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**The role of political leadership in the political development of
India: A comparative case study**

Itty, Johncy, Ph.D.

City University of New York, 1994

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A

**The Role of Political Leadership
in the Political Development of India:**

A Comparative Case Study

by

The Rev. Johncy Itty

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Political Science in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City University of New York.

1994


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This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Political Science in satisfaction of the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK

Abstract

**THE ROLE OF POLITICAL LEADERSHIP
IN THE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT OF INDIA:
A COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY**

by

The Rev. Johncy Itty

Adviser: Professor Stanley Renshon

This research project examines the relationships among personality, beliefs, political leadership, and policy-making in a developing country. Although many factors affect the outcome of political events aside from personality considerations, the personality factor plays a primary and pivotal role in shaping the character of decisions that are made and how policy is implemented. In the particular case of India, the personality component is a critical element in explaining how leadership and decision-making is played out, in a manner which fully appreciates the religious and cultural factors which make leadership a key agent of development causation.

The categories of personality which have been most useful in analyzing political leadership and performance in India have been power-motivation, dogmatism, and political efficacy.

Studying political efficacy has helped to analyze, assess, and evaluate the ability of Nehru and Mrs. Gandhi to successfully pursue goals within India's existing political environment. The study of power motivation has helped to determine the manner and context in which the two leaders pursued their objectives, and the study of the trait of dogmatism helped to evaluate Nehru's ability to manage and process information to make decisions, especially in issues related to the language problem, the crisis in Punjab, and Non-alignment.

There are number of approaches which might have been used to examine the question of leadership, however, there is a lack of any focused study on the question of personality, leadership, and policy-making as it relates to the question of development in India. It should also be noted that this study has taken a very unique approach in studying personality and leadership from the vantage point of father-daughter, parent-child leadership succession. An in-depth analysis of father-daughter personality orientations as they shape leadership and decision-making (over time, dealing with common issue areas) has not been done before. In this regard, this project offers a fresh insight into the nature of developmental politics from the analytical framework that political psychology has to offer.

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I am especially grateful to my parents, my wife, my sisters, and my brother-in-laws, for their prayers and for the support and encouragement they have given me during the many phases of my graduate study and in the writing of this dissertation. Without their help encouragement I would not have had an opportunity to complete this project.

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Chapter 1: Personality, Beliefs and Political Leadership in India: A Framework for Analysis

Introduction:

The purpose of this chapter is to explain the direction of this research project. It will identify the main focus of this study and show how this project is unique in its analysis of personality and political leadership as it applies in the light of a father-daughter relationship in the Indian context. This chapter will also introduce the issues against which the leadership of Jawaharlal Nehru and Indira Gandhi can be compared and critically analyzed.

A. Problem to be Examined:

The aim of this project is to understand personality and leadership efficacy from the vantage point of two political leaders, Jawaharlal Nehru, and his daughter, Indira Gandhi. This research project will examine the relationship between personality, the exercise of leadership, and their effect on policy-making outcomes. The basic model is that the leaders' personality traits, beliefs, and style of leadership influences decisions which leaders make, which in turn effect both the character of their policies and their implementation. This research explores an important (and as yet not fully explored) relationship between leadership,

beliefs, and personality factors which effected development in India, and by extension elsewhere (for a discussion comparing modernization in India and Africa in the context of leadership, see De Souza, 1978; for works on Indian democracy, see Bardwaj, 1983; Brown, 1984, Field, 1981; Gore, 1986; and Hardgrave, 1985). This research does not proprot to study all the factors which effect leadership or a leader's role in formulating policies. It examines leadership but not from every perspective possible since that is not feasible nor is it consistent with my research interests. This study examines leadership taking into account personality and beliefs, which serve as mediating mechanisms that effect how leaders view themselves, their roles, and their environment.

Within the dimension of personality, there are numerous traits which might be explored, however, this task is too monumental for the purposes of this research. Instead I have chosen three personality traits to focus my attention. These are power motivation, dogmatism, and leadership efficacy. Power motivation relates to the manner and context in which a leader pursues his or her goals; dogmatism relates to how a leader manages and processes information in order to make policy decisions; and leadership efficacy provides the evaluative context in which the ability of a leader to successfully pursue goals within his or her existing political

environment can be studied. Power motivation is a trait within the dimension of personality which is an aspect of leadership which can be operationalized by looking at such things as the centralization of power by the Prime Minister. Power motivation does not cause the centralization of power, rather, its manifestation reflects the presence or absence of this trait. Given this view, the working hypothesis that the higher the degree of power motivation (therefore, the more centralized power and authority becomes in the hands of the leader), the weaker the political structures of government in relation to the leader, is quite consistent with the interpretation of the meaning of power motivation.

a. General Research Questions:

The basic question that is being asked in this research project has two complementary trajectories which ask: What is the nature of political power in the context of the father-child relationship in leadership succession?; and, In which ways and under what circumstances does the human element enter the political process in India and in which ways does the personality, beliefs, and leadership of Jawaharlal Nehru and his daughter, Indira Gandhi, affect the development of national identity in India? In this regard, some other important questions related to this issue include the following:

- a) What is the relationship between personality and leadership as it relates to policy decisions?
- b) What categories of leadership are useful in evaluating policy performance?
- c) What categories of personality are useful in discussing political leadership and performance?

b. Specific Research Questions:

1) On the Leader and the Nature of Leadership:

- To what degree and in what specific ways did personality, beliefs of political leaders, and political leadership effect development in India?

- The Indian case offers a rare example of leadership succession from father to daughter in the twentieth century. What observable similarities and differences exist between the personality, beliefs, and leadership of Jawaharlal Nehru and his daughter, Indira Gandhi, in particular issue areas? What form did leadership succession take in India after Nehru -- in which ways did he influence the policies of his daughter, and in which ways did Mrs. Gandhi follow through, amend, or alter the policies of her father?

2) On the Consequence of Leadership:

- How has India fared as a consequence of the leadership of Jawaharlal Nehru and Indira Gandhi, what form did development take, how did the country benefit or not, and what are the consequences of the policies of these two leaders on

development (in terms of national self-identity) in India?

B. Framework for Research:

Analyzing leadership to study development is an important approach which needs further attention. Rustow (1970:7) notes:

The leader as a figure omnipresent in the political process, as the maker of decisions, originator and recipient of messages, performer of functions, wielder of power, and creator or operator of institutions can bring these disparate elements into a single, visible focus. The study of leadership moreover, can readily be supplemented with an examination of the social and political organization that he founds and transforms, with an analysis of the psychological appeals and political sanctions that give leader and organization a hold on their mass following. In short these may be the elements for a new theoretical view, both comprehensive and dynamic, of the political process as a whole.

Viewing leadership as an important agent of development causation, Rustow (1967:136) also notes:

In a world embarked on rapid technological change and involved in an unprecedented degree of global interdependence, the call for leadership has been continual and ubiquitous. Still, there has not yet developed an impressive or sophisticated theory of political leadership - whether in democracies or under dictatorship, whether in old nations or "new."

In this dissertation I will make an attempt to address this need by studying leadership in the context of development in India. As noted, this dissertation will focus on understanding the relationship between personality, beliefs,

and leadership, as it relates to development policies in India. My goal will be to apply existing concepts and theories of personality as they relate to politics and political leadership, to study leadership and development in India. This has not been done before. No one has yet applied existing theories of personality and political leadership in order to contrast the personality, beliefs, and leadership styles of Jawaharlal Nehru and Indira Gandhi with a view toward analyzing development in India (although Henry Hart's (1976) work on Indian politics under Indira Gandhi makes a preliminary effort in that direction).

Many works on Jawaharlal Nehru and Indira Gandhi have given great attention to descriptive detail, however, a common framework for comparing these two leaders is lacking. Many authors have also not sought to clearly define the conceptual and theoretical framework from which leadership can be studied in India, particularly as it relates to its impact on policies. Among the most interesting areas not covered in the literature on leadership revolves around a study of leadership succession in terms of a parent-child (or in the Indian case, a father-daughter) relationship. With regard to the Indian case, it is important to look for patterns and areas of convergence and divergence in leadership styles and how they effected developmental policy-making in India.


This dissertation focuses on Jawaharlal Nehru and Indira Gandhi as the key subjects of this study. Nehru was an important figure in Indian politics. He was India's first Prime Minister and assumed a leadership role at a time when domestic tensions threatened the unity and security of a newly independent nation; Indira Gandhi, his daughter, held office for the longest period of time in recent decades and pursued policies which had a major impact on India's status as a newly industrializing developing nation. These two individuals have had the strongest impact on Indian politics and development during the post-independence period. (Although the impact of Mrs. Gandhi's sons, Sanjav and Rajiv Gandhi, had been significant in shaping some of Mrs. Gandhi's views, these two personalities have not been discussed here since they entered politics much later in life. Consequently, the material regarding their activities is only recently becoming more widely available.)

Development, for the purpose of this dissertation will be analyzed in terms of the evolution and maintenance of national self-identity which I suggest consists of an internal domestic component and also an external component (to be explained in more detail in pages which follow). The diagram presented on the following page outlines the framework of comparison for the two leaders whose personality, beliefs, and leadership will be examined in the study. The diagrams serve to provide

a graphic representation of the domain, forum, or context in which personality, beliefs, and leadership will be analyzed. In this dissertation I will be focusing on an important part but still a part of the broad issues that comprise the development paradigm.

Figure. A

Framework for Comparison



+-----+
 + (C) +
 + Policy Initiatives +
 + vis-a-vis +
 + Nat'l Self-Identity +
 +-----+

+-----+
 + Internal Dimension +
 + +
 + (COMMON NAT'L IDENTITY) +
 + Leader's Leadership in Confronting +
 + Problem of National Integration, +
 + Specifically: Majority/Minority +
 + Relations (e.g. Hindus - Muslims +
 + Hindus - Sikhs) in regard to +
 + Policies Concerning Religion, +
 + Language, Culture, and Political +
 + Participation. +
 +-----+

+-----+
 + External Dimension +
 + +
 + (STATE IDENTITY) +
 + Leader's Leadership in Raising the +
 + Stature of the State, Improving the +
 + Self-Image or Self-Identity of the +
 + State and creating a State Identity. +
 +-----+

Within the internal component (see Diagram A) of national self-identity, I will be addressing Jawaharlal Nehru and Indira Gandhi's leadership in confronting problems of national integration with regard to majority-minority relations. Issues that are relevant to this dimension include those dealing with religion, language, political participation, and culture among other things. India's most pressing concern after independence was to maintain unity and concord among the many religious, linguistic, and social groups which characterize Indian society. The trauma of independence had brought with it a host of other animosities among the many minority groups in India (for a general discussion on challenges to national integration and national development, see Tsurutani, 1972; Deutsch, 1953).

I have sought to examine two case situations which illustrate problems associated integration: (1) Nehru's efforts in developing a language policy and his handling of Hindu-Muslim tensions, and (2) Mrs. Gandhi's handling of the Punjab crisis which in part is an outgrowth of her father's policy to divide states according to linguistic affiliations. Both cases involve challenges to political leadership along religious and linguistic lines and therefore, offer opportunities for comparative analysis in evaluating the policies of the father and his daughter.

One of Nehru's major problems after independence was to resolve regional disputes involving religion, language and culture. The Linguistic Reorganization of States Act of 1957 served to address the issue of national integration by carving up states according to linguistic groupings. This action changed historic territorial boundaries throughout India which invoked strong responses from people.

The Act of 1957 is so closely intertwined with cultural, social, and religious traditions that it should not be isolated and considered to be simply a language policy or merely an effort to deal with a language problem. The Act of 1957 has far-reaching implications which effects contemporary Indian politics. Indira Gandhi inherited many of the consequences of the 1957 act. She followed her father's policy of division of territory according to linguistic, ethnic, and religious traditions when she in 1966 divided a single territory in northern India into two distinct, individual states - Punjab and Haryana.

This act served to exacerbate tensions within the region which culminated in a major political crisis in Punjab where anti-government elements created chaos and instigated linguistic and religious rivalries between the Hindus and Sikhs in Punjab. In view of the importance of analyzing majority/minority relations in the context of national

integration and national-self identity, I have included this issue area as a forum from which the personality, beliefs, and the leadership of the two leaders can be compared.

The diagram essentially shows that the creation of national identity is a consequence of a particular set of policies which in turn are a function of the personality, leadership style, and beliefs of the two leaders. Within the external component of national self-identity, I will be examining the father and daughter's leadership in enhancing the interests, stature, self-image or self-identity of the state in relation to other states. In order to limit my focus in this endeavor I will compare the two leaders' efforts with regard to the leadership of India on the world stage within the Non-aligned movement.

Jawaharlal Nehru was one of the founding fathers of the concept of Non-alignment, a policy of statecraft, which continues to be a major force in guiding the external policies of certain developing nations. Nehru's leadership of India in the Non-aligned movement has enabled India to play a greater role as a state actor on the world stage and to benefit from her increased participation in global forums. Indira Gandhi continued to lead India by the policies of her father, however, her approach to Non-alignment appears to have been quite different. The stature and image of India on

the world stage assumed a different character under her leadership. Non-alignment took different forms. Nehru took a special interest in championing the cause of political issues including mediation and the peaceful resolution of disputes. Indira Gandhi appeared to focus primarily on the North-South issues and other economic concerns relating to the needs of developing countries.

Both of these differing perspectives on Non-alignment share a common thread which make it useful for comparative analysis: both approaches involve disputes which elicit some meaningful response by India or the uses of her good offices to deal with problems related to peace and security. The Non-alignment issue provides a unique opportunity to observe and analyze the development, progression, and implementation of a single policy, over time, by two different leaders -- in this case, father and daughter. Together, the internal and external dimensions discussed here facilitate the discussion of personality, beliefs, and political leadership in terms of national self-identity, an aspect of development. In the first instance one is examining, analyzing, and comparing leadership and the development of national identity at home, in the domestic context; in the second instance one is studying leadership and the development of national identity abroad, as a result of a leader's leadership of the state within a political movement such as Non-alignment.

**C. Outline of a Research Design:
The Operationalization of Leadership Efficacy
Power Motivation, Policy Dogmatism
(Rigidity and Flexibility), and Beliefs**

1. Leadership Efficacy

Some researchers have devised scales which attempt to measure "political/leadership efficacy" (see Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee, 1954). Although the theoretical premises of this scale have been challenged (Renshon, 1972), numerous studies seem to indicate a positive relationship between an individual's feeling of political competence and the degree to which they actively participate in politics (for examples, see Almond and Verba, 1963; Milbrath, 1965; and Barber, 1972).

In using the term "leadership" I will be focusing on "leadership abilities" and "leadership efficacy" which will be operationally defined in terms of how a leader is able to successfully develop, co-opt support, and implement policies which will contribute to national development (for a discussion of political leadership in the specific context of India, see Park, 1969 and Brecher, 1969). These works draw attention to leaders, political institutions and particular issue areas in which leadership has been exercised). In order to assess the leaders' "leadership abilities" I will be examining the following specific policies for each of the

two leaders: (1) Nehru, the language issue and the Hindu-Muslim conflict, (2) Nehru and Non-alignment, (3) Indira Gandhi and the Crisis in the Punjab, and (4) Indira Gandhi and Non-alignment.

Many of the indicators of internal development -- particularly those that I have chosen with respect to majority/minority relations and problems of national integration can be analyzed through Government of India reports, reports of the Planning Commission, reports of international organizations, and also through journalistic, scholarly, and other non-governmental sources. In operationalizing development in terms of leadership one would particularly be interested in examining and comparing the leaders' rhetoric and actual policy practices. For example, one might be concerned with the comparison of public statements which are laden with terms of inclusion or exclusion and how they shape policy outcomes.

In order to operationalize leadership efficacy I will examine among other factors, the degree of policy innovation in implementation (e.g. linguistic reorganization of states) and whether Jawaharalal Nehru and Indira Gandhi actually took steps to dramatically change or improve the political environment to foster development (defined in terms of the policy areas I have selected for analysis), or if their

policies merely sought to "tinker" with the status quo. I have chosen to analyze Nehru's Linguistic Reorganization of States Act and Indira Gandhi's Act of 1966 which created the states of Punjab and Haryana as examples of political efficacy where political changes were brought about within the existing political structure.

In order to carefully focus on operationalizing political efficacy I will be concerned with such factors as legislative success. I will also be concerned with a leader's ability to successfully work "within" the existing political framework to achieve certain policy goals rather than to use extra-constitutional measures to achieve these ends. I will look at "affirmation statements" such as those involving terms of "can" or "will" which may serve as an indicator of efficacy. A possible hypothetical statement which clarifies this might be one which suggests that the higher the degree of political efficacy, the higher the degree of effective policy implementation.

2. Power Motivation

The personality trait of "power motivation" has a long history in political psychology (cf. Lasswell, 1930). Lasswell's work linked power motivation with an individual's unfulfilled needs for esteem (1948). In this dissertation

I examine "power motivation" in terms of how leaders are able to control and directly influence their immediate political environment. To accomplish this I, therefore, look at such factors as the centralization of power in the Prime Minister's office.

This can be operationalized by looking at the actual physical growth of the Prime Minister's office, how responsibilities were delegated to individual bureaucrats, and how certain functional tasks were made to be less dependent on the Congress party structure. I will also look at the manner and degree to which political institutions were either strengthened or weakened (e.g. government bureaucracy, commissions, committees, and cabinet structure) during the periods that each leader was in power. One hypothesis is that the higher the degree of power motivation, the weaker the political structures of government in relation to the leader.

3. Policy Dogmatism: Rigidity and Flexibility

Another psychological trait which has been examined and which has been shown to effect a person's level and quality of political participation is the trait of "dogmatism" (Rokeach, 1960). Rokeach placed subjects along an open-closed-minded continuum. Rokeach argued that closed-minded individuals experience a high level of anxiety and have difficulty in

assimilating new information; they tend to reject or perceptually distort any new information if it conflicts with their beliefs. Open-minded individuals, however, carefully analyze and evaluate information as they receive them before assimilating or rejecting it; consequently, they take longer to solve problems and make decisions.

In the area of political leadership, dogmatism has been useful in suggesting why leaders may screen out and reject information which is incompatible with their beliefs. Dogmatism is important in studying leadership since it affects how leaders think about policy and may also help to determine the degree of innovation in policy formulation.

Janis' study of decisional conflicts (1977) led him to suggest that leaders can make better decisions if they improve the quality and reliability of the information which they receive prior to taking action. Janis argued that Woodrow Wilson experienced difficulties in office partly due to "his deliberate refusal to make use of the channels of information that were available to him...(He) did not care to listen to the opinions he did not welcome" (Janis, 1959:13).

Analyzing Jawaharlal Nehru and Indira Gandhi's handling of issues in the context of majority/minority relations provide opportunities to determine the extent to which the

trait of dogmatism can be applied -- particularly with regard to information processing in policy-making decisions (primary source works indirectly suggestive of this trait include: Mankekar, 1979; Pandit, 1977; Shah, 1965). One working hypothesis is that the higher the degree of dogmatism, the less policy innovation will be found. In this study I will be examining dogmatism in terms of open-close-mindedness and how this effects leaders' decisional processes and policy formulation. In this connection one would be particularly interested in the leaders' reaction and receptivity to new and conflicting information, and the advice of others.

4. Operationalizing Beliefs

The Content analysis of speeches, writings, autobiographical works and other statements by Jawaharlal Nehru and Indira Gandhi are examples of references which help to shed light on the belief systems of these two leaders. This reflects not only the leaders' personality orientations, but how these traits shape the decisions which they make. The latter chapter dealing with Nehru and Indira Gandhi's value profiles bring this out in greater detail.

In operationalizing beliefs it will be important to study leaders' value profile, world view, strategies and tactics of political action. The "operational code" is a particularly

significant portion of the actor's entire set of beliefs about political life. The cognitive framework which take into account world view, strategies and tactics of political activity have been most usefully analyzed in the study of the "operational code" (cf. George, 1969, Johnson, 1977). As George (1969:197) notes, "(a) political leader's beliefs about the nature of politics and political conflict, his views regarding the extent to which historical developments can be shaped, and his notions of correct strategy and tactics -- whether these beliefs be referred to as 'operational code,' 'Weltanschauung,' 'cognitive map,' or an 'elite's political culture' -- are among the factors influencing that actor's decisions.

Summary:

The personality and political leadership of Jawaharlal Nehru and Indira Gandhi as it shapes development has been the key focus of this chapter. It has been noted that three personality traits are especially important in analyzing father-daughter leadership in this case study. They include: power motivation, dogmatism, and leadership efficacy. Development, for the purposes of this study, has been defined in terms of national self-identity which consists of an internal dimension and an external one. The internal dimension relates to issues involving ethnic tensions and how

the leaders responded to them. The two cases which illustrate the problems associated with national integration is Nehru's efforts in developing a language policy and his handling of Hindu-Muslim tensions in the wake of independence. This contrasts with Mrs. Gandhi's handling of the Punjab crisis which is an outgrowth of her father's efforts in developing a policy to divide states according to their particular linguistic affiliations. The external dimension focuses on the issue of non-alignment and the contrasting trajectories used by Nehru and his daughter Indira Gandhi in shaping the position of India on the world stage.

Briefly, the Figures B and B1 which follow provide a summary of the operationalization of the research project comparing Jawaharlal Nehru and Indira Gandhi. Figure B2 provides a summary overview of the traits which will be analyzed throughout this study:

Figure. B

**Summary of Operationalization of Research
Comparison of Jawaharlal Nehru and Indira Gandhi**

BELIEFS

Operational Indicators

1. Leaders' value profile
2. operational code - philosophical (world view)
instrumental beliefs (strategies, tactics of pol. action)

PERSONALITY

Operational Indicators

1. power motivation
 - e.g. a) centralization of power in PM's office
 - b) strengthening / weakening of political institutions
 - c) leaders' accumulation / dispersion of power
2. dogmatism (open / closed-mindedness)
 - e.g. a) reaction / receptivity to new and conflicting information
 - b) degree of policy innovation in policy formulation
3. political/leadership efficacy
 - e.g. a) look at legislative successes achieved within existing political structure
 - b) look at "affirmation" statements such as those with "can" or "will"

LEADERSHIP / STYLE

Operational Indicators

1. degree of policy innovation in policy implementation
2. was leaders' leadership transitional or transformational (cf. Burns, 1978)
3. leadership efficacy / nature and consequences of leadership

Figure. B1

**Summary of Operationalization of Research
Comparison of Jawaharlal Nehru and Indira Gandhi**

POLICY DOMAIN:

Leaders' contribution toward creation of national self-identity as a facet of development.

- A) Internal component**
- B) External component**

Operational Indicators**A. Internal**

1. [Creation of a Common Identity]
[Integration of Minority Groups]
[Majority / Minority Relations]

- examine actions which sought to unify India and integrate minority segments of the population

e.g. Nehru: Division of states & Hindu-Muslim conflict
Gandhi: Division of states & Hindu-Sikh conflict

B. External

2. [Creation of a State Identity]

- examine Non-alignment and how leaders' leadership of India in Non-aligned movement effected its emergence as an important state actor and the manner in which India was influenced as a consequence of her participation.

e.g. Nehru: Non-alignment and Political concerns

Gandhi: Non-alignment and Economic concerns

Figure. B2 Summary of Traits

POWER MOTIVATION:

- in terms of compensation of unfulfilled needs
- in terms of how leaders are able to control and directly influence their political environment.

Possible Indicators of Prevalence of Trait:

- centralization of power in PM's office
- actual physical growth of PM's office
- how responsibilities were delegated to indiv. bureaucrats
- how certain functional tasks were made to be more or less dependent on Congress party structure
- manner and degree to which political institutions are strengthened or weakened (gov't bureaucracy, commissions, committees, cabinet structure) during period leader was in power.

Hypothesis: *HIGHER DEGREE OF POWER MOTIVATION; THE WEAKER THE POLITICAL STRUCTURES OF GOV'T IN RELATION TO THE LEADER.*

DOGMATISM:

- deals with information processing
- Open-mindedness, close-mindedness (cf. Rokeach, 1960)
- perceptual distortion of any new info if it conflicts with leaders' beliefs.
- open-minded individuals carefully evaluate info as they receive them before accepting or rejecting them.
- close-minded individuals take longer to solve problems and make decisions.

Hypothesis: *THE HIGHER THE DEGREE OF DOGMATISM, THE LESS POLICY INNOVATION CAN BE FOUND.*

LEADERSHIP EFFICACY:

- how successfully a leader is able to develop, co-opt support, administer, and implement policies which contribute to national development.

Hypothesis: *THE HIGHER THE DEGREE OF LEADERSHIP EFFICACY, THE HIGHER THE GREATER THE DEGREE OF NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT*

**Chapter 2: The Study of Personality,
Politics, Beliefs, Leadership Efficacy
and the Development Paradigm**

Introduction:

The purpose of this chapter is to identify the methodological focus of certain approaches to the question of personality and political leadership and how they differ from those offered in this study. A brief review of some literature in this area show that personality, beliefs, and leadership have been generally treated as independent elements which effect decisional processes. The focus has, for the most part, been on models based on the social, political, and economic experiences of Western developed countries. This dissertation, however, will show how these independent elements are related and how they come to the fore in a developing country such as India where personality and political leadership are inexorably related concepts.

I. Personality and Politics

The previous research in the area of personality and politics have not sought to integrate some of the various factors that shape personality from the vantage point of father-daughter leadership. The experiential, historical, cultural, and familial factors that have a bearing on

personality have often been studied as independent variables. There have been no focused attempts to link these variables in the comparative analysis of two leaders in a developing country such as India. There have also been no attempt to analyze the dynamics of this in the context leadership in terms of a father-daughter relationship. The overall approaches to the analysis of personality have also not adequately reflected the relationship between personality orientations and politically relevant behavior.

"Personality" is not an easy concept to measure because the term sometimes includes a broad range of internal traits which have not been adequately specified. The term is a "mediating construct" and therefore, cannot be directly observed, but rather "inferred" from certain patterns of behavior (Knutson, 1973:31). The term "personality" as a theoretical construct is valid in terms of specific behavior during observable situations (Kelly, 1955) and can be operationalized using subconcepts such as "traits," "drives," "needs," "values," "habits," etc. (see Sanford, 1968:589).

Knutson (1973:44-45), commenting on the nature of much of the literature in this area notes:

(P)ersonality variables are selectively felt at a number of points in the political process. One point, for example, involves the selection process for leadership roles; another is the inner predispositions which lead individuals to engage in deviant political acts

(although it must be underscored that no intrapsychic commonality accounts for all forms of deviancy). Personality factors are also selectively felt in the process of political learning because values and patterns of behavior are inculcated which may or may not find the psychic resonance necessary for their behavioral actualization. Again, personality is clearly important in understanding the manner in which a person carries out the roles to which (often because of cultural and societal constraints) he has been assigned (or obtained)...Throughout the accumulating research, a basic principle which appears is that the influence of personality is directly related to the specificity of the politically relevant behavior.

Personality affects the way an individual functions in society. In the case of political leaders, personality effects the way leaders view their roles in society, how they relate to other people, and both the kind and manner in which political decisions are made. Knutson's assertion that personality is directly related to the specificity of politically relevant behavior does not go far enough in explaining which factors help in molding certain types of political behavior. This dissertation will attempt to clarify this deficiency.

The concept of personality is broad and there are many contrasting theoretical perspectives which define the concept. However, two common meanings are generally agreed upon: a) personality consists of organized internal dispositions, and b) these dispositions maintain a degree of stability and consistency over time (Knutson, 1973:29). Lazarus (1963:37) for example, notes: "One hallmark of personality is

consistency, or stability. If we had no consistent personal qualities, we could not conceive of personality, since we would all be continually changing so much that we would be scarcely recognizable." Allport (1937:48), notes: "Personality is the dynamic organization within the individual of those psychophysical systems that determine his unique adjustments to his environment." Murray (1968:6) is more specific and argues that:

A personality at any designated moment of its history (in middle life, for example) is the then-existing brain-located, imperceptible and problematical hierarchical constitution of an individual's entire complex stock of interrelated substance-dependent and structure-dependent psychological properties (elementary, association, and organizational).

Although Murray (1968) helps to more concretely define the different levels in which personality is operative, he does not go far enough in showing how individual personality orientations developed over time and are shaped by unique factors such as parental influence. This relationship is a very important one and will, therefore, be analyzed in the course of this dissertation.

II. The Concept of Beliefs

Beliefs, as I will use the term, refer to a leader's world-view, political philosophy, values, and principles, (cf. George, 1969, on the "operational code"). Beliefs, as George (1968:191) notes, serve

as a prism that influences the actor's perceptions and diagnoses of the flow of political events, his definitions and estimates of particular situations. These beliefs also provide norms, standards, and guidelines that influence the actor's choice of strategy and tactics, his structuring and weighing of alternative courses of action. Such a belief system influences, but does not unilaterally determine, decision-making; it is an important, but not the only, variable that shapes decision-making behavior.

In the past theorists have studied beliefs in terms of an individual's values, world-view, and actions and attitudes toward other individuals in an organization as a result of organizational recruitment and processes of socialization (cf. Merton, 1940). Other authors such as Leites (1953) and George (1969) studied individuals and the way in which their idiosyncratic beliefs about the nature, tactics, and strategies of politics and political action affected decisional processes. Theorists such as Holsti (1970) have identified different types of operational codes in terms of philosophical and instrumental belief systems and have applied them to the study of particular political figures. Many others have developed the work of Leites (1953) and George (1969) to study decision makers in different political situations (cf. McClelland, 1972; Johnson, 1977; Walker, 1977). The fundamental shortcoming of these approaches and others like these is that for the most part they are either American or Euro-Centric and, therefore, do not fully appreciate the special role that leadership plays in Asian political systems.

III. Political Leadership

Traditionally, studying "great" political leaders has led to the question: Do great personalities make history and produce great changes within countries or are they molded, shaped, and constrained by the times, situations, and historical circumstances in which they live?

Thomas Carlyle, Sidney Hook, Herbert Spencer, and William James, are among those who have addressed the issue of personality and politics especially with regard to the debate over the "great man" vs. "situation" thesis. Thomas Carlyle believed that certain people are fundamentally more superior than others and possessed certain innate qualities which made them great personalities with great leadership potential. In his work On Heroes, Hero-Worship, and the Heroic in History, Carlyle (1907) argues that great personalities transform the course of human history and that history is defined by the actions of great men. Since Carlyle holds that some men are superior to other men he also subscribes to the view that only "great men" have the right and ability to become leaders while the masses are destined to follow (Carlyle, 1907). Carlyle, however, doesn't fully examine why people tend to follow leaders and does not take into account to particularities of contrasting historical and cultural experiences which have a bearing on followership. In

the chapter which deals with Indian conceptions of leadership, I will be addressing this theme to explain why Nehru and Indira Gandhi's leadership and their followership had particular historical, religious, and cultural referents.

Sidney Hook introduced the distinction between the "eventful man" and the "event-making man." Hook argued that many events in the course of human history have served to give rise to famous personalities. The eventful man to a great extent is the product of the circumstances which gave rise to his eminence. The "event-making" man, on the other hand, uses his environment and the circumstances in which he is placed to chart out a new course of action and to shape the course of history. He "finds a fork in the historical road [and] also helps, so to speak, to create it" (Hook, 1943). Sidney Hook's "event-making man" concept is an especially important when one examines Nehru's leadership in the Non-aligned movement. As a later chapter dealing with Nehru and Non-alignment will show, Nehru introduced non-alignment as a new concept of statecraft. This was an "event-making" concept not only because it charted a new dimension in India's relations with other countries but because it propelled India Nehru into the limelight of world politics and gave India a new identity as an important global actor on the world stage.

Herbert Spencer was the author of the concept of

evolution and slow progressive development as applied to biology, psychology, and to other fields within the domain of the social sciences. Spencer sought to apply the scientific approach to studying politics, society, and other social phenomena in light of his evolutionary paradigm. According to Spencer, society is the major catalyst for social change. The gradual and progressive development of society, therefore, is the most important element which affects the making of human history. For Spencer, the individual plays only a marginal role in the shaping of events, it is the "aggregate change of conditions" in society which both limit and shape the parameters of human action and which foster political and social change (Spencer, 1884).

William James subscribed to elements of both Carlyle and Spencer's theses. Where he differs from them is in his assertion that there must be a high degree of compatibility between the emerging leader and his objective environment. Not anyone can become a great and effective leader. Only those few individuals who possess certain skills and who emerge at particular points in time and who come to the fore in order to service particular needs which need to be fulfilled, can emerge as great leaders. Not all men's traits "fit" the demands or needs of the environment. Some men emerge either too early or too late in relation to their environment so as to preclude their rise to eminence (James,

1917). Although James' views contain an implicit *ex post facto* element in his thesis, his perspective helps to highlight the considerable importance of situational variables which enable individuals to become great leaders.

More recent reformulations of this traditional question seem more promising. Fred Greenstein for example, argues that personality plays a very important role in the conduct of politics. Greenstein, however, argues that the question of "how important is personality"? is not the main issue. While basically adhering to the great-man in history perspective of Carlyle, Greenstein poses the problems of personality in politics in terms of how and under what circumstances the "human element" "enters" the political process and how it has the "potential" of affecting the nature of politics (Greenstein, 1969;1971). It seems clear that the study of political leadership must pay attention to the role of particular situations, culture, social structure, and a leader's unique personal qualities in analyzing his or her impact. These characteristics come together to form a leadership style.

A. The Nature of the Political Leadership and the Development Paradigm

A number of works have addressed the issue of political development. Much of the literature on the subject has

focused on particular aspects of development such as imperialism, dependency, underdevelopment, nationalism, political development and political modernization (Chilcote, 1981).

This dissertation is focused principally on political leadership and its impact on a particular aspect of political development which I refer to as "national self-identity." National self-identity, as I will use the term, has two components - a) an internal dimension and b) an external dimension. My analysis of the internal dimension will focus on the integration of diverse groups into a broader community and the extent to which a leader is able to break down parochial identities and interests in favor of a larger group identity. Most works have not fully stressed the role of political leaders with respect to policies in terms of national self-identity. The external dimension will focus on the creation of state self-identity and how the "nation (is able) to define its place and role in a fast-changing world (Lannoy, 1971:xx). This is related to the ways in which the state raises its stature, acquires recognition as an important actor in global politics, and how it benefits and views itself as a consequence of its interaction with other developing nations. Jawaharlal Nehru and Indira Gandhi's leading roles in the Non-aligned movement and their highly public profiles as spokespersons of the interests of newly industrializing

nations earned them respect as individual leaders. However, the principal issue here is the way and degree to which this recognition contributed to India's self-identity. This is important because recognition by other state actors serves to provide a basis for which a common identity can be sustained. A leader must develop a strong, positive self-image of the country in the eyes of its people before making pleas for unity, loyalty, and support. Stature, recognition, and respect by other states contributes to this effort and also serves as means to obtain certain kinds of developmental assistance and support which may be used to foster certain key domestic programs.

B. The Concept of National Self-Identity and Its Study

My use of the term development will focus on whether, and if so, how a leader is able to strengthen and enhance the national self-identity of the state and its constituent parts. Speaking on this concept of national self-identity, Lannoy (1971:xix-xx) notes:

The idea of national identity -- the self-awareness of the nation, its self-image, and values -- springs from a desire for fixed points of reference in the enlarged world of today. The self-image of India is tentative in character and has evolved from the way it perceives its history from ancient times through many centuries of decline and foreign domination to the decades of its recently achieved status as an independent sovereign state. The difficulties in forming a contemporary national self-image may be more clearly appreciated when it is realized that while India is now building

a modern, secular state, its traditions are permeated by a sophisticated religious sensibility. One of the primary concerns of India's leaders is consequently to build up a cohesive, integrative, and secular nationalism from the sundry particularistic forces which are so strongly ingrained. It is inevitable that the emotional needs of a newly independent nation have prompted influential persons to focus the national energies more on an idealized image than on one which emerges through a discriminating insight into history. However, until the contradictions and, what is less often appreciated, the affinities between India's pluralistic cultural tradition and the new elements of contemporary civilization are frankly faced, and until a clearer image of its identity is thereby obtained, it will be difficult for the nation to define its place and role in a fast-changing world. Because of these contradictions and affinities the individual also remains divided within himself. The search for clearer definition and constant redefinition has to be conducted within the continuous sequence of actions and choices in response to very grave economic and political problems.

Mohan (1971:10) notes:

National integration may be defined as a process that involves a general patriotic consciousness and nationally constructive efforts of different groups and subgroups to attain common welfare and a maximal level of 'tele' including solidarity, identification, and involvement. Integration of various subsystems may also be viewed as a utopian stage in the career of a nation which is confronted with the forces of disintegration in its efforts to seek the welfare of the whole system as one nation.

The creation of a common identity relates to a leader's ability to unify the country so as to make people feel that they are "Indians" first and foremost, and that they should not view themselves as isolated Hindu, Muslim, Sikh, or other groups.

Development does not simply "happen." It occurs as a result of particular policies or a series of policies made by particular leaders. What needs to be studied therefore, is how the personality, beliefs, and leadership traits and style of political leaders contribute to the development of public policies which enhance development in particular states. This dissertation will be an effort in that direction with a special focus on personality, beliefs, political leadership, and development in India.

Summary:

This chapter has defined the terms and context in which personality and leadership factors can be brought to bear in the comparative analysis of the policies of Jawaharlal Nehru and Mrs. Gandhi. The concept of personality has been defined in terms of variables selectively felt at various points in the political process (Knutson, 1973), in terms of its quality of consistency and stability (Lazarus, 1963), and in terms of the organization of those psychological systems that determine an individual's adjustment to his or her environment (Allport, 1937). Although some of the theoretical frameworks for analyzing personality are very useful in obtaining normative definitions of what personality is or is not, there is a marked absence in the analysis of integrative factors that shape the development and dynamics of personality,

especially in terms of some of the experiential, historical, and cultural components which comprise it.

Beliefs have been analyzed by individuals in terms of an individual's worldview, idiosyncratic understanding about the nature of politics and how this effects decisional processes (cf. Leites, 1953; George, 1969). The deficiency in this approach is in the absence of a more focused link between belief and policy behavior, especially in a non-Western context. The subsequent chapters which deal with Jawaharlal Nehru and Indira Gandhi's development and application of principles of Non-alignment will seek to address this shortcoming.

Much of the writings on political leadership and the modernization paradigm discussed earlier have fallen short in analyzing the dynamics of personified leadership and its impact on indigenous development and state identity formation. The chapter which follows will convey the analytical lens employed by the research methodology of content analysis so as facilitate a clearer understanding of personality and leadership. The subsequent chapters will develop and apply the findings of content analysis to particular case situations and how they have a bearing on leadership, decision-making, and policy outcomes.

**Chapter 3: Jawaharlal Nehru and Indira Gandhi:
 A Comparative Value Profile**

Introduction:

One means of studying how the "human element" enters political processes is through techniques of content analysis. This is achieved by examining the psychological dimensions of leadership and decision-making and using a quantitative approach which analyzes leaders' value profiles (cf. Mammen, 1971). The study of Jawaharlal Nehru and Indira Gandhi's value profile is not an independent approach but one which serves to compliment the discussion of leadership and personality along the issue areas which are outlined in subsequent chapters. Quantitative content analysis in this regard treats the same case material which is being studied and offers another perspective in looking at the same data on personality and leadership.

Content analysis of political discourse is a special research technique initially developed and applied by social scientists involved in cybernetics which involves the study of communication and control in various types of organizations. Content analysis has subsequently been used by social scientists who are concerned with understanding the dispositions of decision-makers, how and why leaders make particular decisions, and the principles and standards by

which they function in their roles. In content analysis, researchers study communication in terms of their substance, flow, and what they explain about the source and target of communication.

1. The Utility of Content Analysis and the Study of Political Values

The study of political values has been a useful tool which gives insight into analyzing and measuring leaders' political personality, attitudes, beliefs, and dispositions. Values have been the foundation of political integration in various communities at the level of the political system; they have decided the character and conduct of various groups of people at the level of political communities; and they serve to reflect the character, conduct, and dispositions of individuals, especially those who emerge as political leaders. Mammen (1971) and Jacob (1964) note that the need for analyzing values is important because values bind together political communities whose existence is attributed to shared values among its members. Values are also important because they shape public policies. As Mammen (1971) remarked, "(V)alue-study...must not only enable us to describe and explain political decisions and actions, but also help in giving us directive statements for promoting or demoting such decisions or actions. It is essentially this multi-purpose study that the content-analyst tries to undertake while

pursuing analysis of values that are being communicated in a political system."

2. Content Analysis And its Dual Components in Application:

When content analysis as a research tool is applied, analysts divide speeches and other statements into two basic units for analysis: the object component and the standard component. The object component of a speaker's statements are those remarks which reflect what the speaker considers to be good, right, wrong, desirable, undesirable, etc. The object component may be an action, a proposal, idea, policy, goal, symbol, person, group, or nation; the standard component on the other hand serves to tell why the desired object is desirable or valued. In order to measure the strength or degree of intensity with which a leader accepts, rejects, identifies, or disassociates himself or herself from commitment to or opposition from an object or its standard (referred to below by the variables - Intensity of Identification and Specificity Score), one can use a four point measurement scale (cf. Mammen, 1971; Jacob, 1964). The units of measurement include: +2 representing strong identification; +1 representing weak identification; -1 representing weak rejection and -2 representing strong rejection. In order to measure the degree of specificity in a leader's statements (referred to below as Specificity

Score), a five-point scale ranging from 1-5 can be used; 1 represents very general statements and abstractions, e.g. vague references to freedom and democracy; 3 represents evaluative statements and others referring to specific actions without going into great situational detail; 2 and 4 represent codings that are more flexible and are based on the judgement and discretion of the coder; and 5 represents statements providing greater detail as to times, places, names, dates, etc. By applying these measures one is able to determine if intensity in language is more conducive to political action or decision; whether vague, emotional language is more conducive to action; or personal characteristics of speakers are reflected in statements that they make. All of this data, based on delineation according to object, standard, measurement of intensity toward object and standard, and level of specificity, represent what is known as a value cluster. This value cluster can be compared against various national issues with which a leader is concerned to obtain a value profile of a particular leader which in turn can be compared to a second leader.

3. Value Profile of Nehru and Gandhi:

In analyzing speech/written material for Jawaharlal Nehru, the total number of observations (N) selected was 38; for Indira Gandhi, N=21. The dates of the speeches selected

for Nehru are between September, 1946 and January, 1947. This period represented a time when Nehru was engaged in intense political activities during the height of much of the communal tensions. It also represented a time when the formative ideas regarding Non-alignment began to take place in the form of policy in the advent of India's independence. The dates of Mrs. Gandhi's speeches are between July, 1951, through August, 1979. This represents a broader span of time during which Mrs. Gandhi served as her father's confidante and later assumed the office of Prime Minister. (A listing of the speeches used in this analysis can be found in Appendix III.)

Tables 3.1 and 3.2 (Appendix I) which constitute summary data sheets for each leader's speeches provide the coding syntax used in the content analysis of Jawaharlal Nehru and Indira Gandhi's speeches. These summary data sheets (Table 3.1 and Table 3.2) are generated by adding together all of the individual scores (+1,+2,-1,-2, etc.) for each variable for each speech (38 speeches for Nehru; 21 speeches for Indira Gandhi) to obtain a cumulative score. These speeches constitute Nehru's views on issues relating to both domestic and external affairs in the issue areas which were defined previously. The speeches were coded into three basic categories: "ethnic relations" (denoted by the letter "A" or "a" under the table heading, "Code"), which involve concerns vis-a-vis language and communal conflict; the "political and

economic dimensions of Non-alignment" (denoted by the letter "B" or "b"), and the "role of government in social welfare and economic growth and self-sufficiency" (denoted by the letter "C" or "c").

The letters A, B, or C denote the main theme or thrust of the speech. A capital letter identifies the dominant theme or themes and other main topics which were discussed in the speech. For example, for speech number 1, coded as AbC, the two dominant themes were "ethnic relations" (capital "A") and the "role of government in social welfare and economic growth of self sufficiency" (capital "C"). The secondary topic dealt with the "political and economic dimensions of Non-alignment" (small case letter "b"). In Tables 3.3 and 3.4, the variables which were analyzed and from which the summary data sheet was produced include the following: ToT#Ref - total number of references or lines in speech text; Inten/ID - intensity of identification with a particular subject matter; Deg./Spec. - the degree and depth to which an individual discusses, defines, or elaborates on a given subject matter; Tone - refers to the general affinity or direction of a given speech in the context of the subject matter. Strength score and Specificity Score are summary measures (cf. Mammen, 1971).

Strength score represents a measure of the weight or

degree of importance that a leader gives to each subject matter in the context of the whole speech. It can be defined as follows:

$$\text{Strength Score} = \frac{\text{Intensity of ID}}{\text{Total \# of References}}$$

Specificity Score represents a measure of the level of detail associated with each subject area and reflects a leaders level of attention and interest in the same. It may be defined as follows:

$$\text{Specificity Score} = \frac{\text{Degree of Specificity}}{\text{Total \# of References}}$$

Table 3.3 compares both Nehru and his daughter's comparative specificity and strength scores against the total number of the speeches that each leader made. The control for the problems of the period was the language issue which had the potential for skewing the data. My analysis of the data show that Jawaharlal Nehru had a great deal of interest in dealing with matters associated with ethnic unrest. Twenty-nine out of thirty-eight speeches addressed, in some form, ethnic issues, most notably, appeals to end communal violence in different parts of India. The critical point to note from analyzing the data is that Nehru's primary

preoccupation was with the government assuming a more active role in social welfare issues. Very little was said about the role of government in shaping the economic climate of the country where development can take place which was reflected in the data from Mrs. Gandhi's speeches. For Nehru, topics related to the dimensions of Non-alignment and the role of government in social welfare vis-a-vis ethnic relations were often integrated into the same speech. In this vein, matters associated with the political dimensions of Non-alignment received much more focus and attention than matters associated with the economic dimensions of Non-alignment which was more apparent in Mrs. Gandhi's speeches.

4. Psychological Stress and Cognitive Consistency:

Stress or conflict avoidance is achieved by individuals when they consciously or unconsciously reduce the amount of information about their external environment which conflicts with their individual, pre-conceived notions or beliefs about their environment. It may also occur when individuals accept or subscribe to contrary information about their external environment without becoming aware of the contradiction.

It is especially interesting to evaluate the two leaders' reaction to stress during decisional processes. The speeches

which were analyzed in this regard were those made when each leader faced communal violence. When confronted with sources of psychological stress, individual efforts to realize "cognitive consistency" is an especially important factor. Cognitive consistency, as Mitchell (1981:77) notes, is a psychological defence mechanism or protective process which enables an individual to reduce stress imposed by the external environment, to an acceptable level, by reducing the complexity, ambiguity, and contrariness of incoming information about a conflict, thus, ensuring that the individual receives from the conflictual environment, information which is perceived to be consistent and orderly. Other related sub-processes which were used in analyzing and evaluating the speeches and writings of Nehru and Indira included: selective perception, selective inattention, selective recall, group identification, repression, suppression, psychologic, bolstering, ability to empathize, universalization of one's own frame of reference, tunnel vision, rationalization, and projection (cf. Mitchell, 1981:77ff; see Appendix II for operationalization and brief explication of these terms). All of these sub-processes serve to reduce stress, inconsistency of information, complexity, and levels of anxiety and insecurity about a conflictual environment.


Mitchell (1981:77), speaking to the issue of conflict and

psychological stress, noted that "conflicts (especially intense conflicts) create for those involved a greater need to activate certain psychological processes, and develop particular ranges of beliefs and attitudes; and provide greater opportunities for the easy (and justifiable) utilization of a range of defensive processes and development of a range of attitudes to cope with the situation. Hence, people placed in circumstances of conflict are likely to react psychologically in similar ways." This being the case, it would be appropriate to note that both Nehru and his daughter, Indira Gandhi displayed similar psychological defence mechanisms in order to deal with sources of psychological conflict and tension. The ways in which these psychological processes played out, however, differed.

The Figure C. identifies some of the psychological sub-processes which contribute toward the reduction of psychological stress and the maintenance of cognitive consistency.

Figure C.

Psychological Sub-Processes Affecting Cognitive Consistency



An interpretation of the data shows that the most pronounced among the sub-processes was "psychologic." Nehru displayed a penchant for reducing problems by oversimplifying their probable solutions. In addressing the question of communal tensions he often paid less attention to the historical genesis of the Hindu-Muslim rivalry and focused more in trying to restore order through his own personal appeals. He firmly believed that he could appeal to the masses personally to quell tensions, as had been the case with Mahatma Gandhi. The variable, "conflict avoidance" ranked second in frequency. Nehru's speeches often reflected a tone of conciliation and mediation. The variables "empathy" and the need for "government in social affairs" appeared to be linked and not mutually exclusive in most cases; hence, neither variable, though present throughout the speeches, displayed high frequencies.

Upon evaluating the data comparing specificity scores - the degree and depth to which an individual discusses, defines, or elaborates on a given subject matter, it seems apparent that both leaders exhibited similar qualities. Nehru averaged a value of .7 versus Indira Gandhi who averaged a .4 value. In essence what this shows is that both Nehru and Indira Gandhi had a greater tendency toward vagueness and generality when speaking or writing about issues related to ethnic relations, the role of government in social affairs,

and Non-alignment.

The main difference, however, rests in the fact that Nehru had a great affinity for discussing problems in global terms and was less concerned with minute details. He viewed problems from a much broader perspective. His daughter, on the other hand, viewed problems in terms of immediate, sometimes short-sighted solutions. Like her father, Indira Gandhi was more often vague, general, and not sharply focused on the key issues in question. This is not to say either leader was not concerned about the matters at hand; rather, it is a reflection of their psychological penchant for viewing problems from a macro perspective. It is also apparent that Nehru was much more consistent in his statements; he generally spoke in broad, over-arching terms in most of his speeches. His daughter, however, lacked this consistency and displayed an irregular pattern in her description of problems and in the presentation of her own solutions. One probable explanation for this phenomenon is that Mrs. Gandhi was much more apt in speaking to audiences in a manner which they preferred; her shrewd political instincts enabled her to speak or write to audiences in ways that catered to their concerns. Her father, Nehru, on the other hand was much more blunt and direct; he presented a broader vision of India to his people, irrespective of how they would or would not receive it.

When comparing both leaders' strength scores - the score which represents a measure of the weight or degree of importance that a leader gives to each subject matter in the context of the whole speech, a much sharper difference is apparent. Nehru displayed a remarkable consistency in the depth of his attention to ethnic relations, Non-alignment, and the role of Government of economic and social affairs. Although Nehru was very deeply concerned about communal problems and government's response to it, the data suggests that he held it to the same level of importance as the question of Non-alignment. The graphical presentation of the strength coding shows a mode range of .35 which seems to suggest that Nehru was very cautious in his statements about ethnic relations and Non-alignment. He did not subscribe to dogmatic positions or pander to one segment of the population at the expense of another on these issues. This is consistent with his temperament and proclivity toward compromise and accommodation. Nehru appeared to speak and write about issues from a broad perspective without using divisive language or in a manner that alienated any particular group. Although he had a bad temper, he often chose to publicly express his views in a calm and reasonable manner.

Upon reviewing the data for Mrs. Gandhi, one notes a remarkable divergence. What is apparent is the inconsistency in her speech patterns as it relates to a strong

identification with ethnic matters, Non-alignment, and Government's role in economic and social life. The data show that there is a wide range of strength value scores which reflect the temperament of a person with strong convictions who seemingly voices them freely at will. Mrs. Gandhi was, by far, much more blunt, direct, and outspoken than her father. The strength score values show that the patterns in the focus of her speeches and writings lacked consistency. She appeared seemed to strongly identified with one issue at a given moment and then did not value them with the same intensity at a different point in time. This seemingly shows that Mrs. Gandhi did not pursue policies with a long-term view or with long term objectives. Like her father, she exhibited a proclivity toward conflict management rather than conflict resolution, however, more so. From the data one can see that the great variance in individual scores correlates with the temperament of her personality. Mrs. Gandhi, like her father was strong-willed, however, unlike her father, she often conveyed her views and acted upon them in an unrestrained manner.

5. "Stress-Avoiding"/"Stress-Optimizing" Personality Typologies

There are a number of ways in which one might approach the subject of leadership and decision-making, however, for

the purposes of analyzing the Indian case vis-a-vis Jawaharlal Nehru and Indira Gandhi, it would be helpful to observe and analyze, for comparative purposes, how these two leaders dealt with conflict and decision-making. By looking at value profiles and attitudes of leaders during times of conflict one would get a better understanding of the psychological processes, level of personal involvement, and sets of conditions which define how leaders respond to conflict and their immediate political environment. Table 3.4 (Appendix I) reflects the prevalence or absence of select variable clusters which constitute a leader's personality traits or are indicative of certain psychological sub-processes. These variable clusters were identified earlier in Figure C. and in the Appendix II, earlier in the body of the dissertation, and reference the same speeches for each leader that was mentioned earlier. For example, in Table 3.4, under Nehru the frequency of the variable Conflict/Stress Avoidance is 29 and the percent of the total is 76. This means that out of the 38 speeches analyzed for Nehru, the theme of conflict/stress avoidance is referenced 29 times, or constitutes 76 percent of the total number of references. This contrasts with a score of 4 for Indira Gandhi and a percentage total of 19. Thus, for Mrs. Gandhi, out of the 21 speeches surveyed, Mrs. Gandhi exhibited the theme of conflict/stress avoidance 4 times which constitutes only 19 percent of the total. This suggests that Nehru exhibited a much greater tendency toward conflict

avoidance than his daughter.

