrangements concluded between the local Wehrmacht or Security Service commanders and the local OUN leaders.

The Wehrmacht wanted to withdraw from the Ukraine without being harassed.¹⁹ As far as the Ukrainian SS Division "Galizien" is concerned, it is admitted by the Polish Communist sources that the OUN's view of it was quite hostile, although they maintain that it was so because of the rivalry over recruits.²⁰ The Nazi archives also offer ample evidence that Hitler and his advisors on Eastern Europe could not make up their minds whether to support centrifugal forces among the Soviet anti-Russian nationalities (and thus antagonize anti-Communist Russian patriots) or, on the contrary, seek sympathizers among the Great Russian anti-Bolsheviks to be led by a kind of an anti-Bolshevik "de Gaulle" (the attempt to create such a symbol through the Vlasov army was a half-hearted step in that direction). The two variants of the Nazi attempts at undermining the Soviet "unity" ran, however, against the powerful racial commitment to A. Rosenberg's theories and concepts, placing all the Slavs on a sub-human level, only slightly above the Jews.²¹

Tactics:

Guerrilla tactics is basically a matter of common sense. It is very simple and it has not changed much since ancient times. Colonel T.E. Lawrence summarized its essence admirably: It entails "the smallest force in the quickest time at the farthest place". The tactics of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army did not differ much from that employed by other guerrilla forces.²² The tactical principles include such features as: Mobility, outflanking movement, avoidance of frontal attack; assaults on a narrow sector from several directions simultaneously which increases the psychological pressure on the enemy, creating an impression that he is being surrounded; an emphasis on night attack, when air and artillery support are the least effective; careful planning - one week of planning for one month of anticipated activity; speed of execution and movement; surprise, deception, good intelligence, secrecy, camouflage. The UFA's High Command also emphasized these tactical principles.

The Ukrainian insurgents recognized the following forms of partisan tactics: a) ambush; b) assassination (attentat); c) sabotage; d) assault (vypad); e) raid (zagin).

Ambush is considered by the historian of the Ukrainian resistance, Petro Mirchuk, "as the most important, effective and convenient form of partisan combat."²³ After 1946 most ambushes were platoon-sized actions, supplemented by exten-

sive use of mines and snipers. Strategems, like the wearing of enemy uniforms to confuse the foe, setting up false camp fires and artificial tracks to mislead the pursuers, were widely employed.²⁴ The participants in the attack were prepared to disperse when faced with a stronger force and to recongregate at the place chosen in advance. Night ambushes were preferred, because night nullified the enemy's technological superiority, increased his psychological uncertainty and made disengagement easier. The units would shift their position constantly, making it more difficult for the enemy to ascertain their numerical strength and position.

The tactics of dispersal and mobility were adopted after the period of 1943 and 1944, when large UPA units confronted the Nazis and the Soviets in conventional combat. Because of huge casualties, the UPA commanders were instructed not to resort to positional or static warfare. Defense was to be flexible and mobile as well.

Assassinations (attentants), hit-and-run assaults (vypads), raids (Zapins) and sabotage are regarded by P. Mirchuk as the "lower", or more primitive forms of the struggle. These were employed extensively during the political-military phase of the struggle, particularly after the 1946 decision by the Supreme Command to demobilize the rank-and-file and retain only the professional combat-revolutionary cadres.

Raids, in the words of a prominent Ukrainian emigre nationalist historian Lev Shankovs'kiy, "while not the most convenient and most effective", were "the most popular form of partisan tactics". No wonder, the raids were most likely to result in minimal casualties. Their aim, in theory, was to "propagate the ideas of the Ukrainian Revolutionary-Liberation Movement"; to spread the "anti-Regime" attitude among the local people, to activate their anti-Soviet or anti-Communist potential; to lay down the political foundations for cooperation of the neighboring populations, mainly in Slovakia, in the common anti-Moscow front; to strengthen the friendship between the Ukrainians and the surrounding nationalities. The raids sought to undermine the local communist authority by killing various officials and through political work, like meetings, distribution of propaganda literature, helping with harvests and so forth. In practice, however, the effectiveness of the raids amounted to a simple shifting of the UPA troops from one area to another.²⁵

The purpose of a vypad, sabotage and assassination was to harass and terrorize the enemy everywhere and continuously, to tire him, to undermine his morale and destroy his sense of security.

As stated before, the UPA operated not only in the USSR, it maintained relatively large forces and a high level

of activity in South-Eastern Poland. There the most original innovations of the UPA could be found. These were extensive employment of mines. Bunker-building signified the ability to adjust to terrain which was devoid, by and large, of natural obstacles. From those underground shelters sudden attacks were launched against the enemy. They also enabled the UPA fighters to survive the cruel winter of 1946/1947. Some were, in fact, "underground villages beneath villages", containing underground hospitals, printing presses, ordnance shops and so forth. Polish Communist Colonel Jan Gerhard calls the bunker system "very imaginative", "well designed" and "perfectly camouflaged". The Polish soldiers had to be very well trained to uncover them.²⁶

Another original tactical contribution of the UPA was the ingenious application of mines and booby traps. Colonel Gerhard maintains that the UPA ambushes were not so dangerous as their mines. However, the Polish Arm learned to counter those in time.²⁷

As far as the effectiveness of other forms of fighting is concerned, sabotage proved to be a costly endeavor, because the Polish Army guarded closely the railway stations and bridges. Assaults and assassinations, according to Colonel Gerhard, were directed mainly against the civilians, without hurting the Army much.²⁸

The UPA formulated its tactical principles on the basis of its own experience as well as that of other insurgent movements, such as the Yugoslav one. These principles, contained in the UPA's own field manual, Bojovy Pravilnyk Partizanki, were applied in a uniform manner. On the whole, the UPA got high marks from the Communist military observers for its tactical proficiency. The Commander of the Polish Army's Operational Group, Rzeszow, in a report of April 1946, states that, "the method of operations of these bands is very sharp and ruthless. It carries, moreover, all the traits of a trained and organized partisan movement.." ²⁹ General Ignacy Blum concludes that, "...despite certain trappings of a regular army, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army was a typical partisan establishment. The shortage of experienced, militarily trained commanders had been compensated by the development of specific, standardized methods of fighting, each suitable for a particular condition or circumstance. The emphasis has always been on simplicity in training, in planning and execution. On the whole, the UPA's combat principles and techniques had proven to be effective." ³⁰

Organization:

Organization is recognized as a crucial variable by many writers, regardless of their ideological orientation. Communist writers, from Lenin to Mao, assert that "organization is everything". Non-Marxists, like Paul Berman,

Philip Selznick and Sir Robert Thompson also subscribe to this view. To Paul Berman, Communist revolutionary strategy is a "strategy of organization as both ends and means." A noted expert on counterinsurgency, Robert Thompson holds that the most vital feature of any revolutionary war is its organization. It is the organization which enables a small, dedicated and ruthless minority, often lacking a good cause or genuine popular support, to gain power.³¹

According to any standards, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army was a well organized entity. The two paramount objectives underlying its organization were: Strategic centralization and decentralization of execution. The purpose was to retain as much unity of command and of the objective as possible, preserving at the same time maximum operational flexibility of units in the field. Moreover, the High Command sought to insure the closest cooperation between the military and civilian components of the Nationalist Movement and between their respective territorial and administrative subunits.³²

In theory, the principle of civilian control was maintained. In practice, the division between the civilian and military components, the latter being the UPA, was often unclear and the principle of civilian command was not adhered to.

The supreme organ, in theory, within the National-Liberation Movement was the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council (Ukrains'ka Holovna Vyzvolna Rada - UHVR, for short). The UHVR was formed in July 1944, to "consolidate" and "coordinate" all the Ukrainian pro-independence political groups. In reality, it was totally dominated by the OUN-Bandera (OUN-B) faction. Its Secretary General was also the UPA's Supreme Commander (Roman Shukhevych, alias "Taras Chuprynka"). It did not play any role in the OUN's internal politics or in its military activities. That is why discussion of it can be dispensed with. The real power was represented by the OUN.

The Civilian Network of the OUN:

The OUN's highest organ was the Great Congress of the OUN, which elected the Supreme Provid of the OUN, the provid, meaning command, executive committee or cabinet. The Congress's prerogatives were very limited and thus as a body it was of no consequence. The Supreme Provid, headed by Stefan Bandera with the title of Supreme Leader (or Holovnyi Providnyk), consisted of a number of Referents, each supervising a functional department or a Referat, e.g., the Military Referent, or Minister of War, was also a Supreme Commander of the UPA. To them reported the territorial units.

The whole of the Ukraine was divided into krays,

roughly meaning provinces. For example, the area of South-eastern Poland was known as Zakierzonski Kray. These were run by the Kray Provids. The latter, because of understandable difficulties of communication with the Supreme Provid, located after 1945 in Munich, were authorized in certain cases to make independent decisions of a military and political nature.

The krays were administratively into a number of nad-reyons (super-counties), which in turn were subdivided into reyons (counties). The provids at each level were organized similarly. Each consisted of a providnyk and heads of functional departments or referents (for security, supply, propaganda, organization and military matters).

The Military Network of the OUN:

At the top of the military structure was the Supreme Military Staff. Its Chief reported to the UPA Supreme Commander. It comprised the usual sections, like operations, intelligence, supply, mobilization and so forth. The military staffs at each command level were organized similarly.

Militarily, in 1945 the Ukraine was divided into four Operational Groups: Western, Northern, Southern and Eastern. The first one, comprising the Soviet Western Ukraine and South-Eastern portion of Poland, was truly operational. The last three existed only on paper.

The Operational Groups were divided into Military Districts (Voennyi Okrug, for short, V.O.). The District controlled battalions in its area. The UPA Supreme Command gave the districts a lot of administrative, tactical and logistical autonomy, to enable them to function even in the absence of directives from the center. Below the battalion level, the military organization was conventional, so its detailed description will be dispensed with.

The largest operational unit was initially a battalion (kurin). Even as late as December 1945, the UPA in the USSR and Poland employed whole battalions, for example, an attack on Bircza Garrison in Poland in January 1946. Even earlier, between 1943-1944, two to five kurins, were combined temporarily for large-scale operations into zagins, or brigade task forces. These numbered between 4,500 and 8,000 fighters.

After 1945, because of large casualties and relentless enemy pressure, the UPA was split progressively into smaller formations. The companies (sotnias) began to operate as the UPA's smallest independent tactical units. The latter could, if need arose, combine into kurins, the commander being designated in advance. After 1946, platoons began to conduct independent operations. Thus, the size of a basic operating unit depended upon the fortunes of war.

The increase or decrease in the size of the insurgent's operational units is a good indication of how counterinsurgency campaign is progressing. The victorious guerrilla forces begin with small units, gradually increasing them in size and transforming them into a regular Army. China, Algeria, Indochina or Yugoslavia are the cases in point. In the case of defeated forces, the reverse process is evident, from the largest to the smallest. Thus in Malaya, after 1952, under relentless British pressure, the regiments and companies were disbanded and platoons, controlled directly by the Malayan Communist Party District Committees, became the largest operational units.

The two features of the OUN/UPA organization which deserve particular attention are:

- a) The interlocking or interdependence of civilian and military functions, and
- b) the existence of the SKV (Samooboronni Kushchovi Viddily) or Village Self-Defense Units.

Civilian-Military Interlocks:

The interpretation of functions was very advanced, especially at lower levels. For example, the functionaries of the OUN's Security Service performed simultaneously political security and military counterintelligence functions. They were given military ranks. The propaganda referents were

at the same time political officers of the corresponding UPA units. Heads of the OUN's Red Cross Departments were also in charge of the UPA's medical services. The military referent commanded the military units in the area. The civilian network of the OUN could and often has been, whenever needed, mobilized into the regular military units, increasing their effective strength. Understandably, the military rather than civilian elements predominated. For example, the civilian provid at the reyon or nadreyon level could not order the UPA to commence or cease military operations.

SKV - The Local Self-Defense Units:

Like some other insurgent forces, the OUN/UPA organized local part-time self-defense units. Mao too enjoined the Chinese to form local guerrilla militia. It is the latter that provides temporary "base areas" to the regular force. Without such base areas, a guerrilla is just a roving insurgent, out of touch with the political aspirations of the people.³³

While they must remain mobile, the guerrillas must have a secure and permanent rear base, as Mao taught. Such fixed bases could not have been established in the Western Ukraine. However, some of their functions were taken over by the SKV. Its primary tasks were: To provide the UPA with intelligence, utilizing its members' intimate knowledge

of local conditions and terrain; to supply food, medical care, and shelter. Its members often were combined with the UPA units for various operations. The SKV units also conducted independent operations.

Thus the SKV was very important. It helped to solve the problem of mobility. It has been taken for granted that large UPA units could not stay too long in one place, because they would be threatened with discovery. Moreover, their permanent assignment to and recruitment from a given locality created morale problems. Defeats in battle and death of childhood friends resulted in psychological breakdowns and loss of faith. The SKV had been created to cope with these difficulties. Operating mainly at night and under strict conspiracy, the local militia could swell a small UPA detachment to several hundred men in one night and decrease it just as rapidly, enabling the latter to escape from the enemy and confuse his intelligence service. The assistance of the SKV was one of the reasons why the Communist intelligence erred so often about the UPA's real strength. The Polish Communist writer noted that the, "well organized and widely spread network of the SKV was of tremendous importance to the UPA armed underground... The SKV...created additional difficulties in combatting the Ukrainian Nationalist Underground and to a significant degree prolonged its existence..."³⁴

Training and Cadres:

Combat efficiency of any army depends on the quality of training. The UPA's training was directed by the Department 4 of the General Staff, which obtained, published and distributed manuals, instructions and regulations. Some training sources were provided by the Red Army's field manuals. The latter's combat regulations were utilized only in respect to the employment of heavy weapons and staff work. As stated earlier, the tactical combat principles were formulated on the basis of the UPA's own experiences and those of other movements as well.³⁵

Numerous officer and NCO courses were organized. By November 1944, when the Red Army entered the Western Ukraine, two officer candidate and three NCO schools managed to graduate 2,450 officers and 3,550 NCOs. Each company and battalion had on their staff, moreover, a training officer.³⁶

While it is difficult to present a detailed breakdown, the UPA leaders came from several sources: First, the UPA-trained officers and NCOs, the non-commissioned officers being of particular importance. For example, in 1945 there were only 10 officers in the Military District No. 6 (encompassing South-Eastern Poland), so that the District's operations were run mainly by the NCOs. The ratio of the NCOs was constantly increasing; in some sotnias it was 1:2 or 1:3. Some companies had from 25 to 41 NCOs. Thus the UPA

companies were gradually evolving into cadre NCO units. According to the Polish observers, since the NCOs were ideologically thoroughly motivated, "the fanaticism of the UPA becomes understandable."³⁷ In other words, large numbers of the NCOs in the ranks accounted for its relatively high combat efficiency and staying power.

The second largest contingent consisted of the former Red Army officers. These were employed mainly as instructors.³⁸ Since they were not trusted, only a few of them became field commanders.

The third group included the former officers and NCOs, mostly reserve, of the Polish Army. In pre-war Poland, between 22 and 24,000 Ukrainians were conscripted into the Army annually. Such prominent UPA leaders as its Supreme Commander Roman Shukhevych (alias "Taras Chuprynka"), his Chiefs of Staff, Dmytro Hrycaj and Oleksander Casin; Commander of the UPA Group West, Wasyl Sidor; G.O.C. of the UPA troops in Poland, Mirosław Onyszkiewicz - all attended Polish Reserve Officer Candidate Schools. Such kurin commanders as Grzegorz Jankowski, "Lastiwka", Wasyl Mizerny "Ren" - were reserve NCOs of the Polish Army.³⁹

The next largest instructional contingent was provided by the former members of the German Armed Forces. About 600 soldiers deserted to the UPA from the Ukrainian SS

Division Galizien. The UPA also used the soldiers of this division on furlough as instructors.⁴⁰

Other sources of instructors were supplied by the members of the Ukrainian Auxiliary Police, 5,000 of whom deserted, former officers of the Ukrainian National Army, of the Ukrainian Galician Army, of the Czech and Hungarian Armies.

On the whole, the level of the UPA's training was quite high, considering that this was a guerrilla army. Its leaders devoted a lot of time and effort to training. This was confirmed even by the Communist observers. That is one of the reasons why the Ukrainian Nationalists were able to hold out against the overwhelming odds as long as they did.⁴¹

Armament:

Besides being well trained, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army was relatively well armed, especially with small and heavy infantry weapons. Some units packed considerable firepower, corresponding to and probably exceeding that of conventional military units. For example, a battalion, "Orli", had 16 medium and 48 light machine guns, 100 submachine guns, 12 light and 4 medium mortars. The ammunition was plentiful too.⁴²

The arms and ammunition were acquired from several sources. The withdrawing Nazis had abandoned large quantities

of arms as had the defeated Polish and Soviet Armies in the beginning of the war. Small arms shops, manned by the Ukrainians who worked in the German armament industry, were established. Moreover, 6,000 Ukrainians serving in the Auxiliary Police and SS formations, deserted with their weapons. Finally, the arms were bought from the retreating German, Slovak and Hungarian soldiers or acquired by disarming Polish and Soviet police and border guard posts.⁴³

The Supply Department of the General Staff, long before the arrival of the Red Army, prepared numerous caches of weapons, ammunition and food. These were created in anticipation of the loss of village bases. Hidden in each forest complex, they were to be used during blockades and pursuits. The job of preparing these magazines fell on the rayon supply referents. Money for purchases was obtained either by collections among the Ukrainians or through bank and postal robberies, known as expropriations.

The supply service was good. All needs of the UPA fighters were taken care of, including postal service. Arms and ammunition supplies were particularly plentiful. Even several years after the war, the UPA did not experience a shortage of weapons and ammunition.⁴⁴

Recruitment:

Equally efficient was the UPA's recruiting system,

which was run by the Main Staff's Organization-Mobilization Department. The potential recruits, 15-50 years old, were registered, sent mobilization notices and processed in an almost conventional fashion. Those refusing to go were shot, whipped or lost their farms to fire. Forced mobilization, however, was at times counterproductive: units composed of forcefully conscripted men were unreliable and often disintegrated under fire.⁴⁵ The practice of compulsory recruitment was, therefore, discouraged by the High Command.

Communication:

The lack of an efficient and reliable communication system affects adversely the planning, coordination and operations of a guerrilla force, as the Malayan case demonstrates. For example, it had taken almost a year for the Politburo's decisions to reach all the Communist cells and guerrilla platoons. The lack of effective communications contributed thus to the MRLA's defeat.⁴⁶

In contrast, according to a Polish observer, the OUN/UPA communication network "...functioned quite reliably and made centralized command of the UPA units possible."⁴⁷ It is unnecessary to describe this system in great detail. It suffices to state that the availability of an effective short-distance liaison between the Military District HQ or Krav Provids and the local military and administrative units,

manned by especially trained men, was one of the reasons enabling the Ukrainian insurgents to hold on as long as they did. The long-distance communication, between the OUN Center in Munich and the UPA Supreme Headquarters located in the USSR and the Military Districts and Kray Provids was much more difficult. Due to the strict Communist border controls, the contacts were very sporadic.

Intelligence and Security:

The OUN/UPA Intelligence and Security Services were highly competent. The UPA military intelligence service, run by the Department II of the Main Staff, employed experienced intelligence officers, some of whom began working for the OUN in the 1920s.⁴⁸ They succeeded in infiltrating the Polish Security Service, the Army, and the State organs, taking an advantage of inexperience and incompetence of the "still young, immature apparatus of the people's state."⁴⁹ They also managed to plant their agents into the Red Army's ranks, particularly during the call-up in the Fall 1940, in the newly annexed Western Ukraine.⁵⁰ It must be noted that the Nationalist organization, thanks to its extensive conspiratorial experience, was able to weather the first Soviet occupation of Galicia, between 1939 and 1941, without suffering much damage.⁵¹

The UPA agents in the Polish and Soviet security establishment were able to obtain precise advance information

about the enemy's plans for their command. This enabled the UPA units to anticipate or to avoid engagements. This was confirmed by many Communists as to the "weakness of agent network" and the "ruthless measures by the OUN's counter-intelligence against people who informed the UBP (the Polish Security Service), the MO (the police) and the WP (regular army) about the activities of the Ukrainian Nationalists."⁵⁴ Similarly, Colonel Jan Gerhard notes that "thanks to our intelligence agents we had precise information about the WiN...(the Polish anti-Communist underground organization - A.B.) But that form of intelligence did not produce any results as far as the Ukrainian fascist bands were concerned ...The Banderovites comprised a totally distinct group within the underground. They were the best organized and their conspiratorial system surpassed that of the WiN. That is why the struggle against the UPA was particularly difficult..."⁵⁵

The SB was a competent, omnipresent and ruthless organization, resembling very much its Soviet counterpart, known then as the Ministry of State Security (MGB). It studied and imitated the MGB's methods and that is why it could effectively counter its threat.

Initially, the UPA did not have the security men attached to its units, the SB being considered a part of the OUN civilian establishment and the disciplinary matters being under the jurisdiction of the Field Gendarmerie. But as the mili-

tary situation and morale deteriorated after Spring 1946, the OUN Provid, in Poland at least, began attaching security officials to all the companies and battalions.

Each administrative unit also had the Security Referents attached. The Reyon SB was involved directly in intelligence and counterintelligence work. Each suspect or recruit had a detailed dossier, the copy of which was deposited with the Central Filing Center maintained by the Kray or Military District SB. The Reyon SB also checked the background and reliability of every candidate for promotion. The SB referent had a far-flung authority. He maintained informers in every village and every UPA platoon. He could arrest and execute the suspects without trial, including those who outranked him. Just like Stalin's MGB, he was above the law.

The SB recruited long-time OUN members, the people totally dedicated to the cause and highly experienced in underground work. They were trained in the SB's own schools. It was a relatively large organization. For example, the total OUN/UPA strength in Poland, between 1944 and 1947, was between 7,300 to 7,700 men. Of these, 200 were SB functionaries, a ratio of 1:38, ensuring a very high saturation and wide coverage. (In addition, each reyons, nadreyon and kray referat had at its disposal the so called combat groups of the SB, of 10 to 15 men each, whose commandant reported directly and only to the Security Referent. These men, not

attached to the regular UPA units, were used for "executive action" (arrests, executions, guarding SB prisoners and escorting OUN dignitaries. If one considers personnel of the SB combat groups, the strength of the OUN's Security Service becomes truly formidable). For this reason, the OUN/UPA was so difficult to penetrate by the opposing services.⁵⁶

Conspiracy/Field Security:

The infiltration was made even more difficult by excellent field security. To confuse the enemy intelligence, the UPA employed a highly elaborate system of codes and ciphers to designate its units and commanders, in order to conceal their identity, their location and their plans. Each change of location or commander necessitated a change of code names.⁵⁷

Morale and Discipline:

The morale of the Ukrainian Nationalist underground was, on the whole, high. If the rate of surrenders indicates anything, then the number of UPA fighters availing themselves voluntarily of amnesty offers was remarkably low. For example, when the Polish Government offered amnesty in February 1947, for the members of "the Reactionary Armed Underground", by April 25, 1947, 54,243 members of the Polish anti-Communist forces, most of those civilian followers or functionaries gave themselves up. Only 145 of those were UPA fighters, although they constituted roughly a quarter of the armed

anti-Communist underground's strength in Poland.⁵⁸

High morale in the Ukrainian Nationalist movement was undoubtedly strengthened by the realization that a majority of the Ukrainians in Poland was sympathetic to their cause, a fact confirmed by the Polish authorities. Moreover, a high spirit of dedication and sacrifice had been maintained by skillful political propaganda. For example, the leaflet, "To Soldiers and Commanders of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army" of May 8, 1945, signed by its Supreme Commander, compared the promises of amnesty offered by the Soviet and Polish governments in 1945 to those extended to the Ukrainian guerrillas in the Eastern Ukraine in the 1920s. Those who surrendered voluntarily at that time were either shot or sent to Siberia. The same leaflet also reminded the UPA fighters of the Polish pro-London resistance organization Home Army's order to its members to "reveal" themselves to the Soviet and Polish Communist authorities. Again, only a few who did survived. These analogies must have given the Ukrainian insurgents some food for thought.

After 1946, as more setbacks were experienced, the relatively high morale of the UPA began to deteriorate; depression and doubts set in, alcoholism and the number of desertions increased.⁵⁹ The SB was forced to intensify its surveillance and terror. For merely expressing a desire to desert, the punishment was death.⁶⁰

In connection with this, it must be noted that discipline in the UPA was very strict. The punishment for most of the serious offenses was hanging; for lesser violations there were floggings and "penal companies".

Cohesion and Inner Divisions:

Perhaps the greatest weakness of the UPA was its inner divisions. Like most defeated independence movements, the OUN suffered from intense factionalism which affected adversely its unity and consequently its ability to conduct the struggle. These inner fissures were similar to those that split the Chinese Communists in Malaya.⁶¹ They could roughly be divided into: Ethnic, political/ideological, cultural and generational.

Ethnically, the Ukrainians in Poland were not homogeneous. The Ukrainian-speaking population comprised Lemkos (considered Polonized and loyal), Bovkos and Old-Russians. They differed from the Ukrainians culturally and linguistically. Thus, among the Ukrainian-speaking inhabitants of Rzeszow Province, the Lemkos constituted 15 percent, the Old-Russians - 10 percent. The Poles utilized these differences. The Lemkos were recruited to form Ukrainian-speaking counter-bands, just like the British in Malaya used the Cantonese Chinese as detectives.

Politically, the OUN was split between two factions:

The OUN-M, led by pre-war leader Colonel Melnyk, and the OUN-B headed by Stefan Bandera. The conflict between these groups was highly acrimonious, resulting at times in murders. The origins of the discord are rather obscure and go back many years before the war. Lev Rebet, a prominent Nationalist, traces it to 1935, to the so called Baranowski Affair, when it appeared that Melnyk's close aide was also a Polish police agent. Rebet also lists other reasons, such as: Insufficient contact between the activists in Poland and the foreign-based leadership of the OUN, the excessive autonomy of the former, and above all, the age differences and consequently the differences in temperament between the respective groups. The OUN-M leadership abroad upheld an essentially conservative military approach; the Western Ukrainian youth adopted a more radical political and revolutionary attitude.⁶²

The older generation of the Ukrainian Nationalists, constituting the leaders of the OUN-M, served as officers of the Austro-Hungarian Army (7 out of 9 Provid members). The fact of being older, more established and with the ingrained habits of military discipline, prevented them from subscribing to the principle that all means are legitimate and insulated them from the social radicalism of the young followers of Bandera.

The younger group lacked the experience of growing up in a relatively stable and harmonious society under Austria-

Hungary rule. Forced to live in perpetual conspiracy and danger, they tended to suspect the older emigre leaders of deliberately shirking danger and discomfort of the underground life. Moreover, the older generation had established the Ukrainian state, albeit shortlived, thus escaping the frustrating inferiority complex, the result of being ineffectual, a humiliated ethnic minority in a state governed by a hated people.

The simmering conflict broke into the open in Spring 1941, just before the Nazi invasion of Russia. The immediate cause was a disagreement over strategy. The moderates, represented by Colonel Melnyk, rejected the option of mass armed resistance or declaring independence, asserting that since war between Germany and Russia was unavoidable, the best solution was to wait and see, to save one's strength, to await a favorable international constellation of forces, when foreign support for independence could be obtained.

In contrast, the Bandera faction held that the Ukrainian Army must be created immediately to defend the population and to take over in the event of Germany's and Russia's collapse. Independence must be declared immediately, regardless of the international balance of forces. The Ukrainian people must rely exclusively upon their own material and spiritual resources. They cannot depend on international policy manipulations and favorable international outlook. That is why

armed struggle for independence must coincide with the outbreak of the Soviet-German war, which would provide the unsurpassable opportunity for Ukrainian statehood. (The "independence" was declared on June 30, 1941 in Nazi-occupied Lvov. The Gestapo moved in immediately, arresting and executing half of Bandera's aides, with Bandera being sent to Mathausen concentration camp).

The conflict between Bandera's and Melnyk's followers has been violent at times. There were numerous killings. For example, some of Melnyk's closest aides like Senyk, Bushko, Sciborski were assassinated in 1942, almost certainly by the Panderovites. (Of course, many of the latter claim that they were murdered either by the Gestapo or the NKVD agents, as provocation).⁶³ The vitriolic intrafunctional struggle continues even today.⁶⁴

The third cause of discord within the Nationalist ranks was cultural in nature. The majority of the OUN/UPA members were born in Galicia. During the war, a considerable number of "Easterners" born in the Soviet Eastern Ukraine, joined the Nationalist cause. Being veterans of the Red Army, some occupied responsible positions in the UPA. For example, Mykola Savchenko "Bayda", a former Lieutenant of the Red Army who deserted in 1944, became an outstanding battalion commander. On the whole, however, they were not trusted and some were accorded a rather brutal

treatment by the SD. Many were shot or compelled to desert. No doubt, a few like Major Holubienko, Chief of Staff to the UPA Group "South", were traitors or Soviet agents. The majority, however, was loyal to the Nationalist cause.

Still another source of disagreement has been within the OUN-P itself. After 1945, two groups could be discerned: The Foreign Center of the OUN, located in Munich, led by Bandera directly; and the OUN/UPA in the Ukraine, headed by General Roman Shukhevych, alias "Taras Chuprynka". The latter, isolated geographically from the Center, possessed a relatively high degree of autonomy and was able to modify the ideological platform of its nominal leader.

In brief, Bandera's position was that the OUN's main task ought to be independence. What form an independent Ukrainian state would take would be decided after the attainment of sovereignty. The OUN ought to be, therefore, above "party politics", above petty political squabbles. Hence, the existing political platform needs no modifications; ideological uniformity must prevail. A demand for democracy within the OUN had been condemned by Bandera as an attempt to imitate and appease the decadent West. No opposition or debate within the OUN is necessary. In fact, it is harmful. Bandera leaned more toward an equivalent of Soviet "democratic centralism". Similarly, the demands for a classless society and nationalized means of production were regarded

by him as dangerous manifestations of Bolshevism. He responded with a doctrine of "Christian idealism", which is neither defined nor elaborated upon. The OUN, in his view, must not evolve through debate; it must develop through, what Bandera terms, "organic evolution".

The OUN leaders in the Ukraine were more in touch with reality and thus inclined to be more flexible. In order to gain more adherents among the Eastern Ukrainians and to counter the Communist claim that the OUN members were Nazis, the "integral nationalism" had to be modified. The changes included demands for a multi-party democracy, the supremacy of Parliament, classless society, the nationalization of industry and land reform, constitutionally guaranteed freedom of speech and thought, full rights for ethnic and religious minorities, "inner democracy" and doing away with the Fuhrerprinzip in the OUN. All of these postulates were incorporated into the Program adopted by the Third Great Assembly of the OUN in 1943.⁶⁵

In sum, the OUN was not a monolith. It was torn by ethnic, ideological, generational and political divisions. The interfactional struggle affected negatively the cause and political effectiveness of the Ukrainian resistance. According to Prof. Shanks'kyi, the split within the OUN was a "heavy blow" to Ukrainian nationalism, weakening not only the OUN but the whole Ukrainian political life. The

strife weakened the OUN's influence among the Ukrainians; it gave birth to fanaticism, intolerance and cliquishness. It made hatred and disregard for legality a part and parcel of the Ukrainian political process.⁶⁶

Despite the problem of disunity, the OUN enjoyed the general support of a considerable part, plurality if not majority, of the Western Ukrainians.

Popular Support:

Leftist theorists of guerrilla war maintain that the insurgents need the support of the majority of the population to succeed. Other experts express doubts. For example, Col. T.E. Lawrence maintains that the active support of two percent of the population suffices to launch a revolution, provided that the rest remain either passively sympathetic or merely passive.⁶⁷ According to one authority, the National Liberation Front in South Vietnam was supported by ten to fifteen percent of the population, including passive sympathizers.⁶⁸ Richard L. Clutterbuck concludes that, "...majority support plays little role in how we win".⁶⁹ Hence, substantial popular support does not guarantee victory. The OUN/UFA is the case in point.

No precise statistical breakdown could be obtained. Nevertheless, the Polish Communist sources confirm that the Ukrainian nationalists were supported actively by consider-

able numbers of the Ukrainians. Polish General Blum stated, for example, that "...the support by significant segment of the Ukrainian population given to the Ukrainian bands freely and, in many cases, under duress, made the struggle with the bands more difficult." Another observer noted that the Ukrainians very "reluctantly" surrendered weapons to the Polish Army; only very rarely were there cases of voluntary surrender. Moreover, the Ukrainians "immediately" informed the UPA about any movements of the Polish Army.⁷⁰

To be victorious, however, the insurgent must also have the support of the enemy's public opinion - to convince it that their country's cause is unjust, to evoke within it a revulsion and opposition to its government's policy. The IRA in 1921 and the Vietminh in 1954 succeeded in doing just that. Guerrilla warfare, as noted earlier, is mainly "psychopolitical warfare". The OUN lost this kind of war.

Propaganda and Publicity:

T.E. Lawrence noted that, "The printing press is the greatest weapon in the armory of the modern commander...the printing press and each newly discovered method of communication favored the intellectual above the physical..."⁷¹ Robert Taber rightly notes that "the guerrilla fighter is primarily a propagandist, an agitator, a disseminator of the revolutionary idea, who uses the struggle itself - the physical conflict - as an instrument of agitation."⁷²

The value of publicity has been demonstrated convincingly in the Cuban case. Herbert Matthews' interviews in the New York Times plus Castro's skillful manipulation of foreign correspondents, helped to form an image of a large, popular, confident insurgent army, which initially it was not. Such favorable publicity enabled the barbudos to obtain additional recruits, sympathizers, financial and medical aid. In the Ukrainian case, however, foreign correspondents could not travel. The Ukrainian insurgents, as mentioned before, were effectively cut off from the external world. Their propaganda focused, so to speak, on the internal market: On the members of the OUN/UPA, the Ukrainians at large and their Polish and Russian opponents.

The OUN/UPA stressed political-educational work among its members. Each military unit, sotnia and above, had a political officer attached, just like the Red Army. Propaganda referents conducted similar work at each administrative level. That much attention was devoted to political indoctrination is evident in the impressive number of underground leaflets, newspapers and journals available to the fighters. For example, between 1942 and 1944, the Main Provid, the Kray Provids and the UPA High Command published about 30 periodicals, each circulating 10 to 20,000 issues. The UPA Informator alone printed 30 to 50,000 copies.⁷³

The agitation directed at the enemy forces and people

was conducted by the so called Country Technical Units. Their main job was to print, mimeograph and distribute various underground periodicals throughout the enemy's armed forces population. They also collected or intercepted the enemy's newspaper articles and radio broadcasts and edited appropriate responses to these.⁷⁴

The effectiveness of the OUN propaganda is hard to measure. The political agitation directed at the members of the OUN/UPA and the Ukrainians in Galicia was probably effective. It inculcated obedience and devotion to the cause, despite the hardships of partisan life. It is possible that without it, the resistance offered by the Nationalists would have been less ferocious.

Its effect on the adversaries was less spectacular. The propaganda literature, especially its editing and printing, was not of the highest quality and its value doubtful. Some of the leaflets, translated into Polish, were distributed among the Polish soldiers taking part in the resettlement of the Ukrainian population. Some were mailed to the "prominent" members of society like lawyers, physicians and university professors. For example, from January to April 1947 - 4,170 copies of various underground periodicals were mailed throughout Poland.⁷⁵ Their effectiveness was minimal, however.

