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DANIEL BELL AND THE AGONY OF MODERN LIBERALISM

City University of New York PH.D. 1980

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DANIEL BELL AND THE AGONY OF MODERN LIBERALISM

by

NATHAN LIEBOWITZ

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Sociology in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City University of New York.

1980

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Introduction

The purpose of this study is to examine Daniel Bell's writings as the work of an intellectual, the work of a man who is the architect or articulator of a system of thought that reflects the intellectual mood of a particular period in Western history. The period is the 1940s and 1950s.

This is usually thought of as being a bland if not sterile period in American intellectual life. Yet, if one takes the success of Commentary and Dissent as one index and the favorable response to existentialism as another, then, one derives, as Bell has suggested, an entirely different sense of this period.[1] One derives a sense of the 1940s and 1950s as a period very much preoccupied with the problem of the limits and possibilities of politics and ideology in providing solutions to what John Dewey once called man's "quest for certainty." One begins to think of it as an important and intellectually exciting period.

The idea that Daniel Bell is an intellectual is one that arouses little or no controversy. This is not surprising since most writers, particularly successful ones like Bell, are generally referred to as intellectuals. But, the term itself is an ambiguous one; historically it has been the subject of a number of different interpretations.

Our definition of the intellectual as an architect of a

system of thought has one major advantage over other definitions; it suggests that an intellectual is a producer not a consumer of knowledge. It thus makes a distinction between the intellectual and the intelligenstia, a Russian term which since the 1880s has been used to define highly educated consumers of ideas. However, like all definitions of the term, ours has its drawbacks: it does not enable us to determine, a priori, whether an intellectual is an ideologist, a philosopher or a scientist.

The problem of whether a particular intellectual is a ideologist or a scientist is an empirical problem; no definition, by itself, can provide a substitute for the actual work that a solution to it requires.

We can better comprehend the relevance of this problem to Bell's work if we understand the nature of his recent work.

The theme that runs throughout much of Bell's writings since the late 1950s is his view that modern industrial societies since the end of World War II have been moving to a higher stage of social development and complexity. This movement has, Bell argues, brought into existence a new set of social and political problems that face not only the United States but all modern industrial societies.

Bell, for years, has sought to develop a theory of modern society that can define the underlying nature of the social and political problems confronting American (and Western) society in relationship to the persistence of certain historical trends. In seeking to develop a theory of the post-industrial society, Bell has sought to demonstrate that the

civil disorders of the 1960s and the social tensions that have since gripped American society are the products of a breakdown in the moral values and systems of legitimation in Western society which stem from basic contradictions between modern capitalism and its culture. This has led him to discuss changes in American society in relation to three developments: the erosion of the Protestant ethic; the trend in the 1960s for increased community participation and control; and the demand for guarantees of minority groups that they not be excluded from favorable social and economic opportunities. Finally, Bell is concerned with the increasing reliance on technical skill and education as the primary basis for decision making and mobility in the public and private domain.

Bell's efforts to develop a theory of modern society on the basis of these developments represents for him a venture in social forecasting. It is a venture that provides the basis for identifying problems and issues that, in his view, will continue to confront American society in the future. Bell's venture reflects more than his interest in defining the range of social and political problems confronting the United States as a post-industrial society. More than anything, it reflects his interest in helping American society to develop a theoretical framework that mediates the conflicting principles and their respective ultimate values. These conflicts continue to bedevil American society. At present, Bell views American society as being dominated by principles of social organization that are fundamentally antithetical to each other. These contradictory principles, in Bell's

estimation, both underlie and shape the character of the economic, cultural, and political institutions of contemporary American society.

In seeking to lay the groundwork for the development of this conceptual framework Bell has been clear on his interest in articulating certain social and political values over others. This interest seems to stem from Bell's desire to frame a comprehensive polemic against both communist and Marxian socialist models and theories of a just society. Moreover, this interest seems to have stemmed from a desire to refute the social, moral, and political claims of these models and theories. It also seems to have stemmed from a desire to reaffirm the validity of emerging political and ethical principles associated with contemporary liberalism in the United States along lines that were first established in his earlier writings.

Bell's interest in defining the range of social and political problems confronting the United States as a post-industrial society and his interest in helping American society to develop a new theoretical framework, against which one could mediate the sources of tension manifested in the 1960s, are each elaborated in considerable detail. They were elaborated in a series of essays that in the early 1970s culminated in the publication of The Coming of Post-Industrial Society and The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism. These books are essentially collections of essays that were written in the 1960s, which highlighted the concept of the post-industrial society. This concept Bell initially articulated

in an unpublished, though widely circulated, paper that he presented to a Boston forum entitled "The Post-Industrial Society: A Speculative View of the United States in 1985 and Beyond."[2]

Variously referred to in The Coming of Post-Industrial Society as a historical generalization and as a analytical construct, the concept of the post-industrial society can be understood as a specific set of interlocking ideas. These ideas project the changes in the economic and technological sectors of American society that occurred after the Second World War. Each set of these ideas, to use Bell's phrase, "coalesced" in his construction of the overall post-industrial society concept. In all there were five ideas or dimensions that were fused into the concept. The first is that the steady increase in people employed in service related occupations in both the private and public sectors reflect a shift from a goods producing economy to an emerging service economy. The second dimension is that underlying this transformation to a service economy is the primacy and the centrality of theoretical knowledge as the source of both innovation and of policy-making in the public and private sectors. The third is that, as a product of this phenomena, the professional and technical classes have not only grown in number but in pre-eminence. The fourth is that, owing to the creation of new modes of technological forecasting, the planning and control of technological growth may represent a new dimension of social change. The final idea is that, with the progression of science, there arises new sets of problems

which involve the coordination of large numbers of interacting variables to achieve specific goals related to the management of large scale social, economic and political systems. These are problems which highlight the emergence of a new intellectual technology. This new technology is based on the development of utility theory and stochastic processes, as well as, on the development of information theory, game theory, cybernetics, and decision theory. The new technology which makes its most ambitious claims in systems analysis.

The impulses and ends underlying Bell's efforts to help develop a conceptual framework for mediating and resolving conflicts in American society raises issues and questions concerning the nature of Bell's efforts that are the very heart of this study. To repeat, the purpose of this study is to examine Daniel Bell's writings as the production of an intellectual who is the architect of a system of thought that reflects the intellectual mood of the 1940s and 1950s. Within this framework, we shall try to ascertain whether Bell is merely an analyst of social and economic structure, or whether he is an ideologist. In the latter case he would, of course, be the ideologist of the end of ideology. Since the publication of his book The End of Ideology Bell has generally come to be associated with what his critics have called the end of ideology thesis. That thesis can be defined as an argument that advocates a cessation of ideological politics and the adoption in its place of a kind of administrative or technical rationality which requires that no action should be undertaken unless its costs and benefits

are specified.

If Bell is a scientist, in his terms a public philosopher, then this study will seek to ascertain the normative grounding, if any, of his science. If he is an ideologist, we are concerned with discovering the forms of society and social relations which he legitimates and the ideological bases of that legitimacy.

We recognize that Bell's political, intellectual and academic career spans four decades, that his thought has undergone continuous development reflecting his own personal growth and that it is a reflection of the events in which he has participated and borne witness. He also has, as a journalist, a political analyst and academician, explored a wide diversity of themes and issues and has written often on all these divergent themes and issues. For all these reasons, we would, of course, not expect Bell's work ever to be unified, consistent and "complete."

We shall explore Bell's written works in their various intellectual, occupational, social and political contexts, in order to search for both the unifying and developmental themes in his thought. The issue of consistency, as well as the issue of Bell as an ideologist or scientist, will thus be the problem of this study.

The reason why the determination of whether Bell is an ideologist or a scientist is important has to do with what Max Weber called the critique of concept construction.

For Weber this critique is an essential task in the social sciences, made necessary by the tendency of theorists

to "mix theory with history and to confuse them with each other."[3] Such a tendency, he warned, was promoted by the uncritical use of ideal types.[4] In warning social scientists not to confuse conceptual abstractions like ideal types with reality Weber viewed the critique of concept construction as an instrument by which one could investigate whether shifts in the interpretation of ideas reflect an authors own ideology or changes in the world.

Since the 1930s many intellectuals recognized that in order for capitalism to survive as an alternative to socialism and fascism a new system of legitimation was required. For those like R. H. Tawney, John Dewey, A. A. Berle, Gardiner Means, Peter Drucker, Michael Polanyi, and Hans Morgenthau this task required an understanding of the weaknesses of classical liberalism in providing twentieth century capitalism with an enduring set of philosophical and political legitimations.[5] Capitalism in its increasing reliance on managers to supervise production could no longer base its moral claims on the free market or on natural rights principles traditionally associated with private ownership. The shift from ownership to managerial control not only revealed the changed character of private property they argued; it also required a new set of legitimations.

One of the most significant things about this situation is that many intellectuals, in their belief that both socialism and fascism were antithetical to a democratic society, have associated capitalism's need for a new set of legitimations with the fate of democracy itself. It is thus sometimes

difficult to determine whether some pluralistic theories of society represent scientifically credible defenses of liberal politics or whether they represent intellectual rationalizations for the maintenance of managerial capitalism or the welfare state.

Since ultimately Bell's efforts to develop a theory of the post-industrial society can be understood as an attempt to formulate a new pluralistic theory of society, it is important to determine which of these two categories his efforts fall into. It is only by resolving this problem that we can determine the scientific value of his theory of the post-industrial society. It is thus useful to remember Max Weber's reminder to an earlier generation of social scientists that some of the greatest advances in the social sciences come about through the critique of concept constructions.

The ability to determine whether Bell is a scientist or an ideologist would seem to rest on whether or not Bell's efforts to help lay the conceptual groundwork for a framework that would enable us to mediate and solve conflicts in American society is itself guided by philosophical or ideological ends. Implicit in this problem is the charge raised by Benjamin S. Kleinberg in his study American Society in the Post-Industrial Age. Bell's writings on the post-industrial society, Kleinberg argued, can be understood to project an image of contemporary American society that is based on an ideologically derived construction of the world that rationalizes ideological approaches and policy perspectives.[6]

The difference between philosophical and ideological ends is important because it lends a very different set of meanings to an intellectual enterprise. Neither the philosopher nor the scientist will view the world in the same terms as the ideologist. Philosophy is very different from ideology in terms of the images it promotes and the intentions that it expresses.

Ideology, while it has come to have a variety of meanings and uses since it was first put into use at the time of the French Revolution by Antoine Destutt de Tracy, does not mean the same thing as the term philosophy, nor does it specify the same things. Classical philosophy was a system of thought that sought to postulate an ultimate order to the world. It was a system of thought that tried to unify man's experiences by seeking to determine the principles that regulate the universe and underlie all knowledge and reality.[7] In contrast to philosophy, ideology is part of an effort to promote a specific image of the world, an image that conceals a calculated, predetermined ultimate end. While the images promoted by different ideologies vary, the basic intentions that underlie the construction of those images resist experience. The intentions are closed and rarely amenable to knowledge gained from experience. As such, the images promoted by ideologists either seek to: guide men's actions on the basis of the articulator's class-bound interests or his political, social, and professional interests; or to rationalize his particular predetermined point of view.

The determination of whether Bell's efforts to help lay the conceptual framework for mediating conflicts in American

society is framed by philosophical or ideological ends requires that we consider the possibility that those efforts may have been conditioned by a combination of philosophical and ideological motives. Such a determination also requires that we understand why this issue is important in judging the nature and scientific merit of Bell's efforts to develop a theory of modern society on the basis of the concept of the post-industrial society.

The reasons why this difference is so important is reflected only in part on the differences between philosophy and ideology. More than anything else, it rests on our understanding of the relationship between values and scientific concepts in the social sciences.

One of the major problems that arises in any effort to assess the scientific merit of Bell's recent work is the specific problem of understanding the way his values underlie his construction and use of the concept of the post-industrial society. This problem arises whether we choose to try to measure the scientific adequacy of Bell's work, whether that work has been framed by philosophical or ideological ends or to the extent that either the philosophical or the ideological predominate over the other.

On the surface, Bell's use of the concept of the post-industrial society would seem to provide scientific objectivity and credibility to his views on the nature of American society, the character of its social and political problems, and the approaches required on the policy-making level to mediate effectively the tensions that arise from those problems.

Yet, it would be a mistake to conclude, on that basis alone, that Bell's views represent scientifically derived or objectively correct interpretations and standpoints. Such a mistake could only be borne out of naivete concerning the functions and limits of scientific concepts.

In assessing the value of any concept in science it is important, as Abraham Kaplan has noted in The Conduct of Inquiry, that we recognize the limits of the conceptualization process in science. Every conceptualization we make, Kaplan notes, always involves us in an inductive risk. In a way that is very similar to Max Weber's views on the subject, Kaplan states, that "the concepts in terms of which we pose our scientific questions limit the range of admissable answers. We are forever asking of our subject whether he has stopped beating his wife."[8] In addition the way in which we set up our questions, the way we determine what is problematic and therefore worthy of knowing, has the effect of structuring what it is we are going to see. Kaplan states that "the appropriate conceptualization of the problem already prefigures its solution." Kaplan demonstrates this point very nicely through the follow illustration:

> Ask someone to arrange six matches into four equilateral triangles; he will find it impossible, until he realizes that they need not all be in the same plane, whereupon the tetrahedron becomes obvious. But he must first be able to free his conception of geometric figures from the restriction to the plane. Such freedom is as hard to come by-and to live with-as any other.[9]

These observations concerning the functions and limits of scientific concepts may apply to Bell's construction of the concept of the post-industrial society. It may embody a

preconceived notion of what is wrong with the United States, and Western societies in general, as well as what approaches must be taken to ease social tensions. There is absolutely nothing wrong or unscientific about this; Max Weber and Karl Mannheim pointed out that all scientific attempts at concept construction necessarily involve the use of preconceived notions, that is, presuppositions. But these observations raise a very real issue, one that must be dealt with if any accessment of Bell's efforts to develop a theory of modern society on the basis of the concept of the post-industrial society is to be complete. The issue is whether the presuppositions upon which his construction of this concept rests prevents him from seeing other viable alternative explanations concerning the nature of social problems in the United States.

The resolution of this very basic issue must be, it would seem, predicated on whether Bell's construction and use of the post-industrial society concept is guided by philosophical or ideological ends. The resolution of this issue must thus rest on an adequate definition of the concept of ideology.

By an adequate definition of ideology we mean one that is both more extensive and precise than the one that was frequently used by Karl Marx and Karl Mannheim. Such a definition must convey more than the idea that all knowledge is ideological because all knowledge of social reality is grounded in the social situation of the knower. This use of the concept of ideology is, as Max Weber and Heinrich Rickert

noted, axiomatic given the nature of knowledge in the social sciences,[10] but insufficient.

This study will use a concept of ideology based on Max Weber and Thorstein Veblen's use of the concept. Their usage, which, while it does not completely discount the Marxian notion that economic factors guide a person's perception and subsequent interpretation of the world, nonetheless does not impute to economic factors the determination of every persons perception and interpretation of the world. Implicit in this study's use of the concept of ideology is the rejection of such a dogmatic, a priori, interpretation of motives. Rather, the concept of ideology to be used in this study is based on a principle that allows for a wider range of possible interpretations concerning the nature of the ends that prompt men to define and accept different interpretations of social reality. This principle is simply that men often rationalize one image of the world over another on the basis of different interests, interests that are sometimes economic, sometimes political, sometimes social or religious, and sometimes even professional or occupational. Such rationalizations may therefore determine the perception of reality on the basis of the interests that, at any given time, dominate the intellectuals perception and subsequent interpretation of social reality.

It is in terms of this concept of ideology that the following questions become relevant to our study of Bell's writings: 1) What are the values and assumptions that underlie his concept of the post-industrial society?; 2) Are they

values and assumptions that may narrow their holder's vision of the world to a set of pre-determined and self-perpetuating images and conclusions as ideologically conditioned values invariably do, or are they values that may lead to a broader, but no less committed image of the world and its problems?

The solution to this problem rests in our ability to develop, through the theoretical and substantive elaboration of the ideas and world-images embodies in Bell's writings, an explication of the different values, value axioms, and assumptions that underlies and shapes his construction of the world. This is an approach that has been referred to by Louis Wirth as value analysis.[11]

Value analysis, if we consider its derivations in the writings of Karl Marx, Max Weber, Karl Mannheim, and Vilfredo Pareto, has had a long tradition in the sociological analysis of ideas.[12] Variously referred to as ideological analysis or policy analysis by sociologists and political scientists, value analysis has in modern times featured most significantly in the research of Gunnar Myrdal. In his study of racial conditions and the nature of racial prejudice in the United States, An American Dilemma, Myrdal used value analysis as a method for discovering in the skewed interpretations of social reality that people held concerning racial and social issues the mechanisms through which they were able, both blacks and whites, to rationalize their own often conflicting valuations in a way that served ultimately to justify their own prejudices to themselves while providing the basis upon which they could hide them, in some instances, from others.

Value analysis, if one closely examines some of the methodological writings of Wirth, Myrdal, Weber, Pareto, and the political scientist Harold D. Lasswell, has its origins in a set of questions which can be used by the social scientist or policy analyst to serve a specific set of functions in understanding the derivation, the internal consistency, and implications of a particular theoretical argument or policy position.[13] Largely on the basis of this literature value analysis can be defined and applied as a method of contextual analysis which seeks to examine the content of an argument in terms of:

(1) what that argument treats as axiomatic, that is, what it treats as an ultimate value, one which needs no explanation or justification;

(2) what is the range or plurality of values present in the argument, and what is the relationship that each value has to the others - do these values support or contradict each other;

(3) how, presuming that such a contradiction does exist, is it resolved through the course of the argument;

(4) what language is used to express at the technical level the values, and axioms of the argument as a logical system of thought;

(5) whether the values and axioms in the argument are hidden or overt or whether some are hidden and others explicitly stated;

(6) whether the author of the argument uses the same language to conceal different or shifting value bases;

(7) whether the language and value base of the author change in the course of his argument;

(8) whether the logical scheme of the argument is consistent or invariant or whether it contains some escape clauses that nullify the logical form of the argument;

(9) whether the argument exhausts all the possible conclusions that, given its logic can be reasonably derived from it.

In sum, value analysis can be defined as a method of contextual analysis which seeks to examine the content of an argument in terms of comprehending the relationship between its basic values and the conclusions that are derived from those values. In a Weberian sense, it is a form of analysis which seeks to make explicit the implicit.

Implicit in our adoption of value analysis are two basic assumptions. The first is that value analysis will enable us to determine whether Bell is an ideologist or a scientist. Built into this assumption is the further assumption that this problem is resolvable one way or another. As was suggested earlier such an assumption ignores a third possibility: Bell's writings may reflect a synthesis of both scientific and ideological elements.

It may well be that value analysis implies a greater degree of rationality that can be found in the writings of any theorist. That too is a real possibility. Yet it has one great advantage when applied to the works of an intellectual: value analysis encourages one to examine the works of an intellectual on his own terms. It encourages

one to study the intellectual as a person whose ideas are grounded in the intellectual culture, the Weltanschauung, of a period.

We have defined an intellectual as an architect (and articulator) of a system of thought. To this definition we can add that an intellectual is one who directly or indirectly puts his intelligence, training and experience to political and social use. The intellectual in the course of developing a system of thought self-consciously seeks to define and assign priorities amongst ultimate values. In short, the intellectual is one whose work deals with problems of morality and problems of justice and injustice. To the degree that value analysis permits us to highlight the ultimate and derivative values implicit in the theorists work, it permits us to define the intellectual in the terms outlined here. Yet the problem of whether or not the extension of our definition has any real merit rests only in part in methodological considerations. In greater part it rests in a broader understanding of the place of the intellectual in history.

NOTES

1. Interview with Daniel Bell, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 23 February, 1978.

2. Daniel Bell, The Coming of Post-Industrial Society (New York: Basic Books, 1973) p. 36.

3. Max Weber, "Objectivity in Social Science and Social Policy," in The Methodology of the Social Sciences, translated and edited by Edward A. Shils and Henry A. Finch (New York: Free Press, 1949) p. 102.

4. In an analysis that highlights the problem of misplaced concreteness or reification Weber defined the ideal type as a purely heuristic and analytical device. For Weber the greatest abuses in the social sciences occur "when an ideal construct of a developmental sequence and the ideal types of certain cultural structures are integrated into a genetic classification." He warned that the practice of placing all such constructions into a genetic classification or social system produces a tendency to view the ideal constructs as an "historical sequence unrolling with the necessity of a law." There is also the tendency to neglect or minimize the possible importance of events that do not neatly lend themselves to classification. As Weber put it: "the logical classification of analytical concepts on the one hand and the empirical arrangements of the events thus conceptualized in space, time, and causal relationship, on the other, appear to be so bound up together that there is an almost irresistible temptation to do violence to reality in order to prove the real validity of the construct." "Objectivity in Social Science and Social Policy." p. 102-3.

5. Perhaps the earliest works which described capitalism's need of a new system of legitimations were Thorstein Veblen's The Engineers and The Price System (New York: Viking Press, 1921) and R.H. Tawney's The Acquisitive Society (New York: Harvest Books, 1920).

6. Kleinberg's argument is that in the course of his recent work Bell and other "end of ideologists" have, as theoretists of "postindustrial society," produced an ideologically oriented theory which emphasizes the need for 'technocratic guidance' of the society by a combination of expert knowledge and sophisticated intellectual technology placed at the service of central structures of power. Characteristically, this theory tends to play up certain features of current developments which support its technocratic assumptions, and to deemphasize or neutralize others which raise serious questions as to the political consequences of its realization; particularly questions concerning the impact of technocratic planning on the possibility of

democratic participation in a highly organized post-industrial society." Benjamin S. Kleinberg American Society in the Postindustrial Age (Columbia, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Co., 1973) p. 22. Some of the "end of ideologists" Kleinberg referred to were John Kenneth Galbraith, Zbgniew Brzezinski, and Richard Barber.

7. As John Dewey put it "the notion which has ruled philosophy ever since the time of the Greeks (is) that the office of knowledge is to uncover the antecedently real, rather than, as in the case with our practical judgements, to gain the kind of understanding which is necessary to deal with problems as they arise." John Dewey, The Quest for Certainty (New York: Capricorn Books, 1929) p. 17.

8. Abraham Kaplan, The Conduct of Inquiry, (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Co., 1964) p. 53.

9. Ibid.

10. We shall discuss Max Weber's and Heinrich Rickert's views on ideology and the problem of knowledge in greater detail in Chapter I.

11. Louis Wirth, "American Sociology, 1915-4 ," in American Journal of Sociology Index to Vol. 1-5? 1895-1947 (Chicago: Press, 1948) p. 277.

12. In writing a history of value analysis one must first consider Marx's The German Ideology. In addition one must consider Pareto's The Mind and Society vol. 1 and 2, trans, Andrew Bongiorno and Arthur Livingston (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1935; New York: Dover Publications, 1963), Weber's "Objectivity in the Social Sciences" and Karl Mannheim's "Conservative Thought" in Essays on Sociology and Social Psychology, ed., Paul Kecskemeti (New York: Oxford University Press, 1953).

13. An example of the application of value analysis in political research can be found in: Harold Lasswell and Dorothy Blumenstock, World Revolutionary Propaganda (New York: Knopf, 1939). An example of the policy implications of value analysis can be found in: Richard M. Titmus, Social Policy (New York: Pantheon Books, 1974).

CHAPTER I

THE SOCIAL ROLE OF THE INTELLECTUAL

The Problem of Meaning and The Intellectual

The common ground out of which religion, classical philosophy, and modern science have come to play primary roles in shaping man's understanding of the world is man's need to explain the world in a way that he can understand it, and his place in it, as being meaningful.

In the sense that religion can be understood as "audacious attempt to conceive of the entire universe as being humanly significant", it, like classical philosophy has sought to impose a meaningful order upon reality by reducing the relationship between man and the world to a set of fixed, teleologically derived properties.[1] The investment of these properties with an ontological necessity in classical philosophy can be understood as a manifestation of the continuity between the earliest rational speculation concerning man and the empirical world and the religious representations that lay behind it. As F.M. Cornford noted this relationship was "no mere matter of superficial analogies but rather a process under which philosophy inherited from religion certain great conceptions, for instance, the ideas of God, Soul, Destiny, Law, which continued to circumscribe the movements of rational thought and to determine their main

directions."[2]

These directions were clearly articulated in the relationship that ancient Greek thought established between physics and metaphysics. Here it is important to understand that Platonic idealism invested Greek thought with the idea that natural objects tend throughout their qualitative changes toward ideal ends that are the final objects of absolute or pure knowledge. In this very critical sense, classical Greek thought held that a science of natural changes (physics) is possible only because of this teleological phenomenon. In that thought the empirical world is knowable only because changes which take place in it are dominated by forms or essences that are immutable, complete, or perfect. Building on this idea, classical Greek thought held that all natural phenomena aspire to actualize these prior and perfect forms, and that as such all natural phenomena can be defined and classified in relation to the degree to which they approximate these ideal forms.[3]

What underlies the elaboration of this basic idea into a philosophy of science was its belief that these ideal forms constitute reason in its full and perfect Being. There are three interrelated assumptions that underlie this idea. First, the ultimate comprehension of these ideal forms result in man's capacity to enjoy communion with perfect Being and thus to enjoy the highest happiness. Second, man as a rational and yet natural being also is set forth on a path of striving to realize this end. The third assumption is that this realization is identical with the apprehension of

true and immutable Being.

The most significant and telling aspect of this philosophy, as it has guided the intellectual and social traditions of Western thought, is that it provided man with a way of looking at the world that would ease his uncertainties about his precarious place in it, and would provide him with the basis for hope. Classical philosophy could provide man with the hope and the means of quieting his anxieties because it told him that his life in this world was but one stage in a universal scenario that he was predestined to go through as a means of achieving union with a higher stage of life. This union would allow him to achieve a oneness with the Ideal Forms. Reason, it held, was the means that man was provided with to find through a trial and error comprehension of truth and beauty the ultimate comprehension of these things in their ideal form and a union with true Being. Thus the intellectual legacy that Greek thought provided for Western man is the idea that, in his rationality, man can transcend nature and achieve the certitude that is derived from the unqualified possession of the universal and perfect good.[4]

The adoption of this idea by Western philosophy and in a somewhat different form by Christianity, has had profound consequences in shaping man's understanding of the world and his place in it. This is because it served to guide the direction of man's search for certainty, and by extension of this, what man should consider worthy of being known. In this very critical sense it required that the man of knowledge, be he the priest, the philosopher, or the scientist, must be able

to explain natural and social events in terms of how they reveal inherent aspects of the perfect good. This explains both the predominance of the natural law doctrine in the social, economic, political, and legal thought of the Western world right up to the twentieth century, as well as the underlying tensions that have characterized the relationship between science and religion since the seventeenth century.

The adoption of this same idea also served to condition an intellectual crisis of vast proportions after the seventeenth century. This crisis resulted when the framework provided by classical philosophy lost much of its intellectual authority with the rise of empirical science in the seventeenth century. In the wake of this revolutionary development there emerged a huge gap in Western social thought, one that Comtean positivism, economic determinism, and social Darwinism all sought to fill, while paradoxically adhering to their own reductionary set of principles.[5]

To fully comprehend the nature of the crisis produced by what is commonly referred to as the Copernician revolution we must clearly put into perspective the normative functions classical thought served in guiding Western man's understanding of the world and his place in it. This means that we must understand that classical thought not only held that the only worthwhile knowledge to be gained by man was that concerned with antecedent existences and essences. Classical thought also held that the properties of value found within these existences and essences provide the only legitimate authoritative standards for the conduct of life. Thus the

failure of empirical science to produce a new set of normative standards replacing the old left man in a state of intellectual confusion concerning the criteria and principles he could employ in making decisions about social, political, and legal questions.

For John Dewey the absence of intellectual authority produced by the failure of empirical science to develop such a new set of standards was very much a twentieth century problem. As he put in The Quest for Certainty

> old beliefs have dissolved as far as constituting a definite operative hold upon the regulation of criticism and the formation of plans, and policies, working ideals and ends is concerned, and there is nothing to take their place.[6]

Because it transformed the foundations of man's knowledge of the world from abstract reason to empirical science, the rejection of metaphysical reductionism represents a revolutionary phenomenon, that is without parallel in Western intellectual history. In discrediting the traditional underpinnings of European intellectualism, the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century left the intellectual without a solution to the problem of meaning. On one level this explains the appeal that empirical science, Comtean positivism, Marxism, and social Darwinism had for nineteenth century Western intellectuals. On another, our immediate level it provides us with the opportunity to put into sharper focus the nature of the dilemma that historically intellectuals have come to be associated with and to understand the approach they have taken to this dilemma. This dilemma is that while intellectuals have craved for a

solution to the problem of meaning, they have been generally predisposed to question the validity of solutions that others have willingly accepted on faith alone. In this sense the intellectual, because he has always sought to endow his life with meaning through reason, has always acted to shatter belief in magical solutions to the problem of meaning and salvation. In doing so the intellectual has brought to the world a disenchantment that conditions the "growing demand that the world and the total pattern of life be subject to an order that is significant and meaningful."[7] This is precisely what Max Weber meant when he argued that it is the intellectual who transforms the concept of the world into the problem of meaning.[8]

The idea that the solution to this problem could be found in a world-image that is derived from the metaphysical unification of empirical and external elements has its foundations in this dilemma. But just as significantly the relationship between the intellectual and society in general has its foundations in this dilemma. This accounts for the fact that the intellectual has throughout history invested himself with the responsibility for constructing world-images that lend significance and meaning to men's lives. In other words, he has been invested with the responsibility for laying to rest the insecurities his distrust of magical belief produced.

What enabled the intellectual to fill this role, and therefore supplant in religious and ethical importance the magician and the sorcerer was the task assigned to him by

all the major religions of the world. This task, as Weber noted, was the task of sublimating the possession of sacred values into a belief in redemption.[9] While the idea of redemption is very old, particularly if one takes by it that man can achieve liberation from distress, hunger, drought, sickness, suffering, and ultimately death and damnation, it, as Weber explained, "attained a specific significance only where it expressed a systemmatic and rationalized image of the world and represented a stand in the face of the world."[10] Historically then, we can grasp the lasting significance of the intellectual to religion in offering a solution to the problem of meaning: the intellectual has framed the world-images and stances upon which the meaning as well as the intended and actual psychological quality of redemption could be gained through religion.

To this end Max Weber advanced an argument that has a significant bearing on this discussion. The argument he advanced is that if we are to understand the relationship between the intellectual and society in terms of the problem of meaning, then, we must first understand the relationship between ideas and human action. Weber developed this argument when he noted that while it is not ideas but material and ideal interests that directly govern man's conduct

> very frequently the world-images that have been created by ideas have, like switchmen, determined the tracks along which action has been pushed by the dynamic of interest.[11]

The sociological implications of Weber's argument are very significant. They are especially significant when we

consider that the intellectual crisis of the seventeenth century not only served to invest the problem of meaning with urgency, it also renewed the intellectual's struggle to frame images and stands from which meaning and redemption could be derived through reason. When understood in this light, Weber's argument requires that we examine theories of Western society in terms of two specific considerations. First, it requires that we examine them as they might influence the direction of man's actions and how they provide a response to the need for meaning. Secondly, Weber's argument suggests that we ask specifically how theories and the images of the world they promote rest on ideas whose exact meanings can only be fully comprehended when we understand the assumptions and values upon which they have been based.

Therefore, if we want to determine what impact the intellectual, as the framer of a new way of interpreting the world and man's place in it, can have in contemporary society, we must understand not only the ideas he produces, but the values and assumptions from which these ideas have been derived. It is these values and assumptions that frame his efforts to develop social theories that constitute a response to the problem of meaning. This of course presupposes that we can understand the modern intellectual as a person who is involved in either the formulation or rationalization of principles that are designed to relieve modern society from the state of intellectual confusion generated by the repudiation of metaphysical reductionism.

Whether we can understand the intellectual and his importance in modern society in the terms conveyed here is a problem that requires serious attention because it predisposes us to look at the effort to construct new social theories in a critical way. It also requires us to consider how the role of the intellectual in society has been treated by men who have devoted themselves to answering this question.

The Intellectual and Society

The question of the intellectual in society was first raised by Plato over two thousand years ago in The Republic. The Republic is a work that is devoted to answering the question, what does justice mean and how can it be realized in human society. In it Plato argued that the rulers of the Just or Good State should be philosophers who are kings or kings that are philosophers. The reasons for this connection to knowledge to power in Plato were linked to the foundations of such a state and with its preservation. Plato's reasoning contains the logic upon which all subsequent claims to power on the basis of the intellectual's access to superior knowledge hinge, from Comtean positivism, Marxism, right up to systems analysis.[12]

For Plato the Just State can only be founded on principles that are derived from the knowledge and appreciation of the Form or Idea of the State. Only a philosopher who is fully proficient in the highest of sciences, dialectics is able to see and copy the heavenly original. The reason for this, to paraphrase Plato, is that philosophers love to see

the truth, and a real lover always loves to see the whole, not merely the parts. Therefore the philosopher unlike ordinary people does not just love sensible things and their beautiful sounds and colors or shapes, but he also wants to see and to admire the real nature of beauty, that is, the Form or Idea of Beauty.

Driven by this admiration, the true philosopher, according to Plato, is like "a draughtsman or a painter who has the divine as his model, are the only ones who can sketch the ground plan for the Just State for they alone can see the original, and can copy it, by letting their eyes wander to and fro, from the model to the picture and back from the picture to the model."[13]

But just as only the true philosopher, the dialectician (the philosopher who not only pursues truth and wisdom but is the possessor of the methods by which they can be derived) can provide the principles upon which the Just State can be founded so too is he the only one who can provide for its stability and permanence. He is the only one who can see the divine original of the Just State and he is the only one who can see the divine original of man, the Form or Idea of Man. Because of this ability, the true philosopher is the only one who can derive from this image the principles upon which the god-like qualities of man can be realized on earth as a necessary precondition for maintaining order in the state.[14]

Traces of Plato's logic can be found in Hegel's philosophy of history. For Hegel the principle function of the philosopher, as the man who helps others to summarize the spirit, the

Weltananschauung, of an epoch, was very clear. It is to help man to comprehend the movement of Reason of which the individual's thinking is only a reflex, an objectification of the Universal Spirit that moves through history and becomes conscious of itself, that is, actualized in man. The principle function of the philosopher, as we shall discuss in greater detail in chapter two, is one of helping man to realize the objective meaning of history and the ultimate purpose to which history as the successive unfolding of Reason has directed itself.

Distinct traces of Plato's logic can also be discerned in the works of St. Simon and Auguste Comte, the founders of positivism. Writing in the aftermath of the French Revolution and Napoleon's angry renunciation of Antoine Destutt de Tracy and other intellectuals as ideologists, St. Simon and Comte self-consciously articulated frameworks for restructuring European society that emphasized: (1) the need for the methods of the physical sciences to be applied to the study of social processes; and (2) the need for political leadership to rest in the hands of the scientist-intellectual.

St. Simon advocated a coalition consisting of scientists, artists, and industrialists to be society's leaders and Comte adopted an even more elitist stance. Comte argued that a society seeking to move into a new phase of evolutionary development, industrialism, must put the formulation of social policy into the hands of men who could best understand the laws of historical development and social organization.[15] For Comte the scientist-intellectual in the form of the

sociologist was the person best fit to determine social policy. He presumed that in comparing all societies and establishing comprehensive typologies of their major institutions and structures sociologists could deduce the general laws governing social structures. He also presumed that knowledge of those laws would enable the sociologist to define the moral structures and value systems that together with science would provide the appropriate framework for a rational society.

This Comtean notion of the sociologist as a claimant to political power on the basis of his superior knowledge and mastery of methods represents only one nineteenth century variation of the Platonic idea of the philosopher-king. Marxism can be understood to represent another. This is because Marxism embraces the notion that history is guided by a set of evolutionary laws which can only be comprehended by the mastery of the historical materialism and by the elimination of false consciousness.

The fact that Marxism can be understood to represent another nineteenth century variation of the Platonic philosopher-king becomes evident when we examine critically its claims. Marxism is a theory of human progress that regards history as: (1) the development of man's efforts to master the forces of nature and therefore production; and (2) a product of class struggles between those who own the means of production and those who do not and so must sell their labor as a commodity. As a dialectical theory Marxism rests on two interrelated assumptions. The first is that

each successive stage of human history is the product, the synthesis, of the existing order and the emergent and antagonistic one. The second assumption is that the dynamic for the continuation of this process can be creatively directed when the proletariat or industrial worker is made aware of his alienation and exploitation under capitalism, and thus gains true class consciousness.

For Marx the true class consciousness would belong to the proletariat when the proletariat could be made to understand the terms of its alienation and potentialities for both transforming history and realizing the end of history through the creation of a communist society. This would be a society which, having realized the scientific advances and technical gains of capitalism could eliminate capitalist property relations in favor of more humane ones that rested on common ownership of the means of production. For Marx the ability to comprehend history in these terms required the transcendence of one's own alienation and therefore the elimination of false consciousness. This meant that man must be able to recognize that history is not the inevitable outcome of bourgeois economic and philosophical laws that relegate him to a thing-like quality.[16] Man's comprehension of the fallacy of these laws and the ideological ends they serve in legitimating the perpetuation of capitalism could only be gained through an understanding of the true laws of historical development, that is the non-bourgeois laws, the materialistic principles of social change.

Marx in articulating the conditions under which false

consciousness could be eliminated ascribed to the intellectual a revolutionary role in guiding the proletariat to a true understanding of its class position. In this context, Marx defined the intellectual as an alienated member of the upper class who, because of his alienation was able to see the contradictions in his own position, and apply this insight to society at large. As such, Marx held, that the intellectual could transcend the limitations of his class origins. He also held that the intellectual could through his comprehension of the movement of history lead the proletariat forward by revolutionary leadership into a higher stage of societal evolution.

Marx's view concerning the revolutionary role of the intellectual was later to become absorbed and elaborated upon by Plekhanov, Trotsky, and Lenin into a theory of revolution. In their hands it became the fundamental philosophical and political principle justifying the leadership of the proletarian vanguard by a tightly disciplined group of intellectuals. But Marx's influence in generating interest in the role of the intellectual does not stop with Plekhanov, Trotsky, and Lenin.

Because of Marxism's tremendous appeal, Marx's views on the intellectuals have demonstrated to several generations of sociologists the importance of studying the role of the intellectual in different societies. In this regard, Max Weber's writings on the sociology of religion are of central concern to us not only because they repudiate some of the major principles upon which Marx's interpretation of history

is based, but because they enlarge the dimensions of the study of the intellectual in history. It is in Weber's writings on the sociology of religion that the relationship between ideas and world-images produced by intellectuals, and the effect of these ideas and images in altering or confirming the institutions and value systems of different societies, has received its widest attention. Therefore a brief review of some of these writings is useful in understanding the importance of this relationship in framing an approach to the study of the intellectual.

Max Weber's Views on the Role of the Intellectual

In his study of Confucianism, Weber pointed out that for twelve centuries social rank in Ancient China was determined almost exclusively by an individual's educational qualification for public office.

This accounted for the importance of the literati as the ruling stratum in Chinese society. In his analysis of the social position of the literati, Weber was able to demonstrate that the literati were able to maintain their prestige and powerful position because they were able to perpetuate: (1) the self-serving idea that success in written examinations testing one's mastery of classical literary texts should be the sole criterion by which all positions and promotions within the government bureaucracy should be awarded, and (2) the myth of their indispensibility as interpreters of law and the preservers of tradition. These notions once institutionalized in Mandarin bureaucracy

were decisive in preserving the structure of traditional Chinese society and the unity of its culture.

While Weber's conclusions concerning the role of the literati are consistent with Marx's notion that religious, philosophical, and political-economic systems mask the material interests of the groups in power, it is important not to confine this analysis to Capitalism.

The Chinese literati represent the prototype of an intellectual that is as much in evidence in socialist and communist societies as it is in capitalist societies, that is, the intellectual as a state functionary. The reason for this, as several early commentators on socialism have noted, including Weber, Waclaw Machajski, Bruno Rizzi, Leon Trotsky, James Burnham, and Milovan Djilas, is that socialist societies tend to be even more dependent on bureaucratic management than capitalist societies.[17] Because this dependence conditions the state's growing reliance on a group of highly specialized functionaries, who these commentators warned could become a virtually autonomous class, the conversion of the ideal of a classless society prophesied by Marx and Lenin under communism into a reality has little chance of being realized.

In general, it would be a mistake to generalize on the consistency between Weber's conclusions concerning the Chinese literati and Marx's materialistic conception of history. This is because Weber noted several significant situations and events that did not comply with Marx's deterministic view of history. The most important examples

of this are represented in Weber's studies of the role of religious prophets in ancient Jewish society, and the emergence of modern capitalism through the conversion of religious ideas into ethical and normative prescriptions.

Weber's discussion of the role of the intellectual in Jewish history provided the framework upon which he analyzed the historical and sociological importance of the religious prophets. Here it is important to understand that in his study Ancient Judaism one of the major problems that Weber focused upon was discovering the sociological and psychological factors that enabled the Jews of the Diaspora to accept their role as a pariah people yet maintain their religious and cultural identity.

For Weber the Jews could accept being a landless people after the destruction of the second temple without losing their identity and sense of historic purpose as God's chosen people because first, of all their continued faith in the covenant, the berith, between Moses and God (Yahwe) which in their eyes established them as the chosen people. Secondly, they accepted the view predominant throughout the Diaspora that their exile was both a punishment for the degeneracies of the Judaic kings starting with Solomon, and a test of their devotion to God as His chosen people. A third factor, is their belief that having remained faithful to God and the berith they would ultimately be rewarded and led back to their promised land.

This persistent faith demonstrated by the Jews throughout the Diaspora would not have been possible, Weber argued,

without: (1) the elimination of magic and ethical sublimation of orgiostic rites in Judaism, and (2) the systematic unification of religious law. For Weber these developments did not occur in a vacuum. They were conditioned by the intense struggle between two groups of religious prophets, the prophets of doom and the prophets of good fortune. The prophets of doom, Amos, Ezekiel, Isiaih, and Jeremiah were, as Weber describes them, demagogues and "pamphleteers" who wandered thoughout Judea prophesizing the nation's destruction if the imperialistic foreign policies and the degeneracy of the Judaic kings continued. The prophets of good fortune were religiously trained scholars who in the employ of the kings were paid to praise their policies and predict good things as a means of countering the politically dangerous criticism of the prophets of doom. The latter because of their temperament and sense of righteous indignation could not be coopted or silenced. For Weber, then, the elimination of magic and ethical sublimation, and the systematic unification of religious law was the outcome, the product of the success of the prophets of doom and of their rabbinic successors.

One of the most significant insights that can be derived from Weber's discussion of the struggle between these two groups of religious prophets is that they are the prototypes of two different kinds of intellectuals. The prophets of good fortune can be understood to represent the prototype of intellectuals, who in the employ of modern organizations, function as public relations men. These are intellectuals who, because of the high social status accorded them as

possessors of technical and administrative skills, lend prestige and authority to the policies of their employers. The prophets of doom, on the other hand, can be understood to represent the prototype for intellectuals who, as outraged outsiders refusing to be coopted or silenced, operate as political critics or revolutionaries.

Just as Weber's study Ancient Judaism is important in elaborating the different roles intellectuals have played throughout history, so too is his study The Protestant Ethic and The Spirit of Capitalism important in this connection. Weber's analysis of the emergence of capitalism is all important in elaborating the different roles intellectuals have come to play in different societies and under different historical and social conditions. These variations are particularly present in Weber's discussion of Luther and Calvin.

The discussion is marked by an emphasis on the origins of religious ideas. For Weber the development of Luther's and Calvin's ideas were related intrinsically to problems of biblical scholarship and theology rather than to the establishment of a groundwork for the ascendency of the bourgeoisie and the emergence of capitalism. Luther and Calvin were responding to problems that were internal to theology, and the solutions they formulated to these problems were specific to religion.

In presenting this image of Luther and Calvin, Weber has served to identify them as the prototype of what can be referred to as the autonomous intellectual. This is the

intellectual who, in responding to problems intrinsic to his particular field of interest develops solutions that are meant to be particular to that field, but which may, as in the case of Luther and Calvin's religious thought, be re-interpreted by others to satisfy their own particular interests or ends.

In developing his views of Luther and Calvin, Weber has repudiated the claims of a purely materialistic conception of history, that there is a pre-established correspondence between ideas and the materialistic or class interests that they may be shaped to serve. In having done this, Weber has added an important dimension to the study of the relationship between ideas and events in history.

The serious student of history can, following Weber, examine the "elective affinity" between ideas and interests in order to understand the process by which some ideas become absorbed and diffused in different social movements, while others quickly become abandoned and lost in history. What this boils down to is that the concept of elective affinity provides us with a perspective for studying history, one that hinges on the recognition that, quite apart from their original meaning and usages, ideas are often selected and reinterpreted by those who develop an affinity for them on the basis of how they can be used to express, rationalize or complement their particular set of interests or viewpoints. Weber's approach also provides the basis for the recognition that the survival and diffusion of ideas is often the result of autonomous, sometimes subjective dynamics that underlie

distinctly historical and social processes.

While an appreciation of the themes developed by Weber in his writings on religion allows us to enlarge the dimensions of our understanding of the different roles that intellectuals can and have played in history, by extenting the parameters of our understanding of this complex issue beyond the constraints of Marxian analysis, we should not limit our discussion to these writings alone. Certain insights developed by Weber in his methodological writings concerning values and the construction of theoretical concepts in the social sciences require us to consider these writings. They have a special bearing on our efforts to establish the basis upon which the intellectual can be understood as a person who articulates images and stances that serve to rationalize principles and ends that are not always made explicit in the construction of social theories. These epistemological and methodological insights concern the nature of problem selection and theory construction in the social sciences that allow us to derive from the critical evaluation of particular social theories a set of factors that would aid our understanding of the intellectual in the terms that are useful to our task of evaluating Daniel Bell as an intellectual.

Max Weber's Methodological Writings

Weber's approach to the issues of problem selection and theory construction in the social sciences is grounded in the epistomology of Heinrich Rickert in the sense that he shares with Rickert an adherance to the following principles:

(1) the empirical world is always in a constant state of flux;

(2) because the world is ever changing no science of empirical reality can ever completely grasp the world in its totality;

(3) all that science can seek to do is to imperfectly reproduce partial, one-sides, images of selected aspects of empirical reality;

(4) science can only do this with the aid of conceptual frameworks, prior sets of formally defined criteria, that order our perception of the world and render selected aspects of reality comprehensible from the particular points of view embodied in the framework or in the "paradigms" from which we elect to examine the world.

In his adherance to these epistemological principles, Weber held that values, or sentiments concerning the appraisal of what is meaningful, what is worthy of preserving or acquiring as an end, serve a necessary role in both the selection of problems and the construction of theoretical concepts in the social sciences.

Values, for Weber, are indispensible in the selection of problems in the social sciences because it is only on the basis of his particular values, values that are culturally conditioned, that the researcher can determine what is problematic and therefore worthy of knowing. Values, in other words, provide the basic criteria upon which the researcher determines in advance of his actual research what cultural phenomenon or events are significant, are worth

acquiring more knowledge about, through scientific investigation.

Values, Weber argued in his methodological essays, were also indispensible for the construction of theoretical concepts in the social sciences because they provide the basis upon which problems and hypotheses can be formulated. This, Weber argued, is grounded in the nature of the relationship that exists between the empirical world and science. The empirical world, Weber argued, can only be made comprehensible by science through abstraction, which is a process that involves, as Rickert noted, the transformation of the world from a heterogeneous continuum into a domain of discrete objects.[18] On the basis of this epistemological insight, Weber argued that no science of empirical reality can ever conceptually grasp reality without transforming it; and that such a transformation is always conditioned by the theoretical purposes that underlie each discipline's efforts to attain knowledge of the empirical world. He also maintained that the concepts used in the social sciences to formulate research problems and hypotheses are designed only to provide images of those selected aspects of empirical reality which the individual researcher on the basis of his presuppositions, which are always guided by his values, considers to be essential in making such knowledge possible.

At this level, what the problem of values and objectivity in the social sciences boils down to is two basic propositions. The first is that no social science is possible without presuppositions. The second is that the principle difference

that distinguishes the social sciences from the natural sciences is that, while both rely on presuppositions, the theoretical presuppositions of the social scientist can only be derived from his culturally conditioned sense of what is significant and therefore worth examining in greater detail. The same does not necessarily hold true for the presuppositions of the natural scientist. The reason for this difference is that since the social sciences are concerned with events and phenomena to which the possibility of evaluation attaches itself, the social scientist can only formulate his investigation by reference to what has value to him as a cultural being. The same concern does not necessarily hold true for the natural scientist.

Two aspects of Weber's response to the problem of values and objectivity understand the intellectual bases and functions of Weber's position. The first is that Weber did not mean, when he referred to the indispensibility of values in the social sciences, that all social-scientific research is biased, capricious, or arbitrary. What he meant was that the selection and formulation of problems in the social sciences is always grounded in individual and historical relevences to values. The decisive point for Weber is that once the research problem is defined and stated, then objective methods of research and the personal objectivity of the researcher can and should be brought to bear on the resolution of the problem. It is, Weber argued, at this level of social-scientific research that the quality of the researcher's work and his findings can be debated in objective terms. The second

underlying aspect of Weber's approach to the problem of values and objectivity in the social sciences is that it stems from what he considered to be the need to clarify action and thought in the face of a broad variety of opposed efforts to transform the social sciences into normative disciplines. He stressed the functions and limitations of research concerning issues of social policy and ethical judgment. His response to this problem emerges out of his efforts to repudiate on scientific and epistemological grounds the absolutistic and reductionary claims of Natural Law theory, Marxism, Social Darwinism, and Positivism to be able to derive, on the basis of their allegedly scientific images of the world, universally valid normative prescriptions.[19] His response to this problem of values and objectivity in the social sciences was cast in the Is-Ought controversy that has engulfed the social sciences, legal philosophy, and political theory since the later part of the nineteenth century.[20]

Weber's approach to the problem of values and objectivity is fundamental for our purposes. By arguing that there is no such thing as science without presuppositions, and that such presuppositions in the social sciences are always guided by the researcher's values, Weber has provided us with an important framework. We can use it to critically evaluate a particular theory in terms of the degree to which it may serve to rationalize principles, ideas, world-images, and ends that have not been made explicit within the formal construction of that theory. His framework represents an

agenda for a series of inter-locking questions, one that by design is meant to make explicit those values, assumptions, and beliefs which are implicit within the theory, and which its author may have gone to considerable lengths to conceal in his formal construction of it.

It remained for others, namely Louis Wirth, Gunnar Myrdal, and Arnold Rose to refer to such contextural analysis as value analysis and to develop the specific questions such analysis must embody; but Weber's views on the problem of values and objectivity in the social sciences has provided this form of methodological analysis with its directions and purpose.[21] Weber's views rest on the belief that one of the most important tasks of methodological analysis in any science of cultural reality is to arouse a fuller comprehension and more rational understanding of the ideas over which men struggle by making explicit the values, assumptions, beliefs, and ends that underlie and structure their particular world-views and predispositions to social action. Weber's views thus provide us with the basis for understanding the intellectual as someone who, because he deals principally with the articulation of ideas and world-images may, in certain instances, frame a set of ideas and world-images that either by design or by historical accident may serve to rationalize principles, world-images, and or ends whose consequences may extend beyond what a surface understanding of the theories that embody them.

Weber's approach to the problem of values and objectivity in the social sciences also provide us with the sense of the

importance and direction that the study of the development of ideas and their integration into logically coherent systems of thought must have if it is to be made to extend beyond the pale of ideology and polemics. The reason for this is that these views are grounded in a philosophy of science which takes as its starting point the idea that progress within the social sciences is always marked by the conflict between the intellectual apparatus of the past and man's desire to wrest new knowledge from empirical reality. For Weber this is a conflict which results in the "perpetual reconstruction" of concepts in the social sciences. Moreover, this conflict results from the failure of existing paradigms or conceptual patterns to solve problems created by man's desire for new knowledge.[22]

The nature of Weber's philosophy of science is most clearly reflected in the following statement:

> The history of the social sciences is and remains a continuous process passing from the attempt to order reality analytically through the construction of concepts-the dissolution of the analytical constructs so constructed through the expansion and shift of the scientific horizon-and the reformulation anew of concepts on the foundations thus transformed. It is not the error of the attempt to construct conceptual systems in general which is shown by this process-every science, even simple descriptive history, operates with the conceptual stock-in-trade of its time. Rather, this process shows that in the cultural sciences concept-construction depends on the setting of the problem, and the latter varies with the content of culture itself. The relationship between concept and reality in the cultural sciences involves the transitoriness of all such syntheses. The great attempts at theory-construction in our science were always useful for revealing the limits of the significance of those points of view which provided their foundations. The greatest advances in the sphere of the social sciences are substantively tied up with the shift in practical cultural problems and take the guise of a critique of concept construction.[23]

This viewpoint on the nature of scientific knowledge is one that continues to have a central, but, for reasons that we shall elaborate on in the next section, disquieting place in the philosophy of science. The centrality of Weber's perspective to the study of values and concept-construction is similar to that reflected in Thomas Kuhn's study The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, and this study like much of the growing literature in the field of the sociology of science is based on a perspective that is very distinctly Weber's.[24]

For our purposes, Weber's perspective on the nature of scientific knowledge provides us with a highly useful framework for examining the work of the social scientist who is also an intellectual. By this we mean that Weber's perspective provides a framework for treating the productions of some social scientists as the work of intellectuals, i.e. as persons who create world-images and perspectives that serve to rationalize principles and ends that they do not state explicitly in their social theories or in their rationales for social policy. That Weber's perspective provides such a framework is a function of his emphasis on the place of values in the selection of problems and in the construction and use of scientific concepts in the social sciences and of his emphasis on the positive functions of the critique of concept-construction in the social sciences.

In his emphasis on the role of values in science Weber provides the direction along which we can seek to determine the extent to which the principles and ends rationalized by

the world-images and perspectives developed by a social scientist are reducible to implicit values and assumptions that underlie the construction and use of scientific concepts in his work. Weber's postulate of the indispensibility of values in the scientific process requires that a solution to this problem must originate in the analysis of what is common to the work of all social scientists, that is, the place of values in guiding their construction and use of scientific concepts. Moreover, by connecting research on the values that guide the construction and use of scientific concepts to its progress, Weber has provided the best argument for the value of such research in the social sciences.

When taken in conjunction with his views on the intellectual and the role of ideas in history Weber's discussion on the place of values in the social sciences provides a very important starting point. This framework allows us to assess the writings of those social scientists whose work may have implications beyond mere description or technical analysis. Ultimately, the framework that Weber provides is one that we will use to assess the underlying nature and scientific value of Daniel Bell's work.

Absolutism and Relativism

Weber's views on the nature and limits of scientific knowledge have found a disquieting place in modern social and political thought because of the reaction that surrounds the kind of relativism that these views were couched in and expressive of; this kind of relativism has been labelled

ethical relativism.[25]

Ethical relativism can be defined as both a world-view and as a methodological perspective which holds that: (1) if the social sciences are to be empirical sciences, that is, sciences which follow the scientific methods, then, they must maintain the logical distinction between reality and the judgments of value inherent in the scientific method. (2) judgments concerning the value of an action, policy, or program can be made througn science only in a limited way, one that excludes the assessment of the superiority of one value over another.

Weber's views of the nature and limits of scientific knowledge, as were those of Edmund Lask, Gustav Radbruch, and Hans Kelsen in the field of jurisprudence, focused upon ethical relativism as basically being concerned with defining the relationship between science and value judgments. Ethical relativism was, for each of these thinkers, implied in the scientific method. That relativism aims to find within the self-imposed limits of the scientific method the conditions by which science can investigate the world of social reality free from the ideological constraints and moral imperatives.

The introductory remarks made by Weber in his essay "Objectivity in Social Science and Social Policy" concerning the history of the social sciences up till the twentieth century constitutes a summary of the conditions that led to the formulation of ethical relativism on the basis of Kantian epistemological insights.

Noting that the social sciences first emerged as formal disciplines in connection with practical matters, matters of social and economic policy, Weber added that their basic purpose was the articulation of value-judgments concerning issues relevant to the formulation of state policy. While this situation, Weber noted, was modified over the course of the nineteenth century, it was, he added, done so without the formulation of the logical distinction between empirical and normative knowledge, or, in other words, without the logical distinction between knowledge of what is and knowledge of what ought to be.

The need for the social sciences to draw on this distinction as the basic precondition for separating value judgments from the study of empirical reality, in Weber's estimation, had long been hampered by two views that were held in the nineteenth century about the social and economic life of society. One view was that society was governed by a set of immutable and universal laws. This view was reflective of the natural law interpretation of the social world. The other view, which emerged after the decline of the natural law theory, was conditioned by the evolutionary interpretations of the social world advanced by historicism, economic determinism, and social Darwinism. This latter view consisted of the idea that society was ruled by a single, unambiguous, evolutionary principle, one that could be discerned by man. Noting that what was considered normatively right was held to be identical in the first view with the immutably emergent, in the latter view against the thrust of Marxist

economics that even as late as the early twentieth century there still existed the "confused opinion" that economics does and should derive value-judgments concerning the nature of society from a specifically economic point of view.[26] For Weber this constituted a perspective that like Comtean positivism and natural law theory blurred the distinction that exists between science and value-judgments.

Weber's analysis of the problem of values in the social sciences then took on an added dimension. Guided by the principles of ethical relativism, Weber's analysis represents a polemic against any doctrine or perspective that holds that knowledge of what ought to be done in the area of social policy can be derived a priori from knowledge of what is. Weber's analysis rejects this presupposition by drawing on principles established earlier by Georg Simmel and Heinrich Rickert and which were derived from the latters interpretation of Kant's critical philosophy.[27] These principles are manifest in the rules of deductive analytic logic. The logical, formal rules underlying ethical relativism serve as the grounds upon which the logical distinction between the Is and Ought could be established and maintained. They constitute the technical grounds by which science can be withdrawn from their dependency on moral values and on competing ideological perspectives.

Weber's polemic against the moral absolutism of positivist epistemology and economic determinism, like the polemics of Lask, Radbruch, and Kelsen against the doctrine of natural law, can be viewed as a distinct application of

these rules. Briefly, the rules of deductive analytic logic concerning the distinction between the Is and Ought holds that logical reasoning is only analytical when, and only when, it adds nothing to the meaning of a given term or preposition, but rather is analytical when it makes explicit what is implied in that meaning. This means that inferences of what ought to be can never be derived deductively from premises whose meaning is limited to what is.[28]

Both Comtean positivism and economic determinism like the natural law doctrine share a bias, Weber noted, that marks all absolutist doctrines of Right. That bias is grounded in the presupposition that the history of man, in its different cultural manifestations (law, economics, religion, etc.) follows a predetermined and progressive course constitutive of the a priori existence of a set of universal laws of development. Each of these doctrines therefore violate the Is-Ought dualism by abstracting from the manifold nature of an infinite empirical reality selected facts or elements which correspond to their particular interpretation of history, inferring from them claims which serve to substantiate their particular prior view of history and its "laws." Each then derives from the existence of certain facts knowledge of what should be, or what ought to be done in reorganizing society and its institutions.

Seen in this light, Weber's analysis of the problem of values in the social sciences constitutes a polemic against the moral absolutism of both empirical positivism and economic determinism in that it rejects a view common to both.

This viewpoint is that universal or immutably invariant laws govern history and its cultural manifestations. Weber's analysis under the aegis of ethical relativism rejects this view on the ground that it overlooks the logical distinction between knowledge of the Ought and Is by obscuring the relationship between cognition and value.

Far from being oblivious to the consequences that could result from the withdrawal of science from the search and verification of moral absolutes, namely the erosion of man's confidence in thought, Weber argued that the social sciences operating within the framework of ethical relativism can play an instrumental role in men's lives. Weber's elaboration of this belief was centered on his conviction that the real problem underlying the relationship between values and science lies in determining the meaning and purpose of the scientific criticism of value judgments and ideals. It was to this problem that Weber devoted the main part of his analysis of the problem of objectivity, while in the process developing the concept of ethical neutrality as a blueprint upon which both of these interrelated problems could be approached and made tenable in the social sciences. For Weber the problem of objectivity in the social sciences could only be meaningfully approached through the resolution of this original problem. What this boils down to is that for Weber a determination of the meaning and purpose of the scientific criticism of value-judgments and ideals requires a precise delineation of the function and limits of knowledge in the social sciences regarding the ends of social action.

The undertaking of this task, Weber argued, must begin with the recognition that all serious reflection concerning the ultimate properties of rational human conduct is oriented to discovering the relationship between ends and means. The implication of this is that man desires something concretely either for its own sake or as means for achieving something else which is even more highly desired. It was with this in mind that Weber argued that science can help man make decisions concerning his behavior by providing the context for the causal examination of the means involved in securing the ends of action and for, second, the causal examination of the consequences involved in the pursuit and attainment of a given end.

In the first case, Weber proposed that the function science can serve in facilitating a critical discussion of value-judgments and of ends and means relationships is to provide the acting person with the causal structure to determine which means are appropriate or inappropriate for the achievement of a proposed end. It is in this way that Weber reasoned that science can estimate the chances of attaining a given end by estimating the efficiency of existing alternative means to that given ends. It can in this fashion, Weber argued, serve to evaluate the end itself on the basis of whether it is practically meaningful or meaningless. This, however, is secondary in importance to the critical function science can serve, Weber argued, in providing the context for a causal examination of the consequences of an action. Here Weber stressed that, whenever it appears possible

to reach a proposed end, science can help man to determine within the limits of its existing knowledge the consequences which the application of the means to be used will produce. It can also help in estimating the possible consequences resulting from the eventual attainment of the proposed end. In this way, Weber reasoned, science can provide the acting person with the necessary cognitive resources to weigh the undesired and desired consequences of his own action. This process, according to Weber, involves and is completed when science helps the acting person to answer for himself the one question upon which this process is based, that is, "what will the attainment of a desired end cost in terms of the predictable loss of other values."[29] To this he added that in the vast majority of cases every goal that is striven for costs something. With this in mind he cautioned that "the weighing of the goal in terms of the incidental consequences of the action which realizes it cannot be omitted from the deliberation of persons who act with a sense of responsibility."[30]

This word of caution serves as a prelude for Weber's fundamental conviction that the actual making of a decision concerning a proposed action is not, nor can it ever legitimately be, a task which science can undertake, but rather it must remain the task of the acting, willing person. The onus of responsibility, Weber contended, must ultimately rest with the individual; it is he who must "weigh and choose from among the values involved according to his own conscience and his own personal view of the world."[31] The point is that science can help the acting person make his choice but can

never make the choice for him.

The ways in which science can help the acting person make a decision were not for Weber limited to the causal examination of means and consequences. He also specified three additional ways that science could help the decision-maker. First, Weber contended that science can make the acting person realize that every action and, conversely, every inaction in view of the consequences it engenders implied the "espousal of certain values and the rejection of certain others."[32] Second, Weber contended that science can make the acting person see the significance of what he is after, the ideas and ultimate values that either do or do not underlie the concrete ends he pursues. Here three additional things must be noted: first, that Weber considered it one of the most important tasks of any science which deals with the causal analysis of man's cultural life to arouse a fuller understanding of the ideas and values for which men struggle. He, secondly, acknowledged that the methods to be used in the undertaking of this task could not be based on inductions in the usual sense that science and the rules of logic dictate.[33] Finally, Weber contended that science, to a certain extent, can judge evaluations critically according to their consistency and by laying bare the ultimate axioms from which they are derived. Weber acknowledged that while this analysis was purely formal, through it science can assist the acting person in becoming aware of the "ultimate standards of value which he does not make explicit to himself or which he must presuppose in order to be logical."[34]

It is in discussing the implications of this, specifically in terms of the relationship between knowledge in the social sciences and the formulation of social policy, that Weber defines the limits of a scientific examination of value judgments and of means and ends, or more explicitly of what science can do in helping man to make decisions concerning the appropriateness, utility, meaning and consequences of the actions he considers. Here Weber states, in an argument that again places the responsibility for making decisions on the individual, that the elevation of these ultimate standards, which are manifested in concrete value judgments to the level of explicitness, is the most that the scientific treatment of value judgments can do without entering the realm of speculation. As to whether the person expressing these value judgments ought to adhere to these ultimate standards is for Weber his own ultimate affair, it involves will and conscience, not empirical knowledge.[35]

Weber pointedly summed up his discussion of the functions and limits of science concerning the problem of values with this one comment: "An empirical science cannot tell anyone what he ought to do, but rather what he can do, and under certain circumstances what he wishes to do."[36] This statement constitutes the core of Weber's philosophy of the social sciences. It expresses Weber's belief that the most important task that the social sciences can undertake is to arouse a fuller comprehension of the ideas for which men struggle by making explicit the ideas and values which underlie and structure their actions and world-views. It also expresses his

faith in the necessity of ethical relativism. This faith was expressed in Weber's basic conviction that knowledge of the ought can not be derived a priori from knowledge of the empirical world without violating the limits of logic and science.

Understood against this background the concept of ethical neutrality is no more than the reaffirmation of this conviction on a methodological plane, one that Leo Strauss for instance has pointedly attacked as providing the conditions that led to nihilism and ultimately to the emergence of totalitarianism in the twentieth century.

Thus Strauss takes Weber to task for "assuming as a matter of course that there is no heirarchy of values and that therefore all values are of the same rank and can be treated as equal."[37] The underlying notion is of a "value free" social science, in this line of reasoning, is one that inevitably results in nihilism. Elaborating on this argument Strauss stressed that the idea that "every preference, however evil, base, or insane has to be judged before the tribunal of reason to be as legitimate as any other preference" can only result in the erosion of man's confidence in thought in providing objective standards by which certain values can be affirmed over others.[38] Thus, Strauss like many other moral absolutists of both the "left" and right attributed to Weber a certain moral responsibility for creating the kind of atmosphere and malaise in which Hitler's rise to power could be virtually guaranteed.

Underlying this argument is a skepticism of the possibility

of a methodological dualism between the Is and Ought, the empirical and the normative. Such skepticism is not based on any claims concerning the logical inconsistency of this dualism but rather is based on the claim that it makes all moral values equal.

This emphasis on the erosion of man's confidence in thought and on the emergence of nihilism as the by-products of ethical relativism denies without ever critically coming to grips with the historical conditions that fostered ethical relativism, the logical necessity and value of the distinction between the empirical and the normative. Strauss's denial was reflected in his reversion to the theory of natural law. In his appeal to that theory, he argued that the distinction between the Is and the Ought is meaningless because genuine knowledge of right and wrong can be made discoverable in the "true nature of man."[39] Though this type of knowledge can not be derived directly from empirical science as such, it can be used to direct an empirical social science in searching for the proper means to secure the ends which natural law prescribes. In this sense, Strauss argued that knowledge of the true nature of man can serve as both the foundation and impetus behind research in the social sciences.

It was exactly this point of view that Weber explicitly objected to in the sense that it rests on the presupposition that knowledge of right and wrong can either be subsumed or can fit into a prefixed idea of real, absolutist conceptions of the nature of man, whatever their definition.

The idea that the social sciences can serve to advance

an image of the natural rights of man is in direct opposition to Weber's regarding the functions and limits of science. The use of science to validate absolutistic conceptions of natural rights and images of man and history based on ideological, religious, and political precepts was an idea that Weber sharply disagreed with. Weber's opposition to this use of science was the basic animus that generated his analysis of the problem of values and his polemic against determinism. His formulation of the principle of ethical neutrality was the result. However, Weber's opposition to a morally absolutistic science did not mean that he believed that there could not be any genuine knowledge of right or wrong; it meant only that such knowledge is not demonstrable through science. In this regard, all that Weber was saying through his advocacy of ethical relativism was that one value can not be shown to be morally superior to another through science, because the verification of value judgments fall outside the limits of the scientific method.

Weber was aware of the dimensions and sources of tension that underlie these problems, but he did not build his views of the nature of science and politics on the assumption of natural law or rights. Simply put, in Weber's view science can never be a substitute for faith and politics.[40]

One finds instead in Weber's work an acceptance of basically different predispositions in science and morals and between science and politics. The acceptance of this dichotomy, along with his acceptance of the world's disenchantment as an irreversible consequence of rationalization, caused in part

by and evident in modern science distinguishes Weber's views on the function and limits of knowledge in the social sciences. Weber attempted to work within this framework; moral absolutists like Strauss did not.

The functions and limits of knowledge in the social sciences suggested by Weber in his discussion of the principles of ethical neutrality are also grounded in the problem of the historic erosion of man's confidence in thought as a means of providing a solution to the ultimate problem of meaning of developing ultimate normative guidelines for human conduct.

The erosion of confidence in thought has, we have noted, been a central theme in Western intellectual thought since the seventeenth century when, with the Copernican Revolution, the emergence of modern natural science shook the foundations of Western society. The repudiation of metaphysical reductionism that resulted in the rejection of teleological conceptions of man and the universe only served as a backdrop against the erosion of man's confidence, that erosion has become a central problem in Western society. The repudiation of metaphysical reductionism resulted in the loss of traditional intellectual authority in Western society; a loss that resulted in a door being left wide open for the entrance of a multiplicity of new conceptions and interpretations of phenomena that were previously uniformly provided by the Catholic church and Medieval scholasticism. These new interpretations and conceptions had less lasting significance in shaping the nature and dimensions of man's loss of confidence in thought and in providing ends and purposes for men to act upon than they had as Karl Mannheim

noted, in shaking the foundations of faith for many people and in making more and more persons skeptical not just of the meaning of things of the world but also about the very process of thinking itself. Mannheim states: "the alarming fact that the same world could appear differently to different people."[41]

Mannheim in his writings has treated the problem of the erosion of man's confidence in thought more painstakenly than anyone else in recent history. He did so with regard to the role of the intellectual as well as with the problem of meaning. A discussion of Mannheim's writings concerning the role of the intellectual is indispensible because in Mannheim we find both powerful arguments in favor and against intellectual elitism.

Politics and the Intellectual

The importance and uniqueness of Mannheim's contribution to this discussion can be understood as the product of his efforts to develop a theory of the role of the intellectual in history. His theory located the realization of man's hopes for peace and progress in, what Mannheim considered to be, a historically emergent free intelligenstia.

Mannheim's theory of unattached intellectual was shaped by a positive estimate of the socio-historical sources of the erosion of man's confidence in past thought as a pre-condition for the emergence of a free intelligenstia. A second consequence were efforts to overcome the politically and socially disquieting implications produced by discoveries concerning the historical and social relativity of knowledge.

These discoveries were politicized by Marxist epistemology and political theory. A third element in Mannheim's work was the effort to outline through the sociology of knowledge the conditions upon which the scientific guidance of politics was possible even in an age of uncertainty and social unrest.

For Mannheim the socio-historical sources that conditioned the erosion of man's confidence in thought were the same sources that brought about the emergence of a socially unattached intellectual. By socially unattached intellectual, Mannheim meant intellectuals who were not identified with the material and political interests of a particular social class: there identification would be with the pursuit of truth and knowledge.

In a brief outline of Western intellectual history Mannheim identified the developments that produced the loss of man's confidence in thought. The first was the decline of intellectual authority of the Catholic Church. A second was the replacement of the ecclesiastical interpretation of the world by a multiplicity of new interpretations ranging from the world-views, of Rationalism and Natural Science in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries to the world-views of Positivism, Marxism, and Social Darwinism in the nineteenth century. But these developments were not, in Mannheim's estimation, the dominant factors that led to the erosion of confidence in thought in the early 1930s when he wrote Ideology and Utopia.

For Mannheim these historical developments set the stage for what was as much a social process as it was an historical

one. Decisive for Mannheim was the intensification of social mobility resulting from the breakdown of the Feudal social order, the emergence of Capitalism, and the success of that economic and social system in fostering a wide scale shift in population from the rural areas to new urban centers in Europe. This acceleration of social mobility had the profound effect of destroying an illusion that was the product of what Mannheim referred to as the scholasticism of the Catholic Church, an illusion "prevalent in a static society, that all things can change, but thought remains eternally the same."[42]

For Mannheim the destruction of this illusion had not only the effect of producing the erosion of man's confidence in thought it also served as the socio-historical basis for the emergence of a free intelligenstia. In explaining the reasons why the destruction of the illusion served this secondary function, Mannheim stressed that there is only one way of thinking that frees the intellectual from the constraints of what historically is his traditional role in society. This is a social role that in Mannheim's words "stemmed from the fact that in every society there are social groups whose special task it is to provide an interpretation of the world for that society."[43]

Attached to the Catholic Church, the intellectuals in the Middle Ages were organized into a tightly organized priestly caste. They had a very distinct role in perpetuating the dominance of the ecclesiastical world-view in Medieval society. This role was one of providing a binding dogmatic force for the views of the Church. Moreover, their role

involved the systematization of those views into a unitary and coherent whole. In fulfilling these roles the intellectual served the crucial function of extending and legitimating the intellectual monopoly of the Catholic Church by shaping the entire world-view of European society during the Middle Ages.

With the collapse of the intellectual monopoly by the Church, Mannheim noted, intellectuals were forced to compete for the favor of a new public. This public for the new intellectuals, unlike that of the clergy, was "no longer accessible to them without their own efforts."[44] The competition, Mannheim argued, forced intellectuals to adopt new modes of thought and action as a condition for their social and economic survival. Lacking in a social organization of their own and being thrust into a profoundly new historical situation they were forced to emerge as a free intelligenstia.

To the extent that the collapse of the intellectual monopoly of the Church promised the cultivation of a greater intellectual richness of life that collapsed far outweighed what was, in Mannheim's view, a disquieting but temporary situation: the erosion of man's confidence in thought. For Mannheim the skepticism prevalent in European society in the 1930s was similar to the skepticism of the Sophists. He argued that just as in the early stages of the Greek Enlightenment the uncertainty of the modern age could be viewed in a positive way. In Mannheim's judgment just as the "general uncertainty of the period (the Greek Enlightenment) was by no means a symptom of a world doomed to general decay, but rather

the beginning of a wholesome process which marked a crisis leading to "recovery" the same could be said of the modern period.[45]

The thing that conditioned Mannheim's optimism was his faith in man's ability to take advantage of the intellectual richness of life. For Mannheim, the diversity of thought forms was not a negative condition but one which, if properly addressed by modern man, could renew his confidence in thought. Mannheim's faith, it would appear, rested on several assumptions. The first was that man could accept the validity of a new type of objectivity, one that was not bound by the epistemology of the natural sciences, and the truths that this objectivity could help men produce. His second basis of faith was that the socially unattached intellectual could provide the basis upon which such truths could be utilized to effect a far more comprehensive image of social reality then had ever been possible before.

Mannheim's views of this new type of objectivity and of the role of the socially unattached intellectual in utilizing its truths were conditioned by certain qualities of mind and predispositions that he imputed to the modern intellectual and by his efforts to overcome the problematical issues raised by historical relativism.

Historical relativism, is an approach to the study of history. While it has been applied differently by different schools of thought, historical relativism is based on one central idea: the discovery of all historical knowledge is relative to the social position of the historian. It holds

that the comprehension of historical reality is variable, differing in different places and periods.

Historical relativism is an approach which has raised a number of problems that have been widely discussed in the social sciences.[46] These problems coalesce around one issue: the effect of historical relativism has had in furthering the erosion of man's confidence in modern thought and the social malaise. This social malaise is generally conceded to result from the method of political critique that historical relativism made possible. Mannheim referred to this method as ideological analysis. Ideological analysis seeks to unmask the social roots of an opposing group's claim to knowledge as a means of discrediting it in favor of one's own claims.

For Mannheim the ultimate solution to the social malaise generated by the erosion of man's confidence in thought rested in the ability of the social sciences to solve what he considered to be the singularly most pressing problem raised by historical relativism: given the conditions upon which knowledge of social and historical reality is derived, what is true and what is false within this kind of knowledge. For Mannheim the solution must inevitably be grounded in a new type of objectivity, which while made possible by historical relativism makes a significant departure from it. It develops apart from the natural or physical sciences, its own epistemology.

The reasoning behind this solution rests upon certain aspects of Mannheim's critique of historical relativism. A critique was the limits of historical relativism in providing an adquate basis for the sociology of knowledge. Here we

should understand that for Mannheim the sociology of knowledge constituted a method of scientific analysis which, when properly utilized, could serve both as a basis for overcoming the limits of relativism and for establishing the foundations of a scientific politics. Defining it in these terms, Mannheim conceived of the sociology of knowledge as a method of analysis which is primarily concerned with the "existential determination" of actual thinking, that is, with a comprehension of all mental productions in terms of their grounding in the social life and environment of their producers.[47]

Mannheim's assessment of the limits of historical relativism in providing an adequate basis for the sociology of knowledge rests on one unifying idea: historical relativism has failed to develop, in opposition to the epistemology of the natural sciences, a theory of knowledge that could support the premises upon which its findings were based. The failure of the various exponents of relativism to recognize these limits and correct them was in Mannheim's judgment the product of relativism's unique history. This was a history marked by the transformation of relativism, initially by Marx and later by others into a political means of ideological analysis. As Mannheim noted, ideological analysis developed the potentialities of relativism politically but not its potentialities as a scientific theory of knowledge. The failure of relativism to overcome these limitations had, in Mannheim's judgment, a major consequence: the truths derived from relativism were, in the absence of an alternative epistemology, left to be judged only by the standards of

objectivity embodied in the natural sciences. This epistemology rejected, a priori, all forms of knowledge that were dependent upon the subjective standpoint and social situation of the knower.

Against this background, Mannheim argued that epistemology is as much enmeshed in the social process as is the totality of men's thinking. This made inevitable the emergence of "relationism" as an alternative to relativism. Relationism, Mannheim argued, is unlike relativism based on an epistemological premise that can support its development. Its major premise is that there can be many perspectives, many partial insights into the same historical and social phenomenon. The historian is thus led by the social situation in which he finds himself to view phenomena from one perspective among many. Mannheim realized that this formulation, that is, the doctrine of perspectives, did not solve the problem of relativism, since, as he put it, "once we recognize that all historical knowledge is relational knowledge, and can only be formulated with reference to the position of the observer, we are faced, once more, with the task of discriminating between what is true and what is false in such knowledge."[48]

For Mannheim this problem becomes resolvable through a two part process. One process centers on the synthesis of different but partial perspectives and truths. The first stage of this process entails the critical examination of the various claims to knowledge on the basis of the factors that conditioned each perspective and upon determining the kind of social and historical reality that is embodied in each. The

second stage requires making a choice between the different perspectives on the basis of the perspective or combination that provides the widest comprehension of the historical objects or problems that each generation of investigators finds of interest. The ultimate outcome for the selection of perspectives is thus the consensus of interest among the investigators.

In discussing the properties of this process Mannheim emphasized that the synthesis of different partial perspectives aims for more than a summation of disconnected partial truths; it involves the interpenetration and fusion of interlocking thought styles. Moreover, Mannheim emphasized that this synthesis was not equivalent to the reconstruction of a timeless static absolute, but rather it was representative of ongoing intellectual efforts emanating from different changing centers of systematization.

The dominant theme of Mannheim's sociology of knowledge and its driving force was, to repeat, his efforts to develop from the sociology of knowledge the basis for a scientific politics. To accomplish these ends Mannheim clained that only by a movement toward the relative synthesis of partial perspectives, which must be reformulated from time to time, could contemporary thinkers deal comprehensively with the problems facing modern society. This position reflected Mannheim's belief that the successive attempts at the interpretation of the historical and social world form a meaningful context. They are directed toward the distant goal of a comprehensive world interpretation incorporating selective

aspects of all previous partial perspectives. Mannheim believed that "attempts at synthesis do not come into being unrelated to one another, because each synthesis prepared the road for the next by summarizing the forces and views of its time."[49]

Mannheim may or may not have absorbed Hegelian or Marxist notions of a teleological or utopian process in history that made the successive movements of Weltanschauung progress to, hopefully, an ultimate solution. But Mannheim did believe that "a certain progress towards an absolute synthesis in the utopian sense may be noted in that each synthesis attempts to arrive at a wider perspective than the previous one, and that the later ones incorporate the results of those that have gone before."[50] Whether or not this conviction was a residue from what at least approximates the broad outlines of a metaphysics of history is a moot point. It is a point that Robert K. Merton suggested when, in his critique of Mannheim's sociology of knowledge, he compared Mannheim to Hegel.[51] Certainly Mannheim's utopianism in his early work, at least, is guarded, not elaborated, and ambiguous.

Other aspects of Mannheim's conviction concerning the functions of the synthesis of partial perspectives clearly emerge. It is clear that there is a certain similarity between this conviction of Mannheim's and Max Weber's belief that the greatest advances in the social sciences very often emanate from the critique of concept-construction. Here we need to be cautious. For while there was a certain similarity between

Mannheim and Weber around this issue, a similarity that resulted from Mannheim's having fashioned his discussion of relational knowledge around Weber and Heinrich Rickert's formulation of the principle of value-relevance, the similarity between Weber and Mannheim should not be over-estimated. This is because Mannheim's guarded optimism concerning the functions of the synthesis of partial perspectives far exceeds Weber's more realistic approach to the problem of knowledge in the social sciences.

A second aspect of Mannheim's approach at a synthesis of partial perspectives is that it became the basis for his theory of the socially unattached intellectual. Only the socially unattached intellectual can make such a synthesis possible because of certain qualities of mind that he and he alone possesses. Another dimension to Mannheim's is that he felt that if, with each successive synthesis of partial views, modern man is to move closer to a comprehension of the total historical and social reality, then the intellectual would have to be the principal social agent to make this process possible.

Understood against this background, Mannheim's theory of the socially unattached intellectual is a theory that was fashioned in response to the question: "what political interest will undertake the problem of synthesis as its task and who will strive to realize it in society?"[52] It is therefore a theory which credits a particular type of intellectual with the capacity to rise beyond the class-bound interests and the narrow party perspectives of ideologically colored politics

and interpretations of social reality.

For Mannheim this ability to transcend ideological politics required an experimental outlook, an outlook that allowed the individual intellectual to separate in politics the possible from the defunct and the premature. Such an outlook, along with the intellectual's openness to both the dynamic nature and complexities of society, Mannheim argued, was not likely to be developed by attached or unalienated members of any particular class. Unalienated members of the various social classes were prevented by their immediate economic and political interests from developing the kind of detachment which would enable them to transcend ideological politics. For Mannheim the only individuals capable of developing such qualities were individuals who were members of a relatively classless stratum, one whose members were not directly involved in the processes of material production, distribution, and acquisition.

But while the intellectual's lack of direct participation in the economic process was a major factor Mannheim advanced in support of this view of their role in modern society it was not the only one. Another major factor was based upon the social and intellectual bonds of a common educational heritage that had emerged among intellectuals, Mannheim thus argued that "participation in a common educational heritage progressively tends to suppress differences of birth, status, profession, and wealth, and to unite the individual educated people on the basis of the education they have received."[53] This is not to say that Mannheim suggested that the class and status ties of

of the individual intellectual would completely disappear under the influence of their common educational heritage. But Mannheim believed that the sharing of such a heritage acts to create a homogeneous medium, one which permits the intellectual to understand opposing tendencies in social reality. Through this medium, this culture, Mannheim argued, the intellectual develops the kind of detachment and world-view necessary for him to identify the subjective experience of people located in different social classes and groups and to share vicariously in that experience. Mannheim was not oblivious to the obvious fact that such an identification could lead the intellectual to abandon his detachment and become absorbed in the political struggles of a particular class. He argued that there is an internal element in the intellectuals' efforts to affiliate themselves with different social classes that serves to prevent this from happening on a wide and permanent scale. Mannheim argued that this element was the distrust that members of different classes feel towards intellectuals. This distrust grows from their sense of the intellectual's inability to ever completely abandon those peculiar psychic and social characteristics that make him an intellectual. The intellectual would ultimately be driven back onto themselves. Thus for Mannheim the repeated attempts to identify themselves with, as well as the continual rebuffs received from different classes ultimately is a historical and sociological process. For Mannheim this process of scorn and identification will lead intellectuals to develop a clearer conception of the

meaning and the value of their own position in the social order, and a conception of their historic mission within it.

In his discussion of the historic mission, Mannheim argued that even their involvement in class struggles reflected a tendency, perhaps an unconscious one, towards a dynamic synthesis of different points of view. They inevitably transformed conflicts of interest inherent in class struggles into a conflict of ideas. Ideas not interests were their "medium of exchange." Because of this habit of mind of transforming interests to ideas, the intellectual in an age of increasing class-consciousness had, Mannheim claimed, the ability to discover the sense of his own historic mission. Such a discovery, Mannheim argued, would enable the intellectual to discover the position from which he could develop a "totalistic" perspective from which to view political problems. That perspective would involve the synthesis of partial and particular points of view and truths. Having undertaken such a path, the intellectual might come to assume, in Mannheim's words, his historic mission as "watchmen" in what otherwise would be a pitchblack night."[54]

But of course, this historical mission of objectifying interest and making them accessible to others was given to the intellectual by Mannheim. This amounts to only: that if the intellectual (Mannheim) seized this mission then it was his (or Mannheim's) claim to omnipotence and to a higher objectivity that would ultimately serve to legitimate the intellectual's claim to power. This is the same rationale

that pervaded the Platonic claim to power by the philosopher-kings, that certain men should have power because they have the ability to stand outside the world (of interests) and judge it. What was truly significant about Mannheim's theory of the socially unattached intellectual from this standpoint was that in effect Mannheim made the intellectual the personification of the Hegelian dialectic, the world spirit, ever synthesizing and expressing devergent tendencies in society, raising them to higher levels of consciousness, richness, and development, until an "interest" free reason could create the utopia, the unity that became the end of "bad" history. Thus, for Mannheim the intellectual personified the Zeitgeist.[55]

In sum then, it is in this notion of the indispensibility of the intellectual to modern society, an indispensibility that is the product of the intellectual's mastery of a unique method through which an interest-free set of higher truths can be made known to the rest of society, that Mannheim in effect joined Marx, Hegel, St. Simon, and Comte in producing a theory of the intellectual that represents a modern variation of the Platonic philosopher-kind principle.

While later in his career Mannheim was to develop additional views on the role of the intellectual in modern society, (views which like those of the economist Joseph Schumpeter identified the revolutionary potential of the intellectual as a product of the failure of modern capitalist societies to absorb the excessive numbers of intellectuals they produce), Mannheim never abandoned his theory of the

socially unattached interest-free intellectual.[56] Indeed this theory remains along with his work on ideology a permanent legacy in the field of sociology to those who, in their faith in the Rationalist conception of man, held out the vision of an end of ideology, interest-free ideas, to a world which, even as Mannheim wrote Ideology and Utopia, was being swept up in the passions and fears that demagogic intellectuals like Hitler and Mussolini were able to create through their particular uses of ideology.

