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A Rhetorical Analysis of John Henry Cardinal Newman's
Lectures on the Present Position of Catholics in England

by

Carl F. Frandsen

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty
in English in partial fulfillment of the requirements
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This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in English in satisfaction of the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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To my parents, whose emotional and
financial support proved invaluable

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Chapter One. Introduction: A. The Rhetorical Background.

John Henry Cardinal Newman has long been recognized as one of the most outstanding English controversialists of the nineteenth century. Martin J. Svaglic, for example, says flatly, "Whatever else one may think about Newman, he was unquestionably one of the greatest rhetoricians in our language."¹ In consequence, many of Newman's works have been subjected to an intensive rhetorical analysis to lay bare his masterful techniques of persuasion.² No one has yet seen fit, however, to subject to such a scrutiny perhaps the most rewarding of all Newman's works from the standpoint of rhetorical technique, his Lectures on the Present Position of Catholics in England.

What makes the Lectures a potentially rich field for such analysis? First are the broad range of rhetorical devices employed which are hardly to be found in any of Newman's other argumentative works, devices such as invective, denunciation, sarcasm, satire, burlesque, caricature, irony and just plain humor. Second are the brilliantly planned and executed series of inductive and deductive arguments which inexorably lead the biased Protestant reader to an open-minded consideration of Catholicism. Third is Newman's use of various figures of speech, images and examples which brings vividly home to the reader his sublime personal vision of Catholicism and correspondingly ridiculous view of

Protestant anti-Catholic prejudice, and which provides the emotional impetus for the reader to drop this prejudice. Newman's skillful meshing together of these rhetorical arguments, devices, figures of speech, images and examples into one seamless whole may very well be the reason that he spoke of the Lectures not only as the best composed of all his writings,³ but also as one of his "two most perfect works, artistically."⁴

That the work has achieved the status of a classic in the art of persuasion is no accident; speaking directly to Protestants in the audience at the close of the Lectures, Newman frankly avowed the importance he attached to painstaking rhetorical preparation: "I have uttered nothing at random, but have had reasons, both for what I said and my manner of saying it."⁵ When this comment is coupled with the fact that Newman had extensive university training in classical rhetoric, including further intensive study on his own,⁶ one is led to the inescapable conclusion that his Lectures represent a highly deliberate use of rhetorical art. Therefore, no matter how much a particular passage may appear to be a spontaneous outpouring of humor, sarcasm, wit, irony or any other mode of speech (and we know from his letters that Newman composed the Lectures at the incredible rate of one per week, racing to meet a printer's deadline),⁷ almost certainly it has the highly self-conscious aim of persuading a particular audience of the truth of a particular matter, in accordance with the tenets of classical rhetoric.⁸

Indeed, Loughery, who has built up a cogent picture of Newman's rhetorical theory gleaned from the many comments on the subject which are scattered throughout his writings, reaches the conclusion that "Newman's conception of rhetoric is consistent with the classical tradition as represented by Aristotle, Cicero, Quintilian, and St. Augustine."⁹ Yet a closer examination of the Lectures shows that Newman often uses words in ways very different from the standard techniques of classical rhetoric, so much so that his whole approach to rhetoric with its emphasis on the concrete must be redefined in many instances as "romantic" rather than "classical."

Moreover, a comparison of his comments on rhetoric with those of Aristotle often shows a wide divergence, as well as agreement, with the principles of classical rhetoric. Aristotle, for example, says, "A statement is persuasive and credible either because it is directly self-evident or because it appears to be proved from other statements that are so."¹⁰ Furthermore, he states, "Persuasion is clearly a sort of demonstration, since we are most fully persuaded when we consider a thing to have been demonstrated. The orator's demonstration is an enthymeme, and this is, in general, the most effective of the modes of persuasion" (Rhetorica, I.1.1355^a).

Though Aristotle is also well aware of the effects of the emotions on persuasion, e.g., "Our judgments when we are pleased and friendly are not the same as when we are pained and hostile" (Rhetorica, I.2.1356^a), and devotes a good part of Book II of the Rhetorica to an analysis of the emotions

and how to put the audience in the proper frame of mind to listen favorably to one's argument, still his emphasis is on inductive and deductive reasoning as the only proper mode of persuasion. He holds as essentially irrelevant the stress on the emotions as a means of persuasion by certain writers on rhetoric:

The modes of persuasion [i.e., "attempts at logical argument" (Rhetorica, I.1.1354^a,n.3)] are the only true constituents of the art: everything else is merely accessory. These writers, however, say nothing about enthymemes, which are the substance of rhetorical persuasion, but deal mainly with non-essentials. The arousing of prejudice, pity, anger, and similar emotions has nothing to do with the essential facts, but is merely a personal appeal to the man who is judging the case.

He condemns as wrong attempts to sway judgment by appealing to the emotions instead of reason: "It is not right to pervert the judge by moving him to anger or envy or pity--one might as well warp a carpenter's rule before using it" (Rhetorica, I.1.1354^a).

Implicit in Aristotle's view of rhetoric is the notion of an objective reality independent of the subjective outlook of any particular man, an objective reality which has a natural attraction for men and is capable of being known by them: "Men have a sufficient natural instinct for what is true, and usually do arrive at the truth" (Rhetorica, I.1.1355^a). Ideally, then, one should persuade only by appeals to reason; appeals to emotion or the character of the speaker should be looked upon as necessary concessions to the human frailty of the audience, to get it in the frame of mind favorable to an appeal to the rational faculty: "The

right thing in speaking really is that we should be satisfied not to annoy our hearers, without trying to delight them; we ought in fairness to fight our case with no help beyond the bare facts" (Rhetorica, III.1.1404^a). It is well to emphasize that Aristotle says this even though Roberts notes that for Aristotle, "The average member of a large audience is regarded as a 'sorry creature' (μολοθηρός), carried away by his feelings and paying little heed to reason" (Rhetorica, III,1,1404^a,n.3).

Newman is in full agreement with Aristotle of the power of the emotions to sway listeners, but downgrades the power of reason: "Men act not because they are convinced, but because they feel."¹¹ Moreover, rather than calling the mass of men "sorry creatures" for being swayed by emotion rather than by reason, Newman calls the use of logic "sorry": "Logic makes but a sorry rhetoric with the multitude; first shoot round corners, and you may not despair of converting by a syllogism."¹²

Why does Newman give reason such a low priority when it comes to persuading an audience? It is primarily because he is keenly aware of all the irrational influences that go into the act of making up one's mind: "The heart is commonly reached, not through the reason, but through the imagination, by means of direct impressions, by the testimony of facts and events, by history, by description. Persons influence us, voices melt us, looks subdue us, deeds inflame us. Many a man will live and die upon a dogma; no man will be a martyr for a conclusion." He concludes that "man is not a

reasoning animal; he is a seeing, feeling, contemplating, acting animal."¹³ Furthermore, unlike Aristotle who says that "every one who proves anything at all is bound to use either syllogisms or inductions" (Rhetorica, I.2.1356^b), Newman holds that such formal reasoning is not vital to the process of finding the truth: "Clearness in argument certainly is not indispensable to reasoning well. Accuracy in stating doctrines or principles is not essential to feeling or acting upon them. The exercise of analysis is not necessary to the integrity of the process analyzed. The process of reasoning is complete in itself, and independent."¹⁴

The proof for this statement lies in Newman's analysis of the reasoning process itself:

Reason, according to the simplest view of it, is the faculty of gaining knowledge without direct perception, or of ascertaining one thing by means of another. . . . The mind ranges to and fro, and spreads out, and advances forward with a quickness which has become a proverb, and a subtlety and versatility which baffle investigation. It passes on from point to point, gaining one by some indication; another on a probability; then availing itself of an association; then falling back on some received law; next seizing on testimony; then committing itself to some popular impression, or some inward instinct, or some obscure memory; and thus it makes progress not unlike a clamberer on a steep cliff, who, by quick eye, prompt hand, and firm foot, ascends how he knows not himself, by personal endowments and by practice, rather than by rule, leaving no track behind him, and unable to teach another. . . . and such mainly is the way in which all men, gifted or not gifted, commonly reason,--not by rule, but by an inward faculty.¹⁵

Newman thus perceives the irrationality of the reasoning process itself, how it depends essentially not on a formal system of induction or deduction in the Aristotelian manner, but on "indication," "probability," "association," "received law," "testimony," "impression," and "instinct." Hence it

naturally follows that "our most natural mode of reasoning is, not from proposition to proposition, but from things to things, from concrete to concrete, from wholes to wholes."¹⁶ This description of the way the mind really works puts the relevancy of the whole Aristotelian system of formal reasoning to the real world in doubt: "But what is abstract reasoning to a question of concrete fact? To arrive at the fact of any matter, we must eschew generalities, and take things as they stand with all their circumstances."¹⁷

Newman draws several important conclusions from this. First, "Science [*i.e.*, in the sense of logic], working by itself, reaches truth in the abstract, and probability in the concrete."¹⁸ Hence, "In concrete matter, on which I am engaged, demonstration [*i.e.*, formal proof in the Aristotelian manner] is impossible."¹⁹ This does not, however, rule out the possibility of "absolute certitude" in concrete matters equivalent to the "strictest scientific demonstration," as Newman's famous argument of "converging probabilities" makes clear:

My argument is in outline as follows: that that absolute certitude which we were able to possess . . . was the result of an assemblage of concurring and converging probabilities, and that, both according to the constitution of the human mind and the will of its Maker; that certitude was a habit of mind, that certainty was a quality of propositions; that probabilities which did not reach to logical certainty, might suffice for a mental certitude; that the certitude thus brought about might equal in measure and strength the certitude which was created by the strictest scientific demonstration.²⁰

Because "absolute certitude" could thus be found in the concrete, "reasonings in concrete matters" could be valued as highly as abstract reasoning as a means of attaining the

truth even though "they are never more than probabilities."²¹

The esteem in which Newman holds the concrete as a means of attaining the truth also explains the high value he places on the meaning of words in all their many connotations as well as denotations, in contrast to the precise way in which they are used in logical demonstration:

The concrete matter of propositions is a constant source of trouble to syllogistic reasoning, as marring the simplicity and perfection of its process. Words, which denote things, have innumerable implications; but in inferential exercises it is the very triumph of that clearness and hardness of head, which is the characteristic talent for the art, to have stripped them of all these connatural senses, to have drained them of that depth and breadth of associations which constitute their poetry, their rhetoric, and their historical life, to have starved each term down till it has become the ghost of itself, and everywhere one and the same ghost . . . so that it may stand for just one unreal aspect of the concrete thing to which it properly belongs, for a relation, a generalization, or other abstraction, for a notion neatly turned out of the laboratory of the mind, and sufficiently tame and subdued, because existing only in a definition.²²

Aristotle, on the other hand, believes that "we ought in fairness to fight our case with no help beyond the bare facts: nothing, therefore, should matter except the proof of those facts. . . . Nobody uses fine language when teaching geometry" (*Rhetorica*, III,1,1404^a). Proof via abstract reasoning which Aristotle favors thus demands that words be restricted to one precise meaning. In contrast, Newman's belief in the value of the concrete led him to see words with their many connotations as instruments capable in the hands of the "man of genius" of exactly reflecting his "world of thought as its very shadow." From this it follows that "Thought and speech are inseparable from each other.

Matter and expression are parts of one: style is a thinking out into language."²³

This insistence on the identity between thought and the expression of the thought, though a natural consequence of Newman's valuing of the concrete, puts him poles apart from Aristotle, who downgraded the importance of words except insofar as they affected the clarity with which the proof was demonstrated: "The arts of language cannot help having a small but real importance whatever it is we have to expound to others: the way in which a thing is said does affect its intelligibility. Not, however, so much importance as people think. All such arts are fanciful and meant to charm the hearer" (Rhetorica, III.1.1404^a). Obviously, to Aristotle it was the chain of reasoning, inductive or deductive, which was vital to the attainment of truth; words were merely a means to this end. Just as obviously, to Newman, it was the concrete use of the words themselves which was vital to the attainment of truth.

For him, "thought" meant much more than the use of reason in a formal, Aristotelian manner. It was "the ideas, feelings, views, reasonings and other operations of the human mind" all rolled into one.²⁴ In sum, "It is the concrete being that reasons; pass a number of years, and I find my mind in a new place; how? the whole man moves; paper logic is but the record of it."²⁵ Hence,

The throng and succession of ideas, thoughts, feelings, imaginations, aspirations, which pass within him, the abstractions, the juxtapositions, the comparisons, the discriminations, the conceptions, which are so original in him, his view of external things, his judgments upon

life, manners and history, the exercises of his wit, of his humour, of his depth, of his sagacity, all these innumerable and incessant creations, the very pulsation and throbbing of his intellect, does he image forth, to all does he give utterance, in a corresponding language, which is as multiform as this inward mental action itself and analogous to it.²⁶

All this ceaseless mental activity, which can be summed up as the personal "vision" of the speaker, demands precise expression: "The artist . . . has his great or rich visions before him, and his only aim is to bring out what he thinks or what he feels in a way adequate to the thing spoken of, and appropriate to the speaker."²⁷

Thus, the ultimate result of Newman's valuing of the concrete is the attainment of truth through the apprehension of a personal vision of life rather than through the application of inductive or deductive reasoning in the Aristotelian manner. And since the expression was inseparable from the thought, this meant that the very words themselves made up the vision and were not, in the Aristotelian view, simply "meant to charm the hearer" into accepting it. John Holloway admirably sums up the organic interrelatedness between Newman's personal vision of life and the manner in which this vision was expressed:

[Newman] had a comprehensive doctrine about the world, man's place in it, and how he ought to live. This took the religious form of Roman Catholic Christianity, and its metaphysical form was that the whole universe was one integrated system. In making us accept that view of life, particular doctrines and distinctive methods of presentation or argument stand . . . essentially related; each encourages the reader to accept the other. As for the methods themselves, the central point of this whole inquiry is that they do not merely state Newman's outlook, but they display it. They fuse together to be a picture with the qualities that he wants us to see in the world. All the time, a variety of

techniques--metaphor and analogy, discussions of meaning, carefully chosen examples--steadily tend to make the controversial non-controversial, so that we are not coerced by any "smart syllogism" into accepting Newman's conclusions in the abstract, but brought imperceptibly to a living understanding of his creed. The continuous texture of his work modifies our receptivity until we find ourselves seeing the world as he sees it. To this end all the parts of his work act in conjunction. Tone, forms of argument, illustration and example, imagery and manipulating senses integrate to make something which has a single unified impact on the reader; and the impact is not that of a formal argument, but in its fullness and vividness more resembles that of a work of art, something which can make the reader find more in his experience, see it with new eyes, because for a while it constitutes his whole experience.²⁸

What are the implications of this organic interrelatedness between a vision of life and its expression for Newman's use of rhetoric? First, he recognized that persuasion depended on reaching and affecting the feelings of his listeners: "Strictly speaking, it is not imagination that causes action; but hope and fear, likes and dislikes, appetite, passion, affection, the stirrings of selfishness and self-love."²⁹ Yet since the imagination affected the feelings, by affecting the imagination through the use of the concrete one could also affect the feelings and thus persuade: "But the images in which it [i.e., the imagination] lives, representing as they do the concrete, have the power of the concrete upon the affections and passions, and by means of these indirectly become operative."³⁰

Hence if a listener or reader could but experience the world as Newman saw it, he would come to share Newman's vision and thus be affected by it. Moreover, since the vision and the expression of it were identical, the vision could be given wide circulation by being put in the form, first of

lectures, and then of a book. How persuasive such a vision would be, in turn, would depend on the extent to which it was grounded in the concrete, for Newman had concluded that "What is concrete exerts a force and makes an impression on the mind, which nothing abstract can rival."³¹ Lewis E. Gates has noted that Newman used words for the specific purpose of grounding his vision in the concrete as much as possible for this very intention of persuasion: "By his idiomatic and colloquial phrasing, by his specific vocabulary, by his delicately adroit use of metaphors, by his carefully elaborated imagery, and by his wealth of examples and illustrations, Newman keeps resolutely to the concrete, and imparts everywhere to his style warmth, vividness, colour, convincing actuality [*italics my own*]." ³²

In the Apologia Pro Vita Sua, for example, Walter E. Houghton points out that Newman dramatized narrative settings to make them as vivid to the imagination as possible, that he used syntax to give an impression of the very "inner pattern and movement of his thinking" and metaphor "to define emotion or to project the fusion of thought and feeling," and employed conversational idiom to "translate the clash of ideas back into their original human context."³³ In this work, Mary Babylon Lenz also notes, Newman altered tone through his adept use of imagery, making pleasing imagery project positive ideas and distasteful imagery project negative ones,³⁴ and, to gain sympathy, he shrewdly employed "pathetic images which make no direct appeal for sympathy yet suggest it."³⁵

In sum, what is the result of using language to emphasize the concrete in this way? As Holloway says, "[all these] variety of techniques--metaphor and analogy, discussions of meaning, carefully chosen examples--steadily tend to make the controversial non-controversial, so that we are not coerced by any 'smart syllogism' into accepting Newman's conclusion in the abstract, but brought imperceptibly to a living understanding of his creed." In other words, as Gates notes, Newman uses the concrete of which these techniques are examples, to impart "everywhere to his style . . . convincing actuality." Newman thus wins assent essentially by turning controversy into experience which he then relates to the reader, for one cannot argue with the fact of experience itself but only accept it.

This technique of using the concrete "to make the controversial non-controversial" by turning controversy into experience is of key importance in understanding Newman's rhetorical approach in Lectures on the Present Position of Catholics in England, for here he was dealing with a highly emotional issue, Protestant anti-Catholic prejudice which was sanctioned by a long historical tradition of bigotry. As an aid to understanding the way Newman specifically used figures of speech to emphasize the concrete in the Lectures, and so bring the minds of his readers around to his vision of Catholicism and Protestant anti-Catholic prejudice, examples of schemes and tropes most commonly used in the Lectures can be listed. These will also serve as points of reference for later detailed rhetorical analysis of each of the nine lectures.

A. Schemes (i.e., "a deviation from the ordinary pattern or arrangement of words").

1. Schemes of Balance

Parallelism--similarity of structure in a pair or series of related words, phrases or clauses.