The gist of these publications was to deny that the OUN/UPA was a fascist movement, that it had ever collaborated with the Nazis. They called for Polish-Ukrainian collaboration and solidarity against the common Communist foe. They denied that the Ukrainian atrocities committed against the Poles were part of a deliberate policy.

Other propaganda efforts involved the formation of the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations in Zhitomir, in November 1943, to coordinate the anti-Bolshevik activities of the "enslaved" Soviet ethnic minorities. This was the first and the last time one ever heard of this organization.

In some cases captured Soviet and Polish villagers and soldiers, but not policemen or internal security troops, were not shot, but given pep talks and then released. Also in certain instances, the captured effects of killed enemy soldiers were collected by the Ukrainian Red Cross and mailed to their families with a letter of condolences.⁷⁶

All of this, however, did not have much impact on the Russians or the Poles, as noted by the OUN authorities themselves. (However, the respective governments viewed the OUN propaganda activities with apprehension).⁷⁷

The failure of the Nationalist public relations campaign is even more understandable when viewed through the prism of

history. The roots of Polish hostility toward the Ukrainians should be traced to the Khmielnitzki Uprising of 1648. It was strengthened by the experiences of World War II, when the Ukrainian Auxiliary Police and the UPA committed numerous excesses against the Polish population, for example, the burning of villages Dylagowo and Pikulice together with their inhabitants. The UPA spokesmen maintained that these acts, while committed in revenge for atrocities perpetrated by the Poles against the Ukrainians, were in violation of the official policy. Indeed, on August 5, 1945 the Kray Provid emphatically forbade the mistreatment of the Polish civilians. However, strict control over individual units under the existing conditions was not always possible. Hence, this injunction in practice was ineffective, to the detriment of nationalist public relations.⁷⁸

Conclusion:

It is evident from the above that the Ukrainian Insurgent Army was, on the whole, relatively well equipped, well led, well trained and disciplined. It possessed an efficient intelligence service; it enjoyed popular support. This was confirmed even by its foes. On the negative side, it was torn by factional struggles, affecting adversely its morale. But even if the UPA maintained a high degree of unity, this could have prolonged the struggle only for a brief period of time.

Although the UPA compares favorably in every respect with all known insurgent forces, it failed because it confronted an adversary which was more efficient, more ruthless, more determined than those faced by other comparable guerrilla armies. It is not, therefore, popular support, organization or strategy of the insurgent that determine his success or failure. The decisive factor is the counter-insurgent himself, namely his strategy, tactics and resources.

Footnotes to Chapter IV.

1. Mao Tse-Tung, Problems of War and Strategy (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1954) pp. 14/15.

Vo Nguyen Giap, People's War, People's Army (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publ. House, 1961) p. 79.

2. Mao, Giap and most theorists emphasize such variables as time, will and space. The main military problem is how to organize space so that it could be made to yield time. The main political problem is how to utilize time so that it could be made to yield will (or still more adherents, wider popular acceptance, maintenance of the willingness of the insurgent to accept further sacrifice and suffering). This dilemma is faced by every insurgent force, including the Ukrainian Nationalists.

E.L. Katzenbach, Jr., "Time, Space and Will:- The Politico-Military Views of Mao Tse-Tung", in Lt. Col. T.N. Green, ed., The Guerrilla and How to Fight Him, pp. 11/21; e.g., Mao Tse-Tung, "On Protracted War" (May, 1938) in Selected Works, Vol. 2 (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1965) pp. 121/143.

3. Robert Taber, The War of the Flea, p. 31.

4. Peter Braestrup, Big Story. How the American Press and Television Reported and Interpreted the Crisis of Tet in Vietnam and Washington (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Press/Doubleday, 1978).

Don Oberdorfer, Tet (New York: Avon Books, 1971).

5. Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism and the Liberal State (New York: New York University Press, 1979) and Chinese proverb quoted on p. 49.

Paul Wilkinson, Political Terrorism (London: Macmillan, 1975).

Edward Hyams, Terrorists and Terrorism (London: St. Martin's Press, 1975).

Perry Thornton, "Terror as a Weapon of Agitation", in Harry Eckstein, ed., Internal War. Problems and Approaches (New York: The Free Press, 1964).

On the successful use of terror as a major weapon in Cyprus, see:

Georgios Grivas, General Grivas on Guerrilla Warfare (transl. from the Greek by A.A. Palis, New York: Praeger, 1965).

On the activities of the Irgun in Palestine, see:

J. Bowyer Bell, Terror out of Zion. The Shock Troops of Israeli Independence (New York: A Discus Book/Avon, 1978) - The Irgun's terrorism was one of the major factors forcing the British to leave Palestine.

6. Robert Taber, War of the Flea, p. 22.

7. For example, "V Voennomu Krutizhi", editorial in "Visti Ukrains'koi Informatzionnoi Sluzhbi", Vol. 1 #1 (April 1, 1944) reprinted in Litopys UPA, Vol. 2, Volyn' ii Polissya (Toronto: Litopys, 1977) pp. 77/81.

Also: "Na Porozi Novoho Roku", Visti Vol. 1 #3 (1943) reprinted, Ibid., pp. 70/75.

8. "Postanovi Konferentsii Providu OUN", June, 1946 Idea i Chin, No. 10 (1946).

"Urivki z Krawvoi Instruksii Providu OUN, 1946", Vizvol'na Politika, No. 1 (18) (1948).

"Vidovza Holovnoho Komandira do UPA", Vizvol'na Politika, No. 1 (18), 1948:

All reprinted in OUN Zakordonni Chastyny, Ukrains'ka Holovna Vyzvol'na Rada. Zbirka Dokumentiv za 1944-1951 (n.p.: Biblioteka Ukrains'koho Pid'pilnuka, 1956).

For example, Petro Mirchuk, Narys Istarii OUN, Vol. 1, p. 25, as a theoretician of terror.

9. Pavlo Poltava was the Chief of the Ukrainian Main Liberation Council's (UHVR) Information Bureau as well as the Chief Political Officer of the UPA. According to him, the "Ukrainian National Revolution" had won an important bridge-head in the shape of the Western Ukraine, where: a) the national consciousness was highly evolved, where the people were especially eager to proceed with the establishment of an independent state; b) where the population is used to and experienced in revolutionary underground struggle; c) where an elaborate Nationalist Organization had been built over decades.

P. Poltava, "Pro Nash Plian Barot'by za Vizvolennia Ukraini v Teperishniy Obstanovtsi", P. Poltava, Zbirnyk Pid'pilnykh Pisan', pp. 265/277.

P. Poltava, "Bez Poserednio za Scho my Vedemo Nash Biv", P. Poltava, Zbirnyk Pid'pilnykh Pisan' (Munich: Ukrains'kiy Samostiynyk, 1959) pp. 246/258.

P. Poltava, "Kontseptziya Samostiynoi Ukrainy i Osnovna Tendentsiya Politichnoho Razvitiia Suchasnoho Svit", OUN. Zakordonni Chastyny. Ukraina Protiv Moskvy. Zbirka Statei (n.p.: Biblioteka Ukrains'koho Pid'pilnuka, 1955) pp. 251/314.

P. Poltava, "Pidhotovka Tret'eioi Svitovoi Viini ta Zavdannia Ukrains'koho Narodu", in OUN. Zakordonni Chastyny. Ukrains'ka Holovna Vyzvol'na Rada. Zbirka Dokumentiv za 1944-1951 (n.p.: Biblioteka Ukrains'koho Pid'pilnuka, 1956) pp. 325/353.

Instructions of "Stiah", of September 15, 1945. Quoted in Droga do Nika,d, p. 37.

10. Lev Shankovs'kiy, "UPA", pp. 795/796.

11. Y. Bilinsky, Second Soviet Republic, p. 126.

12. Anonymous, "Through German Eyes:- Observations on the Emergence, the Structure and the Actions of the Ukrainian Underground", seven installments - January 7, 1952 to October 9, 1952 in Suchasna Ukraina (Munich), No.s 1/26, 2/27, 4/29, 14/39, 16/41, 21/47, 22/48. Excerpts translated in Bilinsky, Second Soviet Republic, pp. 126/127.

12A. Ratnik, "Osnovni Elementi Partizans'koi Taktiki", Ibid.

Che Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1961).

Also: M. Borora, "Holovni Militarni Problemi Ukrain's'koi Vizvol'noi Borot'by", Do Zbroi, No.s 8/9 (1950).

M. Borora, "Principy Voennoi Doktriny Ukrain's'koi Vizcol' Borot'by", Do Zbroi, No. 12 (1951).

Captain Bereza, Partizanka (1976), 78 pp. long manual of guerrilla warfare.

13. Renis Debray, "Revolution in the Revolution?" (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1967) p. 76.

Mao Tse-Tung, "The Military Principles of the Chinese Red Army", Selected Works (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1961) pp. 161/162.

Ratnik, "Osnovni Elementi Partizans'koi Taktiki UFA", Do Zbroi, No.s 14/15 (27/28), 1952, pp. 41/54, reprinted from Povstanets', (1976).

Ratnik, "Rolia Poodinokoho Povstantzia ii Revolutzionera v Tsilosti Vizvol'nykh Zmahan' Ukrain's'koi Natzii", Do Zbroi, No.s 14/15 (1952) pp. 55/67.

On the Viet Cong Doctrine, see: Jeffrey Rice, War Comes to Long An: Revolutionary Conflict in a Vietnamese Province (Berkeley, Ca.: Univ. of California Press, 1972).

For also, Petro Mirchuk, Narys Istorii Orhanizatzii Ukrain's'kykh Natzionalistiv, Vol. 1, 1920-1939 (Munich: Ukrains'ke Vidovnitstvo, 1968) p. 25, on the importance of terror.

14. For example, M. Skorups'kiy, V. Nastupakh i Vidstupakh, p. 206.

15. This view was expressed by John A. Armstrong in "Introduction", John A. Armstrong, ed., Soviet Partisans in World War II (Madison, Wisc.: The Univ. of Wisconsin Press, 1964) pp. 37/2 (p. 59).

16. For example, Col. J.C. Murray, "The Anti-Bandit War in Greece", Lt. Col. T.N. Green, ed., The Guerrilla and How to Fight Him, pp. 66/111.

Lt. Col. Edward R. Wainhouse, "Guerrilla War in Greece, 1946-1949: A Case Study", in F. Osanka, ed., Modern Guerrilla Movements, pp. 217/227.

17. Truon Chinh, Primer for Revolt (New York: Praeger,

1963) pp. 112/113.

18. Col. J.C. Murray, "The Anti-Bandit War in Greece", in Lt. Col. T.N. Green, ed., The Guerrilla and How to Fight Him, pp. 66/111.

19. Szczes'niak and Szota, Droga do Nika,d, pp. 193/198.

20. Ibid.; Also Pavlo Szandruk, "Historyczna Prawda o Ukrain'skiej Armii Narodowej", Kultura (Paris) No. 6 (1965).

During the war there was some interesting and little known attempts to establish contacts between the London-based Polish Government-in-Exile and the OUN to find some common front against Bolshevism. The negotiations took place in L'vov in November, 1943 and February, 1944 and were conducted at a relatively low level - between the local commands of the Home Army (A.K.) and the HQ of the Lvov rayon of the OUN.

Ukrains'ki Samostiynyk (Munich) No. 25 (1959) pp. 32/35, quoted in Droga do Nika,d, pp. 324/325.

After the war, cooperation between the UFA and the anti-Communist partisans, like the WiN was established but only on a local level. They launched joint attacks on Bircha for example.

It must be also pointed out that the OUN's leaders emphasized self-reliance. They did not seek Western support too intensely. Perhaps they realized that they would not be able to obtain it. Moreover, their own theorists, like S. Bandera and P. Poltava, maintained that the only "real concept" was the principle of relying on their own strength. The counting on Western support was regarded as "opportunistic". First, such a reliance may lead to dependency. Second, it was not certain that war between the USSR and the West would erupt in the near future or at a time convenient for the OUN. Third, the dependence on such imperialist nations as Britain would not result in liberation, but probably in another form of colonial subjugation. Historically, the reliance on one nation had proven disappointing:- German actions on June 30, 1941 when they arrested and executed most of the nationalist leadership, were cited as the case in point. The conclusion was that the Ukrainian Nationalists must depend primarily on their own strength. Their only natural allies are other subjugated people of the Soviet Union. In November 1943, in Zhitomir, the OUN established the Anti-Bolshevik Resistance Front. However, the ABN was nothing but political fiction, it does not reveal any activities.

P. Poltava, "Problemy Nashoho Vizvolennia" in Zbirnyk Pisan.

21. On Nazi policies in the Ukraine, see:

G. Reitlinger, House Built on Sand (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1960). Norman Rich, Hitler's War Aims. The

Establishment of New Order (New York: W.W. Norton, 1974)
Chapt. 11.

22. On the similarity between the Vietminh's tactical principles and those of the UPA, see:

George K. Tanham, Communist Revolutionary Warfare (New York: Praeger, 1961) Chapt. 4, pp. 73/97.

Truong Chinh, Primer for Revolt (New York: Praeger, 1963).

Truong Chinh, The Resistance Will Win (3rd. ed., Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publ. House, 1966).

Like the UPA, the Vietminh regards ambush as the main form of attack. Four prescriptions for a successful ambush are: a) The proper choice of time and place, based on good intelligence. The attack should be against the enemy's weakest point; b) A carefully designated plan, anticipating an attack from several directions simultaneously, providing for infiltration; night attack is advised, since such an attack precludes the enemy's use of artillery and air power; diversionary attacks ought to be staged and coordinated. Nine-tenths of the force ought to be concentrated along a major direction of attack, on a very narrow sector. The plan should provide for hiding places, prepared in advance, such as subterranean caves; c) Speed of movement and surprise. Attacks should be designed to undermine the enemy's morale:- guerrilla warfare is as much psychological as purely military; d) High combatative spirit.

It is remarkable how these precepts are similar to those contained in the UPA military manuals.

Also: Mao's Military Doctrine - his ten "principles of operations".

Mao, "The Present Situation and Our Tasks" (December 1942) Selected Works, Vol. 4 (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1961) pp. 161/162.

Brig. Gen. Samuel B. Griffith, "Mao's Primer on Guerrilla War", in T.N. Green, editor, The Guerrilla and How to Fight Him, pp. 5/10.

E.L. Katzenbach, Jr., "Time, Space and Will: The Politico-Military Views of Mao Tse-Tung", Ibid., pp. 11/21.

23. I. Mirchuk, UPA, p. 271.

24. On the use of stratagems, like the wearing of enemy uniforms, see:- Stepan Khrin, Kriz Smikh Zaliza. Spohady-Khronika, 1944-1945 (Munich: Do Zbroi, 1952) p. 93.

This is confirmed by Mieczyslaw Redzinski "7" Dywizja Piechoty w Walce z OUN/UPA. Lipiec 1945-1947" M. Turlejska, ed., W Walce z Podziemiem Zbrojnym (1972) pp. 34/104 (pp. 42/43).

25. Mirchuk, UPA, in Lebed, ed., Istoriia Ukrain's'koho Viis'ka, p. 284.

See:- "Instruktsiia dlia Komandira Reiduushchikh Viddiliv",
Do Zbroi, No.s 2/3 (10-11) 1947.

Mykola Vernihora, "Pro Reidi UPA", Ukrains'ka Povs-
tans'ka Armiya. Zbirka Dokumentiv, pp. 67/75.

26. On bunkers, see:- Stepan Khrin, Zymoyu v Bunkri.
Spohady/Khronika (Augsburg, Germany: Do Zbroi, 1950) pp. 17/29.
Wieslaw Piatowski, "Dzialania 32, 34, 36 pp. w Skladzie
8 Dp", Turlejska, ed., W Walce z Podziemiem Zbrojnym (1972)
pp. 105/137 (p. 132).

For a description of a staff bunker equipped with tele-
phone switchboard, typewriters, radio, see:-

Edmund Ginalski, Byliemy za Laba, Z Dziejow 28 Pulku
Piechoty (Warsaw: Wyd. M.O.N., 1964) p. 343 note.

Col. Jan Gerhard, "Dalsze Szczegoly Walk z Bandami UPA
i WiN na Poludniowo-Zachodnim Obszarze Polski", WPH Vol. 4
#4 (October/December, 1959) pp. 304/335 (p. 310).

Szczesniak and Szota, Droga do Nika, d, p. 464.

On fortification-building by the UPA, see:-

Hornostai (pseudonym) "Viis'kovo-Pol'ovi Zagorodrzennia"
Litopys UPA, Vol. 1, pp. 115/121 reprint from Do Zbroi Vol. 1
#4 (Sept. 1943) pp. 5/8.

On summary of the UPA's tactical principles, see:-

Evhen Priirva, "Dii UPA na Operativnomu Tereni Mizh
Rikami Sianom ii Buhom. v rr. 1944-1947", Do Zbroi, No. 16/
17 (1952).

Ratnik, "Osnovni Elementi Partizans'koi Taktiki UPA",
Do Zbroi, No.s 14/15 (1952).

A manual:- Boiovy Pravilnyk Partizanki.

27. Col. Jan Gerhard, Ibid., p. 305/306.

28. Col. Jan Gerhard, Ibid.. Translation is mine.

29. Quoted in Szczesniak and Szota, Droga do Nika, d, p. 279.
Translation is mine.

30. Brig. Gen. Ignacy Blum, "Udzial Wojska Polskiego w
Walce z...", WPH, Vol. 4 #1, p. 10. Translation is mine.

31. Paul Berman, Revolutionary Organization. Institution-
Building Within the People's Liberation Armed Forces
(Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books/D.C. Heath & Co., 1974)
p. 3.

Sir Robert Thompson, Revolutionary War in World Strategy
(New York: Taplinger Publ., 1970) pp. 7/8.

Philip Selznick, The Organizational Weapon. The Study
of Bolshevik Strategy and Tactics (New York: McGraw-Hill,
1966).

32. On the UPA organization, see:- Lt. Col. Ivan But'kovs'-
kiy, "Orhanizatziyna Struktura UPA" in Ukrains'ka Povstans'ka
Armia. Zbirka Dokumentiv za 1942-1950 r.r. (n.p.: Orhani-

zatziya Ukrains'kykh Natzionalistiv, Zakordonna Chastyna, 1957) pp. 3/16 (p. 5).

Lev Shankovs'kiy, "Ukrains'ka Povstancha Armiia" in Istoriya Ukrains'koho Viis'ka (sec. rev. ed., Winnipeg, Canada: Ivan Tyktor, Publ., 1953) pp. 635/819.

Pavlo Mirchuk, Ukrains'ka Povstans'ka Armiya. 1942-1952 (Munich: no publisher, 1953).

Also a lot of details about organizational objective of the OUN/UPA in Poland are contained in: "Protokoi Przestuchania Mirosława Onyszkiewicza Przez Oficera Śledczego MBP", Appendix 18 in Ignacy Blum, Z Dziejow Wojska Polskiego w Latach 1944-1948 (sec. rev. ed., Warsaw: M.O.N., 1968) pp. 324/332.

Also: Antoni B. Szczesniak and Wiesław Z. Szota, Droga do Nika, d. Działalność Organizacji Ukraińskich Nacjonalistów i Jej Likwidacja w Polsce (Warsaw: M.O.N., 1973) Chapters 3 and 5.

33. Walter D. Jacobs, "Mao Tse-Tung as a Guerrilla - A Second Look", Franklin Mark Osanda, ed., Modern Guerrilla Movements, pp. 166/172.

34. W. Szota, "Narys Historii i Organizacji OUN..." WPH, Vol. 8 #3, pp. 185/186.

Also: Mirchuk, UPA, p. 238. On the SKV.

35. See: Manuals reprinted by the Nationalists and approved for use by the Ukrainian military personnel by the UPA's Chief of Staff.

Ukrains'ka Holovna Vyzvol'na Rada. Zakordonne Predstavnytstvo. Viis'kovyi Tzentr. Orhanizatziia ii Pratzia Shtabiv. Proekt (n.p.: Na Chuzhini, 1947) 182 pages long manual on staff work.

Ukrains'ka Holovna Vyzvol'na Rada. Zakordonne Predstavnytstvo Viis'kovyi Tzentr. Topografiya. 1948. 160 pages long textbook of topography.

These two manuals were probably based on the Red Army manuals.

The indigenous effort was represented by Captain "Pereza", the author of manual Partizanka.

During the interwar period, experiences and doctrines of other revolutionary movements were studied and analyzed. The OUN was particularly fascinated by the January 1861 uprising in Poland.

See: L. Ratajczyk, "Jeszcze w Sprawie Wykorzystania Przez OUN Doswiadczen Powstania Styczniowego", Wojskowy Przegląd Historyczny, No. 3 (1966) pp. 453/454.

36. On training, see: Petro Mirchuk, Ukrains'ka Povstans'ka Armiya, 1942-1952 (Munich: n.p. 1953) pp. 30, 253.

On description of NCO training see: Dmytro Hryts'ko-Tziapka, Horyt' Lis. Spomyny Kolishniho Voiaka UPA (London:

Ukrains'ka Vidavnychcha Spil'ka, 1975) pp. 191/192.

Spomyny Chotovocho Ostroverkha, p. 48, Droga do Nika,d, p. 265.

On recruit training, see: Ivan Dmytryk, V Lisakh Lemkivshchyny. Spomyny Voiaka UPA (New York: Suchasnist', 1976).

On training of the SKV, see: Stepan Khrin, Kriz' Smikh Zaliza (Augsburg, Germany: n.p., 1952).

37. Szczesniak and Szota, Droga do Nika,d, p. 266.

38. For example, P.C.S. "Tigri", was commanded by a former Senior Lieutenant of the Red Army, Dmytro Karpenko "Iastrub".

NCO school "Simon Petlura" was run by Major "Stepoviy".

M. Skorupskiy, V Nastupakh i Vidstupakh, pp. 144/145 lists other former Red Army officers who were instructors in the UPA: Major "Bayda", Major "Osip", Lt. Tul'chin, Lt. Feroriv, Major Barvinok, Capt. Bondarenko.

39. See: Piotr Stawewski, Nastepcy Komendanta. Wojsko a Polityka Wewnetrzna Drugiej Rzeczpospolitej w Latach 1935-1939 (Warsaw: M.O.N., 1969) pp. 89, 169.

Biographies of more prominent UPA Commanders in Droga do Nika,d, pp. 241 ff., and in P. Mirchuk, UPA.

40. Major Wolf-Dietrich Heike, Ukrains'ka Diviziia 'Halychyna'. Istoriia Formyvannia ii Boiovykh Dii y 1943-1945 Rokakh (translated from the German by Roman Kolisnyk, Toronto: Brother of Former Soldiers of the First Division, 1970) pp. 49, 167; SS Division "Galizien" trained about 32,000 soldiers and 600 Ukrainian officers.

Pavlo Shandruk, Arms of Valor (New York: Robert Speller, 1959).

T. Cieslak, Hitlerowski Sojusz z Nacjonalizmem Ukrain'skim w Polsce (Warsaw: M.O.N., 1968).

Some German officers and NCOs have remained after the Wehrmacht's retreat, especially in medical services.

Also: Basil Dmytryshyn, "The Nazis and the SS Volunteer Division "Galicia", The American Slavic and Eastern European Review, Vol. 15 #1 (1956), pp. 1/10.

General Mykola Kapustianskiy, "Persha Ukrains'ka Diviziia Ukrains'koy Natsional'noy Armiyi" in Istoriia Ukrains'koho Viiska (sec. rev. ed., Winnepeg, Canada: Ivan Tyktor, Publ., 1953) pp. 604/628.

About 200,000 Ukrainians served in various Nazi auxiliary formations, including the wholly Ukrainian "Sumy" Division, which was annihilated at Stalingrad.

41. P. Mirchuk, UPA, p. 265/6 on the armament.

Ostroverkha, Spomyny Chotovocho Ostroverkha, p. 60.

M. Skorupskiy, V Nastupakh ii Vidstupakh, p. 151, relates that artillery was used during the battle of Dubna. Artillery peices were stored away and used when necessary. The medium

mortars performed the support functions of artillery. Guns were regarded as too cumbersome and slowing down mobility.

43. P. Mirchuk, UPA, p. 266.

44. Szczesniak and Szota, Droga do Nika,d, p. 149.

On the excellence of the UPA supply system it can be testified to the fact that the 34th Infantry Regiment attacked the UPA camp in the Chryszczata Forest complex. It was an area of 800 square meters. It contained a mill, a bakery, tailor and shoemaking shops, hospital, stables and 24 small houses covered by tin roofs for winter.

M. Juchniewicz and St. Rzepski, Szlakiem 34 pp (Warsaw: M.O.N., 1960) pp. 362/363.

Jan Gerhard, Luny w Biewzczadach (Warsaw: M.O.N., 1959).

About the UPA's Postal Field Service, see:

Julian Maksymczuk, Katalogue Ukrain's'kykh Nederzhavnykh Marok. Dopvnnennia, 1957, Part I, pp. 31/33 (no publisher of place). I am grateful to Mr. Borys Fessak for providing me with a Xerox copy of the catalogue.

45. P. Mirchuk, for instance, mentions a painful case of Kurin "Iurchenko", which in the face of the Soviet offensive simply disintegrated in the Fall, 1944; in UPA, p. 249.

46. L. Pye, Guerrilla Communism in Malaya (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1956) p. 100 note.

47. Major W. Szota, "Narys Rozwoju OUN i UPA", WPH Vol. 8 #1 (January/March, 1963) p. 190.

Szczesniak and Szota, Droga do Nika,d, pp. 275, 431; Mirchuk, UPA; describe the communication system in great detail.

48. The intelligence of the OUN/UPA has evolved from the one created by the Ukrainian Military Organization (UVO), which often spied on behalf of the Reichswehr. The Reichswehr's Nachrichten Referat organized in 1925 intelligence courses for the UVO members in Breslau and provided financial support. Osip Dumin, a former head of the UVO's intelligence service, "Pravda o Ukrainskiej Organizacji Wojskowej", Zeszyty Historyczne, No. 30 (Paris: Instytut Literacki Kultury, 1974) pp. 103/137 - a document originally written in June, 1926.

49. Major Dyplomowany Wieslaw Szota, "Zarys Rozwoju Organizacji Ukrainskich Nacjonalistow i Ukrainskiej Powstanczej Armii", Vol. 8 #1 (January/March, 1963) WPH, pp. 163/218 (p. 198).

50. A.A. Bogdanov, G.G. Vlasov, et al., V Poedinke z Abverom. Dokumental'nyi Ocherk o Chekistakh Leningradskoho Frontu, 1941-1945 (sec. rev. ed., Leningrad: Lenizdat, 1974) p. 20.

51. On that, see: Myroslav Prokop, Ukraina i Ukrains'ka Politika Moskvy, Vol. 1, Period Pidhotovky do Druhoy Svitovoy Viiny (Munich: Suchasna Ukraina, 1956) pp. 125 ff.

52. M. Juchniewicz, "Udział 7 Łużyckiej Dywizji Piechoty w Operacji 'Wisła'", WPH, Vol. 7 #4 (October/December, 1962) pp. 3/30 (p. 6).

Still another observer noted that, "It happened quite often that those captured by the Army and delivered to the Public Security Office in Sanok, were seen again walking 'scot free', meaning that they must have had their people there..."

Wiesław Piatkowski, "Działania 32, 34, 36 pp i 37 p.a.l. w Składzie *DP", Turlejska (1972) p. 126.

53. Incidentally, the similarities between the assassination of General Swierczewski and the British High Commissioner in Malaya, Sir Henry Gurney, are remarkable. Also both have triggered successful all-out counter-offensives by the respective authorities.

About the killing of Colonel-General Moskalenko near Tiaziv, Stanislav Oblast; in Summer, 1946, see:

UFA. Zbirnyk Dokumentiv, pp. 230/240.

About the assassination of General Swierczewski by Lt. Khrin's unit, in Ibid., pp. 239/240.

Also: Lisovyyk (pseud.) "Zahibel Henerala Sverchevs'koho" in Dr. Petro Mirchuk and W. Davydenko, eds., V Riadakh UFA. Zbirka Spominiv Byvshykh Voiakiv Ukrains'koi Povstans'koi Armii (New York: By the Society of Veterans of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army in the U.S. and Canada, 1977) pp. 174/179.

Lt. Ostroverkha, Spomyny Chotovoho Ostroverkha, pp. 112/113.

Lt. Khrin, Kriz Smikh Zaliza.

Of course, the Poles maintain that the ambush against General Swierczewski was totally accidental, nor premeditated.

54. Szczesniak and Szota, Droga do Nika, d, p. 257.

55. Col. of General Staff, Jan Gerhard, "Dalsze Szczegóły Walk z Bandami UFA i WiN na Poludnowo-Wschodnim Obszarze Polski", WPH, Vol. 4 #4 (October/December, 1959) pp 320/322.

Brigadier General Ignacy Blum also confirms that the UFA possessed an "...excellent intelligence network through which the UFA obtained precise details about the movement of troops..." He further asserts that, "...strict conspiracy", excellent field security made the precise identification of the Nationalist units very difficult, hampering thus the effectiveness of counter-partisan campaigning.

I. Blum, "Udział Wojska Polskiego...", WPH, Vol. 4 #1, p. 11.

That is not to say that the OUN/UPA was totally immune to infiltration, especially at the highest levels. The Soviet Security Services had scored some significant successes against it.

The NKVD infiltrated the OUN as early as 1940. During the trial of the OUN leaders in Lvov, in 1940, the role of an agent-provocateur was played by one Maksymov, who was a member of the Krai Provid of the OUN.

Borys Lewyckyj, Terror i Rewolucja (Paris: Instytut Literacki Kultury, 1965) p. 127.

"Taras Chuprynka's" successor as the UPA commander, W. Kuk, "Kowal", was apparently a KGB agent, who in 1960 called on former fighters of the UPA to "reveal" themselves to the authorities.

Lewyckyj, Terror i Rewolucja, p. 241.

Myron Matwijejko, a former head of Security Service of the OUN-B, also called on former UPA fighters to surrender in the broadcast on the Kiev Radio on November 24, 1960. Matwijejko parachuted in 1950 into the USSR to conduct anti-Soviet underground work, surrendered immediately to the Soviet authorities. He obviously assisted the Soviets in an intelligence survey of the UPA.

Ibid., pp. 241/242.

56. Lt. Ostroverkha reports on a three-day security indoctrination course directed by the Reyon Referent of the S.B.. The emphasis was on the organization and operational procedures of the Soviet Secret Police MGB/MVD. As instructional material captured MGB manuals, instructions and documents were used.

Spomyny Chotovoho Ostroverkha, p. 47.

On the operations of the UPA's Security Service against the Soviet infiltrators, see: Ibid., pp. 102/106.

On the organization of the Sluzhba Bezpeki, see:

Major Wieslaw Szota, "Zarys Rozwoju Organizacji Ukrain-skich Nacjonalistow i Ukrainskiej Powstanczej Armii", WPH, Vol. 8 #1 (January/March, 1963) pp. 163/218, esp. pp. 192/193.

Also: Mirchuk, UPA, pp. 236 ff.

Szczesniak and Szota, Droga do Nika,d, pp. 262/263.

57. On the UPA's regulations concerning field security, see: "Nakaz No. 10 v Spravi Zberehannia Viis'kovykh Taemnitz" of September 3, 1943, Litopys UPA, Vol. 1, pp. 144/145.

Szczesniak and Szota, Droga do Nika,d, pp. 269/274.

58. The most reliable breakdown of the OUN/UPA membership in Poland is presented in Droga do Nika,d, pp. 241/242, 258, 261 note 86, p. 431:

Regular UPA units	-	about 2,500 men
The SKV	-	2,400 to 2,800 men in 70 kushches
The Security Service	-	200
The Civilian Network	-	2,200 active members involved in political, organizational, supply, health, information and pro-

paranda work. In sum, 7,300 to 7,700 men.

Also: Ignacy Blum, Z Dziejow Wojska Polskiego w Latach, 1944-1948. Szkice i Dokumenty (sec. rev. ed., Warsaw: M.O.N., 1968) pp. 43/44.

59. See: Instructions of Krayovy Provid regarding combatting alcoholism of 6/20/46, cited in Droga do Nika, d, p. 318 note 124.

Many members of the UPA deserted and volunteered for resettlement in the USSR, Ibid., pp 318/319.

60. For example, Lt. Khrin and M. Skorupskiy, truly tough veterans of the UPA were terrified of their own court martials.

Stepan Khrin, Kriz Smikh Zaliza. Spohady-Khronika, 1944-1945 (Munich: Do Zbroi, 1952) pp. 146/147.

M. Skorupskiy, V Nastupakh i Vidstupakh, pp. 171, 219.

61. See: Richard Clutterbuck, Riot and Uprising in Singapore in Malaya, pp. 172/174. Ethnically, the Chinese in Malaya were split into the Hakkas (mostly mine workers), the Hailamese (mostly squatters, providing the bulk of support for the MRLA), the Cantonese (mostly domestics and petty merchants). The Communist leadership was split into two factions, one led by Siew Lau, the State Secretary of Malacca, who regarded the uprising as ill-timed and Lam Swee, the leader of the Trade Unions, who thought that the time was ripe.

62. Lev Rebet, Svitla i Tini OUN (Munich: Ukrains'ki Samostiynik, 1964) pp. 74/75.

Zynovii Knysh, Rozbrat. Spohady ii Materiali do Rozkolu OUN v 1940/1941 Rokakh (Toronto: Stribna Surma, 1960)

63. On the armed clashes between the Banderovites and the Melnykovites, see: Maksym Skorupskiy, "Maks", a former UPA battallion Commander and Melnyk's follower.

V Nastupakh i Vidstupakh. Spohady (Chicago: Ukrainsko-Amerikans'ka Vidavnychka Spil'ka, 1961) pp. 122/127.

The Bandera units forcefully had disarmed and incorporated Melnyk's formed units. Those who refused to join were shot. In the UPA itself, ex-Melnykovites, like Skorupskiy, were closely watched and some brutally prosecuted by the OUN Security Service.

64. The discord was very bitter. For example, Yaroslav Stetz'ko accuses Melnyk's followers of being both the Gestapo and the NKVD collaborators (sic!!). He implies that Taras Bul'ba (Borovets), the founder of the first Armed Nationalist Ukrainian partisans was a Soviet agent and the excesses committed by his men on the Poles were part and parcel of Soviet provocations. His 21 Chervnya, pp. 155/156.

Similarly, A. Osipenko, Vklad OUN v Spravu Tvorennia

i Rozbudovi UFA", in Orhanizatziya Ukrains'kykh Natziionalistiv, Zakordonni Chastyny. Ukrains'ka Povstans'ka Armiya. Zbirka Dokumentiv za 1942-1950 rr. (n.p.: Biblioteka Ukrains'koho Pidpil'nyka, 1957) pp. 22/35.

Osipenko calls the Melnykovites "traitors", "bandits", "agents of Moscow and not Ukrainian Revolutionaries", "adventurers", "Nazi collaborators".

The same epithets are contained in "Zaiava Holovnoho Kommanduvannia UFA", signed by its Supreme Commander, Taras Chuprynka, in Ibid., pp. 178/180.

Not dissimilarly, Melnyk's admirers, like G. Polikarpenko in a vitriolic anti-Bandera tract, asserts that Bandera's closest assistant, Richard Iariy was an NKVD agent. (Ironically, the Polish Communist publication asserts that he was a Gestapo agent. Droga do Nika, d). Polikarpenko also claims that the Banderovites did not start the armed resistance against the Nazis; that the first UPA units were organized by the Melnykovites, that the Bandera followers merely appropriated the name.

