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VIETNAM VETERANS AGAINST THE WAR, INC.: TECHNOLOGY, IDEALISM AND REBELLION

in two volumes

by

DOLORES McCABE

Volume I

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Sociology in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Phiosophy, The City University of New York

1997

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Abstract

THE VIETNAM VETERANS AGAINST THE WAR, INC.:
TECHNOLOGY, IDEALISM AND REBELLION

by

Dolores McCabe

Adviser: Professor Stanley Aronowitz

In all wars, there lies a central question: What is the decisive factor between victory and defeat? The issue is ultimately decided by the soldier in his willingness to fight and die for a cause he feels is just. When that factor is missing, the spirit of idealism serves as the basis for questioning the task itself. Military defection and resistance will follow, not out of a concern for his safety or comfort, but on the basis of moral outrage.

The Vietnam Veterans Against the War is important as the moral catalyst for those elements who no longer could tolerate the injustice or goals and conduct of the war. Their repudiation of the Vietnam War cannot be faulted by an accusation of cowardice or dereliction of duty; many had served in the most hazardous theatres and occupations of that war.

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This study examines the factors leading to their radicalization and impact upon a war that was unjust in its material pursuit and in its inhumane methods, as well. This dissertation shows that it was the inhumane nature of the war that served as the major catalyst for the transition to rebellion through an idealistic rejection of war's modern material reductionism. In this, the alteration of traditional military professional into modern careerist was instrumental; however, the remote, impersonal and deadly imposition of technological overkill to compensate for the loss of human will underlay the historical shift into rebellion.

The significance of this finding will show that the Vietnam Syndrome remains steady within the American military, which has learned nothing from the Vietnam War, except to intensify its pursuit of materialist means and ends. As such, the idealist is today recreating the ancient role of the warrior pursuing truth and justice through his courage and firm conviction that such 'will to truth' ultimately can overcome the mightiest materialistic nations and armies in the world.

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Second, the members of my committee for their guidance and encouragement: Dr. Stanley Aronowitz, my Chairman, provided incisive comments and much patience; Dr. William Kornblum offered impeccable comments on form; and Dr. Bogdan Denitch, the impetus for this theoretical inquiry into rebellion, for the clarity of personal observations on the antiwar movement and the earlier Civil Rights marches. Their contributions were great; my debt is greater.

I would like to express, as well, my deep appreciation to the many non-VVAW Vietnam veterans who answered my survey, some with reservations, a few with apprehension, but all committed to "setting the record straight." I hope I have addressed their concerns fairly. From the New Yorker who entered the terrifying tunnels of Cu Chi and still carries the psychic and physical scars, to the San Franciscan who tired of killing and turned to paths of peace, to Mr. Hugh Roarty who spoke from the heart, in my estimation, these veterans were the finest fighting force

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we ever fielded and certainly the bravest in all categories: those who upheld and defended the reasons for going to war, those who chose neutrality or marginality, and, ultimately, those who fought in another kind of war, one for the hearts, minds and basic decency of the American people.

I thank the many authors whose works have enlightened beyond the reach of my discipline; a special thanks to Dr. Robert Jay Lifton for his compassion and genius; to Daniel Ellsberg for his uncompromising bravery under fire; to William Gibson (whose book I wish I had written); to Bill Ehrhart whose poetry is without peer, and to Dorothy Watson, Jane Feigenbaum and Freida Steinberg for making a difference. I would be remiss if I did not mention the librarians at the West Point Library and Mr. Findlen who spent an entire afternoon explaining strategy and tactics, I thank them all.

Although all the above mentioned have served in some capacity as mentors, role models, educators, devil's advocates and friends, they are not responsible for any sins of omission or commission found in this work, I claim sole responsibility for that. It is my hope that this work will foster an internal dialogue on what the Vietnam War meant in terms of its effect on the men who were sent there, to the people of Vietnam who endured it, and to the American society who accepted the fatal illusion that in a democracy might makes right. Unless we are willing to question who we are, what kind of people we have become, and where our leaders are taking us, there can be no closure on the Vietnam War.

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PREFACE

A literary reviewer lamented that there are too many books written on the Vietnam War, most of it, she thought, bad literature. That may be true, however, the many I have read during the course of this dissertation have convinced me that there can never be a cutting off point for discovering the bitter lessons history teaches. The wealth of material issuing from personal experiences concerning all aspects of the Vietnam War attempts to realign fact with fiction, ultimately, to discover how to avoid a recurrence of such tragic proportions. When one of the most technologically advanced nations in the world fails in its efforts to deny the moral basis of a backward society to exist, unless that society reflects perfect conformity with its political, economic and cultural dictates, there can never be enough said about it.

If perfect syntax is to be the standard for judging the impact of raw experience on reality, will the mental rigidity of perfect form rather than human passion with all

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its literary imperfections be the sole criterion? And who is to decide? Great literature should evoke human feelings of empathy, compassion, outrage and a return to moral foundations. As in Picasso's masterpiece "Guernica" in another medium, art informs us that these texts are capable of expressing multiple dimensions of meaning through silence that penetrate men's minds, and, as such, convevs the deepest human emotions into a universal level of understanding.

In this, one may ask if there could ever be an overproduction of art or literature on Guernicas, Auschwitzs or My Lais to weep over and despair? There may well be an excess of books and articles on Vietnam; but then, there is still so much to be said from that experience; the silence of perfect form is, after all, the stillness of death. Too many were too silent during the entire 25-year span of incredible savagery towards the Vietnamese people and the American society, and many more fell in lockstep with the process of reversing the mentality of power dictates all morality.

I have talked with and listened to many Vietnam veterans, read much of their work and that of others during the course of this research. They are unique and truly memorable persons and their stories bear telling. As with

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the Korean vets, they were unfairly saddled with a "bad" war, yet proudly refuse to deny their contributions to their country. For those who dissented, they did what was right, even if their country didn't. For those who remained "onside," though troubled at the discovery of the information that has emerged on political deception and untruths of that time, they fervently believe they followed the right course. All love their country deeply; the drummer they followed led down divergent paths.

Twenty-one years after the fall of Saigon, many have not forgotten their experiences; when I asked one of the veterans how long has it been since he was in Vietnam, he answered, "last night." Some have made peace, many are still bitter, all have something to say about it, an almost absolute majority have not forgotten Vietnam. What they say will help us to understand the choices they made during the years of anti-war protest. We should listen.

This study is meant to discover why men rebel. In the Vietnam experience, the civil disturbances stemming from our participation in that war led to a deep polarization in this society between loyalty to individual conscience or duty to the state. The increasing number of citizens protesting the war as unethical and immoral was strident but contained; however, when members of the military began

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to question their role in that war and overtly entered into the anti-war protest, combined dissent ultimately became a decisive inhibitor on political decisions to continue the war in Vietnam.

As we follow the introduction of scientific and technological weapons of war into Vietnam and the perfecting of tactics and strategy for a new age of conflict, there is a corresponding rise in resistance from the ranks towards the task they were expected to complete. Although there are some who say that the high rates of desertion, AWOLs, fraggings, drug abuse and outright refusals to obey orders were miniscule, inflated by the media, statistics show that something did happen in Vietnam that compelled top level military officers to admit that the army in Vietnam had all but disintegrated by 1971.

The army is a nation's last line of defense, thus the Vietnam veteran is important to study because ultimately he decided the argument over the merits of human subjectivity or the superiority of scientific and technological objectivity in waging a modern war. The contest was decided on the thinnest moral line between human ethical dimensions and political priorities debasing military honor to attain them. When the soldier's historical task is compromised, sacrifices are withheld; that implies the will to prevail

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in an honorable task is broken. When the idealism that sustains that will falters, he will rebel. What form that rebellion takes will be studied in the following chapters. Subjectively, this work will examine the ethical processes that advance or limit a nation's capacity to survive a moral crisis among its military.

Ultimately, the purpose of this work is to discover whether significant technological changes in the science of warfare can be substituted for the human element in combat without alienating the moral absolutes of traditional military integrity that made the historical differences between victory and defeat.

The contradiction between technological necessity in modern warfare and the principles binding combatants to a moral code of honor is at the heart of the soldier's dilemma today. The Nuremberg trials following the defeat of Hitler's Third Reich in 1945 placed an unbearable burden on those who heed their nation's call to battle: follow orders and be tried as a war criminal if your war is lost, or refuse to obey orders that are deemed criminal in nature and be shot for insubordination.

Thus the morality of war appears to center on winning not losing thereby removing all restraints for taking a country to war. It removes the moral force of injury and

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replaces it with cost benefit analyses of technological possibility. It tends to undo the patina of civilization built up over centuries of attempts to agree on a just war doctrine based on cultural refinements of noblesse oblige.

War is a social institution, it is created, waged, won or lost by humans. Thus the role of the state in the matters of war cannot be separated from its cultural infrastructure. Culture produces the justifications for the vast squandering of life and property, presumably on the premise of a valid moral principle. Because modern wars have the capability of ending civilization, it is absurd not to contemplate moderation and control of its conduct. Still, one of the fundamental flaws appears to reside in the belief that science will provide means to flirt with oblivion while impersonal technocrats fine-tune the doomsday machine.

In this, as many have noted, the Age of Enlightenment has led to a darkening in men's minds and the fruits of the Copernican revolution have become bitter and inedible. War as the sum and substance of mankind's highest achievement, resplendent in his technological advancements, has given us an opposition between law and principles. The military culture we have inherited has given us an unparalleled depletion of natural resources that is all the more tragic

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because it carries the seeds of our own destruction. In this, we are left with an antimony - a mutual contradiction between principles, unconformity, self-contradiction, paradox and absurdity.

If war is not the problem and these concerns would exist even without it, does it not hasten the process with implications for risking future generations as well. Thus rhetorical questions of must we kill in order to live, must we destroy in order to preserve, and must we squander in order to prosper pale in comparison to the answer that we are all subject to moral evaluations and cannot be separated from our technology and its effects on life and death, poverty and wealth, or war and peace, individually and collectively. It is the deepest problem we face and the most difficult because each of us must answer to his conscience in an age of increasingly instrumentality.

The following introduction will address the main themes of this dissertation, technology, idealism and rebellion in historical terms. The argument between war as "dreadful but necessary" and war as totally inhumane spills into the debate on just or unjust wars. These tend to blur the question of whether those who govern are not accountable for their actions. In the experience of Vietnam, the remoteness of political impersonality that

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planned the most rational war we have ever waged has never been fully held accountable. Without seeing or knowing any of the results of their deliberations, except what others wanted them to know, our elected officials produced a policy to nowhere on a battlefield they created in absentia, far away from any intimacy with the warriors who bled and died daily to uphold the myth of an imperial presidency and his inept advisers.

The doctrine of reasons of state will be critically examined within the emerging autocratic structure of power in our country clearly expressed by, call it what you may, imperialist expansion in invading Vietnam with over 500,000 ground troops to support our national interest by shoring up a political regime that was sadly out of tune with its own people. Yet, the folly of all the entire technological wealth spent to stamp out unacceptable ideas is perhaps the greatest foolishness. The only way to stop an idea is to kill everyone who believes it, and even then, like the Phoenix, it will rise again from the ashes.

This introduces the Weberian ethic of ultimate ends/means controversy as the central question of Vietnam: when the ideological hegemony of one nation can be enhanced at the expense of another through military exploitation or preying on its weaknesses, where does answering to one's

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conscience begin and where does obedience to duty end. Idealism appears to begin where political realism fails to consider the human element as anything but flawed and non-productive, easily replaced by scientific precision.

In observation of Max Weber's caution on observing strict value neutrality, I will strive for scientific objectivity in my work; however, being an imperfect human who lived through the 1960s, I cannot promise Olympian detachment.

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VIETNAM VETERANS SURVEY

January, 1996

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ABBREVIATIONS

ADA	Americans for Democratic Action
AIDS	Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
AFSC	American Friends Service Committee
ARVN	Army of the Republic of Vietnam
AWOL	Away Without Official Leave
CALC	Clergy anad Laity Concerned
CBUs	Container (cluster) Bomb Units
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CO	Conscientious Objector
COINTELPRO	Counterintelligence Program
CORDS	U.S. Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support
CP	Communist Party
CWM	Catholic Workers Movement
DOD	Department of Defense
DMZ	Demilitarized Zone Along the Seventeenth Parallel dividing South Vietnam and the DRV
DRV	Democratic Republic of Vietnam
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FOR	Fellowsip of Reconciliation
GIs	Government Issue (slang for military personnel)
IPC	Indochina Peace Committee
ISC	Infiltration Surveillance Center
JCS	U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff
LBJ	Long Binh Jail
MACV	U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam Headquarters
MIAs	Missing in Action
MIC	Military/Industrial Complex

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NCCEWVN	National Coordinating Committee to End the War in Vietnam
NLF	National Liberation Front
NVA	North Vietnamese Army
NSC	U.S. National Security Council
PFC	Private First Class
PTSD	Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder
RAW	Rapid American Withdrawal (Operation RAW was one of the first VVAW demonstrations)
SANE	National Committee for a SANE Nuclear Policy
SEATO	Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
SES	Socio-Economic Status
SIPRI	Stockholm International Peaace Research Institute
SVA	South Vietnamese Army
U.S.S.R.	Union of Socialist Soviet Republics
UN	United Nations
VVA	Vietnam Veterans of America
VVAW	Vietnam Veterans Against the War
VFP	Veterans For Peace
VFW	Veterans of Foreign Wars
WRL	War Resistors League

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INTRODUCTION

This work began as an inquiry into the sociological significance of the Vietnam war in why men rebel. Could an affinity between idealism and rebellion restrict state ability to utilize war as an extension of politics through other means[1] when increasing numbers of active duty personnel and veterans overtly questioned the moral and ethical implications of a war that they had participated in fully. It quickly broadened into issues and areas of inquiry far removed from the original design.

Foremost among these were the social definition of war, just war doctrines, executive drift, military ideological reorientations, and the effects technical and scientific types of warfare have on on men who fight our wars. New discoveries kept interfering with old explanations of why a) we lost or b) did not lose the Vietnam war. The questions that lingered were, if we were as powerful as we were, why didn't we win totally and completely as we have in other engagements, and why not?

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These are the questions of executive drift from constitutional checks and balances to a one man enterprise; the use or misuse of science and technology in waging war to advance ideological hegemony; the political alteration from democracy to political realism and the resulting deformity of means to ends; and ultimately, the dynamics of the Vietnam war itself as the catalyst for internal military refusal to engage in an unjust war in progress for the most intangible of reasons, the idealistic basis of a warrior's task - honor and virtue.[2]

Vietnam was more than a war between unequals, it was also the point of time where executive drift away from constitutional checks and balances toward all sorts of unilateral decisions that had begun with the end of World War II and the entry of the Cold War was brought up short by the people. As such, the war in Vietnam was a major historical alteration for this nation in that it led to a convergence of military and civil disobedience over questions of majority rule or state fiat. The coercive efforts by state agencies towards dissenters led many to question whether democracy could only be preserved by abolishing freedom. In this context, the Vietnam war drew increasing opposition from its citizens who viewed that war

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and, by implication, their political institution as unrepresentative of what this country stood for.

The civilian protesters, although irksome, were generally contained; however, the entry of increasing numbers of protesting military could not be dismissed as irrelevant. Soldier complaints to Congress totaled 250,000 a year by 1971; it had become one of the most popular forms of protest.[3] These Vietnam veterans and segments of the standing military were sickened by the scale of technological devastation wrought on that tiny nation, and agonized over whether government's business wasn't to protect and foster life instead of becoming instruments of death. Much more to the point was the concern that we had propped up an unpopular political regime then had to send in the military, however, in order to kill the enemy we had to kill the entire population.[4]

In effect, American soldiers sent to Vietnam fought with magnificent courage and the most awesome instruments of war but could not overcome the absence of moral purpose. They fought without the benefit of whatever military reserves the country could furnish; they fought without support from an increasingly concerned segment of home support; and they fought in some of the world's most inhospitable terrain. They may not have been defeated on

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the battlefield, however, they were defeated by the lack of attention to an inescapable fact: whatever justification for the war may have existed up to March 16, 1968, after My Lai the fiction could not be maintained. PFC Michael Bernhardt, trained by Green Berets in his Miami ROTC days, refused to follow orders to shoot old men, women and children;[5] in essence, he could not obey an order that violated his conscience.[6]

U.S. leadership, military and civilian, could no longer claim to be saving Vietnam for democracy when they were seen as the deliberate executioners of innocent civilians. As such, caught between the corruption of their mission and the increasing brutality of techno-war after the sting of the Tet Offensive, vengeance appeared to have won over moral judgment where the conduct of the war was concerned. All of Vietnam became a free fire zone. It was at this point that the VVAW message on the immorality of the war began to be heard and the military to unravel.[7]

The ideological weakening initiated by their Vietnam experiences produced deep and widespread disillusionment among the military. One need look no further than the increase in drug addiction; the waning of military successes; the resignations of key officers; racial tensions; fraggings and large scale graft and looting of

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military supplies to realize that whatever idealism had existed previously had been undermined. By 1970, the Secretary of the Navy openly announced that 6,700 navy and marine personnel had been discharged because of drug abuse alone; this does not cover drug abuse that reached epidemic dimensions in the army.[8]

As the American will waned, the Viet Cong demonstrated a stronger military staying power, despite the lack of heavy weapons, no navy, no airforce, and nothing equal to the awesome technical might of the military and industrial infrastructure that supplied the American forces. By spring of 1969, B-52s were bearing much of the American offensive efforts in Vietnam.[9] The shift from human agency to technological substitution was in full swing; the soldier had become suspect.

If there had been a moral justification for American presence in Vietnam, it no longer existed. When reasons for going to war are studied, they have been measured within a frame of balanced credibility. War means killing; ordinarily there are sanctions for murder but war suspends the need for judging or defending the act of murder by virtue of a higher ideal. American wars had a beginning and a decisive end; they were declared after serious provocation against American lives. They weren't merely in

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defense of human rights but to address human wrongs, as well.

Vietnam, however, was different. It crept up on America like the tsunamis, those tidal surges that creep in slowly and silently inundating everything in its path then recede with tremendous force leaving death and devastation behind. The country was in over its head, the people were beginning to be aware of it; most didn't quite know how we got there, except it was not where we ought to be. Unlike natural disasters, there was a deus ex machina and we found him working political levers and controls in the White House, disguising fact from fiction and using every agency of government to keep the voting public unaware of the depth of the deception. It was never the same thereafter.

Vietnam was infinitely more than a war to stop an alien philosophy from destroying our democracy, or a fear for the future of Asian market independence or even to help our allies in South Vietnam; it was a collision between the moral remnants of idealism that required valid ethical reasons for bloodletting and the political realism of pragmatic state interest intensified by the conditions of war.

As in most wars, human expression has had far greater significance in the aftermath than in the technological prologue. Vietnam clearly indicates that idealism as

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the expression of character springing from ethical considerations of how humans should behave undercut pragmatic Machiavellian policies of the supremacy of means over ends.

If Vietnam is an example, moral renaissance promises to have a chilling effect on future military adventures along these lines because war is a social institution and the substance of victory is human courage and will based on altruism. The antithesis of altruism is materialistic self-interest. As such, a culture devoid of heroic qualities will have to substitute human courage with technology when the morality of the task is questioned by those who must face the enemy. In essence, material technology has no conscience and thus can be depended upon to do what humans find unthinkable. Humans, however, have the rare gift of reflecting on their actions and are able to self-correct where technology cannot.

As such, the alteration between technology and humans, where the rational logic of victory resides in elevating the technical impersonality of the machine over human compassion of men, may be the area where subjective appraisals of moral and ethical breaks appear and are resolved through choices of apathy, conformity or active opposition. In Vietnam, an agricultural nation of roughly

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18 million people underwent the most severe technological punishment this country has ever employed in any war. At the end of 1967, the Defense Department announced the total tonnage of bombs dropped on North and South Vietnam together was over 1.5 million, surpassing the 750,000 tons of bombs dropped on Europe by the Army Air Force in World War II.[10]

Where were military values? Gabriel and Savage point to the symbiotic relationship between the corporate business model and the military begun during World War II was the key factor in weakening and eventually destroying traditional military values.(11) The appointment of Robert S. McNamara as Secretary of Defense in 1961 further assured cost benefit analysis, interchangeable replacement parts, systems perspectives, production statistics and zero defect criteria. Now managing war replaced military leadership and its victory the Edsel of an automated battlefield.[12]

Thus, economic ethics proved a poor replacement for universal ideals. It grounded ideology in representations that find plausibility in identifiable antinomies of commodity production. In this, the opposition between laws and principles are forever paradoxical, concerned only with the maximization of profit and self-interest where the individual has no innate responsibility for his actions,

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only for obedience, and the polar opposite where the universals of "freedom," creativity," "peace," define the discourse for cancelling the pervasive influence of systemic inconsistencies. Military values reflect the larger societal articulations that compel altruism, those Durkheimian concepts of cohesion, solidarity, collective representations, that lend their essence to the traditional military virtues of honor, duty, loyalty, integrity and self-sacrifice.[13] In essence, the more intense the incorporation of the economic model has been, the greater the need for technological substitutions in place of human agency in our military.

It was risky to replace the heroic with the pragmatic as it served to alienate the military. It also quickened idealistic reaction to the alteration that human courage was unnecessary in technowar, other than as witness to technologically superior killing machines. This is the classic elimination of the subject. Kristeva[14] has named this 'abjection' - the deep sense of normlessness and meaninglessness that is the result of intense exposure to the horror of modern warfare. As she explains, the horror of this carnage of war or any other event of unbelievable human outrage results in the sense of revulsion that overtakes the collapse of meaning into nothingness. We see

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this reflected in the post traumatic stress syndrome suffered by countless Vietnam veterans. The expansion of relentless scientific and technological methods of warfare in Vietnam became conditions where the individual acted only as a corroborating witness without the ability to exercise a locus of control. Technology took over and humans were rendered mindless automatons functioning under its increasing hegemony.

William Gibson[15] explored this concept in his brilliant chronicle of the Vietnam War as the first war the United States fought and lost as a pure production system in that the officers were managers, the enlisted men were workers, and the assembly line careers rose or fell according to the productivity figures, in this case, the body counts irregardless of gender, sex, age or civilian status of the victims. Most of the body counts resulted from impartial technological genocide.

The elimination of the subject in this instance can be blamed for the loss of humanity (My Lai), sanity (PTSD) and the inability of the soldier to protect himself in the conduct of contemporary war (shattered identities). Thus, the basis for the alienation between soldier and state, soldier from soldier, ultimately, soldier from self that led to the historical failure in Vietnam is evident in the type

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of psychic numbing[16] that followed his exposure to sustained moral horror. Those psychic injuries required an intense personal and group struggle to reintegrate the personality. The end result has been that many were drawn into a deep commitment to prevent Vietnam from ever again happening, and that no one would have to participate in or witness actions deemed morally reprehensible.

The phenomenon of military personnel overtly protesting a war in progress is not something one would expect to see, but then, Vietnam was not a war anyone should have seen. It was a long journey from the 1945 support of the British in Vietnam, to the French occupation till 1954, and some form of American occupation, overt and covert, till 1975. The coup de gras, however, was the ill-advised invasion of Laos and Cambodia ordered by President Nixon that exploded into the killing of nine students by National Guardsmen sent into Kent State on May 4, 1970 to stop war protesters. However, it was the renewed bombing of North Vietnam in December 1972 that served to end the American presence there. The intensity of the scale of destruction affected the emotions of pilots and crew to the point of rebellion and sabotage.

Tom Wells[17] records bomber pilots going into moral shock at the scope of devastation they were causing and

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refusing to take their planes up because "a man has to answer to himself first." Members of flight crews would sabotage B-52 electronic equipment and neglected to arm bombs, and it was said that cheers rose from the ranks every time a pilot refused to take his plane up.[18]

No nation can withstand the phenomenon of its citizens taking a higher moral road than the state in the jurisdiction of affairs of state. When the military, that area that must suspend moral judgment and follow orders unequivocally, cannot or will not do so, then its all over. The state is faced with a Hobson's choice between stopping the war short of complete victory or systemic collapse. There is no viable alternative to an army other than the coercion of pure scientific reason without restraint in service to the garrison state, and coercion has never succeeded in holding back human aspirations.

Chapter I will thus trace the brief history of the Vietnam war and the anti-war movement before the emergence of The Vietnam Veterans Against the War, Inc. In essence, much of what followed the convergence and its impact on the narrowing of political and military options in Vietnam has been well documented. What is of greater importance was the military admission of internal collapse and virtual death of the U.S. Army in Vietnam by 1971.[19] Charles

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DeBenedetti notes the anti-war movement started as a small peace advocacy group in 1955, expanding into a few dozen organizations by 1960 to over 1200 a decade later.[20]

Colonel Heinl's admission of military disintegration in Vietnam arriving within a brief three and a half years after the entry of the VVAW into the anti-war movement in mid-1967 is worth noting as it supports my argument. Even more relevant is General Westmoreland's dating the decline of morale and the subsequent fraggings, desertions, refusals to go into the field and drug abuse to 1969, a brief two year interval from VVAW's entry into the antiwar movement. In Westmoreland's opinion, when the ground war ended and troops were sequentially returned home, no one wanted to be the last man to die in Vietnam for a lost cause.[21]

Thus, within the context of the emergence of VVAW and the disintegration and collapse of an army, an examination into conditions that impelled members of the military into opposition to the state is essential. In this, a personal interview with the founding president of the VVAW clarified the sociological foundations of its emergence.

Chapter II compares the profiles of those who were instrumental in establishing the first veteran and standing military opposition to a war the United States was actively

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pursuing and those who did not. The Vietnam Veterans Against the War, Inc. will be studied as to methods and internal dynamics inherent in expanding an original Vietnam veterans group of six founding members in mid-1967 into well over 20,000 veterans and standing military personnel in 1971.[22]

Chapter III will provide a statistical analysis of veteran participation or lack of such in veteran's organizations during the Vietnam period and after. Composites of who served in Vietnam, who died and class descriptions of these individuals and their reasons for affiliating or not with these organizations will be analyzed as key indicators for an affinity to or away from an association between idealism and rebellion. Levels of idealism are expected to correspond with quantitative data on veteran marginality, conformity and rebellion, based on an empirical examination of the findings.

Chapter IV will examine the internal and external dynamics of the VVAW phenomenon, contributions to the anti-war movement and their effect on delimiting political options in Vietnam. If we consider that the military as the nation's last line of defense, can be neutralized, rendered useless and ineffective as an extension of politics by other means through the intercession of an

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idealistic orientation, then Vietnam may be unique in that the real war was not between one of the most powerful nations in the world and a tiny nation with the scarce resources, as much as a collision between two powerful ideas stated earlier, pragmatism and idealism.

Pragmatically speaking, Vietnam should not have lasted more than a month, considering the technological arsenal, manpower and financial resources available to the U.S. when compared with the resources in that relatively backward peasant society. It may be indicative of American cultural mystification to think we could accomplish what France, another powerfully advantaged nation, had failed to do before us: crush the will of a determined people to maintain their national sovereignty against overwhelming numerical and technological superiority.

Chapter V will argue the limits of technology and the role of idealism in convergence and contradiction when technological innovations are programmed to execute a rational policy of orienting genocidal means to reach peaceful ends. In Vietnam, it proved counterproductive and served to alienate the soldier from his historical mission of compassion towards the innocent, magnanimity in victory, and nobility in exercising choice. Without the power to mitigate, alter or rechannel the impersonal dimensions of a

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pre-programmed technological agenda, there was no alternative to blinding his will into conformity, other than escaping into apathy or rebellion, both of which historically occurred in that battlefield.

The conclusion, Chapter VI, will be a comprehensive look at historical moments when the misuse of technology by the class in power resulted in an internal implosion leading to the eventual weakening of that empire, whether slave, feudal or capital, because when men in war are harnessed in service to machines, the moral reaction to war and its weaponry will enter into the realm of universal ideals far beyond the reach of venal reductionism.

In this evolution, technology has attempted, with increasing ineffectiveness, to compensate for the loss of human will and cooperation as wars have become devoid of a moral purpose. However, these various efforts at substituting the machine for the human element have historically been self-defeating. They have served to increase alienation to a level of rebellion that posed a direct challenge to the slave, feudal, and now technocratic society itself.

Within this theoretical frame, the Vietnam Veterans Against the War, Inc. represents the sociological evolution away from vulgar Marxist interpretation, Weber's national

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reductionistic theme, into a Durkheimian premise resting upon the social determining one's course of action and willingness to risk life. In this, society is the moral arbiter and the inspiration for self-sacifice and dedication to the collective. This has to transcend mere proclamation and requires a testing of courage. Within this framework, truth is arrived at on the battlefield.

At this juncture, perhaps the works of Antonio Gramschi and Georg Lukacs transcend Durkheim and are most applicable for dealing with the question of truth arrived at through struggle and courage. However, Jacques Ellul offers the critical evaluation of misguided attempts to replace human essence with technological advancements in his definition of technique as transcending technology into a "totality of methods rationally arrived at and having absolute efficiency in every field of human activity."[23]

From this we can trace the decline of the idealistic tradition in our culture from the strategic priorities which were paramount in World War I, on to the variables of national cohesion and mobilization which were the hallmarks of World War II, into the undeclared, ongoing third world war and the struggle for men's minds and spirit against material reductionism. In Vietnam we observe the idealist becoming increasingly troubled by a crisis of conscience to

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the point of refusing orders to return to duty. Others, as cited earlier, through overt opposition, sabotage and outright mutiny citing the legitimacy of a higher authority resisted from within the ranks of the U.S. military itself. Meanwhile, the equipment the men had to work with proved ineffective and, in some cases, useless.[24] They caused unnecessary deaths among soldiers who had to stop firing their weapon in order to take their jammed rifle apart to undo the damage.[25] Many more were killed by their own tanks and friendly fire.[26] In addition, ammunition distributed to ARVN forces on Monday found its way into Viet Cong hands by Friday to be used against American soldiers.[27]

It is within this frame of military disintegration built on the criminal irresponsibility of the military establishment to play fair with their men that led to a "what's going on here" mentality leading to distrust among those at the receiving end who could not believe that the army would knowingly place them in harm's way. This is critical to our sociological understanding why the VVAW was able to extend the role of the idealist as a catalyst for the transformation of social critic into sentinel activist.

Vietnam is unique in revealing that our material instruments of mass destruction that were supposed to lead to quick and decisive victory could not, and that

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corruption mandated miscalculations so that no military endeavor could provide the leverage to overcome a determined opponent. The American soldier had to battle internal mismanagement before he could go after the enemy. Throughout the mess, there was a certain euphoria in Washington resting on the belief that we were unstoppable, and that our awesome technology was invulnerable.

We could crush opposition by systematically upping the pressure until the enemy conceded. This may have been the logic for political decisions taking us to war; however, it was only a matter of time before size and power could be neutralized by intangible equivalences. The Viet Cong were adept at pungi traps (sharpened bamboo stakes that proved lethal), tunneling below major American installations, bicycles and low tech equipment while army planning utilized 60% of our forces in logistical areas and apportioned only 40% to defeat the enemy.[28]

They could fashion the tools of victory out of basic resources and no amount of high tech sophisticated weaponry could overcome idealistic will, because without it, there is only pragmatic cost benefit analysis based on utilitarian principles of self interest that don't trade well on the battlefield. The division of labor in highly industrialized nations may foster organic solidarity among

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its disparate members; however, the specialized nature of labor in increasing areas of necessity removes the creativity and independence of the imagination and limits tasks to little cells of expertise. Thus, an American soldier may be an artilleryman or an infantryman or a pilot, whatever, but he is never a master artisan of the entire trade. It is beyond the capability of modern warfare to go beyond your specialty. The Viet Cong guerilla was.

In this sense, the work of the anti-war movement in the coffee houses and areas adjacent to military bases bore fruit when stirrings of military discontent finally converged in the mid-1967 appearance of the Vietnam Veterans Against the War, Inc. (VVAW) and their open attempts to redefine a war in progress, a war they had supported, fought in and now opposed. Their opposition to the Vietnam war as the wrong war, in the wrong place, at the wrong time, with the wrong enemy fueled their belief that it could be ended swiftly by appealing to America's conscience, at a time when public support for the war was still strong. The process of educating to the restricted world of the technologically sophisticated meant instilling a sociological awareness of the warped paradigm produced by the scientific revolution.

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Thus educating the American to the objective conditions of his life could rebalance the tragic flaws was an idealistic VVAW premise that was to be seriously tested during the next few years. Thus, although they do affirm that they are pragmatists, their stated purpose of ending the war in Vietnam, not support it, and to further widen the field to prevent all unjust wars has an idealistic quixotic ring to it. It meant that ordinary members of the military were setting terms on conditional acceptance of state supremacy, and qualifying terms of military obedience to the state on a just war doctrine incorporating universal ideals of justice and the value of human life, all life.

These were serious state usurpations; universal idealism rests on personal qualitative decisions of right or wrong, while state imperatives function within the political realm of good or bad. The deep philosophical contradictions between these two obviously precluded synthesis or compromise. In this, Kohlberg's work on moral development, although flawed,[29] offers that idealism is a rare quality attained by few who successfully reach the sixth level of moral development where abstract universal principles are found. If valid, this could provide an explanation for the affinity between idealism and rebellion across class lines by comparing and analyzing VVAW members

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with other Vietnam veterans for sixth dimension attainment within their task orientations.

Within this framework, although Marx's class analysis is not negated, it is transcended through a higher idealistic commitment which appeals to no known class boundary. The absence of such idealism based on altruism concerns us when we consider that expansionist states devoid of this rare commodity must overcompensate with powerful technological improvisations as a poor substitute for human initiative. We can trace the course of military disaffection with the Vietnam war through the increase of technology (B-52s and artillery) to counterbalance this erosion. This led to an even greater inverse positioning of the human element into becoming mere appendages of impersonal machines.[30]

These powerful alterations were counterproductive. The war production business refined its techniques in delivering the marvels of modern warfare that were antithetical to the traditional role of the soldier. These weapons also meant streamlining the military into corporate standards of bureaucratic administration, interchangeable parts and cost efficient bottom line accounting implemented by Defense Secretary McNamara. These drastic alterations in the traditional task of the warrior ushered in

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individualism and destroyed the ethic of cooperation and honor. This superimposition of the managerial model over the professional officer corps led Gabriel[31] to note in 1985 that "the American military, at least over the last 15 years, has failed to meet the test by which armies have historically been measured." The test he speaks of is battle.

The deformity goes farther back than 1970; we can look to Korea, another undeclared war. The North Korean invasion of South Korea parallels the north Vietnamese excursions over the DMZ. National interest meant expanding into ever widening territorial warm-up exercises in the "non-war" Korean police action.[32] Both conflicts failed to achieve their battlefield objectives after "the application of enormous rates of firepower delivered by highly complex systems that simply did not succeed in breaking the will of the enemy to resist. Like Vietnam, Korea produced high levels of alienation and apathy, but unlike Vietnam, did not lead to rebellion.

Something else happened in Korea that referenced Vietnam; it was the first time in American history that our army failed to win a clear victory. Peace talks between China, North Korea and the United States would extend over years, as they did between the U.S. and Vietnam, while

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soldiers kept dying.[33] In this earlier parallel, as well, Korean veterans would be denied their victory parade and Washington monument, but not their devalued status.[34]

The comparison with Vietnam is all the more remarkable in the doctrine of waging a limited war through unlimited means in both Asian states. These types of war do not allow for the combatants to widen the scope of battle, to take the fight to the enemy; it confines combatants and non-combatants into an intense area of punishment that ultimately becomes a slaughterhouse stripped of all illusions and glory. If Vietnam produced a military crisis, the seeds were sown in Korea. Although the pain inflicted upon the Korean veterans by the enemy was severe, the indifference of their home public, army reports of complicity with the enemy after capture, press coverage of standard deviations from the national character, and concern with the loss of honor from congressional quarters were far more painful than any injury the enemy could inflict.[35] In both wars, the men who acquitted themselves bravely and well were held responsible for the politically designed wars that could not be won.

What differed between these two wars is the absence of protest to the Korean War (or muted protest at best), the length of time each war lasted and the difference in

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resolutions. There were no massive outpourings of dissent over Korea as there was with Vietnam. Korea lasted a brief three years, our commitment in Vietnam some thirty years. Finally, we ended just where we started, at the 38th parallel in Korea while Vietnam was left to fall decisively in Communist hands.

Thus we see in Korea and Vietnam a political task that went beyond the ability of the military to achieve, given the alteration of the military from a traditional to a business orientation following the end of World War II.[36] The alteration into economic goals contradicts the objectives of one of the principles incorporated within the classic just war doctrine, that it has to be fought to a quick conclusion with the least possible number of lives lost. American wars had become, contrary to international law, an instrument of national policy.[37]

On both occasions, the technological dimensions of war were as severe to both groups of Americans who fought in Korea and Vietnam; the intensity of war in those two countries were unlike any we had ever waged. The design and implementation of those wars were negotiated far from the battlefields by men who never experienced the effects of their policies or indecisions, thus political stalemate may have been realized in sanitized board rooms by men who went

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home at night and lived normal lives at the expense of unseen, unheard, unimportant and unsung young men who suffered and died in those politically paralyzed fields for reasons that had nothing to do with national honor and integrity. These men never appeared to argue questions of moral virtue, but only for the merits of political necessity.

Thus, Korea is mentioned here only as a neglected opportunity for examining the normative variations between what has become a double standard of public and private morality. By focusing on technological alterations of war as fertile ground for the type of alienation that led to the eventual collapse of military will in Vietnam, we are aware that private morality rests on normative codes, mainly subjective in nature, that are instilled on an individual basis, thus are subordinate to decisions that often do not transcend personal judgments of right or wrong.[38] Public morality, however, presupposes that decisions are made on utilitarian considerations of the greater good, thus embody collective power over and above personal evaluations of right or wrong conduct; under this interpretation, the state can never be qualitatively right or wrong, only quantitatively good or bad.[39] The distinction is not black or white; Hobbesian argument

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supports both public morality (in that there can be no other authority above the state) and private morality (which holds everyone morally responsible for their actions and that individuals have the duty to appoint themselves moral guardians for the collective, meaning over the state when the social contract is broken).[40] These dialectical opposites became polarized somewhere between 1950 and 1965 as our political institution increasingly rejected the ethic of private morality and claimed preservation of the state as the only morality, apparently on the basis that it is no longer government's business to protect and preserve life, but rather to promote a culture of death.[41]

The anxiety produced by the latter claim rests on the substance of what constitutes national interest itself. Under the Just War Doctrine, self-defense is the basis for waging war; under utilitarian reformulation, it is the greater good.[42] Within a market economy with its increasing emphasis on free trade, military utilization to further corporate expansion at the expense of the social good is a given.

The distinction for reasons of state is clear when considering that placing the economy on a permanent war footing[43] has resulted in exhilaration among new world order devotees but anxiety among purists who see military

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interventions to advance U.S. economic policy since the end of World War II as responsible for the increase in a militaristic state and the steady erosion of democratic privileges. This has fueled rising levels of public cynicism over state encroachments into democratic rights and privileges guaranteed under the Constitution and has helped to foster the view that government no longer responds to the wishes of its constituents.[44]

The uneasiness may rest on the resilience of political realism as the major political philosophy. The art of playing in the big league of international political intrigue has meant a succession of elected administrations that are remarkably similar, where previous policies endure and remain constant across each elective phalanx, despite voter disapproval of painful policies of austerity and Social Darwinism. These patterns are not new; however, their permanence in the American political scene appears to have contributed to the "cynicism and even contempt with which so many people view our political institutions and leaders" that is credited by former Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara as one of the main reasons for breaking his 30-year silence over political mistakes in Vietnam.[45]

Glancing backward toward Vietnam, one can discern the transformative dynamics of war as windows of opportunity

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that impelled ethical introspection into action, as with the VVAW. Historically, veteran dissent had surfaced many times before the VVAW phenomenon arose. There were any number of attempts to organize veterans to petition government to address poverty,[46] bonuses,[47] and other equally valid issues. For the most part, these were brief and bruising, addressed economic issues and disappeared after their demands were met or were neutralized by state use of excessive force,[48] until the Vietnam War.

The war introduced a new sociological dimension to veteran complaints; this time they organized to demand a war they were actively engaged in to end and for their government to be the moral agent to do so. It wasn't until the debate entered this frame that veterans protesting government policies on war formed a critical mass. Although inroads had been made in unionizing some army personnel and to correct class abuses,[49] traditional military loyalty had never been questioned, much less the possibility of conditional obedience or designating your country a criminal state. Until the VVAW.

Thus, even within the turbulence of the anti-war movement, the VVAW appearance was a significant entry. Many VVAWers had personally experienced the war the movement at home was denouncing and many more had suffered

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psychologically from the accumulation of guilt occasioned by involvement in those moral infractions.[50] They confirmed U.S. complicity in human rights abuses that were routinely dismissed by authorities as "Commie propaganda." Their guerilla theatre reenactments exposed violations of The Land Rules of Warfare agreed to at the Hague and Geneva conventions following World War I,[51] and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaimed by the United Nations after World War II,[52] neither of which were signed by the United States.

Although a comparatively small group, they introduced a military segment into the protest and an immediacy that was contagious. The effectiveness of their strategy to educate the American public on their government's complicity in atrocities committed in Vietnam was ample reason for viewing their overt dissent as aiding and abetting the enemy at best to traitors engaged in an undeclared war on their government on the home front at worst. Their effectiveness is evident in the intensity of FBI surveillance initiated by its director J. Edgar Hoover in an effort to link them to the Communist Party to undermine their legitimacy.[53]

Although credit for ending the war must be spread among many individuals and groups, VVAW participation has

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to be considered a major contribution in that endeavor. Ending the Vietnam war was their immediate concern, but so was ending all unjust wars and returning their country to a moral place in a community of nations. However messianic that may appear, they were not your proverbial wild-eyed revolutionaries, they believed the innate goodness of the American people would return the country to its moral standards once they were made aware of the political facts of life.

The VVAW phenomenon is incredible in ways other than moral renaissance. Their emergence had a sobering effect on political control of war as a means of extending economic zones of self-interest. The rise of the modern state and its base in political realism has led to a sweeping away of just or unjust wars as so much sentimental garbage, without any basis under the law. Under those terms, war could be considered an outrage, but never a crime. In rebuttal, the VVAW message was that their country had committed war crimes in Vietnam, thus was culpable under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Ironically, these were men sent to fight in Vietnam; they returned to square off with their government over the absence of morally defensible justification for starting the war, for continuing it or starting any other like it.

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The convergence of civilian and military protest groups certainly assumed major sociological dimensions that lessened political and military options in Vietnam. The leadership of this country found it difficult to pursue the war unilaterally, as evidenced in both the increasing demands at home to end the war and the breakdown of the U.S. army in Vietnam. Increasing technological pressure was the only alternative, and this was the area of bitter controversy and greatest danger. The intensive use of technology to compensate for the loss of human agency only served to alienate human willingness to serve and sacrifice. The rising casualty rates vividly underscored the futility of the policy: it seemed to have almost no impact on an enemy that still fought with everything they had.[54]

There are two views that could possibly explain political irrationality of doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results; externally, as the war failed to destroy the will of the Vietnamese people to resist, it called for the use of terrifying weaponry that was morally indefensible as its only function was to kill more innocent civilians than combatants, and, internally, it led to a misguided attempt to destroy dissent at home through the misapplication of technology

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paid for by public taxation in service to a beleaguered state increasingly out of touch with its polity.

These justify the increased use of any force necessary to conclude hostilities as based on an altruistic avoidance of further suffering and death. The first view holds that, externally, the state was not to blame; the Viet Cong were responsible for the unintended slaughter by buffering themselves with the innocent.[55] Internally, they saw dissenters and protesters preventing an early political resolution to the war by jeopardizing political unanimity on Vietnam thus certifying the need for weapons of mass destruction as a military necessity.

Whatever the point of view, the conflict did serve to focus public attention on questionable activities and policies relating to unpopular foreign entanglements, such as Vietnam, and to a demand for stricter review on government. In addition, government surveillance of dissenters at home was temporarily curbed. What was determined during the Vietnam anti-war protests was the placing of brakes on a runaway war against a third world nation and a rechanneling of government away from inopportune international tests of will for awhile.

The intensity of the war may have oscillated according to presidents though its circularity never did. From

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Eisenhower, who advised using whatever resources we had to stop Communism in Southeast Asia when he left office, to Kennedy whose bitter experiences on Cuba and Berlin foreshadowed the escalation in Vietnam, to Johnson who was caught between the Scylla of winning the war and the Charybdis of calming internal insecurities with a synchronous war on poverty, to Nixon and Kissinger who raised the level of political realism to an all time American high and more than any of the others contributed to public cynicism, to Gerald Ford who had the good sense to stop the meltdown by ending the war, they marched lockstep into one of the most senseless wars we have fought, against a nation and its population a fraction of our size, without the resources of men, money or materiel that we commanded, and who only wanted what we had fought for in our revolutionary war.

This is not to say such men were evil, bought off by special interests, or did not love their country; it is to say that they were locked into a political philosophy that refused to follow time-honored precepts of nobility in war and fairness to people who questioned their policies intensely, because fairness is a sign of weakness and that would send the wrong signals to the international community.[56] Throughout the war there was an appalling

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lack of awareness by the power brokers in Washington who were distanced from the pain they were causing to ordinary people who had to fight their wars, fund their follies, and suffer under the effects of misguided decisions that raised the misery index by a continued, never ending spiral of mistaken priorities.

That legacy has been costly; it deepened divisions in this country that still remain, led to a heightened mistrust of government, a loss of faith in basic institutions, debased the currency and reinforced a nihilistic perception of government as the enemy of the people. Current subjective quiverings are not surprising given the increasing frequency to exclude public participation in political decisions in lieu of political secrecy and closure of debate despite Constitutional guarantees to the contrary.

Within this context, a political system that engages in war has to be be able to justify its actions in order to avoid intensive moral evaluations based on individual conscience that could impact its authority to govern. Because war is a serious social endeavor and raises all sorts of havoc within national and international communities, it should not be initiated by slide rule approximations underlying imperial designs legitimized by

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unreliable evidence. Unless the conflict already has some moral basis for its existence, that constitutes a criminal act.

As we see from Jan Barry's act of conscience and the 20,000 plus veterans who flocked to the VVAW banner in a little under four years, nothing galvanizes ordinary people into action orientations as swiftly as the transformative dynamics of war itself. Under these pressures, it is in the interest of the state to conclude hostilities as soon as possible, in as just a manner as prescribed within international conventions and not to play political games with peoples' lives. The essential state priority during the Vietnam War was to stop political blockage by neutralizing internal dissent before it reached crisis proportions. They failed to contain the unrest or to neatly deactivate the diverse groups of anti-war activists according to game plans or probabilities played out on a maze of computers. The policy dictated from Nixon's Washington was that if internal and external opposition could not be discredited, disarmed or channeled into acceptable patterns of accommodation, then it would have to be addressed with extreme prejudice.[57]

In Vietnam this meant a punishing scale of technological damage far beyond what could be humanely

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defended. At home, the list of illegal activities under FBI and other government agencies towards dissenting citizens included invasions of privacy, curbing of civil rights, legal harassment, and economic blackmail.[58] This proved extremely counterproductive since wars are difficult to fight on two fronts, especially if one of them is on the home front.

In Sophocles' tragedy Antigone, the classic confrontation between state directives and conscience serves as an enduring testimonial to the power of universal ideals over traditional obedience to the state, as reflected in Antigone's decision to bury her treasonous brothers in defiance of a morally unacceptable state decree not to do so. It is at a much later date in Vietnam that this very human dilemma was echoed in similar ethical stands taken by ordinary people opposed to what they viewed as misguided state policies.

In sum, the bruising confrontations that surfaced in the United States between supporters of political realism and the anti-war protesters is nothing new. This conflict has surfaced on many other occasions. Woodrow Wilson was faulted for U.S. isolationism after World War I as the cause for the rise of fascism in Europe leading to an irrevocable World War II. The argument between these two

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philosophies is rooted in whether man is inherently savage rendering violence immutable and the state a necessity or whether man is inherently good, nobly striving for perfection. The pragmatic answer, and the locus of polarity, is that morality and its stress on limiting violence has no place in the political arena which is governed by rational self-interest unhampered by weakening concessions to conscience. On this basis, the two positions are patently irreconcilable.

In Vietnam, the misuse of technology, the mistakes in strategy and tactics, the attrition of a seriously flawed war of limited action, the ill-advised actions against Vietnamese civilians, the superimposition of assembly line military rotations, managerially imposed body counts, and secretive political misrepresentations served as any number of highly volatile ingredients. Added to an increasingly hostile climate for demonstrators exercising their right to be disappointed in a system they viewed as having lost moral legitimacy, the outcome was predictable.

These combinations afford a rare insight into the powerful workings of conscience and critical thinking that emerged during that time. We can examine the decisions impelling courses of action by people when confronted with moral choices and can expect these to emerge during

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occasions of serious moral breaches. The results of these choices are still evident today; families were torn apart, friends estranged; loyalties strained; and even with the passage of 25 years, we have still not acquired the maturity to understand differences between acts that are avoidable or those that are inescapable. It is within the area of inescapable acts that the need to acquit oneself honorably clashes with the necessity of political realism that expects men to act dishonorably for reasons of state.

There has to be a separation between honor and expediency. As Andy Stapp noted during the Vietnam war period "that some citizens seemed more outraged at draft-card burning than at a Government that harmed women and children with napalm."[59]

Far more serious is the reinterpretation of the basic constitutional obligation for Congress to declare war in the old-fashioned way by a slow and silent period of executive drift towards conducting war policy without democratic checks and balances. Even today, this nation appears unable or unwilling to return to its constitutional form; no voice of any substance is raised for the removal of barriers to executive whimsies that commit American troops to a supranational NATO or UN mandates and control. The argument of who takes this country to war dates back to

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our founding fathers; Jefferson holding a conservative view of Congress having the principal power to declare war, and Hamilton's distinction based on war as the means to obtain great ends of state. The Hamiltonian view has prevailed, still subject, however, to moral restraints.

It isn't until after World War II that political realism finally gained an unrestricted ascendancy under the Truman administration into General Eisenhower's term in office and continued into the Korean war period producing additional critical debilitating effects in the loss of soldier morale, reaching crisis proportions in Vietnam where the military ultimately collapsed. Despite the negative track record, these trends have not been reversed, only more successfully concealed in the post-Vietnam era through collaboration with the military and the media.

Such concealment reflects a materialistic reduction of war beginning at the weapons level where mass destruction is stressed over traditional methods of mobility and deployment. Again, managerial conceptions take priority over a traditional sense of esprit de corps and amoral conduct submerges military honor. Henry Kissinger, one of the major architects of the policy of political realism since the end of World War II, is in large part responsible for the merging of technology, managerial sciences and

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scientific knowledge with the military war machine. We witness the removal of all limits on U.S. intervention in any part of the world.

Implicit in this transformation is the north/south split between first and third world nations on economic disparities and the highly privileged position of the affluent northern nations to expect political conformity from the less industrially advanced nations.[60] Such power, however, is illusionary; it lacks a qualitative dimension thus inevitably leads to self defeat, as witnessed by the collapse of the most quantitative intelligence apparatus ever devised in Vietnam and the failure of technology to attain the political objective. We note, as well, that the destruction of the Iraqi army, the removal of Hussein and the occupation of Baghdad eluded American grasp. Then, too, we left Somalia at the first drop of American blood.

Kissinger's perception that only the strong are capable of ruling because virtue is on the side of reality wedded to power, fails to allow for the power of ideals that reside in the vices of freedom, justice and harmony.[61] In his understanding, technology has no conscience and can be depended upon to do what humans find unthinkable, thus only the strong prevail.[62] That is why

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Vietnam still haunts the American conscience. Such thinking crystallized in the lack of restraint utilized by a succession of American political leaders to subdue a tiny nation into their ideological imperatives.

When absolute force failed to produce the anticipated result, the unparalleled destructive capacities of science and technology were leveled by an increasingly frustrated political establishment that could only equate the destructive capacity of their technology with the impulse to compel submission of the enemy will.[63] These actions served to produce an outburst of anger and opposition at home that still echoes and resonates 25 years after, untold numbers of Americans who cannot trust their government, and has to carefully evaluate every military action in terms of overkill to compensate for a nagging doubt on the loyalty of a mercenary military.

The necessity of gaining absolute control through scientific knowledge is one of the fallacies fostered by our cultural dependency on technological determinism. We see the swing away from undependable human agency in lieu of unflawed technological substitutes. Although perfectly utile, this purposively rational development carries long range social implications. Human will and courage, not technology, determine the outcome of conflict. Despite

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the claims put forth by Bruce Ellis in Brute Force, it is seldom the most technologically endowed nations that prevail, but those that encourage the highest degree of will and courage in their warriors[64], a theme echoed by Hoopes.[65]

Technology has thus increasingly replaced historical reliance on human agency in war by substituting science and empirical logic for human passion and its unpredictability. The effect of such alteration has made wars increasingly savage, transcending former ethical limitations on innocents, however, have not rendered wars decisive in the materialistic struggle to subdue human negation. The need to win by any means, a business value, has become greater than the need to win honorably, a soldier's value.

Those inherent contradictions fueled human intangibles of will and morality in the anti-war protest that reacted intensely with each increasing political application of brute force to compel the enemy to accept defeat. The outpouring of disbelief and massive reaction from the home front on these moral breaches did not escape the attention of the front line soldier aware of a growing doubt on technological dependencies in warfare. Questions on the efficiency of advanced war machinery on which American world power rested and the wisdom of its unlimited use on

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"non-humans" appear to have had consequences far beyond theories of failed socialization practices implicit in the loss of his traditional conformity to authority.

Attention turned to duly constituted authority itself within deeper questions of waging technological war leading, in many instances, to a severe crisis of conscience and a failure to hold the warrior class to its traditional task. The demystification of technology by those who are most intimate with its limitations can impel resurgent human agency and intervention, if one is to judge by the Vietnam phenomenon.

We see this in the World War I strategic conceptions of war in which the Allies believed the concept of a naval blockade would be decisive, it was not. Parallel German material fixations assumed that massive artillery and the submarine would be decisive in war, they were not. In reality, both material themes collapsed under Petain's idealistic utilization of shock troops, infiltration techniques, and personal contact with the enemy which succeeded in breaking four years of stalemated trench warfare.

In World War II, the belief was held that strategic bombing and the massive buildup of American equipment were to play decisive roles. In actuality, it was the

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willingness of the Russian soldier to expend his blood which succeeded in tieing down 83% of the German army in Europe[66] while idealistic American shock troops enduring the greatest bloodletting of their history proved to be the decisive factor in the South Pacific and Asia.

These human lessons were lost in Korea in an unknown war whose warnings of human failings in Doolittle's work[67] were largely ignored, and led to the unpreparedness for an ultimate disaster in Vietnam. It was in Vietnam where the fallacy of the material base of our military policies in strategic, conventional and irregular warfare was finally broken when the military itself balked at the automated killing fields that resembled a butcher's assembly line more than the Durkheimian standard of the sacred.

As such, the Vietnam War was a compromised political venture based on flawed judgments and outdated concepts cemented to a my country right or wrong mentality. It was the longest and one of the most unpopular wars in our history, surpassing the War of 1812 and the Civil War, and has had far more serious consequences for the nation. Although as passionate, the deep internal divisions created during the War of 1812 and the Civil War pale in comparison to the intensity of the opposition to Vietnam. In 1812 the

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impressment of American seamen into British service offered a firm moral basis for going to war and in 1864 there were solid moral imperatives against slavery that served to legitimate the four years of incredible internecine slaughter.

There are many examples to draw upon to show this society's natural antipathy to war and sending their young to experience its ultimate horror, perhaps to die. They tend to quiet once a firm moral reason is established. The bitter debate prior to World War I centering on isolation versus helping our allies defeat the Hun silenced once the Lusitania was torpedoed and sunk by a German submarine with a high loss of American lives.

The classic argument arose again prior to World War II, but was stilled after the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor on December 7th, 1941. American culture necessitates compelling moral reasons for going to war, at least until the end of World War II; it allows us to roll up our sleeves and finish the job before we return again to our historical detachment. However, in the aftermath of World War II, there were circumstances that would not permit it - the Russian and Chinese communists. Their godlessness provided us with a never ending, built-in moral line of credit altering our political and military posture

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from defensive to offensive, from passive to aggressive international world class actors.

Since World War II when we were attacked at Pearl Harbor, every military action we have been drawn into has been carried out under executive directive. This raises questions on the authenticity of our involvements and the viability of our political institution. There are well-defined constitutional imperatives to meet before committing our nation to war and subverting these provisions appears to represent an increasing executive contempt for addressing the canons of a just war or democratic constraints on absolute power. There are differing versions of the Just War Doctrine;[68] these general forms of moral and ethical constraints on war were shaped in the Hague and Geneva conventions and are based on Aquinian metaphysics rooted in St. Augustine's thought and further refined by Hugo Grotius.[69] These have their foundations in earlier Greek and Roman concepts of when and how to wage an honorable war.

They formed the ethical foundation for proper international conduct between belligerents during periods of conflict and are arguably of major import, given the present state of technology to effect total planetary destruction many times over since the scope of warfare and

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military options now available are limited only to the degree that we can reduce far more than an enemy and his populated areas to rubble in the amount of time it takes to press a button. Ecocide of this magnitude concerns everyone, thus the necessity to adhere to a just war doctrine, but which among the many doctrines are we to pursue?

This level of power also asks three ethical questions: must we kill millions of people and destroy their society in order for our culture to survive; what do we do about those who are left; and, ultimately, what is the cost and benefit to ourselves? The first two questions are rather irrelevant given the dual character of nuclear warfare as destructive of both enemy and defender; we are left with the third, rationally preventing the unthinkable from happening through utilitarian analysis.

Left to its own devices, political realism extending from utilitarianism has added far more danger to human life than the question of humanism with its "weaknesses." Our present position cannot be understood without a look back at a brief history of the art of warfare and its alteration from altruism to base materialism. Innovations from the one-on-one type of primitive combat experienced in the early days of human conflict have been altered through

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scientific innovations and technological enrichments until today its human creators are dwarfed by their creations, stunned by its possibilities, and numbed by the sheer efficiency of its awesome power.

The step by step progressive reversal of man in charge of machine to becoming its servant can be measured in the paradigmatic shift towards rational scientific practicality from the former feudal universe of chivalry and honor. Consequences have included the distancing of humanistic evaluations concerning the utilization of weapons of destruction beyond a certain point to the pragmatic utilization of all scientific means available to a desired end and beyond.

The administrative practices that attach to technological usage are less visible but are the most serious consequences of our postmodern world and are impersonal in nature, attaching no accountability for the Procrustean necessities. The disappearance of individual culpability and the appearance of collective non-guilt has been the hallmark of state ascendancy during much the 18th, 19th and 20th centuries, increasing in brutality till the 20th century when technology contributed to the enormous loss of lives in the most violent century in recorded history.[70]

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Within this new frame, war has gone far beyond the encircle, besiege and starve tactics of former times when only those involved in the action were witnesses to human injury. It has been replaced by instrumental applications of available technology widening its reach over societies, continents and beyond. Today, we have extended our technological reach even farther than global contexts and civilizations into intergalactic space itself with no qualms.

Thus the expansion of political policy cannot be conducted in the open; it would conflict with the introduction of sophisticated levels of technology that provide instant exposure to the human cost of war missing in previous engagements. The abjection that only soldiers were susceptible to has widened to include distant civilians into spectactor roles. The Vietnam War, in this sense, provided television viewers with instant impressions of carnage, body bags and much of the untidy aspects of fighting for one's country. It was spectacle, thus newsworthy.

In essence, controlling territory and siege tactics, as we had utilized in previous wars, was not possible in Vietnam because the concept of guerilla warfare is based on fluidity, not structured warfare. The enemy appeared, hit

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and ran, disappeared back into nowhere. Pitched battles were rare and when they happened, Americans distinguished themselves well. However, the primary strategy was still cemented in past battles where controlling the management of the battlefield was standard procedure, even when that was no longer applicable and led to huge casualties. According to Gabriel and Savage, we remained an army of amateurs.[71]

This new type of warfare implies there will be no limits to the battlefield; in Vietnam the entire country and neighboring environs was the battlefield. As such, the introduction of the advanced weapons and strategy required to counter the fluidity of guerilla operations rendered the entire country a death trap for civilians and combatants alike. The disturbing questions that surfaced in the decision to use terrifying weapons in an across the board all-out approach designed to break the will of the enemy to resist, without offering full protection to the soldiers who occupied the same field of battle, were not answered. The effects of Napalm, Agent Orange, chemical defoliants, carpet bombing of entire areas of Vietnam, and free fire zones on civilian and military alike fueled perceptions that political decisions were being made in Washington by men of a privileged class who were not personally affected

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or hampered by the escalating commitment of force or resources to achieve all objectives, at any cost. The alteration from historical Clauswitzian aspects of war as contained violence lasting only as long as it took the enemy to cede and obey was not relevant under these conditions. Thus, the introduction of high tech warfare in Vietnam served to render his principles of war obsolete opening a return to the savage forms of primitive warfare that had existed from the dawn of history until the end of the 17th century. Only in this instance, the transformation was in the increasing amount of impersonality between killer and killed as technology permitted the luxury of distancing the technician from the results of his action.[72] Thus, with high altitude bombing conducted by impersonal professionals, there were no safe havens in Vietnam, no noncombatants, only the highly efficient technology and the vulnerable humans who suffered under it - friend and foe alike.

However, unlike the later Desert Shield operation, there was an abundance of information available to public access indicating an opportunity, at least, to argue the moral basis of a backward society to exist and determine what we were doing there within a margin of informed consent. The informed consent window closed after the

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Vietnam War when the political lessons learned there were translated into the rationing of information witnessed in the restricted news offerings from the Gulf War presented through official government channels in Atari concept fashion. The new staged spectacle was orchestrated by the non-dead only as reminders that the war was antiseptic and sanitized, unfelt therefore unreal and perfectly acceptable. It was a perfect war where only the enemy died.

Vietnam was not the first failure of political realism. We can point again to Korea, another undeclared war, that ultimately ended in a stalemate after high casualty rates. The lessons not learned are 1) that technology stops where manpower alters the balance, as witnessed by the decisive intervention of human waves of Chinese military in North Korea that determined the outcome of that war, and 2) there are limits to technological options. The discovery of known parameters where the most advanced technology cannot be unleashed without equally dire consequences to the users as well, in effect a zero-sum game where no one can win and everyone can lose.

In none of these instances has it been necessary to go beyond presidential decree. To echo Hannah Arendt testifying before a Congressional inquiry into Vietnam, she

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noted that when a nation goes to war, it implies it will play fair.[73] Inversely, it would explain why that nation is not prepared to follow established rules of conduct in warfare, thus finds it more convenient to avoid the ethical constraints, meager as they are, provided by international rules of the game. Time and again, we see a political decision to win at all costs.

The danger in this direction is that it poses a possible lack of correctives for those elected officials isolated from their society by foreign interests, administrative staffs or concerned economic entities that have their own agendas not always in concert with the public good. It is easy in this age of unlimited power, delivered across the planet in minutes, to beg the issue of time for arriving at conclusions that affect state imperatives that cannot wait for educating the public to all the facts. Decisions are quick and reflexive, although explanations follow, they are too late to affect the original decision. The cynicism this fosters is only matched by public consternation that its democratic privileges are being abolished or circumvented by those who lead without the necessity of caring if anyone follows.

In hindsight it was folly for Washington not to level with the people; ultimately, it was the loss of trust in

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government that contributed to our military collapse in Vietnam. In this sense, the slow erosion of constitutional protections over time became routinized with very little notice or clamor from the majority of Americans. That is until the war unraveled and the glaring inconsistencies became an educational task for the peace movement.

Thus, the dissent during the Vietnam War cut across class demarcations into the political arena and carried the issue directly to the public on moral and ethical premises, the mainstay of cultural strength. The student protest with strong objective intellectual currents rooted in critical thinking may have been considered a children's crusade, however, even McNamara admits his family was deeply affected by the war and his participation in the war[74] that is said to have led to strained relations with his children, especially with his son, Craig, who was part of the student protest movement.

Religious groups provided the subjective thread "thou must not kill," with the added injunction "on a class basis." The veterans and standing military personnel cemented these disparate groups into a historical phenomenon based on no less than the immorality of dispassionately destroying a tiny nation in technological cold blood.

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Thus rebellion in the ranks appears to have been assured when non-negotiable questions of personal responsibility arose on the increasing use and misuse of scientific warfare in the pursuit of the Vietnam war and could not be answered reasonably within a moral frame. In this, contradicting the state's right to use all force necessary to attain its ends, brought the question of technological violence into closer focus since it became necessary to reinvigorate the moral and ethical ethos of a society to its own involvement in the immorality, even at the risk of inviting a severe political backlash. Moral education requires a high level of idealistic commitment resting on deep convictions of individual conscience based on principles that are inseparable from a military's historical task.

In this sense, if Vietnam was the arena for a historical convergence of idealism and rebellion that led to an American crisis of state legitimacy, then the VVAW is a most unusual unit of analysis. If their deontological assumption was that each individual has a human right not to be treated in cruel and inhumane ways, and this reflection was not in total harmony with the prevailing doctrine of state supremacy, then duty to obey orders at the cost of engaging in morally destructive actions carried

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consequences far beyond the ability of the state to overcome.

Even today, it is difficult to understand how an unbroken string of leaders and their advisers believed a war, any war, could be waged by a bitterly divided nation. Either blinding arrogance or supreme ignorance were operative. Towards the former, history offers many examples of offensive exhibitions of assumed superiority leading to tragic miscalculation; for the latter, we point to Schopenhauer's reflection that reason will always be overcome by invincible ignorance. Both deny utility.

Perhaps what we see emerging from the Vietnam war is that monistic utilitarianism has lost its legitimacy and universal principles based on idealistic commitment of humans as ends in themselves has replaced it in a very silent revolution. Witness the disenchantment with political realism and the pressure to return to community-level participation in government. In this, ideals may travel through predictable avenues with sometimes unpredictable results. Thus the Vietnam Veterans Against the War may ultimately represent not the lost generation of soldiers since World War II, but the best: a new breed of warrior who achieved the greater victory out of defeat.

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FOOTNOTES

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15 Gibson, The Perfect War, 80-81.

16 Robert Jay Lifton, Home From the War Neither Victims nor Executioners (New York: Basic Books, 1970), 109, 124, 203-04.

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19 Col. Robert D. Heinl, Jr., "The Collapse of the Armed Forces," Armed Forces Journal, June 7, 1971, 31.

20 Charles DeBenedetti, Charles Chatfield, Assisting Author. An American Ordeal: TheAntiwar Movement of the Vietnam Era. (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1990), 2.

21 General William C. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1976), 359. Westmoreland credits idleness following the 1969 Nixon troop withdrawals led to morale problems in Vietnam as men began to doubt the American resolve. I disagree; the emptiness of purpose relative to new lethal forms of technological warfare under remote control, rendered their efforts null and void. Impersonal supervisory management (officers & technocrats) had set the stage long before tempers reached the boiling point. Westmoreland hasn't a clue to the dimensions of harm caused by human devaluation or to their reluctance to accept substitution with good-natured savoir faire. The shift in importance from the point man that won wars to remote supervisory staff playing computer games undermined the warrior's will and destroyed an army. Why die when you can send in a B-52?

22 John Helmer, Bringing the War Home: The American Soldier in Vietnam (New York.London: Oxford University Press, 1974), 88-89.

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[23] Jacques Ellul, The Technological Society. Translated from the French by John Wilkerson. With an Introduction by Robert K. Merton. (United States of America: Vintage Books, a Division of Random House, 1964), xxiii-xxvi.

[24] William Shawcross, Sideshow: Kissinger, Nixon and the Destruction of Cambodia (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1979), 291.

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[28] Lt. Colonel Edward L. King (Ret.), The Death of an Army: A Pre-Mortem (New York: Saturday Review Press, 1972), 130.

[29] Lawrence Kohlberg, Essays on Moral Development, Vol. I. (San Francisco, Cambridge, Hagerstown, New York. Philadelphia, Mexico City, Sao Paulo, Sydney: Harper & Row, 1981).

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[31] Gabriel and Savage Crisis in Command, 17-24.

[32] Richard Severo and Lewis Milford, The Wages of War: When America's Soldiers Come Home-From Valley Forge to Vietnam. (New York, London, Toronto, Sydney and Tokyo: Simon and Schuster, 1990), 318.

[33] Ibid., 319

[34] Ibid., 344. For 35 years after the end of the Korean War Washington did not have a monument or honor the men who died or served in Korea.

[35] Ibid., 317, 327.

[36] This is covered in Gabriel and Savage Crisis in Command, 19; Gibson, The Perfect War; and Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier (New York: Free Press, 1971). Alterations within the military from professionalism to careerism and the trend from expressive to instrumental rationality lessens military ability to remain the last line of defense because the new cultural norms mandate a higher priority of individual over societal survival.

[37] Robert L. Holmes, On War and Morality (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1989), 9, 62-63.

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The national interest on occasion mandates going to war without any direct threat to national security; in that sense, war becomes preventive, not reactive, and acting within a perceived moral frame has had and will have international repercussions.

38 Ibid., 54. A theme from Machiavelli in which private morality governs the conduct of individual interactions and public morality their conduct in areas of public life, such as government, business, religion, etc.

39 Feliks Gross, (Ideologies, Goals, and Values With foreword by Don Martindale (Westport, Connecticut. London, England: Greenwood Press, 1984), 6.

40 Holmes, On War and Morality, 52-53. A Hobbesian theme in which the state has no higher authority above it and where self-preservation is the only rule.

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42 Holmes, On War and Morality, 96-97

43 Melman, Permanent War Economy.

44 "The Alienated Voters: Why are we so Angry?" U.S. News & World Report, 30-43.

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46 Severo, Wages of War, 72-76.

47 Ibid., 267-69.

48 Ibid., 72, 274.

49 Andy Stapp, Up Against the Brass: The Amazing Story of the Fight to Unionize the United States Army (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1970).

50 Lifton, Home From the War, 99-113.

51 Edited With an Introduction and Commentary by W. Michael Reisman and Chris T. Antoniou, The Laws of War (New York: Vintage Books, a Division of Random House, Inc., 1994), 36-37, 356-57.

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52 DPU-85-41951, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (New York: United Nations department of Public Information, February 1986).

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54 Al Santoli and the Vietnam Veterans of America, Everything We Had (U.S.A.: Ballantine, 1982), 177-78.

55 Comment from a survey respondent, "the VC would hide among the civilians because they knew the U.S. won't kill civilians;" Holmes, On War and Morality, 105.

56 Ibid., 250.

57 Wells, The War Within, 326-327.

58 Ibid., 276. For further corroboration, G. Wesley Swearingen's work, FBI Secrets: An Agent's Expose (Boston, MA: South End Press, 1995), offers an indepth look at FBI less than legal operations against activists and anti-war protesters.

59 Stapp, Up Against the Brass, 15.

60 Shawcross, Sideshow, 314.

61 John Forbes Kerry, "To Search Out And Destroy The Last Vestiges of This Barbaric War," Before Senate Foreign Relations Committee, April 11, 1971 (abr.). Reprinted in I. F. Stone's Bi-Weekly, May 3, 1971.

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69 Taylor, Nuremberg and Vietnam, 20.

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Macionis, Introduction to Sociology, 450, lists war dead from 10 American wars alone at 1,303,490 in a scant 200 year span from her Revolutionary War to the Persian Gulf War. My perception is that wars have changed in character from local to national to global productions thus altering in nature from defensive to offensive to preventive reasons for going to war. The hallmark of this latter mutation mandates a state of permanent warfare since there is no end to political definitions of external or internal threats to hegemony. This phenomenon has introduced the ultimate violence: a chimerical threat of massive annihilation we see expressed in the metaphorical suspension of the scientific Sword of Damocles over the entire human race.

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72 Thomas R. Cusack and Richard J. Stall, Exploring Realpolitik (Boulder and London: Lynee Rienner Publishers, 1990), 273.

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[73] Hannah Arendt, "Law, Morality and War," from War Crimes and the American Consciousness. Edited by Erwin Knoll and Judith Nies McFadden, Hannah Arendt, et al. New York/Chicago/San Francisco: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970), 44.

[74] Wells, The War Within, 64.

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I. A BRIEF SOCIO-HISTORY OF THE VIETNAM WAR AND THE AMERICAN ANTIWAR MOVEMENT: JULY 1947 TO JULY 1967

A deeper concern for moral and ethical principles in the foreign policy they were developing for Southeast Asia in 1947 could have prevented members of the National Security Council from exposing one of the most powerful nations on earth to the humiliating experience of failure in Indochina. A little less ethnocentricity could have enabled the experts to understand why it was useless to pursue their misguided and amateurish efforts at carving out spheres of influence beyond their ability to control.

It is worthless to pursue what might have been, except that the blunting of America's moral standing at home and abroad left a legacy of suspicion, cynicism and bitterness that still lingers despite the passage of time. Thus, although the theories of limited warfare and the priority of military utopianism have been debated at length, the risks in combining genocidal techniques of warfare to break the enemy's will has not been exhausted.

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In this, the unacceptable levels of bombing, artillery, and waging war on a peasant people was not the way the most democratic country on earth should act. In retrospect, the council failed to understand the contradictions they were setting into motion, specifically, setting the rules for containment of ideological variants and backing it with military force, without leveling with the American people.

This would imply that social argumentation was not welcome and could be offered ex post facto, an imperial whimsy Americans did not support. Systemic survival, in a democracy, demanded a fail safe articulation of intent well in advance, thus setting cardinal rules that would remain constant over time. Simply telling the truth would have avoided much bitterness, recrimination and, possibly, Watergate.

The greatest frustration anti-war protesters experienced was presidential unwillingness to come to terms with widespread public protest against the Vietnam War. The blatant lies and false information disseminated to the public in order to maintain control over running a war that was all but lost infuriated many protesters who doubled their efforts to bring democratic controls back into play.

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This simple civic duty exposed many to the anger of high placed elected or appointed individuals. President Nixon, the most intransigent of all, was obsessed with unidentified domestic enemies, disliked dissent intensely, and harbored grave doubts that American democracy had the will or character to lead the world.[1]

The assertion to power rested on the premise that force could serve to crush those who opposed the liberating influences of a reimposition of an ideological dogma of American imperialism after French colonialism had failed. What that indicated, in terms of Vietnam, is that individual critique of oppression from Ho Chi Minh or General Giap would not impede the outcome of the American effort to extend its hegemony. Within the long Vietnamese experience of foreign aggression, domination and slavery, the society that developed from those objective political and economic forms of forced oppression formed the collective reflection and consciousness that inevitably sustained their long and arduous struggles of historical emancipation. They have a 4,000 year history of fighting for the freedom to decide their own affairs.

In this sense, the people decide. Ho Chi Minh and his vision of nationalistic integrity could be neutralized by imprisonment or assassination; in Giap's case, the deaths of

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his wife and young child by the French in retaliation for political incorrectness could still remain an isolated instance of injustice; however, without the added value of a collectively dedicated army willing to die, Vietnam would have been a weekend exercise for French and American military might.

An accumulation of individual grievances do form the critical mass of resentment impelling individuals to willingly join together to contest forms of oppression individually felt. These collective moral injuries underlie the historical sufferings and resilience of the Vietnamese people. The desire for national identity solidified a level of determination and will to struggle to the death to preserve their cultural integrity and national sovereignty. They would accept 10 to 1, even 100 to 1 casualty rates without any notion of surrendering.

Unfortunately, military force became the only viable option for policy makers in Washington who saw Southeast Asia in danger of falling into Russian hands if Vietnam was permitted to vote its preference. President Eisenhower knew that North Vietnam would rule over a reunited Vietnam by an 80% to 20% voting majority, basing his belief on the population in the partioned country: 15 million in the north to 12 million in the south.

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The choice of options for foreign policy directives was narrowed by fear of a collapsing western presence in Asia, an outcome that the west could not consider. Thus, explaining to a war-weary American public why Vietnam should be the next military venture was no easy task. By its very nature, the entire process had to remain secretive. There was a lack of faith in leveling with the American people, they would never have agreed to a war of attrition and deceit. Democracy is a messy process and prevents the quick and precise actions that have to be taken when necessary, however, it does ensure that ethical and moral concerns are allowed to be expressed before the decision to commit troops to battle.

U.S. interests cover a large range of issues: methods for creating zones of safe haven for foreign investors; protecting cherished allies from aggression; removing all resistance to the free market; and human rights violations among them. If these lesser countries disregard the invitation to join economic, political and social networks under American ideological hegemony, then they can expect to accept them under degrees of intimidation. Utilizing a minimum of force and applying increasing levels of pressure will convince the most unwilling to stop all resistance. Thus, in hindsight we see how autocratic maneuvering

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reformulated national interest into a contradiction of terms. The decisions emerging from these secretive sessions were gravely flawed since, informed consent was not possible in the absence of national debate.

The reluctance of many Americans to become involved with foreign affairs is the result of this type of Machiavellian intrigue that cuts across the American ethic of fairplay. Nothing much changes as even today many of the NSC memos on Vietnam still cannot be accessed and are off limits. Americans have no idea what their government has pledged them to do and we can expect surprises in the future when actions are taken without advising the public.

Towards this, Americans consider themselves the best informed people in the world, however, that belief had no validity in January of 1964. After 14 years of American non-stop presence in Vietnam, one out of four people polled did not know the U.S. was involved in the fighting there, and two out of three paid little or no attention to it.[2] One may presume that fewer still were aware of the Geneva Peace Accords of 1954 that was the crux of the problem.