Here we must understand that Mannheim's theory of the socially unattached intellectual in its emphasis on the capacity of the intellectual to overcome ideological or distortive modes of thinking through the synthesis of partial views promotes a very clear vision of the end of ideology. This is a vision that was conditioned by two interrelated assumptions. The first was that through a succession of relative, time-bound syntheses, intellectuals would produce a body of knowledge which would produce a universal synthesis of all knowledge and a consensus about that knowledge because it was constitutive of different partial truths, truths that were derived from different ideological standpoints. The second assumption was that this growing fund of unproblematic knowledge would steadily enlarge the basis from which the unattached intellectuals would continue to sustain their struggle against false consciousness in the direction of developing an ultimate society-wide consensus emanating from non-partisan thought.

If we are to put Mannheim's theory of the socially

unattached intellectual into perspective we must realize that when he argued that the unattached intellectual can integrate the particular interest-bound ideologies that are based on a multitude of interests into an emerging objective set of truths that are universally binding, he was asserting the notion that the intellectual because of his detachedness can achieve a higher objectivity. He was also asserting that it is possible to create a value-free (interest free) set of ideas that are different from ideologies.

Yet these propositions are problematic. It is relatively easy to imagine detached intellectuals being alienated from all previously existing interest groups. But intellectuals in achieving the consensus necessary, in Mannheim's terms, to arrive at objectivity may also develop interests as intellectuals. These interests may be in jobs, in prestige, and in power, especially the power to impose their thought and their interests upon a society which from the standpoint of its distributive interests may not be predisposed to accept the claims of the intellectual.

His second proposition is even more problematic. The assumption that the intellectuals, in their objectivity, their knowledge, and their wisdom, can create a unified consistent system of thought independent of particular values is open to question. What Mannheim asserts is the possibility of a value-free social theory. Yet, long before Mannheim raised this implicit possibility the possibility of such a social theory was called into question by, among others, Weber, through his concept of value relevance. So far as

we know no body has disproven Weber's notion that ultimate values are not ascertainable by objective inquiry. In order for Mannheim to suggest the possibility of a unified intellectual consensus based on the study of the empirical "laws of history" it is necessary for him to assume that it is possible to reach a stage of intellectual development where ultimate values become the basis of a higher objectivity. The argument that that objectivity is the emerging product of a growing consensus based on scientific inquiry requires that one accept the notion of progressive consensus. So far as we know this consensus has not occurred. In fact, the history of knowledge, at least up till now, demonstrates, as Mannheim himself conceded, the emergence of continuous new forms of dissensus which occur either because of changes in the structure of society or because of changes in the priority given to ultimate values at a given time or place by a particular group of intellectuals.[57] Finally, even scientific or intellectual discovery tends to disturb or upset the established consensus of a given time or place.[58]

Consistent with our efforts to put Mannheim's theory of the socially unattached intellectual into perspective, we must stress that Mannheim was not alone in his faith that the world could be moved to an ultimate end to ideology. Indeed, there is implied in all theories of intellectual elitism, and especially those of Hegel and Karl Marx, a specific conception of the end of ideology. The very phrase itself, we should note, originated with Marx's collaborator Frederich Engels, appearing initially in his essay on Ludwig Fruerbach.[59]

This is not to suggest that Mannheim shared the same conception of the end of ideology with Marx or Hegel, let alone with those sociologists who, in the mid-1950s and early 1960s, were to become the principle elaborators of the concept of an end of ideology. Edward Shils, Raymond Aron, Seymour Martin Lipset, and Daniel Bell. The differences that existed between Mannheim's image of the end of ideology and those projected by all the others can be understood as the product of the variety of meanings they imputed to the term ideology. In brief, it is a product of their different conceptions of ideology.

What lies behind those different conceptions are the values and the problems that each addressed themselves to, in short, the various social worlds to which they were responding. These issues will be discussed in the next chapter. They, much like our discussion of the intellectual and the problem of objectivity in general, constitute a framework we can use to initiate a critical examination of the work of Daniel Bell along the lines we have outlined in our introduction.

NOTES

1. Peter L. Berger, The Sacred Canopy (Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, 1969) p. 28.

2. F.M. Cornford, From Religion to Philosophy: A Study in The Origins of Western Speculation (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1957) p. vii.

3. For a further elaboration on this point see John Dewey, The Quest for Certainty, p. 51.

4. In assessing the intellectual legacy of Greek thought Dewey noted that while modern philosophy rejected through its acceptance of seventeenth century science Greek thought's conclusions about natural objects it retained the idea that certainty can only be found in the fixed and unchanging. For an elaboration of this point see The Quest for Certainty, p. 49-73.

5. For an excellent discussion of the similarities between them see Max Weber's "Objectivity in the Social Sciences."

6. John Dewey, The Quest for Certainty, p. 71.

7. Peter L. Berger, The Sacred Canopy, p. 22.

8. Max Weber, "The Social Psychology of The World Religions," p. 281.

9. Ibid., p. 280.

10. Ibid.

11. Ibid.

12. For an excellent discussion of the logic of systems analysis see Bensman and Lilienfeld's Craft and Consciousness, p. 282-6.

13. Karl R. Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1950) p. 146.

14. Plato developed this argument in Books v and vi of The Republic, trans., W.H.D. Rouse in Great Dialogues of Plato, ed., Eric H. Warminton and Philip G. Rouse, (New York: A Mentor Book, 1956).

15. A rationalist to the core, Comte argued that history demonstrates that "the chief progress of each period, and even generation, was a necessary result of the immediately preceding state; so that the men of genius, to whom such progression has been too exclusively attributed, are essentially only the proper organs of a predetermined movement which would, in their absence, have found other

issues."..."The Science of Society" in Varieties of Classic Social Theory, ed., Hendrik M. Ruitenbeek (New York: E.P. Dutton & Co., 1963) p. 50.

16. Marx's views on alienation were developed in two of his earlier writings The German Ideology and Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, Dirk J. Struik ed., (New York: International Publishers, 1964). It was part of Georg Lukacs genius to have been able to read back from Capital Marx's conception of alienation and develop on the basis of that conception the notion of reification. This notion which is roughly equivalent to Whitehead's fallacy of misplaced concreteness was developed by Lukacs in History and Class Consciousness, trans., Rodney Livingstone (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1968), a work which was originally published in 1923 some twenty or so years before Marx's earlier works were discovered.

17. For an interesting discussion of this point especially with regard to Machajski and Bruno Rizzi or Bruno R see: Daniel Bell, The Coming of Post-Industrial Society (New York: Basic Books, 1973) p. 89-91.

18. Rickert, Science and History, p. 34-7.

19. Weber developed his epistemological critique of these different schools of thought in his essay "Objectivity in Social Science and Social Policy. This essay was first published in the Archiv fur Sozialwissenschaft und Socialpolitik in 1904.

20. For a concise discussion of the history of the Is-Ought controversy see: Arnold Brecht, Political Theory: The Foundations of Twentieth Century Political Thought (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1959) p. 199-240.

21. This is true if only in the sense that much of Weber's methodological writings were reformulated by Karl Mannheim, the man generally conceded to be the founder of the sociology of knowledge; a field that encourages the development and use of value analysis. A full assessment of Weber's contribution to the sociology of knowledge remains to be written.

22. Without having used the now fashionable term paradigm Weber developed this point in "Objectivity in Social Science and Social Policy" in an analysis that not only anticipates Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions but goes beyond that work in discussing the nature of progress in science and the epistemological dimensions of concept-construction in the sciences.

23. Weber, "Objectivity in Social Science," p. 105-6.

24. This perspective is simply that all scientific knowledge is a product of culture.

25. The term ethical relativism was first used by Emil Lask. It has also been referred to as scientific value relativism and value alternativism. For a further elaboration of this point see Arnold Brecht, Political Theory, p. 117-35.

26. Weber, "Objectivity in Social Science," p. 6.

27. For a discussion of the relationship between Rickert, Simmel and Weber as neo-Kantian thinkers see Brecht, Political Theory, p. 207-31.

28. See for a further discussion of this point Brecht, Political Theory, p. 126-30. One example discussed by Brecht to illustrate this point was one that was previously raised by Leon Duguit. The example stated in the form of a syllogism is:

    A. in a society there is a state of mutual dependence among its members,
    B. hence all men should fill their functions in a society.

    The problem this example raises is relatively simple. The The problem is does the premise contained in this statement logically justify on the basis of the rules of deductive analytic logic, the conclusion it makes; if so the conclusion must make explicit what is implied in the meaning of the premise. Can we logically imply from the premise contained in this statement that men ought to fulfill their functions in society. The answer to this is no. What is required to make a statement of this sort logically valid is first a premise which states something like the following: all those who profit from society ought to share the burden of its continued maintenance. From such a premise we can then go on to say, all members profit from society (an empirical statement which is always subject to verification) and then draw the conclusion that hence all men ought to share the burden of society. Even with this modification, however, the syllogism in order to be a scientifically useful one must be subsequently modified or followed by one which takes into consideration factors which are not made explicit in the original premise. One significant factor would be the problem of equality of treatment. Consideration of this factor would necessarily lead to the formulation of another syllogism; one which would have to be added to any modified version of the original one which would also have to meet the requirements imposed through the dichotomy which exists between Is and Ought.

29. Weber, "Objectivity in Social Science," p. 53.

30. Ibid.

31. Ibid.

32. Ibid.

33. Here Weber is referring to the use of Verstehen as a methodology suitable to this task.

34. Ibid., p. 54.

35. Ibid.

36. Ibid.

37. Leo Strauss, Natural Right and History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953) p. 36.

38. Ibid., p. 42.

39. Strauss repeatedly makes this same point in his study, especially in chapter II. His argument is essentially that science can be devoted to discovering immutable principles of justice and moral conduct, but he is very unclear about how this task is to be achieved.

40. This is a central theme in much of Weber's work. It is explicitly developed in his methodological essays, "The Meaning of Ethical Neutrality in Sociology and Economics" and "Objectivity in Social Science." Both of these essays can be found in The Methodology of The Social Sciences. It is also explicitly developed in "Science as a Vocation" which can be found in From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology.

41. Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, trans., Louis Wirth and Edward Shils, with a Foreward by Louis Wirth (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1936) p. 6.

42. Ibid., p. 7.

43. Ibid., p. 10.

44. Ibid., p. 12.

45. Ibid., p. 69.

46. For a critical analysis of historical relativism and the problems that it has raised in the social sciences see Maurice Mandelbaum, The Problem of Historical Knowledge (New York: Liveright Publishing Corporation, 1938) p. 17-37.

47. Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, p. 80.

48. Ibid., p. 79.

49. Ibid., p. 152.

50. Ibid.

51. Robert K. Merton "Karl Mannheim and The Sociology of Knowledge" in Social Theory and Social Structure 2nd ed. (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1957, 1949) p. 507.

52. Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, p. 153.

53. Ibid., p. 155.

54. Ibid., p. 161.

55. Mannheim states this very explicitly when he says in regard to the "socially unattached intellectuals" that: "Today more than ever it is expected of such a dynamic middle group that it will strive to create a forum outside the party schools in which the perspective of and the interest in the whole is safeguarded." Ibid., p. 161-2.

56. See Karl Mannheim, Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1941) p. 98-107. In a section called "The Place of The Intelligenstia in Society" Mannheim argued that democratic societies had placed themselves in a precarious position by producing an over supply of intellectuals. His argument was that "the over production of intellectuals decreases both the value of the intellectuals and of intellectual culture itself with the result that the foundations upon which democracy in a liberal-democratic social order can be developed and undermined. While Mannheim attributed the overproduction of intellectuals to the success of the absolutist states of Europe in increasing the value of legal education and other forms of activity he was critical of capitalist-democratic societies because of their failure to limit the number of intellectuals they produced. Citing the need to develop an equilibrium between supply and demand Mannheim cautioned that in the future quotas and other political measures would have to be instituted in order to both restore and maintain that equilibrium. Mannheim also warned that the failure of modern society to integrate intellectuals would, as it had in Germany during the period of the Weimar Republic, produce the seeds of totalitarianism. We find that both in this sense and in the sense that he attributed the overproduction of intellectuals to the success of capitalism Mannheim to be very similar to that developed by Joseph A. Schumpeter in Capitalism, Socialism and Democarcy 3rd ed. (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1950, 1942) p. 145-155. Yet, Mannheim remained fundamentally optimistic about the socially unattached interest free intellectual and about liberal society in general. For Mannheim liberalism was in a process of transition. Its chief difficulties grew from the fact that "the liberal method of organization has not yet reached the stage where it can produce the organic articulation (Gliederung) which a vast and complex society needs. Mannheim, Man and Society, p. 106. Implicit throughout Mannheim's discussion is the notion that only

the socially unattached intellectual could help liberals to realize this goal.

57. It was in this context that Mannheim argued that "the prevailing philosophic view which cautiously admits that the content of conduct has been historically determined, but which at the same time insists upon the retention of eternal forms of value and of a formal set of categories, is no longer tenable." Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, p. 81.

58. See Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, p. 102-8.

59. Frederick Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach And The Outcome of Classical German Philosophy, ed., C.P. Dutt (New York: International Publishers, 1941) p. 56.

CHAPTER II

THE END OF IDEOLOGY

The Concept of Ideology and The End of Ideology

In the last chapter we noted that Karl Mannheim's theory of the socially unattached intellectual was distinguished by its projection of a vision of the end of ideology. Since 1960, with the publication of Daniel Bell's book The End of Ideology and Seymour Martin Lipset's Political Man, the subject of the end of ideology has become a sensitive and controversial one. What made the subject controversial was a particular conception of the end of ideology, one that was first formally developed by the French political writer Raymond Aron, and the American sociologist Edward Shils in the mid 1950's, but the concept received its sharpest phrasing by Daniel Bell in his essay "The End of Ideology in The West." This essay was written as an epilogue to the some fifteen essays that made up his book The End of Ideology.

This latter day conception varied dramatically from the one that was suggested by Mannheim in his book Ideology and Utopia. Similarly, it varied from the conceptions of the end of ideology that one can derive from the writings of Hegel and Karl Marx.

The distinction between this latter day conception and those which appeared in the writings of Mannheim, Hegel, and

Marx is basic. Where the idea emerges in the writings of Mannheim, Hegel, and Marx as an image of an abstract social order, in Shils' and Aron's writings and, later, in those of Lipset and Bell it was used to capture the spirit, the political and intellectual mood, of the West during the post World War II period. In Shils' and Aron's writings it appeared as a concept that served to describe what for them was only a gradually emerging phenomenon, not the projection of some distant emergent reality.

In order to illustrate this point and expand upon it further we need to outline briefly the conceptions of the end of ideology that were implied in the writings of Hegel, Marx, and Mannheim.

While they presented different visions of the end of ideology in a curious way, reflecting Marx's substitution of the material for the spiritual, Hegel and Marx's conceptions of the end of ideology overlap. While they differed dramatically on the underlying dynamics, the motive force of history, both Hegel and Marx produced a vision of the end of ideology from a mutually shared conception of the meaning of ideology. Both Hegel and Marx saw ideology as representing imperfect modes of thought which, in obscuring the ultimate purposes and ends of history produced false consciousness, the inability of observers to comprehend the real relationship between reality and appearance and between man and reason. Similarly, their visions of the end of ideology were the product of a mutually shared view of history as constituting a rational system whose ultimate purpose would be grasped by

man through a "true" understanding of history, i.e., a comprehension of history free from the distortions of ideological thought and the false consciousness of men laboring under these distortions.

In Hegel's writings the vision of the end of ideology emerges as a product of his efforts to define the conditions upon which a true understanding of history, its purposes, and inevitable direction, can be derived by man through conscious mental activity. Comprehension of the "true" content of history, of its objective meaning, presupposes for Hegel the philosopher's ability to understand and summarize the spirit, the Weltanschauung of an epoch.

This presumption that history has an a priori objective meaning was based on two ideas which underlie Hegel's whole philosophical system. The first is that the Absolute Mind, the Universal Spirit, objectifies itself in material forms in order that it may gain a true comprehension of its essential nature as both a creative and unifying force, that mind actualizes itself through a dialectical process that embodies the overcoming of oppositional forces that it itself creates as a condition for its coming to know itself. This is a process which, in its entirety, involves the self-alienation of the Absolute Mind as a precondition for its attaining true self-consciousness, true knowledge of itself as "being in itself", i.e. as having an existence which is logically prior to that of man's comprehension of its existence. The second idea is that the whole process of self-consciousness is a cognitive process, one that pre-

supposes that the Absolute Mind realizes itself cognitively in man through thought. What underlies this idea is the notion that thought constitutes the highest and purist form through which Absolute Mind actualizes itself.[1]

History as the progress of the Absolute Mind's overcoming of its own alienation from itself was a dominant theme of Hegel's philosophy of history, one that was mutually the basis for his vision of the end of ideology and his doctrine of the end of history.[2] For Hegel the overcoming of Absolute Mind's alienation in historical reflection, in thought, is a task that involves the overcoming of ideological thought. Thus ideology in Hegel's philosophical system always represents a barrier that temporarily prevents man's achievement of true self-consciousness. The problem of ideology thus emerges as a problem of false consciousness.

False consciousness in Hegelian philosophy refers to the failure of men to grasp the objective meaning, the true content of history, with the result that they can not comprehend the ultimate purpose to which history, as the successive unfolding of Reason, has directed itself.[3] The presumption that men can grasp the true content of history, that they can grasp its objective meaning is for Hegel the product of his faith in the philosopher's capacity to overcome the imperfect consciousness that underlies man's past failures to come to terms with the directions that history has taken. This requires a comprehension of the role of certain individuals and nations as the instruments of a process made known through history, a process whose meaning

is concealed from them, but which "becomes self-conscious only post festum in the philosopher who sums up the sense of the epoch."[4] To that extent that Hegel's philosophy of history promotes the view that such self-consciousness is possible it promotes a vision of the end of ideology. In this vision philosophy constitutes a solution to the problem of ideology and false consciousness.

The vision of the end of ideology promoted by Marx flows from an idea which also underlies his philosophy of history. This idea simply put is, that with the inevitable emergence of communism, the structural sources of ideological thought will be removed and then all ideological thought will cease: once the profit-motive is removed a need for ideologies will no longer exist. This view of course rested on the presumption that all ideologies can be understood as systems of thought which serve to obscure the material forces that makes them intellectual instruments through which conditions necessary to the interests of one economic class are rationalized, that is, treated as historically necessary and therefore inevitable.[5]

Mannheim, as we noted earlier, located the end of ideology in the rise of the socially unattached intellectuals. For Mannheim the success of their intellectual labors would produce a series of time-bound, relative syntheses of partial truths (i.e., ideologically conditioned truths) which would ultimately serve to eliminate ideology as a distortive mode of thought. Though not guided by the kind of tenuous assumptions that characterized both Hegel and Marx's vision

of the end of ideology is also questionable. The questionable aspects of Mannheim's logic were discussed at the end of the last chapter, as were the nature of the assumptions which guided the construction of his vision of the end of ideology.

Mannheim's significance, however, for the discussion of the end of ideology far outweighs the substantive and theoretical limitations of his vision of the end of ideology. Despite their shortcomings Mannheim's vision of the end of ideology and his theory of the socially unattached intellectuals have come to hold a prominent place in Western intellectual circles during the late 1950s and early 1960s.

Mannheim significance can be understood to have derived from his definition of the term ideology, and the distinction that he made between ideological and utopian thought. Mannheim elaborated his definition of ideology as thought "which conceals the present by attempting to comprehend it in terms of the past". In so doing he made equally significant contributions to the latter day discussion of the end of ideology. His first contribution was that of laying the groundwork from which Shils, and later Bell and Lipset in their reformulation of Aron's work would develop their particular conception of the end of ideology. A second contribution made by Mannheim was that he provided some of the critics of the latter day conception of the end of ideology with the conceptual grounds against which they would develop their arguments. In short, Mannheim's efforts to elaborate upon his definition of ideology served on a formal level to define the parameters of the end of ideology debate.

Mannheim's definition of ideology was fashioned in his analysis of the function and limits of ideological analysis in politics. It was within the framework of this analysis that Mannheim made the distinction between two different concepts of the term ideology, the particular and the total conception.

By the particular conception of ideology Mannheim was referring to a method of analyzing ideas in which the content of a particular idea or set of ideas are viewed as distortions of a given factual situation. Such an idea or set of ideas are consequently branded as ideologies by those who occupy an adversary position to the individual or individuals who propagate them. Closely related to its "debunking" methodology, the form of analysis generated by the particular conception of ideology is a mode of analysis that is conducted on the psychological level. It designated part of an opponent's assertions as ideologies by treating them as a function of his particular position in his social milieu. The particular conception of ideology thus refers to the function of ideas in obscuring or masking the real intentions and motives of an adversary in claiming truth for one idea or set of ideas over another.

By the "total conception of ideology" Mannheim was referring to a more comprehensive form of analysis, one that critically invades the entire world-view of an adversary. Less concerned with the actual content of an opponent's ideas, the ideological analyst seeks to discredit an opponent's total Weltanschauung, including the methods and concepts through

which he constructs his view of the world by relating the ideas to the socio-existential situation that he, the analyst, views producing them. The analyst views all of his opponent's mental products as being the functions of the collective life in which the opponent participates. Total ideological analysis exchanges the psychological for the theoretical ("noological") level in the very sense that it interprets the content, as well as, the conceptual structure of thought styles as functions of social conditions that determine intellectual production. Thus ideologies are not just interpreted as subjective, deliberate disguises concealing particular interests, as in the case of the particular conception of ideology, but rather they are interpreted as the cognitive reflections of the objective socio-economic conditions which produce them. In both cases the manifest content of the ideas are devalued.

The major distinction that Mannheim drew between the particular and the total conceptions of ideology is that where the particular acknowledges a common standard of truth and validity between the ideological analyst and the opponent, the total conception denies the existence of an objective standard. This is because the total conception of ideology embodies a clash between totally different thought-systems, totally different ways of looking at the world. The particular conception of ideology permits for some dialogue between adversaries in that both can refer to the same theoretical frame of reference to substantiate their respective claims, while the total conception does not.

The distinction that Mannheim made between the particular and the total conceptions of ideology figured prominently in the debate over the merits of the end of ideology "thesis" propagated by Aron, Shils, Bell, and Lipset. Critics like Dennis Wrong and C. Wright Mills among others would, as we shall see later in this chapter, questioned the end of ideology "thesis" in terms of the narrowness of its proponent's definitions of ideology and the ambiguities contained within those definitions. Behind much of this criticism was an expression of the need to preserve the conceptual distinctions embodied in Mannheim's analysis of the particular and the total conceptions of ideology.

But, while Mannheim's distinction between the particular and the total conceptions of ideology figured prominently in the "end of ideology debate," the distinction that he made between ideological and utopian thought had in fact a far greater place in defining the structure of that debate. This was because much of that debate centered on whether or not the proponents of the end of ideology thesis, in their enthusiasm over the decline in political strength of Marxism and Socialism in the West were, actually, describing the end of ideological and utopian thought, in general.

For Mannheim both ideological and utopian thought represent categories of thought that are incongruous with reality in the sense that they each claim to transcend the social and historical realities prevalent at the time of their emergence. Yet, for Mannheim, ideologies and utopias are very different. This is because they embody very different orientations to the world and because they serve to fulfill different functions.

For Mannheim utopias were not merely representative of a state of mind which is incongruous with the order of things and the state of reality in which it develops: utopias, were only those situationally transcedental orientations to the world which, when they become converted into action, have a transforming effect on history in that they "tend to shatter, either partially or wholly the order of things prevailing at the time."[7]

In contrast to utopias, ideologies were reflective of a state of mind which even though oriented to goals that transcend an existing order nonetheless have the effect of maintaining the existing order of things. This conservative function is based upon the recognition that throughout history representatives of different social orders have been able to use situationally transcendental ideas to protect their own interests. Such representatives Mannheim explained have:

> always aimed to control those situationally transcendental ideas and interests which are not realizable within the bounds of the present order, and thereby to render them socially impotent, so that such ideas would be confined to a world beyond history and society, where they could not affect the status quo.[8]

Noting that although every period in history has contained ideas which transcend existing social orders very few of them have functioned as utopias. Rather, most ideas functioned as the "appropriate ideologies" of the times in which they emerged just as long as "they were organically and harmoniously integrated into the world-view characteristic of the period (i.e. did not offer revolutionary possibilities)."[9] For Mannheim the idea of Christian brotherly love in the medieval

world represented a leading example of how a potentially revolutionary idea can serve as an ideology and thus become the mechanism through which the status quo is preserved. With respect to this phenomenon Mannheim noted that:

> as long as the clerically and feudally organized medieval order was able to locate its paradise outside of society, in some other-worldly sphere which transcended history and dulled its revolutionary edge, the idea of paradise was still an integral part of medieval society.[10]

For Mannheim then "ideologies are the situationally transcendent ideas which never succeed de facto in the realization of their projected contents."[11] Decisive for Mannheim is that though these ideas "often become the good-intentioned motives for the subjective conduct of the individual, when they are actually embodied in practice their meanings are most frequently distorted."[12]

That situationally transcendental ideas could function as ideologies was thus for Mannheim not a phenomenon reducible to the content of the idea itself, but rather was contingent on what function such ideas could be made to serve. For Mannheim then situationally transcendental ideas can serve both as ideologies and utopias. Similarly, it must be stressed that in Mannheim's thought any idea can pass from being an ideology into a utopia. A prominent example of this was the Chiliastic idea of the dawn of a millennial kingdom on earth in Western history. This idea always contained a revolutionary tendency, and that the Catholic Church had long committed itself to undermining it; but, Mannheim argued, the idea became utopian only when, through the revolutionary activities of Thomas

Munzer and the Anabaptists, an oppressed strata, tried to put it into practice.[13] Thus, only when an oppressed and potentially ascending social group seeks to transform the wish-images embodied in situationally transcendental ideas into conduct and tries to realize them do ideologies become utopias.

This point provided Mannheim with the basis for locating the emergence of "politics in its modern sense" with the development of the utopian mentality as it came to be shaped by Thomas Munzer and the Anabaptists.[14] In the phrase "politics in its modern sense" Mannheim was referring to "a more or less conscious participation of all strata of society in the achievement of some mundane purpose, as contrasted with a fatalistic acceptance of events as they are, or of control from above."[15] By locating the emergence of modern politics in the utopian mentality Mannheim developed an analysis of the progression of utopian thought that would provide some of the conceptual background against which Shils and Bell, in particular, could develop their own conception of the end of ideology. This analysis traced changes in the configuration of the utopian mentality from its first form, the orgaiaistic chiliasm of the Anabaptists to its most recent historical form, the socialist-communist utopia while emphasizing a line of intellectual continuity between them.[16]

What in Mannheim's view further compounded the difficulties in determining concretely whether an idea is, at a given point in history, ideological or utopian was that invariably the designation of situationally transcendental ideas as utopian always involves the interplay of subjective values and standards.

In elaborating this viewpoint Mannheim stressed that what in a given case appears as utopian or ideological is always dependent on the stage and degree of reality to which one applies those standards and values. He also stressed that "the representatives of a given order will label as utopian all conceptions of existence which from their point of view can in principle never be realized."[17]

While conceding that among them there were certainly some situationally transcendental ideas which in principle could never be realized, Mannheim went on to stress an idea which would figure heavily in some of the criticisms that would be leveled at the proponents of the end of ideology thesis. In conceding the existence of situationally transcendental ideas that were totally unrealizable, Mannheim cautioned that the recognition of this fact ought not prohibit us from recognizing that:

> men whose thoughts and feelings are bound up with an order of existence in which they have a definite position will always evidence the tendency to designate as absolutely utopian all ideas which have been shown to be unrealizable only within the framework of the order in which they themselves live.[18]

For Mannheim the importance of this possibility requires that a distinction be made between two types of utopias. These two types Mannheim explained are the absolute type, a classification which embodies those situationally transcendental ideas that are completely unrealizable in <u>any</u> social order, and the "relative" utopia, a classification which embodies those situationally transcendental ideas that are only unrealizable in a given political order.

Consistent with his emphasis on the subjective forces which shape the designation of a particular situationally transcendental idea as utopian Mannheim stressed that the labeling of an idea as utopian can fulfill a distinct ideological function. A reluctance to transcend the status quo can push one to regard "something that is unrealizable in any order, so that by obscuring these distinctions one can suppress the validity of the claims of the relative utopias."[19] To this Mannheim added another important observation. This was that "by calling every thing utopian that goes beyond the present existing order, one sets at rest the anxiety that might arise from the relative utopias that are realizable in another order."[20]

Mannheim also noted the existence of other factors which served to complicate even further the determination of whether at a given period a situationally transcendental idea can be regarded as a utopia or as a ideology. A first factor was that where the exposure of ideologies as illusory ideas, that are adapted to the present order is generally the work of "representatives of an order which is still in process of emergence", the labeling of an idea as utopian is usually the work of a "representative of an epoch that has already passed."[21] Summarizing his views on this matter Mannheim added that:

> It is always the dominant group which is in full accord with the existing order that determines what is to be regarded as utopian, while the ascendent group which is in conflict with things as they are is the one that determines what is regarded as ideological.[22]

A second complication was the fact that utopian and ideological elements generally do not occur separately in the historical process. Rather, the utopias of the ascendent classes "are often, to a large extent, permeated with ideological elements."[23] In order to explain this seemingly contradictory tendency Mannheim cited the place of the idea of freedom as the utopia of the ascendent bourgeoisie. Mannheim's argument was that the sixteenth century idea of freedom represented a real utopia to the ascendent bourgeoisie because it contained elements that were both instrumental to the disintegration of the feudal social order as well as those which became realizable with the ascent of the bourgeoisie. This idea, nonetheless contained ideological elements. For Mannheim an understanding of the ideological elements embodied in this idea requires us to recognize that "wherever the idea of freedom had to make concessions to the concomitant idea of equality, it was setting up goals which were in contradiction to the social order which it demanded and which was later realized."[24]

Against this background Mannheim argued that the only adequate criterion that could be used to judge what is truly utopian and what is ideological in the outlook of a rising class is their realization. In elaborating on this argument Mannheim adopted the following position:

> The actualized realities of the past put an end to the conflict of mere opinions about what in earlier situationally transcendent ideas was relatively utopian bursting asunder the bonds of the existing order, and what was an ideology which merely served to conceal reality. The extent to which ideas are realized constitutes a supplementary and retroactive standard

> for making distinctions between facts which as long as they are contemporary are buried under the partisan conflict of opinion.[25]

No review of Mannheim's efforts to distinguish utopias from ideologies would be complete if it did not stress what for Mannheim was the single most crucial difference between these two reality transcending modes of thought, i.e. the difference in what their complete disappearance would mean. Noting that where the "end of ideology" would represent a crisis only for certain groups, Mannheim argued that "the complete disappearance of the utopian element from human thought and action would mean that human nature and human development would take on a totally new character."[26] The disappearance of utopia would bring about "a static state of affairs in which man himself becomes no more than a thing."[27] We would then be faced with:

> the greatest paradox imaginable, namely, that man, who has achieved the highest degree of rational mastery of existence, left without any ideals becomes a mere creature of impulses. Thus, after a long tortuous, but heroic development, just at the highest stage of awareness, when history is ceasing to be blind fate, and is becoming more and more man's own creation, with the relinquishment of utopias, man would lose his will to shape history and therewith his ability to understand it.[28]

One thing that is very clear about this argument is that Mannheim's own vision of the end of ideology is not one that can legitimately be seen as promoting an image of a static society.

Whether or not the same can be said for the conception of the end of ideology developed initially by Aron and Shils and later elaborated by Bell and Lipset will be considered

later in this chapter. We need only note here that, in place of some distant vision of the end of ideology, Aron and Shils wrote that the end of ideology was by the mid-1950s, well on the way to being achieved in the Western world. Indeed, Bell and Lipset writing from the vantage point of the late 1950s, would go one step further: for them the end of ideology had already been achieved in the West. Despite these differences, none of them saw the end of ideology as a vision or a distant projection of some future reality; it was an emerging reality. For each of them this reality had roots that were firmly established in the success of Welfare liberalism and the failures of left-wing ideologies to fulfill their "utopian" promises.

We need also note, that unlike Hegel, Marx or Mannheim, these later day proponents of the end of ideology thesis did not explicitly impute to a special group of intellectuals the role of being latter day "prophets" leading a chosen people into the promised land. This is especially important because it highlights part of the context out of which their concept of the end of ideology emerged.

Aron, Shils, Bell, and Lipset each developed their views on the end of ideology very much in the broader context of a discussion of the role of the intellectual in modern society. Each of them defined that discussion in terms of intellectuals as proponents of left-wing ideologies. Moreover, each of them framed their discussion of this issue as a response to the problem of alienation. Their discussion emerged out of what amounted to an emotionally charged polemic against left-wing

intellectuals, intellectuals who did not share with them the conviction that ideological politics no longer had a firm or credible basis in the modern world.

Directed almost exclusively against Marxism and Communism their polemic was especially noteworthy in its origins. To a large extent this polemic originated with and became the dominant theme of the 1955 Congress of Cultural Freedom meetings in Milan.

What also made their polemic noteworthy was that it was developed by men who, save for Aron, had at one point or another been largely identified with various segments of the political left. Not unrelated to this was the fact that in the 1930s Shils had been a registered communist, and both Bell and Lipset in the 1930s and early 1940s had been members of the socialist movement. Indeed, Bell, when in his early twenties had been the editor of the socialist magazine, the New Leader.

The Aron-Shils Conception of The End of Ideology

The entire thrust of Aron's book The Opium of the Intellectuals was directed against the political ideologies of the left, especially Marxism and Communism. Characterizing them as secular religions, Aron sought both to repudiate these ideologies and to renounce those Western European intellectuals who continued their support of them during the post-war period. This was clearly reflected when, in the opening page his book, Aron drew from the French social critic Simon Weil this quote: "Marxism is undoubtedly a religion,

in the lowest sense of the word. Like every inferior form of religious life it has been continually used, to borrow the apt phrase of Marx himself, as an opiate of the people."[29]

As some commentators have noted, Aron was continuing a long-standing argument with French intellectuals, and intellectuals generally, about what he perceived as their general tendency to sympathize with the Soviet Union despite the totalitarian nature of its domestic and international policies.[30] For Aron, this tendency was reflected in the intellectuals' ability to "tolerate the worst crimes as long as they were committed in the name of the proper doctrines" while remaining merciless about the shortcomings of democratic governments.[31] In striving to understand the nature and the origins of this tendency Aron was moved to examine what he held to be the "sacred words," the myths of the intellectuals, the Left, Revolution, and Proletariat. The analysis of these "myths" led him to, in his words, "reflect on the cult of history and then to examine a social category to which the sociologists have not yet devoted the attention it deserves: the intelligentsia."[32]

The organization of Aron's book roughly followed that outline. As such, Aron devoted the first three chapters to an extensive discussion of political myths: those of the Left, of the Revolution, and of the Proletariat. Following this discussion, Aron devoted a separate section to an analysis of what he referred to as the "idolatry of history," i.e., the worship of history as the successive unfolding of a drama whose ending is embodied in an evolutionary process that follows

a set of laws of historical development that have an inner logic and necessity of their own. The third part of his book was in turn devoted to a lengthy but often complex discussion of the role of intellectuals in history and the place of alienation as a nineteenth century phenomenon that shaped the predisposition of modern intellectuals both to embrace Marxism and to support communist inspired revolutions. A separate and concluding chapter was devoted to what Aron framed into a question: "The End of the Ideological Age?"

It was in this last chapter that Aron sought to come to terms with the question of ideology and to summarize the dimensions of his polemic against French Leftist intellectuals. In pursuing these ends Aron dealt with several interrelated subjects. Among them were the place of social science, Christianity, pluralism, intellectuals, and ideology in the modern world. Aron's treatment of each of these subjects converged on a discussion of the political climate of the post World War II period and the substantive weaknesses of Marxist political analysis as demonstrated by historical events. It also focused upon the nature of ideological thought and the sociological and psychological conditions which made ideological thought so attractive to intellectuals.

For Aron the "age of ideology" was a relatively modern phenomenon, one that he associated with the conditions that gave rise to the French Revolution, industrialism, the rise of the bourgeoisie, and the proliferation of intellectuals resulting from both the demands of an industrial society and the democratization of education. Aron distinguished the

"ideological age" (a period which he defined as originating slightly before the French Revolution and extending slightly into the post World War II period) from previous ages by the political ideologies that it produced, (nationalism, classical liberalism, socialism, and Marxism). Yet its most important characteristic was the emergence of an ideological way of thinking. This method of thinking was characterized by an excess in faith in the power of reason and by a belief in the power of science to transform society.

This excess in faith in reason and science caused Aron to loosely define ideologies as particular interpretations of the world which, out of the intellectuals need to find meaning in universals become hardened into secular religions.[33] Aron viewed ideologies as dogmatic or scholastic interpretations of the world which invariably "presuppose an apparently systemmatic formalization of facts, interpretations, desires, and predictions."[34]

Aron's conception of ideological thinking and his use of the term ideology was not Marxian (Aron did not believe in a philosophy of immanence nor in the "truths" of history) but it nonetheless retained Marxian overtones of "false consciousness." This is to say, Aron's use of the term ideology presupposed the correctness as well as the universality of a particular and somewhat fatalistic image of the world. This image is one which held that technology can not be counted on completely to eliminate poverty and hunger, no matter whether the use of technology was guided by comprehensive or partial systems of political and economic planning regulated by the state or,

for that matter, whether its use was left to fall within the natural course of a free market economy because limitations in material resources prevent such ends from being achieved.[35] Moreover, his image of the world held that such technological progress could never be expected to be gained without, what Aron considered to be, the inevitable price that is in recent history has been known to exact: the continued subjection of "millions of workers to the logic of mass production" and the ever present "risk of human beings being turned into machines."[36]

For Aron, French left-wing intellectuals were especially guilty of neglecting the risks that technological progress imposes. Moreover, in their support of Marxism, which he viewed as the "last great ideology," the French left-wing intellectuals neglected a wide range of historical, social, and political realities that revealed the substantive limits of Marxian theoretical insights when applied to the real world. The limits to which he was referring were those which exposed the erroneous nature of Marxist assumptions concerning the consciousness of the industrial worker, the nature of twentieth century revolutions, and the nature of man and political power in general.

There were several realities to which he referred. Prominent among them was the nature of political revolutions in the twentieth century. Here Aron asserted that all the revolutions of the twentieth century, including both the Soviet and the Chinese revolutions, have not been proletarian revolutions but rather "they have been thought up and carried out by intellectuals."[37] In support of this view Aron developed

the following argument:

> The ideologists of the proletariat are bourgeois intellectuals. The bourgeoisie, whether it derived its ideas from Montesquieu, Voltaire or Jean-Jacques Rousseau, set up its own conception of human existence and the political order in opposition to the Ancien Regime and the Catholic vision of the world. The proletariat has never had a conception of the world opposed to that of the bourgeoisie; there has been an ideology of what the proletariat should be or should do, an ideology whose historical ascendancy was most powerful when the number of industrial workers was smallest. The so-called proletarian party, in the countries where it has seized power, has had peasants rather than factory workers as its troops, and intellectuals, exasperated by the traditional hierarchy or by national humiliation, as its leaders. [38]

The validity of this argument, Aron held, demonstrated that idea that capitalism would precipitate a working class revolution comparable to the French revolution, was a fallacy. The blindness of the French left-wing intellectuals to this was, in turn, based upon their need to romanticize the proletariat, to impute to the proletariat an historical mission that represents no more than the demand for fulfillment of their own historic aspirations; i.e., the aspirations of the bourgeoisie. Aron elaborated on this position when in the following passage he argued that:

> It was in the hope of accomplishing fully the ambitions of the bourgeoisie - the conquest of Nature, social equality or equality of opportunity - that the ideologists handed on the torch to the proletariat. The contrast between technological progress and the misery of the workers was a crying scandal. How could one help but impute to private ownership and the anarchy of the market the survival of ancestral poverty which was in fact due to the exigencies of accumulation (capitalist or socialist), insufficient productivity and increases in population. Soft-hearted intellecuals, revolted by injustice, seized on the idea that capitalism, being in itself evil, would be destroyed by its contradictions and that its victims would eventually overthrow the privileged. Marx achieved an improbable synthesis between the Hegelian metaphysic of history, the Jacobin interpretation of the

> Revolution, and the pessimistic theory of the market economy developed by British authors. To maintain the continuity between the French Revolution and the Russian Revolution, it was only necessary to call Marxist ideology proletariat. But one has merely to open one's eyes to be rid of the illusion.[39]

But for Aron the illusion that Marxist ideology was proletarian was not the only thing that served to blind the French left-wing intellectuals from comprehending how historical developments in the twentieth century had exposed the errors of Marxist political and economic theory. In addition to their inability to see through this illusion, the French left-wing intellectuals were remiss in failing to comprehend a number of other things which served to undermine the credibility and contemporary relevance of Marxism as the logical fulfillment of Rationalist philosophy and bourgeois aspirations. The first failure was their inability to understand the relationship between capitalism and socialism. Both systems were rival models and not, as Marx held, successive stages in some fixed evolutionary process. The second failure of understanding was that, rather than being a temporary or transitional phase of development, mixed economies, like those in the United States, Great Britain and in Scandanavian countries, had every indication of being permanent. Given the exigencies of technological progress, these were very workable alternatives to both laissez-faire capitalism and socialism. The third oversight, was the relative contentment of industrial workers and their leaders in the United States and in other countries where Welfare State policies were being practiced. A final failure was of the French left-wing intellectuals to recognize that the history of political repression in the Soviet Union, as

exemplified by the Moscow trials of 1936 and 1938 and the purges of the 1930s represented not just the moral decadence of Stalin, but the inherent weaknesses of Marxism as a political creed. These events revealed how the identification of the proletariat with the collective will of the party inevitably produces tyranny because it rests on an idealized image of man, one that obscures the relationship between power and ideology.

For Aron, then, the failure of those intellectuals who could express no more than disappointment with the political policies of the Soviet Union was that they could not apply to an analysis of those policies an insight that was Marxian in origin. This was the recognition that official ideologies served to justify the interests of those who invoke them in order to retain their power.

In Aron's view the failure of the French left-wing intellectuals to comprehend the nature of Soviet oppression and the success of liberal democracies had additional consequences. It prevented them from recognizing the structural weaknesses of Marxism when it was applied to the real world. It also prevented them from recognizing what was becoming increasingly evident, i.e., the decline of political ideologies as an active social force both in the Soviet Union and in the West.

Discounting the significance of McCarthyism in the United States, Aron asserted that the adoption of Welfare State policies suited to the exigencies of a technological society and their apparent success in satisfying the material

wants of the industrial worker, have served to diminish class antagonisms and ideological debate in the West. While, in the Soviet Union both the suppression of free speech and the intolerance of dissent served to produce the same result.

Still, Aron acknowledged, none of this meant that the ideological age was completely at an end, even in the West. For along with the decline of ideologies in the Soviet Union and in the West there remained the persistance of a residual problem of the ideological age, the intellectual's hunger for ideas of universal applicability. Such ideas in apparently having historical necessity could be held to have meaning as universal truths. This was a problem which, Aron argued, stemmed from the intellectual legacy of the nineteenth century; a legacy in which "Europe was aware of the plurality of civilizations but did not doubt the universality of its message."[40] But while it stemmed from this legacy, the problem, Aron maintained, was fed by conditions generic to countries like the United States, England, and France. These liberal democracies admitted division and pluralism. Moreover, in these modern industrial societies intellectuals in particular suffered from the fragmentation of the world, from uncertainty, and from specialization. In the sense that it fulfills "the longing for a purpose, for communion with the people, for something controlled by an idea and a will," ideology, Aron held, will always promise to provide a refuge for the intellectual.[41]

But though the "ideological age" was ending in the West, save for intellectuals who despite its contradictions continued

to believe in Marxism, Aron acknowledged, this did not mean that it was coming to a close elsewhere. On the contrary, Aron noted, that Western man's "vision of the radiant future" had spread throughout the world raising "foolish and irrational hopes."[42] Ideological debates, while abating in the West, continued in Africa, Asia, and in second rank countries in general. Here too, Aron held, the intellectuals were responsible. This was because many of them were seeking to apply to nations with unique cultural and social problems solutions that were conditioned by Marxism, solutions that were single minded and dogmatic, but which nonetheless had a wide appeal. Marxism's scientific character fostered hopes which simple people could feed upon. Moreover, what also made Marxism so attractive to people in under developed countries was its "prophetism," a dimension which, Aron argued, provided it with its seemingly "spiritual substance."

It was at this point that Aron argued that while a country like China could perhaps find solutions to its problems in Communism and thereby achieve a durable peace, one could not reasonably hold out the same hope for Christian Europe. No, ideologies were definitely on the decline in Europe, and not so much because Christianity provided a viable alternative to Communism but because of the strength of democratic liberalism in providing such an alternative. Resting on a foundation that was partially inspired by Christianity with its emphasis on the absolute value of the individual soul, and on the promise of the social sciences, democratic liberalism, Aron argued, was the only political philosophy which could provide the intellectual with real hope. This

was because it was a philosophy under which the social sciences could continue to develop free from ideological constraints.

Against this background Aron argued that French left-wing intellectuals could attain "the only political universality accessible in our time" through the social sciences, i.e., by their "acting in accordance with the teachings of social science."[43]

This, Aron held, did not necessarily call for an abandonment of the drive for improving the human conditions but rather the recognition on the part of the intellectuals regarding the limits of politics, i.e., its inherent limitations in solving complex and long standing social and economic problems. While this recognition might leave the intellectuals with only skepticism, it was worth the risk. It was on this note that Aron ended his chapter on the problem of ideology with these words:

> Indifference will not harm us.... If tolerance is born of doubt, let us teach everyone to doubt all the models and utopias, to challenge all the prophets of redemption and the heralds of catastrophe. If they alone can abolish fanatics, let us pray for the advent of skeptics.[44]

There were striking similarities between Aron's "The End of the Ideological Age" and Edward Shils' "The End of Ideology?" and "Ideology and Civility." These essays were devoted to a discussion of the same themes, the same issues, as Aron's chapter: the decline of political ideologies, its sources, and the relationship between intellectuals and political ideologies in the post and during the Cold War period.

While representing little more than a summary of Aron's presentation to the 1955 Milan Congress of Cultural Freedom meeting, Shils' essay "The End of Ideology?" nonetheless has had an important place in what has come to be referred to as the "end of ideology debate."[45]

Shils' essay contains the same strong rejection of the different kinds of fanaticism and doctrinairism that Aron had equated with the word "ideology." Among the ideologies named in his essay, Marxism and socialism were singled out by Shils for special attention. Defining Marxism as the last great ideology, Shils gave his essay a decidedly anti-Marxist and anti-Communist tone. As in Aron's writings Classical laissez-faire liberalism was not given much attention, nor for that matter was any attention given to the possibility that the new form of liberalism evident in the West since the early 1930s, with its emphasis on state interventionism, constituted an ideology. Moreover, Shils very much agreed with Aron that ideological politics was ending in the West and rising in Africa and Asia.

But the importance of Shils' essay "The End of Ideology?" has less to do with its substantive content than with the kind of intellectual mood it reflected, the kind of tone that it conveyed regarding the end of ideology theme. Written as a brief report of the Milan meeting of the Congress of Cultural Freedom and concerned largely with summarizing various papers dealing with different economic and political aspects of the end of ideology question, this essay conveyed a very distinct tone. This tone can best be described as celebrationist.

What in part accounted for this tone was Shils' pleasure over the unanimity of the Western intellectuals participating in the Milan meeting, including some socialists, towards the necessity of abandoning closed ideological perspectives in favor of a general independence of thought. Hailing them as an expression of this independence, Shils went on to praise each paper presented at the Milan meeting for going further around the "turning-point" to which, in his view, the West had been steadily moving in the post World War II period. For Shils this "turning-point" was the "end of ideological enthusiasm."[46]

Another feature of his essay's celebrationist tone was his assertion that, having reached a "turning point," in its "end of ideological enthusiasm," the West was enjoying a new period in history. The basis of this assertion was the idea that Marxism as the last great ideology had lost its appeal to most intellectuals. For Shils the cause for celebration was clearly that the Western intellectuals participating at the Milan meeting had now reached a point of intellectual maturity and scholarly wisdom where they no longer felt the need for ideologies. In Shils' words they reached a point where they no longer felt the need for a "comprehensive explicit system of beliefs."[47]

For Shils the reasons for the lack of ideological fervor on the part of those Western intellectuals participating at the Milan meeting were both very clear and warranted. The lack of fervor rested upon their having seen, in Shils' words, "the substantive errors of totalitarianism and extremist

enthusiasm."[48] But more importantly this lack of ideological fervor, Shils argued, rested upon those intellectuals having seen those "substantive errors" in the light of historical reflection concerning the nature of all totalitarian regimes. This was "the wrongfulness of the type of ideological orientation which once constituted its attraction," an attraction for something as in Marxism, for the attainment of a comprehensive explicit system of beliefs.[49]

Implicit in Shils' enthusiasm over the lack of ideological fervor on the part of those Western intellectuals participating at the Milan meeting was the projection that it represented something more than just the disposition of a relatively small group of intellectuals.[50] It represented again, as Aron had asserted, the loss among Western intellectuals in general of that kind of ideological enthusiasm present in the 1930s, the kind of enthusiasm for universal truths that had led an older generation of intellectuals to embrace Marxism and other ideologies.

Having equated the decline of political ideologies in the West with the loss of ideological enthusiasm of Western intellectuals, Shils was quick to laud this decline of ideologies. But, he also expressed a definite note of caution. He warned that the decline of political ideologies in the West was by no means irreversible. What made this decline potentially reversible was a quality intrinsic to all intellectuals. This was "the temptation to construct new ideologies, as rigid, as eager for consistency and for universal observance as those which have been now transcended."[51]

Shils was also quick to point out that, as a condition for eliminating the emergence of new ideologies in place of those which had been "transcended," certain measures must be taken by those committed to the ideals of independent thought and political moderation. Stating these measures in the form of a proclamation, Shils declared to the participants of the Milan meeting that "the positive standards of action inherent in our present attachment to moderation in action and orderliness and stability in change have to be more clearly discerned."[52] To this Shils added the following sentiment: "we must rediscover the permanently valid element(s) in our historical ideals - elements which must be recurrently realized without ever being definitively realizable once and for all."[53] In briefly expanding on this point Shils developed the following argument:

> In our rejection of the ideologies we must study what can be salvaged from them, and what in them should be kept alive, how and in what measure grandiose visions and austere standards have their place. Every society needs a certain amount of these ideals just as it would be ruined by too much of them.[54]

This emphasis on the need to extrapolate justifiable ideals from within ideologies, and on the necessity of eliminating conditions favorable to the development of new ideologies can be found in an expanded form in Shils' essay "Ideology and Civility: On the Politics of the Intellectual." The essay also contains an expanded discussion on the "end of ideology" theme.

Presented originally as a series of lectures at the University of the South to commemorate its centennial, this essay is important because it represents the most coherent

and comprehensive statement on the end of ideology theme developed in the 1950s. Its importance also derives from the fact that it provides a much more comprehensive discussion of pluralism than that offered by Aron. Moreover, in this essay Shils developed an interpretation of the intellectual properties of ideological politics that one can clearly hear echoed in Daniel Bell's writings on socialism in the United States and on the theme of the end of ideology.

"Ideology and Civility: On the Politics of the Intellectual" can be broken down into five parts. These parts concern: (1) the widespread penetration of ideologies into the political life and intellectual thought of nineteenth and twentieth century European society; (2) the nature and intellectual properties of ideological politics, and the appeal of such politics to modern intellectuals; (3) the origin of ideological politics in Judaic-Christian religious thought, and the role of such thought in providing traditions that along with those developed since the sixteenth century have provided the principle sources in sustaining the intellectuals' predisposition towards ideological politics; (4) civility as an alternative to ideological politics; and (5) an examination of the conditions by which modern intellectuals could be persuaded to adopt, in place of ideological politics, an enthusiasm for civil politics.

In the first part of his essay Shils argued that ideological politics had reached a position in the public life of Western countries where it had threatened to achieve universal dominance. Though it varied from country to country,

with Great Britain and the United States showing the least effects of it, France, Germany, Italy, and Russia were countries in which ideological politics had come to possess an overwhelming power. With much conviction, Shils argued that, wherever it became sufficiently strong, ideological politics had "paralyzed the free dialectic of intellectual life, introducing standards irrelevant to discovery and creation...."[55] Similarly, he argued that in the political realm ideological politics had served to constrict and often brake "the flexible consensus necessary for a free and spontaneous order."[56] Noting that ideological politics appeared in a variety of manifestations extending from the extreme left to the extreme right of the political spectrum, Shils argued that, even as each ideology professed itself to be unique, each of them without exception were "members of the same family."[57] Each of these ideologies - Italian Fascism, German National Socialism, Russian Bolshevism, French and Italian Communism, the French reactionary group the Action Francaise, the British Union of Fascists, and McCarthyism - all belonged to the same family because they were all committed to conducting politics on "an ideological plane."[58]

In the second part of this essay Shils continued to define those characteristics that in his view served to make all ideological movements and groups a part of the same family. For Shils an important characteristic was that all ideological movements and groups operate with the assumption that politics should be conducted from the standpoint of a coherent, comprehensive set of beliefs. Such beliefs, Shils explained,

are those beliefs which members of an ideological group hold in such reverence that faithfulness to them "necessarily overrides every other consideration."[59] These are beliefs, Shils continued, which attribute to one group or class, or some variation of them (a nation, the party, the proletariat, the individual leader) the position of being the single bearer of truth and justice.

In continuing this line of analysis, Shils argued that all ideological groups display a common commitment to reordering life as a whole. But this, Shils stressed, was only in accordance with their particular image of truth and morality. Additionally, he argued that all ideological groups expressed the same need to impute the source of all evil to either an ethnic group, a foreign power, or a class. Correspondingly, they all expressed a profound distrust of traditional democratic institutions, politicians, and political leaders. To this Shils added that all ideological groups view the world in fixed, dualistic terms, with either something being necessarily good or evil. Moreover, Shils stressed that every ideological group becomes identifiable through their common obsession with totality and futurity.[60]

The third part of Shils' essay dealt with the passing of the ideological age, of ideological politics. More specifically it dealt with an elaboration of the grounds upon which one could assert that the age of ideological politics was coming to a close in the West in a period when:

> the world is frozen into a menacing division engendered and maintained by Bolshevik ideas, when the Communist Parties of France and Italy are among the largest in their countries, when in the Middle East, in Africa and Asia

> passionate nationalist and ethnic ideologies continuously encroach on rational judgment and reasonable moral action.[61]

In all, Shils gave four reasons to support his contention that the age of ideological politics was coming to a close in the West. The first and (if one is to judge from the order in which he placed them) the most important reason was that Marxism as "the very heart which had sustained ideological politics among intellectuals in the past" was gradually losing its strength, it was "decomposing."[62] For Shils this decomposition started in the mid-1930s when, at the moment of its greatest appeal to the world's intellectuals, the Moscow Trials undermined the strength, the very legitimacy of the Communist claim that in "the Soviet Union the ultimate stage of human history, the true realm of freedom was being entered upon."[63] The Berlin uprising of 1953, and the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 were, to Shils, only further manifestations of Marxism decomposition. Added to this, both the evidence of widespread poverty in Communist nations and the failure of Marxism to be responsive to the multiplicity of life in modern industrial societies have served to discredit Marxism. For Shils the bottom line of this aspect of Marxism decomposition was that its utopian promise had lost its power to convince.[64]

Shils, in expanding this view, argued that Marxian formulae were found to be "too simple....offering nothing to those who are attempting to establish their intellectual individuality in the face of large-scale organizations and their accompanying professional specialization."[65] Marxism's humanitarian element,

its alleged concern for the poor, Shils argued, "can have no appeal when there are still many very poor people in Communist countries, and the poor in Capitalist countries can now be seen not to be poor, not to be miserable, not to be noble -- but to be as comfortable and as vulgar as, if not more vulgar than, the middle classes."[66] For Shils the world was "too tired,....too wise to be aroused by promises of a future which might be spurious and which would not be much different from the present."[67] Correspondingly, Shils argued that "in every sphere of intellectual life....Marxism has lost its power to attract because it is too simplistic, too threadbare intellectually and morally, and too often just wrong or irrelevto the problems of the contemporary mind."[68] For Shils the primary development responsible for revealing the intellectual limits of Marxism was the emergence of the social sciences.

The second reason that Shils gave to support his claim that the age of ideological politics was coming to a close was that like Marxism, Nationalism had lost its once dominant place in Western politics. Like Marxism it too had lost "its doctrinal grip on Western intellectuals."[69]

The third reason was that the bitterness and tensions once present in debates between proponents of socialism and advocates of capitalism were fading. The tensions were fading because of the economic achievements of Western nations since World War II; the failure of economic planning in Soviet satellite states; the political "equivocality" of centrally planned economies; the reintroduction of market economy principles by some Communist States; and the limited success of

nationalization in France and England.[70]

The fourth and last reason that Shils gave in support of his claim again focused on Marxism. This was that Marxism had lost its appeal amongst Western intellectuals because "many of its more valid aspirations and humanitarian elements had been more or less fulfilled in Capitalist countries."[71] What further curtailed the need for Marxism in the West was the realization that "the socialist and Communist countries have neither realized their more grandioise ideals at all nor achieved their more reasonable aspirations any better than the capitalistic countries."[72]

In his reasons for the coming end of the age of ideological politics in the west, Shils neglected ideological politics in developing nations. For Shils the appeal of ideologies like Marxism, Nationalism, and Pan-Africanism amongst the newly developing states of Asia and Africa would pass when these nations would become "more settled and mature."[73]

The fourth part of Shils' essay was devoted to an analysis of the relationship between intellectuals and ideological politics. The problem that framed this analysis was whether or not the decline of ideological politics in the West was permanent or temporary. For Shils the solution to this problem rested in an analysis of the traditions that shaped the outlook of the modern Western intellectual.

In this analysis Shils observed that while an ideological orientation towards life has always existed and has always served to frame man's judgment on all things including political issues, the emergence of ideological politics has, nonetheless,

been a relatively new phenomenon. Like Aron, Shils saw ideological politics as originating with the French Revolution. Before this event, ideological politics had not existed and an ideological orientation towards life had not been converted into political activity. Before the era of the French Revolution those persons bearing a predisposition towards ideological politics had traditionally been excluded from those "circles which discussed and decided on succession to political office and on the actions of governments."[74]

> For Shils what this boiled down to was that "as long as politics were not an instrument of justice or of the realization of the right social order and were concerned with the mere maintenance of order, the conservation of the power of dynasties and classes which already had or sought it, there was no room for ideological politics."[75]

Those who practiced politics were not threatened by those disaffiliated persons and religious zealots who would thereafter seek to practice ideological politics. The reason for this was that prior to at least the sixteenth century, conditions were never such where persons predisposed towards practicing ideological politics could generate mass support for their ideologically or religiously derived aspirations.

What altered the situation and created the conditions in which ideological politics could originate during the French Revolution, were a series of technological, religious, and social events. These included the invention of printing, the emergence of the Protestant religion, and the gradual decomposition of the feudal order. The emergence of the Protestant religious sects were especially important because the sects transformed the basis of moral responsibility from the priesthood to the individual by making the Bible the sole

vehicle to the sacred. Providing a leveling effect, the Protestant sects created a new moral climate in European society, one that was favorable to mass political participation.

But as important as these events were, the crucial element for Shils in the development of ideological politics at the end of the eighteenth century was the emergence of a new class of intellectuals in the sixteenth century. These intellectuals, Shils explained, "were no longer dependent exclusively on patronage or inheritance for their livelihood."[76] The intellectuals that had come into existence in the sixteenth century were like no other type in world history. They were men, Shils explained, "whose sensibility, intelligence, and imagination carried them beyond the standards and requirements of everyday life."[77] Because these men were no longer forced to depend on church or state or princely, aristocratic, or mercantile patronage for their existence, they could attach themselves to symbols beyond those embodied in existing ecclesiastical and government institutions. No longer "coterminous" with the educated classes as they had been before the development of specialized technical training, the intellectuals growing steadily in number and importance were the decisive factor in the "ideologization" of European politics: "they have lived in a permanent tension between earthly power and the ideal, which derives from their nature."[78]

But as important as was this tension in creating the intellectual's predisposition towards ideological politics, Shils argued, it was not strong enough to create the imagery and passion of ideological politics. In response to this

tension, intellectuals had created new traditions, the romantic tradition, the scientific tradition, the bohemian tradition, that had a profound importance in disposing future generations of intellectuals to ideological politics. What provided the intellectual with the necessary disposition to ideological politics was an ideological tradition which, Shils argued, continues to live in modern culture through "invisible radiations coming down from the depths of our Western past."[79] This ideological tradition, according to Shils, was millenarianism.

The millenarian tradition with its emphasis on the second coming, prophesied the destruction of the existing social order, and its replacement by a radically new social order that does justice to the wronged and virtuous by elevating them to eternal bliss. It similarly renders justice to the powerful and wicked by degrading and destroying them for all time. Millenarianism, has thus, always had a central bearing on the ideological orientation towards life.

This affinity of intellectuals for millenarianism, Shils explained, was located in the preoccupation of the ideological outlook with the evil of the world as it exists. This affinity, Shils insisted, was also located in the preoccupation of the ideological outlook with the immiscibility of good and evil, and with its own "violent hatred of the existing cosmic order, and especially of its earthly beneficiaries, governmental, economic, and ecclesiastical authorities."[80] For Shils, the German Marxists discovered their philosophical ancestry in the Anabaptists of Munster, in the Levellers and in the Diggers of

the English Civil War. Their discovery represents an acknowledgement of the affinity between millenarianism and the ideological outlook, an acknowledgement that reflects the depths of the millenarian tradition in Western culture.[81]

But, Shils was quick to point out that the millenarian tradition was no ordinary tradition: unlike other traditions it was not transmitted by the elders of a society to their next generation. How then could millenarianism persist as such a recurrent and appealing theme in Western history, Shils asked. The answer, Shils insisted, could only be found in Christianity because it is Christianity "which contains among its manifold potentialities the ever present promise of a Second Coming and the unchanging imminence of the ultimate catastrophe which precedes the second coming of a Messiah."[82]

For Shils these chiliastic ideas will always find great appeal amongst the downtrodden, the disaffiliated; to those who find "life as it is lived too hard," to those who feel neglected and "uncared for as a result of the failure of their rulers" to be responsive to their needs and talents.[83] Ideological politics, Shils argued, responded to this condition by transforming chiliastic principles of the millenarian tradition into an "idiom more acceptable to the contemporary mind."[84]

Shils concluded this fourth part of his essay by noting that given the place of millenarianism in the Western intellectual tradition, and the pervasiveness of romanticism in Western culture, it would be foolish to believe that such traditions would be likely "to disappear so soon after the fury

and the disillusionment of the first fifty years of this century."[85] For Shils the pervasiveness of the romantic tradition in Western culture especially represented an always present tributary for the renewal of ideological politics. This was because the romantic tradition in both its individualistic and collectivistic variations shared with millanerianism a basic and overriding contempt for all existing authorities, a contempt that was conditioned by the view that all existing social orders mediate, compromise, and ultimately deform the ideal.[86]

For Shils, the persistence of these traditions in Western culture and intellectual thought, was compounded by the fact that new traditions never entirely replace old ones but rather only enlarge and grow through an attachment with the old ones. This was of no small consequence in assessing the nature of the decline in ideological politics in the West in the post World War II period. An understanding of these factors could serve to produce only one valid judgement concerning the permanence of the decline of ideological politics in the West. It would be "excessively sanguine" to conceive of the West as experiencing a permanent and complete end to the age of ideological politics. What would be more realistic, Shils argued, would be for us "to speak of its subsidence, rather than its end."[87] Moreover, the only thing that the West could "legitimately hope for in the coming decades is a condition of quiescence of ideology and of the ideological disposition from which it springs."[88] Correspondingly, Shils concluded that this quiescence could only be sustained only where an effective alternative to

ideological politics was made available to the intellectual.

For Shils civil politics represented this alternative.

The fifth and concluding part of Shils essay dealt with the requirements of civil politics in liberal democracies. These requirements grew out of a particular image of civility. For Shils civility meant more than good manners, it meant the location of man's virtue in his willingness to share in both the moral responsibilities and limitations of democratic politics in deference to the common good. Civility, as such, Shils explained requires from the citizen a partial transcendence of partisanship, as well as, an empathic appreciation of other interests within the political community.[89]

Civil politics because it is based on civility necessarily requires the citizen to adhere to several very trying obligations. These include the maintenance of a sense of affinity with one's society, and the recognition that society represents a single transpersonal entity which demands from the individual citizen a steady commitment to the ideal of the common good, even when others around him may be less steadfast in their commitment. Civil politics also impose on the citizen the obligation that he judge things effecting society independently and in terms of their own merits, rather than through ideologically tinted glasses. Furthermore, civil politics requires the citizen to have respect for tradition. This is because civility is based on a sense of affinity to a past that extends into the future. This is a sense of affinity appreciates the factual reality of past achievements and the human qualities that shaped these achievements. Moreover, the sense of

affinity realizes its obligation not only to those of the present generation but to those in the following ones, whose lives will inevitably be influenced by present day decisions.

But above all, Shils asserted that civil politics necessarily requires the citizen to understand the true nature and complexity of virtue itself. This means that "no virtue stands alone, that every virtuous act costs something in terms of other virtuous acts, that virtues are intertwined with evils, and that no theoretical system of a hierarchy of virtues is ever realizable in practice."[90]

For Shils thus one fundamental issue faces any analysis of civil politics: whether or not intellectuals given their affinity for ideological politics could ever be attracted to civil politics. Can intellectuals, Shils asked, "be expected to affirm a political practice which provides no final solution and which does not promise to bring Society or the human race to a resting point or perfect fulfillment?"[91] In Shils answer the intellectual could pursue a very different, but nonetheless very likely alternative to either civil politics or ideological politics, i.e. the withdrawal from political life.

One condition for successfully incorporating intellectuals into a free society and in turn for providing a moral foundation for the success of civil politics in the modern world rests, Shils argued, is the recognition that the heritage of ideological politics should not be completely disavowed. For Shils the ideological heritage contained valuable elements that were worthy of preservation. Here Shils asserted that

"the demand for moral equality, the distrust of authority and of the institutions which it conducts for its own continuance, the insistence on justice, and the call to a heroic existence, even the belief in the earthy paradise and the realm of freedom all have some validity in them."[92]

Shils concluded his essay by arguing that the denial of the validity of these demands and beliefs, and the substantive values which underlie them can only serve to justifiably lay civil politics open to the charge "of being philistine politics in the worst sense, without feeling or sympathy, unimaginative, timorously clinging to what already exists."[93] Moreover, such a denial would have the function of transforming civility into an ideology of pure politics, that is, a system of politics concerned with no substantive values "except the acquisition and retention of power and the maintenance of public order and with absolutely no other interests."[94]

The significance of Shils' "Ideology and Civility: The Politics of the Intellectual" can not be measured in terms of the amount of serious discussion it generated concerning the decline of ideologies in the West. This is the essay failed to generate much discussion let alone any real debate concerning the merits of its claim that the age of ideological politics was gradually coming to an end in the West. Yet, with the publication of Daniel Bell's far less detailed, more schematic essay "The End of Ideology in the West," two years later, the issue of the end of ideology was to become a dominant, controversial one among both social scientists and

and educated laymen in the United States. Throughout this controversy Shils' name like Raymond Aron's was seldom associated with the end of ideology thesis. The names that figured most in the controversy were those of Daniel Bell and Seymour Martin Lipset. The curious thing about this was that one could hear very distinct echoes of Shils' (and Aron's) argument in Bell's essay.

It has been suggested that the different reactions that these two essays elicited was the product of several different factors.[95] Most mentioned are the changes in political atmosphere, the title of Shils' essay, the relatively obscure place of its publication, and its clearer, more nuanced line of argumentation. All of these seem plausible in assessing why Shils' essay did not figure in the controversy that surrounded the discussion of the end of ideology. Whatever the factors were, one thing is very certain: Bell's essay has served as the principle vehicle by which the concept of the end of ideology became known in American and European intellectual circles.

Daniel Bell's Conception of the End of Ideology

While Daniel Bell's conception of the end of ideology bears a striking similarity to Shils' one can not speak of them as being identical. The difference between the two is that where Shils saw an age in which ideological politics was beginning to come to a close, Bell in speaking of the same period in history, the mid and late 1950s, described it as one in which the end of ideological politics had become a fait

accompli. Only two years separated the publication of their respective essays, but one can question if it was solely the added two years that could prompt Bell to reach a conclusion that Shils had been so hesitant to make. The answer to this question can best be approached when we consider what Bell meant by the end of ideology as he developed that concept in his essay "The End of Ideology in the West."

Bell began this now famous essay by noting that while men of virtually every epoch have been known to complain of the chaos and fragility of their world, similar complaints made by men in the post World War II period had a somewhat different ring to them. These latest complaints had a particular poignancy and intensity. What accounted for these qualitative changes was, Bell noted, that people still remembered the catastrophic events that had taken place between 1930 and 1950. They also remembered painfully the sense of idealism and high hopes they shared so shortly before those same events had occurred. The events that Bell was referring to were the world wide economic depression and sharp class struggles of the 1930s, the growth of Fascism and racial imperialism in Germany, the Moscow Trials, the Second World War, and the systematic murder of millions in Naxi concentration camps.

The memory of these events had changed the minds of many, especially those of the radical intellectuals. Commenting on the impact of these events on this particular group Bell had this to say:

> For the radical intellectual who had articulated the revolutionary impulse of the past century and a half, all this has meant an end to chiliastic hopes, to millenarianism, to apocalyptic thinking - and to ideology. For Ideology, which once was a road to action, has come to be a dead end.[96]

To substantiate this judgement, Bell embarked on a rather lengthy and schematic discussion of the meaning of the term ideology. Both the German philosopher Ludwig Feuerbach and Karl Marx figured prominently in this discussion. This was because, for Bell, both of them, in their insistence that the dominant principle of philosophy should be to rid the present of the past, had provided ideology with its "sharpest phrasing." To demonstrate this point Bell traced their development of the concepts of alienation and false consciousness. The whole purpose of this phase of Bell's analysis was to illustrate the way in which ideology has evolved under the influence of Feuerbach's and Marx' thinking into "a way of translating ideas into action."[97]

Feuerbach, Bell argued, was instrumental in laying the philosophical groundwork for the development of ideology by demonstrating the positive functions of philosophical criticism in liberating man from religion. Feuerbach's use of philosophical criticism, Bell observed, rested on the German philosopher's efforts to demonstrate that the history of all thought was a history of progressive disenchantment. It also rested, Bell further noted, on Feuerbach's efforts to demonstrate the "true" relationship between God and man. For Feuerbach this relationship was not one in which God had created man, but rather one in which man in responding to his needs for meaning and

and certainty had created God (the notion of God) in order to satisfy those needs. For Feuerbach this meant that the function of philosophy must be to allow man to understand that the transformation of God from a parochial deity into abstraction represents nothing more than the product of Christianity, that like all religions was capable only of creating "false consciousness." By placing man, rather than God at the center of consciousness, Feuerbach had sought to assign to philosophy the function of providing man with a "true" image of his creative potentialities in history, of his "true consciousness."

Marx, Bell observed, moved beyond Feuerbach's location of true consciousness in generic Man when he introduced the notions of class truths and revolutionary truth. These were notions that were derived from Marx's view that the real world was made up of men whose perception and knowledge of truth were conditioned by their class position in society. Such truths were partial truths in Marx's view. Moreover, these class truths for Marx were masks that obscured the material interests of the classes which held them, separable and distinct from the real, revolutionary truth, whose meaning is only made known through the unfolding of History and through the class struggle. Noting that for Marx the unfolding of History meant nothing less than the rational being made known to man, Bell argued that Marx had introduced a new dynamic into the analysis of ideology that located truth in action and provided the revolutionary deed with its own ideological basis. In short, Bell argued that Marx was responsible for creating

a new ideology that would predispose men to revolutionary action as a necessary precondition for both their achievement of "true consciousness" and the world's fulfillment of the "logical" ends of History. This devotion to revolutionary action for Marx, noted Bell, was not a call for "mere" social change, but, rather "was in its own way, the resumption of all the old millenarian chiliastic ideas of the Anabaptists. It was, in its new vision, a new ideology."[98]

Following a rather pointed analysis of the deficiencies of Marx' theory of the social determination of ideas, in which he closely examined the underlying assumptions of that theory, Bell sought to clear some of the confusion that for years has surrounded the term ideology. In this regard Bell considered Mannheim's now classic distinction between the particular and the total conception of ideology to be useful. Drawing upon that distinction but adding a new twist to it, Bell outlined the meaning that he assigned to the term ideology. In defining a total ideology is "an all-inclusive system of comprehensive reality....a set of beliefs, infused with passion and seeks to transform the whole of a way of life," Bell argued that the commitment to ideology was not necessarily the result of the "reflection of interests in the shape of ideas."[99] "The yearning for a cause or the satisfaction of deep moral feelings" implicit in the commitment to ideology made ideology something more.[100] Ideology in this sense, he proclaimed "is a secular religion."[101]

This notion of ideology as a secular religion served an important function in Bell's analysis of ideology. It permitted

him to assign to the term ideology certain functions and properties that tended to support his view of ideologies, that they are a way of converting ideas into action. This notion of ideology as a secular religion provided Bell with a distinct conceptual framework, one from which he could describe the "ideologue" as a person whose attitude towards ideas are both "passionate and myopic" in that he inevitably "responds to them on the basis of their immediate relevances alone, and inevitably reduces them to tools."[102]

Passion, for Bell, was something that was closely associated with all ideologies. Passion provided ideology with its force. Moreover, passion, he declared, predisposed the ideologue to turn away from philosophical inquiry and to see truth as arising only in action. Passion also predisposed the ideologue, Bell added, to understand meaning as something which is "given to experience by the transforming moment."[103] It was against this background that Bell declared that "the most important, latent, function of ideology is to tap emotion."[104]

The principle ability of ideology to arouse emotions was its capacity to fulfill, in an age when religious faith was on the decline, the need that once had been satisfied by religion. This need was for a faith that would help men cope with the problem of death. Here Bell argued that ideology could fulfill this function because it provided for many an image of a world where death could be both challenged and, in effect, negated. After denying the existence of the hereafter, ideology, Bell declared, proclaimed that the meaning of life could only be derived from man's actions. In removing the

fear of death from man, ideology, Bell argued, served to eliminate the source of man's conscience and, in turn, the source of all moral restraint. Ideology therefore served to legitimate the use of power as an ultimate end. In serving this function ideology succeeded in investing politics, as the "ready road to domination," with a religious force. This force, he insisted, in effect, served to replace "the sect and the church with the party and the social movement."[105]

In continuing his analysis Bell noted that while nineteenth century ideologies had never entirely succeeded in replacing religion, they were nonetheless able to compete with religion for the loyalties of men. In their ability to identify inevitability with the progressive movement of history they were able to "link" their claims to universal truth on reason with "the positive values of science."[106] But there was another, more important, development which contributed to the success of the nineteenth century ideologies in competing with religion. The nineteenth century ideologies were able to derive, gather support from what Bell referred to as the "rising class of intellectuals."[107] What Bell seemed to be implying was that intellectuals were a class "which was seeking to assert a place in society," who supported ideologies as a means for securing their social ends.

After this analysis of the functions of ideology as a secular religion Bell offered a brief discussion of the differences between the intellectual and the scholar. In this discussion Bell argued that while the scholar "has a bounded field of knowledge, a tradition, and seeks to find his place

in it, adding to the accumulated, tested knowledge of the past as to a mosiac....the intellectual begins with his experience, his individual perceptions of the world, his privileges and deprivations, and judges the world by these sensibilities."[108] For Bell what this boils down to is that because the intellectual imputes such a high value to his status his judgement of the society he lives in invariably reflects the treatment it accords him.[109] Thus driven by his perception that nineteenth century business civilizations were honoring the wrong values, the intellectual rejected society. Built into this rejection of society, Bell argued, was a "built in" compulsion to become political. Driven by this compulsion, the intellectual, argued Bell, "embarked upon what William James called 'the faith ladder,' which in its vision of the future cannot distinguish possibilities from probabilities, and converts the latter into certainties."[110]

Having made the distinction between the intellectual and the scholar, Bell returned to the theme of the end of ideology. While never specifying the ideologies he was referring to Bell declared in a very conclusive tone that the nineteenth century ideologies were "now exhausted."[111] The reasons for their collapse, he noted, were both varied and complex. They included a chain of events that included the Moscow trials, the Nazi-Soviet pact, the concentration camps, and the suppression of the Hungarian workers by Russian troops.

Another source of the collapse of nineteenth century ideologies was the result of such social changes as the modification of capitalism and the rise of the Welfare State.

A still other source of this collapse was the result of changes in the direction and scope of Western philosophy such as the decline of simplistic rationalism and the emergence of "new stoic-theological images of man" as manifested in the works of Freud, Tillich, and Jaspers, and others. True, Bell conceded, communism still carried political weight in France and Italy, but its force, now came "from other sources."[112] Bell, however never identified the sources he had in mind. Rather, he continued his discussion of the exhaustion of nineteenth century ideologies by noting that "out of all this history, one simple fact emerges: for the radical intelligentsia, the old ideologies have lost their 'truth' and their power to persuade."[113]

But the failure of old ideologies to persuade the radical intelligentsia was only one index of the end of ideology. Another index was that "few serious minds could believe it was possible to blueprint through social engineering a new utopia of social harmony."[114] Still another indication of the end of ideology was that, just as men had lost their faith in the production of utopias through social engineering, few classic liberals and few serious conservatives thought state intervention to be catastrophic.[115] Bell summarized this aspect of his argument:

> In the Western world....there is today a rough consensus among intellectuals on political issues: the acceptance of a Welfare State; the desireability of decentralized power; a system of mixed economy and of political pluralism. In that sense, too, the ideological age has ended.[116]

Bell conceded that, although the old nineteenth century ideologies and intellectual debates that had once engulfed the

West were now "exhausted," the role of ideology was steadily growing in Asia and Africa. Bell in response to this point insisted that as new ideologies, the ideologies of industrialization, modernization, Pan-Arabism, color, and nationalism were very different from nineteenth century ideologies. These new ideologies were not humanistic and universalistic as had been the nineteenth century ideologies, but rather they were parochial and instrumental. The new ideologies were fashioned not by intellectuals like the nineteenth century ideologies but by politicians. Unlike the nineteenth century ideologies the driving force of the new ideologies were not social equality and freedom but rather economic development and national power. Russia and China were the models.

The development of new ideologies raised a crucial question in those newly emerging states which had embraced them, but one that was not debated in terms of the merits of communism. No, insisted Bell, "the content of that doctrine has long since been forgotten by friends and foes alike."[117] Rather the debate was over an issue that was older than the merits of communism. This debate was, in Bell's words, over "whether new societies can grow by building democratic institutions and allowing people to make choices - and sacrifices - voluntarily, or whether the new elites, heady with power, will impose totalitarian means to transform their countries."[118] For Bell the answer to this problem, especially in old colonial societies where the masses were apathetic and easily manipulated, rested with "the intellectual classes and

their conceptions of the future."[119]

In sharp contrast to the intellectuals of these newly emerging African and Asian States, the intellectuals of the West find themselves hopelessly looking for new causes. In that search, Bell argued, there emerges, especially on the part of the new generation of intellectuals, "a deep, desperate, almost pathetic anger."[120] This was the result of their not having a "meaningful memory" of the old ideological debates that had consumed the passions of an older generation of intellectuals. Moreover, Bell noted, the anger was the result of the new generation of intellectuals, lacking a secure tradition upon which to build. It now found itself "seeking new purposes within a framework of political society that has rejected, intellectually speaking, the old apocalyptic and chiliastic visions."[121]

For Bell the search for new causes from which to spark a new intellectual radicalism was at the end of the 1950s an empty, futile one. The problem that young Left Wing intellectuals face in satisfying this vain effort is that:

> the old politico-economic radicalism (pre-occupied with such matters as the socialization of industry) has lost its meaning, while the stultifying aspects of contemporary culture (e.g. television) cannot be redressed in political terms. At the same time American culture has almost completely accepted the avante-garde, particularly in art, and the older academic styles have been driven out completely.[122]

To these comments Bell added that where once the ideologue could turn to the workers to generate the force for radical social change, the Left Wing intellectuals could not do so. The workers, Bell pointed out, were, ironically, "more

satisfied with the society than the intellectuals."[123] True, continued Bell, "the workers have not achieved utopia, but their expectations were less than those of the intellectuals, and the gains correspondingly larger."[124] Thus, the "disconcerting caesura" that one finds at the end of the 1950s is nothing more than that dissatisfied, disaffiliated young intellectuals have, in the absence of ideology, nowhere else to turn. They have nothing to consume their passions. What confronts the young intellectual is the fact that "ideology, which by its nature is an all-or-nothing affair, and temperamentally the thing he wants, has become intellectually devitalized: few issues can be formulated any more, intellectually, in ideological terms."[125]

For Bell the only problem that the end of ideology presented was whether Western intellectuals could find passion outside of politics.

Bell concluded his essay on the end of ideology by adding that the end of ideology "is not - and should not be - the end of utopia as well."[126] To this Bell added that "if anything, one can begin anew the discussion of utopia only by being aware of the trap of ideology."[127] With respect to utopias, Bell argued that "there is now, more than ever, some need for utopia, in the sense that men need - as they have always needed - some vision of their potential, some manner of fusing passion with intelligence."[128] But such a utopia could no longer be grounded in the directions that had once so passionately guided men in their pursuit of utopia. In Bell's words "the ladder to the City of Heaven can no longer be a faith ladder, but an empirical one: a utopia has to specify

where one wants to go, how to get there, the costs of the enterprise, and some realization of, and justification for the determination of who is to pay."[129] In this respect Bell's conception was opposed to Mannheim's that emphasized that a utopia that specified its costs and limited its means was not a utopia. It was an acceptance of the status quo.

What the end of ideology means, then, Bell added, was that the West was closing "the book, intellectually speaking, on an era, the one of easy "left" formulae for social change."[130]

Four years would pass before Bell would have anything further to say about the end of ideology. Fashioning his comments in response to Henry David Aiken's criticism of his essay, Bell would say of the end of ideology that it meant the rejection of a commitment to ideology that, infused with passion, would seek to "transform the whole of a way of life."[131] Such a rejection, Bell would add, was the rejection of the commitment to the "total ideology," to the commitment which "is not necessarily the reflection of interests in the shape of ideas, but rather nothing more than "the yearning for a cause or the satisfaction of deep moral feelings."[132]

Though Bell's response to Aiken was not the statement upon which his reputation as the main American advocate of the end of ideology thesis rested, it represents an important statement which in further elaborating the meaning of the end of ideology thesis demonstrates the convergence of Bell's thinking with Lipset's. The view that "democracy is the good society in operation," and that ideological class struggles have ceased in the West are views expressed in Lipset's declaration that

the political apathy of intellectuals and young people in the late 1950s was reflective of "the fact the fundamental political problems of the industrial revolution have been solved." These views were echoed by Bell to confirm the end of ideology thesis.[133]

These views were expressed by Bell when, in commenting about the absorbtion of supposedly radical intellectuals like Leslie Fiedler, Harold Rosenberg, Norman Mailer, and Paul Goodman into the mainstream of American culture, he stated: "today our entire society is committed to change, and in a direction which was first pointed out by the Left."[134] Even more pointedly these views were echoed by Bell when, in commenting further about the paucity of clear cut genuine ideological debate and the meaninglessness of old political labels in American society, he declared that:

> the realization that escapes no one is that the equalitarian and socially mobile society which the "free-floating intellectuals" associated with Marxist tradition have been calling for during the last hundred years has finally emerged in the form of our cumbersome, bureaucratic mass society, and has in turn engulfed the heretics.[135]

This is an important statement not only because it represents an affirmation of Lipset's views, but because it also underscores the normative and prescriptive nature of Bell's thinking on the end of ideology and its meaning with respect to emerging social and political realities. Since the end of ideology means that the "good society" has finally emerged in the form of the modern Welfare State, then such a realization imposes a new set of requirements, a new standard of political conduct, upon those who once embraced Marxism as

the means through which the "good society" could be achieved. This realization requires the abandonment of Marxism and its political strategies in favor of newer intellectual and political approaches, approaches that were better suited to the exigencies of the Welfare State. The adoption of such approaches, Bell argued, embodies a process of "disengagement." Yet such a process for the "heretics" has not been nor is it generally one of seeking "responsible social thought and self-scrutiny."[136] Nor has this process been, Bell continued, "an attempt to find out what kind of institutional structures in a large scale society will best accommodate the old visions of community and individual freedom and self-determination."[137] Rather, argued Bell, this has been a process where "one simply labels oneself a radical, calls for (but rarely produces) utopian thought, and argues that the great need is to be critical."[138] "Such disengagement," concluded Bell, "is quite simply, an escape from intellectual responsibility."[139]

For Bell this escape from responsibility was aided by critics of the end of ideology thesis who, like Aiken, had failed to distinguish the past from the present. Having failed to make this distinction the critics in turn failed to realize the real nature of the debate over the end of ideology. For Bell the "end of ideology debate" was not one that really involved a conflict of intellectual positions, but rather one that involved a "conflict of contrasting temperaments."[140]

Whether or not this was the case can only be established after reviewing some of the criticisms that were directed at Bell and other proponents of the end of ideology thesis.

But what is clear is the background against which Bell made this assertion. Bell, in making this assertion, was responding to Aiken's position that the outright effect of the end of ideology thesis "is to reinforce acceptance of our institutional status quo, and to declass those intellectuals who seek to modify in any radical way the fundamental structures of Western political life."[141]

Bell's response to Aiken's criticism, of which his assertion on the nature of the "end of ideology debate" was only one part, is well worth citing in its totality. Critical of Aiken's for his "lack of specificity" Bell had this to say:

> I don't know what Mr. Aiken regards as the 'fundamental structures of Western political life.' To my mind, the fundamental structure is the democratic process, and this I do not want to change. To speak further for myself, since the question of political identification is at issue, I am a democratic socialist, and have been for almost all of my politically conscious years. As such, I wish to see a change in the fundamental structures of our economic life. I deplore the social and economic power of the corporation. I detest the cult of efficiency which sacrifices the worker to the norms of productivity. I favor national planning in the economy. I want to see more public enterprise. And I want to introduce other criteria than those of the market or the private profit motive as means of allocating resources in the society. I have guiding general principles, rooted in conceptions about the nature of work and community which shape these views. But I also have a test which guides the introduction of these changes; and I think the differences between Mr. Aiken and me on this question are the nub of the issue.[142]

Two aspects of Bell's response are significant. First, except for a brief response to Dennis Wrong a few years earlier, the debate between Aiken and Bell would serve as the only public response that Bell would make to the critics of the end of his ideology thesis. Second, Bell's response provides

us with a criterion to characterize his differences with the critics of the end of ideology thesis. It is one that involves a "conflict of contrasting temperaments." If this criterion is accepted, it involves a resume of his political philosophy and affinities.