In general, most people try to minimize psychological stress or discomfort. Psychological strain is both consciously and subconsciously reduced by means which seek to avoid anxiety-provoking or tension-exacerbating situations. Reducing uncertainty, minimizing ambiguity, and trying to alter individual behavior so as to make it more predictable is a sought after goal.

Nehru's behavior and efforts to seek negotiated settlements to conflict is consistent with this general view of conflict avoidance. Nehru's style of political leadership was such that it accepted compromise, encouraged negotiation, and one which took views on issues that were not dogmatic. Although Nehru displayed certain autocratic qualities and sought to be firmly in control of power at home, as a diplomat and world statesman, he assumed a different character which advocated tolerance, patience, and the pacific settlement of disputes.

His penchant for diplomacy reflected his desire to minimize both his own, and India's involvement in anxiety-provoking situations. His proclivity to dominate politics at home reflected a desire to gain control over his immediate political environment. By having and controlling

access to information, Nehru minimized ambiguity. By assuming direct control over the foreign policy decision-making, Nehru was able to convey a sense of predictability, continuity, and stability, in the decision-making realm. The desire to dominate and control one's political environment domestically, while assuming a much more liberal character in external affairs reflects the dual character of conflict avoidance. In the first case, domination serves to provide continued access and control over information, while in the second case, a more tolerant and diplomatic posture reflects a desire to avoid conflictual and tension-producing situations. These two perspectives are both consistent with Nehru's behavior and personality profile.

Mrs. Gandhi, on the other hand, I would argue was not aversive to conflict. To the contrary, she appeared to thrive on the challenges which result from a conflictual situation. Although most individuals are apt to avoid tension and conflict, certain individuals seek out tension, conflict, or place themselves in situations of uncertainty because it provides them with intellectual or emotional stimulation. Storr (1968) suggests that mild degrees of conflict and stress serve a positive functional purpose in that it facilitates intellectual creative processes. Individuals, like Mrs. Gandhi, who were more predisposed toward assuming combative, conflictual roles, tend to find tension-ridden situations as

a source of psychological stimulation. Conflictual situations, and a combative, domineering posture, one might suggest, serve to stimulate creativity, provide excitement, and challenges. Individuals who share this disposition receive immense satisfaction in facing challenges and then overcoming them.

While overcoming obstacles provide satisfaction, in and of itself, I would argue, that Mrs. Gandhi, and personality topologies similar to hers, are most content during the actual process of dealing with conflict than in dealing with its outcomes. Sperlich (1971:166f) suggested that individuals possess variable tension requirements so that situations will be regarded psychologically comfortable or uncomfortable differently, by different individuals or by the same individual at different times. In this vein, individuals such as Mrs. Gandhi may seem to seek out stressful, conflictual, or challenging situations in order to optimize tension with respect their current needs, rather than to adopt conflict avoiding or conflict reducing tactics.

Whereas Nehru displayed "stress avoiding" qualities and sought to avoid situations which produced tension, Mrs. Gandhi was the opposite and displayed "stress optimizing" qualities. She was more comfortable with conflictual and stressful situations. She displayed a tendency not to avoid stress

completely, but to reduce it to an acceptable level where she would be able to function at her best. Her actions in the Punjab demonstrated this quality of her character.

Summary:

My analysis of the data from Nehru's speeches has shown that Jawaharlal Nehru exhibited a great deal of interest in dealing with matters associated with ethnic unrest and that he was preoccupied with the government assuming a more active role in issues related to social welfare. There was little focus on the role of government in shaping the economic climate of the country so as to spur development. This view was more readily apparent in the speeches of his daughter, Indira Gandhi. In Nehru's speeches the role of government in social welfare vis-a-vis ethnic relations were often integrated into the same speech. As such he appeared to stress the political dimensions of Non-alignment, whereas, the economic dimensions of Non-alignment were more clearly revealed in Mrs. Gandhi's speeches.

An interpretation of the data revealed that the most pronounced among the sub-processes was "psychologic." This means that Nehru displayed an inclination toward reducing problems by oversimplifying their probable solutions. With respect to the Hindu-Muslim problem, he often paid less

attention to the historical genesis of communal problem and focused more attention in trying to restore order through his own personal appeals. The variable, "conflict avoidance" ranked second in frequency. This variable was often apparent in Nehru's speeches which reflected a tone of conciliation and a desire for mediation in conflicts.

The main difference between Nehru and his daughter rests in the fact that Nehru had a great affinity for discussing problems from a macro perspective and was less concerned with minute details. He viewed problems from a much broader perspective, whereas his daughter viewed problems in terms of immediate, sometimes short-sighted solutions. Another significant difference rests in the fact that Nehru was much more inclined toward conflict avoidance than his daughter. Nehru's speeches reflected a great concern for realizing negotiated settlements through compromise and through other constructive techniques. The interesting point to note here is that on domestic issues Nehru appeared to be much more autocratic in his approach in implementing policy. With respect to external affairs issues, especially those dealing with state actors outside the realm of his political control, he appeared to be much more accommodating.

Mrs. Gandhi, on the other hand displayed the same

degree of policy rigidity on both the domestic and the external realm. Whereas Nehru displayed "*stress avoiding*" tendencies, Mrs. Gandhi exhibited "*stress optimizing*" tendencies. Unlike her father, she was more comfortable with conflictual and stressful situations. As the data has shown, Mrs. Gandhi chose not so much to avoid stressful situations but to reduce them to manageable levels.

Chapter 4: The Origins of Person-Centered Leadership and the Nature of Personality, Beliefs, and Leadership Efficacy in India

Introduction:

The study of personality, beliefs, and leadership efficacy in any given country cannot be made in a vacuum. Having now defined what is meant by personality, beliefs, and leadership efficacy and how these terms can be studied and operationalized, it is important to evaluate the unique context in which these dimensions can be analyzed in the case of India. Particular attention must be given to examining the socio-cultural milieu in which these factors affect political activities.

This chapter will serve to direct the reader's attention to Indian beliefs with regard to leadership and the special and perhaps unique ways in which Indians view their leaders and their attitudes toward power and authority. This will help to establish the proper context in which the leadership of Jawaharlal Nehru and Indira Gandhi can be studied in greater detail in the chapters which follow.

I. Indian Beliefs on Leadership

A. Early Origins of Indian Views of Authority, Legitimacy, and Leadership

The personalization of authority, legitimacy, and power is a special, though not necessarily unique, aspect of Indian culture which affect the dynamics of political leadership in India. Early Indian sacred Vedic texts such as the Aitareya Brahmana and the Taittiriya Upanishad focus on political leadership as personified in the form of kingship. Earlier religious texts such as the Aitareya Brahmana describe kingship as a political institution which developed as a consequence of human needs. The king provided services for his subjects but his primary function was that of a leader in warfare. In the later writings of the Taittiriya Upanishad and the Mahabharata, the king as political leader enjoyed divine sanction and the support of the Brahmanical priestly class and was viewed to have a sacred responsibility to govern in the form of a benevolent leader.

The king as leader was viewed to be the "guardian - the 'sword-arm', so to speak -- of the total, divine, social order. In the sacred texts and in the panegyrics composed by court bards, the king is described as 'father of his people' and 'husband of his realm'" (Lannoy, 1971:220). The king as a political leader increasingly assumed a broader range of roles.

The caste system enabled him to govern over a stable constituency in the midst of wars between competing groups who would not vie for power to topple him or to challenge his authority. The caste system, in spite of its structural stability was not the principle factor which preserved his authority and power. Charismatic leadership proved to be the principal agent of the legitimization of political authority. The charismatic qualities of leaders inspired those who were subject to the king's authority and served to create a paternal bond between the king and his subjects. Max Weber (1958) noted that charismatic leadership was originally perceived to rest upon certain "magical qualities," and that the authority of great leaders rested primarily upon the personal charismatic qualities of the leader; in the case of India, it was perceived that charismatic qualities could be inherited which provided a basis for the legitimacy of political authority.

Richard Schmidt (see Butz, 1955), a German political scientist, noted that leadership should be defined in terms of "the relation between an individual and a group built around some common interest and behaving in a manner directed or determined by him" (see Butz, 1955:29). The useful distinctions in leadership that Schmidt identifies focus on three related phenomena: leadership, authority, and demagogy. He argues that an individual who governs and holds power and

influence by virtue of tradition or custom is simply an authority figure who has many subordinates; he is not a leader with a loyal followership. In his view, demagogues are also not leaders but mere agitators, who appeal to the emotions of people, and make decisions that satisfy the interests of people so as to perpetuate their own positions of influence. Leaders, however, assume their true roles when they are willing to make unpopular decisions so as to advance the interests of the broader community which comprises the state; their followership willingly and freely follows them as a consequence of rational choice rather than through blind loyalty.

"Creative" leadership, Schmidt argues, is the most "genuine" form of leadership; it is concerned with the furtherance of group interests. Charles Merriam (1945), in focusing on aspects of "creative" leadership, identified the following attributes: a high level of social sensitivity; ease and ability to nurture personal contacts; ease and ability to nurture group contacts and engage in group diplomacy; ability to communicate with dramatic expression; ability to devise and apply political solutions, plans, or formulas to pressing problems; and a high level of competitive courage (Merriam, 1945: 108-112).

In ancient India, the leader-king assumed specific

responsibilities and was especially responsible for the operation of the varna, to make certain that his subjects performed their respective caste responsibilities (see ancient text, Manusamhita, Ch. VII, VIII). The king was to follow caste obligations and conduct his affairs so that his actions would serve as an example to others.

He was to maintain the caste structure so as to enable those he governed to fully realize their karma. Individual loyalties were pledged not to the state but to the individual leader. Individual rights were not guaranteed by the state, as is the Western view of democracy, but were viewed in terms of social and religious obligations to the caste.

It is important to note here is that the social structure demanded a strong leader who served both a social and political function to maintain order and stability. The social and political structure demanded a strong leader who both identified with people and yet retained a special stature with both reverence and respect. In many ways India's ancient political attitudes toward leadership can be found to be applied to her contemporary leadership.

Both Jawaharlal Nehru and Indira Gandhi commanded the awe and respect of their supporters as well as detractors. Despite the difficulties and challenges of implementing

various social and economic policies, their leadership provided a degree of stability and order. In some instances they governed in an autocratic manner. There was opposition to this and yet they retained an aura of legitimacy which was consistent with traditional values and beliefs. Autocratic rule under Mrs. Gandhi's 1975 Declaration of a State of Emergency was severely criticized at the time of its implementation, however, it was accepted as a necessary, temporary, evil. It was very consistent with traditional attitudes and perceptions of authority and the responsibilities of a political leader. It should be noted that in the ancient Muslim political work, Ain-i-Akbari of Abul Fazl-i-Allami, autocratic rule was not always desired, but it was legitimized because it brought stability to the political system (see Jarrett, 1949:57).

II. Origins of Contemporary Person-Centered Views of Indian Leadership:

Although modern India has long since dispensed with monarchical leadership and the relics of feudal government, the regal, charismatic qualities of the rulers of her past are still sought in contemporary leadership. Kings and Princes have now been replaced by Prime Ministers who govern and command respect, not by the principles of the divine right of kings, but by the same charismatic qualities of leadership found in the monarchical rulers of India's past.

Power, authority, and leadership which was acceded to the Kings of ancient India have later been acceded to strong personalities who now assume the title of Prime Minister in the framework of a constitutional democratic form of government.

Formal titles and the structure of government in India has changed over the centuries. However, the personalization of power and authority in the form of a charismatic leader is an aspect of Indian culture that has persisted over time. The reason for this rests on Indian conceptions of power, authority, and leadership, that are significantly different from those of the West.

In the West the concept of authority, legitimacy, and power has often focused on varying aspects of political participation. In general terms, in Western democratic societies, it is believed that individual participation in the political process should be encouraged. Popular participation in elections and the political expression of concerns through interest groups represent only a sampling of the many different ways in which popular participation is legally guaranteed and often encouraged in Western democratic societies.

In Asian democracies, however, this is not always the

case. In the case of India, authority and power is found not in the ability to make political decisions, but rather to avoid them. In Western democracies, particularly the United States, people generally enjoy being made a part of the political decision-making process through ballots, referenda, town hall hearings, etc. Although in the Indian context this is partly true, people are just as comfortable with having their leaders make difficult choices on their behalf (cf. Ain-i-Akbari of Abul Fazi-i-Allami, transl. in Jarrett, 1949). They seem willing to forgo some of their legally sanctioned democratic privileges and opt instead to have certain difficult decisions made by highly personalized leaders which can closely identify with the people. Lucian Pye (1985:22) notes: "Whereas Americans feel that it is exhilarating to make decisions and that being denied a choice is depressing, the calculus of pleasure and pain is reversed in some Asian societies. Making decisions means taking risks, while security lies in having no choices to make."

Democracy, in the Indian context, is more than the institutional structures of government. It enshrines a particular set of values, relationships between leaders and followers, and a unique set of historical traditions which have particular moral and philosophical connotations.

Jawaharlal Nehru noted that India's contemporary

democratic structure had its roots in ancient historical traditions (Nehru, 1949:349). Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan (1944:36), Nehru's contemporary, India's first President, and one of the country's greatest philosophers when speaking on India's historical traditions and their impact on leadership and democracy, remarked:

The religious tradition of India justifies democracy and if she has not been faithful to this principle, she has paid for it by her suffering and subjection. Spirit is never more persuasive than when it suffers silently beneath the heel of oppression. Democracy is an achievement forged in the fires which make a nation's soul. When I speak of democracy, I am referring not so much to parliamentary institutions as to the dignity of man, the recognition of the fundamental right of all men to develop the possibilities in them. The common man is not common. He is precious and has in him the power to assert his nature against the iron web of necessity. To tear his texture, to trample him in blood and filth is an unspeakable crime.

This passage once again brings to light the religious and moral attributes of democratic leadership in India. While speaking in the role of a statesman and political leader, Radhakrishnan's thoughts also reflect the significance of the leader's responsibility in enabling his constituency to realize their potential and to help them "develop the possibilities in them." This is consistent with the ancient view of the leader who is responsible for protecting the social order so as to enable his subjects from realizing their karma.

In the case of India, the ancient feudal system served to insulate the people from making decisions; the people's security lay in not having to make painful and difficult decisions which were left for the king. Power and authority rested in the benevolent leader. In contemporary India this view has not really changed. Although many interest groups compete for having their voices heard through judicial processes and legislative acts, they still tend to direct their attention to political leaders - especially the Prime Minister, to have themselves heard and to have their grievances redressed. Political authority, legitimacy, and power, therefore, rests not simply in political institutions, but in the persona of a charismatic political leader such as a Mahatma Gandhi, or Jawaharlal Nehru, or Indira Gandhi (see Pye, 1985 who indirectly alludes to this).

The origin of authority and legitimacy vested in leaders have their roots in the caste system in India which imposed distinctions on groups of people based on lineage, religion, and occupation. The concept of dharma which relates to the customs, obligations, and conduct of people during their lives, plays an important role in explaining why people readily submit to authority. During the ancient period the lines of caste were drawn explicitly and accepted; the breaking of rules governing the caste system wrought immediate punishment.

In contemporary India the caste system has been legally dissolved. However, the old vestiges of caste system continue to exist throughout the social system. The strong fabric of tradition has made it difficult to fully change the minds, attitudes, and practices of people. People still tend to uphold social and religious rituals that are consistent with the values and historical traditions of their particular caste or community (see Dumont, 1970 for an excellent account of the caste system).

The caste system not only served to provide legitimacy and order to the social system, but it served a stabilizing function as well. Leaders came from a high caste and assumed the principal task of maintaining the social order so as to enable each individual or groups in the social structure to realize their own karma, or fate. The state, as personified in a charismatic leader, had the obligation to protect its subjects from both domestic and external dangers, maintain and uphold the laws of the people as prescribed by custom and tradition, and to promote the general welfare and happiness of its people (Saletore, 1963:see ch.4)

Through the application of the concept of danda, the ruler exercised his power to coerce, punish, and forcibly impose his will over his subjects in order to protect the social order (Saletore, 1963:see ch.5). During the ancient

period, the ruler's subjects readily subordinated themselves to their leaders actions and submitted to the autocratic exercise of authority and punishment because they believed that the leaders acted in the ways that they did for their own good and to protect their interests.

According to the ancient Indian sacred text, the Manusmriti, a leader's right to punish, coerce, and impose autocratic rule is justified. The Code of Manu notes that "(p)unishment alone governs all created beings, punishment alone protects them, punishment watches over them where they sleep; the wise declare punishment to be identical with the law" (Manusmriti, VII,18 as quoted in Saletore, 1963:219). As strange as this concept may seem to the Western observer, this is not altogether to be so readily dismissed, especially when one examines it in the contemporary Indian context.

In 1975 Indira Gandhi imposed Emergency rule, imprisoned and punished her opposition, and imposed autocratic rule in India and charged that her actions were prompted by the best interests of the people. Despite initial resentment to her policies and the vociferous condemnation of her policies by the intelligencia and her detractors, the Indian people, in subsequent years, returned her to office through the electoral process with a resounding victory. The Indian people for the most part legitimized and viewed her

autocratic rule during the Emergency as an undesired, but necessary evil.

Religion, tradition, and culture continue to shape and influence the ways in which leaders are seen. In the ancient period it was believed that the King as leader should be highly revered and worshiped. The Narada, another ancient text, notes: "Whatever a king does is right, that is a settled rule because the world is entrusted to him on account of his majesty and his benignity towards living creatures. As a husband, though feeble, must constantly be worshipped by his wives, in the same way a ruler, though worthless, must be constantly worshipped by his subjects" (Narada, as quoted in Spellman, 1964:38).

Another ancient text, the Ramayana of Vahkmiki, commenting on the need for a strong political leader as one who imposes stability and order notes: "A kingdom without a sovereign is like a river without water, a forest without vegetation, or a cow without a cowherd... No man loves his own kind in a rulerless state, but each slays and devours the other daily, like fish. Atheists and materialists, exceeding the limits of their caste, assume domination over others, there being no king to exercise control over them... The king, discerning good and evil, protects his kingdom, for bereft of him, the country is enveloped in darkness"

(Ramayana of Vahkmiki, as mentioned in Saletore, 1963:307-9).

In contemporary India the perception of a leader as one who strengthens and sustains the fabric of the social order is a very strong one. As soon as Jawaharlal Nehru assumed the role of Prime Minister, one of the most pressing responsibilities that lay before him was to maintain order and impose order amid the conflicts between many ethnic and religious groups within the country. Many of the groups were not so much vying for more power, but rather to have their traditions and customs honored.

In the West it is often automatically assumed that competing ethnic groups engage in conflictual behavior to gain more power and influence within the political system. What I am suggesting is that in the case of India, ethnic revolts broke out not to gain additional power or influence, but in an effort to protect, maintain, and to insure that the traditions, customs, and values of minority groups would not be swallowed up by the mainstream society. What competing ethnic groups such as the Muslims in India sought from Nehru was his personal intervention in ethnic conflicts and a guarantee that their values, customs, and traditions would be protected from the dominant groups within the country.

In similar fashion, Mrs. Gandhi's troubles with the Sikh

militants in the state of Punjab was not so much the result of their quest for more political power. Rather, it was an attempt by certain groups to protect their identity and culture from being swallowed up by the mainstream Hindu culture. What seems evident when looking at these two cases (which will be examined in greater depth in subsequent chapters) is the fact that in the Indian context, people generally look to the leader and not really at political institutions for remedying ethnic conflicts.

Most of the Indian people looked to Nehru and Mrs. Gandhi to make certain that their own traditions, values, and customs were protected. They sought a leadership that maintained the status quo rather than a leadership oriented toward reform with regard to the handling of majority/minority relations. They sought the protection of their ethnic traditions rather than to initiate efforts which would make them more politically powerful or more active elements within the political process. People looked to these two political leaders for the imposition of order and stability much like their predecessors looked to their regal counterparts to impose order, punish offenders, and distribute justice.

In the past, as it is today, power, legitimacy, and authority was perceived to emanate from the leader at the top

of the political hierarchy and descend downward to the people. This view contrasts sharply with the Western democratic notion of civil liberties and power resting with the people which is then transferred upward, to a leader at the top of the political structure (see Pye, 1985:320, who argues along a similar line of reasoning in the broader context of Asia).

Throughout the centuries, politics remained secondary in thought, value, and status, in relation to Hindu culture. Hindu culture stressed the significant values of spirituality; the physical things of the world were only temporal, but the dharma and spiritual aspects of life were eternal. Power, authority, and legitimacy were viewed in relation to the individual -- the power to govern one's own affairs and to work toward the realization of one's own karma was of greater value than using it as a means to exercise control over other people (see Nandy, 1980). Thus, in the past, political leaders were much inclined to legitimize their actions in moral terms -- they argued that their self-reflection and deep evaluation of their inner selves had made them especially sensitive to moral issues. Nandy (1980) notes, "The uniqueness of the Indian concept of power lay in its strong 'private' connotations... There is always some pressure on rulers to indulge in the language of conspicuous asceticism and self-sacrifice and to render even the most trivial politics as part of a grand moral design--as if power

over one's self, over the self-seeking instinctual self--legitimizes one's political powers" (Nandy, 1980:50-51).

British colonialism in India and the oppression and racism that came with it, served to fuel a burning desire to return to particular Indian cultural values. The British occupation, however, did serve to "elevate" the concepts of power, authority, and legitimacy. These concepts were gradually incorporated into contemporary Indian political thinking and believed to serve unique functional roles in areas related to political development.

The British instituted a civil service system in India that sought to develop an efficient bureaucratic state, however, it failed to develop into the efficient bureaucratic machine that it was intended to become. Certain aspects of Indian cultural tradition such as deference to authority based on rank and status and strict adherence to rules and administrative regulations at the expense of effective management eventually weakened the administrative system. The Indian leadership which grew out of the Independence movement tended to focus on idealistic and utopian planning goals without fully accounting for the implications and consequences of their proposed policies.

As in the ancient period, India's leadership had a penchant for moralizing which served to reinforce the notion that the leader's main concern was to look after the welfare of their constituency in the same manner that a benevolent king looked after his subjects. Leader-patron-client relationships of political patronage, however, is a feature of Indian politics that has evolved over time in the absence of monarchical leadership.

Myron Weiner (1967) notes that the Indian political system is one that evolved out of a system of patronage politics rather than one based on ideologies or public policy preferences. He notes that the "internal conflicts of the party are not related to ideological disputes, or for that matter, to disputes over major questions of public policy. Caste and kinship ties and above all, factional affiliations related to the need for status and prestige or the desire for material rewards have been crucial factors in intra-party conflict" (Weiner, 1967:173). The political system is stable because the leader is able to reward those who help to maintain order in the system.

The political leader in contemporary India, the Prime Minister, in addition to moralizing, makes efforts to stabilize the system by rewarding supporters and punishing detractors in the same manner that ancient kings and princes

rewarded and punished their subjects according to their deeds. Pye (1985:147) notes that "...the rank-and-file politicians can expect to receive generous material rewards in exchange for disregarding their leaders' failures in implementing policies...common citizens can accept the inadequacies of governmental performance in return for being left alone by government...(and) intellectuals are given research grants and freedom to carry on their work in return for withholding criticism of the government." Both Jawaharlal Nehru and Indira Gandhi maintained system stability by rewarding supporters -- most notably through political appointments through government positions.

The difficulties they encountered with minority groups revolved around their efforts to create a common national identity which would not dissolve the many ethnic components comprising that identity. The minority groups sought protection from the majority, preservation of their identity, and in simple terms, to be left alone. Their leadership, however, sought greater benefits from the political patronage system. Pye (1985:147) states that "while there is constant grumbling about government policies, the system of rewards in distributing the bounties of government is usually adequate to keep complaints within bounds -- indeed, much of the carping which enlivens Indian public life comes from those who are left out of the patron-client system. For example,

the demands for changes in state boundaries and for the creation of new states have been inspired by minority communal leaders who feel they could command more patronage resources if they had their own states."

III. Indian Traditional and Cultural Orientations Toward Leadership in the Context of Development

In light of the discussion advanced in the previous chapter, it appears that Indian perspectives on leadership and the role of leaders in relation to those who are governed have evolved from a unique traditional, cultural and religious context. India today is no longer governed by monarchical government. However, the traditional feudal concept of leadership still remains.

The political leader (the Prime Minister today) is still expected to protect those under the province of his or her authority; he is expected to be a benevolent leader - and may assume autocratic powers when the interests of the state require it. He is entrusted with the task of maintaining order, stability, and protecting the traditional values inherent in the Hindu faith. Myron Weiner (1959:21) notes: "There is...a general feeling within the Hindu parties that those who live and think in more traditional ways -- often irrespective of caste position -- are entitled to greater

status in society.

Then, too, it should be noted...that much of the support for Hindu parties come from middle caste groups. While large sections of the Brahman castes have become economically, politically, and educationally successful in the new order, lower caste groups have become increasingly dedicated to Sanskritization. Many of the non-Brahman castes resent the movement towards a more secular order. While they too do not necessarily favor a caste society, there is a feeling that the government leadership is so westernized that it fails to show a positive identification with the Hindu faith."

India, during Jawaharlal Nehru and Indira Gandhi's time, gradually made attempts to move beyond the cultural and religious traditions that defined her political philosophy and political culture. Parliamentary democracy became strongly institutionalized, however, the individual political leader continued to head the social and political structure as he had in her ancient days. The country demanded charismatic leadership, which characterized much of the political history of past times.

Charismatic leadership was sought to lead the nation toward a new era of political development which would represent a partial departure from the traditions of the

past. Change is often a traumatic experience -- particularly when that change is necessitated by a departure from traditional values and customs. The charismatic leader in the contemporary context, represented a bond between the past and the future. "The process of breaking from a traditional past creates attitudes that are strongly inclined toward accepting charismatic leaders. Native ruling houses and aristocracies are rapidly losing, or have lost already, an authority sanctioned by supernatural beliefs. Withering of the deep emotional roots of respect for traditional authority is taking place which leaves habits of obedience free-floating, in search of new attachments. In the meantime, the slow spreading of education of a rational character and the scarcity of media of mass communication retard the development of a new consensus based primarily on intellectual persuasion. In such periods of transition, charismatic leaders are likely to fill the vacuum" (Kahin et al, 1955:1025).

Jawaharlal Nehru and Indira Gandhi emerged as charismatic leaders who closely identified with their constituencies. Charismatic leadership involve a "devotion to the specific and exceptional sanctity, heroism or exemplary character of an individual person..." (Weber, 1947:328). Jawaharlal Nehru and Mrs. Gandhi emerged as leaders who enjoyed the loyal support of a strong following; a following which saw in their

leadership elements of the "exceptional sanctity," "heroism," and "exemplary character" which were found in the monarchical rulers of ancient India.

The concern of the country to maintain national unity and retain a sense of national identity became a priority issue. The country sought individuals who took decisive and forceful measures to counter those forces which challenged national integration. The Indian people trusted and identified more with their national leaders than with other political institutions which sought to address some of their concerns. In ancient days the people looked to the all-powerful king to maintain stability within the political system.

During the advent of constitutional, parliamentary government people looked to the Prime Minister to perform a similar function. The individual personality in politics continued to play a major role in Indian politics. Its influence far surpassed the other constitutionally sanctioned branches of government. The demise of a monarch in ancient days or the loss of a Prime Minister of the stature of Nehru or Mrs. Gandhi brought about a great deal of fear and anxiety for what the future would hold. People tended to put their trust and confidence in the personality and persona of the Prime Minister than in the other structures or process of government. In revealing the extent to which this is the case

Weiner (1959:28) notes:

Disagreements within the states between provincial Congress organizations and provincial governments tend to be resolved by Nehru's intervention or by his emissaries. In the recent linguistic disputes, local groups have focused their pressure on the Congress Working Committee and especially on the Prime Minister; and where a deadlock has occurred among groups, all eyes have turned toward the Prime Minister. As a result, a sense of latency has developed in Indian politics, a feeling expressed in India by the phrase, "After Nehru, what?" Beneath this question often lies the feeling that basic differences will burst forth when the Prime Minister has left the political scene. Within the Congress Party there have developed the machinery and some body of experience and precedent for dealing with intraparty disputes, but it is still an open and crucial question as to whether political groups and leaders inside Congress have developed a sense of responsibility for settling differences which can keep the Congress Party together after Nehru is gone.

Despite the fact that India's constitution calls for a Parliamentary government and has provisions insuring that Parliament's role in decision-making will be a meaningful one, the reality is such that the Prime Minister plays a much more dominant role. The Prime Minister and to a smaller extent, the Working Committee of the Congress Party, played a major role in making decisions with respect to important key issues e.g. the States Reorganization Bill and the Second Five Year Plan under Nehru's tenure as Prime Minister. P.C. Mahalanobis, Nehru's economic advisor, who drafted the framework of the Second Five Year plan and V.K. Krishna Menon, who was Nehru's Foreign Minister, and other close political allies played a major role in policy matters.

The Prime Minister and his key advisors and loyalists were the principal decisionmakers. Parliament often played a less-significant role in policy development. This only served to elevate the importance and stature of the Prime Minister with respect to the rest of the political process.

Authority resided with the personality of the Prime Minister more than with his office (Weiner:1959:30). As a result he set the political agenda and would make certain that his influence was not challenged by his subordinates. Both Nehru and his daughter Mrs. Gandhi achieved this task with masterful skill. Nehru decreased the power of the president of the Congress Party by continually placing less able men into that position; his daughter Mrs. Gandhi, maintained her influence by continually appointing weak subordinates to cabinet level positions (Weiner: 1959:30 and Mansingh, 1984 for Mrs. Gandhi).

The multitude of linguistic, cultural, and religious traditions that characterize India society has made efforts at national integration a difficult task to achieve. As charismatic political leaders, Jawaharlal Nehru and Indira Gandhi enjoyed a fair measure of success in their efforts in spite of many ethnic conflicts, terrorist acts, and internal strife among indigenous ethnic groups which might suggest otherwise. The charismatic political leader in India

serves as a unifying symbol; charismatic political leadership enables people of different ethnic and religious traditions to come together and support a single individual whom they believe is sensitive to their particular concerns, who will protect their historic traditions, and who will provide stability to the political process. When different groups of people are able to identify with a single, charismatic political personality, they are able to find a common means of realizing tolerance and order when consensus is hard to reach on crucial policy matters. The charismatic political leader also serves as the focus of the energies of discontented groups who express their frustrations directly to the leader rather than making concerted efforts to destroy the existing political process. The chapters which follow will make efforts in showing the important ways in which strong personalities who emerge as key political leaders affect policies which have great ramifications for the lives of common people.

Summary:

This chapter has shown that traditionally the king was viewed to be "guardian" of the total divine, social order. The political leader, especially the Prime Minister has replaced the titular role of the traditional king or maharajah, however, he or she is still expected to perform

similar functions in preserving social peace. It has also been suggested, and will be made even clearer in subsequent chapters, that the political leadership of the father and daughter were legitimized by their capacity to maintain political order and stability.

Another key aspect of the leadership paradigm in the Indian context is the personification of leadership. This chapter has shown why the leader-centered form of governance is preferred, why freedom and power is viewed in terms of the absence of making difficult political decisions, and how this structure of governance has particular roots in India's historical and cultural experiences. It has also clarified why in India, the followership is sometimes willing to forgo some of the power available to it through democratic institutions of government. It has also been noted that the followership in India is also willing to overlook certain limitations on the exercise of its rights so that the political leader can emerge as a solitary, strong dominant force in the political structure which is capable of preserving social order. Person-centered leadership begins to fail when the social order completely breaks down and power becomes fragmented into the hands of parochial political interests.

Chapter 5: The Significance of the Father-Centered Political Socialization Paradigm on Personality and Political Leadership in India

Introduction:

In this chapter I will show that the relationship between parent and child, especially the worldview and belief systems conveyed through father-figures, played a significant role in shaping both Nehru and Indira Gandhi's attitudes toward assessing issues and managing conflict. Nehru's father-figure was his natural father; Mahatma Gandhi later assumed this role when Nehru began to be actively involved in the Quit India Movement. In the case of Indira Gandhi, Nehru himself emerged as the dominant father-figure in her life. Indira Gandhi's close association with her father, Nehru, in particular helped to formulate and modify her views and orientation toward dealing with communal conflicts and with the issue of Non-alignment. Thus, the father-centered paradigm is an important element to consider when evaluating the similarities and differences in personality and leadership efficacy.

I. The Nature of the Father/Daughter Relationship

The role of parents in the psycho-history of children has often been analyzed from the vantage point of a traditional family unit. Most of the contemporary

psychological literature focuses on the relationship of the mother to the child in the context of family and social life. There are, however, a few recent shifts toward the study of the father-child dyad (e.g. Lamb, 1976; Parke, 1979; Pederson, Yarrow, Anderson, & Cain, 1979).

**A. Parental Interaction and Child Development:
The Unique Character of Nehru's Relationship
with His Daughter, Indira Gandhi**

The formative development of a child or young adult occur within the framework of a social system which consists of elements that influence and are influenced by each other (Monane, 1967). In a young person's social network, the social system consists of the parent-child, parent-sibling relationship and how they mutually influence one another. In the case of Indira Gandhi, who had no siblings and who lost her mother at a young age, the relationship that is especially important from the vantage point of a social network is the father-daughter relationship. This relationship defined her personality, the character of her orientation toward power, and her approach to statecraft as a political leader who followed in her father's stead as Prime Minister of India. The concrete manifestation of how Nehru's personality orientation was absorbed by his daughter can be seen in the way she conducted herself in dealing with the communal problem in Punjab. The dogmatic, domineering

and headstrong approach which Nehru assumed in dealing with the Hindu-Muslim issue and the language issue were also evident in Indira' Gandhi's approach to the crisis in the Punjab. This will be clearer in the chapters which follow which deal with these topics.

The quantity of time that a parent spends with their child effects the nature of the relationship between parent and child. Given the nature of Indian culture, fathers generally tend to spend less time with their children than mothers do. This is generally consistent with data for the United States which also show that the amount of time fathers spend with their children is less than comparable amounts of time spent by mothers (Weintraub, 1978). The interesting point to note, however, is that differences in the quantity of time that fathers and mothers spend with their children do not necessarily imply that either parents have a differential impact on their children or the quality of their relationship is affected in any significant way (Lamb, 1976c).

It is also important to note that the amount of time that most fathers spend interacting with their children does not always affect the child's relationship with the father (Pedersen & Robinson, 1969). Although the research which suggests this tendency is based on studies of behavior at

infancy through early childhood, emergent patterns can be seen in the particularities of the relationship between Nehru and his daughter. Indira Gandhi's periodic separation from her father contributed toward her own sense of independence and self-reliance. Nehru was physically separated from his daughter for much of her young adult life as a consequence of his imprisonment for participating in the Quit India movement. This physical separation and minimal contact did not strain the relationship between them; to the contrary, it strengthened the ties between father and daughter. While Nehru was in jail and Indira was away in boarding school in Switzerland, the two maintained close contact with each other through regular letters which were a source of emotional strength for each other. (Nehru, 1948).

Whereas, much of the literature defines the fathers' position in a social network model in terms of a functional role, e.g. being a protector, disciplinarian (Thomas, 1968), this was not the case at all with Indira Gandhi whose extended family fulfilled these functions in the Nehru household. Nehru himself, through his letters from prison, imparted to his daughter, his own worldview, his understanding of the political climate in India, and his concern for her welfare. His letters from prison represents a remarkable break with traditional literature on parent

child interactions. Traditional studies have studied parent-child relationships almost exclusively in the context of a structured family setting. The situation with regard to Nehru and his daughter was considerably different since Nehru was imprisoned and maintained close ties with his daughter only through his correspondence from prison. From prison, Nehru could not function as Indira's primary caretaker, however, he was the primary agent of Indira's political socialization. He did not assume the role of a traditional parent in praising or chastising a child for their deeds or misdeeds, but presented himself as a role model for Indira from a very young age.

**B. Nehru's Role as Father:
An Agent of Moral Socialization**

The role of a father on a child's moral development can be understood in terms of how a child internalizes values. Hoffman (1976), noted that the parent serves as the chief agent of moral socialization, firstly because of his or her role as a model for the child; secondly, because of the way in which the parent disciplines the child - encouraging certain behaviors and discouraging others; and thirdly because the parent supplies and fulfills the child's affectional needs. The fourth reason why the parent, most notably the father, is the principal agent of moral

socialization is because he serves as the connecting link which bridges the child's life with the broader society. The father clearly reveals some of societies demands, tensions, and expectations and brings them close to the home environment. By virtue of his own position in society, the father is able to confer a particular status to the child, a sense of importance and self worth, which enables a child to envision the outside world and where he or she fits in (Hoffman, 1976).

Nehru's greatest impact on his daughter was in the realm of establishing a broad social network of friends and acquaintances and in helping to mold and modify her belief systems. In this regard, as a father, Nehru helped his daughter in the internalization of moral norms. One might view moral norms as defined in terms of behavior to others and dealing with people in both interpersonal and group settings. Hoffman (1981:359) notes that the role of the parent, especially in this case, the father, contributes to the child's moral development by 1) serving as a model for the child, 2) disciplining the child or encouraging certain forms of behavior, discouraging others, and offering explanations, 3) fulfilling the child's affectional needs, and 4) "by virtue of his or her position in the larger society, conferring a certain status on the child that may be especially important when the child begins to conceive of

the outside world and where he or she fits within it" (emphasis mine). This last point is key to understanding the dynamic relationship which Nehru had with his daughter, Indira.

Whereas, the mother serves primarily an "expressive" role in family life by supplying affection, discipline, and maintaining order and harmony in the family setting, the father's role is "instrumental" in that it brings society's demands, and norms into the home (Parsons and Bales, 1955). The two forms of socialization are different. Lamb (1976:360) notes: "The overall effect of this parental division of labor is of course, to prepare the girl for her adult, expressive role--mother and wife--and to prepare the boy to function both in the instrumental world of work and the expressive role of father and husband."

Its important to note that in the case of Nehru's relationship with his daughter, Parsons and Bales' heuristic is reversed. Nehru's "instrumental" role served to prepare his daughter for leadership and to deal with some of the challenges that he faced in the political climate in India. In sharp contrast with the expectation that Indira's mother would be the primary source of moral internalization and moral development, it became increasingly apparent that Nehru was Indira's primary influence as an agent of her

moral internalization. This is an especially significant observation given the strong gender-based distinctions which exist in traditional Indian society which do not view father-daughter relationships in the same ways as father-son relationships.

C. The Impact of the Absence of the Father

A number of studies have analyzed the effects of the absence of the father on the moral development of children; among the most notable include those of Hoffman (1971) and Santrock, 1975 which control for family size, social class, age, and IQ. In both cases, the information obtained in the study resulted from teacher observation and reports of student behavior on moral indices which included among others, conformity to rules, accepting responsibility for misdeeds, self-criticism, guilt, and consideration of others. Both studies essentially showed that boys coming from homes where the father was absent for at least six months exhibited a higher incidence of aggressive behavior and were less likely to have internalized certain moral principles than boys who came from homes where the father had been present. Hoffman (1976:366) suggests that the reason for this is due to the loss of the father's influence as a socializing agent and the loss of the father's ability to functionally serve as a model, disciplinarian, and as a

provider of the child's affectional needs.

Although Hoffman (1976) and some of the aforementioned studies suggest that the father serves an instrumental role in socialization process, it is also noted that the mothers, by virtue of their role as primary caretaker, act as direct agents of socialization. No distinctions had been made between the process of socialization in general and political socialization, a particular aspect of the whole process of socialization. Hoffman (1976:375) notes that fathers have an indirect role in the socialization process by serving as identification figures which help to develop overt moral behavior, however, at the same time he suggests that they generally do not have as great an influence on their daughters.

These findings do not precisely fit the case of Nehru's relationship with his daughter Indira Gandhi because Hoffman's research does not focus on the theme of political socialization in particular, in the context of moral development. In the case of Nehru, his role as an identity figure overshadowed the other functional roles which he fulfilled as Indira's father.

Teahan (1963) and Heilbrun, Harrel, and Gellard (1967), who studied college age women, noted that some degree of

separation between fathers and their daughters enhanced cognitive competence in daughters. It must be said that daughters who exhibited high cognitive competence and analytical skill came from homes in which the father was not excessively domineering and ones where the father nurtured autonomous intellectual development. Nehru's relationship with Indira was a very nurturing and supportive one. The physical separation between father and daughter helped Indira to develop her own identity in spite of the fact that she was always viewed as Nehru's daughter and not fully recognized on her own merits until her father's death.

Throughout his youthful years with Mahatma Gandhi, the Nehru household was a place bustling with visitors, speakers, and strategists who were active in the quit India movement. The passionate nationalism which characterized most of Indira's political career did not simply emerge from a void; her views about India, its leaders, and the demands of leadership were shaped through observation, listening to conversations, and attending meetings in which her father was a key participant. In essence, her worldview was shaped to a large degree shaped by the views of her father.

Opportunities for learning about politics was to a great extent a consequence of her father's position in the society in which she lived.

Hoffman (1981:360f) identified four mechanisms of moral internalization which have special bearing on Indira Gandhi's leadership. Firstly, the arousal of deviation anxiety occurs in the process of socialization when a parent punishes a child for deviant acts. Under traditional Indian custom, children, especially females were to assume a subservient role in family life. In a very traditional household, Indira would have been severely reprimanded for speaking to her father, to elders, or any of her father's friends about any subject beyond the purview of her role as a woman, let alone politics. Instead of reprimanding Indira for her interest and boldness in speaking with himself and his friends about political activities and strategies, Nehru encouraged Indira to think, reason, and act independently (cf. Nehru, cf. Gopal, 1972; Mohan, 1967). He allowed her to acquire a public profile by enabling her to travel with him to various capitals to meet with world leaders and prominent foreign dignitaries. The absence of a subjective fear of sanctions, therefore, encouraged Indira to both speak and act boldly without incurring the anger of her father. This is especially evident in Indira's decision to marry Feroze Gandhi (unrelated to Mahatma Gandhi) who was not a Hindu nor a member of the same Kashmiri Brahmin caste in which she was raised. Her boldness in opposing her family in this decision was based in her own understanding that her father would grant her the freedom to think and act independently.

In the end, despite strong protestations from her family, Indira married Feroze with Nehru's tacit approval.

A second mechanism of moral internalization which Hoffman (1981) references is that of identification. In this perspective, children identify with the parents' likes, dislikes, fears, and prohibitions in order to offset punishment or to receive continued affection from parents. Although this phase is most apparent during a child's formative years, it manifests itself in later years as children search for an identity which is separate from that of their parents.

In some cases the identity which is sought may be one which mirrors or augments that of a particular parent; in the case of Indira Gandhi this appeared to be the case as she sought to emulate the leadership qualities of her father. In this regard, the identification model can also be viewed in terms of an imitation model of behavior. Hoffman notes (1981:361) that (i)n the case of exposure to morally behaving models, it is assumed that the child learns by observing the model and consequently tries to behave like the model in similar future situations when the model is not present."

Another mechanism of moral internalization involves the

arousal of empathy and guilt. This relates to an individual's cognitive awareness of other people, their needs and a general concern for their welfare. Nehru's travels with Mahatma Gandhi throughout India and his first-hand experience with poverty and the ailments of an impoverished society precipitated his understanding of the nature of poverty and prompted his concern for pursuing various developmental policies.

Indira Gandhi, in her youth, acting as Nehru's confidante, traveled extensively with her father. Her understanding of poverty, her awareness of the needs of others, and her orientations toward self-sufficient paths toward development took root as a consequence of the experiences she shared with her father. In both Nehru and Indira's case, the experiences of the father-figure helped in formulating and developing a particular mindset about the nature and need for political, social, and economic development in India.

The fourth means by which moral behavior is internalized is through a process of equilibration in the face of cognitive moral conflict. In this instance, an individual incorporates perspectives which can contrast with pre-existing moral conceptions and develops views which resolve any contradictions (cf. Kohlberg, 1969). This

mechanism is most readily apparent in Nehru and Indira Gandhi's way of dealing with challenges to their authority.

In the case of both leaders the primary conflict was getting a desired goal achieved in the face of opposition. Both leaders sought to minimize conflict in their dealings with opposing groups by personally becoming involved in the micro-management of disputes. This was achieved through co-optation of loyalists who would go to battle for their leader, as was the case with Nehru, or through the appointment of weak underlings, creating a power vacuum, as was the case with Indira Gandhi.

II. The Father-Daughter Relationship and Its Impact on Identity Formation and National Integration

A. Jawaharlal Nehru and Indira Gandhi: A Psychologically Informed Developmental Overview

Jawaharlal Nehru grew up in an aristocratic Indian family and was raised in an environment which contrasted sharply with those of his peers throughout India. He was born to a beautiful, young, vibrant, and strong-willed woman, Kamala Nehru. His father, Motilal Nehru, was an even stronger personality.

For the first eleven years of his childhood, Jawaharlal Nehru grew up as an only child who was

strong-willed, adamant, and struggled to form his own identity apart from the strong personality of his father. His father, Motilal, noted that his son was "never moderate in anything but his politics, and step by step his nature drove him from even that remnant of moderation" (Fisher, 1959:45). Nehru's adamant and strong-willed character, his lack of moderation in interpersonal relations, and his zealous tenacity to control his political environment are reflected in his adult political life. The discussion which follows in this chapter and in subsequent chapters will show how his strong-willed character manifested itself in the selection and placement of his cabinet members and the manner in which he pushed through his language policy.

In many respects, Nehru and his daughter, were raised with similar social and political experiences. Both father and daughter were socialized into a charged political climate in India. Jawaharlal Nehru was born into a high caste Kashmiri Brahman family and was educated at home by private tutors during his formative years. Motilal Nehru raised his son without placing too much emphasis on religion or religious traditions which play a major role in Hindu culture. His mother and his aunts, however, taught him Indian culture, values, and traditions through their instruction in the great Hindu epic works. In similar fashion, Nehru raised his daughter with little emphasis on

Hindu religious traditions; her understanding of Indian value, customs, and traditions were derived mostly from her mother while she was alive and by her immediate relatives in the Nehru household.

Indira Gandhi, like her father, was born into a politically charged environment. Indira Gandhi had a turbulent childhood. She was born to Jawaharlal Nehru and Kamala Nehru who was a loving and affectionate mother. She was particularly close to her mother and grandfather Motilal Nehru, Nehru's father, who pampered her with the best amenities available to a wealthy household. Her father was often physically separated because of his numerous political activities, however, she felt close to him and enjoyed his company during the few occasions that they could spend time together. Home life for Indira as a toddler was difficult. Her home was constantly filled with commotion, discussion, and frequented by many prominent guests who were key leaders of the Quit India movement. She always had to share her parents' and grandfather's time and attention with visiting guests and often found herself fighting for attention in her busy household. Life at home became so hectic that at three years of age Indira was sent away to her maternal grandparents in Delhi which was well over 350 miles from her home in Allahabad. She was so unhappy over the separation from her parents that she was

sent home a few short months after her arrival, only to find that her father and grandfather were imprisoned by the British who raided their home and took custody of their possessions. Whenever her father was released from prison, he traveled throughout India on important speaking engagements and was, therefore, frequently away from home. Her mother, Kamala, who had been ill, went to Switzerland for medical treatment. During 1926-27 Indira was enrolled in a Swiss school while her mother was confined to a hospital. She was uncomfortable with her surroundings which lacked the intensity, political dynamism and energy of her home environment. She was not comfortable with the quiet, detached, and sedentary lifestyle she had in Switzerland and eagerly traveled with her father throughout Europe whenever he had a chance to spend time with her and when her mother was well enough to travel. By the time she was ten years old, she returned home in December of 1927 with her parents. Her mother had been diagnosed as having tuberculosis and she was often hospitalized. Whenever her father was not traveling, Nehru stayed home with Indira and Kamala where he would take his daughter to school, on excursions, and along with him on any business or political matters that he had to attend.

Nehru's father, although active in the Quit India Movement, was not physically separated from his son as much

as Nehru was from his daughter Indira. Both Nehru and Indira were drawn to the strength and courage displayed by their parents. As a child, Nehru expressed an early fascination with Prince Siddhartha one of the characters in an ancient Indian classical work. Nehru was enchanted by Prince Siddhartha's inner courage and strength which dominated the pain, torment, and challenges which he faced in his earthly life (Nehru, 1946:8). Nehru's daughter displayed a similar affinity for personified images of courage and strength. As a child, Indira was often seen by her family with outstretched arms with one against a pillar and another outstretched in front of her as if she were leading a crusade or mass movement; and with many of her other dolls, she pretended that they were military characters on a battlefield who were championing a mighty cause, and not simply babies or teddy bears which need to be nurtured as many children view dolls to be (cf. Hutheesing, 1965:45; Fallaci, 1973). As an adolescent of about twelve years of age she organized the "Vanar Sena" or "Monkey Army," which was basically a childrens' movement which sought to actively fight British occupation in India along side the adults' Quit India movement. The "Monkey Army" was designed to perform minor tasks such as eavesdropping of policemen so as to learn about impending arrests, detentions, house searches, etc., and also to secretly transmit messages

among segments of the Movement when adults found it difficult to do so. Indira also spoke to her peers about the need for self-reliance and carried Mahatma Gandhi's protest against foreign goods and foreign intervention on Indian soil.

Indira Gandhi's proclivity toward activism and a sense of mission can also be revealed in an traumatic incident which happened when she was just three years old. At that time Mahatma Gandhi and her father, Nehru were pressing for economic independence from Britain and the necessity for self-reliance. The Nehru family was burning their foreign-made clothing and young Indira was presented with a beautiful dress by a relative who had just come from abroad. After she initially reached for the dress she pulled back her hand, realizing that her household was campaigning against foreign goods. Another relative chided her for not accepting the gift and pointed out to her that the doll she was holding and loved so much was also a foreign-made good. This revelation disturbed her greatly; on the one hand, from what she heard at home, foreign goods were unacceptable, yet on the other hand she was unwilling to give up her doll, one of her most prized of possessions. When she consulted her parents she was told to do what she felt best; this was often typical of the response of her parents who

encouraged her from such an early age to be independent and self-reliant. After a few days young Indira made up her mind and ran to the roof top of their home and set her most-revered doll ablaze and watched the fire consume it. The doll was more than just a toy for Indira, it was her closest companion and friend. When she set it on fire she felt guilty, lost sleep for many nights, and became ill in the days thereafter. The incident was, perhaps, the first time she was called upon to make a personal sacrifice and to transform her strong beliefs into conduct, even though at such a tender age she may not have fully understood all of the elements comprising her beliefs and the significance of her latter actions (cf. Mohan, 1967:65ff; Masani, 1975:15ff)

Just as Indira was impressed by her father, Nehru, Nehru himself also highly regarded his own father, Motilal Nehru who displayed many of the same characteristics which he saw in his classical epic characters. Jawaharlal Nehru was impressed by his father's "strength, courage and cleverness," and feared his father's violent temper. In later years he described to be "indeed an awful thing and even in after years I do not think I ever came across anything to match it in its own line" (Nehru, 1946:7).

After receiving his primary instruction through private

tutors, Jawaharlal Nehru, at fifteen years of age, was sent to England to study at Harrow, an elite private school. He adjusted to his new environment. However, he felt that his presence there "was never an exact fit" and generally found his English classmates to be a dull.

As a young student Jawaharlal Nehru developed an interest in poetry, the natural sciences, philosophy and the arts. For doing well in school, Nehru was given a book of Garibaldi which sparked daydreams of heroism and a gallant fight for freedom in his native India. He saw himself as a gallant freedom fighter and champion of justice who would perform great deeds for India (Nehru, 1946:18f). It is remarkable that Nehru's daughter also shared some of the very same childhood images of grandeur. As a young girl, Indira was impressed by historical figures who symbolized order and strength. Indira's preoccupation with challenges, struggles, and overcoming conflict were well rooted concerns during her childhood. When she was a child she often mimicked make-believe characters as children often do, however, she had a particular fascination for Joan of Arc whom she chose as her proud heroine and role model.

Having spent two years at Harrow, Jawaharlal Nehru then entered Trinity College, Cambridge University where

he read widely and expressed interest in the writings of Nietzsche, G.B. Shaw, Havelock Ellis, Oscar Wilde, and Walter Pater, among others. He was impressed by strong personalities and his interests showed a definite pattern of concern for active involvement in matters relating to politics. His interests also showed a pattern of desire to assume a leading role in any tasks which he assumed; indeed his interests coincided with those of his father, whose strength and fortitude he respected, and whom he tried to emulate in later life. Jawaharlal Nehru as a young man was in search of both his own identity and a purpose and mission in life. He was attracted to "the idea of going through life worthily, not indulging it in the vulgar way, but still making the most of it and living a full and many-sided life" (Nehru, 1946:20).

As he drew near the conclusion of his studies at Cambridge, Nehru considered beginning a career in the Indian Civil Service. His parents advised him against it since it would have required an additional year of preparation and study in England and may have resulted in a posting which was far from home. Both parents wanted him near home and as a result, he pursued the study of law, passed his exams, and was called to the Bar in England (Nehru, 1946:24ff).

