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**A HISTORY OF THE CONCEPT OF LATIN AMERICA IN THE US:
MISRECOGNITION AND SOCIAL SCIENTIFIC DISCOURSE**

by

JOÃO FERES JR.

**A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Political Science in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City University of New
York**

2003

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
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Preface

Terms used to identify peoples, cultures, and regions have lately come under scrutiny, particularly in democratic multicultural societies, where they have acquired marked political significance. English-speaking Americans have reached a reasonable consensus about banishing from daily linguistic usage terms such as the “n” word for African-Americans, the “c” word for Chinese, the “k” word for Jews, the “d” or “w” words for Italians, and many others expressions considered extremely pejorative. It has been recognized that those words do harm to people not only because they are received as an overt insult but also because they propagate a debasing representation of those people (e.g., as lazy, shifty, racially and intellectually inferior, etc) which contributes to lowering their social status, political leverage, and access to public goods.

Other “ethnic” denominations have not become the object of intense critical scrutiny, most probably because they do not overtly convey insult. That is the case of “Latin America,” which is a widely used term in present-day English. Although Latin America has passed the contemporary test of political correctness, I believe this term has been a conduit for misrepresenting the people perceived as Latin American, or more specifically, a means for granting them a very unequal treatment. This point can be elegantly proven by a thought experiment that reveals that the conceptualization of Latin America rests on a fundamental asymmetry between the perceptions of a collective American Self and of a Latin American Other. The experiment starts with the search for symmetrical semantic matches for the concept of Latin America. After the matches are found, the experiment proceeds by assessing the political and historical consequences of their use in everyday English. Finally, the implications of using “Latin America” and its symmetrical matches are compared.

What term for naming Americans would be the exact symmetrical correlative of “Latin America”? The term usually employed nowadays is North America. Nevertheless, since “North” and “Latin” do not name the same category of things, pairing Latin American with North America would be imprecise. Rather than Latin America, the terminological correlatives of North America are South and Central America. For the sake of preserving the parsimony of the argument, let’s for a moment assume that the “Latin” in Latin America refers solely to the linguistic parentage of the major languages spoken in Latin America. Thus, there must be a word that is as becoming to describe the English speaking population of America as Latin is to the Spanish and Portuguese speakers of the same continent. The most obvious candidate is “Anglo-Saxon.”

Although “Angle” and “Saxon” separately name the Germanic-speaking tribes that invaded the British Isles in the 5th century, the hyphenated form “Anglo-Saxon” is usually employed to refer to English itself. Since English is the language of the European power that colonized the USA, the symmetric form for Anglo-Saxon America would be Portuguese America and Spanish America, but not Latin America. In sum, according to this interpretation, Anglo-Saxon is not perfectly symmetrical to Latin.

The noun “Latin” refers to the language originally spoken in a country of west-central Italy known in the ancient times as Latium, which was conquered by Rome in the third century B.C. Through Roman territorial expansion and colonization, Latin was imposed on various European populations, including the ones that inhabited the Iberian peninsula. This process of occupation and language superposition gave birth to several new local languages, which were later granted the qualifier “Latin” to indicate their common origin. Symmetrically, the Angles, Saxons, and Jutes that invaded England spoke some form of proto-Germanic or Teutonic dialect. As a consequence, English is

should be examined. The idea of an Anglo-Saxon heritage has been a strong component of American national identity. Closely associated with pan-Germanism in the racially charged linguistic context of the nineteenth century United States, the praise of things Anglo-Saxon enjoyed a much broader reception than its conceptual peer, surviving up to this day. Nonetheless, as a consequence of the successive waves of political correctness that have swept the United States, particularly since the Civil Rights Movement, the overt glorification of American Anglo-Saxon heritage has become identified with the white supremacist right-wing. In the context of mainstream American society, the praise of ethnic identities and traditions of minorities is encouraged, while overt Anglo-Saxonism is seen as inadequate, mainly because this ideology can be explicitly associated with the continuation of exclusionary and segregationist attitudes towards minorities.

If Anglo-Saxon America can be said to be a symmetric correlative of Latin America, the political overtones of each concept's common usage are widely different: whereas Latin America is often used as an allegedly value-free descriptive geographical concept, Anglo-Saxon America is explicitly loaded with political connotations associated with white supremacist ideology. In other words, when considered from the pragmatic perspective of usage, the concepts are not symmetric. The following example is a good illustration of this point. While some white Americans might define themselves as Anglo-Saxon, most African Americans would certainly deny this identification. The same applies for Native Americans, Asian Americans, Latinos or even groups such as Italians and Jews, who are now considered white. At the same time, this freedom of identification is denied to people of Latin America. Even though most of the populations that are tagged as Latin American are extremely diverse, from the American perspective, they are all equally "Latin American." A black person from Brazil is a Latin American

as well as a Guarany Indian from Paraguay, or an Argentinean of Jewish descent. In other words, despite the fact that the processes of colonization promoted by Spain, England, and Portugal were roughly similar, at least to the extent of producing diverse populations in the colonies, people in the United States have the freedom to “choose” their hyphenated identities whereas people from the Other part of the continent are indelibly marked by the Latin character.

The symmetrical correlatives of Latin America found in this experiment were discredited because the political and social projects to which they were associated lost prestige. This loss might be attributed to the fact both Germanism and Anglo-Saxonism overtly celebrate the racial and cultural superiority of the dominant sectors of American society -- something that contradicts the current self-image of the United States as a multicultural, democratic, tolerant society. Nonetheless, at the same time, “Latin” is accepted as a “politically correct” way of referring to the whole set of countries and societies south of the US border. That is a blatant case of cultural double standards, which marked racist overtones. For if Anglo-Saxon and Germanic are racialized terms, so is Latin or Latino. However, while the mainstream American national culture of the present has detached itself from explicit Anglo-Saxonism or Germanism, the Latin American is depicted as someone who is coherently Latin, and thus, Other, both in cultural and racial terms.

This experiment has revealed that the act of naming Latin America rests on a fundamental asymmetry between a perception of an American Self and of a Latin American Other. My goal in this dissertation is to uncover the meanings and political projects that hide behind this asymmetrical operation.

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements	iv
Preface	vi
1. Introduction	1
2. Theory and methodology	28
Contribution to a typology of forms of misrecognition	28
Misrecognition as asymmetric opposition	38
Response to Axel Honneth: misrecognition v. recognition	51
Questions of method	54
3. Latin America's pre-scientific life	68
Spanish America	72
Enter Latin America	88
Conclusion	94
4. The consolidation of Latin American studies and modernization theory	96
Significant sources	98
The Cold War and the Rise of Latin American Studies	104
The Modernization project and its context	107
Modernization theory's institutional underpinnings	113
Modernization and Latin American studies	127
Conclusion	155
5. Political stabilization	159
The shift toward political stabilization	160
Latin American studies literature on political stabilization	176
Conclusion	193
6. Dependency studies	197
Andre Gunder Frank	201

Cardoso and Faletto's brand of dependency	208
The reception of dependency theory in the United States	214
Conclusion	231
7. Studies of corporatism	234
Morse: precursor of corporatism in Latin America	235
Corporatism in Latin America	241
Ronald Newton	241
Howard Wiarda	252
<i>The Review of Politics</i> : challenge and continuation.....	260
Corporatism: the curse of the undead	269
Conclusion	272
8. Introduction to Latin America textbook literature	279
Modern Latin America.....	281
Presenting Latin America through text.....	286
Concluding remarks: text and image.....	293
A History of Latin America	296
Latin America: a Concise Interpretative History	303
Latin American politics and development	311
Other textbooks	321
Conclusion	331
Appendix 1	363
Appendix 2.....	365
Results.....	367
Bibliography	368

1. Introduction

I know my Latinos ... they understand only two things: a buck in the pocket and a kick in the ass.

Thomas C. Mann, LBJ's Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (1964) (Smith 1996, 156)

Presently in the United States, the term Latin America is often employed, both in textual and oral communication, with the explicit intention of denoting location. As such it appears to simply be a term of the geographical vocabulary. The geographic flavor attached to its usage can be seen, for example, in journalistic excerpts below:

(1) "Conceptualism as a movement that has been happening simultaneously all over the world, as significantly in Japan, Africa and Eastern Europe as in Western Europe, North America and Latin America." (Johnson 1999)

(2) "By the 1920s his renown in both fields was such that he was in demand in Europe and Latin America." (Severo 1999)

(3) "Figures offered by the administration reveal the dimensions of the political confrontation at the university, the largest and once one of the most prestigious in Latin America." (Preston 1999)

The geographic meaning is also suggested by academic texts on Latin America produced in the United States, as the titles of following publications show:

(4) "Communism in Latin America" (Alexander 1957)

(5) "The Hovering Giant; US Responses to Revolutionary Change in Latin America 1910-1985" (Blasier 1985)

(6) "The new Protestantism in Latin America: remembering what we already know, testing what we have learned" (Dixon 1995)

In all examples above Latin America is used with the intent of indicating location. Its status as a geographical term is made clear in examples (1) and (2), where Latin America is listed among other continents (i.e. Europe, Africa, and Eastern Europe). In examples (1), (2), and (5) it means something like “some place within the limits of Latin America” or just “somewhere in Latin America.” The meaning in example (3) is “the whole region of Latin America.” Finally, in examples (4) and (6), depending on the interpretation, the term may mean either “somewhere in Latin America” or “the whole Latin America.”

As a geographical category, Latin America belongs to the class of expressions used for naming continents and their macro-subdivisions (Europe, Asia, Western Europe, Southeast Asia, etc). The correspondence between these words and the landmasses we identify in maps is so immediate that the terms end up acquiring a semblance of concreteness from the object it represents. Like its fellow-continents, Latin America appears to be an age-old, stable, and indisputable concept that names “something that has always been there.” Nevertheless, contrary to this commonly-held perception, Latin America is a recent creation and an even more recent acquisition to the English language (Torres de Caicedo 1856; Ardao 1980; Simpson and Profitt 1997). Also new is the attempt to reduce it to a non-evaluative expression.¹

Despite its frequency, this locative usage is nothing but a thin crust on the semantics of “Latin America” in contemporary everyday English. One does not have to resort to convoluted interpretive arguments to verify that “Latin America” means much

¹ Academics have recently started exploring the cultural and political aspects of cartographical representation. This movement has been stronger in the discipline of cartography (Black 1997; Harley, Laxton et al. 2001; Schulten 2001) but it has also bear fruit in cultural studies (Jarvis 1998) and medieval and renaissance studies (Lestringant 1994; Tomasch and Gilles 1998).

more than a name of a sub-continent. A plain reading of the *Oxford English Dictionary* might suffice.² Someone looking for the entry “Latin America” in the current main edition of the *OED* is bound to get frustrated because it is simply not there. In fact, the *OED* did not have an entry for “Latin America” or “Latin American” until the publication of its *Addition Series* third volume in 1997. Before that date, the term was subsumed under the entry “Latin,” which is also presented in the *Addition Series*.

The entry “Latin” in the *OED Addition Series* has five definitions. The first is indicated by the expression “sense A,” which refers to the classical language spoken by the populations of ancient Latium – a meaning covered by the original entry in the main edition of the dictionary. The second definition is solely “Latin American.” The third corresponds to a geographic/linguistic definition of Latin America: “of or pertaining to those countries of Central, North, and South America in which Spanish or Portuguese is the dominant language.” This definition is followed by a series of historical examples where the term is used in a geographic sense, much like some of the examples analyzed above.

A different slant characterizes the fourth definition: “designating the characteristics of temperament or behaviour popularly attributed to European or American peoples speaking languages developed from Latin.” A plain reading of this definition might understand it as referring exclusively to culture. However, one should be aware that terms such as temperament, behavior, and, sometimes language, have been in the past also associated with racist discourses. After this somewhat polysemous definition, the reader is presented with a short list of those characteristics: “proud,

² Hereafter referred to as *OED*.

passionate, impetuous, showy in appearance ..., sometimes somewhat dismissive.” The fifth usage of Latin is as an elliptic form of “Latin American.” Finally, the reader learns that the word is also used to designate a series of musical styles associated with the countries of “Latin America.”

The cultural elements that define the Latin character, as the fourth definition indicates, are all negative even though some may not appear to be so at first glance. Proud is a dubious term that can be used in a positive sense but also in a negative one, meaning the display of excessive self-esteem. Since, as we will see below, from the American perspective, the Latin American condition provides little justification for pride, the act of being proud in such context amounts for a sort of irrational behavior. “Passionate” and “impetuous” are also qualifiers that can be easily associated with irrationality. Both are used to describe and evaluate types of action that are raptured in emotions and feelings, and thus, not controlled by reason. “Showy in appearance” is obviously negative. Appearance is opposed to substance, thus people who are “showy in appearance” lack actual content; they are vain, conceited. Finally, “dismissive” requires little interpretation. This word can be easily associated with lack of respect and responsibility.

If the qualifiers provided by the fourth definition left some room for interpretation, the journalistic and literary sources chosen to exemplify that particular usage of Latin leave no doubt about their derogatory content.

1914 WYNDHAM LEWIS in *New Weekly* 20 June 13/2 For everything that is *rubishy puerile* in the Latin temperament machinery has come as an *immense toy*. **1956** A. WILSON *Anglo-Saxon Attitudes* II.ii. 278 Sensual and elegant though Gerald was, he detested the *flashy smartness* of such Latin *womanizers*. **1970** *Times* 19 Aug. 6/4 The *weakness* of every Yorkshireman is his Latin temperament, *doubly dangerous* when it has so often to be suppressed, as in ... cricket. **1981** V. GLENDINNING *Edith Sitwell*

iv. 61 He was *extrovert, physical, unstable, and very Latin*. 1989 Sunday Tel. 8 Jan. 17/1 His first language was Spanish and, not surprisingly, he describes his temperament as Latin. A *proud* man, he likes to be seen to succeed.³

These quotations expand the previous roll of negative characteristics ascribed to Latins to include rubbishy puerile, flashy smartness, womanizer, weak, doubly dangerous, physical, and unstable.

The entry “Latin American” immediately follows “Latin” in the *Oxford English Dictionary Addition Series*. A quick read through the text indicates that this composite expression carries most of the negative connotations already associated with “Latin” in the previous entry. The first definition presented is “of or pertaining to Latin America or its peoples.” Through the second definition one learns that “Latin American” is “a native or inhabitant of Latin America; a person of Latin American origin or descent.” Interestingly enough, this definition also seems to carry some racist echoes. Not only a person born in Latin America is Latin American, but so the one who is of Latin American descent. That is, a son of Latin Americans born in the United States remains a Latin American. But the most interesting information is provided in the quotations chosen to illustrate this definition.

1912 *Chambers's Jnl.* Nov. 720/2 An Englishman ... soon wishes himself well rid of the ... Latin-American. 1960 *Business Week* 3 Dec. 87 'Fidelism', or 'Fidelismo', as the Latin Americans call it ... is the Castro-style revolution that's followed by a left-wing, Communist-influenced, perhaps Communist-controlled, government. 1973 A. MANN *Tiara* i. 4 In the Philippines, some crazy Latin American got near enough to Paul VI to attack him with a knife.

³ The quotations from the *OED* are reproduced in their original format and style, with the exception of the italics, which were added to indicate the use of pejorative qualifiers.

The first quote denotes the utter contempt that an Englishman feels for Latin Americans. The second hints at the general involvement of Latin Americans with Cuban-style communism, a political doctrine that was doubtless not popular among the readers of *Business Week* in 1960. The third example associates Latin Americans with craziness, that is, irrationality. The vague tone of the expression “some crazy Latin American” suggests that craziness is a common characteristic of Latin Americans.

The choice of such culturally charged derogatory quotations to exemplify the definition of “Latin American” as “a person of Latin American origin or descent” might seem a little surprising given the strict geographical sense in which the term is sometimes employed nowadays. Nevertheless, that is exactly what makes this passage so telling. The dictionary reports on the actual way language is used. That is, if these derogatory references were marginal to the conceptualization of Latin America, they would not figure so prominently among its definitions. But, in fact, they do. This is evidence that, in everyday language, the derogatory characterization of the “Latin American” cannot be easily dissociated from the geographical meaning of the concept. After all, what demarcates that geographical meaning, what separates Latin America from the rest of America, is the fact that people are seen as Latin, and thus, as an Other⁴ that inhabits America.

⁴ See the next Chapter for a theoretical exploration of the problem of the constitution of Otherness through non-reflexive opposition to Self. The capitalized form is adopted to demarcate that specific meaning. That has become a common practice in theory texts that deal with the political and social consequences of Otherness (example: Honneth 1992; Beauvoir 1993; Spivak 1993).

Surprising as it might appear, the type of derogatory “description” of Latin Americans presented in the pages of the *OED* can also be found in social scientific texts produced by Latin American studies. For example, sociologist David Martin writes in the first Chapter of his *Tongues of Fire: the Explosion of Protestantism in Latin America*.

Informing the whole argument of this book will be a tension between the pacific ideals of personal and cultural development promoted by certain varieties of Protestantism, and the ideals of the military and of male machismo. The cultural clash of ‘Anglo’ and Hispanic is in part fought out on this plane. (Martin 1990, 12)

Martin depicts the American continent as the last stage of a clash between the Anglo and Latin civilizations, which, according to him, started with the defeat of the Spanish Armada. In his view, the penetration of Protestantism in Latin America is the last battle of this “war” (sic), which the Anglos are obviously winning. This conspiratorial view of cultural history is coherently presented in strong colors. Martin calls the Spanish “fanatic;” says that religious conflicts “have dogged all Latin cultures;” and adds that for Brazilians “whoring and gambling are the natural attributes of the proper male” (1990, 71). The vocabulary chosen by Martin to explain his subject speaks for itself. Even the most superficial reading of Martin’s text cannot fail to note the sharp contrast between his praise for the virtues of the Protestant Anglo-Saxons and his contempt for Catholic Latins.

Martin’s Manichaeism is so strong that it sometimes resembles the discourse of white supremacists -- the same perception of insuperable difference couched in a racist terminology and belligerent attitude are present. After all, “Anglo-Saxon” and “Latin” are words that carry both cultural and racial overtones. The author avoids presenting his arguments in straight racial terms, but does not shy, for example, from claiming that

German immigration was particularly operative in lifting Brazil out of “social stagnation.” One can always make an effort to read the passage in exclusive cultural terms: for being Protestant, German immigrants were prone to entrepreneurial activity. If that were the case, Martin would be only presenting the readers with a much simplified and equivocated interpretation of Weber’s arguments in *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*. The only problem is that many Germans that went to Brazil were in fact Catholic.⁵

A more subtle but not less devastating picture of Latin America is presented by Christian Smith in “The spirit and democracy: base communities, Protestantism, and democratization in Latin America” (1994). Gathering support from a large pool of academic sources, Smith provides the following diagnosis about the prospects of democracy in Latin America:

Primary among the cultural obstacles [that hamper democracy] is Latin America's half-millennium-old dominant political culture of "monistic corporatism." This political culture is grounded in the pre-Enlightenment, pre-scientific-revolution, pre-capitalist, aristocratic, patrimonialist, monolithically Catholic, and structurally semifeudal world of the Iberian Peninsula of the sixteenth century, which made a deep impression on the Iberian colonies through conquest and colonization (Rossi and Piano 1980; Malloy 1977; Stepan 1978; Pike and Stritch 1974; Wiarda 1973, 1974, 1976, 1977, 1981; Wagley 1992)...

In Latin America] particular interests, social diversity, cultural pluralism, religious nonconformity, and disrespect for tradition and authority are all viewed as detrimental to the common good. Rights do exist, but they are conceived as group rights, not individual rights. Societies shaped by this Iberian-derived monistic corporatism tend to be characterized by authoritarianism, elitism, clientelism, patrimonialism, familism, hierarchy, caudillismo,

⁵ See a good summary of German immigration to Brazil in <http://www.genealogienetz.de/reg/WELT/brasil.html>.

*machismo, minimal socioeconomic mobility, double standards of sexual morals, reverence for military and political authority, and an aristocratic ethos of disdain for manual labor and high regard for formal etiquette (Rossi and Piano 1980; Wiarda 1986, 1992; Dealy 1985; Martz and Myers 1992; Willems 1975).*⁶

Although presented under social scientific guise, Smith's text is pervaded with normative derogatory allusions that present the "Latin American" mode of existence as contemptible, unjust, immoral, cruel, base, and reactionary. Furthermore, in addition to being pejorative, this characterization of Latin America corresponds to the opposite of a celebratory image of American culture and society. Thus, when Smith declares that in Latin America "particular interests, social diversity, cultural pluralism, religious nonconformity, and disrespect for tradition and authority are all viewed as detrimental to the common good" he is, in fact, implicitly defining Latin America as an exact opposite of an idealized image of Protestant pluralist United States. In other words, Latin Americans are presented by him as the people that reject the same core values that define the "American way of life." His "monistic corporatism" is the negation of pluralism, and the terms "pre-scientific-revolution," "pre-capitalist" can be easily translated into lacking scientific reasoning and lacking the benefits of capitalism. In sum, there is a double movement in the social scientific discourse employed by Smith: the debasement of the Other is intimately linked to an implicit glorification of the Self.

Although Martin's virulent style is somewhat unusual, his arguments are not. His work has been consistently cited as a positive source of information and theoretical insight, not by a large group of Latinamericanists who, like him, claim that Pentecostal Protestants are the future of democracy in Latin America. (Stoll 1990; Droogers, Huitzer

⁶ The parenthetic citations are in Smith's original text.

et al. 1991; Ireland 1991; Burdick 1993; Garrard-Burnett 1993; Mariz 1994; Smith 1994). Moreover, the type of ethnographic evaluation of Latin America embraced by Martin and his followers seem to have a much broader reception in the Latin American studies literature. That is what Christian Smith reveals through the abundant citations in his text. That leads me to hypothesize that this same ethnographic evaluation might be shared by a larger numbers of studies of Latin America.

As the analyses of the *OED* entries and of the social scientific excerpts indicate, the semantics of the concept of Latin America is much broader (or deeper) than the value-free-like geographical meaning suggested in some usages. Defining Latin America in English, giving meaning to this term, entails isolating, identifying, and evaluating another group of people – which is one of the essential purposes of Latin American studies. Such operation of ascribing meaning to Latin America through social scientific discourse is the main subject of this work. In a nutshell, this dissertation is a critical historical study of the concept of Latin America in the United States, with a special focus on the social scientific appropriation of that concept. My goal is not to question the empirical claims made by Latinamericanists but to expose the normative assumptions that enable the presentation of those claims as value-free, interest-free knowledge about Latin America. Furthermore, I want to examine how definitions of Latin America changed throughout American history, with particular emphasis on the period that succeeded the rapid institutional consolidation of Latin America studies.

In current academic language, the expression “Latin America studies” usually refers not only to the study of Latin America as a whole but also to case studies of countries and regions that are perceived as “Latin American.” Given that this dissertation focuses on the concept of Latin America, that is, on the discourses that define its

semantics, I will be chiefly interested in texts that belong to the former category and not in case studies. The case studies literature is abundant but its relevance to the conceptualization of Latin America is secondary. First because most of the generalizations about Latin America present in the case studies literature is cited from works that treat Latin America as a whole, and second, in the hypothetical case that case studies would generate some new revolutionary interpretation of Latin America that has not yet been formulated by the holistic works, that interpretation would eventually be expressed in the form of a general theory about Latin America. In sum, as this dissertation will demonstrate, works about Latin America as a whole are a segment of the Latin American studies literature that stands on its own, with its own internal debates and theoretical disputes and with contributions from the top Latinamericanist scholars of the day.

This particular selection of sources cuts across different disciplines. There are holistic texts on Latin America written by historians, sociologists, political scientists, and anthropologists. Consequently, the aim of this work is not to exhaustively examine the production of any of these disciplines within Latin American studies. There are two main reasons why this clear-cut disciplinary division was not adopted here. First, Latin America studies have been purposefully organized as a multidisciplinary academic activity. Although courses on Latin America are usually given by professors allocated in departments and programs that bear specific disciplinary tags, the Latin American studies literature is pervaded with cross-disciplinary citations and debates. And second, like the Latin American studies literature as a whole, the works produced by Latinamericanists within a particular discipline (i.e., political science) can be divided between holistic approaches and case studies.

The “study of the concept” here should not be understood in a mathematical-like manner as the pursuit of its most precise definition. On the contrary, as my preliminary analysis has shown, a concept like Latin America is a site for many meanings, which are associated with theories, analogies, other concepts, and so on.⁷ This accumulation of meanings can only occur through historical processes experienced by a society (understood as the community of people sharing in the usage of the language). Thus, studying a concept’s semantics also entails understanding the historical processes that contributed to the survival of some meanings and the disappearance of others.

This work bears the qualifier “critical” because it does not aim at providing a simple description of Latin America’s conceptual history. On the contrary, it has a clear normative thrust that consists in demonstrating that the concept of Latin America has historically been a conduit of misrecognition. Or better, if one accepts that language usage is a form of action, the concept of Latin America is a form of misrecognition. But what is misrecognition?

A more in-depth account of the philosophical and ethical problem of misrecognition will be provided in the next Chapter. Preliminarily, misrecognition can be defined as the act of treating people in a manner that overlooks the ways in which they live their daily lives and think of themselves as social and political beings.⁸ That seems to be the case of “Latin America” in English. The expectation of coherence and

⁷ For a more detailed discussion about the polysemous character of “Latin America” see the second section of the following Chapter.

⁸ I prefer to call this the weak or neo-Kantian definition of misrecognition. The “weak” comes from the fact that this definition can be shown to be a particular case of a broader conception of misrecognition as insult and injury. Its “neo-Kantian” identification comes from its proximity to Kant’s second formulation of the categorical imperative: “treat people not only as means but as ends in themselves.”

homogeneity that is indelibly associated with the concept cannot possibly correspond to the lived experience of the inhabitants of the twenty formally independent countries falling under that denomination. In fact, there is no overarching arrangement that supports Latin America as a whole, no single Latin American culture, no Latin American language, no Latin American society, no Latin American state, no common body of laws, and no common Latin American citizenship. A recent survey shows that even “Latin American” immigrants in the United States, who are offered institutional incentives to assume a Latino identity, tend to identify themselves primarily with their nation of origin and not with a common Latin heritage (de la Garza, DeSipio et al. 1992).⁹ In other words, Latin America does not fit Benedict Anderson’s concept of imagined community (1991), for it is indeed “imagined,” but in a very different manner than the nations studied by Anderson. Nowadays, Latin America is mainly imagined by the ones who define themselves as not pertaining to it: Americans.

Inappropriate generalization is not the only form of misrecognition that is perpetrated through the concept of Latin America. As my previous analysis has indicated, the concept of Latin America is also permeated by a series of derogatory meanings. However, in order to classify that practice as misrecognition, the definition of misrecognition must be expanded to include not only overlooking the way people live their lives and conceive of themselves but also casting insult and injury. It should be noticed that the former definition is actually a particular case of the latter, that is, actively

⁹ Some authors argue that the identity of Latino has also served as a factor of political empowerment in the United States (Padilla 1985; Padilla 1990; Padilla 1997; Vichot 1998).

overlooking the way people live their lives and conceive of themselves is already a form of insult.

In the process of studying the conceptual history of Latin America, I repeatedly encountered different forms of misrecognition being articulated through rhetorical presentation. I also found that these forms obeyed some patterns. This raises a broader question, which I begin to develop here, about the possible ways in which misrecognition can be perpetrated through rhetoric. The final product of this theoretical speculation is a typology of forms of misrecognition, which can be applied to the analysis of discourse in general, and thus, not only to the history of the concept of Latin America. Thus, the theoretical section of the dissertation can be seen as a separate original contribution. At the same time, however, this typology of forms of misrecognition was used as a tool to analyze the discourses on Latin America addressed in the body of the dissertation. That is, the dissertation also became an essay of the applicability of this theoretical tool.

This dissertation is conceived as a conceptual history. As such, it tries to capture the continuities and discontinuities that have characterized the semantics of the concept of Latin America. Derogatory references to the United States' southern neighbors have been in practice throughout most of the nation's history, even before the term Latin America was introduced to the English language. But their content and sense changed with the historical evolution of American society. In the case of the concept of Latin America, its elevation to the status of social scientific object was a historical watershed. With the blossoming of Latin American studies after the Cuban revolution, the social sciences became the most prolific agent in the production, reproduction, and circulation

of discourses on Latin America in the United States.¹⁰ Consequently, the textual output of Latin American studies constitutes the main primary source of this dissertation.

The discipline of the history of concepts has only recently entered English-speaking academic milieus as an import from Germany, where it had been practiced for more than three decades (Richter 1995).¹¹ The original project of *Begriffsgeschichte* in Germany owes much to the contribution of Reinhart Koselleck, as both a theoretician and a practitioner of this historiographical approach. This dissertation leans on Koselleck's work in two distinct but interrelated moments. First, the typology of forms of misrecognition uses Koselleck's theory of asymmetric counterconcepts as a foundation. However, despite the insightfulness of his contribution, the foundation had to be reconstructed in order to better support the new edifice. Second, the general project of conceptual history endeavored here borrows many theoretical and methodological elements from that author. Again, selection, redefinitions, and adaptations had to be made. Most of Koselleck's work focused on the study of key concepts (*Grundbegriff*), which are the most important (and thus most contentious) terms of a society's political vocabulary in a given period. In the history of the United States, "Latin America" has never enjoyed this status. On the contrary, as I intend to show, "Latin America"

¹⁰ More specifically, the social scientific branch of Latin American studies. The term Latin American studies is sometimes used to denote all academic activities engaged in studying "things Latin American," including language training and literary studies. In this dissertation, however, the term will be used to denote only social scientific studies of Latin America, which comprise the disciplines of sociology, political science, cultural anthropology, and history.

¹¹ The importance of the pioneering effort of Melvin Richter in establishing channels of conversation and exchange between the Anglophone approaches to intellectual history and German conceptual history can hardly be overemphasized (see Richter 1995; Richter and Lehmann 1996).

approximates what Koselleck has called an asymmetric counterconcept, i.e., a concept defined in opposition to a collective self-image and used to name a generalized Other. Thus, writing the history of a counterconcept is, in a sense, a departure from Koselleck's original orientation. Moreover, it will provide me with means to reassess some basic theoretical assumptions that guides his study of key concepts.

In the present-day disciplinary grid of American academia, this dissertation inhabits a quite unusual space that intersects with history, political theory, and discourse analysis – just to cite some broad disciplinary labels. Furthermore, this is a qualitative study that leans heavily on the idea of hermeneutics, for it operates not by demonstrating causal relations but by opening up new horizons of meaning that were not previously available to the reader (Gadamer 1976). That entails suggesting or alluding to causal relations rather than proving them through systematic recourse to hard data. When the subject is cultural encounters -- the evaluation of human groups by other human groups -- the data are mostly “soft,” i.e., comprised of perceptions of the Self and of the Other that have no neutral universal standpoint. That has been the most fundamental assumption of the hermeneutical approach, from Dilthey to Gadamer, and also a distinctive feature that sets it apart from the positivist modalities of the social sciences.

Due to its unusual disciplinary location, this project converses with many academic literatures without being entirely contained within any single one. As the thriving literature on colonialism and post-colonialism indicates, the ontological condition of “being imagined by the Other” is not exclusive to Latin America. In his foundational work, *Orientalism* (1978), Edward Said identifies a similar syndrome in the conceptions of the Orient produced in the West. Similarly, Larry Wolff argues that Eastern Europe was “invented” by the *philosophes* of the French enlightenment as an

extra-European space tormented by vices that corresponded to exact inversions of perceived European civilized virtues (Wolff, 1996), and V.Y. Mudimbe demonstrates how Western anthropology helped to fashion the idea of Africa (Mudimbe, 1994; Mudimbe, 1988). Other contributions, such as Uma Narayan's study of Western ethnologies of India, indicate that in some cases even national identity can be a product of, or a response to, the condition of "being imagined by the Other" (Narayan, 1997).

Despite a general disposition to assess the exercise of power through discourse, something that must be credited to the reception of Michel Foucault's work in the field (Williams and Chrisman 1993, 5), some key studies of colonialism and post-colonialism focused on fictional literature, poetry and other literary texts (Said 1978; Achebe 1993). This reading of Foucault seemed to me quite thin, given that the author repeatedly insists on the role of the disciplines in yielding social power and controlling bodies (1971; 1972). Despite the richness of this literary material, the sort of criticism its analysis is able to produce is limited by the idiosyncrasies of style and authorial intention. That is what many works that deal with fictional literature seem to imply. In fact, however, this implicit assumption ends up undermining the strength of the arguments made. For the relation of authors to their "culture" and "society" is something very difficult to pinpoint. Furthermore, even if those relations could be established, one is still left with the problem of finding how representative was this author's contribution.

This criticism led me away from the *Nostramo*'s¹² in the direction of social scientific texts on Latin America. In the post-Cuban revolution era, Latin American studies has become a massive collective enterprise with a well-funded institutional

¹² Joseph Conrad's novel about the adventures of a sailor in South America, a place he describes as "a land full of intrigues and revolutions:" (Conrad 1996).

structure. This privileged position allowed it to play a leading role in the reproduction of discourses on Latin America in American society. As the following dissertation will make clear, this dominance is exercised through three main functions: production of specialized knowledge, policy advisement, and mass public education.

Some post-colonial academics, such as Mudimbe and Narayan, have occasionally addressed social scientific works, but the few examples they examine can hardly support generalizations about entire theoretical and disciplinary approaches. Latin American studies has been a collective academic endeavor rooted in a extensive institutional network of universities, publishing companies, journals, foundations, non-governmental and public agencies, and so on. The textual output of this academic enterprise is often self-consciously organized around major theories and problems: modernization, political stability, dependency, etc. Consequently, I found that organizing the primary sources according to those theories could be a good manner to collectively address Latin American studies. In this way, this study can avoid being caught in the mazes of authorial intention and biography or being charged with relying on a superficial selection of sources.¹³

In the early 1990s, Latin America became the object of a branch of the post-colonial literature, the so-called subaltern studies -- an intellectual trend originally devised for the study of colonial and post-colonial India (see Guha and Spivak 1988; Spivak, Landry et al. 1996). Like their Indian peers, academics engaged in subaltern studies of Latin American have worked within the disciplines of history and literary criticism. Their successful collective effort and shared disciplinary perspectives led to

¹³ In the section on methodology I will provide more details about this analytical procedure.

the foundation of the Latin American Subaltern Studies Group in 1994, and the creation of the journal *Nepantla: views from the South* in 2000 (see Group 1993; Mignolo 2000). Nevertheless, probably due to their disciplinary leanings, subaltern intellectuals tend to concentrate on studying literary works and colonial history, consequently giving little attention to social scientific discourse. Their predilection for theorizing about globalization, cross-border issues, “border thinking,” and “thinking in between” reveal a great concern for problems of “Latino” immigration to the United States, but little sensibility to the political consequences of unequal relations of power among nations in the hemisphere.

The whole subaltern studies project is animated by the meritorious ethical purpose of giving voice for social groups that have been silenced by mainstream historiography. Unfortunately, in the process of pursuing this intent, academics tend to present themselves as the spokespersons of groups they allegedly give voice. That seems to be the case of Latin American Subaltern studies, with some of its most prominent representatives presenting themselves as the heralds of a new Latinamericanist critique (Moreiras 2001). The subtitle of *Nepantla*, “views from the South” is an indicative of such pretension. A look at the list of contributors to the journal shows the dominant presence of authors with Spanish names who hold academic jobs in American universities. That is, although the subaltern project entails giving voice to the South, the place of enunciation continues to be the North, and the language of enunciation is mostly English. In sum, “the South” is represented but does not actually participate in making its own history. Not coincidentally, subaltern intellectuals show little interest in studying “Latin America: views from the North,” a phrase that summarizes the basic intent of my work.

The post-colonial literature has also shown that the act of imagining the Other, or as I would prefer, defining Them, has often been connected to conquest, submission, colonization, and exploitation. Thus, hypothetically, discourses of Latin America produced in the United States might have been “connected” to the long list of violent acts that have characterized the US relation with “Latin America.” Several nations of the continent have already suffered and continue to suffer some kind of US intervention, which has ranged from covert operations to temporary military invasion to occupation to conquest.¹⁴ However, post-colonial studies have not exploited these connections. This dissertation intends to be a contribution to filling that hypothetical gap, not by tracing the probable causal paths that leads from interest to social scientific knowledge and vice-versa, but by revealing the presence of entrenched political and economic interests in social scientific reasoning about Latin America.

¹⁴ William Appleman Williams presents the following computation of US interventions in the Caribbean basin for the period 1898-1934: Costa Rica (1921), Cuba (1898-1902, 1906-1909, 1912, 1917-1922), Dominican Republic (1903, 1904, 1914, 1912, 1917-1922), Guatemala (1920), Haiti (1915-1934), Honduras (1903, 1907, 1911, 1912, 1919, 1924, 1925), Mexico (1913, 1914, 1916-1917, 1918-1919), Nicaragua (1898, 1899, 1909-1910, 1912-1925, 1926-1933), Panama (1903-1914, 1921, 1925) (Williams 1980). For a detailed account of interventions during the Cold War period, namely the campaign against Peron in Argentina in 1946, the overthrow of Guatemala’s president Jacobo Arbenz in 1954, the failed invasion of Cuba in 1961, the intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965, the overthrow of Chile’s president Salvador Allende in 1973, the Contras guerrilla warfare in Nicaragua, see Lars Schoultz’s *Beneath the United States* (1998) and Peter H. Smith’s *Talons of the Eagle* (1996). Moniz Bandeira’s *Presença dos Estados Unidos no Brasil (Dois Séculos de História)* (1973) addresses among other things the US collaboration with repressive regimes in Brazil through espionage, infiltration, corruption, and external political pressure. For the role of the US government in Brazil’s 1964 military coup see Phyllis R. Parker 1964: *o Papel dos Estados Unidos no Golpe de Estado de 31 de Março* (1977). The Bush administration’s support for the recent coup d’état attempt in Venezuela, and the political intervention of the American ambassador in the last Bolivian presidential elections are only the last chapters of this sad story.

In his extensive study of US-Latin American relations, the political scientist Lars Schoultz provides numerous examples of pejorative references to “Latin America” made by US government officials and politicians, from the founding to George Bush senior’s presidency. According to Schoultz, contempt for Latin Americans is an unfortunate malady that has plagued Anglo-American culture since the United State’s foundation (Schoultz 1998). Schoultz strives to show that there is a parallel between derogatory representation and the violence perpetrated through American foreign policy. Nevertheless, he is not interested in looking deeper into the social institutions and discourses that allow for the survival of such practices in the United States, and, thus, has no comments about the role of Latin American studies in supporting or rejecting such practices.

In *Latin America in Caricature* (1980), the historian John J. Johnson puts together an impressive collection of cartoons published in well-reputed American magazines in which Latin America and Latin Americans are depicted in a disparaging manner. Johnson classified the works in categories, according to the ways Latin America or Latin Americans are depicted. The names he gave to the categories, which are also titles of the book’s Chapters, speak for themselves: Latin America under US patronage, Latin America as female, the republics as children, the republics as blacks, Latin Americans as non-black males, and militarism in Latin America. The work done by Johnson will be used in Chapter 3 as a source for mapping the semantic historical path taken by the concept of Latin America in its early days, during the first half of the 1900s. Despite the richness of the pictorial material assembled by the author, he is oblivious to similarities between the caustic comic images he collected and the more austere social scientific texts.

Area studies have recently come under criticism by the same institutions that once financed their development, namely, the Social Science Research Council, the Ford Foundation, and other funding agencies (Prewitt 1996; Wallerstein 1996; Shea 1997). The critical diagnostics put forward by the spokespersons of these institutions stressed the inadequacy of the area studies approach in the post-Cold War world that coalesced after the fall of the Soviet Union – implicitly, or sometimes explicitly, acknowledging that area studies were designed according to the “cartography of the Cold War.” In the post-Cold War world, they argue, social scientific research should focus on (and thus the grant money should go to) globalization, international migrations, border crossing, and so on, and not self-contained geographical areas. While these critics do identify a connection between social scientific discourses and geopolitical interests, they showed little interest in critically analyzing the consequences of the adoption of this cartography to the social scientific discourses that have already been produced.

Mark T. Berger's *Under Northern Eyes: Latin American Studies and U.S. Hegemony in the Americas, 1898-1990* (1995) is one of the few pieces that systematically assesses Latin American studies within its historical and political context. Berger strives to show that political and economic interests managed to influence the agenda for Latin America through the channeling of funding and direct academic involvement in public and private agencies. Nonetheless, Berger approaches Latin American studies from the perspective of intellectual history and international relations. As a consequence, his contribution is rich in historiographical information but poor in textual analysis. In the introduction to the book, he speaks of applying Gramsci and Foucault to his analytical endeavor, but this intent seems to get lost in the middle of the narrative. In the end, the reader is provided with few theoretical insights. Berger does impressive bibliographical

work, covering a wide range of approaches in the literature. However, his actual analytical work is explicitly biased towards studies of Central America, his area of expertise as a Latinamericanist historian. In sum, despite his valuable contribution, much is left to be said about the content of the social scientific concept of “Latin America” and the way it is reproduced in the literature.

Although the theoretical part of this dissertation was developed progressively in a dialectical conversation with its historiographical work, the conventions of academic writing compel me to present it in first place. This is done in Chapter 2, which has two sections. The first section of the Chapter covers the development of the typology of forms of misrecognition, the analytical tool employed in all subsequent Chapters. In the second section, the methodological and theoretical issues that support this project are laid out. Selectively appropriating some core notions of Koselleck’s theory of conceptual history, I devise a methodology for the history the concept of Latin America that better suits its asymmetric nature and the characteristics of the social scientific primary sources.

Chapter 3 is an overview of the concept of Latin America’s history from the early nineteenth century to the Cold War period. Before the term Latin America was introduced into everyday English, in the late nineteenth century, concepts such as Spanish America or Hispanic America were used to refer to the United States’s southern neighbors. In the first section of this Chapter, I show the crucial role those concepts played in American nationalist discourses, particularly in the case of the Manifest Destiny ideology. The textual analysis of excerpts from politicians and journalists demonstrates that forms of misrecognition structured the presentation of the southern neighboring peoples. In the Chapter’s second section, I demonstrate through the analysis

of textual and pictorial materials that “Latin America” inherited most of the derogatory contents previously associated with its predecessors.

“Latin American Studies” makes its appearance in Chapter 4. First, I will discuss some institutional aspects of the social scientific profession and the political significance and consequences of the social scientific discourses produced in that particular period. Second, I examine the general tenets of modernization theory -- the approach that presided over the fast rise of Latin American studies during the Cold War, more specifically, after the Cuban Revolution. Next, key works of the modernization in Latin America literature will be analyzed in search of forms of misrecognition in the presentation of Latin America as a social scientific object. I will then discuss the expectations generated through these discursive constructions.

In Chapter 5 I address the literature of political stability in Latin America. This literature should be seen as a partial revision of modernization theory that criticized one of its main premises -- the correlation between economic and political development -- while it preserved the basic arrangement of forms of misrecognition in its conceptualization of Latin America. The practitioners of political stability were the quintessential policy scientists, whose goals and expectations towards Latin America had changed to accommodate the new demands of American foreign policy.

Chapter 6 treats the dependency literature, which is considered by many as the main challenge to modernization theory to date. I examine two of the most influential contributions to the dependency literature as well as the reception of this literature by the American academic milieu. In fact, although phrased in different terms, dependency’s criticism of the modernization approach can be read as a deconstruction of the main forms of misrecognition associated with Latin America. Some *dependentistas* also show some critical awareness of the unwarranted generalizations perpetrated through the

concept's usage. At the same time, the reception of dependency in the United States was marked by a turn towards "higher standards" of scholarship, which was dictated both by the expressive growth of Latin American studies throughout the 1960s and early 1970s and a certain distaste that many elements of a new generation of scholars felt for policy advisement. The penchant for scholarship that plagued the reception of dependency in the United States had the practical consequence of allowing for the reproduction of unwarranted generalizations about Latin America.

The literature on corporatism in Latin America is the subject of Chapter 7. Appearing simultaneously with the reception of dependency studies in the United States, this approach to the study of Latin America reproduces forms of misrecognition in their most strident and explicit form. Its adepts make abundant use of unwarranted generalizations and derogatory expressions when analyzing the Latin American subject. While many of its tenets were already anticipated by modernization theory, corporatism provides a more comprehensive and systematic theory of Latin America. In turn, such potent discourse of misrecognition generates extremely pessimistic expectations about Latin America's prospects for development and democratization. Differently from their modernization predecessors, however, and much like their contemporaries from the dependency camp, corporatists preferred scholarship to direct policy engagement.

In the eighth and last substantive Chapter of the dissertation, the narrative leaps from the early 1980s, the dusk of the corporatism approach in Latin America, to the present-day literature of introduction to Latin American studies textbooks. In fact, as the assessment of the best-selling textbooks reveals, the semantics of "Latin America" continues to be plagued with misrecognition, and the forms of misrecognition reproduced today are basically the same articulated by the approaches we have previously analyzed.

Through the textbook literature, one is able to see Latin American studies actively influencing the concept of Latin America in common language. It is through those textbooks that many students first encounter a systematic image of Latin America. After graduation a few of them will professionally deal with “Latin Americans” while the great majority will pursue other professions. In the end, the reproduction of forms of misrecognition perpetrated by Latin American studies reach almost the entire American society.

By revealing the reproduction of misrecognition through the usage of “Latin America,” I hope to be contributing to the demise of this practice. It is about time for Americans and the ones that identify themselves as Latin American to realize the damaging consequences of stereotypes produced and reproduced through the concept of “Latin America” in English. Having such load of pejorative meanings associated to an identity that is impinged upon someone based on indelible markers such as place of birth, mother language, racial (physical and physiognomic) characteristics, and the like, can be enormously harmful. Unfortunately, that is a condition that scores of Spanish-speaking immigrants to this country have to face on a daily basis.¹⁵

Those identified as Latin Americans who live outside the United States are not exempt from the dreary consequences of the act of defining Latin America. In the contemporary globalized world contacts between Americans and their neighbors have greatly increased, with the invasion of domestic financial markets by international investors and the aggressive takeover of domestic private and public industries by international corporations. The perpetuation of Latin America’s derogatory

¹⁵ Not coincidentally, those are the people who provide a great deal of the cheap and often illegal manual labor that keeps New York City and many other major American urban centers alive and viable (de la Garza, DeSipio et al. 1992; Rodriguez 1999).

conceptualization can only contribute to making these relations even more asymmetric, and, thus, to submitting the so-called Latin Americans to further debasement.

Ironically enough, the subject of this work is American society and not Latin America per se. Criticizing the way Americans conceive of Latin America entails revising the way Americans think of themselves. In a period in which American society is falling prey of a new wave of jingoism and the official discourses are pervaded by the resilient language of Manifest Destiny, this is a small contribution to a timely and much-needed critical exercise.

2. Theory and methodology

Among ourselves, we operate on the basis of laws and open cooperative security. But when dealing with more old-fashioned kinds of states outside the postmodern continent of Europe, we need to revert to the rougher methods of an earlier era - force, pre-emptive attack, deception, whatever is necessary to deal with those who still live in the nineteenth century world of every state for itself. Among ourselves, we keep the law but when we are operating in the jungle, we must also use the laws of the jungle.

Senior British diplomat Robert Cooper, British Prime Minister Tony Blair's political advisor (Cooper 2002)

Every utterance is at one and the same time exuberant and deficient; it says more than the speaker intends, and less than he has in mind.

Ortega y Gasset (1959)

In this chapter I intend to demonstrate how the problem of misrecognition can be approached in a way that allows it to function as a tool for conceptual analysis without losing its normative import. The development of this analytical tool must be complemented by an effort of devising a methodological framework for the analysis of the history of the concept of Latin America in which the specific characteristics of the primary source material, social scientific texts, are taken into consideration.

Contribution to a typology of forms of misrecognition

Recognition is one of the most debated topics in contemporary political theory. The concept seemed to have been originated in Hegel's philosophy of consciousness. Its most well known reference is the section of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* named "Lordship and Bondage," where Hegel explores the first encounter of self-consciousness with another self-consciousness (1979, 111-19). Hegel calls this event the "process of Recognition" (*Anerkennung*), also known in the critical literature as the "dialectic of

recognition.” To be recognized here means to be acknowledged by others, that is, in Hegel’s language, self-consciousness, in order to affirm itself as true, needs to be acknowledged by another self-consciousness. Or as Terry Pinkard felicitously put it: “the subject’s seeking recognition from another agent is thus an instance of the more general way in which agents seek reassurances that what they take to be authoritative *really* is authoritative” (Pinkard 1994, 53).¹⁶ Despite its inclusion in this famous section of the *Phenomenology*, the concept of recognition does not play an important role in the book. Hegel had given great relevance to recognition in the earlier works he wrote while a young professor in Jena, under the influence of Schelling’s and Hölderling’s romanticism and Fichte’s neo-Kantian philosophy (Pinkard 2000). However, in his later phase the author shifted his interests away from the phenomenology of consciousness toward theories of history, law, and the state (Honneth 1995).

The topic of recognition had not been significantly received by English-speaking academia until recently, when it was revived by Charles Taylor in the context of discussing the politics of multiculturalism. In “The politics of recognition”(1992), Taylor recasts recognition into a concept with marked social and political import. He is interested not so much in the individual phenomenological aspects of recognition, but in the problem of marrying a multicultural society to a liberal democratic political regime. From the perspective of cultural minorities, recognition entails having their claims for equal or special treatment attended, and their cultural practices respected. According to his broad definition, struggles for recognition encompass the feminist and gay movements, separatist nationalisms, minority movements based on culture, race, or

¹⁶ Italics added by the author.

ethnicity, and so forth. From the perspective of the liberal democratic state, however, attending these demands has to be weighed against the risk of endangering consensus formation and legitimacy. In sum, for Taylor, struggles for recognition correspond to a great deal of what defines contemporary politics in rich countries as well as in some poor areas of the world.

Since Taylor's initial contribution, which was printed in an edited volume with comments by Amy Gutmann, Jürgen Habermas, Anthony Appiah, and Michael Walzer (Taylor and Gutmann 1992), the academic debate over recognition has gained momentum and spread over the disciplinary map of the humanities. The critical response to Taylor's text was not limited to that volume (see Rorty 1994; Nicholson 1996; Cooke 1997). Some authors have worked on the politico-institutional aspects of recognition, that is, on how modern democracy should deal with the problem of different cultures sharing the same political community (Kymlicka 1995; Habermas 2001) – a problem that was central to Taylor's original essay. Axel Honneth returned to the young Hegel in an effort to construct a theory of modern democracies based on the phenomenology of recognition (1992; 1995). Others have examined the problem of recognition from the perspective of progressive political action (Fraser 1997; Tully 2000; Benhabib 2002). Within that perspective, recognition has also received a careful but critical treatment from scholars who work with feminist theory (Fraser 1997; Halley 1999; Nussbaum 1999; Okin 1999; Benhabib 2002).

Despite Taylor's pioneering contribution, Axel Honneth is the author that gave the most systematic philosophical treatment to the question of recognition. Interestingly enough, Taylor starts "The Politics of Recognition" warning against the dangers of misrecognition:

... misrecognition shows not just a lack of due respect. It can inflict a grievous wound, saddling its victims with a crippling self-hatred. Due recognition is not just a courtesy we owe people. It is a vital human need (Taylor and Gutmann, 1994, 25).

Honneth follows a similar formula:

Negative concepts of this kind are used to characterize a form of behavior that does not represent an injustice solely because it constrains the subjects in their freedom for action or does them harm. Rather, such behavior is injurious because it impairs these persons in their positive understanding of self-a understanding acquired by intersubjective means (Honneth, 1992, 189).

In the passage above, Honneth uses “negative concepts” to refer to the linguistic forms that are used to deny recognition.¹⁷ Like Taylor, Honneth places the problem of recognition in the context of the “language of everyday life” – in which people communicate with each other based on an a priori expectation of mutual understanding. That is, the meanings of terms that compose the “language of everyday life” are shared by the members of a given linguistic community (intersubjectivity), and, thus, usually taken for granted in the course of communicative acts. Honneth concludes that due recognition, which according to him is the basic condition for the “invulnerability and integrity of human beings,” depends on a tacit approval from others. The lack of such

¹⁷ The German term used by Hegel and Honneth is “*Anerkennung*,” which may signify not only recognition but also the act of attributing positive qualities to something or someone. Both Honneth, when writing in English, and his translator in *The Struggle for Recognition* (, 1995) prefer the term “disrespect” to “denial of recognition” or “misrecognition.” The German term *Mißachtung*, which they translate for “disrespect” also carries other negative meanings, such as insult, humiliation, debasement, denial of freedom, and even physical aggression. See “Translator’s note” in *The struggle for recognition: the moral grammar of social conflicts* (Honneth 1995).

approval results in serious injury to one's self-image. The problem here is not only the one of being humiliated and disparaged by others; of experiencing violence solely as an external action. People bound to intersubjective meanings of the "language of everyday life" that belittles their own condition are deprived of the linguistic means to conceive of themselves in a dignified manner. In other words, the insult is also internalized.

In "*Integrity and disrespect*," Honneth gives a systematic treatment to the problem of recognition departing from the previous work of Ernst Bloch.¹⁸ Bloch argues that human dignity is a problem of moral theory that should be studied not from the viewpoint of a metaphysical notion of respect but from concrete forms of insult and injury. Consequently, he advocated the study of insult (misrecognition, disrespect) as the only form to address the problem of respect. Honneth, however, believes that a positive theory of recognition is possible.

If in a concept of the dignity, the complete integrity of man is only to be approximated by determining what forms personal insult and disrespect take, then, conversely, it would hold that the constitution of human integrity is dependent on the experience of intersubjective recognition (Honneth, 1992, 188).

As a preparatory work for his theory of recognition, the author proposes a tripartite typology of forms of misrecognition.

The first case corresponds to physical mistreatment, which occurs when a person is robbed of the control over his own body. Torture and rape are the classic examples of

¹⁸ In fact, Honneth's major source of inspiration is Hegel, particularly the work he produced as a young scholar at Jena, under the influence of Schelling's and Hölderling's post-Kantian romanticism, and Fichte's neo-Kantian philosophy (see Honneth, 1995; Pinkard, 2000).

this form of misrecognition. According to Honneth, the humiliation that ensues from losing autonomous control over one's body, and not physical pain, is the main injury caused by this form of disrespect. This might eventually translate into loss of self-assurance and insecurity in relation to other people and the world in general. In sum, the person is wounded in his self-image. Honneth borrows from Bruno Bettelheim the name for this form of misrecognition: "psychological death" (see Bettelheim 1979).

The second form of disrespect Honneth identifies corresponds to the denial of one's rights. According to him, as a members of a social group, people understand themselves as bearers of a set of rights that they expects to see acknowledged by their peers. Honneth argues that the equality of rights presupposes that all have roughly the same moral capacity to formulate moral judgments. Thus, once the person perceives she is been consistently denied one of these rights, she might feel downgraded to a condition of moral inferiority. This sort of insult undermines the capacity one has to relate to other people as equals. Borrowing from the work of Orlando Patterson on slavery, Honneth baptizes this form of misrecognition "social death" (see Patterson 1982).

The third form consists of disparaging one's lifestyle.

The "honor," "dignity" or, to use the modern term, "status" of a person can be understood to signify the degree of social acceptance forthcoming for a person's method of self-realization within the horizon of cultural traditions in a given society. If this hierarchy of societal values is structured so as to downgrade individual forms of living and convictions for being inferior or deficient, then it robs the subjects in question of every opportunity to accord their abilities social value. Once confronted with an evaluation that downgrades certain patterns of self-realization, those who have opted for these patterns cannot relate to their mode of fulfillment as something invested with positive significance within their community (Honneth, 1992, 191).

This form of disrespect, argues Honneth, undermines one's self-esteem, because the person is not able to invest her projects of self-realization with social worth or meaning.¹⁹ It has to be said that, although most of the theory is based on the individual, the author claims that it might as well be applied to social groups.

Based on this typology of forms of misrecognition, Honneth proposes a typology of recognition, based on the premise that if lack of recognition hurts one's self-conception, mutual recognition is the path for building a positive image of the self (personal or collective), which is endowed with moral positivity and capacity for action. The first form of recognition corresponds to the respect for one's physical integrity, and can only come about, according to Honneth, through the emotional approval and encouragement provided by the circle of people one deems dear.²⁰ The author tells us that the young romantic Hegel called it simply "love." This relation fosters an emotional "body-related sense of security in expressing one's feelings," which is, according to Honneth, a basic prerequisite for other forms of self-respect. Due to its private nature, this form of recognition cannot yield collective moral principles.

The second form entails being recognized as a citizen by one's fellow citizens, and, thus, being acknowledged as a member of the community and bearer of the same rights and duties of any other member. For Honneth, this second form of recognition

¹⁹ One should notice that although the third form of disrespect strongly resembles the problem of multiculturalism raised by Taylor. Honneth gives it a voluntaristic flavor that is lacking in Taylor's talk about other cultures – the concept of culture implies that people are bound to certain values and customs regardless of their personal projects of self-realization.

²⁰ Taylor also talks about this facet of recognition, using the term "significant others" to refer to one's beloved ones -- a term he borrowed from George Herbert Mead (Taylor 1992, 32).

requires apprehending the principle of the law both as a set of specific norms that regulates the society to which one pertains, and as a set of universal principles that regulates the lives of all individuals in that society. This cognitive aspect was absent in the previous form.

The solidarity and esteem for one's lifestyle defines the third form of recognition. Through this form, people are recognized for their singular biographies – the particular injunctions that make them different from all others and yet socially worthy. Honneth claims that this produces an ethical self-assurance, which entails recognizing the other's different lifestyle while acknowledging its equal worth. He adds that this type of recognition depends on the preexistence of the other two forms.

Honneth summarizes:

Morality, if understood as an institution for the protection of human dignity, defends the reciprocity of love, the universalism of rights, and the egalitarianism of solidarity against their being relinquished in favor of force and repression (Honneth, 1992, 196).

The subtitle of Honneth's article, "Principles of a Conception of Morality Based on the Theory of Recognition," is indicative of his ambition to propose an innovative and systematic moral theory based on the concept of recognition. Unfortunately, however, he ends up falling short of his goals. Someone acquainted with Hegel's *Philosophy of Right* (Hegel and Dyde 1896) would recognize the striking similarities between the system proposed in that work and Honneth's typology. Each partition of Hegel's ethical substance (family, civil society, and state) corresponds to one of Honneth's recognition forms – with the exception of the state. But Honneth drew inspiration not from the mature Hegel of the *Philosophy of Right*, but from the young romantic who still used to

give much importance to familial “love” and to a conception of ethical life (*Sittlichkeit*) in which individual consciousness took precedence over the state (Honneth 1995)²¹.

In itself, leaning on Hegel does not constitute a liability. But Honneth ends up importing from his source an anachronistic conception of politics that eventually undermines his claim to innovation. How can that be? A theory of practical reason, or better, a moral theory, must always be grounded in the present. That has been a fundamental principle in critical theory, a tradition to which Honneth explicitly subscribes (Horkheimer 1972; Honneth 2003 (forthcoming)). However, a critical reading of the present would show that the conditions for the exercise of *Sittlichkeit* in the contemporary world can hardly be met. For Hegel, *Sittlichkeit* was premised on national political autonomy, understood as the capacity a given people to live according to their own customs and laws. From Aristotle to Hegel to Carl Schmitt, authors identified with republicanism consistently insisted on the fundamental principle of republican freedom. Despite the fragmentary state of the German empire in Hegel’s time, it is understandable that, under the influence of French revolutionary ideals and German romanticism, he had fashioned a political theory where the nation state was the ethical horizon of the human condition, or as he once put: “the march of God on earth” (Hegel, Knox et al. 1955, § 258). However, we, beings of the present, cannot afford to be so naïve. Which nation state in the present-day world has sufficient autonomy to support a Hegelian *Sittlichkeit*? The United States is the obvious, and probably sole, candidate. The other nations of the OECD, including the birthplaces of the Hegelian theoreticians we have been studying,

²¹ Honneth focuses on the works Hegel produced before the publication of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, particularly *System der Sittlichkeit* (1802/03), *System der spekulativen Philosophie* (1803/04), and *Jenaer Realphilosophie* (1805/06).

might only aspire for this sort of autonomy. In fact, after World War II, their political (and thus ethical) autonomy in relation to the United States was greatly reduced. This is particularly and ironically true for Honneth's Germany.

Our goal here, however, is not to destroy Honneth's theory, but to analyze it up to a point from which it could be radically remodeled. Instead of premising recognition on a dream of national autonomy, I intend to reflect upon this problem in a context of heteronomy – when nations are severely restrained by political and economic powers outside its borders -- which is a condition shared by the vast majority of earth's population. The examples of the present are so abundant that there is no need to refer again to the foreign-sponsored coup d'états and interventions of a not so distant past. Furthermore, heteronomy is not only the result of explicit war and violence. Economic submission is just as strong and probably more effective. For example, in May 25, 2002, the Argentinean president, Eduardo Duhalde, threatened to resign unless congress approved restrictive economic measures proposed by the IMF. Next, still following the lead of the IMF, Duhalde put pressure on the Argentinean senate to reject a bill that punished capital flight (2002).

Identifying this widespread condition of heteronomy does not mean implying that it is everywhere absolute. On the contrary, the degree of autonomy varies from nation to nation. The condition of heteronomy also does not imply being exclusively subjected to American power. Although the United States is beyond doubt the country that most encroaches on others, both militarily and economically, regional powers might also play a role in reducing a country's autonomy. That is, in the contemporary world, many people have their claims for recognition denied by powers that are often outside their political community, and Honneth's republican theory of recognition has little to say about that.

Instead of discarding the problem of recognition at once, however, I think it is possible to use it to critically assess the condition of heteronomy -- in fact, not through recognition itself but through its denial. This solution would not only be more adequate for addressing the condition of heteronomy, but, as we will see, also very useful for conceiving of progressive politics in closed republican contexts -- such the ones studied Honneth and Taylor.

Misrecognition as asymmetric opposition

Nowadays, many critics of Hegel's and Hegelian philosophy embrace approaches that are generically, and at times pejoratively, referred to as post-modern: Nietzsche and followers of all sorts, post-colonialism, feminism, gender theory, post-structuralism, etc. However, the alternative model to Honneth's typology of recognition proposed here leans on quite a different source: Reinhart Koselleck.

One of the editors of *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe* -- probably the most extensive and detailed work on conceptual history to date -- Koselleck's academic output includes works on history, history of concepts, historiography, and philosophy of history and time.²² Although most of his work on the history of concepts has been focused on *Grundbegriffe* (key concepts), this author wrote a very interesting contribution to a rather different type of political vocabulary: asymmetric counterconcepts (Koselleck 1985). That contribution will serve as a point of departure from which a typology of forms of misrecognition will be constructed.

²² During his stay in Heidelberg, Koselleck had the chance to study and/or debate with the likes of Hans Georg Gadamer, Martin Heidegger, Karl Löwith and Carl Schmitt. More details about his intellectual biography can be found in the "Translator's Introduction" to *Futures Past*, authored by Keith Tribe (, 1985). For a careful examination of the *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe* project see Melvin Richter' *The history of political and social concepts: a critical introduction.de* (Richter 1995).

Koselleck's "The historical-political semantics of asymmetric counterconcepts" is a theoretical and historiographical essay about conceptual formations that have the function of providing communal identification to social and political groups while excluding outsiders into a generic category. Koselleck warns that the usage of such concepts has fundamental political implications:

A political or social agency is first constituted through concepts by means of which it circumscribes itself and hence excludes others; and therefore, by means of which it defines itself... In the sense used here, a concept does not merely denote such an agency, it marks and creates the unity. The concept is not merely a sign for, but also a factor in, political or social groupings (Koselleck 1985, 160).²³

According to the author, asymmetric counterconcepts are used to deny the excluded Other the "reciprocity of mutual recognition" (1985, 160). Through these concepts, particular human groups confer a universal character to their own identity while denying others a claim to self-assertion. The positive element of the conceptual pair is widely accepted by the group as a true representation of their collective being, whereas the negative element is semantically constructed in opposition to that representation and generically employed to designate peoples who are perceived as not belonging to the group. The adjective "asymmetric" is employed by Koselleck to indicate that this conceptual opposition is not mutually accepted by the parts, that is, while the Self defines the Other as a pure negation of its Self-image, the Other does not recognize herself in that definition. In sum, at the core of asymmetric counterconcepts there is a problem of

²³ Like Honneth and Taylor, Koselleck also adheres to some of the tenets of the linguistic turn, more explicitly, to the notions that (1) language is action, and that (2) its meaning should be sought in usage and not through metaphysical or ontological speculation.

recognition, or better, of misrecognition: the definition impinged upon the Other appears to her as an insult, offense, and/or violence.

Although Koselleck identifies the denial of mutual recognition (misrecognition) at the core of the counterconcepts' semantic structure, he is not primarily interested in exploring the ethico-philosophical consequences of this problem. As I intend to show, his study is a promising starting point for building a typology of forms of misrecognition, which can be used as an analytical tool to identify misrecognition embedded in texts and pictorial materials. The making of this typology, however, requires reconstructing and expanding Koselleck's original analysis. Before starting the work of reconstruction, let us first expose Koselleck's original analysis of historical cases of asymmetrical counterconcepts.