But, whether or not Bell's identification of himself as a democratic socialist can serve as an adequate basis upon which the issues embodied in the "end of ideology debate" can be reduced to a conflict of temperaments is something that we shall have to consider in greater detail.

Tentatively, the solution to this problem would seem to rest on an understanding of the substantive and theoretical issues involved in the end of ideology debate as well as on an understanding of where the proponents of the end of ideology thesis stand on those issues.

Criticisms of the End of Ideology Thesis

Generally, critics of the end of ideology thesis have tended to view it as an argument that serves to rationalize the status quo, i.e. the prevailing socio-economic and political pattern of post war Western industrial society. In developing this point of view some critics have argued that the thesis is, itself, an ideology, one that makes a fetish of empiricism in order to justify its own ideologically derived image of the world. This image is one of American society as a Welfare State, as a society that has successfully solved the larger class oriented problems that once legitimately stirred the Left. It is an image of a society that has institutionalized

a set of mechanisms through which solutions to racial discrimination, poverty, or unemployment can be administratively secured.

Commenting on the relationship between their past and more recent work, one critic has argued that the end of ideology thesis stands as a point of departure upon which Bell and Lipset in their more recent writings have sought to develop a revised liberal-pluralist theory of interest group politics in order to legitimate the institutionalization of a kind of statist liberalism, one that since the 1930s has evolved into an active interventionist state capitalism.[143]

Characteristically, what underlay much of the criticism of the end of ideology thesis was a concern over the political and cultural implications of the developments that Bell and Lipset had looked so favorably upon, namely, the decline of ideological politics in the United States, and the institutionalization of technical-administrative orientations to the political process.

A survey of the literature shows that by the time that Henry David Aiken had advanced his argument that the effect of the end of ideology thesis was one of reinforcing a New Deal Welfare state status quo that argument had already become the standard thesis of a small core of American and British commentators.

The origins of this argument can be traced back to an essay written by Dennis Wrong entitled, "The Perils of Political Moderation: Our Self-Defeating Party System." This essay first appeared in the January, 1959 issue of Commentary.[144]

Noting that the fear of totalitarianism had introduced a new consideration into the debate between the defenders of the American two-party system and the proponents of the European party system, Wrong sharply objected to the way in which certain defenders of the American two-party system had seized upon this fear to rationalize the politics of moderation into a fixed ideological position. In the main, as Dittberner has noted, what Wrong objected to was the way in which they were, in effect, "raising a mindless moderation based on loose party coalitions into a political principle."[145] For Wrong this was the result of an over-reaction to the political dictum that "the end justifies the means," a dictum that supposedly epitomizes the totalitarian mentality. Wrong argued that "the exponents of moderatism ignore ends altogether in their preoccupation with the use of power, i.e. legal and constitutional means."[146] The result, added Wrong, was the legitimation of "a political formalism which celebrates the institutional process through which decisions are reached while ignoring the content of the decisions."[147]

For Wrong moderation of this kind was hardening into a new conservative ideology. Wrong argued that "the compulsive bi-partisanship of the 50s owes less to the alleged need, so frequently invoked by neo-conservatives, to compromise the demands of rival blocs and interest groups in American society than to the spread of the ideology of moderatism itself in a period of prosperity and international crisis."[148] Such an ideology, stressed Wrong, is one that serves to rationalize "a retreat from politics under the guise of offering a new philosophy of politics."[149]

Though less predominant, the association of the politics of moderation with the end of ideology would remain a persistent theme for Wrong.[150] But no one pursued this theme with greater vigor and force than C. Wright Mills. Mills' critique of the end of ideology thesis was simple, concrete, and polemical.

In his "Letter to the New Left," Mills argued that the end of ideology thesis had a very limited relevance to the modern world.[151] Claiming that the origins of this thesis could be located in a disillusionment of its proponents with any real commitment to socialism that resulted from their own personal and political frustrations, Mills went on to assert that "if the phrase the end of ideology has any meaning at all, it pertains to self-selected circles of intellectuals in the richer countries."[152] To this, Mills added that the end of ideology serves as a "slogan of complacency, circulating among the permaturely middle aged, (and) centered in the present...."[153] But more than anything else, Mills asserted, the end of ideology is itself an ideology, an ideology of "the ending of political reflection itself as a public fact."[154] Expanding on this point, Mills concluded that the end of ideology is "an ideology of complacency which seems the only way now open for many writers to acquiesce in or to justify the status quo."[155]

In comprehending the nature of Mills' biting criticism, we need to understand that he was not just reacting to the notion that the West was experiencing an end to ideological politics. Like Wrong, Mills was reacting much more to the positive interpretation given to this development by the

proponents of the end of ideology thesis. But Mills and Wrong were not alone.

The political scientist, Andrew Hacker, for instance, in an otherwise favorable review of Lipset's book Political Man argued that "liberals such as Lipset are proud of the progress which has been made in the Western world, but it is curious that they never acknowledge the fact that we have gotten as far as we have precisely because of the ideologies which stirred men to action."[156] To this, he added, that "if the end of ideology is, in fact, the case, then we have the best explanation of why we in the West are standing still."[157]

Underlying Hacker's criticism and for that matter most of the criticism which focused on Bell and Lipset's positive interpretation of the end of ideology was a deeply rooted concern over the consequences that would result from the uncritical acceptance of the end of ideology thesis. This concern was largely generated by the view that the uncritical reader would not realize that when Bell and Lipset spoke of the end of ideology what they meant was "the end of utopian thought."[158] Such a misunderstanding, reasoned their critics would be the result of Bell and Lipset's inconsistent use of the terms ideology and ideological politics.

In developing this point, Rousseas and Farganis in their essay, "American Politics and the End of Ideology" fell back upon the distinction that Mannheim made between ideology as ideas and thought patterns of the interest bound ruling classes which serve to justify and rationalize the status quo, and utopias as the intellectual stimulus provided by the oppressed

groups who, in challenging the established order, seek to transform it into their own image of the good society.[159] It was in terms of this distinction that they argued that when Bell and Lipset spoke of the end of ideology what they meant was the end of utopian thought for they were both "clearly referring to the decline of socialist or Marxian ideas within the context of an affluent Western Society."[160] For Rousseas and Farganis the significance of this was that when this interpretation of the decline of Marxian ideas was pushed further by Lipset through his declaration that democracy "is the good society in operation" the distinction between the empirical and the normative, the political and the ethical became "obliterated." For them the obliteration of this distinction meant that the "traditional role of the intellectual as social critic is no longer logically possible." "For if what ought to be," they explained, "already is, then the intellectual has no other function than to describe and to celebrate the arrival of utopia."[162]

By invalidating this role of the intellectual in this way the proponents of the end of ideology thesis, Rousseas and Farganis. argued, served to distort the meaning of much of the intellectual discontent with the established order of things was reflected in literature and in films throughout the post war period. True Bell and Lipset recognized the alienation underlying this discontent; but, by failing to understand that this discontent was political, the proponents of the end of ideology thesis, argued Rousseas and Farganis, had distorted

its meaning not only as a cultural but as a political phenomena. That Bell and Lipset could fail to grasp the political nature of such growing discontent with American society was for these critics a function of their definition of politics as being narrowly concerned with only voting behavior or with welfare measures. To this, Rousseas and Farganis added that "if the traditional idea of political philosophy is maintained, there is yet some small contribution that intellectuals can make, which will be something other than a justification, tacit or overt, for whatever is."[163]

Such a contribution, they argued, can only be predicated on an awareness of the functions that the end of ideology thesis has in promoting an image of Western industrial society that serves to transform modern democracy into a system of technique "sans telos," and to reduce democratic politics to a "constellation of self-seeking pressure groups peacefully engaged in a power struggle to determine the allocation of privilege and particular advantage."[164] Within this context Rousseas and Farganis identified two functions that advanced by the end of ideology thesis. The first was that it served to legitimate the view that there was no room for ideological politics since compromise and evolution represent the only possible means, given the agreed upon rules of the game that characterize the modern democratic political system, for achieving "the few second order goals which continue to remain in an otherwise near perfect society."[165] In serving this function the end of ideology thesis also served to further rationalize the currently acceptable role of the modern

politician as the "man who understands how to manipulate and how to operate in a Machiavellian world which divorces ethics from politics."[166] This was its second function, one which like the first served, in their words, to "defend the status quo in the name of democracy" while failing to recognize what Max Weber was able to come to terms with when he wrote that "certainly all historical experience confirms the truth - that man would not have attained the possible unless time and again he had reached out for the impossible."[167]

Rousseas and Farganis also argued that if the intellectual was to make a meaningful contribution as a social critic he must not accept the choice outlined by the proponents of the end of ideology thesis as absolute, that is, the choice between "the wild-eyed fanatic and the cool, uncommitted pragmatist who is willing to take his progress piecemeal, if at all."[168] He need not, they argued equate ideology with chiliastic fanaticism. Rather, he must recognize that ideology still has a valid role, one of fusing passion with critical reason in response to the problems of the modern world. As such, the intellectual, they reasoned must recognize in ideology that which distinguishes progress from mere change, namely, that progress can be "defined meaningfully only in terms of some vision."[169] It was within this framework that they argued that it is irrelevant whether one agrees with the vision of a particular ideology or note, the important thing is that one must recognize that intellectual freedom "and a social committment which transcends the status quo, are interrelated and interdependent."[170]

In a very critical sense the argument that Rousseas and Farganis developed represents a clear extension of Mannheim's thesis that the disappearance of utopia would bring about "a static state of affairs in which man becomes no more than a thing."[171] This of course was not a thesis that Bell and Lipset were unaware of since Bell, especially, went to great lengths to stress that the end of ideology did not mean the abandonment of utopia. What is very clear is that the proponents of the end of ideology thesis had a very different conception of the nature of utopian thought than Rousseas and Farganis had in their interpretation of Mannheim. The notion of utopias that specify their "costs" represents a very rational image of what, if we follow Mannheim's thinking, never is a completely rational mode of thought. Indeed, it is very understandable why, given the atrocities perpetrated in the name of the Nazi and Soviet "utopias" Bell would be apprehensive about utopias that did not specify their "costs." But to insist that future utopias should only be "empirical" imposes a somewhat arbitrary set of boundaries on a phenomenon that, historically at least, has always defied conventional rules. This insistence would seem to reflect the articulation of boundaries that, as William Delaney briefly noted, were firmly embodied in the values of managerialism, namely, a preference for utilizing administrative rather than political means to secure solutions to fundamentally political problems.[172]

Closely related to this criticism was the criticism made by C. Wright Mills that, in the name of truth and science, the proponents of the end of ideology made a "fetish of empiricism"

in order to rationalize their own ideologically derived image of the world. Criticizing Bell, Lipset et al. for failing to examine their own ideological assumptions Mills in his "Letter to the New Left" referred to the end of ideology as "an intellectual celebration of apathy" which in its selective reconstruction of the world collapses "reasoning into reasonableness."[173]

The broad outlines of this less than systematic, but nonetheless important criticism was developed by Mills when, in noting that the end of ideology thesis embodied a highly stylized form of thought he argued that it is a "journalistic fashion," one in which "the facts are duly weighed, carefully balanced, (and) always hedged."[174] For Mills, the employment of this technique had one common result, namely, that the power of facts to "outrage, their power to truly enlighten in a political way, their power to aid decision, even their power to clarify some situation" all became blunted or destroyed.[175] Underlying this argument was Mills' belief that, while some of the proponents of the end of ideology thesis were able to acknowledge facts and arguments that suggested that the Western democracies have resolved their major political problems, they failed to put them together in a way that would relate them to the changing institutions of Western society. The failure of the proponents of the end of ideology thesis to do this Mills stated "makes it impossible to understand the structural realities which these facts might reveal; the longer run trends of which they might be tokens."[176] The end result of all this, argued Mills, was that "the real questions are not even raised,

and the analysis of the meaning of facts not even begun."[177]

The crux of Mills argument was that having made a "fetish of empiricism" the proponents of the end of ideology have served to artificially delimit and devitalize the functions of sociological analysis. In essence, what Mills was accusing them of was their failure to recognize the nature and limits of scientific knowledge, that is, the fact that "facts" are themselves the product of viewing "reality" through theoretical preconceptions that are grounded in perception of the problematic and of what is significant. Such perceptions, are of course never value-free. But whether or not this failing on the part of the proponents of the end of ideology thesis provides an adequate basis for concluding, as Rousseas and Farganis had done in their interpretation of Mills' critique, that the end of ideologists in their "preoccupation" with "pure facts" were indulging in "an ideological positivism which amounts to nothing more than an unthinking apologia for whatever is," is a point that requires closer examination.

Such an examination must be prepared to deal with the end of ideology thesis in terms of the interplay of a specific set of overlapping theoretical and substantive considerations. With regard to the former such an examination must be prepared to determine the connection between the kind of empiricism specified by Bell and Lipset and the pragmatism of John Dewey. The necessity of establishing this connection is suggested by Bell's acknowledgement of Dewey as one his principle intellectual "masters."[178] It is also suggested by Bell's acknowledgement of the influence of Dewey's student and leading interpretator,

Sidney Hook on his intellectual development; Hook was the man to whom Bell dedicated the book The End of Ideology.[179] Such an examination must also be prepared to consider the consequences that the application of a purely empirical approach to the analysis of international and domestic problems can generate.

As Rousseas anf Farganis noted, this was not an issue that escaped serious attention. To this extent they noted that Hans Morgenthau had addressed himself to this issue when, in his essay "The Perils of Political Empiricism" he argued that anti-utopian empiricists who pride themselves on having "no illusions about the facts as they are nor any grand design for changing them" have provided an approach to foreign policy that serves to fragment American foreign policy and ultimately, to devitalize modern liberalism as a political philosophy.[180] Here we must understand that for Morgenthau this empiricist approach is one which reduces foreign polity into a series of unrelated operations that are not always consistent with each other. It serves to remove the formulation of foreign policy from the realities of the situation that the facts, of their own accord, are supposed to make clear. Such an approach, argued Morgenthau, is one that surrenders piecemeal to the facts of foreign policy. In doing so this approach operates as though "there were nothing else to foreign policy that, according to Morgenthau, in its efforts to escape the Scylla of utopianism and isolationism has come dangerously close to being swallowed by the Charybdis of empiricism."[182] Laboring under the misconception that to be pragmatic and empirical when

faced with a political problem is to be by definition rational, advocates of the purely empirical approach to foreign policy fail to realize, Morgenthau continued, that such an approach is one that can only result in the continued substantive disintegration of foreign policy.[183] For Morgenthau the choice between a social philosophy that is founded on experience and one based on the "unconditional surrender to the facts as they are" need not lead to a foreign policy that refuses to "take account of the concrete facts to the political situation."[184] There must, warned Morgenthau, always be a balance between facts and man's vision for a better world. Without respect for facts foreign policy can only become lame. Without the will to impose upon history a grand design around which foreign policy can be consciously pursued, foreign policy will become blind.[185]

In speaking of domestic politics, Andrew Hacker also spoke out against the validity of a purely empirical approach to the problems of modern society. Hacker did this when in his review of the Political Man he took issue with Lipset's conclusion that the decline in appeal of ideologies throughout the Western world reflects the growing maturity of Western intellectuals to live with the political and economic facts of life. Questioning whether the decline of ideologies in the West is as salutary as Lipset had believed it to be, Hacker argued that Lipset, in his desire to replace left-wing myths with facts, fails to recognize that empiricism because it "forces one to concentrate on things as they are or as they have been," can never offer an adequate approach to the eval-

uation of reality transcending ideas. Facts, by definition can only be "culled" from the attitudes and behavior of men and societies current or past while, "a description of how things might be were we to embark on changing the social order is bound to be speculative, not factual."[186] As such, argued Hacker "the visions of the ideologues" should be evaluated not on empirical but rather on strategic grounds, i.e., on the basis of what demands are required if some meaningful change is to be made, given the history of all political struggles.[187]

The claim that the proponents of the end of ideology thesis made a fetish of empiricism in order to justify their own ideologically derived image of the world requires closer examination. Such an examination, as noted earlier, must aim to develop an understanding of where the proponents of the end of ideology stood on these issues raised by their critics. Specifically, such an examination must seek to determine where they stood on such key issues as the place of utopian or radical politics, the function and limits of empiricism and science in politics and the alienation of the intellectual and its roots. Similarly, the examination of the merits of this charge of empiricism must first, determine the grounds upon which the end of ideology thesis can be understood as establishing a conceptual framework through which the then and still existent preeminance of the New Deal pluralism and liberal statism in the American political system can be justified and maintained. It must then determine whether Bell's framework has its foundations in Dewey's pragmatic approach to social problems and policy-making or in Bell's interpretation of that approach.

Such an analysis may enable us to determine if Bell's image of the post-industrial society is based, as Benjamin S. Kleinberg has argued, on an ideologically derived construction of the world - one which is grounded in the image of American society projected in the end of ideology thesis. To make this determination we must first understand the groundwork out of which Bell's approach to the end of ideology emerged.[188] This means that we must seek to get a sense of the underlying values that conditioned his approach.

Such a project is one that must start with an examination of Bell's earlier work as the summary of a variety of intersecting and converging factors. These factors may allow us to understand the development of that work within the intellectual and historical context from which it emerged. An understanding of them may allow us to gain some measure of the kinds of values and assumptions that framed Bell's efforts to develop a theory of the post-industrial society. The nature of Bell's ideas and intellectual concerns as a member of a once radical generation of intellectuals, his involvement in the Congress of Cultural Freedom, his affinity for Deweyian pragmaticism, his long standing interest in the subject of alienation, particularly the alienation of the Jewish intellectual, these are the factors to which we refer.

The necessity of adopting this approach is dictated by the fact that Bell's essay "The End of Ideology in the West: An Epilogue" is just that, an epilogue. The views and formulations expressed in that essay must therefore be examined and ultimately understood in relation to what that essay was an

epilogue to. More than just an epilogue to fifteen, often diverse, sometimes highly schematic essays it served as an epilogue to the political struggles and moral conflicts that expressed the mood of Bell's generation of intellectuals. Bell, in a highly autobiographical essay, "The Mood of Three Generations," characterized that generation as "twice born." This was a generation of intellectuals that once having revelled in the political struggles of the 1930s was to find in the 1950s, to quote Bell, "its wisdom in pessimism, evil, tragedy, and despair."[189]

"A deep-seated sense of malaise, a feeling that times are profoundly out of joint, a realization that mass industrial society for all its material achievements is not a utopia," nor can it ever be, these things combined with the belief that "somehow man has lost his moral bearings" are, as James P. Young observed, all characteristics of that mood.[190] Infusing much of the social and political thought of the 1950s with its sense of pessimism concerning the basic nature of man and the limits of democracy in providing solutions to deep-seated moral and social problems it is an intellectual mood which did more than just shape Bell's positive interpretation of the end of ideology. More than anything else, it helped to shape his views on the alienation of the modern intellectual and the problems of mass society in almost exclusively cultural terms. In part, it also served to underlay his reaction to the social unrest and tensions of the 1960s. As will be shown later in this study, this intellectual mood also underlay Bell's efforts to develop a theory of the post-industrial society based upon

the social and political problems confronting American society.

The end of ideology essay represents only one stage in an intellectual development that has meaning only in relation to the experiences within which it was grounded, that is, the experiences of Bell as a member of the "twice-born" generation. It must also be understood in relation to the debates and converging theories that, along with those experiences, ultimately served to determine arguments and guide the directions that Bell would take in his more recent writings. In short, "The End of Ideology in the West: An Epilogue" is an epilogue to the events, experiences, and perceptions that shaped Bell's life up until its writing. His essay indicated the end of both a personal and intellectual era, but it contained both the seeds and the problems for his later work.

NOTES

1. There is in Hegel as there is in the Historical School in general the presumption that the world is a unity that is conceivable only with reference to the knowing subject. In affirming the governing principle of the idealist faith, the notion that matter is organized by mind, Hegel held that Reason is at once general and particular. It was, he argued, a concrete universal that differentiates itself into particular thinking minds.

2. Common to both Hegel and Marx's dialectical view of history is this notion that once the objective purpose of history is realized history as man has known it will come to an end. The common assumption was that history was a succession of events that underscored the failure of man to comprehend its ultimate purposes.

3. This is Hegel's cunning of Reason thesis. Historically its significance is that it has been used to justify the totalitarian state. Behind this thesis is the notion that a concrete manifestation of Absolute Mind was provided through the national state. In the 1930s this philosophy was used to support the Nazi state and invest it with legitimacy.

4. George Lichtheim, The Concept of Ideology and Other Essays (New York: Vintage Books, 1967) p. 15.

5. Especially important in this regard is Marx's critique of Adam Smith. Marx's argument against Smith was that in defining all wealth in terms of industrial wealth (and thus failing to distinguish labor from industry) Smith provided capitalism with an ideology that constituted the political-economic basis for man to be conceived of as private property, that is, as a commodity or as a thing. In Capital Marx extended this argument into a thorough going critique of commodity fetishism. For Marx's argument see Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, p. 45. Also important in explicating this point is Lukacs' History and Class Consciousness. In extending Marx's argument and developing his theory of reification around it Lukacs argued that the objective dimension of reification is the emergence of a society conditioned by a commodity structure where the laws governing the movement and the relation of objects "confront men as invisible forces that generate their own power." Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness, p. 87.

6. Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, p. 97.

7. Ibid., p. 192.

8. Ibid., p. 193.

9. Ibid.

10. Ibid.

11. Ibid., p. 194.

12. Ibid.

13. Ibid., p. 211.

14. Ibid., p. 212.

15. Ibid.

16. In an attempt to establish a set of ideal types of utopian mentalities Mannheim analyzed four types and stages of utopian mentality: the orgiastic chiliasm of the Anabaptists, the liberal-humanitarian idea, the conservative idea, and the socialist-communist utopia. The clear line of continuity between each of them Mannheim argued was the refusal of each to accept the present.

17. Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, p. 196.

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid., p. 197.

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid., p. 203.

22. Ibid.

23. Ibid.

24. Ibid., p. 204.

25. Ibid.

26. Ibid., p. 262.

27. Ibid., p. 262-3.

28. Ibid., p. 263.

29. Raymond Aron, The Opium of the Intellectuals (New York: Doubleday, 1957) p. i.

30. For an interesting discussion of Aron's place in French intellectual life and his debates with Sartre and Camus as well as other intellectuals associated with the Left see Job Leonard Dittberner, "The End of Ideology and American Social Thought, 1930-1960" (Ph.D. dissertation, Colombia U. 1974).

31. Aron, The Opium of the Intellectuals, p. lx

32. Ibid.

33. See especially chapter nine "The Intellectuals in Search of a Religion;" p. 265-94.

34. Aron, The Opium of the Intellectuals, p. 307.

35. Ibid., p. 308-9.

36. Ibid., p. 309.

37. Ibid., p. 312.

38. Ibid., p. 310.

39. Ibid., p. 311.

40. Ibid., p. 314.

41. Ibid., p. 323.

42. Ibid., p. 305.

43. Ibid., p. 318.

44. Ibid., p. 324.

45. Shils' essay originally appeared in Encounter, November 1955. It was later included in Chaim X. Waxman ed., The End of Ideology Debate (New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1968).

46. Shils "The End of Ideology?" in Waxman, The End of Ideology Debate, p. 52.

47. Ibid., p. 60.

48. Ibid.

49. Ibid.

50. The Milan Congress for Cultural Freedom meeting took place over a seven day period, that is from September 12th to the 17th. It involved approximately one hundred and fifty writers, journalists, politicans, and university professors. There are two standard works on the Congress for Cultural Freedom, one of which is Shils' account of the Milan meeting, the other is Christopher Lasch's The Agony of the American Left (New York: Knopf, 1969). The problem is that each in their own fashion offer a highly politicized version of the events that took place at Milan. In Shils' article there is the clear suggestion that the Congress spoke for the majority of intellectuals in the West. There is scarcely any evidence in support of this notion. Neglected in Shils' account is any mention of the Wroclaw Peace Conference

1948 and the Paris Peace Conference of 1949. In each of these conferences there were a number of intellectuals who voiced opposition to the anti-communist stance of the Congress for Cultural Freedom, an organization whose history can be traced back to 1939 when Sidney Hook and John Dewey had organized the Committee for Cultural Freedom, an organization that had been dormant during most of the 1940s. We shall have more to say about the Congress for Cultural Freedom later in this study.

51. Aron, The Opium of the Intellectuals, p. 60.

52. Ibid.

53. Ibid., p. 61.

54. Ibid.

55. Edward Shils "Ideology and Civility: On the Politics of the Intellectual," Sewanee Review, Summer 1958, p. 450.

56. Ibid.

57. Ibid.

58. Ibid.

59. Ibid.

60. Ibid., p. 452.

61. Ibid., p. 453.

62. Ibid.

63. Ibid.

64. Ibid., p. 454.

65. Ibid.

66. Ibid.

67. Ibid.

68. Ibid.

69. Ibid.

70. Ibid., p. 455.

71. Ibid., p. 456.

72. Ibid.

73. Ibid.

74. Ibid., p. 458.

75. Ibid.

76. Ibid., p. 459.

77. Ibid.

78. Ibid., p. 458.

79. Ibid.

80. Ibid., p. 460.

81. Ibid., p. 462.

82. Ibid., p. 462-3.

83. Ibid., p. 463.

84. Ibid., p. 462.

85. Ibid., p. 469.

86. Ibid.

87. Ibid.

88. Ibid.

89. Ibid., p. 470.

90. Ibid., p. 472.

91. Ibid., p. 473.

92. Ibid., p. 477.

93. Ibid.

94. Ibid., p. 478.

95. See Dittberner, "The End of Ideology," p. 195-200.

96. Daniel Bell, "The End of Ideology in The West: An Epilogue" in The End of Ideology 2nd. ed., (New York: Free Press, 1962) p. 393.

97. Ibid.

98. Ibid., p. 394.

99. Ibid., p. 400.

100. Ibid.

101. Ibid.

102. Ibid.

103. Ibid.

104. Ibid.

105. Ibid., p. 401.

106. Ibid.

107. Ibid.

108. Ibid., p. 402.

109. Ibid.

110. Ibid.

111. Ibid.

112. Ibid.

113. Ibid.

114. Ibid.

115. Ibid.

116. Ibid., p. 402-3.

117. Ibid., p. 403.

118. Ibid.

119. Ibid.

120. Ibid., p. 404.

121. Ibid.

122. Ibid.

123. Ibid.

124. Ibid.

125. Ibid.

126. Ibid., p. 405.

127. Ibid.

128. Ibid.

129. Ibid.

130. Ibid.

131. Daniel Bell and Henry David Aiken, "Ideology - a Debate" in The End of Ideology Debate, p. 261.

132. Ibid.

133. Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man (New York: Anchor Books, 1963, 1960) p. 442.

134. Bell and Aiken, "Ideology - a Debate" in The End of Ideology Debate, p. 268.

135. Ibid.

136. Ibid.

137. Ibid.

138. Ibid.

139. Ibid.

140. Ibid., p. 267.

141. Ibid., p. 265.

142. Ibid.

143. This is essentially the thesis developed by Benjamin S. Kleinberg in American Society in the Postindustrial Age (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merill, 1973). See especially p. 25-42.

144. Dennis Wrong, "The Perils of Political Moderation: Our Self-Defeating Party System," Commentary (January 1959) p. 1-8.

145. Dittberner, "The End of Ideology," p. 201.

146. Wrong, "The Perils of Political Moderation," p. 6.

147. Ibid., p. 8.

148. Ibid.

149. Ibid.

150. Wrong continued to elaborate on this point in "Reflections on the End of Ideology," Dissent, November 1960.

151. Mills "Letter to the New Left" originally appeared in New Left Review, (November 1960). It was included in The End of Ideology Debate, ed., Waxman.

152. Mills, "Letter to the New Left" in The End of Ideology Debate, ed., Waxman, p. 128.

153. Ibid.

154. Ibid., p. 129.

155. Ibid., p. 131.

156. Andrew Hacker, review of Political Man, by Seymour Martin Lipset, in Commentary, June 1961, p. 550.

157. Ibid.

158. Stephen W. Rousseas and James Farganis, "American Politics and the End of Ideology" in The End of Ideology Debate, ed., Chaim I. Waxman, p. 212.

159. Ibid.

160. Ibid.

161. Ibid., p. 213.

162. Ibid.

163. Ibid.

164. Ibid., p. 210.

165. Ibid., p. 211.

166. Ibid., p. 210.

167. Ibid., p. 211-12.

168. Ibid., p. 216.

169. Ibid.

170. Ibid.

171. Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, p. 262-3.

172. William Delaney, "The Role of Ideology: A Summation" in The End of Ideology Debate, ed., Chiam I. Waxman, p. 312-3.

173. Mills, "Letter to the New Left" in The End of Ideology Debate, ed., Waxman, p. 127.

174. Ibid.

175. Ibid.

176. Ibid.

177. Ibid.

178. In the beginning of The End of Ideology Bell acknowledges his intellectual debt to both Karl Marx and John Dewey. Of all Bell's critics the only one who discussed the link between Bell and Dewey was Henry David Aiken in his debate with Bell. In his rather brief discussion Aiken argued that while Dewey's doctrine of the continuum of means and ends provides a significant contribution to moral philosophy Bell makes no real use of it in his work. He only makes the claim that he does. Aiken also argued that not only did Bell and "his 'socialist'friends" fail to use Dewey's doctrine they fashioned in their distorted view of Dewey's work an "ideal, sentimental socialism, untouched by the slightest hesitation about what socialist aspirations can mean in a historical context in which no determinate program exists for realizing it." Bell and Aiken "Ideology - A Debate" in The End of Ideology, ed., Waxman, p. 275. Aiken also goes on to attack the notion advanced by Bell that "values like any empirical proposition, can be tested on the basis of their claims." He concludes that this notion "is one of the weirdest attempts at redaction of the Dewey-Hook theory regarding the empirical, or even scientific verifiability of value judgements that I have yet seen." The connection between Dewey and Bell is a subject that we shall have a great deal more to say about later in this study.

179. In his acknowledgement of Hook's influence Bell credits Hook with being "one of the great teachers of the generation;" a man who taught him "the appreciation of ideas." Bell, The End of Ideology, p. 409.

180. Rousseas and Farganis, "American Politics," p. 218.

181. Hans Morgenthau, "The Perils of Political Empiricism," Commentary, July 1962, p. 60.

182. Ibid., p. 63.

183. We have learned, argued Morgenthau, "the lesson that a great nation annot escape the risks and liabilities of foreign policy by an act of will, by choosing either to retreat from foreign policy or to soar above it. Yet we are now in the process of going to the other extreme of surrendering piecemeal to the facts of foreign policy, of allowing ourselves to be sucked in by them, of thinking and acting as though there were nothing else to foreign policy but this particular set of empirical facts concering, say, Laos or Cuba." Morgenthau, "The Perils of Political Empiricism," p. 60.

184. Ibid., p. 61

185. Ibid., p. 63.

186. Hacker, review of Political Man, p. 550.

187. Ibid.

188. Kleinberg, American Society in the Postindustrial Age, p. 22.

189. Daniel Bell, "The Mood of Three Generations" in The End of Ideology, p. 300.

190. Young, The Politics of Affluence, p. 29.

CHAPTER III

TOWARDS THE DEVELOPMENT OF A WORLDVIEW

The "Twice Born" Generation

Webster's New World Dictionary of the American Language defines the word epilogue as a "short speech or poem spoken to the audience by one of the actors at the end of a play."[1]

The image of Daniel Bell as an actor so speaking to his audience is an appropriate one. Appropriate, because it is as an actor in an historical drama that he spoke of the end of ideology. The drama is of the radical as the prodigal son. It unfolds over nearly a decade and a half.

Whatever else "The End of Ideology in The West: An Epilogue" was, it was an epilogue to a drama that Bell participated in and studied with keen but by no means detached interest. For many who had participated in the radical movement of the 1930s the drama had a profound and lasting effect on their lives. In Bell's words, their participation involved "the loss of innocence" by a generation of intellectuals and radicals who would come to bear "as on invisible frontlets, the stamp of those years on their foreheads."[2] This generation, the "twice born," would soon come to find its "wisdom in pessimism, evil, tragedy, and despair."[3]

The Depression, the rise of Hitler, the violent suppression of socialism in Austria and Germany, the Moscow trials, the

Nazi-Soviet pact, the Holocaust were the leading events against which their personal drama was played out. But the stage, the scenes, the cast of characters were drawn from the streets of New York's lower East Side, the Bronx, the college campuses of America's northeast, and the small socialist weeklies that grew in number during the 1930s.

Daniel Bell was one of those characters, one of the less than twenty thousand college and high school age youths who took part in radical political activities during the 1930s.[4]

The radical movement of the 1930s is a subject that Bell has dealt with in some detail in several of his writings. As a journalist for the right-wing socialist weekly the New Leader Bell had established a reputation as a knowledgeable and astute commentator of both the student radical movement and the American labor movement. He earned his reputation in the early 1940s. Moreover, his study Marxian Socialism in The United States, a work that was written in 1952, still stands as one of the most exhaustive and knowledgeable studies on the subject. But in none of his writings on the subject, including the somewhat biographical essay which appeared in The End of Ideology called "The Mood of Three Generations," do we ever get any real sense of Bell's personal involvement in that period of American history.

What we do get from both of these particular works is an interpretative framework against which both the failure of Marxian Socialism to sustain itself as an active political movement in the United States and the complexities of political life in an immoral world are outlined and explained. Bell

likens Marxian Socialism to a religious movement, one that because of its messianic and ecstatic faith in the "transforming moment" always stands outside of the real world. Bell constructed this approach partially on the basis of the sociological perceptions of Karl Mannheim concerning the "orgiastic chiliasm" of Thomas Munzer and the Anabaptists of the sixteenth century, and upon those of Max Weber concerning the tensions between the "ethics of responsibility" and the "ethics of conscience." The tensions are between the acceptance of the limits and constraints imposed on a political group by the world as it is and the dedication of that group to a set of absolute or moral ends. It was a framework that permitted Bell to define the failure of Marxian Socialism as being the result of its inability to exist in the real world. It was also a framework that permitted him to define the failure of Marxian Socialism in terms of its inability to make hard and pragmatic decisions about whether it should accept Capitalist society and seek to work within that society in order to transform it, as the labor movement had chosen, or to completely reject Capitalist society as the communists had done. In brief, Bell's framework permitted Bell to locate the failure of Marxian Socialism to, in effect, resolve the tension between the "ethics of responsibility" and the "ethics of conscience" to its being like the Anabaptists of the sixteenth century a movement that was of but not in this world.

The framework developed by Bell is an important one. It is an analytical framework, a conceptual prism, through which Bell would rely and build upon in much of his later work on

ideological politics and political movements in Western societies. We shall expand this point in this and subsequent chapters.

That Bell came to adopt this framework as a way of conceptualizing the failure of Marxian Socialism is no accident; for just as "no generation can be denied an experience, even a negative one" no generation can ever completely spare its members of the experiences that define and significantly shape its collective consciousness, its historically specific weltanschauung or worldview. No style of intellectual thought, no worldview or conceptual framework can ever be, as Karl Mannheim pointed out in his essay "Conservative Thought," completely free from the events and experiences that serve to shape the lives of its creators and its carriers.[5] Thus, it is important that we take notice of some of the events, of some of the turning points in Bell's life and in his intellectual development. In doing so, we must look at Bell's involvement in the radical movement of the 1930s and understand the nature of the issues and events he was responding to, as well as his response to them.

The Making of a Right-Wing Socialist

Born in Brooklyn in 1919 to Jewish immigrant parents Daniel Bolotsky was raised in New York City's lower East Side. When he changed his name from Bolotsky to Bell is somewhat unclear.[6] What is clear is that the early years of his life were not easy ones. Bell's father died when he was six months old. His mother, who spoke only Yiddish, found work in a

factory. As a result Bell spent considerable time in a day orphanage.

This is the bare outline of a childhood spent in a world surrounded by poverty and filled with the hopes and frustrations of a Jewish immigrant population drawn largely from Eastern and Central Europe, a population which for a variety of historical and sociological reasons maintained a clear and persistent association with socialist politics.

The then Daniel Bolotsky was only thirteen when in 1932 he joined the Young People's Socialist League (YPSL) - the youth organization of the Socialist Party.

During the depression it was not uncommon for the sons and daughters of Jewish immigrants to be attracted to the local branches of the League.[7] Typically they served as meeting places which fulfilled both political and social functions. They offered opportunities for young men and women to meet, to exchange ideas and to listen to lectures and readings on Marxist and socialist literature. Factionalism, heated debates over political tactics and philosophy were characteristic of the YPSL meetings as were the development of study groups to discuss particular points of Marxist philosophy and economics.

If Marxism and socialism were of secondary importance to some who were drawn to the YPSL meetings, they were not for Bell. Subject, like other YPSL members to the pressures and pulls of the Young Communist League with whom they held frequent debates and, driven by the rise of Hitler in Germany and the violent suppression of the Austrian socialist party in 1933, Bell had begun to think seriously about becoming a communist.

What persuaded Bell against joining the rival Young Communist League were two episodes that Bell spoke of with great force both in interviews with Job Dittberner and this writer, as well as, in a prepared speech at a dinner marking the 50th Anniversary of the New Leader.[8] This speech was later reprinted as an article "The Moral Vision of the New Leader" in that magazine's December, 1973 issue.[9]

The first episode involved Bell's activities as a volunteer organizer in 1933 when the International Ladies Garment Workers began an organizing campaign. Bell at that point had been working during the summer, and in the afternoons of the school year in the Garment industry as a "pusher" of a small truck filled with dresses through the Garment Center streets. In his role as a volunteer union organizer Bell devoted himself to "handing out leaflets, exhorting workers to come to meetings, leading the applause at rallies and signing up members for the union."[10]

It was while participating in these activities that as Bell put it

> we heard a disquieting piece of news that resulted in a delegation of young organizers going to see Julius Hochman, the manager of the Dress Joint Board, and asking him bluntly: "Is it true, Comrade Hochman, that the ILGWU is hiring gangsters to beat up scabs?[11]

As Bell recalls

> Hoch was nonplussed, but to his credit answered candidly: "Well my young comrades, I will not tell you lies. It is true that the ILGWU is hiring strong-arm men to beat up scabs. But you have to understand, my young comrades, that a strike is a serious thing in a worker's life. It means that there is no bread on the table and no milk for the children. And tell me, my young comrades, do you think a little Jewish clockmaker can beat up a scab?[12]

Bell's recollection of his reaction is vivid.

> Taken aback by this cold dash of realism, we withdrew to ponder an answer. Then one of us spoke up, 'Well, if there is dirty work to be done, we will do it.' Now it was Hochman who was taken aback. Yet he had no way out, so he said quietly, 'All right, you can try.'[13]

To this Bell added, in equally vivid terms the following:

> The next morning, an assistant manager of the union took us to a building on West 35th Street, and when a scab came down, clutching a paper bag to his coat, the ILGer said, 'Go, quickly, give a knyock.' Someone stepped forward, but, as a Yipsel is invariably wont to do, he began making a speech: 'You're a scab, you're taking the bread from a worker's table, the milk from a worker's child.' The man immediately began to scream loudly, 'Help, Police.' In a panic, the Yipsel turned and ran, inexplicably grabbing the bag the scab had been clutching. The police came and arrested him for petty larceny. The ILGWU went back, I think, to using strong-arm men for beating up scabs.[14]

For Bell this episode "was a lesson in the moral perplexities of action."[15] "In that moment, I lost my innocence."[16]

Troubled by this episode Bell now felt, by his own account, vulnerable when debating members of the Young Communist League. The use of violence by the ILGWU represented a betrayal of his faith in the prospects of a socialist society being achieved through the non-violent efforts of the trade unionist movement. When confronted by the Communist charge that the Socialist were naive in believing that Socialism could be achieved without armed insurrection and revolutionary terror, Bell could no longer turn to the ILGWU to justify his faith.

Caught in the tension between wanting a socialist society and an active disdain for violence, Bell turned to reading Leon Trotsky's book Terror and Communism, a book written in response to German Social Democrat Karl Kautsky's attack against the

Bolsheviks for their use of violence. Trotsky, who was then the head of the Red Army, had not hedged on the issue:

> ....in what way do your tactics differ from the tactics of Tsarism,? we are asked by the high priests of Liberalism and Kautskyism.
>
> You do not understand this, holy men. We shall explain to you. The terror of Tsarism was directed against the proletariat....Our Extraordinary Commissions shoot landlords, capitalists and generals who are striving to restore the capitalist order. Do you grasp this distinction? Yes? For us Communists it is quite sufficient.[17]

Bell had discussed Trotsky's answer to the problem of violence with a cousin of him, a Russian anarchist who had lived through the Russian Revolution. This cousin was one of several anarchist cousins on his mother's side of the family who in their concern over Bell's interest in Communism had "challenged" him. The cousin, instead of answering him directly placed in his hands a copy of Alexander Berkman's book The Bolshevik Myth. The book was the diary of an anarchist who had shot Henry Clay Frick during the Homestead strike; was imprisoned in the United States for fourteen years; and then along with another Russian anarchist Emma Goldman was deported to Russia. What concerned Bell were the entries in the last section of the diary, which was simply labeled "Kronstadt." These entries along with two pamphlets given to him by his other cousins, Berkman's "The Truth about the Bolshevki" and Goldman's "The Kronstadt Rebellion," had made a very serious and lasting impression on Bell.

All these writings dealt with the uprising of Russian sailors at the Kronstadt naval base which was located near what is now the city of Leningrad. This was an event which took

place shortly before the Tenth Party Congress in 1921. They described the background of the Kronstadt uprising: the pressing of the Kronstadt sailors' demands for freedom of speech, press, and assembly for all workingmen along with the liberation of all arrested Socialists and nonpartisan workingmen. The writings also described in detail Trotsky's role in this incident, that is, his ordering with the approval of Lenin and the Communist party, the Russian army to open fire upon the dissident Kronstadt sailors who on February 28th 1921 had participated in a strike that would last until March 17th of that year. The writings raised serious questions over the lack of parliamentary democracy in Russia, the harshness of the regime, and the unwillingness of that regime to tolerate and accept political opposition from within the radical movement. What especially impressed Bell was the cynicism of Lenin and Trotsky, their willingness to compromise the moral principles of the Russian Revolution in favor of political expediency. This was an insight which for Bell was confirmed by the following entries from Berkman's diary:

> March 4. An official manifesto appeared today signed by Lenin and Trotsky. They declare the Kronstadt sailors guilty of mutiny and the demand for free Soviets a counterrevolutionary conspiracy. The Moscow radio broadcast this message:
>
> 'Just at this moment, when in America a new Republican regime is assuming the reins of government and showing inclination to take up business relations with Soviet Russia, the organization of disturbances in Kronstadt have the sole purpose of influencing the American President and changing his policy toward Russia....The rebellion of the Petropavlovsk crew is undoubtedly part of a great conspiracy to create trouble within Soviet Russia....'
>
> March 5. Trotsky has issued an official ultimatum decreeing that 'Kronstadt and the rebellious ships must immediately submit...' The city is on the verge of panic. Threats against Jews are becoming audible. Military

> forces continue to flow into Pentrograd. Trotsky has sent another demand to Kronstadt to surrender, the order containing the threat: 'I'll shoot you like pheasants.'
>
> March 7. It is 6 P.M. Kronstadt has been attacked.
>
> March 17. Kronstadt has fallen today. Thousands of sailors and workers lie dead. Summary execution of prisoners and hostages continues.
>
> March 18. The victors are celebrating the anniversary of the Commune of 1871. Trotsky and Zinoviev denounce Thiers and Gallifet for the slaughter of the Paris rebels....[18]

In reading these entries, and learning of the moral cynicism of Trotsky and Lenin, Bell's "moral innocence" returned. As Bell put it:

> Kronstadt, after all, was not just a naval base. It was the very symbol of the October Revolution. The support of the sailors, at the last moment, had been the decisive element in the Bolshevik victory. They were "the proletariat," but the terror had been unleashed against them.[19]

For Bell the significance of this second episode was great. He stated:

> In passionate indignation I turned up at debates with members of the Young Communist League. 'What happened at Kronstadt?' I would shout in trembling fury. 'Where is Kronstadt?' they would answer.[20]

What Bell learned from these debates was that the obliviousness of the young Communists to the moral perplexities in action: to them Kronstadt was not "a question of innocence." The young Communists had their faith, and they were armed against all questions and resolute against all doubts."[21]

The experiences as a volunteer union organizer, the awareness of the Kronstadt rebellion and the moral cynicism of Trotsky and Lenin, along with the debates and the lessons that he would derive from them, all led Bell to become anti-Communist and anti-Bolshevik. They led Bell to move to the right-wing of the socialist party. They also led him to align himself,

following the split in the socialist party in May of 1936 over the nomination of Norman Thomas as its presidential candidate, with the "Old Guard" in its formation of the Social Democratic Federation.[22]

The Social Democratic Federation was a political party that was organized in Cleveland, Ohio, after the convention of the Socialist Party refused to seat a delegation of right-wing socialists from New York State, that is, the "Old Guard." In effect, this action (one which grew out of a relatively long-standing intraparty conflict) served to put this New York delegation outside of the Socialist party.[23] At a subsequent meeting the Social Democratic Federation was formed by right-wing organizations in the Socialist party who were opposed to the central and left-wing factions headed by Norman Thomas.[24]

There were three policies to which the right-wing was opposed. The first, was Thomas' efforts to create a "partial united front" with the Communist Party on specific issues. The second, was Thomas' characterization of the New Deal as a total failure, and of the Roosevelt administration as manifesting an "unabated continuance of Fascist trends" with the result that the country was drifting "increasingly toward insecurity, suppression, and war."[25] The third, was the passage of an amendment pushed by the Trotskyite and Lovestonite factions of the Socialist Party, one that would have meant more centralized control of socialist party activities and the abandonment of State party autonomy.

The "Old Guard" took an uncompromising position of opposition to these policies. Politically, what concerned

them the most was that Thomas' attacks on Roosevelt and the New Deal would serve to alienate organized labor from the Socialist Party and socialism in general.[26] To this end a statement of principle was issued pledging the members of the Social Democratic Federation to the purposes and methods of the international Socialist movement. This statement also outlined the goal of the Social Democratic Federation as "the social ownership and democratic control of all productive wealth which, under private ownership, serves as a source of profit to its owners at the expense of the toiling masses."[27] Stressing that in the United States "there is no justification for a resort to insurrection and violence nor for any open or veiled propaganda in favor of preparation for such action" the statement also declared that the aims of the Social Democratic Federation would be pursued exclusively through democratic methods.[28]

Headed by Louis Waldman, Algernon Lee and James O'Neal, the Social Democratic Federation sought to develop a broad based coalition of labor groups and Socialists in order to establish, ultimately, a third national party. To this end the leadership of the SDF had sought in July of 1936 to develop an amalgamation with Labor's Non-Partisan League for the purpose of establishing a permanent independent labor party which would on a state wide basis present a slate of candidates of its own. If such a party formed, they indicated, they would support its nominees in exchange for the adoption of a platform satisfactory to the Socialists. The leadership of the SDF argued that Socialists could not expect any labor party to adjust wholesale their own program and tactics.

Moreover, they argued that if there was to be a labor party in which the Socialists would play a part similar to that played by the old Independent Labor party, even when they could command a very considerable vote and hold a balance of power, then they would have to compromise on some points, even that of supporting the presidential candidacy of Franklin D. Roosevelt. Waldman at the state convention of right-wing Socialists warned them that, by following their old divisive orthodox course, they would remain "a sterile sect."[29]

In responding to a statement by one of the convention delegates that the policies of the SDF leadership represented an effort to "deliver the Socialists to the Democratic party" Waldman said:

> There is very little to deliver; the trade unions are not in need of us but we are in need of the trade unions.
>
> If Socialists must make a choice between going with the trade union movement or staying with a little sterile group, we will go with the trade union movement.[30]

In choosing to align himself with the Social Democratic Federation, Bell found a political and educational organization that supported his strong anti-communist stance and his interest in the labor movement. Like Bell, the Social Democratic Federation saw itself as part of the political left but was firmly anti-communist in its orientation to political and social problems. Also, like Bell, the Social Democratic Federation had a keen interest in bringing socialism into the labor movement. It sought to do this through exclusively democratic means. From the standpoint of his experiences as a volunteer union organizer

and of his reaction to the Kronstadt Rebellion, it was no accident that Bell would identify with the principles and aims of the Social Democratic Federation.

The Social Democratic Federation was very explicit about what those principles and aims included as the following statement issued by it after the Cleveland Convention demonstrates:

> The party which we now launch stands for the long accepted purposes and methods of the International Socialist movement,....
>
> The goal at which we aim is the social ownership and democratic control of all productive wealth which, under private ownership, serves as a source of profit to its owners at the expense of the toiling masses....
>
> With this goal in view, we strive for every possible betterment of the condition of the masses through extension of private ownership and through social and labor legislation to relieve the workers from poverty, overwork, unemployment and other evils resulting from the system of private ownership and production for profit.
>
> We stand shoulder to shoulder with the organized wage workers and working farmers in their economic struggle and we call upon them to sever their connections with parties which uphold the capitalist system and to organize themselves to use political as well as economic action for the advancement of their interests and for ultimate universal emancipation.
>
> We rely for the attainment of our aims upon the use of democratic methods. In the United States there is no justification for a resort to insurrection and violence nor for any open or veiled propaganda in favor of or preparation for such action.[31]

The framers of this statement went on to express the faith that, when the working classes understood these aims and principles, they would lend them their "hearty approval." Additionally, they expressed the faith that great numbers of men and women of the middle and professional classes "actuated by a sense of justice and humanity as well as by resentment against the evils which they also suffer under the capitalist system," would support those principles and aims.[32]

Apart from its significance in providing Bell with an

intellectual and political outlet and with a medium to develop his thinking on socialism and politics, the Social Democratic Federation was also significant because it provided him with an opportunity to get into journalism. The SDF youth section was so small that, as Bell put it, "everyone knew everybody else."[33] One person closely associated with the youth section of the Social Democratic Federation was Victor Reisel, now a journalist who was then the managing editor of the socialist weekly The New Leader. Impressed by Bell, Reisel in 1938 asked Bell to do a report on the American Student Union Convention.

This was a real opportunity for Bell because it allowed him to continue what he liked doing best, that is, intellectual work. "In those days," remarked Bell, "no one had any idea that you could have any intellectual jobs. In fact, I was extremely lucky, even for $20 a week...."[34]

At that time, part of Bell's "intellectual work" consisted of debating with other politically active students at the City College of New York. Bell was a member of the class of 1939, although he left City College in 1938 at the end of his third year in order to enroll at Columbia Law School where he remained for one year before deciding to switch to Columbia University's Graduate Division in order to pursue a masters degree in sociology.

Though Bell was not a student radical at City College he had learned to move skillfully in student radical circles, even amongst the Trotskyite section of the City College lunchroom. That faction was affectionately referred to by Irving Kristol in a piece that he wrote for The New York Times as "Alcove No. 1."

In this lively and nostalgic piece on student life on the City College campus in the 1930s, Kristol, who was then a Trotskyite, provides us with an interesting picture of Bell and his standing in the radical student movement during that time.

> He (Bell) was that rarity in the 30s: an honest-to-goodness social-democratic intellectual who believed in "a mixed economy," a two party system based on the British model and other liberal heresies. His evident skepticism toward all our ideologies would ordinarily have disqualified him from membership in Alcove No. 1. But he had an immense intellectual curiosity, a kind of amused fondness for sectarian dialectics, knew his radical texts as thoroughly as the most learned among us and enjoyed "a good theoretical discussion" the way some of us enjoy a Turkish bath - so we counted him in. Over the years, his political views have probably changed less than those of the rest of us, with the result that, whereas his former classmates used to criticize him from the left, they now criticize him from all points of the ideological compass.[35]

Bell's skepticism was grounded in a deeply rooted anti-dogmatic temperament, one that was nurtured in great part by a strong affinity for John Dewey. Bell was ironically able to shape that temperament into a political and intellectual stance while he was a student at City College, and there a member of the John Dewey Society. This was a small group, that, as Bell fondly recalled was popularly known on the City College campus as the "Hopefully Confused Liberals."[36] The motto of this group, one which they "proudly flaunted" when they were confronted by some of their "baiting adversaries" was:

> If you think, you can't be dogmatic; if you're not dogmatic, you're not definite; not being definite, you're uncertain; and if you're uncertain, you're confused---but we have the courage of our confusion.[37]

Converting uncertainty and confusion into a political stance and into a positive intellectual perspective, is at best ironic. At the worst it is sophistic. But somewhere in between the ironic and the sophistic, was the conversion of those two emotional attitudes into an intellectual stance that represents both an understandable and intellectually defensible reaction to the Kronstadt Rebellion and the Stalin purges. Belief may have been more indefensible.

While Bell's skepticism and his fierce anti-communism were somewhat out of place on the City College campus, they were not out of place in the small and crowded New Leader offices.

By the time that he joined the New Leader staff in 1940 he more than matched that publication's anti-communist stance. In doing so he fashioned a niche for himself as a serious and knowledgeable commentator, one who knew the ins and outs of the student movement.

Bell took his role as a commentator and as a knowledgeable and serious skeptic who was strongly committed to democracy within the student movement very seriously. At times, he brought to it a crusading zeal. Nowhere was this zeal more in evidence than in an article that he did on the American Youth Congress.

The American Youth Congress was an umbrella organization that had originally been organized, as Bell would later put it, by "some well meaning liberals."[38] Backed in its early days by the fund raising efforts of Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt, in the late 1930s it experienced a phenomenal growth. Entrusted with

drawing plans for the National Youth Administration, "a junior N.Y.A. for student and unemployed youth," the American Youth Congress (A.Y.C.) could at its peak in 1939 claim to represent 513 organizations.[39] Many of these organizations were religious youth organizations that had eagerly sought to affiliate with the A.Y.C. following Mrs. Roosevelt's public support of its efforts to organize American youth effectively.

Bell claimed the A.Y.C. was a Communist Party front whose leadership and administrative staff was dominated by "communists and fellow travelers."[40] In his article "Memo to Mrs. Roosevelt: A.Y.C. Destroys Chances for a Progressive Youth Organization" Bell lashed out at both Mrs. Roosevelt and the A.Y.C. Mrs. Roosevelt, charged Bell, was through her support of the A.Y.C. responsible for the "progressive youth movement being split and discredited."[41] Similarly, Bell charged the A.Y.C. leadership, the majority of whom were either "communists" or "fellow travelers," with undermining the original progressive goals upon which that organization had been established. It also had produced dissension within the youth movement. In short, Bell argued that the A.Y.C. had developed tactics that resulted in leading "many a fine youth organization to vow never to get its fingers burned again, and thus to retire from an active citizenship role in our democracy."[42] That, according to Bell, was the A.Y.C.'s "most grievous sin."[43]

Aside from continuing to report and comment on developments within the student radical movement, Bell, after joining the New Leader staff, turned his attention to the politics of labor and to the subject of profiteering in large-scale industries

crucial to America's war effort.

The New Leader provided a platform for several young writers to formulate ideas and perspectives that would give coherence to their hopes, doubts, frustrations and anger. Among these were: the hopes of a socialist-labor coalition; the doubts about Marxism and messianism as reflected by the writings of Reinhold Niebuhr and Sidney Hook, intellectuals who by the end of the 1930s were turning away from socialism; and the frustrations and anger over the Moscow Trials and the penetration of communists into American socialist politics. Bell, first as a staff writer, and later, as an editor, used that platform to lay the groundwork for a theory of the monopoly state. Bell's efforts to develop such a theory grew out of a basically Marxist orientation to the political and economic complexities and problems that would confront the United States in its movement from a peace time to a war time economy.

Bell's Marxist orientation in reference to issues like managerial capitalism, planning, and the relationship between business and government in the planning of America's future appear to be sharply different from Irving Kristol's recollection of Bell as a strong advocate of the British two party system and of mixed economies. Similarly, Bell's basically Marxist orientation might also appear to stand in sharp contradiction to his acknowledged faith in John Dewey whose pragmatic philosophy and the world view embodied in it is generally not associated with socialism or Marxism.

Socialism and John Dewey

It was not unusual for Bell and many American socialists to both admire England's mixed economy and its two party system and to adjust their commitment to Marxism in the light of the British experience with socialism. It was also not unusual for socialists to have viewed Dewey and Marx as not inconsistent and to derive from American pragmatism with its emphasis on instrumentalism certain principles that were logically consistent with democratic socialism.[44] Both were fairly commonplace in socialist circles by the middle of the 1930s.

Both the British two-party system and the British mixed economy, it must be further noted, were very different from their American counterparts. The peculiarities of the British political system were, as a number of political analysts have observed, very favorable to the development of socialism in England during the early part of the twentieth century.[45] Similarly, the mixed economy that England had come to adopt in the 1930s was fashioned by strong socialist and collectivist interests and tendencies that were unique to that country. Where planning was a virtually revolutionary idea in the United States before the New Deal, by the 1930s that idea already had an established tradition in England. This difference was largely the result of the successes of Fabian socialism, the trade union movement, and of the British Labour Party in promoting a wide-scale acceptance of the necessity of planning well before the Depression made Keynesian economics with its emphasis on fiscal planning a reasonable alternative to

laissez-faire capitalism in the United States. In short, the British mixed economy reflected the relative success of the English socialist and labor movements and allowed the British Labour Party to develop along lines that have long been the subject of intense debate and conflict within the ranks of socialism.[46]

Socialism in England following the successes of the Labour Party in the 1920s was far less revolutionary than it was reformist. The British Labour Party was largely a trade union movement that, having absorbed principles of Fabian socialism, based its claim to being a socialist party on the idea that if socialism were to be successful in a particular country than socialist leaders must be prepared to modify their programs to satisfy the conditions as well as the national character unique to that country.[47]

In regard to the relationship between Dewey and Marx there is a line of continuity between pragmaticism and Marxism around common philosophical principles that extends back to 1913. In that year William English Walling published his book The Larger Aspects of Socialism.

Walling, an English socialist of some international prominence, found Dewey's philosophy of instrumentalism with its emphasis on knowledge as being essentially experimental and truth as being something that was to be realized in practice, to be a radically new technique of inquiry. He also found that this technique was embodied in a rudimentary form in the philosophical writings of both Marx and Engels. Both the idea that all philosophy must evolve just as science

does, as well as the idea that moral ends can be scientifically tested through the consequences they may produce, Walling argued, were principles that Marx and Engels shared with Dewey.[48] In stressing this point, Walling called upon socialists to recognize that American pragmatism was a socially radical philosophy that embodied the true spirit of socialism. In turn, he called upon socialists to swallow their prejudices and not reject American pragmatism even though it had not been created by the founders of socialism. Socialism, asserted Walling, "is constantly assimiliating new elements from all quarters, and it just as significant if science and philosophy evolve toward Socialism as it would be if Socialism itself should produce the scientific philosophy."[49] Walling also asserted that, even though Marx and Engels had made a decided beginning in the direction of pragmatism, they could not have been expected to develop this new philosophy since they were limited by the science and society of their day.

While other attempts to establish a line of continuity between American pragmatism and Marxism were made by Walter Lippman and Max Eastman in their defense of Walling's book, the most noteworthy attempt at such a reconciliation, if not from an intellectual standpoint then certainly from the point of view of its timing, was the one made by Sidney Hook.[50] Hook, an American social philosopher whose works Bell has variously acknowledged, was an influential voice in the late 1930s amongst the growing number of student radicals and left-wing socialists who, in reaction to the Moscow Trials, became suspicious of the kind of Marxism practiced by Stalin

and the Bolsheviks. The reason for this was that, as a long-standing veteran of radical politics and defender of the intellectual merits of Marxism, Hook had already established himself as a knowledgeable and articulate spokesman, one who could properly give vent to their frustrations and growing sense of disillusionment with Communism.

Having described Dewey's Liberalism and Social Action, a work that was first published in 1936, as a "book that which could well be for the twentieth century what Marx and Engels Communist Manifesto was to the nineteenth," Hook proceeded in his intellectual biography of John Dewey to state that Dewey's social philosophy represented the best elements of Marxism without the ideological trappings of Bolshevik-Leninism. Hook repeated this assertion in an extended critique on the relevance of Marxism that was a part of his book Reason, Social Myths, and Democracy. There he also asserted that "if ever a democratic socialist movement succeeds in striking roots in American soil, it will have to derive one of its chief sources of nourishment from the philosophy of John Dewey."[51]

Though he never systematically elaborated this thesis, Hook did state that, allowing for differences in idiom and terminology, the broad philosophical positions of Marx and Dewey were the same. Moreover, Hook in distinguishing Marxism from the Russian Communism of the 1930s took the position that

> were realistic Marxists prepared to submit their methods of achieving democratic socialism to serious scientific criticism, and were Dewey prepared to work out a more

> detailed program of political action with reference to the social and economic relations of the current scene, their positions would converge on a set of common hypotheses leading to common activities.[52]

While Hook never succeeded in elaborating a systematic exegesis on the convergence between Marx and Dewey, he did note some distinct similarities in their way of thinking. Both of them had a common faith in man's capacity to overcome the limits of ideological thought and habit through the use of intelligence as a method of social reconstruction and authority. Similarly, Hook noted that the use of intelligence as a method required the recognition that ethical ideals could and should be made the subject of scientific criticism. In this vein, Hook argued that what was common to both Marx and Dewey was the belief that ethical ideals - the good and the right, the better and the more just - should be evaluations that were based upon knowledge and experimentation rather than on intuition, revelation, habit, authority, or deduction from purely formal laws as preponderantly had been the case throughout history. Each in their own fashion, as Hook further noted, stressed that ethical ideals must be evaluations and commitments to action that are based upon "knowledge of (i) all the relevant interests involved in a particular situation, (ii) how they are related to the state of productive forces and relations, (iii) the alternatives of action open to men, and (iv) the consequences of the respective actions."[53]

While Walling's and Hook's works provide some basis for understanding the sources of Dewey's appeal to some democratic socialists, a better source is provided by Dewey himself.

Here we need only to understand that Dewey's book Liberalism and Social Action (1935) represented a radical critique of liberalism, one that located the "crisis of liberalism" within liberalism itself. By the crisis of liberalism Dewey meant that liberalism in the 1930s was experiencing a crisis in belief and action, one that rendered it wholly inadequate to develop and legitimate the kind of social organization required to provide direction for the creative forces that the success of a capitalist culture had produced in the nineteenth century.

In a succinct and penetrating analysis of the social and political philosophy of liberalism, Dewey was able to show how the glorious ideals of Lockean or early liberalism had released a set of personal and social forces against the restraints of a decaying feudal social order without being able to supply an integrating philosophy for the new capitalist culture which had replaced that order. But even more than that, Dewey also showed how the development of a capitalist economy and a laissez-faire liberalism, in effect, frustrated the ideals of early liberalism. These ideals were: "liberty; the development of the inherent capacities of individuals made possible through liberty," and the sovereignty of "free intelligence in inquiry, discussion, and expression."[54] These ideals had become frustrated and rendered impotent shortly after, as Dewey showed, when they had become formulated as eternal truths. What had happened, explained Dewey, was that by the middle of the nineteenth century the economic and political changes for which liberals had struggled were so

largely accomplished that "they had become in turn the vested interest, and their doctrines, especially in the form of laissez-faire liberalism, now provided the intellectual justification of the status quo."[55]

The transformation of these liberal tenets into an intellectual justification for capitalism took place, because during this period the "earlier doctrine of natural rights superior to legislative action" had been given "a definitely economic meaning by the courts, and was used by judges to destroy social legislation passed in the interest of a real, instead of purely formal, liberty of contract."[56] Indeed, under the caption of "rugged individualism," this doctrine, asserted Dewey, continues to inveigh against all new social policies. But there were only historical manifestations of what served as both the strength and the weakness of Lockean liberalism, namely, a lack of historical sense and interest. This tendency, explained Dewey, served an immediate pragmatic value in that it enabled liberals to undercut the appeal to origin, precedent and past history by which their opponents, the defenders of a decaying feudal social order, gave sacrosanct quality to existing inequalities and abuses. But it also, he added, served to retard the progressive development of liberalism in the nineteenth century.

This disregard for history, Dewey explained, "blinded the eyes of liberals to the fact that their own special interpretations of liberty, individuality, and intelligence were themselves historically conditioned, and were relevant only to their own time."[57] The weakness of this tendency was that it

legitimated and prescribed along doctrinal lines a fixed view of social change, namely, that "beneficial social change can come about in but one way, the way of private economic enterprise, socially undirected, based upon and resulting in the sanctity of private property - that is to say, freedom from social control."[58]

It was against this background that Dewey in turn asserted that "if the early liberals had put forth their special interpretation of liberty as something subject to historical relativity they would not have frozen it into a doctrine to be applied at all times under all social circumstances."[59] They, continued Dewey, would have "recognized that effective liberty is a function of the social conditions existing at any time."[60] That recognition would have enabled them to realize that "as economic relations became dominantly controlling forces in setting the pattern of human relations, the necessity of liberty for individuals which they proclaimed will require a social control of economic forces in the interest of the great mass of individuals."[61] In concluding his critique, Dewey argued that while the rise of national politics in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries pretended to represent the order, discipline and spiritual authority required to counteract the social disintegration produced by nineteenth century capitalism, it proved to be wholly inadequate to the task. The rise of national politics provided "a tragic comment upon the unpreparedness of older liberalism to deal with the new problem which its very success precipitated."[62] This new problem was

the problem of legitimacy: the problem of how to establish upon a set of democratic principles the moral foundations for a new integrating philosophy, one that would give direction to the creative energies unleashed by the success of nineteenth century capitalism.

In a powerful plea for a "renascent liberalism" Dewey argued in a fashion that demonstrated not only his commitment to democracy but his openness to certain socialist principles that

> the values of freed intelligence, of liberty, of opportunity for every individual to realize the potentialities of which he is possessed, are too precious to be sacrificed to a regime of despotism, especially when the regime is in such large measure merely the agent of a dominant economic class in its struggle to keep and extend the gains it has amassed at the expense of genuine social order, unity, and development.[63]

If liberalism hopes to preserve the integrity of these values then, argued Dewey, it must "gather itself together to formulate the ends to which it is devoted in terms of the means that are relevant to the contemporary situation."[64] What this task requires is that liberals recognize that the idea that "liberalism cannot maintain its ends and at the same time reverse its conception of the means by which they are to be attained is folly."[65] Indeed, Dewey went further, "the ends can now be achieved only by reversal of the means to which early liberalism was committed."[66]

It was in this context that Dewey warned that if modern man is to escape from the present and future regimentation of human beings, liberals must recognize that this can only be done by regimenting the mechanical and productive forces of

society.

> Organized social planning, put into effect for the creation of an order in which industry and finance are socially directed in behalf of institutions that provide the material basis for the cultural liberation and growth of individuals, is now the sole method of social action by which liberalism can realize its professed aims.[67]

To this, Dewey added, that "such planning demands in turn a new conception and logic of freed intelligence as a social force" - one that gives as much weight to preserving and extending civil and cultural liberties as to increasing production norms.[68]

This faith in man's conscious capacity to reverse traditional conceptions of thought and practice provides a clue to the ultimate basis of Dewey's appeal to democratic socialists: the utopianism that is implicit in his educational thought.

Like ideology, the word utopianism has been subject to a variety of different uses and interpretations since the nineteenth century.[69] When we speak of Dewey's utopianism we are speaking of a liberal utopia, one that projects a vision of society in which war, superstition, disease, and poverty would be eliminated by the inevitable progress of science and education. Dewey's utopianism is a utopianism of method, one that projects a fluid rather than fixed image of the world. It is a utopianism that advocates the reconciliation between the present and the past; it is, in the final analysis, a world-view that locates progress in a dialectic fashioned by man through the pursuit of knowledge. It is a world view in which knowledge is viewed as a continuous process, one in which the

achieved end is always viewed as the outcome of the consequences produced by the means used in the pursuit of a stated goal.[70]

Richard Hofstadter in his assessment of Dewey's contribution to American education characterized the nature of Dewey's utopianism very well when he said that

> Dewey's utopianism was not based upon some portrait of an ideal educational system. He was too wise to draw a blueprint for a finished world, and the very nature of his thesis that education is the continuous reconstruction of experience argued against it. His utopianism was one of method: he believed that the old polarities and dualisms were not, so to speak, qualities in reality that must be resisted, minimized, managed, and confined; but were miscalculations derived from the false way of conceiving the world that had prevailed in the past. One could do better than merely resolve these polarities in various limited and inevitably unsatisfactory ways; in a higher synthesis one could overcome them altogether.[71]

This emphasis on synthesis, that is on effecting a reconciliation between the polarities and dualisms of the past (the dualism between theory and action) through the present in order to create the future, is one that places Dewey within a very distinct, although sometimes neglected, liberal tradition. This liberal tradition might be understood to have its philosophical and intellectual grounding in the work of Mathew Arnold, a nineteenth century English social critic who, like Dewey, dedicated himself to effecting a reconciliation between the present and the past, between the Hellenistic and the Hebraic.[72]

The New Leader Period

The New Leader, which is still active today as a monthly publication, was in the late 1930s and early 1940s an eight page socialist weekly published in New York City. Its major

fields of interest were international affairs, labor news, and New York City cultural events. Created in 1924 as the successor to the old socialist Daily Call and then the short-lived New York Daily Leader, the New Leader pledged itself to support the struggles of industrial workers for shorter hours, higher income, better sanitary conditions, and increasing control of industry. Declaring that it could not follow any "ill defined and vague 'liberal' or 'progressive' party rooted in temporary discontent and not specifically aiming at the overthrow of capitalism," the New Leader also pledged itself to support the idea of a labor party that would include powerful labor unions whenever they were "ready to act."[73] In short, the New Leader in 1924 was devoted to the Socialist Party and to the principle of rebuilding the Socialist movement in the United States to its once relatively successful position in American politics.[74] Edited by James Oneal it included on its board of contributing editors several major historical figures in the American socialist movement: Eugene V. Debs, Morris Hillquit, and Norman Thomas, among others.

When Bell first started writing for it in 1938 the New Leader had lost its largely Marxist orientation, although traces of it remained. It no longer billed itself as "a Socialist Party publication devoted to the interests of tne Socialist and Labor Movement" as it had done up to May of 1936, but when Bell joined it it projected itself through its new masthead as "an official organ of the Social Democratic Federation devoted to the interests of tne Socialist and Labor Movement."[75] This change in wording grew out of the 1936

Socialist Party convention, where the national leadership refused to seat the "Old Guard" New York State delegation out of the tensions that surrounded Norman Thomas' nomination as the Socialist Party presidential candidate. The change thus was a reflection of the political and ideological factionalism and the uneasy alliances that characterized American socialism during the mid 1930s.

The explanation given to its readers for the change in masthead was brief. The editorial comment simply read:

> An incidental but for us important result of the Cleveland Convention is that after next week the New Leader will not have to give so much space as hitherto to interparty controversy. If many of our readers and all our sub-getters rejoice in this let them rest assured that the editors rejoice with them.76

While this comment provided little hint of the underlying issues, and of the intense ideological and often personal nature of the conflicts that surrounded the change, the editorial staff, still headed by James Oneal but without the services of Hillquit, Debs, and Thomas, could understandably be excused for not going into more detail. This is because for some time preceeding the Cleveland Convention the issues had been widely discussed in the New Leader.

By January of 1936 the issues and antagonisms confronting the American socialist movement had been reduced by the editorial staff of the New Leader to one central and over-riding issue. This was whether the establishment of a working alliance, a partial united front, with the American Communist Party, as Norman Thomas and others of the left and more moderate segments of the Socialist Party had advocated, would compromise

its integrity and undermine its viability as an independent political organization. Such a policy, they felt would limit its abilities to adapt its strategies and aims to the social and political exigencies of American society. This issue, as an editorial in the January 18th issue had put it, was simply "shall the Socialist Party go Bolshevik or shall we remain a Socialist Party."[77]

In its formulation of this issue there was a deep-seated suspicion of Communists stemming from a variety of events, of which many were prominently featured in the pages of the New Leader long before the 1936 split in the movement. Many of these events concerned Communist infiltration of unions and Stalin's purges. While no admirer of Leon Trotsky, Trotsky's views concerning Stalin and the Moscow purges were often cited in articles by New Leader staff writers to demonstrate the corruptability of the Soviet dictatorship and the pitfalls of bureaucratic collectivism. Similarly it defended its opposition to the efforts of the Socialist Party to develop an ad hoc united front with the Communists in the 1936 presidential election. Its opposition reflected a deep-seated faith in the virtues of both democracy and socialism.

Relentlessly anti-Communist, the New Leader was at the same time relentlessly anti-big business and anti-Fascist during the period that Bell was associated with it, first as a staff writer, then, in 1942, as its managing editor. He held the latter position until December of 1944.

While he wrote several articles about the student radical movement for the New Leader, the bulk of the seventy-five

articles and columns by-lined by Bell dealt with subjects that were consistent with that publication's pro-labor, anti-communist, anti-Fascist, anti-big business position.[78]

Bell's commitment to the pro-labor sentiments of the New Leader were reflected in his writings. One of his first published articles elaborated organized labor's concern over its not being represented on the War Resources Board, while four close Morgan associates had been appointed.[79] This was followed with articles and comments in his column "Comments and Clippings" dealing with the internal policies of unions, A.F.L. and C.I.O. disputes and the necessity for labor unity.[80]

Bell's commitment to the New Leader's anti-Fascist sentiments were evident in a large number of his New Leader articles. Concerned with the efforts of American fascists to undermine the Allied War effort by infiltrating strategic defense positions and by spreading anti-semitism and pro-Axis lies, Bell tore into Father Coughlin in particular.[81] This was because of the success of Coughlin's League of the Little Flower, and the relatively high circulation of his "Social Justice" tracts.

Bell's exposes of the influence of Coughlin's activities on business and government leaders and of Coughlin's attempts to have alleged fascists infiltrate the Office of Civilian Defense were followed by articles on other Fascist front organizations and leaders. Separate articles highlighted the revival of the Technocracy movement and the pro-fascist sentiments of its leader Hugh Scott, and on William Dudley Pelley, leader of the Silver Shirts.[82] In addition to these

articles Bell wrote a piece on the entrance of Dr. Tibor Eikhardt into the United States and his efforts to gain recognition for his "Free Hungary" organization.[83] In each of these articles Bell expressed the same concern over America's lack of vigilance in permitting fascists to move into strategic defense posts, and to places where "their word of mouth propaganda, radical incitement, agitation against shipping troops overseas (and) spreading distrust of our allies - does incalculable harm."[84] It was this concern that led Bell to publish a list of fascist front publications, "vials of hate" as he referred to them, whose policy it was to stir opposition to America's involvement in the war in Europe by promoting isolationism and anti-semitism.[85] Along with this, he published a list of American fascist leaders with "far reaching contacts in high industrialist and society circles."[86]

However, the majority of articles written by Bell for the New Leader reflected his commitment to that publication's anti-big business stance. Indeed, as Job Dittberner has pointed out, Bell's primary wartime journalistic efforts were directed principally to exposing the pernicious effects of big business on American government.[87] These efforts grew out of the New Leader's general concern over what it saw as big business' efforts to manipulate the federal government in order to reverse legislation to protect wage workers in organizing unions or to undermine existing legislation. Bell's efforts also grew out of the New Leader's concern over the extensive American corporate investment in German industries, and the effect that this investment was having in bolstering the Nazi

war machine.[88]

Bell's anti-big business articles clearly reflected these two concerns. His targets were the monopolies and cartels. This is not to say that Bell wanted to turn the American economy back to a small business era, as Dittberner has noted.[89] Rather these interests were generated by the belief that business must be controlled by government, or it would control government, a belief that was generally reflective of the New Leader's attitude towards big business. Bell's conviction was that big business was not interested in an all-out war against fascism, but rather it self-consciously pursued a strategy designed to reduce competition after the completion of the war.

Several articles written in the Spring of 1941 were suggestive of Bell's position. In an article that appeared in the May 31st issue, Bell rigorously applauded the federal government's allocation of 700 million dollars for new government aircraft, aluminum, and magnesium plants, noting that this action represented "the first attempt to obtain sufficient vital defense products by government competition with private industry."[90] What especially impressed Bell was that 300 million dollars of that money was specifically going towards the building of a new government aluminum plant. This allocation was in his view a "tremendous step on the anti-monopoly front."[91] "Here," he continued was "a blow at the most complete monopoly in America, the world combine of the Aluminum Corporation of America, popularly known as ALCOA."[92] That ALCOA needed competition was for Bell an absolute certainty.

What made the need for such competition very clear was the failure of ALCOA to live up to its promise to meet all aluminum needs. The result of this failure was to keep down production in all other aluminum producing companies.

In this same article Bell blamed the shortage in aluminum production on the Office of Production Management. Bell's argument was that this agency had been loaded with "dollar - a year men" who had been all too willing to take industry's word that sufficient supplies would be on hand for defense needs. Moreover, he argued that the OPM's committee on aluminum priorities had developed a priorities system which favored du Pont and General Motors and had reduced competition severely. In commenting on the OPU's exclusionary policies, Bell noted that two military officers, a General Motors official and an officer of an aluminum company known to be under the thumb of ALCOA had been serving on that agency.

In another article Bell pointed out examples of business' opposition to government control of war industries and price fixing. Citing the lobbying activities of the National Association of Manufacturers to undermine widespread price fixing and the right of government to sieze property, Bell concluded that business was more interested in profits than in engaging in an all out war against fascism.[93]

Bell's interest in the activities of ALCOA and the National Association of Manufacturers was only surpassed by his interest in the activities of U.S. Standard Oil of New Jersey. Bell was interested in the activities of Standard Oil in order to focus a spotlight on cartels and their

negative effect on the war effort.

In a series of articles Bell outlined how the German chemical trust company, I.G. Farben, and U.S. Standard Oil of New Jersey were able to control the production of synthetic rubber in the United States. The key was a series of agreements between these two industrial giants involving patents and a division of markets that dated back to 1929.

In a front page article entitled "Standard Oil-Nazi Firm Tie-up Halted Rubber Production" Bell specifically charged that a Standard Oil subsidiary, Jasco, was acting as a front for I.G. Farben in the United States. To support this charge Bell noted that, after the war had begun, Farben had transferred to Jasco - a company that was originally organized with equal shares owned by Standard Oil and by Farben - several hundred of its patents, about half of them having to do with synthetic rubber. After flatly stating that "the records will show that an agreement between I.G. Farben and Standard Oil of New Jersey restrained the latter company from synthetic rubber production," Bell called for a Senate investigation into the practices of Standard Oil and Jasco.[94] He called for such an investigation in order to establish the identities of the "small group" within Standard Oil responsible for holding back the production of synthetic rubber in the United States.

In subsequent articles Bell criticized government officials for keeping from the American public documented evidence concerning the relationship between Standard Oil and I.G. Farben. In these articles he charged that, even though both the Senate committee investigating the war effort, the Truman Committee,

and Thurman Arnold, the Assistant Attorney General, had uncovered much in their investigations of the Standard Oil-Farben tie-in, there was one side of the story that was not being told. This side had to do with Farben's sale of millions of dollars worth of patents to Jasco for "a song," and with several obscure persons who were now owners of valuable patents sold to them by I.G. Farben for as little as five dollars.[95] In the end Bell agreed with Max Eastman that Standard Oil of New Jersey was one of many American businesses that were "planning for victory no matter which side wins."[96] He thus called for a full federal investigation of American firms that still had large investments in Germany.

Throughout the summer of 1942 Bell followed with keen interest the investigations of Standard Oil and other American industries. Reports from the anti-trust Division of the Justice Department, along with those from the Truman Committee, and Homer Bones's Senate Patents Committee were referred to and often elaborated upon by Bell. During this period Bell wrote, both under his own byline and various pseudonyms, several articles that detailed the industrial agreements of other corporations which, like Standard Oil, had "put profits before patriotism."[97] Highlighted in these articles were the names of corporations that either continued to sell their products to the Nazis or who severely retarded American war production by engaging in strategies designated to eliminate competition.[98] In all there were, Bell stated, eighty-six corporations that had been pursuing such policies, with Standard Oil of New Jersey, Sterling Products, Dow Chemical

Company and DuPont being very high on the list. The critical shortage of high octane fuel was the most dramatic example of the effect that monopolies were having on the war effort, a shortage that Bell blamed exclusively on Standard Oil.

In addition to outlining the effect of monopoly practices on the war effort, several articles were devoted to identifying the forces that had been engaging in an "undercover drive to throttle" federal investigations into monopolies. One such article bore the title written in large letters "Sterling - A Story the Senate Fears to Hear."[99] Hard hitting and informative, this article raised more questions than it answered. Bell wasted little time in establishing the tone of this article:

> Here is the story of Sterling Products, a drug corporation with powerful ties to the Nazi I.G. Farbenindustrie and a powerful lobby in the U.S. government circles. The full story cannot be told; it is contained in the 30,000 documents held by the Senate Patents Committee. But those documents, once scheduled to be read into the public record, will lie in Justice Department vaults possibly never to be revealed.100

After noting that protests by Senators Pepper and White, as well as by the War Department, had resulted in a whittling down the scope of the Patents Committee's inquiry from 50 to 3 cases, with Sterling Products being one of the groups to escape, Bell made the following observations:

> And Sterling was lucky - or careful - for involved in the case is the most compromising correspondence yet found between an obstensibly American firm and a Nazi corporation. Farben was intent on maintaining its present cartel and patent position, and apparently Sterling Products was not adverse to helping.101

While the Farben articles authored by Bell appeared with

far less frequency after the summer of 1942, his interest in the subject remained constant. Besides being the subject of several of his columns Clippings and Comment, it was also the subject of two reviews that he did towards the end of 1942: one was on Guenter Reimann's Patents for Hitler; the other on Stuart Chase' essay "Dated Socialist-Liberalism." Bell's comments on those works are important in understanding the nature and direction of his writings for the New Leader from the fall of 1942 until the winter of 1944 when he left that publication. They reflect the development of a set of insights and perspectives on the changing nature of capitalism that became the foundations of a somewhat vaguely defined but nonetheless unifying framework that Bell had hoped to develop into a theory of the "Monopoly State."

In his review of Reimann's book, titled the "Secret International," Bell made the observation that where capitalism at the height of its success in the 1880s had produced a stock of "Robber Barons" whose identities were etched into the public consciousness, their successors, the men who were now running the giant industrial empires, were an entirely different breed. In contrast to men like John D. Rockefeller and Andrew Carnegie (whose adventures created a lusty tradition in American enterprise and who had the "say" in the affairs of their corporations unfettered by nothing other than their whims) their successors, were mainly the representatives of absentee capital, who operated in an entirely different fashion: they were faceless and colorless. Through these new breed of men and the patent agreements that replaced the firework and

adventures of another age, corporate wealth was now anonymous and institutionalized. The present generation Rockefellers and Morgans were hollow reminders of their forebearers. Those names now stood, argued Bell, only as convenient fictions for American capitalism. Bell asked rhetorically how many Americans knew the names of the men who run Standard Oil, General Electric, Alcoa, U.S. Steel, the men who dominate American capitalism.

A number of things troubled Bell about this change in the structure of American capitalism, a change that was first discussed by Thorstein Veblen in the Engineers and The Price System and later by Adolph Berle and Gardiner Means in their now classic study The Modern Corporation and Private Property. Because of their anonymity, the corporate managers would make decisions that would effect the lives of Americans without their having to bear any public responsibility for those decisions. His second concern was that the system of trusts, patents, and other legal devices that had become the trademarks of managerial capitalism could allow a Rockefeller to separate his own personal views from the business policies of Standard Oil. In short, these devices could allow him to proclaim, when asked about the policies his corporation's managers had established with I.G. Farben, "business is business."[102]

These comments with their echo of Berle and Means' classic statement of the changing nature of American capitalism served as an appropriate way for Bell to assess the importance of Reinmann's book. This is because a major part of that book was devoted to outlining how Hitler and German big businessmen

had learned to work together in order to manipulate several giant American concerns as a way of advancing their imperialistic ends.

For Bell this was an important and timely book, one that he urged Americans to read with great care. It skillfully illustrated how the changing structure of capitalism had created a "new ruling class crowded with administrators, patent lawyers, business-diplomats and fixers."[103] Similarly, it was a book that illustrated how the changing structure of capitalism had helped to create a divided world, one that was crying out for political and economic stability. But the most important thing about this book was that it illustrated how, in its willingness to share control of new and expanding world markets, Nazi Germany and its capitalists had developed a blueprint that could be followed in other industrial nations, including the United States. This blueprint was a blueprint for a state monopoly system.

Bell also spoke to the issue of managerial capitalism when in his review of Stuart Chase's essay "Dated Socialist-Liberalism" he severely attacked Chase for asserting that both the Berle and Means distinction between ownership and control within the modern corporation and the emergence of the Nazi State demonstrated the irrelevance of the socialist critique of capitalism with its emphasis on property and the inevitability of the class struggle.

True, conceded Bell, capitalism had changed beyond dispute. But Chase, after an exegesis derived from a "felicitous" combination of James Burnham's and Peter Drucker's views on

managerialism, had been too hasty in jumping to the conclusion that socialism was no longer relevant to the modern world [illegible] the problem in industrial society was not capitalism [illegible]managerialism and statism.[104] Similarly, Chase, argued Bell, was too hasty in suggesting that the emergence of Nazism meant that capitalism had been totally displaced in Germany.

Nazism, managerialism, and statism all worked, in principle, to eliminate private property. But, argued Bell, the strength of the socialist critique of capitalism did not exclusively rest on the ownership of property. No, the strength of the socialist critique rested on property relations, on the antagonism between the productive forces and the social conditions of production. Bell argued, in Marxist rhetoric that it mattered little whether control was in the hands of managers or whether it was in the hands of those who owned the means of production. The contradictions of capitalism, "the fetters of production" are not, effected by managerial shifts. Here Bell maintained that the separation between ownership and management was after all nothing really new. The joint-stock company, which was just as familiar to Adam Smith as it was to Marx, had already divorced ownership from management. What was really important and what still made socialism relevant was that neither managerialism in the United States nor statism in Nazi Germany had changed [illegible] property relations.