'Does anyone wish an example of pride? there stands Wolsey; of barbarity? there is the Duke of Alva; of rebellion? there is Becket' (p.78).

Isocolon--parallel elements . . . similar not only in structure but in length.

'He became an artistic decoration, and an heraldic emblazonment' (p. 4).

Antithesis--the juxtaposition of contrasting ideas, often in parallel structure.

'It is not what the Catholic Church imposes, but what human nature prompts, which leads any portion of her ecclesiastics into sin' (p. 136).

2. Schemes of unusual or inverted word order (hyberbaton)

Parenthesis--insertion of some verbal unit in a position that interrupts the normal syntactical flow of the sentence.

'not only should point out their mistakes, but, prodigious insolence! should absolutely laugh at the absurdity of their assertions, and the imbecility of their arguments' (p. 374).

Apposition--placing side by side two co-ordinate elements, the second of which serves as an explanation or modification of the first.

'Such is the virtue of prejudice--it is ever reproductive' (p. 241).

3. Schemes of Omission

Ellipsis--deliberate omission of a word or of words

which are readily implied by the context.

'They say, It cannot be supposed He will work many miracles; we, It cannot be supposed He will work few' (p. 301).

Asyndeton--deliberate omission of conjunctions between a series of related clauses.

'Something or other men must fear, men must loathe, men must suspect' (p. 160).

Polysyndeton--deliberate use of many conjunctions.

'that facts, and logic, and justice, and good sense, and right, and virtue, are all supposed to lie in the opposite scale' (p. 2).

4. Schemes of Repetition

Alliteration--repetition of initial or medial consonants in two or more adjacent words.

'Yet none of these parties, whatever they doubt, or deny, or disbelieve, see their way to leave the position in which they find themselves at present' (p. 137).

Epistrophe--repetition of the same word or group of words at the ends of successive clauses.

'nothing whatever in the universe will ever make him think one hair-breadth more favorably of Popery than he does think, than he has ever thought and than his family ever thought before him' (p. 238).

Climax--arrangement of words, phrases, or clauses in an order of increasing importance.

'It is the world, the flesh, and the devil, not celibacy, which is the ruin of those who fall' (p. 136).

Polyptoton--repetition of words derived from the same root.

'Those cellars were cells! (p. 121).

B. Tropes (i.e., a deviation from the ordinary and principal signification of a word).

Metaphor--an implied comparison between two things of unlike nature that yet have something in common.

'The very flower and cream of Protestantism'
(p.181).

Simile--an explicit comparison between two things of unlike nature that yet have something in common.

'a person sets out in life with these maxims as a sort of stock in trade in all religious speculations' (p. 369).

Metonymy--substitution of some attributive or suggestive word for what is actually meant.

'they proceeded to throw our poor forefathers to the beasts, to the flame, and to the deep' (p.288).

Personification--investing abstractions or inanimate objects with human qualities or abilities.

'Walter Scott . . . cowering before the jealous frown of the tyrant Tradition' (pp. 71-72).

Hyperbole--the use of exaggerated terms for the purpose of emphasis or heightened effect.

'our advances are met as would be those of some hideous baboon, or sloth, or rattlesnake, or toad, which strove to make itself agreeable' (p.265).

Litotes--deliberate use of understatement . . . to enhance the impressiveness of what we say.

∟ Lion commenting on decorations which always showed Man the victor ∟ "Lions would have fared better, had lions been the artists" (p.4).

Rhetorical Question--asking a question, not for the purpose of eliciting an answer, but for the purpose of asserting or denying something obliquely.

'Is it not true? can it be denied? is it not portentous? does it not argue an incompleteness or hiatus in the very structure of their moral nature?' (p. 264).

Irony--use of a word in such a way as to convey a meaning opposite to the literal meaning of the word."³⁶

'the incarcerations, the torturings, the starvings, the immurings, the murderings proper to a monastic establishment' (p. 121).

In considering Newman's use of such rhetorical techniques as figures of speech to emphasize the concrete, however, one must not think that he abandoned inductive and deductive reasoning altogether. On the contrary, as Joseph J. Reilly points out, "he planned his approach so skillfully that mind and heart were both beset at once, and never throughout his numerous controversial works did he make any sustained appeal to the one to the exclusion of the other."³⁷ In other words, Newman's emphasis on the concrete works hand-in-hand with appeals to reason to convince the "whole man," which includes his feelings and not just his rational faculty.

Newman's divergence from the classical rhetoric of Aristotle may thus be summed up this way: Since Aristotle believed in an objective reality which could be discovered by means of inductive and deductive reasoning, he felt that rhetorical appeals should, as much as possible, be directed exclusively to the rational faculty. Therefore, appeals to the emotions or the character of the speaker should be used only to put the audience in the frame of mind proper to receive the appeal to reason. The use of words was merely incidental to this end of proof by inductive and deductive

reasoning.

Since reality for Newman was subjective, however, his essential method of persuasion was to have the audience come to share in his personal vision. He therefore employed whichever appeal, logical, ethical, or pathetic, or combination thereof, which would be most effective in accomplishing this end. Furthermore, since for Newman expression was identical with thought, and not merely incidental to it as with Aristotle, the choice and arrangement of words was of prime importance in presenting this personal vision. Finally, since the "wholeman" had to be persuaded, and could only be convinced by the concrete, the vision had to be grounded in the concrete as much as possible, for the ultimate object was to have the audience re-experience the vision and thus be affected by it, rather than merely giving intellectual assent with the mind while the heart remained unchanged.

Another key to understanding Newman's radical departure from the tenets of classical rhetoric lies in his comments on poetic diction as contrasted with those of Aristotle. In the Poetics, Aristotle might be giving a recipe for effective style in poetical speech:

The perfection of style is to be clear without being mean. The clearest style is that which uses only current or proper words; at the same time it is mean. . . . That diction, on the other hand, is lofty and raised above the commonplace which employs unusual words. . . . Yet a style wholly composed of such words is either a riddle or a jargon. . . . A certain infusion, therefore, of these elements is necessary to style; for the strange (or rare) word, the metaphorical, the ornamental, and the other kinds above mentioned,

will raise it above the commonplace and mean, while the use of proper words will make it perspicuous.³⁸

Clearly form is separable from content here. Nothing is in greater contrast than Newman's thoughts on poetic diction, in which form and content are inseparable:

Poetical eloquence consists, first, in the power of illustration; which the poet uses, not as the orator, voluntarily, for the sake of clearness or ornament, but almost by constraint, as the sole outlet and expression of intense inward feeling.³⁹

Why is this important as a key to understanding Newman's use of rhetoric in the Lectures, which were, after all, delivered in prose? There are two very good reasons. The first is concerned with the connection which Newman sees between poetry and morality: "We do not hesitate to say that poetry is ultimately founded on correct moral perception."⁴⁰ From this conclusion, Newman can draw his visionary conception of the Church which he wishes to impress on his audience:

According to the above theory, Revealed Religion should be especially poetical--and it is so in fact. While its disclosures have an originality in them to engage the intellect, they have a beauty to satisfy the moral nature. It presents us with those ideal forms of excellence in which a poetical mind delights, and with which all grace and harmony are associated. It brings us into a new world--a world of overpowering interest, of the sublimest views and the tenderest and purest feelings. The peculiar grace of mind of the New Testament writers is as striking as the actual effect produced upon the hearts of those who have imbibed their spirit. At present we are not concerned with the practical, but the poetical nature of revealed truth. With Christians, a poetical view of things is a duty,--we are bid to color all things with hues of faith, to see a Divine meaning in every event, and a superhuman tendency. Even our friends around are invested with unearthly brightness--no longer imperfect men, but beings taken into Divine favour, stamped with His seal, and in training for future happiness.

This conception of the Church as a vision, however, naturally inclines more towards poetry as its instrument of exposition and persuasion than rhetoric:

It may be added that the virtues peculiarly Christian are especially poetical--meekness, gentleness, compassion, contentment, modesty, not to mention the devotional virtues; whereas the ruder and more ordinary feelings are the instruments of rhetoric more justly than of poetry--anger, indignation, emulation, martial spirit, and love of independence.⁴¹

Yet to expound the idea of the Church as a vision, essentially a new way of looking at oneself and the world which calls for the use of poetical terms rather than the logical terms of classical rhetoric, immediately leaves the conception vulnerable to an attack by reason; logic can object to parts of the vision in detail as absurd without reference to the whole underlying concept. As Newman says,

Thus, for instance, men attack ceremonies and discipline of the Church, appealing to common sense, as they call it; which really means, appealing to some proposition which, though true in its own province, is nothing to the purpose in theology; or appealing to the logical accuracy of the argument, where everything turns on the real meaning of the terms employed, which can only be understood by the religious mind.⁴²

In addition, this vision of ultimate Truth finds itself at a positive disadvantage in abiding by the rules of classical rhetoric:

the warfare between Error and Truth is necessarily advantageous to the former, from its very nature, as being conducted by set speech or treatise; and this, not only for a reason already assigned, the deficiency of Truth in the power of eloquence, and even of words, but moreover from the very neatness and definiteness of method required in a written or spoken argument. Truth is vast and far-stretching, viewed as a system; and viewed in its separate doctrines, it depends on the combination of various, delicate, and scattered evidences; hence it can scarcely be exhibited in a

given number of sentences. If this be attempted, its advocate, unable to exhibit more than a fragment of the whole, must round off its rugged extremities, and unite its straggling lines, by much the same process by which an historical narrative is converted into a tale. This, indeed, is the very art of composition, which, accordingly, is only with extreme trouble preserved clear of exaggeration and artifice; and who does not see that all this is favourable to the cause of error,--to that party which has not faith enough to be patient of doubt, and has just talent enough to consider perspicuity the chief excellence of a writer?⁴³

The question then becomes, how can the poetical vision of the Church be presented in such a way as to persuade the audience of its truth without becoming vulnerable to an attack by the claims of reason? The connection between Newman's prose and his conception of poetry in which form and content are inseparable becomes important here as a means of presenting his vision successfully; he also later affirmed of prose as used by a "man of genius" that "Thought and speech are inseparable from each other. Matter and expression are parts of one: style is a thinking out into language." In the hands of the "man of genius," then, the form and content of prose are as inseparable as that of the best poetry. Therefore, prose can become as suitable an instrument as poetry for presenting the poetical vision of the Church.

The way in which Newman now uses his prose to present the poetical vision consists of three main techniques, often employed in conjunction. First, he turns potential controversy into concrete experience which he then relates to the reader, gaining his assent for the simple reason that one cannot argue with the fact of experience itself but only

accept it.

Second, he subtly employs gradation, using logic as needed to carry the reader from one state of argumentative assent to the next. Albert S. Cook notes,

Gradation deceives us with the semblance of wholes, of adequacy, of truth, of singular importance. Newman is aware of this, as he explicitly avers, and few modern writers have made a more effective use of the principle. He masses and groups particulars, the individual significance of which we can not help confessing, with reference to a generalization which seems to follow of itself, unaided by effort on our part or his. Link by link the chain of his logic is wound about us, and before we know it we are bound hand and foot in a bondage so pleasing that we almost prefer it to liberty.⁴⁴

Third, he uses schemes and tropes in concrete fashion, imposes special meanings on certain words, and places certain words in proximity to each other, all of which leads the reader himself to draw conclusions too strong to be openly asserted and to infer conclusions for which Newman does not have to provide proof. (Such persuasion by implication would be impossible under the logical system of classical rhetoric as expounded by Aristotle.) In this manner Newman avoids a direct confrontation with the claims of abstract reason; he is free to build up his poetical view of the Catholic Church by concrete example without reference to logic (unless advantageous to his cause) until the reader fully re-experiences this vision in his own mind, as well as that of the Church's Protestant denigrators as ignorant, vicious, and misguided men.

NOTES TO CHAPTER ONE

1. "John Henry Newman. Man and Humanist" in Victorian Prose: A Guide to Research, ed. David J. DeLaura (New York: MLA, 1973), p. 127.
2. See, for example, Sister Mariella Gable, "The Rhetoric of Cardinal Newman's Sermons," Diss. Cornell, 1934; Mary Babylon Lenz, "A Rhetorical Analysis of Cardinal Newman's Apologia Pro Vita Sua," Diss. Notre Dame, 1962; Paul Lee Mitchell, "An Analysis of the Rhetoric of John Henry Newman's Idea of a University," Diss. S. Miss. State, 1971.
3. Letter to Dean Church quoted in Wilfred Ward, The Life of John Henry Cardinal Newman (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1912), I, 264, n.1.
4. Letter to Henry Wilberforce, Dec. 20, 1852, quoted in The Letters and Diaries of John Henry Newman, XV, ed. C. S. Dessain and V. F. Blehl, S. J. (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons, Ltd., 1964), 226. Hereafter cited as Letters.
5. Lectures on the Present Position of Catholics in England (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1918), p. 402. All subsequent page references are to this edition.
6. See James H. Loughery, "The Rhetorical Theory of John Cardinal Newman," Diss. Michigan, 1951, both for an account of Newman's extensive training in classical rhetoric, and his many cogent thoughts on the art, as gleaned from his various works. Loughery reaches this conclusion:

Newman had a thorough education and background in classical rhetoric. . . . The formal course of studies at Oxford introduced him to the classical writings of Aristotle, Cicero and Quintilian. His writings show that he extended his knowledge of Aristotle and Cicero by additional personal study. . . . Being a member of the Oriel Common Room, he frequently conversed with Richard Whately and Edward Copleston, two of the outstanding authorities on classical rhetoric in the middle years of the nineteenth century (p. 281).

7. According to the editors of Letters, the Lectures "were delivered weekly, from 30 June to 1 Sept., except for the first Monday in August," and "Each lecture was on sale separately, a week after delivery" (XIV [1963], 298, n. 2). This meant that Newman had to finish writing each lecture the Friday before he delivered it in order to meet the printer's deadline, give the lecture on Monday, and immediately begin writing the next one

in order to meet the printer's upcoming deadline the following Friday. It is no wonder, therefore, that in his letter of July 16, 1851, to James Hope, written in the midst of giving the Lectures, Newman confessed, "At present I am a man of one idea. The printers are upon me; by the morning after next I must have copy finished and transcribed to the amount of 40 pages close type; and it is not near ready" (Letters, XIV, 310), or that in his letter of August 16, 1851, to Miss Holmes, he admitted the strain was beginning to tell: "I am busy almost to suffocation--I am delivering and printing nearly 50 pages a week" (Letters, XIV, 330).

8. Newman repeated this classical dictum in The Idea of a University Defined and Illustrated (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1935), when he said that rhetoric "is a relative art, and in that respect differs from logic, which simply teaches the right use of reason; whereas Rhetoric is the art of persuasion, which implies a person who is to be persuaded" (p. 415).
9. "The Rhetorical Theory of John Cardinal Newman," p. 282.
10. Rhetorica, trans. W. Rhys Roberts (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1946), I.2.1356^b. All subsequent references to the Rhetorica are to this edition.
11. "Doctrine of Infallibility Morally Considered" in Lectures on the Prophetical Office of the Church (London: J. G. & F. Rivington, 1837), p. 138.
12. "The Tamworth Reading Room" in Discussions and Arguments on Various Subjects (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1924), p. 294.
13. Ibid., pp. 293-94.
14. Fifteen Sermons Preached Before the University of Oxford (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1918), p. 259.
15. Ibid., pp. 256-57.
16. An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1930), p. 330.
17. Ibid., p. 306.
18. Ibid., p. 279.
19. Ibid., p. 8.
20. Apologia Pro Vita Sua, ed. Martin J. Svaglic (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1967), p. 31.
21. Grammar of Assent, p. 159.

22. Ibid., p. 267
23. The Idea of a University Defined and Illustrated (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1935), p. 276.
24. Ibid., p. 291.
25. Apologia Pro Vita Sua, p. 155.
26. Idea of a University, p. 276.
27. Ibid., p. 285.
28. The Victorian Sage: Studies in Argument (London: MacMillan and Co., Ltd., 1953), p. 201.
29. Grammar of Assent, p. 82.
30. Ibid., p. 89.
31. Ibid., p. 36.
32. "Newman as a Prose Writer" in Three Studies in Literature (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1899), pp. 107-08.
33. The Art of Newman's Apologia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1945), p. 48.
34. "A Rhetorical Analysis of Cardinal Newman's Apologia Pro Vita Sua."
35. Ibid., p. 101.
36. Definitions and divisions of schemes and tropes are taken from Edward P. J. Corbett, Classical Rhetoric for the Modern Student (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965), pp. 426-46.
37. "Newman as Controversialist," The Catholic World, 117 (June, 1923), No. 699, 291.
38. Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art with a Critical Text and Translation of the Poetics, S. H. Butcher, 4th ed., (New York: Dover Publications, 1951), XXII, 1458^a.
39. Poetry, with Reference to Aristotle's Poetics, ed. Albert S. Cook (Boston: Ginn & Co., 1891), p. 26.
40. Ibid., p. 22.
41. Ibid., pp. 24-25.
42. Oxford University Sermons, p. 89.
43. Ibid., pp. 89-90.
44. Poetry, with Reference to Aristotle's Poetics, pp. iv-v.

Chapter Two. Introduction: B. The Historical Background.

Why should the Lectures, using rhetorical techniques to emphasize the concrete, win the status of a classic in the art of persuasion if their object was merely to convince Protestants, not of the truth of the Catholic religion, but only that they should examine Catholic beliefs with an open mind? To appreciate the enormous difficulty of Newman's even achieving this limited rhetorical aim, and, at the same time, the enormous benefits that would accrue to English Catholics from his achieving it, we must now turn to the historical background of The Present Position of Catholics in England, for it was the shocking events of the year immediately preceding the Lectures that determined both Newman's appalling rhetorical difficulties and his brilliant strategy for overcoming them.

In the summer of 1850 Bishop Wiseman was summoned to Rome where the Pope at length created him Cardinal Archbishop of Westminster and head of the re-established Catholic Hierarchy in England.¹ In an exultant frame of mind, Wiseman wrote a letter on October 7 "from out the Flaminian gate" and mailed it to England, to be read in all the Catholic churches under his newly-created jurisdiction. In this letter, Wiseman appeared to be announcing a tremendous Roman victory over the Established Anglican Church: "The great work is complete. Catholic England has been

restored to its orbit in the ecclesiastical firmament."