The conceptual pair Hellene/Barbarian, as it was articulated in classic Greece, is the first case studied by Koselleck:

The Barbarians not only were formally non-Greek, or aliens, but also, as aliens, were defined negatively. They were cowardly, unskillful, gluttonous, brutish, and so on. (Koselleck 1985, 166)

In sum, the definition of barbarian implied ascribing to them a load of pejorative terms.

Koselleck also argues that the repeated usage of this conceptualization scheme had the cognitive effect of producing expectations that conditioned the understanding of future encounters with the barbarian Other²⁴:

For every definition there was empirical evidence: contact with overseas traders, the mass of foreign slaves, devastation of the

²⁴ Koselleck borrows the notion of "horizon of expectation" from Gadamer (see Gadamer 1975). For another brilliant application of this Gadamerian notion see Paul Ricoeur's *Hermeneutics and the human sciences* de (1981).

homeland by invading Persians, and similar experiences could easily be generalized without seeming to need revision. (Koselleck 1985, 166)

The Other is thus represented as a generic negation of the collective self.

The name of one people -- the Hellenes-- became the counterconcept for all the rest, who were assembled under a collective name which was simply the negative of Hellene. Asymmetry was thus semantically based on this conscious contrast of a specific name with a generic classification. (Koselleck 1985, 166)

The Greek characterization of “barbarians” was usually expressed as a condemnation of their alleged way of life, which represented the exact opposite of everything the Greeks deemed praiseworthy in their own self-image.

One should note that the semantics of the pair Hellene/barbarian does not produce the expectation of future redemption. The conquest of barbarian cities and their subjection to Greek despots, or the enslavement of barbarian populations did not aim at emancipating them from their wretched condition. In the Hellene/barbarian counterconceptual pair, asymmetric oppositions are irreducible and indelible, that is, they are impervious to the passage of time. In fact, this permanent character guaranteed, at the linguistic justificatory level, an influx of slave labor and, thus, the “stable” functioning of the entire Greek world.

The advent of Christianity prompted the appearance of new distinctions that could not be expressed by the pair Hellene/barbarian . The most important is the opposition between believer and unbeliever, which crystallized in the asymmetrical conceptual pair Christian/heathen. Paul’s universalistic gospel compelled its audience to choose between two courses of conduct: accepting the Christian doctrine and living according to the

scripture, or rejecting it entirely. Like in the Hellene/barbarian case, the semantics of Christian/heathen also contained the positive affirmation of a particular way of life (the Christian) in opposition to all other life-styles (non-Christian). Differently from the previous pair, however, the Christian doctrine created a horizon of expectations open to the future conversion of the heathen to Christianity. That is, even though, in a given moment, humanity was asymmetrically divided between Christians and heathens, the future elimination of this distinction through the consolidation of an entirely Christian humanity was always a possibility. This possibility also provided justification for human action. For example, Augustine coherently concludes that whereas the persecution of Christians by heathenheathens is unjust, the persecution of heathens by Christians is just. This argument was stretched even further by medieval Christianity, which used the redemption of the heathen as an end to justify forceful conversions, war, plunder, and massacres. Ultimately, in practical terms, the disappearance of the heathen's lifestyle could also mean the physical elimination of pagan populations.

According to Koselleck, the appearance of the pair Christian/heathen did not represent the total decline of the previous conceptual distinction. On the contrary, it created the possibility for the application of overlapping categories. This allowed for the temporal aspect of the asymmetry Christian/heathen to be imposed over cultural distinctions (way of life and customs) of the Hellene/barbarian type, generating oppositions where the positive pole was always Christianity, while the negative pole could be specifically represented by barbaric Saracens, Avars, Hungarians, Slavs, or Turks.

Finally, Koselleck examines the oppositions *Mensch/Unmensch*) and *Urbarmensch/Untermensch*, having as a reference the semantic history of the concept of

humanity from the Enlightenment to twentieth century Germany. For reasons of concision and relevance, I will only discuss the opposition Aryan/non-Aryan. Koselleck acknowledges that the semantics of Aryan/non-Aryan created the expectation of the non-Aryan's future elimination. However, the author does not fully develop the implications of this counterconceptual opposition, a task that, I believe, can contribute to the identification of a particular form of misrecognition.

Koselleck's effort cannot be fully understood without an appraisal of his theory of the historical accumulation of human experience through linguistic usage, which underpins the meta-concept of the "contemporaneity of the noncontemporaneous." The author claims that while counterconceptual oppositions are products of particular historical situations, they also "display model-like features which recur throughout the course of history." Given that the Hellene/barbarian pair is the first noteworthy historical case in which such structural oppositions are articulated, the semantics of the following pairs, Christian/heathen and Aryan/non-Aryan, were progressively thickened by the accretion of new oppositions to the previous ones.

The accumulation of temporalities finally makes it possible for the structure of all these counterconcepts to appear together. Today we have both antithetical linguistic figures appearing alongside each other, and the contemporaneity of the noncontemporaneous which is contained within a single pair of concepts, thanks to the historical diversity of the zones of experience that this pair comprehends."

Despite the richness of Koselleck's insights, the grand narrative that organizes his history of counterconceptual pairs is not adequate to the task of putting together a typology of misrecognition forms. The evolutionary line that goes from classical Greece to Christianity to Modern Germany can hardly be considered universal, unless one

assumes that Germany is the culmination of the human historical experience.

Furthermore, since this study addresses the life of the concept of Latin America in the United States, it makes little sense to adopt such a Eurocentric historical narrative. By discarding Koselleck's grand narrative, we are able to put in question the particular historical path of semantic accumulation described by the author, without totally abandoning the theoretical insight that some accumulation might indeed occur.

In order to become workable analytical tools, the "model-like" features of Koselleck's counterconceptual pairs have to be liberated from their original historical groundings, and thus, from their place in the grand narrative. This can be accomplished by extracting from each pair only its original form of opposition. As we intend to show, each form of asymmetrical opposition corresponds to a particular strategy for articulating misrecognition through language, which, in turn, is consequently connected to particular expectations. Thus, from the pair Hellene/barbarian a model of cultural asymmetric opposition can be derived: the one presented in terms of habits and customs. The actual content of the expectations generated by cultural asymmetric opposition cannot be determined outside its context of application and without relation to others forms of asymmetric opposition. In the ancient Greek horizon of expectations, the barbarian was associated with slavery and despotic subjection (Richter 1990).²⁵ But in other contexts, cultural asymmetric opposition might point to the assimilation of the Other, or, alternatively, to its extermination.

²⁵ This type of outcome is also suggested by Hegel's analysis of the struggle for recognition in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* [, 1977 #6038, 111]. Terry Pinkard interprets the encounter as a conflict between two diverse (because entirely subjective) projects for the world. This interpretation can be easily extrapolated to explain encounters between two "cultures" where the solution to the problem of finding a common term of agreement is found by the subjection of one by the other.

The second form of misrecognition, temporal asymmetric opposition, can be reached only through a considerable departure from Koselleck's historical analysis. The original source of this form of opposition is indeed the counterconceptual pair Christian/heathen. However, Koselleck's account of the Christian/heathen counterconceptual pair dwells exclusively on early Christian and medieval European authors, who tended to cast temporal opposition almost exclusively in terms of Christian eschatology. As a result, the author does not examine some powerful modes of temporal asymmetric opposition that were articulated in the modern era.²⁶

Authors engaged in justifying and making sense of Spain's colonial enterprise in the New World, such as the Thomists Bartolomé de Las Casas and José de Acosta, embedded new forms of partially-secularized asymmetric temporal oppositions in their stage-theories of development.²⁷ These theories aimed at explaining the different life-styles of the peoples of the New World, and thus, their status before the Spanish crown and people. In order to accomplish this task, Las Casas and Acosta created comparative ethnologies that took into account all peoples and cultures, present and past, known by Europeans. While Catholic Europe was both the apex and the yardstick of the developmental scale, different life-styles were ranked according to criteria of mutual similitude and proximity to the standard. In this manner, alien cultures could be identified with ancient and early European peoples, enabling the former to be understood as primitive, backward, and historically retarded.

²⁶ Koselleck addresses the question of the modern secularization of Christian eschatology in "'Space of Experience' and 'Horizon of Expectation': Two Historical Categories" (1985). Although he grasps the ethnological implications of new theories of infinite progress, Koselleck did not fully explore the ways in which asymmetrical perceptions of historical time were built into counterconceptual pairs.

²⁷ See Anthony Pagden's *The Fall of Natural Man : the American Indian and the Origins of Comparative Ethnology* (1982).

The secularization of developmental stage-theories accelerated during the French Enlightenment to the point of replacing the Christian *eskhaton* with the notions of human perfectibility and infinite progress. One of the finest examples of this theoretical move is found in Condorcet's *Esquisse d'un tableau historique des progrès de l'esprit humain* (Condorcet (1795)1988).²⁸ However, while human history lost its *telos* and *finis*, Europe was confirmed as the universal standard of moral and material progress.²⁹ Secularization not only preserved the expectation of solving the problem of the Other through drastic intervention, it also provided more means through which difference could be measured and intervention justified.

One should notice that these two theoretical movements towards secularization were contemporaneous of two successive waves of European colonialist expansion. Not by chance, these new theories served to justify, in both cases, the submission of the ones seen now as backward and primitive peoples to Europeans. The paternalistic rhetoric of the *mission civilisatrice* could only be articulated by a perception that equaled the Other to a child. In sum, the secularization of the Christian temporal opposition made possible the translation of cultural difference into temporal difference; of otherness into backwardness, retardation, and primitivism – an ethnological operation that the anthropologist Johannes Fabian has called “lack of coevalness” (1983).

²⁸ See Karl Löwith's *Meaning in History* (Löwith 1949) for a panoramic and insightful analysis of the birth of the historical conception of infinite progress during the French Enlightenment.

²⁹ The concept of Europe also evolved from the early modern period to the eighteenth century. It should be noticed that while early modern Spanish authors could not fully articulate an idea of European unity above religious differences, French Enlightenment thinkers were able to imagine a European civilization, based on what they saw as secular premises. Larry Wolff showed this notion at work in the constitution of the (counter)concept of Eastern Europe. See his *Inventing Eastern Europe* (1996).

In sum, in order to understand the semantic structure of temporal asymmetric opposition one has to go beyond Koselleck's limited analysis of its original formulation and capture its late developments in the form of secularized ethnologies of material and moral development. It is through these ethnologies, and not through pure Christian eschatology, that this form of misrecognition is articulated in the present as a way to deny Others the capacity of being simultaneous with the Self in this same present. Through the usage of this form of opposition, the ones who define themselves as living in the present justify their actions against the ones that are trapped in the past. As in the case of cultural asymmetric opposition, the full range of expectations associated with the use of temporal asymmetric oppositions depends greatly on the rhetorical context in which it is articulated. One should notice, however, that this form of asymmetric opposition is particularly able to yield future expectations that can crystallize into colonial projects, post-colonial tutelage, and other more subtle forms of economic and political intervention.

The third form of misrecognition is racial asymmetric opposition. Its operation can be identified, for example, in the counterconceptual opposition Aryan/non-Aryan. In order to understand its workings, however, we have to expand on Koselleck's exploration of the topic. Like "barbarian," the concept of non-Aryan was used to generically present the Other as morally inferior. Like the opposition Christian/pagan, the opposition Aryan/non-Aryan generated an expectation of future solution for the problem of the Other.

Nevertheless, the semantic field of this more recent counterconceptual opposition contains elements that are absent from previous pairs. This "novelty" corresponds to the articulation of asymmetric oppositions in terms of race. In *Race: the History of an Idea in*

the West (1996), Ivan Hannaford shows how “race” played an important role in the nascent theories of European nationalism of the nineteenth century, particularly in France, England, and Germany. According to Hannaford, the term then had a meaning that encompassed and often synthesized biological, linguistic, and cultural aspects (Hannaford 1996). However, Hannaford fails to notice that even though “race” is polysemous, its semantic aspects might not be equipotent. Our intent here is not to review the material analyzed by Hannaford but to suggest that, at least in the contemporary semantics of “race” in English, the biological aspect (expressed in physical, physiognomic, and psychological terms) is necessary whereas the others are contingent.³⁰

Race is indeed culturally constructed, but as such, it purports to signify something that is beyond or before culture; something usually expressed through physical, physiognomic, and psychological aspects. Hence, the perception of racial difference as asymmetric opposition generates its own horizon of expectations, where, for example, the problem of the Other cannot be simply “solved” by cultural assimilation or acculturation – a solution that has always been on the horizon of colonialist projects. Given its biological aspect, racial asymmetric opposition points to a solution that requires a radical control of the Other’s body.³¹ Examples: Nazi final solution, the ethnic ghettos of the American metropolises, the South African apartheid regime.

³⁰ As it will be shown in the following chapter, this already seemed to be the case in the brand of nineteenth century American nationalist discourse generally known as Manifest Destiny.

³¹ Axel Honneth correctly identifies a basic form of recognition that causes one to loose control over her own body. However, the psychologizing bent of his Hegelo-republican approach leads Honneth to overlook the concrete linguistic games that lead to that situation. The typology of forms of asymmetrical oppositions proposed here contributes to filling up this gap. For a more detailed account of the typology of the forms of misrecognition proposed here and its advantages in relation to Honneth’s see “Contribuição a uma tipologia das formas de desrespeito: para além do modelo hegeliano-republicano.” (Feres 2002).

Besides the three forms of misrecognition that are defined as asymmetric oppositions, there is another rhetorical practice that also contributes to misrecognition by expanding the range of application of asymmetric oppositions. Koselleck has noted in passing that “asymmetry was ... semantically based on [a] conscious contrast of a specific name with a generic classification” (, 1985, 166). Although I have used the term derogatory to characterize expressions that perpetrate misrecognition, asymmetric oppositions do not necessarily have to display an openly derogatory façade. In fact, as the analysis of the social scientific material will demonstrate, misrecognition is often effected by presenting a somewhat unfavorable “description” of a particular situation as a general characteristic of the Other. Conversely, carefully selected particular situations can be used to “explain” a general characteristic of the Other (e.g., a violent rebellion in Nicaragua is perceived as a manifestation of the violent nature of Latin Americans). Classic rhetoricians considered this practice a logical error, which they named *pars pro toto*. I prefer to call it “synecdochical fallacy,” given that the term “synecdoche” denotes both a figure of speech in which the particular is used for the general (as daisy for flower) and the one in which the general is used for the particular (as thief for pickpocket).

This project of reconstruction turns Koselleck’s historical types into ahistorical categories. That would constitute a major interpretive problem if this work were aimed at studying texts from a more distant past, for it is well known that terms such as race, culture and time widely varied their meaning with the passing of time (see Koselleck 1985; Hannaford 1996)³². But that is not the case of the Latin American studies literature, which was produced mainly in the last fifty years. As the reader will see, the

³² Not to mention that before the Enlightenment, terms such as race and culture were not even used in most European languages.

nineteenth century excerpts analyzed in chapter 3 present a version of temporal asymmetric opposition that differs from the one in the typology. Fortunately, however, that conception still fits a particular historical form of temporal asymmetric opposition. Finally, the possibility of this ahistorical treatment was adumbrated by Koselleck himself, who calls attention to the “model-like features” of those counterconceptual pairs, which, according to him, “recur throughout the course of history” (1985).³³

As we have said before, Koselleck’s meta-concept of the “contemporaneity of the noncontemporaneous” is based on the assumption of historical accumulation of human experience through linguistic usage. The author tries to prove his point by showing that, for example, Christians could use the pejorative linguistic arsenal created by the Greeks to refer to barbarians in combination with their own notions of temporality; modern ideologues could overlay or weave their notions of *Unmensch* and *Untermensch* to the semantic load of the past; and so on. Indeed, the “contemporaneity of the noncontemporaneous” seems to be a brilliant insight. However, by suspending the grand narrative that orients Koselleck’s inquiry, we are forced to discard the specific pattern of accumulation identified by the author (from classical Greece to Christianity to Modern Germany). Hence, in being de-historicized, the “contemporaneity of the noncontemporaneous” is reduced to the notion of the translatability of forms of asymmetric opposition, which attests to the imbricated manner in which these forms occur in contemporary language. Example: the inferior and abject character of the Other’s lifestyle is often portrayed as a form of historical stagnation or traditionalism,

³³ The fact that the categories are ahistorical does not render them improper for being used as analytical tools in a historical narrative – given that the time of the narrative is not far removed from the present.

which, in turn, might be coupled with racial overtones. Finally, the employment of the notion of translatability does not hamper scholars from identifying, in the course of their analytical work, historical patterns of semantic accumulation.

Response to Axel Honneth: misrecognition v. recognition

The typology of misrecognition forms developed here is not incompatible with Honneth's own typology of forms of disrespect. In a restricted manner, cultural and temporal asymmetric oppositions might be seen as particular cases of the third form of disrespect identified by the author – the one that debases one's lifestyle. However, through a detailed analysis of the linguistic (rhetorical) articulations of misrecognition, our typology is able to reveal aspects unexplored by Honneth. Separately or in combination, the forms identified in our typology can be used (and have been used) to perpetrate all three forms of disrespect enumerated by Honneth: physical abuse, the denial of rights, and the denigration of lifestyle. For example, while cultural asymmetric opposition might appear at first to be solely a form of debasing one's lifestyle, it can also be used as grounds for the denial of rights and/or physical abuse. Nonetheless, this is not the place to explore in detail the possibility of matching both typologies.

Our typology has the advantage of being able to identify misrecognition (in the form of asymmetric oppositions) in situations that are inaccessible to the Honneth's republican model, that is, when the ones that suffer misrecognition are not a significant part of the society that perpetrates it. This makes it extremely useful for analyzing the conditions of heteronomy that characterize the present-day highly asymmetrical international context. While the identification of misrecognition is not enough to considerably alter the condition of heteronomy, it can make one aware of language usages that perpetrate misrecognition, and thus, able to criticize and/or resist them.

Moreover, our typology of misrecognition forms can also be applied to the restricted context of the republic, the democratic liberal nation, serving disadvantaged groups (e.g., Latinos) as a tool to deconstruct discourses that perpetrate disrespect. More importantly, it can accomplish this critical task without having to rely on a previous positive assertion of authentic identity. In practical terms, one should be able to reject harming definitions without having to assume any self-defining predicates – as the ones implied by Honneth. Furthermore, even the ones who are willing to assume a social identity can equally benefit from the critical power enabled by the employment of such typology. In sum, within the democratic republic, this analytical tool can be used as a politico-ideological instrument in the struggle for (1) realizing in practice the equality formally posed in the letter of the law, and/or, (2) reforming the law according to higher standards of equality.

The importance of conceiving misrecognition as something independent from the notion of authentic identification can hardly be overstated. Following the opposite lead, Honneth fashions a theory of recognition based on the formation of a healthy self-consciousness, which entails enjoying a positive familial and affective life, equal (negative) rights, and cultural recognition (Honneth, 1992). Consequently, political struggles for recognition are translated into struggles to achieve that healthy standard. The dangerous side of this conception is that this same standard can easily be transformed into a criterion of normalcy used to oppress and exclude the ones that, one way or the other, fail to achieve the “correct” development of their self-consciousness. In other words, Honneth’s positive theory of recognition can in itself be converted into an instrument of disrespect.

Our criticism is based on the principle that recognition, in its positive form, must be a product of people's concrete engagement in politics and not a value discovered through theoretical speculation. A successful attempt to theoretically determine its content would undermine the principles of democratic equality and liberty that recognition intends to preserve. Hence, theory should only help us identify forms of misrecognition, creating useful tools for political debate – be it about the national community or about discourses that support imperial and trans-national powers.

Finally, republican theorists such as Honneth and Taylor have adapted Hegel's notion of recognition to the contemporary paradigm of the linguistic turn. That is, instead of relying on the psychology-laden prose of romanticism, they redefined recognition in terms of the social aspects of language use. As Honneth argues, one's positive self-understanding can only arise through intersubjective means, and those means must be available in everyday language. Conversely, he adds, misrecognition corresponds to robbing one of the intersubjective linguistic means to achieve this positive self-understanding. However, Honneth and Taylor's speculations about the relation between recognition/misrecognition and language stop at this general level. The typology of misrecognition forms developed here contributes to furthering the examination of this relation by identifying deep semantic regularities in the practices of misrecognition. The validity of this typology will be tested in the following chapters.

Before discussing methodological issues, I must address the question of the limits and reach of the typology of misrecognition forms proposed here. Do those three forms (cultural, temporal, and racial) cover all possible types of asymmetric oppositions? Probably not. Simone de Beauvoir has shown that the construction of gender also operates in a way that resembles asymmetric counterconcepts, with the feminine sex

being defined as a negation of the masculine one (Beauvoir 1993). Thus, one could conceive of something like gender asymmetric opposition, for gender laden arguments might not be entirely reduced to race, culture, or time, or to any combination of those three forms. Despite this possibility, I have not found significant evidence of asymmetric oppositions articulated around the theme of gender in the discourses on Latin America I examined. In contrast, the other three forms of asymmetric opposition pervade the material. Moreover, the categories of culture, time, and race are broad enough to encompass a plethora of sub-forms. For example, machismo, which at first might appear to be gender related, is often presented in texts as a Latin American cultural pathology. But gender is just one example. In fact, if we accept that language is an expression of human life experiences -- historical linguistics have shown that languages have been in constant semantic and morphological mutation -- there must be no logical limit for the types of misrecognition that can be perpetrated through linguistic means. Putting this typology to use; finding its practical limits and applicability in assessing different materials, is the best way to arrive at future refinements and/or expansions.

Questions of method

Discussions about methodology often get entangled in theoretical and meta-theoretical questions. This is understandable, given that conceiving of ways to deal with the objects of any study always presupposes some assumptions about their nature and relations in the world. Without entirely discarding these questions, this section on methodology is guided by a pragmatic orientation. Thus, instead of beginning with an abstract discussion about how a history of concepts should operate, I start from the identification of my main object of study -- the Latin American studies literature -- and of

my main inquiry -- identifying the practice of misrecognition in this material --, and examining a series of methodological choices that should be made in order to produce a viable study.

As the reader might remember from the introduction, all but one of the “substantive” chapters of this dissertation focuses on the analysis of textual material produced by academics that specialize in the study of Latin America. My interest in studying the social scientific discourses on Latin America actually predates the adoption of conceptual history as a methodology. In fact, through my previous work with the history of political thought, I became acquainted with the Collingwoodian approach³⁴ to the study of the history of political thought, which enjoys a dominant position in English-speaking academic milieus. As a result of this contact, I first thought of adapting the methodological guidelines developed by Quentin Skinner, the approach’s main theoretical mind, to the study of the Latin American studies’ textual material. But this project ran into problems.

Skinner declares that his object of study is utterances, language games or, in later texts, ideologies and linguistic conventions (1974), and that the main aim of his methodology is the recovery of authorial intention (1969)³⁵. Leaning on John Austin’s speech act theory, Skinner argues that the meaning of a particular utterance can only be

³⁴ Formerly known as the “Cambridge School,” this approach has recently been renamed by Quentin Skinner as “the Collingwoodian approach” -- a homage to the philosopher R. G. Collingwood, whose work Skinner sees as an important predecessor of his own (Skinner 2001).

³⁵ Skinner eventually recanted from the thesis that the recovery of authorial intentions must be the primary aim of interpretation to the more modest claim that this recovery must be “*amongst* the interpreter’s tasks” (1974). Nevertheless, it should be noticed that this reformulated argument still deems possible the recovery of authorial intention.

correctly understood if one considers this utterance as the product of an author's intent to mean something within the particular linguistic context of his place and period (Skinner 1969; Tully 1988). Skinner used this call for more historicism, that is, for understanding ideas in their proper historico-linguistic context, to criticize most previous methodologies to the study of the history of political thought, which he charged of being plagued with "mythologies" such as the idea of eternal political themes, authorial originality, presentism, and instrumentalism (1969).

The object of my interest was indeed linguistic, thus the idea of applying categories such as language games, ideologies, or linguistic conventions to the study of the social scientific texts appeared to be adequate. However, I found the project of recovering authorial intention rather problematic. First, because of a meta-theoretical objection: by relying on speech act theory, Skinner ends up equating text with oral communication. Nevertheless, as Paul Ricoeur has brilliantly demonstrated, the inscription of speech produces an irremediable loss of both illocutionary and perlocutionary content,³⁶ and, thus, undermines the possibility of recovering authorial intention through interpretation. In sum, the task of interpreting a text from the past cannot be equaled to the act of understanding a live oral exchange (1979).

Second, and more importantly, some characteristics of the Latin American studies textual output posed practical obstacles to the quest of recovering authorial intention. The sharp increase in funding for the study of Latin America after the Cuban revolution

³⁶ According to the vocabulary of the Speech Act Theory, illocutionary content (or meaning) corresponds to what a speaker intended to do in saying what he said (e.g. a warning, an irony), and perlocutionary content corresponds to what effect or reaction the speaker intended to create by saying what he said (e.g., fear, attention) (Austin 1962; Searle 1969; Skinner 1972).

allowed for the professional specialization of scholars and the institutionalization of a large academic apparatus (see chapter 4). Consequently, this has produced a vast accumulated textual output. On the other hand, Latin America studies has yielded no Hobbeses, Rousseaus, or Marxes, that is, no author has acquired the stature of a grand luminary in the field, at least not to the extent that his or her theories about Latin America became an almost obligatory referent in academic debates. Thus, the model of a “conversation among great thinkers” – which still underpins Skinner’s project despite his stress on context -- cannot be productively applied to the study of Latin American studies. Rather than pursuing authorial intent through the focus on the contribution of each single author, my project would benefit more from an approach that focuses on commonalities shared by several texts.

Finally, since the bulk of the Latin American studies textual output was produced in the recent past, the problem of recovering a meaning that was lost because of the demise of the world of references that surrounded it -- the classical hermeneutical problem of interpreting texts of a distant past -- is not so acute. It can be reasonably assumed that the meanings of the “utterances” produced by Latinamericanists of the 1960s, for example, are still readily available to the reader of the present. Thus, my challenge is not to overcome a disjunction between my reading of the text and the author’s original intent, but to identify the temporal continuity or discontinuity of asymmetric oppositions through an assortment of texts. In substantive terms, I wanted to assess how some crucial misrecognition-bearing rhetorical forms were reproduced, reconstructed, or repressed by the different trends of the social scientific literature on Latin America.

These difficulties with the Collingwoodian approach led me to search for a methodological alternative. Although I did not intend to discover a ready-made methodology to apply to my study, I looked for possibilities that would yield a more productive head start. This I found in the work of Reinhart Koselleck. Together with Otto Bruner and Werner Conze, Koselleck edited an impressive collection of nine volumes dedicated to the study of the social and political concepts in modernizing Germany, the *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe* (1972-1997). Beside his voluminous historiographical work, this author has also published texts on the methodology of conceptual history and on the philosophy of history (1985; 2002). This latter category of texts is obviously of greater interest to the task in question.

The idea of approaching the study of the textual material produced by Latin American studies via the history of concepts makes sense. After all, the common object of study, "Latin America," is what brings those texts together. Furthermore, "Latin America's" centrality to this academic enterprise is not strictly textual. Latin American studies' institutional organization was consciously set around the project of studying "Latin America." That is, "Latin America" is the axis of a series of social practices that involve government agencies, funding institutions, policymakers, universities, and the private sector. Finally, given that "Latin American," or better, "Latino" has also become an ethnic identity in the United States, therefore the set of the social practices that revolve around the concept extend far beyond the ones that surround academic production.³⁷

³⁷ Although the academic textual production is just a parcel of those practices, it is a crucial agent in the social production and reproduction of "Latin America" in the United States, as this dissertation will show.

Placing the concept of Latin America as the central element of a diachronic narrative does not entail discarding forms of synchronic linguistic analysis, such as the identification of a particular configuration of asymmetric oppositions in the material of a certain approach (e.g., modernization, corporatism). On the contrary, the concept provides a reference through which the continuity or discontinuity of these synchronic linguistic elements can be assessed. As Koselleck has argued in a debate with representatives of the Collingwoodian approach, the task of writing the history of thought must necessarily combine synchronic and diachronic analysis; and the history of concepts (*Begriffsgeschichte*) is one way of doing this, but not necessarily the only way (Koselleck 1996).³⁸ In the study proposed here, priority is given to assessing the participation of these forms of misrecognition in the “definition” of Latin America, and not to study them as confined entities. That is, although the typology of misrecognition forms is applied to the analysis of the texts produced under a given approach, which are fairly synchronous, the succession of approaches, and thus, of configurations of misrecognition forms, provide a diachronic thrust to the narrative.

According to Koselleck, conceptual history must be written in parallel and in close connection to social history. The author refrains from enclosing the history of concepts within a purely linguistic realm, and, thus, from granting language complete autonomy in relation to social practices. Conversely, like his Collingwoodean colleagues, he also rejects the treatment of language as an epiphenomenon of social

³⁸ An influential contributor to the Collingwoodian approach, J.G.A Pocock, participated in this debate. Although Pocock chooses to privilege the synchronic aspect of languages, he also acceded to productive perspectives of writing conceptual history (Pocock 1996).

reality.³⁹ This position is better synthesized by the assumption that “the concept is not merely a sign for, but also a factor in, political or social groupings” (Koselleck 1985, 160)⁴⁰. Consequently, for Koselleck, modalities of social history that are not exclusively centered on language must contribute to establishing the historical context and reception of concepts -- something that Collingwoodeans are less eager to admit (Koselleck 1985)⁴¹.

This synergistic approach to the study of conceptual history is fully employed in this dissertation. Placing the discourse of Latin American studies within its politico-historical context is crucial for understanding the justification and expectations produced by it. Furthermore, the strong policy orientation of some trends in the Latin American studies begs for an approach that takes extra-linguistic historical aspects into serious consideration, for texts in general, and particularly academic texts, not always spell out the political applications for which they are written.⁴²

Central to his *Begriffsgeschichte* project, Koselleck’s notion of key concepts (*Grundbegriffe*) must be understood within this conversation with social history. Key

³⁹ A detailed Collingwoodean statement against this form of reductionism can be found in Skinner’s classic contribution “Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas.” (1969).

⁴⁰ On the topic of Koselleck’s position in relation to the German academic trends that embraced the linguistic turn see Melvin Richter’s “A German Version of the ‘Linguistic turn’: Reinhart Koselleck and the History of Political and Social Concepts” (2001).

⁴¹ For a detailed exploration of this topic see Melvin Richter’s *The History of Political and Social Concepts: a Critical Introduction* (1995, 136), and also “A German version of the ‘linguistic turn’” (2001, 60).

⁴² The term “extra-linguistic” must be qualified. Social and political histories often rely on textual sources. However, they usually refer directly to things in the world and are not engaged in critically reflecting about language itself.

concepts are political and social concepts that, due to injunctions of a given society's historical process, become the site of heated struggles (present-day examples would be democracy, justice, etc). Since, according to Koselleck, lived social experience is the source of meaning, the political struggle around a concept contributes to thickening its semantic load through the accumulation of meanings, which can often be incompatible (1996, 64).⁴³ Consequently, the meaning of a key concept "K" can never be exhausted by a sentence such as "K is x."

But Latin America has never been a key concept in American society. As it has already been shown in the previous section, Latin America better fits the category of asymmetric counterconcept, i.e., a concept defined in opposition to a collective self-image and used to name a generalized Other. Koselleck claims that asymmetric counterconcepts are also political concepts (1985). Indeed, all cases studied by him (Hellene/Barbarian, Christian/heathen, and Aryan/non-Aryan) involved societies that used counterconcepts to segregate large parts of their own population. Defining what is to be a barbarian, a heathen, or a non-Aryan, and, consequently, what to do with and expect from them, was certainly a crucial political issue in those societies. Nevertheless, that has not been the case of "Latin America" in the United States, for Latin Americans have not been a sizable parcel of the American population until recently.⁴⁴ What

⁴³ A very simple and limited example: Nowadays, communitarians and liberals disagree in relation to their conception of democracy, each one of those sides ascribing to the concept meanings that are contested by the other. At the same time, if one is to speak of the concept of democracy in contemporary American society, both conceptions have to be taken into account.

⁴⁴ Latin American studies is mostly a discourse about foreigners. The more recent academic interest for the study of "Latin American" communities in the United States has been named "Latina/o Studies" (Padilla 1990).

consequences does this bring to the applicability of the methodology of conceptual history to the study of “Latin America”?

Following Koselleck’s reasoning, one would expect that for not being a site of social and political struggles, of contestation, Latin America would have a much leaner semantic load, and thus would not be an appropriate object for conceptual history. Nonetheless, that is not entirely the case. Contestation has not been a key characteristic of the concept of Latin America but, at the same time, the accumulation of meaning promoted by the prolific activity of Latin American studies contributed to a great expansion of the concept’s semantic load through the aggregation of social and political theories, ethnologies, and historical narratives. Although “Latin America” did not become a site of heated political debate in American society, it did become a prominent object of both security concerns and capitalist interests, particularly after Fidel Castro’s political allegiances shifted toward the Soviet Union. In sum, due to this process of semantic accumulation, the meaning of “Latin America” also cannot be exhausted by a sentence such as “Latin America is x.”

In a sense, the intensification of “semantic activity” brought about by the rise of Latin American studies marks a *Sattelzeit* in the history of concept of Latin America in the United States. According to Koselleck, *Sattelzeit* corresponds to the period in a society’s history when the rate of political and social change, and thus semantic change, accelerate. The author himself has warned that this conception is a practical way of focusing the investigation that does not have a direct implication for the method of *Begriffsgeschichte*. For the project of the *Grundbegriffe Geschichtliche*, the German *Sattelzeit* was assumed to stretch from 1750 to 1850, when the community of German

speakers went through a process of rapid modernization and state formation (Koselleck 1985, x; Koselleck 1996, 69).

Immediately following the end of World War II, the United States entered an epoch of intense transformation. The country was catapulted from a position of mild isolationism under Franklin D. Roosevelt to the role of hegemonic world power after the war (Schoultz 1998). With the rapid growth of the US geopolitical reach, the demand for knowledge escalated, including here expertise about foreign regions of the world. This period of intense knowledge production inaugurated during the Cold War is this project's *Sattelzeit* of sorts. Although it is not characterized by intense political contestation, it does correspond to a shift in the way discourses about the nation's Others were articulated and to a massive increase in the production and circulation of those discourses. Furthermore, it meets the same practical goal of limiting and focusing the investigative work.

The notion of "concept" employed in this dissertation needs some further clarification. Koselleck argues that although "meanings," "ideas," or "concepts" are communicated through words, a word does not necessarily coincide with a single meaning, idea, or concept. That is, a word might be a site for many concepts and/or a concept might be expressed by more than one word. The methodological solution for addressing this conundrum is, according to Koselleck, to alternate two types of analysis: "semasiological (the study of all meanings of a term, word, or concept) and onomasiological (the study of all names or terms for the same thing or concept)" (1996, 64). A historical study focused on a concept can never waive such procedure. For the investigator must not only identify associations of words, but also associations of meaning which are not always obvious (e.g. although the adjectives "personalist" and

“backward” might not be employed in the same sentence in a given text, their meaning in the text might be shown to share temporal and cultural asymmetric oppositional elements).

The procedure of alternating semasiological and onomasiological analysis is also employed in this dissertation. The following chapter is a study of the term “Spanish America,” a synonym of Latin America that had great currency in the nineteenth century. The rest of the dissertation might be seen as a semasiological study of Latin America. However, that is not entirely true. Given that Latin America’s semantic load is also expressed by words, the semasiological study of Latin America entails the onomasiological study of those terms. In practice, each form of asymmetric opposition is identified by the presence in the text of words that share a common meaning, e.g., underdeveloped, backward, retarded, and immature for temporal asymmetric opposition. And translatability is a quality according to which even words that are far from being synonyms get to share meaning through contextual location, e.g., backward and rural denoting cultural asymmetric opposition. One should notice that, as a core methodological procedure, the alternation of semasiological and onomasiological analysis can be extended *ad infinitum*.

Although the procedure of alternating semasiological and onomasiological analysis is adopted as a general guideline in this dissertation, the work of interpretation here is much closer to the text than in many other works of conceptual history, including the essays by Koselleck in the *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe* and elsewhere (see 1985). This difference in approaching the primary source material is partially due to the length of the historical narrative. Although Koselleck’s focus is on German concepts, his historical accounts of them often start in ancient Greece, with the examination of

semantically related notions (semasiology), and travel on the back of a historical narrative of Western civilization until they reach modern Germany. As a consequence of this *long-durée* approach, Koselleck's analysis can hardly engage texts in detail. The textual material is often used as illustrations of linguistic usage that corroborate the socio-political historical analysis provided by the investigator. In this type of narrative, historical analysis takes precedence over textual analysis, which, although an important part of it, remains accessory.

In terms of historiography, this dissertation is much less ambitious than that type of conceptual history. The bulk of the analytical work done here concentrates on text produced during a period of roughly three decades. The following chapter on the concept of "Spanish America" and the subsequent entrance of Latin America in the English language is a necessary introduction to the main subject but it is far from being the focus of the dissertation. I have no pretense of writing here a "longer" history of the term "Latin" in English or other European languages or studying in detail the history of the perceptions associated with "Spanish" and "Spanish American" before the American independence – although those are very interesting related subjects that I might pursue in the future. In sum, given that my object of study is more limited and focused, a greater attention is paid to textual analysis, with historical narrative playing a crucial but accessory role in the overall project.

The alternation of onomasiology and semasiology here is made most of the time within the text, or within the same literary trend (e.g. modernization, dependency). This work of interpretation pays much attention to the way arguments that reproduce forms of asymmetric opposition are presented in a text and to the rhetorical strategies that connect different arguments within that text. Furthermore, I also paid great attention to the

repetition of rhetorical tropes within the same literary trend or across different trends. At times, the analytical way of proceeding in this work approximates discourse analysis. Indeed, that comprises a sizable part of the synchronic aspect of my investigation.⁴⁵ Nevertheless, the diachronic historical perspective should never be forgotten, for the identification of continuities and ruptures in the usage of asymmetric oppositions to describe Latin America is a major goal pursued in this work.

Something must be said about the notion of semantic field. Differently from Koselleck, who uses it to denote regions of meaning within natural languages that congregate many concepts (see Koselleck 1985; Koselleck 1985), I employ the term to refer to a sole concept's (e.g., Latin America) semantic load. That is, while Koselleck's field is characterized by semantic homogeneity, mine is heterogeneous, possibly containing three distinct semantic regions: cultural, temporal, and racial asymmetric oppositions. The metaphor of the semantic field allows one to imagine a space formed by the language usages (vocabularies, sentences, and theories) that gravitate around the term Latin America, with each form of asymmetrical opposition occupying a region in the field. In this metaphor, translatability is represented by areas of intersection between two or three regions – where language can convey more than one form of misrecognition.

Finally, the division of the chapters presented in the introduction begs for a methodological justification. Latinamericanists have consciously identified their work with different theories or approaches, e.g., modernization theory, political stability, dependency studies, etc. The secondary literature, which is usually authored by scholars in the field doubling as critical commentators, has also adopted the same divisions –

⁴⁵ The contextualization of that discourse within social and political aspects that marked its historical time comprises the rest of the synchronic analysis.

something that contributes to the crystallization of this disciplinary self-organization. Moreover, the fact that these approaches rose and declined in chronological sequence contributes to the cohesion of the historical narrative, facilitating the identification of synchronous connections between the history of the concept of Latin America and other socio-political historiographical information about the institutional aspects of Latin American studies and the US foreign relations. As Foucault once argued:

[one] shall accept the groupings that [the discipline] suggests only to subject them at once to interrogation; to break them up and then to see whether they can be legitimately reformed; or whether other groupings should be made; to replace them in a more general space which, while dissipating their apparent familiarity, makes it possible to construct a theory of them " (Foucault 1972).

That is, adopting the groupings that Latinamericanist fashioned for themselves is a good point of departure for finding "other groupings" (asymmetric oppositions) that are not so apparent in the Latin American studies literature.

3. Latin America's pre-scientific life

The vulgar are apt to carry all national characters to extremes; and having once established it as a principle, that any people are knavish, or cowardly, or ignorant, they will admit of no exception, but comprehend every individual under the same censure."

David Hume, "Of National Characters"

According to the *Oxford English Dictionary* the term "Latin America" only started to be employed in English in the last decade of the nineteenth century. The first usage of "Latin America" annotated by the dictionary dates from 1890 and pertains to a document authored by American president Benjamin Harrison, *Reciprocity Treaties with Latin America*. The term "Latin America" is most likely an import for there is evidence of the usage of *América Latina* in Spanish and *Amérique Latine* in French preceding by several decades the incorporation of "Latin America" to the English language.

Although the assumption that the compound noun "Latin America" first appeared in French is current in the Latin American studies literature [see for example\ Skidmore, 2001 #4983], the term *América Latina* seem to have been employed in Spanish first and then translated into the French expression *Amérique Latine*. The earliest usage of the term is found in a poem called *Las Dos Americas* by the Colombian José Maria Torres de Caicedo published in 1856, in Venice (Torres de Caicedo 1856; Ardao 1980; Vargas 1989). Torres de Caicedo was journalist, poet, and literary critic who spent most of his life in Paris. Concerned with the threat of US expansionism, particularly after the Mexican War and William Walker's invasion of Nicaragua, he advocated the need for an association of the American republics to resist "North American" aggression. The basis for this union would be the common Latin heritage shared by the republics. This heritage

included not only the Spanish language and Catholicism, but also republicanism and the rejection of slavery.⁴⁶ Adept of liberal ideas, Caicedo admired the US for its republican democratic system but feared American expansionism, which, he thought, was motivated by an excess of greed and arrogance (Torres de Caicedo 1875); Torres de Caicedo 1865).⁴⁷

Torres de Caicedo might have been the first to put in print the term “*América Latina*,” but the concept of “an America that is Latin” was already foreseen by the French ideologues of Pan-Latinism before Torres de Caicedo coined the term. Pan-Latinism was based on the idea of a common Latin race (*race latine*), which had been current in France at least since the 1830s. The racial bond among Latin societies of the Old and New Worlds celebrated by Pan-Latinism did not necessarily translated into an egalitarian conception of the Latin civilization. On the contrary, as the historian Michel Chevalier, one of the ideology’s main advocates, argued “[France] is at the head of the Latin group; she is its protectress” and, thus, she is responsible for leading the Latin peoples towards the re-conquest of a preeminent role in the history of human civilization” (Chevalier 1839).

⁴⁶ Torres de Caicedo’s original project did not include Brazil, a Portuguese-speaking country that by that time had a monarchical government.

⁴⁷ Simón Bolívar, of whom Torres de Caicedo declares to be a follower, had already imagined the union of Spain’s ex-colonies in a single political body. Nonetheless, Bolívar never developed a special vocabulary to differentiate the sections of the continent he called “America”, on the contrary, he employed the term “American” to denominate all republics and peoples of the New World. Even though Bolívar had a clear sense of the US’s distinctiveness in relation to the other American republics, he wanted it to take part in his project of a truly continental political arrangement. Rather than the United States, Bolívar feared Spain and the encroachment of other European powers (Bolívar 1969).

Even though Chevalier himself did not employ the term *Amerique Latine*, its usage became common in France in the second half of the nineteenth century (Phelan 1968). Pan-Latinism served as ideological support to French imperialism. Chevalier later became a close advisor to Napoleon III⁴⁸, whose Pan-Latinist ill-fated adventures included the construction of a French Panama Canal, the invasion of Mexico in 1861, and the creation of a French-backed project for a "Kingdom of the Andes."

Nonetheless, rather than enjoying hegemonic tranquility during the French Second Empire, the political agenda of Pan-Latinism was the object of heated political debates. The Napoleonic factions defended a closer cooperation with England in Europe and an abandonment of previous policies of support to the United States in the New World against the monarchists who wanted to preserve both the age-old European rivalry with England and the pro-US position (Phelan 1968). Torres de Caicedo "imagined" *América Latina* having that ideological debate in the background. Given that he was a public figure in Paris who attended some of the social gatherings and ceremonies promoted by Napoleon's court (Vargas 1989), it is reasonable to suppose that he was not oblivious to the debates surrounding Pan-Latinism. Unfortunately, this is not the occasion to discuss Torres de Caicedo, his condition as an exiled intellectual, and the context of the Pan-Latinist ideology in detail. It should be noted, however, that Torres de Caicedo rarely wrote about French domestic politics (Ardao 1980). Most of his texts were composed and published in Spanish, that is, he wrote for a Spanish speaking audience. More importantly, in his conception of a Latin American union there was no

⁴⁸ Napoleon III governed the France as president from 1850 to 1852 and as emperor from 1852 to 1870.

place for a French leadership. Torres de Caicedo advocated a confederation of Latin American republics, which should start from a treaty of free regional trade and the acceptance of universal civil and political rights by all its members (Torres de Caicedo 1865).

Torres de Caicedo tried to transform his ideas into a political program through the creation of the *Sociedad Latinoamericana Científico-Literaria* (Latin American Scientific-Literary Society), in 1868, and the *Sociedad de la Unión Latinoamericana* (Society for the Latin American Union), in 1879 -- institutions that brought together intellectual figures from the Spanish-speaking republics of the New World, most of them living as exiles in France, to debate the destinies of their countries.⁴⁹ Despite his efforts, Torres de Caicedo's initiatives were short lived and generated no further institutional developments either in France or in Spanish speaking countries. He died in Paris in 1889. In that same year, the American Secretary of State, James G. Blaine, succeeded in gathering representatives of almost all American nations in Washington for the First International Conference of American States.⁵⁰ One year latter, according to the *Oxford English Dictionary*, the term "Latin America" was officially employed in English for the first time.

⁴⁹ Like Torres de Caicedo, many of these intellectuals were literary figures and not politicians. See the institutions' list of members in "Union Latino-Americana: pensamiento de Bolívar para formar una liga americana: su origen y sus desarrollos" (Torres de Caicedo 1865).

⁵⁰ The Haitian government refused to send representatives claiming that the US was trying to seize part of its territory, the San Nicholas peninsula; and the government of San Domingo also avoided participation arguing that the US was rehearsing a military invasion of the Samana bay (Lockey 1939).

One must note that in both of its earlier versions the term Latin America (*América Latina* and *Amérique Latine*) constituted the core of political programs directly related to imperialist projects. The Spanish-speaking version was a banner for resistance against US imperialist expansion while the French version was a call for French imperialist encroachment over the former colonies of Spain and Portugal. In both cases the perceived difference between the Latin and the Anglo civilizations was foundational. Furthermore, in French Pan-Latinism the concept of race played a key role in this differentiation. In the following sections and chapters we will examine the concept of Latin America in yet another context: the English-speaking United States. Given this brief historical account of the concept of Latin America's origins, what should one expect from its "life" in the English language? Would it also be based on racial perceptions? Would it be also related to some imperialist political project? These valid questions can only start to be answered by a careful exam of history of the concept of Latin America in English, which will be conducted in the following sections and chapters.

Spanish America

The second edition of the *Oxford English Dictionary* informs us that "until the early 20th century, that is, until the appearance of the term "Latin America" in English, "Spanish American" was the preferred term to refer to things "of or pertaining to Latin America or its peoples." Assuming that the *Oxford English Dictionary* is correct, and, thus, that "Latin American" replaced "Spanish American" in everyday English, one can rightfully formulate the question: did Latin America also inherit the semantic field of its predecessor? Before answering that question, however, we must first examine the

semantic inheritance accumulated by Spanish America during the century that preceded the inception of its sister concept in the English language.

In this section I will examine some nineteenth-century references to Spanish America and Spanish American countries and peoples made by prominent American politicians and intellectuals. A special attention will be paid to references made by Manifest Destiny ideologues, for, as it will be shown, the conceptualization of Mexicans and Spanish Americans as the Americans' racial and cultural Others played a key role in the justification of American expansionism. The objective of this section is not to provide a detailed historical study of the concept of Spanish America in the nineteenth-century United States. This subject would require an entire book and, thus, cannot be exhausted in a chapter or a section of a chapter. Likewise, I did not intent to present here a comprehensive study of Manifest Destiny that covers its historical and political contexts and the changes this ideology went through from the Mexican War to the Spanish-American War. My main objective here is to identify in this nineteenth-century material the presence of semantic elements, more specifically, asymmetric oppositions, that might have been later incorporated into the concept of Latin America.

Pejorative references to things Spanish and to the peoples of the Southern republics have existed in English long before the term "Latin America" entered the language. The religious controversies of the sixteenth century and the war against the Spanish Armada contributed to the consolidation of a strong anti-Spanish sentiment in England, which is often referred to as the Spanish Black Legend, or just the Black Legend. Expressions of this sentiment can be found in British fictional literature, political treatises, journals, and speeches of British statesmen, military, and

They are lazy, dirty, nasty, and in short I can compare them to nothing but a parcel of hogs.⁵⁴

Like his father, John Quincy Adams also extended this negative view of things Spanish to “New Spain,” and continued to profess it even after the independence of the Spanish colonies. On one occasion he wrote Henry Clay that:

[Spanish Americans] have not the first elements of good or free government. Civil dissension [is] infused into all their seminal principles. War and mutual destruction was in every member of their organization, moral, political, and physical.⁵⁵

Consistent with his views, Quincy Adams opposed the granting of American diplomatic recognition to the new Spanish Americans republics.

The Adams family was not alone in their contempt to things perceived as Spanish. When commenting on the prospects of the newly independent Southern republics Thomas Jefferson said: “history ... has no example of a priest-ridden people maintaining a free civil government.”⁵⁶ Alexander Scott, a government official sent to Venezuela in 1812, reported to president Monroe that people there are “timid, indolent, ignorant, superstitious, and incapable of enterprise or exertion.”⁵⁷ The US minister to Colombia,

⁵⁴ JQ Adams Diary, 24 December 1779 to 7 January 1780, *Diary of John Quincy Adams*, Robert J. Taylor and Mark Friedlaender, eds., 2 vols. (Taylor and Friedlaender 1981), vol. 1, pp. 17-27. Originally quoted in Lars Schoultz's *Beneath the United States* (1998).

⁵⁵ Adams Diary, 9 March 1821, *Memoirs of John Quincy Adams* (Adams and Adams 1970), vol. 5, p.325. Originally quoted in Schoultz's. Op. cit.

⁵⁶ Jefferson to Thaddeus Kosciuszko, 13 April 1811, *Writings of Thomas Jefferson* (1869), vol. 13, pp. 40. Originally quoted in Schoultz's. Op. cit.

⁵⁷ Alexander Scott to James Monroe, 16 November 1812 and 1 January 1813, *Consular Letters from La Guaira*, NA M84/R1. Originally quoted in Schoultz's. Op. cit.

Beaufort Watts, wrote in 1828 that the typical Colombian was “an obedient animal that fawns when chastised.”⁵⁸

One should notice that these early manifestations of contempt for Spanish Americans are already constructed as asymmetric oppositions. Each of the qualifiers attributed to them -- priest-ridden (Catholic), indolent, ignorant, superstitious, and incapable of enterprise or exertion -- corresponds to a negation of a positive element of the American self-image -- Protestant [thus anti-Catholic], disciplined, educated, rational, and industrious. Given that these qualifiers describe life-styles, customs, habits, and institutions, one can situate them within the category of cultural asymmetric opposition.

The expectations associated with these oppositions could hardly be harsher. John Adams deems Roman Catholicism so inimical to free government that one can rightfully conclude following his line of reasoning that the latter will only prosper in Spanish America with the demise of the former. Thomas Jefferson identifies the same incompatibility. John Quincy Adams takes cultural asymmetric opposition a step forward, opening the possibility for racist translations: first by comparing Spaniards to hogs, thus suggesting that their baseness is so acute that it is non-human, and second, by saying that “war and mutual destruction” was ingrained not only in the moral and political institutions of Spanish Americans, but also in their physical beings. It should be noted that translation here occurs in just one direction: negative cultural characteristics are attributed to physical causes, and thus, seen as a product of racial inferiority. On the other hand, racial inferiority can hardly be seen as a consequence of bad cultural habits.

⁵⁸ Watts to Clay, 10 March 1828, *Despatches from Colombia*, NA T33/R4. Originally quoted in Schoultz's. Op. cit.

Synthesizing in one sentence derogation and expectation, Beaufort Watts likens the “typical Colombian” to an animal that responds well to punishment.

The introduction of racist elements modifies the horizon of expectations in regard to Spanish Americans. While blaming their base cultural habits on Catholicism might point to religious reformation as a solution, seeing those same habits as consequences of physical inferiority rules out that possibility, restricting the range of solutions to measures that would directly interfere with and/or control the body of Spanish Americans. Although those expectations seem to already guide the actions of American governmental representatives allocated in Spanish America, they did not immediately coalesce into a full-blown policy. Furthermore, it must be noted that despite the occasional traces of racialism, cultural asymmetric opposition was the main element in these early nineteenth-century depictions of Spanish Americans.⁵⁹

All quotations above are from the early 19th century, when the young US republic had little contact with the even-younger republics of the South. This situation started to change in the second quarter of that century with the surge of American expansionist designs. Commenting approvingly on the success of white settlers in Texas who wrested their independence from Mexico, the American Secretary of State, Abel Upshur, said in 1843:

No man who knows any thing of his own nature can suppose it to be possible that two races of men, distinguished by external and ineffaceable marks, obvious to every eye; who have held towards each other from time immemorial the relation of master and slave,

⁵⁹ Reginald Horsman argues that the shift towards racialism occurred only around the mid-1800s (1981).

could ever live together as equals, in the same country and under the same Government.⁶⁰

While opposing the annexation of large portions of Mexican territory in Congress, Senator John Berrien asked his audience:

Are you willing to put your birthright into the keeping of the mongrel races who inhabit these territories, by incorporating them into this Union?⁶¹

In a similar vein, the New York representative Washington Hunt opposed simple annexation to the Union:

... think of the character of the population which must come with them into our Confederacy. We must prepare to receive an incongruous mass of Spaniards, Indians, and mongrel Mexicans – a medley of mixed races, who are neither to enjoy nor to administer our free institutions: men of different blood and language, who cannot mingle with our people on a footing of social or political equality.⁶²

If these territories were ever incorporated, Hunt insisted:

They must be governed as a colonial dependency, under provisional laws, or else be incorporated into our federal system, to become an eternal source of strife, anarchy, and civil commotion.

⁶⁰ Upshur to Edward Everett, 28 September 1843, Instructions to Great Britain, NA M77/R74. Originally quoted in Schoultz's. Op. cit.

⁶¹ *Congressional Globe*, 5 February 1847, Appendix pp. 301. Originally quoted in Schoultz's. Op. cit.

⁶² *Congressional Globe*, 13 February 1847, Appendix pp. 363. Originally quoted in Schoultz's. Op. cit.

Whereas in the early nineteenth-century excerpts, race appeared just allusively, in the quotations from around the period of the Mexican War it has become the main rhetorical instrument to assert Spanish American inferiority. A careful look at the racial characteristics enumerated by those politicians shows that they lack specificity. Mexicans are said to be an incongruous mass of Spaniards, Indians, and mongrels or a medley of mixed races – that is, their ultimate racial nature is being non-white. Likewise, Abel Upshur's statement about two races of men that "have held towards each other from time immemorial the relation of master and slave" can only be read as a generic reference to the fact that Mexicans are dark-skinned (non-white), and thus belong to the same category of men that have been slaved by the white men from time immemorial.

As the excerpts above indicate, American territorial expansionism turned the expectations on Spanish Americans from occasional manifestations of contempt and displeasure into a hot political topic. Political platforms varied from no expansion to the appropriation of the entire Mexican territory (Schoultz 1998). But, as Reginald Horsman has stated, the debate over the annexation of Mexico was "not about territory but about Mexicans"(1981). Hence, the excerpts above should not be read as pontifications against territorial expansion but as desperate warnings against granting Mexicans (mongrels, mixed-races, Indians, Spaniards, and the like) full American citizenship. Consistent with this view, Hunt insists that in case of annexation those territories should be governed as colonies under provisional law.

Compared to the "final solution" that eventually took its course, Hunt's proposal seems mild. The territories were eventually incorporated but the majority of the Indians were slaughtered, either by colonists or by the American army. The expectation of

inequality successfully molded the future. In the end, the Indians were not able to live on an equal footing with white Americans.

Although this racist discourse was primarily addressed against Mexicans, it could also be extended to Spanish America in general, as this passage by John Calhoun indicates:

We have never dreamt of incorporating into our Union any but the Caucasian race – the free white race. To incorporate Mexico, would be the very first instance of the kind of incorporating an Indian race; for more than half the Mexicans are Indians, and the other is composed chiefly of mixed tribes. I protest against such a union as that! Ours, sir, is the Government of a white race. The greatest misfortunes of Spanish America are to be traced to the fatal error of placing these colored races on an equality with the white race.⁶³

In this passage, Calhoun uses Mexico as a particular example of a larger entity: Spanish America. That might be understood as an early example of synecdochical reasoning coupled with the asymmetric opposition between the “free white race” and the mixed races, which, by inference, are slavish. Although most Spanish American countries were about thirty years old, or less, he already speaks of “the greatest misfortunes of Spanish America” and foresees its death due to racial mixing. In sum, as the examples indicate, racial asymmetric opposition produce the most ominous expectations.

The rise of romanticism in Europe preceded the blossoming of racist theories in the United States. The Enlightenment’s faith in historical progress and scientific knowledge unfolded into, among other things, an intellectual effort to understand politics and history in terms of determinable natural causes such as climate, geography, language,

⁶³ *Congressional Globe*, 4 January 1848, pp. 96-99. Originally quoted in Schoultz’s. *Op. cit.*

and human physical and psychological characteristics. This new approach to the study of politics and history attracted romantic sensibilities in Germany, England, and France already in the 18th century. Romanticism created the ideological basis for a nationalist political agenda where the notion of people (*Volk*) played (at least rhetorically) a central role, vis-à-vis the traditional justification of rule based on the nobility of bloodline or on the notion of a fictitious social contract. Race thus became the scientific expression of *Volk*, a way of “embodying” its unity and purpose that was supposed to resist rhetorical objections.⁶⁴

Like some varieties of European nationalism, the one that coalesced in the United States around the period of the Mexican war was also racist. Nevertheless, unlike its European counterparts, some varieties of American nationalism carried a stronger and more explicit religious component. The elements of this particular blend of American national ideology can be noticed, for example, in Ralph Waldo Emerson’s justification of the annexation of new lands by the United States:

It is very certain that the strong British race, which has now overrun so much of this continent, must also overrun that tract [Texas], and Mexico and Oregon also, and it will in the course of the ages be of small import by what particular occasions and methods it was done. It is a secular question... America [is] a last effort of the Divine Providence in behalf of the human race, [a radical] beginning of a new and more advanced

⁶⁴ In the eighteenth century the term “race” had an ample semantic field, including all sorts of what were then considered natural factors (climate, geography, language, and human physical and psychological characteristics). The biological revolution of the 19th century eventually caused this field to shrink around the more precise “scientific” meaning of physical and psychological characteristics. See Ivan Hannaford’s *Race; the history of an idea in the West* (1996).

order of civilization ... the home of man [which will stretch] to the waves of the Pacific sea ... a sublime and friendly Destiny.⁶⁵

In Emerson's argument, American racial superiority is aided by an even stronger ally: the will of God itself; "Divine Providence" – in the face of which all "secular questions" must pale.

This brand of American nationalism came to be known as "Manifest Destiny." This expression comes from an article written by one of the most obstinate advocates of American expansionism, the journalist and political agitator John O'Sullivan. According to O'Sullivan:

Texas has been absorbed into the Union in the inevitable fulfillment of the general law which is rolling our population westward... It was disintegrated from Mexico in the natural course of events, by a process perfectly legitimate on its own part, blameless on ours; and in which all the censures due to wrong, perfidy and folly, rest on Mexico alone.

Already the advance guard of the irresistible army of Anglo-Saxon emigration has begun to pour down upon [California], armed with the plough and the rifle, and marking its trail with schools and colleges, courts and representative halls, mills and meeting-houses.

The last order of civilization, which is the democratic, received its first permanent existence in this country.⁶⁶

But no one seems to have surpassed Senator Albert Beveridge in praising Manifest Destiny to perfection:

God has not been preparing the English-speaking and Teutonic peoples for a thousand years for nothing but vain and idle self-contemplation and self-admiration. No! He has made us the

⁶⁵ As quoted in Anders Stephanson, *Manifest destiny: American expansionism and the empire of right* (Stephanson 1995).

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

master organizers of the world to establish system where chaos reigns. He has given us the spirit of progress to overwhelm the forces of reaction throughout the earth. He has made us adepts in government that we may administer government among savage and senile people. Were it not for such a force as this the world would relapse into barbarism and night. And of all our race He has marked the American people as His chosen nation to finally lead in the regeneration of the world. This is the divine mission of America, and it holds for us all the profit, all the glory, all the happiness possible to man. We are the trustees of the world's progress, guardians of the righteous peace.⁶⁷

The passage above carries all three forms of asymmetric opposition. First there is the superior “English-speaking” and “Teutonic” “race” pitched against all of those who do not belong to it. Second, cultural asymmetric opposition is present in the identification of the Other as barbaric and savage, terms that suggest that the superior race is also the bastion of civilization. Finally, the Other is characterized as “savage” and “senile,” that is, as immature and decrepit – temporally loaded images that denote lack of synchrony with the historical moment. A preferred site for translation, the term “savage” harbors both cultural and temporal asymmetric overtones: the savage is the uncivilized but also might be the primitive.

Contrary to the previous racist quotations that discussed the annexation of Mexico, these Manifest Destiny excerpts are loaded with temporal asymmetric opposition. Manifest Destiny’s ideological edifice is premised on the idea that the American Anglo-Saxon race was chosen by God to be the vessel of His will on earth; the true and legitimate agents of human history. Ergo, all other races were doomed to be disciplined or overwhelmed by Americans. One should notice that, in this case, racial asymmetric opposition works as a marker for temporal asymmetry – it is through the

⁶⁷ *Congressional Record*, 9 January 1900, p. 711. Originally quoted in Schoultz’s. Op. cit.

Anglo-Saxon race, identified as the chosen people, that Divine providence can be transformed into human history. But his transformation does not entail a full secularization. The drama of American expansionism unfolds on earth but the moral standards according to which the actions of Americans should be judged are still divine.

Emerson prognosticates that “in the course of the ages” the “particular occasions and methods” through which Mexican territory was appropriated would be of “small import,” after all, “it is a secular question.” Faithful to his bombastic style, O’Sullivan is even more explicit. For him, the annexation and colonization of Mexican territory was the “inevitable fulfillment of the general law,” and thus “perfectly legitimate.” The moral conclusion is that Americans are excused of all blame, while “all the censures due to wrong, perfidy and folly, rest on Mexico alone.” By relying on divination, Manifest Destiny is able to produce a powerful form of moral cynicism that can hardly be challenged by secular practical reason.

Although in Chapter 2 we have derived temporal asymmetric opposition from the Enlightenment’s secularized developmental theories, the type of temporal asymmetric opposition contained in Manifest Destiny resembles earlier Christian eschatology. Instead of expressing their superiority solely in terms of material and moral progress, adepts of Manifest Destiny preferred to rely directly on God’s will. Like medieval crusaders, these Americans speak of themselves as the vanguard on earth of a sacred historical narrative.⁶⁸ At the same time, however, the coupling of racial and temporal oppositions robs Manifest Destiny of universalistic appeal. While Paulinean universalism maintained the conversion of the pagan within its horizon of expectations,

⁶⁸ President Bush’s recent call for a “crusade” against Muslim terrorists is an evidence of the endurance of Manifest Destiny.

nineteenth-century Manifest Destiny was about excluding, submitting, controlling, or eliminating inferior races.⁶⁹

The quotations above also indicate that the maturation of the doctrine of Manifest Destiny only enhanced anti-Spanish sentiment by adding to it messianic overtones. Spanish America could now be represented by all three forms of asymmetric opposition: cultural, racist, and temporal. One should notice that while the founders of Manifest Destiny were primarily concerned with the annexation of Mexican territory, Mexico was not the only target of this boosted version of anti-Spanish ideology. Examples of similar bigoted arguments being used to depict the peoples of other Spanish American republics abound.⁷⁰ Ephraim George Squier, US chargé d'affaires to Central America, writes in 1849:

If the United States as compared with the Spanish American republics has achieved immeasurable advance in all the elements of greatness, that result is eminently due to the rigid and inexorable refusal of the dominant Teutonic stock to debase its blood, impair its intellect, lower its moral standards, or peril its institutions by intermixture with the inferior and subordinate races of man. In obedience of Heaven, it has rescued half a continent from savage beasts and still more savage men... It is only by a judicious system of colonization, which shall ultimately secure the predominance of white blood, at the same time that it shall introduce intelligence,

⁶⁹ For detailed analysis of the import of racial arguments in the debates that surrounded the annexation of the Mexican territories during the Mexican War, and Cuba, after the Spanish-American War see Lars Schoultz's *Beneath the United States: a history of US policy toward Latin America* (Schoultz 1998).