The thrust of Bell's argument was that Chase in his enthusiasm over the Berle and Means thesis had neglected the fact that the exploitation of the industrial worker was the

product of role that the capitalist assumes in relation to the worker. The managers, argued Bell, were just as capable as the capitalists in adopting capitalist ideology to suit their needs. In failing to recognize these constancies and in underestimating the extent of the real power held by the capitalists in America and in Germany, Chase, Bell argued, had produced an analysis warped with error.

"Facts," Bell retorted, "are stubborn masters."[105] Chase had neglected facts that served to put Nazism, managerialism, and statism into proper perspective. The facts, Bell argued, were contained in Franz Neumann's study of the German economy, Behemoth. Neumannhad shown that it was the capitalists who had successfully developed strategies that resulted in monopoly groups gaining control of German industries. Another fact established by Neumann, noted Bell, was that Germany's monopolistic structure was not maintained solely by the managers; it was maintained just as much by owner-capitalists as by general managers. Otto Wolff, Friedrich Flick, and Gunther Quandt were not managers but powerful capitalists and not rentiers who at end of the year merely cut the coupons. Another fact was that the managers who helped maintain the monopolistic structure were not themselves simply managers, that is, salaried employees. They had for some time assumed the role of capitalists by investing in their company's shares and often by speculating with the funds of their own corporation. They thereby strengthened their own financial power and stake within those corporations.

No, the capitalists were not without power in Nazi Germany.

Still the absence of an autonomous, uncontrolled market in the German economy raised the problem as to whether that economy could still be considered capitalistic. Perhaps, as an economic system, Germany's war economy was not, by strict classical or Marxian economic standards, capitalism; but socially, reasoned Bell, it could still be considered capitalism, albeit in a transitional form.

Nonetheless, added Bell, it is the war economy and not the Nazi political system that had given the German State its non capitalist twist. Therefore it is important, Bell stressed, not to impute to Nazism credit for a series of economic changes that were primarily the product of a war economy, as Chase had done, nor to imply that those changes are inevitable in all war economies, as Chase had also done. The war economy, even in a capitalist system, reasoned Bell "may solve the 'contradiction' by creating full employment via subordinating the profit motive and restricted production to the 'use' dictates of the war."[106]

In conclusion, Bell argued that the socialist critique of capitalism was still relevant for it could help to prevent the kind of conspiracy between big business and government which had occurred in Germany from happening in the United States. Socialism could help Americans to sharpen their thinking about the role of property and ownership, class alignments, democratic controls and administrative techniques. In the face of the inevitability of collectivist planning brought on by the necessity of the war economy in the United States, the problems of both statism and of increased

governmental controls were very real problems as Chase had properly noted. But Chase's efforts to reject socialism only served to hinder the development of the kinds of approaches and perspectives such problems required.

Both of these reviews suggest that Bell was developing a new framework of analysis, one that was derived from a consuming distrust of big business and a fear of what might arise with the continued institutionalization of managerial capitalism under the impetus of a war economy. Specifically, Bell expressed the fear that these "new men of power," the managers, could under the ideological banner of "free enterprise" develop an economic policy that was modelled with some political modifications after Nazi Germany.[107] This could lead to the United States becoming a monopoly state and a imperialistic power under managerial capitalism. This theme, with some subtle modifications, was much in evidence in Bell's writings as the war progressed.

While the Farben-Standard Oil deals, the Berle and Means thesis, and the revelations about the partnership between big-business and government in Nazi Germany provided a basis for Bell's adoption of this approach, an additional factor contributed to it. Equally significant was a growing pessimism evident in Bell's writings during the fall of 1942 over what he considered to be a shift in American intellectual thought and values from "progressivism" to conservatism and to reactionary thought.

This pessimism was shaped by Bell's awareness that where the first two years of the war had produced a plethora of books

on themes like the "people's war" and "democratic collectivism," but the hopes for a new world fashioned on democratic and socialistic principles that had produced those works were fading. In his words "the strong voices that had produced such works were becoming more plaintive."[108] Moreover, a new set of books were gaining in popularity. These were books that did not reflect the bouyant hopefulness that the war could mean the end of empire-building and exploitation, nor the confidence that a post-war world could lead to a planned democratic society. At outset of the war books by Harold J. Laski, Carl Dreher, Lewis Corey, and Max Lerner had expressed those emotions; but now books by Peter Drucker, Guliemo Ferrero, and Herbert Agar were fostering a renewal of conservative and reactionary thinking. Moreover, books by Nicholas Spykman, and F.H. Carr were coming "perilously close" to advocating a post-war policy of Anglo-American world-wide domination. The appearance of such books was dangerous, thought Bell, because "booklists oft times mirror the sentient sub-surface changes that are occurring."[109]

What also seems to have conditioned Bell's pessimism, his sense of impending doom, was what he referred to as "the growing partnership of the banking fraternity with government."[110] This partnership, Bell explained in a column that appeared in the November 28, 1942 issue of the New Leader, was based on the government having pumped billions into the banks and on the banks, in turn, having invested much of their capital into United States bonds. But, even more significantly, the partnership was reflected in the government's willingness to underwrite

huge bank loans to American corporations committed to a policy of capital expansion through foreign investment. The case of General Motors underscored the nature of the partnership. It was only after the government had agreed to guarantee a one billion dollar loan to General Motors to back its capital expansion plans that a pool of 400 banks headed by Chase National, Bankers Trust, and J.P. Morgan had agreed to loan it that money. What made such a partnership between the banks and the government dangerous, in the light of such deals, was that any loans made by the banks for foreign consumption, either directly or indirectly, were now political loans. They were political because the government in underwriting the banks had committed itself to guaranteeing the success and repayment of loans made by the banks. Thus, feared Bell, the government could easily be drawn by the greed of American capitalists into a "new imperialism."

By January of 1943 the thesis that Bell had been developing became more sharply defined, more focused. Reviewing developments and trends in production during 1942, Bell declared in his January 9th column "Clippings and Comments" that the United States was moving into a new phase of industrial development. While mass war production was slow in getting started as private interests resisted changeover to war work, strong government action had produced rapid new industrial growth and reorganization by the end of 1942. Many of the "dollar-a-year men" on the War Production Board had been replaced by men less trusting of industry's production projections. No longer was government as trusting of industry; and

no longer did it feel that industry would assign their best men to speed the conversion of the American economy into a war economy. The year 1942, Bell reasoned, was a year of reorganization. Replacing the financial men who feared expansion of plant facilities and jealously guarded private business interests lent to it by industry with qualified production experts, the administration initiated several reforms that led to dramatic increases in productivity. Yet, despite the reforms, and the reorganizations of war agencies "flooded" with representatives from Alcoa, Standard Oil, General Electric, and other giant companies "the monopolies were more than ever firmly in the seats of power."[111] Through war contracts and other government supports, the monopolies were firmly in control of key industries like steel and oil production. Thus, 1942, concluded Bell was a year that saw both the United States move fully into a war economy and "a major acceleration of monopoly in American life."[112]

Throughout 1943 and 1944 Bell continued to watch with keen interest the activities of big business. What impressed him most in the early part of 1943 was that, while there would be almost daily reports in the New York Times of some big business executive calling for the need for "free enterprise" after the war, there would also often appear, right next to those reports, a sober analysis of trends that belied the public utterances made by that executive. Because of government drives to rationalize industry, the concentration of resources and the merging of relatively small businesses with large ones in the war related industries made all the

"thundering" about free enterprise in the post-war world empty rhetoric. This, according to Bell, was because the exigencies of the post-war period coupled with the difficulties involved in placing under separate management, government built plants that had become integral parts of large companies served to make irreversible the trend towards business collectivism and to foster the decline of the small business. Moreover, big business rather than offering any opposition to such collectivistic policies was now playing an active role in shaping them. Additionally, big business despite all the talk about free enterprise was now proposing through Fortune Magazine, a publication that Bell viewed as the "dollar-a-month" spokesman for big business, that the government should underwrite permanent prosperity through comprehensive economic planning and full employment policies.[113]

Government intervention, the mixed economy, and planning were all facts of life, noted Bell. Planning, an idea that had been viciously derided only a decade before was, declared Bell, here to stay. No, the issue was no longer whether planning was good or bad, temporary or permanent; the issues now were who was going to do the planning and who was going to determine what ends would be pursued through the planning process, government or business. This issue was one that Bell dealt with in a March 20, 1943 New Leader article that ran under the headline:

PLANNING BY WHOM FOR WHAT?
BUSINESS MENACES FDR SCHEMES

VESTED INTERESTS PLAN OWN BOARD FOR ECONOMIC CONTROL

The theme of this article was basic in Bell's subsequent development. Bell argued that American society was at a cross-road. Everyone, including businessmen, have found that in this complicated, highly specialized, interrelated economic world, some government regulation was required. As such, everyone realized that we could "no longer depend, as we had for the past 150 years or so, on the 'automatic' functioning of a free market to exchange goods and create jobs."[114] Similarly, no one questioned the idea that someone had to direct the economy through comprehensive planning; this idea was the single most fundamental concept introduced by the New Deal.

Just as it was true that the 1930s had produced a new set of economic and political realities, so too the early 1940s had produced an equally compelling set of realities. The first year and a half of America's involvement in the war had produced a gradual weakening of New Deal agencies. The war had seen a proliferation of business executives in the newly created war agencies with the result that they dominated those agencies. Similarly, the war had brought about a new concentration of control and power in the hands of a few giant monopoly corporations. The result of these two developments, declared Bell, was that business had now formed a powerful bloc in shaping the post war world.

Business, according to Bell, was already providing its own solution to the problem of who was going to be responsible for post war planning. Business, argued Bell, was attempting to pre-empt such planning. It was trying to do this especially

through the Committee for Economic Development, the most important business planning group.

The CED, according to Bell, was in competition with the government's National Resources Planning Board. This might seem surprising on the surface, declared Bell, since both of these planning groups were constructed within the same political-economic framework, a private enterprise and the profit economy. Both would, moreover, formulate planning priorities and goals that would serve to buttress a capitalist economy. However, according to Bell, these planning groups differed sharply in terms of their social and political orientations. This was reflected in the plans that already had been drawn up by these groups.

The NRPB plan submitted to Congress embodied the New Deal; it was "a summation of the New Deal philosophy, with all its humanitarianism and its equivocations."[115] Molded by its New Deal past, by labor and farm pressure, as well as by business views, the NRPB plan, according to Bell, was designed to ensure full employment and prevent industrial oligarchies. It would ultimately result in governmental control of a mixed economy. Its one weakness was that it accepted capitalism. With its proposal of a mixed economy, the NRPB plan was already creating a system that would mobilize big business to exert its influence on the political process. This was because the mixed economy left open the question of how much influence business could exert on the government. In short, Bell felt that the mixed economy set no limits on the amount of influence that big-business could exert on the

government. Thus, planning would remain a fundamentally political process subject to the powerful influence of business interests.

What is important to understand is that Bell's concern over the mixed economy grew out of a set of larger concerns that he shared with Carl Dreher, C. Wright Mills, and other contributors to the New Leader.[116] On one level, Bell feared a mixed economy because it served as a mechanism through which business and government were becoming, in effect, more and more one unit. On another level, Bell was concerned that the notion of free enterprise served as an ideological front that masked big business's intentions to dominate and divide the American and world market according to its dictates.

Both of these concerns led Bell to search for further evidence that America under the prodding and manipulation of big business was moving towards a monopoly state and to the development of a new imperialistic policy aimed at world wide domination.

Bell found evidence to support his suspicions from a variety of sources. Business Weekly was one source. In his October 23, 1943 column Bell noted that that publication had written an editorial outlining the significance of President Roosevelt's appointment of three prominent business men to key foreign policy posts. In this same column he quoted the editors of Business Weekly as saying:

> The appointment of Edward R. Stettinus as Under-Secretary of State, of Leo T. Crowley as Foreign Economic Administrator, and of W. Averall Harriman as Ambassador to Moscow didn't just happen. They are the most recent and so far the most spectacular instances

of a trend that you should keep your eye on.

> Business men, such as these three, are moving up in the New Deal Administration, replacing New Dealers as they go. They are moving up in the main office now, not just over in the wartime subsidiaries where the New Deal was forced to use business men to deal with business men and business processes. The latest choices for positions of power in government are plainly something more than necessities of war production....[117]

From this statement, Bell concluded that business wants it made known that the trend of business men into key government posts is no accident. Business wanted it made known that this trend reflects the "inexorable" necessity of America's moving into the saddle of world leadership where "hard-headedness is the touchstone of success."[118]

The Wall Street Journal was another source of evidence for Bell's thesis. In an article written at the end of 1943 bearing the headline "Monopoly Groups Seek to Smash Anti-Trust Laws After the War," Bell cited a December 20th Wall Street Journal article as evidence of business's plans to control the American post-war economy. That article, noted Bell, had vigorously endorsed an alleged "Administration proposal" that would call for a two year suspension of anti-trust laws and a cartelization of industries to stabilize the economy after the war. While Bell was critical of the accuracy of the implication in this article that that proposal was reflective of the administrations thinking, he wanted to cast light on what he considered to be a campaign that "monopoly elements" were waging to move America closer to becoming a "monopoly state." The Wall Street Journal's endorsement of this proposal was a part of that campaign, but only a part. This campaign was

designed to produce a cartelized economy that would ultimately result in "a permanent merger between government and business and the creation of a huge administrative bureaucracy."[119]

In a January 29th, 1944 article ominously entitled "Washington '44 - Prelude to the Monopoly State?," Bell found other sources that seemed to confirm his suspicions that business was seeking to move the United States toward a monopoly state. The most notable was a speech made by General Motors' Charles E. Wilson. The speech was one that Wilson, in his capacity as the executive head of the War Production Board, gave before members of the Army Ordinance Association. In it, Wilson urged that the United States be continually prepared for war, since future wars were inevitable. He then proceeded to outline two post war programs that would involve an ongoing partnership between business and government. One was a huge armament production program, the other an on-going research program that would involve leading government and private agencies. Both programs would require unity between the government, industry, and the army.

The fact that Wilson gave his speech in the setting that he did, was, to Bell, appropriate. What made it so was that the Army Ordinance Association was not an official body of Army officers but, rather, a private group made up of leading steel and armament executives, as well as key army officers who deal with ordinance and munitions production.[120]

In the same article Bell referred, in addition, to the text of an address that was given by William L. Batt, the United States member of the Allied Combined Raw Materials Board.

Batt, like Wilson, was a leading industrialist. Bell stressed that Batt's speech contained a proposal for a foreign trade and a raw material stockpiling program that would lead to an extension of the Allied Combined Raw Materials Board: that Board was a joint wartime project of the United States, British, and Canadian governments. Such a proposal and others similar to it would, Bell warned, lead the Allied Combined Raw Materials Board to form a world cartel that would police the world's supply of raw materials.

For Bell the speeches by Wilson and Batt were ominous signs of business' efforts to integrate industry with government in the direction of a corporate economy dominated by the huge monopolies. Moreover, for Bell, those speeches were a clear sign of big business's efforts to develop a new language and set of ideas that would act to justify the necessity of a monopoly state. Phrases like the permanent war economy, power politics, and balance of power, phrases that were a consistent part of Wilson and Batt's speeches, as well as of the language of several large American newspapers and magazines, were in Bell's view all a part of the ideological substructure of big business' "efforts to impose a monopoly state within the formal constraints of a democratic capitalist society."[121] Collectively, "what we have here, concluded Bell in his January 29th article, "is the industrial facade of the corporative state, without the brutal political connotations of a fascist party - which might get out of hand and dominate industry."[122]

Until he left the New Leader in December of 1944, Bell continued to write articles that elaborated his views on

America's movement towards a monopoly state. These were hard hitting articles. One article, written in October, concluded with the observation that American industrialists were fighting a different war than were other Americans. That article concluded with the observation that American industrialists were fighting a war to restore nineteenth century capitalism and to extend, under the ideological banner of "free enterprise," the American business "drive to supplant Great Britain as the directing force of a world economy."[123] In another article, written for Common Sense, Bell described the American government's Petroleum Reserves Corporation's proposed plans for the construction of a 1000 mile oil pipeline through the Middle East as being due to the influence of Standard Oil of New Jersey and other "titans" of the oil industry who were shaping the beginnings of a new imperialistic foreign policy.[124] That policy was calculated to provide protection for the American oil monopolies in the attempt to control foreign markets. Such a policy might, warned Bell, constitute the basis for a new world war.[125] But in none of his articles was Bell able to build substantially on the theoretical framework that he had established in his earlier writings on monopoly state capitalism. He focused primarily upon documenting his initial thesis.

Eager to expand that framework into a full scale theory of the monopoly state, Bell left the New Leader to devote his time fully to that task. But this was a task that he would never complete. Instead the period that he spent working on this project seems to have produced, in part, a distinct and lasting shift in Bell's thinking, one that would deepen and

lead him away from his starting point. This shift was characterized by a movement away from the type of Marxism evidenced in his New Leader writings to a growing skepticism of the rationalistic claim that, by eliminating the economic basis of exploitation, socialism would solve basic social problems. This was a shift that led Job Dittberner to characterize this period of Bell's life as engendering a "conversion experience."[126] Bell on the subject of this period, 1944 through 1945, had this to say:

> You see, a young man who's very ambitious, such as I was, wants to write a book. In '44-'45 I began a book and had a contract with John Day for a book called the Monopoly State.... I began sitting daily in the New York Public Library in that famour room 315, and reading and reading and I suddenly thought: all this is silly. I only know this second hand; I know this by imputation: I'm using some mechanical categories; I'm making comments on them, and its all silly. I suddenly realized I was very badly educated. I was educated in a vulgar Marxist framework, if you want to put it that way, making imputations about corporate behavior and I never really knew what was going on. And I suddenly felt that all this was silly. I had a manuscript that was about 300 or 400 pages and I looked at it and I said to myself: this is really nonsense.[127]

On The Nature of Bell's "Conversion"

Bell's rejection of the "vulgar Marxist framework" that he saw himself working from in his short-lived efforts to put together a theory of the monopoly state was, as we shall see, only one part of an intensely complicated and personal experience. That experience can be characterized not without some qualification as a conversion experience.

It is tempting to see Bell's rejection of "vulgar" Marxism as a conversion experience since that interpretation

gains support from the argument of C. Wright Mills and others concerning the end of ideology. That argument, as was noted earlier, was that the end of ideology thesis was based on the disillusionment of Bell, Lipset, and Shils, all ex-socialists, with socialism. Similarly, this viewpoint gains support from the notion expressed by Peter Gay that the end of ideology thesis was shaped by ex-radicals who were expressing through it a self-hatred of their radical past.[128] What makes this viewpoint even more plausible is the fact that is provides an explanation for what on the surface would appear to be a radical shift in perspective and loyalties, that is, Bell's employment in 1949 as a labor editor for Fortune Magazine, a publication that continues to be regarded as the spokesman for American big business.

The only problem with this interpretation is that it is factually wrong. A conversion experience is generally an intense, highly emotionally charged experience. Doubt, disillusionment, crisis, are the things that produce conversions.[129] Conversions are also generally accompanied by a total rejection of the ideas and beliefs around which the convert build his image of the world in favor of a new set of ideas and beliefs. Because they are total, all encomposing experiences, conversions allow for little if any balance between the new and the rejected religious or political faiths.

There were, to be sure, definite shifts in Bell's thinking from the time that he left the New Leader to the time that he joined the staff of Fortune. But those shifts were less dramatic, less extreme, than one might imagine given Fortune's

reputation, a reputation that ironically enough Bell helped to encourage when some time earlier he called it "the dollar-a-month spokesman of big-business."[130] It is true, as Dittberner has noted, that the animus towards big business which was clearly a part of Bell's writings for the New Leader were far less in evidence during his interim period. Yet, nowhere was Bell's loyalty to the radical spirit common to Marx and Dewey as much in evidence as in his essay "Adjusting Men to Machines." In this essay, written in 1947, Bell charged industrial sociologists with being "technicians" who work within a fixed ideological framework that serves to rationalize the claims and objectives of management. They, charged Bell, serve to preserve existing work relations in the factory by imputing to those relations a measure of permanence and historical necessity that is no more than a methodological fiction.

> Being scientists, they are concerned with "what is" and are not inclined to involve themselves in questions of moral values or larger social issues. They operate as technicians, approaching the problem as it is given to them and keeping within the framework set by those who hire them. Many conceive of themselves as "human engineers," counterparts to the industrial engineers: where the industrial engineer plans a flow of work in order to assure greater mechanical efficiency, the "human engineer" tries to "adjust" the worker to his job so that the human equation will match the industrial equation. To effect this, the sociologist seek "laws" of human behavior analogous to the laws of the physical world, and by and large they give little thought to the fact that they are not operating in the physical world. And almost none among them seem to be interested in the possibility that one of the functions of social science may be to explore alternative (and better, i.e., more human) modes of human combinations, not merely to make more effective those that already exist.[131]

Bell repeated this charge when he argued that:

> Despite their claims to scientific objectivity, these researches rest on the unstated assumption that mechanical efficiency and high output are the sole tests of achievement - of 'good' results. There are under way no studies to see what kinds of jobs can best stimulate the spontaneity and freedom of the worker, and how we can alter our industrial methods to assure such jobs. The present organization of industrial organization, inhuman as it may be, is accepted as an inalterable 'given.' Sociologists tend to work on the behaviorist assumption that the human being is a bundle of conditioned reflexes- equally malleable, psychologically, to any situation. But it is possible that the increasing 'rationalization' of living (its organization for greater efficiency), pervading all areas and narrowing all choices, is itself the root cause of the stresses and breakdown in social living that everybody decries.132

While these words were written in 1947, Bell would repeat them, almost verbatim, in his book Work and Its Discontents: The Cult of Efficiency in America, which was published in 1956. That book, as well as, parts of the "Adjusting Man to Machines" essay appeared in 1960 in essay form in The End of Ideology.

In general, it is difficult to characterize Bell's intellectual development between the time that he left the New Leader and the time that he joined Fortune as being part of a genuine "conversion" experience. A huge part of the difficulty that arises with this characterization is that Bell was never, despite his efforts to develop a theory of the monopoly state, and advocate of Marxian socialism. Nor, for that matter, was his method of analysis restricted exclusively to "vulgar" materialism. Bell's sophistication, his ability to recognize the limits of Marxist analysis in understanding the complexities of the modern world, was, for all intends and purposes, demonstrated by several book reviews that he wrote during the

same time that he was attempting to put together his theory of the monopoly state. Each of these book reviews was sharply critical of what Bell saw as the authors' neglect of non-economic factors other than in their attempt to explain the rise of fascism. In one book review, his review of Business As A System of Power, Bell even took its author, Robert Brady, to task for neglecting, in favor of categories of analysis sanctioned by "mechanical Marxism," the psychological mechanisms that in addition to economic factors conditioned the development of German fascism.[133]

The point we are making is a simple and fundamental one. It is only by neglecting or minimizing the significance of both these book reviews and his essay "Adjusting Men to Machines" that one can characterize the changes that took place in Bell's writing after he left the New Leader as being part of a genuine conversion experience.

In total, there was one fundamental, clear cut change that took place in Bell's writings from the time that he left the New Leader to roughly the time that he joined the staff of Fortune in 1949. This was his complete rejection of the finance-imperialism, "military-industrial complex" idea, that was so much a part of the framework that he shared with C. Wright Mills, in favor of a pluralistic theory of power.

This change along with the particularly strong anti-ideological stance that he adopted towards Marxian socialism after 1945 cannot be minimized. They were important changes. They were suggestive not only of a shift in Bell's thinking but also of a fundamental and often overriding shift in the

thinking of many socialists and communists of his generation. This shift was away from radicalism in politics to moderation, particularly as embodied in the Welfare State liberalism of the 1940s. This was less of a shift in ends and means for Bell than it was for others since, as both his and Irving Kristol's comments indicate, his basic impulse was to move cautiously, "to move slowly."[134] More than any thing else, this shift seems to be the product of a young man given to operating on different levels. It also seems to be the product of the intellectual mood that permeated the United States in the post war period.

While there was some relief and happiness in 1945 and 1946 because the allied forces had stemmed the tide of Nazi terror, it was not an entirely happy period. Rather, for many intellectuals it was a period of unrest and crisis. It was in Arthur Schleshinger's words "an age of anxiety."[135] Much of this unrest centered on the fear of continuing totalitarianism and of the seeming inability of Western civilization to develop, despite its emphasis on the inviolability of the individual human being, the necessary social and political instruments to safeguard adequately that inviolability.

This period was no less an age of anxiety for Bell than it was for other intellectuals. For a variety of reasons it would even seem that this period was more frought with anxiety and unrest for Bell than it was for other intellectuals. Bell, in recalling this period, has indicated that several things following his departure from the New Leader, in addition to his experience with the monopoly state book, shook his

confidence and put him into a "real tailspin."[136] There was, first the persistence of a set of lingering doubts that were triggered when, in 1942, he was called upon to write the New York State platform for the American Labor Party. These were doubts about the direction of socialism in America. At the time, Bell recalls that he thought "if I'm writing the state platform for the American Labor Party something's wrong with this whole situation."[137] There was also the failure of his first marriage, an event which as Bell recalls had an incalculable but traumatic effect on his life.

Deepening his feelings of doubt and insecurity was the discovery of anti-Semitism in the American labor movement: a discovery that Bell helped to make when, working as a consultant for the Jewish Labor Committee, he participated in a joint study on anti-semitism with Leo Lowenthal and Paul Massing. The findings of this study were never fully made public because as Bell recalls "they were too frightening."[138]

During the same period, Bell also participated in a series of discussions that were sponsored by the American Jewish Committee. The purpose of these discussions was to provide a forum for Jewish writers to define the role of the Jewish writer in American society. Out of these discussions came the idea for Commentary, a monthly publication whose success played, according to Bell an important part in the theme of the end of ideology.[139] In recalling these discussions Bell has stressed that they served to touch off in him "a fear of mass actions, a fear of passions let loose."[140] These were fears that Bell shared with others who participated in those

discussions, but especially with the historian Richard Hofstadter. Bell recalled:

> I remember having long discussions with Dick Hofstadter during this time. What arose in our conversations has, I think, shaped a lot of subsequent work. I mean a fear of mass action, a fear of passions let loose. A lot of this goes back in many ways to a fundamental Jewish fear. In traditional Jewish life, going back particularly to the Assyrian and Babylonian episodes, the first creativity, there's a fear of what happens when man is let loose. When man doesn't have halacha, the law, he becomes chia, an animal.[141]

For Bell these discussions also served to spark a deep-seated sense of camraderie with a group that has sometimes been called the "family" or the "New York Jewish Intellectuals."[142] Over the years this camraderie continued to grow entailing, as we shall see, both in his writings and in his political activities, that is, in his participation in the 1955 Milan Congress for Cultural Freedom Meetings. Some of the members of this group were Eliott Cohen, who was the founding force and dominant spirit behind Commentary, Delmore Schwartz and Isaac Rosenfeld two leading Chicago based literary figures, Richard Hofstadter, who collaborated with Bell on the book The Radical Right, Irving Kristol, who was to become his co-editor of Public Interest, and Seymour Martin Lipset.

Another contribution to Bell's feelings of insecurity and uncertainty during this period was his appointment to the University of Chicago, where he taught at, from 1945 through 1948. Teaching, Bell found, was a scary experience. Having been away from the academic world since 1939 when he finished work towards a Masters degree in Sociology at Columbia University, Bell found himself thrust into a "high powered"

intellectual world.

While at the University of Chicago Bell was forced to come to terms with a variety of overlapping issues, many of which crystallized around a particular debate that was central to the experiences of many ex-communist and ex-socialist Jewish intellectuals and writers of his generation. This debate was between Sidney Hook and Reinhold Niebuhr who in the 1930s has been outspoken intellectual defenders of Marxism, but who, in the 1940s, became the most outspoken and articulated supporters of liberalism. It involved the issue of Stalinism and the nature of its origins. The issue was whether Stalinism was a function of a particular set of historical accidents as Hook had insisted it was, or a function, as Niebuhr had insisted, of something much deeper and more fundamental: man and the will to power that cuts across all political movements.[143] The issue was: whether what had happened in the Soviet Union was a

> function of a series of accidents in which a minority group taking power in a backward country faced with external enemies and having to mobilize a society against the intervention of its enemies created a dictatorial regime as a response to external events or was what happened in the Soviet Union a function of power when it is unchecked by inner restraints."[144]

What made this debate central for Bell and for many ex-radical Jewish intellectuals and writers of his generation was the deeper issue that it raised: how, in the light of such devastating events as Stalinism, the Second World War, and the Holocaust, could one retain a utopian, progressive, or even optimistic view of human nature and of society.

In reviewing Bell's writings during the three years that

he was at the University of Chicago, Dittberner stressed that they registered the effect of Bell's disillusionment with Marxism. While this is an accurate characterization up to a point, it is inadequate when it is projected as a final assessment of Bell's work. Bell's writings during this period register the effects, as we shall see in the next chapter, of his efforts to develop a new approach resting on the idea that a critical acceptance of Welfare State liberalism need not, either in principle or in practice, result in the suspension of criticism and utopianism. This framework with its ultimate emphasis on the virtues of interest group liberalism as a system of checks and balances seems to have emerged in Bell's writings in response to the issues that the Hook-Niebuhr debates were instrumental in defining for a whole generation of intellectuals.[145]

This point needs to be kept in mind because it helps us to identify one essential aspect of Bell's writings after 1944-5, one that he reasserted in his essay on the end of ideology when at one point he says "the end of ideology need not mean the end of utopia as well." This is the tension that one finds in much of his post New Leader writings in balancing the view that man can effect through reason rational solutions to fundamental social problems with the view that some problems, given the irrational nature of man, can have no ultimately rational solutions but only proximate and shifting ones.

NOTES

1. Webster's New World Dictionary of the American Language, college ed. (1966), s.v. "Epilogue."

2. Daniel Bell, "The Mood of Three Generations" in The End of Ideology, p. 300.

3. Ibid.

4. This is Bell's estimate. See "The Mood of Three Generations: in The End of Ideology, p. 302.

5. Karl Mannheim, Essays on Sociology and Social Psychology, ed., Paul Kecskemeti (New York: Oxford University Press, 1953) p. 77.

6. By the time he joined The New Leader, 1938, he was using the name Bell.

7. For an interesting discussion of this phenomenon see Betty Yorburg, Utopia and Reality (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969). This book draws on a number of interviews with former members of the Young People's Socialist League.

8. See Job Leonard Dittberner, "The End of Ideology and American Social Thought 1930-1960" (Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1974) pp. 434-57.

9. Daniel Bell, "The Moral Vision of The New Leader," New Leader, December 24, 1973.

10. Ibid., p. 10.

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid.

13. Ibid.

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid.

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid.

18. Ibid., pp. 10-11.

19. Ibid., p. 11.

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid.

22. The Old Guard was drawn largely from veteran New York Jewish Socialists and veteran members of successful local organizations from Milwaukee, Wisconsin, Reading, Pennsylvania, and Bridgeport, Connecticut. The leaders of the Old Guard were Louis Waldman, Algenon Lee, and James Oneal. The Old Guard's opposition to the "centrist" group headed by Norman Thomas stemmed in large part from its opposition to the inclusion of Trotskyists and Lovestonites at the national convention of the Socialist party in Cleveland. It also stemmed from the tactics of leftist factions who gained control of the Socialist party organization in New York. Age was another factor. As Martin Diamond put it: "an age gulf of more than a generation tended to exacerbate the theoretical differences between the Old Guard and most of the newer members attracted by Norman Thomas' leadership during the early Depression years." Martin Diamond "The Problems of the Socialist Party" in Failure of a Dream? eds., John H.M. Laslett and Seymour Martin Lipset (Garden City, New York: Anchor Press/Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1974) p. 377.

23. The origins of the conflict can be traced back to 1932 when an attempt was made to remove Old Guard Morris Hillquit from the party chairmanship. While accounts of the campaign to force Hillquit from his post vary there is no doubt that anti-Semitism was a factor. As Diamond put it: "some who sought Hillquit's ouster wanted a native American to represent the party and their language sometimes seemed to verge on anti-semitism." Diamond, "The Problems of the Socialist Party," in Failure of a Dream, p. 378. For a more sharply worded account see Algernon Lee "On the Split of 1936," New Leader, 10 May 1947, p. 3. In this article Lee disputed Norman Thomas' assertion that the campaign to displace Hillquit was actuated by a regard for Hillquit's health. As Lee put it: "the leading point in the long and largely underground campaign" against Hillquit was that Hillquit was 'not an American' and that he was "one of those New York Jews."

24. The date of its formation was May 24, 1936. According to the New York Times the Social Democratic Federation was formed at a meeting attended by the "Old Guard's" forty-four delegates to the Cleveland convention and by delegates and by contested delegates from Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, and other States. Louis Waldman, leader of the "Old Guard," presided at the meeting. "Old Guard Forms New Party After Socialist Ouster," New York Times, 25 May 1936, p. 1.

25. "Socialist Party Enters Campaign Badly Divided," New York Times, 31 May 1936, sec. 4, p. E7.

26. The clearest statement of the "Old Guard's" position was formulated by James Oneal. In an article for New Leader Oneal argued that while Roosevelt was not a Socialist, Socialists should not be reticent about supporting him in

the 1936 presidential election. His argument was that "throughout the history of the (Socialist) movement the movement has conceded that there are exceptional situations, emergency situations and crisis situations that fully justify support of non-Socialist candidates, and especially, if such support tends to bring the whole organized working class to a more advanced position in theory and action." To this Oneal added that Socialists cannot be a "puritan sect." Socialists, Oneal argued, "are either a part of the living labor movement or should be, for without the working class ours cannot be even a Socialist movement, however much we may talk about abolishing the profit system." James Oneal, "Why Socialists in This Campaign Support President Roosevelt," New Leader, 31 October 1936, p. 6.

27. "Social Democratic Federation: Statement of Principles," New Leader, 30 May 1936, p. 1.

28. Ibid.

29. "Old Guard," New York Times, 25 May 1936, p. 1.

30. Ibid.

31. "Social Democratic Federation," New Leader, 30 May 1936, p. 1.

32. Ibid.

33. Interview with Daniel Bell, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 23 February 1978.

34. Ibid.

35. Irving Kristol, "Memoirs of a Trotskyist," New York Times Magazine, 23 January 1977, p. 51.

36. Daniel Bell, "Clippings and Comment," New Leader, 19 September 1942, p. 2.

37. Ibid.

38. Daniel Bell, "Memo to Mrs. Roosevelt: A.Y.C. Destroys Chances for a Progressive Youth Organization," New Leader, 6 July 1940, p. 4.

39. Ibid.

40. Ibid.

41. Ibid.

42. Ibid.

43. Ibid.

44. For some general comments on the subject see John P. Diggins, The American Left in the Twentieth Century (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1973) pp. 34-9.

45. For an extensive discussion of this point see Samuel H. Beer, British Politics in The Collectivist Age (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967), pp. 68-102. One of the chief peculiarities of the British political system is that in England the old often blends with the new. The Toryism of the Conservative Party is, argued Beer, a case in point. Beer's point is that not only did this pre-capitalist, pre-individualist, pre-liberal creed survive in the era of the Welfare State and the Managed Economy but "it can also claim credit for having helped create them."

46. The debate is over whether Socialism should be modified to attract the working class or whether it should remain faithful to Marxist principles. For a penetrating study of revisionism see Peter Gay, The Dilemma of Democratic Socialism (New York: Collier Books, 1962, 1952).

47. The clearest statement of this revisionist position was made by C.R. Attlee in The Labour Party in Perspective and Twelve Years Later (London: Victor Gollanzz Ltd., 1949). In this highly programmatic work the British Socialist leader declared that the Labour Party as a working class move is "not the creation of a theorist. It is seeking to show the people of Great Britain that the Socialism which it preaches is what the country requires in order in modern conditions to realize to the full the genius of the nation."

48. William English Walling, The Larger Aspects of Socialism (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1913) p. 373.

49. Ibid.

50. For a further discussion of the role of Walter Lippman and Max Eastman in establishing a line of continuity in the United States between pragmatism and Marxism see John P. Diggins, The American Left in the Twentieth Century.

51. Sidney Hook, Reason, Social Myths, and Democracy (New York: John Day Co., 1940) p. 132.

52. Sidney Hook, John Dewey...An Intellectual Portrait (Westport Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1971, 1939) p. 174.

53. Sidney Hook, Reason, Social Myths, and Democracy, p. 131.

54. John Dewey, Liberalism and Social Action (New York: G.P. Putnam, 1935) p. 32.

55. John Dewey, Liberalism and Social Action, p. 33.

56. Ibid.

57. Ibid., p. 32.

58. John Dewey, Liberalism and Social Action, p. 34.

59. Ibid.

60. Ibid.

61. Ibid.

62. John Dewey, Liberalism and Social Action, p. 54.

63. Ibid.

64. Ibid.

65. Ibid.

66. Ibid.

67. John Dewey, Liberalism and Social Action, pp. 54-5.

68. Ibid., p. 55.

69. In addition to Karl Mannheim's Ideology and Utopia one can turn to Judith Shklar's "The Political Theory of Utopia: From Melancholy to Nostalgia," Daedelus 94 (Spring 1965): 367-81. for a comprehensive discussion of this subject. Another important work is Adam Ulam's "Socialism and Utopia," Daedelus 94 (Spring 1965): 382-400.

70. For an elaboration of this point and an analysis of Instrumentalism, in general, see Sidney Hook, John Dewey, pp. 88-105. For a critical treatment of this point, one that highlights the limits of Instrumentalism see Henry David Aiken, "Sidney Hook as Philosopher," Commentary, February 1962): 143, and "American Pragmatism Reconsidered: John Dewey," Commentary July 1962, 334.

71. Richard Hofstadter, Anti-Intellectualism in American Life (New York: Vintage Books, 1963) p. 388.

72. For Arnold the Hellenistic and the Hebraic represented two different orientations to life. As he explained in his critique of English social life, Culture and Anarchy, the Hellenistic represented a predisposition towards spontaneity while the Hebraic represented a habit of mind based on conscience and restraint. We shall have more to say about Arnold as this study progresses.

73. "Editorial," New Leader, 19 January 1924, p. 12.

74. Though never statistically a major factor in American politics socialism did enjoy a very successful period from 1902 to 1912. This was a period that highlighted Eugene V. Debs success in promoting ideas that captured the sympathies of relatively large segments of American workers and intellectuals. In his history of American socialism, Marxian Socialism in the United States, Bell refers to this period as the "golden age of American socialism." In support of this characterization Bell emphasized the near success of the Socialist party in 1902 of passing a resolution at the American Federation of Labor convention that would have called for "the working people to organize their economic and political power to secure for labor the full product of its toil and the overthrow of the wage system and the establishment of an industrial cooperative commonwealth." This resolution was defeated by a vote of 4,897 to 4,171. Highlighted also by Bell was the Socialist party's membership in 1912. In that year it had 118,000 dues paying members. What was especially significant about that number was that only thirteen percent of that figure were members of the foreign-language federations. This was a figure that reflected the increasingly American character of the American Socialist party during this period. Bell, Marxian Socialism in the United States (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1967, 1952) p. 64; Literature and art provide other measures of the success of the Socialist party during the 1902-1912 period. As Harry W. Laidler put it in his analysis of the American Socialist party "during and shortly following this period a flood of books, novels, plays, pamphlets, essays, poems, and cartoons presenting the socialistic point of view in various fields of thought and action issued from the pens and pencils of a host of American writers and artists. Scores of magazines, weeklies, and dailies were being issued, the Appeal to Reason, a militant propaganda sheet published in Girard, Kansas, with a half-million subscribers, leading in circulation." Laidler, History of Socialism (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1968) pp. 588-9.

75. The change in the New Leader's masthead occurred in the May 30, 1936 issue.

76. "Editorial," New Leader, 30 May 1936, p. 8.

77. "The Real Issue," New Leader, 18 January 1936, p. 3.

78. It is worth noting that according to Bell there were a number of articles that he wrote under different names while he was with the New Leader.

79. Dittberner, "The End of Ideology and American Social Thought," p. 228.

80. Dittberner's research in this area was extremely helpful. Generally his citations were accurate. However one correction is in order. Instead of "Defense Monopoly Hits Small Business, Chokes Production" appearing in the August 20, 1941 issue of the New Leader the correct date is August 2, 1941. Other New Leader articles that reflected Bell's interest in the labor movement were: "Captive Mine Decision To Settle Lewis Role At CIO Parley Nov. 17," 8 November 1941, p. 1; "Lewis Unions May Provoke Clashes in Organizing Drives," 29 November 1941, p. 1; "Political Intrigues Balk New Moves for Labor Peace; Settling of Jurisdiction Key To Permanent Peace," 24 January 1942, pp. 1, 7; "AFL-CIO Actions Refute Tory Cry on Labor's Slowdowns," 28 March 1942, pp. 1, 7; "Labor Wants 'Win the War' Congress; Tory Drives Hit Production Morale," 25 April 1942, pp. 1, 7; "New CIO Wars Loom Over Lewis Break; Murray to Repeat AFL Peace Feelers," 30 May 1942, p. 7; "Communist Forces Losing Hold in CIO Elections, Survey Shows," 13 February 1943, p. 1; "UAW Parley to Show Labor's Mood Towards FDR Policies; Report Phil Murray to Force Compromise in Reuther-Addes Fight," 2 October 1943, p. 1.

81. See especially "Seek Social Justice at Churches; Gov't to Crack Down in Detroit Area," New Leader, 18 April 1942, p. 1.

82. Daniel Bell, "Technocracy Rides Again in New High-Powered Campaign," New Leader, 14 March 1942, pp. 1, 7; Daniel Bell, "Scott, Ex Wobbly, Makes Fancy Appeal With Catch-All Program," New Leader, 21 March 1942, pp. 1, 7.

83. Daniel Bell, "Pro-Fascist Heads 'Free Hungary' Group, Seeks Official Recognition; Czech, Yogoslav Gov'ts Protest Activity of Tibor Eckhart Here," New Leader, 21 February 1942, p. 1.

84. Daniel Bell, "Chicago Group, Edward Lodge Currant Spread Defeatism," New Leader, 7 March 1942, p. 1.

85. Daniel Bell, "Fascist Papers - A Checklist of Danger," New Leader, 18 July 1942, p. 1.

86. Daniel Bell, "Chicago Group, Edward Lodge Currant Spread Defeatism," New Leader, 7 March 1942, p.1.

87. Dittberner, "The End of Ideology and American Social Thought," p. 228.

88. The New Leader was quite proud of its record of keeping track of developments between Standard Oil of New Jersey and I.G. Farben. In one article the New Leader reminded its readers that evidence of these deals had been laying in secret government files for eight months with no action having been taken. In this article the New Leader also reminded its readers of its track record in pressing for the investigation of these records by the Truman Commission.

"Conviction," New Leader, 28 March 1942, p. 1.

89. Dittberner, "The End of Ideology and American Social Thought," p. 228.

90. Daniel Bell, "OPM Puts Gov't in Aluminum, Magnesium, Aircraft Business," New Leader, 31 May 1941, p. 3.

91. Ibid.

92. Ibid.

93. Daniel Bell, "Business Plans to Defy Gov't Efforts to Control War Industries," New Leader, 28 June 1941, p. 2. Bell's argument was that the fate of the War Department's Property Seizure Bill, then in Congress for three weeks, would determine how far industry would be exempt from an all out war against fascism.

94. Daniel Bell, "Standard Oil - Nazi Firm Tie-up Halted Rubber Production; I.G. Farben Patents Held by Jasco Balked U.S. Efforts - Full Story Told," New Leader, 31 January 1942, p. 1.

95. Daniel Bell, "Urge Probe of Int'l Cartels Balking Production, Foreign Ties of U.S. Firms; Farben Patents Worth Millions Sold to Standard For Song," New Leader, 4 April 1942, p. 1.

96. Ibid.

97. Daniel Bell, "Senate to Probe Hi-Octane Sales to Axis," New Leader, 27 June 1942, pp. 1, 7.

98. Ibid.

99. Daniel Bell, "Sterling - A Story the Senate Fears to Hear," New Leader, 8 August 1942, p. 1.

100. Ibid.

101. Ibid.

102. Daniel Bell, review of Patents For Hitler, by Guenter Reimann, in New Leader, 7 November 1942, p. 3. In elaborating on this point Bell stated that: "In its coming a long way from the individual industrial enterpreneurs of sixty years ago corporate wealth has become anonymous and institutionalized. Morgan and Rockefeller, hollow names of their forebearers, are merely convenient fictions for American capitalism." This is a statement that Bell would return to in the mid-1950s. It would be the basis of "The Breakup of Family Capitalism," which was an essay in which Bell developed his critique of managerial capitalism. This is an essay that we shall examine in greater detail in Chapter Five.

103. Daniel Bell, review of Patents For Hitler, by Guenter Reimann, in New Leader, 7 November 1942, p. 3.

104. Daniel Bell, review of "Dated Socialist-Liberalism," by Stuart Chase, in New Leader, 5 December 1942, p. 2.

105. Ibid.

106. Ibid.

107. This is a phrase that C. Wright Mills later used as the title of his book on the rise of bureaucratic labor leaders. C. Wright Mills, The New Men of Power (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1948).

108. Daniel Bell, "Clippings and Comment," New Leader, 24 October 1942, p. 2.

109. Ibid.

110. Daniel Bell, "Clippings and Comment," New Leader, 28 November 1942, p. 2.

111. Daniel Bell, "Clippings and Comment," New Leader, 9 January 1943, p. 2.

112. Ibid.

113. Daniel Bell, "Clippings and Comment," New Leader, 12 December 1942, p. 2.

114. Daniel Bell, "Planning By Whom For What? Business Menaces FDR Schemes, Vested Interests Plan Own Board for Economic Control," New Leader, 20 March 1943, p. 5.

115. Ibid.

116. The issues that Bell was concerned with were: the compatibility of collectivism with democracy and the compatibility of a mixed economy with full efficiency. These issues were the focal points of a debate between Charles Dreher and John Chamberlain. In the November 1942 issue of Common Sense each wrote articles that attacked the others position. For Dreher Chamberlain's views on planning and collectivism represented "the middle way" and were thus reactionary. In calling for collectivism Dreher argued that democracy and socialism are not incompatible. He also argued that a collectivist industrial scheme could be developed which contains checks and balances and which would accommodate America's technological drives for national defense and welfare without jeopardizing America's basic democratic traditions. Chamberlain's response to Dreher's views were brief but to the point. In arguing that there are certain things which belong to the public and certain things which belong

to the individual and that sharp distinctions must be made between each sphere Chamberlain accused Dreher of not absorbing the lessons of the 1930s, the lessons provided by the Soviet Union. In short, convinced of the irreconciliability of democracy and socialism Chamberlain accused Dreher of an "ignorance of history." With a December 1942 New Leader article called "Collectivism and Freedom" C. Wright Mills joined the debate. His position was that there was no reason why the aims of socialism need not be the aims of classical democracy. In a call for socialism Mills argued that given the power of big business in the United States a mixed economy "would not be a mixed economy for very long, nor would it lead to a mixed and competitive political regime.". Mills also argued that business and government were becoming one. He warned that unless Congress steps in business may well become government. After calling Chamberlain the spokesman of Fortune Magazine Mills went on to argue that Fortune in its December 1942 on the mixed economy had accepted a "bastard version of the Marxian theory of the state." This is a version, Mills argued, that legitimates Fortune's efforts to become the political committee for the ruling stratum of big business. C. Wright Mills, "Collectivism and Freedom," New Leader, pp. 5-6. Fortune's views on the mixed economy will be discussed in some detail in Chapter Five. Other New Leader articles related to the Chamberlain-Dreher debate were "Collectivism and Freedom" by Abba P. Lerner, New Leader, 29 November 1942, p. 2; and "Blueprints, But Not in a Vacuum" by Alfred Braunthal, New Leader, 22 December 1942, p. 2.

117. Daniel Bell, "Clippings and Comment," New Leader, 23 October 1943, p. 2.

118. Ibid.

119. Daniel Bell, "Two Steps Toward Monopoly State," New Leader, 26 February 1944, p. 5.

120. Daniel Bell, "Washington '44 - Prelude To the Monopoly State," New Leader, 29 January 1944, p. 4.

121. Ibid.

122. Ibid.

123. Daniel Bell, "The Balance Sheet of the War," New Leader, 21 October 1944, p. 8.

124. Daniel Bell, "Pipeline to Imperialism," Common Sense, April 1944, pp. 130-3.

125. Bell's warning was very clear and succinct: "We are walking into a new political cockpit which may wind up as World

War III." Bell, "Pipeline To Imperialism," p. 133.

126. The term "conversion experience" was first used by Bell in The Reforming of General Education. The context in which he used this phrase was to describe the impact of contemporary civilization and humanities courses at Columbia College. "For many students, these courses were a conversion experience, a shock of ideas that gave them a new appreciation of the dimensions of thought and feeling - a conversion, so to speak, to culture." Daniel Bell, The Reforming of General Education (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966) p. 210. Both the description and the "conversion experience" phrase were later popularized by Norman Podhoretz. On the subject of being converted to culture at Columbia College Podhoretz had this to say: "certainly something of a kind happened to me at Columbia; I discovered, and really for the time time, that there were more things in heaven and earth than were dreamt of in the philosophy of Brownsville, that the world offered a greater range of possibilities than I or the people among whom I had been raised had ever imagined it to contain. And in time I came to see that some of these were possibilities for me." Norman Podhoretz, Making It (New York: Random House, 1967) pp. 42-3. Following the Spring 1968 student strike at Columbia University Bell used the phrase "conversion experience" to fashion a polemic against the Columbia University administration. His thesis was that the failure of the Columbia University administration to debate Students for a Democratic Society leaders helped to make many students become radicals. Bell developed this thesis in "Columbia and the New Left," Confrontation, eds., Daniel Bell and Irving Kristol (New York: Basic Books, 1968) pp. 67-107. For a discussion of Bell's thesis see Chapter Seven (pp. 479-81).

127. Interview with Daniel Bell, Dittberner, "The End of Ideology and American Social Thought," p. 443.

128. Peter Gay, The Dilemma of Democratic Socialism (New York: Collier Books, 1962, 1952) pp. 310-1. In noting that "despair can be just as modish, just as unpolitical, as certain forms of Utopianism" Gay went on to develop the following argument: "it may be that we must free ourselves from the social worker's cant; but the anti-social worker's cant, based on a misreading of Reinhold Niebuhr coupled with self-hatred for one's radical past, is far more dreary and far less constructive." With regard to socialism and utopianism as the subject of the end of ideology debate Gay went on to add that while "the programs needed to improve at once the standard of living and the quality of life" may be undertaken by a society committed to the preservation of private property and a mixed economy the task would not be pursued without some assistance from socialists. His argument was that: "such programs will become realities only if existing governments are

continuously and intelligently pushed from the left." To this argument Gay added the following sentiment: "It may be the fate of socialists to invent programs that non-socialists will carry out. It may be that democratic socialists will make their mark in history by thinking and criticizing rather than by governing. But even if that should be so, socialist thinking will become more rather than less necessary as the welfare state continues on its blithe, unideological path. The Bernsteins of this world may be so many Moseses, pointing to the promised land they cannot enter. But without their direction, the promised land would lie forever in obscurity. And it is not a bad fate to be a Moses." It seems safe to say that this sentiment was derived both from Gay's study of Eduard Bernstein and his own experiences as an American socialist who lived through the disappointments of the 1930s.

129. William James in discussing both religious and non-religious conversions refers to conversion as a unifying process. Conversion is described by him as a process that enables a troubled individual to overcome his sense of being divided into two worlds and the inner sense of discord and incompleteness that he feels. According to James the non-religious conversion may either come gradually or suddenly. There is no general rule. But conversions in general, he noted, always follow some period of crisis, some disruption of the way one looks at the world. For James's analysis of the conversion process see William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience (New York: The Modern Library, 1920, 1902) pp. 163-253.

130. This does not preclude the possibility that Bell may have experienced a counter-conversion. But counter-conversions are generally rare. According to James they are rare because converts in having committed themselves to the life they have chosen tend to identify with that life no matter how much their enthusiasm for it declines. For an elaboration of this point see William James, The Varities of Religious Experience, p. 173, and p. 253.

131. Daniel Bell, "Adjusting Men to Machines," Commentary, January 1947, p. 80.

132. Ibid., p. 87.

133. Daniel Bell, review of Business As a System of Power, Robert Brady, in Partisan Review, July-August 1943, p. 377.

134. Interview with Daniel Bell, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 23 February 1978.

135. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., The Vital Center (Houghton Mifflin Company, 1949) p. 1.

136. Interview with Daniel Bell, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 23 February 1978.

137. Ibid. The American Labor Party was formed in the summer of 1936. Primarily a New York State political party its intention was to permit labor to support President Roosevelt, Governor Lehman and Mayor LaGuardia. It came to an end as an active political party soon after the 1944 primaries. For more detail see Will Herberg, "The Still-born Labor Party," Common Sense, May 1944, pp. 160-3.

138. Interview with Daniel Bell, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 23 February 1978.

139. Ibid.

140. Ibid.

141. Ibid.

142. The New York Jewish Intellectuals is the more common expression. The phrase "the family" was used by Norman Podhoretz in Making It.

143. The debate was touched off by Reinhold Niebuhr's critique of Marxism in The Nature and Destiny of Man (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1941). The thrust of Niebuhr's critique was that Stalinism was no historical accident. It was the product of a "restless vanity" and was very much an extension of Enlightenment Rationalism. The "restless vanity" a phrase used by Bell as the title of his introduction to The End of Ideology was in Niebuhr's view endemic to man. It was in his view a product of man's being a creature who does not and can not, a priori, know his limits. We shall discuss Niebuhr's thought in greater detail in Chapter Four of this study. Hook's contribution to the debate was an essay entitled "The New Failure of Nerve," Partisan Review, January-February 1943, pp. 2-23. This essay was part of a symposium called "The New Failure of Nerve" conducted by Partisan Review. Other participants in this symposium included John Dewey and Ernest Nagel. Hook continued his rebuttal of Niebuhr in "The Failure of the Left," Partisan Review, July-August 1943, pp. 165-77. The debate was scarcely limited to the pages of Partisan Review. In the early 1940s the New Leader also featured a number of articles that figured in this debate. One important article was Max Eastman's "Socialism and Human Nature," New Leader, 24 January 1942, pp. 5-6. The tone of this article was even more pessimistic than the tone established in Niebuhr's post 1930s writings. Other important New Leader articles related to this debate are Reinhold Niebuhr, "Despite Flaws Marxism Provides Realistic Insight into Society," 7 February 1942, p. 5; Reinhold Niebuhr, "Ideologies: Mental Corruption is No 'Capitalist' Monopoly, Special Interests Pervert Thinking on the Left," 16 August 1941, p. 4; and Sidney Hook, "Social Change and Original Sin: Answer to Niebuhr," 8 November 1941, pp. 5, 7. The Hook-Niebuhr debate was also

the focal point of several articles that appeared in Commentary. One of the most significant of these articles from the standpoint of Bell's development of the end of ideology thesis was Will Herberg's "From Marxism To Judaism," Commentary, January 1947, pp. 25-32. In this article Herberg relates the failure of Marxism to meet the challenge of totalitarianism to its "being infected with the same disease," to its rejection of an ethic that would transcend "the relativities of power and class interest." In short, Herberg related Marxism's failure to its being a false religion guided by a set of false claims and a corrupted image of history. This he explained is an image of history that obscures the paradox that man finds himself the center of: man is at the same time both free and bound. He is free to examine, to criticize, to know, and to create. Yet he is subject to "the restless forces that control his outer life."

144. Interview with Daniel Bell, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 23 February 1978.

145. In his assessment of Niebuhr's influence on American social and political thought James P. Young noted that the full impact of Niebuhr's work can best be seen in the work of Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. After noting Schlesinger's credentials as a liberal historian, intellectual, and special assistant to Presidents Kennedy and Johnson Young detailed the Niebuhrian elements of Schlesinger's The Vital Center. This was a work that served as a manifesto for the Americans for Democratic Action. "In theoretical terms, Niebuhrian themes predominate. Western man is viewed as 'tense, uncertain, adrift.' The capitalist class has failed to be an effective agent of government because, in its zeal to pursue its own narrow ends, it has produced a plutocracy rather than an aristocracy. Even more significant is Schlesinger's emphasis on what he feels to be the failure of the left. 'The defining characteristic of the progressive, as I shall use the word, is the sentimentality of his approach to politics and culture.' The failure of the liberal has been the result of his excessive faith in logic and in the perfectibility of man. The solution to this problem is a more mature and therefore somewhat more pessimistic (or realistic) view of the nature of man. The defense which Schlesinger offers for democracy has a familiar ring:

> The people as a whole are not perfect; but no specific group of the people is more perfect: that is the moral and rationale of democracy. Consistent pessimism about man, far from promoting authoritarianism, alone can innoculate the democratic faith against it."

This statement is shaped, concludes Young, by Niebuhr's view that "man's capacity for justice makes democracy possible; but man's inclination to injustice makes democracy necessary." Young also concluded that it is this view which shapes Schlesinger's indictment of liberalism.

"Liberalism, Schlesinger contends, must give up its optimism about the nature of man and the possibility of progress. It must 'accept the limitations and possibilities' of the real world, and return to a 'tradition of a reasonable responsibility about politics and a modern pessimism about man.' Only then can there be a politically and intellectually sound noncommunist left." James P. Young, The Politics of Affluence, pp. 31-2; Schlesinger himself offered perhaps the best characterization of the nature of Niebuhr's influence in shaping American political thought in the post World War II period. "The penetrating critic of the Social Gospel and of pragmatism, he ended up, in a sense, the powerful reinterpreter and champion of both. It was the triumph of his own remarkable analysis that it took what was valuable in each, rescued each by defining for each the limits of validity, and, in the end, gave the essential purposes of both new power and new vitality. And he did this not alone in his books and articles, but in his life. No man has had as much influence as a preacher in this generation; no preacher has had as much influence in the secular world.... It was almost as much his personality as his writing which...helped accomplish in a single generation a revolution in the bases of American liberal political thought. A culture which had staked too much on illusions of optimism found itself baffled and stricken in an age dominated by total government and total war; history had betrayed its votaries. Defeatism and despair might have been a natural reaction to so devastating a disillusion - a natural reaction in the world of philosophy, at least, even if reflexes of survival would have guaranteed resistance in the world of politics." It was Niebuhr's genius to show, concluded Schlesinger, that the "refutation by history of democratic illusions need not turn into a refutation of democracy; that the appalled realization that man was not wholly good and reasonable need not turn into a repudiation of man as wholly evil and impotent; that men and women could act more effectively for decency and justice under the banner of a genuine humility than they had under the banner of an illusory perfectibility. His penetrating reconstruction of the democratic faith - in the context of Roosevelt's brilliant invocation of democratic resources against the perils of depression and war - absorbed and mastered the forces of disillusion and preserved the nerve of action. With his aid, that faith emerged from two anguished decades far better armed than before against future ordeal and challenge." Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., "Reinhold Niebuhr's Role In Political Thought," in Reinhold Niebuhr: His Religious, Social, and Political Thought, eds. Charles W. Kegley and Robert W. Bretall (New York: Macmillan, 1956), pp. 149-50; In a 1958 Commentary article called "A Critique Of The New Jewish Theology," Judd L. Teller wrote an interesting assessment of Niebuhr's influence of American Jewish thought. Teller wrote of both Niebuhr's influence on American Jews who "progressed from Marxism to Judaism"

and of his influence on modern Jewish theology. "The American Jews who have progressed from Marxism to Judaism in recent years may be divided into two general categories. There are the 'vulgar' but not necessarily anti-secularist ba-alei t'shuvah (returners), the Samuel Ornitzes and Michael Blankforts who produced lachrymose fictional atonements for having broken with parental piety in their youth. And then there are those penitents who required a complete refurbishing of their psyches a new 'system' to replace the one that collapsed. These latter are the 'wrathful' prophets, anti-secularists to the hilt. Their mentor on the way to t'shuvah and Judaism has been, perhaps to his own surprise, a Christian theologian, Reinhold Niebuhr, the chief exponent of American Christian existentialism. But Dr. Niebuhr has influenced more Jews than just those who were once Marxists. The rabbis seem the most addicted. Today nearly all American rabbinical periodicals in English manifest some kind of preoccupation with Niebuhr." Teller went on to discuss the intellectual continuities between Niebuhr and Will Herberg's theological writings. He also commented about the irony of Niebuhr's influence on Jewish theology. "Centuries ago Jewish religious thinkers debated, modified, and absorbed Greek philosophy. But these same thinkers always avoided encounters with Christianity - not only out of prudence but also because they did not deem theology itself worthy of polemic. Maimonides, when coerced into debate by the Church, restricted himself to challenging the contention that the Messiah had come and to refuting in general terms Christianity's claim to be a continuation of Hebraic tradition. That a Christian theologian should become an operative influence in Jewish religious writing is an unprecedented development. And that some of those disillusioned with Marxism should find solace in a Judaism refracted through the prism of a Christian theologian is of special significance." Judd L. Teller, "A Critique Of The New Jewish Theology," Commentary, March 1958, p. 243.

CHAPTER IV

THE ROAD TO THE END OF IDEOLOGY

The University of Chicago Years

While teaching at the University of Chicago was an intimidating experience, it was also, as Bell later recalled, an exciting period, a crucial period in his life. "For the first time I get a real education."[1]

Part of that education included the opportunity to re-read Marx, and part of it also included studying for the first time neo-classical economic theory. Still another part included participating in study groups both on and off the University of Chicago campus. These were devoted to discussions of philosophical issues and to the works of scholars that were related to various historical and theological aspects of Judaism. One such study group was devoted to the Talmud and to the works of Maimonides. Bell participated in this group with Steven Marcus, Benjamin Nelson, and Daniel Boorstin. But, as Bell later recalled, the largest part of his education consisted of his participating in the University's Social Science program. This was at the time a unique educational program.

Largely coordinated by Edward Shils, the social sciences were not divided into specialized courses, as is generally the case in most colleges, but were, instead, organized on the

basis of a specific problem area. The first year of the three year program was devoted to an analysis of American democracy, its philosophical presuppositions, and issues related to American society. The second year was organized around the theme of society and culture, with a heavy concentration on the impact of industrial society on the individual. The focus of the third year was devoted to considering the problem of freedom and control and to generating questions concerning the relationship of economic freedom to the political order and the role of bureaucracy. In all, the program was tied together by what, Bell later recalled was, "an explicit effort to indicate the relationship of social science inquiry to philosophical issues."[2] All courses were interdisciplinary and staff taught. "Weekly staff meetings were held to review materials, to present coaching materials for staff members insufficiently acquainted with a topic, and to discuss questions that should be raised in class."[3]

Though there were a number of other highly respected scholars connected with the Social Science Program, Barrington Moore, Sylvia Thrupp, Philip Rieff, David Reisman, Philip Selznick, Benjamin Nelson, and Nathan Glazer being among them. But Shils' opinions on books and writers carried special weight.

> I suppose that in so far as the education I got taught -- perhaps a little too much -- a respect for the idea of the book, for learning, there was always some secret notion (among us) about the man who knows. You can write a book and everyone will praise it, but there's always someone who knows, not God, but some smart guy. Edward Shils used to always play this role. That was Shils' power. If he said yes, fine. But if he said swish, that was the end of it.[4]

In the main, what seems apparent from Bell's recollections of his experience at the University of Chicago was, that by virtue of the influence of Shils, the quality of staff that it attracted, and the sense of intellectual camraderie that it fostered, the University provided a stimulating intellectual milieu. Together with the study groups on Judaism, the University of Chicago seems to have provided Bell with an intellectual environment that enabled him to broaden his thinking on the subject of the Holocaust and the problems that it touched off for him and other American Jewish intellectuals. In this respect Bell credited the University of Chicago with providing an intellectual atmosphere that allowed him to think through problems and to develop the temperament and skills to place social and political problems into broad anthropological and philosophical contexts. At this level the University of Chicago seems to have helped him to discover, largely from the works of Max Weber and Reinhold Niebuhr, the sociological and philosophical sources against which he would elaborate much of his thinking on subjects like alienation and ideological politics, subjects that elicited in him a fundamentally pessimistic response.

Bell was not alone in his appreciation of Weber and Niebuhr's respective works. During the 1940s, the writings of both came to be widely known and read. Prompted by deep-seated fears about totalitarianism, many scholars and intellectuals raised questions that led them to turn to seminal thinkers like Weber and Niebuhr for answers. These questions called out for perspectives that would enable them

to develop some understanding of the deeper causes of the Holocaust and of the origins of totalitarianism. In this regard it is not without historical significance that Commentary, a publication witn deep roots in the American Jewish intellectual community, chose a paper by Niebuhr to initiate their series on the "Crisis of The Individual."[5]

Even though many of his writings had not been translated by the mid-1940s, Weber's standing in American intellectual circles had by then been firmly established. This was particularly the case at places like Columbia University, where as previously indicated Bell had received his masters degree in Sociology, and at the University of Chicago. Along with University of Wisconsin, The New School for Social Research, and Harvard University, these institutions had assembled among their faculties several noted translators and interpretors of Weber's writings. At the University of Chicago the key figures were Edward Shils and Benjamin Nelson.

Talcott Parsons, who since the 1930s has been one of America's leading sociologists, put it very succinctly when in summarizing the range of Weber's influence during that period he said

> more than any other single writer in the background of our generation, Weber gave us the primary reference points for analyzing the broad common patterns of modern social political and economic development.[6]

One of the principle factors that accounted for the popularity of Weber's work during this period was that even more than Marx he, to paraphrase Dennis Wrong, appeared then to be the prophet of the past who had most fully drawn the

face of the contemporary enemy, bureaucracy.[7] This meant placing the emergence of bureaucracy as the characteristic institution of modern society into a distinct socio-historical framework. That framework was one which traced the source of modern man's malaise to an irreversible social process, one that Weber referred to as the general trend in the West towards rationality.

Reinhold Niebuhr and Jewish Alienation

Just as Weber's popularity in American intellectual thought grew in the 1940s so too, for the same basic reason, did Niebuhr's. Like Weber, Niebuhr too had developed an intellectual framework that was being widely referred to as a way of understanding the deeper underlying conditions that had given rise to totalitarianism in the twentieth century. Niebuhr went even further then Weber in his emphasis on the significance of the general trend towards rationality in the West as a source of totalitarianism. He addressed himself to the very nature of man.

The intellectual framework that Niebuhr developed in his writings during the early 1940s located the sources of totalitarianism in man's failure to come to terms with his own limits as a creature that yearns for absolutes and a balance between these two extremes which he always transgresses. Niebuhr located the failure of Western society to develop the necessary social and political instruments to check man's "will to power," his need to dominate others, in its adherence to a set of utopian illusions that obscured the real meaning of the original sin; man lives in a state of permanent anxiety

because he does not fully know the limits of his possibilities.

In no place was this theme as systematically developed than in his book The Nature and Destiny of Man. That book was both a theological and political analysis of the moral and spiritual degeneration of modern society, one that located the failure of liberalism to provide modern man with an integrating political philosophy in its failure to understand the true nature of man and the ambiguity that defines the human situation.

For Niebuhr the human situation is defined by ambiguity, the nature of which can only be grasped by understanding the relationship between freedom and sin as it was revealed through original sin. Charging that seventeenth century rationalists failed to understand that relationship that makes man an ultimately tragic figure, Niebuhr stressed that man is a unique creature, one that is "both strong and weak, both free and bound, both blind and far seeing."[8] Man, asserted Niebuhr, is a creature of nature. What makes him a creature of nature is the fact that he is bound to a particular time and place and to particular environmental features which shape his destiny. But he is also, explained Niebuhr, a creature of spirit because he has the mental ability to stand outside of himself and thus to see and understand his situation. Similarly, he can see, articulate, and try to avoid the contingencies of nature. But while man's awareness of the limits within which he lives allows him, in some sense, to transcend those limits he can never fully transcend them, for he can never fully escape his finiteness. Because of this

ambiguous situation man, asserted Niebuhr, is made permanently anxious.

Man's anxiety, asserted Niebuhr, is inevitable. It is made inevitable because of the paradox that underlies and defines his situation. As an infinite creature, one who has the capacity to stand outside of himself because of his unique mental abilities, "man knows more than the immediate natural situation in which he stands."[9] Similarly, as a creature of spirit he has the necessary freedom to try to understand his immediate situation in terms of a total situation. This is a freedom that he makes use of for he "constantly seeks to understand his immediate situation in terms of a total situation."[10] And, yet because he is also a creature of nature, a creature whose capacity for knowing is fixed by time and space "he is unable to define the total human situation without colouring his definition with finite perspectives drawn from his immediate situation."[11] This leaves man in a very precarious position, one that leads to the existence of temptation as a permanent and inevitable condition. Here Niebuhr explained that:

> The realization of the relativity of his (man's) knowledge subjects him to the peril of skepticism. The abyss of meaninglessness yawns on the brink of all his mighty spiritual endeavors. Therefore man is tempted to deny the limited character of his knowledge, and the finiteness of his perspectives. He pretends to have achieved a degree of knowledge which is beyond the limit of finite life. This is the "ideological taint" in which all human knowledge is involved and which is always something more than mere human ignorance. It is always partly an effort to hide that ignorance by pretension.[12]

"In short," concluded Niebuhr, "man, being both free and bound, both limited and limitless, is anxious. Anxiety is the inevitable concomitant of the paradox of the freedom and finiteness in which man is involved."[13] Like the existentialist philosopher Soren Kierkegaard, Niebuhr regarded anxiety as a state of temptation rather than sin. This is an important point because it embodies the nub of Niebuhr's analysis on the nature of sin and man. Man is placed in an ambiguous position, one that given his nature as a creature of spirit makes his anxiety inevitable. The man who sees beyond his limits is anxious about his finiteness and desires to overcome it. One of the prominent ways that he seeks to overcome it is to make himself, like God, the center of the universe. Theoretically, man can make the proper response to his situation and accept its insecurities by trusting that they will ultimately be overcome. Here Niebuhr draws upon Martin Heidegger's Sein und Zeit to explain how anxiety is simultaneously the cause of man's achievements and the precondition of his sin. Man knows his life is limited for he has some sense of the total situation of which he is a part, but he does not fully know where the limits are. Compounding this situation is the fact that "man may, in the same moment, be anxious because he has not become what he ought to be; and also anxious lest he cease to be at all."[14] Thus, concluded Niebuhr, no achievement represents perfection, and there is no place for man to rest in his struggle to escape his finiteness. Anxiety is inevitable and, given man's nature, necessary; but only when the situation is misinterpreted does it produce a rebellion by

man against the limits which have been set for his life by God.

The key to all this is that, given the possibility of trust in a redeemer God, one who can overcome the insecurities of history, the abyss of meaninglessness and death, man's anxiety need not, in theory, lead to either pride or sensuality. Man, because he is essentially free, can choose either to place his trust in God or not. That choice is his and his alone. This argued Niebuhr is what liberalism in its optimism about man has failed to grasp adequately.

Understood from this point of view the basic trust of Niebuhr's criticism of liberalism was that liberals make the mistake of not knowing when to temper their hopes with reality. They do not realize that good plans, that on paper should work given their rational design and their humanitarian ends - are in themselves not enough. Such plans are in fact futile unless they are administered by men wise enough to understand the depth of man's lack of wisdom, and unless they are formulated with a moral enlightenment that enables them to be responsive to the strength and pervasiveness of human sinfulness. This viewpoint is best summarized in the following quotations taken from The Nature and The Destiny of Man, and another early work, Christianity and Power Politics:

> The utopian illusions and sentimental aberrations of modern culture are really all derived from the basic error of negating the fact of original sin. This error....continually betrays modern man to equate the goodness of men with the virtue of their various schemes for social justice and international peace.... Obviously there are various degrees of sin and guilt and some men and nations are more guilty than others of disobedience to the heavenly. Also there are

> specific evils in history, arising from the specific maladjustments in social and political organization. But these evils can be dealt with most adequately if men do not give themselves to the illusion that some particular organization of society might be found in which men would no longer stand in contradiction to the law of their being.15

> The assumption of rationalists in the past centuries has been that either education or the equalization of economic interests would finally fashion the mind into a perfect instrument of universal and absolute knowledge, and would ultimately destroy social friction by eliminating the partial perspectives which prompt men to assess social issues in conflicting terms. But this assumption fails to recognize that the most intelligent and disinterested person can never escape his fate as a child of nature and finitude...Thus even the most refined spiritual achievements of humans can never result in an unqualified synthesis of human hopes and aspirations. At some point they will always accentuate social conflict by making men more stubborn in the defense of their interests, under the illusion that their interests represent universal values.16

These quotations attest to the strength of Niebuhr's belief that the moral and spiritual degeneration of modern society along with the failure of liberalism to develop a realistic political philosophy which could address itself to that condition is the product of modern culture's inability to come to terms with what makes man an ultimately tragic figure: man's inability to accept his own limits.

Both the nature of Bell's approach to the problem of alienation and Jewish identity and the influence of Weber and Niebuhr in helping to fashion it are in evidence in an article that Bell wrote in 1946 for Jewish Frontier called a "Parable of Alienation." This article is a signfast of Bell's intellectual development. It provides us with a sense of the intellectual mood that later permeates his writings on the end of ideology, a mood grounded in a particular attitude towards

alienation, which comes out of the experience of being a part of a "homeless radical generation." It is also a mood that stresses the "permanent tension" that man lives in, and the sense of tragedy that dominates his life as a creature whose homelessness is bred by his not being able to know the limits of his possibilities in a world that his restlessness - his need to know - compels him to explore.

Bell began the essay "A Parable of Alienation" with a description of a scene from Arthur Koestler's Dialogues with Death. The scene is of Koestler standing on a hill outside of the seaport town of Malaga the day before his capture by the Spanish fascists. Faced with the imminent threat of capture whom he has antagonized with disclosures of their atrocities, the Hungarian journalist remains fixed to the hill feeling that the only thing which was real was the sunny day; "all else, the distant hub, the nearby confusion, the far off rattling of gunfire, the word fascism, all were unreal."[17]

Claiming that this experience on the hill outside of Malaga as Koestler described it was no longer symbolic but rather a "tangible reality," Bell argued that

> most living today has that blank awareness that gripped Koestler. The men at war had the constant feeling of, What am I doing here, Where did all this come from? Though it was the panic of war which had brought that feeling for a while to the level of conscious reflection, it is not a transient but a fundamental experience of our time. People move about, in the huge caverns that modern technology has constructed, with little sense of relationship to meaningful events. Life is experienced through the unreality of newspaper headlines or five-minute radio news flashes. We work together, but live as atomized beings, no longer controlling our lives but carried by events.[18]

To this argument Bell added that the quality of being lost represents the most pervasive symptom of contemporary life.

> The breakdown of brotherhood, the loss of immediate emotional reward which arises out of the spontaneous actions of work and play - for that is the basic meaning of love - have created a deep tension in the social make-up of modern man. It is a strain which he cannot long endure - under which in fact he has already cracked.19

Stressing that the root of this alienation and strain lies in "the divorce in our contemporary world between moral and secular conceptions" Bell further argued that alienation was the product of the progressive institutionalization of a state of otherhood in modern life. For Bell this state of otherhood was a state of estrangement in which men were made to live in a state of permanent tension between the universal need for community and the failure of Western capitalism to replace the traditionalistic ethic that it destroyed as a precondition of its growth.

Bell combined strains of Weber's thought on bureaucracy, rationalization, and disenchantment of the world with a set of implied references to Niebuhr's notion that no embodiment of community can ever, given man's nature, be final. Using these ideas as a starting point, Bell interpreted the homelessness of the modern Jew as a symbol of the estrangement of modern man and of the sense of permanent psychological crisis that he experiences in a world marked by contradictions.

> over the past hundred and fifty years the capitalist economic ethic has been stripped of its religious support. The sanction of the Protestant calling,' the ascetic devotion to work and thrift and gain, has given way to an Epicureanism and glorification of luxury and debauch. The rhymes of factory life and the human relations that is imposes dominate our moods and manners.

> The result is a life of 'otherhood' -- where common living has given way to rational exploitation -- although our moral precepts still dictate that men should live in brotherhood.
>
> This condition of 'otherhood,' with its repression of spontaneity and personalist affections between men has created a tremendous strain. Subtly these tensions have fashioned an urge for belonging, one of the most compelling need of our day. That yearning has been skillfully utilized by the Nazis in their call for Gemeinschaft and the Communities in their cry for Comradeship. However warped, these doctrines are an affirmation of a need for brotherhood which the world has denied.[20]

After critically analyzing a novel about the Jewish experience in America, Passage From Home, which was written by his friend Isaac Rosenfeld, Bell went on to write about the Jewish intellectual. His model, not surprisingly, was Isaac Rosenfeld.

Characterizing him as a "homeless, independent radical," Bell stressed that Rosenfeld had been a socialist while he was a student at the University of Chicago. Bell also stressed that Rosenfeld had in the late 1930s joined the Trotskyites, leaving them only when the general futility, rigidity, and the deadly Bolshevik direction of the party was revealed.

> Today, he stands, as many, a homeless, independent radical. For unlike some captious radicals, who, in their fear of Stalinism have identified democracy with capitalism, Rosenfeld still retains a deep critical sense regarding the inequalities, injustice, mechanistic, oppressive nature of an exploitative society. At this junction he, with many like him, are in mid-passage.
>
> We reject the basic values of American society as they stand. The increasing centralization of decision, the narrowing of the area of moral choice, the extension into all domains, particularly the cultural, of the rationalized, stilted forms of mass organization and bureaucracy, the rising sense of nationalism as a product of the war, all of these heighten the awareness that the way of life resulting from these pressures - the rawness, vulgarity, mass sadism and senseless sybaritism, the money lust and barbaric extravagances - can only stifle creativity and free living.

> The bureaucratic age into which we are moving is an inexorable extension of the rationalism of ethics and economics. Its outline can be glimpsed in the anguished reflections of Kafka, Toller, or von Horvath. It has been foretold more dispassionately by Burckhard and Max Weber. It is an 'official' world where art, literature, and culture especially will bloom in pattern under the watering hand of the official gardener. For it will require, as it has already begun to practice, a corruption by word and image Organic in its conception, it can only exist by stimulating a spurious brotherhood, while in practice atomizing man.[21]

"What meaningful role can the young Jewish intellectual play in such a world?"[22] This stressed Bell is the major problem that confronts those Jewish intellectuals, who, like himself and Rosenfeld, now find themselves in "mid-passage." Stressing that the problem was not unsolvable, Bell argued that the answer rests in the intellectual's awareness of the underlying dimensions of the problem. The problem, Bell declared, "inheres in the very nature of being a Jew and an intellectual."[23] It, is resolved when the young Jewish intellectual is able to understand both the creative potentialities and limits that enrich and constrain his activities. These potentialities and limits are grounded in his being an intellectual and a Jew.

As an intellectual he knows that the very effort to understand serves to inhibit action. He therefore knows that if his principle aim is to understand then he "cannot surrender himself wholly to any movement," for he knows all too well "the ambiguities of motives and interests which dictate individual and institutional action."[24] He also knows that he cannot "make those completely invidious or utopian judgements regarding the nature and needs of man which the cynic and romantic make."[215] He knows, then, that he can "only live

without dogma and without hope."[26] For as an intellectual he can only "realize his destiny - and by consciously accepting it, rework it - through seeing the world...as disenchanted."[27]

As a Jew who has his roots in a Yiddish immigrant world, the Jewish intellectual knows too that he can never return home. He knows too that he must accept the alienation that his restlessness, his need to know and explore, has made inevitable: for all that has been left to him from the world that he has left is "the hardness of alienation, the sense of otherness."[28] He also knows that his sense of otherness has produced in him a special critical faculty. That faculty is "an unwillingness to submerge our values completely into any 'cause' because of the germ cells of corruption which are in the seeds of organization."[29] He knows that this faculty is one that cannot exist within a territorial demarcation so that Zionism, with its emotional appeal of a Jewish homeland may be a solution for many, cannot be for him. He knows that the "otherness" that makes him a part of a homeless radical generation can only exist "as the attitude of an eternal stranger in a foreign land."[30]

Thus, the young Jewish intellectual, argued Bell, stands in a unique and precarious position. He has a special quality that would disappear in a Zionist world. That quality is something which goes even beyond his unwilligness to submerge his values into a cause or movement for the assumption of alienation does not mean withdrawal or nihilism. Rather, it means assuming a role that requires him to live without dogma, and without any hope of his finding personal salvation. This

is the "assumption" of the role of the prophet, of the one who, through an ethical conscience, speaks the truth freely indicting the baseness of the world and pointing to the need for brotherhood. But this role of the permanent skeptic, of the prophet, is a lonely one Bell warned. It is a role that having been fused out of inheritance and experience creates both a life and destiny of its own.[31]

Against this background Bell outlined, with a sense of resignation that rings principally of Niebuhr, the role of the Jewish intellectual:

> The plight - and glory - of the alienated Jewish intellectual is that his role is to point to the need of brotherhood, but as he has been bred, he cannot today accept any embodiment of community as final. He can live only in permanent tension and as a permanent critic. The Zionist message is extremely strong. Like migratory terns we need to make our way back and the Zionist offer a haven for prodigal sons. But the whole world is our world, we were born in the ghettoes and have a special place. Each man has his own journey to make and the land we have to travel is barren. Out of this fact emerges the tragic sense of life, that we are destined to waste it.[32]

Bell recognized that this did not amount to a political program.

> The stand outlined is a personal one, fused out of inheritance and experience, creating its own life and destiny. It is not meant as a political program, although it is an attitude, I feel, which is shared by others of the homeless radical generation.[33]

How commonly this attitude of and to alienation was shared by other Jewish intellectuals of Bell's generation or age cohort is a moot point.[34] Whether the attitude was or was not prevalent among Bell's contemporaries has little bearing on the ultimate value of Bell's article. For us, its value is that we find that by 1946 Bell was approaching some of the basic themes that permeated his essay on the end of ideology.

The sense of permanent tension between action and understanding that grows out of the kind of experience of alienation described by Bell, the need for permanent doubt in the face of movements that promise total solutions where experience has indicated that no total solutions can exist, are all themes that Bell returns to in the title essay of The End of Ideology.

But, on a more immediate level, this article enables us to see Bell as he saw himself in 1946. As we have seen, his view of himself then was that he was a young Jewish intellectual who had reached a transitional point in his life. As a young man (he was then twenty-seven) in "mid-passage," Bell saw himself sharing a common cultural heritage and a common intellectual attitude towards the world with other sons of immigrant Jews who had sought to find during the 1930s a sense of personal meaning and community in politics. Their cultural heritage was one of homelessness. The attitude was of permanent doubt, of skepticism and detachment rather than of withdrawal. It was an attitude that called upon its holder to point out the need for brotherhood, to in effect remind humanity that man still has the spontaneity to change the conditions that have led him to feel, like Koestler's character on the hill, that he is living in a strange surrealist world. Thus, Bell saw himself as a skeptic, to whom both doubt and radicalism are a permanent and necessary part of life.

Radicalism and Permanent Doubt: The Making of a Social Critic

The nature of Bell's radicalism, as we have previously indicated, was derived from the belief common to Marx and Dewey

that modern man need not accept the pattern of authority relations in existing capitalist institutions as final and inevitable. This, ultimately, is the significance of his 1947 article "Adjusting Man to Machines." That article, as was previously indicated, stressed that, by accepting the existing system of work in the factory as a given, sociologists and industrial psychologists serve only to reinforce the notion that those relations are historically necessary and inevitable. It also stressed the notion that the problem of modern man's malaise, his alienation, can only be met when man's creative potentialities are released through a radical reform in the existing structure of organizational life. While this article was the most radical of Bell's writings during the late 1940s it was by no means the only place where Bell expressed his radicalism.

In an article published in 1948 by Commentary, "Screening Leaders in A Democracy," Bell again focused his attention on the human relations experts. While conceding that some of their efforts to promote greater group participation in the making of decisions in the factory were well motivated, Bell took industrial sociologists and psychologists to task for not realizing the implications of their work. Does not, asked Bell, "the tendency of much present day social science, which is to fit people into a niche in a previously determined bureaucratic and hierarchial structure, violate the values of both free scientific inquiry and democracy?"[35]

Noting that fascist and communist systems have also emphasized participation Bell stressed that "participation

as a goal in its own terms is meaningless."[36] A thorough-going analysis of the problem of democratic leadership and participation was required. Such an analysis must start with the "problem of bureaucracy," that is, the problem of how "within the framework of impersonality which is modern society, can we create areas of genuine spontaneity in which group participation can be satisfactorily obtained."[37] But it cannot stop there, nor can it, as the human relations experts suggest, be limited to a problem of communication. The problem of bureaucracy must instead be considered "within the context of power, and, within that area, as a conflict of interest."[38] These interests, cautioned Bell, "are not only psychological.... they are also sociological - and political and economic - insofar as they are most intimately intertwined with the key problem of how our society intends to distribute the rewards and privileges at its disposal. Such an analysis must therefore recognize the significance of the success of the trade union movement as a reflection of the inadequacies of life in the factory.

> A trade union exists in many areas, after all, largely because the need for belongingness and solidarity which the workers feel can only be fulfilled genuinely and independently outside the power structure of the factory hierarchy.[39]

It must also do more. Ultimately, such an analysis must recognize that the problem of participation "is shaped by the fact that while we live in a political democracy, almost all basic social patterns are authoritarian and tend to instill feelings of helplessness and dependence."[40]

> We be as dependent beings, in the family situation. The nature of middle-class morality drives parents to impose the basic patterns of conformity which will subsequently be demanded elsewhere. Our schools also, despite the long years of effort toward progressive education, still operate largely on authoritarian models. Our factories, hierarchical in structure, are, for all the talk of human relations programs, still places where certain men exercise arbitrary authority over others.[41]

The failure, Bell warned, of well intentioned analysts concerned with the problem of humanizing bureaucracies to take these considerations into account will result in making their stress on participation within the factory system become just another form of ideological support for precisely those authoritarian economic and industrial structures that many of them wish to eliminate. To this warning, Bell added that

> the overwhelming difficulties that confront the democratically-minded researchers working in this field cannot serve as excuse or pretext for ignoring the basic contradiction between their democratic goals and the authoritarian purposes which their experiments are most often made to serve. Possibly the forthright recognition of this contradiction will enable them to formulate a different and broader framework for their future work.[42]

The interesting thing about this article, as we can see, is that like his essay "Adjusting Men to Machines" Bell's radicalism and scepticism are virtually inseparable. Whether or not we can say the same thing about his other writings during this period, the core of which were concerned with the nature of American society and politics in the post war period is another issue.