The Geneva Peace Accords following the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu provided for a reunification of South and North Vietnam through democratic elections to be held in 1956. The U.S. refusal to implement the provision for

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those elections when they were due has been the basis for our military intervention in Vietnam and much of the domestic opposition to it that followed.

It is claimed that the U.S. did not renege on the terms of free election for Vietnam since we had never been a signatory to the Accords and had only pledged to uphold it. Thus the option to void its terms was within our legal jurisdiction. It supports Arendt's testy observation that these omissions imply a decision not to be bound to any agreements we do not intend to honor.[3]

South Vietnam was a key consideration of NSC Memorandum 1, created expressly for the containment policy against communist movement into Southeast Asia assuring American responsibility for protecting Vietnam south of the 1954 partition line. SEATO (The Southeast Asia Treaty) conditionally pledged the U.S. to protect Indochina through military and economic aid. The endless free world negotiations to subsume nationalistic movements under the umbrella of a universal market system hardened into the use of force, if necessary, to circumvent ideological failure to win the war for men's hearts and minds.

Thus, the NSC is answerable for much of the heavy-handed amateurism that resulted in a series of political blunders of major proportions leading directly to

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the only humiliating defeat in war the United States has ever experienced. They could be credited with inflicting more harm on the nation than the enemy. Their program determined the course of military intervention and influenced the illegal use of military force in Vietnam to discourage and dispel the powerful concept of self-rule the Vietnamese people wanted. The absence of diplomatic clarity on the differences between North Vietnamese, Soviet and Chinese political forms reflect a fundamental ignorance of socialism evidenced in the earlier McCarthy witchhunts of the 1950s that saw monolithic communism as the greatest threat to U.S. national interests. Senator Joseph McCarthy of Wisconsin was the person most responsible for purging top East Asian and China experts from the State Department thus depriving valuable insight and advice into Asian affairs. The decision to increase its military presence halfway around the world in a clearly mistaken military strategy was costly to the U.S. in terms of intense anti-war domestic reaction and the loss of an army in Vietnam. The protest originally centered on a moral challenge to the unilateral use of military force on Third World nations, and its hostility was directed to a critical assessment of pragmatic realpolitik operating in a frame of moral numbness within the White House.

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As such, although the anti-war protest may have lacked clarity, a central direction, or even a common unity throughout its existence, it did have a determined commitment to the moral conduct of the war and their impulses were influenced to the extent that the political system refused to accommodate protest even within duly outlined constitutional confines. Eventually, they would force a national debate on the morality of these issues, especially that of a military intervention to further imposition of North/South regional development plans and its disparities on emerging Third World nations.

Wars tend to compel cultural conformity and a dependency on conservative behavior. Vietnam, however, was a different war; it served to separate the dissenters from the conformists on the issue of the personal morality in political actions. Feelings on both sides ran so deep that the polarization between dissenters who could not support the war and others who did could not be transcended. Thus, when questions of choosing sides arose, there were no easy answers; on one hand there was the classic condemnation of the war as immoral on universal grounds of pacifism appealing to a higher authority and, on the other, an equally strong belief in obedience to duly constituted authority: "My country right or wrong, my country."

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Given the bitter acrimony this division engendered, the passionate intensity invested in defending these opposing interests overflowed into the streets of this nation. The need for a careful assessment on the true nature of American power hopefully would address antinomies that concern the public most: the use of power, when to use it, where to use it, what is its purpose, and, why. If the answers imply an indifference to the moral concerns of the polity, it would be prudent to include an ethical dimension to the question of the use of force. This country cannot afford another Vietnam war; losing its first war was a sobering experience, the loss of an army was fatal.

The policy of war as an extension of politics pursued by the United States in Vietnam was not new; the bureaucratic and administrative support binding economic interests and political actions that transformed the military from a mechanistic to an organic base was. The technological alteration of the military is as old as the institution of warfare itself, the introduction of modern scientific management techniques, however, is of recent vintage.

In both strategy and tactics, modern warfare has become more savage, affecting more people, and creating

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more social, economic and political devastation while spending shorter periods of time to do so, aided immensely by the transformation of the military into an assembly line production machine. Of the ten major wars this nation has fought, declared or undeclared, the last five have become increasingly lethal in duration and intensity occurring within shorter periods of time between each event. The perennial state of a permanent wartime footing and the high cost of its maintenance has not been kind to political and economic institutions in terms of widespread public support for wars of aggression. These conflicts have marked the 20th Century as one of the most lethal, costliest, deadliest, and least decisive relative to enduring peace, as well as the most disruptive of political, economic and social stability for the U.S. and the international community. We point to the 86.5 million dead during these conflicts and the bankruptcy of world treasuries in pursuit of the elusive master stroke that will leave one nation master of all it surveys.

Wars have increasingly become offensive rather than defensive types of conflict, and are fought for economic market interests that have very little in common with self-defense. Vietnam is an accurate measure of the trend away from traditional cultural norms of peace until

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provoked into an aggressive "get them before they get us" restructuring of the normative codes into a purely aggressive materialistic mentality.

Whether Vietnam was a valid instance of American attempts to stabilize a sovereign nation struggling to avoid a communist takeover or not, our military objectives there were unattainable. In addition, underlying motivations of American policy were not clear and they certainly were not shared with the public. Valid expressions of national security or ideals were never convincing, what threat could a nation the size of Vietnam, 8,000 miles away from our shores and technologically light years behind us pose?

Culturally, Americans may be ethnocentric, even racist and egocentric at times, however, extending militarism or corporate capitalism is not an overriding value, especially at the cost of American lives. The Vietnam War became problematic when the numbers of American dead and wounded became an unacceptable trade off for market expansion. As the losses grew and public awareness advanced, the less enthusiastic support for it could be traced, as witness the increasing number and intensity of demonstrations.

The diminishing public appetite for the war left beleaguered presidents with fewer avenues to conduct the

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war at a leisurely pace other than Draconian directives to force the enemy into a quick end to the war. Although the ends were pure, the means were not; somewhere the plan to trade enemy lives for peace with honor misfired, the nature of the persuasion did not impel the enemy to the peace table, only stiffened his will. Instead, a moral legitimacy for the war disappeared in the ensuing technological punishment. In brief, the tug-of-war between the political and social spheres erupting in determined anti-war protests during the Vietnam War illustrates, to use the vernacular, that playing fast and loose with deep American yearnings for peace with honor and an end to social turmoil could lead to serious systemic flaws, if the war proved costly in terms of human lives. The raw nature of media coverage in the Vietnam War scenes of death and suffering as they occurred had a disquieting effect on the home front. It succeeded in shocking moral sensitivities of a nation whose outrage had not yet been numbed by overexposure to routinizations of violence.

It would take several generations to reprogram deep cultural imperatives into passivity and apathy. The slow process of socialization and the complex, often problematic, nature of resocialization are time consuming and difficult at best. Toward this, Vietnam was an immature cultural

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alteration. The policies that dictated international containment of a feared and hated Marxian ideology had not been balanced by a cultural realignment into the types of individuals earnest empire building on a militaristic base required. The old ties to honor and duty that motivated earlier generations were based on isolationism, unless provoked.

Then too, political affairs, following World War II, incorporated a leadership more attuned to internationalism and its intense competition for ideological hegemony divorced from dimensions of humanitarian concerns. The ascendancy of the Realpolitik school and further involvement in Cold War issues thus allowed an imitation of Europe's imperialistic quests for world domination and has led to non-stop American military action.

We see this as a troubling feature of the increasing unilateral expansionist policies followed as a non-negotiable private matter of state, peaking during the Nixon presidency and reappearing in the Reagan and Bush presidencies. However the Gulf War during Bush's term of office may have proved effective in eliciting a 90% public support level, it did nothing for his reelection. In addition, he was soundly defeated by an avowed Vietnam War protester.

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During the Vietnam War, political vanity exacerbated the moral sensitivities of Americans unaccustomed to dismissal by imperial presidents as part of the democratic concept of public service. The arrogance shown by their elected leaders in running the country as a private corporation appalled many more whose consciousness was raised by official designations of their constitutional right to petition their government as nihilistic thus punishable. As history shows, autocratic contempt for the governed is ultimately self-defeating; it succeeds in producing a profound loss of confidence in the state and deeper radicalism towards it.

The one unique quality of anti-war dissent was its moral character. Vietnam raised ethical concerns brought home by the anxiety over not only the immorality of the war itself and deep commitment to pacifism, but of the moral numbness to a just war doctrine displayed by the pragmatic realpolitik of an out of touch political establishment. Throughout the entire period of intense outrage and indignation that sustained the anti-war dissent, the moral criterion was the thread of unity between all elements of protest. Their main concern was the loss of national integrity and the controversial nature of violence in support of an immoral cause.

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The question of violence is interesting within the context of charges heaped upon the anti-war dissenters. The violence crested in the 1968 Democratic Convention when critics in the hall challenged the war through a strategy of electoral persuasion. However, it spilled over into the streets and the violence, as during most of the Vietnam War period, was initiated and often influenced by the political conduct of the war and the refusal of the political system to listen to protest of any kind.

In this sense, the anti-war movement passed through several phases that contributed to its longevity. The first phase, circa 1955, was one of public advocacy, essentially agitating for an end to nuclear proliferation; it ended with the test ban treaty of 1963; the second phase was their participation in the Civil Rights Movement and the Black struggle for equality; the third phase, the Vietnam War, offered a new life and direction, this time towards a raised concern for Third World countries and the moral right of a backward society to exist. DeBenedetti[4] credits rising levels of political disillusion to implacable government as the reason for the movement's turn to the Left in 1967, attracting the turbulence and anguish that deepened into disillusionment by 1969. However, that may be based on perceived official unconcern for the

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mounting casualties and the insatiable appetite for manpower in the increasing Vietnam conflict.

We note that the the 1.3 million deaths of U.S. men and women, not to mention the many more injured and maimed, in the combined aggressions of the American Revolution, the War of 1812, the Mexican War, the Civil War, the Spanish-American War, World War I, World War II, the Korean War, Vietnam and the Persian Gulf War were not private matters to be borne individually. That casualty figure represented the highest sacrifice an individual could make for the common good. As such, the gradual mutation of representative government into imperial terms altered the basis of collective altruism into employee/management imperatives borrowed from scientific management techniques where power flowed in one direction, from the top down.

That alteration was felt most keenly in idealistic quarters where human contradictions posed by these oppositional negatives could not be synthesized. The paradigmatic shift from noblesse oblige to individual competitiveness desynchronized altruistic norms and introduced precision into the institutional fabric of the nation. It reached the final contradiction of a scientific corporate model over human intensive areas of honor, integrity and the will to sacrifice.

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Albert Rosenfeld noted in 1966, when the Vietnam War was intensifying, that our contemporary dilemmas were intimately bound up with science and technology whose profound impact could be felt but not understood.[5] In this, the increasing compartmentalization of modern society is possible only within a scientific paradigm that elevates technological proficiency over human unpredictability. Thus the unquestioning task orientation of the machine over human unreliability initiated the very process of rebellion that machines were supposed to overcome. The legacy of Vietnam is the discovery that humans cannot operate in an environment that is alien and dehumanizing without becoming alienated or turning into squalid human caricatures of themselves. Thus they are free to choose between traditional conformity to the past or liberating influences of the future, or, they may opt for passivity, but a nation cannot overcome the loss of its idealists and survive.

In this, very human value judgments about the Vietnam War fostered a deep distaste for immoral trespasses into human areas of endeavor and a reluctance to silently accept its conduct. War, without subjective human appraisal of duration, scope and intensity on the violence being dispensed, is sure to become genocidal excursions in nature thus guaranteeing intense social response to these serious

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infractions of moral standards. Pre-World War II wars were technologically savage; however, that conflict was a justified welding of purposive rationality to technology whose end results we were unable to comprehend at the time.

The results of that mating were rising levels of carnage and paralyzed horror unrealized prior to the imposition of the modern management model over traditional military norms. It can be demonstrably argued that this alteration in traditional patterns of honor, duty, and sacrifice produced the final alienation of the military during the Vietnam War period. This would not be worth mentioning were it not for the implications extending from the use of the military to impose an American hegemony. It failed in Vietnam with terrible consequences.

We can add that the 20th Century and the accelerating journey into purposive rationality has led to a compressing of time between global conflicts and an increase in service related deaths when they occur. Five major wars in the 47 years, from entry into World War I in 1917 to the Persian Gulf War, has cost this nation an approximated 634,000 deaths. When compared to five wars in the one hundred and forty-one year history from the founding of this nation till our entry into World War I, the ratio of 3:1 between yesterday and today noted in the rough figure of 663,500

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killed in the military appear reasonable given the time to recuperate from the last upheaval.

Although these figures are not inclusive of civilian casualties or the amount of property damage thus the total human toll of these wars is not fully known, they do address the increased efficiency of modern warfare through political policies utilizing technological precision in eliminating vast numbers of lives while sponsoring humanitarian ideals in so doing. Of greater importance to wars of the future is the threat of nuclear annihilation implicit in miscalculation or intent.

For instance, bringing World War II to a quick end to save lives as rationale for atom bombing Hiroshima and Nagasaki is overshadowed by nagging doubts about scientific wars as foundations for a peaceable kingdom given the failure of military closure. Like dragon's teeth, each war to end all wars only serves to invite the fanaticism that ignites further escalations of terrorism and military interventions into a never ending cycle of death and destruction with its depletions of state treasuries.

The friction that developed between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. stems from their diametrically opposed economic, political and ideological systems. These divergent philosophies have formed the critical mass of Cold War

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policies whose priorities were to prevent the "enemy" from gaining the advantage and sweeping the "other" into historical oblivion. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States were the only two nations left standing economically in the aftermath of the war. Although the German invasion of Russia devastated much of their country, the U.S.S.R. fared rather well through its wartime relocation of heavy industries to the Urals and the U.S., by virtue of geographic isolation from the firestorm that swept across Europe and Asia, could easily swing back into civilian production.

The U.S. nuclear expertise may have served as a strong deterrent to post-war Communist expansion over a weakened Europe and Asia. However, that edge was short-lived; the U.S.S.R. broke the American nuclear monopoly when it exploded its own device in 1949.[6] Once the atom was split, it was a matter of time before it became international property for any nation determined or wealthy enough to pursue its implementation.

The National Security Act had been passed by Congress and signed by President Harry S. Truman in 1947 in expectation of the new balance of power to replace exclusive ownership of nuclear weapons. Its purpose was to prevent future Communist shopping excursions in market spheres of

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American national interest by removing the necessity for free choice between opposite ideologies. It positioned U.S. military in a policeman of the world status by placing geographic boundaries beyond which Communism would not be permitted to expand.

The U.S.S.R. entry into the nuclear age also assured that each move made by a superpower would be matched by the other thus neutralizing any technological advantage one nation might have over the other. What is interesting here is that two of the most powerful nations on earth as far apart on the ideological scale as possible - one committed to materialistic drives and the other idealistic - were both locked into the myth of science and technology as liberating.

The 1962 Cuban Missile crisis was the end result of how mistaken they were. It certainly was the closest this nation ever came to actual conflict with the former Soviet Union, or for that matter, an end to the splendid geographic isolation that permitted us a safe haven. An end result of that confrontation was a realization by the American public that they had entered a new millennium. Mutual assured thermonuclear destruction (MAD) mandated a new detente between these two nations, but old habits are hard to die.

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It fostered a deep distrust of U.S.S.R. motives and intentions, and, as in other stressful moments in our history, the American gaze turned to a familiar spectacle, the witchhunt - this time, godless communism - to whip up public hysteria. However, the idea of massive nuclear damage was averted between the super powers and surrogate, or limited, wars became the type of negotiated wars we could safely stage in what could be considered a form of "military utopianism."[7] Under this rubric, wars cannot be declared; if entered into, they cannot be won, only utilized as a means of cabinet diplomacy, as tools for diplomats to guarantee the maintenance of a balance of power between East and West.[8]

Thus, ordinary people became mere pawns on the larger chess game of political brinksmanship while wars were finetuned to meet economic necessities, not moral imperatives. These policies are self-defeating eventually serving to weaken the internal cultural balance in nations that play this deadly game and walls come tumbling down. The Vietnam War serves as an example of the type of endeavor that went far beyond expected results into unintended consequences in much the same manner the fall of the Berlin Wall expressed the aftermath of Russia's Vietnam, Afghanistan.

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Since war is a moral issue, it is chancy at best to use it as a form of political utility where populations are discarded or exchanged as surplus or interchangeable parts by those wielding political power. In the power game, lives were lost in Vietnam, families were destroyed, economies were wrecked, and these fueled the social upheaval at home that still echoes politically. Ultimately, these types of social disruptions misfire. In Vietnam, it strengthened the will of the Vietnamese opposition to resist, at tremendous human costs for both sides. There were no political gains for the U.S.; and the delusion of thinking limited war could win on the bargaining table what could not be won on the battlefield is baffling at best.

The contempt for diplomats springing out of the Vietnam War shattered internalized patterns of obedience to the state. Once lost, it could not be recovered. Thus, it would appear that the U.S. has lost the luxury of waging wars of attrition as an extension of political means. If the unwillingness of a generation to die in another international diplomatic game of Russian roulette cannot be overcome, then genocidal tactics and brutal technological types of weaponry to substitute for the absence of human will must be implemented. If so, then we have lost all

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moral legitimacy and cannot hope to prevail because the means will strip every vestige of human compassion from political will.

The ironic twist is that we may commit our armies but dare not incur any loss of life thus, if we are to prevail, we are forced to substitute greater technological barbarism to compensate for the refusal of humans to serve. In the end, wars become more genocidal as technology eliminates the human subject in actuality and in the abstract. In the former, civilian casualties outnumber service losses and, in the latter, reification destroys the human will to resist.

This dialectical process is not merely a polarization between silent puppets or vocal critics. As we learn from the historical events of the Vietnam War, it produced, as well, an influx of significant numbers of military elements into anti-war protests who questioned the nature, direction and wisdom of the technological dehumanization they had experienced and rejected the immorality for a return to gentler social imperatives.

Some credit for this phenomenon rests on the class nature of the Vietnam War. In this sense, the draft was contoured to eliminate college and professionals from service, leaving the poor and the lesser educated to bear the

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brunt of technological innovations. These innovations were discussed in the previous chapter. This is not to say that members of the more privileged classes did not go to Vietnam; this is to note that General Lewis B. Hershey, Selective Service Director, distinguished the character of draftees by carefully selecting those who were not college material[9] or those who were not politically correct as prime candidates for Vietnam service.[10] Thus, unlike World War II, the servicemen who dominated the composition of those who went to Vietnam were categorized as social junk, thus "expendable," as perceived by those in positions of power to so judge. It was an area of extreme concern for those who opposed the war because it ranked human utility by class position.

The escalating war in Vietnam, and the increasing human replacements required to stave off a complete communist takeover, meant sacrifice beyond belief. The seduction of technology is that it is supposed to buffer human environments. Thus, when the old methods of World War II, experimented with in Korea, were introduced into Vietnam, the expected benefits of less exposure to danger through technology were not immediately forthcoming. The elusive quick end to a minor military endeavor was a dilemma for the planners in control centers far removed

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from the battlefield. The North Vietnamese and Viet Cong had first hand information of every facet of the war they were waging. There were no time consuming distillations through layered channels since hands-on human efforts were superior to technological reproductions.

This sanitized version of war depending on entrenched technology created the anti-war movement more than any other single factor. The moral revulsion of armchairing a war while a targeted class of young men and women died in mistaken versions of Atari concept game planning disturbed an older generation of parents. Immersion in electronic breakthroughs had not hit the older group still hooked on radio and film. Thus the original anti-war groups were composed of older peaceniks; the young did not rally till much later.

The core of the opposition to the war came from the traditionally anti-war religious, intellectual and socialist communities with roots in the Civil War, World Wars I and II, and the labor struggles weaving its way throughout their struggles. Students didn't enter the Vietnam dissent in large numbers until the mid-60s when the war was going badly and no end to it appeared to be in sight. In the diachronic view, the task of transcending social and cultural structures of domination and educating

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Americans into a reassertion of cultural human values was a herculean task for these early anti-Vietnam War protesters. They believed the Vietnam War was an obscene immorality. That belief sustained their determination to carry the message by personal action. Basically, that shaped the form of their strategies. It deflected state reactions to vitiate their efforts, as well. These various levels of interaction are all the more remarkable since it signified the subjective awareness evidenced by the protesters in contesting certain aspects of unsurpassed domination by an objective state in defending its failing ideological hegemony. The movement snowballed with the addition of new recruits drawn to the cause.

Demystification occurred on two levels; first, for the anti-war protesters, individual awareness led to the shedding of ideological aspects of the cultural world that had previously internalized conforming acceptance of authority as normal; second, it led to a revolutionary consciousness that attempted to return the life to what it ought to be and reinforced the will to carry the vision to its conclusion. This is seen in the growing resistance to the war with the dedication the anti-war cadres brought to the movement. This phenomenon eventually provided the backdrop for the first military opposition to a war in

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progress when Vietnam veterans joined in a peace march in New York City in April of 1967. The resistance was joined; the state now faced a former unimpeachable ally, segments of its military establishment.

There were many reasons why this convergence was inevitable; however, the senseless loss of lives in an unpopular war and the corruption of the ideal sustaining the will to sacrifice were the immanent reasons for the alteration. These were the powerful norms leading to the synthesis of these dissimilar groups. Ironically, the very premise of traditional military support of the state, the belief that the state is worthy of the ultimate sacrifice of life itself, was the point of negation. It was a historical event fostered on the understanding that the state had a moral obligation to its citizens not to misuse war to further sectarian interests that undercut social betterment. On such simple foundations did the protest over the war lead to the eventual disintegration of an army in Vietnam and institutional paralysis at home.

The healing has been lengthy. The difficulty this nation has had in whipping up enthusiasm for fielding an army under the pre-Vietnam War ideological cornerstones of "sacrifice and service above and beyond the call of duty," are gone. It went the way of the failure of hardnosed

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diplomatic intransigence as real people died while stubborn administrations indulged in their foolish games of perverse political brinksmanship based on technological fantasy. Meanwhile, the policies that got us into the Vietnam War are still operative.

The National Security Act of July 1947[11] was the single most important cause for involvement in Indochina in terms of legislation passed by the U.S. Congress; yet it is relatively unknown to many Americans. The act may be remembered for the unification of the U.S. military into a single unit under the Secretary of Defense. Passed during the Truman administration, it was "the place in the government where the military, diplomatic and resources problems could be studied and continually reappraised."

However, it also established the National Security Council as an advisory body to the President of the United States to assist him in coordinating defense policy, albeit in a voluntary capacity. It removed the Secretary of Defense from a key decision-making role and kept the military establishment under the firm control of civilians outside of the Pentagon. The legislation also particularized the blueprint for American military intervention when and wherever the national interest was threatened. National interest was demarcated into economic

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interest zones where trespass would not be tolerated. This meant the extension of the U.S. territorial borders backed by our military into any part of the world deemed vital for the preservation of our political, economic and social system.

Thus the National Security Council was the incubator for our military involvement in Vietnam and is still the basic prospectus for utilization of the American military in keeping the new world order intact and under Western control. Even today, there are NSC position papers on Vietnam that are still classified "Top Secret" that prevents the full scope of American commitment anywhere and why. Not all presidents used it as a conspiratorial ally; President Eisenhower operated the NSC as a discussion group, leading Dean Acheson to say it was a way for arriving at "agreement by exhaustion."[12] The Kennedy and Johnson administrations ignored it as often as they could, preferring informal methods.[13] That changed when Henry A. Kissinger was named Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs in 1969, a post he kept till 1975,[14] and used the NSC as the locus for directing foreign and domestic policy through the President.

Council members became less influential than its committees and its staff[15] as Kissinger reorganized the

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council to channel all communications to President Nixon through his office, thus effectively keeping the president aloof and, for the most part, isolated from his Cabinet members or anyone who could have added balance to crucial decisions of state as they arose. Simply creating paper streams to keep the council members off-balance creating and recreating projects and white papers that never saw the light of day prevented any meaningful dialogue with President Nixon from happening.

The January 20, 1969, NSC reorganization reestablished the council as the only decision-making body and the President holding the real decision making power.[16] Because traditional bureaucratic techniques were assumed to be protecting vested interests through informal and unstructured discussions where decisions were vague or hidden, this restructuring funneled all NSC affairs into Henry Kissinger's office for his review, prior to final delivery to the President. He decided what President Nixon was to see or know and when.

Although its official purpose was to package the efficient production of critically important matters into firm management techniques, in effect it established what was termed the imperial presidency where foreign and domestic decisions were made in secret, equivocated upon,

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denied, constitutionally invalidated and any inquiry into these affairs deliberately blocked.[17] It permitted an awesome accumulation of power to become vested in two men, one non-elected, ending in arcane constitutionally illegal gestapo-type actions that ended the political career of Richard Milhous Nixon.[18] Members of the National Security Council were the President, the Vice-President, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, Directors of the Office of Emergency Preparedness and members specially appointed by the President as his own counselors. With the exception of the President and Vice-President, none of these individuals are elected to the position. They are appointed by the President from among other government officials or private citizens and these informal appointees have greater clout than the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of the CIA who do not serve as members, only as statutory advisors to the Council.[19]

Through its membership, this body has been the premier method for linking the president with segments of corporate and financial interests while excluding members of the general public from an opportunity to decide national policy and it offered the President the luxury of solid alternatives by cutting the traditional time consuming bureaucratic red tape. However, if we are to examine the

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circularity of American foreign policy across elective changes, the course set by this group in domestic and foreign policy goes beyond White House occupancy and, as such, cements the direction this country will take beyond elections.

It is reasonable to argue that a radical change of policy every four years would usher in a type of political instability that could harm the national interest, so policy has to be set above the electoral process. However, as the Nixon-Kissinger dyadic relationship revealed, the protected status of a secretive body beyond public accountability to decide on issues that take this country to war can be far more unsettling than having to work through any disagreement that may interfere with political expediency.

Du Boff notes that this arrangement underwrites the broad policies of America's politically unseen.[20] If true, this would explain the apparent seamlessness in U.S. foreign and domestic policies that have been continuous over time, no matter the political party in power at the moment. It would also explain the wrinkle-free adoption of unpopular programs such as NAFTA and GATT, as well as autocratic interference with internal affairs of other sovereign nations that those treaties imply. It explains,

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as well, the undeclared wars since World War II initiated by Presidential decree under the War Powers Act and the seamlessness of congressional funding despite presidential end runs into their constitutionally designated task to declare war.

In this sense, U.S. foreign policy has remained constant and its imprimatur has been state ordained commercial and financial expansionism on a military interventionist base, rather than on international rules of self-defense stipulated under just war doctrines. These internal dynamics cannot maintain social equilibrium under the stresses of war in a democratic society. A sequestered state has the luxury of ruling within the consent of its polity; its primary goal, however, is survival.

This poses a contradictory task in that power during the 20th century in this country has been mutating away from relative to absolute terms in a culture that cannot incorporate too many aggressions in contests of survival. In Durkheimian terms, the dysfunctions occasioned by the break in the consensual normative standards evolved over time weakens the patterns of cultural patterns. Anomie is the destructive end result.

In the anti-war reaction to a monolithic state, each presidential decision that led to further loss of lives

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was the single most important element in arousing passions. Those moral breaches sensitized opposition to the war. The religious community, the young idealists, the Utopian Socialists, the academics, no matter the mix or the class status, the overwhelming need to correct an out of control state bent on its own obsessions created intense reaction in a felt need to correct violations of deeply held ethical and moral restraints. In this context, the political influence of the NSC on events in Vietnam was underscored by a morally burdened David Halberstam who wrote that "we had set out to impose our values on a foreign land...help them...teach them to do good things... found them a president...brought them an army...what more could they want?"[21] Still other concerned intellectuals saw their role as guardian of society's moral values jeopardized and called for a shift away from policy considerations to moral imperatives.[22]

The one exception to this argument would appear to be Somalia in that it was designated a humanitarian military effort, under United Nations auspices, to protect the NGO food distribution program there in order to feed the famine-stricken. We note the pre-orchestration of incessant media coverage to present stark images of massive starvation and the tragic human consequences because of the

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civil war being waged there by opposing tribal factions. However, it quickly became a task of militarily separating a political undesirable from power and attempting to install someone of our choice with the resulting inopportune loss of American lives and the humiliation of a hostage situation as the price for intervening in the internal affairs of a Third World nation, a deja vu of Vietnam in the pattern of American military retreat when casualties began to rise and the polity grew restive at home.

Although this type of American military diplomacy is not new,[23] in the case of Vietnam, the creation of the National Security Council provided the position papers that became the definitive blueprint for United States expansion into Indochina and elsewhere long before the escalation into war began. Once set, that policy was not open to negotiation and was supported by state determination to use military intervention through five consecutive American presidents of both political parties.

After the stunning French defeat at Dien Bien Phu on May 7, 1954, NSC 48/1 dated December 23, 1949 became the document that certified direct American military action in Vietnam after years of covert support following the Potsdam Conference and the agreement between Britain, China, the

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Soviet Union and the United States on the carving up of Vietnam.[24]

Under Truman and Eisenhower presidencies, the NSC position papers were the directives of Cold War programs that shaped the political and economic standards for U.S. policy. It altered the historical mandate of the American armed forces into protecting phantom ideological interests, and Vietnam can be seen as that point where post-war crises of U.S. expansionism pointed to a greater American effort to defend and protect wider international economic imperatives or relinquish the right to being "king of the hill." Ironically, Vietnam was the break point where the long history of American war successes was reversed and its moral franchise of victory based on manifest destiny ended.[25]

One may argue that the National Security Council is not vested with unlimited power and that the President has the last word; however, to understate the role of civilian economic and financial circles underwriting military and political strategy in strict secrecy demonstrates how these narrow priorities decide and implement policy directives without a scintilla of input from the larger public who must support these foundational decisions with their lives.[26] It matters not that one investment banking house

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or another is represented on the council, or one corporation over another, or even if this NGO (non-Government Organization) or that is represented, the interests are the same, although perhaps slightly tilted one way or the other.

In the larger picture, however, the broad powers vested in Henry Kissinger and his exhumed Machiavellian political model rendered open democratic procedures vulnerable since an informed society and secret diplomacy are incompatible. This problem is addressed in Weber's haunting preoccupation with the ethic of ultimate ends and means.[27] In this, political realists are free to cut through the Gordian knot of time constrictions in order to arrive at a political solution.

Time is an empty category in the age of technocracy; to avoid negative effects on international goals of diplomacy, the greater evil of waiting for a majority consensus cannot be accommodated within the parameters of statesmanship. As Kissinger stated, "the illegal we do immediately, the unconstitutional takes a little longer."[28] Given this view, the public's right to know could lead to deadlier consequences than a slight democratic oversight. This callous view of participatory democracy offers that the efficient conduct of vital matters of state, once the

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electoral process is over, is better left to technical experts who have all the facts at their command, thus are in a better position to chart the ship of state onto the rocks as they see fit.[29]

The possibility for diplomat mischief is far deadlier under these corrupted circumstances. The exclusion of well balanced alternative choices available to President Nixon, especially in the conduct of the secret Cambodian and Laotian bombings and invasions, attests to the ill-advised consequences inherent in Kissinger's streamlining of the NSC to let information reach Nixon that reflected courses of action he favored.

These highly questionable decisions were carried out with absolutely no formal debate at all. All else forgotten, it points to the Nixon presidency as one of the most disturbing to date in terms of technoplanning the political institution of this country into the gestapo-type of intrigue that culminated in the Pentagon Papers and Kent State. Weaving Byzantine strands of political deceit led to the clouding of his administration and his ignominious departure from the presidency and foreshadowed a later Vietnam withdrawal in much the same fashion.

This type of technoplanning carries unintended consequences, and lack of oversight over legal process is

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one of its major weaknesses. By raising behavioral models over humanistic concerns, removing the actor from the responsibility of his actions renders every unthinkable evil possible. Where there are no internal moral constraints, everything becomes a team plan and individual views are easily suppressed. As Schrage shrewdly observed, the alteration from an irreverent, self-sufficient individual who defies great odds to irrationally bet his life on himself has given way to the type of organization men who are programmed and computerized to the last billion dollar budget and the last televised shot and betting one's life now rests on depending on fewer impersonal and anonymous technicians who control everything for ever larger populations. Their loyalty is not to human endeavors, but to the holder and dispenser of power.[30]

Thus, in this change from an industrial to a scientific society, heroes disappear as prudence replaced passion and, in that sense, modern technology in service to a remote state leads to lethal and unpredictable consequences, as witnessed in Vietnam. The greatest peril came from reinforced mindsets of imperial power that had no basis in the real world of human capability, only in rational planning. Carried out to its eventual conclusion, brute force could have succeeded when all opposition

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ceased; it never happened in Vietnam or at home. The will to resist oppression remained strong throughout.

Gavin correctly identifies the crisis of America as this irrevocable paradigmatic shift from an industrial to a scientific base;[31] Aronowitz assesses this alteration as the end of work, a process that has become globally dehumanizing. However, unlike Aronowitz, by failing to see the human cost of this alteration, Gavin is as subject to the siren call as those who depend on science for resolution of all human complexities. As such, although deploring the violence and misery that marks this shift, he sees the side-effects of crisis as amenable to heightened administrative and managerial expertise developed by giant corporations, who have refined administrative processes to micro-manage all impediments that block the smooth functioning of the system. This technoplanning will defuse the domestic crises of inner cities, correct educational flaws, eliminate crime and violence and address the faulty distribution of wealth to usher in utopian social peace on the present economic and political foundations.

Weber offered a dimmer view of the end results of modernity in his description of purposive rationality. He saw it as a process that could compress creative human activity into efficient units of predictability that serve

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to devalue expressive humanism and increase the importance of the instrumental technocrat with little left for humans than the disenchantment of their world.[32] In this, instrumental rationality reduces the distance between two points by eliminating considerations of the subject, thus eliminating the need to see any alternative, except the most utile - no matter the cost to humanity.

Thus, although Gavin is aware of the tremendous human misery generated as side effects of this new revolution, he mistakenly supposes that mitigating the cause of military disintegration (economics and scientific management) the effects will be altered. It is a flawed consideration; without addressing the independent variables that may be operative under the surface, such as private ownership of the economy or the necessity for submerging subjective human concerns in lieu of results that are objective oriented, human agency will not change.

During the Vietnam War, one of the most alienating conditions was the technoplanning that failed to consider the estrangement of people caught in the cross-fire of Vietnam. In Friendly Fire,[33] for instance, the government, the military and, in many cases, their own localities were the targets of the alienation of those who lost a loved one in Vietnam or who suffered the emotional trauma associated

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with those killing fields. For parents who suffered the loss of a son, just dealing with a bureaucracy and its rational administrative standards of statistical prerequisites in deciding financial delinquencies and income tax responsibilities of the deceased during a time of intense bereavement turned many parents completely off the system. It created a new category of passionate radicals from erstwhile staunch conservatives.

In this, Habermas' life-world[34] where people communicate and interact (parents who sent a son to Vietnam) is the source of systemic power (the Pentagon). However, systemic power soon develops its own autocratic structural profile (stop asking too many irrational questions about circumstances surrounding the death of your son; we've told you all you should know) and as these increase in independence and power (the bureaucratic arrogance), it has to exert more control over the life-world (FBI intrusions into private lives, surveillance, wiretaps on phones, opening mail in transit).

When the life-world (bereaved parents) is confronted with the formal rationality of assessing the most effective means to an end (we have measured the sum financial worth of your son's life, less taxes; please sign this blank voucher), there are bound to be bitter consequences to the

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irrationality of rational technocratic thinking (breaking the very laws they are sworn to obey)[35] that serve to dominate rather than free the reason through the emancipation of universal values. "For reasons of state" dominate abstract human values of justice, honor, and honesty and the life-world becomes empty as a consequence of that warpage.

As M. Wesley Swearingen, former FBI COINTELPRO agent under J. Edgar Hoover's directorship there, writes[36] that by the end of his career, "I had lost the ability to distinguish between different levels of corruption." He wishes he had not been part of the "Black Box intrigues, break-ins and burglaries to protect against subversive domestic elements, or Communist linkages among the antiwar protesters" because then the FBI would have been another type of organization. This type of institutionalized deviation resting on the corruption of the individual to the seduction of the ends not the means was operative during the entire Vietnam experience.

This would support Habermas' communicative rather than Marx's theory of labor orientation as the focus for overcoming sedated moral sensitivities into freeing consciousness from domination. As such, the urge to confess transcends Marx's economic emphasis by requiring a

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deliberate act of communicative clarification in order to reject specific aspects of social life that may have been outside the economic system. In this, what makes man human, his speech, extends his sphere of action into reproducible images and vision linking theory and praxis into an audible component, rather than silent labor "speaking" through actions that tend to be isolated from a wider audience - or rendered silent by media censorship.

During the bitter anti-war debates, Noam Chomsky,[37] the brilliant linguistic, censured academic peers for being "irresponsible intellectual apologists" who were more interested in Skinnerian techniques than in human considerations. He was referencing the acceptance of efficient modern corporate techniques of computerized kill ratios and uncritically working within the system without regard for the human substance they were coldly measuring. They, in turn, reminded him that the search for knowledge was the business of academia, thus turning away the action of praxis for the silence of theory. The moral plateau was successfully returned to the situational safety of bias-free neutrality.

The moral imperative has the power to electrify usually tranquil individuals into passionate action when aroused by distressing human events, as in the atom bombing

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of Hiroshima and Nagasaki when it galvanized the quiescent American peace community into action or My Lai when it aroused an entire nation into a re-examination of conscience. The adaptation to new technology demanded more than their normally passive letter writing actions or petition signatures; it warranted radical assertive citizen action to assure swift disarmament in the former and moral correctives in the latter.

Included in this group were religious, left-of-center intellectuals, some scientists who were concerned with the direction research was taking, and a few internationalists who favored the one world concept. Their timing was faulty; the Cold War was a reaction to intense fears of world Communism, thus their moral concerns differed from those of the average American citizen who welcomed the bombing as the final arbiter against a determined enemy. Very few discerned the looming cultural crisis, they were too focused on the threat of international communism to realize that science itself could provide a greater threat.

The sociological questions concerning these threats are oriented in objective measures of possibility; the subjective realm where most of these fears are kept does not give us much room for theoretical conceptualizations. These threat orientations are reasons why nations go to

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war, why they develop the objective bases for sending their young to defend a hierarchical system of values that are, in effect, steeped in subjective intergroup relations. And although no valid political system would culturally self-destruct over wars without good reasons, inversely, no rational nation would chance their cultural destruction in an effort to maintain peace at all costs. Always uppermost in any system involved in warfare is the concern that there can only be one victor.

The Vietnam War was an incidence of overwhelming folly exceeded only by the political infantilism of the people who believed that might makes right, that the type of technology at our command would mash Vietnam back into the stone age, and maintaining the fiction of the domino theory required staying the military course till completion, no matter what it took to do so. Thus the vast squandering of national resources and manpower in pursuit of the best technological overkill scientific research could produce were set into motion. Today, vast sums fuel the world's military machine as public treasuries are emptied and humans die while decisions to stop warfare fail.

Even when arrived at, these accords or conferences fail because no number of international congresses or conferences can abolish differing political or economic

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agendas. Thus the arms race shows no signs of abatement and the setting of national technological priorities is seen in the lopsided ratios between military security and desperate social needs.[38] This poses a paradoxical condition where to live, the destitute must utilize the highest scientific instruments to kill, not to preserve human life.[39]

The subtle psychological mechanisms involved in reifying sources of error[40] are thus set into motion because science is not a pure doctrine. It requires as much a leap of faith as any religion. In this aspect, the reification of technology into a wall of protection afforded by phantom objectivity, where every trace of relations between humans was reduced to scissions between things that could not be incorporated within the American preoccupation for personal security.

Fragmentation of the object also involved splintering of the subject; that reduction subordinated the nation to the dictates of fixed laws that were in opposition to human need and necessity. If followed, it denoted internalized acceptance of harmful external objective relations of a system that had become too dependent on science as superior to human intelligence; as such the two cannot coexist. American overdependence on technological fixes as barriers

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explains the heavy support military actions in Vietnam had from the American public until 1967. It removed the need to resolve differences within human frames and reinforced a remote but operative, lethal to others but not to ourselves, self-deceptive universe of keeping our enemies at arm's length while we 'managed' their submission through a militaristic foreign policy that has, more often than not, failed in terms of absolute social control because, ultimately, the market system that commands it is antithetical to abstract human needs.(41)

Thus, what followed within this context gave us Vietnam: the myth versus the reality of American support for a war against a weaker nation (the other); the increasing dependency on cold and impersonal B-52 bombings (technological things) on an agricultural society ; the destruction of an entire nation to save it from communism (economic mystification); leading to the collapse of our myth of moral superiority coupled with military invincibility, and the unintended consequence of the unfortunate death of our army in a less technologically advanced Third World nation (the subjective basis of the reassertion of human will).

We interfered before we understood all the ramifications of the cultural basics of Vietnamese society; we gave

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generously, to the wrong people; and while we were espousing social justice, respect for the individual and preservation of Vietnamese values, our great technological marvels guaranteed the prostitution of their daughters, the destruction of their land; wrecked their economy; gave with extreme generosity into the wrong hands; widened the gap between rich and poor and we ignored their cultural integrity. "We lost sight of common people."[42]

In all of this, Indochina was never seen as part of a larger human chain, it was only important within the context of a Japan that had to remain the core of free market Asian economies through which all goods and services must flow[43] in a global free market system under Western hegemony. Western culture could not lose its war in Vietnam, when France did, the United States had to step in. Therein was the failure of thinking corrective American force could overcome internalized basic moral flaws merely through a show of technological superiority that would lead to an immediate paralysis of enemy will. And we never wavered from that misguided dependency on scientific faith.

In Home From the War,[44] Lifton offers that American ideology of a chosen people blessed into immortality posits that we don't lose wars, have our virtue tainted, or our glory questioned. Our extraordinary American technology

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and military hegemony are evidence of our superiority. To paraphrase Lifton, we still cannot understand how our military failed to win a dirty war with a third rate military entity because this would betray our bedrock image of ourselves as morally superior beings by virtue of fetishism not substance.(45) Unless we overcome this illusion, there is only bankruptcy of the national treasury and a constant wartime footing for our society and a lowering of life chances for the entire population. That path leads to internal instability that will become chaotic as U.S. military presence abroad becomes necessarily fixed.

Thus, the refusal of peace leaders to accept the father knows best mantra changed the antiwar focus as the concerns varied, such as, opposing First World power interventions, advocating alternatives to the Cold War and escalating international disarmament agreements. Some of these individuals were the early peace activists of the Cold War and many were members of the Communist Party who had acquired excellent organizational and disciplinary skills while serving as labor organizers or civil rights activists in previous years. These were to form the initial resolute core of the early anti-war movement.

The peace groups were primarily opposed to their government's nuclear weapons testing programs, turning

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their attention later to the Vietnam escalation. Although pacifist in nature and relatively few in number, many became radicalized vis-a-vis the Civil Rights issues, nuclear proliferation and events in Southeast Asia.[46] Although uncoordinated and of disparate class backgrounds, they did share a deep conviction that the rise of militarism on the international scene was becoming unacceptably dangerous and confrontational.

They formed two sub-cultures of the historic American pacifist movement: liberal internationalists and radical pacifists. An odd alliance, understandably divided and fractious, still they managed to set aside personal antipathies to focus on a common effort to alter the course of events before they became irremediable. These early formations included liberal Democrats, Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, world federalists, atomic scientists, journalists, Quakers, and Nobel Prize laureates.[47]

Religious organizations were involved as early as the middle 1950s with prayer chains[48] and peaceful oppositions.[48] The Old Left remained involved mainly in issues pertaining to labor. Later, liberals from SDS, SNCC and similar types of organizations based on student activity, radicalized the New Left. This latter amalgam

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and several southern black civil rights groups attempted to chart the course for the new NCCEWVN as the umbrella organization for the entire anti-war thrust.[50] It failed. As was the usual experience with the left, pure intentions evaporated and the exploratory forums descended into a veritable Donnybrook where every maneuver - parliamentary or political - disrupted the conferences into traditional sectarian debacles where each skein of ideological coloration refused to compromise their purity, especially the hardcore and immovable YSA, Social Democrats, and RCP cadres who would not compromise their political bent or resolve bitter enmities with the CP.[51] Irreconcilable and acrimonious differences destroyed any possibility for a lasting united front.

The Trotskyites could not forgive his assassination, the Maoists could not rise above the ideological division between the USSR and the People's Republic of China and the Social Democrats could not resolve their distaste and enmity for anything that cut into reform and not revolution. The Bernstein and Luxemburg battle continued in unabated theoretical intensity at a tremendous cost in terms of unified action to end the Vietnam War on the home front. However, the sharpest criticism on these historical rehashings of political differences came from the Quaker

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community with a major position paper produced by their American Friends Society stating that the political problem between militarism and the revolutionary concept of non-violence was the key issue, not the argument between types of communism, socialism and democracy.[52]

In opposition to those groups were southern white conservatives, ethnic Roman Catholics, AFL-CIO labor leaders and right-wing McCarthyite supporters backed by some southern and western politicians and their powerful corporate allies who saw "pinkos" and "reds" as the real problem. It revealed a sharp dichotomy between impulses of national egoism and humanistic universalism and seriously impacted resolution of differences.

Machiavelli notes in The Prince that those who have the most to gain by your efforts to better the conditions of their lives will be your most bitter opposition. In this, the antiwar movement drew the wrath of those very classes whose sons were bleeding and dying disproportionately in Vietnam, the less affluent working classes. When protesters led by clergy gathered in California's Redwood City to halt the production of napalm by United Technologies, a new phenomenon appeared among the deep political divisions held by residents there. In the media coverage of the protest, although residents claimed to have

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overcome the fear that their city had become identified with peace concerns, the struggle had split the small city along unexpected class lines.

Surprisingly, upper SES, independent of political party affiliation, backed the crusade overwhelmingly, while lower middle classes appeared to be ideologically immune to the point where they refused to listen or compromise their principles of loyalty and support for the war in Vietnam. The expected correlation between affluence and conservatism no longer could be considered a given in that community or anywhere else in the country and it displaced the traditional communist emphasis for change on the working class. This new social division was not an anomaly, it represented the broader American phenomenon in which the more educated and higher income classes extended far beyond the political and into the moral plateau which proved to be an irresistible communist attraction.[53]

In this sense, the presence of the Old Left, and their outdated class doctrine extended into the antiwar movement on altered class foundations. It would be a mistake to underestimate their influence on the basis of class mantology. Like particles of yeast, they provided the leaven and the ferment for the national network of leadership, exclusive of membership in or affiliation with

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any group. In this, we note CP actions within antiwar demonstrations quickly became national news events. They supported the Fort Hood Three, one of whom was a member of the CP.

These three servicemen became a cause celebre when they sued to prevent the U.S. military from silencing their opposition to the war and sending them to fight in an illegal war in Vietnam. Dr. Harold Levy after his ethical refusal to train Green Berets as medics for Vietnam received moral and financial support from the Party. Members of the Communist Party were on the Fifth Avenue Parade Committee that sponsored the April 15, 1967 march from Central Park to the United Nations.

It was the CP that produced the Vietnam Veterans Against the War banner under which Jan Barry, although ignorant of its authorship and source, marched on April 15, 1967.[54] The banner was prepared under Communist auspices and inspiration, even though there was no reason to believe authentic Vietnam veterans would march behind it. Six of them did. That was not an uncommon practice; the Communist Party provided many of the banners and literature used in demonstrations on all sorts of issues. They provided many of the creative and innovative ideas for illuminating deep human contradictions in an effort to place the differences

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between ideological capitalist fixations and claims of socialist utopias on the public agenda.[55]

Jan accepted help from any source that would not attempt to corrupt the VVAW ideal; he would not compromise the integrity of VVAW's internal integrity. He recalls the few hostile veterans who attended the demonstration, as well as a tremendous number of veterans who weren't interested in ideologies whatsoever and who were also essentially sophisticated into not being shaken by the fact that someone they were talking to was also a Communist. Jan stated in a personal interview (see Chapter II) that the question of communism did not enter into the question of Vietnam. At no time during his tenure in VVAW did he hear anyone on the left pushing their party line; what he did hear was the strength of the coalition to end the war.

The Party was heavily involved in the earlier freedom fighters sent into the south during the civil rights struggle; members were key organizers, recruiting students at universities and colleges. They micromanaged every detail of transportation and liaison building. Their assistance was not always snubbed by organizations and leaders struggling against entrenched state hypocrisy. Martin Luther King, Jr. relied heavily on party support for his civil rights marches in the south but would not enter

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the antiwar movement because it might politically jeopardize the success of his civil rights struggle. Bayard Rustin, a closet advisor to King had to serve as such unobstrusively due to his earlier membership in The Young Communist League, even though he had become an ardent anti-communist.[56] Still, King adamantly refused to enter into overt coalitions with any antiwar group that harbored or was suspected of affiliation with communists.

Thus, it was an extremely difficult task to persuade King to enter into the antiwar movement under those terms until Dave Dillinger, seconded by Harry Bellafonte, pointedly informed him that he would be left behind if he failed to commit to stopping a war that penalized young and poor blacks far more than working class white youths. This is not meant to denigrate King's neutral stance toward the antiwar movement, but the added consideration that he would be preempted by more radical elements within the black community who would assume his mantel of leadership through default played an important part in his change of heart.[57] The realization that the civil rights and the antiwar movements were part of the same battle finally brought the illustrious leader into the mainstream of antiwar activity, heavily weighting the struggle by adding a strong, vocal black constituency to the effort. That decision prevented

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King from becoming irrelevant and fixated within a political process that went nowhere without support from the left.

Communist Party members were everywhere; they were part of SANE, eventually catching the attention of Senator Thomas Dodd of Connecticut who accused that organization of harboring communists in positions of leadership.[58] Actually, though active and highly successful, the Communist Party cannot claim sole responsibility for the huge antiwar movement. Committees of individuals who mirrored a broad range of interests were integral parts of the protest.

The antiwar movement was too large to be ruled by a mere 20,000 or so native American communists. None of these could officially have held the movement together in conspiratorial splendor by duping innocent and gullible Americans to protest against their political establishment, to destabilize it and, in so doing, cause the loss of its war in Vietnam. From the Communist Party, the New Left, military pacifists to the liberal wing, along with their entire collection of political and social points of dissimilarity, the coalition held. And it held because the issue was greater than entrenched sectarian political hardliners.

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Despite the bitter and sometimes acrimonious internal struggles, the movement lurched from one huge demonstration to another, managing to stave off bitter antagonisms for another day. These internal struggles revolved around the nature of theory and praxis and the relationship between the two. First, within the theoretical, left concerns differed on what it was to be moral, central question being what is justice. Second, within praxis, or action, against what standards and values is the moral record measured. Within the third dimension, how is morality to be judged in the struggle for and exercise of power. There were as many opinions as there were left factions, with each segment totally dedicated to their definitive beliefs. Thus, agreement on leaders or organizers to pull the broad based coalitions into meaningful protest was not simple.

For instance, the chief organizer for the New York area was Henry Abrams of SANE, a member of the Communist Party that Norman Cousins was to fire in 1960. However, the profile of people who marched were students, academics, Maoists, Social Worker Party members, Quakers, Catholics, clergy and lay people and ordinary Americans who saw the state as the problem and the war in Vietnam as the significant product of an immoral process; the Communist Party was not as fearful to many of them as their own

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government had become. With each unearthed FBI and CIA dirty trick, the more repressive the state became, thus posing a greater threat to freedom than other ideological differences. There is no way of knowing how much of the internecine battles among the antiwar leadership was planned and implemented by agents provocateur, just as there is no way of knowing the full cadre of communists involved in the antiwar protest.

In an open-ended interview at CUNY on December 17, 1996, Dr. Stanley Aronowitz talked about the antiwar movement as being a positive force in American history and credited the Communist Party with being highly influential in its success.[59] Despite the bitter enmity between factions of Trotskyites, Maoists, nativists, and international devotees to socialism, it clarified many political stances and educated an American public that communism was not a monolithic massive evil empire rigidly incorporating every left position. Thus, the symbolization of the left as a monolithic entity dedicated to destroying the American way of life was a sham. What we note is a disoriented left deeply committed to destructive factionalism.

There were many differences that served to disunite the left, and not all entailed dogged, unalterable

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allegiance to an alien totalitarian entity intent of destroying democracy and religion. They could be humanists, as well. While much attention was focused on the dissension within the left, others did not consider the internecine battles as decisive and suicidal. In this, Aronowitz credits the movement's success to the conflict and upheaval among the individuals and groups forming the massive national response. In that frame, milquetoast unity would have circumscribed the richness of human resources that emerged as the hallmark of American greatness which credits the ingenuity of her people and their dedication to correct what was unjust and unfair within a democratic frame of consensus.

Sometimes dissent does not mean revolution but reform. Steven Lukes credits marxists with having an "honourable place in the resistance to oppression, above all to fascism and nazism, and in simple utilitarian terms, in developing societies."[60] On the other hand, as Trotsky remarked and Barrington Moore reveals, liberal democracy did not enter the world stage via a democratic road.[61] Each system, totalitarian or democratic, has shown the terrible human costs of capitalism and communism. However, in the Vietnam War era, we see capitalism's massive brutalities and communism's vain attempt to end the atrocities quickly.

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Within this contrast, we note the contradiction of a U.S. as the agent of repression and the bete noire and socialists, communists, and liberals as the protectors of freedom from oppression and warriors for universal human rights. Not that the volatile mix of ideologies had carte blanche to a successful trip to Beulahland. An example of savage infighting among the vying contenders can be seen in the first NCCEWVN convention held in Washington, D.C., on November 25-29, 1965. As each group tried to consolidate their efforts, from the liberals to the radical left, the overriding theme was to develop a new program of common actions, the battle was joined.[62] The infighting was bloody and bruising. Dr. Aronowitz observes that the high level of conflict and tension, contrary to what might be thought, were affirmative ingredients in the antiwar movement.[63] He allows that the hours of debates and wheeling and dealing may have been demoralizing to many but, despite the abrasive personality clashes, the power hungry egotists, and the arrogance of demagogues, it succeeded in linking disparate groups and very strange bedfellows into a national program to stop the war. As one participant noted, "This is what we are fighting for in Vietnam - our way of life, so that 1,000 radicals can play political games over a five day weekend and not get into

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worse trouble.[64] It would not be incorrect to say that, despite a significantly high level of disagreement and disruptive attempts by dedicated ideologues, an interegnum of sorts prevailed among antiwar factions for the most part, until the Nixon decision to bring the boys home from Vietnam.

Success in appearing to end the war carried a high price. Dave McReynold[65] noted that with the disengagement of ground forces in Vietnam many activists felt lost without the one great unifying factor in their lives, the struggle to end the Vietnam War. As another protestor stated, the antiwar movement had brought meaning and direction to many people who now had to get their hearts and minds together to experiment with ways of organizing their lives.[66] Still, after experiencing the movement, returning to the bland cultural quotidienne was rendered impossible. Yet for all the intent, peace had not come and the war continued unabated in intensity, albeit of a different kind. The killing of American soldiers had ceased but not U.S. intervention in Vietnam where massive bombings continued.

During the years between 1973 and 1975 the radical left disintegrated following internal upheavals; some of the liberal left returned to the system, the cease fire had

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lterally left the rebels without a cause. Financial problems plagued many of the pacifist groups and membership slipped throughout. Sane and CALC experienced a 50% drop in one year;[67] the VVAW had peaked at 20,000;[68] Another Mother for Peace, numbering 250,000 during its heyday, slipped by 60% during 1973 alone.[69] Slogans were laid to rest, banners rolled up or discarded and efforts were turned towards congressional checks and balances on presidential excesses, mainly by applying pressure on House members (who were vulnerable to biennial elections) to stop funding the war. Lobbying efforts replaced the demonstrators as the leverage for political action and Americans again turned their gaze inward.

For the groups left standing, amnesty and reconciliation were stressed. The VVAW opposed mere pardons because they were not asking for forgiveness[70] just for correcting the record, while others were for limited efforts to reintegrate and others totally committed to no alteration of the status quo. Amnesty was a high priority, as well, for FOR, WRL, AFSC, CALC and other church groups, however, SANE returned to its single issue disarmament roots; ADA to its social problems; IPC to an end of Cold War polarization; and the Communist Party returned to raising American consciousness on repression and exploitation. Post mortems

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on the peace movement concentrated on why they didn't win their domestic war for hearts and minds. Among the reasons offered were the middle class character of the opposition, the short term commitment of the student set, countercultural rhetoric and its anti-American value orientation, romanticizing of North Vietnam and the VC, associations with salient unAmerican types of political radicals and their extremist revolutionary language. Internally, criticism centered on blaming radical groups who used the movement for their own ends, fragmentation of the movement by internal interests and conflicts and subjective notions of moralistic distinctions glorifying passion and feeling at the expense of the intellect, and thus evidencing an infantile preoccupation with their collective navels.

But the antiwar movement was not irrelevant. For one brief shining hour, these organizations and citizens of every argument and persuasion, including the suspect Communist Party, returned a rogue executive branch into compliance with the American Constitution. They did not destroy democracy, furthermore, they helped to establish a political basis for future dissent. Contrary to American rhetoric, the CP helped to return American society into an ethical dimension of political values for a short while.

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The U.S. government did not become a Soviet satellite, the country did not self-destruct, and, most importantly, it helped to foster this nation's first effective antiwar, non-rubber stamp veterans organization that still incorporates an enduring segment of military opposition to war.

Thus, the antiwar movement demonstrated that in the last analysis men, not politicians and their technology, win or lose wars. In addition, the antiwar movement proved there are greater fears than an external red menace or yellow peril, even among those who must defend against it. The increasing efforts among the leaders of the nation to overcome moral and ethical restraints on policy, foreign and domestic, by fudging the moral plateau proved an infinitely greater danger to many witnesses. Although abstract, they serve as sentinels against the corruption of the ideal and men die to uphold their ideals. This last reality, appears to have triggered a genuine GI antiwar protest, thus, in essence, is simply the most incredible historical contribution of the antiwar movement. At first glance, the VVAW may appear to be outwardly directed away from the internalized direction of fealty and responsibility for the defense of their country. However, the reading of what was an honorable course of action for those

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charged with the task merely conjoined theory with praxis; the two were not that entirely far apart.

The term "inner-directed persons"[71] coined during the hotbed of pacifistic actions in 1955 was determined on ideals of social justice and social reform resting on a philosophical basis of disciplined non-violence. Their concerns centered on the larger human brotherhood, not the narrow secularistic approach of national identity. They avoided traditional and legal-rational types of leadership styles and worked toward consensual affiliations typical of the charismatic. Canonical rigidity and bureaucratic inflexibility were not encouraged.[72]

Their actions carried into the 60s and beyond into the VVAW mystique. When considering radical non-violence, however, their form of protest followed Ghandi's pattern of passive resistance and never included anarchy or activism beyond bearing witness to evil and that was generally peaceful and contained. They were the usual limp bodies that had to be removed by police or security during many of the demonstrations.

As long standing pacifists during World War II, their rules deplored the genocidal policies of the Holocaust, Allied fire-bombings of German civilians, forcible relocations of Japanese-Americans to concentration camps

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and the broad range of man's inhumanity to man exclusive of race, color, creed or national origin.[73]

The other major group surfacing during this time, the Intellectual Left, was split between liberal reformist wings and those who wanted revolutionary change. Those who were part of the reformist groups tended to support the prevailing political course thus were faulted by many left of center intellectuals for continuing the misguided patterns of political accommodation.[74] The character of these groups, however, remained as varied as the people who were in it. The argument centered on the question of power and morality with critics of power questioning whether being an intellectual stopped when one became an agent of power.[75]

In this, intellectual agonizing over power and morality led to an ethical paralysis for most of the group. To choose purity through complete disassociation from the corrupting essence of politics into an ivory tower of isolation abandoned the field to those who were not restrained by subjective appeals to conscience on one hand or to those who advocated the destruction of the political structure through violent means, if necessary, on the other. The latter option was viewed as a repudiation of intellectual dependence on reason and the former a

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guarantee in absentia to whatever transpired.[76] Neither held much appeal.

Certain intellectuals stand out during the early stages of peace activity. A. J. Muste, organizer and head of the American Workers Party which he later merged with the Trotskyist Workers Party, firmly resisted the polarization of East and West through his charismatic welding of radical activism with non-violence in the Gandhian sense. Norman Cousins, a founder of the United World Federalists, pursued his vision of world government as an answer to the nuclear age.

Norman Thomas, chronic campaigner for the presidency on the Socialist Party platform, although strongly opposed to Stalin, was against anything other than containment to remove the dictator from power. He operated under the mantra that no communist could be tolerated within any working agenda that asked for his support. Albert Einstein whose work contributed to the nuclear age and Bertrand Russell, prominent British philosopher, deplored the arms proliferation and their threat to the existence of the human race. I.F. Stone wrote on the return of pragmatic liberalism and recognized their political ascendency as problematic far before most did. Many of these men were motivated by deep personal religious principles.

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DeBenedetti lists four formations during the 1955 time frame that were significantly successful: The Fellowship of Reconciliation (FOR); the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC); the War Resisters League (WRL); and the Catholic Workers Movement (CWM). With the rise of the Black Civil Rights Movement in the 1940s, these peace groups had undergone a transformation from absolute pacifism into an active political phenomenon by 1955 through linkages with civil rights and anti-war protest elements.

The common denominator was the moral issue of racism implicit in segregation and genocide but the decisive factor was the will to accept struggle collectively.[77] Their first act of civil disobedience was non-compliance with the presidentially designated Operation Alert on June 15, 1955. It was a national day of supposedly surprise nuclear attack and the presidential proclamation of martial law mandated all citizens to respond to the emergency by engaging in civil defense simulations. They objected to what they viewed as a political attempt to normalize war. They refused to take part in the nationwide ducking for cover exercise deeming it a futile and cruel hoax on Americans who were being led to believe they could survive a nuclear holocaust. Twenty-five were arrested for their

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dissent, interestingly enough the basis of their disobedience was the Antigone defense.[78]

Journalistic support for those arrested and the nineteen found guilty resonated among writers David Dellinger, Dwight McDonald, Dorothy Day, Michael Harrington, William Hesseltine, Norman Mailer, Lewis Mumford, all of whom were contributing authors to Dellinger's journal Liberator.[79] Many of these "peaceniks" would become household words when the anti-war movement skyrocketed later. The merging of the religious and intellectual factions during the early 1950s remained relatively placid until the early 1960s and the civil rights struggle assumed national proportions.

Thus, when the broadening Vietnam war and the increasing draft quotas spilled over into the campuses, it further cemented these two rather disparate groups. The entry of students and faculty into the field welded youth and maturity into a broad based intellectual commitment that produced an unprecedented level of creativity and zeal. As the Vietnam casualties increased and anti-war dissent became vociferous, the media joined in bringing the Vietnam war into context. The sociological significance of this massive unrest, containing many of the deep standing divisions within society, centered on an

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outdated value system that, since the 1890s, had been evolving into strange complexities to maintain its hold.

The long history of petitioning government only to fail when economic interests were at risk patterned an adversarial culture where the Establishment became suspect. It was in the collective action and struggle established during the long feud with state power that the intensity of younger anti-war generational dissent was produced. Their frustrations dealt with the obstinacy of an intransigent warfare state and the unaddressed social responsibilities left in its wake. Irving Howe[80] has called these new norms confrontational politics and considers it a dangerous game for middle class youth to play. He does not state that the greater danger may be moral passivity. These in-your-face confrontations that were the hallmark of the later anti-war movement were so only because of the failure of democratic appeals to compel the state to act on a moral basis. The same tactics that were heroic in a later Tinianamen Square confrontation, however, were not considered such for Americans in Chicago or at Kent State where it was viewed by some as the essence of irresponsible anarchy, just as earlier the Solidarity union in Poland was given America's highest accolades while American union struggles have had a dismal history of physical and legal oppression.

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Thus public theatre as a last recourse to raising the Bakhtinian use of spectacle into theatre on a basis of youthful idealism may lack the seasoned rationality of prudent caution, however, it was not as totally anarchistic as Howe claims. As disbelief over the intractability of its elected officials to heed the national mood, demonstrators grew ever more impatient. The young are notoriously impatient over idealistic matters, seemingly suffering from the misguided notion that fairness and justice are to be had if one is overly persistent. In Wages of War, Severo notes the pointlessness of arguing the merits of whether the young of the 1960s were more abused by the Vietnam War than generations at any other time[81] thus the need for acute public redress of those grievances.

The generation that enlisted or were drafted for Vietnam went with deep convictions on the merits of the task; not all refused to go. They went with idealism and they performed well under difficult conditions and over 56,000 of them never returned home. The youth culture of the 60s reflected a thorough rejection of the rampant greed, shortsightedness and an absence of compassion incapable of relating to very human concerns they found in their own society. Thus the search for lost community was one of the strongest drives of the types of confrontational

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politics practiced by youth during the 1960s. Conforming Americans could not understand the new emergent norm of community held by the 60s generation also incorporated the enemy as part of the human race.

Although the young were criticized for much of the anti-war sentiment, however, the movement attracted a very broad cross-section of interests and ages. There was a strong affinity between compassionate community standards and the dissenters: religious, the poor, the discriminated, women, socialists, and academics. It was their growing impatience with a recalcitrant government that refused to stop destroying Asian communities that resonated into campuses and ignited student radicalization and politicization. Consternation over increasing levels of death and destruction was an accurate indicator of explosive reactions on campuses.

In that respect, the 60s generation discovered they held more in common with those who deplored the fragmenting and atomizing of community by virtue of class position than with those who supported human distortions. That link with empathy transcended philosophical differences that might have had an adverse effect on unified political action. As it was, there were severe disagreements between factions, such as Tom Hayden's SLID and the older left unions whom he

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considered redundant and passe, left behind in historical irrelevance.[82]

Socialists were accepted and were a large part of the dissent. However, they were specifically targeted by authorities for furthering the enemy's political philosophy and tainted with the same brush as other "enemies of the state." Apparently, they were singled out and harassed as designated foreign agents with harmful agendas by agencies of the state who corrupted the essence of constitutional privilege when investigating anti-war activity.

Although the presence of the Communist Party in the peace movement may have disturbed the general public, for the most part it did little to discourage the search for areas of unity among the dissenters until later. Growing dogmatic rigidity, an unwillingness to compromise deep philosophical differences, and intemperate language on the part of the "new left" created the serious internal disruptions that ultimately destroyed the unity of the movement.[83] It led to ideological confrontations producing bitter infighting and splits over competing strategies and tactics, until the arrival of the Vietnam Veterans Against the War into the anti-war movement.

In this, although the peace movement played a major part in bringing the war to an end, its organizational

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integrity was eroding. The unifying presence of these Vietnam veterans re-energized the coalitions by supplying a valid picture of the extent of state-sanctioned immorality in Vietnam.[84] The VVAW threaded their way through the minefields of differences, whether elements of the old guard left communist cadres waiting for the revolution to happen, the Trotskyites with their intransigent zeal to have things their way, or the less rigid doctrinaires of Social Democratic persuasion. These veterans worked hard to lower the level of divisiveness by returning the argument it where it belonged, on the level of social necessity.

Mannheim's[85] subtle exploration of the relationship between theory and praxis offers that social necessity clarifies the objective situation. It is also the process that illuminates experience allowing reality to undergo a transformation into new theory. This gives Thomas Kuhn's work[86] added importance in how narrow thought boundaries in ideological paradigms change. The vast underground reservoir of literature, brochures, faxes, sloganeering, and coffeehouses tuned into by anti-war dissenters in a creative explosion of unparalleled state confrontations was now accessible to the military.

And it was effective. In less than six months, the VVAW had arrived at the national political level.[87] As

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battlehardened Vietnam veterans, they had won the right to speak out on their experiences, successfully reaching out to military and civilians in the process. Basically, what we witness is the desire to escape from a rigid and stifling cultural straight-jacket dominated by economic and political theoretical determinisms.

The demands of national egoism, reflected in the escalating growth of an international policy of aggressive expansionism, was totally out of sync with the cultural changes that had been occurring in this country during much of the 20th century. A younger, highly educated generation trained in critical thinking was expected to forego those skills and willingly conform to the patterned necessity of political expediency. It could not. The motion picture, The Graduate, chronicled the generational alteration of materialistic negation that affected so many young Americans at that time. They simply chose to reject the hypocrisy.

Role models were no longer Abraham Lincoln or Horatio Alger, the new standards were decidedly not mainstream: Paul Goodman, Staughton Lynd, Jack Kerouac, A.J. Muste, Dave McReynolds, and Tom Hayden sponsored radical themes strongly antithetical to the old American value system.[88] Suddenly the search for meaning converged into

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unconventionality and freedom from rigid bureaucratic structures that had served to hold the fiction of the 1950s together. A large part of this cultural deviation was due to the GI Bill of Rights following World War II. Returning servicemen exposed to European modes of Marxian analysis blended their working class culture with academia and altered the university composition from Parsonian complementarity of norms to Marxian dialectics. Again, Mannheim's echo of Karl Marx in that political thought is bound up with social life and "it is not consciousness of men that determine their existence but the social existence of men that determines their consciousness.[89]

The introduction of masses of working class students in an otherwise elitist representative body promoted a democratic mix in professional and managerial categories. It also assured a comparative growth of the middle class producing an affluence unmatched since then. It was responsible for intellectualizing campuses away from conservative authority to a democratic radicalism that lasted till the 1980s return of Reaganism and a reimposition of "old values."

To those who failed to appreciate the broadening of university membership into traditional working class areas, Todd Gitlin's observation[90] that "democracy is not for bad

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nerves or ancestor worship...as such, it is not a quality of the state alone, but of of the populace," is echoed in Carl Oglesby's view that "democracy is nothing if it is not dangerous."[91] The broadening of academia to normally non-college types of working class students ushered in an educated strata among traditional high school or less individuals and introduced an element of social dynamite.

In The War Within,[92] author Tom Wells describes the social richness within these anti-war protest groups. There were senior citizens and teenagers, religious and atheists, pacifists and pugilists, healers and bomb throwers, academics and illiterates, all shades of political affiliations, including Communists and Maoists, Socialists and Trotskyites, rich and poor, Black and White, and civilians and (later) military. The creativity, innovation and spontaneity of programs resulting in civil disobedience and legal demonstrations, sit-ins, preach-ins, teach-ins, and grass-roots organizing were apparent in their varied approaches to organizing against the war and they were contagious. Thus the generally retarding force of competing classes were held in abeyance, while disparate economic groups united under educational enlightenment. That combination led to a volatile mix of determination for change.

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They could not have gone far without a very powerful ally, the media. Even here, the First Amendment of the Constitution has always held interesting dialectical contradictions. The Roosevelt Administration's World War II prohibition against showing war dead so as not to interfere with public support of that war, although weakening in 1943, still held censorship validity during the Kennedy and Johnson years of "no bad news" please, until television and journalists broke all the rules.

The scenes of carnage and body bags were unsuitable silent companions for dinner conversations. Neither were the technological twins of Napalm and artillery socially conducive methods for judging the moral merits of American participation in a war thousands of miles away that entered living space in a matter of seconds. The impact of My Lai and the whitewashing of higher echelons of official responsibility in the action damaged public support of Vietnam even further.

How did this propel the VVAW into front stage center in less than a year? By 1968, the Vietnam war had escalated into a major conflict. Nixon's election to the presidency in November 1968 rested on his promise to bring peace to Vietnam. By January 1969 when he took his oath of office, there were 536,000 American soldiers in Vietnam; in

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April, it would peak at 543,000. However, every week would see about 300 dead American bodies flown back to the states in state of the art, highly cost efficient, reusable metal transfer cases.[93]

Domestic opposition to the war, almost moribund in 1966[94] increased to explosive levels when the campuses exploded over the change in draft exemptions for college students convincing the DOD it had to cope with the possibility of internal United States insurrection, as well.[95] Many Vietnam veterans had returned to the universities after service. Jan Barry stressed that all VVAWers should be trained in forensics in order to debate every facet of Vietnam policy and history effectively with bureaucrats or others following the official "party line."

The rapidly increasing civil disturbances during the first nine months of 1967 included upheavals in 150 cities ranging from minor affairs to major crises, among them, Newark, New Jersey and Detroit, Michigan where the National Guard had to be called out to control the situation. In a few cases, however, federal troops had to be mustered.[96] At the peak of the Detroit riots on July 29, 1967, a total of 15,339 federal and National Guard troops were stationed in "occupied" Detroit and 9,613 had been committed into action.[97]

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On October 21st through the 23rd, 1967, during a massive anti-war demonstration, a total of 10,346 marine and army troops were placed in the Washington, D.C. area; three battalions were posted outside of the Pentagon. The United States Strike Command flew in the 1st Brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division from Fort Bragg, North Carolina.[98] The demonstration was separated into two groups; one of 50,000 non-violent marchers who had gathered at the ellipse and another group of 20,000 marchers, many wearing gas masks and carrying ax handles, who stormed the east side of the Pentagon behind a barrage of rocks and crashed through the lines of the 30th and 504th military brigades but were finally stopped at Corridor 7 of the Pentagon by clouds of tear gas.[99] Added to a manpower shortage of available draftees and the unpopularity of the draft itself, the insatiable appetite for replacements in the the worsening situation in Vietnam placed the Administration between a rock and a hard place. Deserters and draft resisters increased.

Unofficial figures of fugitives from justice by 1972 had reached 75,000, while the FBI totalled a mere 7,000 agents, of whom only a fraction were assigned to tracking down fugitives.[100] The peace movement added substantially to the difficulty of their task by providing safe houses

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and sanctuaries for anyone who asked for it, thus aiding and abetting designated criminals.

Although the rates of non-compliance with military service were not as high in February of 1968,[101] all available military resources in the U.S. were exhausted, and MACV was still asking the Pentagon for more men.[102] Student reaction to the draft was too deep to risk further antagonism of already restive campuses. Stop the Draft weeks had been observed from Oakland, California, to New York City during the October/December 1967 timeframe.

The Johnson Administration began 1968 with the indictment of five advocates of draft resistance on conspiracy charges on January 5,[103] only to be challenged by two national draft-card turn-ins on April 3rd and November 14th. General Westmoreland's request for another 206,000 men on February 28, 1968[104] was understandably ill-timed as the new Defense Secretary Clark Clifford turned against the war and the Wise Men advocated de-escalation of the war during their March 25-26th meeting.[105] The Reserves and National Guard had never been called up for Vietnam duty thus prudently remained on call for home front service.[106] However, there were two major units still programmed for Vietnam. One of them, 1st Squadron of the 18th Armored Cavalry (a Californian National Guard unit), was ordered

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into active federal service at Burbank on May 13, 1968 and was scheduled to leave for Vietnam in August. That had to be cancelled because of the considerable anti-war political turmoil in California by that time.[107]

Consider that three years earlier, January 1, 1965, the U.S. Army totalled 970,000 soldiers with over one-half of these in the continental U.S. and the rest scattered throughout the globe from Germany to Korea and Vietnam, there had been a thinning out of the last line of defense.[108] The financial cost of maintaining a Pax Americana was becoming burdensome to a society not willing to sustain long-range sacrifice. The U.S. had been in a technical state of emergency since Korea and still relied primarily on the draft for manpower and taxpayers to finance its needs. Thus, at the beginning of 1968, allowing for the drain in manpower by rising rates of Vietnam casualties, the 82nd Airborne Division training in North Carolina for riot control, two understrength Marine and four cannibalized Army Divisions were the only units left stateside, with the 82nd the only actual divisional combat able group available for Pentagon use.[109]

Policy decisions related to undercutting the antiwar thrust resulted in cutbacks on manpower and substitution

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with costly military hardware. In Vietnam it left us ill-prepared for a guerrilla type of warfare that invalidated our technology intensive battle plans and actions. By removing vital human intelligence, we were stripped of the ability to flexibly cut and run, to strengthen weak spots quickly and effectively, and it undercut the will of the soldier to do either. Internally, it lowered the ability of the military to stop domestic upheavals.

When Washington, D.C., Chicago and Baltimore blew up following the April 4, 1968 assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., the failure of cost effective measures were felt. It took most of the regular army formations left in the U.S., as well as massive numbers of National Guard troops, to subdue the riots that exploded in only three cities.[110] The best the administration could offer was the April 16, 1968, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directive announcing the DOD would gradually shift the burden of the Vietnam war to the South Vietnamese armed forces.[111]

These events were followed by the FBI launching of their COINTELPRO (Counter Intelligence Program) against the left in May, 1968.[112] The intensity of antiwar protests was not a left conspiracy, the left was never unified to the point of posing a revolutionary threat to anyone, much

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less stopping a war cold. The rising level of discontent was directly attributable to the corresponding rise in troops committed there and the accompanying increase in casualty rates. In November 1963 there were 16,300 advisers in Vietnam, 78 died; at the end of 1964 and the beginning of 1965, there were 23,300 advisers, and a total of 225 deaths; July 1965, there were 81,400 troops, and 509 deaths; December 1965, there were 184,300 troops and deaths totalled 1,594; December 1967 with 485,000 troops, there were 15,979 dead. At the end of December, 1968 the total number of troops killed in Vietnam reached 30,568, and January 1973, 58,191 officially killed in Vietnam.[113] And we see their effect in the increased intensity of demonstrations with each casualty announcement.