⁷⁰ In *The United States and Latin America; myths and stereotypes of civilization and nature* (1992), Frederick B. Pike provides a vast array of derogatory racist remarks made by 19th century Americans of many occupations about "Spanish American" republics. See also James William Park, *Latin American Underdevelopment; a history of perspectives in the United States, 1870-1965* (Park 1995).

industry, and skill, that [Central America] can hope to achieve peace, prosperity, and greatness.⁷¹

The same asymmetric oppositions that were used to deal with Mexico are here employed to speak of Spanish America. This passage differs from the one by Calhoun (printed above) to the extent that it contains an eschatological form of temporal asymmetric opposition that is typical of Manifest Destiny – here marked by the reference to “obedience to Heaven.” The term “savage” is also employed in a manner that might denote both lack of civilized culture and primitivism. As a governmental official, Squier allowed himself to turn his expectations into policy advice. His solution to the “problem” of Spanish America, which he mainly attributes to racial inferiority, consists in colonization by men of “white blood” and the dutiful avoidance of racial mixing. Although he does not expressly say what will be done with the inferior races that already inhabit the place, one can assume that the system would require their perpetual submission and the control of their reproductive activities, if not gradual elimination.

Politicians and governmental officials were not the only ones to express such ideas. Intellectuals, academics, and travellers also shared similar points of view. Commenting on his trip to Brazil in 1866, captain John Codman deplored the high degree of racial mixing of the population, and concluded:

... let the government, the custom-house, the post-office, and the courts be directed by North American intellects, the soil be cultivated by North American energy and machinery, down will go the tottering relics of barbarism (Codman 1867, 144).

⁷¹ Ephraim George Squier, *Notes on Central America, Particularly the States of Honduras and San Salvador* (Squier 1855). pp.57-58 and p. 234. Originally quoted in Schoultz's. Op. cit.

The famous American naturalist, Louis Agassiz, and his wife found that Brazil suffered from the “evil of this mixture of races.”

[One] cannot deny the deterioration consequent upon an amalgamation of races, more widespread here than in any other country in the world, and which is rapidly effacing the best qualities of the white man, the Negro, and the Indian, leaving a mongrel nondescript type, deficient in physical and mental energy. (Agassiz and Agassiz 1895, 292)

They extend to Brazil the same diagnostic granted by others to Spanish America.

As in the case of Mexico, the derogatory description of Spanish America was also accompanied by American interventionism and violence. The historical record is impressive. In the nineteenth century, the United States annexed half of Mexico's territory, officially supported buccaneering in Central America (William Walker's adventures in Nicaragua are the most notorious example), intruded in the war between Chile and Peru, and forcefully arbitrated a boundary dispute between Venezuela and Great Britain (Smith 1996). After the advent of the Spanish-American war, American military intervention became a common foreign policy measure. From 1898 to 1934, that is, from the start of the war to the implementation of the Good Neighbor Policy, the US military intervened at least thirty times in Central America, the Caribbean republics, and Mexico, occupying territory in some cases for years, seizing control of customs houses and public finances, deposing rulers, installing loyal dictators, and splitting Colombia to create an American interoceanic Canal (Williams 1980).

Enter Latin America

When the concept of Latin America entered the English language in the late nineteenth century, Spanish America had been in use for more than a century. Predictably enough, Latin America seems to have inherited from its sister concept most of its semantic load. The association of derogatory terms to “Latin America” recurred throughout the twentieth century. Examples of such usage can be found in the news media (Johnson 1980), in the discourses of US government officials and politicians (Park 1995; Schoultz 1998), in literature (Pike 1992), and in academic works about “Latin America” (Berger 1995; Park 1995).



— In *Latin America in Caricature*, John J. Johnson gathers compelling evidence of the circulation of derogatory images of “Latin America” in the American media. Johnson put together a large collection of cartoons on “Latin America” published in the most prestigious American newspapers and magazines from the late 19th century to the 1970s.⁷² Johnson grouped pieces by

⁷² The Latinamericanist historian John J. Johnson selected cartoons from publications that catered to the American elites. The idea behind his criteria of selection is that elites are the social sectors that actively participate in the formulation of foreign policy. Assuming that a given publication must communicate in a “language” that is suitable to its audience’s, reasons Johnson, gaining insight into this “language” would allow one to better understand the parameters that oriented the decisions made by select members of that audience.

categories defined according to the ways Latin America or Latin Americans were



depicted: Latin America under US patronage, Latin America as female, the republics as children, the republics as blacks, Latin Americans as non-black males, and militarism in Latin America.


The pictorial material collected by Johnson abounds with all three forms of asymmetric opposition. With very few



exceptions, cartoons depict Latin Americans and the nationals of “Latin American” countries as non-white individuals – a clear sign of racial asymmetric opposition.⁷³ While early twentieth century drawings often painted them as blacks, with thick lips and imbecilic expressions (an image that is reminiscent of derogatory representation of Southern rural slaves)⁷⁴, cartoons of a later date represented “Latin American” through the stereotypical figure of the lazy Mexican: a barefoot, mustachioed,

⁷³ Most cartoons depict a dramatized situation where characters representing nations or collectives of nations (South America, Latin America) interact. These characters usually carry nametags -- probably an easy way to convey their identity to readers.

⁷⁴ Cartoon no.1, “A Hint” by Clifford Berryman, *Washington Star*, 1907.



miserable non-white type wearing a big sombrero.⁷⁵

In fact, the “barefoot,” the “mustache,” and the “big sombrero” are signs of cultural asymmetric opposition, which are reinforced in some drawings by the association of Latin Americans with traditional or “ethnic” clothing, militarism, rural settings and activities, and other elements that the American

public might have found antithetical to their image of themselves.

Finally, temporal asymmetric opposition is conveyed by the representation of Latin Americans as children interacting with adults representing the United States. In numerous cartoons, Uncle Sam, or some American president, is depicted as a paternal figure punishing or taking care of rowdy, ugly, non-white, and, not rarely, imbecilic children, who represent the republics of “Latin America.” The child is a symbol of immaturity, but a childlike person can also symbolize arrested development and dysfunction. At any rate, those temporal metaphors justify paternalistic colonial attitudes, such as the ones repeatedly found in the pictorial material.⁷⁶ Other pictorial

⁷⁵ Cartoon no.2, “Neighborly Call” by Pease, *Newark Evening News*, 1934. Cartoon no.3, “For Some, No Siesta” by Roy B. Justus, *Minneapolis Star*, 1962.

⁷⁶ Interestingly enough, some of the earlier cartoons in the category “Latin America as female” have a charming Uncle Sam wooing a gullible female that is explicitly identified as “Latin America.” Would that be a sign of the operation of a fourth type of asymmetric opposition based on gender? It could well be. After all, gender is a form of expressing human difference that often cannot be completely reduced to culture, time, or race.

elements such as barefoot peasants immersed in traditional settings and clothing also suggest an underdeveloped Latin America -- a place tied to a past that is devoid of Western technology and science; a space characterized by lack of coevalness.⁷⁷

The pictorial material of *Latin America in Caricature* abounds with possibilities for translating misrecognition forms. The barefoot Latin American can be a symbol of both cultural difference and historical handicap. The same applies for traditionalism and rural contexts and activities. Childishness and stupidity might be read as temporal references to primitivism and backwardness, but they are also explicitly associated with racial inferiority, given that many of the childish characters in the cartoons are either black or dark-skinned. In fact, directly or indirectly, all derogatory characteristics can be ultimately attributed to race. This is not true for the other forms of asymmetric opposition, however, which enjoy a more reduced scope of translatability.

The pictorial sample is pervaded by synecdochical references as well. As a communicative technique, cartoons have interesting characteristics. Due to their limited size, cartoons need to pack a lot of information in a single dramatic and/or humorous scene. In order to achieve impacting results, cartoonists often appeal to the strategy of representing a whole people, culture, nation, or continent by a sole human figure. The need to be synthetic leads cartoonists in search of the perfect stereotype – a single image that could better convey for their readers the collective object they intend to represent. Thus, synecdoche is a quintessential element of cartoon communication. As we have

Nevertheless, since I found no evidence of such form of opposition in other materials on Latin America, I decided not to include gender as a form of opposition.

⁷⁷ Cartoon no.4, “Over the Andes” by Bill Mauldin, *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 1961. President John F. Kennedy is the truck’s driver.

already said, the human figure often chosen to represent Latin America is the lazy, barefoot, mustachioed, sombrero-wearing, poverty-stricken non-white Mexican. In other words, the characteristics of cartoon communicative technique puts in evidence an aspect of the conceptualization of Latin America that is often hidden in the meanderings of textual material.

In opposition to the negative qualities their southern neighbors, the American characters portrayed in the cartoons are always white, smart, proper, and in fully modern clothing. It should be noticed that, in contrast to the Manifest Destiny ideology, the material put together by Johnson does not carry any reference to the divine destiny of the American people. Rather than through Christian eschatology, temporal asymmetric opposition is expressed in the pictures through references to American material and moral progress, vis-à-vis the Latin American lack of it.

Derogatory images of Latin America were not restricted to the pages of the elite publications examined by Johnson. In a nation-wide poll conducted by the Office of Public Opinion Research in 1940, respondents were asked to attribute qualities to Central and South Americans. The results were:

Dark-skinned	80%	Imaginative	23%
Quick-tempered	49%	Shrewd	16%
Emotional	47%	Intelligent	15%
Religious	45%	Honest	13%
Backward	44%	Brave	12%
Lazy	41%	Generous	12%
Ignorant	34%	Progressive	11%
Suspicious	32%	Efficient	5 %
Friendly	30%	No answer	4 %
Dirty	28%	No opinion	0%
Proud	26% ⁷⁸		

⁷⁸ In this poll, respondents were asked to describe Central and South Americans choosing from a fixed list of nineteen words. For more information on this poll see Hadley Cantril, ed., *Public Opinion, 1935-1946* (1951, 502).

With the exception of “friendly,” all the adjectives in the first column are negative. The most salient characteristic, dark-skinned is overtly racial, while the two following ones have racist overtones. “Temperament,” a category that encompasses “emotional,” has been a common concept of racist theories since Linnaeus.⁷⁹ More importantly, “dark-skinned” is not a specific “racial” characteristic, but just the quality of being “non-white” – a striking evidence of the crucial role racial asymmetric opposition plays in the American image of Latin Americans. Religious, lazy, ignorant, suspicious, dirty, and proud (and also shrewd) clearly are cultural categories. Temporal asymmetry is represented in the list by the word “backward,” which implies being retarded or in another era (lack of coevalness). Furthermore, religious and ignorant can also be associated with a pre-secularized, underdeveloped past, and thus, also have a temporal flavor.

The possibilities of translation are plentiful but not unlimited. Backward, quick-tempered, or emotional might also be seen as cultural characteristics, and, in turn, all cultural characteristics might be explained as effects of racial inferiority. But translation does not work in the opposite direction, that is, racial characteristics, such as dark-skinned, can hardly be understood in purely cultural or temporal terms. That is,

⁷⁹ The Swedish naturalist Carolus Linnaeus (1707-1778) is one of the fathers of modern racist theories. Operating with Aristotle's categories of genus and species, he fashioned a classification of the animal kingdom that included both beasts and humans. Linnaeus also extended his classificatory scheme to humanity, which he divided in *Homo ferus* (wild, savage and cruel man), *Europaeus albus* (ingenuous, white, sanguine, governed by law), *Americanus rubescus* (happy with his lot, liberty loving, tanned and irascible, governed by custom), *Asiaticus luridus* (yellow, melancholic, governed by opinion), and *Afer niger* (crafty, lazy, careless, black, governed by the arbitrary will of the master) (Hannaford 1996, 203-4). One should notice that in Linnaeus's scheme categories such as temperament and of what is called today “race” are strongly related. More importantly, some of the negative traits he identifies with the African and Indian types coincide with the characteristics ascribed to Latin Americans in the poll.

racialist arguments are an indelible core – something that we have already predicted while examining the possible expectations generated by each type of asymmetric opposition.⁸⁰

Conclusion

The opposition American/Latin American fits Koselleck's definition of asymmetric counterconcepts so well that we can simply repeat it, adding the names of counterconcepts in question:

[T]he name of one people [Americans] became the counterconcept for all the rest, who were assembled under a collective name which was simply its negative [Latin Americans].

While the counterconceptual pairs studied by Koselleck covered the whole world, in contemporary English the pair American/Latin American covers just part of it: America. Nonetheless, from the perspective of American nationalist ideology, America (the continent) is a defining element: it is the place in which Americans will fulfill their divine mission. This study indicates that whereas the semantic structure of counterconcepts does depend on an idea of totality, that totality does not have to necessarily encompass the whole world or the whole humanity, as Koselleck had originally proposed.

The identification of synecdochical fallacies in the everyday language material on Latin America is also consonant with another of Koselleck's observations about the

⁸⁰ See Chapter 2.

nature of asymmetric counterconcepts. Again, adding the names of the counterconcepts to his original quotation:

[The asymmetrical pair American/Latin American] is semantically based on [the] conscious contrast of a specific name with a generic classification.

In this chapter we have accomplished much more than simply demonstrating that Latin America is an asymmetric counter concept of America. We have applied our typology of misrecognition forms to the analysis of “Spanish America”-- the concept that preceded Latin America – and found different historical semantic configurations that marked the “life” of this concept in English. In the early nineteenth century, the most common form of asymmetric opposition found in references to Spanish America was cultural -- a form of opposition that continued to be used throughout the period under examination. With the advent of the Mexican War, virulent expressions of racial asymmetry started to be employed by prominent Americans to refer both to Mexicans and to Spanish Americans in general. Finally, the Manifest Destiny ideology reoriented the semantic field of Spanish America according to its own brand of Christian eschatology, introducing a powerful form of temporal asymmetric opposition and preserving previous forms of racialism and cultural opposition.

Our somewhat cursory assessment of Latin America’s early “representations” indicates that the term absorbed a great deal of Spanish America’s semantic load. All three forms of misrecognition were identified both in the pictorial material collected by Johnson and in the nation-wide survey run by the Office of Public Opinion Research.

4. The consolidation of Latin American studies and modernization theory

"I realize that there are among us those who are weary of sustaining this continual effort to help other nations. But I would ask them to look at a map and recognize that many of those whom we help live on the 'front lines' of the long twilight struggle for freedom-that others are new nations poised between order and chaos-and the rest are older nations now undergoing a turbulent transition of new expectations. Our efforts to help them help themselves, to demonstrate and to strengthen the vitality of free institutions, are small in cost compared to our military outlays for the defense of freedom. Yet all of our armies and atoms combined will be of little avail if these nations fall, unable to meet the needs of their own people, and unable to stave off within their borders the rise of forces that threaten our security. This program-and the passage of this bill-are vital to the interests of the United States."

John F. Kennedy, The White House March 13, 1962

Up to this point, I discussed the pre-scientific life of the concept of Latin America. In the following chapters, I will examine how Latin America has been construed through social scientific discourse. It is only by studying Latin America in these two diverse and historically sequenced contexts that we will be able to grasp the continuities and ruptures introduced by the social scientific discourse as well as acquire insights on the relation between the social sciences, policy, and politics. As the previous analysis of the "Latin" and "Latin America" entries of the *OED* indicates, the elevation of Latin America to social scientific status did not stop the concept from being used outside academia. The relation between the scientific and the extra-scientific Latin America will be discussed in the last chapter, following the assessment of some key approaches to the social scientific study of Latin America.

Due to its vast proportions, the literary sources produced by Latin American studies must be organized before textual analysis starts. First, the reader should be

reminded that the object of this study is neither any work produced about any region pertaining to the area known as Latin America, nor any study about political, social, cultural, or racial aspects of peoples perceived as Latin American. The standard classification scheme adopted by libraries and the publishing industry attributes the “subject” “Latin America” to works of single countries or even on regions of countries. Thus, for example, one can find “Latin America” in the “subject” line of a library record of a historical study about slavery in Northeastern Brazil. One can also find a piece about guerrilla warfare in El Salvador being classified under Latin American studies in a book catalogue. This practice can be also found in conferences on Latin America, course syllabi, and secondary literature about Latin American studies. Nonetheless, I do not adopt this loose demarcation of Latin American studies in this dissertation. Since the focus here is the concept of Latin America, I will restrict the analysis to works that explicitly theorize about Latin America, i.e., works in which the main object of inquiry is Latin America as a whole. Thus, the expression “Latin America studies literature” is used here to refer only to that group of texts.⁸¹

Two complementary organizing measures must be adopted: (1) confining the literary sources within established historical periods, (2) identifying themes that organize the material. In the following section the historical context for the appearance of Latin American studies will be assessed. Next, I will examine the rise of modernization as a political project to stop communism in poor areas of the world and as a scholarly

⁸¹ Although the influence of theories about Latin America in case studies is a related and promising subject, its study has to be left for a further opportunity.

approach to the study of development in those same areas. Finally, the focus of the analysis will turn to modernization theory's conceptualization of Latin America.

Significant sources

Some commentators suggest that Latin American studies has existed as an academic activity since the late nineteenth or early twentieth century (Martz 1971; Johnson 1985; Berger 1995). This is a rather imprecise claim. The number of academic texts on issues pertaining to the countries south of the US border published before the turn of the twentieth century is diminutive, and, strictly speaking, they contain no reference to Latin America.⁸² Furthermore, these pieces were neither written by specialists nor directed to professional academic audiences. In sum, this incipient literature was not Latin American studies as we know it: a professional activity supported by an extensive institutional network formed by specialists, university programs, research centers, journals, publishers, associations, conferences, grants and funding structure, and so on. More importantly, this literature produced no theory about or social scientific approach to the study of Latin America. In sum, calling it "Latin American studies" is a

⁸² Searches for the term "Latin America" in the titles of books published before 1900, conducted by me in the Library of Congress and New York Public Library, turned no results -- something that confirms the chronology of the term provided by the *OED*. The catalogue of the New York Public Library has only six entries for books with "Spanish America" in their titles published before 1900, while the Library of Congress has ten such books. In the period between 1900 and 1950, this number increases to ten in the NYPL and twenty-four in the Library of Congress. This seems to be evidence that although Spanish America was the preferred term in the nineteenth century for referring to the US southern neighbors, as the *OED* informs, it has never become the "theme" of an extensive literature, be it social scientific or otherwise. For a more detailed quantitative analysis of the bibliographical production on Latin America see appendix 1.

double presentism: a concept and an institutional practice of the present are projected onto a past circumstance in which they did not exist.

Although the willingness to conceive of Latin American studies *avant la lettre*, or better, *avant l'être* displayed by Berger and Johnson is mostly unwarranted, they do acknowledge that this pre-war "Latin American studies" they identified had very low levels of professionalization and institutionalization. According to the same authors, some early students of Latin America were not specialists, but governmental officials and military that engaged in the study of things "Latin American" as dilettanti. Among professional academics, the study of things "Latin American" was conducted mainly by diplomatic historians and historians, a few geographers, and even fewer political scientists. Moreover, most of these scholars could hardly be called specialists in Latin America since besides publishing occasional pieces on the Southern republics they also pursued other academic interests.

Debuting in 1918, the *Hispanic American Historical Review* became the first US-based academic journal dedicated to the study of America's American Other (AAO)⁸³. The *HAHR* created an outlet for academics interested in writing about AAO. Documents reporting the foundation of the journal printed in the first issue reveal a great deal about the early state of AAO's studies. The first text published by the *HAHR* is a letter from president Woodrow Wilson congratulating editor Charles E. Chapman for the journal's foundation. According to Berger, Wilson actively supported the creation of the *HAHR* (Berger 1995). Besides financial assistance from private donors, *HAHR* founders also

⁸³ I adopt the expression America's American Other (AAO) because while there was already a clear perception of fundamental difference between the United States and the collective of Others who lived south of the border with Mexico, there was no stable vocabulary to refer them.

sought governmental approval and support, which they seemed to have received, based on the congratulatory letters by Secretary of Treasury W. G. MacAdoo, Secretary of State Robert Lansing, and the head of the Pan American Union, John Barret, reprinted in the journal's first issue.

The discussion that surrounded the choice of the journal's name testifies to the uneven acceptance of the term "Latin America" in the early twentieth century. Preceding the *HAHR*'s debut, Chapman sent letters to seventy-two academics, "nearly all members of the history profession believed to have an interest in Hispanic-American studies," asking for support and suggestions for the publication's name. Following James A. Robertson's suggestion, Chapman's letter referred to the future journal as "Ibero-American Historical Review." Fifty-four scholars positively responded to the letter, but many quibbled about the journal's intended name, suggesting "Hispanic American" or "Latin American" in lieu of "Ibero-American" (Chapman 1918, 11).

A Committee on Organization was created in 1916 to coordinate efforts toward the creation of the journal. According to Chapman, the name of the future publication was the subject of much discussion. All members agreed the words "American," "historical," and "review" should be used, but they were divided between "Hispanic" and "Latin" as the proper qualifier to accompany "American" in the title. The contentious subject led to a vote where Hispanic won by six against one. Chapman says that the reasons for such choice were better expressed by the journal's guarantor, J. C. Cebrián, whose words he reproduces in a long quotation. Cebrián argues that, contrary to the general belief, Hispanic does not mean Spanish, but Spanish and Portuguese. Hispania was the name of the original Roman province that comprised the entire peninsula. Cebrián says that the Greek name Iberia is imprecise because it includes parts of France.

According to him, since “Latin” can be equally applied to Italian, Spanish, French, and Portuguese, the term lacks specificity to name a continent that was settled almost exclusively by Spain and Portugal. Cebrián does not forget Haiti, but he disqualifies the Caribbean nation by arguing that “the few thousand negroes and negroids who spoil the French language in Hayti can hardly be considered Latin”(Chapman 1918, 17).⁸⁴

Appealing to conceptual symmetries to disqualify “Latin,” Cébrian argues that calling the southern peoples “Latin” would be the same as calling Americans “Teutonic.” However, he observes, the “world” has rejected the qualifier “Teutonic” for Americans and it should equally reject “Latin America.” Cébrian concludes saying that “the term Latin America is ambiguous, misleading, and unscientific”(Chapman 1918, 17). In the end, the new journal was baptized *Hispanic American Historical Review*.

A survey of *HAHR*’s pre-war output confirms Berger and Johnson’s impressions about the faulty quality of scholarship about “Latin America.” The majority of articles published in the journal belong to the disciplines of history and diplomatic history. More importantly, they rarely address AAO as a whole, and, the ones that do lack theoretical elaboration about their object. That is certainly a consequence of the strong historical orientation of the *HAHR*. Pre-war diplomatic historians tended to write on AAO from the perspective of American foreign policy. Most of their contributions are primarily about US foreign relations and only secondarily about the Southern republics. During the same period, the contributions on colonial history also tended to be US-centric, mainly focused

⁸⁴ As quoted in Chapman’s “The founding of the Review, a text in the first issue of the *HAHR* that recounts the events that preceded the journal’s foundation. Cébrian was probably not a scholar. One should note, however, that this is not the transcript of a meeting but a quotation chosen by Chapman, a scholar and editor of the journal, to illustrate the debate over the name of the journal. Chapman could have edited out Cébrian’s racist innuendo but he did not.

on the study of the history of American regions that had formerly belonged to Spain or Mexico, such as Texas, California, New Mexico, and Florida (Berger 1995, 31). The few political science articles published in this period tended to concentrate on the formal analysis of constitutions and law (for example Cleven 1921; Lima 1922).

The founders' rejection of the name "Latin America" for the title of the journal should be seen as a consequence of the concept's uneven reception during the first half of the twentieth century. This state of affairs reflected in the titles of the articles published by the *HAHR*. The journal did not publish a single article with the term "Latin America" in the title from its foundation to 1940.⁸⁵ The selection of books reviewed by the Review in its early years is meager, uneven, and not entirely academic. Besides the few books on history and intellectual history, the *HAHR* also reviewed fictional literary works and non-academic publications such as books for travelers, businessmen, and dilettanti.

It is understandable that a journal called *Hispanic American Historical Review* gave priority to contributions on history. Nonetheless, one has to bear in mind that *HAHR* was for almost fifty years the only periodical outlet for academic studies of AAO.⁸⁶ It seems that, differently from historians, social scientists such as sociologists, economists, and political scientists, did not have enough incentives to study AAO (see Johnson 1985). This situation was not significantly altered in the decade that followed

⁸⁵ Herbert E. Bolton's "Some cultural aspects of Latin America" was the first. In the following five years, the *HAHR* published at least one article containing "Latin America" in the title per year.

⁸⁶ According to Rosendo A. Gomez's *The Study of Latin American Politics in University Programs in the United States* (1967), with the exception of a couple of occasional articles in the *American Political Science Review*, *HAHR* was the only periodical to publish academic articles on "Latin America" during the pre-war period.

the war. In the introduction to *Governments of Latin America*, the professor of Government and Citizenship at the University of New Mexico, Miguel Jorrín, writes:

When the book was begun, there was no text in English in the field, and only the excellent compilation of Professor Fitzgibbon on the Latin American constitutions was found to be of valuable help to instructors and students (Jorrín 1953, vii).

The fact that Fitzgibbon's *The Constitutions of the Americas, as of January 1, 1948* (1948) was the only textbook available before 1953 concurs with the orientation towards studying law and constitution displayed by the few political science works on AAO found in the *HAHR*.⁸⁷ Moreover, Jorrín's textbook is hardly an exception. As its title declares, the book was designed for students interested in comparative government. Consequently, it sports large sections on laws and constitutions, alternated with sections on history.

As late as 1965, Kalman H. Silvert "complains" of the dominance of history in Latin American studies, adding that even though political scientists had recently become interested in the subject, many academics writing on political affairs in Latin America were still historians (Martz 1965, 1). According to John Martz, before World War II "area studies in general remained in a depressing condition" (1971, 75) -- an affirmation with which Mark Berger entirely concurs (1995, 31). Martz adds that:

Even by the close of World War II the study of Latin America by political scientists had barely begun. A review of the literature for

⁸⁷ The focus on studying of law and constitutions was not a particular characteristic of political science works on AAO. According to Robert Dahl, this approach lost its dominance only with the rise of the behavioral revolution in the 1950s. (1972).

the years 1920-1945 has reported that political scientists, on the average, had produced but one professional article per year.⁸⁸

Most importantly, the effort to build social scientific theories that make sense of AAO as a whole only matured in the 1950s (see for example Kling 1956). Before that, books on AAO were usually compendiums of individual country cases (Martz 1965).

The Cold War and the Rise of Latin American Studies

The unprecedented expansion of American international power and influence prompted by the allied victory in World War II created a growing domestic demand for expert knowledge about other regions of the world, including places and countries with which the United States had little previous contact. The almost immediate onset of the Cold War only enhanced the urge for competence in international affairs. In response to this demand, area studies blossomed in the American academic institutions, fueled by money from both the private and public sectors. Even though foreign countries and regions of the world had been the subject of academic studies before the war, it was only during the Cold War that area studies acquired a high level of professionalization and institutional organization.⁸⁹

Predictably enough, funds for area studies were allocated according to the political priorities of the day. American foreign policymakers had considered Latin America reasonably safe from immediate communist aggression until the advent of the

⁸⁸ Martz takes this information from Rosendo A. Gomez's study.

⁸⁹ From the early 1950s to the early 1960s the number area-studies programs in the whole United States more than tripled, from 29 to more than a hundred (Novick 1988).

Cuban Revolution (see Smith 1996; Schoultz 1998).⁹⁰ The low priority occupied by Latin America in the American foreign policy agenda during the early Cold War was expressed in the allocation of American foreign aid during this period. From 1945 to 1955, Latin America received only 2% of the resources spent by the United States with non-military foreign aid.⁹¹ South Korea alone received more funds than all Latin American countries together (Chirot 1986). The lack of governmental interest in Latin America echoed in academia. Robert A. McCaughey has found that while in 1951 dissertations on Latin America accounted for 30% of all PhDs in area studies, by 1961 this proportion had fallen to 18%.⁹² In the same period, the percentage of PhDs on East and South Asia jumped from 25% to 33% (McCaughey 1984).

This trend of neglect was rapidly reversed after the Cuban revolution. In 1959, the American Council of Learned Societies and the Social Science Research Council

⁹⁰ Authors often include the successful launching of the Sputnik by the Soviets and the disastrous trip of vice-president Nixon to South America among the events that awakened Americans to the "communist threat" in Latin America. The Sputnik here would be a sign that the Soviet reach had become global. The popular demonstrations against Nixon's visit to Peru and Venezuela were interpreted by government as signs of communist agitation in Latin America (Schoultz 1987; Smith 1996; Schoultz 1998).

⁹¹ During this period, the American foreign assistance to Western Europe totaled \$19 billion, an average of almost \$2 billion a year (Bethell 1991). In comparative terms, aid granted to the non-European countries was much smaller. For example, in 1953, the whole "Third World" received only \$150 million under the Point Four Program (Kolko 1988). Furthermore, the general orientation of this policy was to grant financial assistance to places that were allegedly under direct communist threat (e.g., Western Europe, South East Asia), whereas "safer" regions had to deal with profit-seeking private investment.

⁹² The figures presented by McCaughey are aggregates that include both general pieces on Latin America as well as individual case studies. The high percentage of the early 1950s is probably due to the surge of public incentives to the study of things Latin American under FDR's Good Neighbor policy combined with the long maturation of PhD dissertations and the delays and interruptions provoked by the war.

established a joint Committee on Latin American Studies, which expressly aimed at improving communication among those interested in research on Latin America, planning future academic developments, and administering grants for research. The Committee received additional financial aid from the Carnegie Corporation, the Ford Foundation, and the Council on Higher Education in the American Republics (see Johnson 1964).⁹³ Through an aggregate quantitative analysis, Martin C. Needler and Thomas W. Walker provide compelling evidence of the sudden growth of Latin America studies in the period. The authors found that while the number of course offerings in Latin American studies per college was practically the same in 1949 and 1958, it had doubled by 1969. This trend was practically the same across the disciplinary spectrum -- except for sociology courses, which increased four times. While the 1949 and 1958 surveys had identified one hundred and forty nine American institutions of higher education with course offerings in Latin American studies, Needler and Walker found a total of two hundred and twelve of such institutions in 1969 (Needler and Walker 1971). To complete the consolidation of Latin American studies, the Latin America Research Review was created in 1966, following the foundation of the Latin America Studies Association (LASA) in that same year.

A scientific endeavor is only constituted as such through professional and institutional consolidation -- which involves the creation of journals, collections, academic jobs, programs and research centers, grant opportunities, conferences, and so on. Consequently, one cannot speak of Latin America as a social scientific concept before the consolidation of Latin American studies. Since the Cuban Revolution was the

⁹³ For a detailed account of the growth of Latin American studies in the 1960s see Berger's *Under Northern Eyes* (Berger 1995).

event that prompted the field's consolidation, the investigation should start by identifying texts produced around 1959 and then, tracing the evolution of academic discourses on Latin America from that period.

The question then is: what was the dominant theory or approach that presided over the blossoming of Latin American studies around 1959? The secondary literature has a fairly consensual answer to that question: modernization theory (see Foster-Carter 1976; Kahl 1976; Cardoso 1977; Berger 1995; Klarén 1996). Thus, following our directive of first accepting the scholarly distinctions made by the field, let us proceed with a brief examination of modernization theory in general, which will serve as a guiding line to organize the Latin American studies literature.

The Modernization project and its context

In the aftermath of World War II, a call for scientism swept the American social sciences: the behavioral revolution. According to one of its main advocates, the only element that truly united behavioralists was the adoption of a "scientific outlook:" the conviction that sound theory is supported by sound empirical data (see Dahl 1972). Dahl's economical statement can be enriched with some other characteristics proper to the movement. Behavioralists rejected previous approaches to social scientific analysis that relied on the formalistic study of law, constitutions, and diplomatic documents. They also rejected "traditional" political theory and its interpretive methods based on conceptual analysis. Many behavioral reformists borrowed from Karl Popper's philosophy of science the assumptions that theories must be open to falsification through

empirical testing (Easton 1953; Weiner 1966; Lerner 1967; Gunnell 1986)⁹⁴. More importantly, there was a general tendency among authors to elect individual behavior as the unit of analysis of social scientific work.⁹⁵

Scientism was accompanied by claims of value neutrality. By combining methodological insights from the neo-positivist philosophy of science with the already existent American empiricist tradition, behavioralists claimed that knowledge of things human should be impervious to the author's subjective attachments to cultural and political values (see Gunnell 1988; Gunnell 1993). Max Weber's *Science as a Vocation* was often cited in support of the principle that social scientists should abstain from making their values public or letting them interfere with their academic work (Packenham 1992, 131).

Ironically, the quest for value neutrality and scientism was accompanied by an increasing involvement of American social scientists with governmental programs and institutions. During WWII, social scientists were recruited by government to produce studies about the psychological and behavioral aspects of war at home and abroad, and to provide expert knowledge about the geography and culture of foreign regions (Winks 1987; Berger 1995). A report produced in 1943 by the Committee on World Regions of the Social Science Research Council starts with the following considerations:

⁹⁴ In *The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East*. Daniel Lerner defends the "scientificity" of his theoretical model, boasting about its openness to falsification through empirical testing (Lerner 1967). Myron Weiner introduces a volume he edited and co-authored with key modernization authors celebrating the fact that social scientists "do seek to make their hypothesis precise and testable (1966).

⁹⁵ The idea that the social sciences should focus on explaining human "behavior" is not a post-WWII innovation. Authors such as Arthur F. Bentley had already defended it in *The Process of Government: A Study of Social Pressures*, published in the early twentieth century (Bentley 1908).

The present war has focused attention as never before upon the entire world. Interest in foreign regions has been intensified and sharp attention drawn to areas over which we have felt little or no concern. The immediate need for social scientists who know the different regions of the world stands second only to the demand for military and naval officers familiar with the actual and potential combat zones.⁹⁶

Evaluating the involvement of social scientists during the war, William Nelson

Fenton of the Smithsonian Institution declared in 1946:

The war and the Armed Forces reawakened students to study geography and to learn about the “funny people” of the world. We may expect an unforeseen demand for these subject matters in the postwar curriculum, and should not be amazed if courses in anthropology and geography are disproportionately large.⁹⁷

Fenton’s forward-looking assessment anticipates the continuation of the demand for knowledge about “funny people” after the war. With the onset of the Cold War, the United States embarked in an ideological and geopolitical battle for world dominance that far exceeded the pre-war bureaucratic capabilities of the American state. At the same time, American corporations also spread their businesses around the world, also creating a demand in the private sector for specialized knowledge on foreign affairs. The university was the obvious institution to meet this new demand for knowledge. As the chair of the Committee on World Area Research of the Social Science Research Council, Robert B. Hall, wrote in 1947:

⁹⁶ Originally quoted in Immanuel Wallerstein’s “The Unintended Consequences of Cold War Area Studies” (1997, 195).

⁹⁷ Originally quoted in Immanuel Wallerstein’s “The Unintended Consequences of Cold War Area Studies” (1997, 199-200).

Those who hold most strongly to this view [that area studies was geopolitical] contend that the universities have an obligation to the nation. National welfare in the postwar period more than ever before requires a citizenry well informed as to other peoples, and the creation of a vast body of knowledge about them.⁹⁸

However, in order to live up to its new task, the pre-war university system had to be revamped. That was made with public and private funds accruing from governmental and corporate contracts and grants, and private foundations.⁹⁹ Networks and connections established during wartime facilitated the process of bargain and allocation of resources in the postwar period (Ball 1993; Berger 1995).¹⁰⁰

In this context, there was great a incentive for social scientists to become “policy scientists”¹⁰¹, a term coined by one of the behavioral revolution’s leading figures, Harold D. Lasswell (McCaughey 1984; Novick 1988; Ball 1993). Mark Berger describes this situation in the following manner.

⁹⁸ Originally quoted in Immanuel Wallerstein’s “The Unintended Consequences of Cold War Area Studies” (1997, 202).

⁹⁹ The most comprehensive collection of critical studies of the role of the foundations in the Cold War period is *Philanthropy and Cultural Imperialism: The Foundations at Home and Abroad* (Arno 1982). See also Edward H. Berman’s *The Influence of the Carnegie, Ford and Rockefeller Foundations on American Foreign Policy: The Ideology of Philanthropy* (1983), *The use and abuse of social science* (Horowitz 1971), Robert A. McCaughey’s *International Studies and Academic Enterprise; A Chapter in the Enclosure of American Learning* (1984), and Rebecca S. Lowen’s *Creating the cold war university*. (see Chomsky 1968). For the penetration of Cold War interests in the American university system see the excellent edited volume *Universities and empire: money and politics in the social sciences during the Cold War* (Berger 1995).

¹⁰⁰ Terence Ball argues that social scientists used scientism as a means to acquire social recognition and political relevance and social acceptance, and thus improve their chances of winning funds for research.

¹⁰¹ Noam Chomsky prefers the more provoking term “new Mandarins” (Hanke 1967).

Historians, political scientists and international-relations specialists established closer links with the US government during World War II and the subsequent Cold War than virtually any other academic disciplines except physics. The linkages evolved in a number of ways, and although not all historians and political scientists participated, the upper echelons of the historical and political science profession were extremely well represented. A number took up full-time posts with government agencies, while others did so part-time or irregularly, while many others consciously, allowed World War II and later Cold War imperatives to influence their work. (Berger 1995, 70)

During WWII the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the intelligence office that later became the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), employed many academics, among them: Walt Whitman Rostow, seven presidents of the American Historical Association, the Frankfurt School philosophers Franz Neumann, Otto Kirchheimer and Herbert Marcuse, the economists Paul Baran and Paul Sweezy, the sociologists Barrington Moore, Jr. and Edward Shils, the historians Crane Brinton, Gordon Craig, Felix Gilbert, Hajo Holborn, Leonard Krieger, Carl E. Schorske, L. S. Stavrianos, Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., W. Norman Brown, and John K. Fairbank, the founder of modern Chinese studies, the pre-war Latinamericanist Donald M. Dozer, and the president of the American Political Science Association, Evron Kirkpatrick, who maintained strong ties with the CIA after the OSS was extinguished (Berger 1995). The influential political scientist Gabriel Almond assumed headship of the Enemy Section with the Office of War Information in Washington. Even though Latinamericanists were not numerous in the OSS, many were employed by other governmental agencies during the war. According to Lewis Hanke, the majority of Latin American specialists got at least some involvement the War effort (Millikan and Blackmer 1961).

In terms of international relations, the policy imperatives that social scientists were encouraged to contemplate started to be articulated by the American government early in the Cold War. In a speech delivered in 1949, President Truman declared:

More than half the people of the world are living in conditions approaching misery. Their food is inadequate, they are victims of disease. Their economic life is primitive and stagnant. Their poverty is a handicap and a threat both to them and to more prosperous areas. For the first time in history humanity possesses the knowledge and the skill to relieve the suffering of these people.... I believe that we should make available to peace-loving peoples the benefits of our store of technical knowledge in order to help them realize their aspirations for a better life, ... What we envisage is a program of development based on the concepts of democratic fair dealing.... Greater production is the key to prosperity and peace. And the key to greater production is a wider and more vigorous application of modern scientific and technical knowledge.¹⁰²

The world painted by Truman is divided in three parts: “we” (the United States and its prosperous allies), the peoples that are not peace-loving (the communists), and the poor countries. Until the Second World War, the fact that the world was full of paupers had never been perceived as a threat to the “more prosperous areas.” Communism seems to be the reason why the poverty of the poor might have become a “handicap” and a “threat” to the more prosperous areas. In the name of humanity, Truman proposes to help the wretched of the earth with a program of “development based on the concepts of democratic fair dealing,” which is a euphemistic way of referring to “capitalism.” The president adds that modern scientific and technical knowledge are the remedies for the problem he had previously identified.

¹⁰² As quoted in Arturo Escobar’s *Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World* (1995).

Although not fully developed in the passage above, the language of “development” would become a main staple of the American Cold War political agenda. This trend started with Truman in the late 1940s and achieved its apex with John F. Kennedy’s presidency (Latham 2000). Nowadays, one is rarely aware of the “newness” of such language. For example, the expression “underdeveloped countries” or “areas” appeared only in the mid-1940s, while the term “Third World” (*troisième monde*) appeared originally in France in the early 1950s (Horowitz 1982). Despite some exceptions, the term “development” was not employed in economics, sociology, or political science until the mid-1940s (Escobar 1995).

The geography anticipated by Truman is tripartite, but the language he employed is pregnant with binary oppositions. In socio-economic terms, there is the prosperous vis-à-vis the miserable; in temporal terms, the modern against the primitive and stagnant.

The modernization approach appeared as an effort to produce a social scientific discourse to address this Cold War foreign policy agenda. Whereas the language of modernization theory was impregnated with behavioral scientism, its substantive focus was the problem of development and underdevelopment in the Third World.

Modernization theory’s institutional underpinnings

Modernization theory’s connections with governmental policy interests reflected in the professional biographies of its most influential advocates. A prominent example is W.W. Rostow, whose book *Stages of Economic Growth: a non-Communist manifesto*, according to Aida Foster-Carter, “[had] produced far more discussion than any other single contribution, ... and it is surely the most widely known model of development, both within the profession and beyond”(1976, 172). As Lincoln Gordon, a member of

Kennedy's administration, once declared, "[in the 1960s,] thinking in both academic and official circles had been deeply influenced by Walt Rostow's *Stages of Economic Growth*" (1988).

Rostow was the archetypical policy scientist. In the 1950s, he worked at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology's Center for International Studies -- a think tank funded by the Ford Foundation and the CIA that promoted collaborative work among sociologists, political scientists, and economists with the objective of supporting foreign policy making (Klare 1970; Latham 1998).¹⁰³ However, as some commentators have specified, the comprehensive interdisciplinary studies produced under the Center's sponsorship focused on devising ways to provide a secure control over societies undergoing modernization (Berger 1995; Latham 2000).

Another telling example of the interpenetration of social sciences, policy imperatives, and propaganda promoted in the Center was the modernization piece *The Emerging Nations: their Growth and United States* (1961), edited by Max F. Millikan¹⁰⁴ and Donald L.M. Blackmer¹⁰⁵. The work, co-authored by prominent modernization

¹⁰³ The information that the Center was also funded by the CIA can be found in Michael E. Latham (2000, 205)

¹⁰⁴ Millikan was educated at California Institute of Technology and Yale, and received his doctorate in economics from Yale in 1941. In 1952, he became director of the M.I.T. Center for International Studies and Professor of Economics. Millikan served in various branches of the government, including the OPA, the War Shipping Administration, the State Department, and the CIA, of which he was Assistant Director in 1951-52. Even during his stay at M.I.T. he also worked as a consultant to many governmental organizations. In April, 1961 he was appointed as advisor to President Kennedy to assist in the reorganization of the foreign aid program (Weiner 1966).

¹⁰⁵ Blackmer was employed by the US Army intelligence in Europe before returning to Harvard to earn a degree from the Soviet Union Program. In 1956 he joined the MIT's Center for International Studies in the capacity of Executive Assistant to the Director, and later became Assistant Director of the Center.

authors such as Rostow, Everett E. Hagen, Daniel Lerner, Paul Rosentein-Rodan¹⁰⁶, Lucian Pye¹⁰⁷, and Millikan himself, was originally prepared for the US government to be broadcast by the Voice of America to audiences throughout the underdeveloped and communist worlds.¹⁰⁸ The blurb of the book (the study eventually turned into printed matter) informs that all contributors are specialists in development that, besides working for the Center, have held jobs in both government and academia.

In 1961, Rostow and Millikan joined the Kennedy administration. Rostow worked in close contact with the Latin American Task Force – an advisory group put together by Kennedy with the aim of conceiving policies to deter the advancement of communism in the Western Hemisphere (see Latham 1998). The Task Force members were Lincoln Gordon (Harvard economist), Adolf Berle (diplomat), Robert Alexander (Rutgers economist), Arthur Whitaker (Latinamericanist historian), Teodoro Moscoso and Arturo Morales Carrion . The Task Force was responsible for the conception and implementation of the Alliance for Progress – a program with the explicit purpose of promoting fast modernization in Latin America.

¹⁰⁶ Paul N. Rosenstein-Rodan received a Ph.D. from the University of Vienna in 1925. In 1947, he became assistant director of the Economics Department of the World Bank in Washington, D.C. He subsequently joined the Department of Economics and the Center for International Studies at M.I.T., where he became director of research in advisory programs both in Italy and in India. He also took part of the Panel of Nine of the Alliance for Progress (1967).

¹⁰⁷ The M.I.T. political science professor Lucian W. Pye was a senior staff member of the Center for International Studies. Before going to M.I.T., Pye had worked for several years as research associate at the Center of International Studies at Princeton. A former president of the American Political Science Association, Pye also chaired the Social Science Research Council's Committee on Comparative Politics (2000).

¹⁰⁸ The Voice of America broadcast in English and in translation.

The MIT's Center for International Studies is just one example of the close connection between key figures of the modernization approach and policy oriented projects sponsored by public and private institutions. In 1967, a much larger volume containing Voice of America broadcasts was published with the title *Modernization: the Dynamics of Growth* (Weiner 1966). This time, there was a total of twenty-five contributors from the most prominent American universities: MIT, Harvard, Columbia, Princeton, Yale, University of Chicago, Stanford, University of Pennsylvania, and Duke. Despite the leading contribution of MIT professors to the volume, the "diverse" institutional affiliations of its contributors attests to the widespread diffusion of modernization theory in the American academic milieu. Furthermore, the recurrent references to the authors' professional involvement with governmental agencies, made public through the biographies printed at the beginning of each chapter, show that modernization spread not only as a theoretical approach but also as an academic attitude of marrying scholarship with policy involvement (Weiner 1966).

The emerging nations and *Modernization: the dynamics of growth* are simply examples of the collaboration between academia and government that ended up in printed form. In fact, the reach of academic involvement in policy-making went beyond fashioning radio broadcasts. During the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, the participation of modernization theorists in governmental programs allegedly aimed at promoting modernization in the Third World was intense.¹⁰⁹ In the particular case of

¹⁰⁹ Irving Louis Horowitz's *The Rise and Fall of Project Camelot: Studies in the Relationship between Social Science and Practical Politics* (1968) contains both critical essays on the subject and a sample of official documents related to the creation of Project Camelot. See also Michael E. Latham's *Modernization as Ideology: American Social Science and "Nation Building" in the Kennedy Era* (1950), where the author addresses the participation of social scientists in the Alliance for Progress, Project Camelot, and the

Latin America, the US government responded to the perceived threat of communist infiltration with scholarly-backed initiatives such as the Latin American Task Force, the Alliance for Progress, and Project Camelot, as well as with generic aid programs such as the Peace Corps and USAID.¹¹⁰ The collaboration between government and academia was not restricted to civilian programs of development, as we will see in the next chapter, for social scientists also contributed to the making military and policing foreign policy towards Latin America.

The institutional symbiosis between modernization theorists and government also shown in their social scientific textual output. Truman had in fact anticipated modernization theory's agenda almost a decade before this approach blossomed in the academic milieu. Modernization theorists embrace the same temporal asymmetric opposition earlier expressed by Truman, replacing the terms "primitive" and "stagnant in the president's speech with "traditional" -- which equally conveys historical handicap. Truman's socio-economic opposition between prosperous and miserable is reinterpreted by modernization advocates as a cultural asymmetric opposition between non-Western and Western.

The cultural "anthropology" of modernization is often based on Max Weber's historical assumption that the values instilled by Protestantism, particularly by its Puritan variety, prompted the development of the spirit of capitalism. Modernization theorists tend to equal Weber's historical narrative of the birth of spirit of capitalism to the rise of

Peace Corps. For the use of Vietnam as a test field for radical modernization policies, see Noam Chomsky's *American Power and the New Mandarins* (2001).

¹¹⁰ As we will see in the next chapter, social scientists also contributed to the making military foreign policy towards Latin America.

modernity itself. Consequently, Protestantism is taken to be the main cause of modernity. Weber's crucial point about the secularization of the spirit of capitalism, that is, its historical detachment from its original religious cultural roots is played down in modernization theory (Weber, Parsons et al. 1950). Moreover, Weber's related concern with the angst of modern man in face of a society dominated by instrumental rationality all but disappears in modernization writings, which tend to paint a rosy picture of modern societies while throwing the psychological burden of modernization on the man of transitional societies (see Pye 1962, xv).

The interpretive position adopted by modernization theorists allows them to use culture as a pivot for both temporal and socio-economic oppositions. Protestantism is deemed the perpetual source of modernity while all non-Protestants are relegated to a condition of traditionalism. Like "modern," the term "tradition" has cultural, temporal, and socio-economic connotations. Unlike "modernity," however, "traditionalism" does not refer to any specific cultural, historical, or socio-economic formation, i.e., it is solely defined in asymmetric opposition to modernity. Modernization theory teaches that the traditional is non-Protestant, non-modern, and non-capitalist, while modernity is the product of a particular historical process that was prompted by the *Weltanschauung* of a particular culture: Protestantism.

This theory divides the world in two halves: the Protestant, represented by the United States, the other Anglo-Saxon countries and Germanic nations, and the rest (Lerner 1967, Lipset, 1960, Rostow, 1960)¹¹¹. For Millikan, this particular interpretation

¹¹¹ For Weber's original thought, see *The Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism* (Richter 1995, 68). It should be added that this English translation by Talcott Parsons, Weber's most influential disciple in the United States, have recently come under strong criticism. For a brief critical history of the reception of Weber in the United States see Keith Tribe's "Transformation and Translation: Max Weber in English" (Inkeles 1950;

of Weber's ideas corresponds to the modern history of Western civilization itself (Millikan and Blackmer 1961). Some authors coherently replace the term modernization with Westernization. After all, they reason, since modernity is an eminently Western phenomenon, to modernize corresponds to acquiring Western values (Blanksten 1960). Others, still, baptize the culture of the West "World Culture," in opposition to all other cultures that they perceive as non-Western (Pye 1962; Welch 1967). And David Lerner dares explicitly to equal modernization to Americanization (Lerner 1967).

Modernization's cultural asymmetric opposition is not always phrased in terms of an explicit contrast between Protestantism and other religions. As we have hinted above, terms such as "The West" or even "the United States" serve as secular embodiments of this asymmetric opposition's positive element – with the advantage of avoiding the overt expression of religious self-righteousness. Thus, the West is positively described by modernization theorists as being rational, capitalist, industrialized, rich, and democratic. Conversely, non-Western societies are everything Western society is not. Rostow speaks of the pre-Newtonian beliefs, family, and local ties that characterize those societies in opposition to the scientific and democratic attitudes of modern men (1960, 5). Lerner pitches the same opposition in terms of "village versus town, land versus cash, illiteracy versus enlightenment, resignation versus ambition, piety versus excitement" (1967, 44). Lipset ascribes to non-Western societies the value-orientations of ascription, particularism, diffuseness, and elitism, while modern society is infused with the values of

Pye 1956; Inkeles and Bauer 1959; Inkeles and Geiger 1961; Almond and al. 1965). Melvin Richter has criticized Talcott Parsons, Edward Shils and Reinhard Bendix's treatment of the term *Herrschaft* in their translations of Weber's works, arguing that those scholars paid little attention to the meanings this concept had in the turn of the century (1964).

achievement, universalism, specificity, and equalitarianism (1967, 5). According to Max Millikan those societies are governed by hereditary hierarchical rule and live “under the sway of custom rather than of law” (1961, 3).

Modernization’s cultural asymmetric opposition is entirely enmeshed in temporal asymmetric opposition. The binomial Western/non-Western can be directly translated by the binomial modern/traditional. The history of culture that social scientists used to identify modern Western (American) modernization stands in striking opposition to the irrelevance of the histories of “traditional” peoples. In fact, the concept of “traditional” itself implies historical incapacity. Consistent with this view, Millikan presents a history of civilization where traditional societies only change through the intervention of Western powers (1961, 7). In a very similar fashion, Pye suggests that traditional societies only experience historical change through the infusion of Western cultural elements (1962, 32).

The temporal asymmetrical character of modernization can also be gauged by examining the time-related terminology employed by its authors. Modern Western society is described as dynamic, in a process of constant change and innovation, whereas traditional societies are represented as static, stuck in time, unchangeable. For example, Karl Deutsch tries to quantify the “mobility” of modern life vis-à-vis the “stagnation” of traditional societies (1961). According to Inkeles, modern man is defined by his “readiness for new experience and his openness to innovation and change,” while traditional man is less disposed to “accept new ideas, new ways of feeling and acting” (1966). Lerner agrees with Inkeles, declaring that people in the West have become habituated to the “various rhythms of change” (1967, 47). Millikan gives the final touch, arguing that “the accepted Western characterization of the traditional societies as static is

on the whole an accurate one” (1961, 7) – a conclusion that is echoed by Cyril Black years later (1966, 19).

The range of expectations produced by modernization can be roughly divided in two different temporalities: short-term and long-term. This entire intellectual project depends on the expectation that in the long run all human societies can achieve the modern condition. At this level, modernization presents itself as a secularized version of Christian soteriology: the modernizing process corresponds to the actualization of universal history. Not confined to realm of mere speculation, this teleology finds its terrestrial confirmation in the craving of the underdeveloped peoples for modern amenities and goods. In other words, modernization bears the obvious normative overtone of an act of redemption and salvation, of beneficial and inevitable evolution (see Black 1966, 17; Inkeles 1966, 138; Lerner 1967, 45).¹¹²

At the same time, however, the eschatological inevitability of modern redemption is not of much value when it comes to dealing with the immediate “problems” of the underdeveloped. In other words, in order to work as discursive support for policy making, modernization theory also had to produce suitable short-term expectations -- politics is human action and, as such, works with time magnitudes that are proper to the human life process. Descending from the heights of universal history to the particular historical context in which modernization theory appeared, another more immediate historically bound expectation is revealed: the possible spread of communism in the Third World. Although not always explicitly, this concern often transpires in

¹¹² Both Black and Inkeles write panegyrics to the wonders and benefits of modernization, while Lerner declares that traditional societies are unable to resist it.

modernization texts.¹¹³ For, as Rostow warns, the process of modernization is fraught with danger. The breaking of traditions and the abandonment of old ways of life might generate reactions from dissatisfied social sectors and encroached power holders. This can bring about civil unrest and internal conflict or revolution, imperiling the modernization process as a whole.

Rostow, for example, wants his effort in *Stages* to be received as a universally valid theory of modernization – written with the express intent of rebuffing Marx's theory of development and its revolutionary consequences. Nonetheless, his main target is not Marx, the theorist, but actual communism, both in its Soviet and Chinese incarnations. In opposition to "normal" modernization, communism is for Rostow "a kind of disease which can befall a transitional society if it fails to organize effectively those elements within it which are prepared to get on with the job of modernization." Coherently with his line of thought, he called communists "the scavengers of the modernization process" and subtitled his book "a Non-Communist Manifesto" (Rostow 1967)¹¹⁴.

In sum, the voyage from short-term expectations to long-term salvation must avoid both the doldrums of traditionalism and the turbulent waters of totalitarian communism. The perils of this trip probably justify the imperative tone of some advice given by modernization's advocates. Rostow admonishes:

¹¹³ In addition to manifesting their concern with communist infiltration in the Third World in their modernization treatises, some prominent figures of the modernization approach, such as Pye, Almond, and Inkeles wrote pieces on the psychological and behavioral aspects of communism (1985).

¹¹⁴ See *View from the seventh floor* (1997) for Rostow's first-person account on his anticommunist agenda

The broad lines of societal change necessary to prepare a traditional society for regular growth are becoming familiar enough. It would be widely agreed that a new elite-a new leadership-*must* emerge and be given scope to begin the building of a modern industrial society...

Some other men in the society *must* be prepared to undergo the strain and risks of leadership ...

Some other men in the society *must* be prepared to lend their money on long term...

And the population at large *must* be prepared to accept training for-and then to operate-an economic system whose methods are subject to regular change ...(Rostow 1960)¹¹⁵

Rostow's imperative expectations about the modernizing path are also marked by a notion of who should be its agents. Like many of his modernization peers, Rostow tends to see elites as the utmost social agents.¹¹⁶ Modernization studies often have large sections dedicated to identifying and promoting modernizing elites in traditional settings. Still dwelling on Weber's ideas, scholars see the business elite as a promising modernization agent. After all, ideally speaking, the businessman embodies the self-interested individual whose action is guided by instrumental reason. He values achievement over all, and his rational nature is conducive to universalistic values.

¹¹⁵ Italics added.

¹¹⁶ For an informative critical account on the rise of elite theory to dominance in the Cold War American academe and its close relations to foreign policies that aimed at controlling Third World countries see Irene L. Gendzier's *Managing Political Change: Social Scientists and the Third World* (1985). For a Marxist critique of developmentalist elite theories see Paul Cammack's *Capitalism and Democracy in the Third World. The Doctrine for Political Development* (1997).

Modernization's Keynesian bent also led to the appreciation of the role played by modernizing political elites – the ones that adopt Western ways of life and values – in complementing the role of the business elite. Some authors have also noted that, since education is a key aspect for instilling people with modern values, fostering modernizing intellectual elites is also crucial (Lipset and Solari 1967).

Besides the imperative tone that characterized some of modernization's advices, the literature was also marked by overall optimistic expectations. Many theorists claimed that they had actually discovered the secrets of promoting development and modernization. Rostow declared that “the tricks of growth are not all that difficult” (1960). Meier and Baldwin wrote that “the economic problems of development are relatively simple” (1957). In a similar fashion, Daniel Lerner argued that “everywhere, increasing urbanization has tended to raise literacy; rising literacy has tended to increase media exposure; increasing media exposure has ‘gone with’ wider economic participation (per capita income) and political participation (voting)” (1967, 46). Seymour Martin Lipset claimed that economic development, urbanization, literacy, and political participation are all positively correlated (1960). In sum, these claims suggest that once the mechanisms of modernization have been discovered and publicized, they could easily be employed by local elites or foreign policy makers.

In fact, however, as a whole, the expectations generated by modernization theory generate an apparent paradox: on the one hand, the portrayal of an easy path to modernization seems to indicate a spontaneous self-propelling process; on the other, the instability and reactions generated by the dismantling of the traditional society call for imperative measures to be undertaken by American foreign policymakers and/or domestic political elites. Even though American intervention is rarely directly addressed

in modernization texts, one should notice that the whole edifice of modernization theory rests on the premise of denying agency to the ones classified as underdeveloped. That is, only Americans and their followers (West-loving elites) are expected to act; the others must go along. Consequently, resistance to modernization formulas is seen as either traditionalist survival or communist agitation. In sum, if left alone, the underdeveloped will not become modern – at least not in the pace and direction desired by these American specialists.

Nowhere are the paradoxical expectations generated by the modernization approach are clearer than in Rostow's discussion about democracy in the *The Stages of Economic Growth*. The author presents his modernization project as a call for democracy in the underdeveloped world. At the same time, he also teaches that democracy is a political process where the ends are never fixed: where outcomes are always a product of negotiation among different human interests and passions. Nevertheless, if that definition of democracy is true, there is no guarantee that the underdeveloped countries will follow the modernizing path prescribed by Rostow. Furthermore, following his own definition, one must conclude that Northern interference will always thwart democratic freedom in those countries, unless Rostow believes, with Rousseau, that "they" should be forced to be free. This conclusion, however, would be in plain contradiction with Rostow's previous defense of the non-determinacy of democratic outcomes. In sum, it is impossible to reconcile Rostow's defense of democracy with his strongly prescriptive master plan where elites *must* "build" and "risk," while the population *must* "accept" what is imposed upon them. That is, if democracy is the highest goal, then the underdeveloped society must be free to choose its path – an outcome that puts in risk its commitment to capitalist, pro-American modernization. On the other hand, if allegiance

to modernization is the top priority, then democratic autonomy might be sacrificed in the name of speeding the process.

Although most modernization theorists avoid facing the paradox and, thus, clearly manifesting their choice, some of them provide enough evidence of their preferences while commenting on a very explicit form of intervention: imperialism. Cyril Black reasons that:

Imperialism is frequently seen only as a source of political oppression; but in fact it has served to diffuse the benefits of modernity at a cost that is, relatively speaking, quite modest.

In a similar fashion, Rostow adds:

There is no doubt that without the affront to human and national dignity caused by the intrusion of more advanced powers, the rate of modernization of traditional societies over the past century-and-half would have been much slower than, in fact, it has been...(Rostow 1960)

Both authors agree that Western colonialism was beneficial to the underdeveloped world because it promoted the diffusion of modern technology, values, and manners. In other words, modernization authors provide us with enough clues to conclude that when the imperatives of modernization clash with democratic autonomy, the latter must be sacrificed for the sake of the former. In fact, the rise of political instability in the “Third World” eventually forced scholars to face the paradox of democracy built into the theory of modernization. Their allegiance to democratic values was tested, and the answer was a shift towards the study of political instability – which is the subject of the following chapter. In the end, their allegiance to American capitalism seemed to have prevailed.

Modernization and Latin American studies

The birth of professional Latin American studies occurred under the sign of modernization theory. Due in part to the multidisciplinary character of area studies, the collection of works on modernization in Latin America display some degree of theoretical and methodological diversity.

According to Shannan Mattiace and Roderic Ai Camp, Seymour Martin Lipset's "Values, education, and entrepreneurship" is "the foremost modernizationist writing on Latin American development" produced in the United States (1996). In his lengthy first chapter to *Elites in Latin America* (1967), Lipset analyzes Latin American society in terms of value-orientations.

A society's value system may emphasize that a person in his orientation to others treats them in terms of their abilities and performances (achievement) or in terms of inherited qualities (ascription); applies a general standard (universalism) or responds to some personal attribute or relationship (particularism); deals with them in terms of the specific positions which they happen to occupy (specificity) or in general terms as individual members of the collectivity (diffuseness). (Lipset 1967, 5-6)

Lipset borrows these conceptual analytical tools from Talcott Parsons, who called them "pattern-variables."¹¹⁷ To Parsons original trio of conceptual pairs -- achievement/ascription, universalism/particularism, and specificity/diffuseness -- Lipset adds one of his own making: equalitarianism-elitism. Predictably enough, Lipset grants to the United States all four positive value-orientations, while reserving to Latin America the negative ones: ascription, particularism, specificity, and elitism. In fact, his sociological

¹¹⁷ For a similar usage of Parsons's pattern- variables conceptual pairs by a modernization theory author see Berthold Frank Hoselitz (1952; 1960; 1965)

findings are not terribly innovative, given that Parsons had already identified Latin America as a particularistic/ascriptive system in stark contrast with modern society (see Parsons 1951, 199).¹¹⁸

Lipset has no qualms with adopting dualist oppositions as analytical tools. The discovery of a “Latin American” society that corresponds exactly to the negation of a picture-perfect “American” society does not lead him to question either his object or his methods. On the contrary, it seems only to confirm something that he and his peers and readers already knew. Much in the flavor of the structural functionalist sociology of Parsons, Lipset describes Latin America in the following manner:

Such a system tends to be focused around kinship and local community, and to de-emphasize the need for powerful and legitimate larger centers of authority such as the state. Given a weak achievement orientation, such systems see work as a necessary evil. Morality converges around the traditionalistic acceptance of received standards and arrangements. There is an emphasis on expressive rather than instrumental behavior. There is little concern with the behavior of external authority so long as it does not interfere with expressive freedom. Such systems also tend to emphasize diffuseness and elitism. The status conferred by one position tends to be accorded in all situations. Thus if one plays one elite role, he is respected generally... (Lipset 1967, 7)

As the passages above indicate, the most salient element of Lipset’s ethnology of Latin America is cultural asymmetric opposition. All four value-orientations attributed to Latin American society (ascription, particularism, diffuseness, and elitism) can be understood as cultural aspects, or better, handicaps. One cannot fail to notice that this Weberian inspired vocabulary suggests a picture of irrationality. Lipset speaks of the Latin American rejecting instrumental behavior in the name of expressiveness, which

¹¹⁸ In fact, Parsons uses the term “Spanish-American” and not “Latin American.” The difference seems to be irrelevant for Lipset.

should be understood as one's impulse to affirm his own particularities. Consequently, the Latin American is attracted to the unequal social relations of the family and kin, and less inclined to support universalistic arrangements such as the modern state. In sum, Latin American irrationality has severe political consequences.

Not content with simply stating his sociological analysis, Lipset provides a historical explanation for this radical difference between Americans and the Latin Americans. Weber is the obvious source of inspiration.

Weber sought to prove that capitalism and industrialization emerged in Western Europe and North America because value elements inherent in or derivative from the "Protestant Ethic" fostered the necessary kinds of behavior by those who had access to capital; while conversely during other periods in other cultures, the social and religious "ethics" inhibited a systematic rational emphasis on growth (Lipset 1967, 2).

From this a general scene of opposition between Protestants and the rest of the world, the author moves to the specificities of the Latin American case.

The relative failure of Latin American countries to develop on a scale comparable to those of North America or Australasia has been seen as, in some part, a consequence of variations in value systems dominating these two areas. The overseas offspring of Great Britain seemingly had the advantage of values derivative in part from the Protestant Ethic and from the formation of "New Societies" in which feudal ascriptive elements were missing. Since Latin America, on the other hand, is Catholic, it has been dominated for long centuries by ruling elites who created a social structure congruent with feudal social values (Lipset 1967, 3).¹¹⁹

¹¹⁹ The rhetorical choices made by the author are worth noting. Lipset seem to have employed the passive form "has been seen" in the passage above to avoid a direct authorial statement about the subject. Instead, he preferred to couch his opinions on Latin America on acclaimed authors such as Weber and Louis Hartz.