Indira Gandhi's early years and the course of her

formal education were affected by her mother's health. Her mother's health had always been on Indira's mind and watching her mother's condition gradually deteriorate was a very painful experience. By October of 1930 when Indira was twelve years old, her father was once again arrested after completing a six month term in jail for his activities in the Quit India movement. Her grandfather who was also ailing had been imprisoned a short time earlier and his mother threw herself into the political spotlight by campaigning with Mahatma Gandhi to launch civil disobedience struggles and the Salt March in April 1930-31. The Salt March was a campaign initiated by Mahatma Gandhi to focus global attention on the injustices of British colonialism and to challenge Britain's Salt Acts which gave Britain a monopoly in the manufacture and distribution of salt. Kamala joined with her in-laws, friends, and relatives, in various agitations in opposition to British colonial rule. Once again Indira was left alone without her parents' company. Although she felt loved by her parents and understood the reason why she was always separated from them she, nonetheless, felt a vacuum in her life and gradually began to become more independent and matured into adulthood at a much faster pace than her peers. She felt different from others her age and transformed her tumultuous home-life experiences into opportunities for assuming greater autonomy and

responsibilities for maintaining the Nehru household. During the 1930s her father spent many years in prison for defying British colonial laws; she was limited to only a few visits with her mother during her advancing illness because of health restrictions. As a result of her mother's illness, her father's imprisonment, and the detention of many members of her immediate family, Indira was forced to move from school to school and in addition to being separated from her family; she never had an opportunity to stay in one place and keep new friends.

In April of 1935 Indira returned home to Allahabad after studying in different schools in India. By the time she was eighteen her mother drew near death from tuberculosis. After coming home she left home once again with her mother and left for Switzerland seeking medical treatment. During this time, her father who had been imprisoned for many years had been released to visit his ailing wife. Nehru quickly left India to be with his wife and child in Europe. In the midst of these difficulties, Nehru had been pressured by his close friends to resume the leadership of the Indian National Congress party. Nehru was torn between his loyalty to his family and his commitment to the struggle against British colonialism in India. Nehru remarked:

I went to Paris for a few days and paid another brief visit to London. Life was pulling at me and news reached me in London, that I had been elected for a second time president of the Indian National Congress, which was to meet in April. It was a dilemma for me: to leave her as she was or to resign from the president-ship. Meanwhile the call of India was insistent and friends there were pressing me to return. My mind grew restless and ever more occupied with the problems of my country... I was straining at the leash (Nehru, 1960:31-32).

Nehru finally decided to leave for India when his wife's condition seemed to improve, however, as it became apparent that her final days were near, he postponed his departure. Soon thereafter, Kamala died. After some days of mourning Nehru left for India and sent Indira for higher education at Oxford. Indira did not excel at Oxford; she did not take her studies seriously even though she had great interest in history. Her education at Oxford was interrupted by many visits to India and abroad with her father, and by health problems due to pleurisy.

As a young man, Nehru, after having lived in England for more than seven years, returned home to India in autumn of 1912 where he joined the Allahabad High Court as a barrister. His career was secure but he quickly grew bored and weary of his lifestyle. His English education exposed him to a wide range of experiences which he could not bring to bear on his traditional Indian lifestyle. By 1919 he became increasingly aware of the social and political

unrest that was brewing throughout India and Mahatma Gandhi's organized efforts to oppose British occupation of India. Jawaharlal Nehru was inspired by the non-violent protests and demonstrations which Gandhi initiated; the Satyagraha Sabha was one particular protest activity which pledged the loyalty of the members of the protest movement to go to jail in opposition to the Rowlatt Bills. Jawaharlal Nehru would have quickly joined with Gandhi's movement if it were not for the opposition of his father (Nehru, 1962).

The Jallianwala Bagh massacre of April 1919 and other bloody killings of villagers during confrontations with British troops forced a change of heart for Motilal Nehru who then gave up his lucrative law practice to join Mahatma Gandhi in the struggle against British occupation. His father's change of heart provided Jawaharlal Nehru with a fortuitous opportunity to participate in the movement he longed to be a part of.

**B. The Dynamics of Mentoring Relationships:
Jawaharlal Nehru, Mahatma Gandhi,
and Indira Gandhi:**

Jawaharlal Nehru once noted that the three individuals who had the most influence in his life were his father, Mahatma Gandhi, and to a smaller degree, Rabindranath Tagore, the renowned Indian philosopher and poet (Hindu

Weekly Review, 14 May, 1956). The political socialization of Jawaharlal Nehru began at home and was greatly influenced by his father during Jawaharlal's early years and was later shaped and molded by Mahatma Gandhi during his early adult years in which he actively involved himself in various political activities. Indira Gandhi's early means of political socialization was through her own father. In this vein it is crucial to study the influence of Mahatma Gandhi on the young Nehru and how Nehru in turn, helped to forge his daughter's understanding of politics. The task at hand is to examine the dynamics of the mentoring relationship and how the close association between Nehru and his father-figure, Mahatma Gandhi and his own daughter, Indira Gandhi affected his worldview, political philosophy, and ultimately, the public policy choices which the father and daughter later made as Prime Minister. In both sets of mentoring relationship the common element that ties them together is the strength of the paternal influence.

Jawaharlal Nehru saw in Mahatma Gandhi, the same inner strength and fortitude that he appreciated in his father. Jawaharlal respected his father's "strong feelings, strong passions, tremendous pride and great strength of will"; he appreciated the manner in which his father enjoyed his wealth and the many material amenities that he had acquired (Nehru, 1946:23). Nehru looked upon his father as "a kind

of renaissance prince." At the same time, Jawaharlal was drawn inexorably to the "meek," humble, and seemingly virtuous lifestyle of Mahatma Gandhi who renounced material gains and pleasures and was on a quest for truth and moral justice. Nehru's respect and admiration for these two men also represented two distinct and conflicting value systems and political philosophies which he sought to reconcile in his own life. It is interesting to note that Nehru displayed and applied many of the headstrong, strong-willed attributes of leadership which he admired in his own father, on domestic issues, especially in his efforts in dealing with communal tensions and in the language issue. Quite remarkably, Indira Gandhi admired some of the same qualities that Nehru appreciated in his own father. Indira was drawn to her father's strength of will, tenacity, and commitment in accomplishing goals as demonstrated in his leadership in the Quit India Movement and in his role as Prime Minister (Gandhi, 1965).

On external issues especially in the realm of Non-alignment, Nehru displayed attributes of accommodation, negotiation, and tolerance, which were elements of Mahatma Gandhi's leadership style that he admired. Nehru's daughter, Indira, to the contrary did not demonstrate these attributes to the same degree as her father and was much more of a strong-willed political pragmatist.

During the early months of 1915 Mahatma Gandhi had returned to India from South Africa and began a two year excursion traveling throughout India to fully understand its people and the great diversity which characterized the country. It is interesting to note that it was through Nehru's extensive travels that he developed first-hand knowledge about the needs of India and the demands of leadership. Indira received the same form of political education from her father who often took her on his various travels throughout India and abroad as his aide and close confidante.

Jawaharlal Nehru met Mahatma Gandhi in 1917 and was drawn to Gandhi's fearless courage and proclivity to action-oriented tactics of political reform. Nehru was drawn to Mahatma Gandhi's strength and fearlessness and saw in Gandhi an "alter-ego" of sorts which compensated for his fears, frustrations, and inhibitions about involving himself in active politics. He said of Gandhi: "The dominant impulse under the British rule was that of fear, pervasive, oppressing, strangling fear; fear of the official class; fear of the laws meant to suppress, and of prison....it was against this all-pervading fear that Gandhi's quiet and determined voice was raised: Be not afraid" (Nehru, 1967:299).

C. The Father and Daughter's Development of Political Beliefs

Prior to Mahatma Gandhi's arrival on the scene, the Congress party's efforts to pressure the British in leaving India was limited to party platform resolutions, debates, and other passive forms of political action which did not involve direct confrontation with the British. What Nehru saw in Gandhi's political philosophy was the moral legitimation of the use of force in a constructive and positive manner. Mahatma Gandhi employed active and concrete measures in opposition to British occupation. Gandhi's views and actions provided Nehru with the courage and momentum to begin voicing his own concerns. What he appreciated in Gandhi was the leader's commitment to direct, concrete action as a mechanism for social change rather than simply engaging in further rounds of endless talk and debate about the status quo (Nehru, 1949:713).

Jawaharlal Nehru was particularly impressed by Mahatma Gandhi's ability to make key decisions and lead the Quit India Movement, particularly when decisions involved painful choices and produced unpredictable and often undesired outcomes. Nehru, like his father, had a clear and logical mind who sought to make decisions based upon sound and clearly-stated goals. Nehru's daughter, however, did

not always seem to make decisions based on clearly defined objectives on internal matters. As the subsequent chapter on the Punjab crisis shows, Indira Gandhi decided to storm the Golden Temple complex after receiving reports that it was being used as a training ground for anti-government activities. Unlike her father, she quickly came to conclusions and made decisions without fully assessing the broader implications of her actions.

Initially, Nehru often found himself in disagreement with Mahatma Gandhi's perspective on Non-Violence as a means of political protest. Gradually, Nehru accepted Non-Violence as a tactic which he believed had the possibility of working in India. However, it remained for him, only a tactic or strategy while to Gandhi, it was a valued and revered philosophy. Non-violence and ethical conduct in the face of oppression were simply a "means" to achieve certain ends for Nehru, while for Mahatma Gandhi, these were "ends" themselves. For Gandhi, means and ends were interchangeable terms which enjoyed a "purity" of their own. Mahatma Gandhi drew an analogy between the means and a seed and the ends to a tree and believed that both were so inexorably related that each depends on the other for their being (Gandhi, 1938:60).

Gandhi's philosophy of using good means to achieve good

ends had a great impact upon Nehru's own political orientations upon Nehru's acceptance of this view. After becoming Prime Minister, Nehru spoke in almost similar terms, in an address at Columbia University in 1949. Nehru noted that good means had to be used if the ends desired were to be good, wholesome, and positive. He said that it was impossible to separate the two and that even if certain ends were good, it would be weakened if bad means were used their adoption (Government of India, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 1949:396).

Jawaharlal Nehru's attitudes toward values such as integrity, honesty, and righteous action were to a great extent influenced by his close association with Mahatma Gandhi. He read and carefully studied the Bhagwad Gita, a sacred Hindu religious text, while associated with Mahatma Gandhi, in spite of his loose attachment with religion. For Nehru, the Bhagwad Gita later began to shed light and reinforce his secular convictions to actively participate in a political movement which would redress various forms of injustice caused by British rule in India. In particular, the Bhagwad Gita's teaching that if a person performed righteous deeds and acted on behalf of a just cause, good and just deeds would automatically follow.

In more concrete terms, Nehru's views on religion

served to reinforce Nehru's belief that he had a moral responsibility to assume a political role and that righteous actions would lead to righteous results (Mende, 1956:31). His socialist inclinations were less the product of Mahatma Gandhi's influence than it was his educational experiences in England which made him aware of Fabian socialism. He was also influenced by his awareness of the conditions of people in Tsarist Russia, the outbreak Bolshevick Revolution and Lenin's activities which took place at the time.

His devotion to Mahatma Gandhi's teachings and the principal tenets of Socialism and Communism did not conflict with his political philosophy of moral secular democratic socialism. He held steadfast to the Gandhian view that to achieve a free, stable, and just society, both the means and ends of political activity must be equally good. Nehru noted: "I believe more and more in socialism. More and more even in some parts of communism, not the action part but the theory part of it, a communist society somewhere in the future. But I always conditioned it that the means should be peaceful, broadly speaking peaceful and not wrong" (Mende, 1956:31-32).

D. The Father-Daughter Leadership Paradigm:

Jawaharlal Nehru believed in the legitimacy and necessity for India to pursue non-violent means to rid the country of British occupation. He was genuinely convinced that the non-violent approach could be successful in India and save the country from the perilous destruction and mass scale political violence which might result from a violent exercise of force. It is interesting to note that although Indira Gandhi honored the principle of non-violence, she did not fully appreciate it as an essential tenet of leadership. In the same manner that Nehru readily used Indian troops to drive the Portuguese from Goa, Indira Gandhi readily used Indian troops to aid the then East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) against West Pakistan in the 1971 refugee crisis which precipitated a split of Pakistan into two independent territories.

At a Congress Party meeting in Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh, in April of 1936, Nehru noted that the use of terrorist tactics were symbolic of "political immaturity in a people." He was fully convinced that violent struggle was a bad means to achieve a desired end. Unlike Mahatma Gandhi, who viewed non-violence in terms of moral political action, Nehru conceived of it to be a political strategy or policy which he believed would yield successful and beneficial

results (Nehru, 1962:82-84). The moral component of non-violence was not as important as the efficacy of its potential for political action.

In another Congress Party speech in 1929 in Lahore, (in what is now Pakistan), Nehru called for support of non-violence as an effective political strategy because he believed that the Indian people at the time were unprepared materially and psychologically to launch an effective violent attack against the British. He believed that organized support to fight against the British might in the long run be weakened if the country incurred early rounds of defeats in an armed struggle with high death tolls and widespread destruction in terms of lives, land and property (Nehru, 1949:716). Non-violence, however, for Nehru had to be tempered with the dynamics of the political situation in which it was exercised. The key point to note here is that for Nehru, the application of non-violence was a strategic response to a particular problem in the face of appropriate alternative courses of action. In sharp contrast, non-violence was never seriously regarded by Indira Gandhi as a viable policy option. Indira Gandhi never sought to apply non-violence as an over-arching principle because she always felt more secure from arguing from a position of strength from a posture where she would be able to dictate the manner, flow, and conduct of negotiations.

Nehru's psychological orientation toward non-violence changed over time. Initially, during his close association with Mahatma Gandhi, he conceived it to be a moral imperative. Later as Nehru's own political identity emerged, and when he was called upon to lead, rather than remain under the protective watch of Mahatma Gandhi, non-violence became a moral strategy to achieve a moral end.

For Nehru, non-violence was not a universal creed or dogma to be applied in all cases. From the vantage point of leadership style, he was in many respects a political pragmatist and understood that passive submission to injustice and oppression by those with little concern for ethics and moral rights would be futile. The use of force to counter force was, therefore, an unsavory option which must be left open. He stated that "...the right means (to achieve right ends) may well be beyond the capacity of infirm and selfish human nature. What then was one to do? Not to act was a complete confession of failure and a submission to evil; to act meant often enough a compromise with some form of that evil, with all the untoward consequences that such compromises result in" (Nehru, 1967:10).

As a young man, Nehru was nurtured by the strength, courage, and conviction of Mahatma Gandhi. As Mahatma

Gandhi advanced in years and as he became perceived as the new "heir" apparent, Nehru was forced to shape his own notions of morality, justice, and how India would have to be governed when the British left. Indira, however, despite serving as Nehru's confidante, did not perceive herself to be her father's successor as Prime Minister. She was informally trained for leadership without formally preparing for it.

As Nehru grew older, he began to move further away from non-violence as a political strategy. He assumed a much more forceful and pragmatic approach to conflict management and his daughter Indira did so also to a much greater degree than her father. Nehru's handling of the Goa incident as Prime Minister provides a brief example of this "political maturation" and the development of his own style of leadership.

Goa consisted of a territory that remained under Portuguese Rule, located along the western coastline of India. It represented a "thorn" in territorial unification under one government. Nehru was convinced that Portugal would not accede the territory readily and therefore believed that force would be necessary to overtake the region and drive the Portuguese out. In a debate in the Lok Sabha, the lower house of the Indian parliament, Nehru was

confronted head-on with the question of whether he would use non-violence as a strategy to get the Portuguese out of Goa. Nehru flatly rejected non-violence under this particular context and argued that no government should leave out the use of force to achieve its goals - especially those goals it deems to be just and proper (Government of India, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, c.1959: 382).

Mahatma Gandhi's influence on Nehru gave a moral temperament to Nehru's political philosophy although Nehru was unmoved by the religious dimensions of the non-violent movement. Mahatma Gandhi always stressed the religious component of the non-violent struggle while Nehru quietly and privately voiced his reservations about it. Nehru was so inspired by Gandhi's leadership and depth of thought that he continued to allow the aging Gandhi to speak unchallenged. This behavior at a very young age reflected his later penchant for compromise and quiet behind-the-scenes diplomacy.

Nehru was more concerned with the religious and factional disputes between Hindus and Muslims and the potential problems it posed for the unity of India. Mahatma Gandhi on the other hand viewed it to be a means to unite the best elements of religious values and convictions to serve a common end. Mahatma Gandhi's economic philosophy

however, had a dramatic impact on shaping Nehru's attitudes toward the multitude of poor people with whom Nehru had little contact.

It enabled him to identify with the needs of the masses and gave rise to the "Empathetic Leadership" which characterized Nehru's tenure as Prime Minister. The focus of his speeches makes his concern for the poor and disenfranchised very clear. Nehru noted:

Mahatma Gandhi taught us to view our national struggle always in terms of the under-privileged and those to whom opportunity had been denied. Therefore, there was always an economic facet to our political struggle for freedom. We realized that there was no real freedom for those who suffered continuously from want and because there were millions who lacked the barest necessities of existence in India, we thought of freedom in terms of raising and bettering the lot of these people" (Government of India, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, [Speeches Sept. 1946-May 1949], 1949:160)

Quite remarkably, Indira Gandhi drew upon the "empathetic leadership" tradition of her father. As Prime Minister, during the early morning hours, she would meet regularly with poor people and other common people from all walks of life. From the compound of the Prime Minister's residence, she held an open forum to discuss peoples' needs, concerns, and fears.

E. The Crystallization of Attitudes Toward Development

Jawaharlal Nehru's close association with Mahatma Gandhi helped to develop self-confidence and emotional security under the shadow of a great leadership figure. It also brought him into contact with the common people of India with whom his privileged lifestyle had very little contact. In May of 1920 Nehru met with a gathering of about two hundred people in Allahabad who traveled a great distance to tell Gandhi and his colleagues about the miserable conditions in Pratapgarh district in which they lived.

Upon confronting first-hand, the nature of poverty, Nehru noted: "A new picture of India seemed to rise before me, naked, starving, crushed, and utterly miserable. And their faith in us, casual visitors from the distant city, embarrassed me and filled me with a new responsibility that frightened me" (Nehru, 1962:340).

The Pratapgarh episode and the numerous excursions Nehru made with Mahatma Gandhi throughout the many villages all over India served to shape Nehru's attitudes toward poverty, developed in sharper focus, and his own personal responsibility in ameliorating the conditions of his people. It also to a great extent shaped his attitude toward

national development and the prerequisites for it. Mahatma Gandhi emphasized the development of village industries and was less supportive of plans to create heavy industries to foster development in India. Gandhi was concerned that such policies would serve only to concentrate wealth and income in one part of India in the hands of a few at the expense of other parts of the country.

Jawaharlal Nehru's first-hand experience with the magnitude and dimensions of poverty in India caused him to shift away from the policies of national small scale cottage industries which his mentor, Mahatma Gandhi advocated. Nehru's first discernable rift from the policies of Gandhi revolved around the issue of national development. This rift reflects a leadership style that is rooted in political pragmatism and one which is concerned with fostering large-scale industrial indigenous development to mitigate vestiges of colonial political or economic dependence. In this regard, Nehru remarked:

It can hardly be challenged that in the context of the modern world, no country can be politically and economically independent even within the frame-work of international inter-dependence, unless it is highly industrialized and has developed its power resources to the utmost...An industrially backward country will continually upset the world equilibrium and encourage the aggressive tendencies of more developed countries. Even if it retains its political independence, this will be nominal only, and economic control will tend to pass to others. This control will inevitably upset its own small scale economy which it has sought to preserve in pursuit of its own view of life. Thus, an

attempt to build up a country's economy largely on the basis of small-scale industries is doomed to failure. It will not solve the basic problems of the country or maintain freedom, nor will it fit in with the world framework, except as a colonial appendage (Nehru, 1962:342).

Indira Gandhi espoused essentially the same position in her role as Prime Minister as her father had. Like her father, she advocated large-scale industrial development, however, she deviated from her father's policy to the extent that she insisted that almost all large-scale development should be realized through indigenous means. In this respect, she was more like her father's mentor, Mahatma Gandhi who felt that any development would only be meaningful if it was self-created, self-sustained, and self-reliant.

Jawaharlal Nehru served Mahatma Gandhi as a loyal and dutiful servant in Gandhi's leadership of the non-violent movement against British occupation in India. Differences in attitudes and perspectives on the future of India after Independence emerged at various times. However, the mutual respect each man had for the other and Nehru's willingness to yield to Gandhi's wisdom on certain issues served to strengthen the ties between the two men. Indira's relationship with her father ended abruptly with Nehru's death and the election of his friend Lal Shastri to the office of Prime Minister. Nehru's legacy, however, was

still very much alive as India sustained its desire for strong personality-centered leadership.

What initially began as a father-son type of relationship between Nehru and Mahatma Gandhi sustained itself and developed into a collegial relationships through the many years they worked together. Gandhi, who began advancing in years let it be known that he wanted Nehru to continue his struggle for peace and justice after independence was won. The mantle of leadership was handed down freely amid the brewing tensions of renewed conflict among various groups within the country in the wake of the British departure from the subcontinent. Nehru's own death ushered in a period of uncertainty and trepidation since there had been no formal transfer of the mantle of leadership. The Hindu-Muslim question continued to reassert itself in various forms and posed a very formidable challenge to Nehru's leadership. The communal problem, especially in Punjab, continued to be Indira Gandhi's nemesis as well.

Summary:

This chapter has shown that person-centered leadership has deep historical and religious origins in India and why the leaders' personality and leadership style are affected

by paternal influences. It has also given some insights into the psycho-social dynamics of the father-daughter relationship and leadership. It was revealed that Indira Gandhi's close association with her father, Jawaharlal Nehru, helped to define her orientation toward issues relating to communal conflicts and on the issue of Non-alignment. Nehru's own political orientations were influenced by Motilal Nehru, his father, and by Mahatma Gandhi, who was also a father-figure for Nehru.

On the question of parental interaction, it was noted that the quantity of time of parental interaction with children did affect the relationship between parents and their children, however, limited contact due to extenuating circumstances, such as Nehru's imprisonment which separated him from his daughter, did not necessarily have an adverse affect on the child.

With respect to the parental figure and political socialization, it was noted that Nehru was his daughter's primary agent of political socialization. Indira's interaction with her father and her father's network of friends, acquaintances, and contacts, during the Quit India Movement and during his tenure as Prime Minister, helped to define her understanding and worldview of politics.

Indira Gandhi acquired some of the same sensitivities toward leadership that her father had. As a result of her extensive exposure to the political climate in India through her travels with her father and her contacts with her father's colleagues, she developed an understanding of India which was marked by her empathetic concern for the country's poor. She also appreciated the need for self-sufficient means of achieving independent development. These visions were ones which her father shared and they are better reflected in a subsequent chapter which deals with Indira Gandhi's leadership of India along path's of self-sufficient, indigenous development.

The discussion in this chapter has also drawn together some of the similarities and differences in the father and daughter's perspective on leadership. On external matters, and to a lesser extent on the issue of the communal problem, Nehru displayed attributes of accommodation, negotiation, and tolerance, however Nehru's daughter, Indira, did not demonstrate these attributes to the same degree as her father. She was much more of a strong-willed political pragmatist.

It was also noted that both Nehru and Indira Gandhi exhibited a high degree of policy dogmatism and skewed means of information processing. Indira Gandhi displayed the

trait of dogmatism, to a much greater degree than her father, especially. Unlike her father, she drew conclusions quickly and made decisions without fully assessing the broader implications of her actions. This will be made clearer in the subsequent chapter on her actions in the Punjab.

On the question of leadership efficacy along a particular policy such as non-violence, it is interesting to note that unlike Mahatma Gandhi, who viewed non-violence in terms of moral political action, neither Nehru nor his daughter conceived of the policy to be an effective political strategy beyond a certain time, after it had outlived its strategic and functional utility (cf. Nehru, 1962:82-84). The moral component of non-violence was less important than its short term functional utility as a strategy of political action. This was demonstrated in Nehru's use of armed troops to forcibly remove the Portuguese colonialists from Goa and Mrs. Gandhi's use of army troops to remove anti-government elements from the Sikh Golden temple in Amritsar..

Both father and daughter were very similar in their display of "empathetic leadership." The extensive travels of both leaders throughout India enabled them to obtain a first-hand view of some of the pressing problems, concerns, and fears of the Indian people. Nehru's speeches and

Indira's daily morning open forum session with poor and common people helped to mold their identification with the concerns of the common person.

Another area in which both leaders shared a common philosophy was in their view of India's need for rapid development. Although Nehru stressed the political dimensions of development and his daughter stressed the economic dimensions of development, both shared the view that India needed to promote large-scale, heavy-industry based, internal development. Indira was much more like her father's mentor, Mahatma Gandhi, in the promotion of indigenous, self-reliant means of development. The techniques Mrs. Gandhi employed will be discussed at greater length in an up-coming chapter which describes Mrs. Gandhi's penchant for self-reliant cross-sectoral development.

**Chapter 6: Jawaharlal Nehru's Leadership:
The Hindu-Muslim Conflict and Linguistic
Reorganization of States**

Introduction:

The purpose of this chapter is to analyze and assess Nehru's policy with respect to the communal problem and the language issue. The first segment of this chapter will focus on the communal problem between the Hindu and Muslim community and the later half of the chapter will focus on the related topics of language, linguistic reorganization of states, and an assessment of Nehru's leadership in the administration and implementation of the Official Language policy. This chapter will analyze Nehru's personality and leadership traits in the context of the communal and language problem and reveal how these attributes play out in the context of policy development.

I. Approaches to Communalism and the Language Problem

The Hindu-Muslim problem had its genesis centuries before the advent of Nehru's leadership. In ancient India, Moghul Muslim monarchies were scattered throughout the country. When the British came, they weakened the hold of an already crumbling empire which was divided amongst itself and constantly feuding with rival Hindu kingdoms. Instead of uniting together to repel British encroachments

into India, the Hindus and Muslims continued to fight each other. When British rule was consolidated within the country, the colonizing power dominated both groups by encouraging division among them; this placed each group in the position of having to compete with each other for influence (Nehru, 1960:379).

During the early years of the twentieth century, the political dimensions of Hindu-Muslim conflict were magnified to a considerable degree. In 1905 Bengal was partitioned into two regions which physically separated large segments of the Hindu and Muslim communities. Later, in 1909, the Minto-Morley Reform bill sought to quell political violence by providing a separate electorate for the Muslim population. Instead of easing tensions, this act served to fuel it further since it served to politically divide groups of people into independent, distinct entities. Hindu's and Muslims were treated as two different peoples rather than as a single community sharing a common cultural and national self-identity.

Jawaharlal Nehru's views on the Hindu-Muslim situation and the dynamics of policy-making with respect to this domestic concern was shaped by attitudes developed during the days of his youth, his early education, later contacts with world leaders, international events, and also as a

consequence of his socialist, secular, perspective on life and the nature of politics (Pillai, 1987:267 cf. Patil, 1987). During his youthful years when he was closely associated with Mahatma Gandhi, he had a first hand account of the many atrocities committed by Hindus and Muslims during various riots. The high numbers of deaths occurring as a consequence of the Hindu-Muslim riots in Multan, Punjab (September, 1922), in Sharanpur, Uttar Pradesh (1923), and Calcutta (1926), moved him to shy away from orthodox religion.

Nehru's personal experience, having witnessed bloody conflict arising from religious rivalry, caused him to become highly critical of dogmatic religion. In a letter to a close friend, Nehru noted: "The communal frenzy is awful to contemplate...We seem to have been caught up in a whirlpool of mutual hatred and we go round and round and down and down the abyss..." He added that, "No country or people who are slaves to dogma... can progress, and unhappily our country and people have become extraordinarily dogmatic and little-minded...I have no patience left with the legitimate and illegitimate offsprings of religion (Nehru Papers, May 24, 1926).

His experiences as a result of his foreign travels and meetings with prominent world leaders enabled him to

crystalize his views about communal rivalry in India. He believed that the British played a great role in fueling the fires of animosity between the Hindus and Muslims. His travels to Brussels to attend the Congress of Oppressed Nationalities conference in February, 1927, and his trip to Moscow during the same year helped to foster his socialist attitudes toward politics. In an address before the plenary session of the Brussels conference, Nehru, criticizing Britain's policy of divide and conquer, remarked: "It is frequently stated and made much of in the English press, that Indians are fighting against each other, the Hindu against the Muslim, etc....apart from the fact that these troubles are greatly exaggerated it is the policy of the British to create these troubles or where they already exist to increase them and to take every step to keep them going....This has been the policy of the British."

I would argue that Nehru's travels and experiences abroad marked a pivotal point in his life as a nationalist leader. It is interesting to note that after his trips abroad, Nehru began to more actively stress themes of nationalism, unity, socialism, and secularism with greater conviction in his speeches. During the early 1920s, many of his speeches and correspondence material did not focus on these themes (c.f. Nehru Papers). However, after 1926,

these concepts were much more explicitly developed in his speeches.

His speech at the Indian National Congress meeting in Madras in 1927 and his speech before the Lahore Congress session in 1929 was laden with references to nationalist independence and socialism (c.f. Nehru Papers, Jan. 1926-1929). His visit to Moscow, in particular, helped to shape his views vis-a-vis policy-making in matters relating to communal rivalries. In an article which favorably views Russia's handling of the Muslim minority population, Nehru noted:

(A) (T)rue solution of our difficulties can come only when we have won over and given satisfaction to our minorities...some of them fear the majority and for fear of it keep apart from the struggle for freedom... The new Russia has gone a long way in solving its minorities problems by giving each one of them the fullest cultural, educational and linguistic freedom. Therefore, in India we must make it clear to all that our policy is based on granting this freedom to the minorities and that under no circumstances will any coercion or repression of them be tolerated... with religious and cultural and linguistic freedom granted, the principle questions that will arise in our legislature will be economic ones and divisions on the cannot be on communal lines... The Congress has endeavored to give effect to the principle that should govern the treatment of minorities... in communal matters it (Congress party) will not deviate to the right or the left, will hold the centre impartially. It will, I hope, prove to the minority communities that in independent India for which we strive, there will be an honoured and favoured place.

This passage shows that Nehru was in touch with

communal problem. However, the leadership trait of dogmatism is apparent in Nehru's insistence in trying to "win over" and seemingly appease discordant groups through guarantees of fair treatment. Nehru conceptually and perceptually ignored some of the economic and political factors which precipitated much of the communal conflict.

Jawaharlal Nehru was genuinely concerned about the communal problem in India and the need to resolve it to create some sense of national self-identity. I would like to note that, consistent with his leadership style of accommodation, compromise, and the pursuit of satisficing solutions to pressing problems, Nehru did not simply manipulate the current political climate to advance his own position in the Congress party. Nehru's style of leadership stressed conflict management rather than conflict resolution. He sincerely felt that the problem could be managed if not totally resolved. In this regard the trait of leadership efficacy is also reflected here. Nehru's pursuit of a temporary peace was a satisficing option because it offered a temporary solution to the problem and not a lasting one. His leadership in the communal issue demonstrated a leadership style geared toward accommodation, compromise, and the pursuit of satisficing solutions as a band-aid approach to conflict management.

Nehru vehemently criticized both Hindu's and Muslims alike and made a passionate, impartial plea for leaders of these two rival groups to give up their parochial claims in favor of the broader interest of creating a strong, united, independent India. Yet there was little attention given to resolving the tensions that existed between the two competing groups. He was dogmatic in his belief that the problem could be successfully addressed through his own personal intervention in the matter.

In a speech before students at Benaras Hindu University in 1933, Nehru strongly attacked the tactics of Hindu communal groups. Nehru emphatically exclaimed that "under the cover of seeming nationalism the Mahasabha not only hides the rankest and narrowest communalism but also the desire to preserve the vested interests of the group of big Hindu landlords and princes"; he further attacked the policies of the Hindu Mahasabha and charged that their activities were "degrading, reactionary, anti-national, anti-progressive, and harmful" (The Tribune, November 16, 1933). In an article which elaborated his position on the communal problem in India, Nehru remarked that one opportunity for dealing with Hindu-Muslim conflict lay in the selection of members for the Constituent Assembly which would govern the country. He shrewdly left open the possibility of having separate electorates for Hindus and

Muslims if this would serve as a remedy to quell violence (Nehru, Jan.4, 1934 article). This plan, however, did not materialize because it resembled prior British policies to hold separate electorates which in effect divided the country and retarded the emergence of a common national self-identity. Once again, it appears that Nehru's approach to the ethnic problem was limited in scope. His decision to leave open the possibility of having separate electorates was a satisficing option which might have quelled violence for a short time, however, in no way did it serve to bring the two communities of people together so as to foster further dialogue.

Nehru was a skilled and seasoned political leader in the Quit India movement which sought to oust the British from India. He sought to use the Quit India movement as a uniting mechanism which would focus communal animosities against the British rather than against rival Hindu and Muslim groups. In this regard, the trait of power motivation is apparent here in the context of the need to control the direction of the conflict. The Quit India movement was sought as a uniting mechanism against the British so that rival Hindu and Muslim groups would turn their attention away from the problems that precipitated violence between them.

In a letter to a Muslim leader, Sheik Mohammad Alam, Nehru noted: "I think the communal problem does stand by itself but is part of the larger social problem of India and the world... Looked at from the national point of view I think that the most important thing for us is to carry on our civil disobedience struggle. Only through that can we divert attention from the wretched communal wrangle..." (Nehru Papers, October 29, 1933). In this particular case, Nehru appears to be more of a political strategist than an effective leader. The communal problem was shifted as the focus of attention in favor of the civil disobedience struggle which was used as a vehicle for shifting attention away from some of the pressing domestic tensions prevalent in the country.

Consistent with his strategy-oriented style of leadership, Nehru actively tried to convince his colleagues in the Congress Party that the communal problem was simply a mask for deeper social and economic divisions which divided the masses. One strategy to unite people was to identify a common enemy and rally the masses against the British in the Quit India movement. Another strategy, which he believed to be central to the communal issue, was to work toward economic development among the Muslims which were the disadvantaged group.

This strategy was influenced, in part, by Nehru's friend, C.F. Andrews, who in a letter advised that "If we want to take the line of least resistance and avoid brute force would it not be for the best and most effective method to concentrate in India the national movement on certain definite economic objectives and seek a united front on these? ...If it could be proved to the vested interests themselves that economic dependence is as deadly for them as it is for the workers and peasants, then it might be possible to set up two or three immediate aims and carry them through" (Nehru Papers, November 13, 1933). Asaf Ali, a prominent Muslim leader, in a letter to Nehru made a similar appeal to press for economic reforms as a means of combatting the communal problem. Asaf Ali wrote, "Unity, I say this after full and mature consideration and experience of the last unity conference, on an economic basis alone will be possible, which neither pacts nor appeals can bring about... These Muslims, as I know them, will not give up an inch of what the Communal Award has secured (to) them and others will not concede to them an inch beyond it... The socialist ideology has great potentialities and if properly set out must catch the people's imagination" (Nehru Papers, September 30, 1933).

Upon examination of Nehru's later remarks on the communal problem, it seems readily apparent that his views

had been shaped in part by the thoughts of these two men. In his 1934 article, entitled "Reality and Myth," Nehru argued that the key to addressing the communal problem, which he viewed to be a "myth" masking deeper inequalities, was economic development for disadvantaged Muslims. Nehru remarked: "We live in an age when economics dominate national and international issues... (S)o long as the fullest economic freedom does not come to us there can be not freedom whatever the political structure may be. Economic freedom must of course include political freedom. That is the reality of today; all else is myth and delusion, and there is no greater myth than the communal myth (Nehru Papers, Jan. 4, 1934).

In a later article, Nehru followed up on this theme and noted: "If the masses are fully represented inevitably economic issues affecting them will come to the forefront and superficial problems like the communal one will lose importance" (Nehru Papers, February 25, 1936).

Nehru believed that a democratic socialism focusing on redressing economic inequalities would end communal strife. In 1937 after the Congress Party emerged victoriously after the elections, Nehru thought that his party's success at the polls were a true reflection of consensus among the Indian people. The trait of dogmatism is reflected here in

the context of Nehru's belief that a Muslim presence in the political decision-making process would help to end communal conflict. He erroneously believed that Muslims accepted the Congress Party as a legitimate institution in which their concerns could be voiced and their grievances remedied. This major miscalculation reflects his inability to critically evaluate his own role in the leadership of the Congress party. He was not receptive to the possibility that the Congress party may not be viewed as legitimate by various ethnic communities, most notably, the Muslims.

Nehru, perhaps naively, thought that electoral victory would soon lead to peace among the Hindus and Muslims. In a letter to Sir Stafford Cripps, the British representative, Nehru remarked: "Even the Muslim masses are getting out of the rut of communalism and are thinking along economic lines... On the whole I think that the communal position is definitely brighter. The Hindu communalists have been largely swept away by the Congress and they count for little... The Congress is supreme today as far as the masses and the lower middle classes are concerned. Even the Muslims look up to it for relief (Nehru Papers, February 22, 1937).

Nehru's naive view that efforts to politically include the Muslim leaders in the political process would quell

violence soon led to disenchantment when Mohammed Ali Jinnah, the Muslim leader, claimed special rights and privileges for Muslims. Instead of challenging Jinnah directly, Nehru sought to press his own Congress party to appeal to the Muslim people -- particularly the intelligencia. He hoped to win over prominent Muslim leaders and co-opt them into the Congress party so that they would help to bring masses of people into a unified Congress party.

Nehru preferred accommodation to direct conflict. This leadership style was concretized in a specific manner when he helped to set up a Muslim Contacts Department in the Congress party in 1937 with his friend, Dr. K.M. Ashraf who served as secretary. Various subcommittees of the Congress party also sought to deal with Muslim concerns so as to weaken the hold of reactionary elements in various militant Muslim groups. This policy successfully brought in large numbers of Muslim people into the Congress party -- especially young people who were co-opted through various student organizations affiliated with the Congress party and which were set up throughout the country. This action is indicative of the trait of power motivation in terms of Nehru's efforts to control his political environment. Nehru used the Congress party structure as the means of co-opting certain members of the Muslim leadership. Nehru's

selection and placement of his friend, K. M. Ashraf in the Muslim Contacts Dept. of the Congress Party was a reflection of his desire to maintain nearly total control over the leadership recruitment process within the Congress party.

Certain people among the Muslim leadership, however, grew increasingly antagonistic and suspicious of Nehru and the Congress party whom they viewed to be conspiring to divide Muslim people from their leadership. Instead of alleviating tensions, Nehru's efforts through the Muslim Contacts Department exacerbated it; Muslim leaders such as Jinnah bitterly assailed the Congress' policies and called them "massacre contact" (c.f. K.M. Ashraf, The Tribune, April 2, 1938). Jinnah and other Muslim leaders asked Nehru and other Congress leaders to directly negotiate with them and not the masses. After failing to receive this guarantee and Congress' mounting success in co-opting Muslims into the Congress party, Jinnah and his colleagues initiated an acrimonious campaign which preached that Islam was in danger and that their faith would be trampled underfoot by the Hindu majority. Tensions between the Congress party and Muslim leadership mounted as both groups tried to win over the hearts and minds of the Muslim people.

Consistent with Nehru's desire to avoid confrontation and his preference for accommodation, Nehru was prepared to

enter into dialogue with Jinnah, the Muslim leader, who began to call for the partition of India into two states. Nehru's principal concern was to maintain peace, order, stability, and unity. Jinnah primarily sought to protect the interests and concerns of the Muslims whom he feared would be isolated and persecuted by the majority Hindu population.

Nehru's daughter, Indira Gandhi, did not share the same political orientation as her father. As it will be shown in a subsequent chapter dealing with Indira Gandhi's handling of the Punjab crisis, Mrs. Gandhi's views contrasted sharply with those of her father's. Mrs. Gandhi was not averse to confrontation, and sometimes even seemed to encourage it. Whenever she sought to negotiate, she made certain it would be from a position of strength.

Nehru, in a series of letters between 1938 and 1939 (c.f. Nehru Papers, Jawaharlal Nehru's letters to Jinnah), advanced his argument that the Congress party was not a communal organization but that it was fully representative of all the communities in India. He claimed that its primary purpose was nation-building and to maintain peace and unity in order that the goals of national development might be realized. Jinnah, however, argued that the Congress party was partial to the Hindu majority and

claimed that only the Muslim League was in a position to advance the interests of the Muslims living in India. Both of these leaders were unable to reconcile their differences until partition became a reality.

Nehru had a deep sense of personal mission in contributing to the freedom and well-being of India. He assumed his political role as a very personal one and attributed his political victories and defeats in very personal terms. In a letter to Jinnah, in October, 1938, Nehru wrote:

I entirely agree with you that it is a tragedy that the Hindu-Muslim problem has not so far been settled in a friendly way. I feel terribly distressed about it and ashamed of myself, insofar as I have not been able to contribute anything substantial towards its solution. I must confess that in this matter, I have lost confidence in myself, though I am not usually given that way... At the present moment, as you will no doubt appreciate, my mind is full of the rapid developments that are taking place (Nehru, Oct. 18, 1938).

In spite of periodic setbacks and frustrations, Nehru remained optimistic and constantly sought new opportunities for pressing forward when difficulties prevailed. In another letter to Jinnah, Nehru wrote:

What has oppressed me terribly since yesterday is the realization that our sense of values and objectives in life as well as in politics differs so very greatly. I had hoped after our conversations, that this was not so great, but now the gulf appears to be wider than

ever. Under the circumstances, I wonder what purpose will be served by our discussing with each other the problems that confront us. There must be some common ground for discussion, some common objective aimed at, for that discussion to yield fruit (Nehru, Dec. 9, 1939).

Nehru's correspondence with Jinnah produced no encouraging results. Jinnah would not accede his claim that only the Muslim league should represent his constituency. In a letter to Nehru, he wrote, "So long as the Congress is not prepared to treat the Muslim League as the authoritative and representative organization of the Mussalmans of India it (is) not possible to carry on talks regarding the Hindu-Muslim settlement as that was the basis laid down by the working committee of the All-India Muslim League" (Nehru, Dec. 13, 1939). The Muslim League, unlike the Congress party which represented a broader and diverse constituency, represented only Muslims and had very parochial concerns.

Nehru would not yield to Jinnah's demands and strongly felt that any national organization must be representative of a broader array of interests in order to foster unity. The trait of policy dogmatism is apparent here in light of Nehru's unwillingness to accept the view that the Muslims community was not united under a common leadership. Nehru refused to believe that the Muslim community was a disjoint, and internally divided community, which was linked less by

political philosophy than by the religious principles that they shared in common. Consequently, Nehru was convinced that other Muslim organizations such as the All India Momin Conference, the Jamiat-ul-Ulema, the Majlis-e-Ahrer, and the All India Shia Conference, would not enter the Congress party apparatus and thus, gave up his efforts to bring them into Congress' fold.

The trait of power motivation is most readily apparent in the way Nehru sought to control conflict within his own party structure in the face of Muslim protests. Instead of attacking his Muslim opponents publicly or denouncing the Muslim League's opposition to membership in the Congress party, Nehru gingerly avoided conflict and tension between the Congress and Muslim League's leadership by neglecting the matter and leaving it open for further negotiation whenever conditions were more favorable. By doing this he in effect weakened the bureaucracy's ability to manage the conflict due to the absence of any prescribed strategy or plan of action. Nehru, alone, sought to mediate the conflict which meant that conflict management became a highly personalized, individual-centered policy priority. Writing to Jinnah, Nehru noted: ".... I am afraid that if your desire is that we should consider the League as the sole organization representing Muslims to the exclusion of others, we are wholly unable to accede to it... It seems

that politically we have no common ground and that our objectives are different. That in itself makes discussions difficult and fruitless... I feel therefore that it will serve little purpose for us to meet at this stage and under these conditions with this background" (Nehru, Dec. 14, 1939).

Nehru's frequent dialogue with Jinnah had a great effect on his personality and attitude towards the Hindu-Muslim problem. The trait of power motivation is revealed in Nehru's relentless efforts to control and influence the Muslim political leadership. In communal matters, as opposed to the language issue exclusively, he relied less on the Congress Party apparatus than on his own personal initiatives in dealing with the problem. Initially, Nehru was optimistic that efforts to redress economic and social inequalities would help to resolve the problem; His dealings with Jinnah, however, gradually lead him to believe that the situation could never be completely resolved -- it could only be managed. His talks and correspondence with Jinnah transformed Nehru from being a slightly naive, innovative, optimistic, Congress party leader at the outset to becoming a frustrated, resigned, and temperamental leader with regard to the communal problem.

The power motivation trait is amplified in the communal

issue to the degree that Nehru no longer sought bold, new innovative proposals to unite Hindus and Muslims under the common banner of the Congress party. He was resigned to accepting satisficing solutions which at best would simply manage tensions between the two groups rather than attempt to resolve origins of the conflict between them. Nehru's frustration and disenchantment is evident in one of his letters to Jinnah in which he writes: "May I say again that no one on our behalf so far as I know, challenges or minimizes the authority, influence, and importance of the Muslim League... I am compelled to think that the real difficulty is the difference in political outlook and objectives... I do wish to assure you that for my part I do not want to leave any stone unturned which can lead to mutual understanding and settlement. But you will not have me, as I do not want to have you, leave integrity of mind and purpose in pursuit of anything. Nothing worthwhile can be gained that way. I have deep political convictions, and I have laboured in accordance with them these many years. I cannot leave them at any time, much less now when the world is in the throes of a terrible crisis" (Nehru, Dec. 16, 1939).

Having abandoned entering into dialogue with Jinnah and other prominent Muslim leaders to find a solution to the communal problem, Nehru still held on to the weakened

belief that people could change for the better and that a solution to the problem would emerge if both religious groups showed goodwill and practiced the positive elements of their faith. He also felt that progress on this matter would only be made if the Muslims were given the freedom to elect their own representatives to the Constituent Assembly.

The problem remained, however, and by Nehru's advocacy of Muslim representation, he was sending the Muslim constituency a double message. They were equal yet they were also separate and, therefore, needed their own representatives. Writing to a prominent Muslim leader, Ahmed Bashir, Nehru makes this clear:

It seems clear to me that the unity of a free India can only continue with the goodwill of the Hindus and Muslims; if that goodwill is lacking, that unity will be endangered. I do not see why the fullest cultural freedom should not be allowed to every group, nor do I understand why you should object to a Constituent Assembly where Muslims have a right to elect their own representatives, and further, where it is definitely stated and laid down that all minority rights must be settled by agreement and not by majority vote (Nehru, Dec. 26, 1939).

Nehru's frustration was partly due to the lack of cooperation from Jinnah and other Muslim leaders, however, he placed a great deal of blame on the British who supported militant groups on both sides and sustained tensions between both religious groups. Nehru energetically tried to publicize the British policy of "divide and conquer" and

hoped that the Hindu and Muslim leadership would reconcile their differences in the face the British policy. In his autobiography, Nehru noted: "Fundamentally and inevitably the British policy has been one of preventing the Hindu's and Muslims from acting together and of playing off one community against another" (Nehru, 1962:460).

Having failed to reach a settlement with Jinnah, Nehru, in a last ditch attempt, sought to reach out to their followership by casting the blame on British policies. This act reflects Nehru's policy thinking which sought conflict avoidance and peaceful domestic relations at any cost. He was a very shrewd leader who knew that attacks on Jinnah, the Muslim League, and other organizations might prove to be counterproductive. He knew that irrespective of the outcome of the Hindu-Muslim problem, he would still have to deal with Jinnah or other members of the Muslim League, in order to hold the country together in the wake of Britain's departure. Therefore, his statements reflect not only a tactic of casting blame, but also his genuine belief that the communal issue has its roots in external problems, namely the policies of the British.

Writing to a another prominent Muslim leader, Nehru wrote: "You will have noticed the rebirth of the idea of pan-Islamism. This is not merely due to (the) Muslim League

here or to their organizations. This is fundamentally due to the desire of the British Government to encourage it... the main difficulties of the communal problem are due to the attitude of the British Government today (Nehru, Feb. 22, 1940). In another article, written after the Muslim League formally called for the creation of an independent Pakistan, Nehru appealed to the leadership and followership of both religious groups to exercise restraint, work for unity, and recognize that the source of tension was not domestic but external.

Nehru suggested that unity would still be a possibility upon Britain's departure from the subcontinent. His policy thinking is reflected in his view that once Britain left, both groups would have to come to terms with the differences that divide them and work for peace. The other alternative was mass violence which, like a fire, would consume all those who were touched by it. Nehru wrote: "... It (communalism) lived on invectives, violence, and general offensiveness... It discovered that what it had valued most in the past--separate electorates--brought little good. In fact they weakened a minority group. Then by the very force of the logic of hatred and separation that it pursued it had to go to the extreme step of demanding a partition of India (Nehru, Aug. 10, 1940). In another letter, Nehru wrote: "Personally I see no solution, of this problem,

however hard one may try, so long as the third party (the British) is not eliminated. We shall inevitably come near a solution when we are forced to agree by circumstances, the alternative being conflict on a big scale. That can only happen when it is clear that neither party can seek the help of the British or any other alien authority. Once this alien authority is excluded we fall back upon ourselves and either agree or fight. In all likelihood we then agree for the prospect of a real struggle that will not be a pleasant one for anybody" (Nehru, Feb. 1, 1940).

Nehru simply did not have a complete understanding of the magnitude of the Hindu-Muslim problem and the religious, traditional, cultural, and historical factors which made integration of the two communities difficult. Nehru was perhaps somewhat naive and simplistic in his attempt to envision the problem in simple economic terms and that it could be resolved with economic reforms. This is reflective of his policy thinking which viewed domestic problems only in terms of their short-term consequences.

He also believed that the election of Muslim representatives to a Constituent Assembly could diffuse the political tensions between the two groups. While supporting this policy, he failed to recognize that this mere act would label Muslims as outsiders who needed their own

representatives. This policy went against the grain of unity and the creation of a sense of national self-identity. Nehru also inaccurately perceived that Congress and the Hindu Majority's willingness to accede linguistic, religious, and cultural liberties to the Muslim minorities would quell their yearning to be a separate people. What Nehru neglected to see that for the Muslims, their religious, historical, and cultural experiences led them to identify more with the tenets of their faith than the society in which they lived. What Nehru and the Congress party asked of them was to pledge their allegiance to a society whose belief systems were different than their own.

Nehru considered the Muslims to be a single group of people with common aims. What Nehru did not see was that certain Muslims sought independence at any cost; others, however, would forgo their political independence in the land of their birth if their religious freedoms could be guaranteed. Nehru could never change the minds of those who subscribed to the former view; at best he could manage tensions and work toward unity with those who held the latter view.

Summary:

This section has shown that Nehru was in touch with communal problem and was concerned about the problem it

terms of its barrier to the development of a national self-identity. However, he perceptually ignored some of the factors which contributed to the hostilities which divided the Hindu and Muslim communities. The trait of dogmatism is reflected in Nehru's insistence in trying to "win over" and seemingly appease discordant groups through guarantees of fair treatment while ignoring the particulars of the issues that divided them.

In this regard, I would like emphasize the fact with respect to the communal problem, Nehru was consistent with his leadership style of accommodation, compromise, and the pursuit of satisficing solutions to pressing problems. It is not correct to say that Nehru tried to manipulate the current political climate to advance his own position in the Congress party. Rather, Nehru's style of leadership stressed conflict management rather than conflict resolution. From the vantage point of the trait of leadership efficacy, Nehru's pursuit of a temporary peace through satisficing options did not contribute toward national integration or any movement toward national self-identity.

Nehru's efforts in setting up the Muslim Contacts Department in the Congress party in 1937 under the leadership of his friend, Dr. K.M. Ashraf is indicative of

the trait of power motivation because it reflects his desire to control his political environment and to maintain nearly total control over the leadership recruitment process in the Congress party.

The trait of power motivation is also apparent in the way Nehru sought to control conflict within his own party structure. Instead of publicly denouncing the Muslim League's opposition to membership in the Congress party, Nehru carefully avoided conflict tension between the Congress and Muslim League's leadership stalling discussions and leaving the issue open for future deliberations. This had the effect of weakening the bureaucracy's ability to manage the conflict because of the absence of any prescribed strategy or plan of action. In contrast, Nehru, sought to ignore institutional and bureaucratic mechanisms to intervene in disputes, and instead, sought to mediate the conflict himself. This had the effect of shaping the conflict management mechanisms of government into a highly personalized, highly individual-centered task.

The power motivation trait is amplified in the communal issue by the fact that Nehru no longer sought bold, new innovative proposals to unite Hindus and Muslims under the common banner of the Congress party. His policy thinking of the communal problem was narrow and only in terms of its

short-term consequences. Nehru did not fully appreciate the traditional, cultural, and historical factors that contributed to the conflict. As such, he was resigned to accepting satisficing solutions that sought conflict management rather than conflict resolution.

II. Jawaharlal Nehru, the Language Problem and the Linguistic Reorganization of States

One of Nehru's most difficult tasks in bringing together a diverse group of people was to devise a way in which people could agree upon a common form of communication. Before independence and to this day, India is a country of great linguistic diversity. The Census of India, in 1951 reported a total of 845 languages or dialects; the 1961 Census reported 1,652 "mother tongues," and classified 87 percent of the total Indian population as speakers of fourteen major language groupings as prescribed by the Eighth Schedule of the Constitution of India. The constitution identifies Assamese, Bengali, Gujarati, Hindi, Kannada, Kashmiri, Malayalam, Marathi, Nepali, Oriya, Punjabi, Sindhi, Tamil, Telugu, and Urdu, as primary languages representing major linguistic families with a majority of speakers (Census of India, 1961: clxiii). English and Sanskrit were also viewed to be an important, but secondary, in the list of languages according

to the number of native speakers. India today has two official languages, Hindi and English and the government officially recognizes the dominant state languages noted above which represent major linguistic families. All official communication with the central government can be in either Hindi or English and each state may use its own language for official internal communication.