Despite the tide of anger and rage, the Vietnam War remained a functioning technical marvel. It was said to be run by cold, impersonal, dispassionate technocrats responsible only for calculating the effective use of the best modern technology science could provide. It was the political aspect of casting dissenters at home in the same mold as the enemy that energized protestors to double their efforts to neutralize public support for the war by attracting as many new recruits as possible into their ranks. As a result, the creativity, massive concentration

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of human resources, and criticisms of technology were ammunition used in the ideological battle to capture minds.[114] VVAW emerged, coincidentally, with rising casualty rates and further escalation of the war by President Johnson. We note that within seven months of their entrance, Secretary of Defense McNamara left the administration after notifying President Johnson the war in Vietnam could not be won, followed six months later by President Johnson who decided not to seek reelection.

Within two and a half years of their entry, despite Nixon's election to the presidency and a further intensification and widening of the war, the American army had disintegrated in the field amid worsening chaotic conditions at home.[115] The invasion of Cambodia on April 30, 1970 was the flashpoint that triggered student anger at Kent State and public shock that it could have happened at all. Kent State became symbolic of the Vietnam War; children could die if the state so deemed it necessary, even American children.[116]

An astonished nation had been led to believe the war was winding down, now the realization that it had far to go was counterproductive to political goals plagued by peculiar types of military ineptness in the field.[117] The advantages of technological superiority were

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countermanded by "friendly fire," carpet bombing of entire areas, acres of real estate saturated with harmful chemical agents, and every conceivable type of weaponry that were not human friendly. Add to this the secrecy under which these operations were conducted, even to keeping the intelligence sector in the dark so that the knowledge of even the number of bridges on roads, the length of the frontier between South Vietnam and other countries, or accurate aerial reconnaissance on North Vietnamese troop movements were not available. All this tended to impact military operations. Despite our huge technological advantages of resources, we were no closer to winning the war in 1970 than when we started.

The mystification of power went far beyond its ability to control every outcome, seen or unseen. President Nixon, if nothing else, may be remembered for his skill in disturbing bees' nests. The Cambodian invasion shut down one-third of American colleges that were severely disrupted or closed by campus unrest and led the Vietnam Moritorium Committee to call for massive and immediate protests against the renewal of hostilities. Campus buildings were destroyed or vandalized and the Kent State ROTC building was sent up in flames ushering in the National Guard by command of Governor James Rhodes on May 7, 1970 resulting

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in 4 killed, and 15 wounded wounded on campus.[118] Kent State marked the domestic turning point of the Vietnam War, passive non-violence went by the boards, so did confidence in democratic rule. Students do not operate in a vacuum, they have parents. The shockwaves that emanated out of Kent State thus galvanized an entirely different set of war dissenters, people who were more or less in a neutral state of suspension till then.

In keeping with cybernetic refinement, the White House had been compiling daily statistics on what was happening in terms of the number of violent bombings, incidents of assassinations, snipings, etc. during war escalations.[119] During May 1970 alone, 40,000 bombings took place across the entire nation. The resignations from government service was among those of upper middle class affluence, former unequivocal supporters of the Vietnam policy. It was accompanied by the increasing dissension within the Nixon administration, affecting his physical and psychological state.[120]

By 1972 the administration had been forced to negotiate with the enemy; by May 1, 1975, it had deserted an ally, even though a corrupt one, to their own fate; destroyed an army; alienated an entire generation; and had stamped an indelible distrust of government on the cultural

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roots of this country as a result of major errors made by the political branch. Specifically, the mistakes were made during the Kennedy and Johnson terms, but assumed fatal proportions during the the Nixon/Kissinger administration. Finally, as a direct outgrowth of the Vietnam War, this country came within a hairsbreadth of impeaching a standing president for the first time in its history for punishable criminal violations of office.[121]

It is in hindsight that we see how successful the anti-war movement was in reforming the system. The increasing anger and frustration as a result of the Vietnam war did not lessen. Its roots were set in the moral convictions represented by those who resisted the war and those who served in it. Myra MacPherson wrote of the need to heal the schism between opposing moral convictions on both sides of the divide: those who resisted the war and those who served in it.[122] The deep anger that served to polarize this country is evident in polls taken in post-war public opinion samples.

In this when asked if we could have won the war if the politicians in Washington had let us, 47% of the general public agreed, as did 72% of Vietnam-era veterans, as well as 82% of those who fought in heavy combat there. Still, the country and Vietnam veterans were deeply divided on

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this issue. 37% of Vietnam veterans believed they were asked to fight in a war they could not win, and 38% of the American public thought so too.[123]

Basic to this loss of trust in government was the class basis of who went to Vietnam and who died there. Willis' study of who died in Vietnam[124] reported an inverse relationship between class and casualties over the World War II official reports for the identical geographic areas.[125] The groups he studied which contained the lowest levels of social indicators, such as median income, rent and house values, had the highest casualty rates, and these patterns remained constant across different branches of the service, rank and position within the military, racial composition and educational levels.

Furthermore, when he used the same technique to compare the similar relationships between World War II and Vietnam casualties, more affluent states had higher rates of casualties in World War II than in Vietnam. This is explained by the over representation of lower and working class men in the Vietnam war due to the voluntary nature of service, as opposed to their under representation in World War II. Willis found that in all categories, those in lower SES backgrounds suffered higher casualty levels in the Vietnam War than in World War II.[126] Towards the

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increasing rationality of technoplanning evidenced in Gibson's work[127] and the corresponding alienation, we can utilize Willis' findings that in June of 1939, 60.1% of army enlisted men were in ground combat positions, declining to 39.6% by July of 1945; by 1963 this statistic had declined to 39.5%, remaining there for most of the Vietnam War.[128]

In this sense, the proportion of support to combat troop increases occasioned by the alteration of traditional to modern warfare, as indicated above, could mean that men from higher SES backgrounds would qualify in higher numbers for support positions than the less qualified combat infantryman by virtue of expanded technological expertise.

Although he notes the greater shift in ratios occurred before and during the first stages of World War II, because of total mobilization, there wasn't the disproportionate imbalance between classes witnessed in the Vietnam War casualty lists.[129] In the Vietnam War, the smaller proportion of available manpower than in the World War II period is due to the likelihood of a smaller cross-section of American society available to the draft. He notes that during the end of World War II, draft eligibles in the military stood at 51.9%, however, during the height of the Vietnam War, 1968, only 14.1% of registered draft eligibles

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were in the military.[130] Thus Willis sees an individual's race as a more important factor for risks of being killed in World War II than a person's class status. This was reversed in Vietnam in that class status, not race, was a greater influence in the risk of becoming a fatality.

The smaller pool of men and women willing to enter the military service of a country that is seemingly programmed to protect market relations on a global basis, indicates a cultural split between the political and economic institutions on one side of the divide and the social sphere on the other. This may be the area where internal contradictions will lead to further ideological erosion that was only dimly discerned in all of the wild anti-war years of the Vietnam War period.

The declining rates of enlistment, the class basis of poor, less educated, and lower SES personnel which is the imprint of our modern American army predicted by Willis[131] thus appears to be the weak link in the seamlessness of American market expansionism. The slogan: "Hell No We Won't Go," so prevalent during the mass parades of the 60s underlies the perceptions gained in interviewing veterans who served in Vietnam, who overwhelmingly avow they would never serve in a military capacity unless this country were physically attacked. I do not find as much concern for the

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nature of the poor having to carry the load for the rich as much as a concern for the way we wage war. The sacrificial aspect of technology waged over soldier and the enemy in equal proportions of risk is that point that recurs throughout the research data.

Theoretically, the cultural break between state and society is a classic ideological failure of the state to maintain hegemony through the traditional sacrificial nature of "service above the call of duty" from personnel in its last line of defense merely on factors of assertion. The planning for Vietnam calculated human risks in terms of attaining the goals, thus, Agent Orange, napalm, gassings, and friendly firing were equated in cost effective terms.

Towards this purposive rationality, Heidegger notes that a stress on scientific objective is that "being is being measured." Humans did not fare well in the Vietnam War in the sense that they could not command higher value than the bottom line faceless statisticians assigned to them. In this, Vietnam was the historical point where for one brief moment, human resistance corrected the record. Society is in a constant state of creation and recreation among countless numbers of people, many of them acting in concerted action to alter roles into a meaningful historical frame. The implosion of the military in Vietnam

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following the emergence of the VVAW is an example. It gained momentum after their Janus-type linkage with elements within the military and the anti-war protesters. Their entry into the frame provided the military discipline, the experience gleaned from having been in Vietnam, and the will and dedication to see the task through to completion.

The coalitions formed between a widening range of defections from traditional obedience to the state eventually led to a military impasse in Vietnam that mandated negotiations for a withdrawal of U.S. military forces in Vietnam before victory was secured. Thus the deviation from obedience to state to moral imperatives is clear; the state itself could not withstand the informal sanctions of moral indignation of a polity that had reached the limits of forbearance and challenged the legal basis of the state to exist. Nor could it afford the defection of its last line of defense, the military.

That objective reality was observable in the vast political awakening within the military that undercut the ability of this very powerful nation to carry out the normal functions of war and thus experienced a dismal loss of national honor and the trust of its people that will have repercussions into the future. We can state that the

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unquestioned supremacy of the state to decide policy unilaterally ended for the United States on May 1, 1975. The equation of victory based on an obsession with technology and science contributed to the failure of will that we are only now dimly beginning to understand. That, coupled with an unbending policy of reducing all costs to the lowest common denominator, produced the greatest failure rate among wars waged by this country to date. It correlates with the increasing rationalization within the society that reifies inanimate objects over human value. We see the continuation of this process in the present recanting of promises given to World War II veterans, the solid support of the Establishment, for health care in veterans hospitals. They are now being shunted onto Medicare as the Veterans Administration downsizes or closes facilities that have served veterans at negligible cost to them.

Eventually this process of rationally breaking faith cannot substitute scientific production and technological insertions for the inherently human accomplishments of will and endeavor. Technology is neutral, humans are not, still, although we have learned where areas of human resistance are most likely to surface, overcoming obsolescent, bureaucratic obsessions with simple statistics

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is not that easy. For instance, the cost of the Department of Defense's combined budgets from 1946 to 1973 was $1.5 billion. The U.S. surpassed more than 100% of the material reproducible national wealth, or the money value of everything man-made on the surface of the U.S. continent and the spending on the military was $87.00 for every $100 of fixed capital formation in the civilian economy.[132]

Global military expenditures are expanding rapidly, at a quicker pace than the ability of the population to meet, roughly 5% of total world income in 1993. That figure eclipses the entire economic production of Africa and is higher than all of Asia, excluding Japan.[133] Despite the increasing emphasis on security, the 20th Century has witnessed 86,597,000 deaths through war,[134] 1,303,490 American dead included in that total.[135] Military security, no matter the technological base, can never be expected to totally protect a political system whose public is insecure and dehumanized by the methods necessary to protect an out-of-touch leadership.

It is futile for a nation whose political institution is at war with its social sphere to expect the weaker elements and poorer classes to staff its military to protect the very systemic forces that victimize them.[136] Thus current Social Darwinistic policies are self-

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defeating in that it echoes the Vietnam experience where racism, class, and ideology clashed and out of that collision old traditional class loyalties disappeared, as did the will to engage an enemy with whom they identified. The poor and unproductive again face the state, the same state that expects their sons to defend a system that will not defend them.

The anti-war movement, in that respect, did its most effective work in educating individuals into assessing whether moral deficiencies were in the best interest of a healthy society. A decent society spends its resources eliminating hunger, disease, and poverty at home and internationally. A responsive government addresses pressing social needs because that is the best defense it has. It means cooperation and not competition and the willingness to work for peace, not war, to correct the imbalances in standards of living.

It is such a simple idea; no amount of money will ensure absolute safety, a country is only as secure as its most insecure citizen. Thus advancing the moral foundations of personal commitment into dedicated action was a classic example of human awakening to correct a wrong. The VVAW serves as a guide in the process into the metamorphosis of responsible military rebellion. It will

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surface whenever individuals cease to trust their organized institutional forms yet do not want to destroy the foundational values those institutions offer. The recurring social theme is that institutions should be there for human betterment, not vice versa. However, Vietnam offers the classic example of corporate addiction to war profits in the $590 billion spent on the war in Indochina.[137] There appears slight difference between the drug addiction that preceded the collapse of the military and the corporate addiction to war profits that ensured it. Each was as deadly to our society as the other.

The Vietnam War offered a window of opportunity to struggle for correctives that would reverse the ideological process of equating human need with technocratic necessity where many suffer so few may benefit. The length of the war provided fertile soil for the cynicism in American society to grow into the perception that their government could not be trusted to govern. For many, the routinization of violence that deadened the will into sustained brutality and brought so much misery to Vietnam was no different than Hitler's sustained brutality against "surplus populations" or "useless eaters."

Mantell's[138] work on Green Berets and war resisters traces the processes that ultimately can lead to resistance

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over conformity and discovers the key to be the disaffection for conforming obedience devoid of individual freedom of choice. By its very nature, violence precludes the incorporation of free will by brutalizing all opposition to its hegemony. Within this theme, the challenge to state immorality ultimately came from those within its own military who were charged with protecting the integrity of the state and did so by paralyzing it simply by choosing to follow a higher universal standard of honor and duty.

However, we could note that the groundwork was carefully laid by an assortment of left wingers and fellow travelers who joined in the great crusade to stop the destruction of human standards of freedom and justice for all. Americans have a strange fixation on freedom; they fail to see that freedom is the right to select standards on which to live or die, whether distinctly different or homogenously constant to the American brand. In this, there has always been savage campaigns waged to destroy anyone or anything who tried to humanize American standards of economic disparities.

In the labor strife following the great industrialization wave after the Civil War, the massive foreign immigration it engendered subjected these alien masses to the fortress America mentality and occasioned

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bitter class warfare under the formula "fear of the other." They were not wanted, only their labor. Their ideas were not wanted, only their passive acceptance for the wretched conditions they were subjected to so the system of self-interest could continue unabated and supreme.

They were expected to remain silent, imperceptible and create the wealth without sharing in it. Thus the rigidity in U.S. stratification has remained constant without any parity in a rising standard of living for those under the top 15% of the population who enjoy a disproportionately 20% of the nation's wealth. Democratic notions of equality and brotherhood remain silent spectres on the fringes of conservative rhetoric and liberal democratic platitudes.

In the antiwar movement, we see all these differences coming together into a single issue - stop the war. On that point, all shades of so called fringe elements, the left crazies, were brought together with the wild idea that they could stop an insane government from destroying the world. Communists, Trotskyites, Socialists, Fascists, Catholics, Quakers, Protestants, Jews, Blacks, Whites, Asians, and all shades of the rainbow laid aside their deep differences and divisions for the greater cause.

However, it didn't last long. Infighting and polemics took precedence to educating the American mind to the

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dangers of state usurpation of inherent constitutionally guaranteed rights. We see, again, the time-honored methods of state surveillance, disruptions, misrepresentations of political allegiance of those who opposed official government policies. Not that the left met these with equanimity, they were not passive. In fact, one of the greatest points of disagreement among segments of the antiwar movement was on intent and action: Ghandian non-violence or in your face confrontations.

The intellectual thrust came from left of center groups. The Berkeley Free Speech Movement could not have functioned without communist support and leadership; The later teach-ins were shaped by prominent communist members or their admirers. Many ex-communists or members in good standing were pivotal in shaping the issues and debate of the antiwar years. The cream of the crop of intellectual opinion molders are reputed to have been either CPers, CP dropouts or dedicated socialist adherents of every persuasion during much of the leftwing antiwar activity: A. J. Muste, Norma Becker, Rennie Davis, Fred Halstead, Bogdan Denitch, Stanley Aronowitz, Clyde Magarelli, Angela Davis, Gus Hall, Lou Diskin and many others actively helped to organize the antiwar movement into a historic endeavor to educate the American mind.

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To say there was no left presence in the antiwar movment would be quite naive. They could not have controlled the entire upheaval on campuses, the tell-all revelations of publications emerging from the war,[139] the critiques of I.F. Stone, and, finally, they could not have comprised the entire growing opposition to the war by rank and file military personnel. They offered alternatives to the rubber-stamp avenues of diluted and mendacious official government sources of information.[140]

In this, the left was very definitely better at what they do than the Washington bureaucratic apperatchiks were. The left not only had a field day with their mission and mandate to turn American fixation with death into a celebration of life, but they had fun doing so. And, of course, the results speak for themselves in the successful presentation of absurdity as it was.

They not only helped to stop the war, they convinced an army to join them and quit. We perceive historical conditions that in this instance separated ideals from the rigidity of necessry conformity engendered by entrenched warfare and the conflict that separation produced. Under the stress of war, and the type of assembly line combat it introduced, the anti-human scientific management incorporation of the human intensive war areas itself

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provided the opening for the greatest architects of antiwar struggle to emerge.

As an example of the wealth of talent in this area, the Fifth Avenue Parade Committee was composed of but did not represent some eighty organizations who did not share the same ideologies or approaches. The multi-faceted group was originally chartered to coordinate New York activities in the first International Days of Protest. This contentious group of individuals were held in check by A. J. Muste's skill in harnessing inflexible ideological rigidities with the need for cooperation and conciliatory civility.

As with all antiwar work that mandated lowering political differences in common cause to a greater ideal, it was difficult, time consuming, and heartbreaking when it failed. The years of agitation are littered with broken minds, bodies, and burned out determinations. The Nixon Administration operated for the first half of 1969 by moving against and crushing antiwar critics. The Committee of Six, a Pat Buchanan and Tom Huston covert White House undertaking,[141] utilized the IRS, harassed and starved liberal foundations of funding, such as the Brookings Institute, allocated 2,000 FBI agents to monitor the New Left, had agent provocateurs disrupt activities and assist

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extreme right wing activism among them, gathered political intelligence by conducting illegal wiretaps of not only leftists but administration officials and journalists after the leaks on the secret bombing of Cambodia were made public.

The CIA was used to document links between international communists and the domestic war movement. For the third time, the CIA could not find any evidence of foreign infiltration or linkages of the antiwar groups, at a time when the second highest FBI official was funnelling $2 million a year in funds from Russia to the American Communist Party.[142] Dissidents within the antiwar movement knew what the American public did not, that government infiltration of the antiwar movement was a far greater threat to this nation in the dissolution of constitutional rights they represented.

In this sense, the government that was charged with maintaining the American way of life did far more harm than left wing agitation to return the country to democratic roots ever could. The success of the antiwar movement did not turn this country over to communists; it did not destroy the American value system; it did not destroy the U.S. Constitution; it did not destroy ownership of private property; it did not allow Russia or China to paralyze our

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political system; it did not destroy our religious or our educational institutions or our freedom of choice where either is concerned; it did not destroy our army; the implosion was accomplished by the state without assistance from the left.

Thus, it was not the antiwar movement that posed the greater threat to this nation and its people, but those who were designated protectors of the moral and ethical ideals from which this society supposedly received its strength and resilience. In this, the two antithetical ideological systems rested on differing ideological imperatives: marxists followed the power of the will while capitalists followed the corruption of the intellect. No better reflection on the merits of the two opposing philosophies exists than Martin Luther's succinct statement that reason is a whore, it will follow any master,[143] or Nietzsche's observations on the passion of what humans are and their will to power by contrasting it with reason in choices between Apollonian rationality or Dionysian celebration of life.[144] He observed that these choices usually appear in times of great danger when philosophers and art take the place of disappearing myth, something most of which their contemporaries appear unaware; thus only people conscious of the danger they are in produce genius.[145]

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As a historic postscript, this argument wove its way through the Vietnam War; the will prevailed on the belief in supremacy of human passions while the collapse of a capitalist army eloquently speaks to the internal weakness of purpose and resolve rooted in dependency on intellect separated from human essence and devoid of responsibility whatsoever to human needs.

An explanation of why communism failed in the USSR zones of influence is required. Simply, imitation may not be the sincerest form of flattery, it could be fatal. The recent implosion of the Soviet Empire and the "end" of communism can be traced to the USSR deviation from its marxian roots of bettering the human condition by trashing their social contract and opting for parallel impersonal bureaucratic management-intensive structures operative in the U.S. They seem to have all but vanished as a historical exlamation point.

Thus no matter the political system, the idealist will rebel at the juncture where the system elevates science and technology as self referential universes enthroned as the epitome of state perfection and imperfect humans are seen merely as means to that end, easily replaced, easily manipulated, easily discarded, easily ignored and of little consequence. For a brief window of opportunity following

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the end of the Vietnam War, there was hope for discussions on ending less socially repressive concepts of freedom. With the collapse of the left, it has been closed.

Toward a return to this ideal, Aronowitz arques for the rebirth of radical democracy.[146] In this, radical democracy does not insist on a single truism, whether moral, sexual, or whatever. He states the aim of radical democracy is to free the individual from all forms of domination, whether familial, sexual, race, class, or state. In this, "it is to create the conditions for the free development of the individual, upon which the possibility of a satisfying collective life rests."[147] Toward that end, the following chapters will trace the reasons why men rebel. Unless government rests on a base of guaranteeing individual social justice and fairplay, it will have to abandon all democratic pretense of serving at the will of the people, by the people and for the people.

Present trends indicate a widening breach between the state and the people in whose name it governs indicating a general loss of the free exercise of sovereignty over the conditions of life. Cynicism increases as a culture is dying. We note, with Hegel, that the owl of Minerva takes to flight only when the darkness has fallen. He was speaking of the death of Athenian democracy and the rise of

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tyranny, both inextricably bound within a web of corruption and tyranny. If we view the characters of our political leadership, from Vietnam till now, there is a sound basis for American distrust of their elected officials.

Increasingly, the state appears to be following the illustrious Henry Kissinger's advice on time distinctions between the unconstitutional and the illegal. The illegal having been accomplished, the dismantling of the U. S. Constitution away from citizen empowerment and protection can proceed. As in the antiwar movement, agency is key; however, if present trends continue, we may expect a renewed state/idealist collision over the abuse of power. It is, after all, over issues of moral and ethical concerns where life, all life, cannot be subsumed to a less than human existence with the products they create, or to human degradation and the loss of freedom therein, that action is impelled. Toward correcting that imbalance, we can expect the idealist to rebel sooner than later.

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FOOTNOTES

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[90] Todd Gitlin in the Preface to Tom Wells, The War Within, xiii.

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[92] Ibid., 2.

[93] Shawcross, Sideshow, 85.

[94] Shelby L. Stanton. Rise and Fall of an American Army: U.S. Ground Forces in Vietnam, 1965-1973 (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1985), 211,

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[100] Halberstam, "The Vietnamization of America, The Dissent of the Governed, 265-66.

[101] Stanton, Rise and Fall of an American Army, 214.

[102] Wells, The War Within, 243.

[103] Ibid., 230-233.

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[105] Wells, The War Within, 250-252.

[106] DeBenedetti and Chatfield, An American Ordeal, 42.

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II. THE EMERGENCE OF THE VIETNAM VETERANS AGAINST THE WAR, INC.

The Vietnam Veterans Against the War was founded on June 1, 1967 by six former enlisted men in New York, all of whom had served in Vietnam, and had met when they joined in the April 15, 1967 Peace Mobilization march organized by Norma Becker[1] and others in New York City. They were at the march because they had concluded the Vietnam conflict was wrong, unjustifiable and contrary to the principle of self-determination on which America was founded.[2] Further, they believed that involvement in Vietnam was not in the best interest of the Vietnamese people or for Americans, that U.S. policy in Vietnam supported tyranny and was anti-democratic.

They realized the American people didn't know the extent of the misinformation they received. Their personal experience informed them Vietnam was one country, as specified in the 1954 Geneva Accords, and that the conflict was a civil war.[3] They also discovered that the government

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in Saigon was a military dictatorship supported by a small feudal aristocracy, the ARVN and one-half million American troops. In addition, the U.S. was not fighting the North Vietnamese in South Vietnam but the South Vietnamese people themselves and that the problem in Vietnam was not military but a combination of social, economic and political factors. As such, there was no military or American solution possible.[4]

Jan Barry, one of the six founding members of the VVAW and its first president, saw the organization he helped found as one based on a single issue: getting the American troops out of Vietnam and that could best be accomplished by educating the American people to the true situation in Vietnam. He had arrived in Vietnam in December of 1962 in the first wave of American troops sent by President John F. Kennedy when he increased the number of American advisors to the Diem regime. Jan was one of the replacements for the original group that had been there for about a year. He recalls how he was "in a position to see a process at work that troops who came in later had no idea that this is how they got to be where they were."[5]

What follows is the history of the emergence of the VVAW Organization as offered by Jan Barry Crumb during a personal interview granted this author on January 31, 1994, at his home in Montclair, N.J.

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"I was there for the troop escalation and the myth that we weren't there at all. I went over originally with a passport in dress uniform and most of the time wore civilian clothes as soon as the military function was over for the day. I understand the misrepresentation by the U.S. government of our not really being in a military situation was one of long duration. I ran into people in Vietnam who had been through all those earlier stages of the war and learned the history of the war from these old-timers. I began to appreciate the people who had been around and gave me the insight into what was going on. I gained an entirely new understanding of what was happening in Vietnam, in contrast to the official version of what was going on.

I spent ten months with an army aviation unit that resupplied Special Forces and advisors all over South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia and did, or at least had, active participation in the illegal or secret cross-border operations into North Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. While the United States government was denying all this, even denying being into Cambodia, I was in an airplane that was flying over Cambodia.

Everything we did there was done in denial, done, and you reached a certain point where the GIs over there knew

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there was a complete difference between what they were doing and what they were reading about what they were doing. At that time, I had no basis on which to judge the apparent double standard that posed questions of propriety; that came later when I would ask if my country was lying about the serious conditions of warfare, what else were they lying about. I was a nineteen year old soldier whose entire focus from childhood on had been on planning on getting into West Point and making a career of the military. It was clear to me that Vietnam was this little tiny sideshow we were in and there was a larger picture but one was too busy to take time out then to write about it.

Even VVAW history follows that pattern; we were too busy making history to write about it. There is no comprehensive history about the VVAW organization to date, although several attempts have been made to record it. The difficulty is one of trust; for many years there had been a deliberate attempt to sabotage the true representation of our organization. We were not wild-eyed radicals intent on destroying the democratic institutions of this country, we wanted to save them. We were not willing or unwitting stooges of Communist front organizations determined to wage revolution, but we would work with any group, any

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organization, and talk to anyone who respected our integrity and educational agenda.

We were first and foremost American servicemen who had been in Vietnam and knew firsthand the senselessness of the endeavor and had come to the conclusion that we had to do everything we could to bring our buddies home. The organizers of the peace march were quite creative and put together a sign hoping that Vietnam veterans would show up; the sign itself was not a VVAW undertaking; actually, there wasn't an organization at that time. My understanding is that people who were organizing the march to the United Nations, including the Veterans For Peace, were quite creative and put together a sign hoping that Vietnam veterans would come, but we didn't do the sign. It was a very professionally done poster and it said 'Vietnam Veterans Against War.' It was 20 feet, one-half a street wide or something.

I happened to be at the demonstration with some friends because I had seen an ad a week before in the New York Times in a small advertisement of Veterans For Peace which was the first thing that alerted me to the fact that there were veterans in the peace movement. They (VFP) were quite left wing, had a few members of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade; I think there were a number of independent veterans

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who went there who were hostile, also a tremendous number of veterans who weren't interested in the ideologies whatsoever and they were also sophisticated enough not to get shaken by the fact that someone they were talking to was also a Communist.

And they had an infusion of some younger veterans who had been in Vietnam just prior to Vietnam heating up. They had none of the historical associations with the leftist organizations; this just happened to be the organization that was veterans within the peace movement that brought them into that orbit. In that sense, the question of communism did not enter into the question of Vietnam; to many it was living history. The old timers would say "look out for this, look out for that, they're going to come down on us like a ton of bricks; there's going to be saboteurs, there's going to be people to look constantly to twist everything around."

I never heard anyone, although there were members of the Socialist Workers Party who were veterans, I never heard anyone of them pushing their party line. What I heard was the strength of the coalition. A lot of them were union members. They also were what I called the pragmatists among those pragmatic groups of the left. These are not, these are not hysterical people. They had

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survived all this stuff and were still going and when they started talking about, talking about the Korean War, which I had not even heard there was a protest against it, I was in awe of these guys because they had done something that nobody had even heard about and yet, clearly from what they were talking about, they had done it and kept doing it.

They had a commitment that had lasted for decades; I mean some of them had been in the Abraham Lincoln Brigade. Then there were GIs who were in World War II there. And then they took on the entire McCarthyite society over the issue of the Korean War and they didn't get crushed. I was impressed by this living history and they didn't boast. They didn't go around waving like some people who I felt were just misguided people coming in from the peace movement and they were very much focused upon what is it we need to reach the average person in America and not turn them off, to reach them and to educate them.

So, my first point of contact was with these older people and somewhat just a little bit older than I who had been active with this group and, as I said, I was attracted by the fact that they had an advertisement in The New York Times that turned the whole issue around in a kind of humorous way. It said, "If North Vietnam would stop bombing the United States, the war would be over."

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I thought that's what you've got to do with this issue is turn the absurdity around - if North Vietnam would stop bombing the United States. So I arrived at this demonstration which was gathering in Central Park and it was enormous. I had never seen so many people in one place for any reason, other than you know for frivolous activities. Someone said, "Vietnam veterans go to the front," and I thought, my God, you know, I've been invited to participate in something, you know, an honored spot there. It was not a spontaneous decision for me, not entirely. I had been building up to that point for nearly two years but there was this block of veterans all wearing their hats, blue and white hats that said, "Veterans For Peace," that looked like a military formation. Everybody else was just buzzing around, you know, the usual movement - chaos. They (VFP) were standing in military formation and they started marching in military formation and the people along the route in New York had never seen and here comes the peace movement and, my God, the military formation at the head of it, it says, "Vietnam Veterans Against War," and there were these six guys carrying this banner and behind that there were several other people. I was walking behind them.

There were young families and I thought, "who are these people?" Nobody ever really knew who these people

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were. When we got to the United Nations Plaza, I had assumed that there was an organization. Everybody started going various ways and of course the crowd came in behind us and we were lost in a sea of people that went for blocks. I assumed there was an organization so I started asking around where is this organization and somebody pointed me to the Veterans For Peace and I went to their meeting and they said no, we merely provided the banner and I think there may have been a number of smaller ones that said, "No Viet Cong Ever Called Me a Nigger," or something like that and a black veteran showed up and carried that.

I mean there was a lot of good ideas of the issues raised in such a way that we adopted them and the first issue I had to deal with was the Veterans For Peace who wanted to include VVAW veterans within them and I said I don't think you realize the strength of the Vietnam veterans movement or organization speaking directly to the people of America. I made my pitch to this group and I was nervous. Can you imagine talking to a room full of living history? And I had never done any of this before and I convinced them that it would make sense to help me form a group of veterans and they did. I was the organizer who started looking for who were these guys. I'll tell you that to this day I'm not quite certain. I think I know who some of them were cause I

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picked up people over the next few months by asking who do you know is a Vietnam veteran and then we formally had an organizational formation on June 1st.

But by then we had already been through another demonstration in Philadelphia and another demonstration in Washington on Memorial Day with the Veterans For Peace and veterans would come from as far away as Chicago and each of them would seek to pick up one or two veterans so that literally Veterans For Peace was the organizational and support network bridge for the first year.

They also raised the money for us for a nearly full page ad in The New York Times saying that we are Vietnam veterans against the war which had a statement which really were the issues which the VVAW at time was focused on[6]. You can ask for it from the archives if you don't already have it. It is the anniversary booklet. You'll see on just one page there's this statement and there's a bunch of names underneath with about 65 signatures. It took me until the fall of 1967 to find 65 veterans who were willing to sign their names to a document.

I found Vietnam veterans were willing to protest in a demonstration but didn't want their names put down someplace. It had never been done before. More than anything else, simply doing something that had never been

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done before without precedent held more people back. They would be sympathetic; I had assistance from every conceivable profession and background imaginable, but, you know, leave me out of it - the limelight aspect of it. We spent the first several months doing everything from talking on New York City sidewalk corners from Times Square to the Village, whatever. I discovered how conservative that New Yorkers are. It's a myth that New York is a liberal city and also very quickly discovered conservatives would give you a fairer hearing more quickly. The thing that drove me up a wall is that liberals had already decided upon something that wasn't much different from Lyndon Johnson's perspectives on war and that's where the liberals were up to that point.

Well, what I exactly began to discover, you know, I had no sense of any of this. You know, I didn't grow up in that kind of a political family background. I came from a traditional small town Republican family. We didn't talk politics. But what I also discovered in later years is that it was from the progressive wing of the Republican Party. These were the people who were behind the original Republican Party of Lincoln, who were behind the social changes that Teddy Roosevelt personified as president, behind Rockefeller who created the State University of New

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York, as an example, right in the 50s, they didn't shy away from progressive action that made sense. And so what I did naturally was to address people with: "This war doesn't make sense and here's why. I'll tell you why it doesn't make sense."

I was 19 when I went over there. My entire focus was on getting into West Point and making a career of the military and so I was like a sponge in terms of the military - military this and military that. I was constantly asking questions about observing and putting pieces together about the military aspects and it was clear to me that Vietnam was this little tiny sideshow, I mean they took, I read a chapter in a book called Everything We Had,[7] you might want to look at it. It was an oral history that was done several years ago by a variety of Vietnam veterans.

Even with VVAW history, we were too busy to take time out to write about it and there is a book that is essentially about the VVAW. The author had a contract and when he delivered the manuscript, they said we're not going to publish this book, it's too left wing. What did they want? What were they contracting for, right? All the way for years there has been a deliberate attempt to sabotage a true representation of the organization. VVAW grew in

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stages. We had our own ad in The New York Times in June 1967 and six people showed up. June 1st was the first day of the Israeli War; I always remember that. There were lots of reasons for Vietnam not having vocabulary for moral terms outside of Sunday school. There was public ignorance; they did not want to know, did not want to know what the experience was.

You had MIAs and you had a lump sum benefit. The real MIAs were forgotten immediately. I remember saying to myself, do I want to spend thirty years of my life to support a lie and to do something entirely against everything I had been taught? Boy Scouts, noblesse oblige, I am my brother's keeper. I came from a small town. Civility was key to becoming a real person. You deferred gratification for a higher purpose. I remember I went to work for a newspaper and went to college in 1966 feeling very bitter. In 1965 the units dribbled home, bitter and alienated. You cannot lose the totally alienated feelings and cynicism prevalent at that time.

Publicity brought the peace march to me and I guess the idea took off after that. In February 1968, the village voice ran a series by freelance writers giving an overview of the VVAW. Carl Rogers[8] from California gave an interview to the New York Post about dissident Vietnam

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veterans and there was a profile feature story in Redbook in March 1968. Carl was a chaplain's assistant with the United States Army in Vietnam. Quite simply, the VVAW message is a non-violent way of addressing violence. The VVAW absorbed Martin Luther King's non-violent confrontation that was also popular among many other groups. We cannot take any one stand because we evolved out of crises - one after the other.

In 1967 toleration in viewpoints, openness with other groups we organized so well, we've accomplished everything on our agenda. The 25th Anniversary shows the various threads later. Tensions could have been produced but my suggestion has always favored integration. Concerning underlying differences, it depends on the issue. Born on the Fourth of July, Ron Kovic's book did not go for altercation. All kinds of crazies in Miami and the VVAW refused to associate with violence. We are not messianic; there is no propping up of a rotten society. In 1967 the American public would not listen to My Lai or even want to discuss it.

The response to war crimes by the VVAW was 1) citizen hearings across the country had to be corroborated and 2) a group in the Progressive Policy Institute in Washington, D.C. wanted to document atrocities and why war crimes took place.

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Later, Senator Gruening of Alaska invited a group of Vietnam veterans to the Harvard Club. You know, the Fullbright hearings were going on and he suggested our people write to Fullbright, give our background and specific experiences in Vietnam, either as enlisted men, officers, or non-commissioned officers urging withdrawal in an orderly manner. I was never invited to those hearings. John Kerry was and made his memorable speech.[9] He started out with the VVAW until he got into politics.

In August of 1970, Labor Day weekend, parts of VVAW dramatized the cross-country route of George Washington. They wanted to show grass-roots America the face of war in Vietnam. The commitment in Vietnam had been 500,000 GIs in Vietnam. Less than one full army division was left to protect the entire nation. There were a variety of styles for organizing, coalition work, some good, some bad, in 1970. There were several criticisms of the VVAW. To the feminists we were too macho, and to others we were too sensitive about not wanting to be treated as freaks. You have to understand that the group almost ceased to exist in 1969.

What path to take; there were some in the group that wanted to go beyond the war crimes issues and others who wanted to stick to veterans issues.

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There were attempts to get the VVAW violent and into revolution. This was not our thing. International education, how to do things better, transitional groups, lots of liaison with other groups - VVAW was only one part of their life, not even central, and the VVAW network was one of facilitation. For instance, Carl Rogers worked for Eugene McCarthy for president. He wanted to shake the country up. Also, the big thing was to avoid an illegal status for VVAW. Self-education has always been a big thing with us in working with other groups or working with other elements. There have been a variety of styles for organizing, coalition work, etc. We are always open to participating with other groups to further social issues.

By 1972 we had a membership approaching 8,000 veterans, with chapters chartered or in formation in all fifty states. The VVAW had come a long way in the four years since it was founded in the spring of 1967 by six angry, young veterans living in New York City. Along the way there were the laborious build-up of membership and funding, and all the history of the Vietnam War itself. So it has had its periods of peak activity and dormancy with the Democratic Convention in Chicago as that period of time when the VVAW sent fifty of their most articulate lobbyists and were teargassed, along with the rest of the

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demonstrators. Chicago questioned whether anything peaceful was worth pursuing.

By early 1970, the VVAW was approaching a membership of 1,500 members and were past the 2,000 mark by summer's end. Only after the Labor Day weekend of the VVAW Operation Rapid American Withdrawal (RAW),[10] did the group gain national recognition and were on their way to a peak membership of 20,000 members by the mid-70's. What I saw and was reacting to was not government lies but to a military culture that had already become used to a certain way of doing things. Tell the public one thing and do the opposite. It was not only authoritarian but duplicitous. Now contrast this to West Point in which a cadet does not lie, steal or cheat, nor tolerate anyone who does. This is where I was. All I ever wanted was to be one of these officers who goes through a program where you did not lie, steal or cheat and I was in the middle of lying, stealing and cheating. In fact, in order to do my job, I ended up doing all three of those things in order to do my job and was given a medal for doing it.

The first thing I learned was how to survive in the army and I became very good at it. So I lived a double life and became very good at becoming a conniving GI who knows how to survive in a war, who knows how to get what he

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needs to get his job done, and to get recognized for doing that; all of which would get you into jail in civilian society. At the same time I got into West Point through this system and I arrived at West Point a year later. This was a military preparatory school just outside of the Pentagon that since has moved to New Jersey. It's called the Military Academy Preparatory School and they sent me to that and it was very competitive, like fifty openings for two hundred soldiers and I was one of those openings.

By the time I got into West Point in July of 1964, I looked very askance at these people and here I am where I want to be. I'm 21 years old and I already know too much to be a cadet. Except it had changed so that by the 60s and what I began to hear in the preparatory school where they brought the best and the brightest from around the world and I'm comparing notes. I don't know if these other guys are comparing notes and they're talking about, they talked about careers and Turkey and West Germany and all those various places where the people were stationed in those days, and I'm hearing the same thing that's going on.

There's the official story and the reality which, if you told your mother and father, you would die of embarrassment to say this is really what we did in our unit. This preparatory school was full of some of the most

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idealistic young men in America who were very good academically, usually very good athletically, and they were very good to get to that point in the military program itself and they couldn't afford to go to Harvard or Yale but they were that caliber and West Point was their ticket to get into the same spot. They were not buying their way into it; they could accomplish it through the West Point opening opportunity. They were highly idealistic and yet very practical on the other hand. I really enjoyed being with that group of people but none of them had been in what I had been in in Vietnam and with which I really couldn't articulate how much of a morass it was.

I left Vietnam in October of 1963 just before the coup which I had heard from the rumor mill was about to happen.[11] I wasn't there for the bloody 1968 period, the 1971 saturation bombing, not there for the escalation that came later. However, this is what VVAW was later responding to cause I don't think the VVAW would have been able to have been organized in 1964 or 1965 without what was going on because I had to go through a personal decision without reference to anybody or anything else not having any historical knowledge of anybody else, having no awareness of the Civil Rights movement, other than something is going on that had nothing to do with me.

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So I'm a cadet at West Point in the summer of 1964 and they are on the one hand harassing me by being the first person from a war since Korea to be in West Point, on the other hand, some people are just green with envy and just thrashing me to get into the same spot, so that the plebes program where they just harass the hell out of the cadets and that was, I believe, the first year where they announced to the class that hazing had been outlawed. Well it didn't stop one iota.

The first thing that really rubbed me wrong was that one of those idealistic guys from some place like Michigan that came in with me from that fifty from the regular army was mercilessly hazed and he did what he was told to do, he reported it. And then these upper classmen all got together and lied and said that he had lied and he was thrown out. There was a tremendous class basis at West Point. Many of those upper classmen, as I discovered, were second, third, fourth generation at West Point and it was like an old boy society - a lot of southerners of a military caste.

And the second part of what rubbed me wrong about that situation is that an upperclassman came and whispered what had happened in my ear, rather than report what had happened to the authorities about what the other upper

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classmen lying or having this honest person thrown out. I think the authorities knew and went along with it anyway. I think they did and then during the summer Lyndon Johnson was running for election and he was saying he was the peace candidate and Barry Goldwater was a warmonger who wanted to bomb Hanoi and Lyndon Johnson was not going to have any more Americans fight and die in Southeast Asia. This is what he's saying in the papers right? Just after the Gulf of Tonkin thing happened, well right after the whispering in my ear, the upper classmen standing before me saying the North Vietnamese navy has attacked our navy and I knew right away this didn't make any sense. There wasn't any North Vietnamese navy and, secondly, they didn't go around looking to attack bigger targets of that sort. It was a guerrilla war.

I said to myself, I don't believe this story. This was the official story being put up by the United States government and I don't believe from my own experience that it's true. I have no basis to do anything other than just having been in Vietnam. I don't believe this story. They have a rally I think, either that night or in that period of time, because the Gulf of Tonkin thing played out for three days. These alleged attacks, more alleged attacks, and they had this rally in the evening in which they brought out

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this quarterback from the football team just like a football rally only it was for going to war in Vietnam.

Can you imagine this? I mean this is a kind of thing that even Hollywood does not know how to deal with. The imagery here. They had a football rally for going to war because now it was official that we were really going to go in there and one of the officers or upper classmen said you plebes better start paying attention to everything we have to teach you because in four years from now you're going to be going into combat leading platoons in Vietnam.

Very accurate, and that's what happened to that class of 1968. They graduated and were immediately thrown in as platoon leaders in the worst year of the war. It was a thunderclap to me that I was caught in a situation in which none of these people were to be trusted. And most of them hadn't even a clue as to what they were going to get into. I couldn't imagine the disaster the war was going to be for them. What I knew was that it was going to be a disaster for the people in Vietnam who didn't deserve that because what was the purpose, what was the point. They never attacked us, this had nothing to do with the Soviet menace, this had nothing to do even with Communist China because I knew from being in Vietnam that the Vietnamese and the Chinese were, you know, at loggerheads.

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The reason I was kidding from what they were saying in West Point and when I went back into a regular unit after resigning from West Point is that we were going to go in there and have this war because we hadn't had a war in a while and these guys missed it. That's why they were so enthusiastic; they did not talk about communists, I never heard about communism in Vietnam, in West Point or in a regular army that was being prepared for the big assault in 1965. It was not even on the radar screen.

At one point after my unit and I had been with this unit for several months, some guy called us all together in this outdoor area where we watched movies and, in the background, fighter bombers are taking off on all these missions and he says - he had to shout over those airplane engines - "I had to call you men together to tell you why we're here in Vietnam," and everybody snickered and laughed. And then he read some official statement that no one paid any attention to whatsoever and he clearly was paying no attention to the words he was reading cause it was all malarkey.

We were in Vietnam because we liked killing people. We're in Vietnam because we are soldiers and this is what you try to do and you do it. They didn't care whether they were in Vietnam or in Canada. When I was in the regular

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army units, they were joking about their campaign medals for Selma, Alabama, for Mississippi and the various other places where the Civil Rights situation reached a point in which they called in the regular army troops. Even the southerners in the army would shoot down other southerners if they were given the okay to do that.

My other observation is that they could have cared less about there being some enormous threat from Vietnam because of the equipment they gave the soldiers in the early 60s, because of the equipment they gave them to use. I had an M-1 rifle from World War II; we had helicopters that looked like bananas that were from the Korean War; we had fighter bombers that were World War II planes that the wings would come off. It was the equipment that was killing more people and they didn't bring in more modern equipment until they designed it. In other words, they designed the M-16 and tested it with Special Forces in Vietnam in 1963. I saw this funny looking gun one day. The helicopters and those Huey helicopters didn't exist previously. They were designed as part of experimental activities and then they designed tactics around the use of these things. And the Vietnam War was all part of designing all this stuff figuring out what we do with all this stuff against a people who had no airforce whatsoever.

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I don't think the emergence of the VVAW was political. From what I've read about soldiers in Somalia, their realization of the same thing we were realizing in Vietnam is an issue. It had turned into a mindless military exercise. That's what Somalia turned into. The military had no political objectives, it had no humanitarian objective, it had an objective to do military missions and if people shoot, then you wipe out the town. What I'm trying to say to you is that it is a myth that the army does things for a real purpose.

When you are called in the middle of a situation and you begin to realize there's no connection between what we are doing and a purpose. It was the mythology that if Lyndon Johnson had not micromanaged the Vietnam War, the military could have ended it. Military commanders know from Korea you could not get too close to the Chinese border without bringing in China. They were hesitant and Lyndon Johnson kicked them just like Lincoln kicked his generals to do more than they wanted to. One of the things that I think you have to realize about professional soldiers, I heard this from a Special Forces sergeant, Donald Duncan[12] talks about this in his autobiography, professional soldiers don't want to get themselves killed, they just enjoy the battle, but they are not there to get

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killed. That's for draftees. The Vietnam War, even with the number of draftees ultimately thrown into it, was run by the professionals. They rotated the officers every six months so they could all get their command experience and promotions but it did not make any sense in terms of organizational efficiency for running a war.

Secondly, they did not see this as a threat to themselves or the United States. It was an opportunity to develop tactics, to develop some battle-trained people while the Soviets did not have a war going on. So we were one leg up on them in terms of having more battle veterans of a new generation and they saw their opportunity to kick around another Asian people because I think I got that very clearly from what people were saying and the way they talked because we've been doing this ever since the turn of the century with the Boxer Rebellion and we had a really anti-Asian attitude.

These people were gooks, they were not considered to be people; they were gooks. They were slipper heads, they were slat heads, they were a sub-human species who we mocked in all different ways and they were no different from the Japanese, the Chinese, the Koreans, the Filipinos; they are the same mix of people who we didn't even take seriously because we've been kicking them around one way or

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another since the turn of the century and, in Vietnam, they jumbled together all of the various phraseology from all those periods of time - "Kung Po" from the Chinese period of time, "Mama-san" was from the Japanese occupation. All this was thrown together, plus "the only good gook is a dead gook," which is fighting the Indians. Talk about Indian territory, and you begin to realize that the army, the professional army, and I saw that even more when I was at West Point, lives its own mythology. They had not left the Civil War.

And here is what I finally picked up on was the real connection, the real analogy to make. Every GI in my unit in Vietnam were collectively pooling their money together to have a housegirl and the officers individually had a houseboy or a housegirl. They preferred housegirls for obvious reasons. We had our beds made, we had our boots shined, we were no longer American enlisted men, we were British officers. And it was even more so for the American officers. They had their servants and they loved it. They didn't want to go home to their wives and children in middle America.

Of course, I mean the Vietnamese played the army like a violin and I once in a while would get an inside from somebody that they'd been doing this to the French, to the

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Japanese, you know, they were very good at surviving no matter whose army was occupying them at the moment. But none of this made sense to me in terms of our alleged mission in the world, made no sense to me in terms of practical what we were here to do, let's do it. This is what I heard, most people around me were of the same mind. What is our job here? Let's do it. They were trying to do it then realized, "wait a minute, it's not connecting, what is it that we are here to do?"

The army got mad because in 1965, that's even before the Tet Offensive, there's an even more important battle, Ia Drang,[13] all of 1965. The assumption was I resigned from West Point, was sent to Fort Rutger, Alabama, which is where they were perfecting helicopter tactics with infantry units. They've never done this before and that's where they worked out that business of using helicopters and having people jump out of them that has become the symbol of that war. That didn't exist before. I was in one of those units that was doing this and they were prepared to go into Vietnam in 1965 with what they called the "Big Battalion." They were going to kick ass and they were going to show these people who was boss. They sent those units in and in Fall 1965 one of them got decimated in a place called Ia Drang Valley and there's now a book out by

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one of the officers who became a general who survived that and a reporter who was there. I gather from the New York Times fairly recently or it may be the Book-of-the-Month Club selection, I get books through the History Club, and it may have been one of those selections, I gather it was one of those "we've been through hell but we survived" stories.

What have they learned? What the army learned was they got mad; things didn't go the way they had predicted. They started to lose some people. We're not talking about the World War II massive battle losses. I'm talking about one battle - hundreds of thousands of people died. There you can just see where they died. Here we had nothing like that. The army simply got mad because a couple of hundred people died in an ill-conceived battle. They never learned why the battle was ill-conceived so they kept doing it over and over again.

I was back here following the war break mostly and having been there I could realize at a certain point they're recreating Dien Bien Phu in a place called Khe Sanh. They literally had found a place in South Vietnam that in physical characteristics was as close as Dien Bien Phu was like. Never been a proof that we would have won if we had been at Dien Bien Phu instead of the French. They

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put marines into that place and almost lost them. That was the I Corps. They did that kind of thing over and over again in what is called using the troops as bait. Put them out someplace where they knew they're going to be attacked then they bring in the B-52s and all this enormous firepower to decimate everything around them, the unit that's under attack, and repeatedly they could not imagine how the North Vietnamese could manage to bring in rockets and other powerful equipment that managed to practically decimate these military units that were supposed to simply, you know, be the bait. And they couldn't imagine how they could keep bombing and bombing and bombing and these people would continue fighting, fighting and fighting and they couldn't not ever conceive that Tet was possible.

Well, they lost a lot of people. There's a point, however, that is when the GIs who wouldn't even have listened to me, I mean you've got to keep two things in mind here. When I started talking to people in 1967, it included talking to people who were home on leave prior to going to Vietnam or coming back from Vietnam or, even in some cases, they'd been in Vietnam and were going back to Vietnam because a lot of people spent more than one tour in Vietnam. They really questioned me very closely. I'd be talking at a peace demonstration and the guys in uniform

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listening on the sidelines would make a beeline to me. Who are you? What do you know? And I would convince them I knew what I was talking about but there's no way you are going to convince them that they'll say, "Hell no, I'm not going back." But we had a dialogue where they'd be quite willing to confirm in their own experience the absurdity of the situation.

They were still willing to go back because the military was their life. Tet happened and the same kind of people like that were so disillusioned because they finally understood the people running the show were willing to get them killed in this repeated stupidity rather than to learn anything. Only at that point did I have the opportunity to start raising the second part of the reason I was raising the question. I was raising a two-fold question; one was the practical aspect of it. The other was the moral issue; you could not talk morality to anybody in 1967 and get anywhere in your conversation. You could not talk about the war crimes because Americans didn't do war crimes. You could not talk about mistreating the Vietnamese because no one cared - here or in the military. No one cared they were mistreating the Vietnamese.

The same thing with the Gulf War. We cannot really talk in America about what that did to the Iraqi civilians

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because we don't really care what it did to the Iraqi civilians. Of course, it was short and it was a brilliant victory and it made us feel good. It was masterful and it scared the hell out of me because I was out there doing the best I could and no one cared.

The VVAW, it succeeded where other anti-war veterans groups may not have because virtually all of our VVAW philosophy and tactics were embraced in all sorts of coalitions. In fact, in New York and New Jersey, it is a combination of the two groups, the VVAW and the Veterans For Peace.[14] The Vietnam Veterans of America was started by Bobby Muller[15] who was active in VVAW and some other people and then it really got torn apart by other more conservative people joining badmouthing the VVAW saying what they wanted was simply getting better benefits for veterans and not social issues.

And it keeps bouncing back and forth; some of the chapters addressed social issues and I saw this whole thing come together in a roundabout way. A few years ago I was organizing people to do exchanges with the Soviets when they were still the enemy. I was bringing real Commies here to New Jersey and there was a VVA chapter headquartered in Bayonne where they were very proud to say that 33 guys died in Vietnam. They have several chapters in New Jersey, one

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of which is in Bayonne. They're very proud of those 33 guys that died in Vietnam.[16]

I'd say they're very conservative, blue-collar. They heard about an Afghanistan war veteran who was here, either through the VVAW or one of those processes by which we were bringing people here. They asked to have this guy come there and they embraced this guy in a way that was beautiful to see and these guys would not touch VVAW itself with a ten-foot pole and I didn't tell them that I was one of the founders of VVAW because that would have been an entirely different discussion. I would see this all the time, that there were things about what VVAW started as a process that got embraced by people who would not think that they could even be in the same room as one of those VVAW people.

There has not been one VVAW because there is a constant infusion all the time which has made the American Legion, as an example, embrace the Agent Orange issue with the fervor I never believed that organization would have been capable of, in coalition with VVAW people on that one particular issue. There is a professor at Rutgers who comes out of the peace movement and who used to go around the state because the state of New Jersey had its own Agent Orange Commission and he'd go to an American Legion post or

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a Veterans of Foreign Wars post and say, "I come out of the peace movement with those VVAW people and I know what I'm talking about and I'm going to tell you the scientific aspects of what you need to deal with, what you need to understand." Those people would listen with rapt attention.

What gives the VVAW clout are the issues. Then there's another of those places where someone got up and was deriding VVAW up one side and down the other side of the room. I was there as a reporter but I had finally had enough and when this whole thing broke up, I walked outside with this group of guys and I said, "You know, I was one of the founders of VVAW, you got something to say to me?" He answered, "Okay, no, I mean I was just shooting my mouth off."

Other founders of the VVAW were Carl Rogers[17] and Stephen Green,[18] who was from Brooklyn, and I don't know what happened to him after he wasn't any longer active after awhile. I'm not so sure about the others. It wasn't that kind of a thing. There was a march and then later there was the organization. Ed Damato got involved sometime later. In other words, like I said, VVAW went through many stages when people would discover VVAW[19] and in some cases literally revived the organization so after

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it collapsed in 1969 it was revived by different people who came in after the Moratorium in 1970. I think that Ed Damato came in at that time, as did a whole bunch of the other people who continued to be activist.[20]

There are very few of those people from the group of people from 1967, 1968 or 1969 who continued to be veteran activists. They were activists in other areas. The later group had more cohesion for various reasons. The group that came together in 1970, 1971 and 1972, that's the group that has primarily stayed together. They've all known each other years. Some were members of the VVAW prior to the break up.

I literally had a call one day from an organizer at the first Moratorium: "I guess we have all these Vietnam veterans showing up and I don't know what to do with them. Didn't you used to have an organization?" And they provided an office for it to be revived. That was in New York City and the Moratorium organizers were people like staff members or prior staff members for Robert Kennedy. I'm trying to remember, Dave Braum was another important person in all of this because among other things it was his design. He was from West Virginia now lives in Oklahoma someplace and once every five years or so I get a letter from him.

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I completely put together these anthologies of poetry that was called Hearts and Minds;[21] various people contributed to them and VVAW was clearly the vehicle through which we solicited poetry.[22] It says in the book that this is a VVAW project. We did our fund raising through VVAW; we sell books through VVAW. There are only two or three people of those contributors who I ever heard from again and years later I was talking to somebody here in New Jersey or in New York, I forget where, and I was doing a reading of some poetry and he says he like went to Sussex County, that is the most rural part of New Jersey, and lives there in complete isolation.

There were a number of other people who were active members in the first few months. The only thing I can find for you is an article by a veterans publication is the history of the VVAW through about 1970 that I had written for a veteran's publication. It was more like a statement of purpose or something like that. Basically, I've gotten a lot about the focus, the direction of the organization, but very little about the specifics, the underpinnings. I wouldn't have predicted it still being around; people kept it going because they saw some reason to do so and it has gone up and down in terms of size. When things are going on there are more people active.

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The VVAW hit its peak in 1971-72. There's a tremendous myth out there, much of it generated by people who had ulterior motives and were generating that myth. I lost a job at CBS news prior to Watergate and it was because of my having been a VVAW organizer. My journalism career was sidetracked for quite a long time. People who were caught in Watergate claimed they were doing it because of VVAW.[23] What you have to realize about VVAW is that this was a group that education became very important and not for the usual reasons. Whether or not you went to college or didn't go to college, I insisted that if people were going to go out and talk, they'd better know what the Geneva conventions were all about; they'd better have read them in the first place, and they'd better be able to understand what that was all about and not just fail.

So I had to debate, for example, when people were representing the administration. One of them was from the State Department, one of them was from the Pentagon, and one of them was a Congressman, and they all got flustered because I knew all the details about all of this and I could talk about what the relationships were in historical periods on how we got to where we were. They couldn't believe that a mere GI knew this and I insisted that all our, all of our public speakers knew all that.

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So the graduate students or the guys who didn't go to college would all be at that level talking about real details and, you know, I thought the most creative thing the peace movement collectively did were the teach-ins[24] and the VVAW embraced that as something that has just continued to spread out. The best possible way to doing something is that teach-in approach. It's not encouraged too much anymore but you know when the Gulf War came, I participated in several teach-ins and all of a sudden people said, "what is this thing, is this wonderful, I never heard of this before."

The interview ended at that point. Jan had generously given most of his Sunday afternoon to my interview. There is more to the man than the legend. Jan's first comment of the interview was an unassuming statement that he didn't think he had done anything out of the ordinary, anyone could have done the same thing and a lot of them did. Jan Barry was born in a small town in upstate New York where civility was a major value. He believes he became the kind of person he did because of two American Legion programs: one was with a Boy Scout troop and the other was the American Legion Boys State which he was sent to as a delegate. Although he rebelled against unquestioning loyalty later, at the time he didn't know enough to question anything.

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He went from those programs into the military and clearly sees the early training years as an apparent military preparation in the 1950s for what was to come later. In retrospect, he sees the Boy Scouts as a para-military teen-age organization. His family's political bent was conservative and bedrock small town America, or "at least used to be." His father, although a veteran of World War II[25] never joined the American Legion or any other veterans' organizations, possibly to maintain emotional distance. Later, when Jan had thoroughly broken with the military, his father would offer various observations, such as "they never told us about the Hiroshima bombing."

Although ideologically sound, Jan considers the American Legion less conservative and right-wing than the Veterans of Foreign Wars, despite the fact that the VFW supported the Bonus Army marchers of 1932[26] while the American Legion did not. As he stated, the American Legion did take an advocacy role on Agent Orange in concert with the VVAW who had initiated the investigation into its effects on Vietnam veterans and their families.

He remembers going to work for a newspaper while going to college in 1966 after completing his year's tour of duty in Vietnam and feeling bitter as the American units drifted

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home angry and alienated. He recalls an inability to lose the totally alienated feelings then and the cynicism prevalent in those feelings, along with the growing conviction that something had to be done to stop the madness in Vietnam.

The VVAW grew in stages following their initial June 1, 1967 recruitment ad in the New York Times. Six people showed up; he remembers that June 1st was the first day of the Israeli War so it is easy to remember. Their mandate was and still is to educate the American people into a realization of the true nature of war, thus offer the undistorted facts to enable millions of Americans to join in dissenting unjust wars. They believed deeply that the best support they could offer their buddies still in Vietnam was to demand that they be brought home, whatever it took - preferably negotiation, before anyone else died in a war not constitutionally sanctioned by the American people who, by the way, neither voted for nor wanted the Vietnam War.[27]

By the time the VVAW position paper appeared in a New York Times ad on November 19, 1967, it was signed by a partial listing of 65 Vietnam veterans. The signatories ranged from enlisted men to officers and represented the USMC, USA Special Forces, USAF, USN, and USNR personnel.

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The ad itself was read into the Congressional Record by Senator Ernest Gruening,[28] subsequently reproduced in a number of other cities and successfully expanded membership into chapters in every part of the country in short order. By February 1968, one hundred and one Vietnam veterans had signed the "Speak Out" ad and the next VVAW signature goal as set at convincing 500 Vietnam veterans to join the list.[29]

The group was committed to putting ideas into action, taking a stand, speaking out, moving the masses, making media coverage, keeping the organization legal in order to legitimate its organizational integrity to move it forward. In February 1971, Playboy offered them an entire page to promote their organization and to appeal for membership. That ad reached a million plus audience, penetrating even into the military in Vietnam.

It pictured a coffin draped in an American flag with a statement informing the readers that "in the last ten years, over 35,000 of our buddies have been killed or wounded in Vietnam. And more are being killed and wounded every day. We don't think it's worth it." It then went on to state the reasons for their beliefs and convictions, ending with an appeal to join and identify with the VVAW in an effort to end the war.[30]

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The ad is credited with increasing membership to 20,000, including military personnel on active duty in Vietnam and elsewhere, thus adding significantly to the anti-war momentum by incorporating standing members of the military in a war they were actively engaged in waging. Graphically, it could be said to represent the ultimate in the mechanical representation of art, a photographic image that vividly expressed the distilled pain of 35,000 families who had suffered the loss of a son, a husband, a lover, a father or a relative. Emotionally, it poignantly touched others who saw reflected in the flag-draped casket a nullification of the best, now frozen into eternal sleep, never to experience the promise of a future, except in deadly silence. And twenty thousand of our military who saw the ad did not think it was worth the sacrifice.

In sum, the symbolism encapsulated the tragedy of the Vietnam War with one glance enhancing the Chinese adage that one picture is worth a thousand words. In tearing through the layers of exaggerated patriotism and empty rhetoric that these soldiers had died defending democracy and freedom, the VVAW provided a deep metaphorical unmasking by expressing the role of the victim caught in the crossfire of an economic struggle in which the final American product was a dead American boy beautifully

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packaged in red, white and blue bunting to be delivered free of charge to his parents. The ultimate in free marketing practices.

Within the framework of a tension between the VVAW's novel struggle to present the ultimate degeneration of a system that cannot support freedom but cannot also not hold it back without producing an ultimate rebellion, we see the power of VVAW utilization of art in the process of rebellion. Thus Bakhtin's observation that the struggle against conformity has deeper significance and organization than appears on the surface, is mirrored in the VVAW's assault on convention in twisting the signification.

The importance of the assault on the mask of ideology can be understood as assigning meaning to phenomena and entering into a space/time continuum to alter meanings in the order of social experience. Thus the taking on of a sign, a picture, a sketch, spoken expression, or any of these codes, and assigning a profound transformation as their significance is severed from the ongoing social world, can work miracles.

That still life photograph dealing with the loss of a dead youth spoke volumes of the moral compromises and ethical amnesia one has to swallow in order to accept the destruction of innocence itself to maintain the illusion of

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the superiority of an economic system over social life itself. The final projection of that coffin was a victim who could not transcend the degeneration of a system that thrived on a culture of death. In this instance, the dead soldier's departure was a final stage performance that personalized the text. Benjamin[31] defended the photograph as art that hauntingly conveys something of a fleeting expression of a human life, the essence of melancholy, and the loss of incomparable beauty, thus although a photograph is a mechanical representation of art, true art is inextricable from tragedy and humanity.

Who were these masters in the art of spectacle and gesture? Historically, very little has been written on the Vietnam Veterans Against the War, Inc., with a mere handful of works referencing their participation in the anti-war movement. As Jan Barry noted, they were too busy making history to write about it. In terms of sociological relevance, the VVAW represents a unique opportunity to investigate the idealistic impact on rebellion. As with the other anti-war organizations that proliferated, they did not hesitate to place principles above self-interest, to reestablish the ethical dimensions they found wanting in much of their society. As scientific and technological weapons of war into Vietnam increased in destructive

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capacity, so too did the non-compliance of the Vietnam warrior toward the task he was expected to perform.

The rates of desertion, AWOLs, fragging, outright refusals to obey orders, insubordination, increased usage of drugs of all kinds point to a general disintegration of an army in the field. These visible signs of malaise must have been noted before they entered a state of crisis. Yet failure to correct faulty leadership, bad planning, and a logistical overemphasis on creature comforts ensured the incipient implosion. Overlooking serious corruption in the South Vietnamese government and its military while recreating little America in Saigon did nothing to help strengthen our position against the enemy or our self image.

We may have won the battle of commodities, but it was not transferable to the larger necessity, winning the war. The commodification of Saigon led to black marketeering, drug dealing, kickbacks, prostitution on a massive scale, and theft of food and military supplies that led up to the highest level of government and military personnel that ricocheted on a society producing a cultural weakening and a loss of the necessity for self-sacrifice.[32] Our greatest blunder, however, and one that was irremediable was to underestimate the enemy's spartan restraint. The

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communists shunned the corruption and capitalized on skill and ingenuity in countering the effects of both our instruments of war and the softening effects of our transported material values.

Thus the Americanization of Saigon and its role in the rapid implosion of an ancient culture was the main thrust behind the deep commitment to the war that drove the North Vietnamese people and the Viet Cong, as well as undermining the lack of personal commitment from the South Vietnamese. People who have everything material to live for have nothing to die for. Although many ARVN units did fight admirably, many more relied on the Americans to sweep out the communists. Caught between the antinomies of training and sponsoring South Vietnam's army American-style and the imposition of a mirror-image technological-scientific management model that would not ask for sacrifice from elites, we could not match the enemy's determination to prevail at all human cost.

Thus, there was an over-concentration on technological componentry and little dependency placed on the irreplaceable non-electronic brains of humans. This phenomenon is a direct outgrowth of the managerial contempt for the substrata of personnel they direct. How could easily replaceable parts have the same intellectual capacity

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as those who hold decision-making power. Thus, lower echelon ranks were subjected to futile search and destroy missions, to friendly fire, to a rising litany of incompetency and insensitivity from officers socialized into a corporate identity of superiority over their men by merit of occupational status and fawning servility.[33]

It wasn't merely the enemy who suffered, the growing distaste for a war you could not fight, an enemy you did not see, and the punishing conditions under which these futile exercises were conducted undermined confidence. Nothing seemed to succeed; you won the battles but lost territory. Rising casualties rates were the only visible gains, and they were not worth the effort. They were in the best equipped, the most feared fighting force in the world, they had come to complete an honorable task, and they could not prevail. Most of what they gained today, they lost tomorrow; the results can be seen in the ideological slippage.

Jan Barry's observations on the distance between reality and illusion informs us that what we were being told was not what he knew was happening. Administration claims based on military reports were a farce. Men were dying and the war was going badly, still the fictitious information the American people were being fed, that the

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war was all but won, was in direct opposition to Jan Barry's experiential knowledge. The same mendacity and cover ups that had weakened his ardor for West Point resurfaced leading to a larger systemic search on questions of military ethics and national morality. Innocent lives were too important to waste in a battle of imagery, not substance, no matter the national origin.[34]

There is an important link between Vietnam and wars we have fought in earlier epochal frames. The shift away from the foot soldier and the emphasis on airpower. The foot soldier was seen as the determining factor of success or failure in war. Now inexorable scientific and technological methods of warfare operating under conditions where the individual acts only as a corroborating witness submerged in the collective without the ability to exercise a locus of control became the norm.[35] It is only when agency is key that theoretical application reinforces the need to reimpose that which is human over that which is inhumane and becomes an important reality for judging moral equivalencies.

As Jan Barry remarked, he began to realize that we were using Vietnam as a testing ground for our new technology.[36] In such a process, humans had little worth. The deep sense of normlessness and meaninglessness that is

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the result of intense exposure to the horror of modern warfare or any other event of unbelievable human outrage results in the sense of revulsion where meaning collapses into nothingness.[37] The elimination of the subject in this instance results in the loss of humanity, of sanity and the inability of the soldier to protect himself in the conduct of contemporary war.

The question of why men fight has occasioned indepth studies that range from primary group cohesion[38] to the psychological conflict between Eros and Thanatos[39] on to the class basis in the loss of morale.[40] All of these appear to skirt the issue of science and technology as antecedent to these constructs. Their status as the independent variable is thus removed from discovering why soldiers conform or rebel and the role idealism plays in their decision remains peripheral and not central to the core. One of the specifics of VVAW emergence is based on their loss of ideological commitment to participate in what they viewed as an unjust war. That loss was occasioned by a moral and ethical evaluation. The judgment was key in impelling introspective searches on the morality of personally killing an enemy that shared your religion to the alienation experienced upon returning home, to the moral basis for disengagement from the war.

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As Jan Barry notes, the 65 signatories to the VVAW ad were the tip of the iceberg. Eventually an excess of 20,000 veterans were to join. Although many more were in sympathy with the protesters, they were hesitant to become identified with a dissenting group, although they were extremely generous with anonymous support and funding.[41]. Their literature provides the strong link between idealism and rebellion and chronicles the intensity of psychic injuries occasioned by participating in actions deemed morally reprehensible and contrary to ethical and moral beliefs.[42]

The values that appeared to matter to Jan Barry were those acquired through traditional patterns of socialization: deferred gratification, civility, doing one's duty, helping others, all intricately integrated with community and individual placement within the group. Thus, Jan's courage to stand up for what he believed to be the right thing to do was an honorable course of action resting on a firm foundation of family solidarity and community integration.

This Durkheimian structure enabled Jan Barry to perceive crossed boundaries and breached parameters in historic military norms of noblesse oblige and openly contradicted with biblical injunctions to see oneself as

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his brother's keeper. In truth, the corruption he witnessed in Vietnam rendered absurd our claim of defending democracy in South Vietnam when the most corrupt and undemocratic regime was being protected. The Saigon regime came to be seen as the real enemy by the majority of their population who suffered the full burden of advanced scientific warfare on a third world people. If the North Vietnamese were the enemy, why were Americans bombing them and destroying their land.

We can note that in this sense the veterans who founded the VVAW saw the Vietnamese civilians and the U.S. troops equally as victims of unconscionable U.S. military policies whose architects appeared incapable of knowing who or where the enemy was, much less to how defeat him and whose compensatory actions in this regard was to destroy every living and growing thing from the face of Vietnam.

From 1965 to 1971, we begin to see the escalating blunders attributed to introducing high tech warfare resulting only in one ill-conceived mission after another, wreaking havoc upon civilian populations and U.S. troops, given the type of close interactions with the Viet Cong and the NVA indicative of the IA Drang campaign and the areas in the Central Highlands.[43] The actions were counter productive only serving to lower troop morale, increase

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disaffection with the military position in Vietnam, thus contributed to those disciplinary infractions that severely impacted the ability of the military to remain a viable force in Vietnam.[44]

It was morally painful for Jan Barry to witness the senselessness of the military mission, the historical racism fueling the unconcern over a tragic waste of American and Asian lives, the incompetence of his military institution and the misrepresentations of the situation in Vietnam disseminated by his government. It prompted the historical break and the idealistic decision that with the help of an educated and aroused American public, he could bring his buddies home. His experience and personal journey of discovery was shared by a significant portion of veterans as well, as witnessed by increasing membership and clout of the VVAW in the anti-war movement. Instead of viewing their activities as subversive, they saw it as a moral necessity to curb the excesses of a government that no longer practiced what it preached on human rights.

The literature that describes that period of intense organization and demonstrations, liaisons and coalition building is rich in the idealistic genre of poetry and music, as well as the self examination exemplified in the journalistic offerings of many of VVAW members.

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For instance, in an article for the New York Times[45] on the conviction of Lt. William L. Calley, Jan Barry eloquently wrote that:

> "with the conviction of Lt. William L. Calley, the real dilemma of our generation has finally been brought unmistakably home. To kill on military orders and be a criminal, or to refuse to kill and be a criminal is the moral agony of America's Vietnam generation."

Vietnam provided the opportunity for militaristic posturing, truth evasion and outright lying to prevent the American public from discovering the full extent of military excess and failure. It was a sea change from earlier ideological claims of turning back the aggressor and playing by the rules. The lies were the basis for introspection on where obligation lay: duty to nation or to an abstract concept of justice and respect for humans. In this, his personal experiences and strength of character led Jan Barry to place international law above national criminal law by defining the U.S. as the violator of the Geneva Convention of 1949.

Jan had witnessed the undemocratic methods, thus felt a need to educate an American public "into the lessons of Nuremberg and the horrors and terrors of a police state." The American public had to clearly see how far their country had strayed from the stated purpose of being in Vietnam to save democracy to instead:

> "help institute and supervise perhaps the world's most deadly efficient police state - to slaughter and lay

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> waste to, intimidate and kill 'Communist' bushes and trees and pigs and rice and thatched huts and women and children and old men and babies by the hundreds of thousands in the name of Democracy.'"

Advanced technology thus elevates the moral issues even further. It appears to have colored Jan Barry's observations on free-fire zones, search-and-destroy missions, massive areas of defoliation, recon by fire, saturation bombing, mad minutes, and forcibly relocating villagers as violations of human rights. Although not critical of technological introduction into warfare, the path to Jan Barry's rebellion was not a reaction to its necessity in fighting just wars. It was simply a journey of self discovery through years of deep affection and high regard for the military. He does admit anxiety over the progression from obsolete weapons to a high tech arsenal that would enable us to become hired guns, so called troops for hire, and something the American public appeared to support. However, he does not see technology as the root cause of the moral backlash, but rather in the Ellulian sense, the misuse of that technology and the political lies that justified its excesses.

We were not fighting an enemy, we were the enemy. In this scenario, the loss of an entire generation of young men and women who were called upon to defend their country while laying waste to millions of innocent civilians caught

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in the crossfire was unacceptable. It poisoned the ideological well and produced a tension between loyalty to duty or upholding a personal code of honor.

Advanced technology, in the Vietnam experience, positioned humans as "bait," to be used in support of a technology whose entire raison d'etre was to destroy on a scale that was pure abjection and horror and then quantify it. The Ia Drang campaign was illogical and ill-conceived project that could not be incorporated into a rational framework of military necessity. The military operation was a failure; it placed American lives in jeopardy to ensure technological slaughter of the enemy.[46] The result was a huge and personally unacceptable loss of lives. Jan's doubt turned into disbelief that his country and the military he loved could sacrifice humans as expendable to eliminate an enemy who lacked the hi-tech parity of B-52s.

It did not escape his notice that despite the intense and punishing destruction of technical precision, the North Vietnamese and VC returned to the fray. Paramount in this mental shift was the mindless devastation that did not bother to distinguish between innocent civilian or Viet Cong, between friend or foe. Thus a growing cynicism for the effects of technology and an admiration of an enemy who resisted regardless of the level of pain interlaced.

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The human evil personified by the enemy paled in comparison to the related harms knowingly permitted by his government through saturation bombing, Agent Orange, incineration of entire villages and My Lai executions and tacitly, if not openly approved, by the military.[47] With that discovery, any claim of validity for the war evaporated.

The tradition of warfare is to fight for an overriding principle of justice, for an honorable cause; however, in this exercise, humans were of infinitely less value than the methods of their elimination. Technology seemingly was being designed primarily for cost effective genocide on an unprecedented scale and few appeared to care.[48] It worked, and quantifiable body counts became the questionable ethical justification for a war in progress and the supreme test of a worthy cause lay in weapons performance. That signified a degree of callousness; Americans did not want to know or recognize the damage as immoral or wrong, only necessary and useful, or a means to an end. The spectacle became the lietmotif of judging the morality of the war.

Utilizing Bakhtin,(49) it is understandable that the spectacle became the VVAW's medium of educational choice for change, as well. It proved to be an excellent teaching technique during the Vietnam War on the consequences of

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disobedience. The VVAW anti-war movement was built on bearing witness, on carrying the spectacle to the American public. They wanted to shake a complacent society into examining alterations of character they had undergone and the idiocy of believing that we could prevail without inner corruption occasioned by warped ideals. Their first endeavor, Operation RAW,[50] introduced Americans to the reality of the Vietnam war experience.

The VVAW was destroying the myth of a trusting but misled public by holding a mirror to the horror that could not continue without the complicity of the American public. Operation Dewey Canyon III - A Little Incursion into Washington D.C. and the Halls of Congress was a symbolic representation of the two separate invasions of Laos, erstwhile named Dewey Canyon I and II, occurring in January and February of 1969 by elements of the 3rd Marine Division.[51]

Increasing confrontations with agents of repression and tactics of harassment or obstructions over the right to peacefully petition their government were carried by the media, providing them with highly visible profile. The VVAW organized the Washington, D.C. demonstration of over 1,000 Vietnam veterans from around the country in order to capture the imagination of the American people. They succeeded; the

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public was treated to a Bakhtinian break where the seamlessness of the normative code was broken by the shock therapy of discovering truth through actions that are contrary to normal expectations.(52) Over 1,500 Vietnam veterans returned their medals earned in that war, some hurling them over a barricade set up by the very government that had presented those medals for instances of action above and beyond the call of duty.

Despite many restrictions, it may be noted that the moral will of the anti-war veteran community to defy an impervious government didn't buckle, in fact, it was bolstered by a stream of new alliances, including the Gold Star Mothers and veterans who were barred from entering Arlington Cemetery, and by Neil Olsen of Russell, Pa., wearing his dead son's army fatigue jacket, sounding taps before the medals were returned to the government.

Elsewhere, large groups of veterans peacefully marching to the steps of the Supreme Court building to ask why it had not ruled on the constitutionality of the war, and their rendition of God Bless America, did not warrant the arrest of 110 of those veterans being led off with their hands clasped behind their heads for disturbing the peace. It did not follow normal expectations of fairplay or a citizen's right to peacefully petition his government.

