

CHINA & MULTILATERAL INSTITUTIONS: THE DECISION TO JOIN

by

MICHAEL G. KULMA

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Political Science in partial
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September 8, 2005
Date

Jacqueline Braveboy-Wagner
Chair of the Examining Committee

September 8, 2005
Date

Ruth O'Brien
Executive Officer

Ming Xia

Thomas Weiss

Benjamin Rivlin

Vincent Boudreau
Supervisory Committee

THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK

Abstract

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by

Michael G. Kulma

Adviser: Jacqueline Braveboy-Wagner

I contend that the literature on China and multilateral institutions lacks a comprehensive understanding of why China has decided to join key multilateral institutions. Generally speaking, the literature on China tends to favor neo-realist analysis, focusing on the importance of relative gains to China's decisions. In addition, the literature on multilateral institutions focuses on China's impact on the institution or the institution's impact on China, after admission. Furthermore, works on China that take a multi-causal approach are dated, concentrate on factors at only two levels, or are not applied to Chinese multilateralism. Instead, I take a foreign policy approach, which focuses on the influences of international, state-societal, and leadership factors. I explore the relevance of these factors by looking at five different instances of China's choice to incorporate multilateralism into its foreign policy, specifically, China's decision to join the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the World Trade Organization, the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. As China has modernized and liberalized, single factor explanations of its foreign policy no longer suffice. I hypothesize that Chinese foreign policy decisions are impacted by factors at all three levels of analysis. In addition, there are differences in the strength of influencing

factors depending on the issue area. Based on the current literature, in the security area, I hypothesize that leadership influences dominate the decision to join multilateral institutions. In the economic realm, because of increasing liberalization, international and state-societal influences are most important. I use a three-step methodology, involving the English language literature, the Chinese language literature and interviews, and confirmation forms, to systematically determine which influences are considered to be important by Chinese experts and generalists. The results are mixed. Support exists for the first hypothesis. However, the evidence does not sustain the hypothesis that leadership influences dominate in the security realm. Furthermore, for economic decisions, state, societal and international influences prove important, but leadership factors are equally as influential.

To Luella for her constant love and support
And to Mom, Dad, and Nadine for always believing

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Section I: Rationale, Design, and History

Chapter One: Introduction

Since the initiation of the “open door” policy in 1978, China has foregone its previous foreign policies of isolation or “leaning toward one side.” Instead China supports an “independent foreign policy” free from necessary association with Russia (formerly the Soviet Union), the United States, or the non-aligned nations. Part and parcel of this foreign policy is an increased interest in joining multilateral institutions. We see a China increasingly joining and participating in multilateral institutions, to the extent that its foreign policy has become highly dependent upon such institutions. Of these institutions, arguably the most important deal with free trade (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade [GATT] and the World Trade Organization [WTO]) and nuclear non-proliferation (International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [NPT], and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty [CTBT]). Multilateral institutions are here defined as having persistent and connected sets of rules that prescribe behavioral roles, constrain activity, and shape expectations among states (Keohane, 1989). Using this definition we can suggest that the above agreements, organizations, agencies, and treaties can be readily described as multilateral institutions.

To have believed thirty years ago that China would attempt to join major “Western” dominated multilateral institutions such as the GATT, WTO, IAEA, NPT, and CTBT was virtually unthinkable. Take, for example, China’s views of the NPT, as expressed in 1978: “The so-called NPT is a conspiracy concocted by the USSR and the U.S. to maintain their nuclear monopoly” (Zhu, 1997, p. 43; Swaine and Johnston, 1999). On the economic side and equally important, prior to the 1980s we find a China cooperating mainly with other

socialist countries and regularly denouncing the “bourgeois” economic institutions of the West as clubs of the rich (Feeney, 1994; Economy and Oksenberg, 1999).

China’s growing multilateral participation is part and parcel of more than twenty-years of opening to the outside world. During this period, China has begun to “abandon its previous aversion to multilateral institutions” (Medieros and Fravael, 2003, p. 25). According to the literature, states join international organizations to achieve goals they cannot gain alone. As Abbott and Snidal note, organizations help in “facilitating the negotiation and implementation of agreements, resolving disputes, managing conflicts, carrying out operational activities like technical assistance, elaborating norms, shaping international discourse...Rational states will use or create a formal IO when the value of these functions outweighs the costs, notably the resulting limits on unilateral action” (Abbott and Snidal, 2001).

Since the late-1970s, the Chinese government has focused its policies almost exclusively on developing the Chinese economy. In this process, the government recognizes that engagement with the outside world is critical to continued growth. Neo-realist models do not do justice to the complexity of decision-making. As a growing economic and military power on the world stage, what China does has significant consequences for the world. Understanding the international, state-societal, and leadership influences that impact China’s policy can help us reduce uncertainty about China’s perception and place in the world. There is particular global interest in China’s participation in certain key multilateral institutions, because it is assumed these institutions are expected to have a moderating effect on belligerent behavior. Thomas Friedman understands this assumption when, writing about China’s accession to the WTO, he says that “This is the

time to keep our eyes on the prize, and the prize remains the stable, steady transformation of China into a responsible member of the world trading system and into a more free and open society. Few things are more important for world stability than that” (Friedman, 2000, p. 21). If we agree with this statement and with the idea that multilateral institutions will play an important role in this stable and steady transformation, it is in our best interests to better understand why it is that China joins such institutions. By this I do not only mean the process by which they make the decision, but also the influences, which impact upon the decision to join various multilateral institutions.

Scholars have taken a number of different approaches in an attempt to better understand the relationship between China and multilateral institutions. Most authors have looked at China’s behavior in these institutions. These works can be separated into three different efforts: those that look at the impact of China’s behavior on the policies of multilateral institutions (Kim, 1977); those that look at the impact of multilateral institutions on China’s behavior (Chan, 1989; Jacobson and Oksenberg, 1990; and Johnston and Evans, 1999); and those that look at both (Pearson, 1999). Few authors have looked at China’s decision to join multilateral institutions; in fact, Gill and Medieros emphasize that only limited work has been done (Gill and Medieros, 2000). Furthermore, what work has been done focuses on only one or two levels of analysis, to the detriment of a fuller discussion of the impact of all three levels on the decision to join multilateral institutions. It is in an attempt to fill these two gaps in the literature that I will concentrate my efforts.

In this thesis, the focus of my research will be on five significant decisions, which highlight China’s departure from earlier isolation or “leaning to one side.” I suggest that these decisions are indicative of China’s increased participation in multilateral institutions.

In the economic realm I will look at which international, state-societal, and leadership influences impacted China's decision to apply to join the GATT on July 11, 1986 and secondly, to seek entrance to the WTO as of December 7, 1995. On the security side I will look at the decision to apply to join the IAEA on September 5, 1983, the NPT on March 9, 1992, and the CTBT on September 24, 1996.¹ These discrete decisions are reflective of an apparent commitment by China to participate in two key global regimes, the one free trade, the other, nuclear non-proliferation.

Despite the monolithic decision structure often posited for China, much has changed over time. China's economy has moved toward the market, leading to greater foreign direct investment and general foreign involvement in China. Village elections and the empowerment of the National People's Congress (NPC) have softened the hierarchical feel of the government structure. The technocrats Jiang Zemin, Zhu Rongji and the new leader Hu Jintao, have replaced the old-guard revolutionary leadership of Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping. These changes support the need to concentrate on international, state-societal and leadership influences in seeking to understand China's policy.

The literature on China and multilateral institutions is at an exciting stage. The research in this dissertation suggests that adding richness and complexity to this field through multi-causal analysis is crucial to understanding China's decision to apply to join these institutions. Existing works on China that are multi-causal are dated, concentrate at most on only two levels, or have not been applied to the particular topic of Chinese multilateralism. Preliminary research shows that global, state-societal, and leadership influences have all contributed to China's decisions to apply to join multilateral institutions.

¹China is a member of the IAEA and NPT, and has signed but not yet ratified the CTBT. Also, China never regained admission to the GATT, but became a member of the WTO in December of

My analysis also shows that there is reason to believe that “issue-area” plays a role in the mix of factors impacting China’s decisions.

Chapter Two: The Theoretical Literature and Research Design

Theoretical Framework and Substantive Focus

My focus on multilateral institutions and three levels of influence is supported in both the literature on Chinese foreign policy and the general foreign policy literature. I will begin this section by first discussing the general literature dealing with the importance of multilateral institutions. I will also detail the existent work on China and multilateral institutions, pointing specifically to the void in the literature that I intend to fill. Next I will move on to discuss the relevance of factors at each level of analysis to foreign policy generally and Chinese foreign policy in particular, finishing with a concentration on multi-causal efforts to explain foreign policy. Finally, I will discuss the importance of issue-area in the determination of a country's foreign policy.

The Literature on Multilateral Institutions

The general work on multilateralism is germane to my work. The definition of multilateral institutions as “persistent and connected sets of rules that prescribe behavioral roles, constrain activity, and shape expectations” is taken from the work of Robert Keohane, the preeminent writer on the existence and importance of institutions in the international system (Keohane, 1989, p. 3). Furthermore, according to Ruggie, multilateral is a qualifier that refers to the coordination of national policies by groups of three or more states on the basis of principles, which specify appropriate conduct for a class of actions (Ruggie, 1993, p. 14). Multilateral institutions are important for a number of different reasons. They are important as they can affect the costs associated with alternatives. They may also affect the understandings that leaders of states have of the roles they should play and their

assumptions about others' motivations and perceived self-interests. They help determine how interests are defined and how actions are interpreted. Most importantly, institutions are worth studying "because they are pervasive and important in world politics and because their operation and evolution are difficult to understand. Without institutions there is little cooperation" (Keohane, 1989, p. 174).²

Various authors have focused on China's role and behavior in multilateral institutions. These works can be separated into three different efforts. Unlike my research, this literature mainly seeks to understand China's policy behavior after it becomes a member of various multilateral institutions. Some authors look at how China impacts the policies of multilateral institutions. For example, Samuel Kim looks at the behavioral dimensions of Chinese multilateral diplomacy with an emphasis on the political process in the General Assembly of the United Nations (Kim, 1977). Kim analyzes China's voting record in the United Nations, six years after membership, to see what type of behavior China has displayed to this point.

Others look at the reverse: that is, the impact of multilateral institutions on China's behavior. To date, the most comprehensive of such efforts is Harold Jacobson and Michel Oksenberg's China's Participation in The IMF, the World Bank, and GATT: Toward a Global Economic Order. The authors study China's changing stance with regard to what they describe as Keystone International Economic Organizations (KIEOs), mentioned in the title, and conclude that the relations with these organizations changed after the Tiananmen

²For more on institutions see: Lisa Martin and Beth Simmons, "Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions," International Organizations (Autumn 1998): 729-757; Stephen Walt, "International Relations: One World, Many Theories," Foreign Policy 110 (Spring 1998): 29-46; Robert Keohane and Lisa Martin, "The Promise of Institutional Theory," International Security 20 (Summer 1995): 39-51; John Meisheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," International Security 19 (Winter 94/95): 5-49; and Joseph Nye, "Neorealism and Neoliberalism," World Politics vol. XL (January 1988): 235-251.

Square incident. The changed relationship after this event is an indication to the authors that Chinese participation is not an automatic outcome dictated by the structure of the international system, as realists might believe. Thus, they suggest that to understand China's participation in these economic institutions we need to undertake national and sub-national analyses as well as international. In fact, Jacobson and Oksenberg find in China an adjustment in state behavior and a convergence toward international norms and standards, which are seen as important to creating a harmonious relationship between China and the world and stabilizing the global system (Jacobson and Oksenberg, 1990). Likewise, Johnston and Evans have researched China's engagement with multilateral security institutions, displaying particular interest in knowing "how China's involvement in international and regional security institutions has affected its foreign policy behavior" (Johnston and Evans, 1999. p. 235). They find that China's behavior, evolving from multiple institutional pressures, has become more sophisticated, detailed, participatory, and cooperative in these institutions.

Gerald Chan takes a different approach that deals with China's interaction with other countries, in particular interaction with respect to international non-governmental organizations (INGOs). Chan's work searches for similarities and differences between Mainland China and Taiwan's involvement in these organizations. He considers specific case studies: the International Olympic Committee, the International Council of Scientific Union, and the International Red Cross, among others, to determine areas of commonality or agreeability (Chan, 1989).

Yet other authors look at both China's impact on the institution and the institution's impact on China. Margaret Pearson is one such author. Regarding China's impact on

institutions, she sees China's involvement as adding new legitimacy to such regimes, because the largest outsider economy has finally chosen to join. Conversely, she finds that the regime has had an impact on China's behavior in the realms of domestic political conflict (with reformers winning out), central-local relations (the localities gain more power), trade policy (China's policy has been made increasingly consistent with the requirements of the international regime), and political institutions (China has restructured its institutional framework for foreign economic affairs to facilitate trade and investment) (Pearson, 1999).

Alternatively, and most relevant to my own work, a few authors have looked at China's decision to join multilateral institutions. Without the decision to join there would be no discussion of China's behavior in relationship to the organization. Gill and Medieros (2000) are interested in the external and internal factors affecting Beijing's arms control and nuclear non-proliferation decision-making, particularly regarding China's decision to join the CTBT. On the external side, they examine the multilateral and unilateral pressures on China to adhere to international norms and agreements on arms control and nonproliferation, finding that an international movement toward nuclear non-proliferation and against nuclear weapons tests has impacted China's policy. On the national level, they examine the multiple and competing institutional pressures affecting China's policy, finding a fractious debate within the arms control policy-making community along political and military lines between the MFA (for signing) and the PLA (against) (Gill and Medieros, 2000).

Margaret Pearson also briefly looks at the external and internal variables impacting China's decision to join what she calls the international trade and investment regime (our GATT/WTO). On the external side, she sees an increasingly liberal international trading environment, which opened to China in the 1980s and 1990s in an effort to cash in on the

billion plus consumers in the Chinese market or in the hopes that integration would lead to changes in the Chinese political system. On the internal side, she finds that changes in the outlook of the Chinese leadership were of overwhelming importance to China's original decision to join the trade and investment regime and to the decision to slow down integration in 1994 (Pearson, 1999).

The Literature on International Level Variables

There are a number of different realist theories of international politics (classical, structural, offensive, and defensive, to name the most notable), but they all share a set of core beliefs. Generally speaking these theories hold that: states are the most important actors in the international system; anarchy is the distinguishing feature of that system; states seek to maximize power or security; states adopt rational policies; states rely on threat or the use of military force to achieve objectives; and that aspects of the system result in basic patterns of international politics and foreign policy.³ More specifically, classical realists believe that the most significant factor in international politics is that states attempt to increase power as the desire for power is rooted in human nature.

Neo-realism concentrates its analysis on the behavior of great powers in an anarchical system. According to this way of thinking the structure of such a system will cause states to have a tendency to act alike, mostly with larger, more powerful states setting the tone for smaller states. A change in the structure will lead to a change in the way we would expect to see states act.⁴ Offensive and defensive realism are offshoots of such theoretical underpinnings. Offensive realism suggests that the international system

³See: Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller *The Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and International Security* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press), 1995.

fosters conflict and aggression, while defensive realism finds that states realize that defensive strategies are the best route to security. However, a change in structure, like that which occurred with the collapse of the Soviet Union, is a once in a lifetime event.⁵ There is much more happening at the international level on a day-to-day basis of which we must remain aware. For example, Gill and Medieros find that an international movement toward nuclear non-proliferation and against nuclear weapons tests has impacted China's policy (Gill and Medieros, 2000).⁶ China experienced international pressure to join the CTBT in order to uphold their international image as a responsible member of the international community (Johnston, 1996).⁷

Further to this issue of norms, this neo-realist discussion is different from that espoused by the neoliberal institutionalist school of thought. While both seek to explain behavioral regularities by examining the international system, neoliberal institutionalists believe that in institutionalized systems, states may exert influence by drawing on widespread diplomatic norms.⁸ In our cases we see the impact of widespread diplomatic norms suggested as having influenced China's decisions. For example, in the case of

⁴See: Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc.), 1979.

⁵The end of the Cold War undermined the tenets of neorealism in a number of different ways. Contrary to the expectations of bipolarity, the Soviet bloc fell apart. In addition, the change that we did see did not follow the suggested neorealist path. The end of the Cold War did not result from hegemonic or system wide war, it was not due to different alliance patterns; and it was not the result of a sudden gap in military capabilities.

⁶The nuclear non-proliferation movement might best be described as a regime, which is a set of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors expectations converge in a given issue area.

⁷For more on realist interpretations of the international system see: Stephen Walt, "International Relations: One World, Many Theories," Foreign Policy 110 (Spring 1998); John Meisheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," International Security 19 (Winter 94/95); Robert Keohane, ed., Neorealism and Its Critics, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986); Stephen Walt, "Alliance Formation and the Balance of Power," International Security 9 (Spring 1985); and Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1948).

⁸See: Robert Keohane, International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989).

China's decision to apply to join the NPT, after France decided to join in the early-1990s, all known nuclear powers had signed on to the NPT except for China. To sustain the image of a responsible member of the international community (or influenced by the widespread norm of non-proliferation), China felt it had to join the NPT (Johnston and Evans, 1999; and Swaine and Johnston, 1999).

Also in the literature on foreign policy, Latin American authors and others have long focused on the importance of global trends in the shaping of foreign policy behavior. In fact, some have suggested that the foreign policy decision-making processes of most countries of the world are strongly affected by external events (Van Klaveren, 1997, p. 40).⁹

The State-Society Literature

To foreign policy analysts the state has traditionally referred to the decision-makers whereas society is composed of the groups within. However, to political economists the state has a different connotation. Skocpol gives the following overview (not specifically with respect to foreign policy): Traditional studies of politics and government have focused on "Cultural values, socialized personalities, clashing interest groups, conflicting or allying classes, and differentiating social systems—these were supposed to provide sufficient keys both to the political process and to political conflicts...Government itself was not considered to be an independent actor..." (Skocpol, 1990, p. 59). However, another way to look at politics and government is from the viewpoint that the state is an autonomous actor. In this capacity, "States conceived as organization controlling territories and people may formulate

⁹For more, see: John J. Stremmlau, "The Foreign Policies of Developing Countries in the 1980s," Journal of International Affairs 34(1) (Spring-Summer 1980): 161-178; Patrick McGowan, "Economic Dependence and Economic Performance in Black Africa." Journal of Modern African Studies 14(1)

and pursue goals that are not simply reflective of the demands or interests of social groups, classes, or society.” (Skocpol, 1990, p. 61). As such, for the purposes of studying state factors impacting on China’s decisions to join multilateral institutions, we use here a hybrid “state-societal” categorization, which stresses the importance of both traditional and non-traditional factors.

On the state side, among the key contributions has been the literature on the role of the bureaucracy. Graham Allison’s bureaucratic model suggests that inter-organizational factors are crucial to understanding the intricacies of crisis, including the Cuban Missile Crisis. My research will draw on the works of those who attempt to explain how bureaucratic factors lead to one decision rather than another.¹⁰ While mine is a multi-causal approach and does not focus on the details of the process, this literature is instructive in focusing our attention on the relevance of bureaucratic entities. It is important to note that in China the bureaucracy includes not only the “traditional” bureaucracy (ministries), but also scientific institutions and strategic research organizations (all of which are government affiliated).¹¹

(1978): 25-40; and William Jess Biddle and John D. Stephens, “Dependent Development and Foreign Policy: The Case of Jamaica,” *International Studies Quarterly* 44(4) (December 1989): 411-434.

¹⁰See: E. Beard, *Developing the ICBM: A Study in Bureaucratic Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976); F. A. Bergeson, *The Army Gets an Air Force: Tactics of Insurgent Bureaucratic Politics*, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980); Morton H. Halperin and Arnold Kantor, eds., *Readings in American Foreign Policy: A Bureaucratic Perspective*, (Boston: Little, Brown, 1973).

¹¹For more on societal influences on foreign policy see: Philip Powlick, “The Sources of Public Opinion for American Foreign Policy Officials,” *International Studies Quarterly* 39 (December 1995): 427-451; Kevin Hill, “The Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy Making: Congressional Voting and American Mass Attitudes Toward South Africa,” *International Studies Quarterly* 37 (June 1993): 195-214; Joe Hagan, “Regimes, Political Oppositions, and the Comparative Analysis of Foreign Policy,” in *New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy*, ed. Hermann, Kegley, and Rosenau (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1987): 339-365; and Martin W. Sampson III, “Cultural Influences on Foreign Policy,” in *New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy*, ed. Hermann, Kegley, and Rosenau (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1987): 384-408.

In fact, David Shambaugh suggests that policy-makers on a wide range of issues are increasingly consulting international relations specialists in China. This is being done in a number of ways: they are asked to produce commissioned reports, to personally brief leaders, to participate in ad hoc groups, and to publish on independent topics of their own scholarly interest (Shambaugh, 1987). Economy and Oksenberg picked up this idea recently, suggesting that there are a “growing number of think tanks and policy research groups, which have been influential in the formulation of China’s domestic and foreign economic policy” (Economy and Oksenberg, 1999. p. 18). In fact, they propose that to understand China’s policies, one must grasp the bureaucratic politics and interests at work.

Others have written more specifically on the importance of what I have termed traditional bureaucratic entities in post-Mao China decision-making, using the term “fragmented authoritarianism” to describe the Chinese system (Lieberthal and Lampton, 1992). Further, these authors suggest the need to turn particularly to the highly centralized bureaucracy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Waijiao bu) to understand Chinese foreign policy (Yang, 1995). But at the crossroads of the traditional and non-traditional bureaucracies, we find the creation of epistemic communities--networks of knowledge-based experts--around certain areas of expertise. Such epistemic communities, whether they exist internally or across borders, may play a role in articulating the cause and effect relationships of complex problems, help states identify interests, frame the issues for collective debate, propose specific policies, and identify salient points for negotiation (Haas, 1992). In the case of China, for example, China’s Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation worked closely together with the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and the Chinese Institute of International Studies.

Finally, any understanding of state-societal factors must include a discussion of public opinion. While most naysay the relevance of public opinion in an authoritarian environment such as China's, it has been posed that the goals of China's decision-makers have been easier to implement because of widespread public support (Pearson, 1999). Put another way, public opinion was in favor of such movement by China. While judging public opinion in China is an unenviable task, there are reasons for believing that policy-makers' decisions to apply to join multilateral institutions have the support of the public. First, there has been no strong rural or urban unrest or opposition to such movement by the Chinese government. Second, the urban intellectuals and business elites are quite solid in their support for such policies. This is particularly found to be the case for China's involvement with multilateral economic institutions (Pearson, 1999).

The Literature on Leadership

What sets foreign policy analysis apart from mainstream international relations is its insistence that "a compelling explanation of foreign policy cannot consider the decider exogenously" (Hudson and Vore, 1995, p. 217). Any number of authors have taken the role of leaders and their advisers to be important in determining foreign policy. For example, in looking at who makes foreign policy decisions and how, Margaret and Charles Hermann posit the existence of three possible different "ultimate decision-making units" (UDU): self-contained or externally influenced predominant leader, self-contained or externally influenced single group, and self-contained or externally influenced multiple autonomous actors. They then create a decision tree to aid in the classification of the UDU in a given

country. They determine that different UDU types will result in different foreign policy (Hermann and Hermann, 1989).

Others have suggested that the way in which leaders of nation-states view each other and the nature of world political conflict is of fundamental importance in determining what happens in relations among states; beliefs impact decision-making (George, 1969). George argues that leaders have an operational code, which serves as a significant portion of the actor's entire set of beliefs about political life and so creates the foundation of a worldview for that person (George, 1969). This operational code is made up of instrumental beliefs and philosophical beliefs. Instrumental beliefs refer to what means the actor believes are needed to reach a specific end. For example, we might ask questions about what a leader thinks is the best approach for selecting goals or objectives for political action or how are goals of action pursued most effectively? Philosophical beliefs refer to assumptions and premises made regarding the fundamental nature of politics, the nature of political conflicts, and the role of history.¹²

Following on the works of Hermann and Hermann, and George, there has been much made in the literature on China that would justify a concentration on the importance of China's leadership and the making of foreign policy. From Mao Zedong to Deng Xiaoping to Zhao Ziyang to Jiang Zemin, all of these leaders have made their mark on Chinese foreign policy. It is hard to imagine China's policy of a united front, or isolation, or opening to the outside world unless considered in the context of the leader at that time. For example, Zhao Suisheng, speaking generally about China's decision-making (not strictly foreign policy),

¹²For other work on the impact of leaders on policy see: Margaret Hermann, "Explaining Foreign Policy: Using Personal Characteristics of Political Leaders," International Studies Quarterly 24 (March 1980): 7-46; Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics

suggests the need for scholars to include a concentration on Chinese leaders (Zhao, 1995). In addition, Wang Jianwei writes about the importance of the cognition of China's leaders on decisions with respect to multilateral diplomacy in collective security (Wang, 1999). According to Wang, we have seen subtle changes in Chinese perceptions about collective security, starting from the bad memories of the Korean War, moving to nonparticipation in Security Council voting, changing toward an independent foreign policy in the early 1980s, leading to the 1986 announcement that multilateral diplomacy is a part of Chinese foreign policy and finally to Chinese participation in the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (Wang, 1999). Economy and Oksenberg concur with a concentration on China's leaders saying that if "a single leader attaches importance to an otherwise lower-priority issue and energizes the effort, entry might go forward" (Economy and Oksenberg, 1999, p. 24).¹³

Economy and Oksenberg have further found that the differences of opinion as well as the shared values among the leaders, and the relations of influence among them impact China's decisions. In particular, they believe that the degree of consensus in the uppermost echelons of government has an impact, with strong consensus making entry into a multilateral institution more likely (Economy and Oksenberg, 1999). Even more recently, Andrew Nathan and Perry Link in The Tiananmen Papers reinforce the importance of looking at the different views among the leaders in China's decision-making process. Their work focuses on decision-making at the highest level of the Chinese leadership during the Tiananmen Square crisis of 1989. Among many things that it attempts, one thing that

(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976); Ole Holsti, "The Belief System and National Images: A Case Study," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 6 (September 1962): 244-252.

¹³See: Alastair Iain Johnston and Paul Evans, "China's Engagement with Multilateral Security Institutions," in Engaging China: Managing a Rising Power, ed. Alastair Iain Johnston and Paul Evans (London; New York: Routledge Press, 1999): 235-272; and Margaret Pearson, "China's Integration into the International Trade and Investment Regime," in China Joins the World:

becomes clear over the course of their study is the lack of a monolithic decision structure and the divisiveness of the Chinese leadership on important issues (Nathan and Link, 2001).

The Literature on Multi-causal Analysis

Multi-causal analysis of foreign policy stems from the early post-World War II foreign policy literature, which focused on decision-making as organizational behavior. This literature took into account the spheres of competence of the actors involved, the flow of communication and information, and the motivations of the various players (Hudson and Vore, 1995). The explanations produced were both multi-causal and interdisciplinary (political science, psychology, sociology, and history) and marked a significant departure from the earlier focus on realist concerns with power. However, critiques of this early decision-making literature stressed that such efforts focused too much on process, to the detriment of analysis on external and internal influences. At the same time, these models, with their abundance of relevant variables, were seen as being difficult to operationalize. Later work in the 1960s and 1970s attempted multi-level explanations in large-scale projects (Inter-nation Simulation, Dimensions of Nations, CREON, and Interstate Behavior Analysis Project). The empirical results of these efforts were disappointing, which, in fact, led to disenchantment with comparative foreign policy in the late-1970s.¹⁴

Robert Putnam helped resuscitate the interest in factors at multiple levels of analysis with his ideas on two-level games. According to Putnam, diplomacy and domestic politics

Progress and Prospects, ed. Elizabeth Economy and Michel Oksenberg (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1999): 161-205.

¹⁴See: Stephen Andriole, et al, "Framework for the Comparative Analysis of Foreign Policy," *International Studies Quarterly*, 19 (June 1975): 160-198; R. Rummel, "Indicators of Crossnational and International Patterns," *American Political Science Review*, LXIII (March 1969): 127-147; and Raymond Tanter, "Dimensions of Conflict Within and Between Nations 1958-1960," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 10 (March 1966): 41-64.

interact to create policy. Putnam posited two stages. In the first, there is bargaining between negotiators leading to tentative agreements. At the second level, there are separate discussions within each group of constituents about ratification, with the win set being the set of all possible level one agreements that could be ratified. The three sets of factors impacting on this win set are preferences and coalitions at level two, institutions at level two, and negotiating strategies at level one (Putnam, 1988). Putnam's work has had a lasting effect on international relations studies. In a more recent article on the post-war history of foreign policy, Valerie Hudson and Charles Vore suggest that one exciting area for future foreign policy research lies in the integration of knowledge across multiple levels of analysis (Hudson and Vore, 1995).

Although they are few in number, examples of the importance of such analysis exist as well in the literature on Chinese foreign policy. A recent work focusing on two levels of analysis, Lu Ning's The Dynamics of Foreign Policy Decision-Making in China, emphasizes the role China's top leadership (paramount leader or leading nucleus, nuclear circle, members of the Politburo Standing Committee, and other important Politburo members) and the chief foreign policy bureaucracy, found mainly in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. While he does not deal with multilateralism and largely ignores the international environment, his book is important to the understanding of main actors--the top leadership, the MFA, and the foreign affairs establishment and working level officials--involved in forming China's political-military foreign policy (Lu, 1997). As elsewhere, the leaders in China make the guidelines and the MFA implements policy based upon these guidelines. However, Lu goes on to say that "sensitive" issues must have MFA approval, suggesting that the MFA has some direct policy input (Lu, 1997).


Zhao Quansheng goes beyond these two levels to concentrate on the processes, situations, and structures of Chinese foreign policy, analyzing the international environment, domestic determinants and individual decision-making (Zhao, 1996). In particular, at the macro-level he examines the international constraints and domestic determinants, while at the micro-level he looks at the decision-makers. He suggests that all of these factors interact to produce a foreign policy output. Zhao proposes a micro-macro linkage approach because he believes that the single-level or even two-level game approaches are missing the interaction between international (system and structure) and domestic (society and internal institutions) variables and individual decision-makers at the micro-level (Zhao, 1996). His hope in using this approach is to determine the relevance of the factors and the connections between factors at each level.

Issue-area

Finally, a discussion of the importance of issue-area in explaining the behavior of states in the international arena can begin with James Rosenau, who postulated that the relative potency of variable-clusters depends on the *type of issue* involved, in his case territorial (security), status (diplomatic), non-human resources (the economy), or human resources (population) (Rosenau, 1971). Others have followed this path of distinguishing between the factors of importance in security and economic issue areas. Charles Lipson found that the differences between multilateral economic and security institutions rest with decision-makers who are faced, in the security realm, with higher costs of betrayal, difficulties in monitoring, and a tendency to comprehend security issues as competitive struggles (Lipson, 1984). Ikenberry, Lake, and Mastanduno also believe that the relevance

of system, societal and state factors, in their case regarding U.S. foreign policy, is at least partially dependent upon issue area (Ikenberry, Lake, and Mastanduno, 1988).

This difference in factors impacting the economic and security realms comes out as well in the literature on China. Faust and Kornberg allude to the difference between the two areas when they say that unlike what pertains to security and arms areas, China really wants to join international economic organizations (their examples are the IMF and World Bank) (Faust and Kornberg, 1995). This is a result of domestic economic considerations in which international economic organizations serve as important sources of capital, technological assistance, technical training, and as information providers regarding modernization. For reasons similar to those of Faust and Kornberg, Wang Jianwei suggests that in the realm of China's multilateral economic diplomacy China is more open to involvement with the outside world, than it is in the security realm. Wang finds greater opening to economic institutions resulting from a more pressing need for growth in the Chinese domestic economy. In the realm of security (collective security is his concentration), he believes that China is in no hurry to join such institutions, because China has experienced a relatively stable security environment over the last 10 years (Wang, 1999). Finally, Zhao Suisheng finds that regarding China's economic policy-making, institutions dominate, whereas in the realm of security personalistic power is key (Zhao, 1995). Combining these two conclusions (Faust and Kornberg, Wang; and Zhao) it is my belief that in security, leadership factors dominate, whereas in economics, international and state-societal influences are important. Whether analyzing the economic or security realms a basic chart on the flow of information would look as follows:



Through five case studies, I hope to generate greater understanding of these multiple causes. Recalling Gill and Medeiros' comment, I believe that there is a need for more work on China and multilateral institutions, particularly work that compares the economic and security realms.

