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**EMPATHY WITHIN A PROTRACTED CONFLICT: IMPLICATIONS FOR
CONFLICT RESOLUTION**

City University of New York

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**EMPATHY WITHIN A PROTRACTED CONFLICT:
IMPLICATIONS FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION**

by

Lynn A. Ruggiero

**A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty
in Psychology in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of Doctor of
Philosophy, The City University of New York.**

1987

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1987

This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Psychology in satisfaction of the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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Abstract

Empathy Within a Protracted Conflict: Implications for Conflict Resolution

by

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Adviser: Professor Stephen P. Cohen

Investigated the relationship between empathy for one's own group versus for one's adversary's group in terms of perceived victimization and intensity of the situation, and the relationship between ideology and empathy. The purpose of this study was to ascertain the meaningfulness of empathy within the broader Middle East conflict.

Major hypotheses tested involved perceptual differences between how one viewed the "victims" of the conflict when they were from one's own group rather than from the "other" group and the differential amount of displayed empathy between those groups. In addition, "significant other" relationships were investigated. A multiple regression model for ideological beliefs and empathy for the enemy was developed. Also included was a preliminary analysis for

future research investigated the "openness" versus "closedness" of ideology and its relationship to empathy.

Interviews for 1336 subjects from Israeli, Palestinian, and Egyptian societies were obtained by quota sampling methods. Actual photographs of the Middle East conflict were used as the stimuli for the projective technique. Factor analyses, analyses of variance, analyses of means, Chi square, and a multiple regression analysis were employed. Pearson r correlations were used to analyze the data from the separate preliminary analysis for future research.

Results revealed differences in perceived intensity of the situation and victimization for the victims of the adversary's group versus one's own group. The frequency of empathy was greater for one's own group than for the other group. There was evidence to support the proposed "significant other" hypothesis for the Israeli respondents: more empathy was displayed for the Palestinian victim than for the Egyptian victim, suggesting the importance of the Israeli-Palestinian relationship for the Israeli respondents.

The multiple regression model was useful, for Israeli respondents only, in predicting the relationship between ideologies held about the influences important in solving the Middle East conflict and empathy towards the Palestinian victim. Those who believed in Russian and European influence and those who believed in the autonomous strength

of Israel were more likely to show empathy for the Palestinian victims than were those who believed in the influence of the United States and world Jewry. Empathy for one's own group was also an important variable for the Israeli respondents. The separate analysis for future research revealed preliminary findings about "openness" of ideology and empathy. Again, empathy for one's own group was predictive for the Israeli respondents in displaying empathy for Palestinian victims.

Several implications for future research were discussed.

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-my parents, with love and admiration, who taught me through word and deed to seek goodness, to value justice, and to strive for high ideals;

-and always, to John, my Husband, teacher, inspiration,
and friend, for his unending support, encouragement, pride,
and faith in me and in my work. He is an idealist committed
to realistic change.

I dedicate this work:

To Peace.

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(USAID for Africa 1985)

Chapter 1 Introduction

Based on the proposed meaningfulness of empathy, this study seeks to determine if empathy is significant to the achievement of conflict resolution. The purpose of this dissertation is also to quantitatively and objectively analyze the existence, or lack, of empathy between parties to the protracted conflict (Note 1) of the Middle East, in hopes of ascertaining distinguishing political ideological characteristics between those who display empathy and those who do not. The intention is to determine if and how those who display empathy might fit into the broader process towards resolution of that conflict.

Note 1. Protracted conflict (Azar & Cchen 1979, p. 162) is "conflict which lingers over time and appears to have no single or distinguishable breakpoint.... Such conflict is a continuation of a basic situation.... Protracted conflicts tend to deepen and reinforce as they go on and to fix even more firmly held mutual images of deception and hate."

Conflict and conflict resolution

Conflict is manifested in all strata of human life, from intrapersonal to international levels. Conflict may have positive ramifications, with such benefits including the avoidance of interactional stagnation, the challenging of the status quo, and instigating progress towards growth, development, and change through a creative process of thinking (Coser 1957). The struggle to rebalance power differences so that social change might be accomplished may be realized in social conflict.

Much more obvious and well known, however, are the negative, destructive results of conflict. Protracted conflict, conflict that has endured over generations, is embedded in all aspects and levels of society including in education, the media, socialization, and the identity of self and the "other" (Azar and Cohen 1979). All aspects of society are affected by, and interwoven within, such conflict. Protracted conflict is maintained and enhanced through a "closed communication" system (Burton 1969) between the parties. In such a system, all images of oneself and the other are in a closed loop; they are self-reinforcing based on what one expects of the "other". Discrepant information about the opponent does not penetrate the system so that one can easily maintain one's stereotypes, images, and fears of the other group, and attributions to the other group. In a protracted situation,

messages sent to the other are not necessarily the messages received. Messages received are those that are anticipated. That is, independent of what the opponent attempts to send as a message, that message is interpreted according to the stereotypes held about that opponent. Those messages will be reinterpreted to reinforce the images held by the receiver. In such protracted situations, conflict has become the norm to many people of the involved societies, the structure of their lives and identities.

Discrepant patterns of behavior and/or communications are perceived as threatening and are treated with suspicion. They are reinterpreted into those which maintain the conflict images so as to maintain consistency between attitudes, behavior attributions, and the communications sent and received. For example, in the U.S.-Soviet relationship, any messages sent by the Soviet Union are interpreted as manipulative, insincere, and suspicious by the U.S. government. Consistency in U.S. images of Russia is maintained through reinterpretation of messages; as President Reagan said, Russia is the "evil empire" and therefore, nothing but evil is attributed to it. Although he later tried to eradicate the effects of this comment, the Russians remember it and evaluate other messages by it (O. Klineberg, personal communication November 14, 1985). It was a clear statement by Reagan that reinforced the Russians' images of how the U.S. thinks and behaves. Hence, a closed

communication system organizes the world so that the conflict is enhanced and/or maintained.

Lack of conflict may be threatening due to the void left where conflict-sustaining behavior had been utilized and to the change in identity necessitated by the major change in the system. Conflict is the known and established way of interacting; there is an apparent crisis without it (Azar and Cohen 1979). Interactions with the other have been based on learned conflict-maintaining patterns; new cooperative patterns would need to be developed and learned by the involved parties in order to resolve that conflict.

Within the system are images of self, of the enemy and of the overall conflict. Images are deeply-held constructs which define the self and life. In protracted conflicts, therefore, they serve to maintain that conflict. The image of self on both sides of a protracted conflict is one of being the victim, while the "other" is the victimizer—"mirror images" (White 1965) of self and other are shared unknowingly by the opponents. The enemy's intent, it is believed, is to fulfill one's worst fears (Cohen 1983).

This closed communication and mirror imaging of victim and victimizer involve attributional processes regarding intentions. One's own group is regarded as good-intentioned, dispositionally good, with any "bad" action undertaken considered to be caused by the situational

conditions. One's group engages in destructive behavior only in necessary reaction to the "evil" other. The "other", however, is dispositionally bad and evil-intentioned; any "good" that might happen is attributed to the situation and is, thus, discounted (Rosenberg and Wolfsfeld 1977).

The "other" is perceived to be a unanimous, undifferentiated "evil" group. No movement towards contact with the other that might encourage cooperative interactions can occur with such beliefs. This again reinforces the images and attributions--although one's own group may want to work towards resolution, the "other" is so strongly unified as a unanimous front, that many believe that there is no one willing or able to make an effort to meet (Kelman 1979) and work open-mindedly together. These tensions, fears, stereotypes and attributions lead to dehumanization of the other (Kelman 1965). Dehumanization deprives the other of individuality, human motives, and human feelings. Human values are relegated to one's own group only; to be able to dehumanize the other is to be able to maintain a conflict. This dehumanization appears to be related to Erikson's concept of pseudospeciation (1984), in which members of the out group are perceived as being less than human by the in-group members.

With protracted conflict penetrating all aspects of society, resolution must also affect all these same levels.

Resolution can only be achieved through addressing all these major issues, including the differentiation between needs, values and interests (Azar in Burton 1984). According to Azar (cited in Burton 1984), human needs are the basis of most conflicts. Being basic, they can never be compromised, negotiated or bargained for (Burton 1984). Since needs can not be negotiated, traditional means of settling conflicts are irrelevant and ineffective when dealing with human needs. For conflict resolution, motivations and intentions must be uncovered. Resolution must be directed towards structural change (Burton 1984), reaching all levels and people of the society, centrally incorporating their needs (e.g. home, identity, or political representation).

Important for movement towards resolution of the conflict is the opening of the communication system. Breaking down negative images and stereotypes, making contacts between groups to dispel the unanimous front image and, simultaneously, differentiating the other group, coming to understand the perceptions of who the "other" is and who one is in relation to the other are all integrally involved in the opening of communication system. To understand how the conflict is maintained is to provide a window through which to see the possibility of resolution.

An important factor in the process of opening communication and meeting with each other is accepting as legitimate the hurt and pain of the other group (Kelman &

Cohen 1976). Legitimizing hurts, fears, and needs of the other side, shared hurt, is essential for progress in understanding. Identifying and addressing superordinate goals (Sherif 1958), those goals which must be addressed together by both sides so that each will benefit and without which both will lose, can provide a structure for contact and cooperation and a basis for interdependence.

It should be noted, however, that this belief in sharing affect about the conflict is not shared by all. In particular, Burton believes that empathy is irrelevant to conflict resolution and that it can be dangerous for the involved parties to develop empathy for their adversaries. If representatives to a specific party to a conflict become strongly identified with their adversary, those people will find themselves discredited among their compatriots when they return home. As a result, they will be at least ineffective in trying to bring about change and, at worst, considered to be traitors, with potentially fatal consequences. Kelman (in a private conversation, January 1987) agrees with this general reasoning but does not believe that the logical conclusion is to blanketly reject empathy. As an example, according to Kelman (1987), "to recognize the legitimacy of the adversary's fears is not the same thing as becoming excessively (and dangerously) identified with the adversary." This approach seems to be related to what Moses (1985) called "disempathy" (to be

elaborated on later).

For resolution and interdependence, the system must be reorganized so that peace is perceived as being far more beneficial than conflict; that the costs of conflict are too great to be sustained compared to the benefits which might be obtained through cooperation. A system of interdependence will establish a situation that will be too costly to violate; one in which the benefits of cooperation far outweigh the costs of continued war. For example, the Egyptian-U.S. relations after the Achille Lauro hijacking incident (Oct. 1985) demonstrated the strength of their interdependent ties. It would have been much too costly for each side to sustain their anger with the other side. The first step towards reestablishing and strengthening relations was their coming to the point of "understanding each other's position" (Whitehead 1985) in regards to the incident. They each made efforts to come to this understanding, and because of that, their overall cooperative relationship survived.

Empathy

At this point, I will introduce the concept of empathy on which my study is based. Below, I will elaborate on the conceptualization and study of empathy by various other researchers.

Basch (1983) put forward "an acceptable working definition of empathy (which) appears in the American Heritage Dictionary. It is: 'understanding so intimate that the feelings, thoughts, and motives of one are readily comprehended by the other'" (Basch p 103). Basch emphasized the interaction between cognition and affect as being integral to this concept in explaining how such understanding comes about. He quotes Sawyer as saying that "empathy is a capacity within the most advanced developmental stage of affective life through which one comes to know another. It is based on the German concept of 'Einfuhlung'--'feeling into'--and refers to the ability of one person to come to know first-hand, so to speak, the experience of another." (Basch p 110) Such an understanding of another person includes an affective experience, along with inference, judgment, and other aspects of reasoned thought (Basch). The experience of empathy is similar to the American Indian saying of getting to know a person by walking a mile in his/her moccasins.

Empathy involves the "accurate appraisal of the context in which the affect is mobilized, the overall level of

maturation the individual has reached or can be expected to reach, and the actual level of maturity being exhibited under the circumstances... It lays the groundwork that makes interpretation (of experience and behavior) appropriate and effective." (Basch p 123) Empathy differs from identification in that empathy is not a becoming like, or wanting to become like, the other person, and, unlike identification, it does not involve permanent change in the empathizer (Basch p 106).

White (1983) emphasized the cognitive components, while also referring to affective components, of empathy. The focus of his work is on international relations between the United States and the Soviet Union and the implications of involving empathy in the process of conflict resolution. He stressed the importance of understanding the "psychological context" of the "other's" actions "as seen by its own members" (White, in Kelman 1965 p 266). This is necessary to understand fully that group's motives and behaviors, and empathy is the source of such knowledge about the adversary. White referred to "realistic empathy" as the "chief corrective" for the conflict between the U.S. and Russia (White 1984).

Although not specifically spoken about as "empathy", "problem-solving workshops" (Kelman and Cohen 1979) involve to a basic degree the parties coming to understand and accept the hurts, pains, needs, and fears of their

adversaries. This involves developing empathy for those adversaries. Attitude changes towards the conflict and towards the enemy are sought and often achieved through this workshop experience.

The concept of empathy, in general, is somewhat elusive and very difficult to measure objectively. This is compounded in the context of this study by the focus on protracted conflict which would seemingly hinder and limit the experience and expression of empathy with one's adversary, since the contact which seems essential in developing such an "intimate understanding" is lacking for most people of the involved parties. For these reasons, a broad conceptualization of empathy will be used. The bulk of the analyses will involve a conceptualization of empathy based on descriptive accounts of perceiving similarity of feelings, hopes, thoughts, and experience with one's adversary; perceiving the adversary as being similar to one's "self" and one's group in human feelings, needs, and desires. Specifically perceiving the "other" as being victimized and experiencing the intensity of such a situation, as based on scaled answers to direct questions, is central to the conceptualization of empathy, for this project. Additionally, in a separate preliminary analysis for future research which is also included in this study, any expressed indication of feeling or understanding similar to the portrayed stimuli of the study will be used as an

indication of empathy. Because this conceptualization of empathy is very broad and inclusive, it takes empathy somewhat in the direction of sympathy. But, with the expressed purpose of this dissertation being to provide a stimulus to affect the peace process by some contribution to increased understanding between parties, any such indication of positive attitudes across groups will be hopeful and possibly useful within the context of fighting, hatred, and generally negative interactions. It is, therefore, considered appropriate and acceptable to focus on even broad-based suggestions of empathic understanding within a protracted conflict.

"Images in Conflict" (Cohen and Arnone, 1983) (Note 2)

The data for this study are from the "Images in Conflict" research project and this particular piece of research is part of the larger study investigating cross-cultural social scientific aspects of the Middle East conflict(s). A team of social scientists from Egyptian, Israeli, Palestinian, and American societies were the project directors and S.P. Cohen was the Principal Investigator. The multidisciplinary team of social scientists worked interdependently on the design, implementation, and consideration of the results. "The view of the scientists who designed Images was that if understanding is to transcend national boundaries one must incorporate a variety of perspectives. First, it cannot be the work of one national group alone--understanding depends on inclusion of multiple perspectives. Second, it must take seriously the criteria of expertise in each society and follow research principles and methods credible to each." (Cohen et al. 1984) Unlike many other cross-cultural studies, Images avoided the narrowed vision of unidirectional

Note 2. "Images in Conflict" refers to an unpublished study, kindly provided by S.P. Cohen, Principal Investigator.

research in which scientists from one society study another society, with or without the other's knowledge and/or participation. Such one-sided studies are viewed with suspicion and incredulity by the society under observation. Thus, although a large amount of data exist about the conflict and the parties to it and, in particular, about Israeli society, they are often perceived as having questionable credibility. Images is the only study of its kind (as far as I am aware) in which all societies involved are equally represented, maintain equal status within the project, and have equal input into all aspects of the research.

One critical advantage of having such a team of scientists from each society working together is that through them each society's symbols, attitudes and perceptions would be included in the design and in all other aspects of the study. In that way, important information about each society, including that society's perceptions of the other parties to the conflict, is thus included in the research. The depth and breadth of information involved in the study, along with its reliability, were expanded and the results and conclusions enhanced by having "nationals" interviewing their own groups. The pitfalls of many cross-cultural studies (Warwick 1980), including the imposition of Western concepts and methodologies on other parts of the world, and biases due to misunderstandings of

the cultures being studied, were avoided by such a team working together on equal terms. The Images study "came in response to these problems of scholarly inquiry on the conflict. Its goal was to create a research group which would apply to the problems of in-depth understanding of the conflict perceptions within Palestinian, Israeli, and Egyptian societies, techniques credible in each. In that way, for the first time, scholars in all three societies would have available the same kind of information about the other side as they have about their own group." (Cohen et al. 1984 p. 36)

Other approaches to conflict resolution in general, and to the Middle East in particular, have included more direct conscious interventions, such as surveys, or workshops (Kelman & Cohen 1979; Burton 1969) rather than unobtrusive projective measures such as were included in the Images in Conflict study. With projective techniques believed to tap unconscious desires, fears, perceptions, and attitudes (e.g. Murray 1935), the data gathered in this project should add significantly to the fuller understanding of the people involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict by understanding their perceptions of themselves as victims and the other as victimizer. (For a full analysis of the benefits of using projective techniques for research in areas of political psychology, see Knutson 1972.) "The process of imagining solutions to protracted conflict begins with developing an

understanding of how each side views itself, particularly in relation to its adversary. For both Arabs and Israelis, the pursuit of the Middle East conflict has occurred at a critical time in the development of their national identities. For each, participation in this conflict has come to symbolize its struggle to become an independent nation, to slough off elements of oppression by others, to emerge in its own right" (Cohen and Aracne 1983 p. 1). Such an understanding expands the issues and complexities of the overall conflict with the belief that such scope will enable one to view the conflict with increased openness, flexibility, and creativity so as to enhance the possibility of discerning a pathway to the resolution of the conflict.

The projective technique developed for this study involved six photographs of the Middle East conflict to which respondents were asked to make up stories. This technique was used to elicit indirectly people's attitudes and feelings toward the conflict in order to learn about "...the essential elements of each group's 'conflict scripts': empathy and hatred; aggression and victimization; preoccupation with self and/or focus on the other" (Cohen 1983 p. 26). It was devised in order to evoke people's hopes, fears, desires, and fantasies aside from what they might believe to be "realistic" or possible. As Collier (cited in Eichenstein 1981 p. 16) stated, "...factual representation of critical areas of the informants' life can

trigger emotional revelations otherwise withheld, can release psychological explosions and powerful statements of values." This is what was to be tapped.

In addition to the projective technique here employed, the interview schedule for "Images in Conflict" included a questionnaire intended to elicit images and attitudes through a more structured, direct approach. Some questions in the "Images in Conflict" study included closed-ended rating scales, open-ended descriptive questions (e.g. "Over what is the conflict?"; "What should be done to end the conflict?"), and comparisons of one's own preferences for acceptable solutions to the conflict versus preferences of one's own group versus perceived preferences of the "other" group. Personal experiences, positive and negative, of contact with members of the adversary's group were also elicited. Images of past, present and future relations between groups were tapped by other closed-ended questions.

Both the direct and indirect measurement techniques were used to elicit and assess opinions, attitudes, perceptions, and experiences of the respondents, thus yielding a fundamental knowledge of people's images of the overall conflict. It is believed that the information derived from this extensive interview will lead to a greater understanding of this protracted conflict, including what sustains it and what would be necessary for each party in order to progress to a process towards conflict resolution.

Chapter 2 Review of the Literature

Basch (1983) discussed empathy in terms of the capacity of coming to know another person's thoughts, feelings, and motives through an interaction of physiological resonance, affective and cognitive processes within the specific person. The capacity for empathy is the most advanced stage of affective life development. "....it is an objective (de-centered) evaluation of another's situation through affective resonance." (p 120) Not all people reach this maturational level because of various kinds of obstacles. "Cultural bias, the opportunities for learning and for expression, the presence of intrapsychic conflict, as well as arrests in development, all play a part in determining on what level and with what freedom any one person can perceive, transmit, organize, and utilize affective signals in a given situation" (p 117). "To be empathic an individual must be able to separate himself sufficiently from his feelings and emotions so that instead of simply reacting to them he can establish their genesis and the significance they have in the context in which they are experienced" (Basch p 119). Resonance, interpretation and evaluation are parts of the complex process of empathy, which can be viewed as a "hermeneutic helix". (Basch) Basch explains that biological, cultural and psychological similarity between people make it more likely that, from the

outset, one's unconscious will be receptive to and able to understand the other's communication but points of analogous similarity can be actively fostered through "generalization" with those people who do not share such similarities. (p 112)

Greenson (1960) defined empathy as "emotional knowing, the experiencing of another's feelings." Through empathy, one could come to understand a person's present feelings by reliving that person's past experiences and realizing how they affect the present.

White (1984) defined empathy as "understanding the thoughts and feelings of others," (p 160) which is in contrast to sympathy, i.e. "feeling with others". White (1983) stressed the role of cognition in empathy (p 121), with empathy being a mode of understanding. Empathy implies, according to White (1984), understanding, or at least genuinely trying to understand, the feelings of other people (p 160). "Empathy with opponents is therefore psychologically possible even when a conflict is so intense that sympathy is out of the question." (p 160) This differentiation was exemplified by H.J. Lifton (personal communication November 13, 1985) when he explained that, through his interactions, he could call forth some empathy for the Nazi doctors he interviewed, although he certainly did not sympathize with them.

White suggested that empathy would allow each side to

understand the justified fears they evoke in the other based on their attitudes and behavior in regards to that other. Without empathy, one only sees fears and concurrent behaviors that are unjustified, i.e. those that are based on misperceptions of the other's intentions and communications. Behaviors and communications from one's own group which justify fear and action on the part of the other are not perceived as such or understood by one's group. The opponent "may have grounds for distrust, fear, and anger that we have not permitted ourselves to see" (p 161). For example, the Reagan "Star Wars" plan raises (I think) suspicion and fear on the part of the Soviets. However, the U.S. government is unable to understand and comprehend the Soviet fears and consequent demands to abandon the "Star Wars" plans. The U.S. perceives the Soviets' concern as a ploy for them to get ahead of the U.S. in nuclear arms stock piling. The arms race, then, is in danger of escalating. With empathy, each side might better understand the realistic impact their attitudes and behaviors have on the other.

Allport (1954) proposed that empathy is an important factor in "tolerance". The "empathic ability (is)...a flexible capacity to know the other person's state of mind, and adapt to it (Allport p. 436). He states that a "...person lacking this ability cannot trust his skills in dealing with others. He is forced to be on guard, to put

strangers into categories, and to react to them en masse. Lacking subtle powers of distinction, he resorts to stereotyping" (Allport p. 436).

Allport described a study done by Nevick (cited in Allport 1954, p. 435-436) and related to empathy. "...foreign students in a training school in the United States were asked to name the Americans from among their fellow students who they thought would be most likely to succeed, and to be accepted, if they entered the U.S. Foreign Service, in the foreign student's home country. Allport commented as follows on the results:

The crucial factor turned out to be 'empathic ability'. Those who were chosen were students who had demonstrable ability to put themselves in other people's shoes; they had skill in sizing up other people; they were sensitive to the other's frame of mind... The unchosen lacked social sensitivity. Two findings in this research are particularly important. (1) Skill in human relations is not specific to a given culture; all the nations represented chose the same gifted persons. (2) The giftedness consists largely in empathic ability, a flexible capacity to know the other person's state of mind, and adapt to it.

The fact that this empathic ability turns out to be inversely related to the authoritarian syndrome (high score on the F Scale) again indicates that we are dealing with a rather well unified aspect of personality" (Allport 1954 p. 435-436).