The London newspapers soon printed the letter, and, in fierce editorials, promptly denounced the restoration of the Catholic Hierarchy as an act of "Papal Aggression." To make matters worse, the Prime Minister, Lord John Russell, then jumped into the fray by writing an open letter to the Bishop of Durham in which he spoke provokingly of the Papal action as "the pretension of supremacy over the realm of England." The Prime Minister's letter, coming on top of Wiseman's, helped to trigger an uproar throughout the country. Protest meetings under government sanction were held in which the Pope and Wiseman were furiously denounced and then burned in effigy, Wiseman in his new cardinal's red hat. Catholic clergymen were stoned and beaten, and the windows of many Catholic Churches smashed by irate Protestant mobs.

When Wiseman finally reached London in November, he immediately sized up the situation and wrote "An Appeal to the English People," which apologized for the exaggerated phrasing of his earlier letter and asked for fair play in the English tradition. Wiseman soothingly pointed out that the only power he sought was the power to minister to the poor in the slums of Westminster. With the publication of this appeal, ruling circles were mollified, but, among the general population, the fierce outcry against Catholics continued unabated. One result of this continuing uproar was that in Birmingham, as Newman scathingly noted, "a variety of calumnies" of the most wild and

exaggerated sort were "circulated one after another against Catholics." The house being constructed for the Oratorians, for example, was supposed to be fitted up "with cells for the purpose of secret murder," while a "notorious work of Maria Monk . . . was largely circulated in Birmingham making people believe that all priests and nuns were profligates."²

Newman's primary purpose in giving the Lectures was to expose as absurd such gross libels, which were a constant incitement to riot for Protestants, as well as the whole Protestant tradition of anti-Catholic prejudice from which the libels ultimately sprang. Moreover, he had strong personal motives for giving such talks. In a letter written five months before the Lectures began, Newman, objecting to proposals that he be made a bishop, set forth the idea of his specific vocation: "My line is different--it is to oppose the infidels of the day. They are just beginning to attend to me--Everything shows this. . . . For twenty years I have been working on towards a philosophical polemic, suited to these times. I want to meet the objections of infidels against the Church. . . . A fearful battle is coming on and my place seems to lie in it."³ At last what seemed a golden opportunity, the chance to rebut the Protestant "No Popery" campaign set off by Cardinal Wiseman's letter, had arisen for him to meet the furious, unthinking "objections of infidels against the Church," and to test his "philosophical polemic, suited to these times" which he had been working on the past two decades.

Then, too, Newman felt he had the honor of his position

as a Catholic clergyman to uphold; in the midst of giving the Lectures, he asserted to a correspondent, "You must also understand I am in a very different position from what I was at Oxford. Then 1. I was known. 2. I was a private person; so no matter what people said of me. But now at Birmingham 1. I am not known [i.e., to local people generally]. 2. I am not a private person; so I cannot afford to let people speak against me."⁴

On the other hand, as Trevor notes in her biography, Newman started off with one positive advantage: people, even the most hostile, always listened to what he had to say. So he exploited his fame by renting the Corn Exchange as a public platform for his Lectures.⁵ Yet the manner in which Newman gave the Lectures raises a host of intriguing questions which must be answered before their rhetorical analysis can begin, for the answers to these questions contain the key to his overall rhetorical strategy. Why, for example, did Newman insist on lecturing to a predominantly Catholic audience, which certainly did not need to be told that the wild anti-Catholic fabrications of Protestants were absurd? Why did he not try to speak before Protestants instead, as it was Protestants who needed to be convinced? And why did Newman make such a point of acting the wronged innocent before his own supporters, surely a self-evident proposition in their eyes? In fact, how could Newman possibly hope to convince Protestants of anything in the first place by speaking to Catholics, since the biased

Protestant reader would most probably come to read his Lectures in some such frame of mind as to ask, "What lies is Newman telling his supporters now?"

Yet one knows that Newman wrote the Lectures primarily to influence Protestants; he expected the newspapers to reprint what he was saying, even if only for the excuse of attacking him, so that his speeches would have wide impact throughout the country.⁶ Then, too, he had previously made arrangements to have his Lectures printed up as they were delivered, both in Birmingham and in London, and to have the Lectures published in one volume as soon as they were all finished, in a cheap edition for wider circulation as well as in a regular edition.⁷ Most convincing of all, in the Preface to the collected Lectures, Newman speaks directly to Protestant readers, challenging them to abide by the rules of debate:

In all controversy, it is surely right to mark down and record what has been proved, as well as what has not; and this is what the Author claims of the reader as regards the following Volume.

He claims, and surely with justice, that it should not be urged against his proof that Protestant views of Catholics are wrong, that he has not thereby proved that Catholicism is right. He wishes his proof taken for what it is. He certainly has not proved what he did not set about proving; and neither he nor any one else has any encouragement to go on to prove something more, until what he actually has accomplished is distinctly acknowledged. The obligations of a controversialist lie with Protestants equally as with us. (pp. xi-xii)

Why bother to throw down the gauntlet to the Protestant reader unless Newman expected him to read the Lectures?

Why bother to publish a cheap edition as well as a regular

edition of the collected Lectures, both in Birmingham and in London, unless he expected a wide sale of his works, much greater than the tiny Catholic portion of the reading public could absorb?

On the other hand, how could Newman reasonably expect Protestants to read his Lectures, ostensibly written for Catholics, with even half an open mind when he was considered by them to be a liar, hypocrite, religious traitor and political agent of the Papacy? The constant, hysterical attacks on Newman's religious beliefs and personal character in the Press, Parliament, and at public meetings had gone on unabated ever since the days of the Oxford Movement, with the result that everything he ever said or did, especially after his conversion to Catholicism, was painted in the worst possible light. Newman had done far too little to refute such attacks, as he himself noted philosophically in a letter to a Member of Parliament:

To tell the truth, I have been now for seventeen years the subject of so much daily misrepresentation, in the public prints and at public meetings, that I never think at all about whatever is said against me in the one or at the other. Did I attempt to answer them all, my life would be spent in the occupation, if I answered only some, the rest would be taken for granted as true. . . . In consequence, I have never done anything but smile at the extravagant things which have been said against me, unless a call of duty interfered.⁸

Among the more serious charges which Newman felt duty-bound to refute, however, was the old saw that he was a hypocrite and a liar, having been secretly a Roman Catholic during his days in the Anglican Church as a leader of the Oxford Movement. (It was precisely this charge by Charles

Kingsley in 1864 that led Newman to write the Apologia Pro Vita Sua, and justify his own conversion to Catholicism.) In a letter to F. W. Faber, Newman made clear the kind of unreasoning prejudice he had to contend with even from the educated public. He related how he had written to an Anglican clergyman asking him to withdraw the charge that he, Newman, had held one belief and advocated another while an Anglican, providing ample proofs of his good faith, only to have the clergyman reply "that my explanation of my words might be true, but 1. A Romish priest always lies for the good of his church, I am a Romish priest (and this lie was for the good of my church?) therefore this need not be true --and I must take the liabilities of a Romish priest with resignation."⁹

More ominous still than such unyielding prejudice, in which Newman was damned if he did and damned if he did not, was the notoriety he achieved as a religious traitor in the eyes of the Protestant populace. Trevor notes that he had become, in fact, "the symbol" of Popery in England, "of all that the great mass of his countrymen feared and hated and despised, and wished to crush and cast out" (p. 547).

In the face of this overwhelming mass of hostility and prejudice, the steps Newman took to win a measure of toleration for Catholics are extremely puzzling. First, he took advantage of the ill fame he had unwittingly earned and hired the Birmingham Corn Exchange as a public platform for his Lectures, thus trumpeting to the Press and the nation at large that he was about to defend the "Romish Church"

once more. Next, instead of lecturing to Protestants and persuading them to drop their unreasoning prejudices, he insisted on speaking to a predominantly Catholic audience, the lay Brothers of the Birmingham Oratory, thus immediately laying himself open to charges of special pleading and, worse, cowardice at not being able to stand up to a crowd of Protestant accusers. Finally, his ostensible topic would not be a self-righteous defense of the Catholic Church against the wild charges of the Protestant "No Popery" campaign, but a pained and reasoned exposition of how Catholics, pure and honest though they be, would have to act in order to diminish the deep-rooted prejudice so shamelessly whipped up against them.

Perhaps a clue to Newman's puzzling rhetorical strategy can be found in an examination of his correspondence dealing with the anti-Catholic outbursts of the preceding year. As shown by a letter written in the fall of 1850, the outbursts simply confirmed Newman's opinion of the deep-rooted, unthinking hatred which the average Englishman had for Catholic beliefs. He noted that the "row" over Wiseman's letter "has but brought out what all sober people knew, though one is apt to forget it--that the English people is not Catholicly-minded. . . . I dislike our smoothing over the nation's aversion to our doctrines, just as I dislike smoothing over these doctrines themselves."¹⁰

One notes at once Newman's unflinching, realistic estimate of the strength of the anti-Catholic feeling. How best to combat it? By first creating means strong and

effective enough to meet the prejudice head-on: "I am really inclined to think our game is . . . to make the excuse of this persecution for getting up a great organization, going round the towns giving lectures, or making speeches, none but Catholics being admitted to speak, starting a paper, a review etc."¹¹ It is important to realize here how Newman, the consummate polemical strategist, has turned the enemy's great strength, the depth of the anti-Catholic feeling on the part of the overwhelming majority of the populace, to his own advantage. He does this not by attacking the prejudice directly, which would only incite further violence, but indirectly, by making the persecution the "excuse" for creating a "great organization," "giving lectures," "making speeches," "starting a paper, a review etc." The persecution was thus to be both the "excuse" and the stimulus for organizing Catholics and getting them to hold up their heads on equal terms with Protestants.

This indirect approach was soon to be enlarged upon by Newman in discussing the strategy of giving lectures on Catholicism to the general public. In October of 1850 he had already warned against a plan of Catholic laymen who had previously been Anglican clergymen to speak against the Established Church as being unseemly, and, instead, suggested that the speaker "give lectures on some subject, not directly against the Church of E. [England] but opening the mind of his hearers on the general subject, and preparing the way for others."¹² Here is the first faint

glimmering of what Newman's own rhetorical approach would be in The Present Position of Catholics in England.

In February, 1851, Newman wrote to J. M. Capes amplifying this strategy:

As to the Establishment, what I have written in my Lectures [i.e., Certain Difficulties Felt by Anglicans in Catholic Teaching] is addressed to educated men. The more we can weaken its hold upon them, the better. But this does not directly weaken its authority on the masses--nor does it involve any practical measure of assault upon it. . . . As far as the people is concerned, our line is, not to attack the Church of E. [England] which is low game, but to remove prejudices against ourselves, as you are doing at present in your Lectures. ¹³

He also went on to suggest in a following letter specific ways in which Catholic laity might act in the face of persecution, most of which involved this indirect approach to religious controversy: "Why should not half a dozen meet and consecrate their purpose by a religious act?--their object being to stir up their bretheren on the duty of maintaining and impressing on the people of England the spiritual independence of the church, as a kingdom not of this world?"¹⁴ This passage clearly points the way to calm Protestant fears of the Catholic Church as an international political organization intent on undermining the temporal independence of England.

In the same letter, Newman indicated yet another indirect approach to battling religious persecution. He commented about Catholic opposition to the Ecclesiastical Titles Bill (introduced in Parliament for the purpose of forbidding members of the Catholic Hierarchy from assuming titles proper to their stations): "I should like . . . the

immediate object, of resistance to the Bill to drop, but the occasion to be seized for instructing the young Catholic mind in all Catholic matters." Newman then suggested specific lecture topics on how Catholics should conduct themselves in controversy, all of which stressed the need for extensive rhetorical preparation beforehand:

The subjects might be such as these--1. how to address oneself to Protestants in controversy--e.g. not sneaking, apologizing, etc--2. how to treat the question of persecution 3. how to treat the question of truth. 4. how to deal with objections generally, etc etc. 5. how to bring an adversary to, to grapple, board and make him strike--6. how to deal with a Protestant--an unbeliever--an anglo-catholic etc."¹⁵

Here is seen at its clearest Newman's indirect approach to controversy which emphasized a well-thought-out rhetorical strategy to catch the opponent unawares at his most vulnerable point.

This indirect approach is also to be found in two of Newman's other works dealing with relations between Protestants and Catholics. In Loss and Gain, a satire on the failings of the Anglican Church comes disguised as part of a novel dealing with the conversion process; in the Apologia Pro Vita Sua, Kingsley's attack is dealt with by means of an examination of Newman's own life. Both of these works thus take the reader unawares in dealing with the shortcomings of Protestant religion and the attacks inspired by Protestant prejudice, i.e., they both find a neutral common ground with the reader to begin with, and then sweep him along by the force of the writing to a conclusion favorable to the Catholic cause. Could Newman's choice of a friendly Catholic

audience for his Lectures and limitation of the subject matter to an exposure of an absurd tradition of prejudice likewise have caught the Protestant reader unawares, and helped to overcome the grave handicap under which Newman labored of being a bête noir to the Protestant cause? Certainly the indirect approach is reflected in that what would start out as a seemingly dispassionate historical inquiry into the origins of anti-Catholic prejudice would end by destroying the prejudice of the unsuspecting Protestant reader through the very act of analyzing it, for who would hold to his prejudice once he was led to see how absurd it was?

A comparison of the Lectures with Pope's Epistle to Dr. Arbuthnot can help to uncover further advantages of Newman's indirect approach to controversy, for here the poet assumes much the same pose of an injured innocent speaking to a friendly audience. Elder Olsen notes that Pope, by casting the poem in the form of a dialogue between himself and Arbuthnot, has given it the effect of an overheard conversation between friends "unaware of any other hearer," a situation "in which sincerity and frankness can be expected." Since there appears to be no need for Pope to use any rhetorical devices in the company of a friend, the audience is caught with its guard down, and "the strategy obtains for Pope the opportunity of using every device of rhetoric while appearing to use none." Furthermore, since the audience is admitted as a kind of unseen witness, as it were, to the dialogue, it is liable to take all statements

at their face value.¹⁶

In addition, Pope reinforces his pose as the injured innocent by drawing up a bill of complaint against his enemies as the plaintiff, rather than attempting to answer their charges as the defendant. Olsen shrewdly observes, "To have answered as defendant would have been to indicate the charges as worthy of serious consideration. . . . to file a bill of complaint, on the other hand, is to propose one's self as the injured person and to lay the burden of disproof upon the opposition" (p. 40). Moreover, Olsen also notes that Pope is hard at work throughout the poem building himself up through various rhetorical devices as a person of irreproachable virtue, not by stating "that he is virtuous," but, more subtly, by showing "himself acting as if he were" (p. 42). Most important, Pope is concerned to remove any fear the reader might have of him as a kind of "mad dog" satirist who will attack anyone out of viciousness; he is careful, instead, to show his enemies as the vicious party woefully in need of correction, while he himself is civil to enemies as well as to friends (p. 44). Thus Olsen reaches a conclusion very important to any consideration of the rhetorical plan of the Lectures: "It is the state of mind of the audience that orders the work: the ordering, that is, is not logical or poetical, but one determined by the stages in which such prejudice can be removed, and in which the proper conception of Pope as a man can be constructed" (p. 43).

Following Olsen's analysis, one can see right away how

Newman's choice of topic and audience, in line with his indirect approach to controversy, achieved several all-important rhetorical advantages for him even before he began his first lecture. He was not forced into the defensive position of answering charges, which by implication would mean that the charges had enough merit to necessitate refutation, and could only be refuted by special pleading before a sympathetic audience (for Newman would have been sure to have been shouted down speaking before the general public, which was overwhelmingly Protestant). On the contrary, by implying, in effect, a bill of complaint against his accusers, putting the question to his Catholic listeners, "Why it is that, in this intelligent nation, and in this rational nineteenth century, we Catholics are so despised and hated by our own countrymen " (p. 1), he immediately assumed an offensive posture as the innocent wronged person who puts the burden of disproving what he is about to say on the shoulders of the bigoted Protestant opposition.

But a still more subtle effect must be noted here. By simply asking this question, Newman has already sidestepped the issue of whether his bill of complaint is valid or not; his question implies that to despise and hate Catholics is unintelligent and irrational. Immediately, then, Newman has taken away the opportunity for the biased Protestant to take issue with his implied assertion that Protestant prejudice is unreasonable, by proposing to inquire in the same breath why it is unreasonable. The very fact of seeking an explanation for irrational Protestant behavior "in this

intelligent nation, and in this rational nineteenth century," reinforces as nothing else can the image of the wronged innocent who is too charitable and magnanimous to lash out at his tormentors in a self-righteous diatribe, but rather, seeks to understand their behavior so as to correct it. At once, then, the Protestant reader is deprived of the image of Newman as the archenemy, for Newman does not give him a self-righteous defense of the Catholic Church to attack, nor even any assertions by way of a bill of complaint to take issue with; he simply removes the argument at once into the realm of dispassionate historical inquiry where the reader's bias finds no suitable objects to engage.

Newman goes on to limit the subject of his inquiry strictly to that which can be proved or disproved by reason, and does not involve the discrediting of any religion per se: "I am neither attacking another's belief just now, nor defending myself: I am not engaging in controversy, though controversy is good in its place: I do but propose to investigate how Catholics come to be so trodden under foot, and spurned by a people which is endowed by nature with many great qualities, moral and intellectual" (p. 2). By at once taking the argument out of the realm of controversy where nothing ultimately can be proved (as, for example, would be the case in arguing the relative merits of Catholicism and Protestantism, both of which depend on subjective personal beliefs), Newman forces the biased Protestant reader to meet him on his own ground, that of argument by reason where historical proof is possible.

Newman realized that such an argument would finally lead to the destruction of the reader's cherished prejudice, if allowed to run its course, for elsewhere he had analyzed how imagination, not reason, was the primary molder of public opinion: "Your neighbor assures you that everyone is of one way of thinking; that there is but one opinion on the subject; and while he claims not to be answerable for it, he does not hesitate to propound and spread it. In such cases, everyone is appealing to everyone else; and the constituent members of a community one by one think it their duty to defer and succumb to the voice of the community as a whole." He therefore concluded that public opinion "has the force of authority rather than of reason."¹⁷ Hence the tradition of Protestant prejudice, though certainly authoritative, could also be vulnerable to an attack by reason working hand in hand with the concrete to convince the "whole man," which was Newman's primary strategy in the Lectures.