Research Objective and Hypotheses

My hypotheses are:

1. As China has modernized and liberalized, single factor explanations of its foreign policy (usually individual level or realist) can no longer suffice. I hypothesize that Chinese foreign policy decisions will be impacted by factors at three levels of analysis: individual (leadership), state and societal, and international (regional and global).
2. There will be a difference in the strength of influencing factors depending on the issue area. Based on the current literature, in the "high politics" security area, I hypothesize that leadership influences will dominate the decision to join multilateral institutions. In the "low politics" economic realm, because of increasing liberalization, international and state-societal influences will be most important.

Methodology

In preliminary research using English language sources I began my investigations by noting all references to influences at the three levels in the most relevant literature. Second, to determine the differences between English language and Chinese perspectives, I searched the Chinese language literature on the topic and began fieldwork and interviews in China; with a view to confirming or rejecting the influences discovered in stage one and adding other factors. In this stage two effort, I conducted discussions with Chinese officials, former Chinese officials living in the United States and elsewhere, Chinese research institute employees, and Chinese academics. These interviewees were classified as either experts (those interviewees with a particular specialization in either the economic or security area), or generalists (those interviewees specializing in Chinese foreign policy and international politics, but not specifically in economic or security issue areas). Within each issue area, I was able to conduct 13 discussions with experts and another 8 with generalists. As a result, I gained information for each case study from 21 people. As is often the case, when dealing with somewhat sensitive matters in China, interviewees asked to remain anonymous, a wish I honor throughout this study. It should be noted that some interviewees were contacted more than once. Following each discussion the notes (handwritten) were transcribed and eventually the influences mentioned by each person were compiled into a table. While numerous people mentioned certain influences, others were mentioned by only one person. Interviews were open-ended to allow for the maximum degree of flexibility in a normally conservative environment. These discussions were conducted over the course of three different trips to China over a sixteen-month period. In addition to work undertaken in China, I have also had the opportunity to meet

with a few members of the Chinese government stationed in New York, as well as former officials living in the U.S.

Publications in Chinese were also an important resource at this stage, adding further to the list of influences impacting China's decisions. These written resources consist of official public documents, speeches, books written on the topics, and journal and newspaper articles. Here, again, I looked for mention of factors impacting China's decision to join the case study institutions.

Written materials were easier to obtain for the GATT and WTO case studies than they were for those dealing with security. This is the result of the fact that the Chinese government is more open about economic data in its effort to join the global economic community. Also, China, much like other countries, is more reluctant to release information relevant to issues of national security. Finally, it seems that even on the academic side little has been written in the security area in China. This may be the result of a lack of interest, but more importantly may be the result of a lack of access to such information by Chinese writers coupled with an unwritten restriction placed upon such research undertakings.

In stage three of my research, experts and generalists were asked to formulate a hierarchy out of the factors uncovered in stages one and two. This was done through a confirmation form (See Appendix A), which consisted of those influences overlapping at stage one and two of our research, as well as new influences uncovered at stage two.¹⁵ In this effort, each interviewee was e-mailed both a cover letter and attached confirmation form, which he/she was asked to fill out and return. Each expert was only sent the sections of the confirmation form for which he/she was considered to be an expert. Thus, those who

¹⁵ Note: those overlapping were considered more relevant and so included in the confirmation form

initially discussed security issues, were sent the security related confirmation forms. Those people who were considered generalists were sent all of the confirmation forms. Every person was asked to rank each possible factor (broken down into international, state-societal, and leadership level variables) as very important, important, somewhat important, or unimportant. Each of these categorizations was then assigned a corresponding number:

- Very important = 3;
- Important = 2;
- Somewhat important = 1; and
- Unimportant = 0

This number was then multiplied by either 1.0 (expert) or 0.75 (generalist) to determine the weighted score and level of importance. If an expert determined a certain international factor to be very important it would have a weighted score of 3.0. A total weighted score was then calculated for each influence and for each type of respondent, divided by the number of respondents and totaled for a final score. Under this weighted system, an influence would be scored very important, important, somewhat important, or unimportant, according to the following:

- Very important: 2.25-3.0
- Important: 1.5-2.24
- Somewhat important: .75-1.49
- Unimportant: Below .75

For each decision at each level, two charts will be presented. The first chart contains the raw number of respondents and how they marked the confirmation form. The second chart presents the calculated weighted totals for both expert and generalist responses, and the

rank for each influence. Finally, at the end of each case study chapter there will be a summary chart for all influences on that particular decision at all levels.

In sum, my research will perform a number of important tasks that will enrich the specific literature on Chinese foreign policy and the more general foreign policy literature. It will support the need for more comprehensive discussions of foreign policy decisions, by noting the importance of factors at all levels of analysis. At the same time it will help distinguish the relevance of factors across issue area. Finally, it will help clarify the differences between American and Chinese perceptions, which I hope, will lead to better future analysis and understanding.

Chapter Three: China and Multilateral Institutions: A History

Critical to the undertaking is the need to provide background that will help us place our cases into some greater historical context. Four distinct eras of China's history are covered here. First, I look at what I refer to as the Republican Period. This period runs roughly from the end of the last Chinese dynasty in 1911 to the end of Guomindang rule in 1949. Second, I discuss the period 1949-1971 during which the Communist Party ruled China, more specifically under Mao Zedong. This was a time marked mainly by isolation and very little Chinese participation in international organizations. Third, the shortest of the periods, 1971-1978 marked a transitional phase in Chinese participation. During this time China slowly began to come out of its isolation, first being accepted into the United Nations and later, other UN related organizations. Finally, from 1978 to the present there has been a remarkable "opening", when China began to shed its policies of isolation or "leaning to one side," more fully opening to the rest of the world, particularly in the realm of economics, but on the security front as well. Following brief historical summaries, I will present background material on the institutions discussed in the case studies: the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the World Trade Organization, the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

The Republican Period: 1911-1949

The Republican Period was a time of both great joy and great sorrows in the history of China--great joy because the last of the imperial dynasties was overthrown, allowing the people of China to determine the way they would be governed; but great sorrows because the forces competing for power in the political void left by the fall of the emperor almost immediately proved detrimental to the plight of the people. Examples abound of the problems China faced in this new age of "independence." From the immediate conflict over who would be China's first president, to the warlord period (1926-34) during which various personages independently controlled large tracts of Chinese territory, to the war years (World War II with Japan, 1936-45; Civil War, 1946-1949), this period was one of great unrest in Chinese history.

There were far fewer international organizations in existence in 1911-1949 than there are today and China was in a state of almost continual upheaval. Under any circumstances a country moving from imperial control to some semblance of a republic would have been hard pressed to join the world in international organizations. For a country dealing with internal strife, external concessions and invasion, and an ever-increasing population with which to share these hardships, maintaining the capabilities to participate would be that much harder. While the evidence of China's participation in multilateral institutions prior to 1949 is somewhat scarce, there is evidence to suggest that China did get involved. China was party to two of the most important institutions of that time.¹⁶ It was an original member of the United Nations in 1945 and it was an original contracting party to the General

¹⁶It is worth noting here that China was also scheduled to be an original contracting party of the UN predecessor organization, the failed League of Nations. It is also worth mentioning that Mao Zedong and the communists saw the League as nothing more than a tool of the imperialists.

Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in 1947. It is important to note that China became a member of these institutions under the then ruling Guomindang government. After 1949, when the Communist Party and its supporters defeated the Guomindang and its supporters at the end of a three year civil war, the Guomindang fled to Taiwan and “ruled” as the recognized legitimate government of all China until the mainland government took over China’s UN seat in 1971. Subsequently, as the “newly” recognized legitimate rulers of China, the Communist Party needed to “apply/reapply” for membership to institutions such as the GATT.

The Spirit of Revolution: 1949-1970

On October 1, 1949, Mao Zedong, the other leaders of the Communist Party, and the people of China founded the People’s Republic of China. Having been victorious in the civil war with the Guomindang, the Communist Party took over active control of China and represented the best bet the country had seen for stability in over thirty years. Included in the Party’s mandate was the ability to decide to join or not join the slowly growing number of international organizations. It is important to remember, however, that China did not have full control over this process. For example, until 1971, and despite repeated attempts, the mainland government failed to be acknowledged by the UN. Instead, the Guomindang government based in Taiwan was recognized as the legitimate ruler of all of China, including Taiwan and the mainland. So it was not necessarily through a lack of desire that China did not join certain institutions.

A number of other factors explain why China participated in so few international organizations during this time. For one, during the 1950s, China’s subordinate position in relations with the Soviet Union hindered it from becoming actively engaged with the

international community. Second, in the 1960s, China's "dual-adversary strategy toward both super-powers...had the effect of shutting China out from both the First World (Western) and Second World (Eastern) IGOs" (Kim, 1994, p. 405). Thus, on the one hand, the international community excluded China from joining various international organizations, while on the other hand, China's foreign policy excluded it from applying to join multilateral institutions.

The one area in which China did seem to attempt greater interaction was with what came to be known as Third World, developing, non-aligned countries. For example in 1955, China participated in the Bandung Conference, an Afro-Asian conference, which gave China a chance to make its own way independent of the Soviet Union. The aim of the conference was to promote economic and cultural cooperation and to oppose colonialism. Following the conference, China worked with Afro-Asian nations for many years to put together a second, similar conference, which was never held. Instead, the Afro-Asian movement was superseded by the creation of the Non-Aligned Movement. This movement and China's relations with the less developed and non-aligned movement, impacted China's future foreign policy in a number of important ways. During this "Bandung-era" China developed its "five principles of peaceful coexistence"¹⁷ which are still regularly mentioned today. In addition, China came to be seen (at least from its own perspective) as the unofficial voice of these countries in their struggle against the United States, Soviet Union, and other Western imperial powers.

¹⁷The five principles of peaceful coexistence suggest the universal significance of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression and non-interference in internal affairs, and mutual benefit.

However, generally speaking, the raw numbers back up the lack of Chinese participation in the international community through membership in international organizations. By 1960, more than a decade after the Communist Party came to power, China was a participant in only 2 international intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and 30 international non-governmental organizations (INGOs). By 1966, the number had dropped to 1 for China's participation in IGOs, while it rose to 58 for INGOs (Kim, 1994, p. 406). As the numbers suggest, Chinese participation in economic or security IGOs was low. Regarding China's interaction with what Jacobson and Oksenberg call Keystone International Economic Organizations (World Bank, IMF, and the GATT), the years 1950-71 marked a period of isolation (Jacobson and Oksenberg, 1990). While there were some informal contacts between China and these organizations, with specialists informing Chinese leaders upon request, interaction was minimal. On the security front, China did not participate in any multilateral institutions from 1950-1971. Even in arms control agreements Johnston and Evans found there existed little interest on the Chinese side. For example, from 1950-1960, China joined only one arms control agreement, the Geneva Protocols. From 1960-1970, out of a possible five arms control agreements they could have signed, the Chinese signed none (Johnston and Evans, 1999, p. 246). This suggests not only a policy of exclusion on the part of the outside world, but also a policy of exclusion on China's part.

The Transitional Phase: 1971-1978

China took a turn toward greater participation in multilateral institutions on October 25, 1971 with the PRC's admission to the United Nations following the improvement of relations with the United States. Earlier in 1971, Henry Kissinger, U.S. National Security Adviser, made a secret trip to China to meet with Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai in an effort to improve U.S.-China relations. These meetings became public in July of 1971, paving the way for China's entry into the UN. However, following admission into the UN and having been largely isolated from such organizations for years, China was ill-equipped to handle interaction with the UN (Jacobson and Oksenberg, 1990). In an effort to better equip itself, China immediately started to strengthen its international organization staff at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and sent a delegation to the United Nations. In addition, in 1972 the Chinese government set up the UN Small Group in the Bank of China. This group was created to help analyze the costs and benefits to membership in all UN financial agencies. While not whole-heartedly embracing multilateral institutions, China did begin to interact with these institutions on a more regular basis and increasingly chose to become a member of various organizations. In fact, by 1977 China was a member of 21 international intergovernmental organizations and 71 international non-governmental organizations (Kim, 1994, p. 406). This was a marked increase in participation from 1966, particularly with respect to intergovernmental organizations.

However, with respect to major economic and security institutions, China was still largely inactive. By the end of this "transition" period in 1978, China had still not joined any of the Key International Economic Organizations (Jacobson and Oksenberg, 1990). In fact, as a result of the changing times and changing allegiances, Taiwan lost its GATT observer

status in 1971, but China chose at the time not to take Taiwan's place. On the security front, there seemed little change in China's cooperation profile (Johnston and Evans, 1999). Prior to the 1980s, China continued to condemn multilateral security institutions, such as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Nuclear, as monopolies of the big powers. Thus, China's markedly increased participation in multilateral institutions from the late-1960s to the late-1970s cannot be completely understood as a consequence of their acceptance into the United Nations. China would go much further in its levels of participation over the next twenty years. It is the factors impacting this participation, which I will later analyze.

The "Opening"

It was not until the end of the Mao period in 1976 and the beginning of the Deng Xiaoping era in 1978 that a major movement by China toward greater participation in multilateral institutions began. This movement toward greater participation was part and parcel of an overall policy of economic opening to the outside world in an effort to more rapidly develop the Chinese economy. While the initial reforms were in the internal agricultural sector, where a "household responsibility system" was put into place that eventually brought proven gains to the livelihoods of those in the countryside, it is probably in the realm of trade with other countries that China's opening appears most striking. In 1978, China's total exports and imports totaled 35.50 billion yuan, making up 9.89% of GNP (Ross, 1994, p. 436). China conducted the majority of this trade with other socialist or underdeveloped countries. Little or none of this trade took place with developed countries such as Japan, the United States, or the Western European nations. Under the policy of opening to the outside world

instituted in 1978 China's trade numbers increased dramatically. For example, by 1989, China's exports and imports totaled 415.6 billion yuan, accounting for 26% of GNP (Ross, 1994, p. 436). By 2000, total trade numbers reached approximately 3.8 trillion yuan (WTO, 2002). China's largest trading partners are no longer fellow socialist countries; instead its largest trading partners are the United States, Japan, and member countries of the European Union.

China's increased multilateral involvement is no less striking. While China's increased level of participation may be seen as a logical outgrowth of its increased activity in global activities, it was not until 1985 that the government (in a speech by Deng Xiaoping) highlighted the importance of international institutions and their relevance to peace and development. From the rather paltry numbers already presented for 1977 we see a marked shift in China's participation following "opening" in 1978. By 1984, China was a member of 29 IGOs and 355 INGOs (Kim, 1994, p. 406). By 1989, these numbers increased further to 37 and 677 respectively (Kim, 1994, 406). Finally, by 2000, the latest year for which we have numbers, these numbers had increased to 49 and 1366, respectively (Yearbook of International Organizations, 2001-2002). In fact, from 1990 to 2000 China joined almost 700 INGOs and 12 IGOs. These numbers suggest remarkable increases from the numbers we saw prior to 1977. China is joining the world.

While it may seem that the rate of increase in Chinese participation in intergovernmental organizations is flagging somewhat, particularly when compared with the numbers for its participation in non-governmental organizations, it is important to note that there are far fewer such intergovernmental organizations. In addition, the requirements for joining IGOs are much more rigorous, often taking years to understand and implement.

However, as a percentage of existing organizations, China's participation rate is higher in international intergovernmental organizations than it is for international non-governmental organizations.

The GATT, World Trade Organization, International Atomic Energy Agency, Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty: A Brief Synopsis

The focus of my study is multilateral institutions. The multilateral institutions that will comprise my case studies are both economic and security organizations. In the realm of economics I look at the GATT and WTO. In the security area I look at the IAEA, NPT, and CTBT. The purpose of this section is not to go into great depth regarding China's involvement with these institutions; that will be covered in the following chapter. Here I present a brief background on each institution. This will provide a greater understanding of the context in which China's membership must be analyzed.

The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade was first signed in 1947 and entered into force in January 1948. There were 23 founding GATT members. The GATT was originally designed to provide an international forum that encouraged free trade between member states. It would do this by regulating and reducing tariffs on traded goods and by providing a common mechanism for resolving trade disputes. This was to be done as part of a larger International Trade Organization (ITO) that was being negotiated between countries simultaneously. The ITO Charter was agreed to in 1948, but never entered into force as numerous national legislatures (including that of the United States) refused to ratify the

Charter. Thus, the GATT, created despite the failure of countries around the world to agree to a full-fledged international trade agency, ended up as the only multilateral instrument governing international trade from 1948 until 1995.

Created after the Second World War, the GATT dealt with the trade in goods, which dominated international commerce. Three basic principles guided this trade in goods: non-discrimination, transparency, and predictability. Simply put, the GATT was two things:

- (1) an international agreement, i.e. a document setting out the rules for conducting international trade, and
- (2) an international organization created later to support the agreement (WTO, 2002).

Over the last 50 years the GATT has helped to provide a strong and prosperous global trading system. This system was developed through a series of trade rounds, held under the auspices of the GATT. Early trade rounds were held in 1949, 1951, 1956, and from 1960-1961. These negotiations largely focused on efforts to reduce tariffs. Later rounds continued along this vein, but also went further. The Kennedy Round, lasting from 1964-1967, also resulted in an Anti-Dumping Agreement.

The Tokyo Round, from 1973-1979, attempted to address concerns over the increasing imposition of non-tariff barriers (NTBs). It was necessary to address the NTB issue as countries were agreeing to reductions in tariff barriers only to then increase non-tariff barriers. While the Tokyo Round proved modestly successful, it ended with mixed results as some of the weaknesses of the GATT system became more apparent. For example, during this round of negotiations, countries were unable to adequately address certain problems affecting the trade in agricultural goods and some issues relating to NTBs. 102 countries participated in the Tokyo Round.

The last round, the Uruguay Round, lasted from 1986-1994. Prior to 1986, it was becoming readily apparent that “the General Agreement was clearly no longer as relevant to the realities of world trade as it had been in the 1940s” (WTO, 2002). For one, world trade had become far more complex than it was during the 1940s, with trade in services becoming an increasingly important piece of the trade pie. Second, loopholes in the agricultural products trade portion of the GATT were being readily exploited and needed to be addressed. Third, “even GATT’s institutional structure and its dispute settlement system were giving cause for concern” (WTO, 2002). These and other issues led countries to realize that new negotiations of sweeping proportion were necessary. The result was the Uruguay Round. This round of negotiations not only led to the creation of the WTO, but also marked the most all-encompassing round of discussions to date with a focus on tariffs, non-tariff measures, rules, services, intellectual property, dispute settlement, textiles, and agriculture.

By 1994, and nearing the end of its run, the GATT had 123 contracting parties, or signatory states. China was an original contracting party, but this was under the auspices of the ruling Guomindang government of the time, which eventually fled to Taiwan after losing the civil war in 1949 and subsequently pulled out of GATT. It was not until July 11, 1986 that the mainland government applied to re-join as the internationally recognized legitimate rulers of all of China (including Taiwan). China was never readmitted to the GATT. GATT, the international agency, no longer exists. It has been subsumed and updated under the auspices of the World Trade Organization.

The World Trade Organization

The World Trade Organization grew out of the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations that ended in 1994. Based in Geneva, the Organization derives the majority of its annual budget from contributions from its 144 members, the share of which is based on each countries' share of international trade. The Secretariat has a staff of around 550 workers and had an annual budget of approximately 131 million Swiss Francs in 2001 (WTO, 2002). The WTO is headed by a Director-General (currently Dr. Supachai Panitchpakdi). The top decision-making body is the Ministerial Conference, which meets at least once every two years. The General Council is just below this and it is the top day-to-day decision making body. It meets several times a year in Geneva. Reporting to the General Council are the Goods Council, Services Council, and Intellectual Property Council. Below this level there are numerous specialized committees, working groups, and working parties that deal with individual agreements and other areas of concern. The WTO has more than 144 members with 30 others negotiating for membership. Together its members account for over 97% of world trade.

The WTO is “the only global international organization dealing with the rules of trade between nations. The goal is to help producers of goods and services, exporters, and importers conduct their business” (WTO, 2002). Its many functions include:

- Ensuring that trade follows as smoothly, predictably, and freely as possible;
- Administering WTO trade agreements;
- Serving as a forum for trade negotiations;
- Handling trade disputes;

- Monitoring national trade policies;
- Providing technical assistance and training for developing countries; and
- Cooperating with other international organizations.

The heart of the WTO is its agreements, negotiated and signed by the bulk of the world's trading nations and ratified in their parliaments. The GATT has been updated and is now a part of the WTO agreements. In addition to the GATT, WTO agreements include the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). GATS operates on a number of different levels: general principles and obligations; specific country commitments; and rules for specific sectors. The TRIPS agreements cover five broad issues: how the trading system's principles should be applied to intellectual property rights; how best to protect intellectual property rights, how to enforce the protection; how to settle disputes; and what should happen while the system is gradually being introduced (WTO, 2002). Generally speaking, these agreements:

...cover goods, services and intellectual property. They spell out the principles of liberalization, and the permitted exceptions. They include individual country commitments to lower customs tariffs and other trade barriers, and to open and keep open services markets. They set procedures for settling disputes. They prescribe special treatment for developing countries. They require governments to make their trade policies transparent (WTO, 2002).

It is also worth noting that a country can become a member as a developed country, or least-developed country. The WTO agreements contain special provisions for those countries that are allowed to join in this latter category. These provisions include: longer time periods to implement agreements and commitments; measures to increase their

trading opportunities; and support to help them build the infrastructure for WTO work, handle disputes, and implement technical standards. There is a specific committee in the WTO on trade and development as well as a subcommittee on least-developed countries that attempts to adequately address the needs of these members (WTO, 2002).

The WTO was established in 1995 and continues the work of providing a more stable and free international trading environment. Negotiations are constantly ongoing to address old and new concerns alike. For example, in 1997 an agreement was reached on telecommunications services that went above and beyond what was agreed to in the Uruguay Round. Also in 1997, various members concluded agreements for tariff-free trade in information technology products, while others concluded a financial services deal. Further, in 2000, new talks began on issues in the agricultural and services sectors. China applied to re-join the WTO on December 7, 1995 and was admitted to the WTO on December 11, 2001.

The International Atomic Energy Agency

The International Atomic Energy Agency was established as an autonomous organization under the United Nations in 1957. It is “the world’s foremost intergovernmental forum for scientific and technical cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear technology” (IAEA, 2002). The Agency’s broad spectrum of services, programmes, and activities is based on the needs of its 134 Member States. The IAEA is based in Vienna, Austria and has additional offices and laboratories in Canada, Geneva, New York, Tokyo, Monaco, and Italy. At the end of 2000, the IAEA had 2,173 staff members from 93 nations and operated with a budget of US\$230million in 2001 (IAEA, 2002). The Agency is headed by a Director-

General and the main bureaucratic departments include the Department of Technical Cooperation, the Department of Nuclear Energy, the Department of Nuclear Safety, the Department of Management, the Department of Nuclear Sciences and Applications, and the Department of Safeguards. The main policymaking apparatus is the General Conference, which meets once a year to deal with the ongoing activities of the IAEA, which include: considering the report of the Board of Governors; approving the budget; and approving any applications for membership. In addition, it conducts a wide-ranging discussion on the Agency's policies and programmes.

In carrying out its mandate, the Agency staff focuses its efforts in three areas, technology, safety, and verification. More specifically, "the Agency seeks to: act as a catalyst for the development and transfer of peaceful nuclear technologies; build and maintain a global nuclear safety regime; and assist in global efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons" (IAEA, 2002). The 2000 Annual report of the IAEA details the important subcategories within each of these areas. For example, in technology, the IAEA is concerned with: nuclear power around the world; nuclear fuel cycle and waste technology; the global climate change debate; advanced technologies and innovative designs; the maintenance of knowledge and competence; and applications of nuclear technologies. In the area of safety the Agency is concerned with such things as: the developments in nuclear safety in 2000; and the developments in radiation and radioactive waste safety in 2000. Finally, regarding verification, the IAEA is concerned with: the international non-proliferation disarmament scene; the implementation of safeguards agreements and additional protocols; integrated safeguards; new technologies; and the physical protection of nuclear material (IAEA Annual Report, 2000).

IAEA related treaties and conventions include the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). China applied to join the Agency on September 5, 1983 and became a member January 1, 1984.

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, more often referred to as the Non-Proliferation Treaty, was opened for signature in 1968 and entered into force in 1970. The Treaty grew out of a general concern in the UN, starting in 1946, about the problems raised by the discovery of atomic energy and in particular the use of nuclear weapons, following their use at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The NPT currently has 186 members, which amounts to most states, with the notable exceptions of Cuba, India, Israel, North Korea, and Pakistan.

The NPT is an international treaty (or multilateral institution) that has three main objectives based on two main principles. The first principle is that the peaceful application of nuclear energy should be made available to all parties. The second principle is that the spread of nuclear weapons undermines international peace and security. From these principles flow three main objectives. First, the NPT is intended to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology. Second, it promotes cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Finally, it works to achieve the goal of nuclear and conventional disarmament (United Nations, 2002).

Toward the goal of non-proliferation and as a confidence building measure, the Treaty has a system of safeguards under the responsibility of the International Atomic Energy Agency. These safeguards are used in an attempt to verify member compliance with the

Treaty. As a nuclear-weapon state under the NPT, China is not required to place its own nuclear materials and facilities under safeguard. However, it is obliged to require those that receive Chinese exports of nuclear material or equipment to place them under IAEA safeguards. This is the case whether or not the receiving country is a member of the NPT. Furthermore, the Treaty “promotes cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear technology and equal access to this technology for all States parties, while safeguards prevent the diversion of fissile material for weapons use” (United Nations, 2002).

The signatories to the Treaty meet every five years to review the operation of the Treaty, the last such meeting having taken place from April 24 to May 19, 2000 at the United Nations in New York City. The first of these review conferences took place in 1975 and had 91 participating countries. While there was serious debate regarding whether or not nuclear weapons states had done much regarding the elimination of nuclear weapons, in the end the parties in attendance agreed that the first five years demonstrated ready adherence to averting the further spread of nuclear weapons. The second conference was held in 1980, by which time there were 112 members. This conference did not go quite as well as the first, with members expressing very different opinions on the amount of progress being made toward the objectives of the treaty. Discussions were such that in the end participants were unable to issue a final document upon which all participant countries could agree. By 1985, the year of the third conference, membership participation had risen again, now to 131. This conference proved no less divisive than the one held in 1980, but it did result in a final declaration in which members declared their continued support for the objectives of the Treaty and for its essential nature in the continuation of peace and security in the international system. The 1990 review conference welcomed 140 members and

proved as divisive as previous meetings. Members were particularly concerned about the lack of movement toward disarmament among nuclear weapons states and the lack of any progress toward a comprehensive test-ban treaty. There was no final declaration. The 1995 conference had the dual task of reviewing the implementation of the Treaty (as all other such conferences had done) and deciding whether or not the Treaty should continue in force indefinitely. Membership now stood at 178. Again there was a great deal of contention over movement toward the objectives of the Treaty, but in the end members agreed to extend the Treaty indefinitely. The Review Conference of 2000, in which 187 members participated, reaffirmed member conviction of the importance of the Treaty for peace and security in the international system. China applied to join the Treaty on March 9, 1992.

The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty was adopted and opened for signature by the United Nations General Assembly on September 24, 1996. It was the culmination of a fifty-year effort to ban the testing of nuclear weapons in all environments, which included the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963 and the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968. As such, it is “a cornerstone of the international regime on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and an essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament” (CTBT, 2002). It is important to note that the Treaty has not yet entered into force. It will only do so after the 44 states that formally participated in the 1996 session of the Conference on Disarmament, which are those states that possess nuclear power or research reactors, ratify the Treaty. Both China and the United States have yet to ratify the CTBT.

While waiting for ratification, the States Signatories to the Treaty on November 19, 1996 have put into place the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization. This Commission carries out necessary preparations for the effective implementation of the Treaty, and prepares for the first session of the Conference of the States parties to the Treaty. The Commission's main task is "the establishment of the 337 facility international Monitoring System and the international Data Centre, and the development of operational manuals, including for on-site inspections" (CTBT, 2002).

After the Treaty enters into force the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization will attempt to ensure the implementation of the Treaty's provisions, including those for the international verification of compliance with it, and to provide a forum for consultation and cooperation among State Parties (United States State Department, 2002). This Organization will be based in Vienna, Austria and will be comprised of three main organs: the Conference of the States Parties; the Executive Council; and the Technical Secretariat. China signed the CTBT on September 24, 1996.

Section II: China's Decisions to Apply to Join Multilateral Economic Institutions

Chapter Four: China and the GATT

First, I will briefly discuss the various phases of China's involvement with the GATT; this includes first contact, isolation, reapplication, and negotiation. Second, I will present the three stage results of my research into the influences impacting China's decision to apply to rejoin the GATT.

Background

China's history of involvement with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade is long and complex. China was an original contracting party to the GATT in 1948. At the time, the ruling government that signed the GATT was the Guomindang, led by Chiang Kai-shek. This was the same government that the following year would lose the civil war with the Chinese Communist Party and flee to Taiwan. Subsequently, the Communist Party founded the People's Republic of China on October 1, 1949. Both governments considered themselves to be the legitimate rulers of all of China (mainland, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macao). When the members of the government that had signed the GATT fled to Taiwan, they took that commitment with them, but as a result of the instability that followed, promptly withdrew from the GATT in 1950.

The mainland government neither protested nor fought this withdrawal. It was deeply involved with establishing control in the mainland, while fighting the Korean War and positioning itself under the tutelage of the Soviet Union. In the 1960s, when China moved toward a policy of self-reliance, away from alliance with the Soviet Union, it still did not

express a desire to be a member of GATT. In fact, within the first few decades of establishing the PRC, the government vilified the international economic system (Economy and Oksenberg, 1999). Even after the UN accepted the mainland government as the legitimate ruler of all China in 1972, China did not immediately move to embrace the international community through such key international economic institutions as the GATT, World Bank, and International Monetary Fund.

China's change in policy toward multilateral institutions was gradual. China began to show an interest in participating in international economic institutions in 1980 when it resumed its seat on the UN's Interim Commission for the International Trade Organization (ICITO). Since the ICITO was responsible for appointing the GATT secretariat, this suggested that China was interested in aspects of the GATT. Also starting in 1980, China regularly sent its officials to participate in the commercial policy courses conducted by GATT (Oksenberg and Jacobson, 1990). Next, in 1981, China began to send observers to attend GATT meetings, gaining permanent observer status in 1984 (a standing that it held until it was admitted to the WTO in 2001). Attending these meetings would serve to "further China's understanding of the GATT activities and, therefore, facilitate a decision by the Chinese government on membership in GATT" (The Xinhua General Overseas News Service, 11/8/84). In the interim three years, China applied for membership in the Multi-Fibre Agreement under the auspices of the GATT and was accepted as a member of this Agreement in January 1984. This was seen as a preliminary step to China eventually joining the GATT (Financial Times, 8/19/83; The Economist, 1/18/86). Despite these efforts, we can clearly see a China still in the midst of a transition in thinking about multilateral economic institutions. For example, at a GATT meeting in November of 1982, Chinese

representative Pu Zhaomin, speaking in his capacity as an observer at the conference, expressed China's interest in further developing relations with GATT, while at the same time admonishing members to take into account demands from third world countries (Xinhua General Overseas News Service, 11/25/82). Here we see a China opening to the new, while continuing to fight for old and long supported causes. In September of 1983, China sent a five-man mission of senior officials to Geneva to meet with GATT's director-general, Arthur Dunkel, and 70 country missions in the city to continue "laying the groundwork...about an association with GATT (Financial Times, 9/9/83). Later in 1984, China invited Ake Linden, legal adviser to the director-general of GATT, to visit China and talk about GATT. He returned toward the end of 1985 to talk specifically about what would be involved in China's adherence to and full participation in the GATT. Arthur Dunkel also returned in January 1986.