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It is interesting to note that not one act of violence was recorded during their February 1971 five day stay in the nation's capital; they had come in peace and had kept their peace.

1971 was pivotal for the anti-war movement as consciousness raising efforts continued unabated producing increased membership and adding to the military anti-war protest. The powerful events set into motion by the VVAW resulted in some of the most far reaching protests against the war in Southeast Asia. By then, there were 50,000 plus members with chapters in every state, most cities, and many overseas locations.

Although many in government considered them to be among the most subversive of anti-war groups, the techniques and tactics employed by the VVAW were not promoted to encourage revolution but to alter public support for political and military policies that kept the Vietnam War going.[53] It wasn't true that they were prolonging the war with their methods of resistance; they worked hard to maintain the passive resistance above confrontation and education over rhetoric.

It be should be noted that, above the suggestively disruptive confrontational pictorial offerings on television and the press, larger issues that loomed were

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overlooked by the media: peace, compassion, an end to killing, the future of the world, and an emphasis on the public consequences of the Vietnam War or any war based on lies and misrepresentations.[54]

VVAW's forte has been in altering symbolic renditions of racist infused propaganda and transforming it into thought provoking messages on hypocrisy and lies. For instance, U.S. Military Assistance Command (MACV) issued an official insignia designed by the Institute of Heraldry, U.S. Army to those serving in Vietnam. It was issued to 12,000 so called advisors in Vietnam in March of 1963. Under that insignia 60,000 Americans and 2 million Vietnamese died. In it yellow and red are the colors of Vietnam; the red ground alludes to the infiltration and aggression from beyond the embattled yellow "wall," (the Great Wall of China). The opening in the wall through which this infiltration and aggression flow is blocked by a white sword representing the United States military aid and support. The wall is arched and the sword is pointed upward in reference to the offensive action of pushing the aggression back.

The official insignia of Vietnam Veterans Against the War was taken from the MACV patch, however, the white sword was replaced with an upside-down rifle crowned with a

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helmet, the international symbol of soldiers killed in action. According to their explanation,[55] this was done to expose the lies and hypocrisy of U.S. aggression in Vietnam as well as its intolerable cost in human lives.

As with all of the information put out by the government to justify U.S. intervention in Indochina, the MACV insignia showed U.S. protection of the Vietnamese from invasion from the People's Republic of China. The VVAW insignia represents veterans fighting against new "adventures" like the Vietnam War, while at the same time fighting for a decent way of life for veterans and their families. The insignia belongs to VVAW and no other group or organization may use it for any reason without permission.

In a policy statement directed towards attracting new members,[56] "the VVAW welcomes all people who want to join together to build a fighting veterans' organization. Although the majority of their members are veterans of the Vietnam-era, we want all veterans of all ages--as well as interested non-vets--to join to build the vets' struggle. Membership requirements are participation in the life of the organization, and a payment of $1 per month to the national organization with a $5 initiation fee." VVAW is a democratic organization.

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Chapters decide on local projects and programs under the general guidelines of the national program. Each chapter elects its local leadership and representatives to the National Steering Committee meetings where major organizational decisions are made and national coordinators are elected. These coordinators are responsible for day-to-day leadership and publish the national newspaper, THE VETERAN[57].

There are no full time paid positions in the organization, in fact, many pay for their own expenses (and often VVAW financial necessities) out of pocket. However, membership participates fully in all policy and decisions; the VVAW is not a rubber stamp entity. The eight bylaws in the VVAW charter are:

1. The name of the organization shall be Vietnam Veterans Against the War.
2. Membership in the organization is open to all veterans (regardless of discharge) and to non-veterans interested in joining together to build a veterans movement. While VVAW is made up primarily of Vietnam and Vietman-era and Vietnam-era veterans and their families, the organization also welcomes veterans from other eras and non-veterans.
3. Membership requirements include filling out a membership form, paying the $5 initiation fee and $1 monthly dues to the national office. Other requirements, not in conflict with national requirements, may be added by local chapters.
4. Local VVAW chapters will decide on their own chapter structure, by-laws and dues. Chapters will, to the best of their ability, work on the national programs of VVAW plus whatever local campaigns they decide on which are not in opposition to national programs.
5. National meetings of the organization, open to all members, will be held at least once yearly. A National Steering Committee, made of the national officers, the regional officers, and an elected representative from each chapter shall meet as

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necessary. Such meetings may consist of phone calls to the chapter representatives if necessary.

6. National officers are elected at national meetings for a period of a year. They are responsible for the day-to-day operation of the organization, for speaking on behalf of the national organization, and for the publication and content of THE VETERAN and "The Guidon."

7. Regional coordinators, as needed will be elected at national meetings to serve 1 year terms; regional coordinators will facilitate and coordinate regional activities, aid the building of local chapters, and provide input from chapters into the national office.

8. Policies, programs and positions of VVAW nationally will, as much as possible, be decided at national meetings. If that is not possible, such decisions will be made by the National Steering Committee or, in emergencies, by the National Office.

In addition to the bylaws, they offer a historical briefing on "Where We Came From, Who Are We, Who Can Join the Vietnam Veterans Against the War[58]."

We are a national veterans organization recognized as tax deductible.

The Vietnam Veterans Against the War began in 1967 to join the ranks of those who wanted an end to U.S. involvement in Indochina. Basic principles of the organization have continued ever since: we have fought against unjust wars, whether the U.S. invasion of Indochina or, potentially, El Salvador, or the USSR's invasion of Afghanistan. We have supported, by whatever means were possible, those who are fighting for their own liberation. And we have stood with veterans of all eras in fighting for the things we need, have been promised, and have been earned.

From its early days VVAW has operated on the knowledge that the government will give vets what we need only when forced to do so--that vets get nothing for nothing. We've learned that when one vet fights alone, there is a limited amount he or she can accomplish, but when veterans unite to fight together, we can do much. VVAW has seen some real successes; we helped to put an end to U.S. troops in Southeast Asia, we helped get Nixon tossed out of office on his ear, we helped to win (to a great extent) amnesty for war resisters. With other vets groups we helped to stir up enough public furor that the Veterans Administration took its first halting steps to look for an answer to Agent Orange poisoning, and recognized what VVAW used to call Post Vietnam Syndrome when we were leading rap groups in 1970 (and is now called "post-traumatic stress syndrome") as a service-connected disability.

VVAW has consistently stood with the interests of vets of all eras, especially Vietnam and Vietnam-era vets. Sometimes this has brought us into conflict with the "traditional" vets organizations. While they have tended to stand behind the U.S. government and its war-like maneuverings, VVAW has always asked

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> "Why?" We've opposed moves toward war, fight against registration and the draft which will follow, opposed inflated defense expenditures, welcomed vets with "bad" discharges into the organization and fought to get the discharge system dropped entirely from the military.
>
> We know what it means to have been used once by the government and its corporate backers, and then be thrown away with a bad GI Bill, wretched healthcare, Agent Orange ravaging our bodies, vivid memories of the war often ravaging our minds, no jobs, and all the multitude of other problems Vietnam vets face. We do not intend to see our children go through the same thing in the next war for somebody else's profit!

In organizational context, the VVAW thus deviates from hierarchical organizations prevalent in veterans affairs. It is closer to acephalous societies and open ended in the sense that the immediate crisis determines the leaders. When the crisis is over, the need for that person's special qualifications disappears and the cementing of elites into positions of leadership is avoided.

In their newspaper, THE VETERAN,[59] VVAW introduces a comprehensive litany of critical questions relative to patriotism and a citizen's duty to the state by asking whether showing and raising the American flag or burning it is a patriotic gesture? Is criticizing government action in placing American men and women at risk patriotic? Is it un-American to want wives not made widows or children rendered fatherless or motherless? Is it un-American not to want his or her country resorting to violence and mass destructions to settle differences? Is vetoing the Civil Rights Bill patriotic while expecting black minorities to

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staff 30% of the military while they are denied basic rights while fighting for someone else's human rights and freedom. Is it patriotic to send other people's children to fight and die while not choosing to do so for yourself or your loved ones? Is it patriotic to fight your country's enemies on foreign soil while not expecting your country to fight internal enemies of poverty, ignorance, hunger, unemployment, drugs, crime, gang violence, corruption that kill us and make us suffer?

Jan Barry's strongest condemnation of the Vietnam War is directed towards the military who he sees as pursuing its own agenda of power and politics, generally in tandem with a political institution that no longer reflected the good and welfare of the people who supported it. This divergence from the warrior code of honor respecting the sanctity of human life appears to be the point of convergence for idealism and rebellion.

The reasons why men rebel is key for the American century; how that rebellion affects the social institution of war and, if idealism is the key to rebellion, then the attitudes, intensity and integrative aspects of the spread of information itself will serve to unify unique and common features expected to surface in that search by individuals for moral integrity. The phenomenon of individual decisions

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based on conscience and principle, as in Jan Barry's moral crisis, was a process that did not lend itself to a military's historical task of preserving national integrity.

In this, Jan Barry's loyalty may have wavered from implicitly obeying authority, but not until he had left the military and returned home. There were doubts about the war itself leading to a deep crisis of conscience over the concern "if his country was lying about what was happening in Vietnam, what else were they lying about?" The questions could not be answered within the one-sided traditional frame of duty to country. Thus the simple decision to place his convictions on the line and march with the six veterans carrying the VVAW banner was the first step in organizing veterans and standing military into a cohesive block of opposition within the nation's last line of defense.

This has implications far beyond the immediate; it merged past veteran experiences of the Vietnam War with current convictions that it was destroying the nation and energized them into action that seemingly brought an out of control administration to its knees by virtually paralyzing its war making capabilities. Although each veteran experienced different nows, they could relate to

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the remote control war management production of the war as some videotaped fantasy, that had no relationship to the true conditions on the battlefield.

Jan Barry's past observations on the battle of Khe Sanh, which he saw as an eerie duplication of the French debacle at Dien Bien Phu, was filled with disbelief that his military could be as incompetent as they were in electing to make a stand at an area that was not militarily friendly, to say the least, then to expend the marine forces in suicidal missions.

The 26th Marines had been assigned the task of defending that key marine base and the surrounding environs. They were thinly spread, at a manpower level far below their capacity to realistically complete the task and suffered large casualties when the North Vietnamese enticed General Westmoreland into a cleverly designed military noose. Not that he is entirely to blame. The historical alteration in Marine Corps utilization had begun during the Korean War when they were ordered into army-types of defense operations, away from their former assault troop orientation. By the Vietnam War, that tactic had become standard operating procedure. Instead of being held in escrow for offensive operations then returned to shipboard, they were placed as permanent extensions to the infantry,

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artillery and airforce in defense of protracted army roles contrary to their historic mission. This increased the likelihood that permanent enclaves would decrease their impact as shock troops held in reserve until the most opportune moment. The geographical area itself exposed Khe Sanh to intense enemy resistance with only helicopter airlift as an umbilical cord. On January 19, 1986, two crack divisions of the North Vietnamese Army cut it by ambushing a platoon from Company I, 3d Battalion, 26th Marines.[60] It was at this battle that the North Vietnamese Army used tanks for the first time.

The bitter defense of Khe Sanh was carried out under the most intense hand-to-hand fighting in Vietnam. The internal arguments among top U.S. command over relieving the Khe Sanh siege or concentrating on containing the thrust of the Tet Offensive in the South played out against a backdrop of coordination problems, control of additional Army formations, air support, and the inability of Pentagon, Pacific Command and MACV-III MAF petulance.

The siege was not lifted until Easter Sunday, April 14, 1968 when 3rd Battalion, 26th Marines fought their way up Hill 881 North to secure the summit at 2:28 p.m.[61] It ended the hold of Khe Sanh by the U.S. military and meant the abandonment and dismantling of the marine base there.

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The firestorm of public debate coupled with military debate erupted on the discovery that the marines should not have been there in the first place, reasons for the establishment of Khe Sanh were political and not military objectives. It ended, as well, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara's illusions of American grandeur in sponsoring an electronic barrier between the two Vietnams, marked a return to the utilization of Marine forces as mobile units, not static sitting ducks, and to the Vietnamization of military forces to carry the major burden of offensive combat.[62]

The disintegration in morale of the common soldier who lived through, witnessed, or heard about the tremendous managerial faux pas certainly contributed to the loss of respect for the brass. Again, the ideological mask slipped ushering in further erosion of trust. There were too many political decisions and not enough military ones. However, as Jan Barry notes, the military did not especially take control of the running of the war; that came from Washington, D.C.

Thus one could say that the major failure lies in setting management prerogatives over military objectives thus appears to have led to intense disillusionment within the lower echelon soldiers who suffered the adverse

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consequences of those directives to actually do the fighting, dying, and suffer the consequences of those foolish decisions, whether through military silence or civilian arrogance, on appeasing all internal factions and presenting a united front before the enemy was addressed or the value of American lives placed in prime consideration. The almost complete loss of I Corps in this area was not in keeping with winning a war, only getting through this particular nasty affair that could have serious ramifications for the career aspirations of both bureaucrat and officer.

We saw this in the disintegration of the army in Vietnam in 1971. The perception that you were giving up your life and watching your buddies torn apart to win a war that had nothing to do with defending your country but became perceived as having everything to do with setting up and defending hated regimes of U.S. sponsored elites to secure corporate interests was and still is fatal.

In addition, the war was not being fought under traditional motives of "saving the world for democracy," it was being fought for senseless nothings; the vast majority of Vietnamese were not supportive of the political puppets set up and maintained through the force of American imperialism. The loss of life at Khe Sanh only to abandon

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it underlines the tragic consequences of entering and waging wars of imagery, to paraphrase Jan Barry, to do something even Hollywood would not attempt to do.

Thus the historic break in the traditional military role of duty to nation appears to have been that instance when the challenge to non-negotiable terms of personal morality arose and led to questions about complicity in the increasing use and misuse of scientific warfare in the pursuing of the Vietnam War. In this sense, technology has no human conscience and can be depended upon to do what humans find unthinkable. Technology may not offer value judgments, but humans can and do.

In essence, if one utilizes history as substantiation, change occurs when objective conditions impel men to act; thus it may not be an objective act of furthering one's own class in the Marxian sense as resisting the misuse of technological priorities by another class. In retrospect the killing fields of the spectacle and slaughter of Vietnam did not end until the soldier tired of imperial sponsored technological methods of overkill of those "just like us."

Whether aware of it or not, Jan Barry addresses the horror and experiences of the type of advanced contemporary scientific warfare in Vietnam that appears to have reduced

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military options when humans balked at automated killing fields that eliminated "gooks," "slat heads," and "slipper heads," just like us. Elimination of the other is understandable and even desirable since their claim to humanity is questionable relative to the larger picture of selective survival of only the fittest. In this translation, utilization of technological sophistication is harnessed to the corruption of ethical means to an end in a moral vacuum of assessing one's accountability in these actions. I offer Guernica, Auschwitz, and My Lai.

In essence, if the military institution cannot conduct its operations because it cannot depend on its members to implicitly obey orders, then the effect is felt on three levels. First, in the economic sphere that becomes affected when subsequent costs of military operations become prohibitive as weapons have to substitute for human courage and innovation that could no longer be trusted. Thus an unbearable financial burden is placed on a culture not supportive of long-term sacrificing. Second: the military institution is impacted when its inability to maintain administrative costs or control over troops in combat places the army at risk, especially when officers have to be removed for their own safety when men refuse to follow orders or place price tags on the heads of their

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superiors. Third: the political conduct of the war has to dictate ever increasing use of costly weapons intensive, oppressive managerial imperatives that ultimately undermine the idealistic basis of war at the point where the soldier cannot be replaced with interchangeable parts, nor cost effective market methods placed on the value of his life, and where the planners and movers have no idea of why they are doing what they are doing or the consequences of the decisions conceived far beyond the battlefield itself.

Thus we lost in Vietnam because we lost sight of what honor is; the superimposition of the business model over the traditional model was the deadliest cut of all. This final alteration in the traditional social contract between soldier and state was irrational; it cost us the best and the brightest. It alienated idealists who had to do the fighting and dying and thus served to undermine the capacity of the state itself to remain viable.

The alienation stemming from the reduction of soldier to butcher's role proved antithetical to the valor of killing honorably or being killed under the Durkheimin standard of the sacred. When this idealistic alienation extended into military paralysis, as it did in Vietnam in 1971, the state was faced with a Hobson's choice between stopping the war short of complete victory or facing

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systemic collapse. There is no viable alternative to an army, other than the coercion of pure scientific reason without restraint in service to the garrison state.

We witness the legacy of Vietnam in the Iraqian War where the punishing power of technological overkill had to compensate for a military that would not and could not commit its army to high body counts so could not countenance a bloody confrontation in Baghdad, could not utilize its troops in face-to-face combat, and could not allow open coverage of a war in progress that may have had adverse complications from a non-supportive public that was unwilling to shed the blood of its children to protect corporate interests, no matter how many idealistic claims of protecting human rights, freedom and democracy were offered.

The VVAW is of historic importance in revealing how personal involvement in denouncing the immorality of a war in progress had a sobering effect for a hooked-on-science society. Their guerrilla theater representations emphasized the inherent contradictions of science and technology as extensions of human ideals by pointing to the high tech, automated battlefield avenues to My Lai, the Phoenix Project, napalm and Agent Orange, free-fire zones and Air America, thus were pivotal in moving the dimension

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of that war into a spectacle of experienced amorality instead. Such an immoral approach compounded political inability to separate the soldier from a corruption of the ideal.

The end result of this internal tension was that the American political system could not commit its military with certainty, could not utilize war to further national policy, and had to capitulate on the bargaining table when that war increasingly came to be viewed as a loss of national honor. Paradoxically, removing the cornerstone of the military ideal led to the U.S. army crashing down in a serio-comedic reversal of the original domino theory.

VVAW has been extremely effective in educating the general public into an understanding that our wars have increasingly gone beyond rather narrow circumscribed fields of individual or group endeavors among combatants to one of total annihilation of civilizations through ever increasing detachment of human agency made possible by scientific and technological Atari concepts. In this, we have strayed far afield from the earlier belief in Kantian ethics not to treat others the way we, ourselves, would not want to be treated. When the lapse occurred, first in the higher echelons of power, then dispersed downward into the ranks of military commanders, career officers who commanded

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battles far above the ground or behind protected enclaves, the lack of respect for your "betters" and the wounding of an entire American army was visible in the aftermath of Tet and Khe Sanh.

Unless we recognize our failure to restrain dangerous trends toward antiseptic detachment of human agency in dispensing violence to other humans, we cannot grasp the importance of VVAW's participation in opening national debate on moral issues confronting U.S. presence in Vietnam or anywhere else in the world. At last count, the American soldier is to be found on duty in some 70 countries of the world while inner economic, political morbidities unhinge the social fabric that has to support American commitments far afield.

It is problematic because the erosion of trust in government and a deepening dislike of private and public U.S. institutions permeates the nation as a whole. What is increasingly evident is that once more economic and political policies empty concern for the public, thus unqualified bedrock support at the once staunch grass-roots level is questionable. Frustrated citizen efforts to redirect economic, political or social policies fail and less than 25% of eligible voters elect a president of the U.S. who governs by default rather than popular mandate.

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Further, Congressional efforts to reinstill Adam Smith's invisible hand of market diplomacy by removing financial support from the classes we depend on to fill the ranks of our military today, the poor and lower middle classes, will not translate into patriotic frenzy when they are called upon to face danger or provide the ultimate sacrifice.

Vietnam was thus unique in the American military experience; it was the crucible for a historical convergence of idealism and rebellion that in turn provided a disciplined civilian/military pattern of civil disobedience. If the phenomenon of active duty military personnel questioning political and religious justifications of a war they were engaged in fighting, then becoming the agency of change towards a higher morality, then the VVAW may be viewed as that group of veterans where we can solidly trace a correlation between subjective human factors that influence objective historical decisions.

It was, after all, their personal experiences in Vietnam that led to unsettling doubts concerning their task. Ultimately, very human questions concerning life or death, war or peace, political expediency or just cause entered into the dialectics. Thus their evolution of thought led into a confrontation with the very state they were sworn to uphold because morality was possible only

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within an ethical dimension where political self-interest was subordinated to respect for the dignity of life - all human life. All Jan Barry and the VVAW ever wanted to do was to educate American society into the immorality of the kind of war in Vietnam they had experienced. Never again should young men have to die in distant corners of the world for nothing more tangible than contrived political fantasies based on the arrogance of power and contempt for those who must suffer for their misguided stupidity.

Thus, as the Vietnam War recedes into history, VVAW members are trying to keep alive the lessons of that war. They know what an educated citizenry can do to check and balance out of touch executive, judicial and legislative arrogance. They fervently share the hope that our children, any of America's young, will never again have to fight a war based on lies, such as the one they fought, and that the lives of their friends who died in Vietnam will serve to make another such venture more difficult.

The latest issue of the Veteran (Spring 1997), reveals their long lasting dedication to that ideal. Their organization was built on the premise that they would tell the truth about the war they had been in by stripping facade from reality. B-52s dropping their state-of-the art human exterminating devices are harmless enough, until they

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are contrasted with images of the terrible human toll stemming from policies of massive retaliation. Search and destroy missions are very innovative, until Americans are subjected to its process in mock reenactments.

When asked why they are still VVAW, they explain that the quest for peace and justice is unending. As Ben Chitty eloquently answers, the Vietnam War is not over for its veterans: too many are still dying from collateral damages, too many are serving hard time in prison, too many are homeless, too many know the anguish of holding their deformed or stillborn children, and too many are victims of a society that still doesn't know or care about what happened to them in Vietnam.[63]

Thus, VVAW's commitment is to social justice and their reach is global. Underlying the will to serve as the voice of conscience is the warrior's knowledge that educating on the utter abjection of war is the antidote to rhetoric and chauvenism. Their mandate is to always tell the truth and respect the individual. That is the human corrective on which VVAW was born, and the cause to which VVAW still remains deeply dedicated.

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FOOTNOTES

[1] Tom Wells, The War Within: America's Battle Over Vietnam, With a Foreword by Todd Gitlin (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1994), 52-53. Norma Becker led the New York Fifth Avenue Peace Committee. The 15, 1967, demonstration she helped to organize attracted Jan Barry and propelled the VVAW into history.

[2] Personal interview with Jan Barry at his home in Montclair, N.J. on Sunday, January 31, 1994.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Gabriel Kolko, Anatomy of a War (New York: Pantheon Books, 1985), 545-46. Kolko faults the U.S. for implanting satellite systems throughout the Third World without considering cultural and ideological differences. The U.S. installs a military system as a mechanism for controlling the political structure of American imposed economic order. Thus, military ethics of self sacrifice and idealism by are replaced by capital intensive, corrupt market forms which ultimately prove fragile and damaging. When funding stops, the surrogate military collapses and the entire subsidized political order crumbles.

[5] Jan Barry interview, January 24, 1994.

[6] "Vietnam Veterans Speak Out," New York Times, Sunday, November 19, 1967 (partial listing of signatories). The ad was a statement of purpose and intent and carried an appeal for funding and signatures.

[7] Al Santoli and the Vietnam Veterans of America, Everything We Had (U.S.A.: Ballantine, 1982).

[8] Bell Gale Chevigny, "The Different Wars: Escalation of Cynicism" Veterans vs. War: III, the village VOICE, February 29, 1968, p. eight. Carl Rogers' overview to the New York Post, "What Can I Do, One Unimportant Person"?, was reprinted in Redbook Magazine, March 1968. (Copy of composite articles on a leaflet distributed by Viet-Nam Veterans Against the War Newsletter Feb-Mar 1968).

[9] John Kerry before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on April 22, 1971. Portion of speech duplicated in a leaflet by Vietnam Veterans Against the War National Office, undated; Wells, The War Within, 495.

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10 Tom Wells, The War Within, 587.

11 Charles DeBenedetti, Charles Chatfield, Assisting Author. An American Ordeal: TheAntiwar Movement of the Vietnam Era (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1990), 91. The coup that Jan Barry refers to was the overthrow of the Diem regime on 11/1/63. He and his brother were assassinated in an armored carrier while attempting to escape.

12Donald Duncan, The New Legions (New York: Pocketbooks, 1967).

13 General William C. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1976), 189-191. General Westmoreland views that battle as a great victory. Again, vision did not progress beyond the number of body counts as the deciding point: 1,300 enemy lives to 300 American lives would allow that wars are won by mathematics.

14 Veterans for Peace joined in the anti-war protest. They were an older group with roots in the Spanish Civil War. Jan Barry attended a VFP meeting after the April 15 demonstration but was disappointed that Vietnam veterans were not included in the gathering. The VFW organization wanted to have the anti-war Vietnam veterans join under their umbrella, however, Jan Barry thought a separate group would have higher autonomy. The VFP did help the fledgling VVAW with funding.

15 Bobby Muller, "Grunts and Generals," (Chapter Three) Kim Willenson with the Correspondents of Newsweek, The Bad War (New York and Scarborough, Ontario: NAL Books, The New American Library, 1987), 75. Bobby Muller is a former VVAW member, now with the Vietnam Veterans of America. Mr. Muller is confined to a wheelchair as a result of taking a bullet in his spine. See Wells, The War Within, 489.

16 The VVA chapter in Bayonne Jan Barry mentioned in our interview on 1/24/94 was founded by Mr. Hugh Roarty, an intelligence officer with MACV HQ in Saigon. I interviewed Mr. Roraty at his home in Bayonne, N.J. on 1/23/95.

17 Sp/4 Carl D. Rogers, USA, was a signatory of the New York Times Ad of Sunday, November 19, 1967 VVAW position statement and membership solicitation. Sp/4 Rogers was one of the original founders of VVAW.

18 S/4 Stephen Green, USA was also a signatory of the NY Times ad of 11/19/67

19 Bell Gale Chevigny, "A Farewell to Arms: 'Over There' is Here," the village VOICE, March 14, 1968, p. 56.

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20 Ed Damato is a contributor to the VVAW national newspaper, The Veteran, writing on topics that range from the Tunnels of Cu Chi to Agent Orange. He presently resides in Brooklyn, New York.

21 Jan Barry, Basil T. Paquet, and Larry Rottman, eds. Winning Hearts and Minds: War Poems by Vietnam Veterans (New York: 1st Casualty Press/McGraw Hill, 1972).

22 The list was originally carried in The Veteran, VVAW national newspaper. My copy is undated with page number missing.

23 Wells, The War Within, 5, credits the antiwar movement, particularly their nourishment of deterioration in U.S. troop discipline and morale in Vietnam, for undermining the military mission in Vietnam. Wells outlines White House paranoia that the VVAW was Communist inspired, thus open for covert attention. See Operation Gemstone Plan, 549.

24 Joseph A. Amter, Vietnam Verdict: A Citizen's History (New York: Continuum, 1982), 124. The first teach-in was organized by University of Michigan faculty. In Tom Wells' book, The War Within, 23, Professor William Gamson is credited with proposing that the group organize a one-day faculty moratorium on teaching-as-usual and transform the university into a massive classroom on the war. Nearly 50 faculty members signed a petition to support the plan. Professor Marshall Sahlins suggested a day and all-night session instead. 3,000 people showed up for the event.

25 The Discovery Channel, August 4, 1995. 85% of the fathers of those serving in Vietnam had volunteered for World War II.

26 Richard Severo and Lewis Milford, The Wages of War: When America's Soldiers Come Home-From Valley Forge to Vietnam (New York, London, Toronto, Sydney and Tokyo: Simon and Schuster, 1990), 276.

27 Wells, The War Within, 11. Wells comments that the basis for McNamara's formal execute order for the reprisal strikes over the "North Vietnamese attacks on two U.S. ships in the Tonkin Gulf," was not valid. "It is now apparent that the attacks never took place."

28 Jan Barry interview, 1/31/94. Also, Wells, The War Within, 473.

29 Wells, The War Within, 281. Veterans close to VVAW in Chicago were organizing within the military through their antiwar newspaper, Vietnam GI.

30 Playboy Magazine, V 18.2, February 1971, p. 65.

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31 Walter Benjamin, Illuminations, edited and with an introduction by Hannah Arendt, translated by Harry John (New York: Schocken Books, 1968).

32 Amter, Vietnam Verdict, p. 91 and James William Gibson, The Perfect War: Techno War in Vietnam (Boston. New York: The Atlantic Monthly Press, 1986), 252-53, describes the corruption running rampant in South Vietnam, including sales of arms to the VC and North Vietnamese.

33 Richard A. Gabriel and Paul L. Savage, Crisis in Command: Mismanagement in the Army (New York: Hill and Wang, A Division of Ferrar, Straus and Giroux, 1978), 38-39, 171. Germans during World War II coined the derisive term "die goldenem Fausanen" Golden Pheasants) to describe those German generals where rank was acquired by politics - S.S. hacks in ornate uniforms or SS rear area administrators and others who paraded bedecked in shined boots and ribbons but never exposed themselves to the enemy; Gibson, The Perfect War, 121, describes the traditional military social bonds between troops and their commands deteriorating as soldiers became costs of production...virtually free to any given war manager to manage to death.

34 Robert Jay Lifton, Home From the War Neither Victims nor Executioners (New York: Basic Books, 1970), 131.

35 Ibid., 185-87 and 250-51.

36 James H. Jones, Bad Blood: the Tuskegee Syphilis Experiment (New York: The Free Press, A Division of Macmillan, Inc., 1981). The author documents the 40 year study by the United States Public Health Service (PHS) of the effects of untreated syphilis on black men in Macon County, Alabama. The study, known as the Tuskegee Study involved over 400 men, of which 399 were syphilitic and an additional 201 who were not.

37 Lifton, Home From the War, 137-38. Lifton describes the rage Vietnam veterans felt under the psychic numbing of nothingness.

38 Samuel Stouffer, et al., The American Soldier (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1949) Stouffer's classic study on World War II combat soldiers focused on the primary group as the source of cohesion in combat.

39 Sigmund Freud, Civilization and its Discontents, Standard Edition. Newly translated from the German and edited by James Strachey. (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1961), 48 and 65-71. Freud places the integrative power of Eros, love, against the destructive urges of the death wish, Thanatos, as instinctual phenomena. Freud considers Thanatos destructive, seeking to return the specie to a primeval state of nothingness.

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40) John Helmer, Bringing the War Home: The American Soldier in Vietnam (York.London: Oxford University Press, 1958), 249. Helmer notes that an analysis of a recent opinion poll on the war revealed the strongest correlation between social class and attitude on war policy were those indicating a high preference for withdrawal among low socioeconomic status working class respondents, especially among those low SES Democratic voters.

41 Jan Barry interview, January 24, 1994.

42 Lifton, Home From the War, 156-57 and 167. Lifton describes the process as a double-agent problem in that whatever ethical sensitivity impels the individual evil is under constant external and internal assault. His term for this is a "counterfeit universe" in which all pervasive, spiritually reinforced inner corruption becomes the price for survival.

43 Wells, The War Within, 63. Wells chronicles the first large battle for Americans in the Vietnam War. Over 200 Americans soldiers died in the Ia Drang Valley in mid-November 1965 when the entire nature of the war changed. At that point, the NVA would be the decisive military force in the war, not the Viet Cong. Amter, Vietnam Verdict, 126-27, notes the battle raged over 7 days and demonstrated the toughness of the opponents.

44 There are many authors who substantiate this revelation, among them, 1) Lawrence M. Baskir and William A. Strauss, with a Foreword by Father Theodore M. Hesburgh, Chance and Circumstance: The Draft, The War and The Vietnam Generation (New York: Vintage Books, A Division of Random House, 1978); 2) Gibson, The Perfect War, 210; 3) David Cortright, Soldiers in Revolt (Garden City, New York: Doubleday (Anchor Press) & Company, Inc., 1975), 10-11; 4) Lt. Col. (U.S. Army) William L. Hauser, America's Army in Crisis: A Study in Civil-Military Relations (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), 94-95; 5) Wells, The War Within, 474-75.

45 Jan Barry, "The Vietnam Veteran." Originally printed in The New York Times, 4/23/71 edition, a photocopy of the reprint appearing in the Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, April 26, 1971, was sent to me by Mr. Barry. Relative to this, DeBenedetti and Chatfield, An American Ordeal, 308-09, list the VVAW among those who criticized the government for making Lt. Calley the scapegoat..."the guilt ran all the way up the chain of command, yet those men escaped courts martial;" Gibson, The Perfect War, 441, notes that Lt. Calley was the only person found guilty of leading the My Lai massacre; everyone else implicated in the affair, from the top echelon to the lowest enlisted man, had their court-martial charges dismissed. Gibson perceives the action as military preservation of institutional practices.

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46 Tuchman, March of Folly, 332. The author states General Westmoreland deployed combat units as lures to provoke attack so that U.S. artillery and air force could close in for the kill and a gratifying body count.

47 Jan Barry interview, January 24, 1994. Jan spoke of the types of harm as possibly the result of unintended consequences, but showed a dislike of "covering up" the facts. Gibson, The Perfect War, Chapter 7, 225-269, describes the terrible effects on the South Vietnamese.

48 Bevin Alexander, The Future of Warfare (New York. London: W. W. Norton & Company, 1995) points to the Vietnam War as impossible for the U.S. to win because of North Vietnam's designation as "off limits." Only wars that can be won quickly , cheaply and effectively will be waged.

49 M. M. Bakhtin, The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays, edited by Michael Holquist translated by Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1985), third paperback printing.

50 See Wells, The War Within, 455.

51 Gibson, The Perfect War, 55. Dewey Canyon I, the invasion into Laos in January 1969 followed by Dewey Canyon II, the Cambodian invasion in March, were named after OSS Lieutenant Colonel Peter A. Dewey killed on August 28, 1945 during fighting between the French and Viet Minh after the British released and rearmed over 1,500 French prisoners; Wells, The War Within, 480-81, referencing the VVAW targeting of Congress.

52 Bakhtin, The Dialogical Imagination. Their guerrilla presentations of the panorama of war included body bags thus introducing a question of political implementation of such standards of measurement. In this, Lifton, Home From the War, 64-65, is convinced ethical historians of the future will focus on the body count as the perfect symbol of America's descent into evil. He sees no greater corruption than the killing that becomes the total measure of achievement mandates lies to others, as well as oneself, about why, who, what and how many one kills. Helmer, Bringing Home the War, 90-91, on the other hand, sees the VVAW guerrilla theater not as rhetoric aimed at veterans, nor representing anything else than moral outrage against the war, which they shared with many.

53 Wells, The War Within, 123, 409, and 491. The erosion in public support would appear to result from growing VVAW educational successes within the American public; Mr. Wells traces the public opinion polls from a first quarter 1967 47% approval rating for President Johnson to an April 1970 Harris poll revealing a 46% support President Nixon. By April 1971, most Americans felt for the first time that the war was morally wrong by a 60% to 26% majority.

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54 Gabriel and Savage, Crisis in Command, 40, negate the premise a mere lack of cohesion was the cause of the disintegration of the Army in Vietnam; it was not the lack of home front support, of ideology, or system alienation but the loss of ethics in the officer corps. In this, Shelby L. Stanton, The Rise and and Fall of an American Army: U.S. Ground Forces in Vietnam, 1965-1973 (Novato, CA: Presidio Press), 368, writes that American soldiers and Marines in Vietnam fought through some of the toughest encounters in American military history and some of the world's most difficult terrain. Their magnificent courage could not overcome fatal handicaps of faulty campaign strategy, incomplete wartime preparation and tardy superficial attempts at Vietnamization of the civilian population. Thus, the collapse of the army in Vietnam was an internal implosion, would have happened without external verities.

55 "Insignia," The Veteran, (Spring 1991), 12.

56 Ibid, "Vietnam Veterans Against the War: Where We Came From, Who We are, Who Can Join," 16.

57 "By-Laws of VVAW," The Veteran, Vol. 14 No. 4 (Fall 1984), 10.

58 "VVAW Fighting for Peace Veterans, Peace & Justice Since 1967." Membership Form. The Veteran (Spring 1991), 16.

59 "Phoney VVAW and Flag Burning: Open Letter to the Media," Pete Zastrow, National Coordinator, VVAW, Inc. The Veteran, Vol 20., No. 1 (Winter 1990), 1. Mr. Zastrow takes issue with an October 28, 1990 television, radio stations, and newspapers story of Vietnam Veterans in Seattle burning 1,000 paper flags to protest passage of the Congressional passage of a bill outlawing flag burning. Mr. Zastrow issues a declaimer that VVAW members were represented as there are no VVAW chapters in Seattle; any group using their name was lying. VVAW, Mr. Zastrow remarked, is for the First Amendment Rights, no matter how infantile or silly, although some members do find flag burning offensive.

60 Wells, The War Within, 242-43. Also, Amter, Vietnam Verdict, 144, notes that American planes attempting to land with men and supplies were hit by enemy fire, runways were blocked, cleared and blocked again; Robert L. Holmes, On War and Morality Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1989), 265. Mr. Holmes offers that the moral edge was turned back on the American officer corps at Hamburger Hill during the Khe Sanh operation. The marines had to leave the hill they had suffered huge casualties to wrest from the enemy; it broke their will. Gabriel and Savage, Crisis in Command, 170, state that an officer must never allow his men to be squandered or used in a manner that is not directly related to the true purpose of a command. In this regard, they are extremely critical of "the idiot who ordered the same company back up Hamburger Hill in Vietnam after it had been virtually decimated, or the fool who sent a

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platoon down a well ambushed road to retrieve a burnt-out armored personnel carrier" as prime examples of officers who allowed their men to be misused.

61 Colonel Donaldson D. Frizzell and W. Schoot, editors, Lessons of Vietnam (New York: Crane, Russek and Company, 1977), 73-93. The devastation of the Marine defense at the small garrison at Khe Sanh was an example of grave U.S. underestimation of the willingness of the other side to accept losses and terrible punishment and come back for more. Before the two month siege of Khe Sanh was over, 12,000 Vietnamese were lost while marines suffered 200 killed. Among the dead marines at Khe Sanh was the son of the ambassador to South Vietnam, Graham Martin, who was airlifted out of Saigon April 30, 1975, amid the wreckage and debris of a failed U.S. Indochinese policy; Gibson, The Perfect War, 210-212, places the number of killed on Hill Number 937 alone (Hamburger Hill), at 54 dead with another 420 wounded.

62 Gibson, The Perfect War, 396. The concept of an electronic barrier to keep the enemy out of South Vietnam was conceived by scientists working on the Jason Project in 1966 who discovered bombing was ineffective and recommended that the electronic barrier be built across the DMZ. McNamara recommended that the $1 billion dollar "fence" be be built. Part of the plan would place American troops in positions of monitoring the listening posts and the sensory directly south of the DMZ; the idea was abandoned when North Vietnamese troops shelled across the zone and it was realized that thousands of troops would be required to man the McNamara Line.

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III: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF VIETNAM VETERAN GROUPS I, II and III

This research is an exploratory work into ethical processes that advance or limit the ability of a nation to survive a crisis of conscience among segments of its military. However, the scope of the material and social variables had to be widened to include aspects of the Vietnam War and the anti-war sentiment as prelude to the emergence of the VVAW, The Vietnam Veterans Against the War, Inc.

If Vietnam was the arena for a historical convergence of idealism and rebellion that produced a maelstrom of civil disobedience leading to the phenomenon of veterans and active service military personnel questioning first the ethical and moral justification of a war they were engaged in fighting then becoming the agency for change, then the VVAW may be viewed as that group where the correlation between subjective factors that influenced objective historical decisions merged.

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The emphasis of this analysis was to explore levels of idealism on men in the Vietnam War and determine its effect on subsequent processes of moral alienation that led to the historic break between soldier and state, soldier and soldier, soldier and society and soldier from self. The VVAW appears to be the catalyst for reintegrating the shattered solidarity of military cohesion into a return to the ideals of military integrity in war. Ideals in themselves may not be worth researching, however, idealism as that expression of character springing from an ethical concern of how humans should behave or be treated is of enormous import to political and economic policies that increasingly take this country into undeclared wars of questionable necessity and conduct.

The following survey was conducted between January and June of 1996. Seven hundred and fifty surveys were sent to a random sampling of Vietnam veterans. Twenty-one surveys were returned to sender as undeliverable, 608 were never returned, 16 surveys were returned blank, and 2 arrived too late to be used. Thus, for this survey, N = 103. Veterans of other wars before Vietnam, the Korean or World War II eras, were excluded, unless they served during the Vietnam War era. The Vietnam veteran proved elusive, jealously guarding his privacy and that of other veterans; it might

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be added, with good reason. He is among the highest homeless; he has a high drug addiction rate; many have died of AIDS; he is dying at a faster rate for his veteran group than any other; and he has more service related illnesses and injuries than among the general veteran population with little notice from governmental agencies or congressional interest. Most American Legion veterans have age-related disabilities or illnesses; however, the Vietnam veteran suffers from Post Traumatic Stress Disorder or other psychological and health problems that are still being denied by Washington. They have a higher rate of divorce, suicide, imprisonment, unemployment, and other socially dysfunctional conditions compared with other veterans, although the Gulf War veterans have encountered the same information blockage on the Gulf War Syndrome as Vietnam veterans did with Agent Orange and other chemical agents. It has proven extremely difficult to secure information under the Freedom of Information Act or to gain agreement from the health establishment.

It was extremely difficult to secure interviews, due essentially to a reluctance to talk about the war or experiences in it or severe time pressures. For instance, a veteran who served in Graves Registration in Vietnam would only say that he knew he would go to heaven when he

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died because he had already been to hell. He refused to be interviewed or to complete a survey, and told me he's afraid to go anywhere alone; he cannot sleep in the dark.

Table II lists information on the status of the surveys: completed, returned or missing. The minimum sampling of 100 veterans was not reached until mid-August 1996. All avenues of outreach were utilized, however, it was not until a subscription listing of veterans who had dealt with a mail order enterprise was sent to me, did I succeed in accessing Vietnam veterans across a broad spectrum that provided the random sampling that gave this survey legitimacy. Many of those responding generously contributed the names and addresses of other Vietnam veterans they knew, adding a multiplier effect to my efforts.

The surveys were distributed nationwide via names and addresses secured from mailing lists, friends, students and every conceivable area where Vietnam veterans could be found. Respondents were then selected from every tenth name. In addition, names and addresses were taken from magazines, newspaper articles and, in addition, Vietnam veterans were solicited at parades, Veteran Administration hospitals, veteran's clubs and organizations, a moving wall exhibit, prisons and an appeal on the internet for

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volunteers. Batches of surveys were sent to friends and relatives in Hawaii, Colorado Springs, San Francisco, Wisconsin, Florida, Texas, and the New York Metropolitan area for distribution to Vietnam veterans.

The results of this survey thus include veterans who had served in a diverse range of military positions as enlisted men and seamen to Warrant Officer's and beyond; the highest ranking respondent was a retired Colonel. The representation of military occupation specialties run from combat infantryman to the intelligence officer in charge of the Phoenix Program in MACV HQ, Saigon, who graciously shared a Sunday afternoon with this author discussing every phase of activity and rationale for its implementation.

I hoped for and received a wide cross-section of military personnel in all branches of service and at all levels of rank and rating. I failed, however, to persuade a general or an admiral to complete the survey in the interests of advanced scholarship. Surveys were sent to and returned from states as diverse in geographical areas as California to New York, from Minnesota to Florida. Although surveys are necessarily anonymous, many of the respondents felt compelled to call me to discuss the survey and the concerns they had over the messengers again being blamed for the news; others inscribed their names and

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addresses (a few with telephone numbers) on the survey or return address envelope with requests to be contacted if additional information was required, and to forward my findings when the tabulations were completed. I sense a lack of closure about the Vietnam War among those who were there. For many I spoke with or exchanged letters, it is still a part of their lives, an incomplete part that is still searching for reintegration with the ideal.

I hope I have justified their faith in me and thank each and everyone for the tremendous support extended to this researcher and for the genuine openness of their shared Vietnam experiences, both objective and subjective, and I am proud of having shared a part of their lives in this brief span of time. Along the way, I have found many new friends; I discovered that Vietnam veterans followed two divergent paths: either they were reclusive and guarded or they were open and expansive. They were, above all, supportive of my research, even those who for personal reasons could not complete the questionnaire.

My findings are not meant to dishonor the bravery and or disparage the dedication of all these men who followed an internal sense of duty, albeit in many diverse directions; they truly personify the best there is in America in that, in times of genuine crisis, you can depend on your

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military to stand firm. The fault for Vietnam lies beyond their call to duty, the tragedy lies in a political elite who forgot the people who trusted them, thus the Vietnam tragedy does not reside in the Vietnam veteran but in those who did not have the best interests of this country at heart. The basis for this observation lies in the results that follow.

The analysis was completed on three groups of Vietnam veterans; specifically, the separation of these groups was determined on choice of organizational membership or lack of it, 1) those who did not join a veteran's organization, 2) those who joined traditional veteran organizations, such as the American Legion, Veterans of Foreign Wars, Disabled American Veterans, Vietnam Veterans of America and other mainstream types of veteran organizations, and 3) those who belonged to the Vietnam Veterans Against the War, Inc., an anti-war veterans organization. For purposes of identification, these three groups will be designated Group I, Non-Joiner, Group II, Joiner, and Group III, VVAW throughout the analysis.

When comparing birth years among the three (Chart #1), we note the Non-Joiners evidencing a range of eleven years between 1940 and 1951; the Joiners are an older group by years of birth ranging from 1918 to 1954, a 36-year span.

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VVAW members are in-between with a 13 year spread from 1935 to 1948. The year of arrival in Vietnam (Chart #3a) shows a range of 5 years for the Non-Joiners; 10 for the Joiners; and 12 years for the VVAW. Understandably, the crucial years between 1965 to 1971 reflects the highest number of arrivals in Vietnam for all three groups (Chart 3a) and Chart 3b asks for their age when they arrived at Vietnam. The Non-Joiner group averages age 19 through 27; the Joiners 19 through 37; and the VVAW with a younger profile of 19 through 23. The majority of our sample of veterans were born in the East, with the Northern geographical area evidencing the lowest number of Vietnam veterans (Chart #4). All respondents were male (Chart 5) and an overwhelming majority in all groups serving in Vietnam. There were approximately 206,000 women in Vietnam, most serving in service organizations or the nursing corps.

The major difference between veterans' place of birth and their parents appears in the foreign area with fathers and mothers of the Non-joiners registering 25% and 17.9%, respectively, parents of Joiners were at a lower 12.2% and 7.6%, and the VVAW with 11.1% fathers and 0% for mothers in the foreign category (Charts #5 and #6). All groups registered high percentages in the number of siblings of either sex in the 1 to 3 category (Charts #7 and #8).

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The racial majority in all three groups were Caucasian, although Non-joiners the exception to the pattern, reflecting a 32.1% Black representation, Joiners 1.5% with the VVAW having no minority members in this sampling (Chart #9). All groups of veterans were educated beyond the High School diploma, with strong representation in the college degreed veterans, lessening at the graduate level; there was no appreciable difference among the three groups (Chart #10). Types of education show a high level of general and professional training among all three groups, with less representation in the technical area (Chart #11).

46.6% of the Non-joiners, 60.6% of the Joiners, and 55.6% of the VVAW were unemployed prior to service entry, (Chart #12). A third of the Non-joiners and the Joiners fathers were in the Unskilled occupational category, while a third of VVAW fathers were employed in the Technical area (Chart #13). The highest occupational percentages for mothers were found in the Housewife category in all three groups: Non-joiners 71.4%, Joiners 62.1% and VVAW 88.9% (Chart #14). In this there appears to be some positive correlation between a traditional family household and the level of moral criticism mothers at home can be expected to use to socialize their progeny in the imperatives and

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commands of their societal ethos, provide the repetition necessary for reinforcement, and the adult supervision to curb incipient deviant conduct norms. Joiner's reported the highest family income level, $45,000 and over (28.8%); VVAW family income peaked at $15,000 to $29,999 (33.3%); and Non-joiners registered a 32.1% between $5,000 to $14,999, the lowest annual income (Chart 15).

Residential patterns (Chart #16) are highest in urban centers for the Non-joiner and the VVAW (46.4% and 44.4%, respectively) and a 39.4% suburban representation for the Joiners. In the category of religion, the Non-joiner shows a higher percentage of Catholic in all categories of father, mother and self, while Joiners and VVAW have higher representation among the Protestant denomination (Charts #17, 18, and 19). A mere 1.9% of respondents did not establish religious identification.

A large majority of all three groups were single prior to entry into service (Chart #20). A strong affinity for the Democratic Party is evident in all groups, except for father's in the VVAW grouping who registered a 55.6% Republican affiliation (Charts #21, 22 and 23). Prior to enlistment or being drafted, very few of these veterans were represented among the Reserve, Regular Army, National Guard or ROTC before entering the service (Chart #25), and

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most enlisted, rather than answered a draft call (Chart #24). Altruism is not seen as the overriding value as several veterans reported they enlisted after receiving draft notices in order to bargain for better choices and conditions of military service.

Recollection of AFQT or pre-1965 Test Scores was low across all groups; Charts #26 and #27 indicate test scores, with high score representations appearing in all three categories for those few who did recall the information. In all three groupings of highest rank and rating held when they left the service (Chart #28) NCOs are in the majority. Non-joiners and Joiners entered the Army and the Marines in higher percentages (Chart #29) than the VVAW, who register a higher percentage of Navy personnel. When comparing the three groups and their service units, the VVAW is highly represented in the Group I category where I expected to find higher levels of idealism based on exposure to higher access to informational areas, such as, Communications, Medical Corpsmen, Intelligence and certain Aviation/Airborne personnel privy to a wide range of interaction (Chart #30, Group I). They are seconded by the Joiners with 42.9% in support and combat units and a mere 21.1% showing in critical areas of Communications, intelligence, medical corpsmen and aviation/ airborne, and

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Joiners with a 33.3% presence in combat and only 17.5% representation in the above listed critical areas.

Those areas are considered important avenues where personal knowledge of events versus news distortions and information concerning the war often differ, thus enabling critical review on the basis of first hand exposure to events that were misrepresented to the American public.

Chart #31 notes the majority of our veterans in every group serving in Vietnam while Chart #32 identifies the company, battalion, regiment, division, shore/ship command units by group; each group percentaged high in the Enlisted/Seaman and NCO category (Chart 33) and registered across the board higher promotions before leaving the service Chart #34). Military Occupation Specialty (Chart #36) reveals a lower percentage of Communications, Intelligence, Medical Corpsman in all groupings (7.1% for non-joiners; 10.5% for joiners; and 88.9% for the VVAW). Each group experienced intense combat conditions. (Chart # 37) with 82.1% of the non-joiners, 90.9% of the joiners and 77.8% of the VVAW exposed to conditions of heavy combat. Types of combat experienced (Chart #36a), types of combat and combat actions experienced (Charts #37 and 38), and casualties sustained by groups (Charts # 39 through 42) show high rates of exposure to personal danger in all three

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groups. Chart #43 gives us an overview of hostile and non-hostile types of action underlying casualties, with hostile actions far outnumbering non-hostile incidents. Number of times wounded (Chart #44) records over 50% of respondents reporting no physical wounding, however, psychic trauma is left unaddressed.

The Joiners hold the most medals and awards given, 183, equating to 2.7 bestowals per person, among them:

- 1 Navy and 3 Army Medals of Honor
- 37 Bronze Stars
- 12 Silver Stars
- 1 Presidential Unit Citation
- 27 Purple Hearts
- 5 Navy and Marine Corps Crosses
- 16 Airmen's Medals
- 4 Distinguished Flying Crosses
- 1 Coast Guard Unit Commendation
- 4 Distinguished Service Medals.

The Non-joiners listed a total of 78 medals and awards, among them:

- 6 Purple Hearts
- 1 Silver Star
- 1 Presidential Citation
- 2 army Medals of Honor
- 7 Bronze Stars
- 6 Air Force Crosses
- 26 Distinguished Flying Crosses

and 38 other assorted medals and awards for an average of 2.7 per person.

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The VVAW listed 16 medals and awards, among them:

- 2 Bronze Stars
- 1 Purple Heart

and 13 other assorted medals and awards or 1.7 per person (Chart #40).

Although they appear to trail the Joiners and Non-joiners in overt recognition of bravery and valor, it is important to note that the VVAW returned their medals to the government during their April 23, 1971 Dewey Canyon III demonstration in Washington, D.C. in what they considered a negation of their dishonored role in an immoral and unsanctioned war. This low representation could thus be a strong indication of reluctance to acknowledge awards or decorations.

Respondents were asked for data on number of friends killed in action (Chart #44) and for subjective feedback on how they felt about those deaths (Chart #45). Although the Non-joiners and the Joiners evidenced higher numbers of friends killed, 82.1% and 77.3% to 44.5% for the VVAW in the category of multiple deaths, only the Non-Joiners and the VVAW 42.9% and 55.6% respectively, considered those deaths senseless, while 50.0% of the Joiners viewed the deaths as tragic. This trend from the nihilistic view of sacrifice to strong support for the sacrificial aspect of

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killed in action offer clues to the strength of ideological support or lack of such for military actions and policies leading to the deaths. Friends killed in action averaged 32 for the entire group of Non-Joiners or 1.1 per person; increasing to 638 or 9.7 friends killed per Joiner and 28 or 3.1 friends killed per VVAW. One respondent answered that they were all his friends, all 58,044, and another commented that CAC (Combat Action Command) units, in which he served, suffered more than 50% killed in action. Another veteran lost 80% of his unit, and others quoted that they had lost "too many" friends.

When asked how they evaluated their officers (Chart #46), Joiners held them in the highest esteem (60.6)%, while Non-Joiners and VVAW rated their officers "mediocre" at 42.9% and 66.7% respectively. This indicates the range of respect for authority and the degree of ideological support ranging from the superior rating of Joiners to the lower rating from Non-Joiners and reflecting the lowest esteem from among the VVAW category.

Dates of discharge vary; Joiners were discharged from service between 1960 and 1990, with 56.0% discharged between the peak years of 1965 and 1972. Non-joiners left the service between 1966 to 1994, with 67.8% discharged between 1965 and 1972; VVAW members left the service

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between 1958 and 1972, with 77.8% leaving during the peak years of the Vietnam conflict (Chart #47). In the entire sample, only one individual received an Undesirable Discharge (Chart #48).

Most veterans joined their organizations during the post-Vietnam years, even into the recent 1990s (Chart #51). This may be explained by the passage of time and the tempering of stigma impositions and ostracism moral entrepreneurs within the traditional organizations leveled at the Vietnam veteran when he returned home and sought membership in these organizations. However, when addressing the 28 members or 27.2% of the entire sample who did not join a veteran's organization, this is not unique to the experience of the Vietnam veteran. Historically, four out of every five veterans do not join any group (Helmer:1974, p. 68).

The VFW listed the largest number of sample members, 45 or 65.1% of the Joiners (Chart #49). The American Legion was second with 40 members and 60.6% of the respondents. The Vietnam Veterans of America was third with 31 members or 46.9% of the sample population, while the Disabled American Veterans registered a membership of 26 members for 39.3% of the population. Other organizations, such as unit, regiment, battalion or

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divisional organizations, blanketed the remaining 37 members or 56.1% of the sample. Many veterans held membership in several organizations.

Another less discussed impact of the Vietnam War is that the American Legion slipped as the first organization of choice for this sampling of veterans. Helmer (1974:68) notes that by June 30, 1971, of 2,700,000 American Legion members, only 300,000 Vietnam veterans were members or 5.7% of all eligible Vietnam era veterans; the VFW with a membership of 1,700,700,000 numbered 450,000 Vietnam era members or 15.0% of the total eligibles; and the VVAW numbered 20,000 or 0.4% of Vietnam era eligible veterans.

Many Vietnam veterans upon returning home and attempting to join the Legion were told to go elsewhere, that they had lost their war. That rankled men such as Jan Barry who had been honorably discharged and did apply for membership but was discouraged from doing so. 11.1% of our VVAW sample did hold membership in the Legion, 33.3% in the VVA and 22.2% belong to the "Other" organizational designation. It is interesting to note that Bobby Mueller, instrumental in starting the Vietnam Veterans of America was a member of the VVAW before leaving it to organize the VVA. Certain eligibility requirements of a particular organization may have limited membership; first, military

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service with honorable discharge; second, military service in a theater of war; and third, military service under any conditions of discharge (Helmer:68). The VVAW fell into the third category.

Reasons for why they joined their particular veteran's organization (Chart #51) touches on the issue of commitment versus social considerations; 100.0% of the VVAW answered "To Make a Difference," in short to stop the war, while 59.1% of the Joiners answered "Comradeship," a social bond apparently lacking at home.

Chart #52 and #53 offer insights into the depth of convictions by measuring current membership status and positions within the organizations for insight providing an understanding of levels of personal involvement and dedication. Rank and file positions are expected to provide lower levels of responsibility within the organization than the more demanding tasks of national leadership. Joiners evidence the highest rate of active participation and positions in national leadership.

The next series of questions were constructed in order to gain an understanding of attitudes, perceptions, and those areas Wittgenstein called "gut-level understandings," as clues to the importance of ideological convictions, value judgments, and empathy for universal principles

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versus narrower secular interests. We note in Chart #54 that 59.1% of the Joiners stated that the U.S. was winning the war when they left Vietnam, while 28.6% of the Non-joiners said no one was winning, as did 44.4% of the VVAW. Toward this, measuring the distance between perceptions of the enemy as technologically or physically inferior, rather than capable and equal, offers discernible comparison between chauvenism and universalism. The percentages of "Didn't Knows" and Didn't Cares," which could point to lack of information or alienation from the war, when added to the "No one" respondents, show that 53.6% of the Non-Joiners, 31.8% of the Joiners, and 66.6% of the VVAW appear to differ substantially from political and military assurances that "victory was just around the corner," and "light at the end of the tunnel."

In answer to whether the Vietnam War was moral, 62.1% of the Joiners said it was, while 35.7% of the Non-joiners and 100.0% of the VVAW stated that it was not (Chart #55). Changing attitudes about the war itself occurred in 53.6%, 51.5% and 75.0% of the Non-Joiners, Joiners and VVAW, respectively (Chart #56). The underlying criteria for the war had less to do with the intensity or risk of combat experience and more with the ability to be privy to the overview of the strategic situation and its consequences.

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Thus, America's combat troops are in many ways reflective of the conservatism of the American workforce, abused and brutalized, but still loyal to the system as no overview exists to his perception of reality, except "to get the job done."

In this, if there was erosion within the solid wall of loyalty to authority among combat soldiers, it ultimately emerged from their perception of having been lied to by their government. Although there is a universal agreement and disillusionment with politicians through such lies, the lies themselves nevertheless give rise to a triple category of a perceived reality, again, less dependent on direct combat involvement than in the combat overview.

In relationship to the question of technology, all categories agree that a more advanced technology could not have won the war; however, where Non-Joiners and Joiners do agree, in the order of 60.7% to 62.1%, with 100% of the VVAWers, is that such technology could not have won the war. Again, pointing toward a greater awareness on the part of those with access to the realities of war and the technical limitations (Chart #57). The critique of technology goes further into whether we used everything we had. In this, 21.9% of the Joiners felt this to be the case, as did 23.5% of the Non-Joiners and a third of the VVAW. However, the

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Non-Joiners appear to reflect the limitations of such technology in relationship to a more human intensive enemy in that 52.9% felt that the Vietnamese could nullify such technology as opposed to 44.4% of the VVAW, as did 17.0% of the Joiners. The Joiners appear to reflect a negative image of the Vietnamese military ability which appears to relate to their concepts of organizational loyalty to their buddies and subordination to higher authority.

Relative to whether the high tech war did more harm than good, this was overly accepted by the VVAW in the form of 88.9%, while the Non-Joiners and Joiners appear to disagree with 25.0% and 33.3%, respectively (Chart #58). For those who agree that the technology was more harmful than good, the VVAW appears more idealistic in that our technology was only killing innocent people. Ironically, the Joiners appear to reflect a basic working class ideology in that 70.0% felt that it enriched Corporate America. The Non-Joiners displayed the highest intensity toward killing innocent people in their 71% rating.

In relationship to the question of misuse of technology being the main cause of our failure in Vietnam, all groups generally disagree, Non-Joiners leading with 14.3%, VVAW 11.1% and 10.6% of the Joiners agreeing. In this there appears to be a universal acceptance that there

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were other than technical reasons for failure in Vietnam (Chart #59). Chart #61 illustrates that in this the main reasons for our failure in Vietnam cited by the Joiners were political restraints 87.9% and lack of support at home 83.3%. The Non-Joiners appear to also hold similar views, although with less intensity, 78.6% and 78.6%. The VVAW appears to reject these concepts and concentrates on three features for our failure by 2/3rds of the group: these evolve around the question of an immoral war, poor military leadership and the North Vietnamese were better fighters.

In relationship to the escalation of advanced technological methods of warfare in Vietnam (Chart #60), 47% of the Joiners felt it was morally justified, as opposed to 25% for the Non-Joiners and 11.1% for the VVAW. In relationship to the scientific methods of warfare in Vietnam, 88.9% of the VVAW believed it to be inhumane, where 40.9% of the Joiners felt it was necessary and useful, as did 37.7% of the Non-Joiners. In this it must be recognized that at most 40% of the respondents found such scientific wars necessary and useful (Chart #66).

From such findings we can conclude several things in relationship to technology. For the VVAW, it was morally repugnant, and for the Non-Joiners and Joiners, it was unnecessary and non-useful; therefore a universal rejection

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of the technological imperatives appears in effect for the VVAW.

When addressing the human conduct of war, in which organizational questions of leadership play a paramount role, none of the VVAW felt that the military did everything they could to minimize the loss of civilian lives in Vietnam. This is in sharp contrast to 2/3rds of the Joiners who felt that lives were spared, but is closer to the Non-Joiners 28.6%. Thus, we are again beset with the fact that at least half of the surveyed felt that the military did not make every effort to minimize civilian losses (Chart #65).

Going deeper into the moral organizational question of war, virtually all agree that the My Lai massacre was unjustified, a phenomenon led by the VVAW with 88.9%, seconded by the Non-Joiners with 75% and supported by the Joiners with 63.6%. Divisions appear, however, over methods of war beyond open massacres of the My Lai type. Thus utilization of Agent Orange, although rejected by 88.9% of the VVAW and 46.4% of the Non-Joiners, was rejected by 30.3% of the Joiners. (Charts #67a, b and c). In questions of Napalm, Free Fire Zones, Chemical Defoliants, the Phoenix Program, bombing of the Red River dikes and body counts, we registered a 77.8 to 88.9% of the

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VVAW remaining critical. For the Non-Joiners, the most unjustifiable element of the war were the body counts with 56.6% followed by Agent Orange with 46.6%. For the Joiners, the most critical review of the conduct of the war beyond My Lai centered on body counts at 39.4%. Thus beyond the officially recognized My Lai massacre, there appears to be a deep alienation over body counts as a legitimate means of engaging in the conduct of war.

Innovative body counts was the attempt by Secretary of State Robert S. McNamara to quantify the war in Vietnam. It meant tabulating the corpses of enemy soldiers killed on the battlefield then sending the information to Washington, D.C., where it was given to the news media to disseminate. It served to sanitize death and mutilation as numerical substantiations of our superior ability to wage war, witness the efficiency with which we dispatched so many of the enemy.

As with many of the managerial implementations introduced by the business model, it led to inflated reports and to mendacious and fictitious tallies of U.S. military advances with the trophies of collected corpses as proof of military superiority. It was a surreal manifestation where, if compared to the massive bombings of World War II, one is reminded that after all the civilian

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casualties, we still had to face the enemy on the battlefield and win through superiority of will based on an honorable task.

The response after the Vietnam crisis displays a continuation of their consciousness of the Vietnam experience where 88.9% of the VVAW engaged in or supported the anti-war movement, as opposed to 15.2% and 14.3% of the Joiners and Non-Joiners respectively (Chart #68) and even lower percentages supporting "deviant" groups. Ironically, the highest percentage of those who have served in wars since Vietnam has been the VVAW as contrasted to the Non-Joiners and Joiners (Chart #63). This may be a calculated attempt to change military policy from the inside. All agree that the Vietnam War has impacted American military options; ironically, the highest percentage is that of the Joiners, 62.1%, followed by the VVAW 55.6% and the Non-Joiners 53.6% (Chart #62).

When asked whether they would personally serve in another war, although 80.3% of the Joiners agreed, as well as 60.3% of the Non-Joiners and 44.4% of the VVAW, the options of commitment appear quite narrow. In this, there appears to be a virtual universal rejection of the New World Order concept vis-a-vis Bosnia, Iraq, Haiti, as none of the VVAW support such moves, only 3.7% of the Joiners

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and 5.5% of the Non-Joiners would serve in that capacity (Chart #64).

Further, in relationship to a response to aggression in conjunction with other international bodies, none of the VVAW, 41.5% of the Joiners and 27.2% of the Non-Joiners would do so. Again, these figures are below a third of the respondents. In relationship to protecting vital U.S. economic interests, none of the VVAW, 33.3% of the Joiners and 22.2% of the Non-Joiners would do so. One area in which there appears to be agreement is over the question of a direct attack on U.S. territory. In this, 100% of the VVAW would fight if attacked, as opposed to 72.2% for the Non-Joiners and 62.2% for the Joiners. Thus we have a paradox for the New World Order commitment in which less than 5% or less of Vietnam veterans will support that endeavor with their lives, or those of their sons. Even the question of protecting American economic interests abroad is supported by less than 25% of the veterans. The only major area in which they agree to serve is a direct attack on U.S. territory (Chart #64).

Thus we note that wars have expanded beyond rather narrow circumscribed fields of individual or group endeavors among combatants to one of total annihilation of civilizations. This has been paralleled by an increasing

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detachment of human agency made possible by scientific and technological Atari concepts of computerized Star Wars. Unless we recognize this increasingly antiseptic detachment of human agency from complicity in violence upon other humans, we shall fail to gain an understanding of the importance of VVAW participation in opening national debate on the moral issues confronting American participation in Vietnam, or anywhere else.

However, one must still deal with addressing the mindset that one won the war but lost the peace. That area has evoked the most aggressive confrontations and comments from respondents in my sample. In this, it must be remembered that much of the ground forces America committed to Vietnam viewed the measurement of the war's success or failure in a very materialistic light, equating victory to body counts; the more body counts, the greater success in relationship to one's unlimited losses.

However, there is a traditional concept of war adhered to by the classic Clauswitzian framework and practiced at West Point which views wars as largely victorious based upon the acquisition or delimitation of territorial gains. In this, America was clearly the loser as less territory was under American control as it departed from Vietnam in 1972 than had been under French control before Dien Bien Phu or

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had been under Japanese control before their final defeat in 1945. Not only was the loss of ground or territory, relative to other allies, an indication of defeat, but so too was it a reality in relationship to the territory we controlled in 1963 and the territory we controlled by 1973. In this, the Tet Offensive, which could be considered a material victory in inflicting greater losses on the enemy than we ourself suffered, was in fact a traditional defeat in forcing us to abandon the critical outposts, such as Khe Sanh along the mountainous provinces in order to fall back to the safer highland and coastal areas.

However, all indication is that the Vietnamese went beyond this positional mobile conception of war into a struggle of will, the oldest form of war and military art as outlined by Sun Tzu 2500 years ago. In this, they were clearly victorious, for despite their losses, even if given the inflated figure of 5 to 1 as outlined in Savage's work, Crisis of Command, the American units which became demoralized first and most intensely were in the rear-based high tech segments. It was also the American public whose will had been broken to support the war through the failure of their high tech projected victory.

In this, the TeT Offensive destroyed the illusion of high tech warfare and with it the will of the public, the

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politicians, and the military command to continue the struggle. However, the turning away from Vietnam before accomplishing political ends, abandoning an ally to their fate, and a rearrangement of Vietnamese, Cambodian and Laotian political systems does not support the argument that we won the war and called it off when we had accomplished what we had set out to do.

It is noted that although the background of all respondents in relationship to age, religion, national origin, and SES appears to have little variation, a profound change occurred in these veterans within the Vietnam experience itself. The most important feature underlying any change in attitude towards the war they were pursuing appears in being lied to by their government: 53.6% of the Non-joiners, 51.5% of the joiners, and 88.9% of the VVAW say the war became immoral when they discovered the extent of governmental lies.

Further, we trace erosion of trust in government in Chart #72 where anti-government rhetoric outweighs pro-government support by a slight margin. However, those in medical positions, communications and intelligence were most salient in understanding the full extent of the lies and this in itself appears to be the major independent variable leading to fundamental political realignment. In

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this, fully 44% of the VVAW were drawn from communications or intelligence services as opposed to only 7% for the Non-Joiners and 3% for the Joiners. Charts #70 and #71 afford a clear picture of the depth of support for the vvvgovernment among the veterans it sent to Vietnam; 42.9% of the non-joiners and 66.7% of the VVAW strongly agree or moderately agree that the government in Washington is the enemy, not the friend of the people; the joiners strongly or moderately agree with 39.4% of their sample. They strongly or moderately disagree at the same percentage: 39.4%. Chart #71 registers a 3.6% pro-government stance for non-joiners, while the joiners stand at 6.1%. The VVAW polls a 11.1% pro-government sentiment. Anti-government respondents are 53.6% within the non-joining group; 36.4% of the joiners; and 66.7% of the VVAW; those perceiving government as neutral total 25% in the non-joiners, 21.2% for joiners, and 11.1% for VVAW . The missing category reveals a high percentage of joiners, 21.2%, to VVAW respondents, 1.1%, while the non-joiners stand at 25%.

Basically, this can be seen as the fallout of governnment policies that were naive in thinking that there would not be a day of reckoning. Such lies in themselves led to distrust but the growing awareness of military alterations in waging the Vietnam War from Washington produced much of

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the radicalization. As such, the lies appear to have delimited American military options today to the point where only 5% of the Vietnam veterans appear willing to support that which is most political, the New World Order, with the VVAW going beyond lack of support to a most vehement call for political action against the slippage into military adventures worldwide by projecting a radical solution in the realm of armed resistance itself or leaving the country altogether.

Relative to this, Chart #72 lists the options for responding to another draft call making the respondents liable for military service whenever the president declares a national emergency. 42.9% of the Non-joiners and 74.2% of the Joiners would serve if called, however, the remaining personnel would follow directives ranging from a mild sign a petition about what is happening, joining a group interested in what is happening, demonstrating in the streets over what is happening to participating in a physical or armed action about what is happening or leaving the country.

The reality that intelligence and communications project in this instance is that technology is not only immoral but ineffective against the human spirit. The grasp of that reality places the VVAW in a dangerous

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position of understanding the need for human struggle. Thus it is no accident that they have the highest percentage of those who are willing to take up arms against an unjust war in the future. In this, they are at direct odds with materialist doctrines of war and the social system responsible for it.

In relationship to the social data on our three groups, although income differentiation appears to have little effect upon the radicalization process, two salient features do appear present which may explain both the radical concepts among the VVAW and the more conformist views among the joiners. Relative to radicalization, there appears to be a higher developed sensitivity and consciousness when there is a sustained maternal presence in the home vis-a-vis the housewife role: 89% of the VVAW mothers were listed in that category, while 71% of the non-joiners and 62% of the joiners (Chart 14) reported mothers at home.

The second feature, residency, VVAW personnel are characterized as coming from an urban background (44.4%) and a rural background (33.3%), where community values still appears to exist as opposed to suburban alienation where only 11.1% of VVAW came from, the breakdown shows a suburban residence pattern of 32.1% for Non-Joiners and 34.9% for the Joiners. In this, both family and community

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ties appear to have developed a sense of consciousness for the good and welfare of others.

The third salient feature appears to be the racial composition of the groups, which appears to have drawn heavily in from the black minority for Non-Joiners where they comprise 32.1% of the group, as opposed to the 1.5% for joiners and 0% for VVAW (Chart #9). This appears to place an orientation of a racial perception of the war which viewed the war as a white establishment, although there was a high profile black component of the VVAW which I was unable to tap. The Clarence Fitch Chapter of the VVAW in the New York Metropolitan area was named after a black Vietnam veteran who was active within the VVAW.

At the highest level and type of education received (Chart #11), there appears to be no discernible division. Beyond race, residence and family support, the major factor determining radicalization appears to be the Vietnam experience itself and the realization of being lied to. Joiners generally had a higher percentage of combat decorations, wounds, awards and medals; however, it was the factor of having an overview and personal experience of the contradictions of the war itself which appears to be the major force in the phenomenon of radicalization for the VVAW.

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In the area of Military Occupation Specialty, personnel having access to intelligence communications or an understanding of true casualty rates, via medical corpsmen or helicopter personnel, appear to have a higher affinity for VVAW radicalization. All other factors as tours of duty, rank, years served and branches appear secondary. In this, we must thus draw the conclusion that it was less the combat stress that produced the radicalization as the recognition of political deception. The primary conscious rejection and discovery by those privy to such knowledge evolved around the technical question. In this, it was found that such technology in use in Vietnam was inhumane and ineffective in that the utilization of a greater intensity of such technology would have proven increasingly counterproductive. In this, the VVAW is at odds with the joiners who enjoy an optimistic view of technology vis-a-vis the protection it afforded, albeit at a cost to the civilian population. It could be labeled a one-dimensional official political and military challenge of technological buffering designed to destroy an elusive and ephemeral enemy who refused to stay and fight, choosing, instead, to hit and run and to melt into the jungle.

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Ultimately, all groups are united in their belief that they had been lied to by their government, only the VVAW had a greater awareness of this lie with their links to technology as a method and end to war itself, thus led to a delimiting faith in future employment of military options over human will. Vietnam still intrudes into the memories of our veteran groups (Chart #75). Well over 50% of our entire sample in all three groups report thinking about Vietnam very often or often.

When asked for the legacy of Vietnam (Chart #74), 35.7% of the Non-joiners and 66.7% of the VVAW respondents see that legacy in terms that the government can no longer enjoy unilateral jurisdiction over war, while 37.9% of the Joiners see it as an imperative to return to the old values that made our country great.

We are finally drawn to the final analysis which is the effect of such awareness for future wars. In this, there appears to be a universal alienation in which, although there may be a bare majority of acceptance of fighting for the defense of the nation, this acceptance drops readily as one moves into the ambiguous options of national interests abroad away from taking up arms after direct U.S. territorial attack, and becomes rejective when dealing with the question of going to war for the new world

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order, to protect U.S. interests, to respond to international aggression, and to promote human rights. Although laudatory, the major stress is to go to war for the survival of your country and your way of life. Chart #73 offers a view of how our groups feel over the waging of a technologically advanced brutal war over a peasant society with 42.8% of the Non-joiners and 88.9% of the VVAW strongly agreeing or moderately agreeing with that premise while 66.7% of the Joiners strongly or moderately disagree with that statement.

In conclusion, the Vietnam syndrome is still with us and firmly embraced by those privy to the reality of war. As such, it has restricted American options increasingly towards a narrow range of territorial self-defense more in keeping with the Just War Doctrine. However, there is still a 50% support for political policies involving war and peace, although questions surface as to the authenticity or legality of taking a country into a war you have no intention of pursuing to a victorious end.

Ultimately, the question that has to be answered by everyone who takes up arms in defense of his or her country is at what point does the decision have to be made about individual responsibility for immoral actions by the state and does the individual have a moral right to do so under

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conditions of all out warfare when the future of his nation and society are in jeopardy.

I would argue that was never the consideration in Vietnam; we were apprehensive about the military potential of China and Russia, both superpowers. However, although both were implicitly cooperative with the North Vietnamese, the war was a Vietnamese thing. Further, American dependency on science to guarantee success in any human endeavor through an emphasis on technological superiority failed to affect the ultimate conclusion of a flawed conflict; human bravery and will cannot be underestimated. As an example, the Iron Triangle area south and northwest of Saigon incorporated the Cu Chi district, which was a honeycomb of tunnels used as the focal point of attacks on Saigon. In an article written by Ed Damato for The Veteran, (Vol. 17 No. 3 & 4, Fall 1987), we learn that the tunnels were 350 kilometers long with deepest sections measuring over 7 meters. They were dug by the Vietnamese during the French phase of the Indochinese war and enlarged significantly after the 60s and 70s. These tunnels were used by the Viet Cong and village defense forces as a military complex and refuge from the American military; at some points the tunnel networks went directly below the base camp of the U.S. 25th Infantry Division.

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Understandably, Cu Chi was the most defoliated and bombed area of Vietnam. 1.5 kilograms of bombs were dropped for each person in the district; 3.0 kilograms of bombs per square meter. To gain a perspective of what the millions of pounds of bombs dropped in Cu Chi could do, of the 16,000 Vietnamese killed in battle 10,000 were killed there, and one in every three families living there suffered a wartime death. Despite the sustained bombing, B-52s could not break the tunnel system, although they did do some damage. General Westmoreland later admitted the tunnel system was undestroyable.

After the most technologically advanced aircraft in the world supposedly destroyed the complex, American volunteers had to be summoned to serve as "tunnel rats" to clear out the intact tunnels. The task was one of the most dangerous and particularly difficult military duties. It takes enormous courage to do that, as well as an understanding that after the technology ends, humans still have to complete the task. American servicemen in Vietnam did not lack for courage or patriotism, but there is a difference between courage and will; will far outlasts courage because it is intrinsically bound with the ethos of a people. That ethos or ethics is culturally determined and incorporates the moral foundations of that people; it

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is the determinant of strength of purpose and level of perseverance in historic patterns of resistance. When the moral edge is lost, the cause is lost as well.

One may argue that morality is situational, and as such answers to as many interpretations as there are individuals to offer them. However, when the rule of necessity, which knows no rules, is offered as moral suasion, then we are left with a savage world where only the powerful occupy the high plateau. In this inverted less than perfect universe, innocents can be murdered routinely simply on the basis of being "the other," and massacred en masse within a vacuum of situational moralities. History is littered with human lives sacrificed for no other reason than they differed from those who were empowered to decide who lived and who died within the brief span of time their power lasted.