Moreover, Newman's stance of the wronged innocent (a status instantly achieved simply by speaking to a Catholic audience) also allowed him to employ all the innumerable rhetorical devices of which he was past master without arousing the least suspicion that everything he said was for the calculated purpose of persuading Protestants that their prejudice was absurd. The brilliant use of invective, irony, sarcasm, satire and burlesque, for example, would appear to be the spontaneous outpouring of a decent man hitting back at his tormentors who have provoked him past all human endurance, rather than traditional rhetorical

devices carefully chosen for their traditional effects. Newman's role as the injured innocent is thus in line with Aristotle's clear-sighted dictum about the importance of speaker image: "Bring yourself on the stage from the first in the right character, that people may regard you in that light; and the same with your adversary, but do not let them see what you are about" (Rhetorica, III.17.1417^b).

Perhaps the greatest advantage of all such a stance afforded Newman, however, was the opportunity it conferred of systematically undermining Protestant prejudice without seeming to do so. Ostensibly his purpose was to expose the absurd foundations on which the Protestant tradition of anti-Catholic prejudice rested, so that Catholics could win increased toleration for themselves by pointing out this absurdity to Protestants in personal contact, and shaming them from their prejudice by their own exemplary conduct. In reality, however, Newman's role of the wronged innocent also allowed him to achieve the indirect effect of undermining a Protestant's faith in his own prejudices without putting him on his guard that he was doing so, since Newman was supposedly addressing his Lectures to Catholics only. In support of this view, elsewhere Newman had said that when a preacher "addresses himself to some special danger or probable deficiency or need of his hearers, he should do so covertly, not showing on the surface of his discourse what he is aiming at."¹⁸

Furthermore, the announced limited aim of the Lectures, not "to prove the divine origin of Catholicism," which would

have had to have as a corollary the discrediting of Protestantism, "but to remove some of the moral and intellectual impediments which prevent Protestants from acknowledging it" (Preface, p. ix), would also tend to keep the Protestant reader's guard down and not arouse his hostility, since his prejudice, and not his religion, was being attacked. But why make Protestant prejudice the object of his Lectures without going on to prove Protestantism false and Catholicism true? Newman recognized that in controversy it was necessary to proceed one step at a time: "While a country is overrun with prejudices, it is as premature to prove that doctrine to be true which is the object of them, as it would be to think of building in the aboriginal forest till its trees had been felled" (Preface, p. x).

Right at the start of his first lecture, then, Newman's shrewdly chosen argumentative stance of the injured innocent, which reflects his indirect approach to controversy, has won these implicit advantages for him:

1. By giving as the ostensible reason for the Lectures a suggestion about how Catholics should behave in an intolerant Protestant country, Newman gains an excuse for addressing a predominantly Catholic audience; the Protestant reader is forced into the position of a bystander who cannot question his role as the injured innocent, or, indeed, even think of doing so.
2. By addressing a predominantly Catholic audience, Newman need waste no time justifying or defending himself, but can move with full audience sympathy as the injured

innocent into his chosen line of argument.

3. By holding to the limited objective of exposing the absurdity of the Protestant tradition of anti-Catholic prejudice, Newman forces the argument into the realm of historical facts, which can be proved or disproved.
4. By uncovering these facts, his argument inevitably leads to the discrediting, both on abstract and concrete grounds, of Protestant prejudice, thus leaving the reader with an open mind towards Catholicism.

Cecil Chesterton was the first critic who noticed how Newman's controversial technique depended upon careful preparation beforehand, in much the same manner as the plans of a military campaign are worked out well in advance of the actual fighting. Perceiving that the ultimate aim of a controversialist was "to produce conviction," Chesterton saw that to do this he must first "render the position of a controversial opponent untenable, to force him into self-contradiction or withdrawal, and to leave on the mind of the balanced reader the impression that his particular line of objection has ceased to exist."¹⁹ In comparing Newman's ability to do this with that of Macaulay and Huxley, two other great controversialists of the day, Chesterton shrewdly noted, "In Newman alone do you find an elaborate series of operations, patiently worked out without reference to the temptations of immediate 'scoring' and intended to end, so to speak, in the surrounding and obliteration of the enemy" (p. 453).

A primary aim of this dissertation, therefore, will be

to discover and make explicit the "elaborate series of [rhetorical] operations" which Newman so painstakingly worked out in his Lectures, premises leading to conclusions which become new premises leading to other conclusions, all of which brought the typically biased Protestant reader inexorably to an open-minded attitude towards Catholicism. Yet what is important to note here is the way in which Newman's preparation beforehand, in choice of topic, audience, and speaker image, pre-empts any possibility of dissent on the part of the Protestant reader; to begin reading Lecture I is to get Newman's message over the shoulder, as it were, of the Catholic audience, and thereby immediately implicitly agree to Newman's status as an injured innocent in the eyes of himself and his audience, and to accept without question his proposal for a dispassionate historical inquiry into the roots of the Protestant tradition of anti-Catholic prejudice (even though the Protestant reader at this point does not accept the conclusion that his tradition of prejudice is absurd).

Thus, by his careful choice of topic, audience and speaker image, Newman at the very beginning of the Lectures has forced the biased Protestant reader to meet him on his own carefully chosen ground, that of argument by reason; here the unsuspecting reader will be vulnerable to the force of Newman's ruthlessly applied logic, and reach the conclusion that Newman wishes him to reach. Moreover, having seen the Lectures open with a proposal for dispassionate historical inquiry, the reader should unconsciously expect that the

argument will continue to be strictly an affair of reason. He thereby will be caught off guard when Newman turns to emphasizing the concrete through carefully chosen figures of speech and images for the purpose of subtly bringing the reader to share and thus be affected by his personal vision of Catholicism as sublime and Protestant anti-Catholic prejudice as absurd. Newman has barely begun to speak, but is already well on the way towards the "surrounding and obliteration of the enemy," the absurd Protestant tradition of anti-Catholic prejudice which keeps the Church of Rome from getting a fair and respectful hearing in England.

Newman's strategy of obliteration therefore closely follows Olsen's conclusion about Pope's Epistle to Dr. Arbuthnot: "It is the state of mind of the audience [for Newman, this would really be the biased Protestant reader] that orders the work: the ordering, that is, is not logical or poetical, but one determined by the stages in which such prejudice can be removed." (Such a conclusion also reflects Newman's own dictum that "we cannot determine how in detail we ought to preach, till we know whom we are to address,"²⁰ for his rhetorical strategy is built around addressing the Protestant reader indirectly while speaking to a Catholic audience.) The first stage in removing such a prejudice, then, would be to position it in the area where it is immediately most vulnerable and cannot assert itself, i.e., through argument by reason, which Newman has succeeded in doing simply by his choice of topic, audience and speaker image.

NOTES TO CHAPTER TWO

1. This historical background is based upon accounts given in Wilfred Ward, The Life of John Henry Cardinal Newman (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1912), I, 252-64, and Meriol Trevor, Newman: The Pillar of the Cloud (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1962), pp. 531-37.
2. Quoted from Newman's "Memoranda" for his lawyers in the Achilli trial concerning the circumstances under which the Lectures were given (Letters, XIV, 504, Appendix 4).
3. Letter to George Talbot, Feb. 3, 1851, Letters, XIV, 206.
4. Letter to F. W. Faber, Aug. 26, 1851, Letters, XIV, 334.
5. Trevor, p. 551.
6. Even while Newman was in the midst of giving his Lectures, he was already beginning controversial correspondence with opponents who had read his speeches in the newspapers, each speech being reported separately soon after it was delivered. Examples of correspondence which quickly became rather heated are Newman's Letters of July 13 and August 20 to Samuel Minton (Letters, XIV, 309, 333), and Newman's Letter of August 20 to the Editor of Aris's Birmingham Gazette, protesting Minton's attack upon him, which the newspaper had published. In this letter, Newman erupted as follows:

A clergyman of the Establishment says of me in your last week's paper, that "the whole of my public life" has been "one unmitigated lie." That is, in other words, either he or I am a liar. It is not I.

Were I well known at Birmingham, he would not dare to say it; or, if he did, all men would laugh at it, as I do. . . . A person who can say that another habitually lies, ought not to wish to correspond with him or his friends.

Strange to say, he feels this so little that he has just had the impertinence to send me a letter by post; I have returned it unread. I shall burn the next; and the third, if it comes, I shall nail against the wall. I will have no private dealings with such a man. (Letters, XIV, 331-32)

For controversy on a more restrained and gentlemanly level concerning Newman's fourth lecture, see Newman's Letters of July 31, August 5, and August 7 to R. B. Seeley (Letters, XIV, 322-29). Newman's and Seeley's exchange of correspondence received wide circulation by being printed in the Morning Herald (Letters, XIV, 323, n.2, 324, n.2, 328, n.1, 329, n.1).

7. See Trevor, p. 551 and Letter to James Burns, July 17, 1851, Letters, XIV, 311, including n. 2.
8. Letter to Philip Henry Howard, M. P., Nov. 24, 1850, Letters, XIV, 141.
9. Letter to F. W. Faber, Aug. 26, 1851, Letters, XIV, 333-34.
10. Letter to Mrs. Wood, Dec. 7, 1850, Letters, XIV, 160.
11. Letter to J. M. Capes, Feb. 18, 1851, Letters, XIV, 213-14.
12. Letter to J. Spenser Northcote, Oct. 10, 1850, Letters, XIV, 99.
13. Letter to J. M. Capes, Feb. 18, 1851, Letters, XIV, 214.
14. Letter to J. M. Capes, Feb. 21, 1851, Letters, XIV, 217.
15. Ibid., 218.
16. "Rhetoric and the Appreciation of Pope: The Epistle to Dr. Arbuthnot," Modern Philology, 37 (August, 1939), rpt. in Edward P. J. Corbett, ed., Rhetorical Analyses of Literary Works (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 40. Subsequent page references are to this edition.
17. "Rise and Progress of Universities" in Essays and Sketches, II, ed. Charles Frederick Harrold (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1948), 277.
18. Idea of a University, p. 418.
19. "The Art of Controversy: Macaulay, Huxley and Newman," Catholic World, 105 (1917), 447. The subsequent page reference is to this article.
20. Idea of a University, p. 415.

Chapter Three. "Lecture I. Protestant View of the Catholic Church."

Newman's purpose in his opening lecture is to make the biased Protestant realize that one's viewpoint is relative to one's experience, that there are two sides to everything, and that it is wise as well as only fair to investigate both sides of an issue carefully before making up one's mind. While the merits of such an approach should be obvious, prejudice keeps Catholicism from getting a fair hearing in the Protestant reader's mind, making it a closed issue. The question then becomes, how can Newman convince the Protestant reader that he is biased to begin with, and that he must drop this bias before he can make an objective investigation of Catholicism? Obviously a direct assertion that this is so would simply antagonize the reader. Newman must take the indirect, roundabout way of proving his point. This indirect approach consists, first, in using various rhetorical devices which "tend to make the controversial non-controversial" by translating it into different terms,¹ and then leading the reader to draw conclusions favorable to his case from the implications of what he has written. Only then can Newman make a direct assertion summarizing the justice of his cause, i.e., that Catholics are the innocent victims of undeserved prejudice, and expect the reader's assent.

Newman's use of rhetorical devices "to make the controversial non-controversial" is immediately apparent in his opening proposal not to attack Protestantism or defend Catholicism but simply to make what seems to be an objective historical inquiry:

I am going to inquire why it is, that, in this intelligent nation, and in this rational nineteenth century, we Catholics are so despised and hated by our own countrymen--

Yet the juxtaposition of "intelligent nation" and "rational nineteenth century" with the phrase, "we Catholics are so despised and hated by our own countrymen" subtly implies that the prejudice is absurd in an age of reason without Newman's having to prove that it is.

Newman continues to reinforce this impression of absurdity by carefully juxtaposing phrases which imply irrational prejudice on the part of Protestants without his having to spell out the logical connection:

--our own countrymen, with whom we have lived all our lives . . . are prompt to believe any story, however extravagant, that is told to our disadvantage--

Newman can now exaggerate the absurdity of the prejudice beyond what would be credible if he were to speak of the prejudice directly, through hyperbolic simile:

--as if beyond a doubt we were, every one of us, either brutishly deluded or preternaturally hypocritical, and they themselves, on the contrary were in comparison of us absolute specimens of sagacity, wisdom, uprightness, manly virtue, and enlightened Christianity.

Furthermore, the negative turn of the opening phrase in the next sentence stresses his own relative tolerance, "I am not inquiring why they are not Catholics themselves,"

while the concluding phrase implies the illogical nature of Protestant prejudice,"but why they are so angry with those that are," the two phrases also implying a logical connection with each other through parallel construction.

Newman then adds proof of Protestant prejudice to strengthen the credibility of his previously implied attack: "Protestants differ amongst themselves, without calling each other fools and knaves" (p. 1). He now subtly implies the purity of Catholic motives and actions without having to prove them through the device of negative statement:

Nor, again, am I proposing to prove to you, or to myself, that knaves and fools we are not, not idolaters, not blasphemers, not men of blood, not profligates, not steeped in sin and seared in conscience; for we know each other and ourselves. (pp. 1-2)

Newman next takes up the pose of impartial historical investigator, all the more impressively neutral because of the "Catholic friends" he openly addresses and the purity of Catholic motives he has just implied:

No, my Catholic friends whom I am addressing, I am neither attacking another's belief just now, nor defending myself:--

He drops all pretense of controversy, though making clear he does not do so out of weakness:

--I am not engaging in controversy, though controversy is good in its place:--

Having carefully taken his subject out of the realm of the controversial and thereby attempted to lower the Protestant reader's guard, Newman can now move from the image of impartial historical investigator to that of injured innocent and remain believable by virtue of his accompanying praise

of Protestants:

--I do but propose to investigate how Catholics come to be so trodden under foot, and spurned by a people which is endowed by nature with many good qualities, moral and intellectual;--

The vivid hyperbolic imagery of "trodden under foot, and spurned" is neatly balanced by the high compliment of "many good qualities, moral and intellectual"; for the Protestant reader to accept the tempting praise, he must also accept the preceding blame, and thus be more open to the justice of Newman's argument.

The dramatic personification which follows is an allusion to the stoning of Catholics in Birmingham during the recent "No Popery" campaign:²

--how it is that we are cried out against by the very stones, and bricks, and tiles, and chimney pots of a populous busy place such as this town which we inhabit.

As it is an allusion rather than a direct reference, however, the tendency is for the Protestant reader to feel shame instead of becoming openly defiant (which is the effect a direct accusation would have), since he is not called upon to justify himself over the stoning but simply to make the connection between the allusion and the actual event.

As the reader should now feel somewhat contrite and unsettled, Newman can now press his advantage by contrasting the difference between the sublime aims of Catholicism and its hostile reception among the general populace:

The clearer sense we have of our own honesty, of the singleness of our motives, and the purity of our aims --of the truth, the beauty, the power of our religion, its exhaustless fund of consolation for the weary, and its especial correspondence to the needs of the weak--

so much the greater may well be our perplexity to find that its advocates for the most part do not even gain a hearing in this country; that facts, and logic, and justice, and good sense, and right, and virtue, are all supposed to lie in the opposite scale; and that it is bid be thankful and contented, if it is allowed to exist, if it is barely tolerated, in a free people.(p.2)

Newman does not simply state that Catholics are honest and have singleness of motives and purity of aims; instead, his assertion that a clearer understanding of Catholicism would make the glories of the religion self-evident implies that such, indeed, is the case without his having to engage in controversial statements by way of proof which would antagonize the reader. Thus the "perplexity" follows logically from the implications of this previous statement.

Furthermore, the specific instances Newman gives of the "power" of Catholicism, something which all Protestants feared, emphasize its ties to the meek and lowly, and thereby nullify any offensiveness in the term "power": "its exhaustless fund of consolation for the weary, and its especial correspondence to the needs of the weak." Newman characteristically uses repetition and alliteration to emphasize the parallelism of these two phrases: "its" and "its," "exhaustless" and "especial," "consolation" and "correspondence," and most important, "weary" and "weak" make stand out in bold relief just on whose behalf the Church exercises its "power." Newman's bias in favor of the concrete is next graphically demonstrated in the way he personifies abstract words in the succeeding phrase, and emphasizes them by use of polysyndeton:

that facts, and logic, and justice, and good sense, and right and virtue, are all supposed to lie in the opposite scale;--

Catholicism itself is now personified as "it," a humble and despised member of society, emphasized by the use of anaphora and apposition:

--and that it is bid be thankful and contented, if it is allowed to exist, if it is barely tolerated, in a free people.

Newman ends the introduction to his first lecture by again making abstract terms function in a concrete way:

Such a state of things is not only a trial to flesh and blood, but a discomfort to the reason and the imagination; it is a riddle which frets the mind from the difficulty of solving it. (p. 2)

"A trial to flesh and blood" makes the prejudice which Catholics have to bear less a matter of a mental indignity than a physical ailment, as the metonymy of "flesh and blood" for "human being" implies. "Reason" and "imagination," ordinarily thought of as abstract mental qualities, have to contend with a "discomfort" which connotes physical or emotional rather than simply intellectual unease. Finally, by metaphor the "state of things" now becomes a "riddle which frets the mind," again an emotional or physical irritation rather than a purely mental one. Thus, by implication Newman has made the fact of prejudice seem absurd, and, by his use of concrete terms, has made this absurdity an emotional rather than a strictly intellectual matter so that the reader can feel the injustice of it instead of simply agreeing abstractly that there is an injustice.

At the end of the introduction, then, the reader should

be in the proper emotional frame of mind to listen receptively to Newman's inquiry into the origins of Protestant prejudice. Newman's introduction which projects a speaker image of the injured innocent and carefully guides the emotions of the reader thus follows Aristotle's dictum that the speaker must "make his own character look right and put his hearers, who are to decide, into the right frame of mind" (Rhetorica, II.1.1377^b). In accomplishing these ends, it also conforms to Aristotle's definition of the Introduction as "the beginning of the speech . . . paving the way, as it were, for what is to follow" (Rhetorica, III.14.1314^b).