Bapoport (1970) suggested and described a technique of enhancing positive communication and understanding between parties by simply "stating the opponent's case as clearly and eloquently as possible" (p 289). Such an approach

towards understanding the message of the opponent allows the party to really attend to the opponent and to hear the actual message being sent, rather than what the party expects to hear. In addition, Rapoport believes that such effort to understand what is said fosters more open communication because the defenses of the parties are relaxed. "The purpose is to convey to the opponent the assurance that he has been understood, so as to reduce his anxiety on that account, and to induce him to listen." The presentation of the person's own message should be "admissible to the opponent" and, thus, instead of predetermining what will be said and developing arguments against it, the opponent should listen to what the person is saying. "Conveying assurance of understanding to the opponent is the first step in the removal of threat" (p 291), thus opening the exchange between the parties. A more open exchange might then lead to the breakdown of some barriers to understanding and to the images held about the other party.

The psychological study of empathy seeks to concretize empathy so that scientific research may be carried out in order to measure, comprehend, and predict the processes involved in empathy. Empathy is a very difficult phenomenon to be studied scientifically and objectively because of its elusive and affective nature. Hence, psychological studies have thus far fallen short of adequately describing,

measuring, and studying the complex phenomenon of empathy. Historically, the psychological study of empathy was divided into two schools--the cognitive, role-taking school and the affective school, which used physiological arousal as its measurement. Dymond's (1949) definition of empathy, from which she developed her rating scale, was based on the earlier definitions of empathy which had been developed by both Lipps (1902) and Mead (1934): the "imaginative transposing of oneself into the thinking, feeling, and acting of another and so structuring the world as he does." (p. 127) From this, Dymond developed the cognitive role-taking approach to empathy, or as some call it, "predictive empathy" (for example, in Deutsch & Madle 1975; Kaliopuska 1983; Lindzey & Aronson 1968; Mehrabian & Epstein 1972; Stotland 1969). Her work was the foundation of such research on empathy. Her views structured the empathic experience into a predominantly cognitive rather than affective process; the emphasis being to understand the world view of another, rather than on feeling the other's feelings.

Stotland (1969) operationalized empathy to be "an observer's reacting emotionally because he perceives that another is experiencing an emotion." (p. 271) From this developed the "vicarious emotional response" approach. Stotland used physiological measures, which included the Galvanic Skin Response (GSR) and palm sweating, to determine

if and how a person reacted to watching another person be shocked. His methodology and measurement focussed on emotional arousal in another but omitted the concept of a person experiencing the same emotion as the person who was being observed. Stotland stressed the physiological emotional arousal of one person who observes another person. His definition did not specify that the people should be experiencing the same emotion because he was unable to measure what emotion was aroused; he could only measure arousal.

Hoffman (1977) expounded upon Stotland's operational definition, by defining empathy as "the vicarious affective response to another person's feelings," (p. 712) thus specifying the sameness of the emotional reaction. Hoffman showed to children a slide sequence with narration but without affective labels. After showing the slides, the subject was asked, "How do you feel?" Verbatim answers were recorded and later scored on a scale from 0 to 2, according to the extent of matching with the actual content of the story. Hoffman found that the measures of recognition of affect consist of the subject's judgement of how people feel, which usually included facial and situational cues. Hoffman's results provided a stronger case than other previous research for the proposition that females are more empathic throughout the life cycle than are males. In addition, he found that cognitive and spatial

perspective-taking showed no such pattern of sex differences. Although females were more empathic than males, they "were not more adept at assessing another's affective, cognitive, or spatial perspectives." (Hoffman 1977, p 712) He suggests that "females may have a greater tendency to imagine themselves in another's place whereas males are more set toward instrumental ameliorative action." (p 713)

Batson et al. (1981) hypothesized that "empathic emotion evokes altruistic (rather than egoistic) motivation to see another's need reduced." (p. 290) They manipulated the level of empathic emotion based on the belief that perceived similarity between the Subject and the stooge would predispose the Subject towards empathy. (Stotland 1969; Krebs 1975) To manipulate the perception of similarity between the Subjects and the stooges, they told the Subjects that the stooges were like or not like themselves in various ways, such as what magazines they liked to read or what kind of hometowns they were from. Half way through the experiment, as a manipulation check, the Subjects filled out a trait scale questionnaire about their perceptions of the stooge. Batson et al. had the Subjects watch another person being shocked for errors on the "work" that person was doing. In the "easy escape" condition, the Subjects only had to witness 2 of the 10 trials that the confederate had to experience. In the

"difficult escape" condition, the Subjects were supposed to watch all the trials. The dependent variable was the Subject's response to being asked to change places with the confederate and, if she would, for how many trials. The results showed "a highly significant main effect for similarity, qualified by a significant Escape x Similarity interaction." Conditions assumed to produce relatively high empathic response to a distressed person led to helping regardless of ease of escape without helping. Conditions presumed to produce low empathic response led to helping only when it was difficult to escape without helping. In this experiment, empathy was considered to be the helping response the Subject made to watching the presumed distress of another. The sameness of responses of the S and the confederate were not determined. Whether the emotions experienced by the Subjects were actually empathy or, rather, sympathy or projection, was not an issue discussed by the authors.

Wiske (1968) tried to integrate the various concepts when he described empathy as "the self-conscious effort to share and accurately comprehend the presumed consciousness of another person, including his thoughts, feelings, perceptions, and muscular tensions, as well as their causes....while maintaining an awareness of oneself as distinct from the other." (p 441) Wiske presented an integrative definition and further contrasted empathy with

sympathy. In empathy, one attends to the other's feelings and tries to feel them, whereas in sympathy, one attends to the suffering of another but feels one's own negative feeling.

Recently, specifically multidimensional definitions and explanations of empathy have been suggested. Barrett-Lennard (1981) proposed an interactive cycle which includes five process steps within three phases to complete the cyclic empathic experience. Communication of the empathic feeling is essential here in order to have the perception of understanding by the person with whom one is empathizing. Based on the definition of empathy as "the reaction to the observed experience of another", Davis (1983 p. 113) proposed a multi-element concept of empathy which seeks to tap cognitive and affective role-taking. He proposed four aspects of empathy which relate to social functioning, self-esteem, emotionality, and sensitivity to others. Gladstein (1983) also contended that previous concepts and measurements of empathy were inadequate. Hence, he proposed that empathy is a multistage interpersonal process that can involve, but is not limited to, emotional contagion, identification, and role-taking. Previous studies had measured these aspects as being synonymous with empathy. In addition, other studies have linked empathy with altruism and prosocial behavior (e.g. Adelman et al. 1974; Batson et al. 1981; Krebs 1975;

Underwood & Moore 1982), but although each is a possible consequence of empathy, neither is necessary for empathic feeling. Gladstein also contended that behavior might be stimulated by empathy but does not necessarily follow from it. Barrett-Lennard, Davis, and Gladstein have presented empathic complexes which include affect, cognition, and communication in an interactive system involving a feedback loop. The major contribution of these approaches, I think, is the focus on the interaction of cognition and affect. In this way, they are similar to Pasch's representation.

Many studies have tied empathy to altruism (e.g. Underwood & Moore 1982; Krebs 1975; Fatsen et al. 1981) without specifically differentiating the two variables. Criticisms of these studies (e.g. Marwell 1964; Cronbach 1955; Chinsky & Rappaport 1970; Deutsch & Madle 1975; Mehrabian & Epstein 1972; Rotenberg 1974) maintain that there is not a differentiation among the various affective-cognitive experiences within the research studies and their data, especially between empathy, sympathy, projection, and identification. In addition, clear distinctions between these concepts and altruism have not been established.

Katz (1963) suggested that empathy "yields the how and what of human understanding," focussing on the feelings and situations of the other person. He believed that "flexibility" is needed by a person in order to experience

other people empathically. Self-knowledge and self-evaluation are linked to empathizing with others, according to Katz. Empathy will be inhibited by "fears, or unmet needs or tensions." (Katz p 166) Empathy might also be inhibited if there is not "shared meaning of common symbols, thus prohibiting clear communication." A sense of "mutuality and solidarity in addition to possessing a set of verbal symbols in common..." facilitates empathy through the experienced sense of similarity (Katz). Hokeach (cited in Katz) stressed that similarity which facilitates the empathic experience does not require belonging to a specific group. "Empathic similarity is not just a function of membership in the same religion or ethnic group. Empathy among individuals who hold the same beliefs may be even stronger than among those bound by ties of race or cultural group." (p 132) Doob (1970) found that individuals from conflicting countries were better able to communicate and deal with people from the other countries who shared similar ideologies than with members of their own country who held opposing ideologies.

Moses (1985) referred to "dis-empathy" as the opposite end from excessive empathy on the "spectrum of intensity of empathy". (p. 135) Dis-empathy is a withholding of empathy and, like empathy, can serve various functions in daily lives as well as in politics. According to Moses (p. 137), "the function of dis-empathy is, in certain circumstances, a

protective one for its holder. This is so either when the individual is particularly sensitive; or when the task to be carried out requires it; or last, when there is such suffering around us." Although this phenomenon can be applied to many situations, people, and nations, he believes that at least the last two conditions specifically exist in Israel. For these reasons, then, dis-empathy appears to be the affective relationship that many Israelis share with Palestinians, for example. Because of the political situation and the threat to their very existence, for security reasons and for personal protection, the Israelis, in Moses' example, must stifle their inclinations to feel with Palestinians. If they empathize with their enemy, they risk personal tragedy, such as a soldier empathizing with the person whom he is expected to kill and, therefore, is killed because (s)he did not defend her/himself. He thus provided an explanation for any differential display of empathy by one group, e.g. Israelis, for its own members versus for members of the other group, i.e. Arabs, in the Israeli case.

Some philosophical studies of empathy

Philosophical and psychological approaches to understanding empathy differ. According to the major philosophers most often referred to in the psychological literature which discusses empathy, philosophical approaches focus on the soul, the spirit, and the unity of humans on affective and spiritual levels. According to phenomenologists, "fellow-feeling" (Scheler), which is the basis for empathy, is "an ultimate and organized function of the spirit. It is innate in everyone who is human; it is part of the constitution of the emotional being generally." "What is inborn is the more or less marked tendency to avail oneself of this function and to exercise it in practice" (Scheler p. 130). Scheler continued by explaining that "fellow-feeling undergoes an extensive development in each individual due to the growth in our understanding of the nature and differences of mental processes of other people." According to Scheler (p. 32) "the only long-term and simultaneous cooperation of a world-wide scale between the individual yet complementary portions of humanity can bring into play the total capacity for knowledge inherent in mankind at large without distinction of time or place." In other words, in order to benefit by all that is human, to understand others fully and to become more human oneself, all parts of our shared humanness need to be included and involved "on a world-wide scale". To be able to understand

each other better, this ability to empathize, based on the oneness of spirit, must be actualized. Incorporating phenomenology and psychology, Rogers (1984 p 4) stated that "when group members experience themselves as being truly heard, and accepted, in their bitterness, their yearnings, or whatever, they are able to view themselves and their feelings more objectively, and with less irrationality....In an atmosphere which contains more mutual understanding, steps can be taken toward dealing with the issues on a more realistic basis with consideration of all of the interests involved."

The "non-primordially" of the empathic experience is essential to Stein's (1970) thesis. It is at a feeling level which is incorporated into, and experienced by, the "self" although it is not a direct feeling from within the self. There are individual differences in the capacity to empathize at any point in life because of the differential development of the structures within the "self". Individuals may empathize with others through structures within one's own self even if they are not fully developed yet because the basic structure is always there. In addition to experiencing the other through empathizing, one is confronted with aspects of oneself which were previously unknown. In this way, one comes to better know oneself (Stein 1970).

Central to the definition, and description, of empathy

is the experiencing of the other person's feelings 'as if' they were one's own but without losing oneself in the process. Lipps (1903, in Germany) emphasized this in his aesthetic empathy; Stein (1970) described it as a "non-primordial" experience. Wysocki (1981) defined empathy as a "feeling act" on the same gradient as sympathy. She differentiated empathy from sympathy by explaining that empathy does not depend on knowledge of the object of the feeling although such knowledge might intensify the feeling. Sympathy does depend on the object. Empathy is feeling the other person's feeling, while sympathy is feeling the similar feeling that others are feeling towards a known object, feeling with the others. These two feeling acts may "run into" each other.

Chapter 3 Summation and Hypotheses

The theory of conflict maintenance and enhancement described above, as well as the definition and description of empathy, suggests that there is very little empathy between adversaries. The distance and dehumanization which are part of maintaining conflicts would be difficult to achieve if the sides were empathizing with each other. The lack of "intimate" contact and differences between the perceived victims and the victimizers seem to be so great within protracted conflict that empathy would be impossible. Thus, it is here proposed that empathy, when it is added to, or enhanced within, a conflict situation will help move that conflict towards resolution, while its absence will maintain and/or magnify the conflict. Through empathy, each party might better understand the fears, hopes, and perceptions of the other as well as of itself. The sharedness of these feelings and images, these mirror images, could be recognized, understood and accepted as being basic to maintaining the conflict. Empathy would open and enhance communication between the groups, which would result in differentiation of the other, allowing for substantial and honest meetings between groups. The established attributions of the self and the other may be thereby altered, with the realization that "they" are not all evil and "we" are not all good. Critical understanding of the

self and the other will be facilitated through empathy (Stein 1970; Katz 1963). Such understanding could become the basis for negotiations and agreement because it would help in the analysis and understanding of the roles of each party within the conflict which serve to maintain that conflict, and the need for new forms of interactions. By injecting creativity and flexibility (Katz 1963) in searching for resolution, empathy might lead to a gradual increase of trust and credibility, along with a reduction of tension. The realization of the benefits of cooperation and its concurrent reduction in the costs to each group that the conflict involves can be more readily realized. With empathy, the systems that maintain conflict would begin to dissolve, increasing groups within the population that could affect perceptions of the other and one's own group within the societies. This would yield an increase in the numbers within the unified groups that can affect the political leadership and public opinion about policies and actions regarding the other group. In addition, social norms regarding perceptions and interactions would be gradually altered. As this gradual process unfolds, the effect would reach further. Education, media, and social institutions would contribute to the humanizing of the enemy which, in the long run, would yield more open communication, increased cooperation and an interdependence, rather than the old pattern of competition and separation between the groups.

The theoretical relationship between empathy and protracted conflict has been outlined above. Although empathy is often referred to in discussions and presentations (for example, White 1984; Moses 1984), research has not specifically studied the absence or presence of empathy within a protracted conflict. While the theoretical basis is relevant for any protracted conflict, the research here presented will address the protracted conflict between Israelis and Palestinians in the Middle East, as a case in point.

An attempt will be made to explore the following hypotheses:

1) As a basis for intergroup empathy, the following was hypothesized. Perceptions of intensity of the portrayed situation, victimization within the situation, frequency of occurrence of that type of situation, hostility, inequality, and domination of the aggressor towards the victim within the portrayed situation will be different when the portrayed victim is a member of the adversary's group rather than a member of one's own group, indicating a differential affective reaction to one's own group members versus members of the "enemy" group.

2) There will be more "misperceptions" in identifying the people in the picture portrayed as victims when these people are members of the adversary's groups than when they are members of one's own group. Portrayed victims will be

perceived as being members of one's own group rather than as members of the other group; aggressors will be perceived as being from the other group. Empathy would allow the specific perception of victimization of the other as being similar to one's own group's victimization. Lack of empathy, then, might produce an interjection of one's own group into the role of victim.

3) The intensity of the situation will be less strong when the other group is perceived as victim rather than when one's own group is victim.

4) Empathy will be displayed most frequently within one's identity group rather than between groups. Similarities are more evident in definition of the group one identifies with. In addition, conflict dehumanizes the other, thus inhibiting the perception of similarity.

5) Empathy decreases social distance between people (Katz 1963). It is proposed that in conflict, because of its nature and the hatred, fear, and dehumanization involved, a "human interaction distance", so to speak, is evident. This "distance" would allow such dehumanization, fear, avoidance, and stereotypes to exist. It is believed that such "human distance", although not the same as social distance per se, might be somewhat related. Therefore, empathy will be more frequently displayed between Israelis and Egyptians, who have decreased their "human interaction distance" by the Camp David Accord, than between Israelis and Palestinians,

who have not accomplished that.

Alternatively, however, the Palestinians are the "significant other" (Bales & Cohen 1979) to the Israelis, more than the Egyptians are. The "significance" of the relationship helps define one's own identity based on that relationship which the group identifies as being "significant" to itself. If the Palestinians are the "significant others" to the Israelis (and vice versa), then the Israelis might identify themselves in terms of that conflict relationship. For example, each sees itself as the victim of the other. One group contributes to the identity of the other group. In that way, the two parties (Israelis and Palestinians) are bound to each other and, perhaps, more psychologically aware of, or attuned to, each other than to less "significant" groups. Such "significance", then, seems to decrease the distance between the groups on certain levels. If that is the case, it seems that under certain circumstances and in some respects, empathy would be greater between Israelis and Palestinians than between Israelis and Egyptians since the Israeli relationship with the Palestinians appears central to the psychological definition of the Israelis (i.e. the people who are in conflict with the Palestinians over the same land and, thus, over national identity).

6) Females will demonstrate a greater degree of empathy than males. Based on the measure used here, of those who

demonstrate empathy, more will be females than males. This would be consistent with Gilligan's (1982) theory that female morality is based on interpersonal interactions, while males' is based on logical analyses. This would also support research findings that suggested that females have a greater capacity for demonstrating empathy than males do (e.g. Hoffman 1977).

7) Those respondents who demonstrate empathy for the other side will support options for the West Bank and Gaza Strip which are less extreme and which take into consideration the specific needs of the other side.

An additional hypothesis will be tested as part of a separate preliminary analysis for future research:

8) Ideological differences, including the degrees to which ideology is asserted, will affect empathizing with the adversary. Those who have a "closed" ideology, similar to "totalism" (Lifton 1969), will be least likely to empathize with the other. Those with more "open", or "sympathetic", ideology will be more likely to at least register the emotions of members of the opposing group.

Chapter 4 Methods

Data from the "Images in Conflict" study, which include projective data from stories told to photographs and survey data from closed-ended questions asked about those same photographs, as well as about preferred options for the future of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, were analyzed using analysis of variance, Chi Square analyses, comparison of means, and factor analyses. A multiple regression model was also developed. The projective data from "Images" were the focus of the analyses. Other data from the more directive parts of the interview schedule were included for some comparisons with the information from the projective part.

There is a separate chapter for a preliminary analysis of the projective data (to be used for future research) in which a randomly selected subsample was coded specifically for openness versus closedness of ideology and affective and cognitive approaches towards empathy. The stories told to the pictures were analyzed for expressions of political, religious, and philosophical ideology which were either "closed" (e.g. "totalism"), or critical, or non-judgemental, or "open"/sympathetic to the situation which was perceived in the picture. Indications of approaches towards empathy for the people in the pictures were coded on a scale which included non-registering of the internal state of the person and denial of human feelings, through registering the

appropriate emotion, to empathy (see Appendix A for the coding scheme). The data were then analyzed to determine if and how ideology affects one's capacity to empathize with the adversary.

Subjects

Equal-sized representative samples from each population that would be directly comparable across national groups were sought. Due to political and sociological constraints of the individual societies and differing views as to what constituted the best sampling procedures, two different sampling methods were employed to achieve the representative sampling goal. Random sampling and quota sampling techniques were used. For the quota sample, six theoretically important variables (age, religion/ethnicity, area of residence--urban/rural, sex, income, and education) were selected and subjects were recruited to fill the targeted number for each characteristic. "Operationally, the quota sampling was an adaptation of prevailing conditions of the network sampling measure. Guidelines for each team were developed for using personal and professional acquaintances (e.g. friends, students) to develop lists of potential interviewees. In order to increase the restricted pool of names generated by such a procedure, each person approached was asked to recommend potential respondents differing from him/her on predetermined dimensions. Diversification within samples drawn from these lists was achieved by striving to fill with an equal number of respondents each of the 64 cells..." based on the targeted variables in combination (i.e. 2x6) (Cohen, 1983). Only people 18 years or older were included. In total, 4019

individuals were included in the study. All participants completed the projective and "objective" sections of the "Images in Conflict" questionnaire.

Israelis. Throughout this project, the terms "Israeli" refers to Israeli Jews. Two samples of Israeli participants were drawn, one using random sampling techniques and the other using quota sampling techniques. A total of 1737 subjects were included--N=1182 through random sampling and N=555 through quota sampling. The demographic guidelines for locating subjects using the quota sample were those outlined above, with the "religious" dimension being Ashkenazi or Sephardi. Dahaf, the polling company in Israel, was hired by the Israeli project directors to do the random sample of the Israeli Jewish population, since they were familiar with random sampling of the Israeli Jewish population. For the quota sample, the dichotomy for the ethnicity variable was Ashkenazi/Sephardi. In this study, the quota sample will be utilized so that there will be consistency in sampling methods across samples; only quota sampling was used in Egypt.

Palestinians. Throughout this project, "Palestinians" refers to Israeli Arabs, unless otherwise stated. Two samples of Palestinians in Israel (Israeli Arabs) were drawn, one using random sampling methods and the other using quota sampling techniques, similar to the other samples collected using this method. A total of N=831 subjects

participated--N=580 through random sampling and N=251 through quota sampling. The religion/ethnicity variable was dichotomized to include Muslims or Christians. In this study, only the quota sample will be analyzed, for the same consistency reason as mentioned for the Israeli sample.

Egyptians. Only quota sampling was used in Egypt. The 2x6 design presented above was followed, with the religious dimension dichotomized into Muslim/Copt. Additional respondents were included without differentiating area of residence (all were urbanites), which yielded four more respondents per 2x5 cells. Although quota sampling was the only sampling method used in Egypt, two samples were interviewed with a time dimension differentiating these samples--one sample was drawn before the Sinai withdrawal (as were the other samples of the study) while the other was drawn in June 1982, after the Israeli withdrawal from Sinai. Differential time frames allowed for a control of time effects and the effects of historical events (including the Lebanon invasion of June 1982). In the first wave Egyptian sample, N=530. In the second wave, N=305. In this study, only the first wave sample will be utilized since it controlled for time and events along the same dimensions as the other samples did.

Materials.

Six actual photographs of the Arab-Israeli conflict

were used as stimuli to which stories were formulated. The photographs (Appendix C) were selected by the team of scientists from collections of thousands of photographs from major photo archives. Pictures were selected to achieve a balance for victim/victimizer roles between Israelis and Palestinians and between Egyptians and Israelis in the incidents of the pictures, and for conflict and cooperation situations. Two pictures were of prisoners of war (Egyptian and Israeli); two were of female victims of violent conflict acts (Palestinian and Israeli); and two depicted events of the peace process (the opening of the Israeli embassy in Cairo and a meeting of Arafat and Israelis). After the administration of all six photographs, a series of seven objective questions to be rated on a five-point scale ranging from "extremely" (1) to "not at all" (5) was asked for each picture--"how intense does this picture seem?"; "how (un)friendly is the person in the picture?"; "how dominant is the person in the picture?"; "how victimized is the person in the picture?"; "how unequal does that relationship seem?"; "how hostile does the relationship seem?". "How often does this kind of event happen?" was rated on a five-point scale which ranged from "never" (1) to "always" (5).

The photographs were 8x10 black-and-white prints. The five-point scale was placed in front of the respondent during the objective questions to the photographs.

Procedure

The photographs were in a set order, with a "cooperative" event as the first and last pictures. The administration was either forward (1 to 6) or backward (6 to 1) ordering, so that the influence of the order of presentation would be controlled. All photographs were administered prior to asking the objective questions about each picture.

Photos were shown one at a time, with the specific photograph visible to the subject throughout the duration of the story telling, and later throughout the questions asked in regards to the picture. The experimenter began by explaining that, "These are actual photographs of the Middle East conflict. To each, I would ask you to make up a story. You can tell any story; there are no right or wrong answers. As you tell your story, keep in mind the following questions:

- 1) Who are the people in the picture?
- 2) What are they doing?
- 3) What led up to the situation?
- 4) What are they thinking and feeling?
- 5) What will happen in the future as a result of this incident?"