Lipset's reading of the relation between religious-instilled values and economic achievement was rebutted by Roger Hanson, who based on data published by Kuznets in

Once more Latin America is contrasted with the United States, or better, with Anglo-Saxon America. Now, a religious component is added to the set of cultural oppositions that define the Southern "continent." At the same time, this religious cultural element has the rhetorical role of allowing a translation from cultural asymmetric to temporal asymmetric opposition. In substantive terms, Lipset presents Latin America's Catholic cultural heritage as the cause of Latin America's incapacity to develop.¹²⁰ The image of historical handicap (temporal asymmetric opposition) is strengthened by the affirmation that that Latin America is feudal and has remained feudal since its foundation. The use of the expression "long centuries" only magnifies this perception.¹²¹

1964 states that "...Mexican economic performance over the past several decades...compares favorably with the growth records of the world's developed economies.... Whether measured in aggregate or per capita terms, whether compared with other Latin American countries or with the developed economies of the world, whether compared over the period since the mid-1930s or with the decades of rapid industrial growth for all countries concerned, Mexican economic growth for the last 35 years registers an almost unparalleled achievement" (as quoted in Black 1998). Hanson adds that, with the exception of per capita growth rates, the same can be said about Brazil.

¹²⁰ The argument presented in a syllogistic form in the last sentence of the passage suggests the hidden major premise that all Catholicism is feudal. Otherwise, it would be a non sequitur.

¹²¹ Lipset claims that the findings of David McClelland and his colleagues provide empirical evidence for his claims. A psychologist abundantly cited by modernization theorists, McClelland studied the interaction between achievement orientation (which he called *n* achievement) and economic growth in a wide variety of contexts, from contemporary United States, Brazil, and Japan to ancient Greece, pre-Incan Peru, early modern Spain, and England from the Tudor era to the industrial revolution (McClelland 1961)¹²¹. Contrary to what Lipset suggests, McClelland intends to demonstrate that economic development and achievement orientation were correlated regardless of the specific cultural context. That is why he included so many disparate cases in his comparative study. McClelland argues that, for example, during the era of discoveries, achievement orientation in Spain was at its peak and the Spanish economy was growing at high rates. This argument is in blatant contradiction with Hartz's romantic claims

The reference in the passage above to the “formation of new societies” comes from Louis Hartz’s *The Founding of New Societies* (1964) – one of Lipset’s major sources of inspiration in this work. In this influential book, Hartz blatantly defends that Latin America has been frozen in perpetual Iberian feudalism, an idea that Lipset takes to the heart.¹²²

The semantic of the concept of “traditional” is pervaded with the image of historical handicap,” that is, a traditionalistic society is one that is incapable of changing

about the undying feudal character of Latin America. Nonetheless, Lipset seems to see no problem in enlisting both authors to support his arguments as if their contributions were obviously complementary.

The methodology employed by McClelland is, to say the least, very heterogeneous. In the case of contemporary societies, he compared interviews with children whereas the study of achievement orientation in historical societies is based on the interpretation of literary sources. In his section on Spain, the author relies on the analysis of only three literary works to interpret two centuries of that monarchy’s history. Nonetheless, McClelland assures the reader that those works are representative of the Spanish behavior and values throughout that period.

¹²² Hartz was one of the most influential American historians of the twentieth century (see Berger 1995). In *The Founding of New Societies* he presents a historical theory of world civilization loaded with Hegelian and romantic overtones. Hartz portrays Europe as a cultural entity within which three main cultural trends were generated: liberalism, radicalism, and feudalism. In Europe, the constant conflict among those trends created a condition of historical dynamism and change. Nonetheless, with the age of discoveries and colonialism, isolated cultural trends (fragments of Europe) were transplanted to other parts of the world – a process Hartz calls “the founding of new societies.” The United States was granted with liberalism, Australia and South Africa with radicalism, and Latin America with feudalism. Since in the new environments each fragment was isolated from the other two elements of the triad, no dynamics of change could ensue. In sum, in the new societies the fragments of Europe were converted into traditions.

Hartz identifies the spirit of liberal America with John Locke, while he says that Francisco de Suárez represents feudal Latin America. The association between Suárez and feudalism, or generally, with Latin American patriarchalism and hierarchy, became a common-place in the Latin American studies literature, as we will see in more detail in the Chapters 7 and 8. Hartz seems to be the original source of this controversial interpretation.

its old ways; of experiencing historical change. As we have already seen above, “tradition” is a core category used by modernization theorists to oppose all those they perceive as Others to an American-led West. This concept is so crucial to Lipset’s theoretical effort that he employs it sixty-three times in the text, most of them to explicitly refer to historically handicapped aspects of Latin America.

In sum, on the top of being culturally unfit to modernization, Latin America is also resistant to historical change. This bleak picture is conducive to pessimistic expectations, which is exactly what one gets from Lipset’s analysis of Latin American elites. The business elite is the first to be scrutinized. Although businessmen should hypothetically be the bearers of modernizing attitudes, argues the author, in Latin America they are drawn to the dominant aristocratic agrarian values of the landowner upper class, which are family particularism and ascription. As a result, Latin American businessmen are suspicious of sharing managerial responsibilities with professionals who do not belong to their family circle. This reduces the opportunities for ascending achievement-oriented managers and hampers the rationalization and professionalization of business activities. According to Lipset, these values also contribute to making Latin American businessmen averse to long-term planning and risk taking, suspicious of the stock market, and eager to extract quick high profits from transactions. In a nutshell, from the perspective of modern capitalism, Latin American businessmen are irrational.

The author identifies a similar malady plaguing Latin American political elites. Their attachment to particularism and ascription results in an incapacity to operate through universalistic principles, which hampers the production of consensus and contributes to the perpetual instability of the political system in Latin America. In turn,

lack of political stability also contributes to a climate of economic uncertainty that enhances the risk aversion of the entrepreneurial elite.

The intellectual elite is no different from the others. Even though, says Lipset, intellectuals should be a means through which modern ideas and values are introduced in developing societies, this is not what happens in Latin America. The Latin *pensadores* “reject the values of industrial society, which they often identify with the United States.” According to the author, due to their influence in the education system, Latin intellectuals are able to maintain the reproduction of the values of the landed upper class. Consistent with their values, they prioritize humanistic education, overlooking the fact that in modern societies scientific education must have primacy.

While most elite studies are based on the premise that elites are the most effective social and political agents¹²³, Lipset’s text seems to point to the opposite direction. Fiercely engaged in the conservation of tradition, the Latin American elites he describes are not the agents of modernization but its true enemies. Why is Lipset’s version of modernization so pessimistic about the prospects for Latin America? After all, such pessimism is not conducive to the policy orientation that characterized developmental programs. The answer should be sought in the timing of his work. Although “Values” is considered by the secondary literature to be a typical modernization piece, it is in fact a late modernization work. By the date of its publication in 1967, the Alliance for Progress was all but dead. Many Latinamericanists had turned away from original modernization to the study of political stability – an option that suited well the “policy” of providing

¹²³ In *Managing Political Change: Social Scientists and the Third World*, Irene Gendzier argues that elite theories of American democracy influenced the way American social scientists studied development in the Third World (Gendzier 1985).

support to anti-communist dictatorships adopted by Johnson and Nixon. Thus, while Lipset still clings to the problem of modernization, his diagnosis and prognosis are pessimistic. Nonetheless, as we will see, he does not recoil from some policy recommendations.

Earlier social scientific works on Latin America already contained the same cultural asymmetric oppositions identified in Lipset's modernization piece. One of the most noteworthy pieces is "Pathology of Democracy in Latin-America: a symposium" (Pierson 1950)¹²⁴, published in the *American Political Science Review*. The political scientist Russell Fitzgibbon, one of the participants in the symposium, claims that Latin American political thinking is plagued by a strong individualism that was inherited from the Iberian Peninsula. He adds that the dominant Catholic influence teaches people to accept authority, both secular and religious, but excessive localism combined with hierarchical fragmentation impedes the consolidation of a strong national state (1950, 122). Among other ailments of the Latin American scene, Fitzgibbon names lack of political dignity, overabundance of personal dignity, and militarism.

The other contributors to "Pathology" arrive at similar conclusions. The historian Arthur P. Whitaker¹²⁵ identifies Latin America with old landlordism, personalism, and militarism. In his contribution, the sociologist W. Rex Crawford speaks of the cult of personality, nepotism, and an extreme form of individualism that contributes to

¹²⁴ "Pathology" is composed of four pieces, each one assessing the problem of democracy in Latin America from a different discipline: history, political science, economics, and sociology.

¹²⁵ One of the most prominent Latinamericanists of the first half of the twentieth century, Arthur Whitaker also collaborated with Kennedy's Task Force on Latin America (see Berger 1995).

“widespread personalism.” According to him, personalism is also linked to the “natural” Latin American inclination to corruption and bribery (1950).

The authors of “Pathology” present a picture of Latin America that is similar to that painted by Lipset seventeen years later. The semantics of terms such as “strong individualism,” “personalism,” “excess of personal dignity,” “extreme individualism,” and “cult of personality” overlap with Lipset’s “ascription” and “particularism,” and also with what he called an emphasis on “expressive behavior.” Through this ethnology, it is suggested that Latin Americans are not entirely rational – an assessment that also points to lack of responsibility and incapacity to act. Although Lipset does not use the same nosological metaphor embraced by the authors of “Pathology,” the value-orientations through which he defines Latin America can all be read as pathologies. In sum, these ethnologies are structured by the same set of cultural asymmetric oppositions.

While “Values” can be considered a late modernization text, “Pathology” should be read as an early modernization piece. While presenting an ethnology of Latin America that anticipates modernization theory in many aspects, the authors of “Pathology” are not clearly engaged in producing policy-worthy conclusions that would promote development in Latin America. Indeed, their prognosis is mostly pessimistic. Some of them even criticize programs of technological and economic assistance, such as Truman’s Point IV, as superficial efforts to break the reproduction of cultural processes that are deeply ingrained in the Latin American ethos, (or should I say *ontos*?).

Up to this point, we have assessed a late modernization text and an early contribution. We must now show that there was continuity between those two extremes. No one seems to have “studied” Latin America’s individualism with more abandonment than the sociologist John Gillin. Gillin explains that, differently from the North

American individualism, which is based on a sense of equality, Latin American individualism is connected with sentiments of uniqueness, and particularity. In Latin America, individualism is often expressed in language by abundant references to the soul (*alma*). This shows, according to the author, that this brand of individualism has deep mystical and religious connotations for Latin Americans. Such deeply ingrained value has also secular consequences. Latin American individualism heightens the value of “*la dignidad*,” the sentiment that drives “every person ... to defend his inner integrity to the utmost of his ability”(1955).¹²⁶

The sentiment of *dignidad* is behind the macho character, which, Gillin claims, “is highly valued in Latin American culture.” Moreover, he adds, “from this it is but a short step to the caudillo” -- the political leader who is valued not because he represents others but because he “embodies in his personality those inner qualities that [Latin Americans] themselves feel that they possess and which they would like to manifest.”

Gillin concludes that “the controlling concept of the soul is, I believe, logically and emotionally connected with the pattern of personalism in Latin America.” Caught in the interstices of his inwardness, the Latin American is unable to develop an interest for the study of concrete things: “the pragmatic, empirical investigation of premises and of data is not congenial, or highly motivating, to the Latin America.” Gillin argues that contrary to the North American and his practical point of view, the Latin American is “primarily interested in spiritual values.” The same inwardness that hampers pragmatism

¹²⁶ Gillin informs the reader that Wagley claims that “Brazilians, although motivated by *dignidad* (sic), are said to be less touchy in this respect than Spanish Americans, less given, ... to saving face.” (Gillin 1955, 492)

in the Latin American spirit produces an affection for idealistic and transcendental world views.¹²⁷

In his brief analysis of Latin American machismo printed in the modernization treatise *On the Theory of Social Change: how Economic Growth Begins*, Everett E. Hagen depicts a pathological complex that connects irrationality, the malformation of individuality, authoritarianism, and machismo. According to Hagen, in traditional societies, parents “do not see the phenomena of the world as interacting in systems amenable to analysis” but rather as “fortuitous objects or events over which they have no control....” This lack of rationality leads them to fear the fragility of the infant, and thus, to overprotect him. As a result, the child indulges in the pleasures at his reach, including sexual contact with his mother. After the child has grown older and physically stronger, the father reverts the treatment from indulgence to strict authoritarian rule, blocking the boy’s access to maternal gratification. Shocked by this sudden prohibition and unable to negotiate with his authoritarian father, the boy directs all his frustration inwards, resulting in an Oedipal complex, which, among other things, makes the boy uncertain of his own masculinity. This mechanism, says Hagen, produces the Latin American macho (1962, 147).¹²⁸

Anticipating Lipset, the economic historian Thomas C. Cochran writes in “Cultural Factors in Economic Growth”(1960)¹²⁹ that Latin American entrepreneurs do

¹²⁷ Gillin does not bother to offer either original fieldwork or case studies to support his generalizations about Latin America.

¹²⁸ One should note that despite its psychoanalytic veneer, Hagen’s argument lends support to nineteenth century claims of Anglo-Saxon manliness vis-à-vis Spanish American feebleness and affectation.

¹²⁹ “Cultural Factors in Economic Growth” is a good example of early modernization text on Latin America.

not behave like their North American counterparts. This is because Latin American cultural characteristics are unfavorable to economic development. The “Latin entrepreneur” enjoys talking and abstract speculation but not action (for a similar opinion see Morse 1964). He strives for social status that is not based on business success, a practice that deviates him from dedicating all his efforts to economic progress. Leaning on the “findings” of John Fayerweather, Cochran claims that Latin American individuals “place more emphasis on the forms of politeness and obedience than on the facts of behavior” (see Fayerweather 1959).

Like Hagen, Cochran argues that this defect in the Latin American character is transmitted through child rearing, education, and familial life. Citing David McClelland’s cross-cultural comparative study of achievement orientation, he says that cultures in which children are told stories with high achievement content display higher rate of economic development (see McClelland 1953). This is not the case of the Latin American family, states Cochran, which prefers to instill in children values that are detrimental to competitiveness and achievement. Since, according to Cochran, the family system is much stronger in Latin America than in North America (the “old-South” included), Latin Americans are more prone to be caught in its hierarchical authoritarian network.

For Cochran, different sorts of individualism animate the cultures of Latin America and the United States.¹³⁰ Latin individualism is turned inward, sensitive to internal criteria, whereas American individualism is social and thus supported by external criteria. The passage is largely based on Gillin, who is cited almost verbatim. Cochran

¹³⁰ The author uses “United States” and “North America” interchangeably.

adds that the Latin American egocentric personality produces incapacity for organization, authority delegation, loyalty, or managerial tasks – a list of failures he borrowed from Albert Hirschman (see Hirschman 1958). The author then provides a series of anecdotal evidence to support his claims, among them the tendency Latin Americans have to spend too much time at lunch, and their love for leisure.

Cochran then shifts to the subject of communication, which according to him plays a dominant role in economic development. Starting from Gillin's argument that Latin Americans are not primarily interested in technology or in knowing the causes of things, Cochran concludes that they are not receptive to new ideas brought by the means of communication. According to the author, Latin Americans are even able to mimic the language of American entrepreneurs, but this mimicry never evolves into true entrepreneurial behavior because their reactions continue to be guided by emotions and attachment to traditional patterns. In order to illustrate his arguments, Cochran provides the reader with a fair amount of anecdotes about Mexicans, borrowed from Fayerweather, and about Puerto Ricans, extracted from his own research.

In "Traditions of Conflict in Latin America" (1964) the Latinamericanist historian Richard W. Weatherhead also anticipates Lipset's description:

Political life in Latin America is always handicapped by the personalist tradition, unquestioning loyalty to the person of the leader rather than to the law of the republic.

Like most to the authors reviewed so far, Weatherhead lacks the systematic conceptualism adopted by Lipset in his sociological depiction of Latin America.

Nonetheless, the final product is strikingly similar. If the material is considered in its

totality, we can see that even though the vocabulary may vary from text to text, the semantic fields of concepts employed have large zones of intersection.

As the excerpts above indicate, cultural asymmetric oppositions pervade modernization's ethnology of Latin America. The United States is always the purely positive pole of comparison, while Latin America is always shown to be the United States's contrary. Even when a cherished American virtue such as individualism is found in Latin America, authors strive to show that that is an entirely different brand of individualism. While American individualism is a core value of modernity, Latin American individualism is responsible for generating the most powerful anti-modernization dispositions: from lack of social mobility, to authoritarianism, to lack of entrepreneurial attitude, to machismo, to irrationality.

Modernization theorists tended to see culture as a set of psychological dispositions capable of generating social structures and political institutions. For being a discipline on the threshold between social and natural sciences, psychology allows for much ambivalence, and, thus, for some subtle semantic translations. Through allusions to this quasi-medical discipline, the negative cultural aspects of Latin America are presented as pathologies. In this sense, the pre-modernization piece, "Pathology," anticipates most of what modernization had to say about its object.

Cultural asymmetric opposition is, however, just half of the picture. Its other half is composed of another affliction; one that is as crippling as the pathologies we have examined so far: historical handicap. One can find it subtly expressed, for example, in the following passage of Richard W. Weatherhead's "Traditions of Conflict in Latin America:"

The Latin American lives under the sign of paradox. He inherits a tradition of conflict that underlies his culture and his way of life. The very foundations of his existence are a series of basic antagonisms from which he can never escape. His life and his work, as well as his spiritual being, respond to these antagonisms. Whatever he affirms will somehow be fatally contradicted by its opposite. This rule will hold true no matter what he does, and no amount of logical consistency can overcome his burden of paradox (1964).

The most prominent element in this passage is the anguished image of human existence caught in inescapable paradox. Its dramatic tones reminisce of Aeschylean tragedy and biblical images of eternal damnation. This effect is produced by the coupling of suffering with the incapacity to escape the situation. Weatherhead is not speaking of a momentarily accidental incapacity to effect change, but of an inescapable curse that affects the “very foundations of [the Latin American] existence.” In other words, he is clearly stating that Latin America is historically handicapped. This interpretation is further confirmed by the claim that this situation of conflictual paralysis was inherited as a tradition. The word “tradition” stresses the incapacity to change, while the verbal form “inherited” conveys the idea of something transferred through time. That is, in Latin America the passage of time does not produce history.¹³¹

Predictably, Weatherhead identifies feudalism in Latin America:

¹³¹ The association between conflict and historical handicap was not created by Weatherhead. As I have argued in Chapter 2, this association was first made possible in the early-modern ethnologies created by Spanish Thomists and was further developed by the thinkers of the Enlightenment. For example, when describing the Oriental empires, Hegel states: “On the one side we see duration, stability -- Empires belonging to mere space, as it were [as distinguished from Time] -- *unhistorical History*... On the other side, the Form of Time stands contrasted with this *spatial stability*. The States in question, *without undergoing any change in themselves*, or in the principle of their existence, are constantly changing their position towards each other. They are in ceaseless conflict, which brings on rapid destruction... This History, too is, for the most part, really unhistorical, for it is only the repetition of the same majestic ruin.” (Hegel 1899, 105-6).

Feudalism and the legacy of the past conspire against the present
and the future in a thousand seen and unseen ways.

Here the author resorts to reiteration to highlight the trope of historical handicap: feudalism, which is nothing less than a legacy of the past, conspires with the "legacy of the past." The fact that they conspire against present and future completes the exposition of historical immobility. Staying true to his dramatic style, Weatherhead speaks of this conspiracy operating "in a thousand seen and unseen ways."

Similar descriptions can be found in the contributions to "Pathology of Democracy in Latin-America." Whitaker quotes García Calderón to speak of Latin American politics:¹³²

"All the history of America, and the inheritance of the Spaniard and the Indian," he wrote, "has ended in the exaltation of the caudillo. Government by caciques, absolute masters, like the caudillos themselves, is very ancient in Spain.... [Latin] American revolutions are like the Moorish wars directed by mystic Kaid." ¹³³

The wording varies, but the trope is the same. The passage declares that Latin America's whole history produced the preservation of a "very ancient" Spanish political institution. That is, Latin America's whole history was not historical at all. To corroborate the trope the text equals revolutions in Latin America to the Moorish wars of medieval Spain. That is, in Latin America revolutions are simulacra through which the repetition of the past operates.

¹³² The rhetorical device using a native's testimony to give credence to one's own interpretation is commonly found in the Latin American studies literature.

¹³³ García Calderón uses the term America instead of Latin America.

The images of Latin America's endemic political instability (Lipset) and constant revolution (Whitaker) are pregnant with temporal meaning. The terms instability and revolution convey the ideas of movement and change. Nonetheless, those authors strive to show that in Latin America there is movement without change. Here we find Latinamericanists mimicking the image of the endless repetition of an unhistorical history, which Hegel used to speak of the Orient (1899). Latin America's constant instability hampers development; its revolutions do not bring new political orders.

Whitaker adds:

Escape from this pattern of political absolutism is made difficult by the prevalent Catholic pattern of religious absolutism, which breeds among the various parties and groups an "aggressive intolerance" that makes orderly political life well-nigh impossible... The passage of time has not greatly changed this pattern (Whitaker 1950).

Escaping is not possible; the passage of time does not bring change: the idea of historical handicap is repeatedly stated. Like Lipset, Whitaker blames Latin America's historical handicap on Catholicism.

Fitzgibbon blames Latin America's pathological individualism on the Iberian inheritance – an expression that subsumes Catholicism. The author refers to the "Latin American political pattern" as a "relic" of the Iberian inheritance. That is, in Latin America a relic of the past is the present of politics – a clearer allusion to historical handicap can hardly be found. Similarly, Gillin identifies "the Roman Catholic view of the soul as it was elaborated in medieval Spain" at the root of Latin America's individualistic pathology (Gillin 1955, 491).

Authors sometimes also identify Indian and, less frequently, African heritages as sources of traditionalism in Latin America. This can be seen in Whitaker, who after arguing that Latin American authoritarianism has Iberian roots, adds that:

The [pre-Conquest] American Indians [too] obeyed caciques;" and this original pattern was strengthened by the physical environment, for "the desert is monotheistic; over its arid uniformity one imposing God reigns supreme (Berman 1970)

In another passage, Whitaker cites James Bryce, late nineteenth century British historian, to blame Latin America's backwardness on its "colonial heritage, Indian and Negro, as well as Iberian."

A more radical denunciation of Indian traditionalism is found in W. Rex Crawford's contribution to "Pathology:"

[Latin American Indians] simply live at a level of traditionalism and gerontocracy... It is only an act of realism on our part to recognize as the anthropologist does this element, unchanging and resistant, rather than dynamic and controlling, in the life of many Latin America republics (Crawford 1950).

The trope of historical handicap is presented in Crawford's passage through the depiction of a "unchanging and resistant, rather than dynamic and controlling" Latin America. But now Indian traditionalism is to be blamed.

In his contribution to Gabriel Almond and James Coleman's well-received modernization volume, *The politics of the developing areas* (Almond and Coleman 1960), George I. Blanksten¹³⁴ finds a solution that integrates both Iberian and Indian

¹³⁴ George I. Blanksten was a political science professor at Northwestern University and also served as political analyst in the Department of State (see Kautsky 1965, xi).

traditionalism in a sole historical scene.¹³⁵ Echoing Whitaker, who in turn quoted Bryce, he argues that since authoritarianism is common to both Spanish and Indian traditions, it is able to bring together the two cultural halves of Latin American society, contributing in this way to the cohesion of Latin America's otherwise weak national states (Blanksten 1960).

In the end, however, one has to concede that, although not entirely absent from the literature, allusions to Indian and African traditionalism pale in comparison to the prominence given by Latinamericanists to Iberian Catholicism in explaining Latin American's historical handicap.

As the repeated identification of the historical handicap trope indicates, temporal asymmetric opposition is a crucial element of modernization's approach to the study of Latin America. The concepts through which historical handicap is expressed -- "traditional," "feudal," "Catholic," "medieval," "Iberian inheritance" -- have overlapping semantic fields, which allows for some variability in the ways the trope is voiced and emphasized. Thus, we find authors saying that Latin America is feudal and Catholic, or that it is feudal because it is Catholic, or that it is overwhelmed by its Iberian inheritance or traditionalism, etc: all different ways of stating the same thing.

Besides the prominent role of cultural and temporal asymmetric oppositions in modernization texts on Latin America, some were not entirely devoid of racist

¹³⁵ *The politics of the developing areas* was published by Princeton University Press for the University's Center of International Studies, under the auspices of the Comparative Politics Committee of the SSRC. Besides Almond, Coleman, and Blanksten, other modernization authors such as Lucian Pye, Myron Weiner, and Dankwart A. Rustow also contributed to the volume. This book belongs to a series of modernization treatises published by Princeton's International Studies Center from the late 1950s to the late 1960s. According to Mark Berger, Almond's work "represented the most influential example of modernization theory produced by a political scientist."

perceptions. Whitaker tells the reader, quite uncritically, that James Bryce attributes Latin America's lack of democracy partially to "racial heterogeneity" -- an argument that, as we have already shown, nineteenth-century American nationalists have openly embraced. Bryce also states that Argentina and Chile are the only bona fide republics in Latin America. This privilege he attributes to the influx of European immigrants from Spain and Italy and to the influence of foreign merchants (Whitaker 1950). Here the cultural diffusion of European values cannot be separated from the racial infusion of European blood in Chile and Argentina.

Fitzgibbon claims that the lack of integration between whites, mestizos, and Indians is partially responsible for the lack of democracy in Latin America. Despite the apparent non-normative descriptive character of this claim, the author chooses the following words of William Lythe Schurz to speak of mestizos:

"[a] disturbing leaven of mixed peoples, who move in an uncertain political and social world between the fixed status of the pure bloods" (Fitzgibbon 1950, 124)

A pioneer Latinamericanist of the pre-war period, Schurz explains the promising future of democracy in Argentina in the following terms:

Conditions in Argentina are unusually favorable to the development of political democracy. It is peopled by a predominantly white race. It is free from the dead weight of the heavy Indian population, the too mercurial influence of the Negro, and the ... [the passage above follows] (Schurz 1941, 140).

The adverb "unusually" indicates that the author is comparing Argentina with the rest of Latin America, which is "usually" loaded with Indians, blacks, and mixed bloods (racial asymmetric opposition). Racial asymmetric opposition is constructed by contrasting the

goodness of the white race to the degenerate character of Indians, Negros, and mixed bloods, that is, of all that are non-white. The derogatory wording used to racialize the Other in this passage is reminiscent of the virulent racist discourses of Manifest Destiny. Echoes of bravados of Anglo-Saxon purity and superiority vis-à-vis the natural degeneracy of the mongrels, mestizos, and zambos of Spanish America are too loud to be ignored. Fitzgibbon does not object to that argument, on the contrary, he seems to consider Schurz's deprecatory remarks a useful piece of knowledge.

Peter Berger argues that with the rise of modernization theory, racist arguments that were common in pre-war social scientific texts on Latin America eventually disappeared. Indeed, Bryce wrote those racially loaded comments in the early twentieth century and Schurz published his in 1941. Furthermore, when Whitaker and Fitzgibbon published their contributions (1950), Truman's developmentalist discourse was just starting to penetrate the academic milieu. In other words, the traces of racism found so far are indeed from a pre-modernization context. However, one should not assume that racist concerns entirely disappear with modernization theory. Even if, compared to the importance of cultural and temporal asymmetric oppositions in the modernization theory, racism had remained quite marginal, it was not entirely absent from some modernization texts.

Blanksten, for example, writes in the section of his text entitled "Traditional Culture:"

It is possible to write an essay on the politics of the United States without mentioning the American Indian; a similar feat cannot be performed in the case of Latin America (Blanksten 1960).

This, he continues, is because the pre-Hispanic Indians of Latin America differed significantly from the “British North American Indian, and because European colonization in these areas also differed. The civilized Indians of Latin America survived colonization better than their Northern nomadic cousins did. As a result, countries such as Peru, Ecuador, and Bolivia “still” have large Indian populations. Moreover, while Europeans in British North formed a society that excluded the Indians, Spaniards used their labor force and married Indian wives.

The meeting of the Indian and the European civilizations produced a class system which is of fundamental importance in the political patterns of Latin America. This system of classes, with the passing of generations, has become highly rigid and formalized (Blanksten, 1960, 460).

Blanksten informs us that this class system is based on what the Latin Americans call race. He advises his English speaking readers that, contrary to the modern, Western, or American concept of race, “the bases of differentiation among them are social rather than biological.”

Despite his effort to cast the analysis in terms of culture and to warn the reader about different conceptions of race, one cannot avoid noticing that culture and race overlap in Blanksten’s comparison of North America and Latin America. His cultural narrative is also a racial narrative that presents to his readers a pure Anglo-Saxon North America vis-à-vis a mongrelized Latin America: the Anglo-Saxons excluded the Other whereas the Spanish intermarried. The importance of this element is magnified by the fact that Blanksten uses it to justify Latin America’s highly rigid and formalized system of classes, which, according to him, resisted the passing generations. That is, here one finds translation among racial, cultural, and temporal asymmetric oppositions.

Given the definition of Latin America as a place plagued by cultural pathologies and historical handicap, what sort of expectations could it plausibly generate?

Some early texts display an uncertain attitude towards the prospects of modernization in Latin America. For example, leaning on the Argentinean case, Whitaker tries to demonstrate that, in Latin America, there is no positive correlation between democracy and level of literacy, urbanization, middle class, and party organization. He acknowledges that those variables are “widely regarded as of crucial importance” to the promotion of democracy, but still refuses to concur. Whitaker prefers to attribute the weakness of democracy in Latin America to a supposed lack of agreement among Latin Americans upon democracy’s “basic principles” and “significant issues” (1950). He stops at that. Like Whitaker, Crawford uses the example of Argentina to argue that the contribution of middle class to democratization in Latin America should not be taken as an “iron law.”

Contrary to Whitaker, Fitzgibbon is among the ones who regard those variables “as of crucial importance.” According to him, the prospect of democracy in Latin America could be improved by economic development, which promotes political stability, mass education, and higher literacy rates. On the other hand, Fitzgibbon admonishes that democratization in Latin America must be indigenous, that is, it cannot be imposed by the United States. The author concludes his piece arguing that democratization of the entire continent will take a long time to be achieved. Like his previous call for non-intervention, this final assessment does not fit modernization’s urge for policy directives, action, and rapid results.

Other early modernization authors display a clearer concern about American agency in Latin America's modernization, which is often expressed through references to Truman's Point Four Program. Showing an interventionist bent, Mosk states that the program should promote not only industrialization but also an agrarian reform in Latin America. Contrary to Mosk, Gillin argues that, alone, programs of technological assistance will fail to modernize Latin America. This is because the scientific pragmatic thinking embedded in technology is alien to Latin American culture. Gillin stops at the negative assessment and does not risk saying how modernization should be accomplished in such adverse environment.

Whereas early modernization texts displayed a mix of dismay and enthusiasm for the prospects of modernization in Latin America, works produced after the Cuban Revolution tend to treat Latin America as a transitional society. That is, despite disagreements concerning the nature, extent, and speed of the modernization in Latin America, almost every author in the post-Cuban revolution era acknowledges that this process is already in the making.¹³⁶

Weatherhead, who shares with Gillin a similar conception of the Latin American soul, argues that the success of Latin America's modernization depends on both Americans and Latin Americans. Attuned to the policy orientation of the moment, he pledges support for the Alliance for Progress, which, according to him, was the means to accomplish modernization theory's ends.

¹³⁶ Starting a text with a dramatic description of the workings of modernization on the underdeveloped became a cliché of the modernization literature (see Millikan and Blackmer 1961; Pye 1962; Silvert 1963; Black 1966), and also of the modernization on Latin America literature (see Johnson 1958; Maier and Weatherhead 1964)

Despite agreeing with Gillin and Weatherhead on the terms of their bleak diagnostic of Latin American culture, Lipset is also concerned with prescribing modernization measures. He spends the last section of his text discussing a reform of Latin America's educational system. His goal is to create through education a new entrepreneurial elite equipped with the values of achievement and innovation. The institutional measures that would push this reform through include the professionalization of university careers, the democratization of the admissions system, and, more importantly, the creation of new curricula that prioritize technical and scientific disciplines over humanistic ones. Lipset's pontification for education reform could be read as a advice book for bureaucrats and policy makers, particularly the types engaged in educational programs of cooperation such as USAID.

Lipset also names some agents of modernization.

The managers of foreign-owned companies, whether Brazilian or foreign, are different in their behavior. They tend to emphasize a high degree of rationalization and bureaucratic practice in running their firms... The executive personnel are ambitious and competent employees, concerned with their personal success, and valuing ambition in themselves and others (Lipset, 1967, 14).¹³⁷

Together with the diffusion of modernizing habits promoted by managers of foreign-owned companies, he argues, immigrants also play a modernizing role in Latin America. Since they find the traditional paths to social status practically closed, immigrants look for alternative ways to achieving success and recognition. In traditional

¹³⁷ In this passage, Lipset uses Brazil as an example of the modernizing role of foreign managers in Latin America as a whole: another case of synecdochical reasoning.

anti-achievement cultural milieus such as Latin America, says he, these alternative ways might be entrepreneurship and achievement orientation.

As we have said above, in Lipset's view Latin American elites are not agents of modernization but obstacles to it. They do not act, or better, they only react negatively to the advance of modern value orientations. The actual agents of modernization are the ones that are not Latin American: immigrants and foreign companies. Can these be considered tips to recommend policies to further immigration and foreign private investment in the region? Although Lipset does not provide a definite answer to this question, his awe for immigration (which in "Latin America" has been mostly European) and foreign managers echoes racist theories of a not so distant past.

Blanksten's expectations toward the future of modernization (which he labels westernization) in Latin America are more optimistic than but not quite different from Lipset's. He first presents a summarized history of Latin America's Westernization in which the agents are Europeans and North Americans. First came the Portuguese and the Spanish, who Westernized the region their own way. In the following centuries, waves of European immigration contributed to further Westernization. Finally, from the 19th century to the present, the United States has been the most important agent of Latin America's Westernization.

More than any other great power, the United States is in contact with Latin America. This contact has had its Westernizing effect. The forms of United States contact with the area have been many and varied, ranging all the way from invasion and military occupation through cultural and constitutional influences as well as financial investment, to trade and technical assistance (Blanksten 1960, 468).

Economic development, says the author, also promotes Westernization. Here again, the United States has a crucial role.

The international exchange of technology, of course, is a process as old as international relations itself. But since the early 1940's steps have been taken, at first in Latin America and later in other underdeveloped areas, to structure or channel these exchanges through public policies designed to contribute to the more immediate and effective economic development of the participating countries. These policies have generally been known as technical assistance, "Point Four," or technical cooperation (Blanksten 1960, 471).

According to Blanksten, these programs of technological cooperation played a crucial role in the impressive economic development experienced by some Latin American countries, such as Brazil, Peru, and Mexico. Finally, he adds that Latin Americans, through its participation in international diplomatic forums and organizations as a weaker partner of the West, will be able to absorb beneficial Western influences.

In Blanksten's view, agency in Latin America's Westernization always comes from outside. Latin Americans are able to absorb Westernization, but not to produce it or to work on it by themselves. This line of reasoning echoes Gillin, who speaks of the Latin American's capacity to learn how to operate machines coexisted with his incapacity to understand the scientific causes and reasons behind the machine's technology. Predictably enough, the United States is declared to be the agent of the last phase of Westernization in Latin America – which corresponds to what other authors call simply modernization. The series of actions involved in this process is quite impressive: technological cooperation, constitutional influences, trade relations, and also invasion and military occupation. While Americans act, Latin Americans should patiently watch.

In the end, Blanksten's conclusion is something that one could coherently expect from modernization's ethnology of Latin America. After all, due to their pathological culture and historical incapacity (cultural and temporal asymmetric oppositions), Latin American would never be able to lift themselves by their bootstraps. Thus, following the theory, modernization in Latin America must be a process conducted under American oversight and influence.

Like mainstream modernization theorists, Latinamericanists also expected modernization to thwart the advancement of communism. Echoing Rostow, Lipset argues that communism might achieve modernization through the promotion of achievement oriented behavior – a veiled warning against the ones who thought that a policy of benign neglect toward Latin America was still possible. In a text with abundant anti-Castro invectives, Weatherhead dares to be more explicit:

The imperatives of change will become the winds of revolution unless we and [Latin Americans] devise a workable set of policies and politics for our changing times (Weatherhead 1964).

Giving the modernization-*contra*-communism motto a more optimistic visage, John J. Johnson sees the modernizing middle sectors as a social force able to undermine the leftist radicalism of the urban labor movements (1958).

From the modernization school's perspective, curing the pathologies of Latin America and saving it from communism were often one and the same thing. And this cure should be operated by the ones that are healthy: Americans. According to Weatherhead's view:

[O]n the whole, today's gringo is a civilized, well-balanced, constructive creature. Think, to take a few examples, of the earnest student who goes to Latin America to learn and discover, the

altruistic adventurer of the Peace Corps, the businessman who accepts socialistic restriction of his enterprise and splits his total profits with the host government, and the increasing number of talented career men occupying more and more posts of authority in the State Department and the Foreign Service (Weatherhead 1964).

Latin Americans should not fear. Despite their dreadful condition, they are in good hands.

Conclusion

The Latinamericanist historian Richard Morse once wrote:

... whichever the emphasis, it seems safe to say that within much of United States historiography dwells the tacit premise that Latin America is an archaic extension of southern Europe that has never booked passage on the great American dreamboat. (Morse 1964, 49)

As the analysis in this chapter has shown, Morse's general assessment of the state of historiographical discipline can be extended to all social sciences that contributed to the study of modernization in Latin America. Be they sociologists, historians, or political scientists, authors adopt a model of modern society and construct an image of Latin America as a collection of imperfections, omissions, and negations of this model. If modern society is achievement oriented and universalistic, Latin America is ascriptive and particularistic. If modern individualism is the basis of personal and political freedom, democracy, and economic progress, Latin America's individualism is the source of authoritarianism, machismo, caudillismo, and irrationality. Oppositions are also temporal. While the Anglo-Saxon Protestant West is said to be the beacon of human progress and development, Catholic Latin America is declared to be the reason why Latin Americans have been stuck in their own feudal past for centuries. Finally, although in a

marginal manner, it is sometimes suggested that Latin America's lack of modernity is due to the non-whiteness of its population.

So far, we have extensively identified expressions of both cultural and temporal asymmetric oppositions in modernization texts. But an important question still has to be addressed: is there a dominant type of asymmetric opposition, or they are equally translatable? The same texts show that the two forms of asymmetrical opposition are highly translatable, that is, expressions of cultural Otherness can be understood as signs of historical incapacity, and vice-versa. Nonetheless, it seems that, at least in some texts, cultural asymmetrical opposition is made more dominant through the argument that, ultimately, the Latin American condition of historical paralysis is due to Catholicism. But even then, a translation into temporal terms can be attempted, for Catholicism can also be also "understood" as an outdated, less developed Christian creed: a survival of feudal Europe (e.g., Lipset 1967).

The sort of temporal asymmetric opposition found in modernization texts differs from the forms that characterized the Manifest Destiny ideology. The eschatological religious phraseology of conflict gave place to the notion of a secular modernizing process -- the type of temporal asymmetric opposition originally identified in some Enlightenment theories of historical progress. More importantly, the undermining of racial asymmetric opposition allowed temporal asymmetric opposition to become the justificatory basis of a neo-colonial project. The modern, as the ones who achieved the apex of historical development (both moral and material), are opposed to the rest -- the ones that are perceived as lagging behind. Since racialism was played down, expectations toward rescuing the non-modern from their wretched condition could be formulated. However, like European nineteenth century colonialism, this project of

redemption must be the white man's burden. The non-modern can have at most an auxiliary whole in their own modernization, for the fact that they have remained in a situation of historical paralysis for so long is proof of their incapacity to effect the change.

Synecdochical reasoning has been the *modus operandi* of the Latin American studies pieces examined so far. In order to present Latin America as a coherent negation of the American modern self, the social scientific texts examined in this chapter utilize two narrative styles. The first corresponds to a simple generic narrative where Latin America is the sole character. That can be found in Gillin and particularly in Fitzgibbon, who speaks of the "Latin American point of view," of a "Latin American picture," of the "Latin American body politic," and so on. The second style, used by Whitaker, Lipset, and others, can be called anecdotal: as the theory is exposed, particular examples are used as illustrations. This technique produces the rhetorical effect of demonstrating that the theory or the historical narrative is supported by empirical evidence. Given that there are at least twenty "Latin American" cases, authors can choose the example that better fits the point they want to make, methodically ignoring the ones that might put it under suspicion.

The simple generic style produces a narrative that is always true to itself, i.e., true to the negative character attributed to Latin America. Nonetheless, for a social science that claims its discourse is based on empirical facts, this narrative style is rhetorically unsophisticated and heavily interpretive – probably due to the difficulty of producing empirical facts about Latin America in general. Despite the widespread belief in Latin America's ultimate coherence, it is still hard to imagine how can one design research or win a grant to study "Latin America" writing solely on generic terms. That is probably

the reason why the anecdotal is the most popular style adopted in the literature. In this case, the conduit of the narrative is also a generic theory, but its generalizations are often “supported” by particular examples, in a constant exercise of synecdochical reasoning. The number and name of the countries used as examples vary widely but this is not a problem since the example is validated by the generic theory and not vice-versa. Thus, the case of Argentina is said to be an example of Latin American conservative democracy, Costa Rica is a proof that democracy in Latin America is not correlated with urbanization, while the Vargas’s presidency in Brazil is a product of Latin American statism. In sum, in this narrative style Latin America is a *Geist* that manifests itself through particular embodiments. However, contrary to the *Geist* of political romanticism, this one has no positive quality. We should more appropriately call it a damned ghost.

5. Political stabilization

We should cease to talk about vague and ... unreal objectives such as human rights, the raising of living standards and democratization. The day is not far off when we are going to have to deal in straight power concepts. The less we are hampered by idealistic slogans, the better.

Secretary of State George Kennan, 1948.

...a strong base for Communism exists in Latin America. He said that wherever a dictator was replaced, Communists gained. In his opinions, the US should back strong men in Latin American governments.

Minutes of a National Security Council meeting reporting the arguments of Treasury Secretary George Humphrey, February 17, 1955.

... Warmest good wishes ... the American people have watched with anxiety the political and economic difficulties through which your great nation has been passing, and have admired the resolute will of the Brazilian community to resolve these difficulties within a framework of constitutional democracy and without civil strife.

President Lyndon Johnson. Telegram sent to the Brazilian military junta within hours of the coup d'état that deposed president João Goulart in April 1, 1964.

In this chapter, I analyze the literature of political stabilization in Latin America. Although some commentators have understood this literature to be a departure from modernization theory, I think it should be considered more as a branch of modernization, at least from the perspective that interests this work, namely, the conceptualization of Latin America. Contributors to this literature did not attempt to significantly reform or abolish the interpretation of "Latin America" put forward by modernization. On the contrary, when necessary, they borrowed elements from modernization's conceptualization to support their own arguments. At the same time, the political stabilization literature is even closer to policy concerns than mainstream modernization. As a result, the literature focuses on a smaller set of issues -- mostly military relations between the United States and Latin America -- and is more concerned with finding

answers to specific policy questions (e.g., the evaluation of different types of military aid programs). It can be safely argued that political stabilization is the earliest specialized (sub)literature produced by Latin American studies.

Due to the specific policy focus of the political stabilization literature, the textual analysis conducted in the following sections will differ in some aspects from the one previously done. Although identifying asymmetric oppositions is still a major goal, the paucity of ethnological descriptions in the texts reduces the possibilities for actual identification. At the same time, the abundance of policy-oriented arguments (oriented to future action) provides a great opportunity to examine the expectations created through those texts. In the concluding section, I attempt to explain the interplay between asymmetric oppositions and expectations in the literature of political stabilization in Latin America.

The shift toward political stabilization

Even though the most visible facet of the Alliance for Progress emphasized social and economic reform,¹³⁸ the policies toward Latin America implemented by the Kennedy administration had a much broader scope. As we have seen in the previous chapter, the project of developing Latin America was directly linked with the security concern of avoiding the advance of communism south of the border. However, Kennedy did not entrust the defense of the Western Hemisphere solely to developmental programs.

¹³⁸ The goals proposed in the Charter of the Alliance for Progress included progressive taxation, agrarian reform, investment in health, housing, and education, elimination of inflation, stabilization of the export prices of commodities, economic integration, and fostering private enterprise (Lieuwen 1964, 4).

Parallel to these programs, or sometimes enmeshed in them, the administration implemented a whole set of security policies that were based on a new way of dealing with the communist threat in the hemisphere.

Before 1962, American military assistance programs to Latin America had been based on the hypothesis of extra-hemispheric aggression. That “concept” presided over the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, signed at Rio de Janeiro in 1947, and the Mutual Security Act, approved by Congress in 1951, during the Korean War. According to the section 105 of the Mutual Security Act, internal security would not be a basis for military assistance to Latin American nations. Following the Act, the administration started negotiating bilateral agreements with individual countries, which included the provision of weaponry and military advisors. In less than nine years after the Act was passed, the United States had installed military missions in all southern republics, and transferred \$ 317 million in military aid grants to a list of twelve countries and \$140 million worth of military equipment to a larger list of seventeen countries. (Lieuwen 1960; Barber and Ronning 1966).¹³⁹

The Kennedy administration revised that previous orientation on the premises that (1) the Soviet Union would not try a direct invasion of the continent, and (2) in case of a large-scale conflict with Soviet forces, the Latin American military would not be able to

¹³⁹ The transference of these resources was usually conditioned by requirements of equipment standardization, enforced by the US government. Using the argument that maintenance and part replacement depended largely on shared industrial standards, the American government tried to dissuade its southern neighbors from acquiring military equipment from Europe or Asia, or producing their own. That is, the program had the intended aim of securing those countries as clients of the American military industry (Lieuwen 1960, 205).

play an important role in the defense of the hemisphere.¹⁴⁰ This policy shift was later summarized by Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara in 1963 before the House Subcommittee on Appropriations:

Until about 1960, military assistance programs for Latin America were oriented toward hemispheric defense. As it became clear that there was no threat of significant overt external aggression against Latin America, emphasis shifted to internal security capabilities for use against Communist-inspired subversion or covert aggression and to civic action projects designed to promote stability and strengthen national economies."¹⁴¹

For the administration, the Cuban revolution had shown that, rather than direct warfare, communists would exploit internal strife to infiltrate Latin America. Policy was changed in accordance with this perception, reducing military assistance under the Military Assistance Program (MAP) and transferring funds to "internal security programs," which were also known as counterinsurgency programs. A sizable part of those programs was classified as "military civic action." According to the *Dictionary of United States Military Terms for Joint Usage*, issued on February 1, 1964, by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "military civic action" corresponds to:

the use of preponderantly indigenous military forces on projects useful to the local populations at all levels in such fields as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation,

¹⁴⁰ According to John D. Powell, this shift occurred in 1961 and became public in 1963, through Defense Secretary McNamara's budget request statement before Congress, which ascribed half of the funds to internal security equipment and training (see Powell 1965, 383).

¹⁴¹ House Subcommittee on Appropriations, Hearings, Foreign Operations Appropriations for 1964, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. [May, 1963], Part 2. (see Barber and Ronning 1966, 48)

communications, health, sanitation, and others contributing to economic and social development, which would also serve to improve the standing of the military forces with the population. (United States forces may at times advise or engage in military civic actions in overseas areas.) (see Barber and Ronning 1966, 6)¹⁴²

In sum, if on the one hand, the American government had given public support for social reform in Latin America, through both the Act of Bogotá in 1960 and the Charter of the Alliance for Progress in 1961, on the other hand, this same government was taking measures to hamper any sign of social unrest in those countries. But the discourse that supported military civic action was rhetorically fashioned to avoid this potential paradox by presenting it as a policy solution that could marry internal security with modernization. In fact, this sort of argument was already present in a statement proposing the Alliance to Progress, delivered by John F. Kennedy on March 13, 1961¹⁴³, only six weeks after his inauguration:

And the new generation of [Latin American] military leaders has shown an increasing awareness that armies cannot only defend their countries—they can, as we have learned through our own Corps of Engineers, help to build them.

Nine days later, President Kennedy delivered a message in which he stated:

¹⁴² One should notice that the “internal security programs” advocated by the Kennedy administration involved much more than the actions defined under “military civic action.” Counterinsurgency involved among other things, strengthening relations with anti-communist “Latin American” military and providing them with training and equipment to repress dissident political groups and social movements (see Nelson-Pallmeyer 1997; Schoultz 1998).

¹⁴³ The Charter of the Alliance for Progress was signed by representatives of all countries in the OAS in Punta del Este, Uruguay, on August 17, 1961 (Lieuwen 1964, 4).

. . . To the extent that world security conditions permit, military assistance will in the future more heavily emphasize the internal security, civil works and economic growth of the nations thus aided.

On May 25, 1961, Kennedy spoke before Congress:

Military assistance can, in addition to its military purposes, make a contribution to economic progress. The domestic works of our own Army Engineers are an example of the role which military forces in the emerging countries can play in village development, sanitation, and road building (Barber and Ronning 1966, 73).

In sum, the Kennedy administration was actively promoting the engagement of "Latin American" military in domestic affairs not strictly related to the maintenance of national security. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara went even further to argue before a Senate subcommittee that by increasing the contact between American and Latin American officers, Civic Action initiatives would contribute to the diffusion of a spirit of democratic commitment among the Latin American military.

The experience we have had indicates that the exposure of [Latin American] military officers to our schools acquaints them with democratic philosophies and democratic ways of thinking which they, in turn, take back to their countries (Barber and Ronning 1966, 218).¹⁴⁴

The idea of using civic action against social unrest originated from the American experience with counter guerrilla operations in Southeast Asia. As some commentators have noted, the actual priority of military action programs was to improve the image of the military before isolated pockets of the population that might be prone to social unrest,

¹⁴⁴ Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings, Foreign Assistance Act of 1962, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (April 5-18, 1962), p. 76. (see Barber and Ronning 1966, 218)

and not modernization per se (Lieuwen 1964; Barber and Ronning 1966). Moreover, a sparsely publicized facet of the contact between American and Latin American military was even more inimical to democracy: counterinsurgency. This included not only support for anti-communist dictators but also the training of “Latin American” military in repressive techniques such as guerrilla warfare, collective psychological intimidation, torture techniques, sabotage, and other means to “promote democracy.”¹⁴⁵ Predictably, official rhetoric found that modernization and progress sells better than a “Machiavellian” scheme of repression and military propaganda through public works.

This new way of addressing security policy, brought about by the Kennedy administration, was also supported by academic works. Like the agenda of mainstream modernization through economic development, security with modernization also relied on a large body of academic work, which I have named political stabilization literature. In fact, as we will see, since both literatures share the same epistemological substratum

¹⁴⁵ The most infamous example of this “close” contact is the School of Americas (SOA). First established by the American government in 1946 in the Panama Canal Zone, and later transferred to Fort Benning, Georgia, SOA was open almost exclusively to Latin American military. Under Kennedy, this military academy was converted into a school of counterinsurgency. Not coincidentally, SOA graduates have been involved in all sorts of abuses, including torture, assassination of clergy, union leaders, politicians and social movement activists, coup d’états, and so on. The lack of academic interest for the School of the Americas is noteworthy. In order to gather information about this infamous branch of the US government one has to appeal to non-academic literature. For an appalling description of SOA’s activities see Jack Nelson-Pallmeyer’s *School of Assassins: the Case for Closing the School of the Americas and for Fundamentally Changing U.S. Foreign Policy* (1997). A radical denunciation of SOA activities and a call for the schools closure is presented by father Roy Bourgeois in the videotape documentary *School of the Assassins* (1994). For a small sample of the SOA instruction materials that were made public see *Spanish-language intelligence training manuals* (US Government Defense Department 1992). In order to better understand the jargon employed in the publicized manuals read first Steven Lee Myers’s “Be all that you can be: your future as an extortionist” (1996a) and “Old U.S. Army manuals for Latin officers urged rights abuses” (1996b). On SOA in general see also Eilerman (1999), Privett (1996), and Bourgeois (1992).

and ethnological view, they should be seen as subspecies of modernization theory rather than as entirely separate approaches.

Like mainstream modernization, the literature on political stabilization did not exclusively apply to the Latin American case. Some authors worked on theories to explain instability in underdeveloped countries in general. The most influential writer that adopted this all-encompassing approach to political stabilization was Samuel P. Huntington.¹⁴⁶ Huntington had been working on the political aspects of modernization for more than a decade when he published *Political Order in Changing Societies*, in 1968.¹⁴⁷ *Political Order* is a book about modernization, though Huntington rejected that label. Indeed, he aimed at demonstrating that previous works on modernization were deeply mistaken about the nature and consequences of the modernizing process. Huntington argues that academics and policymakers took politics for granted, or at most, considered it as a benign byproduct of economic development.

In American thinking the causal chain was: economic assistance promotes economic development, economic development promotes political stability. (1968, 6)

¹⁴⁶ Huntington collaborated with the US government for a long period. From 1966 to 1969, he was chair-man of the Council on Vietnamese Studies of the United States Agency for International Development's (USAID) South East Asian Advisory Group. Under the sponsorship of the US State Department, Huntington traveled to Vietnam, in 1967, to study communism in that country. During the Carter administration, he became the Coordinator of National Security on the National Security Council, a post he occupied until August 1978. (Chomsky 1968; Berger 1995).

¹⁴⁷ In 1973, Henry C. Kenski and Margaret Gorgan Kenski surveyed political development courses from a nation-wide sample of 575 American colleges and universities, and found that Huntington's *Political Order in Changing Societies* was by far (1) the book on political development and modernization respondents found most important (57.6%) and (2) the approach to political development respondents found most useful (59.4%) (Kenski 1974).

Huntington argues that this reasoning is plainly wrong. In fact, the opposite often occurs: economic development promotes political instability. According to him, American policymakers have been unaware of the dreaded political consequences of economic modernization for too long. They now have to realize their mistake and correct their line of action. His advice is unequivocal: political stabilization must come first. But why?

At this point in the analysis, we should be aware of the somewhat unusual nature of Huntington's writing. Contrary to other policy scientists, who tend to bury policy concerns and interests below a thick layer of socio-scientific arguments, Huntington is explicit about them. At the same time, he does not entirely abandon the project of writing social sciences. The final result is a book with a hybrid nature; part an advice-book for the prince, following the *raison d'état* of national interest and strategic action, and part social scientific piece, where reasons emanate from the objects themselves, independently from interested subjects.

Huntington's advice-book for prince within *Political Order* is punctuated with citations from Machiavelli, Plato, and Aristotle, discussions about forms of government, paths of constitutional decay, reform and foundation, and warnings about the importance of action in the realm of politics. Despite Huntington's political philosophizing, this part of the book contains a very simple answer to the question raised above: if Americans do not promote the stabilization of modernizing political systems, the Soviets will. Few academics let Cold War imperatives shine so bright and clear through their text. However, in order to fully understand Huntington's argument, one has to delve into the

socio-scientific text that completes *Political Order*, i.e., one has to understand why modernization produces instability.

According to Huntington, economic modernization promotes “rapid social change:” urbanization, increase in literacy, industrialization, and mass communications. This contributes to extending political consciousness, multiplying political demands, and broadening political participation. In sum, modernization produces a “rapid mobilization of new groups into politics” – a fact that, according to him, has been often overlooked by the social scientific literature. In turn, argues the author:

[t]hese changes undermine traditional sources of political authority and traditional political institutions; they enormously complicate the problems of creating new bases of political association and new political institutions combining legitimacy and effectiveness... The result is political instability and disorder.

The concrete manifestations of instability and disorder, Huntington claims, are political strikes, guerrilla, insurgency, civilian and military coups, revolts, and revolutions.

One might prematurely conclude that, for Huntington, the intrinsic dynamics of modernization are solely responsible for the rise of instability. Nevertheless, this is not the case. According to the author, modernization is only disruptive because of the traditional nature the countries’ political institutions. In other words, the conceptual framework he uses to explain the Other is still the one of modernization theory. As the passage above indicates, the opposition modern/traditional is central for understanding his political science of modernization.

... the absence of trust in the culture of the [traditional] society provides formidable obstacles to the creation of public institutions. Those societies deficient in stable and effective government are also deficient in mutual trust among their citizens, in national and public loyalties, and in organization skills and capacity. (1968, 28)

Coherently preserving the asymmetric nature of the opposition modern/traditional, the author defines traditional society in terms of “absence” and “deficiency” of modern cultural traits. Like in other modernization texts, cultural asymmetric opposition is intertwined with temporal asymmetric opposition, that is, with presentation of the Other in terms of historically handicapped traditionalism.

Huntington expands the semantic possibilities of asymmetric opposition by creating a new conceptual pair: effective/debile political systems. This new opposition corresponds to the expression of the fundamental asymmetric opposition modern/traditional in the realm of politics. According to the author, an effective political system corresponds to ...

strong, adaptable, coherent political institutions: effective bureaucracies, well-organized political parties, a high degree of popular participation in public affairs, working systems of civilian control over the military, extensive activity by the government in the economy, and reasonably effective procedures for regulating succession and controlling political conflict. (1968, 1)

The United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union are given as examples of effective political systems. Representing the other extreme of the opposition are Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Predictably, their debile political systems lack the attributes Huntington has ascribed to the first group. He speaks of ...

a shortage of political community and of effective, authoritative, legitimate government, ... where the political community is fragmented against itself and where political institutions have little power, less majesty, and no resiliency – where in many cases governments simply do not govern.

“Shortage,” “little,” “less,” “no,” all these terms define the debile political system as a negation of the effective one. In the end, Huntington’s “innovation” is still contained within the same framework of asymmetrical oppositions that characterize modernization theory. The pair effective/debile political can be interpreted in terms of cultural asymmetric opposition, i.e., the one defined in terms of ways of life, institutions, and customs. At the same time, however, he also speaks of political underdevelopment, as something as characteristic of Asia, Africa, and Latin America as economic underdevelopment. In other words, debile political systems can also be understood as signs of their immature nature or backwardness -- temporal asymmetric opposition.

Huntington identifies the same cultural malaises affecting Asian, African, and Latin American societies: lack of trust, lack of solidarity, lack of political community. However, when speaking of Latin America the author adds something else:

In Latin America ... traditions of self-centred individualism and of distrust and hatred for other groups in society have prevailed.
(1968, 29)

Huntington stresses that “Iberian culture” is not just another source of “distrust and hatred for other groups in society,” it is also the mother of “self-centred individualism” – an ethnological gem he received from his fellow Latin Americanists. Evidence is then presented in the form of quotations from Simón Bolívar and an Ecuadorian newspaper that “confirm” his description of Latin America as helplessly consumed by mistrust, unrest, and violence. The synecdochical fallacy once more make its appearance, here helped by the rhetorical expedient of using the natives’ testimony to confirm one’s own theories.

In order to conclude our analysis of *Political Order* we have to go back to the advice-book for prince. The alleged purpose of this piece is to convince American policymakers of the ultimate folly of their previous line of conduct. Huntington does not save on rhetoric to accomplish his intent. First, he plays the flatterer:

In confronting the modernizing countries the United State was handicapped by its happy history. In its development the United States was blessed with more than its fair share of economic plenty, social well-being, and political stability. This pleasant conjuncture of blessings led Americans to believe in the unity of goodness.... Americans ... were born equal and hence never had to worry about creating equality, they enjoyed the fruits of democratic revolution without having suffered one. (1968, 5-7)

This rosy picture of American history has the effect of presenting the “policy mistake” as a product of American natural naïveté: the American effort to help developing poor countries is full of good intentions, but the actual world is much uglier than they originally thought.¹⁴⁸ Then, Huntington turns into a grave counselor, arguing that the primary problem of underdeveloped countries is not liberty but order; that unless authority is firmly established, those countries will be “at the mercy of alienated intellectuals, rambunctious colonels, and rioting students.” And the tone gets even graver when the subject is communism:

... one thing communist governments can do is to govern ... they may not provide liberty, but they do provide authority; they do create governments that can govern. (1968, 14)

¹⁴⁸ Weatherhead also repeats the same argument. See previous chapter.

The advice-book for prince sounds as a call for action: Americans should urgently correct their policies and focus on promoting political stability in the third world, lest the red menace does it first. But how would American policymakers implement this new policy directive? Most countries usually welcome loans, aid, and technological cooperation, but how can they “receive” political institutions from abroad? That is, this new directive begs for specific means through which conditions of stability are created through political institutionalization. Furthermore, since it is known that Soviet-backed communist revolutions usually involve a great deal of popular participation, what is the direction that American-backed political stabilization should take?

Let us start answering these questions from the end. According to Huntington, political development should precede political participation. Given that underdeveloped countries lack sound political institutions, those should be created before the political system is democratized – otherwise participation will overwhelm political capacity. Huntington’s formula for Asia, Africa, and Latin America was: less democracy, less popular political participation, and more control. In order to achieve these ends, Americans needed internal agents, nationals that were not primarily involved in the traditional political culture of those countries. Previous modernization authors had argued that pro-Western elites should be the internal agents of modernization. Huntington, however, was much more pessimistic about the prospects of democratic modernization in the Third World. According to him, only one elite group assembled sufficient capacities to play the role of heralds of modernity: the military.

In many societies the opportunity the military have for political creativity may be the last real chance for political institutionalization short of the totalitarian road. If the military fail to seize that

opportunity, the broadening of participation transforms the society into a mass praetorian system. In such a system the opportunity to create political institutions passes from the military, the apostles of order, to those other middle-class leaders who are the apostles of revolution. (1968, 262)

Why the military? Because ...

[i]n these early stages of political modernization, the military officers play a highly modernizing and progressive role... Like the Protestant entrepreneurs of Western Europe, the soldier reformers in non-Western societies embody and promote a puritanism which is a distinctive innovation in their societies. (1968, 203)

Huntington offered additional arguments in support of his claim that the military can actually play such role:

... [i]n the twentieth century the professionalization of the officer corps produced a still greater commitment to modernization and to national development and also transformed the typical expression of military participation in politics from the individualistic leader to the collective junta. (1968, 203)¹⁴⁹

This panegyric is followed by the “successful example” of Brazil, where, according to the author, “development-minded” military officers seized power.

In sum, *Political Order in Changing Societies* justifies American support for anti-communist military dictatorships in the Third World – particularly in Latin America, the book’s main source of examples.¹⁵⁰ In fact, rather than a call for action, the book seems

¹⁴⁹ Huntington had already written about the importance of military professionalism in *The Soldier and the State; The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (1957).

¹⁵⁰ In a latter text, Huntington apparently recants from this agenda, arguing that neither the military nor free elections could be a long-term substitute for political organization. He advises the American government to shift its policies toward supporting at least “one

to be a *post factum* justification of a policy that, although not well publicized, the American government had already been following for quite some time. Evidence pointing to this conclusion abound: the overthrow of democratically elected Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala by an American-designed, -funded, and -guided military movement (Schlesinger and Kinzer 1983; Gleijeses 1991), Truman's sharp increase of military aid to Latin America,¹⁵¹ Kennedy's investment in counterinsurgency programs, Lyndon Johnson's support for military dictators (Parker 1977; Parker 1979), the American intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965 (Gleijeses 1978), and so on.

As the analysis of Huntington's work suggests, the contribution of social scientific discourse to policy cannot be reduced to the contribution of social scientists to policymaking. Social scientific discourses can also play the important role of furnishing *post factum* rationales to justify unsavory governmental policies that are not well publicized. One should note that even under the ideological pressure of Cold War, support for dictators never became an explicit governmental policy – probably because of the domestic criticism such endorsement would prompt. In this context, social scientific discourse plays the therapeutic role of “demonstrating” that what might appear at first as an act against the principles of democracy is in fact a wise political way of marrying the

strong anti-Communist political party (Huntington 1967). Nonetheless, he does not explicitly discard the recourse to military political intervention in cases where expediency requires postponing long-term objectives.

¹⁵¹ Edwin Lieuwven argues that American military aid to Latin American countries enhanced the domestic political stand of the military in those countries, and eventually contributed to the collapse of democratic regimes via military coups (Lieuwen 1961; Lieuwen 1964). Irving Louis Horowitz denies that American military aid to Latin America aims at chiefly promoting hemispheric defense against foreign aggression by showing that aid programs have emphasized technologies of counterinsurgency and civilian repression (Horowitz 1972).

protection of American democracy and interests to the safest and most promising path for Third World development. Furthermore, social scientific discourse has the authority and legitimacy to speak to a constituency larger than the bureaucratic personnel of the State and Defense Departments. Thus, the unsavory policy becomes a little more palatable and more public, although it never made it to the speeches of presidents.