Now Newman goes into the fable of the Man and the Lion for which the reader's curiosity has already been aroused in the opening words of the Lecture. He writes that it "is not the worse for being old" (p. 2), which not only has the effect of distancing the fable from the controversy swirling around the then present-day anti-Catholic prejudice, but also insures that it is not of the speaker's invention and reflects his bias; thus, the Protestant reader may be disposed to let his guard down and be receptive to the story.

Newman spins the fable out to great length to build up a fascinating picture for the reader; he fills in concrete details of how the Lion was invited by the Man to be his guest, how he admired the art work of the Man's Palace, how he noted the main motif was that of a lion, and a lion which was always conquered by man in various scenes of combat. Newman uses a neat antithesis to express this--"the man was

always victorious, and the lion was always overcome" (p. 3) --and then employs the rhetorical device of accumulation to repeat and expand the idea through differing examples in successive sentences for greater emphasis. He takes the trouble to go into long detail, starting each sentence with "There was" or "There were" (anaphora) to bind the whole into greater unity.

At length, Newman relates, the Lion noticed that not only was Man always the victor, but the lion as motif "was tortured into extravagant forms, as if he were not only the slave and creature, but the very creation of man." An example is made extraordinarily vivid through precise detail: "The feet of alabaster tables fell away into lions' paws." Here the alliteration of "feet . . . fell" helps to make the reader follow the table leg down in his mind's eye to where it turns into a lion's paw. This is not simply a vivid description, but one which causes the reader to re-experience the sight for himself as if he had actually been there. Here, then, is a re-enactment in miniature of Newman's power to make the reader re-experience what is, after all, his own personal vision through the use of carefully chosen concrete details and rhetorical techniques.

Finally, Newman brings the description to a climax through an accumulation of lions of various types which add concrete emphasis to the summation:

There were sphinxes, too, half lion half woman; there were lions rampant holding flags, lions couchant, lions passant, lions regardant; lions and unicorns; there were lions white, black and red: in sort, there was no

misconception or excess of indignity which was thought too great for the lord of the forest and the king of the brutes. (p. 4)

In building this accumulation, the author is careful to vary the structure of individual phrases in the series to avoid monotony and increase audience expectation of the final outcome. The anaphora of "there were" in the first two series of lions is followed by a parallel series of three, "lions couchant, lions passant, lions regardant," a lion with another beast, "lions and unicorns," inverted syntax, "lions white, black and red," and two examples of metonymy in parallel structure, "the lord of the forest and the king of the brutes."

This wealth of descriptive detail fascinatingly presented helps build suspense to such a pitch that the reader should eagerly await the conclusion of the fable. Before Newman gives it, however, he is careful to have the lion pay tribute to the outstanding craftsmanship of the art work:

After he had gone over the mansion, his entertainer asked him what he thought of the splendors it contained; and he in reply did full justice to the riches of its owner and the skill of its decorators,--

The author has built up only to destroy, however:

--but he added, "Lions would have fared better, had Lions been the artists."

Such classic understatement (litotes) is doubly effective because of the compliment that precedes it, and points up the moral and its application which Newman is quick to add: "There are two sides to everything; there is a Catholic side of the argument, and there is a Protestant" (p. 4).

Why did Newman use a fable to bring home the moral,

instead of a more realistic story? The fable of an animal and a man conversing partakes of fantasy; because there is no distracting realism, it lends itself to the presentation of a moral most efficiently, as Newman himself had once noted: "Fables, again, are economies or accommodations, being truths and principles cast into that form in which they will be most vividly recognized."³ The mind may readily assent to the moral because it is presented in isolation without any possibly damaging parallels to real life being drawn. Furthermore, thanks to Newman's use of vivid, concrete details, the moral becomes part of the vital experience of reading the fable, and can be unquestioningly accepted as part of that experience without any thought of its application to present-day religious controversy. Once the moral is accepted, however, one can refute the application which immediately follows that there is a Catholic side to the story as well as a Protestant side only by refuting what one has just assented to, namely, that there are two sides to every story.

To reinforce the point, Newman at once follows with another non-controversial story (non-controversial because absurd), that of the two knights who fought on the issue of whether the ornamentation on a shield was gold or silver. In fighting they changed places only to discover "that the shield was gold on one side, silver on the other, and that both of them were right and both were wrong." At this stage, however, Newman must engage in a delicate balancing act. To reassure his Catholic listeners, he has to assert "there

is but one truth, not two truths, and that one truth, we know, is in the Catholic Religion," which must be offensive to the Protestant reader. To minimize the damage, Newman quickly returns to his inoffensive line of argument, namely, that there are two sides to every story, giving as his reason the limitation of his topic:

However, without going on just now to the question where the truth lies (which is a further question not to my present purpose), still it is certain, though truth is one, that arguments are many, and there are always two sides in every dispute--

This is at once followed by a disclaimer not only to reassure his Catholic audience, but also to challenge the Protestant reader on the basis of reason alone:

--I do not say both of them supported by arguments equally cogent and convincing, of course not;--

and a reaffirmation that there are two sides to religious controversy:

--still, there is a Protestant side and there is a Catholic side--

Finally, and most important, there is the conclusion to be drawn from this premise:

--and if you have but heard one of them, you will think that nothing at all can be said on the other.

This sounds reasonable enough and the Protestant reader might give his intellectual assent to the proposition.

Newman now applies this conclusion to the specific case:

If, then, a person listens only to Protestantism, and does not give fair play to the Catholic reply to it, of course he thinks Protestantism very natural and straightforward, and Catholics very absurd;--

Newman is careful not to apply the same argument to Catholicism, but follows it up with assertions which challenge the

Protestant reader to stay with the argument to see if Newman can prove his point:

--because he takes for granted the Protestant facts, which are commonly fictions, and opens his mind to Protestant arguments, which are always fallacies.(p.5)

In support of what he has just said, Newman now subtly goes on to denigrate Protestant prejudice with guilt by association, by proximity putting it in the same company with villainy and vice:

A case may be made out for any one or any thing; the veriest villain at the bar of justice is an injured man, a victim, a hero, in the defense made for him by his counsel. There are writers who dress up vice till it looks like virtue:--

Specific examples of well-known writers lend substance to his charges:

--Goethe, I believe, has invested adultery with a sentimental grace; and Schiller's drama of the "Robbers" is said to have sent the young Germans of his day upon the highway. The same has been reported of Gay's "Beggar's Opera"; and in our own time a celebrated poet has thrown an interest over Cain, the first murderer. (pp. 5-6)

His examples of these famous writers who "dress up vice till it looks like virtue" by unspoken analogy may lead the reader to suspect that Protestant prejudice may be similarly dressed up.

Newman's following observation that "Anything will become plausible, if you read all that can be said in its favour, and exclude all that can be said against it," applied to the individual leads logically to the conclusion that

every one (as I may say) has his own sphere of ideas and method of thought, in which he lives, and as to

which he differs from every one else; and, unless he be a philosopher, he will be apt to consider his own view of things, his own principles, his own tastes, to be just and right, and to despise others altogether.

Again, he drives this conclusion home by the force of concrete example:

So it is especially between country and country: the Englishman thinks his beef and pudding worth all the resources of the French cuisine; and the Frenchman thought for certain, until the peace, that he had gained the battle of Trafalgar. (p. 6)

Englishmen, both Protestant and Catholic, are asked to laugh at themselves for thinking "beef and pudding worth all the resources of the French cuisine"; they do so because Newman follows up this trivial failure with the much greater failure of awareness on the part of the Frenchman offering an indirect compliment to the English. The Englishman should be more than willing to admit his failing over what is to him a comparatively trivial matter, cooking, for the sake of the compliment to the great naval victory of his nation. More important for Newman, the reader may now assent to his general proposition that individuals live in their own "sphere of ideas" because he has been charmed by the force of his concrete example into doing so.

Newman reinforces this conclusion with another example, this one drawn from the fiction of Sir Walter Scott. It demonstrates the differing viewpoints on life and each other by a middle-aged country gentleman and his young lady guest (pp. 7-8), and should win assent from the reader because it is at once concrete, non-controversial and charming. Newman now gives the example wider application through a series of

neatly balanced antitheses:

This is but a sample of what meets us in life on every hand; the young have their own view of things, the old have theirs; high and low, trader and farmer, each has his own, by which he measures everything else, and which is proved to be but a view, and not a reality, because there are so many other views just as good as it is. (pp. 8-9)

These examples lead logically to his assertion that

No conclusion is trustworthy which has not been tried by enemy as well as friend; no traditions have a claim upon us which shrink from criticism, and dare not look a rival in the face.

Through personification, Newman now pictures Protestantism as too cowardly and weak to engage in the open debate his conclusion calls for:

It is jealous of being questioned; it resents argument; it flies to State protection; it is afraid of the sun; it forbids competition.

The repetition of "it" in successive clauses (anaphora) and omission of conjunctions between them (asyndeton) produce the hurried rhythms that build to the climax of forbidding any rivals out of a sense of weakness. The Catholic Church being alluded to as the "sun," traditionally the greatest of the planets, Protestants can only suffer by the comparison.

Newman's following abstract rhetorical question, "How can you detect the sham, but by comparing it with the true?", is made vivid by concrete examples:

Your artificial flowers have the softness and brilliancy of nature, till you bring in the living article, fresh from the garden; you detect the counterfeit coin by ringing it with the genuine. (p. 9)

Here again Newman's careful choice of images does not result in merely vivid description, but makes the reader re-experience the comparisons in his own mind: the term "fresh from the

garden" conjures up such pleasant associations as dew-drops on the flowers, their fragrant smells and exquisite texture in contrast to which artificial flowers give but a pallid imitation; then to ring the counterfeit coin against the genuine article is to make the reader hear the difference in his own mind.

Now Newman makes a general analogy which follows logically, succeeded by a particular one:

So it is in religion. Protestantism is at best but a fine piece of wax-work, which does not look dead, only because it is not confronted by that Church which really breathes and lives.

By the metaphor and synecdoche of "wax-work," Protestantism is now personified as a wax-work dummy, while the Catholic Church is seen (also by metaphor and synecdoche) as a living, breathing person. This juxtaposition of the real and its imitation implies that Protestantism has been able to pass for authentic Christianity only to the extent that it imitates Catholicism. Furthermore, Newman, under the terms of the comparison, is able to supply a convincing reason why the Church must be held down:

The living Church is the test and the confutation of all false churches; therefore get rid of her at all hazards;--

He uses hyperbole to drive the point home, addressing the audience as if it were Protestant:

--tread her down, gag her, dress her like a felon, starve her, bruise her features if you would keep up your mumbo-jumbo in its place of pride. (p. 9)

The vivid personification of the Catholic Church as a criminally maltreated lady contrasts strongly with "mumbo-jumbo"

("A grotesque idol said to have been worshipped by certain tribes or associations of negroes," according to the Oxford English Dictionary), a shabby imitation of religion with connotations of savage superstition which can only appear ridiculous trying frantically to hold its "place of pride" like a vain African chief. The worshippers of "mumbo-jumbo" (a metaphor for Protestantism) by implication are thus reduced to the religious level of African savages. In contrast, the Catholic Church, already personified as a great lady--"the dazzling brightness of her glance, the sanctity beaming from her countenance, the melody of her voice, the grace of her movements" (pp. 9-10)--now becomes the victim in a fairy tale: Blacken her; make her Cinderella in the ashes." In addition, Newman's addressing the audience as if he were giving advice to Protestants, "Do not look on her but daub her in your own way, keep up the good old sign-post representation of her," has the ironic intent of making the Protestant reader feel guilty over the very plausibility of Newman's assertions. The reference back to the moral of the fable, already accepted as true by the reader, reinforces this: "The lion shall not draw the lion, but the man shall draw him."

Now Newman employs irony to expose the futility of Protestant efforts to stamp out Catholicism:

She shall be always worsted in the warfare with Protestantism; ever unhorsed and disarmed, ever running away, ever prostrated, ever smashed and pounded, ever dying, ever dead; and the only wonder is that she has to be killed so often, and the life so often to be trodden out of her, and her priests and doctors to be so often put down, and her monks and nuns to be exposed so often, and such vast sums to be subscribed by Protestants, and such great societies to be kept up, and such millions of

tracts to be written, and such persecuting Acts to be passed in Parliament, in order thoroughly, and once for all, and for the very last time, and for ever and ever, to annihilate her once more. (p. 10)

This deliberately long sentence, using a series of clauses beginning with "and" (polysyndeton), is an enactment in itself of the continually futile Protestant efforts to stamp out Catholicism, especially the last phrase, which is a deft contradiction in terms.

Newman next uses a series of graphic examples to point up the utterly arbitrary nature of Protestant prejudice, and underscores the flimsiness of these stereotyped views by hyperbolically asserting the catastrophic results that would follow from challenging them:

These are our first principles; they are unalterable; like the pillars of heaven, touch them, and you bring our firmament down. True or false is not the question; there they are.

Hen then asks a rhetorical question, "Have not free-born Britons a right to think as they please?", and plays off this freedom of thought against its ironic abuse, the whole-hearted espousal of a prejudiced outlook through the exercise of free will:

We rule Popery to be what we say it is, not by history, but by Act of Parliament; not by sight or hearing, but by the national will.

This leads in the same arbitrary way to the conclusion that

It is the will of the Legislature, it is the voice of the people, which gives facts their complexion, and logic its course, and ideas their definition. (p. 11)

Newman begins part 2 of his first lecture by repeating the intentional limitation of his argument, not to prove the divine origin of the Catholic Church, but only to investigate

why it is held in such scorn and hate (p. 11). Why does he do this? So as not to scare the Protestant reader into thinking that his argument will tend to undermine his religious beliefs, as opposed to his prejudice, and thereby encourage him to keep reading.

Newman now asserts that Catholicism is "the victim of a prejudice which perpetuates itself" (pp. 11-12), and proceeds to give examples of the proposition. Noting that most English people believe "that Christianity was very pure in its beginning, was very corrupt in the middle age, and is very pure in England now, though still very corrupt everywhere else" (pp. 12-13), and quoting examples of this prejudice from the Homilies and Bishop Newton, Newman adds ironically:

However, all are not satisfied to learn by rote what they are to affirm on matters so important, and to feed all their life long on the tradition of the nursery. They examine for themselves, and then forthwith we have another side of the question in dispute. (p. 14)

Who wants to be identified with "the traditions of the nursery"? Of course the reader wants to join those who "examine for themselves," but then he must also accept "another side of the question in dispute."

Now Newman shows his shrewdness by presenting the conclusions of an "eminent Protestant historian," the late Prime Minister of France, M. Guizot, who is quoted as saying, "I do not think I say too much when I affirm, that, at the close of the fourth and the commencement of the fifth century, the Christian Church was the salvation of Christianity!" Newman also notes,

You will observe (what makes his remarks the stronger) that, being a Protestant, he does not believe the Church really to have been set up by Christ himself, as a Catholic does, but to have taken her present form in the middle age. (pp. 14-15)

What Newman has done very cleverly here is to blur the distinction between the original Primitive Church which Protestants believe, indeed, to have been set up by Christ, and the later Catholic Church which they held was a corruption of it, so as to seemingly use Protestant beliefs to advance his own case. He then goes on to quote another Protestant authority as to the "six special benefits which the Church of the middle ages conferred on the world." Newman can now play on the disparity between what these Protestant historians say, that the Church saved Christianity at the start of the Middle Ages and was a force for good during that time, with what the popular Protestant tradition holds, namely that the Church was corrupt during the Middle Ages and a source of false, pagan religion. He asks, rhetorically: "Can blasphemy and idolatry be the salvation of Christianity? Can sorcery be the promoter of charity, morality, and social improvement?" (p. 16).

Newman now proceeds, "So much for the middle ages; next I will take an instance of modern times" (p. 17). Here is a demonstration of rhetorical strategy by simple omission. The popular Protestant conception of the Catholic Church as corrupt was largely concerned with the period of the Reformation, but Newman solves this embarrassing problem by simply moving at once to modern times, when the Church benefited from reforms initiated during the Counter-Reformation. The unsuspecting reader may not think of raising the Reformation issue, however,

because Newman is already holding his attention by discussing another Protestant bête noir, the Jesuit order. Here again he contrasts what a Protestant has to say with the cherished beliefs of the Protestant tradition of prejudice. Newman quotes his old friend from Oxford days, Blanco White, all the more impressive an authority because White had once been a Catholic priest. White, of course, has nothing but good to say about the Jesuits (pp. 18-19).

This strategy of using Protestant witnesses to advance his own case is repeated by Newman in detailing the history of monks during the Primitive Age of the Church, another eminent Protestant historian, Dr. Neander, being quoted as to their beneficial effect upon society: "'The monks of the East greatly contributed to the conversion of the heathen, both by their plain, sincere discourse, and by the veneration which their lives inspired'"(p. 23). Newman shrewdly does not insist on Neander's viewpoint as being absolutely true, but leaves it to the Protestant reader to draw that conclusion through implication:

Now the enemies of monks may call that an ex parte statement if they will,--though coming from a Protestant, one does not see with what justice it can undergo such an imputation.

He is content not to push his advantage but merely to assert, "I can only say there are evidently two sides to the question," the "evidently" being a masterpiece of ironic understatement, playing as it does on the disparity between what a Protestant historian says and what popular Protestant tradition holds about monks. Here is an example of Newman's strategic as well

as tactical use of irony, not merely for the immediate purpose of scoring a hit against the opposition, but more importantly, for the achievement of the long-range goal of undermining a Protestant's belief in his prejudice.

Newman next wittily rubs in the conclusion to be drawn from all this, through a neatly balanced antithesis:

I can only say there are evidently two sides to the question, and therefore the Protestant public, which is quite ignorant of more sides than one, and fancies none but a knave or a fool can doubt the received Protestant tradition on the subject of monks, is, for the very reason of its ignorance, first furiously positive that it is right, and next singularly likely to be wrong.

Nor is this all. Newman now caps this witty conclusion by showing how Protestant prejudice flies in the face of conventional British wisdom:

Audi alteram partem, hear both sides, is generally an Englishman's maxim; but there is one subject on which he has intractable prejudices, and resolutely repudiates any view but that which is familiar to him from his childhood.