The nature of the language problem stems from the fact that although India is a multilingual country, its people for the most part are monolingual (cf. Census of India, 1961:437ff). Given this problem, opportunities for cross communication and social interaction across regions becomes difficult if not impossible. Another problem stems from the fact that language implies certain traditions, customs, and ways of life which people are often unwilling to give up. A great deal of mistrust permeates Indian society directed against the dominant Hindi-speaking northerners who are perceived to press for Hindi dominance and increased political power at the expense of other non-Hindi speaking communities.

Nehru was fully aware of the political climate in India after independence and was certain that Muslims and other minority groups would resist any efforts to bring about a national language common to all the people of the

subcontinent. At the same time he knew that the only way to draw people together with a shared national identity was to work toward the creation of a common language. Nehru deftly pursued this aim by pressing for the creation of "official" languages which would be used to run the affairs of state and for various communication between the state and central governments. This "official" language policy was an example of innovative leadership on domestic matters. Consistent with his conflict-averse leadership style, Nehru carefully tried to avoid using the term "national" language so as to shed any image of dominance of one language over another. His play with semantics served a useful function by avoiding the issue of language preference. His application of the "official language" principle allowed for the continued use of major languages in the states in which they were spoken but also provided an opportunity for the selection of a common language for communicating with the central government. Despite the fact that this was indeed an innovative approach to the language problem, Nehru's leadership in this area also demonstrates his penchant for short-term satisficing options to manage conflict rather than to resolve them.

In terms of political leadership and strategy, Nehru's approach served to avoid the broader issue of ethnicism which was cloaked behind the language issue. In order the

preserve order, Nehru did not address the issue of ethnicity directly but rather focused on the issue of language as a representation of ethnic identity. His development of the concept of "official language" served to mitigate ethnic rivalries by drawing peoples' attention from historic ethnic rivalries to the issue of language so that some compromise might be reached. His penchant for pursuing satisficing options damaged his effectiveness because he seemingly separated the issue of ethnicity from language in his dealings with the minority problem.

Since all states had to communicate with the central government, and all government transactions had to be in a commonly accepted language, it would only be a matter of time before the constituents of each state would learn and accept the common language so that they would be able to communicate with their government and with other people in neighboring states. Das Gupta (1970:37), clarifying the important distinction between national language and official language, notes:

For analytical convenience, it may be suggested, then, an official language should imply an accepted language of administration as well as a means of communication between the government and the governed. Such an official language may or may not be the same as the diplomatic language used for external relations. It is necessary to interpret the notion of a common language in a much wider sense than what is implied in the narrower category of official language. Common language should stand for a generally comprehensible code of communication used throughout the nation. It is

conceivable that the common language may not be coextensive with the national language. In fact, in a multilingual society there may be a plurality of national languages. The criterion of a national language may lie in its being the natural speech of a major linguistic community for which the members of the group nurture a primordial affection. Given these analytical distinctions, it is possible to describe a political community where the official language may not be a common language, just as several national languages can exist and be recognized within such a political community without all or most of them being designated as official languages.

Consistent with Nehru's style of leadership which values accommodation and compromise as a means of realizing certain desired objectives, Nehru's approach in the language problem was a reconciliatory one. Having traveled throughout the country extensively, he fully understood the South's concern that Hindi could be used as a tool to establish the dominance of the North over the South. At the same time he could not ignore the fact that over 30% of the total population spoke Hindi. The trait of leadership efficacy is most readily apparent in Nehru's development of the "link language" concept. This enabled him to co-opt support for his language policy and have it successfully administered in slow stages. In order to find a common basis of agreement he sought a link language that would sustain the important position of Hindi while still establishing a second language acceptable to south Indians. The link language was English; it was a language familiar to the educated aristocracy but spoken by few people in

both the North and the South. Table 6.1 in the appendix depicts the nature of the language situation in India:

The trait of power motivation is apparent in Nehru's efforts to forge a link language. Whereas, in the Hindu-Muslim communal problem, Nehru weakened the bureaucratic structure by diminishing its powers of negotiation and conflict settlement, this was not the case with respect to the language issue. From the perspective of power motivation, Nehru seemed to strengthen the bureaucracy in its efforts to manage the language problem. In sharp contrast with his micro-management approach to the communal problem, Nehru tried to limit his own personal intervention in conflict management in the language issue. This may be the result of unpleasant and unsuccessful results when he sought to do the same in the communal problem. In 1957 Nehru appointed an Official Language Commission whose task it was to determine the best way in which the country could be unified linguistically. It is interesting to note that he entertained little if any other option of drawing the country together rather than through the means of linguistic unification. He was dogmatic in his belief that social concord could be realized if the country could be unified linguistically. This again represents a very short-term and narrow view of problems from the vantage point of effective political leadership.

Nehru's commission produced a report which advocated the use of Hindi and English as official languages. English would serve as the link language bridging the communication barrier between the people of the North and the South, while Hindi would continue to be considered the language of principal discourse. Nehru's commission report noted that Hindi was "adopted as the official language for the official business of the Union and for purposes of interstate communication, not because it is better developed than the other regional languages are; not because a greater or more varied wealth of literary output is available in it; nor because it has presently a large availability of books in the sciences and in different branches of modern knowledge. It is chosen for performing the job of the official language medium on pan-Indian levels because it happens to be understood and spoken, amongst the regional languages, by the largest number of people..." (Report of the Official Language Commission, 1957:37).

III. Nehru and the Political Turmoil Behind the Language Question

Aside from Nehru's support of the use of Hindi as an official language, many other communal groups and prominent leaders supported the Hindi cause. The militant communal groups, however, posed a problem for Nehru in that they

advocated no accommodation with Muslim and other ethnic groups. They ardently supported Hindi as the dominant language and called for drastic measures to have it implemented as a national language as well as the official one.

Although Nehru concurred with their views on the selection of Hindi as a common language, he was disenchanted with their rejection of other tongues, particularly the use of English as a link language. Once again, in his dealings with regard to the language issue the trait of political efficacy is brought to the fore. Nehru illustrated his leadership style which sought compromise rather than confrontation, diplomatic tact instead of unbridled hostility. Instead of publicly attacking opponents of English as a link language through official statements or through the press, Nehru had his demands aired through close friends in Parliament during Parliamentary debates. This had the effect of making Nehru's views known while at the same time forestalling confrontation so that his language policy could be implemented. Instead of directly attacking prominent pro-Hindi leaders such as P.D. Tandon, Sampurnananad, Ravi Shankar Shukla, Govind Das, and K.M. Munshi, among others, he allowed them to air their views in the Constituent Assembly where they were criticized by Nehru's Congress Party supporters.

In the context of leadership efficacy, and in terms of leadership strategy, Nehru initiated this maneuver in order to present himself as a leader who was above the political bickering and one who had the broader national interest at heart. The trait of power motivation is apparent in the way he delegated responsibilities to loyal subordinates who assumed the task of thrashing out his policy through parliament. Nehru left the major political battles and acrimonious debates to his supporters in Congress. This strategy seemed to work well for Nehru. The Congress party held strongly together in support of his leadership. The southern region of the country hesitantly supported his policy based his support of English as a second official language. At the same time, the weakness of this approach was in its inherent inability to search and develop possible alternative solutions to the language issue.

The trait of policy dogmatism is apparent in the fact that Nehru distanced himself from his opposition to the degree that he did not have to confront other policy alternatives. At the same time, Nehru was able to rigidly hold steadfast to the view that creating a common language would produce social tranquility in the long run. From the vantage point of historical experience this appears to be an inaccurate assumption, however, from the vantage point of Nehru, given his proclivity toward satisficing options, it

was a valid and correct assumption. At the very least it would buy time and ease tensions so that other ethnic issues could be resolved at a later date.

Nehru's strategy of rising above conflict and exercising conciliatory leadership was in tune with the political culture of India which insisted on consensual, cooperative decision-making and which recognized and appreciated the religious, ethnic, and linguistic diversity that characterized the country. At the same time, Nehru's strategy was consistent with Indian political culture which acknowledges the significance of the personification of leadership and individual-centered decision-making.

Despite Nehru's efforts, his opponents did not give up their fight in their support of having Hindi as India's exclusive national language. Govind Das and P.D. Tandon actively pursued votes in the Constituent Assembly; Govind Das organized a National Language Convention and other gatherings with prominent intellectuals, writers, and linguists who supported the cause of Hindi as the dominant national language. Tandon, Das, and their colleagues gained more votes as they tactfully turned to a new strategy of convincing undecided members of parliament that support for Hindi as a national language did not automatically imply Hindu dominance in India. They successfully conveyed the

message that support for Hindi was not automatically an expression of consent for ethnic, religious, or linguistic particularism. Although they could not claim an overwhelming victory, Tandon, Das, and their supporters earned the respect of Nehru and his followers. Their successful lobbying made a compromise solution inevitable.

Nehru was quite content to have it as such. The alternative of having a single dominant language, in Nehru's eyes, would be far worse. Das Gupta (1970:137) notes: "Given the almost equal strength in the Assembly of the rival blocs in the Congress party, it was obvious that these rivals both needed a measure of compromise if they cared for a viable national language policy. The mood of the house also favored a compromise. Ultimately, a compromise was reached on the basis of what became known as the Munshi-Ayyangar formula. This formula did not provide for a national language. It used the term "official language of the Union" and provided that this language would be Hindi written in the Deva Nagari script. The acceptance of this provision by the Constituent Assembly of India clearly suggests that in spite of many concessions on details, the Hindi bloc was successful in getting its major demand accepted by framers of the Indian constitution."

The final result of the protracted deliberations by various factions within the Constituent Assembly was a constitutional provision in the Indian Constitution which declared that Hindi in Deva Nagari script would be the legally recognized official language (Constitution of India, 1965:182ff).

Nehru's acceptance of this reflects his policy flexibility on pressing internal matters such as the one relating to language. In light of his policy flexibility, Nehru carefully introduced his proposal for English as a link language by having it incorporated as an official language for all central governmental transactions. His strategy was successful. In 1963 Parliament enacted the Official Language Act of 1963 which called for the use of English or Hindi for all central government transactions. The use of English was sanctioned indefinitely and proved to be the unifying link language through which peoples of the North and South would communicate. English, unlike Hindi, was not laden with cultural, religious, and ethnic associations. It was not the preferred language by the people of the north and the south but the only one which seemed acceptable at the time. At the very least it provided an opportunity for greater interregional communication and provided the preliminary basis for some

form of unity based upon the expression of ideas through a common forum of communication.

Nehru's strategic introduction of English as a link language provides another insight into how the trait of leadership efficacy is played out and how Nehru forcefully pushed through his own political agenda under the semblance of political compromise. With regard to English as a link language, Nehru sincerely believed that such a proposal would serve as the basis for future negotiations between rival ethnic groups. For some Hindu's the use of English had "colonial" associations with it. However, the Muslims and other non-Hindi speaking communities did not associate English as being the language of the former colonial power. English was much more acceptable to non-Hindi speaking communities because it did not pose a threat of linguistic, cultural, and political dominance by any particular community over the others. English was also viewed as a springboard from which India could more effectively deal with her outside world, especially the West.

IV. Nehru's Leadership in Administration of the Official Language Policy

During the time of the 1956 Report of the Official Language Commission which recognized English and Hindi as the languages of official governmental transactions, Nehru

and his friend and cabinet member, Maulana Azad, who was then minister of education, came under sharp attack for being pro-English and trying to delay the phasing out of English in favor of Hindi. Much of the confrontation over this issue which took place were between Nehru and P.D. Tandon, the leader of the pro-Hindi faction. Although these two men were once close personal friends, they differed in their views of how India should be governed. Nehru's vision of independent India incorporated certain secular, western principles; Tandon's perspectives, however, evolved from deeply held religious and traditional beliefs (cf. Brass, 1965:35f).

Nehru's involvement with the language issue illustrates his leadership capabilities and the style in which his political influence was exercised. His dealings with P.D. Tandon reveal how he handled opposition and the manner in which he was able to get policy implemented.

In 1950 P.D. Tandon ran a heated campaign to gain the presidency of the Indian National Congress. Nehru did not run against him but supported a candidate against Tandon. Once again, his decision not to run against Tandon reflects his conflict averse personality and his leadership style which favors accommodation and reconciliation. Tandon emerged victorious and had the loyal support of pro-Hindi

groups in Parliament. Nehru and his backers lost the Congress presidency, however they retained their influence in Parliament. After Tandon's victory, Nehru used various forms of pressure to thwart Tandon's leadership of the Congress and finally was able to force him to resign the presidency (Das Gupta, 1970:164). This incident shows that despite Nehru's proclivity toward compromise and conciliatory diplomacy, he would be readily prepared to forgo these attributes when he found it convenient and politically expedient to do so.

One of Nehru's major tasks was to devise a policy which would promote Hindi as an official language while at the same time promote English as an acceptable link language. Much of the difficulty which he encountered resulted from the fact that there had been no clearly defined plan for implementing any official language policy. His ability to innovatively formulate and develop a means of implementing a language policy, as discussed in the material which follows, illustrates his skills as an administrator.

V. Nehru's Leadership in Language Implementation:

In 1950 Nehru oversaw the creation of a Board of Scientific Terminology (later the Commission for Scientific and Technical Terminology) whose task it was to create over

350,000 new terms in Hindi to facilitate communication and research in various matters relating to science and technology. Instead of leaving this task to a special government-appointed panel of experts, Nehru sought to expedite the process by assigning various translation responsibilities to certain universities such as Delhi and Ranchi University who were assigned specific fields for translation.

The delegation of responsibilities in this format appeared to be more efficient, but for Nehru it seemed to be a politically productive one as well. The trait of power motivation is apparent here in Nehru's attempt to strictly control the translation aspect of his language policy. He was careful not to leave control of the tasks of translation to expert panelists who might have the political support of some members of the opposition. Instead, he appeared to leave the task to various persons in universities who maintained close political ties with his supporters. By doing this he weakened the bureaucratic structure, most notably, the Commission for Scientific and Technical Terminology, which could have managed a phase of the language implementation project. The weakened commission served to promote strongly personality-oriented and centralized leadership in the Prime Minister's office.

Nehru's control over the process of implementing his language policy was primarily maintained through various forms of indirect political and financial controls. This was very much a political move. Since many universities receive considerable governmental support for their training and research activities, Nehru's appointee at the Ministry of Education would oversee the manner in which they perform their tasks, especially those requested of them from the central government is closely monitored. Nehru's policy of subsidizing nonofficial bodies and organizations for creating books, manuals, dictionaries, and other items involved in translation allowed him to maintain control over the groups involved in the translation and editorial process. This suggests a leadership style that was strongly oriented toward centralization of power in the hands of the Prime Minister. This also reflects a high degree of the trait of power motivation where Nehru sought nearly absolute control over his political environment on the language question.

His insistence in having the Ministry of Education disseminate information and matters relating to Hindi language administration, his use of the Ministry of Home Affairs to teach and supervise the training of central government employees in Hindi, his use of the Ministry of Law to translate legal texts in Hindi for use in courts

throughout India, and his use of the Ministry for Information and Broadcasting to publicize and rally support for his language policy reflect a concerted effort to use the political infrastructure and loyal supporters at ministerial levels to advance his political agenda. Nehru was so concerned with successfully pushing through his common language policy to linguistically provide some basis for unity for the country, that sometimes the quality his efforts and the quality of the translated materials had much to be desired (cf. Ministry of Scientific Research and Cultural Affairs, 1962, Sharma, 1964).

Das Gupta (1970:166ff) notes:

The policy of subsidizing nonofficial bodies for the dissemination of the products of Hindi planning was apparent in the act of officially assigning to the Nagari Pracharani Sabha (a Hindi organization) the task of preparing a ten-volume encyclopedia in Hindi. This work has been running behind schedule, and the nine volumes published thus far have not set any enviable standard. In fact, the policy of giving liberal grants to nonofficial organizations to promote and develop Hindi initially raised many problems of coordination and control of quality. The routinized system of a standard ministry in India was inadequate to handle such problems...

All of these implementation efforts require the investment of a sizeable sum of money. These funds are ultimately used to employ thousands of Hindi authors, experts, teachers, and scribes. The actual output of these personnel has been oriented more toward contribution in quantity than quality. Success has been measured by the number of terms, volumes, schools, incentives, and even programs. The actual use of the products of Hindi planning has rarely been subjected to systematic investigation. This is not surprising, since administrative leadership in India has generally been interested in measuring any plan more by its monetary investment than by substantial results.

This is evident upon comparison of what Nehru's government spent to promote Hindi actual outcome from that expenditure. Table 6.2 in the appendix reflects governmental expenditure and shows that a great deal of money was spent by Nehru for the purposes of promoting literacy programs in many of the northern Indian states. Table 6.3, which conveys information on literacy rates in various states, shows that the expenditures that were made did not produce significant results. This strongly reveals that Nehru's leadership on the language issue lacked the important ingredient of quality control.

In spite of the fact that Nehru spent a considerable amount of money to launch the language programme, the lack of quality control diminished its effectiveness. Nehru's immediate concern was to initiate a greater number of programs to use a common language for communication. Little progress was made since the quality of these programs was lacking and there was still considerable reluctance to change linguistic usage and linguistic affiliations. Table 6.3 in the appendix reflects the low rates of literacy which existed even after the language policy was introduced. Table 6.3 provides 1961 data and compares literacy rates in various states against in relation to one another. It appears that even after Nehru's strong financial and

political support of the common language policy, many states still had low rates of literacy.

VI. Assessment of Nehru's Language Policy:

Nehru's official language program which sought to spread Hindi and English did not achieve the widespread acceptance or beneficial results that it sought. After having initiated the program educational and literacy rates did not significantly increase as a result of governmental policy. Higher literacy levels were intended as a means of fostering the notion of a national self-identity. It was also viewed as a means to diminish parochialism in favor of a common identity.

The desired goals were not fully realized. Educational development among common people in the Hindi-speaking states still remained lower than those of non-Hindi speaking states. According to the Press Registrar report of 1967, seven Indian languages surpassed Hindi in the amount of readership among prominent Indian papers. According to 1966 figures, Hindi (5.4%) lagged behind Malayalam (36.9%), Tamil (20.9%), Gujarati (20.6%), Marathi (15.6%), Bengali (12.8%), Urdu (11.4%), and Kannada (11.1%) in terms of newspaper circulation and readership (Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 1967:49,103).

Nehru's efforts to promote English, however, met with greater success. The states in the South were especially receptive to the development and proliferation of English. Although only about 2.5% of the population understood English, newspaper, magazine, and other print material in English flourished. English language dailies multiplied a great pace and soon assumed the largest share of the total circulation of all dailies. From 1964-1966 readership in English increased from 24.9 to 25.3 percent while it declined in Hindi from 14.1 to 13% in spite of the fact that approx. 30% of the total population were Hindi speakers. English readership among the Malayalam speakers was 11.3% even though Malayalees comprised only about 3.8% of the total population; 11 percent of the Tamil speakers read English although they comprised only about (6.9%) of the total population; figures for other groups are as follows (amount of readership [percent of total population]: Marathi 9.4[7.6]; Gujarathi 7.9[4.6]; and Bengali 7.9[7.7]. Having taken all dailies and periodicals into account, it appears that English dailies command the largest share of the total circulation (Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 1967:98).

Nehru and his Official Language Commission soon realized that the allotted 15 year span of time would not be sufficient to make a transition to Hindi and English.

Nehru had accepted this time frame as a compromise measure to satisfy pro-Hindi enthusiasts who were suspicious of Nehru's proclivity towards English. He realized that his programs to spread the use of Hindi had not yet taken root and that it would be unrealistic to expect success in such a short span of time.

Instead of publicly calling for an end to a specific time for transition to Hindi, Nehru had his Home Minister in Parliament declare that the 1965 deadline could not be met. Nehru opposed a rigid formula of transition and critiqued his own program of trying to spread Hindi which he initiated in deference to the pro-Hindi lobby in Congress. Nehru remarked: "The business of some kind of slot-machine turning out Hindi words and Hindi phrases is artificial, unreal, absurd, fantastic, and laughable. We cannot have that kind of approach to a language" (Nehru, 1964:60). In support of English, Nehru remarked: "English will continue as an associate language to the official language Hindi, and the question as to how long English should continue as an associate language will be determined only by the non-Hindi speaking people...There will be no bar or handicap imposed on the non-Hindi speaking people in the matter of recruitment to services. While I would certainly welcome a man who does not know Hindi to learn it, I would like all feelings of disability to vanish... I do not want

to impose Hindi on any state which does not want it"
(Nehru, 1964:59).

VII. Nehru the Great Conciliator and Political Compromise:

In spite of Nehru's personal assurances that Hindi would not be forcibly imposed upon states in the South, many southern leaders remained skeptical of personal claims and wanted legislative enactments which would guarantee their freedom with respect to the language issue. To neutralize any organized opposition to the Hindi-English official language plan, Nehru insisted that local languages would continue to be used. In a committee meeting of the Congress session at Pragjyotishpur, Nehru remarked that "the use of any of the fourteen national languages in India, even for official All India purposes, was not ruled out even though it might be a little inconvenient." This reflects Nehru's penchant for cooperation and accommodation in order to achieve some degree of consensus.

Nehru was much more accommodative and receptive to compromise than Govind Das and other members of the opposition who favored Hindi supremacy. Nehru's reassertion that majority decisions will not be imposed upon the minority and that regional languages would be officially recognized, gained him significant popular support,

including the support of certain leaders of the Communist party such as Ajoy Ghosh. Although he emerged as a symbol for unity, Nehru was still subjected to criticism from the pro-Hindi groups for trying to undermine Hindi as a national language and from non-Hindi groups for failing to provide specific legislative guarantees to protect their rights vis-a-vis language.

Nehru's own popularity and personal respect, admiration, and appeal allowed him to forge the Official Language Act which recognized Hindi and English as the principal official languages of communication along with fourteen other major languages representing significant linguistic majorities in various states throughout India. What emerges here is an image of a leader who has a vision broader than those of his contemporaries; a leader who is willing to endure criticism on both fronts and yet refrain from spontaneously retaliating against those who instigate verbal assaults made upon him. Instead, Nehru constantly worked through his close advisors to push his policies through. He had his ministers, such as Home Minister G.B. Pant, to vocalize his concerns in Parliament and rally support for his programs while he worked behind the scenes for compromise solutions. As a politician, speaking to the people he was a "great communicator." As a chief executive involved in legislative tangles, he appeared to be a "great

conciliator or compromiser." He was not pandering to various interest groups but respectful of them and fully recognized that the unity of India could only be insured by consensus decisions which respected the rights of minorities and other groups whose loyalty would be necessary to forge together a united nation.

Summary:

This chapter has given an insight into the major factors that shaped Jawaharlal Nehru's belief systems and world-view. Nehru's father, and especially Mahatma Gandhi shaped his views toward the direction of development in India as a consequence of Nehru's participation in the Quit India Movement. In particular, Nehru's leadership style is manifest in his efforts in dealing with the language issue and in dealing with the Hindu-Muslim conflict where he advocated a consensual, compromise-based approach to conflict management. At the same time, he sought to rigidly control the implementation process of his language policy by creating commissions and relying on his subordinates to enter the fray with Parliament over the language issue.

It has been shown that Nehru had a deep sense of personal mission in contributing to the freedom and well-being of India and that he viewed his political

functions, victories and defeats in very personal terms. Nehru's involvement with the Hindu-Muslim conflict and the way in which he dealt with the language conflict reflected certain aspects of his leadership style, which in summary, included some of the following attributes:

- a) *Nehru exhibited a leadership proclivity toward accommodation, compromise, and negotiation.*

- b) *Nehru expressed an affinity for the pursuit of temporal, satisficing solutions to pressing problems;*

- c) *Nehru's leadership stressed conflict management rather than conflict resolution; Nehru was satisfied with managing problems rather than completely working toward its resolution.*

d) *Nehru employed strategy-oriented leadership.*

In light of the issue of leadership efficacy, Nehru sought to focus on particular issues in order to divert attention from others. For example, Nehru sought to use the Quit India movement as a uniting mechanism that drew animosities against British rule rather than against rival Muslim and Hindu groups. Another strategy which he employed was to convince his colleagues in the Congress Party that the communal problem was simply a mask for deeper social and

economic divisions which divided the masses. One strategy to unite people was to identify a common enemy and rally the masses against the British in the Quit India movement. Another strategy, which he believed to be central to the communal issue, was to work toward economic development among the Muslims which were the disadvantaged group.

e) *On domestic issues, Nehru displayed a penchant for a short-term conflict management, rather than long-term planning that would foster conflict resolution.* In 1937 after the Congress Party's victory at the polls, Nehru erroneously concluded that his party's victory reflected some form of policy consensus among the Indian people. He associated electoral success with Muslim acceptance of Congress party leadership which was not the case at all. He misread the political climate in India and was not receptive to the possibility that the Congress party may not be accepted by the Muslims and other ethnic communities in the country.

f) *Nehru exhibited a conflict-aversive personality disposition.* He preferred accommodation to direct conflict; he sought to appease the militant Muslim leadership's demand for greater political influence by trying to co-opt them into the political structure. This was achieved in his efforts to set up a Muslim Contacts Department in the

Congress party in 1937. He exhibited his tendency to dominate the political structure by appointing his friend, Dr. K.M. Ashraf to serve as secretary of the Muslim Contracts Department in the Congress party. Other subcommittees of the Congress party were also created to deal with Muslim concerns. The purpose of this was to weaken the hold of reactionary elements in various militant Muslim groups. In essence, this policy successfully brought in large numbers of Muslim people into the Congress party -- especially young people who were co-opted through various student organizations affiliated with the Congress party and which were set up throughout the country. However, the perceived fundamental political and economic inequalities which divided the Hindus and the Muslims were not fully addressed.

h) Nehru did not seek bold, new, innovative proposals on the communal problem and in efforts which sought to unite Hindus and Muslims under one Congress party leadership. He believed that the conflict management was more of a practicable alternative than the realization of any permanent solution.

i) Nehru's dogmatism and rigid perceptions about the Muslim community mitigated his efforts in forging an effective communal policy. Despite Nehru's meetings with Mohammed Ali

Jinnah's in which Jinnah expressed his reservations about the Congress party's intentions, Nehru rigidly believed that the election of Muslim representatives to a Constituent Assembly could diffuse the political tensions between the two groups. By taking this position, he failed to recognize that this mere act would label Muslims as outsiders who needed their own representatives. This policy went against the grain of unity and the creation of a sense of national self-identity. Another manifestation of Nehru's policy dogmatism is reflected in his misperception that Congress and the Hindu majority's willingness to accede linguistic, religious, and cultural liberties to the Muslim minorities would diminish their desire for separate statehood. He was dogmatic in his belief that peace and order in the country could be realized if the country could be unified with a common language. Nehru could not fully appreciate the Muslims' religious, historical, and cultural ties to Islam which was stronger than any attachment to the society in which they lived.

Nehru also mistakenly viewed the Muslims to be a single community of people with common aims. What Nehru failed to see was that there were essentially two groups in the Islamic community in India. One group sought independence and a separate Islamic state at any cost. The other group would forgo their political independence in the land of

their birth if their religious freedoms could be guaranteed. In this regard, Nehru seemingly gave up on the possibility of union because of the minds of those who subscribed to the former view. His perception of the Muslim community as a single group which sought separation from India precluded his efforts to work toward forging unity. This also could never be resolved but only managed at best.

j) *Unlike the communal issue, Nehru exercised an innovative, but satisficing, approach to the language problem.* Although, in general, Nehru did not exhibit innovative leadership in dealing with the issue of majority-minority relations, vis-a-vis the communal problem, he did exercise an innovative approach in his dealings with the language issue. He played with semantics of the language question so as to avoid raising the issue of language preference. Instead, he employed the novel concept of establishing two official "languages" for India, Hindi and English, along with other recognized major state languages. Consistent with Nehru's style of leadership which places a great premium on accommodation and compromise, Nehru's approach to the language problem was a reconciliatory one.

k) *Nehru distanced himself from political conflict and political infighting over policy issues.* In terms of leadership strategy, he left the major political conflict to

his loyalists in Congress to iron out, especially regarding the language issue. This strategy was effective for sustaining support for Nehru's advocacy of English as a second official language among the southern Indian states.

Chapter 7: The External Dimensions of National Self-Identity: Nehru and Non-alignment

Introduction:

The purpose of this chapter is to show how certain attributes of Nehru's personality and leadership style helped to define India's Non-aligned policy. Jawaharlal Nehru's adroit skill in political compromise, viewing issues and problems from a global perspective, and his reliance on close confidantes to engage themselves in arduous and sometimes acrimonious battles with Parliament, enabled him to work toward fostering change with a somewhat politically detached style of leadership. Although Nehru was ever present in canvassing support for his domestic policies behind the scenes, he removed himself from overly detailed attention to issues on the domestic front. This contrasted sharply with his daughter's micro-management leadership efforts in the Punjab as will be discussed in a later chapter.

Unlike Nehru's management of domestic issues, in matters related to external affairs, Nehru was his own spokesperson. His leadership role in the Non-aligned movement demanded very direct and personal involvement. Aside from working to contribute to the development of national self-identity on the domestic front at home, Nehru sought to enhance the image of India and foster the

development of India's "state identity" in the eyes of the world community. In this regard, his daughter, Indira Gandhi exhibited the very same affinity for personal involvement in external affairs issues.

I. Independence and the Development of Nehru's Non-Aligned Policy

Jawaharlal Nehru formally announced the principle of Non-alignment as a key feature of India's external relations on September 7, 1946 in a radio announcement on All India radio; it was made during a time when an Interim Government had been set up to facilitate the transfer of power from the British into Indian hands. Nehru (1958:2) noted:

We propose, as far as possible, to keep away from the power politics of groups, aligned against one another, which have led in the past to world wars and which may again lead to disasters on an even vaster scale.

Demonstrating his commitment to democracy and his opposition to participating in the ideological battles between the East and West, Nehru (1959:68f) remarked:

Talking of India only, and not of all Asia, we have fairly clear ideas about our political and economic structure. We function in this country under a Constitution which may be described as a parliamentary democracy. It has not been imposed upon us. We propose to continue with it... We intend to function on the economic plane, too, in our own way... We have no intention to turn communists. At that same time, we have no intention of being dragooned in any

other direction... We have chosen our path and we propose to go along it, and to vary it as and when we choose, not at somebody's dictate or pressure..."

This statement reflects Nehru's policy flexibility. Nehru would not allow himself to be limited or debilitated by circumstances defined by the status quo. He was an innovative leader who forged a new path in India's relationship with her neighbors. Non-alignment as a policy serves as another example of his ability to achieve compromise and consensus in the context of inter-state relations. Non-alignment was, during its own time, a unique, deft, and truly innovative policy which many other countries emulated or sought to emulate in the context of their own domestic and external political conditions.

What is remarkable to note is the fact that Nehru sought to pursue a policy of Non-alignment in the face of external hostility and provocations which might have deterred other leaders from pursuing a similar course. During the latter stages of the independence movement the Soviet Union appeared hostile to the emergence of a democratic republic and openly supported acts of armed insurrection by the Communist Party of India and resultant uprisings during 1948-1949. The Soviets were unwilling to provide economic support necessary for domestic development; China supported pro-Marxist movements in India and was unwilling to receive India as an independent

democratic republic. Domestically, there were opposing factions voicing contrasting ideological affinities, many of whom preferred a pro-Western policy (Bandyopadhyaya, cf. Nanda, 1976:180f). Remarkably, despite pressures to the contrary, Nehru chose Non-alignment as the foundation of India's external policy since its inception as a newly independent nation.

Nehru's focus on Non-alignment evolved from strong political concerns. He sought to raise India's stature in the global community of nations so that it would be treated an equal partner in global politics. He believed that once India was accepted as a major state actor, it would benefit from the economic ties, political support, and security enjoyed by other key global actors (cf. Nehru, 1958:6,21-5,34-40,205-6). This was important because stronger political ties with other countries would precipitate stronger economic, commercial, and trade-based interactions with other states. The acceptance of India as a major world actor would improve the domestic economic climate and would reinforce its identity as a newly independent united nation which would be fully able to manage its own affairs and participate in global decision-making. He worked to create India's "state-identity" to foster her image as great state actor in the eyes of her neighbors and also in the eyes of her own people so as to

establish a basis for unity around national pride and loyalty (Nehru, 1958:220-1,247).

Mallik (1967:48f) notes:

(T)he sense of self-respect that India had been long cultivating was a motive force behind her non-alignment. Being conscious of her greatness, potential as well as actual, India was fully awake to what she viewed as her great responsibility for the cause of the underdog among nations. Notwithstanding the military weakness and industrial backwardness keeping her in the third rank of Powers, she was desirous to play a big and constructive role in world affairs and to earn international prestige thereby. But she was also cautious not to undermine internationalism and pollute her self-respect thereupon.

An enlightened self-respect being the greatest single cause of its popularity in India, her non-alignment drew from a disciplined and well-cultivated ego. India's Non-alignment drew also from an urge for power...She visualized the gradual displacement of the "urges to domination" by the sense of service among nations and stood for the decentralization of power among them. She worked for building the temper of peace for the former and stimulated the solidarity of the weak and small Powers to achieve the latter while also encouraging the harmony of the Great Powers. But inasmuch as she sought to get her status and prestige enhanced and exerted her influence through these endeavors, functioned as a go-between in relation to the antagonistic power blocs and tried to preserve her weight for keeping the balance, even though in favor of peace, her non-alignment, far from being based on the negation of power politics, was a calculated projection for power and a move, with a difference, of power politics.

Mallik (1967) quite accurately portrays the essential character of India's approach to Non-alignment but doesn't fully appreciate the degree to which this policy was

formulated and shaped by Nehru. Nehru helped to apply the abstract concept of Non-alignment in a very terms in a practical setting which benefitted India. In principle, Nehru's Non-alignment policy subscribed to the following guidelines. It rejected military commitments and political or economic relationships which would require or lead to any form of military alliance. It reflected a pursuit of peaceful policies vis-a-vis India's neighbors from a position of strength so that attempts at peaceful resolution of disputes did not appear as weakness. It rejected dependency on any of the major powers in order to pursue national developmental goals. In this regard, it was also a shrewd policy because it offered a means of entering into only those relationships that would enable India to become more self-sufficient. Finally, its goal was to enable India to emerge as an independent actor which was capable and able to take various positions on issues based on her own assessment of the situation and not on the political or ideological inclinations of either Super Power blocs (cf. Gaur in Patil, 1987:187f).

Soon after independence, by April, 1949, Nehru established contacts with numerous countries. By April 5, 1949, he signed a Treaty of Friendship and Establishment with Switzerland, entered into trade agreements with the American-backed segment of Germany, entered into commercial

relationships with Yugoslavia, Pakistan, Czechoslovakia, Afghanistan, and Japan then under U.S. occupation. Other formal treaties of friendship and commerce were formally signed by Nehru with the governments of the United States, China, Iran, France, Italy, the Soviet Union, Sweden, Finland, Egypt, Australia, Tibet, Yemen, Iraq, Poland, and the Philippines, among others (Constituent Assembly, 1949:1122ff). By the end of 1949, India spent approximately 6.1 million rupees (cf. Constituent Assembly, 1949:165f) on diplomatic exchanges, good will missions, and other activities which generated high profile publicity for India's emerging status in the world. The numerous treaties that Nehru entered into shows that the primary focus of Non-alignment was political in character. It reflects his leadership style which places a great premium on negotiation, compromise, and accommodation with other political actors in order to reach a desired end. The desired goal at this time was political acceptance and recognition from other countries, and independence from all vestiges of colonialism. It is interesting to note that Nehru's daughter, Indira, also initiated personal direct contact with various heads of government in order to establish closer ties. The difference, however, was that for Nehru Non-Alignment was the goal; it was a desired and sought after policy objective, whereas for Mrs. Gandhi, Non-Alignment was merely a strategy applied to realize

politically expedient ends e.g. continued aid from both Eastern and Western states and the development of various indigenous heavy industries.

The late 1950's and early 1960s represented a time during which Nehru's preoccupation with a high profile Non-aligned policy came into fruition. It was during a time when India faced mounting foreign exchange difficulties, low levels of domestic food production, and increasingly relied upon the West for helping her to sustain her slow rate of economic growth. It was also a time when the United States grew more receptive to India's Non-aligned position in the wake of the Cold War and concerns with the Soviet Union. Both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R increased their economic and technical assistance to India during this period as both sought a stable friendly country adjoining China which was viewed to be a potential threat, in different degrees, to both Super Powers.

Nehru was fully aware of the fact that India, because of its economic and military weaknesses, would be unable to assume the role of a major political actor between Super Powers. He fully realized that allying with either bloc increased the potential for regional conflict. Non-alignment would help India to retain the role of an independent observer, mediator, or arbiter in select

East-West disputes. Nehru's pursuit of Non-alignment as a policy initiative served to fulfill both Nehru's and India's deep psychological need for recognition. Brecher (1959:559f) notes:

Non-alignment had the added merit of satisfying a deep, inner urge for recognition, a natural by-product of colonial subjection. And it enables a relatively weak, newly independent state to play a major role on the stage of world politics. There is, finally, a psychological barrier to full-fledged alliance with any bloc. Like the American 'founding fathers' in the early years of the Republic, Indian leaders are intent on guarding their recently won freedom from all possible encroachments. Membership of a bloc is equated with loss of freedom of action in external affairs. This, in turn, is identified with a return to colonialism, though in different form.

Brecher's comment amplifies the point raised in an earlier chapter that notes that in many matters, especially in foreign affairs, there is considerable deference in authority to the leader. His comment also reinforces the point that the personification of leadership is a unique feature of the Indian political landscape. Consequently, leaders personally become identified with the country and vice versa, thereby satisfying both the leaders' and the country's deep urges for recognition which have been inexorably woven together.

The Non-alignment issue provides helpful insight into the personification of leadership which characterizes the

Indian view on leadership, as noted earlier in the dissertation. Nehru and India became symbolically one in the same. Nehru sought prestige and identified himself as the standard bearer for the nation. He was an individual with great pride in himself and in his country who enjoyed himself basking in the limelight of attention by the Super Powers and by poorer countries who looked upon India as a model upon which their own external policies could be mirrored. Nehru's pride in himself and his pride in country, dominated his views on external policies. His work in forging a state-identity revolved around his efforts to bolster his own image in contrast to the leaders of the major countries in the world. The same could be said about his daughter, Indira, who applied Non-Alignment, as a policy strategy which also resulted in the personification of leadership . Brecher, (1959:560f) notes:

What gives it (pride) special significance is the fact that pride finds its most acute expression in the personality of Jawaharlal Nehru. The consequences may be intangible, but they cannot be ignored. To cite but one example: the history of Indo-American relations bears ample testimony to foreign economic aid, and most dramatically in Nehru's refusal to sacrifice what he considered to be a measure of independence for much-needed American food in 1950-1...
Pride was not the decisive factor, but it served as a defence mechanism against foreign criticism, influenced Nehru's outlook and, therefore, affected the content of India's foreign policy.

From the vantage point of leadership, it is important to note that as Prime Minister, Nehru exerted overwhelming influence in the shaping of his external policies so as to enjoy a virtual monopoly over such issues (Brecher, 1959:564). Very few critics challenged his initiatives. They generally respected his efforts to provide India with a high profile image abroad. This contrasts sharply with Nehru's efforts in domestic matters such as the communal problem and language issue where he often encountered vociferous opposition in Parliament to some of his proposals.

Nehru sought to monopolize his control over the foreign affairs portfolio and directly went to foreign capitals to voice his concerns or to provide offers for mediating disputes such as during the Korean war when he contacted Stalin, Dean Acheson, then U.S. Secretary of State, and during the Indo-China war when he appealed to the parties involved to press for a cease-fire and later offered a six-point peace proposal for ending the conflict (Times of India, July 8, 1950; cf. Feb. 25, April 24, 1954). Nehru personally visited China in 1954, the Soviet Union in 1955, the United States in 1949 and 1956, Japan in 1957, many countries in South-east Asia and Europe, and visited Britain annually from 1948 in order to attend the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference. He established

direct personal contact with major leaders and sought every opportunity to generate a positive public image for himself which also reflected upon his country.

His strong-willed character prompted him to usurp all aspects of external policy in his own hands. It is interesting to note that on matters related to domestic affairs, especially as they relate to ethnic or communal issues, Nehru engaged in artful compromise in order to advance his political agenda. At the same time, on external relations issues, he exhibited a completely different behavior. In the realm Non-alignment and external affairs, it appeared that the word compromise was absent from his political lexicon. In many respects this leadership quality foreshadowed his daughter's leadership style which gave very little importance to negotiation and artful compromise as strategies of amicable dispute resolution.

Although Parliament and Cabinet members theoretically had a role in decision-making, Nehru sought to gain exclusive, domineering control over this area. As shown in the material which follows, from independence until the time of his death, Nehru held the External Affairs portfolio and would never relinquish control over this responsibility to any of his appointees. His daughter, Indira Gandhi, behaved in the same way when she assumed the role of Prime Minister.

II. The Centralization of Power: Nehru's Dominance in India's External Policies

Jawaharlal Nehru had a broad vision of how India should be perceived by the international community. He sought to bolster his own image among prominent leaders of the major world powers and sought to project his own views, and fame onto India. He sought to fulfill a deep-seeded need to earn respect, to be loved and admired. Indira Gandhi did not display the same desire for recognition. She seemed more concerned about legitimizing her leadership in the face of opposition at home. She shared with her father, a common desire to raise India's political profile on the global stage, however, her concern was focused more toward enabling India to benefit economically from a higher profile on the world stage.

Nehru sought to forge India's state-identity and to raise it toward a higher status by solidifying his control over India's foreign relations (cf. Nehru, 1959). The trait of power motivation can be seen in the way in which he sought to centralize foreign affairs policymaking in the office of the Prime Minister and how he appointed loyal confidantes to key decision-making positions whom he could control (cf. Nehru, 1961).

Often it is the case that institutional pressures help to shape and give direction to a country's external policies. In the case of India, it was the personality and the views of Nehru which dominated and at the same time weakened the institutional structures of government. Institutional structures such as Parliament and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was weakened due to lack of use. Nehru was so closely and personally identified with India's external policies, particularly Non-alignment, that both terms were regarded as synonymous. Instead of relying on the advice or expertise of appointed foreign service officials, Nehru established personal contacts with major world leaders. He preferred direct, face-to-face meetings with leaders in major foreign capitals to achieve this task.

The trait of power motivation is also apparent in the delegation of responsibilities to Krishna Menon who was one of Nehru's closest advisors. The delegation of most of the responsibilities to a single appointee offers even further insight into how the trait of power motivation precipitates the centralization of power. Krishna Menon was immensely loyal to Nehru yet Nehru allowed Menon to deal only with those political aspects of Non-alignment which Nehru chose to delegate to him. In any case, in nearly all major issues affecting Non-alignment and India's external relations, Nehru had the final say in all cabinet discussions. He

enjoyed the support of Congress Party loyalists in Parliament who would pass resolutions (often framed by Nehru himself) which would pledge full support of Nehru's external initiatives (Brecher, 1959:567f).

Nehru did face opposition from the Socialists, Communists, and other party leaders on issues such as the Hungarian revolt of 1956, territorial disputes in Kashmir, Indo-Pakistani relations, and Nehru's decision to remain in the Commonwealth of nations. However, given the fact that 365 of the 489 seats in Parliament during the 1957 elections went to the Congress Party, threats to Nehru's leadership were minimal.

The Indian press and financial community never seriously challenged Nehru's Non-aligned policy or its ancillary external policies. Much of the criticism that did exist centered on the tone and sometimes strained relations with the West. However, the basic foundation and principles of India's external policies were not brought into question (Brecher, 1959:568).

The trait of power motivation as reflected in the centralization of decision-making power in Nehru's hands did not come into being in a manner that violated India's democratic process. Nehru's leadership was anchored in a

leadership of deference to his authority; a deference to the power and magnetism of his personality at a time when India was groping for its own identity and esteem in the shadows of an imperial power. Brecher (1959:569) notes:

(T)he normal institutional pressures of a democratic state have had little discernible effect on the pillars of Indian foreign policy. This does not mean, however, that Nehru has imposed his views on a hostile political environment. On the contrary, his role on the world stage has called forth unstinted praise from the vast majority of politically conscious Indians. The reasons for this widespread support are many. For one thing, Nehru's policies have brought great prestige to India in the first decade of independence. His words are received with a marked effect on the course of events, as in Korea, Indo-China and the Middle East. The growing recognition of India's prominence in international affairs satisfies a deep urge of his people; they share his triumphs and find compensation for past colonial subjection and present social and economic ills. For another, there is a mass faith in Nehru's leadership which extends to large sections of the intelligentsia. But most important is his capacity to express in words and deeds the basic feelings and aspirations of his people. He guides them as a teacher does his pupils, he knows their mood and channels their ideals into realistic policy, but he rarely goes too far ahead of them. Non-alignment, anti-colonialism and anti-racialism admirably reflect these emotions and objectives.

Nehru centralized leadership by making certain that he was privy to all policy discussions which involved his loyalists that headed key cabinet positions. He fully lived up to traditional Indian conceptions of leadership in which the political leader enjoyed unchallenged, and domineering control over the political establishment. As mentioned in prior chapters, a leader's capacity to maintain order and

peace in a stable political, social, and economic climate is the primary, desired goal. In this regard, both he and his daughter were viewed to be successful. Consequently, some of the autocratic mannerisms which both he and his daughter exhibited were tolerated and sometimes even viewed to be necessary in order to preserve order.

It needs to be stressed that in large part, the centralization of decision-making was precipitated by the selection of close friends to hold key ministerial portfolios. The prevalence of the trait of power motivation and Nehru's desire to centralize decision-making in matters related to external affairs is reflected in his choice of advisors. Lord Mountbatten, the last Viceroy of India, became a close friend of Nehru; during the early period after independence, and influenced his decision to submit India's dispute with Pakistan over Kashmir to the United Nations, and to retain her membership in the Commonwealth (Campbell-Johnson, 1951:251f). Nehru chose his sister, Mme. Lakshmi Pandit to serve as his ambassador to Moscow, Washington, London, and later to the United Nations. She loyally conveyed information and developed a close personal link with major political capitals around the world.

He selected Dr. S.S. Radhakrishnan, one of India's eminent philosophers to serve as his ambassador to the

Soviet Union during 1950-1953. Dr. Radhakrishnan later became Vice President of India and remained a loyal political ally who vocally defended and articulated India's Non-aligned policy within the Indian political establishment. Nehru's selection of Maulana Azad as his representative to Iran and Turkey served to send a positive public signal that India sought to improve her domestic situation with discontented Muslim groups. Azad was a close friend of Nehru from the early Congress Party movement; he was a leader of the Muslims who supported Congress' activities against British occupation. Azad helped to improve Nehru's public image among Muslim minority groups in India and among predominantly Muslim nations abroad.

Sardar Panikkar was Nehru's closest advisor on matters relating to India's policy with respect to China during the early 1950s, when Panikkar served as Nehru's ambassador in Peking. He served as Nehru's emissary during the Korean War conflict during which he helped Nehru mediate in a negotiated settlement to the dispute, thereby, bring greater prestige and a higher public profile for both Nehru and India.

Among the closest of Nehru's advisors was Krishna Menon who served as Nehru's public spokesperson for the conduct of India's external relations. Although Krishna

Menon was appointed to various senior positions such as High Commissioner to London, ambassador to the United Nations, and Minister of Defence, his primary asset was his personal loyalty to the Prime Minister. Menon helped to persuade key Parliament leaders that India's continued membership in the Commonwealth of nations after independence was in the best interests of the country. He got along well with Congress party leaders and served Nehru well as his spokesperson and troubleshooter during the Korean conflict and the Suez Crisis.

Most of Nehru's senior advisors who helped to shape his Non-aligned policy and other matters related to external affairs comprised a "kitchen cabinet" of loyalists who faithfully articulated and implemented Nehru's policy initiatives. They were not foreign policy experts nor professional bureaucrats; they shared similar ideological affinities, subscribed to the same view of trying to bolster India's state identity, and willingly removed themselves from the limelight in order to advance the image and political agenda of their Prime Minister.

III. The Application and Political Impact of Nehru's Non-Aligned Policy

A. Rationale for Non-alignment:

An understanding of the political impact of Jawaharlal Nehru's Non-aligned policy cannot be fully explored unless it is examined in the context of the Prime Minister's role in it. If one were to draw inferences from this issue one would note that parallels can be made to Spencer's questions relating to great personalities in history shaping events or being shaped by them and Nehru's role in defining his political environment or being shaped by it. Nehru himself considered his role in political activity in minimal terms. On the question of his role in shaping India's Non-aligned policy, Nehru (1961:80) notes:

It is completely incorrect to call our policy "Nehru" policy. It is incorrect because all that I have done is to give voice to that policy. I have not originated it. It is a policy inherent in the circumstances of India, inherent in the past thinking of India, inherent in the whole mental outlook of India, inherent in the conditioning of the Indian mind during our struggle for freedom, and inherent in the circumstances of the world today. I come in by the mere accidental fact that during these few years I have represented that policy as Foreign Minister. I am quite convinced that whoever might have been in charge of the foreign affairs of India and whatever party might have been in power in India, they could not have deviated very much from this policy. Some emphasis might have been greater here or there because, as I said, it represents every circumstance that goes toward making the thought of India on these subjects.

Brecher (1959:564f) takes a completely different view and regards Nehru's leadership ability and personality traits to be instrumental in forging India's Non-aligned policy. Brecher notes:

In no other state does one man dominate foreign policy as does Nehru in India. Indeed, so overwhelming is his influence that India's policy has come to mean in the minds of people everywhere the personal policy of Pandit Nehru. And justifiably so, for Nehru is the philosopher, the architect, the engineer and the voice of his country's policy towards the outside world. This does not mean that he operates in a vacuum, for the aspirations... provide the framework within which policy must be devised. Nor is he entirely free from the influence of individuals and institutions in India. It does mean, however, that he has impressed his personality and his views with such overpowering effect that foreign policy must properly be termed a private monopoly....It was he who provided a rationale for India's approach to international politics since 1947. It was he who carried the philosophy of non-alignment to the world at large. And throughout this period he has dominated the policy-making process.

Although Brecher doesn't account for the unique context of the Indian political experience, it must be said that Nehru was, in part, successful in formulating, articulating, and implementing India's Non-Aligned policy because of notion of "deference to authority" ascribed to political leaders described in chapter four. Although his detractors sometimes characterized Nehru as an idealist, Nehru in many respects was a political pragmatist who understood the geo-political realities in which India could conduct her policy of Non-alignment. Perceiving the

potential utility of pressing for a Non-aligned external policy, Nehru (1961:32) noted:

I can understand some of the smaller countries of Europe or some of the smaller countries of Asia being forced by circumstances to bow before some of the greater powers and becoming practically satellites of those powers, because they cannot help it. The power opposed to them is so great and they have nowhere to turn. But I do not think that consideration applies to India... India is too big a country herself to be bound down to any country, however big it may be.

He went on to add:

I do not say that our country is superior or that we are above passion and prejudice, hatred and fury. But as things are, there are certain factors which help us. First of all, we are geographically so situated that we are not drawn into controversies with that passionate fury that some countries are. This is not due to our goodness, but is a matter of geography (Nehru, 1961:73).

Nehru's proclivity toward Non-alignment had an economic component in that he sought to raise India from conditions of adverse poverty and foster rapid economic development. The major thrust of his views on Non-alignment, however, gravitated toward politics. Nehru's approach to Non-alignment had a greater political component to it, whereas, his daughter, Indira's approach to the subject contained an economic dimension.

Nehru sought to alter the perception that India was simply a poverty-stricken sleeping giant. He wanted India

to be seen as a major emerging actor on the world scene. He believed that given the country's limited capital and low level of technology, it would be unlikely that India could emerge as a major industrial or technological power within a short span of time. He also knew that for these reasons India would be unable to meet all of her military and defence needs.

In view of these concerns he opted to approach the Non-alignment issue from the viewpoint of political diplomacy rather than focus on military or economic issues (cf. Nehru, 1961:79). Bandyopadhyaya (cf. Nanda, 1976:174) subscribes to this view and argued that Nehru's focus on the political dimensions of Non-alignment was prompted by a desire for international stature while minimizing the cost to obtain it. Bandyopadhyaya remarked: "Peace is a minimum pre-condition for our economic development, not only because a military preparation, which would be adequate for our security in all contingencies, would in fact be beyond our economic capability, but also because, even when we are not directly involved in a war, a war elsewhere would inevitably dislocate our foreign trade, reduce, if not eliminate the inflow of foreign aid, and thus upset our programme of development... In other words, it was necessary for India from the beginning, for the sake of her economic development, if for no other reason, to avoid entanglement

in the world-wide bipolar (or poly-centric) power conflict, and to play such a role in international politics in general and the United Nations in particular, as would minimize the chances of war, global, regional or local."

Bandyopadhyaya incorrectly presumes that the pursuit of Non-alignment was purposeful in that it sought to avoid entanglement with the Superpowers in favor of economic development. From the vantage point of Nehru, I would suggest that this was not the case at all. Nehru offered a new, innovative policy to promote India's public image on the global political landscape. The important point to note here is that any economic benefits resulting from Non-alignment was consequential, not intentional. In Indira Gandhi's case, however, Bandhyopadhyaya is correct. Indira Gandhi's pursuit of Non-alignment was based not so much on strengthening India's global political identity than it was on promoting purposeful, self-reliant, indigenous development.