This empirical study supports the hypothesis that the handful of veterans who founded and became part of the Vietnam Veterans Against the War rediscovered their ethos first under the intense conditions of a war waged, for the most part, against a peasant society with the will and determination to resist the most advanced scientific and technological nation in the world and a second war to educate the American people into a morality of war.

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Further, the moral factor, the basis for idealism leading to rebellion appears higher in their group than the other veteran groups in all key areas.

They may not, as the national commander of the VFW, H. R. Rainwater, said, "speak for the average Vietnam veteran who is...trying to get an education or establish a home life and become useful citizens once again." However, 21 years after the end of the Vietnam War, they are a visible presence in the opposition to war and attempts to restore diminishing political and moral responsibility to a society that is unalterably convinced that we are "good" and other countries are inherently "evil" (quoted by Al Hubbard, Executive Secretary of the VVAW, during the Winter Soldier Investigation).

Re-examination of our political interest and military means to obtain such will reveal an irreconcilable schism in which, although economic policy of the new world order may dictate global ventures and hegemony, the national and moral will of its soldiers no longer appear acquiescent towards such folly. The executive, legislative and judicial branches have learned nothing from recent history. As we note, everything has a price tag. When the Vietnam War ended, so did the responsibility for veteran concerns. The coverup of Agent Orange is well taken, it took a Maude

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deVictor to blow the scandal wide open, and a VVAW to care. In this, empty platitudes, such as honor, fairplay, and justice, are not for sale. These idealists deviated sharply from a market economy where everything has a price, including human integrity. They followed their ideals, which could not be bought - and gave freely to right a wrong, however, the cause must be just. In this, when national crises arise, appeals to honor, duty, and loyalty toward a society that that did not instill those values in its young can only end in electing surrogates whose idea of defense is a financial shield.

The latest disclosures on recent election financing adds further to this dimension; the Taiwan government's alleged $15,000,000 contribution to President Clinton's reelection committee following the intervention of U.S. Navy ships during recent Chinese war exercises off their shores, the selling of the White House literally and figuratively to unsavory characters, photograph sessions with Chinese communist officials, and the rampant hunger for power that cuts across "must not lie, cheat or steal," asks whether American and American lives are now bought and sold for personal political gain, as in any slave auction. How much is each military transaction worth and who benefits?

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If these questions have merit, then the importance of the VVAW wake up call in every foreign or domestic military intervention other than direct territorial aggression on this country deserves to be heard. "No one wanted to be the last man to die in Vietnam for nothing."

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CHART #1:

Question: {What is} your date of birth?

Non-Joiner (1940 through 1951)			Joiner (1918 through 1954)			WAW (1935 through 1948)		
Value	Frequency	%	Value	Frequency	%	Value	Frequency	%
1940	2	7.1	1918	1	1.5	1935	1	11.1
1941	1	3.6	1920	1	1.5	1940	1	11.1
1942	1	3.6	1921	1	1.5	1943	1	11.1
1943	2	7.1	1924	1	1.5	1946	2	22.2
1944	1	3.6	1927	2	3.0	1947	2	22.2
1945	1	3.6	1929	1	1.5	1948	2	22.2
1946	5	17.9	1931	2	3.0	Missing	0	0.0
1947	4	14.3	1936	2	3.0			
1948	4	14.3	1937	1	1.5			
1949	4	14.3	1938	1	1.5			
1950	1	3.6	1940	2	3.0			
1951	2	7.1	1941	1	1.5			
Missing	0	0.0	1942	3	4.5			
			1943	4	6.1			
			1944	1	1.5			
			1945	6	9.1			
			1946	11	16.7			
			1947	14	21.2			
			1948	3	4.5			
			1949	4	6.1			
			1950	1	1.5			
			1954	2	3.0			
			Missing	1	1.5			
Total	28	100.0	Total	66	100.0	Total	9	100.0

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CHART #2:

Question: {What is your} sex?

	Non-Joiner	Joiner	WAW
Male	(28) 100.0	(66) 100.0	(9) 100.0
Female	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0
Missing	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0

CHART #3:

Question: Are you a Vietnam War veteran?

	Non-Joiner	Joiner	WAW
Yes	(27) 96.4	(65) 98.5	(9) 100.0
No	(1) 3.6	(1) 1.5	(0) 0.0
Missing	(0) 0,0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0

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CHART #3a:

Question: [What was the] year of your arrival in Vietnam?

Non-Joiner			Joiner			WAW		
Value	Frequency	%	Value	Frequency	%	Value	Frequency	%
1965	1	3.6	1962	3	4.5	1958	1	11.1
1966	3	10.7	1963	1	1.5	1962	1	11.1
1967	5	17.9	1965	3	4.5	1966	1	11.1
1968	5	17.9	1966	11	16.7	1967	2	22.2
1969	7	25.0	1967	12	18.2	1968	1	11.1
1970	2	7.1	1968	15	22.7	1969	1	11.1
Missing	5	17.9	1969	5	7.6	1970	1	11.1
			1970	1	1.5	Missing	1	11.1
			1971	1	1.5			
			1972	1.	1.5			
			Missing	13	19.7			
Total	28	100.0	Total	66	100.0	Total	9	100.0

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CHART #3b:

Question: How old were you when you arrived in Vietnam?

Non-Joiner (19 through 27)			Joiner (19 through 37)			WAV (19 through 23)		
Value	Frequency	%	Value	Frequency	%	Value	Frequency	%
19	4	14.3	19	7	10.6	19	2	22.2
20	5	17.9	20	8	12.1	20	2	22.2
21	6	21.4	21	14	21.2	21	1	11.1
22	2	7.1	22	4	6.1	22	1	11.1
23	1	3.6	23	2	3.0	23	2	22.2
24	1	3.6	24	5	7.6	Missing	1	11.1
25	1	3.6	25	2	3.0			
26	2	7.1	26	2	3.0			
27	1	3.6	28	1	1.5			
Missing	5	17.9	29	1	1.5			
			31	1	1.5			
			34	2	3.0			
			35	1	1.5			
			36	2	3.0			
			37	1	1.5			
			Missing	13	19.7			
Total	28	100.0	Total	66	100.0	Total	11	100.0

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CHART #4:

Question: Where were you born? (Town/state/country)			
	Non-Joiner	Joiner	WAT
North	(1) 3.6	(4) 6.1	(1) 11.1
South	(5) 17.9	(18) 27.3	(2) 22.2
East	(9) 32.1	(23) 34.8	(4) 44.4
West	(3) 10.7	(4) 6.1	(0) 0.0
Mid/West	(4) 14.3	(15) 22.7	(2) 22.2
Foreign	(3) 10.7	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0
Missing	(3) 10.7	(2) 3.0	(0) 0.0

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CHART #5:

Question: Where was your father born? (Town/state/country)

	Non-Joiner	Joiner	WAT
North	(0) 0.0	(5) 7.6	(2) 22.2
South	(6) 21.4	(18) 27.3	(1) 11.1
East	(6) 21.4	(17) 25.8	(3) 33.3
West	(3) 10.7	(5) 7.6	(0) 0.0
Mid/West	(3) 10.7	(10) 15.2	(1) 11.1
Foreign	(7) 25.0	(8) 12.1	(1) 11.1
Missing	(3) 10.7	(3) 4.5	(1) 11.1

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CHART #6:

Question: Where was your mother born? (Town/state/country)

	Non-Joiner	Joiner	WASP
North	(1) 3.6	(7) 10.6	(0) 0.0
South	(9) 32.1	(15) 22.7	(3) 33.3
East	(6) 21.4	(20) 30.3	(3) 33.3
West	(2) 7.1	(2) 3.0	(1) 11.1
Mid/West	(3) 10.7	(15) 22.7	(2) 22.2
Foreign	(5) 17.9	(5) 7.6	(0) 0.0
Missing	(2) 7.1	(2) 3.0	(0) 0.0

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CHART #7:

Question: Number of brothers?			
	Non-Joiner	Joiner	WAT
None	(4) 14.3	(23) 34.8	(2) 22.2
1 - 3	(21) 75.0	(37) 56.1	(7) 77.8
4+	(3) 10.7	(5) 7.6	(0) 0.0
Missing	(0) 0.0	(1) 1.5	(0) 0.0

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CHART #8:

Question: Number of sisters?			
	Non-Joiner	Joiner	WAW
None	(10) 35.7	(23) 34.8	(2) 22.2
1 - 3	(13) 46.4	(36) 54.6	(7) 77.9
4 +	(5) 17.9	(6) 9.1	(0) 0.0
Missing	(0) 0.0	(1) 1.5	(0) 0.0

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CHART #9:

Question: What is your ethnic group?

	Non-Joiner	Joiner	WA*
Black	(9) 32.1	(1) 1.5	(0) 0.0
Hispanic	(0) 0.0	(2) 3.0	(0) 0.0
Caurasian	(18) 64.3	(61) 92.4	(9) 100.0
Asian/Pacific Islander	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0
Other	(1) 3.6	(2) 3.0	(0) 0.0
Missing	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0

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CHART #10:

Question: [What is] your highest level of education?			
	Non-Joiner	Joiner	WAY
High School	(8) 28.6	(20) 30.3	(2) 22.2
College	(14) 50.0	(29) 43.9	(44) 44.4
Graduate School	(6) 21.4	(17) 25.8	(3) 33.3
Missing	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0 0.0

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CHART #11:

Question: Type of education (you received)?

	Non-Joiner	Joiner	WA[1]
General	(13) 46.4	(34) 51.5	(3) 33.3
Technical	(3) 10.7	(11) 16.7	(2) 22.2
Professional	(12) 42.9	(21) 31.8	(4) 44.4
Missing	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0

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CHART #12:

Question: (What was your) pre-military employment?

	Non-Joiner	Joiner	WAF
Administration	(3) 10.7	(8) 12.1	(1) 11.1
Technical	(8) 28.6	(14) 21.2	(3) 33.3
Professional	(4) 14.3	(4) 6.1	(0) 0.0
None	(13) 46.4	(40) 60.6	(5) 55.6
Missing	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0

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CHART #13:

Question: {What was your} father's occupation?			
	Non-Joiner	Joiner	WA*
Administration	(3) 10.7	(6) 9.1	(2) 22.2
Technical	(8) 28.6	(19) 28.8	(3) 33.3
Professional	(6) 21.4	(16) 24.2	(2) 22.2
Unskilled	(9) 32.1	(24) 36.4	(0) 0.0
Missing	(2) 7.1	(1) 3.0	(2) 22.2

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CHART #14:

Question: [What was your] mother's occupation?

	Non-Joiner	Joiner	WAV
Administration	(2) 7.1	(5) 7.6	(0) 0.0
Technical	(1) 3.6	(6) 9.1	(0) 0.0
Professional	(4) 14.3	(12) 18.2	(1) 11.1
Housewife	(20) 71.4	(41) 62.1	(8) 88.9
Missing	(1) 3.6	(2) 3.0	(0) 0.0

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CHART #15:

Question: [What was your] family income?

	Non Joiner	Joiner	WAT
Under $5,000	(0) 0.0	(1) 1.5	(1) 11.1
$5,000-14,999	(9) 32.1	(14) 21.2	(2) 22.2
$15,000-29,999	(6) 21.4	(14) 21.2	(3) 33.3
$30,000-44,999	(3) 10.7	(11) 16.7	(0) 0.0
Over $45,000	(7) 25.0	(19) 28.8	(0) 0.0
Missing	(3) 10.7	(7) 10.6	(3) 33.3

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CHART #16:

Question: {Where was your} family residence?			
	Non-Joiner	Joiner	WA?
Urban	(13) 46.4	(20) 30.3	(4) 44.4
Suburban	(9) 32.1	(26) 39.4	(1) 11.1
Rural	(5) 17.9	(20) 30.3	(3) 33.3
Other	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(1) 11.1
Missing	(1) 3.6	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0

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CHART #17:

Question: [What was your] father's religion?

	Non-Joiner	Joiner	VAW
Catholic	(13) 46.4	(22) 33.3	(2) 22.2
Protestant	(7) 25.0	(39) 59.1	(6) 66.7
Jew	(6) 0.0	(3) 3.0	(1) 0.0
Other	(2) 7.1	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0
Missing	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0

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CHART #18:

Question: {What was your} mother's religion?

	Non-Joiner	Joiner	VAV
Catholic	(13) 46.4	(22) 33.3	(4) 44.4
Protestant	(11) 39.3	(40) 60.6	(5) 55.6
Jew	(0) 0.0	(1) 1.5	(0) 0.0
Other	(3) 10.7	(3) 4.5	(0) 0.0
Missing	(1) 3.6	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0

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CHART #19:

Question: [What was] your religion?

	Non-Joiner	Joiner	VA?
Catholic	(15) 53.6	(24) 36.4	(3) 33.3
Protestant	(8) 28.6	(35) 53.0	(4) 44.4
Jew	(0) 0.0	(1) 1.5	(0) 0.0
Other	(5) 17.9	(6) 9.1	(0) 0.0
Missing	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(2) 22.2

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CHART #20:

Question: {What was} your marital status before entering the service?

	Non-Joiner	Joiner	WAV
Single	(24) 85.7	(58) 87.9	(7) 77.8
Separated	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0
Married	(1) 3.6	(8) 12.1	(1) 11.1
Divorced	(3) 3.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0
Widower/Widowed	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0
Missing	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(1) 11.1

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CHART #21:

Question: {What was your} father's political affiliation?

	Non-Joiner	Joiner	WAY
Republican	(6) 21.4	(22) 33.3	(5) 55.6
Democrat	(12) 42.9	(35) 53.0	(1) 11.1
Independent	(4) 14.3	(5) 7.6	(1) 11.1
Socialist	(1) 3.6	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0
Other	(2) 7.1	(1) 1.5	(0) 0.0
Missing	(3) 10.7	(3) 4.5	(2) 22.2

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CHART #22:

Question: [What was your] mother's political affiliation?

	Non-Joiner	Joiner	WAV
Republican	(5) 17.9	(22) 33.3	(3) 33.3
Democrat	(13) 46.4	(36) 54.5	(3) 33.3
Independent	(5) 17.9	(6) 9.1	(1) 11.1
Socialist	(1) 3.6	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0
Other	(2) 7.1	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0
Missing	(2) 7.1	(2) 3.0	(2) 22.2

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CHAPT #23:

Question: {What was} your political affiliation?

	Non-Joiner	Joiner	WAV
Republican	(7) 25.0	(22) 33.3	(1) 11.1
Democrat	(7) 25.0	(27) 40.9	(4) 44.4
Independent	(4) 14.3	(14) 21.2	(2) 22.2
Socialist	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(1) 11.1
Other	(9) 32.1	(1) 1.5	(1) 11.1
Missing	(1) 3.6	(2) 3.0	(0) 0.0

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CHART #24:

Question: Under what conditions did you enter the service?

	Non-Joiner	Joiner	WAF
Enlisted	(20) 71.4	(46) 69.7	(8) 88.9
Drafted	(8) 28.6	(20) 30.2	(1) 11.1
Missing	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0

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CHART #25:

Question: Before that (entry into the service were you in the:

	Non-Joiner	Joiner	WAN
National Guard	(1) 3.6	(5) 7.6	(0) 0.0
Reserve	(1) 3.6	(3) 4.5	(0) 0.0
Regular Army	(1) 3.6	(1) 1.5	(0) 0.0
ROTC	(1) 3.6	(3) 4.5	(1) 0.0
None	(24) 85.7	(53) 80.3	(8) 88.9
Missing	(0) 0.0	(1) 1.5	(0) 0.0

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CHART #26:

Question: Do you recall your Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) Score?

	Non-Joiner	Joiner	WAF
93-100	(7) 25.0	(26) 39.4	(4) 44.4
65-92	(3) 10.7	(10) 15.2	(0) 0.0
31-64	(1) 3.6	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0
10-30	(0) 0.0	(1) 1.5	(0) 0.0
Missing	(17) 60.7	(29) 43.9	(5) 55.6

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CHART #27:

Question: {Do you recall your} AFQT score if taken 1965 or earlier?

	Non-Joiner	Joiner	WAF
75 - 100	(2) 7.1	(2) 3.0	(0) 0.0
101 - 125	(0) 0.0	(3) 4.5	(0) 0.0
126 - 150	(1) 3.6	(3) 4.5	(1) 11.1
Missing	(25) 89.3	(58) 87.9	(8) 88.9

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CHART #28:

Question: {What was your} highest rank/rating and date attained?			
	Non-Joiner	Joiner	WAF
Enlisted man/Seaman	(10) 35.7	(9) 13.6	(4) 44.4
NCO	(14) 50.0	(44) 66.7	(5) 55.6
Warrant Officer	(0) 0.0	(1) 1.5	(0) 0.0
Officer	(4) 14.3	(12) 18.2	(0) 0.0
Missing	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0

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CHART #29:

Question: What branch of service did you enter?

	Non-Joiners	Joiners	WAV
Army	(19) 67.9	(44) 66.7	(3) 33.3
Navy	(2) 7.1	(6) 9.1	(4) 44.4
Coast Guard	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0
Airforce	(0) 0.0	(1) 1.5	(1) 11.1
Marines	(7) 25.0	(14) 21.2	(1) 11.1
Missing	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0

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CHART #30:

Question: What unit were you in?

	Non-Joiner	Joiner	WAC
Group I	(12) 42.9	(23) 34.8	(6) 66.7
Group II	(13) 46.4	(30) 45.5	(2) 22.2
Group III	(3) 10.7	(13) 19.7	(1) 11.1
Missing	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0

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CHART #31:

Question: Where did you serve? Add dates if more than one.			
	Non-Joiner	Joiner	WAN
Stateside	(1) 3.6	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0
Overseas	(3) 10.7	(3) 4.5	(1) 11.1
Vietnam	(23) 82.1	(63) 95.5	(8) 88.9
Missing	(1) 3.6	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0

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CHART #32:

Question: What was the name of your unit? (Company, Battalion, Regiment, Division, Shore/Ship Command.

Non-Joiner			Joiner			WAW		
Value	Frequency	%	Value	Frequency	%	Value	Frequency	%
1 AVNBG	2	7.1	1 AVNBG	3	4.5	1 MARDIV	1	11.1
1 CAVDIV	2	7.1	1 CAVDIV	1	1.5	18 AVNCO	1	11.1
1 MARDIV	2	7.1	1 INFDIV	1	1.5	25 INFDIV	1	11.1
165 AVNCP	1	3.6	1 MARDIV	6	9.1	3 MARDIV	2	11.1
219 AVN	1	3.6	101 ABN	4	6.1	9 INFDIV	1	11.1
25th DIV	1	3.6	11 ARMOR	1	1.5	DESO 21	1	11.1
3 MARDIV	2	7.1	12th MARDIV	1	1.5	3 MARDIV	1	11.1
330 RADIO	1	3.6	142 MP	1	1.5	USAFSEC	1	11.1
33D ORD	1	3.6	18 FLDART	1	1.5	Missing	1	11.1
4 MARDIV	1	3.6	199 INF	1	1.5			
51st SIGBN	1	3.6	21st ART	1	1.5			
9th INFDIV	1	3.6	22 INFDIV	1	1.5			
BRAVO	1	3.6	25 INFDIV	4	6.1			
DIVISION	1	3.6	3 MARDIV	2	3.0			
GROUP	1	3.6	388 TC	1	1.5			
H 2/5	1	3.6	4 INFDIV	2	3.0			
HMM 364	1	3.6	4 MARDIV	2	3.0			
LST-1166	1	3.6	4th CAV	1	1.5			
MP	1	3.6	716 MPBN	1	1.5			
ORD	1	3.6	75 Range	1	1.5			
Missing	4	14.3	7 CAVDIC	1	1.5			
			7th REG	1	1.5			
			8 CAVAIR	1	1.5			
			9 DIV	1	1.5			
			9 INFDIV	4	6.1			
			ABN	1	1.5			
			ADVTEAM1	1	1.5			
			AMERICAL	1	1.5			
			BN	1	1.5			
			BRAVO	1	1.5			

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CHART #32: (cont.)

Question: What was the name of your unit? (Company, Battalion, Regiment, Division, Shore/Ship Command.

Non-Joiner			Joiner			WAW		
Value	Frequency	%	Value	Frequency	%	Value	Frequency	%
			CAB	1	1.5			
			CAC SU4	1	1.5			
			CoC2BN	1	1.5			
			CVA43	1	1.5			
			HQ MACV	1	1.5			
			HQ IMARDIV	1	1.5			
			MCB-74	1	1.5			
			NMCB-40	1	1.5			
			OSS	1	1.5			
			TFS366IF	1	1.5			
			TRANSCOM	1	1.5			
			USCG	1	1.5			
			WESTPAC	1	1.5			
			Missing	4	6.1			
Total	24	100.0	Total	66	100.0	Total	9	100.0

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CHART #33:

Question: What was your rank/rating at the time of your arrival in Vietnam?

	Non-Joiner	Joiner	WAV
Enlisted/Seaman	(15) 53.6	(33) 50.0	(5) 55.6
NCO	(5) 17.9	(17) 25.8	(2) 22.2
Officer	(4) 14.3	(12) 18.2	(0) 0.0
Missing	(4) 14.3	(4) 6.1	(2) 22.2

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CHART #34:

Question: What was your rank/rating at the time you left the service?			
	Non-Joiner	Joiner	WAW
Enlisted/Seaman	(4) 14.3	(6) 9.1	(0) 0.0
NCO	(18) 64.3	(46) 69.7	(8) 88.9
Officer	(4) 14.3	(12) 18.2	(0) 0.0
Missing	(2) 7.1	(2) 3.0	(1) 11.1

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CHART #35:

Question: How many tours of duty in Vietnam did you complete?

	Non-Joiner	Joiner	WAF
One	(17) 60.7	(45) 68.2	(7) 77.8
Two	(5) 17.9	(11) 16.7	(1) 11.1
Multiple	(1) 3.6	(7) 10.6	(1) 11.1
Missing	(5) 17.9	(3) 4.5	(0) 0.0

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CHART #36:

Question: MOS (Military Occupation Specialty) by categories.			
	Non-Joiner	Joiner	WAW
Aviation/Airborne	(4) 14.3	(5) 7.6	(1) 11.1
Combat	(7) 25.0	(22) 33.3	(1) 11.1
Rear echelon	(3) 10.7	(11) 16.7	(0) 0.0
Communications	(2) 7.1	(3) 4.5	(5) 55.6
Intelligence	(0) 0.0	(1) 4.5	(1) 11.1
Medical corpsmen	(0) 0.0	(1) 1.5	(1) 11.1
Missing	(12) 42.9	(23) 34.8	(0) 0.0

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CHART #37:

Question: Describe your combat experience:

	Non-Joiners	Joiners	WAF
Yes	82.1 (23)	90.9 (60)	77.8 (7)
No	17.9 (5)	4.5 (3)	11.1 (1)
Missing	0.0 (0)	4.5 (3)	11.1 (1)

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CHART #37a:

Question: Describe your combat experience.

	Non-Joiners	Joiners	WAC
Direct:			
Heavy	39.3 (11)	50.0 (33)	22.2 (2)
Moderate	14.3 (4)	21.2 (14)	0.0 (0)
Light	17.9 (5)	10.6 (7)	0.0 (0)
Missing	28.6 (8)	18.2 (12)	77.8 (7)
Indirect			
Heavy	3.6 (1)	30.3 (20)	0.0 (0)
Moderate	25.0 (7)	22.7 (15)	0.0 (0)
Light	21.4 (6)	10.6 (7)	0.0 (0)
Missing	50.0 (14)	36.4 (24)	77.8 (7)
Sapper			
Heavy	0.0 (0)	9.1 (6)	0.0 (0)
Moderate	17.9 (5)	15.2 (10)	0.0 (0)
Light	10.7 (3)	16.7 (11)	22.2 (2)
Missing	71.4 (20)	59.1 (39)	77.8 (7)

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CHART #38:

Question: Number of times [you were] wounded.

	Non-Joiner	Joiner	WAT
None	(20) 71.4	(38) 57.6	(7) 77.8
Once	(5) 17.9	(14) 21.2	(1) 11.1
Multiple	(3) 10.7	(11) 16.7	(1) 11.1
Missing	(0) 0.0	(3) 4.5	(0) 0.0

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CHART #39:

Question: {Did you receive} combat decorations?

	Non-Joiner	Joiner	WAVE
None	(11) 39.3	(9) 13.6	(5) 55.6
One	(4) 14.3	(4) 6.1	(0) 0.0
Multiple	(13) 46.4	(45) 68.2	(4) 44.4
Missing	(0) 0.0	(8) 12.1	(0) 0.0

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CHART #40:

Question: [Did you receive] Awards and medals? Please number in order awarded.

	Non-Joiner	Joiner	WAW
One	(4) 14.3	(8) 12.1	(2) 22.2
Multiple	(16) 57.1	(48) 72.7	(4) 44.4
Missing	(8) 28.6	(10) 15.2	(3) 33.3

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CHART #41:

Question: (What) type of combat action did you experience in Vietnam?

	Non-Joiner	Joiner	WAV
Heavy	(11) 39.3	(29) 43.9	(2) 22.2
Moderate	(5) 17.9	(22) 33.3	(2) 22.2
Light	(7) 25.0	(7) 10.6	(2) 22.2
None	(4) 14.3	(6) 9.1	(3) 33.3
Missing	(1) 3.6	(2) 3.0	(0) 0.0

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CHART #42:

Question: What would you say was the casualty rate for your ship/shore/air unit?

	Non-Joiner	Joiner	WAV
Light	(15) 53.6	(21) 31.8	(4) 44.4
Medium	(3) 10.7	(28) 42.4	(2) 22.2
Heavy	(5) 17.9	(13) 19.7	(1) 11.1
None	(3) 10.7	(2) 3.0	(2) 22.2
Missing	(2) 7.1	(2) 3.0	(0) 0.0

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CHART #43:

Question: Hostile of Non-hostile types of action causing casualties:			
	Non-Joiner	Joiner	WAW
Hostile	(15) 53.6	(45) 68.2	(4) 44.4
Non-hostile	(3) 10.7	(4) 6.1	(2) 22.2
Both	(6) 21.4	(12) 18.2	(2) 22.2
None	(4) 14.3	(2) 3.0	(4) 44.4
Missing	(0) 0.0	(3) 4.5	(0) 0.0

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CHART #43:

Question: Hostile/Non-hostile types of action causing casualties.

	Non-Joiner	Joiner	WAV
Light	(15) 53.6	(21) 31.8	(4) 44.4
Medium	(3) 10.7	(18) 42.4	(2) 22.2
Heavy	(5) 17.9	(13) 19.7	(1) 11.1
Missing	(2) 7.1	(2) 3.0	(2) 0.0

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CHART #43a:

Question: Hostile/Non-hostile casualties		
	Non-Joiner	
	Hostile	Non-Hostile
Aircraft loss/crash	32.1 (9)	10.7 (3)
Vehicle loss/crash	14.2 (4)	10.7 (3)
Gunshot/small arms fire	46.4 (13)	10.7 (3)
Artillery/rocket	46.4 (13)	7.1 (2)
Mine	28.6 (8)	7.1 (2)
Booby trap	25.0 (7)	7.1 (2)
Drowned/suffocated	10.7 (3)	7.1 (2)
Illness	10.7 (3)	7.1 (2)
Suicide	7.1 (2)	7.1 (2)
Homicide	7.1 (2)	0.0 (0)
Accident	21.4 (6)	17.9 (5)
Other	10.7 (3)	0.0 (0)

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CHART #43b:

Question: Hostile/Non-hostile casualties		
	Joiner	
	Hostile	Non-Hostile
Aircraft loss/crash	21.2 (14)	4.5 (3)
Vehicle loss/crash	4.5 (3)	6.1 (4)
Gunshot/small arms fire	68.2 (45)	6.1 (4)
Artillery/rocket	50.0 (33)	1.5 (1)
Mine	37.9 (25)	3.0 (2)
Booby trap	40.9 (27)	0.0 (0)
Drowned/suffocated	1.5 (1)	3.0 (2)
Illness	1.5 (1)	1.5 (1)
Suicide	1.5 (1)	1.5 (1)
Homicide	0.0 (0)	3.0 (2)
Accident	7.6 (5)	7.6 (5)
Other	1.5 (1)	0.0 (0)

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CHART #43c:

Question: Types of casualties sustained by your unit?		
	VIET	
	Hostile	Non-Hostile
Aircraft loss/crash	11.1 (1)	22.2 (2)
Vehicle loss/crash	11.1 (1)	0.0 (0)
Gunshot/small arms fire	22,2 (2)	0.0 (0)
Artillery/rocket	44,4 (4)	0.0 (0)
Mine	22.2 (2)	0.0 (0)
Booby trap	11.1 (1)	0.0 (0)
Drowned/suffocated	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)
Illness	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)
Suicide	22.2 (2)	0.0 (0)
Homicide	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)
Accident	11. (1)	0.0 (0)
Other	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)

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CHART #44:

Question: How many of your friends were killed in Vietnam?

	Non-Joiner	Joiner	WAV
None	(3) 10.7	(12) 18.2	(4) 44.4
One	(2) 7.1	(3) 4.5	(1) 11.1
Multiple	(23) 82.1	(51) 77.3	(4) 44.4
Missing	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0

CHART #45:

Question: What were your feelings about their death?

	Non-Joiner	Joiner	WAV
Senseless	(12) 42.9	(15) 22.7	(5) 55.6
Tragic	(9) 32.1	(33) 50.0	(0) 0.0
For a worthy cause	(4) 14.3	(6) 9.1	(0) 0.0
Missing	(3) 10.7	(12) 18.2	(4) 44.4

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CHART #46:

Question: What is your evaluation of the officers in your unit?

	Non-Joiner	Joiner	WAF
Superior	(9) 32.1	(40) 60.6	(2) 22.2
Mediocre	(12) 42.9	(17) 25.8	(6) 66.7
Inferior	(4) 14.3	(5) 7.6	(0) 0.0
Missing	(3) 10.7	(4) 6.1	(0) 11.1

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CHART #47:

Question: {What was your} date of discharge?

Non-Joiner			Joiner			VAW		
Value	Frequency	%	Value	Frequency	%	Value	Frequency	%
1966	1	3.6	1960	1	1.5	1958	1	11.1
1967	3	10.7	1965	3	4.5	1961	1	11.1
1968	2	7.1	1966	2	3.0	1965	1	11.1
1969	3	10.7	1967	3	4.5	1968	1	11.1
1970	6	21.4	1968	8	12.1	1969	2	22.2
1971	3	10.7	1969	10	15.2	1970	2	22.2
1972	1	3.6	1970	6	9.1	1972	1	11 1
1974	1	3.6	1971	3	4.5			
1975	1	3.6	1972	2	3.0			
1980	1	3.6	1973	1	1.5			
1984	1	3.6	1974	2	3.0			
1994	1	3.6	1975	2	3.0			
Missing	4	14.3	1976	2	3.0			
			1978	2	3.0			
			1979	1	1.5			
			1981	1	1.5			
			1984	2	3.0			
			1985	1	1.5			
			1988	1	1.5			
			1989	1	1.5			
			1990	1	1.5			
			Missing	10	15.2			
Total	28	100.0	Total	66	100.0	Total	9	100.0

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CHART #48:

Question: [What] type of discharge [did you receive]?			
	Non-Joiner	Joiner	WAC
Honorable	(27) 96.4	(62) 93.9	(9) 100.0
Dishonorable	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0
Medical	(0) 0.0	(3) 4.5	(0) 0.0
Other	(1) 3.6	(1) 1.5	(0) 0.0

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CHART #49:

Question: Are you a member of a veterans' organization?

	Non-Joiner	Joiner	WAW
YES	(0) 0.0	(66) 100.0	(9) 100.0
NO	(28) 100.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0
Missing	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0

IF YES:

	Joiner	WAW
American Legion	(40) 60.6	(9) 100.0
Veterans of Foreign Wars	(43) 65.1	(0) 0.0
Disabled American Veterans	(26) 39.3	(1) 11.1
Vietnam Veterans of America	(31) 46.9	(3) 33.3
Vietnam Veterans Against War, Inc	(0) 0.0	(9) 100.0
Other	(37) 56.1	(2) 22.2

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
CHART #50:

Question: Why did you join this particular veteran's organization?			
	Non-Joiner	Joiner	WWI
To make a difference	N/A	(17) 25.8	(9) 100.0
Comradeship	N/A	(39) 59.1	(0) 0.0
Benefits advancement	N/A	(5) 7.6	(0) 0.0
Missing	N/A	(5) 7.6	(0) 0.0

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CHART #51:

Question: When did you join your veteran's organization?



Non-Joiner	Joiner			VAW		
	Value	Frequency	%	Value	Frequency	%
	1944	1	1.5	1967	2	22.2
	1948	1	1.5	1969	2	22.2
	1954	1	1.5	1970	2	22.2
	1964	1	1.5	1987	1	11.1
	1965	1	1.5	1990	1	11.1
	1967	2	3.0	1993	1	11.1
	1969	1	1.5			
	1970	3	4.5			
	1971	1	1.5			
	1972	1	1.5			
	1975	1	1.5			
	1979	1	1.5			
	1980	5	7.6			
	1981	2	3.0			
	1982	2	3.0			
	1983	1	1.5			
	1984	1	1.5			
	1985	8	12.1			
	1986	3	4.5			
	1988	6	9.1			
	1989	4	6.1			
	1990	3	4.5			
	1992	2	3.0			
	1995	3	4.5			
	1996	1	1.5			
	Missing	10	15.2			
	Total	66	100.0	Total	9	100.0

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CHART #52:

Question: What is your current status?

	Non-Joiner	Joiner	WAW
Active participation	N/A	(35) 53.0	(4) 44.4
Moderately active participation	N/A	(15) 22.7	(2) 22.2
Inactive	N/A	(14) 21.2	(3) 33.3
Missing	N/A	(2) 3.0	(0) 0.0

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CHART #53:

Question: What position do you occupy in your organization?

	Non-Joiner	Joiner	WAC
Rank and file	N/A	(24) 36.4	(4) 44.4
Associate member/ Auxilliary	N/A	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0
Local leadership	N/A	(10) 15.2	(3) 33.3
Regional leadership	N/A	(2) 3.0	(0) 0.0
National leadership	N/A	(23) 34.8	(2) 22.2
Missing	N/A	(7) 10.6	(0) 0.0

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CHART #54:

Question: When you left Vietnam, who was winning the war?

	Non-Joiner	Joiner	WAV
The U.S.	(7) 25.0	(39) 59.1	(0) 0.0
The enemy	(5) 17.9	(4) 6.1	(3) 33.3
No one	(8) 28.6	(15) 22.7	(4) 44.4
Didn't know	(4) 14.3	(4) 6.1	(2) 22.2
Didn't care	(3) 10.7	(2) 3.0	(0) 0.0
Missing	(1) 3.6	(2) 3.0	(0) 0.0

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CHART #55:

Question: In your opinion was the Vietnam War moral?

	Non-Joiner	Joiner	WAW
Yes	(8) 28.6	(41) 62.1	(0) 0.0
No	(10) 35.7	(11) 16.7	(9) 100.0
Don't Know	(10) 35.7	(12) 18.2	(0) 0.0
Missing	(0) 0.0	(2) 3.0	(0) 0.0

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CHART #56:

Question: Did your attitude about the war change in Vietnam?

	Non-Joiners	Joiners	WAW
Yes	(15) 53.6	(34) 51.5	(8) 88.9
No	(10) 35.7	(28) 42.4	(1) 11.1
Missing	(3) 10.7	(4) 6.1	(0) 0.0

IF YES:

	Non-Joiner	Joiner	WAW
It became an Immoral War	(4) 26.6	(4) 11.7	(6) 75.0
It Was too Dangerous	(0) 0.0	(2) 5.8	(1)C 12.5
The Politicians Lied to us	(13) 86.6	(28) 82.3	(6) 75.0
Vietnam and the Vietnamese were used as Guinea	(2) 13.5	(5) 14.7	(4) 50.0

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CHART #57:

Question: Do you agree that more* advanced technology could have won the war in Vietnam?

	Non-Joiner	Joiner	WAW
Yes	(7) 25.0	(19) 28.8	(0) 0.0
No	(17) 60.7	(41) 62.1	(9) 100.0
Don't Know	(2) 7.1	(5) 7.6	(0) 0.0
Missing	(2) 7.1	(1) 1.5	(0) 0.0

IF NO: ↓

	Non-Joiner	Joiner	WAW
We used everything we had	(4) 23.5	(9) 21.9	(3) 33.3
Unadaptable too difficult to operate	(2) 11.7	(4) 9.5	(3) 33.3
Too risky for our troops	(3) 17.7	(1) 2.4	(2) 22.2
Undependable	(2) 11.7	(3) 7.3	(2) 22.2
Vietnamese could nullify its effects	(9) 52.9	(7) 17.0	(4) 44.4

*More in the qualitative sense meaning higher sophistication.

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CHART #58:

Question: Do you agree that our high tech war in Vietnam did more harm than good?

	Non-Joiner	Joiner	WAV
Yes	(7) 25.0	(20) 30.3	(8) 88.9
No	(16) 57.1	(38) 57.6	(1) 11.1
Don't Know	(5) 17.9	(6) 9.1	(0) 0.0
Missing	(0) 0.0	(2) 3.0	(0) 0.0

IF YES:

	Non-Joiner	Joiner	WAV
Placed too many of our soldiers	(3) 42.8	(13) 30.3	(7) 88.9
It killed too any innocent people	(5) 71.0	(11) 55.5	(8) 100.0
Enriched corporate America	(3) 42.8	(14) 70.0	(7) 88.9
Destroyed our country's fiscal balance	(0) 0.0	(6) 30.0	(2) 25.0

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CHART #59:

Question: Do you agree the misuse of advanced technology was the main reason for our failure in Vietnam?

	Non-Joiner	Joiner	WAW
Yes	(4) 14.3	(7) 10.6	(1) 11.1
No	(15) 53.6	(48) 72.7	(7) 77.8
Don't Know	(8) 28.6	(6) 9.1	(1) 11.1
Missing	(1) 3.6	(5) 7.6	(0) 0.0

IF NO:

	Non-Joiner	Joiner	WAW
It stopped communism from spreading to other Southeast Asian countries	(5) 33.3	(10) 20.8	(0) 0.0
Led to the end of the cold war	(0) 0.0	(8) 16.6	(0) 0.0
It finetuned the weapons and strategies we need for future wars	(4) 26.6	(14) 28.3	(1) 11.1
It heightened American awareness to the inhumanity of the war	(4) 26.6	(9) 18.1	(3) 33.3
Revealed the limitations of its use	(7) 46.6	(17) 35.4	(4) 44.4
It did not serve to further ethical principles of conduct in war	(2) 13.3	(5) 10.4	(1) 11.1

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CHART #60:

Question: Do you agree that escalating the advanced technological method of warfare in Vietnam was:

	Non-Joiner	Joiner	VVAW
Moral and justified	(7) 25.0	(31) 47.0	(1) 11.1
Immoral and unjustified	(6) 21.4	(6) 9.1	(6) 66.7
No opinion either way	(15) 53.6	(23) 34.8	(1) 11.1
Missing	(0) 0.0	(6) 9.1	(1) 11.1

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CHART #61:

Question: Reason we lost the war in Vietnam.

	Non-Joiner	Joiner	WAV
Political restraints	(22) 78.6	(58) 87.9	(3) 33.3
Lack of home support	(22) 78.6	(55) 83.3	(4) 44.4
Spoiled generation of servicemen unwillling to die for their country	(9) 32.1	(19) 28.8	(1) 11.1
It was an immoral war	(11) 39.3	(17) 25.8	(6) 66.7
Poor military leadership and organization	(13) 46.4	(31) 47.0	(6) 66.7
The North Vietnamese were better fighters	(9) 32.1	(18) 27.3	(6) 66.7
Corruption in high places	(15) 53.5	(30) 45.5	(4) 44.4
Sensational media coverage	(13) 46.4	(41) 62.1	(3) 33.3

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CHART #62:

Question: Has the Vietnam War impacted America's military options?

	Non-Joiner	Joiner	VVAW
A great deal	(15) 53.6	(41) 62.1	(5) 55.6
Somewhat	(11) 39.3	(12) 18.2	(3) 33.3
Not at all	(1) 3.6	(6) 9.1	(0) 0.0
Don't know	(1) 3.6	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0
Missing	(0) 0.0	(7) 10.6	(1) 11.1

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CHART #63:

Question: Have you served in another war since Vietnam?

	Non-Joiner	Joiner	WAW
Yes	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(1) 11.1
No	(28) 100.0	(62) 93.9	(7) 77.8
Missing	(0) 0.0	(4) 6.1	(1) 11.1

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CHART #64:

Question: Would you serve in another war?

	Non-Joiner	Joiner	WAW
Yes	(18) 64.3	(53) 80.3	(4) 44.4
No	(10) 35.7	(7) 10.6	(4) 44.4
Other	(0) 0.0	(3) 4.5	(0) 0.0
Missing	(0) 0.0	(3) 4.5	(1) 11.1

If yes:

	Non-Joiners	Joiners	WAW
Only if U.S. territory is directly attacked	(14) 72.2	(33) 62.2	(4) 100.0
As part of an international response to aggression	(5) 27.2	(22) 41.5	(0) 0.0
To protect vital U.S. economic interests	(4) 22.2	(15) 28.3	(0) 0.0
To impose a new world order	(1) 5.5	(2) 3.7	(0) 0.0
To protect human rights	(4) 22.2	(18) 33.9	(1) 25.0

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CHART #65:

Question: The military in Vietnam did everything they could to minimize the loss of civilian lives.

	Non-Joiner	Joiner	WAW
Yes	(8) 28.6	(44) 66.7	(0) 0.0
No	(18) 64.3	(14) 21.2	(8) 88.9
Don't Know	(0) 0.0	(1) 1.5	(0) 0.0
Missing	(2) 7.1	(7) 10.7	(1) 11.1

If yes:

	Non-Joiner	Joiner	
Targets were carefully selected	(4) 50.0	(26) 59.0	(0) 0.0
The population was given ample warning	(4) 50.0	(14) 9.0	(0) 0.0
Damage was not intentional	(4) 50.0	(28) 63.6	(0) 0.0

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CHART #66:

Question: As a soldier in Vietnam, do you think our scientific methods of warfare were:

	Non-joiners	Joiners	WAW
An inhumane misuse of technology	(4) 14.3	(8) 12.1	(8) 88.9
A means to an end	(8) 28.6	(14) 21.2	(0) 0.0
Necessary and useful	(10) 35.7	(27) 40.9	(0) 0.0
Other	(3) 10.7	(5) 7.6	(1) 11.1
Missing	(3) 10.7	(12) 18.2	(0) 0.0

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CHART #67a:

Question: According to what you have seen or been part of in Vietnam, what would you say about:			
		Non-Joiner	
	Unjustified	Not Sure	Justified
My Lai	(21) 75.0	(3) 10.7	(0) 0.0
Agent Orange	(13) 46.4	(4) 14.3	(8) 28.6
Napalm	(7) 25.0	(3) 10.7	(15) 53.6
Free fire zones	(4) 14.3	(1) 3.6	(20) 71.4
Chemical defoliants	(8) 28.6	(6) 21.4	(11) 39.3
Phoenix campaign	(5) 17.9	(7) 25.0	(9) 32.1
Bombing Red River dikes	(5) 17.9	(3) 10.7	(12) 42.9
Body counts	(15) 53.6	(2) 7.1	(7) 25.0

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CHART #67b:

	Joiner		
	Unjustified	Not Sure	Justified
My Lai	(42) 63.6	(10) 15.2	(6) 9.1
Agent Orange	(20) 30.3	(7) 10.6	(32) 48.5
Napalm	(4) 6.1	(3) 4.5	(51) 77.3
Free fire zones	(3) 4.5	(3) 4.5	(52) 78.8
Chemical defoliants	(16) 24.2	(7) 10.6	(34) 51.5
Phoenix campaign	(8) 12.1	(18) 27.3	(29) 43.9
Bombing Red River dikes	(3) 4.5	(13) 19.7	(39) 59.1
Body counts	(26) 39.4	(12) 18.2	(19) 28.8

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CHART #67c:

	WAR		
	Unjustified	Not Sure	Justified
My Lai	(8) 88.9	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0
Agent Orange	(8) 88.9	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0
Napalm	(7) 77.8	(0) 0.0	(1) 11.1
Free fire zones	(7) 77.8	(0) 0.0	(1) 11.1
Chemical defoliants	(8) 88.9	(0) 0.0	(0) 0,0
Phoenix campaign	(7) 77.8	(0) 0.0	(1) 11.1
Bombing Red River dikes	(7) 77.8	(0) 0.0	(1) 11.1
Body counts	(7) 77.8	(0) 0.0	(1) 11.1

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CHART #68:

Question: Did you support the anti-war movement?
what would you say about:

	Non-Joiner	Joiner	WAV
Yes	(4) 14.3	(10) 15.2	(8) 88.9
No	(24) 85.7	(53) 80.3	(0) 0.0
Missing	(0) 0.0	(2) 3.0	(1) 11.1

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CHART #69:

Question: Have you held membership in or supported deviant groups?

	Non-Joiner	Joiner	VVAW
Yes	(6) 21.4	(14) 21.2	(8) 88.9
No	(22) 78.6	(52) 78.8	(0) 0.0
Missing	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(1) 11.1

IF YES:

	Non-Joiner	Joiner	VVAW
Gay or Lesbian organizations	(1) 16.6	(1) 12.5	(2) 12.5
Civil rights organizations	(6) 100.0	(11) 78.5	(5) 62.5
Anti-war organizations	(0) 0.0	(3) 21.4	(8) 100.0
Left of center organizations considered subversive by the Attorney General of the U.S.	(0) 0.0	(3) 21.4	(5) 62.5
Right of center organizations considered subversive by the Attorney General of the U.S.	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0
Missing	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0

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CHART #70:

Question: People have said that the government in Washington is the enemy, not the friend of the people like themselves. Do you:

	Non-Joiner	Joiner	WAW
Strongly agree/ Moderately agree	(12) 42.9	(26) 39.4	(6) 66.7
Not Sure	(5) 17.9	(10) 15.2	(0) 0.0
Strongly Disagree/ Moderately Disagree	(10) 35.8	(26) 39.4	(2) 22.2
Missing	(1) 3.6	(4) 6.1	(1) 11.1

CHART 71:

Question: Why?

	Non-Joiner	Joiner	WAW
Pro-government	(1) 3.6	(4) 6.1	(1) 11.1
Neutral	(7) 25.0	(14) 21.2	(1) 11.1
Anti-government	(15) 53.6	(24) 36.4	(6) 66.7
Missing	(5) 17.9	(24) 36.4	(1) 11.1

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CHART #72:

Question: Imagine that Congress has passed a law making you liable to drafted again for military service whenever the president declares a national emergency. What kind of response do you think you would feel right making about this?

	Non-Joiners	Joiners	VVAW
Serve if Called	(2) 42.9	(49) 74.2	(1) 11.1
Sign a petition about What is Happening	(3) 10.7	(3) 4.5	(1) 11.1
Join a group who is interested in what is Happening	(4) 14.3	(2) 3.0	(1) 11.1
If nothing else worked, demonstrate in the streets about what is happening	(2) 7.1	(0) 0.0	(1) 11.1
If nothing at all seemed to work, participate in a physical or armed action because of your feeling about what is happening	(1) 3.6	(3) 4.5	(3) 33.3
Leave the Country	(5) 17.9	(4) 6.1	(2) 22.2
Missing	(1) 3.6	(5) 7.6	(1) 11.1

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CHART #73:

Question: The Vietnam War has and is still affecting Americans deeply. Some people say that waging a technologically advanced brutal war over a peasant society was immoral. Do you:

	Non-Joiners	Joiners	WAW
Strongly Agree/ Moderately Agree	(12) 42.8	(8) 12.2	(8) 88.9
Not Sure	(4) 14.3	(9) 13.6	(0) 0.0
Strongly Disagree/ Moderately Disagree	(11) 39.3	(44) 66.7	(0) 0.0
Missing	(1) 3.6	(5) 7.6	(1) 11.1

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CHART #74:

Question: What do you see as the legacy of Vietnam?

	Non-Joiner	Joiner	WAV
There isn't any	(7) 25.0	(5) 7.6	(0) 0.0
We have to return to the old values that made our country great	(9) 32.1	(25) 37.9	(1) 11.1
Our government can no longer expect to have unilateral jurisdiction over war	(10) 35.7	(20) 30.3	(6) 66.7
Missing	(2) 7.1	(11) 16.7	(2) 22.2

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CHART #75:

Question: How often do you think about Vietnam?

	Non-Joiner	Joiner	WAW
Very often	(11) 39.3	(40) 60.6	(5) 55.6
Often	(4) 14.3	(15) 22.7	(2) 22.2
Sometimes	(11) 39.3	(8) 12.1	(1) 11.1
Never	(1) 3.6	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0
Missing	(1) 3.6	(3) 4.5	(1) 11.1

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VIETNAM VETERANS AGAINST THE WAR, INC.: TECHNOLOGY, IDEALISM AND REBELLION

in two volumes

by

DOLORES McCABE

Volume II

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Sociology in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Phiosophy, The City University of New York

1997

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IV. IMPACT ANALYSIS OF THE VIETNAM VETERANS AGAINST THE WAR INFLUENCE IN ALTERING MILITARY OPTIONS IN VIETNAM AND THE POST-VIETNAM ERA

When I asked for a history of the VVAW, Jan Barry answered there wasn't any, they were too busy to write about it. Because of its loose structure, it would have been a difficult task; there were as many VVAWs as there were members. During his tenure as president of VVAW, he refused to dictate a political principle because, "when someone asks me what he should do, I say it depends on what he thinks he should or can do - he can only do what he believes in."[1] One would expect the freedom to express diverse philosophies and interests to end in anarchy. This was, however, no ordinary group. The VVAW offered members a sense of security and camaraderie they had known in the military but found missing upon returning to civilian life.

Returning Vietnam veterans were seldom shown ceremonial appreciation for their efforts; traditional virtues of bravery and honor had no market value. Instead, they were

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faulted by their society for not expeditiously ending a little war against little people. Nor were they perceived as surrogates for a class system that rewarded the elites and influentials by keeping them home, or thanked for serving as substitutes for those of higher worth to their society in terms of scholarship or status. They were not rewarded for being decent kids who did what others had done before them, serve when their country called. Many did not avoid the draft or seek CO status, although some were so inclined. The majority did not follow through on those avenues, either through a strong ethic of service or the thought that other alternatives were not personally viable. In this understanding, those who went to Vietnam were the best, if not the brightest, if escaping military service was the new criterion of intelligence.

Thus most answered the draft or volunteered and served honorably; if they changed their mind about the war, it was in Vietnam and exposure to a double standard of morality once in the war zone: first, when it became easy to participate in acts which no human should conduct or be subjected to; second, absence of cross-class representation in the task; and third, the conclusion that they were not involved in an honorable task.[2] The first falls under the Nuremberg interdiction, the second is classic Marxian class

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analysis and the third is the element of moral persuasion. The army that went to Vietnam may have been unrepresentative of earlier class compositions where all were asked to serve and few were spared. There have always been the perennial escape routes from service, either through networking or wealth, but these were exceptions not the rule. When those instances of class privilege did surface, such as during the Civil War when the poor were unable to access free market avenues for draft avoidance,[3] there were corrective methods for unequal life chances, such as the draft riots in New York City.[4]

In the two recent world wars, the troublesome aspects of class privilege were not as evident. Manpower needs were processed through a relatively impartial conscription process.[5] At the time of Vietnam, American society had undergone radical cultural alterations impacting similar mass mobilizations of manpower.[6] Among these changes that contributed to a reluctance to serve in the military were increasing materialistic preoccupations with affluence and rising levels of narcissism that re-centered the individual over his society.

Still, the Vietnam era cohort was the generation born of World War II fathers deeply infused with the pride of victory. Thus, contrary to general belief, only 1% of

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eligible men failed to answer their Vietnam era draft notice and only another 1% refused induction. Combined they represent 2% of the 25 million or so in the available pool of manpower, yet the draft barely survived even that miniscule challenge.[7]

The draft followed patterns of racism within the rubric of historical discrimination; America has had a long lasting fascination with white superiority over people of color and a gentlemen's agreement that the poor should be the sacrificial lambs. The twin pronged class and race ranking produced unintended consequences; when the blacks in Vietnam perceived they were fighting in a racist war for a racist society, in effect indulging in reverse discrimination, it led to bonding with other minorities, eventually extended into efforts to disengage from further military actions against their Vietnamese brothers under the skin.[8] The class issue surfaced in the officer/enlisted man relationships where it exploded into overt insubordination over perceived inequalities in risks on the battlefield and beyond.[9]

Class and race conflicts, although problematic, have been a part of military culture for a long time. These injustices tend to wither on the vine when facing the enemy requires unity; returning to internal conflict and

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unfinished business will follow once the external threat is contained. However, the decision to leave a war, to quit cold, to refuse to go on combat missions, to disengage from a war in progress, to place your society at risk requires crossing a moral barrier with severe legal consequences. The decision to extricate front line support for the war developed out of these deep grievances; it rested on flawed pursuits based on double standards of behavior.

Thus America's flirtation with the poor when they were needed to defend systemic flaws did not fall apart in Vietnam, although it may have appeared to surface there during skirmishes, battles, guerrilla actions, intensive bombing operations where even World War II devastation paled in comparison. Fighting to support open black market operations by high SVA military, their military coups against the South Vietnamese government on an almost daily basis, the drug profiteering, prostitution and destruction of an entire culture, and the torture of prisoners contrary to the rules of warfare were troubling and too reminiscent of their historical context of being on the receiving end.[10]

These were experiences producing uneasy questions on the reasons for the war; for what kind of freedom were they risking their lives. These were views the home front could

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never understand, nor could they be communicated to people convinced beyond all doubt that Americans do not commit immoral acts nor support corrupt governments.

Their return home to a quasi-pariah status of "baby killers" and other atrocities did not offer an uneventful reintegration with their society. It was an unexpected disappointment; they had done what they were sent to do, now their society scorned their sacrifices, even blamed them for it. In the public's mind, it served to alienate and separate the group from veterans of earlier wars who had been welcomed with all the pomp and circumstance a grateful public could bestow. The VVAW; however, offered an oasis of intimacy, belonging, and a healing process through understanding. Thus these new members were not going to destroy the organization that offered them a unity of purpose firmly focused on ending the madness. Anarchy would not have served their purpose.

Basically, Jan Barry's refusal to set policy from the top assured personal accountability for actions. All members were expected to exemplify the best of military virtues. Within that frame of responsibility, he had to answer for himself and others. In this, the form of their organizational structure was devoid of class divisions found in traditional hierarchically rigid and inflexible

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bureaucratic structures that doesn't permit the implementation of power other than top down. VVAW founders rejected mechanistic organizational patterns that reflected rigid attributes of loyalty, discipline and obedience found in the military. In this context, there is an extensive hierarchy where communication flows vertically, from top down. At the same time, loyalty and obedience to superiors and the organization is highly prized; formal leaders are thus assumed to be omniscient.[11] This is especially true of the military where in the absence of those rigid lines of command from top to bottom and unquestioning obedience, loyalty and discipline from below, no one would be able to function in a combat situation.[12]

The VVAW rejection of this type of bureaupathy[13] where institutionally controlled power was in the hands of a few grew out of their experiences in the military and the resentment created by closure of criticism to orders issued by their officer corps. They could not question orders; even from green officers who had no idea what kind of a war was being fought in Vietnam and had received only formal textbook expertise before being placed in command.[14] John Kenneth Galbraith noted that the tendency to approach Asian problems in Vietnam from a Western frame of reference[15]

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wasn't always the best way to win the war. For instance, policy planners thought it a great idea to flood the Mekong River delta, imagining the same severe effects that the Ohio floods do to their towns.[16] Mechanistic systems do not allow for confronting flawed decisions from the top.

The new group thus incorporated everyone into an egalitarian frame of cooperation as a method to avoid the fragmentation of the individual, Dave Cline,[17] to prevent the alienation felt upon returning home (Pon Kovic, 1976) and to offer interactive avenues of agency for veteran involvement. (Vietnam veterans speak out: 11/19/68) Thus we see an organic organizational structure where member interactions result in continual readjustments and redefinitions of tasks. Communications flow in a lateral direction because communicating is directed toward consulting, rather than commanding, and the leader is not regarded as all-seeing, but rather a conduit for the free flow of direct information between VVAW members and their leaders.[18]

The six former enlisted men who organized the new VVAW peace group were convinced of the need to educate the American public into the truth about the war and the actual situation in Vietnam. To do this, they first had to educate themselves. They had the Vietnam experience, they

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had to learn the historical bases of just war doctrines, peace conventions, treaties, and an entire range of political, economic and social issues therein.

The organization that began as a small nucleus of six veterans on June 1, 1967 grew into a country-wide phenomenon with former officers and enlisted members in all branches of service rallying to the VVAW. What is remarkable about this group is the wide range of political philosophies, conflicting views and definitions of its own strategies. It wasn't long before the VVAW was noticed by the media; we see a growing interest in this group in direct proportion to higher casualty rates in Vietnam following each rapid escalation of the war.

In addition to the frustration of a war without decisive battles or seizures of territory offered visible symbols of failure. These veterans had seen enough death and destruction to last a lifetime, had come to understand how senseless the war was, only to come home to discover that their country held them responsible for the mess. Understandably, they turned to each other for support and solace. This was parenthetically expressed in a survey completed by a combat Marine veteran, poignantly recalling how he had held 17 men in his arms, watching helplessly while they died. He considers their deaths senseless and

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thinks about Vietnam every day. In the social character of choices, comforting his dying buddies was the sanest moral act he could contribute in an insane world that didn't care. The next was to join the VVAW and stop the war itself.

With each escalation of the war, convergence between civilian and military dissent became more certain. Civilians were sensitized by the discovery that their government could brutalize an agrarian society back to the stone age while servicemen were radicalized by military nihilism resulting from an institutional loss of honor. Up till mid-1967, anti-war demonstrations, although pesky, were not much of a problem to Washington, other than one of crowd control, easily checked by utilizing the enormous power of the state to intimidate, channel and retard these huge masses of people. These demonstrators tended to be weekend skirmishers, tied to academia or to a job, thus had to vacate the streets after Saturday and Sunday.

However, the introduction of organized veterans into the area of protest was another matter. They reinvigorated the anti-war movement and provided the internal dynamics required to successfully maneuver around artificial nuisance barriers. It was just another type of war, this time to force a recalcitrant political institution back

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into democratic conformity. Their impact was undeniably felt within the anti-war movement for, not only did they prove to be highly visible, articulate, and most effective, they were also very skillful in altering support away from the war by reaching into the public and military itself for a moral reappraisal. They appealed beyond the intellect and into the consciousness of a society whose sons were dying in an undeclared war.

No other peace group carried the immediacy of ending the Vietnam War to the American public and this seriousness cemented the disparate strands of opinion, belief and values into the cohesiveness and dedication that was vital to their success in moving from one project into another. There were no groups they refused to meet to discuss the war, and their resolve to speak out in public was certainly not based on ego distress but rather reflected a deep commitment towards educating the public into the evil nature of the war.

Such a profoundly quixotic approach to moral obligations in advancing educational opportunities as a vehicle for cultural change can only be understood within a commitment to counter "military solutions" carried out under the ethic of political expediency. Rejection of the organizational norm of managers and workers paralleled

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their distaste for the bureaucratic structure of the Vietnam War itself, whether in the field or in Washington, D.C.

We can measure their effectiveness by comparing their debut in 1967 with subsequent actions that produced substantial levels of internal military resistance to the war. During peak years of VVAW activities, 1968 to 1972, their effectiveness in altering public support for the Vietnam War was surpassed only by their success in reaching into the military itself for anti-war support. By 1971 the Rubicon had been crossed and an army was lost in Vietnam.[19]

Although this phenomenon occurred over a relatively short period of time, three and a half years since the emergence of VVAW, the roots went deeper into a deeper temporal frame. Many VVAW respondents said they went into service with patriotic zeal, a few admitted to some misgivings yet carried out their duties honorably because they loved their country and believed it was the right thing to do. It was the exposure to war, to things they saw, heard and experienced over time, that served to sharply separate truth from the fiction of official untruths that radicalized them. Those contradictions with how they were raised, what they were taught, and what they valued were turned upside down. Their entire grounding in

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acceptable human patterns of behavior based on strong values of personal morality was inverted. It was unfortunate that they came to believe they held more in common with the enemy than with their own society.[20]

This does not mean the VVAW were traitors; they strongly denounce attempts to label them as such and still affirm they were not the ones destroying their country; they were trying to save it.[21] They turned their attention to the political power that was responsible for lengthening suffering and pain and arrived at the realization that Vietnam was only one of a long string of historic signifiers indicating that the true conflict was not between cultures, political philosophies or economic determinations but between the loss of humanity indicative of allowing political expediency over life and death. In this, the VVAW can be said to view their emergence in anti-war dissent not as revolutionary activity but as a natural and pragmatic reaction to a senseless war that they had been involved in on a very personal level for less than honorable reasons of state. It was a courageous act, the state is the final arbiter of acceptable citizen conduct.

This theme of the citizen in the clutches of political power echoes through Jacques Ellul's works, whether theological or secular. He stresses fear of the sovereign

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as the impelling reason why individuals are bereft of even the desire to exercise freedom. In democratic societies, ideology permits a Hobbesian tradeoff of power to the state in that, although nominal power is granted to the people, real power resides elsewhere. Ellul sees absence of opposition contributing to the usurpation of power through its "sleep of death" routine that numbs the mind through the working out of technique. In this instance, technique represents cultural baggage, including the vast network of rules, regulations, ordinances and administrative edicts found in modern society.[22]

The result of this consolidation of power under bureaucratic rationality is technology, the ultimate evil, that destroys the bonds between men and nature placing each in an inescapable iron cage. The greatest danger Ellul envisions, is the absolute state on one hand and the narcissistic individual on the other. That duality ensures justification for legitimate power behind a facade of public and private morality that maintains the hypocrisy by manipulating the force of reality into distortion. Thus, the state is able to misuse technology towards the wrong priorities: death over life and glorification of it in the minds of the masses who should know better. Matters of life and death are uncontested when they are decided by the

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state. The sometimes horrifying, acceptance of evil is masked under flags and rhetoric as "right" while the real issue of state violence by those who protest is never addressed or is suppressed under the rubric of "wrong."

Power is thus not simple hypocrisy orchestrated as "the people's will or welfare," it is the consolidation of consensus under the sword because, when confronted by crisis at any level, the state cannot permit democratic points of view to flourish. The greatest danger to the state is the right to free speech, which has to be suppressed by conjuring the necessity for anti-democratic laws to prevent conspiracies from happening.[23]

Ellul, like Nietzsche, sees power as the imposition of will of another on yours. This assimilation of the voice destroys the essence of what it is to be human: passion, laughter, art, music, and self-determination, are all extinguished by technique. There can be no meaningful dialogue between the state and those who attempt to criticize and unmask links between it and its equally corrupt citizenry. Ideals of human dignity, rights of other nations, even human rights are emptied, serving only as symbolic smoke screens that the powerful can disregard anytime it becomes necessary to do so. The technocratic society is possible only through the relaxation of

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individual will:[24] when that happens, societal vitality is drained and only numbing passivity remains.

To Ellul, dissent and opposition are seen as the means of restoring power to the people; however, it can only succeed within a frame of rejecting violence to attain the ends. Whether the Romans throw you into the lion's den or the Chicago police break your skulls at the Democratic Convention, resistance is condemned. In that sense, the portrayal of violence witnessed by others will elicit rejection of what is perceived as inhumane measures to restore peace; sympathies will be with the victim.

Ultimately, if we are to follow Ellul's arguments, the VVAW offers a convincing argument for its validity in recognizing political ideologies were at stake, not national survival, when they were targeted for political harassment.[25] Tragically, Nixon was so afraid of America's future and the inability of the political system to survive that he over reacted; he broke laws to save the country thus misguidedly corrupted the quintessence of integrity. He could not transcend ideology because that demanded a personal reappraisal of the kind of person he was, what his beliefs meant, and what he had to change if these VVAW witnesses to the horrifying events of history were to be silenced. That, he could not do; instead, he tried to

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overcome opposition through the most undemocratic methods at hand and failed.[26]

On such farce, immense historical alterations are set into motion. The thin line of veterans who carried the Vietnam Veterans Against the War banner on April 15, 1967 were not a threat to national security. They were an overt expression of intense soul-searching each had separately undergone in Vietnam. That process served as the catalyst for bonding together to end the war - that and the war itself.[27] Jan Barry had been looking for a veteran's organization to join and had exhausted the possibilities. The usual American Legion response was that they were not interested in inducting veterans "who had lost their war." Veterans of Foreign Wars were not significantly more tolerant of the Vietnam veteran.

The Concerned Officers' Movement was anti-war but did not include non-commissioned personnel, preventing many veterans from being assimilated. Other groups were not philosophically attuned, being too far to the right or left of center. That changed after the April 15th demonstration in New York and on June 1st, 1967, when an alternative was offered. Unlike traditional veterans' organizations, VVAW accepted any past and present military into their organization, no matter the type of discharge, personal

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philosophy or stigma. It was a refuge of last resort with the one stipulation, a regard for discipline and unity. By Veteran's Day, 1967, the original VVAW founding group had expanded to several dozen members, allowing them to hold their own Veterans' Day rally in Union Square in Manhattan and bringing in the funds for a half-page ad in the November 19, 1967 New York Times,[28] tripling VVAW membership and launching their organization onto a national level.[29]

The leaders of the fledgling organization vigorously reached out for every Vietnam veteran they could find, literally beating the hustings to flush out anyone who appeared likely to join the organization and managed to attract many who did. They appeared in demonstrations, joined in rallies, distributed leaflets, were invited to appear on local radio and television, produced an endless array of petitions against the war and were interviewed by the media, not always in terms of endearment. Jan Barry remembers a few confrontational interviewers who didn't bother with civility, "hollering and yelling at us....it was a real fight.[30]

Although most organizational theorists hold that size is an important element in resource mobilization,[31] the VVAW never rose too far above the 25,000 member level

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compared with the 2.5 million American Legionnaires. Their effectiveness was in their message and that proved of greater importance in presenting the political issues of the war to the American public. They debated with the best the administration had to offer, including Pentagon experts, and as Jan Barry offers, "we weren't just dumb GIs, we could hold our own with anyone because we had served our time and done our homework."[32] Media frenzy is criticized for providing their group publicity far beyond their obligation to articulate for the American conscience; without it, they would not have gained the attention or audience they did. Marshall McLuhan's statement that the medium is the message should place the matter at rest. They had something to say, and Americans should be allowed to hear it. They did more to preserve the First Amendment of the Bill of Rights than their detractors who would prevent them from enjoying its protection.

It is interesting to note that although they did not expect government officials to be among their strongest supporters, their most savage critics were often other soldiers. Their advice to anti-war activists who were "beating up on the soldiers" was to stop alienating them with taunts of "baby killers" or worse but to hold out the olive branch and welcome them. It introduced an extra

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dimension of disciplined, trained military into the antiwar ranks. It was a brilliant move and its effectiveness can be measured by a very concerned J. Edgar Hoover, director of the FBI, who ordered an investigation of the VVAW as early as September 1967 for evidence of infiltration by the Communist Party, a mere three months after their emergence as an organized group.[33]

Although relatively unheralded when they began, by 1968 VVAW had established chapters in Alabama and California, Ohio and Oregon, and were coexistent with a vast reservoir of veterans across the country independently speaking out against the war as concerned individuals who were just waiting for something organized to come their way.[34] And it did. Operating with a base of 500 to 600 active members, VVAW soon saturated towns and cities in New Jersey, Connecticut and New York states with organizing activity.

Despite their increasing effectiveness, they remained apolitical; 1968 was an election year and the VVAW refused to endorse any one candidate. Although politically impartial, many VVAWers were free to work in election campaigns for candidates. The VVAW voted to set up special campaign committees for any candidate the veterans wished to support. Lack of public support after President

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Johnson's decision not to run for reelection in 1968 drained their treasury to the point where they had to close their New York office. Jan Barry remembers, however, that it was the Chicago Democratic National Convention where "they had sent 50 of their most articulate veterans, one from each state, only to be tear-gassed along with everyone else that really killed us."[35] Other than a small chapter in Los Angeles, the VVAW remained dormant until the Moratoriums of fall 1969. Then the My Lai massacre in November of 1969 electrified and revitalized the VVAW because they knew the Administration's contention that My Lai was an isolated incident was not true. Their own experience negated it.

In rapid order, the April 30, 1970 announcement by President Nixon of the invasion of Cambodia, the massacres at Kent and Jackson State colleges on May 4th and 6th, and the national student strikes resulted in a tremendous burst of energy and applications for membership skyrocketed. The VVAW led student strikes on many major campuses throughout the country; what may have been an imperceptible blip on the radar screen in mid-year 1967, had become a potent anti-war force with significant clout behind their stopping the war now ultimatums. VVAW membership had reached the 2,000 mark by the Labor Day weekend when Operation RAW

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(Rapid American Withdrawal) was conducted. The operation was a four day simulated search and destroy mission by 80 veterans who travelled between Morristown, NJ, to Valley Forge, PA, to show Americans what war was really like. By the time they completed the 86 mile sweep to Valley Forge, the complement had swelled to 150 veterans.[36]

Conveying graphical representations of the reality of war to people who had never experienced the brutality of ambushes, cordoned villages, interrogations, or shooting civilians as not so gentle reminders of the kind of war being waged by the U.S. government was not expected to be a popular event. Speaking in retrospect, Jan Barry expressed surprise at the enthusiastic reception they received during their march. Although there was an occasional harasser, the veterans were given encouragement from the audience, including offers of food and beverages, horn blowings and raised fist salutes from motorists, and even several mayors of towns along the route turned out to meet them.[37]

That action gave it national recognition. Although publicity from Operation RAW doubled their membership with new chapters forming in New Jersey, Pennsylvania, the District of Columbia, Virginia, Maryland and Ohio, it was the Winter Soldier Investigations that helped to raise its membership to well over 7,000. Prior to their Labor Day

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1970 Operation RAW, the VVAW had helped form a series of war crimes hearings under the sponsorship of the Citizens' Commission of Inquiry into U.S. War Crimes in Indochina, with the first hearing scheduled for Annapolis, Maryland, in February 1970 and the second in Springfield, Massachusetts, six weeks later.

These were expanded nationally into the Winter Soldier Investigations held from January 31st to February 2nd, 1971 in Detroit, Michigan, with over one hundred veterans testifying to their own involvement in atrocities in Vietnam.[38] Their stated reason for the hearings was to refute the scapegoating of Lt. William Calley for the My Lai atrocities by implicating an Administration that was cynically trying to shift the guilt to lower commissioned officers and men in order to cover up war crimes that originated higher up.[39] Peter P. Mahoney, a former national coordinator of the VVAW, was moved to ask, "how can we isolate and punish instances of criminality in a war that was totally criminal?"[40]

By having veterans testify in panels,[41] a picture of deliberate Administrative policy was presented permitting the VVAW to refute their claim that the atrocities were individual aberrations. The VVAW was built on confronting these types of hypocrisy and their experiences with the

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establishment kept them totally involved. They questioned Administration snafus and continually challenged traditional attitudes in this country by bringing home the terrible human price exacted in Vietnam by silence at home.

Their greatest boost in membership occurred in February 1971 when a full-page membership ad in Playboy Magazine[42] raised their membership to an incredible 20,000 to 25,000 members, among them some several hundred active duty personnel in Vietnam. Wells credits their phenomenal growth to many veterans who were utterly disillusioned with the war, feeling that they had been deceived and horribly used.[43]

VVAW had done some work in VA hospitals and were moved into vocally protesting the conditions they found there, serendipitously enlisting Vietnam veteran patients in VA hospitals in large numbers.[44] That led to a new role for VVAW, pressuring and lobbying for veteran's rights, adding to their dedication to peace.[45] A close association with Dr. Robert Jay Lifton developed from concerns over inadequate psychological services for veterans and led to the formation of the famous VVAW rap group sessions, official recognition of the Post Traumatic Stress Disorder syndrome, and the adverse effects of Agent Orange, napalm and defoliants.

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In spring of 1971, VVAW members conceived the Operation Dewey Canyon III march on Washington which they carried out on April 19 through the 23rd, coincidental with the Student Mobilization Committee's May Day demonstration called for April 24th. It was a masterpiece of Juvenalian satire referencing the Laos invasion code-named Dewey Canyon II and the earlier Cambodian invasion, Dewey Canyon I. President Nixon's words were altered to reflect the VVAW's planned "incursion designated Dewey Canyon III into the country of Congress for the limited purpose of severing the supply lines currently being utilized by the illegal mercenary forces of the Executive Branch. And, for the limited purpose of ascertaining if any pretense of Constitutional Democracy exists in this country....Vietnam Veterans Against the War, the winter soldiers of today, have identified the enemy. He is us. Armed with this knowledge, we will not in this crisis shrink from the service of our country. Instead, we will press on with the winter soldier offensive; we will continue to bring the war home."[46]

But Dewey Canyon III went deeper than the presentation of guerrilla theater during their five days of lobbying, civil disobedience, rap sessions, and targeting of the Supreme Court, the Pentagon, Congress and the press. They

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would conclude their demonstration by returning all their war medals to the government in body bags or shit cans filled with blood."[47] Understandably, President Nixon's efforts to discredit the VVAW and blunt their effectiveness through every mean available were heightened; these efforts are thoroughly documented in The War Within.[48]

On April 19th, led by their own Gold Star Mothers, the VVAW attempted to lay a wreath at Arlington National Cemetery. Some of the marchers were in wheel chairs or on crutches. When they were prevented from entering the cemetery, they laid their wreaths at the gate instead. Incensed over the insult, two hundred veterans returned to Arlington Cemetery the next day determined to correct the injustice. Jan Barry recalled that the cemetery superintendent again tried to stop them from entering but decided not to after now Senator John Kerry told him that "these guys risked their lives to go out and pick up those bodies and put them in body bags so they could be shipped home. You can't bar these men from paying honor to their friends."[49]

The idealistic challenge to the state, as seen in Sophocles' classic play Antigone, is echoed in VVAW determination to be allowed to respect their dead; there is the neutralization of duty to authority and the commitment

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to principles based on the perception of a higher authority, those of honor and virtue, assuming primary thrust. I would argue against the action as motivated by a desire for spectacle, rather it can be considered a collective reaffirmation of the power of universal ideals - the survivor owing homage to his fallen comrades.

Guerilla theater was marching to the Pentagon to surrender for war crimes they had committed, prompting a general to say they didn't accept prisoners of war there advising them to try the Justice Department. These humorous expressions of the spectacle mitigate potentially dangerous ideas into channels of acceptability since anywhere along the presentation, the actor's sentiments behind his screen of action can be rescinded by any number of techniques of neutralization; smiling, laughing, or only kidding have successfully defused offensive situations. When compared to art or drama, the spectacle serves to present fluid challenges to the status quo, to place established ideas front stage center in a wider range of operations, and to promote social change by shaking the hold of conventional mores by offering liberating alternatives.

The line of separation between the spectacle and idealism is one of degree and is clearly differentiated in

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VVAW actions during Operation Dewey Canyon III. As in their other endeavors the emphasis may have been on spectacle, "where one jests, the truth lies concealed." That was guerrilla theater, but refusing to surrender their deepest held values no matter the consequences introduced the Antigone syndrome. We point to two instances of VVAW activity at the Washington demonstration where guerrilla theatre was replaced by idealistic resolve; first, the Arlington National Cemetery on April 20th, and second, the instance of flinging their medals back at an unworthy government. Guerilla theater ended and hardened wills emerged requiring resolution when they refused to be turned away from Arlington National Cemetery a second time, and on the day they returned their medals to their government. Those were the points where conflict became the driving force and signified an assertion of freedom from their oppressor through rejection of conventional understandings of authority and submission.

Although there were other veterans in the anti-war movement, the VVAW became the dynamic thrust that led to the increasing militancy in resisting the war, finally cresting in the decision to remove all American troops from Vietnam. They brought a legitimacy to the anti-war resistance, they inspired others into joining, and,

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according to Sydney Peck, set precedence for the peace movement's next offensive.[50] Within the brief span of four years, they became the vanguard of warriors who reset the terms and conditions of military obedience, especially in regard to the legitimacy and support for military action for this country that lasted into the 1980s and beyond. In this they still serve to remind America that its historical commitment is to universal ideals of fairness.

They were fortunate in having many creative, innovative and effective people to be found in the peace movement in their ranks, and these veterans were constantly devising a wealth of graphic illustrations of war designed to educate the audience to a deeper level of understanding, sometimes through the inane, sometimes into bedrock realization of misplaced allegiances. This creativity was viewed with disapproval in high places whose canons were not to be vulgarized.