G. Polikarpenko, Orhanizatziya Ukrains'kykh Natziionalistiv Pidchas Druhoi Svitovoi Viini (4th ed., n.p.: Na Chuzhyni, 1951) p 44 note.

Bandera's emphasis on orientation on "own strength":

F. Mirchuk, Stepan Bandera, pp. 110 ff.

Stepan Bandera, "Do Zasad Nashoi Vizvol'noi Politiki", Vizvol'na Politika (Munich) Vol. 1 #9/10 (Nov./Dec., 1946).

Also in Stepan Bandera, Persektyvy Ukrains'koi Revoliutsii (Munich: By the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalistiv, 1978) pp. 45/55.

Stepan Bandera, "Plianovist' Revoliutzionni Borot'by v Kraiu", Vizvol'na Politika (Munich) Vol. 3 #1 (1948) reprinted in Bandera, Perspektyvy Ukrains'koi Revoliutsii, pp. 56/56.

65. Roman Shukhevych, "Demokratiya ii Ukrains'kii Viz'vol'nyi Rukh", Suchasna Ukraina (1951).

Democratic tendencies are also reflected in July, 1944 Platform, see: "Platforma Ukrains'koi Holovnoy Vizvol'noy Rady", adopted by Velykyi Zbor UHVR in July, 1944", in Orhanizatziya Ukrains'kykh Natziionalistiv. Zakordonni Chastyny. Ukrains'ka Holovna Vyzvol'na Rada Zbirka Dokumentiv za 1944-1950 rr. (n.p.: OUN Zakordonni Chastyny/Biblioteka Ukrains'koho Pidpil'nyka, 1956) pp. 9/13.

Pavlo Poltava, "kto Taki Banderivtsi ta za Scho Voni Boriutsia", in Pavlo Poltava, Zbirnyk Pid'pilnykh Pisan' (Munich: Ukrains'kii samostiynyk, 1959) pp. 113/139.

"Nasha Vidpovid'", in Ukrains'ka Povstans'ka Armiya. Zbirka Dokumentiv 1942-1950 rr. (n.p.: OUN Zakordonni Chastyny, 1957) pp. 170/176 - This is a reply to the Polish press. It denies that the OUN had anything to do with fascism or Hitlerism; declares the Ukrainian Nationalist Movement to be a "Liberation and social-liberation movement". Denies that it is a bourgeois movement. Claims it consists mostly of

small and medium peasants, who are against "Capitalism", who are for social membership in the means of production, who seek to eliminate Bolshevik overlords, who replaced former landlords by introducing serfdom in kolkhozes.

"Politychna Delkharatziya UPA: za Scho Boriotsia Vyzvol'no-Revolutziyna Ukrain's'ka Povstans'ka Armia", Litopys UPA. Vol. 1, Nimetzka Okupatzia (Toronto: Vydavniststvo Litopys UPA, 1976) pp. 121/131.

After 1945, some authors, like Roman Il'nytzki, identify three distinct ideological currents within the Ukrainian Nationalist Movement: a) Melnyk Faction; b) the Bandera Faction in Exile (atotalitarian faction, unable to adjust to changing circumstances); c) one represented by the UPA High Command in the Ukraine proper - striving for a liberal-democratic parliamentary Ukrainian state. "Democratization" and "Socialization" of the OUN's faction in the Ukraine occurred under significant pressure by Eastern Ukrainians. Roman Il'nytzkyi, Orhanizatziya Ukrain's'kykh Natsionalistiv v Ukraini. Orhanizatziya Ukrain's'kykh Natsionalistiv za Kordonom. Prichynok do Istorii Ukrain's'koho Natsionalistichnoho Rukhu (New York: Politychna Rada Odnodumtziiv OUN v Ssha, 1962) esp. pp. 24/41.

On Bandera's position, see: Stepan Bandera, "Ukrains'ka Natsional'na Revolutziia a ne Til'ki Proterezhinmi Rezistans", Ukrains'kiy Samostiynyk, January 29, 1950 in OUN. Zakordonni Chastyny. Ukraina Protiv Moskvy. Zbirka Statei (n.p.: Biblioteka Ukrain's'koho Pidpil'nyka, 1955) pp. 338/388.

Stefan Bandera, "Za Pravil'ne Rozuminnia Vizvol'no-Revolutzionnoho Protzesu", in OUN. Zakordonni Chastyny. Bolshhevizm ii Vizvol'na Borot'ba. Zbirka Dokumentiv ii Statei (n.p.: Biblioteka Ukrain's'koho Pidpil'nyka, 1955) pp. 184/190.

66. Lev Shakovs'kiy, "Ukrains'ka Povstan'cha Armiya", in Istoriya Ukrain's'koho Viis'ka (sec. rev. ed., Winnipeg: Ivan Tyktor Publ. 1953) pp. 635/819 (p. 649).

But even assuming that the OUN/UPA was totally homogeneous and united, for how long could it prolong the struggle? For a couple of more months?

67. T.E. Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom (New York: Dell Publ. Co., 1962) p. 199.

68. Douglas Pike, War, Peace and the Viet Cong (Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 1969) p. 6.

69. Richard L. Clutterbuck, The Long, Long War. Counterinsurgency in Malaya and Vietnam (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966) p. 5.

70. Gen. Ignacy Blum, "Udzial Wojska Polskiego w Walce..." WPH, Vol. 4 #1 (Jan/March, 1959) p. 16.

Col. Michal Tyliszczak, "9 Drezdenska Dywizja Piechoty..."

in Maria Turlejska, ed., W Walce ze Zbroynym Podziemiem, 1945-1947 (Warsaw: M.O.N., 1972) pp. 148/149.

71. T.E. Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom (New York: Dell Publ. Co., 1962) p. 198.

72. Robert Taber, The War of the Flea. A Study of Guerrilla Warfare. Theory and Practice (New York: The Citadel Press, 1970) p. 23.

73. Szczesniak and Szota, Droga do Nika,d, pp. 299/330.

Lev Shankovs'kiy, "Ukrainian Underground Publications in the USSR", Ukrainian Quarterly, Vol. 8 #3 (Summer, 1952) pp. 225/238. Other important periodicals for internal consumption were: Idea i Chyn; Visti z Frontu; Chornyi Lis.

Shankovs'kiy lists 21 titles of various periodicals, 60 pamphlets, 81 leaflets that appeared in the Soviet-ruled Ukraine, between 1944-1950.

Evhen Priirva, "Ukrains'ki Pid'pilni Vidannia Pid Moskovs'-ko-Bolshevits'koyu Okupatziej", Do Zbroi (Munich) No.s 2, 3, 6 (1950).

74. On propaganda see: Major Wieslaw Szota, "Zarys Rozwoju Organizacji Ukrainskich Nacjonalistow i Ukrainskiej Powstanczej Armii", WPH, Vol. 8 #1 (Jan./March, 1968) pp. 163/218.

A Szczesniak and W. Szota, Droga do Nika,d, pp. 299/330.

Gen. Jan Czapla, "Walka z OUN/UPA w Latach 1944-1947. Kuren Zeleniaka", in Maria Turlejska, ed., Z Walk Przeciwko Zbrojnemu 1944-1947 (Warsaw: M.O.N., 1966).

75. The typical leaflets distributed among soldiers are: Polacy, Zolnierze, Oficerowie of Sept./Oct., 1946; List Otarty do Wojska Polskiego; Ukraincy-Powstancy - Nasza Odpowiedz.

Among those sent to the "prominent members" of Polish society, were, for example: Stosunki-Polsko Ukrainskie (Polish-Ukrainian Relations); Czy Bomba Atomowa Uratuje Anglie (Will the atomic bomb save England), Nasza Odpowiedz (Our answer); Krwawym Szlakiem Stalinowskiej Demokracji (Along the Bloody Trail of Stalinist Democracy); and so forth.

All mentioned in Droga do Nika,d, pp. 307/312, passim.

76. In many cases, however, the P.O.W.s were simply shot. For example, in March 1946, 60 captured Polish soldiers were executed in the area of Wislok Wielki. The incident inspired Polish Colonel Jan Gerhard, later a noted journalist, to write a novel, Luny w Bieszczadach. This was not an isolated incident.

77. Reyon Provydnyk (County OUN Leader) "Slawko" and Major "Ren", Commander of the UPA tactical sector in Poland, in their joint report note that, "...the attitude of the

Poles toward the Ukrainians is hostile, especially of those repatriated from the Soviet Union." Quoted in Droga do Nika,d, pp. 308/309.

78. On some of the UPA atrocities, see: Col. Jan Gerhard, "Jeszcze o Walkach Bandami UPA", pp. 314/315.

On the directive by the UPA High Command forbidding mistreatment of the Polish civilian population, see: Droga do Nika,d, pp. 309/310 and the instructions by Propaganda Referent "Halana", Ibid..

The behavior of the Poles toward the Ukrainians was not always exemplary, however. Prof. Shankovs'kiy claims that the Polish guerrillas in 1944, killed 2,000 Ukrainians in the village of Piskorovich and 300 in the village of Pavlik.

"UPA", in Istoriya Ukrains'koho Viis'ka, p. 776.

CHAPTER V Communist Counterinsurgency
 Policies and Resources

Introduction:

Counterinsurgency denotes those military, police, political, economic and psychological measures taken by a government to defeat an insurgency. The determination, skill and speed with which an incumbent government campaigns against the guerrilla depend upon many variables. Those could be divided into strategic and tactical categories.

The strategic factors are those which affect the general policy toward insurgency. They may either facilitate or restrain the use of force. They influence the manner in which it is used. The strategic variables, include among others:

1) The incumbent's perception of international and internal situations. The way in which the country's leaders perceive their position on international and domestic arenas will determine the sense of urgency, the means employed, the way the force is used and the resolve of the government to crush the rebellion.

2) Political Culture. This is often a neglected factor. However, according to J.K. Zawodny, "...utmost attention must be given to the cultural values of the groups in conflict, because these values - as much as capabilities - often affect the choice of strategy".¹ The cultural factors

include such features as:

- a) The population's morale and cohesion, its habits of obedience and loyalty to the government, its sympathy or antagonism toward the insurgent.
- b) The government's coercive style or its repressive mentality. This is a product of a country's history, national character, constitutional and ideological restraints; it is part of the elite's "operational code".

All of this will shape the technique, the style, ruthlessness and speed with which the counterinsurgency campaign is conducted. The cultural element may also determine the incumbent's emphasis on either purely military/coercive activities or the civic action and reform, persuasion or force, stick or carrot.

- 3) International and Domestic Public Opinion. These also may exercise a restraining influence on the government's conduct of counterinsurgency.

Strategic factors influence, what is termed here, tactical considerations. For example, such an aspect of national political culture, as tolerance or discouragement of dissent, may affect the size, objectives and operational means of a country's security services. Tactical factors are those which determine directly the conduct of the counterinsurgency itself. These include:

- a) Government resources: manpower, weaponry, equipment.
- b) Morale of the forces involved, as reflected in their dis-

cipline, in their professionalism and dedication.

- c) Intelligence and Security Services: their skill, the extent to which they penetrate and control society.
- d) Counter-guerrilla tactics itself.

It ought to be stated that this study constantly emphasizes such intangible but crucial variables as will, morale and perceptions of the adversaries. Except for the number of participants, lives lost, economic damage caused and acres covered, guerrilla and revolutionary wars, as other complex political events, cannot be easily quantified. Thus, it is obvious that no matter how badly trained, numerically weak, poorly equipped and inexperienced the insurgent is, he might succeed if his quantitatively stronger opponent is demoralized. Batista's Cuba is the obvious example. In every rebellion, therefore, there are imponderables and immeasurables which do not fit preconceived intellectual constructs but which, in the final analysis, may be decisive.^{1A}

The Domestic, Economic, Political
and Social Situations as Perceived
by the Polish and Soviet Governments:

The political, economic and social situations, as perceived by the ruling circles in Poland and the Soviet Union, undoubtedly reinforced their determination to eradicate the Ukrainian Nationalist Underground as soon and as completely

as possible. Its activities were considered a grave threat to the precarious political stability emerging immediately after World War II.

The economic situation between 1944 and 1948 was very difficult. The material damages caused by the war were tremendous. The Soviet Union lost 22 million lives (about 12 percent of the 1941 population); 4,770,000 living dwellings; 31,850 factories and plants; 82,000 schools; 98,000 collective farms; 4,100 railway stations. The total economic losses amounted to 128 billion pre-war U.S. dollars. The direct war expenditures amounted to an additional 357 billion dollars. About 25 million Soviet citizens, or one-sixth of the total population were left homeless. In 1946 and 1947, the USSR suffered a catastrophic drought, in the wake of which many died of hunger. Most of the destruction occurred in the Ukraine. Moreover, in 1946 and 1947, living conditions were appreciably worse than in 1945, when the loot from Eastern Europe and Germany helped to mitigate the most desperate economic shortages. War-imposed rationing remained in effect until 1947. The situation was made worse by the termination of Lend-Lease in July 1945, and of the UNRRA assistance in June 1945. The precariousness of the economic situation was illustrated by violent hunger riots in Kharkov in the winter of 1946/1947. This was not an isolated incident.²

The economic devastation sustained by Poland was equally heavy, involving 40 percent of the railways; 70 percent of railroad installations; 85 percent of dwellings in Warsaw; 60 percent of cattle; 35 percent of horses. Six million Polish citizens perished (about 17 percent of the 1939 population). The sum total of destruction in 1938 prices was 20 billion pre-war U.S. dollars, or about 250 percent of Poland's 1938 Gross National Income.

Poland also experienced severe industrial unrest from 1944 to 1948. There were strikes, like one in Lodz in September 1947, over food shortages. Real wages in the first half of 1945 were less than 10 percent of their 1938 level. Nevertheless, the recovery of the already low pre-war standard of living had to be postponed, to the intense disappointment of the population. The destruction was just too great.³

Economic difficulties in the respective countries contributed to political problems and these were considerable. First, as mentioned earlier, the Soviet regime had, just like the West, to undo the affect of its own war propaganda, picturing the Anglo-Americans in a favorable light. The war resulted in a decline of party zeal or dedication and in a tremendous turnover in party membership. The millions of returning veterans and displaced persons discovered in Central Europe a capitalist world which differed sharply from

the official party description. The peasants during the war unlawfully appropriated Kolkhoz-owned land, cattle and machinery. The re-organization of agriculture, therefore, became a formidable task, especially since so many peasants expected the abolition of Kolkhozes.

Intellectuals were also in ferment, expecting more creative freedom and the relaxation of censorship. The Soviet people, after such tremendous sacrifices, looked forward to the relaxation of totalitarian controls, and an improvement in the quality of life. The international situation, as elaborated upon in Chapter IV, seemed threatening to the Soviet leaders. The most important problem, however, was the growth of nationalism, which threatened the integrity of the multinational state.

The war greatly increased national unrest within the Soviet Union. It recreated nationalist tensions which led up to the break-up of the Czarist Empire. During the war, Alfred Rosenberg, Nazi chief ideologist and Minister for Eastern Territories, had proposed that Germany exploit the nationality problems to destroy the USSR, by creating a network of vassal states subordinated to Germany. The experiment was tried in the Caucasus area, where the Karachay National Government, led by one Bairamukov, was created under the Wehrmacht's sponsorship. This experiment, isolated and limited as it was, was quite successful. It may have

proven to Stalin that the Soviet federation was quite fragile despite 25 years of Socialist indoctrination. It may have proven that the borderlands were vulnerable, that such a vulnerability during another international crisis could have threatened the entire system with dissolution.

This concern was reinforced by the proliferation of numerous nationalist insurgencies at the peripheries of the Soviet Union. Besides the Ukrainian nationalists, there was extensive fighting in Lithuania, involving several thousand guerrillas and requiring the employment of up to 100,000 security troops. The sporadic insurgencies erupted in other Baltic countries and in Central Asia. The Soviets were forced to deport, between 1944 and 1948, about 400,000 Lithuanians; 150,000 Latvians and 35,000 Estonians.⁴

The largest, best organized, most experienced and thus most dangerous, in the Soviet eyes, was the Ukrainian nationalist underground. To the Soviet leaders its activities made the country's postwar internal stabilization more difficult, they undermined the regime's prestige by throwing water on the mill of Western "anti-socialist", "anti-Soviet" and "anti-peace" propaganda. Such resistance could have proven contagious. It could have been emulated by other ethnic minorities. It could have demonstrated to various anti-Soviet "white" bourgeois elements that resistance against the Soviet power is possible.

Moreover, as stated in Chapter IV, the Soviet leaders expected war with the West. The memory of the UPA's disruptive activities during the war enhanced, therefore, a desire to secure the Soviet rear in the event of another conflict, to ensure the society's cohesion by eliminating the disloyal elements in advance.

The UPA operations during the war caused a deep concern to the Soviet High Command. According to the official Soviet history of the war, as early as 1944 the First Ukrainian Front Command detached regular combat army units to destroy the UPA "bands" which "paralyzed the lines of communication", "disrupted conscription" into the Red Army, killed military personnel and destroyed supply depots. These operations must have been on a large scale; in just one of them the regular troops allegedly killed 4,315 "bandits".⁵ The repetition of such subversive activities could not be permitted in the event of another war. Hence, one cannot but agree with Vernon Aspaturian's view that, "the nationality problem is in many ways a matter of life and death for the Soviet state because of the strategic location of the border nationalities".⁶ The Ukrainians are the largest, the most strategically located and thus the most important nationality.

The internal consolidation of the country after the war was also disrupted by the Ukrainian Nationalists. According

to the official Soviet sources, "...The OUN and UPA bands had created certain difficulties in the implementation of political and state measures...", particularly collectivization and the consolidation of the state apparatus in the Western Ukraine. Terror launched by the OUN/UPA against the Party, State and Police officials and sympathizers was effective. The struggle required, according to the official Soviet statement, "patience, endurance, time, vigilance and courage."⁷

The losses among the Soviet officialdom, inflicted by the UPA were indeed considerable. Even after partial demobilization in 1946 and the transformation of the struggle from an "open" to a "conspiratorial" one, the UPA was still very active. For example, from July 9, 1946 to June 30, 1947, 912 armed actions were staged, resulting in 1,102 Soviet officials and 303 UPA fighters dead; from July 1, 1947 to June 30, 1948, 1,265 armed actions were launched, leaving 1,031 Soviet and 407 UPA soldiers dead; from July 1, 1948 to June 30, 1949 there were 1,073 attacks, as a result of which 565 Soviet functionaries and 255 UPA fighters lost their lives. Even assuming that these figures have been inflated by 50 percent, they still signify intensive activity. The terrorism continued well into the early 1950s.⁸ The inability of the authorities to check it, could have contributed to the undermining of the Government's authority and prestige in the eyes of society.

But terrorism was not the only urgent problem. The nationalist propaganda represented potentially a much broader danger. The most important aim of the insurgent was to establish a psychological rapport with the Soviet-reared Ukrainians from the East. In the Fall and Winter of 1945/1947, tens of thousands of peasants from the East came to Galicia in search of food. (As poor as Galicia was, the standard of living there was much higher than that of the Kolkhoznik in the East). Moreover, thousands of party officials, army officers, policemen, teachers, bureaucrats were brought from the Eastern Ukraine to fill "responsible" positions in Galicia. This exposed them to the nationalist agitation.

The OUN did use this opportunity. Through the local population, bread was handed out together with propaganda leaflets. (Incidentally, the influx of so many hungry peasants from the East could not make the collective farms more attractive to the Galician small peasant proprietors. Conversely, even the very relative prosperity the Soviet-bred peasant found in Galicia could have undermined his belief in the evils of capitalism). To counteract the OUN propaganda, large numbers of party agitators and teachers were dispatched from the Eastern Ukraine. Some of them, no doubt, succumbed to the Nationalist appeal. The potentially contagious source of nationalist infection had to be eradicated.⁹

Still another danger which the Ukrainian Nationalists represented to the Soviet power was a dynamic, intrepid, undefeatable spirit of rebellion combined with the considerable conspiratorial and organizational experience that the OUN acquired in pre-war Poland. For example, the influx of Western Ukrainians into the Soviet labor camps resulted in growing resistance, which sometimes erupted in large-scale and bloody uprisings. They provided the leaders and the moving spirits behind revolts in the Norilsk, Vorkuta, Kinshir and Karamanda camps. This must have given the Soviet leaders additional worries. If nationalist Ukrainians could be in forefront of resistance in such closely supervised places as the labor camps, there was no telling what danger they could represent outside of them.¹⁰

The official Soviet concern was evident in a number of pronouncements by such important Soviet officials as D.Z. Manvilsky, N.S. Khrushchev, Leonid Melnikov and O. Korneichuk.¹¹ It was made clear in a number of appeals, combined with promises of amnesty, to the OUN members.¹² Such appeals to the "reactionary fascist beasts and traitors" had been and are unprecedented in Soviet history. No similar offers of amnesty had been made to the Lithuanian Nationalists or to the Basmachi. This indicates that the Soviet rulers realized that the struggle against the Ukrainians would be hard, long and costly. Hence, any means, even amnesty, to weaken the OUN were considered acceptable.^{12A} The possible utilization

of the UPA as a tool of subversion by the West worried them immensely.

Communist Poland faced a similar, if not a graver, problem. The activities of, what the Communists termed, a "reactionary" armed underground posed a serious challenge to the stability and consolidation of the young "People's Power" (Wladza Ludowa). Its already weak administrative apparatus was constantly being eroded. For example, according to the data compiled by the Ministry of Public Security, in 1945 - 6,983 armed attacks against the State were recorded, resulting in the deaths of 7,373 individuals, including 1,714 Security and 359 Party officials. The rest were Party members and ordinary civil servants. In 1946, 10,834 such attacks caused the death of 3,274 Poles, including 1,453 Security and 436 Party functionaries. Since the ruling Polish Workers' Party (P.P.R. - Polska Partia Robotnicza) had only 10,000 members before 1948, this was a rather high mortality rate. To this, 3,705 killed soldiers must be added.¹³ Most of these casualties were inflicted by the Ukrainian Nationalist guerrillas. According to the statistical data supplied by Polish General Blum, out of 2,705 killed Polish servicemen, 1,099 were thought to have been killed by the UPA, 112 by the NSZ (Narodowe Sily Zbrojne - National Armed Forces, a Polish underground fascist organization), 98 by the AK (Armia Krajowa - Home Army, a resistance organization controlled by the Polish Government-in-

Exile in London), 46 by WIN (Wolna I Niepodlegla - Free and Independent - another Polish underground anti-Communist organization, formed by the Home Army Fighters who refused to leave underground), 1,340 by unidentified bands, most likely the UPA, especially since 817 of these died in Rzeszow Province, the UPA's main theater of operations.¹⁴

Being the largest, best organized and equipped of all the anti-Communist underground organizations operating in Poland, the UPA posed a serious threat to the young Communist state.¹⁵ Its activities ought to be viewed in the context of the general political situation which, in the words of Communist commentators, was very "complex". A difficult economic situation, especially food shortages, low wages, desperate lack of housing, created wide-spread misery and dissatisfaction, especially among the workers. The peasantry, fearful of collectivization, was also very hostile toward the authorities.

The Communist Regime itself was regarded as a temporary phenomenon by the Polish people; there was a universal expectation of an imminent war and "liberation" by the West, especially the United States. The Communist Polish rulers were looked upon as the Soviet puppets, who arrived from Moscow in "baggage trains" and were backed by Soviet bayonet. Moreover, the presence and the brutal behavior of the Soviet troops had provided good justification for anti-Communist

propaganda depicting Poland as a Russian colony. The new Poland's administrative apparatus was small, inexperienced, incompetent and thinly spread. It was full of "unreliable elements" and, sometimes, infiltrated by openly anti-Communist elements. Communist-oriented press and radio were poorly organized and edited. Hence, the population paid close attention to news and views presented by the anti-regime organizations. There were some good reasons for it. Some Communist writers, like W. Szota, admit that the Communist security organs adopted an "improper" attitude toward the London-directed and pro-Western Home Army, which during the war bore the brunt of the underground resistance and hence won the admiration of the society. This often involved, what was euphemistically called, "violations of principle of socialist legality". The illegal executions and imprisonments of the Home Army soldiers by Communist authorities have been blamed partly on the inexperience of the security organs, partly on the fanaticism and over-zealousness of its functionaries and finally on the infiltration of these cadres by "hostile" elements and agents-provocateurs.

All this contributed toward the weakening of the state authority and, as Szota puts it, "lack of confidence expressed by the part of the population toward the Young People's Power and its policies." In short, it was a highly unpopular regime.¹⁶

Under these circumstances, the activities of the OUN/UPA posed an additional serious threat to the stability of the young regime. The cooperation of the Ukrainian Nationalists with such native Polish anti-communist organizations as the WIN and the NSZ caused grave concern. Sometimes this cooperation was close. The UPA and WIN launched joint attacks on garrisons in Hrubieszow on May 27, 1946 and in Bircza on May 28, 1946. Besides joint assaults on administrative centers and military garrisons, they exchanged intelligence, supplies, weapons and cooperated in the liquidation of agents and informers of the Polish Security Service (U.P. - Urząd Bezpieczeństwa, popularly known as Bezpieka) operating in their respective sectors.¹⁷

The most serious danger to the Communists was posed by the OUN/UPA in South-Eastern Poland, namely in the Rzeszow Province. All governmental activities were paralyzed there. The influence of the political parties belonging to the Communist dominated Democratic Bloc was, according to communist writers, "negligible". The Communist Party members were at times forced into conspiratorial existence. For example, in the Sanok County (Powiat), the secretary of the County Party organization stated that, "...we are afraid to do anything, because the bands terrorize us." The PPR members were afraid to reveal their political allegiance and the Army's political apparatus could not re-establish any contact with them.¹⁸ The state administration and Police

remained functional in only two counties. In some villages and even towns it had to be re-established four times and each time the authorities there were physically liquidated by the UPA. After a while, nobody wanted to join the state apparatus and as a result, some counties had no administration at all. Large scale assaults on garrisons and police posts continued well into 1947. For example, the town of Sanok was attacked on April 12, 1947, leaving 18 Polish soldiers dead. The compulsory deliveries of grain were realized in only 10 to 12 percent. Taxes were not collected. The prestige and the authority of the young Communist regime, which the Polish society "unjustly blamed for this state of affairs", was therefore severely undermined. This fact was constantly emphasized by the military and police officials.¹⁹

To conclude, the Ukrainian Nationalists represented a clear and present danger for the Soviet Union and Communist Poland. The Ukrainians did not operate in a distant, overseas territory; the occupying power could not withdraw to the metropolis, as France did in Indochina. They operated within the state itself. Their liquidation became, therefore, paramount. The survival of both states was at stake.²⁰

The National Coercive Style:

The national coercive style is composed of many variables such as traditional political culture, population's habits of obedience, the existence or absence of legal res-

straints and the political elite's operational code. The coercive style influences not only the operational methods of police agencies; it also affects their size, prestige and influence exerted on the society.

One of the most important components of the national coercive style is the nation's idea of law and justice.

The Idea of Law and Justice:

Being such vague and relative concepts, coercion and repression are often misunderstood and misinterpreted. (While Websters Dictionary recognizes the difference between the two, here these terms will be used interchangeably). For instance, some contemporary radical-leftest commentators, like H. Marcuse or Alan Wolfe assert that liberal-democratic states are, in reality, just as, or more, repressive than the so called Communist totalitarian states. The difference is, they argue, only in form, not in substance. They assert that repression does not have to be violent. It could involve, what is termed, "consciousness-manipulation". Such manipulation enhances the legitimacy of the ruling classes in liber-bourgeois democracies; it indoctrinates the masses in the spirit of obedience; it deflects their attention from the truly important issues of the day by imbuing them with the spirit of "consumerism" and acquisitiveness. It stupifies by forcing them to watch silly TV programs. Concludes Mr. Wolfe, "...repression is an essential aspect of liberal

rule, not something alien to it."²¹

It is granted that coercion is a feature of every state. It is an undeniable fact, however, that there are various degrees and levels of coercion; there are more and less permissive societies. The fact that Professors Marcuse and Wolfe so openly critical of the liberal state and so openly anti-Establishment, were allowed to teach, preach, write and publish in this country proves the point. This would not be possible in Cuba, China, Vietnam and certainly not in the Soviet Union, particularly in Stalin's era.

This is the reason why some of these writers are necessarily forced to contradict themselves. Mr. Wolfe, for example, admits, however reluctantly, that "repressive forces are not omnipresent and impenetrable" in bourgeois liberal democracies, especially since in such societies the "use of repression is also hindered...by a rhetorical commitment to due process." There are officials there "who are interested in procedure to the point where ends are irrelevant and often their voices are eloquent, sometimes even influential..."²² Undoubtedly, the Chicago Seven or Angela Davis were protected by such a commitment to proper judicial procedure.

In contrast, in Stalin's Russia there was no pre-occupation with the subtelties of judicial procedure or due pro-

cess of law. Such concern was derided as "legal formalism". Stalin himself defined "dictatorship" as the acceptance of rule based on force and unlimited by law.^{22A} His chief legal theorist Andrei Vyshinsky argued that, "The formal commands of law" are subordinated to the Party's policy, that is, expediency. The law is not above political partisanship; it is a tool of the dictatorship of the proletariat. In a society like Stalinist Russia not the slightest degree of autonomy had been conceded to individuals or groups in whatever endeavor. The state regarded every human activity as a matter of concern for public policy. The law was no exception.

Hence, in Stalin's Russia the repressive apparatus, unrestricted by law or conventions, was all-powerful and omnipresent, penetrating every nook and cranny of the society. There were no recognized and accepted rules of political and legal discourse. The whole legal philosophy could have been neatly summarized in a celebrated remark by Tsarist General Skobelev, the conqueror of Turkestan, made in 1877, "...he is the master who seizes people pitilessly by the throat."²³ Lenin expressed it even more succinctly as kto kogo (who gets whom).

More elaborately, the Stalinist legal system was characterized by, what may be termed, legalized terror and politicized criminal process. It introduced such concepts as

preventive or prophylactic justice, unknown in the West, except in wartime. The object of terror was not only to punish but above all to prevent heresy or actions hostile to the regime. The security police was authorized, through the use of the so called deductive or analogy method, to arrest those who were thought likely to commit political offenses in the future, who were considered predisposed toward unreliable or disloyal behavior. As its tool, the Soviet security services used an all-encompassing and deliberately vaguely worded or defined Article 58 of the 1927 RSFSR Penal Code, dealing with counterrevolutionary crimes. Anything and anybody could be covered by this article and be dealt with by the Osoboye Soveshchanie or Troikas. Those were Special Administrative Boards, not legal tribunals, and they could impose any kind of penalty. The accused had no right to defense or appeal.²⁴ Millions of Soviet citizens were sentenced by them.

The Soviet rulers were not apologetic about such an appalling absence of legal guarantees. Lenin stated frankly that, "...A scientific interpretation of dictatorship means nothing else but a government unlimited by any rules, and relying on force..." and "...dictatorship means, take this into consideration once and for all, constitutional Democrats - an unrestricted government resting on force and not on law..." Similarly, Andrei Vyshinsky, this foremost advocate of the extra-legal method argued that, "...In our state,

naturally, there is and can be no place for freedom of speech, press and so on for the foes of socialism. Every sort of attempt on their part to utilize to the detriment of the state - that is to say, to the detriment of the toilers - these freedoms granted to the toilers, must be classified as counterrevolutionary crime..." Adds Vyshinsky, "...the old exploiting classes must be subjected to pitiless repression...That is one of the basic tasks of the proletarian dictatorship..."²⁵ He several times said that, "when it is a question of annihilating the enemy, we can do it just as well without a trial."^{25A}

The Soviet coercive style mirrors Russian history. Russia, after all, has one of the oldest secret political police forces in the world. Mere Communist ideology could not be held wholly responsible for the Soviet terror in the 20th century. As a noted historian, Nicholas L. Chirovsky notes, "it has been in the Russian blood and psyche for centuries." The Oprichnina is evidence of this fact. Organized in 1560s by Ivan the Terrible, the Oprichniki were the special agents of the Tsar, reporting only to him. Run by Maliuta Skuratov - Bielskii, they conducted the 16th century equivalent of the Great Purges of the Boyars (Nobles), liquidating them as a class. Like their 20th century NKVD colleagues, they were fully exempt from the competence and jurisdiction of any agency. From their actions there was no appeal. They constituted a separate "state within a state".

tism which nurtured it. Autocracy generates its own authoritarian antibodies and endows them with its own peculiar contours."²⁸

It must be noted, however, that the Tsarist regime was much less ruthless and much more inefficient than Stalinist Russia. Lenin, Stalin, Trotsky, Dzerzhinsky would probably not have survived the penal system they themselves established. They all escaped from Tsarist prisons. Very few, if any, escaped from Stalin's jails. Another indication of the inefficiency of the Old Regime was, according to Robert Conquest, the fact that more than 4,300 assassinations were scored by the foes of the Tsarist state, like the Social-Revolutionaries and Anarchists between 1905 and 1914. During the Stalin period one successful assassination is known to have been carried out - that of Kirov (and even this is debatable, since some claim he was killed on Stalin's orders). This does not include the Soviet officials who died as a result of the GUN activities).

Moreover, in Tsarist Russia, between 1825 and 1895, death sentences totalled only 1,008, and executions, mostly for ordinary crimes, only 525. Between 1906 and 1910 about 8,100 people got death sentences, 5,735 of them for criminal offenses. Of those, 4,366 were executed. During the last 50 years of Tsardom, 14,000 individuals were executed. There were 77,000 prisoners in 1898, 110,000 in 1907, 180,000

in 1911 and 184,000 in 1912. Forced labor under the Tsars reached its peak in 1914, when 33,000 prisoners were so employed. The entire prison population in Tsarist days never exceeded 225,000. In contrast, according to Robert Conquest, there were 12 to 17 million prisoners in the USSR in 1948, the annual average prison population being 8 million between 1936 and 1950. It is estimated that only during the Great Purges, between 1936 and 1939, one million Soviet citizens were executed. It is possible that 12 million perished in prisons and camps between 1936 and 1950.²⁹

It may be argued that the traditional coercive style has been reinforced in Soviet Russia by the so called Chekist mentality. (Chekist is a popular, honorific name given to the agents of the Soviet secret police. It derives from the acronym Cheka or Chrezvychnaia Komissia, Extraordinary Commission, or the first name under which the Soviet Security service was known.) This denotes the replacement or substitution of universally accepted legal, moral and political safeguards by strict "class morality" and uncompromising "revolutionary conscience". The basic yardstick of class justice is revolutionary expedience and social or political prophylaxis. Such a mentality scorns false humanitarianism and petty bourgeois sentimentalism. Anything that enhances the power of the Party is permissible; anything that advances the cause of Communism must be util-

ized. As Stalin put it, "every Communist must become a Chekist." The police itself becomes the vanguard of the vanguard, the vengeful "sword of revolution".