The culmination of this interaction with the GATT occurred on July 11, 1986, when China applied to rejoin the GATT. In part, the document submitted said "The government of the People's Republic of China, recalling the fact that China was one of the original contracting parties to the GATT, has decided to seek the resumption of its status as a contracting party to the organization" (The Xinhua General Overseas News Service, 7/12/86). The Chinese position in applying to rejoin the GATT revolved around four basic principles. First, they were rejoining, not joining. The mainland government did not recognize the Taiwanese government's withdrawal from the Agreement in 1950 as valid and so China wanted to be accepted as an original contracting party. Second, China wanted to use a reduction in tariffs as a basis of negotiations. Third, China wanted to be admitted as a developing country. This would allow China longer periods of time to adjust

to the changes required by membership in the GATT as well as greater flexibility in its application. Finally, China wanted unconditional Most Favored Nation status to be part and parcel of its acceptance (Jacobson and Oksenberg, 1990).

The Chinese application to rejoin the GATT was only the beginning of the process of being readmitted. Being accepted would require major negotiations, both bilateral and multilateral, over the terms under which China would be readmitted. These negotiations would span the better part of fifteen years, at which time China would be accepted for membership into the entity that succeeded the GATT, the WTO. While the reasons are many for the length of negotiations, it can be at least partially understood by contrasting the U.S. position on China's acceptance with the Chinese position, previously stated. The U.S. wanted China: to commit to a single, consistent, effective, nationally applied trade policy; to increase transparency; to let prices reflect supply and demand; and to be admitted as a developed country (Jacobson and Oksenberg, 1990). This difference in positions marked the major boundary lines that would need to be crossed in order for China to be admitted. To this end the Working Group on China was established in March 1987 and met for the first time in October 1987.

At the same time as China was applying to rejoin the GATT and beginning negotiations, the member countries of GATT began to meet in the next round of trade negotiations. These negotiations were known as the Uruguay Round and they lasted from 1986-1994, the longest and most comprehensive of any such trade round since the original founding of the GATT. The result of these negotiations was a complete reassessment and updating of the GATT and its being subsumed under the rubric of the newly created World Trade Organization. As will be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter, China

applied to join the WTO December 7, 1995 and negotiations for its admittance continued until its acceptance in December of 2001.

Influences on China's Decision to Rejoin the GATT

What were the factors impacting China's decision to apply to rejoin the GATT? In the following I will discuss what my research suggests to be the most relevant influences to this decision at three levels of analysis: leadership, state-societal, and international. In so doing, I hope to begin to fill in the gaps in the literature suggested in earlier chapters, while at the same time finding support for or evidence against my hypotheses.

Leadership Level

The preliminary research of available English language resources suggested a number of different leadership factors as important to the GATT decision. First was the change in beliefs of the central leadership from those of communist stalwart Mao Zedong to the liberal economic thought of Deng Xiaoping. In fact, Pearson suggests that Deng Xiaoping was the one who sanctioned the decision in the mid-1980s to seek GATT membership (Pearson, 2001). She also notes that Zhao Ziyang may have played a key role. Under the guiding hand of Deng Xiaoping, Zhao Ziyang became China's Prime Minister, and carried on his legacy of opening. Named Premier in 1980 and General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party in 1987, Zhao Ziyang advocated economic liberalization and an open foreign policy. The initial decision to rejoin the GATT may have been heavily influenced by Zhao Ziyang and by Zhao's meetings with GATT Secretary Arthur Dunkel in 1986 (Pearson, 2001, p. 357).

Second, the dynamics of the relations among the leaders seemed to be important: although the views of Deng Xiaoping eventually triumphed, there existed dissenting voices in the discussion about applying to join the GATT (and WTO). It was the dominance within the Chinese leadership of reformers committed to the open door policy that swung the decision in favor of rejoining (Pearson, 1999). In China all decisions are funneled through the upper reaches of the Chinese leadership hierarchy, what Pearson calls the middle and the top (Pearson, 2001).

As my research continued into stage two, including interviews and research using Chinese language materials, these original assumptions were largely borne out. These second stage undertakings solidified the idea that leadership variables had to be broken down into two categories: dominant individual, and group influences. The dominant individual playing a role in China's decision was Deng Xiaoping. The group influence came from a liberal group of leaders looking to continue opening to the outside world.

Deng Xiaoping was the guiding light in the opening of the Chinese economy in the late-70s and in all subsequent moves to open and liberalize the Chinese economy. His voice was crucial to China's deciding to apply to rejoin the GATT.¹⁸ Roughly from the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949, China's economy was based on a grand vision of socialism with Chinese characteristics. In a China at the time weakened by years of international and civil war, it was not surprising that the leaders opted for policies of maximum control and political organization and economic planning that benefited from close alliance with the Soviet Union (Riskin, 1991). By the late-1950s, almost all private industry had been abolished and the state found itself having to plan and manage most of the

complex networks of interactions that made up the economy. This practice continued through to the mid-1970s with a particular focus on self-reliance following the dissolution of relations with the Soviets in the early-1960s. The tide against such economic practices only began in earnest following a number of important events. The most important was the elevation of Deng Xiaoping in January 1975 at the Second Plenum of the Tenth Central Committee and the subsequent Fourth National People's Congress at which he was made a vice-chairman of the Party, a member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo, and the first Vice-Premier of the State Council. As a result, he was number three in line behind Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai. With Mao still alive at this time, Deng presided over the preparation of a number of documents that mapped out major changes in China's economic future (Riskin, 1991). These documents undertook a comprehensive attack on the "left" in China that had been responsible for the disastrous political and economic policies of the Cultural Revolution. An equally important event was the death of Mao in 1976 and the arrest immediately thereafter of his principal followers.

With Mao's death and the arrest of the Gang of Four, Deng was able to consolidate power and in his push for change, his first priority was to reform the Chinese economy so as to improve people's standard of living. In an effort to solidify his position of power and make reforms more palatable, Deng spoke of "four cardinal principles" which were at the heart of Mao's ideology. Any reform measure was acceptable so long as it did not call into question the leadership of the Party, the dictatorship of the proletariat, the correctness of Marxism-Leninism, or the goal of socialism (Starr, 1997, p.79). By the early-1980s, China's economy was operating in ways that would have seemed impossible just a few

¹⁸Interview with former official, July 2001; Interview with expert from the Pudong Institute for the U.S. Economy, November 2001; and Interview with official from the Shanghai Academy of Social

years before. Deng Xiaoping was the driving force behind these reforms and he was the driving leadership level force behind the decision to apply to rejoin the GATT, another piece in the puzzle of continued reform and growth in the Chinese economy.¹⁹

However, Deng Xiaoping was not the only key person. The leadership (plural) wanted to continue opening to the world. They realized that China could not develop by itself, it needed the rest of the world (Interview with expert from the Pudong Institute for the U.S. Economy, November 2001). This factor stems from the discussion above of Mao and Deng and China's opening to the outside world and expands it to include the leaders beyond Deng and their views. Coming out of the Cultural Revolution, the leadership was split on which economic path to follow. On the one side were Deng Xiaoping and his supporters, advocating economic reform and opening to the outside world. On the other side were the leftists, who believed that the existing organs of party and state were still permeated by 'representatives of the bourgeoisie'. The reformers won out when in 1978 the Ten Year Plan announced by Hua Guofeng attacked the policies of the past as having caused large-scale economic losses. Huge increases in agricultural output, trade, and retail sales from 1978-1985 led to a continued belief by the leadership that further growth and opening to the outside world was both positive and necessary. The leadership realized that China could not develop by itself. It realized that China needed the rest of the world to continue rapid development and that joining the GATT was one way to perpetuate that interaction and growth. Dominance of such thinkers within the Chinese leadership was crucial to the decision.

Sciences, November 2001.

¹⁹Interview with former official, July 2001; Interview with expert from the Pudong Institute for the U.S. Economy, November 2001; and Interview with official from the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, November 2001.

In sum, the picture presented at stages one and two is that of a decision impacted at the leadership level by both individual leaders and the group. In the early to mid-1980s Deng Xiaoping developed as preeminent decision maker in China with an inclination toward opening China to the outside world. One way he found to further open China was through applying to rejoin the GATT. While there existed those in the leadership who may not have desired that China rejoin the GATT, the overall mood in the leadership pointed China toward increased openness; in this case toward GATT membership. Overall, there was little difference in suggested influences at these first two stages.

The influences uncovered in the first two methodological stages were followed in the third stage by a survey, or what was referred to as a “confirmation form” to those people previously interviewed to get further information on the validity of variables, to allow interviewees to add anything they might not have mentioned previously and to help in devising a system of ranking for impacting factors.

As we can see from Table 4.1, the respondents seem to confirm Deng Xiaoping’s importance to China’s decision to rejoin the GATT. Five experts and three generalists marked this influence as very important, while the other two generalists marked it as important and somewhat important. The leadership (plural) also appears to have played a vital role with four experts and two generalists marking this influence as very important, while two generalists marked important, and one generalist marked somewhat important.

Table 4.1 GATT: Leadership Influences Raw Data

GATT									
<u>Leadership</u>	<u>Influences</u>	<u>Number of Expert Responses for Each Category¹</u>				<u>Number of Generalist Responses for Each Category¹</u>			
		0	1	2	3	0	1	2	3
DOMINANT INDIVIDUAL	DENG Xiaoping was the guiding light in the opening of the Chinese economy in the late-70s and in all subsequent moves to open and liberalize the Chinese economy. His voice was crucial to China deciding to apply to rejoin the GATT.	-	-	-	5	-	1	1	3
GROUP INFLUENCES	The leadership (plural) wanted to continue opening to the world. They realized that China could not develop by itself, it needed the rest of the world.	-	-	-	4	-	1	2	2

¹ 3=very important; 2=important; 1=somewhat important; and 0=unimportant

Table 4.2 takes the raw data from Table 4.1 and converts it to provide us with a score showing the importance of these influences. How we determine this score is worth repeating in this first case study. To determine this score, each categorization was assigned a corresponding numerical value according to the following:

- Very important = 3;
- Important = 2;
- Somewhat important = 1; and
- Unimportant = 0

We then multiplied this number by either 1.0 (expert) or 0.75 (generalist) to determine the weighted score.²⁰ So, for example, with five experts replying that the influence of Deng Xiaoping was very important, our total weighted score for expert responses is 15

²⁰Expert responses received full weighting while the responses of generalists are considered slightly less important and so are weighted lower.

($5 \times 3 = 15$).²¹ In the same vein, with three generalists responding very important ($3 \times 3 \times .75 = 6.75$), one important ($2 \times .75 = 1.5$) and one somewhat important ($1 \times .75 = .75$), our total weighted score for generalist responses is 9.²² The weighted score for each is then combined (in this case 24) and divided by the number of respondents (in this case 10) to get the average. This weighted score was further ranked as very important, important, somewhat important, or unimportant, according to the following ranges:

- Very important: 2.25-3.0
- Important: 1.5-2.24
- Somewhat impt. .75-1.49
- Unimportant Below .75

Thus, we can see that according to our respondents, both Deng Xiaoping and the group leadership were very important influences in China's decision to apply to rejoin the GATT (Deng more than the group).

²¹Confirmation forms were sent to thirteen experts in each case study. Not everyone rated each factor.

²²Confirmation forms were sent to eight generalists for each case study. Not everyone rated each factor.

Table 4.2 GATT: Leadership Influences, Weighted and Overall Importance Scores

<u>GATT</u>				
<u>Leadership</u>	<u>Influences</u>	<u>Expert Response Combined Weighted Score</u> ¹	<u>Generalist Response Combined Weighted Score</u> ¹	<u>Overall Score (Ranking)</u> ²
DOMINANT INDIVIDUAL	DENG Xiaoping was the guiding light in the opening of the Chinese economy in the late-70s and in all subsequent moves to open and liberalize the Chinese economy. His voice was crucial to China deciding to apply to rejoin the GATT.	15	9	2.4 (VI)
GROUP INFLUENCES	The leadership (plural) wanted to continue opening to the world. They realized that China could not develop by itself, it needed the rest of the world.	12	8.25	2.25 (VI)

¹Combined Weighted Score equals the sum of responses (numerical values) in each category (Table 4.1) times the relevant multiple (Expert response, multiple 1.0; Generalist response, multiple 0.75).

²Overall Score equals the sum of the weighted scores (expert and generalist) divided by the total number of respondents for each factor (Table 4.1).

Ranking: Very important: 2.25-3.0; Important: 1.5-2.24; Somewhat important: .75-1.49; Unimportant: Below .75

State-Societal Level

State-societal factors can be separated into categories: those dealing with the economy, those having to do with both the traditional and the extended Chinese bureaucracy, and public opinion. Initial efforts to determine the influences at the state-societal level led to a list that included the State Council, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), and the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC). The State Council is the highest bureaucratic organ of State power, responsible for carrying out the principles and policies of the Communist Party, and under which all other ministers and ministries sit (Jacobson and Oksenberg, 1990). Second, while their degree of influence and areas of jurisdiction have changed over time, the MFA and MOFTEC are the main forces in the bureaucratic chain of command dealing with GATT issues (Yang, 1995; Pearson, 2001).

In addition to these “traditional” bureaucratic entities, various government affiliated scientific institutions and strategic research organizations, as well as universities are beginning to play a potentially influential role in China despite the continued authoritarian nature of the political system. Specifically, the Institute of International Studies (IIS), the Institute for Contemporary International Relations, the China Institute of International Strategic Studies, and the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) are relevant foreign affairs research institutes (Lu Ning, 1997, pp. 130-135). Certain academic institutions: the College of Foreign Affairs, the College of International Relations, Beijing University, the People’s University, and Fudan University are also relevant sources of influence. These research institutes and academic institutions produce commissioned reports, personally brief leaders, participate in ad hoc groups, and publish on independent topics of scholarly interest. Public opinion is also beginning to exercise some influence. It plays a role directly and indirectly through rural and urban unrest or the activities of disgruntled urban intellectuals and business elites. In this way, the Chinese government assesses the needs of the Chinese people even though the democratic channels common in other societies might be absent.

This combination of traditional (State Council and ministries) and non-traditional (research institutes and academics) might well be categorized using Margaret Pearson’s idea of an “influential periphery” as an important consideration in China’s decision to join the GATT (Pearson, 2001). In this periphery, Pearson suggests that there are three players: economic commissions of the central government; industrial sectors; and provincial and local governments. Industrial bureaus, ministries, and corporations are

suggested to have impacted the decision to apply to join the GATT when negotiations directly impinged upon their business interests (Pearson, 2001).

Again turning to Margaret Pearson for guidance in categorizing these relevant factors, she suggests that the organizational structure for GATT/WTO decision making has a core backbone consisting of three levels: the bottom; the middle; and the top. At the bottom of this hierarchy is MOFTEC, which was largely responsible for China's day-to-day interaction with GATT. While receiving basic guidance from higher levels, MOFTEC was responsible for determining the specific implications of this guidance. Additionally, MOFTEC collected reports and analyses from research institutes relevant to the decision to apply to join. Finally, and while reporting all of this information up to the higher levels, MOFTEC was responsible for coordinating China's position with all other interested domestic bureaus and industries. As it was MOFTEC's responsibility to promote Chinese growth and trade, it is believed that its representatives were largely in favor of China's reapplying to join the GATT (Pearson, 1999).

In stage two, Chinese sources recommended some of the above-mentioned influences, discarded some, and added a number of others. With respect to applying to rejoin the GATT, the factors mentioned by Chinese sources at this level include: the formulation of a national strategy of strategic development; concern about a growing Chinese trade deficit; reports from various ministries to the State Council; the dominant role played by MOFTEC; the role played by the MFA; the role of research institutes; and personnel issues. With regard to public opinion the *lack* of public opposition played an indirect role.

With respect to the economy, China's need for continued economic development/economic reform was brought up repeatedly in the course of interviews and

was referenced in many Chinese books and articles.²³ In this view, China's decision to apply to rejoin the GATT was all part of a national strategy of strategic development.²⁴ In 1978, two years after the death of Mao, which allowed for a dramatic shift from the former concentration on self-reliance and strict adherence to a planned economy, China launched what would become known as its reform and opening (*gaige kaifang*). The beginnings of this change in policy were first implemented in the countryside, where the household responsibility system (*jiating zeren zhidu*) was put into place. Until this time, the Chinese countryside was organized into large collective enterprises called communes. Compensation within the commune system was based on work points with these points assigned based on the difficulty of the task, the capability of the worker, and the amount of time spent at work (Starr, 1997, p.117). Under the new system, Chinese farmers were required to provide the state with a set amount of a given commodity. However, anything above and beyond that set amount the household was free to dispose of as it chose; for personal consumption, barter, or sale. This proved to be a major boon to agricultural production, which experienced average annual increases of 3.6% in the total amount of grain produced between 1970-1977, but which saw average annual increases of 5.5% in the seven years following the introduction of the household responsibility system (Starr, 1997, p.119). Total income also showed impressive gains in these timeframes, increasing

²³Interview with former official, MOFTEC, July 2001; Interview with professor, Beijing University, July 2001; Interview with MOFTEC official, July 2001; Interview with official, SASS, November 2001; Interview with official, WTO Affairs Consultation Center, July 2001; Interview with official, MOFTEC, November 2001.

²⁴See Fangwei Hongfeng, "Ruguan hou Woguo Gongye Mianlin de Tiaozhan Jiqi Duici." [After Joining the GATT the Choices Faced by Chinese Industry and its Countermeasures]. *Zhongguo Wujia*. [China's Prices] 1/1993. In *Waimao Jingji, Guoji Maoyi* [Economy of Foreign Trade and International Trade] 1 (1999): 40-43; Jun Wang "Lun Woguo Huifu Guan Mao Zong Xieding Diyueguo Diwei Yu Fandui Xin Maoyi Baohu zhuyi de Douzheng." [Discussing China Resuming GATT Status and Opposing the New Trade Protectionism Struggle]. *Henan Xuebao* [Henan Journal] 1/1993. In *Waimao Jingji, Guoji Maoyi* [Economy of Foreign Trade and International

from 3.1% to 13.9%, respectively a very important factor in a country where 75-80% of the population lives in the countryside (Starr, 1997, p. 119). Such success served as an incentive to further reforms in China's urban areas (Starr, 1997, p.119).

Urban reforms were admittedly much more difficult to implement and control than those enacted in the countryside. These reforms were initially enacted on an experimental basis beginning in 1979, but only in selected areas of the country. It was not until 1984, when the agricultural reforms had successfully taken root and the limited urban experiments seemed to be bearing fruit, that more detailed urban reforms were enacted. These urban reforms, outlined in a document adopted by the Third Plenum of the Twelfth Central Committee in October 1984, set out to change three key relationships for state-owned enterprises: their relations with the state (less dependence), with employees (introduce incentives and phase out the lifetime tenure system), and with customers (enterprises were given new authority to determine their products prices) (Starr, 1997, p.137).

As suggested by China's Minister of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation, Shi Guangsheng, China's application to rejoin the GATT was a further extension of these reforms, part and parcel of a national strategy of strategic development ("Jiaru Shimao yu Gaige Kaifang Mudiao Yizhi," 8/3/99). In fact, one can argue that China's first foreign policy priority has been the pursuit of policies that promote China's economic development (Zhongguo de WTO Zhilu, 1999, p. 21). China has focused a large piece of its economic development on foreign trade and investment. Thus, rejoining GATT would help increase both imports and exports, by opening China's market and products to the

Trade] 2 (1993): 56-62; and Zhongguo de WTO Zhi Lu, [China's WTO Path], (Guangdong Economic Publications, 1999).

outside world (Wang Jun, 1993, p. 59). Part of this would be increased access for Chinese goods to foreign markets and at the privileged rates afforded member nations. Also, membership would mean increased foreign investment in China, a further engine for growth.

Also mentioned as an economic influence was China's trade deficit, which was still high at the time, approximately US\$1.73 billion in 1984 (Riskin, 1991, p.317). Some believe that China applied to rejoin the GATT, to rectify this situation (Interview with official, CASS, November 2001). There are those who believe that China's concern with this trade deficit impacted its decision to apply to rejoin, in the hope that membership would allow greater access for Chinese goods abroad.

On the issue of traditional and non-traditional bureaucratic influences, several factors came out during the course of interviews. For example, more and more reports on GATT (both positive and negative) were being sent to the State Council by various ministries under its control, over the years. All ministries were concerned about competition from foreign goods or loss of power (Interview with former MOFTEC official, July 2001). These reports might come from any number of different places: the ministry itself, the research institute affiliated with the ministry, or an academic institution.

Another interviewee suggested that the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC), specifically, was the most important player in this decision and it was largely in favor of China joining (Interview with MOFTEC official, November 2001). This confirms the stage one perspective that ideas started with MOFTEC and then went to the leaders.

Three other non-traditional bureaucratic factors were also mentioned during my interviews. First, it was suggested that China's research institutes were increasingly

important after 1979 and that they were equally important to the decision of China to apply to rejoin the GATT (Interview with official, Pudong Institute for the U.S. Economy, November 2001). Following the open door policies China enacted in the late-1970s, greater freedom to conduct research was also granted to research institutes. As a result, research institutes became increasingly influential in their capacity to produce commissioned reports, to personally brief leaders, to participate in ad hoc groups, and to publish on independent topics of their own scholarly interest.

Second, the personnel that China needed to both understand the GATT and to deal with China/GATT interaction were finally being put into place as of 1986. Prior to this time, China would have been ill-equipped, from a personnel point-of-view, to rejoin the GATT (Interview with official, CASS, November 2001). This factor is a matter of numbers, which unfortunately, are not readily available. When China opened its doors to the rest of the world in the late-1970s, there was little in the way of expertise in either the traditional or non-traditional bureaucracy on multilateral institutions generally and the GATT, specifically. As regards the traditional bureaucracy, it was not until 1982 that China's trade administration was reorganized to create the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade (MOFERT), which was charged with dealing with GATT. Later in 1984, these responsibilities were given over to the newly formed MOFTEC, which would serve to largely take over the duties of MOFERT. Thus, the government had to basically create a structure in the 1980s to deal with the GATT and other key international economic organizations. In 1985, an interagency working group on the GATT was formed between the Bank of China, MOFERT, and the State Council (Jacobson and Oksenberg, 1990, p.

147). As the CASS official noted, therefore, it was only after the structure was established that China could think about rejoining.

In addition to the lack of expertise in the formal institutional structure there was a lack of relevant and qualified researchers attributable to the aftereffects of the Cultural Revolution. The Cultural Revolution was an attempt by Mao to once again reconstruct China from the ground up, instilling the revolutionary zeal of his youth in the youth of contemporary China in an effort to root out capitalist thought. It began in 1964, emerging in full force in the summer of 1965 with the establishment of the Red Guards; high school, college and other youths organized to attack and depose all those taking the capitalist path (Schrecker, 1991). The Cultural Revolution lasted until 1976. During Mao's time and particularly during the Cultural Revolution, primary and secondary instruction was heavily laden with political lessons. But it was the postsecondary level of education that was hit the hardest during the Cultural Revolution and is most relevant to this discussion. During the Cultural Revolution, the vast majority of these institutions were closed down. In 1960 there were close to one million university students in China, but in 1970 there were but 48,000 enrolled (Starr, 1997, p. 222). In addition, those who were enrolled during the Cultural Revolution and in the early years after its end were admitted based upon their class background and political attitude with little consideration given to what they were interested in studying. Thus, China lost a generation of potential economists and specialists, which it could only begin to replace in the early to mid-1980s.

Finally, some believe that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) was the most powerful actor in this area (Interview with professor, People's University, November 2001). The logic behind this suggestion is similar to that mentioned for MOFTEC, that, in fact, it was

the MFA that was responsible for carrying out all of the aforementioned duties with regard to China's application to rejoin the GATT.

During the course of discussions on societal issues, one factor mentioned was the lack of public opposition to China's applying to rejoin GATT; people knew little about the GATT (Interview with former official, MOFTEC, July 2001). While popular opinion outside of China might suggest that public opinion has little or no role to play in Chinese foreign policy, there are those who believe that public opinion can influence policy in China.²⁵ So, for example, public opinion can impact policy by, first, urban or rural unrest, and second, opposition from urban intellectuals and business elites. In the case of the GATT, a lack of public opposition at least provided Chinese leaders with indirect support.

Unlike the leadership level, the influences uncovered in the second stage of research at the state-societal level of analysis do not quite match those found in the first stage. With regard to leadership, we found matching sentiments among both English and Chinese resources. At the state-societal level we see some level of overlap with regard to bureaucratic factors (State Council, MOFTEC, MFA, and research institutes), but we also find new economic (development and trade deficit), bureaucratic (personnel) and societal (little public opposition) influences mentioned.

The overlapping and the new factors were included in the stage three confirmation form, as I attempted to determine the importance of all state-societal level influences. The raw data and weighted ranking of influences are presented in Tables 4.3 and 4.4, respectively. The picture these tables present is of a decision influenced most importantly

²⁵ Although not specifically mentioned vis-à-vis GATT, for example see Margaret Pearson, "The Case of China's Accession to GATT/WTO," in *The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform, 1978-2000*, ed. David M. Lampton (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001).

(the only influence ranked at the very important level) by an urgent need for continued economic development and reform. Rejoining the GATT would help further these goals, which were all part of a national strategy of development. Other factors were important (range 1.5-2.24), including the lack of public opposition, the role of MOFTEC, and the role of research institutes. Also playing a role and defined by respondents as “somewhat important,” were reports sent to the State Council and the issue of personnel. Trade deficits and the MFA appear to have played no role, in the eyes of respondents.

Table 4.3 GATT: State-societal Influences Raw Data

GATT									
State-Societal	Influences	Number of Expert Responses for Each Category¹				Number of Generalist Responses for Each Category¹			
		0	1	2	3	0	1	2	3
ECONOMY	China needed continued economic development/economic reform. Joining GATT would help exports (partly by reducing the tariffs of other countries for China). It was all part of a national strategy of strategic development.	-	-	1	3	-	-	2	3
	China's trade deficit was still high at the time. China believed that by joining the GATT, exports would rapidly increase, thereby closing this trade deficit.	3	-	-	-	1	2	1	1
TRADITIONAL/ NON- TRADITIONAL BUREAUCRACY	More and more reports on GATT were sent to the State Council (both positive and negative). All ministries were concerned about competition from foreign goods or loss of power.	-	2	1	1	-	3	2	-
	The Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC) was the most important player in the bureaucracy and it was largely in favor of China joining. Ideas started with MOFTEC and then went to the leaders.	-	1	2	2	-	-	4	1
	The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) had all the power in this area.	2	1	-	-	2	2	1	-
	Research institutes were very important after 1979. They were important to the decision of China to apply to rejoin the GATT.	1	1	-	2	-	1	4	-
	The personnel that China needed to both understand the GATT and to deal with China/GATT interaction were now in place. Prior to this time, China would have been ill-equipped, from a personnel point-of-view, to join the GATT.	2	-	-	2	-	1	3	1
SOCIETY	There existed little public opposition to China's applying to rejoin GATT as people knew little about the GATT.	-	1	-	3	-	1	1	-

¹3=very important; 2=important; 1=somewhat important; and 0=unimportant

Table 4.4 GATT: State-societal Influences, Weighted and Overall Importance Scores

GATT				
<u>State-Societal</u>	<u>Influences</u>	<u>Expert Response Combined Weighted Score¹</u>	<u>Generalist Response Combined Weighted Score¹</u>	<u>Overall Score (Ranking)²</u>
ECONOMY	China needed continued economic development/ economic reform. Joining GATT would help exports (partly by reducing the tariffs of other countries for China). It was all part of a national strategy of strategic development.	11	9.75	2.31 (VI)
SOCIETY	There existed little public opposition to China's applying to rejoin GATT as people knew little about the GATT.	10	2.25	2.04 (I)
TRADITIONAL BUREAUCRACY	The Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC) was the most important player in the bureaucracy and it was largely in favor of China joining. Ideas started with MOFTEC and then went to the leaders.	11	8.25	1.93 (I)
NON-TRADITIONAL BUREAUCRACY	Research institutes were very important after 1979. They were equally important to the decision of China to apply to rejoin the GATT.	7.0	6.75	1.53 (I)
TRADITIONAL BUREAUCRACY	More and more reports on GATT were sent to the State Council (both positive and negative). All ministries were concerned about competition from foreign goods or loss of power.	7.0	5.25	1.36 (SI)

Table 4.4 (continued)

<u>State-Societal</u>	<u>Influences</u>	<u>Expert Response Combined Weighted Score</u> ¹	<u>Generalist Response Combined Weighted Score</u> ¹	<u>Overall Score (Ranking)</u> ²
TRADITIONAL BUREAUCRACY	The personnel that China needed to both understand the GATT and to deal with China/GATT interaction were now in place. Prior to this time, China would have been ill-equipped, from a personnel point-of-view, to join the GATT.	6	5.25	1.25 (SI)
ECONOMY	China's trade deficit was still high at the time. China believed that by joining the GATT, exports would rapidly increase, thereby closing this trade deficit.	0	5.25	.66 (UI)
TRADITIONAL BUREAUCRACY	The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) had all the power in this area.	1	3	.50 (UI)

¹Combined Weighted Score equals the sum of responses (numerical values) in each category (Table 4.3) times the relevant multiple (Expert response, multiple 1.0; Generalist response, multiple 0.75).

²Overall Score equals the sum of the weighted scores (expert and generalist) divided by the total number of respondents for each factor (Table 4.3).

Ranking: Very important: 2.25-3.0; Important: 1.5-2.24; Somewhat important: .75-1.49; Unimportant: Below .75

International Level

At the international level, a number of external events/trends came under consideration in our initial analysis. These included: a reduction in global resistance to Chinese admission, the worldwide recession of the early-1980s, and the trade protectionism of the 1980s. First, following China's admission to the UN in 1972 and in particular the normalization of relations with the United States in 1979 there was a lessening of international opposition to China regaining its seat in the GATT (Liaowang Overseas Edition, 1986). Second, as a result of the worldwide recession of the early-1980s many countries took an inward turn in their relations with other countries. This was difficult for a China that had just a few years

earlier begun to grow its economy through trade. As a result, China began to consider the possibility of joining the GATT as a way of guarding against such protectionism through the GATT's open trading system (Zhao Quansheng, 1996).

Further inquiries into the relevance of international factors at stage two suggested a somewhat more complex picture than found only in stage one, with factors divisible into two categories: first, status variables that deal with how a country is viewed by the outside world; second, the impact of the regional or global environment on China's decision. With respect to applying to rejoin the GATT those influences mentioned during the course of interviews or uncovered in the Chinese literature include: improving China's image (status); visits from GATT, World Bank, and International Monetary Fund officials; desire to access the GATT's Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSM) and to be granted Most Favored Nation (MFN) status; the fact that most of China's trading partners were members of the GATT; an international environment accepting of China (as in stage one); reports from China's Geneva working group that were sent back to the government; and pressure from the United States. The impact of the global recession was not mentioned.

As regards status, the idea that China was influenced internationally by a need to improve its image as a responsible member in the international system was mentioned on numerous occasions and referenced in numerous Chinese publications.²⁶ As a result of its near thirty year absence (1949-1979) from multilateral institutions, and its adherence to Communist ideology, China suffered, and to some degree still suffers, from image problems. With its lack of involvement during that period and only gradual increase in involvement in

²⁶Guanyu Woguo Jiaru Shimao Zuzhi de Ruogan Wenti, [Regarding the Problems of China Entering the WTO] (People's Publishing House, 2000); Zhongguo de WTO Zhi Lu, [China's WTO Path] (Guangdong Economic Publications, 1999); Interview with former official, MOFTEC, July

the following years, China was an outsider. This outsider status prevented China from being readily accepted as a full-fledged participant in international activities. Furthermore, even after China joined the UN and increased its level of participation in multilateral institutions other countries expressed concern about China's adherence to and implementation of the rules and regulations of these multilateral institutions. So to some extent, China continued to be seen as an irresponsible member of the international community. Also, in an age of increasing democratization and marketization, China stood as one of the last bastions of communist ideology in a liberalizing world. By applying to rejoin the GATT, China would perhaps overcome these image issues, incorporating itself into the most important trade related global institution and committing itself to adherence to the rules and regulations of this body, a commitment that was important for a country that was still in the process of breaking from its planned economic policies before making a full commitment to a market economy with Chinese characteristics.