There were endless investigations into the VVAW organization, government spies were placed in the organization and agents provocateur were utilized in attempts to discredit the group. They were accused of sedition, of attempts to overthrow the duly elected officials of their government, they were harassed and physically abused; tear

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gassed and imprisoned, still they deflected all efforts to destroy their viability.[51]

A study of their social interactions in terms of theatrical drama offers us a script for the discovering ways in which they created specific impressions in the minds of others, what Goffman terms the presentation of the self implicit in "impression management."[52] In Operation RAW they wore costumes (combat veterans jungle battle gear) that supported their legitimacy, carried props (plastic M-16 rifles) to emphasize the instrument of their trade, utilized terminology ("A U.S. infantry company just came through here...help us end the war before they turn your son into a butcher...or a corpse.) to anchor reality, visual effects (leaflets, "shooting" of innocent civilians who were pre-arranged actors for impact, medics in their ranks, and carrying litters of wounded--returned amputees--sweeping into Valley Forge carrying five body bags with the numbers of U.S. and Vietnamese dead written on them) for denouement. Their certification of legitimacy was symbolized by the medals and ribbons they wore, including 110 Purple Hearts among the 150 veterans at the end of Operation RAW.[53]

In this, personal performances rely heavily on cultural norms that unfortunately carry unequal social

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power; the power of the VVAW in neutralizing the manifest content of disapproval conveyed by a powerful political establishment capitalized on latent messages to defuse these self-proclaimed "moral entrepreneurs" from successfully enforcing deviant labels of "un-American" or "treasonous" on them. Their use of non-verbal communication added to the power of language reshaped the agenda of social reality and was, in essence, a dramaturgical tour de force that offered the public an opportunity to detect dishonesty in someone else's performance, not theirs.

As Goffman[54] states, performance tends to idealize intentions; the task was to convince the audience that what they did truly reflected ideal cultural standards, rather than base motives exemplified in the Washington culture of lies and deception. In this sense, taking on the entire state in an attempt to reinvigorate the moral and ethical ethos of a society meant incurring strong reaction from the state the greater their success in educating the general public with their techniques of guerrilla theater and non-organizational patterns of action.

In sum, relations between government and veterans were not improving with time and the VVAW became quite proficient at stripping political hypocrisies behind the Administration's continuous appeals to values of patriotism

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and conformity. The VVAW responded to these provocations by inundating military bases with literature and information that helped spark several major riots on bases and in military prisons by the middle of 1970. They circulated peace petitions to increasing numbers of military personnel at home and in Vietnam, one of these bearing 1,700 signatures of active duty service men.[55]

Military personnel were increasingly transferred to less desirable assignments for placing their names on these lists or supporting the growing disenchantment for the war, and official disapproval intensified as insubordination deepened. Amid this background of declining morale and discipline at home, combat officers in Vietnam were warning Washington that the government was considered more of an enemy by their men than the Viet Cong or the North Vietnamese Army.[56]

The VVAW may not have been the only determining factor in the political decision to cease overt U.S. military action and to turn the war over to the South Vietnamese government. There were millions of dissenters. However, VVAW participation was a strong rallying point for understanding that if servicemen abandoned the war who would be left to fight it. The ability of the South Vietnamese Army to hold their own was minimal at best.

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Although some units of the South Vietnamese army did serve admirably in defense of their government, still, it was an appalling lack of resolve from most of the others that mandated American intervention into most of the heavy fighting in that area. Official government communications did not address this shortcoming.

Thus the unique VVAW ability was in using their skills to raise questions and elicit answers, to bridge the chasm between the public and the military mind to draw the super patriots and those engaged in war into a collective understanding of the depth of their ideological mystification so as to redirect conventional behavior into altered states of consciousness. They understood the war, they had been there. They had felt the suffering, been participants in tests of endurance, and had a keen appreciation for survival. They could not understand a political system that would not or refused to extricate itself from the quicksand of Vietnam: "for God's sake, men were dying while the government Mickey Moused around."[57]

Their performances never ceased to provoke Nixon who was not an avid fan of these metaphorical sentinels. They were a reminder that the discipline and military skills they had been taught in defense of their country's honor could be used to compel a return to American decency in

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matters of war and peace by simply removing the authenticity of support, by refusing to be part of the entire misguided adventure and by convincing others to follow their lead. We can measure their success in this endeavor by comparing their anti-war campaign actions with the corresponding disengagement policies that subsequently followed their appearance in relatively short order.

Official withdrawal of the U.S. military from Vietnam began in 1969, a mere 18 months of so of their emergence; the last ground combat unit departed in August 1972. Although South Vietnam did not fall until 1975, there was a vastly reduced American military presence there. There had been growing opposition to the war among the GIs in Vietnam as early as 1969 with soldiers offering $10,000 rewards to anyone who murdered abusive or overzealous officers with fragmentation grenades. The Pentagon began keeping records on fragging incidents in 1969 and confirmed incidents rose from 96 attempted fraggings resulting in 39 deaths in 1969 to 205 assaults and 34 deaths in 1970 and 215 attempts and 12 deaths in the first eleven months of 1971.[58]

In general, we can make a case between the emergence of the VVAW, their national exposure in the intensification of protests and demonstrations at home and the disintegra-

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tion of an army in Vietnam.[59] There was a real danger to the survival of the U.S. itself when the incessant stripping of internal forces to Vietnam left the country relatively unprepared to defend from internal threats from rising levels of anger and moral outrage over each escalation of the war. We now know that participation in demonstrations often outnumbered the available internal forces required to repel potentially undesirable actions. Yet, who could have guessed that a ragtag assemblage of returning Vietnam veterans could be the catalyst for reshaping American foreign policy and stopping the war. Yet, between their 1967 entry and the disintegration of an American army in 1971, we have a compelling illustration of unceasing struggle to change what could not be accepted.

Richard Moser in The New Winter Soldiers,[60] offers an interesting theme: he sees the war resisters (VVAW and Veterans for Peace) as reaching back into the past for their ideal of the citizen-soldier. In this, the thousands of anti-war veterans and soldiers created a dissident political movement to ensure a return to the old values of American heroic traditions of activism for peace, empowerment and justice prevalent in the American Revolution and the Civil War.[61] Although Moser may be quite accurate in chronicling cultural alterations and a desire for community

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as the basis for VVAW militancy and defection,[62] these may not have served to expand political horizons toward the millenium as much as to advance a troubling compartmentalization of separate but equal categories of identities tending towards separatism rather than unity. Thus a broad coalition wasn't possible given the many diverging imperatives, thus the desired convergence tended to be temporary, at best, unless there was personal advantage to be gained from it.[63]

A VVAW member recalled how women's groups were the most difficult to speak to on common cause; they had their own agenda. Although Blacks and Hispanic veterans were represented within the VVAW, feminists, though sympathetic, remained aloof. Few were willing to forfeit autonomy. Although a veteran's organization, VVAW consciousness transcended parochial interests along gender or racial lines and, they knew the time tested formulae for defeating an enemy was to unite and worked hard to develop liaisons.

Their methods were grounded in the very nature of universal idealism that has searched for truth on the battlefield in a test of skill, knowledge and raw courage which could not be bound by loyalties to provincial interests or nationalistic appeal. Thus, instead of finding the institutional imperative of valor whose task

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was to protect the weak, these modern day warriors found instead internal divisions within the anti-war groupings that tended to separate into hardened defense of fiefdoms. It was important for the VVAW not to trivialize the task by pursuing the usual veteran concerns.

In this we can follow the dialectical movement of Vietnam veterans beyond the narrow scope of Moser's citizen soldier, where mobilization and numbers had been decisive, into the ideals of a just war conception, and beyond winter soldiering. No longer could the citizen soldier answer duty, complete his task, and return unsullied to the community. He had to belong to a world community before he could ponder questions of the legality of the war and implications of the Nuremberg Doctrine.

These issues went far beyond goals of splintered community. Ben Chitty[64] reminisced that perhaps a mistake was made in the naming of their organization. Vietnam Veterans Against the War left the impression that it was a one issue campaign, to be abandoned once the war ended, and not the ongoing humanistic endeavor they had envisioned. People tended to forget the war once the troops came home, thus ending any necessity to struggle on. That may be true for the general public, however, this group was not

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complacent. They were born in crisis, achieved historical results, and are still active today, despite a high rate of burnout. They don't appear to be relaxing their role of sentinel over the nation's morality. They teach, they salvage society's rejects, they take on unpopular causes, they work with the homeless, they have returned to Vietnam with olive branches, they have helped erect their own war memorial, they are concerned with the weak and the helpless wherever they are to be found. And they write.

It has been said that the greatest contribution to this nation the Vietnam War provided was the wealth of literature coming from the veterans who fought there. W. D. Ehrhart, Jan Barry, Ron Kovic, John Kerry, Al Santoli, Tim O'Brien, Donald Duncan, and so many others to mention individually, have recorded a necrology of modern warfare, similar in genre to Erich Maria Remarque[65] and Ernest Hemmingway.[66] To a man they represent the reservoir of antipathy to state manipulation of truth to mask its priorities that had nothing to do with honor. We can trace those reasons why the resolution to "quit" was made. The following mini-biographies offer a portrait of idealistic moral responses that initiated the personal decision to rebel. When orders were too immoral to accept and their consequences too brutal to forgive, they turned away.

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Roy Barrington enlisted in the Army in 1969-1971 and served in the Infantry in Vietnam. His experiences there led Roy to fashion peace signs out of shaving cream on a landing zone in Cambodia where a battalion commander was scheduled to arrive. AWOL after Vietnam, he was reduced in rank from sergeant to private first class and received a General Discharge. Roy chained himself to the gate at the Naval Reserve Station in Seattle to protest reserve troop shipments to the Persian Gulf and lost his job as a result of his protest work against the Gulf War.

Ben Chitty, a current VVAW regional coordinator (East) whose grandfather was an Annapolis graduate, served in the U.S. Navy 1965-69, with tours in Vietnam during 1966-67. He served in the Gulf of Tonkin on the USS Richmond K. Turner. He doubted the official version of the Tonkin Bay incident after talking to personnel on duty aboard those ships. His decision to refuse to follow orders to go on shore patrol came after the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr. in April 1968.

David Cortwright, author of Soldier in Revolt, was drafted into the Army in 1968-1971. He did GI organizing at Fort Hamilton, NY and Fort Bliss, TX, and was one of a group of GIs who filed a federal court suit against the Army, Cortwright V. Resor, alleging that transfers, work

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assignments and changes in duty were an attempt to suppress First Amendment rights. He also authored Left Face, an examination of soldier resistance and trade unions in the armies of many countries. Dave is a former Executive Director of SANE and was a Visiting Fellow at the Institute for International Peace studies at the University of Notre Dame.

Charlie Clements, an Air Force brat, following the example of his father and brother, entered the Air Force Academy where duty and discipline were instilled, along with the ideals of honor and ethics. He credits that sense of honor to his refusal to fly anymore in Vietnam. He was sent to to Vietnam as a C-130 pilot and soon developed a deep revulsion to what was happening there but never gave quitting a thought. He flew a secret mission to Cambodia and remembers seeing the utter devastation caused by U.S. saturation bombing. He knew that the damage could only have been caused by one source, B-52s. When he began ferrying troops from Saigon to the Parrot's Beak area, he realized they were being positioned for an invasion into neutral territory he declared himself unfit to fly because of a cold. After attending an antiwar rally in San Francisco told the crowd there that he was not going to fly any more missions in Vietnam. Although he opted for

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assignment to a non combat unit when he returned to Saigon, he was sent to San Antonio and cashiered into a psychiatric ward after confiding to his psychiatrist about the reasons for his change of heart: the Phoenix Program, secret bases in Laos, flying planeloads of money for a black marketing scam, secret missions into Cambodia, and coups and invasions. A major offered to cancel the psychiatric stay if Clements agreed to return to Vietnam; he realized then the extreme lengths the government would go to in order to wasn't really crazy and the government will go to extreme maintain the fiction of duty to country. A friend later discovered where he was, broke in and helped in his escape.

Donald Duncan, former Green Beret, endured non-stop U.S. air bombardment for 12 straight hours with no apology from air command for overriding orders. He remembers Viet Cong running blindly past, over and trying to bury themselves next to his group of Green Berets helplessly caught in the same trap. After he returned to the rear, he discovered the intelligence reports he had compiled were altered to exclude information the government did not want the American public to have; they were not to be told that the U.S. would sacrifice its own military to attain tenuous objectives. After 10 1/2 years in the army, he resigned in the summer of 1965 to return home and "get out the word."[67]

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Clarence J. Fitch, now deceased, was in the Marine Corps 1966-1970; he served in Vietnam in 1968 and was involved in organizing efforts for GIs while still on active duty, especially in fighting for the rights of black servicemen. He came to believe he was killing people of color, like him, and could not justifiably continue to do so. He became a veteran activist for VVAW, Inc. The VVAW Chapter in New York bears his name.

Dr. Howard Levy enlisted in the Army 1965-1969. A medical doctor, he refused to train Green Beret medics and was sentenced to three years in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. After his prison term, he worked with United Servicemen's Fund, an organization providing material aid to the GI movement. He co-authored the book, Going to Jail, with David Miller, the first person to burn his draft card.

Greg Payton was drafted into the Army, serving in 1967-1969. Greg faced court-martial on three occasions for a number of charges, including AWOL, assault and disrespect to an officer. In addition, he was involved in the 1968 Long Binh Jail (LBJ Hotel) riot in South Vietnam. He returned to Vietnam in 1988 as a representative of VVAW and traveled to South Africa in 1990 for VVAW.

Randy Rowland enlisted in the Army 1967-1969, went AWOL for 45 days in order to prepare for his second CO

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application, was imprisoned in the Presidio Stockade, San Francisco, and was a participant in the Presidio 27 Mutiny, a sitdown strike by prisoners. He was court-martialed and sentenced to 21 months, serving only 18 months before being released from the U.S. Disciplinary Barracks in Leavenworth and given a Dishonorable Discharge.

George Silver enlisted in the Army 1967-1973. He served with a long range reconnaissance team in Vietnam from 1968-1969. He decided to "quit" the war after an orphanage and village befriended by his team were bombed and destroyed by American forces. He received 100% disability from the military for non-controllable epilepsy resulting from wounds sustained in Vietnam and suffers from PTSD.

Jack Tracy, in the US Navy circa 1969-1972 served as a radio operator in Vietnam. He became involved with VVAW five days after returning from Vietnam and still on active duty. He helped organize the Lexington to Boston anti-war march in May 1971. He was court-martialed for being AWOL and spent his 21st birthday in the brig. Assisted by the Legal in-Service Project, he later joined the organization assisting active duty GIs and veterans with legal assistance and counselling.

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These were the tip of the iceberg; there were many more than the few listed above, however, although they saw their rebellion as ordinary behavior, they entered the heroic in opposition to, not in compliance with, actions they judged to be personally reprehensible. In all of these instances, in confrontation with his military machine, perhaps unwittingly, the conversion follows in the Augustinian definition of overcoming evil by recognizing it has no independent power of its own, except that which we give it through our own weakness and corruption.

In this, simple noncompliance with the seduction of custom could and did bring down the monolithic U.S. political and military machine. The dissidents have been accused of being cowardly, that their overt protests lessened the risk of dangerous assignments and bodily harm; that is simply not the case. We note the harsh retaliatory measures taken to ensure an end to their refusal and to deter anyone else from entertaining similar sentiments.[68] Reactions of these types are legend because insubordination is the one impasse a military cannot cross. By showing that human will could withstand the most sophisticated techniques of repression through an internal reimposition of conscience within the spiritual frame of the warrior, these human actors transcended nationalism.

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In this, the men were aware of the misuse of techne by the class in power. Technology was subverted to ensuring victory at all costs, even if it showed an alarming impartiality in harming friend and foe alike. Friendly fire, Agent Orange and sharing your enemy's punishment in the same type of overkill, ultimately proved how incompatible the means proved to the task: first, it stiffened the will of the Vietnamese people to resist and second, it estranged some of our best soldiers who found themselves fighting two enemies: the VC and the NVA on one hand and the priorities of another class on the other.

For many, however, there was no conflict between affluence and technology; both appeared to be blessings, a reward for being progressive people. There were a few voices of opposition to technological perfection and the hypnotic compliance to its siren song. Where there were doubts, such as David Cortwright[69] who noted that affluence and technology was the internal flaw in our society that weakened the warrior ethic causing incompatibility with the military, the tocsin fell on infertile ground. Thus, it was not the weak generation of undisciplined draftees and enlisted men that lost the war but an inability of their society to retain the moral edge by exercising restraint over state utilization of unlimited power over life itself.

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If the warriors changed their minds, it was over injury to their idealism and humanism implicit in their belief that the world could be a better place to live in if we eliminated injustice, ignorance, poverty war and, for the first time in human existence, they thought it could be done. Their role in the task was misdirected into avenues of harm implicit in the reified forms of automated battlefields, saturation bombings, and general mayhem.

Gibson offers added support in his realistic appraisal of the automated battlefield and reactions to human immersion in the excesses of technological misappropriation and the consequences that follow - "they did not know the terms of war, its architecture, the rules of fair play."[70] In this vein, Frank Toner, in a personal interview, explained how he could no longer be part of the butchery that had become the routinization of evil. He had been a seminarian and asked for a CO status instead found himself in Vietnam serving as an unarmed medic in forward areas.[71] He recalls reaching overload on one particular night and stealing a truck from the motor pool driving it around the compound at top speed hoping he would kill himself and not caring what happened because he could not bear to witness any more anguish and pain.[72]

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The ideal of serving meritoriously in the noble institution of warfare was not possible in Vietnam. There was no separation from the enemy; friendly fire, the accidental misplacement of artillery fire, and B-52 bombings could not always realistically separate friend from foe. The deadly results of technological neutrality, from McManamara's electronic barrier[73] to control of the skies over Vietnam, is that it was impartial; these were just as deadly to friend and foe alike. Then, too, we see abandoned technology miraculously finding its way back into use, this time in the hands of the enemy against American soldiers.[74] In addition, Tet revealed that there were as many North Vietnamese sympathizers behind American lines as in front of them.[75] The enemy was never truly isolated and identified but melted into the society itself.

In every poem, song, work of fiction, autobiography, documentary and work of art that has emerged from the Vietnam experience, including the Vietnam Veterans Against the War, Inc., the tragedy of a system that satisfied all material desires but failed to nourish the spiritual roots of mission is apparent. A society divided against itself is in trouble, a society that divides individuals into dualities of cognition is even more tragic. Thus, VVAW has bestowed wisdom on their society in that they offer promise

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to Schumacher's hope that the "non-electronic brains of men are still the best method for preserving the human role."

Their revelations offer glimpses into a Weberian nightmare of ends over means that led to deep introspection and reappraisal of the goals of war and their part in it, as well as a vision of the future which may remove the necessity for ever again having to return to the dark side of politics. Who better to render a first person account of the inverted relationship between the less than neutral reversal of machine over master. The poetry of Bill Ehrhart provides a glimpse into the modern high tech army he had been in service to and that realization emptied his task of its nobility and undermined forever the historical edge the halo effect American soldiers have held in the conduct of our wars.[76]

This phenomenon followed a common pattern; in Vietnam we see it appearing at the crucial juncture of judging their role in an abhorrent act or betraying principled beliefs. Those beliefs incorporating traditional humanitarian considerations were soaked in years of immersion in the socialization process; Jan Barry and the Boy Scouts, Bill Ehrhart, the son of a minister; Frank Toner, a former Roman Catholic seminarian; Brian Matarese whose family was deeply committed to social justice and whose grandmother

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had been a suffragette; all these indicate a direction towards service over narrow sectarian self-interest; as Moser notes in his discussion of "Winter Soldiers,"[77] they were taught early and often.

We see this phenomenon emerging in Kohlberg's assertion that the height of moral reasoning is the post-conventional level moving individuals beyond the specific norms of their society into broader terms of abstract ethical principles. These are learned from significant others and they are learned well. However, the significant alteration occurs between the conventional and post-conventional stages where the individual no longer is in the ideological cocoon of society but has broken free into the sphere of criticizing the imperfections of the society that has taught him his morality. Reflection is on the meaning of "justice," and "freedom," among others, and the duty to doing what was in the basic interest of society is metamorphosed into higher humanitarian appeals. It is not surprising that this group of idealistic protestors grappled deeply with the experiences of Vietnam to a final introspective understanding that their own society, in the Antigone argument, proved that what is lawful still may not be the right thing to do.

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The sectarian interests of the state failed to recognize the increasing dilemma for servicemen, the choice between obedience and conscience. And even if it did, could not alter the specific logic of a war they had set into motion. For many, the dilemma was eventually resolved by an altered allegiance to humanism away from specific political systems. In this, although the anti-war peace movement conceivably could be contained within national borders and attaching a Commie label, VVAW as the unifying military link could not.

They represented a potentially liberating force for freedom from rhetoric and custom, thus could bond with other groups of sympathetic military and veterans, if necessary, to present a formidable barrier to state manipulation of patently false information and accusations about anyone who dissented. A group of veterans or standing military in opposition to the very policies of their political establishment, however, carried a value added element of military integrity into the quotient. In that contest, the political establishment had squandered its legitimacy and the VVAW was a formidable witness to the truth.

In this, Moser's stress on "forgotten voices and lost memories,"[78] emphasizes the guilt syndrome explanation

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popularized by members of the conforming community where these dissenting veterans are viewed as guilt-ridden thus compelled to stop the politicians from continuing the war so as to bring their brothers home for no higher altruistic principle than survival guilt. That perception negates the premise that there are ideals that rise beyond the egocentric placement of "I've survived and I have to do everything I can to overcome the guilt of having had my skin saved while others are still left behind." Occasions do arise where higher values supersede baser motivations.

That rational explanation presumes that the reason Vietnam veterans did not take on the political or military establishment until they came home is that they were too intimidated to surface until the military had lost its hold over them. That is not so; many did dissent, vocally and actively and paid their dues for it.[79]

Interviews with diverse members of the VVAW, indicate a perplexed disbelief that those responsible for the survival of this country could not deal with issues fairly and openly. Conversion for some began in Vietnam but nothing was done until they came home; for others overt commitment was initiated before returning home, influenced in large part by the increased presence of the VVAW. Still others remained silent supporters through fear of govern-

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ment retaliation; discharged veterans were subject to a 6-year immediate recall option and were afraid they would be sent back to Vietnam, while active duty personnel feared being sent into high risk engagement areas.[80]

Furthermore, a reading of Jay Lifton's Home From the War tells of the psychic horror these veterans experienced that helped reshape their consciousness. There were many who did not successfully sort out the psychical, transcendental spiritual trauma of that conflict. Those who did credit the support and understanding of many who served as midwives in the healing process that helped to overcome their participation in genocidal acts on people who were simply caught in the wrong place at the wrong time. To fixate Vietnam veterans with the old-fashioned aspirations of pre-World War I generations of warriors disregards that the Civil War itself was an introduction into mindless technological slaughter. Michael Brady's photographs of Antietam where humans died en masse vividly portrays the crumpled refuse of battles to save the republic that echoed into Vietnam's legacy of napalm victims and assassinations on national television.

The civilian soldier legacy is carried out of the closet on those occasions where the glorification of war is key in persuading the populace that the necessary price of

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societal survival is the ruthless destruction of everything alien in its path. In this, Weber's theme of increasing modernity introduces the rise of instrumental purposiveness with its cost benefit standard for life itself. We witness in the Vietnam War that those who could did escape the duties expected of citizen soldiers, and they did it under the most creative and artistic mechanisms of escape. It is worth noting that for 20% of those who answered the call, whether under duress or considerations of advantageous conditions of service prior to induction, fairness and the necessity for social justice often prompted their voting with their feet. In contradiction to these, many of those who succeeded in avoiding active duty during that time are now enjoying the privileges of power purchased by the sacrifices of those who were not as skilled in networking as they were[81] and who experience no guilt on sending other youths to die for today's political expediencies.

Even survival guilt could not have prompted those responses, although it may have served as auxiliary emphasis, it was the personal evaluation of their honorable role in war that served to separate honor from murder. When that distinction no longer held, they turned on the false ideals that had contributed to that betrayal. That went beyond conventional expectations of obedience to

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authority into a "no holds barred" commitment to principle. When asked if they weren't afraid of the consequences of their actions, the answer was, "What else could anyone do to me that had not already been done in Vietnam.[82]

In actuality, the concept of military invincibility may no longer be valid when we consider the introduction of lesser qualified individuals into the military. The creation of Project 100,000 to induct fundamentally disadvantaged youths from predominantly poor or minority populations into the military to break the cycle of inequality may have been noble in theory; however, in praxis, the insertion of 'McNamara's boys' did little other than to assure equal opportunity in the casualty rates without the redeeming qualities of social integration.[83] We discover, as well, that social engineering, such as Project 100,000, can do more harm than good by destroying the cohesion of a military through belated efforts to overcome the social neglect of America's other racial war.[84] It served to bury the citizen soldier ideal who would return to his community better than he left it, inculcated with ideals that would enrich the community through a new universalism.[85]

Thus, I would argue that VVAW idealism was not expressly dedicated to returning to the essence of the

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citizen soldier, it carried far beyond the plastic facade of returning military ideals into an 18th, early 19th, century reincarnation of participant volunteerism, where the combatant melts back into the complacent after the crisis is past. Moser's assumption that the Civil War was waged for equality and freedom is inherently flawed when one considers the conflict arose between two unalterably opposed views of economic determination: Southern agricultural interests versus Northern plans for an industrial revolution. The only valid criterion may be the American Revolutionary War, which for all of the winter-soldier rhetoric, however, quickly descended into ideological resumptions of power relationships, territorial conquests, and American imperialism.[86]

I would argue that the VVAW extended beyond winter soldiering; they were the new universal soldier in that they understood that participation in unjust wars was detrimental to the struggle for peace and justice, and that the battle was to stop misuse of the military institution by a class in power. In that sense, the battle to prevent the abuse of power is never ending and the price to be paid is eternal vigilance, not a return to social amnesia or fantasy constructs.

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Ironically, it was in the VVAW critique of his political, economic and social institutions where moral linkages with the enemy in common condemnation of the war were formed.[87] This transcended any desire to return to a simpler version of circumscribed ideals. This signified an identification with another culture and the perception that perhaps your cultural system in its present form was unworthy of defense. This compelling image of a new American ethic of social responsibility has basically altered the way America can go to war.[88]

The Vietnam generation has been much maligned. They were touted as being weak, undisciplined, unwilling to obey authority, drug addicted and, in general, rebellious and soft, a disgrace to the fine tradition of American military history that has never, or almost never, suffered military defeat. It has been stated that the generation sent to Vietnam was unwilling to arbitrarily obey authority without compelling reasons for placing their lives at risk,[89] that the unfairness of the draft and its more affluent evaders were poor role models for those who did go,[90] thus the appeal to conduct above and beyond the call to duty was irrelevant and ideologically suspect.

My research indicates that many returning veterans did not share these sentiments or belong in these categories;

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many thought then, and still do, that the endeavor was in the best interests of this country and true patriotism lay in stopping Communism away from home rather than waiting for it to come here. Questioning the morality of the war never entered into their frame of reference, although in some instances they may have questioned the preeminence of political policies over military advice.[91] In the main, other than to reaffirm their belief in the nation's survival and in their duty to serve honorably, for many the issue was survival of their democratic system against godless communism.[92]

In an interview with an officer who served in the Phoenix Program in Saigon and helped found his local Vietnam Veterans of America chapter after returning home, the question of right or wrong never entered into a moral assessment of our right to be in Vietnam and to do the things we had to do to win. Right was defending your country at all costs, and wrong was to find fault with decisions of people who knew more than you did. There was a job to do and in order to succeed we had to identify and eliminate those who were attempting to destroy the democratically elected government of South Vietnam because the communists were the real enemy of the Vietnamese people. Anyway, we weren't doing anything there the enemy wasn't

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doing first. We were there to save American lives and to stop the communists from enslaving the Vietnamese people and the rest of the world, unless we stopped them cold in Vietnam.[93] In this classical Kohlberg conventional level, there was no guilt over using every thing we had to accomplish our goal, it was the moral thing to do.

To intimate that the "new morality" of contemporary society was not synchronous with long standing patterns of loyalty to country ignored the extreme cultural warpages occurring between World War II and the Vietnam experience, the Korean War as perhaps the leading edge of what later transpired in Vietnam. It was a different army and a different war for fathers and sons; the turbulence of the intervening 19 or 20 years between the two total wars was the playpen of the generation that was sent to Vietnam.

Although the ethic of service to country remained strong in the World War II generation, some of the most violent events seen in American history transpired in the interim between wars, including the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, and clearly left a deep impression on the youth of this country. The Peace Corps and Vista were lightning rods for idealistic response, however, altruism requires role models and internalization, both of which were disappearing in a society that had

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become self-indulgent and narcissistic. The market system had triumphed producing an insular preoccupation with materialistic benefits that clashed with the ethic of self sacrifice for one's society.

The problem was not that the Vietnam generation had learned a new ethic of self-interest, one that was light years away from the generations that preceded them. Cultural imperatives had changed. They were more critical of the rigidity of military discipline and saw through the hypocrisy. They were aware of moral equivalents to war and they rebelled. Misguided observations, such as offered by Army Secretary Robert Froehlke who commented that "the Army had serious problems because society has these problems and there is no way the Army can avoid the problems of society,"[94] did little to address the crux of the problem. These dysfunctions were created within the social structure but were left to the individual to overcome, a monumental task given the reality of political and economic spheres as immovable objects. Thus, the responsibility for defeat is deflected from the architects of war onto the messengers.

Who were these messengers? The VVAW presumes a normative break within the Vietnam generation. A profile of these 75 million baby boomers reveal they are the first generation to have full access to birth control, harbor

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strong anti-authoritarian and anti-establishmentarian sentiments, experiment with mind altering substances, and, in general, leave their imprint in deviations from the patterned ways of behavior. They were the first to live under the nuclear umbrella and to experience all the marvels of technology and science that gave their society the ability to place a man on the moon, to enter the space race, and to push the visionary frontiers into a wider international scope than had previously been accomplished. With all of these superlatives, they were not taught the essence of noblesse oblige that would have countered the rationality of My Lai. They are the best educated generation of Americans, probably the most ruthless, and also the most materialistic.[95]

The VVAW profile shows that, although they were more likely to leave the religion of their birth, they were as likely to remain closet humanists for the most part, concerned with making the world a better place to live in. Many perceived the politicization of their religion into a creeping political correctness that was contrary to the spirit of their faith. Frank Toner, a VVAW member and a former seminarian, recalls that Cardinal Spellman blessed the instruments of war in Vietnam at a time when he, Frank,

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was having intense misgivings about the pain we were inflicting on innocent people there.[96]

In essence, there are bitter lessons to be learned in the experience of war; an army divided against itself can no more prevail in battle than can the divided society that produced it. It is impossible to expect altruistic behavior from sons unless fathers have provided the example. Among the VVAWers, we can trace early socialization processes that were instrumental in leading to disillusionment with the war as rendered in their poetry, stories, and songs - in their art.[97] Bill Ehrhart, son of a protestant minister and a Catholic mother, eloquently notes that he realized while drawing a bead on an enemy in Vietnam that the only things he had ever hunted in this life were men.[98] Dave Cline coming from a socialist background suddenly realized in Vietnam that he was fighting on the wrong side.[99]

These observations are humanistic echoes and appear to reflect a deep uncertainty over human harm. What they were called on to do in Vietnam left deep spiritual scars overlaid with protective layers of subjective withdrawals that carried them through the worst of their experiences in Vietnam into their return to civilian life. The return to normalcy was much longer; catharsis came in a "compendium

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of idealism and rebellion through their art."[100] The creation of art, in this sense, provided an avenue for overcoming alienation and estrangement from other humans, by offering access to freedom from scientific and technological partitioning that had turned these human elements into pawns devoid of any freedom of expression other than self destructive rage.

For these veterans, art was part of the healing process offering compassion and introspection as an alternative to uncontrollable rage; they have written, rhymed, and have shown an intensity to create a future of peace. To do otherwise would place them in the empty space between placid acceptance of historical objectification and the desire to transcend it. In short, that bridging can only be accomplished by a certain purity and truth in art and being to become a unique individual capable of being human.

In Home From the War Lifton traces the tasks veterans performed in Vietnam to the moral alienation that led to psychic shock and the long process of catharsis and self rediscovery in the company of other veterans who had experienced the same trauma.[101] The healing process was a significant turning point for many members of the VVAW. Their drift from basket case to political action was intensified by their introduction to innovative

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psychotherapy and for many the reintegration with their subjectivity was realized in their poetry, songs and art.

In this, the VVAW cannot be viewed as an isolated instance; as in all art, the decision to pursue social requisites of justice and equality lessened the hold of systemic imperatives and opened a search for genuine historical interpretations of what they had experienced in Vietnam. Art, as Lifton notes, may have offered a way out of the bind through the rap sessions conducted under VVAW auspices. However, the greater obligation to search for and actively struggle toward human values well beyond the necessity to support class interests was VVAW's most important artistic expression.

The songs of Country Joe McDonald, especially his "Fixin' to Die Rag," best illustrates the thought-provoking mixture of entertainment and hard earned lessons. When it cannot be subsumed and channeled into controlled conformity, categories of doctrinal purity will collapse into laughter. Its greatest strength was in using the human voice as liberator, reinforced by the human eye, as the foci of the most dangerously liberating ideas.

Resistance to form and the questioning of time-honored principles of doctrinal orthodoxy offered VVAWers a healthy alternative to self-destructive urges experienced by so many

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returning Vietnam veterans; that resistance to form and structure could have torn the fragile infant organization apart, if the founders had not had the vision and wisdom to avoid the types of rigid inflexibility of class hierarchies that had contributed to the decline of morale in the military.[102] You could not get them to join an organization that paralleled the rigidity of military bureaucracy, nor its irrelevance in their lives. All VVAW members tended to operate autonomously, yet in symmetry, again autonomously rather than under orders to.

Thus, the VVAW, in this sense, could carry the moral edge back into the standing military by raising serious questions of legitimacy, morality, conscience, and guilt; and they did it during a war. By 1971, the U.S. Army in Vietnam was in collapse.[103] If outright resistance to service is also an indication of a distressed army, then the 100,000 soldiers discharged for absence offenses during Vietnam-era pales when compared to the 463,000 men qualifying for the deluge of less-than-Honorable discharges for reasons such as AWOL, serious assaults, drug violations, fragging and outright refusals to engage the enemy.[104]

These statistics far outnumber total VVAW membership that peaked somewhere around 50,000 members in 1972. We are told that by 1971, out of a random group of 100 army

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soldiers, there would be approximately 86 disciplinary incidents of desertion, AWOL, frequent marijuana smoking, narcotic addicts, disciplinary discharges, complaints to congressmen and lesser punishments.[105] These serious failures in military leadership could not have happened without a corresponding breakdown in command.

Identifying the flaw within the rank and file took the military institution off the hook by ignoring institutional inflexibility may have kept previous American generations in disciplined ranks but no longer proved adequate for maintaining its hegemony over the modern soldier. They may be faulted, as well, for the rapid decline in morale based on institutional unwillingness to relax channels of communication between officers and men.[106] The Vietnam generation that staffed lower military ranks were better educated, for the most part, and were accustomed to explanations not orders. The newer stress on soliciting voluntary patterns of compliance instead of ordering it could not be incorporated quickly into a hierarchy of command, especially one that found new ideas unacceptable and where the old norms still held. The perception of Vietnam as an unpopular war with the burden of fighting falling on the lower social classes didn't help to quell growing dissatisfaction among the new soldiers.

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In the absence of a warrior ethos, class conflict did serve to divide men from officers, with each believing the other responsible for the gravest derelictions of duty. Without this basic mistrust, the army may have held. The crucial area of technological overkill that surpassed anything the human element could endure is that area of moral intrusion that we have to address. For the first time, enormous technological advantage could be utilized within American military ranks against each other, thus proving more deadly than anything the enemy could improvise. For the officer, fragging and worse, for the serviceman, risky combat assignments, friendly fire or defoliants; in each instance a destruction of mutual trust between officers and men ending in anarchy and mutiny on the field of battle where cooperation was essential.

This served to nullify noble concepts of human intervention by creating the terms of warfare as an extension of the class struggle embedded in a total production system.[107] Now fragging and contracts on superiors were on the same footing as My Lai and the Phoenix Program. This departure from the norm produced an excess of half a million men receiving clouded discharges, no doubt fueling public perception that the generation sent to fight in Vietnam was deficient in character, lacking

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backbone, and were cowards unwilling to fight thus running under fire.[108] Such criticisms are unfair. Not all desertions were based on cowardice.

Vietnam was an undeclared war, and deserting was not an act punishable by imprisonment or death. 52% deserted for compelling family and financial reasons; another 33% found army life difficult and left. 79% of AWOL personnel had less than an 11th grade education, 73% were white and 27% non-white. 34% of those away without official leave had been inducted and 66% had enlisted.[109] There were 12,000 desertions during a Vietnam tour of duty or upon receiving orders to report to Vietnam. During the combat intensive years between 1968 and 1972, of 14 soldiers tried for the crime of desertion, six were found guilty and all but one given 1- to 5-year prison sentences to serve.[110]

Only 10 percent of AWOLs were because of opposition to the war. AWOL is considered to be an absence of less than thirty days duration while desertion is being away without leave past that period of time. There were 1,500,000 AWOL incidents and 500,000 deserters during the entire Vietnam War. An American soldier was going AWOL every two minutes and deserting every six minutes. In lost time, these absences added up to one million man-years of military service and the equivalent of ten combat divisions of

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fifteen thousand men each lost to the military.[111] Many of the desertions and absences may not have been for reasons of conscience but they do carry the conviction that it was not a popular war for those expected to wage it.[112]

Far more serious effects of this altered conception of war were the military defectors who resisted the war after being "red, white and blue" all the way before going to Vietnam and then experiencing a change of conscience while serving there.[113] To reiterate, after VVAW's Playboy ad appeared in the February 1971 issue, their membership climbed to astronomical proportions - many from servicemen still on active duty in war zones.[114]

Thus, the perception that they were on the wrong side of the conflict was a painful and wrenching experience for many; there are innumerable examples of insubordination after witnessing the results of their role in the state-of-the-art warfare: pilots flying the high tech bombing runs that reduced people to atomized rubble, no matter the race, ethnicity or country of origin were revolted by what they had done; crews refused to take their planes up again; a B-52 pilot refused to fly saying that "a man has to answer to himself first," after being deeply disturbed over the strikes at civilian targets. When one person refused to follow orders that conflicted with his conscience, a

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statement was made; when it arrived at dimensions of concerted military insubordination of refusal to obey orders radiating outward to crew members defusing bombs, loosening parts, staging work stoppages, sabotaging electronic equipment and even cheering every time a B-52 bomber was shot out of the sky, American systemic hegemony was fatally undermined on two fronts - externally and internally.[115]

In this, one of the reasons Americans still agonize over Vietnam is the loss of the heroic and the demystification of their ideology signified by the turning away of its warriors. The long slide into failure came from three areas where the public had no say. First, political inability to cope with worsening military morale, second, an insensitive military to the true state of internal affairs and third, inflated self-estimation on the part of our career diplomats. The first instance can be attributed to political arrogance that an ideologically docile public would applaud war escalations; second, customary military caution about historical American antipathy towards foreign adventurism may have been dampened by a reserve pool of 75 million baby boomers; and third, since Vietnam casualties appeared to be overwhelmingly lopsided in our favor,[116] our diplomatic corps could engage in a little Machiavellian

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mischief by toying with their counterparts in a contest of wills over seating arrangements at the peace talks with an enemy who was aware of and could wait out the imminent American military collapse in Vietnam.[117]

The tragic consequences of the self contained political and military delusions in Vietnam weren't lost on restive elements within ordinary elements of the polity and military. Increasing resistance to the war after each escalation, military debacle, and diplomatic faux pas. The public wanted to know how a nation as powerful as America, with a military budget going ballistic, could not resolve a war where the opponent wasn't even in the same ball park. Rank and filers in the military wanted to know why they were bleeding and dying in a senseless war. And everyone wanted an explanation for the failure of the world's most powerful nation to reach a quick, simple and decisive victory on the bargaining table. Those questions should have been asked of the civilian architects of military policy, far removed from the battlefield and trained in positivistic logic that computerized, predicted and controlled human behavior, yet could not influence the fluidity of battle nor will the actions of the enemy with certitude.[118]

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Basic to the argument was the rising level of ex cathedra intervention into a military institution that gave us a war packaged and delivered from Washington under the centralization of bureaucrats who second guessed military commanders, placed political consensus before military integrity, thus successfully destroyed the norms and traditions of a military in war at a time when they were the most critical components of systemic survival.[119] The Joint Chiefs of Staff could not remain unsullied by politics, given the symbiotic relationships within the MIC. In addition, an American fantasy of the citizen-soldier ideal[120] mitigated against an autonomous military, in Vietnam or elsewhere. Thus military capacity was undermined by pseudo-military civilian experts.[121]

The war was a flawed political endeavor before it became a military failure. Winning the war was inextricably linked to political priorities that impacted military capacity to respond by substituting institutional goals with other time consuming imperatives.[122] Because there could be no mishap with the Russians or the Chinese, everything had to be cleared through Washington. Part of the problem was the paralysis of men who, at some point during their tenure, realized the war was a mistake, that lives were being lost unnecessarily in a losing venture,

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yet did nothing. Their silence, whether based on personal career aspirations, a corporate culture of yes men, or fear of sending the wrong signals to the enemy, ultimately harmed the nation far beyond anything their criticism could have caused. Their loyalty to the state thus rose above critical correctives on life and death because they were everything the state was; thus the pity that they could not, no matter how deadly, willingly contest that institution.[123] Thus the fatal flaw in democracy or any other political system is that mistakes will never be acknowledged at the top; to do so would appear infallible, weak, and incompetent; thus, the entire ensemble of power of the state will be utilized to maintain the facade that the mighty are above mistakes, tacitly believing that lies, deception, and immorality are justified and forgiven.[124]

With each authored mea culpa, we are privileged to discover how it was possible for administrative types to impose a detested surrogate regime in South Vietnam and maintain it through the vast network of governmental immune systems backed by military force. Thus inadvertently destroying an American army from within in a vain attempt to ensure foreign domination of a country that had a long tradition of struggle to affirm its national cultural integrity was the tragic war this country did not have to

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wage. It was a serious American miscalculation of the Vietnamese people's will to resist a rewriting of the 1954 Geneva Accords; but an even greater loss of American confidence in their government.

The cynicism that so many Vietnam veterans evidence is thus traceable to the dismal record of political involvement in Vietnam and the senselessness of their friends or buddies being killed in action in Vietnam for nothing. The critical loss of confidence in mission surfaced when policy no longer supported a credible vision of honor. When diplomacy could not achieve what was lost in the field, a commitment to mission, scientific warfare could not over come the loss of belief in the task. An army turned on its oppressor, this time it was a different enemy. Lord Acton noted that power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely.[125] This signified the end of unwavering allegiance and loyalty to nation. Henceforth, humans would be better served without the destructive capacity of war under the supervision of unworthy men. Vietnam may have been the worst experience of their lives, but for many it was the crucible where soldier loyalties were realigned away from nationalistic chauvenism into universal values of justice and peace thus marking the end of citizen-soldier ideals. The ceding of humanity to the enemy, also caught

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in the cross-fire of events, transcended national boundaries and relocated empathy into a desire to lay down arms and never take them up again, except to defend their nation if invaded.

In this, there is a strong current away from foreign entanglements into a guardian status of watchful awareness. This new role of the warrior appears to have consequences far beyond theories of failed socialization practices implicit in the loss of conformity to authority. It goes far deeper into questions of the nature of duly constituted authority itself and the reassertion of internalized cultural implants of basic decency. The issues raised by the VVAW contingent on the moral and ethical parameters of personal behavior during and after war and one's personal responsibility for the consequences offers a unique window from which to view their deviation from traditional veteran norms. They moved away from mute acceptance of society's dictates into methods of corrective value alignment. We can conclude that a nation's last line of defense, its military, can be neutralized by high levels of guilt associated with immoral means and methods of waging warfare leading to a break in the norm of obedience expected of the soldier. Thus, the norm of ethical responsibility transcends the old citizen-soldier image of part time warrior in

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service to country and we have a shift into those bothersome idealistic universal conceptions of honor, virtue and brotherhood in those who are ordered to face the enemy.

Such a moral approach has compounded political inability to separate the soldier from a corruption of the ideal of honor. The end result was that the American political system could not commit its military with certainty, could not utilize war to further national economic policy, and had to capitulate to the enemy on the bargaining table when that war increasingly came to be viewed as an internal loss of national honor leading to the collapse of an army.

Thus the key appears to be idealism and rebellion within the shifting paradigm of traditional military honor occasioned by the introduction of modern imperatives of warfare, techne. We can test the reasons why men rebel by discovering the attitudes, intensity and integrative aspects of the data on the automated battlefield and under the umbrella of saturation bombing and surgical strikes through their effect on the men who had to fight and die in Vietnam. The knowledge itself serves to unify unique and common features that surfaced in the search for the human reasons why soldiers rebel. They do so when idealistic conceptions of a just war are subverted into a corruption

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of universal human precepts over the very mandate for the social institution of war. You can't have it both ways; when the warrior's task of butchery in service to the machine is the only option, you will have an adverse reaction from those whose idealistic conceptions of the reasons for war are higher than those who send them to war.

Again, Gibson's exploration of this concept in his incisive chronicle of the Vietnam War as the first war the United States fought and lost as a pure production system in that the officers were managers, the enlisted men were workers, and assembly line careers rose or fell according to the increase of productivity figures, in this case the body counts, no matter the gender, sex, age, civilian status or country of origin. VVAW was in the forefront of criticizing the use of civilian and GI victims to successfully incorporate the falsified cost accounting methods of kill-to-cost ratios to protect the American Military Industrial Complex as a "self referential" universe and to inflate MIAs into political fodder.[126]

In opposition to this bureaucracy, the VVAW shunned hierarchical organization or a vanguard party and was designed along acephalous patterns where crisis occasioned leadership, not vice versa. They deal with issues on a small, integrated basis extending onto other spheres as the

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necessity arises, thus applying a measure of control commensurate with Schumacher's "small is beautiful" school of thought.[127] The future field of activity may not be the technological and scientific scope of enormous growth and progress of the modern organization, but smaller circles of independent operations advancing into a wider range of meaning and motivation as necessary, given their diminished access to capital but increased control over intelligence and informational avenues that presupposes an end to the administrative iron cage.[128]

This augurs a shift towards loyalties that can no longer remain frozen within geographical parameters, nor maintained within warped value systems, but is free to judge human consequences. In this, Schumacher raised the argument into the universal when he questioned the relationship between freedom and science, noting that modern science is happiest when human freedom does not appear to enter into the equation.[129] If we follow this logic in Vietnam, the automated battlefield concept removes the necessity for humans to question their participation in killing or dismemberment, the victim initiates his own harm. In this reversal of guilt, human creative freedom could not rival the electronic brain for established patterns of stability based on prediction and control.

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In effect, if science succeeds in its misguided attempts to replace human judgment with techne, there will be no vice that is unthinkable, no inhumanity that is not acceptable, and no act that is beyond redemption. In any case, human freedom will cease to exist because with all of their imperfections, humans can no longer be trusted to interfere with scientific and technological rationality prioritized by the state.

Vietnam can be seen as one of a long string of historic indicators that reveals the true conflict there was not between cultures, political philosophies or economic determinations, although valid, but the loss of humanity indicative of allowing the machine scope over life and death. Thus, when humans balk at that they had to do, then the introduction of the antiseptic, impersonal utilization of scientific rationality in the isolated from the battlefield technician as capable of any act, any vice, thus willing accomplice to the destruction of humans on an unimagined scale is the ultimate scientific triumph of the will.

VVAW did not introduce the direct moral question of Vietnam; it had appeared long before they surfaced. The war produced its first major schism when Marine Commandant General Shoup wrote the foreword to the book by his

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adjutant, Colonel M. Donovan,[130] listing the underlying illusions of attempting to enter a war without a moral premise and its morally reprehensible effects upon the American character itself as the major reason for the loss of the war. Later, the most decorated soldier in the Korean War, Colonel Anthony Herbert[131] explains the reason for his resignation from the army on the basis of his moral repulsion to the military coverup of atrocities on the battlefield which, for him, was a direct affront to military honor.

This conception of becoming an eyewitness to history and a moral resister to immoral wars and methods of waging war was put forth by Donald Duncan.[132] He was one of the earliest enlistedmen to turn his back on the Vietnam War because of the immoral goals and methods being perpetrated by the brightest and the best, the American Green Berets. Thus, before the appearance of the VVAW on the national scene, a number of anti-war military groups did emerge but without the military and political clout that the VVAW did possess.

As a body, the Marine Corps did produce perhaps the largest number of officers to critique the war but they did so largely from within the Corps expressing their discontent more through interpersonal contact with

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political leaders and resigning their commissions than as vocal opposition during the war itself. Other large bodies of general staff officers were to express their opposition on a national and moral level upon retiring when they would found the Washington, D.C. based Center for Defense Studies. This body, however, would largely be devoid of direct field contact with GIs.

The first major group to begin to emerge within the military evolved around basic union issues under the leadership of Andy Staff who authored Up Against the Brass.[133] Such unionization, however, failed to effectively deal with the national or moral issues and effectively served to undercut military discipline thus alienated most veterans, including the VVAW.[134]

This premise that war is not worth it because it demands discipline or even sacrifice which can only be addressed through monetary retribution appears to be part of the conception advanced by Richard Severo and Louis Milford in The Wages of War.[135] The resistance against the war certainly went beyond questions of discomfort or monetary interest as the growing mutinies indicated the premise of organizational demoralization and idealistic alienation, a theme put forward by Louis G. Heath[136] in which it was demonstrated that the easiest and safest thing

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to do when faced with irrational commands and dangerous situations was nothing.

A more socially and idealistically based organized antiwar resistance is perhaps best put forth by Charles DeBenedetti and Charles Chatfield[137] who manage to capture the wide gamut of the anti-war opposition from the materially opportunistic to those who were concerned for national survival to those who were morally repulsed. However, for all of the book's virtues, it fails to deal with the element of moral outrage from those who had to serve and die in the immoral adventure.

Herein lies the uniqueness of the VVAW organization: they, more than others, grievously suffered from the war but were more than willing to suffer in the future so that others would not have to follow the immoral path to warfare.[138] They welded their opposition into a most effective, concentrated, dedicated to change veteran's group this country has ever seen. This opposition to immorality within the framework of one's own sacrifice is best offered by Tim O'Brien's <u>If I Die in a Combat Zone</u>[139] in which death is not to be feared, the great fear is the voicelessness of death in opposition to the injustice of the struggle. This theme is echoed by John Ketwig[140] where even the discomforts, boredom and continuing stress is

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accepted as long as their voice of moral discontent is not squelched.

In many respects it was the army's own attempts to destroy the openness of such discontent that produced the fatal blow to army morale and led to the death of the spirit, a theme advanced by Fred Wilcox[141] who states that America was turned on itself, which not only paralyzed its activity to wage war, but fatally severed the artery of its life blood in the inability to raise the spirit of its young to war. This is perhaps the best expression of Ron Kovic, one of the VVAW leaders, in his Born on the Fourth of July.[142]

Within this frame, it must be remembered that the greatest supporters of the war in Vietnam were generally those whose sons and daughters were safe from that war. Myra Macpherson[143] notes that 22,165 kids were killed or reported missing in Vietnam after November 1968 when Nixon was elected on a secret plan for peace. "If those kids were from Yale, he never would have gotten away with it." In essence, the middle class were never emotionally involved with the war in Vietnam as their sons were safe by virtue of affording a college tuition. This theme of pursuing war from the safety of the real lines of protest

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is best pursued by Gordon Zahn's War Consciousness and Dissent[144] and later elaborated in more detail by Nancy Zoroulis.[145] In all of this, one cannot negate that class, motivation and idealism are important variables in testing the shattering of conventional class distinctions, cultural conformity and commitment.

However, of greater importance are moral disclaimers of the scientific means and technological ends of that war, as noted by Gavin,[146] Gibson,[147] Caputo[148] and Lifton[149] in contributing to value judgments that may have altered motivation. Parallels[150] and A Matter of Conscience[151] offer personal accounts of men who fought or chose not to in Vietnam and the moral foundation of their decisions.

The War Within[152] chronicles the drift of executive rule while Gibson[153] describes the intensification of the use of scientific methods of extermination that alienated many and Palmer[154] examines the themes that impelled VVAW moral challenges to state legitimacy to continued involvement in that war. The question of why men fight has occasioned indepth studies that range from primary group cohesion[155] to macho superimpositions masking deeper inferiority feelings[156] on to class basis in the loss of morale.[157] Helmer[158] has examined dissent from as well as

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conformity to the goals of the military organization. His focus on the issues of science and technology as instrumental thus remains removed from an examination of why soldiers conform or rebel and the question of idealism based on a moral and ethical dilemma is never raised or, if it is, remains peripheral and not central to the core. In this approach, Helmer focuses on working class veterans to test theories of alienation contributing to rebellion and avoids a cross-class examination of what impels alienation to enter in the first place.

One of the specifics of VVAW emergence is based on their loss of ideological commitment to participate in what they viewed as an unjust war.[159] It was key in developing introspective explorations on the morality of personally killing an enemy who shared your religion,[160] on the alienation experienced in coming home[161] and on the moral basis for disengagement from the war.[162] Thus the historic break in the traditional military role of absolute duty to authority appears to have been that instance when the challenge to non-negotiable terms of personal morality arose leading to compelling questions of mission, complicity and ethics.

In essence, injuries of class are not as important in turning one away from allegiance as are the psychic

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injuries of participation in actions deemed morally reprehensible.[163] That transcends class. One can overcome class distinction and wage war; it takes a higher consideration to turn one against his own fellow men and country. Thus, Helmer may be correct in centering on working class alienation but doesn't travel beyond to determine the basis for that alienation.

In this, we have to question the use of technology without restraint as the historical moment for questions on the warrior role itself. There is no doubt that the Vietnam War signified our overwhelming technological superiority; in areas of death, devastation and destruction, it had no peer.[164] It failed dismally, however, to neutralize the enemy's will to resist or nullify his ingenuity; the Vietnamese proved formidable antagonists quite skillful in selecting the time and place of battle and turning deadly technology back onto its creators.[165]

Technological superiority proved inadequate to the task. Prevailing wisdom held that North Vietnam could not withstand our arsenal. But it did. Over time, even our advantage of massive air power proved to be vulnerable to North Vietnamese missiles and anti-aircraft defense.[166] So what, then, were the variables that led to the incredible defeat of the world's most powerful army? Theoretical

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points of view on technological advances ranges from a guarded neutrality,[167] to advancing humanitarian ideals,[168] or absolute control over humans by becoming the sole arbiter of instrumental agency thus offering the full gamut of functional, conflict and symbolic interactionist paradigms from progressive conceptions of technology for the betterment of the human race, its misappropriation from ushering a new utopia, or the alteration of the human into an appendage of the machine.

The argument enters cultural dimensions where a philosophical examination of these two societies on either side of the conflict in Vietnam, exemplifying Western and Eastern theories of moral doctrines, will offer dimensions of how the role of the warrior is viewed in each culture. If Western overemphasis on science and technology in determining the outcome of warfare could not provide the overwhelming victory of material forces, then we have to consider the other variable in this human intensive area, the concept of the spiritual warrior, the human equation.

The American military model has developed along the lines of the citizen soldier ideal. As such, although it is an offshoot of the British Liberal school of economics and warfare with an emphasis on mass destruction, particularly rear-based heavy weapons systems of artillery

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and heavy bombers, the American model could not incorporate the feudal concept of noblesse oblige. Instead, it displayed an affinity for the wild frontier individualism of the citizen-soldier. As such, a personal ethic of responsibility for what you do on the basis of higher commitment to service ideals was missing, replaced by levels of rationality that excused all excesses on the premise that the enemy was not human and the ends justified the means.

In occupying a middle ground, we note that, although showing altruistic impulses towards others less privileged than oneself, the European model gave us the blueprint for the colonization of less technologically blessed countries and set the ideological foundations of imperialism on a firm basis of technological superiority under an accomplished military. The farther away Europe drifted from the feudal ethic into the Protestant Reformation, the greater the loss of nobility in warfare once expressed in terms of compassion and empathy for the weak and unarmed.[169]

The Eastern model appears to be the least instrumental of all military models in terms of antipathy towards modern purposive rationality and the most sympathetic towards the spiritual nature of human relationships, as indicated in

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their forms of worship. In this, a pronounced Western dependence on Kantian philosophy, abandoned ever really knowing things in which the mind is not involved - intuition, non-rationality, compassion and pity. This is the heritage of the Cartesian split where subject and object were separated and supremacy of the rational over the spiritual became the scientific ethic.

Thus the American military model is based an extension of the rational mind, in which the citizen soldier can be utilized as interchangeable parts to be channeled into service to country when called and returned to the community when the crisis is over, refutes the holistic Eastern view that the warrior is in harmony with his society, a protector of truth and honor as a profession. In this, protecting the weak and unarmed is the reason for his being. When he violates this sacred truth, he not only profanes his entire culture, but threatens the very fabric of international society. This tradition of fighting men is longer and more honorable in that it is based on the noblest of human traits, sacrifice.

Thus the Western concept stresses materialistic progress where winning is everything, the quicker the better, by not being disadvantaged by any burden of guilt or conscience by excessive brutality in accomplishing the

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ends. In contrast, Eastern philosophy stresses harmony and man's place in the cosmic unity. China had gunpowder long before Marco Polo travelled there and carried it back to Europe. The Chinese knew its possibilities, yet used it in celebration of life; Europeans quickly discerned its possibilities and developed it to take life.[170]

Eastern philosophy calls for a transcendence from Western materialism, away from ideology and egoism, toward spiritualistic impulses. The individual, history and civilization are viewed as one unity linked in a three tier system of development leading toward greater perfection. This theme threads throughout history; originally formulated in the 6th century by Buddha reflecting the three paths to spiritual development. During the same period, it was independently formularized into a political psychological theme by Plato to mean his City of Philosophers based on wisdom representing the highest level, City of Warriors based on courage and service, and the end of civilization based on the City of Pigs.

In the feudal epoch, St. Augustine developed much of his city of God on this principle, while in the modern epoch, Arnold Toynbee placed the spiritual over reason as the epitome of human development. However, it was Gibbon who defined the essence of this spirit a- a reflection of

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an altruistic warrior creed which, when turned into the doctrine of individual salvation and peace, brought the death of civilization as expressed in his Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire[171]

This recurrent theme of the spiritual warrior is in conflict with material forces represented by the merchant and forms the essence of eastern philosophy in the ancient Tang dynasties of the Third to Ninth centuries, the Golden Age of Chinese civilization. It transcends the biological school in that, although accepting noble qualities as the highest expression of a race, any race can correct its material imperatives in several generations or even in one generation, by following the path of a spiritual warrior, as all races possess both a material gene which will destroy it in time if not purged from levels of leadership by its spiritual warriors' genetic reserves.

As such, war is the only means to obtain inner peace in one's striving for truth and justice against internal and external material corruption and deception. The highest civilization thus rests upon a self-sacrificing cultural ethic of personal and universal perfection toward which art and science reflect a descending and dependent level of values and beliefs with the social structure and economics occupying second and third supportive roles to

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the culture, respectively. In this theme, the search for truth or meaning begins at creation and descends from that point until the final struggle with materialistic illusion and egoism, and a rebirth into the spiritual warrior, a task achievable not by faith or dogma but through confronting the limitations of mind and individual being. Within this quest, which transcends both material empire and logic analysis, man experiences an awareness of the void or the great nothingness of being - not in a negative sense but in the realization that the universal lies in the unity of the mind.

The experience carries a compulsion toward mission to save the universe from the forces of material reductionism, separation and illusion. Within this realm, the soldier plays the central role devoted to this task in which the division between life and death are transcended in the recklessness of battle during which physical survival and even temporal victory are secondary to the emergence from the dream of illusion.

The cultural support system to this ethical search and struggle is expressed in the visual art of space and the music of silence which aims to quiet the soul, not for passivity but for contemplation in preparation for an instant plunge into combat and death. Truth is thus

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expressed in self-discovery. Social institutions are culturally dependent and the spiritual hierarchy where the true noble spirit recognizes no self rights, only levels of descending responsibility from the emperor to the warrior to the family. Within this social order, the warrior role continues to play the primary role of spiritual purifier and protector of the family, the race and humanity in his preparation for death to uphold honor.

The Samurai, carriers of the spiritual tradition, maintained honor primarily against those with power and wealth who in essence are subject to great temptation and seduction. As such, they are empowered to act as judge, jury and executioner. Although not in accord with Western democratic precepts of innocent until proven guilty under law, this concept rests on a political structure of a spiritual system residing on an emperor who is the most spiritually pure and may reign over both a single homogenous system or united homogenous systems which recognize him as the final judge in all moral matters, much as the emperors of the ancient Ming Dynasty, rulers of the feudal Japanese and Holy Roman empires, and modern Hapsburgs, Romanovs and Ottomans prior to World War I. In the Eastern sphere, although the emperor's word is absolute and must be obeyed even to death, he can be challenged by

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the warrior who protects both his physical being and integrity. If the emperor requires dishonorable conduct, he must be disobeyed, and if he initiates such dishonor, he must be slain by his guards who prove their honor by their own suicide.

In the educational realm, the holistic theme is centered in a seminary or monastery where everyone is expected to serve for a period of time. In this, education begins with the destruction of the ego or the slaying of the mind with the help of a tutor, or Guru, whose task is to confront the student with impossible questions that cannot be answered in the realm of fact or logic but only through a mystic transcendence which cannot be articulated. The ego must be destroyed and is shown to be slain through the mystic expression of the eyes which appear to see everything through a stare.

This phenomenon is often referred to by combat veterans as the "thousand yard stare" to describe those soldiers who have approached the edge of death and returned but cannot express what they saw. Once such personal advantage is destroyed, the more formal process of education can begin, outwardly resembling both the traditional and modern, in stressing first logical relationships and theory then facts, not in a scientific

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form but in an aspect that transcends both, which is essentially art.[172]

In the medical area, drug and surgical cure is subordinated to social rehabilitation, which itself is subordinated to a holistic medicine stressing prevention and originally discovered by the military in that the best method to maintain a healthy army is through unity of the mind, body and spirit. Although basic herbal medicines and accupuncture are assumed superior to drugs and surgery and are administered by medics, all are privy to learn the medical secrets of health through exercise, proper diet and a stress-free mind released from material and ego strivings and focused on a spiritual mission. Within such a medical approach, there is no distinction between physical and mental illness, as physical ailments are largely attributed to sickness of the soul which has lost its mission. The healing will come through reuniting the fragmented parts.

The realm of economics occupies the last priority with an emphasis placed on self-sufficiency through creativity and artistic expression striving toward the monumental task. Ecology stresses balance and harmony with nature and, through nature's example, moves forever toward perfection. Within this frame, anything that destroys the soul or nation is forbidden. Although the merchant is

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allowed to exist, he occupies the lowest rung in the social ladder and is viewed as the personifier of lies through the illusions he projects to facilitate the sale of his goods. The ultimate objective is to remove the necessity of money and create a totally self-sufficient economic structure of producers, a goal far removed from western preoccupation with accumulation.

The collision between east and west in Vietnam was the first intensive penetration of eastern philosophy by a generation of western warriors. Every conflict between east and west has been remarkable for its brevity and lack of long term exposure to Eastern philosophies,[173] although commercial ventures as a result of western superimpositions have been longer lasting. These have been largely naval expeditions, not land based. Even where land based, such as Japan following their defeat in World War II, very few learned to speak the Japanese language or, for that matter, any other language. Our military were isolated in separate communities away from contamination with the alien culture.[174]

Vietnam was a 25 year submersion in non-stop hostilities offering opportunities for comparing the cultures of two opposing war machines. This is instructive in that western philosophy appears to have failed to imbue its

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military with a sense of mission, as evidenced in the collapse of its army. American will failed in a contest with Asiatic determination to survive. Ironically, it failed unforgivably for the most inexcusable of all reasons, a cultural blindness that elevated materialistic objectivity over spiritual subjectivity ending in the loss of its most important audience and supporters, its idealists. Thus The Wall, the Vietnam veteran's memorial in Washington, D.C. adds an exclamation point in its symbolism.

Whether initially conceived as such or not, the Vietnam War Memorial metaphorically reflects art imitating life in its resemblance to a tombstone depicting the repository of material remains of American technological arrogance in Vietnam. Inadvertently, perhaps, the monument focuses on the dilemma of human systems and the series of harm it is capable of creating. Herman Wouk wrote that "the beginning of the end of war is in remembrance;"[175] and that is reflected in the human act of never forgetting cause and effect. Those human lives etched on cold granite, name after name, was the price Americans paid as hard currency in maintaining an unsustainable market diplomacy long after it failed to serve as the rallying point for the will to military in Vietnam.

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FOOTNOTES

[1] Interview with Jan Barry at his home in Montclair, N. J. on January 24, 1994.

[2] These observations are based on answers to my survey question #56 (Did your attitude about the war change in Vietnam?)

[3] Lawrence M. Baskir and William A. Strauss. Chance and Circumstance: The Draft, the War and the Vietnam Generation Foreword by Father Theodore M. Hesburgh. (New York: Vintage Books, A Division of Random House, 1978), 17.

[4] Ibid., 18.

[5] Ibid., 20-21.

[6] Ibid., xv-xvi.

[7] Ibid., 3, 244.

[8] Wallace Terry II, "The Angry Blacks in the Army," in Two, Three...Many Vietnams By the Editors of Ramparts with Banning Garrett and Katherine Barkley (San Francisco: Canfield Press, a department of Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., 1971), 222-231; Tom Wells, With a Foreword by Todd Gitlin, The War Within: America's Battle Over Vietnam (Berkeley/Los Angeles/London: University of California Press, 1994) 282-83; James William Gibson, The Perfect War: Techno War in Vietnam (Boston.New York: The Atlantic Monthly Press, 1986), 217-18.

[9] Wells, The War Within, 282.

[10] Baskir and Strauss, Chance and Circumstance, 7-10, 122-31.

[11] Gabriel and Savage, Crisis in Command: Mismanagement in the Army (New York: Hill and Wang, A division of Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1978).

[12] Richard A. Gabriel and Paul L. Savage, Crisis in Command.

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[14] Richard A. Gabriel, Military Incompetence: Why the American Military Doesn't Win, Fifth Printing (New York: The Noonday Press A division of Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1985), 14-15.

[15] James Clay Thompson, Tolling Thunder: Understanding the Policy and Program Failure (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina, 1980), 91. John Kenneth Galbraith noted the tendency to approach Asian problems from a Western perspective.

[16] Ibid. Devising a program to flood the Mekong River to severely impact the VC in South Vietnam rested on a presumption that the Mekong River followed the same internal dynamics as the Mississippi River relative to what it does to American towns.

[17] Private conversation with Dave Cline, VVAW member on 11/08/94 at William Paterson College, Wayne, NJ. Dave sees of working class background and a union organizer who the cohesion of the group (communion) as capable of democratic decisions through the broad base of information and knowledge they possess thus are able to foresee many more contingencies than a leader (agency) who may not be exposed to all the facts he must have in order to avoid unanticipated consequences of anticipated consequences.

[18] "A Farewell to Arms: 'Over There' is Here," by Bell Gale Chevigny in Veterans vs. War: IV, the village Voice, March 14, 1968., Page Twenty-two.

[19] Charles DeBenedetti, author, and Charles Chatfield, assisting author, An American Ordeal: The Antiwar Movement of the Vietnam Era (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1990), 320.

[20] Richard R. Moser, The New Winter Soldiers: GI and Veteran Dissent During the Vietnam War (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1996), 72-79.

[21] Ibid, 104-06.

[22] Jacques Ellul, The Technological Society, trans. from the French by John Wilkerson. With an Introduction by Robert K. Merton (New York: Vintage Books, A Division of Random House, 1964).

[23] Ibid.

[24] Ibid.

[25] Ibid.

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[26] Barbara W. Tuchman, The March of Folly: From Troy to Vietnam (New York: Alfred A. Knoff, 1984, 366.

[27] Moser, The New Winter Soldiers, 43.

[28] Jan Barry, History of the Vietnam Veterans Against The War, A rough draft of an article that appeared later in a veterans publication in 1972 (unidentified).

[29] Ibid., 1.

[30] Tom Wells. With a foreword by Todd Gitlin, The War Within: America's Battle Over Vietnam (Berkeley/Los Angeles/London: University of California Press, 1994), 141.

[31] Charles Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1978. Regarding size and resource, Tilly analyzes processes of collective action, narrowing the process to organization, mobilization, common interest and opportunity. Only groups having systemic organization can hope to have an impact on those in power. Supposedly, organized groups shout, lone individuals whisper.

[32] Wells, The War Within, 32, 141.

[33] Ibid., 141.

[34] Barry, History of the Vietnam Veterans Against The War, 1.

[35] Ibid., 2.

[36] Wells, The War Within, 455.

[37] Ibid.

[38] Barry, History of the Vietnam Veterans Against The War, 7. Wells, The War Within, 473-74.

[41] Barry, History of the Vietnam Veterans Against The War, 6.

[39] Gunther Lewy, America in Vietnam (New York, Toronto, Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1978), 357.

[40] Ibid.

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41 Barry, History of The Vietnam Veterans Against The War, 7. I.E., 101st Airborne, 3rd Marine Division, 5th Special Forces to show it was policy and not individual aberrations.

42 Playboy Magazine, V. 18.2, February 1971, 65; Barry, History of the Vietnam Veterans Against the War, 6. Barry relates that according to Joe Urgo, former Air Force security sergeant in Vietnam and VVAW's national membership chairman, 3,000 Vietnam veterans signed up, including several hundred in Vietnam.

43 Wells, The War Within, 474-76; Gabriel Kolko, Anatomy of a War (New York: Pantheon Books, 1985), 364-67.

44 Barry, History of The Vietnam Veterans Against The War, 3.

45 Ibid., 4.

46 DeBenedetti and Chatfield, An American Ordeal, 309-10.

47 Personal interview with Frank Toner and Brian Matorese on Thursday, March 31, 1994, at the City University of New York Office of Veterans Affairs, 101 West 31st Street, New York City, NY. The context of the remark was taken within the context that the medals veterans were planning to return to their government had been purchased dearly with human blood for political reasons that "smelled," thus were not worthy of the level of tragic sacrifices. In addition, the massive, assembly line medal distributions saw many unqualified recipients and served to cheapen their value.

48 Wells, The War Within, 489-91.

49 Ibid., 492.

50 Ibid, 496.

51 Ibid., 549.

52 Erving Goffman, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (New York: Overlook Press, 1973), 52.

53 Barry, History of The Vietnam Veterans Against The War, 5.

54 Goffman, The Presentation of Self, 52.

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[55] Wells, The War Within, 526, and Moser, The New Winter Soldiers, 58.

[56] Wells, The War Within, 474-75.

[57] George McTurnan Kahin and John W. Lewis. The United States in Vietnam: An Analysis in Depth of the History of America's Involvement in Vietnam, rev. ed. (New York: A Dell Book Published by Dell Publishing Co., Inc., 1969), 380. For over a month, Washington and Hanoi were unable to agree on a mutually acceptable site for their talks.

[58] Gibson, The Perfect War, 211.

[59] DeBenedetti and Chatfield, An American Ordeal, 389.

[60] Moser, The New Winter Soldier, 103.

[61] Ibid., 42, 169.

[62] Ibid., 7.

[63] Ibid., 160.

[64] Interview with Ben Chitty, 9/21/96.

[65] Erich Maria Remarque, All Quiet on the Western Front, trans. from the German by A. W. Wheen (New York: Fawcett Crest, 1975).

[66] Ernest Hemingway, A Farewell to Arms (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1929).

[67] Willa Siedenberg and William Short, A Matter of Conscience: GI Resistance During the Vietnam War (Andover, MA: Lavigne Press, 1987), 38.

[68] DeBenedetti and Chatfield, An American Ordeal, 288; Baskir and Strauss, Chance and Circumstance, 11-13, 134, 142, 158-59, 164.

[69] David Cortright, Soldiers in Revolt (Garden City, New York: Doubleday (Anchor Press) & Company, Inc., 1975).

[70] Interview with Frank Toner on 3/31/94 at the CUNY Office of Veterans Affairs, 101 West 31st Street, New York City, NY.

[71] Ibid.

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[72] Ibid.

Gibson, The Perfect War, 26-27, 396, 398-99, 400-01; Robert S. McNamara, In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam, With Brian VanDeMark (New York and Canada: Times Books, a division of Random House, 1995), 246. Mr. McNamara claims the anti infiltration barrier was supposed to and did increase infiltration losses by North Vietnam. His account is based on his recollection rather than the contemporaneous record as the 1966 JASON study has not been declassified. Mr. Gibson has a less flattering description of the "McNamara Line." He describes a comedy of errors where the destruction wrought on the Ho Chi Minh Trail due to the ABF could not be found, even during daytime recon flights over the area.

[74] Gibson, The Perfect War, 192-93, 249-54, 258.

[75] Ibid., 168.

[76] W. D. Ehrhart, "Hunting," in Carrying the Darkness: America in Indo-China The Poetry of the Vietnam War, ed. by W. D. Ehrhart New York: Avon, 1985, 95.

[77] Moser, The New Winter Soldiers, 33-40.

[78] Ibid., 117.

[79] Ibid., 120.

[80] DeBenedetti and Chatfield, An American Ordeal, 309-10; Bell Gale Chevigny, The Village Voice, 3/14/68, 22, 56; Gibson, The Perfect War, 213; Baskir and Strauss, Chance and Circumstance, 25, 113-16.

[81] Myra MacPherson, Long Time Passing (New York: A Signet Book, New American Library, 1984), 352. This is a theme echoed in Gibson's The Perfect War, 214, and Baskir and Strauss, Chance and Circumstance.

[82] Stated by Frank Toner during our March 31, 1994 interview.

[83] Gibson, The Perfect War, 215-18; Baskir and Strauss, Chance and Circumstance, 122-31.

[84] Baskir and Strauss, Chance and Circumstance, 116.

[85] Moser, The New Winter Soldiers promotes the theme of the citizen soldier as such; however, that ideal is insular and not universal in the experience of the VVAW who transcended narrow American provincialism by entering into and remaining in international militaristic policies, rather than returning home to rest on their laurels.

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86 Smedley Butler, Major General, USMC, (ret.), War is a Racket, Fifth Printing. (Costa Mesa, CA: The Noontide Press, 1991).

87 Kolko, Anatomy of a War, 359; Vietnam Veterans Against the War press release dated 1/22/88; Moser, The New Winter Soldiers, 53-54; Ed Damato, "20 Years Later, The Flight Back," The Veteran, Vol. 17 No. 3 & 4, Fall 1987; Dave Cline, "Vietnamese Combat Vet Says, Its Time for Reconciliation," The Veteran, Spring 1991, 10. Helmer, Bringing the War Home The American Soldier in Vietnam and After (New York: The Free Press, A Division of Macmillan Publishing Col, Inc., 1974), 41-42. In his brilliant sociological presentation of why men fight and why they rebel, Helmer notes that 50% of the veterans of the Vietnam War who opposed the war thought they were made suckers, risking their lives in the wrong war, in the wrong place, at the wrong time, and did not want someone close to him to have to go through a tour in Vietnam; another 25%, although still in favor of the war, did not want that either. Helmer discovered that among those who opposed the war, cynical reasons of the U.S. refusing to give up economic and political advantages in Asia, or big business interests were common explanations for allowing American Empire to substitute for British Empire. "If 50% of all veterans opposed the war and 50% of the American public felt the men were manipulated into serving in Vietnam, in a long wasting war, then...we are beginning to learn something that few of us believed credible before."

88 Robert Jay Lifton, Home From the War: Neither Victims Nor Executioners (New York: Basic Books, 1973), 258; Gibson, The Perfect War, 206-207; Caspar Weinberger, "The Legacy of Vietnam," By Kim Willenson With the Correspondents of Newsweek, The Bad War: An Oral History of the Vietnam War (New York and Scarborough, Ontario: A Newsweek Book, New American Library, 1987), 393. Ronald Reagan's Defense Secretary Weinberger sees the legacy of Vietnam as showing strong residual antipathy on the part of the American public towards involvement in actions requiring military force. Thus, "when we do, you have to apply military force in sufficient numbers and with sufficient skill and determination and resolve to win." Apparently, Mr. Weinberger sees danger in lengthy wars where the opportunity to transcend ethonocentricity is enhanced and empathy for the enemy "other" is possible.

89 Time Gabriel, Crisis in Command, 12; Macpherson, Long Passing, 68; George Walton, Colonel, USA (Ret.) The Tarnished Shield: A Report on Today's Army (New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1973). Colonel Walton blames a guilt ridden, permissive society for the complete breakdown in discipline; Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, 450-51, notes cultural changes leading to a lessening of old fashioned discipline among the young men entering the service.

90 Baskir and Strauss, Chance and Circumstance, 7-10.

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91 See Chart #55: Question, In your opinion, was the Vietnam War moral?"

92 See Chart #56: Question: Did your attitude about the war change in Vietnam?

93 Personal interview with Hugh Roarty at his home in Bayonne, New Jersey, July 23, 1995. Mr. Roarty, an officer in the MACV intelligence office in Saigon described the Phoenix program during the Vietnam War as "we did not do anything the North Vietnamese did not do first." The intent of the war, according to Mr. Roarty was to stop communism from spreading and we succeeded in doing that. In that view, the ends justified the means. In 1980, Mr. Roarty helped found the VVA Chapter in Bayonne.

94 Baskir and Strauss, Chance and Circumstance, 132.

95 Anthony Giddens, Introduction to Sociology, 2d ed., (New York London: W. W. Norton & Company & Company, Inc., 1996), 269. This is the generation born between 1946 and 1964, numbering about 25% of the U.S. population. The doubling of the Gross National Product that accounted for much of the affluence that their generation enjoyed came crashing down in the 1970s.