To the Chekist mentality everything becomes politicized or to coin a term, policized. Everything must be under scrutiny, no matter how trivial. External vigilance is paramount. As Stalin remarked in 1927, "In our Soviet country we must evolve a system of government which will permit us, with certainty, to anticipate all changes, to perceive everything that is going on among the peasants, the non-Russian nations and the Russians; the system of supreme organs must possess a number of barometers which will anticipate every change, register and forestall a...bandit, a Kronstadt (site of bloody sailor's and worker's revolt in March, 1921 against Lenin's regime - A.B.) and all possible storms and ill fortune." Stalin understood well that control and repression are indivisible. That is why his power and his willingness to wield it ruthlessly were limitless.³⁰

Chekism was, therefore, an important ingredient of the Bolshevik elite's operational code. Expediency and party cause were the only acceptable criteria of action, not the conventional "petty bourgeois" morality, humanitarianism, or loyalty. The Bolsheviks were enjoined to persevere to the very end, incessantly, no matter how much misery or sacrifice it involved. No relaxation of effort, no mercy is allowed

in the liquidation of enemies. It is less of a mistake to use too much violence than too little. As Stalin put it, "...we do not want to repeat the errors of the Paris Communards. The Communards of Paris were too lenient in dealing with Versailles....They had to pay for their leniency..." To a Bolshevik, the first principle of politics is always "who gets whom" (kto kogo), an attitude which does not predispose to capitulation or compromise.³¹

To sum up, the maxims of political strategy comprising the communist operational code, expressed in the legal code, predisposed the Soviet rulers toward a determined, purposeful and consistent course of action, especially during such emergencies as the Ukrainian Nationalist Insurgency.

As stated earlier, the incumbent's political traditions and culture may either preclude or sanction indiscriminate and intensive patterns of repression. While police agencies in all modern societies have much in common, they differ considerably in their size, efficiency, jurisdiction, influence on political and social life, and so forth. They differ naturally in their operational methods since these mirror the society's political system, culture and traditions. Thus roughly similar functions are performed differently in various political systems. In Western liberal, parliamentary democracies a policeman's mission, functions and working methods are much more precisely defined and circumscribed by

law, by custom, by constitutional norms than they are in the Soviet Union. They are also under much greater scrutiny by the press and parliamentary bodies.

The Security Agencies:

Let us first consider the size of and the degree of penetration by police agencies in various countries. The publications which are very critical of the United States security agencies, estimate that at the height of the Vietnam War, some 2,000 FBI and 1,200 Army CIC agents were assigned to political surveillance. (Today not more than 1,000 FBI agents are assigned to internal security tasks. The FBI does not employ more than 50,000 informers, the majority in purely criminal matters). In Britain, the Security Service, or MI-5, numbers up to 5,000 agents and Scotland Yard's Special Branch, about 1,000. America and Britain have no Third Force, that is, internal security troops. In France, the SDECE and the DST number together no more than 5,000 agents, the mobile Gendarmerie and the Riot Police (CRS), as internal security troops, about 35,000.³² The KGB, on the other hand, employs today about 100,000 officials and the internal security troops number hundreds of thousands. As will be elaborated upon later, the size of the internal security establishment in Stalin's times was even greater. (Curiously enough, the Tsar's Security Police, the Okhrana numbered at its peak in 1916 about 15,000 agents and employees). The size affects sat-

uration of the society by the security agencies and thus their efficiency.

As far as efficiency is concerned, it ought to be noted, for example, that in the United States 1.5 to 6 million illegal aliens live undetected, the precise number being unknown. Such a situation could hardly exist in the Soviet Union, where every citizen is accounted for. The numerous espionage scandals rocking the British, American, French or West German security and intelligence agencies speak for themselves.

The operational methods of the Soviet Secret Police are all too well known to require elaboration here. They are adequately described by A. Solzhenitsyn and various defectors from the Soviet Union. It suffices to state that in Stalin's Russia, the secret police was all-powerful and omnipresent. There was no recourse against it; a secret policeman was also a prosecutor, a judge, and a legislator. After Stalin's death, the situation has not changed substantially. The KGB remain a very powerful body; the degree to which it penetrates and influences the Soviet society is unthinkable in any Western society. (Especially when one recalls the criticism of the CIA and FBI immediately after the Watergate affair). Apart from various political, constitutional and cultural considerations, the power and thus the efficiency of the police in Russia is enhanced by the

fact that it is so concentrated, and centralized. For example, the KGB combines the functions performed in the United States by the CIA, DIA, FBI, NSA, Secret Service, DEA, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Border Patrol, Coast Guard. There is only one major security and police agency in the Soviet Union (even the military intelligence service - GRU, is subordinated de facto to it). It has no rivals. In every Western society, on the other hand, the intelligence and internal political security functions are split between several agencies, ranging from four in Britain to about a dozen in the United States.^{32A} The ordinary police functions are performed in the USSR by one centralized agency - the Soviet Militia, in the West these are shared by 2 or 3 (as in France or Italy), a dozen (W. Germany), 50 (Britain). In the United States, there are 40,000 separate police jurisdictions; the Federal Government alone runs 18 police agencies. Such fragmentation, duplication and competition sometimes deliberately introduced, cannot but affect their efficiency. (As reflected in solved crimes statistics, for example).

As mentioned before, political culture influences, what we term, counterinsurgency style. Obviously every nation has a different counterinsurgency style. In the Soviet Union, as pointed out earlier, a person challenging the authority, even in purely political a manner, is "depoliticized" or "criminalized". He is called a "bandit"; he is

reduced to a common criminal. For example, the NKVD's section dealing with the UPA was called Otdely Bor'byz Banditizmom (Departments to Combat Banditism). The UPA fighters were called bandits. (Similarly, political dissenters not involved in armed resistance are termed either parasites (tuneyadtsy) and exiled, or deemed dangerously insane and locked up in psychiatric clinics.)

Also, unlike in the case of so many Americans, among the Soviet people, especially among the Russians, the words like "rebel", "insurgents", or "dissenter" are rarely surrounded with an aura of glory - the Bolshevik rebels being, of course, the legitimate and honorable exception. The emphasis on collective interests - from the peasant mir to "Mother Russia" - rather than on the individual ones is recorded in Russian literature and political writings more often and consistently than in the case of individual and citizen-oriented American writings and pronouncements.

As far as the counterinsurgency methods are concerned, as early as 1923, long before, what is euphemistically known in Russia as the cult of personality era, when all the violations and abuses of the so called socialist legality had taken place, the instructions given to internal security troops in the Ukraine recommended taking hostages (zalozhniki) and responsible individuals (otvetchiki) from the kulak and former landed classes. This, according to a high NKVD

official, R. Eidemann, was utilized on a wide scale. One could imagine the reaction of the American public, press, courts and Congress to a similar proposal by the United States military.³³

Within this framework, one particular dimension of popular tenets in the Soviet multi-ethnic imperial state should be mentioned - the difference between Russian and non-Russian attitudes and values. While for brevity's sake this study has often used the term Soviet, even in connection with such concepts as tradition, political culture and values, the difference between the Russian and non-Russian (Ukrainian, Baltic, Caucasian and Muslim) political cultures should be stressed. In many ways the current Soviet political culture is dominantly reflective of the Russian rather than non-Russian traditions and values; Soviet Moscow, after all, is a successor to Russian St. Petersburg as a ruler of a multinational empire. Few are indeed, even the Soviet dissidents, who would devote their energies denouncing the Soviet/Russian annexation of the Baltic States, Caucasian and Muslim people, and Western Ukraine; Sakharov in this respect is an exception, Solzhenitsyn is not. If the cause and aspirations of the Ukrainian Nationalists - Western and Eastern - were known to the Russian public, they would be seen by a great many as a threat to the security, prosperity and cohesion of the Soviet/Russian state.

Thus, the liquidation of the Ukrainian Nationalists, misunderstood and closely identified in the popular mind with the Nazi atrocities during the war, was very popular with the Soviet public. But even if it were not, the majority of the Russians were not even aware that anything was going on in the Western Ukraine. As stated earlier, there was almost a total news blackout from the Ukraine and the foreign press and broadcasts were unavailable to the public in the 1940s. To enforce this blackout and to combat any kind of dissent, the Soviet leaders had at their disposal formidable internal security apparatus.

The Communist Counterinsurgency Resources:

In numerical terms, the Soviet and Polish police establishments, employed between 1944 and 1948 against the Ukrainian Nationalists, were immense. The Soviet Internal Security Forces, run by the Ministries of Internal Affairs (MVD) and of State Security (MGB), bore the brunt of fighting the nationalist "banditism". Their main components included (between 1945 and 1950):

- 1) Special Purpose Troops (Voiska Osobovo Naznachennia) - about 250,000;
- 2) Guard and Railroad Troops (Karaul'nye Voiska) - 100,000;
- 3) The Border Troops (Pogranichnye Voiska) - 300,000;
- 4) The Militarized Guard of the Labor Camps and the Militarized Guard of the Railways - 150/200,000 strong;
- 5) The Soviet Militia (Regular Police) - about 300,000;

- 6) The officials of the Soviet Secret Police (Organy Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti) at least 100,000, possibly more;
- 7) The Militarized Prison and Industrial Guards - about 100,000.

Altogether there were about 1,250 to 1,350,000 full-time police functionaries. This seems to be a conservative estimate. Robert Conquest states that in 1939, there were in a labor force of 78,811,000, no fewer than 2,126,000 guards and watchmen - not counting NKVD militia - and only 589,000 miners and 939,000 railwaymen. Other estimates place the number of full and part-time employees of the NKVD at 3,500,000 (including probably paid informers). They were backed by an even larger body of part-time police functionaries, such as:

- 1) Druzhinniki - (Auxiliaries to the Regular Police in the cities - 6 million strong in 1964);

- 2) Rural Executives - the village equivalent of the above, the number unknown;

- 3) Narodnye Zashchitniki (People's Defenders) - the equivalent of the Malayan Home Guard. Out of these, the so called Istrebitel'nye Bataliony (Destroyers; Battalions) were formed, cooperating with the MVD and the MGB officials. They provided the local village defense.

- 4) In the Border regions there were Brigady Sodeystviya (Support Brigades) which helped the Border Guards to patrol the Soviet frontiers.

The officials of the Soviet Secret Police directed several hundred thousand, or even a million, strong network of Seksoty (short for Sekretnye Sotrudniki - secret collaborators) and Sekretnye Osvedomiteli - (secret informants). This network penetrates every nook and cranny of the Soviet society. Every plant, factory, important office, scientific and learning institution maintains so called Special Sections (Spetsotdely) staffed by the police officials. The KGB and its predecessors have been running a highly elaborate passport and population control system - for example, even today, any visitor to the city must register with the authorities; until the 1960s railroad tickets could be purchased only upon presentation of an internal passport; until 1966 the farmers could not leave villages, even temporarily, without first being issued an internal passport, which was difficult to obtain. The Secret Police supervised the food rationing, in force until 1948. The Soviet Union has always maintained very tight border controls and permission to travel abroad was, until the 1960s, very hard to get, as was permission to enter the Soviet Union. The secret police run a very thorough and strict licensing system; weapons, explosives, printing presses, mimeographing and photocopying devices are almost impossible to obtain by a private citizen and their illegal possession is severely punished. Finally, there is a large and omnipresent censorship establishment, also supervised by the secret police through such organs as the 70,000 strong Glavlit (civilian censorship) and OVT

(Organy Voennoi Tsenzury - Military Censorship). This huge police establishment was backed by the Regular Army and Air Force, 3 to 4 million men, many of whom had previously participated in counter guerrilla operations.³⁴

The extent to which the Soviet society was saturated by the security personnel could be demonstrated by the fact that whereas during the Malayan Emergency, 85,000 regular soldiers and policemen maintained law and order for 7 million people (1:82),³⁵ in the Soviet Union the authorities had between 4,300,000 to 5,300,000 full-time military and police personnel to deal with the situation, for a population 25 times that of Malaya (1:35).³⁶

The presence of such a formidable security apparatus and the degree to which it penetrated the society was highly detrimental to the conduct of underground activity; the insurgent's freedom of movement was very restricted and there was little he could do without the authorities knowing it.

The conditions in Poland were similar. The Poles in 1946, apart from the Regular Army of 300,000, had at their disposal 230,000 soldiers of the Border Troops (Wojska Ochrony Pogranicza - WOP for short) and the Internal Security Corps (Korpus Bezpieczenstwa Wewnetrznego - KBW). Moreover, there were up to 50,000 regular policemen (MO - Milicja Obywatelska - Citizen's Militia). They were supplemented by 120,900

Voluntary Reserve of Citizen's Militia, (ORMO - Ochotnicza Rezerwa Milicji Obywatelskiej). Half of the ORMO consisted of the Communist party members. The strength of the Security Service or Urząd Bezpieczeństwa, UB for short, also popularly known as Bezpieka, is unknown, but it could be safely estimated at 10,000 at least. There were other para-military organizations, such as the Railway Police, the Industrial Guards, Prison Guards (Straz Wiezienna) and so forth. Altogether, about 500,000 full-time security personnel for the population 3.5 times that of Malaya (23 million in 1945) or a 1:46 ratio.³⁷

Needless to add that the Polish Army and Internal Security troops formed almost an appendage to the Soviet security establishment, so closely were they supervised by the Soviets (at least before 1956). For instance, 19 percent of the KBW officers on July 1, 1945 were active Soviet officers. The proportion was even higher in its senior echelons. (That does not include former Soviet officers of Polish extraction who spoke Polish, wore Polish uniforms and were considered a part of the Polish officer corps. Among them were Minister of Defense, Konstanty Rokossowski; Karol Swierczewski and Stanislaw Poplawski, Deputy Ministers of Defense; Chief of General Staff, Jerzy Bordzilowski and others). In the Regular Army (Ludowe Wojsko Polskie - LWP) the respective percentages were: Infantry - 15 percent; Artillery - 59 percent; Armor - 42 percent; Air Force - 89 percent. Altogether

the Soviet officers comprised about 40 percent of the Polish officer corps in 1945 or 16,396 out of 40,859, including its most senior officers. In the Secret Police, the proportion must have been even higher, particularly in command echelons. For example, Polish Minister of State Security, Stanislaw Radkeiwicz and Polish President Boleslaw Bierut were both former NKVD officials. The attached Soviet advisors, called "uncles" closely supervised the activities of the Polish Army and Security Service, ensuring firm Soviet control of the Polish counterinsurgency operations and Poland's adoption of the Soviet counter-guerrilla doctrine.³⁸

The officers of the Soviet Internal Security Troops and the Security Service had considerable experience putting down the Basmachi, the Ukrainian peasant guerrillas, the Anarchists in the 1920s and peasant disturbances during the Collectivization. The Polish Internal Security Corps (KBW) included many former leaders of the People's Army (Armia Ludowa - AL, a Communist-directed guerrilla force during the war), who acquired some experience in partisan warfare. Additional cadres were provided in former officers of the wartime paratroop battalion (Batalion Szturmowy), who got limited experience fighting behind the enemy lines. Moreover, some senior Polish officers directing the operations against the Ukrainian underground served in the pre-war Polish Army and conducted "pacifications" of the Ukrainian peasants in the 1930s. Among them were: Lt. General Bruno

Olbrycht, the G.O.C. of the Warsaw Military District, who before 1939 led the Third Infantry Division involved in the "pacification" of the Lublin Province; General Mikolaj Prus-Wieckowski, the G.O.C. of Krakow Military District, who before the war led the First Infantry Division which put down brutally the Ukrainian rural unrest in Tarnopol Province; General Gustaw Paskiewicz, G.O.C. of the Rzeszow Military District, was also involved in the pacification of the Tarnopol Province in August, 1930.

Training:

The Soviet and the Polish Security Forces had initially some problems with training, which apparently were quickly corrected. Thus, between May 1944 and June 1946, only 10 percent of the Soviet Border Troops serving on the Soviet Western Frontier were familiar with the "border-chekist" service; 90 percent of the soldiers were recruited either from other MVD formations or the Red Army.³⁹ Similarly, the Polish sources state that training of many officers was inadequate. For instance, some Army and KBW officers could not even read a map or use a compass and had problems finding their way in the terrain. The KBW combat efficiency was adversely affected by the fact that 72 percent of all officer and 79 percent of NCO positions were not filled. By 1947, however, the situation was remedied.⁴⁰

Morale:

The quality of the security forces is not only influenced by training but also by the morale of their personnel, an elusive but very important factor. As noted before, the absence of political leadership, a lack of firm strategic direction, and low national morale cannot but affect the military leadership itself. In South Vietnam it was of rather low quality, especially at the junior level. Guerrilla war is, after all, a small unit war, where junior officers lead. The quality of officers affects in turn the performance of the soldiers.

The morale of the troops can be measured by such criteria as drug usage, desertion rate, the number of court-martials for disobeying orders and crimes against the civilians. Much was written about the morale and performance of the American Army in South Vietnam. It suffices to state that 10 to 15 percent of its soldiers there were heroin users, including officers. This undoubtedly reflected the flourishing of the "drug culture" or "counterculture" ethos in the United States. Some of the officers led operations from steel bunkers, sometimes while "stoned" on drugs. This could not but affect the performance of the soldiers in the field. The Army was plagued by "fraggings" (271 in 1970 alone) against unpopular officers and NCOs. In fact, the underground GI press in South Vietnam offered a bounty of 10,000 dollars to kill the officer responsible for a bloody attack on Hamburger Hill in

mid-1969.⁴¹

Such incidents could not have happened in the Communist Armies. The strict party and secret police supervision generally prevent it. There is no data regarding the Soviet Army. However, it could be assumed that the victorious Soviet army, well led and closely supervised, possessed a high esprit d'corps, although a continuation of dangerous operations after the war must have posed some problems among those Soviet soldiers who had been anxious to return home after victory.

Some morale and disciplinary problems existed in the Polish People's Army (LWP) which was created in 1943, in conjunction with the formation of the Polish Communist Government. Initially, its morale was quite low. There were many cases of desertion. In October, 1944 alone, 3,266 cases of desertion were recorded. There were cases of mass desertion as well. At the beginning, even the Internal Security Troops, the mainstay of the regime, were not entirely reliable. For example, one of the KBW battalions deserted en masse on April 27, 1945 and melted into the countryside. Besides desertions, poor morale manifested itself in poor performance in action, poor marching and communication discipline, disobedience, many training, weapon-handling and automobile accidents and so forth.

Low morale in the Polish Army was caused by many factors. First, the Communist regime, arbitrarily installed by Moscow, could not immediately command the loyalty of the Polish population. Being still very young, inexperienced and unpopular, it did not impose a firm grip on its security apparatus and the population at large, until 1947. The Army obviously reflected its incompetent, inexperienced, weak and nonconfident government.

Moreover, the Army's material conditions were hard. There was a shortage of uniforms, of food, of adequate living accommodations. For example, 90 percent of the soldiers in the 9th Infantry Division had to walk barefoot. There were many cases of soldiers being shot for robbery of civilians. The soldiers wanted to be demobilized. This was postponed, however, and they received this decision bitterly.

Many LWP soldiers served during the war in the London-directed Home Army and Peasant Battalions. These organizations were proscribed right after the war by the Communist authorities. (There were many soldiers of Ukrainian origin as well). This naturally reinforced the soldier's anti-Communist attitude, which in turn influenced their morale, discipline and the attitude toward assigned tasks.

Besides poor material conditions, there were a number of political factors affecting adversely the morale of the

Polish soldiers. The so called "reactionary propaganda" had a certain effect. According to Communist Polish Colonel Mikolaj Tyliczszak, "the reactions between Soviet officers and Polish soldiers were rather 'strained' and this was utilized by "hostile" propaganda. The attitude of the society at large toward the new Communist army was hostile. The soldiers were regarded by the Poles as Soviet stooges. This could not but affect their morale. The Communist writers admit the influence of the "reactionary underground" in the Army was considerable.⁴²

However, by 1947 the Polish government established firm control over the Army and the Internal Security Forces. With the help of Soviet advisors, training was improved, discipline was tightened and the so called "unreliable elements" purged.

It must also be noted that the morale has not been a constant factor. The Polish soldiers were probably reluctant to fight the native Polish, London government-in-exile directed underground. The Ukrainian Nationalist underground, on the other hand, was another matter. This was the deadly enemy. The Polish Communist sources point out that sometimes the operations against the UPA were undertaken by the soldiers with "enthusiasm".⁴³

In sum, the Communists had at their disposal a very

large, well equipped, loyal and experienced security apparatus. Their operational or legal code sanctioned its employment in a ruthless, extralegal, all-encompassing manner against the enemies of the society. However, the numbers are not always decisive; the way they are employed is. Tactics and strategy used against the Ukrainian nationalists will be the subject of the next chapter.

Footnotes to Chapter V.

1. J.K. Zawodny, "Guerrilla and Sabotage: Organization, Operations, Escalation", American Academy of Political and Social Sciences: Annals, May 1968, pp. 8/18.

1A. Napoleon said that, "in war morale counts for three quarters, the balance of man-power counts for only one quarter."

The Great Quotations, (Compiled by George Seldes, New York: Picket Books/Simon & Schuster, 1969) p. 675.

General Maxwell D. Taylor points out that the will of opposing leaderships is an "element of perceived equivalence; yet it is certainly a preponderant factor...Material strength, perceived or covert, is of little avail if the spirit fails."

Maxwell D. Taylor, Precarious Security (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1976) p. 81.

2. On riots in Kharkov, see: George Von Rauch, A History of Soviet Russia (6th ed.) (New York: Praeger, 1972) p. 388.

On good introduction to the atmosphere and mood in those times, seen by a Soviet historian, see:

Anton Antonov-Ovseyenko, The Time of Stalin. Portrait of Tyranny (translated from the Russian by George Saunders) (New York: Harper & Row, 1981) and also:

Alexander Werth, Russia. The Post-War Years (London: Robert Hale & Co., 1971).

On war devastation in Russia, see:

N.A. Voznesenskiy, Soviet Economy during the Second World War (New York: International Publishers, 1959) pp. 131/133.

Prof. William O. McCagg challenges the opinion that Stalin's control over his underlings was complete and that his rule was secure.

William O. McCagg, Jr., Stalin Embattled, 1943-1948 (Detroit, Mich.: Wayne State Univ. Press, 1978).

3. Jaime Reynolds, "Communists, Socialists and Workers: Poland, 1944-1948", Soviet Studies (Glasgow), Vol. 30 #4 (October, 1978) pp. 516/559.

J. Van Berend and Gyorgy Ranki, Economic Development in East-Central Europe in the 19th and 20th Centuries (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1974) p. 340, table 13-2.

4. Stanley Vardys, "The Partisan Movement in Post-War Lithuania", Stanley Vardys, editor, Lithuania Under the Soviets (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965) pp. 85/108.

The number of Lithuanian guerrillas cited by Vardys seems exaggerated. The number was probably one third of this figure.

5. Velikaia Otechestvennaia Voina Sovets'kogo Soiuza, Vol. 4 p. 224.

M. Padzhev, Cherez Vsyu Voinu. Zapiski Pogranichnika (Moscow: Politizdat, 1972) pp. 305/317; about the fighting against the UPA behind the front line, written by a former MVD officer (Colonel).

6. Vernon A. Aspaturian, "The Non-Russian Nationalities", in Allen Kassoff, editor, Prospects for Soviet Society (New York: Praeger Publ., 1968) p. 146.

7. The problem was that most of the Galician Ukrainians did not want Soviet rule. Prof. M. Chubatyi was probably right in estimating that in 1944 no more than 5 percent of the Western Ukrainians would have freely joined the USSR, especially since the majority of them remembered very well the "blessings" of the short Soviet rule between September 17, 1939 and June 22, 1941. During that period about 1,250,000 Galicians were either deported, imprisoned or executed by the Soviets.

Mykola Chubatyi, "The Ukraine and the Polish-Russian Boundary Dispute", The Ukrainian Quarterly, Vol. 1 #4 (October, 1944) p. 70.

Mykola Chubatyi, "Ukraine Between Poland and Russia", Review of Politics, Vol. 8 #3 (July, 1946) pp. 331/353.

Pogranichnye Voiska SSSR, 1945-1950, pp. 35/37.

This official anthology devotes 266 pages to the Border units operations on the Western frontier, where the UPA was active, 37 pages to the Baltic frontier, 30 pages to the Caucasian and 25 pages to the Far Eastern frontiers. One more indication of Soviet concern.

8. Lev. Shankovs'kiy tends to be reliable, however.

Lev. Shankovs'kiy, "UPA" in Istoriya Ukrain's'koho Viis'ka..., pp. 806, 808, 810, tables 1, 2, 3.

As late as May 15, 1949, Hanson Baldwin reported in the New York Times that 4 MGB divisions were sent to the Carpathian Mountains. On August 10, 1952, Radianska Ukraina reported about the decoration of 28 MVD officials with the medal "Za Boevye Zaslugi" (combat achievement). Another such ceremony was reported in February 1, 1953 in the same issue of Pravda Ukrainy. Where else could such medals be earned if not in operations against the UPA?

The Border Troops were fighting with the UPA bands as late as in December, 1950.

Communique of the Main Administration of the Border Troops of December 14, 1958, in Pogranichnye Voiska SSSR..., p. 504.

Moreover, quite a few members of the OUN?UPA went underground without being detected or caught. Even those who "surrendered" or "revealed" themselves, under the Consecutive Amnesties, continued to pursue their cause under the conditions of "deep conspiracy" or "legalized existence". In the words of Soviet study, "The Hidden Enemy was Dangerous". Some probably still are, keeping the KGB fully occupied in

Galicia.

Pogranichnye Voiska SSSR, 1945-1950, p. 37.

9. Galicia, because of its higher standard of living, inherited from "bourgeois" Poland, was regarded as a "plum" assignment by the Soviet officials.

See: Pyotr Pirogov, Why I Escaped, The Story of Peter Pirogov-Duell (New York: Sloan and Pearce, Inc., 1950) - memoirs of one such official, who defected to the West.

On the OUN/UPA agitation among the immigrants from the East, see:

Lev Shankovs'kiy "UPA", Ibid., p. 789ff. This was confirmed by a Soviet historian I.K. Sas in "The Presentation of Socialist Construction in the Western Provinces of the USSR", Ukrains'ky Istorichny Zhurnal (Kiev) No. 4 (July/August, 1960) p. 105. Not seen by me but mentioned by Yaroslav Bilinsky in Second Soviet Republic, pp. 217/229.

10. One Joseph Scholmer, a former German prisoner in Pechora and Vorkuta camps, estimates that in 1954 the Ukrainians constituted the largest ethnic contingent in any camp, and of those, 60 to 70 percent came from the Western Ukraine. The latter, mostly former OUN/UPA members, were in the forefront of the camp uprisings.

Joseph Scholmer, La Grave de Vorkuta, Paris, 1954, cited in Roland Gaucher, Opposition in the USSR, 1917-1967, pp. 396/424 (p. 408).

This was confirmed by Alexander Solzhenitsyn, himself a former labor camp inmate. According to him, a large majority of the camp rebels in Vorkuta in 1954, were former Banderovites. The Gulag Archipelago, 1918-1956, Vol. 3 (New York: Harper & Row, 1978) pp. 326/329.

Andriy Mikulin, Kontzentratsionni Tabori v Sovets'komy Soiuzi (n.p.: OUN Zakordonni Chastyny/Biblioteka Fid'pilnyka, 1958) pp. 200/202; Mikulin asserts that the 1954 camp revolts were planned and organized mainly by the underground camp Provid of the OUN, especially since in some of those camps, the Ukrainians comprised up to 60 percent of all prisoners. This is true even today.

Also: Brigitte Gerland, "Vorkuta - 1950-1953", George Saunders, editor, Samizdat. Voices of the Soviet Opposition (New York: Monad Press, 1973) pp. 217/234. Ms. Gerland provides Trotskyist commentary.

11. Leonid Melnikov, First Secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party, attacked bitterly the Ukrainian Nationalism at the 17th Congress of the CP (6) U. Pravda Ukrainy, September, 1952. He also blasted such Ukrainian writers, like Poet V. Sosyura, for alleged pro-nationalist sympathies in Pravda of November 26, 1951. Also his speech at the 16th Congress of the CP (6) U in CP (6) U Kongress. XVI Z'ezd Komunistychnoi Partii (Bil'shevykiv) Ukrainy 25-28 Sichnia 1949. Mater-

ivaly Z'izd (Kiev: Derzhavne Vydavnytstvo Politychnoi Literatury URSR, 1949).

Speech by D.Z. Manuilsky condemning nationalist sentiment in Galicia, considered by him very dangerous, Ibid., pp. 71/74.

During the same Congress, Nikita Khrushchev blasted the manifestations of the Ukrainian Nationalism in literature. He called for the creation of Ukrainian Soviet culture, "national in form and socialist in content", Ibid., pp. 10ff. Bolshevik No. 3 (February 15, 1949) pp. 77/38.

O. Korneichuk's attack on Sosyura in Pravda, July 4, 1947.

12. The authority of the state was at stake. For example, Khrushchev asserted that the Carpathian Mountains "were literally out of bounds for us because from behind every bush, from behind every tree, at every turn of the road, a government official was in danger of a terrorist attack".

Khrushchev Remembers (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1970) p. 95. Elsewhere Khrushchev claims that the "Ukrainian Nationalists gave us more trouble than anyone else between the signing of the Treaty in 1939 and the outbreak of war in 1941...After the war, we lost thousands of men in a bitter struggle between the Ukrainian Nationalists and the forces of Soviet power". Ibid., pp. 145, 147.

The Khrushchev contention is confirmed by V. Solenko, "Serdse Chekista" in Front Bez Linii Fronta (Moscow: Moskovskiy Rabochiy, 1970) pp. 376/403 about the killing of several NKVD officers in Chernowitz by the UPA.

The assassination of Yaroslav Galan, the noted Communist playwright and propagandist, by the OUN, see:

Vladimir Belaev, "Prestuplennye Na Gvardeiskoi" in Neotvratimoe Vozmezdnie (Moscow: Izdatelstvo Ministerstva Oborony SSSR, 1973) pp. 289/309 and Oleksander S. Iakovlev, Pravda Karae Kativ (Lviv: Vydavnytstvo 'Kameniar', 1976) a fictionalized account of the same.

12A. The Soviets claimed and probably believed that the OUN from "the day of its inception" has been closely connected with the "...most reactionary circles of the capitalist countries and obediently executed tasks given to it by special services of the capitalist countries conducting subversive activities against the USSR".

Akademia Nauk SSR/Glavnoe Upravleniye Pogranichnykh Voisk. Pogranichnye Voiska SSSR, May 1945-1950, pp. 30/33.

The Soviet concern was also shown as early as March 1, 1944 when Khrushchev, then First Secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party delivered a speech of the "Osvobozhdeniye Ukrainy'kykh Zemel...". (Liberation of the Ukrainian Lands from the German Aggression and the Immediate Tasks of Reconstruction the National Economy of the Ukraine) The section on the Ukrainian Nationalism contains 3.5 pages. He admitted, among other things, that the OUN/UPA was relatively large

and stated that he hoped that the Appeals of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR and the Sovnakrom of the Ukrainian SSR to them to lay down their arms would decrease their numbers.

His speech reprinted in *Bolshevik*, Vol. 20 #6 (March, 1944) pp. 7/35.

Another indication of serious concern was the Plenum of the Ukrainian Communist Party's Central Committee of November 22/24, 1944, debating the All Union Party's Central Committee Resolution entitled "Deficiencies in Political Work Among the Population of the Western Provinces of the Ukrainian SSR" of September 27, 1944. After the Plenum, the second appeal "To the Population of the Western Provinces of the Ukrainian SSR" was issued on December 1, 1944, calling on the OUN/UPA to surrender. The full text of the appeal in Volodymyr P. Byelaev and Mikhaïlo Rudnytsky, *Pid Chuzhymy Proporamy* (Kiev: Vidavnytstvo Politychnoi Literatury, 1956) pp. 194/196.

There were six such appeals combined with promises of amnesty: One of February 12, 1944, "To the Population of the Occupied Regions" which offered amnesty to "the members of the so called UPA", which the Manifesto called "German helpers, German-Ukrainian Nationalists". This appeal was signed by Khrushchev. The original is in the UHVR Archives in New York, also in *Droga do Nika, d*, Appendix 2, p. 483.

The second appeal was issued on December 1, 1944; the third on May 18, 1945. Promising amnesty, they were signed by Khrushchev. *Pogranichnye Voiska SSR*, p. 260. The fourth appeal signed by Minister of Internal Affairs of the Ukraine Lt. General Riasny, ordering the Organs of State Security to show leniency to the OUN Underground members who voluntarily gave themselves up. The fifth appeal took place on November 26, 1946. The sixth appeal of December 30, 1949 took the form of the order No. 312 by Lt. General Mykola Kovalchuk, the Ukrainian Republic's Minister of State Security, promising for those UPA fighters who voluntarily surrendered. All this was unprecedented.

Reproduced in English, in *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, Vol. 6 #4 (Autumn, 1950).

13. About the problem of ascertaining casualties precisely, see:

Brig. General Mgr. Ignacy Blum, "W Odpowiedzi Moim Oponentom", *Wojskowy Przegląd Historyczny*, Vol. 5 #4 (October/December, 1960) pp. 335/342 (p. 338) later referred to as WPH.

2,703 killed were servicemen of the Polish Regular Army (WP) and the Internal Security Corps (KBW) plus 1,000 Red Army soldiers stationed in Poland. Out of 2,705 killed in action, w,010 died in direct contact with the enemy, the balance being killed by mines. In addition to 3,705 killed soldiers, 3,895 officials of the Security Service and Police, 1,049 Party activists and 8,927 civilians were killed by the

Underground between January 1, 1945 and December 31, 1948. About 3,000 were wounded in action. All this testifies to "highly intensive" activity by the Reactionary underground. This data from:

Ignacy Blum, Z Dziejow Wojska Polskiego W Latach 1944-1948 (sec. rev. ed.) Chapter 3, "Bilans Czteroletnich Walk ze Zbrojnym Podziemiem", pp. 113/135 (p. 125).

In his earlier work, General Blum puts the number of Polish dead at 1,300 regular army and 3,000 KBW or Border Troop soldiers, 3,823 Security functionaries and 8,728 Party members. All killed between January 1, 1945 and December 31, 1948.

Ignacy Blum, "Udzial Wojska Polskiego w Walce o Utrwalenie Wladzy Ludowej w Latach 1945-1948. Walka z Podziemiem Reakcyjnym", WPH, Vol. 4 #2 (April/June, 1959) pp. 3/34 (pp. 32/33).

14. A. Szczesniak and W. Szota, Droga do Nika,d in a revised estimate of the losses inflicted by the UPA puts the number at 720 killed soldiers of the Regular Polish Army, 196 soldiers of the Border Troops and 72 members of the Internal Security Corps. In addition 404 policemen and state officials between 1944-1947.

Droga do Nika,d, Appendices 36 to 39, pp. 422/423, 526/528. Appendices 40, 41 list major terrorist acts committed by the UPA in Poland between July, 1945 and March, 1947.

The number of Soviet casualties is also hard to ascertain. Some Ukrainian sources estimate that between 1945 and 1948, the UPA killed over 35,000 MVD and MGB soldiers.

Vasyl Hryshko, Experience with Russia (New York: The Ukrainian Congress of America, 1956) p. 29. This seems exaggerated, however. The figure of 20,000 killed Russians does not seem unreasonable.

15. Yet, the UPA in Poland comprised about 6,000 armed men or 40 percent of the total hostile active reactionary underground. However, in the event of a "sudden mobilization", the UPA Command could greatly increase its force by incorporating the OUN civilian network. Out of these, 2,500 were "regulars" organized into 4 kurins, or battallions. The rest belonged to the SKV, SB, etc.