From 1946 to 1949 Bell wrote several reviews of books that generally offered either liberal or Marxist interpretations of

American society, its problems and its potentialities. Generally these reviews were highly critical. They, in most instances, reflected a growing impatience with those who, despite the political and economic lessons of the 1930s, continued to frame their analysis of post war American society in terms of traditional Marxist categories. Similarly, most of these reviews reflected a distain for writers who "lapsed into the old radical jargon."[43] They reflected a distain for writers who offered Marxist or liberal panaceas in place of realistic social analysis, that is, in place of analysis which seeks to specify "the range of activities through which people can genuinely share in the decisions that affect them."[44] Writers like Saul Alinsky and Fritz Sternberg, one an activist liberal the other a Marxist, both came under heavy fire. The former came under fire for his naive faith in the "power of the people," the latter for his "utopian" faith in the power of economic crisis to produce a radical transformation in the consciousness of the American masses. Where Alinsky neglected to focus on questions concerning the limits of individual activity in a technologically organized and power oriented society, Sternberg obscured, in favor of an outdated and unproven theory of economic crisis, the real political problems confronting the post war American economy.

Directed almost exclusively to the repudiation of the political and economic formulations of the left, these book reviews rested on a coherent image of American society. The image registered a growing appreciation of American society, its complexities and its strengths. It was also an image of

American society that gave evidence of Bell's belief that business could no longer be viewed as the natural and irreconcilable enemy of a free society. Similarly, Bell located the strength of American society in the tremendous range and diversity of its people and their interest. In turn, these book reviews reflected a growing emphasis on the need to discuss economic problems and policies within the framework of interest group politics and government spending priorities, within the framework of "political economy." Finally, they reflected a growing sensitivity for the need of a free society to develop a democratic philosophy that could effectively harmonize ideals and material interests.

Bell's image of American society, his assessment of the major problems confronting post-war American liberalism, his impatience with Marxist and liberal panaceas, and the reasons for his impatience with them were particularly evident in a review that he wrote in 1949 of Irwin Ross' book Strategy for Liberals: The Politics of the Mixed Economy. Bell began this review, which was entitled "Has America A Ruling Class?" with a critical assessment of the state of American political thinking. He declared that it is "a singular commentary on the state of American political thinking that in almost two decades no new 'names' have come to the fore among left-wing and liberal thinkers."[45] The political response to the age, he wrote, "was the revival of interest in the "elite theorists," the re-reading of Machiavelli and Hobbes, and the acceptance of the oblique political theology of Reinhold Niebuhr with its strictures against utopianism."[46] These then, he concluded,

"Have been fallow years."[47] Now three thinkers, each just over thirty were coming to the fore: Arthur Schlesinger Jr., Peter Viereck, and Irwin Ross, all concentrating on the same central problem of welfare and freedom in American society.

This group interested Bell because they were "the harbingers of a new political generation."[48] In this regard, he saw their emergence on the American political scene as a real "phenomenon," one that provided a glimpse into both the recent past and possibly the immediate future. Viewing them in these terms Bell was especially interested in Ross. Bell thought Ross to be the group's "most authentic representative."[49] "Ross," wrote Bell, "is a product of the 'youth movement,' that doll's house of revolution, where young socialists, Communists, and liberals locked in mimetic combat, debating furiously the road to power."[50] His book, continued Bell, reflects

> the education of a generation that went to college in the days of the Popular Front, learned the organizational logic of Communist control in the American Student Union and the American Youth Congress, was disillusioned ideologically and morally by the Stalin-Hitler pact, cast its first vote for Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1940, accepted quite soberly its tasks in the war, and is today "liberal without tears.[51]

But, asked Bell, "what are the fruits of this education."[52] The answer, indicated Bell, rests in Ross' book, in the mood that it conveys. "Touchminded, realistic, hardheaded," the book elaborated a strategy for liberals, a program, and a warning, one that is grounded in the European experience.

As a strategy for liberals the book, Bell indicated, was tough-minded with its message being very clear:

> The labor and liberal movements (e.g. Americans for Democratic Action) are not setting their sights high

> enough. The short-ranged goals of housing, medical care, etc., are important, but these do not meet the major challenge, the inherent instability of our economic system. When the blow comes, the liberals must be prepared with a program which can offer a thorough-going solution and is dramatic enough to appeal to the restless masses. Such a program is the mixed economy."[53]

Having absorbed the lesson of Soviet Russia, Ross with an emphasis on the mixed economy rather than upon Socialism offered a realistic program for America. The essentials of the program were clear, well thought out and well within the tradition of Keynesian thinking. There would be socialization only of the giant corporations whose monopolistic practices restrict production and whose investment decisions affect the level of economic activity. But other sectors of the economy would be left "free." Based on moral, economic, and political grounds, Ross' defense of the program left little doubt as to who he thought the enemy was:

> The moral case for such a program is that it provides for a flexible "welfare state" with a minimum of governmental bureaucracy; the economic case is that government control of key decisions can guarantee full employment; the political case rests upon the proposition that the power of big business or entrenched wealth to dominate Congress and sabotage the economy would be broken.[54]

Ross' book was no less explicit, indicated Bell, in warning liberals to be prepared for what could lie ahead once such a program were adopted.

> Such far reaching social change, however, may provoke a reaction on the part of big business. The European debacle indicates that the 'conservative business group' will engage in various forms of sabotage ranging from a sit-down strike of capital to the fostering of "an indigenously fascist system....(or) the ultimate sanction which reaction can invoke against a popularly elected radical administration: a military coup." Ramsey Mac Donald, Manuel Azana, and Leon Blum were

not prepared. Liberals must learn from their mistakes.[55]

It was obvious, wrote Bell, that Ross was well read in economics. The chapters in his book on the case for a mixed economy reflected this. Those chapters provided an excellent popularized rendering of Keynesian thinking with no vulgarization whatsoever. No less obvious, thought Bell, was the social theory implicit in the book and the effect of the last decade in shaping that theory.

It was clear that one word that Ross had learned well was the word power. This, thought Bell, had its advantages and disadvantages. Certainly the recognition that power must be curbed leads, as it did in Ross' case, one to being more realistic about organizing programs that will eliminate poverty and exploitation without sacrificing basic human freedoms. But, Bell warned, the absorption with the concept of naked power can lead one to reduce all significant political motives to the realm of political drives, thus obscuring differences in motivation. Moreover, it can lead to making formulations on the nature of power and its use that are too "easy." When they are applied to the description of intricate and complex social processes they add nothing to either our theoretical or substantive understanding of them. It is all very fine to say that since power is so tempting that human beings will not give it up; and even further, one can argue when their power is threatened, human beings will not give it up easily. Hence any action to deny them that power will necessarily bring a vigorous reaction. But, these generalizations apply exclusively to individual behavior. They do not apply to the understanding

of intricate and complex social processes in which many interest groups clash and jockey for strategic position. One can apply them only by personifying political concepts and talking of "big business" or Wall Street as single, 'real' entities. This, added Bell, is what Ross did.

> In this respect, noted Bell, Ross still bears, like the mark of Cain, the intellectual curse of a generation - a vulgarized Marxism which reduces social action to a mechanical economic determinism, and in which the most significant contribution of Marx's thought, his analysis of the nature of ideology is lost.[56]

This vulgarized Marxism put Ross at a severe disadvantage in attempting to offer anything more than a political and, albeit, distorted view of contemporary American society. Ross's Marxism prevents him from understanding and taking advantage of the most enduring part of Marx's work, his stress on the ideological dimensions of social action. Marx, noted Bell, had long ago in his critique of Bentham and utilitarianism stressed that men act and, in a crucial sense, need to act on a moral plane. At the same time, Marx also stressed that men seek to justify their actions, often without hypocrisy, in terms of some moral purpose.

Ross's vulgarized Marxism puts him at the further disadvantage of not being able to employ successfully a materialistic analysis of American society. In denying himself access to the significance of the ideological dimension of social action, he is unable to come to terms with what Sidney Hook had once pointed out was a real problem of materialistic analysis.[57] That problem is that of showing "the specific mechanisms by which economic conditions influence habits and motives of

classes, granted that individuals are actuated by motives that are not always a function of individual self-interest."[58] Conversely since classes are composed of individuals, this problem also embodies showing "how class interests are furthered by the non-economic motives of individuals."[59]

Granted, argued Bell, that even if Ross had attempted an answer to this problem, it would still be questionable whether his analysis could have provided "more than a partial (and hence, if taken for the whole, a distorted) view of American society even if it had used Marxian categories in their fullest and richest sense."[60] However, it remains clear that because Ross failed to come to terms with the deficiencies of materialistic analysis several of his findings were very debateable.

With these observations and remarks behind him, Bell went on to question Ross's suggestion that American capitalists would turn fascist if the giant corporations were socialized. Ross's whole thesis, concluded Bell, was derived from the European experience. There was, charged Bell, no examination in his book of the American past. Instead there was this assumption that American society must recapitulate the European experience, that American capitalism must follow European patterns. Such an assumption, argued Bell, was unwarranted because of the nature of politics and the class structure of American society.

Noting that, unlike fascist Germany and Italy, America has always been a country that has been distinguished by the tremendous diversity of its people and their interests, Bell

stressed that it has produced a political system in which the politician rather than the ideologue occupied the center of the stage. Such a system has always been based on "the shifting sands of coalition in which interests are rarely explicitly defined."[61] In the light of this fact it seemed only a remote possibility that a demagogue like Hitler could weld together the diverse forces in American society and impose upon them an arbitrary system of rule.

In developing this argument Bell stressed that Ross had misread the drift of America toward becoming a technological and managerial society. Implicit in Ross' suggestion, observed Bell, was the notion that business was defined by a single set of interests; that it was a cohesive community of groups joined together into a ruling class. Granted business groups exercise tremendous influence in the United States; asserted Bell, it is still impossible to talk about business as a single class. This is because the term class implies both a community and continuity of interest. Business in the United States, Bell argued, lacks these qualities. It lacks them, he asserted, because there are no family, status, or legal property ties that serve to bind business groups together. There are always temporary and partial coalitions of power amongst business groups but, concluded Bell, one could hardly derive from this a theory of the ruling class. Noting that to do so would be to mis-read the drift of a technological and managerial society, Bell stressed that in the United States the area of manipulation was becoming so vast and the sources of authority so diverse that it was increasingly difficult to maintain a uniform

pattern of action. How then, asked Bell, could one seek to apply the idea of the ruling class to the United States.

For Bell the answer to this question was relatively simple: it sprang from what David Reisman had pointed out was the "Almost animistic feeling that since things run, somebody runs them."[62] Granted that in the immediate sense somebody does run things, what does this really mean, Bell asked, since it is obvious that this somebody is himself a part of a larger system of action. In this regard, Bell argued, that while "it was one of the major contributions of Marx to demonstrate how a social system operates independently of the will of individuals, and in some sense molds them" it was "the contribution of his vulgarizers to create bogeymen."[63]

Who, then, Bell asked, if not a ruling class is the real enemy of American society and of liberals especially. These, Bell indicated, were complex questions with no ready made sure fire, answers. In approaching them, Bell thought it best to define the chief problems confronting American society. Dividing these problems into three spheres, the economy, the culture, and the politics of American society (in anticipation of The Coming of Post-Industrial Society), Bell made it very clear as to what he thought the problems facing the United States in 1949 were.

> The problem of the American economy is the power of monopolistic enterprises to create drags on economic development. The problem of American culture is the standardization of mind and taste induced by mass-consumption markets. The problem of American politics is (metaphorically) the small-town mentality.[64]

Noting that it was curious that the subject of the small-

town mentality had received no attention from Ross or from other recent writers on the problem of literal politics, Bell argued, that unless combatted the small-town mentality threatened to exploit America's lack of an integrative moral philosophy. In this regard, Bell predicted that as the pressures of conformity squeeze harder on America's lower middle class they will in large numbers embrace the small-town mentality. Noting that narrowness, anti-intellectualism, and prejudice find their greatest expression in the small-town mind, he concluded that if American society continues to grow more amorphous and undifferentiated it could safely be predicted that the sense of panic of the small-town mind when confronted by social changes would rise leading to unrest and violence.

Bell's review of Ross' book is thus an elaboration of the theme that ran through his other book reviews during this period: the inadequacy of "straight-jacketed" theorists on the left to grasp the complex and changing realities of American life. The nature of these realities and the failure of left-wing political writers to grasp them adequately are issues that Bell elaborated in even greater detail in an article that he wrote for Commentary in 1949 called "America's Un-Marxist Revolution." This article which was sub-titled "Mr. Truman Embarks on a Politically Managed Economy" was written as an analysis of President Truman's 1949 State of The Union Message.

Bell began this article by declaring that "after a decade and a half, an adequate political characterization of the New Deal era is still to be written."[65] There have been, observed Bell, numerous historical analogies likening its architect,

Franklin D. Roosevelt, to a temporizing Solon, whose political reforms sought to stave off the revolution of the property less masses. There have, he added, also been historical analogies likening Roosevelt to Tiberius Gracchus and to the demogogue Louis Napolean. Shedding little light on the way governmental action gives rise to new combinations of interests and the operation of these shifting coalitions that were "the raw stuff of politics," Bell thought these characterizations meaningless. Given his lack of personal magnetism, how much more of a mystery was Truman to those "straight-jacketed theorists" who were confounded by the nature of "the Roosevelt Revolution."

> How does one classify an American president who, without the rhetoric of the prescribed political sonorities, tells the people of the United States: "We have rejected the discredited theory that the fortunes of the nation should be in the hands of a privileged few. We have abandoned the 'trickle-down' concept of national prosperity. ... Wealth should be created for the benefit of all. The recent election shows that the people of the United States are in favor of this kind of society and want to go on improving it.[66]

True, granted Bell, such sentiments could also be found dotting all of Roosevelt's speeches. Yet twelve years after 1937, the last year in which substantial New Deal reforms were made Truman submitted a budget message which proposed more far-reaching social and economic advances than any other budget message in American history. Truman's budget message, Bell noted, included funds for nearly fifty new and important government agencies as well as funds for the strengthening of some important government regulatory agencies. Because a full employment economy can be dangerously inflationary if production

does not expand rapidly enough to meet the new demands created by high employment and large government spending, the most important sections in Truman's budget message, Bell noted, were those passages dealing with industrial capacity. Within this context, he further noted that Truman in his State of The Union speech had proposed "immediate legislation to deal with this problem of capacity and supply."[67] The steel industry was singled out as an immediate case in point with the President asking authority for the "construction of such facilities directly if action by private industry fails to meet our needs."[68]

Asking his reader to note in Truman's messages the word "needs" Bell stressed that their significance rested with the fact that "the American government is acknowledging that one of its primary tasks is to set up a human, as well as a housekeeping and economic budget, and thereby to direct the resources of the country to fulfilling human needs."[69] The alternative, on which the United States has been operating for one hundred and fifty years, noted Bell, was the free market system: under it, resources were "siphoned" off to suit the preferences and whims of those who have the money to command goods. Thus, pointed out Bell, the significance of Truman's emphasis on needs is that it "is an implicit admission that the present distribution of income, exerting its force freely on the market mechanism, works against the principle of general welfare."[70]

With these observations behind him, Bell charged that "for years liberals, the democratic Left, and the conservatives

have so allowed the repetition of their reflexes that the full measure of the Truman pronouncements have yet to be taken."[71] Here is," declared Bell, "no Thermidorian reaction against FDR, as many liberals feared, but the continuation of a revolutionary impulse, however vague and confused."[72] Nor was Truman's program an invasion of Washington D.C. by "naked socialism" as certain "hysterical reactionaries" had shrilly insisted. In this regard, Bell argued that "the prevailing ideologies, on both Left and Right, are still unconsciously obedient to the Marxist notion that only a bald class struggle reveals the 'realities' of politics." The result, reasserted Bell, was that the importance of Truman's Fair Deal program has not been seriously appreciated by political writers on either the left or the right.

The Fair Deal was in effect, according to Bell, a movement into political economy, an assertion that no privileged interest group, including business, could run a modern industrial society. It was a "square assertion" that the federal government must manage the economy. The only question which remained was, "managed for whom?"[74]

Treating this as an open question, Bell was optimistic. His optimism was about the chances for political analysts to now see where the United States has been and where, given the revolutionary character of the Fair Deal, it may be heading. Now, it moves "in the grey light of Harry Truman" beyond the public face of the New Deal.[75] Noting that some liberal writers and, indeed, Franklin Roosevelt himself had "quite naively called the New Deal an assertion of human rights

over property rights."[76] Bell argued that such terms carry little weight either philosophically or pragmatically. How do we on the basis of this characterization classify support prices for farmers? Are they a human right or a property right? No, reasoned Bell, if the meaning of the New Deal revolution is to be established then it must be established through a different set of terms. An alternate approach was to look at the seventeen years since the start of the New Deal as years that have produced a "new definition of politics in terms of group rights, and more vaguely, an implicit theory of justice which sets limits to group prerogatives."[77]

Such an approach, continued Bell, allows us to look at major social legislation in terms of interest blocs. It also, claimed Bell, "provides us with a valid framework for political analysis of the past and future."[78]

Bell's thesis, the thesis upon which his whole pluralistic interpretation of American politics rests, was that the history of the American political system was a history filled with a complex series of class and group struggles, and with national unity. Because the American political system is the product of these different elements it still mystifies both the "European observer and the American participant."[79] While the former's vision is blurred by simplistic generalizations on the class struggle between "Finance Capital" and the "Little People," the latter's vision is blurred by blanket phrases like "democratic heritage and "American individualism."[80] Ironically, each is prevented by their own biases from seeing the same thing, that

> the movement of American politics has been from a sharp struggle between merchant-capitalist and farmer at the founding of the Republic, to multiple group struggles in which identifications and loyalties shifted rapidly as the society expanded and became industrialized. The temporary victory of one group, the business class, at the end of the 19th century, brought with it an attempt to identify democracy with the narrower category of "free enterprise." But the depression broke the crust of ideological unity and revealed the manifold group conflicts beneath.[81]

For Bell the irony in all of this was obvious. If the European observer and the American participant had remembered their first "and surprisingly accurate premise, that Americans have been a materialist people concerned with practical achievement and not with ideologies - all would follow naturally."[82] They would be able to see that, in great part, America's political system is based on compromise. This would be obvious to them simply because when the goal of each person is immediate material advantage, rather than class pride and preservation of status, compromise becomes an inevitable way of political life. It becomes, in effect, the natural way of attaining one's ends. They would also be able to make use of a second premise, one which is generally known to everyone but whose implications are never fully drawn: the American political system is marked by "the tremendous diversity of interests, sectional and functional, that have arisen successfully in our history and the permutations possible in such multiplicity."[83]

In elaborating his thesis on the need to interpret American history through the prism of group struggles so that an accurate understanding of the New Deal and the Fair

Deal programs could be achieved, Bell returned to the subject of the history of American politics. The earliest struggles in American history corresponded to the image of class struggle projected in Marxist political theory. They were, explained Bell, direct class struggles between the merchant group, represented by the Federalists, and the agrarians who were represented by the Democrats. A decisive victory for either class would have decided the basic character of American society. But, the Eastern merchants, "the early American plutucracy," proved to be an unstable social group.[84] In the end, because they were incapable of maintaining their political initiative, the Federalists lost. But the Democrats faced by the economic facts of life of a "burgeoning capitalism" found that they could not really win or so the "Jeffersonian revolution" faltered.[85] With the faltering of this social revolution, the seeds of the peculiarly American party system were sown. As a consequence of these successive defeats by claimants for political dominance, the social system was left largely undefined: it was neither predominantly mercantile, slave, free, agrarian, industrial, or proletarian. Having lost direct political control, the wealthy groups now sought to work indirectly through the politician. Meanwhile, the politician finding himself in a rapidly shifting society, one whose hugeness casts up a variety of conflicting interests, realized that he could only succeed if he is a "broker" and if the party system "an agency of mediation."[86] Thus was born "that strange American institution, the party system, and its equally strange actor, the politician cast in the role of an

interest broker."[87]

However, by the end of the nineteenth century, continued Bell, the growing industrial class had scored a smashing victory. With their victory came several efforts to undermine the American political system by dissolving the structure of group interests through the development of a pervasive political ideology. Just as the nationalistic political ideologies of manifest destiny and of Americanism proved premature the appointment of America's first national political boss responsive to big business, Mark Hanna, proved to be only temporarily successful. Stymied by the country's bigness, by the fact that the location of industry and agriculture produced a set of regional conflicts that made coordinated political pressure virtually impossible to sustain, the industrial class failed in its efforts to translate its economic ascendency into politics through direct control of American society. While these efforts proved unsuccessful, the dominant business class was able to achieve an important victory by, ironically enough, identifying democracy in the American mind with capitalism.

> (Where) the early commercial class had feared democracy as a political instrument whereby the "swinish multitude" (Burke) would prepare the way for a radical despotism. The ideology of victorious capitalism defined democracy almost completely in agreeable economic terms, as liberty of contract.[88]

The dominant business class was so successful in establishing its "ideological hegemony" between 1920 and 1929, that strong purely ideologically expressed interest struggles had become a thing of the past. During this period "the victory

of American capitalism was so complete that history could be written in its image."[89] Political philosophy, which in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries had clearly outlined the struggles of interest groups now gave way to an ideological samemindedness, an "ideological Gleichschaltung."[90]

During the depression, this unity between interest groups collapsed. It collapsed, explained Bell, because "the philosophers of the free enterprise system did not understand the realities of the 'socialized' economy that had come into existence."[91] Failing to grasp the extent to which this market economy had imposed a dependency upon everyone, they failed to see that business enterprise, the farmer, and labor had all become reciprocally interdependent.

The depression, in producing a recognition of this system of reciprocal relations, made each of these collectivities turn to the federal government for protection and security from the risks of the market. It also made the managed economy an inevitability because the measures that each group would predictably resort to for protection against the risks of a "free market" in time of depression dictated that the federal government intervene in the economy in order to prevent the entire economy from being overturned.

While the changes in the workings of the economy made bare by the depression were enough to require sweeping government intervention, the demands of post war reconstruction along with the national debt incurred by America's war economy have now made it impossible for the government to withdraw from the management of the economy. Truman's adoption of a

"housekeeping budget," continued Bell, was a recognition of this fact. But, cautioned Bell, it was a limited response to the dictates of a managed economy.[92] In developing this thesis Bell argued that it was "amazing," in retrospect, that while America's commitment to a politically managed economy could have been seen well before the Fair Deal, America was "so badly deficient in organizing its thinking for it."[93] What was now needed was for the Fair Deal to abandon classical economics. Given its emphasis on seeing the economy in terms of an infinite number of single units rather than a small number of basic aggregates, classical economics was an outdated model. It was only by substituting this model with a picture of the overall economy in motion that the Fair Deal could develop in addition to a housekeeping budget an economic budget that states the major magnitudes of economic interaction for American society as a whole and plan accordingly.

Returning to his central thesis, Bell proclaimed that, since, 1939 America has seen not only the emergence of a new set of powerful and self-conscious group interests and the directed economy they require but something equally profound. These developments, he argued, have produced "a basic and fundamental shift in the relations of economic power to political power."[94] This thought Bell had all kinds of current and future ramifications. Where once economics was the key to social power and politics "its pale reflection" the order was now being reversed. Now politics operating through the government "was becoming more and more a means of registering a social and economic decision." Thus, instead of acting independently,

as in a market society where individual dollar-and-cents decisions rendered independently of each other add up to a social decision, the individual is now forced to work consciously with others. In turn "the particular collectivities created by the economy become the vital organs of the body politic."[95] One of the most significant and enduring ramifications of this shift was that now since politics, not dollars, will determine what is to be produced,

> the intervention of the government will not only sharpen pressure group identifications, but also force each to adopt an ideology which can justify its claims, and which can square with some concept of 'national interest.'[96]

In the light of this development considerable thought, Bell warned, will soon have to be given to the ideological nature of planning. This is because there will be brought into the public arena a variety of conflicts that were previously hidden from the public eye. Clashes between industry and government on capital expansion will become increasingly more visible. More visible too will be the clashes between the sectional interests seeking to expand their share in industrial expansion. Even clashes between unions "when they are forced to become spokesmen for their respective industries" will become more visible to the public. In a more subtle sense the individual will find himself having to decide between his role in making economic decisions and his responsibilities as a citizen. With the increased visibility of these clashes attention will be drawn to the failure of American policy-makers to recognize that "what government planning presupposes is some overall mechanism responsible for the crucial decisions

regarding the balancing of the economy."[97] It also presupposes that each person is not "fully" free to follow his own self-interests because there is "an overriding social decision, established before action, which tends to shape each man's action. And this social decision is necessarily ideological."[98]

For Bell the shift from economic to political power generated by the institutionalization of the managed economy raised pointed questions concerning the relationship between interest groups and the national interest. What lines would be drawn between public and private interests in the coming years if, Bell wondered, ideological arguments serve to increasingly influence political outcomes. "How," in other words, "will private group policy square with national interest?"[99] Discerning signs of the emergence of a new and far-reaching debate on the nature of freedom in American society, a debate which he felt could very likely determine the course of the Truman administration and of the pattern of American politics for some years, Bell sought to delineate within the framework of this question what the managed economy might mean to the three major interest groups, business, agriculture, and labor, and to the United States as a whole.

Stressing that neither of these collectivities had a full-blown ideology and that neither of them were entirely happy with the Welfare State, Bell was sharply critical of both business and labor. He was critical of business spokesmen who decried government interference and an interference with "perfectly natural fluctuations" and lashed out at these

"ideologues" for failing to learn that economics follow no "natural laws."[100] Noting that if economics did follow such laws, then, Bell argued, the ability of man to transform his social environment by conscious intelligence would be denied. Bell developed his point by arguing that "economics is not a science of discovering a set of hidden supra-human absolutes and obeying them, but an assertion that if certain human goals are desired then certain means must be fashioned to attain them."[101]

In regard to labor, Bell stressed that at the heart of labor's difficulties with the Welfare State was the fact that it has not resolved the conflict that it finds itself in as both a trade unionist and a labor movement. In expanding on this theme, a theme that he would devote much attention to in his writings for Fortune, Bell argued that as a trade union movement labor is concerned largely with creating a job monopoly for its membership. In order to assure continued employment a union must attempt to gain protection for the particular industry it serves. This sometimes will make labor a natural ally of the employer and an opponent of the expansion of competitive industries competitive to his own. But as a part of the labor movement, a union must be concerned with a larger set of issues such as social security, protection of the right to organize, and the maintenance of purchasing power through government spending. How in the future will labor square its stake in specific industries while its wider labor perspective is still, concluded Bell, a moot point.

Switching to the United States as a whole and the Fair

Deal in particular, Bell inferred that the new claims on the government generated by the institutionalization of the managed economy from labor, business, and agriculture would in time require both it and the American political community as a whole to come to terms with a number of fundamental questions. The first of these, as yet, largely unaddressed questions was: would the managed economy be managed fiscally or through production control? The second one was "how are we to achieve a popularly accepted definition of an overall social interest."[102] Granted, argued Bell, that Truman's Fair Deal program represents a clear-cut assertion of the duties of government in a managed economy, this was not enough. There remains a wide gap between program and practice. Washington remains a giant pork-barrel with various groups converging to exert pressure on legislators for their needs. In this atmosphere political and sectional maneuvering predominate; but soon attention will have to turn to a consideration of political fundamentals. Needed, argued Bell, was "a general theory as to how the satisfaction of varied group interests may be harmonized with the general welfare."[103] This question was the question that Bell was later to articulate under the concept of the public philosophy

Doubting that "transient majority coalitions" can ever offer a convincting theory of social justice, Bell ended his article with some critical reflections on America's lack of an integrative moral philosophy; reflections that imply that America was in the midst of a deep-seated moral crisis.

> We are floundering, both in practice and in analysis, because we no longer know what holds a society together. The political strength of the American "founding fathers"...was the fact there thinking was rooted both in tradition and in a coherent moral order that assigned men - a certain place both in nature and vis-a-vis one another. Their moral conceptions were rooted either in Locke's theory of natural rights or in Hobbes' theory of the need of law and authority to keep the passions of men in check; out of these arose conflicting descriptions of the rights and privileges of men. But we have little basis today for accepting either of these political myths.[104]

If a democratic society is to survive, warned Bell, then "some new sense of civil obligation must arise that will be strong enough to command the allegiance of all groups and provide a principle of equality in the distribution of rewards and privileges of society."[105] Thus, concluded Bell, the central task which lies ahead for the Truman administration and eventually the American body politic to work out is "the relationship between government and people in a way that permits this civil sense to emerge and sustain itself."[106] Whether or not this can be done was problemmatic. But, concluded Bell, "at the moment the omens are ambiguous enough to discourage dispair without exactly encouraging hope."[107]

By far, this article stands as the most definitive single piece that Bell wrote during the immediate post-war period. One of the principle reasons that this is so is that, in identifying and making explicit his interpretation of American society and history, it in turn served to make explicit the basis of his criticism of Marxist and liberal writers. This, of course, is their failure to understand the complexities of American society. Another major reason why

this article stands out is that it identifies a set of concerns that, as we shall see in the next chapter served to define the character and direction of his writings in the 1950s up till and including "The End of Ideology in the West: An Epilogue." These were concerns about the nature of American liberalism and about its need to develop a new integrative moral philosophy - concerns that became the focal point of his participation in the 1955 Congress for Cultural Freedom Milan Conference.

It must be noted, that all Bell's arguments rest upon the need for a moral order that could integrate and unify American society and which would provide a moral framework within which American society as a whole and its respective interest groups could calculate their shares of rewards and efforts. The moral standards, social standards, perhaps an ideology, did not exist in the present. Bell called for their creation, but did not know from whence they would come. They were, for Bell, an unfinished task. Perhaps he, Daniel Bell would finish the task, or perhaps he was a John the Baptist, continually demanding that ideology, that definition of a moral community, that would end the end of ideology. The end of ideology was thus more than the failure of Marxism, itself an ideology of the "end of ideology"; it was a demand for a new pragmatic ideology. Perhaps this was a contradiction in terms, but the moral community that would make planning, pragmatism, and the calculation of responsibility possible, would be a consensually held ideology. It was not the end of ideology that Bell was calling for, but the replacement of a particular ideology, Marxism.

NOTES

1. Interview with Daniel Bell, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 23 February 1978.

2. Bell, The Reforming of General Education, p. 32.

3. Interview with Daniel Bell, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 23 February 1978.

4. Ibid.

5. The paper chosen was entitled "Will Civilization Survive Technics." This paper appeared in the December 1945 issue of Commentary.

6. Talcott Parsons, Introduction to The Sociology of Religion by Max Weber (Boston: Beacon Pres, 1964, 1922) p. lix-lx.

7. Dennis Wrong, Max Weber (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1970) p. 71.

8. Reinhold Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, 2 vols. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1941) p. 181.

9. Ibid., p. 182.

10. Ibid.

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid.

13. Ibid.

14. Ibid., p. 184.

15. Ibid., pp. 273-4.

16. Reinhold Niebuhr, Christianity and Power Politics (New York: C. Scribner's sons, 1940, p. 156.

17. Daniel Bell "A Parable of Alienation," Jewish Frontier, November 1946, p. 12.

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid.

20. Ibid., p. 13.

21. Ibid., p. 18.

22. Ibid.

23. Ibid.

24. Ibid., pp. 18-19.

25. Ibid., p. 19.

26. Ibid.

27. Ibid.

28. Ibid.

29. Ibid.

30. Ibid.

31. Ibid. In elaborating on this point Bell quoted the Hebrew essayist Akhad Ha-am who described the prophet in the following terms: "...he is a man of truth. He sees life as it is with a view unwarped by subjective feelings; and he tells you what he sees just as he sees it, unaffected by irrelevant considerations. He tells the truth not because he wishes to tell the truth, not because he has convinced himself, after inquiry, that such is his duty, but because he needs to, because truth telling is a special characteristic of his genius - a characteristic of which he cannot rid himself, even if he would..."

32. Bell, "A Parable of Alienation," p. 19.

33. Ibid.

34. This concept of double alienation was first elaborated by Delmore Schwartz in a symposium sponsored by the Contemporary Jewish Record called "Under Forty: A Symposium on American Literature and the Younger Generation of American Jews." Contemporary Jewish Record, February 1944, pp. 12-14. It was later the subject of a series of reviews by Irving Howe of Isaac Rosenfeld's Passage from Home: "Review of Passage from Home" by Isaac Rosenfeld Commentary, August 1946, pp. 190-2; and "The Lost Young Intellectuals," Commentary, October 1946, pp. 361-67. Howe offered the following approach to the problem of the Jewish intellectual's double alienation: "My personal opinion is that any conclusion which affirms the necessity of returning home to the ways of one's people is - like it or not - unrealistic and unlikely to be effected; the Jewish intellectual cannot, even if he wished to, return to a world no longer his. Possibly he can find some alleviation in individual psychotherapy, but even that can only ease individual problems without touching the cause. Ultimately the problem can only be solved if an American society appears in which both the Jewish intellectual and his people, along with everyone else, can find integration, security and acceptance.

At the moment he must live in a society providing none of these; he must continue as what he is: the rootless son of a rootless people. He can find consolation and dignity, however, in the consciousness of his vision, in the awareness of his complexity, and in the rejection of self-pity. To each age its own burdens." From "The Lost Young Intellectuals," p. 367.

35. Daniel Bell, "Screening Leaders in A Democracy," Commentary, April 1948, p. 374.

36. Ibid.

37. Ibid., p. 375.

38. Ibid.

39. Ibid.

40. Ibid.

41. Ibid.

42. Ibid.

43. Daniel Bell, review of The Coming Crisis, by Fritz Sternberg, in Commentary, May 1947, p. 494.

44. Daniel Bell, review of Reveille for Radicals, by Saul Alinsky, in Commentary, March 1946, p. 94.

45. Daniel Bell, review of Strategy for Liberals: The Politics of the Mixed Economy, by Irwin Ross, in Commentary, December 1949, p. 603.

46. Ibid.

47. Ibid.

48. Ibid.

49. Ibid.

50. Ibid.

51. Ibid.

52. Ibid.

53. Ibid.

54. Ibid., pp. 603-4.

55. Ibid., p. 604.

56. Ibid.

57. Ibid. The criticism that Bell is extending is derived from Sidney Hook's essay on Materialism in the Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, 1st ed., s.v. "Materialism."

58. Bell, review of Strategy for Liberals, p. 604.

59. Ibid.

60. Ibid., p. 606.

61. Ibid.

62. Ibid.

63. Ibid.

64. Ibid.

65. Daniel Bell, "America's Un-Marxist Revolution," Commentary, March 1949, p. 207.

66. Ibid.

67. Ibid., p. 208.

68. Ibid.

69. Ibid.

70. Ibid.

71. Ibid.

72. Ibid.

73. Ibid.

74. Ibid.

75. Ibid.

76. Ibid.

77. Ibid., p. 204.

78. Ibid.

79. Ibid.

80. Ibid.

81. Ibid.

82. Ibid.
83. Ibid.
84. Ibid.
85. Ibid.
86. Ibid., p. 210.
87. Ibid.
88. Ibid.
89. Ibid., p. 211.
90. Ibid.
91. Ibid.
92. Ibid., p. 212.
93. Ibid.
94. Ibid.
95. Ibid.
96. Ibid.
97. Ibid.
98. Ibid., p. 213.
99. Ibid.
100. Ibid.
101. Ibid.
102. Ibid., p. 215.
103. Ibid.
104. Ibid.
105. Ibid.
106. Ibid.
107. Ibid.

CHAPTER V

THE FORTUNE YEARS

The New York Jewish Intellectuals

In 1948 Bell resigned his position at the University of Chicago and moved back to New York City to become Fortune's first labor editor, a position that he held until 1958.

The ten years that he spent at Fortune were busy years. Judging from the range of his activities it seems almost as if he was pursuing three careers: as journalist, scholar, and political organizer. For a brief time his activities included co-editing with the Russian emigre and former high ranking Menshevik Raphael Abramovitch a quarterly publication called Modern Review. This publication was put out by the American Labor Conference on International Affairs. Created in 1947 Modern Review represented, according to Bell, "an effort to bring together leading figures of the international labor and socialist movements to re-think the problems of Socialist theory in the post-war period."[1] For Bell it provided an "opportunity to remain active in intellectual journalism."[2]

In addition to his journalistic activities Bell resumed work on a comprehensive history of American Socialism, a project that was initiated in 1946 and 1947 when he participated in a series of conferences at Princeton University and which

culminated in the publication in 1952 of his book Marxian Socialism. At the same time Bell participated with Irving Kristol and Nathan Glazer in a study group devoted to Jewish issues and problems. The group met once a week for nearly two years.[3] From 1952 through 1956 he also worked as a lecturer in Columbia University's School of General Studies. Living in the Columbia University area Bell also resumed his close friendship with Richard Hofstadter who at the time was a faculty member at Columbia and like Bell a community resident. With Hofstadter, Milton Himmelfarb, and others Bell became part of what was affectionately referred to as the "Claremont kibbutz."[4] In part of his friendship with Hofstadter resulted in work on The Radical Right, which was a collection of essays on status politics edited by Bell and published in 1955. Finally, Bell also participated in a series of American Committee for Cultural Freedom activities, the first of which was in May of 1951 when he spoke at a forum on freedom and social progress with Max Ascoli, Peter Viereck, and Lionel Trilling.[5]

The American Committee for Cultural Freedom was a coalition of intellectuals and writers that in 1949 was largely organized through the efforts of Sidney Hook.[6] Established by Hook and other members of the Americans for Intellectual Freedom, a short-lived and ad hoc group, the Committee, which prior to 1950 was known as the Committee for Cultural Freedom, was designed to bring together "everyone who believed in intellectual and cultural freedom."[7] As such, it started out as a broad based, loosely knit organization

that was established to attract intellectuals who independent of their political differences would work together in opposition against totalitarianism. The inclusion of intellectuals with frequently divergent political orientations ranging from Trotskyism to conservatism led the Committee to have a shaky beginning. After a number of desertions by some of its politically more conservative members, the Committee for Cultural Freedom grew in strength. Renamed in 1950 as the American Committee for Cultural Freedom the organization became an affiliate of the Congress for Cultural Freedom.

The Congress was an organization of well known figures in the world of art, science, and social thought drawn from America, England, Germany, and Western Europe. It originated at the Berlin Congress for Freedom meetings in June of 1950 to serve as a permanent political and educational organization with the aim of realizing pledges made at these meetings. These pledges included encouraging those behind the Iron Curtain, particularly intellectuals, to resist Communist tyranny and prevention of Western intellectuals frommaking compromises with Stalinist oppression. Aside from these pledges, of other pledges made at these meetings - meetings which were attended by some one hundred and twenty five individuals at the behest of Berlin's Mayor Reuter - included the provision of scholarships for Eastern European students and inexpensively priced books for German citizens.

The history of this international organization like the history of its American affiliate has been shrouded in controversy. From its very beginnings suspicions were voiced

about its claim to being an independent organization. These suspicions were reinforced when in May of 1967 it was disclosed by the New York Times that the Congress for Cultural Freedom had been receiving funds from the American Central Intelligence Agency.[8] Since this disclosure it has come under sharp attack by the Old and New Left.

Despite this controversy there has been remarkably relatively little unbiased reporting of this international organization and its American affiliate.[9] What is known about it is that it openly functioned as a political organization whose principle task was to provide a response to the communist dominated Wroclaw Peace Conference held in Poland in 1948, and to that of the Paris Peace Conference of 1949 which ended with "third force intellectuals" winning control and declaring "a plague" on both the communists and the anti-communists.[10]

Bell's involvement with the American Committee for Cultural Freedom extended in the mid-1950s to his participation in the Milan Congress for Cultural Freedom meetings where he presented two papers: "America As a Mass Society: A Critique," and "The Breakup of Family Capitalism." These papers later appeared in Commentary and Partisan Review and were included among the essays that made up the book The End of Ideology.[11] For a year, 1956-1957, he also served while on leave from Fortune as director of international seminars for the Congress and was stationed in Paris.

Throughout the ten years he was employed at Fortune Bell became increasingly drawn through his intellectual, social, and

political interests and activities to the overlapping informal circles that made up the group life of the New York Jewish Intellectuals.

The New York Jewish Intellectuals or the "family" as Norman Podhoretz referred to them in his book Making It was a group that joined together three generations of writers and intellectuals drawn largely from the literary and journalistic world. Generally acknowledged to evolve around the New York City world of publishing many of its members were contributors to Commentary, Partisan Review, and the New Leader. Outside of Podhoretz's account of this group and some relatively brief and highly personalized accounts written by Irving Howe and by Bell, there has been little written about this group.

Because it was a highly informal group characterized less by unanimity than by free wheeling discussion and debate, it is difficult to list authoritatively all those who may have been a part of the group. This is one of the reasons why Bell's efforts to delineate the members of this group on the basis of their "coming of age" - a reference to their disillusionment with Communism and extreme left-wing panaceas, as well as to their animosity towards Stalin - provides a useful point of reference. The following chart containing the geneology of this group was constructed by Bell some years ago:

The New York Jewish Intellectuals
c. 1935 - c. 1965

1. The Elders: Coming of Age in the late 1920s and early 1930s

Elliot Cohen	Lionel Trilling	Hannah Arendt
Sidney Hook	Meyer Shapiro	Diana Trilling
Philip Rahv	William Phillips	

Gentile Cousins: Max Eastman, Edmund Wilson, Reinhold Niebuhr, Fred Dupee, Dwight Macdonald, James T. Farrell

The "Other Synagogue." Michael Gold, Joseph Freeman

Magazines: Menorah Journal, The New Masses, Partisan Review

1.A. The Younger Brothers: Coming of Age in the mid and late 1930s

Alfred Kazin, Richard Hofstadter, Saul Bellows*, Delmore Schwartz, Bernard Malamud, Harold Rosenberg, Clement Greenberg, Lionel Abel, Paul Goodman, Issac Rosenfeld

European Relatives: Nicola Chiaramonte, George Lichtheim

Gentile Cousins: Mary McCarthy, Elizabeth Hardwick, James Baldwin, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., William Barrett, Richard Chase, Ralph Ellison

Magazines: The Nation, The New Republic, Partisan Review, Commentary, Politics

2. The Second Generation: Coming of Age in the late 1930s and early 1940s

Daniel Bell, Irving Howe, Leslie Fiedler*, Robert Warshow, Gertrude Himmelfarb, Irving Kristol, Melvin Lasky, Nathan Glazer, S.M. Lipset, David Bazelon

Gentile Cousins: Murray Kempton, C. Wright Mills

Magazines: Commentary, Partisan Review, Encounter, New Leader, Dissent, The Public Interest

2.A. The Younger Brothers: Coming of Age in the late 1940s and early 1950s

Norman Podhoretz, Steven Marcus, Robert Brustein, Midge Decter, Jason Epstein, Robert Silvers, Susan Sontag, Theo. Solotaroff, Norman Mailer, Philip Roth

Gentile Cousins: Michael Harrington, "The Paris Review"

Magazines: Commentary, Partisan Review, New York Review of Books

The European Intelligentsia

Raymond Aron
Arthur Koestler
Ignazio Silone
George Orwell
Manes Sperber
Davud Rousset
Jean-Paul Sartre
Albert Camus
Simone de Beauvoir

The English Intelligentsia

Isaiah Berlin
Stuart Hampshire
Stephen Spender
Noel Annan
John Gross
Jonathan Miller

Institutional Attachments

Columbia University
Congress for Cultural Freedom

Influentials - at a distance

12

T. S. Eliot
W. H. Auden
Robert Lowell
James Agee
Edward Shils

Sharing a common distrust of Marxist panaceas and Stalinism, a distrust that was borne largely from the "Popular Front" crusades of the 1930s when the American Communist Party joined forces with the socialists and liberals to foster a united progressive front only to reverse themselves with the signing of the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression pact, many of the New York Jewish Intellectuals, although certainly not all, came to be involved with the activities of the Congress for Cultural Freedom. In addition to Hook and Bell, key figures from this group included Melvin Lasky who was one of the organizers of the Berlin Conference, Edward Shils who was one of the principle American delegates to the Milan Conference, and Irving Kristol who during the 1950s was the editor of Encounter, the official publication of the Congress for Cultural Freedom.

While his writings increased dramatically in number from his days at the University of Chicago, the number of themes that he dealt with during this ten year period was relatively small and constant. The themes which were prominent in his writings during this period were all themes that were touched upon in his review of Irwin Ross' book Strategy for Liberals and in his article "America's Un-Marxist Revolution." These themes were: the exhaustion of socialist and liberal political thought in the United States; the tension facing American labor as a result of its being both a trade-union and a reform movement; the danger of social unrest resulting from the status anxieties of the middle class; and the need for American liberalism to develop a new moral philosophy in order to effectively harmonize conflicting interests and values.

In much of his writings during this period there was considerable overlapping of issues and themes. Nowhere is this more in evidence than in his writings for Fortune and his book Marxian Socialism in the United States; the common bond of these writings is an emphasis on the relationship the rise of trade-unionism and the exhaustion of "left" ideologies in the United States.

Bell's Critique of Socialism in the United States

Marxian Socialism in the United States was written as a response to the question raised at the turn of the century by the German social economist Werner Sombart in the title of his book Why Is There No Socialism in the United States? In both this book and in his 1949 Modern Review article

"American Socialists: What Now?" Bell made it very clear that he thought that socialism was no longer politically viable in the United States. He also made it very clear in both of these works that he thought that previous attempts to explain why socialism had failed to become a successful movement in the United States were of little real theoretical or substantive value.

Bell's argument was very simple. The explanations by Sombart, Selig Perlman and by historians who stressed that, by virtue of its being a welter of sectional and economic interests, America was not a country conducive to the development of any ideological party, all fell short of the mark. They served only to provide understanding of the external conditions that restricted the chances of socialism's success in the United States. But none of those explanations came to terms with the real problem that underlies socialism's failure to become a successful movement in the United States. That problem was: why, granted these external conditions, had the Socialist Party failed to understand the social environment of the United States and adapt accordingly. Neither the explanations of the general historians nor the explanations of Sombart, who saw the existence of America's open frontier and its opportunity structure as mitigating factors in the development of socialism in the United States, or those by Perlman who emphasized the free gift of the ballot and immigration as factors which discouraged the development of class consciousness among American workers, dealt with the socialist movement itself and its limitations.

Framing his analysis of this problem around the history of the Socialist Party, Bell argued in Marxian Socialism in the United States that the "nub of the issue" rested with the fact that since at least 1939 the Socialist Party has ceased to function as a political party. This he argued highlights the real weakness of socialism in the United States: the failure of the Socialist Party to resolve the dilemma that it continuously confronted, whether it was a political party or an ethical movement. His explanation was that the shuttling back and forth between these two positions had the consequence of producing a series of schisms and ambiguous positions that left the Socialist party impotent.

In developing this argument Bell made it clear that the failure of the Socialist party to resolve its dilemma was conditioned by a problem that was even more basic, the failure of the socialist movement to accept certain fundamental features of modern American life. It could not fully understand that while in certain historical periods and in certain generally closed societies politics and ethics have been closely connected, modern societies are distinguished largely by the separation between the two. Because of this separation the actual distribution of tangible rewards and privileges has in modern societies no fixed ethical basis. No theory of justice dictates how these rewards and privileges ought to be distributed. Lacking such a standard, politics in modern society very often becomes a struggle for power by groups who promote their claims to reward and privilege through ideologies.

If the goal of a group is to seek a redivision of the rewards and privileges allocated by a society then the group must translate its recognition of these realities into more than unmasking the self-serving myths of other groups who seek to preserve the legitimacy of their claims on society: it must accept the fact that "it is only on the field of politics that such a struggle can take place."[13] The separation between politics and ethics he argued makes no other alternative possible. Similarly, he argued, that if a group is genuinely committed to pursuing through politics, the security of its ethical commitments, of its vision of a better society, given the separation between politics and ethics, it must "accept the hazards of evil that are implicit in politics and shun utopianism."[14] It must, in other words, accept the distinction that Max Weber made between the ethics of responsibility and the ethics of conscience. Such an acceptance Bell argued presupposes that the group recognize that success in politics means the acceptance of relevant alternatives, and the system one must operate in to secure its ends.

Concerned with tracing the sources of its dilemma, Bell characterized the Socialist Party as a movement that was "in but not of the real world." Framing his analysis of the history of the Socialist Party around this characterization, one which was patterned after Karl Mannheim's analysis of the orgiastic chiliasm of Thomas Munzer and the Anabaptists of the sixteenth century, Bell singled out the messianistic and utopian elements represented within the party. In stressing

that the rhetoric of the party was as much fashioned by the utopianism of Edward Bellamy and Laurence Gronlund and by the agrarian insurgency of the Greenbacks and the Populists as by Marx, Bell argued that from its inception the Socialist Party had placed itself in a position that made its dilemma inevitable. His argument was that under the weight of its messianistic and utopian impulses it rejected the institutional framework of American society, "the rules of the game," while seeking on other levels to operate within that framework.

Characterizing the twists and turns in the history of the Socialist Party as the product of this incongruity, Bell focused much of his analysis on several key events and controversies. Among them was the failure of the Socialist Party to adopt a pro-American policy towards World War I, the debates on revolution and party orthodoxy which from 1919 to 1936 remained unresolved, the failure of the Socialist Party to accept Roosevelt's New Deal labor policies, and finally its failure to do no more than adopt a moral stance against fascism in the 1930s. Each of these events and controversies served, Bell argued, to remove the Socialist Party from the American worker and from the trade-unionist movement.

By contrasting the Socialist Party to the American Communist Party and to the American trade-union movement, Bell argued that the Socialist Party would not have found itself in some fundamentally untenable positions if it had been either more like the Communist Party or more like the trade-unionist movement. Infused totally with Bolshevism, the

American Communist Party was confronted with none of the agonizing problems of ethics in its politics. Always the perpetual alien living in hostile enemy territory, any gestures of support for immediate social reforms were reduced to tactics, to sets of "Potemkin Villages," the facades of which could be "torn down after the necessary moment for deception had passed."[15] Regarding only the goal as important never the means, the revolutionary communist stands totally outside the real world. Compelled to take concrete stands on practical issues that grew out of the soil of the society, it sought to work within, yet at the same time rejected, the Socialist Party could not like the Communist Party afford the luxury of turning its back on the workers' needs for immediate reforms.

Faced with the immediate needs for reform, the Socialist Party could not give itself to making exaggerated demands that were calculated to secure ultimate, absolute ends like communists without alienating the American worker. It was, argued Bell, the genius of Samuel Gompers, the guiding spirit behind the American Federation of Labor and himself a product of the Socialist movement, to recognize this and to mold a movement that could and did meet the on-going needs of the American worker.

In Gompers Bell found a "case study" of a socialist who was both in and of the real world. Creating the American labor movement in "his own stubborn and pragmatic image," Gompers stood out in sharp contrast to Daniel DeLeon, the staunch uncompromizing purist, whose adherence to Marxian dogma led

the socialists to consistently mis-read the American working class well after the demise of the Socialist Labor Party which he headed. For Bell, Gompers stood out as a keen student of history and politics, as a man who though somewhat of an economic determinist could still recognize the wisdom behind Engels' warning that the isolation of the Socialist Labor Party "proves how useless is a platform - for the most part theoretically correct - if it is unable to get into contact with the actual needs of the people."[16]

Adapting himself and the American Federation of Labor to the realities of American politics and the immediate needs of the worker Gompers was able to fashion a political movement which was relatively free of the factionalism and discord that throughout its history marked the development of the Socialist Party. Limiting its aims to the immediate problem of wages and hours, the A.F. of L under Gompers' leadership could and did reject all the alliances which had proved the undoing of its forerunners, the National Labor Union and the Knights of Labor. By limiting it to the immediate problem of wages and hours it could also openly accept the concentration of economic power as an inevitable fact of industrial capitalism. The fact that it did accept the power of the new rising capitalist class and its role as a permanent class within American society enabled the A.F. of L "to create an institutional framework for its continued existence."[17] In Gompers, then, the labor movement found a man who, after having participated in the interminable theoretical wranglings that constituted the substance of the socialist movement, developed

a skepticism of Marxian politics as applied to the American scene. He could develop a strategy that the Socialist Party could not follow, for Gompers' approach required a minimal acceptance of capitalist society. His strategy was simply one of seeking a secure place within capitalist society, and, "when powerful enough slowly transforming it by demanding a share of power."[18]

Bell's emphasis on Gompers and the success of the American Federation of Labor was by no means incidental to his analysis of the American socialist movement. The relationship between the two highlighted the nature of the Socialist Party's impotence as a political party. The comparison highlighted the Socialist Party's inability both, in key instances, to rise above Marxist dogma and make the kind of compromises that would have enabled it to attract organized labor and to work within the framework of established socialist economic theory.

Ultimately, Bell's analysis of the problems that resulted, after 1902 (the year in which socialist strength in the labor movement reached its peak), in a total lack of unity between the two organizations sets the stage for some of his most important articles for Fortune on the labor movement. As we shall soon see, like Marxian Socialism these articles stressed the theme of the end of ideology.

For Bell there were three problems that made for a sharp division between the Socialist Party and the A.F. of L. These were the alleged "class collaborationist" character of the A.F. of L, the issue of monopoly and the limited program of

the American Federation of Labor.

The socialist characterization of the policies of the A.F. of L as "class collaborationist" rested on the idea that trade-unionism is not socialism, but the "capitalism of the proletariat." A corollary to this idea was the notion that under trade-unionism the union leader must become the "labor lieutenant" and "lackey" of the capitalist class. In treating this corollary as a development of the first idea, the socialists viewed the A.F. of L. as a divisive force which sought to benefit the skilled workers at the expense of other sections of the working class by refusing to admit industrial unions and by following a strategy of "business unionism."

Gompers had defended the A.F. of L by attacking the socialists for their failure to understand the logic of the trade-union movement, a failure which in his view derived from a fundamental misconception about class-consciousness. Gompers' argument, as summarized by Bell, was that the class-consciousness which the socialists made so much of was neither a fundamental nor inherent idea but rather an emotional attitude, a mental process shared by all who had imagination. Moreover, the real social cement that binds the worker into a class movement was a primitive force that had its origins in experience only, the worker's "class feeling." By emphasizing class-consciousness to the exclusion of class feeling the socialists failed to make an essential distinction between the skilled and the unskilled. Where the skilled workers had accepted their role, had a "commodity" of their own, and were

in a position to bargain, most of the unskilled workers, many of them immigrants had no thought of staying in an especially low paying job, and drifted. The unskilled workers, thus, constituted a large labor resevoir which the capitalist could always use to break strikes or depress wages. Given this situation the A.F. of L, forged, on behalf of the skilled workers, the trade agreement as the instrument for exacting a higher price for his commodity, that is, his skill. The A.F. of L did this because it found that control of job supply was the prime means of protecting the wage worker.

The consequence of this bargaining strategy, observed Bell, was that the union in recognizing that the fate of skilled labor was dependent on the health of the industries it served necessarily committed itself to being actively involved in the market problems of those industries. The necessity of "business unionism," of "living in and of the market" was something that the early Socialist Party could not adequately understand.

Like the controversy over "business unionism," the controversy over the American Federation of Labor's stand on the issue of monopolies rested on a fundamental disagreement involving politics and theory. This time, explained Bell, the positions were reversed with Gompers views on trusts being more in line with socialist economic theory then the Socialist Party. The latter, like every major American social protest movement from 1880 to 1910 was strongly anti-monopoly. Socialist economic theory as it was later articulated by Rudolf Hilferding in his Finanzkapital[19] was clear on this issue.

The theory "saw the growth of monopoly as inevitable under capitalism. It condemned antimonopoly programs as out of keeping with historical development, and in many instances approved the development of monopoly because such concentration of productive prices would make the transformation of socialism easier."[20]

Gompers, explained Bell, felt that monopoly as an outcome of economic growth was unavoidable. He also felt that the state could not control the trusts because it was subservient to them. Gompers, in acting on these beliefs took the only position that made sense to him: labor should endure the evils of the monopolies until the workers were sufficiently organized and educated to the degree that they could recognize that the state was, by right, theirs. But in the meantime it should never relax in its efforts to secure the very best economic, social, and material improvements in the workers conditions. Socialists in Germany and England adopted similar positions. Following their lead "the German unions acquiesced in the cartelization program of German industry, and the English unions early abetted the monopoly devices of British industry. Because of the influence of agrarian elements in the West, the American Socialist Party could not follow suit. While always uneasy about it, the Socialist Party was nonetheless in its politics forced into adopting a firm anti monopoly stance.

The limited program of the American Federation of Labor created a virtually irreconcilable source of tension, according to Bell, because to socialists the demand for a shorter work-

day and more wages provided no solution to the capitalist crisis. The socialist position was that "some ultimate goal had to be fixed lest the workers gain illusions that the trade union was a sufficient instrument for melioration."[21] Whether their position was right or wrong depends, observed Bell, on how the relationship between the union and the capitalist society within which it operates is conceptualized. The problem of which side was right ultimately depends on one's perspective:

> If one accepts the viewpoint that the union, by its own nature, becomes an end in itself and an integral part of capitalist society, then such a socialist theory makes sense. If, however, one regards unionism as a social force which by its own position in an industrial hierarchy becomes a challenge to managerial power in capitalism, then Gompers' strategy of focusing on the day-to-day issues was undeniably correct.[22]

The issue of the ultimate goal of the trade union and the tension it created was a subject that Bell devoted considerable attention to in some of his earlier Fortune articles. Thematically the stage for those articles was established when Bell concluded his analysis of the sources of this problem with the observation that "this is the very problem which unionism, now an established and powerful force in the economy, faces today."[23] Concerned with elaborating how the tension that surrounds this issue manifests itself on the contemporary labor scene, Bell defined the problem as the problem of trade-unionism versus labor as a social movement. Bell focused upon this problem in Fortune, a publication that has a strange place in American journalism.

Fortune

Conceived by Henry R. Luce before the depression of 1929 and run by him from 1930 until well after Bell's 1958 departure, Fortune's policy of "unbridled curiousity" and commitment to journalistic independence went, side by side with an unremitting optimism over the capacity of business to provide intellectual and moral leadership in a free society. These features led Luce to employ a number of writers on its staff who were by word and reputation liberals. Prominent amongst them were John Kenneth Galbraith who was on staff when Bell was hired and Dwight MacDonald, who was affiliated with it from 1930 to 1936 before he bacame a Trotskyite. MacDonald wrote some sharply critical pieces for Fortune. These were articles on the U.S. Steel Corporation that dealt with monopoly capitalism and the inevitability of socialism. Fortune in a curious sense in the 1930s and 1940s was almost a liberal publication. While there has never been a social history written about it, Dwight MacDonald's reflections on Fortune provides some insight into what kind of publication it was:

> The New Deal was inspiring to me, as to my fellow writers on Fortune. To Luce's dismay, we became increasingly liberal; we wanted to write about Roosevelt's farm program, about the N.R.A. (National Recovery Administration), the C.I.O., the Wagner Act, unemployment, social security, anything but business. Luce was divided between his pro-business convictions and his journalistic instinct, which told him the C.I.O. was news and that the wonders of American Cyanamic Co. weren't; his typically American pragmatic fascination with Power and Success told him the same thing. He compromised (as did we) and for a few years Fortune was a pastiche of mildly liberal articles on social themes and reluctantly written "corporation pieces" dealing with enterprises that somehow managed to make a profit.[24]

A report on the national economy put out by it and its parent company Time provides some insight into the kind of publication Fortune was in 1942. In this report, entitled "The Domestic Economy," and in the preface to it, the editors of Fortune argued that American business has failed to understand Keynesian economics and the potential that, when imaginatively applied, it can have in creating the basis for a political economy that could provide both freedom and security for American society. Similarly, the editors of Fortune also charged Keynesian economists, particularly those who called for a virtually total substitution of private enterprise in favor of total government control of investment and fiscal management, with underestimating the creative potentialities of the "inventor and risk-taking enterpriser" and ultimately with failing to think through the problems that Keynes raised. Charging that no theory of employment can be complete without a theory of business enterprise, the editors of Fortune proposed a program that in their judgement represented "a genuine reconciliation of the profound but perplexing American desire for both security and freedom."[25] The broad outlines of this program as well as part of the philosophy behind it are reflected in the following passage:

> We ask the government to underwrite the whole economy, using fiscal controls, public works, and a broader social-security program so that everyone who wants and is able to work may have a reasonable chance at a job. We also ask the government to recognize its responsibility for the health of the economy, by vigilantly policing the free market and actively encouraging the risk-taking individual, our most productive asset. This program is not socialism, nor fascism, nor a return to laissez-faire. It is, we believe, a synthesis of the conflicting elements in our recent past; a new democratic capitalism,

> which will allow production and consumption to keep on expanding as fast as science and human ingenuity point the way.[26]

Ultimately, then, the program proposed by the editors of Fortune recognized the value for the United States of having a mixed economy and a commitment to full employment. On this level the editors of Fortune reflected a certain pragmatism grounded in part by the belief that "if the creative risk-taking, profit seeking, competitive individual were to be restored to the legitimate throne of a free market," then:

> ...the individualist must enlist the aid of the very power that has been harassing him and whose intentions he instinctively mistrusts: the power of government.[27]

Fortune's pragmatism was also dictated by its editors' perceptions of the long-term implications of the New Deal. The nature of both their fear of government and the scope of the perceptions which dictated Fortune's pragmatism are partially reflected in the following passage:

> ...in this age the inertia of industry itself allows it to drift in the direction of collectivism; and only the active and determined intervention of the state can exert enough power to stop it. Moreover, the balance of economic power was transferred to Washington during the thirties and will probably stay there. The only realistic question is: to what use will that power be put? We therefore ask a more rigorous governmental policing of the free market. For unless it becomes a better policeman, the government will become a universal economic administrator; and we should then lose all economic freedom, with which our other freedoms are linked.[28]

Bell's Fortune Essays

In his writings for Fortune, Bell's treatment of the problem of labor as trade unionism versus labor as a social movement

was most clearly reflected when in 1951 he wrote "The Language of Labor" and "Labor's Coming of Middle Age." Both of these articles were part of a series devoted to an analysis of the sources of nature of labor's militant language in 1951, a language that business found baffling in the light of labor's successes in the post war period.

Cautioning his readers not to make too much of labor's militant language, Bell in "The Language of Labor" outlined the position of labor in the United States. Labor by 1951, he observed had come a long way.

Almost every major industry in the United States was unionized; and in many ways the union shop - "the hallmark of security for labor" - had, despite the Taft Hartley Act, been achieved. Labor's forebodings about business attempts to break unionism after the end of the Second World War were unrealized. The contrast between the managerial attitudes of 1919 with those of 1951 provided a manifestation of the distance that labor had traveled. Accepted as a fact of life, the unions were no longer viewed as outsiders. Indeed, labor leaders were now being invited to serve with business leaders on civil board, community chests, and in patriotic organizations. Moreover, like their business counterparts labor leaders were receiving honorary degrees from major academic institutions as well as being enlisted to serve their nation in the field of international politics. For all intents and purposes then, labor had arrived. It had received a full measure of acceptance in American society and was thus no longer the outsider it had been in 1919.

Despite its apparent success, labor did not talk like a recognized power. Rather it talked as if it were still a weak minority that was "politically helpless before a marauding business class."[29] It talked as if its "own small voice were the only defender of the national interest against the greed of special interests."[30]

In stressing the confusion of labor leaders at this new reality, Bell noted that the language of labor in the American press was hardly consistent with the language they used in statements to their foreign counterparts. In those statements the American labor leaders "point with considerable pride to labors' powerful place in American Society as proof of the vitality of the democratic system."[31] The real problem he argued was thus whether the language labor addressed to the American press was a "ritualistic piety" or a reflection of a deeply felt sentiment. Stressing that only a specific correlation of word and behavior in particular historical context could produce a solution to this problem, Bell turned to the controversy between labor and Charles E. Wilson the chairman of the Defense Mobilization Board and the president of General Electric because in this public conflicts the rhetoric used by labor "was quite extreme."[32]

Even after Wilson finally succumbed to political pressure and appointed George Harrison from the ranks of labor as one of his executive assistants, charges of capitalistic plots to sabotage labors' position in American society were still being directed towards Wilson. The failure of Harrison to report in for the swearing in ceremonies until four weeks

after his appointment to the Mobilization Board and his subsequent eight week trip to Europe to attend some international labor conference dramatized the tension between the labor leaders and Wilson. But these incidents, explained Bell, were only the surface manifestations of a deeper struggle, one that touched on status differentials between the "self-made" men of labor and industry. This was a personal struggle, one that had seen Wilson, (a self-made man who like his labor counterparts frequently boasted of being "up from the bench") almost come to blows with a labor leader after each had accused the other of representing his own rather than the national interest.[33]

Granted there were significant differences between Wilson and the labor leaders on controls and wage price policy, but problems relating to status, argued Bell, remained the touchiest. One of the real questions that these incidents raised, was why labor felt so threatened by Wilson? Why did their reactions to him reach the proportions of a status conflict? Finally, why did labor invoke a language that has been virtually dormant since the mid 1930s to convey their animosities? The answers to these questions, cautioned Bell, lies fundamentally in the history and nature of trade-unionism; in the relationship between the federal government and the labor movement under the New Deal; and in the uncertainty of the top labor leaders resulting from the nature of labors' alliance with the government and from labor's absence of a defined ideology in a period of relative prosperity.

"Every institution in some degree carries the stamp of

its founder and the weight of its past. Samuel Gompers is the great totem of the American labor movement, and in his image much of labor unionism is today shaped."[34] With these words Bell began his analysis of the history of trade unionism in the United States, the bulk of which was devoted to establishing the point that labor's militant rhetoric stemmed from Gompers. Bell's thesis was that the contemporary labor leaders were invoking in rhetorical fashion a language that was the product of the status anxieties that shaped Gompers' perceptions of American business and the temper of the times in which he lived.

"The most salient fact about Samuel Gompers," declared Bell, "was that he was an immigrant boy who struggled all his life to become accepted by America."[35] Born in the squalor of London's Spitalfields slums, one of five children," Gompers at the age of ten had been apprenticed to a shoemaker.[36] In 1863, when he was thirteen, the Gompers family moved to New York City, where Gompers like his father became a cigar maker. In those days, noted Bell, cigar making had become a popular vocation for working class intellectuals primarily because it required "only skilled and busy fingers" leaving the men free to talk at will.[37] Lacking a formal education, the shop became Gompers' classroom. In it, Gompers' having been exposed to "the strong winds of socialism, anarchism, communitarianism, colonization schemes and single taxism" learned a political rhetoric that for the rest of his life remained a crucial part of his vocabulary.[38]

The political rhetoric that he learned was European in

character stemming equally from Darwinism with its emphasis on the struggle for existence and Marxism with its emphasis on economic determinism. It was no accident, observed Bell, that the official constitution of the American Federation of Labor as adopted in 1886 carried the following Marxist cast:

> Whereas a struggle is going on in all the nations of the civilized world between the oppressors and the oppressed of all countries, a struggle between the Capitalist and the Laborer, which grows in intensity from year to year, and will work disastrous results to the toiling millions if they are not combined for mutual protection and benefit. It therefore behooves....[39]

Gompers was always "a crude economic determinist."[40] He therefore always saw "power relations through the prism of the Class struggle."[41] Yet, prompted by the experience of having seen "too many unions wrecked on the shoals of sectarian politics" Gompers rejected the ultimate aims of the Socialists and substituted in their place "the limited goals of the trade union: another 10 cents an hour, a half hour less a day of work, better conditions, goals summed up in the simple word more."[42] Embarking on this course Gompers found the American labor movement to "the fateful commitment of seeking a place within capitalism rather than, as the Socialists did, trying to overthrow it."[43]

The need for acceptance, the perception of power relations through the prism of the class struggle, the commitment to finding a place within capitalism for the American skilled worker, all contributed to making Gompers a man who could not fit comfortably into both the world of socialism or capitalism. Gompers' life was marked, argued Bell, by the paradox that both he and the temper of the times in which he lived created.

Gompers had vigorously sought to win acceptance from industry for the unions. Together with John Mitchell, the leader of the coal miners, he joined with Mark Hanna and August Belmont in creating the National Civil Federation in order, in his words "to establish the practice of accepting labor unions as an integral social element and logically of including their representatives in groups to discuss politics."[44] His forty year career as a labor leader was marked by notable successes for both the union which he represented and for himself. An early entry and hearing at the White House coupled with, among other things, membership during the first World War on the Advisory Commission to the Council of National Defense were some of his major personal achievements.

But despite those achievements Gompers who had in his own right "a fierce sense of class" was placed by the temper of the times in which he lived in the position of having to refuse the food served to him at a dinner held by several industrialists, a dinner to which he had been invited by Charles R. Flint, "the self-styled head of the trusts" to present labor's case.[45] Granted, observed Bell, one might suspect Gompers' polite refusal of the food served to him to be "a pose to call attention to himself," but in actuality "the temper of the times was such that Gompers genuinely had to defend himself against the charge of being seduced by capitalists."[46]

For much of the time that Gompers led the American Federation of Labor (1884-1924) the country, explained Bell, had been in ferment. The steady growth of the trusts, the exposes of the muckrakers, the intense labor disputes, the

spread of Socialist ideas in the first decade of the twentieth century all contributed to making the idea of the United States being run by a purposeful, well coordinated ruling class an acceptable and popular notion.

Largely because of John L. Lewis and the influence of Communism's mode of thinking and speaking on the temper of left-wing political thought, the image of business leaders as constituting a ruling class has been, observed Bell, carried over from Gompers' day into contemporary labor journalism and thinking. A product of "the devil theory of politics," the primitive logic which holds that since something is running then someone, somewhere must be pulling the strings, the idea of a ruling class with its separate images of business and labor served the same function for many contemporary labor leaders that it provided for Gompers. It was a way of managing their status anxieties.

Bell's argument was that, like Gompers, many of the contemporary labor movement, when made anxious by being thrust into new and potentially threatening situations, found it a matter of training and habit to see the world in conspiratorial terms. The notion of a ruling class perpetrating plots to rob labor of its due becomes then a useful managing device because it provides a way of identifying "the enemy."

"The United States is today, argued Bell, in concluding "The Language of Labor" both a "broker state" and a society that is undergoing a swift transformation. As a broker state it necessarily operates through a series of changing coalitions. As a swiftly transforming society the once relatively stable

coalitions established under Franklin D. Roosevelt have begun to give way with the result that power cannot be permanently located in any one generally recognized group. This is a situation which inevitably produces in everyone anxieties about the future for whether they admit it or not, argued Bell, "people do like to know who's in charge."[47] Only then can they know where they "fit - and whom to fight."[48] Thus it is the absence of stabilized power in the contemporary situation which becomes one of the major sources of labors' anxieties and ultimately of its need, when threatened by a man like Wilson, to revert back to a language that masks its insecurities.

While Bell placed considerable emphasis on the absence of stabilized power as the source of labor's insecurities in the post-war period, it was not the only characteristic of labor that he emphasized. In "Labor's Coming of Middle Age" he argued that labor was very insecure because it saw the actions of the post-war Republican Congress with its passage into law of the restrictive Taft-Hartley Act as a signal that the alliance of government and labor alliance fostered under the New Deal was at an end. The fact that they had to "strong-arm" Truman into giving them some of the recognition they sought during the war further reinforced labor's perception that the alliance between them and the federal government was finished: they were now once again outsiders. This would not be an anxiety-provoking situation for labor if, Bell argued, its leadership were certain of which way to turn.

The uncertainty of labor's leadership about the political

course labor should take was, Bell further suggested, the result of the absence of a defined trade-union ideology. No politically viable alternative to leaning on President Truman for concessions was being offered. The only alternative being proposed was the one which was being loudly suggested by John L. Lewis, the outspoken maverick president of the United Mine Workers. Lewis believed in militant trade-unionism. While doubting that labor would ever accept Lewis' "egoistic" type of leadership there was, cautioned Bell, no doubt that his militant trade-unionism would continue to appeal to other labor leaders for the same reasons that left labor without a defined ideology. There were two immediate and overlapping reasons why Lewis' brand of trade-unionism with its emphasis on labor relying on its own economic strength instead of on coalitions between it and the government was growing in appeal among many labor leaders. The reasons highlighted the conflict between trade-unionism and labor as a social movement, and underlying them was an "exhaustion of the left."[49]

The first reason concerned the decline in influence of Walter Reuther, the then president of the United Auto Workers and the principle spokesman in America for trade-unionism as a force for large scale social planning. The second concerned the fact that many labor leaders were tired of the "mantle of social leadership" that liberal and New Deal intellectuals had cast upon them during the 1930s.[50] This fact was underlined by the obvious reluctance in 1949 of the labor leaders to participate with left-wing intellectual in the Americans for Democratic Action. But these, implied Bell, were only surface factors.

One of the underlying factors that prompted labor leaders to move back, under Lewis' prodding, to the traditional Gompers business union attitude with its focus on the market situation and collective bargaining was the threat of losing their base of political support. The office of union president made them focus their concerns on the particular unions they represented rather then on larger social interests.

The even more fundamental and overriding factor was that the shift to trade-unionism was the product of the "exhaustion of the left." By this expression Bell was referring to the failure of the political left to provide union leaders interested in social planning with a new set of philosophical legitimations. In elaborating this view Bell explained that:

> ... in the last five years the social impulses that had agitated the minds of labor intellectuals and radicals have been almost completely exhausted. The enthusiasm for planning is probably at its nadir. Attempts to articulate a philosophy of labor have practically ceased. The organizational and ideological influence of the once-powerful left-wing groups, notably the socialists, have disappeared.[51]

There were, explained Bell, three "facts" that accounted for labor's shift in mood; for its failure to retain the social impulses that in the 1930s made it a social movement. The first concerned the changing nature of union leadership. Many of the union leaders who had helped to transform unionism into a social movement were either, as in the case of Sidney Hillman dead, or as in the cases of George Meany, David Dubinsky, George Harrison, and Phil Murray, just "tired and aging."[52] Moreover, the men who were being groomed to replace the aging leaders were of a different breed. They were not men who had come, like their predecessors, from the "hurly-burly" of union

politics but rather they came up quietly through the ranks of the union bureaucracy. More adept at consolidating rather than building a power base they were administrators rather than individualists. They were also, both in their social attitudes and style of life, members of a new class, one that was more "bourgeois" then the working class. Thus, aside from his rhetoric, this new labor leader enjoys a high salary and a powerful and high status position in society and bears none of the real independence and militancy of the old labor leader.

The second fact that accounted for the "exhaustion of the left" in the American labor movement concerned the threat of Russian communism sabotaging the labor movement in Europe. Finding "the realities of the East-West struggle more exciting than the pallid issues at home," many high ranking labor leaders and intellectuals chose to remain in Europe where they worked either with the Economic Co-operation Administration labor programs or with the State Department as labor attaches.[53]

The third and most important reason for labor's shift in mood, according to Bell, was the remarkable resiliency of the American economy. Despite the absence of social planning of the kind proposed by Walter Reuther and other labor intellectuals the American economy from 1940 to 1947 had prospered beyond all expectations. The call for sixty million jobs seemed messianic when made by Henry Wallace in 1945, but by 1948 that figure had already been reached.

A symbol of the exhaustion of the left for Bell was David Dubinsky, the ex-socialist leader of the Ladies Garment Workers

Union. For Bell, Dubinsky's reflections on the nature of his rejection in 1944 of socialism dramatized the shift in the labor movement away from "ideology" to trade unionism. The following is Dubinsky's assessment of the change in his political ideas as quoted by Bell:

> When I resigned from the Socialist Party in 1936 it was for purely political reasons. We...wanted Roosevelt re-elected. But since that time I have come to the conclusion that socialism certainly the orthodox variety will never work. Trade unionism needs capitalism like a fish needs water. Democracy is possible only in a society of free enterprise, and trade unionism can only live in a democracy... But capitalism,..must be made responsible. Nobody but a lunatic could believe in a system - or rather a lack of system - that produces violent business cycles, mass unemployment, and misery for millions of people... Where do we draw the line in a society as infinitely complicated as the modern industrial world?... I'm for the New Deal, with all its faults, because it's an American attempt to make capitalism work in terms of industrial democracy... I don't think that we in America are in danger of a European kind of statism.[54]

The exhaustion of the left in the American labor movement, asserted Bell, was not a passing phenomenon. Rather, with the reversion back to trade unionism the possibilities of labor assuming, in the fashion of the 1930s, a strong ideological role in American politics were virtually non-existent. The reasons for this assessment had less to do with any external factors then with the underlying nature of trade unionism.

Bell's central thesis was that it is fundamentally business union-oriented trade unions who promote conditions that create constraints against them becoming part of a social movement. Business unionism commits labor to work within the limits of a specific industrial environment. It commits each union to protect the health of the particular industry its survival is dependent upon. The "market role," because it stresses

immediate economic problems, tends to divide unions along the economic lines of the industries in which they live. Trade unionism thus serves to restrict the chances for cohesion amongst the different unions. Operating as a "conservative" force within the labor movement trade unionism predisposes each union to develop vested interests which it functions to protect. The result is that politics is seen as a means of winning specific and narrowly defined union ends rather than broadly based social ends.

The exhaustion of the left and the reversion of the unions to business unionism thus makes the politics of labor very predictable. In discouraging a trade-union social movement, business unionism prevents labor from being anything more than a reactive movement. In lacking any positive drive of its own, labor reacts to other groups in the social order; it seeks to at least maintain parity with them.

After repeatedly emphasizing this point, Bell concluded "Labor's Coming of Middle Age" with a word of caution, the underlying nature of which was that business should not be misled by trade unionism's reputation. Granted a trade union is an instrument for the accumulation of power. The union is "under constant pressure to deliver gains to its membership the exercise of power whets the appetite for more."[55] Granted, too, that "within the plant it has, up to a point, challenged the unambiguous right to manage."[56] But under trade unionism labor's challenge to business is a limited one. Tempered both by the realities of the market and by its acceptance of the basic structure of capitalist society under trade unionism,

labor's challenge to business will always remain a partial and limited one. In this context, it is well worth remembering, asserted Bell, that the antibusiness rhetoric of labor reached its height of abuse only when the struggles between labor and business became very personal or, in other words, when the status claims of the union leaders were undermined. Moreover, it is well worth noting that labor's militant language was

> not a language, like Veblen's, that bitterly satirized the whole society. It lacked any bite or mordancy. It never attacked the culture of the society, its canons of success and social standing. It was a language of protest against exclusion. It challenged the right to rule, but not the nature of the rule.57

It is difficult to interpret this article. Part of its intent may have been to soften management, i.e. Fortune's readers view of labor to produce in them more tolerance and understanding and to "apologize" for the abusive rhetoric of the labor leaders. Yet Bell does more. He presents again the concept of the exhaustion of the left and the end of ideology thesis. The left in failing to provide labor with a planning ideology, is deficient. But implied in his argument is the necessity of such an ideology, a planning ideology that would give labor a place in a larger moral community. Again Bell is arguing that the end of a particular ideology requires a new, pragmatic planning ideology, in his terminology a "philosophical legitimacy," within which planning is acceptable and can be made to work.

While most of his writings for Fortune after 1951 were largely devoted to reports on scandals and corruption in the unions Bell continued to elaborate his argument concerning the

"anti-ideological" effect of trade unionism on the labor movement and the tension between trade unionism and social planning unionism. Ultimately, this was the significance of his 1953 Fortune article "Labor's New Men of Power," an article which saw Bell compare Walter Reuther with George Meany and two other top labor leaders. In a re-working of the "in but not of the real world" framework that he used to explain the demise of the Socialist Party, Bell pictured Reuther as a man who was in a real dilemma. Having "shrewdly" seized the issue of the guaranteed annual wage as his own Reuther, who was then the president of the C.I.O., now had to decide whether he wanted to be a political leader with broad appeal and thus seek to organize a broad based social movement around this issue or be a more narrowly focused trade unionist. Reuther was in Bell's view a man caught in the middle of a real dilemma.[58]

Outside of his writings for Fortune Bell continued to write about many of the same issues that were related to his interest in the anti-ideological effect of trade unionism and the tension between business unionism and social planning. The exhaustion of the left, the existence of status anxieties as a result of both prosperity and the absence of ideology and the political exigencies of the "broker state" were all issues that Bell continued to write about during the 1950s. Indeed, the ultimate value of his introductory essay to The Radical Right, "Interpretations of American Politics" was that in it Bell sought to establish a theoretical framework for understanding the underlying sources of tension in American society of the

fifties largely on the basis of his reflections on these issues.

Bell continued these reflections in the two papers that he gave at the 1955 Milan Congress for Cultural Freedom meetings. Like his writings on American socialism and trade-unionism these papers helped shape Bell's efforts to develop his end of ideology thesis and they, like his writings on trade unions, constituted an integral part of Bell's thinking on that theme.

Bell's Congress For Cultural Freedom Papers

The first paper Bell presented at the Milan meetings was entitled "The Ambiguities of the Mass Society and the Complexities of American Life." Later retitled "America as a Mass Society: A Critique" this paper was written in order to elaborate the theoretical and substantive limitations of the theory of the mass society as applied to midcentury American society. Its stated purpose was to reveal "the scientifically spurious" character of aristocratic conceptions of modern society; conceptions that were fostered by the underlying assumptions and value judgements that framed the construction of the theory of the mass society.

Concerned largely with exposing the conservative implications of this theory Bell was very critical of what he saw as its less than scientific applications by both liberal and conservative European trained social scientists. In its emphasis on the sense of estrangement and self doubts that arise from the breakdown of traditional authority, the theory of the mass society provided an attractive means for under-

standing the progressive disenchantment of the modern world and the rise to power of charismatic and authoritarian political leaders. "In a world of lonely crowds seeking individual distinction, where values are constantly translated into economic calculabilities," this theory seemed to offer both a forceful, realistic description of contemporary society, and "an accurate reflection of the quality and feeling of modern life."[59] Yet, something was missing. "When one seeks to apply the theory of the mass society, analytically, it becomes very slippery."[60]

According to Bell the theory was wrong for several reasons. One reason was that it did not necessarily follow that greater interdependence produces estrangement, or that greater spatial and social mobility intensifies concern over status or results in the individual losing a coherent sense of himself as proponents of this theory claimed. Aside from the general concept of the breakdown of traditional values and the search for new unifying beliefs, the theory offered no organizing principle around which the different elements of the theory could be put together in a logically meaningful and historically accurate manner. But even more significantly the theory in its contemporary applications was wrought with ambiguities.

After distinguishing between five different and "sometimes contradictory" uses of the theory and reviewing each of them, Bell defined the principle focus of his critique of the concept of mass society. Because it was so imprecise contradictory judgements often get mixed up in its application: "a judgement

regarding the quality of modern experience and a presumed scientific statement concerning the disorganization of society created by industrialization and by the demand of the masses for equality."[61] While the negative judgement was one that "any sensitive individual might agree with" the statement was a decidely reactionary and elitist view point, one which hides a value and serves as no more than a ideological defense of privilege.[62]

Bell's argument was that behind the theory of social disorganization embodied in the theory of the mass society there rests a romantic and "somewhat false notion of the past."[63] This is a notion of the past which sees society in terms of the distinction beteen Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft. Under this notion society is viewed as "having once been made up of small organic, close knit communities that were shattered by industrialism and modern life."[64] The gemeinschaft or traditional society is viewed as having been replaced by a large, impersonal, atomistic society that is both unable to provide the basic gratifications and to call forth the same loyalties prevalent in the older communities. "Value-riddled" in its "sociological determinism" this notion obscures man's capacity for adaptiveness and creativity. No credit is given to man for having made certain adjustments to a changing world or for creating new social networks and emotional support systems to compensate for the loss of traditional primary group relationships. Because it conveys the doubt that the large mass of mankind can ever become truly educated or acquire an appreciation of culture the mass society theory serves to

rationalize the older aristocratic cultural tradition.

Substantively, the theory of the mass society also legitimated the image of the mindless mass and the fear of the mob, the cornerstones upon which so much of existing conservative political theory was derived. Because the theory of the mass society performed these functions it gave credibility to a philosophically important but sociologically skewed interpretation of modern democracy and the problem of political legitimacy. In equating democracy with a particular conception of equality, one in which equality is taken to mean a leveling of tastes to the lowest "common denominator," and by narrowly conceptualizing liberty as something which guarantees each man the right to be different, the sources of social tension in modern society are conceived of and approached in a overly fixed and distorted manner. They are conceived as the product of an "irreducible conflict between liberty and equality."[65]

Later day applications of this theory legitimated another view that was sharply critical of Western democracy. Largely conditioned by the works of Karl Mannheim, Emil Lederer and Hannah Arendt, with their common emphasis on over-organization and the disruption of the social fabric of European society, this was the notion that fascism was not a reaction against, but rather the inevitable end-product of democracy. Under this view Hitler was seen as "a replica of the classical demogague swaying the mindless masses and leading them in nihilistic revolt against the traditional culture of Europe."[66]

In this context, Bell argued that, in their emphasis on

social disorganization and anomie, mass society theorists often underestimated the role of constitutionalism and the rule of law as constituent elements of Western democracy. In his opinion, many of these theorists also neglected the social and political achievements that these progressive constitutional developments made possible. These achievements included "the right to privacy, the free choice of friends and occupation, status on the basis of achievement rather than of ascription, and the existence of a plurality of norms and standards instead of the exclusive and monopolistic social controls of a single dominant group."[67]

In the process of developing this critique of current theories of society Bell elaborated his own position on democracy and the problem of political legitimacy. He was concerned that, in the face of communist successes in infiltrating mass organizations in European democracies, use of the theory was leading political analysts to miscalculate the nature of the problem of political legitimacy in modern and developing nations. Bell further argued that it is not the "mass society" or poverty per se that enables communism to be successful. The principle determining factor that facilitates the growth of communism or any other radical movement has less to do with the "mass society" or poverty than with "the capacity or incapacity of the given social order to satisfy the demands for social mobility and higher standards of living that arise once social change is underway."[68]

In elaborating this argument Bell explained that

revolution had less to do with poverty than with the management of expectations in status and standards of living:

> ...poverty most often induces fatalism and despair, and a reliance, embodied in ritual and superstitious practices, on supernatural help. Social tensions are an expression of unfulfilled expectations. It is only when expectations are aroused that radicalism can take hold. Radical strength is greatest (and here the appeal of communism must be seen as a variant of the general appeal of radicalism) in societies where awareness of class differences runs deep, expectations of social advancement outstrip possibilities, and the establishments of culture fail to make room for aspiring intellectuals.[69]

Just as he was critical of mass society theorists for their failure to emphasize the achievements of modern society so toowas Bell critical of what he saw as their failure to properly test the mass society hypothesis. In his view the United States provided the most logical test of the validity of that hypothesis. Never on the same scale had urbanization, industrialization, and democratization eroded the older primary and community ties extolled in the Gemeinschaft model as in the United States. Thus, from the standpoint of the mass society hypothesis the United States should be a country that evidenced considerable radicalism and discontent.