96 Frank Toner interview, 3/31/94.

97 Lifton, Home From the War, 221, 289-91. Lifton examined the veterans' Protean style of narrative as a link between commitment to an intensely personal survival mission and social transformation which is the essence of their experiences in Vietnam that left them vulnerable to depression.

98 W. D. Ehrhart,

98 W. D. Ehrhart, "Hunting," in Carrying the Darkness:, 85.

99 Siedenberg and Short, A Matter of Conscience, 40.

100 Lifton, Home From the War, 225.

101 Ibid., 287, 309-10.

102 Gabriel and Savage, Crisis in Command, 19; also see the Membership Form in The Veteran, Vol. 2, No. 1, Winter 1990, p. 2.

103 Wells, The War Within, 474-78; Kolko, Anatomy of a War, 359-367; Lifton, Home From the War, 339-43; and Gabriel and Savage, Crisis in Command, 50.

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104 Baskir and Strauss, Chance and Circumstance, 109.

105 Ibid., 110.

106 Gibson, The Perfect War, 224, 446.

107 Ibid., 18, 214; also Baskin and Strauss, Chance and Circumstance.

108 MacPherson, Long Time Passing, 498; Baskir and Strauss, Chance and Circumstance, 111; and Walton, The Tarnished Shield, 108.

109 Timothy F. Hartnegal, "Absent Without Leave: A Study of the Military Offender," Journal of Political and Military Sociology 1974, 2.2 Fall, 205-220

110 Baskir and Strauss, Chance and Circumstance, 112.

111 Ibid., 122.

112 Ibid.

113 Ibid.

114 Barry, History of the VVAW, 6.

115 Wells, The War Within, 561.

116 Ibid, 511; and Gibson, The Perfect War, 9.

117 Kahin and Lewis. The United States in Vietnam, 390-91.

118 General Bruce Palmer, The 25-Year War: America's Military Role in Vietnam (New York: A Touchstone Book Published by Simon & Schuster, Inc., 1984), 29; and Gibson, The Perfect War, 80.

119 Palmer, The 25-Year War, 191; and Captain Shelby L. Stanton, (Ret.) The Rise and Fall of an American Army: U.S. Ground Forces in Vietnam, 1965-1973 (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1985), 368.

120 Moser, The New Winter Soldiers, 19.

121 Ibid., 6. Gibson, The Perfect War, 320

122 Ibid., 122.

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123 Ellsberg, Papers on the War, 306-09. Ellsberg offers a moving portrayal of the progression of moral decline in Hitler's Germany and admits his own and other officials moral failure in the Vietnam decision-making process.

124 Ibid., 290-91. Ellsberg equates dangerous military interventions and U.S. policy of annihilating recalcitrant native populations with presidential attempts to maintain American hegemony by legitimizing the use of all force necessary in order to maintain their own survival in office.

125 Tuchman, The March of Folly, 32.

126 Gibson, The Perfect War, 112-14; Lifton, Home From the War, 167-71. E. F. Schumacher, Small is Beautiful: Economics as if People Mattered. Reissued with two new prefaces by John McClaughry and Kirkpatrick Sale. (New York, Grand Rapids, Philadelphia, St. Louis, San Francisco, London, Singapore, Sydney, Tokyo: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1973).

127 Schumacher, Small is Beautiful, 261-62. Schumacher defines real freedom and entrepreneurship as existing only at the top.

128 Ibid., 136-69.

129 Ibid., 254-56.

130 Donovan, Militarism U.S.A., xiii-xiv.

131 Anthony B. Herbert, Lt. Col., The Soldier (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1976).

132 Donald Duncan, The New Legions (New York: Pocket-books, 1967).

133 Andy Stapp, Up Against the Brass: The Amazing Story of the Fight to Organize the United States Army (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1970).

134 "On Lifting the Trade Embargo Against Viet Nam," The DMZ newsletter of the Clarence Fitch Chapter of New York/ New Jersey, Vietnam Veterans Against the War, (April 1994). DMZ is an acronym for Demilitarized Zone.

135 Richard Severo and Lewis Milford, The Wages of War: When America's Soldiers Came Home-From Valley Forge to Vietnam (New York, London, Toronto, Sydney and Tokyo: A Touchstone Book Published by Simon & Schuster, Inc., 1990).

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136 G. Louis Heath, editor, Mutiny Does Not Happen Lightly (Metuchen, NJ: The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 1976).

137 DeBenedetti and Chatfield, An American Ordeal.

138 Helmer, Bringing the War Home, 90-91.

139 Tim O'Brien, If I Die in a Combat Zone Box Me Up And Ship Me Home (New York: Dell, 1973; A Laurel Book, published by the Dell Publishing, a division of Bantam Doubleday Dell Publishing Group, Inc., June 1987).

140 John Ketwig, And A Hard Rain Fell (New York: Macmillan, 1985).

141 Fred Wilcox, Waiting for an Army to Die (New York: Vintage Books, A Division of Random House, 1983).

142 Ron Kovic, Born on the Fourth of July (New York: Pocket Books, 1976).

143 MacPherson, Long Time Passing.

144 C. Gordon C. Zahn, War, Conscience and Dissent 1st. ed. (New York: Random House, 1968).

145 Nancy Zaroulis and Gerald Sullivan, Who Spoke Up? American Protest Against the War in Vietnam 1963-1975 (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1984).

146 James M. Gavin in collaboration with Arthur T. Hadley, Crisis Now Crisis in the Cities, Crisis in Vietnam A Commitment to Change (New York: Random House, 1968.

147 Gibson, The Perfect War.

148 Philip Caputo, A Rumor of War (Toronto: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1977).

149 Lifton, Home From the War.

150 J. T. Hansen, Susan A. Owen, And Michael Patrick, Parallels: The Soldier's Knowledge and the Oral History of Contemporary Warfare (New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 1992).

151 Seidenberg and Short, A Matter of Conscience.

152 Wells, The War Within.

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153 Gibson, The Perfect War.

154 Palmer, The 25-Year War.

155 Samuel Stouffer, et al, The American Soldier (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1949.

156 David Mark Mantell, Green Berets and War Resisters: A Study of Commitment (New York and London: Teachers College Press, Teachers College, Columbia University, 1974).

157 Baskir and Strauss, Chance and Circumstance, 9; Gibson, The Perfect War, 224.

158 Helmer, Bringing Home the War.

159 "Reclaiming the Calendar," The original article was written by a Vietnam veteran for the War Resister's League (u.d.).

160 Ibid., Dave Cline interview.

161 Kovic, Born on the Fourth of July.

162 Lifton, Home From the War, 177; Moser, The New Winter Soldiers; W.D. Ehrhart, Passing Time: Memoir of a Vietnam Veteran Against the War (Jefferson, North Carolina and London: McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers, 1993).

164 Amter, Vietnam Verdict, 164, 273; "Technology and American Power," War Crimes and the American Conscience, edited by Erwin Knoll and Judith Nies McFadden, Hannah Arendt, et al. (New York/Chicago/San Francisco: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970), 57-59; "A Human Tragedy: Agent Orange," The Veteran (undated supplement), 11. MacPherson, Long Time Passing, 500; Colonel James A. Donovan, U.S. Marine Corps (ret.), "Assessing the War's Costs," Vietnam Magazine, April 1996, 42-48. Colonel Donovan provides statistics that, by any standard, marks the Vietnam War as the most costly in the history of the United States, and it cost more than lives and money.

165 Gibson, The Perfect War, 122.

166 Amter, Vietnam Verdict, 289; Gibson, The Perfect War, 376-77; Kolko, Anatomy of a War, 138; Colonel Harry Summers, Jr., Vietnam War Almanac (New York, New York.Oxford, England: Facts on File Publications, 1985), 100, 290, 344-45.

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167 Ellul, The Technological Society. Throughout his book, Ellul regards technology as neither good nor wicked until the priorities are set by humans; Shawcross, Sideshow, 31, notes that technology over human will works well by the book, but it cannot control the attitudes of men who are expected to implement it on moral evaluations of their role in the process.

168 Edward W. Lawless, Technology and Social Shock (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1977), 523, notes that wars and intense social conflict have been leading factors in developing and adapting technology in the growth of scientific knowledge; Bernard James, The Death of Progress (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973), 12-23, 31-34, laments that, despite undreamed of riches amassed by capitalism in tandem with science and technology to extend human ideals, all the wealth that exists as goods and services today could support only 1/6th of the world's people at the present level of life in North America.

169 Max Weber, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, trans. and ed. with an introduction by H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), 334-35, (Paperback).

170 World Book Encyclopedia, Volume 7:426 and Volume 12:573. Giddens, Introduction to Sociology, 426, informs that the Chinese were far more advanced than western societies in weaponry, the arts and literature. There is evidence of at least two arsenals in the late 11th Century producing 32,000 suits of armor every year.

171 Gibbon, Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire

172 Lewis Lloyd Bart, The Thousand-Yard Stare: A Socio-Cultural Interpretation of Vietnam War Narratives, (College Park, MD: University of Maryland, 1982). Bart probes social reality or the symbolic universe shared by a generation of American males sent to Vietnam. The thousand-yard stare encompasses a referential universe shared by veterans who have been to hell and back.

173 Clyde Magarelli interview, February 12, 1997. Dr. Magarelli spent his 3-year U.S. Army enlistment on Okinawa.

174 Ibid.

175 Jan Scruggs, The Wall That Heals, With editorial assistance from Kim Murphy (Printed in the USA: Vietnam Veterans of America Memorial Fund, 1992). Mr. Scruggs sees that quotation from Herman Wouk's World War II epic novel, Winds of War "reflected in the thoughts and feelings of those interviewed" in his book.

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V. LIMITS OF TECHNOLOGICAL RATIONALITY AND THE ROLE OF IDEALISM: CONVERGENCE OR CONTRADICTION

The statement hotly contested by many of the Vietnam veterans is that America lost the war; they cannot believe that the most efficient, well-trained and deadliest fighting machine ever assembled had been defeated by a fourth-rate North Vietnam power. According to Colonel H. G. Summers,[1] the U.S. army won every battle in Vietnam yet lost the war. In terms of not meeting objectives, despite an assemblage of the most lethal weaponry ever marshalled by a nation engaged in battle, America lost the war.

Communism was not stopped; the 17th parallel division of the country was not maintained; the hearts and minds of the Vietnamese people were lost in the only destruction we could wreak - in areas under our jurisdiction, the South, and our allies there were thrown to the wolves, except for the few who were skilled at reading the handwriting on the wall or commanded special privileges removing them from the consequences of the complete collapse of the South

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Vietnamese government on April 30, 1975. We failed to win the war under the terms and conditions on which it was waged: modern rationalism in which the interests of the average human were inconsequential

From the perspective of lessons to be learned for the future, the struggle in Vietnam was a classic example of American over-reliance on technology and a devaluation of the human element in warfare dispensed under the most brutal means that could be devised. The North Vietnamese Army and the Viet Cong may have been unable to directly confront American military power, with its backing of technology and superior weapons, but the sources of their astonishing victory lay elsewhere, deep in theoretical differences in the art of warfare resting on the moral principle of human will opposed to forces of the material.

The western stress on the rights of man, a vestigial philosophical Lamarckian relic, stressed the survival of the fittest firmly embedded in an altered mindset that elevated the mechanistic over the social. Individuality and lex talionis became the natural consequences of slash and burn tactics to take what was not freely given. Respect for the other as deserving of compassion was discarded; science became the weapon of choice in a war of moral darkness where human suffering no longer mattered.

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Scientific progress, then has destroyed the old rules of war as a contest between armies to an instrument of total annihilation. It has metamorphosed from a struggle of will into savage and total war against civilians, thus marking the collapse of civilization based on moral restraint into scientific perversion and cultural suicide. Technology as an extension of cabinet diplomacy feeds on militarism. As such, human will is expected to adapt to the whims of defective political systems laboring under mistaken assumptions that national immunity can be purchased through equipping the military with the latest scientific gadgetry while undercutting human struggle.

In this vein, General Vo Nguyen Giap, following the theoretical framework of Sun Tzu, successfully integrated into Mao Zedong's military campaigns against the Nationalist Chinese Army, had little in reference with technology and superior weapons. Instead, he relied on human intensive areas of endeavor: ideas of surprise, deception and avoiding what is strong while attacking what was weak.[2] His most important tactical principles were speed of movement and surprise.

He possessed no mountains of materiel that proved to be ideal targets and drained manpower in its defense; no equipment maintenance to counter adverse climatic

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conditions and impassible terrain, and no huge structure of bureaucratic and administrative log jams that resulted in long periods of time elapsing before military action could be taken. He could only depend upon low tech weapons and the fighting spirit of his men to maintain the long, arduous struggle with a formidable opponent. Within that context, disbelieving Americans still ask, "What more could we have done to win the war in Vietnam that we had not done? How could we have changed the policies that led inevitably to defeat? At what point should we have done so? Would it have mattered?" Those are indicative of the domination of science school of thought and do not address the crux of the problem.

The salient question should be why did we discredit the idealist and discount the moral dimension in warfare. Why did we elevate the technological impersonality of killing to a fine art? Why did we not involve the subjective human element of restraint in a senseless war? Why did we weld propaganda with ignorance and continue to maintain faith in a technological enterprise that failed not break the enemy's will, no matter the intensity of force expended? And how could we fail to read signs of the moral decay pointing to a collapse of military will to serve in the American abattoir of Southeast Asia?

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In Papers on the War, Daniel Ellsberg agonized deeply over American presence in Vietnam,[3] concluding that the American value system mandates a national purpose of winning, and that we were not able to do.[4] He agonized over his part in the immorality and recognized his culpability in policy formation in actions deemed liable under rulings of the Nuremberg war crime tribunal.

We had everything going for us, except the will to win which required idealism and the morality of a just cause, and it was the lack of such will and an immoral reliance on high technology that ultimately defeated us. The less likely we were to prevail, the more certain escalation of destruction would follow. Thus the patterns that thread through four Presidential administrations show a remarkable deadly similarity: a juggernaut mentality riding on the illusion of power from expensive and sophisticated weapons designed to overcome and compensate for human weaknesses and unpredictabilities. Supposedly, one of the reasons offered for our dismal failure in Vietnam were advisors who lied, deceived and, in general, misled the presidents.

Ellsberg refutes that view, saying it was the power invested in the Executive branch and the interests that supported it that must accept the blame. In short, he

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points to the Eastern establishment that provided the best and the brightest of these advisors to the presidents, and who reflected their interests while occupying those positions.[5]

He insists that these Presidents were the best informed men in America on what was happening in Vietnam, and policy did not change, each did not deviate from the course set by each of his predecessors and each, in turn, deliberately misled the public and Congress on what he was doing and what he had been told about Vietnam.[6] The war in Vietnam was thus only one piece in the long-range plan to destroy Communism. It was a fixed national priority to attain the permanent exclusion of Ho Chi Minh's Communist Party from legitimate political rule, or participation in such, and to destroy it as a viable organization in Vietnam.

Thus to label the Vietnam War a civil war was to color an armed conflict between communism and capitalism as a local matter. It was a foreign aggression; it was our aggression.[7] We defied the UN Charter decreeing self-determination in Vietnam and we violated our own principles at the Geneva Accords of 1954 because we had no recourse than to impose our economic interests through the barrel of a gun. The American people were thus captives to

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conflicting interests that went beyond protecting national sovereignty by entering into a colossal struggle over ideological supremacy between two antithetically committed economic systems.

Whether manifest destiny, white man's burden, saving the world for democracy, or whatever appellation selected for current consumption, American willingness to enter into the indecisiveness of the battlefield was based on the premise of technological invincibility. The combined power and force of weapons systems to compel submission was awesome, and well they should be; they were designed to keep another superpower at bay, the USSR. Vietnam would be a short battle once we introduced our full military potential.

Those weapons served to lower public discourse on the feasibility of fighting a land war in Asia. Technology, under management skills of logic, quantification and analysis, was the powerful one-two punch to clear the field and to ensure unimpeded advance into spheres of American influence and interests. By advancing concepts of "freedom" and "democracy to all downtrodden nations," the benefits of American protectionism tended to soften internal dissent and legitimate lapses of impeccable conduct in war. When questions of how humane, respected,

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decent people could participate in the destruction of other cultures surfaced, they were easily brushed away by pointing to our moral restraint since we possessed the power to destroy those people many times over, if we so chose. Our patience appeared endless considering that we could but did not use nuclear weapons.

Ellsberg[8] notes that the distinction drawn between high and low technology is one of class utilization; the higher the class, the higher technological innovation has to be to maintain the distance factor and provide defense for a class that will no longer engage in face-to-face low tech combat. This has consequences in the moral plateau, if one considers the guilt of My Lai as opposed to free fire zones. In free-fire zones, there are no discernible class boundaries, thus no possibility for misuse of technological priorities by a class in power. My Lai was not high tech, it was low tech utilization of guns, rifles, ricocheting bullets of the type of inferior technological utilization of World War I/Civil War types of weapontry used against people in face-to-face confrontations. Thus the killings at My Lai had nothing to do with advanced sanitized technology.

Another disquieting distinction of low tech culpability is that only those below the rank of captain

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are thus liable for trial under the Nuremberg Doctrine. In the targeting of responsibility for My Lai, it is noteworthy to our argument that Lt. Calley was the highest ranking officer to be found guilty, later pardoned by presidential decree.

Thus, concentrating on low tech harm would tend to absolve all high ranking military personnel and the highest civilian leaders in government who plan and implement the burning of villages, the use of herbicides, defoliation practices, tortures, the creation of millions of refugees, air and ground invasions and the dropping of bombs 640 times the power of the atom bombs dropped on Japan to end World War II[9] because distance removes culpability or guilt.

The Nuremberg interdiction thus apparently fails to cover B-52s, carrier aircraft, helicopter gunships, CBU bombs (the major causes of death and destruction in Vietnam) because their use tends to absolve the high tech American weapons on the premise that the dispensers of death do not have to look upon the face of their victims. The victim is invisible, thus there is no complicity, responsibility or guilt over the consequences.

This raises the stakes a little higher; can the perspectives and values of those responsible for Vietnam

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be faulted when they are representative of the larger American populace, who typically support H. Rap Brown's statement that: "If you invite us in to do your hard fighting for you, then you are going to get bombing and heavy shelling along with our troops."[10] Or General Curtis LeMay's observation that "war is killing people. When you kill enough people, the other side quits"[11]

This fictitious concept of the American citizen directed toward peace until provoked by injustice has emptied the space for an effective dialogue regarding the morality of a society sponsoring a commanding military presence and a permanent war economy on a global scale to ensure economic compliance in concert with cultural warpage. It has been five decades since this nation's claim of citizen soldiers was valid; the alteration has been into a military of mercenaries.[12]

The advance of the military into an indispensable adjunct to political power has led to a peculiar American fascination with forceful interventions into the internal affairs of other sovereign states when they refuse to accept ultimatums. These have been smaller nations, for the most part, as they pose little threat to superpowers because of innate weaknesses or less technological endowments, thus the argument that making the world safe

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for democracy and freedom implies that populations are far better off under our protective custody, free to pursue their particular internal aspirations within our directives.

These policies have been successful only to the extent that protective geographical factors and technological advances have afforded safety against retaliatory harm. The slow erosion of an innate American ethic of fairplay into a doctrine of might makes right has masked much of what the rest of the world perceives as a "bully" mentality.[13] Thus, justifiable American pride in technical progress is offset by the lack of restraint in using it to successfully quell opposition. Thus the truism "war is hell" was amended to "for the other" and the moral consequences of the politics of provocation stricken from the discourse or quickly muted under the logic that victory decides morality.

Irrevocable though they were, the moral crises attached to expanding political and economic interests were not sufficient in themselves to raise public consciousness. Alterations within the military, away from its traditional mandate of protecting American citizens to a modern base of advancing economic interests, has removed the last barrier to empire building. The changed essence

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of the military is at the core of the problem; it has caused a decline of the public sphere, permitted increasing interference of the state into economic interests, and protects the growing domination of science in the state's interest in technical control.[14]

Until Vietnam. Vietnam was the greatest moral crisis this country has ever encountered, and there have been many.[15] The absence of public debate or deep introspection into issues of morality over our entry into Vietnam never surfaced - perhaps because of the slow tsunami-like swell of involvement there. Neither was there a spontaneous reaction by the American public throughout the long agonizing national debate on the issues of conscience and culpability that emerged. Reappraisal of the U.S. role in Vietnam developed slowly on the recognition, finally, that the most powerful technological nation in the world was substantially inferior to a relatively unsophisticated agricultural society, a third rate entity that we could not force into submission and obedience.

The Viet Cong gained their strength from their people, and the people willingly gave their support to gain independence. Those who benefited either socially or economically from the invaders were a small minority,

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conspicuously professionals, officials and landlords who exploited peasants through loans and renting out farmland or who were committed to the government.[16] Thus, the Communists had no need to hold villages, conquer territory, or defend a specific "mole d'amarrage"[17] because they had no need for them; they fought a fluid type of warfare while the restrictions imposed by mountains of commodities that had to be defended and antagonistic peasantry that could not be trusted precluded any but rigid and inflexible types of holding patterns with occasional commitments of combat troops or aircraft penetrations into the all inclusive enemy territory.[18]

The French were defeated for most of the same reasons the Americans were: overtaxing of transport capacities and a contempt for the Vietnamese. In the former instance, General Giap's tactics to destroy the enemy's supply lines and at the same time consolidate his bunker system where he could launch human attacks once logistical and technological advantages had been overcome were brilliant. In the latter, the French and American disdain for anything Vietnamese went further to ensure Giap's victory than anything he could have conceived.

The North Vietnamese Army and the Viet Cong were far inferior in firepower to the Americans who came after the

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French; and they had no air power to speak of. They lacked the greed of the South Vietnamese army surfeited with their American supplied aircraft, transport and attack helicopters and they rejected the corruption that permeated the Saigon Government.[19] Promotion and tenure in the North Vietnamese Army depended on competence and skill, bravery and loyalty to the people of Vietnam, as opposed to loyalty to the Diem regime reflecting alien interests in the South. The ARVN was structured to uphold the political interest and exploit peasants and others economically, rather than fight the Communists.[20]

Something the leadership of the U.S. never had a clue to was that the key to defeating the Viet Cong or the North Vietnamese Army was to be morally superior to them. Abuses of power by our allies in South Vietnam would have to be addressed and equitable land redistribution would have to be encouraged, initiated and implemented. Towards all of these, the war was a political and not a military struggle. The military mandate is to fight wars, its mandate cannot be altered to impose social, economic and political change on an unwilling population, either through violence, force or compulsion, all of which are determinants in the act of breaking your opponent's will. Thus to use an army as an agent of political repression

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over a recalcitrant population destroys its historical mission of national defense and invites deep hatred from its captive audience well aware of the difference between national sovereignty and external dictatorial impositions.

Thus, saving the South Vietnamese for democracy was soon perceived by some of the staunchest American anti-Communist servicemen as so much verbiage masking deeper political reasons for economic foundations for empire building. The individual need for an object of belief that would give meaning to his life, or the loss of it, could not remain internalized among the military we sent to Vietnam because the war became never-ending thus senseless and tragic consuming everything in its path. Thus the breakdown of an army by 1971 caught between an abysmal irresponsibility, which expressed no belief, and an obsessive almost tyrannical imposed conformity that went beyond the limits of tolerance should not have been surprising, only inevitable.[21]

Was it morally and ethically wrong to send an army to solve a political problem in our favor? It is difficult to expect politicians to follow the logic[22] of their military interventions, particularly the political burdens they placed on how the armed forces were to operate, where they would be allowed to go, and when they would engage

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the enemy in Vietnam. Further, without clear and honest discourse with the people at home, it was difficult to establish the real purpose for being there. Without clearly setting forth the aims of the actual conflict, the military could not determine whether it could meet its traditional mandates within whatever political limitations were set.[23]

The traditional military mandate is to "find, fix, fight, and finish the enemy." That aim was impossible given the civilian management of the war. Those goals were significantly amended to meet civilian dominated body counts as the prime determinant of finishing off the enemy. That meant a war of attrition and blood-letting; it was thought a ratio of 10:1 kills could sustain public opinion at home. However, attrition worked against Americans, not in their favor. It was a war where the proportion of static defensive American troops remained high;[24] obviating the "find" objective. It was impossible to "fix" the enemy whose ability to blend into the surrounding areas or disappear across borders was legend. The U.S. military could not "fight" because the enemy could not be found, unless he wanted to be. And the final "finish" could not be followed up on because delivering the huge amounts of ammunition, fuel and other supplies

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required to maintain and repair the vast numbers of vehicles, aircraft and weapons it employed, meant dispersal of American forces over the country of Vietnam into heavily defended enclaves.[25]

When one considers that the principal purpose of the entire array of weaponry amassed by the U.S. in Vietnam, and that the intent of that buildup was to deliver unbelievable extremes of heavy firepower, it is ludicrous that we could find, fix, and fight the enemy, but we could not finish him off.[26] Understand that the North Vietnamese Army was one-fourth as large as the U.S.[27] and you begin to develop a perspective of the limitations of technological rationality and the role of idealism in convergence and contradiction.

The larger picture of our technological innovations within the Vietnam War and the reaction of idealists to the superimposition of technology over human essence in warfare is seen in all its clarity. One of the reasons why the anti-war movement, involving many individuals of impeccable moral persuasion, could not alter public sentiment on the war significantly was the absence of angry fighting men. Until the emergence of the Vietnam Veterans Against the War, long after debate on political, economic or military immorality were exhausted by

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religious and intellectual circles, there were few who had intimate experience with actual conditions of warfare in Vietnam. Their entry into the peace movement finally jolted the American public and its leaders into a realization of deep contradictions in the logic of high tech warfare. If servicemen spoke eloquently on three basic points of failure: the folly of the air campaign; the human toll and dollar cost of the war; and the futility of the policy of attrition, closer scrutiny of moral infractions occasioned by U.S. firepower was indicated. It was not an easy lesson to learn; reverse learning curves are infinitely more difficult to imprint.

On August 25, 1967, just four months after the first appearance of the VVAW, Secretary of Defense McNamara said that the air campaign against North Vietnam had not met its goal; unless the U.S. shifted to an indiscriminate air campaign of annihilation of the entire population of North Vietnam, we could accomplish nothing more than exacting a high price for North Vietnamese continued aggression.[28]

By October of 1967, 40% of our combat ready divisions and half of our tactical air power and at least one-third of our naval strength numbering 480,000 men were waging total war in Southeast Asia. The dollar cost of the war was running at an annual rate of well over $25 billion;

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and the number of Americans killed in action, which had totalled 6,500 for the six year period through 1966, was nearing the 9,000 mark with an additional 60,000 wounded for 1967 alone.[29]

The major problem was the misreading of the Vietnamese mind. The American military mind, in particular, could not really comprehend the adaptability of the North Vietnamese because they compared it instinctively with Americans. Mechanical solidarity enabled them to operate collectively with relatively few resources, while the individualism of the American division of labor depended on immense logistical support to operate.

North Vietnamese could round up entire villages to transport material for days and weeks; something Americans could not conceive of being ordered to do. Railroads that had been destroyed by air action would have their craters filled in by the population of nearby villages with each person asked to fill one rice bag with dirt, providing 1,000 or so bags in record time, thus filling the bomb crater and laying new tracks on top of it, permitting trains to run within 24 hours.[30] "Caucasians cannot really imagine what ant labor can do."[31]

Not until their complacency and dependency on American technological superiority was shaken did the

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discussion of what we were doing in Vietnam surface among increasing numbers of concerned citizens. We note in Jan Barry's narration that his father never once spoke about doubts he had had in World War II on the atom bombing of the two Japanese cities until long after Jan had committed to the VVAW. His father later commented in a conversation with him that if "we had never been told the truth about the bombing - what else were they (the government) lying about."[32]

Habermas tells us that power grounded on scientific breakthroughs removes the space for moral argumentation. Thus, when we examine the convergence of teleological, normatively regulated, dramaturgical and communicative actions produced by the events in Vietnam, we can understand the development of the reappraisal of the destructive direction science had taken this country.[33] In teleological action, the ultimate separation of human distinctions into the right and wrong of how we waged war in Vietnam cannot be raised, there is no issue. Neither can the responsibility of acting agents in their drive to achieve ends, especially in areas of oppressed peoples be faulted. That is a closed subject. Thus the reaction to rationality and the revulsion at witnessing behavior devoid on human compassion spilled over into the area of

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normative action where behavior could be decided on the common values of a group in terms of moral evaluations of ends and means.

The internal conflict between these two types of action consumed much of the American conscience during the long anti-war years. Some accommodation with instrumentality was apparently negotiated, there were incursions into the moral legitimacy of political and military action, but not before a long media application of dramaturgical actions presented the results of rational self-interest to the American public softening opposition and forcing a discourse between the two oppositional points of view, those who supported the war and those who did not.

Thus, in Habermas' conceptual frame,[34] the division of these four types of action form separate universes that can only be bridged by communicative actions through which undistorted information may be filtered. In teleological action, the power to manipulate the objective external world removes the necessity of reflecting on social factors, as in the normative, or recognizing the subjective and external of dramaturgical actions, which assume dimensions of play acting or the spectacle that are "make-believe," therefore not the real world. Communica-

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tive action cannot be discounted as easily as the other three universes, since this is the area that negotiates the assertions of validity claims. Although types of actions signify different worlds, communicative action mediates between all three towards a common cultural acceptance of understanding.

Utilizing a teleological frame, it was not possible for the U.S. to lose the war in Vietnam, her superiority in scientific and technological precluded the possibility of defeat. Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara's statement that, "we have enough power to bomb any society out of the 20th century"[35] may have been an imperious assertion of empire, however, it was rhetoric backed by Newtonian mechanistic applications and a willingness to use the most expensive arsenal ever assembled on earth that expressed the prevailing American view of his world.

Although an insistence on instrumental rationality over human creativity, removes uncertainty and unpredictability, the machine, rules or regulations cannot compensate for human intuition, especially in the artificial environment where thinking is mechanical and programmed for ultimately, it cannot account for all probabilities, human capacity can. For instance, during his tenure as Secretary of Defense, McNamara furthered

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one-man rule of the Pentagon with an intensity unmatched before or since.[36]

These routine administrative practices to consolidate power and provide efficient control over human irrationality were carried into a human intensive area that had nothing in common with statistical data or cost effective conduct of war. In fact, it is the one area where irrationality decides between victory and defeat: the most irrational act any human can do within a teleological frame is to die.[37]

That he did not succeed attests to the strength of the social climate of Washington where all the authority, direction and control are not vested in one individual, at least not openly, but in the group. Without the backing of Congress, McNamara was just another bureaucrat, a whiz-kid from the Corporate world who failed to apply marginal utility approaches in Vietnam - areas of his unmatched expertise in the private sector. That, and the rising numbers of dead and wounded tended to carry the argument into the normative frame where social values are important.

Thus, in terms of the cost of the Vietnam War, the utilization of manpower, or even the domestic priorities in a shifting international order, his policies were a

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failure. His deep commitment to conventional warfare over nuclear pursuits led to the high casualty rates in Vietnam that ultimately funneled into the loss of resolve to continue a seemingly endless war, despite having the advantage of highly destructive instruments of war. This stress on non-nuclear intervention carried further implications; it meant he could not, in essence, deny the Joint Chiefs of Staff any of their increasing demands for combat troop strength in Vietnam. Since he was the architect of the conventional method and its strongest supporter, he could not prevent the escalation of troops into Vietnam.[38] It also meant he had to take the flak for every setback in Vietnam in the absence of nuclear closure. During his long tenure at the Pentagon, 1960 to 1967, the Department of Defense changed into a centrally managed government organization. The usual methods of managerial expertise were employed - public relations, and publications and reports by the intelligentsia brought in as staff for the DOD.[39] It was a virtuoso performance, prompting President Johnson to suggest other government departments might want to emulate techniques of central control introduced by McNamara.

Facts reveal, however, that under his time in office the myth of the all-seeing perfection of administrative

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and bureaucratic techniques were as empty as the political promises of victory as "just around the corner." Cost excesses of unprecedented amounts were compiled in short order. F-111 planes whose final cost was three times the initial estimate per plane; C-5A transports that registered a $2-billion cost excess; and the Deep Submerging Rescue vehicle with an initial $36 million estimate per twelve craft weighed in at a cost overrun of $463-million per six craft[40] are only a few examples of mismanagement. By year-end 1969, a GAO report spanning the McNamara period, stated that major weapons systems were costing $20-billion more than the original estimates and, record-keeping and control in the DOD was such that no one person knew the total number of systems required - or their cost.[41]

In the merger of technology and management skills,[42] the military establishment had done what other bureaucracies do, it succumbed to internal dynamics that followed managerial imperatives that maintained and enlarged its decision power, and was given unprecedented access to the entire wealth of American society. The alteration to central control did something else - it formulated growing policies that included a new world order.[43] These policies were incubated and hatched in the DOD, away from the normal military overview of action.

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This removed the line officer from decisions that involved utilization of men under his command placing it in a remote civilian entity operating within a self-referential universe of instrumentality reflecting economic priorities.[44]

In historical review, America led the free world by dint of exclusive ownership of nuclear expertise in the aftermath of World War II, but more so in terms of moral leadership in human rights and justice. Much of the European and Asian infrastructure had been devastated or otherwise adversely affected and it was American money that helped rebuild both friends and former foes. Thus, American advancement of her economic and political interests was uncontested, as long as the basis of her nuclear arsenal and state of the art delivery systems were unchallenged but fair.

Nuclear power served well, it permitted the carving of lines in the sand beyond which no one dared go, guaranteed peace and economic rebuilding, as well as the permanent war economy and non-stop militarism that has expanded far beyond national security needs. The American high lasted as long as it did because of exclusive rights to creative scientists; loyal, productive and inspired people, institutions second to none; the most astute

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political leadership in the world; and the best economic system ever. And we had God on our side. All of this produced a national euphoria firmly attached to self-congratulatory, well deserved greatness.

That euphoria quickly evaporated with Russia's development of her nuclear arsenal and Sputnik, the latter indicating her lead in the space race. Suddenly making the world safe for democracy assumed an urgent priority with heightened risks because we were no longer beyond the bomb sights or push button capacities we had envisioned as our exclusive preserve.

Russia was an especially odious alternative to American hegemony because she lacked our designated moral incentives to protect the free world for democratic self rule, given the oppositional aspects of her political and economic system. If there were stirrings of concern with the increasing risks of nuclear escalations stemming from the vexing confrontations that sprang up occasionally, such as the human waves of Chinese in Korea or the fiasco of the Bay of Pigs in Cuba, these were quickly forgotten and of relatively short duration. A further stress on technology could overcome human failings by concentrating on higher killing power to compensate for smaller populations.

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Thus any criticism of a huge and expanding MIC (Military Industrial Complex) was not open to discussion because it insured protection for a culture that would unhesitatingly inflict pain on others but was unwilling to absorb any. American civilians have been buffered from the realities of war; relatively few have been killed during much of the military violence exhibited in the 20th century. Domestic violence has been the exception, usually flaring up in union organizing efforts, poverty agitations or veteran bonus demands, all of which were considered to be "the other." These were dispelled with a minimum of force and a low level of deaths and didn't warrant agonizing over methods since these "others" were on the "wrong" side of the law. Pearl Harbor, occasional high level Japanese bomb balloons, or submarine shelling of coastal areas during World War II were random and unsustainable attacks on U.S. territory, thus non-combatant Americans lived through relatively uneventful war years.

Whatever suffering was endured in the loss or wounding of a loved one, was not equal to the intensive human sufferings of the sieges of Moscow or Leningrad, the fire bombing of Dresden and Tokyo or the German attempt to exterminate London with V-1s or V-2s, and heavy bombings.

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They were spared, as well, the wrenching refugee or holocaust experiences of other populations or the witnessing of the total destruction of their homes and the wreckage of their lives.

The same 20th century has not dealt as gently with most of the global population. Wars have caused 86,597,000 deaths[45] with still uncountable numbers of missing persons. Military expenditures have shown no signs of abating, continuing to rise alarmingly between 1950 and the end of the 1980s, consuming well over $1 billion a day by 1977 and doubling in the 1980s.[46] With each new conflict in the Middle East, each new re-arming somewhere in the world, the international arms trade is provided with a lucrative new surplus, in a reality where 80% of earth's inhabitants live below basic subsistence levels. As recent as 1993, the cost of world military acquisitions was estimated at 5% of total world income. That figure eclipses the entire economic production of Africa, and is higher than all of Asia, excluding Japan.[47] These expenditures on instruments of death appear extravagant and irrational.

Although there has been some lessening in the arms race since the end of the Cold War, the area of savings appears minimal since the savings are associated with

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downsizing human intensive areas.[48] The weapons procurement areas were left relatively untouched. The policy expands into removing human unpredictability from war and replacing it with computerized and robotized non-human, non-irrational techne. With conservative estimates indicating some 50,000 nuclear devices out there[49] under the control of vast systems of delivery with split second response capability, the danger grows considering the loss of human capacity to overcome unforeseen cybernetic flaws.

The collapse of the former Soviet Union has removed a balance of power that had been successful in preventing nuclear use to advance political ends. It is becoming extremely difficult to maintain a closed nuclear club and prevent these weapons from entering the market place of supply and demand. The deepening conflicts among religious, ethnic, political and economic factions thus poses far greater risks for peace now that the decentralization of arsenals once in the hands of a few are accessed by the many. Thus insults may be easily settled on nuclear terms by societies who have a wealth of historical grievances to settle.

In addition, scientific breakthroughs are no longer isolated instances; new information on building nuclear

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devices is easily available and becoming affordable. Two elements required for building a nuclear arsenal, plutonium and uranium, can be tapped for use, given the two thousand metric tons of plutonium expected from reprocessing spent fuel from nuclear power stations in Europe and Japan alone by the end of this century.[50] Since less than 15 pounds is needed to make a single nuclear bomb, and plutonium has a lifespan of thousands of years, previous expectations for nuclear weapons to serve as the guarantor of peace appears slim.

Thus, science and technology in service to provincial interests, and the power to bomb back into the stone age has to be tempered with reason. Stronger nations that could level ultimatums in the past with impunity appear to have developed a higher degree of temperance, more willing to negotiate than to pulverize. Nuclear access thus appears to be a neutralizing agent in the disparities between nations who have historically profited from technological expertise based on wealth and those who could not, although still viable in terms of a Samson Syndrome.[51]

However, without a change of systemic imperatives, withdrawal from the American Century is illusory. Leaving Vietnam merely signalled the need to cut losses,[52] in

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preparation for the next adventure. The resources of the Third World are vital to the interests of the advanced nations, and this is the reason why U.S. military forces are in 30 countries in the world today,[53] because not to do so is to commit national suicide. Apparently, these underdeveloped nations cannot be trusted to control and develop their resources on their own.

Thus, the question of compulsion or consent becomes inseparable from extending human rights and dignity because they attain critical mass most often in those areas of rule and unruliness in modern society where some form of coercive social control becomes obligatory. Military extension becomes extremely tempting as a method of choice, as we remember from Vietnam; however, this can lead to tragic moral breaches. The wide use of psychological, chemical and medical methods of pacification come to mind and these are adequately dealt with by Jonas'[54] examination of moral concerns, among which he considers one of the most important to be the scientific trend toward overcoming aggression by electronic pacification; he does not view it as the proper task for science.[55] Neither did the North Vietnamese.

Partly responsible for the increase of deadliness in wars has been the steady progression of Western dependency

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on quantification, of elevating statistics over men, for material gain. It has produced the negation of human necessity; humans are too unpredictable to trust in important economic matters and cannot be left to their own economic endeavors. Lowering the probability factors in this way manifestly produces a statistical base for estimating outcomes in time costs and efficiency.

However, in forcing a contraction of time on humans, indicative of allowing techne full sway (automation voids a need for reflective time consuming thought), latent elements of insecurity and danger surface and these rise in proportion to other issues that raise the stakes even higher.[56] As the temporal frame contracts, small mistakes which could have been caught by humans are missed. The longrange implications of increasing technological predictability thus becomes the catch-22 where the space of time required between pushing a button and its end results is emptied, allowing no reversal by human intervention in aborting the unthinkable. Since none of this is open for human scrutiny, and human reflexive contemplation on his own actions cannot be certified, there is no way to accommodate suspect data derived from ultra human sources, pre-programmed to overcome subjective human hesitations, no matter how temporary.[57]

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Ellul's critiques on the placement of unlimited faith in techne faulted the state for removing human agency and critical judgment long before it became fashionable to do so. His view places technology in a neutral zone; it is not an evil technology, it is the utilization of technology toward ends and the attempt to compensate technology for human weakness in the pursuit of such ends. Following the Newtonian model has, in his opinion, resulted in a system of laws which allowed scientists to corrupt nature by using what they learned to define humanity in terms of operations that would lead to accurate measurements of behaviorism, and not to revealing the humanizing promises of nature.[58] The Frankfurt School sees the flattening effects of one dimensionality as the destructive effects of the technological imposition over the social and the spiritual. It is their view in that just as instrumental reason serves the domination of man over nature and man over man, so too does appealing to instrumental reason conceal the real nature of man's domination over himself through technology.[59]

Weber states that the obsessive preoccupation with instrumental reason can only lead to further contradictions because it represses human nature. In this, instrumental rationality which applies bureaucracy

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to technology ultimately produces the subjugation of human beings to the demands of a system which subjects them to a system which overwhelms its creators and envelopes them in its own imperatives. Thus, in his view, technology is good if it serves a social end and has social participants.[60]

Thus attempts to reduce man to a quantitative animal whose behavior is statistically predictable was destroyed in Vietnam in the face of social and spiritual reaction. We point to the fallacy of statistics which reached an all time high with the body counts in Vietnam in keeping with the progressive quantification of economic theory into the human intensive areas of war.[61] Gibson faults leaders in Washington for thinking they had a clear monopoly on "true" knowledge, thus could easily defeat a backward people living on a primitive agriculturally based economy with space age technology. The humiliation of being beaten by little men on bicycles was nothing to the costs of misjudging people solely on the basis of their perceived cultural inferiority.[62]

Gibson further asks, "who defeated the most powerful nation in world history? Who defeated several hundred thousand troops equipped with the most advanced weaponry that the most technologically sophisticated nation had to

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offer? Who defeated a war budget more than one trillion dollars? For the most part, peasants of underdeveloped agricultural economies defeated the United States." [63]

In this, classification of nations and their people on the basis of the ownership or lack of advanced production and warfare systems led to a seriously inaccurate view of where power truly resides. A priori categories of the mind classified the enemy as racially, ethnically, religiously, and intellectually inferior, thus subhuman since Western commitment to technological progress was thought to be indicative of an immensely superior specie. Even in defeat, Washington never had a clue that they fought the wrong battle in the wrong place at the wrong time against the wrong enemy. While we gambled our reputation on automated assembly lines and air power, the enemy bet his life. He had more to lose.

The discourse of the Vietnam War is simple to translate; any enemy we meet in the future who adopts the policies, tactics and strategies of the Chinese in the Korean War or the Communists in Vietnam, will be very difficult to overcome, much less defeat. They have learned from history that their return to spiritual and traditional values is the key to their survival and victory. Those values sustain the will to survive

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throughout the long, arduous protracted guerrilla wars of attrition. Although there were no fine lines of resistance in Vietnam, only an entire country filled with American invaders, the Viet Cong had the advantage of being among his own people. Because new recruits came from the villagers and peasants, they would not turn in their own husbands, sons or daughters to the enemy. The few traitors that surfaced were easily identified and eliminated.[64]

A backward glance at wars we have fought and have a chance of winning in the future are those where the enemy has access to modern weaponry but is rather technologically inferior to us. He is likely to be defeated and destroyed in short order, if he tries to confront our forces on even ground.[65] Although guerrilla or modern warfare places the entire population at great risk, it has the edge over conventional armies whose technology (communication lines, supplies, depots, and essential impedimenta) has to be protected to a high degree before, during and after enemy engagement.

Our wars have not been serially isolated where one ends and is historically bracketed before another begins, each separate and distinct from the other. These wars have been historically determined and follow the logic of

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a certain logic. One can turn from the Vietnam discourse into the Korean conversation back to the monologue of World War II to trace the evolution of the scientific logic we pursue. Our participation in untold civilian atrocities in Vietnam was nothing new; we had no qualms about Indian, South American, or Asian souvenirs in previous campaigns and very few voices were raised over these transgressions.[66] The Nazi genocidal patterns, medical experimentation, or other assorted evils that we deplored in World War II have come full circle.

One has to travel no farther than My Lai to see the switch from moral savior to transgressor. Assertions of the most inhumane misuse of technology in rationally dispatching innocent men, women and children was considered inhumane and reprehensible when it surfaced in Germany, but not when it furthered American interests in Vietnam. Marcuse[67] tells us that Auschwitz haunts us because it is the place where the greatest human development of science, medicine and technology converted illusion to reality and fiction to truth testifying to the extent that imagination itself had become an instrument of quantifiable progress.[68] At a later date, Julia Kristeva delved into the world of abjection where even voice is lost in the presence of such unbelievable evil that even

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the mind cannot grasp the loss of all morality, all decency, and ultimately leads to a paralysis of the will.

In that vein, our moral preoccupation with Vietnam is warranted. These human achievements, like others in established societies, are abused consistently. If horror does not penetrate consciousness, it is because these conditions are perfectly rational in terms of hegemony legitimized by science. The scope of human ingenuity and power is magnified far beyond the limits of imagination because of the character of scientific rationality itself.[69]

Imagination is afforded recognition in mathematics, in hypotheses and experiments, as well as in psychoanalysis, yet Marcuse doubts pacified existence without fear can ever be possible after the images of domination and death in the two instances, Auschwitz and Vietnam, especially when they are contrary to the spiritual nature of man's value in the universe. Thus mastery of nature and political needs may supersede moral imperatives, although at a high cost, the risk of reason itself becoming irrationality.[70]

In this, the sophistry of the imagination, as in science fiction, differs from the equivocal reasoning of law and morality where law is formally sanctioned and

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morality only informally so. Thus, objective categories of morality are mechanically established over ontological essences. In contrast, Jonas[71] notes the serious side of science fiction lies precisely in performing such well informed thought experiments whose intense imaginary results assume the vital heuristic function of moral consequences ex libris of scientific determination. In his view, imagination affords the human accuracy in developing long-range institutional steps of natural evolutionary caution, rather than the few colossal technological mistakes that has neither human patience nor slow mental checks and balances to prevent an irreversible calamity from happening.[72] Again, one is struck by the differences in world views between Western quantification and Eastern qualification as basic causes of misunderstandings of intent and the area where cultural differences can lead to grave political miscalculation requiring deadly military intervention.

On the issue of Vietnam, it points toward continued escalation past the point where the war was lost. The superiority of our war machine rising on pillars of esoteric mathematical precision was the way to counter unsound dependency on human creativity and imagination that could not be subverted into scientific mathematical

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formulae. Possibly the most powerful critique to the positives of modern preoccupation with science and technology come from Nietzsche[73] when he stated that quantitative differences were qualitative and could not be reduced to one another indicating that relations are always signs of difference that signify different worlds inhabited by human knowledge.

Human interpretations and values should be universal as one of the hereditary madnesses of the human specie,[74] instead we see the smug presumption that scientific dominance of all discourses was the distillation of logic because it alone underlies the concept of universalism.[75] Just as Western technology can no longer be viewed as neutral because it cannot be isolated from the use to which it is put, the technological domination of societal systems operates in the conception and construction of a technical universe. That universe has become dominant over human capability and desire.

It cannot operate in a vacuum. As such, it is the underpinning of the advanced industrial society that gave us a political universe as the latest stage in the transformation and organization of nature itself as the locus of domination. It removes the inner space in which to remain oneself, to question, to evaluate in terms of

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human responsibility. Therefore there are no limits to unthinkable horror after the elimination of that ethical dimension from the human subject.

Robert S. McNamara's role as Secretary of Defense in itself is of little concern if checks and balances were utilized; as a close advisor to two presidents, he could have argued more persuasively that the Vietnam War was lost, however, that crucial factor was absent. Once identified as less than a hawk, his usefulness was over. He, and the few others like him,[76] were pre-empted by Walter Rostow, President Johnson's principal foreign adviser at the White House, whose views on Vietnam were closer in line with the presidential temperament and national priorities.

Basically, Secretary McNamara may; have been a decent and intelligent man, a loving husband and father, whoever, his tragic flaw was not to humiliate his superiors. Loyalty to his president precluded disagreeing with him publicly on Vietnam. Loyalty was a cheap price for men to pay for the pride, ambition or attraction towards the center of power made possible by leaders who could assign great projects for them to carry out.[77] Thus, it indicates not flawed judgment as much as a flawed character that could not be erased by a belated confession of mea culpa.

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McNamara failed primarily because he had placed his trust in the realization that major decisions of the war could be quantified through rigorous logic and financial analysis. These had nothing in common with internal human qualities, other than an objective external application of rationality; quantifiable data would fill the gaps. These factors failed because they did not allow for Ho Chi Minh's irrational determination that North Vietnamese, by reason of their readiness to die in great numbers, could in fact outlast U.S. firepower.[78] It was a the failure of the intellect as much as a belief on the superiority of the science of technical and professional systems over human ingenuity.

Alfred North Whitehead notes that the domination of science[79] during these past three centuries has become total since science has become, like the proverbial camel in the tent, the dominant discourse displacing all others. Preoccupation springing from the fascination with science has been asserting itself at the expense of other points of view.[80] Criticizing the prevailing ethic is not a simple matter because the mentality of the modern world does not permit ideological infractions from the scientific norm.

Thus the belief that all we had to do was bomb North Vietnam into oblivion was a mental process unconsciously

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performed without attention to the possible irrationality of such thought because science had rendered our cause invincible, the only recourse, submission, did not belong in American discourse. The impulse to break the will by all means possible facilitates the utilization of all force necessary to bring the endeavor to a successful conclusion. The presence of an electronic line across Vietnam designating the DMZ off-limits from North Vietnam and keeping the enemy off "our property" failed to do either.

Apparently the architect of the Vietnam War during the period of the greatest loss of American lives there could think of nothing more creative than resorting to an electronic barrier as a way to contain the enemy while we completed mopping him up from the air with data supplied by listening outposts in Thailand that operated on failsafe computer enhanced information.[81]

The abandonment of McNamara's line signaled the futility of attempting to secure victory by substituting the automated battlefield for the human brain. In theory it worked, in reality it was a total waste of time, money and lives.[82] Cognitive dissonance, that psychological process that screens out irreconcilable information, may be considered a necessary component of the drive to power.

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As framed in Lord Acton's observation that "power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely," deceitful practices of glossing over any information that might have led to moral action were overruled as they only served to confuse the facts as they were understood by those who were in the inner circle of power. In March of Folly, Barbara Tuchman broadens the argument by commenting on Montesquieu's observation that the deterioration of government, any government, begins with the decay of principles on which it was founded.[83] Thus the glossing over or discarding of basic constitutional checks may have facilitated political dictates, but did nothing for the nation.

Elaborating on the U.S. Constitution or the Bill of Rights may be the proper starting point for discovering deviations from the norm, however, it will not tell us the reasons why the leaders of this country refused to live up to the letter of the law explicit in the 1954 Geneva Accords that would have better served the future of this nation by accumulating some democratic capital among the international set, especially those less powerful in mandating policies based on political decency. Thus political motives remain suspect since Vietnam was where men in government sought power over others, and in their

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methods for so doing, lost power over themselves.[84] Ultimately, the possibility of powerful leadership through the high plateau of moral suasion is irretrievably gone, lost in the sorry spectacle of military clout.

Tuchman posits that to avoid the corrupting influences of power, character has to be tested and the best test of character is moral courage. In her opinion, moral failure, not failure of competence was the root cause of the American debacle in Vietnam and it rested on a basic lack of character among men with power.[85] The men who decided the political and military direction of the war in Vietnam were far from stupid.

President Kennedy, one of the most politically astute of men and someone who did not lack personal courage, knew in 1963 that we had to withdraw from Vietnam, yet failed to do so because it would have invited a storm of opposition from the conservatives. For political gain, he let an election 18 months away extend a war he no longer believed in because not to continue would have destroyed his chances for a second term as president.[86]

Thus the explanation offered that these men did what they had to do because there were no alternatives fails to address the absence of the courage of convictions. It fails to justify inflated dependencies on arsenals and

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weapons and it fails, as well, to acknowledge that alternatives are always available once policies prove counter-productive to the task. That takes moral courage and moral courage springs from strength of character.

Thus, resistance to the Vietnam War surfaced in those men and women who were most intimately aware of misguided military and political subordination to falsification and the misuse of force and violence. They, more than the men who dismissed alternatives, knew the consequences - intended and unintended - of those closed door meetings that led to one miscalculation after another, each more deadly than the last, leading to one death after another, to the final humiliation of abandoning an ally to his fate. It was carefully built up over time in the myriad duplicities, mendacities, rivalries, deceits, overweening egos, and the pretense of invincibility built around a mindset of power blindly pursuing inanimate scientific warfare over the hearts and minds of men.

The pity is that true wisdom can only be acquired in hindsight. The Vietnam war witnessed the most intensive usage of scientific and technological instruments of modern warfare to no avail; we gave up before they did. Exclusive of nuclear bombs, we threw everything we had at the Viet Cong and the National Liberation Front to no

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avail. The statistical charts that predicted victory were were extensions of a belief system that worshipped material gadgetry of war above the foot soldier, who still remains the true indicator of victory or defeat in battle.[87]

The acclaimed superiority of our scientific products over human intelligence failed to be borne out in the battlefield, that area where severe technological limitations repeatedly surfaced giving the lie to scientific dogma that "for all practical purposes, technical limits have been removed from the exercise of power in foreign policy."[88] Rifles jammed; artillery fire fell short of the target; tanks were not suitable for jungle terrain or had to be refueled every two to three hours in use; weapons were too sophisticated to handle easily and often failed when needed are a few examples of an over reliance on computer graphics in designing technowar.[89]

Every new weapon, technique, or innovation was neutralized in no time. It was an exercise in futility. Our increased technical applications only resulted in changed tactics by the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese, thus could not serve to persuade them abandon the war.[90] For instance, between 1965 and 1971, the U.S. dropped 13

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million tons of bombs in Indochina; 11 1/2 million of which landed on Vietnam. This equals approximately 447 pounds of bombs per acre or 1,215 pounds per person.[91] By the end of October, 1968, the U.S. had lost 915 fixed wing aircraft and 101 helicopters over the North. The (Losses over the South during the same time were 315 fixed wing aircraft and 906 helicopters.) The cost of bombing in the North was 4 times the dollar value of enemy targets destroyed, and they were operational at 75% of pre-bombing capacity within three months. In human terms, a greater loss was the more than 450 pilots killed or missing.[92]

In terms of the three years and nine months that Rolling Thunder was operational, the airforce flew over 304,000 combat against North Vietnam. In addition, 2,830 B-52 raids, which were not actually part of Operation Rolling Thunder, were included in the statistics). Pentagon sources estimated that B-52 strikes flown against the North, with each flight totalling seven tons of bombs. Thus a conservative estimate for the tons of bombs released over North Vietnam appears to far exceed the 600,000 tons that the Pentagon lists, at least by twice that number. The final cost of Vietnam may well average $32,000 per minute, if the Pentagon totals are used ($140 billion). Although questionable, that minimum means that

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the U.S. spent nine times as much as North Vietnam's entire gross national product.[93] If true, 70% of all funds appropriated for national defense between 1967-1972 went up in smoke in the Vietnam War alone.[94] In 1967, the CIA calculated that every $1.00 worth of damage to North Vietnam cost the U.S. $9.60.[95] The traditional cost effectiveness touted as the American secret weapon failed to produce desired results.

Systems analysts at the Department of Defense found that the enemy could construct alternative supply routes "faster than we could choke them off."[96] Added to this, the total weight of American shells fired in Vietnam exceeded 7 million tons, or 500 times more power than the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima,[97] to no avail. The total tonnage of bombs dropped on Vietnam was the equivalent of 640 atom bombs of the type dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.[98]

In 1961 the U.S. estimated that with 40,000 U.S. troops, it could clean up the Viet Cong or with another 205,000, it could handle the situation in both the DRV and China, if she were to enter the conflict.[99] In keeping with this, the French at Dien Bien Phu did not capitulate in 1954 because of a shortage of men, guns or bullets, General Navarre had 375,000 French troops available

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against the Asiatic state's 125,000 regulars and 75,000 regional, with some 200,000 to 300,000 village militia.[100]

One may presume that men, not materiel, was the contributing factor and that the French lost the war for the same reasons the later American effort failed - the arrogance and vanity of the military and their political leaders, their technological self-delusion and moral weakness, and their contempt for the Asian enemy.[101]

Both nations were remarkably alike in their reliance on technological superiority as the only variable in the war in Indochina; the French with their World War I fortresses and the U.S. in the seductive delusion that air power would render all resistance useless. Because the French believed these people were barely out of the stone age, as well, they could not credit the Vietnamese with the capability of developing the military sophistication that could place four divisions in the field around them at Dien Bien Phu and force their surrender.[102]

The French were defeated in their effort to re-colonize Vietnam when their fortress mentality failed them. Nor were they willing to admit that the basic reason for communist development in Vietnam had been French corruption of the Vietnamese cultural norms of honor and integrity implicit in the destruction of the

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traditional strength of the family, community, and nation which were being torn apart by the French imposition of western values.

In an important interview with the French General Andre Beaufre, who had accompanied De Lattre de Tassigny to Vietnam in 1950, Ellsberg was told that the French lost the war because they failed to see what was happening in the civilian population. The Communist apparatus had grown too large, it had penetrated too deeply, and it was no longer to be defeated by the French.[103] It had become too late in 1947, perhaps in 1946, but by 1950, any Vietnamese who could have rallied to confront the Communists were already dead. Still the French fought on for seven more years.[104]

When Ellsberg described his exchange with Beaufre to General Lansdale at a later date,[105] Lansdale said it had become too late for the U.S. to meet the goal of winning in 1964 after the Khanh coup. Before that, the Minh government that had succeeded the Diem brothers had some plausibility with the people; after Khanh's ascent, that was ended when Americans began shelling villages in June of 1965.[106]

Herbert Marcuse[107] noted that the process of liquidating two-dimensional culture takes place not

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through the denial or rejection of cultural values but through their wholesale incorporation into the established order, through their reproduction and display on a massive scale. This, destruction of their culture, the North Vietnamese were not willing to accept from the French or later from the Americans. With each failure to destroy old traditions and old peasant social relationships in Vietnam, we see the thrust of official policy of painful escalations on how to win the conflict with new technologies and new techniques. Technological strength could not overcome the strength of these ways of life that were the foundation of the Vietnamese will to outfight, outmaneuver and outclass the French and American invasions of their country.

The French learned to their dismay, however, what escaped U.S. policy makers and the Joint Chiefs of Staff who could not conceive a North Vietnam capable of withstanding the intensity and superiority of the American war machine and its vast arsenal of war technology. It was a painful lesson to learn. Despite years of punishing air bombings, ground artillery and assaults and naval strikes, despite the brutal punishment inflicted on that small country, the North Vietnamese economy remained viable, the political regime did not collapse and they

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continued to send men and material into South Vietnam at will.[108]

By 1964, North Vietnam had control over 46% of South Vietnam and could perceive the disintegration of the Saigon government. They could initiate or cut off any action against U.S. troops, choose the time and place of action, and disengage and disappear without a trace. By February of 1965, retaliatory air raids had become fairly common practice whenever the Viet Cong guerrillas or North Vietnamese troops attacked U.S. forces.[109] Our covert operations failed to stop North Vietnam, and that failure served to further reduce U.S. options to air strikes.[110]

In February 1965, the year McNamara thought the war unwinnable, Rolling Thunder air operations were begun as a gradual intensification of bombing and strafing missions in Vietnam to suppress enemy activity. They began in February 1965 and lasted till March of 1968 when it was judged to be an obvious failure after the Tet offensive. It was President Johnson's decision to initiate the sustained bombing program against North Vietnam in order to bring the enemy to his knees.[111]

Although it was nothing new, it followed a series of efforts, some secretive, others in full view, that had been conducted since 1961.[112] It is noteworthy that just

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a few weeks before the January 1968 Tet offensive, General William C. Westmoreland had appeared before the National Press Club in Washington, D.C., to inform the public that the enemy had been defeated and war would soon be over: "we had reached a point where the end begins to come into view."[113] It would appear that illusion blocks the need for inquiry; someone should have asked the general why the enemy did not beg for mercy under the intense U.S. campaign of technological obliteration.

The Tet offensive was relatively short - 2 weeks duration; when it was over, the peak of American power following World War II had ended, the American policy of expanding involvement in Vietnam was through and withdrawal of American troops from Indochina began.[114] Although experts still differ on the results of the Tet offensive,[115] Tet revealed the fiction of bombing policies to stop the flow of men and supplies from North Vietnam into South Vietnam was invalid. Bombing alone could not prevent the infiltration of manpower needed to conduct massive operations if the enemy so chose, and that the will to sacrifice and hardship was more powerful than air strikes.[116]

After three years of warfare against considerable U.S. ground forces and receiving the full force of air

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strikes, the Tet offensive demonstrated the insurgent forces were nowhere near defeat. Tet broke the ARVN ranks and exposed U.S. inability to control events there.[117] Even the Joint Chiefs of Staff could not deal with truth; in classic Orwellian doublespeak, when confronted with the failed Rolling Thunder operations, they maintained it was not failure, just not carried out properly; the principle behind it was sound. Removing all limitations to bombing would produce desired results in short order.[118]

This is reminiscent of the prevailing rule of thumb for American advisors when they dealt with the Vietnamese communists. That was to "teach-em a damned good lesson... you can't convert them, only kill them,"[119] even if death failed to impress an enemy who feared dishonor more. This attitude paved the way for the failure of the Skinnerian carrot (pacification programs) or the stick (pain and punishment) meted out for their stubborn refusal to learn to obey. To no avail; as the Pentagon Papers noted,[160] bombing only served to harden the enemy's will. We could not reach a level of pain in North Vietnam as that pain only served to increase the enemy's will to resist."[120] North Vietnam's conceptual framework was not tied to technological superiority; in fact, they were severely deficient in weaponry, other than that sent from China and

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Russia. Along with that imbalance, they were opposed by a first world power that had used military intervention to back political ends 215 times between January 1, 1940 and December 21, 1975.[121]

Western science and technology churned through the Third World at will, flinching only when the enemy had equal or seemingly superior capability in the form of a big brother, Korea for one, Cuba for another. These paths of glory mirror Western fixation with advanced systems of warfare to consolidate gunboat diplomacy. For most of the American century the combination of force and the will to use it emphasized a closure of national sovereignty or counter-revolutionary doctrines of a single world order.

Thus the pouring of social resources into a search for the ultimate sci-fi automated battlefield as the centerpiece of technological dominance over the last possible area of human resistance, the battlefield. Ideally, automation to protect humans from extremely hazardous tasks or physical harm is admirable. The question of who is in control, though, man or machine, is not as essential as human fluidity in terms of battle - when national survival itself is at stake if men falter, retreat from, or fail to accomplish the task. The uncertainty of conditions, the lack of time for reordering

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priorities in answer to the enemy's maneuvering, other essentially unforeseen and unintended intrusions are hidden for the most part and require immediate human skills and intuition.

The automated battlefield may have been conceived as the ultimate tidiness of scientific warfare, but it failed to accomplish its visionary mission. It could not compensate for human will or eliminate mortality and casualty rates during battle. The concept places physical endurance second to machine reliability, and the machine can be depended upon to refrain from value judgments, to follow all pre-programmed instructions without pause, and to rationally complete tasks of increasing complexity and stress without emotional involvement in the task or breaking ranks.

An added value is that this technology can be depended upon to do what humans find unpalatable. The coordination between ground, sea and air combat can be accomplished easily, inter-service rivalries or budgetary battles that linger can be overcome. Technology and science are touted as replacing human intensive areas of war to save lives, and the use of automatic systems relying on electronics permits the gathering of intelligence without queasy dependencies on human factors, such

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as errors in judgment or faulty loyalties. However, these new weapons carry a heavy price tag and cannot help but drain the financial capacities of even the most industrialized nations of the world. Any advantage gain is lost in the race to keep up with the latest developments, and the likelihood of an ultimate weapon for all time seems distant and elusive.[122]

Vietnam, as its testing ground, is a prime example of the failure of the automated battlefield to serve as a failsafe mechanism. It offers, as well, an accounting sheet panoramic view at the unattainable task of containing costs while protecting national pride. The humiliation of abandoning a top technological project such as the McNamara Line is a case in point. As though locating and identifying belligerents can be executed primarily by costly infrared devices that are planted on the battlefield to unerringly relay the same physical stimuli ordinarily detectable by human senses of sight, sound, etc. These artificial sensing devices have sensitivities beyond human capability to detect, such as radiation, magnetic fields, electromagnetic waves and an entire battery of unseen phenomena,[123] thus were superior to human detection. Basically, the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese military did not have access to these marvels,

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yet this lack had no apparent difficulty in permitting them to locate the enemy whenever it was necessary to engage him.

These detection devices include simple trip wires, that give advance notice of intrusions, or wire filled canisters that serve as underground receivers to transmit seismic changes above ground indicating vehicle or personnel movement. These are expensive to deploy and are limited to short distances because of their physical dimensions. The receiver has an approximate radius of 100 meters, although a certain degree of sophistication can be attained by wire transmissions to the human attended receiver. Best results are gained from from sensors capable of radio transmission over distances of several miles.[124] These sensors are very expensive ranging in price according to sophistication. Information on inventory and costs of the Vietnam War is not easy to find.[125] These include acoustic, seismic, magnetic, chemical, radar and infrared sensors.

In Vietnam they proved inconclusive, as did everything we tried there. The enemy discovered these devices in record time and destroyed them; or they were captured and investigated, turned back on American troop movements; even when designed to self-destruct when

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discovered, many failed to do so; and the North Vietnamese managed to develop effective counter measures within a very short time of sensor deployment. The Pentagon admitted in 1968 "that it was seldom more than a few months after we introduced something new before we captured an enemy document telling how to counter the new device."[126]

The weakness in depending on non-human utilities is in the countering devices invented by the enemy. Dummies were splendid substitutes for activating sensors; water buffaloes carrying water cans that sloshed were mistaken for enemy tank movement; urine saturated bags were mistaken for people and magnetic sensors could not work properly if there was too much metal in the surrounding area. Then, too, bulldozers employed on the Ho Chi Minh trail is thought to have overloaded the seismic, acoustic and magnetic sensors deployed there to the point where some 600 North Vietnamese tanks had no difficulty infiltrating into South Vietnam.[127]

When aircraft were used to relay information, they were subjected to anti-aircraft fire and when the unmanned drones were developed and placed into operation, they were neutralized by jamming radio frequencies rendering the information incomplete, distorted, or incomprehensible.[128]

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During periods of high activity on the battlefield it is impossible to operate sensor receivers successfully, therefore information has to be recorded automatically. Computers are required to organize information and to monitor sensors deployed along the Ho Chi Minh trail in Laos.

The ISC (Infiltration Surveillance Center) was installed in Thailand to do this; originally equipped with two IBM 360-65 computers, they produced high speed readouts that were used as the basis for air strikes against areas of activity. Enemy counter measures included attacking the ground stations in Vietnam to destroy the equipment, fed misinformation into the computer or they overburdened them with saturation reports similar to saturating the sensors and deactivating them.[129] We evidenced a remarkable dependency on psychological warfare to aid and abet airpower and chemical utilization in lieu of human restraint. Each failed to accomplish the original task of destroying the "Other's" will to resist. This was a costly loss for even military pawns who viewed themselves as second in value to technological imperatives found the entire situation senseless and illogical. Platoons were sent into risky areas as bait to draw out the enemy so the fighter bombers and artillery could eliminate them. This

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served to alienate the men who were subordinated to the hazards of impersonal technology - a deadly art form that could not be incorporated into continued levels of support of the war by our military troops mainly on the basis of its failure to distinguish friend from foe.[130]

Thus science and technology were not up to the task. Ultimately, the McNamaras could not differentiate the fine line between courage and honor on one side and the business enterprise on the other. The results of overkill did not fall into the neat predictability provided by statistical charts, that hallmark of market rationality. Perhaps the error lay in nominating a member of the business community to head the human intensive institution of war. The belief that technology could do what humans could not blinded the most cautious of men, including those who should have known better, the military Joint Chiefs of Staff. Perhaps the years spent at the Ford Motor Company, placing statistical compilations into opposition to human creativity tended to cloud vision and screen out things of the heart; a pity that McNamara could not factor in the living for the numbers of dead that mattered more.

It is still difficult for Americans to come to terms with Vietnam or to realize we lost the war because of our misplaced dependency and trust on weapons. The refusal to

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repudiate a mistaken emphasis on technology is a sad commentary on the power of fixated ideology on the American mind. Neutralization of its technical arsenal, its management skills, its imperatives of economic and political power by an enemy that could outfight, outthink and outlast us are as unacceptable today as it was when we left Vietnam.

Perhaps the valid point is that technology can only flourish where there is corruption of the spirit, a mistaken belief that technology can overcome the human will, thus the will to action based on solid moral imperatives never enter the equation. With each new weapon introduced into the war, that much farther did we drift away from winning the battle for Vietnamese minds and convincing them of our goodness.

With each Phoenix program,[131] CORDS program,[132] bombing of the Red River Delta,[133] ill-conceived Pacification program,[134] deforestation and poisoning of crops,[135] napalming,[136] indiscriminate usage of Agent Orange[137] and, ultimately, our imposition of a political regime too corrupt to win the loyalty of an abused population we had promised to save for democracy were all like tears in rain.[138] By destroying everything they owned or held dear, including the prostitution of 200,000 of their

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daughters, victory in Vietnam was thus placed beyond the reach of our military capability in Vietnam.[139]

The bombing alone can be credited for increasing popular support for the Viet Cong and the rising number of people available for military service for North Vietnam; the infiltration rates into the South actually increased after the U.S. started bombing. Actually, it also helped to disaffect many American servicemen who experienced serious misgivings over their participation in the Asian holocaust. The amount of overkill, designed to limit enemy resistance to ultimatums, inevitably resulted in a backlash of disaffiliation from the war by Americans who were there to fight it.

When asked to comment on whether our high tech war in Vietnam did more harm than good, a sample of the combat veterans replied that it placed too many of our soldiers at risk (26%); it killed too many innocent people (42%), enriched Corporate America (26%), and destroyed our country's fiscal balance (6%). When asked if more advanced technology could have won the war in Vietnam, (25%) answered that we used everything we had; (20%) it was unadaptable, too difficult to operate; (20%) that it was too risky for our troops; (15%) stated it was not dependable; (20%) that the Vietnamese could nullify[140]

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its effects. It implies that in addition to a lack of confidence in the merits of our high tech armament and devices, the men in the field perceived U.S. policy makers as continually underestimating the opponent's strength of will, military skills and perseverance, preferring to look into the crystal ball of body counts and post-bombing evaluations for a numerical verification of irrefragible signs of defeating the enemy.

Hannah Arendt theorized that "perhaps this is the first generation which has become fully aware of the murderous consequences inherent in a line of thought that forces one to admit that all means, provided that they are efficient, are permissible and justified to pursue something defined as an end."[141] In Vietnam it proved self defeating. The ideological basis for sponsoring concepts of an automated battlefield was reinforced with a static reading of a list of computerized profiles of all possible alternatives Americans could imply to enemy action, but they were light years ahead of our science.

The implication is that seduction with scientific superiority ruled out any references to information that did not conform to the tables of predictability and irreversibility funneled into the IBM computer. It is worrisome to reflect that the best error-free high tech we

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had to offer failed to problem solve or fathom the faculties of human judgment nor predict the full range of possible human interactions within their environment.

In the end we failed in Vietnam because of the insistence on a perfect artificial fantasy production unplugged from imperfect human serial thought and action. Leaders of this country were confounded by the enemy's tenacity and skill in countering everything we used in Vietnam to his advantage. Science and technology because of their inability to reflect on the consequences of an act proved inferior to human actions that can extend into infinity.[142]

There is an excellent volume of work by SIPRI,[143] the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, addressing the interactions of humans and the automated battlefield. Normal battle sequences are separated into four phases: the intelligence gathering phase; the decision-making phase; the action phase; and the impact monitoring phase.[144] The first phase locates and identifies the enemy; the second decides on the appropriate course of action; the third determines which weapons are best utilized against the enemy; and the fourth assesses the results of the previous three phases in order to decide whether to repeat the sequences or not.

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These phases have historically been the task of men: it is the responsibility of soldiers to place their lives at risk to complete phase one; officers to complete phase two; soldiers who have to fire the weapons in phase three; and those who must visibly assess the results of such action in phase four. Nudging humans out of the queue can be accomplished either partially or completely, depending on the automated systems employed. An absolute automated battlefield would employ sensors to collect intelligence data and transmit it back to central control where computers would analyze then decide the proper course of action and activate pre-selected weaponry, followed by sensing devices to assess results and further courses of action. This was not yet a reality during the Vietnam War, however, the technology for it is available and several systems are in use today.[145]

Because of the secret classification on these systems, information on them is not available making it difficult to pinpoint the exact state of the art. United States research in this area leads other countries in the world; however, techne is not the eminent domain of any one nation and it may be only a matter of time until effects of science and technology are neutralized by other breakthroughs. The last seduction is the seduction of the

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best. The persistence of pursuing American interests towards a goal that was unattainable, and would remain so, led to the eventual loss of faith in the effort. It was damaging in the sense that the classic refusal of leaders to draw conclusions from the evidence before their eyes ended in frustration and cynicism and observations from men in the field that leadership was doing everything they could to wring defeat out of the jaws of victory.[146]

The American Army did not suddenly collapse in 1971; it was a long process from innocence to withdrawal.[147] In 1956, Donald Duncan was drafted into the army, by 1959 he had been accepted into the Special Forces, eventually going to Vietnam to make the world safe for democracy, to "free people from communism," only to discover there was no freedom in South Vietnam. The North Vietnamese were not creating communists, we were through institutionalized genocide.[148] He quit the Green Berets in 1965. Sartre[149] pointed out that genocide is never an accident of history. Cultures have to be destroyed, and if unsuccessful through assimilation, obligatory liquidation of resistance is necessary.[150]

Captured North Vietnamese battle reports reveal that American troops had poor fire discipline, were easily frightened at night, tended to bunch up when brought under

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fire and were lax on posting flank guards and sentries.[151] If this is accurate and addresses trends in army ability to repel the enemy, then the domination of technology over men is understandable in an area where human action is withheld. The dominant thrust of official American policy is how to win future wars; this conflicts with new technologies and new techniques. Instead of offering them to troops (who could no longer be trusted to respond unequivocally), mobility, massive firepower and technological gadgetry would have to substitute a praxis of knowledge for the human type of undependability in transcendental reflection.[152]

Thus, as levels of confidence in high tech cover decreases, a lessening of trust on defensive and offensive weapons leads to a malaise of the general will in areas of conflict devoid of human intervention.[153] The necessity of non-human extensions to counter this loss grows symmetrically. We see this phenomenon developing between 1968 and 1973 ending with the post-Tet decision to replace ground troops with airpower.[154] 7.5 million tons of explosives were consequently dropped on Indochina by U.S. planes. This was the most intensive bombing campaign ever conducted by the United States and it failed. Studies conducted by the Rand Corporation revealed the bombing only

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served to increase the number of people going over to the enemy while decreasing American morale by increasing combat alienation.[155]

We are aware now that throughout the war, U.S. political and military leaders continually underestimated the opponent's strength and perseverance that undercut American performance in the field. They were seduced by the articulation of technological power that could make the enemy change tactics, but could not force him to quit. In the end, that illusion served to reduce our combat troops to mere appendages to a killing machine where honor rested on fictitious body counts and victory on statistics.

As enemy morale increased, it was marked by a matching decrease in the American forces. Konrad Kellen, a Rand Corporation researcher, found that neither American military actions nor our psychological warfare effectively served to make an appreciable dent on the enemy's overall motivation and morale.[156] He had the advantage of fighting on his own soil; of knowing where his enemy was at all times; operated an extensive intelligence system reaching even into the highest echelons of the South Vietnamese government and the American military;[157] and had the paramount advantage in that he was repelling the

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invaders. We could not infiltrate his intelligence apparatus.

Military philosophy offers that the soldier, whether friend or foe, is charged with the protection of the weak. It is the very essence and reason for his Being. When he violates this sacred trust, he not only profanes his entire culture but threatens the very fabric of international society. The traditions of fighting men is long and honorable; they are based on the noblest of human traits and sacrifice.[158]

Contrast this statement with the 234 of every 1000 marines that went AWOL by 1973, compared to the average of 77 per 1000 in service the same year, while 63 per 1000 marines were deserting outright, compared to 24 per 1000 for all services.[159] The Marine Corps has long held the reputation of being the most idealistic of American servicemen so these figures are alarming.

Without the idealist, no amount of weaponry, organizational refinement or tactical deployment can compensate for his loss. And in the attempt to pursue a war through other means, will in the future as in the past, prove counter productive and propel the idealistic soldier in opposition to the war effort into sponsoring a moral social system. The loss of idealism among

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servicemen in Vietnam rose or fell according to the type, intensity, and introduction of technological impositions into their original human intensive areas of war.

If we follow Adorno, Horkheimer, or Marcuse, we can understand the effects of technology and rational reasoning in that both serve the domination of man over nature and man over man; so in appealing to instrumental reasoning, the real nature of domination is concealed. The contradictions rising from the dependency on technology to break the will of North Vietnamese insurgency led to contradictions within our own military because it fostered a recognition that rationality allows for subjecting human beings to the demands of an inhumane system which overwhelms its human creators and subjects everyone to its own imperatives, including its dispensers. In essence, what was being questioned in the social systems was the rigid imposition of codes, rules and regulations at odds with deep human desires for evaluation beyond regimentation.