The first photograph was then presented and the questions were repeated. No time limits were imposed. The questions were repeated as necessary.

The experimenter kept as close to verbatim accounts of the stories as possible, as well as audio-taping the stories whenever the respondent agreed to this procedure.

Four groups of data from the responses to the questionnaire were utilized for the analyses. a) The total samples for the Israeli quota, Palestinian quota, and Egyptian first-wave samples were coded for the closed-ended questions directed towards the perceptions of victimization, intensity, dominance, inequality, hostility, friendliness and frequency of occurrence in relation to each of the portrayed events in the six photographs. The perceptions of victimization and intensity became central to the measure of empathy. b) A subgroup of the stories were coded based on the five questions specified above. Coding categories were devised to include the nationality characterized in each picture, according to the respondent, the "action" described, and the "background" events which led to the pictured situation. In addition, the anticipated "future" based on the situation, and the thoughts and feelings described were coded. c) A selected subgroup based on those respondents whose closed-ended questions and stories were coded (that is, those responses which were included in groups 'a' and 'b' above) and were then selected based on particular answers to key questions (i.e. the accurate identification of the nationality of the person in the picture, and those who answered 3, 4, or 5 on the scale of

how victimized the person seemed to be). It should be noted, then, that the n's involved in the various analyses were dependent on the group or subgroup of data used in the particular tests. In addition, in a separate chapter for a preliminary analysis for future research, a random sample from group 'b' above-the group of coded stories about the pictures-was selected. That chapter (Chapter 7) will be further discussed below.

Although the stories to all six pictures were coded, the emphasis for the analyses of the empathy index will be on picture #3-the wounded Israeli woman-and picture #5-the Palestinian woman crying-and picture #2-the Egyptian POWs. Each of these was selected to indicate each party as victim in different situations. The Israeli (#3) and Palestinian (#5) victim pictures seemed to involve the most intense reactions and, thus, became the focus of much of the analysis. The cooperation pictures (#1 and #6), in general, were perceived to be the least intense pictures. Those two pictures, therefore, were not central to the analyses. Since the photograph of the Israeli POWs (#4) was of poor quality and, thus, difficult to see well, and since there was another picture of an Israeli victim (#3) which was clear and evocative, the fourth picture also was not included in most of the analysis.

Interviews were carried out in the native language of the respondents, thus being in Arabic or Hebrew.

Translators were hired to translate all stories verbatim into English, the language used for the analysis done in this study. Translators were native speakers of the language they were to translate from and fluent in English. All translators were also at least college educated and familiar with their own country and the conflict. All translations were done in the United States, as was the coding. All coders also had at least some college education; all coding was done on the English translations of the interviews. Systematic reliability checks were performed on the Israeli questionnaires.

The closed-ended scales for the pictures which included the total samples from the Palestinian, Egyptian, and Israeli groups, were analyzed using factor analyses to determine the groupings of the variables for the conceptualization of the respondents' perceptions concerning the depicted situations. In addition, comparisons of means of the scales ("extremely" to "not at all") of the variables and analyses of variance were performed. The correlations and comparisons were also analyzed according to those variables, which compared conflict versus cooperation situations.

Chi Square analyses were performed between the closed-ended variables for the pictures and the variables coded for the open-ended stories (especially "nationality") in order to determine who and what the perceptions were

geared towards. In other words, were the perceptions of dominance, hostility, inequality, victimization, and frequency of occurrence of the situation based on seeing the people in the picture as being members of the "enemy" group interacting within a conflict situation? It is essential to determine whom they were perceiving and within what context. These data, therefore, compared responses within the group of the total sample with those in the subsamples whose stories had been coded. The data, of course, were matched for those who answered the stories with those who answered the scales.

Additional analyses were performed, using Chi Square and t-tests, to determine if those who displayed empathy in their responses to the photographs differed significantly from those who did not display empathy on their support of various options for the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Options which a) they support, and which b) they believe the other group supports were addressed. The options considered were:

1) annexation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip into Israel with transfer of the Palestinian population into other Arab states (Trans)

2) annexation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip without relocation of the Arabs (Notran)

3) continuation of the status quo (Statqo)

4) complete autonomy of the Palestinians within the occupied territories (Autonc)

5) the establishment within the occupied territories of an independent Palestinian state living side by side with Israel after border modifications to satisfy Israeli security requirements (Isecur)

6) establishment of an independent Palestinian state living peacefully side by side with Israel within pre-1967 borders (Pre67E)

7) the establishment of an independent Palestinian state in accordance with the 1947 partition plan (Plan47)

8) the establishment of a unified secular state which includes the territories of both present day Israel and the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and the population of which would include all Palestinians and all Israelis (Unify)

9) the establishment of a Palestinian state in all of Palestine with transfer of the Jews to their country of origin (Tranjew)"

Each option was rated on a five-point scale ranging from "not at all acceptable" (1) to "very acceptable" (5).

Chapter 5 Results

Various statistical procedures which included factor analyses, analyses of variance, Chi squares, t-tests, and a regression analysis were employed to analyze the groups of the data based on the description outlined in the Methods chapter above. The results of the tests used to investigate each hypothesis are presented in this Chapter.

Before the presentation of the results, however, certain limitations of the data should be addressed. Empathy was not directly measured by specific scales within the questionnaire or probed for within the administration of the projective section of the interview. Therefore, indirect measures were devised as an index of empathy based on the available data. For example, all participants were asked how "victimized" they thought the subject of each photograph was and how intense they found the situation to be (these were 2 of 6 direct questions about the perceptions of the participants). These variables appeared to be related to the concept of "feeling with another", or empathy, and proved to act as "empathy", as a variable, was predicted to act. Thus, "victimization", in particular, was used as a central aspect of the empathy measure.

In addition to the tapping of these variables, however, it was believed to be necessary to relate those responses to the stories told about the pictures specifically to who the

respondents said the subjects of the pictures were. This, too, involved problems and special considerations based on the nature of projective techniques-- defenses and personal projections are involved. If a Palestinian said that the Israeli woman who was pictured as having been wounded was "a woman", without specifying her nationality (even though it was asked for), does this mean the respondent did not recognize the victim as a member of the "enemy's" group or does it mean that the respondent did so recognize the victim but did not admit it (or are there a variety of other possibilities)? The same possibilities need to be considered if an Israeli generalized in response to a Palestinian woman to say that she is "a woman" or "an Arab". Thus, the index of empathy included cognitive and affective components. The subgroup of those who had coded answers for both the direct questions and the stories to the pictures, in addition to the statistical procedures that selected for the specified national identity of the victim in the picture and which tapped approaches towards empathy (i.e., rating "victimization" as ranging from "extremely" victimized to the mid point of the scale), yielded sample sizes that were quite small. Such small n's, however, should not be discounted, it is believed, because they can suggest relationships and give some support for the hypotheses even though they cannot be definitive. Based on the context of a protracted conflict in which the data were collected and the

limitations of the data described above, the small n's should not be a surprise but also should not be accepted as representative or definitive. With the recognition of the limitations of the data, then, it is believed that the results are nonetheless informative and meaningful.

Hypothesis 1. Perceptions of intensity, victimization, frequency of occurrence, hostility, inequality, and domination of the aggressor towards the victim will be different when the portrayed victim is a member of the adversary's group rather than a member of one's own group.

Factor analyses on the data based on the direct questions asked of the total samples were performed in order to test this first hypothesis which anticipated differential perceptions across groups in regards to the portrayed victims in the pictures. Table 1-1 highlights some of the support of this hypothesis for the "victimization" and "intensity" variables, in particular. (For the entire factor analysis table, see Appendix D-1.) The factor analysis (PA2, varimax rotation) which included all samples of participants and all the stated perceptual variables (i.e., intensity, inequality, dominance, victimization, hostility, and frequency of occurrence) indicated differentiation between conflict and cooperation pictures and between Egypt-Israel relations versus

Palestinian-Israeli relations.

TABLE 1-1 Highlights from Factor Analysis--All Samples and All Perception Variable

<u>Pal. intensity factor</u>	<u>Pal. victim factor</u>
intense: Pal woman (#5) .69	unequal: Isr-Pal (#5) .84
freg: Isr woman (#3) -.65	
freg: Eg POWs (#2) -.68	
freg: Isr POWs (#4) -.65	

<u>Israeli victim factor</u>	<u>Isr-Eg cooperation factor</u>
unequal: Pal-Isr (#3) .55	friendly: embassy (#1) .65
hostile: Pal-Isr (#3) .48	dominance: meeting (#6) .65
	unequal: Eg POWs (#2) -.78
	hostile: Eg POWs (#2) -.66

Clustering of items suggests that the Palestinian woman in the fifth picture was perceived as being substantially different than the Israeli woman in the third picture. (See Palestinian intensity, Palestinian victim, and Israeli victim factors.) The victimization and intensity of the two "victims" were not perceived as being related or similar.

Additionally, the cooperation pictures (#1 of the opening of the Israeli embassy in Cairo and #6 of the joint meeting) were perceived as less intense and very different from the conflict pictures (Israel-Egypt cooperation factor). The Israeli-Egyptian relationship factored separately from the Israeli-Palestinian relationship.

Factor analyses (PA2, varimax rotation) were also performed on the data from each complete sample separately--the Israeli quota, Palestinian quota, and

Egyptian first wave samples-for the perceptual variables. Again, evidence supported the hypothesis and the consolidated factor analysis described above. (Tables 1-2, 1-3, 1-4; see Appendix D-2 through D-4 for the complete tables.) Each sample indicated, by the clustering of the items, differential thinking in regards to "us versus them" on the victimization and intensity variables. For the Israeli sample, for example, the "Arab intensity factor" is separate from the "own group intensity factor". The "own group victim factor" is differentiated from any perceived victimization of either the Egyptian or Palestinian portrayals.

TABLE 1-4: Highlights from Factor Analysis -
Egyptian Sample and Perception Variables

Israeli Victim Factor		Arab Intensity Factor	
victim:Isr POW (#4)	.68	intense:Pal woman (#5)	.63
victim:Isr woman (#3)	.46	intense:Eq POW (#2)	.45

For the Palestinian sample, the "own group intensity factor" is in contrast to the frequency of the Israeli and Egyptian victimization events. It and "own group inequality factor" are separate from the "Israeli factor".

The Egyptian respondents perceived the "Israeli victim factor" as separate and unrelated to any other items related to their own or the Palestinian situations. Although the items for dominance, hostility, frequency, inequality, and

**TABLE 1-2: Highlights from Factor Analysis -Israeli
Sample and Perception Variables**

**"Arab" Intensity
Factor**
intens: Eq POW (#2) .68
intens: Pal vic (#5) .66

**Egypt-Israel Conflict
Factor**
freq: Isr POW (#4) .78
freq: Eq POW (#2) .70

**Cwn Group Intensity
Factor**
intens: Isr POW (#4) .72

**Cwn Group Victim
Factor**
victim: Isr-Pal (#3) .56

**Isr-Egyp Cooperation
Factor**
friend: Embassy (#1) .69
unequal: Embassy (#1) -.65

**Cooperation
Factor**
friend: jt. meet. (#6) .59
hctile: jt. Meet. (#6) -.65

TABLE 1-3: Highlights from Factor Analysis -

Palestinian Sample and Perception Variables

**Own Group Intensity
Factor**
intens: Pal woman (#5) .69
freq: Isr woman (#3) -.69
freq: Eq POW (#2) -.68
freq: Isr POW (#4) -.65

**Own Group Inequality
Factor**
uneq: Pal woman (#5) .84

**Israeli ("other")
Factor**
uneq: Isr woman (#3) .55
hostil: Isr woman (#3) .48

**Eq-Isr Cooperation
Factor**
friendly: embassy (#1) .65
dominant: Jt meeting (#6) .65
uneq: Eq POW (#2) -.78
hostil: embassy (#1) -.66

friendliness were clustered together across the conflict pictures, the victimization and intensity items did not cluster across the portrayed victims in the pictures. The Israeli victim was separate from the Arabs and the "Arab intensity factor" was separate from the Israelis.

Furthermore, the Israeli sample generally seemed to differentiate between Palestinian-Israeli relations and the Israeli relations with Egypt, as evidenced by the clustering of items for the Palestinian (#5) and Israeli (#3 and #4) pictures without including those for the Egyptian picture (#2). (See complete table in Appendix D-2.) For example, the "hostile" and "friendly" variables for the Palestinian and Israeli victims factored together and did not include those variables in regards to the Egyptian victim (#2). Factor numbers 5 and 14, for example, involve Egyptian and Israeli pictures and not the Palestinian one. The Egyptian sample appeared to extend the "us" factor to include Palestinians in a greater "Arab us", against the Israeli "them". (See complete table in Appendix E-4.) Factor 7 shows Israeli victimization as being separate from the victimization of either the Egyptians or the Palestinians. Factor 10 shows the intensity of the situations for the Egyptian and Palestinian victims to be related to each other and as different from the intensity of the situations involving Israelis. The sampled Palestinians, on the other hand, had different factors for Israeli-Palestinian

relations and Israeli-Egyptian factors (similar to those for the Israelis). Who was defined as belonging to the "us" group differed for the Palestinian and Egyptian respondents; many Egyptians in the study seemed to emphasize the "pan Arabism" while many Palestinian respondents seemed to stress the individual or particular struggle that they as Palestinians were involved in.

In summary, based on the clustering of items from the closed-ended questions from the full samples, conflict and cooperation events are differentiated, with cooperation events appearing to be less intense. Dichotomies of "us versus them" define who is in one's in-group along significant dimensions. The factor analyses indicated that one's own group's victimization and intensity were perceived as different than that of the other groups.

Hypothesis 2. There will be more "misperceptions" (including vague and unclear descriptions) in identifying the people in the picture when those people are members of the adversary's group and portrayed as victims rather than when they are members of one's own group. Portrayed victims will be perceived as being members of one's own group rather than as members of the other group; perceived aggressors will be perceived as being from the other group.

The subgroup of respondents whose stories to the

pictures were coded (see the explanation in the Methods chapter) was the basis for the following analyses. The pictures of the Palestinian woman crying (#5), the wounded Israeli woman (#3), and the Egyptian POWs (#2) were the stimuli used for the data analyzed for this hypothesis.

Israeli-Palestinian relations. For picture #5 (the Palestinian woman), a crosstabulation analysis was performed which compared the expressed identification of the Palestinian victim with the sample perceiving that identification. The Chi square results were significant ($\chi^2(60)=428.89, p < .001$), indicating that the respondent's national identity was a significant factor in determining how that respondent would identify the victim in that specific picture of a Palestinian woman.

Analyzing the samples separately, the Israeli results supported the hypothesis in that the victim was not clearly identified as "Palestinian", although the Israelis did not interject their own group into the picture. Most often, the general category of "Arab" (68%) was used, rather than the specific "Palestinian" identification (8%). In contrast, the Palestinian quota sample identified the victim as "Palestinian" (70%) most often (only 11% said "Arab"). Although "Arab" is a common term used by Israelis when referring to Palestinians (H.C. Kelman in a private conversation, December 1986), it appears to be a

deliberately vague term which reinforces the non-identity of the Palestinians as a national, distinct group.

The majority of Israelis (72%) did not specify who the aggressor was in this incident, although a group of 24% did say that Israelis were responsible. The reverse was the case for the Palestinians, as expected. The majority of Palestinian respondents (73%) identified the aggressor as being "Israeli". (Table 2-1)

TABLE 2-1: Identification of the Palestinian Victim (Picture #5)

<u>Id Given</u>	<u>Israeli</u>	<u>Sample Palestinian</u>	<u>Egyptian</u>
Palestinian	8%	70%	60%
Arab	68%	11%	9%
Egyptian	3%	0	19%
non-descript	2%	14%	0
no answer	14%	3%	3%

Note. The remainder of samples split their responses between various other categories.

For picture #3 (the wounded Israeli woman), the crosstabulations which compared the identification of the Israeli victim with the sample perceiving that identification (Table 2-2) also revealed significant results ($\chi^2(70)=515.51, p < .001$).

**TABLE 2-2: Identification of the Israeli Victim
(Picture #3)**

<u>Id Given</u>	<u>Sample</u>		
	<u>Israeli</u>	<u>Palestinian</u>	<u>Egyptian</u>
Israeli	70%	23%	33%
Jews	8%	23%	9%
Palestinian	0	14%	37%
Egyptian	0	0	10%
non-descript	5%	22%	2%
no answer	24%	6%	6%

Note. Any remaining responses were divided between various other categories.

The Palestinian sample was divided in their responses between identifying the victim as "Israeli" (23%), "Jewish" (23%), and the non-specific category of "man" (22%). A smaller group of 14% of the Palestinian respondents said the victim was "Palestinian", thus interjecting their own group into the victimized position of the picture, as was hypothesized. In contrast, the majority of Israeli respondents identified the victim as "Israeli" (70%), which was also predicted.

As with the general term "Arab", which many Israeli respondents used to describe the Palestinian victim, the term "Jew" avoids the specification of the national identity of the Israeli victim. Thus, although many of the Palestinian respondents who used the label "Jewish" to describe the victim in picture #3 probably recognized the portrayed victim as Israeli, there was some avoidance and lack of sensitivity towards the Israeli national identity.

These results tend to support the hypothesis about the problems in identifying the victims of the "enemy's" group.

Although the Israeli respondents did not specifically interject their group into the identification of the Palestinian victim, this could be due, in part at least, to the depiction of the Palestinian woman as Arab by her national dress. The photograph was not ambiguous enough in its details to assure projective qualities for national identification. However, each group seemed to use some avoidance in naming the victim of their enemy's group in the pictures. The Israelis used general "Arab" categories and the Palestinians included non-specific categories, such as "woman", along with some interjection of their own group.

The interjection of Palestinians as the victims in the scene of the Israeli victims (picture #3) is particularly interesting because the photograph of the Israeli victim was a well-known, and often recognized, picture from the Maalot attack of Israeli school children by Palestinians. Even with this reduced ambiguity of the stimuli, the hypothesized effect occurred with a small group of Palestinian respondents.

The majority of the Israelis (64%) actually specified the picture as the Maalot event, while another smaller group (29%) described it as a "terrorist attack". Although only 15% of Palestinians specified it as the Maalot attack, another 15% described it as a "Palestinian attack". Lending support to the hypothesis, 14% of the Palestinian respondents said that the incident pictured in the third

photograph was an Israeli action on the West Bank and 9% said it was a demonstration, thereby interjecting their group as the victim and their adversary's group as the aggressor. Another group of Palestinians (10%) vaguely identified the scene as one of "violence, unspecified" (seeming to avoid specific identification).

It is important to recognize that the picture of the Israeli victim and that of the Palestinian victim are different. Therefore, how the Palestinian respondents identified the Israeli victim and how the Israeli respondents identified the Palestinian victim (as indicated below) must be made cautiously.

Pictures

<u>Samples</u>	<u>Israeli victim (#3)</u>	<u>Palestinian victim (#5)</u>
Israeli	71% accurate id	76% accurate id
Palestinian	46% accurate id	81% accurate id

Note. Percentages of "accurate" identification of the victim in the pictures include specific and general categories, i.e., Israeli and Jewish, and Palestinian and Arab.

Israeli-Egyptian relations. The crosstabulation of the identification of the Egyptian POWs (in picture #2) by the samples perceiving them revealed significant results ($\chi^2(70)=170.89, p < .001$). (Table 2-3)

**TABLE 2-3: Identification of the Egyptian Victim
(Picture #2)**

<u>Id Given</u>	<u>Israeli</u>	<u>Sample Palestinian</u>	<u>Egyptian</u>
Egyptian	47%	25%	49%
Arab	35%	41%	11%
Palestinian	0	11%	17%
Israeli	2%	3%	11%
no answer	14%	6%	5%

Note. All other answers were divided between various other categories.

The largest group of respondents from the Israeli sample (47%) did identify the POWs accurately, which does not support the hypothesis. Another group of 35% of the Israeli sample used the general category of "Arab" to identify them, which tended to give only limited support for the hypothesis. Interestingly, 41% of the Palestinian respondents also used the term "Arab", while only 25% of the Palestinians accurately specified the Egyptian identity. These results would tend to lessen the Israeli support for the hypothesis, suggesting that 82% of the Israeli respondents accurately recognized the Egyptian victims. Seventy-four percent of the Israeli respondents identified the "aggressor" (the guards) as Israeli, again not supporting the hypothesis. These results suggest that the "peaceful" (or non-conflict) relations between Israel and Egypt, as opposed to the conflict relations between the Palestinians and Israel, may have affected the cognitive and affective reactions of the Israeli sample towards their former enemy.

The plurality of Egyptian respondents (49%) identified the victims in the second picture accurately as Egyptian, which would be expected. Interestingly, 17% identified the POWs as Palestinians and equal-sized groups (11% each) used the general category of "Arab" or used "Israeli" as the identification, thus avoiding the identification of their own group as the victim or, perhaps, as the "loser". It seemed that those small groups from the Egyptian sample did not want to see themselves as "weaker", or the "loser", to their adversary, Israel. This avoidance took the form of reversing the pictured roles by identifying the POWs as "Israelis", or interjecting another group, specifically the Palestinians, into the picture as the adversary and victims of Israelis.

Sixty-three percent of the Egyptian respondents, a majority, identified the guards accurately, as Israelis, again as was expected.

As a comparison, in the portrayal of the Israeli victim in picture #3, the plurality of Egyptians (37%) interjected another group, i.e. the Palestinians, as the victims. Those who did accurately identify the victim as Israeli comprised 33% of the Egyptian sample. The Israelis were identified as the aggressor (i.e. the opposite role as was portrayed in the photograph) by 38% of the Egyptian respondents, while a smaller group of 29% said the Palestinians were actually the aggressor!

The hypothesis was partially supported here in that Egyptians were unable to identify their enemy as a victim and even transposed their role into that of the aggressor.

There seems to be a suggestion that the Israelis and Egyptians perceive their relationship with each other differently. Perhaps the Israelis are less likely to perceive the Egyptians as "enemy" than the Egyptians are to perceive the Israelis as "enemy". This might be accounted for by the Camp David Accord in which the result was the Israeli government seeing Egypt separately from the other Arab countries in relation to itself while maintaining the "enemy" relationship with the other Arab countries. Egypt, on the other hand, has some ambivalence about the Camp David Accord because of its isolation from the other Arabs, the result which had positive ramifications for Israel. Although the Camp David Accord resulted in governmental relations between Egypt and Israel, the people of these countries seemed to be affected by the opening of communications. With governmental approval of relations, the dehumanization of the enemy is lessened; curiosity about "them" and similarities between "them" and "us" as people can be discovered and, thus, barriers which prevent feeling for the other can be slowly overcome.

In summary, based on the subgroup of respondents whose stories were used, there was evidence to support the hypothesis of psychological defenses used to maintain

distance between groups and the conflict relationships. There was evidence that respondents guarded against perceiving the member of the "other" group as victim. Some groups of respondents transposed the situation into patterns that maintained their conflict images, with the members of their own group, or their in-group (as Palestinians are part of the Egyptians' in-group), being perceived as the victim in situations where the opposite was portrayed.

Hypothesis 3. The intensity of the situation will be less strong when the other group is perceived as victim rather than when one's own group is victim.

To test this hypothesis, data from the full samples of respondents were analyzed. The response to the closed-ended questions about intensity was the basis of the analyses and, again, pictures 3 (wounded Israeli woman), 5 (Palestinian woman crying), and 2 (Egyptian ICWs) were the focus.