I. Blum, Z Dziejow Wojska Polskiego, Chapter 2, "W Walce z Bandami UPA", pp. 69/112 (pp. 79/98). Some authorities put the total UPA/OUN membership in Eastern Poland at 15,000. For example, Brig. General Bronislaw Bednarz, "Zagadnienia Polityki Wojskowej Polskiej Partii Robotniczej", Mysl Wojskowa, 1966 #4 in Blum, Ibid., p. 129 note 4.

The number of active and inactive members of the "reactionary" underground in Poland has been estimated at 50,000 most of them inactive, the majority belonging to the Home Army during the war. Droga do Nika,d, pp. 333 and 427. Most

of them "came out of the cold" during the Amnesty of February 25, 1947.

Tadeusz Walichnowski estimates that 158 armed underground units with a total strength of 25,000 men operated in Poland, after the Amnesty of August 1945.

U Zrodel Walk z Podziemiem Reakcyjnym w Polsce, (second edition, Warsaw: Ksiazka i Wiedza, 1975) p. 175.

16. Major Wieslaw Szota, "Sily Zbrojne R.P.W. Walce z Reakcyjnym Podziemiem Zbrojnym w Latach 1945-1948" in Polska Akademia Nauk/Wydzial Nauk Spolecznych. Henryk Jablonski et al., editors, 20 Lat Ludwego Wojska Polskiego. II Sesja Poswiecona Wojnie Wyzwolenczej Narodu Polskiego, 1939-1945 (Warsaw: MON, 1967) pp. 966/996 (pp. 969/970).

General Blum concurs that "the climate conducive to reactionary activities and sympathy on the part of the population for the Underground made it difficult for the Government to fight them."

I. Blum, Z Dziejow Wojska Polskiego, p. 50.

17. I. Blum, "Udzial Wojska Polskiego...", WPH, Vol. 4 #2, pp. 13/14.

Also: Droga do Nika,d, Chapter 7, pp. 322/343, on the relations between the Polish pro-London and the Ukrainian Undergrounds between 1944 and 1947. Droga do Nika,d also records in detail meetings between the local commanders of the respective organizations such as on May 2, 1945; Sept. 15, 1945; May 18, 1946; October 27, 1945.

On the utmost gravity with which such contacts were received, see:

Tadeusz Chech, "Inspektorat Biala Podlaska Zezeszenia Wolnosc i Niepodleglosc WiN, Wrzesien, 1945 - Kwiecien 1947" in Maria Turlejska, editor, W Walce ze Zbrojnym Podziemiem, 1945-1947 (Warsaw: MON, 1972) pp. 258/314 (pp. 304/309).

Also: Droga do Nika,d, Chapter 7, pp. 322/343.

It must be noted that the Polish authorities probably overestimated the danger of cooperation between the OUN/UPA and the native Polish anti-Communist underground organizations. Such cooperation, for a long time, was impossible because of the mutual hatred and mistrust, which at times was even stronger than the commonly perceived interests. The contacts and agreements were generally initiated at the local level, by local commanders. Despite the agreement of October 27, 1945 not to fight each other, the WiN and the OUN/UPA massacred each other's villages.

Droga do Nika,d, pp. 249/252, 346/347.

At any rate, most Poles regarded the Banderovites their deadliest enemies. Not to lose popular support, therefore, the Polish anti-Communist Resistance could not appear to be too pro-Ukrainian. Hence, all contacts ceased after July, 1946. Moreover, the resettlement of the Ukrainians made the problems of cooperation rather academic.

18. Quoted in Wiesław Piatkowski, "Działania 32, 34, 36 pp i 37 pal w składzie 62 ;. Lipiec 1945-Lipiec 1947". in Maria Turlejska, editor, W Walce ze Zbrojnym Podziemiem, 1945-1947 (Warsaw: MON, 1972) pp. 105/137 (p. 125).

19. Col. Michał Redziński in Turlejska, Ibid., also Pograniczne Wojska, SSSR, p. 339.

A confidential memorandum of the Polish Army's Supreme Command stated that, "...the fact that the bandit activities, one year after the liberation of the country from the Nazi occupation, not only do not decrease but are on the increase, is not only detrimental to the prestige of the Army...but constitutes, above all, serious danger to the consolidation of the State and stabilizing of its future...Thousands of youth might go into the forests."

Appendix 5, March 27, 1946, "Projekt Planu Bezpieczeństwa Opracowany Przez Naczelne Dowództwo Wojska Polskiego", in Ignacy Błum, Z Dziejów Wojska Polskiego, pp. 260/267.

Appendix 3, "Ocena Układu Sił Politycznych w Polsce Opracowany Przez Zastępcę Szefa Sztabu Generalnego Generala Brygady Stefana Mossora" of February 25, 1946, Ibid., pp. 257/260.

The State Security Committee as late as September 30, 1947, in an order to General Officers Commanding Military Districts No. 5 and 7, pointed out that continuing terrorist activity by the UPA had a detrimental effect on the prestige of the Party, Government and the Army, "retarding the normalization of Polish political and social life." Droga do Nika, d, the text cited on p. 467, note 126.

20. As the official Communist sources put it: "The liquidation of the UPA became the principal precondition of securing law and order in South-Eastern Poland" and "depriving the Ukrainian Nationalists of the opportunity of conducting in our country anti-Communist and Cold War propaganda", to prevent the Nationalist cause from becoming popular in the world, as a weapon of the Cold War.

Droga do Nika, d, p. 473. The same holds true for the Soviet Union.

The native Polish and the Ukrainian undergrounds had to be neutralized as soon as possible because their influence, quite considerable, was affecting not only the public but the Army itself. The Army's morale was very low in 1945 and there were many cases of desertion and refusal to obey orders. For example, see:

Colonel Mikołaj Tyliśszczak, "9 Drezdeńska Dywizja Piechoty W Walce Z Ukraińskim i Polskim Podziemiem Zbrojnym" in Maria Turlejska, ed., W Walce ze Zbrojnym Podziemiem 1943-1947 (Warsaw: MON, 1972) pp. 138/206.

Incidentally, the Operation Wisła designed to eradicate the UPA completely, and which ended on July 21, 1947, did not end the fighting. It was only in July, 1947 that the UPA command decided to demobilize and go underground. Never-

theless, the Lublin Military District lost 34 killed and 45 wounded in August 1947 alone.

I. Blum, Z Dziejow Wojska Polskiego, pp. 1, 104. In the USSR, as late as July 1946 the UPA operated in units of 50 or more men. Between only July 2 and August 19, 1946 there were 18 cases of the UPA-launched attacks in which 23 persons were killed.

21. Alan Wolfe, "Political Repression and the Liberal-Democratic State", in Anthony Platt and Lynn Cooper, editors, Policing America (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1974) pp. 10/23 (p. 13).

Alan Wolfe, The Seamy Side of Democracy. Repression in America (New York: David McKay Co., 1973) p. 352.

In this book Mr. Wolfe asserts, among other things, that from "quick review" (very quick, one might add) "it is possible to see that socialist revolutions in other countries, far from replacing one repressive elite by a more repressive one, have a liberating effect, substantially reducing the amount of total repression in the society." Ibid., p. 253. Citizens of Poland or Czechoslovakia would have disagreed with this assertion.

For examples of other publications arguing that the United States is a repressive, police, almost quasi-fascist state, see:

Susia Bernstein, Lynn Cooper, Elliott Cooper, et al., The Iron Fist and the Velvet Glove. An Analysis of the United States Police (rev. ed.) (Berkeley, Ca.: The Center for Research on Criminal Justice, 1977). A new-left pamphlet.

David Wise, The American Police State. The Government Against the People (New York: Vintage Books, 1976).

Morton B. Halperin, Terry I. Berman, Robt. L. Borosage, Christine M. Marwick, The Lawless State. The Crimes of the U.S. Intelligence Agencies (Harmondsworth, Middlx., England: Penguin Books, 1976).

22. Alan Wolfe, "Political Repression...", in Platt and Cooper, editors, Policing America, pp. 20/21.

22A. I.V. Stalin, Voprosy Leninizma, 11th edition (Moscow: Politizdat, 1953) p. 120.

23. Quoted by Robt. Thompson, Revolutionary War in World Strategy (New York: Taplinger, 1970) p. 69.

24. Robert Sharlet, "Stalinism and Soviet Legal Culture" in Robert S. Tucker, editor, Stalinism. Essays in Historical Interpretation (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1977) p. 174.

Andrei Y. Vyshinsky, The Law of the Soviet State (trans. by Hugh W. Babb, New York: Macmillan & Co., 1948).

The full text of the infamous Article 58 of the 1927 RSFSR Penal Code in Robert Conquest, The Great Terror.

Stalin's Purge of the Thirties (rev. edition) (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1973) Appendix G., pp. 741/746.

25. V.I. Lenin, Works, Vol. 25, 3rd. ed. (Moscow: Gospolizdat, 1931) pp. 439/441.

Andrei Y. Vyshinsky, The Law of the Soviet State, pp. 153. 617, Ibid..

25A. Sovetskoe Gosudarstvo i Pravo No. 3 (March, 1965) quoted in Robt. Conquest, Great Terror, p. 426 and p. 305, note 215.

26. For example, Robert K. Massie, Peter the Great. His Times and World (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1980) p. 765.

It ought to be noted that Peter the Great had a Great Purge of his own, The Streltsy Massacre of 1698.

On Oprichnina, see:

Nicholas L. Fr.-Chirovsky, A History of the Russian Empire, Vol. 1 (New York: Philosophical Library, 1972) pp. 300/303 (p. 302).

Marquis de Coustine, Journals for Our Time (edited and translated by Phyllis Penn Kohler (New York: Pellegrini and Cudahy, 1951) pp. 76, 146, 337.

It is obvious that tradition influences counter guerrilla strategy. This is clearly demonstrated by the French operations in Algeria. The technique of "quadrillage", that is the covering of the country with a grid of garrisons and forts, backed by mobile forces, was extensively used during the French Revolution, namely during the Vendee period.

Peter Paret, Internal War and Pacification: The Vendee, 1789-1796 (Princeton, N.J.: The Center for International Studies, Research Monograph, No. 12, 1961).

It is largely forgotten that the Tsarist Government had conducted a couple of successful counter guerrilla campaigns in the 19th century in the Caucasus and Central Asia, for example:

John F. Beddeley, The Russian Conquest of the Caucasus (New York: Russell and Russell, 1969).

27. Richard Pipes, Russia Under the Old Regime (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1974) p. 294.

28. Merle Fainsod, How Russia is Ruled (rev. ed., Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1967) p. 3.

On the history and traditions of the Tsarist Secret Police, see:

P.S. Squire, The Third Department. The Establishment and Practice of the Political Police in Russia of Nicholas I (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1961).

Edward Ellis Smith, The Okhrana, The Russian Department of Police (Stanford, Ca.: Stanford Univ. Press, 1967).

On the suppression of the Basmachi, see:

"The Basmachis", The Central Asian Review, No. 7 (1959), pp. 236/250.

On the history of the Russian police: Ronald Hingley, The Russian Secret Police. Muscovite, Imperial Russian and Soviet Security Operations (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1970).

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Malaya Sovets'kaia Entziklopedia (Moscow: 1936) Vol. 5, p. 361, cited in Herbert McClosky and John E. Turner, The Soviet Dictatorship (New York: McGraw Hill, 1960), p. 488.

Robert Conquest, The Great Terror. Stalin's Purge of the Thirties (rev. ed., New York: The Macmillan Co., 1973) Appendix A - "Casualty Figures", pp. 699/713 (p. 708 note).

Also his: Kolyma (New York: The Viking Press, 1978) pp. 229/231.

30. Joseph Stalin, The October Revolution (New York: International Publishers, 1934) p. 154.

For other books on Stalinist terror, see:

Zhores Medvedev, A Question of Madness (translated from the Russian by Ellen deKaaf, New York: Vintage Books/Random House, 1971).

Anton Antonov-Ovseyenko, The Time of Stalin. Portrait of Tyranny (translated from the Russian by George Saunders, New York: Harper & Row, 1981).

Borys Levyts'kyi, The Stalinist Terror in the Thirties. Documentation from the Soviet Press (Stanford, Ca.: Hoover Institution Press, 1974).

31. I.V. Stalin, Leninism (London: Modern Books, 1933) pp. 98/99.

On the Bolshevik Operational Code, see:

Nathan Leites, A Study of Bolshevism (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1953).

Nathan Leites, The Operational Code of the Politbureau (Westport, Ct.: Greenwood Press, Publ., 1972) a reprint from 1951 McGraw Hill edition.

Nathan Leites, "Panic and Defenses Against Panic in the Bolshevik View of Politics", Psychoanalysis and the Social Sciences, Vol. 4 (1955) pp. 135/144.

32. On the size of U.S. internal security agencies, see for example:

Donald R. Davis, "Police Surveillance of Political Dissidents", in Columbia Human Rights Review. Surveillance, Deviate Surveillance and Person Freedom, Use and Abuse of Information Technology: A Symposium (Fairlawn, N.J.: R.E. Burdick, 1973) pp. 113/154 (p. 118).

On Britain, see:

Kenneth Lindsay, The British Intelligence Services in Action (Dundalk, Ireland: The Dunrod Press, 1980) pp. 274/281.

Besides the FBI, CIA and the Military Intelligence Agencies, such units as the IRS, INS and the Secret Service participate sometimes in political surveillance in the U.S.. The closest equivalent to the Internal Security troops in America are the Coast Guard (Treasury Dept.) and the Border Patrol (Justice Dept.) numbering together about 40,000 men. The National Guard has been used for internal security duties, but it is not a police agency.

On the present size of the KGB, see reminiscences of a former KGB Captain, Alexei Myagkov, who estimates the number of its officials exclusive of informers and secret collaborators, at 110,000.

Inside the KGB (New York: Ballantine Books, 1981) p. 30. Frederick C. Barghoorn, "The Security Police", in H. Gordon Skilling and Franklyn Griffith, editors, Interest Groups in Soviet Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1971) pp. 93/130.

On Russian attitudes toward authority, see, among others: Margaret Mead, Soviet Attitudes toward Authority (New York: Schocken Books, 1966).

Brian Freemantle, KGB (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1982) p. 37, estimates that the KGB employs 90,000 officers and 40,000 clerks, plus about 1.5 million agents and informers.

32A. On this proliferation of security agencies in the West, see for example, Christopher Dobson and Ronald Payne, Counter-Attack. The West's Battle Against the Terrorists (New York: Facts on File, 1982).

33. R. Eideman, "Banditizm", Sovetskaya Voennaya Entsiklopedia, Vol. 2 (Moscow: Sovetskaya Entsiklopedia, 1933) pp. 182/191 (p. 190). Also:

"Basmachestvo", Ibid., pp. 222/226.

On this attitude in action, see:

"Captured Soviet Documents pertaining to Deportations during the First Soviet Occupation of Lithuania, 1940/1941", cited in:

Select Committee on Communist Aggression. House of Representatives, 83rd Congress.

Baltic States: A Study of Their Origin and National Development; Their Seizure and Incorporation into the USSR. Third Interim Report (Washington, D.C.: U.S.G.P.O., 1954).

Appendix B, pp. 464/529. These orders well document the operational methods of the NKVD.

On wide prerogatives accorded the KGB, as compared with the Western police agencies, see:

Myagkov, Inside the KGB, pp. 30/31, 44/49. Orders No. 00222, 0080, 00225, 00117 of 1964 and 1965 were the relevant portions of documents quoted. Also Appendix 1, pp. 169/177.

Just compare Eideman's attitude to the one held by Michael Walzer who asserts that guerrilla war, "...cannot be won and should not be won. It cannot be won, because the only available strategy involves a war against civilians...The struggle against them is an unjust struggle as well as one that can only be carried on unjustly. Fought by foreigners, it is a war of aggression; if by a local regime alone, it is an act of tyranny. The position of the anti-guerrilla forces has become doubly untenable." This somewhat naive view is held by many Americans. Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars. A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations (New York: Basic Books, 1977) pp. 195/196. This view extended even to the U.S. military, as reflected in Lt. Col. Anthony B. Herbert, Soldier (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1973). It extended to the CIA; Philip Agee, CIA Diary. Inside the Company (Harmondsworth, Middlx., England: Penguin Books, 1975) and even to the FBI: Pat Waters and Stephen Gillers, editors, Investigating the FBI (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Co., 1973).

34. V.P. Artemiev, "The Armed Forces of the Soviet Union Organs of State Security:", in Simon Wolin and Robert M. Slusser, editors, The Soviet Secret Police (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1957) pp. 260/279.

Robert Conquest, The Soviet Police System (London: The Bodley Head, 1968) p. 26.

Robert Conquest, The Great Terror (sec. ed.) p. 410, 804, note 135.

Vladimir Maevs'kim, Dorevoliutsionnaia Rossiia ii SSSR (Madrid: no publisher, 1965) pp. 9/40 (p. 11), states that Yezhov, the head of the NKVD, in November 1937, allegedly put the effectives of the NKVD at 3,500,000.

On the degree to which the organs of Soviet State Security have penetrated the Soviet society, see:

Merle Fainsod, Smolensk Under Soviet Rule, Chapter 8.

Other important books on internal operations of the Soviet secret police, and the role of terror:

Z. Brzezinski, The Permanent Purge (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1956).

Alexander Dallin and George W. Bratslauer, Political Terror in Communist Systems (Stanford, Ca.: Stanford Univ. Press, 1970).

George Leggett, The Cheka. Lenin's Political Police (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981) especially pp. 300/302, 330/361.

Lennard D. Gerson, The Secret Police in Lenin's Russia (Philadelphia, Pa.: Temple Univ. Press, 1976).

Borys Lewyckyj, Terror i Rewolucja (translated from the by Alfred Balicki, Paris: Instytut Literacki/Biblioteka Kultury, 1965).

David Rousset, Police-State Methods in the USSR (Boston: Beacon Press, 1953).

On the political controls in the Soviet Army, see:
 Roman Kolkowicz, The Soviet Military and the Communist Party (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1967).

35. On the number of the Malayan forces of law and order, see:

Geoffrey Fairbairn, Revolutionary Guerrilla Warfare - The Countryside Version (Harmondsworth, Middlx., England: Penguin Books, 1974) p. 160. The exact population - 6.82 million in mid-1953.

36. On the number and tactics of the Polish troops, see:
 Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, The Rape of Poland (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1948, reprinted by Greenwood Press, 1973) pp. 233/234.

Henryk Dominczak, Wojska Ochrony Pogranicza w Latach 1945-1948 (Warsaw: Ministerstwo Obrony Narodowej, 1971).

Wieslaw Szota, "Sily Zbrojne RP w Walce z Reakcyjnym Podziemiem Zbrojnym w Latach 1945-1948", 20 Lat Ludowego Wojska Polskiego, pp. 966/996.

Gen. Jan Czapla, "Korpus Bezpieczenstwa Wewnetrznego w Walce z Podziemiem Zbrojnym", Wladyslaw Gora i Ryszard Halaba, editors, W Walce o Utrwalenie Wladzy Ludowej w Polsce, 1944-1947 (Warsaw: Ksiazka i Wiedza, 1967).

Wladyslaw Nowacki, "Organizacja i Dzialalnosc Wojsk Wewnetrznych, Sierpien, 1944-May, 1945", in Maria Turlejska, editor, Z Walk Przeciwko Zbrojnemu Podziemiu, 1944-1947 (Warsaw: MON, 1966).

Jan Lawski and Czeslaw Zmuda, "Wojska Ochrony Pogranicza w Latach 1945-1946", WPH, Vol. 11 #4 (1956).

Wladyslaw Gora, "Organizacja Sluzby Bezpieczenstwa w Latach 1945-1946", WPH, Vol. 12 #1 (1967).

Tadeusz Walichnowski, U Zrodel Walk z Podziemiem Reakcyjnym w Polsce (sec. rev. ed., Warsaw: Zsiazka i Weidza, 1975) p. 215.

Leszek Grot, "Dzialania Ludowego Wojska Polskiego Przeciwko Zbrojnemu Podziemiu w Latach 1944-1947", in Maria Turlejska, editor, W Walce ze Zbrojnym Podziemiem (1972), pp. 11/33 (p. 27).

38. Ignacy Blum, Dzieje Wojska Polskiego, p. 185.

39. Pograniczne Vojska SSSR. May 1945-1950, p. 302.

40. Gen. Brig. Jan Czapla, "Korpus Bezpieczenstwa Wewnetrznego w Latach 1944-1945", WPH, Vol. 10 #3 (1965) pp. 74/95 (p. 80).

Similar complaints were raised about the Polish Security Service, consisting of young, poorly trained, educated and trained men - 98 percent of its personnel had "no theoretical preparation for work".

Droga do Nika.d, p. 385.

41. K. Bruce Galloway and Robt. Bowie Johnson, Jr., West Point. America's Power Fraternity (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1972) p. 277.

On GI Underground Press, see:

Larry G. Waterhouse and Ariann G. Wizard, Turning the Guns Around. Notes on the G.I. Movement (New York: Delta Book/Dell Publ. Co., 1971).

On mutinies and fraggings in the U.S. Army in Vietnam, see:

Lt. Col. Anthony B. Herbert, Soldier. Ibid..

42. On the morale of the Polish Army:

Gen. Brig. Ignacy Blum, Z Dziejow Ludowego Wojska Polskiego w Latach 1944-1948. Szkice i Dokumenty (sec. rev. ed., Warsaw: MON, 1968) pp. 18/31, table on p. 23.

Gen. Brig. Ignacy Blum, "Sprawa 31 Pulku Piechoty", WPH, Vol. 10 #3, pp. 40/73.

Col. Edmund Ginalski, Bylismy Za Laba. Z Dziejow 28 Pulku Piechoty (Warsaw: MON, 1964) pp. 26/28, 269/273.

Szczesniak and Szota, Droga do Nika.d, p. 370.

43. Col. Mikolaj Tyliczszak, "9Drezdenska Dywizja Piechoty w Walce Z Ukrain'skim i Polskim Podziemiem Zbrojnum", in Maria Turlejska, editor, W Walce z Zbrojnym Podziemiem, pp. 138/206 (pp. 143/144).

CHAPTER VI Counter-Guerrilla
 Strategy and Tactics

Six Approaches to Counterinsurgency:

There are some writers who believe that counterinsurgency is mainly a matter of appropriate military action.¹ There are also those who believe that a military solution is never sufficient unless accompanied by political, social and administrative reforms.²

In this writer's opinion there are six possible strategic approaches to counterinsurgency and the popular support thereof.

- a) Genocide, which has never been either committed nor contemplated, but figures prominently in propaganda accusations directed at the incumbent.
- b) Resettlement of the civilian indigenous population harboring pro-insurgent sympathies.
- c) Military action, that is, defeating the guerrillas by military means, ignoring or minimizing the political aspects of the conflict.
- d) Civic action, by emphasizing the political and social reforms, to the detriment of administrative or military ones, the government attempts to sway the population to its cause. The underlying assumption is that because of good deeds and material goods provided by the state, the indigenous population will stop its support of the insurgent.

- e) Organizational or Administrative approach. Insurgency is to be defeated by improving the efficiency and dedication of the state bureaucracy, particularly the police and intelligence services.
- f) Surrender to the guerrillas in a form of compromise political solution, like that of the admission of the rebel into the government (as in Rhodesia) or withdrawal of the colonial power by concluding a peace agreement with the insurgents, as France did in Indochina or Algeria.

In practice, all six approaches have been used, often in various combinations or changing over time, rarely in pure form. Depending upon various national cultural, historical, constitutional or political considerations, in each situation a different approach may be emphasized at different times. For example, the Americans tend to stress both the "stealing their thunder" and purely military approaches. Their actions are affected, in a way, by the "carrot and stick" mentality. The Russians and the British emphasize the Resettlement and Administrative solutions to the problem.

Genocide:

The total extermination of the indigenous population has never been put into practice. Such a solution, however, often figures prominently in pro-rebel propaganda. As noted, many experts, particularly those with radical-leftist sympathies, believe that popularly-backed insurgencies,

those with mass support and the right cause cannot be eradicated, unless the incumbent resorts to genocide. For instance, Robert Taber asserts that, "modern industrial societies, with all their awesome destructive capacity, cannot suppress popular insurgencies, once firmly rooted," short of total annihilation of the entire populations.³ The Ukrainian, Malayan and Mau-Mau cases prove this statement to be inaccurate. Of course, the Americans, the French and the Russians, were all accused of genocide. However, in practice, it was never done nor planned. (We talk here only of guerrilla warfare. The extermination of the Jews in World War II is a different case.)

Resettlement:

The resettlement of the population sympathetic to the insurgents is an alternative that has been tried. Its success or failure depends on the efficiency and dedication of the administrative and police apparatus. The British are credited with "inventing" resettlement in Malaya, between 1952-1954, as the means that broke the Insurgency's back. The Poles and the Russians conducted the Resettlement of the hostile indigenous populations much earlier (1945/1947) and probably more effectively or thoroughly. For instance, the guerrillas and popular support reappeared in Malaya; they did not reemerge in Poland or the Soviet Union. Indeed, some observers, like Charles T.R. Bohannon, see the British resettlement policy as a Pyrrhic victory. Its cost was pro-

hibitive and the insurgents were not totally eradicated.⁴ Similar techniques will not work under all circumstances, as the case of South Vietnam demonstrates.⁵

The Resettlement in Poland:

While the British Resettlement program during the Malayan Emergency has been regarded as the first and most successful model, the Communists have had previous and considerable experience in "resettling unreliable elements." Several million kulaks were deported to Siberia during the Collectivization, the majority of them being Ukrainians. During World War II whole nationalities were exiled to Siberia, like the Volga Germans (1.5 million), the Crimean Tartars and the smaller Caucasion Nationalities (1 million). After the war, about half-a-million Baltic peoples were deported to Siberia. It is estimated that about half-a-million Galicians were deported between 1939 and 1941 and an additional 700,000 between 1944 and 1948 from the Soviet held Western Ukraine. There is little documentation regarding the Soviet "Resettlement" programs, however.

The Polish Resettlement (Przesiedlenie) Campaign between 1944 and 1947 is much better documented. It preceded the Resettlement in Malaya by five years. It was also on a bigger scale, involving 750,000 Ukrainians (as opposed to half-a-million Chinese squatters in Malaya) inhabiting South-Eastern Poland, particularly Rzeszow and Lublin Provinces.

As stated before, the Ukrainian Nationalists enjoyed a widespread support of the Western Ukrainian population, both in Poland and the USSR. Because of this support, a hard, long, yet ineffective struggle with the UPA continued until 1947, when the decision was made to relocate the entire Ukrainian population to the Soviet Ukraine and Northern and South-Western Poland, the so called Recovered Territories (Ziemie Odzyskane). The aim of the Resettlement, therefore, was to deprive the UPA of supply and manpower base.⁶

The Communist sources maintain that there were only two alternatives to the Ukrainian problem in Poland. The first one was a gradual alleviation of material and social conditions, with particular emphasis on political work among the Ukrainian population. Such a solution designed to win allegiance of the Ukrainians toward Poland, to win their hearts and minds, would have taken a long time. But it would have been less costly in terms of human suffering. It would have prevented heavy economic damage brought by the UPA attempting to prevent or slow down the Resettlement by burning down villages, forests, railroad stations and bridges.

The second solution was the accelerated pacification of the terrain combined with the resettlement of all the Ukrainians. This solution required strict synchronization of the

operations against the OUN/UPA with the USSR and Czechoslovakia and the commitment of huge human and material resources.

The compelling need to secure law and order in the country as soon as possible, forced the Polish authorities to choose the second solution. The assassination of the Polish Deputy Minister of Defense, General Karol Swierczewski speeded up the "painful" decision. It was made only after, as General Blum puts it, "all other means were exhausted". But without it, the speedy liquidation of the Ukrainian armed underground could not have been attained.

The Polish resettlement campaign differed from that of the British in Malaya. The Poles did not build "Strategic Hamlets" or "New Villages". Some Ukrainians, about 140,000 or 43,000 families, were simply transported to the Recovered Territories, particularly Szczecin (Stettin) and Olsztyn (Allenstein) provinces, from which the native German population was removed to Germany. They were given 10 to 20 hectares of land, either from the farms abandoned by the Germans or allotted by the Government. The property abandoned in Galicia was to be compensated for. This applied to the "loyal" Ukrainians. The balance were simply put into trains and transported to the Soviet Union. The closest thing to the "strategic hamlet" were the so called "isolation camps". into which 2,781 "active Ukrainian fascists"

were incarcerated.⁷

The purpose of the Resettlement was to liquidate the social and material base of the OUN underground, to deprive it of intelligence, shelter, food and recruits. It faced some problems, however. First, the Ukrainian population was very unwilling to move and the so called "political-informational" campaign by the Polish authorities was rather unsuccessful. The people escaped into the forests, instead of reporting to the evacuation centers. In the forests new guerrilla units were formed. Moreover, the UPA constantly strived to slow down the resettlement by attacking military camps, police stations, bridges, roads and railway stock. Only by May 1, 1946 in the counties of Sanok and Lesko alone 1,130 farms were burned.⁸

One of the reasons why the Ukrainians opposed resettlement was that it was at times conducted quite brutally. Polish Colonel Tyliczszak admits that some soldiers and units did not obey orders and instructions. For instance, the time allotted for packing was "shortened to 20 minutes" instead of the statutory 5 hours; the people were not given sufficient food; their possessions were taken from them by force. Sometimes they were physically mistreated by the Polish soldiers, bent on avenging their killed buddies. The OUN/UPA utilized these incidents in its propaganda, thus furthering the Ukrainian opposition to resettlement.⁹

The resettlement was very thorough. No Ukrainian was exempt; ethnicity, and nothing else, counted. Since it was very difficult to distinguish a loyal citizen from the enemy even the Communist Party officials, the Army and the Security Service officers of Ukrainian descent as well as their families, were removed from the area by order of the State Security Committee of August 4, 1947.¹⁰ This order applied also to the Boykos and Lemkos, a 150,000 strong community of Ukrainian-speaking ethnic subgroups considered loyal to Poland.¹¹ They too were "evacuated". Their place was taken by military settlers. By July 31, 1947 - 13,500 such settlers had moved in. To pacify the terrain, garrisons in county towns like Baligród, Bircza, Lubaczów were reinforced each by one battalion of the Internal Security Troops. The Army, like the British in Malaya, garrisoned moreover, at least one company in every village in the area, Polish and abandoned Ukrainian alike.

The whole operation, code-named Wisla, lasted about 3 months. Almost all the Ukrainians were removed from the area. Those in hiding or those who escaped from the Western Territories were tracked down by the Control Groups, consisting of a commander, his deputy for political affairs, military intelligence, the security service and regular police officials and about 30 soldiers.¹²

It ought to be noted that the subject of the Resettle-

ment has been treated with a certain embarrassment by the Polish authorities. Colonel Redzinski admits that, "it must be said frankly that the Resettlement of the Ukrainian population was a painful affair. Those people, during the Sanacja Regime, suffered national exploitation and oppression. Nevertheless, the Resettlement was unavoidable for external and internal reasons." General Ignacy Blum asserts that without the resettlement, it would have been impossible to liquidate the bands. According to him, "...had we not resettled the Ukrainian population, this part of the country would have been burning for much longer."¹³ The resettlement is further justified by General Blum on the grounds that, "In the history of every nation there are events which cannot be entirely justified if the criteria of abstract absolute humanitarianism are applied, but which fully deserve understanding and positive evaluation of history and of the future generations...The resettlement of the Ukrainian population in Poland constitutes one of such events."¹⁴

It may be noted that mass deportations and resettlement schemes abounded in East Central Europe in the post-war era: The Polish government, for example, expelled all the German-speaking inhabitants from the newly acquired provinces in the West, former portions of Germany. The Potsdam Conference, in August 1945, authorized Czechoslovakia to expel all of its 3.5 million German-speaking citizens from the Sudeten-

land into the American and Soviet zones in Germany - which was done in 1945/1946 - and 600,000 Hungarian-speaking citizens from Slovakia - which for various reasons was never implemented. In this context then, except for its brutal form, the Polish resettlement of its Ukrainians did not appear an unusual operation per se; it was different only insofar as it was intimately connected with the UPA insurgency, which was not the case in the other cases cited above.

A. Szczesniak and W. Szota are much more prosaic, stating that Poland, considering her sad experience with the national minorities, "...desired to become a nationally homogenous state. The resettlement of the Ukrainians made this possible." Of course, the authors see no contradiction between such a "desire" and their subsequent statement that Poland not only in theory, but also in practice, followed the "Marxist-Leninist position regarding nationality policies."¹⁵

Some other Polish communist authorities, like Lt. Colonel Boleslaw Szwejkiert disagree, maintaining that the deportation of the Ukrainians from Eastern Poland was a mistake. This, in his opinion, involved mainly "elements with democratic, leftist views", including whole villages from Lublin and Rzeszow Provinces, which at one time constituted the strong Communist recruiting base. The resettlement, according to him, did not curb the activities

of the UPA. In fact, it facilitated its operations by decreasing sharply the number of indigenous opponents of the Ukrainian "reactionary" Nationalists, that is, "the Ukrainian democrats..." (who could presumably have become governmental informers - A.B.). For example, in the counties of Hrubieszow, Tomaszow, Lubelski, Wlodawa, Lesko, most of the resettlement took place in 1945; the UPA activities intensified, however, at the end of the year and during all of 1946.¹⁶

Whatever the argument, the Resettlement of the Ukrainian population facilitated greatly the destruction of the UPA by curtailing sharply its intelligence and supply network and affecting thus adversely its morale and that of the supporters.¹⁷ Moreover, the Resettlement and the simultaneous liquidation of the OUN's civilian network compelled the dispersed UPA units to combine into much larger ones, like kurins, in order to survive. This, in turn, made it easier for the Polish Army to locate and trap them.¹⁸

The Soviet Government, as stated before, had deported hundreds of thousands of potential or real Ukrainian Nationalists to Siberia, where they became a majority among political prisoners. Moreover, the Collectivization enabled the state also to reassert political control over the villages and to sever the OUN from its popular roots of support. Kolkhoz, after all, is not unlike the New Village in Malaya.

The population movements and working patterns are strictly supervised; their spending habits are easy to track down since they are paid in kind, according to the days worked (trudoden).¹⁹ The kolkhozniks' movements were easy to trace because to travel outside the village, they needed a special travel document. (Until 1966, the kolkhozniks were not issued internal passports).

In sum, in the case of the British and the Poles, the Resettlement was a decisive factor in defeating the insurgency.