Here Newman follows Aristotle's dictum that the use of a maxim "invests a speech with moral character" (Rhetorica, II,21,1395^b). The maxim brings home to the reader his own ethical unfairness in not hearing the Catholic side of the story, since an Englishman should be ready to hear both sides about anything before making up his mind.

Newman now compares Rome to the Englishman's Nazareth, thus shrewdly giving the reader the hint to draw an unflattering parallel between a typical Protestant Englishman and the too-sceptical Nathaniel who, when invited to meet Jesus, sneeringly asked, "Can any good come out of Nazareth?"

(John I.46).⁴ Echoing the Apostle Philip's reply (John I.47), Newman challenges the Protestant reader to "'Come and see!'" the Catholic religion for himself (p. 24), leaving the reader to draw the conclusion that if he does, he will be converted to the Truth, as Nathaniel was. What is too strong to be said directly is thus said indirectly through allusion.

On the surface, Newman's celebrated story of the mass protest meeting in Moscow which immediately follows would seem to have nothing to do with the absurdity of the Protestant tradition of prejudice. Here Newman, utilizing the strategy of the common ground with the Protestant reader and appealing to patriotic emotion, picks a work, the British Constitution, venerated by Protestant and Catholic alike. He tells the story of a hysterical Russian protest meeting over it to

show you how even it, the British Constitution, would fare, when submitted to the intellect of Exeter Hall, [5] and handled by practitioners, whose highest effort at dissection is to chop and to mangle. (p. 25)

So suggestive and vivid is the metaphor that the reader immediately gets the impression of butchers aping surgeons, and by unspoken but damning analogy, Protestants Catholics. The implications of this metaphor provide a hint of Newman's strategy to come, of arranging his material in such a way that the reader is led to draw the disconcerting parallel he wishes and suffer its effect, without Newman saying it openly.

Although he admits at the beginning of the story that it is of his own invention, Newman is careful to put down a plausible motive for the mass meeting, instigated by the Czar

as a countermeasure against the spread of liberal ideas, and to put the story in the form of a newspaper account, as if it actually happened (p. 26). These two realistic touches lend substance and credibility to the story, even though Newman expressly states that it is made up. Then, too, the incident of the individual who kept interrupting the meeting, "a foreigner, supposed to be a partner in a Scotch firm" (p. 28), and who finally shouted to the speaker, "'You cowardly liar, our dear good little Queen,'" before leaving the meeting (p. 31), is well calculated to win the sympathy of the reader by playing on his patriotism. Newman also does this at the beginning of the story by artfully referring back to the fable of the Man and the Lion in such a way as to insure that the patriotic reader (for whom the lion was a popular symbol of the nation) winds up on the lion's side:

a number of spirited and impressive speeches were made, in all of which, however, was illustrated the fable of the "Lion and the Man," the man being the Russ, and the lion our old friend the British. (p. 26)

Finally, Newman is careful to dramatize his story in concrete detail as much as possible so that the reader grasps the ridiculousness of it as stemming from actual experience rather than merely perceiving it intellectually in abstract fashion, e.g.,

The gallant speaker then delivered the following passage from Blackstone's volume, in a very distinct and articulate whisper: "Some have not scrupled to call its power --the OMNIPOTENCE of Parliament!" No one can conceive the thrilling effect of these words; they were heard all over the immense assemblage; every man turned pale; a dead silence followed; one might have heard a pin drop. A pause of some minutes followed. (p. 33)

Again, through the use of concrete details such as these which

dramatize the meeting into actuality, the reader should tend to accept the story as if it really happened, despite Newman's express disclaimer in the beginning.

The story proper starts with a Russian count who addresses the meeting and works the audience up into a frenzy by reading quotations out of context from Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England, quotations which assert the sovereign can do no wrong and indeed, has divine attributes. Soon the crowd in a rage smashes the windows of all the British households in Moscow, drags an effigy of John Bull through the mud and then burns it, along with a "lion and unicorn, and a Queen Victoria" (p. 41).

As the Protestant reader goes along enjoying the story with gusto because of such vivid, concrete touches which emphasize the underlying ridiculousness of the whole situation, several disconcerting parallels with the recent "No Popery" protest meetings come to his mind, however. As Joseph J. Reilly points out:

How deftly even the most minute parallelisms are insinuated and their cumulative force made to tell against the foes of the church! The Russians look with sullen suspicion at the English; is it possible that the Protestant Englishman looks in similar fashion upon the Catholic Englishman? A Russian leader incites the vast assemblage to a pitch of hatred against the English. How? By misreading and misunderstanding and misconstruing--what? "One of the greatest of human works," says Newman, "the object of Englishmen's wonder and veneration"--the English Constitution. How artful is that praise! How deftly it insinuates the analogously sacred character of the Church. Every word of laudation uttered of the one tells equally through implication for the other.⁶

Furthermore, Reilly describes how the Russian count who addresses the meeting reflects embarrassingly on English

aristocrats who lend themselves to the cause of bigotry, how the meeting approved by the Czar is similar to anti-Catholic protest meetings in England held with government endorsement, and the final touch of irony, how the mob burned in effigy John Bull thoughtfully "provided beforehand by the managing committee" (p. 41), which leaves the reader uncomfortable at the thought of similar carefully staged protest meetings against Popery in England.⁷

At the end of the story, Newman finally makes explicit the relation which the reader has been artfully led to perceive between Russians and Protestants: "Now my Brothers of the Oratory, I protest to you my full conviction that I have not caricatured this parallel at all" (p. 41). To the reader, the hysterical frenzy whipped up over the British Constitution is ridiculous because he knows the British Constitution as it is actually applied from first-hand experience, and recognizes the distortion that arises from an uninformed reading of Blackstone's Commentaries on it. In the same way, Newman now draws perhaps the most damaging parallel of all, since he knows both Catholicism and Protestantism from the "inside," as it were:

I say deliberately, and have means of knowing what I say, having once been a Protestant, and being now a Catholic--knowing what is said and thought of Catholics, on the one hand, and, on the other, knowing what they really are--I deliberately assert that no absurdities contained in the above sketch can equal--nay, that no conceivable absurdities can surpass--the absurdities which are firmly believed of Catholics by sensible, kind-hearted, well-intentioned Protestants.

In other words, the Protestant tradition of anti-Catholic prejudice, "the consequence of having looked at things all on

one side, and shutting the eyes to the other" (p. 41), has the effect of turning even the best of Protestants into fools deserving of scornful laughter because they simply do not know what they are talking about. Newman is too shrewd to state this openly, but again, leaves it to the Protestant reader to draw this embarrassing conclusion.

To sum up Newman's rhetorical strategy in this first lecture, then, one can see how concerned he is with winning the reader's assent, as a necessary first step, to the proposition that "there are two sides to everything; there is a Catholic side of the argument, and there is a Protestant." Through vivid, illustrative stories, particularly those of the fable of the Man and the Lion and the account of the Russian protest meeting, Newman is able to communicate the idea emotionally as well as intellectually that one's viewpoint is relative to what one chooses to experience, and that it is the better part of wisdom to hear both sides of an issue before making up one's mind.

At the same time he is winning the reader to this outlook, Newman is also busy undermining his prejudice through carefully setting up situations which lead the reader to draw parallels in his own mind extremely damaging to Protestant prejudice. By letting the reader draw the parallel, Newman not only magnifies its damning effect, but also avoids the antagonism sure to be aroused should he state the parallel openly himself. Such a strategy is but another example of Newman's subtle indirect approach to controversy.

NOTES TO CHAPTER THREE

1. Holloway, p. 201.
2. See Trevor, pp. 531-32 and 536-37 for details of violence in England generally and Birmingham in particular during the "No Popery" campaign. Newman specifically refers to the stoning again on pp. 206-07 of the Lectures.
3. Oxford University Sermons, p. 342.
4. All Biblical quotations and references are taken from the King James version of the Bible.
5. According to the Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church, ed. F. L. Cross (London: Oxford University Press, 1958), Exeter Hall was "a building in the Strand, London . . . used for religious and philanthropic purposes, especially by those of Evangelical sympathies. . . . 'Exeter Hall' thus came to be used allusively as a title for a certain type of Evangelicalism."
6. Newman as a Man of Letters. (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1932), p. 197.
7. Ibid., p. 198.

Chapter Four. "Lecture II. Tradition the Sustaining Power of
the Protestant View."

Having tried to win the Protestant reader over to the idea that Catholicism deserves a fair hearing, Newman proceeds in the second lecture to expose the Protestant tradition of anti-Catholic prejudice as having been arbitrarily imposed by those in power for political ends. The linking of Anglicanism to the weak side of the Englishman's character, his love of the concrete, distrust of abstract reasoning, indifference to history, and contempt for foreign ideas all make it appear that the Protestant religion was designed by those in authority to keep him in mental fetters of his own liking.

The Protestant reader, who naturally has a picture of himself as a person who does his own thinking, should thus be powerfully motivated not to imitate the mass of apparently duped Englishmen who unquestioningly accept the prejudices handed down by their church and rulers, but to investigate Catholicism for himself in an objective manner. Yet to bring the reader to the point where he will question his own prejudices, Newman must build up, step-by-step, a mass of evidence from the past that becomes irresistible in its implications, and make controversial suggestions in metaphorical terms so as not to antagonize the reader, and to catch him with his mental guard down.

He begins in the most obvious way by noting the vast extent of Catholicism, its long and splendid history, the

great number of works of art and literature which it has inspired, and the immense number of human souls who profess its tenets, all facts which cry out for an investigation of the Church's claims in an objective and unprejudiced manner. The rhetorical device Newman uses to make this point without arousing antagonism is that of accumulation, of bringing together in one extraordinarily long sentence the most telling reasons why Catholicism is worthy of serious consideration, all arranged in climactic order for maximum effect. His very opening phrase is instructive:

Considering, what is as undeniable a fact as that there is a country called France, or an ocean called the Atlantic, the actual extent, the renown, and the manifold influence of the Catholic Religion--

The intention is for the reader to accept the Catholic religion as existing in the same solid way as a great ocean or a country exists, and therefore to accept its attributes, "the actual extent, the renown, and the manifold influence of the Catholic Religion" and all those contained in the rest of the sentence that follows, as stemming from the existence of the religion itself and not to be questioned in the same way that one does not question the attributes of other natural phenomena.

Starting each successive major phrase of this opening sentence with "considering" (a word which in itself implies established facts to follow), Newman lists an impressive catalogue of attributes which build to a climax while keeping the reader artfully in suspense as to what the conclusion will be and thereby hanging on every word:

--considering that it surpasses in territory and in population any other Christian communion, nay, surpasses all others put together,--considering that it is the religion of two hundred millions of souls, that it is found in every quarter of the globe, that it penetrates into all classes of the social body, that it is received by entire nations, that it is so multiform in its institutions, and so exuberant in its developments, and so fresh in its resources, as any tolerable knowledge of it will be sure to bring home to our minds,--that it has been the creed of intellects the most profound and the most refined, and the source of works the most beneficial, the most arduous, and the most beautiful,--and, moreover, considering that, thus ubiquitous, thus commanding, thus philosophical, thus energetic, thus efficient, it has remained one and the same for centuries,--considering that all this must be owned by its most virulent enemies, explain it how they will;-- (p.42)

At last Newman is ready for the conclusion which is in the strongest possible contrast to what has gone before:

--surely it is a phenomenon the most astounding, that a nation like our own should so manage to hide this fact from their minds, to intercept their own vision of it, as habitually to scorn, and ridicule, and abhor the professors of that Religion, as being, from the nature of the case, ignorant, unreasoning, superstitious, base, and groveling. (p. 43)

The use of the word "phenomenon" in the sense of "a highly exceptional or unaccountable fact or occurrence" (the Oxford English Dictionary definition) underlines the unique absurdity of the English response to Catholicism. Then, too, Newman's careful use of parallel clauses, "to scorn, and ridicule, and abhor," together with his use of asyndeton in "ignorant, unreasoning, superstitious, base and groveling," also serves to emphasize this absurdity by keeping the reader waiting for the end of the sentence and holding these derogatory words in his mind as he does so, all the while contrasting them with the awesome vision of Catholicism just expressed.

Newman then expands on this absurdity by means of a comparison which is in itself an enactment in miniature of the indirect rhetorical strategy he uses to catch the reader unawares in his own contradictions. Typically, he first prepares a common ground by describing something both Protestants and Catholics as Englishmen feel contemptuous of:

It is familiar to an Englishman to wonder at and to pity the recluse and devotee who surround themselves with a high enclosure, and shut out what is on the other side of it;--

He then metaphorically applies this description to the state of mind of the typically bigoted Englishman who refuses to look objectively at Catholicism:

--but was there ever such an instance of self-sufficient, dense, and ridiculous bigotry, as that which rises up and walls in the minds of our fellow-countrymen from all knowledge of one of the most remarkable phenomena which the history of the world has ever seen?

Newman again emphasizes Catholicism as a concrete reality by comparing it to great natural bodies of matter:

This broad fact of Catholicism--as real as the continent of America or the Milky Way--

This sets the stage perfectly for his metaphorical description of bigoted Englishmen in terms of the proverbial ostrich:

--which Englishmen cannot deny, they will not entertain; they shut their eyes, they thrust their heads into the sand, and try to get rid of a great vision, a great reality, under the name of Popery. (p. 43)

By saying that Catholicism is "as real as the continent of America or the Milky Way," and calling it "a great vision, a great reality," Newman makes an immaterial vision just as real and just as awesome as great material bodies. Bigoted Protestants are then reduced to the absurd level of

metaphorical ostriches who can only put the sight out of their minds by shutting their eyes to it; the ostrich metaphor makes the vision seem overwhelmingly real.

Yet who wants to be thought of as an ostrich? To this natural repugnance Newman adds the fact of Catholicism's 1500 year sway, beside which Britain's hundred years of imperial rule look puny indeed, and then asks rhetorically, "How can it then be actually imbecile or extravagant to believe in it and join it, even granting it were an error?" (pp. 43-44). Here Newman has cleverly forestalled any counterargument based on doctrinal grounds, by admitting its possible validity only for the purpose of showing its irrelevancy to his argument that belief in Catholicism is not "imbecile or extravagant," as Protestant prejudice would have it.

From the religious point of view, he now metaphorically calls England "one large convent, or rather workhouse," conjuring up visions of desperately poor people kept harshly in line by tyrannical overseers. The description which follows reinforces the idea of a workhouse as a broken-down, dirty old building with dust and grime keeping out the sunlight: "no pure gleam of light finds its way in from without; the thick atmosphere refracts and distorts such straggling rays as gain admittance." Newman now makes logical use of the gloomy atmosphere to employ the metaphor of the camera obscura ("An instrument consisting of a darkened chamber or box, into which light is admitted through a double convex lens, forming an image of external

objects on a surface of paper, glass, etc., placed at the focus of the lens," according to the Oxford English Dictionary). This in turn allows him implicitly to portray English Protestantism in terms of darkness and English Catholicism in terms of light without stating so openly and therefore offensively, for again, it is the reader, not he, who draws, and cannot help drawing, this conclusion from the vivid metaphor which makes such a graphic impression on the mind:

Why, it is not even a camera obscura; cut off from Christendom though it be, at least it might have a true picture of that Christendom cast in miniature upon its floor. (p. 44)

Newman now paints a glaring contrast between the growth of scientific investigation of natural phenomena in the nineteenth century and the Englishman's ignoring of the largest natural phenomenon of all, Catholicism (for his earlier linking of Catholicism to great bodies of nature should induce the reader to accept this definition). His graphic description of men ransacking the four corners of the earth in pursuit of scientific knowledge points to a monstrous contradiction as these same men ignore the great social reality of Catholicism all about them. Here style acts to reinforce the sense; first, polysyndeton builds man's scientific accomplishments to an impressive climax:

but in this inquisitive age, when the Alps are crested, and seas fathomed, and mines ransacked, and sands sifted, and rocks cracked into specimens, and beasts caught and catalogued,--

Next, Newman uses anaphora to build up the Englishman's ignorance of Catholicism to a climax as well:

--as little is known by Englishmen of the religious sentiment, the religious usages, the religious motives, the religious ideas of two hundred millions of Christians poured to and fro, among them and around them,--

These schemes prepare for the final climax of the hyperbolic simile,

--as if, I will not say, they were Tartars or Patagonians, but as if they inhabited the moon.

The simile is now treated as accomplished fact, becoming an even more hyperbolic conclusion:

Verily, were the Catholic Church in the moon, England would gaze on her with more patience, and delineate her with more accuracy, than England does now.

Such a hyperbolic conclusion vividly supports Newman's assertion that Catholics "were thought dupes and rogues, because we were not known."

But why do not Protestants wish to investigate the claims of Catholicism?

because our countrymen would not be at the pains, or could not stand the shock of realizing that there are two sides to every question, and that in this particular question, perhaps, they had taken the false side.
(p. 44)

The Protestant reader is, in effect, challenged to see if he can stand to look at things from the Catholic point of view, especially if it means he may be proved wrong. Newman's artfully chosen words are meant to play on the Protestant reader's self-respect in such a way that the reader should feel he will be unforgiveably slothful or an intellectual coward if he does not listen to this argument. Again, Newman is careful not to scare the reader into thinking that Protestantism will be proven false, only that in the question

of prejudice, "perhaps, they had taken the false side." By this use of understatement (litotes), the reader is thus tactfully challenged to hear out his argument.

Most important, Newman states that he will be investigating how it is that the tradition of prejudice is still held in an age of science, a tantalizing paradox to whet the reader's curiosity:

And this evening I am proceeding to the inquiry how in a century of light, where we have re-written our grammars and revolutionized our chronology, all this can possibly come to pass;--

Again the fable of the Man and the Lion turns up in a powerful metaphor that drives home how out-of-step anti-Catholic prejudice is with the spirit of the age:

--how it is that the old family picture of the Man and the Lion keeps its place, though all the rest of John Bull's furniture has been condemned and has been replaced. (pp. 44-45)

The furniture metaphor is now expanded to include the Protestant's open attitude towards the finest of material things:

Alas! that he should be inspecting the silks and the china, and the jewellery of East and West,--

This is contrasted to his rigid attitude on what should be more important, spiritual treasures:

--but refuse to bestow a like impartial examination on the various forms of Christianity!