The tests for this hypothesis were based on the "intensity" scale which ranged from 1 (extremely) to 5 (not at all). This scale was derived from the closed-ended question which each respondent was asked at the finish of the projective portion of the interview. At that time, the respondent was asked "how intense does this picture seem, based on the scale with 1 being extremely intense and 5 being not intense at all?" Each respondent was asked this

question for each of the six pictures.

Analyses of variance were performed on the intensity variables for the full sample sizes to determine if one's nationality was significant in determining how that variable was perceived. (Table 3-1) As predicted, one's national group was significant (at the $p < .001$ level of significance) in determining how one perceived victims from one's own group differently from victims of "other" groups. Each group's mean score indicated that that group perceived the intensity of its own group's victims more extremely than the other groups' victims. In addition, the Israeli responses indicated that they did not perceive the intensity of either the Egyptian victims or the Palestinian victims as being very extreme, as was predicted. The Israelis showed the greatest difference in scores between groups when all three groups were compared on their perceptions of their own and the other victims. (Table 3-2)

TABLE 3-2: Comparison of Sample Means for Intensity of "Own vs Other" Victims

<u>Victim</u>	<u>Sample Means</u>		
	<u>Palestinian</u>	<u>Israeli</u>	<u>Egyptian</u>
Palestinian	1.5	3.0	1.7
Israeli	2.1	1.3	2.0
Egyptian	2.0	3.3	1.9

Note. Scores were based on a 1 to 5 scale with 1 being "extremely" and 5 being "not at all".

One-tail t-tests were performed in order to compare the mean scores of the intensity scale. The comparisons

were performed for the selected subsample of those

TABLE 3-1: ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE -PERCEIVED INTENSITY

Intensity by Sample:	Mean (SD)
Egyptian	2.01 (1.22)
Palestinian	2.11 (1.53)
Israeli	1.33 (0.74)
TOTAL	1.73 (1.17)

SOURCE	SS	DF	MEAN SQ.	F	SIG.
BETWEEN GR.	158.85	2	79.42	63.45	.001*
WITHIN GR.	1529.63	1222	1.25		

(a) THE SITUATION OF THE ISRAELI VICTIM

Intensity by Sample:	Mean (SD)
Egyptian	1.70 (1.07)
Palestinian	1.48 (1.12)
Israeli	2.95 (1.30)
TOTAL	2.20 (1.36)

SOURCE	SS	DF	MEAN SQ.	F	SIG.
BETWEEN GR.	541.34	2	270.67	192.77	.001*
WITHIN GR.	1707.40	1216	1.40		

(b) THE SITUATION OF THE PALESTINIAN VICTIM

Intensity by Sample:	Mean (SD)
Egyptian	1.85 (1.05)
Palestinian	2.03 (1.28)
Israeli	3.35 (1.18)
TOTAL	2.55 (1.36)

SOURCE	SS	DF	MEAN SQ.	F	SIG.
BETWEEN GR.	623.38	2	311.69	231.48	.001*
WITHIN GR.	1644.06	1221	1.35		

(c) THE SITUATION OF THE EGYPTIAN VICTIM

respondents who accurately identified the victims in the pictures as being members of their own group and as members of their enemy's group, respectively. (This refers to data grouping 'c' in the Methods chapter, p. 53.) (Table 3-3)

TABLE 3-3: T-Tests--Intensity of Own vs Other Group's Victim

COMPARISON	DF	T Value	Prob	Means (SD)
a) Pal. vs Isr.	28	2.04	.025*	P=1.5(1.3); I=2.1(1.3)
b) Isr. vs Pal.	7	-4.77	.001**	I=1.1(0.4); P=3.5(1.4)
c) Isr. vs Eg.	34	-9.37	.001**	I=1.1(0.3); E=3.3(1.3)

*p<.05 level, for one-tail test; **p<.001

Note. P=Palestinian; I=Israeli; E=Egyptian a)=Palestinian sample comparing its own vs Israeli victim; b)=Israeli sample comparing its own vs Palestinian victim; c)=Israeli sample comparing its own vs Egyptian victim.

Israeli-Palestinian relations. For the Israeli quota sample, the hypothesis was supported. The perceived intensity of the situation which involved their own group (Israelis, picture #3) versus the other group (Palestinians, picture #5) was significantly greater for the Israeli victim ($t(7)=-4.77, p < .001$).

For the Palestinian quota sample, the results were also significant ($t(28)=2.04, p < .05$). The perceived intensity of the situation with the Palestinian victim was significantly greater than for the Israeli victim.

An additional test was performed using the random sample, since the sample sizes of those who accurately identified the victims of the enemy groups were so small in the quota samples, and thus in the t-tests. The results of

the Israeli random sample were significant ($t(36) = -5.80, p < .001$), as were those for the quota sample. The intensity of the situation again was perceived to be significantly greater for the Israeli victim. The Palestinian random sample also revealed significant differences in the perceived intensity of the victim of their own group versus that of the Israeli victim ($t(21) = 2.99, p < .004$). The perception of intensity for the situation of the Palestinian victim was significantly greater than that for the Israeli victim. (The sample size was not greater in this random sample than in the Palestinian quota sample.)

Israeli-Egyptian relations. A subsample of the Israeli quota sample was selected for those who specifically identified the pictured Egyptian "victims" (picture #2) and the Israeli "victim" (picture #3) accurately. Then the perceptions of the intensity of each situation were compared. As predicted, the Israelis perceived the situation with an Israeli victim to be significantly more intense than the situation for the Egyptian victims ($t(34) = 9.37, p < .001$).

The hypothesis was also supported by the Israeli random sample. Again, the intensity for the Israeli victims was significantly greater than for the Egyptian victims ($t(72) = 11.88, p < .001$).

There were insufficient data for the Egyptians after

the selection for accurate identification of the Israeli victims, therefore, a comparison of perceptions was not possible.

In summary, the perceived intensity of the situation of members of one's own group being victimized was significantly greater than was the perceived intensity for members of the other groups. When matched for accurate identification of the pictured victims and the intensity score, the relationship of greater intensity for one's own group was maintained. These findings also support the results of the factor analysis.

Hypothesis 4. Empathy will be displayed most frequently within one's identity group rather than between groups.

The perception of "victimization" of the other group, when that group is specifically identified by the respondent, is considered here to be an index of "feeling with another", or empathy. (Victimization was a major factor from hypothesis 1 that distinguished the "us versus them" dichotomy.) The data analyzed, therefore, included a selected subsample based on specific identification of the person in the picture (data group 'c', as per p. 53). The pictures focussed on were numbers 2,3, and 5, as in other analyses.

An analysis of variance was performed on the data from

the question, "how victimized is the person in the picture?", in order to determine if nationality of the respondents was a significant determinant of how one perceived the victimization of one's own group versus that of the other group. (Table 4-1) As with the ANOVA performed on the intensity variable, this ANOVA was also significant at the $p < .001$ level. Nationality, thus, was demonstrated to be a major determinant of how one perceived the victimization and intensity of the situation, which lends support to the hypothesis of empathy being significantly greater for one's own group versus the other group.

To further test for the difference in empathy between groups in hypothesis 4, t-tests were performed on the victimization variable, using only those respondents who accurately identified the victims.

Israeli-Palestinian relations. The results of the t-tests on the selected subsample of data which compared the Israeli sample's perception of victimization for victims from one's own group versus those for the "other" group supported the hypothesis. (Table 4-2) The Israeli respondents perceived the Israeli woman (picture #3) as being significantly more victimized than the Palestinian woman (picture #5) ($t(7) = -3.55, p < .005$). (See item 'b', Table 4-2.)

TABLE 4-1: ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE -PERCEIVED VICTIMIZATION

Israeli Victimization by Sample:		Mean (SD)
	Egyptian	1.98 (1.25)
	Palestinian	2.02 (1.53)
	Israeli	1.3 (0.63)
	TOTAL	1.69 (1.10)

SOURCE	SS	DF	MEAN SQ.	F	SIG.
BETWEEN GR.	144.98	2	72.49	59.76	.001
WITHIN GR.	1476.16	1217	1.21		

(a) THE SITUATION OF THE ISRAELI VICTIM

Palestinian Victimization by Sample:		Mean (SD)
	Egyptian	1.67 (1.20)
	Palestinian	1.23 (0.72)
	Israeli	2.38 (1.15)
	TOTAL	1.89 (1.09)

SOURCE	SS	DF	MEAN SQ.	F	SIG.
BETWEEN GR.	257.29	2	128.65	107.61	.001
WITHIN GR.	1437.03	1202	1.195		

(b) THE SITUATION OF THE PALESTINIAN VICTIM

Egyptian Victimization by Sample:		Mean (SD)
	Egyptian	1.98 (1.33)
	Palestinian	2.38 (1.65)
	Israeli	2.62 (1.17)
	TOTAL	2.35 (1.34)

SOURCE	SS	DF	MEAN SQ.	F	SIG.
BETWEEN GR.	99.43	2	49.72	27.79	.001
WITHIN GR.	2171.45	1214	1.79		

(c) THE SITUATION OF THE EGYPTIAN VICTIM

TABLE 4-2: T-Tests--Victimization of Own vs Other Group's Victim

<u>Comparison</u>	<u>DF</u>	<u>T Value</u>	<u>Prob.</u>	<u>Mean (SD)</u>
a) Pal. vs Isr.	28	3.13	.002*	P=1.1(0.2); I=1.9(1.5)
b) Isr. vs Pal.	7	-3.55	.005*	I=1.3(0.4); P=2.6(1.2)
c) Isr. vs Eq.	35	-7.14	.001**	I=1.1(0.3); E=3.2(1.3)

*p<.05 level, for one-tail test; **p<.001

Note. P=Palestinian; E=Egyptian; I=Israeli

In addition, Israelis perceived the hostility in the pictures to be significantly greater in the situation of the Israeli victim than in those situations for the other victims ($t(7) = -2.38, p < .025$), suggesting, again, that their own group's victimization is worse and more hostile than that of the Palestinians. It should be stressed that the sample size, after the control for different variables, is too small to say anything definitively; however, the results suggest support for the hypothesis.

The results of the t-test for the Palestinian quota sample also revealed significant differences in perceived victimization of Palestinians (45) versus Israelis (43) ($t(28) = 3.13, p < .002$). (See item 'a', Table 4-2.)

Overall, as shown by a frequency measure performed on the selected subsamples, Israelis and Palestinians both expressed empathy more often for their own groups rather than across groups (Table 4-3).

TABLE 4-3: Percentage of Empathy for Own vs Other Group

	<u>SAMPLE</u>	
	<u>Israeli</u>	<u>Palestinian</u>
for own group	11.1	19.1
for other group	.5	.7
for Eg	5.1	

For the Israeli sample, 11% of the respondents expressed empathy, based on the defined index of accurate identification of the pictured victim and victimization scores, for their own group versus 0.5% for the "other" group. For Palestinians, 19% of the sample expressed empathy, based on the same index, for their own group's members versus 0.7% of the respondents who showed empathy for the "other" group.

Israeli-Egyptian relations. There was support evidenced for the hypothesis in relation to Egyptian-Israeli relations. (See Table 4-2, item 'c'.) The perception of the Israeli sample for their own group's victimization (picture #3) was significantly greater than for the perceived victimization of the Egyptians who were pictured as victims (picture #2) ($t(35) = -7.14, p < .001$), as predicted. In addition, the portrayal of the situation of the Israeli victim was also perceived as being significantly more hostile than the situation portraying the Egyptian "victims" ($t(32) = -3.46, p < .001$). This suggests that their own group is more victimized, to a worse and more hostile extent, than are the Egyptian ECHs. It might also

suggest that their own group is less likely than the other group to be perceived by them as being a hostile aggressor towards another.

There were insufficient data for the Egyptian sample to be considered.

In summary, evidence from data from the complete sample and from selected subsamples support the hypothesis that the victimization in a situation involving members of one's own group versus members of the "other" group is perceived as being greater for members of one's own group. The empathy index involving the victimization score and the accurate identification of the victim also indicates a greater level of empathy for members of one's own group versus for members of the "other" group.

Hypothesis 5. Empathy will be more frequently displayed between Israelis and Egyptians, who have increased their "human interaction" factor, or decreased the "conflict distance" by the Camp David Accord, than between Israelis and Palestinians, who are adversaries without any "peace" agreement. (The factor analysis of Hypothesis 1 lends some support to this.) Alternatively, the reverse will be the case because the Palestinians are the "significant other" for the Israelis, more than are the Egyptians.

These hypotheses were difficult to tap because of their

nature and because of the data available. Although the results, then, are not definitive, they have proved to be interesting and worthy of consideration.

The data analyzed for these hypotheses included the complete sample data for victimization and intensity items. It also included a select subsample based on accurate identification of the people in the stories told to the pictures. Pictures 5 and 2 for the Israeli sample are the focus.

In general, the Israeli respondents perceived significantly more extreme victimization in the picture of the Palestinian victim (picture #5) than in the picture of the Egyptian victim (picture #2) ($t(532)=4.32, p < .001$), which seems to support the alternative hypothesis. (Table 5-1) In addition, many of the members of the Israeli sample also perceived the picture of the Palestinian victim as being significantly more intense than that of the Egyptian victim ($t(527)=7.41, p < .001$), which again seems to support the alternative hypothesis. Interestingly, though, the Israeli respondents perceived the situation of the Egyptian POWs as involving significantly more hostility than the situation of the Palestinian woman crying ($t(495)=-2.59, p < .005$). Perhaps this is an indication that the Israeli respondents found it difficult to see themselves as the aggressors in the situation of a Palestinian woman who appeared distraught.

TABLE 5-1: T-Tests for Perceptions of Victimization and Intensity for Pal. vs Egyp. Victims (Israeli Sample)

<u>Comparison</u>	<u>DF</u>	<u>T Value</u>	<u>Prob.</u>	<u>Mean (SD)</u>
Victim.	523	4.32	.001**	E=2.6 (1.2); P=2.4 (1.2)
Intensity	527	7.41	.001**	E=3.3 (1.2); P=3.0 (1.3)
(Hostility	495	-2.59	.01*	E=2.3 (1.1); P=2.5 (1.3))

*p<.05; **p<.001 Note. P=Palestinian; E=Egyptian

The alternative hypothesis was supported by this statistical analysis. The "significant other" hypothesis suggests that even though there is protracted conflict between the Israelis and Palestinians, they are very important to each other psychologically. That kind of importance seems to involve much psychological energy and unconscious effort in trying to know that "other" better and to define themselves based on their "significant other." The Egyptians are no longer the threat they had been because of the Camp David Accord which binds Israel and Egypt; therefore, not as much psychological attention is focussed on the Egyptians, in general. Interestingly, the Palestinians and Israelis are bound together not only by a common conflict over the same land, but also by similar histories and persecutions. Such similarities might account for the significantly greater amount of empathy on the part of the Israelis towards the Palestinians rather than towards the Egyptians; empathy has been demonstrated to occur more often between people who are similar on a variable which is significant for the other (e.g. Katz; 1963; Bokeach cited in

Ratz 1963).

The nature of the stimuli should be kept in mind, however, when analyzing these data. The pictured Egyptian victims are a group of POWs (96% of Israelis identified them as such), whereas the Palestinian victims are mainly women (77% of Israelis responded as such) and children. The situations compare war and soldiers to an "everyday situation" with civilians, thus, comparisons between the pictures must be made cautiously, keeping the differences in the stimuli in mind.

The perception of greater hostility in the Egyptian picture, rather than in the picture of the Palestinian victim, might be a defensive reaction to seeing their own group (i.e., Israelis) as the aggressor towards civilians. The situation of war involves hostilities on both sides; perhaps some of the Israeli respondents did not perceive the kind of hostility between Palestinians and Israelis as being similar to that hostility which exists between two fighting armies, such as Egypt and Israel in the photograph.

When the Israeli sample was controlled for the specific accurate identification of the victims, thus involving only a selected subsample, the sample sizes dropped, in part because of problems with the data set. With that drop, the differences between Israeli-Egyptian versus Israeli-Palestinian relations were no longer evident. (Table 5-2) Victimization and intensity were not significantly

different when the focus was "Egyptian" or "Palestinian" ($t(4) = .78$, $p < .23$; $t(4) = -.41$, $p < .35$, respectively). In those cases, neither hypothesis was supported.

TABLE 5-2: T-test for Perceptions of Victimization and Intensity for Egyptian vs Palestinian Victims (Israeli Sample)

Comparison	DF	T Value	Prch.	Mean (SE)
Victim.	4	.78	.48	E=2.8(1.3); P=2.4(0.9)
Intensity	4	-.41	.70	E=3.4(1.4); P=3.6(1.4)
(Hostility	4	.69	.53	E=2.6(1.5); P=2.0(1.0)

Note. E=Egyptian; P=Palestinian

However, as explained above, identification of people in the pictures was often non-specific or inaccurate due to defensiveness in seeing one's "enemy" in the situations portrayed, thus, selection bias might be involved for those who did specifically identify the "victims". Masking of the significant difference between Israeli-Egyptian and Israeli-Palestinian relations might have occurred because of the subjectivity involved in labeling the "victims".

Overall, then, there was support for the hypothesis that the "significant other" for the Israelis, i.e. the Palestinians, provided a base from which some form of empathy could be, and was, developed. They are significant to each other because their identities are bound to each other.

Hypothesis 5. Of those who demonstrate empathy, more will

be females than males. Females will show a greater degree of empathy.

There was some support for this hypothesis by the Palestinian and Israeli respondents, but the more consistent support was from the Palestinian sample. The data were incomplete and, thus, inconclusive but there was enough evidence to suggest a pattern of females demonstrating more empathy than males in these samples. A variety of tests were performed, including analysis of variance, chi square, and t-tests, in order to determine as much as possible about the sex differences in demonstrated empathy based on these data. Due to the shortcomings of the data, it is suggested that further, more conclusive evidence be sought.

Total sample data were used for some of the analyses and selected subsamples were used for other analyses. The direct questions about victimization and intensity for pictures 2, 3, and 5 were the focus of these analyses.

Palestinians. An analysis of variance was performed on the Palestinian data which were selected for those respondents who accurately identified the Israeli victim in the picture, thus involving a selected subsample of the data (i.e. data grouping 'c', p. 53). The empathy index for "more" or "less" demonstrated empathy (i.e., score of less than or equal to 3 on the victimization scale indicated "more

empathy", while a score of 4 or 5 on that scale indicated "less empathy") was considered to be the dependent variable and sex was the independent variable. The results were significant at the $p < .055$ level (table 6-1), suggesting that, for the Palestinian respondents who demonstrated empathy for the Israeli victim, gender has an effect on the amount of empathy demonstrated (on this measure).

TABLE 6-1: Analysis of Variance--Empathy for "Other" Empathy by Sex (Palestinian Sample)

Level of Empathy by Sex:						
			Mean	(SD)		
			Female	1.0	(.00)	
			Male	1.3	(.47)	
SOURCE	SS	DF	MEAN	SC.	F	SIG.
BETWEEN	0.6	1	0.60		4.000	.055
WITHIN	4.2	28	0.15			

Chi square tests were performed on the intensity and victimization variables for the pictured Egyptian, Palestinian, and Israeli victims. Those tests did not select for accurate identification of the victims, and thus, included the total samples. The results demonstrated a significant effect of sex at the 90% level of confidence for all those variables; most, except the victimization of the Palestinian victim, were also significant at the 95% level of confidence. (Table 6-2) One's gender did significantly determine how one perceived the victimization of the members of the other groups and of one's own group.

Another chi square test for the empathy index of "score"

or "less" demonstrated empathy for the accurately identified

TABLE 6-2: CHI SQUARE TESTS- SEX BY EMPATHY INDRI+

PALESTINIAN SAMPLE

EG. VICTIM.	SEX			Ncw Total
	Female	Male	Missing	
Extremely	46.5	48.8	4.7	47.6
Very	40.4	60.0		9.2
Somewhat	42.9	52.4	4.8	7.7
A Little	20.8	41.7	37.5	8.9
Not at all	54.9	37.3	20.0	18.8
Missing	42.9	57.1		7.7

χ^2 DF SIG. MIN E.P. CELLS WITH E.P. < 5
 41.56 10 .001** 1.55 5 OF 18 (27.8%)

a) EGYPTIAN VICTIMIZATION

EG. INTENSITY	SEX			Ncw Total
	Female	Male	Missing	
Extremely	53.1	45.3	1.6	47.2
Very	36.4	60.0	3.6	20.3
Somewhat	51.7	48.3		10.7
A Little	20.7	31.0	48.3	10.7
Not at all	33.3	53.3	13.3	5.5
Missing	46.7	53.3		5.5

χ^2 DF SIG. MIN E.P. CELLS WITH E.P. < 5
 87.77 10 .001** 1.11 5 OF 18 (27.8%)

b) EGYPTIAN INTENSITY

ISB. VICTIM.	SEX			Ncw Total
	Female	Male	Missing	
Extremely	51.0	47.8	1.3	57.9
Very	32.1	64.3	5.0	10.3
Somewhat	60.6	40.0		7.4
A Little		80.0	20.0	1.8
Not At All	27.9	34.9	37.2	15.9
Missing	44.4	55.6		6.6

χ^2 DF Sig. Min E.P. Cells with E.P. < 5
 77.22 10 .001** 0.37 7 of 18 (38.9%)

c) ISRAELI VICTIMIZATION

ISR. INTENSITY	Female	Male	Missing	Total
Extremely	51.7	47.6	0.7	53.5
Very	35.3	58.8	5.9	12.5
Somewhat	35.0	65.0		7.4
A little	42.9	50.0	7.1	5.2
Not at all	31.7	29.3	39.0	15.1
Missing	47.1	52.9		6.3

χ^2 DF Sig. Min E.P. Cells with E.P. < 5
 76.68 10 .001** 1.03 5 of 18 (27.8%)

d) ISRAELI INTENSITY

PAL. VICTIM.	Female	Male	Missing	Total
Extremely	46.4	46.8	6.8	81.2
Very	25.0	55.0	20.0	7.4
Somewhat	75.0	25.0		1.5
A little	20.0	80.0		1.8
Not at all		75.0	25.0	1.5
Missing	55.6	44.4		6.6

χ^2 DF Sig. Min E.P. Cells with E.P. < 5
 16.16 10 .10 0.30 11 of 18 (61.1%)

e) PALESTINIAN VICTIMIZATION

PAL. INTENSITY	Female	Male	Missing	Total
Extremely	47.1	47.1	5.9	75.3
Very	24.0	44.0	32.0	9.2
Somewhat	33.3	66.7		1.1
A little	25.0	75.0		3.0
Not at all	52.9	47.1		6.3
Missing	50.0	50.0		5.2

χ^2 DF Sig. Min E.P. Cells with E.P. < 5
 29.60 10 .001** 0.22 9 of 18 (50%)

f) PALESTINIAN INTENSITY

*Empathy index is based on the scores from the "victimization" (victim) scale and the "intensity" scale. "More empathy" equals a score less than or equal to 3; "less empathy" equals a score of 4 or 5.

Note. Figures in this table are row percentages.

Israeli victim (picture #3) also demonstrated a significant sex difference ($\chi^2(2)=6.25, p < .04$) (Table 6-3). This, like the analysis of variance, was based on a selected subsample of data.

TABLE 6-3: Chi Square Test--Sex by Level of Empathy+
(Palestinian Sample)

<u>EMPATHY</u>	<u>SEX</u>			<u>Row Total</u>	<u>N</u>
	<u>Female</u>	<u>Male</u>	<u>Missing</u>		
"More"	37.5	54.2	8.3	72.7	24
"Less"	---	66.7	33.3	27.3	9
χ^2 6.25	DF 2	Sig. .04	Min E.P. 1.36	Cells with E.P. < 5 3 of 6 (50%)	

+Empathy is considered to be "More" or "Less" depending on the score on the "victimization" scale and the accurate identification of the "other's" (i.e. Israeli) victim.