Although very well received, Huntington was neither the only nor the first author to study the role of the military in the modernization process. Other heavy-weights of American academia such as the sociologist Edward Shils (1962) and the political scientist Lucian Pye also wrote about the subject.¹⁵² Pye's "Armies in the Process of Political Modernization" (1962), written under the sponsorship of the Rand Corporation, anticipates Huntington's contribution in many points. Assuming an explicit tone of policy advisement, Pye argues that in "transitional societies" armies are more effective agents of modernization than political parties and civilian groups. According to him, the military contribute to foster a "sense of citizenship," "responsible nationalism," and social justice. Furthermore, military leaders are "far less suspicious of the West" than their civilian counterparts. His final conclusion is that American military aid is crucial for advancing modernization in underdeveloped countries (Pye 1962).¹⁵³

¹⁵² See also the contributions of Morris Janowitz (1964) and Hans Daalder (1962)

¹⁵³ The same assessment was reproduced in influential policy documents. For example, in the report to his presidential mission to Latin America made for the incoming Nixon administration, New York Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller writes "motivated by increasing impatience with corruption, inefficiency, and a stagnant political order, the new military man is prepared to adapt his authoritarian tradition to the goals of social and economic progress" (Rockefeller 1969, 32-33).

Latin American studies literature on political stabilization

Social scientists that dealt with political stabilization in Latin America also tended to show a strong policy orientation. While reviewing the literature on the military in Latin America, Lyle N. McAlister affirms:

In any case, U.S. policy considerations have been an important stimulant to the study of the Latin American military; not only because of the intrinsic interest and importance of this factor, but because policy oriented organizations such as the Council on Foreign Relations and various agencies of the United States Government have provided financial support for research. (1966, 7)

This testimony comes from someone who was quite comfortable with the Cold War agenda of American foreign policy and the role of intellectuals in furthering its interests.¹⁵⁴

If Huntington was the most influential author of the political stabilization literature at large, John J. Johnson was certainly the most important Latinamericanist in that literature. Johnson worked for the State Department as Acting Chief of the South American Branch of the Division of Research for the American Republics, in 1952 and 1953.¹⁵⁵ In 1958, he published *Political Change in Latin America: The Emergence of the Middle Sectors*, a book considered by commentators as an early contribution to modernization theory (Berger 1995; Mattiace and Camp 1996). *Political Change in*

¹⁵⁴ For a clear statement of McAlister's position, see the discussion on the political and ethical implications of doing research on the topic of military involvement in politics in Latin America during the Cold War (1966, 31-2).

¹⁵⁵ This biographical information comes from *Political Change in Latin America: The Emergence of the Middle Sectors* (Johnson, 1958), p. ix. Johnson also worked as a consultant for the RAND Corporation in late 1950s and early 1960s (see Johnson 1962).

Latin America shares with many other contemporary modernization pieces an optimistic perspective on the final political and economic outcomes of the modernization process. Nevertheless, instead of insisting on the importance of structural changes and policy reforms to further economic development, Johnson focuses on the role of the Latin American middle sectors as historical agents of modernization.¹⁵⁶

Even though political stability is not a key topic in *Political Change in Latin America*, Johnson already displays some enthusiasm toward the role of the military in the Latin American modernization process. He ranks them among state bureaucrats, a category that tends to become more powerful as modernization progresses. Johnson says that “since 1930 the social and economic orientation of politically active officers has been away from that of the old ruling groups and toward that of the civilian middle sectors.” This occurred due to three reasons: 1) professionalization increased, providing middle sector elements with an attractive source of income and job stability and repelling traditional elite groups; 2) since the civilian middle sectors improved their political stand, military officers tended to preserve political links with those sectors rather than be co-opted by elites; 3) the military sympathize with the modernizing bent of the middle sectors towards industrialization. Highlighting this final reason, Johnson argues that despite their different approach to politics, the civilian middle sectors and the military have a common project of industrial growth associated with national progress (1958, 13-14).

¹⁵⁶ According to Johnson, the middle sectors of Latin American society are composed of urban professionals, public employees, and other social groups that do not belong either to the traditional landed elites or to the impoverished masses (Johnson 1958).

These insights on the political role of the military in Latin America are further developed in “The Latin-American Military as a Politically Competing Group in Transitional Society,” a chapter Johnson wrote to *The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries* (1962). The author starts the text stating that “[m]ilitarism ... has been and is a fact of life in Latin America” – a claim that is soon followed by a historical explanation: “Militarism in Latin America today is a cultural residue of the Wars of Independence (1810-1825) and the subsequent civil disorders.”

Johnson calls militarism a residue because he sees it as a dying form of personalistic politics linked to traditional aristocratic values and interests. In fact, the demise of militarism, according to Johnson, should be understood as an outcome of the modernization process, which strongly affected the military. Repeating what he had already stated in *Political Change*, Johnson argues that the increasing need for higher education, technical training, and specialization required to operate modern military equipment changed the profile of the military career, attracting people from the middle-sectors to the corporation. Such move towards modern professionalism led the military away from the interests of the landed elites and toward the agenda of the middle sector: developmental nationalism. Johnson adds that even if these new military seize power, the intricacies of administering complex modern societies will force them to use civilian advisors and to stick to the political agenda of the middle sectors.

Politically, then, the militarists who seek power in the foreseeable future may be expected to bid for popular support from the same socioeconomic groups-ranging from the urban workers through the bureaucracy and professions to the owners and managers of commercial enterprises-as the middle sectors have for a half century. (1962, 127)

The author claims that empirical evidence for this new military political consciousness already exists:

In several of the nations where the militarists have engaged in politics, officers have developed a new concept of the military's role in government and society. Under the influence of the new concept, the armed forces have sought, in most cases successfully, to discard their traditional subservience to an all-powerful dictator and instead have organized in such a way that when intervention takes place it is in the name of the armed forces rather than an individual. (1962, 119)

And the good news about the new military is not restricted to the structural consequences of modernization. Anticipating Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, Johnson states:

... there is a growing body of evidence that training programs for bringing young officers to the United States have interesting political possibilities. In the United States academies and training schools the Latin-American trainees rub shoulders with future United States officers who rigidly separate their professional and political interests. The United States attitude toward the role of the military has apparently had some effect (1962, 129).

Unfortunately, Johnson states, this positive effect of rubbing shoulders with American military might not be enough for democratic regimes in Latin America:

From all this it might be concluded that, if Latin America must continue to content itself with militarism, which seems likely, it might benefit from having at least a hard core of officers who, trained in the United States, might at times serve as countervailing forces against their military colleagues, of either the right or left, who would selfishly usurp power and impose totalitarian dictatorships. (1962, 129)

But even if the beneficial consequences of rubbing shoulders with American military will not deliver Latin America from its old vices, it will at least produce a pro-US military elite to fight communism.

In other words, Johnson claims that the US-educated Latin American military are not only conduits of economic development but also promoters of democratic values such as the separation between the military profession and politics. Militarism, in this context, is seen as a traditional Latin American ailment against which these new brand of democratically minded military officers fight a battle they might not win. Even if Latin America is incapable of ridding itself of its old militaristic vice, the US-educated military will maintain a centrist position and reject the “selfish usurpation of power” and “totalitarian dictatorships.” Johnson leads the reader to conclude that the US-educated Latin American military would not be prone to get involved in military coups, but if they do get involved, it would be for the sake of limiting the recklessness and greed of their non-US-educated Latin American colleagues.¹⁵⁷

In the introduction he subsequently wrote to *Continuity and Change in Latin America* (1964), Johnson’s tone turns even less optimistic, and a clear concern for the problem of political stability in Latin America comes to light.¹⁵⁸

¹⁵⁷ Unfortunately, the facts strongly contradict the rubbing-shoulders thesis defended by Johnson, Huntington, McNamara and other scholars and politicians. The list of Latin American military who received instruction in the United States and later usurped power in their countries is extensive, including the Panamanian Manuel Noriega, the Argentinean Leopoldo Galtieri, the Bolivian Hugo Banzer, the Guatemalan Romeo Lucas García, the Honduran Policarpo Paz García, and the Salvadoran Rafael Bustillo – all former “heads of state.”

¹⁵⁸ *Continuity and change in Latin America* was written under the auspices of the Committee on Latin American Studies, which was jointly established in 1959 by American Council of Learned Societies and the Social Science Research Council, with financial assistance of the Carnegie Corporation, the Ford Foundation, and the Council on Higher Education in the American Republics.

Now, in response to the strides of modern science and technology, the pace and scope of the transformation are accelerating. The traditional structure is breaking down, and political and economic power are being transferred with increasing speed from the integrated haciendas to the as yet unorganized cities. A philosophy of constant change has supplanted one of stability. (1964, 3)

Johnson belongs to the group of Latin Americanists who prefer to characterize "Latin America" as a transitional society rather than a traditional one. The difference is that instead of being solely static, transitional societies, as the name indicates, have sectors that experience a process of transformation. Consequently, those societies contain a mix of traditional and modern elements.¹⁵⁹ This characterization is already presented in *Political Change in Latin America*. Now, however, Johnson discovers that change might have some dangerous consequences -- the "revolution of rising expectations" might turn sour.¹⁶⁰

New frames of reference are being constructed; new outlets for discontent are appearing. It has become more and more fashionable to be revolutionary. Those who seek progress through reform contend directly with those who demand progress through violence. (1964, 3)

¹⁵⁹ One should notice that the introduction of the notion of transitional society does not rid this ethnology of temporal asymmetric opposition. After all, the transitional society is still considered not developed enough or immature.

¹⁶⁰ The expression "revolution of rising expectations" is a rhetorical staple of modernization theory. Interestingly enough, with the evolution of that approach its usage also changed. In early modernization treatises, the "revolution" was often called upon to demonstrate that modernization was an unstoppable process that also attended the aspiration of underdeveloped peoples. Nevertheless, in later works, like Johnson's, the term becomes a warning banner for the dangers of political instability unleashed by the process of modernization.

The realization of the impending revolutionary threat makes Johnson reevaluate his previous optimism toward Latin American modernization.

For one thing, traditional systems are being repudiated before viable substitutes for them have been found. Millions are abandoning established values for new ones that are transitory or rooted in the moment. The last remnants of mutual interest between the haves and the have-nots are threatened. The have-nots demand a new, more "democratic" type of relationship. (1964, 3)

Interestingly, while Johnson seems to fear the replacement of traditionalism by a revolutionary agenda, he also repudiates the "survival" of Latin American traditions – which he sees as a sign of the partial failure of the modernization process in the region.

Of course, Latin America is not a single unit, and much of the past-personalism, monoculture, gross inequalities remains even where progress toward a better life has been greatest. The imprints of old attitudes and values can be seen on the most modern of institutions. At every turn the impulse for change confronts inhibiting forces. Schools are not producing enough leaders, or enough technicians, to shape the new order in all of its dimensions. In short, change and constancy are in conflict everywhere; it is only a question of intensity (1964, 16).

For Johnson, the road to modernization is a desirable narrow path between traditionalism and revolutionary upheaval. The problem now is: who is going to conduct Latin America through this path? The author immediately refrains from an institutional solution:

Not institutions, but people, sometimes individually but more often collectively, will determine, in the final analysis, whether the forces at work in Latin America will retard or promote social development (1964, 16).

In other words, similarly to Huntington, Johnson claims that democratic institutions cannot guarantee modernization. On the contrary, the enhancement of political participation exacerbates the revolution of rising expectations, attracting the ghost of social revolution. The solution must come from a group of people, or an individual, with the political resolve to modernize the country and avoid communist infiltration. In *The Military and Society in Latin America* (1964) Johnson provides an unequivocal answer:

[Latin Americans must know] that they are moving rapidly into an era of profound social disorder and that Western representative democracy no longer has a monopoly in this Hemisphere, the public can maintain their armies as deterrents against extremist-provoked violence but at the same time work to convert them into more socially constructive institutions. That would not be so heroic but it would certainly be realistic, and Latin Americans will probably have to be more realistic than they ordinarily have been if they are to survive the onslaught of extremists from both the right and the left. (1964, 262)

The solution Johnson proposes points toward political stabilization:

The armed forces, in circumstances in which frustration and disappointment over national development have often left politicians plagued with anxieties and self-doubt, may become increasingly confident of their ability "to clean up the mess." If and when such situations arise, the armed forces may choose to provide ... the security that is being sought by so many. In any event, since the armed forces will probably remain for some time the only agency capable of countermanding rampant demagoguery, they will appear different to the states of Latin America than they do to states with great national social cohesion. (1964, 262)

Johnson adds that the military are better conduits of modernization than Latin American civilians. Their professionalism makes them more competent than civilian bureaucrats. They might contribute to building the country's infrastructure, exploiting

economic activities in the frontier (e.g. deforestation), and providing social services that civilian have not been willing to provide. Finally, Johnson claims that due to their commitment to nationalist causes, the military tend to be less corrupt than their civilian counterparts are when in charge of managerial activities.

In policy terms, Johnson's arguments provide strong justifications for supporting both civic action programs and anti-communist military dictators in Latin America. Following his line of thought, only a strong hand would be able to safely conduct immature Latin America through the narrow path of modernization.

Johnson is not alone in his partial revision of modernization theory. Despite a more tentative tone, Lyle N. McAlister presents the same arguments. In his view, the Latin American military have historically contributed to promoting public education and technical training and to breaking traditional class and caste barriers. McAlister also suggests that the military are more competent than Latin American civilian bureaucrats in dealing with managerial tasks. Most importantly, he argues that the modern brand of Latin American military is able to contribute to political stability by directly engaging in politics and thus stopping "the political pendulum from swinging too far from the center", and by undermining insurgency through "civic action" (McAlister 1964)¹⁶¹.

Like Johnson, McAlister claims that the military involvement with science and technology induced them to become modernizers. For him, the context through (or against) which these military modernizers move is still the one depicted by modernization theory. The main hurdles in the path to modernization continue to be the "individualistic

¹⁶¹ McAlister claims that civic action programs are "based on the experience of British, American, and Philippine forces operating against Communist irregulars in southeast Asia" (McAlister 1964).

character of the Hispanic temperament,” the “Hispanic tradition,” and the “highly personalistic structure of Spanish (sic) society.” In other words, things that are “truly” Latin America are negative, and modernization is always something that comes from abroad, usually from a predictably specific place abroad.

[The Latin American military who] are academy-trained and have had advanced work in the United States rather than Europe... have the best technical preparation and the most lively intellectual curiosity; they are the least bound by tradition and are inclined to be idealistic. (McAlister 1964)

The pervasive presence of this argument in the texts we have been examining shows that Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara was much attuned to the discourse of political stabilization academics, or vice-versa.

Professor of Military Science at Arizona State University and Lieutenant Colonel of the US Army, Theodore Wyckoff also contributed to the subliterate of political stability in Latin America. He ranks Latin American countries according to their level of military political intervention in three categories: always, never, and occasionally.¹⁶² Wyckoff warns his readers that, in reality, most Latin American countries are in between two of these categories (1965). The main variables that explain the differences among countries are, according to him, size and population profile. Costa Rica and Uruguay belong to the never category because they are small, and their population is “homogeneously European” (sic), hence governing is not too complex. On the opposite side, the always countries tend to be also small, thus easily controlled by a small military

¹⁶² Wyckoff’s typology of military intervention was later appropriated by other authors in the field of political stability and military studies in Latin America (see Powell 1965; McAlister 1966).

elite, and composed mostly of “unassimilated Indian or Negro groups which have absorbed very little Western culture and which possess almost no political consciousness” (1965).¹⁶³

Wyckoff declares that his intent is to find solutions to Latin America's militaristic problem. In fact, however, his writing is guided by policy concerns. The tripartite typology is proposed as a preamble for determining how Latin American endemic militarism correlates with political modernization and, more importantly, stability. Wyckoff concludes his study proposing four theses. First, the role of the military depends on the political conditions of a particular country. Thus, a politically active military is rather a symptom of a country's “political immaturity” than intractable political disease. Second, which is basically a repetition of the first thesis, the military is only strong when the opposition is weak, that is, when the country's political system suffers from “political immaturity.” The third hypothesis is not directly related to the military, but it amounts to nothing less than a partial restatement of the first hypothesis: with the progressive acculturation of the lower classes, the political system will become more democratic and less elitist, i.e., with modernization democracy will naturally follow. Finally, Wyckoff argues that ...

... far from being a threat to democratic institutions [the military] may serve as a force to uphold and safeguard them. Constitutional provisions might even be rewritten so as to formalize this arrangement, making of the top uniformed officers a sort of *judiciary*, with power to interpret the rightness or wrongness of acts of the executive and the legislative branches of government. If this hypothesis should prove to be correct, democracy in such countries

¹⁶³ Wyckoff's “The Role of the Military in Latin American Politics” first appeared as an article in the *Western Political Quarterly* (1960). Of the same author see also “Communist Military Capabilities in Latin America: The Spectrum of Violence” (1963) and “The Defense of Latin America: the Changing Concept” (1964).

would have nothing to fear from the political role of the military (Wyckoff 1965, 275).

As outrageous and contradictory it might sound, Wyckoff does propose that democracy under military supervision is desirable for Latin America. The solution is rather similar to the one proposed by Johnson and McAlister, with the possible difference that Wyckoff dares to suggest that the military's supervising power over both executive and legislative should be perpetuated as a constitutional principle.

One should note that, for Wyckoff, Westernization is a prerequisite to democracy. According to him, the absence of military intervention in Latin American countries correlates with the level of "political acculturation" of their populations; or, as he phrases it, "political acculturation ...draws the teeth from the forces which might imperil it" (1965, 275). Wyckoff's ethnological account of Latin America resembles modernization theory's definition of transitional society, with societies ranked according to their degree of acculturation. But he adds a racist component to it by claiming that the "homogeneously European" populations of Latin America are prone to civil government, whereas "unassimilated Indian or Negro groups" (i.e., non-whites) are the breeding ground of militarism. Racial asymmetric opposition is indeed an insistent vestige.

Some pieces written on the subject of political stability in Latin America are openly geared toward policy advisement. John D. Powell's "Military Assistance and Militarism in Latin America" is a case in point. In this article, Powell identifies a basic contradiction between the long-term goals of Kennedy's Alliance for Progress, which aimed at promoting democracy and development in Latin America, and the short-term goal of the Military Assistance Program (MAP), which since the passage of the Mutual

Security Act of 1951 has been focused on deterring “communist penetration” in Latin America. Relying on the analysis of abundant quantitative data, he concludes that MAP in fact contributed to military intervention in politics in Latin America. Powell sums up his analysis stating that “this may be the hidden price tag on the anticommunist security which the United States seeks in the Western Hemisphere through the MAP” (Powell 1965, 388). Extending his analysis to Kennedy’s civic action programs, the author argues that the shift towards internal security contributed to enhancing the internal interventionist capabilities of the Latin American military, and thus to further undermine democracy in the region. That is, according to the author, the policy shift under Kennedy only contributed to exacerbate that contradiction.

Powell proposes a solution to this dilemma that could fare better than MAP in terms of fostering “political development” in Latin America, while maintaining the short-term goal of preventing communist penetration in the Hemisphere. He argues that since security is a political matter, the State Department, rather than the Pentagon, should be coordinating programs of military assistance. MAP should be reduced and combined with the Public Safety Program of the Agency for International Development (AID), which ...

...offers training and equipment to Latin American constabularies for this purpose; the training includes police administration, organization and management, rural and urban police operations, border control, investigative techniques, nonmetal riot control, communications, and records and identification. In addition, police equipment is provided, including communications, motor transport, and police-type weapons (Powell 1965, 390).

The correct combination of MAP and the Public Safety Program will depend on the profile of each country. Borrowing Wyckoff’s tripartite typology, Powell states that

in the never countries (civilian-dominated), MAP should be restricted to antisubmarine warfare, leaving the bulk of American military assistance to the Public Safety Program. In the always nations (military-dominated), MAP should be partially preserved while American economic assistance and the Public Safety Program should focus in setting up a civilian-controlled policy force independent from direct military control (Powell 1965, 391).¹⁶⁴

Even though Powell acknowledges that US military assistance has contributed to boost the political stand of the military in Latin America, he thinks that this is an inevitable outcome prompted by Latin America's ingrained militarism.

It is widely accepted that there are several identifiable factors in the Latin American cultural milieu, such as machismo and a marked tendency toward fatalism, that affect both the military, and the political, environment in which the military operate (Powell 1965, 388).

In the footnote to this passage, Powell cites John Gillin in support of his conclusion, adding that machismo is a "highly valued type of masculinity characterized by sexual prowess, action-orientation, daring and self-confidence," which also carries "connotations of authoritarianism, as is found in many aggressively patriarchal cultures."

¹⁶⁴ For a historical study of the participation of the US government in setting up internal policing in Brazil see Martha Knisely Huggins's *Political Policing: The United States and Latin America* (1998). In the book, Huggins gives special attention to the collaboration of US officials, secret agents, and some civilians with the repressive apparatus mounted after the 1964 military coup, which included death squads, illegal imprisonment, and torture of political prisoners. Huggins argues that the strategy of using policing to fight communism in Latin America gained momentum with the turn toward counterinsurgency made by the Kennedy government. According to her, attorney general Robert Kennedy was a key figure in orchestrating this turn (1998, 101-111). Following Huggins account, one can see that that US collaboration with police repression in Brazil started before Powell published his piece (1965) and continued throughout the 1970s.

In other words, his conception is not very different from Wyckoff's, who, according to Powell's own words, "seem[s] to feel that the Latin American political and cultural environment somehow 'demands' military intervention in politics by its very Iberian nature."

Powell's approach to managing stability in Latin America could be called discretionary anti-communist repression combined with an alleged democratic concern. Countries that had shown some previous democratic vocation should receive training and aid for the creation of an anti-communist repressive police apparatus, whereas countries that have a "tradition" of military political activity should also receive such incentives combined with direct military cooperation. In this way, Powell gives a chance to the anti-communist civilian elements of democratically inclined countries to preserve "democracy," given that communist-tainted popular movements are duly repressed.

Another relevant contribution that does not hide its policy orientation is Willard F. Barber and C. Neale Ronning's *Internal Security and Military Power: Counterinsurgency and Civic Action in Latin America*, which was published under the auspices of the Merston Center for Education in National Security (1966).¹⁶⁵ In the opening page, the authors state that they are interested in examining how the United States, as a superpower, can enforce "its own brand of international peace and security" in its relationship with its Southern neighbors. In the same paragraph, the problem is rephrased into how to promote stability in countries that are experiencing rapid change.

¹⁶⁵ Willard Barber worked for the Foreign Service Office and later for the State Department always in posts dealing with Latin American affairs. C. Neale Ronning, is a political scientist who, according to the book's preface, "delved deeply into the sources and implications of political violence in a number of [Latin American] countries" (Barber and Ronning 1966, viii).

This argumentative move shows how easily imperialist ideology can be translated into the academic endeavor of studying modernization *cum* political stability. Coherently, the book provides a detailed evaluation of Military Civic Action (MCA) programs and their usefulness for meeting the security goals of American foreign policy in Latin America.

After reviewing the historical evolution of hemispheric security doctrine in the United States, Barber and Ronning conclude that the Latin American military had become the main means for defending the hemisphere against communism. Not because they could resist a direct Soviet attack, but because their "fiercely anti-communist" determination is useful against internal subversion. However, this does not make MCA in itself worthwhile. First, compared to MAP, provisions for MCA had always been small, and second, there is no reliable evaluation of the consequences and benefits of MCA. The authors argue that the lack of a trustworthy evaluation raises questions about the competence of the Latin American military to meet MCA's primary goals: to contribute to modernization and to improve the image of the military before population pockets that might be prone to agitation. Furthermore, MCA gives US officials little control over the actions of their Latin American counterparts:

For some time Latin America has been the testing ground. Latin American officers are trained by North Americans in how to combat the guerrilla - the instructors offering up a prayer that their pupils will find the new game more engrossing than the old one of "throw out the president," that they will not use learned techniques to aid the cause of insurrection, and, above all, that they will successfully distinguish the revolutionary guerrilla (badly infected with alien ideology) from the protestor against injustice and oppression (a goodly agrarian reformer) (Barber and Ronning 1966, viii).¹⁶⁶

¹⁶⁶ In this passage, the authors refer to MCA as a counterinsurgency program. This reveals how thin was the distinction between them.

But for Barber and Ronning, this is mostly wishful thinking. Contradicting other specialists on the subject, the authors doubt that the Latin American military can outperform civilians in building infrastructure and providing social services. Moreover, they claim that the infrastructure works implemented under MCA programs are not significant enough to play a decisive role in promoting modernization. As for the objective of winning the popular favor, they argue that military projects are usually little permeable to civilian participation and thus contribute little to strengthening civilian-military relations.

By enumerating MCA's few pros and many cons, Barber and Ronning end up downplaying the importance of those programs. Although they do not advocate the termination of MCA, the authors claim that MCA was oversold by US politicians and governmental officials as a panacea against communism and underdevelopment, inflating the expectations concerning its results. The problem with this different "revolution of raising expectations" is that once results fall short of expectations, MCA programs will be rapidly discredited. In fact, they note that this was already happening. Differently from the Kennedy administration, Lyndon Johnson had little interest in MCA and was leaning toward direct support of anti-communist military dictators and direct American military intervention. Barber and Ronning conclude that MCA programs should be tailored according to each national case, adding that the expectations toward those programs should be reassessed according to the relatively small importance they have within the broader scope of American security policy in the hemisphere.¹⁶⁷

¹⁶⁷ One of Barber and Ronning's complaints is that, in congressional hearings, appropriations for civic action are discussed in terms of "Latin America" as a whole, overlooking the specificities of each national case (Barber and Ronning 1966, 231).

Conclusion

As the analysis above indicates, the literature of political stability in Latin America departs from classical modernization theory without breaking with its core ethnological assumptions. Latin America continues to be a place characterized by the same blend of cultural, temporal, and sometimes racial asymmetric oppositions. Signs of such continuity can be seen in Huntington's definition of debile political systems, which he credits to the lack of modern cultural values. The problems Johnson identifies in the transitional Latin America society are attributed to the persistence of traditionalism – a term that is pregnant with temporal and cultural asymmetric oppositions. Furthermore, his “middle sectors” are nothing more than acculturated social groups that can only become the heralds of modernity because they liberated themselves from Latin American traditionalism by incorporating “Western” values. Following a similar formula, McAlister argues that acculturation is the only path toward democracy – that is, only by getting rid of the negative load of Latin culture and adopting “Western” values will those societies escape instability and underdevelopment. Finally, Wyckoff goes a step further by impregnating his typology of acculturation with racist hues. Through racial asymmetric opposition, Wyckoff's recurrent references to Latin America's “traditional” authoritarianism, militarism, and machismo acquire a deterministic tone that immensely contributes to the pessimism of his message.

Based on that diagnosis of the situation, those authors find that Latin America can only “expect” to be saved by anti-communist pro-US military, who acquired a penchant to progress and democracy from contacts with their American counterparts. The general picture is quite ironic given that the same military that are declared to be the potential

guarantors of democracy in Latin America can only play this role by seizing power, and thus eradicating democracy. Sensing this contradiction, Wyckoff recommends that Latin American democracies should transform military tutelage in a constitutional principle, a proposition that not only fails to address the contradiction but also clearly reveals the rank of democracy in political stabilization's list of priorities.

While the ethnologies are basically the same, the expectations produced by the mainstream modernization and the political stability literatures are quite different. While modernization theory sees Latin America's backwardness and cultural pathology as obstacles that the modernization process would overcome, the literature on political stability understands these same characteristics to be an eminent threat against American security. For its authors, Latin America has become the United States's "soft underbelly" – a major stage for to the fight against communism in the post-Cuban revolution Cold War context. In a sense, the Manifest Destiny's perception of the American continent as the American people's *Lebensraum* was, in the post-World War II context, gradually replaced by a conception of Latin America as a security buffer zone against communism. Of course that, beyond immediate Cold War security concerns, saving Latin America from communism was also a means to guarantee the continued influence and profitability of American capitalism in the region (Schoultz 1998).

But how could such similar ethnologies of Latin America produce such different expectations? This can only be understood as a product of the malleability of social scientific discourse. As it was shown in the previous chapter, "classic" modernization theorists have also warned against the perils of instability generated by the modernization process. However, they preferred to stress the possibilities and benefits of US-sponsored modernization and to downplay the factors that might not contribute to that agenda.

Conversely, the authors of the political stabilization literature are also enthusiastic about US influence in Latin America, thus the recurring argument about the beneficial contact between Latin American military and their democracy loving American counterparts. Nonetheless, they prefer to dwell on the prejudicial consequences of modernization, thus producing a general expectation of impending threat which justifies extreme measures such as military coups, intervention, counterinsurgency, and so on. Not coincidentally, this shift of emphasis within the theory of modernization followed a shift in governmental policy orientation.

Compared to most of the Latin American studies literature, the literature on political stability in Latin America displays an unusually overt nationalist stance, which can be partially explained by its overt policy bent. The authors above, without exception, agree upon the main contents and priorities of American national interests in Latin America: preventing the spread of communism. Cold War imperatives remain unchallenged and there is little pretense of hiding security interests behind allegedly value-neutral social scientific discourses. Some authors do display a certain uneasiness with what they see as contradictory goals of American foreign policy toward Latin America: promoting democracy and fighting communism through military aid. However, they suggest that this contradiction can be solved by the correct tailoring of military aid policies. Thus, the Latin American military would be turned into the agents of both modernization and political stability in the continent – an assessment that produced the most unfortunate consequences, mostly for the so-called Latin Americans, of course.

In the political stability literature synecdochical reasoning continues to be a much used literary resource. By arguing that militarism is ingrained in Latin American culture and that the military have played a crucial role in Latin America's history, social

scientists contribute to the stance of treating Latin America as a unit, and thus, to extending their ominous conclusions to all “Latin American” countries. This argument also serves to exempt Americans from any responsibility in fostering militarism in Latin America. After all, if militarism is part of the Latin American political nature, aiding the military would not constitute a significant interference in Latin American affairs.

Scholars were not the only ones to reason in such manner. As Barber and Ronning have shown, the US Congress addressed the problem of military aid to Southern countries not individually but as a whole, as a problem of US foreign policy toward Latin America.

6. Dependency studies

Además del objetivo general ya señalado, también se procuró mostrar, implícitamente, que considerar los problemas económicos o políticos de América Latina como un todo, sin especificar las diferencias de estructura y de historia que distinguen las situaciones, países y momentos, dentro del conjunto constituye un equivoco teórico de consecuencias prácticas peligrosas.

Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto

In this chapter we assess the trend of the Latin American studies literature that became known as “dependency studies”¹⁶⁸. Probably the most sweeping critique to modernization theory within Latin American studies to date, dependency entered the American academic milieu as an import from “Latin America.” The patterns of transnational academic crosspollination and influence that gave birth to dependency “theory” can only be sorted out through a detailed study of the reception of works by academic communities.¹⁶⁹ Even though we do not intend to make such a complete study here, some crucial information about the production of dependency’s original contributions and their reception in the United States shall be considered.

Before sorting out patterns and paths of academic exchange, I should state once more that this study is restricted to the analysis of social scientific works on Latin America produced in the United States. This choice has both theoretical and methodological reasons. The whole study rests on the hypothesis that Latin America has been conceptualized by Americans through forms of asymmetric opposition. Given the massive output and institutional structure of Latin American studies, we have

¹⁶⁸ Hereby also referred to as “dependency.”

¹⁶⁹ A general introduction to the philosophical basis of reception theory can be found in Robert C. Holub’s *Reception Theory: a Critical Introduction* (Holub 1984).

hypothesized that the social sciences play a crucial role in the definition of Latin America in the US society. This institutional structure is nationally funded to produce a social science focused on national interests.¹⁷⁰ Moreover, the linguistic-pragmatic orientation of our approach asks for such restriction. Since concepts only exist through the usage of speaker/writers in a given linguistic community, that community must be our first and more important locus of investigation.

That being said, it should be added that in this particular section of the dissertation, some foreign sources must be examined. The focus here, however, shall not be on the original context in which these texts were produced but on the ways they were received by American academic professionals.

A brief survey of the primary and secondary literature shows that dependency theory "arrived" in the American academia in two successive waves. First, in the late 1960s through the influential work of Andre Gunder Frank, and later, throughout the 1970s with the slow reception by American scholars of the work produced by "Latin American" dependentistas. As J. Samuel Valenzuela and Arturo Valenzuela observed in 1978,

it is revealing that the most important writings of the "dependency perspective" still have not been translated into English, over a decade after the first mimeographed drafts began to circulate in Santiago. Dependency analysis became known in the United States and Europe not through the writings of Latin Americans but through interpreters such as André Gunder Frank whose work differs substantially from that of important authors in the field such as F.H.

¹⁷⁰ For a detailed mapping of public and private funding sources for Latin American studies see *The University-Military-Police Complex: a Directory and Related Documents* (Klare 1970), Fagen (1977), Horowitz (1967: 1971), and Seybold (1982). For a recent exposition about the importance of national interests in defining research lines and grants see "Center Directors Discuss the Future of Latin American Studies" (Torres 2000).

Cardoso, O. Sunkel, and T. dos Santos (Valenzuela and Valenzuela 1978, 540).

Fernando Enrique Cardoso, and Enzo Faletto's *Dependencia y Desarrollo en América Latina: Ensayo de Interpretación Sociológica* is a case in point. While they wrote the piece roughly at the same time and place as Frank's, (Santiago, second half of the 1960s), their book was translated and published in English only in 1979, ten years after the publication of its first Spanish edition. In contrast, Frank's numerous works were promptly published in English, beginning with *Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America: Historical Studies of Chile and Brazil* in 1967.¹⁷¹

Many authors were received by the American academia as dependentistas from Latin America, among them Osvaldo Sunkel, Celso Furtado, Ruy Mauro Marini, Theotonio dos Santos, Aníbal Quijano, Octávio Ianni e Florestan Fernandes. I chose to restrict the analysis here to Cardoso and Faletto because they seem to have reached a wider audience in the United States than their "Latin American" counterparts (see Packenham 1982). Even Frank, who is considered a major contributor to the literature, ended up been overshadowed by Cardoso's leading reputation as a *dependentista*. Looking back (and with great disapproval) to more than a decade of history of dependency's reception in the United States, Robert A. Packenham declares:

Of all the writers who have used the dependency perspective, none has been more acclaimed and influential, especially in the United States, than the Brazilian sociologist Fernando Henrique Cardoso....Of all Cardoso's writings about dependency, none is more important than the book he wrote with the Chilean Enzo Faletto, Dependencia y Desarrollo en América Latina (1969). For many, it is the locus classicus of the dependency literature (Packenham 1982,).

¹⁷¹ A revised and enlarged edition was published in 1969.

Packenham follows with a list of “celebrated” Latinamericanists who ascribe Cardoso the same capital importance.

This gap between the two waves of dependency consumption is partially related to the degree of foreignness of their respective authors and original texts. Cardoso was a Brazilian professor of sociology exiled in Chile and Faletto a Chilean intellectual. Both were influenced by French sociology and the economics of Raúl Prebisch and Celso Furtado. Their original text was written in Spanish. Frank, on the other hand, was a German émigré to the United States who graduated in economics from the University of Chicago and started his academic carrier as a “conventional” economist and Sovietologist. He latter taught economics and social sciences at Iowa State, Michigan State, and Wayne State Universities before sojourning at the University of Brasília, the University of Chile, and the National University of Mexico. Frank explicitly admits that “he went to Latin America a liberal, and rapidly became a revolutionary (see Foster-Carter 1976, 176). Whereas some commentators have preferred to call him a popularizer of Latin American-based dependency studies in the United States, others also see him as an intellectual heir of an American Marxist tradition that includes Paul A. Baran and Paul Sweezy (Valenzuela and Valenzuela 1978).

In the following section, I will first examine the way Frank, and Cardoso and Faletto conceptualize Latin America in their most well-received contributions, and then assess the reception of their work in the American academy.

Andre Gunder Frank

Frank's unrelenting attack against modernization theory purports to rebut modernization's main premises. First, that the premise that underdeveloped countries experienced no significant historical change, and thus, that their underdevelopment corresponded to the perpetuation of backwardness and traditionalism. Frank argues that:

... our research indicates that these countries do have a history, and that their underdevelopment has been produced by the development of mercantilism and later, industrial capitalism (Cockcroft, Frank et al. 1972, xi).

Second, he seeks to rebut the premise that Latin American society is divided in two sectors, one modern, urban and capitalist, and another rural, backward, and sometimes called "feudal." According to Frank, the rural regions of Latin American countries have been an integral part of the capitalist economies of those countries, serving as "internal colonies" to the more industrialized regions, whose dynamics of growth, in turn, depended on metropolitan capitalism.¹⁷² The underdevelopment of those regions is not an anachronistic survival of traditionalism but a product of the development of internal metropolises. Thus, underdeveloped societies should be understood as a whole rather than as split in two halves that are functionally unrelated (one modern and one anachronistic)

¹⁷² Frank uses the term "metropolis" (as opposed to satellite) to refer to the developed capitalism. In the world capitalist system, the leading industrialized countries are the metropolises. At the same time, within satellite countries a relation metropolis/satellite also exists between the industrialized and rural areas (Frank 1969).

This long relationship between the now underdeveloped and now developed countries within the same historical process did not affect only the export enclave in the underdeveloped countries, as the almost universally accepted and just as empirically and theoretically erroneous "dual" society or economy thesis has it. On the contrary, this historical relationship transformed the entire social fabric of the peoples whose countries are now underdeveloped, just as in the developed countries (Frank 1972, 348).

Third, modernization theorists have argued that diffusion of capital, culture and technology from the developed capitalist countries is a crucial factor in the industrialization of satellite countries. But Frank demonstrates through the analysis of historical evidence that satellite countries tend to develop economically more rapidly when ties with metropolitan capitalism are weakened, i.e., during the Great Depression and the two World Wars. However, when the ties of dependence are reestablished, and satellite countries are reintegrated to their dependent function in the world capitalist system, their economic dynamism recedes (Frank 1972, 7; Frank 1972, 327).

And fourth, modernization theory has classified the underdeveloped areas of Latin America as precapitalist. Frank provides the following rejoinder:

The argument of a precapitalist stage is used by many scholars, even Marxists, to justify the supposed need for reform, or a bourgeois revolution, to bring Latin America into the capitalist stage of history. We will show, however, that the allegedly precapitalist, feudal, or backward parts of Latin America (which also can be termed *internal colonies*) both reflect and contribute to Latin America's ongoing, thoroughly capitalist underdevelopment (Cockcroft, Frank et al. 1972, xi-xii).

One cannot avoid noticing that Frank's assault on modernization theory is both theoretical and semantic. That is, the author strives to show that modernization was not only wrong as a set of premises and hypothesis, but also misguided in its conceptualization of the very problem of development. This is explicit in his criticism of

the concept of “underdevelopment,” which is crucial to modernization’s temporally loaded ethnology. Frank claims that the developed countries of today were never underdeveloped, but only undeveloped, adding that “no country was ever in an original state of underdevelopment.” He goes on to show that “underdevelopment” is not a simple absence or negation of development, but a condition that results from transforming a self-sufficient undeveloped economy into a dependent one so that it serves the needs and markets of the developed capitalist countries..

Through this move, Frank subverts the basic temporal asymmetric opposition that founds modernization theory. Now development and underdevelopment are conceptualized as parts of the same problem. For Frank, underdevelopment is not a product of historical paralysis but of a process he calls “the development of underdevelopment” (Cockcroft, Frank et al. 1972, 23).

This criticism is extended to the use of the term “feudal” in describing Latin America and its regions. Frank claims that the regions that are today deemed feudal by modernization theory were the first ones to be integrated to the world capitalist system, adding that the relations and conditions reproduced in those regions have been functionally integrated to that system ever since. Hence, the author denies that economic inequality should be understood as a sign of historical handicap. According to him, the European world expansion that started in the fifteenth century has incorporated most of the world into a “single stream of world history” (Frank 1972). The underdeveloped and the developed areas of the world have been sharing the same history for centuries: they belong to the same time. Although through a different vocabulary, Frank’s rejection of the asymmetrical character of the historical handicap argument is patent.

This entire approach to economic development and cultural change attributes a history to the developed countries but denies all history to the underdeveloped ones (Frank 1972, 346).

His awareness of the fundamental temporal asymmetries that support modernization theory is once again displayed in his dismissal of developmental stage theories.

It is generally held that economic development occurs in a succession of capitalist stages and that today's underdeveloped countries are still in a stage, sometimes depicted as an original stage of history, through which the now developed countries passed long ago. Yet even a modest acquaintance with history shows that underdevelopment is not original or traditional and that neither the past nor the present of the underdeveloped countries resembles in any important respect the past of the now developed countries (Frank 1972, 3).

By rejecting modernization theory's temporal asymmetric opposition, Frank also avoids confining the problem of development/underdevelopment within self-contained national borders. Both underdeveloped and developed countries are said to share the same world, the same international capitalist system. The identification of feudalist survival and spatial isolation is at once demolished. For Frank, underdevelopment appeared exactly because satellite countries were neither feudal nor isolated (Frank 1969, 221-30). Frank's notion of internal colonization allows him to claim that, for example, even parts of the United States were underdeveloped (see Cockcroft. Frank et al. 1972, xix). Once the fixed spatial boundaries that modernization assumed to be immutable givens are confounded, the nationally based, culturalist theory of capitalist development loses its analytical worth. Frank's economic structuralism has little room for culturalist interpretations, including the ones based on national or religious identity (e.g., American, Western, Protestant, Puritan, Anglo-Saxon). Together with culturalism, the assumption

that modernization depends on the diffusion of values and technological expertise through contact between developed and underdeveloped also evaporates. Again by examining historical records, the author finds that the exact opposite is actually true, i.e., places where contact was more intense became more acutely underdeveloped (Frank 1972, 10).

Despite his encompassing conceptual critique of modernization theory, Frank continues to use the term “Latin America.” What are the consequences of that choice? First, in his text, the concept is not a site of explicit cultural or temporal asymmetric oppositions. The author repeatedly says that his analysis of the development of underdevelopment in satellite countries applies to Latin America as well as to Africa and Asia. Moreover, metropolises and satellites are complementary parts of the whole world capitalist system and not a pair of concepts created by simple opposition.¹⁷³ Frank sometimes suggests that Latin American countries share a common history of colonialism and “satellitization,” that is, they were first colonized by metropolises that later also became satellites of other metropolises. However, he also says that this common past is also shared with other post-colonial sites of the world that are not Latin American.

Most of the time, the author uses “Latin America” to designate a geographic region. It can be argued that, by getting rid of cultural and temporal asymmetries, Frank ends up reducing the semantic field of “Latin” to a minimum. Nevertheless, the semantic field of a concept can hardly be monopolized by a single author or even a single approach. In order to succeed, Frank’s radical semantic reduction of Latin America had to become hegemonic to the point of eliminating or overpowering competing definitions.

¹⁷³ Many metropolitan features are reproduced in the satellites and vice-versa.

both in academic circles and in society at large. As we are going to see, neither Frank nor dependency theory as a whole achieved this hegemonic status. In following sections, we shall demonstrate that despite Frank's effort, the concept of Latin America continued to be a site of racial, cultural, and temporal asymmetric oppositions.

Frank's academic attitude greatly differs from the narrow policy orientation of previous modernization theorists. While modernization theorists tended to concentrate on policy "questions" and to treat academic debates in a rather cursory manner, Frank spent a great deal of his writings revising and criticizing the American literature on economic development that preceded him. The lengthy essay entitled "Sociology of development and underdevelopment of sociology" (Frank 1972) best exemplifies the scope of his criticism. Using the rhetorical tactic of appropriating the categories of the enemy to prove him wrong, Frank borrows from Manning Nash a scheme that divides the academic field of economic development into three approaches: ideal-typical, diffusionist, and psychological.¹⁷⁴ The ideal-typical approach has two subtypes: pattern-variable theories, such as Berthold Hoselitz's,¹⁷⁵ and developmental stage-theories, which have in W. W. Rostow their most influential example. He identifies the diffusionist trend with the work of Martin Bronfenbrenner and Daniel Gamick, particularly with their contributions to the *Journal Economic Development and Cultural Change*. Finally, the psychological approach is represented by Everett Hagen and David McClelland. Based

¹⁷⁴ Nash himself is an economic development theorist, who Frank identifies with the psychological approach also adopted by Everett Hagen and David McClelland (Frank 1972, 390).

¹⁷⁵ For an examination of Seymour M. Lipset's employment of Talcott Parson's pattern-variable concepts to the analysis of modernization in Latin America see Chapter 4.

on the same analysis sketched above and on a great deal of empirical evidence, Frank argues that each one of these approaches to political development is theoretically unsound and empirically false, adding that policies based on those theories can never succeed in producing any sort of development but rather the development of underdevelopment.

Frank's condemnation of modernization theory is not strictly academic. He also accuses policy scientists of nepotism, of producing justifications for the invasion of the Bay of Pigs, the displacement of millions of Vietnamese, the napalming and bombing of their country, and of covering all these atrocities under the mantle of humanitarian development policy (1972, 331). Many names are indeed named.

Despite his biography and his commitment to tackle a whole interdisciplinary field of American academia, Frank at times defines himself as a Latin American economist (Frank and Bonilla 1972, 305). He also tries to present his contribution as a call not for sound policy making but for direct political action in favor of Latin American national liberation. In an article entitled "Who is the enemy?" Frank discusses revolutionary tactics and strategy. Resorting to Leninist political vocabulary, he claims that the national bourgeoisie is the tactical immediate enemy of revolution whereas imperialism is the strategic enemy.

Frank's reading of the revolutionary situation frontally challenged the mainstream interpretation of the problem of revolution in underdeveloped countries held by communist parties worldwide. According to this vision, capitalist development is a necessary precondition for communist revolution. Hence, communists concluded, in underdeveloped countries a tactical alliance with the national bourgeoisie must be the first step towards liberation. Frank correctly identifies in this Marxist assessment a form

of developmental stage theory that, like liberal stage theories, attributes underdevelopment to isolation, feudalism, and backwardness. By proving this assessment wrong, Frank also wants to show that mainstream communist tactics is strongly misguided. After all, since the national bourgeoisie is a local agent of imperialist exploitation, and thus a crucial element in the reproduction of underdevelopment, Frank claims that such an alliance would be self-defeating (see Frank 1972). In sum, Frank's theory of dependency challenges both the American-based modernization theory and the mainstream communist theory of revolution.

Cardoso and Faletto's brand of dependency

In this section, we will examine the original arguments presented by Cardoso and Faletto in *Dependencia y Desarrollo en América Latina: Ensayo de Interpretación Sociológica*. (1969),¹⁷⁶ then we shall assess some features of the reception of dependency theory by American academia.

Differently from Frank, Cardoso and Faletto do not identify modernization theory, then the leading approach to the problem of development in underdeveloped societies in American academia, as their only intellectual foe. They do criticize modernization theorists such as Hoselitz and Rostow, but they are also much concerned with discussing previous theories of development created by other *dependentistas* and authors working around ECLA. Cardoso and Faletto claim that previous dependency studies have put too

¹⁷⁶ Published in English as *Dependency and Development in Latin America* (Cardoso and Faletto 1979).

much stress of structure and external control.¹⁷⁷ However, they claim, since the point is to change the given situation of domination, understanding structures is not sufficient. One has to also grasp the way structures change through time. The authors claim that their own approach, which they named “structural-historical, accomplished just that. Cardoso and Faletto agree that social and economic structures limit the possible courses of action, however, they add that those structures are also sites of contradictions and opportunities that can be exploited by social actors in search of change. These structures of dependency are both international and national and can only exist through domination, which is, according to them, eminently political. It is through the political arena, therefore, that structures of dependency can be preserved or changed. Conversely, the study of structures of dependency in a particular national setting can help understand national politics, society, and economic history. This ambitious project has been ably described by a commentator as an effort to not only juxtapose politics and economics but to “concretely link” them (Font 2001).¹⁷⁸ Cardoso and Faletto also speak of concepts and the way they have been misused in current theories of development. Like Frank, they extend their effort from criticizing theories to conceptual revision. They are particularly critical of the dualist opposition between “traditional” and “modern.” The authors realize that the concept of “traditional” is a mere unspecific negation of an idealization of the “modern,” and, hence, a poor analytical tool that misrepresents the historical processes

¹⁷⁷ Cardoso later criticized Frank’s version of the dependence approach for reproducing the same type of structural determinism of previous dependentistas, and thus, overlooking the historical specificity of each dependent situation (Cardoso 1977).

¹⁷⁸ In another text, Cardoso has called for a rejection of the study of politics and economics as compartmentalized disciplines and defended a return to political economy (Cardoso 1977)

through which present developmental inequalities were created (1969, 12). The so-called traditional societies have not been frozen in time, on the contrary, since their creation; they have been integrated into the world capitalist system, first as colonial appendages, then as peripheral markets, and finally, in some cases, as industrialized peripheries. That is, the internal social, political, and economic structures of those societies indeed changed, and those changes should be understood in relation to the evolution of their role in the world capitalist system. However, the dualistic opposition modern/traditional is impervious to historical context for it assumes the universality of a model of European development, which according to the authors is neither universal nor a good description of the process of economic development that took place in most European countries (1969, 14-16). Finally, this dualistic conceptualization poorly describes the inner structure of dependent Latin American societies. For the sectors that look “traditional” have actually been functionally integrated to the most developed sectors of those societies, either as producers of raw materials or suppliers of cheap labor (1969, 12). In order to clearly establish their critical distance from the social scientific usage of the concepts of “*tradicional*” and “*moderno*”, Cardoso and Faletto always use them in quotes.

Embedded in Cardoso and Faletto’s criticism of the traditional/modern dualism is a rejection of temporal asymmetric opposition. In historical terms, the problem of underdevelopment must be understood according to the synchronous relation between central and peripheral societies and not as an internal capacity of a society to mimic a universal developmental pattern. Consequently, if underdevelopment is a product of that historical relation of subordination, it cannot be confused with lack of development.

In this sense, there must be a distinction between the situation of underdeveloped countries and that of countries that lack development... In this present essay, it is just necessary to indicate that ... the latter refers in historical terms to the situation (ever more rare) of economies and peoples that do not have market relations with the industrialized countries. (1969, 22)¹⁷⁹

The assumption of spatial and historical isolation, so dear to modernization theory's characterization of underdevelopment, is shattered. In fact, the authors redefine the concept of "underdevelopment," discarding the temporally asymmetrical overtones of "absence," "retardation," and "primitivism." For them, rather than lack of development, "underdevelopment" is a form of development produced by hierarchical (asymmetrical) relations of domination: while the industrialized countries in the center of the world capitalist system can be said to be interdependent, the periphery must be characterized as dependent. Even though the condition of dependency allows for a wide range of developmental forms (from agricultural enclave to industrialization), it falls short of producing self-sustained development, remaining structurally dependent on the importation of foreign capital and technology.¹⁸⁰

Despite making extensive usage of the term "Latin America," Cardoso and Faletto avoid defining underdevelopment in cultural terms. Their reliance on structural economic variables leaves little room for musings about ingrained values and customs. As a result, they produce no encompassing theory of underdevelopment in Latin

¹⁷⁹ Translate from the original in Spanish by me.

¹⁸⁰ One could reasonably argue that given that the development of Europe and of the United States was supported by the exploitation of the rest, the idea of self-sustained development is false, a fabrication -- something that the so-called developed countries never actually achieved. Differently from Frank, however, Cardoso and Faletto were not interested in painting the "development of underdevelopment" as an inexorable outcome of the world capitalist system.

America. Instead, they present a typology of forms of underdevelopment based on degrees of dependency. First, there is a basic division between economies where national ownership of the productive system was preserved (national dependency), and economies of foreign enclaves. The former type is subdivided in cases where industrialization ensued and cases where agricultural sectors maintained economic preeminence. The enclave economies can be based on either agricultural activity or mining. Each case enables a different set of social and economic relations both internal and external to the nation. The authors claim that even though the situation of dependency is marked by economic structural limitations that diminish the degree of national autonomy, the range of responses can never be determined a priori. In sum, in the end, the unity of analysis is the nation state and not Latin America.

On the other hand, however, as the title of the book indicates, the authors strive to speak about Latin America. Although they focus on national cases, they frame their comparative analysis within Latin America. This can be partially explained by their institutional location at the moment the text was produced: the ECLA. In the preface they wrote to the first English edition of the book, published ten years after it first came out in Spanish¹⁸¹, Cardoso and Faletto declare:

We wrote this book in Santiago, Chile, between 1965 and the first months of 1967. At that time, we worked at the Latin American Institute for Economic and Social Planning, a United Nations organization which originated from the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA). Our purpose was to show specifically how social, political, and economic development are related in Latin America (Cardoso and Faletto 1979, vii).

¹⁸¹ Although the book did not become available for the larger monolingual English speaking audience until 1979, Latinamericanists, many of them with proficiency in Spanish, started to cite the work already in the early 1970s.

Differently from Frank, who explicitly downplays the specificity of Latin America in his theory of dependence, Cardoso and Faletto never abandon the goal of making sense of Latin America. Even though they insist on the differences among countries, regions, and economies, Cardoso and Faletto also present their findings in terms of Latin America. In other words, the task of producing knowledge about Latin America seems to be an a priori given. In fact, regardless of their disposition to theorize about Latin America, the institution in which they were employed focused on producing just such knowledge.

Cardoso and Faletto's situation was pregnant with ironic overtones. On the one hand, ECLA had since the 1950s become a center of critical reaction against developmental theories imported mainly from the United States and produced by the same policy social scientists that we have studied in the previous chapter (Font 2001)¹⁸². On the other, however, the institutional structure of the UN and its developmental agencies followed the geopolitics of the Cold War traced by the American intelligentsia. In that geopolitical map, "Latin America" was defined as an underdeveloped area, hence in need of developmental policies (see Escobar 1995). It should be noted, however, that *Dependencia y Desarrollo en América Latina* presents no policy solutions to the problem of underdevelopment in Latin America. In fact, most of the text is dedicated to proving that dependency has been deleterious to the development of Latin American countries. The countries that managed to sustain a higher degree of relative autonomy were the ones

¹⁸² For a detailed history of ECLA see Gert Rosenthal's "The contribution of the economic commission for Latin America and the Caribbean to the United Nations intellectual legacy" (Rosenthal 2002).

that developed the most. A rough lexical analysis of the text shows that “dependency” (*dependencia*) is always equaled with “heteronomy” (*heteronomia*), and both are contrasted with “autonomy” (*autonomia*). Moreover, the locus of the opposition autonomy/dependency is the nation state and not Latin America as a whole.

On the biographical level, Cardoso had moved to Chile to escape the persecution of recently established military dictatorship in Brazil. Thus, we find him writing about the need of national autonomy but employing the conceptual framework of imperial domination. But there was also another important element separating Cardoso and Faletto from Frank: the goal of achieving development within capitalism. While Frank concludes that the development of underdevelopment can only be stopped with a complete severance from the world capitalist system, brought about by a popular revolution, Cardoso and Faletto prefer to stress the possibility of development under dependency situations and the desirability of pursuing that route in the case of Latin America. In sum, the difference here is not properly theoretical but politico-strategic.¹⁸³ Not surprisingly, Frank continued to be identified as a radical leftist intellectual while Cardoso went on to pursue a political career in Brazil and was eventually elected president in 1995, backed by a center-right political alliance.

The reception of dependency theory in the United States

The reception of dependency theory in the United States was wide and varied. The amount of text produced by American scholars on the subject is so large that we can

¹⁸³ Cardoso’s political position has increasingly shifted to the center since the publication of *Dependencia y Desarrollo en América Latina* (see Cardoso and Font 2001).

only risk pointing to some general characteristics here. Before delving into textual analysis, however, we should address some contextual issues that conditioned this reception.

The political moment in which it occurred, the early 1970s, differed considerably from the context of previous modernization theory. Until the mid 1960s, the American establishment managed to produce a hegemonic support for governmental Cold War policies, both internal and foreign. Dissenters were effectively silenced, isolated, defunded, or otherwise reduced to a position of insignificance.¹⁸⁴ Nonetheless, events such as the Civil Rights Movement and the Vietnam War ended up cracking this hegemony and generating a barrage of criticism against American domestic and international policies. Riding this domestic wave of self-criticism, the American left started to gain some public recognition. The breach between critical social sectors and government was further broadened as its policies moved increasingly to the right, from Kennedy's Harvard-educated liberalism, to Johnson's timid Cold War militarism, to Nixon's hawkish Kissingerian realism.

This ideological split also was reflected in academia, with the appearance groups of dissenters with a more radical or left wing orientation, particularly among the new generation of scholars that graduated from American universities in the 1960s. In this context, Latin American studies also became a stage for dissent and radical scholarship. Interestingly, this occurred when funding for Latin American studies was on the rise.¹⁸⁵

¹⁸⁴ See the growing literature on the persecution of left-wing intellectuals in American universities, both private and public (Sanders 1979; Melanson 1983; Mueller 1985; Richards 1986; Chomsky 1997; Lowen 1997).

¹⁸⁵ The Joint Committee of the Foreign Area Fellowship Program "Report of Activities" states that in the 1960-70 period Latin American studies received more than \$40 million in funds from both government and private foundations. Richard R. Fagen observes that

Dissenters did not form a unified front, and their strategies of dissent assumed different forms, some more militant, some more academic. In the first category we can place NACLA (North American Congress on Latin America), which started with the mobilization of a group of American intellectuals, mostly Latin Americanists, against the American invasion of the Dominican Republic in 1965, and shortly developed into an militant institution against American imperialism in the continent, denouncing actions by both government and private corporations. In 1974, Marxist and other leftist Latinamericanists founded the journal *Latin American Perspectives*, which provided space for new attempts to match scholarship with radical political stances. Eventually, dissenters also assumed key positions in the profession's institutional mainstream: the Latin American Students Association (LASA) and its journal, the *Latin American Research Review*. LASA was founded in 1966 by "old school" Latinamericanists such as John Johnson, Kalman Silvert, Federico Gil, Richard Morse and Howard Cline (see Johnson 1984; Gil 1985; Safa 1985). Nevertheless, during the vertiginous growth of the profession in the late 1960s and early 1970s, a swarm of young scholars entered the association, among them many leftists and sympathizers of dependency studies (see Packenham 1992, 268-297). They soon started to occupy elected administrative posts in the association and promote what Robert Packenham, one of the most zealous critics of dependency and its reception, has called the politicization of LASA's activities.

this estimate excludes funding through AID or other governmental programs and agencies, funds from international agencies, and financial support directly granted through the university system. Making use of alternative sources of information, Fagen concludes that "US colleges and universities were spending no less than an average of \$40 million annually during the 1960s on the direct costs associated with Latin American studies programs" (1977).

According to Packenham, this new orientation first appeared in the form of internal criticism. During the conference on Inter-American relations that took place in Lima in 1972, some Latinamericanists called for new types of social science work and organizational forms which should be more critical, anti-status quo, and more directly linked to social action (1992, 271). Packenham claims that those concerns were incorporated by LASA as institutional principles, and have been dominant from Richard R. Fagen's presidency (1974-76) to Helen I. Safa's (1983-85) and beyond. In order to prove his point, he quotes from Safa's end-of-term speech:

Some see [LASA] as a purely academic organization, designed to bring together scholarship on Latin America through our congresses and publications. Certainly, this is a central function of LASA, and was probably the central function of the founding members of the association . . . At the same time, however, some members of LASA feel that we need to take a more activist position regarding events in Latin America. They feel we should not simply study events and issues in Latin America, but attempt to assist and participate in the process of social change ... My LASA presidency has clearly been activist rather than purely academic . . . I am prepared to defend this policy against charges of partisanship and politicalization [sic]. As an academic, I have always felt committed to speaking out on issues of concern to me, particularly where I felt I had some special expertise. As president of LASA, I felt this need even more deeply, because of the visibility and respect the association enjoys in most Latin American scholarly circles, both in the United States and abroad. If we wish to continue to earn this respect, especially in Latin America, we must support the principle of self-determination and return to civilian democracy in all the countries of our hemisphere ... I am confident that my successors in the LASA presidency will uphold these standards as fervently as I do.¹⁸⁶

Packenham accuses dependentistas and their American followers of undermining the American liberal tradition of separating the political and the scholarly vocations,

¹⁸⁶ As quoted in Packenham (1992, 272-273).

which is inspired on Weber's ethical ideas. He also charges them with constructing holistic theories that are not open to falsification, and thus are not strictly scientific, according to the teachings of Popper and Lakatos (1992, 50, 317). Ironically, the fact that Packenham managed to publish the claim that Cold War policy scientists separated politics from academe is in itself a proof that "falsificationism" is a poor notion to explain the pragmatics of the social sciences.

This is not the place and time to explore the contradictions of Packenham's highly politicized piece of scholarship. However, I want to call attention to a mistake in his argument that is directly related to our subject matter. Blinded by his scorn for leftist calls for activism, Packenham overlooks the dutiful determination with which this new generation of Latinamericanists engaged in scholarship. Contrary to their policy-oriented predecessors, who were more concerned with facts and actions, grants and results, and had a very short academic literature to debate with, dissenters were much more prone to engage in scholarly debates against their Latinamericanist forbearers, with and about dependentistas, and with other currents of the American left. Never before, texts on Latin America carried so many scholarly citations, theoretically elaborations, and methodological discussions. Although also engaged in empirically oriented studies, dependency scholarship in the United States gave a great deal of attention to the reception of dependency "theory", something that was done both through review articles and theoretical texts (e.g. Bodenheimer 1971; Chilcote 1974; Gilbert 1974; James 1976; Chilcote 1978; Halperin-Donghi 1982; Hentfrey 1982).¹⁸⁷

¹⁸⁷ Among the review articles of the literature, one finds a piece by Cardoso in which he discusses the "consumption" of his theory in the United States (Cardoso 1977).

The history of the reception of dependency theory in American academia must start with Frank's works in English. As we have seen above, his penchant for systematically reviewing and criticizing modernization theory can only be understood in the context of a debate that was, in the first moment, internal to the American academic milieu (Frank 1972).

Susanne Bodenheimer's "Dependency and Imperialism: The Roots of Latin American Underdevelopment" (1971) is an early document of this reception. In this article, she strives to propose an encompassing theory of imperialism based on dependency theory. Most of the text, however, is spent with an extensive and detailed presentation of dependency theory, from Prebisch to Theotônio dos Santos. Although she does not strongly rely on Frank, Bodenheimer agrees that a socialist revolution is the only solution for the problem of Latin American dependency. But while one can find some grounds for criticizing the idea of Latin America's coherence in the works of "original dependentistas", there are none in Bodenheimer's text. For the author, the condition of dependency provides coherence to Latin America as a whole, to such an extent that she rarely bothers to comment on any particular national case. Here an interesting movement takes place. We have seen that "original" dependency writings rely mostly on structural economics and sociology and have little room for culturalism. In fact, culture is not Bodenheimer's main theme. At the same time, however, culturally loaded vocabulary is generously employed by the author, particularly the qualifier "Latin" to construct noun phrases such as "Latin industrial bourgeoisie," "Latin society," "Latin underdevelopment, and dependency." This application of synecdochical reasoning is indicative of forms of cultural asymmetric opposition – something that Koselleck identified in the classical Greek notion of barbarian. In a context where modernization theory's culturalism was

still hegemonic, a greater concern with culturally impregnated vocabulary should be expected – particularly from someone who was siding with dependency studies.

The leaning of the American dependency literature towards scholarship is also seen in operation in some authors' efforts to apply the "concept" to the study of underdevelopment in regions other than Latin America (Girvan 1973), or to fashion a "theory of dependence" with universal explanatory validity (Lall 1975), a project that is not far from Bodenheimer's own theoretical attempt. However, neither Girvan nor Lall are, strictly speaking, Latin Americanists. A different case is presented in "A Preliminary Test of the Theory of Dependency," written by the Robert R. Kaufman et al. Here the authors submit a formalized construction of dependency theory to statistical testing, using data from all "Latin American" countries with the exception of Cuba, Haiti, and Venezuela. The authors argue that their choice allows the statistical "control of shared cultural characteristics and colonial experiences" (1975, 310). After running the test, they claim that some hypotheses generated by "dependency theory" are supported by data while some are not. Following a common trope of social scientism, they conclude asking for more data crunching, more systematic research, refinement and redefinition of concepts, and "clear-cut theoretical dimensions which would allow for the framing and testing of more complex multivariate hypotheses" (Kaufman, Geller et al. 1975). The aspect that interests us here is that beyond the scientist jargon, or better, through it, Kaufman et al. pass forward the basic epistemological assumption that Latin America objectively is a cultural entity, i.e., they present Latin America as if its cultural "unity" was not produced from the particular standpoint of another cultural self-understanding: the American. Kaufman et al. do not bother to name those shared cultural characteristics, which indicates that they assumed that their readers already knew them.

Even dependency sympathizers, such as Ivar Oxaal, Tony Barnett, and David Booth, who spouse political positions more radical than Kaufman's, Girvan's, or Lall's, insist on testing "Frank's ideas scientifically by applying them to new empirical situations, and to pursue alternative or complementary lines of theoretical inquiry where these appear fruitful or challenging" (Oxaal, Barnett et al. 1975). The volume edited by Oxaal et al. starts with a lengthy bibliographical review of the dependency literature written by Philip J. O'Brien: another document of a conscious reception. After covering many of the same *dependentistas*, O'Brien concludes on a critical note saying that, as a whole, the "literature" is full of inconsistencies and lacks coherence. Nonetheless, he concedes that:

The basic point it makes – that the interplay between the internal Latin American structures and international structures is the critical starting point for an understanding of the process of development in Latin America – is of vital importance.