By comparing "the various forms of Christianity" to material goods, Newman insinuates the idea that, like a wise shopper, one should compare Protestantism and Catholicism carefully before embracing either.

Newman now attributes the rigid, unexamined attitude of Protestants towards Catholics to "tradition, immemorial unauthenticated tradition" (p. 45). He drives the point home that tradition is "unauthenticated" by dramatizing in dialogue the fact that tradition is taught by one man passing on to another suppositions which may not be true or which may be irrelevant to the issue in the first place:

Each man teaches the other: "How do you know it?"
 "Because he told me." "And how does he know it?"
 "Because I told him;" or, at very best advantage,
 "We both know it, because it was so said when we
 were young; because no one ever said the contrary."
 (pp. 45-46)

This concrete dramatization which vivifies the circular reasonings and irrelevancies of tradition paves the way for the reader's assent to Newman's conclusion about the value of tradition:

It is sufficient to make us take a thing for granted, in default of real proof; it is sufficient for our having an opinion about it; it is sufficient often to make us feel it to be safest to act in a certain way under circumstances;--

and its limitations:

--it is not sufficient in reason to make us sure, much less to make us angry with those who take a different view of the matter. It is not sufficient to warrant us to dispense with proof the other way, if it be offered to us. (p. 47)

After giving several examples of the superiority of evidence to tradition, Newman contrasts this with the completely illogical explanation which Protestants would give for holding their prejudice:

single out a man from the multitude, and he would say something of this sort: "I am sure it is;" he will look significant, and say, "You will find it a hard job to make me think otherwise;" or he will look wise

and say, "I can make a pretty good guess how things go on among you; or he will be angry, and cry out, "Those fellows, the priests, I would not believe them, though they swore themselves black in the face;" or he will speak loudly, and overbear and drown all remonstrance: "It is too notorious for proof; every one knows it; every book says it; it has been so ruled long ago. It is rather too much in the nineteenth century to be told to begin history again, and to have to reverse our elementary facts." (pp. 49-50)

Because this is a colloquial dialogue, the reader may tend to accept it as real, as overheard conversation. It thus prepares the reader to accept Newman's conclusion as to the telling flaw of tradition, no matter how much believed in:

As is the origin so is the tradition; when the origin is true, the tradition will be true; when the origin is false, the tradition will be false. (pp. 51-52)

But can a false tradition be capable of inspiring so much animosity as that which Protestants of Newman's own day held against Catholics? Again, Newman's proof that such, indeed, can be the case involves an indirect rhetorical strategy. He uses an apparently innocuous illustration, the fact that the Jewish religious tradition at the time of Jesus, though soon to be proven false, was still capable of generating strong passions in its defense. Of course, the Protestant reader should assent at once to the force of the example, sharing as he does with Catholics a reverence for Christ and bias against the outmoded Jewish tradition of belief; but to accept this example means unwittingly to accept the analogy to be drawn from it as well:

If the Jews could be induced to put to death the Founder of our religion and His disciples on tradition, there is nothing ridiculous in saying that the British scorn and hatred of Catholicism may be created by tradition also.

The question then becomes, is false tradition, just proven fully capable of generating fierce passions, in fact the cause of Protestant bias? Newman asserts that it is, again forestalling the argument against Catholicism on grounds of doctrine, saying that this argument motivates merely a small number of educated men and that he is concerned only with the "great mass of Protestants" (p. 53). This forestalling of any argument over doctrine allows Newman to focus on the tradition of absurd prejudice, where Protestantism seems most vulnerable to attack; he can go on from there to make the Protestant reader feel foolish about opposing Catholicism in general.

Newman now indulges in carefully chosen historical examples to drive his points home. He notes that Calvinism and Lutheranism have become moribund in their places of origin, in Geneva and Germany, and that the same fate would have overtaken Anglicanism in England except for government intervention which made it the religion of the state. With a fine touch of irony, Newman describes how the establishment of Protestantism came about:

Give it rope enough, and any one could prophesy its end, so its patrons determined that rope it should not have, but that private judgment should come to a close with their own use of it. There was enough of private judgment in the world, they thought, when they had done with it themselves. So they forcibly shut-to the door which they had opened, and imposed on the populations they had reformed an artificial tradition of their own, instead of the liberty of inquiry and disputation. They worked their own particular persuasion into the political framework of things, and made it a constitutional or national principle, in other words, they established it. (p. 55)

Newman here is playing on the contradiction between the Protestant theory of free inquiry and private judgment, and the actual practice of an established church to which everyone must conform. The implication is, of course, that a true Protestant should not allow himself to be dictated to but should judge things for himself, and this is exactly what Newman wishes the reader to do as regards Catholicism.

In contrast to Protestantism, which depends for its very existence on the state and an absurd tradition of anti-Catholic prejudice foisted on the people, Newman now asserts that "Catholicism does not depend on its establishment for its existence, nor does its tradition live upon its establishment" (p. 55), and offers as historical proof the example of Ireland: "Where is the country in the whole world, where Protestantism has thriven under persecution, as Catholicism has thriven in Ireland?" (p. 56). He goes on to explain why the establishment of Protestantism was so easily accomplished in England: it satisfied the desires of an insular national character distrustful of abstract doctrines, and became inextricably mixed up with the national passion of loyalty to the crown. In proving his point that Englishmen worship flesh and blood characters whom they can see, no matter how illogical such an attitude may be, Newman uses real-life examples of the warm reception accorded colorful dignitaries who were outright enemies of England, Marshall Soult and Napoleon, who represented unpopular political principles, Louis Philippe of France and the Emperor Nicholas of Russia, or who had obviously flawed characters, Lord Londonderry and

Charles the Second (pp. 59-60).

These examples now prepare the way for and lend credence to a series of hyperbolic statements in a carefully graded series of increasing exaggeration, each one drawing believability from the one before it and lending believability to the one after it:

It is the way with Englishmen. A saint in rags would be despised; in broadcloth, or in silk, he would be thought something more than ordinary. St. Francis of Assisi, bareheaded and barefooted, would be hooted; St. Francis Xavier, dressed up like a mandarin, with an umbrella over his head, would inspire wonder and delight. A Turk, a Parsee, a Chinese, a Bonze--nay, I will say, a chimpanzee, a hippopotamus--has only to show himself in order to be the cynosure of innumerable eyes, and the idol of his hour. (pp.60-61)

Nor is Newman content to reduce the Englishman's love of the concrete to the absurd. He is now ready for the final exaggeration which makes the Englishman's anti-Catholic prejudice completely nonsensical. This final exaggeration also gains believability from the carefully qualified phrases which Newman inserts, including an artful use of the double negative to tone down the assertion:

Nay, even more,--I will say a bold thing,--but I am not at all sure, that, except at seasons of excitement like the present, the Pope himself, however he may be abused behind his back, would not be received with cheers, and run after by admiring crowds, if he visited this country, independent of the shadow of Peter which attends him, winning favour and attracting hearts, when he showed himself in real flesh and blood, by the majesty of his presence and the prestige of his name. (p. 61)

Thus, by bringing the Englishman's love of the concrete to this reductio ad absurdum, Newman has, in fact, deftly turned the national character against itself. What are ordinarily thought of as virtues peculiar to the English,

distrust of abstract reasoning and love of the concrete, in Newman's hands become grave weaknesses in the religious sphere, and lend plausibility to his conclusion about Anglicanism:

It is religion grafted upon loyalty; and its strength is not in argument, not in fact, not in the unanswerable controversialist, not in an apostolical succession, not in sanction of Scripture--but in a royal road to faith, in backing up a King whom men see, against a Pope whom they do not see. (p. 62)

By becoming the religion of the state, Newman adds, Protestantism gained advantages which aided in its perpetuation. It inevitably became "the passport to office and authority" (p. 63), and hence, "the tradition of law and of good society," "of literature" (p. 67), and "of civil intercourse and political life" (p. 72), all of which acted together to make the tradition self-supporting (p. 73). Thus by showing how the Protestant tradition fit in with the needs of the rulers and ruled, Newman is able to explain plausibly why the tradition continues as strongly as ever. Moreover, by showing the authorities who established Protestantism and its accompanying tradition of prejudice as having acted purely for reasons of political expediency, i.e., to maintain themselves in power, Newman, by implication, makes the reader who shares Protestant prejudices a willing dupe in their schemes:

It was plain, then, what had to be done in order to perpetuate Protestantism in a country such as this. Convoke the legislature, pass some sweeping ecclesiastical enactments, exalt the Crown above the Law and the Gospel, down with the Cross and up with the lion and the dog, toss all priests out of the country as traitors; let Protestantism be the passport to office

and authority, force the King to be a Protestant, make his court Protestant, bind Houses of Parliament to be Protestant, clap a Protestant oath upon judges, baristers-at-law, officers in army and navy, members of the universities, national clergy; establish this stringent Tradition in every function and department of the State, surround it with the lustre of rank, wealth, station, name, and talent; and this people, so impatient of inquiry, so careless of abstract truth, so apathetic to historical fact, so contemptuous of foreign ideas, will ex animo swear to the truth of a religion which indulges their natural turn of mind, and involves no severe thought or tedious application. (pp. 62-63)

Presumably the reader now has a powerful motivation, that of looking upon himself as a thinking man, for breaking the fetters of prejudice and judging Catholicism for himself.

To make his case even more plausible, Newman has been careful to present examples in such a way as to suit his argument that it is of the nature of a historical law that Protestantism needs to be established to survive whereas Catholicism can survive independently on its own merits. The way he has used the examples of religion in England and Ireland makes it appear that these are illustrations of universal laws (rather than special cases resulting from unique circumstances). Again one notes the prime importance for Newman's persuasive art of pre-empting the grounds of debate at the start of the lecture.

Having demonstrated the importance of the tradition of anti-Catholic prejudice per se in keeping Englishmen Protestant, Newman logically argues that it follows that the "especial duty" of the Anglican Church "is not to inculcate any particular theological system, but to watch over the anti-Catholic Tradition, to preserve it from rust and decay, to keep it bright and keen, and ready for action on any

emergency or peril" (p. 74). With the raison d'etre of the Anglican Church now established, he is afforded an opportunity to satirize the mechanical, unthinking character of its anti-Catholic tradition. He points out that those things which orthodox religion is usually swift to combat are ignored by Anglicanism:

Heresy, and scepticism, and infidelity, and fanaticism, may challenge it in vain;--

Instead, it centers all its energies on fighting Catholicism, a task which is made to appear ludicrous by hyperbolic metaphor:

--but fling upon the gale the faintest whisper of Catholicism, and it recognizes by instinct the presence of its connatural foe.

Newman now builds the scene up to a high pitch of suspense:

Forthwith, as during the last year [i.e., the "No Popery" campaign], the atmosphere is tremulous with agitation, and discharges its vibrations far and wide. A movement is in birth which has no natural crisis or resolution. (p. 76)

The reader, expecting some horrendous tale of Catholic persecution, instead is amused to find this takes the metaphorical form of bell ringing:

Spontaneously the bells of the steeples begin to sound. Not by an act of volition, but by a sort of mechanical impulse, bishop and dean, archdeacon and canon, rector and curate, one after another, each on his high tower, off they set, swinging and booming, tolling and chiming, with nervous intensesness, and thickening emotion, and deepening volume, the old ding-dong which has scared town and country this weary time;-- (pp. 76-77)

The very phrases themselves echo the rhythm of bells ringing, as can be seen by scanning them:

/ v v /
 bishop and dean,
 / / v /
 archdeacon and canon,
 / v v /
 rector and curate,
 / / v /
 one after another,
 / v v /
 each on his high tower,
 / / /
 off they set,
 / v v /
 swinging and booming,
 / v v /
 tolling and chiming,
 v / v /
 with nervous intensesness,
 v / v /
 and thickening emotion,
 v / v /
 and deepening volume,
 v / /
 the old ding-dong.

Thus, the Anglican clergy are turned by metaphor into mechanical carillons:

--tolling and chiming away, jingling and clamouring
and ringing the changes on their poor half-dozen notes.

Their automatic responses which follow now rhythmically and verbally imitate the limited combination of notes possible in bell ringing, as can also be seen by scansion:

v / v /
 "the Popish aggression,"
 / v / v /
 "insolent and insidious,"
 v / v /
 "insidious and insolent,"
 / v / v /
 "insolent and atrocious,"
 v / v /
 "atrocious and insolent,"
 v / v /
 "atrocious, insolent and ungrateful,"
 v / v /
 "ungrateful, insolent and atrocious,"

To emphasize his point, Newman now makes the metaphor of bell ringing explicit as he ends the satire:

bobs (I think the ringers call them), bobs, and bobs-royal, and triple-bob-majors, and grandsires, --to the extent of their compass and the full ring of their metal, in honour of Queen Bess, and to the confusion of the Holy Father and the Princes of the Church. (p. 77)

This extended bell metaphor reduces the Protestant tradition of anti-Catholic prejudice to the absurdity of the robot-like response which befits an unthinking machine, not a thinking man.

Having shown the tradition of Protestant prejudice to have been arbitrarily set up for political ends, Newman is now ready to make a veiled thrust at the Establishment which stands behind the tradition. He relates how Charles II, to play a joke upon the Royal Society, asked why a fish weighed less in water when dead than when alive. As Newman tells the story, the Royal Society set about busily propounding theories to explain the matter until

it occurred to its members to determine the fact, before deciding on any of them; when on making the experiment, to their astonishment they found that the hypothesis was a mere invention of their royal master's, because the dead fish was not heavier in water than the living.

The moral to the story follows inescapably:

Well would it be if Englishmen in like manner, instead of taking their knowledge of us at (what may be called) royal hand, would judge about us for themselves. (p. 81)

The implication here, which Newman is again too tactful to state openly, is that the government, like King Charles II, is out to make fools of the people. In this case, therefore, blind obedience for the sake of patriotism does not apply; to avoid being made a laughingstock, one should judge the matter for oneself.

Newman ends the lecture with an example of prejudice brought to a reductio ad absurdum, the result of Protestants unthinkingly passing it on from generation to generation:

Each in his turn, as his reason opens, is indoctrinated in the popular misconception. At this very time, in consequence of the clamour which has been raised against us, children in the streets, of four and five years old, are learning and using against us terms of abuse, which will be their tradition all through their lives, till they are grey-headed, and have, in turn, to teach it to their grandchildren.

The concrete details surrounding the children,

They totter out, and lift their tiny hands, and raise their thin voices, in protest against those whom they are just able to understand are very wicked and very dangerous;--

not only makes the prejudice seem ridiculous as the harmless, pathetic little children ape the hatred of their elders, but lends such dramatic immediacy to the scene that the reader may tend to accept it as if it really happened. The next phrase,

--and they run away in terror when they catch our eye,

raises connotations of bed-time stories in the nursery, as Catholics appear to the little children much as wicked ogres or giants in fairy tales; the phrase thus plays on the disparity between what Catholics really are (human beings, as even Protestants must admit), and what they seem to be as seen through the distorting lens of prejudice. Prejudice learned at such an early impressionable age before one begins to think for oneself is apt to remain firmly implanted all life long, however, as Newman notes with a clear-eyed appreciation of the force of the irrational upon men's minds:

Nor will the growth of reason set them right; the longer they live, and the more they converse with men, the more will they hate us.

The closing sentence with its metaphor of an evil enchantment again is bound up with the fairy tale motif, and God as the good fairy becomes the only one capable of overcoming the prejudice:

The Maker of all, and only He, can shiver in pieces
this vast enchanted palace in which our lot is cast;
may He do it in His time!" (p. 82)

The concrete example of the little children learning to fear and hate Catholics as if they were hobgoblins now lends credence to Newman's comparison of the prejudice to an evil enchantment. This in turn conveys the idea of the total irrationality of the prejudice, because it then becomes something which no one under normal circumstances would ever engage in. Here, again, Newman is careful not to state this openly, but lets the reader draw the implicit conclusion for himself.

Repeatedly in this lecture Newman has set up his line of argument to reduce the Protestant tradition of anti-Catholic prejudice to absurdity; repeatedly he plays on the Protestant reader's fear of being taken for a fool to force him to examine his blind prejudices. He suggests that those in authority, the government and the Anglican Church, mean to keep the people in willful ignorance of the Catholic Church for political, not religious, reasons, and that, therefore, every sincerely religious Englishman has the right, indeed, the obligation, to investigate matters for himself.

Typically, Newman makes this controversial suggestion in metaphorical terms throughout the lecture, comparing Catholicism to a great material body crying out for scientific investigation, bigoted Englishmen to ostriches thrusting their heads in the sand, England to a tyrannical workhouse and, negatively, to "not even a camera obscura," "the various forms of Christianity" to material goods which should be carefully inspected, Anglican clergymen to mechanical bell ringers, anti-Catholic prejudice to an evil enchantment, and God to a good fairy who will break the spell "in His time!" The effect upon the Protestant reader, who must make the correlation between the metaphor and the suggestion to which it points, should be constantly to undermine his own prejudices, for he is caught more or less unawares in having to draw the correlation for himself, and should therefore be vulnerable to the force of its implications.

Chapter Five. "Lecture III. Fable the Basis of the
Protestant View."

Newman's concern in the third lecture is to expose the Protestant tradition of anti-Catholic prejudice as resting upon sheer fabrication. To make this exposure plausible, he first assembles a mass of evidence from different spheres of English life to show how pervasive the tradition is, and second, traces up the tradition in these different aspects to its roots to lay bare the utter falsehood, or at least, absence of proven facts, upon which it ultimately rests. In doing so, Newman is careful to begin by exposing the least controversial aspects of the anti-Catholic tradition where the Protestant reader should not be so emotionally involved and might be more susceptible to his argument. The cumulative effect of many specific exposures, however, may tend to sow doubt in the reader's mind about the truthfulness of the tradition in general, thus progressively preparing the reader to accept Newman's final, scathing conclusion that the tradition is maintained only "by wholesale, retail, systematic, unscrupulous lying" (p. 126).