In addition to this concern over status, interviewees also mentioned the influence of visits from World Bank and International Monetary Fund personnel in the early-1980s (Interview with official, CASS, November 2001; Interview with professor, People's University, November 2001). It is suggested that these visits and the expertise provided served to persuade Deng Xiaoping and Zhao Ziyang of the need to apply to rejoin. Specifically, toward the end of 1984, China invited Ake Linden, legal adviser to the director-general of GATT, to visit China and talk about the purpose, structure, and function of GATT ("Seminar on GATT Closes in Beijing," 2/25/84). He returned toward the end of 1985 to talk specifically about what would be involved in China's adherence to and full participation in

2001; Interview with official, Consul General's office of the People's Republic of China, New York, July 2001; Interview with professor, Beijing University, Summer 2001.

the GATT. Arthur Dunkel, the director-general of GATT, did the same in January 1986 (Zhonguo de WTO Zhilu, 1999). Such interaction with international actors is at least partly responsible for what Samuel Kim calls the emergence of epistemic communities of similarly interested experts, not only internally, but also between Chinese experts and people from other countries (Kim, 1999, p.79).

Third, as China was not an active member of GATT it had no recourse against the anti-dumping policies of other countries. Joining GATT would give China access to its dispute settlement mechanisms (Interview with official, SASS, November 2001). As suggested earlier, prior to the 1980s, China's exports were minimal (\$7.1 billion in 1975) in relation to its population, with most goods going to other communist countries (Riskin, 1991, p.322). After the opening of the economy in the late-1970s, China slowly began to move away from a planned economy and to rapidly increase its production and exports to other countries. Soon, Western nations replaced the communist nations as China's biggest export markets. However, China stood at the mercy of these markets in any trade disputes that arose over time or in the implementation of tariffs or nontariff barriers against Chinese goods (Hongfeng Fangwei, 1993). As a result, China viewed the Dispute Settlement Mechanism of the GATT as a way to provide legitimacy to Chinese concerns. The DSM would serve as protection for Chinese goods against the possibility of discriminatory trade practices by its trading partners (Wu Wenjun, 1993).

Closely related to China's concern over anti-dumping issues and access to the Dispute Settlement Mechanism was China's concern with Most Favored Nation (MFN) status, which would be granted to China by all countries if it became a member. One of the Chinese conditions for joining the GATT was its demand to receive MFN status from the U.S. and

other countries as a member of GATT (Wang Jun, 1993; Zhongguo de WTO Zhilu, 1999, p. 21).

Fourth, the fact that most of China's trading partners were members of GATT may also have led China to seriously consider the benefits of membership (Wu Wenjun, 1993). When China looked around the region and globe in the 1980s and as it continued to open its economy to the outside, it saw a world in which its traditional trading partners were rapidly being replaced by countries from the market-driven West. Globally, Western countries were replacing the eastern-bloc as China's main trading partners. Regionally, the other countries of East and Southeast Asia, led by Japan and Hong Kong were increasingly replacing the former interaction China had with the Soviet Union and North Korea. With this realization came the understanding that the majority of these new trading partners were members of the GATT. Furthermore, it did not take long to realize that as a result of their membership in GATT, these countries held privileged trading status (i.e. lower tariff rates and access to a dispute settlement mechanism) with other member countries; a status that China did not hold as a non-member. This led China to consider the benefits of joining the GATT. Believing these benefits to be greater than the cost, China applied to rejoin (Interview with professor, People's University, November 2001).

Also mentioned in interviews was the accepting nature of the international environment, which prior to 1972 would not have even considered China for acceptance (Interview with former official, MOFTEC, July 2001). As previously discussed, from 1949-1971, prior to the PRC's recognition by the United Nations, China would not have been accepted into organizations such as the GATT. Between 1971-1986 and China's decision to apply to rejoin GATT, we see a steady increase in China's interaction with multilateral institutions.

This suggests two things. One, it suggests an increased interest on the part of China in participating. Two, it suggests a greater level of acceptance of Chinese participation in such institutions. From either perspective, after UN entry and near universal recognition of the mainland government, the international environment was such that China could now participate in most multilateral institutions, if it so chose.

In addition, China's Geneva working group gave advice to the government on what China needed to do to become a member of GATT. This gave China greater confidence in its abilities to meet the requirements of membership (Interview with official, MOFTEC, July 2001). China began to attend meetings of the GATT in 1981 as an observer. In 1984, China was granted permanent observer status. Attending GATT meetings allowed the Chinese delegation to have a deeper insight into the functioning of GATT and what would be required by China to rejoin. This was important for a country that had largely been cut off from market-driven economies and organizations of the West for the better part of two generations. China was faced not only with a lack of knowledge about the functioning of the GATT and what would be required of China, but also a lack of personnel to deal with these issues. The reports from abroad helped to address these shortcomings.

Finally, it was suggested that China was being pressured by the United States and other countries to apply to rejoin the GATT, and play by the rules of the international economic system (Interview with former official, MOFTEC, July 2001; and Interview with official, WTO Affairs Consultation Center, November 2001). Furthermore, in the early-1980s, GATT made overtures to China to join. The flip-side of China's interest in joining due to its desire to be seen as a responsible member of the international community, is the pressure placed on China to join by the United States and other Western powers. While

this may have been more the case for China's decision to apply to join the WTO, it has also been suggested as a method the West used vis-à-vis the GATT to help make China into a more responsible and consistent member of the international community. In addition, GATT's acceptance of China as an observer and then permanent observer nation, as well as China's acceptance into the Multifiber Arrangement²⁷, can be seen as indicative of GATT overtures to move China along the path to readmission.

Stage two analysis at the international level thus results in one overlapping influence and many new factors. The overlapping international influence is a more accepting international environment. Among the newly mentioned influences are: concerns about China's image; desire for dispute settlement recourse against anti-dumping policies and a related desire to receive MFN status from other countries; visits from outside experts; the influence of China's Geneva working group; the fact that most of China's trading partners were members; and pressure from the United States. To determine the relevance of these influences, I now turn to stage three and the results from confirmation forms.

The overall picture presented by the data in Tables 4.5 and 4.6 is one of a decision impacted internationally by factors considered slightly less important than at either the leadership or state-societal level of analysis. None of the influences fall into our "very important" ranking. However, China's desire to improve its status in the international community, the fact that most of its trading partners were members, and the impact of international experts were all "important." The impact of the anti-dumping policies of other countries, a more accepting international environment, the efforts of China's Geneva working group and direct pressure also played somewhat important roles.

²⁷ The Multifiber Arrangement is a textile accord that sets quotas on textile exports of member countries.

Table 4.5 GATT: International Influences Raw Data

GATT									
<u>International</u>	<u>Influences</u>	<u>Number of Expert Responses for Each Category¹</u>				<u>Number of Generalist Responses for Each Category¹</u>			
		0	1	2	3	0	1	2	3
STATUS	Desire to improve China's image as a responsible member in the international system	-	-	1	4	1	1	2	1
REGIONAL/ GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT	In the early-1980s, visits from the GATT, World Bank, and International Monetary Fund officials, persuaded Deng Xiaoping and Zhao Ziyang of the need to rejoin.	-	2	-	2	1	1	1	2
	As China was not an active member of GATT it had no recourse against the anti-dumping policies of other countries. This was a consideration as China's exports were steadily increasing over time. Joining GATT would give China access to its dispute settlement mechanisms. Also, if China became a member there would be no further concern over MFN issues with the US and others	-	1	1	1	-	2	3	-
	Most of China's trading partners were members. This led China to consider what were the benefits of membership.	-	2	1	2	-	1	3	-
	The international environment was accepting of China after UN entry (From 1949-1972, prior to the PRC's recognition by the United Nations, China would not have been accepted into organizations such as the GATT).	1	1	-	1	-	3	2	-
	China's Geneva working group came back often to China to tell them what China needed to reform. This gave China greater confidence in its abilities to meet the requirements of membership.	1	1	1	-	-	3	1	1

Table 4.5 (continued)

<u>International</u>	<u>Influences</u>	<u>Number of Expert Responses for Each Category¹</u>	<u>Number of Generalist Responses for Each Category¹</u>
	China was being pressured by the United States and other countries to apply to rejoin the GATT and play by the rules of the international economic system. Furthermore, in the early-1980s, GATT made overtures to China to join.	1 2 1 -	2 - 3 -

¹3=very important; 2=important; 1=somewhat important; and 0=unimportant

Table 4.6 GATT: International Influences, Weighted and Overall Importance Scores

GATT				
<u>International</u>	<u>Influences</u>	<u>Expert Response Combined Weighted Score¹</u>	<u>Generalist Response Combined Weighted Score¹</u>	<u>Overall Score (Ranking)²</u>
STATUS	Desire to improve China's image as a responsible member in the international system	14	6	2.0 (I)
REGIONAL/ GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT	Most of China's trading Partners were members. This led China to consider what were the benefits of membership.	10	5.25	1.69 (I)
	In the early-1980s, visits from the GATT, World Bank, and International Monetary Fund officials, persuaded Deng Xiaoping and Zhao Ziyang of the need to rejoin.	8	6.75	1.63 (I)
	As China was not an active member of GATT it had no recourse against the anti-dumping policies of other countries. This was a consideration as China's exports were steadily increasing over time. Joining GATT would give China access to its dispute settlement mechanisms. Also, if China became a member there would be no further concern over MFN issues with the US and others	6	6	1.33 (SI)
	The international environment was accepting of China after UN entry (From 1949-1972, prior to the PRC's recognition by the United Nations, China would not have been accepted into organizations such as the GATT).	4	5.25	1.16 (SI)

Table 4.6 (continued)

<u>International</u>	<u>Influences</u>	<u>Expert Response Combined Weighted Score¹</u>	<u>Generalist Response Combined Weighted Score¹</u>	<u>Overall Score (Ranking)²</u>
	China's Geneva working group came back often to China to tell them what China needed to reform. This gave China greater confidence in its abilities to meet the requirements of membership.	3	6	1.13 (SI)
	China was being pressured by the United States and other countries to apply to rejoin the GATT and play by the rules of the international economic system. Furthermore, in the early-1980s, GATT made overtures to China to join.	4	4.5	.94 (SI)

¹Combined Weighted Score equals the sum of responses (numerical values) in each category (Table 4.5) times the relevant multiple (Expert response, multiple 1.0; Generalist response, multiple 0.75).

²Overall Score equals the sum of the weighted scores (expert and generalist) divided by the total number of respondents for each factor (Table 4.5).

Ranking: Very important: 2.25-3.0; Important: 1.5-2.24; Somewhat important: .75-1.49; Unimportant: Below .75

Table 4.7 is a combination of Tables 4.2, 4.4, and 4.6, compiled in an effort to determine the importance of influences across levels. Taken together, we see a decision impacted by factors at all levels of analysis and many that are quite different from what the current literature suggests (new factors are emphasized in bold). Leadership factors dominate, holding two of the top three spots, along with an economy in need of further development and reform. But these factors alone would not determine the decision. Factors scored "important" include: a lack of opposition from societal forces, China's need for status, MOFTEC's support for membership, the fact that China's trade partners were members, visits from outside experts, and input from research institutes. Other factors played a somewhat lesser role in the decision, including reports to the State Council,

China's desire for access to the GATT's DSM and the MFN treatment that would result from membership, personnel issues, the overall mood of the international environment, reports from China's Geneva working group, and direct pressure from outside forces. The impact of China's trade deficit and the MFA seem to have played no role in China's decision. Of the fifteen factors considered by this evaluation to have played a role (rated somewhat important or higher) in the decision, eight are new to the discussion of these issues. This highlights the difference between what we would expect to find from the available literature on the subject and what the Chinese believe to be the case. We also find that of these fifteen factors, two are leadership, six are state-societal, and seven are international. The ranking of these factors places leadership influences first (2.33), followed by state-societal (1.74) and international (1.41). This differs from the international/state-societal emphasis anticipated by my hypothesis.

Table 4.7 GATT: Scoring of Influences Across Levels of Analysis¹

GATT				
Category	Influences	Expert Response Combined Weighted Score²	Generalist Response Combined Weighted Score²	Overall Score (Ranking)³
DOMINANT INDIVIDUAL	DENG Xiaoping was the guiding light in the opening of the Chinese economy in the late-70s and in all subsequent moves to open and liberalize the Chinese economy. His voice was crucial to China deciding to apply to rejoin the GATT.	15	9	2.4 (VI)
ECONOMY	China needed continued economic development/economic reform. Joining GATT would help exports (partly by reducing the tariffs of other countries for China). It was all part of a national strategy of strategic development.	11	9.75	2.31 (VI)
GROUP INFLUENCES	The leadership (plural) wanted to continue opening to the world. They realized that China couldn't develop by itself, it needed the rest of the world.	12	8.25	2.25 (VI)
SOCIETY	There existed little public opposition to China's applying to rejoin GATT as people knew little about the GATT.	10	2.25	2.04 (I)
STATUS	Desire to improve China's image as a responsible member in the international system.	14	6	2.00 (I)

Table 4.7 (continued)

<u>Category</u>	<u>Influences</u>	<u>Expert Response Combined Weighted Score²</u>	<u>Generalist Response Combined Weighted Score²</u>	<u>Overall Score (Ranking)³</u>
TRADITIONAL BUREAUCRACY	The Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC) was the most important player in the bureaucracy and it was largely in favor of China joining. Ideas started with MOFTEC and then went to the leaders.	11	8.25	1.93 (I)
REGIONAL/ GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT	Most of China's trading partners were members. This led China to consider what were the benefits of membership.	10	5.25	1.69 (I)
REGIONAL/ GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT	In the early-1980s, visits from the GATT, World Bank, and International Monetary Fund officials, persuaded Deng Xiaoping and Zhao Ziyang of the need to rejoin.	8	6.75	1.63 (I)
NON-TRADITIONAL BUREAUCRACY	Research institutes were very important after 1979. They were important to the decision of China to apply to rejoin the GATT.	7.0	6.75	1.53 (I)
TRADITIONAL BUREAUCRACY	More and more reports on GATT were sent to the State Council (both positive and negative). All ministries were concerned about competition from foreign goods or loss of power.	7.0	5.25	1.36 (SI)

Table 4.7 (continued)

<u>Category</u>	<u>Influences</u>	<u>Expert Response Combined Weighted Score²</u>	<u>Generalist Response Combined Weighted Score²</u>	<u>Overall Score (Ranking)³</u>
REGIONAL/ GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT	As China was not an active member of GATT it had no recourse against the anti-dumping policies of other countries. This was a consideration as China's exports were steadily increasing over time. Joining GATT would give China access to its dispute settlement mechanisms. Also, if China became a member there would be no further concern over MFN issues with the US and others	6	6	1.33 (SI)
TRADITIONAL BUREAUCRACY	The personnel that China needed to both understand the GATT and to deal with China/GATT interaction were now in place. Prior to this time, China would have been ill-equipped, from a personnel point-of-view, to join the GATT.	6	5.25	1.25 (SI)
REGIONAL/ GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT	The international environment was accepting of China after UN entry (From 1949-1972, prior to the PRC's recognition by the United Nations, China would not have been accepted into organizations such as the GATT).	4	5.25	1.16 (SI)

Table 4.7 (continued)

<u>Category</u>	<u>Influences</u>	<u>Expert Response Combined Weighted Score²</u>	<u>Generalist Response Combined Weighted Score²</u>	<u>Overall Score (Ranking)³</u>
REGIONAL/ GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT	China's Geneva working group came back often to China to tell them what China needed to reform. This gave China greater confidence in its abilities to meet the requirements of membership.	3	6	1.13 (SI)
REGIONAL/ GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT	China was being pressured by the United States and other countries to apply to rejoin the GATT and play by the rules of the international economic system. Furthermore, in the early-1980s, GATT made overtures to China to join.	4	4.5	.94 (SI)
ECONOMY	China's trade deficit was still high at the time. China believed that by joining the GATT, exports would rapidly increase, thereby closing this trade deficit.	0	5.25	.66 (UI)
TRADITIONAL BUREAUCRACY	The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) had all the power in this area.	1	3	.50 (UI)

¹ Bold print indicates new factors uncovered at stage two of our research.

² Combined Weighted Score equals the sum of responses (numerical values) in each category times the relevant multiple (Expert response, multiple 1.0; Generalist response, multiple 0.75).

³ Overall Score equals the sum of the weighted scores (expert and generalist) divided by the total number of respondents for each factor.

Ranking: Very important: 2.25-3.0; Important: 1.5-2.24; Somewhat important: .75-1.49; Unimportant: Below .75

Chapter Five: China and the WTO

The history of China's decision to apply to join the World Trade Organization, while not as lengthy and as filled with the ups and downs of the GATT history, is nonetheless filled with its own twists and turns. This chapter will attempt to do a number of things in an effort to better understand the factors impacting upon this decision. First, I will give a general overview of China's application to join, the negotiations, its acceptance, and China's role as a member. Next, I will present the results of my three-stage research into China's decision to apply to join the WTO.

Background

China's history vis-à-vis the World Trade Organization goes back to the Uruguay Round of negotiations during which time China's status was still that of permanent observer in GATT and hopeful founding member of the WTO. However, leading up to the WTO's launch on January 1, 1995 the two sides were still far apart in their negotiating positions (The Economist, 8/6/94, p. 52). In fact, on December 20, 1994, at the final meeting of the year of the committee overseeing China's readmission, the distance between the two sides was still too great to allow for Chinese admission. While China had made progress addressing issues of transparency, there were still major areas of concern regarding its liberalization of agriculture, manufacturing and financial services (The Economist, 12/24/94, p. 85). China would not become a founding member of the WTO. Instead, China officially applied to join the WTO December 7, 1995 and continued what would be another six years of negotiating to become a member of the organization.

This is a good place to try and make clear the process through which China and any other country must go in order to become a member. There are four basic steps. First, the applying country needs to describe all aspects of its trade and economic policies that have a bearing on WTO agreements. This declaration is submitted to the WTO and is examined in detail by the “working party” dealing with the country’s application. Every Working Party is composed of all WTO members that have an interest in negotiations with the applying country. The Working Party for China’s accession was originally established under GATT in 1987 and at the time concerned only China’s trade regime for goods. In 1995, after China’s application to the WTO, this Working Party was converted to one under the guidance of the WTO and its scope was broadened to include trade in services, new rules on non-tariff measures and rules relating to intellectual property rights (WTO, 2002). The Working Party has two main tasks: to compile a report based on its deliberations; and to complete a Protocol of Accession.

Second, bilateral talks are undertaken between the prospective new member and the other interested countries. These talks cover tariff rates and specific market access commitments and other goods and services issues. The new member’s commitments “are to apply equally to all WTO members under normal non-discrimination rules, even though they are negotiated bilaterally. In other words, the talks determine the benefits other WTO members can expect when the new member joins” (WTO, 2002). Bilateral negotiations are undertaken in both formal and informal sessions, usually at the WTO offices in Geneva or in the capitals of the respective negotiating parties.

Under the auspices of the WTO these bilateral negotiations took China more than six years to complete (fifteen years if we include those conducted under GATT). China made

numerous efforts to cut tariffs and indicate its movement toward following WTO rules and regulations during the course of those six years, but it was not until 1999 that negotiations really started to heat up. In April of 1999, China's Premier and economic tsar, Zhu Rongji, visited the U.S. and came tantalizingly close to an agreement with President Clinton, which could have led to the completion of bilateral WTO negotiations between the U.S. and China. President Clinton rejected the deal presented to him by Premier Zhu, sending a forlorn Zhu Rongji back to China to face the critics who believed he had offered too much. Adding insult to injury, in May 1999 during the U.S. bombing of Belgrade, a U.S. bomb struck the Chinese embassy. In addition to the loss of life that resulted on the side of the Chinese, this further harmed the undertaking of any serious negotiations. However, due to the efforts of leaders from both countries, the U.S. and China resumed bilateral negotiations in September of 1999 and on November 19, 1999, concluded bilateral negotiations. I mention the U.S. bilateral negotiations as they were pivotal in the conclusion of the overall negotiations. Following the successful conclusion of U.S.-China discussions it would take little time for the rest of the bilateral negotiations to be completed. Negotiations concluded on September 17, 2001.

The third and fourth steps in the accession process occur after the first two steps have been brought to a successful resolution. At that point in time the Working Party finalizes the terms of accession, writes a draft membership treaty, and lists the member-to-be's commitments. That is step number three. Ambassador Pierre-Louis Girard of Switzerland, chairman of the Working Party for China's accession, submitted this draft membership treaty, some 900 pages long, to the 142 member governments of the WTO. The fourth and final step occurs when this report is presented to the General Council or the Ministerial

Conference for adoption. It takes a two-thirds majority of WTO members in favor to pass this protocol. If this occurs, the applicant can then sign the protocol and accede to the organization. After having the draft protocol of the Working Group accepted by WTO members, China accepted the protocol on its entry to the WTO on November 11, 2001. The protocol officially took effect 30 days later, December 11, 2001 at which point China began to enjoy all the rights the WTO gives to its members and was officially allowed to participate in WTO activities.

China has been busy since becoming a member of the WTO. On December 19, 2001, little more than a week after becoming a member, China attended its first meeting. At this meeting of the WTO General Council, China was represented by Zhang Xiang, a vice-minister at MOFTEC and China's first ambassador to the WTO. In addition, in the first half of 2002, China filed its first WTO complaint against the U.S. in response to tariffs imposed by the U.S. government on several types of steel imported from China and other countries. Internally, China has also moved quickly to address the special needs associated with becoming a member. To this end, MOFTEC has set up three departments to help better deal with WTO membership. First, they have set up the Department of WTO Affairs, the predecessor to which dealt with China's 15-year process of bilateral and multilateral negotiations. This "new" department is entrusted with handling China's participation in the new round of multilateral negotiations on further trade liberalization. Further, it is responsible for making sure China carries out its promises vis-à-vis the WTO and it must create laws and rules in line with those of the WTO. The Fair Trade Bureau of Import and Export is responsible for guiding and coordinating Chinese companies in responding to foreign charges of dumping and subsidy. At the same time it must also investigate the

possibly discriminatory trade practices of other countries, filing complaints with the WTO if need be. Finally, the China WTO Notification and Enquiry Center will respond to WTO inquiries into China's trade policies and notify the WTO of China policies, laws, and rules on trade and investment.

Influences

Leadership Level

Similar to what was found in the GATT decision, initial inquiries suggest that leadership influences can again be broken down into two categories, dominant individual and group influences. The dominant individual playing a role in China's decision continued to be Deng Xiaoping, paramount leader till 1997 and supported by his appointees, first Zhao Ziyang and then Jiang Zemin (Pearson, 2001). Group influences came from a liberal group of leaders looking to continue opening to the outside world (Pearson, 2001).

Stage two research further solidified support for the importance of Deng Xiaoping and group influences. First, Deng Xiaoping continued to be the guiding light in the opening of China's economy. For example, his 1992 statement on capitalism was a major moment, providing support for China's future economic path and providing room for China to apply to join the WTO.²⁸ In this 1992 speech on the future of China's economic development, Deng Xiaoping committed China to the development of a socialist market economy, with Chinese characteristics. While China had been rapidly moving down this path for the last fourteen years, prior to this pronouncement, there had been no formal commitment by the Chinese

²⁸Interview with official, WTO Affairs Consultation Center, November 2001; Interview with professor, Department of International Economics, People's University, October 2001; Interview with official, CASS, November 2001; Interview with official, Pudong Institute for the US Economy, November 2001; Interview with Professor, Beijing University, July 2001; Interview with official, CASS, November 2001; Interview with official, SASS, November 2001.

government. The speech served to open the door to further reform not only on the domestic front, but also in China's foreign policy initiatives. In making such an unequivocal statement, among other things, China was obligating itself to the principles of free and fair trade amongst market economies. This statement further paved the way for China's subsequent application to join the WTO in 1995.

Second, that the leaders had different perceptions and styles, but generally most were liberally minded also was suggested to have been an important influence (Interview with professor, Beijing University, July 2001). During the course of reform and opening to the outside world, China experienced many economic ups and downs. Following a long period of growth from the late-70s to the late-80s, China went through a period in which its economy was overheating and there existed serious concerns over the possibility of rampant inflation. This led to a great debate amongst the leadership, during which time there were conservative calls to move from market-driven policies, back to policies of the past. There were also moderates who suggested policies that might slow the economy a bit, but still move it down the path of reform and opening and there were those who pushed for things to move full steam ahead. In the end, the moderates won out, catastrophe was averted, and China continued down the path toward a market economy. This has been the case throughout China's experience with the market. While China may face some difficulty or experience some problem, and while the leadership may differ on how best to address the issue, on the economic front reformers have overwhelmingly won out. According to this way of thinking, this was again the case in China's decision to apply to join the WTO.

The individual and group influences from the first two stages of research were then combined into a confirmation form sent to experts and generalists alike.²⁹ Table 5.1 provides the responses in their raw form, while Table 5.2 converts these responses into a weighted score. The picture this data presents is that of a decision impacted at the leadership level mainly by Deng Xiaoping, who pushed China officially down the path to becoming a socialist market economy. However, it is likely this would not have occurred if not for the liberal economic nature of the leadership more broadly defined. I should note that in confirmation form responses some respondents added in the critical role played by two other prominent Chinese leaders, Jiang Zemin and Zhu Rongji. According to these respondents, without their personal involvement in moving efforts forward, particularly during times of difficulty, it seems quite unlikely that China would have applied to join the WTO.

Table 5.1 WTO: Leadership Influences Raw Data

WTO									
Leadership	Influences	Number of Expert Responses for Each Category¹				Number of Generalist Responses for Each Category¹			
		0	1	2	3	0	1	2	3
DOMINANT INDIVIDUAL	-DENG Xiaoping continued to be a guiding light in China's opening and eventual application to join the WTO.	-	-	-	5	1	-	2	1
GROUP INFLUENCES	-The leaders had different perceptions and styles, but generally most were liberally minded.	-	1	-	3	1	-	2	1

¹3=very important; 2=important; 1=somewhat important; and 0=unimportant

²⁹ Confirmation forms were sent to thirteen experts and eight generalists.

Table 5.2 WTO: Leadership Influences, Weighted and Overall Importance Scores

<u>WTO</u>				
<u>Leadership</u>	<u>Influences</u>	<u>Expert Response Combined Weighted Score¹</u>	<u>Generalist Response Combined Weighted Score¹</u>	<u>Overall Score (Ranking)²</u>
DOMINANT INDIVIDUAL	-DENG Xiaoping continued to be a guiding light in China's opening and eventual application to join the WTO.	15	5.25	2.25 (VI)
GROUP INFLUENCES	-The leaders had different perceptions and styles, but generally most were liberally minded.	10	5.25	1.90 (I)

¹Combined Weighted Score equals the sum of responses (numerical values) in each category (Table 5.1) times the relevant multiple (Expert response, multiple 1.0; Generalist response, multiple 0.75).

²Overall Score equals the sum of the weighted scores (expert and generalist) divided by the total number of respondents for each factor (Table 5.1).

Ranking: Very important: 2.25-3.0; Important: 1.5-2.24; Somewhat important: .75-1.49; Unimportant: Below .75.

State-Societal Level

English language resources at stage one highlighted a number of different factors that may have had an influence on China's decision to apply to join the WTO. First, some have suggested that MOFTEC was responsible for most of the day-to-day work on China's WTO bid (Pearson, 2001, p. 346). Support for these MOFTEC efforts was further provided by other bureaucratic entities including the Bank of China (finance issues), Ministry of Information and Industry (telecommunications issues), Ministry of Finance (accounting and insurance services issues), and Ministry of Internal Trade (distribution issues) (Pearson, 2001, p. 347; Wang, 1999, p. 43). Second, China's Leading Small Groups on various economic issues were in a position to have some input further up the bureaucratic chain of command (Pearson, 2001, p.348). Third, in the literature, the State Development Planning Commission, various industrial sectors and provincial and local governments are listed, but are seen as having a hand in delaying (not fostering) China's application, being at least

somewhat against China's decision to apply to join (Pearson, 2001, p.350; Wang, 1999, p. 43). Finally, Pearson suggests that China's decision to seek membership may have come at least partly as a result of its push for modernization and concentration on expanding exports (Pearson, 2001, p.357). Whereas in the GATT decision there was some suggestion in English language resources that non-traditional bureaucracies such as research institutes played a role, there is scant evidence for this found for the WTO decision.

In stage two, support was given for some of these stage one influences and others were added to the list. Again, for comparison these factors are separated into categories, those dealing with the economy, those having to do with the traditional and non-traditional Chinese bureaucracy, institutional/political factors, and purely societal factors. With respect to applying to rejoin the GATT, three economic factors were mentioned. They are: the government's desire to use the WTO to help spur reform and economic growth; added benefits to consumers; and increased competitiveness of China's companies as a result of GATT membership (Tao Chuanshi, 1999).³⁰ At the bureaucratic level, factors identified include: the role of different bureaucratic entities; and the role of academic and research institute employees, the latter not having been mentioned in the literature at stage one. The relevant societal factor suggested was pressure from successful groups and businesses in Chinese society. On the institutional/political front a concern over Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan becoming members in the WTO prior to China may have spurred the decision.

³⁰Unfortunately, these final two economic factors were uncovered in the Chinese language literature after confirmation forms had been sent out and returned and so there are no confirmation form results for these factors. They may, however, be considered as subsumed under the general economic rubric.

Economically, the Chinese government wanted to use the WTO to help spur reform and economic growth.³¹ Joining the WTO and its system of regulations and requirements would push the market system in China and help break down state monopolies. The Chinese economy had come a long way by 1995 from the original opening, and in particular since applying to join the GATT in 1986. Following the initial agricultural reforms of the late-1970s, there were urban reforms in the early-1980s, when China also joined the IMF and WB, and increased openness to foreign investment and trade. In 1986 China's exports and imports totaled US\$73.8 billion, by 1995 that figure had grown to US\$280.9 billion (Pearson, 1999, p.168). Similarly, foreign direct investment in China, circa 1986, stood at US\$2.83 billion (value of projects pledged), but by 1995 it had grown to US\$90.30 billion (Pearson, 1999, p. 171). Furthermore, China had moved to reduce the levels of both tariff and non-tariff barriers on a large number of products, while domestically continuing economic reform from the national down to the local level.

However, much work still needed to be done to bring China into the ranks of the developed countries. In trade, the PRC continued to heavily subsidize state-owned enterprises, giving them an unfair advantage in market competition; maintain market access restrictions and nontariff barriers on agricultural and service goods; restrict foreign firms in their ability to operate like local entities; and lack transparency and uniformity of rules. On the investment side, reforms were needed to pay foreign businesses on time, provide information on potential partners, and open the highly restricted areas of

³¹Interview with official, Consulate General of the People's Republic of China, New York, July 2001; Interview with professor, Beijing University, July 2001; Interview with professor, Department of International Economics, People's University, Beijing, October 2001; Interview with official, MOFTEC, November 2001; Interview with official, SASS, November 2001; Interview with official, Development Research Center of the State Council, November 2001; Interview with official, WTO Affairs Consultation Center, November 2001.

investment banking, securities, accounting, law, and insurance (Pearson, 1999, p.179). At the same time China was struggling with such domestic economic issues as corruption and reform of the legal system, to better address the needs of both domestic and foreign businesses. The hope of China joining the WTO would be that the institution, with its system of rules and regulations and access to the market knowledge of other member states, might help China to accelerate the addressing of these problems, which would result in long-term growth and reform of the system (Yu, Zheng and Song, 1999, p. 575-576; Ren, 1999, p. 195; and Tang, 2000, p. 15).