Nothing, however, was further from the truth. Even though the United States had experienced a greater level of large scale unemployment during the depression than any country in Western Europe, neither the communist nor the fascist movement had made any significant inroads into American politics. The reason for the failure of these movements in the 1930s was that, contrary to the image of American society projected by mass society theorists, the United States was not "a atomized

society composed of lonely, isolated individuals" but rather a nation of joiners.[70] It was, in his view, a country with an astonishing number of voluntary and ethnic group organizations. Representing close to eighty million people these organizations provided their members with a sense of community and purpose.

In focusing on the United States he developed an analysis of the complexities of American life that led Edward Shils to speak of Bell's paper as a "gratified contemplation of American life" and an "exculpation" of the masses.[71] Projected in this analysis was an image of the United States as a country where the rising levels of education and the steadily increasing amounts of money spent on cultural items all indicated the "growth of a vast middle brow society."[72] Also represented was an image of the United States as a country that was ideologically opposed to conformity; a country where conformity was in decline, where crime was decreasing, and where the increasing divorce rate might, instead of indicating the disruption of the family, be a reflection of a new, more individual approach to marriage. Projected in Bell's analysis, then, was an image of the United States as a country that was ideologically committed to social change; a country that in lacking a feudal tradition and in possessing a pragmatic ethos had adopted change and innovation into its culture. In short, the United States was a country that was "now providing one answer to the great challenge posed to Western - and now world-society over the last two hundred years: how within the framework of freedom, to increase the living standards of the majority of people and the same time

maintain or raise cultural levels."[73] What is significant is that in attacking "right" elitism, Bell defends and celebrates American society.

Bell concluded his paper with a call for an alternative social theory. His argument was that aside from its decidedly conservative implications and its skewed image of the world the theory of the mass society does not provide a useful framework for locating the sources of social change in modern societies in general, and the United States in particular. There may not, he remarked, be enough data on which to construct such an alternative theory but there were certainly relatively recent developments in the United States that warranted closer analysis than the theory of the mass society could freely allow for. In his words these developments included:

> America's change from a society that was once geared to frugal saving but was not impelled to spend dizzily; the breakup of family capitalism, with the consequent impact on corporate structure and political power; the centralization of decision-making, politically, in the state and, economically, in a group of large corporate bodies; the rise of status and symbol groups replacing specific interest groups.[74]

By now we see a familiar pattern. Bell seems to be rejecting the left; but, in this paper, he also seemed to be rejecting the right. Yet his tone is optimistic, pointing to the beneficial elements of American exceptionalism. He does not present a "new theory," rather he presents a program for, the prolegomena, for a new theory. The proposed theory, based upon a momentary vision of an emerging society, is never completed, always in the process of construction. It,

however, never "resolves" the issues that evoke the new theory.

The second paper that Bell gave at the 1955 Milan Congress for Cultural Freedom was a short paper entitled "The Breakup of Family Capitalism." While it was written for the Congress the outlines of the paper were developed well in advance of 1955. The framework for this paper was laid out by Bell in a 1952 article that he wrote for Commentary called "The Prospects of American Capitalism."[75] "The Breakup of Family Capitalism" can thus be discussed in relation to the earlier article.

"The Prospects of American Capitalism" was an essay that was generally concerned with exploring the limits of economic theory in embracing the changing structure of post-war capitalism. In both this essay and in "The Breakup of Family Capitalism" Bell expressed the view that American capitalism was undergoing a series of changes whose import could not be fully comprehended by the friends and critics of capitalism unless each were prepared to give up the elaborate myths they held concerning modern capitalism. These changes concerned the character of modern capitalism, expecially the fact that with the separation between property and authority capitalism was dominated by a managerial class who lacking an ideology of their own had long been searching for an intellectual spokesman. The changes also concerned the alliance between business and government, an alliance that despite business' talk of free enterprise the managers, like the labor leaders, wanted maintained.

Written as an assessment of American capitalism's prospects in the immediate future "The Prospects of American Capitalism" was in fact a review of John Kenneth Galbraith's American Capitalism, a book which was published in 1952. Galbraith's book served as a convenient focal point for Bell because it sought implicitly, according to Bell, to reconcile the two different strands of economic theory popularized in the United States since the early 1940s, Keynesian economics and Schumpeterian historical analysis. Thus Bell weighed the significance of Galbraith's book in the light of economic discussions that had grown around Keynes' and Schumpeter's writings. These discussions, in Bell's view, had created a confused picture of American capitalism and its future prospects.

Galbraith's book represented an important contribution to American economic theory according to Bell; but its importance, he argued, was less the result of his theory of countervailing power than it was the result of his efforts to develop within the framework of that theory a reconciliation between the fundamentally contradictory visions of Keynes and Schumpeter concerning capitalism.

Bell's thesis was that the phrase "countervailing powers" crystallized a feeling that a number of observers had had about the United States being a society that was made up of functional blocs that confront and check each other. It was thus an important book. However, the ultimate test of the value of Galbraith's book rested in its ability to reconcile Keynesian and Schumpeterian theory as an essential precondition for

freeing both the American business and intellectual communities from myths and outdated stereotypes that continued to dominate the American political scene.

These were myths and stereotypes that Keynes was helping to create through his theory of over-savings and his crusade to free Western society of its puritanism. That puritanism continued to extoll the "bourgeois virtues of thrift" at the risk of economic stagnation. As a "savage polemic against puritanism" Keynes' The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money helped to foster an image of the capitalist as "an old miser sitting on his pile of sterile bullion, which weighed down the economy."[76] Similarly, Schumpeter in a far more involved way had helped create these myths and stereotypes through his theory of the entrepreneur. As a defense of capitalism and a polemic against bureaucratization Schumpeter's highly successful Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy had also lent intellectual credibility to businessmen's fears of large scale social planning. Schumpeter's book had also reinforced the "old left" intellectual's complaints against the depersonalizing effects of the corporate world. As an expression of an aristocratic image against the mass society, Schumpeter had projected the spectre of the state as an autonomous force taking over the direction of society in response to its own bureaucratic impulses and in response to the demands of the intellectual. These were demands that no capitalist society could fulfill because they were grounded in a set of expectations that were fundamentally utopian in character.

Bell conceded that Galbraith's book did achieve a partial reconciliation of Keynes' essentially static economic model and Schumpeter's primarily historical economic model. For Bell it was one of the books virtues that the problems posed by Keynes and Schumpeter, the problems of regulation, investment, and demand, were stated in less "apocalyptic" and more manageable terms by Galbraith than either of them could allow for, given their fundamentally sharply defined interpretations of the modern world.[77] It was also one of the book's virtues that Galbraith was able to locate in classical economics a set of ideas that legitimated the fears and concerns of both liberals and conservatives alike regarding the future of capitalism, the alliance between the government and business and the prospects of a stable post-war planning economy.

It was also to Galbraith's credit, Bell asserted, that he had developed a "realistic theory of political economy" that offered a more suitable defense of corporate bigness in a world of economic behemoths than classical economics with its inherent fear of concentration could produce.[78] Galbraith's defense of capitalism on the surface could seem to satisfy both liberals and conservatives. In this regard, it was to Galbraith's credit that in following Schumpeter's lead he was able to show that while oligopoly does exist under capitalism, few of the consequences liberals feared concerning "the specter of untrammeled corporate power standing firm on the commanding heights of the economy" actually eventuate. Moreover, it was to Galbraith's credit that, as a Keynesian,

he recognized that the substitution of countervailing power for competition as the regulator of private economic power was not enough. According to Bell, Galbraith knew that the American economy lacked a "mechanism" which autonomously acts to insure proper performance and that "some form of centralized government decision in the area of fiscal policy was required to influence the total demand for goods: these were taxation or government spending.

But despite his reasoned analysis, and his attempts to reconcile Schumpeter and Keynes, and despite his recognition that the problem of making capitalism workable required more than the substitution of countervailing power for competition as the regulator of private economic power there was, asserted Bell, something missing in Galbraith's analysis of post-war capitalism. The book in attempting to alleviate the fears of both liberals and conservatives sought to make businessmen and conservatives recognize the end of the myth of free enterprise and the fact of countervailing power. It sought to bring liberals to shake off their fears of big business by getting them to recognize the benevolence of self-regulating market mechanisms. Yet it never answered the question that it posed: why the business community and the left are "captives of a description of reality that no longer exists."[79] It never came to terms with why, in effect, businessmen and liberals found the myths of free enterprise and the fear of bigness more compelling than the reality of countervailing power. To reply, as Galbraith did by supplying a truer picture of the reality is "merely like telling a neurotic that

his fears are groundless: they may be, but the answer can not convince the neurotic of the fact until the sources of the fear are laid bare."[80]

There was, indicated Bell, no one reason to explain why businessmen and liberals alike shared the same compulsion to deny the new reality of countervailing power. Instead there were a cluster of reasons whose comprehension required an understanding of "the new nature of capitalism" and the "new challenges to its survival."[81] It was in this context that Bell explained that American capitalism had been undergoing a process of change that was the result of the breakup of family capitalism and the emergence, in its place, of corporate or managerial capitalism. The transformation of capitalism from a family based system in which authority was invested exclusively in property and transmitted predominantly through descent to a system in which power was placed exclusively in the hands of a class of managers who had no property stake in the corporations they ran was, in his words, a "swift and remarkable development."[82] It was also a development, explained Bell, which accounted for much of the resistance within the business community towards the acceptance of the United States as a society regulated by a system of countervailing power.

According to Bell, much of the business resistance towards the acceptance of countervailing power was the result of the insecurity of the managers who, in lacking a property stake in the corporations they ran, had no established system of self-justifications for their authority. Despite their efforts to substitute productivity and achievement for property, the

managers, lacking their own basis of legitimacy, were forced to retain the older "mythical" justifications of capitalism. A consequence of this defense, was the use of private property and the free market ideologies against the reality ot countervailing power in the United States.

While the absence of a new basis of legitimacy and status anxiety were factors that prompted the managers to deny the reality of countervailing power, another set of factors led the middle sized businesses (which on the whole were still family owned and operated concerns) to the very same denial. Because they were threatened by the very amorphousness of American society, by the rise of new interest groups, and by the emergence of new social movements and ideologies, the heads of the middle sized business concerns were, explained Bell, finding it easier to deny the reality of countervailing power than to accept it as a fact of American life. In short, the denial of countervailing power provided the "small town" minds who ran the middle sized businesses to preserve an image of the world that they were unwilling to let go of because of the psychological function that this image served for them. It allowed them to define the world in more manageable terms and thus to locate an "enemy."

According to Bell, the amorphousness of American society made it equally difficult for the liberal to accept the new reality of countervailing power. The reasons, indicated Bell, concerned both the exclusion of the liberals from power and the fact that, under a war economy, the crucial decisions were becoming more and more technical. In this context, Bell

explained, since the beginning of the war economy the liberal has not shared power to nearly the same degree as he did in the early days of the New Deal. Because he had been excluded from power and because the sense behind technical decisions is generally not known to anyone accept the specialist, it was easier for the "liberal" to hunt for some sinister hidden reason or power source behind technical decisions for the distribution of government contracts and the allocation of metals than it was for him to accept the new reality of countervailing power.

Bell concluded "The Prospects of American Capitalism," characteristically, on a cautious note. The post-war capitalism that was defined and justified as a system of decentralized economic decisions was not being threatened by America's adoption of a permanent semi-war economy. The modern system of countervailing powers was in turn being threatened by the political and economic exigencies of the war economy, exigencies that no administration, Republican or Democrat, could escape. The principle threat was inflation, a condition attendant to any war economy. Because it operates within a framework of relative scarce demand and is thus regulated by the buyer, inflation disrupts the system operating on the basis of countervailing power. This is because inflation acts to transform the economy from a buyer's to a seller's economy. What in fact was happening, argued Bell, was that, together with the Korean war, inflation was causing a centralization of power in the state. This was a development that served to compensate for the disappearance of counter-

vailing power in American society.

Administrative decisions by the state would thus continue to become the chief means of allocating resources and of making production and consumption decisions in the economy, but the centralization of power in the state raised problems that required political, as well as, economic solutions. These problems were of cost allocations and of the nature of the controls required to maintain a war economy. While Keynes, Schumpeter, and Galbraith provided Americans with a more comprehensive picture of contemporary society than ever had been produced before they provided little real help in solving these problems. Each of them were bound to the specific analytical framework of purely economic variables they worked with. The result was that they each neglected the political side of the economy. Within this context, Bell reasoned that the real problem confronting the United States was how, within the framework of an interest group society and a war economy, could the political solutions required to meet these fundamentally political problems of domestic planning be reached in the absence of a comprehensive theory of the political economy. In the long run, concluded Bell, the problem of the distribution of costs or "burdens" and the nature of controls could not be deflected because it was inevitable that "the statist needs of a semi war economy with its technical imperatives must clash with the restless anti-statist attitudes of the corporate managers."[83] Yet, in underlining the need for a political and moral calculus, to replace or supplement the purely economic calculus of Keynes,

Schumpeter, and Galbraith, Bell was raising a demand for a new theory, if one wishes, a new ideology of capitalism. His demand was, again, programmatic. How he answered that demand remains to be seen.

After outlining in "The Breakup of Family Capitalism" the history of the decline of family capitalism, Bell returned to the subject of the managers and ideology. It was his thesis that the drive of the corporate managers in the United States to "find an ideology to justify their power and prestige" reflected both the uniqueness and the dynamic nature of modern American capitalism. "In no other capitalist order, as in the American, has this drive for an ideology been pressed so compulsively."[84] According to Bell this was because "in other orders it was less needed." In European capitalist societies:

> Private property was always linked, philosophically, to a system of natural rights; thus property itself provided a moral justification. But private productive property, especially in the United States, is largely a fiction, and rarely does one hear it invoked any longer as the moral source of the corporate executive power.[86]

The fact that private property was no longer invoked as the moral, i.e. ideological, source of the corporate managers power did not mean that Bell felt that the managers were not trying to find a new ideological basis of legitimacy for their position in the corporate world. On the contrary, Bell argued that

> As we have had in the corporation the classic shift from ownership to managerial control, so, on the symbolic level, we have the shift from "private property" to "enterprise" as the justification of power. And, as with any ideology, the symbol itself

> sometimes becomes a propelling force, and "performance" for its own sake has become a driving motive to the American corporate head.[87]

It seems apparent that to Bell this fact suggested an end of ideology in American capitalism since, as he makes it clear in both his essays on capitalism, the legal fiction or myth of private property traditionally provided capitalism with its ideological foundations, i.e., with its basis of moral and political legitimacy in Western society.

Though "The Breakup of Family Capitalism" was important in the sense that it served to round out Bell's discussion of the corporate managers search for a new ideology to replace the ideology of private property it was also important for yet another reason. The significance of the breakup of family capitalism was framed in a polemic against Marxist class analysis. In it Bell questioned the applicability of the ruling class model in comprehending changes in the relation between class and power in the United States. Thus, it was not without significance that Bell began "The Breakup of Family Capitalism" with the following observation:

> The story of the rise and fall of social classes in Western society, as Pirenne and Schumpeter have pointed out, is that of the rise and fall of families. Without understanding that fact, as many American sociologists, accustomed to viewing class position in individualistic terms, have failed to do, one cannot understand the peculiar cohesiveness of dominant economic classes in the past, or the sources of the breakup of power in contemporary society today.[88]

The thrust of Bell's polemic against Marxist class analysis was that capitalism was not as Marx saw it, an economic system with employer-worker relations and classes formed on strictly economic lines, but rather it was a social system whose legal,

moral, and economic foundations rested in the link between property and family. The changes in its structure must therefore be understood within the framework of changes within the property and family systems of Western society.

In philosophical terms, explained Bell, "the linked institutions of property and family were always seen as a necessary precondition to established society."[89] The preservation of the inalienability of private property and of the "dynastic" family as the means by which land, and hence, power, was invested in the heir was thus the foundations upon which the European system of power and privilege was based. Thus, it was not without meaning that

> When Godwin and Condorcet, at the turn of the nineteenth century, insisted that progress and freedom lay only in striking the bonds of marriage and sharing all property, they were answered for all bourgeois society by Parson Malthus, who insisted that without the restraints of family and property the "natural" instincts to lust and licentiousness would assert themselves so freely that population would break all bounds, outstrip the growth of resources, and result in privation and misery for the multitude rather than happiness.[90]

But, pointed out Bell, there were more than economic and moral considerations that were involved in the preservation of the link between the institutions of property and family. There was also the need to preserve a way of life and the stratification system upon which that way of life was maintained and perpetuated, for as Bell noted:

> Through the fusion of the two institutions a class system was maintained: people met at the same social levels, were educated in common schools appropriate to their wealth, shared the same manners and morals, read the same books and held similar prejudices, mingled in the same milieus - in short, created and shared a distinctive style of life.[91]

"The singular fact" that Marxists, implied Bell, were not able to grasp, was that since the 1880s the old relations between the two institutions of property and family had, for a variety of reasons, broken down. Among these reasons was "the growth of romanticism, the high premium on individual achievement and free choice, the translation of passion into secular and carnal terms. In the end, each of these developments worked against the system of "dynastic" marriage. The effects of the breakdown of the institutions of property and family while they were less in evidence in Europe because of the persistence their family enterprise was, asserted Bell, very much in evidence in the United States where for a combination of historical and socio-psychological factors, a full scale system of family capitalism had never, despite numerous efforts, developed on any large and enduring basis.

Limited in the United States to middle sized enterprises, family capitalism never had succeeded in establishing its hegemony in the area of large-scale capital industries. The reasons, Bell asserted, rested in the peculiar set of economic events which marked the most crucial period in American capitalism, the period from 1890 to 1910. Within this context the breakup of family capitalism had begun at the turn of the century when, in overextending itself American industry underwent a series of economic crises that led to the bankers being called in to reorganize and take control of many of the country's leading enterprises. By their intervention, the investment bankers, "in effect, tore up the social roots of the capitalist order."[92] He argued that "by installing

professional managers - with no proprietary stakes themselves in the enterprise, unable therefore to pass along their power automatically to their sons, and accountable to outside controllers - the bankers effected a radical separation of property and family."[93]

Even where family capitalism still prevails in the United States, that is, in small industrial towns and cities where middle sized family businesses predominate, the image projected by the Lynds in Middletown in Transition of one family dominating the economic and political life of a town "has in less than twenty years become a picture of the past rather than of contemporary society."[94] The reason for this, explained Bell, is that sociologically, the breakup of family capitalism was linked to a series of shifts in power in Western society as a whole. Bell saw these shifts as involving

> two silent revolutions in the relations between power and class position in modern society.... One is a change in the mode of access to power insofar as inheritance alone is no longer all-determining; the other is a change in the nature of power-holding itself insofar as technical skill rather than property, and political position rather than wealth, have become the basis on which power is wielded.[95]

These two silent revolutions, declared Bell, have proceeded simultaneously with the major political result being that the whole notion of a ruling class has lost its meaning.

In defining a ruling class as "a power-holding group which has both an established community of interest and continuity of interest" Bell ruled out the usefulness of that concept in understanding the post-war structure of power

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relations in the United States. His argument was that in the United States the terms "upper class" and "ruling group" were no longer synomous.

> Being a member of the "upper class" (i.e., having differential privileges and being able to pass those privileges along t one's designees) no longer means that one is a member of the ruling group, for rule is now based on other than the traditional criteria of property; the modern ruling groups are essentially coalitions, and the means of passing on the power they possess, or the institutionalization of any specific modes of access to power (the political route, or military advancement), is not yet fully demarked and established.97

The essays we have just reviewed focus upon the themes of the amorphousness of power in contemporary America and its relationship to the breakup of family capitalism in the United States, the inadequacy of existing social and political theory in comprehending ongoing changes in American society, and the call for a new theory of social change. Together with the exhaustion of the left, the existence of status anxieties as a result of prosperity and the absence of ideology, and the notion of the broker state, these themes, especially the call for a new theory of social change, were all integrated into Bell's introductory essay to The Radical Right, "Interpretations of American Politics."

Yet the positioning of all of these trends were, for Bell, only the basis for his calling for a new theory of American society, a new ideology, that would replace both the myths and ideologies of the left and of the right. The latter sites the myth of the free market and private capital. The new theory would have to provide the basis for making allocations of costs and benefits on moral and political

grounds and would make new societal institutions clear to both liberals, intellectuals, corporate managers and family business operators. It would reconcile them to their emerging reality.

Yet if these were the goals of the new theory, its realization was only in its program. The theory was yet to be constructed.

The Radical Right: The Call for New Social Theory of Modern Society

As previously indicated The Radical Right was a book of essays that was edited by Bell in 1955. According to him the idea for the book first arose in 1954 at a Columbia University faculty seminar on McCarthyism, one which sought to bring to bear on this subject "whatever sophistication the social sciences had achieved."[98] From the standpoint of defining its focus, the chief contributors to the book were Richard Hofstadter and Seymour Martin Lipset. Other contributors included Bell, Peter Viereck, Talcott Parsons, David Reisman and Nathan Glazer.

One of the central themes that defined the book was the inadequacy of standard explanations of American political behavior in comprehending the origins and appeal of McCarthyism, i.e., explanations that viewed the emergence of this extreme rightest movement "in terms of economic interest-group conflict or the role of the electoral structure."[99] Closely related to this theme was the books emphasis on the need to understand the emergence of McCarthyism as a social phenomenon in terms of status politics and status anxiety.

The emphasis on understanding the emergence of McCarthyism as the function of status anxiety was developed principally by Richard Hofstadter in his essay "The Pseudo Conservative Revolt." Hofstadter's basic thesis was that historically there has always been a preoccupation in American politics with status and that McCarthyism as a social phenomenon could best be comprehended as a form of status anxiety in groups that were "tormented by a nagging doubt as to whether they are really and truly and fully American."[100] Borrowing the term from Theodore W. Adorno's study The Authoritarian Personality, Hofstadter referred to the supporters of Senator McCarthy as pseudo conservatives. The term, he thought, was appropriate because the exponents of McCarthyism while claiming to uphold tradition, were in reality projecting their own fears and frustrations onto society. Thus, while they believed themselves to be true conservatives and even employed the rhetoric of conservativism they in point of fact had little in common with "the temperate and compromising spirit of true conservatism in the classical sense of the word," a fact that was confirmed by their displeasure with the "dominant practical conservatism of the moment as it was represented by the Eisenhower administration ...and their profound if largely unconscious hatred of our society and its ways."[101]

The emphasis on analyzing McCarthyism from the standpoint of status politics was articulated principally by Seymour Martin Lipset in his essay "The Sources of the Radical Right." In this essay Lipset distinguished class politics,

which seemed applicable during periods of depression, from status politics. By the term status politics Lipset was referring to a form of politics that seemed to predominate during periods of prosperity when groups concerned with defending their new won positions would become politically active. In his view scapegoating and a preoccupation with protecting "traditional" American values were the characteristic features of status politics. McCarthyism, Lipset argued, was a "species" of status politics, one which drew its support from the "radical right." By his term radical right, Lipset referred to a highly diverse group that was made up of upwardly mobile ethnic individuals and members of downwardly mobile old American groups united by a common opposition to the reforms initiated under the New Deal and by a refusal to accept the political and social realities of the recent past.

Still, yet another theme that was elaborated in The Radical Right principally by David Reisman and Nathan Glazer in their essay "Intellectuals and Discontented Classes" was the "exhaustion of liberal ideology" as a factor that paved the way for the growth of McCarthyism amongst the middle class. The interesting thing about McCarthyism Reisman and Glazer argued was not its growth amongst the less educated segments of the American population but its growth amongst the better educated and college trained middle class. "Called out of the city tenaments and the marginal small towns by the uneven hand of national prosperity" people who had once been poor were now constituting a "new middle class."[102]

Though college educated and successful by the standards of the depression, they were discontented. Their discontentment was the product of their "intellectual uncertainty" in a world where they as members of the middle class were supposed to have an opinion and a perspective that would enable them to cope with the world, as well as, their own immediate surroundings and jobs. Their discontent was heightened by the fact that the liberal proposals put forward under the New Deal and the Fair Deal concerning the reduction of opportunity barriers for blacks and women were not only unsatisfying but also threatening. Within this context, Reisman and Glazer explained, the liberal intellectuals had withdrawn during the post-war period from any serious effort to influence the new middle class because they no longer felt any real sense of challenge or purpose. Satisfied that with the Eisenhower administration's adoption of Keynesian economics the New Deal reforms that they had fought for were permanently institutionalized in the American political fabric, the liberal intellectuals were consumed by their own sense of victory. The architects of opinion for the educated the liberal intellectuals could no longer make demands. Unable to make demands they had lost the only basis upon which they could lead the new middle class; they, in short, had "lost the elan which can attract new forces."[103]

Collectively, these themes were represented in what Bell in his introductory essay "Interpretations of American Politics" referred to as the new framework established by The Radical Right for comprehending the sources of social

strain and anxieties in American society. This new framework with its emphasis on "the deeper running social currents of a turbulent mid-century America" was, "derived from an analysis of the exhaustion of liberal and left wing political ideology, and by an examination of the new, prosperity-created 'status groups' which in their drive for recognition and respectability, have sought to impose older conformities on the American body politic."[104]

In the course of defining the nature and function of The Radical Right as a "thesis book" which added a "new and necessary dimension to the analysis of American society," Bell explored the limits of "conventional political analysis" in comprehending the deeper social undercurrents that had produced McCarthyism.[105] At this level, "Interpretations of American Politics" was much more than a restatement of views developed in the other essays in The Radical Right. Though no doubt shaped by the views of some of the contributors to the book and by others whose views were absorbed into several of the essays, namely Theodore W. Adorno and Edward Shils, Bell's "Interpretations of American Politics" stands out as an essay that not only fused together many of the strands of his earlier writings but as an essay that reflected a strong interest in providing a supplement to conventional interest group explanations of American politics.

This interest stemmed from Bell's belief that while the role of interest groups in shaping and modifying legislative policy provided a useful framework for understanding "traditional political problems" it like other traditional

approaches to the analysis of American politics left the modern day analyst ill-equipped to understand the issues that have dominated political dispute since the end of World War II. Bell's argument was that like the anti-ideological effect of the American electoral structure and of the democratic tradition of American politics, the emphasis on interest group politics did not help the modern day analyst to understand McCarthy's exploitation of the communist issue nor the growth of McCarthyism in general. What was needed was a new framework, that could allow the analyst to understand McCarthyism in relation to the groups behind Senator McCarthy "and the changed political temper which these groups have brought."[106] For Bell the role of status groups as a major entity in American life and status resentments as a real force in politics provided such a framework principally because it enabled political analysts to raise some new and important questions about the political theory and political temper of American democracy. Bell hoped that by posing these questions he would be able to go beyond conventional interest group theory.

Against this background Bell argued that contemporary political analysis must begin with a realistic image of American society. Political analysts must, he stressed, realize both the amorphousness of power in the United States and the fact that "more than ever, government in the United States has become in John Chamberlain's early phase "the broker state."[107] But to say that the United States has a broker state

> does not mean that all interests have equal power. This is a business society. But within the general acceptance of corporate capitalism, modified by union power and checked by government control, the deals and interest group trading proceed."[108]

In addition to beginning with a realistic image of American society, modern day analysts must also, cautioned Bell, understand that Senator McCarthy's ability to transform the issue of communist infiltration into an ideological issue reflected a significant shift in the moral temper of the United States. Traditionally Americans, under the weight of the evangelicalism of Methodism and Baptist, and protestantism, have been a people who had a "extraordinary talent for compromise in politics and extremism in morality."[109] In this regard, the moralism so much a part of the American temper, the fervid moralism of the itinerant preacher with its intolerance of man's foibles and weaknesses, "had a peculiar schizoid character: it would be imposed with vehemence in areas of culture and conduct, in the censorship of books, the attacks on 'immoral art,' etc., and in the realm of private habits; yet it was heard only sporadically regarding the depredations of business or the corruption of politics."[110] All of this, argued Bell, was changing.

> While we are becoming more relaxed in the area of traditional morals, we are becoming moralistic and extreme in politics. The fact that Senator McCarthy could seek to pin a communist label on the Democratic Party, and tie it with a tag of "treason" - and be abetted for a time by Attorney General Brownell and the Republican Party is a reflection of a new political temper in America.[111]

The modern day analyst must also, cautioned Bell, understand that the tendency to convert politics into "moral"

issues was being reinforced through the political rhetoric of both the right and the left. The strong anti-communist rhetoric of the McCarthyite intellectuals - James Burnham, William Schlamm, Max Eastman and their "minor epigoni" were now serving to create a political environment where "traditional conservative issues no longer count in dividing liberals from anti-communists."[112] The only issue is whether one is to be "hard" or "soft" in opposing communism. The effect of this changed political climate was that under the force of the McCarthyite intellectuals' hatred of liberals (a hatred that stemmed from their own radical past as Communists in the 1930s) "an amorphous, ideological issue, rather than an interest group issue, has become a major dividing line in the political community." Just as the political rhetoric of the McCarthyite intellectuals was leading to the "ideologizing of politics" in the United States, so too was the rhetoric of the political left. Largely under the influence of "vulgar Marxist thinking" the political left, was helping to convert, in the public mind, interest groups into "symbolic groups." This, explained Bell, was leading to a polarization of images in which the "Symbolic groups" - "Labor," "Business," "the Farmers" - were each being invested with a greater coherence and sense of purpose than was the actual case.

Moreover, the modern day analyst must realize that "the tendency to convert issues into ideologies, to invest them with moral color and high emotional charge, invites conflicts which can only damage a society." It has been, asserted Bell,

"the saving glory of the United States that politics has always been a pragmatic give-and-take rather than a series of wars-to-the-death."[113]

All of these observations indicate that, apart from its value in setting the tone for The Radical Right, "Interpretations of American Politics" conveyed much of Bell's own thinking about the nature of American politics in a changing society. Part of his thinking was apparently grounded in the belief that against the "ideologizing" of American politics by both the extreme left and the polical right some effort must be made to preserve the boundaries of what Shils had earlier called civility in American politics. This belief resonates in Bell's evaluation of Theodore Roosevelt as a model of political pragmatism.

> One ultimately comes to admire the 'practical politics' of a Theodore Roosevelt and his scorn for the intransigents, like Godkin and Villard, who, refusing to yield to expediency, could never put through their reforms. Politics, as Edmund Wilson has described T.R.'s attitude, "is a matter of adapting oneself to all sorts of people and situations, a game in which one may score but only by accepting the rules and recognizing one's opponents, rather than a moral crusade in which one's stainless standard must mow the enemy down."[114]

It seems equally apparent that much of Bell's thinking about the nature of American politics and about the disurptive potential of ideological politics in a democratic society was grounded in a very distinct world-view, in which liberalism was equated with civility. This point becomes very clear when we hear Bell, in extolling the virtues of American democracy, speak of democratic politics as a process

that necessarily involves both bargaining and consensus within the framework of the "rules of the game."

> Democratic politics is bargaining and consensus because the historic contribution of liberalism was to separate law from morality. The thought that the two should be separate often comes as a shock. Yet, in the older Catholic societies, ruled by the doctrine of 'two swords,' the state was the secular arm of the Church, and enforced in civil life the moral decrees of the Church. This was possible, in political theory, if not in practice, because the society was homogeneous and everyone accepted the same religious values. But the religious wars that followed the Reformation proved that a plural society could only survive if it respected the principles of toleration. No group, be it Catholic or Protestant, could use the state to impose its moral conceptions on all the people. As the party of the Politiques put it, the "civil society must not perish for conscience's sake."
>
> These theoretical foundations of modern liberal society were completed by Kant, who, separating legality and morality, defined the former as the 'rules of the game' so to speak; law dealt with procedural, not substantive issues. The latter were private matters of conscience with which the state could not interfere.[115]

As these remarks would indicate it seems apparent that in developing this introductory essay Bell defined his role as editor of The Radical Right as one of establishing the groundwork for serious reflection on the underlying threat of extremism in American politics. When read at this level, "Interpretations of American Politics" can be understood to constitute both a reformulation of liberal political theory and a defense of American pluralism, one that became absorbed into his essay on the end of ideology.

NOTES

1. Daniel Bell, "Modern Review, New York, 1947-1950," in The American Radical Press 1880-1960, vol. 2, ed., Joseph R. Conlin (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1974) p. 644.

2. Ibid., p. 646.

3. Other members of the group were Milton Himmelfarb and Milton Cohen.

4. Interview with Daniel Bell, Harvard University, Cambridge Massachusetts, 23 February 1978.

5. See the back cover of the May 1951 issue of Commentary for an advertisement of this meeting.

6. The American Committee for Cultural Freedom grew out of an organization called the Americans for Intellectual Freedom and the events that led to the creation of that organization. The pivotal event was the Waldorf Peace Conference which was held in 1949. Before the Conference was held Hook submitted a paper called "Class Truths" to the committee in charge of the Conference. Upon the rejection of his paper, Professor Hook and others who suspected that the Conference was a communist front activity called a meeting at Dwight MacDonald's home. In that group, according to Hook, were Norman Thomas, William Phillips, George Counts, Hans Kohn, and Dwight MacDonald. They agreed to form the Americans for Intellectual Freedom in order to reveal the hypocracy of the Waldorf Peace Conference. Their position was that the Conference was organized in order to promote the foreign policy of the Soviet Union not peace. Instead of supporting the Conference they organized a counter-conference at Freedom House. For further details see Job Dittberner's interview with Sidney Hook in "The End of Ideology and American Social Thought," pp. 432-34.

7. Dittberner interview with Sidney Hook in "The End of Ideology and American Social Thought," p. 433.

8. The disclosure was first made by Thomas W. Braden, a former official of the Central Intelligence Agency, who asserted in the May 20, 1967 issue of The Saturday Evening Post that the Agency had placed an "agent" in the Congress of Cultural Freedom. On May 14, 1967 Michael Josselson in submitting his resignation as its executive director acknowledged that for sixteen years the Congress for Cultural Freedom had received funds from the C.I.A. His resignation was not accepted. Daniel Bell was among the sixteen members of the Congress who voted on Josselson's resignation. After stating that it had been a "grievous burden" for him to conceal the source of the funds received

by the Congress Josselson went on to add in a New York Times interview that "he regretted having accepted the funds 'because the ends do not justify the means.' "Cultural Group To Keep Director," New York Times, 15 May 1967, p. 19.

9. Christopher Lasch's The Agony of the American Left (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969) offers an analysis of the Congress for Cultural Freedom. But his analysis reads more like a polemic than anything else. Lasch highlights the CIA infiltration of the Congress and the fact that many of its members were duped. Yet, one hears little from the supporters of the Congress in Lasch's analysis. On the other side of the ledger one can find various apologies for the Congress by its supporters in "Liberal Anti-Communism Revisited: a Symposium," Commentary, September 1967, pp. 31-79.

10. Francois Bondy, "Berlin Congress for Freedom," Commentary, September 1950, p. 246.

11. "America As a Mass Society: A Critique" first appeared in the July 1956 issue of Commentary. "The Breakup of Family Capitalism" first appeared in the Spring 1957 issue of Partisan Review.

12. Daniel Bell, "The Intelligentsia in American Society," in Tomorrow's American (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977) pp. 34-6.

13. Daniel Bell, "American Socialist: What Now?" Modern Review, January 1949, p. 347.

14. Ibid.

15. Daniel Bell, Marxian Socialism in the United States (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1952) p. 13.

16. Ibid., p. 36.

17. Ibid., p. 37.

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid., p. 44.

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid.

22. Ibid.

23. Ibid.

24. Dwight MacDonald, Memoirs of a Revolutionist (New York: Farrar, Straus and Cudahy, 1957) pp. 8-9.

25. "The United States in a New World: the Domestic Economy," Supplement to Fortune, December 1942, pp. 1-17.

26. Ibid.

27. Ibid., p. 9.

28. Ibid.

29. Daniel Bell, "The Language of Labor," Fortune, September 1951, p. 86.

30. Ibid.

31. Ibid.

32. Ibid., p. 87.

33. Ibid., p. 88.

34. Ibid.

35. Ibid.

36. Ibid.

37. Ibid.

38. Ibid.

39. Ibid., 202.

40. Ibid.

41. Ibid.

42. Ibid., p. 88.

43. Ibid.

44. Ibid., p. 204

45. Ibid.

46. Ibid.

47. Ibid., p. 211.

48. Ibid.

49. Daniel Bell, "Labor's Coming of Middle Age," Fortune, October 1951, p. 114.

50. Ibid.

51. Ibid.

52. Ibid.

53. Ibid.

54. Ibid., p. 137.

55. Ibid., p. 149.

56. Ibid.

57. Ibid., p. 150.

58. Daniel Bell, "Labor's New Men of Power," Fortune, June 1953, p. 151. In this article Bell also characterized Reuther as a "new Machiavellian." The new Machiavellian, as Bell put it in quoting H.G. Wells, is one who sees "an organized state as confident and powerful as modern science, as balanced and beautiful as a body." He is a person who holds that: "the organized state should end muddle forever." Bell's justification for his characterization of Reuther as a new Machevellian was that: "While many people once attracted to such a vision have now recoiled from it, Reuther has not. Intellectually he knows the possibilities of evil that arise from concentrated power. But his emotional drive is still toward the social engineering of the ordered society. These emotions have been bred into his character. The sources are the old Lutheran duty to work, instilled by his father; the German sobriety of purpose; a nineteenth-century Protestant ethic fused with an immigrant family's desire for self-improvement. Temperamentally Reuther is no rebel. His tastes, cultural ideas, manners, morals, and habits are conventional. Nor is he an intellectual; he is not concerned with ideas as steps in a critical theory of knowledge. He is primarily, in Veblen's sense, an engineer. His emphasis is always on efficiency. His criticisms of capitalism turn on the 'tragedy of waste' that a loose society entails. In that sense he is a radical; he is the cold idealist who wishes to create the functional society. Bell, "Labor's New Men of Power," p. 149.

59. Daniel Bell, "America as a Mass Society," in The End of Ideology, p. 22.

60. Ibid.

61. Ibid., p. 27.

62. Ibid.

63. Ibid.

64. Ibid.

65. Ibid., p. 29

66. Ibid.

67. Ibid., p. 30.

68. Ibid., p. 31.

69. Ibid.

70. Ibid., p. 32.

71. Edward Shils. "The End of Ideology?" in The End of Ideology Debate, p. 58.

72. Bell, "America as a Mass Society," p. 33.

73. Ibid., p. 38.

74. Ibid.

75. "The Prospects of American Capitalism," was reprinted in a somewhat form in The End of Ideology. Except where indicated all references to this work will be to the version in The End of Ideology.

76. Bell, "The Prospects of American Capitalism," in The End of Ideology, p. 79.

77. Ibid., p. 75.

78. Ibid., p. 89.

79. Ibid.

80. Ibid.

81. Bell, "The Prospects of American Capitalism," Commentary December 1952, p. 610.

82. Bell, The End of Ideology, p. 89.

83. Ibid., p. 94.

84. Bell, "The Breakup of Family Capitalism," in The End of Ideology, p. 44.

85. Ibid.

86. Ibid.

87. Ibid.

88. Ibid., p. 39.

89. Ibid., p. 40.

90. Ibid.

91. Ibid.

92. Ibid., p. 43.

93. Ibid.

94. Ibid., p. 45.

95. Ibid.

96. Ibid.

97. Ibid.

98. Daniel Bell, ed., The Radical Right, (Garden City, New York: Anchor Book/Doubleday & Company, 1964) p. ix.

99. Ibid.

100. Richard Hofstadter, "The Pseudo Conservative Revolt," in The Radical Right, p. 90.

101. Ibid., p. 72.

102. David Riesman and Nathan Glazer, "The Intellectuals and the Discontented Classes," in The Radical Right, p. 109.

103. Ibid., p. 127.

104. Daniel Bell, "Interpretations of American Politics," in The Radical Right, p. 47.

105. Ibid., p. 48.

106. Ibid., p. 61

107. Ibid., p. 56.

108. Ibid.

109. Ibid., p. 61.

110. Ibid., pp. 63-4.

111. Ibid., p. 64.

112. Ibid., p. 68.

113. Ibid., p. 71.

114. Ibid.

115. Ibid.

CHAPTER VI

THE FUNCTION OF THE END OF IDEOLOGY IN THE WEST

Introduction

The End of Ideology was published after Bell left the staff of Fortune, but, with two very notable exceptions, the sixteen essays which appeared in it were almost all written during the ten year period that Bell was with Fortune.

The essay "Work and Its Discontents," completed in 1956, included a section that was taken almost verbatim from a 1947 Commentary article, "Adjusting Men to Machines." In addition there was a new essay "The End of Ideology in The West: An Epilogue." This essay was written sometime during 1958-1959 when Bell, as a Fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, was given the opportunity to collate and revise the other fifteen essays in The End of Ideology in order to complete his requirements for a doctoral degree in sociology from Columbia University.

Accepted as a doctoral dissertation in 1959 The End of Ideology was a peculiar book. One of the things that made it peculiar was that despite the claim made by Bell in his introduction, "The Restless Vanity," the essays which made up The End of Ideology were not united by any one problem, nor by any one mood. Instead there were rather sixteen essays embodying a set of overlapping problems, issues, and themes.

Two underlying moods framed The End of Ideology, one largely derived from Reinhold Niebuhr and the other from John Dewey.

In fairness to both Bell and his critics, particularly C. Wright Mills and Irving Howe, the simultaneous presence of both a fatalistic and optimistic mood makes difficult the assessment of "The End of Ideology in The West: An Epilogue" in any other way then as an essay that was seeking to provide a balance between these two moods of this earlier works when in it Bell proclaimed that the end of ideology "is not - and should not be the end of utopia as well."

In "The End of Ideology in The West: An Epilogue" Bell sought to balance the fundamentally pessimistic mood that runs throughout the overwhelming majority of the essays in The End of Ideology with an optimistic mood derived from John Dewey. The latter mood embodies an almost utopian faith in science and man. This interpretation of the epilogue, of course, only makes sense if we grant two largely untestable assumptions: the first is that, when Bell said that the end of ideology need not mean the end of utopia, he was not engaging in some exercise of rhetoric but making a statement that reflected deeper sentiments. The other assumption is that Bell knew enough about Mannheim's distinction between ideology and utopia to know that utopias as "situationally transcendental ideas" are not ideas or plans whose costs can always be specified. If we grant that these are plausible assumptions, and certainly in the case of the second of the two there is more than enough evidence of its plausibility judging from Bell's use of Mannheim's analysis of Thomas Munzer and the

Anabaptists to frame his study of American socialism, then it seems especially plausible for us to discuss "The End of Ideology in The West: An Epilogue" in these terms.

The Essays in The End of Ideology

As indicated at the end of Chapter Three of this study "The End of Ideology in the West: An Epilogue" was both a conclusion to fifteen essays and to his intellectual life and journalistic career up to that moment and to the concerns that spanned the better part of three decades. One can hardly get any immediate sense of this culminating quality if one reads the essay only as an epilogue to the other essays in The End of Ideology. This is because the book as a whole does not present any uniform image of Bell, the intellectual, engaging in the intellectual, political, and emotional struggles that clearly defined his path to the idea of the "end of ideology." And, yet when read back through the prism of Bell's previous life, some of the essays not only register the effect of those struggles but also focus upon the central issues that sparked those struggles.

This is not to say that The End of Ideology stands as some systematic exposition of Bell's life nor for, that matter, of the times in which he developed his thought. Nothing could be further from the truth; for The End of Ideology has an internal coherence and direction. Its coherence, however, is not one of revealing so much the line of development underlying Bell's struggles as it is of bolstering the conclusions he elaborated in the "Epilogue." The initial chapters thus serve to make those conclusions sound inevitable and evidential.

In this sense The End of Ideology is very much a "thesis book."[1] Its thesis contains a polemic. The development of this polemic represents the books central and primary purpose; the demonstration that some problems, especially the problems of planning, work, and management, have no final, total and absolute solutions, but only partial and relative ones.

The organization of The End of Ideology was simple and straightforward. Fifteen of the essays were divided under three headings, with "The End of Ideology in The West: An Epilogue" appearing as a summary statement, after the section "The Exhaustion of Utopia." The following essays appeared under the first heading "America: The Ambiguities of Theory":

1. America as a Mass Society: A Critique
2. The Breakup of Family Capitalism: On Changes in Class in America
3. Is There a Ruling Class in America? The Power Elite Reconsidered
4. The Prospects of American Capitalism: On Keynes, Schumpeter, and Galbraith
5. The Refractions of the American Past: On the Question of National Character
6. Status Politics and New Anxieties: On the "Radical Right" and Ideologies of the Fifties

Under the second heading, "America: The Complexities of Life," the following five essays were presented:

7. Crime an an American Way of Life: A Queer Ladder of Social Mobility
8. The Myth of Crime Waves: The Actual Decline of Crime in the United States
9. The Racket-Ridden Longshoremen: The Web of Economics and Politics

10. The Capitalism of the Proletariat:
A Theory of American Trade-Unionism

11. Work and its Discontents:
The Cult of Efficiency in America

Under the third and last heading, "The Exhaustion of Utopia," the following four essays were presented:

12. The Failure of American Socialism:
The Tension of Ethics and Politics

13. The Mood of Three Generations:
A. The Once-Born, the Twice-Born, and the After-Born
B. The Loss of Innocence in the Thirties
C. Politics in the Forties
D. Dissent in the Fifties

14. Ten Theories in Search of Reality:
The Prediction of Soviet Behavior

15. Two Roads from Marx: The Themes of Alienation and Exploitation and Worker's Control in Socialist Thought

The starting point in reading Bell's life back through The End of Ideology is "The Mood of Three Generations." What resonates in that essay is the strong distrust of communism that was one of the pre-eminent features of Bell's early New Leader writings. As was suggested by the words "ours is a generation that finds its wisdom in pessimism, evil, tragedy, and despair," there is also in this essay a sense of the tragic of no longer wanting to take chances or of making investments in political enterprises that do not specify, in advance, their costs. Hardbitten, the essay recounts the frustrations and the anguish of a 1930s generation that has not forgotten the popular front tactics of the Communists, the Moscow Trials, and the Nazi-Soviet Non Aggression pact.

There are two other essays that provide some glimpse into the experiences that were part of Bell's life in the 1930s. One of those essays is "The Two Roads from Marx: The Themes of Alienation and Exploitation and Worket's Control in Socialist Thought," the other is "The Failure of American Socialism" which is an abridged version of Marxian Socialism in The United States. While in the former there are liberal references to the Kronstadt Rebellion and the role of Trotsky in putting it down, the latter conveys the attitude of the Socialist right wing or the "Old Guard" faction Bell supported after the 1936 split in the American Socialist Party. The attitude of the right-wing faction was, that under Norman Thomas, the Socialist Party was becoming an irrelevent force in American life. This attitude gave expression to the belief that if socialism were to be made into an effective force some compromises with American labor leaders were required even if this meant socialist support of Franklin Delanore Roosevelt and other liberal candidates, a belief that Bell editorialized in the pages of the New Leader.

Just as "the Failure of American Socialism" touched upon Bell's New Leader period so too did his critique of C. Wright Mills' The Power Elite "Is There A Ruling Class: The Power Elite Reconsidered." It is one of the ironies of this essay that there are in it no explicit reference to that period in the early 1940s when both Bell and Mills were writing articles for the New Leader about the threat of monopoly capitalism resulting from the institutionalization of a then emergent military-industrial complex. This is to say that while Bell made no

specific reference at all to the fact that, like Mills, he too at that time had expressed the same basic concerns, fears, doubts, and warnings about corporate capitalism that one finds in The Power Elite. Their former common approach provides a crucial backdrop to the drama that is played out in Bell's 1956 critique of Mills' analysis of power and politics in post-war American society. Bell rather condescendingly dismissed that analysis as a "romantic protest" against the bureaucratization of American life. This drama is in the relationship between two intellectuals who to a significant degree went in different intellectual directions during the 1950s. Reunited at Columbia University where they both taught during the 1950s their relationship, as we shall soon see, personifies two sets of conflicts that resonate through much of the end of ideology debate: the conflict between proponents of the elite and pluralistic theories of American democracy and the conflict over the relevance and future of socialism in the United States.

While Bell's critique of Mills' The Power Elite evokes memories of his New Leader writings and his efforts, in general, to develop a theory of state monopoly capitalism, his essay "Status Politics and New Anxieties: On the Radical Right" touches upon another period of his life in the 1940s. It touches upon that period when Bell became absorbed by the issue of anti-Semitism in the American labor movement. In addition to containing large segments of his essay "Interpretations of American Politics," this essay also contained segments from a 1944 Jewish Frontier article, "The Face of

Tomorrow"; that drew critical attention to this issue. Highlighted in these segments was Eugene Debs mourning of the death of Tom Watson a southern populist who succeeded in being elected to the United States Senate largely on the basis of the appeal of his attacks on Jews; attacks that "made the Jews the active agents of a closed conspiracy for world control." Touching upon this same period was the introduction to The End of Ideology, "The Restless Vanity." In this brief set of introductory remarks is a reaffirmation of the same Niebuhrian concept of alienation with its emphasis on alienation as "a positive role, a detachment, which guards one against being submerged in any cause, or accepting any particular embodiment of community as final." Bell first elaborated this theme in his 1946 essay "A Parable of Alienation."

While these essays touch upon one facet of Bell's writings during the 1940s, "Work and Its Discontents" touched upon another facet of his writings during this same period. This was the strong sense of indignation that characterized his 1947 Commentary article "Adjusting Men to Machines." The moral indignation centered on industrial psychologists and sociologists being concerned more with "what is" than with larger social issues and questions of moral values. As we noted in Chapter Three, Bell in "Work and Its Discontents" reaffirmed his attack on social scientists who used a "human relations" model by including in it large sections from his Commentary article. This attack, it will be remembered, was upon technicians who seek to "adjust" the worker to his job so that the human equation will match the industrial equation.

It was an attack against scientists who work within a fixed ideological framework that serves to rationalize the claims and objectives of management rather than representing a genuine scientific effort to explore alternative and better, i.e. more human, systems of work and management. Their work thus serves to lend legitimacy and historical necessity to those claims.

In accessing the overall significance of "Work and Its Discontents" several ideas are suggested. Aside from constituting a reaffirmation of his polemic against social scientists of the human relations school of industrial management "Work and Its Discountents" was an essay that covered a lot of new ground. In it Bell was concerned largely with elaborating the differences between what Karl Mannheim referred to in Man and Society in An Age of Reconstruction as "functional" and "substantial" rationality and with the human costs of efficiency in work. "Work and Its Discontents" was also an essay that saw Bell elaborate his views on the problem of work satisfaction in the factory and on the problem of planning in industrial societies. Bell elaborated these views within the framework of two overlapping critiques. The first was of what Bell called "the cult of efficiency in America." By this term Bell was referring to the industrial engineers and efficiency experts who, in the tradition of the founder of the scientific school of management Frederick W. Taylor, analyzed the relations of work to time in purely functional or technical terms. Bell was referring to industrial engineers who measured work in calculated terms that were aimed exclusively

at the maximization of production with no regard for the emotional or psychic needs of the worker. Thus, aside from focusing on the human relations school of management with its emphasis on "adjusting men to machines" in order to facilitate the productive capacity of the factory Bell also focused extensively on "Taylorism" and the scientific school of management in general. By the phrase, the human relations school, Bell referred to a tradition that was largely associated with the Australian social scientist Elton Mayo and his associates in the Harvard Business School. This was a tradition which, largely on the basis of the Hawthorne studies and the theoretical insights of the Italian sociologist Vilfredo Pareto and the physiologist L. J. Henderson concerning the concept of equilibrium in society, viewed the factory as a "social system" the maintenance of which was both dependent on the satisfaction of the non-logical sentiments that motivate behavior, and the satisfaction of the formal requirements of organization. Bell also understood in "Work and Its Discontents" a critique of the nature of planning and work in socialist societies, in which Bell elaborated the theme of the "exhaustion of the left."

"Work and Its Discontents" also was a critical response to David Reisman's argument that it was a "fallacy of misplaced participation" for social scientists to seek to "personalize, emotionalize, and moralize the factory and white collar worlds" since such efforts ran against the grain of impersonality in modern industry.[2] Reisman's argument as presented in The Lonely Crowd, was that in attempting to introduce joy and

meaning into modern industrialism management experts like Henri De Man and Elton Mayo made the mistake of seeing American society as an "impersonal society and bemoaning it."[3] In bemoaning the impersonality of American society they neglected the possibility that the impersonality of work, Reisman argued, need not be a negative phenomenon but could, in fact, be a positive development. What the Mayo School neglected was the possibility that the impersonality of work was a positive development in that it permitted the worker a greater opportunity for autonomy and happiness than ever before. The impersonality of the productive and distributive machinery within modern industrial societies allowed the worker to find emotional fulfillment in other activities besides work, namely, in play and leisure. These were, reasoned Reisman, activities that could permit the development of skill and competance in the art of living. What was required, according to Reisman, was a "reconsideration of the emotional space left in our society by its impersonality" as well as a reconsideration of the definitions of work and leisure in a changing American society.[4]

No accessment of the significance of "Work and Its Discontents" can be complete without considering Bell's critique of "the cult of efficiency in America" as well as the relationship between that critique and his critique of planning and work in socialist societies. Bell stressed in both of these critiques the absence, in both the United States and in socialist societies, of an approach to the problem of production and work satisfaction that challenged the concept of

efficiency advocated at the turn of the century by Frederick Taylor and adopted with equal fervor by General Motors and by Lenin shortly after the Russian Revolution.

Reisman's approach with its glorification of play did not provide a viable response to this problem, insisted Bell because it obscured the relationship between work and play. For Bell the quality and function of play was dependent on the nature and quality of one's work. This was because play, as opposed to both leisure and relaxation, represents a release from the tension of work. Play, explained Bell, was an alternate use of muscle and mind. The decisive thing was that "a tension that is enervating or debilitating can only produce widly aggressive play or passive, unresponsive viewing."[5] As such, argued Bell, "to have free time one needs the zest of a challenging day, not the exhaustion of a blank one. If work is a daily turn around Ixion's wheel, can the intervening play be anything more than the restless moment before the next turn of the wheel?"[6] It was true, observed Bell, that under the weight of the advertising industry's heavy hand, American workers were now seeking to recapture through play what they have been denied in work. How else could one explain the fantastic mushrooming of arts-and-crafts hobbies, of photography, home woodwork shops with power driven tools, and the like since the war? How else could one explain the fact that America has seen the multiplication of the "amateur" on a scale previously unknown in history? Though this was intrinsically commendable, Bell reasoned, there nonetheless remained one overwhelming fact: "it has been achieved at a high cost indeed - the loss of satisfaction in work."[7]

In Bell's response to Reisman's argument there is a strong existentialist association imputed by Bell to work, one that has a decidely Marxist flavor. It is as if Bell is saying, in repudiating Reisman's argument of the fallacy of misplaced participation, that work has its own intrinsic rewards. But it was not only in his response to Reisman's argument that we find evidence of this heavily Marxian conception of work. We find Bell, sometimes explicitly and at other times implicityly, utilizing it throughout "Work and Its Discontents." Indeed this normative conception of work permeates both his critique of "the cult of efficiency in America" and his critique of the nature of planning and work in socialist societies. This is not to say that other normative conceptions of work were not invoked by Bell in this essay. Invoked with almost equal force were the normative conceptions of work of Sigmund Freud and A. D. Gordon, the theoretician of the Zionist cooperative communities. Both of these conceptions emphasized the therapeutic and regulatory benefits of work. Yet, it was this largely Marxian conception of work coupled with John Dewey's educational philosophy of learning by doing, with its emphasis on the rejection of prefigured experiences in favor of the search for problems that called for new solutions, that figured most heavily in setting the stage for his critique of "the cult of efficiency in America" and his critique of socialism.

The nub of these two critiques was that the solution to the problem of work satisfaction rested in the willingness of industrial societies to challenge the concept of efficiency and

to replace productivity and the minimization of cost with a more humane standard of work. The social technology for making belt or line work less burdensome, less weary and mentally taxing, resided in the implications that could be drawn from the Walker and Guest study of the American factory worker, The Man on The Assembly Line.[8] One of the results of this study, noted Bell, was that the assembly line workers often sought to "bulk the line" in some small way in order to introduce some variety into their work and in order to assert their own work rhythms. Another finding of the study was that the most popular work in the plant were those least resembling assembly line jobs. These were jobs like utilityman, foreman, and repairman. An even more salient finding was that those men whose responsibility it was to fill in for the linemen at various times during the day, the utilitymen, found it less burdensome to work on the line than the linesmen. The utilitymen attributed this to their getting an idea of the whole line, of meeting and talking with different workman on the line and, finally, of their knowing all the jobs related to the functioning of the assembly line. According to Bell the implications of the Walker and Guest study were fairly simple:

> Since detailed job breakdown becomes socially (and humanly) self-defeating, the answer lies in job rotation, in job "enlargement," and in lengthening the work cycle. Whatever the losses this entails from the view of time-and-motion study - and cost - the gain in worker's satisfaction is the fact we should consider.[9]

Whether or not, observed Bell, industrial societies choose to implement these steps on a wide scale at the probable cost of productivity was a value problem, one that could be trans-

lated into the following terms:

> Should work be organized so as to increase output and decrease costs and - assuming these benefits are passed on - so that there is a larger product for society? Or could work be organized so as to benefit the individuals on the job? Some relative costs are the variable around which our utilitarian calculi revolve, who shall bear the costs, the consumer or the worker? [10]

Historically, the answer of the market society to this problem has been that the consumer should benefit. This is the answer that underlies the American concept of efficiency. Under a competitive or consumptive economy, it is the only answer possible since no single company can be expected to take on the burden of increased costs unless all its competitors were to do likewise. No, reasoned Bell, the rejection of efficiency in favor of increased worker satisfaction could not be expected from individual companies in any market society to come. It could only come from the society as a whole, from the political process as it was made subject to the demands of the unions. This was, insisted Bell, not only the case for the United States but for socialist societies as well. The fact that the British Labour Party's decision in the early 1930s that nationalization would proceed through public corporations administered by the state but responsive to the market rather than through some form of syndicalist control or guild socialism bore out this point. The British Labour Party's decision to pursue this course demonstrated that it too was accepting the norms of efficiency. Against this backdrop Bell argued that "short of pressure from the workers themselves, there is no action which would force modern enterprise to

reorder the flow of work."[11]

In both the "Work and Its Discontents" and the "Two Roads From Marx" essays, Bell applied this judgement equally to the United States and the Soviet Union. Indeed, this judgement with its emphasis on the role of the unions provided the backdrop against which Bell pursued the theme of the exhaustion of the left. For Bell, one of the concrete measures of the exhaustion of the left was, that in Western democracies, the unions failed to challenge the norms of efficiency dictated by the needs of the market society. This failure led Bell in a passage that underlies a fundamental aspect of his thinking on the end of ideology to conclude that "in this fashion, as in so many other ways (the enforcement of discipline, the "disengaging" of worker control over output, and so on, the unions have become part of "the control system of management" itself."[12] In his "Two Roads From Marx" essay Bell extended his criticism of the unions when he asserted that:

> ....in the challenge to the work process itself, the unions have failed. The most characteristic fact about the American factory worker today - and probably the worker in factories in other countries as well - is his lack of interest in work. Few individuals think of "the job" as a place to seek any fulfillment. There is quite often the comraderie of the shop, the joking, gossip, and politicking or group life. But work itself, the daily tasks which the individual is called upon to perform, lacks any real challenge, and is seen only as an irksome chore to be shirked, or to be finished as fast as possible.
>
> For the unions to challenge the work process would require a radical challenge to society as a whole: for to question the location of industry or size of plant is not only to challenge managerial perogatives, it is to question the logic of a consumption economy whose prime consideration is lower costs and increased output.[13]

Where in "Work and Its Discontents" he was somewhat tentative in his charge that the need to challenge the norms of efficiency was not unique to capitalist societies Bell was far less tentative in making this same charge in his "Two Roads From Marx" essay. He stated this charge very forcefully towards the end of that essay when he proclaimed that

> In the socialist societies, sadly, there have been almost no imaginative attempts to think through the meaning of the work process. And, in Communist countries, were minority dictatorship has sought to speed rapid industrialization, the effects on the workers have been even harsher.[14]

Behind this charge lay Bell's critique of the nature of planning and work in socialist societies. After reviewing the philosophical origins of Marx's writings on alienation and discussing the problem of bureaucratic collectivism in some detail, Bell initiated his critique in the "Two Roads From Marx" essay by proclaiming in a statement that conveys much of the mood of "The End of Ideology in The West: An Epilogue" that

> One of the most extraordinary facts in the history of social thought is that the leaders of socialism, from Marx down sought to win millions of people for the idea of a new society without the slightest thought about the shape of that future society and its problems.[15]

One of the principle reasons for this failing of Marx and other socialist theoreticians, according to Bell, was their blind faith about the promise of socialism and their naivete about man and the problems of planning and administration

> In part, these men could do so, confidently, unthinkingly, because of the apocalyptic belief that "the day after the revolution," rationality would make it heralded appearance on the historic scene and put all

> society aright. In a striking passage, Trotsky once described capitalism as an anarchic economic system "in which each man thinks for himself, and no one thinks for all." Under socialism, presumably, "one" would think for all. How the "one," the Universal Mind, would think for all was never elaborated. It was simply assumed that capitalism was basically irrational, and that the creation of a "social direction" would impose order on society.
>
> Although socialism today is largely identified with planning, there are few clues in the patristic writings as to what planning - the organization of production, the allocation of resources, the determination of wage payments, the supervision of work; the creation of new products, the proportion of investment to consumption, - would mean. The paucity is extraordinary.[16]

At the heart of Bell's critique was a strong emphasis on the relationship between work and alienation and on the absence of understanding of the complexities of planning and administration among continental socialist theoreticians. It was this emphasis which gave Bell's efforts to trace, through in his "Two Roads From Marx" essay, the progression in Lenin's thinking on the problems of work and the meaning of public administration. In this progression Lenin switched from endorsing the principle of Workers' Councils in his utopian blueprint for the socialist society, State and Revolution. to rejecting them within six months after the Bolsheviks seized power in favor of harsh efficiency measures more stringent than those employed in the west. In that progression the trade union was made an extension of the control system of the factory in the Soviet Union.

According to Bell the story of the exhaustion of the left in the Soviet Union was a short but melancholy one. It was a story that began with the Kronstad Rebellion and ended with the

Sixteenth Congress of the Communist party in 1930. At this Congress Stalin called for an attack on equalitarianism in wages and for measures to attach workers to their factories. This attack prepared the way for the establishment of laws that required the worker to obtain the permission of the head of the plant to change jobs, and which called for sanctions against workers in plants that failed to meet their production quotas along with stiff fines for lateness.

In Bells view, the story of the exhaustion of the left in the Soviet Union was a story that reflected the failure of Marxist theoreticians like Lenin and Trotsky to ever successfully deal with an issue that a little known Polish revolutionist named Waclaw Machajski had first warned about in 1899 in his book The Evolution of Social Democracy: the growth of bureaucracy under socialism and the entrenchment in it of a new class of professional leaders. It was in greater part a story about discontinuities between theory and practice and how ill prepared Lenin and the Bolsheviks were to run an industrial society, one that reflected Lenin's naivete and opportunism. Finally it was a story about the discontinuity between Marx's early philosophical writings with their emphasis on the relationship between work and alienation and his economic writings. Ultimately then, it was a story about how, unpublished and unknown in the years when "orthodox" Marxism and Leninism were developing, Marx's early philosophical writings of the 1840s, The German Ideology and Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, could not be integrated by

socialist leaders with his (Marx's) economic writings and hence made the foundation of a new and more humanistic conception of work. In the final analysis, then, it was a tragic story about how the failure to understand this relationship led to Marxist thought developing along "the narrow road of primitivist economic conceptions of men, property and expliotation, while another road, which might have led to new, humanistic conceptions of work and labor, was left unexplored."[17] In the end it was, concluded Bell, a story of how a "movement which arose in the name of Workers' Control now controls the workers."[18]

It is one of the characteristic features of Bell's writings, at least up to and including The End of Ideology, that where one essay ends another one frequently begins. This as can be seen from Bell's critique of the nature of work and planning in socialist societies was the case with "Work and Its Discontents" and "Two Roads from Marx: The Themes of Alienation and Expliotation and Workers' Control in Socialist Thought." In the former Bell began his critique with a set of general remarks he ended it in the latter with a fairly systematic exposition on the relationship between theory and practice in continental socialist thought. In this exposition Bell compared the writings of Marx, Karl Kautsky, and Lenin on the problem of administration in a socialist society with those of Annie Besant and other British socialists who contributed to the Fabian Essays and found them wanting.

But this is not the only line of continuity that exists between these two essays. In addition, there is a firm line

of continuity between "Work and Its Discontents" and the "Two Roads from Marx" essay on the subject of planning and administration. This line of continuity saw Bell stress three themes which helped to ultimately shape his perspective on the end of ideology. The first was the realization that what compounds and ultimately limits planning at the substantive level is that men are not always rational, that they tend to function and make choices in terms of their own particular and immediate self interests often without regard for the larger social good. This realization underlay Bell's analysis of Lenin's adoption and then movement away from the utopian blueprint of the socialist society projected in State and Revolution. In the wake of this realization Bell stressed secondly the necessity of "piece meal" over total planning in order to avoid the same kind of results that the "eschatological visions" projected in State and Revolution, a totalitarian implementation of efficiency measures that caused a loss of satisfaction of work unequaled in the annals of history. His final emphasis was the exhaustion of socialist or left thought as it was reflected in the absorbtion of the trade union into the control system of the factory in both the West and in the Soviet Union.

If there is one unifying theme to the great majority of the essays in The End of Ideology it is with the limits of planning at the substantive level. Sometimes explicitly, at other times implicitly, this is the theme that resonates throughout the essays in this book. This is certainly one of the underlying themes of "The Capitalism of the Proletariat:

A Theory of American Trade-Unionism." This essay sums up much of what Bell had to say in his Fortune articles about the political reality and constraints that in his view defined the character of the American labor movement in the post-war period. Just as in the Fortune articles, Bell elaborated his argument concerning the anti-ideological effect of trade-unionism on the labor movement and the tension between trade or market unionism and social planning unionism. Just as in those articles Bell's central point in this essay was that under trade-unionism labor follows its own logic, its own rationality, one that is dictated by its own immediate economic interests. Within this context, "Crime as an American Way of Life: A Queer Ladder of Social Mobility" stands as the corrollary to "The Capitalism of the Proletariat" because its basic point is that organized crime obeys its own rationality while "The Prospects of American Capitalism," "The Breakup of Family Capitalism," "Status Politics and New Anxieties," and "America as a Mass Society" each stand as essays that attempt to throw light on the irrational aspects of life that Reinhold Niebuhr emphasized in his critique of socialism and liberalism. Each of these essays, in other words, focused on factors that make it impossible to plan on a total or comprehensive basis, such as fixed ideological thinking and status anxiety.

One of the major problems in accessing the meaning of "The End of Ideology in the West: An Epilogue" as an epilogue to the book's fifteen other essays is knowing where and to what extent each of the several themes elaborated by Bell in these and other writings from 1944 on, especially his articles

for Jewish Frontier, Commentary, and Fortune, enter into his construction of that essay. Out of the distinguishing features of the final essay was that much of it was written in a kind of intellectual shorthand, one that is hard to decipher without some awareness of both the social and historical background out of which Bell developed his views on the end of ideology and of the audiences to whom he was writing.

The "Epilogue" As a Message To a New Generation of Intellectuals

The reasons why much of "The End of Ideology in the West: An Epilogue" was expressed in an intellectual shorthand are varied. First of all the essay is an epilogue not to just the fifteen essays in The End of Ideology and not just to Bell's personal experiences up to that time. Besides being an epilogue to both of these, it is also an epilogue to an era that stretched out over the 1930s, 40s and 50s. It expresses the different moods that shaped that era, especially for what Bell in his "The Mood of Three Generations" essay called the "twice-born" and the "after-born" generations. The "after-born" generation is that generation which Norman Podhoretz spoke of in a 1957 New Leader article, "The Young Generation of U.S. Intellectuals," as the "non-generation" when referring to those intellectuals who were in their late twenties and early thirties. A basic reason why much of the essay is written in intellectual shorthand is, in part, that it is a sermon written for an audience, namely Podhoretz and other intellectual spokesmen of the "after-born" generation, that, presumably, knows who they are and what the message of the

end of ideology is. It is a commentary about them and their feeling of having been "cheated" out of "an experience" and out of "a cause to believe in."[19]

The second reason for the shorthand character of the essay is that much of it is a polemic written for a relatively small audience who, having lived through the same experiences and debates that Bell participated in, presumably had a ready knowledge of the past intellectual controversies referred to in the essay. The most prominent controversy was Bell's reference on the opening page of the essay to "a failure of nerve." As Bell remarked this was a phrase that was first used by the historian Gilbert Murray in his characterization of the Hellenistic period. But it was also a phrase evoked by Sidney Hook in a 1943 article that was written for a Partisan Review symposium. The title of the article and the symposium was "The New Failure of Nerve."[20] Thus, embodied in Bell's use of this phrase is an implicit reference to Hook's article. The reference is not without significance since, as we shall shortly see "The End of Ideology in The West: An Epilogue" can be understood as a reaffirmation of Hook's defense of liberalism and the scientific method against religious and ideological extremism.

The third reason for the essay's cryptic character rests with the fact that in "The End of Ideology in The West: An Epilogue" contains a great deal of repetition of arguments that were fully developed in other essays in The End of Ideology. Moreover, these were sometimes reworked, general formulations of arguments originally presented more elaborately in Bell's

other writings. What thus emerges in "The End of Ideology in The West: An Epilogue" is that ideas and arguments are presented in a fashion that presumes that their context and content is already familiar to its readers.

A final reason why much of "The End of Ideology in the West: An Epilogue" was expressed as intellectual shorthand relates to style. When Bell chooses, as in his analysis of the Marxian origins of the term ideology, he can be very thorough; but when he chooses to employ literary and journalistic flair he can be and often is elusive. As in much of his writing, there is a preference in this essay for turning a phrase and for embellishing an idea so that it becomes invested with considerable dramatic force and literary imagery. Sometimes this is done at the price of straightforward reasoning and clarity. The result is that we are presented with ideas that often have more force than precision.

As an intellectual sermon or message delivered by a member of one generation to another, "The End of Ideology in The West: An Epilogue" was addressed to two new generations, one an American, and the other a European. The American generation was that "twice-born" intellectuals who perceived of themselves to be cheated out of the "experience" of the thirties and out of a cause to believe in. They, in Bell's words, were made restless by their "inability to define an enemy."[21] They, in short, were the "restless generation."

The European generation was a new generation of intellectuals that Bell, in "The Mood of Three Generations," associated with "New Left" publications: University and Left Review in

England, and Arguments in France. The writers associated with these journals, like those intellectuals associated with the American publication Dissent were, in Bell's words, made up of individuals "at odds with the doctrinaire interpretation of orthodox Marxism and at one with the search of a new socialist humanist."[22] However, there were fundamental differences between those intellectuals associated with Dissent and those associated with the other publications. The differences related to circumstance and temperament. Where Dissent was started by Irving Howe and Lewis Coser, who had left the Trotskyte or other non-Stalinist communist movements only a few years before and "who were long schooled in the doctrinal debates of Marxist exegetics," the other publications were started by a younger group of men, men who were not battle worn veterans of old ideological debates. Where, in Bell's words, Dissent is "a magazine of the epigone, the after-born, jejune, and weary" these other publications "are intense, frenetic, naive, bursting out with a new sense of autodidact wonder about theoretical issues that have wrangled over by the Left twenty years before."[23] In the case of Universities and Left Review these were intellectuals whose search for a new socialist humanism was generated "out of the ferment in the Communist world following the Khrushchev admissions that the Stalin regime had criminally murdered thousands of innocent Communists."[24] In the case of Arguments these were intellectuals whose search was generated by the brutal suppression of workers in Poland and Hungary.[25]

In "The End of Ideology in The West: An Epilogue" Bell

lumped the American and European generations of new intellectuals together. In so doing he presented cryptic references to a taken for granted knowledge of the critical events and the debates of the past that may not have been appropriate for these new audiences. Collectively the audiences were a new generation of intellectuals that had no "meaningful memory" of the old ideological debates that had consumed the passions of an older generation in the 1930s and 40s. Bell also referred to them as a generation that with "no secure tradition to build upon finds itself seeking new purposes within a framework of political society that has rejected, intellectually speaking, the old apocalyptic and chiliastic visions."[25] And, finally he referred to them as an angry generation, a generation that, in their search for a cause, was experiencing "a deep, desperate, almost pathetic anger."[27]

In offering the "Epilogue" as a message from the "twice-born" to the "after-born" Bell on the basis of his own experience and authority was providing both this "restless generation" and his own a coda that was largely derived from his 1957 essay "The Mood of Three Generations." The coda was in part a re-affirmation of Reinhold Niebuhr's argument that life offers no final or total solutions. In greater part it was a reaffirmation of an argument developed by Sidney Hook in his 1943 essay "The New Failure of Nerve." Hook's argument was at the same time a defense of both liberalism and the scientific method against the charges by Niebuhr and other ani-rationalish stoics that "the bankruptcy of Western European civilization is the direct result of the bankruptcy of the scientific and natural-

istic spirit."[28] But the coda Bell offered the "after-born" generation was also a response to Lewis Coser's essay in a 1956 issue of Dissent, "What Shall We Do," an essay that prescribed that his generation of radical intellectuals "must be concerned with maintaining, encouraging, and fostering the growth of the species radical."[29]

Bell offered the "restless generation" a fairly simple and direct message. But he made it complicated by presenting it as a summary to what he had said in "The Mood of Three Generations" essay about the contrast in the socio-historical situations of the Old and the New Left, the "twice-born" generations. He did this in the context of discussing the sociological nature of radicalism in general.

The coda to the "restless generation" was also made complicated by the fact that it was presented as a summary statement of what he had already said in his End of Ideology chapter, "The Two Roads from Marx." In that essay Bell argued, as we read it, for the desirability, in the light of the Soviet experience, of piece-meal over total planning. In total, the coda was filled with oblique references to ideas that were highlighted in "The Mood of Three Generations" and "The Two Roads from Marx." However, the entire End of Ideology essay can be understood, although not very readily, without reference to the issues that were discussed by Bell in the two earlier essays. Broadly speaking, these issues centered upon the relevance and future course of socialism in the United States, the relationship between planning and democracy, the dangers inherent in total planning and the meaning and

nature of the United States as a mass society.

The coda was presented with both historical and political references and imagery. These included the Moscow trials, the Nazi-Soviet pact, the concentration camps, the suppression of the Hungarian workers on the one hand, and the institutionalization in Western democracies of the Welfare State on the other. All these facts provided reasons why the "old left" had decided to descent from the "faith ladder" that Marxism and socialism had offered the intellectual in the 1930s. The "old left" realized that it could no longer continue to climb a ladder "which in its vision of the future cannot distinguish possibilities from probabilities, and converts the latter into certainties."[30] Whether the younger generation of Western intellectuals "can find passions outside of politics is moot" for while social reform is open to them it is not their way, it is the "middle way," but it is a way without passion.[31] While "social reform does not have any unifying appeal, nor does it give a younger generation the outlet for 'self-expression' and 'self-definition' that it wants," in the absence of an "easy left formulae for social change," and a utopia, it is the only meaningful course open.[32] But Bell argued that the acceptance of this course and, in turn, the realization of an "end of ideology" need not mean the end of utopia, for while

> the end of ideology closes the book intellectually speaking, on an era, the one of easy 'left' formulae for social change... there is now, more than ever, some need for utopia, in the sense that men need - as they have always needed - some vision of their potential, some manner of fusing passion with intelligence.[33]

Bell in his coda offered a warning that at the same time was both explicit and vague; a warning that

> .... if ideology by now, and with good reason, is an irretrievably fallen word, it is not necessary that utopia suffer the same fate. But it will if those who now call loudest for new utopias begin to justify degrading means in the name of some utopian or revolutionary end, and forget the simple lessons that if the old debates are meaningless, some old verities are not - the verities of free speach, free press, the right of opposition and of free inquiry.[34]

Similarly, while it is true that "there is now more than ever some need for a utopia," the tragic events of the 1930s and 40s have dictated that "the ladder to the City of Heaven can no longer be a 'faith ladder' but an empirical one: a utopia has to specify where one wants to go, how to get there, the costs of the enterprise, and some realization of, and justification for the determination of who has to pay."[35]

In all of these discussions, as in the entire End of Ideology book and essay, Bell has of course, created his own definitions of "ideology" and "utopia." In Marx's sense of the term, an ideology meant a political theory that justified the past, and a utopia meant an "impossible dream." Mannheim, who gave conventional meanings to both terms, defined an ideology substantively as a legitimating theory for the past, and utopia as a legitimating theory based upon images of the future. Bell's concept of ideology is his own creation, referring to what in both Marx's and Mannheim's terms would be a utopia, and Bell's notion of utopia, refers directly to Marx (but not necessarily to Mannheim's) definition of a utopia.

The Marxian and Mannheimian notion of ideology (a justification of the past) does not exist in Bell's work, nor does the notion of a utopia as a guide to short range, piecemeal planing exist in either Marx's work or in Mannheim's sociology of knowledge.

In giving these conventional terms new meaning, Bell undoubtedly confused a whole generation of critics (see page 410-415) who read conventional meanings into his intellectual creations.

The coda that Bell offered his own generation, the "twice-born" generation, was less historical and political and more philosophical and social. Its terms were derived from his 1946 essay "A Parable of Alienation" with its fundamentally Niebuhrian image of man as a creature that lives in a state of anxiety brought on by his inability to know and, hence, accept his limits. He is a creature that must explore and test those limits, and who finally can only overcome his anxiety through faith. While the specifics of this theme were developed in "The Mood of Three Generations" essay, it was re-invoked by Bell in the "Epilogue" as a way for the "Old Left" to gain perspective on the "New Left." That perspective touches upon their own experience. They like the "after-born" had a deep-seated need for a deep "experience," for the opportunity to explore an exciting but unknown and untested world. The message that Bell offered his own generation was simply this: just as it is true that "no generation can be denied an experience, even a negative one" it is equally true that

> A radical is a prodigal son. For him, the world is a strange place whose contours have to be explored according to one's destiny. He may eventually return to the house of his elders, but the return is by choice, and not, as of those who stayed behind, of unblinking filial obediance. A resiliant society, like a wise parent, understands this ritual, and, in meeting the challenge to tradition grows.[36]

To the "restless generation" Bell offered a warning, one that like Edward Shils' writing on ideology and radicalism was stated in terms of civility.[37] The warning was simply that one should not be trapped in one's own rhetoric.

> If the end of ideology has any meaning, it to to ask for the end of rhetoric, and of rhetoricians, of "revolutions" of the day when the young rench anarchist Vaillant tossed a bomb into the Chamber of Deputies, and the literary critic Laurent Tailhade declared in his defense: What do a few human lives matter; it was a beau feste.[38]

The warning to the new generation of intellectuals is vague because Bell made no mention of who he was referring to when he cautioned those who would call loudest for new utopias ought not to forget the painful lessons of the 1930s and 40s. Nor is there any attempt on Bell's part to specify anywhere in the End of Ideology essay the limits of his conception of utopia when viewed against Mannheim's analysis of utopian thought. In Mannheim's emphasis utopias were situationally transcendental ideas, that is, ideas which by definition cannot specify their costs in existing terms. Bell's omission of this idea is somewhat ironic since much of his analysis of the meaning of the term ideology in the "Epilogue" explicitly draws upon the distinction that Mannheim made in Ideology and Utopia between the particular and the total conceptions of ideology.

In order to know what group Bell was talking about when he warned about the danger of utopia suffering the same fate as ideology, one must return to his 1956 "Mood of Three Generations" essay. In this essay Bell developed a critique of Coser's Dissent stand on radicalism. It was in this critique that Bell charged Coser, the Dissent editor and Dissent, itself, with providing programmatic statements about radicalism without providing concrete statements about what it meant by radicalism. Highlighted in this critique was Lewis Coser's essay on radicalism and socialism in the United States, "What Shall We Do?", an essay which Bell dismissed as being strictly programmatic. Bell also emphasized the role that Dissent played in creating, through essays like Coser's, a "bravura radicalism." This for Bell was a false radicalism, one that makes much noise about the alleged ossification of Western society while it proposes nothing new nor concrete, especially, in the area of politics, that is, nothing related to "the prosiac, yet necessary questions of school costs, municipal services, the urban sprawl, and the like."[39] It is against this background that one can reasonably assume that when Bell issued his warning to the new generation of intellectuals his remarks about the danger of "utopia suffering the same fate as ideology" were directed to Irving Howe and Lewis Coser, the editors of Dissent. Both were intellectuals with whom he had had a long standing, albeit, sometimes stormy political and intellectual relationship.[40]

Weaknesses in Bell's End of Ideology Thesis

While a knowledge of "Mood of Three Generations" essay

helps us to clear up some of the vagueness that was associated with his warning to the new generation of intellectuals, the vagueness that is associated with Bell's use of the term utopia cannot be so readily overcome. As was previously indicated, it is one of the major weaknesses of the "Epilogue" that for all the attention that he gives to clarifying the different uses of the term ideology and to Mannheim's writings on the subject there is no attention given in this essay to the German sociologist's writings on utopian thought. Similarly, it is one of the major weaknesses of this essay that Bell never explicitly defined his use of the term utopia. There is a presumption on Bell's part that utopias are visions of the future that can specify their costs in existing terms. This leads us to suspect that it is a conception inspired by Dewey but expressed in Marx's and Mannheim's language. Yet it is one that owes more to Bell's interpretation of Dewey's philosophical and educational writings than it owes to Dewey himself. Moreover, as previously suggested, it seems to be one of the major weaknesses of "The End of Ideology" essay that Bell never dealt with Mannheim's conception that utopias, by definition, cannot specify their limits, and their costs.

Instead, against the anti-rationalist stoicism and the tragic sense of life that permeates the writings of Reinhold Niebuhr and Paul Tillich, who Bell in "The Mood of Three Generations" essay acknowledges as the mentors of the "twice-born" generation, one finds that in the concluding essay a reaffirmation of Sidney Hook's arguments in favor of pragmatism and limited planning. As elaborated in "The New Failure of

Nerve." Hook's argument was marked by its Deweyian faith in the capacity of man to effect change through a scientific or experimental philosophy of life. In this philosophy all values are tested by their causes and consequences. Rational solutions could thus be found to long standing social problems like poverty and unemployment. If not in actual wording then certainly in spirit, this was also the argument that in his "The Two Roads from Marx" essay Bell used to justify his preference for piece-meal planning against the allure of total planning. This argument resonates through his proclamation that "one need not accept the fatalism of the machine process - or wait for new utopias in automation - to see that changes (in the nature of the work process) are possible."[41]

Yet, forgotten in his restatment of Hook's argument is any serious reflection about utopias being situationally transcendental ideas that necessarily do not specify their costs in calculable terms. Moreover, there is no serious reflection in the "Epilogue" about what the absence of utopia as specified by Mannheim would mean. In this context, it is worth remembering that one of the principle danger that Mannheim warned about in Ideology and Utopia, as was noted in Chapter Two, was that the disappearance of utopia would bring about "a static state of affairs in which man becomes no more than a thing" and in which man would be confronted with, Mannheim argued,

> the greatest paradox imaginable, namely, that man, who has achieved the highest degree of rational mastery of existence, left without any ideals becomes a mere creature of impulses. Thus, after a long tortuose, but heroic development,

> just at the highest stage of awareness, when history is ceasing to be blind fate, and is becoming more and more man's own creation, with the relinquishment of utopias, man would lose his will to shape history and therewith his ability to understand it.[42]

This observation is by no means incidental for one of the major things that lends intellectual authority to the charges made by critics of the end of ideology like C. Wright Mills, Dennis Wrong, William Delaney, and Stephen W. Rousseas and James Farganis in that nowhere in "The End of Ideology in the West: An Epilogue" does Bell weigh the intellectual and political limits of his conception of utopia against the conceptions outlines by Mannheim in Ideology and Utopia. Moreover, nowhere in the essay does Bell weigh the effect of his conception of utopia in barring from consideration possible political approaches to problems that fall outside the range of short-term rational calculations based upon established paradigms of social analysis. Theologies in the conventional meaning of that term also serve functions, albeit short term, specific ones, in providing a basis for the calculation of the costs of social action.

As discussed at the end of Chapter Two, there was one central and overarching idea that underlay the charges made by Mills, Wrong, and these other critics of the end of ideology. This was the idea that the end of ideology theses was far from being an independent assessment of a set of social and historical trends that culminated for the moment in the end of socialist political activity amongst Western intellectuals. The end of ideology thesis was itself an ideology; an ideology

that served to rationalize a set of unstated but distinctly political and ideologically conditioned functions. Within this context, it should be remembered that while Mills saw the end of ideology as an ideology of complacency, one that, in having made a "fetish of empiricism," provided both the "intellectual celebration of apathy" and the rationalization of the status quo, Wrong saw the "end of ideology" as an ideology of "moderation," one that served to justify a retreat from politics. Similarly, it should be remembered that in expanding on these charges William Delaney viewed the end of ideology theses as an argument that embodied a preference for utilizing administrative rather than political means to secure solutions to fundamentally political problems, while Rousseas and Farganis viewed the end of ideology as an expression of an "ideological positivism," one that amounts to nothing more than "an unthinking apologia for whatever is."[43] Like Andrew Hacker, Rousseas and Farganis viewed the end of ideology thesis as an ideology that would justify the end of all utopian thought.

These are sharp and severe charges, so too are the charges of Peter Gay and Irving Howe that the end of ideology was a statement shaped by ex-radicals who expressed through it a self-hatred of their own radical past, yet they are all charges which can be levelled at Bell. This is not so much because they are necessarily true. Given Bell's basically long standing commitment to the mixed economy and to a two party system based on the British model the efficacy of Peter Gay's and Irving Howe's characterization is questionable.

One cannot, as does Job Dittberner, imply a recent "conversion" by Bell to democratic planning. Bell's "conversion" from Marxism occured before 1944. Since this is the case, the charge of over-reaction certainly appears to be of marginal importance.

The charges by Mills, Wrong, Delaney, and Rousseas and Farganis, are each well deserved. Bell completely left himself open to these charges. He left himself open to them when he failed to weigh the intellectual and political limits of his conception of utopia against the conception outlined by Mannheim. He also left himself open to these charges when he failed to weigh the effect of his conception of utopia in blocking from consideration possible political approaches to problems that fall outside of the range of short-term rational calculation. Not only did he leave himself open to these charges, he, partly for the reasons given and partly for other reasons that shall be discussed shortly, opened the door for these charges.