Another point which many commentators on Non-alignment do not fully address is the fact that Nehru's pursuit of Non-alignment served to address domestic political needs in addition to India's quest for recognition among the external community of nations. India's diverse religious, linguistic, and social groups posed problems in forging a

common identity for the country. The pursuit of an aligned external policy subscribing to certain ideological inclinations would have served to divide and polarize various groups within the country. Bandyopadhyaya (cf. Nanda, 1976:178f) remarked that "(a) generally acceptable and dynamic foreign policy which made India an important actor on the international stage could provide a common focus for the nation as a whole and thus help the difficult process of national integration and state building." Bandyopadhyaya went on to note that "(w)hile the Indian National Congress represented the mainstream of Indian thinking on political and ideological issues, there were segments of political opinion and organization on both the right and the left, inside the Congress and outside, which would have been seriously disaffected by India's alignment with one of the two power blocs, to the point of threatening the internal security of the state...Only a policy of non-alignment could have prevented the acute polarization of the domestic political forces and thus created one of the essential conditions for state building."

It must be stressed that this view may result with the benefit of historical hindsight. From the vantage point of Nehru, Non-alignment was a bold, new initiative which lacked an appropriate contemporary precedent. The critical point to note is that as a political strategy, Nehru had no idea

whether Non-alignment as a policy would succeed or fail. Given the political climate in India at the time, and given the political climate in the world at large, Non-alignment was the best possible policy that Nehru could conceive of at the time. With the benefit of retrospection and historical hindsight it appears that this was an appropriate policy for India at the time.

Some of the more specific aspects of Non-alignment can be seen in Nehru's handling of the Korean case, his innovative development of the area of peace concept, and his approach to the Suez and Hungarian case.

**B. The Political Dimensions of Nonalignment:
Korea, the Area of Peace, the Suez and
Hungarian Crisis**

i) Korea

The Korean crisis put India's nonalignment to a far greater test. That India took interest and played her role in it lay in the logic of her nonalignment, for the crisis was the first, and a very powerful, thrust of the cold war in Asia. But the crisis proved a challenge to her non-alignment, for in relation to this greatest trial of strength between the two antagonistic power blocs she had to take a clear stand which might antagonize one side or the other (Mallik, 1967:74).

Consistent with Nehru's leadership style of personal, hands on diplomacy, Nehru demonstrated the trait of leadership efficacy by successfully applying the principles of Non-alignment through his direct contacts with Dean

Acheson and Stalin. He sought to bring the Soviets back to the Security Council after the UN decision to send peace-keeping forces was made in their absence. He also sought to persuade the U.S. to formally accept and recognize communist China's membership in the United Nations. This reflects Nehru's tenacious commitment to maintaining concord and harmonious relations in the global political environment. His reaching out to the Soviets after the decision to send forces to Korea was made in their absence, and his efforts to recognize communist China's membership in the UN, sought to specifically ease tensions among the major political actors who were concerned with the outcome of the situation in Korea.

Nehru's preoccupation with dialogue, the limitation and abatement of conflict, and his noncombative style are in the Korean case is reflective of his leadership style. These attributes of leadership were also mirrored in his handling of domestic issues such as the communal problem and the language issue.

It is interesting to note that in his dealings with other leaders and other state actors in the Non-alignment issue, Nehru the trait of dogmatism is less readily apparent. In Nehru's role as mediator in various conflicts such as Korea, he maintained an open mind to conflicting

information. His ability to process information was not hindered by conflicting sources of information. The evidence for this is even more readily apparent at the time when United Nations forces took a more active role to stop and revert North Korean aggression. When Nehru saw that China might intervene in the conflict in direct opposition to occupying U.S. forces and UN peacekeeping forces, he urged the General Assembly to call for a cease-fire to be effective at the 38th parallel (Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches, n. 5, 171). Nehru successfully introduced this resolution by galvanizing support for it among the Arab-Asian membership which served as his principal base of support. Again, one sees Nehru pressing for conflict avoidance rather than confrontation in foreign affairs issues. His efforts in attempting to galvanize support among Arab and Asian states for a cease-fire at the 38th parallel reflects a leadership strategy which values consensus-building and cooperative conflict management.

As noted in the preceding chapter, there is a notable absence of some of these very same qualities in some of the domestic issues which Nehru dealt with. Nehru's daughter, in contrast, was generally much more consistent in her orientation toward leadership in both domestic and external affairs. Whereas Nehru was open-minded, amenable to compromise, and conciliatory on matters related to Non-

alignment and foreign affairs, he did not display these very same tendencies in internal matters, most notably those with regard to ethnic conflict management and the language issue. This contrasts with his daughter's exercise of leadership. In both internal and external matters, Mrs. Gandhi displayed a very forceful, deliberate and uncompromising character; She was not averse to becoming involved in conflict in any fashion.

Soon after many of the Arab and Asian states supported Nehru's efforts for a cease-fire, it became apparent that China's opposition to it would break down negotiations. As a skilled strategist, Nehru did not directly confront China's opposition to the cease-fire but rather sought to secure China's acceptance of continued negotiations during the cease-fire, to reduce tensions. This displays Nehru's penchant for behind the scenes diplomacy. Despite Nehru's efforts, the First Committee of the Security Council condemned China's role in supporting North Korea and successfully introduced a cease-fire resolution on Feb. 5, 1952 which was led by the United Kingdom, the U.S. and France. This resolution differed from Nehru's in that it continued to alienate China and was done in opposition to the Soviet bloc's concerns.

The trait of leadership efficacy is apparent in this approach because it reveals Nehru's low-key non-confrontational approach to resolving tensions. It also reveals a very daring quality in decision-making because by pursuing the position which he did, he risked adverse reactions from the United States which at the time was providing generous food, economic, and technical assistance. This particular incident reveals that Nehru's leadership and commitment to Non-alignment was not simply devised as a strategy; it was based on a philosophy of statecraft which was predicated on the desire for independence and self-reliance.

ii) Nehru's "Area of Peace" Concept

By June of 1952, in the wake of increasing Cold War tensions Nehru introduced the innovative concept of an "Area of Peace" which further applied his views on Non-alignment. On June 12, 1952 Nehru elaborated on this concept in Parliamentary debates and conceived of the concept in terms of an area consisting of many countries whose primary objective would be the maintenance of peace (Parliamentary Debates, 2 (2), 1953, n.37. This required countries to abstain from entering into combative roles in the Korean and similar conflicts, and to disassociate themselves from inflammatory rhetoric, military maneuvers,

economic, political, or diplomatic activity which might have the potential of drawing them into conflicts. The "Area of peace" concept, as Nehru envisioned it, consisted principally of Asian countries since most were not aligned with either of the two power blocs. Although "area" was defined in broad-based terms, it had its base in South and South-East Asia in spite of the fact that African states were also included in this broad generic term.

It should be stressed that Nehru's "Area of Peace" concept displayed his innovative leadership; it was a reflection of his own views on conflict management. It reflected his penchant for viewing external affairs problems in terms of their long-range implications and consequences and showed his affinity for abstract ideas and concepts. The concept revealed his concern with searching for general solutions to problems rather than a desire to deal with particular details. The "Area of Peace" concept, as Mallik, (1967:131) notes, included the following characteristics:

Diplomatically, the countries of the 'area of peace' were to make moves against the use of horrible nuclear weapons. In judging international issues on their own merits in respect to world peace, they were to work together in the United Nations and elsewhere functioning independently of the power blocs which were engaged in contesting the cold war. They were to endeavor for promoting harmony between those power blocs and were not to play off one against the other. In approaching the rival power blocs they were to be

persuasive generally, but they might, if necessary, make use of the weight of their common voice without harbouring hostility for the side against which they would require throwing the weight. Psychologically, they were first to discipline themselves. They would have to resolve against war, cultivate fearlessness and inculcate the 'temper of peace.' The temper of peace would imply being peace-minded in putting forth their own points of view, tolerating others' view-point and being graceful in expressing disagreement with others.

The problem with Nehru's "area of peace" concept which Mallik (1966) did not fully address and which Nehru himself did not realize, was that the concept did not seriously appreciate the difficulty in drafting concrete agreements which would materialize this idea in a tangible way. I am suggesting that the concept, as defined by Nehru and interpreted by Mallik (1966), lacked a means of identifying, prioritizing, and pragmatically dealing with regional problems. Among its most serious flaws is the fact that the concept did not fully appreciate the difficulties associated with forging consensus, or looking beyond individual states' particular security, political, and economic needs in favor of a broader peace.

Looking at the concept in a more positive light, it can be said that despite its inadequacies, the concept helped to pave the way for weaker states to band together in political forums such as the United Nations, in order to express their concerns. I would argue that the Area of

Peace concept helped to precipitate a greater political consciousness in African and Asian states. Individually, African and Asian states lacked political influence, but as a joint political entity they had within their means the ability to affect global public opinion. In this regard I would argue, through the Area of Peace concept, this new found sense of self-worth, importance, and political efficacy, helped in some measure to instigate the anti-colonial movements in these states during the late 1940s through the 1960s.

Although Nehru's opponents viewed his ideas about an "area of peace" as superficial, impractical and unenforceable, others viewed it in terms of the respect and prestige that it brought to India. Nehru's participation in the Korean armistice negotiations and his advocacy of the "area of peace" concept helped to create a very favorable image for India in the international community. This is evidenced by the fact that from the period June 1952 through March 1953, India entered into treaties of friendship, commerce, navigation, and cooperation with Japan, the Philippines, West Germany, Austria, Hungary, Sweden, and Indonesia (cf. Foreign Policy India, 1959:71ff), among other countries.

In the aftermath of the Korean armistice agreement, the two disputing parties and their supporters called upon Nehru's leadership to amicably help them deal with matters relating to reparations. By virtue of an agreement signed on June 8, 1953, India was entrusted with the responsibility for assuming the chairmanship of the Neutral Nations Reparation Commission (NNRC) whose other members consisted of Sweden, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. India had strong support from most of the African and Asian states, and many European states. In contrast, Nehru's daughter was not afforded equal stature as an arbiter of disputes because she did not display the same qualities of temperance, willingness to compromise, and preference for mediation and negotiation which her father displayed.

In the wake of increased prestige for India's role in mediating in regional conflicts, Nehru sought to once again push forward his "area of peace" concept. By September of 1953, Nehru was riding atop a wave of general support for his Non-aligned policy. The innovative "area of peace" concept was actively promoted through Nehru's formulation of a set of guidelines that would preserve regional security and peace, which was later termed "Panchasheel".

Nehru's advocacy of *Panchasheel* reflects the trait of leadership efficacy through its attempt to forge support for

peaceful relations between states. The concept of *Panchasheel* (peaceful co-existence), which initially centered around a Sino-Indian agreement to sustain peaceful relations, has as its five principles, the following characteristics: 1) mutual respect for each others' sovereignty and territorial integrity; 2) non-aggression; 3) mutual non-interference in others' internal affairs; 4) establishment of an equal and reciprocal relationship that would be mutually beneficial to both parties; and 5) the advocacy and maintenance of peaceful co-existence between states (Constituent Assembly of India (Legislative) Debates, 4 (1), 1949, columns 20,21).

Although the "Panchasheel" concept was generally held in high regard as Nehru's "area of peace" concept, it was often criticized for the very same reasons. Nehru conceived of ideas and approached problems from a very abstract point of view, however, he often ignored the technicalities, details, and pragmatic means which would make his concepts applicable in a tangible way. This dramatically contrasts with his daughter who approached problems with a careful, pragmatic, and purposeful strategy, which was very sensitive to details.

Panchasheel was both an innovative and a fine concept, however, there was no mechanism for enforcing it. It should

be noted that Nehru advocated it during a time when latent tensions existed between China and India over disputed frontier territory. The trait of dogmatism is also apparent in Nehru's support of the concept because he was so ardently supportive of Panchasheel and the "area of peace" idea that he seemingly overlooked the underlying tensions India faced vis-a-vis China, which eventually resulted in armed conflict a few years later. Nehru's inability to recognize and heed warnings from close advisors such as Krishna Menon about Chinese intentions caught him by surprise when the Chinese overtook disputed territory in the northern outposts of the country.

Despite their shortcomings, the policy of Non-alignment and the concepts of "area of peace" and "Panchasheel" were examples of innovative, creative leadership. Nehru was much more than a mere politician. He had a broader vision for India unlike many of his contemporaries. He was quite unlike his daughter who was more of a pragmatic politician than an innovative statesman. Nehru was a statesman because he created new concepts, formulated new ideas and sought creative ways to have them implemented. Indira Gandhi on the other hand was not such a statesman. She simply sought to follow, modify, and amend the policies of her father in order to realize very narrow, pragmatic, political ends. Both types of leadership are important at different times in

a country's political history and both offer different outcomes.

iii) The Suez and Hungarian Crisis

The Suez and Hungarian crisis during 1956 represented other major events which challenged Nehru's ability to manage India's Non-aligned policy. On July 26, 1956, within a week after Nehru met with Nasser of Egypt, Nasser announced that the Suez Canal would be nationalized. Nehru said that he had come to know of the event only through the press and believed that Egypt's position was in part, the result of the U.S. unwillingness to continue aid for building the Aswan Dam (Lok Sabha Debates 6 (2) 1956, cols. 1559-62).

The trait of leadership efficacy in terms of the management of Nehru's Non-aligned policy is reflected in the nature of Nehru's response to the Suez Canal Crisis. Nehru accepted Egypt's sovereignty of the Canal, however, he believed that other nations had the right to enjoy peaceful and free navigation. Although he opposed the British and French effort to militarily resolve the problem, the critical point to note is that he refused to brand either Powers as aggressors. Nehru genuinely believed that a negotiated settlement could be undertaken to resolve the

dispute. This again reflects Nehru's conflict averse personality disposition and a leadership style which puts a premium on negotiation and compromise as precursors for a peaceful negotiated settlement.

India participated in the Suez Conference in London during August 16 through August 23rd. At the Conference Nehru advanced a five-point proposal which sought to allow Egypt to remain in control of the Canal but would transfer rights relating to freedom of navigation to an international advisory board operating under the aegis of the United Nations. Ceylon, the Soviet Union, and Indonesia were the only countries among the other twenty-one participants which supported India's proposal. The United States pressed to advance a proposal which would have allowed Canal users to regulate their own navigational activities, while other members sought to use the United Nations to forcibly wrest control of the Canal from Egypt. When Egypt was attacked by Israel on October 29th, the British and the French issued an ultimatum to both countries calling for an immediate cease-fire. Soon thereafter, Anglo-French forces entered the region on the pretext that their appeals for peace went unheeded.

Nehru viewed the Anglo-French action as an act of aggression, however, he refrained from condemning the two

countries as such. He actively sought to have the United Nations peace-keeping forces enter the region to contain conflict and was willing to send Indian troops as part of the UN detachment. He opposed any great Super Power role and sought to use the peace-keeping forces as a means of reducing the Anglo-French presence. Although he was against internationalization of the Canal, Nehru's opposition to the Anglo-French, American, and Soviet presence made his views unacceptable to the West which wanted user-control of the facilities. His relationship with the Soviets, however, continued to remain warm and cordial.

Nehru's position of supporting UN forces to keep peace in the area and his opposition to Anglo-French, American and the Soviet presence in the Canal zone serves as another example of policy boldness and policy innovation. The policy was a bold one because his opposition to any military presence in the Canal zone would anger and possibly diminish economic aid from both the U.S. and the Soviet Union which were among India's largest aid donors at the time. The policy was innovative because it allowed peace and order to be brought to the area by an international body which both Super powers reluctantly supported in order to serve common, mutual interests. The desired end would be achieved and the potential for the exacerbation of conflict would be mitigated.

The Hungarian crisis magnified the trait of leadership efficacy and tested Nehru's ability to manage India's Non-aligned policy so as to not strain the cordial relationship he enjoyed with the Soviet Union. During October 1956 popular demands, protests, and demonstrations to oust Soviet troops from Hungarian soil gained momentum with the return of Imre Nagy to power. As protest demonstrations flourished and opposition to Soviet forces stationed under the Warsaw Agreement grew fierce, Soviet forces were sent into Hungary to restore order. On October 24th, Soviet troops opened fire on a crowd of demonstrators in Budapest, which served only to exacerbate tensions. Responding to the issue, Nehru remarked:

We are in the middle of things there. A wise man would like to wait before passing judgement, but it seems clear to me that this is what might be called a nationalist upsurge. I do not suppose it is likely to affect the broad foreign policies or economic policies of those countries. But it is affecting their internal independence, that is, a feeling that they themselves are going to fashion their policies and not necessarily others. Anyhow, it is not for us to interfere in any way even by expressing opinion on the internal affairs of those countries (Hindu, 26 Oct. 1956).

Once again, it is interesting note the trait of leadership efficacy as seen in Nehru's reluctance to condemn aggression. Nehru refrained from labeling the Soviet Union as an aggressor because he believed that by doing so it would be all the more difficult for her to leave Hungary

while saving face. At the same time, however, at the United Nations, Nehru asked the General Assembly during its second special emergency session, to urge the Soviets to withdraw occupying forces from Hungary, allow Hungary to manage her own internal affairs, and allow the United Nations to investigate violations of human rights.

Nehru sought to avoid conveying the image that India supported the condemnation of the Soviet Union on the Hungarian issue, yet at the same time, through the United Nations, he drew attention to the Soviet's illegal intervention. This is yet another example of Nehru's use of intermediaries to advance his political objectives. As mentioned in the previous chapter, Nehru advanced the language program only after having his political loyalists involve themselves in the political infighting. In the Hungarian case, he sought to have the machinery of the United Nations involve itself in the political infighting in order to mitigate the effects of the Soviet Union's illegal occupation of the state.

Nehru consistently adhered to the principles of Non-alignment, sought the containment of conflict, and pursued negotiated settlements that would insure peace. In the same token, he sought public, open, international forums to advance the cause of Non-alignment where India's

role, prestige, and image would be enhanced. Noting the consistency of Nehru's policy, Mallik (1967:182) noted:

Political motives and pre-possessions guiding India's role in the two questions were not hidden. In the Suez she sought to remain friendly to Egypt as well as to the UK and France. She felt discouraged in her continued intention to help the adjustment between Israel and the Arabs. She was so shocked at the Anglo-French behaviour suggesting their retreat to past colonial ways and was in full sympathy with Egypt, fraternal in relations with her and sharing her anti-colonialism, non-alignment and opposition to the great power military pacts and alliances. In Hungary, she was unwilling to embarrass the Soviet Union particularly when she knew that the embarrassment would help neither the Hungarians nor world peace. In Suez, she was pre-possessed with an anti-colonial complex. In Hungary, her pre-possession lay in her hope that de-Stalinization, left unintercepted, would lead to de-polarization in world politics.

Mallik (1967) accurately depicts the character of Non-alignment as India had applied it, however, he fails to note that India's orientation toward non-confrontational diplomacy and her application of the principles of Non-alignment and Panchasheel reflect in very real measure, the orientations of Nehru himself. Non-alignment, in the case of India was not so much an abstract policy as Mallik (1967) tends to treat it in his discussion. It was an example of the personification of leadership at the level of policy-making and policy implementation. This practice reinforces the idea that political leadership in India is highly individual-centered and that the personification of

leadership is not an exception to traditional conceptions of leadership but that it is the norm.

**C. The Impact / Benefits of Non-alignment:
Externally and Internally**

i) External Implications of Non-alignment:

Nehru's persistent efforts to maintain his own personal profile and India's profile on the world stage accrued benefits for the country which previously had been unanticipated. Aside from gaining personal prestige, Nehru secured for India a broad network of treaties, agreements, and diplomatic contacts which served to address some of her particular developmental needs. Nehru entered into diplomatic and commercial relationships with Egypt, France, Canada, the USSR, China, Nepal, and Ceylon. She secured increasing economic assistance from the United Kingdom, the United States, West Germany, Australia, Japan, and New Zealand among other states. Similarly, diplomatic relations were strengthened with Ghana, Ethiopia, Brazil, Argentina, and other countries in Africa and South America. The "(r)ange of India's friendly relations and contacts with other nations of the world, as indicated in her treaties, agreements, joint statements and communiques and the goodwill visits of the foreign dignitaries to India and those of the Indian dignitaries abroad, was so wide and so significant in this period that India appeared to match any

great power of the world in political importance" (Mallik, 1967:185).

From the vantage point of the trait of leadership efficacy it may be said that Nehru's pursuit of Non-alignment brought about a greater consciousness among other developing states that such a policy would serve to maintain order and stability during times of regional crisis. Non-alignment brought to Nehru, world recognition of his capacity as a major statesman and India's potentially great role in global political affairs. However, more immediate benefits resulted from the support he generally enjoyed at home in pursuing his external policy. From the perspective of national identity, Non-alignment served as a standard bearer or common unifying theme against which nationalist impulses surfaced amid the competing opposition groups which vied for power. Despite fears over China's aggression in the late 1950s, Nehru was able to galvanize almost unanimous support in the Lok Sabha for pushing India to the forefront of global politics under the banner of Non-alignment (cf. Lok Sabha debates, 46(1960:cols 5936ff).

Both Nehru and the country which he led gained a phenomenal degree of respectability as a major Non-aligned actor on the world stage. Nehru's leadership style within the Non-aligned movement, in particular, served to realize

this end. Nehru's approach was to deal with all parties to a dispute with a spirit of cordiality and friendliness to the degree this was possible. When this was not the case he sought to use the United Nations as a forum where negotiations could take place, where, states would not be condemned or branded as the aggressor and where face-saving mechanisms would be sustained so as to encourage the pursuit of negotiated settlements. In view of Nehru's leadership style, Mallik (1967:222) noted that "(a)dding to the composure of India's Non-alignment was the respectability it attained as the capping point of recognition. She left a stamp of her own at the non-aligned summit. The UAR, Yugoslavia, Ghana and Ceylon among others clearly amended many of their initial stands along the lines taken by India. Even Indonesia, Guinea and Mali gave way. India's own accommodativeness was a factor of the esteem that others came to have for her. Her post-Belgrade image showed a brighter halo than the pre-Belgrade one except in the quarters which were bent on dimming it. It was remarkable in that context that after the Conference was over, India's Prime Minister was received with the usual warmth and respect in the Soviet Union and with a mark of respect unprecedented in the United States of America."

During the early years of the 1960s, prior to Nehru's death in May, 1964, Non-alignment served as a unifying theme among discordant elements within the Indian political spectrum. It was, however, China's attack of India over disputed territory, which set the stage for changing the character of Non-alignment.

On October 2, 1962, China launched a major military offensive against India over disputed territory and later declared a unilateral cease-fire which ended the conflict. India appeared to have been unprepared to repel Chinese aggression and was badly damaged politically at home by the conflict. The Indo-China conflict best reflects the trait of policy dogmatism. Nehru came under attack for adhering to a Non-aligned policy which left India vulnerable to external military and economic threats. Nehru himself admitted that in the wake of the Chinese aggression, India was "out of touch with reality" and was living in "the artificial atmosphere of its own creation" (*Keesings Archives*, (1961-62:19137)).

It is remarkable to note that despite the political setbacks incurred by the Chinese aggression, Nehru would not deviate from the essential principles of Non-alignment. This is an example of the trait of policy dogmatism in the particular case of Non-alignment. Nehru remained steadfast

in his belief that India's role as a mediator in major disputes could serve a constructive function in diffusing tensions. The China conflict exposed India's military, economic, and political weaknesses which she now was forced to deal with immediately and up-front. However, Nehru was determined to preserve the integrity of Non-alignment and India's mediatory roles in conflict management which placed a premium on persuasiveness rather than on the capacity to coerce those parties who rejected mediation, compromise, or the pacific settlement of disputes.

Despite setbacks resulting from the Chinese invasion, Nehru's leadership of India in the Non-aligned movement served to bring India into the limelight of global politics. Commenting on Nehru's achievements and the benefits of Non-alignment, Mallik (1967:252) notes:

Even a Western critic, not very sympathetic to India's foreign policy, enlisted the following: (i) prestige, status, influence and economic aid, (ii) support of the Asian and African countries, (iii) non-involvement in violent clashes near her frontiers, (iv) utilization of the meagre resources to internal growth, and (v) satisfaction of the Indian people about the independence and importance of their nation in international politics. India's policy makers pointed to some more: (vi) the survival of democracy, (vii) India's emergence as an area of agreement between the two super Powers, and (viii) the ever growing global respect for non-alignment itself.

The critical point to remember, which Mallik (1967) neglects to point out is that, at the time when Non-

alignment was formulated and adopted by Nehru, there was no expectation that India would receive the benefits that she had through the application of this policy. Non-alignment for Nehru, I would argue, started out as a personal mission for Nehru to increase his own personal stature as a world leader and as a result produce a greater public profile for India on the world stage. Many of the positive and beneficial outcomes of Non-alignment are the unplanned, consequential results of Nehru's personal actions and interventions.

ii) Internal Implications of Non-alignment:

Although Nehru was viewed to be the quintessential negotiator and adroit diplomat on the global stage, as noted earlier, on the domestic front he exercised dominant control over internal pressures that were brewing in various parts of the country. In certain domestic matters he sought to legitimize the State's right to coercive tactics to maintain order. In the case of Kerala, a south Indian state where a Communist government was freely elected into power, Nehru applied strong political measures to ensure the Congress Party's dominance in the political process.

On July 31st, 1959 a Presidential Proclamation was declared which dismissed the Communist Government in Kerala. Nehru cited various Communist Party abuses and its refusal to allow new elections to take place in the state in the wake of increasing mass agitation and political turbulence (cf. Rajya Sabha Debates 1959: cols. 1768-76).

After 28 months in power Nehru forcibly ousted the Communist government which was an action legitimized by the state's constituents in February of the following year when they voted the Communist Party out of power. It should be noted that Nehru's daughter, Indira Gandhi, exhibited similar forceful tactics in responding to anti-government elements in her declaration of a State of Emergency in 1975 which suspended many civil freedoms, and also in her policies in Punjab which will be discussed in greater detail in the chapter which follows. It is indeed remarkable that in domestic issues, both leaders displayed the same domineering and forceful leadership qualities in managing conflict. Whereas Nehru was much more conciliatory, accommodating, and valued negotiation and compromise in order to reach amicable settlements in external matters than domestic ones, his daughter Indira was not inclined to this approach in either domestic or external affairs issues.

During the time when Nehru nullified the Communist government in Kerala, India's relations with both the United States and Soviet Union improved as both Super Powers were more fully acceptive of India's Non-aligned external policy. Both countries were content in accepting India's independent posture so long as it did not challenge their respective security concerns. After President Eisenhower visited India in December, 1959, American aid to India increased by 50% (McCellan, 1960:154). Soviet assistance to India during this period came in the form of material support for major industrial projects such a heavy industry plant for Ranchi, credits of 1,500 rubles for assistance to help India meet her third five-year plan goals, and through favorable commercial agreements which would permit the transfer of technology and outlets in Eastern Europe for certain Indian commodities (CDSP, 26, July 1959; cf. Lok Sabha Debates 46(1960), cols. 5587-90).

The pursuit of Non-alignment enabled Nehru to draw together many discordant elements within the political spectrum. Non-alignment, aside from its external political and economic benefits, brought to India a form of domestic consensus in acceptance of Nehru's leadership in the foreign affairs realm. This is not to say that differences and discord did not exist; indeed, during the formative years of Nehru's Non-aligned policy various elements of the

political establishment were suspicious of the policy. The Socialist Party during the period after independence viewed Nehru's concept as being passively neutral while the Communist Party, after initially supporting Non-alignment, later attacked it for being tacitly pro-Western. In general, however, the consensus of politically aware and active groups was consistent with Nehru's views and proved to be the major supportive structure holding together Nehru's Non-Aligned policy (Mallik, 1967:60).

During the 1950s the differences that did occur over policy were over specific applications of Non-alignment and not the policy itself. The Communist Party of India became less vociferous opposing Non-alignment than it had been in the past and had recognized the Communist Government in China and sought to develop closer ties with the Soviet Union. The Socialist Party sought to reduce India's involvement in the Korean issue and would have liked to put more pressure on India to urge China to provide for Tibet's independence. Differences over the direction of Non-alignment permeated the political scene while the fundamental premises on which Non-alignment was based was not challenged. Nehru retained almost exclusive control over the direction of his external affairs; Non-alignment was subject to serious scrutiny and heated discussions which became cantankerous at times, however, the overall

philosophy behind Non-alignment was generally acceptable (cf. Mallik, 1967:59-60;87-88;112-13;139-140).

Summary:

This chapter principally focused on the external dimensions of National-self identity, most notably, the issue of Non-alignment as an innovative and bold technique of statecraft.

Through Nehru's leadership, he established stronger ties with liberation movements in other countries and sought to enhance the sovereignty of India by making her an equal participant in world affairs. Since India lacked the financial, technological or logistical resources to compete with Western countries and some of the Communist block countries, India had to create a base of support of its own from which to advance the cause of economic and social development. It is important to note that Non-alignment was, during its own time, a unique, deft, and truly innovative policy which many other countries later emulated. Nehru's focus on Non-alignment evolved from strong political concerns which were geared toward raising India's stature in the world community of nations. It is also important to realize that Nehru sought to pursue a policy of

Non-alignment in the face of a political and economic climate which did not guarantee its success for India.

Nehru's pursuit of Non-alignment displayed particular attributes of his personality and leadership style. He monopolized his control over the foreign affairs portfolio by weakening other policy-making structures of government. The trait of power motivation is evident in the manner in which Nehru centralized foreign affairs policy-making in the office of the Prime Minister and how he appointed loyal confidantes to key decision-making positions whom he could control (cf. Nehru, 1961).

Nehru's proclivity toward dialogue, the abatement of conflict, and his non-combative leadership style is reflected in his handling of the tensions associated with the Korean case. Nehru's "Area of Peace" concept displayed his innovative leadership. This policy reflected Nehru's inclination for viewing external affairs issues in terms of their global implications and showed his affinity for abstract ideas and concepts. This concept also revealed his concern with searching for general solutions to problems rather than a desire to deal with particular details.

Nehru's development and application of the concept of "Panchasheel" was generally held in high regard as was

Nehru's "area of peace" concept. These policies, however, were often criticized for the very same reasons that made them popular. Nehru conceived of ideas and approached problems from a very abstract point of view, however, he often ignored the technicalities, details, and pragmatic means which could make his concepts applicable in a tangible way.

Nehru's position of supporting UN forces to keep peace in the Suez canal area and his opposition to Anglo-French, American and the Soviet presence in the Canal zone was another example of policy boldness and policy innovation because it enabled non-cooperative states to support a peace process that was of mutual advantage to all parties concerned.

In essence, Nehru's persistent efforts to maintain his own personal profile and India's profile on the world stage accrued unanticipated benefits for the country. Aside from gaining personal prestige, Nehru secured for India a broad network of treaties, agreements, and diplomatic contacts which served to address some of the countries special political and developmental needs.

Chapter 8: Indira Gandhi and the Punjab Crisis

Introduction:

Thus far we have evaluated the ways in which beliefs and the personality element have impacted on Nehru and his leadership during India's formative years after independence. In particular, his handling of the minority problem, language, and Non-alignment issue, have been reviewed in previous pages. In an effort to draw analytical comparisons, this chapter will study Nehru's daughter, Mrs. Indira Gandhi's leadership in the Punjab crisis. In both of these instances internal problems have been subjected to analysis; a comparative review of their external policies vis-a-vis national self-identity and Non-alignment will be also be a topic of future discussion.

In order to assess Mrs. Gandhi's Punjab actions in light of leadership style and political advantage, the following issues need to be addressed: 1) What specific demands did the Sikh leadership make to Mrs. Gandhi, how did she view the problem, and what negotiations took place? 2) Why did the government delay for such a long period of time before taking action; to what degree did its delay or subsequent action contribute to the violence in

Punjab; and 3) was the military option against the Golden Temple the best response to resolving the crisis?

Indira Gandhi and the Punjab Crisis

Often enough it is the case that one associates communal violence and political turmoil within a country with political instability. What is often not realized, as this chapter will show, is that political stability can in fact exist during periods of political turmoil and tension in the same way that an abundance of life can survive and thrive in the oasis of a parched desert. To pursue this issue further it will be necessary to examine Mrs. Gandhi's handling of the Punjab problem in terms of her policy to storm the Sikh Golden Temple in Amritsar on June 5-6, 1984, which, as I will argue, represented one example of a major political "flare-up" with dire consequences, however, one which did not totally threaten national unity. In this military action, Mrs. Gandhi received the support of a large segment of the population after it had been reported that the Golden Temple was being used as a repository for arms and insurgent activities against the Government.

At issue here is not only the question of the propriety and efficacy of Mrs. Gandhi's action but the

broader issue of national identity and whether her final policy was just and necessary given the political climate in which Mrs. Gandhi chose to exercise her leadership and policy options.

A. The Historical Demands of Sikhism and the Genesis of the Punjab Problem

Sikhism is monotheistic religion which affirms man's ability to find salvation through righteous works, conquest over the ego, temptations of the flesh, attachment, anger, greed, and pride. Sikhism advocates social equality and casts aside divisions among people along caste divisions.

The founder of Sikhism, Guru Nanak (1469-1539) was originally a Hindu Vedi (a scholar knowledgeable about the "Vedas" which were sacred religious writings) of the Kshatriya caste. He left the Hindu fold and preached the existence of one God, set up "Gurudwaras", which were special Sikh houses of worship, and sought to separate from Hinduism by initiating a separate script, "Gurmukhi", in which the Guru's writings and other prayers and sacred text were translated, which also included prescriptions for ceremonies for births, marriages, and deaths.

By 1606, the time of the fifth guru, Guru Arjun Dev, the Sikhs had built their own temple of worship within their own sacred city -- Amritsar, and had also compiled their own sacred scripture known as the *GRANTH SAHIB*. Guru Arjun Dev's son, Hargobind (1594-1644) succeeded his father as the sixth guru and built the "Akal Takht" (throne of the Timeless God) and set it apart as the seat of spiritual and temporal authority for Sikhism from which "hukumnamas" (edicts) were to be issued to the community. By the time of the tenth and last Sikh guru, Guru Gobind Singh, the Sikhs emerged with a unique identity of their own and were considered be a martial community with five distinct emblems which would make the Sikh martial community (the Khalsa) separate from other groups. The "kes," the "kara," the "kanga," "kirpan," and "kacha" became symbols of a common identity; and the names "Singh" (lion) for men and "Kaur" (princess) for women were designated common family names for the Sikh community.

Although distinctions were made between the Sikhs and Hindus in Punjab by virtue of their form of dress, place of worship, sacred writings, and mode of worship, ties between the two communities remained very strong in Punjab. Many Hindu families intermarried with Sikh families and often raised one of their sons as a keshadhari (unshorn hair and long beard) Sikh.

The origins of conflict between the two groups can be traced back to the period of British rule in India. The British representatives in India conferred many minority privileges only upon keshadhari Sikhs -- especially in terms of recruitment into military service, and later through the allotment of special seats for Sikh leaders in the legislature. This preferential treatment for the Sikhs over the Hindus in Punjab gave rise to increased militancy and calls for a separate identity for Hindu groups.

During the 1870s, prominent Hindu leaders such as Swami Dayanand Saraswati sought to bring Sikhs back into the Hindu fold which was only met with bitter resentment and hostility and sparked the cry "ham hindu nahin hain" ("we are not Hindus"). The rising agitation between these two communities was neutralized, however, with the rising tide of Muslim communalism. In nearly every communal conflict in Punjab, the Hindus and Sikhs have united together to oppose Muslim demands for a separate Muslim state. When India was partitioned in 1947 into two separate states, India and Pakistan, many Punjabi Hindus and Sikhs freely chose to leave Pakistan and settle in India. The Hindu Punjabis were principally urban people who were able to quickly gather up their possessions, cash, and other property before fleeing the territory prior to its annexation by Pakistan after partition. The Sikhs, however, were principally farmers and

comprised some of the wealthiest landowners in the region when Punjab was still undivided. After partition many chose to flee to India and lost their homes, cattle, land, and property and claimed that "while Hindus got Hindustan and Muslims got Pakistan, all they got was poverty" (Nayar, 1984:21).

The partition of India into two states and the subsequent division of Punjab between them contributed to a diminution of Sikh privileges which they previously enjoyed during British rule. They also experienced a decline in numbers in the armed forces and in the legislature which contributed to their feelings of alienation as a religious minority. Two options were available to the Sikh community to remedy this situation. One option was to expand their community and assert themselves in numerous parts of the country, particularly, in business ventures in which the Sikh community flourished. The other option was to work toward the creation of a separate Sikh state within India where their religious, political, social, and economic rights could be guaranteed.

For the first two decades after independence, the Sikh community chose the former option and set up industries and business concerns in different parts of India and held a near virtual monopoly over the transport industry in the

country. It was only in the years following the first fifteen to twenty years after independence did small elements of the population raise the cry for a separate independent Sikh state. By 1966, however, a Punjabi-speaking state consisting of a sixty percent Sikh majority came into being which diffused initial demands for a separate Sikh state. Before examining the political nature of the crisis in Punjab, it would be useful to examine the degree to which they were active participants in Indian politics under the leadership of Indira Gandhi.

B. Sikh Political Participation Under Indira Gandhi

Punjab (land of Five Rivers) is a region in northwestern India that has prospered because it has ample access to water. After partition the region was territorially divided into two areas; one area remained on the Indian side and one was absorbed by Pakistan after Partition. As of consequence of the Indo-Pakistan Indus Water Agreement of 1960 which was enacted during Nehru's tenure as Prime Minister, three of the five rivers, the Sutlej, Ravi, and Beas rivers, went to India while the remaining two, the Chenab and Jhelum went to Pakistan. During Mrs. Gandhi's tenure as Prime Minister, the region evolved into a distinct state which comprised the Indian union with a Sikh majority. Punjab's abundance of water

made it an agricultural paradise as compared to the arid, parched, and sun scorched plains of most the states in central and south India. Because of high crop yields and agricultural surplus, Punjab enjoys among the highest per capita incomes of any state in India -- Rs. 3122 per annum (1981-1982); it has the highest enrollment of children in primary schools; the largest number of automotive vehicles -- 192.6 per 10,000 of the population (1980-1981); the largest net irrigated area in terms of the percentage of cropped area -- 78% (1978-1979); the greatest per capita bank deposits -- Rs. 1657 (Dec. 1982); and the second highest percentage of national wheat production, 23% (average production 1979-1982 (Gov't of India, 1984:13); only Uttar Pradesh enjoys a greater share of wheat production given the fact that it has six times the land and population of Punjab.

Under Indira Gandhi, in terms of material well-being, Punjab and its majority Sikh population has greatly benefited from agricultural development. On the political dimension it appears that the Sikhs have enjoyed a high level of political participation in the Central Government despite their small numbers with respect to the country as a whole. Officially, the Government of India considers Sikhs to be a political minority group, not a religious one, consequently, they enjoy all civil and political

rights afforded to them by the Constitution to the same degree that other minority groups enjoy them. However, unlike other minority groups, Sikhs have been appointed to the most senior levels of Government and have been placed in very influential positions with significant policy-making or policy-influencing powers. Under Indira Gandhi, a proportionately large percentage of senior government officials who were political appointees were Sikhs with close ties to the Prime Minister. An overview of her political appointment choices bear this out (See Table 7.1 in appendix - cf. Gov't of India, 1984:8ff):

The inclusion of this list of prominent Sikh government officials served to draw attention to the high profile and high level of political participation that the Sikhs enjoyed under Mrs. Gandhi's tenure as Prime Minister. Claims that she intentionally sought to suppress their political involvement in the governing of the country, especially, at the top level, do not appear to be warranted. A lack of political influence or participation, therefore, was not the most pressing reason that gave rise to the Punjab crisis; the problem had deep economic and political dimensions which affected the character of the political, social, and religious forces within the region.

C. Sikh Demands and the Political, Economic, and Religious Origins of Conflict

In the early 1960s tensions in Punjab began to mount between militant Sikh and Hindu groups. The Akali Dal Party which sought to represent the more moderate elements within the Sikh community claimed to represent their political interests and worked toward the creation of a state where a Sikh majority could be increased from sixty to seventy percent. In response to this the Indian Government worked out an agreement which would reorganize state boundaries so as to account for the religious and linguistic concerns of the Sikh population. By 1966, when the state of Punjab was officially declared by Mrs. Gandhi's government, Sikhs who originally comprised 60% of the region, later lost the majority and comprised 57% of the population.

As a result of a growing Hindu population and a decline in the Sikh population, the Sikhs lost some political power because of fewer seats in the state legislature that could be assumed by Sikhs. The rise in the Hindu population and the slow but steady deterioration of Sikh political influence in local politics in Punjab gave rise to fundamentalist movements within Sikism; some Sikhs feared that the younger generation of Sikhs would lose their identity and be swallowed up by Hinduism (Singh, 1984:50-52).

It may be of interest to note that during the Green Revolution when agricultural productivity was high and the standards of living for Sikh farmers was comparatively high and they enjoyed great prosperity, little was heard of Sikh grievances (Nayer, 1984:21). During the Green Revolution in Punjab and in other neighboring states, agricultural productivity was so high that the Government was able to hold nearly 15 million tons of food grains as "buffer stock" which laid the foundation for India's agricultural stability in the years which followed. This is particularly significant because wheat as a staple commodity was introduced only 18 years earlier from Mexico; at the same time Punjabi farmers were experimenting with dwarf varieties such as the "kalyan sona" and other strains which contributed to fast growth and among the highest wheat crop yields in the world.

When the Green Revolution reached its zenith and agricultural productivity could no longer sustain the needs of a growing population and maintain the standard of living, tensions mounted. As agricultural productivity reached a threshold, employment opportunities in Punjab, in other Indian states, and in other countries were also declining; Punjab's industries also declined and could no longer employ growing numbers of well-educated young men which paved the way for increased militancy and more active

protest against the Central government. "It was the educated unemployed Sikh youth who became pliable material in the hands of Marxists and Sikh fundamentalists. At times both joined hands to put the administration of the state in jeopardy" (Sikh Review, 1983:3).

a) Political Demands

On December 11, 1972, the Akali Dal Party drew up a document known as the Anandpur Sahib Resolution which outlined the demands of Sikhs. It was passed during October 16-17 of the following year and was approved by the General membership of the Akali Dal party on August 28, 1977. The Anandpur Sahib Resolution, among other things called for the following (cf. Sidhu, c.1978:9-12):

1) The Sikhs demand a homogenous, unilingual state of Punjab whose official language is Punjabi.

2) The state of Punjab would be officially recognized as the "Sikh Homeland." All official business in Punjab would be conducted under the supervision of the state except matters relating to defence, foreign affairs, communications, and currency, all of which fall under the province of the Central Government and thereby remain under Central Gov't control; even on these matters, the Central

government would retain only partial control -- Punjab would retain partial jurisdiction.

Akali Dal leaders claimed that the Indian Federal Constitution was being converted into a unitary one and that and the present state of a Central government's relationship with its states served only to advance the political interests of the Prime Minister and other government leaders. They charged that was done through financial controls, the existing bureaucracy, use of para-military forces, and the operation of Central Commissions.

1. Financial Controls:

(i) Akali leaders charged that all expenditures of Punjab must be cleared through a government planning commission which enables it to allocate or withhold funds to any development project within the state. One example cited is a case involving the construction of the Thien Dam on the Ravi river. In this case it had been charged that the construction of this dam would have eased Punjab's increasing need for power and water. Apparently the project had been delayed for 18 years because of a lack of clearance from the planning commission which subsequently pushed up construction costs from 70 crore rupees to 700 crores.

(ii) With regard to matters relating to taxation and revenue, Sikh leaders demanded a more equitable allocation of revenue between Punjab and the Central government. It was claimed that the Central government diverted revenue generated in Punjab and within the Federal treasury to other Hindu states, leaving Punjab with only 1.5% annual income for development from tax revenue. This, it has been argued, weakened Punjab's economy by creating capital drain. It has also been said that the Central government had invested much of the funds collected from Punjab in other state banks and on public and private works outside Punjab which do not benefit Punjabis directly.

(iii) Another grievance against the Central government centered around its manipulation of prices for certain commodities. It was charged that the government allowed a slow, steady increase in price of agricultural commodities, for export, however, the price it was willing to pay farmers to buy grain remained low. Since Punjab is principally an agricultural state and since 70% of its crop yield are channeled to the Central government, farmers remain in an economically unfavorable situation. Punjab contributed over 51 tons of wheat and nearly 5 million tons of rice to government reserves. The government's price support policy has enabled the government and other traders to buy Punjabi grain at Rs. 1500 per ton and rice at Rs.

1320 per ton, which is below the market value of Rs. 2500 per ton and Rs. 3200 per ton respectively. As a consequence of this policy, the Punjabi farmer incurred losses in the order of approximately Rs. 2.850 billion.

(iv) It had also been claimed that "The price of agricultural inputs had increased ten times since 1960, but the price of farm produce had increased 2.5 times only. Taking 1960 as a base, the price of tractors increased from Rs. 9,000 to Rs. 90,000; diesel from 0.30 paise to Rs. 3/- per liter and a 50 kg bag of fertilizer from Rs. 17 to Rs. 170, whereas the wheat price has been increased by the government from Rs. 60 per quintal to Rs. 151 only. In India the price of farm produce is being controlled by the central government, all other commodities are practically sold in the open market without any control" (Sidhu, c.1978:11).

b) Administrative Bureaucracy

Sikh leaders in the Akali Dal party opposed the administrative arrangement of the Indian government which consists of personnel organized into the Indian Administrative System (IAS), Indian Police Service (IPS), Indian Audit and Accounts Service (IAAS), and a host of others. The Sikh leaders' concerns evolved from their

criticism that personnel working in administrative positions at the state level often do not get appointed to key positions at the national level. Senior personnel for key ministerial posts are appointed by the Prime Minister. This claim contrasts with the fact that there were many Sikhs who were appointed to high level cabinet and ministerial positions during Mrs. Gandhi's tenure as Prime Minister. Perhaps the most serious charge relating to administrative affairs is that the Central government's administrative staff often goes beyond its bounds and undermines the authority of the provincial staff in running the affairs of the state. Constant Central government interference and "meddling" into provincial affairs has generated a great deal of animosity; this is especially of concern to provincial leaders since Central government staff cannot be suspended, nor can charges be brought against them by state government officials without the prior permission of the Central government.

c) Para-Military Forces

Although in matters relating to domestic peace and security and issues of law and order the Central government assumes responsibility, the maintenance of law and order within each state has been delegated to be within the province of state governments. Sikh leaders have charged

that the Central government has excessively used its coercive powers through the use of para-military forces (e.g. central reserve police, border security forces, and Indo-Tibetan police) to subjugate the local population whenever local agitations break out. In Punjab, local tensions are met by Central Government forces, and not handled by state government and state law enforcement agencies.

d) Central Commissions

The establishment of Central Commissions has been another major area of conflict and discontent among Sikhs. Sikh leaders claim that Central Commissions have been set up to undermine the authority of the state governments. As one example, they have cited that central commissions, such as the University Grants Commission, involved in the field of Education, have served to minimize state control over various areas. The University Grants Commission, it is charged, has the authority to appoint instructors, screen textbooks, and assume other administrative functions relating to the operation of educational institutions. It oversees funding of these institutions and insures that institutions follow the dictates of the government's University Grants Commission.

e) Territorial Demands

The principal territorial claims held by the Sikh leadership include the return to Punjab of all Punjabi speaking areas which were left out when the state was originally created in 1966 along principles of linguistic homogeneity. The key Punjabi-speaking territories include: Dalhousie (Gurdaspur District), UNA Tehsil (Hoshiarpur District), Desh Area (Nalagarh), Pinjore, Kalka and Ambala Sardar (Ambala District), Shahbad and Gukla blocks (Karnal District) Tohana Sub-Tehsil, Ratia Block and Sirsa Tehsil (Hisar District) and six tehsils of Granganagar District (Rajasthan State) (Sidhu, c.1978:18).

f) Water Demands and Disputes Over River Waters:

The disputes over river water rights has been one of the most sensitive political / economic concerns that exacerbate tensions between the Hindu and Sikh communities and the Government of India.

Punjab, primarily an agricultural state, is heavily dependant on water for its well-being. Sikh leaders charged that the Government of India had sought to weaken its economic base by limiting its access to water and energy from neighboring rivers. Although control over matters

relating to irrigation and water works are left to state governments, in the case of Punjab, it has been charged that the Central government has intervened in order that it might exercise complete control over all matters relating to irrigation and water allocation to different parts of Punjab. This policy was initiated by Mrs. Gandhi during the Punjab Reorganization Act of 1966 which created Punjab and made it the only state whose rivers were controlled by the Central government; in other states, state governments maintain jurisdiction over these matters. As a consequence of this enactment, river water which is greatly needed by Punjab, has been flowing out of the state to the neighboring states of Harayana and Rajastan. It is claimed that since both of these states are non-riparian states, they do not have a rightful claim on Punjab's key rivers, the Ravi, Sutlej, and Beas.

What the Sikh leadership desires is to have the entire river water issue adjudicated in the Supreme Court where it feels it will be able to establish Punjab's exclusive claims over its waterways and allow state control over irrigation and other water projects.

g) Religious Demands

Among the religious demands made by the Sikh leadership is the call for an amendment to be made to Article 25 of the Indian Constitution (which guarantees minority religious groups religious freedom) so as to declare the Sikh people as a separate nation, with a constitutionally distinct identity, and subject to their own religious and personal laws.

i) All India Gurudwara Act

In recent times most of the historical Sikh shrines and houses of worship (gurudwaras) were administered by an elected body known as the Shromini Gurudwara Prabandhak Committee (S.G.P.C.) which is recognized by the Gurudwara Act passed by the Indian parliament. Sikh leaders demand that all Sikh houses of worship should come under the jurisdiction of the S.G.P.C. and have vehemently criticized government interference in the management of Sikh shrines and religious institutions. It has been charged that "... (T)he Government does not want to bring all Sikh shrines under one management. Many a time the Government of India interferes in the management of Gurudwaras by unilaterally amending the Gurudwara Act and encouraging dissension among the management. The Government of India is dragging its

feet to enact an All India Gurudwara Act on the excuse that it must consult the state governments who have no locus-standi in the matter. Sikhs suspect that by sponsoring candidates for the S.G.P.C. elections, the government is trying to control Sikh shrines...." (Sidhu, c.1978:26).

ii) Kirpans

The Sikh leadership claims that their right to carry "kirpans" (swords) is a constitutional right afforded to Sikhs under Article 25 of the Constitution and is a right that has been abridged. During the period of the Moghul and British rule in India, Sikhs were afforded the right to bear kirpans as a distinct Sikh religious symbol. Protests over the bearing of kirpans erupted when the Government sought to restrict the size of the kirpan to six inches and limitations on its display in certain public places.

iii) Status of the Golden Temple

Sikhs view the Golden Temple in Amritsar as the principal religious center for Sikhism in the same manner that Roman Catholics regard St. Peter's Basilica in Rome as the religious center of Catholicism. Sikh leaders have sought to have the Golden Temple declared a holy city bound

by distinct religious laws. Since Sikhism, unlike other major religions, lacks an ordained priestly class and divinely prescribed and sanctioned laws, calls for a Sikh state would be invariably based on secular laws and not along theocratic principles (Sikh Review, 1984).

**D. Leadership and Government Policy-Making:
Mrs. Gandhi's Response to Sikh Claims**

The mounting tensions in Punjab were viewed by Mrs. Gandhi and her government as a major problem which threatened not only the stability of the country but also the territorial integrity of the country as a whole. Increasing violence and political conflict in Punjab were viewed as a consequence of the following problems (cf. White Paper, 1984:1):

- 1) agitations and civil unrest sponsored by the Shiromani Akali Dal party which pressed for certain demands while negotiations with Mrs. Gandhi's government were still underway;
- 2) extremist elements within militant Sikh groups initiated and were responsible for terrorist activities directed against citizen within the state;
- 3) secessionist, anti-government activities instigated by militant extremist Sikh factions who have received various forms of "external" support;
- 4) the involvement of smugglers, criminals, and other elements who participated and used the anti-government movement to service their own interests.

This closed view of the problem reflects the prevalence of personality trait of dogmatism. Indira Gandhi's definition of the problem in no way accounted for any shortcomings in the Government's policies. The genesis of the problem was externalized and she was unable to account for any government policies which could have exacerbated tensions in the Sikh community.

Consistent with effects of the trait of dogmatism which inhibited the effective processing of information, Mrs. Gandhi's government claimed that the ideological foundation for the Sikh secessionist movement had its origins outside of India and that domestic unrest was fueled by the inflammatory statements of Shir Amrik Singh and Shri Jarnail Bhindranwale among others whom the government regards to be dangerous militants. It was charged that (cf. White Paper, 1984:2-3):

the tactics employed by the secessionist and terrorist groups were: systematic campaign to create bitterness and hatred between Sikhs and Hindus; indoctrination in the ideology of separatism in militant terms behind the facade of gurmat camps (camps held for expounding the religious doctrines of the Sikhs); training in the use of modern weaponry; use of terrorism against specific targets in the police and administration of Punjab; preparation of "hit lists" of those who disagreed; random killing of persons of a particular community aimed at creating terror and instigating communal violence; stockpiling of arms and ammunition in places of worship; utilization of smugglers and anti-social elements for procuring supplies of arms, ammunition and for looting banks, jewellery shops and individual homes; and obtaining covert and overt support from external sources. All this they did by lodging themselves within the holy precincts of the Golden Temple

and other gurudwaras throughout Punjab and elsewhere. The government's reluctance to send police forces into gurudwaras out of deference to the religious sentiments of the Sikh community was fully exploited. These elements misused sacred places of worship to direct and commit acts of murder, sabotage, arson, and loot. Their actions plunged Punjab into disorder and anarchy, giving rise to a sense of deep insecurity among law abiding sections of the population. There was real danger between different communities. Conditions of insurgency were fast emerging, seriously threatening the country's unity and territorial integrity.