Military Solution:

Fighting the guerrillas by armed forces, equipped with sophisticated military technology, but underestimating the intangible political or social implications of such measures, is another possible approach. It was initially adopted by the Americans in Vietnam and elsewhere. Many Americans tend sometimes to simplify complex issues of revolutionary wars, including their own (1776). Raised in an atmosphere of free political competition, most Americans are convinced that legitimate grievances could be alleviated through civic action or material aid and apply this conviction to foreign insurgencies; for those who do not want a carrot, there is a stick in the form of modern military technology. As stated earlier, to many Americans war is a form of crusade, where decision must be reached as soon as possible, as well

as a nasty job which must be finished as soon as possible, especially when the Army consists of conscripted citizen-soldiers and where the whole society is involved. No wonder that there is no patience or taste, in the American context, for a protracted war, which demands patience and more sophisticated techniques than firepower, where stratagem, cunning and deception are at a premium. In the words of one observer, the Americans view counterinsurgency as a "football game" - they are excessively preoccupied with promoting and practicing the principles of the economy of time, the idea which traditionally dominates American military and diplomatic planning. The stress is on short-term solutions, purely military ones, to the detriment of long-term political consequences. (World War II is the case in point). A typical remark was made by General Earle G. Wheeler, the Army Chief of Staff during the Vietnam War, "...despite the fact that the conflict is conducted as guerrilla warfare... it is nevertheless, a military action...It is fashionable in some quarters to say that the problems in South-East Asia are primarily political and economic rather than military. I do not agree. The essence of the problem in Vietnam is military."²⁰

It should be recalled that counterinsurgency in South Vietnam was directed by West Point graduates. The training they receive instills in them a penchant for quick, logical, functional solutions. The military technicians from West

Point approach insurgency as an engineering exercise in problem-solving. Political, social, psychological aspects were neglected. Richard A. Gabriel and Paul L. Savage maintain that one of the reasons the United States did not win in Vietnam was because the officer corps became imbued with corporate business ethics, to the detriment of the traditional "gladiatorial" military values. Officers simply became "corporate executives in uniforms". Wars are not to be fought but "managed". The main criterion became "cost-effectiveness".²¹ Such a technological, functional approach to counterinsurgency implied a retreat from the political battlefield, where ideology and psychology play so important a role, to the "electronic battlefield", where various gadgets and operations research get political and social factors and other intangibles out of the equation. Yet such a great practitioner of guerrilla war as T.E. Lawrence, pays attention to the "psychological element", which to him is "more subtle than tactics, and better worth doing, because it dealt with uncontrollables, with subjects incapable of direct command".²² In sum, revolutionary war is fought mainly on a political battlefield and technology is a complement to, but certainly not a substitute for, politics.²³

Indeed, because of the fascination with sophisticated technology, American anti-guerrilla tactics tended to emphasize electronic devices such as olfatronic detectors, intrusion detectors, electronic fences, as well as tremendous

firepower. The prevailing view of the Pentagon was that if sufficient a quantity of sophisticated hardware is marshaled, victory will be assured. Such a technological orientation precluded, what Richard T. Barnett calls, "national security managers" from understanding the political and psychological realities of the insurgency and thus from evolving suitable strategies. Therefore, as David Halberstam put it, the American leaders, both political and military, were "supremely conventional men in a supremely unconventional war".²⁴

Thus, Samuel P. Huntington, reflecting the Pentagon's view, argued that massive bombardment will contribute to victory. This creates massive, involuntary refugee movement into the cities (called by Huntington, "forced urbanization and modernization") depriving the rural insurgent of potential support.²⁵

However, such wholesale creation of refugees denoted certain insensitivity to political reality and was ultimately counterproductive. For example, the land and the graves of the ancestors are very important in the traditional Vietnamese culture. The village or "xa" signifies the "place where people come together to worship the spirits" of the departed. To bomb a villager out of his ancestral home was to deprive him of his old identity, to increase his psychological insecurity and to expose him to, or to make

him more susceptible to a political movement which could provide him with a new identity. Moreover, such involuntary resettlement may and did create social chaos, which was exploited by the insurgent.²⁶

In sum, the American penchant for quick, decisive, pragmatic military solutions resulted in the use of excessive fire-power, whether the situation required it or not. This attitude was underlined, at least in some cases, by an anti-oriental racial bias. General MacArthur, for example, urged General William C. Westmoreland, U.S. Commander in Chief in Vietnam, to always have plenty of artillery, for the Oriental "greatly fears artillery."²⁷ Indeed, artillery and aerial bombardment were applied on a tremendous scale. One could also add the massive use of defoliants. However, bombs and shells kill indiscriminately and only alienate the local population. Bombing is too visible not to be noticed by the international public opinion, undermining the counterinsurgent's prestige, as the American bombing of Vietnam did.

The British counterinsurgency style in Malaya differed by, what Dennis Bloodworth called, "the advantage of poverty". If one does not have hundreds of heavy bombers to spare to hit a "suspect" village or a computer to work out how to be human, it may be easier to preserve a certain sense of proportion. Plentiful resources can encourage a wild spending

spree on gadgets as well as on facts and figures. This can obscure reality and create a world of illusion. The conviction that truth is born out of the punch-card often leads to false and overoptimistic conclusions that deceive planners. Projects like Agile, designed to measure the "loyalty rating" of Vietnamese villages and their "behavioral and attitudinal responses to externally imposed changes", are called by Bloodworth "adding-machine evaluation systems", which tell nothing, because the desire to tidy up unkempt reality and express it in neat mathematical symbols leaves out the all-important idiosyncratic personal factors.²⁸

In contrast, the British effort was characterized not only by a lesser technological sophistication but by greater unity of command and of purpose. As discussed previously, the British insisted on firm civilian control, simplicity of organization and operation, without the burden of large and cumbersome staffs so typical of the American effort in Indochina. To the British, the central issue was to insure the loyalty of the population to the government. The counterguerrilla operations should, therefore, create as few additional reasons for supporting the insurgents as possible. Thus the civilian control over the military operations was considered absolutely indispensable. The military left to themselves would have concentrated their forces and firepower and struck a devastating blow at one point. However, the guerrillas would usually melt away and the innocent

civilians would be hurt instead. Therefore, the police were assigned the role of protecting the population, not the Army. With the police playing a central role, the counterinsurgency assumed the character of a large-scale criminal investigation, rather than a war. Superb intelligence led to meticulously targeted operations, increasing greatly the precision of the counter guerrilla strikes, thus minimizing the damage and losses visited upon the civilian bystanders.

Similarly, the Soviets and the Poles, having the "advantage of poverty", did not rely extensively on artillery shelling; neither did they use air bombardment. At the time the Soviet Air Force was not yet fully modernized. Like the British, the Russians and the Poles treated the counterinsurgency mainly as a police and domestic intelligence operation. Like the British, the campaign was termed "pacification", not war. Last, but not least, as stated earlier, the Communist military and the police have always been under firm political control by the Communist Party and its directing body, the Politburo. In the countries so destroyed by war, the ruling authorities obviously did not wish to inflict greater material damage on the country, in the course of counter guerrilla operations, than was absolutely necessary.

Civic Action:

"Stealing their Thunder", in President Magsasay's words, of the "carrot side" approach to counterinsurgency has been heavily emphasized by various American experts. According to such an exponent of "civic action" approach as Robert McNamara, "...In a modernizing society security means development that is economic, social and political progress... without development there can be no security..." It follows that such development could make an insurgency fizzle or prevent its outbreak in the future. The object of restoring "law and order" is to enable development to proceed. Thus to McNamara, "...if security implies anything, it implies a minimal measure of order and stability. Without internal development of at least minimal degree, order and stability are impossible..."²⁹ The implementation of economic, social and political reforms is designed to convince the insurgents and their sympathizers that their legitimate grievances could best be solved by cooperation with the government, that the continuing resistance will be unproductive, unpleasant and ultimately fatal. The "stick and carrot" approach has been successful in the Philippine Huk Insurgency. The Government there obtained very considerable U.S. material support; the powerful personality of Magsasay certainly also played an important, if not decisive role. The Philippine success influenced the American approach in South Vietnam.

Civic action contains, however, severe drawbacks. In

practice, the impact of extensive scientific, technical or cultural aid could have quite an opposite effect. For example, in some parts of South Vietnam, the American-inspired modern farming techniques had proven so profitable that landowners had begun evicting their tenants in order to cultivate the lands themselves. The end-result of "technical assistance" in this case turned out to be a growing army of discontented and landless laborers.³⁰ In South Vietnam an enormous amount of material poured in was often misused or was outrightly counter-productive. (After all, the Vietcong did use U.S. arms)

Moreover, many Americans expect that our allies and our aid recipients should adopt a "democratic way of life" for their own and our good. Such expectations often interfere with a realistic assessment of the situation and incline the Americans toward, in Charles Wolfe's words, "creeping righteousness" in their relations with the allied governments plagued by insurgency. These regimes are often portrayed by the American critics, often within the U.S. government, as bullies and tyrants defending vested interests. Thus, the Americans, the primary ally and benefactor, often tend to work against the regimes they are supposed to support. Sometimes this is counterproductive. For example, after Diem's overthrow in 1963, in which the United States was involved, the N.L.F. Chairman told U.S. journalist Marguerite Higgins that the dismantling of Diem's police

state has been a "gift from Heaven" for the revolutionary movement. The police and intelligence apparatus set-up over the years with great care and supposedly effective was totally shattered. The Viet Cong, which was at the time under increasing pressure from the Government, got a breathing spell. The increase in its activity became immediately apparent. It had taken years to rebuild the security networks and by then it was too late.³¹

In contrast, the British, deprived of funds or inclination to be professional do-gooders, seem to emphasize instead the police, intelligence and administrative perfectionism. The main emphasis of the British counter-insurgency philosophy is on creation of an effective administrative apparatus, particularly of workable police and domestic intelligence organization.

Judging from our case-study, the Communist approach was more along the British lines. The Poles and the Soviets concentrated first on developing an all-encompassing apparatus of control or supervision: Party, State, Regular Police, Security Service, Army. Social organizations, or the Party transmission belts were not neglected either. The concept of civic aid was applied by them only so far as their program of "social engineering" and building a new Soviet man was concerned. Central Asia was a case in point. No program of social or economic improvement was evident in

the Ukrainian case. Quite to the contrary. As stated before, the lot of the Galician peasants actually deteriorated during the first years of the Soviet rule. The Soviet doctrine, like the British, regards insurgency more of a police than a social problem. (For example, as mentioned earlier, the insurgents, in Soviet parlance, were called bandits and depicted as common criminals) It also ought to be noted that the Communist system by its very nature puts a premium on organization, administration and order. The Soviet Communist Party itself, has been called by Philip Selznick an "organizational weapon" - ubiquitous, competent, effective. It was a powerful opponent even if pitted against such a formidable organization as the OUN/UPA. In sum, the British and Soviet counterinsurgency doctrines emphasize, what is termed here, an organizational or administrative approach to the problem.

Organizational Approach to Counterinsurgency:

The problem of dealing with revolutionary insurgency is, according to some British authors, unrelated to specific economic, social and political ills in a given country. It is not a matter of meeting grievances; it is not an issue of how true they really are; it is fundamentally a contest of organizations in which a superior one wins. The most vital feature of revolutionary war, according to Sir Robert Thompson, is its organization. That is why revolutionary war cannot be defeated by firepower or civic reforms alone

but by establishing a more superior organization and applying the measures designed to break the revolutionary infrastructure, especially its basic unit, the cell.³²

The revolutionary organization, therefore, is one of a specific type. It does not, in any real way, owe its existence to specific social conditions. The struggle is all about organizational techniques, which by definition could be replicated by the incumbent.

Moreover, an insurgency is not usually a result of social-economic deprivations, but of external conspiracy. For example, the Algerian revolution was triggered mainly by Nasser's wish to expel the French from North Africa. Revolutionary war, claims Thompson, has been used as an instrument of Soviet, Chinese or Cuban foreign policy designed to spread Communist control and influence world-wide.³³ To expect that reforms will alleviate anything, under the circumstances, is fallacious. The crux of the matter is organizational conspiracy, either internal or inspired from abroad (real cause) and not the inequities of the society (imaginary or pretended cause). The masses could be dissatisfied, but it is the revolutionary elite that triggers a revolt, because it is either committed to a particular ideology or desires political power, at times for egoistic personal reasons.

In a word, a revolutionary war is essentially a contest between organizations, more particularly, between rival governments. As stated before, the insurgent's aim is to create a sort of administrative vacuum into which he could insert his own "parallel hierarchy" or "alternative government". As a leftist commentator puts it, the major task of the insurgent is "...not to outfight but to outlegitimize and out administer the government".³⁴ The incumbent's objective is to prevent such a crisis of confidence, to destroy any illusion that the insurgents have any authority whatsoever or any chance of victory. That is why the maintenance of effective and visible governmental authority becomes so important. The incumbent to win must destroy the links between the insurgent and his infrastructure. If he does not, the peasant will have no recourse but to back the insurgent in order to avoid retribution, in order to survive. The government troops come and go, but he and the guerrilla remain.

Gil Carl Alroy noted that the peasant countryside becomes receptive to insurgency not merely because of economic and social grievances, but also because of "the virtual absence of government in much of underdeveloped countries".³⁵ As an illustration, in the Philippines the peasant's lot actually worsened during the insurgency. The percentage of landless farmers increased from 37 percent in 1948 to 46 percent in 1952. Nevertheless, the government forces pre-

vailed. The peasant's estimate of the government's authority, durability and desirability depends very much on its administrative effectiveness, especially on its ability to protect him. Thus the government must function, must be seen to function and to make decisions, must be present everywhere - otherwise there is only one alternative for the people. The problem of an effective and efficient administrative apparatus, therefore, particularly of police agencies, becomes paramount.

The British realized that. In Malaya they emphasized the development of a strong, efficient and omnipresent administrative system. This was acknowledged by the Malayan Communist Party's Directive of December 1948. According to it, "...The British have already created a totalitarian, complete, penetrating system of administration, from the Federal Government down to small towns...We have nothing like Federal provincialism to exploit...nor is there any weak link in the enemy's administrative system for us to exploit".³⁶ It is curious that the CUN/UPA reports in 1947 and 1948 resemble very closely the aforementioned directive.

In contrast, South Vietnam lacked an effective administrative infrastructure. Her officials lacked the requisite motivation, training and ability to govern. The South Vietnamese high administrative, military and police officials

were, on the whole, corrupt and inept. For example, all the echelons of the country's administration, from the highest to the lowest, were involved in the heroin trade. Not surprisingly, the Army and Police officers were probably more interested in making a profit out of illicit heroin, gold and diamond traffic than in safeguarding their country's security.³⁷ Their corruption and idleness were proverbial. Sir Robert Thompson noted that, "the real problem with South Vietnam has been to have a government at all, whether democratic or not. If there is no machinery underneath it, a government is not going very far, whatever its high and noble aims are."³⁸ The firm fabric of government is essential if the effective counterinsurgency measures are to be initiated and implemented.

The superior organization is the one which utilizes the resources of the country as efficiently as possible. In South Vietnam the government failed to organize itself efficiently, wasting its resources. As an example, the South Vietnamese Army could be mentioned, on which a lot of money was spent in terms of weapons, equipment and salaries. Yet its activities were uncoordinated, misdirected and ineffectual. Instead of one war - political, military, social and psychological wars were fought as if being separate. There was no national policy. Decisions made were erratically implemented. On the whole, the government, because of a weak bureaucracy, was incapable of executing any of its

measures or policies effectively.

In insurgency, the police becomes the main agent of the government. In Vietnam no effective police force was created.³⁹ It expanded only two-fold, from 52,000 in 1965 to 120,700 in 1972, for a population of 17 million (1:141 ratio). Most of the National Police recruits were the ones the Army did not want. But only half of those were employed in regular police duties. The Vietnamese police officers were incredibly corrupt, inefficient and brutal. They were universally hated. This affected adversely the counterinsurgency effort. The Vietcong purchasing agents avoided detection at checkpoints by paying bribes to the police. The issuance of tamper-proof identity cards to the citizens was of little use, since the personnel administering and enforcing it was bought at will. The reputation of the National Police was so bad and its standing in the community was so low, that some American advisors in the provinces opposed the establishment of police stations in their villages.

In Malaya, in contrast, the Police Force, both regular and part-time, expanded seven-fold, from 9,000 to 60,000 men, for a population of 7 million (1:117 ratio). The police saturation in Malaya was thus higher than that in South Vietnam. Its quality was also much better, especially since it was led by experienced and dedicated British police officers. Its social prestige was also much higher.

For the British and the Soviets, the Police was a decisive force in counterinsurgency. The police being closer to the population among which it lives, is more adept than the army to deal with the situation. The policeman, being a member of the community, can detect more easily the supporters of the insurgent than the soldier. It is not against the active guerrilla but against his active and potential supporters, his infrastructure, that the police force should be employed. At the peak of the Malayan Emergency, there was one policeman or home guardsman for every 5 to 10 active or potential sympathizers. In 1948, at the beginning, there were less than 1 per 100.⁴⁰ The key to victory, therefore, is the survival of village police posts, intact and uncorrupt, which protect and control the population and collect the necessary intelligence. Their survival is the major purpose of military operations, which seek to force the guerrilla units to split up into progressively smaller formations and make them too weak to destroy police posts.

According to Clutterbuck, it was precisely this lack of a "policeman on the beat" that was one of the biggest single weaknesses of the Vietnamese counterinsurgency effort. Unlike in Malaya, there was no real equivalent to a police force in the hamlets. There, security was in the hands of the Popular Force, an equivalent of the Malayan Home Guard. Unlike the latter, however, the members of the Popular

Force lived in separate compounds outside the hamlets. Thus, any villager who failed to obey the Viet Cong order or had given information to the Government, had no protection at night from the "man with the knife", whom the villagers were far more afraid of than of the government officials.⁴¹

The only truly successful counterinsurgency is the one which has prevented an insurgency from getting underway, before the revolutionaries have developed an effective organization on which their success hinges. But the ability to prevent the evolution of such an infrastructure depends on the quality of the incumbent's police and internal security establishment. That is why in the Communist systems the degree of infiltration of society by intelligence and security apparatus is so thorough.⁴² The OUN/WPA could not have emerged in the Soviet Union or Communist Poland had it not been for the interruption of the Communist rule caused by the Nazi invasion. Similarly, in Malaya, the Communist insurgency was able to crystallize only because of the interruption of the British rule by the Japanese occupation during World War II. However, the British, because of their superior police and intelligence apparatus, were able to contain it. Sir Robert Thompson points out that in Malaya, in 1949, there were 4,500 guerrilla fighters with about 50,000 supporters; in South Vietnam in 1959, there were about 5,000 guerrillas and 100,000 supporters, in a popu-

lation twice the size. Initially, the levels of violence in Malaya and South Vietnam measured by the number of civilians killed were rather similar. In 1950 there were 10,000 insurgents in Malaya, double those in South Vietnam in 1959, or four times higher in proportion to the population.

Thompson concludes, therefore, that the measures which succeeded in Malaya, could have succeeded in South Vietnam at that time, but were not applied because there was no effective governmental bureaucracy to implement them.⁴³ (There were, of course, other very important differences between the respective countries, which neither Thompson nor Clutterbuck nor other experts had taken into account)

Like the British, the Polish Communists and the Soviets used well the organizational approach to combat the OVN insurgency. Unlike the British, however, they were not restricted by the rule of law (very strongly emphasized by the British experts). For example, most of the captured insurgents were either shot without trial or locked in detention camps through the decision of the aforementioned Special Boards or Troikas.

The first thing the Soviet counterinsurgency leaders tried to do was to establish police and security posts in the affected area or to put a garrison in every locality. They permeated the terrain with security personnel to a much higher degree than the British in Malaya, both in absolute

terms and per capita.

Coordination of Effort:

The Communist Soviet and Polish counterinsurgency campaign in Western Ukraine was characterized by the unity of command and of purpose. It was noted for firm governmental control and for simplicity of command and organization, without the burden of large and cumbersome staffs so typical of the French and American establishments in Indochina.

Like the British in Malaya, but long before them, the Poles adopted a Government by Committee system. In Malaya, the British War Executive Committees, existing on every administrative level of government, were able to take rapid and decisive action on a daily basis, without much red tape. They successfully unified the conduct of operations without so much reorganization, delay and duplication characterizing the American involvement in South Vietnam. This system, so informal and flexible, enabled numerous agencies to merge their efforts and submerge their separate identities and goals, preventing much needless rivalry and effort. Coordination was provided at every level. At the Federal level, there was the Emergency Operations Council, consisting of the Prime Minister, the Defense Minister, the Director of Operations. At the State level, the District War Executive's composition was similar, except that it also had attached Military Intelligence, Special Branch, Home Guard, Inform-

ation and Psychological Warfare Officers. All the intelligence activities, including those of the military, were subordinated to the Police's Special Branch.

Little is known about the Soviet organization. However, since the Polish Security and Military Forces were run by former or active Soviet officers, it is clear that the analysis of the Polish counterinsurgency organization will yield relevant insights into the Soviet organization.

The Polish High Command and political leadership, to ensure proper coordination between the various bodies and the concentration of all resources, created in March 1946, the State Security Committee chaired by the Minister of Defense, comprising also the Chief of General Staff, Deputy Minister of Defense for Political Affairs, the Minister of State Security, the Commandant of Milicja Obywatelska (Regular Police, in short, M.O.) the G.O.C. of the Internal Security Corps (Korpus Bezpieczenstwa Wewnetrznego, in short, KBW) and the Minister of State Administration. The country was divided into 14 security zones, each corresponding to a particular province (wojewodztwo). Each Security Zone had a Provincial Security Committee, composed of the G.O.C. of the Military District or the G.O.C. of the Division as Chairman, his Deputy for Political Affairs, the Province's Commandants of Police and Security Service, the Commanders of the Internal Security Corps and of the Border Troops in

General Giap once remarked that, "I won notably because the French were not informed. The French were always on an average a year behind in their evaluation of our strength."⁴⁴

In guerrilla war major military operations are not decisive. It is a high ratio of contacts in minor skirmishes, based on reliable information, which defeats the guerrilla. The more contacts, the more kills; the more kills, the greater the confidence of the population in the government; the more and still better the intelligence, the more contacts and the more kills. In sum, efficient intelligence means less effort, financial or human, for the government.⁴⁵

To have an efficient intelligence, a major bureaucratic problem must be solved, namely which agency is responsible for collecting and evaluating pertinent information. The Western and Communist experts feel that police are best suited to handle domestic intelligence. Sir Robert Thompson, on the basis of his Malayan experience, argues that "the best organization responsible for all internal security intelligence is the Special Branch of the Police Force, rather than any other organization." The Police establishment being interspersed among the population and covering every corner of the country, is always close to the focal points of dissatisfaction.⁴⁶

Hence, the security information gathering should be centralized as much as possible under the direction of one agency, such as the Special Branch, as in Malaya. The danger of decentralization is illustrated well in the case of South Vietnam. There, ten separate intelligence agencies operated. These were excessively concerned with spying on each other, instead of on the enemy; in addition, there were nine separate American intelligence agencies in South Vietnam. In Algeria, the failure of the French intelligence was in part caused by the existence of six rival intelligence organizations.⁴⁷

Because their information-gathering system was centered around and run by the Special Branch, the British were highly successful. The Special Branch was responsible for all tactical intelligence and countersubversion. (It was formed in August, 1950 - two years after the outbreak of the Emergency). It handled and coordinated agents and informers on every level of the government. Every village was covered and its police post contained one or two Special Branch detectives. The Military Intelligence Officers (MIOs) were subordinated to the Special Branch officers at each administrative level. Their major task was to compile the insurgent's Order of Battle. General Briggs realized that it was essential to have a single intelligence organization. Rival services tend to compete with each other. Besides being unreliable, a multi-intelligence system is inefficient. For

example, a single informer will, if he can, collect rewards from several agencies for the same information which, while unreliable, may appear at the "center" to be "confirmed" by several sources. This happened in South Vietnam, Algeria and Poland (at least at the beginning of the campaign).

The Special Branch concentrated on two aspects of the problem in its operations. First, it ferreted out guerrillas and their sympathizers through a very thorough, almost scientifically precise food-denial operation, designed to detect the habits and identity of suppliers and through them trace the insurgents. In this way, the MCP/MRLA's (Malayan Communist Party/Malayan Races Liberation Army) infrastructure was destroyed. Its second target was the MCP's courier system. By infiltrating the usually vulnerable courier system, the Special Branch often knew the content of the MCP directives, orders and reports; sometimes before the guerrilla units for which they were destined.⁴⁸ The problems encountered by Communist counterguerrilla intelligence experts in Poland, between 1944 and 1947, were remarkably similar to those faced later by the British in Malaya, the French in Indochina and the Americans in Vietnam. What is remarkable, however, is that the Poles and the Russians came to the same conclusion as the British in Malaya and much earlier.

In the Polish case, intelligence presented the biggest problem. There were several agencies: the Office of Public

Security (UBP) or security service; Informacja Wojskowa (Military Intelligence); Intelligence components of the Internal Security Corps (KBW); of the Border Guards (WOP); of the Regular Police (MO). The Soviet Security Service (MGB) operated in Poland as well. Needless to say that the Polish Communist Security Service, was at the beginning quite inexperienced and inefficient. Had it not been for the Soviet advisors it would have been totally ineffective.⁴⁹ All of this did not help to solve the dilemma facing the field commanders, or as Polish Communist Colonel Gerhard put it, what to do to avoid "needless expenditure of human strength and energy in fruitless searches and marches." General Blum noted that at the beginning, the data about "the hostile reactionary groups was quite imprecise", particularly since each intelligence service had a different estimate about their location, plans and strength. The services were at each other's throats; they refused to exchange and coordinate information-gathering.⁵⁰

The UBP's information about the UPA bands was, as Gerhard put it, "modest and inexact". It was also exaggerated. Its agent network (wywiad agenturalny) was generally weak, because of lack of funds and a dearth of experience. Its information about the UPA was neither complete or accurate. The report of the Rzeszow Provincial Party Committee (KWPPR) of January 1946, stated that "...the appropriate activity of the UBP is paralyzed by lack of funds for buying

information." Because of this, the data supplied by the UBP remained a subject of "frequent controversies" between the UBP and the Army unit commanders.⁵¹

Equally poor, initially at least, was the intelligence service of the Internal Security Corps. The quality of its intelligence officers. Poorly trained, they, until September 1945, did not even receive any instructions or guidance from the Center. Each worked as he wished, according to his own system. No wonder that such basic rules of intelligence work as cooperation with other security agencies, the maintenance of agent networks, the mutual exchange of information and keeping of intelligence files were not implemented. In a word, until 1946, "it was chaos". No wonder that its work against the OUN/UPA was inadequate, to say the least. The intelligence section of the KBW-Rzeszow, the major theater of operations, was the weakest one in the Internal Security Corps. "Your information ought to be regarded as disinformation..." stated the letter of the Head of the Investigative-Intelligence Department of the KBW to the Intelligence Chief of the KBW-Rzeszow of June 14, 1946.⁵²

Thus, even before the decisive operation "Wisla", the data about the enemy was sparse, despite three years of intelligence activity. The UPA's numerical strength, equipment, organizational structure, the composition of its civilian network were almost totally unknown. Such inform-

ation had to be acquired only in the process of the operation itself.⁵³

However, before 1947 certain improvements were made. The training of the intelligence personnel was improved. In 1947, it was decided to concentrate intelligence-gathering around the Public Security offices, the Polish equivalent of the Special Branch. In every division, group and Military District, a post of Deputy Commander for Security Affairs was created, manned by the UBP officers. Similarly, in the Soviet Union, the Ministry of State Security or MGB coordinated all such activities through the so-called Otdely Po Bor'bez Banditizmom (sections for fighting banditism) abbreviated BB - attached to Region, Oblast' and Republican NKVD or MGB Departments. (As stated earlier, every Soviet internal security or regular army unit, regiment and higher had the so called Special Sections of Osoby Otdely of one or two MGB officers, who kept an eye on the army personnel and the surrounding civilian population. They were also responsible for gathering information on subversive activities.)

Hence, for operation Wisla, all the means of information were concentrated in the hands of the Operation Group Commanding Officer's Deputy for Security Affairs, who was an UB officer. The organs of military or aerial reconnaissance, military intelligence, KBW, UB were to transmit all the mater-

ials regarding the OUN/UPA to him, as soon as possible and every day. The UB officers were attached to every unit from a battalion up, to coordinate the information-gathering and to prevent competition and conflicting evaluation.

Propaganda Activities.

Agitation and Political Warfare:

Of course, the efficient intelligence by itself cannot decide the outcome of the struggle. It can, however, speed up its resolution and prevent waste of time, effort and resources. In every war, and in internal war in particular, intelligence work must be supplemented by effective political warfare. In a revolutionary war, as David Gulula put it, "politics becomes an active instrument of operation."⁵⁴

Intensive political warfare was conducted by the British in Malaya. They created the Psychological Warfare Sections at each administrative level. The Psychological Warfare Service coordinated its activities closely with the Special Branch.

As stated before, the British emphasized the organizational approach in order to conquer the insurgent's minds and wills. The British approach avoided polemics or direct argument with the enemy, in order to prevent the population from becoming an audience for the attention of which both parties were equally contending.

The main objective of political warfare was to prevent the crisis of confidence, to shatter the illusion that the guerrillas were invincible and that they were in control or had any authority or following. Its purpose was to encourage surrenders and to sow dissent among their ranks.

The information officers, mostly Chinese, conducted a low-key agitation, avoiding polemics or exaggerated reports. The major theme was development. It contrasted the Communist "illegality, destruction and promise" with the Government's "legality, construction and results". The enemy's misdeeds were emphasized. They made an extensive use of the surrendered enemy personnel, who spoke to their comrades in the jungle through megaphones; leaflets, promising safe conduct and presenting pictures of the former comrades leading a content and comfortable life, were dropped.

The promises were kept. The guerrillas who did not commit any crimes were simply let go; those who did, were promised and got a fair trial. The troops and the Police were indoctrinated to pay particular attention to religion and the customs of the Chinese. Their behavior was supervised and misdeeds or corruption were severely punished. Proper treatment of prisoners, avoidance of excesses and the observance of strict legality were strongly emphasized. Citizenship rights were given to 1,200,000 Chinese in Malaya. "Black" propaganda was used as well; for example,

statements purporting to come from the MCP leaders were spread. The effectiveness of the psychological warfare may be seen in the MCP decision to impose a death penalty for reading government leaflets.

The psychological warfare was supplemented by the so called White Areas policy instituted in 1953. In those areas where the MCP were destroyed, all the Emergency Regulations were lifted and all food or curfew restrictions were removed. The public's relief was so great that any attempt by the MCP to reactivate their organization would be quickly betrayed to the Special Branch.

The British intelligence and propaganda activities were supplemented by an extensive system of generous rewards for any information leading to the capture or killing of a guerrilla. Those ranged from 2,000 Malayan Dollars for a common insurgent, to 10,000 Malayan Dollars for company commanders and so on. (60,000 Malayan Dollars constituted a good monthly wage). Rewards were handled by the Head of the Special Branch on each level. There was little agitation directed at the British soldiers, since the majority of them were professionals. To them the Emergency was just a job.⁵⁵

The Communist mode of operation in the Ukraine placed a much lesser emphasis on propaganda directed at the guer-

rillas. The Communists were more interested in getting the insurgent's bodies than their minds, wills or hearts. There was almost no effort to convince the Ukrainian population to desist. The only effort of the Political-Educational Service of the Polish Army, responsible for the political warfare, that could be discovered was a leaflet entitled Do Obalamucenych Band UPA (To the Misled Bands of the UPA). In the Soviet Union there were several offers of amnesty but apparently they were not effective.

The main targets of the political work conducted by the Army were its own personnel and the non-Ukrainian population, especially peasants. It was designed to convince the soldiers that the Soviet or Polish struggle against the OUN was just and necessary.⁵⁶ The soldiers were also instructed to behave correctly toward the Ukrainian population, but they followed such orders only half-heartedly; many atrocities were committed. In the Soviet Union, in the frontier area the Border troops conducted propaganda meetings and lectures, showed movies, provided medical and material aid, food, distributed rewards. They enlisted the local people into the so called Brigady Sodeystviya (Brigades of Assistance) to cooperate with the Border Troops.⁵⁷ The Soviets also formed the so called Istrebitel'nye Bataliony (Destroyer's Battalions) or the Civic Guards, recruited, usually involuntarily, from the local population. The insurgents had little choice but to shoot them and with each

casualty, they would alienate the relatives and friends of the victims in the villages which they themselves were dependent on for support.

In Poland, the political work among the Polish peasantry was conducted by the so called Security-Propaganda Groups, 25 to 40 men each, both static and mobile. The "carrot" approach was never entirely abandoned. But the "stick" ruled. Their task was to prevent the boycott of largely rigged elections scheduled on January 19, 1947. They also argued that Poland would not become just another Soviet Republic. They conducted meetings, spread literacy, provided medical help, constructed schools, clubs, redressed various grievances, helped with the harvest and so forth. They, above all, terrorized the political opposition by removing in an "administrative manner" the heads of villages (soltysi) belonging to the pro-London Peasant Party (PSL), headed then by Vice Premier St. Mikolajczyk. All "suspects" were detained without trial. Thus, the so called "free" elections were "secured" by thousands of soldiers - the campaign required the employment of 56,000 soldiers.⁵⁸

The absence of psychological warfare directed against the UPA was primarily due to the Soviet and Polish awareness of their geopolitical and armed superiority; there was no need to worry about either domestic or international public opinion. The UPA was indeed totally isolated. In fact, it

was trapped.

International Cooperation:

The cooperation between the military and security officials of Poland, Czechoslovakia and the USSR played an important role in the liquidation of the UPA. Geographically, the Ukrainian Nationalists were surrounded on every side by the Communist countries, namely Poland, USSR and Czechoslovakia. The cooperation between these countries was very close, especially during the most important operation launched by the Poles, codenamed Wisla. According to the Agreement of June 28, 1947, this involved mutual exchange of information, mutual operational plans, mutual assistance, the right of "hot pursuit", allowing the Soviet border troops to cross the border up to 10 kilometers inside Poland and vice-versa, common "communication systems" or networks and so forth. The success of operation Wisla was predicated upon the closing of the Czech-Polish and the Polish-Soviet borders to prevent the UPA units from escaping.

Similarly, the British had almost an identical agreement with the Thai authorities. The 150 mile-long Thai-Malayan border was closed, depriving the Communist guerrillas of sanctuaries and any source of supply whatsoever.⁵⁹

Tactics:

Successful counterguerrilla tactics utilized by the Poles

in the Western Ukraine and then several years later by the British in Malaya bear some interesting similarities. Of course, problems faced by the counterinsurgents in Poland, Malaya and by the Americans in Vietnam, were similar, initially at least. One major similarity, from which many other mistakes were derived, was the initial military overconfidence.

The military command in Poland, at the beginning at least, "underestimated" the Underground's strength and influence, according to Polish official Communist sources. The High Command believed that the Army, by its mere presence, would compel the Underground to surrender. The senior commanders were of the opinion that the struggle would, at worst, be brief.⁶⁰

Similar overconfidence is evident in the pronouncement of the American political and military leaders early in the Vietnam conflict. For example, General Earle G. Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1964-1980, remarked that, "...if we just keep up the pressure those little guys will crack...".⁶¹

Such overconfidence on the U.S. side was partly caused by inadequate intelligence data. As was stated before, there was a lack of precise information about the guerrillas, their strength, their location and their plans. But there

were other, more fundamental reasons.

The U.S. Army in South Vietnam, probably because of general overconfidence, as evident in the Pentagon Papers, was particularly unprepared to fight this kind of war. The American tactics had traditionally stressed a spirit of aggressiveness, a spirit of offensive, the massive use of fire-power to save manpower and time, a reluctance to "give up an inch of ground". Since massive firepower could be applied only by large units, the American tactics were to conduct operations on a large scale, using huge formations like divisions and brigades. These conventional units, with unchanged organization, equipment and tactics, were required to fight counterinsurgency. They were overreliant on good roads; they could not fight independently of an elaborate supply system. Their immense firepower could only hurt innocent civilians and do little harm to, or trap, the guerrillas. It was like shooting a fly with a cannon. Such wasteful operations were conducted irrespective of the enemy's strength; they were employed even against the bands consisting of a few people. The terrain was not reconnoitred properly by the military. The attacks were frontal, enabling the bands to escape.⁶²

According to such experts as Douglas S. Blaufarb, "...clearly, the alternative of leaving behind most of the division's equipment was never seriously contemplated...it

appeared to defy common sense to reduce a sophisticated and immensely potent war-making force to something less potent and fearsome and then deploy it in combat." Later a smaller combat brigade of five battalions was authorized to fight a counterguerrilla war. Nevertheless, overreliance on massive firepower remained a part and parcel of American counterguerrilla style. The Army Manual FM-31-16 issued on March 27, 1967 and incorporating several years of combat experience in Vietnam, still prescribed to make an appropriate use of all the brigade's weapons and equipment, including tanks, heavy artillery, armored personnel carriers, heavy transport, radar, aircraft. The only unit of this "new" brigade, admittedly without a combat function in counterinsurgency operations, was an anti-tank platoon.