Another aspect of Bell's work that contributed to the power of the charges leveled against Bell's end of ideology thesis is that, in developing his thesis, Bell presents the basic speculative images subsumed in his argument as a set of facts. Nowhere in the "Epilogue" does Bell discuss the debates that surrounded these images when they were presented in his original essay. In the ultimate essay he presents what originally he, himself, defined as conjectures, speculations, and theories now as facts. His definition of the "broker state" as the model for the legitimated plural, Welfare State, the enthusiasm of intellec-

tuals for the Welfare State and Bell's earlier reasons for the failure of socialism as a political movement were each subsumed as facts in his arguments for the end of ideology. The fact that each in their own way served to frame his construction of that argument with all that that means (namely, that aside from being a summary statement about a set of social and historical trends about a relatively brief period in Western history Bell's end of ideology thesis was also a positive evaluation of those trends) is extraordinarily important. This collapsing of ideas of value and facts is extremely important because it allows us to define Bell's construction of the end of ideology argument as constituting, more than anything else, a two sided polemic.

Bell's construction of the end of ideology argument as it was elaborated in the "Epilogue" was a polemic against the editors of Dissent, a socialist quarterly. It was also a polemic against men like Dwight MacDonald, the former radical who in the 1950s dropped out of political journalism to join the staff of The New Yorker. MacDonald could be regarded as one who turned away from politics in favor of lighter pursuits. In this regard the "Epilogue" was a polemic directed towards a representative figure of the "twice-born" generation. Their fall, in Bell's words, "from innocence came in the horrifying realization that violence - and the drive for domination - was a craving in man, and, following Hannah Arendt, that modern society had become a bureaucratized apparatus for periodically, and necessarily, evoking and suppressing such violence."[44]

The polemic that Bell directed towards MacDonald was a simple and straightforward one. Its message was that even in a world filled with disillusionment and pessimism one must try to remain involved in politics despite its violence and betrayal. The political images invoked in the pessimistic theories of man and society invoked by Arendt "are conceptions that derive from heroic and ultimately romantic images of life and man's place in it."[45] In the final analysis the truth of such theories remains a difficult and perhaps unresolvable problem. Against these theories "to see politics on the more mundane, and civil, level of reconciling diverse interests may be naive. But this has been the British experience and McCarthy apart, that of America, too. We do not live at extremes..."[46] One of the fundamental things that separates the scientist from the intellectual is that where "the intellectual takes as his starting point his self and relates the world to his own sensibilities; the scientist accepts an existing field of knowledge and seeks to map out the unexplored terrain."[47]

Implictly Bell's polemic against MacDonald was more a polemic against apathy than anything else. It has the same moreal quality and the same faith in science and liberalism that, to repeat, framed Sidney Hook's polemic against Reinhold Niebuhr as the former developed that polemic in "The New Failure of Nerve." Just as Hook's polemic was distinguished by its reaffirmation of Deweyian pragmatism and liberalism in the face of Niebuhr's negativism and his retreat from radicalism to theology, so too Bell's polemic against MacDonald was a

reaffirmation of science and liberalism in the Deweyian mode. Bell, in making these progrommatic charges against MacDonald, perhaps failed to see as he did in the case of his charges against the editors of Dissent, the substantive, political consequences of his purely programmatic position.

Bell's polemic against Dissent was somewhat more involved and complicated than his polemic against MacDonald. In part, the polemic against Dissent centered on that magazine's attacks on Parisan Review and Commentary. Dissent, charged Bell, attacked these publication "for not being radical enough. But, other than attacking these magazines, there was little in Dissent itself that was new; it never exemplified what it meant by radicalism; and it has not been able, especially in politics, to propose anything new."[48]

In greater part, Bell's polemic centered on what he considered Dissent's misguided attacks against the quality of American life, attacks that were conditioned by its conception of America as a mass society. Bell's argument was that while Dissent's attacks on "advertising, the debaucheries of mass culture, and the like" smacked of radicalism, because they were generally couched in the language of the early Marx with its emphasis on alienation, those attacks completely missed the mark. They made advertising and other problems of mass culture something they were not. Hence, in the final analysis they ended up obscuring the fundamental nature of those problems and of the contemporary task of radicalism in the United States. The point, explained Bell, "is that these problems are essentially cultural and not political, and the problem of radical thought

today is to reconsider the relationship of culture to society."[49]

Towards a Final Assessment

While we have been severe in criticizing Bell over the shortcomings of his presentation of the end of ideology argument, an argument which as Bell properly makes note of in "The Mood of Three Generations" essay captures the mood and political stance of Commentary, Partisan Review, and the New Leader, our final estimate of Bell's efforts to bring new light to the argument must be tempered. In Bell's defense, it must be pointed out that in none of his writings up to and including "The End of Ideology in the West: An Epilogue" does he write as a theoretician, which is to say that nowhere in his writings up to and including 1960 does he write as a man who considers all the alternative arguments that would result from his failure to anticipate criticism. Bell writes as an advocate and as a journalist, one who is pushing an argument, a position that he firmly believes in. Bell also writes as a theoretician who seeks to invoke a paradigm, to promote a scientific framework in which he believes. He is hence always the polemicist, but sometimes the scientist.

As a social scientist Bell has tried to reconcile his inherent pessimism and caution about man with his faith in rationalism. His belief that the end of ideology need not mean the end of utopia seems to be the product of his efforts to reconcile this seeming contradiction, a contradiction that ultimatley derives from his efforts to reconcile the pessimism

of Niebuhr with the optimism of Dewey and Hook.

Within this context, it is to Bell's credit that he could, within the framework of the end of ideology, intellectually reconcile for himself the seemingly contradictory positions that were at the heart of the Hook-Niebuhr debates on the Soviet Union. The most salient aspect of Niebuhr's position was that in emphasizing the irrationalities in human nature, the limits in our knowledge of the future and the changing context within which planning takes place, he emphasized the limits of planning. The most salient aspect of Dewey's and Hook's thought was that while providing a pragmatic basis for planning, they each rejected overarching, utopian, total planning. Their notions of pragmatism and science emphasized not total planning but a series of plans each geared to the specific context and specific knowledge of those contexts. Both Niebuhr and the pragmatists rejected utopianism in planning and focused on the importance of particular plans not overall planning. In this rejection of total planning Bell could reconcile the positions of Dewey and Niebuhr in the 1960s.

For Bell the series of short term specific plans that are an alternative to overarching "utopian" planning are, among other things, a means by which he could intellectually cope with the pessimism that he and others could find in Niebuhr's work. In focusing on pragmatic planning Bell, it seems, was able to answer to his own satisfaction the criticism of rationality and planning that is explicit in Niebuhr's work after 1940. The solution of pragmatic planning thus enables

Bell not to reject the heritage of liberal-humanitarianism in response to his horror at the inhumanity of totalitarian planning as he perceived it in the Soviet Union, especially under Stalin.

Yet in a basic sense, any final assessment of The End of Ideology must weigh the success of Bell's writings on the end of ideology against his efforts to call, through Deweyian pragmatism, for some way of measuring values, for some way of developing a scientific approach to planning. This is because what emerges in the final analysis is less a picture of the end of ideologies in the West than the image of the end of socialism in the United States as refracted through the eyes of an ex-socialist who remains in principle a firm advocate of large-scale, centralized planning. Like the image of the United States as a broker state, as a society that, while lacking a clear-cut philosophy of planning has, all the same, embraced the necessity of planning, this image seems clearly to have been subsumed into Bell's construction of the end of ideology thesis. A comparison between his "epilogue" and his "The Breakup of Family Capitalism" with its emphasis on the corporate managers and their search for the new ideology necessary to justify their power and prestige helps to substantiate this point. In comparing these two essays it becomes very clear that in "The End of Ideology in the West: An Epilogue" Bell was using the term ideology in a limited way, one that has a far more restricted application than the way in which he used that term in "The Breakup of Family Capitalism," and one that bears the imprint of his earlier

writings on the failure of socialism in the United States.

The final assessment of The End of Ideology must also clearly distinguish what this book is from what it is not. This book of sixteen largely journalistic essays, was, on one level, the work of a man who was seeking in the epilogue to reconcile his own pessimism, his own doubts about man and the inevitability of progress, with the faith in science and man that Dewey and Hook's writings on instrumentalism evoked in him as an intellectual whose roots rested in the socialist tradition with its emphasis on the inevitability of progress through science and planning. These doubts were the doubts that Reinhold Niebuhr's writings echoed for him and for a number of other Jewish intellectuals.[50] On another level, The End of Ideology was the work of a social analyst who was describing a number of changes in American society during the 1940s and 1950s, and who was critical of existing social and political theory because of its failure to adequately grasp and explain these changes. These changes as indicated earlier included the decline of socialism, the final shift away from socialism to business, i.e. market unionism in the American labor movement, the emergence of the broker state, the existence of status anxieties as a result of prosperity and the absence of ideology, the amorphousness of power in contemporary America and its relationship to the breakup of family capitalism in the United States.

At this level, The End of Ideology was the work of a social analyst who, in describing these changes and in commenting on the shortcomings of existing social and political theory in embracing them, was calling for a new theory of American society,

a new ideology, that would replace the myths and ideologies of the left and of the right, the free market and private capital. As stated earlier in this chapter, Bell's call for a new theory of social change was the call for a theory that would provide the basis for making allocations of costs and benefits on moral and political grounds and would make new societal institutions clear to both liberals, intellectuals, corporate managers, and family business operators. It would reconcile them to their emerging reality. Hence, The End of Ideology was the work of a social analyst who in 1960 had still not contructed this new theory of social change, one whose need he originally specified in 1955 in The Radical Right, and "The Breakup of Family Capitalism."

When understood in this light we can speak of The End of Ideology as a book that represents the efforts of a social analyst who while intellectually reconciling for himself the struggles of his generation (the struggles over the meaning and limits of ideology when viewed against the background of the Moscow Trials, the popular front, the Nazi-Soviet pact, and the struggles over the meaning of Stalinism as elaborated in the Niebuhr-Hook debates) was establishing an agenda of work that remained to be completed. Hence, The End of Ideology should not be understood as a finished work but as the work of a man who was at a mid point in his intellectual career, an intellectual whose working agenda called for both the development of a new theory of social change, and a new system of legitimacy for welfare state planning, as well as, for a new way of looking at the problems discussed by the mass society

theorists, one that would take into account the changing relationship between culture and politics. In this context, The End of Ideology should also be understood as the work of a moralist, of a man who against his perception of the excesses of the 1930s and the realities of the 1950s was trying to establish a political and moral basis for modern liberalism as a philosophy of political pluralism and limited social planning. At this level it was the work of a man deeply touched by the tragic events of the 1930s and 40s, and of an intellectual moved to seeking a format against which a new philosophy of planning could be developed, one that would continue to safeguard the principles of free speech, free press, the right of opposition, and of free inquiry. These were the principles that Bell saw Lenin and Trotsky in their unremitting commitment to total planning, all too willing to sacrifice. In conclusion, then, The End of Ideology was less the work of a scholar writing a systemmatic exposition on the meaning of ideology than of a intellectual defining a range of problems that, as we shall see in the next chapter, would continue in the 1960s and 70s to frame and underlie his writings on the post-industrial society.

It is against this background that we can ask whether the concept of the post-industrial society is an ideologically derived construction or not. The answer, as we shall explain shortly, has less to do with the values embodied in Bell's argument about the end of ideology than it has to do with his efforts to develop, in the course of his work in the 1960s and in the early 1970s, a scientific approach to planning and to

the problem of legitimacy in a liberal society. These concerns were the basic value problems embodied in the end of ideology argument. They involve the methods of effecting the choice of science over ideology and anti-rational stoicism, the need to develop a system of comprehensive planning without sacrificing the principles of free speech, free press, the right of opposition and of free inquiry. These problems pose questions of value that were absorbed into Bell's construction of the end of ideology thesis. The values and assumptions implicitly underlying these questions frame his efforts to develop on the basis of the concept of the end of ideology, a theory of the post-industrial society as a theory of social change in America. That theory of change ultimately serves to project an image of the United States that he had first projected in his 1949 essay "The Un-Marxist Revolution." This is the image of the United States as a "broker state," as a nation that has embraced the Welfare State economics of the New Deal. It is also the image of a pluralistic society that lacks an integrative moral philosophy which can evoke some new sense of civil obligation."strong enough to command the allegiance of all groups and provide a principle of equity in the distribution of the rewards and privileges of society."[51] In short, it is the image of a society that while having committed itself to the maintenance of a managed economy, one that requires the federal government to arbitrate the competing claims placed upon it by the different groups that it serves, nonetheless, lacks "a general theory as to how the satisfaction of varied group interests may be harmonized with the general

welfare."[52] In essence, then, it is the image of society that needs a new system of legitimation, a new theory of the "public household."

Raised to an explicit level the values and assumptions implicit in the questions of value that were absorbed into Bell's construction of the end of ideology were in part the values and assumptions of a man, who like John Kenneth Galbraith, views the "broker state" as a desired end. They were also the values and assumptions of a man whose first impulse is to move slowly.[53] Translated into the every day world this preference for moving slowly, for exercising caution in responding to social problems, was a value that conditioned much of his perspective about the end of ideology. It was a value that permeated his writings on socialism and the labor movement. It was a value that led him to frame his analysis of the decline of American socialism in terms of the Weberian distinction between the ethic of responsibility and the ethic of conscience. Translated into the everyday world of ideas, Bell's preference for moving slowly was a preference for removing passion from politics. In the final analysis, it was a preference, a value, that led him to embrace the principle of the "broker state" with its emphasis on order and consensus and to defend, against the socialism of his critics, the politics of American pluralism with its emphasis on politics as game played between different interest groups each of which keeps the other in check through a self-regulating system of countervailing power.

Heavily associated with Bell's endorsement of the "broker

state" are the same set of normative assumtpions that framed Galbraith's theory of countervailing power. Implicit in the notion of the "broker state" was the assumption that the equilibrium effected by government between major interest groups through the adoption of a managed economy constitutes an optimal state of functioning. In this regard, just as Galbraith assumes countervailing power to be a special good, Bell's treatment of the "broker state" contains the same assumption, namely, that the maintenance of countervailing power is the desired goal that should be striven for in a modern liberal society. Beyond this, another underlying assumption that frames both Galbraith's theory of countervailing power and Bell's notion of post-war America as a "broker state" is that countervailing power is the only method by which a decentralized decision-making process that is harmonious with the American political values can be developed and maintained. This may or may not be so. However, it is treated by both Galbraith and by Bell as a given, as an unquestioned truth, an axiom whose validity is for them firmly grounded in American historical experience and values.

The identification of these values and assumptions fosters two questions that we shall seek to answer over the next two chapters. The first is: do these same set of values and assumptions help to frame Bell's construction of the concept of post-industrial society? If so, how do they do so? The second question is how do we reconcile Bell's predisposition to move slowly within the framework of the duality that marks

his work up to 1960? This duality is between the activism of John Dewey, with its optimism about man and the inevitability of progress through science and planning, and the pessimism of Reinhold Niebuhr, with its emphasis on the limits of planning and reform. The answer to the first question ultimately rests in defining the concept of the post-industrial society, how it emerges in his work. That answer also requires an examination of the contexts in which the term post-industrial society is used by Bell to elaborate an emergent reality. Much of his work in the 1960s and early 1970s is devoted to describing that reality. The answer to the second question is to be found in another area. It is to be found, we shall argue in the concluding chapters of this study, in Bell's efforts to temper the radical idea with the conservative impulse.

NOTES

1. The term thesis book was used by Bell to characterize The Radical Right. Yet, despite Bell's own hesistancy about The End of Ideology being a thesis book it too, in the terms specified here, can be considered a thesis book.

2. Bell, The End of Ideology, p. 258.

3. David Reisman, The Lonely Crowd (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950) p. 318.

4. Ibid.

5. Bell, The End of Ideology, p. 259.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid., p. 262. For Bell the implications were fairly simple: "since detailed job breakdown becomes socially (and humanly) self-defeating, the answer lies in job rotation, in job enlargement, and in lengthening the work cycle."

9. Ibid., p. 262.

10. Ibid., p. 263.

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid., p. 264.

13. Ibid., p. 390-1.

14. Ibid., p. 391.

15. Ibid., p. 367.

16. Ibid., p. 367-8.

17. Ibid., p. 386-7.

18. Ibid., p. 386.

19. Bell, "The Mood of Three Generations" in The End of Ideology, p. 300.

20. This article appeared in the January-February 1943 issue of Partisan Review. Others who participated in the symposium were John Dewey, Ernest Nagel and Dwight Macdonald. Macdonald's article "The Future of Democratic Values" appeared in the July-August 1943 issue of Partisan Review.

21. Bell, The End of Ideology, p. 301.

22. Ibid., p. 308.

23. Ibid., p. 309.

24. Ibid.

25. Ibid.

26. Ibid., p. 404.

27. Ibid.

28. Sidney Hook "The New Failure of Nerve," Partisan Review, January-February 1943, p. 9.

29. Bell, The End of Ideology, p. 311.

30. Ibid., p. 402.

31. Ibid., p. 405.

32. Ibid.

33. Ibid.

34. Ibid., p. 406.

35. Ibid., p. 405.

36. Ibid., p. 302.

37. See especially Shils' "Ideology and Civility." The civility theme was developed by Shils' in The Torment of Secrecy (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1956).

38. Bell, The End of Ideology, p. 406.

39. Ibid., p. 312.

40. The relationship between Bell and Howe extends back to the 1930s. Both according to Irving Kristol were members of "alcove no. 1." The relationship between Bell and Coser goes back to 1949. Each helped to establish the socialist publication Modern Review.

41. Bell, The End of Ideology, p. 391.

42. Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, p. 263.

43. Rousseas and Farganis, "American Politics" in The End of Ideology Debate, p. 215.

44. Bell, The End of Ideology, p. 308.

45. Ibid.

46. Ibid.

47. Ibid., p. 306.

48. Ibid., p. 311.

49. Ibid., p. 313.

50. See again Judd L. Teller's Commentary article "A Critique of The New Jewish Theology." For another indication of Niebuhr's influence on American Jewish intellectuals see Will Herberg's "From Marxism to Judaism," Commentary, January 1947, pp. 25 - 32. In this article Herberg credits Niebuhr with providing him with the recognition that "the worship of a holy God who transcends all relativities of nature and history...saves the soul from taking satisfaction in any partial performance, curbs self-righteousness, and instills a most wholesome humility which gives man no rest in any achievement, no matter how high, while a still higher level of achievement is possible." Herberg also credits Niebuhr with providing him with the recognition that "the worship of a holy and transcendent God who yet manifests himself in history saves us alike from the shallow positivism that leaves nature and history and life all without ultimate meaning, from a pantheism that in the end amounts to an idolatrous worship of the world, and from a sterile other-worldliness that breaks all connection between religion and life." After praising the neo-orthodoxy of Niebuhr, Herberg concluded his essay with the observation that contemporary Judaism requires "a great theological reconstruction in the spirit of a neo-orthodoxy distant alike from sterile fundamentalism and secularized modernism."

51. Bell, "America's Un-Marxist Revolution," Commentary, p. 265.

52. Ibid.

53. Interview with Daniel Bell, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 23 February 1978.

CHAPTER VII

FROM THE END OF IDEOLOGY TO THE POST-INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY

Introduction

While Daniel Bell wrote several important books and articles during the 1960s and 1970s his major works during this period are The Coming of Post-Industrial Society and The Cultural Contradiction of Capitalism. The former was published in 1973, the latter in 1976.

Both of these works helped to summarize more than a decade of his work on a wide variety of subjects and enterprises. These ranged from Bell's work on The Commission for The Year 2000 to his interest in "the dysjunctions between social structure and culture," and the student protest and Black protest movements, and the growing pre-eminence of the university in American society.

Written roughly over the same time period (most, though not all, of the essays which appeared in these books were written between 1964 and 1972) these books provided the outlines of a theory of social change, that Bell had called for in The End of Ideology. At the core of this theory of social change was his concept of the post-industrial society.

As we pointed out in the opening chapter, Bell used the concept of the post-industrial society in The Coming of Post-Industrial Society both as a major substantive theory and as a

major substantive theory and as a analytical or methodological construct. In both that book and in The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism, Bell referred to that concept in both ways without making the distinction clear. Over the course of both works, Bell defined the post-industrial society in nine, sometimes overlapping but at other times distinct, ways. To complicate matters, while it is most often defined by Bell as a theoretical construct it is also defined by him as an emergent reality, one that, in its largest measure, has been realized in the United States.

As a methodological or "theoretical" construct, the post-industrial is defined by Bell as a "standpoint" from which models and theories of social change can be generated, conceptual scheme that "identifies a new axial principle of social organization and defines a common core of problems which societies that become more and more post-industrial have to confront."[1] As a methodological construct Bell also defines it as an "ordering device," one that attempts "to describe and explain an axial change in the social structure of the society."[2] As such an "ordering device" it is a concept that, in short, serves "to make more intelligible the complex changes in Western social structure."[3] By "social structure" it should be understood that Bell is referring to the economy, the technology, and the stratification system of a society.

And, finally, as a methodological construct the post-industrial society is defined by Bell as both an "ideal type" and as a "social system," one that "does not succeed capitalism or socialism but, like bureaucratization, cuts across both."[4]

In the sense that he defines the post-industrial society as an "ideal type" it serves as a "specification of new dimensions in the social structure which the polity has to manage."[5]

As an emergent reality the post-industrial society is defined concurrently by Bell in The Coming of Post-Industrial Society as a "knowledge society" a "service society," and as a "communal society."[6] As an emergent reality he also defines it as a society that "in its initial logic, is a meritocracy."[7] And, finally, as an emergent reality the post-industrial society is defined by Bell as "a crescive, unplanned change in the character of society, the working out of the logic of socio-economic organization, and a change in the character of knowledge."[8]

A principle reason why there are so many different characterizations and definitions of post-industrial society as specified by Bell in The Coming of Post-Industrial Society is that this book, much like The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism and The End of Ideology is basically a collection of essays that were written for separate purposes over an extended period of time. Hardly finished works, The Coming of Post-Industrial Society and The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism seem to represent the working out of a broad set of often discrete ideas and themes that coalesce in the concept of the post-industrial society, with the result that the concept often becomes stretched and enlarged to the point that it takes on new and sometimes contradictory meanings even within the same chapter.

It has been said of Bell that he is a writer who does not

write books but one produces "large thoughts that fill books."[9] In terms of both The Coming of Post-Industrial Society and The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism this would seem to be both a very accurate and far-reaching assessment of Bell's intellectual and literary style. In each of these books the concept of the post-industrial society embodies an image of American society torn by tensions which are the result of historically contradictory impulses and tendencies within it. It is an image that was based on a set of interlocking ideas and themes that Bell developed largely between 1962 and the early 1970s. These ideas and themes concerned mass society and culture, the growth of advanced technological systems based upon the codification of theoretical knowledge, the growth of the university as the "gatekeeper" of a changing stratification system, and the problems involved in long-range social forecasting and planning. They also concerned the relationship between technology and politics in a democratic society, the role of the corporation and the tension between functinal and substantive rationality. And, finally, these ideas and themes concerned the role of the intellectual and the scientist in modern society, the emergence of the New Left, meritocracy and the problem of equality, the nature of liberalism and its philosophical presuppositions and the problem of legitimacy as related to modern liberalism.

It is against this background that we can approach the problem of determining the origins of the concept and idea of post-industrial society in Bell's work. Within this rather broad framework, we can attempt to determine the degree to

which the values and assumptions that frames Bell's views on the broker state that permeated his essay on the end of ideology also guided his construction and use of this concept. What we shall do in this chapter is to seek to understand The Coming of Post-Industrial Society, in relation to both The End of Ideology and to the themes and interests that dominated Bell's writings in the 1960s.

In effect, what we shall seek to determine how that concept permitted Bell to elaborate upon the themes and ideas that he raised in his earlier works and in an essay that first appeared in The Public Interest in the fall of 1974, "The Public Household." The central point that Bell stressed in this essay was that while the United States has a mechanism for the satisfaction of public needs and wants as against private wants within the federal budget, the public household, we lack the wisdow to use this redistributive mechanism effectively. In support of this view Bell charged that modern liberalism has

> no integrated theory of the economics and politics of public finance, no sociology of the structural conflicts between classes and social groups on the decisive question of taxation, no political philosophy (with the recent exception of John Rawls, but nothing from socialist writers) which attempts a theory of distributive justice based on the centrality of the public household in the society.[10]

This essay, somewhat expanded, comprised the concluding chapter of The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism. "The Public Household" was distinguished from the other five essays that appeared in The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism less because it raised the call for a new set of normative and planning guidelines (this was a call that was implicit in

each of the other essays that appeared in the book) than that it explicitly sought to lay the foundations for the development of those guidelines. It sought to do so both in its analysis of the crisis of authority in Western society and through its reaffirmation of a set of liberal principles that were embodied in the ethos of Welfare State liberalism.

Like the concept of the post-industrial society, the public household is a concept who construction emerges from Bell's earlier work. Indeed, if the concept of the post-industrial society originates, as Bell has acknowledged, out of a set of ideas discussed in "The Breakup of Family Capitalism" the concept of the public household originates in an even earlier work.[11] It originates from Bell's 1949 essay "America's Un-Marxist Revolution."

The Public Household: The Call for a New Public Philosophy

In assessing the implications of the New Deal in "America's Un-Marxist Revolution" Bell wrote of America's lack of an integrative moral philosophy and of the failure of its policy makers to recognize that government planning presupposes some over-all mechanism for making crucial decisions that balance the economy. These processes would result in an agenda of problems that the American body politic would have to begin solving if the United States were to survive as a democratic society.

In "The Public Household" Bell issues exactly the same warning. The tone, however, is very different. In the earlier essay Bell suggested that America was in the midst

of a deep-seated moral crisis, but in "The Public Household" Bell was more definite. In that essay he warned, in very explicit language, that the United States is in the midst of a moral crisis, a "crisis of belief."

Bell again argued that modern liberalism has failed to come to terms with the realities of American life. It has failed to recognize and pay very close attention to and come to grips with the consequences of the liberal reforms of the last forty years. This failure was the absence of a new public philosophy. It has also failed to recognize the pre-conditions for maintaining order in society.

In coming to terms with the consequences of the last forty years, modern liberalism, argued Bell, must recognize that the ideology of economic growth to which it has committed itself since the 1930s no longer serves as the basis for solving political problems. Furthermore, it must recognize the reasons why the ideology of growth fostered in the West by the Keynesian revolution can no longer serve this function.

Because of that "revolution," the United States has undergone a transformation that has witnessed the pre-eminence of the public household, the national budget, over the domestic household and the market economy. The federal budget is now both prior to other sectors of the American economy and directs these sectors. The federal government committed itself in the 1930s to the establishment of a normative economic policy. In the 1950s it committed itself to a policy of underwriting the majority of scientific and technological research in the United States; and in the 1960s the federal government was

committed to establishing normative social policies in the fields of health, education and income maintenance.

The significance of these transformations is that it has given rise to a revolution of rising entitlements for all groups in the United States and a political state that in adjudicating the conflicting claims of the different constituencies that it serves "is at worst an arena of power and is at best a normative umpire."[12]

The public household rests in an understanding of the basic economic fact that in relation to productivity, wage increases, unit costs, and inflation there has been in the United States "a structural imbalance between the technological (industrial and scientific) sector and the human and governmental services sector."[13] The significance of this imbalance is that where automobile workers may demand and receive a ten percent wage increase, that escalation need not represent an inflationary increase while the same wage increase when extended to policemen or other municipal workers would more than likely be inflationary. This is because labor costs in the serve sector represent a significantly higher proportion of the total costs of services than do labor costs in the productive sector. The wage cost proportion is generally so much higher in service industries that it cannot be readily made up through increased productivity as in the productive sector. Hence, the cost of a wage increase to policemen would more likely be passed on to the consumer, in the form of taxes, than would the same wage increase to the automobile worker.

Finally, economic growth can no longer serve as a political solvent because of double digit inflation. In contrast to the steady, albeit manageable inflation of four to five percent a year which is an inevitable concomitant of growth, double digit inflation weakens the middle-class and creates class war. This class was is "not primarily between employers and workers but between the middle class and the working class, in the arena of the state budget."[14] Double digit inflation promotes political instability, intellectual uncertainty, and discontent, especially among groups favored in the past whose income instability makes them vulnerable to the erosion of purchasing power caused by inflation.

Modern liberalism must start thinking of the public household as being more than just the fereral government or as a public sector alongside the market economy and the domestic household, that is, alongside the primary and secondary sectors of the American economy. It must, argued Bell, start thinking of the public household as a mechanism for reallocation and redress that can only be effective when it is based on sound principles of household management.

Though the federal budget is now both prior to the market economy and the domestic household, Bell argues, "we do not have any theoretical underpinning for this state of affairs."[15] We do not have, noted Bell, "a political economy of the public household that joins the economic and the political dimensions or a political philosphy of the public household that provides rules for the normative resolution of conflicting claims and a philosophical justification of the outcome."[16]

Modern liberalism must also start rethinking the public household because the problem of unbalanced growth and the revolution of rising entitlements require it. The demands made upon the public household as a political market place cannot now he easily matched by the revenues available to it or by available sociological knowledge. Modern liberalism must turn to the concept of the public household because it helps it to think of the problem of management in terms of needs and limits. In short, the concept of the public household may help modern liberalism to recognize that just as families have to learn to live within their means so does the economy.

In doing so liberalism must recognize that inflation has to be controlled because it creates political instability and discontent when it reaches unmanageable double digit proportions. Liberals must also recognize that the politically unstable situation which the revolution of rising entitlements has given rise to has been reinforced, in part, by cultural tendencies in the West that promote debt as a common way of life. At the same time, the intellectual establishment, in its "loss of nerve," has shown an eagerness to repudiate its own existence. This has causedmany college students who would normally move into elite positions to question the legitimacy of Western institutions.

In facing up to these problems, Bell argues, liberals must recognize that the only way to curb inflation is to curb appetites, to set limits on acquisitive behavior. Modern liberalism can only do this when it creates a philosophy of

the public household that states who get what, when and where. In order to establish such a philosophy, modern liberalism cannot look with much help to classical political theory, laissez-faire liberalism or to Marxian socialism. Rather, given the nature of the United States as a pluralistic society, it must "accept the differences between men and establish which differences are relevant and legitimate for the normative functioning of the public household."[17] Yet undefined in more than formal terms it must, in other words, develop a philosophy of the public household on the basis of the "principle of relevant differences."[18]

Modern liberalism, Bell argues, must recognize the sociological preconditions for maintaining order in a society. It must recognize that all societies are moral orders that, in the end, have to justify their "allocative principles and the balances of freedoms and coercions necessary to facilitate or enforce such rules."[19] Furthermore, modern liberalism must recognize that " the point of philosophy is that it states a rational standard, provides for consistency of application so that actions are not arbitrary or capricious, and establishes a normative justification which satisfies men's sense of fairness."[20] And finally, modern liberalism must recognize that the pre-eminence of the public household in American life has created new and deep dilemmas for modern liberal society that requires a normative theory of the fiscal state which can, on a "renogiatiable basis," reconcile the faith common to both classical liberalism and to socialist utopianism, a faith in man's power to remake through reason themselves and

society "with the knowledge of its limits."[21]

In "The Public Household" Bell reworks and articulates more finely his "Un-Marxist Revolution" essay. In its emphasis on both the limits of reason and on the temporal limits of any normative theory of the state, Bell also extends the "End of Ideology" essay in terms that reflect the sustained influence of both Reinhold Niebuhr and John Dewey on his sociological work.

Yet, "The Public Household" is more than these extensions. It is also an attempt to develop, largely as a result of a polemic against John Rawls that he developed in The Coming of Post-Industrial Society and of his long standing distrust of socialist utopianism, the conceptual groundwork upon which a philosophy of the public household can be developed that:

(1) though "renogiated in the renewal present, does not, cannot, ignore the past";[22]

(2) restates what the grounded values of the society are, and hence what it considers to be, legitimate claims;

(3) provides decision rules for the normative resolution of conflicting claims made upon the public household by multiplicity of interest groups which make the United States a pluralistic society "and a justification of the outcome";[23]

(4) provides some agreed upon "balance between equity and efficiency in the competition between social claims and economic performance";[24]

(5) accepts "the tension of the public and the private, the dual roles of person and citizen, individual and group";[25]

(6) provides the need for some "transcendent tie to bind

individuals sufficiently for them to make, when necessary, the necessary sacrifices of self-interest."[26]

In this list of functions to be served by the philosophy of the public household we have Bell's formal program for a system of Welfare State liberalism that will limit the inflationary thrust in welfare state created rising entitlements and make the federal budget responsive to both the productive capacities of the primary and secondary sectors of the economy. It also may serve to limit the claims of less productive segments of the economy.

Bell's program is one that grows out of his assessment of the "crisis of liberalism" and his desire to have a public household that can provide a definition of the common good and a system for the satisfaction of the private rights and wants claimed by individuals and groups on the basis of scarcity rather than abundance.[27]

The fact that "The Public Household" can be defined in these terms is a function of one thing: Bell's efforts to specify, on the basis of the principle of relevant differences, the dimensions upon which the determination of who gets what, when, and where can be made.

Yet, the "need for a public philosophy" as stated in "The Public Household" is a program for the creation of the public philosophy that will, if created and accepted, achieve its goals of limiting appetites, justifying the distribution of the benefits of a welfare state, and gaining acceptance for the limitations on appetites that emerge in the process of adjudication of benefits. But it is no more than a program

for the creation of such a public philosophy: it is not the public philosophy that Bell deems so necessary and right. To treat the program, the intention or the statement of need for the product of the program would be a reification of one's hopes, desires, and ambitions, a fallacy of misplaced concreteness, or the treating of one's dreams as realities. We must ask, again, if in his subsequent work, Bell creates the public philosophy, he says we so urgently need.

We have noted that Bell restates the program of "America's Un-Marxist Revolution" in "The Public Household," as he restated the programmatic implications of "The Breakup of Family Capitalism" in The End of Ideology and The Coming of Post-Industrial Society. Yet the continuous restatement of programs, no matter how finely they become articulated, does not constitute the conversion of the program into the substantive work that replaces the program.

Toward a Reconstruction of Bell's Thought in the 1960

"No idea ever emerges full-blown from the head of Jove, or a secondary muse."[28] Bell in The Coming of Post-Industrial Society used these words to initiate a discussion of the history of the post-industrial society as a conceptual idea. Had he been considering the history of his concept of the public household, he might very well have used the same words.

Like the post-industrial society the idea of the public household is one that slowly evolved in Bell's writings. It was an idea that was grounded in his analysis of modern liberalism, one that focused upon America's need for a new

national style and for a new public philosophy. At the same time, his analysis highlighted modern liberalism's need for a new set of normative and planning guidelines.

The need of modern liberalism for a new set of normative and planning guidelines was an implicit theme of an essay that Bell wrote in 1962 called "The National Style and The Radical Right." In this essay Bell outlined the circumstances that made the 1950s "an age of anxiety" in the United States. By the start of the 1960s several developments, Bell stated, had helped to shatter "the belief which Americans had in their own omnipotence, and left, almost, a free-floating anxiety about the future."[29] Prominent among these developments were the fall of China, the frustrating stalement in Korea, "the eruption of anti-colonialism (with the United States cast bewilderingly among the arch-villains), the higher growth rates in the western European economies at a time when our growth has slowed down considerably, and the continued claims of Khrushchev that Communism is the wave of the future."[30]

For Bell "these immediate crises of nerve," as he called them, served only to reflect a deeper set of challenges to the adequacy of "America's classic national style." By national style, Bell meant "a distinctive way of meeting the problems of order and adaptation, of conflict and consensus, of individual ends and communal welfare, that confront any society."[31] "America's classic national style" according to Bell had four distinct properties. The first was a pattern of achievement that defined an American as someone who "makes

himself, and in so doing transforms himself, society, and nature."[32] In Bell's view this pattern of achievement was grounded in Thomas Jefferson's deism, the belief that "God was not a transcendental being but a Workman whose intricate design was being unfolded on the American continent."[33] It was also, in Bell's view, a pattern in which achievement was envisaged as embodying an "endless future," one that provided a life on constant improvement.

The second property of the American national style, as stated by Bell, was a profound sense of optimism, "a feeling that life was tractable, the environment manipulable, anything possible."[34] The third was a sense of progress, one that bordered on a feeling of omnipotence. Created by the American pattern of achievement and the masculine optimism that was embodied in the pioneering spirit, this sense of progress was reinforced by the grandeur of America's materialistic achievements, by its always being first, and by its having built in an age of rapid expansion "the tallest buildings, the biggest dams, the largest cities."[35] The fourth property, was the extension of America's pattern of achievement to the unique emphasis on locating the source of reform in the individual. This emphasis on the individual was so great that "the idea that society is a system of social arrangements that limits the range of individual behavior was an abstraction essentially alien to American thought."[36] For Americans "reality was concrete and empirical, and the individual was the moral unit of action."[37]

Each of these properties of the "American classic national

style" helped to shape a distinct style of thought that discouraged theory, social reform, and quality. Instead, this style of thought was one that encouraged action, individual reform and quantity. In the political realm, the American belief in achievement, optimism and progress helped to make the "American way... one of ad hoc compromise derived from an implicit consensus."[38] Hence, unlike France, "where every political division was rooted in the alignments of the French Revolution or in attitudes toward clericalism and the Catholic Church," there was rarely in American political debates any appeal to "first principles."[39] The sole exceptions were those surrounding the Civil War. In place of "first principles" what underlay and ultimately determined the pragmatic nature of political debate in the United States, according to Bell, was "three unspoken assumptions."[40] These assumptions were "that the values of the individual were to be maximized, that rising material wealth would dissolve all strains resulting from inequality, and that experience would provide solutions for all future problems."[41]

The salient element in the adequacy of America's national style in relation to the events that created a new "crisis of nerve" was that

> that style with its ad hoc compromise and day-to-day patching of problems, rather than the formulation of consistent policy, no longer gives us guides to action. The classic notion was that the individual was the unit of action. But the chief realization of the past thirty years is that not the individual but collectivities - corporations, labor unions, farm organizations, pressure groups - have become the units of social action, and that individual rights, in many instances, derive from group rights, or have become fused with them. But other than the

> thin veil of the "public consensus" we have few guidelines, let alone a principle of distributive justice, to regulate or check the arbitrary power of many of these collectivities.[42]

In the light of the inadequacy of America's national style, implied Bell, was a strong need for a new national style, one that could adequately respond to the changing character and structure of post-war American society.

> Styles of action reflect the character of a society. The classic style was worked out during a period when America was an agrarian, relatively homogeneous society, isolated from the world at large, so that ad hoc measures were a realistic way of dealing with new strains. As an adaptive mechanism, it served to bring new groups into society. But styles of action, like rhetoric, have a habit of outliving institutions. And the classic style in no way reflects the deep structural changes that have been taking place in American life in the past quarter of a century.[43]

In 1967 Bell asserted the need of modern liberalism to create a new set of normative guidelines to an explicit level. He did this through an analysis of the changing needs of the United States that he constructed as part of his work for the Commission on the Year 2000. As the chairman of that commission, Bell edited a report that detailed the proceedings of the Commission on the Year 2000, Toward the Year 2000: Work in Progress. In its introductory essay Bell analyzed the Commission's task as it had been outlined by Lawrence K. Frank, a noted psychologist and founding spirit of the Commission.

The task of the Commission had been outlined by Frank in a 1964 memorandum to Hudson Hoagland, the then president of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. Bell quoted Frank's memorandum:

> As large scale transformation occur, our customary designs for living, our homes and family life, our interpersonal relations, and our social, economic, and political activities will require greater or less modification, if not supersedure. It is likely that our traditional morals and ethics and our American 'character structure' will undergo far-reaching and often radical changes...[44]

To this diagnosis Frank prescribed: "if we are to maintain a free social order in the face of the discontent and anxiety (we) will probably provoke, we must attempt the Promethean task of renewing our traditional culture and reorienting our social order as a deliberately planned process..."[45]

In describing this emergent reality Frank argued that the situation confronting contemporary American society was somewhat similar to that of the eighteenth centure, "when such inquiring thinkers as John Locke, Adam Smith, and the French philosophes formulated the premises that underlie the democratic polity and market economy of the past two hundred years - rationality, mobility, the need for public information, free exchange."[46] What we need today, Frank further argued, was a new comprehensive political philosophy, one that "would formulate the assumptions of the pluralistic economy and the service society that is emerging."[47]

Against this background Frank, Bell reported, proposed to Hudson Hoaglund and the American Academy of the Arts and Sciences "the creation of an academy commission to write an Agenda for the Year 2000 as the first step toward meeting this urgent need for a new social philosophy."[48]

Bell was chosen by Hoaglund's successor, Professor Paul Freund of the Harvard Law School, to become the chairman of the

newly created Commission. Bell then assessed the task of the Commission as it had been outlined by Frank. He evaluated the task of writing an agenda as the first step towards creating a new social philosophy, on the one hand, between his predilections toward planning, and on the other, against his skepticism that a commission could be a vehicle of such a major undertaking. It was withing this context that Bell made his feelings about Frank's proposals to Hoaglund known:

> I am not sure that I completely shared Mr. Frank's hope that we could attempt the "Promethean task" of renewing our traditional culture or articulating a new philosophy. Experience with earlier projects made me somewhat skeptical that a commission could be the vehicle of such an effort. By temperament, moreover, my concerns had been more with policy problems and with the need for adequate and rational planning to deal with the. Like many of my sociological colleagues, I was appalled by the fact that the Kennedy and Johnson Administration had "discovered" the problems of poverty, education, urban renewal, and air pollution as if they were completely new. In typical American fashion, tremendous energy was suddenly mobilized to "solve" the problems. Although action is typical of the American style, thought and planning are not; it is considered heresy to state that some problems are not immediately or easily solvable, that it might take, as Daniel P. Moynihan argues in his famous study of the Negro family, perhaps a generation for real improvement to occur. A sense of historical time is absent from American thought, and a desire for "instant" reform or "instant" solutions is deeply ingrained in the American temper, both on the left and the right. The left wants, for example, an immediate end to poverty; the right, an immediate victory in Viet-Nam. Yet all these newly discovered American problems were, in fact, anticipated many years ago. Intelligent research and planning could have laid the groundwork for more effective programs. The real need in American society, as I saw it, was for some systematic efforts to anticipate social problems, to design new institutions, and to propose alternative programs for choice. 49
>
> Thus, my own sights were more prosiac than Mr. Frank's."

If Bell had some doubts about the ability of the Commission on the Year 2000 to become the vehicle for the development of an entirely new social philosophy, they did not prevent him from expressing optimism about the prospects of the Commission's work providing a useful stage in the ultimate development that philosophy. In assessing his differences from Frank's approach, Bell indicated that, while different, their perspectives were complimentary.

> Yet I do feel that both perspectives gain from the interplay between them. One cannot write a new political philosophy without rooting it in some concrete problems: one cannot design new political mechanisms without becoming conscious of the philosophical assumptions behind them. The important task for any commission would be not to foreclose any area of inquiry.[50]

Thus, while he expressed skepticism about the ability of any commission to develop a new social philosophy for an enire national Bell did not question America's need for such a philosophy. If we turn to his conclusions, in which Bell summarized the work of the second working session of the sub-committee on the need for normative statements, we find Bell voicing agreement with Frank about "the need for some new philosophy that can guide society in the twenty-first century."[51] Bell also indicated, in this statement, that the development of such a philosophy must meet two basic requirements: it should be based on a comprehension of the changing nature of American society and it should also be geared to meeting those problems that changes in the nature of American society could be expected to produce. It thus reflected Frank's initial memorandum.

Foreshadowed, in Bell's prescriptive statement was an analysis of the changing needs of American society that he developed in "The Year 2000 - The Trajectory of an Idea." This was an analysis in which Bell isolated several technological and political changes in American society. For Bell, each of these changes were transforming the United States into a new kind of society.

One major change identified by Bell was the changing character of Western technology. No longer based exclusively on a "machine technology," the United States was, argued Bell, a society that was increasingly becoming based on an intellectual technology." This technology with such techniques as simulation, model construction, linear programming, and operations research held the promise of providing "the new tools" for decision making. Another major change was the transformation of the American economy "into a post-industrial society."[52] Embodied in this transformation were two distinct sets of changes. The first was that "the weight of the economy has been shifted from the prodect sector to services."[53]. The second, and more important change, was that the sources of innovation in the American economy were more and more "becoming lodged in the intellectual institutions, principally the universities and research organizations, rather than in the older, industrial corporations."[54]

In the political realm, Bell identified another major change: the centralization of the American political system. The result of a variety of factors, most notably, the need for central instrumentalities, the centralization of the American

political system "marked an extraordinary transformation of American life."[55] Together with the "diffusion" of existing goods and privileges the increasing centralization of American society was making the United States become more and more a "communal society," one in which "the public sector has a greater importance, and in which the goods and services of the society - those affecting cities, education, medical care, and the environment - will increasingly have to be purchased jointly."[56]

The final major change identified by Bell in his analysis of the changing needs of American society, was one that cuts through the political, cultural, and economic sectors of American life. It was "the growing disjunction between the culture and the social structure." According to Bell this disjunction was the result of American society having become "more functionally organized," more "geared to knowledge and the mastery of complex bodies of learning" while at the same time American culture was becoming "more hedonistic, permissive, expressive, distrustful of authority and of the purposive, delayed gratification of a bourgeois, achievement - oriented technological world."[57]

Bell continued his analysis of the changing needs of American society by arguing that each of these major changes could be expected to produce a new set of social and political problems that would ultimately have to be resolved in the political arena. The transformation to a post-industrial society makes "more urgent the husbanding of human capital, rather than financial capital" and raises "crucial sociological

questions about the relationship of the new technocratic modes of decision-making to the political structures of society."[58] The fact that the United States was increasingly becoming a more communal society, one in which the goods and services of the society will increasingly have to be purchased jointly, created another major problem, that of balancing social choice against individual values. This problem of reconciling conflicting individual desires through the political mechanism, was one that could become a potential source of conflict and social tension. This was particularly the case, warned Bell, since "one of the most powerful engines in American society... is the realization of the promise of equality which underlies the founding of this country and the manifestation of Tocqueville's summation of American democracy: What the few have today, the many will demand tomorrow."[59]

Another source of problems outlined by Bell was the increasing centralization of government. Bell felt that because "the increasing centralization of governemtn creates a need for new social forms that will allow the citizenry greater participation in making decisions," the relation of the individual to bureaucratic structures will be subject to greater strain than ever before in history.[60] "The growth of a large, educated professional and technical class, with its desire for greater autonomy in work, will force institutions to reorganize the older bureaucratic patterns of hierarchy and specialization."[61] But this, warned Bell, was only one aspect of the problem of the relation of the individual to bureaucratic structures. The responsiveness of the government bureaucracy to the needs

of more and more individuals for "renewed education and new careers was another significant aspect of this problem. These were needs that would result from technological changes and the longer lives that people would live as a result of advances in modern medicine.

The final problem Bell outlined was one that could be expected to grow out of the disjunction between the "culture" and "social structure" of American society. This was a problem that would highlight the tension between the "technocratic" mode of the American social structure and the "apocalyptic" mode of its increasingly hedonistic, anti-authoritarian, and antinomian culture. The tension between these two contradictory and antagonistic modes of thought, warned Bell, "particularly among the intellectuals, may be one of the great rupture in moral temper, especially in the universities."[62]

It was on the basis of these identifiable problems and social changes that Bell specified that

> The only prediction about the future that one can make with certainty is that public authorities will face more problems than they have at any previous time in history. This arises from some simple facts: Social issues are more and more intricately related to one another because the impact of any major change is felt quickly throughout the national and even the international system. Individuals and groups, more conscious of these problems as problems, demand action instead of quietly accepting their fate. Because more and more decisions will be made in the political arena than in the market, there will be more open community conflict. The political arena is an open cockpit where decision points are more visible than they are in the impersonal market; different groups will clash more directly as they contend for advantage or seek to resist change in society.
>
> For all these reasons, the society of the year 2000....will be more fragile, more susceptible to hostilities and to polarization along many different lines.[63]

It was also on the basis of these identifiable problems and social changes that Bell defined the nature of America's changing needs. Forethought, must first be given to the impact that the diffusion of existing goods and privileges will have on society. When "diffusion begins to take rapid sway (as has recently been seen in higher education), it changes the size and scale of the servicing institutions and, consequently, that institution's character."[64] Because diffusion has this impact, the United States has a strong need for anticipating the future. This is so that the university, as an example, does not become a "corporate entity because of the pressure of size."[65] Forethought must also be given to the consequences that attend America's emergence as a communal society. Because the public sector will come to have a greater importance in determining the allocation of goods and services, one of the most pressing tasks facing the United States is the need for it to consider the adequacy of its political mechanisms. Forethought, indicated Bell, must also be given to the adequacy of planning mechanisms "for in the decisions we make now, in the way we design our environment and thus sketch the lines of constraints, the future is committed."[66] Because the future "begins in the present" the most basic need that confronts American society is for some systematic effort "to anticipate social problems, to design new institutions, and to propose alternative programs for choice."[67]

The major result that emerges from our analysis of Bell's work for the Commission on the Year 2000 is the image

of a man whose approach to the Commissions tasks were consistent with his earlier perspectives towards the problems of the future. His basic premise was that, ultimately, "the problem of the future consists in defining one's priorities and making the necessary commitments."[68] It is the image of a man who through this perspective expressed a growing concern about the importance of establishing new normative guidelines for planning in order to prevent potentially explosive situations from being left unattended.

It is also the perspective of a New-Deal liberal, who rejected laissez-faire faire liberalism in favor of planning. But his emphasis on planning was not the ad hoc piecemeal intervention that had characterized federal legislation during the New Deal and the post-war period and even earlier. Instead, what Bell wanted was for American society to make explicit its commitment to planning and for it to establish the basis for democratic planning within a public philosophy that would provide the guidelines for allocation and priorities within which such planning would operate. The public philosophy, once made explicit and diffused would be the basis of a new consensus that hopefully would legitimate, would gather public support for both the planning process, and for the allocations and priorities that would democratically be negotiated. In hoping for this transformation from the individualistic, hedonistic calculus upon which classical liberalism was predicated to democratic planning, Bell was aware of the resistances and the restraints planning would

entail, but he hoped that by creating and diffusing the new public philosophy these resistances could be overcome and self-restraint would be facilitated.

Initially Bell had been skeptical that any one commission could self-consciously undertake to effect a fundamental change in social values that would reverse the entire tenor of America's classic national style; but, as he warmed to the task, he apparently lost some of these reservations. Yet Bell was attempting to state "First Principles" for New Deal like, democratic national planning, despite his knowledge of the American penchant for pragmatic ad hoc individual and unideological approaches to action, and apparently despite his earlier reservations against total planning.

He was attempting to create a revolution in the style and content of the national consciousness of the American citizenry.

If Bell was somewhat tentative in suggesting that American liberalism required a new set of normative and planning guidelines in Toward the Year 2000: Work in Progress, by 1974, the year in which he wrote "The Public Household" that tentativeness was behind him. Indeed, as we have suggested in a number of places, Bell through "The Public Household" sought to lay the conceptual framework for the development of those guidelines. Bell did this by specifying the dimensions along which a new philosophy of modern liberalism could be articulated, a philosophy that would reaffirm the importance of certain principles central to his image of a sound liberal society.

Although the difference between Bell's stance in these two works may be attributed to his skepticism about the prospects of a commission being able to develop such a philosophy, it may also be reasonably attributed to a new set of demands and struggles that emerged after the completion of Toward the Year 2000. These were demands and struggles that Bell commented about in a number of articles that he wrote in the late 1960s and early 1970s.

The University and The Failure of American Liberalism

The late 1960s and early 1970s were turbulent years for the United States in general, and for American universities in particular. The Black Power movement and the student unrest over the Vietnam war and the draft transformed many college campuses into virtual battlegrounds. Many social scientists and educators, puzzled by the fact that institutions like the University of California at Berkeley, the home of the Free Speech movement, Cornell University and Columbia University, all institutions with an established liberal tradition, has become centers of "confrontationist" politics, addressed themselves to this seemingly anomalous and paradoxical situation.

With Irving Kristol, Bell towards the end of 1968 edited a book of essays on the subject of student unrest in the universities called Confrontation.

In this book Bell and Kristol traced the "generalized" sources of student unrest and resentment in the 1960s. In a brief introductory essay they discussed the effects of mass

higher education, the multiplication of scholarly fields, the differentiation of subjects into newer and smaller specializations, and the burgeoning of research in the universities that was the result of government contracts, in transforming the American university after World War II. Highlighted in their analysis was the "sense of the failure of American liberalism, a sense that the students "shared with the liberals themselves."[69] The students experience continuing pressure and competitive anxiety as a result of the demands placed upon them to get into a high status college and to maintain a high average in order to get into a "good" graduate school. Their anxieties contributed substantially to this sense of the failure of American liberalism.

The failure of the United States to mount effective social programs in the 1960s was another source of the "sense of the failure of American liberalism" that became fused with other sociological and political factors to provide the basis for new student discontent. These "other factors," Bell and Kristol explained, were the Vietnam War and their sense of being neglected that resulted from a shift in professorial attention from the undergraduate college to the graduate school. The same shift in attention was also the result of the sheer increase in the number of students that was the result of mass higher education and poor educational planning in the post war period.

What was significant about the "sense of the failure of American liberalism," Bell and Kristol explained, was that

while the failure of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations to mount effective social programs was seen by the liberal "as arising out of the inherent complexity of our social problems, the lack of detailed social science knowledge as to how to cut into the, and the shortage of trained administrators," it was seen by the students in a very different light.[70] Embodied with a "temperament more moral than political," the failure of the liberal Kennedy and Johnson administrations was seen by the college students as an example of the government having "copped out" on its responsibilities.

The rest, the progression from student malaise to outright rage and to the questioning of the legitimacy of all existing authority, Bell and Kristol argued, followed its own inherent logic; one that, paradoxically, was "legitimated" by the culture of American society.

> And when many turned to politics from their moralism, they found - as generations have in the past - a set of ready-made formulas in a stilted and primitive Marxism. But since even Marxism has lost much of its explanatory power, these students have been led to think in such amorphous terms as the system and the establishment, and to rely heavily on a conspiracy theory of history.
>
> The upshot has been that what was originally concern over a specific set of identifiable and specific political issues (e.g., Vietnam, civit rights) has been overwhelmed by an onrush of anger, rancor, and generational rage born of seeming impotence. And what began, often, as an attack against the way in which authority has been exercised turned into an attack against all existing authority. Here, that mood merges into a historic cultural tendency that, in the name of attacking repression and taboos, has been anti-institutional and even antinomian. And this leads to a paradox, for the most important aspect of student behavior is that, while its sociology and politics are easily ridiculed in intellectual terms, its temperament and its style are actually legitimated by the culture of the society. This schizophrenia has

> often made it difficult for professors, themselves the products of that culture, to oppose the student style.
>
> And that style has evolved into the style of confrontation. It is the style of symbolic gesture, the style of expressive action. It provides an emotional satisfaction in mobilizing a collective resentment. It fits the moralism of student politics in that it puts issues in either/or terms, and demands a resolution on a total level.[71]

In addition to tracing the "generalized" sources of student unrest and resentment of the 1960s, Bell and Kristol use their introduction to Confrontation to define the underlying functions and consequences of the politics of confrontation as it was employed by both the New Left and the black militants in the university.

Fashioned by the New Left and couched in the language of democracy or populism, the politics of confrontation, they argued, was not a rational politics, whose goal was the satisfaction of grievances. Instead, the New Left politics was a form of theatre, one whose goal was the destruction of authority itself. Within this context, Bell and Kristol argued that "the sweeping demand for participation" that was credo of the radical student body, circa 1969, was one that served to "mask" a distinct ideological function: "a desire to disestablish and render illegitimate all existing authority."[72]

Here Bell and Kristol, characteristically use the term "ideology," contrary to established usage, to mean the attempt by radicals to create a theory that attacks established institutions, ideas, and society. It is designed to render existing authority illegitimate.

Yet at virtually the same time Bell was attempting to create a "public philosophy" that would devalue or transform

the American classic national style, and "legitimate" intellectually a new stance toward democratic national planning.

Under these circumstances, it is hard to resist the notion that Bell (and Kristol) use the term ideology obliquely reserving it exclusively for the radical left. Along with "first principles," when they are dealing with ideas that they are more sympathetic to they call them philosophy, public philosophy, and national style.

Similarly legitimacy seems to be a "good" rather than a technical or value neutral term that conveys a moral tone that is independent of the regime being "legitimized," the radicals delegitimate and Bell creates a public philosophy.

It is important to again note, these changes in the meanings and careers of words. We have previously noted changes in the meaning and application of the concept of ideology. Here, Bell and Kristol begin to concern themselves with variations in the term legitimacy; legitimation, illegitimacy and delegitimate, etc. In subsequent years and re-works, this Weberian, value neutral term, will become increasingly important, perhaps more important than ideology.

Equally concerned with describing the growth of black militancy on the college campuses Bell and Kristol in their introduction cautioned their readers not to confuse the goals of the black militants with the New Left. Such confusion was possible, they suggested, because, like the New Left, the black militants used a style of confrontational politics. But there was, Bell and Kristol argued a significant difference

between the black militants and the New Left. Their argument was that, whereas the anger of the New Left is diffuse, the anger of the black militants is specific; and where the goals of the New Left are moral, the goals of the black militants are decidedly political. The black militants

> are openly and directly seeking to carve out for themselves, right now, a special enclave within the university which will concede to them a measure of self-governing power; and which will allow them to enlarge the number of blacks in the university system with little regard to the traditional criteria of competence.[73]

In a psychological sense, declared Bell and Kristol, the efforts of the black militants to gain power within the university represents "a surge for identity through self-assertion."[74] In a sociological sense, the efforts of the black militants represent more than the "put down" of whites: "it is the cool reckoning that, if what is emerging is a meritocratic society based on achievement, then what they want is a ticket into that society, written on their own terms."[75] In short, the efforts of the black militants represents "a clear bid for status and power, (one) in which education becomes the medium of the demand."[76]

The problem, stated Bell and Kristol, is that the efforts of the black militants for status and power "has little to do with the problems of education as they have been conceived in traditional terms, and one consequence of such a demand for power may easily be the destruction of the idea of education."[77] But, cautioned Bell and Kristol, the issue of the black militants' demands for power in the university as an entitlement is one that is problematic. One can draw hasty conclusions,

they warned, concerning the future if one confuses "the rhetoric of black militants with their practice once they have had to face up to concrete responsibilities."[78]

Foreshadowed, in their introduction to Confrontation, was Bell's historical account of the spring 1968 Columbia University siege. "Columbia and The New Left." This was an essay that was written in the wake of a series of violent confrontations between Columbia University students and the New York City Police Department. These confrontations followed both the days of sit-ins that closed the University and the intense round the clock meetings between some faculty members who sought to act as a mediating force, the protesting students and the University administration.

While not in New York when this ad hoc faculty group first convened Bell, a full time faculty member of Columbia, after his return to tbe city was asked by the faculty to serve on a fifteen member steering committee to mediate between students and the University. This committee was "made up principally of individuals who were politically liberal in orientation, who had studied radical movements, and who had some experience in the study of comparative politics."[79] Hence, it was both as a long time student of radical politics and as an active participant in the tumultuous events that shook the Columbia University campus and the nation that Bell wrote "Columbia and The New Left."

More than just a first hand account of the events that followed the April 23rd student rally organized by The Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), "Columbia and The

New Left" represents a set of personal reflections about both the nature of the crisis that confronted Columbia University and the way in which the university administration had handled that crisis. This rather lengthy and detailed essay was as much a critique of academic liberalism in the University as it was a critique of the New Left as a history of the events following the April 23rd Low Library demonstation and subsequent student takeover of Hamilton Hall by black militants protesting the construction of a new university gymnasium in Morningside Park. It was also a part of an ongoing polemic that Bell had developed in response to both SDS and to Zbigniew Brzezinski, one that Bell continued to elaborate upon in a Spring, 1970 Public Interest article called "Quo Warranto? Notes on the Governance of Universities in the 1970s."

In this polemic Bell had singled out Brzezinski, whose New Republic article "Revolution and Counterrevolution (But Not Necessarily about Columbia!)" as the object of his opposition. He characterized Brzezinski's piece as "a rather Machiavellian essay written from the balcony."[80] He especially singled out Brzezinski for defining the Columbia University siege in the same terms that the SDS had used to initiate the violence at Columbia, namely, that the university was a microcosm of American society. Bell's argument was that, while Brzezinski's thesis about the mistakes of the Columbia University administration and faculty contained some critical insights into the failure during the 1930s of the democratic regimes of Europe to combat anarchy and fascism effectively,

it completely missed the point about the situation at Columbia.

In drawing upon the European experience, Brzezinski attributed the deep "crises of values" at Columbia to the failure of the university administration to act quickly and decisively to suppress the student revolution. In the course of developing his thesis, Brzezinski at the time a colleague of Bell at Columbia, also argued that in the revolutionary process "legitimist reformers and intellectuals..objectively become the tools of the revolutionary forces."[81] This was characteristically the case, Brzezinski argued because intellectuals are inclined, when "interposing" themselves into a revolutionary situation, "to apply most of their pressure against the established authority, with which they have many links, than equally against established authorities and the revolutionary forces on behalf of reformist appeals."[82]

If, argued Bell, the university were a microcosm of the society, then, Brzezinski's argument would have some merit. The point, stressed Bell, is that "the university is not the microcosm of the society; it is an academic community with a historic exemption from full integration into the society."[83] There were, argued Bell, two salient facts about the situation at Columbia. The first was that "it was SDS which initiated the violence at Columbia by insisting that the university was the microcosm of the society, and challenging its authority."[84] The second was that "after some confusion, the administration in its actions accepted this definition and sought to impose its authority on the campus by resorting to force."[85]

In accepting the SDS logic the university made a fundamental mistake, one that resulted in the radicalization of hundreds of students: it called the police instead of publically debating SDS Columbia violated its status as a community. In a community, argued Bell,

> one cannot regain authority simply by asserting it, or by using force to suppress dissidents. Authority in this case is like respect. One can only earn the authority - the loyalty of one's students - by going in and arguing with them, by engaging in full debate and, when the merits of proposec change are recognized, taking the necessary steps quickly enough.[86]

What led it to make this critical mistake, argued Bell, was that in its experience and in its conceptions of politics the Columbia administration "was ill-equipped for either the Machiavellianism of Brzezinski or the politics of persuasion that... would have served the university far better."[87] Though "reputable political scientists," the administration leaders, Grayson Kirk and David Truman, "were familiar only with the American political system, in which one operates either legalistically or by making deals."[88] Hence, neither of them, argued Bell, "had any feel for the volatility of social movements, or for the politics of ideology."[89] Trapped by the shortcomings of their liberalism they could not "understand the dynamics of the student protest."[90] They could not understand that

> whatever reason there may have been for early police action, when the buildings were seized by the hard-core SDS members, the subsequent surge of political support on the part of 500 other students - most of them liberal, moderate, pacifist, and not members of SDS - effectively changed the political character of the situation. The failure to make the necessary distinction between these students

> and SDS, and thus to understand that these students were not wreckers but were now trying to express their inchoate grievances against the university, permitted SDS to call the tune - which, in the five crucial days of the occupation of the buildings it did.91

In the critical five days, five hundred students had undergone a "conversion experience."[92] This experience transformed them into "ideologists."* Bombarded by SDS with "an extraordinary barrage of propaganda" these students had been converted into people who operate with a "cognitive map," a map "with a built-in set of emotional judgements and rationalizations."[93] This was an experience that was not challenged by the university administration. Rather, the students' conversion was reinforced by the administration's use of the police to suppress the protest. The conversion experience, the experience of acquiring a new set of beliefs or judgements is one, argued Bell, that never occurs in a vacuum. The acquisition of any new set of beliefs or judgements requires both some confirmation of their validity by some "significant others" (some testing of reality) and some confirmation at the cognitive level, "some real test of the intellectual validity of the new conception."[94]

While members of the New York literary establishment provided one set of legitimations by throwing large fund-raising parties in support of SDS and by their actions the French radical students at Nanterre and at the Sorbonne another,

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* Here, Bell defines an ideologist as one who consumes ideology not as one who creates it. An ideologist usually is defined as one who produces an ideology rather than one who consumes it.

the administration never provided the new converts with the intellectual debate that all new converts seek in order to validate their new beliefs.[95] In not challenging the charges of SDS that "Columbia was the intersect of a corporate-military-CIA nexus to advance American imperialism" and that it "was guilty of institutional racism in its neighborhood policy" Columbia, unknowingly, left the "reality testing" to the police. The "bust," argued Bell, had one ultimate function: it confirmed the students' new beliefs.

> Whatever psychological guilt or unease was felt about the demonstrators' coercive and disruptive tactics was dissolved in the payment of broker heads and spilled blood. As the students saw it, the administration resorted to force because it could not answer them.[96]

In the final analysis, argued Bell, "with the police action, the administration lost a large part of its legitimacy - its moral authority - which had previously commanded the loyalty of students and faculty."[97] Because it had this price attached to it, the police action, allowed SDS to prove to both itself and its new converts "the truth of an old revolutionary adage that no demonstration is successful unless it compels repression."[98] By allowing SDS this opportunity it allowed SDS to achieve its goal of undermining the legitimacy of the university.

Ultimately, argued Bell, "SDS will be destroyed by its own style."[99] Impelled not to innovation, but to destruction, SDS "lives on turbulence, but is incapable of transforming its chaotic impulses into a systematic, responsible behavior that is necessary to effect broad societal change."[100] Chiliastic in nature and temperament, its "desperado tactics"

give evidence not of a coherent social movement, but rather of "the guttering last gasps of a romanticism soured by rancor and impotence."[101]

Nonetheless, argued Bell, the questions that SDS raises, "the challenges to hierarchical decision-making and the desires for broadened participation in the institutions that effect their lives - are real ones."[102] The questions that SDS raises "reflect the more generalized sources of student unrest which themselves arise out of world-wide structural changes in advanced industrial societies."[103] Ultimately, what makes both the university and the problem of its legitimacy so important is that while in

> the post-industrial societies of tomorrow...the problems of decentralization, of the balance between technical and political decision-making and of greater participation, will be pressing ones...in the world of the university, as the experience of Columbia demonstrates, these problems have already come to the fore, and are now on the agenda.[104]

The way in which the university will deal with these problems and the violent reaction from the New Left that they engender cannot come, argued Bell, by its invoking civil force. The university can only effectively deal disruptions "by rallying an entire community to establish common rules of common procedure."[105] The test of its ability to do this is ultimately, argued Bell, the test of its ability to make "the fullest commitment to being a participatory institution, to an extent consonant with its full responsibilities."[106]

What exactly those responsibilities were, Bell did not

say in "Columbia and The New Left." What he did say, in concluding this essay, was that unless the University takes steps required of it to enlarge participation, (on the basis of an agreed upon "definition of areas of rights and powers and responsibilities appropriate to the division of function and place in the university itself") and "convincingly," the university "may be forced to the wall by those who, in the words of Fidel Castro that the New Left has adopted, are "guerrillas in the field of culture."[107]

In his "Quo Warranto?" essay Bell took up the issue of the university's responsibilities and indicated the specific functions that it served in American society. These functions included the custodianship of the traditions of Western culture, the search for truth through inquiry and scholarship, the training of a large number of people as professionals in specific fields, a function that in an earlier time was performed by a system of apprenticeship, and the application of knowledge to social use.[108] But what is more important is that Bell raised to a new level, in this essay, the problem of authority and the New Left. He discussed this problem in terms of both the "crisis of legitimacy" and the emergence of a post-industrial society. While each would receive considerable attention, it was the crisis of legitimacy that would become the more important theme in his subsequent work.

The Crisis of Legitimacy

In "Quo Warranto" as in a number of his other essays, up

to and including "The Public Household," Bell defined the crisis of legitimacy in terms of two overlapping developments: the "revolution in rising entitlements 'and the emergence of a "new sensibility" in American culture.

The product of a variety of forces, including a "participation revolution" generated by a poorly planned War on Poverty program, diffusion and a shift in the temper of the Black protest movement from an emphasis on equality of opportunity to that of "equality of results," the revolution of rising entitlements reflected a deep shift in the character of Western society. The revolution of rising expectations or diffusion has been, Bell argued, in "The Public Household," one of the chief features of American society since the end of World War II. By the 1970s it was being transformed into a revolution of rising entitlements.[109] This revolution reflected a broadening of the demand for equality into "a demand for a wider set of rights - political, civil, and social - as claims on the community."[110] It reflected not just the claims of the minorities, the poor, or the disadvantaged; it reflected "the claims of all groups in the society, claims for protection and rights - in short, for entitlements."[111]

A major theme in his writings from 1965 on, the emergence in American culture of a new sensibility was viewed by Bell in "Quo Warranto" as "the most diffuse, but in the long run the most potentially disintegrating force in American society."[112] Defined by him as anti-institutional and antinomian, the primary features of this new sensibility was a distinct distrust

of criticism and a positive reliance on feelings as the touchstone of human experience and judgement.

Sceptical of literary and artistic criticism in all forms, the new sensibility, Bell explained in "The New Sensibility of the Sixties" was one that emphasized sensations and feelings over intellect and restraint. Another primary feature of this new sensibility was the "democratization of culture," a phenomenon that stressed the removal of all distinctions between high and low culture.

"The democratization of genius" was also another primary feature of this new sensibility. An extension of the nineteenth century idea that the artist as genius "need not regard the laws of society and its authorities," that he should "only be guided by the inner necessities of the expansion of the self to embrace new experiences" the democratization of genius emphasized the idea that each man should be his own "artist-hero."[113] An idea central to the democratization of genius was that "art tells a truth which is higher than that perceived via the ordinary cognitive mode, that the language of art, in the words of Herbert Marcuse, must communicate a truth, an objectivity which is not accessible to ordinary language and ordinary experience."[114]

Based on the writings of the utopian socialist Charles Fourier and the anti-bourgeois writings of Baudelaire, Rimbaud, and Nietzsche, the "new sensibility" had its origins in the nineteenth century. The 1960s version of this anti-bourgeois sensibility found, according to Bell, its distinct anti-institutional and antinomian coloration in the work of

Herbert Marcuse, Norman O. Brown, and R. D. Laing. "A new trinity for a new left," as Bell put it in "Charles Fourier: A Prophet of Eupsychia," their work provided "a new recipe for Eupsychia - the psychological utopia of individual release far beyond the utopia of material plenty and freedom that nineteenth century prophets (including Marx..) had foretold for the future."[115]

Though he defined the crisis of legitimacy in The Cultural Contradicitons of Capitalism largely in terms of the revoltuion of rising entitlements and the emergence of the "new sensibility," the dangers that each of these developments posed concerned Bell less than their relationship to America's emergence as a post-industrial society. The cultural contradictions set off by the interplay of these developments represented for Bell the largest problem to the legitimacy of American liberalism. This was a problem that Bell directed himself to in his 1970 essay "The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism." It was a problem that he would continue to address himself to in The Coming of Post-Industrial Society.

Bell argued in "The Cultural Contradicitons of Capitalism" that the crisis of legitimacy faced by contemporary liberalism and American society could only be understood in relation to changes in both the culture and the social structure of American society. These changes dated back to the first decade and a half of the twentieth century. They embodied shifts in the value structure and moral foundations of American life.

Written originally as an article for The Public Interest and later included as part of a book of essays on capitalism that Bell edited with Irving Kristol called Capitalism Today, "The Cultural Contradicitons of Capitalism" was an extremely important essay. In it Bell joined with Kristol in repudiating those liberals who attributed the emergence of the New Left and the counterculture to liberal-capitalism's failure to realize its ideals.[116] Bell in this polemic presented a detailed analysis of the erosion of the Portestant ethic and Puritan temper. Yet Bell located the source of the counter-culture of the 1960s to changes in the very development of capitalism, but the New Left emerged because of the failure of liberalism in the 1950s and 1960s to provide a new "viewpoint" to take the place of the older political ideas of an exhausted radical movement: these "had become exhausted and no longer had the power to compel allegiance or passion among the intelligenstia."[117]

In his own essay in Capitalism Today "When Virtue Losses All Her Loveliness," Kristol argued that while many political analysts have constructed the most elaborate sociological and psychological theories to explain the new upsurge of radicalism in the late 1960s, there was no great mystery about this phenomenon. The explanation is the obvious fact that the student radicals are rejecting the offer of "the liberal, individualist, capitalist civilization that stands ready to receive them as citizens."[118] Kristol argued that not only do the radicals reject this offer of citizenship but they are also declaring their desire to see some other kind of civilization to replace it."[119]

Some liberals missed this point, Kristol argued, because it is much easier for them to focus on the arguments of the more timid of the student radicals, those who "insist that what they find outrageous are the defects and shortcomings of the present system."[120] The failure of liberals to perceive this total rejection of capitalism also rests with the fact that in accepting such polemics as representative of the student radicals dissatisfaction they can console themselves that the New Left is interested in reforming liberal society. The "plain truth," argued Kristol is that in subscribing to this view liberals are deceiving themselves. "Our young radicals are far less dismayed at America's failure to become what it ought to be then they are contemptuous of what it thinks it ought to be."[121]

The failure of many liberals to understand the character of the new upsurge in radicalism, Kristol argued, also relects something else. It reflects their failure to recognize that "dissatisfaction with the liberal-capitalist ideal as distinct from indignation at failures to realize this ideal, are coterminous with the history of capitalism itself."[122] In short, this dissatisfaction is nothing new and something that one can turn to to explain the emergence of the New Left as a distinctive phenomenon.

> Indeed, the cultural history of the capitalist epoch is not much more than a record of the varying ways such dissatisfaction could be expressed - in poetry, in the novel, in the drama, in painting, and today even in the movies.[123]

In a very similar vein, Bell argued, that because it calls itself a counter-culture, the post-modernist culture has

been incorrectly interpreted "as defying the Protestant ethic, heralding the end of Puritanism, and mounting a final attack on bourgeois values."[124] Such an interpretation he argued is "too facile," and as such it misses the mark. The Protestant ethic and the Puritan temper, as social facts, as regulative codes that emphasized work, sobriety, frugality, sexual restraints, and a forbidding attitude toward life, "were eroded long ago."[125] Now, they linger on as pale ideologies, used by moralists to admonish and by sociologists to mythologize than as behavioral realities."[126] In point of fact, argued Bell, "the breakup of the traditional bourgeois value system...was brought about by the bourgeois economic system - by the free market, to be precise."[127] And this is "the source of the contradiction of capitalism in American life."[128]

In elaborating his argument, Bell noted, that while Puritanism from the seventeenth to the end of the nineteenth centure had undergone a transfiguration, the major intellectual attack on it came in the first decade and a half of the twentieth century. This attack came "from the realm of culture and from the Young Intellectuals, a Harvard group that included Walter Lippmann, Van Wyck Brooks, John Reed, and Harold Stearns."[129] The Young Intellectuals in their attack on Puritanism and the sexual repression that it generated had "preached an ethic of hedonism, of pleasure and play - in short a consumption ethic."[130] While this ethic served to undermine the legitimacy of Puritanism as an intellectual system it was not, argued Bell, the Young Intellectuals' advocacy that was sociologically decisive.

Rather, it was the adoption of this hedonistic, consumption ethic by capitalism itself that undermined the legitimacy of Puritanism as a regulatory mode.

Within this context, Bell argued that just as the institutionalization of temperance through prohibition and the emergence of the small-town mentality was a feature of American life by 1920 so too "was the transformation of the American social structure, and the end of small-town dominance of American life as a social fact."[131] Over the life span of the Prohibition movement, America, was, continuing, he noted, to experience a demographic change, one which resulted in the growth of urban centers and the shift in political weight. But an even more significant change was the fact that by 1920 a "consumption society" was emerging in the United States. This was a society that emphasized spending and the importance of material possessions. It was also a society that undermined the traditional value system, "with its emphasis on thrift, frugality, self-control, and impulse renunciation."[132]

Integral to both these social changes, explained Bell, was a technological revolution. This was a revolution of massive proportions, one which, "through the automobile, the motion picture, and the radio, broke down rural isolation and for the first time fused the country into a common culture and a national society."[133] It was, argued Bell, this social transformation that "was responsible for the end of Puritanism as a set of practices that could support the traditional value system."[134] Bell summarized this argument by noting that

> If we retrace the social process, we can see that 200 years earlier, in the early eighteenth century, the social structure had been fused with a culture that sustained it. Gradually, that culture became attenuated, and by the beginning of the twentieth century, small-town Protestanism no longer had any effective symbolic meanings, or defense against attacks. An emerging new cultural system, based as it was on an urban middle class and a new radical groups, was able in short order to launch so effective a criticism of the older culture that almost no one would try to defend it. To maintain its legitimacy, the status group embodying the traditional values resorted to political means of reaffirming its domination. But a status group can do this effectively only if its social base is congruent with the social structure. And the base of the Termperance groups, the old social foundation - rural small-town life based on agrarian values - was undermined by the new industrial transformations of the early twentieth century. Having staked their fate on enacting the old middle-class virtues into the law of the land, the Termperance groups found at the time of repeal that such norms had been repudiated as socially valid modes of behavior, and to that extent had lost much of their legitimacy. Thus, a change had first been effected in the culture, but it could only become effective when it was confirmed within the social structure itself.[135]

The transormation of American society from a Puritan to a consumption society was thus ultimately caused by mass consumption as it was embodied in the American social structure. Sociologically, the institutionalization of mass consumption was important because it produced a change in American self-consciousness in which "past luxuries are constantly redefined as necessities, so that it eventually seems incredible that an ordinary object could ever have been considered out of reach of an ordinary man."[136]

While the revolution in technology was significant in creating mass consumption an even more significant development, argued Bell, was the installment plan. Bell's argument was that with installment buying the seduction of the consumer

became total, and the Protestant ethic was completely undermined. As a result, by the 1920s capitalism was left with no "moral or transcendent ethic."[137] But Bell went even further: "bourgeois society, justified and propelled as it had been in its earliest energies" by the Protestant ethic and the Puritan temper, could not readily admit to the fact that while it promoted a hedonistic way of life it could no longer justify it.[138] "It lacked a new religion or value system to replace the old, and the result was disjunction."[139]

Under this disjunction, the "new capitalism continued to demand a Protestant ethic in the area of production - that is in the realm of work - but to stimulate a demand for pleasure and play in the area of consumption."[140] The disjunction between work and play, production and consumption reflected a profound historical change in human society, a change that witnessed the primacy of culture over economics.

> For thousands of years, the function of economics was to provide the daily necessities - the subsistence - of life. For various upper-class groups, economics has been the basis of status and a sumptuary style. But now, on a mass scale, economics had become geared to the demands of culture. Here, too, culture, not as expressive symbolism or moral meanings but as life-style, came to reign supreme.[141]

Moreover the disjunction was bound to widen resulting in the erosion of the moral foundations of bourgeois society.

> The spread of urban life, with its variety of distractions and multiple stimuli; the new roles of women, created by the expansion of office jobs and the freer social and sexual contacts; the rise of a national culture through motion pictures and radio - all contributed to a loss of social authority on the part of the older value system.[142]

This loss of social authority, a loss that was equally

shared by capitalism and the American value system, did not generate any disruptions in the 1920s, in the 1950s and in the early 1960s. This was due to the success of the "new capitalism" in promoting an ever increasing abundance as the new justification of the American economic system. This glorification of plenty was highly incongruent with the sociological foundations of the American value system, yet the incongruence mattered very little: the incongruity was "eschewed with the blithe assurance that there was a consensus in the society on the moral verity of material abundance."[143]

Such assurances came in different forms, the most significant being the sophisticated rhetoric in the 1950s of the Luce magazines, Time, Life, and especially Fortune. Its theme was that "the secret of productivity and the permanent revolution of change that was the contribution of the American economic system to the coming prosperity of the world."[144] It was a rhetoric that was able "to take the traditional American values, the belief in God, in work, in achievement, and to translate these, through the idiom of the coming urban civiliation, into the creed of American destiny (the American century) on a wide scale."[145] Moreover, the new Time-Life Fortune rhetoric fused "the nervous rhythms of the new expressive journalism...with the pace of urban life and the new hedonism."[146] Thus, while American business was the dynamic agency tearing up small-town life and catapulting America into world economic dominance, the Luce publications enabled its ability to do these things "within the language and cover of the Protestant ethic."[147]

But there was trouble in Tahiti; the new rhetoric did not resolve the problems of the underlying realities.

While the success of the new capitalism has long been in evidence, "the overt contradictions in the language and ideology" of American business and of American bourgeois society, "the lack of any coherant moral or philosophical doctrine, have only become manifest today."[148] The contradictions between ideology and society and the lack of a philosophical doctrine provoked a crisis for American liberalism because of the abdication by the corporate class of responsibility in the field of political philosophy. The crisis was aided by the fact that a politically dominant liberalism was unable to define, in the face of the assaults from the counter-culture, the limits of modernism. The two failures were directly related. "The fact that the corporate economy had no unified value system of its own...meant that liberalism could go ideologically unchallenged."[149] But while liberalism had become dominant as an ideology in the field of culture from the 1920s on, it had never resolved in its own terms the struggle between tradition and modernity that was the distinct cultural feature of American politics from the 1920s to the 1960s. Left alone in the fields of culture and politics to combat the counter-culture, liberalism found itself in an uneasy and tenuous position that was the direct result of its internal struggle between tradition and modernity.

The counter-culture, argued Bell, embodied only an extension of several tendencies initiated in 1910 by political liberalism and modernist culture. It represented a split in

the camp of modernism. The counter-culture "sought to take the preachments of personal freedom, extreme experience, and sexual experimentation to a point in life style that the liberal mentality - which would aqprove of such ideas in art and imagination - is not prepared to go" when applied to personal life.[150] Yet despite its strong reservations about personal libertarianism, liberalism could not explain to the counter-culture why it chose not to go in the directions that the counter-culture and the New Left was taking it. The fact that liberalism still finds itself uneasy in trying to explain its objections to the counter-culture and the New Left, argued Bell, is a function of the fact that modern liberalism "approves a basic permissiveness, but cannot with any certainty define the bounds."[151] This, concluded Bell, is its dilemma. It is liberalism's new crisis of nerve and legitimacy: "in culture, as well as in politics, liberalism is now up against the wall."[152]

Heretofore, we have spent a considerable amount of time reviewing "The Public Household" and the ideas and social developments which gave rise to that work. We have treated it as a summation of a number of trends in Bell's thought: his differences with neo-Marxist theorists over the problem of legitimacy in industrial society; his efforts to reconcile the tension between the optimism of socialism and classical liberalism with the pessimism of Reinhold Niebuhr; his emphasis on America's need for new planning and allocative mechanisms; his emphasis on America's need for a new normative theory; his reaction to the student

and black protest movements; and finally, his emphasis on the cultural contradictions of capitalism.

In the next, and concluding, chapter the problem we shall undertake is that of determining the degree to which "The Public Household" and the ideas that it is reflective of guide Bell's construction and use of the concept of the post-industrial society.

NOTES:

1. Bell, The Coming of Post-Industrial Society, p.114.
2. Ibid., p.119.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid., p. 483.
6. Bell defines the post-industrial society in these terms in a number of places. For his definition of the post-industrial society as a knowledge society see page 212 in The Coming of Post-Industrial Society. For his definition of the post-industrial society as a service society see page 127 in The Coming of Post-Industrial Society. For his definition of the post-industrial society as a communal society see pages 128 and 364.
7. Ibid., p. 409.
8. Ibid., p. 480-1.
9. Peter Steinfels, The Neoconservatives (New York: Simon and Shuster, 1979), p. 164.
10. Bell, "The Public Household," The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism, p. 221. All subsequent references to this essay will be from The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism.
11. Bell, The Coming of Post-Industrial Society, p. 34.
12. Bell, "The Public Household," p. 232.
13. Ibid., p. 234.
14. Ibid., p. 240.
15. Ibid., p. 252.
16. Ibid.
17. Bell, "The Public Household," p. 256.
18. Ibid., p. 257.
19. Ibid., p. 250.
20. Ibid., p. 252.
21. Ibid., p. 282. The tone here is distinctly Niebuhrian, a fact that is confirmed when we hear Bell say: "Within limits, men can remake themselves and society, but the

knowledge of power must coexist with the knowledge of its limits. This is, after all, the oldest and most enduring truth about the human condition."

22. Ibid.

23. Ibid., p. 252.

24. Ibid.

25. Ibid., p. 279.

26. Ibid., p. 281.

27. Ibid., p. 254. In elaborating this position Bell argued that modern liberalism must face one "inelectable" fact: "there is no escape from economics." Within this context he argued that "men constantly redefine needs so that former wants become necessities. The constraints of resources are tangible, and while the amounts needed may not become physically exhausted, the costs of using these rise, and relative costs, not physical quantities, become the measures of scarcity."

28. Bell, The Coming of Post-Industrial Society, p. 33.

29. Bell, "The National Style and The Radical Right," Partisan Review - Fall 1962, p. 521.

30. Ibid.

31. Ibid., p. 519.

32. Ibid., p. 519-20.

33. Ibid., p. 520.

34. Ibid.

35. Ibid.

36. Ibid.

37. Ibid.

38. Ibid., p. 522.

39. Ibid., p. 521.

40. Ibid.

41. Ibid.

42. Ibid., p. 522.

43. Ibid., p. 523.
44. Bell, Toward The Year 2000, p. 9.
45. Ibid.
46. Ibid.
47. Ibid.
48. Ibid.
49. Ibid. p. 10.
50. Ibid.
51. Ibid., p. 367-8.
52. Ibid., p. 5.
53. Ibid., p. 5-6.
54. Ibid., p. 6.
55. Ibid., p. 5.
56. Ibid., p. 6-7.
57. Ibid., p. 7.
58. Ibid., p. 6.
59. Ibid., p. 5.
60. Ibid., p. 7.
61. Ibid.
62. Ibid.
63. Ibid., p. 7-8.
64. Ibid., p. 5.
65. Ibid.
66. Ibid., p. 1.
67. Ibid., p. 10.
68. Ibid., p. 8.
69. Daniel Bell and Irving Kristol, eds., Confrontation (New York: Basic Books 1969) p. x.

70. Ibid.

71. Ibid., p. x-xi.

72. Ibid., p. xi.

73. Ibid.

74. Ibid.

75. Ibid.

76. Ibid.

77. Ibid.

78. Ibid., p. xii.

79. Ibid., p. 83. The members of the steering committee were: Alan Westin (government), chairman; Alex Dallin (government), Dankwart Rustow (government), Immanuel Wallerstein (sociology), Terence Hopkins (sociology), Alan Silver (sociology), James Shenton (history), David Rothman (history), Robert Fogelson (history), Walter Metzger (history), Robert Cumming (philosophy), Sidney Morgenbesser (philosophy), Ralph Belkap (Russian literature), and Seymour Melman (industrial engineering).