The expectation of coherence suggests that O'Brien presupposed that there was such a thing as "a" Latin American theory of dependency. In fact, however, the unity of such theory is more a product of the reception of critical contributions to the sociology and economics of development made by authors from different countries over decades than a consistent product of a "Latin American" academic milieu (see Cardoso 1977). After all, although there was some circulation of publications and ideas among some Spanish speaking countries, such as Mexico, Colombia, Chile, and Argentina, there was no such thing as "a" "Latin American" academic milieu. Moreover, as the passage above indicates, O'Brien fails to see that for dependentistas such as Cardoso and Faletto, whose

contribution he analyses in detail, the “internal” is always national and not “Latin American.”

Published in 1976, the third issue of *Latin American Research Review* has a lengthy review of the dependency literature authored by C. Richard Bath and Dilmus D. James (1976). The authors classify *dependentistas* in two groups, radical and moderate, and also discuss part of the reception of their ideas in the United States. After charting the map of dependency and its reception, Bath and James come up with a set of suggestions to improve the quality of scholarship. One is to replace the name “dependency theory” by “linkage politics.”

Linkage politics is an approach that encompasses the basic components of dependency theory, but without the ideological predilections (sic) of the latter (Bath and James 1976, 33).

The passage does nothing less than reprimand radical dependentistas for being ideologically biased, counseling them “to consider themselves first as social scientists and secondarily as social engineers.” A clearer example of the shift away from policy engagement towards apolitical scholarship can hardly be found.

Crowning their assessment, Bath and James suggest that ...

Certain unique features of Latin America would have to be considered, such as personalismo and the fact that class identification within Latin America may be based on different criteria than in Western Europe or the United States (Bath and James 1976, 34).

In other words, instead of adopting a general definition of class to the study of Latin American society, they suggest that authors should try to redefine it taking into account the Otherness of Latin American culture. Such move would draw the teeth from class

analysis, transforming it into a study of cultural exoticism. Furthermore, it would certainly concur with the objective of depoliticizing dependency studies. Traces of old deeply ingrained ethnologies are often put to the use of the freshest political agendas.

Some *dependentistas* had the chance to see their comments on the American academic reception of dependency studies published in the pages of an American journal. Cardoso's "The Consumption of Dependency Theory in the United States" (Cardoso 1977) is probably the most revealing of these documents. One of his main quibbles is that many American social scientists endeavored to transform dependency into a formal empirically testable theory, something that he sees as a deviation from dependency studies' original purpose, which was, to help transform situations of "domination."

The divergence is not merely methodological-formal. It is, rather, at the very heart of [original] studies of dependency. If these studies do in fact have any power of attraction at all, it is not merely because they propose a methodology to substitute for a previously existing paradigm or because they open up a new set of themes. It is principally because they do this from a *radically critical* viewpoint... In these analyses, therefore, there is no presumption of scientific "neutrality." They are to be considered more "true" because they assume that, by discerning which are the historical agents capable of propelling a process of transformation and by providing those agents with theoretical and methodological tools for their struggles, these analyses thus grasp the meaning of historical movement and help to negate a given order of domination.... They are therefore *explanatory because they are critical*. (Cardoso 1977, 15)

One can hardly avoid hearing through these lines the echoes of Marx's call for interpreting the world in a way that would contribute to changing it.¹⁸⁸ Cardoso's

¹⁸⁸ Ironically, this criticism comes not from the most revolutionary of the *dependentistas*. Cardoso has been repeatedly identified as a reformist (Bath and James 1976; Chilcote 1984). His rejection of Frank's revolutionary solution to the problem of dependency is well known (Cardoso and Faletto 1979).

criticism of sterile scholarship might also be read as a call for a return to policy orientation. Nonetheless, given that policy is almost always implemented by national states and that his theory is highly concerned with national autonomy, it is hard to picture a proper place for American-based Latin American studies in his scheme. That is, a *radically critical* viewpoint that marries thinking and transformative action would have to engage primarily with the national subject¹⁸⁹, and, thus, have little use for a concept such as Latin America.

In fact, Cardoso failed to understand that academic activities are also subjected to structural financial, institutional, and political limitations that pertain to the national context in which they are produced. More specifically, he failed to acknowledge that the absence of a critical viewpoint in American dependency studies might be related to the way Latin American studies was constituted in the United States. What were the choices open to a person who decided to pursue a career in Latin American studies in the United States in that particular historical context? A turn towards scholarship and scientism may have been a solution that married the comfort of a well-funded academic carrier with a well-founded suspicion for policy involvement. And that did not exclude, in principle, participating in civil associations and political movements in support of particular political causes in “Latin America.” A combination of personal political convictions and

¹⁸⁹ The problem of the interplay between ideas and reality is the main theme of Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit* (1977). The same concern is present in Marx and in great part of the Marxist tradition, including the critical theory of the Frankfurt School and dependency studies. However, Marx and his followers distanced themselves from the political problem of the national state, often adopting internationalist viewpoints and/or sociologic and economic categories that deal poorly with politics. Few authors have returned to the question of thinking this interplay in the context of the national state. Franz Fanon adaptation of Hegel’s ideas to the political context of colonialism is an exception (Fanon 1965; Fanon 1967).

professional opportunities, in different proportions, also caused some Latin Americanists of that generation to leave the United States for good, and assume academic jobs in countries of the so-called Latin America.¹⁹⁰

This brief review does not aim at indicting all Latin Americanists who received dependency studies of being prey of sterile scholasticism. At the same time, one has to acknowledge that a penchant for furthering scholarly standards has become pervasive, even among authors that openly assume their leftist leanings, as in the case of those connected to the journal *Latin American Perspectives*.¹⁹¹ The work of Ronald Chilcote – the journal's managing editor since its foundation -- is probably the most emblematic example. An declared Marxist, Chilcote once predicted the advent of classless societies in Latin America and the breakdown of the American empire, which, according to him, could eventually lead to the demise of American capitalism (1974).¹⁹² However, the bulk of his contribution has been an effort to sort out the scholarly debate among different

¹⁹⁰ Telling the intellectual history of this generation of self-exiled Latin Americanists is a worthwhile project that is yet to be realized.

¹⁹¹ Described by its editor as a “non-sectarian scholarly journal on Latin America with a Marxist anti-imperialist viewpoint” (1983), *Latin American Perspectives* was founded in 1974, and ever since has been a conduit for leftist Latin Americanists, particularly Marxists. In his founding statement, printed in the journal's first issue, one reads: “while many bourgeois journals and scholarly associations dealing with Latin America prefer to disguise their support of the capitalist system in Latin America behind a façade of ‘academic neutrality’. *Latin American Perspectives* has no such abstract pretensions. We explicitly declare that nothing academic can ever be neutral and that all scholarship has a political function” (1974).

¹⁹² This opinion is stated in the introduction to *Latin America: The Struggle with Dependency and Beyond* -- a book edited by Chilcote and Joel C. Edelstein. With chapters authored by Susanne Jonas (Bodenheimer), James D. Cockcroft, Theotonio dos Santos, and James Petras, the book is a proof of the collaboration between *dependentistas* and American Marxists – another document of the reception of dependency in the United States.

theories of development: modernization, dependency, and Marxism (1974; 1974; 1978; 1982; 1984). Chilcote's concern with scholarship has also led him to write a book on the methodology of comparative politics, which is already in its second edition (Chilcote 1981; Chilcote 1995).

James Petras is another regular contributor to *Latin American Perspectives* (twelve articles and counting) that follows a Marxist orientation. In his contribution to an influential book he co-edited with Maurice Zeitlin early in his career, *Latin America: Reform or Revolution? a Reader* (1968), Petras analyzes the prospects of revolutions and guerrilla movements in Latin America with the clear intent of designing successful revolutionary strategies. The book is an early document of the collaboration between "Latin American" dependentistas and American Latinamericanists. In this context of reception, the rebuttal of temporal asymmetric opposition enjoyed a prominent place. In the opening chapter, "Seven fallacies about Latin America" (1968), the Mexican sociologist Rodolfo Stavenhagen attacks the assumption that Latin American societies were dualistic, that is, split into a capitalist and a feudal half. Like the other dependentistas, Stavenhagen strives to show through the analysis of economic and social historical data that most sectors of Latin American societies have been integrated directly or indirectly to the world capitalist system since the countries were European colonies. Following the same line of reasoning, the Argentinean historian Luis Vitale dedicates the entire second chapter of the book, "Latin America: Feudal or Capitalist" (1968), to showing that neither early-modern Spain nor Latin America were actually feudal.¹⁹³

¹⁹³ Vitale treats Latin America as if it were exclusively colonized by Spain. There is no mention to Brazil or Portugal in his text.

Surprisingly, however, *Latin America: Reform or Revolution?* also contains an old article by Merle Kling, “Towards a Theory of Power and Political Instability in Latin America,” which was originally published in 1956. Kling had made the championing of scientism the leitmotiv of his academic career as a Latinamericanist. During the ascension of modernization theory in the early 1960s, he became a strong supporter for the introduction of quantitative comparative approaches to the study of Latin America. These opinions are defended in a paper on the state of political science research on Latin America he presented in a meeting organized by the Joint Committee of Latin American Studies in 1963 (Kling).¹⁹⁴ The article that became a chapter in Petras’s book, “Towards a Theory of Power,” is one of the earlier efforts of his scientist crusade. Starting the text with a comparison between political science and the natural sciences, Kling claims that the former has yet to get rid of theoretical metaphysical speculations and abstractions in order to become a real science. He then shows how this should be done:

¹⁹⁴ The Joint Committee of Latin American Studies was appointed by the American Council of the Learned Societies and the Social Science Research Council in 1959. The Committee’s primary objectives were to “improve communications among those interested in research relating to Latin America, to consider ways in which the development of such research might be furthered, and to administer a program of grants for field research.” Financial support came from the Carnegie Corporation of New York, the Ford Foundation, and the Council on Higher Education in the American Republics (Wagley 1964, v). Among the 11-member political science group that gathered to discuss Kling’s paper at the meeting, there were two academics working full-time for the State Department, one employee of the Foreign Service, and one Lieutenant Colonel from the U.S. Army Special Warfare School at Fort Bragg (Fagen 1977, 23). Commenting on the meeting, Richard R. Fagen (1977) says that “in no other disciplinary group was the US government so generously represented.” The meeting on the state of Latin American studies research was preceded by another meeting on the subject of “continuity and change in Latin America,” sponsored by the Joint Committee and organized by John J. Johnson. From that meeting, Johnson edited the book of the same name, which we already discussed in the previous chapter.

Within a scientific framework, consequently, a theory of power and instability in Latin America must attempt to discharge at least four functions. (1) An adequate theory must serve "to reduce the degree of empiricism;" that is, it must place in a broad and meaningful context the apparently disconnected manifestations of instability in Latin America. (2) It must offer generalizations regarding the exercise of power and the prevalence of instability in Latin America which are compatible with the available evidence... (Kling 1968 (1956), 21)

The project of the article depends on the expectation that Latin America is a coherent object that must yield a specific "Theory of Power and Instability." The functions enumerated by Kling are in fact premised on such an expectation. In order to understand how this premise works within the argument, one should pay attention to the synecdochical interplay between the locative "in Latin America" and the adjectival "of" Latin America," which often denotes an essential characteristic. The first function declares that "manifestations of instability in Latin America" should be shown to be manifestations of instability "of" Latin America, that is, once placed in a proper "meaningful context," particular cases of instability in Latin America can be connected to reveal the essential unstable character of Latin America. The second function asks for drawing generalizations about the exercise of power and the prevalence of instability in Latin America that are compatible with available evidence. Nonetheless, since Kling had already called for a reduction of the degree of empiricism, one should question what would be the consequence of that action to the availability of evidence. The solution to this apparent conundrum, often found in the Latin American studies literature, consists in selecting from a sample of particular cases a sub-sample of typically Latin American characteristics. Of course that this procedure entails knowing beforehand what is typical of Latin America, which is, ironically, the objective of the social scientific effort. In sum, in the end, authors always find what they already knew.

Kling does not seem to realize that the premise of Latin American coherence is not subject to the “scientific” strictures of empirical testing. The criteria for sorting out what is “essentially” Latin American from what accidentally happens in Latin America is not apparent. Nevertheless, the results of his theoretical effort are promptly advanced:

Political instability in Latin America is distinguished by three characteristics: (1) it is chronic; (2) it frequently is accompanied by limited violence; (3) it produces no basic shifts in economic, social, or political policies (Kling 1968 (1956), 23).

The single most salient element of this “theory” is temporal asymmetric opposition. We learn that political instability in Latin America is chronic. In other words, Latin America is trapped in a historical cycle of violence. Unwittingly parroting Hegel’s trope about the unhistorical character of Oriental history, Kling also claims that Latin American instability does not produce actual change. While describing another function of his theory of political instability (see the penultimate quotation), he had already referred to the “relatively static elements in the Latin American environment,” a hint that brings to mind the theory of social dualism (so detested by dependentistas) and other allusions to historical handicap.

Armed with such theoretical insights, Kling authoritatively concludes:

Political instability in a Latin American country cannot be evaluated as a temporary deviation in a pattern of peaceful rotation in office (Kling 1968 (1956), 23).

The theory has come a full circle, and now is used to interpret “empirical” evidence: if the country is Latin American, the norm cannot be political stability. Exceptions must obviously be filtered out.

Now that some of the pitfalls of Kling's article have been exposed, its inclusion in Petras's book seems even more intriguing. One of the few insights that unify *dependentistas* is a rejection of blatant forms of temporal asymmetrical opposition, as the ones imbedded in conceptions such as the dual society, Latin American feudalism, and underdevelopment as lack of development. So what is the reason for including Kling's text in a reader that is mostly constituted by texts that deny those same insights ? Would that be a sign of academic pluralism?

That could be the case, for the book also contains an article by Frederick B. Pike in which he attributes Chile's lack of economic progress to the racist attitudes of the country's Europeanized elites against the mestizo and Indian lower class – a culturalist argument that is rarely current among Marxists and dependentistas. However, we cannot fail to notice that Petras is not immune to synecdochical reasoning. While commenting on Fidel Castro's successful revolution, the author notes:

The ease with which the Castro forces took power and the absence of any effective opposition by the middle class indicate the degree to which the Latin American middle class is dependent on the traditional military (Petras 1970, 52).

What makes the Cuban middle class typically Latin America? Why does that particular situation represent a middle class behavior that is typically Latin American? One cannot avoid perceiving in this passage the same line of reasoning Kling uses to advise his readers to expect the worst from Latin American countries: if that is not the case, then the country is not "being" Latin American. After all, things deemed to be typically Latin American must be negative, pathological. As we have already found, synecdochical reasoning is often a sign of the operation of asymmetric oppositions. Petras's suggestion

that there is “one” Latin American middle class and that that class is consistently dependent on a social sector named as “the traditional military” sadly confirms our findings.

Conclusion

In this chapter, we have examined some key contributions to dependency studies and their reception by American social scientists. We have also discussed some institutional and political developments that affected the profession of Latin American specialist. During the period in which dependency studies started being received, many young Latinamericanists became aware of the critical political implications of their work, which led to active criticism of both governmental policies toward Latin America and the contribution of some of their colleagues to the making of those policies. This new cohort of Latinamericanists relied more than the previous generation on standards of scholarship and on the same old sources of financing for their professional activities. That is, due to the conservative context of their profession, radical Latinamericanists emphasized scholarship in order to gain institutional acceptance and stability.

Nevertheless, institutional acceptance and stability can only be conquered through more institutional involvement, and that is not without consequences. The profession had always depended on resources and funds controlled by governmental and private institutions with direct or indirect interest in Latin America. We are not suggesting here that all research lines are directly dictated by these interests, after all the veil of academic freedom is an important ideological component of social scientific discourse and practice. Nevertheless, one cannot deny that Latin American studies have been structurally constrained by these interests. Thus, under this structural situation, an approach that

seriously challenged those interests (which have been shown an impressive degree of cohesion through the Cold War period) would have very limited chances of becoming hegemonic.

But if Latin American studies are indeed subjected to this situation of dependency, then Packenham's assertion about the hegemony of dependency studies must be questioned. If he is right, that must be because dependency scholarship has lost its bite and ceased to be a threat to major constituted interests; if he is wrong, it is probably because dependency studies have remained just one among many trends within Latin American studies. However, the world is not so black and white. As we have already suggested, in order to pursue their call for scholarship Latinamericanists have to "accommodate" their political agendas with the research agendas of sponsoring institutions. Institutional constraints end up producing a "field" where radical authors tend to be a minority whereas the center is occupied by the ones that make more institutional concessions.¹⁹⁵ In the end, the quest for scholarship might be seen as a symptom of both a loss of dependency's political edge and the isolation of radical authors.

As we have shown, the contributions of Frank and Cardoso and Faletto contained elements that could be used to radically criticize both the institutional underpinnings and academic output of constituted Latin American studies. However, dependentistas chose

¹⁹⁵ While commenting on the role of theory in comparative politics, Peter Evans argues that the viability of social scientific work does not depend on its theoretical precision but on its capacity to meet the practical demands of its "consumers and patrons." As a result, he adds, "(Research) agendas are powerfully shaped by the demands and constraints of consumers and patrons" (Kohli, Evans et al. 1996, 4). This assessment comes from an author who also contributed to the reception of dependency studies in the United States (see Evans 1979).

to focus on scholarship, leaving the institutional structure to thrive along the same pattern of close relations between funding and constituted interests. Despite being separated in two analytical categories, institutional constraints and theoretical choices are deeply interconnected. As we have already seen, the project of producing a social science of Latin America rests on the perception of radical opposition between an American Self and an Other in America. By opting to preserve Latin American studies, scholars contribute to the reproduction of that perception. Not coincidentally, although in small quantities, traces of synecdochical reasoning and asymmetric oppositions are present even in the arguments of some dependency sympathizers: those who for the most part reject these inferences. Given that forms of misrecognition and synecdochical reasoning were available in the everyday language and in other approaches to the study of Latin America, that was a predictable outcome of American dependency theory's quest for a theory of the true Latin American object.

Whatever the final verdict about the hegemonic status of dependency is, the reception of dependency in the United States did not succeed in expelling asymmetrical oppositions from Latin American studies. In the next section, we will witness the reinstatement of the same oppositions in a *grandiloquent* style by the sub-literature of Latin American studies known as corporatism.

7. Studies of corporatism

A Protestant civilization can develop its energies endlessly in a wilderness, as did the United States. A Catholic civilization stagnates when it is not in vital contact with the diverse tribes and cultures of mankind.

When feudal cultures are manufactured out of Europeans and Africans and Indians, the aristocrat of course has good reason to remember the "old country."

The founding of new societies. L. Hartz. (1964)

What is required, therefore, is a counterpart volume for Iberia and Latin America of, say, Hartz's *The Liberal Tradition in America*, a study which traces and analyzes these dominant political-cultural variables and provides us with that integrative view of the whole Iberic-Latin tradition that is so sorely needed.

Howard Wiarda, "Toward a Framework for the Study of Political Change in the Iberic-Latin Tradition: The Corporative Model." (1973)

Although studies of corporatism in Latin America¹⁹⁶ appeared simultaneously with dependency in the early 1970s, they were based on radically different assumptions about their object of study. In this section I will examine some of the most relevant contributions to that approach giving a special attention to the way the concept of Latin America is constituted, or better, is semantically constructed through theoretical activity. The analysis of corporatism will further our understanding of the Latin American studies literature, and provide us with more means to assess the state of the "discipline" in the present – something that will be done in the next chapter.

In Latin, *corpus* means "body." As a social scientific approach, corporatism is based on the premise that the biological organism is a useful heuristic metaphor to

¹⁹⁶ Hereby also referred to simply as "corporatism."

understand the workings of human societies. Compared to other trends of the Latin American studies literature studied so far, corporatism exhibits a great deal of conceptual and theoretical cohesion. This peculiar characteristic will be shown throughout our analysis, which starts with a text by Richard Morse, an author considered by other corporatist scholars as a major source for their ideas. Then the attention turns to two foundational texts of the corporatist literature: Ronald Newton's "On 'Functional Groups', 'Fragmentation', and 'Pluralism' in Spanish American Political Society" and Howard Wiarda's "Toward a Framework for the Study of Political Change in the Iberic-Latin Tradition: The Corporative Model." After assessing the tenets of the literature, I will examine a series of articles published in the *Review of Politics*, in which the approach is applied to the study of particular cases. Finally, I will discuss the fate of corporatism in Latin America and the enduring contributions it has made to the semantic field of Latin America.

Morse: precursor of corporatism in Latin America

Corporatism was not terribly innovative in its premises and core theories about Latin America. A brief examination of the literature shows that its authors relied on the work of a fairly consistent group of predecessors, who anticipated most of the arguments that corporatists later put to use. Richard Morse is probably the most influential of these predecessors, and "The Heritage of Latin America," a text originally written as a chapter to Louis Hartz's *The Founding of New Societies* (Hartz 1964), and later included by

Howard Wiarda in his “corporatism in Latin America” reader (1974; 1982), his most cited piece.¹⁹⁷

The arguments presented by Morse in “The Heritage of Latin America” are so similar to the ones later employed by students of corporatism, that a detailed analysis of the text should be forfeited in order to spare the reader from excessive repetition. However, it is important to lay out some basic elements of Morse’s contribution and its place in Hartz’s book.

The Founding of New Societies is divided in two parts: the first, “A theory of the development of new societies” is exclusively authored by Hartz, and the second, entitled “Five National Histories,” is composed of a series of case studies by other authors – among them Morse’s “The Heritage of Latin America.” Hartz’s text is mostly a historical theory of world civilization loaded with Hegelian and romantic overtones.¹⁹⁸ He portrays Europe as a cultural entity that generated three distinct cultural trends: liberalism, radicalism, and feudalism. According to Hartz, the constant conflict among those trends was responsible for Europe’s historical dynamism. Nonetheless, with the age of discoveries and colonialism, isolated cultural trends (fragments of Europe) were transplanted to other parts of the world – a process Hartz calls “the founding of new societies.” The United States was granted with liberalism, Australia and South Africa

¹⁹⁷ Authors such as Glen Dealy, Claudio Véliz and Kalman Silvert also anticipated some of corporatism’s tenets. Nonetheless, Morse’s influence is unrivaled.

¹⁹⁸ Author of the influential *The Liberal Tradition in America* (1955), Louis Hartz was one of the main exponents of the “consensus school” of American historiography. Hartz might be credited with contributing to the myth that liberalism is the essence of American political culture (Novick 1988; Smith 1997).

with radicalism, and Latin America with feudalism.¹⁹⁹ Once unable to interact with the others, each trend remained in a congealed state. Although Hartz claims that the fragments were impervious to historical transformation, one should notice that while he grants the United States a modern “tradition,” liberalism, Latin America receives medieval feudalism -- a fragment of the past that exerts its most reactionary influences without producing conflict. Hartz argues that all other fragments of Europe are “governed by the ultimate experience of the American liberal tradition” (1964, 4) -- a cryptic assertion he does not explain.

The second part of the book, “Five National Histories,” has essays about the United States, Australia, South Africa, Canada, and Latin America. This is a peculiar way of organizing this chapter of the book, all units, with the exception of Latin America, are national states. The reader might conclude that Hartz is not concerned with such “fine” details, but this organization follows a defined criterion: the romantic notion of equating nation with people. In other words, since Latin Americans are perceived by Hartz as one sole people, Latin America must have “one” national history. That is, the fact that human beings in “Latin America” constituted different nations, different political communities, and, thus, have distinct national histories, has no relevance in this scheme. Hartz’s nation is grounded on the premise of the cultural homogeneity and common racial profile of the Latin American people, i.e., of a Latin American *Volksgeist*. Romantic overtones of cultural and racial determinism are too loud to be ignored.

Morse roughly follows Hartz’s roadmap. His ethnology of Latin America combines extreme versions of cultural and temporal asymmetric oppositions. The

¹⁹⁹ Hartz identifies the spirit of liberal America with the ideas of John Locke, while Francisco de Suárez represents feudal Latin America.

perception of the Latin American as a catholic, and thus, as an ultimate Other of the American Protestant is fundamental to him.

Just as there are political and psychological assumptions which characterize Protestant societies and transcend, or underlie, the circumstances of time and place, so may we expect there to exist a common ethos within which Catholic societies find their historical development (Morse 1964, 151).

But the appearance of symmetry in the passage above is rapidly dismissed by the enunciation of a deep historical asymmetry rooted in cultural difference.

A Protestant civilization can develop its energies endlessly in a wilderness, as did the United States. A Catholic civilization stagnates when it is not in vital contact with the diverse tribes and cultures of mankind (Morse 1964, 176).

Following Hartz, Morse also concludes that the liberal fragment is capable of internally generating its own historical dynamics, while the feudal one is not, and thus needs "contact" with other "tribes and cultures of mankind" in order to develop. This contact, Morse adds, would come as a product of "the impingement of world politics from without" (1964, 176). The perception of Latin American ultimate historical paralysis is repeated many times over.

The Hispanic American continued as if no change had taken place. And in truth none had. Nothing real or conclusive seemed to have been gained. The political freedom which had been attained was only a formality. . . . Every Hispanic American sought only to take the place left by the conquistador. From the dominated man which he was, he aspired to be the dominator o the weakest. . . . Meanwhile the rest of the world marches forward, progressed, and made history. Hispanic America continued to be a continent without history, without a past, because the past was always present (Morse 1964, 169).

Moreover, Morse not only teaches the reader to expect no actual change in Latin America but also to dismiss any trace of apparent change as a false product of mere rhetoric.

If we accept seriously the notion that Spanish America had taken a cultural and institutional fix long before this time, we are interested in identifying a deep-lying matrix of thought and attitude, not the rhetoric by which it may for the moment have been veiled (Morse 1964, 153).

Such imprecations vividly reveal the potential cognitive effect of the social scientific text. In this particular case, the reader is taught what to properly expect from the object Latin America: no history, expect the constant repetition of the same past.

Morse's culturalism borrows elements from Weber and Parsons. From the former author he gets the thesis that "patrimonialism" is a form of "traditional domination." Morse then claims that the Spanish is a patrimonial state, something that fits well his overall assessment of the Spanish culture as traditional. From Parsons, he learns that Spanish American societies follow a "particularistic-ascriptive pattern" – which, as it has been already shown here, is a manner of saying that they are neither universalistic nor geared toward achievement. In sum, Weber and Parsons provide Morse with social scientific concepts to explain Latin America's ultimate temporal and cultural Otherness.

Of course that traditionalism, and lack of universalism and achievement, entails lack of rationality – at least of the instrumental type of rationality Weber identified with modernity. Morse confirms this diagnosis by observing that the hierarchical Spanish society allows for manifestations of much "eccentricity and affective release." The author also finds that Latin America is afflicted by another form of irrationality so aptly identified by Max Weber: charismatic domination. When the structures of the traditional

hierarchical society break, personalistic leadership rises to occupy a leading position in the political arena. In the end, the only movement that occurs in Latin America is from one form of irrationality to another.

Morse's text opens with a fairly long section on the "people" of Latin America, which addresses the subject of race. The United States is again the yardstick against which Latin America is explored. He chooses the expression "melting pot" just to argue that Latin America does not have one. He defines the American melting pot as the mixing of white European immigrants with the descendants of the British that already inhabited the United States – no blacks or Indians are included in that mix. In Latin America, however, what took place was a mixture of three different races: white, black, and Indian. Even in places where something similar to the American melting pot occurred, he argues, like in the Southern cone of South America, this mixing followed typical "Latin-American patterns of acculturation" (Morse 1964, 124).

The reference to "Latin-American patterns of acculturation" might suggest that culture is a determining factor in the formation of Latin America's alternative melting pot. However, Morse also argues that:

The universality with which Indian and Negro women served as wives or concubines for the white men leads one to suspect the transmission of lasting psychological tonalities to the New World society (Morse 1964, 129).

As the passage suggests, Morse attributes psychological characteristics to race, and thus opens the possibility for understanding collective cultural traits as a product of racial inheritance.

In sum, Latin America is opposed to the United States in all three aspects: race, culture, and historical capacity. Furthermore, all these aspects appear to be interwoven in defining Latin America's ultimate difference. In the following sections I will examine how Morse's ideas were received and built upon by the literature on corporatism in Latin America.

Corporatism in Latin America

Ronald Newton

Ronald Newton's "On 'Functional Groups', 'Fragmentation', and 'Pluralism' in Spanish American Political Society" (1970) is one of the earlier specimens of the corporatism literature produced by Latin American studies. In this very revealing piece, the author describes the "new" epistemological position of corporatism in relation to the rest of the Latin American studies literature and also lays out the theoretical and conceptual bases of this "new" approach.

Newton starts the text arguing that the study of "functional groups," to which he subscribes, defies the "the more traditional methods of conceptualizing and analyzing Spanish American political society, ... [breaking] with many of the categories and premises that have shaped North American thinking" (1970, 2) Without specifying what traditional methods those would be, the author adds that "the repeated cycles of civic violence and civic paralysis, protracted incidences of dysfunction" in Spanish America cannot be understood in "terms of constitutional dispositions and electoral and parliamentary behavior" (1970, 1)

Following a trend in Latin American studies that was already noted in the dependency literatures, Newton is concerned with placing his contribution within a specific academic debate. That is, different from early modernization Latin Americanists, who had a slim amount of previous literature to comment on and, thus, relied more on systematizing factual information and borrowing theories from other disciplines, these second and third generation scholars can place their theories within the internal debates of the now prolific Latin American studies literature. In a nutshell, the trend towards increasing scholarship was not exclusive to dependency and its followers.

Newton's "new" approach is marked by a "new" vocabulary, a different way of speaking about Latin America. Even though his ideas are not very distant from Morse's, his language is. Unlike Morse who has little use for the term "corporate," Newton employs it thirty five times in the article. The term "functional" in the title of the article should be understood as a metaphorical reference to "biological" functions, i.e., to the idea that social groups contribute to the life of society like organs contribute to the life of the organism: executing hierarchically ordained specialized tasks.²⁰⁰ As the words chosen by Newton to present his "research problem" indicate, the study of corporatism in Latin America is about pathologies. Terms such as "paralysis" and "dysfunction" seem to come straight from a medical book. The presence of "violence" beside those terms reminds us readers that we are allowed to apply this nosologic vocabulary to the understanding of social processes. Moreover, according to Newton, those are not ordinary pathologies; they are chronic ones. The cycles of civic violence are "repeated," incidences of dysfunction are "protracted" and civil society is "paralyzed."

²⁰⁰ Historically, corporatist political regimes are identified with Fascism – an ideology that overtly used the analogy between national politics and the functioning of the organism.

As the very beginning of Newton's article seems to foretell, despite the different vocabulary, corporatism bring us back to a very familiar terrain: temporal asymmetric opposition. But one should not stop at that finding, for it has been already shown here that forms of asymmetrical opposition usually appear interweaved. Hence, traces of other forms of opposition should be sought in Newton's text, as well as in other texts of the corporatist approach.

"On 'Functional Groups'" has many other interesting things in store, as the following passage demonstrates.

Functional interest groups are thus by no means unfamiliar; the point is, however, that the conceptual armamentarium, at present available to the investigator seeking to comprehend them as a *culture-wide phenomenon*²⁰¹ remains meager and imprecise. An adequate working definition of the Spanish American "functional interest group ... is still lacking-indeed, even the terminology itself must be regarded as only provisional. Furthermore, we need a conceptual framework-a "model," if one wishes - by means of which a total Spanish American national system may be examined in terms of the interrelationships among its constituent functional groupings, and of their involvement in the political process. Hence this essay, whose purpose is to isolate and define the issues and to develop a vocabulary and a frame of reference for their further study (Newton 1970, 1-2).

Newton's argument is unequivocal: Latinamericanists should strive to find a conceptual framework to comprehend Spanish American functional interest groups as a culture-wide phenomenon. There are two premises imbedded in this line of reasoning. First, that the so-called functional interest groups are indeed a cultural phenomenon. Second, that there is a coherent common Spanish American culture that determines the behavior of these groups everywhere in Spanish America. The same premises support

²⁰¹ Italics added by the author.

the following call for a "model" of a "total Spanish American national system," which bear the further implication that Spanish American nations not only have the same culture but also produce the same political institutions: synecdochical reasoning. Merle Kling's search for a unified theory of political instability in Latin America immediately comes to mind. Not coincidentally, Newton places him in what he calls his "corporal's guard of North Americans,"²⁰² together with Blanksten, McAlister, Morse, Phelan, and Silvert (1970, 2).

The passage is also a fine example of how the rhetoric of scholarship is often articulated with the definition of Latin America as a coherent cultural Other. In fact, given that its cultural Otherness is taken for granted, the task of the social scientist becomes a search for the proper "conceptual framework" to comprehend that Otherness -- which has been always there waiting to be deciphered. Here the meaning of "comprehend" approximates its non-metaphorical etymological roots: to grab a physical object. Newton appears to know what object should be pursued and what should be done with it. On the other hand, he also acknowledges that, so far the scientific effort has produced only "meager and imprecise" concepts. His contribution is then presented as an effort to "isolate and define the issues and to develop a vocabulary and a frame of reference for their further study." This scientist mimicry of the natural sciences is presented very seriously by the author, as if the accumulation of knowledge and the "refinement" of concepts about Latin America would eventually reveal the inner truth of that social scientific object: something of the sort of a "total Spanish American national system."

²⁰² An expression he used to convey "major intellectual influences."

After presenting his ambitious project, Newton starts his substantive analysis. He borrows from Whitaker the concept of fragmentation, used originally by that author to study Argentina, and argues that it explains other Spanish American nations of similar socio-political development as well.²⁰³ However, before laying out his theory, Newton tells the reader how Spanish American fragmentation differs from North American pluralism.

In the first place, although large secondary groups are central to both, North American pluralism is indeed, as Whitaker indicates impressionistically, very different from the Spanish American phenomena in question. Both are culturally determined, which is to say historically determined ... (Newton 1970, 3)

Here one finds the first clear traces of cultural asymmetric opposition. The definition of the Spanish American political system's core characteristic (fragmentation) is established in contrast to a North American understanding of North American pluralism. Predictably, the picture of North American pluralism presented by Newton could hardly be rosier.²⁰⁴ While cultural opposition is made explicit, the author also says that these cultural differences can be understood in historical terms.

²⁰³ According to Newton, fragmentation corresponds to a condition where political society is deeply divided into "mutually isolated and bitterly antagonistic *intereses creados* (group interests based on custom)" (1970, 3).

²⁰⁴ According to Newton, North American pluralism is based in two guiding principles: multiplicity of groups and multiplicity of affiliations. The former principle is possible because of the "unfettered freedom to form such groups," a claim he supports by citing Alexis de Tocqueville. Newton claims that a number of causes contributed to the sprawl of the spirit of association, among them, the social fluidity that allowed individuals to get rid of "ascriptive" ties of birth and status. The second principle, multiplicity of affiliations, defines a condition according to which the North American individual may have allegiances to a diversity of collectivities and thus, not be forcefully bound to the imperatives of a hegemonic association (1970, 5).

In the second place, however, the two are not direct opposites, for fragmentation is not, in any sense, a system. The term can only refer, rather, to the *dysfunction* of a system -- one which, until relatively recently, has performed with tolerable efficiency. It is this traditional set of arrangements -- which lacks any universally-accepted descriptive label -- that is the Spanish American counterpart of pluralism (Newton 1970, 3).

The asymmetric character of opposition is enhanced in the passage above, for it is assumed that while American pluralism is a system, Spanish American fragmentation is the “*dysfunction* of a system.” The author suggests that before fragmentation, Spanish America had a functioning system in place, to which he refers as a “traditional set of arrangements.” In sum, Spanish America shifted from a traditional system to plain dysfunction. The pathological metaphor continues to enrich Newton’s vocabulary.

Thirdly, therefore, the fragmentation syndrome is to be correlated to the emergence of transitional modes of socio-political organization. This means, in its simplest terms, that as a given Spanish American national system acquires more fully the attributes of transitional society, and, in particular, as its political framework distends to accommodate newly-articulate and newly-exigent urban groups, the conjuncture of constitutional and informal structures through which, in traditional society, political demands were received, processed, and acted -upon, grows increasingly unworkable, and may, as in Argentina, become directly obstructive (Newton 1970, 4).

The medical vocabulary is enriched by the addition of the word “syndrome.”²⁰⁵
The general picture seems quite familiar. The Spanish American political system was

²⁰⁵ “Syndrome” is defined in the *American English Heritage Dictionary* as: “a group of symptoms that collectively indicate or characterize a disease, a psychological disorder, or another abnormal condition” (1992). There are other cases of social-scientific appropriation of this term, such as, for example, Leon N. Lindberg’s *The Energy Syndrome*. This author defines the “syndrome” as “a group of symptoms that occur

stable because it was based on traditional cultural arrangements. Then, modernization forced society to shift from traditional to transitional mode. But the social changes and the new interests brought about by modernization clashed with the traditional arrangements, causing the whole political system to become dysfunctional. The picture of the dysfunctional Spanish American system resembles the unstable transitional Latin American society described in the political instability literature.

Newton does not stop there, however, for his main thesis is that Spanish American traditionalism wins the battle of the transitional society.

[T]he remarkable tenacity with which traditional patterns resist alteration and/or supplantation draws strength not only from the Bourbon attitudes of the present holders of power, but also, to a degree not yet properly remarked, from the peculiar modalities of Spanish America's *pre-industrial* urban structure. This implies, among other things, little reason to believe that Spanish America's transitional periods will be anything but protracted and agonized. or that the more complex configurations ultimately to emerge will bear much more resemblance to the North American variety of pluralism than they do at the present (Newton 1970, 4).

Although the allusion to transition might at first suggest the possibility of movement and change, Newton reinstates the historical paralysis of Spanish America with renewed conviction. Modernization was supposed to bring change, but in Spanish America it brought only higher levels of instability under the continuing dominance of traditionalism. By calling the attitudes of political leaders Bourbon, Newton suggests that they have changed little since the region was under Spanish monarchical rule.

together and that describe a pathology or system malfunction" (1977, xi). In both cases, "syndrome" is used to name the set of symptoms prompted by a pathological condition.

Finally, he prognosticates that the dysfunctional transitional period will be “protracted and agonized,” that is, even in transition Spanish American history is not fully historical: historical handicap is once again restated.

According to Newton, this historical handicap also manifests itself in the organization of social groups.

Many of the *occupations* pursued within them have been “called into existence” by the requirements of a complex industrial age, and are highly modern in their narrow specialization and the formidable technical expertise they demand. This is as true of the clergyman trained as sociologist or social worker or the *militar de laboratorio*, as of the management consultant or automation expert. Still, on the principle of cumulateness, as suggested above, the groups comprise intricate webs of personalistic, non-instrumental relationships. Moreover, the institutional matrix—the juridical principles involved, the ascription of individual and corporate status and roles, the devices of corporate self-government, the legitimation of political intervention in the larger system and frequently the mechanisms through which such intervention is exercised—is one which pertains to Spanish America’s preindustrial urban past (Newton 1970, 8).

Their occupations might be modern, but their form of organization is personalistic, and non-instrumental. Personalism makes here another appearance as a defining element of the Latin American character. Its association with “non-instrumental” adds overtones of irrationality to the depiction of Spanish American individuals and groups.²⁰⁶ Confirming this interpretation, Newton adds that the concept of “interest group” is not valid for Spanish America because “its connotation of ‘rationality’ and ‘instrumentality’ does not in the least accord with the totality of the affective as well as the cognitive involvement of the latino.” Not surprisingly, he also

²⁰⁶ The Weberian inspiration of culturalist analyses produced by Latin American studies is, most of the time, explicit and can hardly be overstated.

calls Spanish American functional groups particularistic. The members of those groups are connected primarily by affection and are incapable of reasoning according to universalistic moral principles. Given these characteristics, Spanish American groups cannot establish relations of horizontal solidarity amongst themselves and, hence, depend on a strong state to intermediate conflict and allocate privileges and resources. It is also important to note that, according to Newton, this complex of cultural defects corresponds to the survival of "Spanish America's preindustrial urban past:" cultural asymmetric opposition is translated into temporal asymmetric opposition.

Newton is probably not conscious that his "theory" mimics Hegel's take on the workings of Oriental empires (1956). In both authors the state is considered to be the only source of rationality capable of maintaining the cohesion of a society formed mostly by irrational groups and individuals, who, in turn, are caught up in overwhelming affections and desires and thus incapable of reasoning according to universal principles. Accordingly, for a society that does not understand freedom, only a despotic or authoritarian state is appropriate. Newton finishes the text commenting on the prospects for military dictators to maintain the stability of Spanish America's dysfunctional system.

The contrast between a self-congratulatory image of the American self and the social scientific exploration of the "latino" is sometimes openly voiced by Newton.

The North American observer, culturally conditioned to "open-mindedness" toward the infinity of human possibilities, is disturbed to find himself surrounded, in a Spanish American milieu, by highly disparate, sharply modeled, and reasonably predictable types. It is, however, an equally crude folk-wisdom that permits the latino to conduct his social affairs -- and regularly to deduce on a one-to-one basis the political allegiance of individuals from their group affiliation-by departing from ascriptive assumptions (Newton 1970, 15).

The passage is meant to be a critical note on US ethnocentrism, but, in fact, it only justifies the contempt that the superior North American should feel for the Otherness that characterizes the Latin American way-of-life.

According to Newton, modernization theory's claim that "latino" middle-sectors have been a reformist force in Latin American history is another product of North American myopia, which is based on "culturally-derived premises concerning the 'natural' behavior of matured middle classes." In fact, he argues, these middle sectors have been bound to the same ascriptive particularistic corporative practices that dominate Spanish American society, and hence, incapable of producing "horizontal solidarities."

Newton concludes the text by arguing that the cultural defects of Spanish America must be understood in "historical" terms.

The conclusion seems inescapable that, taken as a whole, the congeries of institutionalized functional groups, the mutual isolation and/or hostility that characterizes their extra-mural relations, and the peculiar modalities of their articulation to the political apparatus of the state bear more than a superficial resemblance to the corporate system of the ancien régime (Newton 1970, 21-22).

The term "ancien régime" here refers not to France but to the Spanish monarchy, which was inaugurated by Isabella and Ferdinand in the late 15th century and lasted throughout the colonial era. Newton claims that the tensions and contradictions that characterized that ancien régime survive at the core of twentieth century Spanish America's political system. Those tensions and contradictions are basically related to the need to harmonize a body of medieval rights and privileges with the centralizing demands of the newly established monarchy. The solution was a corporatist system where groups of particular interests are mutually isolated and vertically dependent on the monarch, leaving the monarch with great unaccountable power.

Newton attributes the intellectual authorship of this system to the sixteenth century Jesuit Francisco Suárez, who, according to him, fashioned an intricate combination of Roman Imperial law, Thomism, and Spanish consuetudinary law. The author acknowledges that his thesis is inspired by Richard Morse, particularly by his contribution to Louis Hartz's *The Founding of New Societies* (1964) – the text we have just examined in the previous section. Newton acknowledges that his take on Suárez is in disagreement both with authors who claim that the Spanish Thomist was a precursor of doctrines of doctrines of "popular sovereignty" and with authors who deny that Suárez has had a lasting influence in Spanish political thought. However, instead of presenting convincing arguments in support of his position, he just states that Suárez is important because he provides "closely-reasoned and authoritative rationales he provided for ... the stasis of Spanish statecraft " (Newton 1970, 24).²⁰⁷ Suárez is not the only "victim" of Newton's cursory analyses and overblown generalizations. With the same intellectual attitude he examines centuries of Spanish history, "Spanish American" history, society, politics, and so on.

Newton compensates for the fragility of his arguments with a vocabulary that is loaded with moralistic judgmental and deprecating overtones. In addition to the nosologic terminology and the Parsonian pattern variables (particularistic, ascriptive), words such as febrile, extravagance, stridency, debility, and inchoate also are generously employed to describe the Spanish American subject. In none of the texts examined so

²⁰⁷ For a more detailed analysis of Suárez's thought and its place within the early-modern European intellectual context see Quentin Skinner (1978). Richard Tuck argues that Suárez was an important precursor of the concept of subjective rights, an element Tuck deems crucial to the formulation of social contract theories (Tuck 1979). On Suárez's doctrine of rights see also José Eisenberg (2000).

far, are the forms of asymmetrical opposition so close to insult. In Newton's text, are the forms of asymmetric opposition reveal themselves as incontrovertible forms of misrecognition: in order to recognize themselves in the Spanish America described by him, people must have the lowest of self-esteems.

But the author takes some precautions. In order to protect himself from charges of overgeneralization, Newton reminds the reader of the true social scientific spirit of his enterprise: "At this stage of the inquiry, too much remains to be tested and verified."

As for terminological usage, Newton prefers the term "Spanish America" to "Latin America." At the same time, he uses the term "latino" several times to refer to "Spanish Americans." Despite this terminological variety, one should notice that from the perspective of the reception, "Spanish America" is virtually identical to "Latin America." Not only Newton cites several works on Latin America in support of his arguments, but other Latinamericanists also received his text as a contribution to the social scientific study of Latin America. Moreover, as it will be shown below, other authors applied the same arguments Newton fashioned for Spanish America to "explain" Latin America.

Howard Wiarda

Howard Wiarda certainly is the most prolific and influential author of the literature on corporatism. His earliest theoretical contribution to it is "Toward a Framework for the Study of Political Change in the Iberic-Latin Tradition: The Corporative Model" (1973). Faithful to the trend stressing scholarly debate, Wiarda starts the text by contrasting his contributions to the Latin American studies literature previously produced. According to him, in the 1960s both governmental policy-makers

and Latinamericanists were convinced of the impending revolutionary threat in the region. However, that “scare” wave prompted a reaction, which came in the form of a series of works defending the idea that, in fact, Latin America was inherently conservative and un-revolutionary. The author claims that none of these scenarios explains well “the nature of the Latin American development process” – which he also calls “Iberic-Latin development process.”²⁰⁸ According to Wiarda, the previous analyses were flawed because they failed to note that

there are some unique aspects to the process of sociopolitical change in the Iberic-Latin tradition that do not correspond to the models ordinarily used to analyze national development. These nations are not particularly well served by Rostow's "stages of growth" analysis, by Easton's and Almond's systems theory and the functionalist development literature, or by class analysis and the "power elite" paradigm (Wiarda 1973, 208).

He also criticizes modernization theory for projecting a model of European and American development onto Latin America, and consequently overlooking the fact that Latin societies are quite distinctive: “the Iberic-Latin tradition represents a ‘fourth world of development,’ a peculiar way of managing the great transformations of modern times.” One cannot avoid noticing here the same rhetoric previously employed by Newton and so many others: developed and democratic Americans err because they naively expect Latin America to follow the virtuous developmental path the United States once experienced. According to Wiarda, that is a perilous illusion, for Latin America is a whole different being.

²⁰⁸ Although Wiarda does not provide a definition for the expression Iberic-Latin in the text, it is safe to assume that it refers to Spain or Portugal plus all countries in the Western Hemisphere that were colonized by them.

After warning his readers against false expectations, Wiarda starts to layout the edifice of corporatist theory:

The Iberic-Latin nations were largely bypassed by the great revolutions associated with the making of the modern world. The Protestant Reformation, the rise of capitalism, the scientific revolution, the rise of socially more pluralistic and politically more democratic societies, the Industrial Revolution and its many-faceted ramifications all of these had little effect on the nations of the Iberic-Latin culture area. They remained cut off and isolated from these modernizing currents, at the margin of the ideological trends and socio-political movements taking place elsewhere in Europe, fragments and remnants of a peculiarly Iberic-European tradition dating from approximately 1500, with a political culture and a socio-political order that at its core was essentially two-class, authoritarian, traditional, elitist, patrimonial, Catholic, stratified, hierarchical, and corporate (Wiarda 1973, 209).

In a single paragraph, the author manages to weave the basic semantic field of temporal and cultural asymmetric oppositions that defines corporatism. According to him, the passage of time has brought no significant historical transformations to Iberic-Latin nations since the 1500s. More specifically, they missed all the “great revolutions” that brought about the “modern world,” and thus, remained pre-modern, medieval, pre-capitalist, or, in Wiarda’s own terms: “authoritarian, traditional, elitist, patrimonial, Catholic, stratified, hierarchical, and corporate.” In other words, the Iberic-Latin nations exist in the present as an ossified negation of modernity; of a modernity that is, one should conclude through a simple logical exercise, democratic, dynamic, pluralist, based on popular sovereignty, Protestant, egalitarian, and universalistic. In a nutshell, this image of modernity is hardly distinguishable from a self-congratulatory image of the United States as the beacon of human history – echoes of Manifest Destiny are too loud here to be ignored. In fact, they are so loud that Wiarda

even provides a rationale for the sentiment of hostility and contempt that Americans feel towards Latin Americans:

ours has been a Protestant and is now a pluralist nation, and our academic disciplines are of an increasingly secular and scientific orientation, with the result that we are 'insensitive and vaguely hostile to the sociological and psychological foundations of a Catholic society .' (Wiarda 1973, 210)²⁰⁹

For Wiarda, the American cultural aversion to the values and traditions that constitute Latin America caused Latinamericanists to turn away from studying them, and to erroneously apply to Latin America development theories originally fashioned on the bases of European and US experiences.

Wiarda then conducts his own exploration of the traditional structure of Iberic-Latin societies. First, he finds that they have produced no modern political theory. vis-à-vis "Locke and the Anglo-American experience," Rousseau and the French revolution, and German philosophy. Modernity, he adds, has been Anglo-American and Northern European rather than simply European; for the Latin-Iberians have remained outside this historical process, stuck to their own distinctive tradition. In substantive terms, while moderns have produced political pragmatism, materialism, the success theory (sic), and a unilinear stage-by-stage conception of development based on their own experience, the Others lived according to moral idealism, philosophical certainty, a sense of continuity, and a "unified organic-corporate conception of the state and society." Wiarda claims that these principles spring from Roman Law, parenthetically suggesting that the reader read Seneca "for an understanding of the Iberic-Latin tradition." But he also names some

²⁰⁹ The phrase in quotes was borrowed from Morse, an author whose writings on Latin culture were warningly received by Newton, Wiarda and other writers of corporatism.

early modern intellectual authors of the Iberic-Latin system: Vitoria, De Soto, Suárez, Molina, and Mariana, i.e., the Thomistic-Aristotelian tradition – a term he also borrows from Morse.

Playing the role of historian of political thought, Wiarda (as Newton before him) comparatively analyzes this distinctive European traditions:

Their view of society and the state is an organic one-that government is natural, necessary, and ordained by God for achieving harmony among men. This conception is an almost inherently conservative one. In contrast to contract theory which, except in Hobbes, is individualistic, democratic, liberal, and progressive, organic theory subordinates human law to natural and divine law, is more tolerant of authority, slights the individual in favor of group "rights" or a superior "general will," accepts and justifies the status quo, reserves extensive powers for traditional vested interests, and leads inherently toward a corporate system which subordinates man to some allegedly higher end and unity (Wiarda 1973, 212).

He states that while it is not surprising that such system was articulated in the sixteenth century Iberian peninsula, it is surprising that it has endured so long, for "one still finds powerful echoes and manifestations of the earlier corporate-organic framework in virtually all contemporary regimes and institutions in Latin America and in their underlying political-cultural foundations." According to Wiarda, the Latinamericanist Charles Anderson was correct in calling Latin America a "living museum" (see Anderson 1967).

Wiarda then presents a brief historical account of Iberic-Latin nations, in which the "corporate-patrimonialist system" is said to persevere despite modernizing challenges and influences. This narrative follows a peculiar rhetorical pattern. Historical innovations are announced just to be dismissed next by an adversative clause that reaffirms the "pervasiveness of the dominant political culture and legacy." (Wiarda 1973,

220). Wiarda adds that even the most recent “wave” of modernization has not cracked the hegemony of the Latin-Iberian corporative framework. Latin societies have become more unstable, argues Wiarda, but their cyclical crisis are eventually accommodated by the enduring corporative system:

The same traditional hierarchical, corporative, elitist, and authoritarian orientation and structure is also still present today, modified by twentieth-century changes but by no means destroyed by them... The personnel of government may shift, new groups and ideas may be assimilated, and the elites may rotate in power (thus giving the appearance of change more than its substance); but the essentials of the socio-political order and the base on which it rests must remain steadfast (Wiarda 1973, 223).

Like Newton, Wiarda parrots the Hegelian image of movement without change to refer to “Latin America’s history” as unhistorical. Temporal asymmetric opposition is repeatedly stated throughout the text. Again drawing from Anderson, Wiarda argues that Latin American politics is hectic and contentious because “power contenders” have interests and life-styles which pertain “to quite different historical epochs,” and thus are incompatible. The image of constant conflict without actual historical movement continues to pervade the entire passage. The author also quotes Newton to restate one more time Latin America’s temporal pathology:

One comes to think in terms of multiple currents of cultural evolution moving at different rates to uneven rhythms, regressing as well as advancing, submerging as well as predominating, intersecting and interacting fortuitously within the framework of a given metropolis, a given institution, or indeed, a given personality structure (Wiarda 1973, 227).

One should note that these images of uneven rhythms, of incompatible interests from different historical epochs, also suggest that Latin politics is ultimately irrational.

Wiarda concludes that the fact that some sparse development has been achieved in these “crazy-quilt political systems” can only be attributed to the “genius” of some politicians (Wiarda 1973, 226). The charge of irrationality is also alternatively made through the argument that the state is the sole rational agent capable of keeping the belligerent parts of the Latin society together. Using of poetic license, the author coins a phrase that sums up Latin America’s historical handicap: “the weight of history and the past is still so heavy in virtually all the Iberic-Latin nations.”²¹⁰ Nonetheless, as our previous analysis has already demonstrated, this metaphorical way of synthesizing temporal asymmetric opposition is a late product of a practice that was already deeply rooted in the social science of Latin America. The characterization of the Latin culture as static and conservative allows Wiarda to conclude that change can only occur as a product of external influence, particularly that of the United States. In his view, Latin Americans do not act; they only react to modernizing trends that come from abroad, and their reaction inexorably aims at preserving corporatism. In his own words, “the socio-political order and the base on which it rests *must* remain steadfast” (Wiarda 1973, 223).

At this point one should notice some rhetorical aspects of Wiarda’s piece. The text is divided in three parts: introduction, exploration of the topic, and conclusion. The introduction and the conclusion are virtually identical and the middle section is an extended version of the other two. The final product is impressively redundant. Wiarda repeats that Latin American is historically handicapped innumerable times. A brief lexicographic analysis of his text reveals that the verb “remain” is used 30 times, “preserve” 6, and “prevailing” 7. But the most shocking result comes from counting the

²¹⁰ See the next chapter for similar formulations reproduced in the introduction to Latin America textbook literature.

number of times the word “tradition” and its derivatives were employed in the text: 98.

One should note, however, that the stronger the point of temporal asymmetric opposition is made, the sharper cultural asymmetric opposition becomes. In practical terms, Wiarda strives to show that the Latin historical handicap is a product of their specific culture, which is consistently contrasted with that of Northern Europe and Anglo-Saxon America. This cultural opposition is lexically marked in the text by the usage of the term “culture” and derivatives (24 times) and by the abundant employment of the expression “Iberic-Latin” (61 times) and “Latin” (163 times). Finally, the generous use he makes of terms such as “Iberic-Latin” and “Latin” indicates the pervasiveness of synecdochical reasoning in Wiarda’s text.

The author also shows an awareness that the expectations generated by his theory of Latin culture have cognitive import.

In comprehending the Iberic-Latin systems, one must think in terms of a hierarchically and vertically segmented structure of class and caste stratifications, of social rank orders, functional corporations, estates, juridical groupings and *intereses*-all fairly well defined in law and in terms of their respective stations in life... [a] good starting point for the discussion is to picture the Iberic-Latin nations as structured horizontally in terms of distinct and fairly rigid layers and vertically in terms of a number of corporate elites and *intereses*, with the Crown or the central state apparatus controlling and guiding its various components (Wiarda 1973, 210).

Interestingly, he claims that these expectations should pre-inform the social scientific enterprise on Latin America. That is, Latinamericanists should already have in mind this ethnology of the Latin before starting their own explorations.

But the expectations generated by Wiarda’s writings do not apply only to future social scientific research. He teaches his readers that the so-called Iberic-Latins are

completely different beings. They live according to the exact opposite principles that animate North American life. Furthermore, North American should expect no rational behavior from them. For “us,” he declares, Latin politics “defies not only all ‘reason’ but also our conceptions of ideological consistency” (Wiarda 1973, 228)

He also deems just (but not wise) the sentiment of scandal and repulsion that the Anglo-Saxons feel toward Latins. That is, given the sharp difference, lack of sympathy is also warranted. Ironically, Wiarda presents himself as a critic of Western-centric theories on Latin America. His argument, as I have shown here, is that Western scholars distorted the knowledge of the true Latin America by transposing the categories generated in the analysis of their own societies to the Latin American context. Wiarda wants to rectify this mistake by presenting Latin America according to its true inner corporative logic. The picture he draws is ultimately terrifying: Latin Americans are irremediably caught up in the perpetual repetition of a deeply unjust, oppressive, violent, and irrational society.

The Review of Politics: challenge and continuation

The consolidation of the corporatist approach to the study of Latin America was marked by the publication of an entire issue of *The Review of Politics* on the subject in January 1974.²¹¹ This rare piece provides hints about some noteworthy elements of the corporatist literature and its internal reception. It is made of contributions from some of corporatism’s luminaries: Howard Wiarda, Ronald Newton, James Malloy, Philippe Schmitter, and Frederick Pike.

²¹¹ This issue of the *Review of Politics* also appeared as a book: *The New Corporatism: Social- Political Structures in the Iberian World* (Pike 1974).

Wiarda is certainly the most prominent contributor to the “corporatism in Latin America” literature both as an editor of books and as an author (1974; 1977; 1981a; 1981b; 1981c; 1982). Newton was a very influential pioneer of corporatism. Even after shifting his career interests toward the study of fascism and Nazism in Latin America in the mid-1980s, he never abandoned the culturalist arguments of his early corporatist studies (1977; 1992). Malloy has written about corporatism in Latin America for more than two decades. Besides contributing to the general theory of Latin American corporatism (1977; 1987; 1996), he has also assessed the special cases of Peru and Brazil (1974; 1979; 1985). Pike has applied corporatist theory to the historical study of US-Latin American international relations (1973; 1974; 1977; 1986; 1992).

An analysis of the scholarly sources cited by the authors of this volume reveals a great degree of “internal” consistency. In their contributions to the *Review*, Wiarda, Newton, Malloy, and Pike mutually cite each other – a sign of cohesion within the corporatist literature. Furthermore, they also consistently refer to other authors as precursors of the corporatist approach. Among them, Richard Morse figures prominently, particularly his contribution to Louis Hartz’s *The Founding of New Societies* (Hartz 1964). Other common sources are the works of sociologist Claudio Véliz, and of political scientists Kalman H. Silvert and Charles W. Anderson – authors that, as will be shown below, had anticipated most of the arguments of the corporatist literature already in the 1960s.

With the exception of Schmitter’s, all articles in the *Review* reproduce the topoi of the Latin American corporatism literature that I have exposed above. Nonetheless, differently from the two texts previously analyzed, these are not foundational pieces

concerned with laying out the basic theoretical arguments of the corporatist approach, but efforts to “apply” it to case studies or to another problems and disciplines.

For example, despite its misleading holistic title, Wiarda’s “Corporatism and Development in the Iberic-Latin World: Persistent Strains and New Variations” is mostly an effort to identify the resilience of corporatism in Portugal and Brazil. But Wiarda covers up the synecdochical fallacy by writing some brief notes (less than two pages out of 30) about the Peruvian case – which according to his criteria would be enough to present the piece as a study about Latin America. The problem that moves the author in this text is also different from the one in “Toward a Framework.” Wiarda is not concerned here only with explaining a generic Latin American developmental pattern, but with making the point that the contemporary military dictatorships in Peru and Brazil are products of yet another historical resurgence of the undying Latin corporatism. After an introduction in which the theory of corporatism in Latin America is re-presented and the history of Latin corporatism is once more explained, Wiarda briefly examines the cases of Portugal, Brazil, and Peru to conclude that:

There is a direct and sustaining continuity, regardless of the constitutional form and labels used, between the older, historical tradition of corporatism on which the Iberic-Latin systems were originally erected, and its more contemporary manifestations (Wiarda 1974, 32).

For Wiarda, corporatism corresponds to the Iberic-Latin way of development: a way that is more suited to the Iberic-Latin “indigenous realities and historical traditions. ... to their own political culture and social structure ... than the older imitation of the United States and European models” (1974, 31). The author adds that “many will find that a welcome and healthy development” (1974, 32), and he indeed seems to be among

the ones sharing this opinion, for he recommends that US policy-makers give up on their ethnocentric and biased models of development and recognize that corporatist arrangements are Latin America's own solution to development. One must notice that, in that particular historical context, what Wiarda calls the Iberic-Latin corporatist "way" was being implemented by repressive military dictators. Thus, in effect, the author is advising his readers to accept this political arrangement as something inherent to Latin America. Wiarda intersperses a quote from a Peruvian colonel with a remark of his own (between brackets in the quotation below) to stress this point:

We the military [along with the mechanisms of the corporative system, one might add] are the only ones who are capable of leading them – and us – onto safe ground (Wiarda 1974, 31).

"Natural" is the word Newton chose for the title of his contribution to the *Review*: "Natural Corporatism and the Passing of Populism in Spanish America" (1974). Newton starts commenting on the particular case of authoritarian Chile under Pinochet. The problem proposed in the article is: why is Chilean authoritarian government corporatist? The author articulates his answer through an opposite type of synecdochical rhetoric. The Chilean case is only examined in the first three paragraphs of the introduction and in the very last paragraph of the article (conclusion), while the bulk of the text is actually about corporatism in Latin America in general. Hence, contrary to Wiarda, who used Brazil to explain corporatism in Latin America, Newton uses Latin America to explain corporatism in Chile. Aware of the recent studies that had identified the existence of corporatism in twentieth century "non-Latin" European regimes, Newton claims that a distinction must be made between European and Latin American corporatism. While the former is an extraordinary product of radical sectarian activism that often is accompanied

by strife and violence, the Latin variety is a core structure that organizes the whole Latin social and political bodies, hence “natural.” Newton concludes by arguing that the Latin American functional and political elites have not been competent enough to develop their nations; hence, military authoritarian corporatism stepped on to the task. Again, corporatism provides a fine justification for military dictatorship in Latin America: it is a natural outcome.

James M. Malloy’s article, “Authoritarianism, Corporatism, and Mobilization in Peru” (1974), is less ambitious than the others. The author strives to demonstrate that the military dictatorship in Peru follows a corporatist model. Malloy avoids some of corporatism’s *topoi*, such as the lengthy introductions about the “(un)-history” and ethnology of Latin corporatism present in all texts previously examined, and goes straight to the analysis of the Peruvian case. First, he explores the “mentality” (sic) of Peru’s elites, then he strives to show that some policies adopted by Peru’s military dictators are indeed corporatist, and finally, he concludes claiming that Peru’s corporatism should be understood as a subtype of development-oriented authoritarianism. Despite being more concerned with his typological conceptual scheme than with exploring the generalities of the Latin American corporatist nature, he is not immune to synecdochical fallacies such as:

The turbulent history of Bolivia since its populist revolution of 1952 illustrates a number of inescapable facts that are quite relevant to an understanding of the politics of development in Peru and elsewhere in Latin America (Malloy 1974, 54).

As the title indicates, in “Corporatism and Latin American-United States Relations,” Fredrick B. Pike uses corporatism to analyze the history of Latin American-

United States foreign relations, from Taft to Nixon. Rather than a theoretical innovation, the adoption of corporatist theory serves Pike as a device to simplify the historical narrative. By assuming that Latin America is immutably and inherently corporatist, the author is able to “explain” his history in very general terms, as if all Latin American nations were basically the same. The argument is quite simple. The Latin American nation is characterized by a two-culture society (ruling elite and masses), vis-à-vis the United States, which is a pluralistic democratic society. According to Pike, the United States has historically tried to instill the values of individualism, self-reliance, freedom, free enterprise, and competitiveness in Latin America, but the local ruling elites have resisted that influence fearing that the masses, once seduced by those “new” values, will revolt and end the elites’ centuries of dominance. From Taft to Wilson to Roosevelt to Kennedy, the American presidents and policymakers are depicted as good-intentioned (yet naïve) reformists, who wanted to extend to Latin America the benefits of democratic capitalism. In opposition to the good Americans, and with the sole purpose of preserving their privileges, Latin American elites responded to American benevolence by adopting and adapting corporatism to the demands of each particular historical situation. That allowed Latin American society to remain traditional throughout its history.