Another set of analyses was performed on the total sample of Palestinian respondents' data in order to elicit further information. T-tests to compare the mean responses of the closed-ended questions about the perceptions of the pictures, especially in terms of intensity and victimization, were done for all Palestinian respondents, not just those selected for demonstrated empathy for the Israeli victim or for accurate identification of the pictured victims. The results revealed a significant difference between males and females only for the variable of victimization for the victim of one's own group (the Palestinians) ($t(191.76)=-1.99, p < .024$). Palestinian females in the study, on the average, scored victimization

of the Palestinian woman (picture #5) as being more extreme than did the male counterparts, as was predicted (Table 6-4).

TABLE 6-4: T-Tests--Victimization and Intensity Variables by Sex (Palestinian Sample)

Variable	DF	T Value	Prob.	Mean (SD)
Eg. Victim.	228	0.80	.212	F=2.4(1.7); M=2.2(1.6)
Eg. Intens.	234	-1.38	.085	F=1.8(1.1); M=2.0(1.2)
Is. Victim.	231	-0.94	.174	F=1.7(1.3); M=1.9(1.4)
Is. Intens.	232	-0.56	.29	F=1.9(1.4); M=2.0(1.4)
Pal Victim.	231	-1.99	.024*	F=1.1(0.5); M=1.3(0.9)
Pal intens.	235	-0.60	.276	F=1.4(1.2); M=1.5(1.2)

*p<.05 level, for one-tail test

Note. F=Female; M=Male

Although the results are more suggestive than conclusive, it appears that gender does have an effect on the level of empathy displayed for other people, with females displaying greater amounts of empathy than males.

The sample and subsample sizes varied greatly as more variables were used to select those data to be analyzed, thus affecting comparability of results across tests. However, a consistent finding was that females, when empathy was displayed at all, were more likely than males to demonstrate it. For those who accurately identified victims, more females than males showed empathy for that victim. In the overall sample, there was much less empathy displayed for members of the other group, as was expected; but for one's own group, where most empathy was evidenced if it were evidenced at all, again it was females who

demonstrated more of that empathy than did the males of the sample.

Israelis. The analysis of variance performed on a subset of the Israeli data which were selected for the accurate identification of the Palestinian victim (picture #5) was inconclusive due to the small size (N=9).

Chi square tests based on the total samples for the intensity and victimization variables for the pictures of Egyptian (picture #2), Israeli (picture #3), and Palestinian victims (picture #5), demonstrated a significant effect of sex on the perceptions of the victim for one's own group (i.e., the Israeli victim, picture #3) ($p < .01$). The effect for sex was also evident for the victimization and intensity items of the picture of the Palestinian victim (picture #5) ($p < .03$ and $p < .007$ respectively), but no significant differences between males and females were noted for the picture of the Egyptian "victims" (picture #2). These results also support the "significant other" hypothesis, as discussed in hypothesis 5.

T-tests were done on all the Israeli data, not just those selected for accurate identification of the victims, derived from responses to pictures 2, 3, and 5. They were performed to compare the mean responses of the closed-ended questions for the pictures, especially in terms of intensity and victimization. The results revealed significant

differences between the sexes for the victim of the member of their own group ($t(524.71) = -1.85, p < .03$) (picture #3) and for the perceived intensity of the picture of the Palestinian victim (picture #5) ($t(511.74) = -2.04, p < .02$). The sex differences for perceived victimization of the Palestinian victim was significant within the 90% confidence interval ($p < .08$). In each case, the female respondents perceived greater intensity than the male respondents, as was predicted. Again, there were no significant results for the perception of the Egyptian victims (picture #2). (Table 6-5)

TABLE 6-5: T-Tests--Victimization and Intensity Variables by Sex (Israeli Sample)

Variable	DF	T Value	Prob-	Mean (SD)
Eg. Victim.	532	-0.58	.28	F=2.6 (1.2); M=2.7 (1.2)
Eg. Intens.	528	-0.85	.19	F=3.3 (1.2); M=3.4 (1.2)
Is. Victim.	530	-1.85	.032**	F=1.3 (0.5); M=1.3 (0.7)
Is. Intens.	530	0.13	.45	F=1.3 (0.8); M=1.3 (0.7)
Pal Victim.	515	-1.44	.075*	F=2.3 (1.1); M=2.5 (1.2)
Pal Intens.	522	-2.04	.021**	F=2.8 (1.3); M=3.1 (1.3)

*significant at the 90% level of confidence

** $p < .05$, one-tail tests

Note. F=Female; M=Male

In general, for the Israeli respondents, there was evidence to support the hypothesis that females were more likely than males to display empathy for other people.

Egyptians. The data for the Egyptian sample were incomplete and, thus, inconclusive.

In summary, based on analyses of the total Israeli and Palestinian samples and on selected subsets of those data, there was some evidence to suggest that females tended to show a greater amount of empathy than males did in response to members of their own group's victims or in response to members of the "significant other" group. That is, the results were suggestive for Israeli responses to Israelis (picture #3) or to Palestinians (picture #5) and Palestinian responses to Palestinians (picture #5) or Israelis (picture #3). The evidence did not hold up for either group's response to the picture of the Egyptian POWs (picture #2).

Hypothesis 7. Those respondents who demonstrate empathy for the other side will support options for the West Bank and Gaza Strip which are less extreme and which take into consideration the specific needs of the other side.

Nine options for the West Bank and Gaza Strip that might lead to "peaceful relations between Israelis and Palestinians" were presented to each respondent to be answered on a 5-point scale ranging from "not at all acceptable"(1) to "very acceptable"(5). The total samples for each group answered these questions. The options presented were:

1)annexation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip by Israel and the transfer of all Palestinians to other Arab

countries;

2)annexation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip by Israel with the Palestinian population remaining;

3)the establishment of a Palestinian state living peacefully side-by-side with Israel within the pre-67 borders;

4)the establishment of an independent Palestinian state in accordance with the 1947 partition plan;

5)complete autonomy for the Palestinians within the occupied territories;

6)establishment within the occupied territories of a Palestinian state with border modifications for Israeli security needs;

7)the establishment of a unified secular state which includes all the territories of both present day Israel and the West Bank and Gaza Strip and the population of which would include all Palestinians and all Israelis;

8)maintaining the status quo;

9)the establishment of a Palestinian state in all Palestine with the transfer of the Jews to their country of origin.

Each respondent was asked to answer how acceptable each option was to his/her and how acceptable he/she thought each option was to the "other" (e.g., the Israeli respondents were asked how acceptable they thought each option was to the Palestinians, and vice versa). Only the Israeli and

Palestinian samples were used for these analyses. New "accuracy" scores were computed by subtracting what each thought the "other" would say minus the mean of the other group's responses for that question. The data for those respondents who specified the accurate identification of the victim of the "other" group were analyzed. Those data were divided into those that included "more" versus "less" empathy demonstrated for that victim, thus utilizing a selected subsample rather than the total sample. Analyses of variance were performed on each new variable to determine if "more empathy" versus "less empathy" had a significant effect on the accuracy of prediction of the "other's" position in reference to the presented options (i.e., the newly computed scores were the dependent variables, while empathy was the independent variable). Such an ability to predict the level of acceptability of the options for the "other" was considered to be an indication of empathy.

In addition, one-tail t-tests were then performed comparing the mean scores of the "more empathy" versus "less empathy" groups, predicting those with "more empathy" to have scores which were less extreme in their orientation to a solution to the conflict over the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

Israelis. The analysis of variance on the difference scores of one's prediction of the "other" minus the mean of what

the "other" said, by the level of empathy (and thus, being only a subsample), revealed significance in only one out of the 9 options (Table 7-1; for the complete table of results, see Appendix D-5). Those with "more empathy" versus those with "less empathy" differed significantly in predicting the level of acceptability of "the establishment of a unified secular state which includes all the territories of both present day Israel and the West Bank and Gaza Strip and the population of which would include all Palestinians and all Israelis." Those respondents who demonstrated "more" empathy tended to overestimate the acceptability of this option for the Palestinians. Those who demonstrated "less" empathy tended to underestimate the level of acceptability of this option for the Palestinian respondents. The two groups erred approximately the same amount but in different directions.

TABLE 7-1 Highlights from Analysis of Variance
Empathy and Options for the West Bank
and Gaza Strip (Israeli Sample)

<u>Unified Secular State:</u>			<u>Mean (SE)</u>		
	"more" empathy		.54	(1.5)	
	"less" empathy		-.38	(1.48)	
<u>Source</u>	<u>SS</u>	<u>DF</u>	<u>Mean Sq.</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>Sig.</u>
Between Gr.	12.78	1	12.78	5.73	.02*
Within Gr.	162.78	82	2.23		

*p<.05

Note. Scores were calculated from the difference between what the Israelis thought the Palestinians would find to be acceptable minus the mean of the scores of what the Palestinians actually said that they found to be acceptable.

Palestinians. The analysis of variance of the "accuracy" scores by levels of empathy ("more" or "less"), revealed significant differences between those with "more" and those with "less" empathy for 3 out of the 9 options. The groups differed on "complete autonomy for the Palestinians within the occupied territories" and on "annexation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip by Israel and the transfer of Palestinians to other Arab countries." A third option, "the establishment of a Palestinian state living peacefully side-by-side with Israel within the pre-67 borders", revealed significant differences between those with "more" versus those with "less" empathy for the Israel victims at the 90% confidence level. (Table 7-2; for full tables of results, see Appendix D-6.) The most inaccurate prediction, based on the accuracy score, was for the presented option of annexation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip with the transfer of Palestinians to other Arab countries. Both groups, i.e., those who demonstrated more and those who demonstrated less empathy, overestimated the level of acceptability of this option for the Israeli respondents. However, those Palestinian respondents who demonstrated less empathy overestimated its acceptability to a greater extent than did those who demonstrated more empathy. That is, those with less empathy had more error in predicting the Israelis' response than did those with more empathy.

For the option of complete autonomy for the

Palestinians, those Palestinians with more empathy overestimated the level of acceptability of this option for the Israeli respondents; while those with less empathy underestimated the level of acceptability. The two groups, i.e., those who demonstrated more and those who demonstrated less empathy, actually erred about equally, but in opposite directions.

Those Palestinian respondents who demonstrated more empathy for the Israeli victims erred significantly more on the prediction of the level of acceptability of the options for a Palestinian state in accordance with the pre-'67 borders than those who demonstrated less empathy. The two groups erred in opposite directions, again with those with more empathy overestimating the level of acceptability of this option.

Overall, the difference in being able to predict what the other group found to be acceptable in terms of options for the West Bank and Gaza Strip based on demonstrated empathy levels obtained from the measure used here was limited. The Israeli respondents differed significantly in their ability to predict the Palestinians' responses only for the option concerning a unified secular state. The empathy levels were not good predictors of the other group's response for any of the other options presented to the respondents. For the Palestinian respondents, however, level of empathy was a predictor on three options-- complete

autonomy for the Palestinians, annexation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip with transfer of the Palestinians to other Arab countries, and establishment of an independent Palestinian state within the pre-67 borders. The level of empathy demonstrated for the Israeli victims in the photograph, then, seemed to have an effect on the prediction by Palestinians of what Israelis would find to be acceptable options. The Palestinian respondents who showed more empathy for the Israelis overestimated the level of acceptability of the options for the pre-'67 borders and for autonomy for the Palestinians. Additionally, they were not as inaccurate as those with less empathy in predicting the acceptability of annexation with transfer. It seems, then, that the Palestinian respondents who demonstrated more empathy had a more benign view of Israelis than did those with less empathy.

T-tests were done for selected subsamples of the data from the separate samples to compare the mean responses of those who demonstrated "more" empathy, i.e. those who rated "victimization" as being great (less than or equal to 3), with those who displayed "less" empathy, in terms of how they perceived each option, after the data were selected for accurate identification of the victim.

Israelis. The Israeli data were selected for those who accurately identified the Palestinian victim (picture #5) as

being "Palestinian" or "Arab", the more general category (again, which takes into account the defensiveness with which the identification of the victim might be mediated). Significant differences in acceptability of the various options were indicated for the 1947 partition plan ($t(71) = 2.44, p < .009$) and for annexation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip with transfer of the Palestinians to other Arab countries ($t(13.9) = -2.07, p < .029$). (Table 7-3)

TABLE 7-3: T-Tests on the Acceptability of Options for the West Bank and Gaza Strip (Israeli Sample)

Variable	DF	T Value	Prob.	Mean (SD)
Annex w trans.	83	-2.07	.03*	M=2.4 (1.6); L=3.5 (1.8)
Annx w/o tran.	83	.18	.43	M=3.1 (1.5); L=3.0 (1.5)
Stat quo	83	-0.48	.32	M=2.0 (1.1); L=2.3 (1.4)
Autonomy	81	.71	.25	M=2.4 (1.3); L=2.1 (1.3)
Pal state w Is security	83	.02	.49	M=1.9 (1.3); L=1.9 (1.4)
Pre 67 borders	83	-0.39	.35	M=1.1 (0.5); L=1.2 (0.6)
47 Plan	81	2.44	.01*	M=1.1 (0.5); L=1.0 (0.0)
Unified secular	82	-0.03	.49	M=1.4 (0.9); L=1.4 (0.7)
Pal state, Jew transfer	80	1.0	.16	M=1.0 (0.2); L=1.0 (0.0)

* $p < .05$

Note. M= "More empathy"; L= "Less empathy" displayed

Those Israeli respondents who demonstrated "more" empathy found the 1947 partition plan to be significantly more acceptable than did those respondents who showed "less" empathy (although both groups seem to be opposed to that option). Those respondents with "more" empathy found the option of annexation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip with transfer of the Palestinians to other Arab countries to be

significantly less acceptable than did the respondents with "less" empathy for the Palestinians. In that case, those with "more" empathy were on the "against" side of the scale (a mean response of 2.4), while those with "less" empathy were on the "for" side of the scale (a mean response of 3.5). Those results support the hypothesis that displayed empathy for the "other" would mediate political positions in regards to options for the West Bank and Gaza Strip, although in a limited way.

Palestinians. The Palestinian data were selected for those respondents who accurately identified the Israeli victim as an "Israeli" or as a "woman" (thus including proposed defensive responses). The groups of those with "more" empathy for the Israeli victim and those with "less" empathy for the Israeli victim were then compared on their responses of acceptability to the options for the West Bank and Gaza Strip. (Table 7-4)

**TABLE 7-4: T-Tests on the Acceptability of the Options
for the West Bank and Gaza Strip
(Palestinian Sample)**

<u>Variable</u>	<u>DF</u>	<u>T Value</u>	<u>Prob.</u>	<u>Mean (SD)</u>
Annex w trans	49	-1.48	.08*	M=1.0 (0.0); L=1.5 (1.2)
Annx w/o tran	47	-0.62	.27	M=1.3 (0.8); L=1.6 (1.3)
Stat quo	49	-0.64	.26	M=1.3 (0.8); L=1.5 (1.2)
Autonomy	48	.24	.41	M=2.1 (1.5); L=2.0 (1.3)
Pal state, Isr security	48	.39	.35	M=2.9 (1.6); L=2.7 (1.8)
Pre 67 borders	48	1.57	.07*	M=4.0 (1.4); L=3.1 (1.8)
47 Plan	49	-0.29	.39	M=3.1 (1.7); L=3.3 (1.5)
Unified secul	46	-1.83	.05**	M=2.5 (1.6); L=3.4 (1.4)
Pal state, Jew transfer	49	-0.96	.17	M=1.7 (1.4); L=2.2 (1.6)

*significant at the 90% confidence level

**significant at the 95% confidence level

Note. M= "More empathy"; L= "less empathy" displayed

Those Palestinian respondents who demonstrated "more" empathy for the Israeli victims found the unified secular state to be significantly less acceptable than did the Palestinian respondents who had demonstrated "less" empathy. Those Palestinian respondents who had demonstrated "more" empathy were also significantly less accepting of the annexation with transfer option (although, again as with both groups of Israelis, both Palestinian groups were opposed to that option). In addition, those with "more" empathy for the Israeli victims were significantly more accepting of the option for a Palestinian state living side-by-side with Israel within the pre-1967 borders than were those with "less" empathy. These results also lend some support to the hypothesis.

In summary, when displayed empathy for the adversary

was determined and used to assess its effect on how strongly specific options for the West Bank and Gaza Strip were held by the respondents, it was found that such empathy was more of a mediating factor for the Palestinian respondents than for the Israeli respondents. There were some results that supported the prediction of less extreme positions held by those respondents who displayed empathy for the adversary but the findings were not dramatic or conclusive. Empathy as an independent variable for prediction of political positions would need to be more carefully defined and controlled.

Multiple Regression Model.

Several multiple regression models were attempted to try to determine factors which could be used to predict empathy that was displayed towards the pictured "victims" of the "other" group. Factors for "distance" between groups, sex of respondents, and displayed empathy for one's own group members were used in various models but did not prove to be helpful in understanding and predicting the displayed empathy for the "other" group. (Less than 15% of the variances were accounted for by any of the attempted models.) In these models, empathy for one's own group was the only factor that was somewhat helpful in advancing such understanding.

A multiple regression model based on a relationship between ideological beliefs and displayed empathy was then attempted in order to determine ideological variables which might be significant in determining the expression of empathy for "the other" group(s). The independent variables which were tested included ideological variables determined from a scale which asked how important each of the following factors was considered to be in "determining the outcome of the Middle East conflict": military strength, population size and growth, Arab unity, economic strength, U.S. influence, Russian influence, European influence, world opinion, American opinion, world Jewry, justice, passage of time, God's will, leadership. Each variable was rated on a

5 point scale from 1 "unimportant" to 5 "very important". A factor analysis (Tables 8-1 and 8-2) was performed on these variables for each sample and a scale was developed for ideology based on the resultant factors.

TABLE 8-1: Factor Analysis of "Ideology" Variables (Israeli Sample)

<u>Variables</u>	<u>Factors</u>			
	<u>USworld</u>	<u>ideal justice</u>	<u>other forces</u>	<u>internal</u>
USopinion	.90			
worldopinion	.73			
worldjews	.66			
justice		.88		
Russian influence			.70	
European influence			.59	
economy				.61
population size				.48
military				.47

Note. Variables entered included: military strength, population size and growth, Arab unity, economic strength, US influence, Russian influence, European influence, world opinion, American opinion, world Jewry, justice, passage of time, god's will, leadership

TABLE 8-2: Factor Analysis of "Ideology" Variables

<u>Variables</u>	<u>Factors</u>				
	<u>opinion</u>	<u>ideal</u> <u>justice</u>	<u>power</u>	<u>USSR</u>	<u>internal</u>
worldopin	.70				
USopinica	.61				
justice		.62			
world Jewry			.65		
US power			.60		
Russia				.76	
economy					.59
Arab unity					.41
military					.39

Note. Variables entered included: military strength, population size and growth, Arab unity, economic strength, US influence, Russian influence, European influence, world opinion, American opinion, world Jewry, justice, passage of time, god's will, leadership

The scale variables were then used as independent variables in the multiple regression analysis (Table 8-3). In addition, a variable for empathy for one's own group (espown) was also included as an independent variable in the equation (Table 8-4).

effects external opinions on Israel (world Jewry, US opinion, and world opinion=USworld) were less likely to display empathy towards the Palestinians. The belief in justice as a variable in resolving the conflict had little effect on empathy of the Israelis towards the Palestinians.

The ideological belief in the influence of Russia and Europe on the outcome of the Middle East conflict, and its related display of empathy for the Palestinian victim in the fifth picture, seems to lend support to the finding from a pilot study done in Israel and on the West Bank (Succiero & Abed 1984). Interviews from that study revealed that some Palestinians who were willing to work jointly with Israelis were most willing to cooperate with those Israelis that were believed to be "communist", or members of Israel's communist party. The Israeli communist party is the only Israeli party in which Palestinians and Israelis are equal members, which seems to be an ideological belief in the acceptance of Palestinians as equal citizens with equal justification to having rights and political representation. There seems to be a convergence, then, between Israeli respondents in the multiple regression model for prediction of empathy for the adversary and for the perceptions of some Palestinians who believe they can trust and work with Israelis whom they perceive as believing in some equality between Israelis and Palestinians.

It must be remembered that only small groups of

respondents are included in these analyses since it was the minority of respondents who displayed empathy for their "enemy". Thus, the information elicited here refers to a small group of people whose perceptions of feelings for the "other" group are considered to be a positive dimension which I am attempting to understand further.

The multiple regression analysis on the data of those Palestinians who demonstrated empathy for Israelis (based on the accurate identification of the Israeli victims and the level of "victimization" described) did not reveal significant ideological foundations for that empathy. (Table 8-4)

TABLE 8-4: Multiple Regression for Empathy for the "Other" (Palestinian Sample)

Variables entered on step no. 1) empown
 2) power
 3) ideljust
 4) opinica
 5) USSR
 6) internal

Multiple R .383
 R Squared .147
 Adjusted R Sq. .036
 Standard Error .451

Variable	Variables in the Equation		Beta
	B	Stand. Err. B	
empown	-.030	.0697	-.083
power	-.032	.0488	.167
ideljust	-.020	.0351	-.118
opinica	-.051	.0326	-.342
USSR	-.061	.0685	-.2
internal	.047	.0356	.303
(constant)	1.238	.5346	

These factors, like the previous ones of sex of the respondent and "distance" between their own group and the other groups are not helpful in understanding the dimension of displayed empathy that some Palestinian respondents showed for the Israeli victim in the picture. Some other model will need to be developed in order to try to understand and predict the empathy of Palestinians that was displayed for the Israeli victims in the third picture. It seems that the factors which motivate some Israelis to empathize with Palestinian victims are different from those which motivate Palestinian respondents to display empathy for members of the "other" group.

Chapter 6 Discussion

Some support for all the hypotheses was revealed through the statistical analyses performed. In addition, a model to help understand and predict the portrayal of empathy for one's adversary was attempted using a multiple regression analysis. Although there were shortcomings in the data available, as discussed above, the results obtained can lead to certain conclusions and implications for future work, as will be addressed in the following discussion and in the last chapter (Conclusions and Implications for Future Research).

First, a summary of the findings are presented. Consistent with the theory of conflict and conflict resolution (Chapter 1), research data here demonstrated that differences do exist between how one perceives oneself and how one perceives one's adversary. Although this was expected, data were found to support the theories. Evidence revealed that within a conflict, one tends to perceive oneself as "victim" and the other party as "aggressor", without realizing the mirror images of these perceptions. Identifying one's own group as being separate and distinct from the "other" group determines how one perceives the situation. For example, situations involving one's own group were perceived as evidencing more victimization and greater intensity than similar situations involving the "other" group. Further, situations which provide discrepant

portrayals of one's adversary, that is, one's adversary as being the victim, are often misperceived, misrepresented, or avoided through vague descriptions rather than precise terms. Identifying the nationality of the pictured victim, for example, proved to be difficult, with general and non-descript categories used by the respondents rather than specific identifications being given. In addition, some of the Palestinian respondents transposed the situation to interject members of their own identified group as being the victims, while some Egyptians transposed situations into those of Palestinian victimization when the pictures were actually of Israeli victimization. Defensiveness and avoidance seemed to be utilized rather than seeing one's enemy as a victim of one's own group.

Closed communication systems (Eurton 1969) may partially account for these differential perceptions between one's group and the "other" because of the lack of available non-biased information and interactions between parties. In addition, dehumanization allows a group to be maintained as "enemy" and lacking in human feelings and attitudes. Here, too, the research data provide evidence which supports these theories. These data also make available similar research information about each party's perceptions and feelings of its own group and to others, which might serve to "open" the communication system somewhat. To my knowledge, these are the only research data that provide each

side access to information about its own group and the other group which was gathered using the same interview schedule and research methodology.