In sum, World War II tactics were applied by the U.S. forces in Vietnam. This was often counterproductive. For example, by digging in, one gives himself away by making a lot of noise. This activity also dissipates human energy. In the jungle, success depends on stealth and surprise, not on making noise.⁶³

The Americans also overrelied on static defenses, the folly of which were exemplified by such projects as the McNamara Line, the Bien Hoa Line, the Green Line and extensive defense perimeters around every base. However, even if the Army defended every place, the guerrilla still out-

numbered the incumbent at the place and time of his choosing. This implied surrendering of the initiative to the guerrilla. Instead, bases should have been staffed with mobile forces, constantly ready to harass the enemy everywhere and anytime. These were the lessons the Poles and the British learned and which the Americans seemed to have forgotten.

Similarly, the Poles, who learned their counterinsurgency tactics from the Russians, initially (up to April, 1946) conducted their operations by large formations, including divisions and brigades, supported by heavy artillery and tanks, employing them in direct attack. The operations were conducted during the day. A quick solution was sought. The attacks were frontal in nature; no encirclement was attempted. They involved simple combing of forests and were just exhausting for thousands of soldiers and thus totally ineffective. The UPA units, with their excellent knowledge of the terrain, were able to observe the movement of troops during the daytime and simply escaped. There was no coordination, no adequate training of soldiers, no adequate intelligence. The cleared terrain was not occupied.

The British and Polish experience demonstrated that quick, easy and ready solutions to protracted warfare are hard to achieve. Thus, the authorities of both countries finally concluded that the troops are most effective if allowed to make steady, though unspectacular, progress in

eliminating the guerrillas by ambushes and patrols in their own assigned sectors, where they get to know the terrain and the people. This approach worked better than large encirclement and sweep operations, in which the effort was disproportionately large to the results obtained; the operations which eliminated only a few guerrillas and did nothing to reduce their hold on the people. In fact, they may have provided the insurgents with a propaganda point that the government could not beat them even when it employed thousands of troops against them - the familiar "paper tiger" argument.

Moreover, the population must be weaned away from the guerrilla and his cause; the political network backing him must be destroyed. As one noted expert put it, "...All successful counter guerrilla operations combine mobile striking forces with close territorial control, dividing combat zones into areas and assigning stationary modern technological means with unconventional tactics..."⁶⁴ The mobile forces must be centrally controlled and directed and must consist of the best regular troops. In military terminology, "fix and destroy" operations, relying on good intelligence, should be followed by "sweep" operations, which should be followed by "hold" operations which restore governmental authority and establish a firm security framework and conduct continuous, occasional forays into the enemy-held territory, to harass the enemy, to deny him the freedom

of action or movement, to exhaust and demoralize him.

As mentioned earlier, to ensure proper coordination and unification of effort, the Poles, just like the British, created on March 29, 1946, the State Security Committees at every level of the Government. The country was divided into 14 security zones (Strefy Operacyjne) graded, according to security attained, into categories A, B, C, the latter being the least secure.⁶⁵

By April 1946, the tactics were totally changed. The cleared regions or villages were occupied by the organs of the Police (MO). Each cleared Ukrainian village received a garrison or Army company to deny the UFA its use. The Polish population was resettled into newly created villages and defended by the stationary, local ORMO units (Voluntary Reserve of People's Militia - an equivalent of the static Home or Civic Guards in Malaya).

The operations were conducted at night by small mobile formations, which were instructed not to stay around their own bases, not to wait for an attack but to seek bands actively. The forests were searched thoroughly. The brush was often set on fire. The terrain was observed very carefully. The mobile groups were instructed to make sudden, unexpected movements, to move in random fashion to confuse the enemy, to destroy not only men but also depots, bunkers, to deprive

the enemy of shelter, food and sleep. The ambush was the main and the most effective method and was usually set at night, near water sources, at the edge of forests, bivouacks, the entrances to UPA bunkers or village roads.

The mobile groups known as maneuver groups, consisting of 15 officers and 150 enlisted men, with 2-11 security officials attached, could operate independently, without any logistical train. They were used only against the bands whose location and strength were known. They were not tied up to any sector. They consisted of the best soldiers. The reconnaissance was mounted by strong mounted reconnaissance patrols which could be either used to reconnoitre the terrain or block the enemy's retreat.⁶⁶

In case of contact, the whole area was immediately and tightly sealed by several rings of troops. Strong patrols were sent inside the encirclement to determine the exact location of the bands. Then strong maneuver groups were sent into the ring. Each army battalion was given a reconnaissance-assault platoon (rozpoznawczo-uderzeniowy pluton) totally motorized, equipped with radio, security officers, dogs. Its task was to discover new bands. The roads were controlled by permanent control points (grupy zaporowe) - 15 men strong, as well as by mobile patrols - 15 to 20 soldiers. In all the cities and villages in the area, the police hour or curfew was introduced (9am - 4am). All the

entrances to the cities and all the railroad stations were under surveillance by security officials. All people coming and going were checked.

This tactic worked. The adoption by the Polish Army of guerrilla tactics in reverse forced the UPA to admit that this was a most dangerous development. The instruction of Proviknyk Stiah of the Zakierzonski Krai of May 2, 1946 asserted that, "we cannot allow the Army to operate in small units - this is most dangerous". He called for a "ruthless" struggle against it.⁶⁷

While there were similarities between the Communist and the British counter guerrilla tactics, there were also certain differences. Although the British in Malaya were not above using quite harsh methods, their attitude was that even the most ruthless and severe means must be confined within a legal framework. So, for instance, the protection of the suspect's rights was emphasized. No one could be sentenced to death without a trial, where the usual legal procedure was followed. While a suspect could have been detained without trial, his case had to be reviewed by a judge every six months. As noted previously, the adherence to "due process" was also designed to strengthen the impact of the British political warfare vis-a-vis the insurgents.

In Stalinist Russia, on the other hand, the "revolution-

ary expediency", the struggle against the class enemy was paramount. As stated before, bourgeois "legal formalism" was abhorred. The Soviet counterinsurgency methods were, so to speak, above the law and in conformity with the alleged class interest and morality.

The most prominent and characteristic features of the Soviet tactics were: The extensive use of counterbands and agent provocateurs; intimidation of the population by terror; "blockades" (similar to the British food-denial operations, but much more extensive); proverka (checks or combing and "disarming" the population); mass deportations. The propaganda depicting the OUN/UPA as a "kulak-nationalist-fascist organization" led by Nazi collaborators, (though there were amnesty offers too). The Soviet/Polish struggle against it was presented as a proletarian struggle against the exploiting classes and against the impediment to the construction of socialism. Collectivization, in conjunction with the establishment of the Motor-Tractor Stations (MTS), presented an additional control device. Chemical-bacteriological warfare was also used. None of these techniques were really new or original. Our point is that they were utilized on a much wider scale, much earlier and much more ruthlessly or brutally - than in the West.

Some aspects of the Soviet counter-guerrilla tactics deserve a closer look:

1) The use of counter-bands and agent provocateurs.

The employment of counter-bands has been widely practiced by the Western Powers. The personnel was recruited either from ethnic minorities hostile to the insurgents or from surrendered enemy personnel. In Indochina, Major Roger Trinquier recruited and led the so called Groupements Mixtes d'Intervention (G.M.I.) or Mixed Airborne Commando Groups composed of native Meo Hill Tribes.⁶⁸ Similarly, in South Vietnam and Laos, the American CIA and the Special Forces recruited, trained and led the Meo Tribesmen and Montagnards. In Algeria, there were counter-bands recruited from the Algerian Moslems, many of them former FLN fighters, for example, one group led by a former FLN commander Si Cheliff. (Some of them turned against their French masters).

Against the Soviet partisans, the Nazis in the Soviet Union employed the so called Graukopf units, some composed almost entirely of the anti-Communist Russians, or of the ethnic minorities. The most notorious were the infamous Kaminsky Brigade in the Bryansk area and the Crimean Tartars in the Crimea.

During the Malayan Emergency, the British utilized the tribes of Ibans and Dyaks of North Borneo as counter guerrillas. They also successfully employed the so called Surrendered Enemy Personnel in the Special Operational Volunteer Force to fight the MRLA itself.⁶⁹ In Kenya the native

Kikuyu Home Guard and Tribal Police were probably the most effective, in terms of numbers, "inflicting greater damage on the Mau Mau than any other security component".⁷⁰

Brigadier Frank Kitson, drawing on his experiences in Malaya and Kenya, recommends the employment of pseudo-gangs by the incumbent in counter guerrilla operations. These are to be composed of Government agents posing as members of an independent revolutionary organization, who carry out a number of illegal acts to prove their revolutionary zeal and then seek contact with a genuine organization. Their task is to obtain leadership positions within the latter, to attain a measure of control over the subversive movement, to identify its plans and its membership, to disintegrate it from within by actively promoting dissention and factional strife. One of the techniques employed by agents provocateurs is to induce the organization to perpetuate despicable criminal acts thus discrediting such a movement in the public eye by associating its political activism with ordinary lawlessness and presenting its members as common criminals. David Galula suggests that such penetration ought to take place in the early stages, when a movement is still inexperienced and vulnerable.⁷¹

It must be noted, however, that there is little evidence that the British, Americans or French ever used the agents provocateurs to liquidate the insurgency. The domestic

political restraints and political culture prevent these governments from adopting such methods.

In contrast, in Russian history the use of agents provocateurs has been frequent. This technique was utilized, therefore, to a much greater extent than in the West, against hostile underground movements. For example, during the war the NKVD agents infiltrated the Gestapo in order to trigger the destruction of anti-Soviet elements in the occupied areas. For example, in German-occupied Rovno, Soviet agents, in the guise of Ukrainian nationalists, killed a highranking Nazi officer, causing a bloody Gestapo retaliation against the OUN.⁷²

After the war, the Soviet MGB extensively employed detachments of "volunteers", well trained in the peculiarities of the local dialect, history, customs and religion of the local ethnic groups. These groups were sent into the area where the Nationalist partisans operated. They fought or pretended to fight against the Russians and when the insurgent networks and sympathizers were discovered, they liquidated them.⁷³ For example, in the Baranovichi Region, the MGB in 1946 organized a counter-band which, to gain the confidence of the UPA units operating in the area, staged an "attack" on the MGB garrison in one of the villages.⁷⁴

The Poles too formed counter-bands, simulating the

guerrillas, led by former partisans, especially by former members of the pro-Communist People's Army (Armia Ludowa, or AL) like one led by Lt. Colonel Tadeusz Sonta. Even former commanders and fighters of the London-oriented Home Army were enlisted against the hostile native underground.⁷⁵

Another variant of counter-bands was their camouflaging themselves as deserters from the Red Army, or as woodcutters.

These counter-bands often resorted to such acts as the killing of clergymen, of popular leaders, teachers. They resorted to rape, robbery or plain murder in order to discredit the UPA and to ferret out its members and sympathizers.⁷⁶

The Soviet MGB at times would resort to truly extraordinary measures. One agent-infiltrator, in the guise of a false resistance fighter, named Soroka, was ordered by his MGB superiors to kill Captain Amosov, the head of Rohatyn MGB, so that Soroka could acquire enough credibility to infiltrate the Ukrainian Nationalist Underground.⁷⁷

2) Still another counterguerrilla technique was bacteriological and chemical warfare, like spreading typhoid epidemics, poisoning drugs like penicillin and then distributing them on the "black market" to be purchased by the UPA representatives.⁷⁸

The Soviets and the Poles also burned whole forest complexes, like the Tzuman Forest in the Kovel Rayon, including the farms at the edges of the forest. The Poles did the same with Chryszczata Forest Complex in the Bieszczady Mountains. They anticipated, therefore, the application of similar methods by the West by almost twenty years. (The Americans in South Vietnam used fire, napalm and defoliants to deny cover to the Vietcong).

Another technique, reminiscent of the British food denial operation in Malaya, but conducted on a much wider scale and much more thoroughly, was the blockade. For example, during the so called Great Blockade, between July 1945 and June 1946, 585,000 Soviet soldiers and policemen were employed. Each village in the Western Ukraine received a garrison of 25 to 100 soldiers, sometimes up to 500. Each household was checked at night and a strict curfew was imposed. All roads and trails were patrolled during the day and night; in all of them, permanent checkpoints were set. The garrisons were changed very often to prevent fraternization. Food was carefully rationed and sometimes denied to the villages suspected of harboring the UPA fighters, forcing thus the guerrillas to leave.⁷⁹

Just like the British in Malaya, the Soviets and the Poles conducted a thorough census of the population for example in the Volhynia Province (Oblast'). If any of the

male members of a household were unaccounted for, their absence had to be justified by documents or witnesses. If their absence appeared suspicious to the authorities, an ultimatum was issued and if the suspects did not appear within the allotted time or place, their families or relatives were deported. Of course, the Soviet universal passport system, requiring each adult over 16 to carry an internal passport, was in existence since 1930 and so was the population movement control. The citizens in Stalinist Russia could not move around Russia at will. To travel to some cities, permission was needed. When staying in another town, a stranger was required to register with the police within 3 days.

The use of intimidation was widely practiced. For example, the bodies of killed "bandits" were sometimes publicly displayed in the market place or town square, inducing the relatives to step forward. This type of "psychological" warfare was unknown in the West.

Ratio of Forces:

The discussion of tactics often raises the question of what should be the proper ratio between the governmental and insurgent forces. A typical comment is that of Walt W. Rostow who maintains that between 10 to 20 soldiers are required to control one guerrilla in an organized operation. The Polish sources agree.⁸⁰ Hence, the Poles employed from between 150

to 180,000 policemen and soldiers against 6,000 members of the OUN/UPA in Poland (1:25 to 1:30 ratio). The Soviets used about 585,000 soldiers and policemen against 20 to 30,000 UPA members in the Soviet Union (1:29 to 1:19).

Conclusion:

In this chapter we attempted to determine the factors influencing the efficacy of the counterinsurgency. We have divided these factors into strategic and tactical. The former include the incumbent's perception of the international and domestic situation, his coercive mentality and tradition. We concluded that the Soviet Government perceived the international and domestic situations as highly unfavorable to itself. The Ukrainian Nationalism had to be liquidated as soon as possible because it represented a highly dangerous element, threatening the integrity of the Soviet state (as well as that of the young Polish Communist state). Moreover, we have concluded that the traditional Russian political culture reinforced by Communist Bolshevik "Operational Code" predisposes the Soviet political elite to employ repression much more ruthlessly, decisively and on a much wider scale than its Western counterparts. It was unencumbered in its actions by political, social or legal constraints. In addition to tradition or resources there was a determination, a will to use as much force as the attainment of the incumbent's goals may require. The end justified many means unacceptable in Western statecraft.

Our basic contention is that in time of crisis, the national political leadership makes all the difference. A divided, uncertain of itself or demoralized elite will affect adversely the morale of the population at large and thus that of the Armed Forces and Police. The example of the United States and France comes to mind. The will to govern, to function, to impose one's views and aims, however perhaps intangible a factor, is a decisive key to victory in an insurgency situation.

The credibility of the Government, which in turn is a product of a dynamic, confident, competent leadership, is crucial in revolutionary guerrilla warfare, where the visible signs of victory or defeat are not always readily apparent. The Soviet Union and Poland had such leadership in the 1940s. Hence, whichever side can convince the target population that it is winning, is in fact winning. The totalitarian society, with its strict control of the media and the movement of the population and with its enormous propaganda and police apparatus, has much less of a problem in doing so than a Western society.

Revolutionary war is, by definition, a total war in which no holds are barred. Every available weapon could be used by the Communist insurgent against any target. He should have no concern, in Mao's words, for "stupid scruples about benevolence, righteousness and morality in war". These

are, however, virtues which Western parliamentary governments cannot easily discard. The insurgent's terrorist acts often go unreported, whereas any action by the government is a part of the daily news. Therefore, a parliamentary government avoids acquiring a reputation of being unscrupulous and brutal for this would undermine its standing with its own and world public opinion, as happened to the United States in Indochina. Hence, its relative emphasis on civic action, due process of law and political and social reform.

In contrast, the Communist totalitarian government, like that of Stalinist Russia, due to peculiar political and cultural factors, can afford to ignore the international and domestic public opinion to a much greater extent than the Western powers. Its counterinsurgency style does not include operating within the framework of law, socio-economic reforms and so forth. There is no restraint on its use of terror and brutal methods of fighting and punishment. It emphasizes the organizational approach relying on police, military and intelligence agencies, with minimal attempts at winning the insurgents over. This is what makes a guerrilla victory so unlikely; and in fact, in the socialist world it has never happened.

Footnotes to Chapter VI

1. Sir Fitzroy MacLean, "Foreword" to Charles W. Thayer, Guerrilla (New York: Harper & Row, 1968) p. xiii.

2. Peter Paret and John W. Shy, Guerrillas in the '60s, pp. 40/51, 72/78.

Peter Paret and John W. Shy, "Guerrilla Warfare and U.S. Military Policy: A Study", in Davis S. Bobrow, editor, Components of Defense Policy (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965) pp. 250/271.

3. Robert Taber, The War of the Flea. A Study of Guerrilla Theory and Practice (New York: The Citadel Press, 1970) p. 11.

4. Charles T.R. Bohannon, "Anti-Guerrilla Operations", American Academy of Political and Social Science: Annals (May, 1962) pp. 19/29.

5. The aim of resettlement is to deprive the insurgent of potential support. In Malaya, the Resettlement involved 423,000 Chinese squatters living at the edge of the jungle. They were concentrated in 410 New Villages at the cost of 41 million pounds or 205 million U.S. dollars in 1954. Counting the already existing villages, 740,000 rural Chinese almost all of them were gathered into wired and defended compounds.

The resettled squatters were treated with consideration. All were given Temporary Occupation Licenses, both for their homes and agricultural holdings. This, in turn, increased greatly their feeling of security, especially since most of them had previously no legal title to any land. The resettlement officers were not charged with such "unpopular" duties as tax collection or conscript registration.

On the other hand, South Vietnamese village chiefs were unpaid and charged with tax collecting and draft registration making them very susceptible to corruption. They were, therefore, quite unpopular. Their killings by the Viet Cong were frequent and often welcomed. However, they were not even protected. Until 1968, there were no village police posts in South Vietnam.

In contrast, every New Village in Malaya had a police post of 10-12 policemen and 35 Home Guardsmen each, 5 being on duty every night. All police posts had an attached Special Branch detective, whose job was to collect information.

In Malaya, the main task of the village police posts was to protect village officials and to conduct registration of tenants. Every household was required by law to maintain a list of all occupants, duplicated in the Police station, and to notify the Police about any arrivals or departures within a day. Strict rationing insured food control and deprived the insurgents of food supply. Extensive passport system

guaranteed an effective population movement control by the government. But these measures never supplemented the Strategic Hamlet Program in South Vietnam.

Undoubtedly, the Malayan Resettlement Program influenced profoundly the American-inspired Strategic Hamlet Program. Yet, in South Vietnam, it failed. Western counter-insurgency experts tend to universalize on the basis of one concrete case. Malaya was too often compared with Vietnam. However, the differences there outnumbered the similarities. For example, Malaya was a multiethnic country, South Vietnam was almost homogenous; in Malaya only half-a-million squatters were involved, in South Vietnam - 10 million peasants. The squatters were people without roots or social cohesion; the Vietnamese peasant was deeply attached to his ancestral land. To conduct the resettlement, the British in Malaya could rely on a cadre of experienced, dedicated, reliable and hard-working administrators. Such a body was non-existent in South Vietnam. Finally, Malaya, unlike South Vietnam did not border on a Communist country and no sanctuaries were available to the insurgents. A similar military problem does not imply similar political environment, similar history, similar government and so forth.

For a detailed review of various British and South Vietnamese administrative measures, see:

Richard Clutterbuck, Riot and Revolution in Singapore and Malaya, p. 177, figure 13.

Milton Osborne, Strategic Hamlets in South Vietnam. A Survey and Comparison with Malaya (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press, 1965).

Robert W. Komer, "Impact of Pacification on Insurgency in South Vietnam", David S. Sullivan and Martin S. Satter, editors, Revolutionary War: Western Response (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1971) pp. 48/73.

Robert O. Tillman, "The Non-Lessons of the Malayan Emergency", Asian Survey, August 1966, pp. 407/419.

6. Lev Shankovs'kiy, "Trinadzat' Let. Di UPA ii Zbroynoho Pidpillya OUN na Tereni Viis'kovoi Okruhi #4 'Hoverlia' v 1943-1956 rr", in Shevchenko Scientific Society, Almanakh Stanyslava'koi Zemli. Zbirnyk Materiialiv (New York: The Shevchenko Scientific Society, 1975) pp. 163/193 (p. 186 note).

A. Szczes'niak and W. Szota, Droga do Nika.d, Chapter 4, pp. 207 ff. - for detailed discussion of the Resettlement of the Ukrainians in Poland.

7. Brig. Gen. Ignacy Blum, "Udzial Wojska Polskiego...", WPH, Vol. #1, pp. 3/29 (pp. 22/23).

Droga do Nika.d, pp. 230/231, note 67.

8. For example, M. Redzinski, "8 Dywizja Piechoty W Walce z Ukrain'skim i Polskim Podziemiem Zbrojnym" in Mania Turlejska, editor, W. Walce ze Zbrojnym Podziemiem. 1945-1947 (Warsaw: MON, 1972) pp. 193/194, 151.

9. For instance, the Ukrainian inhabitants of villages Zavad'ka Morohivs'ka or Groziowi in Sanok County were massacred on January 1, 1946 by the Polish soldiers. While such incidents were numerous, however, they were not mentioned in the Communist sources.

Spomyny Chotovocho Ostroverkha, p. 39.

10. Tyliszczak, Ibid., p. 203.

Edmund Ginalski, Bylis'my za Laba. Dzieje 28 Pulku Piechoty (Warsaw: MON, 1964) pp. 300/312.
Droga do Nika,d, pp. 459, 230.

11. Lemkos and Boykos are Uniates, they speak Ukrainian. They resided mainly in the counties of Sanok and Lesko. They were fiercely anti-UPA and very loyal to Poland. Ethnographically, they are not considered Ukrainians, since they arrived into the area from the Balkans, between the 15 and 17th centuries.

12. Mikolaj Tyliszczak, Ibid., p. 202.

13. Col. Mieczyslaw Redzinski, "8 Dywizja Piechoty w Walce z OUN/UPA. Lipiec, 1945-Lipiec, 1947", Maria Turlejska, editor, W Walce ze Zbrojnym Podziemiem. 1972, pp. 34/101 (p. 83).

Gen. Ignacy Blum, Dzieje Wojska Polskiego, p. 112.

14. Gen. Ignacy Blum, "Udzial Wojska Polskiego W Walce o Utrwalenie Wladzy Ludowej. Walki z Bandami UPA", WPH, Vol. 4 #1 (January/March, 1959) pp. 3/29 (p. 26).

15. Szczes'niak and Szota, Droga do Nika,d, p. 233.

16. Lt. Col. Boleslaw Szwejgiert, "Jeszcze o Walkach z Bandami UPA", WPH, Vol. 5 #2 (April/June, 1960) pp. 334/336 (p. 335).

There was also an intense debate about this problem in the 1960s in Poland, see:

Jerzy Lovell, "Kompleks Ukrain'ski", Zycie Literackie, No.s 11/12 (March 13, 1966 and March 20, 1966).

17. This is evident in the testimony of Supply Referent "Meteor", after his capture by the Poles. Moreover, the OUN officials reported "deterioration of morale of the Ukrainian population" which lost its faith in the UPA's ability to protect it. The people looked on the UPA, as one source put it, as "something very unnecessary". The Ukrainian people in Poland did not believe that they "will ever gain an independent Ukrainian state". Such doubts were widely prevalent among the so called "nationally-conscious" elements, who also doubted whether "we can be victorious in this struggle".

The report of the Lesko Reyon Providnyk "Dashyn" of Sept. 1946, quoted in Droga do Nika.d, p. 295, note 43.

Testimony of Supply Referent "Meteor" after his capture by the Poles:

M. Redzinski, "8 Dywizja Piechoty", Ibid., cited pp. 90/91.

18. I. Blum, "Udzial Wojska Polskiego w Walce o Utrwalenie Wladzy Ludowej. Walki z Bandami UPA", WPH, Vol. 4 #1 (January/March, 1959) p. 18.

It ought to be noted that the UPA's operations continued even after the Resettlement and the Operation "Wisla" ended. For instance, between August 10th and 20th, 1947, the 9th Infantry Regiment lost 31 killed and 47 wounded. Thirty-three villages in Lublin and Rzeszow provinces were burned at the same time.

19. For example, M.K. Ivasiuta, "Sotsialistychna Perebudova Sils'koho Hospodarstva v Zakhidnykh Oblastiakh Ukrains'koi RSR", Ukrainski Istorichni Zhurnal (Kiev) No. 4 (1959) pp. 7/8.

20. Major John S. Pustay, Counterinsurgency Warfare (New York: The Free Press, 1965) p. 160. General Wheeler quoted in Roger Hilsman, To Move a Nation (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1967) p. 426.

21. On the excessively technological training of the West Point cadets, see:

K. Bruce Gallaway and Robert Bowie Johnson, Jr., West Point. America's Power Fraternity (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1973) esp. Chapter 8, "The American Insurgency", pp. 343/388; on criticism of managerial ethos in the military:

Richard A. Gabriel and Paul L. Savage, Crisis in Command. Management in the Army (New York: Hill and Wang, 1978) pp. 17/22.

22. T.E. Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom (New York: Dell Publ. Co., 1962) p. 198.

Not surprisingly, Communist writers stress the human factor above all.

23. Lin Piao, in "People's War...", states that, "The bourgeois line...ignores the human factor and sees only the material factor, regarding technique as everything and politics as nothing". Quoted in John Gerassi, editor, The Coming of the New International. A Revolutionary Anthology, pp. 122/138.

To Mao, "Politics is war without bloodshed; war is politics with bloodshed". Guerrilla war is a kind of a violent form of a plebiscite in which both sides attempt to win the population's "hearts and minds".

Another Viet Minh theorist, Truong Chinh stated in 1946 that, "The decisive factor in any war is the human factor and the revolutionary spirit of man...It is the bravery of man, not steel and weapons, that decide the outcome of war."

Truong Chinh, Primer for Revolt (New York: Praeger, 1963) p. 113.

24. David Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest (New York: Random House, 1972) p. 552.

Halberstam describes well the mental climate of Kennedy's circle. J.F.K. and most of his staff, recruited in part from intellectuals, were fascinated by counterinsurgency, which they developed into a doctrine. Perhaps it was caused by his fascination with the unconventional - he avidly read Ian Fleming's James Bond novels; perhaps he wanted to live up to certain macho standards.

There was a certain fascination with counterinsurgency. It became a fetish during the Kennedy years. On the highest level, some of his advisors treated it as an intellectual concept, as an opportunity to experiment with nation-building, to test various social theories. Sometimes this fascination took on ridiculous dimensions. For example, every school in the Army, after 1961, devoted a minimum of 20% of its time to counterinsurgency. So did the Finance School and Bakers' School, where they talked about how to make typewriters explode...or how to make apple pies with hand grenades inside them.

Douglas E. Blaufarb, The Counterinsurgency Era: U.S. Doctrine and Performance. 1950 to the Present (New York: The Free Press, 1977) p. 71.

Counterinsurgency fascinated also low-ranking officers as evidenced in:

Philip Caputo, Rumor of War (New York: Ballantine Books, 1977) pp. 16/17.

Richard J. Barnet, Intervention and Revolution. The United States in the Third World (New York: Meridian Books, 1968) pp. 17/18.

25. Samuel P. Huntington, "The Bases of Accommodation", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 46 #4 (July, 1968) pp. 642/656.

26. Point made by Frances Fitzgerald, Fire in the Lake, p. 12/13.

There is no golden mean. Sam C. Sarkessian notes that, "...indeed, few military men appreciate the complex nature of revolutionary guerrilla warfare and the limitations it imposes on the application of military power. On the other hand, academics often fail to appreciate its actualities and exigencies. While the military man may be guilty of depreciating the social, the intellectual may misjudge the importance of the military factor."

Sam C. Sarkessian, editor, "Preface" to Revolutionary Guerrilla Warfare (Chicago: Precedent Publ. Co., 1975) p. IX. However, both of them ignore the psychological factor, being too preoccupied promoting one-dimensional explanations.

27. General William C. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports (New York: A Dell Book, 1980) p. 49.

28. Dennis Bloodworth, An Eye for the Dragon, South East Asia Observed: 1954-1970 (New York: Lancer Books, 1970) pp. 313/315.

On a detailed discussion and listing of U.S. technological innovations and social science projects in the field of counterinsurgency, see:

Michael T. Klare, War Without End. American Planning for the Next Vietnams (New York: Vintage Books/Random House, 1972) especially Chapter 7, pp. 370 ff.

A typical discussion of the U.S. tactics in Vietnam, advocating the employment of a large body of troops supported by massive firepower:

Colonel Sidney B. Berry, Jr., "Observations of a Brigade Commander", Military Review, Vol. 48 #2 (February, 1968) pp. 54/66.

Obviously the American penchant for quick, purely military solutions, disregarding long-range consequences, may do more harm than good in the long run. For example, America's "destabilizing operations", and her invasion of Cambodia contributed to the rise of the murderous Pol Pot regime. Thus the way the war is won decides for how long and what kind of peace will emerge.

As an example of such "input-output" and "Cost-benefit" analysis, see:

Charles Wolf in the United States Policy and the Third World. According to Wolf, "...insurgent movements should be viewed as operating systems or organizations, requiring certain inputs, from either local or foreign sources, which are converted into the outputs characterizing the active insurgency. Thus, one part of the problem is to raise the cost and reduce the availability of the inputs that the insurgency requires. The second part is to curtail the outputs of the system by interfering with the process by which inputs are converted into outputs...Military measures are the principal means of directly curtailing the system's output." Pp. 55/56.

Of course, such theorists see revolution and counter-revolution as competing systems in a kind of marketplace of force. They assume that the people, as individuals or groups, behave rationally. They calculate costs and benefits to the extent that they can be related to different causes of action. Idiosyncratic elements are ignored, however. These may be all-important, however.

29. Robert S. McNamara, The Essence of Security (New York: Harper & Row, 1968) p. 149.

30. Dennis Bloodworth, An Eye for the Dragon, South-East Asia Observed: 1954-1970 (New York: Lancer Books, 1970) p. 315.

On the use of the U.S. Army for civic work, see:

Davis C. Bobrow, "The Civic Role of the Military: Some Critical Hypotheses", in Davis C. Bobrow, editor, Components of Defense Policy (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965) pp. 272/283.

31. Marguerite Higgins, Our Vietnam Nightmare (New York: Harper & Row, 1965) p. 241.

Charles Wolf in U.S. Policy and the Third World, pp. 58/59.

32. R. Thompson, Revolutionary War in World Strategy (New York: Taplinger Publ. Co., 1970) pp. 71/72.

33. Ibid., p. 3.

Also: Robert Thompson, No Exit from Vietnam (David McKay, 1970).

34. Egbal Ahmad, "The Theory and Fallacies of Counterinsurgency", The Nation, August 2, 1971, p. 76.

35. Bil Carl Alroy, "Insurgency in the Countryside of Underdeveloped Countries", in Sam C. Sarkessian, editor, Revolutionary Guerrilla Warfare (Chicago: Precedent Publ. Co., 1975) pp. 257/265 (pp. 260/261).

36. Quoted in Richard Clutterbuck, Riot and Revolution in Singapore and Malaya, 1945-1963 (London: Faber and Faber, 1973) p. 187.

37. Alfred W. McCoy et al, The Politics of Heroin in South-East Asia (New York: Harper Colophon Books, 1972) pp. 160/222.

38. Thompson, No Exit from Vietnam.

39. Guenter Lewy, America in Vietnam (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1978) pp. 184/185.

The Polish commentators disagree, however, that the counterinsurgency operations should center around the police. Droga do Nika, d, p. 368. However, the KBW of Internal Security Corps is an equivalent to the Police. It is subordinated to the Ministry of Internal Affairs and is especially trained to fight the insurgency, although its enlisted personnel are specially selected conscripts.

The South Vietnamese Army "was less a national army than a federation of semi-autonomous corps; there was little flexibility in deployment and the dispatch of divisions from one region to another could create major problems. Each division commander believed that only he knew how to fight the war and resisted outside direction."

(Ibid., p. 184) and Wm. C. Westmoreland, A Soldier

Reports (New York: A Dell Book, 1980) pp. 224/226.

40. Richard L. Clutterbuck, The Long, Long War, Counterinsurgency in Malaya and Vietnam (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966) p. 44.

Tom Bowden in his comparative study of the Irish uprising, 1916-1921, and Palestine, 1936-1939, demonstrates the centrality of efficient police units, especially of their intelligence components to the short-term resolution of insurgency. The Royal Irish Constabulary, not unlike its South Vietnamese counterpart, was totally demoralized, corrupt and ineffective. The Palestine Police was not. The results were evident. The Arab uprising was liquidated.

Tom Bowden, The Breakdown of Public Security, The Case Study of Ireland, 1916-1921 and Palestine, 1936-1939 (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publ., 1977).

41. Clutterbuck, The Long, Long War, pp. 72, 76.

42. For example, on pervasive censorship, see:

Merle Fainsod, Smolensk Under Soviet Rule (New York: Vintage Books/Random House, 1958) Chapter 8 and Chapter 12, "Censorship", pp. 364/377. The Guideline or "Perechen", for censors, instructs them to prevent reports about anti-Soviet terrorist activity, murder of Soviet officials, ethnic conflicts or any other event calculated to emphasize internal instability in the Soviet Union. No wonder that the activities of the Ukrainian Nationalist Underground received so little attention in the Soviet Press. After all, publicity is the insurgent's main ally. In the USSR 70,000 censors are at work to prevent it.

43. Sir Robert Thompson, "Foreword", to Clutterbuck's The Long, Long War. Counterinsurgency in Malaya and Vietnam, P. viii.

Also in Sir Robt. Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency (New York: Praeger, 1966) Chapter 4, pp. 57/60.

The measures that Thompson has in mind are: To prevent the Communists from "outadministering" the Government, to prevent them from establishing a "parallel government"; proper administrative controls must be established, including:

- 1) National Census, carefully done, with identity vouched by two locals.
- 2) The issue of obligatory tamper-proof identity cards, containing signature and fingerprints, to all individuals 15 years and older. Such internal passport system always existed in the Soviet Union and Poland.
- 3) A population index should be established on all administrative levels. In Poland it was called "rozbrojenie terenu" (disarmament of terrain).
- 4) An efficient national police force, having good relations

with the local population ought to be set up; it should enlist as many locals as possible.

5) Food and Supply Movement Control.