At times, however, Pike suggests that American benevolence was also accompanied by sentiments of contempt, if not hate, for what Latin Americans represented. According to him, the American “sense of mission rested on rejection of the dichotomized, two-culture, corporate society and on the desire to banish that sort of society from the American hemisphere and perhaps from the entire world.” He also speaks of an “inevitable confrontation” between the two “profoundly differing” concepts of development – a clash of civilizations that resembles Hegel’s prediction about the

future of the New World (Hegel and Sibree 1900), the racist theories of Michel Chevalier (1839), and the geopolitics of Manifest Destiny.

Pike is also faithful to other corporatist topoi. The pathological vocabulary is present: Latin American leaders are said to have developed a “mania” for economic progress (1974, 131); in other passages he calls them “development-obsessed” (1974, 136). As described by Pike, the whole history of Latin America is in fact pathological, a history of arrested development, of anti-productive values, and parasitic aristocratic dominance. Allusions to Latin American irrationality are frequent in his text, and they occur mainly in association with references to the Latin American anti-capitalist and anti-materialist values. For example, while addressing Latin America as “that world,” Pike says that its leaders “might well continue to cling to the values, attitudes, prejudices, myths and fantasies encompassed by corporatism” (Pike 1974, 169). Pike’s ethnology sometimes approximates overt insult, such as when he argues that the “Iberian world ... never developed a deep commitment to the pragmatic notion that truth is something that happens to an idea” (Pike 1974, 169).

Like Wiarda and other students of corporatism, Pike claims that ethnocentrism has rendered Americans incapable of seeing the real corporatist nature of Latin America. Nevertheless, the main target of his criticism is not academic writings but policymaking. In fact, Pike suggests that, under Nixon’s presidency, US policy towards Latin America had for the first time overcome its naïve liberalism. Now, Washington is able to understand Latin American military dictators as a true product of Latin American corporatism (Pike 1974, 166).

Finally, Schmitter’s lengthy contribution to the *Review of Politics*, “Still the Century of Corporatism?” (1974), must be assessed. This text differs from the others in

the publication in crucial aspects. It is a theoretical compilation rather than an effort to apply corporatism to particular cases. It is not about Latin American corporatism but about corporatism in general, as a world phenomenon. And more importantly, it is acutely critical of the culturalist approach adopted by the main figures of the corporatism in Latin America literature. Schmitter starts the text by declaring his intention to strip the concept of corporatism from “its pejorative tone and implication.” The author accuses what he calls “political-cultural ‘explanations’” of being based on “impressionistic evidence and circular reasoning.” Like many social scientists before and after him, Schmitter intends to operationalize a concept, in this case corporatism, by stripping it from its normative content. In lieu of excessive “normative variety and behavioral hypocrisy” (sic), he wants the concept to refer only to “a specific concrete set of institutional practices or structures involving the representation (or misrepresentation) of empirically observable group interests” (Schmitter 1974, 87).

Without denying the existence of corporatism in Latin America, he claims that corporatism is not a distinctive product of the Iberian political culture. In fact, argues Schmitter, corporative political arrangements have emerged and persisted in a variety of cultural contexts, “from Northern Europe, across the Mediterranean to such exotic places as Turkey, Iran, Thailand, Indonesia and Taiwan, to name but a few.”²¹² The author also identifies strong corporatist elements in FDR’s New Deal, suggesting that not even the American culture (which was deemed by other authors the antithesis of corporatism) is immune to such arrangements. Further advancing in his critique of the literature,

²¹² Leo Panitch identifies a strong corporatist political culture in post-World War II England, both among conservatives and Labor – an evidence that severely undermines the argument that the opposition between corporatism and pluralism can be explained by the opposition between Iberic-Latin and Anglo-Saxon cultures.

Schmitter rebuffs the trope of Iberian-Latin intellectual origins of corporatism by showing evidence that those origins are in fact “predominately German, Belgian, French and Austrian and, secondarily and belatedly, English, Italian and Rumanian.”

Schmitter distinguishes two variants of corporatism: societal and state. According to him, “societal corporatism is found imbedded in political systems with relatively autonomous, multilayered territorial units; open, competitive electoral processes and party systems”, while state corporatism

tends to be associated with political systems in which territorial subunits are tightly subordinated to central bureaucratic power; elections are nonexistent or plebiscitary; party systems are dominated or monopolized by a weak single party; executive authorities are ideologically exclusive and more narrowly recruited and are such that political subcultures based on class, ethnicity, language, or regionalism are repressed (Schmitter 1974, 105)

The former type he identifies with the empirical cases of Sweden, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Norway, Denmark, Great Britain, Western Germany, France, Canada, and the United States, while the type is represented by Portugal, Spain, Brazil, Chile, Peru, Mexico, Greece, and the historical cases of Fascist Italy, Petainist France, National Socialist Germany, and Austria under Dollfuss. Nonetheless, Schmitter avoids explaining the two variants of corporatism in cultural terms or attributing the differences between them to some sort of inherent historical handicap.

Without directly discussing the conceptualization of Latin America articulated by other corporatist authors, Schmitter provides elements for deconstructing the temporal and cultural asymmetrical oppositions that characterize the concept. He strives to show that corporatism is neither a product of historical handicap nor a necessary political consequence of a culture that is in all aspects the opposite of Anglo-Saxon Protestantism.

Furthermore, looking from the perspective of reception, Schmitter should be considered a contributor to the literature of corporatism in Latin America. His works on corporatism in Brazil and Portugal (1971; 1973) are consistently used by authors such as Wiarda and Newton in support of their arguments. In the end, his rejection of corporatism's mainstream is not consistent. While he declares that Wiarda's "Toward a Framework for the Study of Political Change" is based on "an ill-defined, Catholic *weltanschauunglich* argument," he considers Newton's "On 'Functional Groups'" a "subtle, institutionally sensitive" piece. However, as we have just seen, the two articles have basically the same arguments.

Corporatism: the curse of the undead

In 1984, Wiarda published the second edition of *Politics and social change in Latin America: the distinct tradition* (1982), an edited volume that brings together influential contributions to the theory of corporatism in Latin America.²¹³ Organized as a reader, this volume differs very little from its first edition, published in 1974. In a sense, the second edition of *Politics and social change in Latin America*, celebrates a decade of corporatism in Latin America studies. At the same time, however, some of its texts show that the premises of the corporatist approach had been circulating among Latinamericanists since the early 1960s. That is the case of Richard Morse's famous "The Heritage of Latin America" (1964) and "Toward a Theory of Spanish American

²¹³ I am referring here solely to texts whose main objective is to apply the corporatist approach to Latin America as a whole. Therefore, case studies on individual countries fall outside this category.

Government" (1964), of Charles W. Anderson's "Toward a Theory of Latin American Politics" (1968), which editor Wiarda calls "one of the most sophisticated and most widely influential efforts yet made to fashion a full-fledged framework and theoretical model for the analysis of the Latin American political systems and their change processes," of Claudio Véliz's "Centralism and Nationalism in Latin America" (1968)²¹⁴, and of Glen Dealy's "Prolegomena on the Spanish American Political Tradition" (1968).

Together with precursors of the literature, the book contains "classics" such as Wiarda's "Toward a Framework" and Newton's "On Functional Groups," plus some other articles by Wiarda, Dealy, and Pike -- all written during the 1970s. The textual content of the book does not deserve further comment, given that its texts are mostly redundant rearrangements of the same corporatist topics and arguments already exposed here.

Predictably, the book has no contribution from Schmitter, who by the mid 1980s was already studying "transitions to democracy."²¹⁵ The re-adoption of formal democratic regimes by most "Latin American" countries during the 1980s seems to have undermined the corporatist approach. The focus of research shifted from explaining

²¹⁴ Véliz has played the role of a reliable "native" source of intellectual criticism about Latin America. Consequently, his work has been generously cited by corporatists and other culturalist scholars. A Chilean sociologist that later found employment in American universities, Véliz enthusiasm for Anglo-Saxon culture can hardly be overstated. In one of his works, he writes that "the cultural forms originated by the English-speaking peoples have been consolidated effortlessly as principal strands in the common fabric of knowledge, habits, affectations and beliefs on which rest the quality and survival of civilization" (Véliz 1983).

²¹⁵ In 1989, Philippe Schmitter published an article discussing the possible death of corporatism (1989).

dictatorship to studying democratization, and the corporatism literature was ill equipped to explain how Latin countries could ever become democratic.²¹⁶

Despite the demise of the corporatist approach, its arguments did not disappear from the Latin American studies literature.²¹⁷ Some corporatist authors are still received as part of the canon of Latin American studies. For example, both Dealy and Malloy contribute with an article to the influential, *Democracy in Latin America: Patterns and Cycles* – a state-of-the-discipline type of volume on democratization in Latin America edited by Roderic Ai Camp (1996). Dealy's article has a very allusive name: "Two cultures and political behavior in Latin America." In this piece, he maintains the same line of argumentation that has made the reputation of corporatism. His readers are served with bits like:

the civic virtues cherished by Latin Americans are essentially those perfections prized by classic Roman civilization...many virtues and values have changed little over the centuries.

Indeed, the cursing of the undead continues.

²¹⁶ The new task Latin American studies set for itself, studying transitions to democracy in Latin America, did not have a readily available theoretical approach. Nowhere is this "paradigmatic" crisis more apparent than in the voluminous *Transitions from authoritarian rule*, edited by the same Schmitter and Guillermo O'Donnell in 1986 (1986). After a long series of case studies, O'Donnell concludes the book arguing that since politics depends on the future *fortuna* and the *virtu* of politicians, two unfathomable variables, no prognosis could be made about the future of democratization in developing countries.

²¹⁷ Wiarda continued to publish works that hardly deviated from his original formulations. In the next chapter, we will have the chance to analyze a textbook authored by him, which is currently used in Latin American studies courses throughout the United States. More importantly, corporatist tropes (e.g., the strong pull of history) are reproduced in many textbooks, including the literature's bestseller, *Modern Latin America* (Skidmore and Smith 2001).

Conclusion

The perception of Latin American otherness reproduced by studies of corporatism is rhetorically weaved through the generous usage of synecdochical reasoning. This perception is so fundamental that the ultimate coherence of the Latin American object is never put in question. That is true for the foundational texts of the literature as well as for the works in which authors try to apply the “theory” to the study of cases – as we have seen in Wiarda’s, Newton’s, and Malloy’s contributions to the *Review of Politics*. Furthermore, *pars pro toto* is not the only “logical” mistake committed by corporatists. Schmitter accuses his peers of the committing a false syllogism:

Latin Americans behave differently from North Americans; Latin America was colonized by Spain and Portugal; North America by Great Britain; Latin Americans are Catholics, North Americans are predominantly Protestant; *ergo*, Latin Americans behave differently from North Americans because of their Catholic-Iberian heritage! (Schmitter 1974, 89)

The employment of circular arguments is also abundant in corporatist studies. Wiarda provides an example.

As a result of the tenacity of these traditional socio-political institutions, there has been limited "development" in the Iberic-Latin nations in either a Marxian or an Almondian sense (Wiarda 1973, 226).

Thus, one learns that because they remained traditional they did not develop.²¹⁸

²¹⁸ Ironically, the corporatist authors we have studied in this chapter are the same identified by Robert Packenham with the true American liberal scientific approach to the

Studies of corporatism in Latin America provide the critical reader with a pedagogical example of the clear operation of asymmetrical oppositions. Wiarda himself acknowledges that the literature on corporatism in Latin America has defined Latin America by the lack of perceived American characteristics. That disconcerting passage is found in the introductory text to the fourth part of his corporatist reader – which is the last part before the conclusion. Speaking as the volume's editor, he declares that, in the first three parts of the book (the previous eleven articles), authors had contrasted Latin America to the United States and explored “a good deal about what the development process in Latin America *is not*” (Wiarda 1982, 257). To correct this “deficiency” Wiarda starts the fourth part of the book with “Towards a Framework” – a text that, as we have seen, repeats the formula of defining Latin America in opposition of the United States.

The blend of asymmetrical oppositions that structured the perception of Latin America conveyed in the studies of corporatism can hardly be distinguished from that of modernization studies: the same set of cultural asymmetric oppositions with a strong reliance on the trope of historical handicap. The difference resides in the realm of the expectations worked out by each theory. While modernization rhetorically projected the overcoming of Latin America's traditionalism through acculturation, studies of corporatism strived to show that Latin America would not be able to overcome its

study of Latin America. Packenham opposes this group to the dependentistas and their American reception, who he accuses of fashioning tautological theories that were not open to testing and falsification. This author praises the allegedly liberal tradition for producing value-free social sciences. However, as we have shown, the texts produced by the advocates of corporatism in Latin America are strongly interpretive and highly charged with value judgments.

cultural pathologies and historical paralysis. The ethnological baggage remained the same, but policy imperatives were redefined.

Furthermore, the pessimistic expectations produced by texts on corporatism supports the justification of authoritarianism in Latin America.²¹⁹ Since the corporative state is declared to be a natural product of Latin American culture, the actual existence of authoritarian rule is seen as something “normal,” or “natural.” Wiarda, for example, praises the Brazilian military for their no-nonsense policy of not tolerating the Brazilian “*jeito*” (1973, 230). In “Authoritarianism, Corporatism and Mobilization in Peru,” James Malloy uses the corporatist argument to justify the developmentalist military dictatorship of Peru. He also claims that, in a similar corporatist manner, Mexico also married authoritarianism with economic development policies. And Newton sees Pinochet’s authoritarian rule in Chile as a product of Latin America’s natural corporatism.

Like their dependency theorist peers, students of corporatism felt obliged to bow to scholarship. Furthermore, policy orientation does not appear as a major concern in their texts. From the perspective of US policy-making, studies of corporatism seem to recommend isolationism rather than paternalistic interventionism. One would think that due to their pessimistic generalist interpretations, studies of corporatism in Latin America would have been of little practical use for specific policy-making. But this is not entirely true, for there were exceptions. For example, Howard Wiarda, one of the literature’s luminaries, actively engaged in policymaking. From 1981 to 1987, he was the director of

²¹⁹ For a similar interpretation of the expectations and practical policy advice generated by studies of corporatism in Latin America see Keith A. Haynes’s “Authoritarianism, Democracy and Development: The Corporative Theory of Howard J. Wiarda” (1988).

the Center of Hemispheric Affairs of the American Enterprise Institute, a conservative think tank that played an influential role in foreign policymaking during the 1980s. Wiarda also served as a lead consultant in the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America, also known as the Kissinger Commission. Set up by Henry Kissinger in 1983, the Bipartisan Commission had the alleged purpose of providing insights and advisement to governmental foreign policy toward Central America.²²⁰ According to William M. LeoGrande, however, the true goal of the Commission was to break the partisan impasse in Congress over the continuation military aid to Central America's repressive regimes. The Kissinger Commission produced a report in January 1984, which was subsequently published as a book (US National Bipartisan Commission on Central America 1984a). In fact, despite the abundance of liberal arguments for promoting peace and human rights in Central America, the report does conclude that the promotion of the United States interests in the region does "require a significantly larger program of military assistance ..." (US National Bipartisan Commission on Central America 1984a, 125).²²¹

²²⁰ William M. LeoGrande argues that although bipartisan, the membership of the Commission was selected in a way to avoid the inclusion of liberal democrats, who were then concerned with human rights abuses conducted by Central American anti-communist governments and paramilitary groups funded by the US. In fact, the only liberal democrat intentionally included among the thirteen members of the Commission (twenty four if one counts the Senior Advisors) was the mayor of San Antonio, Henry Cisneros. The Yale professor Carlos Diaz-Alejandro was included by mistake, for the administration assumed he was a conservative due to his Cuban background (LeoGrande 1984, 253).

²²¹ LeoGrande also accuses the Report of what he calls "rewriting history" by portraying the popular insurgent movements in Central America as a product of communist infiltration. According to him, those movements grew out of legitimate popular grievances with social injustices during a period of practical absence of foreign communist infiltration in the region, either from the Soviet Union or from Cuba. LeoGrande describes the Report as a "trip through the looking glass, where words and

The Kissinger Commission also put out a larger volume with a selection of individual papers by its lead consultants (US National Bipartisan Commission on Central America 1984b).²²² Howard Wiarda's forty-five page piece opens with one of studies of corporatism's most repeated arguments: Americans fail to understand Central America "in its own terms" because they tend to project their own values and expectations over it (in this case "Central America" replaces "Latin America", for the same effect). Wiarda then rapidly exposes the true expectations Americans should have in relation to Central America.

For one thing Central America today remains strongly a prisoner of its historic past ... one doubts that in the near or even longer-term Central America will be altered fundamentally by whatever we choose here to do. The heavy hand of history is too powerfully present there for these time frames to serve more than analytical purposes, or for much to be altered quickly despite all our efforts (Wiarda 1984, 208).

But this bleak statement drenched with the image of temporal paralysis does not lead him to advise complete neglect, for the threat of communist infiltration requires that something be done. Wiarda adds:

We can marginally affect change in that area but we cannot reverse the course of history. However, as former Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chief of Staff Pat Holt has remarked, "even a change of

history mean whatever Kissinger wants them to mean. nothing more. nothing less" (LeoGrande 1984, 255).

²²² Interestingly, the published version of the Kissinger Commission's Report only lists the Commission's members and senior councilors. The names and contributions of the lead consultants, such as Wiarda, only appear in the *Appendix to the Report of the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America*. For Wiarda's take on the Kissinger Commission as an insider see "The Kissinger Commission Report: Background and Political Dimensions" (1984) and "The National Bipartisan (Kissinger) Commission on Central America, 1983-1984" (2001).

direction of 3-4 percent would have been enough to save the Titanic (Wiarda 1984, 208).

After considering the possible paths that American foreign policy toward Central America could take, Wiarda concludes that:

US military assistance should be continued, may even be stepped up in some countries; but we should have no illusions that we can create a modern professionalized (by our criteria) military that will eschew involvement in civilian politics (Wiarda 1984, 240).

His assessment supports the main line of the Report, which is to advise the continuation or even the increase of military aid to Central America. It is interesting to note that in this passage Wiarda discards the argument previously defended by authors of the political stabilization literature, according to which US military aid would foster the development of a professional military ethics in Latin America that “eschew[s] involvement in civilian politics”. In practical terms, the author is suggesting that military aid should not be conditioned upon the promotion of democracy in Central America. That is, American foreign policy should not “eschew” collaboration with military dictators.

In 1987, after the Iran-Contras scandal had already hit the headlines, Wiarda published the policy-oriented *Finding Our Way? Toward Maturity in US-Latin American Relations*. In this collection of essays the author praises president Ronald Reagan for his “extraordinary political skills” in overcoming the tendency to immobility that, according to him, has characterized US policy toward Latin America as a whole. Wiarda claims that, under Reagan, “the overall American foreign policy toward Latin America [has become] more sophisticated and more discriminating than in the past, that we are now more certain where we are going and what our goals are, and that our grasp of the handles of foreign policy is now surer” (Wiarda 1987, xiv).

Among the “major accomplishments” of the Reagan administration’s policy toward Latin America, Wiarda cites the transformation of El Salvador into “a model of stability and democracy”, the reversion of “Grenada’s not-so-comic opera revolution”, and the recommendations of the Kissinger Commission for a multipronged policy in Central America (Wiarda, 1987, 229). It should be noted that Wiarda’s cultural relativism (read each culture according to its own measures) suited well the political agenda of maintaining or even increasing the US influence in the region, while providing relief to the ones that wanted to avoid thorny moral issues such as collaborating with anti-democratic “Latin American” political forces and funding and arming human rights abusers. After all, according to his view, Americans are not responsible for the fact that Latin Americans are trapped in their own culture, in a condition of historical paralysis. In the end, the corporatist reading of Latin America showed in practice that it could also be policy-worthy.

8. Introduction to Latin America textbook literature

Throughout their modern history Latin Americans have sought, with greater or lesser zeal, to achieve political and economic independence from colonial, imperial, and neo-imperial powers. Thus it is bitter irony that the phrase "Latin America" was coined by mid-nineteenth century French, who thought that since their culture, like that of Spanish and Portuguese America, was "Latin" (i.e., Romance language-speaking), France was destined to assume leadership throughout the continent.

Thomas Skidmore and Peter H. Smith. Modern Latin America (2002)

From the demise of the corporatist approach in the 1980s our narrative leaps straight to the present, to the analysis of the introduction to Latin America textbook literature. As a result, some important trends in the social scientific study of Latin America developing during the 1980s and 1990s will be left out of the analysis. The most obvious examples are the transition to democracy and democratic consolidation literatures. Other noteworthy subliterations, such as the sociology of religion in Latin America, social movements, gender relations, and so on, will have the same destiny. Many of these subliterations and approaches deserve a separate analysis of their own, but this would entail expanding this dissertation to unacceptable proportions. As I intend to show in this chapter, the study of the present-day textbook literature allows us to bring the narrative to a desirable closure. On the contrary, the textbook literature not only brings us back to the present, but also gives us a glimpse into the interface between specialized academic languages and everyday language.

It is through college education that most Americans are introduced to the study of Latin America. The task of introducing someone to the systematic study of an object that is also conceptualized in everyday language must happen in a conversation between

“scientific knowledge” and everyday notions; or, translating into the language of language, between social scientific language and everyday language. Through this literature we will be able to glimpse the ways everyday prejudices against Latin Americans relate to social scientific notions about them.

College education is a major force in the social circulation of the concept of Latin America. Social scientists, writers, journalists, bureaucrats, businesspeople, and other professionals responsible for the circulation of discourses on Latin America in American society acquire their education on Latin America in the benches of American universities, frequently through introduction to Latin American studies courses where these textbooks are employed. Thus, knowing what these people are taught is crucial for understanding what is the present status of and perspectives for “Latin America” in the United States. Finally, some of those professionals eventually become involved with dealing with “Latin America,” either through the private or public initiatives. Given that American influence and power over its southern neighbors has been vast, understanding the way Americans think about Latin America is capital to understanding the way they act toward the ones they see as “Latin American.”

In this chapter, I analyze the most popular textbooks used in introductory courses to Latin American studies nowadays taught in American universities. All bestsellers were included, plus some other books of lesser circulation.²²³ A special emphasis was given to sections of the book dedicated to presenting Latin America to the reader. Since presentation, or representation, is the tonic of my analysis here, the book covers could not be left out. Contrary to the more austere presentation of specialized literature, most

²²³ The methodology used to determine the most popular textbooks is explained in appendix 2.

present-day textbooks are paperback editions with colorful pictures on their covers. As a communicative device, a book is more than the text it contains. The order of chapters, the disposition of the text, the choice of titles and subtitles, the inclusion of pictures, all these elements are used to communicate with the reader. Particularly in the case of pedagogic books, those elements are meant to contribute to the task of educating the reader. Thus, in this chapter, the analysis of pictures works as a complement to textual analysis.

Modern Latin America

Modern Latin America is the most popular textbook of introduction to Latin America studies. Now in its fifth edition,²²⁴ this book is a product of the collaboration of an acclaimed Brazilianist and Latinamericanist historian, Thomas Skidmore, and a Latinamericanist historian Peter Smith.

The book opens with a prologue entitled "Why Latin America?" which aims at justifying the study of Latin America. The first text one reads is a quotation by James Reston: "The U.S. will do anything for Latin America, except read about it." The authors then argue that there are enough reasons to try to prove Reston wrong.

First, our nation's economic interests are deeply involved in the region. Latin America is one of our major trading partners. It is the site of much U.S. investment and a source for oil and other critical raw materials (Skidmore and Smith 2001, 1).

Second,

²²⁴ The fifth edition was published in 2001. Previous ones appeared in 1984, 1989, 1992, and 1997, respectively.

... we also have political links. Revolutionary upheavals and repressive responses in Latin America directly challenge U.S. foreign policy. They raise difficult questions about how to protect and promote U.S. national interests (defined as not simply economic or strategic interests) (Skidmore and Smith 2001, 1).

And finally,

... there is another important consideration closer to home. Large sections of our country have become Latinized by the influence of migrants from Mexico, Puerto Rico, Central America, the Caribbean, and even Brazil. This is in addition to the Hispanic descendants of the original Spanish speaking population of the formerly Mexican Southwest. Migration, both historical and recent, then brought peoples and customs from Latin America to the American Southwest (from Texas to California), Florida, and New York. Many major U.S. cities now have more children from Spanish speaking families than from any other group. (Skidmore and Smith 2001, 1)

The rhetoric of the language employed in these passages is noteworthy. The opposition between “us and them” structures the arguments in the three passages. First, there is “our nation's economic interests,” then “we also have political links,” and “large sections of our country have become Latinized.” The speaker here identifies himself with the “us” position and assumes that the reader would do the same. Through this language, the text explicitly assumes that the thing that brings speaker and reader together to the same “us” position is the nation. More specifically, the United States – which is expressly named in all passages. In sum, this text sets up a communicative situation where an American Latinamerican specialist speaks to an audience of American students.

Asymmetric oppositions are present even in this early stage of the preface. While the United States is presented as an active political body, a nation-state with defined economic and political interests, Latin America is portrayed as (1) a source of profit, oil, and raw materials, (2) an incubator of “revolutionary upheavals and repressive responses”

that are both a threat to the protection of American interests and a challenge to U.S. foreign policy, and (3) a source of immigrants that have Latinized “large sections of our country.”

The argument that “revolutionary upheavals and repressive responses in Latin America directly challenge U.S. foreign policy” is a generalization that sadly echoes the stereotype of “Latins” as irrational and violent peoples who are unable to fashion stable political arrangements (cultural asymmetric opposition). Such interpretation is further warranted by the manner in which the passage is phrased. By choosing to put the verb “challenge” in the present, the authors suggest that “revolutionary upheavals and repressive responses” not only “were,” or “have been,” but also “are” and “will be” constant events in Latin America. In other words, the reader is bound to conclude that instability is not an episodic characteristic of Latin America but an essential one (temporal asymmetric opposition). Furthermore, the deleterious thrust of these ethnological remarks are enhanced by synecdochical fallacy. For example, no distinction between countries such as Chile and Costa Rica, with a record of political stability hardly matched by “developed and democratic” European countries²²⁵, and countries that have been through repeated coups d'état, such as Bolivia and Argentina. On the contrary, the Latin American record is leveled at the lowest standard.

More importantly, the argument that “instability” in Latin America challenges U.S. foreign policy and “raise[s] difficult questions about how to protect and promote U.S. national interests” has been used by the American government as a justification to

²²⁵ An argument can be made that without the American effort in destabilizing Chile's democracy in the early 1970's, the country would never have interrupted its long-lived constitutional democratic government.

install and support dictatorships throughout the region; an action that often involved the ousting of democratically elected political leaders.²²⁶ Such perception dates back to Monroe Doctrine, which portrays Latin America as the backyard of the United States,²²⁷ or worse, to the Manifest Destiny ideology, which depicts the continent as a sort of Americans' *Lebensraum*. According to this perception, every political or social transformation that occurs in Latin America is open to American scrutiny and potential corrective intervention. Such generalization fits well the function of representing Latin America as a homogenous space upon which American national interests act. Unfortunately, the authors reproduce a form of reasoning that only contributes to the perpetuation of "Latin American" heteronomy and US imperialist interventionism.

In fact, rather than proving Reston wrong, Skidmore and Smith concur with his witty remark by reaffirming that Americans do not have enough information about Latin America and that they actually do not care about it. Nonetheless, the authors argue that since Americans indeed have many interests in Latin America, such ignorance is prejudicial to the promotion of these same interests.

According to Skidmore and Smith, lack of information breeds the proliferation of stereotypes. Many Americans and Europeans still identify Latin Americans with

²²⁶ The cases of Guatemala (1954), Brazil (1964), Dominican Republic (1965), and Chile (1973) come to mind. US participation in those episodes varied from veiled support and undercover cooperation (Brazil) to direct military action (Dominican Republic) (Smith 1996; Schoultz 1998; Huggins 1998).

²²⁷ I use the expression "reception of the Monroe Doctrine" because, according to Dexter Perkins, the understanding of James Monroe's original text has considerably changed since its creation. Each new generation of American statesmen reinterpreted and adapted the doctrine to their freshest intentions. Hence, knowing the original intentions of Monroe and John Quincy Adams can only be a preliminary step to the study of the doctrine's history. See (Perkins 1963).

caricatures such as the "Latin lover," the "Frito Bandito," etc. In order to substantiate this claim, they show the reader the results of a nation-wide poll conducted by the Office of Public Opinion Research in 1940.²²⁸

Dark-skinned	80%
Quick-tempered	49%
Emotional	47%
Religious	45%
Backward	44%
Lazy	41%
Ignorant	34%
Suspicious	32%
Friendly	30%
Dirty	28%
Proud	26%

Imaginative	23%
Shrewd	16%
Intelligent	15%
Honest	13%
Brave	12%
Generous	12%
Progressive	11%
Efficient	5 %
No answer	4 %
No opinion	0%

Skidmore and Smith claim that even though caricatures "have their own truth to tell," they are a very limited form of information that should be replaced by enlightened social scientific knowledge. In general terms, thus, the authors present *Modern Latin*

²²⁸ Respondents were asked to describe Central and South Americans choosing from a list of words presented to them. Skidmore and Smith acquired this information from John J. Johnson's *Latin America in Caricature* (Johnson 1980, 18); the original source can be found in an edited volume called *Public Opinion, 1935-1946* (Cantril 1951, 502). This is the same poll analyzed in Chapter 3.

America as a tool to enlighten American readers about things Latin American. Finally, the stage is set for introducing the “real” Latin America.

Presenting Latin America through text

Instead of providing a straight definition of Latin America, however, the authors approach the subject in an indirect and rather tentative way. Rhetorical elements such as negative assertions and evasive generic statements abound in this section of the text.

Latin America [is a] complex region...

Latin America is not an easy place to understand...

The term Latin America covers a vast variety of people and places...Physical features present sharp differences ...

As these observations suggest, Latin America resists facile categorization... (Skidmore and Smith 2001, 3)

This treatment to the question of “what Latin America is” works as a disclaimer through which the authors try to protect themselves from charges of oversimplification and generalization. Nonetheless, in the midst of such disclaimers, they insert elements of an allegedly positive definition. After declaring that “Latin America is not an easy place to understand,” they add that “the same language is spoken [almost] everywhere.” After saying that “[t]he term Latin America covers a vast variety of people and places,” they add a geographical definition that makes sense of the entire “Latin American space:”

Geographically, Latin America includes the land mass extending from the Rio Grande border between Texas and Mexico to the southern tip of South America, plus some Caribbean islands (Skidmore and Smith 2001, 3).

One should note that implicit asymmetric perceptions condition the definition of this geographic space. The defining limits of Latin America are said to be the Rio Grande border and the southern tip of South America. While the former is a political border, established only after much contestation and a war of conquest, the latter corresponds to the natural southern limit of the continental mass; where land meets the Ocean. In other words, Latin America is a space defined by a political border in the North and a natural border in the South. The Latin American space construed by this definition knows of no national borders but the United States', no man-made lines of separation but the one created by Americans.

After briefly glossing about some mountains and forests of Latin America, the authors drop the first bit of anthropological knowledge:

The people of Latin America contain elements and mixtures of three racial groups -- native Indians, white Europeans, and black Africans (Skidmore and Smith 2001, 3).

The term used here to describe the Latin American people is neither ethnicity nor culture, but race. Interestingly, by giving priority to race the authors are paying a tribute to a notion that has pervaded the representation of "Latin" and Spanish Americans in the United States since its foundation but that has generally been remained at the margins of social scientific discourse. Race is currently used in American everyday English as a meaningful social, political, and anthropological category – something to which readers can immediately ascribe meaning. The authors' description is however quite generic. So generic that one might conjecture if the American people could not be described in the same manner. However, the United States is not used as a term of comparison, which leads one to ask: What would American college students think after reading this passage?

Would they attribute any specific racial characteristic to Latin Americans? We will come back to this question later.

After introducing Latin America's natural assets, race and geography, the authors move on to the social-scientific presentation of their object. Maintaining the rhetorical strategy of presenting Latin America as a complicated subject, Skidmore and Smith define it "a region rich in paradox," where opposing principles can coexist without contradiction. The authors present four key Latin American paradoxes. Three of them are worth commenting.

The first paradox identified by them is: "Latin America is both young and old."

Compared with the ancient civilizations of Africa and Asia, these Latin American societies are relatively young. On the other hand, most nations of Latin America obtained political independence from Spain and Portugal in the early nineteenth century, more than 100 years before successful anticolonial movements in other Third World countries. Thus by the standard of nationhood, Latin America is relatively old (Skidmore and Smith 2001, 4).

The elements employed in this comparison are interestingly heterogeneous. Latin America is said to be young as a society or civilization and old as a set of nations. While as a civilization it is contrasted to the "ancient civilizations of Africa and Asia," as set of nations it is compared to the other ex-colonies of the Third World.

It is hard to see how this paradox is typical of Latin America. One could reasonably argue that the same paradox applies to the United States. The American society is also much younger than "the ancient civilizations of Africa and Asia," and older than the ex-colonies of Europe in those same continents. The only thing the United States is not is a Third World country. That seems to be a crucial element to understanding this passage. Even though it is hidden in the text, an American self-perception of exceptionalism structures the comparison. Through this careful choice of

elements of comparison, the authors limit the possibilities open to knowing Latin America. The reader implicitly learns that Latin America should be properly compared to “other” Third World countries (underdeveloped, backward: temporal asymmetric opposition). As a Third World space, Latin America is not open to the same questions and experiences of the First World. Consequently, the readers, who the authors have already identified as American nationals, also learn that inquiring about Latin America does not necessarily entail inquiring about their own society (the United States). After all, those societies belong to different and thus non-comparable worlds, or categories.

Skidmore and Smith present the second paradox as follows:

Latin America has throughout its history been both tumultuous and stable. The Conquest began a tradition of political violence that has erupted in coups, assassinations, armed movements, military interventions, and (more rarely) social revolutions. Ideological encounters between liberalism, positivism, corporatism, anarchism, socialism, communism, fascism, and religious teachings of every doctrinal hue have sharpened the intensity of struggle. Despite the differing forms of political conflict, old social and economic structures have persisted. Even where modern revolutions have struck, as in Mexico (1910) and Bolivia (1952), many aspects of traditional society survive. The Cuban Revolution (1959) seems at first an exception, yet even in Cuba the pull of history has continued to be strong, as we shall see (Skidmore and Smith 2001, 5).²²⁹

²²⁹ This passage strongly resembles another by Howard Wiarda in “Toward a Framework for the Study of Political Change in the Iberic-Latin Tradition: The Corporative Model” (1973): “Positivism, with its emphasis on order and progress, was accommodated and assimilated within the prevailing tradition. Later, the ideologies of socialism, communism, nationalism, social democracy, Christian democracy, populism, developmentalism, Third-Worldism, and others also made their presence felt. Except in rare, probably unique circumstances, however, such as Cuba and possibly now Chile, the older tradition has been able to maintain its paramount dominance even in the face of these challenges” (Wiarda 1973, 214)

First, we must fully understand the meaning of “tumultuous” and “stable” in this passage. Tumultuousness corresponds to “a tradition of political violence” that expressed itself in the form of “coups, assassinations,” etc. This traditional violence was exacerbated by ideological conflict, for the authors suggest that an overabundance of ideological trends has been prejudicial to Latin America.²³⁰ On the other hand, stability is associated with the persistence of “old social and economic structures.” Latin America is stable because “the strong pull of [its] history” has kept it immersed in tradition. At this point, however, the paradox collapses into a coherent presentation of Latin America as a society inexorably tied to tradition, that is, plagued by historical handicap (temporal asymmetric opposition): like the Orientals of Hegel, the Latin Americans of this description move in space (conflict) but do not experience real historical change. Finally, the Latin American incapacity to successfully deal with both political and ideological conflict can be also read as an allusion to lack of rationality – a handicap that might combine cultural, temporal, and racial overtones.²³¹

The second paradox expresses a double form of generalization. First, there is a generalization in space: tumultuousness is presented as a characteristic that pertains to all Latin America. Thus, “coups, assassinations, armed movements, [and] military interventions” seems to be part of the political history of all countries. Second, there is a generalization in time, according to which Latin America has been stably tumultuous throughout its history. The authors suggest that Latin American tumultuousness has a genesis: the Conquest, which started the “tradition of political violence,” but they give no

²³⁰ After all, diversity is only good for the ones who can handle it.

²³¹ Lack of rationality can be explained in terms of cultural inadequacy, immaturity, and/or biological inferiority.

clues about the causes that perpetuated this tradition. The reader is led to conclude that violence, irrationality, and incapacity of change are inherent to the Latin American character (temporal asymmetrical opposition). Unfortunately, this conclusion echoes the sort of Latin stereotyping from which the authors allegedly try to distance themselves.

The fourth paradox is explained as follows:

Latin America is both prosperous and poor. Ever since the Conquest, the region has been described as a fabulous treasure house of natural resources. First came the European lust for silver and gold. Today the urge may be for petroleum, gas, copper, iron ore, coffee, sugar, or soybeans, but the image of endless wealth remains. In startling contrast, there is also the picture of poverty: peasants without tools, workers without jobs, children without food, mothers without hope. An aphorism oft repeated in Latin America summarizes this scene: 'Latin America is a beggar atop a mountain of gold' (Skidmore and Smith 2001, 5)

Skidmore and Smith might have said that in "Latin America" poverty and prosperity widely vary from country to country, and, in some cases, from region to region within the same country. Nevertheless, since their aim is to present Latin America as paradoxical whole, they appeal to the synecdochical formula "Latin America is both prosperous and poor." This assertive is followed by the information that the Europeans first came to Latin America in search of silver and gold -- the "Europeans" here being not all Europeans who came to the New World, but only the colonial powers that conquered Latin America: Spain and Portugal. Finally, they add the assertion that "today the urge may be for petroleum, gas, copper, iron ore, coffee, sugar, or soybeans, but the image of endless wealth remains."

There are some interesting remarks to be made about the enunciation of this paradox. First, while in the first episode of Latin America history the Europeans were the agents, in the second, introduced in the text by the adverb "today," the subject that acts

on the urge for “petroleum, gas, copper, iron ore, coffee, sugar, or soybeans” is not explicit. The inattentive reader might be led to suppose that Latin Americans themselves have such urge for raw materials and mineral resources, but one should remember that the authors have ranked the American interest for Latin American raw materials as the first reason for studying Latin America, as well as acknowledged American “penetration” in the region in a previous passage. Thus, the historical shift suggested by this interpretation would be from Spanish and Portuguese colonialism to American imperialism. However, if that is the case, the paradox dissolves. If Latin America has been continuously subjected to external schemes of exploitation, the existence of “peasants without tools, workers without jobs, children without food, mothers without hope” should be seen as a product of that exploitation and not as a paradox.

Even if we interpret the passage on “today’s urge” to be referring to Latin Americans, the enunciation of the fourth paradox still remains problematic. For the “Latin American” countries that have struggled for more than a century, and partially succeeded in, industrializing their domestic economies, this assertion is quite fallacious. Their urge is for more industrialization and larger international markets for their products, and not for more raw materials. Whatever is the case, the United States is never explicitly named as the agent of the present-day urge for things Latin American, nor any connection between the interests of American-led international finance and the reproduction of poverty in Latin America is ever mentioned. In sum, while American interests are crucial for justifying the study of Latin America, those same interests, and their consequences, disappear when the “real” Latin America is presented.


Concluding remarks: text and image

The textual analysis of *Modern Latin America* reveals the pervasive presence of asymmetric opposition and some of the possibilities opened to translating forms of misrecognition. The preface has two distinctive sections: one in which the study of Latin America is justified and another in which Latin America is introduced to the reader. The first section locates the reader and the speaker within the American nation, and justifies the study of Latin America in terms of American national interest. In this section, asymmetric opposition can be grasped by the fundamental contrast between an interested American nation and an amorphous Latin American object that is presented as a source of profit, raw materials, and as a potentially dangerous threat.

The second section of the preface introduces Latin America to the reader. Explicit references to the United States and its national interests disappear from the text. The section starts with brief geographic and racial descriptions of Latin America, which are followed by an exploration of the region's "paradoxical" socio-historical condition. A careful analysis shows that both cultural and temporal asymmetric oppositions structure Skidmore and Smith's presentation. Moreover, the constant identification of Latin cultural handicaps with traditionalism attests to the translatability of forms of asymmetric opposition. Throughout the text, Latin America is cognitively construed in opposition to a positive self-perception of the United States – a perception that, because it is hidden or sheltered from comparison, is never actually open to criticism. But what about racial asymmetric opposition?

The text does not treat race in detail. The passage in which this subject is briefly addressed alludes to "elements and mixtures of three racial groups native Indians, white

Europeans, and black Africans.” Although this short textual excerpt can hardly yield a meaningful interpretation, the book’s cover speaks volumes about the subject.



The cover of *Modern Latin America*’s fifth edition sports a reproduction of an oil on canvas by the Guatemalan Mariano González Chavajay called *Mercado de Noche*. The painting depicts a group of sixteen people, most of them engaged in trading activities in a place that looks like a street market. They all have very similar faces and the same golden-brown skin color. Most probably, the persons in the picture belong to some Central American or Mexican Indian pueblo. Make no mistake, though: the picture is

there to represent Latin America. Every time the students reach for their books, they are reminded of the Latin American looks: non-white, Indian, dark-skinned.


Race is not the only element in this picture that is in direct dialogue with the text. The situation depicted is typically backward, traditional, underdeveloped, semi-rural, agricultural, and pre-capitalist (temporal asymmetric opposition).

All the characters in the picture are dressed in non-Western clothes. All the ones whose feet are shown are barefoot. A woman carries her baby in a non-Western way. Predictably, they are trading agricultural goods and pottery (cultural asymmetric opposition). One cannot fail to notice that these cultural and temporal forms can be mutually translated.

Dark-skinned, traditional, and backward, that is the picture chosen to represent Latin America on the cover of the book. The great irony, however, is the contrast between the images suggested by this picture and the title of the book, printed in large elongated letters right above the picture: Modern Latin America.

The findings yielded by our analysis put in check the authors' self-proclaimed aim of enlightening their audience through *Modern Latin America*. Instead of providing enlightenment, as the book works as a means through which the same age-old American stereotypes of Latin America not only are reaffirmed, but also receive the authoritative credence of expert social scientific knowledge. In order to confirm this sad finding, one should just compare their characterization with the qualifiers chosen by common Americans in the 1940's poll. The Latin America *Modern Latin America* presents to students is violent and volatile (quick-tempered, emotional), destitute of intellectual tools to deal with ideological conflict (ignorant, religious), incapable of producing riches other than mineral raw materials and agricultural goods (backward, lazy), and definitely non-

Skidmore and Smith's book and eventually arrived at the cover. Now we will proceed the opposite way.



Like *Modern Latin America*, the third edition of Keen and Wasserman's *A History of Latin America* (1988) has a sole picture in its cover: a reproduction of an oil on canvas entitled *Revolucionarios*, by the Mexican muralist José Clemente Orozco (1930). This picture shows a group of nine people walking together. Seven are adults, two women and five men, and two infants wrapped on the women's backs. The image depicted is desolate and grim. All seven adults walk with a stooped posture. The background is dark and barren. All men wear Mexican-style sombreros and carry rifles. One of them sports two cartridge belts crossed around his torso. The most striking

feature of this painting, and one that adds a cold aspect to the whole ensemble, is the fact that the characters have no faces. It is not that they are defaced, but Orozco displayed them in a way in which the spectator is able to see only the side of their bodies or their backs but not their faces.

We are interested here, however, not in Orozco's original authorial intentions, but in assessing the message conveyed by this picture on the cover of *A History of Latin America*. The picture provides small but decisive clues concerning racial perceptions, long sleeved clothes and hats cover most of the characters' skin. Nonetheless, the most prominent character, a woman carrying a huge bundle and a child on her back has one of her arms almost entirely exposed. The left hand of the most detailed male character can also be seen. Both skin samples are dark-brown, a detail that would not mean much if the picture were not there to represent Latin America, and if the representation of Latin Americans as non-white were not a staple of the concept's semantic field (racial asymmetric opposition).

The sexual division of activities in the picture is also clear. Women are responsible for childrearing whereas men take care of manly activities such as warring and protecting. All those elements conspire to convey a sense of cultural difference. Furthermore, there is a hint of traditionalism in this scene where sexual roles are clearly and traditionally defined. Based on their garments and posture, one can easily conclude that those are rural people living in an impoverished and backward condition. The conspicuous presence of rifles and bullets obviously reinforce the association between Latin Americans and violence, political instability, civil unrest, militarism, etc. The conjunction of the stooped posture of walking looking to the ground, the lack of human faces, and the dark colors of the painting convey a message of fatigue, destitution, and

sadness. In sum, temporal asymmetric opposition reinforces cultural asymmetric opposition, that is, they can be mutually translated: cultural difference assumes is perceived as backwardness and vice-versa.

The covers of *Modern Latin America* and *A history of Latin America* depict Latin America in a similar manner: dark-skinned, traditional, and backward. To that triad of images, *A history of Latin America* adds the association of Latin America with violence and sadness.. The Indians depicted on the cover of Skidmore and Smith's book seemed poor, backward but happy and lively, while the picture of the revolutionaries that adorn Keen and Wasserman's book have no positive attribute.

Keen and Wasserman spend much less text to introduce their subject than their colleagues do. The basic functions accomplished by their introductory text, however, are quite similar to Skidmore and Smith's. Right in the first paragraph, they explain:

For most North Americans, perhaps, the colonial past is a remote, picturesque time that has little relevance to the way we live now. The situation is very different in Latin America. "Even the casual visitor to Latin America," says the historian Woodrow Borah, "is struck by the survival of institutions and features that are patently colonial..."(Keen and Wasserman 1988, 8)

Temporal asymmetric opposition expressed in the form of lack of coevalness, is the first thing Keen and Wasserman teach American students about Latin America: while North Americans live solely in the present, Latin Americans live the past in the present. The contrast between North America and Latin America is clearly established in terms of distinct relations with historical time. While in North America the past was left behind, in Latin America its "strong pull" is still felt. By describing Latin America through temporal asymmetric opposition, the author reduces all experience in "Latin America" to a common denominator that is externally defined as a negation of the American self-

image of unstoppable progress and innovation. In the passage above, Keen and Wasserman use the rhetorical device of enlisting someone else to speak in his name -- a move that allegedly gives more credibility to his claim.

This asymmetric perception of Latin America is then reinstated by the authors.

In Latin America the colonial past is not a nostalgic memory but a harsh reality (Keen and Wasserman 1988, 8).

Keen and Wasserman then connect this “statement of fact” to the claim that the survival of the past in Latin America ...

signifies economic backwardness; political arbitrariness, corruption, and nepotism; a hierarchical social order and attitudes of condescension and contempt on the part of elites toward the masses (Keen and Wasserman 1988, 8).

In other words, they suggest that all these dreaded attributes of Latin American society should be understood as survivals from the past. Coherently following their train of thoughts, the authors conclude that, since the colonial past is so present in Latin America, studying it must be a crucial introduction to knowing Latin America as a whole.

Keen and Wasserman start their historical exposition by identifying the first and most prominent characteristic of Spanish colonization: violence. According to him, violence was widespread in early modern Spain. Consequently, the Spanish *conquistadores* imported violence to the New World, where it became the main tool to administer their colonial possessions. In sum, like Skidmore and Smith, Keen and Wasserman also claim that violence is an essential characteristic of Latin American societies that is firmly rooted in its ever-present past.

After decrying the violent nature of the Spanish colonization, the authors say that “defenders of Spain's colonial record” have argued that this harsh view of Spanish colonization, which they call “Black Legend,” is biased and exaggerated. They then claim that all colonial powers have their own Black Legend, arguing that the atrocities committed by Americans against Indians are comparable to the ones of the Spanish *conquista*. Interestingly, however, an attentive reader who carefully follows their teaching will be led to conclude that despite the similar violent nature of both Spanish and North American “colonial” pasts, their consequences in the present are rather different. While in Latin America this violence is still very present, in the United States it is something buried in the past. After all, Keen and Wasserman have already primed their readers with the fundamental assumption that for North Americans the past is a “remote [and] picturesque time that has little relevance to the way we live now.” This example reveals once more the Janus-faced character of Latin America’s definition through asymmetric oppositions: the teaching of things Latin American has the simultaneous, uncritical and less-evident teaching of American things as its back side.

The authors also argue that Spain laid the foundation of the colonial social order, which was characterized by “the predominantly feudal character of its economic structure, social organization, and ideology.” The merits of such temporal conceptualization seem dubious. After all, Spain abolished serfdom in the fifteenth century, that is, before conquering the New World. Furthermore, commerce was a prominent economic activity in early modern Spain. In sum, whatever the term one can use to describe Spain’s economic system in the 16th century, it was not typically feudal.

Keen and Wasserman seem to know that they are stepping on shaky conceptual grounds, for they try to mend their previous claim with the following formula.

These feudal characteristics, admixed with some capitalist elements, formed part of Spain's (and Portugal's) legacy to independent Latin America and help explain the tenacious hold of some anachronistic institutions on the area today (Keen and Wasserman 1988, 8).

Our main aim here is not to discuss the propriety of applying the category of "feudal" to describe early-modern Spain, but to assess how this category is used to explain Latin America's historical handicap. In the passage above, Keen and Wasserman first state that "feudal characteristics" formed part of the colonial legacy of independent Latin America. Second they add that that legacy "help[s] to explain the tenacious hold of some anachronistic institutions on the area today." Even if we accept as true the claim that "feudal characteristics formed part of Spain's (and Portugal's) legacy to independent Latin America," it does not explain the "tenacious hold of some anachronistic institutions on the area today." That is, the fact that they are "feudal" does not explain their "tenacious hold," after all feudalism has subsided elsewhere in the European continent. There must be something about the Iberian feudal legacy that explains this special capacity to resist the passage of time. However, this "something" is not made explicit. In fact, it seems that the authors are able to "see" some institutions as a tenacious feudal anachronism only because they previously assume the implicit premise that Latin America is stuck in the past.


Ironically, Keen and Wasserman state that their book is set within the broad interpretive framework of dependency theory, which according to them, is "the most influential theoretical model for social scientists concerned with understanding Latin America" (Keen and Wasserman 1988, 9). Nonetheless, as we have already seen, most dependentistas have actively rejected both temporal and cultural asymmetric oppositions.

One of the crucial insights of dependency theory is that the production and reproduction of underdevelopment in Latin America should be understood in its connection with the present and not as a survival of the past. The use of synecdochical reasoning is even more acute in Keen's text than in Skidmore and Smith's. The abundance of expressions "Latin American civilization," "Latin American history," "Latin American culture," and so on, reveal a clear intent to constitute Latin America not only as a collection of peoples that live in a geographical region but as a *Volk*. The terms "culture" and "civilization" convey the sense of the overarching unity of a common ethos. For Keen, the expression "Latin American history" is not only the sum of disparate national historical narratives, but also a narrative in itself with an internal coherence that often overlooks national borders.

Latin America: a Concise Interpretative History

E. Bradford Burns's and Julie A. Charlip's *Latin America: a Concise Interpretative History* (2001) is another textbook commonly used in introductory courses to the study of Latin America.

The book cover sports an oil on canvas by the Argentine Pedro Figari, which portrays eleven characters in a rural setting. Two of them play guitars, while two couples dance at the center of the picture and other five figures watch the scene. The men, probably gauchos, are dressed like cowboys, with hats, leather pants, scarves around their necks and cowboy boots. The two men dancing also sport something that resembles a bullet belt around their waist. One brings a long knife tucked in his belt. All women have long hair held by scarves and colorful dresses. On the background there is a blurred green mass that represents either a big mountain or a forest, and a shack. The skin of all



characters is chocolate. Once more we see the reproduction of cultural, temporal, and racial asymmetric oppositions in the same pictorial piece.

Like Keen and Wasserman, Burns and Charlip also opt for a short preface. Their first substantive argument is about the relative character of Latin American underdevelopment.

Certainly by the standards of the United States and Western Europe, Latin America is economically underdeveloped (Burns and Charlip 2001, ix).

In regards to Latin Americans, they add that:

Paradoxically they live in poverty in a region that holds great promise of wealth. Becoming more fully aware of that promise, they want to take advantage of it, to tap their own resources for their own improvement and enrichment. In short, they yearn to improve their quality of life (Burns and Charlip 2001, ix).

The idea that the New World “holds great promise of wealth” is a colonial cliché that Burns and Charlip apply here to the particular case of Latin America. This cliché is usually conveyed as a cornucopia of natural resources: large rivers, fertile soil, sunny and warm weather, ore and precious gems, etc. Nonetheless, Burns should know that in the present-day world economy, ruled by finance and high technology, natural resources are of small value.²³³ Burns’s description of the Latin American drive “to tap their own resources for their own improvement and enrichment” sounds more as a quixotic dream than as sound judgment. One should not forget that Skidmore and Smith also evoked the same “paradoxical” image.

Although the authors take the cautionary step of affirming that Latin America is only comparatively underdeveloped, their argument is rather dubious. In fact, all large Latin America countries, Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, and Chile, have GDP’s per-capita fluctuating around 6,000 dollars – which, in the economic jargon of the World Bank, classifies them as “middle-income countries” (Gereffi 1994). The problem of poverty in those countries stems not from insufficient economic development but from unequal wealth distribution. So far, the effort of “tapping more of their own resources” has not contributed to solving the problem of poverty in these middle-income countries, but to

²³³ The disadvantages of trading raw materials vis-à-vis industrialized goods were demonstrated by the economist Raúl Prebisch already in the late 1940s (Prebisch 1949).

the reproduction of inequality. Nonetheless, Burns and Charlip prefer to maintain their analysis in the language of developmentalism.

Not surprisingly, developmentalism comes accompanied by temporal asymmetric opposition. Burns and Charlip present the following argument to justify Latin American underdevelopment:

Seemingly, one of the major obstructions in their pursuit of improvement is a complex of institutions, patterns, and attitudes fastened on Latin America during the decades in the sixteenth century in which the Iberians were discovering, conquering, and settling the vast area. Many of those institutions, patterns, and attitudes contained vestiges from the Middle Ages, a period already well on the wane in the Iberian Peninsula. But in the New World those seeds from the past took root and flourished (Burns and Charlip 2001, ix).

Their arguments seem still more convoluted than Keen and Wasserman's, but their conclusion is the same. For Burns and Charlip, the introduction of some medieval institutions "during the decades in the sixteenth century in which the Iberians were discovering, conquering, and settling the vast area" are the cause of present underdevelopment. That can only be possible if one already assumes that history in Latin America is reduced to the incessant repetition of the same; not a history of movement and change but of conservation. Contrary to Keen, Burns states that by the time of the New World encounters Spain was no longer medieval. Nonetheless, he adds that in Latin America the "institutions, patterns, and attitudes [that] contained vestiges from the Middle Ages" flourished again. That is, in the end, their disagreement in relation to the actual status of Spain in the sixteenth century does not alter their basic allegiance to the idea that Latin America is stuck in history; it is historically handicapped. Burns repeatedly elaborates the same idea.

To fully develop, to bring the Latin American nations into the twenty-first century, to build a new society in which Latin Americans are masters of their own destiny, it is necessary to substitute newer institutions for those discredited inheritances of the colonial past (Burns and Charlip 2001, x).

This type of reasoning overlooks the fact that, in order to transform present-day poverty and exploitation in Latin America, one has to identify its roots and connections with institutions of the present and not of the past. The majority of the poor in Brazil, for example, live large urban centers, not in the countryside. Their condition is a product of capitalism and not a survival of medieval economic forms. Nonetheless, the survivalist argument fits well the image of a backward and undeveloped Latin America, producer of agricultural goods and raw materials.

Differently from other authors, Burns and Charlip do not identify the violence in Latin America with the preservation of medieval Spanish heritage but with the struggle against it.

[The] desire for change engenders tension, stress, ferment, and violence in contemporary Latin America. The unrest promises to persist until the change from archaic to more rational institutions is made, until a majority both control their government and enjoy the benefits of their society (Burns and Charlip 2001, x).

Nevertheless, the paradigm is still the same. As the passage above shows, Burns and Charlip consider Latin American institutions to be not only traditional and archaic but also lacking in rationality. This seems to be a poor and distorted picture of the actual struggle for democratization in some "Latin American" countries. For example, the political support of domestic and foreign capitalists was crucial to the promotion and maintenance of repressive military regimes both in Brazil and in Argentina -- and those

social forces can hardly be called irrational (Huggins 1998). Burns attachment to the framework of modernization theory leads him to overlook even some mainstream contributors to the Latin American studies literature, such as Guillermo O'Donnell -- who argues that the authoritarian solution was in fact engendered by rationalizing elites (O'Donnell 1973).

Burns and Charlip seem to truly sympathize with what they identify as the struggle of Latin Americans for development and democratization. Contrary to Skidmore and Smith, who limit themselves to portray Latin America as a passive object of American interests, they are actually critical of the way some of those interest have played out in the recent history of US foreign relations.

Preoccupation with the problems and goals of the United States has clouded our vision of Latin America's struggle for justice and development. Tending to interpret Latin America's struggles and problems from our own quite different experiences and perspective, we have misread the meaning of events in Latin America to such an extent that we have made it nearly impossible to understand fully either what is occurring there or its long-range significance for ourselves, our country, and our future. This has become so true that we have unjustly cast Latin America's struggle for change through development into the context of our own conflicts with the USSR... Confusing a struggle for change with a conflict between communism and capitalism-a dangerous misreading of events-the U.S. government has committed unfortunate international errors that have alienated many Latin Americans. Too frequently in this hemisphere, the United States has supported repressive dictatorships, governments that have tended to preserve, indeed to strengthen, those iniquitous institutions from the past that hobble Latin America's development. To the disappointment of many, the United States has not become the champion of the change and reform a majority of Latin Americans want (Burns and Charlip 2001, x).

Despite Burns and Charlip's good intentions in providing the students' with a critical assessment of US foreign policy, their interpretation is somewhat misleading.

They attribute the unjust treatment dispensed by the United States to Latin America to the incapacity that Americans have displayed in understanding Latin America in their own terms -- an argument repeatedly stated by students of corporatism. The use of terms such as “confusing” and “misreading” gives the impression that the US foreign policy record towards Latin America is a product of American naiveté and not of deliberate economic and political interests.

Like Skidmore and Smith, Burns and Charlip write in terms of them and us – they Latin Americans and us, Americans. This language might serve as an easy pedagogic tool to teach American students about the ones who they are not; the others. Nonetheless, it also inculcates a series of unwarranted generalizations that teach students to expect ultimate coherence from Latin America. Unfortunately, this sort of synecdochical reasoning can hardly enlighten readers about the actual “struggle” of people south of the border. For Latin Americans do not act as Latin Americans. People in “Latin America” actually live in national states. Their actions are directed to and constrained by the institutions and societies in which they live. The phrase “the majority of Venezuelans want something” has political meaning, because those people constitute the political community of Venezuela. But the phrase “a majority of Latin Americans want something” has hardly any political meaning, for there are no Latin American institutions through which this collective will could express itself.

The references to race in Burns and Charlip’s *Latin America: a Concise Interpretative History* are not restricted to the cover of the seventh edition. The introductory chapter of the book is named: “The origins of a multiracial society.” The text begins with the following passage:

The New World provided a vast and varied stage upon which met people from three diverse and distant continents: Asia, Europe, and Africa. Representatives of the three races arrived at different times and for different reasons. They mixed, mingled, and married. From their contributions emerged the unique Latin American civilization (Burns and Charlip 2001).

The passage starts with the New World and ends with Latin America. In other words, the United States, or the part of the New World that is not Latin America, was discarded somewhere during the presentation of the argument. Burns states that the three races (Asian, European, and African) met in the New World. Since one should rightfully assume that the United States is part of the "New World," it seems that the first sentence of the passage refers to the whole American continent. Then the reader is informed that "representatives of the three races" "mixed, mingled, and married." It is harder to determine, however, exactly where this mixing, mingling, and marrying actually occurred, because the following sentence, "from their contributions emerged the unique Latin American civilization," suggests that the uniqueness of Latin American civilization comes from racial mixing. After all, if the same mixing had occurred in the United States, Latin America's civilization would not be so unique. That conclusion concurs with the racial asymmetric opposition between the superior white European United States and inferior mulattos, mestizos, and mongrels of Latin America. On the cultural side, it also differentiates a Western United States from the non-Western and exotic Latin America. The general gist is certainly to inform the American reader that Latin America is racially different from the United States.²³⁴ The fact that "Latin America" has nations

²³⁴ Of course that after making those generalizations many authors go into the detail of analyzing particular national cases in Latin America and showing how immensely diverse they are. One should notice, however, that this differentiation is already done within the boundaries of otherness established by the generic definition. Cases that do not fit the generalization, such as the Argentinean's whiteness or the Chilean and Costa Rican

that are predominantly white-European, as well as nations that are predominantly black, or predominantly Indian, does not stop Burns from suggesting this racial generalization.

Latin American politics and development

The exponent of studies of corporatism in Latin America, Howard Wiarda, has also written, in conjunction with Harvey Kline, a fairly popular introduction to Latin American studies textbook called *Latin American politics and development*.²³⁵ Wiarda and Kline spend a great deal of text to introduce Latin America to their student readers. The rhetorical device of repeating the same arguments many times over certainly contributed to the length of the this introductory chapter. Wiarda and Kline write:

James Reston of the *New York Times* once remarked that people in the United States seem willing to do anything for Latin America except read about it or seek to comprehend it. It is our hope that in this book you will not only read about Latin America but also try to understand it. Given the United States' political and strategic interests in the area, the massive Hispanic immigration into the United States, and the country's vulnerability to commodity and raw-material shortages, Latin America is now more important to the United States than ever before (Wiarda and Kline 2000, 5).

The reference to Reston is the same used by Skidmore and Smith, the rhetorical strategy of stating the lack of interest to advocate the need for more knowledge is very similar, and the three reasons called upon to justify American interest in Latin America are exactly the same.

attachment to democracy are rightfully considered exceptions. In other words, the epistemic approach of Latin American studies is set in a way that the examples that confirm the general rule are used while the ones that do not are filtered out: all in the name of the ultimate coherence of Latin American otherness.

²³⁵ See appendix.

The similarities do not stop there. Wiarda and Kline also explicitly condemn the stereotypes through which Americans have historically represented Latin Americans as false and misguided. Also like Skidmore and Smith, Wiarda and Kline use the rhetorical device of first stating that Latin America is complex and diverse to then conclude that it is actually a coherent whole.²³⁶ Their rhetoric operates through adversative formulas.

In fact, the area is characterized by immense diversity... Yet ... there are also important common characteristics of language, culture, institutions, and social and historical backgrounds. Not only is Latin America diverse, but it faces-and has always faced-a profound identity crisis... yet it represents a particular Luso-Hispanic variant of the Western tradition, and its social and cultural underpinnings are quite different from the variant established by the British in North America.

Although the Latin American economies have modernized rapidly since World War II, important continuities with the past still remain.

Increasingly drawn into a world capitalist system, the Latin American systems have *nonetheless* retained a number of distinct historical features (Wiarda and Kline 2000, 4).

Thus, although the book sports a contemporary veneer, the ideas in it are not very different from the ones in Wiarda's pieces on corporatism. Cultural and temporal asymmetric oppositions are deeply interwoven in their arguments. As the passages above indicate, Latin America is perceived as a cultural block, in opposition to British North America. At the same time, the cultural coherence of Latin America is ultimately guaranteed by the strong grasp of tradition. "Tradition" is such an important term for their teaching on Latin America that the authors use the word thirty two times in the fifteen-page introductory first chapter. Predictably, most of the passages in which the

²³⁶ The first edition of *Latin American politics and development* (Wiarda and Kline 1979) preceded the first edition of Skidmore and Smiths *Modern Latin America* by five years (1984).

term is employed convey the idea of a Latin America stuck in the past (temporal asymmetric opposition). The terms “tradition” and “traditional” occur in the text within contexts that are rich in descriptive/evaluative vocabulary:

...the traditional isolation of the *patria chica*... (Wiarda and Kline 2000, 7)

...Latin America's historical traditions of *central control*...(Wiarda and Kline 2000, 12)

...the power of the traditional hacendados... (Wiarda and Kline 2000, 13)

...The elitism of Latin American society stems from the Iberian tradition of nobility, a medieval tradition...(Wiarda and Kline 2000, 15)

...Elitism, hierarchy, and authoritarianism all had a powerful base in traditional Spanish Catholicism...(Wiarda and Kline 2000, 15)

...In many ways, these traditions of hierarchy, authoritarianism, elitism, corporatism, and patrimonialism are still strongly present in Latin American political society...(Wiarda and Kline 2000, 17)

The language adopted by Wiarda and Kline follows a structural principle: asymmetric opposition. Each characteristic ascribed to Latin America corresponds to the negation of an idealized American characteristic. Latin American tradition is the opposite of American modernity; contrasting with *Patria chica*, there is the ever-expanding American nation; for Latin American tradition of central control, there is American federalism; Latin American traditional *hacendados*, American modern capitalists; Latin American elitism, aristocracy, medievalism, American popular democracy and modernism; elitism, hierarchy, and authoritarianism, more democracy, pluralism, and liberalism; Spanish Catholicism, Germanic Protestantism; *et coetera*...

One should notice that despite the apparent pure cultural aspect of some of these oppositions, the overall dependency of the whole presentation of Latin America on the notion of tradition always leaves the possibility of translating cultural asymmetric oppositions into temporal asymmetric opposition.