The Chinese literature on this topic suggests that WTO membership might bring added benefits to consumers (Tao Chuanshi, 1999). First, increased competition from both domestic and foreign enterprises as a result of WTO membership would drive down prices for both consumer products and services. For example, competition from foreign agricultural goods would decrease the price of these goods to Chinese consumers, and the increase in competition from foreign businesses in finance, banking, securities, and insurance, would have the same effect. In addition, tariffs and prices on items such as foreign autos and electronics were still quite high at the time. These tariffs and prices would go down as a result of WTO membership. This drop in prices would not only be good for those consumers already partaking, but would also open up these goods and services to those previously unable to afford them (Yuan Hong, 1999). Second, membership would bring more foreign companies into China, which in turn would increase the number of choices available to the Chinese consumer in their search for products relevant to their lives.

Finally, membership would mean improvements in the competitiveness of Chinese enterprises, their management, and available technology (Tao Chuanshi, 1999). With increased access to the Chinese market for foreign firms as a result of WTO membership, in theory domestic enterprises would be forced to compete or risk going out of business. Raising their level of management capability has been a focus of Chinese businesses for quite some time, from the state-owned enterprises to privately owned companies. In order to survive in the increased competitive environment of a post-entry China, companies would be forced to improve their management capabilities or face the possibility of closure. Another necessary by-product of stronger competition--something that has been at work for years--is increasing technological capabilities. China has done remarkably well at requiring foreign businesses in joint ventures to transfer technological capabilities to do business in China. In addition, China is a master of reverse engineering of foreign goods. WTO entry would further this, while helping to break down the foreign barriers that existed with respect to the transfer of technology to China.

Looking at bureaucratic influences, it seems that the forces supporting China's application to join the WTO, the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), were more powerful than the forces against joining; that is the Agricultural Ministry, Bank of China, services sector, intellectual property rights sector, the insurance industry, the communications industry, and other internally driven ministries.³² In foreign policy decision-making the Chinese bureaucratic entities play an important role. Referring to Pearson's methodology in which bureaucratic ministries occupy the "bottom" of the decision making structure, MOFTEC does stand out

as clearly the most important of the ministries. MOFTEC was responsible for the day-to-day work regarding the GATT/WTO negotiations for entry. While MOFTEC received basic guidance from higher levels, it “determined the specific implications of this guidance, collected reports and analysis from research institutes, proceeded to negotiations, and reported back up the hierarchy” (Pearson, 2001, pp. 346-347). Most of these activities were undertaken by MOFTEC’s WTO division under the direction of chief negotiator Long Yongtu. In addition to these responsibilities, MOFTEC was also responsible for coordinating China’s negotiating positions with other interested domestic bureaus and industries. Overall, “as China’s chief representative in the WTO negotiations, MOFTEC has been one of the most important forces in promoting trade liberalization” (Wang, 1999, p. 44). While the MFA is not nearly as important to the GATT/WTO decision, its general support for international activities and for multilateral institutions buttressed support for China applying to join the WTO.³³ The support from these two ministries provided impetus toward China’s application, even in the face of concerns from other ministries.

Other important bureaucratic entities mentioned during the course of interviews included: the State Economic and Trade Commission; State Planning Commission; State Owned Enterprises; the Ministry of Post and Telecommunications; the People’s Bank of China; the Ministry of Agriculture; the Ministry of International Trade; and the State

³²Interview with professor, Beijing University, July 2001; Interview with official, Development Research Center of the State Council, November 2001; and Interview with professor, People’s University, November 2001.

³³Interview with professor, Beijing University, July 2001; Interview with official, Development Research Center of the State Council, November 2001; and Interview with professor, People’s University, November 2001.

Council's Development Research Center.³⁴ While MOFTEC was the center for the coordination of responses from the Chinese bureaucracy, this is not to downplay completely the role of other bureaucratic entities. The State Economic and Trade Commission was at least partially responsible for determining tariff rates, while the State Planning Commission, along with MOFTEC, was responsible for determining quotas. These agencies were concerned with trade in goods, but trade in services is even more closely protected in China. As a result, ministries like the Ministry of Post and Telecommunications also had some say in the decision, and eventually in negotiations over China's accession. In fact, Pearson suggests that during negotiations the Bank of China covered negotiations on finance, the Ministry of Finance on accounting and insurance services, and the Ministry of Internal Trade on distribution (Pearson, 2001).

Two interviewees also suggested that more and more support for applying to join the WTO from academics and institute employees might have played a role in China's decision to apply to join the WTO (Interview with official, WTO Affairs Consultation Center, November 2001; Interview with official, SASS, November 2001). Following the open door policies China enacted in the late-1970s, greater freedom to conduct research was also granted to research institutes. As a result, research institutes were becoming increasingly influential in their capacity to produce commissioned reports, to personally brief leaders, to participate in ad hoc groups, and to publish on independent topics of their own scholarly interest. In fact, part of MOFTEC's responsibilities included coordinating reports from research institutes regarding China's interaction with the GATT/WTO. These are reports that would either be commissioned by MOFTEC relating to China's application or were

³⁴Interview with professor, Beijing University, July 2001; Interview with official, Development Research Center of the State Council, November 2001; and Interview with professor, People's

independent research efforts relevant to China and the WTO. Regarding the WTO, these reports came from such institutes as the Chinese Institute of International Studies, the International Studies Research Centre, and the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.

Another influencing factor, this in the institutional/political realm, concerned the 1994 breakdown in discussions with the WTO. It is suggested that after this breakdown, there were concerns that by 1997, after the Hong Kong and Macao handovers, the provincial governments would be members, while the central government would not. The same concern existed for Taiwan. Hong Kong became a member of the GATT on April 23, 1986 and Macao became a member on January 11, 1991. At the time of their entry, each was still ruled by its colonial power, Great Britain and Portugal, respectively. In addition, Taiwan, long unassociated with the GATT, had begun to approach the GATT about rejoining, a move that severely worried the mainland government. While membership at the time for both Hong Kong and Macao was not of particular concern to the mainland government, concern would grow with the rapidly approaching handover of sovereignty for each of these areas to China in 1997. This pressure increased in 1995, when on January 1, both Hong Kong and Macao became members of the newly established WTO. It was not acceptable that areas over which it was sovereign should become WTO members, while the central government was not. In addition, there were concerns that growing global regard for Taiwan might bring about Taiwanese membership prior to mainland membership. This is something that the government wanted to avoid at all costs and may have played a role in China's decision to apply to join the WTO in late-1995 (Interview with professor, People's University, November 2001).

Finally, on the societal side, one person suggested that there existed pressure to apply to join from successful groups and businesses in Chinese society (Interview with official, CASS, November 2001). Major interest groups were linked to successful segments of the Chinese economy. Prior to opening and reform in the late-1970s, the state ran the economy and the Party ran the state. There were no private enterprises and thus no businesses or business groups that might have an interest in China opening to the outside world. However, this all began to change rapidly following the implementation of reforms. Whereas in 1978 there were only 136, 000 persons employed privately in retail trade, 73,000 in catering, and 53,000 in services trade, by 1983 those numbers had jumped to 4.1 million, 1 million, and 930,000 respectively (Riskin, 1991, p. 360). These trends have continued. While the government may still be the most important player in the Chinese economy, this is rapidly changing, and the most rapidly changing piece of the economy is the private sector. It is the fastest growing part of the Chinese economy with at least half a million private enterprises located in China's cities (Starr, 1997, p.83). Private enterprises are responsible for upwards of 15% of output and were growing at a rate of 52% per year, as of 1996 (Starr, 1997, p. 84). The segment of the population making up this private sector is a growing voice in the Chinese economy and one in search of higher profits and greater access for its goods and the goods of others.

In sum, in stage two of the research a number of overlapping influences and myriad new influences were offered. Overlapping influences included the importance of MOFTEC and various other ministries and the importance of economic expansion. Newly mentioned influences included the role of some other bureaucratic entities, some extended economic

factors, and all the institutional/political and societal factors. In stage three, these influences are ranked by importance.

Tables 5.3 and 5.4 present the results, both in raw and weighted form, respectively. Only one factor falls within the very important range of categorization, that being the idea that the Chinese government wanted to use the WTO to help spur reform and economic growth. Two other factors are ranked as important influences: the pressure felt over possible membership of Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan, and the growing influence of research institute employees and academics. After these three influences others fall further down the ranking scale, but are still relevant to our discussion. Ranked as somewhat important are other bureaucratic entities, a slowing economy, MOFTEC and the MFA, and lastly, pressure from groups in Chinese society.

Table 5.3 WTO: State-Societal Influences Raw Data

WTO									
State-Societal	Influences	Number of Expert Responses for Each Category¹				Number of Generalist Responses for Each Category¹			
		0	1	2	3	0	1	2	3
ECONOMY	-The Chinese government wanted to use the WTO to help spur reform and economic growth. Joining the WTO and its system of regulations and requirements would promote the market system in China and help break down state monopolies.	1	-	-	4	-	-	1	3
TRADITIONAL/NON-TRADITIONAL BUREAUCRACY	-The forces for applying to join the WTO, which were the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) were more powerful than the forces against joining (Agricultural Ministry, Bank of China, services sector, intellectual property rights sector, the insurance industry, the communications industry, and other internally driven ministries)	1	2	-	1	1	1	2	-
	Many bureaucratic entities were influential, including: -State Economic and Trade Commission -State Planning Commission -State Owned Enterprises -Ministry of Post and Telecommunications -People's Bank of China -Ministry of Agriculture -Ministry of International Trade -State Council's Development Research Center	-	2	1	1	1	1	2	-
	-Academics and research institute employees favored applying to join the WTO.	-	-	4	1	1	2	1	-
INSTITUTIONAL/ POLITICAL	-There were concerns that by 1997, after the Hong Kong and Macao handovers, the provincial governments and Taiwan would be members. This would embarrass the central government.	-	-	2	2	-	1	3	-

Table 5.3 (continued)

<u>State-Societal</u>	<u>Influences</u>	<u>Number of Expert Responses for Each Category¹</u>				<u>Number of Generalist Responses for Each Category¹</u>			
		0	1	2	3	0	1	2	3
SOCIETY	-There existed pressure to apply to join from successful groups and businesses linked to successful segments of the Chinese economy.	-	1	2	-	2	1	1	-

¹3=very important; 2=important; 1=somewhat important; and 0=unimportant

Table 5.4 WTO: State-Societal Influences, Weighted and Overall Importance Scores

WTO				
<u>State-Societal</u>	<u>Influences</u>	<u>Expert Response Combined Weighted Score¹</u>	<u>Generalist Response Combined Weighted Score¹</u>	<u>Overall Score (Ranking)²</u>
ECONOMY	The Chinese government wanted to use the WTO to help spur reform and economic growth. Joining the WTO and its system of regulations and requirements would promote the market system in China and help break down state monopolies.	12	8.25	2.25 (VI)
INSTITUTIONAL/ POLITICAL	There were concerns that by 1997, after the Hong Kong and Macao handovers, the provincial governments and Taiwan would be members. This would embarrass the central government.	10	5.25	1.91 (I)
NON- TRADITIONAL BUREAUCRACY	Academics and research institute employees favored applying to join the WTO.	11	3	1.75 (I)
TRADITIONAL BUREAUCRACY	Many bureaucratic entities were influential, including: -State Economic and Trade Commission -State Planning Commission -State Owned Enterprises -Ministry of Post and Telecommunications -People's Bank of China -Ministry of Agriculture -Ministry of International Trade -State Council's Development Research Center	7	3.75	1.34 (SI)

Table 5.4 (continued)

<u>State-Societal</u>	<u>Influences</u>	<u>Expert Response Combined Weighted Score¹</u>	<u>Generalist Response Combined Weighted Score¹</u>	<u>Overall Score (Ranking)²</u>
TRADITIONAL BUREAUCRACY	-The forces for applying to join the WTO, which were the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) were more powerful than the forces against joining (Agricultural Ministry, Bank of China, services sector, intellectual property rights sector, the insurance industry, the communications industry, and other internally driven ministries)	5	3.75	1.09 (SI)
SOCIETY	-There existed pressure to apply to join from successful groups and businesses linked to successful segments of the Chinese economy.	5	2.25	1.04 (SI)

¹Combined Weighted Score equals the sum of responses (numerical values) in each category (Table 5.3) times the relevant multiple (Expert response, multiple 1.0; Generalist response, multiple 0.75).

²Overall Score equals the sum of the weighted scores (expert and generalist) divided by the total number of respondents for each factor (Table 5.1).

Ranking: Very important: 2.25-3.0; Important: 1.5-2.24; Somewhat important: .75-1.49; Unimportant: Below .75

International Level

With respect to joining the WTO, initial research efforts at stage one suggested few international influences. Pearson believes this is because Chinese decision-making goes on behind closed doors and officials are loath to acknowledge that changes have been made as a result of foreign pressures (Pearson, 1999, p.193). However, two factors are mentioned in the literature as impacting China's decision: a drop in outside resistance to Chinese admission, and consultations with outside experts and organizations. First, as mentioned in the last chapter, following China's admission to the UN in 1972 and in

particular the normalization of relations with the United States in 1979 there was a lessening of international opposition to China regaining its seat in the GATT. In fact, there was a growing eagerness among the international business community and Western governments to have China participate in the world economy, and so in the WTO (Pearson, 1999, p.194). Second, visits from outside experts and information gathered in visits to the GATT/WTO may also have impacted China's decision (Pearson, 2001, p. 194).

International influences discovered at stage two are more numerous and are divided into two categories: status and regional/global environment factors. These were: China's desire to be accepted as similar to other developing and developed countries, most of which were members of the GATT/WTO (status); China's desire to play a role in the formulation of future global and regional economic trade rules and to reap the benefits of globalization; the hope that joining the WTO would end the annual US debate over China and MFN status; China's view of the major advances of its Four Tiger neighbors and the membership of most in GATT/WTO; the collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent collapse of faith in communism; and the pressure placed on China by the international community over the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989.

First, all developed countries and most developing countries were already members of the WTO. China wanted to be accepted as similar to these countries (Interview with professor, People's University, October 2001). Almost ten years after its original application to the GATT, China was still wrestling with the demons of its past isolation and perceived persecution at the hands of the developed countries. Although, during the late-1980s and early-1990s China continued to join multilateral institutions at a rapid rate and continued on its path of opening and reform, there remained questions as to its commitment to this path.

China was already a member of both the IMF and the World Bank, two cornerstones of the international economic triumvirate of key international economic organizations. Becoming a member of the WTO would complete China's commitment and put it on par with other members (Zhongguo de WTO Zhi Lu, 1999, p. 177-183). In addition to China's desire to become a member like most other countries, China also felt the WTO needed China as much as China needed the WTO. As the world's most populous nation and fastest growing developing economy, it would be in the interest of the organization to have China as a member. In addition to these factors, it is also important to note that in the nine years between application to GATT and application to WTO, the percentage of China's trade with WTO member countries has increased tremendously. However, as a non-member the terms of this trade were not always favorable to the Chinese, and there existed a subsequent desire to be on par with the countries that were already major trading partners. The only way to accomplish this was to become a member of the WTO.

Also mentioned as regional/global environment factors was the idea that China realized that in order to reap the benefits of globalization, it had to become a member of the international economic order's most important global organization.³⁵ As David Lampton recently suggested, globalization "has figured prominently in the evolving character of the Chinese foreign and national security policy-making process since 1978..." (Lampton, 2001, p. 24). Since 1978, China had become an increasingly active and important member of the international economic community. Trade and foreign investment had become important factors in the growth of the Chinese economy. In addition, Chinese industry had become further integrated into the international division of labor in a world capitalist system.

Becoming a member of the WTO would be the next logical step in the evolution of China becoming a full-fledged member in the global economic community (Guanyu Woguo Jiayu Shimao Zuzhi de Ruogan Wenti, 2000).

There are other examples of the impact of globalization on Chinese foreign policy behavior. Perhaps the most known is Beijing's response to the Asian Financial Crisis. Moore and Yang suggest that among all the factors impacting China's policy and behavior during the crisis, China's integration into the world was primary (Moore and Yang, 2001, p. 222). In deciding not to devalue the renminbi (RMB) during these most difficult of times in Asia, China consistently characterized its decision as for the good of its neighbors, designed to prevent a series of possibly disastrous devaluations throughout Asia.

Furthermore, with greater understanding of how the global economy worked, China realized that the only way to have a say in how things progressed in the future was to join the institution and work within the institution to promote policies favorable to China.³⁵ Prior to this time at least two phenomena were evident with respect to China. First, the terms of trade were largely dictated to the Chinese by the larger players in the international system. Second, and more directly related to the WTO, China was not intimately involved in the creation of the terms of globalization (as seen in the rules and regulations of the WTO) under which it would be required to participate. For China to have a say in future deliberations on the terms of globalization, and maintain the ability to direct these terms in ways favorable to China, it would have to be a member of the WTO (Yu, Zheng and Song,

³⁵Interview with official, WTO Affairs Consultation Center, November 2001; Interview with official, CASS, November 2001; Interview with official, CASS, November 2001; Interview with official, MOFTEC, November 2001.

³⁶Interview with official, WTO Affairs Consultation Center, November 2001; Interview with official, CASS, November 2001; Interview with official, CASS, November 2001; Interview with official, MOFTEC, November 2001.

1999). Proof of China's intent to act on this proposition has been in their behavior since joining the WTO in 2001. After joining, Chinese representatives have been very active in supporting policies favorable to themselves and they have attempted to serve as self-appointed representatives of the interests of developing countries.

Third, one interviewee suggested that the annual Most Favored Nation (MFN) debate in the United States was seen as an economic and political thorn in relations between China and the US (Interview with professor, People's University, October 2001). This annual debate had been going on for years and stemmed from U.S. implementation of the Jackson-Vanik amendment in 1974. "According to the Jackson-Vanik amendment to the Trade Act of 1974, MFN status for 'non-market economies' became conditional on freedom of emigration" (Vogel, 1997, p. 46). Originally aimed at restrictions on Jewish emigration by the Soviet Union, China-U.S. relations were snagged by this amendment in two ways. One, and less important, was the issue of emigration. While China has some restrictions on emigration to the U.S., the U.S. places more limits on Chinese emigration to the U.S. than does the Chinese government (Vogel, 1997, p. 46). Rather, it was the second issue with China as a non-market economy that puts U.S.-China relations under the stricture of this amendment and required the annual process of presidential certification.

Granting MFN to China was not always such a contentious issue and really only became of major significance to the relationship following the events at Tiananmen Square in 1989. In fact, one of President Clinton's campaign platforms in his initial run for the presidency was cracking down on what he suggested were the liberal policies of the Bush administration toward China. However, after coming to power and realizing that cracking down on China and revoking MFN was not in the best economic interests of the United

States “President Clinton renewed MFN status for China in May 1993, but going beyond the requirements of Jackson-Vanik on freedom of emigration, linked further renewal to “significant overall progress” on human rights” (Bloch, 1997, p. 197). While this linking of human rights to the annual discussion on granting MFN to China officially ceased in 1994, this did not bring to an end the informal linking of human rights to this issue. In 1995, the debate “was brutally divisive, pitting an unholy alliance of the left and far right, who fought to relink MFN renewal for China with human rights and a host of other issues, against the president and a broad coalition of business and trade interests” (Bloch, 1997, p. 197). In addition to the major debates and the international press this engendered in the US, this annual maelstrom also severely pressured China into annually making some moves on human rights and business practices to demonstrate some token level of improvement. It has been suggested that prior to each annual debate, China did just that, whether by releasing long-held, high-profile political prisoners or by cracking down on illegal companies infringing on the intellectual property rights of US companies, for example. Joining the WTO would end this annual debate as membership in the organization requires the extension of most favored nation status to all other member countries (Ren, 1999).

Another factor mentioned during the course of interviews was that the four Asian Tigers had advanced far beyond China’s economy and two were members of the GATT. Some suggest that one of the impetuses for China’s original opening and reform in the late-1970s was the fantastic growth found in nearby economies (Interview with official, CASS, November 2001; Interview with official, MOFTEC, November 2001). In particular, the decidedly capitalist economies of Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan had experienced tremendous growth from the 1960s onward. In fact, from 1960 to 1995 these

four economies had growth rates of real per capita gross domestic product of 6% annually. While the explanations for these amazing levels of growth are many and varied, all of these economies, save for Taiwan and Hong Kong, were members of the GATT. At the same time as these economies were rapidly expanding, China's economic growth during this period, while steady, did not provide well for its rapidly expanding population. In fact, "the Chinese economy of the immediate post-Mao period was providing living standards that were not qualitatively higher than those of the mid-1950s" (Riskin, 1991, p. 261). China needed to find ways to better provide for its people and to catch up with these rapidly growing economies. The example of the Tigers and their active engagement with the international community and the GATT/WTO, suggested to China one such avenue for development

Fifth, the collapse of the Soviet Union shocked China (Interview with official, MOFTEC, November 2001). This was seen as an economic collapse, at least partly a result of a lack of trade with other countries. China did not want the same thing to happen to it. As international relations experts will concede, the collapse of the Soviet Union and its socialist economic system in 1991 came as a surprise to the world. While the United States and other Western powers may have been working towards this in any number of different ways, it seemed ludicrous at the time to think that the Soviet Union would collapse and shortly thereafter adopt a democratic system of governance and a capitalist economic system. If we can say that some countries may have been more stunned than others, it would be safe to put China into that category, along with other countries with communist governments and planned economies. Since the Revolution of 1917, the Soviet Union had stood as the beacon of socialist success. Even with the ups and downs of its relations with China, right

up to the time of its demise, the Soviet Union was the example of a developed socialist economy. Its collapse and the subsequent downward trend in almost every indicator of economic and social well-being presented a petrifying picture of what could happen to China if it strayed back towards socialism and a planned economy and away from a continued economic opening. Joining the WTO would steady that path and provide China with the means necessary for continued reform and growth without the possibility of collapse.

Sixth, one person suggested that as China was contemplating applying to join the WTO there was still pressure from the international community as a result of the Tiananmen events of 1989. This was pressure to conform to the dictates of international society, as manifest by the rules and regulations of the WTO (Interview with official, CASS, November 2001). The crackdown on demonstrators on and around Tiananmen Square on June 4, 1989 led the US to “call off high-level visits, to withhold aid programs, and to distance itself from association with China’s leaders” (Vogel, 1997, p. 23). Other countries followed suit. This ended a decade of mainly positive opinions about China and the direction in which it was headed. The Chinese government’s response to the student activities at Tiananmen still has a negative impact on US-China relations, with the American public viewing the events as a suppression of freedom and democracy. This event also led to a concentration on human rights in US economic policy toward China. Pressuring China to become a member of the WTO would force it to further adhere to international principles that might prevent future Tiananmens.

Two other influences were mentioned in Chinese written materials.³⁷ First, China hoped that becoming a member of the WTO would help promote relations between itself and other countries (Ren, 1999). This factor flows at least partially from the preceding discussion of the Tiananmen Square incident. As a result of the response by the Chinese government, many governments, including that of the United States had tenuous relations with China for years to come. This is not to say that Tiananmen serves as the only confounding issue in relations between China and other countries. For example, relations with the U.S. have at times been hindered by concerns over the protection of intellectual property rights or the alleged “dumping” of Chinese goods in the American market. By joining the WTO, China could throw off the majority of these burdens, as they would be addressed by both the multilateral agreements between China and the WTO, and the specific bilateral agreements China would make with members countries.

Finally, as with the GATT, membership in the WTO would give China access to the institution’s Dispute Settlement Mechanism (Guanyu Woquo Jiaru Shimao Zuzhi de Ruogan Wenti, 2000; Zhongguo de WTO Zhilu, 1999). This knife cuts both ways. Access to the DSM would give China both the ability to bring concerns to the DSM for settlement and to have the disputes of others settled by the DSM. For example, China might bring a case to the DSM over U.S. protection of its steel industry. Or, the U.S. might bring a case against China for perceived dumping of steel. Either way, instead of being at the mercy of international rules which it played no role in creating, China would have access to an objective arbitrator to help settle disputes.

³⁷ Unfortunately, these final two factors were uncovered in the Chinese language literature after confirmation forms had been sent out and returned and so there are no confirmation form results for these factors. They may, however, be considered as subsumed under the general international rubric.

At this international level, there is no overlap between factors mentioned in stages one and two. Stage three confirmation form responses were then sent and the results compiled to develop a score ranking the importance of these factors. The picture this data paints (See Tables 5.5 and 5.6) is one of a decision impacted most importantly by the forces of globalization of which the WTO was a part. Ending the annual debate over MFN in the United States and the fact that other trading partners were members appear to have played important parts in impacting China's decision to apply to join. Though international pressure over Tiananmen may have played a small role in the decision, after these three influences, there is little evidence to suggest that any of the remaining factors (Soviet collapse and four Tiger membership) played any strong role in China's decision.

Table 5.5 WTO: International Influences Raw Data

WTO									
International	Influences	Number of Expert Responses for Each Category¹				Number of Generalist Responses for Each Category¹			
		0	1	2	3	0	1	2	3
STATUS	All developed countries and most developing countries were members. China wanted to be accepted as similar to these countries.	1	1	-	2	-	1	2	1
REGIONAL/ GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT	China realized that in order to reap the benefits of globalization it had to become a member of the international economic order's most important global organization. With greater understanding of how the global economy worked China realized that the only way to have a say in how things progressed in the future was to join the institution and work within the institution to promote policies favorable to China.	-	-	1	4	-	-	-	4
	The annual MFN debate in the United States was an economic and political thorn in relations between China and the US. Joining the WTO would end this annual debate.	-	-	2	3	-	-	3	1
	The 4 Asian Tigers had advanced far beyond China's economy and they had all joined GATT.	2	1	-	-	1	3	-	-
	The collapse of the Soviet Union shocked China. This was seen as an economic collapse that was at least partly a result of a lack of trade with other countries. China did not want the same thing to happen to it.	2	1	-	-	2	1	-	1
	China still felt pressure from the international community as a result of the Tiananmen events of 1989.	3	-	-	1	2	-	1	1

¹3=very important; 2=important; 1=somewhat important; and 0=unimportant

Table 5.6 WTO: International Influences, Weighted and Overall Importance Scores

WTO				
<u>International</u>	<u>Influences</u>	<u>Expert Response Combined Weighted Score¹</u>	<u>Generalist Response Combined Weighted Score¹</u>	<u>Overall Score (Ranking)²</u>
REGIONAL/ GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT	-China realized that in order to reap the benefits of globalization it had to become a member of the international economic order's most important global organization. With greater understanding of how the global economy worked China realized that the only way to have a say in how things progressed in the future was to join the institution and work within the institution to promote policies favorable to China.	14	9	2.56 (VI)
REGIONAL/ GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT	-The annual MFN debate in the United States was an economic and political thorn in relations between China and the US. Joining the WTO would end this.	13	6.75	2.19 (I)
STATUS	-All developed countries and most developing countries were members. China wanted to be accepted as similar to these countries.	7	6	1.63 (I)
REGIONAL/ GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT	-China still felt pressure from the international community as a result of the Tiananmen events of 1989.	3	3.75	.84 (SI)
REGIONAL/ GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT	-The collapse of the Soviet Union shocked China. This was seen as an economic collapse that was at least partly a result of a lack of trade with other countries. China did not want the same thing to happen to it.	1	3	.57 (SI)

Table 5.6 (continued)

<u>International</u>	<u>Influences</u>	<u>Expert Response Combined Weighted Score¹</u>	<u>Generalist Response Combined Weighted Score¹</u>	<u>Overall Score (Ranking)²</u>
REGIONAL/ GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT	-The 4 Asian Tigers had advanced far beyond China's economy and they had all joined GATT.	1	2.25	.46 (UI)

¹Combined Weighted Score equals the sum of responses (numerical values) in each category (Table 5.5) times the relevant multiple (Expert response, multiple 1.0; Generalist response, multiple 0.75).

²Overall Score equals the sum of the weighted scores (expert and generalist) divided by the total number of respondents for each factor (Table 5.5).

Ranking: Very important: 2.25-3.0; Important: 1.5-2.24; Somewhat important: .75-1.49; Unimportant: Below .75

Table 5.7 is a combination of Tables 5.2, 5.4, and 5.6, compiled in an effort to determine the importance of influences across all three levels. Taken together, the decision by China to apply to join the WTO in 1995 appears impacted by factors at all levels of analysis. This differs somewhat from the international—state-societal focus anticipated in my hypothesis. For example, the three influences that we would score here as very important (the forces of globalization, the role of Deng Xiaoping, and aspects of the economy), come from three different levels of analysis, with one of these being previously unmentioned in the literature (new influences in bold). An additional seven influences (annual MFN debate, group influences, pressure related to the position of Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan, a generally liberal leadership, influence from research institute employees and academics, and a need to fit in globally) fall into the “important” category in our ranking system, with six of these new. Four other factors (the role of various bureaucratic entities, MOFTEC and the MFA, groups and businesses in China, and pressure from the international community) played “somewhat important” roles in the decision, while two others (collapse of the Soviet Union and impact of the Tigers) played no role at all in the view of respondents. Again, I would point out here the difference in perception over the factors relevant to China’s decision to apply to join the WTO found in the available literature

versus what the Chinese believe. In this case, nine of the fifteen factors considered relevant to the decision were uncovered in stage two. And once again, the role of societal factors tended to be discussed more by the Chinese than by English language sources.

Table 5.7 WTO: Weighted and Overall Importance Scores Across Levels of Analysis¹

WTO				
<u>Level of Analysis</u>	<u>Influences</u>	<u>Expert Response Combined Weighted Score²</u>	<u>Generalist Response Combined Weighted Score²</u>	<u>Overall Score (Ranking)³</u>
REGIONAL/ GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT	China realized that in order to reap the benefits of globalization it had to become a member of the international economic order's most important global organization. With greater understanding of how the global economy worked China realized that the only way to have a say in how things progressed in the future was to join the institution and work within the institution to promote policies favorable to China.	14	9	2.56 (VI)
DOMINANT INDIVIDUAL	DENG Xiaoping continued to be a guiding light in China's opening and eventual application to join the WTO.	15	5.25	2.25 (VI)
ECONOMY	The Chinese government wanted to use the WTO to help spur reform and economic growth. Joining the WTO and its system of regulations and requirements would promote the market system in China and help break down state monopolies.	12	8.25	2.25 (VI)
REGIONAL/ GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT	The annual MFN debate in the United States was an economic and political thorn in relations between China and the US. Joining the WTO would end this.	13	6.75	2.19 (I)

Table 5.7 (continued)

<u>Level of Analysis</u>	<u>Influences</u>	<u>Expert Response Combined Weighted Score²</u>	<u>Generalist Response Combined Weighted Score²</u>	<u>Overall Score (Ranking)³</u>
INSTITUTIONAL/ POLITICAL	There were concerns that by 1997, after the Hong Kong and Macao handovers, the provincial governments and Taiwan would be members. This would embarrass the central government.	10	5.25	1.91 (I)
GROUP INFLUENCES	The leaders had different perceptions and styles, but generally most were liberally minded.	10	5.25	1.90 (I)
NON-TRADITIONAL BUREAUCRACY	Academics and research institute employees favored applying to join the WTO.	11	3	1.75 (I)
STATUS	All developed countries and most developing countries were members. China wanted to be accepted as similar to these countries.	7	6	1.63 (I)
TRADITIONAL BUREAUCRACY	Many bureaucratic entities were influential, including: -State Economic and Trade Commission -State Planning Commission -State Owned Enterprises -Ministry of Post and Telecommunications -People's Bank of China -Ministry of Agriculture -Ministry of International Trade -State Council's Development Research Center	7	3.75	1.34 (SI)

Table 5.7 (continued)

<u>Level of Analysis</u>	<u>Influences</u>	<u>Expert Response Combined Weighted Score</u> ²	<u>Generalist Response Combined Weighted Score</u> ²	<u>Overall Score (Ranking)</u> ³
TRADITIONAL BUREAUCRACY	The forces for applying to join the WTO, which were the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) were more powerful than the forces against joining (Agricultural Ministry, Bank of China, services sector, intellectual property rights sector, the insurance industry, the communications industry, and other internally driven ministries)	5	3.75	1.09 (SI)
SOCIETY	There existed pressure to apply to join from successful groups and businesses linked to successful segments of the Chinese economy.	5	2.25	1.04 (SI)
REGIONAL/ GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT	China still felt pressure from the international community as a result of the Tiananmen events of 1989.	3	3.75	.84 (SI)
REGIONAL/ GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT	The collapse of the Soviet Union shocked China. This was seen as an economic collapse that was at least partly a result of a lack of trade with other countries. China did not want the same thing to happen to it.	1	3	.57 (SI)
REGIONAL/ GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT	The 4 Asian Tigers had advanced far beyond China's economy and they had all joined GATT.	1	2.25	.46 (UI)

¹Bold print indicates new factors uncovered at stage two of our research.