E. Mrs. Gandhi's Leadership Style and Its Impact on Her Punjab Policy

In view of what has been said about Akali Dal demands and the rise of violent anti-government activities it would be helpful to more fully assess Mrs. Gandhi's leadership style and how it affected her Punjab policy and the propriety of her government's response.

One of Mrs. Gandhi's biographers note that "(t)he people of India do not yet constitute a homogeneous secular nation. They are a congeries of discrete communities owing allegiance to sub-national, ethnic, creedal, and caste symbols. Whenever an external threat is perceived, an appeal is made to the over-arching symbol of national sovereignty, and an effervescent unity takes shape as rapidly as it evaporates" (Mohan, 1984).

Indira Gandhi dominated Indian politics and enjoyed immense popularity for much of her tenure as Prime Minister.

Consequently, her magnetic personality enabled her to pursue many policy issues without stagnating opposition or challenge (cf. Tharoor, 1982:38). She saw herself as a political reformer and appeared to act out the "Joan of Arc" image which she identified with as a child. She projected herself as the "outsider" as a "martyr" crusading against a corrupt and decadent political establishment which threatened India's progress and well-being.

In 1978 she split the Congress Party by forming the Congress-I ("I" for Indira) and dominated the Indian political establishment by projecting Congress-I to be the legendary party of her father, an embodiment of the values during the independence movement, and of representing the true interests of its constituency.

From the very early days of her childhood, Indira Gandhi has stood in the very center of dynamic political activity and has been exposed to powerful personalities such as Mahatma Gandhi, Mohammed Ali Jinnah, among many others. Mansani (1976:16) argues that, "like so many other children who grow up in a disturbed environment and of whom much is expected, Indira seems to have felt threatened and vulnerable. And like other children, she sought compensation, partly through defence-mechanisms which insulated her from intimacy with people other than the very

few she felt she could trust, and partly, through fantasies in which she felt she could assert her superiority as a successful and admired figure in the world of action. The result was an obsessive desire to excel and prove her mettle, coupled with a painful shyness and difference which, for many years, would cramp her personality and prevent the realization of its full potential".

As a child her strong identification with the Joan of Arc image and visions of martyrdom helped her to act out her inner feelings and beliefs. As an adult this identification remained with her and the "Joan syndrome would remain with her long after she had forgotten and outgrown the fantasy" (Mansani, 1976:16). Her decision to storm the Sikh Golden Temple to expel militant terrorists seems reflective of her strong willed personality and the Joan of Arc image. Her decision to storm the Temple was designed to "prove her mettle" and to emerge victoriously from a challenge at any cost. Her policy dogmatism and the repercussions of this decision from hindsight, show that her plan was not fully thought out and produced numerous unintended consequences.

F. Mrs. Gandhi and the Government's Assessment of Mounting Violence in Punjab

From Mrs. Gandhi's view, terrorist activities in Punjab were the result of sectarian conflict between fundamentalist Sikh leaders and Nirankaris Sikhs (a religious group who believe in one formless God "Nirankar" who can only be approached through the intercession of a living Guru). Violence spread throughout Punjab after the April 24, 1980 assassination of the spiritual head of the Nirankaris, Baba Gurbachan Singh. The Government also claimed that the Akali Dal refused to denounce murder, arson, looting, and other acts of civil disorder which took place during the sectarian violence. It was noted that "(t)he misuse of the Golden Temple and other shrines to accumulate large quantities of arms and ammunition to shelter murderers and criminals, and to make detailed preparations for subversion and insurgency was not condemned by the Akali Dal leadership who even denied the very existence of such activities" (White Paper, 1984:24).

Specific charges made by Mrs. Gandhi's government included the following (cf. White Paper, 1984):

- 1) While negotiations between Mrs. Gandhi and leaders of the Akali Dal party were underway in October 1981, November 1981, and April 1982, Akali Dal leaders introduced measures which sought to obstruct the Sutlej-Yamuna canal and encourage the non-repayment of government loans.

- 2) On April 26, 1982 the Dal Khalsa, a militant Sikh faction publicly vowed to work to create an independent, sovereign Sikh state, and assumed responsibility for acts of sacrilege against Hindu temples which it brazenly vowed to repeat.
- 3) On July 19, 1982 Shri Amrik Singh, President of the All India Sikh Federation (AISSF) was arrested in connection with the murder of Lala Jagat Narain who criticized Sikh involvement in communal violence directed against the Nirankaris. It was also charged that at this time Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale, a key militant Sikh leader, moved his base of operations from the Mehta Chowk region of Punjab to the Golden Temple complex from which he sponsored violent activities and initiated insurrection against the government.
- 4) In October of 1982, after the government released all arrested Akali Dal agitators, in order to advance a negotiated settlement to the dispute, Akali Dal leaders continued to issue statements which incited acts of rebellion against the government; on April 25, 1983, Shri A.S. Atwal, Deputy Inspector General, Jalandhar Range of the Punjab Police force was assassinated by Sikh militants while he was returning from worship at the Darbar Sahib gurudwara.
- 5) On December 15, 1983, Jarnail Bhindranwale moved to the Akal Takht. It was charged that "(f)rom this sanctuary he and his associates intensified incitements of violence and communal hatred. An important target of extremists were those Sikhs who opposed their anti-national activities. They were liquidated in a planned manner. A similar fate befell those within the Golden Temple who were judged to have defiled the authority of extremists. Several were tortured and subjected to painful deaths, their bodies being thrown into open drains. Desecration of the Golden Temple complex extended to other, equally reprehensible forms."

The interesting point to note here from the vantage point of the trait of leadership efficacy, is the absence of any mention of some of the key economic and political issues which divided the feuding communities. Mrs. Gandhi's

inattention and unwillingness to address some of the deep-seeded economic and political policies that precipitated much of the violence in Punjab, is a reflection of the trait of policy dogmatism.

Violence in Punjab was caused not by the militant Sikhs alone but was exacerbated by the activities of militant Hindu groups. Innocent blood was shed by both rival factions. Did Mrs. Gandhi have a right to intervene to resolve this communal violence when under usual circumstances this would be the responsibility of state governments? It would seem that in view of the magnitude of conflict in Punjab which went out of control in the hands of the state government, Mrs. Gandhi did have a legitimate right to intervene in the conflict. The frequency of terrorist violence in Punjab from March 20, 1981 to June 2, 1984 as shown in Table 7.2 (cf. White Paper, 1984:110-162; Annexure VII), rose significantly demanding Mrs. Gandhi's immediate attention.

G. Mrs. Gandhi and the Government's Response to Akali Demands

Before assessing the political efficacy of Mrs. Gandhi's response to Akali demands, it would be helpful to first examine the nature of some of the specific claims which they brought forward. Mrs. Gandhi's government received a "List of 45 Demands" in September, 1981 and

received a "Revised List of 15 Demands" in October, 1981. The list in Table 7.3 and Table 7.4 reflect the demands made (cf. White Paper, 1984, Annexure I:61;Annex. II:64).

A careful analysis of these two sets of demands shows that the basis for much of the tensions between the Akali Dal leaders and Mrs. Gandhi revolve around Center-State relations and the desire of certain elements within the Sikh community to form an independent nation. It would therefore, now be appropriate to more carefully focus on Mrs. Gandhi's leadership in responding to these demands and her handling of a mounting crisis which challenged national unity and thwarted her efforts to create a common national self-identity.

Mrs. Gandhi's negotiations with Akali Dal representatives basically focused on three areas (cf.White Paper, 1984:7-22) which merit further discussion:

- I. Matters relating to the Sikh community as a religious group;
- II. Matters relating to states other than Punjab;
- III. Other general issues.

I. Matters Relating to the Sikh Community
as a Religious Group

In response to the Akali leaders' demands to declare Amritsar a "holy city," Mrs. Gandhi's government denied the request citing that no other city in India has been officially designated a "holy city" with any formal sanction. Mrs. Gandhi also held that any consideration of "holy city" status would not be consistent with the secular character of India's constitution. She responded to this request, however, by saying that the sale of meat, liquor, and tobacco would be banned in demarcated areas within Amritsar to accommodate the concerns and wishes of worshipers and pilgrims to the city. This response reflects the prevalence of the trait of dogmatism since Mrs. Gandhi was unable to interpret the Sikh's religious demands in terms of anything but a request for a specific declaration for holy city status afforded to Amritsar. She was closed-minded to Sikh concerns that their religion should be treated with the same dignity afforded to other religions. In this respect, the request for "holy city" status, I would suggest, was more figurative than it was literal. The trait of dogmatism is apparent here because she appeared to reject any Sikh preferential claims without evaluating their merits. Her response to the Sikh request did not reflect an empathetic concern for their interests. Instead of addressing Sikh religious sensitivities she seemed to cloak herself behind bureaucratic precedents which prevented her from conceding to some of the Sikh's religious demands.

Responding to Akali demands for a private radio broadcasting license to facilitate the transmission of "kirtan" (prayers and recitations from Sikh holy books) from the Golden Temple, Mrs. Gandhi argued that she could not concede on this issue because that it was a matter of national policy that no group anywhere would be afforded exclusive broadcasting privileges. Once again, the trait of dogmatism is revealed here since Mrs. Gandhi refused to evaluate the merits of the issue before passing judgement on the request. Mrs. Gandhi responded to this request by offering to arrange for the broadcast of "kirtan" from the Golden Temple through a direct relay facility in the Jalandhar station of the government's All India Radio. The trait of power motivation is also reflected here as Mrs. Gandhi sought to maintain absolute control over channels of communication. Since all radio and television stations were government-run and monitored by the government, her offer to allow *kirtans* to be broadcast on government-run radio and television would enable her to carefully monitor the character and content of the broadcast material.

On the issue of allowing Sikhs to carry kirpans on flights, Mrs. Gandhi accepted the right of Sikhs to wear kirpans as a symbol of their religion, however, after a 1981 high-jacking incident, she imposed restrictions on the display of kirpans and ordered that Sikh passengers could

not wear kirpans longer than 22.8 cm (9") in length and whose blade length does not exceed 15.24 cm (6") on domestic Indian Airlines flights. She noted that on external Air India flights, international regulations prohibited the carrying of objects that could be used as weapons, hence she was obligated to enforce this law. Once again, the nature of her response was based on laws and regulations and did not reflect the deeper question of religious sensitivities which was at the heart of the Sikhs' demands.

With respect to Akali Dal demands that all Sikh gurudwaras should be brought under the control of the Shiromani Gurudwara Parbandhak Committee (SGPC), Mrs. Gandhi opposed this measure charging that she met with numerous representatives of various gurudwaras who were opposed to this form of control and that consultations among gurudwaras in other states would have to be made prior to making any decision on the matter. She noted that the All India Gurudwara Act could not be enacted until some form of consensus could be reached among all of the interested leaders of the respective gurudwaras. This response reflects the trait of power motivation since Mrs. Gandhi prevented the creation of an institution that was outside the realm of government control. Her suspicions about the intentions of the Sikh leadership prompted her to

try to maintain nearly total control over nearly all aspects of religious, economic, and political life in Punjab.

II. Matters Relating to States Other than Punjab

When initiating negotiations over concerns over the river water dispute, Mrs. Gandhi found that the rivers Ravi-Beas had surplus water in the order of 17.17 MAF (million acre feet) which contrasted with previous claims of availability of 15.85 MAF. This surplus water, she argued, was sufficient so that it could be shared between the states of Punjab and neighboring Rajasthan which frequently suffered from drought conditions. According to a 1981 agreement under Mrs. Gandhi's leadership, negotiations took place among representatives of the states of Punjab, Harayana, and Rajasthan, and the central government. Punjab's allotment of the water supply was raised to 4.22 MAF while Harayana's share remained at 3.50 MAF. Rajasthan's share was allocated to Punjab because at the time it was not in a position to fully utilize the surplus water.

The surplus water argument in light of agricultural demands in Punjab, did not appear to hold its own weight. According to non-government estimates, pre-independence (undivided) Punjab had 170 MAF of water. After independence,

East Punjab which joined Pakistan had access to 133 MAF (approx. 80%) while West Punjab which became part of India had only 32 MAF. It is also important to note that at the time, the cultivated land in Punjab amounted to approximately 10.5 million acres, and 2.0 million acres of unirrigated land and 3.5 million acres of inadequately irrigated land. In view of the heavy agricultural demands, a minimal estimate of water use for Punjab stood at the order of 52.5 MAF. It has been projected that by the year 2000, Punjab's water needs will increase any additional 10.5 MAF although the three rivers provide only 32.5 MAF (cf. J.S Bhullar et al, p.21-22). In view of this, it seems that Punjab will be unable to meet its own water needs in the years to come; conflict has been exacerbated when demands have been made on Punjab and its farmers to share their water resources with neighboring states.

In the context of Mrs. Gandhi's response to the water allocation problem, the trait of leadership efficacy is reflected in her negotiations with Akali leaders. Mrs. Gandhi was unable to develop or administer a coherent plan which would equitably provide more water resources to the areas in the Punjab that needed it most. Instead, she sought a satisficing option by postponing the making of a decision. Mrs. Gandhi noted that talks over Punjab's allocation of water was still in progress and the water

issue remained unresolved after Partition. She noted that Indian claims to Punjab's water stemmed from her claim to use it for irrigating the arid regions of the Indus Basin in Rajasthan and that it was upon this need that an agreement had been reached in 1955 with the Rajasthan government to construct infrastructures which cost over Rs. 600 crores (Rs. 6,000 million) to utilize water resources. The trait of dogmatism is also apparent in this situation in Mrs. Gandhi's closed-minded view that she could appease the Akali leadership by promising future negotiations to settle the matter. She convinced Akali leaders that this matter should not be an issue of contention concerning future negotiations, however, this view was not necessarily shared by common people, especially poor farmers, who were dependent on water for their livelihood. After a series of extended negotiations taking into account the agricultural and water needs of Punjab, Harayana, and Rajasthan, Mrs. Gandhi outlined the following proposals (cf. White Paper, 1984:12f):

- (1) The Agreement of December 31, 1981 between the governments of Punjab, Harayana, and Rajasthan regarding allocation of surplus flows of the Ravi-Beas will be treated as rescinded. The notification of the Government of India, Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation, Department of Irrigation, dated March 24, 1976 under sub-section I of section 78 of the Punjab Reorganization Act of 1966 will be treated as withdrawn.
- (2) The dispute between Punjab and Harayana with reference to the surplus waters of Ravi-Beas will be referred

to a tribunal presided over by a judge of the Supreme Court to be appointed under the Inter-State Water Disputes Act, 1956, to determine afresh the allocation between the two states.

- (3) Pending the final decision of the tribunal, the allocation of water between Punjab and Harayana will be decided on a year to year basis by the said tribunal.
- (4) The tribunal will be requested to give its decision within a period of two years. The decision of the tribunal shall be final and binding on the two states.
- (5) Punjab shall take immediate steps to construct the Sutlej-Yamuna canal and complete it within a period of two years.
- (6) Suitable legal and administrative steps will be taken expeditiously to implement the above.

The key point to note here is that from the vantage point of the trait of leadership efficacy, the only purpose of the points noted above was to stall for more time when a definitive decision could be made. The trait of dogmatism is reflected in Mrs. Gandhi's inability to solve the water problem and make a firm decision on it. Instead of outlining clear proposals which would provide water equitably to areas that needed it most, Mrs. Gandhi shifted the focus of the problem by blaming the Akali leadership for making unreasonable demands. During negotiations, Mrs. Gandhi charged that Akali leaders were unreasonable and unwilling to withdraw some of their demands even after her assurances that an independent committee of experts would review the water issue for Punjab. She also noted that Akali leaders reneged on a mutual agreement not to include

Rajasthan in future negotiations. She noted that Akali leaders sought to press for Punjab's exclusive sovereignty over the Yamuna river's waters which was not provided for in the Punjab Reorganization Act of 1966. This position, therefore, was totally unacceptable to her and the state governments of Harayana and Rajasthan as well.

In all fairness, it must be said that Mrs. Gandhi successfully promoted agricultural development in Punjab. The trait of leadership efficacy is apparent in the fact that she made a concerted effort to simultaneously increase agricultural production and at the same time try to meet Punjab's water needs. It might be noted that the Beas, Bhakra Nangal, Harike and Sirhind are major government sponsored irrigation projects in Punjab which provide water to 26,230 sq. kms. of land while other areas of Punjab are irrigated by 70,220 government funded tube-wells (Times of India, c1982:177f).

During the period 1978-1979 the government sponsored numerous irrigation projects such as the Thein dam, Shah Nehar Freeder, Dholbaha dam, extension of the Shah Nehar irrigation scheme, Anandpur Sahib Hydel project, Mukerian Hydel project, and Lift irrigation schemes. Work was also underway in the Anandpur Sahib Hydel and in the Goindwal Sahib Hydel project (Times of India, c1982:177f).

Given the fact that major water works projects were underway, this raises the question of whether Mrs. Gandhi's efforts to divert water resources away from Punjab were appropriate and warranted. Table 7.5's data outlining land utilization (Times of India, c1982:105) and cultivated and irrigated land area statistics (Times of India, c1982:105) show that Haryana and Rajasthan did in fact have very pressing need for water resources.

In most cases disputes over water rights are handled by local state governments, however, in this situation where the construction and funding of major water works are by the central government, it has a major responsibility in becoming involved to insure a distribution of water supply which is consistent with the needs of neighboring states. From the vantage point of leadership and policy-making, what Mrs. Gandhi had inappropriately done was to allocate water based upon projected increases in demand and not simply on the basis of figures of current levels of water usage.

III. Other General Issues

In responding to territorial concerns of Akali leaders, most notably on the issue of Chandigarh, the joint capital of the states of Punjab and Harayana, Mrs. Gandhi agreed to give Chandigarh to Punjab with Harayana receiving some form

of due compensation. Her formula for compensation included some territorial concession of Punjab to Harayana which included the transfer of some Hindi-speaking areas (part of the area is Fazilka Tehsil, including Abohar, of Ferozepur District in Punjab). She also suggested that the transfer of Chandigarh to Punjab in exchange for Abohar-Fazilka to Harayana should be handled by a commission which would settle any outstanding claims and whose decisions would be binding on both states. The trait of power motivation is reflected here in Mrs. Gandhi effort to control the transfer and management of these territories through a government-appointed commission. Some of the members of this commission would be appointed by the Prime Minister or her loyalists in Parliament. Hence, in this particular case she sought to use a commission to certify the centralization of power in the office of the Prime Minister. The trait of policy dogmatism is also reflected here in her unwillingness to explore alternative means of managing and transferring the various areas that were disputed. This is especially significant since the Akali Dal leadership did not receive her commission proposal very favorably.

Center-state relations have remained at the forefront of much of the tensions between Akali leaders and the government. On the question of center-state relations, Akali leaders called upon Mrs. Gandhi to take an initiative

in amending the constitution so that more power and authority could be delegated to individual states and that they would enjoy greater autonomy. In particular they sought a provision which would allow central government control over the portfolios of defence, foreign affairs, currency, and communications, while all other responsibilities were to be assumed by individual states. They also demanded that Sikhs be afforded special privileges and that they be considered a separate "nation" with a distinct identity (cf. White Paper, 1984:16).

In responding to these claims Mrs. Gandhi noted that the center-state issue can only be studied in the context of all the states in India and cannot be examined exclusively as it relates to Punjab alone. The trait of power motivation and the urge to maintain nearly total control over the political environment is reflected in Mrs. Gandhi's selection of a commission to study the center-state question. In June of 1983, Mrs. Gandhi appointed a special commission, headed by Shri Justice Ranjit Singh Sarkaria, in order to examine the existing relationship between the central government and its states with respect to powers, functions, and responsibilities, so as to point to problems or deficiencies which need to be addressed. The task at hand was to review the state of center-state relations and provide opportunities for amendments which were consistent

with the Constitution and the need to preserve the territorial integrity and unity of the country. Mrs. Gandhi offered an opportunity, through the Sarkaria Commission, for Akali Dal leaders to vent their concerns, however, she flatly rejected the basis of their claims. It was noted that "(t)he propositions contained in the Anandpur Sahib Resolution on center-state relations are at total variance with the basic concept of unity and integrity of the nation as expressed in (the) constitution. These cannot be accepted even as a basis for discussion... The people of India do not accept the proposition that India is a multinational society. The Indian people constitute one nation. India has expressed through her civilization over the ages, her strong underlying unity in the midst of diversity of language, religion, etc" (White Paper, 1984:17).

One of the Akali demands with respect to amending the constitution was to seek to change Article 25(2)(b) of the Indian Constitution in which the term "Hindu" was viewed to be used as a general term to include Sikhs, Jains, and Buddhists in the same category. Mrs. Gandhi did not respond to these religious sensitivities but instead offered a bureaucratic response noting that the matter would be reviewed at a later date. She cloaked herself from taking a firm position on the issue and making a decision by

stating that her Home Minister's statement of March 31, 1984 regarding this concern reflected her government's willingness to consult the SGPC, legal experts, and other members of the Sikh community to clarify and resolve areas of contention. The trait of policy dogmatism is reflected in her firm belief that article 25(2)(b) did nothing to weaken the identity of the Sikh community but that it showed that the Sikh community as one among many others, comprised a mosaic which formed a common national identity. From the Sikh community's point of view this was not the case at all. Instead of responding to the issue she deflected attention from it by charging that the Akali Dal's preoccupation with Article 25(2)(b) was simply a strategy by Akali leaders to secure separate personal laws for Sikhs. Policy dogmatism is also reflected in the rigid line she took on this issue in the wake of the Akali leaders' inability to present alternative proposals or specific suggestions for changing existing laws to resolve the matter.

How serious were Mrs. Gandhi's efforts at securing a negotiated settlement? Table 7.6 shows a "Calendar of Meetings with Representatives of the Akali Dal, 1981-1984" (cf. White Paper, 1984:91) and reflects the seriousness with which the Government looked upon this matter. Mrs.

Gandhi and members of her cabinet initiated several contacts with Akali leaders to resolve mounting tensions in Punjab.

Although Mrs. Gandhi sincerely sought a political negotiated settlement, more needs to be said of her role as a "politician" and the nature of the political maneuvering over this issue which sought to centralize and consolidate greater power and influence in her hands.

H. Mrs. Gandhi the Politician and the Government's Political Maneuvering in the Punjab Tensions

While it may be said that Mrs. Gandhi sought to end the tensions in Punjab through a negotiated settlement, it has been charged that she participated in elevating tensions around the Golden Temple incident long before its final outbreak. The trait of power motivation is apparent in Mrs. Gandhi's attempt to weaken the Akali leadership's control over the Sikh gurudwaras. It had been claimed that Mrs. Gandhi's government helped to prop up radical elements in the Sikh community so as to provide a reason for a sharp government crackdown to usurp power and influence over the Sikh leadership and gain control over gurudwaras. In particular it has been suggested that the rise to power of Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale, the Sikh militant fundamentalist leader who controlled the Golden Temple prior to the

government crackdown, came to power with the assistance of Sanjay Gandhi, the late son of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, and Giani Zail Singh, the then President of India (Surya India, 1984:8-9). The trait of power motivation is most pronounced in Mrs. Gandhi's attempt to control the Akali leadership by propping up her own political candidate. It had been charged that Bhindranwale was propped up to serve the political ends of the Congress party during the mid 1970's prior to Mrs. Gandhi's loss at the polls to Morarji Desai. It was noted that "the first to try to exploit his (Bhindranwale's) potential as a political force was Giani Zail Singh, who as a leader of the Congress Party who thought that with Bhindranwale's support he might be able to end Akali hegemony over the gurudwaras. Little did Gianiji then realize that in a few years to come he would be host with his own petard" (Nayer and Singh, 1984:25). Bhindranwale was then said to have broken away from his sponsors and turned against them.

Bhindranwale came to the forefront of the political scene in Punjab during a confrontation which he lead against Nirankari Sikhs at Amritsar on April 13, 1978. The Nirankari Sikhs, who believe in a succession of Gurus and who follow sacred texts of their own, some of whose passages are deemed offensive to fundamentalist Sikhs, have often had bitter confrontations with their fundamentalist

counterparts. In November 1973, a "hukumnama" (edict) had been issued by Akali Dal leadership denouncing the Nirankari Sikhs as renegades. Since then numerous bloody clashes between the two groups had ensued. It had been noted that the Congress Party sought to prop up Bhindranwale and his fundamentalist colleagues in order to exacerbate conflict between the moderate Akali Dal Sikhs, the fundamentalist Sikhs, and Nirankaris so that these groups would be sufficiently weakened so that Congress would have a greater power in governing Punjab. Bhindranwale's orthodox followers and the Akali Dal, instead of fighting against each other, merged together as a united front in opposing encroaching Congress power in Punjab. It had been said that:

The Akalis represented the interests of the comparatively well-to-do peasant farmers who had prospered with the Green Revolution. Their aim was to wrest political power from Congress and insure further agricultural prosperity through liberal supply of river waters and electric power (both generated in Punjab) as well as set up agro-industries like sugar and textile mills to process their abundant harvests of cane and cotton. Sikh fundamentalists, including Bhindranwale's followers the 'Akhand Keertani Jathas' and the All India Sikh Students Federation were more concerned with ensuring Sikh dominance in Punjab by emphasizing Sikh separateness from the Hindus and making sure that the large-scale influx of Hindus and labor from U.P (Uttar Pradesh) and Bihar, which threatened to reduce Sikh proportion of Punjab's population, was halted (cf. Nayer and Singh, 1984:26).

It had also been noted that the list of political, economic, and religious demands voiced by the two groups

had not existed before but were only drawn up after the Akali Dal lost control in the Punjab legislature. Bhindranwale was conceived to be propped up in order to embarrass and cause conflict among the Akali leadership. It is noted that after the death of Gurbachan Singh, leader of the Nirankaris, Zail Singh (then Home Minister) came to Bhindranwale's defence after he was believed to be a prime suspect. Indira Gandhi's penchant for tactical back-door diplomacy is reflected in how Bhindranwale was relieved of responsibility for Gurbachan Singh's death. Her leadership attribute of unbridled determination to see her political agenda carried out is also reflected in this incident. Indira Gandhi is said to have worked through Zail Singh by having him tell parliament that Bhindranwale was not responsible for Gurbachan Singh's assassination, despite strong evidence suggesting his involvement. After warrants were issued for Bhindranwale's arrest and publicized through All India Radio news bulletins, Mrs. Gandhi was believed to have used Zail Singh to issue orders to Darbara Singh, chief minister of Punjab at the time, to allow Bhindranwale to leave from police surveillance and to permit him to choose his own time and place to surrender. Bhindranwale left for the Golden Temple complex and when he left, he was arrested. In the wake of strong protests from Akali and fundamentalist Sikh leaders the government

conceded to Bhindranwale's unconditional surrender (cf. Nayer and Singh, 1984:42-50 for account).

From the vantage point of the trait of leadership efficacy, Mrs. Gandhi's handling of the Bhindranwale incident did little to promote internal peace and order. It had been suggested that Mrs. Gandhi's ready willingness to allow Bhindranwale to set his own terms for surrender and for allowing violence among the Sikhs to continue was to deliberately anger the Hindu community and so that they would demand strong government intervention to quell the problem. It has been charged that the government's unwillingness to take a firm response to mounting violence was to "politically exploit the Hindu `backlash'" (Surya India, 1984:8).

Did Mrs. Gandhi have any opportunity for political gain from exacerbating the conflict in Punjab and inciting Hindu protests for stronger government action? One might note that the "Congress (I) polled 52.45 percent votes in the 1980 Lok Sabha elections against 34.85 percent in 1977, while the Akali Dal was reduced to 23.37 percent in 1980 against 42.30 percent in 1977. In the Assembly elections in 1980, the Congress (I) pulled 45.19 percent of the votes against 34.07 percent in 1977, while the Akali Dal declined to 26.92 percent in 1980 compared to 31.41 percent in 1977.

In Mrs. Gandhi's calculation the Congress Party in Punjab had a base among the Hindus; they looked toward the center for protection. After losing their homes and hearths in Pakistan they feared disruption once again at the hands of the Sikhs; the Akali demands alienated them further. Why should she risk losing their loyal, solid support" (Nayer and Singh, 1984:50).

Mrs. Gandhi perhaps allowed tensions to brew in Punjab too long for the purposes of consolidating her support among the Hindu parties. This action reflected poor a low degree of the trait of leadership efficacy because Mrs. Gandhi's actions did not contribute to the cause of sustaining order in Punjab and the creation of a common identity. It was quite possible to have swiftly taken stronger measures to restrict the movements of Bhindranwale and other fundamentalist militants prior to their siege of the Golden Temple complex. The low degree of the trait of leadership efficacy is even more apparent in Mrs. Gandhi and the Congress I's efforts to use Bhindranwale as a tool to canvas votes and as a vehicle for promoting conflict between fundamentalists, moderates, and Nirankaris. This tactic was designed to weaken them and it had inadvertently set the stage for a Hindu backlash, which contributed to the deterioration of conditions (cf. Nayer and Singh, 1984:44ff). Mrs. Gandhi apparently waited for a propitious

time to take action as she sought firm Hindu support for a high handed policy which would further consolidate her party's power in Punjab (cf. Newsweek, 1984:44-46).

When Bhindranwale and his followers charted an independent course and behaved as renegades, the government was forced into responding to a crisis it had helped to bring to life. A pandora's box had been opened unintentionally.

Until October 6, (1983), the target of Bhindranwale's men were Hindus who were known to be hostile, Nirankaris, police officials or Sikhs who had been 'informers,' or who had sided with the government. But from then on the killings became indiscriminate... They were innocent people who had nothing to do with politics, and this marked a watershed in relations between the Hindus and the Sikhs.

Throughout the country people began to believe that the Sikhs were out to kill the Hindus in Punjab. The Akali demands, which had come to enjoy large-scale support among the Hindus, were relegated to the background. The divide between the communities which was earlier confined to Punjab now spread all over India (Nayer and Singh, 1984:76f).

The uncontrolled violence in Punjab which magnified and multiplied on a daily basis gave rise to the government crackdown, known as "Operation Bluestar," a policy option which could have been avoided had Mrs. Gandhi taken steps against Sikh and Hindu extremist groups in Punjab.

**I. Operation Bluestar:
Mrs. Gandhi's Crackdown in Punjab**

Mrs. Gandhi's crackdown in Punjab reached its zenith in early June of 1984. Her crackdown in the Punjab is reflective of the force of her personality which did not tolerate any opposition to the exercise of her political power. From the perspective of the trait of leadership efficacy, despite the fact that her initial support of Bhindranwale contributed to the tensions in Punjab, her subsequent crackdown in the Punjab helped to root out anti-government elements and restored order in Punjab. On June 3, 1984 she initiated the Foreigners Act which prohibited foreign nationals from entering Punjab. She later initiated the Punjab Press (Special Powers) Act which placed strict censorship on press reporting of activities in Punjab and prevented the transmission of material which she deemed to be inflammatory in content or had the potential for inciting communal violence.

The Golden Temple complex was believed to have been radically transformed from a place of worship to an armed fortress which served host to anti-government activities. It was noted (White Paper, 1984:47) that:

The terrorists had converted the Golden Temple complex into a veritable fortress for mounting attacks on any para-military or military forces that might challenge their position. They had received extensive training in

military operations and use of explosives and sophisticated weapons, installed their own communication systems and stored adequate quantities of food grains to last several months. Training had been provided by experienced ex-army personnel and battle plans had been drawn up with ingenuity, maximizing the advantages provided by the lookouts and towers in the Temple complex. Wearing assorted uniforms, the terrorists were well trained and well equipped as any regular force could be. The pattern of killings, bank robberies and arson committed by the terrorists all over Punjab also show how well they were trained in the use of weapons. They had an elaborate protective cover of getaway plans and eventual sanctuary in places of worship.

Table 7.7 shows the degree to which the Golden Temple was fortified and the reflects the magnitude of the problem (cf. White Paper, 1984:169f):

During Operation Bluestar the government called approximately 500 specially trained anti-terrorist commando troops from New Delhi to Amristsar. The whole operation to remove terrorist elements involved nearly 5,000 army troops which surrounded the temple, blockaded points of exit and supply routes, while another 5,000 troops were called in to maintain a curfew and insure order in the streets of Punjab. The operation involved the leadership of a Muslim, Hindu, and four Sikh officers who commanded various units in different stages of the crackdown.

It had been noted that when army officers used the public announcement system to call for the surrender of

terrorists (June 5/6, 1984) several civilians and many children came out from the Guru Nanak Niwas and SGPC building in order to surrender. At this time terrorists opened fire, threw grenades and killed about 70 people, among them 30 women and 5 children (White Paper, 1984:51). It had also been noted that two junior commissioned officers who were captured had been skinned alive, had explosives strapped to them, and blown up as they were thrown from an upper floor of the Akali Takht. An unarmed army doctor who entered the complex to treat casualties was hacked to death (White Paper, 1984:51).

The government crackdown resulted in the loss of many lives. Government estimates (cf. The Sikhs in Their Homeland India, 1984:27; White Paper) report that "83 officers and jawans (soldiers) were killed and 249 were wounded in the area of the Golden Temple (total casualties, including those in other religious places and other operations amounted to 92 killed and 287 injured, as of 30 June 1984). Four hundred and ninety-three terrorists/civilians were killed and 86 wounded in the area of the Golden Temple. One thousand five hundred and twelve were apprehended there and taken into custody. (Total casualties, including those in other religious places and other operations, as of 30 June 1984 amounted to 554 killed and 121 wounded; apprehensions amounted to 4,712)."

Non-government sources point to a much higher number of casualties (cf. India Today, 1984:17). "By the evening of June 9, over 750 inquest reports had been prepared on the extremist dead alone, and many bodies still awaited clearance. It would be safe to assume that close to 1,000 extremists were killed, while army sources admit that their own dead could be as high as 200 or more."

In view of the severe and terrible consequences of Operation Bluestar, the evidence suggests that Mrs. Gandhi's actions were appropriate, however, the problem could probably have been averted had she made a stronger effort to restore peace in Punjab at an earlier time. Operation Bluestar was a necessary but avoidable policy option which is reflective of poor leadership in conflict and crisis management.

**J. Final Assessment of Mrs. Gandhi
and her Punjab Policy:**

Looking at the Punjab problem from the vantage point of political leadership, it can be said that Mrs. Gandhi displayed a very low degree of the trait of leadership efficacy because her policy did not serve to bring lasting order, peace, or create a sense of unity among the Sikh leadership and the Sikh community. A common sense of national identity was not nurtured -- the Sikhs continued to view themselves as a people set apart from the many other

groups that characterize India. Instead of decisively taking action to quell mounting violence in Punjab, she allowed tensions to grow so that it would consolidate her influence in the region and weaken her rivals. Her final decision to storm the Golden Temple did not reflect any personal animosities towards Sikhs; it was simply the worst case solution to a problem that had gone out of control. Her decision to storm the Golden Temple reflected the prevalence of policy dogmatism. She disregarded the serious consideration of other unpopular, slow, and less bold options which may have ended the conflict with minimal bloodshed, in favor of a quick military strike which seemed to reinforce her position as a strong leader. She might have chosen to cut power, access to supplies, and simply waited for the extremists to surrender. From the perspective of historical hindsight it is easy to offer a number of alternative scenarios for dealing with the problem, however, in the midst of growing conflict and violent clashes between the Sikhs and Hindus, the solution that she opted for seemed to be the best one at the time. Although the storming of the Golden Temple may be justified in terms of a leader and a government's responsibility to maintain order and protect the lives of innocent civilians, the "perception" which was created by having the Golden Temple assaulted by military troops only contributed to the

alienation which was already felt by certain segments of the Sikh community.

A military attack on the Sikh holy shrine was viewed not as an expedient act to maintain peace, but as a desecration and assault on the beliefs and sensitivities of the Sikh community. This view made a political settlement in Punjab through formal negotiations all the more difficult. It made the prized goal of successfully bringing people together to share a common national identity an even more difficult task.

Summary:

The main focus of this chapter has been to analyze Indira Gandhi's leadership in the context of majority/minority relations vis-a-vis the Punjab problem. This chapter has shown how beliefs and personality enter into the political process in the light of Mrs. Gandhi's leadership in the crisis in the Punjab.

The analysis of this issue has revealed Mrs. Gandhi's personal inclination toward self-reliance and the need to take charge, monitor, and dominate her political environment. One of the strengths of Mrs. Gandhi's leadership was in her ability to affect the perception of

events and circumstances. In this regard, she was able to galvanize support for her actions such as the one taken in Punjab, in the face of opposition in Parliament.

Her weakness in leadership is reflected in her policy rigidity and unwillingness to explore appropriate policy alternatives to storming the Golden Temple. On this issue, Mrs. Gandhi's move against the Sikh Golden Temple received the popular support of much of the country. At the same time her policy also served to isolate, alienate, and embitter some of the more moderate elements of the Sikh community. This made the prospect of realizing a negotiated settlement more difficult. Mrs. Gandhi's inattention and unwillingness to adequately focus her attention to some of the deep-seeded economic and political policies that precipitated the violence also represents a weakness in her leadership in the Punjab crisis.

Although the consequences of Operation Bluestar in many ways damaged opportunities for constructive conflict resolution, the evidence suggests that Mrs. Gandhi's actions were necessary under the existing circumstances. However, it must also be stressed that the problem could probably have been avoided if stronger efforts to restore peace in Punjab had been made at an earlier time.

Chapter 9: Indira Gandhi and Non-alignment

Introduction:

Although there are notable similarities in the personality and belief structures of Nehru and his daughter, Indira Gandhi, there are some unique similarities and differences in the application of their views on Non-alignment. This chapter serves to identify some common links between the two leaders' application of the principal of Non-alignment and analyzes how India benefitted from Mrs. Gandhi's Non-alignment policy.

A. Non-alignment and the Nehru Legacy:

Jawaharlal Nehru, prior to his death in 1964, brought India from mere oblivion as a newly independent country into a forefront of global politics. At home he governed in a manner which at times made him appear to be a benevolent autocrat. He appointed close aides who were fiercely loyal to his policies, overlooked dissent, and at the same time sought to concentrate power into his own hands.

An example of this and the prevalence of the trait of power motivation which shows how he tried to control his political environment may be seen in Nehru's attempt to

restrict the free dissemination of information regarding the conclusion of the 1962 border conflict with China. Nehru developed a very restrictive information policy which banned all published material on the border conflict from China, Taiwan, North Korea and Vietnam and other magazines, articles, books, maps or pamphlets which challenged or opposed India's position on the border dispute (cf. Tharoor, 1982:44). The trait of power motivation is also reflected in the fact that "Nehru insulated foreign policy from parliamentary influences. The government did not seek parliamentary advice on or consent to a single treaty or international agreement... (n)or did the administration tell Parliament of Chinese encroachments on Indian territory till 1959, five years after they had begun" (Tharoor, 1982:45).

Parliament, political parties and other interest groups generally had little influence over the shaping of Nehru's Non-aligned policy which accounted for Nehru's successful dominance over the external policy-making apparatus. Ilchman (1966:226) noted that Non-alignment in general was accepted as national policy without much debate. I would argue that part of this was due to Nehru's persuasive yet domineering style. It was also due to the fact that none of the parties made a strong effort to educate its constituency on matters related to external affairs. Very few parliament members had the expertise or desire to

familiarize themselves with foreign affairs and the dynamics of Nehru's Non-alignment principles.

The trait of power motivation and Nehru's control of the foreign policy bureaucracy is amplified in Nehru use of the Congress Party's Standing Committee on External Affairs to advise his government on foreign affairs. In reality, though, this committee was simply a tool used by the Prime Minister to galvanize support for his policies. Parliament's Consultative Committee on Foreign Affairs was designed to serve a similar advisory purpose, however, it was simply used as a sounding board to advance Nehru's policies. Given this situation, Nehru displayed the trait of policy dogmatism by perceptually screening out any information which conflicted with his policy interests. The rubber stamp function of the Parliament's Consultative Committee on Foreign Affairs did not enhance Nehru's ability to process information from a wide range of conflicting sources. Instead it made him close-minded in his exploration of policy alternatives.

Ilchman (1966:224) noted that the Parliamentary Consultative Committee was "unwieldy in size, dominated by the Congress in numbers, controlled by the Ministry (External Affairs), infrequently called, and, without authority..." He also noted that it "served as an

opportunity for the Prime Minister or the Minister of State to lecture the members on the achievements of Indian foreign policy." Nehru did not hesitate to apply force where force was due, however, his intent to exercise domineering control over the political establishment lay far beyond his political ambition to be admired and recognized by his peers around the world (cf. Nehru, 1961). He held a philosophical outlook on the demands and responsibilities of statecraft and sought to raise India from the turmoils of domestic conflict in order to forge a country with a common identity that would advance the cause of economic, social, and political development.

In many ways, Nehru was influenced by Mahatma Gandhi who taught that adherence to moral principles would overcome a multitude of injustices. This had a great affect on his personality and his political proclivities. In this vein, it should be noted that Nehru espoused principles of tolerance, cooperation, patience, and perfected the art of diplomacy in his dealings with other leaders. He preferred mediation to conflict and sought quiet diplomacy as a means to reconcile regional disputes. As a previous chapter has shown, this leadership orientation was not fully reflected in his dealings with domestic matters where his internal policies were more often challenged and critiqued than his foreign policy agenda.

Despite autocratic tendencies at home which was a response to the Opposition party's hostile political forces, as an image-maker on the world stage Nehru preferred to be the quintessential diplomat who genuinely preferred the art of persuasion to the exercise of brute force. He recognized that India's power lay in her capacity to influence the views of others through peaceful means. He pursued Non-alignment as a practical and politically efficacious alternative to involvement in Cold War politics. He identified the defence of Non-alignment with the defence of India's independence and viewed his policy as the moral high-road of contemporary statecraft. In many ways he appeared to be a very forceful and enlightened leader who was more than willing to exercise the power of his personality and that of his office in order to advance his views. Tharoor, (1982:45f) noted:

Jawaharlal Nehru bequeathed to his successors a conception of foreign policy as not the Prime Minister's or the Congress party's but the nation's, transforming opposition to its fundamentals into opposition to India's very independence. Nehru's brilliance at giving conceptual shape to that policy and expressing it in terms of the national Zeitgeist rendered his own place at the peak of the foreign policy elite secure. But this also meant that foreign policy, unlike other areas of action in the nascent Indian democratic polity, was not formulated by the same process of pluralistic bargaining and interest-reconciliation that marked domestic politics in the same period. It became the preserve of a few men who elevated the national genius above the national interest and were rarely checked by popular pressure or public opposition.

Indira Gandhi had a very different view of herself and India's role in global politics. She, like her father, displayed autocratic qualities, however, she was far more willing to high-handedly exercise her influence to obtain what she desired. She did not appreciate conciliation, persuasion, and diplomacy as effective tactics of negotiation as had her father. Instead she sought power in order to consolidate her own position in the political establishment and sought to make India a major regional actor. In part, this was a reflection of her own insecurity and inability to control events that transpired around her (cf. Gandhi, 1965; Carras, 1979).

1. Contrast With Her Father's Legacy and Non-alignment:

Jawaharlal Nehru was very much a product of the British colonial experience in India. The transfer of power into Indian hands was an insufficient guarantor of freedom. Nehru sought political independence and a political identity distinct from India's colonial rulers. Political independence and the development of a distinct political identity, for Nehru, came in the form of Non-alignment. Nehru sought an honored and revered status for India in the global community of nations. Speaking at an Asian Relations Conference in New Delhi, in March 1947, Nehru (1949:298) remarked:

We stand at the end of an era and on the threshold of a new period of history....Asia, after a long period of quiescence, has suddenly become important again in world affairs.... It is fitting that India should play her part in this new phase of Asian development...we have no designs against anybody; ours is the great design of promoting peace and progress all over the world. Far too long have we in Asia been petitioners in Western courts and chancelleries. That day must now belong to the past... we do not intend to be the playthings of others.

For Nehru, Non-alignment was more than an external policy of statecraft, it was the embodiment of traditional Indian values which Mahatma Gandhi described. Among those values were peace, tolerance, non-violence, and respect for others. Nehru was genuinely committed to these ideals and viewed Non-alignment as a means by which some of these values could be applied to the political realm. For Nehru, Non-alignment was a highly moral cause reflecting the best qualities of India's political culture.

Indira Gandhi, on the other hand, viewed Non-alignment as a strategy to assert India's dominance in South Asia. Like her father she sought to draw India into the limelight of global politics; in similar fashion, her views on Non-alignment reflected her personality and temperament. For Nehru, Non-Alignment brought political independence to India; for Indira Gandhi freedom came in the form of economic independence and the capability to exert influence on others through any means available. Independence and the

ability to dominate over one's external environment were virtues which Indira Gandhi appreciated. Non-alignment was less a moral cause than it was a strategy for India to pursue in order that she may effectively complete and exercise her political will in a manner mirroring the great Powers of the post-war era.

Although Indira Gandhi had little formal direct experience with government, she had a direct, first-hand knowledge of foreign affairs and India's external relations. She accompanied her father all over the world as he visited various capitals and met with numerous heads of state. She fully understood her father's views on Non-alignment and grew extremely defensive when he was attacked and criticized for continuing to uphold it after the debacle with China over disputed territory. She grew up around the Congress Party establishment, was keenly aware of the internal political dynamics of the organization and of its leadership and was able to draw upon its troubles, lack of cohesion, and internal rivalry to divide and weaken it so that she might be in control of the Congress Party apparatus. In 1969, Indira Gandhi split the Congress Party into two factions and by 1971 she had mastered control over the organization which dominated politics during her tenure as Prime Minister.

2. Policy as a Reflection of Personal Proclivities: Indira Gandhi's Penchant for Independence and Self-Reliance

As a child, Indira Gandhi had a lonely and unstable childhood which made her feel insecure (cf. Hart, 1976:234). Her troubled childhood magnified her feelings of insecurity, friendlessness, and a brought to the surface a strong desire to control and dominate both the people and the situation around her (cf. Vasudev, 1974:48; Hart, 1976:234ff; Sahgal, 1982). Tharoor (1982:55f) noted that "(i)n keeping with the motive forces of her personality, Mrs. Gandhi transformed the system to ensure her political survival and dominance. The political process under Indira Gandhi was more centralized and less institutionalized than Nehru's; pluralism in party and government were negated, federalism was modified to the point of attenuation and the Prime Minister was confirmed at the pinnacle of decision-making...." Tharoor (1982:56) went on to add:

...Mrs. Gandhi undoubtedly dismantled or undermined the institutions obstructing her dominance - the judiciary, the presidency, the press, the Cabinet, Parliament, the Congress party - but she failed to replace them with alternative institutions of her own, preferring instead to exercise her authority through no recognized procedure (as with the appointment of Congress Chief Ministers in the States before the Emergency) or arbitrary and sometimes unconstitutional pressure (as with the doings of her son's 'caucus' during the Emergency). This reflected not so much the creation of a new, rational structure as the failure to institutionalize her system of rule, which remained in essence an informal authoritarianism.

Tharoor, however, neglects to note that the "informal authoritarianism" which may surface as a consequence of the personification of leadership is not a new development in Indian political culture. As noted in Chapter 4, in Asian political systems, and most notably in India, there is great deference to the leader in matters related to domestic and external affairs. As long as the political leader can maintain order, his or her leadership is not subject to debilitating confrontation or challenge. Mrs. Gandhi's actions were tolerated because she was able to convince the vast majority of the electorate that the opposition was diffused, confused, and could not be trusted in maintaining social order.

Mrs. Gandhi, in part, was successful in centralizing power and authority because of the erosion of public confidence in the political system. Ashis Nandy (1977) noted that the late 1960s and 1970s were a period of mounting political, economic, and social crises when public confidence in the leadership of India was at its lowest ebb. He noted that Mrs. Gandhi's emergence to power were the product of "defensive neo-nationalism," "total commitment to ruthless realpolitik," the middle class' "fear of chaos and disorder," which could only be remedied by having centralized authority and a monopoly on power and finally, an "atmosphere were the idea of a plural society

was increasingly losing its shine" among nearly all segments of society.

Mrs. Gandhi's leadership gained legitimacy as people identified her with the state and with the office of the Prime Minister. She labeled her critics and opponents as individuals who sought to undermine the political institutions and integrity of the country by attacking her. An attack on her was viewed as an attack on the institution of the Prime Minister, and by default, upon the integrity of India (see Times of India, 27 June 1975).

She so closely identified with the country that she believed that her office and her role were the embodiment of the will of the Indian people, hence, giving credence to the slogan "India is Indira and Indira is India," which emerged in the print media. Quite remarkably, her father, Nehru was viewed in the same light. Nehru was the symbol of India and India was inexorably personified through Nehru. The character and persona of both father and daughter as individual political leaders became inexorably linked with the office of the Prime Minister and with the country which they led.

Most mornings Indira Gandhi had a brief series of meetings, her morning darshans ("at-home meetings") with

the public at the Prime Minister's residence. In many ways she had regular, direct contact with a small cross-section of the Indian population and could "empathize" with their fears, needs, and concerns in a first-hand manner which her father was unable to do.

Nehru, in this regard was different from her daughter and yet was popular but for a different reason. Indira Gandhi was perceived to be an empathetic leader who could identify with the needs of common people, whereas Nehru appeared to be the princely, imperial, leader who was closely linked with India's historical past and its tradition of benevolent feudal leadership. As Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi seemed more down-to-earth in the eyes of people. In contrast, as a matter of style and tactics, Nehru spoke in broad, idealistic, and general, philosophic terms, while Indira communicated through simple, directed, pointed stories to her constituency. She became adept at extemporaneous speech-making and mastered the ability to simplify complex ideas into short slogans and convey her views in simple terms that people could relate to in their everyday lives.

Perhaps the most apparent and noticeable differences in leadership style between Nehru and his daughter is the motivation which propels their processes of decision-making,

and consequently their actions vis-a-vis Non-alignment. Nehru was propelled by a strong desire to be accepted, respected, and revered among his peers; he sought the same for his country among the international community of nations. Indira Gandhi, on the other hand, appeared to be propelled by a latent feeling of insecurity which she viewed to be threatening to her position, and by extension, to India. During the late 1960s she bitterly opposed American efforts establish contacts with Morarji Desai and other members of the Opposition. She also attacked proported CIA activities in India and used the CIA issue as a rallying point to stir up her supporters who believed her claim that external forces were trying to destabilize India.

Mrs. Gandhi's nearly total identification with the country and the Indian people; her inability to tolerate a challenge to her authority and criticism, and the desire to dominate were traits which both she and her father shared. Whereas Nehru sought prestige and recognition, Indira Gandhi sought security and a consolidation of power in her hands to ensure it. Whereas Nehru viewed Non-alignment to be a means of drawing India into the community of major political actors on the world stage, Non-alignment for India was a "strategy" or "tactic" which she used to ensure just the opposite; Indira sought "independence" and "self-reliance" and viewed these goals as virtues of strength. Nehru

desired that India gain strength through her association with other major actors; Indira viewed India's strength in terms of the country's ability to do without or dispense with such associations. "Independence" and "self-reliance" were virtues she respected and exhibited and which she sought for India as opposed to the virtues of "cooperation" and "comity" which her father advanced.

Nehru sought to apply his principles of Non-alignment in order to reduce the likelihood that conflict would break out between the Super-Power states and other peripheral states. He desired that India play a mediatory role in reducing tensions by providing conciliatory advice and generally assisting in the limiting of regional tensions. His daughter, on the other hand, sought to apply Non-alignment in such a way so as to balance the influence of the Super-Powers and to prevent them from manipulating the affairs of weaker states.

It is interesting to note, that Mrs. Gandhi's views of both Super-Powers were far from those of her father. She exhibited a personal proclivity toward the Soviet Union because she felt that the USSR best met the needs of India's goal toward a more "self-sufficient" economy. Non-alignment was not independence from the Super-Powers as her father envisioned; it was just the opposite. Non-alignment for

Indira was the ability to retain independence of action and the free exercise of political and economic relations in ways that would benefit India.

Although Nehru was much more of an ideal universalist, Indira was much more of an ardent, militant nationalist. Nehru was very careful in trying to avoid even the semblance of partiality in Indo-Soviet or Indo-American relations; his daughter, on the other hand was unhesitant in her support of whichever power had the most to offer India. Since the Soviet Union was more cooperative in providing India with industrial and technical expertise, and the design and establishment of heavy industries that would enable her to achieve a fair degree of economic self-sufficiency in certain sectors, she was much more receptive to the Soviet Union's diplomatic and political efforts. At the same time, in an effort to sustain India's independence, she was resolute in entering into only those cooperative arrangements that had no strings attached. The 1971 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union represents an example where an agreement to establish friendly political and economic relations carefully precluded the suggestion of any such military arrangements (cf. Foreign Affairs Record, 1977:498).

Despite disagreements and occasional strained relations between India and the Super Powers, Indira Gandhi sought to maintain cordial relations with both the Soviet Union and the United States. The major difference was, however, that she applied a double standard which more often than not was more sympathetic towards the Soviet Union.

Her criticism of the United States stemmed from its overt support of Pakistan as a regional ally. When the Soviets sold arms to Pakistan during 1967/68 her criticism of the USSR was muted. In the case of the United States, criticism of U.S. policies would be public, whereas, in the case of the Soviet Union, it would be private. During Nehru's tenure, it was very rare that his government's opposition to any particular Super-Power policy would be vocalized or scrutinized in any broad public forum.