Thus, the questioning by VVAW members, not of technology per se, but the ends of domination through fear, liquidation, or conquest, dependent on the power of such force and violence is the point of origin and the point of no return.[160] The point of origin appears at the

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cultural level where culture opposes constraints. Thus social structure tends to ignore reflexive, active, creative and any potentially transformative agents of behavior. Still, people think, act, and change, according to human agency and the capacity to oppose compulsion of entrenched systems of control.[161]

Thus the imprecision and mysticism of satisfying human desires compels negation of the cynical manipulations of systemic imperatives over human possibilities. The point of no return appears to be the recognition of a moral harm in the misuse of technology, and its failure to accord quick and easy victory over a people who were engaged in a revolutionary war. Why couldn't we outfight, outgun, out bomb, and outlast the enemy? Thus, the perception that technology was not the answer and, in fact, did more harm than good, forced qualitative inquiry into why the Viet Cong was a powerful force which could not be dislodged and why the most powerful military hardware on earth failed to ensure victory?[162] That indicted the social structure for typifying a sterile set of expectations where the human agent represents passivity, not reactivity.

Thus, in interview after interview of VVAW members, the information garnered reflects deep concern for a lack

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of moral clarity and a need to resolve the internal conflict between passivity and action. It was not necessary to massacre civilians to save them for democracy;[163] and forcing them to accept a political and economic system at variance with their cultural values was not their stated reason for being in Vietnam.[164] In this vein, Professor Samuel Huntington explains that the technological horror meted out to the Vietnamese population was on such a massive scale as to force a massive migration into urban areas in order to further bomb the countryside into oblivion.[165] Vietnam by spring of 1969 more than 105 B-52s made 1,800 sorties per month from bases in Guam, Okinawa and Thailand. In the preceding three years, 886,000 tons of bombs, during 35,680 sorties had been dropped: 100 bombs per bomber per month or 2,160,000 bombs per year for all B-52s. The resiliency of the culture to absorb the punishing impact of technology could not but help further military disaffection.[166]

Simply stated, the military solution to Vietnam did not work because it alienated the best and the brightest idealists because computers, cybernetics, robotics and mass technology could not compensate for the loss of human control or the universal human desire to retain viable

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agency over their destiny. Ideology demanded vindication far beyond necessity, and the necessary act of war was perceived as out of control by men who endured in battle, who were on intimate terms with pain and suffering, and could appreciate a common bonding with even the lowest Vietnamese peasant, were he the enemy or not.[167] Thus, when the act became immoral, it went beyond the boundaries of necessity and become its own reason for being and by its own terms, was irrational. The idealist could not support duty to country if such duty required condoning senseless barbarity in defense of ambition. In this, his honor transcended obedience to the state.

When asked how a man of his intelligence and sensibility could allow himself to remain part of so evil a system (Nazi), however gradually it enveloped him, Albert Speer[168] replied: "There is no correlation between intelligence and decency; the genius and the moron are equally susceptible to corruption." He saw his moral failure one of particular items but as residing in his active association with the whole course of events. He preferred to follow his leader, rather than his conscience.

Vietnam still haunts us because we know the depth of our responsible for the merciless destruction and human

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wreckage we left in our wake. There was a felt need to destroy what we could not win. In a conflict where nothing seemed to work, where the rules either didn't exist or obviously could not apply, where leaders and soldiers fighting in the war were confronted by failure day after day, we had to destroy what could not be won.[169] Our overall failure was the attempt to transcend all ethical restraints in a drive to win at all costs and not to recognize the immense pressure these unrestrained applications placed on the sensibilities of those who had to execute and view the terrible consequences of moral failure. We see the results in three categories of warriors: apathy, continued blind adherence to rules, or rebellion. The first two categories are not viable alternatives to action; the first category will fight to survive, the second category will follow orders and the third will be that area of uncertainty.

The limitations of technology thus were not those of type or efficacy, they were remarkably lethal, as were those charged with its implementations. They were rendered impractical in Vietnam and could go no further when those service individuals charged with waging war proved to have stronger characters and evidenced higher levels of idealism than those who sent them there.

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Sometimes true democracy is the inherent right of people to choose their own economic, political and social systems and the tolerance of those who think they have the perfect alternative that everyone should have. Vietnamese refusal to let their nation be conquered and rendered a satellite of western hegemony offers vivid testimony to their will for freedom. VVAW refusal to engage in, quietly support or allow continued technological devastation to substitute for human decency is clearly the reason why no technology can go beyond the idealistic concepts of men who will rebel, if moral limitations are breached.

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FOOTNOTES

[1] Colonel Harry G. Summers, Jr., On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War (Novato, CA: The Presidio Press, 1982), 1.

[2] Stanley Karnow, Vietnam A History (New York: The Viking Press, 1983, 141-42; Joseph A. Amter, Vietnam Witness (New York: Continuum, 1982), 248-49.

[3] Daniel Ellsberg, Papers on the War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1972), 25.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Ibid., 278-79.

[6] Ibid., 22-33.

[7] Ibid., 33.

[8] Ibid., 246.

[9] James William Gibson, The Perfect War: TechoWar in Vietnam (Boston.New York: The Atlantic Monthly Press, 1986), 319. Gibson notes over 8 million tons of munitions were dropped onto Southeast Asia from 1965 through 1973 making the air war there the largest in history.

[10] Ellsberg, Papers on the War, 241.

[11] Ibid., 272.

[12] Edward L. King, Lt. Col., U.S. Army (Ret.), The Death of the Army: A Pre-Mortem) New York: Saturday Review Press, 1972), 230.

[13] Robert Jay Lifton, Home From the War: Neither or Executioners (Printed in the U.S.A.: Touchstone Books, Published and Distributed by Aldine Publishing Company, 1980), 210.

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[14] Gibson, The Perfect War, 13-14.

[15] Smedley D. Butler, Major General, USMC (Ret.) War is a Racket (Costa Mesa, CA: The Noontide Press, 1991, 17. Major General Butler notes that until 1898 the U.S. did not own a bit of territory outside the U.S.; Michael Myerson, Stopping World War III (Mark and Soloman, Publications, U.S. Peace Council), 79, notes that according to the Brookings Institute in Washington, D.C., the U.S. has used arms or armed forces for political ends 215 times between January 1, 1940 and December 21, 1975; William L. Standard, Aggression: Our Asian Disaster (New York: Random House, 1971), 119. We maintain 1,517,000 Americans in uniform overseas in 119 countries. We have eight treaties to help defend 48 nations if they ask us to - or if we choose to intervene in their affairs.

[16] Gibson, The Perfect War, 69-72.

[17] Karnow, Vietnam, 189-90. Mole d'Amarrage is the French term for a mooring point from which the French and their native auxiliaries could penetrate the Viet Minh's rear areas.

[18] Gabriel Kolko, Anatomy of a War (New York: Pantheon Books, 1985), 183-84; and, Seymour Melman, The Permanent War Economy: American War Economy in Decline, rev. and updated for the '80s. (New York: A Touchstone Book, Published by Simon & Schuster, Inc., 1985), 171-71.

[19] Shelby L. Stanton, Captain, U.S.A. (Retired), TheRise and Fall Fall of An American Army: U.S. Ground Forces in Vietnam 1965-1973 (U.S.A. The Presidio Press, 1985), 23-24.

[20] Gibson, The Perfect War, 276-78.

[21] Ibid., 256, 269, 426.

[22] General Bruce Palmer, The 25-Year War: America's Military Role in Vietnam (New York: A Touchstone Book, Published by Simon & Schuster, Inc., 1984), 37.

[23] Ibid., 126.

[24] Guenther Lewy, America in Vietnam (New York, Toronto, Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1978), 174-75; Gibson, The Perfect War, 113; SIPRI 1974 Yearbook, World Armaments and Disarmament (Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England: The MIT Press, Almqvist & Wiksel Stockholm, 1974), 328.

[25] Kolko, Anatomy of a War, 278-79; Palmer, The 25-Year War, 41.

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[26] Robert B. Asprey, War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1975), xi-xii.

[27] Palmer, The 25-Year War, 191. Following reunification, Vietnam's army was the third largest in the world and one of the best.

[28] Townsend Hoopes, The Limits of Intervention (New York: McKay Publishers, 1969), 86-87.

[29] Ibid., 57; Gibson, The Perfect War, 9.

[30] Hoopes, Limits of Intervention, 79, tells of peasant intensive labor that had the trains running within 24 hours of its destruction.

[31] Hoopes, The Limits of Intervention, 79.

[32] Interview with Jan Barry at his home in Montclair, N.J. on January 24, 1994.

[33] Anthony Giddens, et al. Habermas and Modernity, ed. by and with an introduction by Richard J. Bernstein. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1985), 23.

[34] Jurgen Habermas, Legitimation Crisis, trans. T. McCarthy (London: Heinemann, 1976; originally published in German in 1973).

[35] Barbara W. Tuchman, The March of Folly: From Troy to Vietnam (New York: Alfred A. Knoff, 1984), 285.

[36] Gibson, The Perfect War, 319.

[37] Hoopes, The Limits of Intervention, 83-84.

[38] Robert S. McNamara, with Brian VandeMark, In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam (New York and Canada: Times Books, a division of Random House, 1995), 345; John P. Lovell and Philips S. Kronenberg, eds., New Civil-Military Relations: The Agonies of of Adjustment to Post-Vietnam Realities (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Books, Distributed by E. P. Dutto and Co., 1974), 233.

[39] Melman, The Permanent War Economy, 212.

[40] Ibid.

[41] Ibid.

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[42] Gibson, The Perfect War, 14-15.

[43] Kolko, Anatomy of a War, 547.

[44] James M. Morris, America's Armed Forces: A History 2d ed., (Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., Simon Schuster/A Viacom Company, 1991), 321-24; Gibson, The Perfect War, 27. Gibson sees the self Vietnam War as a referential universe in terms of the deep structured logic of how it was conceptualized and fought by American war-managers. As such, the Vietnam War was the perfect war because no mistakes were made during the war, nor was there a failure of will; self-imposed restraints were on paper only, never in actual technowar practice.

[45] Anthony Giddens, Introduction to Sociology, 2d ed., (New York London: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1996), 238-39.

[46] Ibid., 237.

[47] Ibid., 239.

[48] Morris, America's Armed Forces, 323-24.

[49] Giddens, 2d ed., Introduction to Sociology, 240.

[50] Ibid., 241.

[51] My term for an iconoclastic reaction to perceived immoral actions; an impulse to set the record straight for past treachery, injuries, or grievances, e.g., Samson and Delilah.

[52] Morris, America's Armed Forces, 357-59, 361-62, 382, 390.

[53] A. Lizichev, Sound Ideological and Theoretical Foundations (Soviet Military Review, No. 11, 1981), 9. According to the Brookings Institute, the U.S.A. used its forces to support its foreign policy and military strategic goals against people of dozens of countries 215 times from 1940 to the end of 1975. Official sources admit that the U.S. had approximately 2,500 various military installations in more than 30 countries around the world.

[54] Hans Jonas, The Imperative of Responsibility: In Search of an Ethics for the Technological Age. Trans. by Hans Jonas with the collaboration of David Herr. (Chicago & London: The University of Chicago Press, 1984), 20.

[55] Ibid.

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56 Ibid., 31.

57 Ibid.

58 Jacques Ellul, Technological Society, trans. from the French by John Wilkerson, with an introduction by Robert K. Merton (New York: Vintage Books, a Division of Random House, 1964). Ellul argues that science has dehumanized human essence by corrupting nature through examining and predicting, the twin prerequisites for controlling that which is human. Thus, instrumental action focuses on the goal not the means; science is utilized for mastery, not for liberating human beings. Ellul considers technology neutral but faults science because it is not.

59 George Ritzer, Contemporary Social Theory, 3d ed., (New York, St. Louis, San Francisco, Auckland, Bogota, Caracas, Lisbon, London, Madrid, Mexico, Milan, Montreal, New Delhi, Paris, San Juan, Singapore, Sydney, Tokyo, Toronto: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1992), 143.

60 Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (New York: Scribner's, 1904/1958), ix.

61 Kolko, Anatomy of A War, 196-97.

62 Gibson, The Perfect War, 16-17. Towards this, placing success on technological hierarchies is fatal as it implies all other categories except the most sophisticated are delusional. Thus, the Vietnam War was an exclusion of an entire classification of nation and people solely on the basis of material possessions or lack of advanced technology. It credits the real world as external in terms of observed measurables, rather than internal creativity and passion.

63 Ibid., 16-17.

163 Mao-Tse-Tung On Guerrilla Warfare Translated and with an introduction by Brigadier General Samuel B. Griffith USMC (Ret.) (New York . Washington: Praeger Publishers, 1961), 27.

65 Ibid., 22-23; also, Morris, America's Armed Forces, 361-65.

66 World Book Encyclopedia, Vol 12 M (Chicago, 54, Illinois: Merchandise Mart Plaza, 1961), 107.

67 Herbert Marcuse, One Dimensional Man (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964).

68 Ibid.

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[69] Julia Kristeva, Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993).

[69] Marcuse, An Essay on Liberation (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969).

[70] Ibid.

[71] Jonas, Imperative of Responsibility, 30-31.

[72] Ibid.

[73] Stanley Aronowitz, class lecture, Sociology of Science and Technology course, CUNY Graduate Center, 33 West 42nd Street, NYC, 2/20/86.

[74] Ibid.

[75] Ibid.

[76] Tuchman, March of Folly, 344-45; Gibson, ThePerfect War, 78-79.

[77] Ellsberg, Papers on the War, 306-07.

[78] Bernard Fall, Viet-Nam Witness (New York . Washington . London: Praeger Publishers, 1970), 333.

[79] Alfred North Whitehead, Science and the Modern World (New York: The Free Press, A Division of Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1967, 1st. Free Press Paperback ed., vii-viii.

[80] Ibid., 193-208.

[81] Gibson, The Perfect War, 396; SIPRI 1974 Yearbook, World Armaments and Disarmaments, 329, 333-34, 353-54.

[82] Stanton, Rise and Fall of an American Army, 184; Gibson, The Perfect War, 353, 396; Wells, The War Within, 98-99.

[83] Tuchman, March of Folly, 340.

[84] Ibid., 382.

[85] Ibid.

[86] Ibid., 303.

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87 Stanton, Rise and Fall of an American Army, x.

88 Henry A. Kissinger, American Foreign Policy, expanded edition (New York: W. W. Norton, 1974), 57.

89 Eric Hammel, "The NVA and VC thought the Que Son Que Valley was theirs. The U.S. 1st Division had other ideas," from the Fighting Forces section, Vietnam (August 1994), 10. While praising the virtues of the M-48 tank, Mr. Hammel informs us that "the 50 caliber machine gun manned by Marine Corporal George Ishihara originally was housed in a mini-turret; it was switched to an external mount, sacrificing protection for better visibility;" Melman, Permanent War Economy, 174, expounds on the errors generated by complex systems; In Military Incompetence, 25-29, Gabriel documents that the GAO found 35% of the sidewinder missiles and 25% of the Sparrow missiles did not work and there were not enough trained technicians to keep aircraft flying. As the Air Force relies heavily on civilian technicians to maintain its planes so they can fly at least 65% of the time, in times of war that may pose a problem as civilians may not want to volunteer for duty in battle areas leading to a 20% flying and combat readiness for pilots. Gabriel notes that troop transport C-5A "Galaxie" numbers fewer than 100 aircraft and they have been plagued by a number of operational problems; it requires 500 flights of these aircraft to airlift a single Army division to the battlefield as defective wing roots make it impossible to fly a full load; Gibson, The Perfect War, 377-79; Bevin Alexander, The Future of Warfare, 53-57; King, Death of an Army, 188-92; SIPRI 1974 Yearbook, World Armaments and Disarmament, 356, details the difficulty of non-human sensors to differentiate between friend and foe. Identification in this area has not shown positive and automatic recognition and identification.

90 David T. Johnson and Barry R. Schneider, Current Issues in U.S. Defense Policy (New York, Washington, London: Praeger Publishers, 1978), 14; James Clay Thompson, Rolling Thunder: Understanding Policy and Program Failure (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina, 1980), 46; Gibson, The Perfect War, 416.

91 Survey questions #55 (In your opinion was the Vietnam War moral?) and #56 (Did your attitude about the war change in Vietnam?.

92 Donovan, Militarism U.S.A., 179.

93 Amter, Vietnam Verdict, 338.

94 Ibid.

95 Tuchman, March of Folly, 346; Gibson, The Perfect War, 380.

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[96] Tuchman, The March of Folly, 346.

[97] "U.S.A. Power Diplomacy Plus Terror," Sputnik (August 1981), 14.

[98] Gibson, The Perfect War, 319.

[99] Gravel ed., Volume II, The Pentagon Papers, 108-09.

[100] Amter, Vietnam Verdi, 20; Gibson, The Perfect War, 62; Gibson, The Perfect War, 100; Karnow, Vietnam, 194; Roy Jules, The Battle of Dienbienphu (London: Faber and Faber, 1965), 4.

[101] Jules, The Battle of Dienbienphu, xv.

[102] Ibid., 4; Douglas Perch, "Vietnam Reconsidered," Vietnam (June 1994), 48-53.

[103] Ellsberg, Papers on the War, 25-26.

[104] Ibid.

[105] Ibid., 27.

[106] Ibid.

[107] Herbert Marcuse, One Dimensional Man (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964), 57.

[108] Tuchman, The March of Folly, 346; Thompson, Rolling Thunder, 43.

[109] Thompson, Rolling Thunder, 27-28; George McTurnan Kahin and John W. Lewis, The United States in Vietnam, 153.

[110] McNamara, In Retrospect, 244; Amter, Vietnam Verdict, 14.

[111] Gibson, The Perfect War, 355.

[112] William Shawcross, Sideshow: Kissinger, Nixon and the Destruction of Cambodia (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1979), 306; Karnow, Vietnam, 363. Thompson, Rolling Thunder, 13.

[113] Gibson, The Perfect War, 162.

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114 Hoopes, The Limitations of Intervention, 81-83; Tuchman, The March of Folly, 353.

115 Gibson, The Perfect War, 404; General Westmoreland was replaced by General Creighton Abrams the summer of 1968; Tuchman, The March of Folly,353, President Lyndon Baines Johnson decided not to run for reelection, and the 200,000 troops requested for Vietnam were not sent.

116 Thompson, Rolling Thunder, 64; Shawcross, Sideshow, 210; Tuchman, The March of Folly, 337; Colonel James A. Donovan, U.S. Marine Corps (ret.), "Assessing the War's Cost," Vietnam (April 1996), 42-46. Hoopes, The Limitations of Intervention, 85; Robert L. Holmes, On War and Morality (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1989), 71.

117 Kolko, Anatomy of a War, 310; Thompson, Rolling Thunder, 11. Gibson, The Perfect War, 164-65.

118 Gibson, The Perfect War, 342, 336, 352-55.

119 Douglas Pike, Viet Cong: The Organization and Techniques of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam (Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London, England: The MIT Press, 1966), 41; Amter, Vietnam Verdict, xiv.

120 Colonel General Rice,

121 Michael Myerson and Mark Solomon, Stopping World War III (U.S.A.: Published by the U.S. Peace Council, 1980), 79.

122 Lifton, Home From the War, 171; Wilfred G. Burchett, Vietnam North: A First-Hand Report, 1st. ed., (New York: International Publishers, 1966), 24-25.

123 SIPRI 1974 Yearbook, World Armaments and Disarmament, 329-32.

124 Ibid., 332-33.

125 Gibson, The Perfect War, 396.

126 SIPRI 1974 Yearbook, World Armaments and Disarmament, 342.

127 Ibid., 343.

128 Ibid.

129 Ibid., 344-45.

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130 Ibid., 356.

131 Karnow, Vietnam, 602; Gibson, The Perfect War, 299-303. Kolko, Anatomy of a War, 330; Palmer, The 25-Year War, 89; Amter, Vietnam Verdict, 327.

132 Gibson, The Perfect War, 281-82, 304-05.

133 DeBenedetti and Chatfield, An American Ordeal, 236; Amter, Vietnam Verdict, 272.

134 Gibson, The Perfect War, 82; Amter, Vietnam Verdict, 197.

135 Kolko, Anatomy of a War, 144-45; Tuchman, The March of Folly, 332,33; SIPRI 1974 Yearbook, World Armaments and Disarmament, 400; Amter, Vietnam Verdict, 330.

137 Amter, Vietnam Verdict, 333.

138 Gibson, The Perfect War, 70-73, 83, 88.

139 Gibson, The Perfect War, 262, 272.

140 The results from survey question #58 (Do you agree that high tech war in Vietnam did more harm than good?)

141 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago, Il.: University of Chicago Press, 1959), 229.

142 Gibson, The Perfect War, 444.

143 SIPRI 1974 Yearbook, World Armaments and Disarmament, 328-352.

144 Ibid., 328-29.

Ibid., 352-53.

146 Wells, The War Within, xiv.

147 The editors of Ramparts with Banning Garrett and Katherine Barkley, One, Two Three Vietnams (New York, Evanston, London: Canfield Press, San Francisco, a department of Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., 1971, 37. American terms of: "declare you are beaten or we will bomb you back into the Stone Age" only hardened North Vietnamese resistance.

148 Ibid., 1-2.

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149 Ibid., 2-3.

150 Ibid.

151 King, Death of an Army, 70.

152 Richard Moser, The New Winter Soldiers: GI and Veteran Dissent During the Vietnam Era (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1996, 67.

153 Wells, The War Within, 474.

154 Tuchman, The March of Folly, 319.

155 Johnson and Schneider, Current Issues in U.S. Defense Policy, 14; Gibson, The Perfect War, 231. A Rand study showed 75% of the peasants whose crops were poisoned explicitly hated the U.S. and the GVN; Karnow, Vietnam, 254.

156 Karnow, Vietnam, 460.

157 Alan Dawson, 55 Days: The Fall of South Vietnam (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1977, 37-18.

158 General Douglas MacArthur, 1946, confirming the death sentence imposed by a U.S. military commission on General Tomayuki Yamashita.

159 David Cortright, Soldier in Revolt Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Press Doubleday, 1975), 14.

160 Ken Johnson, "May 4, 1970," from Vietnam Veterans Tell their Story: Recollections, The Veteran (Summer 1990), 6. Johnson compares the National Guard at Kent State with Nixon's war in Cambodia to crush a patriotic people's righteous resistance. He considers it point and counterpoint.

161 Barbara Myerhoff, Number Our Days New York: A Touchstone Book, Published by Simon and Schuster, 1978). In her study of a group of Jewish old people in an urban ghetto, Myerhoff shows how meaning and narrative, even being itself, are presented through the human existence. She weaves through the underlying levels of Jewish culture to discover how people assign meanings to not only their lives but to others as well. The quality of history, through memory and narrative as process, underlines the personal quest for meaning in a society that devalues thus constrains a group. Elie Wiesel and Bruno Bettelheim offer that those who "bear witness" are ultimately an embarrassment to a world that would find it easier not to have "disturbers" of the peace, the survivors who have the

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[166] Kolko, Anatomy of a War, 483-85.

[167] Ibid., 364-65.

[168] Ellsberg, Papers on the War, 306-09.

[169] Feliks Gross, Ideologies, Goals and Values (Foreword by Don Martindale. (Westport, Connecticut, and London, England: Greenwood, 1984), 55.

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VI. CONCLUSION

The Vietnam veterans in this study were separated into three groups according to their decision to join or not join a veteran's organization and the organization of choice. In this, the Non-Joiners were unaligned; Joiners were represented in established organizations, such as the American Legion, Veterans of Foreign Wars, Disabled Veterans of America, and Vietnam Veterans of America and other traditional mainstream organizations; and the VVAW opted for a non-traditional approach, an anti-war veteran's movement. Their choices reflected affinities towards a) total non-involvement, b) supporting the status quo, or c) dissent from an undeclared war in progress, a war in which they had fought, were fighting or, for some, would continue to fight.

Thus degrees of difference were traced within parameters of action or non-action into an alteration away from traditional soldier conduct in past wars, thus the Vietnam War offered us the luxury of analyzing the phenomenon that

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literally led to the death of an American army. In his pre-mortem of the Vietnam War,[1] retired Lieutenant Colonel Edward L. King presents a disorganized military establishment riddled with dishonesty and self-interest tracing back to the undeclared Korean War - a military unable or unwilling to restore that institution to the "old values that made this country great" or to keep it honest. In essence, the separation of military from the political arm of government was removed, thus situating it within the pattern of historical corruption set by an earlier Roman Praetorian Guard.

The VVAW offered us that instance where we could test those premises through their refusal to dishonor the profession. The traditional role of the obedient soldier under the revised rules removed the opportunity to measure values apart from ideology and altered the forms of military allegiance, as well. Toward this, disobedience became the norm in the historic task of sacrificing for ideals. Those changes are illustrated in self-directed actions leading to the erosion of ideological consistency because of idealistic convictions that what was happening in Vietnam was morally indefensible.

That conviction intensified as the war progressed into higher levels of savagery and barbarism and with it grew a

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stronger determination to educate towards a higher universal standard of morality. Thus the stated reasons for founding the VVAW was to end all unjust wars and to educate the American public into the depth of their cultural depravity, as illustrated by their elected and appointed leadership - political, military, and media. There were too many fabrications, too many lies, and the truth had to be resurrected by those who witnessed the immorality. Thus, we can gauge the degree of alienation from duly constituted authority, an alienation from systemic imperatives, and the point of departure from complicity in actions deemed morally and ethically repugnant.

Within this form, idealism is the area that will evoke the most intense reaction to perceived abuses of power, on any level, and mandate every attempt to reintegrate the artificial world of alienation with social reconstructions on a foundation of fairness and justice. Over and again we have witnessed times of crisis ushering in periods of change that adapted to a new historical reality, or, if they remain unaltered, subjected is to further strains as the need for change was subordinated by the power of entrenched interests. For the most part, these crises have been financial, thus have not altered the cohesion and

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solidarity that have been America's strength. The type of social change that results from tumult and irrationality, have thus, with a few exceptions, escaped being part of the American scene because of a lack of consent from the public.

However, these chaotic forms appeared during the Vietnam War, not as an outgrowth of an impoverished class, but as a result of indignation. An educated generation had been well taught. They questioned the authenticity of assertions for protecting American interests in Vietnam. They were the ones to be drafted; they were the ones who had to suspend choices; and they were the ones who had to defend democracy for a country operating in disregard of the Geneva Accords. They chose dissent.

Thus the anti-war movement grew in the silence of young minds where the alienation began in the discovery of lies, deceit, and manipulations created in a political process that rejected human values. Basically, they wanted to be heard; thus the determination to realign the state with democratic principles grew. The appearance of the VVAW was an attempt to reintegrate the social contract. Their early opposition to the war was evident before they emerged in mid-1967. Jan Barry found it difficult to accept the premise of using Vietnamese as guinea pigs.[2]

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He had seen the wasteful extravagance of resources, where we would "blow the bankroll" on inconsequentials but exercise extreme penury on the vital necessities of war - radio parts that could not be procured, and that he had to cannibalize to keep vital avenues of communications open.

If members of that organization were impatient with the American fixation for one dimensional ideological consistency that demanded silencing of all opposition, that impatience led to actions that went beyond the paralysis of mental criticism into an articulation of the entire idea system that had, up to that point, kept them integrated into the web of their respective social system.

This fixation with the truth is the point of separation for the VVAW, the Non-Joiners and the Joiners. The resolve to change conditions of an unconscionable nature evolved into political action that removed the VVAW from the farce and opened highly vocal dialogue with their society. This is not to say they were moral entrepreneurs, but they were highly motivated individuals who wanted to make a difference and they took it seriously.

So we have the reasons for the historical divide within the military in Vietnam: one group maintained unquestioning traditional support for duly authorized national priorities and the other group who could not

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remain ideologically committed to a dishonorable venture but sought to reassert traditional democratic values based on respect for the individual. The third group of veterans chose marginality in lieu of involvement of any kind.

The core elements that formed the dominant cultural values of what it was to be American, the signifiers, hadn't changed; the signified did and there was a lengthy period of incubation before they were released. We often hear negative disclaimers on the differences between the Vietnam generation of warriors and those who went before or followed after. Questions of socialization appear most often; they underlie perceptions that failure in Vietnam was the effect of political restraints, lack of home support or sensational media coverage. These far outweigh other reasons offered as the basis for the loss of American honor in Vietnam.

Criticism has been offered that "these guys" (VVAW) did not agitate while in the service. This would assume that alterations occurred when the danger of being in Vietnam had passed, or at a time they could not be held liable for their actions. It then becomes a matter of cowardice where one dissents when he is safe from enemy bullets or being placed in front of them. However, change in the traditional conduct of the military mind happened

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long before the soldier became a Vietnam veteran. It began in the Boy Scouts, in religious training, in areas of duty to and responsibility for society and was reinforced in families and communities.

For many VVAWers, dissent was inseparable from questions of task and duty. We note a David Cline whose conduct as a soldier in Vietnam was exemplary; or a Frank Toner, conscientious objector sent to Vietnam without a gun as a medic to test his seriousness as a C.O. and didn't flinch; there is Ben Chitty, imbued with southern gallantry who could not believe what was happening in Vietnam and refused to follow orders because he could not become part of the corruption; then there is Jan Barry who began to see the inconsistencies between what he was told and the reality of what he did, saw and experienced in Vietnam. And finally, we see Shelley Ramsdale whose photographs of Vietnam were used in mapping targets before he became one of the VVAW founders and an ardent activist for peace.

If rebellion followed, we can point to the idealistic roots supporting the emergence of the VVAW in their conviction that American democracy was not being furthered in a nasty little war 8,000 miles away from the secure and comfortable lives of the average American citizen. It happened because these veterans not only firmly believed

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that America should not descend into barbarism to remake the world in its image, but were idealistically motivated to educate Americans on the type of war being waged in Vietnam.

The weakening of a military ethos in Vietnam stemmed from an alteration in the professional code of honor where a warrior abstains from barbarism. His replacement by the cool technician who has no responsibility for his actions, only a directive from higher management that the job has to be done exclusive of value judgments or other ethical abstractions violated that area of personal integrity based on respect for life.

Thus assembly line impositions of body counts as tools of measurement mellowed human tragedy into conformity with tactics, not strategy, and removed the need for restraint. For those far removed from the results of pressing a button that released tons of steel programmed to fragment into showers of death meant not having to judge the merits of their conduct in war. The violence would stop once the Viet Cong and North Vietnam understood the futility of resisting.

In this vein, Gibson's work[3] illustrates the technique of replacing bedrock military honor and sacrifice with technology and management skills toward the corruption of

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institutional integrity; Tom Wells' work on America's battle over Vietnam and the political corruption that destroyed the social contract between governing and governed adds another dimension of understanding[4], and Philip Knightley's work[5] on media coverage in Vietnam and the internal war that buried the myth of press neutrality once and for all provides a clear look into the corruption of the fourth estate, which may be the greatest corruption of all. In essence, a press running shotgun for an economic and political elite has never been in the best interest of an enlightened democracy. We see the burgeoning of underground press material, brochures, faxes, pamphlets, conversations, posters, sweat shirt statements, the establishment of coffee houses as the doubts grew about the war and its micromanagers. The press has not been trusted to relay anything but political correctness since. It was the alternative press, the uncredentialled that broke the silence; they did not have to worry about job security, name status, national and international renown because there were other concerns that were far more important: life and death, truth and honesty, and morals and ethics for starters.

We note that the task of Vietnam Veterans Against the War was to present the truth. Many reporters in fact did

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yeomen duty in reporting the facts on Vietnam; but there were those who knew of My Lai and other atrocities but kept their silence. When silence was broken, it usually came from freelancers who could approach international news agencies when U.S. media refused to run their news stories.

The charge that sensational news coverage was high on the list of why we failed in Vietnam is understandable. They pointed a finger at the hypocrisy surrounding American actions there. The depth of feeling against the news media was second only to the distaste they felt for VVAW antiwar rhetoric. They viewed it as debasing the military, and that VVAW actions were scandalous. Some attributed such incomprehensible behavior to survivor guilt over leaving buddies behind. Others attributed their actions to ego distress; still others to ulterior motives of weakness or conversion to alien philosophies that was giving aid and comfort to the enemy. Still others saw their betrayal as nothing other than trading their military traditions for free sex and drugs they believed had become the hallmark of the antiwar movement.

Very little attention was directed towards the abuse of power. The task of citizens was to support duly elected leaders whose obligation was to guarantee national survival. They never distinguished between the imperatives

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of a new world order that could not depend on corrupt puppet governments to control internal opposition. As a result, The U.S. had to commit its Treasury, its manpower, and its legitimacy in supporting an arrogant foreign elite against the majority of its own citizens.

We became mired in a land war in Asia, a war that could not be sustained. The real issue was not communism as much as whether a government may justifiably do anything in its power to coerce another government to bow to its will. Montesquieu has stated that the deterioration of any government begins with the decay of the principles on which it was founded.[6] To a large number of Americans, the Vietnam War failed to meet those principles, thus the war was a political as well as a moral failure: killing of civilians, assassinations and torture, terror-bombing, and the unparalleled coverup in high places.

For many of us, Vietnam was an example of the evil political realism can do to impair national pride by destroying basic respect for other people. As Jan Barry tersely answered when asked what the legacy of Vietnam was, "we have to learn to respect other people." The boundaries shifted and being human was more important than being an American, although there was no question that service to country also resides in negation of state immorality.

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In this, respect for Vietnam's sovereignty disappeared in a non-declared war that shifted the American role from protector to aggressor. The breakdown of basic respect for human life also contributed to the disintegration of American social structure. Without core values of respect for human life, all life, nobility towards others became non-existent; the less privileged Vietnamese peasantry were increasingly exposed to types of military action that pulverized any innocent caught in the crossfire of querrilla warfare.

That type of warfare could not be accommodated within the code of honor associated with permissible conduct in war. With each official pronouncement that we were not doing a fraction of the harm the enemy was not doing first, we lost the moral incentives to prevent human suffering beyond the necessary. What restraints had been in effect all but disappeared after the Tet Offensive when military forces withdrew from the highlands and were placed in defendable zones or along coastal areas.

The technological war grew in intensity with no end in sight, and dissenting VVAW members turned with a vengeance against the symbols of the power that sustained it. We see the return of their medals as the highest revulsion any veteran could express. The medals, after all, had been given for participating in the havoc created in Vietnam.

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Again, the break in traditional military obedience to nation appears to have been that instance when the challenge to non-negotiable terms of personal morality arose and led to questions about complicity in the increasing use and misuse of scientific warfare in pursuits of war.

For those who fought in Vietnam, who began to see the contradictions in destroying the world to save it for democracy, there followed the realization that cultural differences were inadequate bases for war. If anything altered allegiance from the nation to the universal, it was the core moral value of respect for human life. In this, we see the value of that life as not particularly American, Vietnamese, or international, but a universal standard of conduct from which flows the foundation of war or peace.

We find an inordinately high number of Vietnam veterans believing that what we did in Vietnam was necessary and useful; that engaging a backward peasant society in war was not immoral or supportable; and that we did not deliberately destroy civilian lives or property. Still, there are those veterans who offer differing perceptions of what happened in Vietnam, that My Lai was neither the first, nor an isolated example of suspending moral conduct in war but one that must not be permitted.

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Most saw their task as fighting to secure political parity for the South Vietnamese people who were thought to be innocent victims of a nefarious North Vietnamese expansionism.

The VVAW evidences the highest rate of separation in accepting the official explanation for the war; the Non-Joiners, for the most part, view the war as a political contrivance and war is hell but you do what you have to do, then go home and try to forget it. The veterans in the Joiner group show the least amount of deviation from the traditional normative expectations - not to equivocate, but to win as quickly and decisively as possible thus saving human lives in the long run.

In this, the VVAW can be seen as the destabilizers in the military tradition of obedience to orders. In a narrow sense, maintaining systemic integration through adherence to consistent predictability in responding to authority is the bedrock of taking a country to war and keeping it there till victory is guaranteed. However, their challenge to immoral authority introduced an element of ethical outrage that raised consciousness on the war. The major effect of their participation in the anti-war movement can be seen in Nixon's disengagement of ground operations and escalation of the air war into Laos, Cambodia and all of Vietnam. When

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you cannot trust the last line of defense, you retreat into technological overkill.

The official lies and coverup of the escalation of the air war from 1972 till 1973, when disclosed, added to public cynicism and a loss of trust in their political institution. This reluctance to let people know the extent of actions in Vietnam may well be an indication of the general moral climate of the American public. If the government had to resort to misinformation of the facts, they, at least, had an understanding of the level of morality within their polity. As such, VVAW faith in educating the public to the truth so they would stop the war was well founded.

They broadened signifiers to the extent and meaning of values and, in the historical vortex of Vietnam, the meaning of those values changed the outcome of the war, as well. Feliks Gross[7] offers core values as a society's superethos. These values set the boundaries and direction of action because they ultimately rest on societal yardsticks of right and wrong and set the standards for maintaining social control. When these standards are corrupted and undermined, the symbolic underpinnings of the superethos are removed and the change is felt throughout the entire social system.

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One need look no farther than Jan Barry and the VVAW for a determination to correct the warpage. The VVAW did not reinvent core values, they served as correctives by presenting how far this country had straved from its ideals. Ideals in themselves may be close to or far apart from reality; in either case, they can be devastating to levels of consistency maintained by universal sets of expectations inherent in the norms that bind all members of a society together. The very existence of the state depends on these voluntary acceptances of shared values, and if it is not elicited, the state, as we have seen during the Vietnam era, will not hesitate to reimpose their legitimacy through force and coercion. The risk is great, the state could lose. The major VVAW accomplishment was to reach into the ranks of the military by appealing to a universal standard of duty and conscience.

In this sense, they were a very lethal transformative agent for they concentrated on the critical area that preserved social structure - strength of character. By offering an avenue to universality over the one dimensionality of the entrenched objective class conditions, they were able to cut across class lines, racial barriers, and national boundaries (linking with international groups in the effort to end the war.

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In the Joiner group, although aware for the most part of the kind of force necessary to compel Vietnamese political obedience, many saw it as "necessary and useful" to stop ideological Communism that would ultimately enslave a surrogate state struggling to survive. Ultimately, it would have to be destroyed militarily if our way of life was to continue - there, rather than here. Ideologically this maintained the will to overcome alien threats to our economic, social and political institutions and our way of life. Thus, emotionally, the men we sent to Vietnam fought with great courage and tenacity, suffered and endured beyond anything their fathers had in World War II.

They were, in this author's estimation, as good an army as any we have ever fielded; they were the warriors who entered the tunnels of Cu Chi; they were the men who fought against enormous odds at Hamburger Hill; they comforted their dying buddies the only way they knew, by holding them in their arms at great personal risk until they died; they did what they were asked to do and, if there is a feeling of betrayal, it is not at the task but the strategy of political restraints, betrayal of home support and the sensational media coverage more attuned to the spectacle than to the truth.

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They remain believers of the war as moral and justified, and view instances of norm failure, such as My Lai, as unjust and certainly not illustrative of American morals or ethics, but are supportive of other questionable areas of civilian risk because it saved American lives. To this group, what happens in war cannot be helped - the moral and ethical frame is suspended while the task is ongoing, that is why it has to be quick and final.

There is no questioning the right of others to determine their political and economic choices, since the wrong choice could not be tolerated. There was also a lack of questioning of the basis of a Communist threat to South Vietnam; the people who comprised the vast majority of the population there had nothing in common with the South Vietnam regime. Their resistance to the U.S. effort went far deeper than ideological differences, it affected their right to remain Vietnamese, not acceptable replicas of the nation that was destroying their nation and their way of life. The South Vietnamese government that had been imposed on them had no legitimacy, and with the exception of the Catholic population, had nothing in common with their forms of worship.

The VVAW, more than any other military personnel, understood the cultural basis of the struggle and went

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beyond the misrepresentations from Washington for the reasons we were in Vietnam. And they wanted to involve the American public into that search for truth. It was important to know why people were dying in Vietnam, and it had to be for more important reasons than fantasy and myth.

Those who withdrew, the Non-Joiners, remained, for the most part, on the fringes of the debate. They had a job to do. Some did it well, some opted for passivity and unconcern. Many were good soldiers, judging from the number of honorable discharges, and many have opted for private lives and less intrusion of social or state demands; if asked to serve again, many will not. Even more telling is the admittance that if their sons face compulsory military service, they will send them out of the country or counsel them to avoid the draft. This group is half in size to the group who have joined traditional veterans organizations and subscribe to the general ethos of the consenting warrior group, and three times the number of VVAW members.

They have been stigmatized as dropouts, drug addicts and no gooders, but that is not apparent from their Vietnam history. Many may not have liked what they did, but the only way to get home was to get it over with. As one survey respondent commented, "didn't know, didn't care, and didn't give a damn about who was winning the war when he left

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Vietnam."[8] This group may not be counted on to fight another war or to encourage their sons and daughters to do so.

Without an ideological analysis, there is little to separate these three groups from their zones of reality. Class, socialization, education, religion, socio-economic status are similar; predominantly middle class and poor, the wealthy and powerful did not go to Vietnam. So it is within the historical dimensions of Vietnam and its impact on the men who served there that the answers to why men rebel are to be found.

Because the VVAW was the group that rebelled, tracing the independent variable of idealism and its effects on altering patterns of strong, historic patterns of obedience contrary to individual inclinations became the focus of this research. This form of idealism is separated from religion, because not all beliefs are religious. We note that Durkheim's massive sociological contributions rested on a theory of the human spirit, turning it into another level of belief - one of society as the moral arbiter. With this interpretation, we can look to the scientific and rational potential of man for clues to behavior. Idealism has to be present to some degree when we are considering choices in transcending or maintaining boundaries; it is the basis for

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supporting traditional conformity or opting for unparalleled decisions based on idealistic principle.

This is not meant to say that the other groups were not capable of being idealistic, just that their frame of reference prevented them from making the final leap into idealistic praxis or seeing the need for it. The historic decision Jan Barry made to join the April 15, 1967 anti-war demonstration in New York City as a dissenting Vietnam veteran was the synthesis of the tension between knowing what was wrong and doing something about it. It was a revolutionary praxis that would not have been possible without the importance of critiquing ideological givens in advance of his action and that theoretical critique undermined the hold of ideology.

When Jan could no longer conceal or incorporate the internal contradictions of the Vietnam War into his frame of reference, it was over, the idealist was lost. Just as his actions at West Point underscored a strong idealistic streak over rational self-interest, so too did the choice between taking a stand or keeping quiet give a measure of the man. He chose to change conditions through a conscious, informed praxis. In this sense, the historical act is based on an ideological break and the dissolution of the reproduction of ideology because the break that

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precipitated the crisis in the first instance removes the basis of ideology itself.

Thus, we see that Jan Barry's decision to project the new consciousness was not promoted from a deformed outside reality, but from within a very humane and human mind which, once his part in the reproduction of the Vietnam War was grasped, became liberated into divergent revolutionary praxis. Arriving at this plateau was not quickly or easily accomplished.

In this, ideology is a difficult concept to isolate since arguments range along a continuum of negative to positive, and the scope of the task of discovering the strength of ideological belief patterns or its fissures are difficult to articulate. When do men rebel and why? Marx, unlike Bacon, Hobbes, Feuerbach, Kant or Hegel, conceived ideology in terms of appearance. Ideology appears within the consciousness of individuals as the reign of ideas and these ideas cloud your vision of reality. There is the polarity of subject and object and a dualism of sharply separated lines of demarcation between reality and consciousness.

"Consciousness can never be anything else than conscious existence, and the existence of men is their actual life-process," thus reintegrates subject and object

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in that men think and they act on that thought. Thus his dictum that consciousness does not determine life, life determines consciousness provides a validity seen in the perceived moral essence of VVAW actions removed from personal gain or social support but part of their conditioned historical reality of their society. It is not in contemplation that we distinguish them as different, but through their actions, their praxis.

Within the VVAW, the consequences of perceived moral failure - the tactics of war, the lack of ethical restraints, and the continued stress on blind obedience to orders that mandated complicity in technological mayhem - highlighted the dilemma between the ideological distortions which they believed to be basic human values and that which their patriotic duty mandated they do. They came away from that war convinced that veterans could and would take the lead in trying to stop the horrors they had survived and to turn away from celebrations of war and militarism.[9] They see the remarkable toughness of humanity in that people can go through the most brutalizing and dehumanizing of experiences and still be human.[10] In this, Vietnam demystified the deceit and distortions of types of exploitation and produced a new consciousness above the deformed reality of ideological consensus.

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We see in the VVAW that the ideal is thus not one of deep inner psychological motivations; on the contrary, it appears far removed from pure subjective explanations. The twin polarities of determination and free will which appeared to produce an internalized synthesis rested on the valid acceptance of external dimensions, in this instance the Vietnam War. With the refusal to synthesize contradictory hypocrisies, the reintegration of subject-object could begin to overcome the illusion of false consciousness. Thus reality could not be compromised because it escaped the rigid parameters of doctrine and ideology lost its hold because it was no longer valid. Not that man has total free will to do whatever he wishes, but that once aware, he has no choice but to rebel against that which he holds morally unacceptable.

Antiwar activist David Harris, Stanford University's student body president was compelled to ask at his moment of ideological breakthrough: "What is the responsibility of an individual in the face of immoral acts of the state?"[11] He answered the question by returning several draft cards with his name on them to the Government, refusing to serve in what he considered to be an immoral war, eventually going to prison for his act of disobedience. The difficulty with individual stands is

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that there is no single interpretation of what immorality is, a wide divergence of thought renders consensus practically nil. Since morality is situational, altering patterns of acceptable behaviour from person to person, from institution to institution, from state to state and from ideology to ideology is not a simple matter of seeing through the phantoms. It is the transformative area where belief is either a blind activity or a freeing mechanism.

Thus, ideology remains that area where momentous decisions can be made to retain patterns of behaviour or refrain from actions deemed immoral and inhumane. David Harris' action was an individual act of moral idealism, but with the VVAW we see soldiers uniting to further the dissension. The question of honor and conduct and the inseparability of the two from conscience remains vital in issues of war. It was easier to decide in earlier times when religion was successfully sure, thus the standard for belief and action was whether you obeyed your god or went against his will. With the intellectual deviation from this theological worldview came the emergence of science as the critique of the entire baggage of cultural cognition of what was right or wrong.

Science as that approach to truth apart from the superstitions of medieval approaches to reality swept aside

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fictions that once held a sacred world as the only source of the true representation of knowledge. Science could now proclaim its hegemony through unbiased knowledge since religion could no longer overcome those irrational and contradictory elements that defied formal logic. Bacon, Descartes, Feuerbach led the approach that no longer supported a deductive logic in the approach to reality but could now replace it with the inductive method.

Thus the religion that provided a concept of morality in war stemming from the fourth century writings of St. Augustine, later refined by St. Thomas Acquinas in the 13th century, cannot be held valid against scientific doctrine emerging from the Age of Enlightenment.[12] The Just War Doctrine evolved into a dualistic conception stating the requirements attached to any decision to go to war, jus ad bellum, and the moral conduct of war, jus in bello[13] are thus seen as based on antiquated ideology.

Thus to discover why the Vietnam War or modern war per se can no longer be held to these erstwhile Christian ethics of a just war, we have to examine the moral guidelines and their internal requirements to analyze the ideological break inherent in the modern world view. As far as any war can be considered "just" in the Augustinian sense, they are heavily laced with religious

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justifications. One of the ten commandments offers that thou shalt not kill. Since war is an act of actively killing or being killed, it calls for terms and conditions when that impersonal killing is to be approved or condemned.

The three requirements for jus ad bellum is that war must be declared by proper authority, it must involve a just cause, and must have right intentions. For jus in bello, the criteria to be met are that the war must be waged in proportion to the ends to be achieved; extreme measures are to be taken to avoid harming civilians and non-belligerents; and the means must be in accordance with the positive laws of war.[14] These codes were conceived for a feudalistic society, one where face-to-face confrontations were the norm, and considerations between combatant and non-combatant had not achieved the state-of-the-art technician far removed from the consequences of his acts on other humans.

The advanced state of modern warfare calls for an even greater stress on protecting the innocent; yet abiding by an honorable conduct of war invites losing the opportunity to best your opponent by insisting on greater moral qualities of military virtue thus is sadly at odds with priorities of the modern state based on modern scientific

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premises. Thus, My Lai is perfectly rational in an age of logical adherence to tactics and not strategy - the Weberian ends/means argument.

That is why the Vietnam War cannot be said to qualify as a just war in any of the above criteria, or in the requirements incorporated in each that designate moral from immoral wars. An examination of U.S. participation in the Vietnam War in terms of the just war doctrine reveals that none of the requirements for a moral war were met, or could be met. The first requirement of jus ad bellum, that war be declared by proper authority unequivocably sidestepped the constitution by permitting the president to send troops anywhere he deemed necessary without consultation with Congress; thus war was never declared by proper authority, although it was mandated by a supreme authority.

The war in Vietnam never involved a just cause, despite protestations of Communist takeover and the Domino theory, it was an internal crisis and a civil war. This fact was twisted beyond reason by appeals to a demonized enemy bent on imposing a godless philosophy on mankind. It escapes reason since science in its own right can explain every phenomenon in time, exclusive of a God in residence, yet in retrospect, ideological separation of science from religion was found wanting.

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The third stipulation of right intentions would insure proper international protection for the terms and conditions for the Geneva Accord of 1954 and not for its dismemberment through falsification of data. For jus in bello, war was waged in Vietnam far beyond the means required to attain the ends; despite protestations that every effort was made to protect non-belligerents from harm, it remained moot since all Vietnamese were considered as sympathetic with or members of the Viet Cong; and the war was never in conduct with the positive laws of war - it was genocidal and brutal.

One glance at the history of relations between Vietnam and the United States since the Geneva Accords of 1954, reveals that the people of Vietnam could not be trusted with the decision to decide the political, economic and social future of their country. The Geneva Accords set the terms for the future reintegration of Vietnam through the ballot box; of special importance was paragraph 13 providing for consultations to ensure that the agreements were to be respected. Although the United States committed to paragraphs one through twelve, it omitted paragraph 13.

In a world dominant power, the regard for matters of justice and fairness often evaporates when a powerful executive is free to pursue with overwhelming military power

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what he cannot gain in diplomacy. The sad reality of committing the U.S. to an undeclared war over alleged emergencies and attacks (such as the Tonkin Gulf incident) merely because American leaders see the world as their exclusive preserve, is reminiscent of King Leopold's treatment of the Belgian Congo in a not so distant past.

As the Viet Cong proved extremely difficult to root out of South Vietnam, new rules were implemented for civilians. The new distinction was between those who were "loyal" or "disloyal," however, the designation was arbitrary. Thus they were designated enemy or non-combatant, never civilians to protect. The new standard was no longer based on overt military complicity but on political allegiances. The label of Viet Cong or VC sympathizer thus could be applied to anyone at any time in any place, and in the case of General Thieu in summer of 1972, entire areas of South Vietnam were so designated.[15] Since it was an arbitrary label, pilots could not be faulted for killing civilians and non-combatants became fair game when politically labeled as such.

This alteration of rules for identifying civilian non-combatants in Vietnam meant that 1) villages could be bombed and shelled without warning if American troops had received fire from within it, 2) any village known to be

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hostile could be bombed or shelled in advance of dropping leaflets or notification by helicopter loudspeaker warning of imminent danger, or 3) the civilian population could be moved out and the village and surrounding countryside designated a free fire zone.

Often no warning was given; leaflets could not be read by illiterate peasants;[16] and forcible evacuations left large numbers of civilians behind who either would not leave ancestral lands or had no place to go.[17] The pressure between the moral concept of war and necessary measures that had to be taken may be seen in the dilemma of troops conducting Operation Benton in August 1967. They were told not to add to the refugee population by removing Vietnamese from their villages as they could not be accommodated in the overflowing refugee camps.[18] It was later noted that it was not considered the role of the military to integrate diplomacy with the use of force.[19]

In essence, rising above military subculture can be difficult; as a total institution, it destroys identity and molds a new persona in the image of the characteristics best suited for military service: obedience, compliance, and other elements suited for the orientation of war. As a child, you are socialized into your familial cultural patterns, properly made aware of the sacred by your church

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and integrated into the dominant culture by your schools. War is not a human endeavor suitable for civility, and American troops were called upon to suspend ethical behavior in lieu of rational, albeit sometimes controversial operational standards. Guerilla warfare was contrary to the professional training they had been given and it was impossible to corner and eliminate an enemy that proved as illusive as he was innovative.

Katherine Chorley notes that the only possible method for countering the actual immense superiority of professional armed forces is a form of sustained guerrilla warfare.[20] It was clear that the U.S. obsession with doctrines of counter insurgency clouded the issues of engagement in Vietnam. They could not see that with the increasing change from guerrilla to conventional army the entire nature of the war was changing. The decisive force in Vietnam was not the Viet Cong but the North Vietnamese Army, however the balance remained the Vietnamese civilian.

Thus impugning irrational behavior to the soldiers who had to follow orders removed the onus from decision makers at the top who gave it volition. Thus critique as the preventive to rational lapses leading to events such as My Lai was missing. The checks and balances provided by raising red flags of warning enabling proper functioning of

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legal structures and institutions within a democracy to discipline politics under conditions of war into an art of compromise were inoperative. We see that none of the conditions for jus ad bellum or in jus in bello were met, either by default or by intent.

Taking the first three requirements of jus ad bellum, the Vietnam War was an undeclared war and was never constitutionally designated as anything else. In the second instance, a just war presupposes that setting up a puppet regime contrary to the terms of the Geneva Accord of 1954 election assumes the dimensions of arrogance in determining internal conditions within that sovereign state precluding a divided Vietnam in the Korean experience. Differing political philosophies would impact the political, economic and social ideologies of this nation by threatening Western control of Southeast Asia; the third stipulation regarding the right intentions were not altruistically or ethically motivated, as witnessed by the shattering of war conventions and the political codes laboriously worked out at the French capitulation in Geneva in 1954. Thus placing America above the law was ultimately the gravest moral flaw of all.

In addressing the terms and conditions of jus in bello, the means utilized to produce compliance from North Vietnam were far and beyond civility and approached

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barbarism in its escalation of terroristic bombing approaches on a people whose only crime was in opposing the superimposition of a non-Vietnamese political and economic system, along with the degradation of a unique cultural perspective rooted in antiquity. The second requirement addresses the distinction between what is morally permissible in aiming or not aiming accurately at a particular people because of things they have done or, more to the point, have not done or are doing, thus aiming at the whole group of people indiscriminately because of who they are and how their thinking differs. The third stipulation had no merit since the laws were those deemed valid by the United States and not those set by terms of the Geneva Accord.

If it appeared that the South Vietnamese stood to lose the election and were to be swept from office, then other methods to legitimate American military support of its unpopular superimposed regime had to be devised. That introduced oppositional interpretations depending on the point of view each participant held; the moral absolutist following a "Fiat justica ruat coelum," do justice even if the heavens fall meant not interfering into an internal affair, while the utilitarianism of extremity (do justice unless the heavens are about to fall)[21] presupposed a

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sliding scale of justice where transferring the rights of ethical parties to the citizen soldiers of an alien state whose right to wage war is said to be just because it had the power to so designate the terms and conditions of political sovereignty by artificial means.

When the indiscriminate elimination of whole peoples superseded the need for ethical balance because of the time spent in waiting out the attritional nature of the war, we lost our moral appeal. Threatening an entire society because the members share a common identity was no different in Vietnam under U.S. aegis than Hitler's wholesale extermination of Jews and any other group who did not identify or fit into the Aryan schematic.

Limited struggles are costly; secondly, ordinary citizens not engaged in political business are supposedly immune to punishment whether or not they support the laws of their country tacitly or with their labor. In this sense, terrorism is a step away from genocide because it is associated with demands for unconditional surrender or else. It destroys conventions and expectations and resides in the political codes that brook no other god before it.

President Eisenhower, who was in office during the period of time designated as the election for reunification, knew that if the scheduled election were

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held, the South Vietnamese puppet government would fall; it was estimated that the election for a unified Vietnam would carry 80% of the votes away from Western influence into nationalistic priorities. In this sense, American policy appears to have been revolutions are to be squelched by all force necessary. Nations will no longer evolve by their own internal laws. One purpose of the violence in Vietnam was to prove that wars of national liberation could not succeed, to demonstrate in the clearest and most explicit terms that any revolutionary movement the United States did not designate as legitimate would face the most efficient and ruthless machinery that could be developed by modern technology.[22]

Where was international law during this moral breach? Again, once the situation becomes political, then it enters into the situational - who decides the law? As in the case of history, the winners own it, and everything else, as well, including, and especially, the law itself or its interpretation. There are two kinds of international law: the first binding and formal, such as the Geneva Protocol; the Hague Convention Rules of Warfare; the U.N. Genocide Convention of 1948; and the International Tribunal held in Nuremburg in 1947-48. These are absolute binding sanctions against harming civilian populations and have provisions

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for penalties to be extracted from the guilty party. The second is of an informal and customary nature, more nebulous in implementation, although it carries the full weight of the law in that lawyers consider both types to be equally binding.

Both types imply that the basic distinction between non-combatants and combatants in war is one of the fundamental principles of the law of war. This means that attacks in war must not be directed specifically at civilian populations and, further, that attacks against legitimate targets must not cause damage out of proportion to their military advantage.

In World War I, 5% of those killed were civilians;[23] World War II witnessed an increase in civilians killed to 48% and the Korean War civilians killed reached 84%.[24] Although the figures for Vietnam are not available, they are believed to be even higher. The pattern set in Vietnam eliminated the separation between combatant and non-combatant rendering the term innocent civilian an empty category.

In World War II, the U.S. had dropped 2 million tons of bombs and other types of munitions from aircraft.[25] In comparison, from 1965 through 1973, we dropped at least 8 million tons of munitions from aircraft on Southeast

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Asia.[26] That was the equivalent of 640 atomic bombs similar in size to those dropped on Hiroshima.[27] the 1972 total tonnage of bombs dropped, mainly from B-52s had surpassed 800,000 tons by the time of the November election.

That would mean that by the spring of 1972, for each minute Nixon had been in office, one ton of bombs had fallen somewhere in Indochina.[28] at a cost of $32,000 per 60 seconds. or $350,000 for every actual Viet Cong killed in the war.[29] Vietnam absorbed 70% of all funds appropriated for U.S. national defense between 1967 and 1972.[30] When a minute fraction of that sum is expended on the Health, Welfare and Education, the entire country rises up in indignation, but the U.S. reportedly spent over $1 billion a year to neutralize the Viet Cong, not to mention the $2.25 billion on military assistance programs for Vietnam and Laos, without a whisper of complaint.[31] In two and a half months in 1972 alone, the U.S. spent more than $400 million on munitions in Vietnam.[32]

Beyond the question of taxpayer inconvenience, however, is a far more tragic aftermath of our involvement in Vietnam. Teaching the Vietnamese an American lesson was translated into a scarred land and suffering of a people that defies the imagination. Twenty-one million bomb

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craters in South Vietnam; many of these 30 to 40 feet across, in a piece of real estate averaging less than 100 miles in width, and some 600 miles in length. The extent of defoliation alone destroyed nearly 1/2 of all arable land in South Vietnam. Added to the herbicides, we seeded the land with 6 pounds of chemicals for every inhabitant of South Vietnam.[33]

There were no birds left to sing, no trees to shelter, no rice to feed the hungry, no gardens to mask the ugliness, very little that moved and no people at a higher level of civilization.[34] Instead of the promised democracy, we introduced the Phoenix Campaign (a direct contravention of democratic ideals) and we inflicted deadly wounds on the American public who were as much victim as the Vietnamese.

Our military was not unaffected; but unlike the Vietnamese whose hospitality we abused, they could leave it all behind after 365 days, Vietnamese had to endure 25 years of American visitational rights. While the best statesmen the American public could vote into office were ignoring the futility of their policies, 57,259 Americans lost their lives in Vietnam. Of these, 8,000 Black soldiers came home wrapped in the flag of their country, at a time when the civil rights battles were thriving in the U.S. Another 64%

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of American boys serving in Vietnam no older than 21 years of age would never return.[35]

By 1970, almost 70% of all casualties were among draftees, and the Pentagon estimated that another 10,303 Americans were killed in unrelated war incidents. Friendly fire deaths, if we utilized official government figures for the time, was given at 3,370 American lives.[36] We scan the faces of these unnamed soldiers, frozen by the camera for all eternity, and for some, that eternity is endless.

In Reason Without Revolution, Habermas posits that the primacy accorded to purposive rational action in modern culture produces both a loss of moral meaning in our daily lives and results in a lessening of freedom.[37] The freedom to act with honor is not a viable option. However, as we note from the emergence of the Vietnam Veterans Against the War military imperatives were sharply held to account on the morality of the tactics and strategies of the war itself based on personal witness to it.

The breaking with traditional obedience and loyalty appeared with the realization that their leaders lied. It produced the inner rage that most Vietnam veterans still carry at being deceived into conducting a war that was packaged and delivered from Washington, D.C. for reasons never fully confided to the men who had to kill and die.

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Vietnam was the longest war in our history, most reported and most visible to the American public of all wars. The period of time between World War II and the Vietnam War witnessed the proliferation of television sets in the U.S. from a mere 10,000 sets in 1941 to 10 million sets at the Korean War and 100 million sets in use at the peak of the Vietnam War.[38] Thus, the Vietnam War had a visual immediacy that placed you in the action, although safe and secure from an 8,000 mile surrealistic distance. Vietnam thus becomes an aberration, explained away as faulty military or political reasoning and the dependence on high tech obliteration remains inviolate and the warrior is blamed for losing the war.

This has been the area of historical rebellions leading to successful revolutionary change in societies and nations. To understand this phenomenon, we must transcend Marxist economic reductionism and enter into a Weberian concept embracing nationalism, and even a Durkheimian conception of morality. As such, the works of Gibbons' The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire,[39] Toynbee's study of history[40] and Spengler's The Decline of the West,[41] although flawed by circularity, offer pivotal relevance to the agents of revolutionary change than is outlined in Marx's Das Kapital[42] and Lenin's What's to be Done.[43]

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In this, it may be the soldier, himself, who is the historical agent of revolutionary transformation throughout its epoch. When humans rebel, either to reclaim their 'species being' or as a vanguard party, success is determined by the soldier - either through his unwillingness to support or openly rebel against the existing order on breaches of social and moral commitment to humanity.

Ultimately, the last line of defense is breached by the consideration of a soldier's historical task as guardian of the nation and keeper of its integrity. That idealistic premise is based on moral and ethical considerations of his socialization and, ultimately, the strength of his commitment to its directives. Toward this, the answer is shockingly simple. As the VVAW has shown, it is not race, class, or sex, although these are important variables. It is found in character and realized in high principled, aboveboard actions that permit others to choose between good and evil because the possessor of that rare quality is absolutely trustworthy. Men and women with this attribute infuse others with the remarkable courage to persevere in the endeavor, wherever the course may lead.

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FOOTNOTES

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APPENDICES

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ABBREVIATIONS

ADA	Americans for Democratic Action
AIDS	Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
AFSC	American Friends Service Committee
ARVN	Army of the Republic of Vietnam
AWOL	Away Without Official Leave
CALC	Clergy anad Laity Concerned
CBUs	Container (cluster) Bomb Units
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CO	Conscientious Objector
COINTELPRO	Counterintelligence Program
CORDS	U.S. Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support
CP	Communist Party
CWM	Catholic Workers Movement
DOD	Department of Defense
DMZ	Demilitarized Zone Along the Seventeenth Parallel dividing South Vietnam and the DRV
DRV	Democratic Republic of Vietnam
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FOR	Fellowsip of Reconciliation
GIs	Government Issue (slang for military personnel)
IPC	Indochina Peace Committee
ISC	Infiltration Surveillance Center
JCS	U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff
LBJ	Long Binh Jail
MACV	U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam Headquarters
MIAs	Missing in Action
MIC	Military/Industrial Complex

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NCCEWVN	National Coordinating Committee to End the War in Vietnam
NLF	National Liberation Front
NSC	U.S. National Security Council
PFC	Private First Class
RAW	Rapid American Withdrawal (Operation RAW was one of the first VVAW demonstrations)
SANE	National Committee for a SANE Nuclear Policy
SEATO	Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
SES	Socio-Economic Status
SIPRI	Stockholm International Peaace Research Institute
SVA	South Vietnamese Army
U.S.S.R.	Union of Socialist Soviet Republics
UN	United Nations
VVA	Vietnam Veterans of America
VVAW	Vietnam Veterans Against the War
VFP	Veterans For Peace
VFW	Veterans of Foreign Wars
WRL	War Resistors League

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VIETNAM VETERANS SURVEY

January, 1995

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SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE:

This questionnaire has been prepared by Dolores McCabe of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, 33 West 42nd Street, New York City, NY 10019. The survey is part of a study of Vietnam veterans and the purpose of this work is to explore the effects of idealism and rebellion. Please provide the information asked for, without giving your name or identifying yourself in any way, then mail the completed survey to me as soon as possible. If you want to know more about the study, or would like to discuss your experiences and problems in Vietnam or after, or talk about the issues mentioned briefly here, feel free to add your name, address or phone number, or write or call Dolores McCabe at 898 Route 32, Highland Mills, NY 10930 telephone (914) 928-6621.

I. PRE-SERVICE HISTORY

1. Your date of birth? _____

2. Sex: { } Male { } Female

3. Are you a Vietnam War veteran? { } Yes { } No

4. Where were you born? (Town/state/country) _____

5. Where was your father born? (Town/state/country) _____

6. Where was your mother born? (Town/state/country) _____

7. Number of brothers: _____

8. Number of sisters: _____

9. What is your ethnic group?

{ } Black
{ } Hispanic
{ } Caucasian
{ } Asian/Pacific Islander
{ } Other

10. Your highest level of education:

{ } High School
{ } College
{ } Graduate School

11. Type of education:

{ } General
{ } Technical
{ } Professional

12. Your pre-military service employment:

{ } Administrative
{ } Technical
{ } Professional
{ } None

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13. Father's occupation?

[ ] Administrative
[ ] Technical
[ ] Professional
[ ] Unskilled

14. Mother's occupation?

[ ] Administrative
[ ] Technical
[ ] Professional
[ ] Housewife

15. Family income?

[ ] Under $5,000
[ ] $5,000 - $14,999
[ ] $15,000 - $29,999
[ ] $30,000 - $44,999
[ ] $45,000 and over

16. Where did your family live?

[ ] Urban
[ ] Suburban
[ ] Rural

17. Your father's religion:

[ ] Catholic
[ ] Protestant
[ ] Jew
[ ] Other

18. Your mother's religion:

[ ] Catholic
[ ] Protestant
[ ] Jew
[ ] Other

19. Your religion before entering the service:

[ ] Catholic
[ ] Protestant
[ ] Jew
[ ] Other

20. Marital status before entering the service:

[ ] Single
[ ] Separated
[ ] Married
[ ] Divorced
[ ] Widower/Widowed

21. What was your father's political affiliation?

[ ] Republican
[ ] Democrat
[ ] Independent
[ ] Socialist
[ ] Other

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22. What was your mother's political affiliation?

{ } Republican
{ } Democrat
{ } Independent
{ } Socialist
{ } Other

23. What was your political affiliation?

{ } Republican
{ } Democrat
{ } Independent
{ } Socialist
{ } Other

II. SERVICE HISTORY

24. Under what conditions did you enter the service?
{ } Enlisted
{ } Drafted

25. Before that were you in the:
{ } National Guard
{ } Reserve
{ } Regular Army
{ } Other _____

26. Do you recall your Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) Score?

	%	Mental Group	
{ }	93-100	I	
{ }	65-92	II	
{ }	31-64	III	
{ }	10-30	IV	
{ }	(-9	V	(Disqualified unless
{ }	(-9	V	Project 100,000; specify)

_____

27. AFQT score if taken 1965 or earlier: _____

28. Highest rank/rating and date attained:

{ } Enlisted man/seaman _____
{ } NCO _____
{ } Warrant officer _____
{ } Officer _____

29. What branch of the service did you enter?

{ } Army
{ } Navy
{ } Coast Guard
{ } Airforce
{ } Marines

30. What unit were you in?

a. { } GROUP I
{ } ~~Cavalry~~
{ } Special Forces
{ } Submarines
{ } Airborne

b. { } GROUP II
{ } ~~Infantry~~
{ } Artillery
{ } Armored
{ } Evacuation medics

c. { } GROUP III
{ } ~~Ordinance~~
{ } Supply administration
{ } Maintenance/construction
{ } Hospital assignment

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III. VIETNAM SERVICE HISTORY

31. Where did you serve? Add dates if more than one:

[ ] Stateside
[ ] Overseas
[ ] Vietnam

32. What was the name of your unit? (Company, Battalion, Regiment, Division, Shore/Ship Command?) _____

33. What was your rank/rating at the time of your arrival in Vietnam? _____

34. What was your rank/rating at the time you left the service? _____

35. How many Vietnam tour(s) of duty did you complete?

[ ] One From _____ to _____
[ ] Two From _____ to _____
[ ] Multiple From _____ to _____

36. What was your branch of service and M.O.S. for each tour of duty in Vietnam? _____
_____
_____

37 Describe your combat experience?

	Heavy	Moderate	Light
[ ] Direct fire	_____	_____	_____
[ ] Indirect fire	_____	_____	_____
[ ] Sapper Activity	_____	_____	_____
[ ] Didn't see any	_____	_____	_____

38. Number of times wounded:

[ ] None
[ ] Once
[ ] Multiple

39. Combat decorations:

[ ] None
[ ] One
[ ] Multiple

40. Awards and medals: (Please number in order awarded)

[ ] Medal of Honor ___ Army ___ Navy ___ Air Force
[ ] Navy Cross [ ] Purple Heart
6 [ ] Air Force Cross [ ] Soldier's Medal
[ ] Silver Star [ ] Bronze Star
[ ] Airman's Medal [ ] National Security Medal
[ ] Distinguished Flying Cross
[ ] Navy and Marine Corps Medal
[ ] Distinguished Service Cross
[ ] Distinguished Service Medal
___ Army and Air Force ___ Navy

[ ] Other _____

41. Type of combat action you experienced in Vietnam?

[ ] Heavy [ ] Moderate [ ] Light [ ] None

42. What would you say was the casualty rate for your ship/shore/air unit?

[ ] Light [ ] Medium [ ] Heavy

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43. What were the main causes of casualties in your unit (if known):

	Hostile	Non-hostile
Aircraft loss/crash	[ ]	[ ]
Vehicle/loss crash	[ ]	[ ]
Gunshot/small arms fire	[ ]	[ ]
Artillery/rocket	[ ]	[ ]
Mine	[ ]	[ ]
Booby trap	[ ]	[ ]
Drowned/suffocated	[ ]	[ ]
Illness	[ ]	[ ]
Suicide	[ ]	[ ]
Homicide	[ ]	[ ]
Accident	[ ]	[ ]
Other (Specify) _____	[ ]	[ ]

44. How many of your friends were killed in Vietnam?

_____

5. What were your feelings about their death?
[ ] Senseless
[ ] Tragic
[ ] For a worthy cause

46. What is your evaluation of the officers in your unit?
[ ] Superior
[ ] Mediocre
[ ] Inferior

47 Date of discharge: _____

IV. POST VIETNAM GENERAL INFORMATION

48 Type of discharge:

[ ] Honorable
[ ] Dishonorable
[ ] Medical
[ ] Other _____

49. Are you a member of a veterans'organization?

[ ] Yes
[ ] No

If yes: (Number in order of date joined)
[ ] American Legion
[ ] Veterans of Foreign Wars
[ ] Disabled American Veterans
[ ] Vietnam Veterans of America
[ ] Vietnam Veterans Against the War,
[ ] Other (Specify) _____

When did you last attend a meeting?

50. Why did you join this particular organization?

[ ] To make a difference
[ ] Comradeship
[ ] Benefits advancement

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51. When did you join this organization?

_____

52. What is your current status:
{ } Active participation
{ } Moderately active participation
{ } Inactive

53. What position do you occupy in your organization?
{ } Rank and file
{ } Associate member/auxilliary
{ } Local leadership
{ } Regional leadership
{ } National leadership

54. When you left Vietnam, who was winning the war?

. The U.S. { }
. The enemy { }

. No one { }
. Didn't know { }
. Didn't care { }

55. In your opinion was the Vietnam War moral?

{ } Yes
{ } No
{ } Don't know

56. Did your attitude about the war change in Vietnam?

{ } Yes
{ } No

If Yes:

{ } It became an immoral war
{ } It was too dangerous
{ } The politicians had lied to us
{ } Vietnam and the Vietnamese were used as guinea pigs

57. Do you agree that more advanced technology could have won the war in Vietnam?

{ } Yes
{ } No
{ } Don't know

If No:

{ } We used everything we had
{ } Unadaptable; too difficult to operate
{ } Too risky for our troops
{ } Undependable
{ } Vietnamese could nullify its effects

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58. Do you agree that our high tech war in Vietnam did more harm than good?

{ } Yes
{ } No
{ } Don't know

If yes:
{ } Placed too many of our soldiers at risk
{ } It killed too many innocent people
{ } Enriched corporate America
{ } Destroyed our country's fiscal balance

59. Do you agree the misuse of advanced technology was the main reason for our failure in Vietnam?

{ } Yes
{ } No
{ } Don't know

If No:
{ } It stopped Communism from spreading to other South East Asian countries
{ } Led to the end of the Cold War
{ } It finetuned the weapons and strategies we need for future wars
{ } It heightened American awareness to the inhumanity of the war
{ } Revealed the limitations of its use
{ } It did not serve to further ethical principles of conduct in war

60. Do you agree that escalating the advanced technological methods of warfare in Vietnam was:

{ } Moral and justified
{ } Immoral unjustified
{ } No opinion either way

THE FOLLOWING SET OF QUESTIONS ARE EXTREMELY SENSITIVE BUT ARE VITAL TO THE INTEGRITY OF THIS DISSERTATION.

61. Reason we lost the war in Vietnam? (Rank in order of importance 1,2,3 etc..)
{ } Political restraints
{ } Lack of support at home
{ } Spoiled generation of servicemen unwilling to die for their country
{ } It was an immoral war
{ } Poor military leadership and organization
{ } The North Vietnamese were better fighters
{ } Corruption in high places
{ } Sensational media coverage

62. Has the Vietnam War impacted America's military options:

{ } A great deal
{ } Somewhat
{ } Not at all

63. Have you served in another war since Vietnam?

{ } Yes (Specify place and date) _____
{ } No

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64. Would you serve in another war?

[ ] Yes
[ ] No.

If yes:
[ ] Only if U.S. territory is directly attacked
[ ] As part of an international response to aggression
[ ] To protect vital U.S. economic interests
[ ] To impose a new world order
[ ] To protect human rights

65. The military in Vietnam did everything they could to minimize the loss of civilian lives?

[ ] Yes
[ ] No

If yes:
[ ] Targets were carefully selected
[ ] The population was given ample warning
( ] Damage was not intentional

66. As a soldier in Vietnam did you think our scientific methods of warfare were:

[ ] An inhumane misuse of technology
[ ] A means to an end
[ ] Necessary and useful
[ ] Other _____

67. According to what you have seen or been part of in Vietnam, what would you say about:

	Unjustified	Justified	Not sure
. The My Lai massacre of civilians	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
. The use of Agent Orange	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
. Napalm	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
. Free fire zones	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
. Use of chemical defoliants	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
. Phoenix campaign	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
. Bombing the Red River dikes	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
. Body counts	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

68. Did you support the anti-war movement?

[ ] Yes
[ ] No

If yes:
[ ] Before entering the service
[ ] During your service
[ ] After your discharge

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69. Have you held membership in or supported:

[ ] Gay or Lesbian organizations
[ ] Civil rights organizations
[ ] Anti-war organizations
[ ] Left of center organizations considered subversive by the Attorney General of the United States?
[ ] Right of center organizations considered subsersive by the Attorney General of the of the United States?

70. People have said that the Government in Washington is the enemy, not the friend of the people like themselves. Do you:
[ ] Strongly agree
[ ] Moderately agree
[ ] Not sure
[ ] Moderately disagree
[ ] Strongly disagree

71. Why? _____

72. Imagine that Congress has passed a law making you liable to be drafted again for military service, whenever the President declares a national emergency. What kind of response do you think you would feel right making about this?
[ ] Serve if called.
[ ] Sign a petition about what is happening.
[ ] Join a group who is interested in what is happening.
[ ] If nothing else worked, demonstrate in the streets about what is happening.
[ ] If nothing at all seemed to work, participate in a physical or armed action because of your feeling about what is happening.
[ ] Leave the country.

73. The Vietnam War has and is still affecting Americans deeply. Some people say that waging a technologically advanced brutal war over a peasant society was immoral. Do you:

[ ] Strongly agree
[ ] Moderately agree
[ ] Not sure
[ ] Moderately disagree
[ ] Strongly disagree

74. What do you see as the legacy of Vietnam?

[ ] There isn't any
[ ] We have to return to the old values that made our country great.
[ ] Our government can no longer expect to have unilateral jurisdiction over war.

75. How often do you think about Vietnam?

[ ] Very often
[ ] Often
[ ] Sometimes
[ ] Never

Thank you for participating in this survey. Your thoughts and experiences are invaluable sources of information that cannot be duplicated in any other way. If there is anything you would like to talk about or clarify, please do not hesitate to call or write me.

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