²Combined Weighted Score equals the sum of responses (numerical values) in each category times the relevant multiple (Expert response, multiple 1.0; Generalist response, multiple 0.75).

³Overall Score equals the sum of the weighted scores (expert and generalist) divided by the total number of respondents for each factor.

Ranking: Very important: 2.25-3.0; Important: 1.5-2.24; Somewhat important: .75-1.49; Unimportant: Below .75

Section III: China's Decisions to Apply to Join Multilateral Security Institutions

Chapter Six: China and the IAEA

Background

China applied to join the International Atomic Energy Agency on September 5, 1983. Prior to that time China showed little support for and little interest in the activities of the IAEA. At that time it was the only one of the world's five nuclear weapon nations not to belong to the IAEA, which polices the NPT and promotes international collaboration in nuclear energy (Fishlock, 1983). On October 10, 1983, during the IAEA's 27th conference, China was admitted as an IAEA member and on January 1, 1984 officially became a member. Interestingly, during the October IAEA meeting the Chinese said they still opposed the nuclear nonproliferation treaty administered by the IAEA (The New York Times, 1/7/84).

For the next eighteen years, China made a number of important declarations and commitments in addressing the concerns of the IAEA. For example, in September of 1985 China announced it would voluntarily submit a few of its civilian nuclear facilities to IAEA safeguards (Blum, 9/25/85). Later that year, China announced that it would ask all recipient countries to accept IAEA safeguards. The basic purpose of IAEA safeguards is to verify that nuclear material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other explosive devices. IAEA safeguards are of two types. One type is the so called limited-scope safeguards. These safeguards are placed on individual plants, shipments of nuclear fuel, or supply agreements between importers and exporters. The other type of safeguards is full-scope safeguards. These safeguards are mandatory and apply to all nuclear materials in all peaceful nuclear activities within a country's territory or under its control.

On September 18, 1988, China and the IAEA concluded a voluntary-offer safeguards agreement in which China included a list of the Chinese facilities subject to such safeguards (Christian Science Monitor, 9/21/88). One year later this agreement became effective. Later, in the fall of 1989, China agreed to apply IAEA safeguards to cover its nuclear power reactor sale to Pakistan. Next, in November of 1991, China announced that it would report to the IAEA any export or import of nuclear materials of one kilogram or greater. In March of 1992, China acceded to the NPT. Further, in 1993 China agreed to voluntarily report to the IAEA about any imports or exports of nuclear materials and all exports of nuclear equipment and related non-nuclear materials. Finally, in January of 1999, China and the IAEA signed an additional protocol to an existing agreement in which China assumes obligations to bring its civil nuclear projects under IAEA control. At present, the principal modes of cooperation between the Agency and China are:

...as a designated Board Member, attend the Board meetings, and take part in the policy-making activities of the IAEA; as a developing Member State, obtain TC assistance from the IAEA; take part in training courses, fellowship and academic activity sponsored by the IAEA; make due contributions to the technical assistance of the IAEA by way of providing voluntary contributions to TC assistance, sending abroad its experts, holding training courses, etc.; take part in the IAEA activities associated with nuclear safety and physical protection for nuclear materials, aiming to improve the management level in nuclear safety and physical protection for nuclear materials; and take part in the IAEA safeguards activities to prevent nuclear proliferation (Chinese Atomic Energy Agency, 2004).

Influences

Unlike the economic cases, stage one of my research uncovered very few factors mentioned as influences at any level of analysis. The list of factors at stages two and three are also somewhat limited. The reasons for this lack of evidence are two-fold. First, falling as it does in the security issue-area, a discussion of the IAEA is likely to elicit fewer

responses as a result of the sensitive nature of the topic. Second, with the IAEA decision taking place over twenty years ago, in a China whose foreign policy decisions occurred in a more closed environment, we might expect to find fewer factors impacting China's decision.

Leadership Level

Research at stage one indicates no distinct leadership influences for this decision. This is a result that is both interesting and hard to explain. One would assume a prominent role for the Chinese leadership in making this decision, but it is not suggested by our research at stage two either. One reason for this may be the result of the open-ended questioning undertaken during the course of interviews. In an effort to allow interviewees as much freedom and leeway as possible in their responses, they were not pushed if they did not suggest relevant factors at each level of analysis. In retrospect, it would probably have made for a better analysis in this case study had I pushed slightly for thoughts on leadership level factors.

State-Societal Level

At stage one, there are no national security apparatus factors found to impact specifically on China's decision to apply to join the IAEA. However, at the Chinese research stage, factors mentioned fit into the state of the economy and bureaucratic categories. These factors are: the adoption of an open-door economic policy; the support of the military and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA); and pressure from the technical scientific communities. First, an open-door policy promoted by the government was a precondition for joining any international organization, including the IAEA (Interview with former official, MFA, November 2001). While most references to the open-door policy focus

on economics, even with regard to the IAEA this was a pre-condition for joining. Prior to enacting the open-door policy of the late-1970s, China was a member of few international security organizations (as compared to the total number of these organizations). Following the policy of opening, there was an increase in the level of China's participation in these organizations.

Second, the military and MFA were (and still are) the most important bureaucratic entities dealing with non-proliferation and arms control. MFA officials and other experts gradually learned about the IAEA and thought it was in China's interest to join (Interview with former official, MFA, November 2001; Interview with professor, Fudan University, November 2001). In the early 1980s, it was the MFA's International Organization Department, which was responsible for providing information on international organizations, dealing with the intricacies of membership application, and the day-to-day involvement of Chinese membership. At the same time the military was concerned with anything related to China's nuclear weapons capabilities. As suggested elsewhere in relation to China's participation in international economic organizations, knowledge of the intricacies of international organizations was not very high in China in the late-70s to early-80s as a result of the Cultural Revolution and an overall lack of competent personnel. This was surely the case for China's knowledge of the IAEA. For example, while the MFA's Department of International Organizations dealt with initial IAEA inquiries, it was not until the mid-1990s that the MFA created the Arms Control and Disarmament Department, an entity that would deal specifically with such issues. Furthermore, it was not until the mid-1990s that the PLA set up a small leading arms control group in the Central Military Commission to coordinate arms control policy research across the system. However,

progress was being made. Joining the Conference on Disarmament in 1980 required a level of expertise and sophistication that in turn required training arms control experts primarily in the MFA (Johnston and Evans, 1999). Furthermore, in September of 1982, China sent three experts to observe IAEA meetings in Geneva and in August of 1983, IAEA leaders were invited to China to meet with Chinese leaders (Xinhua, 9/13/82 and 8/15/83). The subsequent increase in the level of sophistication in dealing with the IAEA was crucial to China's decision to apply to join.

Finally, it was suggested that China's technical scientific communities were important (Interview with former official, MFA, July 2001). Joining organizations such as the IAEA, NPT, and CTBT require a level of scientific expertise that is not a prerequisite for membership in organizations such as the GATT and WTO. In carrying out its mandate, the IAEA groups its activities into the three areas of technology, safety, and verification. To be a member, China needed expertise in areas as diverse as: nuclear power around the world; nuclear fuel cycle and waste technology; the global climate change debate; advanced technologies and innovative designs; the maintenance of knowledge and competence; applications of nuclear technologies; developments in nuclear safety; developments in radiation and radioactive waste safety; the international non-proliferation disarmament scene; the implementation of safeguards agreements and additional protocols; integrated safeguards; new technologies; and the physical protection of nuclear material. Such expertise could only come from technical scientific communities. These communities fall under the direction of the State Council, MFA, and military. However, these technical scientific communities were rare commodities in pre-1978 China. In fact, it was not until February 1980 that the first meeting of the Chinese Nuclear Society was

convened (Xinhua, 2/22/80). Meetings such as these helped provide decision-makers with the knowledge necessary to commit to the IAEA and apply for membership (Interview with former official, MFA, July 2001).

Stage three confirmation form responses are presented in Table 6.1. The raw data seems to suggest that all state-societal level factors played almost equally important roles. In response to the confirmation forms, four experts and two generalists marked the economic factor as very important, while two experts and one generalist marked it important, and one generalist as unimportant. The role of the military and MFA was suggested by three experts and a generalist to be very important, while one expert and three generalists marked it important, and yet another expert marked it as somewhat important. Support for the role of the scientific community in China's decision appears a bit weaker. One generalist marked this very important, two experts as important, and one expert as somewhat important. Analysis of the weighted scores (Table 6.2) suggests a similar picture with all factors being ranked as important.

Table 6.1 IAEA: State-Societal Influences Raw Data

IAEA									
<u>State-Societal</u>	<u>Influences</u>	<u>Number of Expert Responses for Each Category¹</u>				<u>Number of Generalist Responses for Each Category¹</u>			
		0	1	2	3	0	1	2	3
ECONOMY	-An open-door policy promoted by the government was important because it was a pre-condition for joining any international organization, including the IAEA.	-	-	2	4	1	-	1	2
TRADITIONAL BUREAUCRACY	-The military and Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) were the most important on arms control. MFA officials and other experts gradually learned about the IAEA and thought it was in China's interest to join.	-	1	1	3	-	-	3	1
NON-TRADITIONAL BUREAUCRACY	-The technical scientific communities were important, especially in the fields related to high-tech.	-	1	2	-	-	-	-	1

¹3=very important; 2=important; 1=somewhat important; and 0=unimportant

Table 6.2 IAEA: State-Societal Influences, Weighted and Overall Importance Scores

IAEA				
<u>State-Societal</u>	<u>Influences</u>	<u>Expert Response Combined Weighted Score</u>¹	<u>Generalist Response Combined Weighted Score</u>¹	<u>Overall Score (Ranking)</u>²
ECONOMY	-An open-door policy promoted by the government was important because it was a pre-condition for joining any international organization, including the IAEA.	16	6	2.20 (I)
TRADITIONAL BUREAUCRACY	-The military and Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) were the most important on arms control. MFA officials and other experts gradually learned about the IAEA and thought it was in China's interest to join.	12	6.75	2.08 (I)
NON-TRADITIONAL BUREAUCRACY	-The technical scientific communities were important, especially in the fields related to high-tech.	5	2.25	1.81 (I)

¹Combined Weighted Score equals the sum of responses (numerical values) in each category (Table 6.1) times the relevant multiple (Expert response, multiple 1.0; Generalist response, multiple 0.75).

²Overall Score equals the sum of the weighted scores (expert and generalist) divided by the total number of respondents for each factor (Table 6.1).

Ranking: Very important: 2.25-3.0; Important: 1.5-2.24; Somewhat important: .75-1.49; Unimportant: Below .75

International Level

In the preliminary stage of research, I found a number of references to China's application to join the IAEA, including pressure from the Western powers, and Japan's reluctance to sell China equipment for nuclear power plants without China first becoming a member of the IAEA. By the early-1980s, all known nuclear powers had signed on to the IAEA except for China. As a result, non-member China was seen as somewhat of a renegade nuclear power (Agence France Press, 8/15/83). In June 1983, China broke ground for its first nuclear power plant. At the same time, China was looking to buy equipment for the plant from outside the country, particularly from Japan (Nuclear News, July 1983). However, Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry was wary of such business because China had not yet joined the IAEA (Nuclear News, July 1983). China applied to join the IAEA a few months later.

Analysis in stage two suggests that China felt pressure to join the IAEA from other declared nuclear powers (Interview with professor, Beijing University, July 2001). Many interviewees made the suggestion that China's foreign policy decision-making is impacted by outside influences, but it is exceedingly difficult to prove. However, as Gill and Medieros suggest, it seems plausible that international pressures are increasingly influencing China in the realm of its arms control and nonproliferation policies (Gill and Medieros, 2000).

To better understand the logic behind why many feel that international factors influenced China's decision to apply to join the IAEA, we need to give some more detail on the history of China's relationship with this organization. To become a member of the IAEA a country must adhere to the safeguards, which are at the very root of the IAEA's existence. These safeguards attempt to verify that nuclear material is not diverted from peaceful

applications to nuclear weapons or other explosive devices. China's views on non-proliferation and arms control institutions have changed substantially since the late-1970s. For the most part, China refused to participate and often claimed that these institutions were tools of the superpowers. By 1970, China had only signed on to become a member in 10-20% of all arms control institutions (Swaine and Johnston, 1999, p. 101). But by 1996 China's participation rate in arms control institutions had reached 85-90% of the total (Swaine and Johnston, 1999, p. 101). While China's participation increased over time, by the early-1980s, all known nuclear powers had signed on to the IAEA except for China. However, as early as 1963 in comments made about the Limited Test Ban Treaty, China suggested that it would not approve the import and export of nuclear weapons. Further, after other countries signed the NPT in 1968, China stated that it would avoid nuclear proliferation and would not help other states acquire nuclear capabilities. So it was not a complete surprise when China applied to join the IAEA. Discussions about China's participation began and by August of 1983 the government alluded to its impending application when Qi Huaiyuan, the Director of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Information Department stated; "If China joins the IAEA, it will accept the relevant provisions in the statute of the agency, including the relevant provisions on safeguards" (Beijing Review, 8/22/1983).

Table 6.3 presents the raw results of our research at stage three. The idea that other declared nuclear powers were pressuring China to become a responsible nuclear power by joining the IAEA was marked by one expert as very important, three as important, one as somewhat important, and one as unimportant. The generalists who responded to the IAEA case study found this factor to be important (two), somewhat important, or unimportant.

However, compared to state influences, this factor seems to have played a minimal role, scoring only as “somewhat important” in the overall weighted scheme (see Table 6.4).

Table 6.3 IAEA: International Influences Raw Data

<u>IAEA</u>									
<u>International</u>	<u>Influences</u>	<u>Number of Expert Responses for Each Category¹</u>				<u>Number of Generalist Responses for Each Category¹</u>			
		0	1	2	3	0	1	2	3
GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT	-The other declared nuclear powers were pressuring China to become a responsible nuclear power by joining the IAEA.	1	1	3	1	1	1	2	-

¹3=very important; 2=important; 1=somewhat important; and 0=unimportant

Table 6.4 IAEA: International Influences, Weighted and Overall Importance Scores

<u>IAEA</u>				
<u>International</u>	<u>Influences</u>	<u>Expert Response Combined Weighted Score</u> ¹	<u>Generalist Response Combined Weighted Score</u> ¹	<u>Overall Score (Ranking)</u> ²
GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT	-The other declared nuclear powers were pressuring China to become a responsible nuclear power by joining the IAEA.	10	3.75	1.38 (SI)

¹Combined Weighted Score equals the sum of responses (numerical values) in each category (Table 6.3) times the relevant multiple (Expert response, multiple 1.0; Generalist response, multiple 0.75).

²Overall Score equals the sum of the weighted scores (expert and generalist) divided by the total number of respondents for each factor (Table 6.3).

Ranking: Very important: 2.25-3.0; Important: 1.5-2.24; Somewhat important: .75-1.49; Unimportant: Below .75

Overall, the picture this data presents (see Table 6.5) is that of a decision driven by a number of “important” state level influences, including China’s open-door policy, the role of the MFA and military, and increased understanding by China’s scientific communities as to the positive aspects of the IAEA. This does not conform to my hypothesis, which proposed that leadership would be most important in the security arena. Pressure from the other declared nuclear powers appears to have played a lesser role in China’s decision.

Table 6.5 IAEA: Weighted and Overall Importance Scores Across Levels of Analysis¹

<u>IAEA</u>				
<u>Level of Analysis</u>	<u>Influences</u>	<u>Expert Response Combined Weighted Score</u> ²	<u>Generalist Response Combined Weighted Score</u> ²	<u>Overall Score (Ranking)</u> ³
ECONOMY	-An open-door policy promoted by the government was important because it was a pre-condition for joining any international organization, including the IAEA.	16	6	2.20 (I)
TRADITIONAL BUREAUCRACY	-The military and Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) were the most important on arms control. MFA officials and other experts gradually learned about the IAEA and thought it was in China's interest to join.	12	6.75	2.08 (I)
NON-TRADITIONAL BUREAUCRACY	-The technical scientific communities were important, especially in the fields related to high-tech.	5	2.25	1.81 (I)
GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT	-The other declared nuclear powers were pressuring China to become a responsible nuclear power by joining the IAEA.	10	3.75	1.38 (SI)

¹Bold print indicates new factors uncovered at stage two of our research.

²Combined Weighted Score equals the sum of responses (numerical values) in each category times the relevant multiple (Expert response, multiple 1.0; Generalist response, multiple 0.75).

³Overall Score equals the sum of the weighted scores (expert and generalist) divided by the total number of respondents for each factor.

Ranking: Very important: 2.25-3.0; Important: 1.5-2.24; Somewhat important: .75-1.49; Unimportant: Below .75

Chapter Seven: China and the NPT

Background

China was not an original signatory to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, also known as the Non-Proliferation Treaty or NPT. In fact, for many years China vehemently opposed the NPT. In a 1978 document submitted to the UN, the Chinese government states:

The so-called NPT is a conspiracy concocted by the USSR and the US to maintain their nuclear monopoly. By it, they not only try to restrict other countries in their efforts to develop nuclear force for self-defense, but limit their peaceful uses of nuclear energy. While the two superpowers are further intensifying the vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons, they seek to limit the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. They praise the NPT as a major measure in overcoming the threat of nuclear war. This does not convince others. There is no reason to impose the NPT on other countries arbitrarily (Quoted in Zhu Mingquan, 1997, p. 43).

The Chinese held this belief for quite some time. However, this did not mean that they were in favor of nuclear weapons proliferation. In fact, in 1979, then Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping suggested that China stood for “destroying all nuclear weapons completely” (Xinhua, 14 February 1979; in FBIS Special Memorandum, 18 December 1991).

During the 1980s, China continued to attack the NPT as an imbalanced, discriminatory treaty, but it began to change its view regarding more general nonproliferation. For example, in 1982 China first stated its support for the norm of nonproliferation. Then in September 1983, China applied to join the IAEA, becoming a member in 1984. Under this agreement China agreed to place all of its nuclear exports under the safeguards of the IAEA. Almost immediately after officially becoming a member of the IAEA, Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang during a speech at a White House state dinner, further clarified China’s position on nonproliferation:

We are critical of the discriminatory treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, but we do not advocate or encourage nuclear proliferation. We do not engage in nuclear proliferation ourselves, nor do we help other countries develop nuclear weapons. We actively support all proposals that are truly helpful to realizing nuclear disarmament, terminating the nuclear arms race, and eliminating the threat of nuclear war (Xinhua, 11 January 1984; in FBIS Special Memorandum, 18 December 1991).

As the 1980s wore on, the Chinese continued to criticize the efforts of the NPT focusing particularly on its placing of limits on horizontal proliferation, while placing no limits on the continual expansion and improvements of the nuclear arsenals of the superpowers (U.S. and USSR).

In 1990, China, though still not a member, sent a delegation to attend the fourth NPT Review Conference. While continuing to criticize the treaty, focusing now on the lack of provisions banning the deployment of nuclear weapons on the territories of non-nuclear weapon states, the head of the delegation, Ambassador Hou Zhitong, did suggest that the Treaty had “played some positive role in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons” (Xinhua, 12 September 1990; in FBIS Special Memorandum, 18 December 1991). Later that year, in a statement to the UN General Assembly, Ambassador Hou reiterated this positive assessment of NPT undertakings, while stating that China supported the three major objectives set forth in the Treaty: preventing nuclear weapon proliferation; promoting nuclear disarmament; and facilitating the peaceful use of nuclear energy. (Xinhua, 24 October 1990; in FBIS Special Memorandum, 18 December 1991).

Early the following year, Chinese officials began to suggest that China was considering joining the NPT and in August of 1991, shortly after France acceded to the NPT, China declared its intention to join. This intention was backed up by action, when in December of that year, at the 23rd session of China’s Standing Committee of the National People’s

Congress, a resolution was passed calling for China's accession to the NPT. Following on the heels of that resolution, China applied to and became a member of the NPT on March 9, 1992. In its statement of accession, China called on all nuclear powers to take five measures: to issue unconditional no-first-use pledges; to issue negative and positive security assurances to the non-nuclear weapon states; to support the development of nuclear weapons free zones; to withdraw all nuclear weapons deployed outside national territories; and to halt the arms race in outer space.

Since becoming a member, China has continued to voice support for the NPT and China agreed with the decision in 1995 to extend the NPT indefinitely. At the same time, China continues to state that it views nonproliferation not as an end in itself, but as a means to the complete destruction of nuclear weapons. Over time, China has also been faced with various warnings, particularly from the U.S. about its NPT obligations in the context of alleged nuclear technology transfers to Iran and Pakistan. China has addressed these accusations and appears to be adhering to the obligations of the NPT.

Influences

Leadership Level

Stage one research uncovered no mention of important influences at either the leadership or state-societal levels of analysis on the decision to join the NPT. Instead, the English-language research stressed international-level factors as having the main impact on China's decision. However, in my Chinese language research, leadership influences were noted in both dominant individual and group categories. First, interviewees noted that in 1985, Deng Xiaoping made a key speech on international institutions in which he spoke about their relevance to peace, development and China's future. This speech seems to

have opened the way for China's involvement with the NPT (Interview with former official, MFA, July 2001; and Interview with official, SIIS; November 2001). Second, one interviewee also noted the impact of the leadership's more practical and less ideological foreign policy as it opened up to and learned more about the world (Interview with former official, MFA, November 2001).

At the stage three confirmation form level, the raw data (see Table 7.1) seems to suggest that the influences found in stage two were indeed important to China's decision. However, most important appears to be Deng Xiaoping himself. Almost as important was the idea that joining the NPT was part of the leadership's more practical and less ideological foreign policy. This basic analysis of the raw data is close to borne out in the weighted rankings found in Table 7.2. However, interestingly, the first and second factors mentioned above are in opposite order, suggesting that the group played a more important role than any individual.

Table 7.1 NPT: Leadership Influences Raw Data

NPT									
Leadership	Influences	Number of Expert Responses for Each Category¹				Number of Generalist Responses for Each Category¹			
		0	1	2	3	0	1	2	3
DOMINANT INDIVIDUAL	-Deng Xiaoping's thoughts and words were of overwhelming importance to this decision. His 1985 speech on international institutions and their relevance to peace and development paved the way for China's involvement with institutions like the NPT.	-	-	2	3	1	-	2	1
GROUP INFLUENCES	-Joining the NPT was part of the leadership's (plural) more practical and less ideological foreign policy as it opened up to and learned more about the world.	-	-	2	3	-	-	3	1

¹3=very important; 2=important; 1=somewhat important; and 0=unimportant

Table 7.2 NPT: Leadership Influences, Weighted and Overall Importance Scores

NPT				
<u>Leadership</u>	<u>Influences</u>	<u>Expert Response Combined Weighted Score</u>¹	<u>Generalist Response Combined Weighted Score</u>¹	<u>Overall Score (Ranking)</u>²
GROUP INFLUENCES	-Joining the NPT was part of the leadership's (plural) more practical and less ideological foreign policy as it opened up to and learned more about the world.	13	6.75	2.19
DOMINANT INDIVIDUAL	-Deng Xiaoping's thoughts and words were of overwhelming importance to this decision. His 1985 speech on international institutions and their relevance to peace and development paved the way for China's involvement with institutions like the NPT.	13	5.25	2.03

¹Combined Weighted Score equals the sum of responses (numerical values) in each category (Table 7.1) times the relevant multiple (Expert response, multiple 1.0; Generalist response, multiple 0.75).

²Overall Score equals the sum of the weighted scores (expert and generalist) divided by the total number of respondents for each factor (Table 7.1).

Ranking: Very important: 2.25-3.0; Important: 1.5-2.24; Somewhat important: .75-1.49; Unimportant: Below .75

State-Societal Level

Again, there is little in the English language literature to suggest state-societal influences that may have impacted China's decision to apply to join the NPT. In stage two, I found influences that fall into both the economic and traditional/non-traditional bureaucracy categories. With respect to the economy, one interviewee mentioned that even in this security realm, China's need to create more economic growth played a role. By joining security organizations, China would be seen as a responsible member of the international community and be more likely to receive continued and enhanced foreign direct investment, loans, and aid (Interview with professor, Fudan University, November 2001).

Second, and as with the IAEA, the role of the military and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) were suggested as important. Experts from each of these institutions took part in the Conference on Disarmament negotiations and began to see arms control and non-proliferation as beneficial.³⁸ As early as 1980, when China joined the Conference on Disarmament (CD), China began to train arms control experts in the MFA, over time rotating over 40 ministry officials through the CD delegation (Johnston and Evans, 1999, p. 240). Also, over the course of time, China built up its arms control community mainly in the MFA (Arms Control and Disarmament Department and Asia Department) and the PLA (General Staff Department) (Swaine and Johnston, 1999).

Third, the possible influence of Chinese embassies abroad in this decision was mentioned. Embassy personnel played a positive role by providing information to the central government regarding the NPT (Interview with former official, MFA, November 2001).

Fourth, according to a number of different sources, prior to applying to join the NPT there were more and more pro-NPT articles being written independently by the academic and research communities. The National Defense University, the Chinese Institute of International Strategic Studies (CIISS), Chinese Academy of Rocket Research, PLA, College of Preventive Chemistry, and Fudan University—all played crucial roles in providing information to the government. For example, as early as 1987, articles appeared suggesting military support for nonproliferation. China's leaders eventually accepted this pro-NPT view.³⁹

³⁸Interview with official, CASS, July 2001; Interview with former official, MFA, July 2001; Interview with Director, Arms Control Program, Institute of International Studies, Qinghua University, October 2001; Interview with former official, MFA, November 2001; and Interview with official, SIIS, November 2001.

³⁹Interview with former official, MFA, July 2001; Interview with professor, Beijing University, July 2001; and Interview with official, SIIS, November 2001; and Interview with official, CICIR, November 2001.

Finally, as was the case with the economic decisions, the personnel that China needed to both understand the NPT and to deal with China/NPT interaction were now in place. Without the proper personnel, China would have been unable to adequately handle the day to-day functions of NPT membership.⁴⁰

Raw data (Table 7.3) at stage three suggests that support for influences at this level of analysis was spread a bit more evenly across factors than at other levels of analysis and for other multilateral institutions. However, two variables seem to stand out slightly from the others. First, the role of the MFA and military and their support for applying to join the NPT appear to have played a crucial role in China's decision, with two experts marking it very important, two important, and two somewhat important, while the generalists all (four) found this factor to be important. The other factor seeming to receive a bit more support than the remaining four is economic in nature. China believed by joining security organizations like the NPT it would be seen as a responsible member of the international community and thus reap the benefits of continued and enhanced foreign direct investment, loans, and aid that would accompany such status. One expert and one generalist checked this factor as very important, four experts and two generalists as important, one expert as somewhat important, and one generalist as unimportant.

Two other variables at the state-societal level also received a moderate level of support: with respect to the idea that China applied to join the NPT when it did because it now had the personnel in place needed to deal with the NPT, expert opinions were varied with responses ranging from very important (one) to important (two) to somewhat important (one) and even unimportant (two), the last with which one generalist agreed. The other

⁴⁰Interview with former official, MFA, July 2001; Interview with official, CICIR, November 2001; and Interview with professor, Fudan University, November 2001.

generalists believed this factor to be important (three). Second, the relevance of research institutes, their reports, and the pro-NPT nature of these reports received support in the course of our inquiries. Responses to the confirmation forms ranked this as important (two experts, three generalists), somewhat important (two experts, one generalist) and unimportant (two experts).

Finally, one variable appears to have received little support from our respondents. The suggestion that Chinese embassies played a positive role providing information on the NPT, which might push China toward applying garnered low levels of support. Experts marked this factor as important (two), somewhat important (one), and unimportant (two). In addition, generalists marked this factor as important (two) and somewhat important (two).

The information provided in Table 7.4 mainly supports the suppositions made by looking simply at the raw data. The picture this data presents is of a decision impacted at the state-societal level by bureaucratic experts in the military and MFA, and an overarching concern with economic growth. In fact, these two influences are the only two that seem to be of any major significance in this decision, both being ranked as important. The remaining three influences (presence of personnel capable of dealing with the NPT, the appearance of pro-NPT writings from various research institutes and universities, and overseas embassies sending back information on the NPT) are categorized only as “somewhat important” in the overall scheme.

Table 7.3 NPT: State-Societal Influences Raw Data

NPT									
State-Societal	Influences	Number of Expert Responses for Each Category¹				Number of Generalist Responses for Each Category¹			
		0	1	2	3	0	1	2	3
ECONOMY	China needed to create more economic growth. By joining security organizations China would be seen as a responsible member of the international community and become more likely to receive continued and enhanced foreign direct investment, loans, and aid.	-	1	4	1	1	-	2	1
TRADITIONAL/ NON- TRADITIONAL BUREAUCRACY	The military and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) were the most important on arms control. Experts in each of these were very important with both taking part in the Conference on Disarmament negotiations and beginning to see arms control and non-proliferation as beneficial.	-	2	2	2	-	-	4	-
	Embassies played a positive role providing information on the NPT.	2	1	2	-	-	2	2	-
	Prior to applying to join the NPT there were more and more pro-NPT articles being written. The National Defense University, CISS, Chinese Academy of Rocket Research, PLA, College of Preventive Chemistry, and Fudan University—all played crucial roles in providing information to the government. For example, as early as 1987, articles appear suggesting military support for nonproliferation. Eventually, this view was accepted by the leaders.	2	2	2	-	-	1	3	-
	The personnel that China needed to both understand the NPT and to deal with China/NPT interaction were now in place. Prior to this time, China would have been ill-equipped, from a personnel point-of-view, to join the NPT.	2	1	2	1	1	-	3	-

¹3=very important; 2=important; 1=somewhat important; and 0=unimportant

Table 7.4 NPT: State-Societal Influences, Weighted and Overall Importance Scores

NPT				
<u>State-Societal</u>	<u>Influences</u>	<u>Expert Response Combined Weighted Score¹</u>	<u>Generalist Response Combined Weighted Score¹</u>	<u>Overall Score (Ranking)²</u>
TRADITIONAL BUREAUCRACY	The military and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) were the most important on arms control. Experts in each of these were very important with both taking part in the Conference on Disarmament negotiations and beginning to see arms control and non-proliferation as beneficial.	12	6	1.80 (I)
ECONOMY	China needed to create more economic growth. By joining security organizations China would be seen as a responsible member of the international community and become more likely to receive continued and enhanced foreign direct investment, loans, and aid.	12	5.25	1.73 (I)
TRADITIONAL BUREAUCRACY	The personnel that China needed to both understand the NPT and to deal with China/NPT interaction were now in place. Prior to this time, China would have been ill-equipped, from a personnel point-of-view, to join the NPT.	8	4.5	1.25 (SI)

Table 7.4 (continued)

<u>State-Societal</u>	<u>Influences</u>	<u>Expert Response Combined Weighted Score</u> ¹	<u>Generalist Response Combined Weighted Score</u> ¹	<u>Overall Score (Ranking)</u> ²
NON-TRADITIONAL BUREAUCRACY	Prior to applying to join the NPT there were more and more pro-NPT articles being written. The National Defense University, CISS, Chinese Academy of Rocket Research, PLA, College of Preventive Chemistry, and Fudan University—all played crucial roles in providing information to the government. For example, as early as 1987, articles appear suggesting military support for nonproliferation. Eventually, this view was accepted by the leaders.	6	5.25	1.13 (SI)
TRADITIONAL BUREAUCRACY	Embassies played a positive role providing information on the NPT.	5	4.5	1.06 (SI)

¹Combined Weighted Score equals the sum of responses (numerical values) in each category (Table 7.3) times the relevant multiple (Expert response, multiple 1.0; Generalist response, multiple 0.75).