The adjective “strong” is also generously used by the authors: thirteen times in the first chapter. Its function is to dramatize and emphasize the traditional aspect of Latin America.

...traditional Spanish institutions were *strong*... (Wiarda and Kline 2001, 17)

...Some countries that lacked *strong* Hispanic institutions endeavored later to create them ... (Wiarda and Kline 2001, 17)

...[a] Greco-Roman-Hispanic tradition, integrated into a world pattern of change and interaction but with a style and institutions all of its own and with *strong* institutions and political dynamics... (Wiarda and Kline 2001, 5)

...the traditional institutions and holders of power (such as the oligarchy) remain *strong*... (Wiarda and Kline 2001, 5)

Skidmore and Smith’s formula “the strong pull of history” comes immediately to mind.

One have to bear in mind that Wiarda and Kline’s book aims at explaining development in Latin America, that is, change, movement, words that do not go well with the idea of indelible tradition. Indeed, Wiarda and Kline speak of Latin America going through a process of modernization. Nonetheless, for them, change in Latin America is always something that comes from outside, from the West, from the United States. Traditionalism is in fact *the* essential Latin American character. Latin American

condition is thus characterized as split between a natural tendency to maintain endogenous traditions and the unstoppable appeal of foreign modernization.

Latin America today is an area of immense vibrancy and sometimes dizzying change, of clash and conflict, of complex efforts to deal with developmental issues of great importance, of attempts to retain what is valuable in its own traditions and past (strong family ties and interpersonal relations, a strong sense of community, intense individualism, an ethical view of people and society) while also accommodating itself to the modern world (Wiarda and Kline 2001, 5).

In other words, Latin Americans do not act, they only react, and their reaction is in the direction of trying to maintain their traditions, which are basically the same ones that have been continuously lambasted by modernization theory and corporatism.

Another important argument presented by the authors is that the encounter between modernizing ideologies and traditional values resulted in conflict, confusion, and instability. Like Skidmore and Smith, and Burns, they identify the modernizing process as a cause of violence and unrest in Latin America.

The assumption of inherent traditionalism is the key analytical tool through which the authors elaborate holistic interpretations that encompass not only cultural and historical, but also political and economic aspects.

Latin America is indeed a part of the capitalist world, but it often practices its own special form of capitalism. In keeping with Latin America's historical traditions of central control, the capitalism of Latin America has generally been not one of laissez-faire and individual initiative but a system of state capitalism, with a comparatively large public sector and a great deal of central direction (Wiarda and Kline 2001, 12).

Here, the reader is led to believe that the state had an important historical role in promoting capitalist development in "Latin America" *because* of the "strong pull"

exerted by the Latin tradition of central authority. In fact, it would be reasonable to say that the state played a crucial role in all “Latin American” countries that succeeded in developing industrial capitalism. That does not mean, however, that the economic intervention of the state was prompted by tradition. Quite the contrary, in the case of Brazil, for example, the “tradition” from the foundation of the Brazilian republic (1889) to the 1930s was one of small state and liberal economic policy. The policy of import substitution and incentives to industrialization promoted by Getúlio Vargas were in fact innovations and not some sort of traditional continuity.²³⁷ During the same period, the American government was also intervening in the economy in order to mend the disastrous effects of the Great Depression. Thus, while the phenomenon is quite similar, only in Latin America it is ascribed to a tradition of central control. One could hardly imagine that Wiarda and Kline would use the same causal argument to explain the American New Deal. Furthermore, the suggestion that state economic interventionism is a Latin American form of capitalism is an outright fallacy. The majority of the most economically developed countries of today adopted a large array of interventionist and protectionist policies while they were developing, and only adopted laissez-faire policies after they had acquired a technological lead. This is particularly true for “Anglo-Saxon” countries such as the United States and England.²³⁸

Even though the subject of the passage is Latin America, the student is also taught something about the United States: that its economic success is founded on the values of

²³⁷ Even James M. Malloy, who like Wiarda “explains” Latin America in terms of corporatist values, affirms that before the 1930s “liberal concepts of political economy that had been previously dominant” in Latin America (Malloy 1996).

²³⁸ In *Kicking Away the Ladder: Development Strategy in Historical Perspective* (2002), Ha-Joon Chang substantiate this argument through the analysis of large array of historical economic data.

“laissez-faire and individual initiative.” This idealized image of the American national self lurks behind the comments on Latin America, as an implicit yardstick, and Latin America is described as the opposite of that image. Once we learn how to read through Wiarda and Kline’s rhetoric of adversatives, their message becomes clear: Latin America is so strongly bound to the past that even capitalist development there is nothing more than a simulacrum.

In many respects, the modern Latin American economies represent an updated, modernized extension of the semi-feudal, exploitative “milk-cow,” mercantilist system of the colonial period (Wiarda and Kline 2001, 13).


In sum, temporal asymmetric opposition is the most important element of Wiarda and Kline’s teaching. Their whole presentation is based on inculcating in the reader the perception that Latin America has a different relation with time than does the United States. While the United States is continuously leaving its past behind and advancing toward the future, Latin America is irremediably stranded in its own past. The authors claim that this basic perception should also inform the epistemic attitude of the reader toward Latin America.

Latin America is a product of its past in ways that North America is not. In many respects, Latin America remains dominated by institutions and practices first established during the colonial era; in many ways, it is still a semifeudal area. Because the weight of history is so strong, one must come to grips with Latin America’s past in order to understand its present (Wiarda and Kline 2001, 20).

The passage above is presented as a summary of the whole introductory chapter.

The cover of the fifth edition of Wiarda and Kline’s *Latin America Politics and*

Development corroborates the general tone of the text. It carries a simple geometrical drawing of Aztec origin.



When encountering the book for the first time, most readers might not be able to identify the source of that picture. Some impressions, however, are more readily accessible. The drawing can easily be associated with primitivism. Its pattern is repetitive but the repetitions are imperfect and irregular – a typical feature of handiwork. Handiwork is associated with low technological skills, exoticism, alien cultures, and otherness. Furthermore, the most obvious way through which “primitive” features survive in the present is through undying traditionalism, backwardness, and archaism. Nevertheless, the book is about Latin America in the present. In other words, Latin

America in the present is represented by a drawing that symbolizes the past. In sum, the cover communicates the main feature of Wiarda and Kline's description of Latin America: temporal asymmetric opposition.

Most readers might be able to recognize the drawing on the book's cover as a product of "Indian" handiwork. Interestingly, the combination between such an image and the name "Latin America" in the title creates an apparent paradox: Latin America is represented by a symbol that is explicitly pre-colonial, i.e., pre-Latin.

The association between Latin America and Indians carries obvious racial overtones. So we should go back to the text in search of the authors' take on race. Wiarda and Kline avoid presenting a unified racial profile of Latin America. Nonetheless, their comparative explanation of racial relations in the Americas should be looked at in more detail.

It has been estimated that whereas the Indian population of North America numbered only 3 million at the time of European colonization and generally consisted of dispersed and small-sized tribes, the number of Indians in Latin America was about 30 million and many of them were grouped into settled, large civilizations. These differences in number and complexity shaped the subsequent histories of the two areas to a major extent and help explain the differences in society and race relations that persist in the two parts of the Americas.

North Americans largely "solved" their Indian problem by either killing the Indians or, later, confining them to reservations. In Latin America there were, in many areas, too many Indians to be killed; although the Spanish conquest involved barbarism toward the Indians at least equal to that of the English colonists, the sheer number of Indians in Latin America dictated a policy of assimilation rather than one of annihilation. The Indians were generally subdued rather than slaughtered, Indian leaders were often co-opted into working with or for the Spaniards, and the Spanish usually replaced the Indian aristocracy at the top of the social pyramid without destroying the pyramid per se (Wiarda and Kline 2001, 21).

Interestingly, Wiarda and Kline abandon culturalist arguments when talking about race. The guiding assumption of their text is that the American and the Latin American experiences have been clearly separated along the lines of different and opposing traditions. Nevertheless, racial relations seem to constitute an exceptional case. They explain the difference between the almost complete extermination of the Indian peoples in the United States and the survival of large Indian populations in Latin America in terms of the different levels of civilization and population of the Indian peoples in each place. That is, the attitude of the colonizer, “their tradition” in terms of dealing with perceived racial difference does not count here. It seems that tradition is only important when it describes some Latin American characteristic that is comparatively inferior to an American one.

North America was settled mainly by families, but Latin America was conquered by conquistadores who did not bring their families along because they viewed the conquest as a military campaign. The immense differences in the number of Indians and the level of their civilizations between the two parts of the Americas also implied a greater racial intermingling and less manifest racial prejudice in Latin America than in North America (Wiarda and Kline 2001, 20).

Here the previous argument is translated into the present. The authors acknowledge that “manifest racial prejudice” is greater in North America than in Latin America. However, cultural traditions are once more left out of the argument. Again, the causes are the civilization level of the Indians and number. The reader is led to conclude that American racism has nothing to do with a “Anglo-Saxon” racist tradition. The counterexample of South Africa comes to mind when the argument of number promoting “greater racial intermingling and less manifest racial prejudice” is raised, after all in that country the native population greatly outnumbered the European colonizers. Another

counterexamples, closer to “home” can also be found. The case of Brazil can be used to rebut the argument based on the civilization level of the Indians. The Brazilian Indians had the “simplest” material culture of the whole continent. Their population was comparatively small and dispersed in small tribes throughout Brazil’s immense territory. Nonetheless, the Indian element in the contemporary population of Brazil is much stronger than in the United State’s. That is, it seems that “level of civilization” and number cannot explain alone “greater racial intermingling and less manifest racial prejudice.” In sum, Wiarda and Kline use of culturally loaded arguments in a very selective manner: they are employed to compose a negative image of Latin America and put aside to avoid exposing negative features of the United States.

In sum, the introduction to Latin America taught by Wiarda and Kline miseducates the students in two ways: it misrepresents the ones they call Latin American at the same time that it discourages the development of a critical instance toward American politics and values.

Other textbooks

Although not bestsellers, the following textbooks are still adopted throughout the university system.²³⁹ Among them, one finds John Charles Chasteen’s *Born in blood and fire: a concise history of Latin America*, which begins with the following thoughts:

Latin America was born in blood and fire, in conquest and slavery. So that is where to begin a brief introduction to Latin American history, cutting straight to the heart of the matter, identifying central conflicts, and not mincing words. It is precisely conquest and its


²³⁹ See appendix.

sequel, colonization, that created the central conflict of Latin American history. Conquest and colonization form the unified starting place of a single story, told here with illustrative examples from many countries. We need a single story. Rapid panoramas of twenty national histories would merely produce dizziness (Chasteen 2001, 15).

The same familiar tropes of temporal asymmetric opposition and synecdochical fallacy are here presented in a concentrated form. For Chasteen, as for many others, the ultimate coherence of Latin American history springs from the continuous presence of the past – expressed by him through the argument that conquest and colonization created the central conflict of Latin American history. According to him, they “form the unified starting place of a single story” – despite the fact that there were actually two colonial processes in “Latin America,” led by two independent European monarchies. Of course that, like many other Latinamericanists writing today, Chasteen is partially aware of some problems involved in making such bold claim. But also like his peers, he resorts to the usual cliché references to Latin America’s complexity and diversity in order to deflect those problems. Nonetheless, those rhetorical clichés are rapidly discarded ([r]apid panoramas of twenty national histories would merely produce dizziness) in the name of the synecdochical imperative: “We need a single story.”

The title of Chasteen’s book is actually a dramatization of the idea of a Latin American unity through attachment to the past. He explains that “Latin America was born in blood and fire, in conquest and slavery:” that is the heart of the Latin American matter. If being born on blood and fire is specific of Latin America, it must be because other places were not born the same way. That is, this way of “putting things” suggests a hidden comparison other places. The most obvious comparison, of course, is with the United States. That is, the reader is lead to infer that the United States was not born in the same conditions. Nonetheless, given the fact that the “birth” of the United States

involved a long war of liberation, the bloodiest fratricidal war in the history of the continent, large scale Indian genocide, and the continued reliance of the national economy on slave labor, one can hardly claim that this country was not born in blood and fire, in conquest and slavery. Why is the “Latin America” experience presented in such dramatic terms and the American simply forgotten? After all, the atrocities that contributed to the appearance of new nations in the New World are quite similar, be they North or South of the Rio Grande. Once again, the construction of Latin America in asymmetrical opposition to the United States serves not only to degrade the supposed Latin Americans but also to miseducate American readers about their own country.



The cover of the book could not be more predictable.²⁴⁰ Similarly to the picture on the cover of Keen and Wasserman's *A History of Latin America*, this one shows the token Latin Americans as dark-skinned types wearing crossed bandoleers on their chests, sporting big sombreros on their heads, and carrying rifles with long bayonets. The image repeats so many of the pictorial clichés that we have already seen associated to Latin Americans that its analysis in terms of asymmetrical oppositions is not necessary.

Finally, we are going to assess the most radically stereotyping textbook of this selection: the fifth edition of Paul B. Goodwin's *Global studies: Latin America* (1992). Like many other textbooks, Goodwin starts his book warning against the stereotypes through which Latin America has been represented by most of the "world:" "mustachioed bandit wearing a large sombrero and draped with cartridge belts," guerrilla, laziness, and machismo. He adds that those stereotypes spring from bias and ignorance of Latin America diversity. Goodwin equals stereotypes with mythology, something that he opposes to reality. Hence, he names the first chapter of his book "Latin America; Myth and Reality." However, he spends only a paragraph of that chapter decrying stereotypes. All the remaining text is dedicated to dealing with "Latin America's reality."

Goodwin starts describing Latin America's reality by stating its complexity and multiplicity of cultures. He then cites two scholars who defend conflicting interpretations of that reality: one that the Iberian inheritance is an essential part of [the Latin Americans'] lives and customs, and the other "that generalizations about Latin American

²⁴⁰ The book does not provide the name of the artist.

cultural unity are no longer tenable." Goodwin's side in this conflict is elaborate in the following passage:

It is true that there are profound differences that separate each of the nations of the region. But there exists a cultural bedrock that ties Latin America to Spain and Portugal, and even beyond-to the Roman Empire and the great cultures of the Mediterranean world (Goodwin 1992).

Confirming the pervasiveness of the same rhetorical clichés in the introduction to Latin American studies literature, Goodwin first states Latin America's complexity just to insert after it an adversative sentence reinstating its ultimate unity. In substantive terms, his account is dominated by temporal asymmetric opposition: the key to understand Latin America is in its past. At the same time, this past is also presented as a set of cultural Iberian and Roman traditions. That is, temporal asymmetric opposition is interwoven with cultural asymmetric opposition.

Thus, after introducing the trope of Latin America's historical handicap, Goodwin comments on its most relevant cultural features. First comes the "Latin American family:"

The family unit has survived even Latin America's economic development and the pressures of modernization. Family ties are strong and dominant (Goodwin 1992).

From his assessment of the family, he adds that

In a region where the interaction of networks of families is the rule and where frequent human contact is sought out, it is not surprising to find that Latin Americans are, above all, an urban people (Goodwin 1992).

How come? Because Latin Americans are still attached to the ancient conception that leisure time is necessary for a good life.

Their concept of dignity was linked closely to this lofty conception of leisure. Work, by contrast, is often perceived as a necessary evil (Goodwin 1992).

According to the author, concepts of work and leisure spring from a deeper Latin American conception of time.

Latin American attitudes toward time also reveal the inner workings of the culture... When a Latin American spends hours over lunch or over coffee in a cafe, he is not wasting time. For here, with his friends, he is with the source of his power. It is important to remember that networks of friends and families are the glue of Latin American society (Goodwin 1992).

Goodwin then explains the different nature of Latin American time to his American audience:

Perceptions of time in Latin America also have a broader meaning. North American students who have been exposed to Latin American literature are almost always confused by the absence of a "logical" chronological development of the story. Time, for Latin Americans, tends to be circular rather than linear. That is, the past and the present are perceived as equally relevant-both are points on a circle. The past is as important as the present (Goodwin 1992).

Such perception of time obviously influences their concept of history.

The historical memory, from a North American or Northern European perspective, is faulty. From the Latin American perspective, however, it is the perception of the past that is important, regardless of its factual accuracy. Myth and reality, appearances and substance, merge (Goodwin 1992).

Predictably, after the enunciation of temporal asymmetric opposition, cultural asymmetric oppositions rapidly follow: attachment to family values, widespread machismo and *marianismo*, and love of appearances, which can be likened to pride, vanity, and irrationality. For example, Goodwin says that the Latin American love of appearances is so extreme that people put television antennas over their shantytowns shacks even when they do not have a television set.

Translatability is always present in the form of the association between historical handicap and lack of modern rationality. The author explains that due to the survival of ancient Roman values, Latin Americans dislike work and love leisure. The Latin American conception of time is also said to be related to the traditional social structure dominated by family values. Finally, the claim that Latin Americans confuse myth and reality, past and present, and are not prone to factual accuracy borders overt insult -- in fact, a sort of insult that we have already identified in both the modernization and the corporatist approaches.

Goodwin attributes the lack of linear ("logical") chronological narratives in some "Latin American" literary works to Latin America's ingrained notion of circular time. Nevertheless, the fact that some "Latin American" literary figures have been tinkering with non-linear chronological narratives since the late nineteenth century seems to be more a product of deliberate artistic practice in literary milieus connected to the European avant-garde than some expression of cultural determinacy. After all, the author should know that linear chronological narratives abound in "Latin American" literature, the same way it does in the American paperback literature and in the narrative of Hollywood movies. The problem, thus, is not Latin American irrationality but Goodwin's ignorance.

After reading so many passages, it is hard to believe in the seriousness of Goodwin's self-proclaimed purpose of rejecting common-held stereotypes. On the contrary, he seems to be engaged in proving that those stereotypes are real. But Goodwin insists on the corporatist cliché of arguing that Latin Americans should be understood by their own measures: that the North American tendency of judging Latin America according to the American yardstick generates grave distortions. As we have seen above, Goodwin's ethnology is actually about comparing Latin Americans to rational Americans and Europeans. The most blatant evidence of the terms of understanding Latin America are given by an American yardstick is stamped at the opening two pages of the book, dedicated to providing the student with information about the United States. The text starts with the following passage:

The United States is unique. It has some of the most fertile land in the world, which, coupled with a high level of technology, allows the production of an abundance of food products-an abundance that makes possible the export of enormous quantities of basic foodstuffs to many other parts of the world. The use of this technology also permits the manufacture of goods and services that exceed what is possible in a majority of the rest of the world. In the United States are some of the most important urban centers in the world focusing on trade, investment, and commerce as well as art, music, and theater (Goodwin 1992).

There are three photographs printed over the top of this text: one showing a tractor on a long ploughed agricultural field – a clear reference to mechanized agriculture, another showing a high-tech auto industry operated by robots, and a third photo showing the Manhattan skyline with the Empire State Building and the World Trade Center in it. Only after reading and seeing this rosy description of American exceptionalism, which portrays only progress and wealth, is the student introduced to Latin America through the text we had just analyzed. This introduction also comes with three photographs

interspersed with text. Like the photos of the United States, those also have explanatory subtitles. The first says:

In Latin America, the family is an important element in the cultural context. These children, who live in a slum in Santiago, Chile, come from caring families (Goodwin 1992).

The second:

The role of the native woman in Latin America has been defined by centuries of tradition. This woman is spinning wool, in Chimburaso, Ecuador, just as her ancestors (Goodwin 1992).

And the third:

Agriculture is the backbone of much of Latin America's cultures and economies. These workers are harvesting sugarcane on a plantation in the state of Pernambuco, Brazil (Goodwin 1992).

The photographs not only confirm the stereotypes that Goodwin states through his writings, they portray a rural (something that he denied in the text), backward, and dark-skinned Latin America. The interplay between text and pictures we have seen so far is also found here. Whereas the load of temporal and cultural asymmetric oppositions is delivered through both text and pictures, racial asymmetric opposition is conveyed mostly through pictorial material. Like in many other textbooks, the pictures in Goodwin's *Global studies* show what the subtitles do not have to say: Latin Americans are dark-skinned people, mostly Indians.

The premise that Latin America constitutes an absolute Other has also rhetorical and stylistic consequences. The most relevant of them is the pervasive use of

synecdochical reasoning. Goodwin speaks of “Latin American culture,” “society,” “history,” “political culture,” and so on, as if Latin America were not only absolutely different but also absolutely cohesive and homogeneous. When it comes to generalizing, Goodwin can hardly be matched. His text is a good example of how a language that is presented as descriptive can assume normative and evaluative character.

Conclusion

Goodwin’s *Global studies* is a really interesting case. On the one hand, it is almost a caricature of a textbook, where the three forms of asymmetrical opposition are abundantly used and clearly reveal themselves as insult, and synecdochical reasoning is employed with no restraint. On the other hand, the arguments, images, and rhetoric employed by Goodwin can be found, sometimes in a subtler manner, in almost all other textbooks. That is, the caricature reveals some of the deep truths about the Latin American studies textbook literature.

The analysis of the allusive book covers sported by those works also throws a revealing light over the activity of teaching “Latin America.” The thorny issue of race, which is usually avoided or downplayed in text, finds full expression in the pictures that adorn the covers. Racial asymmetric opposition is widespread in this material, with Latin Americans being consistently depicted as non-white. One should remember that the meaning of the picture changes with its transposition to the cover of a publication. That is, a painting produced by an artist that originally meant to depict, for example, Mexican revolutionaries, assumes an entirely different meaning when sported on a cover of an introduction to Latin America studies or history of Latin America book. In this new location, the picture represents Latin America as a whole to a public of young Americans that know very little or nothing about the Mexican revolution, and thus, do not have the

means to recover the original authorial intention. The same applies for the ubiquitous paintings of Indians, Aztecs, and Maya, parting gauchos, and other “exotic” types chosen to represent Latin America. Finally, the fact that authors are not always the ones who choose the images on the covers of their books might be important from the perspective of authorial intention, but becomes irrelevant when the aim is to assess the social circulation of the concept of Latin America and the role of Latin American studies as an institution in it.

9. Conclusion

This critical history of the concept of Latin America in American English reveals the consistent presence of forms of asymmetric opposition in the concept's semantic field. That is, Latin America has been repeatedly defined through explicit or implicit comparison to an idealized model image of America (the United States). At several moments of the analysis, I also pointed to the possibilities of translation among different forms of asymmetric opposition. That phenomenon is possible due to the polysemous character of words that inhabit a given configuration of Latin America's semantic field, e.g., Catholic, which is a cultural category, acquires temporal meanings such as retarded, backward, underdeveloped. I have also noticed the widespread usage of synecdochical reasoning, a rhetorical device that extends the reach of asymmetrical oppositions by generalizing their application, e.g., a military coup d'état in El Salvador is perceived as a manifestation of the Latin American militaristic, violent, and unstable character.

The typology of forms of misrecognition, together with the property of translatability and the rhetorical device of synecdochical reasoning, have shown to be productive analytical tools for the analysis of discourses on Latin America. But they are not specific to that particular case. That is, at least hypothetically, this analytical apparatus can be applied to the study of any asymmetrical concept as well as for identifying the practice of misrecognition through linguistic usage in general. Furthermore, it is important to note that its application is not restricted to textual analysis, as the assessment of cartoons (chapter 3) and pictures on book covers (chapter 7) made clear.

In the following section, I review the findings of this conceptual history of Latin America, focusing on the operation of forms of asymmetric opposition within its semantic field. The idea here is to establish rupture and continuity in the historical succession of configurations of misrecognition forms that have structured the semantic field of the concept of Latin America (e.g., Manifest Destiny, modernization, corporatism, textbooks, etc). Next, I address the relation between configurations of forms of asymmetric opposition and the respective set of expectations they are able to support. In order to understand those expectations, each configuration must be placed within its own historico-political context. That allows one to see how the conceptualization of Latin America was integrated to actual political projects and policies. Following this analysis, I will make some considerations about the role that Latin American studies has played in producing politically useful knowledge about Latin America. Finally, this dissertation comes to a conclusion with some considerations about the political and normative consequences of the critical approach it adopts.

Latin America through asymmetric oppositions

With the analysis of the introduction to Latin America textbook literature, the last chapter has brought this inquiry to the present. From this viewpoint the history of the concept of Latin America can be assessed in terms of the successive configurations of forms of asymmetric oppositions that have structured its semantic field. This assessment should start with the general picture of this history in the context of the language of everyday life. Although the main focus of the dissertation was the social scientific literature, we also had the chance to examine some of the “images” associated with Latin America in everyday usage. That is the case in Chapter 3, where the pre-history of Latin

America is addressed. Most of the excerpts chosen to exemplify the role of the concept of Spanish America in the Manifest Destiny ideology were originally published as newspaper articles and other publication of great circulation. The cartoon collection put together by John J. Johnson – which covers the first seven decades of the twentieth century -- and the results of the poll conducted by the Office of Public Opinion Research in 1940 can also be considered as sources of everyday linguistic usage of “Latin America”. Finally, the introduction to Latin America textbook literature (chapter 8), although written by social scientist specialists, has the express intent of teaching things about Latin America to a public that is not yet acquainted to social scientific theories about that subject. Due to its pedagogical intent, the literature is forced to converse with everyday notions of Latin America held by its audiences.

The general picture gathered from three “moments” is quite disappointing to those who have believed that the United States has overcome its historical biases toward Latin America. The three forms of asymmetric opposition, cultural, temporal, and racial, seem to have endured the passage of time, for they are clearly articulated in the Manifest Destiny’s texts, in the cartoons, in the poll results, as well as in the textbook literature. Therefore, on this general level, the semantic field of “Latin America” seems to have enjoyed a great deal of historical continuity in American English. Latin Americans are today still misrecognized by basically the same characteristics attributed to them a hundred and fifty years ago: non-white (i.e. racially inferior), culturally corrupted, and historically incapacitated.

Nevertheless, the main focus of the substantive work in this dissertation was not the language of everyday life but social scientific discourse on Latin America. At this level, the concept of Latin America seems to have experienced some historical change.

In modernization theory's presentation of Latin America cultural and temporal asymmetric opposition predominate, whereas racial asymmetric opposition is rarely articulated. Furthermore, the type of temporal asymmetric opposition present in modernization theory considerably differs from the one of Manifest Destiny. This nineteenth century nationalist ideology rested on the explicit religious conviction that American superiority was a direct product of God's will. That religious conviction expressed itself through all three forms of opposition; i.e., racial, cultural (moral), and historical superiority were perceived as manifestations of America's God willed Destiny. In Manifest Destiny's teleological conception, history is determined by forces that are not themselves historical.

In contrast to Manifest Destiny, modernization theory (chapter 4) presents a form of temporal asymmetric opposition that is based chiefly on the ideas of material and moral progress, and thus is exempt from explicit references to religious belief. This conception of temporality, which can be traced back to some trends of the French Enlightenment,²⁴¹ suits scientific discourse for it enables allegedly objective value-free standards for measuring and comparing human subjects. Whereas Manifest Destiny could not assert the United States claim to superiority without resorting to the providential Will of God, modernization theory can state it in terms of levels of industrialization, literacy, education, urbanization, democracy, etc -- things that are produced by human activity. However, modernization aims not solely at stating material superiority but, more importantly, at explaining it through the "measurement" of culture, which authors prefer to address, according to Weberian social scientific convention, in

²⁴¹ For a more in-depth exploration of this topic see João Feres Jr. "Political philosophy, ethnology, and time: a study of the notion of historical handicap" (2002).

terms of “values”.²⁴² As the analysis has shown, the values attributed to Latin American culture by modernization authors are explicit opposites of what are deemed to be the fundamental American (United States) values, which, in turn, are strictly positive. In other words, in modernization theory, cultural opposition functions as measurement for temporal opposition. It is through the comparative analysis of cultural values that modernization social scientists establish the temporal location of his object: either in the modern or in the traditional camp. Nevertheless, the cultural comparison is not done without embedded temporal assumptions, for one of the poles of comparison, the positive American model, is considered modern from the outset. Conversely, the cultural values attributed to Latin America are repeatedly qualified as “traditional”, something that also suggests a temporal perception that informs the cultural analysis.

On the one hand, temporal asymmetric opposition in Modernization Theory cannot be understood without its cultural asymmetric markers. But the opposite is also true, for cultural asymmetric opposition is laced with temporal asymmetric meanings that cannot be easily extricated. That is why I have stressed the possibility of mutual translation between these two forms of misrecognition in modernization theory: terms used to express temporal opposition often have cultural import and vice-versa. The same is not true for the Manifest Destiny ideology, which besides cultural and temporal asymmetric opposition also has a strong racial asymmetric component. Although a great deal of translation among its three forms of asymmetric opposition could be also accomplished through Manifest Destiny, there were clear limits. The religious conviction about God’s grace justified the perceived American superiority, but in practical

²⁴² The problem of making a value-free theory of values is obviously not addressed by modernization theory.

(empirical) terms race played a crucial role in marking the ones that were not favored by God, even more so than cultural traits. That can be gauged by the abundance of racist arguments in Manifest Destiny's texts. Thus, a characteristic such as, for example, morally corrupt was understood as being rooted in racial inferiority, whereas the opposite does not necessarily apply.²⁴³

The presence of racial asymmetric opposition severely alters the range of expectations generated within Latin America's semantic field. For example, the absence of strong racial asymmetric opposition in modernization theory enabled the justification of the modernization project in the particular historico-political context in which it appeared. That is, the idea of reforming the culture of Latin America (and thus promoting economic development) could only be articulated because the "theory" takes for granted that, whatever their racial characteristics, Latin Americans are at least hypothetically capable of achieving modernization. Modernization theory not only presents a diagnosis of Latin America's cultural and temporal pathologies, it also points to the possibility of a future solution, which authors repeatedly say will require the Latin Americans' acculturation through the inculcation of modern Western or American values.

The hypothetical addition of racial asymmetric opposition to the concept's field would lead to the conclusion that the modernization project could not be accomplished without significantly "whitening" Latin America's population. Similarly, the presence of racial asymmetric opposition in the Manifest Destiny Ideology enabled the expectations

²⁴³ It is reasonable to suppose that the Manifest Destiny ideology did not foreclose the possibility of moral corruption among white Anglo-Saxons. After all, the existence of some Catholics (e.g., Maryland), misfits, criminals, and other forms of marginality among American Anglo-Saxons could hardly be denied. Thus, the asymmetry introduced by race can be summarized by the idea that although being Anglo Saxon does not entirely guarantee moral excellence, being non-white necessarily entails moral inferiority.

of fulfilling God's will through the subjection, segregation, if not elimination, of the racially inferior population. In sum, racial asymmetric opposition projects the rigorous control of the Other's body through measures much more severe than the process of cultural diffusion imagined by modernization theorists.²⁴⁴

The literature on political stabilization (chapter 5) adopted the basic diagnosis of Latin America presented in "mainstream" modernization texts: a mix of cultural and temporal asymmetric oppositions. However, political stabilization authors gave different emphasis to some elements of this diagnosis, which led them to significantly alter the range of expectations produced by their theoretical effort. Some modernization texts do refer to their object of study as transitional societies, that is, societies that are in the process of shedding their traditional values and acquiring modern ones – this is also true for modernization texts on Latin America. The introduction of modern elements in those societies, the argument proceeds, may cause a "revolution of rising expectations" that has politically destabilizing consequences. Despite the occasional presence of this argument, the concern with the dangers of transition is often supplanted in modernization texts by the optimistic prognosis for the modernization process. The positive horizon of expectations created by modernization rests on the assumptions that the intricacies of economic development have been cracked, that economic development contributes to the parallel development of democracy and political institutions, and that modern values will diffuse within traditional societies compelled by their own superiority.

²⁴⁴ As we have seen in chapter 3, some modernization theorists argued that the diffusion of modern values through cultural contact was a historically unavoidable and almost spontaneous process.

Differently from its counterpart, the literature on political stabilization puts a great emphasis on the dangers of transition. Its authors claim that the priorities of the “modernization project” should be reshuffled, with political stability assuming the first position and modernization falling to an honorable second. This critical move exposes important features of the “modernization project” that were not completely apparent in modernization texts. As I have shown, before becoming an academic approach, “modernization” was projected by the American government as a means to fight the spread of communism in the Third World. The argument supporting this project was that poverty provides a breeding ground for communism; thus, eradicating poverty through development would be an efficient way of combating communist infiltration. This syllogism appears in foundational modernization texts such as Rostow’s and Millikan’s. Nonetheless, its importance to the overall argument is overshadowed by the claim that modernization was a true aspiration of Third World peoples. On the one hand, the fight against communism and the honorable betterment of the wretched of the earth could be happily married under modernization’s program of salvation. On the other hand, fulfilling the Third World aspiration for development was a much better selling pitch than the interest-laden arguments of Cold War antagonism. In sum, evading explicit references to the Cold War agenda was a strategy often adopted in modernization texts, including the ones on Latin America that I have analyzed here.

For political stabilization authors this tactic of evasion is no longer possible, not because they think that modernization misdiagnosed Latin America’s pathologies, but because they argued that the remedy prescribed by modernization is not only insufficient against communist infiltration but actually contributes to its spread. Political stabilization authors criticize the idea that political development would be parallel to economic

development, stressing that the revolution of rising expectations would bring the frail political systems of transitional societies to the brink of revolution. Their solution, thus, was to promote political stability first, which could be accomplished with American support for Latin American anti-communist pro-US military. This conclusion brought the Cold War agenda to the forefront of their project, something that political stabilization authors were not shy to admit. At the same time, they make a concession to modernization concerns by arguing that the same stability-providing military were the trustworthiest heralds of modernization in Latin America as well as elsewhere in the transitional world.

One should notice that the literature on political stabilization in Latin America was able to perform this revisionist movement without significantly altering the basic description of Latin America they inherited from modernization theorists, which was one of cultural corruption and historical paralysis. That is, the same combination of cultural and temporal asymmetric oppositions used by modernization authors to depict Latin America is also found in the political stabilization literature. The revision was done by shifting the stress put on different elements of Latin America's semantic field without adding or subtracting core elements.

The real challenge to modernization theory's description of Latin America came not from the political stabilization literature, but from the dependency approach, which was also named by the secondary literature "dependency theory" or "dependency studies" (chapter 6). The dependency approach was received in the United States as "Latin American" intellectual response to modernization theory -- although Andre Gunder Frank, one of the most received authors, came originally from the American academy. As the analysis of two of the most influential "original" works revealed, dependency's

criticism can be interpreted as a challenge to the two forms of asymmetric opposition that support modernization's diagnosis of Latin America. First, dependency authors such as Frank, and Cardoso and Faletto argue that underdevelopment in Latin America was not a sign of the region's historical handicap, but, on the contrary, the product of the historical relationship the developed countries maintained with Latin America. Second, they add that underdevelopment in Latin America is not a product of Latin America's inadequate cultural values, but a structural consequence of the international division of labor imposed by the asymmetric world capitalist system. Racial asymmetric opposition plays no role in those texts.

Dependency theorists went further to question the political agenda that animated modernization writings on Latin America. More importantly, they also contributed to placing the concept of Latin America under critical scrutiny. Although Frank, and Cardoso and Faletto abundantly employ the expression Latin America (or América Latina) in their works, they also show a great awareness of the problems involved in generalizing about Latin America. Frank does that more indirectly by arguing that, rather than a product of specific Latin cultural characteristics, Latin America's history was a product of the historical process of European colonization and, later, American imperialism shared by other regions of the world. Cardoso, in turn, explicitly decries the obstinacy of American social scientists in creating theories to explain Latin America as a whole, arguing that dependency studies were originally designed to understand national political and social contexts.

Dependency was positively received in the United States by a young generation of scholars who were critical to both American foreign policy toward "Latin America" and modernization theory, which by the mid-1960s had become a leading approach to the

study of Latin America and other Third World areas in the United States. Consequently, they also showed a great disposition to reject the cultural and temporal asymmetric oppositions proposed by modernization's reading of Latin America. At the same time, however, authors showed a somewhat less critical awareness in relation to the fallacy of what I have called synecdochical reasoning – a basic element of misrecognition that can survive the demise of asymmetric oppositional forms.²⁴⁵ The perseverance of synecdochical reasoning seems to be linked to the penchant for scholarship that assailed American dependency studies of Latin America. Instead of further pursuing the critique of the concept of Latin America, something that could have been done through the critical path opened by “original” dependency writings, American dependency studies ended up chasing an ever more “perfect” scholarly theory of Latin America. The more “perfect” the theory of Latin America, the less it captures the specific political and social conditions under which the actual people perceived as Latin American live, for, as I have already stated here, there is no Latin American citizen, state, or constitution. The more the theory becomes drenched with synecdochical reasoning, the more it misrecognizes the people it allegedly portrays, the more useless it becomes as a tool for transforming reality, which was a basic concern in original dependency studies.

The reception of dependency studies in the United States was not entirely positive. The more conservative branch of American academia rejected dependency on the grounds that the approach was holistic, non-scientific, and permeated with left-wing values. Although one of the exponents of this reaction, Robert Packenham, warned

²⁴⁵ Synecdochical reasoning or synecdochical fallacy corresponds to explaining a particular observation in terms of a general characteristic or, conversely, selecting particular examples that fit a general characteristic in order to “prove” it.

against the hegemonic dominance of dependency theory within Latin American studies, his assessment was overstated. An approach elaborated by scholars who Packenham deemed to be true social scientists in the American tradition, studies of corporatism in Latin America (Chapter 7), appeared roughly at the same time as American dependency studies, the early 1970s. Although corporatism does not seem to have been as successful as the American reception of dependency studies in immediately winning adepts to its approach, it ended up having a lasting influence in the field, as the identification of corporatist arguments in the textbook literature reveals (Chapter 8).

Studies of corporatism in Latin America thoroughly reinstate the asymmetric oppositions that characterize modernization theory. More importantly, in corporatism those oppositions are interwoven in a systematic presentation of the Latin America object that is much more cohesive and deterministic. Although modernization was the first social scientific approach to formulate a theory of Latin America in terms of temporal and cultural asymmetric oppositions, the final result is a somewhat porous description where the possibility of modernization is affirmed despite the burden of traditionalism and moral corruption, or better, with their hopeful demise through acculturation. While modernization theorists always had an eye on the practical problems of the modernization project, students of corporatism have a more distanced scholarly attitude of dissecting the Latin American object without apparently committing to any specific policy or project of intervention. In theoretical terms, corporatism takes cultural and temporal asymmetric oppositions to their limit, thickening their semantic load with elaborate historical accounts and cultural explanations.

Modernization theorists identified Latin American cultural values as traditional or, sometimes, feudal. Studies of corporatism explain where, when, and how these values

originated, providing historical accounts that narrate their preservation through the eras, from the Iberian feudalism or Roman patriarchalism to the present. The authors of that approach also venture in the realm of the history of political and social thought to show that corporatism is not only a socio-political consequence of Latin cultural values but also an intellectual creation of Latin ideologues. Modernization theorists argued that Latin American cultural values such as personalism, ascription, and machismo were inimical to modernity. Studies of corporatism present a systemic sociological interpretation that links the psychological operation of these values in the Latin American mind to the social relations and institutions they engender to the political system that regulates these institutions: the corporatist state. Contrary to modernization theorists who saw the diffusion of Western values as a remedy against Latin American pathologies, studies of corporatism tell a history of Latin America where the destabilizing consequences of successive modernizing waves are eventually neutralized by the never-dying spirit of Iberian corporatism, which reinvents itself just to remain the same.

In terms of expectations, studies of corporatism produce a serene pessimism in its American audience.²⁴⁶ The threads of cultural and temporal asymmetric opposition are so abundant and woven with so much strength around the Latin American object that there is no possibility of escaping. The prospect of modernization is discarded from the outset, and so are democratic aspirations in Latin America. According to those authors, undying Iberian corporatism is inherently authoritarian, thus one should not expect Latin America to follow the example of pluralistic democratic America. Contrary to the political stabilization literature, whose call for supporting military regimes was justified

²⁴⁶ Or sheer desperation in case one decides to wear the Latin American shoes these authors have made.

by the alleged unpredictability of democratic outcomes in the debile political systems of transitional societies, studies of corporatism justify authoritarian regimes in Latin America because they are the natural expression of the Iberian corporatist spirit. Resignation replaced the call for action. A timely shift, given that by the time corporatists wrote their pieces, military regimes were already in place throughout “Latin America”.

Authors of that approach repeatedly argue that American scholars have failed to understand Latin America because they projected their own values and expectations upon the Latin American object. Contrary to their predecessors, they claim, corporatism understands Latin America on its own terms. However, the “Latin America in its own terms” they present is in fact the perfect negative of a self-congratulatory image of the United States.

The analysis of the textbook literature puts the narrative in perspective. Up to that point, three of the four approaches had shown a great deal of similarities in their description of Latin America. The pioneering Modernization theory assembles the template of highly translatable forms of temporal and cultural asymmetrical oppositions. The political stability literature arrived at different conclusions using basically the same template. And corporatism deposited on that template a thick semantic layer of derogatory meanings without significantly altering its basic structure. In opposition to those approaches, dependency studies criticized both cultural and asymmetrical oppositions, although its reception has somewhat lost its critical momentum. In the textbook literature one is able to identify arguments of all these approaches, including dependency. Best-selling author such as Skidmore and Smith, and Keen and Wasserman are proud to announce their adherence to the dependency approach, but as I have shown

their presentations of Latin America are pervaded with the same tropes of cultural and temporal asymmetric oppositions previously articulated by modernization, political stability, and corporatism: the heavy burden of history, the survival of the past, cultural traditionalism, the suffocating influence of Iberian feudalism, the violent and unstable Latin temperament, etc. The end result is less than coherent.

The four approaches that preceded the textbook literature have one thing in common besides the fact that their object of study is Latin America: they do not stress racist arguments. Some traces of racism appear here and there in modernization, political stability, or corporatist texts, but, in general, Latinamericanists do not dwell on them to explain the pathologies of their subject of study. Textbooks often provide racial descriptions of Latin America but, despite some exceptions, those have no significant trace of racial asymmetric opposition. Nevertheless, the images on the covers of textbooks reveal a communicative dimension that is absent in the texts. All best-selling textbook covers are pervaded with allusions to racial asymmetric opposition, which can be summed up by the perception that Latin Americans are non-white. Furthermore, the pictorial material on the covers often associates racial with temporal and cultural asymmetric oppositions, that is, it provides an opportunity for multiple translations.

I have already noted in the beginning of this section that the *long durée* history of the concept of Latin America in everyday language hints at the persistence of the three forms of asymmetrical opposition. I have also shown that academic social scientific discourse on Latin America rarely contains explicit articulations of racial asymmetric opposition. However, it is exactly in the introduction to Latin America studies textbook literature – in the institutional space where the academic discourse of the specialist meets

the language of everyday life – that racial asymmetric opposition is again abundantly identified. What is the significance of that finding?

My answer can only be hypothetical. It seems just reasonable to assume that the students that first register for a course of introduction to Latin American studies already have a concept of Latin America, which our brief inquiry into the language of everyday life has shown to be pervaded with the three forms of asymmetric opposition. The social scientific education they receive through those books, thus, helps them solidify a concept of Latin America with theories and narratives where temporal and cultural asymmetric opposition predominate, and racial asymmetric opposition is undermined at the level of argument. This repression of racially asymmetric arguments, however, does not entail a critic of racialism. Quite the contrary, racial asymmetric opposition disappears from text but is ubiquitous in the images that adorn the textbooks' covers. In this way, the perception is not only confirmed and reproduced but also isolated from textual criticism. Although isolated from text, racial asymmetric opposition might still be associated with forms of cultural and asymmetrical opposition expressed through text: the backward Latin America suggests a dark-skinned character, traditional values beg for an Indian face, the macho is imagined with a big mustache and a mestizo visage, etc. In fact, the images in the book covers consistently make these associations.

Asymmetric oppositions and expectations in historical context

Once the conceptual history of the concept of Latin America has been reviewed in terms of forms of misrecognition, I should inquire about the types of actions to which social scientific discourses on Latin America might have served as a guide. The answer to this question must be sought in the general relation between the linguistic articulation

of asymmetric oppositions and the expectations derived from them. Expectations are projections of future outcomes enabled by past experience -- which in this case is systematized in the form of scientific discourse. As such, they serve to justify or forestall action upon the object of study, e.g., the description of increasing volcanic activity in a region creates the expectation of an impending natural catastrophe, which might lead authorities to evacuate the inhabitants of that region. *Mutatis mutandis*, the description of the unstable nature of Latin American political regimes creates the expectation of an impending communist revolution, which, in turn, might lead to the enactment of a policy to support strong military rulers in the region.

I have shown that, except for dependency theory, there was a great deal of continuity in the definition of Latin America advanced by Latin American studies. On the other hand, if we look on the side of the expectations generated by different approaches there is some variance. Modernization pointed to the possibility of economic development through acculturation, political stability urged for supporting right-wing military to deter communist take-over, and corporatism advised tolerance toward authoritarian regimes in Latin America. How could different sets of expectations be generated from a similar semantic substratum? This question has already been partially answered. The semantic field assembled by modernization theory and its followers was large and diverse enough to enable different types of expectations. Even within the modernization literature, one finds a great deal of variance in regards to the future possibilities open to Latin America's progress. Political stabilization radically revised the expectations created by modernization theory just by giving different weights to elements already present in modernization's concept of Latin America. In sum, the same semantic field has room for different expectations.

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Nonetheless, this degree of freedom in the realm of expectations, that seems to exist in the strictly linguistic level, disappears when we place the different approaches within their politico-historical context. The main historical sources utilized here were the history of US-Latin American relations, American national history and the institutional history of Latin American studies. As I have shown, modernization was born as a governmental project for managing the Third World against communism before it became a social scientific approach. Furthermore, modernization authors became directly involved in policy advisement and policymaking during the Kennedy administration, which, among other initiatives, launched the Alliance for Progress – a program for Latin America fashioned according to modernization directives. Not coincidentally, the theory produced, despite all its negative aspects, pointed to expectations of economic development and Western acculturation in Latin America.

An even greater level of engagement with policymaking is found in the political stabilization literature. But the programs these authors discussed were of a different nature. Besides modernization initiatives such as the Alliance for Progress, Kennedy revamped programs of military aid, intensifying the contacts between American and Latin American military, funding anti-communist “Latin American” military, and promoting the growth of counterinsurgency programs. Again, academic discourse provided support for policy by projecting the military as the only viable alternative for stopping the advancement of communism in Latin America. Under the Johnson administration the Alliance for Progress was already declining, whereas support for Latin American anti-communist military dictators continued to be a governmental priority in the region. In sum, the political stabilization literature was validated by the shift in

policy orientation, something that contributed to further solidify the approach as an alternative to mainstream modernization.

The policy of supporting military dictators was also embraced by Nixon, who, among other things, successfully pursued the overthrow of Chile's democratically elected president Salvador Allende. By the mid-1970s, all South American countries, with the exception of the Guianas, were under some sort of military rule. In the end, although Latin America continued to be underdeveloped and poverty stricken, it did escape communism. After all, that was the guiding purpose behind the modernization project, anyway. The price for keeping the Western Hemisphere free from communism was paid, of course, by "Latin Americans" themselves. That was an enormous tab, which included the deaths of 350,000 in Central America and tens of thousands in South America, displacement and exile of others, terror, the repression of social movements, the destruction of organized civil society, and a protracted process of institutional retrocession. Although not focusing on these unsavory details of right-wing military rule, the "realist" discourse of political stability suggests that that is a fair price, for that is what it takes to save Latin America.

The left-leaning American advocates of dependency theory had a different attitude towards policy involvement than their Latinamericanist predecessors. Many openly condemned American foreign policy in Latin America through their works and political militancy. In fact, some exponents of this literature, such as Frank and Chilcote, initially claimed that a socialist revolution would be the only solution for severing the chains of dependency that produced Latin America's underdevelopment. Even the reformist camp of dependency studies speculated about means to undermine Latin America's dependency from developed capitalism. Nevertheless, despite the successful

penetration of dependency in Latin American studies as a whole, which led Packenham to state that its advocates had taken over the profession and its main institutions, American dependency has accomplished little in turning its expectations into action. In fact, as I have already stated, the general movement of dependency's American reception has been toward increasing scholarship and not militancy.

Like dependency, authors of the literature on corporatism in Latin America were not so closely involved in policymaking, with the important exception of Howard Wiarda. By the time of corporatism's consolidation in the mid-1970s, Latin American studies was already a large academic enterprise that supported competing approaches and an ever-growing differentiation of sub-literatures. The Alliance for Progress was long dead and the prospects for economic development in Latin America rested on the hands of its military rulers. The threat of communism had seemingly been erased from the Western Hemisphere. Meanwhile, using the same template of asymmetric oppositions put together by modernization theory, studies of corporatism produced a baroque and highly rebarbative description of Latin America that among other things conveys the message that authoritarianism is Latin America's natural form of government. Interestingly, the lack of direct policy involvement did not prevent studies of corporatism from producing ideological support for foreign policy, which, with the partial exception of Jimmy Carter's presidency, continued collaboration with right-wing military dictators until the widespread return of democratic regimes in the Southern countries (Schoultz 1981; Huggins, 1998).

The textbook literature is explicitly made for pedagogic purposes, and thus does not have a direct conversation with policy. However, one should note that these books do present Latin America from a perspective of American national interest. The student is

taught that, for Americans, Latin America is a source of profit and raw materials, a geopolitical threat, and a cause of domestic social problems (i.e., massive immigration) (Wiarda and Kline 2000; Skidmore and Smith 2001). This politically realist outlook of American national interest reduces “Latin Americans” to objects that ought to be studied in order to be properly managed. Of course that this “version” of American national interest, like any other, is rooted in prior conceptions not only of US-Latin American relations but also of US politics. Although these conceptions are never entirely spelled out in the textbooks, one should look for hints of them in the description of Latin America itself. Asymmetric oppositions have a cognitive effect that is not always apparent. The repeated representation of Latin Americans as non-white people, for example, not only teaches students to associate with Latin Americans racist meanings that are readily available in everyday language, but also suggests, by opposition, that the American subject is white. That is probably the most remarkable feature of asymmetric oppositions: the constitution of the Other can only occur simultaneously to the constitution of the Self. One can only find that Latin American is historically handicapped if he affirms himself, by opposition, as fully historical. Likewise, the condemnation of Catholic moral depravity is made from the perspective of Protestant self-righteousness. In sum, this study of Latin America produces a white Anglo-Saxon Protestant subject. The fact that students are not all white Anglo-Saxon Protestants does not stop them from acquiring modes of thinking proper to the alleged interests of that position.

Not coincidentally, conceptions of American national interest were present throughout the history of defining Latin America in the United States. That was the case of Spanish America in the Manifest Destiny ideology, where American national interest

was explicitly articulated as the God-blessed interest of white Anglo-Saxon Protestants. Modernization theory covered its particular national agenda with a coat of social scientific justifications, which, in turn, produced a semblance of universal truth. Overt racialism was discarded but modernity, the model to which the underdeveloped should aspire, was often equated to Anglo-Saxon Protestantism, when not directly to Americanism. In modernization theory, the conversion of Latin America to American values through acculturation and the national interest of fighting communism were one and the same thing. Advocates of the political stabilization approach blamed modernization for not making the case of American national interest more clearly-- which for them meant that stopping communist infiltration in Latin America came first. The image of the American Self they adopted, however, had in fact been put together by modernization. With studies of corporatism social scientific rhetoric returns with renewed strength while the national political agenda is again covered. Authors claimed that Latin America should be understood in its own terms, but, as a plain reading of their texts demonstrates, the Anglo-Saxon Protestant subject continues to be the yardstick for measuring the Latin American object. Studies of corporatism's national agenda toward Latin America expressed itself mostly through recommendations of benign neglect.

Dependency studies was the only approach that escaped this pattern. Its advocates were the first to realize that a critique of Latin American studies could not be made without a critique of the national project that underpins Latin American studies. They were the first to de-reify the Latin American object, showing that what Latin American studies had so far defined as Latin American pathologies were in part a product of a very asymmetric world system where the United States was a major player. In practical terms, they rejected the Cold War agenda, denouncing American imperialism as

a crucial factor in Latin America's political and economic "history" – a datum that escaped previous Latinamericanists despite the long record of American intervention in the southern countries. Some authors hoped that the end of relations of dependence would have great consequences for American politics. Ronald Chilcote, for example, dared to argue that a wave of socialist revolutions in Latin America would undermine American imperialism and eventually contribute to a socialist revolution in the United States itself. However, most authors held a more skeptic outlook for prospects of change in the United States, and preferred to concentrate on the problem of undermining or severing relations of dependency in Latin America.

Skepticism towards changing the United States suited well the shift from militancy to scholarship, made possible by the great availability of research funds in the heyday of dependency (1970s). However, through scholarship Latin America is again reified, for although American dependency had rejected the substantive forms of temporal and cultural misrecognition, it did not criticize synecdochical reasoning, which is a crucial assumption in the scholarly search for an ever more perfect theory of Latin America. Dependency scholarship on Latin America becomes depoliticized in the sense that theories of Latin America are very poor instruments to capture the ways in which the people perceived as Latin American actually live their lives, i.e., in national contexts, and, thus, it can hardly generate expectations of future transformative action, given that there is no Latin American political space and no significant Latin American transnational institution that could provide a forum for such action. In order to become politically relevant, these theories would presuppose the creation of such forums, something that has never occurred. Finally, the project of treating all Southern countries under the "Latin" banner is not only strategically dubious but, from my point of view,

politically objectionable. Given that some of those countries have struggled to construct national images in which African, Indian, and other heritages share space with European influences, assuming the label “Latin” would be a retrocession to Eurocentric conceptions of nationhood, if not an acquiescence to the negative image cast by the American Self.

Concluding remarks

Koselleck has called attention to the productive enterprise of studying key concepts but has not explored the theoretical assumptions that could underpin a history of counterconcepts. I hope to have shed some light upon that problem through this dissertation. As it was showed, in general terms, the semantic field of the counterconcept of Latin America has not considerably changed since the nineteenth century. That substantiates the claim that Latin America has not been a key concept in American English. If we are to trust Lars Schoultz’s assessment, Latin America has interested only specific sectors of American society: governmental agencies involved with security and economic foreign policy and some private corporations (1987). Schoultz forgot to add the scholarly establishment dedicated to the study of Latin America: Latin American studies. Latin Americans do not belong to American society and, thus, have little chance to contest the representations made of them.²⁴⁷ Not coincidentally, the interested sectors have shown little disagreement about defining Latin America. On the contrary, as this dissertation has shown, government, private funding agencies, and Latin America studies have enjoyed a synergistic relation in the production of discourses about Latin America.

²⁴⁷ That might change in the near future with the rapid growth of the Latino minority in the United States.

On the other hand, despite the lack of contestation, the conceptual history of Latin America was shown to be highly productive. For even when a concept's semantic field does not suffer significant historical change, the concept might be appropriated for different purposes and integrate different projects of intervention in the world, as I have shown in this work. Only the history of those appropriations can capture the true political significance of the concept. Furthermore, in the case of Latin America, saying that there was not significant change might be an overstatement. Each re-appropriation of Latin America entailed selecting and re-describing elements, suppressing some and stressing others. It was in the details of those rhetorical moves that much of the synergy between Latin American studies and American national political interests could be identified.

This dissertation does not aim at passing a general condemnation of the use of categorical generalizations in social scientific reasoning, but at showing how a specific type of generalization, the asymmetric counterconcept of Latin America, has been used to reproduce the debasement of the ones labeled with that generalization, while surreptitiously projecting a picture perfect image of the collective Self that does the labeling. Of course that the successful identification of forms of misrecognition throughout the literature not only serves to substantiate my point, but also raises suspicions about the possible existence of such practices in similar social scientific enterprises. I do not want to question the practice of generalizations per se, but the effort to invest a highly evaluative derogatory discourse with a value-free objective façade. General categories can be a powerful tool for collective political action, serving as a means for mutual recognition and synergistic cooperation. However, as I have extensively demonstrated, they can also be a conduit for misrecognition; and a particularly powerful one when presented under the guise of scientific truth.

Value neutrality, a presupposition that underpins empiricist social scientific discourse, also contributes to misrecognition because it presents itself as a guide for action that is independent from subjective points of view, partisanship, political leanings, opinion, etc. Thus, it protects misrecognition practices from criticism. Thus, linguistic practices of misrecognition assume an apolitical semblance of mere factuality, something that both the agent and the object of misrecognition must acknowledge as true. Nevertheless, my objective here was not only to reveal that which is not, at first, apparent in the discourse of Latin American studies, but also to explore some of the political implications of this discourse.

A political theorist might object that the criticism I put forward in this dissertation is too nihilistic in the sense that it leaves no alternative for addressing or studying collective Others. Conversely, a social scientist might see my approach as anti-scientific. The former objection is not true given that my objective here is only to call attention to a very distorting way of portraying the Other. I do not have any blueprint for reforming area studies or comparative politics, but I must say that studying such collective Others ought to entail questioning the assumptions that constitute those people as “Other for us” to begin with, something that, in turn, can only be done through questioning the assumptions that found our collective political identity. This “ought” can be understood in terms of Kantian universalism: we owe to human beings in general not to reduce them to mere means to our actions.²⁴⁸

²⁴⁸ Kant’s categorical imperative is founded on the principle that one could not possibly will a universal norm and, at the same time, reject its application upon himself. Of course that this is a moral principle, which cannot be proven or justified through empirical descriptive science. A realist thinker might reason that this principle is gibberish given that many people do have the power to impose norms whose applications they can evade. However, that is a statement of fact and not a moral objection, for in order to transform it into a moral objection, one has to add that “given that this is what

But universalism is not the only normative viewpoint from which to assess the study the Other. As is increasingly the case of Latin America in the United States, the Other might also become part of the collective Self. This has been addressed by a great number of contemporary thinkers as the problem of democracy in multicultural societies (Taylor 1992; Kymlicka 1995; Habermas 1996; Habermas 2001). Given that those societies, due to their diversity, do not have a common substratum of shared cultural values, how can a collective identity be fashioned? Charles Taylor has proposed a Gadamerian solution to this problem, which entails transforming the Self through the study of the Other (1992). Gadamer argues that the hermeneutical movement of understanding other human beings forces the interpreter out of his original position and, thus, opens the possibility for him to assess that position from a critical distance. In the end, interpretation does not produce a reaffirmation of Selfness and Otherness, but what Gadamer calls a fusion of horizons (1995).

Of course that this hermeneutical movement presupposes an initial disposition of empathy for others, an acknowledgment that there is a minimum substratum of humanity that ultimately allows for different experiences to be mutually intelligible. As I have strived to show, the type of “interpretation” produced by Latin American studies could not have been farther from this model, for instead of a fusion of horizons, Latin American studies has produced the reification of a contemptible Other, while protecting an idealized Self from criticism.

happens, this is how it ought to happen”. But then the realist rejection of the categorical imperative would become as moral as the principle itself. In sum, the problem cannot be answered in terms of true or false but in terms of right and wrong.

Although Taylor's solution would be an improvement in relation to the type of social science practiced by Latin American studies, it is still far from satisfactory given that it assumes an understanding of the Self that precedes the hermeneutical movement. In fact, the only desirable study of the Other is the one that is able to address the conditions and mechanisms through which the Other and the Self are produced. That is exactly what this dissertation has aimed to accomplish.

I must also reject the charge of anti-scientific attitude made by my hypothetical social scientist. As I have shown, abstractions such as Latin American society, Latin American history, and other products of synecdochical reason are poor scientific categories that profoundly misread their alleged object of study. Furthermore, presenting value-laden interpretations as value-free descriptions can hardly classify as a scientific way of proceeding. In sum, by revealing the problems Latin American studies has in meeting its own empiricist standards, I am already contributing to the improvement of social scientific work. But that is not all. In fact, this charge of anti-scientific attitude can only be articulated through a very narrow and mistaken understanding of reason. One cannot call something anti-scientific without previously examining what science actually consists of. If we assume a pragmatic viewpoint, we find that there is not a single science or a single scientific method but a myriad of them.²⁴⁹ In the case of the social sciences, which Kuhn calls pre-paradigmatic, competing scientific approaches coexist.²⁵⁰ In other words, this dissertation is not anti-scientific. It just relies on a mode

²⁴⁹ Thomas Kuhn's *The structure of scientific revolutions* is probably the most influential pragmatic reading of the philosophy of science (1962).

²⁵⁰ Although Kuhn is known for criticizing the idea of linear progressive scientific development, he uses the prefix "pre" to convey that the social sciences are still in a retarded state, which suggests that they will eventually catch up with the scientific standards of the natural sciences. Also adopting a pragmatic perspective, Richard Rorty rebuts this evolutionist thesis by asserting the degree of uncertainty that all things that

of rational inquiry that differs from empiricist social sciences. Conceptual history is a well-established mode of inquiry that does not rely on methods borrowed from the philosophy of the natural sciences to legitimize itself.²⁵¹ Furthermore, the project of a rational critique of science and other modes of instrumental reasoning, to which this dissertation is indebted, have a long tradition in European political thought that goes from Kant to Dilthey to Gadamer to the Frankfurt School to Foucault, just to name a few influential figures. Finally, I think the critical approach adopted here is actually superior to empiricist social sciences for it engages things human in its factual, moral, and political aspects, without striving, at the same time, to hide its own normative premises.

As Koselleck has noticed, political concepts might endure through generations, only changing when they become the central themes of political struggles and contestation. It is reasonable to assume that “Latin America” will survive us all. Nonetheless, as I hope to have shown in this work, there are plenty of reasons to start

bear meaning necessary have (1979; 1995). On this debate see also Jürgen Habermas’s *Moral consciousness and communicative action* (1990).


²⁵¹ John Gunnell argues that the movement toward empiricism and scientism inaugurated by the behavioral revolution was based on the misguided assumption that the scientific principles postulated by the philosophy of the natural sciences, chiefly by Karl Popper and Carl Hempel, were in fact the essence of the scientific method. Gunnell observes that, in fact, natural scientists do not follow the prescriptions of those philosophers (1988; 1993).

contesting its meanings right now. That will require Americans to change the ways they interpret their own history and national identity, and the way they perceive the peoples who share with them this continental landmass.

Appendix 1

These are the results of a search for publications that contain the term “Latin America” in the title conducted through the website of the Library of Congress. The search was limited to books, periodicals, and magazines published in English. The search engine at the website allows one to search the entire main collection of the library at once.

Decades	No. publications
0-1900	0
1901-10	2
1911-20	23
1921-30	25
1931-40	50
1941-50	155
1951-60	91
1961-70	328
1971-80	450
1981-90	361
1991-00	502



The results clearly indicate an abrupt growth in the number of publications starting around 1960, reversing the declining trend that followed the end of WWII. The data confirms many points that I have stressed in the text.

- The virtual inexistence of the concept before 1900.

- A lack of interest for “Latin America,” indicated by the small number of publications, that lasted until the Cuban Revolution.
- The sharp rise in number of publications after the Revolution that coincided with the rapid growth of Latin American studies.

Appendix 2

The data in this table comes from a series of searches conducted through Google (www.google.com), probably the most powerful search engine available today in the Internet.

The methodology used in this search was implemented according to the following steps:

- 1 – Searches were run with the names of authors and books in the search line.
- 2- Syllabi of academic courses on Latin America were selected from the search results.
- 3- Syllabi were examined in order to establish the actual existence of the book either as the main textbook or in the “required readings list.”
- 4- the results were then ranked according to the number of syllabi contained each of the books.

Although this search method does not provide the total number of academic courses in the American university system that utilize a certain book, it does provide a means to rank books according to the frequency of their incidence in the sample of syllabi found by Google. There is no reason to believe that the methodology employed by the search engine will produce a significant bias. According to the information provided in its site, Google operates in the following manner: ²⁵²

²⁵² Go to www.google.com for more information about the methods and technologies used by the search engine.

- The heart of its software is PageRank™ is a system for ranking web pages developed by Larry Page and Sergey Brin at Stanford University.
- it finds most of its pages when robots crawl the web through an automated process, jumping from page to page via hyperlinks.
- PageRank relies on the uniquely democratic nature of the web by using its vast link structure as an indicator of an individual page's value. In essence, Google interprets a link from page A to page B as a vote, by page A, for page B. But, Google looks at more than the sheer volume of votes, or links a page receives; it also analyzes the page that casts the vote.
- Google's complex, automated methods make human tampering with our results extremely difficult. And though the site does run relevant ads above and next to our results, Google does not sell placement within the results themselves (i.e., no one can buy a higher PageRank). A Google search is an easy, honest and objective way to find high-quality websites with information relevant to your search.

Many courses do not have their syllabi posted on the web. However, the number of courses that have syllabi available on the web is fairly large (the search found approximately 300), and the search lines introduce no other limitation to the results but the name of book and author.

Results

Google search line	No. hits
Skidmore and Smith and "Modern Latin America"	202
Keen and Benjamin and "History of Latin America"	54
Burkholder and "Colonial Latin America"	59
Burns and Bradford and "Latin America a Concise Interpretive History"	28
Winn and Peter and "The Changing Face of Latin America"	26
Wiarda and Kline and "Latin American Politics and Development"	18
Wynia and Gary and "Politics of Latin American Development"	18
Black and Knippers and "Latin America its Problems and its Promise"	16
Chasteen and John and "Born in Blood and Fire"	15

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