Both Indira and her father shared a common aspiration that India would be well received as a major political actor on the world stage. Speaking to this issue, she once noted: "Because of our size and geographical position and resources in materials and men, we cannot but play a fairly large part in international affairs and that role will always be on behalf of peace. People recognize us as a power, even as a potential great power...." (Sen, 1971:159).

For Indira Gandhi, strength was synonymous with independence and the converse was true as well. Unlike Nehru, who viewed India's health and well-being through closer political and economic ties with all states, Indira viewed strength in terms of the relationships that India could forgo. Economic self-sufficiency was her prime directive. Her world-view was not based on the socialist inclinations of her father; Indira Gandhi to the contrary, refused to be bound by ideological perspectives or principles that would define a set of policies or values that she would be required to adhere to. Freedom and strength in decision-making for Indira was found by remaining non-committal. Hart (1976:261) noted that for Indira Gandhi "to accept a set of principles, however abstract, would be to accept power over her own will. She would not bind herself even to ideals, in any way she could not manipulate." Speaking to the issue of ideology and values, Indira Gandhi (cf Foreign Affairs 1972:206), herself, noted:

India's foreign policy is a projection of the values which we have cherished through the centuries as well as our current concerns. We are not tied to the traditional concepts of a foreign policy designed to safeguard overseas possessions, investments, the carving out of spheres of influence and the erection of cordons sanitaires. We are not interested in exporting ideologies.

Ideology played only a minimal role in her choice of friends. After becoming increasingly disenchanted with the U.S. for supporting Pakistan, delaying PL480 economic assistance, and attaching strings to various forms of foreign assistance, she grew very distrustful of U.S. intentions in South Asia. Her proclivity towards the Soviet Union was not based on any greater feelings of trust than she had for the United States. Her more cordial relations with the Soviet Union were based on her belief that she could extract a better economic arrangement with the U.S.S.R that would benefit India. Non-alignment was little more than a strategy which could be selectively applied to secure the best possible economic and political arrangements favorable for India. In this context, Indira Gandhi applied double standards in criticizing the U.S. and the U.S.S.R's policies in various parts of the world. The United States was publicly criticized for its designs for South Asia, however, her criticism of the Soviet Union's high-handed tactics in Eastern Europe and the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 were muted. Tharoor (1982:83) noted that on the questions of "Czechoslovakia, Eastern Europe, the Indian Ocean and economic relations -- Mrs. Gandhi at the very least gave the Soviets the benefit of the doubt, and this after three months out of office, at a time when a return to power seemed impossible and when she was free to express a non-official viewpoint. Clearly, there was an element of

bias in Indira Gandhi's evaluation of international situations. This does not imply that she was anything but sincere in her perception of what was best for India; only that it was obviously coloured by a pro-Soviet predilection."

Among the personality dispositions most revealing about Indira Gandhi's character, the desire to remain independent, the need to be self-sufficient, an ardent sense of indian nationalism, and the desire to gain personal eminence and prestige which is transferrable to India, stand out most vividly.

Among the most notable and revealing differences between Indira Gandhi and her father is in the practice of Non-alignment and the rationale for it. Nehru viewed Non-alignment to be a moral position which had the potential for reducing regional tensions. It also had the potential of ascribing to India, a great deal of respect and prestige.

For Indira Gandhi, Non-alignment was little more than a strategy that could accrue political and economic benefits for India. Non-alignment served a utilitarian purpose in that it served to guarantee India's independence. In this vein, Mrs. Gandhi noted: "we are neither anti-Western nor are we pro-Soviet. We take help

from wherever we can get it and I think there is nothing shameful in it provided we are not compromising any of our ideals or our policies or anything by getting this help. But primarily we are working for India" (D.V. Gandhi, 1976:100).

Despite her statements giving the impression that she was neither pro-Soviet nor pro-U.S., Mrs. Gandhi, did harbor a conviction that the greatest threat facing India and other emerging countries came from Western economic colonialism (cf. Sen, 1971:209). As a result, she was a strong advocate of Indian self-sufficiency in nearly all matters related to indigenous economic development; she also strongly favored Non-Aligned solidarity with Afro-Asian states because she believed that this might dilute the influence or restrict opportunities for Western economic dominance of Third World economies.

3. Real Politick and Mrs. Gandhi's Non-Aligned Policy

In view of the fact that Mrs. Gandhi's external policies lacked a major ideological dimension or philosophical framework, one might posit that it was essentially based on pragmatic principles (cf. Mansingh, 1984:6f). Indira Gandhi viewed contemporary statecraft in terms of hard national interest and cost-benefit calculations; a view which drastically differed from those

of her father. It is interesting to note that Mrs. Gandhi viewed Non-alignment and her external policies in terms of "friendship" and loyalty. Friends were any countries that would help India advance the cause of independent and self-sufficient economic growth and development. In this view there remained little room for ideology, moral principles, or sentimentalism. Speaking to the issue of foreign policy in the light of "friendship," Mrs. Gandhi (1965:137) remarked:

The fact is that India today has about as many friends as any other country has. How we keep those friends or whether they remain friends is not dependent merely on what we do, but what happens to be their national interests at any given time... We must try to increase our friendship but all the time we have to be prepared for any other situation when the same country may not be a friend or a country which is not our friend may decide for various reasons to become our friend. Our whole attitude must be flexible in all these matters.

When certain Parliament members criticized Mrs. Gandhi for accepting PL 480 aid from the United States because of the perception that strings were attached to the aid, Mrs. Gandhi again reverted to the friendship analogy and noted: "We are taking aid from friends. I can say there are no strings attached... It is stupid not to take friendly advice when there is an acute food problem in this country" (cf. Mansingh, 1984:c14). It is interesting to note than when placed on the defensive, Mrs. Gandhi applies to

"friendship" analogy to diffuse conflict. In 1968, after the Soviet Union initiated the sale of certain arms to Pakistan, Mrs. Gandhi responded by commenting:

The old divisions are no longer sharp. Antagonisms between the different blocks are (giving) way to a situation where the Soviet Union is trying to multiply bridges regardless of ideological differences... I was not surprised by the Russo-Pakistani deal not because I had no prior information but because speculation had been rife that the Soviet Union wanted closer relations with Pakistan without affecting friendship with India. We have no reason to believe that they would want to injure us in any way. Friendship is not exclusive (cf. Pant, c.1977:88).

The preceding statements reflect the two standards of behavior she applied to the Soviet Union and the United States. She was more tolerant of Soviet Union's behavior than the United States' when there was a clash of interests vis-a-vis India. Mrs. Gandhi was more concerned with the loss of Soviet aid to India's heavy industries and in those sectors that promoted a self-reliant economy than anything else. She viewed "friendship" in pragmatic terms and in light of the utilitarian purposes that it might serve. She noted, "....it is important what relationship we have with our neighboring countries. If we are a long way from other countries, we can look at them from different angles" (Sen, 1971:128).

Mrs. Gandhi's penchant for independence and self-reliance drew her away from the global, mediatory character

of Non-alignment which her father, Nehru, sought for India. She sought a political environment that would be able to isolate India from the external pressures of Cold War politics while at the same time afford India the opportunity to pick, choose, and support those policies that would advance her own interests. In criticizing this perspective, Tharoor (1982:101f) noted:

...Mrs. Gandhi replaced Nehru's values to some degree with values of her own, which coloured her policy and circumscribed its reality and realism... Mrs. Gandhi had no broader vision, no sense of a role for India in world politics, except in terms of preserving her 'independence' and conserving her 'strength.' Such realism and feel for power as she did bring to bear on policy attained no conceptual articulation and was never applied to a regional situation or a global theme. It was always reactive, applied to a problem thrust upon India... In such situations Mrs. Gandhi could excel, as demonstrated over Bangladesh. But where India was called upon to initiate a policy or exercise in tangible terms the influence she sought for it in international affairs, Mrs. Gandhi failed. She failed because while she had interests she could not relate them to a strategic picture. Though she was a realist, Mrs. Gandhi was a short-term realist. Her handling of situations did not suffer from lack of pragmatism, but this was not accompanied by a broader conception of the national good...

4. The Centralization of Power and the Aggregation of Power and Indira Gandhi's Leadership Style

Mrs. Gandhi's desire to control the foreign policy apparatus in her government resembled similar efforts by her father. In the same manner that Nehru was his own Foreign Minister, Indira Gandhi sought to maintain tight

control over conduct of India's external relations. Mrs. Gandhi insisted on being informed and consulted on nearly all major foreign policy questions, especially on matters related to the U.S, the U.K. and the Soviet Union although she was not nearly as adroit as her father in dealing with diplomatic activities. (cf. Verghese (1974:1).

Like her father, Nehru, Indira Gandhi enjoyed the limelight of summitry and high level meetings with heads of state. She relegated the details of specific policy issues to her subordinates and took little interest in the intricacies of negotiation or the specific details of her own policies. This contrasted sharply with Nehru who appeared much more concerned with both the substance and the implications of policy decisions. Both she and her father displayed a remarkable astuteness of politics. Nehru was a seasoned orator and possessed a remarkable ability to persuade others. Mrs. Gandhi, however, was not gifted in the art of speech to the degree that her father was. She valued virtues of toughness, firmness, and realism. While Nehru was strong-willed, he was more apt to communicate a strongly-held view or position through his persuasive abilities. He held strong opinions, however, he was always on his guard in expressing them publicly where they might be misinterpreted. Mrs. Gandhi, on the other hand, was much more outspoken on issues such as racialism

or colonialism, and was less inclined to restrain her comments in public forums. As a result she inadvertently and unintentionally alienated or irritated states which sought improved relations with India.

Despite President Johnson and Nixon's requests to refrain from publicly denouncing the U.S. position vis-a-vis Vietnam, Mrs. Gandhi continued to vocalize her opposition to American policy in the region. The Vietnam issue for Mrs. Gandhi represented a case in which power politics was involved - a large, powerful nation against a much weaker one; an issue dealing with national sovereignty and independence; and an issue dealing with racial discrimination against a particular people. These concerns were matters which Indira Gandhi identified very strongly and consequently spoke out against in public forums. Unlike Nehru who launched a moral crusade against colonialism, threats to sovereignty, and against discrimination, Mrs. Gandhi's style was more of a tactical one. When Dubcek was ousted from Czechoslovakia in 1968 and Soviet armed forces rolled into the country to impose Communist rule, Mrs. Gandhi was unwilling to openly challenge the Soviet Union's actions. She expressed India's discontent over the matter, however, she never pressed the issue further and instead argued that states must subscribe to principles of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states as

prescribed in the UN charter (cf. Keesings, 1968:229- 97). Clearly there was a double standard invoked here. In this context, Tharoor (1982:111) notes that "where (Mrs. Gandhi's) caution on Czechoslovakia was justified on pragmatic grounds, the same principle should have been applied to Vietnam. The overt biases indicated in official statements on similar questions constituted a serious erosion of India's credibility and diplomatic effectiveness. While Nehru was generally respected by both sides in the Cold War because he never criticized one to another, Indira Gandhi left no doubt as to which side she stood on every question dividing the superpowers. When Nehru sought to reduce tensions, Mrs. Gandhi tried to exploit them, by currying favor with one party to the dispute, thus stretching even her definition of Non-alignment. The gap between rhetoric and action, between professed aim and practical intent, was wider for that reason than it ever was under Nehru."

5. Centralization of Power in the Cabinet Structure:

The foreign affairs establishment and the conduct of India's Non-aligned policy, in theory, was to fall within the province of authority of the Cabinet. In most cases, however, Mrs. Gandhi displayed a tendency to neglect her Cabinet's advice and counsel in decision-making vis-a-vis

external affairs. Tharoor (1982:141) noted that "...Mrs. Gandhi preferred to consolidate her power through herself with advisers responsible only to her, whose advice and services she availed of as and when she chose -- and who remained unaccountable to any democratic forum in the parliamentary system. At the same time she never relied fully on these advisers, accepted only such advice from them as she wished to, and by frequent changes ensured that none became close enough or important enough to her to acquire an aura of indispensability."

During her early years as Prime Minister, Mrs. Gandhi consulted the Standing Committee of the Cabinet on Foreign Affairs, which consisted of certain key, loyal, Cabinet Ministers who held the portfolios of Home, Finance, Defence, and External Affairs. A similar committee existed in the Defence Ministry; the Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs also served similar functions, however, these bodies served to essentially sanction decisions already made by Mrs. Gandhi and her closest allies. By 1970, Mrs. Gandhi abolished the Committees on Foreign Affairs, Defence, and Internal Affairs and replaced them with the Political Affairs Committee (PAC, later known as the Cabinet Committee on Political Affairs.

The purpose of this reorganization was to weaken the voices of those who opposed Mrs. Gandhi's policies; it also served as a forum in which she could consolidate support for her foreign policy and non-aligned initiatives. The reason for this, in part, was due to the ministers' lack of interest and ability in wrestling with the complexities of global statecraft.

Another factor that contributed to the weakening of the Cabinet structure was Mrs. Gandhi's maneuver to have her political appointees select key officials to head various agencies of the civil service bureaucracy. Since any individual minister could not appoint his subordinates because they were appointed by a committee of four Secretaries responsible to Mrs. Gandhi, there was little opportunity for any challenge to Mrs. Gandhi's authority. Thus, the bureaucracy, which implemented Mrs. Gandhi's policies, became more powerful than the Cabinet and individual Ministers were politically dependent upon Mrs. Gandhi to retain whatever limited influence they had (cf. Subrahmanyam, 1975:3ff).

The bureaucracies were staffed by "technocrats" and intellectuals who had no regional political affiliation or power-base and who looked to Mrs. Gandhi to continue service in their capacities (cf. Nicholson, 1972:179ff).

Although the membership of the Cabinet consisted of well-educated and able men, they were all well advanced in age and well set in their ideas and political views; younger, more forceful, ambitious men with fresh ideas were seemingly absent from the Cabinet (Jha, 1974:50-57).

Another means of checking and reducing the power of the Cabinet was achieved through the constant reshuffling of Ministers from one department to another before they were able to set up political linkages, power-bases, or consolidate power and influence in any given part of the country (cf. Kripalani, Indian Express, 8 July 1970).

Indira Gandhi consistently chose to subordinate the Cabinet and Parliamentary Committees dealing with Foreign Affairs in order to advance political agenda's of her own. Her desire to do so was, to a large degree, precipitated by a policy fiasco which resulted when the Cabinet took the initiative in introducing a policy that would have devalued the Indian rupee in 1966. In this instance, Cabinet Planning Minister Asoka Mehta, Food Minister C. Subramaniam, Commerce Minister Manubhai Shah, and Finance Minister Sachin Chaudhuri, among others, sought to bring down the value of the Indian rupee in order to meet U.S. aid conditionality requirements and to continue India's production plans. While the U.S. denied exerting pressure

on the continuance of aid, the manner in which the incident was dealt with turned out to be a public relations nightmare for Indira Gandhi. Neither Parliament nor the Indian electorate was informed or educated about the needs or implications of the decision to devalue the rupee. Consequently Mrs. Gandhi took the blame for the decision and was charged with submitting to the will of the U.S. and neglecting India's own development needs (cf. Nayer, 1967:70ff).

The rupee devaluation incident noted earlier made Indira Gandhi appear inept floundering, and unable to take charge of her government. The incident made her distrustful of the Cabinet and increased her resolve to govern by her own standards of conduct, instincts, political interests, and preferences. I would suggest that in many ways, this incident represented a unique turning point early in Mrs. Gandhi's tenure as Prime Minister.

After this incident she sought greater independence in making decisions and sought to centralize power in her own hands so as to maintain control over all aspects of policy analysis and decision-making. This is exemplified by the fact that in one instance, she met Soviet Premier Alexi Kosygin twice during unscheduled meetings without informing her Cabinet of the nature of their discussions (cf.

Bandhyopadhyaya, 1970:146). In another instance the Cabinet was not fully made aware of how the 1971 refugee crisis would be handled in view of the division of Pakistan. Foreign Minister Swaran Singh and some of his other colleagues sought to seal the East Bengal frontier to stem the flow of refugees; others sought actions that would provide relief to the East Bengalis. Mrs. Gandhi, however, after considering various options, had the military prepare for possible intervention in the conflict which was legitimized through Cabinet approval in April of 1971.

These instances reflect Mrs. Gandhi's strong desire to always remain in rigid control of her political environment. She sought to control both the access and management of information which she needed to make decisions and at times selectively screened out information which were incompatible with her own views on a particular concern. In this vein, Verghese (1974:1) noted:

If the Prime Minister has been unable to evolve a grand strategy for India and give the country ...national goals and (a) frame of reference...she has not allowed a body of advisors to develop such a frame for her...Ever since (the decision to devalue the rupee) Mrs. Gandhi has felt it inadvisable to trust anyone or any one group of advisors completely and has preferred to be guided by her own intuition. If she has accepted advice it has been piecemeal and seemingly disaggregated from the world view of the advisor.

Her control over the Congress Party establishment was not much different. It exhibited the same qualities of dominance that were evident in her dealings with the Cabinet. Tharoor (1982:132) notes that Mrs. Gandhi,

set about 'centralizing a federal party' -- reducing the power of state organizations, eliminating the power of state organizations, eliminating the party bosses, placing their own nominees on key Congress decision-making bodies, nominating Congress Chief Ministers in the states instead of encouraging their free election by state legislators, personally appointing the Congress President, and deferring indefinitely intra-party organizational elections. Her control of the Congress Presidency was an important instrument of her domination. After the party split Mrs. Gandhi initially thought of assuming the position herself, and then decided to staff the Presidency with frequently-replaced loyalists.

Indira Gandhi was not averse to conflict as was her father. While Nehru would have sought compromise to achieve consensus, his daughter willingly accepted divisive confrontation as a tactic to produce similar results. Desai (1973:189ff) noted that Mrs. Gandhi's "tendency to push an issue even at the risk of division, greater reliance on populist ethos and techniques than on the instrumentality of the party and increased ideological articulation and performance... She would not hesitate to bring about a divisive confrontation, if needed for goal achievement." Her approach to Non-alignment was a reflection of her personal proclivities toward self-reliance, independence, and security. Non-alignment was not a goal but more or

less a strategy. Mrs. Gandhi was less concerned and pre-occupied than her father was, with her own international public image or India's image as such; her goal was to maximize the political and economic benefits that she would obtain from either Super-Power blocs. In this regard, she had a much more Machiavellian approach to foreign affairs and contemporary statecraft than her father.

B. The Economic Dimensions and Benefits of Indira Gandhi's Non-Alignment Policy:

Earlier in this dissertation it had been shown that Nehru's leadership had drawn India into the limelight of world politics. Nehru's leadership of India in the Non-aligned Movement produced a much higher and more public profile for India and had carved out a special political role for the country as a neutral, informed, mediator in many disputes. Nehru's approach to Non-alignment had a distinctly political character, whereas, his daughter's approach to the same issue was predicated on a particular economic agenda which favored self-reliance.

Whereas, her father sought to define India's role among the Super Powers, Indira sought to define India's position and raise her stature as a leader among developing

states. While some of her detractors claim that Indira Gandhi's aim was to create a state that would emerge as a new sub-imperialist dominant power in South Asia, I question this assessment. What I will suggest in the pages which follow is that India under Indira Gandhi strived to be a regional power with very limited internally-focused aims.

From the vantage point of leadership efficacy, Mrs. under Mrs. Gandhi's leadership India has emerged as a leading Third World donor of services, foreign and finance aid, and technology. By the early 1980s it has been actively involved in over 107 industrial investments abroad with nearly 100 more planned for the future. The Government of India has provided over 34 monetary loans to over 13 Third World states worth nearly Rs. 4,631.57 million; grants worth Rs. 5,234.86 million; and technical assistance to 65 countries, and military aid going to at least 32 countries. Major Indian banks have set up operations in over 26 countries (Dutt, 1984:9).

The key aspect of India's development which is a reflection of Mrs. Gandhi's personality is the drive toward independence and self-reliance. This quality of Mrs. Gandhi's personality is reflected in many of her policy decisions with respect to India's development. Shortly after becoming Prime Minister, Mrs. Gandhi had concentrated

her energies toward enabling India to becoming self-sufficient in many areas of industrial production. In the same manner that she demonstrated the trait of policy dogmatism in her handling of the Punjab problem, her blind determination for large-scale rapid industrialization at any cost reflects the prevalence of policy dogmatism also. Mrs. Gandhi initiated numerous projects to develop heavy industries, a well-equipped and modern arms industry, and a highly skilled cadre of technicians and scientists, while neglecting to ensure that development took place evenly in all parts of the country. The result of her "rapid development at any cost" philosophy has resulted in uneven development throughout the country in a manner that favors one group of people over others.

Although Indira Gandhi's efforts in Non-alignment had successfully introduced various forms of foreign, finance, and military aid from nations of both the East and Western bloc of states the major problem which India continued to face was the periodic flare-ups within the country due to tensions between rival ethnic groups. The low degree of the trait of leadership efficacy is reflected in the fact that she was unable to successfully implement a policy that produced uniform growth throughout the country. Industrial development did encourage the creation of a common identity or forge a special affinity or loyalty to the state. From

the perspective of leadership efficacy, I would argue that in spite of the great deal of progress that had been made, efforts at large scale societal integration and cohesion had remained largely unsuccessful.

In spite of India's dependence on both the East and the West, Mrs. Gandhi had successfully balanced autonomy with dependence. Mrs. Gandhi's desire, therefore, was not to remain subordinate to states of the East or West but to consolidate enough political, economic, and military power to continue to sustain export-oriented growth. Her aims in South Asia were not, I would argue, imperialistic ones. She did not attempt to centralize South Asian economic and political power in India. Nor did she seek to make the states of India's periphery dependent on India. Mrs. Gandhi's sought to push India toward becoming a hegemonic power which could defend her own interests in the wake of Chinese and Pakistani threats to her territorial security. Thus, I would suggest that regional hegemony rather than sub-imperialism is India's principal objective in South Asia. This goal has become increasingly important since 1962 when India was involved in a border conflict with China and the 1971 war with Pakistan which created Bangladesh.

The interesting point to note about Indira Gandhi's desire for regional dominance is the question of control. Indira Gandhi, like her father, always sought to control her immediate political environment. Both leaders achieved this by centralizing power in their hands, appointing loyalists to key positions, and by making weakening the political structure and making it dependent upon them for leadership in conflict management. Interestingly enough, the concept of regional dominance is an extension of Indira Gandhi's personal proclivity toward maintaining control over her political environment. By making India a dominant regional power, she would be in a position to control the economic and political landscape of South Asia and its immediate periphery. By entering into various joint venture and other economic arrangements with less developed countries, the local economies of these countries would be linked with India's own economy. Although the economies of these countries would not be totally dependent on India's, India would still enjoy greater control and leverage in South Asia with respect to the region's economic, political, and security needs.

1. Indira Gandhi's Promotion of State Capitalism as a Means of Centralizing Power

Under Mrs. Gandhi, India, like many other developing states, pursued the development of numerous capitalist modes

of production under the leadership of a national bourgeois which comprises large business interests, wealthy landowners, traders, and moneylenders. At the same time, the country clinged on to certain socialist economic policies, thereby resulting in a "mixed" public/private sector economy.

The mixed public/private sector philosophy which Mrs. Gandhi strongly advocated, I would argue, is very closely linked with her personality disposition which desired to maintain and exercise control over her immediate environment. Mrs. Gandhi's socialist orientation toward development and its emphasis on government management of key sectors of development such as transportation, heavy industry, communications, etc. reflected her desire to centralize development policy and decision-making in the office of the Prime Minister. Private sector development was only encouraged to the degree that it complemented government-sponsored development programs, and when it was encouraged, it was done so with tight restraints on what private enterprise could and could not do.

a. State Capitalism and India's Arms Industry as Agents of the Centralization of Power:

The best means of maintaining tight control over the character of development policy-making in India was by

having it subsidized and sponsored by a profitable government sponsored industry. Under Mrs. Gandhi, India's arms industry, which was tightly controlled by the government, increased in scope and in volume. The role of the state in India's domestic development is most clearly apparent in industries such as defence. Mrs. Gandhi took a special interest in encouraging the development of a strong indigenous arms industry, unlike her father Nehru who did not fully recognize a need for it.

The Indian defence industry emerged as a notable by-product of India's state capitalism. It served as Indira Gandhi's means of centralizing development-related decision making in the hands of the Prime Minister. By the late 1970s India had developed a growing, self-reliant arms industry which sought to service the needs of a strong national defence while at the same functioning to draw capital into the country through arms exports. India, like other Western and developing states, participated in the arms industry because it was profitable and provided a major source of transfer capital. The arms industry was also closely linked with the government which could tightly control production, revenues, and sales. Mrs. Gandhi's efforts to control developmental decision-making through profits from a state-sponsored arms industry reflected the trait of policy dogmatism because of its narrow-focused

approach to development. The arms industry proved to be an unreliable source of generating revenues necessary for internal development because of problems associated with over-production and excess capacity. Mrs. Gandhi seemingly neglected this deficiency. When this resulted, the trend had been to export arms to the other Third World states when the local market for military goods became saturated.

The indigenous arms industry, aside from being profitable at least in the short term, has played a major role in enabling India to pursue foreign policy priorities independent of the two Super-Power blocs. The indigenous arms industry was also a vehicle which Mrs. Gandhi employed to become less dependent on other nations for internal development funds. This policy was pursued because it was consistent with Mrs. Gandhi's own personality disposition which valued independence and self-reliance. India's indigenous arms industry provided a major source of employment for millions of people. The arms industry also provided the country with opportunities to develop and refine industrial technology which could be applied to other non-military sectors of the economy.

Under Mrs. Gandhi's leadership, India's indigenous arms industry sought markets in neighboring states as well as in the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America. It is

interesting to note that some of India's major purchasers were countries which were active in the Non-aligned movement of which India was one of the leading nations. Thus, from the perspective of leadership efficacy, Mrs. Gandhi's pursuit of Non-alignment as a strategic policy produced not only political benefits but economic ones as well. During 1972 weapons worth between Rs. 70.5 and Rs. 100 million were exported to countries in Africa and West Asian, including Kenya, Egypt, Malaysia, Nigeria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. "In 1974, requests from friendly countries for arms supplies were also met with substantial orders then coming from Singapore, Iran and elsewhere... By 1975 the Indian defence industry's export quota was said to be 20% of all production, and software worth Rs. 174.9 million was exported in the same year" (Dutt, 1984:30f). Unlike her father who focused primarily on the political and diplomatic dimensions of Non-alignment, Indira Gandhi capitalized on the economic benefits that it offered, especially in terms of markets for indigenously produced Indian commodities.

It is important to note that Mrs. Gandhi's efforts to promote the domestic arms industry sought to generate domestic growth and employment; it was not designed to create the same relationships of dependency that India once faced with vis-a-vis the West. It is also important to note

here that the sale of these arms did not attempt create conditions of dependency. A large bulk of India's arms exports went to other large newly industrializing states who bought from India because of better credit or contract terms. Much of the material available to these countries could have just as easily been purchased from Brazil, Israel, or other Western arms manufacturers. The sale of arms, therefore, was purely based on economic benefits and not predicated on Indira Gandhi's desire to create patterns of dependency with the purchasers of India's weapons systems.

Some of Mrs. Gandhi's detractors have suggested that the prevalence of the personality trait of dogmatism with respect to Mrs. Gandhi, and her desire to centralize power in her own hands on domestic issues, have similar parallels in external affairs issues (cf. Tharoor, 1982). The evidence which follows, however, suggests although Mrs. Gandhi may have exhibited a desire for the centralization of power and control in India's hands, she did not desire the creation of any patterns of dependency with other states in the developing world.

2. Indira Gandhi's Policies Fostering Economic Cooperation in India's Relations With the Third World

Although on domestic matters, Indira Gandhi was much more of a confrontational leader, in matters related to foreign affairs, especially in the area of economic relations with neighboring states, she assumed a much more cordial, friendly, and supportive role.

Under Nehru, the nurturing and fostering of multinational economic ties had been an important component of Indian foreign policy since the days of her independence. In 1948 India actively participated in the Colombo Plan which sought to develop regional cooperation among developing states based on the finances and resources of the Commonwealth network of nations. She also actively worked for the creation of ESCAP, the Economic and Social Council for Asia and the Pacific, which sought to strengthen economic links among states in Asia through the use of American aid.

Under Indira Gandhi's leadership, the movement toward regional cooperation, especially in the economic realm, gained even greater momentum. Table 9.1 depicts India's total aid contributions through multilateral forums. The data in this table reveal the breadth and diversity of India's assistance programs. The important point to note

here is that a large bulk of India's foreign aid is channelled through these multilateral programs. Little evidence suggests that bilateral aid has been used as a means by which recipient states are made to be dependent on India or that she assumes a sub-imperialist role vis-a-vis her neighbors.

Upon examining India's foreign aid and assistance programs one is struck by the broad range of states and multilateral forums which are targeted for various contributions to developmental assistance. Since a great bulk of Indian aid is channelled through the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the claim that Mrs. Gandhi's appropriation of Indian aid served to make other states dependent on India, is indeed a weak one.

The principle objective of India's aid programs was not to so much to make other third world states dependent on India or to have created conditions of "dependent development. Mrs. Gandhi's goal was to open up new export markets for indigenously produced and processed goods and services. From the vantage point of leadership efficacy and Indira Gandhi's contribution to national development, it needs to be stressed that under Mrs. Gandhi's leadership, India's aid programs paved the way for "market creation"

through increased Indian investments and the introduction of financial and economic institutions into neighboring developing states.

a. India's Overseas Investments:

In the area of technology transfers, India has been only marginally successful in the exchange of low/intermediate level technology. Under Mrs. Gandhi's leadership, High technology, however, has emerged as a primary item in technology transfers -- particularly nuclear technology. Industrial technology involving chemical recovery systems, steel and gas processing technology have also been major items exchanged in return for capital and export market opportunities. The key point to note here is that Mrs. Gandhi was able to use technology as a bargaining tool to open markets for Indian commodities. The willingness of India to transfer technical know-how to end users made her a desired trading partner. As one observes the broad range of services that India provides to her Third World neighbors (see Tables 9.2 and 9.3), it becomes evident that the "type" of technology transferred is readily available from other newly industrializing states. Therefore, although Mrs. Gandhi sought to link local economies with India's through the exchange of technical expertise, the argument that India's technology

transfers reflect any sub-imperialist inclinations is not a valid one.

In recent decades "Joint Venture" agreements have flourished between newly industrializing states and other less developed countries. Joint ventures may be defined as the commitment of capital, facilities, and services by two legally separate firms for prolonged profit-related commercial activity (Tomlinson, 1970). It has often been argued that Joint Ventures and other similar foreign investment strategies seek to make less developed countries dependent on new imperial centers. While this claim may be valid in certain contexts, especially in the Third World's dealings with the Western industrialized powers, this is not readily evident in the case of India.

Mrs. Gandhi did, however, employ the use of joint ventures to solidify market opportunities in various countries. Her pursuit of joint venture arrangements is reflective of the trait of leadership efficacy because she successfully brought capital into the country and contributed to further development of various indigenous Indian industries. Joint ventures enhanced development in India not because Indian industries enjoyed monopoly control over technology, access to resources, or capital but

because the terms of the agreement were mutually favorable and beneficial to both parties concerned.

Mrs. Gandhi displayed a high degree of the trait of leadership efficacy through joint venture arrangements that contributed to national development because they: 1) facilitate export promotion; 2) may draw high profits; 3) open new markets; 4) protect old markets; 5) diversify investment risks; 6) dump old technology and equipment; 7) fulfill the need for raw materials; and 8) successfully avoid costly tariff barriers (Aharoni, 1966).

In spite of the possible gains that might have been made through Joint Ventures, Mrs. Gandhi had not vigorously pursued these types of arrangements with all countries but only with those that offered a sizeable market share for India goods.

From the vantage point of Mrs. Gandhi's policy development, thus far it appears that the nature, type, and direction of India's foreign aid, military aid, economic, financial, and commercial transactions were not designed to dominate the political, economic, or social character of the countries in India's periphery.

In a broader perspective, India's contacts with South Korea, Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Nigeria, Taiwan, Singapore, Tanzania, and other developing states have provided new opportunities for development in areas that might otherwise have been ignored. The multi-faceted, interconnected networks of contacts between Third World states presented new opportunities for development. Mrs. Gandhi's concerns with the economic dimensions of Non-alignment prompted her to pursue closer ties with other developing countries. Not only did it bring a fair degree of economic self-sufficiency to India, it also brought her the prestige and stature she sought as a major political actor on the world stage. It served to place Mrs. Gandhi in the limelight of the Non-aligned Movement and helped India emerge as a strong spokesperson for the concerns of the developing world.

**3. Personality and Policy Efficacy:
Mrs. Gandhi's Drive Toward Self-Reliance
and Political Independence in the Non-Aligned
Movement.**

In earlier chapters it was noted that Mrs. Gandhi had a strong personality orientation toward political independence and self-reliance. This personal proclivity was concretized in terms of policy and was expressed in the character of her leadership of India in the Non-Aligned

Movement and the various development-oriented economic arrangements she entered into with other states.

The trait of leadership efficacy is reflected in Mrs. Gandhi's efforts in drawing Non-aligned developing countries into cooperative economic arrangements. Mrs. Gandhi chose the policy of working within the Non-aligned movement to increase South-South economic activities among countries of the developing world was chosen for a number of reasons: it was believed to be better than expanded North-South cooperation in areas of development, industrialization, technical advancement, and in the use of human resources to produce more capital; it was also based on the assumption that South-South relations would be able to replace the North-South dialogue so as to increase self-sufficiency in many areas of production among the developing economies, thereby placing them in better negotiating positions when dealing with the West; it was also believed that the Western economies would eventually be plagued with economic stagnation which would result in the placement of many restrictions on the Third World's access to various markets and to technology that would make them more competitive on the international economic forum (Lall, 1982).

Thus, as a strategy of leadership, Mrs. Gandhi's advocacy of the South-South option of increasing trade,

economic, and technical assistance among the developing states, many of whom comprise the Non-aligned Movement, was perceived to be the best route to achieving sustained economic growth.

Mrs. Gandhi's leadership and her efforts at increasing South-South economic cooperation has benefited India by enabling the country to expand its international economic activity, and increase its specialization in certain industries. It allowed India to make better policies with scaled economies and had also enabled her to diversify risk so as to defend herself from protectionist measures on certain goods and unstable international exchange rates.

Summary:

The main focus of this chapter has been to analyze and evaluate Indira Gandhi's leadership in the context of the policy of Non-alignment. Indira Gandhi's perception about herself and her role as a political leader as a symbol of the state resembled that of her father in many ways. However, in both domestic and external affairs issues, she was far more willing to high-handedly exercise her influence to obtain what she desired.

Mrs. Gandhi was less inclined to pursue conciliation, persuasion, and diplomacy as effective tactics of negotiation. These techniques were all trademarks of her father's leadership style. Instead, she sought power in order to consolidate her own position in the political establishment and worked to make India a major regional actor in Asia. Among the personality dispositions most revealing about Indira Gandhi's character which had been projected onto India include the following: the *desire to remain independent*, the *need to be self-sufficient*, a strong sense of *indian nationalism*, and the *desire to gain personal eminence and prestige*.

Mrs. Gandhi's efforts to tightly control the foreign policy apparatus in her government resembled those of her father's. Just as her father appointed loyalists to key positions, Indira Gandhi contributed to the weakening of the Cabinet structure by maneuvering to place her political appointees and select key officials to head various agencies of the civil service bureaucracy, especially in the area of foreign affairs. This enabled her to control the decision-making and policy implementation process at various phases.

It has been suggested here that Indira Gandhi's search for power, authority, and dominance reflected her own

feelings of inadequacy and that her personality and leadership was closely linked with the well-being of the state. The character and persona of both father and daughter as individual political leaders became inexorably linked with their functional roles as Prime Minister and with the country they led.

Mrs. Gandhi viewed Non-alignment as a strategy to assert India's dominance in South Asia. Like her father she brought India into the limelight of world affairs. Nehru conceived of Non-alignment as a means of bringing political independence to India, however, Indira Gandhi viewed the same policy in stronger economic terms. For Indira Gandhi, Non-alignment was less a moral cause than it was a strategy for India to pursue in order to acquire tangible economic benefits. Whereas, Nehru viewed Non-alignment to be a moral position which had the potential for reducing regional tensions, his daughter considered it to be more of a strategy that would bring particular economic and political benefits for India.

Under Mrs. Gandhi, Non-alignment contributed to India's increased dialogue and economic contact with neighbors in her periphery. Mrs. Gandhi's policies which established growing commercial ties with her neighboring states through foreign, military, and technical aid

programs, her joint ventures, investments, and technology transfers all reflected a high degree of the trait of leadership efficacy because they produced tangible and very significant economic benefits for the country. Mrs. Gandhi's proclivity toward policy dogmatism is also reflected in the fact that nearly every developmental policy which she initiated sought to achieve short-term goals, most notably, the securing of local markets for indigenously produced goods.

From the perspective of leadership efficacy, Mrs. Gandhi's policies were very successful. Her contribution to South-South economic activities had reinforced many of India's development strategies. Mrs. Gandhi's interactions with South Korea, Brazil, Argentina, Saudi Arabia, Taiwan, Nigeria, and other Newly Industrializing States had allowed India to sustain export-oriented development and enabled her to pursue other policies which were finely tuned to service the country's special internal development needs. Mrs. Gandhi's leadership and her application of the economic dimensions of Non-alignment enabled India to increase in prestige as a major actor on the world stage. It has also enabled the country to secure a much more positive image of itself in relation to others so as to boost its own national (state) identity.

Chapter 10:**Conclusion and Synoptic Assessment**

The personality, beliefs, and leadership of Jawaharlal Nehru and Indira Gandhi have greatly transformed politics in India. This dissertation has shown how and under what circumstances the "human element" enters the political process and how it has affected the nature of politics in India. In particular, it has shown how the "human element" has affected the development of a national-self identity. This work has not attempted to prove or disprove personality theory nor has it attempted to verify its presence or absence in any given situation. What has been studied here is which aspects of personality are observable and relate to an individual's ability to lead and make decisions.

I. Categories of Personality in the Context of Political Leadership and Performance

The categories of personality which have been most useful in analyzing political leadership and performance in India have been power-motivation, dogmatism, and political efficacy. Looking at political efficacy has helped to analyze, assess, and evaluate the ability of Nehru and Mrs. Gandhi to successfully pursue goals within India's existing political environment. The study of power motivation has helped to

determine the manner and context in which the two leaders pursued their objectives, and the study of the trait of dogmatism helped to evaluate Nehru's ability to manage and process information to make decisions, especially in issues related to the language problem, Punjab, and Non-alignment.

"Power motivation" is a personality trait which has been previously linked in terms of compensation and an individual's unfulfilled need for esteem (Lasswell, 1948). In both the case of Nehru and his daughter, Indira Gandhi, power motivation was deeply rooted in their desire to maintain strong control over their political environment. Both individuals were preoccupied with being in the limelight and forefront of political activities to dominate the political landscape around them. For both Nehru and his daughter this was realized through the strategic control over the domestic and foreign policy institutions of government. Both father and daughter assumed autocratic qualities at home on domestic issues by centralizing power in their hands. This was most notably achieved through the strict appointment of loyal confidants to senior-level positions in government. Where there is a difference between Nehru and Mrs. Gandhi in this regard is the fact that Mrs. Gandhi often appointed weak underlings who often did not have the ability or support to effectively discharge their responsibilities. Political loyalty for Mrs. Gandhi was important, however, it could not

be guaranteed, therefore, she chose to impose control over the political structure by weakening or keeping weak the links that supported it. In the case of Nehru, political appointees were highly qualified and adept in fulfilling their responsibilities but at the same time were very devoted and loyal to Nehru and refrained from challenging his views on most issues.

Both Nehru and Mrs. Gandhi wrestled with a personal identity crisis during their youth in order to assert their own identities which were apart from their parents. As mature individuals they continued to compensate for their feelings of inadequacy by trying to enhance and protect their self-esteem. The diagrammatic models which follow explain the linkage between categories of personality and the context of political leadership and performance. Appendix IV identifies a Mathematical Model of How the Human Element Enters the Political Process. This model reveals the way in which personality, beliefs, and leadership variables are inter-related and how their inter-relationships can be quantitatively represented using principles of calculus.

Figure D.

**Model: Categories of Personality in Political Leadership
and Performance**

Level of Analysis: Individual

```

:-----: ;-----:
:Identity Crisis :precipitates:Power Motivation:
:(Desire to Compensate for Emotions:-----> : Trait :
:of Inadequacy / Need for Esteem) : :-----:
:-----: :

```

**Level of Analysis:
Transitory**

```

:-----:
: Challenges to self-esteem,
: values, beliefs neutralized;
: Strong attempts made to Reassert
: Leaders' Self-Identity and
: World-view in Face of Opposition;
: Identity of Leader and Identity
: of State Become Interwoven.
:
:

```

**Level of Analysis:
Global**

```

:-----:
: Dogmatism : Decisional Activities
: Trait : Assumed by Leaders
:-----:
: Are Based on "Psychological
: Memory" of Identity Crisis,
: its Challenges, How it was
: Dealt With;
: Psychological Memory Affects
: Policy-Making Activities.
:


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:-----:
: Political :
: Efficacy :
:-----:

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Model of How Personality and the "Human Element" Enters the Political Process in India



What I am suggesting here is that the "human element" enters the political process by bringing to surface important psychological functions which are individual-specific in character. In the case of this research project it was found that Nehru and Mrs. Gandhi, both father and daughter, shared similar desires to dominate their political environment. "Psychological Memory", the recollection of a multitude of personal events, circumstances, and happenings, serves as a link or "trigger" mechanism which draws the personality element into the picture. In other words, the trait of power motivation came to the fore because Nehru and Indira Gandhi were deeply affected by their feelings of psychological insecurity. The constant desire to come to terms with these fears is due to the psychological memory or recollection of past experiences which precipitated these fears.

The trait of dogmatism is also a reflection of how these two leaders came to terms with these fears and concerns. The desire to dominate and constantly remain in tight control over their political environment was a response or way of dealing with these concerns. Psychological memory also affected policy-making activities in that the leaders' decisions vis-a-vis minority problems and Non-alignment served to reinforce the tendency to dominate, and control people and situations in a way that would reconcile their identity crisis.

Psychological Memory which is triggered by an identity crisis for the individual is reflected in a more global level of analysis when leaders make policy-making decisions based on their individual experiences. Nehru's penchant to dominate the political environment while at the same time avoid direct conflict is most vividly apparent when he used loyal subordinates to argue his case for his language policy before Parliament. He used his cabinet members as a buffer between himself and Parliament while at the same time he pressed his case diplomatically through personal channels and relied on the power of his personality to persuade and accomplish his tasks. Indira Gandhi's penchant to dominate differed from that of her father since she did not have a conflict-aversive personality. She assumed a very forceful position in the Punjab as an outgrowth of her desire to dominate events and overcome any latent fears of being perceived as weak and malleable, which she believed, would have destroyed her self-esteem.

II. Categories of Leadership in the Context of Policy Performance

In this dissertation it has been shown that leadership motivation and policy performance are the consequence of two discrete yet related factors. Firstly, leadership motivation is prompted by the cultural context in which it is exercised.

Secondly, in the case of Nehru and Mrs. Gandhi it is the consequence of their efforts to realize "private yearnings for esteem and the resolution of an identity crisis." This notion differs in certain respects from Lasswell's (1960) concept of compensation or realization of "private motives" as possible reasons which drive men to positions of power and influence. In this work two leaders were studied who were not trying to change the status quo, as did Lasswell's political men. They sought to maintain or enhance it. Both Nehru and Mrs. Gandhi sought to hold on to and enhance their self-esteem and their positions of power after obtaining it.

In chapter 4 it was shown that the unique cultural and historical experiences of India encouraged the emergence of a strong leader with a dynamic personality who has very strong views on the nature and direction of India's development. Jawaharlal Nehru and Indira Gandhi emerged as successful leaders who altered and transformed the political landscape because the cultural context in which they exercised their leadership, to a great degree, enabled them to do so. In India, the personalization of authority, legitimacy, and power, are unique aspects of Indian culture which affect the nature and exercise of leadership in India. The leader and the state are viewed to be inexorably related. Nehru and Mrs. Gandhi were more than holders of a particular office; they were perceived to be representations of India's hopes,

dreams, and aspirations. They were, in a sense, viewed as "ministerial monarchs" whose task it was to shape, mold, and defend the political and social order.

India is still very strongly entrenched in a feudal conception of leadership. Historically, the king as a political and social leader was viewed to be the "guardian" of society; the charismatic qualities of the king and the divine sanction which he enjoyed served to cement a paternal bond between the king and those over which he governed. What I have suggested here is that this view still remains strong in India's political consciousness. Obedience to authority, especially to those whose task it is to maintain and defend the social order, is a valued virtue. Personality orientations which exhibit a proclivity toward dominance and control over the political environment are much more readily tolerated in a culture which places a premium on the preservation of the social order.

Jawaharlal Nehru and Indira Gandhi both had a penchant for maintaining control over their political environment. Nehru, in large measure, assumed autocratic qualities in attempting to define a language policy and in applying his policy of Non-alignment to India's external relations. Indira Gandhi acted in similar fashion in the Punjab; she forcefully pressed forward the economic component of her

Non-aligned policy which stressed independence and self-reliance and which differed significantly in character and in scope than her father's efforts in the same area which involved high profile, non-combative, diplomatic negotiations.

In this dissertation I have not dismissed the influence of external forces in affecting the nature and conduct of political leadership. In the case of Nehru and Mrs. Gandhi's handling of domestic issues such as Punjab or external ones such as Non-alignment, personality and leadership are complementary factors which helped to shape decision-making and the outcomes that result from it. What I am suggesting is that the leadership and the personality and belief dimensions which comprise it help to serve as mediating mechanism. Nehru, for example, was considered by his contemporaries to be a high profile statesman who helped to voice many of the concerns of developing countries. His personal contacts with major foreign leaders earned him a very positive image as a leader of a newly independent developing nation. This "perceptual image" concretely translated itself into political action as Nehru's skills as a negotiator and as a mediator were requested during the Korean Crisis and in other regional disputes. This is an example of how the leadership framework and its personality and belief dimensions help to shape external events. To use

Herbert Spencer's terms, in this case, Nehru was not an "eventful" man but rather an "eventmaking" one.

III. Relationship Between Personality and Leadership as it Relates to Policy Decisions

In this dissertation it has been evident that different manifestations of the trait of power motivation are apparent in Nehru and Mrs. Gandhi's efforts in the communal problem, language problem, tensions in the Punjab, and in the leaders' different approaches to Non-alignment. It has been shown that personality traits have a major role in defining the nature and character of political leadership. In this research project, personality has been viewed as a "mediating construct", and therefore, is not directly observed, but rather "inferred" from certain patterns of behavior (Knutson, 1973:31). Power motivation has been viewed to be an aspect of personality. The significance and importance of this trait in shaping the personality construct of the two leaders has revealed by studying the occurrence and magnitude of the centralization of power in the hands of Mrs. Gandhi and Nehru.

The process of centralization of power, as seen in this dissertation, involved the weakening of the advisory (cabinet), deliberatory (parliament), and implementing organs

of government (commissions, political appointees) so that the individual leader exercised a greater degree of control over the formulation and development of policies. The leader maintained control over access, flow, and the application of information to service various policy demands. In the case of India, Nehru and Mrs. Gandhi, through their leadership of the Congress Party, exercised a higher level of influence than their peers by virtue of their knowledge, access to information, and political resources at their disposal. The power motivation trait as a precipitator of dogmatism and leadership efficacy has also been viewed in this context. These traits, as they relate to decision-making were especially noted vis-a-vis Mrs. Gandhi's aggressive posture in Punjab and Nehru's efforts in the language and minority problem.

Although many factors affect the outcome of various events aside from personality considerations or the question of leadership, when specifically looking at the case of India, it must be noted that the role of the individual, be they Prime Ministers or feudal kings or princes in ancient India, plays a paramount role in influencing the direction of events. Lucian Pye (1985) speaking to the issue of Asian power and politics, takes note of the fact that in Asian political systems there is a much greater deference to authority and to the leadership factor. He does not argue,

nor have I suggested that it be the case, that other factors are unimportant or should not be regarded in relation to development, but rather that the leadership dimension has unique cultural and religious referents which make it important for careful study.

All forms of decision-making at the level of individual leaders involve questions of perception, processing of information, and strategies for political action; indeed the personality dimension of leadership seeks to take these elements into account. In this dissertation I have not attributed policy successes or failures to the personality of Nehru and Mrs. Gandhi; what I have shown is how the personality, or "human" element affects politics in India which is quite consistent with Greenstein's concern with how the "human element" "enters" the political process and how it has the "potential" of affecting the nature of politics.

IV. The Leader and the Nature of Political Leadership

In showing how personality and the "human" element enters the political process we have been drawn to evaluate the leader and the contributions that the leader has made vis-a-vis the national identity of the state. This dissertation has shown how the personality and identities of Nehru and Mrs. Gandhi became so inexorably linked with the

identity of the state. The prestige and high profile image which Nehru enjoyed in the limelight of world politics reflected back on India which received tangible political benefits from its newly found respect in the international community of nations. In the same token, independence and self-reliance, which were strong personality attributes which Mrs. Gandhi possessed, were translated into developmental policies. Mrs. Gandhi's personal proclivity toward independence and self-reliance translated itself into the public policy realm which required that India produce most of its essential commodities at home, reducing its reliance on outside sources for creating its own national wealth.

When one assesses the leadership of Nehru and Mrs. Gandhi in terms of national-self identity it must be done so by evaluating the internal and external components which comprise it. On the question of minority issues, I am suggesting that Nehru's efforts in this area and in forging a national language policy did not enhance national identity of the state, yet at the same time, it did not contribute toward its deterioration. Nehru's strength and political leadership was in his ability to preserve some semblance of order and to sustain the status quo. In essence what I am suggesting is that political leadership does not always have to be transforming in nature to be meaningful or effective; it does not always have to dynamically alter the course of

events to be significant. In the case of India as has been the case, this would not be consistent with traditional historical and cultural orientations toward power and authority. Great political leaders were those who maintained order and essentially preserved the status quo. They helped to preserve and stabilize the social, cultural, and political order rather than work to dramatically or forcefully change it. More than anything else, Nehru's leadership efforts in this vein kept the minority and language tensions in check, albeit for a short time. His leadership served to perpetuate the status quo in that the minority problem persisted despite his personal intervention. Where his leadership did play a major role was in minimizing the expansion and exacerbation of conflict. His accommodative style encouraged even those who opposed his leadership to work within the rubric of the political system than to challenge it from outside in an effort to overthrow it. Although his leadership did not produce major transformations in ethnic relationships it did provide a stabilizing support to the fragile blossom that characterized Indian democracy in its formative years. Although he did not completely forge national unity, Nehru emerged as a symbol for national unity. His own popularity and personal appeal, and the respect, and admiration his supporters and detractors ascribed to him enabled him to push through the Official language act which recognized Hindi and English as the principal official languages of communication

along with fourteen other major languages representing major linguistic groups in various states throughout India. Dividing India into areas based on language served to temporarily quell ethnic tensions for a short period of time. This policy served a useful and functionally utilitarian role at the time of its inception, however, many years later, the very same policy continued to thwart efforts at really significant national integration since people continued to identify themselves along linguistic and religious lines than in terms of broader, national affinities.

Nehru's strength and greatest contribution to the strengthening of the identity of the state lay not so much in the dynamics of his internal policies but rather in his external ones, most notably, the Non-alignment policy. Nehru's high profile statesmanship, his personal contacts with major world leaders, and his offers to mediate in high profile political disputes earned him prestige and enabled him to carve out a prominent role for India in the eyes of the international community. Nehru and India in the eyes of the world were almost synonymous terms. At home Nehru's leadership brought a new found prestige and self-respect for the historical and cultural heritage that made India a unique country; an acceptance and respect for this heritage had withered during two centuries of British occupation. His leadership in the Non-aligned movement brought to India new

contacts abroad which wrought both political and material benefits for the country.

By contrast, Mrs. Gandhi's combative and assertive style also impeded progress in forging a national identity among the various groups that characterize Indian society. This is not to say that Mrs. Gandhi was completely unsuccessful; to the contrary, her authoritative rule during the emergency and her decisive actions vis-a-vis the refugee problem after the 1971 war with Pakistan contributed toward maintaining order when the potential for chaos was great. Her efforts in Punjab had only limited success since tensions in the area and in neighboring states continued to fester; Hindu's and Sikh factions felt isolated and were unable to reconcile their grievances with the confidence that Mrs. Gandhi's government was fully sensitive to their concerns. Despite the fact that her approach to the ethnic minorities issue contrasted greatly with her father's, the outcomes of their efforts varied. Whereas Nehru helped to sustain the status quo and preserve order among competing ethnic groups, under Mrs. Gandhi's leadership this was not the case. The status quo was not an acceptable alternative because the lives of millions were constantly under the threat of communal agitation, terrorist activity, and mass violence. In this regard I am suggesting that with respect to majority / minority relations in the context of national identity,

Nehru fared much better than his daughter since he was in a better position to maintain peace and order. Neither he nor his daughter pursued or achieved great gains in uniting the mosaic of Indian society under a common identity, however, of the two leaders, Nehru was most successful in preserving the social order.

In the realm of Non-alignment as the external component of the national identity issue, the difference between father and daughter's leadership was more pronounced. Non-alignment for Nehru was always conceived of in political terms, whereas for his daughter it had very particular economic referents. Both Nehru and Mrs. Gandhi's high profile and active participation in the Non-aligned movement contributed toward India's emergence as a major global actor. In this capacity it must be said that both leaders contributed greatly to the development of state identity. In more specific terms, however, India's most tangible benefits from Non-alignment resulted from Mrs. Gandhi's leadership. Her insistence on independence, self-reliance, and sharp focus on technological development and the evolution of ties with other newly emerging states enabled the country to develop a newly found confidence in itself, its resources, and its people. Although Mrs. Gandhi alienated the West at times with her rhetoric and closer ties with the Eastern bloc, she successfully pursued a developmental strategy which enabled

India to more fully realize the national identity which she desperately sought to achieve: independence, self-reliance, and the ability to play a meaningful role in the global community of nations.

V. Other Findings:

- A) *A leader's personality orientation, especially as reflected through the traits of dogmatism, leadership efficacy, and power motivation have a direct bearing on the character and dimensions of national development.*

The prestige and high profile image which Nehru enjoyed in the limelight of world politics reflected back on India which received tangible political benefits from its newly found respect in the international community of nations. In the same token, independence and self-reliance, which were strong personality attributes which Mrs. Gandhi possessed, were translated into developmental policies. Mrs. Gandhi's personal proclivity toward independence and self-reliance translated itself into the public policy realm which required that India produce most of its essential commodities at home, reducing its reliance on outside sources for creating its own national wealth.

B) Nehru's Leadership Did not Enhance the Forging of National Unity Domestically, but Benefited the Country by Preserving the Social Order.

On the question of minority issues, I would like to note that Nehru's efforts in this area and in forging a national language policy did not enhance the national identity of the state, yet at the same time, it did not contribute toward its deterioration. Nehru's strength and political leadership was in his ability to preserve some semblance of order and to sustain the status quo. In essence what I am suggesting is that political leadership does not always have to be transforming in nature to be meaningful or effective; it does not always have to dynamically alter the course of events to be significant. In the case of India as has been the case, this would not be consistent with traditional historical and cultural orientations toward power and authority. Great political leaders were those who maintained order and essentially preserved the status quo.

C) Nehru's personality orientation and leadership in external affairs and Non-alignment, more than any other factor, forged a much stronger state identity and higher political profile for India in global politics.

Nehru's strength and greatest contribution to the strengthening of the identity of the state lay not so much in the dynamics of his internal policies but rather in his external ones, most notably, the Non-alignment policy.

Nehru's high profile statesmanship, his personal contacts with major world leaders, and his offers to mediate in high profile political disputes earned him prestige and enabled him to carve out a prominent role for India in the eyes of the international community. Nehru and India in the eyes of the world were almost synonymous terms. At home Nehru's leadership brought a new found prestige and self-respect for the historical and cultural heritage that made India a unique country; an acceptance and respect for this heritage had withered during two centuries of British occupation. His leadership in the Non-aligned movement brought to India new contacts abroad which wrought both political and material benefits for the country.

D) Domestically, Indira Gandhi's personality orientation and leadership impeded the development of national identity.

Mrs. Gandhi's combative and assertive style also impeded progress in forging a national identity among the various groups that characterize Indian society. This is not to say that Mrs. Gandhi was completely unsuccessful; to the contrary, her authoritative rule during the emergency and her decisive actions vis-a-vis the refugee problem after the 1971 war with Pakistan contributed toward maintaining order when the potential for chaos was great. Her efforts in Punjab had only limited success since tensions in the area and in neighboring states continued to fester; Hindu's and Sikh

factions felt isolated and were unable to reconcile their grievances with the confidence that Mrs. Gandhi's government was fully sensitive to their concerns. Despite the fact that her approach to the ethnic minorities issue contrasted greatly with her father's, the outcomes of their efforts varied. Whereas Nehru helped to sustain the status quo and preserve order among competing ethnic groups, under Mrs. Gandhi's leadership this was not the case. The status quo was not an acceptable alternative because the lives of millions were constantly under the threat of communal agitation, terrorist activity, and mass violence. In this regard I am suggesting that with respect to majority / minority relations in the context of national identity, Nehru fared much better than his daughter since he was in a better position to maintain peace and order. Neither he nor his daughter pursued or achieved great gains in uniting the mosaic of Indian society under a common identity, however, of the two leaders, Nehru was most successful in preserving the social order.

E) Indira Gandhi's personality orientation and leadership, more than any other factor, contributed to a new, more indigenously oriented, self-sufficient economic order within the country.

In the realm of Non-alignment as the external component of the national identity issue, the difference between father and daughter's leadership was more pronounced. Non-alignment

for Nehru was always conceived of in political terms, whereas for his daughter it had very particular economic referents. Both Nehru and Mrs. Gandhi's high profile and active participation in the Non-aligned movement contributed toward India's emergence as a major global actor. In this capacity it must be said that both leaders contributed greatly to the development of state identity. In more specific terms, however, India's most tangible benefits from Non-alignment resulted from Mrs. Gandhi's leadership. Her insistence on independence, self-reliance, and sharp focus on technological development and the evolution of ties with other newly emerging states enabled the country to develop a newly found confidence in itself, its resources, and its people. Although Mrs. Gandhi alienated the West at times with her rhetoric and closer ties with the Eastern bloc, she successfully pursued a developmental strategy which enabled India to more fully realize the national identity which she desperately sought to achieve: independence, self-reliance, and the ability to play a meaningful role in the global community of nations.

Personality plays a major role in politics and often significantly contributes to political change. Recent events have reinforced the idea that individuals, their personalities, beliefs, and leadership have the potential to significantly shape the political environment. Mikhail

Gorbachev's leadership of the Soviet Union and his contributions toward democratization, and the leadership of Boris Yeltsin in opposition to the August coup d'etat are but two very recent examples of how individual leaders have the potential to alter the course of history. In broader terms, this dissertation has shown the ways in which the "human element" enters the political process in Indian politics and how personality and beliefs of individual leaders affect the political environment. It has shown how three important traits: power motivation, dogmatism, and political efficacy have played out in different issue areas as they relate to the development of a national self-identity in India. In essence, it has shown that personality is not an amorphous entity which is independent of the political process; rather, it is a profound and powerful aspect of a leader's profile which plays itself out when leaders make decisions. In the case of India the personality factor and how the "human element" enters the political process is a major consideration in efforts to integrate the mosaic that characterizes Indian society. In the case of India it has been the "human element," through the leadership of Jawaharlal Nehru and Mrs. Gandhi, that has shaped the direction and character of development in India and has made the greatest contribution to shaping the national self-identity of the nation.

APPENDIX I - TABLES

TABLE 3.1: Content Analysis of Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches

| Speech Number | Code | Tot#Ref | Inten/ID | Deg./Sp | Tone | StrengSc | Spec. Scor |
|---------------|------|---------|----------|---------|------|----------|------------|
| 1 | AbC | 78 | 11 | 20 | 7 | 0.141 | 0.256 |
| 2 | aBC | 121 | 5 | 15 | 10 | 0.041 | 0.124 |
| 3 | C | 39 | 7 | 2 | 2 | 0.179 | 0.051 |
| 4 | abc | 168 | 9 | 5 | 10 | 0.054 | 0.030 |
| 5 | Ac | 42 | 12 | 5 | 10 | 0.286 | 0.238 |
| 6 | ac | 65 | 4 | 4 | 7 | 0.062 | 0.062 |
| 7 | ac | 17 | -3 | -3 | 1 | -0.176 | -0.176 |
| 8 | AC | 24 | 7 | 7 | 10 | 0.292 | 0.292 |
| 9 | AC | 11 | 13 | -4 | 8 | 1.182 | -0.364 |
| 10 | AC | 35 | 14 | 7 | 8 | 0.400 | 0.200 |
| 11 | aC | 15 | 3 | 19 | 4 | 0.200 | 1.267 |
| 12 | ac | 14 | 3 | 18 | 3 | 0.214 | 1.286 |
| 13 | AbC | 99 | 20 | 24 | 16 | 0.202 | 0.242 |
| 14 | AC | 30 | 8 | 20 | 8 | 0.267 | 0.667 |
| 15 | bc | 125 | 9 | 12 | 7 | 0.072 | 0.096 |
| 16 | ABC | 130 | 18 | 48 | 17 | 0.138 | 0.369 |
| 17 | A | 67 | 12 | 23 | 11 | 0.179 | 0.343 |
| 18 | A | 120 | 9 | 26 | 10 | 0.075 | 0.217 |
| 19 | aBC | 473 | 21 | 39 | 11 | 0.044 | 0.082 |
| 20 | aBC | 435 | 22 | 36 | 20 | 0.050 | 0.083 |
| 21 | aC | 16 | 3 | 11 | 2 | 0.188 | 0.688 |
| 22 | ac | 47 | 5 | 19 | 5 | 0.106 | 0.404 |
| 23 | ac | 28 | 7 | 19 | 8 | 0.250 | 0.679 |
| 24 | Ac | 85 | 13 | 21 | 12 | 0.153 | 0.274 |
| 25 | AC | 251 | 10 | 24 | 13 | 0.040 | 0.096 |
| 26 | C | 146 | 13 | 18 | 12 | 0.089 | 0.122 |
| 27 | C | 258 | 7 | 16 | 12 | 0.027 | 0.062 |
| 28 | AC | 133 | 11 | 22 | 11 | 0.083 | 0.165 |
| 29 | ABC | 103 | 17 | 30 | 17 | 0.165 | 0.291 |
| 30 | ABc | 119 | 14 | 20 | 11 | 0.118 | 0.168 |
| 31 | AB | 172 | 15 | 22 | 6 | 0.087 | 0.128 |
| 32 | B | 87 | 11 | 21 | 11 | 0.126 | 0.241 |
| 33 | AB | 216 | 16 | 25 | 14 | 0.074 | 0.116 |
| 34 | B | 255 | 22 | 35 | 16 | 0.086 | 0.063 |
| 35 | B | 45 | 12 | 30 | 14 | 0.267 | 0.667 |
| 36 | B | 34 | 14 | 30 | 14 | 0.412 | 0.882 |
| 37 | B | 89 | 11 | 27 | 9 | 0.124 | 0.011 |
| 38 | aBC | 134 | 18 | 29 | 17 | 0.134 | 0.216 |

**TABLE 3.2: Content Analysis of Indira Gandhi's
Speeches / Writings**

Summary Data Sheet

| Speech Number | Code | Tot#Ref | Inten/ID | Deg. / Spec. | Tone | StrenSc | Spec./Scor |
|--------------------|------|---------|----------|--------------|------|----------|------------|
| 1 | abc | 102 | 8 | 12 | 5 | 0.078 | 0.118 |
| 2 | Abc | 54 | 6 | 18 | 7 | 0.111 | 0.333 |
| 3 | aBc | 133 | 6 | 22 | 6 | 0.045 | 0.045 |
| 4 | ABc | 175 | 10 | 14 | 11 | 0.057 | 0.063 |
| 5 | Abc | 72 | 9 | 6 | 12 | 0.125 | 0.083 |
| 6 | ABc | 87 | 7 | 7 | 14 | 0.080 | 0.080 |
| 7 | abc | 73 | 2 | 3 | 6 | 0.027 | 0.041 |
| 8 | Abc | 81 | 9 | 10 | 8 | 0.111 | 0.123 |
| 9 | Abc | 52 | 5 | 8 | 11 | 0.096 | 0.154 |
| 10 | ABC | 33 | 11 | 14 | 15 | 0.333 | 0.424 |
| 11 | abc | 50 | 4 | 12 | 5 | 0.080 | 0.240 |
| 12 | Abc | 357 | 7 | 30 | 9 | 0.020 | 0.084 |
| 13 | abc | 114 | 6 | 12 | 3 | 0.053 | 0.105 |
| 14 | aBc | 10 | 3 | 14 | 4 | 0.300 | 1.400 |
| 15 | Ac | 38 | 2 | 18 | 7 | 0.053 | 0.474 |
| 16 | bc | 41 | 5 | 3 | 3 | 0.122 | 0.073 |
| 17 | C | 44 | 9 | 18 | 15 | 0.205 | 0.409 |
| 18 | Ac | 43 | 10 | 22 | 12 | 0.233 | 0.512 |
| 19 | aC | 77 | 7 | 16 | 6 | 0.091 | 0.208 |
| 20 | BC | 63 | 4 | 23 | 12 | 0.063 | 0.365 |
| 21 | ac | 72 | 4 | 6 | 3 | 0.056 | 0.083 |
| TOTAL | | | | | | 2.339 | 5.417 |
| AVERAGE | | | | | | 0.111381 | 0.257952 |
| MAXIMUM | | | | | | 0.333 | 1.4 |
| MINIMUM | | | | | | 0.02 | 0.041 |
| STANDARD DEVIATION | | | | | | 0.083763 | 0.296452 |

TABLE 3.3: Comparative Specificity and Strength Scores

| Speech Number | Comparative Specificity Score | | Comparative Strength Score | |
|------------------|-------------------------------|-----------|----------------------------|-----------|
| | J. Nehru | I. Gandhi | J. Nehru | I. Gandhi |
| 1 | 0.256 | 0.118 | 0.141 | 0.078 |
| 2 | 0.124 | 0.333 | 0.041 | 0.111 |
| 3 | 0.051 | 0.045 | 0.179 | 0.045 |
| 4 | 0.03 | 0.063 | 0.054 | 0.057 |
| 5 | 0.238 | 0.083 | 0.286 | 0.125 |
| 6 | 0.062 | 0.080 | 0.062 | 0.080 |
| 7 | -0.176 | 0.041 | -0.176 | 0.027 |
| 8 | 0.292 | 0.123 | 0.292 | 0.111 |
| 9 | -0.364 | 0.154 | 1.182 | 0.096 |
| 10 | 0.200 | 0.424 | 0.400 | 0.333 |
| 11 | 1.267 | 0.240 | 0.200 | 0.080 |
| 12 | 1.286 | 0.084 | 0.214 | 0.020 |
| 13 | 0.242 | 0.105 | 0.202 | 0.053 |
| 14 | 0.667 | 1.400 | 0.267 | 0.300 |
| 15 | 0.096 | 0.474 | 0.072 | 0.053 |
| 16 | 0.369 | 0.073 | 0.138 | 0.122 |
| 17 | 0.343 | 0.409 | 0.179 | 0.205 |
| 18 | 0.217 | 0.512 | 0.075 | 0.233 |
| 19 | 0.082 | 0.208 | 0.044 | 0.091 |
| 20 | 0.083 | 0.365 | 0.05 | 0.063 |
| 21 | 0.688 | 0.083 | 1.88 | 0.056 |
| 22 | 0.404 | | 0.106 | |
| 23 | 0.679 | | 0.250 | |
| 24 | 0.274 | | 0.153 | |
| 25 | 0.096 | | 0.040 | |
| 26 | 0.122 | | 0.890 | |
| 27 | 0.062 | | 0.027 | |
| 28 | 0.165 | | 0.083 | |
| 29 | 0.291 | | 0.165 | |
| 30 | 0.168 | | 0.118 | |
| 31 | 0.128 | | 0.087 | |
| 32 | 0.241 | | 0.126 | |
| 33 | 0.116 | | 0.074 | |
| 34 | 0.063 | | 0.086 | |
| 35 | 0.667 | | 0.267 | |
| 36 | 0.882 | | 0.412 | |
| 37 | 0.011 | | 0.124 | |
| 38 | 0.216 | | 0.134 | |

TABLE 3.4: Frequency of Select Variable Clusters

| | Nehru | | Gandhi | |
|-------------------------|-----------|------------|-----------|------------|
| | Frequency | % of Total | Frequency | % of Total |
| Power Motivation | 25 | 66 | 18 | 86 |
| Pol/Leadership Efficacy | 37 | 100 | 19 | 90 |
| Dogmatism | 29 | 76 | 17 | 81 |
| Ethnic Relations | 26 | 68 | 13 | 62 |
| Nonalign-Political | 17 | 45 | 14 | 67 |
| Nonalign-Economic | 2 | 5 | 16 | 76 |
| Role-Gov-Soc Welf | 27 | 71 | 12 | 57 |
| Role-Gov-Econ-Grow | 9 | 24 | 15 | 71 |
| Conf./Stress Avoid | 29 | 76 | 4 | 19 |
| Selective Perception | 12 | 32 | 8 | 38 |
| Selective Recall | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Repression | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Suppression | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Psychologic | 31 | 82 | 16 | 76 |
| Bolstering | 24 | 45 | 18 | 86 |
| Empathy | 17 | 45 | 18 | 86 |
| Univ. Frame of Ref. | 22 | 58 | 16 | 76 |
| Tunnel Vision | 9 | 24 | 10 | 48 |
| Group Identification | 5 | 13 | 7 | 33 |
| Rationalization | 20 | 53 | 13 | 62 |
| Projection | 19 | 50 | 11 | 52 |

Table 6.1:

Major Languages in India 1951 and (1961)

| Languages | Number of Speakers | Percent Total Pop. |
|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------|--------------------|
| ----- | ----- | ----- |
| Hindi, Urdu, Hindustani, Punjabi | 149,944,311* (133,435,369) | 42.01 (30.37) |
| Telugu | 32,999,916 (37,668,132) | 9.24 (8.57) |
| Bengali | 25,121,674 (33,888,939) | 7.03 (7.71) |
| Marathi | 27,049,522 (33,286,771) | 7.57 (7.57) |
| Tamil | 26,546,764 (30,562,698) | 7.43 (6.95) |
| Gujarati | 16,310,771 (20,314,464) | 4.57 (4.62) |
| Kannada | 14,471,764 (17,415,827) | 4.05 (3.96) |
| Malayalam | 13,380,109 (17,015,782) | 3.69 (3.87) |
| Oriya | 13,153,909 (15,719,398) | 3.68 (3.57) |
| Punjabi | NA (10,950,826) | NA (2.49) |
| Assamese | 4,988,226 (6,803,465) | 1.39 (1.54) |
| Kashmiri | NA (1,956,115) | NA (0.44) |
| English | NA (222,781) | NA (0.05) |

Total Population: 356,879,394 (up to March 1, 1951,
excluding Jammu and Kashmir and tribal areas in Assam)
439,235,082 (1961)

Note: NA - figures not available. Separate figures for Hindi, Urdu, Hindustani, and Punjabi (1951) were not issued due to discrepancies in survey results due to falsification of records. Results of Sanskrit census surveys were returned by only 2,544 people.

Table 6.2:

**Ministry of Education Grants to State Governments for
the Promotion of Hindi**

| Year ----- | Rupees Approved ----- |
|---------------|--------------------------|
| 1954-55 | 279,001 |
| 1955-56 | 540,915 |
| 1956-57 | 283,905 |
| 1957-58 | 643,783 |
| | ----- |
| TOTAL | 1,747,604 |

Source: see Ministry of Education, Programme for the Development and Propagation of Hindi. (New Delhi: Central Hindi Directorate, 1960) p.31.

**Central Government Grants to Nonofficial
Associations Helping to Promote Hindi, 1951-1960**

| Association (Rupees) ----- | Amount approx. ----- |
|--|-------------------------|
| Hindustani Hindi Sabha, Hyderabad | 3000 |
| Rashtra Bhasha Prachar Samiti, Wardha | 9000 |
| Hindustani Prachar Sabha, Bombay | 10000 |
| Bharatiya Hindi Parishad, Allahabad | 15000 |
| Sahityakar Sansad, Allahabad | 25000 |
| Mysore Riyasat Hindi Prachar Samiti, Bangalore | 25000 |
| Hindi Prachar Sabha, Hyderabad | 31500 |
| Hindustani Prachar Sabha, Hyderabad | 31750 |
| Hindi Association, Parliament | 46000 |
| Dakshin Bharat Hindi Prachar Sabha, Madras | 52500 |
| Hindustani Cultural Society, Allahabad | 90000 |
| Hindustani Prachar Sabha, New Delhi | 156000 |
| Akhil Bharatiya Hindi Parishad, Agra | 163203 |
| Nagari Pracharani Sabha, Varanasi | 360000 |
| Hindi Sahitya Sammelan, Allahabad | 360125 |
| | ----- |
| TOTAL | 1378078 |

Source: Ministry of Education. PROGRAMME FOR THE DEVELOPMENT AND PROPAGATION OF HINDI. (New Delhi: Central Hindi Directorate, 1960)p.74ff

**** note: most of associational funding went to assns. in northern India while the south was generally neglected (except Madras).

Table 6.3:

Indian States' Level of Education (1961)

Literate Without Univ. Degree Technical Deg.
Education and Diplomas

| States | % pop. | % literate | % literate | % literate |
|-----------------|-----------|---------------|---------------|---------------|
| Andhra Pradesh | 12.6 | 59.5 | 0.74 | 0.25 |
| Assam | 19.4 | 70.8 | 0.40 | 0.05 |
| Bihar | 13.6 | 74.0 | 0.61 | 0.10 |
| Gujarat | 9.8 | 32.1 | 0.48 | 0.27 |
| Jammu & Kashmir | 6.8 | 61.7 | 1.60 | 0.33 |
| Kerala | 31.9 | 68.0 | 0.23 | 0.16 |
| Madhya Pradesh | 12.3 | 71.9 | 0.81 | 0.16 |
| Madras | 21.5 | 68.3 | 0.60 | 0.17 |
| Maharashtra | 14.7 | 49.2 | 0.86 | 0.51 |
| Mysore | 19.3 | 76.0 | 0.71 | 0.18 |
| Orissa | 18.4 | 84.7 | 0.27 | 0.10 |
| Punjab | 10.9 | 44.9 | 0.91 | 0.36 |
| Rajasthan | 12.7 | 83.1 | 1.05 | 0.12 |
| Uttar Pradesh | 11.7 | 66.3 | 1.09 | 0.12 |
| West Bengal | 17.0 | 58.0 | 1.42 | 0.20 |

Source: Census of India, 1961, vol. 1, part IIIc p.94ff

Ranking and Literacy Rates in Indian States, 1961

| States | Rank in pop. | % of India's pop. | Rank in area | % of literacy |
|------------------|-----------------|----------------------|-----------------|------------------|
| Andhra Pradesh | 4 | 8.20 | 5 | 21.2 |
| Assam | 14 | 2.71 | 12 | 27.4 |
| Bihar * | 2 | 10.59 | 8 | 18.4 |
| Gujarat | 9 | 4.70 | 7 | 30.5 |
| Jammu & Kashmir | 15 | 0.81 | na | 11.0 |
| Kerala | 13 | 3.85 | 15 | 46.8 |
| Madhya Pradesh * | 7 | 7.38 | 1 | 17.1 |
| Madras | 6 | 7.68 | 10 | 31.4 |
| Maharashtra | 3 | 9.02 | 3 | 29.8 |
| Mysore | 8 | 5.38 | 6 | 25.4 |
| Orissa | 12 | 4.00 | 9 | 21.7 |
| Punjab | 10 | 4.63 | 11 | 24.2 |
| Rajasthan * | 11 | 4.60 | 2 | 15.2 |
| Uttar Pradesh * | 1 | 16.81 | 4 | 17.6 |
| West Bengal | 5 | 7.96 | 13 | 29.3 |

Note: "*" denote Hindi-speaking states

Source: Census of India, Paper No. 1, 1962, 1961 p.xi,xxxii

Table 6.4:

Mrs. Gandhi's Appointees

1. Mrs. Gandhi's supported the election of Giani Zail Singh who is a Sikh, to be the President of India.
2. Sikh Governors of various Indian states who were appointed by Mrs. Gandhi included the following persons:

| | | |
|-----------------------------|----|-----------------------------|
| Sardar Hukam Singh | -- | Rajasthan State |
| Sardar Ujjal Singh | -- | Punjab and Tamil Nadu State |
| Sardar Joginder Singh | -- | Orissa State |
| Sardar Gurmukh Nihal Singh | -- | Rajasthan State |
| Sardar Harcharan Singh Brar | -- | Haryana and Orissa |
3. Prominent Sikh individuals have held high-level ministerial positions in the Union Government many having served under Mrs. Gandhi which included the following persons and their respective portfolios:

| | | |
|--------------------------------------|----|--|
| Sardar Swaran Singh | -- | External Affairs Ministry |
| Giani Zail Singh | -- | Home Ministry |
| Sardar Baldev Singh and Swaran Singh | -- | Defence Ministry |
| Sardar Swaran Singh | -- | Industrial Ministry |
| Sardar Surjeet Singh | -- | Barnala-Agricultural Ministry |
| Sardar Buta Singh | -- | Works and Housing and Parliamentary Affairs Ministry |
4. Speakers in the Lok Sabha (Lower House of Parliament) included: Sardar Hukam Singh and Sardar Gurdial Singh Dhillon.
5. In the Rajya Sabha (Upper House of Parliament) eight of the eleven representatives from Punjab state were Sikhs.
6. Some of the Chief Ministers appointed in Punjab included:

| | | |
|-----------------------------|---|------------------|
| Sardar Partap Singh Kairon | - | Congress Party |
| Sardar Lachhman Singh Gill | - | Akali Dal Party |
| Giani Gurmukh Singh Musafir | - | Congress Party |
| Sardar Gurnam Singh | - | Akali Dal Party |
| Sardar Darbara Singh | - | Congress-I Party |
| Sardar Parkash Singh Badal | - | Akali Dal Party |
7. In the Punjab legislature, 76 out of its 113 members or 67% were Sikhs (note that these figures are at the time when the legislature was suspended on Oct. 6, 1983 by President's rule which was imposed to counter terrorist activities).

Table 6.4 (continued):

8. Numerous Sikh mayors governed various cities in Punjab such as Sardar Mahinder Singh, Mayor of the capital city of New Delhi, and Sardar Manmohan Singh who was formerly the Mayor of Bombay.

Prominent Sikhs during Mrs. Gandhi's term have also held high level positions in India's defence departments, administrative agencies, and in the judiciary which included the following:

1. Chief of Air Staff, Air Chief Marshal Dilbogh Singh (ret. Sept. 1984), former Chief of Air Staff, Air Chief Marshal Arjan Singh were Sikhs.
2. Sikh Army Lieutenant Generals included: Daulet Singh, Harbaksh Singh, Jogjit Singh Aurora, Sartaj Singh, Jaswant Singh, Gurbachan Singh, Inder Singh Gill, Bhupinder Singh Ahluwalia, T.S. Oberoi, M.S. Sodhi, Bhupinder Singh, Surjit Singh Brar, Narinjan Singh Cheema, Mohinder Singh, Ranjit Singh Dyal, Rajinder Singh, and Bakshi Joginder Singh.
3. Sikh judges included: Justice Ranjit Singh Sarkaria, of the Supreme Court of India, Chief Justice R.S. Narula of the Punjab and Haryana High Court, Chief Justice S.S. Sandhawalia of the Punjab and Haryana High Court, and Chief Justice M.S. Gujral of the Sikkim High Court.
4. Members of the Planning Commission included: Sardar Tarlock Singh and Sardar Manmohan Singh who served as Governor of the Reserve Bank of India.
5. Many Sikhs have worked under the Union Government in office of the Cabinet Secretary, Foreign Secretary, Education Secretary, and a number of other high-ranking appointed and senior civil-service positions.
6. Mrs. Gandhi's and her father's appointments to various ambassadorships and as High Commissioners have included a number of prominent Sikhs including the following persons:

| | | |
|---------------------------|---|--------------------------------------|
| Hardit Singh Malik | - | Paris |
| Kewal Singh | - | Moscow, Washington, and Islamabad |
| Gurdial Singh Dhillon | - | Ottawa |
| Maharaja Yadavindra Singh | - | The Hague |

Table 6.4 (Continued):

| | | |
|------------------------------|---|--------------------------------------|
| Gurnam Singh | - | Canberra |
| Major General M.S. Chopra | - | Manila |
| Major General Tara Singh Bal | - | Buenos Aires |
| Dr. Gopal Singh | - | Georgetown |
| Gurbachan Singh | - | Colombo |
| G.J. Malik | - | Santiago, Dakar, Madrid |
| Niranjan Singh Gill | - | Addis Ababa, Mexico City and Bangkok |
| H.S. Vahali | - | Phnom Penh, Brasilia |
| J.S. Teja | - | Kabul |
| S.J.S Chhatwal | - | Colombo |
| S.M.S. Chadha | - | Khartoum, Buenos Aires |

Table 7.2:

**Terrorist Violence in Punjab
(March 20, 1981 to June 2, 1984)**

| <u>Month</u> | Number of Reported Incidents of Terrorist Violence: | <u>1981</u> | <u>1982</u> | <u>1983</u> | <u>1984</u> |
|--------------|---|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| January | | -- | 1 | 4 | 18 |
| February | | -- | 1 | 1 | 58 |
| March | | 1 | 1 | 5 | 46 |
| April | | 3 | 4 | 9 | 95 |
| May | | 1 | 4 | 5 | 124 |
| June | | 0 | 2 | 15 | 22 |
| July | | 1 | 5 | 7 | |
| August | | 1 | 4 | 12 | |
| September | | 9 | 1 | 14 | |
| October | | 5 | 4 | 36 | |
| November | | 5 | 4 | 17 | |
| December | | 1 | 2 | 12 | |
| | | ----- | ----- | ----- | ----- |
| TOTAL | | 27 | 33 | 137 | 363* |

* figures reported for six month period

In view of mounting violence and disorder in Punjab the need for Mrs. Gandhi's intervention seems warranted, however, what needs to be examined now is an analysis of her role in addressing this problem after she decided to impose Presidential rule which dispensed with local autonomy and curbed certain freedoms which would have remained intact under normal political conditions.

Table 7.3:**List of 45 Demands Received from the Akali Dal by the Government in September, 1981****A. Religious**

1. Non-interference in religious affairs of Sikhs.
2. No endeavors by the government for Sikh control over the management of gurudwaras in Pakistan.
3. Apathy towards safety of life and property of Sikhs settled abroad and in other states of India.
4. Forcible occupation of Delhi gurudwaras in 1971.
5. Applying Land Ceiling Act to gurudwaras in Harayana.
6. Failure to name any train as Golden Temple Express while 15 trains have been named after other religious places.
7. Delay in awarding Holy City status to Amritsar.
8. Not permitting installation of a transmitter in Golden Temple.
9. Not enacting the All India Gurudwaras Act.
10. Not recognizing SGPC as the only representative institution of the Sikhs.
11. Usurping the SGPC's authority in the field of sending pilgrims to Pakistan.
12. Interfering in the Sikh tenets and violating the sanctity of Sikh traditions.
13. Illegal and forcible occupation of Delhi Gurudwaras with the help of police.
14. Restrictions on carrying of 'Kirpans' (swords) by Sikhs in the National Airlines.

B. Political

1. Violation of the assurance given to Sikhs for an autonomous region and instead declaring Sikhs as criminal.
2. Ban on 'Punjabi Suba' slogan.
3. Keeping out Chandigarh and other Punjabi speaking areas out of Punjab and taking away control of water head works and river water distribution.
4. Denial of internal autonomy to the state.
5. Toppling of Akali governments through illegal corrupt practice.
6. Denial of second language status to Punjabi in neighboring states.
7. Expressing lack of confidence in Punjabis and disarming them by withdrawing licensed arms.
8. Rejecting the Anandpur Sahib Resolution and following a policy of divide and rule by inciting communal tensions.

Table 7.3 (Continued):**C. Economic**

1. Reduction in the recruitment quota of Sikhs in armed forces from 20% to 2%.
2. Nationalizing of the Punjab and Sind Bank.
3. Failure to establish dry port at Amritsar.
4. Grant of minimum central aid to Punjab.
5. Concentration of economic power in the hands of 5 percent of the people.
6. Economic exploitation of Punjab.
7. Increase in prices.
8. Paucity of heavy industries in Punjab.
9. Eviction of Punjabi farmers from Uttar Pradesh.
10. Fixation of land ceiling at 7 hectares, but no ceilings on urban property.
11. Not introducing group insurance scheme in Punjab.
12. Denial of loans to farmers at the rates given to industrialists.
13. Non-renumerative prices for agricultural produce.
14. Procuring agricultural produce at cheap rates but selling the same to consumers at higher prices.
15. Failure to safeguard the rights of Harijans and other weaker sections.
16. Non-payment of unemployment allowance.
17. Non-payment of compensation to the victims of Indo-Pak wars in Punjab.
18. Linking of production to the price index.
19. Denial of facilities to farmers and workers under the Employment Insurance scheme.
20. Forcible acquisition of urban agricultural land at cheap rates.
21. Ban on the sale of rural land within the 5 km radius of the corporation limits.

D. Social

1. Non-recognition of the Sikh Personal Law.
2. Projecting Sikhs in an improper way in films and TV, etc., encouraging anti-Sikh literature and not giving sufficient time for coverage of Sikh literature on Radio/TV.

Table 7.4:**Revised List of 15 Demands Received from the Akali Dal
by Government in October, 1981**Religious Demands

1. Unconditional release of Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale and judicial inquiry with regard to police action in connection with Delhi rally (September 7), Chowk Mehta and Chando Kalan.
2. Removal of alleged government high-handedness in the management of Delhi gurudwaras, holding democratic elections after removal of forcible control by "one of Government's stooges."
3. Restoration of the SGPC's right to send pilgrim parties to Pakistan and deploy sewadars for the maintenance of local Sikh shrines.
4. Permission for Sikhs travelling by air to wear kirpans in domestic and international flights.
5. All India Gurudwara Act to be passed.
6. Grant of holy city status to Amritsar on the pattern of Hardwar, Kurukshetra and Kashi.
7. Installation of "Harmandir Radio" at Golden Temple, Amritsar to relay kirtan.
8. Renaming Flying Mail as Harimandir Express.

Political, Economic, and Cultural Demands

9. As per the Anandpur Sahib Resolution, the S.A. Dal is firmly convinced that progress of states would entail prosperity of the Center, for which suitable amendments should be made in the constitution to give more rights and provincial autonomy to states. The Center should retain foreign affairs, defence, currency, and communications (including means of transport), while the remaining portfolios should be with the states. Besides, the Sikhs should enjoy special rights as a nation.
10. Merger of Punjabi-speaking areas and Chandigarh into Punjab.
11. Handing over of dams and headworks in the state to Punjab and re-distribution of river waters as per national and international rules.
12. Second language status to Punjabi language in Harayana, Delhi, Himachal Pradesh and Rajasthan.
13. Stoppage of the uprooting of Punjabi farmers from Terai area of Uttar Pradesh.
14. Setting up of a dry port at Amritsar.
15. A license should be granted for a new bank in place of the Punjab and Sind bank, which should be under Sikh control and remunerative price should be fixed for agricultural products by linking it to the index of industrial production.

Table 7.5:

Land Utilization Statistics: 1975-1976 (Provisional)
*in '000 hectares

| State | Area | Area Reporting | | Net Area | Total Cropped |
|--------------|-------------|-------------------|----------------------|------------------|---------------|
| | | Geographic | for Land Utilization | | |
| <u>State</u> | <u>Area</u> | <u>Statistics</u> | | <u>Sown Area</u> | |
| Punjab | 5,036 | 5,033 | | 4,158 | 6,255 |
| Rajasthan | 34,222 | 34,188 | | 15,105 | 17,164 |
| Harayana | 4,422 | 4,404 | | 3,624 | 5,451 |

Cultivated and Irrigated Area in States: 1975-1976
('000 hectares)

| State | Area | Total Reporting | | <u>Cultivated Area</u> Area to Total Area | % of Net Cultivated |
|-----------|--------|-----------------|--------|--|---------------------|
| | | Net | Gross | | |
| Punjab | 5,033 | 4,158 | 6,255 | | 82.6 |
| Rajasthan | 34,188 | 15,105 | 17,164 | | 44.2 |
| Harayana | 4,404 | 3,624 | 5,451 | | 82.3 |

| to State | <u>Irrigated Area</u> | | <u>% of Net Irrigated Area</u> Net Cultivated Area |
|-------------|-----------------------|-------|---|
| | Net | Gross | |
| Punjab | 3,121 | 4,619 | 75.1 |
| Rajasthan | 2,547 | 2,934 | 16.9 |
| Harayana | 4,404 | 3,624 | 48.3 |

Table 7.6:

**Calendar of Meetings with the Representatives of the
Akali Dal, 1981-1984**

A. Meetings taken by the Prime Minister

| <u>Date</u> | <u>Venue</u> |
|------------------|-----------------------------|
| 1. Oct. 16, 1981 | South Block, New Delhi |
| 2. Nov. 26, 1981 | Parliament House, New Delhi |
| 3. April 4, 1982 | Parliament House, New Delhi |

B. Meetings taken by Members of the Union Cabinet

| | |
|------------------|--|
| 1. Oct. 23, 1981 | Office of the Minister of External Affairs, New Delhi |
| 2. Oct. 24, 1981 | " " " |
| 3. Nov. 1, 1983 | Raj Bhawan, Chandigarh |
| 4. Nov. 18, 1983 | Raj Bhawan, Chandigarh |

C. Secret Meetings

| | |
|-------------------|-------------------------------|
| 1. Nov. 16, 1982 | 27 Safdarjung Rd., New Delhi |
| 2. Nov. 17, 1982 | 27 Safdarjung Rd., New Delhi |
| 3. Jan. 1, 1983 | 27 Safdarjung Rd., New Delhi |
| 4. Jan. 24, 1984 | A guest house in New Delhi |
| 5. March 27, 1984 | A private house in Chandigarh |
| 6. March 28, 1984 | A guest house in New Delhi |
| 7. March 29, 1984 | A private house in Chandigarh |
| 8. April 21, 1984 | Airport lounge, Chandigarh |
| 9. May 26, 1984 | A guest house in New Delhi |

D. Tripartite Meetings

| | |
|-------------------|------------------------------|
| 1. Jan. 24, 1983 | Parliament Annexe, New Delhi |
| 2. Jan. 25, 1983 | " " " |
| 3. Feb. 8, 1983 | " " " |
| 4. Feb. 10, 1983 | " " " |
| 5. Feb. 15, 1983 | " " " |
| 6. Feb. 18, 1983 | " " " |
| 7. Feb. 19, 1983 | " " " |
| 8. Feb. 20, 1983 | " " " |
| 9. Feb. 14, 1984 | " " " |
| 10. Feb. 15, 1984 | " " " |

Table 7.7:

**Items Recovered from the Golden Temple after
Operation Bluestar**

| <u>Items Recovered</u> | <u>Golden Temple Area</u> | <u>Other Religious Places</u> | <u>Curfew Violation/ Cordon and Search Operations in Other Areas</u> | <u>Total</u> |
|---|---------------------------|-------------------------------|--|--------------|
| Light Machine Guns | 41 | -- | -- | 41 |
| Sten Guns | 57 | 7 | 32 | 96 |
| Point 303 Rifles | 377 | 5 | 50 | 432 |
| 7.62mm self-loading rifles | 83 | -- | 15 | 98 |
| 12 Bore Guns | 88 | 51 | 204 | 343 |
| 7.62mm Chinese rifles | 52 | -- | -- | 52 |
| Assorted Rifles | 71 | 21 | 36 | 128 |
| Revolvers | 49 | 15 | 25 | 89 |
| Pistols | 33 | 10 | 65 | 108 |
| Pistols, country-made 12 Bore | 61 | 17 | 11 | 89 |
| RPG (anti-tank) weapon | 2 | -- | -- | 2 |
| 2-inch Mortar (country-made) | -- | -- | 8 | 8 |
| Mines | 128 | -- | -- | 128 |
| Ammunition/Explosives -- large quantities recovered | | | | |
| High Frequency Transmitter/Receiver -- 1 in Golden Temple | | | | |
| Gold -- 5.4 kgs. | | | | |
| Silver -- 1.14 kgs. | | | | |
| Precious stones -- 1.442 kgs. | | | | |
| Cash -- Over Rs. 30 Lakhs (Golden Temple area) | | | | |
| Rs. 1,53,559 (found during search of other areas) | | | | |
| Over Rs. 31,53,559 (found in Total) | | | | |
| A total of Rs. 1,29,966 was found in Pakistani currency. | | | | |

Table 9.1:

**India's Total Aid Contributions
(Multilateral Programs)**

| Year ----- | Programme ----- | Amount ----- (Rs. Million) |
|---------------|--------------------------|----------------------------------|
| 1974 | UNDP | 357.25 |
| | SCAAP | 8.90 |
| | CFTC | 1.50 |
| | ESCAP | 4.99 |
| 1970-73 | ADB | 483.51 |
| 1959-73 | IAEA-TAP (US \$ 482,000) | |
| 1979 | Colombo Plan | 900.00 |
| Total: | | 1276.05 |

Bilateral Programs

| | | |
|--|-------------------------------|-----------------|
| 1978 | ITEC | 216.54 |
| 1978 | Total Bilateral Loans/Credits | 4631.57 |
| 1978 | Total Bilateral Grants | 5234.86 |
| Total Indian Aid to All Programs: | | 11359.02 |

Abbreviations:

UNDP- United Nations Development Program
 SCAAP- Special Commonwealth Africa Assistance Plan
 CFTC- Commonwealth Fund for Technical Cooperation
 ESCAP- Economic and Social Council for Asia and the Pacific
 ADB- Asian Development Bank
 IAEA-TAP- International Atomic Energy Agency - Technical Assistance Programme
 ITEC- Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation

Source: Vorha, 1980

Table 9.2:**Technology Transfers from India to Developing Countries**

| Year | Company/Organization/Country Process |
|---------|---|
| 1971 | Ahmedabad Textile; Industry Research Assoc. Durable Press Egypt |
| 1973 | J.K. Industries; Gwalior Rayon: S. Korea, Turkey, Thailand, Ethylene Glycol recovery |
| 1969 | Regional Research Lab. Jorhat Assam: Malaysia Bamboo cardboard |
| 1975 | Projects and Equipment Corp: Reactive Dyes; Argentina whiteners |
| 1978 | Development Consultants: Cement, Steel Syria, Venezuela Plant techniques |
| 1972 | Chemicals and Fibers of India Ltd: Sudan Polyester fiber |
| 1975 | Khadi and Village Industries Gobar gas units; Commission: Tanzania handmade paper |
| 1975-80 | Sri Lanka, Nepal, Somalia, Brazil, Iran, Uganda, Upper Volta Gobar gas techn. |
| 1975-79 | Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh Beekeeping |
| 1974 | National Research Development Corporation: Philippines Erection of plant |
| 1974-79 | Burma, Thailand, Sri Lanka, Nepal 12 transfers; various fields |
| 1971 | Amar Dye Chemicals: Reactive Dyes Argentina |
| 1978 | Indonesia |
| 1979 | Brazil Atlas Cycle Industries: Bicycle Manuf. |
| 1974 | Iran |
| 1978 | Bangladesh, Tanzania |
| 1979 | Guyana, Sudan, Zambia |

Source: (Dutt, 1984)

Appendix II

Psychological Sub-Processes

- 1) Selective Perception is a term which has been applied by individuals (e.g. Boulding, 1956, Holsti, 1967), in the fields of political science, international relations, and conflict research, to refer to the relatively rigid image, view, or belief, held by individuals, about their environment. Certain individuals are more able and apt to screen out (selective inattention) information which is contrary to their beliefs than others. (Holsti, 1967) analyzed the personality profile of John Foster Dulles and noted that Dulles was an extremely inflexible, closed-minded individual, who was both willing and able to selectively screen out any information about the Soviet Union and its inclinations, which conflicted with his own beliefs or threatened his own image of the international environment. Selective perception and the perceptions of the current environment are also affected by past experiences, exposure, and influences to which individuals have been subjected.
- 2) Selective Inattention (cf. White, 1970) occurs when different individuals possess differing propensities to exclude information which is inconsistent with their notions or beliefs and as a result, they exclude non-conforming information or re-interpret incoming information so it conforms to their view or image of the world.
- 3) Selective Recall involves a distortion of recollections of past events in order to fit or concur with current images of the conflict or view of an adversary.
- 4) Repression is an "unconscious" psychological process whereby information which clashes with one's views or images of conflict or conflictual situations is not remembered; tension-producing, disturbing thoughts, emotions, or perceptions of events are excluded from consciousness.
- 5) Suppression is a "conscious" psychological process where individuals, deliberately and consciously choose not to think about something.
- 6) Psychologic is a concept discussed by Charles Osgood (1962) in which he noted that under conditions of stress or psychological conflict, certain individuals choose only those aspects of reality that conform to their own beliefs.

Psychological Sub-Processes (Continued)

This is achieved by over-simplifying complex and contradictory information. Individuals tend to reduce complex information into simple, black-and-white, categories. Complex situations are over-simplified and views of others or opposing parties are based on scant information or gross intentional misinterpretations of opposing parties and their acts or intentions.

7) Bolstering, (cf. White, 1970), involves the search for evidence to support a view or position that has already been adopted in order to justify the action to oneself or to others.

8) Ability to Empathize relates to an individual's ability identify with a particular cause, issue, or opinion. Strong adherence to a particular, view, image, or perception of a conflict makes it difficult to empathize with other peoples' views, fears, concerns, intentions, etc.

9) Tunnel Vision is a process occurring in conflictual situations or in other decisional processes where decision-makers tend to focus on a few select aspects of their environment to the exclusion of all others. In "selective perception," certain types of information are ignored or disregarded because they do not conform to the views of decision-makers. In the case of "tunnel vision," all information is ignored which is perceived as unrelated or not having a bearing on the immediate problems which decision-makers are facing.

10) Rationalization is an unconscious process of coming to accept or trying to explain or legitimize behavior which is otherwise unacceptable to oneself, by attributing positive reasons for accepting the behavior or allowing it to be excused.

11) Projection is purely an individual psychological attribute which involves an individual's effort to "project" onto others, in order to realize their psychological comfort, those characteristics or traits inherent in oneself which one strongly dislikes, is ashamed of, and wishes to deny. "Projection" often accompanies and reinforces "rationalization."

12) And finally, Group Identification deals with the development of a person's own self image and understanding of their roles in groups, associations, or parties with which they closely identify themselves.

Appendix III

Jawaharlal Nehru and Indira Gandhi's Speeches, Writings, and Remarks: A Select Sample

Source of Many Speeches:

Works on File at Nehru Memorial Library, New Delhi, India.

- S. Gopal. Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru.
(New Delhi: Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund, 1984).
Pouchpadass, Emmanuel, Indira Gandhi: My Truth.
(New York: Grove Press, 1980).
Norman, Dorothy. Indira Gandhi.
(New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1985).

1. Relinquishing Presidency of Indian National Congress Party
(Inaugural address at A.I.C.C. session, New Delhi, 23 September 1946). In The Hindustan Times, 24 September 1946 and Amrita Bazar Patrika 25 September 1946)
2. Speech on India as a Sovereign, Independent Republic
Speech at subjects committee meeting of Meerut Congress after presidency of the Congress Party was handed over to J. B. Kripalani on 21 November 1946. In The Hindustan Times, 22 November 1946.
3. Speech Commenting on the Dynamism of India
Address at Meerut session of the Congress Party in which delegates and Congress Party workers from Uttar Pradesh attended, 22 November 1946. In The Hindustan Times. 24 November 1946.
4. Speech Introducing a Resolution Regarding the Objectives of the Congress Party
Subjects Committee Meeting of the Congress Party in Meerut, 22 November 1946. Resolution passed unanimously.
In The Hindustan Times, 23 November 1946.
5. Fears of Communal Fascism in India
Speech in support of a resolution dealing with the communal problem in India, Indian National Congress Party meeting at Meerut, 24 November 1946. In The Hindu, 25 Nov. 1946.

6. Independence Day Remarks
Resolution advanced by Nehru at Congress Party Working Committee, New Delhi, on 7 January 1947.
In The Hindustan Times, 8 January 1947.
7. Letter to Rafi Ahmad Kidwai, Allahabad, Uttar Pradesh, 28 September 1946 Jawaharlal Nehru Papers, Nehru Memorial Library and Museum
(Uttar Pradesh gov't sought to levy punitive taxes on Muslims in the city of Aligarh due to the participation of certain groups in violent, anti-government activities in March 1946.
8. Appeal for the Cessation of Violence in E.Bengal and Calcutta
Drafted by Nehru, Liaquat Ali Khan, Vallabhbhai Patel and Abdur Rab Nishtar at Calcutta, 3 Nov. 1946.
In The Hindustan Times, 4 Nov. 1946.
9. Plea for a Cessation of Communal Violence in Bihar
Speech at Fatwa, 4 November 1946.
In The Searchlight, 6 November 1946
10. Speech Commenting on Nehru's Intolerance for Lawlessness
Speech at Biharsharif, 4 November 1946.
In The Searchlight, 6 November, 1946.
11. Appeal to Stop Violence and Not Force the Government to Act
Speech at Patna, 4 November 1946.
In The Searchlight, 6 November 1946.
12. Speech Warning Rioters
Speech at Poonpooon, 4 November 1946.
In The Hindu, 6 Nov. 1946.
13. Appeal for Harmony and Good Neighborliness
Speech at public meeting, Patna, 6 November 1946.
The Hindu, 7 November 1946.
14. Speech to Students Concerning Relief Work
Speech at Patna, 8 November 1946
In The Searchlight, 11 November 1946.
15. Letter to Vijayalakshmi Pandit (Nehru's Sister / Amb. to UN) Jawaharlal Nehru Papers, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library Letter written from London, 5 December 1946
16. Letter to V.K. Krishna Menon
V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library. Letter from New Delhi, 6 October 1946

17. Letter to M.A. Jinnah
In The Transfer of Power, 1942-47, v. 8, cf. 671-627.
Letter from New Delhi, 6 October 1946
18. Letter to Lord Wavell
In The Transfer of Power, 1942-47, Vol. 8, pp. 777-779
From New Delhi, 23 October 1946
19. Speech Regarding the Aims of the Constituent Assembly
Speech in the Constituent Assembly, 13 December 1946
Constituent Assembly Debates, Official Report, Vol. I,
1946, 9-23 December 1946, pp. 55ff
20. Speech Concerning the Necessity to Pass a Resolution
on the Objectives and Aims of the Constituent Assembly
Speech in the Constituent Assembly, 22 January 1947
Constituent Assembly Debates, Official Report,
Vol. II, 1947, 20 to 25 January 1947, pp. 296ff
21. Address to Indian Soldiers on the Role of the Army
Address to Indian soldiers and civilians at Razmak,
17 October 1946. In The Hindu, 20 October 1946
22. The Role of Science During times of War and Peace
Address to army officers, Wana, 19 October 1946.
In Hindustan Times, 21 October 1946.
23. Speech Appealing to Pathans (Tribal Community)
for Cooperation
Speech at Jandola (Waziristan), 19 October 1946.
In The Hindustan Times, 21 October 1946.
24. Speech on the Problems of Tribesmen
Speech at Sardaryab, 21 October 1946.
In The Hindustan Times, 23 October 1946.
26. Speech at the Commencement of an Exhibition of
Irrigation, Engineering and Research, New Delhi, 27
November 1946, In The National Herald,
28 November 1946.
27. Speech Regarding the Role of Science in the Service of
the Community
Speech at the Thirty-Fourth Indian Science Congress,
3 January 1947, New Delhi
In The Hindustan Times, 4 January 1947
28. Speech Outlining the Responsibilities of
the Interim Government
Informal meeting with press correspondents
in New Delhi, 2 September 1946
In The Hindu 4 September 1946

29. Speech Regarding Independent India's Role in World Affairs Broadcast over All India Radio on 7 September 1946, In The Hindustan Times, 8 September 1946
30. Remarks on India's Role at the United Nations Notes of 5 September 1946, Minister of External Affairs, File No. 6 (58)-cc/46, National Archives of India as found in Gopal (1984:438ff).
31. Remarks on India's Policy Toward Dependent Territories Notes of 15 Sept. 1946 from External Affairs Dept. File No. 6(76)-cc/46, pp. 31-3/n, in Gopal (1984:445ff)
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17. Topic: Emergence as National Leader
18. Topic: Pressing National Issues
19. Topic: Exercise of Leadership Domestic and Int'l Realm
20. Topic: State of Emergency
21. Topic: Aspirations for National Development

Appendix IV

Mathematical Model of How the Human Element Enters the Political Process

In the context of what has been discussed thus far, the following mathematical model shows how personality, beliefs, and political leadership enters the political process. This simplified calculus equation integrates the variables that have been discussed thus far which have a bearing on development in India.

What this mathematical model shows is that the relationship between leadership and personality factors is based on the sum of historical/cultural/socio-political-economic factors (H_t) and personality traits (P_t) which, when influenced by specific situation variables (V_t), enable a leader to make political decisions that contribute toward the development of national-self identity. These factors are weighted (w) to account for varying degrees of influence.

$$\Delta \lambda = \int \left[\sum_{j=1}^4 \left(\sum_{i=1}^X (\Delta P_{t_i} \omega + \Delta H_{t_i} \omega) \right) \Delta V_j \omega \right]$$

In this equation, lambda represents the sum total of all leadership and personality traits or factors, which, when influenced by specific situational variables, affect the nature of national self-identity in India. It represents a function of the following variables which comprise the equation:

- V_1 = Majority-Minority Problem (Nehru)
- V_2 = Majority-Minority Problem (I. Gandhi)
- V_3 = Political Dimensions of Non-alignment (Nehru)
- V_4 = Economic Dimensions of Non-alignment (I. Gandhi)

Where,

$$\begin{aligned} H_{t_1} + H_{t_2} + H_{t_3} \dots H_{t_i} &= \sum_{i=1}^i H_{t_i} \\ P_{t_1} + P_{t_2} + P_{t_3} \dots P_{t_i} &= \sum_{i=1}^i P_{t_i} \\ V_1 + V_2 + V_3 + V_4 &= \sum_{j=1}^4 V_j \end{aligned}$$

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