²Overall Score equals the sum of the weighted scores (expert and generalist) divided by the total number of respondents for each factor (Table 7.3).

Ranking: Very important: 2.25-3.0; Important: 1.5-2.24; Somewhat important: .75-1.49; Unimportant: Below .75

International Level

As already noted, it was only at the international level that influences on China's decision were found in the English language literature. In fact, there is considerable overlap between the influences uncovered at stage one and those mentioned during interviews at stage two. These influences include: concerns about China's image, access to technology, ending isolation after Tiananmen, and the relative ease of joining/lack of costs to joining. First, when France decided to join the NPT in the early-1990s, all known nuclear powers had signed on to the NPT except for China. To sustain the image of a responsible member of

the international community China felt it had to join (Johnston and Evans, 1999; and Swaine and Johnston, 1999). Second, according to the literature, by joining the NPT, China would have greater access to technologies and energy resources previously held back by other countries (Johnston and Evans, 1999, p. 248). Third, following the events at Tiananmen Square in the summer of 1989, countries throughout the world, led by the United States, imposed severe sanctions on exports from China and imports to China. Though many of these sanctions were short-lived, heading into 1991, there were still some in place that were proving to be a hindrance to China's development. By joining the NPT, China believed it could break out of this externally imposed isolation (Johnston and Evans, 1999, p. 251). Lastly, it has been suggested that China was influenced to join the NPT by the relative painlessness of the organization's rules and regulations for a country like China (Swaine and Johnston, 1999, p. 109). From the beginning the NPT has always been an institution more concerned with the horizontal spread of nuclear weapons than vertical spread. Because of this, China, a country already possessing nuclear weapons, would experience little in the way of costs by applying to join the NPT.

Stage two research finds support for all four of these suggested influences, plus a number of new possibilities. A number of interviewees supported the view that China applied to join the NPT because the Chinese government wanted to get rid of Tiananmen sanctions.⁴¹ Others supported the view that after the French said they would join, China would be left as the only declared nuclear power not adhering to the NPT. This placed China under a great deal of pressure to join.⁴² Third, it was further suggested that China

⁴¹Interview, Beijing University, July 2001; Interview, Fudan University, November 2001; and Interview, Fudan University, November 2001.

⁴²Interview, Beijing University, July 2001; Interview, Qinghua University, October 2001; Interview, Fudan University, November 2001.

applied to join to get the technology agreed to in a 1985 US-China technology/energy agreement, which was being held up by a lack of adherence to NPT (Interview, Beijing University, July 2001). Fourth, two interviewees believed that the fact that joining the NPT was not costly to China influenced China's decision. Furthermore, China's joining would stop other non-nuclear signatories from becoming new nuclear competitors (Interview, Qinghua University, October 2001; and Interview with official, CASS, November 2001).

Three other factors, not found at stage one, were also brought to bear during the course of discussions at stage two. One interviewee mentioned the idea that the Chinese government wanted to get rid of sanctions that the U.S. had imposed in 1991 due to alleged Chinese arms transfers to Pakistan (Interview with professor, Beijing University, July 2001). Three other interviewees brought up the idea that the end of the Cold War led to greater global support for non-proliferation, a factor that affected China's position.⁴³ Finally, a number of interviewees believed that China's desire for a better image after the Tiananmen events of 1989 pushed it into applying to join the NPT.⁴⁴

At stage three the raw data responses were as follows (See Table 7.5). With respect to status issues, the belief that China wanted to develop a better image after the Tiananmen events, believing that joining the NPT would help create an image of China as a responsible power was marked by one expert as important, while three others and a generalist suggested it to be only somewhat important. The other generalists' responses ranged from very important to important to unimportant. A good deal of support was found for the

⁴³Interview with former official, MFA, July 2001; Interview with former official, MFA, November 2001; and Interview with official, SIIIS, November 2001.

⁴⁴Interview with former official, MFA, Summer 2001; Interview with professor, Beijing University, Summer 2001; Interview with former official, MFA, November 2001; Interview with professor, Fudan University, November 2001; and Interview with professor, Fudan University, November 2001.

importance of the pressure put on China when the French declared their intention to join the NPT. French membership would leave China as the only declared nuclear power not adhering to the NPT, thereby placing China under a great deal of pressure to join. Four experts found this factor to be important, while one thought it somewhat important, and another unimportant. Generalists marked this factor as important or somewhat important (three). Third, the fact that at the end of the Cold War there was greater global support for non-proliferation was supported by experts, who marked this factor as very important, three as important and two as somewhat important. In addition, the generalists found this factor to be important (three) or somewhat important. Fourth, the experts thought that the idea that the Chinese government wanted to get rid of the sanctions imposed on China by other countries following Tiananmen was very important (one), somewhat important (one) and unimportant (one). The generalists concurred with these views, marking important, somewhat important, and unimportant (two). Fifth, regarding the idea that the government, by joining the NPT, hoped to get rid of sanctions that the U.S. had imposed on China in 1991 due to alleged arms transfers to Pakistan, one expert found this factor very important, the majority did not. The generalists marked this influence as either somewhat important (two) or unimportant. Sixth, the idea that China applied to the NPT so that it could finally receive the technology included in a 1985 U.S.-China technology/energy agreement, which was being held up by a lack of Chinese adherence to the NPT, seemed to receive little support from our respondents. Only one expert and one generalist respondent marked this factor as important, while the others found it to be either somewhat important (four experts, one generalist) or unimportant (one expert, two generalists). Finally, the thought that China applied to join the NPT as a result of the ease of entrance (lack of debilitating costs) and the

influence Chinese membership might have on countries looking to become nuclear powers was supported as very important by one expert, important (three), and somewhat important (two). The generalists responding to this inquiry marked this factor as somewhat important (four). Converting this raw data from Table 7.5 into rankings in Table 7.6 we see a picture of myriad international influences with impact upon China's decision to apply to join the NPT. However, only the end of the Cold War appears to have been an important factor at this level of analysis. After this, all other influences were ranked as "somewhat important."

Table 7.5 NPT: International Influences Raw Data

NPT									
International	Influences	Number of Expert Responses for Each Category¹				Number of Generalist Responses for Each Category¹			
		0	1	2	3	0	1	2	3
STATUS	China wanted a better image after the Tiananmen events of 1989. It believed that joining the NPT could help it create an image of a responsible power.	-	3	1	-	1	1	1	1
REGIONAL/ GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT	The French said they would join. That would leave China as the only declared nuclear power not adhering to the NPT. This placed China under a great deal of pressure to join.	1	1	4	-	-	3	1	-
	The end of the Cold War changed the world's views on proliferation; toward greater support for non-proliferation. China was pushed into applying to join the NPT as a result.	-	2	3	1	-	1	3	-
	The Chinese government wanted to get rid of Tiananmen sanctions. It believed that joining the NPT could help.	1	4	-	1	2	1	1	-
	The Chinese government wanted to get rid of sanctions that the US had imposed in 1991 due to alleged Chinese arms transfers to Pakistan. It believed that joining the NPT would help.	-	5	-	1	1	2	-	-
	China applied to join to get the technology included in a 1985 US-China technology/energy agreement, which was being held up by a lack of adherence to NPT.	1	4	1	-	2	1	1	-
	Although the NPT would not have much effect on China, a country that already possessed nuclear weapons, it would stop other non-nuclear signatories from becoming new nuclear competitors.	-	2	3	1	-	4	-	-

¹3=very important; 2=important; 1=somewhat important; and 0=unimportant

Table 7.6 NPT: International Influences, Weighted and Overall Importance Scores

NPT				
<u>International</u>	<u>Influences</u>	<u>Expert Response Combined Weighted Score¹</u>	<u>Generalist Response Combined Weighted Score¹</u>	<u>Overall Score (Ranking)²</u>
REGIONAL/ GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT	The end of the Cold War changed the world's views on proliferation; toward greater support for non-proliferation. China was pushed into applying to join the NPT as a result.	11	5.25	1.63 (I)
REGIONAL/ GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT	Although the NPT would not have much effect on China, a country that already possessed nuclear weapons, it would stop other non-nuclear signatories from becoming new nuclear competitors.	11	3	1.40 (SI)
STATUS	The French said they would join. That would leave China as the only declared nuclear power not adhering to the NPT. This placed China under a great deal of pressure to join.	9	3.75	1.275 (SI)
REGIONAL/ GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT	The Chinese government wanted to get rid of sanctions that the US had imposed in 1991 due to alleged Chinese arms transfers to Pakistan. It believed that joining the NPT would help.	8	1.5	1.06 (SI)
STATUS	China wanted a better image after the Tiananmen events of 1989. It believed that joining the NPT could help it create an image of a responsible power.	5	4.5	1.06 (SI)

Table 7.6 (continued)

<u>International</u>	<u>Influences</u>	<u>Expert Response Combined Weighted Score</u> ¹	<u>Generalist Response Combined Weighted Score</u> ¹	<u>Overall Score (Ranking)</u> ²
REGIONAL/ GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT	The Chinese government wanted to get rid of Tiananmen sanctions. It believed that joining the NPT could help.	7	2.25	1.03 (SI)
REGIONAL/ GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT	China applied to join to get the technology included in a 1985 US-China technology/energy agreement, which was being held up by a lack of adherence to NPT.	6	2.25	0.83 (SI)

¹Combined Weighted Score equals the sum of responses (numerical values) in each category (Table 7.5) times the relevant multiple (Expert response, multiple 1.0; Generalist response, multiple 0.75).

²Overall Score equals the sum of the weighted scores (expert and generalist) divided by the total number of respondents for each factor (Table 7.5).

Ranking: Very important: 2.25-3.0; Important: 1.5-2.24; Somewhat important: .75-1.49; Unimportant: Below .75

Considering the emphasis in the English language literature on international factors, taken together, the data at all levels presents a somewhat surprising picture. While none of the influences uncovered during the research is ranked in the very important category, five influences fall into the “important” ranking (2.25-1.50). Of these five, two come from the leadership level of analysis, two from state-societal, and one from the international level. Recalling my hypothesis that security decisions will be influenced primarily by leadership factors, this turns out to be true in terms of the overall score of ‘group influences’ but the hypothesis should still be modified to reflect the fact that state-societal factors are also influential. All five important factors were uncovered at Stage Two. The remaining nine influences fell into our “somewhat important” categorization. Of these nine, five are new in Stage Two.

Table 7.7 NPT: Weighted and Overall Importance Scores Across Levels of Analysis¹

NPT				
<u>Level of Analysis</u>	<u>Influences</u>	<u>Expert Response Weighted Score</u>²	<u>Generalist Response Weighted Score</u>²	<u>Overall Score (Ranking)</u>³
GROUP INFLUENCES	Joining the NPT was part of the leadership's (plural) more practical and less ideological foreign policy as it opened up to and learned more about the world.	13	6.75	2.19 (I)
DOMINANT INDIVIDUAL	Deng Xiaoping's thoughts and words were of overwhelming importance to this decision. His 1985 speech on international institutions and their relevance to peace and development paved the way for China's involvement with institutions like the NPT.	13	5.25	2.03 (I)
TRADITIONAL/ NON-TRADITIONAL BUREAUCRACY	The military and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) were the most important on arms control. Experts in each of these were very important with both taking part in the Conference on Disarmament negotiations and beginning to see arms control as beneficial.	12	6	1.80 (I)
ECONOMY	China needed to create more economic growth. By joining security organizations China would be seen as a responsible member of the international community and become more likely to receive continued and enhanced foreign direct investment, loans, and aid.	12	5.25	1.73 (I)

Table 7.7 (continued)

<u>Level of Analysis</u>	<u>Influences</u>	<u>Expert Response Weighted Score²</u>	<u>Generalist Response Weighted Score²</u>	<u>Overall Score (Ranking)³</u>
REGIONAL/ GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT	The end of the Cold War changed the world's views on proliferation; toward greater support for non-proliferation. China was pushed into applying to join the NPT as a result.	11	5.25	1.63 (I)
REGIONAL/ GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT	Although the NPT would not have much effect on China, a country that already possessed nuclear weapons, it would stop other non-nuclear signatories from becoming new nuclear competitors.	11	3	1.40 (SI)
STATUS	The French said they would join. That would leave China as the only declared nuclear power not adhering to the NPT. This placed China under a great deal of pressure to join.	9	3.75	1.275 (SI)
TRADITIONAL/ NON- TRADITIONAL BUREAUCRACY	The personnel that China needed to both understand the NPT and to deal with China/NPT interaction were now in place. Prior to this time, China would have been ill-equipped, from a personnel point-of-view, to join the NPT.	8	4.5	1.25 (SI)

Table 7.7 (continued)

<u>Level of Analysis</u>	<u>Influences</u>	<u>Expert Response Weighted Score²</u>	<u>Generalist Response Weighted Score²</u>	<u>Overall Score (Ranking)³</u>
TRADITIONAL/ NON- TRADITIONAL BUREAUCRACY	Prior to applying to join the NPT there were more and more pro-NPT articles being written. The National Defense University, CISS, Chinese Academy of Rocket Research, PLA, College of Preventive Chemistry, and Fudan University—all played crucial roles in providing information to the government. For example, as early as 1987, articles appear suggesting military support for nonproliferation. Eventually, this view was accepted by the leaders.	6	5.25	1.13 (SI)
REGIONAL/ GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT	The Chinese government wanted to get rid of sanctions that the US had imposed in 1991 due to alleged Chinese arms transfers to Pakistan. It believed that joining the NPT would help.	8	1.5	1.06 (SI)
STATUS	China wanted a better image after the Tiananmen events of 1989. It believed that joining the NPT could help it create an image of a responsible power.	5	4.5	1.06 (SI)
TRADITIONAL/ NON- TRADITIONAL BUREAUCRACY	Embassies played a positive role providing information on the NPT.	5	4.5	1.06 (SI)
REGIONAL/ GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT	The Chinese government wanted to get rid of Tiananmen sanctions. It believed that joining the NPT could help.	7	2.25	1.03(SI)

Table 7.7 (continued)

<u>Level of Analysis</u>	<u>Influences</u>	<u>Expert Response Weighted Score²</u>	<u>Generalist Response Weighted Score²</u>	<u>Overall Score (Ranking)³</u>
REGIONAL/ GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT	China applied to join to get the technology included in a 1985 US-China technology/energy agreement, which was being held up by a lack of adherence to NPT.	6	2.25	0.83 (SI)

Bold print indicates new factors uncovered at stage two of our research.

²Combined Weighted Score equals the sum of responses (numerical values) in each category times the relevant multiple (Expert response, multiple 1.0; Generalist response, multiple 0.75).

³Overall Score equals the sum of the weighted scores (expert and generalist) divided by the total number of respondents for each factor.

Ranking: Very important: 2.25-3.0; Important: 1.5-2.24; Somewhat important: .75-1.49; Unimportant: Below .75

Chapter Eight: China and the CTBT

The final case study focuses on China's decision to apply to join the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). At the time of its decision, China had the least developed capability of any nuclear power and so, out of all our cases, this choice may have been the most difficult for China.

Background

China completed its first nuclear explosion on October 16, 1964. The name given by the Chinese for this explosion was Device 596. This represented the year and month in which the Soviet Union refused to provide China with a prototype nuclear device (June 1959). Thus, the explosion in October of 1964 was a huge step for the Chinese marking a pivotal moment in its move toward self-reliance. This would be the first test in what would become over thirty years of testing. Some of the highlights include:

- May 14, 1965: China's first air-drop explosion by aircraft
- June 17, 1967: China's first full-yield multi-stage thermonuclear test
- September 23, 1969: China's first underground test
- November 17, 1976: A 4 megaton test, China's largest ever
- October 16, 1980: The last atmospheric nuclear explosion by China or any country
- July 29, 1996: China's 45th and most recent test

By decade, the Chinese conducted 10 tests in the 1960s (all atmospheric), 16 tests in the 1970s (atmospheric and underground); 8 tests in the 1980s (all but one underground); and 11 tests in the 1990s (all underground). However, the number of tests conducted by the

Chinese pales in comparison to the number conducted by either the U.S. (1,030) or Soviet Union (715) (The Independent, 7/30/96).

Around 1986, China began to suggest that it would participate in the work of an ad hoc group on a CTBT, if one were to be created (Monterrey Institute of International Studies, 2002). In the beginning of the 1990s, China clarified its position, suggesting that it would join such a treaty under two conditions. First, if it was couched in the context of a move toward complete nuclear disarmament. Second, only if it included a no-first-use pledge from the other nuclear powers. In 1993, China dropped these demands and pledged support for the creation of an ad hoc committee in the Conference on Disarmament to begin negotiating a CTBT, hoping for the completion of those negotiations no later than 1996.

In contrast to China's interaction with the other multilateral institutions discussed earlier, China was actively involved in the negotiations to create this institution. During these negotiations China voiced two major concerns. One, China wanted developing nations to be allowed to conduct peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs), which might result in economic benefits. Two, China disagreed with the proposed use of national technical means (NTM), such as satellite reconnaissance, for CTBT verification. This disagreement was based upon the belief that the U.S. and Russia would dominate these means as they dominated the satellite reconnaissance market. They also worried about potential abuse by the U.S. and Russia given the vast differences between the capabilities of these two countries and all others. The Chinese further expressed concern about the possibility of on-site inspections, believing that this might in some sense "legitimize espionage" thus infringing upon the sovereignty of member countries (The Times, 6/11/96). Over the course

of negotiations, China dropped the links between their commitment to join and these concerns. Ultimately, they applied to join the treaty on September 24, 1996.

While it has not yet ratified the Treaty, China has begun the ratification process. In this respect, in March of 2000, China forwarded the CTBT to the State Council for review and to the National People's Congress (NPC) for hearings and ratification. There is however, no timetable set by the NPC for ratification and it has been suggested that the two-year delay to date has been complicated by a number of different factors. The factor believed to be of overwhelming importance is that the United States has yet to ratify the Treaty. In fact, at the moment, there is no real hope in sight for the Treaty from a U.S. point of view. The U.S. Senate previously voted not to ratify the CTBT and the Bush Administration is vehemently opposed to ratification. The second factor comes from the possibility of an increase in perceived threat to Chinese national security. This arises as a result of nuclear tests in South Asia, recent changes to the U.S.-Japan defense guidelines, U.S. missile defense cooperation with Japan and Taiwan, and the U.S. air campaign in Kosovo. When China will ratify remains to be seen.

Influences

As with the NPT, the English-language literature hardly mentions any factors at the leadership level. However, the literature did suggest a number of different state-societal influences that may have played a role in China's decision and which I will expand upon shortly. But again, it is at the international level that the English language literature has the most to offer.

Leadership Level

As there were no distinct leadership level variables mentioned in the English language literature on this decision, I will begin at stage two where Chinese resources suggested one leadership influence from the group category. One interviewee spoke of the influence of the second generation technocrats who relied more and more on experts, and less and less on ideology (Interview with former official, MFA, November 2001). Indeed, though the English-language literature does not refer to this in the context of the CTBT decision, much has been made in the literature about this change in China's leadership over time, from the old ideological guard led by Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping, to the internationally experienced, university educated Zhao Ziyang, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao. For example, in comparing the make up of the Politburo's of Deng Xiaoping (1982) with that of Jiang Zemin (1997), we find that the Jiang leadership was nearly a decade younger, on average, more than half the members did not join the CCP until after the PRC founding in 1949, and whereas none of the 1982 members had university degrees, 70% did in 1997 (Lampton, 2001, p.5). Thus, the experts were in favor of joining the CTBT (see state-societal influences), and these experts influenced the technocratic leaders.

Stage three research and analysis found agreement that the decision was impacted by this influence. Looking first at the raw data (Table 8.1) we see that the fact that the leaders making the decision to apply to join the CTBT were 2nd generation technocrats, seems to have played a significant role. Almost all respondents to the confirmation forms, six experts and three generalists found this variable to be important to China's decision, while one generalist believed it to be very important.

Table 8.1 CTBT: Leadership Influences Raw Data

CTBT									
Leadership	Influences	Number of Expert Responses for Each Category¹				Number of Generalist Responses for Each Category¹			
		0	1	2	3	0	1	2	3
GROUP INFLUENCES	-The leaders were 2 nd generation technocrats, so they relied more and more on experts, who were in favor of joining, and less and less on ideology	-	-	6	-	-	-	3	1

¹3=very important; 2=important; 1=somewhat important; and 0=unimportant

Table 8.2 CTBT: Leadership Influences, Weighted and Overall Importance Scores

CTBT				
<u>Leadership</u>	<u>Influences</u>	<u>Expert Response Combined Weighted Score</u> ¹	<u>Generalist Response Combined Weighted Score</u> ¹	<u>Overall Score (Ranking)</u> ²
GROUP INFLUENCES	-The leaders were 2 nd generation technocrats, so they relied more and more on experts, who were in favor of joining, and less and less on ideology	12	6.75	1.88 (I)

¹Combined Weighted Score equals the sum of responses (numerical values) in each category (Table 8.1) times the relevant multiple (Expert response, multiple 1.0; Generalist response, multiple 0.75).

²Overall Score equals the sum of the weighted scores (expert and generalist) divided by the total number of respondents for each factor (Table 8.1).

Ranking: Very important: 2.25-3.0; Important: 1.5-2.24; Somewhat important: .75-1.49; Unimportant: Below .75

State-Societal Level

The English language literature dealing with China's decision to apply to join the CTBT is quite sparse, but does make some suggestions as to influences at the state-societal level. In fact, it focuses on two bureaucratic entities also discussed with respect to the NPT decision, the MFA and the People's Liberation Army (PLA) (Gill and Medieros, 2000). However, unlike what we saw for the NPT, it is suggested these two groups saw the issue in entirely different ways. The PLA argued that China was not ready to sign the CTBT and that more nuclear tests and time were necessary before China would have the data and computer capabilities it needed to run simulations and thereby keep its nuclear force structure up to date (Gill and Medieros, 2000, p.88). Gill and Medieros believe that we can see the importance of the PLA in that despite China's involvement with CTBT negotiations beginning in 1994, China's nuclear testing continued and its pace increased right up through July 29, 1996 (Gill and Medieros, 2000, p.88). On the other side of the argument was the MFA, which supported the idea of China's applying to join, as doing so would help China's great power image, promote the goals of the NPT, create more favorable and peaceful

international conditions for Chinese economic development, and contribute to further disarmament on the part of the major nuclear powers (Gill and Medieros, 2000, p.91).

My interviews suggest a much more diverse and robust set of influences impacting upon China's decision. These factors fall into both the security and traditional/non-traditional bureaucratic categories. First, one interviewee mentioned that by 1996 China had conducted a sufficient number of nuclear tests thereby leading its experts to believe that China could join the CTBT without any future risk to its security (Interview with official, CASS, November 2001). The tension between the PLA and the MFA seems to have been resolved by continued testing.

Second, and as suggested in research at stage one, many discussants believed that the military and Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) had the most important impact on arms control, with the Institute of Applied Physics and Computational Mathematics⁴⁵ also having some relevance.⁴⁶ The reasoning here for the MFA is the same as that at stage one and so will not be repeated here. This was the only influence found in both stage one and stage two research.

The remaining influences brought up during discussions revolve around the role of research institutes and the scientific community and their influence on China's decision to apply to join the CTBT. In the case of the CTBT, bureaucratic entities, scientific institutions and strategic research organizations have all broadened their engagement in

⁴⁵The Institute of Applied Physics and Computational Mathematics is located in Beijing and is under the guidance of the China Academy of Engineering Physics. It conducts research on design computations for nuclear warheads. The work of the Institute was relevant to China's need for continued modeling and testing prior to applying to join the CTBT. See www.iapcm.ac.cn for more information.

⁴⁶Interview with former official, MFA, July 2001; Interview with professor, Beijing University, July 2001; Interview with former official, MFA, November 2001; Interview with researcher, Fudan University, November 2001; Interview with professor, Fudan University, November 2001; Interview with official, SIIS, November 2001; Interview with official, CICIR, November 2001; and

nonproliferation and arms control research and policy implementation over time (Gill and Medieros, 2000). This being the case, other suggested influences at the state-societal level include: the idea that The China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), The China Institute of International Studies (CIIS), and The Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) were all relevant as they helped shape the context in which the decision was made (Interview with professor, Fudan University, November 2001); and as with the other decisions studied, that the personnel that China needed to both understand the CTBT and to deal with China/CTBT interaction were now in place (Interview with official, CASS, November 2001; and Interview with professor, Fudan University, November 2001).

In stage three, at the state-societal level of analysis, research suggests that two influences dominate China's decision to apply to join the CTBT (Tables 8.3 and 8.4). First, the respondents were mainly supportive of the idea that by 1996 China had conducted a sufficient number of nuclear tests thereby leading its experts to believe that China could join the CTBT without any future risk to its security (ranking 1.90). Among our experts, two marked this factor as very important, three as important, and one as somewhat important. The generalists were supportive of this factor marking very important (two) and important, while one checked unimportant. Second, the military and MFA are seen to have also played significant roles, along with the Institute of Applied Physics and Computational Mathematics (ranking 1.84). This influence was seen as very important (one expert, one generalist), important (two experts, three generalists), and somewhat important (one expert). As we find with other cases, support for the remaining suggested factors was lower. In fact, the other influences were ranked only as somewhat important (see Table 8.4).

Interview with official, CASS, November 2001.

The picture this data paints is of a decision impacted at the state-societal level of analysis by security projections and by particular bureaucratic entities. At the same time, the relevance of research institutes and the presence of necessary personnel cannot be completely denied.

Table 8.3 CTBT: State-Societal Influences Raw Data

CTBT			
<u>State-Societal</u>	<u>Influences</u>	<u>Number of Expert Responses for Each Category¹</u>	<u>Number of Generalist Responses for Each Category¹</u>
SECURITY	-By 1996, China had conducted a sufficient number of nuclear tests thereby leading its experts to believe that China could join the CTBT without any future risk to its security.	- 1 3 2	1 - 1 2
TRADITIONAL/ NON- TRADITIONAL BUREAUCRACY	-The military and Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) were the most important agencies determining the CTBT decision. The Institute of Applied Physics and Computational Mathematics was also important.	- 1 2 1	- - 3 1
	-Research institutes had some influence. The CICIR, CIIS, and CASS were all relevant as they helped shape the context in which the decision was made.	- 4 2 -	- 2 2 -
	-The personnel that China needed to both understand the CTBT and to deal with China/CTBT interaction were now in place. Prior to this time, China would have been ill-equipped, from a personnel point-of-view, to join the CTBT.	2 1 2 1	1 - 2 -

¹3=very important; 2=important; 1=somewhat important; and 0=unimportant

Table 8.4 CTBT: State-Societal Influences, Weighted and Overall Importance Scores

CTBT				
<u>State-Societal</u>	<u>Influences</u>	<u>Expert Response Combined Weighted Score</u> ¹	<u>Generalist Response Combined Weighted Score</u>	<u>Overall Score (Ranking)</u> ²
SECURITY	-By 1996, China had conducted a sufficient number of nuclear tests thereby leading its experts to believe that China could join the CTBT without any future risk to its security.	13	6	1.90 (I)
TRADITIONAL BUREAUCRACY	The military and Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) were the most important agencies determining the CTBT decision. The Institute of Applied Physics and Computational Mathematics was also important.	8	6.75	1.84 (I)
NON-TRADITIONAL BUREAUCRACY	-Research institutes had some influence. The CICIR, CIIS, and CASS were all relevant as they helped shape the context in which the decision was made.	8	4.5	1.25 (SI)
TRADITIONAL/ NON-TRADITIONAL BUREAUCRACY	-The personnel that China needed to both understand the CTBT and to deal with China/CTBT interaction were now in place. Prior to this time, China would have been ill-equipped, from a personnel point-of-view, to join the CTBT.	8	3	1.22 (SI)

¹Combined Weighted Score equals the sum of responses (numerical values) in each category (Table 8.3) times the relevant multiple (Expert response, multiple 1.0; Generalist response, multiple 0.75).

²Overall Score equals the sum of the weighted scores (expert and generalist) divided by the total number of respondents for each factor (Table 8.3).

Ranking: Very important: 2.25-3.0; Important: 1.5-2.24; Somewhat important: .75-1.49; Unimportant: Below .75

International Level

At the international level, a number of possible influences were uncovered at stage one and affirmed in stage two. These influences include: concerns over China's image; a growing movement in the international arena against nuclear proliferation and nuclear testing; and France's decision to end testing. In addition, the literature cites something new: pressure from a number of China's Asian neighbors, including Japan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan; and pressure from non-nuclear states.

Swaine and Johnston suggest that one powerful reason for China's participating in and acceding to the CTBT may have been a concern about image and status (Swaine and Johnston, 1999; Johnston and Evans, 1999). With the majority of states in favor of the CTBT, if China wanted to maintain its image as a responsible member of the international community, it would have to join the CTBT. Moreover, in the mid-1990s there was a growing global opprobrium directed at nuclear proliferation and testing (Gill and Medieros, 2000). As suggested earlier, possibly in an attempt to upgrade its weapons capabilities, China continued to test up through 1996. The anti-nuclear movement may have forced China's hand on both testing and the CTBT. In addition, after France ended testing, China stood as the only known nuclear power still not a member of the CTBT (Gill and Medieros, 2000). This increased the pressure on China to join. China also came under pressure from Japan (Gill and Medieros, 2000, p.69). For example, in April 1995, Japanese Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama, in a visit to China, called upon the Chinese to cut by half its nuclear testing and to cooperate in early implementation of the CTBT (The Daily Yomiuri, 4/28/95). Further, in May 1995, after another of China's tests, Japan suggested that it would have to reconsider economic cooperation with China as continued testing might violate Japan's four

principles regarding official development assistance that obligates the government to monitor recipient countries' military expenses (The Daily Yomiuri, 4/28/95; and Bellamy, 5/16/95). Finally, the literature suggests that China's decision may have been swayed by pressure from non-nuclear states like Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan.⁴⁷ In fact, the Chinese government has readily admitted such pressure. Their admission statement to the CTBT noted that the decision to stop testing and subsequently apply to the CTBT was in part a response to the appeal of non-nuclear states (Gill and Medieros, 2000).

In stage two, four of these five influences were confirmed: China's image;⁴⁸ the end of French testing and subsequent pressure for China to join;⁴⁹ pressure from Japan (Interview with professor, Beijing University, July 2001); and pressure from the non-nuclear countries. A number of other influences and connections were brought to light as one interviewee noted that China's opening to the outside world in the late-1970s had put it on a path of integration with the norms of the international system. It was therefore not a matter of "if" China would join, but "when" (Interview with former official, MFA, July 2001). Still other interviewees mentioned that after the Cold War ended there was less military pressure on China, so it could afford to join the CTBT with fewer costs (Interview with official, CASS, November 2001). However, another interviewee believed that the CTBT was much tougher to join than the NPT, as China needed to give up much more in order to join. Thus, China

⁴⁷For more on the response from Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan see "Kazakhstan Unhappy with Chinese Nuclear Test," OMRI Daily Digest, No. 113, Part II, 11 June 1996; "Beijing Promises To Conduct Nuclear Explosions With Consideration For Kazakhstan," The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, Vol. XLVII, No. 37 (1995), pp. 25-26.; "Foreign Ministry Protests Chinese Underground Nuclear Tests", Slovo Kyrgyzstana (Bishkek), 21 October 1994, p. 1; and "PRC Envoy On Willingness To Halt Nuclear Tests", Rossiskaya Gazeta (Moscow), 21 July 1994, p. 6.

⁴⁸Interview with former official, MFA, July 2001; Interview with professor, Beijing University, July 2001; Interview with professor, Fudan University, November 2001; and Interview with official, SIIS, November 2001.

⁴⁹Interview with professor, Beijing University, July 2001; Interview with professor, Fudan University, November 2001; and Interview with professor, Fudan University, November 2001.

applied to join only after conducting tests sufficient to meet its needs (Interview with official, CASS, November 2001). Finally, there was one mention that China's motivation lay in the fact that if it joined it could stop others from joining the nuclear club (Interview with former official, MFA, July 2001).