6) Introduce a comprehensive set of emergency regulations, which the South Vietnamese never introduced.

7) The power to detain and arrest without trial, which Stalinist Russia obviously always had. Strictly enforced curfews reinforced this power. This was done in Poland and the Soviet Union.

8) Strict control of firearms, unauthorized possession of which was punished by death. This always existed in the Soviet Union. In contrast with South Vietnam in 1965, where 1 million firearms were unaccounted for. Also the soldiers had the right to shoot in certain areas; such areas were designated in Malaya. They existed in the Soviet Union and Poland as well, particularly in the border areas and at night (booby-trapped death-zones).

All of these administrative measures were introduced by the Poles and the Russians and effectively implemented.

44. Michael Clark, Algeria in Turmoil. A History of the Rebellion (New York: Praeger, 1959) p. 9.

Giap, quoted in Ambler, The French Army in Politics, p. 16 note.

45. For example, in the jungle one quarter of all contacts with the guerrillas was the result of chance, three-quarters because of advance intelligence. Thus in South Vietnam in 1966, 73,726 operations from a squad up, resulted in 491 contacts or 1 per 150 operations, signifying very poor field intelligence. Of course, such intelligence will not come out of fear; first, the security of the population must be assured. In South Vietnam it was not, drying up intelligence.

Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency, p. 88.

In Malaya, by the same token, it took up to 1,000 hours of patrol time or 300 of ambush time to spot a single guerrilla and up to 1500 hours on patrol to kill a single one. Of those spotted, one out of ten was either killed or captured. This required an immense expenditure of manpower. One guerrilla could easily tie down ten conventional soldiers.

Richard Clutterbuck, The Long, Long War.

46. Sir Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency (New York: Praeger, 1966) p. 85.

Similarly, David G. Epstein, maintaining that the indigenous police forces are best equipped and suited to identify and neutralize clandestine political apparatus, especially since the police intelligence system, already adapted to rooting out the ordinary criminal, can easily turn its attention to a political criminal. Policeman's usefulness consists of his knowledge of local terrain, population and con-

ditions which enable him to detect the unusual and ferret out strangers. The Police, therefore, should not be organized into large formations and moved around the country, as in South Vietnam. The intelligence network must be, therefore, centered around and subordinated to the police, capitalizing on the static nature of the police force, as in Malaya.

David G. Epstein, "The Police Role in Counterinsurgency Effort", Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science, Vol. 59 (1968) pp. 149/151.

Likewise, Richard Clutterbuck asserts that "counterinsurgency is primarily a matter of restoring law and order, and law and order is a function of policemen with the necessary training and the lawful status for the task." Defeating Communist Insurgency.

47. In South Vietnam, far from constituting various sources of information, all these agencies were engaged in throat-cutting competition. They avoided communicating with one another, they neutralized each other's operations and even liquidated each other's agents. They were more preoccupied with spying on each other and illicit drug trafficking than with the enemy. Since the counter guerrilla forces were deprived of intelligence, the provincial administrations had to run their own networks. The latter, being less professional or reliable, were much more susceptible to penetration by Vietcong intelligence. Vital information was often withheld from the presidential palace if it reflected adversely on the lack of success on the part of the reporting officer. The funds for intelligence activities were obtained from such illegal sources as extortion, protection rackets, narcotics trade, smuggling and the like. In effect, the security agencies did not differ much from criminal gangs, which of course did not increase their prestige of effectiveness among the population.

Alfred McCoy, The Politics of Heroin in South-East Asia.

Dennis J. Duncanson, Government and Revolution in Vietnam (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1969) pp. 255/256.

General William C. Westmoreland notes that a proliferation of intelligence agencies made, "...correlating those multiple agencies and coming to an agreement on estimates... complicated and time consuming and, as the adage has it, 'when something is everybody's business it is nobody's business'." A Soldier Reports (New York: A Dell Book, 1980) p. 550.

On Algeria, Michael Clark, Algeria in Turmoil. A History of Rebellion (New York: Praeger, 1959) p. 9.

48. On Food Denial Operation in great detail, see:

Richard Clutterbuck, Riot and Revolution in Singapore and Malaya, pp. 212/217 and Chapters 12/13, pp. 220/250.

The Latimer Report, pp. 217/219.

The food denial operations were designed to "dig out the

roots" of Communist infrastructure out of the villages. It was the major means of obtaining advance, precise intelligence to identify the suppliers, to force the guerrillas to make contact with the suppliers and thus make themselves vulnerable to ambush. They required a lot of time, they could have taken 4-6 months in which to collect intelligence and exploit it.

Richard Miers, Shoot to Kill (London: Faber and Faber, 1959) pp. 140/145.

49. 98% of the Security Service's personnel had no "theoretical" preparation for work. It was poorly armed, poorly paid, badly armed. Its morale was quite low. It consisted mostly of badly educated men. Its low efficiency was also compounded by the fact that sometimes it was infiltrated by "reactionary underground" and thus weakened.

Szczesniak and Szota, Droga do Nika, d, pp. 364, 366, 385, p. 367 note 27.

Gen. Franciszek Ksiezarczyk, Droga w Ogniu (Warsaw: M.O.N., 1964) p. 321.

50. Droga do Nika, d, p. 468 and note.

The Polish Army treated intelligence received from the Police (MO) and the UB, with a "certain reserve".

Mikolaj Tyliniski, "9 Drezdenska Dywizja w Walce..." in Turlejska, p. 169.

51. Gerhard, "Dalsze Szczegoly...", WPH, Vol. 4 #1 (1959) p. 321.

Ignacy Blum, Z Dziejow Wojska Polskiego, pp. 43/44.

52. "Sprawozdanie z Dzialnosci Organow Wywiadowczych za Czas Instnienia KBW na Dzień 26/8/46" in Droga do Nika, d, p. 374.

53. Droga do Nika, d, p. 435.

54. David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare. Theory and Practice (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964) p. 9.

55. Richard Clutterbuck, Riot and Insurgency in Singapore and Malaya, pp. 180/183, pp. 192/193.

Robt. Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency, pp. 60/68.

56. Polish leaflets such as found in the OUN Archives in New York. Faszyzm Ukrainski w Walce z Polska. Ludowa, and Poradnik Terenowy Zolnierza, containing the information about the basic tasks facing the Army in the struggle against the UPA as well as the instructions regarding the proper behavior toward the resettled population.

The political-educational apparatus of the Army became so important because the political parties in Lublin and Rzeszow Provinces were very weak, especially the Communist PPR.

Droga do Nika,d, pp. 460/463.

Also, the amnesties offered by the Soviet authorities, but not by the Polish, specifically to the Ukrainian underground, could be regarded as a part of political warfare.

57. Pogranichnye Voiska SSSR, May 1945-1950, p. 360.

58. I. Blum, Dzieje Wojska Polskiego, p. 57.
Mikolajczyk, The Rape of Poland.

59. Curiously enough, the Political Apparatus of the Polish Army was compelled to explain to the Polish soldiers that such cooperation did not imply "...the interference of the USSR into our internal affairs but a common struggle against the common enemy - Ukrainian fascism."

Droga do Nika,d, p. 418.

Sometimes there were misunderstandings. The UPA soldiers, dressed in Polish uniforms, would shell the Soviet border points and villages. Because of this, the nervous Russians would often open fire on "friendly" Polish units, causing casualties and irritations.

Droga do Nika,d, p. 450.

Pogranichnye Voiska SSSR, 1945-1950, p. 34.

The Czechs employed up to 13,600 soldiers, by Sept. 1947, against the UPA, and formed an Operational Group "Teplice", to guard the Slovak-Polish border. It closely cooperated with the Polish Operational Group "Wisla". Aviation, according to the agreement between the Czechs and the Poles of June 28, 1947 could penetrate each other's territory up to 30km.

The so called "assault battalions", Grupy Uderzeniowe, of 220 men each, could penetrate each other's territory, in "hot pursuit" up to 10km., and at the request of each group's C.O. up to 30km., and could operate on foreign territory up to 3 days, using its own provisions, however.

Such cooperation was not always successful - during operation "Wisla", 460 members of the OUN/UPA broke through Czechoslovakia to Austria and Germany. It is admitted that the UPA units behaved on the Czech territory in a "correct, disciplined and friendly manner".

On the Czech-Polish cooperation, see:

Droga do Nika,d, pp. 450/456.

The Czech contribution was not large: The UPA lost 61 killed there, 41 wounded, 248 captured. The Czechs lost - 22 killed and 22 wounded.

Droga do Nika,d, p. 456.

Richard Clutterbuck, Riot and Insurgency in Malaya, pp. 259/260.

60. Wieslaw Szota, "Sily Zbrojne RP w Walce ze Zbrojnym Podziemiem Zbrojnym w Latkach 1945-1948", in 20 Lat Ludowego Wojska Polskiego, pp. 966/996, p. 979.

61. The New York Times, The Pentagon Papers, edited by Neil Sheehan, Hedrick Smith, Fox Butterfield, et al (New York: Bantam Books, 1971) quoted p. 637.

62. How remarkably similar are the criticisms of the Polish tactics by the Army's senior commanders, when compared with those criticizing the U.S. Army in South Vietnam:

For example, remarks by Brigadier General Stefan Mossor, Deputy Chief of the Polish General Staff, made in Leszek Grot, "Działania Ludowego Wojska Polskiego Preciwko Zbrojnemu Podziemiu w Latach 1944-1947", in Maria Turlejska, editor, W Walce ze Zbrojnym Podziemiem, 1945-1947 (Warsaw: Ministerstwo Obrony Narodowej, 1972) pp. 11/33.

Similarly, remarks by General Bruno Olbrycht, G.O.C. of the Warsaw Military District, quoted in Grot, Ibid., pp. 28/30.

Also a document prepared by the Polish General Staff: Rozwazania o Walce z Bandytyzmem, in Droga do Nika.d, pp. 392/395 and "Notatka Szefa Oddzialu Operacyjnego do Szefa Sztabu Generalnego" of February 1946, Ibid.. For example, the Order of the Supreme Commander of the Polish Army of May 24, 1945 ordering 1, 3, 9 Infantry Divisions to destroy the bands.

Quoted in Droga do Nika.d, p. 386, 389/390.

The employment of tanks by Commander of Rzeszow Military District. It was thought that their firepower, speed and their moral effect on the lightly armed enemy would intimidate him.

Ibid., pp. 400/401, note 136.

However, those operations and demonstrations of force were extremely exhausting for thousands of soldiers and were totally ineffective. The enemy with his excellent knowledge of terrain and intelligence had plenty of time to escape. Usually these operations were conducted without even knowing the locations of the UPA units. There was a lack of coordination, poor intelligence. Cleared terrain was not even occupied. For operations, divisions would form the so called (temporary) "combined regiments", encompassing soldiers from all the divisional units. These lacked "esprit d'corps", officers often did not know their subordinates.

63. Compare these to criticisms contained in:

Cincinnatus (pseud.) Self-Destruction. The Disintegration and Decay of the United States Army during the Vietnam Era (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1981) pp. 100/130.

Douglas Blaufarb, The Counterinsurgency Era, p. 81.

Herbert, Soldier, p. 135.

64. Peter Paret and John Shy, Guerrillas in the 60s, pp. 40/51, 72/78.

65. For example, Rzeszow Provincial Security Committee consisted of Divisional Commander, (its head), his Deputy for Political Officers, his Chief of Staff, the Chief of Provincial Security Service, the Provincial Internal Security troops.

Its job was to coordinate the efforts of all the bodies involved, to give such efforts a more planned and organized character, to make them more aggressive, to develop new tactics.

66. Very little was said about the use of aircraft in tracking down the UPA bands. The only information found was:
 "Report of the Commander of the Aviation Section of the Administration of the Border Troops of the USSR", April 30, 1946, Pogranichnye Voiska SSSR, May 1945-1950. Shornik, pp. 299/300.

67. Cited in Droga do Nika, d, pp. 291/292.

68. McCoy, Politics of Heroin..., pp. 92/107.

69. L. Pye, Guerrilla Communism in Malaya, p. 117.

70. James T. Johnson, "The Mau-Mau Insurgency. A Guerrilla and Counterguerrilla Study" in Andrew M. Cordier, editor, Columbia Essays in International Affairs. The Dean's Papers, 1966 (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1967) pp. 195/221.

71. Frank Kitson, Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency and Peace-keeping (London: Faber & Faber, 1971).
 David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964) p. 68.
 Julian Paget, Counterinsurgency Campaigning (London: Faber & Faber, 1967).

72. B. Lewyckiy, Terror i Rewolucja (Paris: Kultura, 1965) p. 141.

73. Ibid., pp. 157/158.

74. See: Na Boevom Postu. Literaturnyi Zbornik (Minsk: Masteckaia Literatura, 1974) pp. 17/18.

Gerogi Mironov, "Timofey Strokach", in G. Ananyev and M. Smirnov, editors, Pogranichniki Zbornik (Moscow: Molodaya Gardiia, 1973) pp. 211, 250/254.

75. For example, a unit led by Major "Przepiorka" Edward Gronczewski.

Leszek Grot, "Dzialania Ludowego Wojska...". Turlejska, editor, p. 30.

76. One such MWD unit, led by one Emelian Voitzow killed villagers, masquerading as UPA fighters, in 1947, in L. Shankovs'kiy, "UPA", p. 800.

"Samostiynist", Vol. 1 #1 (1946) pp. 192/212.
 Reported on phony "underground" organization.

77. Shankovs'kiy, "UPA", p. 809.

The whole story was also recorded in the leaflet "Iak Zwinuv Nachal'nik Rohatyns'koho R.O. MGB Kaptain Amosov, Sept. 1947" in UPA. Zbirnyk, pp. 180/183. There were not a few instances like this.

78. Bohdan Melodia-Kruk, "Pratzia Ukrain's'koho Choruonoho Khresta y Ukrain's'koy Poustans'koy Armii", in UPA. Zbornik Dokumentiv, pp. 76/88.

L. Shankovs'kiy, "UPA", p. 768.

79. On the Great Blockade, see:

Lev. Shankovs'kiy, "UPA", p. 762, note 152.

Out of 585,000 Soviet troops, 75,000 were stationed in the Volhynian Oblast', 90,000 in Rovno Oblast', 132,000 in Stanislav Oblast', 95,000 in Tarnopol.

The Blockade did force the UPA into action. Altogether 1,500 battles were fought, the OUN/UPA lost 5,000 killed and the Soviets 15,000 killed. The Great Blockade did, however, break the UPA's organizational structure.

Ibid., pp. 765/6.

80. W.W. Rostow, "Countering Guerrilla Warfare", The New Leader, Vol. 44 #29 (July 31/August 7, 1961) p. 14; and W.W. Rostow, "Guerrilla Warfare in Underdeveloped Areas", in Lt. T.N. Green, ed., Guerrilla and How to Fight Him, pp. 54/61.

Szczesniak & Szota, Droga do Nika,d, p. 434.

CONCLUSION

The basic task of this study was to determine under what circumstances could armed, organized, nationalist insurgency erupt in a modern, communist totalitarian system, like the Soviet Union, and whether it could succeed. Judging from our case-study, the emergence of an organized nationalist movement in Soviet Russia would be possible only during crises like war, as Amalrik predicts, or violent factional struggle within the center of power, when the Soviet government loses control over a portion of territory or when its system of administrative controls breaks down to such an extent that the crystallization of nationalist movement becomes possible. Such a prognosis is implausible at the present time. Still another possibility would be progressive "petrification", using Zbigniew Brzezinski's term, of the Soviet political elite. The political leadership by becoming older, more conservative, obstinate, self-complacent, and demoralized, would cease to attract creative and innovative talent into its top echelons, would become incapable of fundamental reforms, would stop to respond flexibly and vigorously to challenges to its authority and gradually lose its grip over the instruments of power.¹ Such a possibility seems unlikely, however, at least not in our generation. After all, there were many apocalyptic predictions of the collapse of communism. No signs of advanced

"decay" have been detected so far. Given the pervasive, sophisticated and efficient system of control, the emergence of an organized nationalist armed resistance does not seem feasible at the present time. However, the Ukrainian nationalism remains a potent force, particularly in the Western Ukraine, testifying to a failure of the Soviet nationality policy of molding "a new Soviet man".

Thus this dissertation's main thesis is that, contrary to many Marxist or leftist theorists and their now polarized theses, anti-imperialist insurgent movements do not always succeed. Our case-study demonstrates that the Ukrainian Insurgent Army in the Western Ukraine was a numerically large, relatively well trained, organized and equipped insurgent force. Moreover, it enjoyed the overwhelming support of the indigenous population. All this has been confirmed by the Communist observers themselves. Yet the UPA failed. The conclusion is that, barring a severe international crisis, even well organized and popularly supported struggles cannot succeed against a modern, reasonably efficient totalitarian regime, which Stalinist Russia certainly was. It is true that the OUN/UPA leadership had not viewed the international situation realistically and even if there had been neither factionalism nor any deficiencies in organization, tactics or strategy - for how long could they have held in their geopolitical isolation? For how long could they have with-

stood the formidable Russian Communist military machine? Not much longer than they did; perhaps a few months longer, but no more. The outcome was never in doubt.

Historical evidence suggests that a strong, self-confident modern totalitarian dictatorship, whether Communist or Fascist, has little to fear from even highly dissatisfied and motivated groups outside the Party framework.

The case of Iran in 1980 does not refute our central thesis. Iran was not a modern totalitarian state. If anything, it was an archaic authoritarian regime with some modern trappings. It did not possess a competent, confident, unified political elite, which was able and willing to wield the instruments of power. Quite to the contrary, at the first sign of trouble it clearly lost its nerve.^{1A}

Old-fashioned authoritarian systems are often tempered by and open to successful rebellions by their own inefficiency. One could not but agree with Charles T. Wolf, Jr.'s statement that, "one is impressed...more with the ineptitude of the government's use of force than with the skill of the opponent's use of force".²

Stalin's Russia and the contemporary Soviet Union definitely do not belong to this category. Its ruling elite has been clearly able and willing to employ force in many a crisis

situation. When threatened by an outbreak of an armed Ukrainian Nationalist insurgency, the Soviet authorities quite skillfully and effectively have been able to:

1) Insulate the insurgents from the domestic public opinion through their tight control of communications network, of mass media, of population movement. The Soviet regime maintains extensive surveillance of the population by well developed domestic intelligence network, be this the security services, the Party apparatus, the administrative organs or the press. All these institutions are deployed in the Communist systems to monopolize the gathering and dissemination of information. Thoroughness, with which the society is penetrated by the security network, means that any manifestation of the anti-Soviet organized activity will come to the attention of the authorities, enabling them to adopt effective preventive measures.

2) A Communist regime is also able to insulate an insurgent movement from international forum, cutting it off from foreign news media, supplies, sanctuaries, moral and diplomatic support.

3) Not being subject to the constitutional, political and social restraints, that in the Western democracies are taken for granted, its ruling elite can employ the most drastic measures without fear of condemnation by their own publics.

A Communist elite is able to maintain its cohesion and its grip on the society in a period of acute crisis, as World War II demonstrated.³ Those who had reached the top in the Soviet system (particularly during Stalin's era) are hardened veterans and survivors of deadly political struggles; they dread any lessening of their control. Moreover, their operational code, based on the common ideology and concept of the past and the future, basically orients them toward the concept that the Communist end justifies any means. It conditions them to face any emergencies in a determined and vigorous fashion.

On one point both leftist and rightist commentators in the West seem to agree. Both assert that "repressive" societies do not last long. According to General Richard Clutterbuck, for example, "...The right to protest has provided the healthiest tonic for peaceful societies. No society which has consistently denied it has survived in modern times, for more than a half a century without major upheavals and bloodshed..."⁴ Whether such a "safety valve" is absolutely necessary is debatable. The Soviet Union has existed for nearly 65 years. There is no influential or significant dissident movement there; the publicity which some courageous individuals and minor, though admirable, groups receive in the Western press is not indicative of their popular support inside the Soviet Union. Some manifestations of dissent, moreover, are more apparent than real. (There is consider-

able evidence that some dissident activities in Russia have been sponsored or manipulated by the KGB)⁵

The argument that repression is a double-edged sword, that an insurgent benefits from governmental repression applies, therefore, mainly to regimes whose powers of coercion are limited either by tradition, law, culture or crisis. The Ukrainian nationalists certainly have not benefited from governmental repression. After all, while guerrillas are, in Mao's words, "the fish" that need "water" in the sense of popular support, the swimming movements in the "water" require a certain minimum of freedom - for example, the freedom to agitate and travel. Such freedom exists only in either relatively liberal or relatively corrupt and inefficient regimes, like Batista's Cuba. In the Cuban case, it is often forgotten that some freedom of press was allowed there; for example, Castro's Sierra Maestra Appeal, calling for an uprising against Batista, was reported in Havana's newspapers. In contrast, the UPA appeals have not been reported in the Soviet press. Hence, if a totalitarian state's coercive apparatus and informational monopoly are really effective, an insurgency is bound to be nipped in the bud, provided, of course, that the political leadership has not lost its self-confidence or nerve and has no scruples in employing terror to the hilt. The Communist and Nazi experience testifies to that. The Ukrainian nationalist resistance emerged only because the Soviet system of control had temporarily broken

down due to the outbreak of the Soviet-Nazi hostilities. In the present-day Soviet Union, with its sophisticated, efficient and ubiquitous system of control, the re-emergence of armed nationalist resistance is highly unlikely. But while the Soviet authorities were able to liquidate the UPA physically, they remain unable to destroy the "psychological bridgehead" of the Ukrainian Nationalism. In the eyes of the Kremlin rulers the potential danger of a Ukrainian nationalist revival remains.

Moscow's official worry that Ukrainian nationalism is but waiting for a possible reawakening has been more than amply demonstrated in various pronouncements of the Soviet leaders. For example, the Resolution of the 22nd Congress of the Ukrainian Communist Party of September 30, 1961 stated in part, that the "major subject of concern for the party organisms ought to be...the total elimination of the vestiges of bourgeois nationalism from the population of the Ukraine."⁶ The same theme was sounded by Nikolai Podgorny who, in a speech of February 20, 1962 in Kiev, declared that, "...the most important problem facing our ideological activity is the intensification of the struggle against bourgeois ideology and particularly against the ideology of Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism."⁷ Another example is the so called Shelest incident of April 1973, when Pyotr Shelest, the Ukrainian Party Chief, was condemned and disgraced for allegedly endorsing Ukrainian nationalism in his book, O Ukraine

Our Soviet Land.

Particularly are the Soviet authorities concerned about nationalist activities emanating from the annexed Western Ukraine, especially those conducted by former OUN activists. As early as 1954, the First Secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party called on the Party organs in the Ukraine to "...increase their vigilance in their struggle against the OUN remnants, by not allowing them to penetrate into collective farms, industrial enterprises and educational establishments..."⁸ Indeed, Prikarpatis'ka Ukraina reported the existence of the OUN network, which was involved in various acts of terrorism as well as the capture and trial of its principals on February 28, 1964.⁹ There are very few reports on the OUN activities in the Soviet press, particularly on a national level. As stated earlier, any news of nationalist or anti-Soviet terrorist acts are censored by Glavlit and by and large go unreported. However, whatever leaks through reveals the sporadic existence of a network of dedicated nationalists in the contemporary Soviet Ukraine. Apparently the OUN activism caused a sufficient concern for the Kremlin to order in 1959 the assassination of such nationalist leaders as Lev Rebet and Stepan Bandera in Munich. A KGB officer, Bohdan Stashinsky, confessed to these murders. The armed terrorist activity was confirmed by the same sources.¹⁰ There were other manifestations of nationalist activity as

well. In 1958, the Soviet Security organs uncovered the so called United Party for the Liberation of the Ukraine. In 1961, members of the Ukrainian National Committee were put on trial. In 1967, the so called Ukrainian National Front was destroyed. However, there has been no indication that there has been a central directing and coordinating authority over all these activities.

There is, therefore, strong evidence that the Western Ukrainian nationalism has not been dormant since the destruction of the OUN/UPA and that its influence on the revival of nationalist feelings in the whole of the Ukraine has been considerable. It is no accident that the leading contemporary Ukrainian dissenters like V.I. Chornovil, Ivan Dzvuba, V. Moroz were all born in Galicia. The Ukrainians comprise the majority of the political prisoners in the USSR today.¹¹ If the attachment to the native language is any indication of the strength of national consciousness, then the Ukrainian language rules supreme in the Western Ukraine.¹² Also, the Communist Party has been weaker in the Western Ukraine than in the rest of the country.¹³

The legacy of national insurgency is thus manifest: Memories of the armed resistance will contribute to the shaping and development of nationalism for years to come. An American scholar of Ukrainian origin, Yaroslav Bilinsky plausibly argues that the incorporation of Galicia may delay

the process of building of a "new Soviet" people in the Ukraine. The injection of often fervently nationalist Western Ukrainians into the population of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic may play a role of a catalyst or a stimulant of nationalistic or even independence movements. There are historical precedents.¹⁴

Not only Ukrainian nationalism with its anti-Russian and anti-Soviet overtones, but other major non-Russian nationalities continue to represent 13 time bombs ticking away in the Soviet foundations. It would indeed be astonishing if the revival of virulent ethnic nationalism in France (Bretons, Corsicans, Alsatians); Britain (Welsh, Scots); Spain (Catalans, Basques) and other polyethnic states were to stop conveniently at the borders of the Soviet Union which has tried, but clearly not succeeded, in demoting nationalism to the bottom and raising class consciousness to the top.

While the emergence of armed resistance movement in the present system of Soviet totalitarian controls is unlikely, nationalism can re-emerge with vigor, in an armed, organized fashion either in the event of war, especially if supported by anti-Soviet powers, or in the event of liberalization or crisis in the very center of the Soviet regime. In peacetime, the insurgent victory against a modern totalitarian Communist regime is highly improbable.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

As stated earlier, only a fraction of the original documents issued by the UPA reached the West. The Archives of the Supreme Ukrainian Liberation Council, UHVR for short, and the Archives of the UPA Supreme Command were smuggled into the West during the war, during the Nazi occupation. Those unfortunately do not cover the period of the struggle against the Soviets. Some documents were delivered by couriers in the early post-war years or were brought over by the UPA units which reached West Germany in 1947 and 1948. Most of these are located either in the Archives of the ZP UHVR (Foreign Representation of the Supreme Ukrainian Liberation) in Munich or in the Archives of the UPA Mission in New York. Some are in the possession of various Ukrainian organizations, mainly the Zch OUN (Zakordonni Chastyny OUN), External units of the OUN, and in private hands. Recently a group of Ukrainian emigre scholars is involved in compiling all of these into Litopys UPA (Chronicle of the UPA) an ambitious 15 volume project, of which 8 volumes have already appeared and were consulted by me.

The bulk of the pertinent documents available in the West originated mainly during the Nazi occupation. Next in quantity are those from the Polish-held areas, with which very limited contacts were still possible. The least numerous are documents from the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic,

mainly because contact with the West was extremely difficult, especially during Stalin's rule. Hence, certain gaps in our knowledge about the UPA's plans, intentions and operations exist and have to be filled through guesswork. Naturally, the files of the Communist Security Service are closed to scrutiny, except those that are officially released. However valuable the Soviet, Polish Communist and Ukrainian emigre publications are, they are still biased. The claims of the latter are usually exaggerated, especially as far as the UPA's performance, casualties and popular support are concerned. Memoirs available are usually subjective. They attempt to justify the author's motives or actions in the events depicted. The rapidity of developments, excitement of the moment and limitations of perception or memory often compel the participants to exaggerate and distort the events. Corroborating evidence to cross-check various claims and assertions is not always available. That is why in many instances one must rely on an educated guess.

Footnotes to Conclusion

1. Zbigniew Brzezinski, et al, Dilemmas of Change in Soviet Politics (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1969).

Also: Andrei Amalric, Will the Soviet Union Survive Until 1984 (New York: Perennial Library, 1971).

1A. The case of Tsarist Russia in 1917 also readily comes to mind.

Some authors claim that the Shah had no reliable instruments to wield. His secret police, Savak, was a rather incompetent bunch of operatives. Some of its internal operations were more of a tragicomic than of a terrifying nature. But as we stated, the apparatus of repression may reflect the nature of the regime itself.

On the inefficiency of Savak, see: Thomas Plate and Andrea Darvi, Secret Police. The Inside Story of a Network of Terror (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1981) pp. 202/204.

In contrast, the Nazis in Germany were able to maintain their grip over the population up to the very end, under the most strenuous circumstances.

2. Continues Wolf, "It is almost safe to say that no government is likely to be overthrown until it loses its ability to make adequate use of its military and police powers."

Charles Wolf, Jr., United States Policy and The Third World. Problems and Analysis (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1967) p. 266.

Only the unstable liberal-democratic regimes, like pre-1968 Uruguay or old-fashioned authoritarian or autocratic systems like Iran or Tsarist Russia, are vulnerable. Even if the rebellion succeeds, it is usually more by accident than by design.

3. For example, in September, 1941, when Soviet military position was desperate and Stalin was frantically begging Churchill for 25 or 30 divisions to be sent to fight on the Russian front, a huge reserve up to a million well-armed and trained NKVD troops were kept to ensure the security of the rear. This reserve was never touched.

Nikolai Tolstoy, Stalin's Secret War (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1981) pp. 248/249.

4. Richard Clutterbuck, Protest and the Urban Guerrilla (New York: Abelard-Schuman, 1974) p. 303.

5. The activities of a well-known Soviet journalist and suspected KGB operative Victor Luis in disseminating dissident writings in the West may be a case in point.

6. Quoted by Roland Gaucher, Opposition in the U.S.S.R.

1917-1967 (transl. from the French by Charles Lam Markmann, New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1969) p. 440.

7. Ibid., quoted on p. 440.

8. Pravda Ukrainy, March 24, 1954, quoted by Robert Conquest, Soviet Nationalities Policy in Practice (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publ., 1967) p. 98.

9. Gaucher, Opposition in the U.S.S.R., pp. 447/448.

10. Among others by a former Professor of the Kharkov Univ., Alexander Rathaus, who left the Ukraine in 1962. He reported on various underground cells still in existence and on sporadic attacks which continued well into the 1960s. See also an informative article by Roman Szporluk, "The Ukraine and the Ukrainians" in Zev Katz, et al, editors, Handbook of Major Soviet Nationalities (New York: The Free Press, 1975) pp. 21/48 on the manifestations of the Ukrainian nationalism in the 1960s and 1970s.

The Ukrainian Review, Vol. 18 #3 (1962). On April 20, 1966, Pravda reported the "press-conference" in Kiev with an ex-member of the OUN, who surrendered to the authorities. Attacks on the OUN were also launched by The Kommunist Ukrainy, No. 2 (1966) pp. 40ff.

11. Erik P. Hoffmann reports that 60 to 70 percent of all political prisoners in the Soviet labor camps today are Ukrainians, mostly from Galicia.

Erik P. Hoffman, "Political Opposition and Dissent in the Soviet Union", in Barbara V. McLennon, editor, Political Opposition and Dissent (New York: Dunellen Publ. Co., 1973) pp. 329/379 (p. 354).

According to the Ukrainian poet Masyutka, himself a political prisoner, out of 15,000 political prisoners in the USSR, 60 to 70 percent are Ukrainians, who make up only 18 percent of the total Soviet population.

In George E. Kilchycky, "Dissentism and the non-Russian Nationalities", Ukrainian Quarterly, Vol. 33 #3, (Autumn, 1977) pp. 236/254.

Valentyn Moroz, a noted Ukrainian dissenter estimates the number of the Ukrainians among the political prisoners at 50 percent. The New York Times, May 1, 1979.

Shporluk, Ibid..

12. For example, according to a 1959 census, 98 percent of the urban males in the Tarnopil Oblast' and 94 percent in Lvov Oblast', both in Galicia, consider Ukrainian their native tongue as contrasted with 84.7 percent of the males in the Ukraine as a whole.

Y. Bilinsky, Second Soviet Republic, pp. 424/425.

This is still true today. An American scholar, Roman

Szporluk asserts that Ukrainian nationalism has grown unaffected by modernization; for example, Western Ukrainians tend to become urbanized without assimilating to the Russian. In fact, the circulation of Ukrainian newspapers increased from 77.7 percent of the total in 1950, to 80.7 percent in 1960 and to 85 percent in 1970, while circulation of the Russian newspapers decreased from 14.8 percent in 1950 to 13.1 percent in 1960, to 10.5 percent in 1970. There were 10 Ukrainian newspapers in Galicia in 1950, 14 in 1970; their circulation increased from 252,000 copies in 1950, 400,700 in 1960, 1,104,700 copies in 1970 (an increase of 175.7 percent over 1960, while the circulation of the total Soviet press increased only by 110.8 percent in comparison with 1960).

Roman Szporluk, "West Ukraine and West Byelorussia: Historical Tradition, Social Communication and Linguistic Assimilation", Soviet Studies (Glasgow), Vol. 31 #1 (January, 1978) pp. 76/98.

13. In 1966, 19 percent of the Ukrainians lived in the Western provinces but the Party organizations there numbered about 11 percent of the total Communist Party membership in the Ukraine. In 1958 in the Ukraine as a whole, there were 28 party members per 1,000 citizens, in Galicia there were 19 per 1,000. In 1966, the respective figures were 47/1,000 and 27/1,000. It must be noted, moreover, that only part of the indigenous people are members of the Party. For example, in 1947, out of 15,943 Party members in Lvov Province the Galicians comprised only 2.8 percent, and on January 1, 1954, only 13.1 percent of the total, the balance being either the Ukrainians from the East or the Great Russians. Moreover, in the Lvov Party organization in 1948, the Ukrainians from the East and West constituted 37.5 percent and the Russians, 49.1 percent of the Party members. In 1953, the respective figures were 43.4 and 42 percent.

Yaroslav Bilinsky, "The Incorporation of Western Ukraine and Its Impact on Politics and Society in Soviet Ukraine", Roman Szporluk, editor, The Influence of East Europe and the Soviet West on the U.S.S.R. (New York: Praeger Publ., 1975) pp. 183/189.

The Communist Party has always been weaker in the Ukraine than in the rest of the USSR. For example, T.H. Rigby estimates the membership ratio of the Communist Party in the Ukraine at 43 per 1,000 for the Great Russians and 20 per 1,000 for the Ukrainians in the 1960s.

T.H. Rigby, Communist Party Membership in the USSR (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1968) p. 389.

14. On this, see: Yaroslav Bilinsky, "The Incorporation of the Western Ukraine...", Szporluk, ed., Ibid., pp. 180/225.

Yaroslav Bilinsky, "Assimilation and Ethnic Assertiveness among Ukrainians of the Soviet Union", in Erich Goldhagen, editor, Ethnic Minorities in the Soviet Union (New

York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1968).

Similarly, Ivan L. Rudnytsky argues that the annexation of the Western Ukraine will strengthen Ukrainian nationalism. The annexation brought, according to him, a "psychological mutation" of the Ukrainian people.

Ivan L. Rudnytsky, "Soviet Ukraine in Historical Perspective", Canadian Slavonic Papers, Vol. 14 #2 (Summer, 1972) pp. 235/250.

Sidney Monas considers Ukrainian nationalism "surely the most potent separatist force within the Soviet Union, far more important than similar movements either in the Baltic or the Caucasus".

Sidney Monas, "Commentary: Amalrik's Vision of the End", in Andrei Amalrik, Will the Soviet Union Survive Until 1984 (New York: Perennial Library/Harper & Row, Publ., 1971) pp. 69/90 (p. 83).

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