An example of the effect of "opening" a communication system that previously had been closed is the relations between Egypt and Israel that were opened (to some degree, at least) by the Camp David Accord. The results of that "opening" were evidenced in some of the perceptions of the Israeli respondents of the pictured Egyptians, as compared to their perceptions of the pictured Palestinians. Factor analyses demonstrate that Israelis tend to distinguish between their relations with Egypt versus those with Palestinians. Additional evidence was found in the correct identification of the Egyptian "victim", and to some extent, by the accurate and often hopeful response to the "cooperation" picture between Egypt and Israel, i.e., the opening of the Israeli embassy in Egypt.

Egyptians, however, appeared ambivalent about their new relations with Israelis. About half (55%) said the opening of the Israeli embassy in Cairo was a positive event, but another 21% said it was negative (86% of Palestinians and 93% of Israelis said it was a "positive" event). But, the future based on this event was seen as "positive" no less often by Egyptians than by either other group (46% of each group's responses). The difference between the groups was evident when the perception of a "negative" future was

analyzed; 20% of Palestinians perceived the future as negative based on this event (versus 10% of Egyptians and 5% of Israelis). Even though many Egyptians were not sure that the event was positive, they seemed to have hope in the future. Although these results might have been anticipated, this study provided research evidence collected from the people (rather than the governments) of the various societies as support and evidence of Egyptian ambivalence, and hope.

Many Egyptian respondents (37%) interjected the identification of "Palestinian" as the victims in situations of Israeli and, to a lesser extent (17%), Egyptian victims. Egyptian respondents also included Palestinians as part of their group, the "in-group" of Arabs, as evidenced by the factor analysis. This emphasis of "Arab versus Israeli" is probably partially due to the repercussions of the Camp David Accord, that is, the isolation of Egypt from the other Arab countries. Many Egyptians seem to be compensating by keeping the Arab identity salient, by emphasizing the "us-them" dichotomy based on Arabs and Israelis, and by concentrating on the victimization of the Palestinians.

The Palestinian perceptions are different again. They, like the Israelis, distinguished between the Israeli-Palestinian relations and Israeli-Egyptian relations. The Palestinians do not seem to group the sides as "Arab" versus "Israeli"; they appear to see Arab

nationalities more distinctly. Their own victimization and conflict with Israel is distinct from other Arab countries' relations with Israel. Their identity as Palestinians appears to be much more important and significant than an identity as being "Arab" (although this does not suggest that they want to disregard or minimize their place in the Arab world). As Palestinians, then, their relationship to Israel is of utmost importance in defining themselves, their activities, and their lives.

It seems evident that the Israelis are the "significant other" (S.P. Cohen in a private conversation June 1986) for the Palestinians, as are the Palestinians for the Israelis. As "significant others", their identities, who they are, are linked to their relationship, in this case, as adversaries. Of utmost importance to each group's identity is its relationship to the other. As Stone (in Stryker & Statham 1985, p 345) explained, "identities are internalized positional designations existing insofar as persons participate in structured role relationships, the convergence of being placed as a social object and appropriating the terms of placement for themselves." Thus, the "significant other" is a highly salient identity relationship which defines oneself as a group member in relation to another group. That identity affects conceptualizations of oneself in relation to one's own group, as well as one's group in relation to the other

group. As discussed in Chapter 1, protracted conflict helps define all levels of society and socialization and, thus, thinking and feeling. Identity based on the "significant other" relationship seems to similarly affect various levels of individual and group thoughts, feelings, and actions.

This conceptualization might account for the somewhat greater levels of empathy by Israeli respondents towards the Palestinian victims rather than towards the Egyptian victims (hypothesis 5). In addition, it may explain the similar structure of the conflict by Israeli and Palestinian respondents, unlike that of Egyptian respondents--i.e. Israeli-Palestinian and Israeli-Egyptian relations, as differentiated by the Israeli and Palestinian respondents, versus Israeli-Arab relations, as perceived by the Egyptian respondents.

It should be stressed, then, that there are three separate groups within those sampled for this project--Israelis, Egyptians, and Palestinians, rather than just two--Arabs and Israelis; and three distinct relationships-- Israeli-Egyptian, Palestinian-Israeli, and Palestinian-Egyptian (which appears to be perceived as stronger, in a positive sense rather than a "significant" sense, by both these parties in comparison with either one's relationship with Israel).

The concepts of the "unanimous Arab other" for the Israelis or "Arab us" for the Palestinians seem to be

inaccurate categories for these groups at the present time, since the Palestinian identity is separated from the Arab category by both Israelis and Palestinians. This perceived differentiation between all Arabs and separate Arab nationalities, for example, Palestinians, is essential to remember and to integrate into any negotiations which are devised to impact or resolve the Middle East conflict(s). Which relationship is being targeted and who should be the parties to those negotiations based on that relationship? These are essential, fundamental questions to be answered prior to negotiations. Although this is realized by many people, governmental meetings and negotiations often do not seem to accept and incorporate it into practice.

Previous research has demonstrated that empathy is more often displayed within one's group than it is across groups (e.g., Katz 1963) and that "in-groupness" can be defined along various dimensions, with ideological dimensions, for example, being stronger than national ones at times (e.g., Rokeach cited in Katz 1963; Doob 1970). The dyadic group differentiations discussed above were significant in the empathy displayed towards the people in the various photographs. Each group displayed empathy most often for its own members and least for "outsiders". In addition, Egyptians displayed empathy towards Palestinians based on their membership in the larger "Arab" group at the expense of Israeli victims who were actually depicted. Israelis

displayed somewhat more empathy towards Palestinians than towards Egyptians seemingly because of the so-called "significance" of the relationship for the Israelis.

Research has also suggested that females will display more empathy than males will (e.g., Sciffman 1977). The sex differences between those who displayed more versus less empathy are not very clear but do lend some support to the previous findings that females are likely to display more empathy than males. Israeli females perceived the intensity and victimization of the pictured Palestinian woman as being more extreme than the males did (at the $p < .05$ level). In addition, the differentiated perception of the victimization of their own group was significant within the 90% confidence level.

Palestinian females also perceived the victimization and intensity of their adversary's wounded, the Israeli victim, and the victimization of the Egyptian PCBS to be more extreme than the males did. The perceived intensity of the situation for their own group was also greater for females, while the intensity for the Egyptians approached significance. There were not clearcut consistent differences between males and females based on these analyses, though.

Gilligan's (1982) theory of moral development suggests that the moral development of females is based on relationships between people, while males' is more dependent

on logical analyses. This theory would tend to support the female perceptiveness of the victimization of others as being more extreme than that of the male respondents. It would also support the concept of empathy being more readily displayed by females, because the females would be, according to the theory, more attuned to the relationship between people and, thus, the feelings of others. Further research would need to be done in order to determine conclusively if empathy displayed towards one's adversaries is displayed consistently more often by females than by males, although there is some evidence here to support that it may be so. However, when sex was used within a multiple regression analysis as a possible determinant of expressions of empathy for one's adversary, it alone was not a significant contributor to empathy for the "other".

A model was developed which proposed that ideological beliefs, rather than gender or "distance" between groups, predict the level of empathy that one will demonstrate towards one's adversary. Such a relationship between ideology and expressed empathy for members of the "other" group proved to be important in predicting and understanding such shared feelings between adversaries. Also included with ideological positions was the level of empathy which one displayed for one's own group. This overall model proved very useful and significant in determining the empathy which Israeli respondents demonstrated for the

Palestinian victims in the photograph. It did not, however, have such predictive ability for the Palestinian respondents.

For the Israelis in the sample, ideological beliefs in Russian and European influence as important determinants in the outcome of the Middle East conflict, as well as self-reliance and the strength of Israel as an autonomous nation, were important factors involved in the Israeli display of empathy for Palestinians. Conversely, those Israelis who believe in the influence of the United States and world Jewry as being important in determining the outcome of the conflict were less likely to demonstrate empathy toward the Palestinian victim in the photograph. The results about the belief in the influence of Russia and Europe seem to be related to data from a pilot study done on the West Bank and in Israel (Buqiero & Ahd 1984) in which some Palestinian interviewees specified that they would be willing to interact and work in cooperation with those Israelis who they identified as being "communists" rather than with other Israelis. The ideological belief in the equality of human beings appears to have been sensed by Palestinians about Israelis who may act on that belief by joining the Israeli communist party, for example. Evidence suggests that this belief is related to empathy for members of the "other" group.

Perhaps a sense of greater control over their own lives

is a reason why those who do not focus on the importance of the United States influence and world Jewry (viewed by some as "power politics") were more willing and able to show some empathy for Palestinian victims. Belief in Israel as an autonomous, self-reliant nation, rather than its being under the control of the United States, seems to have allowed some Israelis to define for themselves whos they wanted to deal with; who is "significant" to them; and how they want to interact with the other.

Additionally, when empathy for one's own group was introduced into the model, the predictability for empathy for Palestinians was significantly increased again. The ideological beliefs of Russian and European influence, and the concept of Israeli self-reliance, combined with a demonstration of empathy for the victims of their own Israeli group predicted with a high degree of assurance a display of empathy for the Palestinian victim in the photograph by the Israelis in this sample.

This model is based on a small group of respondents because of the limitations of the data available and because of the definition of empathy used. By including only respondents who accurately identified the Palestinian victim, the number of respondents whose data were analyzed was greatly reduced. It was predicted, however, that the amount and frequency of empathy demonstrated across nationalities would be very limited; therefore, within these

considerations this model contributes to the understanding of a group of Israelis who did demonstrate such empathy.

In regards to political positions, empathy for the other group seemed to affect the level of acceptability of only some of the various options for solving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Both Palestinians and Israelis who displayed empathy for the "other" found "annexation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip into Israel and transfer of the Palestinians to other Arab countries" to be less acceptable than their compatriots who did not display empathy. In addition, Palestinians with "more" empathy for the Israeli victims were also less accepting of the option of "a unified secular state", which is consistent with the hypothesis of a more "moderate" acceptance of possible options for the West Bank and Gaza Strip by those who demonstrated "more" empathy for the adversary and indicative of an understanding of an Israeli concern. Those Palestinians who demonstrated empathy for the Israeli victim were significantly more accepting, than those who did not display such empathy, of "an independent Palestinian state within the 1967 borders". Israelis, on the other hand, who demonstrated "more" empathy were more accepting of the option of "establishing an independent Palestinian state in accordance with the 1947 partition plan". These differences in acceptability of options by those with "more" versus "less" empathy for their adversaries are limited but suggest

that empathy might have some role in mediating political positions.

The measure of empathy used in this study based on more or less demonstrated empathy for the other side proved to be largely unrelated to ability to predict that other's political position on the options for the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The analysis based on the accuracy of prediction of what the other group would find acceptable showed few significant differences between those with more versus those with less empathy for the other. The Israeli respondents only showed a significant difference in accuracy of prediction for the option about the establishment of a unified secular state. The Palestinian respondents differed in their predictions of the Israelis' responses on the options for complete autonomy for the Palestinians in the occupied territories, annexation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip with transfer of the Palestinians, and the establishment of a Palestinian state within the pre-1967 borders. Those respondents who demonstrated more empathy overestimated the level of acceptability of the various options for Israelis, while those with less empathy underestimated the level of acceptability of the options of autonomy and a Palestinian state in accordance with the pre-'67 borders of Israel. For the annexation with transfer option, those with less empathy had a greater error in overestimating the level of acceptability by Israelis than

did those with more empathy. It appears that those Palestinian respondents who demonstrated more empathy for the Israeli victim in the picture had a more benign view of Israelis than did those with less empathy.

The effect of the level of empathy for the adversary on the accuracy of prediction of that adversary's position by the other group was greater for the Palestinian respondents than for the Israeli respondents. Although ideology was a good predictor of empathy for the adversary (i.e. the Palestinians) by the Israelis, that empathy did not necessarily allow the Israeli respondents to accurately predict the acceptability for the Palestinians in the sample of options for the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The level of empathy for Israelis by the Palestinian respondents allowed for a somewhat better prediction of the acceptability of various options for the Israelis, although the model for predicting that empathy by ideological belief did not hold for the Palestinian respondents.

The major findings from this research, then, can be outlined in four points. First, empathy was displayed to some degree between some members of a party to the conflict and the adversary in that protracted conflict. Empathy across groups within a protracted conflict was not predicted. Second, ideology appears to be a major factor in how one perceives and reacts to members of the adversary's group, at least for the Israeli respondents. Third, the

"significance" of the other group as it relates to one's own identity also seems to be important in how one members of the group, including the positive sharing of feelings for them. The evidence for this, though, is limited and requires further investigation.

Fourth, it is important to realize the differences, too, between the Israeli and Palestinian respondents in the cognitive maps used to conceptualize the conflict and the involved relationships. The patterns of responses and models for predicting responses are not the same for Palestinians and Israelis; for example, ideological factors involved in the prediction of empathy by Israelis were not as helpful for predicting empathy by Palestinians. A model for understanding and predicting empathy by Palestinians for Israeli victims was not successfully discovered through this research. It does not seem, however, that displayed empathy for the adversary by the Palestinian respondents was unrelated to political positions in that empathy seemed to play some kind of modifying role for the Palestinian respondents in regards to the degree to which they find various options for the West Bank and Gaza Strip to be acceptable. A clear pattern was not discovered, however.

Chapter 7 Preliminary Analysis for Future Research

In this preliminary analysis, a subsample of the Israeli, Palestinian, and Egyptian quota data was analyzed in terms of empathy and ideology. The hypothesis tested was as stated above: a "closed" ideology will inhibit the feeling and expression of empathy for people outside of one's own group.

Ideology is "any set of emotionally-charged convictions about man and his relationship to the natural or supernatural world" (Lifton 1969 p 419). It underlies religious, scientific, and political thought and helps to "create a world image convincing enough to support the collective and the individual sense of identity" (Erikson 1984 p 22).

In way of introducing this preliminary study, some of the data's strengths and weaknesses will be outlined. The data collected in the "Images in Conflict" study are rich, varied, and numerous. Having collected them is, then, a major accomplishment which had not been achieved up to that point. To be able to collect the data, political considerations had to be attended to, including sensitivities and suspicions above and beyond those encountered in other forms of research which are not undertaken in the middle of a conflict, or cross-culturally. For this reason, "scientific" methods of doing research were closely adhered to as much as possible, although

circumstances prohibited exact adherence to Western standards. However, methodological issues specific to carrying out research within a protracted conflict were discovered and dealt with. In addition, many of the ethical issues of doing cross-cultural research were also addressed and met. (For an analysis of the ethical issues involved in cross-cultural research, see Warwick 1980.)

All attempts were made to reduce suspicion and defensiveness on the part of the respondent in order to be able to obtain accurate accounts of perceptions, feelings, thoughts, experiences, and opinions from them. In addition, questions asked and methods followed were determined and agreed upon by an international and interdisciplinary team, which affected what could be asked and how it could be presented. Thus, the data are limited for analyses related to specific research questions.

This being the case, the data available for the analyses to be here undertaken are suggestive rather than conclusive. Questions and probes directly eliciting information about the respondent's ideology and ability to empathize were not part of the projective interview. The information available to test the presented hypothesis, then, was incomplete, at best.

Procedure

A randomly selected subsample of 20 Egyptian (first-wave), 15 Israeli (quota), and 20 Palestinian (quota) data was obtained. A computer list of all respondents was generated and then the specific cases were picked by a random numbers table. The additional 5 Israeli questionnaires were unavailable to be included in this analysis.

Norms for each picture, which the stories were compared to, were established by having three "judges" describe the bases of the depicted situation--cooperation versus conflict, emotions involved, characters involved, and a general description of the event. These judges were independent of the team of scientists who selected the pictures to portray stated categories of victim/victimizer balanced for nationality, conflict and cooperation. The stories to the pictures for this random sample were recoded for this preliminary analysis (see Chapter 4). Thus, the data referred to in this chapter are different from those of the main research presented above. A random subsample of the raw data from the large "Images in Conflict" study was used, but the data were coded along different dimensions than were the data referred to in the main analysis.

Since empathy was not directly probed for in the interview, and since its occurrence within a protracted

conflict was believed to be extremely limited between members of "enemy" groups, movement towards empathy was coded. It was believed that all such positive expressions between adversaries were significantly important to discover in hopes that such positive experiences could be understood in a way that would contribute to the peace process. Various gradations were developed for the coding scheme which involved the "registering" of another's emotion appropriate to the situation as being an acceptable initial movement towards empathy.

By reading many interviews from each national group, "Weberian ideal types" (Burger 1976) for coding categories were established. That is, the standards for judging responses as "appropriate" were derived by reviewing many responses to the specific pictures. In addition to the responses, the categories used by the project directors when they selected the pictures were also considered in developing the standards. For example, appropriate emotions for the picture of the opening of the Israeli embassy included accomplishment, pride, hope, ambivalence, and anticipation. Examples of appropriate emotion for the picture of the Israeli victims included shock, pain, revenge, and fear. (See Appendix A for the full coding scheme.)

Ideology was more difficult to measure because the stories developed often did not directly include references to the individual's ideology. Although the coding for

ideology was as rigorous as possible given the data, the inclusion of ideology was speculative in this preliminary study.

Degree of "closedness" versus "openness" was the focus for the consideration of ideology. Closedness was related to "totalism" (Lifton 1969), an "all or nothing emotional alignment" of "immoderate ideology with equally immoderate individual character traits" (p 419). A closed ideology involves the impenetrability of the categories one uses to view the world. Religious fundamentalism is one example of a "closed" ideological belief about religion, and often about matters of life, such as male-female relations, the value of human life, and even politics. Such a rigid view of life, even from a single perspective (e.g., religion), would seem to preclude being able to empathize with others, that is, being open to their feelings and thoughts.

An "open", or "sympathetic" ideology would predispose one to experience and share other's perspectives. When one has an "open" ideology, as "open" implies, one is flexible enough to be able to consider and share others' beliefs, even momentarily. Such an openness, it seems, would allow for the possibility of empathy, even with a member of the group known as the "enemy".

Each story was coded, as well as possible, for different categories within ideology, specifically, political, religious, and "philosophical" (e.g. value of

human life, pacifism/militarism, etc.) categories. That is, each picture had three ideological scores, one for political ideology, one for religious ideology, and one for philosophical ideology. For example, a "closed" score for political ideology in the picture of the Palestinian victim might be, "the Israelis caused this attack on innocent people and the Palestinians need to fight back with the only thing the Israelis listen to--bloodshed." An inflexible approach to viewing causes of conflict and the ways adversaries interact depict a closed response. An "open" response might be, "there has to be a better way of interacting. Destruction, retaliation, and fighting must stop for everyone's sake." (See Appendix A for complete coding scheme.)

In addition to individual scores for political, religious, and philosophical ideology for each picture, estimates of a general open or closed ideology were coded based on an impression gathered from all the information given in that person's stories. One general ideological score based on the scale ranging from open to closed was coded.

Characterization of the people in the photographs--e.g. "appropriately identified" or "interjected one's own group"-- and the depicted situation--e.g. "appropriate identification" or "misinterpretation"--were also coded. (See Appendix A for the Codebook.)

Categories were checked for interrater reliability by an independent "judge" who coded a randomly selected set of interviews which had also been coded by the researcher using the same categories. A subsample of 17% of the pilot interviews were tested for inter-rater reliability. Pearson correlations were done to obtain a reliability coefficient. A correlation of all the questions obtained a reliability coefficient of .849. A separate Pearson correlation was done on questions 3,4,5,6 and 7, assuming them to be ordinal scales rather than nominal scales, as the first two questions were. That correlation coefficient was .748. In addition, the first two questions were tested as nominal scales for the relationship between the scores of the independent raters. A chi square test indicated a significant relationship ($\chi^2(9) = 44, p < .001$). Thus, these tests for inter-rater reliability indicate that the coding categories can be considered adequate to obtain reliable data, independent of the rater.

Correlations and crosstabulation analyses were performed on these data to determine the relationship between empathy and ideology.

Results

Pearson correlations were performed on all the data for this study and on individual samples in order to determine the relationship between empathy and political ideology. (Religious and philosophical ideology were eliminated from the analyses because of the lack of available information.) The hypothesized relationship between openness of ideology and empathy displayed toward one's adversary was not supported. However, some interesting relationships were discovered. Again, it must be stressed that the data available are somewhat insufficient for these analyses because the interviews were not focussed on ideology.

Israelis. Empathy for Palestinian victims was slightly correlated with openness of ideology in general ($r = .23$) and has no correlation with the individual score for openness of political ideology in the Palestinian-Israeli situation depicted in the picture of the Palestinian victim ($r = .00$). However, empathy for the victims of their own Israeli group was highly correlated with openness of political ideology for the Palestinian-Israeli relationship in that same picture of the Palestinian victim ($r = .73$). This is consistent with the results of the multiple regression model (Chapter 5) in which empathy for one's own group was included in the regression analysis to predict

empathy for the Palestinian victim by the Israeli respondents.

Empathy for the Egyptian FCWs proved to be inversely related to the openness of ideology for the Palestinian situation of picture 5 ($r = -.45$). This would suggest that the more empathy the Israeli respondents showed for the Egyptian situation, the less open those Israelis would be towards the Palestinian victims (Table 9-1).

TABLE 9-1: Highlights of Pearson Correlations between Empathy and Ideology (Israeli Sample)

<u>Empathy</u>	<u>Ideology</u>		
	Gen open ideology	Open political ideol, Pal-Isr	Open political ideol, Eg-Isr
Isr for Pal	-.23	-.00	----
Isr for own	---	-.73	----
Isr for Eg	---	-.45	----

When the subsample was selected for those who specifically identified the situation in the picture of the Palestinian victim accurately and identified the person in the picture either accurately or by a non-specific term (e.g., woman), the results changed. The numbers in the analysis, though, became too small to be anything but suggestive. The empathy scores for those Israeli respondents who demonstrated empathy for the Egyptian FCWs were highly correlated with the openness of political ideology in that situation ($r = .88$) and also correlated, although less strongly, with openness of political ideology in the situation of the Palestinian victim ($r = .41$). In

this small subgroup of the pilot sample, openness of ideology towards the Egyptians also implied openness toward the Palestinian-Israeli relationship. In addition, empathy for their own group was inversely related to empathy with the Egyptian POWs ($r = -.61$), inversely related to openness of political ideology in that situation of the Egyptian prisoners ($r = -.92$), inversely related to openness of ideology in the situation of the Palestinian victim ($r = -.93$) and inversely related to ideology in general ($r = -.58$). There was no relation between empathy with their own group and empathy with the Palestinian victim ($r = .00$). (Table 9-2) To summarize these findings, for the Israeli respondents who showed empathy for their own group members, there was no predictable empathy displayed for Palestinians and there was predictable lack of empathy for the Egyptian "victims". Since this is the opposite of the finding of the larger subsample and of the multiple regression model, the smallness of the cell numbers will be considered the reason although further study should focus on these contradictory findings.

TABLE 9-2: Highlights of Pearson Correlations between Empathy and Ideology (Israeli Sample selected for accurate identification of Pal. victim situation, i.e. picture #5, and nationality)

<u>Empathy</u>	<u>Ideology</u>		
	Gen open ideology	Open political ideol, Pal-Isr	Open political ideol, Eg-Isr
Isr for Pal	-.65	-.79	---
Isr for own	-.50	-.93	-.92
Isr for Eg	---	.41	.68

Empathy with the Palestinian victim was related to no other variables tested except in an inverse relationship with openness of ideology in the situation of the Israeli victim ($r = -.79$) and in an inverse relationship with ideology in general ($r = -.65$). That is, according to this subsample of respondents, those who displayed empathy for the Palestinian victims in the picture were likely not to display an openness to dealings with the political situation between Palestinians and Israelis or an openness in dealing with the conflict situation in general. It seems to have been a response to an individual in pain, and not generalized further. Again, the numbers of respondents analyzed after the selection for accurate identification were much too small to draw any final or definitive conclusions.