Tables 8.5 and 8.6 present the rankings at stage three. First, Table 8.5 gives the raw data responses to the confirmation form inquiries. Here we see that there were 5-6 expert responses and 3-4 generalist responses for each factor. Table 8.6 introduces the data in weighted form with accompanying ranking. According to these rankings the decision to apply to join the CTBT was impacted at the international level by a number of different factors ranked as "important", including: China's concern with its image (2.08); the impact of the end of the Cold War (1.78); the belief that they had conducted enough tests (1.75); and the thought that in a globalizing world China had no choice but to apply (1.55). Two other factors may have had some bearing on the decision. They are: the positive leanings of non-nuclear countries toward the CTBT and the subsequent pressure on China to join (1.48), and the halt in testing by the French (1.25). Two influences are completely unimportant according to our respondents: if China joined it could stop others from joining (.58); and Japan's threat to stop loans to China as a result of China's continued nuclear tests (.50).

Table 8.5 CTBT: International Influences Raw Data

CTBT									
International	Influences	Number of Expert Responses for Each Category¹				Number of Generalist Responses for Each Category¹			
		0	1	2	3	0	1	2	3
STATUS	Image was very important to China as it wanted to show it is a responsible power.	-	-	4	2	-	-	3	1
REGIONAL/ GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT	The French stopped testing, leaving China on its own as the only nuclear power still testing and not having applied to join the CTBT. This placed China under a great deal of pressure to join.	1	2	3	-	-	2	2	-
	Although, the CTBT was much tougher to join than the NPT, as China needed to give up much more in order to join, China could afford to join once it had conducted enough tests to meet its needs.	1	-	1	2	-	-	4	-
	The non-nuclear countries pressured China to join.	-	1	5	-	1	1	2	-
	Japan stopped loans to China in protest over China's continued testing. This pressured China to join as it needed the loans for continued economic growth.	4	2	-	-	1	2	1	-
	In a globalizing world, China had to enter the world and be integrated into the world. It had no choice.	-	3	1	2	-	2	2	-
	After the Cold War ended there was not as much military pressure on China, so it could afford to join the CTBT with fewer costs.	-	2	1	2	-	-	4	-
	If China joined, it could stop others from joining the nuclear club.	3	3	-	-	-	3	-	-

¹3=very important; 2=important; 1=somewhat important; and 0=unimportant

Table 8.6 CTBT: International Influences, Weighted and Overall Importance Scores

CTBT				
<u>International</u>	<u>Influences</u>	<u>Expert Response Combined Weighted Score</u>¹	<u>Generalist Response Combined Weighted Score</u>	<u>Overall Score (Ranking)</u>²
STATUS	Image was very important to China as it wanted to show it is a responsible power.	14	6.75	2.08 (I)
REGIONAL/ GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT	After the Cold War ended there was not as much military pressure on China, so it could afford to join the CTBT with fewer costs.	10	6	1.78 (I)
REGIONAL/ GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT	Although, the CTBT was much tougher to join than the NPT, as China needed to give up much more in order to join, China could afford to join once it had conducted enough tests to meet its needs.	8	6	1.75 (I)
REGIONAL/ GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT	In a globalizing world, China had to enter the world and be integrated into the world. It had no choice.	11	4.5	1.55 (I)
REGIONAL/ GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT	The non-nuclear countries pressured China to join.	11	3.75	1.48 (SI)
REGIONAL/ GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT	The French stopped testing, leaving China on its own as the only nuclear power still testing and not having applied to join the CTBT. This placed China under a great deal of pressure to join.	8	4.5	1.25 (SI)
REGIONAL/ GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT	If China joined, it could stop others from joining the nuclear club.	3	2.25	0.58 (UI)

Table 8.6 (continued)

<u>International</u>	<u>Influences</u>	<u>Expert Response Combined Weighted Score</u> ¹	<u>Generalist Response Combined Weighted Score</u>	<u>Overall Score (Ranking)</u> ²
REGIONAL/ GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT	Japan stopped loans to China in protest over China's continued testing. This pressured China to join as it needed the loans for continued economic growth.	2	3	0.50 (UI)

¹Combined Weighted Score equals the sum of responses (numerical values) in each category (Table 8.5) times the relevant multiple (Expert response, multiple 1.0; Generalist response, multiple 0.75).

²Overall Score equals the sum of the weighted scores (expert and generalist) divided by the total number of respondents for each factor (Table 8.5).

Ranking: Very important: 2.25-3.0; Important: 1.5-2.24; Somewhat important: .75-1.49; Unimportant: Below .75

Combining the data at all levels, while none of our influences gets a ranking that would lead us to consider it “very important” there are eight influences that fall into the “important” ranking category (Table 8.7). Of these eight, five were not mentioned in the English language literature. After these eight, another four played smaller, somewhat important roles. Of these four, two were from Chinese sources. Two factors were found to be completely unimportant in the final analysis. Regarding my hypothesis, then, the data again produces surprising results: There are many more international and state-societal influences on this security decision than anticipated by the hypothesis, which emphasizes leadership factors.

Table 8.7 CTBT: Weighted and Overall Importance Scores Across Levels of Analysis¹

CTBT				
<u>Level of Analysis</u>	<u>Influences</u>	<u>Expert Response Combined Weighted Score²</u>	<u>Generalist Response Combined Weighted Score²</u>	<u>Overall Score (Ranking)³</u>
STATUS	Image was very important to China as it wanted to show it is a responsible power.	14	6.75	2.08 (I)
SECURITY	By 1996, China had conducted a sufficient number of nuclear tests thereby leading its experts to believe that China could join the CTBT without any future risk to its security.	13	6	1.90 (I)
GROUP INFLUENCES	The leaders were 2nd generation technocrats, so they relied more and more on experts, who were in favor of joining, and less and less on ideology.	12	6.75	1.88 (I)
TRADITIONAL/ NON- TRADITIONAL BUREAUCRACY	The military and Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) were the most important agencies determining the CTBT decision. The Institute of Applied Physics and Computational Mathematics was also important.	8	6.75	1.84 (I)
REGIONAL/ GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT	After the Cold War ended there was not as much military pressure on China, so it could afford to join the NPT with fewer costs.	10	6	1.78 (I)
REGIONAL/ GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT	Although, the CTBT was much tougher to join than the NPT, as China needed to give up much more in order to join, China could afford to join once it had conducted enough tests to meet its needs.	8	6	1.75 (I)

Table 8.7 (continued)

<u>Level of Analysis</u>	<u>Influences</u>	<u>Expert Response Combined Weighted Score²</u>	<u>Generalist Response Combined Weighted Score²</u>	<u>Overall Score (Ranking)³</u>
REGIONAL/ GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT	In a globalizing world, China had to enter the world and be integrated into the world. It had no choice.	11	4.5	1.55 (I)
REGIONAL/ GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT	The positive inclinations of non-nuclear countries toward joining the CTBT were important as seen in China's official application and at conferences with academics, research institute employees, and officials. This was the case since China commonly viewed itself and was viewed by the non-nuclear countries as looking out for their best interests.	11	3.75	1.48 (SI)
REGIONAL/ GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT	The French stopped testing, leaving China on its own as the only nuclear power still testing and not having applied to join the CTBT. This placed China under a great deal of pressure to join.	8	4.5	1.25 (SI)
TRADITIONAL/ NON- TRADITIONAL BUREAUCRACY	Research institutes had some influence. The CICIR, CIIS, and CASS were all relevant as they helped shape the context in which the decision was made.	8	4.5	1.25 (SI)
TRADITIONAL/ NON- TRADITIONAL BUREAUCRACY	The personnel that China needed to both understand the CTBT and to deal with China/CTBT interaction were now in place. Prior to this time, China would have been ill-equipped, from a personnel point-of-view, to join the CTBT.	8	3	1.22 (SI)

Table 8.7 (continued)

<u>Level of Analysis</u>	<u>Influences</u>	<u>Expert Response Combined Weighted Score²</u>	<u>Generalist Response Combined Weighted Score²</u>	<u>Overall Score (Ranking)³</u>
REGIONAL/ GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT	If China joined, it could stop others from joining the nuclear club.	3	2.25	0.58 (UI)
REGIONAL/ GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT	Japan stopped loans to China in protest over China's continued testing. This pressured China to join as it needed the loans for continued economic growth.	2	3	0.50 (UI)

¹**Bold print indicates new factors uncovered at stage two of our research.**

²Combined Weighted Score equals the sum of responses (numerical values) in each category times the relevant multiple (Expert response, multiple 1.0; Generalist response, multiple 0.75).

³Overall Score equals the sum of the weighted scores (expert and generalist) divided by the total number of respondents for each factor.

Ranking: Very important: 2.25-3.0; Important: 1.5-2.24; Somewhat important: .75-1.49; Unimportant: Below .75

Section IV: Conclusions

Chapter Nine: Conclusions

The change in China's foreign policy over the last twenty-five years has been dramatic. China has truly become an active participant in the international arena. Part and parcel of this opening has been a major increase in participation in multilateral institutions. Not long ago, the Chinese condemned the purposes of most such entities, particularly those that seemed to be run by the West. Today this is definitely not the case. In fact, we now see a China becoming increasingly comfortable participating in such institutions and from time to time even working toward the creation of new institutions (e.g. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization).

With this being the case, it is important to focus on China's involvement with such entities. One focus is to look at the influences impacting China's decision to join these multilateral institutions. Surprisingly, little work has been done to date on this topic and so we still know little about why China has taken certain decisions and the work that does exist focuses on influences at only one or two levels of analysis. This thesis has taken a foreign policy approach that allows us to better consider the complexities of China's policy choices. I have done so by looking at five different instances of China's choice to incorporate multilateralism into its foreign policy, specifically, China's application to join the GATT, WTO, IAEA, NPT, and CTBT.

My two hypotheses are repeated here, serving as a focus for further discussion and analysis:

1. As China has modernized and liberalized, single factor explanations of its foreign policy (usually individual level or realist) can no longer suffice. I hypothesize that Chinese foreign policy decisions will be impacted by factors at three levels of analysis: individual (leadership), state and societal, and international (regional and global).
2. There will be a difference in the strength of influencing factors depending on the issue area. Based on the current literature, in the “high politics” security area, I hypothesize that leadership influences will dominate the decision to join multilateral institutions. In the “low politics” economic realm, because of increasing liberalization, international and state-societal influences will be most important.

How well did our data corroborate these hypotheses? Looking at the factors from the very important to somewhat important categories for each decision supports hypothesis number one. For the GATT decision there were fifteen factors ranked from very important to somewhat important. Of these influences, two were leadership (the initiative of Deng Xiaoping as well as the rise of a liberally-minded political elite), six were state-societal (primarily pressures of China’s economic needs, a lack of public opposition, the central role of MOFTEC, and the importance of research institutes), and seven were international (in particular a desire to improve China’s image, the fact that most of China’s trading partners were members, and visits from GATT, World Bank, and IMF officials). For the WTO decision there were twelve factors ranked from very important to somewhat important. Of these influences, two were leadership (the initiative of Deng Xiaoping as well as the rise of a liberally-minded political elite), six were state-societal (primarily pressures of China’s economic needs, a concern about Hong Kong and Macao becoming members before China, and the importance of research institutes), and four were international (in particular concerns

over MFN status and over China's international responsibility and image). This data suggests that influences at all levels are relevant to the GATT and WTO decisions.

Research into China's security decisions also appears to support the need for a multilevel approach. For the IAEA four factors were ranked as important or somewhat important. Of these factors, none were leadership, three were state-societal (particularly open-door economic factors, the military and MFA, and the technical scientific communities), and one was international (outside pressure). The NPT decision was influenced by fourteen factors. Of these influences, two were at the leadership level (especially a more practical and less ideological and technocratic second generation of leaders, and Deng Xiaoping), five were state-societal (of special note are the role of the military and MFA and economic factors), and seven were international (for example outside pressure). For the CTBT decision eleven influences were relevant. Of these, one was leadership (a more practical and less ideological and technocratic second generation of leaders), four were state-societal (especially the completion of appropriate testing and the military and MFA), and six were international (in particular the importance of image, the end of the Cold War, the rules of the CTBT and Chinese testing, and a globalizing world). Although the leadership influences were somewhat weak (none for the IAEA), the case for multifactor analysis is still supported.

Turning to hypothesis number two, it was assumed that the type of influences impacting upon China's decisions in the economic arena would be different than that in the security realm. Specifically, hypothesis number two suggests that in the security arena leadership variables would be important, whereas for economic institutions international and state-societal would be most relevant. However, for China's decisions to apply to join the IAEA, NPT, and CTBT we do not find support for the idea that leadership influences are highly

important. Since no leadership influences were found for the IAEA decision, this area was scored at a zero for purposes of calculation of rank. Thus we find that the most important factors are state-societal (1.60), followed by leadership (1.53), and then international influences (1.40). This hypothesis is therefore not supported.

For the economic decisions, support for hypothesis number two is mixed. Yes, the predicted state-societal and international factors rank highly but so do the leadership influences. Averaging the overall scores of factors ranked from very important to somewhat important at each level for the GATT and WTO decisions, we find that leadership factors have the highest average rank (2.20), followed by state-societal (1.61), and international (1.55) influences. Therefore, contrary to our expectation, leadership remains important in understanding the economic behavior of China.

How are we to explain these unpredictable results? In particular, why is leadership not as important as we expected to security behavior? I think there are a number of reasons behind this surprising finding. First, the technical and scientific nature of these agreements and issues appears to have resulted in a reliance on the bureaucracy, both traditional and non-traditional. Second, China's fixation with status and being seen as a responsible power also seems to have played a role. Finally, external pressure on China to join security organizations has grown over time and appears to be playing an increasingly important role in China's decisions.

As for the importance of leadership in China's economic decisions, without Deng Xiaoping as a driving force, joining the GATT and WTO would have been unthinkable. This is the result of China's relentless pursuit of economic growth, which began with China's original focus on economics in its opening in the 1970s. This concentration on economics

has been the one constant in China's policymaking over the last 25 years across issue area. While at times this concentration has been challenged and the correctness of specific policies has been debated, the primacy of economics to the future of a stable and prosperous China stands today and will continue well into the future. Deng Xiaoping initiated this focus and steered China through decisions on the GATT and WTO, two institutions most directly related to this overwhelming concentration on economics and China's future prosperity.

When all decisions are considered together, leadership influences are actually the most important. The average rank is 1.86 for relevant leadership influences if the IAEA score is factored in at zero. State-societal influences rank second at an average ranking of 1.61. Such a high overall ranking supports the idea that state-societal influences are becoming increasingly important to China's decisions, and that it is no longer useful to see these decisions as simply driven by an authoritarian decision-making process. International influences come in a close third with an average rank of 1.47.

This research also pinpoints the gap between the perspective found in research available in English and the Chinese (in China) viewpoint. The data from tables 4.7, 5.7, 6.5, 7.7, and 8.7, suggest a significant number of factors that the Chinese see as relevant, but which are not cited in the English literature. For example, in the decision to apply to rejoin the GATT, of the fifteen relevant influences, eight were cited only by the Chinese. For the WTO, there were seven influences added by the Chinese out of a total of thirteen. The data for the security decisions is similar. In the case of the IAEA, out of the four factors found to impact China's decision, three were cited only by Chinese sources. For the NPT, there were ten of these out of a total of fourteen relevant factors. Finally, in the decision to apply to join the CTBT, out of eleven total factors, six turned up only in China. Why is there such a

difference in perspective? As China has opened, so have the opportunities for research, analysis, and dissemination by Chinese academics, researchers, and officials. My heavy concentration on interviews with such people and reading of Chinese language materials in such an environment has allowed for new and exciting factors to be realized.

Finally, what impact or relevance does this study have on the broader political science, international relations and foreign policy literature? First and foremost the impact seems to be greatest on the literature on Chinese foreign policy. There I have attempted to fill a number of gaps in the literature and update it to suit this modernizing era. As stated earlier, most authors have looked at China's behavior after joining the institution. In addition, what little work has been done regarding China's interaction with multilateral institutions either before or after deciding to join has focused on only one or two levels of analysis. This thesis certainly adds to the growing literature on China's behavior, while filling in the details at multiple levels of analysis. By focusing on different levels of analysis as relevant to China's decisions, we also go against the assumption that the study of Chinese foreign policy is coterminous with the study of elite preference (Pearson, 2001, p. 367). By focusing on three levels, this thesis also addresses a need in the foreign policy literature to integrate knowledge across multiple levels of analysis (Hudson and Vore, 1995).

A concentration on multiple levels of analysis further addresses the international relations literature, where realist arguments might suggest that China's participation is dictated by the structure of the international system. It appears from the case studies researched here that China's decisions were more a result of domestic factors than influenced by the international system.

While it already has implications for the foreign policy and international relations literature, this study is a beginning point and can now be taken in any number of different directions. The possibilities include, but are not limited to:

- Further analysis of the factors at each level and determination of how they interact in decision-making;
- Further targeted study of the new factors uncovered at each level of analysis. This effort might include a deeper analysis of the differences between English language and Chinese language resources;
- A comparative study of factors in the 1980s versus factors in the 1990s;
- Further development of the findings targeting either the literature on Chinese foreign policy or the theoretical literature;
- Extending the research to other case studies in the security and economic realms to see whether or not the findings are consistent; and
- Based on this new-found knowledge of the factors impacting China, engage in studies of the impact China has had on institutions it has joined and the impact the institutions have had on China.

China's interest in multilateral institutions over the last twenty-five years marks a significant change from the past. Prior to the 1980s it would be difficult to conceive of a China fully engaged with international institutions twenty years hence. And yet that is exactly what we are seeing today. We need to better understand why this change is occurring. It is my hope that this study has contributed in some way to filling this gap.

APPENDIX: CONFIRMATION FORMS

101 Daniel Low Terrace, Apt. 6E
Staten Island, NY 10301
mkulma@asiasoc.org

Month x, 200x

Professor/Mr./Ms. X
Title
Affiliation
Address

Dear Professor/Mr./Ms. X:

I am writing this letter to follow-up on the discussion(s) that we had last year regarding topics of mutual interest as well as my current research. If you will recall, I am currently doing research on China's decisions to apply to join certain multilateral institutions, in particular, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the World Trade Organization (WTO), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). More specifically, I am interested in the international, state-societal, and individual level factors that impacted China's decisions to apply to join said institutions.

Having completed all of the discussions that I am likely to undertake, the research aspect of my work is close to complete. However, I am hoping that I might again call on your expertise to further my understanding of the relevant factors involved in these decisions. To this end I would ask that you review the attached "confirmation form."

The information found on this "confirmation form" comes from the discussions I have had over the course of time regarding this research project. If you would be so kind as to review the attached, provide your responses to the inquiries and return it to me either via e-mail (mkulma@asiasoc.org) or fax (212-517-8315) it would be greatly appreciated. Please do not hesitate to contact me with any questions.

I wish you well and I thank you for your consideration in this matter. Should you plan to make your way to New York, I hope that you will call upon me, as well as letting me know if there is anything I can do to help facilitate your stay.

Sincerely,

Michael G. Kulma

Ph.D. Candidate, Graduate Center—City University of New York and
Senior Program Officer for Northeast Asia, Asia Society

CONFIRMATION FORM

Following are factors (international, state-societal, and leadership level) that have been suggested as impacting China's decision to apply to join the GATT (关税与贸易总协定) in 1986. Please indicate on the line next to each factor whether you consider it to be very important (VI), important (I), somewhat important (SI) or unimportant (UI) to the decision. For those factors you consider to fall in the first three categories (VI, I, or SI) please then indicate why in the space provided. If you believe that there are other relevant factors that are not listed, please check "other," list the factor(s), rank it as you did the other factor(s), and provide your reasoning in the space provided.

INTERNATIONAL FACTORS

Status

_____ Desire to improve China's image as a responsible member in the international system

Regional/Global Environment

_____ China was being pressured by the United States and other countries to apply to rejoin the GATT and play by the rules of the international economic system. Furthermore, in the early-1980s, GATT made overtures to China to join.

_____ As China was not an active member of GATT it had no recourse against the anti-dumping policies of other countries. This was a consideration as China's exports were steadily increasing over time. Joining GATT would give China access to its dispute settlement mechanisms. Also, if China became a member there would be no further concern over MFN issues with the U.S. and others.

_____ In the early-1980s, visits from the GATT, World Bank, and International Monetary Fund officials, persuaded Deng Xiaoping and Zhao Ziyang of the need to rejoin.

_____ The international environment was accepting of China after UN entry (From 1949-1972, prior to the PRC's recognition by the United Nations, China would not have been accepted into organizations such as the GATT).

_____ China's Geneva working group came back often to China to tell them what China needed to reform. This gave China greater confidence in its abilities to meet the requirements of membership.

_____ Most of China's trading partners were members. This led China to consider what were the benefits of membership.

_____ Other (please specify): _____

WHY?:

STATE-SOCIETAL FACTORS

Economy

- _____ China needed continued economic development/economic reform. Joining GATT would help exports (partly by reducing the tariffs of other countries for China). It was all part of a national strategy of strategic development.
- _____ China's trade deficit was still high at the time. China believed that by joining the GATT, exports would rapidly increase, thereby closing this trade deficit.

Traditional/Non-Traditional (Government Affiliated Scientific Institutions and Strategic Research Organizations; Universities) Bureaucracy

- _____ More and more reports on GATT were sent to the State Council (both positive and negative). All ministries were concerned about competition from foreign goods or loss of power.
- _____ The Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC) was the most important player in the bureaucracy and it was largely in favor of China joining. Ideas started with MOFTEC and then went to the leaders.
- _____ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) had all the power in this area.
- _____ Research institutes were very important after 1979. They were important to the decision of China to apply to rejoin the GATT.
- _____ The personnel that China needed to both understand the GATT and to deal with China/GATT interaction were now in place. Prior to this time, China would have been ill-equipped, from a personnel point-of-view, to join the GATT.

Society

- _____ There existed little public opposition to China's applying to rejoin GATT as people knew little about the GATT.
- _____ Other (please specify): _____

WHY?:

LEADERSHIP FACTORS

Dominant Individual

_____ DENG Xiaoping was the guiding light in the opening of the Chinese economy in the late-70s and in all subsequent moves to open and liberalize the Chinese economy. His voice was crucial to China deciding to apply to rejoin the GATT.

Group Influences

_____ The leadership (plural) wanted to continue opening to the world. They realized that China could not develop by itself, it needed the rest of the world.

_____ Other (please specify): _____

WHY?:

CONFIRMATION FORM

Following are factors (international, state-societal, and leadership level) that have been suggested as impacting China's decision to apply to join the WTO 世界贸易组织 in 1995. Please indicate on the line next to each factor whether you consider it to be very important (VI), important (I), somewhat important (SI) or unimportant (UI) to the decision. For those factors you consider to fall in the first three categories (VI, I, or SI) please then indicate why in the space provided. If you believe that there are other relevant factors that are not listed, please check "other," list the factor(s), rank it as you did the other factor(s), and provide your reasoning in the space provided.

INTERNATIONAL FACTORS

Status

_____ All developed countries and most developing countries were members. China wanted to be accepted as similar to these countries.

Regional/Global Environment

_____ China realized that in order to reap the benefits of globalization it had to become a member of the international economic order's most important global organization. With greater understanding of how the global economy worked China realized that the only way to have a say in how things progressed in the future was to join the institution and work within the institution to promote policies favorable to China.

_____ The annual MFN debate in the United States was an economic and political thorn in relations between China and the US. Joining the WTO would end this annual debate.

_____ The 4 Asian Tigers had advanced far beyond China's economy and they had all joined GATT.

_____ The collapse of the Soviet Union shocked China. This was seen as an economic collapse that was at least partly a result of a lack of trade with other countries. China did not want the same thing to happen to it.

_____ China still felt pressure from the international community as a result of the Tiananmen events of 1989.

_____ Other (please specify): _____

WHY?:

STATE-SOCIETAL FACTORS

Economy

_____ The Chinese government wanted to use the WTO to help spur reform and economic growth. Joining the WTO and its system of regulations and requirements would promote the market system in China and help break down state monopolies.

Traditional/Non-Traditional (Government Affiliated Scientific Institutions and Strategic Research Organizations; Universities) Bureaucracy

_____ The forces for applying to join the WTO, which were the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) were more powerful than the forces against joining (Agricultural Ministry, Bank of China, services sector, intellectual property rights sector, the insurance industry, the communications industry, and other internally driven ministries)

_____ Many important bureaucratic entities were influential, including:

- State Economic and Trade Commission
- State Planning Commission
- State Owned Enterprises
- Ministry of Post and Telecommunications
- People's Bank of China
- Ministry of Agriculture
- Ministry of International Trade
- State Council's Development Research Center

_____ Academics and research institute employees favored applying to join the WTO.

Institutional/Political

_____ There were concerns that by 1997, after the Hong Kong and Macao handovers, the provincial governments and Taiwan would be members. This would embarrass the central government.

Society

_____ There existed pressure to apply to join from successful groups and businesses linked to successful segments of the Chinese economy

_____ Other (please specify): _____

WHY?:

LEADERSHIP FACTORS

Dominant Individual

_____ DENG Xiaoping continued to be a guiding light in China's opening and eventual application to join the WTO.

Group Influences

_____ The leaders had different perceptions and styles, but generally most were liberally minded.

_____ Other (please list): _____

WHY?:

CONFIRMATION FORM

Following are factors (international, state-societal, and leadership level) that have been suggested as impacting China's decision to apply to join the IAEA 国际原子能机构 in 1983. Please indicate on the line next to each factor whether you consider it to be very important (VI), important (I), somewhat important (SI) or unimportant (UI) to the decision. For those factors you consider to fall in the first three categories (VI, I, or SI) please then indicate why in the space provided. If you believe that there are other relevant factors that are not listed, please check "other," list the factor(s), rank it as you did the other factor(s), and provide your reasoning in the space provided.

INTERNATIONAL FACTORS

Regional/Global Environment

_____ The other declared nuclear powers were pressuring China to become a responsible nuclear power by joining the IAEA.

_____ Other (please specify): _____

WHY?:

STATE-SOCIETAL FACTORS

Economy Influences

_____ An open-door policy promoted by the government was important because it was a pre-condition for joining any international organization, including the IAEA.

Traditional/Non-Traditional (Government Affiliated Scientific Institutions and Strategic Research Organizations; Universities) Bureaucracy

_____ The military and Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) were the most important on arms control. MFA officials and other experts gradually learned about the IAEA and thought it was in China's interest to join.

_____ The technical scientific communities were important, especially in the fields related to high-tech.

_____ Other (please specify): _____

WHY?:

CONFIRMATION FORM

Following are factors (international, state-societal, and leadership level) that have been suggested as impacting China's decision to apply to join the NPT 不扩散核武器条约 in 1992. Please indicate on the line next to each factor whether you consider it to be very important (VI), important (I), somewhat important (SI) or unimportant (UI) to the decision. For those factors you consider to fall in the first three categories (VI, I, or SI) please then indicate why in the space provided. If you believe that there are other relevant factors that are not listed, please check "other," list the factor(s), rank it as you did the other factor(s), and provide your reasoning in the space provided.

INTERNATIONAL FACTORS

Status

_____ China wanted a better image after the Tiananmen events of 1989. It believed that joining the NPT could help it create an image of a responsible power.

Regional/Global Environment

_____ The end of the Cold War changed the world's views on proliferation; toward greater support for non-proliferation. China was pushed into applying to join the NPT as a result.

_____ The Chinese government wanted to get rid of Tiananmen sanctions. It believed that joining the NPT could help.

_____ The French said they would join. That would leave China as the only declared nuclear power not adhering to the NPT. This placed China under a great deal of pressure to join.

_____ The Chinese government wanted to get rid of sanctions that the US had imposed in 1991 due to alleged Chinese arms transfers to Pakistan. It believed that joining the NPT would help.

_____ China applied to join to get the technology included in a 1985 US-China technology/energy agreement, which was being held up by a lack of adherence to NPT.

_____ Although the NPT would not have much effect on China, a country that already possessed nuclear weapons, it would stop other non-nuclear signatories from becoming new nuclear competitors.

_____ Other (please specify): _____

WHY?:

STATE-SOCIETAL FACTORS

Economy

- _____ China needed to create more economic growth. By joining security organizations China would be seen as a responsible member of the international community and become more likely to receive continued and enhanced foreign direct investment, loans, and aid.

Traditional/Non-Traditional (Government Affiliated Scientific Institutions and Strategic Research Organizations; Universities) Bureaucracy

- _____ The military and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) were the most important on arms control. Experts in each of these were very important with both taking part in the Conference on Disarmament negotiations and beginning to see arms control as beneficial.
- _____ Embassies played a positive role providing information on the NPT.
- _____ Prior to applying to join the NPT there were more and more pro-NPT articles being written. The National Defense University, CIISS, Chinese Academy of Rocket Research, PLA, College of Preventive Chemistry, and Fudan University—all played crucial roles in providing information to the government. For example, as early as 1987, articles appear suggesting military support for nonproliferation. Eventually, this view was accepted by the leaders.
- _____ The personnel that China needed to both understand the NPT and to deal with China/NPT interaction were now in place. Prior to this time, China would have been ill-equipped, from a personnel point-of-view, to join the NPT.

_____ Other (please specify): _____

WHY?:

LEADERSHIP FACTORS

Dominant Individual

_____ Deng Xiaoping's thoughts and words were of overwhelming importance to this decision. His 1985 speech on international institutions and their relevance to peace and development paved the way for China's involvement with institutions like the NPT.

Group Influences

_____ Joining the NPT was part of the leadership's (plural) more practical and less ideological foreign policy as it opened up to and learned more about the world.

_____ Other (please specify): _____

WHY?:

CONFIRMATION FORM

Following are factors (international, state-societal, and leadership level) that have been suggested as impacting China's decision to apply to join the CTBT 全面禁止核试验条约 in 1996. Please indicate on the line next to each factor whether you consider it to be very important (VI), important (I), somewhat important (SI) or unimportant (UI) to the decision. For those factors you consider to fall in the first three categories (VI, I, or SI) please then indicate why in the space provided. If you believe that there are other relevant factors that are not listed, please check "other," list the factor(s), rank it as you did the other factor(s), and provide your reasoning in the space provided.

INTERNATIONAL FACTORS

Status

_____ Image was very important to China as it wanted to show it is a responsible power.

Regional/Global Environment

_____ The French stopped testing, leaving China on its own as the only nuclear power still testing and not having applied to join the CTBT. This placed China under a great deal of pressure to join.

_____ The non-nuclear countries pressured China to join.

_____ Japan stopped loans to China in protest over China's continued testing. This pressured China to join as it needed the loans for continued economic growth.

_____ In a globalizing world, China had to enter the world and be integrated into the world. It had no choice.

_____ After the Cold War ended there was not as much military pressure on China, so it could afford to join the CTBT with fewer costs.

_____ Although, the CTBT was much tougher to join than the NPT, as China needed to give up much more in order to join, China could afford to join once it had conducted enough tests to meet its needs.

_____ If China joined, it could stop others from joining the nuclear club.

_____ Other (please specify): _____

WHY?:

STATE-SOCIETAL FACTORS

Security

_____ By 1996, China had conducted a sufficient number of nuclear tests thereby leading its experts to believe that China could join the CTBT without any future risk to its security.

Traditional/Non-Traditional (Government Affiliated Scientific Institutions and Strategic Research Organizations; Universities) Bureaucracy

_____ The military and Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) were the most important agencies determining the CTBT decision. The Institute of Applied Physics and Computational Mathematics was also important.

_____ Research institutes had some influence. The CICIR, CIIS, and CASS were all relevant as they helped shape the context in which the decision was made.

_____ The personnel that China needed to both understand the CTBT and to deal with China/CTBT interaction were now in place. Prior to this time, China would have been ill-equipped, from a personnel point-of-view, to join the CTBT.

_____ Other (please specify): _____

WHY?:

LEADERSHIP FACTORS

Group Influences

_____ The leaders were 2nd generation technocrats, so they relied more and more on experts, who were in favor of joining, and less and less on ideology.

_____ Other (please specify): _____

WHY?:

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