80. Bell, "Columbia and The New Left," Confrontation, p. 99.

81. Ibid., p. 100.

82. Ibid.

83. Ibid., p. 101.

84. Ibid.

85. Ibid.

86. Ibid.

87. Ibid.

88. Ibid.

89. Ibid.

90. Ibid.

91. Ibid.

92. Ibid., p. 102.

93. Ibid., p. 97.

94. Ibid, p. 98.

95. "....the acquisition of new beliefs or judgements also requires confirmation at the cognitive level, some real test of the intellectual validity of the new conception. This can - in more neutral areas and in quieter times - take the form of intellectual debate about the consistency of the argument, the quality of evidence, the congruity with other beliefs, its place within a larger theoretical or intellectual structure, and so on; reality testing also takes the form of prediction, and the falsification of such judgements becomes the basis for the beginning of disbelief. Where emotions are deeply involved, such testing is never wholly persuasive, of course, but it is still necessary, of only to rationalize earlier action when a glimmer of disbelief or disillusionment has.

The accusations - and beliefs - or the students were never challenged by the administration: in part out of bewilderment with their whirlwind appearance and their patently intellectual simplifications, which the administration thought few would believe; in part because the administration was enraged at the tactics used..." p. 98-9.

96. Ibid., p. 99.

97. Ibid.

98. Ibid., p. 102.

99. Ibid., p. 106.

100. Ibid.

101. Ibid.

102. Ibid.

103. Ibid.

104. Ibid.

105. Ibid., p. 107.

106. Ibid.

107. Ibid.

108. Bell, "Quo Warranto?", in The Public Interest 19 (Spring 1970) p. 62.

109. Bell, "The Public Household," p. 232.

110. Ibid., p. 233.

111. Ibid.

112. Bell, "Quo Warranto," p. 59.

113. Bell, "The Sensibility of the Sixties," The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism, p. 130.

114. Ibid., p. 131.

115. Bell, "Charles Fourier: Prophet of Eupsychia," American Scholar (Winter 1968/69) p. 41.

116. Bell, "The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism," Capitalism Today Daniel Bell and Irving Kristol eds., (New York: Basic Books, 1971) p. 24. This essay also appears in The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism. All subsequent references to this essay will be to its appearance in this later work.

117. Bell, "The End of Ideology in The West," p. 403.

118. Kriston, "When Virtue Lossess All Her Loveliness," Capitalism Today, p. 3.

119. Ibid.

120. Ibid.

121. Ibid., p. 4.

122. Ibid.

123. Ibid.

124. Bell, "The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism," The Cultural Contradictions, p. 55.

125. Ibid.

126. Ibid.

127. Ibid.

128. Ibid.

129. Ibid., p. 61.

130. Ibid., p. 63.

131. Ibid., p. 64.

132. Ibid., p. 65.

133. Ibid.

134. Ibid.

135. Ibid.

136. Ibid.

137. Ibid., p. 74.

138. Ibid., p. 74-5.

139. Ibid., p. 75.

140. Ibid.

141. Ibid.

142. Ibid.

143. Ibid.

144. Ibid., p. 76.

145. Ibid.

146. Ibid.

147. Ibid.

148. Ibid.

149. Ibid., p. 79.

150. Ibid.

151. Ibid.

152. Ibid.

CHAPTER VIII

THE POST-INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY IN PERSPECTIVE

The Functions of The Post-Industrial Society

There were four ways in which Bell used the concept of the post-industrial society in The Coming of Post-Industrial Society. The first way he used it was as an ideal-type construction, one that, in contrast to pre-industrial and industrial societies, specified both a new "design" (that is, a new pattern and mode of interaction) and a new set of "structural" problems. The design of pre-industrial society is a "game against nature," a game in which its resources are drawn from extractive industries. The design of industrial society is a "game against fabricated nature," one which is centered on man-machine relationships. In contrast, the design of a post-industrial society is, stressed Bell, "a game between persons."[1] It is "a game between persons in which an intellectual technology, based on information, rises alongside of machine technology."[2]

In addition to using the concept of the post-industrial society as an ideal type construction, Bell used it as a way of articulating a theory of social change and as a way of identifying a set of problems. He also used it as a way of describing an emergent reality, a reality that justifies the establishment of a new set of philosophical legitimations.

The theory of social change that Bell outlined in The Coming of Post-Industrial Society (and the one that he continued to elaborate upon in The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism) was based on a rough and loosely drawn analytical scheme. In this analytical scheme Bell defined the post-industrial society as both a "knowledge" and a "communal" society.

For Bell there are three factors which go into making the post-industrial society a knowledge based society. First, in contrast to both pre-industrial and industrial society, the post-industrial society is a society that relies almost exclusively on theoretical knowledge as opposed to empirical or experiential knowledge. In addition, the sources of innovation in post-industrial society are increasingly derived from that knowledge through research and development efforts. These efforts that highlight a new relationship between science and technology stem from the centrality of theoretical knowledge. This relationship in the United States and other post-industrial societies (along with the United States, Bell considered the Soviet Union, Germany, and Japan to be the first stages of a post-industrial society) is the product of post-World War II government financed research ann development. Finally, knowledge is central because the effectiveness of post-industrial societies as measured by indices like the Gross National Product and by employment figures is "increasingly in the knowledge field."[3] Central importance lies increasingly in occupations having to do with the husbanding, distribution, and expansion of knowledge as

measured in the United States by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.[4]

The post-industrial society is a communal society in that in it more and more goods necessarily have to be purchased communally. Given prohibitive costs, the planning and maintaance of cities, the development of highways and systems of mass transit in society all become "public institutions" or enterprises. So too does the maintenance of open spaces and the extension of recreational areas, the elimination of air pollution, the maintenance of rivers, and the underwriting of education and the organization of adequate medical care. No longer is defense, as in classical liberalism, the only public expenditure. Like military armanents and the maintenance of a standing army, each of these other functions in the post-industrial society become public institutions because their costs cannot be undertaken by individuals.

The analytical scheme that Bell used to develop his theory of social change is one in which contemporary society is divided into three institutional realms. These realms consisted of the techno-economic order (the "social structure) the polity, and the culture. Each of these realms was viewed by Bell as being organized around their own "axial" principles and, in some instances, their own axial structures. These axial principles were defined by Bell as organizing principles that, additionally, "legitimated different and even contrasting types of behavior."[5]

Bell defined the social structure as an institutional realm concerned "with the organization of production and the

allocation of goods and services."[6] The distinguishing feature of the social structure is that it "frames the occupational and stratification system of the society and involves the use of technology for instrumental ends."[7] In contrast to the social structure, the polity is an institutional realm that constitutes a society's "arena of social justice and power."[8] The distinguishing feature of the polity is that it represents the arena in which men in power exercise "the control of the legitimate use of force and the regulation of conflict, in order to achieve the particular conceptions of justice embodied in a society's traditions or in its constitution, written or unwritten."[9]

Bell defined the third realm, culture, as "the realm of expressive symbolism and meanings."[10] In his analytical scheme culture represents the sum total of "those efforts, in painting, poetry, and fiction, or within the religious forms of litany, liturgy, and ritual, which seek to explore and express the meanings of human existence in some imaginative form."[11] Historically associated with religion the distinguishing feature about culture is that its modalities "derive from the existential situations which confront all human beings, through all times, in the nature of consciousness."[12] Such situations include death, tragedy, and love. They also embody the way in which one confronts "the tension between an animal and a human nature and the claims of instinct and restraint."[13]

In contrast to the holistic images of society stressed by both Marxian and structural-functionalist social theory, Bell's theory of social change emphasizes a new image of society, one

whose characteristic feature is disjunction and conflict. Where both Marxism and structural-functionalism were based on the common premise that society is a structurally interrelated system and that, therefore, all social actions can only be understood in relation to that unified system, Bell's theory does not claim to see societies as organic or integrated social systems.

Developed more as a "conflict" than as a unitary theory, of social change emphasizes that the tensions that framed the 1960s and gave rise to the student protest and Black protest movements were the result of a set of historical contradictions deeply embedded in the value structure of Western society. His theory locates the structural sources of those tensions in the axial principles and structures that underlie and define according to Bell, the social structure, the polity, and the culture of modern Western society.

Bell considered the axial principle of the social structure of modern Western society to be functional rationality. He defined the "regulative mode" of the social structure as "economizing," by which he meant "the science of the best allocation of scarce resources among competing ends."[14] He considered the axial structure of the techno-economic order of all modern societies, whether socialist or capitalist, to be bureaucracy and hierarchy.

Bell considered the axial principle of the polity to be legitimacy. He defined the axial principle of the modern democratic polity to be "the principle that power can be held and governance exercised only with the consent of the governed."[15]

This principle rested on a specific conception of equality: "all men are to have an equal voice in this consensus."[16] Bell considered the axial structure of the modern democratic polity to be participation, by which he specifically meant "the existence of political parties and/or social groups to express the interests of particular segments in the society, to be a vehicle of representation or a means of participating in decisions."[17]

Bell considered the axial principle of modern culture to be the desire for self-fulfillment and self-enhancement. He defined this principle as a style of thought that encourages the denial of any limits or boundaries to experience. In short, he defined this principle as one that encourages "a reaching out for all experience"; a reaching out in which "nothing is forbidden," and, "all is to be explored."[18]

The central dynamism, the underlying motor of Bell's analytical scheme was the idea that the United States was becoming increasingly a post-industrial society. In becoming more and more post-industrial, the United States was characterized by Bell as both a knowledge and a service society. The United States was also characterized by Bell as undergoing a set of transformations that intensifies the discordances between its social structure, its polity, and its culture.

What makes post-industrialism a catalytic agent is that "the post-industrial society, in its initial logic, is a meritocracy."[19] It is a society in which "differential status and differential income are based on technical skills and

higher education."[20] Because it is a society in which few high places are open without those skills, it is a society that breeds considerable insecurity especially, given their history of discrimination, amongst Blacks and women. The insecurity focuses upon their being excluded from the opportunities to share power and to achieve social mobility and status. This insecurity has become manifested in the university primarily because the university, in the post-industrial society, increasingly becomes "the arbiter of class position."[21] It provides the necessary skills and knowledge for entrance into the post-industrial society. In short, the university is both the "gatekeeper" of the post-industrial society and the center of unrest and insecurity because "it has gained a quasi-monopoly in determining the future stratification of the society."[22]

Within this context the demand for equality that was part of the "populist" reaction to the post-industrial society in the early 1970s represents a defense against exclusion from that society. This demand for inclusion is one that is reinforced by a political system, Western democracy, that, through its axial principles, encourages equality and participation. Formally based on equality and participation, the axial principles of a democratic polity is one that stands in sharp contradiction to a industrial order that is based on functional rationality and on a stratification system that is based on achievement. The stratification system includes claims to power and the allocation of rewards that are based on technical skill and knowledge. Based on the principle of representation, the

democratic polity is one that encourages participation in decision-making concerning the distribution of goods and services. Hence, it is a polity that by definition encourages competing claims on the political system.

The demand for equality encourages adversary relationships that question the existing legitimations of the American industrial and political systems. The adversary culture ultimately rejects the claims and ends of the entire industrial and political system. It acts out the anti-bourgeois values that were given initial impetus by Baudelaire, Rimbaud and Nietzsche and promotes ends that are antagonistic to the ends of the industrial and political systems. These ends are purity, personal freedom and self-fulfillment.

Post-industrialism is the spark that raises these historically conditioned contradictions to the surface. It intensifies them by raising new insecurities and demands that become disjunctive elements in the value structure of American society.

In focusing on the disjunction between the social structure, the polity and the culture of American society, Bell developed a theory of social change that stresses changes in the class structure of American society, particularly the emergence of a new technical elite. Made up of scientists and engineers this new elite consists of individuals listed in the National Register of Scientific and Technical Personnel maintained by the National Science Foundation. Largely, although not exclusively, employed in the universities and

government (the single largest group of scientists is located in manufacturing but together the universities and government employ a larger number of scientists), the new technical elite numbers some three hundred thousand persons.

The emergence of this new elite was largely the result of the revolution in knowledge. This revolution involved a change in the character of knowledge, one that reflected the centrality of theoretical knowledge in modern industrial societies, and one that made chemistry the first truly "modern" industry. It involved the establishment of a much closer link between science and technology. It involved the pre-eminence of theory over empiricism and the codification of knowledge into abstract systems of symbols as the basis for the organization of decisions and the direction of change in production and management in the post-industrial society.

The revolution in knowledge also reflected the growing pre-eminence in modern society of the science based industries: computers, electronics, optics, and polymers. It reflected the growing pre-eminence of industries "which increasingly dominate the manufacturing sector of the society and which provide the lead, in product cycles, for the advanced industrial societies."[23] In short, the scientific-technical revolution reflected a shift in the thinking of twentieth century man away from the indifference to science and abstraction that was the credo of many of the nineteenth century inventors. "Inspired and talented tinkerers" inventors like Thomas Edison and Alexander Graham Bell were men who "were indifferent to science and the fundamental laws underlying their investigations."[24]

In both the public and corporate worlds abstract or theoretical knowledge was adopted as the "strategic" and necessary resource.

Another major factor that lead to the emergence of the new technical elite was the close relationship that developed in the post-war period between the federal government and science. This relationship during the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations was the product of federal research and development expenditures that increased by an average of fifteen to sixteen percent a year. The federal government became during those years the largest single sponsor of scientific and technological research in the United States.[25]

Bell's theory of social change in the "Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism" particularly, relates the tensions in American society of the late 1960s and early 1970s to historical shifts in its social structure and culture. It ascribes the undermining of the Protestant ethic to capitalism, that is, to capitalism's ability in the 1920s to promote through mass production and mass consumption a hedonistic way of life. His theory also locates the source of capitalism's lack of a transcendent ethic in its lack of a unifying ideology. At the same time contemporary American culture is anti-institutional and antinomian. Bell attributes the pre-eminence of nineteenth century anti-bourgeois values in contemporary culture to both the victory of modernism and to the expansion of a new intellectual class, one that was "huge enough to sustain itself economically as a class."[26]

Bell's theory of social change ultimately emphasizes the

failure of modern liberalism and the democratic polity to mediate the conflict between the social structure and the culture of American society. It attributes this failure, on the one hand, to the inability of the United States to develop planning and allocative mechanisms to meet the demands that have been placed upon it as a result of America's emergence as a communal society. It attributes the failure of liberalism, on the other hand, to its inability to create a philosophy of the public household, its lack, in short, of a "common framework of values that canguide the setting of political policy."[27] In short, it appears that the failure of liberalism is its failure to give substance to Bell's programmatic injunctions.

Bell's theory of social change acknowledges both the triumph of an "adversary ideology" within the welfare state and the collapse of an older value system based on Puritanism and nineteenth century capitalism that was ironically undermined by the very structural transformation of capitalism. The new "inimical ideology" was not, declared Bell, "the secular socialism of the working class - if anything, the working class covets everexpanding goods and production - but the cultural chic of modernism which retains its subversive thrust however much it is absorbed by the system."[28] At the same time, Bell's theory proclaims that because of capitalism's absence of a transcendent ethic the "cultural paradox" fostered by capitalism in the 1920s will remain "a continuing crisis of capitalist society."[29] This, explains Bell, is because "a cultural crisis cannot be resolved, like a political problem, by the inclusion or exclusion of a particular social group; it

lies deep in the character of the values which sustain or fail to sustain a system."[30]

And finally, Bell's theory of social change is a prediction that "in a post-industrial society the disjunction of culture and social structure is bound to widen."[31] This is because modern Western society is experiencing a crisis of legitimacy, a crisis that both underlies the cultural contradictions of capitalism and frames the future of the post-industrial society.

> The historic justifications of bourgeois society - in the realms of religion and character - are gone. The traditional legitimacies of property and work become subordinated to bureaucratic enterprises that can justify privilege because they can turn out material goods more efficiently than other modes or production. But a technocratic society is not ennobling. Material goods provide only transient satisfaction or an invidious superiority over those with less. Yet one of the deepest human impulses is to sanctify their institutions and beliefs in order to find a meaningful purpose in their lives and to deny the meaninglessness of death. A post-industrial society cannot provide a transcendent ethic - except for the few who devote themselves to the temple of science. And the antinomian attitude plunges one into a radical autism which, in the end, dirempts the cords of community and the sharing with others. The lack of a rooted moral belief system is the cultural contradiction of the society, the deepest challenge to its survival.[32]

In addition to using the concept of the post-industrial society to develop a theory of social change, Bell used it to describe an emergent reality. This was a description of an American society beset by a number of overlapping social and political problems, the great bulk of which were the product of America's emergence as a knowledge and as a communal society. In turn his description of American society justifies the establishment of a new set of philosophical legitimations.

Bell's image of American society includes the questioning of the very values of the private enterprise system and its basic institution, the business corporation. One of these endangered values is the emphasis on individual private consumption through the increased production of material goods. This value is summarized by the notion that all that is required to satisfy people in a society is the increased availability of more and more goods at relatively stable prices.

Another of these values is summarized by the term "economizing." Based on the proposition that individual satisfaction is the best unit upon which costs and benefits can be calculated, "economizing" reflects a strong advocacy of the principles of functional rationality, the notion that "all aspects of organization are single-mindedly reduced to becoming means to the goals of production and profit."[33] Economizing also reflects an atomistic view of society, one that propagates the idea that the most appropriate mix of men in the organization of production can be established through a calculus of monetary costs within a framework of relative prices. More than that, argues Bell, the atomistic view of society "reflects the utilitarian fallacy that the sum total of individual decisions is equivalent to a social decision."[34]

In the tradition of "The End of Ideology," Bell's description of current social reality is of people questioning these older values in a new way, one that is different from that in which socialists and radicals questioned them in the 1930s. No longer were those values being questioned because they were being achieved only at the cost of the exploitation of

the worker. Instead they are questioned at the more basic levels. Questioned are the creation of private goods at the expense of social values like clean air and water. This new emphasis on social, collective values has emerged despite the fact that, since the end of the Second World War, the corporation has been moving steadily towards the "sociologizing mode," that is, towards the view that corporations are more than institutions for "economizing"; they are also ways of life for their members. Hence the corporation must provide services, the coordination of which both tests the limits of the economizing mode and challenges its most basic assumptions. Thus, Bell's description is of an American society in which, paradoxically, the legitimation of corporate capitalism is being challenged on the same grounds that in the 1950s were used to justify it ideologically. The challenge is on the basis of its performance. Yet this notion of ideological justification by performance is a new idea in Bell's work, first appearing in 1971.[35]

Bell's description is of an American society that finds itself in the midst of a cultural crisis. In part, this crisis is the product of a social structure that is directed towards functional rationality and technocracy and a culture that is anti-institutional and antinomian. In part, it is also a crisis that stems from modern liberalism's use of "intellectual concepts and paridigms that are products or summations of an older order of experience."[36] Hence, Bell's description is of a society in which people in discussing its governmental structure "still use the language and often the assumptions

of two hundred years ago."[37] These are the language and the assumptions of laissez-faire capitalism and of seventeenth century liberalism; the language and assumptions of Adam Smith and John Locke.[38] More than that, Bell's description is of a society that faces one overarching problem; the problem of reconciling the logic of the economizing mode with the logic of the sociologizing mode.

Equally important is the fact that Bell's description is of a "great society" in which more and more goods necessarily have to be purchased. It is a description of a communal society in which

> defense apart, the planning of cities and the rationalization of transit, the maintenance of open spaces and the extension of recreational areas, the elimination of air pollution and the cleaning up of the rivers, the underwriting of education and the organization of medical care, all are now public institutions.[39]

In a related way Bell's description is of a society in which the rise of the new post-World War II claimants on the political system, scientists, educators, intelligentsia, blacks, youth, and the poor, had disrupted the power of the old political coalitons. The result of both post-industrialism and the revolution of the 1960s, the rise of these new claimants to political power had disrupted the kinds of coalitions that had given interest-groups politics its force. On the national level these coalitions involved big-business, labor, and the farmers; on the state and city levels, they involved ethnic groups. Bell's description is thus of a society that will, he asserts, require more conscious decision-making. The salient fact is that ultimately the post-industrial

society is a society in which "the clash of individual interests, each following its own whim, leads necessarily to a greater need for collective regulation and a greater degree of coercion (with a reduction of personal freedom) in order to have effective communal action."[40]

Bell's description is of a society that, despite its emergence as a communal society, lacks both an allocative mechanism for the distribution of goods and services and for the adjudication of claims to scarce resources: It lacks a communal ethic. Individuals have their respective scale of values that they utilize to make purchases; yet the society as a whole lacks a mechanism, a scale of values, that enables its political leaders to consider, "in terms of costs and benefits, the varying combinations of private consumption and public purchases of goods."[41] It is, in other words, a description of a society that lacks a philosophy of the public household.

Beyond this, the description of American society that Bell offered is one that Michael Young foresaw in his fable of English society, The Rise of Meritocracy. Young wrote about a populist revolution which completely disrupted the England of the year 2034 some forty years after it had become a meritocracy of the type where each man had achieved his place exclusively on the basis of "IQ and Effort."[42] Its leaders were high status women who were often the wives of leading scientists. Having been "relegated during the early married years to the household because of the need to nurture high IQ children," the activist women had demanded

equality between the sexes. In turn, this movement became generalized into the demand for equality for all, a demand for a classless society. Their argument was that life should not be ruled by "a mathematical measure" but rather that each person should develop his own diverse capacities for leading his own life. A war was fought and the Populists won, reversing a trend that had begun in 1990 when England had been transformed into a society in which all men of talent, all men with an IQ of 125 or more, were raised into a common elite.

And finally, Bell describes an emerging knowledge society that is being confronted with a new set of costs or scarcities the management of which both confounds the utopian visions of the post-industrial society envisaged by nineteenth century writers and tests the limits of modern liberalism. These new scarcities are the costs of information, the costs of coordination, and the costs of time.

The theory of social change and the descriptions of the emergent reality projected through the concept of the post-industrial society are, in and of themselves, not so important although they, to be sure, create an image of the United States at a critical crossroads in its history. In this image, the United States requires a new legitimacy, a new normative theory, the prospective theory of the public household. What is even more important in assessing his theory are the problems Bell poses and the way he poses the. The statement of several of the problems that he develops through the concept of the post-industrial society merge and reinforce his theory of

social change and his description of American society. Most of those definitions of problems reinforce certain images that were present in Bell's earlier writings. His theory, diagnosis, description, prognosis, and prescription may reflect on-going realities, or they may reflect, perhaps at the same time, a personal or political ideology that are largely independent of the answers he gets to the problems he poses. But ultimately the decision as to whether Bell is an ideologist or not rests with the problems that he poses. This is because, as Bell acknowledges in quoting John Dewey in the introduction to The Coming of Post-Industrial Society, the setting of a problem "is the most effective way of influencing subsequent thought."[43]

The Problems Subsumed in the Concept of Post-Industrial Society

While there was some overlap in the problems that Bell articulated through the concept of the post-industrial society they can be understood to fall within five broad categories or types of problems. These categories include: (1) problems related to America's emergence as a knowledge society; (2) problems that stem from America's emergence as a communal society; (3) problems of corporate capitalism; (4) problems of political philosophy and planning; and (5) problems concerning the relationship between culture and the social structure of American society.

(1) Problems of the Knowledge Society

Under the first category, problems related to America's emergence as a knowledge society, we can delineate two sets of

problems that Bell articulated through the concept of the post-industrial society. The first are problems generated by the meritocracy principle and the second are problems that arise "from the historic independence of the scientific community and the contradictory problems generated by its tradition of autonomy, its increasing dependence on government research funds, and the service it is called upon to perform." The first set of problems attends the switch from equality of opportunity to equality of result. To Bell this constitutes the "central value problem" of the post-industrial society. Along with this problem, Bell emphasized, the chief problem of the emerging post-industrial society "is the conflict generated by a meritocracy principle which is central to the allocation of position in the knowledge society."[44]

In the second set of problems Bell related to the subject of the knowledge society he identified five specific problems; the problem of defining the relationship between science and government; the problem of what constitutes a policy of science; the problem of creating representative structures for science; the problem of defining the legitimate functions of science in the post-industrial society; and the problem of whether or not the technicians and engineers in the post-industrial society will become a "new working class" as the socialist theoreticians Serge Mallet and Andre Gorz had predicted.[45]

(2) The Problems of the Communal Society

Under the second category, problems that stem from America's

emergence as a communal society, we can delineate two problems that Bell articulated through his concept of the post-industrial society. The first problem concerns what the socialist writer James J. O'Connor called "the fiscal crises of the state."[46] This is the problem of how wealth is to redistributed in a society in which the government has become the single largest employer and in which the multiplication of government functions that are the result of a combination of forces creates a continuous need for new revenues.

The second concerns how the claims on the political system are to be settled. This for Bell is a central problem for two reasons, one of which is that a post-industrial society is by definition "a communal society wherein public mechanisms rather than the market become the allocators of goods, and public choice, rather than individual demand, becomes the arbiter of services."[47] The other reason is that "a communal society by its very nature multiplies the definition of rights - the rights of children, of students, of the poor, of minorities - and translates them into claims of the community."[48] Ultimately, in a democratic society the solution to this problem rests in a determination of what criteria it will use to adjudicate the competing claims placed upon it as a result of its emergence as a communal society.

(3) The Problems of Corporate Capitalism

Under the third category, the problems of corporate capitalism, we can delineate several problems that Bell

articlulated through the concept of the post-industrial society, the bulk of which derive their force from his analysis of the changing character of American capitalism in the twentieth century.

In his analysis Bell assessed the significance of the new wave of criticism that has been directed towards industry. This criticism centers on environmental issues and raises questions concerning the social responsibility of the corporation in protecting the environment from the effects of industrial waste and pollution, from the effects of what welfare economists call "externalities," or costs of production that are passed on to the public in the government expenditures for cleaning polluted rivers and lands. The significance of this criticism is that it raised key questions about the authority and legitimacy of the corporation in American society.

By the end of the 1950s corporate capitalism, Bell argues, had established a new legitimacy in American life. This legitimacy was not based on the natural right of property which from Adam Smith's time to the 1930s had been capitalism's traditional basis of legitimacy but rather on performance, that is, on the role of the corporation "as an instrument for providing more and more goods to the people."[49] That performance could serve as the new basis of legitimacy for corporate capitalism was, argued Bell, a function of several factors. One of the most important was a change in ideology.

This was a change in which "the idea took hold that size was less relevent than performance."[50] It was a change

in which the corporation no longer had to defend itself against the charge that the bigness of business represented an economic and political threat to democracy. This charge, going back to 1890 when Congress passed the Sherman Antitrust Act, had been the credo of the populist movement in the United States. Buoyed by John Kenneth Galbraith's argument that "size was an asset because it enabled the large corporation to underwrite technological progress" (an argument that he developed in the early 1950s in American Capitalism) in the 1950s "a vigorous large company could present its case to the public that size was immaterial, so long as the corporation displayed those hallmarks of dynamism that added up to performance."[51]

Another factor in the acceptance of the corporation was the elusiveness of performance as a criterion for evaluating the responsiveness of corporate capitalism to the needs of the American society. Performance, argued Bell, embraces ideas that historically have appealed to liberal economists. These ideas with their emphasis on innovation and expansion serve to relax the single greatest fear of the 1930s, stagnation.

> "It embraces the idea of receptivity to innovation; willingness to expand capacity (one of the chief charges by liberal economists in the 1940s against such oligopolistic industries as aluminum and steel was that they were unwilling to expand capacity); the reflection of increased productivity in better quality, higher wages, and steady, if not lower, prices; and similar indices of responsiveness to the needs of the society."[52]

Another factor in its success in making performance the new basis of its legitimacy was the fact that by the end of the

1950s corporate capitalism seemed to be performing its role as an instrument for providing more and better goods to the American people very adequately.[53]

The fact that it had achieved a new basis of legitimacy was, noted Bell, reflected in the fact that by the end of the 1950s criticism of corporate capitalism had become so muted that the criterion of performance went virtually unchallenged. With the new wave of criticism that grew out of the late 1960s all that changed.

Ironically, corporate capitalism was challenged by environmentalists and by citizens concerned with the price of externalities that had been passed on to the public, precisely on the grounds of performance. Instead of the quiet acceptance of the legitimacy of corporate capitalism "a feeling has begun to spread in the country that corporate performance has made the society uglier, dirtier, trashier, more polluted, and noxious."[54] The significance of this turnabout, argued Bell, is that "the sense of identity between the self-interest of the corporation and the public interest has been replaced by the sense of incongruence."[55]

There are two basic problems that Bell posed which fall into the category of the problems of corporate capitalism. The first concerns the obligation of the corporation to society and deals with the need to establish a balance of obligations between the public and the private in a liberal society. It is the problem of determing whether the corporation should be viewed as an instrument of "owners," that is, the stockholders, or as "an autonomous enterprise which, despite its particular

history, has become - or should become an instrument for service to society in a system of pluralistic powers."[56] The second basic problem of corporate capitalism focuses upon the limits of the economizing mode is of establishing a balance between the logic of the economizing and the sociologizing mode.

These problems are important for Bell for one underlying reason: in a post-industrial society there will be enormous growth in the non-profit area outside of business and government, the "third sector" which includes schools, hospitals, and research institutes, but "the business corporation remains, for the while, the heart of the society."[57]

In addition, Bell raises a number of problems that, in his view, both test the limits of the economizing mode and pressed the issue of the corporation's obligation to the society to the forefront. Among them are the problems of satisfaction in work, minority employment and environmental pollution. The last problem is one of private versus social costs. Another related problem is determining the role of the corporation in dealing with such moral issues as private investment in South Africa.

(4) Problems of Political Philosophy and Planning

Under the fourth category, problems of political philosophy and planning we can delineate two problems that Bell articulated through the concept of the post-industrial society. The first is the problem of formulating a normative theory of the public household. This is the problem of formulating

a normative theory, which - taking into account the

> ineluctable elements of centralized decision-making, the extension of social or communal choices, and the need for conscious social planning (not to direct the society, but to facilitate desired social changes) - can set forth rational criteria consonant with the values of a free society.[58]

The second is the problem of developing a system of social accounts, a system whereby social changes can be charted, political demands anticipated, and the effectiveness of present social policies tested.

(5) The Relationship between Culture and Social Structure

Under the fifth category, problems concerning the relationship between culture and the social structure, we can delineate two major problems that Bell articulated through the concept of the post-industrial society. The first is the tension that exists in the United States between its culture and its social structure. The second is whether the United States as a post-industrial society can survive without a transcendental ethic.

The question that remains to be answered is in what contexts does Bell pose all of these problems. Does he pose them, for instance, as solvable or unsolvable problems? It is both interesting and important that he poses them in different contexts.

The Nature of the Problems Posed by Bell

If we start with the problems of corporate capitalism that Bell posed through the concept of the post-industrial society, we find him posing them within two overlapping contexts: one of repudiating classical liberalism with its emphasis on the inviolability of private property and the other within the context of justifying America's need for

a new ordering mechanism and a new public philosophy.

Behind each of these problems that Bell poses one finds the same basic set of intentions. They include the desire to demonstrate that the problems are complex technical ones and hence do not yield to "ideological" solutions but rather can only be effectively approached with the creation of an ordering mechanism and a system of social accounts that measures costs against responsibilities for all sectors of society. Bell also desires to demonstrate to the corporate managers the new realities that give weight to the criticisms of the New Left against corporate capitalism. And, finally, his intention is a desire to demonstrate that, given the pre-eminence of the public sector in American life, comprehensive government planning is both necessary and inevitable if something resembling a liberal society is to survive. It is these intentions that give rise to Bell's critique of corporate capitalism.

Bell's critique is multi-faceted. It embodies a polemic against the defenders of private property and the economizing mode and attacks their underlying assumptions. In nature and purpose this polemic closely resembles the one that John Dewey developed in Liberalism and Social Action. It should be remembered that Dewey in this book located "the crisis of liberalism" in liberalism itself, in its failure to rise beyond its special and historically relative interpretation of liberty and deal with the new problems which its very success precipitated. This problem, as presented in Chapter Three, was of legitimacy: how to establish within

the framework of a democracy the moral foundations for a new integrating philosophy.

The thrust of Bell's critique is that the problems of environmental pollution, minority employment, and the moral responsibility of the corporation on racial issues can only be approached when they are placed into a larger context, one that permits us to recognize that the concepts through which we have traditionally approached them are inadequate. The problem of pollution, argued Bell, is a case in point. It is easy to blame the business corporation and to stop there but the inescapable reality is that

> "if we take pollution of the air and water as the criterion of social ill, then clearly all sections of the society are at fault: The farmer who, by seeking to increase food production, uses more nitrate fertilizer and thus pollutes the rivers of the country; the individual automobile owner who, seeking greater mobility, spews noxious gas into the atmosphere; the Atomic Energy Commission which, in seeking to expand nuclear power, may be responsible for thermal pollution of the waters; and the corporation whose smoke-stacks emit smog-creating gases in the air, or whose waste products pollute the lakes."[59]

But where does this realization leave us? Bell's response was both quick and decisive.

> "But if one takes the attitude that everyone is to blame - and simply ends with the moral exhortation for each person to restrain his behavior - then one misses the important point. Such a situation itself points to the fact that the allocative mechanism of society, the proper distribution of costs and resources is not working. In a free society, the socially optimal distribution of resources and goods exists where the market reflects the true economic cost of an item. But where private costs and social costs diverge, then the allocation of goods becomes skewed. When the owner of a factory has no incentive to take account of costs to others of the pollution

> he generates because these costs are not charged to him, factory output (or automobile mileage in the case of a car owner) will be at a higher level than is socially optimal."[60]

The fact that this increasing devergence of private costs and social costs constitutes a growing problem for modern society is for Bell indisputable. The fact that it is a problem which necessitates the development of a new allocative mechanism is for Bell equally indisputable. The underlying problem is whether or not such a mechanism can be developed within the framework of the traditional conceptions of private property and liberty that corporate capitalism continues to find itself trapped by. The answer Bell offers is that it cannot.

The development of a new allocative mechanism requires a system of social accounts, one that can go beyond the individualistic utilitarian fallacy promoted by classical liberalism and legitimated by the economizing mode: the fallacy that "the sum total of individual decisions is equivalent to a social decision."[61] Hence, the development of a new allocative mechanism requires a commitment to go beyond the economizing mode with its emphasis on individual satisfaction constituting the best unit for the reckoning of costs and benefits in a free society and its commitment to economic growth. It requires the recognition that what is required on the part of government is a commitment to planning; not single purpose planning but comprehensive social and technological planning. It requires, in other words, that the government must make a commitment to the kind of planning which

can calculate the secondary and tertiary costs of social and technological change and develop adequate supporting systems to offset the negative effects, the costs, of social and technological change. Also required is the recognition that "the major sociological problem ahead will be the test of our ability to forsee the effects of social and technological change and to construct alternative courses in accordance with different valuations of ends, at different costs."[62]

The development of a new allocative mechanism in the exact sense that it requires a system of social accounts requires, argued Bell, the recognition that the business corporation is not just an economic instrument or an institution of private property. The business corporation, in addition to being an economic instrument, is now a lifetime experience for many of its employees. When taken in conjunction with the fact that the stockholder today "is often an in-and-out person with little continuing interest in the enterprise" (a fact that is supported by the tremendous growth of mutual, pension, and trust funds) this recognition requires a new perspective. We will have to defind the balance of obligations between the business corporation, its employees, and society in a very different way then the way which is legitimated by the economizing mode. We must also recognize that private property is a legal fiction. Finally this recognition makes untenable the conservative position that the business corporation is a private property institution whose sole function sould be the pursuit of profit for its stockholders, the position legitimated by the economizing

mode, completely untenable.

Within this context, Bell's critique can be understood as an appeal to corporate capitalism to accept the new realities of American life, to accept the fact that "the consumer-oriented free enterprise society no longer satisfies the citizenry as it once did, and to adjust itself to those new realities.

> ...Reforms will never be as sweeping in their effects as their proponents hope, and the results will rarely be as damaging and apocalyptic as the opponents fear. Workmen's compensation was an issue that inflamed a generation of radicals and was fought by industry on the ground that it would relieve the workman of individual responsibility for his actions; yet who today would deny that industrial safety is a legitimate cost of factory operations? Such reforms are always an expression of a revision - in the American public philosophy. This kind of revisionism is inevitable as men and societies change, and as the dominant values assume a new shape. The private enterprise system has been the primary institution of Western society not because of its coercive power but because its values - economizing and increasing out of material goods - were congruent with the major consumer values of the society. With all its obvious imperfections the system worked. Today, however, those values are themselves being questions, not in the way socialists and radicals questioned them a generation ago...but at the very core, the creation of more private goods at the expense of other social values...No one, meeting collectively voted in our market economy. But now votes are being taken."[63]

Bell's appeal is in part an appeal for corporate capitalism to recognize a larger set of social obligations than it has in the past and to include on its boards of directors not just stockholders but also workers and consumer. Yet it is more than an appeal.

Bell's critique is a warning to corporate capitalism that,

unless it seeks out such representation, serious questions about the legitimacy of managerial power will continue. It is at the same time a statement that exhorts corporate capitalism to recognize that the conditions it has helped to foster through its successes not only creates the necessity for a new allocative mechanism but also that the development of that mechanism provides something that is indespensivle. It provides for a system of countervailing power that would permit for the survival of liberal society and for the treatment of stockholders "not as owners but as legitimate claimants to some fixed share of the profits of a corporation."[64] Within this very specific context Bell's critique can be understood as the rationalization of the public household, and of Welfare State liberalism that he ultimately developed to both counter the claims of Milton Friedman and other American conservatives about the inviolability of private property and to press for the creation of a new ordering mechanism that can reconcile the logic of the economizing mode with the logic of the sociologizing mode.

If we take the problems of political philosophy and planning what we find is Bell posing the problem of formulating a normative theory of the state within the context of an analysis of the limits of interest group theory for understanding the changing nature of American politics. This is an analysis in which Bell is critical of V.O. Key's characterization of the politician in a democratic society as a "broker," a characterization in which the politician is viewed as an umpire whose role "is to maintain a working balance between

the demands of competing interests and values."[65]

In his analysis of Key's work Bell takes the position that the latter's characterization is "astonishingly out of date for an understanding of politics in the second half of the twentieth century."[66] Key's interest group theory fails "to take into account the three most decisive characteristics, or shaping elements, of national policy today: the influence of foreign policy, the future orientation of society, and the increasing role of technical decision-making."[67] Each of these elements has, he argues, served to create in the United States an enormous centralization of power in which the President in his role as chief executive must, with the addition of such new staff functions as the National Security Council, the Bureau of Budget, and the Council of Economic Advisers, coordinate a wide variety of functions that are new to the presidential office. In emphasizing this point, Bell concludes his analysis with the observation that a more adequate picture of politics in American society than the one projected by interest group theorists "would have to see the presidency as a system capable of free action, even choosing which interests it allows to become inputs, and the executive itself bargaining - on the basis of technocratic decisions - with various interest groups in the society."[68]

The significance of this conclusion is that it is far from being a legitimation of the broker state, a fact which stands out when Bell's views on the problem of developing a system of social accounts are closely reviewed.

What we find when we examine Bell's views on this problem

is that he poses it in terms that are very consistent with his views on utopianism. This is to say that he poses the problem as an inherently unsolvable problem; but it is one that we must nonetheless struggle with if there is to be any hope of achieving a more rational and hence a better society. Bell's position, in brief, is that though the United States can develop a system of social accounts that will give us some truer measure of our needs, it is very doubtful that we will ever reach the point that we can in a completely rational fashion make choices between which needs we sould give precedence to.

Two presuppositons underlay Bell's statement of this problem. The first is his conviction that because the United States is becoming a communal society it must now create an ordering mechanism whereby the choices between different normative and economic policies can be weighed. To this end, a system of social accounts would serve to "broaden our concept of costs and benefits, and put economic accounting into a broader framework," one against which we can eventually "create a balance sheet that would be useful in clarifying policy choices."[69]

The second was his acceptance of Kenneth J. Arrow's "impossibility theorem," a theorem which demonstrated to many welfare economists satisfaction the impossibility of any society achieving a truly rational system of social choice through democratic means.[70] At the heart of this theorem is the assertion that though it fulfills more of the conditions of "fairness" than any other principle and hence is infinitely

more desirable morally than its alternatives, the principle of majority rule cannot be viewed as a rational principle. This is to say that it cannot be viewed as a principle upon which we can predict what a majority will choose when there are at least three alternatives which the individual members of a society are free to order in any way they choose.

If the ordering of alternatives is to be rational, it must, argued Arrow in his book Social Choice and Individual Values, meet two formal conditions or axioms of rationality. First, it must be "connected," which is to say that of any two alternatives x and y either one is preferred to the other or else they are regarded as indifferent. Second, the ordering has to be "transitive," which is to say that when choices x, y, and z are presented in a set to be voted on by the consumer, it must yield a predictable ordering. By this it is meant that it must produce an ordering in which we can say that "if x is either preferred or indifferent to y and y is either preferred or indifferent to z then x must be either preferred or indifferent to z."[71]

After noting that is is clear than an arbitrary ordering (be it imposed by custom or by dictatorial power) will satisfy the formal conditions of rationality and that despite the complete absence of any connection between society's choice and the preferences of the individuals composing that society such an "imposition" would formally constitute a social welfare function, Arrow posed the central question of his analysis. The question that he posed is can a rational social welfare function (that is, a process or rule which

for every set of individual preferences or orderings determines a social ordering) be constructed by way of democratic processes.

Some doubt, he argued, is raised by the "paradox of voting" which was first raised and discussed by the Marquis de Condorcet in the eighteenth century.[72] The "paradox of voting" (or as Bell refers to it "the paradox of the cyclical majority") raises doubts about a rational social welfare function being constructed under democratic processes. When we say that a group should prefer one alternative to another if a majority of its members prefer the first alternative to the second, we find that when they are given another alternative to freely choose, we cannot predict what the majority choice will be. The proof of this paradox can be demonstrated if we construct a scale based on the following inputs: three individuals stating their preferences on the three issues they think are most important. Suppose after surveying their preferences on these three issues, call them issues x, y, and z we find that the following pattern emerges:

	VOTERS		
PREFERENCES	A	B	C
First	x	z	y
Second	y	x	z
Third	z	y	x

On the basis of this information we can clearly see that x is preferred to y by a majority (A and B). We can also see from the data that y is preferred to z by a majority (A and C). Now, given both these facts and the principle of transitivity

(the principle that says that if an individual prefers x to y and y to z then he would also logically prefer x to z) we would assume, in seeking to predict what the majority would be, that x would also be preferred by the majority over z. Yet, as we can see, z is preferred over x by a majority, that is, by voters B and C. Hence, no majority can be formulated on these three issues.

There is something that is very striking about Bell's acceptance of the Arrow "impossibility theorem (apart from his failure to discuss in any detail the questions that have been raised by some economists, namely Paul Samuelson and Richard B. Brandt about its methodological soundness) especially when we consider his views on the problem of developing a normative theory of the s state.[73] In his acceptance of the theoretical implications of that theorem (the fact that when accepted at face value it strikes out any possibility of the United States or any other formally democratic society achieving a truly rational ordering rational mechanism) Bell frames an argument that, when taken in isolation, can be construed as legitimating the broker state. This arguemtn is simply that while Arrow's "impossibility theorem" raises all sorts of "drastic" implications for theorists in that it strikes "at the assumption of those who think that the general will emerge out of necessity in democratic debate and thos rationalists... who assume that the public interest is discoverable simply by a summation of preferences," it, far from posing any significant problem to others, has a beneficial effect.[74] The fact that this theorem challanges these basic rationalist

assumptions reinforces the idea common to the American democratic tradition "that differences between persons are best settled, as are so many differences, by bargaining."[75]

When we consider the problems of equality and meritocracy that Bell poses what we find is that he raises them as problems that underscore the need in the West for a reaffirmation of Welfare State liberalism and the principles of liberal education developed by John Dewey in his philosophy of education. Within this context, it is very important to understand that Bell poses these problems as a preamble to both a vigorous defense of the idea of meritocracy and the university and an equally vigorous polemic against the New Left. This polemic is ultimately designed to illustrate the limits of socialism and the virtues of Welfare State liberalism around a set of larger problems, the problem of scarcity and the problem of consensus.

In the "Coda" to The Coming of Post-Industrial Society, the place where he poses the problem of meritocracy and equality, Bell introduces the subject of meritocracy in a very dramatic way, one that is designed to highlight the urgency of the problems that he poses. He introduced the subject by providing a brief summary of Michael Young's fable The Rise of Meritocracy, a book which, as mentioned earlier, outlined the turmultuous demise of meritocracy in England through revolution. He then posed a question, the analysis of which dominated much of the Coda; a question that was made relevant by him through his observation that "the post-industrial society, in its initial logic, is a meritocracy."[76] The question he raised was whether the fate of the meritocracy

described by Young was also to be the fate of the post-industrial society.

After outlining the role of the university in American society as both the principle "arbiter of class position" and as the "gatekeeper" which has "gained a quasi-monopoly position in determining the future stratification of the society" Bell made it very clear that this was not just an academic question. In the fashion of "Columbia and The New Left," he argued, that by virtue of the New Left, and the activities of the student and the black protest movements in the late 1960s and the early 1970s the fate of the post-industrial society has become a contemporarily relevant question.

> Any institution which gains a quasi-monopoly power over the fate of individuals is likely, in a free society, to be subject to quick attack. Thus, it is striking that the populist revolt, which Michael Young foresaw several decades hence, has already begun, at the very onset of the post-industrial society. One sees this in the derogation of the IQ and the denunciation of theories espousing a genetic basis of intelligence; the demand for open omission to universities on the part of minority groups in the large urban centers; the pressure for increased numbers of blacks, women, and specific minority groups such as Puerto Ricans and Chicanos in the faculties of universities, by quotas if necessary; and the attack on credentials and even schooling itself as the determinant of a man's position in the society.[77]

In discussing this issue, Bell made it very clear that he opposed the affirmative action policies of the Johnson and the Nixon administrations. In this regard, he also made it very clear that he viewed these policies as having dangerous implications for the society in general and the university in particular. With respect to the former, he argued, that what the adoption of quotas and preferential hiring has done is to

reverse the progressive movement of Western society from universalism and achievement back to ascription and particularism. We have seen an extraordinary change, argued Bell, one in which, "without public debate" there has been both a switch from equality of opportunity to equality of result and a substitution of professional qualification and individual achievement for a "new ascriptive principle of corporate entity," membership in an ethnic or racial group.[78] "The historic irony" of this is that it constitutes a "complete reversal of radical and humanist values"; a fact that is confirmed, he argued, when we realize that historically the liberal and radical attack on discrimination has always been based on the denial of group criteria.[79] Now one finds liberals and radicals demaning that "one must have a place primarily because one possesses a particular group attribute."[80]

In extending this argument to the university Bell made it equally clear that he thought that the use of quotas in the hiring of faculty and research personnel could only have negative effects for the University and the minority persons that it largely hires on the basis of ascriptive criterion:

> ...quotas and preferential hiring mean that standards are bent or broken. The inescapable assumption of the ascriptive criterion as regards tenured university positions is that minority persons are less qualified and could not compete with others, even if given a sufficient margin. What effect does this have on the self-esteem of a person hired on second class grounds? And what effect does it have on the quality of a university, its teaching and research and morale, if its faculties are filled on the basis of quotas?[81]

Bell also made it very clear that the extention of affirmative action policies to the universities by the Nixon

administration was the product of a misguided assumption, one that, in effect, makes no distinction between mental and physical labor and no distinction between talent and credentials.

> By focusing on group identity rather than the person, by making the mechanical equation of number of woman Ph.D.s to number of positions they should hold, the government assumes that educated labor is homogeneous - that individual talent or achievement is less important than the possession of the credential. This may be true in many occupations, but not in university teaching and research, where individual merit is the singular test. Putting someone in a tenure position, which is capitalized at three-quarters of a million dollars, is very different from hiring a black rather than a white plumber; simply having the degree is not necessarily the qualification for the high position.[82]

Bell also made it very clear that while the affirmative action programs of the Nixon administration posed one threat to the principle of meritocracy the New Left assertion that "all schooling is being subordinated to the demands of technocratic thinking and that the school is assuming a disproportionate influence in the society" posed another.[83] Within this context, he noted Ivan Illich's demand for the elimination of the university and the substitution, in its place, of an informal system of "learning webs made up of skill-exchanges, peer matching and Educators-at-Large" as making in its efforts to re-create a Rousseauian state of nature through the elimination of existing educational institutions the same fundamental mistake that one finds in so much of modernism: the confusion of "experience, in all its diversities, with knowledge."[84] The modernists are right, the role of experience is important, but it does not, argued Bell, gain from the rejection of the old or the existent.

> Experience has to be made conscious, and this is done, as Dewey remarked, 'by means of that fusion of old meanings and new situations that transfigures both.' Knowledge is the selective ordering - and reordering - of experience through relevant concepts. Reality is not a bounded world, out there, to be imprinted on the mond as from a mirror, or a flux of experience to be sampled for its novelties according to one's inclination (or its relevance for me), but a set of meanings organized by mind, in terms of categories, which establishes the relations between facts and infers conclustions.[85]

While granting that the post-industrial society imposes certain constraints on education as education, constraints that have an impact on higher education, Bell argued that one need not abandon the university as a viable institution of learning. "One need not defend the technocratic dimensions of education - its emphasis on vocationalism and specialization - to argue that schooling becomes more necessary than ever before."[86] All that one has to realize is that

> by the very fact that there are now many more differentiated ways in which people gain information and have experiences, there is a need for the self-conscious understanding of the processes of conceptualization as the means of organizing one's information in order to gain coherent perspectives on one's experience.[87]

Within this context, Bell defined the function of the university in the post-industrial society as one which involved the ability

> to relate to each other the modes of conscious inquiry: historical consciousness, which is the encounter with a tradition that can be tested against the present; methodological consciousness, which makes explicit the conceptual grounds of inquiry and its philosophical presuppositons; and individual self-consciousness, which makes one aware of the sources of one's prejudgments and allows one to re-create one's values through the disciplined study of the society.[88]

To this, Bell added in concluding his polemic with Illich on the role and the nature of education that

> "Education is the reworking of the materials of the past, without ever wholly surrendering its truths or bending to its pieties. It is a continuing tension, 'the tension between past and future mind and sensibility, tradition and experience, (which) for all its strains and discomforts, is the only source for maintaining the independence of inquiry itself.' It is the affirmation of the principle of intellectual and artistic order through the search for relatedness of discordant knowledge."[89]

Bell continued his polemic against the New Left in the Coda by challenging John Rawls' theory of justice. Bell's interest in Rawls stemmed, in part, from the fact that under Rawls "the concept of equality of result has become the Archimedean point of a major new effort to provide a philosophical foundation - a conception of justice as fairness for a communal society."[90] In greater part it stemmed from the fact that in his critique of Rawls' theory, Bell provided himself with a vehicle upon which to reassert through the Arrow "impossibility theorem" his own philosophy of the public household, the principle of relevant differences.

Bell's critique is fundamentally an extension of his critique of the limits of utility theory. It is an extension of his thesis that Arrow's impossibility theorem demonstrates the fallacy of the rationalist assumption that the public interest is discoverable simply by a summation of preferences. The fact that it can be understood in these terms is a function of Bell's criticism of Rawls' notion that there can be a generalized social norm that is truly rational. The problem, as Bell put it, is not so much the development of social norm that expresses our interest in achieving a society based on fairness, that is, the principle of helping

the least fortunate as the prior obligation of society. The problem is, can we develop a social norm that is both fair and rational at the same time.

Rawls makes the claim, Bell argues, that a generalized social norm can be constructed that corresponds to the sum total of the individual's preferences on what that norm should be. He also makes the claim that this social norm can be rational; but he avoids the central question that a democratic society must seek to come to terms with. This question is: if rationality is the basis of the social norm, can we have, given Arrow's impossibility theorem, "a social welfare function that amalgamates the discordant preferences of individuals into a combined choice which recapitulates the rationality of the individual choice?"[91]

Now, we can choose to avoid the difficulties imposed by this theorem as Rawls does by rejecting the principle of majority rule on the grounds that the action of a majority does not, a priori, make any decision just. But if we do we face the over-riding problem: "is there, as a consistent rule, any better method than majority vote, subject to the democratic check of a minority having the right and ability to change the decision and become a majority, in reaching consensus."[92] This, argued Bell, is but one of the problems that we find in Rawls' work.

Rawls' theory also suffers, argued Bell, from the fact that while his proposal that the maximization of the minimum sounds equalitarian because it moves the distribution of such primary social goods as income and self-respect to the mean, it, as

Lester Thurow has demonstrated, need not be equalitarian at all. Thurow's argument is that what Rawls presumes in this proposal is that the trickle-down effect would be "so large that it would be impossible to design economic activities that concentrated income gains among high income groups."[93] What he rejects is the fact that "there are many economic activities with marginal amounts of trickle-down."[94] He thus skirts, argued Bell, the essential problem of distribution, which is the fact that "some coercive device may be necessary to achieve the desired outcome of a set of rules that will maximize the minimum prize, or give priority to the disadvantaged."[95]

Barring the rejection of the principle of majority rule, what we are faced with, given the Arrow impossibility theorem, is the fact that what the social norm will be is ultimately a political question that is "subject either to consensus or to conflict - extortion by the most threatening, or collective bargaining in which people eventually accept some idea of trade-off."[96] We are faced, in other words, with the realization that while "we may want a social norm for reasons of fairness, but in the structure of rational choice procedures we cannot define one."[97]

Because this is the case we are faced with another binding truth. This is the fact that "the principle of helping the least fortunate as the prior social obligation may mean - in a sociological sense as well as statistical sense - a regression toward the mean."[98] The problem here, argued Bell, is that

> if it is assumed that we have reached a post-scarcity stage of full abundance, this may be a desireable social policy. But if this is not so - and it is questionable whether it can ever be so - and if one defines society, as Rawls does, 'as a cooperative venture for mutual advantage,' why not, just as logically, allow greater incentives for those who can expand the total social output and use this larger social pie for the mutual (yet differential) advantage of all?[99]

Bell concluded his polemic against Rawls with the following observation:

> The United States today is not a meritocracy; but this does not discredit the principle. The idea of equality of opportunity is a just one, and the problem is to realize it fairly. The focus, then, has to be on the barriers to such equality. The redress of discrimination by representation introduces arbitrary, particulistic criteria which can only be destructive of universalism, the historic principle, won under great difficulty, of treating each person as a person in his own right.[100]

To this he added in a remark that he would soon elaborate into the principle of relevant differences that "the difficult and thorny question, in the end, is not just priority - who should be helped first - but the degree of disparity among pdersons."[101] This is the question of how much difference there should be."in income between the head of a corporation and a common laborer, between a professor at the top of the scale and an instructor?"[102] As economic decisions become politicized," and the market becomes replaced by social decisions the question that will be one of the most "vexing" for the United States as a post-industrial society is what shall be "the principle of fair reward and fair differences."[103]

What, of course, we hear in these set of remarks, (remarks that we cite because they as much as anything else constitute

the context in which Bell ultimately poses the problems or meritocracy and equality) is the very same thing that we hear when we examine the context in which he posed the problems of social structure and culture. We hear a call made on the basis of the principle of relevant differences for a philosophy of the public household; the call for a new public philosophy. Yet the call is not the response.

The fact that Bell poses the questions of social structure and culture within this context is confirmed by his advancement at the end of The Coming of Post-Industrial Society of the very same assessment of the crisis of liberalism that he formulated in "The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism": inculcated by the adversary culture, liberalism, though repelled by the tendencies of the counter-culture "finds itself at a loss to explain its reticence" about them.[104] Trapped by the fact that it approves a basic permissiveness, liberalism, argued Bell, (in words that he originally used in "The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism") "cannot with any certainty define the bounds" of that permissiveness.[105] What is significant about this assessment is the conclusion that he derived from it, that liberalism's failure to define the limits of the disruptive behavior that it will tolerate "leaves the moral order in a state of confusion and disarray," one from which liberalism "may yet suffer a reaction."[106] The reason, why such a possibility could not be ruled out, argued Bell in a statement that (if not explicitly, then certainly implicitly) represents, in the image that it evokes, a call for a philosophy of the public household, is that while

> Ideas and cultural styles do not change history - at least, not overnight...they are the necessary prelude to change, since a change in consciousness - in values and moral reasoning- is what moves men to change their social arrangements and institutions.[107]

Conclusion

In considering the problems that Bell posed through the concept of the post-industrial society we can reach certain conclusions about The Coming of Post-Industrial Society.

One conclusion that we can draw is that Bell posed many problems, especially the problem of meritocracy and equality, in a way that serves to rationalize an image of the world that is implicit in his concept of the post-industrial society. In this image the world is a game between people in which, given the limits of planning and reason, there can be no perfect set of rules concerning the distribution of rewards and services. This image ultimately serves to justify the development of a philosophy of the public household on both the same grounds specified in "The Public Household" and foreshadowed in "The End of Ideology" essay, that is, on the grounds that scarcity and the insatiableness of human appetites prohibits anything more than the achievement of welfare state liberalism in the United States. But does this make Bell an ideologist?

The answer is "yes" if we understand by that term a man who seeks to rationalize an image of the world that conceals an articulated pre-determined end. It is also "yes," if scarcity and restraint of human appetites are to be an a priori grounds applied to some groups and not to others. Yet, Bell feels that this aspect of the allocative mechanism is a

technological, not an ideological problem.

An interesting thing about Bell is that his work is marked by a tremendous intellectual and emotional investment in demonstrating to an audience that he feels does not have his vivid recollections of the Moscow Trials and the Nazi-Soviet peace pact that ideological politics has no constructive place in a world whose complexities require technical and administrative solutions rather than ideological ones. Bell's concept of the post-industrial society in the sense that it promotes an image of the world in which there are no fixed absolute solutions, (a world subject to the constraints demonstrated by the Arrow "impossibility theorem") reflects his message about the limits of ideological politics. More than anything else this concept served as a vehicle by which Bell could promote, against the New Left a message that, again, is implicit in the concept's very construction.

Yet this image of ideology as being the absolutism of the left, is as we have noted a unique one, it is Mannheim's utopianism. Under Bell's conception one could not be a liberal ideologist or a conservative one, but one could, we imagine, be of the radical right.

Yet, if we were to stop here and conclude that Bell is ultimately an ideologist whose work is only designed to rationalize technocracy we would be making a grave error. Not only would such a conclusion be intellectually wrong it would also be downright unfair. One need not have to be an apologist for Bell to recognize that just as The Coming of Post-Industrial Society serves to rationalize the message

of his "End of Ideology" essay it also, in the fashion of Thorstein Veblen's The Price System and The Engineers, provides a strong argument against technocracy. This argument which is elaborated in the sixth chapter of The Coming of Post-Industrial Society, "Who Will Rule?", is that given the technical complexities of planning and decision-making in advanced industrial societies both. the politician, and the political public, will have to become increasingly versed in the technical character of policy, aware of the ramified impact of decisions as systems become extended."[108] This argument, especially when taken in conjunction with Bell's assertion that "the technical intelligentsia must learn to question the often unanalyzed assumptions about efficiency and rationality which underlie their techniques" discredits the principle of technocracy on grounds that were first laid out in his "Adjusting Men to Machines" essay and in "Work and Its Discontents," grounds that qualify Bell as a radical critic of managerial absolutism."[109] Yet the demand that politicians should become versed in technology and technologists become aware of their assumptions in a programmatic hope that they can do so. It is a hope upon which, like other of Bell's hopes, one bases current policy. The hope is taken as a fact; and the possible non achievement of the hope is discounted or not considered.

One might entertain the possibility that politicians can take over the technocrat's view, including the technical, bureaucratic rationality and the authoritarianism of the technologist, and, conversely, technologists might in the

process of mobility take over, like Eichman in Jeruselem, the larger "irrationalities" of the politicians and implement them rationally. Finally the technologists may take over the values of monopoly capitalism as suggested by Benjamin S. Kleinberg.[110]

All of these are possibilities within the assumption of the future convergence of the perspective of democratic politics and managerial rationality. Yet Bell only considers one possibility. If he is an ideologist - even for democratic planning - he accomplishes his ideological arguement by excluding alternatives, not by polemic advocacy; and achieves the same purposes that a manifest ideologist would.

Yet Bell's opposition to technocracy and to the claims of purely functional rationality suggests that Bell is not just an ideologist.

Bell above all else attempts to be a conciliator. He sees his mission as one of developing the ultimate grounds upon which some reconciliation between the economizing and the economizing and the sociologizing mode can be effected in a world that he perceives as being divided on the right by conservatives, who, like Milton Friedman, would see the United States return to the world of Adam Smith and on the left by those consumed by an adversary culture that would threaten the standards upon which Bell's political philosophy is constructed. These are the standards of a man who defines himself as "a socialist in economics, a liberal in politics, and a conservative, in culture."[111] They are the standards of a man who, in his own fashion, has remained faithful to

his own "revisionist" conception of socialism, yet who, at the same time, has ruled out the feasibility of a socialist victory in the United States. This possibility was ruled out by Bell's experiences in the 1930s as a right-wing socialist and his perceptions of the "exhaustion" of socialism in the labor movement as manifested by its reversion back to tradeunionism in the post-war period, that is, to the business unionism of Samuel Gompers.

Bell's conception is one that springs out of the British socialist tradition as articulated by the former British Labour Party leader Clement R. Atlee who in his treatise on socialism in England, The Labour Party in Perspective and Twelve Years Later declared that in order for socialism to succeed in countries with a democratic tradition, it must be adapted to the particular exigencies of the country in which it seeks to occupy a dominant role in. Bell's conception, like Atlee's, rules out of socialism the membership of theorists or revolutionaries so absorbed by "utopian dreams" that they are "unwilling to deal with the actualities of everyday life."[112] Bell's conception is one that would seek to reconcile the faith of socialism with the American pragmatic "national style" with the necessities of limited planning and with the limits of man as a rational being.

In this regard, it is not without significance that Bell could end The Coming of Post-Industrial Society with the same argument about utopianism with which he ended "The End of Ideology in The West: An Epilogue." His ultimate argument is that utopia represents an unrealizable idea that men can

and should strive for but one which they, given the nature of things, can never achieve.

> Utopia has always been conceived as a design of harmony and perfection in the relations between men. In the wisdom of the ancients, utopia was a fruitful impossibility, a conception of the desireable which men should always strive to attain but which, in the nature of things, could not be achieved. And yet, by its very idea, utopia would serve as a standard of judgement on men, an ideal by which to measure the real.[113]

Nor is it without significance that Bell directed this admonition to the New Left:

> The modern hubris has sought to cross that gap and embody the ideal in the real; and in the effort the perspective of the ideal has become diminished and the idea of Utopia has become tarnished. Perhaps it would be wiser to return to the classic conception. Men in their imagination will always seek to make society a work of art; that remains an ideal. Given the tasks that have to be solved, it is enough to engage in the sober construction of social reality.[114]

Yet within his own framework, a public philosphy that is based upon achieving an agreement or concordance on ultimate values, that will limit the demands of all groups on the "public household," be the basis of the rational allocation of societal rewards, and secure the consent of all parties to the allocations and to the mechanism of allocation is itself utopian. Certainly it embodies the Enlightment belief in reason as projected to the total society. Bell's scheme is also utopian in the Enlightment sense that the mere announcement of the reasonable solution to a problem (in his case a reasonable program for the solution of the problem) is the basis of its acceptance. His rationality thus assumes the rationality of others. Yet there is nothing in Bell's program to suggest that his hopes that politicians, businessmen and technologists

will be reasonable (as new-left ideologues are not) are any more than hopes. In converting programmatic hopes to facts, based perhaps on the idea that the necessary will be rationally perceived, Bell may be both a utopian and an unlikely dialectician. The future inevitable reaches out and guides blind men to higher reason that only he, the dialectician, forsees.

The salient problem is how useful is the concept of the post-industrial society in providing a sober construction of social reality. If by "sober" Bell means a construction of social reality that reinforces the end of ideology thesis that the problems of modern industrial society transcent (utopian) ideology and can only be dealt with through planning, the answer is that Bell's concept does provide a sober construction of reality. But a sober construction of reality must also deal with the problem of how planning is legitimated and who legitimates it. A sober construction of reality must, in other words, try to determine when planning, political and otherwise, becomes an end in itself. And in this, the concept of the post-industrial society fails. It also fails to go beyond the formal statement of the need for planning. The specific substantive goals, priorities and allocations are left, to repeat, to the future as are the plans to work out a mechanism for goal allocation and the decision as to who does the actual planning.

Ultimately all that Bell's concept of the post-industrial society succeeds in doing is to specify the programmatic or formal dimensions along which men can plan for a better world.

These dimensions, in effect, represent attempts at a reconciliation of Deweyian instrumentalism with its optimism about the inevitabiltiy of progress through science and planning and the pessimism of Reinhold Niebuhr with its emphasis on the limits of planning reform. But it succeeds at doing this at the price of sacrificing, in the name of a sober image of man, what it was Karl Mannheim's genius to recognize: that utopias cannot always specify their costs in pre-established terms. Nor should they have to, especially when the insistence that they do, in effect, guarantees the virtual perpetuation of the status quo. Bell's image of man is one that stresses the duality that encompasses man's existence and the ineradicable tension under which he lives. It stresses, on the one hand, a murderous aggression from primal impulse, to tear apart and destroy, and on the other, man's "search for order, in art and life, as the binding of the will to harmonious shape."[115]

Ultimately, it is this image of man, an image forged over a lifetime, that makes The Coming of Post-Industrial Society the work of a synthesizer, a moralist, dedicated after the fashion of the nineteenth century English critic Mathew Arnold, to the termpering of the radical idea with the conservative impulse.

In conclusion, it is no accident that we have identified Bell with Mathew Arnold rather than with Edmund Burke the figure that Bell's critics generally implicityly compare him with in their efforts to characterize his work as that of a "neo-conservative." This is not to say that there is

not some basis to using Burke as a model for analyzing Bell's work.

One does not have to strain too hard to see that Burke's Reflections on the Revolution in France bears the strain of his knowledge of the danger of modern abstraction and ideologies when they are allied with modern politics. So too does Bell's work up to and including The Coming of Post-Industrial Society and The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism show evidence of this strain, and often with same result; the failure to recognize that "the moral imagination can easily smother and destroy valuable ideas as (it can) humanize dangerous abstractions."[116] Yet, the use of Burke as a model upon which to discuss Bell's work is fundamentally wrong and on some levels it is even intellectually distasteful.

Such characterizations miss the complexities of Bell's work. They miss the fact, that from a left-liberal perspective, his work is that of a man dedicated to demonstrating the justification of the reconciliation of the economizing and the socialogizing mode to the corporate managers and the defenders of laissez-fair capitalism. They miss the fact that on the right his work is that of a man dedicated to showing the limits of the "adversary culture" embraced by the New Left. The use of Burke as a model upon which to analyze Bell's work misses the fact that Bell's work is rich in the kind of contradictions that one would expect of a man who seeks to reconcile for himself the optimism of a John Dewey with the pessimism of a Reinhold Niebuhr. Bell is an intellectual who, in effect, seeks to reconcile the

Hellenic, the "spontaneity of consciousness," with the Hebraic, "the strictness of conscience."[117]

The advantage in using Mathew Arnold as a model upon which to discuss Bell's work is that it permits us to focus on the contradictions in his work without ever losing a sense of the original impulses that gave rise to them. The Arnold analogy thus gives us a sense of the grounding of the contradictions that frame his work in intellectual history.

What are the contradictions that frame Bell's work? Certainly the most basic and overriding one that permeates his work is the acceptance of what he himself, when discussing the limits of growth argument developed by exponents of the Forrester model, rejected in principle, the view that the world is a closed system of fixed resources. For Bell the Forrester model in espousing this view assumes, that no qualitative change in the behavior of the system takes place or is even possible."[118] The telling thing about Bell is that he accepts a Niebuhrian image of the world, one that as pointed out earlier presumes that man lives in a world of immutable boundaries. This is an image of the world in which is bound by a fixed set of limits; limits that by definition preclude the search for utopia. In this image man is destined to live in a permanent state of anxiety unless he, in accepting his limits as a creature of nature, can operate between those limits and his own aspirations in effecting a balance between the finiteness and the freedom that both bounds his life and makes him, in the final analysis, a creature of necessity.

The most striking thing that one finds in Bell's work from the mid-1940s to the present is that it is guided by the desire to effect some balance between the seventeenth century rationalism of the Enlightenment with its faith in the inevitability of progress and what he calls the "wisdom of the ancients": the realization that life must be bound by "Halakah," that is, by "the law" or "the way."[119] This of course is the basis of his polemic against Marxian socialism. It is the reason why he invoked, against the chiliasm of the Old Left, Max Weber's distinciton between the ethics of responsibility (or the acceptance of limits) and the ethics of conscience (or the dedication to absolute ends). It is also the basis of his polemic against the New Left and modernism.

The counterpart to Bell's efforts to strike a balance between these two strands of intellectual life, seventeenth century enlightenment rationalism and the religiousity of Judiasm and Pauline Christianity, is Mathew Arnold's critique of mid-nineteenth century English life, Culture and Anarchy. In this now classic work Arnold analyzed the philosophical defense of anarchism as a pre-condition for trying to establish "a principle of authority in England sufficiently strong to judge and control the excesses of doing as one likes" that he associated with the Hyde Park riots: one that would constitute a balance between the Hellenic and the Hebraic.[120] Although it was not explicitly mentioned by him, Arnold's subject was John Stuart Mill's essay On Liberty: a work which he respected but nonetheless viewed as rational-

alizing the anarchic tradition that he associated with Benthamism and Nonconformism.[121]

For Arnold the distinction between these categories of intellectual development is that where Hebraism is concerned primarily with conduct and with obedience to a law of conduct - with "strictness of conscience" - Hellenism is concerned primarily with seeing things as they are - with "spontaneity of conscience."[122] It is a distinction between one conception of human nature which "speaks of thinking clearly, seeing things in their essence and beauty, as a grant and precious feat for man to achieve (Hellenism) and another, Hebraism, that "speaks of becoming conscious of sin, of awakening to a sense of sin, as a fact of this kind."[123] The distinction between the two is, as Lionel Trilling noted, a distinction between the basic assumptions of rationalism and Christianity.

The basis of comparison between Arnold and Bell rests upon the fact that where Arnold could weave a philosophy of history around the distinction between the Hebraic and the Hellenistic to analyze the merits of quantity and quality in English society, Bell could do the same thing with respect to American society. This is to say that where Arnold could say in utilizing these concepts "Here is too much of a good thing, or too little and (thus be) spared the offense of saying Here is a bad thing" Bell can do the same thing with respect to rationalism and religion in analyzing American society.[124] The comparison between the two also rests in the fact that each in his own fashion attempted to find in the balance between the Hebraic and the Hellenistic a foundation for order

and authority in society. The difference between the two men of course is that where Arnold argued that mid-nineteenth century England required more Hellenism to achieve a balance between the two extremes Bell has taken the opposite position. For him what is required in order for contemporary America to achieve such a balance is more Hebraism, more order. Yet, what joins Arnold and Bell together are their efforts to effect a reconciliation between these two discordant concepts in response to their own perceptions of the "crisis of liberalism." They can be defined in each case as the efforts of men committed to tempering the radical idea with the conservative impulse.

NOTES

1. Bell, The Coming of Post-Industrial Society, p. 116.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid., p. 10.
6. Bell, The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism, p. 11.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid., p. 12.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid., p. 275.
15. Ibid., p. 11
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid., p. 12.
18. Ibid., p. 14.
19. Bell, The Coming of Post-Industrial Society, p. 409.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid., p. 410.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid., p. 25.
24. Ibid., p. 20.
25. Ibid., p. 258.
26. Ibid., p. 478-9.
27. Ibid., p. 482.

28. Ibid., p. 479.

29. Ibid., p. 480.

30. Ibid.

31. Ibid.

32. Ibid.

33. Ibid., p. 288.

34. Ibid., p. 283.

35. Bell's essay,"The Subordination of the Corporation," originally appeared in the Summer 1971 issue of The Public Interest.

36. Ibid., p. 301.

37. Ibid.

38. Ibid., p. 303.

39. Ibid., p. 304.

40. Ibid., p. 475.

41. Ibid., p. 304.

42. Ibid., p. 409.

43. Ibid., p. 10.

44. Ibid., p. 44.

45. Ibid., p. 150.

46. Ibid., p. 157.

47. Ibid., p. 159.

48. Ibid.

49. Ibid., p. 272.

50. Ibid., p. 271.

51. Ibid., p. 272.

52. Ibid., p. 271.

53. Ibid., p. 272.

54. Ibid.

55. Ibid.

56. Ibid., p. 293.

57. Ibid., p. 269.

58. Ibid., p. 313.

59. Ibid., p. 273.

60. Ibid.

61. Ibid., p. 283.

62. Ibid., p. 284.

63. Ibid., p. 297.

64. Ibid., p. 295.

65. Ibid., p. 310.

66. Ibid.

67. Ibid.

68. Ibid.

69. Ibid., p. 326.

70. For a further discussion see Sidney Hook ed., Human Values and Economic Policy (New York: New York University Press, 1967).

71. I.M. Copi review of Social Choice and Individual Values by Kenneth J. Arrow (New York: John Wile & Sons, 1951) in Ethics 62 (April 1952) p. 221.

72. Bell, The Coming of Post-Industrial Society, p. 306.

73. See Hook Human Values and Economic Policy, p. 41-51.

74. Bell, The Coming of Post-Industrial Society, p. 307.

75. Ibid.

76. Ibid., p. 409.

77. Ibid., p. 410.

78. Ibid., p. 419.

79. Ibid.

80. Ibid.

81. Ibid., p. 418.
82. Ibid., p. 418.
83. Ibid., p. 419.
84. Ibid., p. 422.
85. Ibid.
86. Ibid., p. 423.
87. Ibid.
88. Ibid.
89. Ibid.
90. Ibid., p. 433.
91. Ibid., p. 448.
92. Ibid., p. 449.
93. Ibid.
94. Ibid.
95. Ibid.
96. Ibid.
97. Ibid.
98. Ibid.
99. Ibid., p. 449-50.
100. Ibid., p. 450.
101. Ibid.
102. Ibid., p. 450-1.
103. Ibid., p. 450.
104. Ibid., p. 479.
105. Ibid.
106. Ibid.
107. Ibid.
108. Ibid., p. 365.

109. Ibid.

110. See Kleinberg's American Society in the Post-Industrial Age, p. 85-110. In his critique of Richard J. Barber's The American Corporation: Its Power, Its Money, Its Politics (New York: Sutton, 1970) Kleinberg argues that the adoption of methods not related to the solution of fundamental problems in the Social Sciences has begun to persuade public management. He cites a trend towards the adoption of "business solutions" to public management issues.

111. Bell, 1978 Forward to The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism.

112. Atlee, The Labour Party in Perspective, p. 29.

113. Bell, The Coming of Post-Industrial Society, p. 489-9.

114. Ibid., p. 489.

115. Ibid., p. 488.

116. Richard Chase, The Democratic Vista, (New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1958) p. 124.

117. Mathew Arnold, Culture and Anarchy, p. 129.

118. Bell, The Coming of Post-Industrial Society, p. 464.

119. Bell, Toward the Great Instauration," The Cultural Contradictions, p. 162.

120. Arnold, Culture and Anarchy, p. 45.

121. See Lionel Trilling, Mathew Arnold (New York: W.W. Norton, and Company, 1939) for a discussion of the relationship between the two.

122. Arnold, Culture and Anarchy, p. 124.

123. Ibid., p. 135-6.

124. Ibid., p. 136.

APPENDIX

VALUE ANALYSIS

In the introduction to this study it was suggested that value analysis may imply a greater degree of rationality than can be found in the writings of any theorist. In both our summation of Bell's writings on the end of ideology and of his writings on the post-industrial society we suggested that Bell writes like a journalist and a polemicist. In neither case did we mean to imply that there is anything inherently wrong with journalism and polemics. Our only point was that Bell writes in a less than systematic way. He often uses literary images, allusions and rhetorical devices that convey his meaning by allusion and association rather than by the general and abstract statements that often makes much philosophic and academic prose precise but dull (and often abstract, profuse and murky). Bell's writing reads well, but often at the expense of logical consistency.

In Toward The Year 2000 Bell makes the statement that most readers derive no real sense of the uncertainty and the confusion that marks the path writers travel to reach their conclusions. He made another interesting observation in this study: sometimes the process by which a conclusion is reached may be just as important as the conclusion itself. It was within this context that he called the report of the Commission on the

Year 2000 "works in progress."

In a similar way all of Bell's major books from The Radical Right to The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism including The End of Ideology may be thought of as works in progress. As we have noted in a number of places in this study (pp. 274, 285, 344, 412) it is one of the peculiarities of Bell's intellectual style that the solution to a problem Bell poses is very often assumed by his articulation of the problem. Thus in defining the problem, Bell assumes that he has resolved it. Yet the problems are never fully resolved. Instead, they are placed on an ongoing or prospective "agenda of problems." Bell continuously returns to and re-works these articulations of problems, sometimes in a way that is consistent with his earlier approaches, and at other times in a way that is not. At other times, his essays may end up with a programmatic statement of the intellectual or philosophic thought that must be accomplished before a problem can be solved. In subsequent works, he will treat, i.e., assume that his statement of the programmatic need is the substantive solution of the problem. He therefore allows himself to develop his ideas upon the secure assumption that the necessary preliminary work has been done.

This lack of consistency makes it extraordinarily difficult to analyze Bell's writings: it is often difficult in fact to ascertain what in fact Bell actually has said. Yet because of their inconsistency Bell's writings are especially responsive to value analysis. His writings are responsive to it in a way that underscores the method's ultimate utility. It permits

the analyst to go beneath the literary and programmatic surface and to raise the kinds of questions by which one can ascertain the ultimate values that underlie the development of a particular work or set of works as well as the contradictions and tension that are contained in the works which underlie the writer's articulation of those values.

As we noted at the beginning of this study, value analysis is a method of contextural analysis which seeks to examine the content of an argument in terms of what that argument treats as its ultimate values, to discover the value which are treated as needing no explanation or justification. It also permits the analyst to discover the relationship between these ultimately and necessary hidden values and the more explicit, manifest immediate values and goals. And finally it enables one to ask what is the logical relationship between "deeper" values and more immediate goals; what are the contradictions; what are the unresolved tensions. At the level of ideas, value analysis raises then the question between intellectual means and ends. Work within its parameters allows one to answer these questions. But the method only allows us to place the question, our complete work is the answer.

While we have found Bell's essays often to be internally consistent we also found that, when viewed collectively, different and sometimes irreconcilliable ultimate or axiomatic values are expressed. Nowhere is this more in evidence than in The End of Ideology.

The value of science and comprehensive social planning as a means of collectively solving societies problems

democratically constitute one set of ultimate values that are expressed in The End of Ideology. "Two Roads from Marx," and "The End of Ideology in the West: An Epilogue" embody statements of these values most strongly. The inviolability of individual rights and the virtue of democratic social action are another. "Work and Its Discontents," "Two Roads from Marx," "Status Politics and New Anxieties," and "The End of Ideology in the West: An Epilogue" embody statements of these values most strongly. Restraint and individual moral responsibility constitute yet a third set of ultimate values expressed in that work. "The Breakup of Family Capitalism" and "Status Politics and New Anxieties" provide the clearest statement of these values.

There is a fourth cluster of values, one which is a negative statement of the values of individualism and of democracy. This statement refers to Bell's adversion to the psychological individualism, hedonism, and irresponsibility implicit in modernism and the avante-gardism of Baudelaire, Rimbaud, Nietzsche, Van Wyck Brooks, Walter Lippmann, John Reed, and Harold Stearns. A similar devaluation of individualism with different origins is present in Bell's devaluation of small town hedonism and the pursuit of quantity. The devaluation of modernism and the avante-garde appears to come late in Bell's intellectual development. Manifested initially in 1966 in The Reforming of General Education it reached strident proportions in "Columbia and the New Left" and "The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism." This dimension underlies the renewed emphasis on legitimacy that

characterizes Bell's work after 1968.

Thus while there may be four value clusters in Bell's work the emphasis given to each have varied over time: at no time does any one predominate totally. They are at all times in contradiction but the emphasis at any time will vary.

The fact that The End of Ideology can, at the same time, give expression to these different and, on the surface at least, often irreconciliable ends is only in part the result of that work being a collection of essays written over an eleven year period during which he was in the process of "changing his mind." It is primarily the result of the fact that The End of Ideology was a work which expressed Bell's internalization of both the optimism of John Dewey concerning the potentialities of man to effect through science and reason a just and rational democratic society and the pessimism of Reinhold Niebuhr concerning the limits of planning and democratic action. We repeatedly emphasized in Chapter Six of this study that it was only in the final essay, the "Epilogue," that Bell sought explicitly to reconcile these opposing perspectives. He undertook this task when he stated that the end of ideology need not mean the end of utopia. Yet nowhere in The End of Ideology was Bell able to reconcile the different ultimate values that these opposing perspectives had given rise to in the essays which made up that work.

As we indicated in Chapters Seven and Eight, Bell repeats the same pattern in The Coming of Post-Industrial Society and The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism. The same ultimate values are expressed in each of these works as are expressed

in The End of Ideology. The same attempt to reconcile the Deweyian and the Niebuhrian perspectives is also present, and the same conclusion is reached at the end of each work, to remind the reader that the end of ideology need not mean the end of utopia. The conclusion of each work is to promote the same image of utopia as the one outlined in The End of Ideology: that it is possible for utopias to specify, in advance of their realization, their costs and consequences.

The persistence of this pattern reveals the fact that in none of his major works does Bell ever resolve the tension between the Deweyian and Niebuhrian perspectives. This is to say that in no subsequent work does Bell surmount the unresolved program of the end of ideology. As a result the emphases placed upon the ultimate values his writings give expression to are always shifting, never constant.

Yet there is one overriding constant value which underlies all of his major works. It is an implicit value but one which rises to the surface in 1974 in "The Public Household." It is a value that is implicit in his belief that men in responding to Bell's programmatic injunctions will rationally adopt his unfulfilled program for constructing a public philosophy and, in adopting it, will limit their own individualistic and group aspirations. This is a belief in reason, the same Enlightenment belief in reason that one finds in the works of Saint Simon and Auguste Comte. Yet it is a belief in reason which violates Niebuhr's notion of the self-limitation of men, a belief which receives its first expression in Bell's work in his 1949 essay "America's Un-Marxist Revolution."

The only place where that belief is explicitly discussed (see pp. 459-70) is in the introductory essay to the Commission on the Year 2000 report, Toward the Year 2000. But if Bell expresses any real doubts about this belief in reason, those doubts are limited to the capacity of a commission to serve as a vehicle for articulating a new public philosophy. They are never the doubts of a man who questions his own ability to articulate that philosophy. He seems to be saying that the change he anticipates and predicts will generate, by virtue of his and the Commission's work the creation and acceptance of the yet not stated public philosophy.

The use of value analysis in this study has enabled us to both locate and trace the sources of the contradictions and tension in Bell's writings. It therefore enabled us to view Bell's work within a larger intellectual context than would have otherwise been possible. Value analysis also enabled us to comprehend Bell's work as that of an intellectual who operates within a very distinctly Jewish socialist tradition, a tradition that seeks to reconcile the Hellenistic worldview with the Hebraic worldview. And, finally, value analysis enabled us to see Bell as an intellectual who re-defines ideology to accommodate the needs of his programmatic injunctions and values.

It will be recalled that the purpose of this study was to examine Bell's writings as the production of an intellectual and to determine the degree to which he could be understood in more specific terms as an ideologist or a scientist. It was dedicated to the critique of concept construction. As Max

Weber suggested the character of knowledge in all the sciences rests on value assumptions, and one of the ultimate functions of the critique of concept construction is to shed light on what a generation of scientists finds culturally significant, problematic and therefore worthy of knowing. The use of the critique of concept construction is thus a way of studying the values of a particular society and hence of knowing more about that society. Indeed, Weber stated that the greatest gains in the social sciences come through the critique of concept constructions. In part then the critique of concept constructions permits us to study the rise of new and previously unanticipated problems. These are problems that might not otherwise come to our attention but which nonetheless may determine what the scientist unreflectively will study.

If value analysis permits us to comprehend Bell as an intellectual who operates within a distinctly Jewish socialist tradition then it also permits us to see him as an intellectual who is well versed in both Deweyian instrumentalism as he is in the more conventional dictums of scientific value relativism yet who can not find an intellectual resting place in either.

If it does nothing else but enable us to see an analyst of social policy in these terms value analysis provides an invaluable function. It enables us to define Bell's efforts to develop a theory of social change in relation to the problem of objectivity in the social sciences.

Time and time again we have found Bell groping for a way of establishing through Deweyian pragmatism some way of measuring values, some way of developing a scientific approach

to planning which does not negate the principles of a free and liberal collective society. The End of Ideology is one example. The Coming of Post-Industrial Society is another. The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism is yet, a third. Sometime ago Bell said that "facts are stubborn masters." Two "facts" can scarcely be neglected. The first is that his work almost always fails to realize his programmatic intentions. The second is that this failure may be inevitable. It rests in a basic methodological deficiency of Deweyian pragmatism.

The salient feature of Deweyian pragmatism is that in rejecting absolute values Dewey expressed the hope that one can judge one's values by the consequences of the application of those values in practice. Yet, to judge the application of values in practice one must use values as the basis for one's standard of judgement. The act of judgement thus implies a priori values: if we are to judge values we have to judge them in terms of other values. Those other values, if accepted as the criterion for judgement, are at least for the moment, accepted as absolute values. At the most, Dewey may be saying that we postpone the act of judgement of values until that time when the judgement of values is necessary and appropriate. If this is Dewey's argument Dewey "solves" the problem by postponing final judgement and rendering any complete acceptance of ultimate values into a series of discrete judgements which may when viewed with the passage of time as contradictory, reversible, and expedient. But, if this is the case Dewey does not solve the problem of what values are to be the criteria of judgement. To repeat, Dewey postpones the

problem but does not rule it out of existence. If one wishes to support Dewey's position one can say that "that's life." There is no other solution in human existence than the fact that our ultimate values are always emergent and, socially, are based on consensus.

Ultimately then, it is not without some irony that Bell, the man most commonly associated with the end of ideology, remains a utopian in his belief in reason. He is trapped by the same ultimate optimism that one finds in Marx and Dewey. Theirs is not the utopianism of fools but of intellectuals whose faith in reason can only find a home outside of science. But this is a conclusion they refuse to accept. Science will assure their quest for certainty; their own values do not.

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