Palestinians. For the Palestinian respondents in this subsample, empathy demonstrated for the Egyptian POWs was correlated with openness of political ideology for that situation ($r = .51$). Empathy for their own Palestinian group was not correlated with any of the other variables tested.

Empathy for the Israeli victims, however, was negatively correlated with openness for the Israeli-Egyptian relation depicted in the second picture ($r = -.25$) and with the Israeli-Palestinian relationship in the third picture of

the Israeli victim ($r = -.21$). There was no relationship with openness in the picture of the Palestinian victim ($r = .05$). The general openness of ideology for the Palestinian respondents was slightly related to empathy for the Egyptian POWs ($r = .29$) and slightly with empathy for the Israeli victim ($r = .15$). It was negatively related to empathy for their own group ($r = -.25$). None of these relationships is strong, suggesting that the interrelation of empathy and ideology was not explained by these data except to suggest that it does not exist for these Palestinian respondents. (Table 9-3) Further study would be needed to better test that relationship. It would be more interesting, too, if the Palestinian respondents were from the West Bank rather than from within the 1967 borders of Israel.

TABLE 9-3: Highlights of Pearson Correlations between Empathy and Ideology (Palestinian Sample)

<u>Empathy</u>	<u>Ideology</u>		
	General open ideology	Open political ideol, Pal-Isr	Open political ideol, Eg-Isr
Pal for Isr	.15	-.21	-.25
Pal for own	-.25	.00	.00
Pal for Eg	.29	----	.51

When these data were selected for accurate identification of the picture of the Israeli victim and selected for the people in that picture as being identified as being Israeli or in non-specific terms, empathy for the Israeli victim was inversely related to empathy for the Egyptian POWs ($r = -.56$) and inversely with openness of

political ideology for the Egyptian-Israeli situation ($r = -.31$), for the Israeli victim situation ($r = -.26$), and for the Palestinian-Israeli situation in the fifth picture of the Palestinian victim ($r = -.12$) (although this is a very weak relation). It was slightly correlated with the openness of ideology in general ($r = .20$).

For the subsample of data selected for accurate identification of the situation and the victim in the picture of the Israeli victims, openness of political ideology in the Israeli-Egyptian relation was correlated with openness in the Palestinian-Israeli relation in the picture of the Palestinian victim ($r = .80$) and in the picture of the Israeli victim ($r = .63$) and with openness of ideology in general ($r = .57$). That is, those Palestinian respondents who accurately identified the picture of the Israeli victim and showed openness of ideology for the Egyptian-Israeli relationship were also likely to show openness of ideology in all other situations measured. However, if they showed empathy for the Israeli victim, they were likely to show no empathy for the Egyptian victims and a lack of openness in their ideological beliefs. (Table 9-4)

TABLE 9-4: Highlights of the Pearson Correlation between Empathy and Ideology (Palestinian Sample)

	<u>Empathy for Eg.</u>	<u>open ideol in general</u>	<u>open ideol Pal-Isr</u>	<u>open ideol Eg-Isr</u>
Empathy for Isr	-.56	.20	-.26	-.31

	<u>open ideol Pal-Isr (P #5)</u>	<u>open ideol Isr-Pal (P #3)</u>	<u>open ideol in general</u>
open ideol for Eg-Isr	.80	.63	.57

Egyptians. For the Egyptian respondents in this subsample, empathy for the victims of their own Egyptian group was positively correlated with openness of political ideology in the Egyptian situation ($r = .42$) and the Palestinian-Israeli situation of the Palestinian victim ($r = .45$). Empathy for the Palestinian victim, however, was inversely correlated with openness of political ideology in the Egyptian-Israeli relationship ($r = -.59$) and for openness of ideology in general ($r = -.58$). (Table 9-5)

TABLE 9-5: Highlights of Pearson Correlation between Empathy and Ideology (Egyptian Sample)

<u>Empathy</u>	<u>Ideology</u>		
	<u>Gen. open ideology</u>	<u>Open political ideol, Pal-Isr</u>	<u>Open political ideol, Eg-Isr</u>
Eg for own	---	.45	.42
Eg for Pal	-.58	---	-.59

In general and in summary, those Palestinian and Egyptian respondents who demonstrated empathy for victims of their own groups also demonstrated general closed ideology

(56% of the Egyptians and 65% of the Palestinians). However, Israeli respondents who showed empathy for their own group also demonstrated general open ideology (55% of the Israeli subsample). The majority of Palestinian respondents who demonstrated some empathy in picture 3 of the Israeli victims demonstrated a closed ideology (54% of that group), which seems to contradict the original hypothesis. The majority of Israeli respondents (56%) who demonstrated empathy for the Palestinian victims, however, also demonstrated open ideology in general. This is not definitive, however, because of the very small cell sizes (4 closed and 5 open). (Table 9-6)

TABLE 9-6: Percentage of "Open" vs "Closed" Ideology with Displayed Empathy

<u>Empathy</u>	<u>Ideology</u>	
	<u>Open</u>	<u>Closed</u>
Eg for own		56%
Pal for own		65%
ISR for own	55%	
Pal for ISR		54%
ISR for Pal	56%	

Discussion

This preliminary analysis for future research revealed interesting relations between ideology and empathy which need further research to be conclusive. The subsample size numbers were small, and the information available was extremely limited because the original interviews of the "Images in Conflict" study were not specifically focused on the information that was coded for in this analysis. Interviews which probe for ideological positions and specific indications of empathy would be necessary for future research along this line of analysis.

The available data, however, illustrated that the Palestinians, of this sample at least, demonstrated most frequently a closed ideology, while the Egyptian respondents were most often willing to express openness, or hope, in relationships within the conflict. Israeli respondents seemed "cautious" in that they often registered in the midpoint of the closed-to-open scale. An explanation for this differentiation might involve the Palestinian situation of having little power as a minority within a state that they believe should be theirs and as being part of a people who does not have a state of its own. They do not have full rights in the state that they live in either. As the "powerless" group who has restricted availability to information and interactions, it seems consistent for them

to maintain a closed ideology in relation to the situation and relationships of the conflict.

Egyptians have experienced the cessation of fighting between their country and Israel. This experience may explain the division of opinions within the interviews of the Egyptian respondents, illustrating ambivalence with the Camp David Accord. However, many Egyptians also seem to maintain hope for the future. Those Egyptian respondents who demonstrated empathy for the Palestinians, however, also demonstrated closed beliefs for other situations, especially for those between Palestinians and Israelis. There seems to be an extreme position, that is not flexible, when the Palestinian victims are focussed upon by the Egyptians.

Interesting and significant was the finding that Israeli respondents who demonstrated empathy for their own group were more open in dealing with the "other" group, too. Perhaps this suggests that empathy for their fellow Israelis means finding a resolution to the fighting and acquiescence. Further research is necessary to determine if the suggestion of openness of ideology and empathy for the "other" is maintained or if the results of the subdivided sample who were selected for accurate identification of the picture of the Palestinian victim (but which had too few members) would be supported. If the former is maintained, the support for the hypothesis for this preliminary study, along with the

multiple regression model, indicates a better understanding of Israeli positions and feelings than for the Palestinians. Are power differences between Israelis and Palestinians, and the controls that involves, such that it is not possible for us to determine the cognitive maps of Palestinians because they are ideologically "closed" in order to maintain their positions or the autonomy and dignity of their national group? Is "empathy" on the part of the "powerless" for the "powerful" an irrelevant concept?

Chapter 8 Conclusions and Implications for Future Research

The results of this research and the preliminary study for future research illustrate differences between the national groups and also some similarities between them. The differences between the groups, the gaps in the available data, the paucity and inconclusiveness of some findings and the many unanswered questions are no surprise. The similarities discovered, though, are very important, although few. Especially since the study is of and within a protracted conflict, having data and results which are as conclusive in some areas and suggestive in others as these are is a major accomplishment. The search for a broad picture and for the cognitive maps of the Middle East conflict (Cohen & Arnone 1983) must continue if a resolution is to be achieved. It is hoped that this research will add some understanding to that search.

The Israelis and Palestinian respondents, in general, have developed a similar construction of the conflict. Each sees its conflict relationship with the other as separate from the larger Arab-Israeli relationship. As a distinct relationship which revolves around a conflict over the same land and, therefore, essentially over national identity, it appears that each party is psychologically significant to the other. Personal and national identities of each are bound to the other according to such dimensions as

minority/majority, powerful/powerless, enfranchised versus disfranchised, one with a state/one without a state. The awareness of the significance of their relationship with each other may well be at a deeper level than the political one.

In addition, Israeli and Palestinian respondents share similar perceptions about their experiences in the conflict. Each sees its own group members as more victimized and the intensity of their victimization within the conflict situation as greater than those of the other group. Each tends to identify itself as victim and the other as aggressor rather than seeing the other, too, as victim sometimes. Defenses, such as avoidance, denial, and dehumanization, seem to be used by each in dealing with the discrepant image of their enemy as "victim" and themselves as "aggressor". Although Moses (1985) introduced the concept of "disempathy", i.e., actively avoiding feeling for the other as a means of personal survival, specifically in terms of the Israelis, it seems reasonable to suggest that dis-empathy is applicable in terms of Palestinian interactions with Israelis, too. Being each other's "significant other" influences the identity of self and other and the roles each group brings to the protracted conflict environment. This relationship needs to be studied further.

Models developed, and relationships discovered, in an

attempt to predict and understand empathy that was demonstrated across groups, that is, between Palestinians and Israelis, were found to be useful for Israeli responses but not for the Palestinian responses. Ideology and empathy were demonstrated to be related for the Israeli respondents but not for the Palestinians. Ideological beliefs, especially those focussed on the importance of Russian and European influence to the outcome of the conflict, and those focussed on an autonomous and internally strong Israel were likely to be related to the demonstration of empathy for the Palestinian victims portrayed in the photograph. The ideological belief in the influence of the United States and the influence of world Jewry were likely to hinder the expression of empathy toward the Palestinians. In addition, when empathy for their own Israeli group was present, there was evidence to suggest that the experience of empathy for the Palestinian victim was very likely.

The results of the preliminary study for future research support the evidence for Israelis that empathy for their own group's victims is important for the relationship with the Palestinians. Israelis in the preliminary study who showed empathy for their own group were likely to possess an open political ideology in regards to the victimization of civilian Palestinians. There was also limited evidence that a general open ideological stance was related to empathy displayed for the Palestinian victim, but

this, too, needs further study.

Palestinian data were not explained by the ideology-empathy models. An adequate model for predicting and understanding Palestinian empathy for Israeli victims was not discovered. Perhaps the power differences in the relationship between Israelis and Palestinians are an essential variable to explore in relation to "closedness" of ideology (as suggested by the auxiliary preliminary analysis) and the prediction of empathy demonstrated by Palestinians. Perhaps empathy across groups is not possible from a "powerless" position, or perhaps any such demonstrated empathy is an individual trait. Or, perhaps again, their expressed ideology is different from their held ideology, thus suggesting an explanation for the empathy that was expressed by the Palestinian respondents, although the data were not explained by a statistical model.

It seems that further research on ideological change in general is needed. How can ideology be changed to promote more "open" thinking? One way seems to have been the dramatic and surprise move that contradicts beliefs about the "other" that Sadat, for example, undertook when he visited Jerusalem. However, it also seems to be unlikely that another such dramatic, surprise, and well-timed move can happen again (especially if it is kept in mind that Sadat was later assassinated).

How does ideology develop? What parts do

socialization, parental upbringing, and governmental control of information have in the development of ideology, especially in the development of "closed" ideology?

According to Lifton (1969), "the degree of individual totalism involved depends greatly upon factors in one's personal history: early lack of trust, extreme environmental chaos, total domination by a parent or parent-representative, intolerable burdens of guilt, and severe crisis of identity." (p 436) Ideological totalism (similar to "closedness") is "an extremist meeting ground between people and ideas.... Any ideology can be carried by its adherents in a totalistic direction." Such a movement in the direction of totalism is "most likely to occur with those ideologies which are most sweeping in their content and most ambitious in their claims." (p 419).

Linked to ideology is identity (Erikson 1958, p. 22) and bound up in identity are the forces and issues which keep "an ideology relevant" (Erikson p 52). Crisis in identity, it is believed, can lead a person to strong ideological beliefs that may become extreme, closed, and totalistic, simplifying life into such bipolarities as good and evil, right and wrong, and us versus them. Additionally, "behind ideological totalism lies the ever-present human quest (to) eliminate the terror of death and nothingness." (Lifton p. 436) Totalism tends to involve what Lifton calls "dispensing of existence", that

is, determining who has the "right to exist and who has no such right to exist" (p. 433).

It appears that the Palestinian and Israeli fears of annihilation by the other and of the loss of their identities which are tied to their "hometown" are threats similar to what Lifton was describing. Their personal and national identities are bound to the conflict and to their relationship with each other. This might explain the "closed" ideologies expressed by each group, their fears of "death and nothingness" both literally and symbolically.

Additionally, the more consistent "closedness" of the political ideology of the Palestinian respondents might be explained by the "milieu control" (Lifton p. 420) that is imposed by the restriction of rights, for example, the right to political expression and the right to vote, that the Palestinians within the 1967 borders of Israel experience. By controlling the information the Palestinians receive and their interactions and cultural expressions, a "threat to personal autonomy" (Lifton p. 420) may result, which is a major factor in totalistic ideology. It seems, then, that the occupying and repressive force is a result of the fear for their (Israeli) own existence and identity, and results in the control of the Palestinians. That control of the Palestinians environment, with all the consequences to the Palestinians of experienced threats to personal autonomy, the dispensing of existence and personal identity, then

moves the Palestinians to a closed ideological position. The Israeli control, then, results in a backlash and prohibits movement toward resolution on both sides.

Consistent with this line of thinking is the result of the multiple regression model. Those Israelis who held the ideological belief in the autonomous and internal strength of Israel as an important factor in determining the outcome of the Middle East conflict were also those who demonstrated empathy for the Palestinian victim. In other words, those who believed in the autonomy of Israel, thus, perhaps, decreasing the "fear of death and non-existence", were able to be open to their adversary (at least to some extent).

Another example of total control of information and its backlash effect might be seen in the perceived "terrorist" acts of some Palestinians and the effect of world opinion on the Palestinians as a national group. Since those acts are usually the acts that get media coverage and attention, the control of public opinion by those negative acts, and their media coverage, seem to shape public opinion against the Palestinian cause. Instead of raising attention and feeling for their cause, those "terrorist" acts create the opposite reaction against empathy for the Palestinian people and their cause. Maybe a reduction in the "control of fear" by those participating in the acts and an increase in other kinds of information about, and communication with, Palestinians would reduce the backlash effect which has

consequences for Palestinians as a group, not just those who participate in violence.

It appears, then, that ways of changing, or opening, ideology need to be sought and later implemented in ways that the people will find to be acceptable. Reductions of environmental controls (on both sides), allowing diverse information and communication (Eurton 1969; Liftan 1969), and reducing fears of annihilation and non-existence on both sides should help "open" ideology. With reduction of the fear of non-existence and opening the communication systems, humanization (rather than "dehumanization") of the adversary should follow. With that, feeling for the "other's" victims may develop and lead to increased creativity in attempting to resolve the protracted conflict. The "problem-solving workshops" of Kelman and Cohen (1979; 1976) seem to be a method that seeks to achieve this, or at least the foundations for this, movement toward open perspectives and, hopefully, a more open ideology. Very important in the process of the workshops is the spontaneously occurring experience of "sharing hurts" that each side's members have caused members of the other group. Each side comes to realize through that experience that their side is not the only victim, is not "always right", and has not been the only group to suffer.

The Palestinian sample involved in this research was comprised of Palestinians who live within the 1967 borders

of Israel, rather than those who live in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. There are differences in the experiences and life situations of these two groups; however, there is also convergence in their experiences. Such convergence involves the Palestinization of the Israeli Arabs and the westernization of the West Bank Palestinians (S.P. Cohen in a private conversation November 1986), which is based on the experience of democracy that each has through different mediums and also the contradiction of democracy that each group experiences. The West Bank Palestinians and the Israeli Arabs have experiences which allow them to identify with democracy and to desire it to be applied to them, while living in situations that do not allow the tenets of democracy to apply to them. Each Palestinian group lives with different, although convergent, experiences of the denial of democratic rights.

There might well be differences, then, between the results of the data in this study and those that might be obtained from a sample from the West Bank. For example, would the sex difference noted in the display of empathy by the Palestinians in this research exist if a sample from the Palestinians in the West Bank were studied? Though a West Bank sample might produce different findings, the Palestinians who live within Israel's 1967 borders nonetheless do provide a Palestinian perspective. It is noted that this is not the Palestinian perspective. It must

be realized that one cannot generalize from this sample to all Palestinians any more than one can generalize from perspectives from West Bank Palestinians to East Bank Palestinians.

Empathy, feeling from the other's perspective, might be considered as a process variable in the search for resolution of the conflict. The findings in this project suggest the need to understand each group and its relation to the other. Within political negotiations, it might be much more beneficial to allow the parties to the conflict to identify themselves and their issues rather than imposing the sides and the issues. For example, Palestinians and Israelis have demonstrated their construction of the conflict as including their two parties, rather than avoiding the Palestinians and substituting another "Arab" group. In addition, the negotiators might be more productive, with work toward a common result as a goal, if each negotiator individually had an "open", rather than "closed" ideology. Further, since females have demonstrated more empathy than males, it might be useful and important to include women as negotiators. The American Indians have long acknowledged the importance of women's perspectives: women have consistently been a part of their tribal councils (J.A. Scilleppi in a private conversation, April 1984). It also seems important for those involved in negotiations to understand and be aware of, if not experience, the shared

hurts, fears, and hopes of the involved parties (Kelman & Cohen 1976). In addition, a methodological approach to ensure the understanding of the positions which each side presented was put forth by Rapoport (1970). He suggested that each side repeat the other's position until that other person was satisfied that it had been understood. In that way, misunderstandings and misperceptions might be minimized by all present in the negotiations.

People who are willing and able to demonstrate empathy and an openness to the "other" might get involved in other activities besides negotiations. Education, political activism for consciousness-raising and informing the public, as well as cooperative joint projects (Bucquero and Ahed 1984) might be powerful forces for change in the protracted conflict situation.

The data analyzed in this research have suggested that there are people on each side of the conflict who are able to perceive the pain and suffering of members of the adversary's groups and even to realize that members of their own group caused that pain. Ideological beliefs which are consistent with the display of empathy for members of the other group were also discovered for the Israeli respondents. The presented evidence of hope and a desire for the cessation of the conflict from members of the various parties to the conflicts is significant to keep in mind and use to sustain activation in the search for a

solution.

Further research is needed in all these, as well as other, areas and in the implementation and consequences of such things as empathy for the enemy, open ideology, and political activism. Other future research topics might include: a) implications of identity issues; b) "significant other" relations; c) sex differences in cognitive and affective approaches to dealing with conflict, conflict resolution, and one's adversary; d) Palestinian cognitive maps of the conflict and possibilities for resolution, especially within the occupied territories; e) how to develop empathy for one's own group, without ethnocentrism, and for others; f) application of empathy experiences and research within individual societies, within "Track II Diplomacy" (Montville 1983), and in formal governmental negotiations; and g) further research on the relationship between empathy and ideology.

Many of these issues would be difficult to study directly, and some would be impossible. These ideas were not meant to be a recipe, or a step-by-step process. The suggestions and conclusions drawn from the research are discussed here, with full awareness that political issues and the complications of a full range of intranational as well as international issues need to be involved in the process of research and the implementation of research findings. With this in mind, however, we should not

discontinue our search. Hope appears present in many of the involved people in the conflict and fear in all. Perhaps reducing the fears and encouraging the hope will help the human creative potential to achieve a resolution to that conflict one day.

Appendix A

Codebook

I. Picture (P1)

- 1 appropriate id of situation (i.e. opening of Isr embassy in Egypt; Isr man/"mixed" crowd at ceremonies; Israel-Egypt cooperation; peace negotiations/Camp David/Sadat initiative)
- 2 non-registering/non-response
- 3 misleading description (e.g. role reversals; rationalizations; action reversals; exaggerating the situation; interjecting other parties to the situation)
- 4 misinterpretation of situation (e.g. removal from the conflict; seeing situation as event of only one party, such as seeing this picture as an Egyptian demonstration in general)
- 9 NA/CR

II. Characters (Char1)

- 1 appropriate id (i.e. "mixed crowd"; Isr man; Egyptians

and Israelis)

2 partial id (who _____) (at least 1 appropriate party mentioned)

3 own group interjected

4 another group interjected

5 not specified (e.g. people)

9 NA/DK

III. Empathy (Emp1)

9 non-registering of internal state/NA/DK

1 denial of human feelings (e.g. "they don't feel")

2 registering reverse/inappropriate emotion

3 registering appropriate emotion then negating or qualifying it ("they'll get over it")

4 registering appropriate emotion (i.e. accomplishment; pride; hope; happiness; anticipation; ambivalence)

5 "sympathy" ("I feel that for them"; "I feel the same when facing a similar situation")

6 "empathy" ("we all feel that way"; "I feel what they're feeling now")

IV. Ideology (Idephil1; Iderel1; Idepol1) (to be interpreted based on the whole story)

Idephil1 (e.g. value of life; view of life and its meaning and purpose; "all life is---";

"cost of war is too high for everyone"--eq of 'open' code;
"we are here for our own ends"--
e.g. of 'closed' code)

- 1 "closed"/"totalism" (e.g. unquestioning adherence)
 - 2 critical (recognition of another view but, "I disagree; its wrong")
 - 3 non-judgemental (some understanding without taking a position)
 - 4 acceptance as another approach (I understand and respect your position; agree to disagree)
 - 5 "open"/"sympathetic" ("I share your position"; negotiate for all to benefit; value of all life)
- 9 NA/DR

Ideology (e.g. chosen people of God; view of God's will; way live according to religion; about our group vs other group--they're pagans/sinners)

- 1 "closed"/"totalism"
 - 2 critical
 - 3 non-judgemental
 - 4 acceptance as another approach
 - 5 "open"/"sympathetic"
- 9 NA/DR

Idepol (causes of tension and conflict; ways of
interacting between adversaries,
e.g., military retaliation;
beliefs re: groups involved,
e.g., aggressor vs victim)

- 1 "closed"/"totalist"
- 2 critical
- 3 non-judgemental
- 4 acceptance as another approach
- 5 "open"/"sympathetic"
- 9 NA/DK

I. Picture (P2)

- 1 appropriate id of situation (i.e. Egyptian, or Arab, prisoners and Israeli guards; war led to it; FCNs being guarded, released; marched)
- 2 non-registering/nca-response
- 3 misleading description (e.g. role reversals; rationalizations; action reversals; exaggerating the situation; interjecting specific other parties to the situation)
- 4 misinterpretation of situation (e.g. rescue from the conflict; seeing situation as event of only one party, such as seeing first picture as an Egyptian demonstration, in general)
- 9 NA/EE

II. Characters (Char2)

- 1 appropriate id (i.e. Egyptian POWs and Israeli soldiers/guards)
- 2 partial id (whc _____) (at least 1 appropriate party specifically mentioned; or naming Isr. captors but "Arab", rather than Eg., FCNs)
- 3 own group interjected

- 4 another group interjected
- 5 not specified (e.g. people)
- 9 NA/DK

III. Empathy (Emp2)

- 9 non-registering of internal state/NA/DK
- 1 denial of human feelings (e.g. "they don't feel")
- 2 registering reverse/inappropriate emotion
- 3 registering appropriate emotion then negating or
qualifying it (e.g.,
"they'll get over it")
- 4 registering appropriate emotion (i.e. humiliation,
fear (soldiers), not happy,
but victorious; weary (guards))
- 5 "sympathy" ("I feel that for them")
- 6 "empathy" ("we all feel that way")

IV. Ideology (Idephil2; Iderel2; Idepol2) (to be interpreted based on whole story)

- Idephil2 (eg value of life; view of life and its
meaning and purpose)
 - 1 "closed"/"totalist" (e.g. unquestioning adherence)
 - 2 critical (recognition of another view but, "I disagree;
it's wrong")
 - 3 non-judgmental (some understanding without taking a
position; e.g., expected)

future—"another war")

4 acceptance as another approach (I understand and respect

your position; agree to disagree)

5 "open"/"sympathetic" ("I share your position"; negotiate

for all to benefit; value of all life)

9 NA/DK

Ideol2 (e.g. chosen people of God; view of God's will; way

to live according to religion; about

own group vs other group--they're

pagans/sinners)

1 "closed"/"totalism"

2 critical

3 non-judgemental

4 acceptance as another approach

5 "open"/"sympathetic"

9 NA/DK

Ideol2 (causes of tension and conflict; ways of

interacting between adversaries--e.g.

military retaliation; beliefs

re: groups involved--e.g. aggressor

vs victim)

1 "closed"/"totalism"

2 critical

3 non-judgemental

4 acceptance as another approach.

5 "open"/"sympathetic"

9 NA/CK

I. Picture (P3)

- 1 appropriate id of situation (i.e. Maalot; Isr man
evacuating Isr woman; caused by
PAL/PLO/terrorists (according to
Israelis); civilians running from
attack or battle; Isr. victims of
Palestinians)
- 2 non-registering/non-response
- 3 misleading description (e.g. role reversals;
rationalizations; action reversals;
exaggerating the situation;
interjecting other parties to the
situation)
- 4 misinterpretation of situation (e.g. rescue from the
conflict; seeing situation as event
of only one party, such as seeing
this picture as one group's members
having a party" or practicing for a
drill)
- 9 NA/DK

II. Characters (Char3)

- 1 appropriate id (i.e. Israelis victims and Palestinian
aggressors)
- 2 partial id (who _____) (at least 1 appropriate party
mentioned)

- 3 own group interjected
- 4 another group interjected
- 5 not specified (e.g. people)
- 9 NA/DK

III. Empathy (Emp3)

- 9 non-registering of internal state/NA/DK
- 1 denial of human feelings (e.g. "they don't feel")
- 2 registering reverse/inappropriate emotion
- 3 registering appropriate emotion then negating or
qualifying it ("they'll
get over it")
- 4 registering appropriate emotion (i.e. shock, pain,
revenge, fear)
- 5 "sympathy" ("I feel that for them")
- 6 "empathy" ("we all feel that way")

IV. Ideology (Idephil3; Iderel3; Idepol3) (to be interpreted based on whole story)

Idephil3 (e.g. value of life; view of life and its meaning
and purpose)

- 1 "closed"/"totalism" (e.g. unquestioning adherence)
- 2 critical (recognition of another view but, "I disagree:
it's wrong")
- 3 non-judgemental (some understanding without taking a
position)

4 acceptance, as another approach (I understand and
respect your position;
agree to disagree)

5 "open"/"sympathetic" ("I share your position";
negotiate for all
to benefit; value of all life)

9 NA/DK

Ideol3 (e.g. chosen people of God; view of God's will; way
to

live according to religion; about our
group vs other group--they're
pagans/sinners)

1 "closed"/"totalism"

2 critical

3 non-judgmental

4 acceptance as another approach

5 "open"/"sympathetic"

9 NA/DK

Ideol3 (causes of tension and conflict; ways of
interacting between adversaries--e.g.
military retaliation; beliefs re:
groups involved--e.g., aggressor
vs victim)

1 "closed"/"totalism" (eg "get them back"; bombard all

Pal.": "wipe them out ")

2 critical

3 non-judgemental

4 acceptance as another approach

5 "open"/"sympathetic" (eg understand why it happened; all
will work out for peace)

9 NA/DK

I. Picture (P4)

- 1 appropriate id of situation (i.e. Isr POWs captured by Syrians; war led to it; POWs being heavily guarded by soldiers)
- 2 non-registering/non-response
- 3 misleading description (e.g. role reversals; rationalizations; action reversals; exaggerating the situation; interjecting other parties to the situation)
- 4 misinterpretation of situation (e.g. removal from the conflict; seeing situation as event of only one party, such as seeing first picture as an Egyptian demonstration in general)
- 9 NA/DK

II. Characters (Char4)

- 1 appropriate id (i.e. Israeli POWs)
- 2 partial id (whc_____) (at least 1 appropriate party mentioned)
- 3 own group interjected
- 4 another group interjected
- 5 not specified (e.g. people)
- 9 NA/DK

III. Empathy (Emp4)

- 9 non-registering of internal state/NA/DK
- 1 denial of human feelings (e.g. "they don't feel")
- 2 registering reverse/inappropriate emotion
- 3 registering appropriate emotion then negating or qualifying it ("they'll get over it")
- 4 registering appropriate emotion (i.e. humiliation, loss, shame, retaliation, fear)
- 5 "sympathy" ("I feel that for them")
- 6 "empathy" ("we all feel that way")

IV. Ideology (Idephil4; Iderel4; Idepol4) (to be interpreted based on whole story)

Idephil4 (e.g. value of life; view of life and its meaning and purpose)

- 1 "closed"/"totalism" (e.g. unquestioning adherence)
- 2 critical (recognition of another view but, "I disagree: it's wrong")
- 3 non-judgemental (some understanding without taking a position)
- 4 acceptance as another approach (I understand and respect YOUR position; agree to disagree)
- 5 "open"/"sympathetic" ("I share your position"; negotiate for all to benefit; value of all life)
- 9 NA/DK

Ideol4 (e.g. chosen people of God; view of God's will; way
to live according to religion; about own
group vs other group--they're
pagans/sinners)

- 1 "closed"/"totalism"
- 2 critical
- 3 non-judgemental
- 4 acceptance as another approach
- 5 "open"/"sympathetic"
- 9 NA/DK

Ideol4 (causes of tension and conflict; ways of
interacting between adversaries--e.g.
military retaliation; beliefs re:
re: groups involved--e.g.,
aggressor vs victim)

- 1 "closed"/"totalism"
- 2 critical
- 3 non-judgemental
- 4 acceptance as another approach
- 5 "open"/"sympathetic"
- 9 NA/DK

I. Picture (P5)

- 1 appropriate id of situation (i.e. Palestinians mourning or crying; caused by Israeli occupation and/or destruction of houses; killing son/husband)
- 2 non-registering/non-response
- 3 misleading description (e.g. role reversals; rationalizations; action reversals; exaggerating the situation; interjecting other parties to the situation)
- 4 misinterpretation of situation (e.g. rescuee from the conflict; seeing situation as event of only one party, such as seeing this picture as Pal. hurting Pal.; trouble in a Pal. neighborhood caused by other Pal.)
- 9 NA/ER

II. Characters (Char5)

- 1 appropriate id (i.e. Palestinians; Israeli aggressors)
- 2 partial id (who _____) (at least 1 appropriate party mentioned)
- 3 own group interjected
- 4 another group interjected
- 5 not specified (e.g. people)

III. Empathy (Emp5)

- 9 non-registering of internal state/NA/DK
- 1 denial of human feelings (e.g. "they don't feel")
- 2 registering reverse/inappropriate emotion
- 3 registering appropriate emotion then negating or
qualifying it ("they'll get over it")
- 4 registering appropriate emotion (i.e. shock;
devastation; sorrow; loss; despair)
- 5 "sympathy" (eg "I feel that for them")
- 6 "empathy" (eg "we all feel that way")

IV. Ideology (Idephil5; Iderel5; Idepol5) (to be interpreted
based on whole story)

Idephil5 (e.g. value of life; view of life and its meaning
and purpose)

- 1 "closed"/"totalism" (e.g. unquestioning adherence)
- 2 critical (recognition of another view but, "I disagree;
it's wrong")
- 3 non-judgemental (some understanding without taking a
position)
- 4 acceptance as another approach (eg "I understand and
respect your position;
agree to disagree)
- 5 "open"/"sympathetic" (e.g., "I share your position";

negotiate for all to benefit;
value of all life)

9 NA/DK

Ideol5 (e.g. chosen people of God; view of God's will; way
to live according to religion; about own
group vs other group--they're
pagans/sinners)

- 1 "closed"/"totalism"
 - 2 critical
 - 3 non-judgemental
 - 4 acceptance as another approach
 - 5 "open"/"sympathetic"
- 9 NA/DK

Ideol5 (causes of tension and conflict; ways of
interacting between adversaries,
eg military retaliation; beliefs
re: groups involved--e.g.,
aggressor vs victim)

- 1 "closed"/"totalism"
 - 2 critical
 - 3 non-judgemental
 - 4 acceptance as another approach
 - 5 "open"/"sympathetic"
- 9 NA/DK

I. Picture (P6)

- 1 appropriate id of situation (i.e. "mixed" meeting between Israelis and Arabs; attempt at cooperation; reporters or journalists listening to statements of men's groups' cause)
- 2 non-registering/non-response
- 3 misleading description (e.g. role reversals; rationalizations; action reversals; exaggerating the situation; interjecting other parties to the situation)
- 4 misinterpretation of situation (e.g. removal from the conflict; seeing situation as event of only one party, such as seeing this picture as just Eq. or just Pal. or just Isr.)
- 9 NA/ER

II. Characters (Char6)

- 1 appropriate id (i.e. "mixed group"; Isr and Arabs)
- 2 partial id (whc _____) (at least 1 appropriate party mentioned)
- 3 own group interjected
- 4 another group interjected
- 5 not specified (e.g. people)

III. Empathy (Emp6)

- 9 non-registering of internal state/NA/DK
- 1 denial of human feelings (e.g. "they don't feel")
- 2 registering reverse/inappropriate emotion
- 3 registering appropriate emotion then negating or
qualifying it ("they'll get over it")
- 4 registering appropriate emotion (i.e. at an impasse; not
hostile; hope; wanting agreement;
removed)
- 5 "sympathy" ("I feel that for them")
- 6 "empathy" ("we all feel that way")

**IV. Ideology (Idephil6; Iderel6; Idepol6) (to be interpreted
based on whole story)**

Idephil6 (e.g. value of life; view of life and its meaning
and purpose)

- 1 "closed"/"totalism" (e.g. unquestioning adherence)
- 2 critical (recognition of another view but, "I disagree:
it's wrong")
- 3 non-judgemental (some understanding without taking a
position)
- 4 acceptance as another approach (I understand and respect
your position; agree to
disagree)

5 "open"/"sympathetic" ("I share your position"; negotiate
for all to benefit;
value of all life)

9 NA/DR

Ideol6 (e.g. chosen people of God; view of God's will; way
to live according to religion; about
own group vs other group--they're
pagans/sinners)

1 "closed"/"totalism"

2 critical

3 non-judgemental

4 acceptance as another approach

5 "open"/"sympathetic"

9 NA/DR

Ideol6 (causes of tension and conflict; ways of
interacting between adversaries,
e.g. military retaliation;
beliefs re: groups involved--e.g.,
aggressor vs victim)

1 "closed"/"totalism"

2 critical

3 non-judgemental

4 acceptance as another approach

5 "open"/"sympathetic"

9 NA/DK

V. General ideological approach (Idegent) (assessment and
generalization based on all pictures
as a whole)

1 "closed"

2

3

4

5 "open"

Appendix B

Coding Instructions

1) You must interpret the responses somewhat to get accurate answer codes; e.g. if an Israeli is the respondent whose answers are being coded, and says "our _____", then the story should be coded for the presence of Israelis, even if they were not explicitly named. If an Israeli speaks of "terrorists" and "Maalot", the presence of Palestinians should be coded.

2) If a specific and unusual aspect of a story is told, you must find a place to code for its presence; e.g. if Palestinians and Israelis are meeting and peace is wanted, etc. but it is obviously biased against one side ("if only they'd admit it's all their fault") then, perhaps the best "empathy" code should be "appropriate but qualified".

3) Remember that the "ideology" codes are scales, even if the answers do not match the examples exactly. Examples of "philosophy" code which would be "open"--"the cost of any war is too high for everyone"; "all life is precious". Examples of "closed" philosophy--answers that depict the respondent as always seeing the "party line", e.g. "we are the victims and right and they are the aggressors and wrong":

always seeing "them" as the cause and never as the victim, e.g. always seeing the Palestinians as the victim even in the Maalot picture.

4) An example of "closed" political ideology is seeing attack as the only option.

5) Examples of "open" political ideology--peace, negotiations, compromise, stop war through settlement.

6) For the "general ideology", consider in balance all 6 pictures and come up with a score which represents, in generalization, the point of view of the respondent. Example, if Israeli-Palestinian relations are always portrayed as "closed" but Israeli-Egyptian relations are "open" (at least somewhat), the general score must reflect this--it should not be all "open" (5) or all "closed" (1), but it must also not be "neutral" (3); because of totalism of the Israeli-Palestinian relations and the focus of it, I would code the general ideology as 2.

If there are practically no answers or elaborations except maybe a label, code that response as being "closed" (1).

7) Refer to the examples given for each picture and each code and code according to those examples. If two different

codes seem applicable for specific reasons, go with the code which best represents the whole story. Example for the second picture of Egyptian captives and Israeli soldiers-- If the responses is that there are Israeli captors of Palestinians, it could be fairly coded as Char=2 (partial id) but also as 4 (another party interjected). The latter code (4) is more indicative of the respondent's view of the conflict and the flavor of the story, therefore, it should be coded as Char=4.

8) Keep in mind that this coding includes the general tone based on who is speaking and about what.

9) If there is not a story but a label or comment, or a 1 liner, try to indicate it in Pict or Char codes, if at all possible. Example for picture 6--"Camp David." Although this is just a label or title, it should be coded as a joint meeting (Pict=1) but "NA" for all other categories. In that way, I at least know that the picture elicited some recognition of a cooperative effort between two different people, especially between an "Arab" and Israeli.

Appendix C

The Pictures*

*I would like to acknowledge, with gratitude, the photo archives that gave permission to "Images in Conflict" for the use of their photographs in that research study.

Picture #1 Opening of the Embassy in Cairo



Picture #2 Egyptian FOMs



Picture #3 Hounded Israeli Woman



Picture #4 Israeli IOBs



Picture #5 Arab Woman Cryisa



Picture 46 Joint Meeting



APPENDIX D-1: FACTOR ANALYSIS-EG., ISR., AND PAL.
 SAMPLES AND PERCEPTION VARIABLES*

Variables	Factors							
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
friendly1	.65							
dominant6	.65							
unequal2	.78							
bcstile2	.66							
hostile1		.79						
unequal1		.78						
intense5			.69					
often3			-.65					
often2			-.68					
often4			-.65					
often6				.59				
intense1				.51				
unequal3				-.53				
friendly5					.74			
friendly3					.72			
friendly4					.63			
unequal5						.84		
unequal6							.70	
friendly6								.74

*Perception variables include frequency of occurrence (often), intensity of situation (intense), friendly, inequality of situation (unequal), hostile, victimized, and dominance in situation.

Note. All perception variables and all three samples were included. The numbers connected with the variable names refer to the pictures: 1=cooperation between Eg. and Isr. in opening the embassy

2=Eg. POWs with Isr. guards

3=Isr. victims of the Maalot attack by Pal.

4=Isr. PCIs

5=Pal. woman crying

6=cooperation in a joint meeting

The 12 factors, based on varimax rotation, account for 95% of the variance.

D-1 (cont.)

Variables	Factors			
	9	10	11	12
dominant4	.75			
unequal3		.55		
hostile3		.48		
victim4			.62	
friendly2				.36
dominant1				.30
dominant2				-.23
victim3				-.24

**APPENDIX D-2: FACTOR ANALYSIS-ISRAELI SAMPLE AND
PERCEPTION VARIABLES**

Variables	Factors							
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
unequal4	.81							
unequal2	.74							
unequal3	.69							
unequal5	.65							
intense2		.68						
intense5		.66						
hostil4			.81					
hostile3			.74					
hostile5			.67					
friendly4				.73				
friendly3				.68				
friendly5				.60				
often4					.78			
often2					.70			
dominan						.80		
friendly1							.69	
unequal1							.65	
intense4								.72

Note. All perception variables and all three samples were included. The numbers connected with the variable names refer to the pictures: 1=cooperation between Eg. and Isr. in opening the embassy

2=Eg. FCHs with Isr. guards

3=Isr. victims of the Maalot attack by Pal.

4=Isr. FCHs

5=Pal. woman crying

6=cooperation in a joint meeting

The 12 factors, based on varimax rotation, account for 95% of the variance.

E-2 (cont.)

Variables	Factors					
	9	10	11	12	13	14
dominant1	.62					
dominant6	.59					
victim1		.63				
victim6		.47				
friendly6			.59			
hostile6			-.57			
often6				.82		
victim3					.56	
often3						.35
victim2						.29
victim4						.25
unequal1						.21
unequal6						.21

APPENDIX D-3 FACTOR ANALYSIS-PALESTINIAN SAMPLE AND
PERCEPTION VARIABLES

Variables	Factors							
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
friendly1	.65							
dominant6	.65							
unequal2	-.78							
hostile2	-.66							
hostile1		.79						
unequal1		.78						
intense5			.69					
often3			-.69					
often2			-.68					
often4			-.65					
often6				.59				
intense1				.51				
unequal3				-.53				
friendly5					.74			
friendly3					.72			
friendly4					.63			
unequal5						.84		
hostile6							.78	
unequal6							.80	
friendly6								.74

Note. All perception variables and all three samples were included. The numbers connected with the variable names refer to the pictures: 1=cooperation between Eq. and Isr. in opening the embassy

2=Eq. POWs with Isr. guards

3=Isr. victims of the Maalot attack by Pal.

4=Isr. POWs

5=Pal. woman crying

6=cooperation in a joint meeting

The 12 factors, based on varimax rotation, account for 95% of the variance.

(E-3 cont.)

Variables	Factors			
	9	10	11	12
dominant4	.75			
unequal3		.55		
hostile3		.48		
victim4			.62	
friendly2				.36
dominant1				.30
intense4				.20
dominant2				-.26
victim3				-.24
intense3				-.22

**APPENDIX E-4 FACTOR ANALYSIS-EGYPTIAN SAMPLE AND
PERCEPTION VARIABLES**

Variables	Factors							
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
dominant3	.85							
dominant4	.80							
dominant5	.74							
dominant2	.67							
hostile3		.78						
hostile2		.64						
hostile5		.61						
hostile4		.58						
often3			.79					
often2			.67					
often5			.61					
often4			.59					
unequal5				.67				
unequal3				.63				
unequal2				.58				
unequal4				.56				
friendly2					.67			
friendly5					.66			

friendly3	.48	
friendly4	.40	
victim4		.68
victim3		.46
unequal1		.60
hostil1		.59
intense1		.52
friendly1		.39

Note. All perception variables and all three samples were included. The numbers connected with the variable names refer to the pictures: 1=cooperation between Eg. and Isr. in opening the embassy

2=Eg. POWs with Isr. guards

3=Isr. victims of the Maslct attack by Pal.

4=Isr. FCHs

5=Pal. woman crying

6=cooperation in a joint meeting

The 12 factors, based on varimax rotation, account for 95% of the variance.

D-4 (cont.)

Variables	Factors		
	9	10	11
hostile6	.65		
unequal6	.62		
intense5		.63	
intense2		.45	
friendly6			.34
dominant6			.30
victim3			.23
victim6			.21
often6			-.40
unequal3			-.31
friendly4			-.24
unequal4			-.23

ISRAELI SAMPLE-STATUS CUC						
Source	SS	DF	Mean Sq.	F	Sig.	
Between Gr.	.23	1	.23	.41	.53	
Within Gr.	45.81	82	.56			

f) Autonomy:		Mean (SD)
"more" empathy		.85 (1.24)
"less" empathy		.60 (1.59)

ISRAELI SAMPLE-AUTONOMY PCB PAL						
Source	SS	DF	Mean Sq.	F	Sig.	
Between Gr.	.95	1	.95	.53	.47	
Within Gr.	143.75	81	1.77			

g) 1947 Partition plan:		Mean (SE)
"more" empathy		.96 (1.31)
"less" empathy		1.22 (.94)

ISRAELI SAMPLE-47 PARTITION PLAN						
Source	SS	DF	Mean Sq.	F	Sig.	
Between Gr.	1.1	1	1.1	.69	.41	
Within Gr.	124.7	82	1.5			

h) Unified secular state:		Mean (SE)
"more" empathy		.54 (1.5)
"less" empathy		-.38 (1.48)

ISRAELI SAMPLE-UNIFIED SECULAR STATE						
Source	SS	DF	Mean Sq.	F	Sig.	
Between Gr.	12.78	1	12.78	5.73	.02*	
Within Gr.	182.78	82	2.23			

i) Transfer of Jews:		Mean (SE)
"more" empathy		1.94 (1.58)
"less" empathy		2.38 (.995)

ISRAELI SAMPLE-PAL STATE WITH TRANSFER OF JEWS						
Source	SS	DF	Mean Sq.	F	Sig.	
Between Gr.	3.00	1	3.00	1.4	.24	
Within Gr.	175.24	82	2.14			

**Scores were calculated from the difference between what the Isr. thought the Palestinians would find to be acceptable minus the mean of the scores of what the Palestinians actually said that they found to be acceptable.

*significant at the 95% confidence level.

"less" empathy .68 (1.69)

PALESTINIAN SAMPLE-STATUS QUC

Source	SS	DF	Mean Sq.	F	Sig.
Between Gr.	.37	1	.37	.12	.73
Within Gr.	98.77	33	2.99		

f) Autonomy: Mean (SD)
 "more" empathy .76 (1.5)
 "less" empathy -.80 (.87)

PALESTINIAN SAMPLE-AUTONOMY FOR PAI

Source	SS	DF	Mean Sq.	F	Sig.
Between Gr.	16.36	1	16.36	9.21	.005*
Within Gr.	58.62	33	1.78		

g) 1947 Partition plans: Mean (SD)
 "more" empathy .45 (1.4)
 "less" empathy .05 (0.44)

PALESTINIAN SAMPLE-47 PARTITION PLAN

Source	SS	DF	Mean Sq.	F	Sig.
Between Gr.	1.03	1	1.03	.71	.40
Within Gr.	47.71	33	1.45		

h) Unified secular state Mean (SD)
 "more" empathy -.13 (.60)
 "less" empathy -.07 (.71)

PALESTINIAN SAMPLE-UNIFIED SECULAR STATE

Source	SS	DF	Mean Sq.	F	Sig.
Between Gr.	.03	1	.03	.07	.79
Within Gr.	13.12	33	.40		

i) Transfer of Jews: Mean (SD)
 "more" empathy .14 (.80)
 "less" empathy -.05 (.60)

PALESTINIAN SAMPLE-PAI STATE WITH TRANSFER OF JEWS

Source	SS	DF	Mean Sq.	F	Sig.
Between Gr.	.25	1	.25	.51	.48

Within Gr. 16.04

33

.49

†Scores were calculated from the differences between what the Palestinians thought the Israelis would find to be acceptable minus the mean of the scores of what the Israelis actually said they found to be acceptable.

*significance within the 95% confidence level

**significant within the 90% confidence level

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