Newman begins with the general observation that the Protestant tradition of fierce anti-Catholic prejudice has endured essentially unchanged for 300 years while society itself has undergone the most radical changes. He then contrasts this situation in England to that of other lands:

there is scarcely a country besides ours where Catholicism is not at least respected, even if it is not studied, and what is more observable still, scarcely a country besides ours, originally Protestant, in which Protestantism even exists at present.

Why has Protestantism flourished only in England? Newman anticipates the Protestant answer and forestalls it by pointing out what should be the logical consequence of a successful religion:

He would be eager to reply, if he could, that the Protestant spirit has survived in the land amid so many changes in political and social science, because certain political theories were false, but Protestantism is true; but if this is the case, why has it not kept its ground and made its way into other countries also? (p. 84)

The answer to this now enormous paradox which Newman has so carefully built up is, of course, the false tradition of prejudice which has blinded the English people to its real defects, a tradition which was absent in other Protestant countries. Newman then logically reasons,

Instead, then, of concluding that it is true, because it has remained here during three centuries substantially the same, I should rather conclude that it is false because it has not been able during that period to remain the same abroad. To the standing, compulsory Tradition existing here, I ascribe its continuance here; to fact and reason operating freely elsewhere, I ascribe its disappearance elsewhere.

So Newman turns the argument for the truth of English Protestantism against itself by comparing its unchanging state to the considerably changed state of Protestant movements abroad! The effect is to make the reader see Protestantism in an altogether different light, as desperately needing the support of a tradition of prejudice not having anything to do with the authentic religious impulse to maintain itself.

For proof of his assertion, Newman first makes a general statement:

This view of the subject is confirmed to us, when we consider, on the one hand, the character of our countrymen, and on the other, the character of those instruments and methods by which the Tradition of Protestantism is perpetuated among them. (p. 85)

This is now made concrete by a catalogue of specific examples which, through their very length, build up a powerful impression as the reader waits for the sentence to end to make sense of the complete word group. Anaphora and asyndeton are used to lend emphasis to the accumulation:

There is an established Tradition of law, and of the clergy, and of the court, and of the universities, and of literature, and of good society; and all these act upon a people peculiarly susceptible of the claims of personal merit, of embodied authority, of constituted order, of rank, and of reputation in the world, and little sensitive in comparison of abstract argument, logical sequence, moral fitness, historical results, or foreign transactions. (pp. 85-86)

Once more Newman turns to meet and forestall the objection that much of Protestant opposition to Catholicism rests on theological grounds, and not on prejudice. Again he uses the device of accumulation to give the impression that he understands and appreciates the weight of the arguments of the great Protestant thinkers:

Bacon and Hooker, Taylor and Chillingworth, Hampden, Clarendon, and Falkland, Russell, Somers and Walpole, Hobbes and Locke, Swift and Addison, Hume and Robertson, Warburton and Horsley, Pitt and Fox, Walter Scott and Hallam, and a multitude of other illustrious names, nay, the whole host of educated men, are all separate authorities; each speaks for himself; they do not copy, the one from the other; there are among them men of extensive reading, profound philosophy, intimate knowledge of the world; they are all men of intelligence, and at least able to give an opinion. It is absurd to say otherwise. (p. 86)

Newman goes further, however. He admits that these arguments on doctrine are among the strongest reasons for the existence of Protestantism:

This simple consideration, it may be said, overthrows from its very foundation the argument drawn out in my last week's Lecture, about the traditional character of Protestantism in England. (pp. 86-87)

Yet having freely admitted the ability of many spokesmen for Protestantism, and thus having given the impression of leaning over backward to be fair, Newman can now plausibly deny its relevancy to the Protestant tradition of prejudice. He calls the doctrinal arguments of such men "the Protestantism of the few" and asserts, "these great men, and those philosophical arguments, whatever be their weight, have no influence with the many" (p. 87). This abstract proposition is now given weight and substance by particular instances from the highly emotional and non-intellectual "No Popery" agitation of the very recent past:

Crowds do not assemble in Exeter Hall [the meeting place of the more radical Evangelical Wing of Protestantism¹], mobs do not burn the Pope [i.e., in effigy²] from reverence for Lord Bacon, Locke, or Butler, or for anything these gifted men have recorded. (p. 87)

In an immensely long sentence, Newman concretizes by a manifold series of specific examples his assertion that theological arguments have no relevance to the tradition of anti-Catholic prejudice:

I am treating of the unpopularity of Catholicism, now and here, as it exists in the year 1851, and in London, or in Edinburgh, or in Birmingham, or in Bristol, or in Manchester, or in Glasgow; among the gentlemen and yeomen of Yorkshire, Devonshire, and Kent; in the Inns of Court, and in the schools and colleges of the land; and I say this Tradition does not flow from the mouth of the half-dozen wise, or philosophic, or learned men

who can be summoned in its support, but is a tradition of nursery stories, school stories, public-house stories, club-house stories, drawing-room stories, platform stories, pulpit stories;--a tradition of newspapers, magazines, reviews, pamphlets, romances, novels, poems, and light literature of all kind, literature of the day;-- a tradition of selections from the English classics, bits of poetry, passages of history, sermons, chance essays, extracts from books of travel, anonymous anecdotes, lectures on prophecy, statements and arguments of polemical writers, made up into small octavos for class-books, and into pretty miniatures for presents; --a tradition floating in the air; which we found in being when we first came to years of reason; which has been borne in upon us by all we saw, heard, or read, in high life, in parliament, in law courts, in general society; which our fathers told us had ever been in their day;-- (pp. 87-88)

Beside this great catalogue of the many popular ramifications of the rag-tag, patchwork "tradition" which swell and expand pervasively into all areas of national life, the arguments of a "half-dozen wise, or philosophic, or learned men" seem totally insignificant and of no consequence whatsoever.

Now Newman tags on to the end of this accumulation a conclusion (reached in the previous lecture) exposing its weak points:

--a tradition, therefore, truly universal and immemorial, and good as far as a tradition can be good, but after all, not more than a tradition is worth: I mean, requiring some ultimate authority to make it trustworthy.

His admonition logically follows:

Trace up, then, the tradition to its very first beginnings, its roots and its sources, if you are to form a judgment whether it is more than a tradition.

Newman drives home the consequence of doing so by a clever play on words:

It may be a good tradition, and yet after all good for nothing.

He then dramatizes the weak point of a spurious tradition,

its source, by metaphor and allusion:

What profit, though ninety-nine links of a chain be sound, if the topmost is broken?

The reader may be reminded of Jesus saying, "For what shall it profit a man if he shall gain the whole world, and lose his own soul?" (Mark 8.36), the implication being that reliance on the false tradition of Protestant prejudice will have the same dire consequences.

Using the same chain metaphor, Newman now openly asserts "that this Protestant Tradition, on which English faith hangs, is wanting in just the first link" (p. 88); the Tradition is hanging on nothing, as it were:

Fierce as are its advocates, and high as is its sanction, yet, whenever we can pursue it through the mist of immemorial reception in which it commonly vanishes, and can arrive at its beginnings, forthwith we find a flaw in the argument. (pp. 88-89)

Newman then gives a catalogue of specific instances of this flaw:

Either facts are not forthcoming, or they are not sufficient for the purpose: sometimes they turn out to be imaginations or inventions, sometimes exaggerations, sometimes misconceptions; something or other comes to light which blunts their efficiency, and throws suspicion on the rest. Testimonies which were quoted as independent turn out to be the same, or to be contradictory of each other, or to be too improbable to be true, or to have no good authority at all:--

The flaw thus brings the position of bigoted Protestants to a reductio ad absurdum:

--so that our enemies find they cannot do better, after all, than fall back on the general reception of the Tradition itself, as a reason for receiving the Tradition;--

The illogic of using "the Tradition itself, as a reason for receiving the Tradition," is now applied perfectly logically

for ironic impact:

--and they find it prudent to convict us of all manner of crimes, on the simple ground of our being notoriously accused of them.

Through terse clauses in apposition, "Hard measure, scanty justice!" (p. 89), Newman now contrasts this state of affairs with that of a court of law, where charges must be proved and the burden of proof lies upon the accuser. He imagines a situation where he would be sent to prison because of allegations and concludes, "I conceive public opinion would say I was shamefully treated" (p. 91). What Newman has done here is very cleverly to imply a direct relationship between public opinion and the legal process: since Catholics could not be convicted in a court of law of crimes they are accused of in the popular mind, for lack of any hard proof, the popular mind should therefore not accuse them. To reinforce the idea of this relationship as validly existing, Newman now deals with Protestant prejudice in legalistic terms:

Now I put it to the experience--I put it to the conscience of the Protestant world,--whether such is not the justice which it deals out to Catholics as a matter of course. No evidence against us is too little; no infliction too great. Statement without proof, though inadmissible in every other case, is all fair when we are concerned. A Protestant is at liberty to bring a charge against us, and challenge us to refute, not any proof he brings, for he brings none, but his simple assumption or assertion. (p. 92)

This implied conclusion that legal standards should apply to the holding of prejudice is important to Newman's next line of argument as well. Here he is concerned to show how easy it is, lacking such standards, to denigrate an

institution through a wild charge which the existing tradition of prejudice predisposes the mind to believe. He vividly demonstrates the immense labor involved in refuting such a charge, and the disheartening fact that by the time the charge is so laboriously refuted, no one is listening any longer:

who cares for it by that time? who cares for the story itself? it has done its work; time stops for no man; it has created or deepened the impression in the minds of its hearers that a monk commits murder or adultery as readily as he eats his dinner. Men forget the process by which they received it, but there it is, clear and indelible. (p. 95)

Having shown how a baseless fabrication can so easily be taken for the truth by a population predisposed to believe it, Newman is now ready to achieve the goal up to which his argument has been leading: to demonstrate actual examples of the fraudulent historical basis of Protestant accusations against Catholics in such a manner as to discredit the entire Protestant tradition of historical research in Catholic matters--as Chesterton observes.³ He begins by relating the charming story of the priest who mistakenly learned to say "" Quod ore mumpsimus"" instead of ""Quod ore sumpsimus"" as part of the mass. Many years later when a scholar finally told him of his error, he replied stubbornly, "" I'll not change . . . my old Mumpsimus for your new Sumpsimus."" Newman adds gleefully, "Now this happily applies to the subject which I am going to illustrate, as you will presently see" (p. 97), thus promising the reader the spectacle of ridicule. He proceeds to quote from the Protestant historian Hallam who in turn had quoted one St. Eligius out

of context to prove his point that Catholics of the Middle Ages held that the essence of Christianity lay in mechanical forms of worship, and not in a spirit of love towards mankind. Newman observes, however, that Hallam does not quote directly, but is content to relay on the authority of the Scotch historian Robertson and the German historian Mosheim, adding slyly, "and therefore, in a word, his saying 'Mumpsimus' and passing it on" (p. 99). The eminent Hallam has been reduced to the same level of absurdity as the unlearned priest. But more is to come.

Newman moves on to Robertson and discovers that Robertson got the quotation from the English translator of Mosheim, one Maclaine. Again drawing the ridiculous parallel with the unlearned priest, he concludes, "Here, then, we trace our 'Mumpsimus' a step higher; from Hallam to Robertson, from Robertson to the 'learned and judicious' Maclaine" (p. 100). Now Newman adds sarcastically, "Robertson and Maclaine were Scotchmen, but the tradition was not idle the while in the south either" (pp. 100-01). He proceeds to quote two eminent English Protestant historians, White and Jortin, who used the same quotation of St. Eligius in order to attack the Catholic Church, relying for its accuracy on "the first father of Mumpsimus, the Lutheran Mosheim himself" (p. 103).

Now Newman is ready to bring the whole structure he has so carefully built up crashing down headlong:

Brothers of the Oratory, take your last look at the Protestant Tradition ere it melts away into thin air from before your eyes. It carries with it a goodly succession of names, Mosheim, Jortin, Maclaine,

Robertson, White, and Hallam. It extends from 1755 to the year 1833. But in this latter year, when it was now seventy-eight years old, it met with an accident attended with fatal consequences. (pp. 103-04)

This brilliant personification conjures up the image of a decrepit old man about to meet his doom through mischance, and heightens reader interest in what is to come:

Some one for the first time, instead of blindly following the traditional statement, thought it worth while first to consult St. Eligius himself. (p. 104)

A certain Dr. Waddington found that the quotation consisted of a group of unrelated sentences strung together out of context to form a totally misleading impression of what the Saint had actually said. Chesterton has this shrewd observation to make about the startling effect of Newman's exposure:

Now observe the controversial effect of Newman's superb strategy. He has nailed the particular lie about St. Eligius to the counter. . . . But he has done much more than that. By his patient tracing of the tradition, by his careful marshalling of all the authorities that support it, before he smashes it, he has erected in the minds of his readers an indelible distrust of all the Protestant traditions however venerable and however authoritative. The victory is complete. The enemy is simply obliterated.⁴

Newman's use of guilt by association to take in the whole Protestant tradition of literature is exemplified by his above assertion to the lay brothers of the Oratory to take a remaining glance at "the Protestant Tradition" before it evaporates, rather than saying "this particular Protestant historical tradition." Nor is he content to stop here. Newman goes on to show how Mosheim's misquotation of St. Eligius, though exposed as false in 1833, has been reprinted in a new edition of Mosheim's history published in 1841,

and concludes that "Mumpsimus still reigns" (p. 108). By carefully choosing one particular set of historical examples, then, Newman has been able to discredit the entire Protestant tradition of literature concerning the Catholic Church as a tradition built on falsehood and maintained even after exposure.

The net of guilt by association is now spread to take in other Protestant traditions as well:

I have given you, my Brothers, a specimen of the Tradition of Literature; now I proceed to the Tradition of Wealth, Respectability, Virtue and Enlightened Religion. (p. 108)

Newman's technique with the tradition of wealth and respectability is the same as his technique with the tradition of literature; he picks an outrageous accusation from a leading article of the Times, a newspaper reflecting solid middle class opinion, and proceeds to expose its complete absurdity. First, however, he ironically inflates the reputation of the Times as a champion of truth and justice and the pinnacle of journalistic perfection so that the later exposure will be that much greater by contrast:

If anywhere is to be found the sternness of those who are severe because they are pure--why may securely cast stones, for none can cast at them--who, like the Cherub in the poem, are "faithful found among the faithless"--you would say that here at length you had found the incorruptible and infallible, the guides in a bad world, who, amid the illusions of reason and the sophistries of passion, see the path of duty on all questions whatever, with a luminousness, a keenness, and a certainty special to themselves. (p. 109)

The reference to casting stones, of course, is an allusion to Christ saying to the men about to stone the woman found guilty of adultery, "He that is without sin among you, let

him first cast a stone at her" (John 8.7), and it brings home the impossibility of remaining pure in this world. Then, too, the Cherub who is "'faithful found among the friendless'" is a non-human creature, an order of Angel, and therefore capable of absolute standards of morality. Both allusions together thus cast ironic doubt on a human institution like the Times to "see the path of duty on all questions whatsoever, with a luminousness, a keenness, and a certainty special to themselves."

Newman's praise of the Times for its dedication to the truth, however ironic, now gives him a reason for using the newspaper as the most prestigious example of the insidious pervasiveness of the anti-Catholic tradition, for he finds the following outrageous charge in its columns:

"It is the practice, as our readers are aware, in Roman Catholic countries, for the clergy to post up a list of all the crimes to which human frailty can be tempted, placing opposite to them the exact sum of money for which their perpetuation will be indulged."
(p. 110)

Here, then, is a charge of the most serious import found in the most respected newspaper in the nation. Newman has built up the accusation only to magnify the effect of destroying it. This he does in a series of well-planned steps. First, Newman says, the charge is so serious as to persuade him to digress for a moment and explain what the Catholic teaching upon the subject of indulgences is, since the accusation "rests on a confusion between the forgiveness of sins and admission to Church communion, two ideas perfectly distinct from each other, both in themselves and in Catholic theology" (p. 111). He demonstrates how forgiveness of sins

cannot be bought with money but only through repentance (pp. 111-13).

Now the reader may wonder how such a charge, that forgiveness of sins can be bought for money, could come to be believed as a fact so that it is printed as a self-evident proposition in the Times. Newman suggests an answer by close analogy. He tells the story of a zealous Protestant clergyman who discovered on the door of a cathedral in Belgium a supposed "catalogue of sins, with a specification of the prices at which remission of each might severally be obtained." Now, says, Newman ironically, "It is a pity for the Protestant cause" that the clergyman only waited sixteen years to tell the tale, because contemporaries were still alive who could refute his charges. He next makes an oblique ironic reference to Protestant obscurantism in historical scholarship which is then slavishly taken for absolute truth by Protestant posterity, by using "weighty" and "heavy" simultaneously in both their literal and figurative senses to drive his point home:

Why did he not consign it to some safe volume of controversy, weighty enough for England, too heavy for the Channel, instead of committing it to the wings of the wind and the mercy of reporters? Then tranquilly and leisurely would the solemn tale have ventured out upon platforms and into pulpits, when contemporaries were gone, and would have taken its place beside my own Don Felix of Andalusia and similar worthies of Exeter Hall. But the fates willed otherwise. (p. 115)

In this case, the clergyman's accusation reached the cathedral in Belgium, and a statement was issued by the cathedral authorities there flatly denying the charge.

Then was the Protestant clergyman lying? Newman reveals his brilliance as a rhetorical strategist by saying no. His magnanimity towards the Protestant clergyman now paves the way for the acceptance by the reader of his own explanation, which is based on probable cause only. Newman tells how in cathedrals on the Continent chairs instead of pews are used by the worshippers, and these are rented out for small sums by persons attached to the cathedral. Furthermore, he relates, information supplied by a Belgian newspaper shows that the particular cathedral in question had a blackboard on its door on which was chalked the rental prices of these chairs. Newman then supposes that this is the true explanation of what the Protestant clergyman saw, which tends to be accepted by the reader because it is so plausible (p. 117). The attendant inference is clear: as Protestants have completely misunderstood the Doctrine of Indulgence through understandably plausible but nevertheless incorrect suppositions, they may be mistaken about other Catholic doctrines as well.

This second example of misapprehension has put Protestant prejudice in a more ridiculous light than the previous example of careless and biased Protestant historical scholarship; yet the tenacity of the Protestant tradition upon the minds of the educated classes of society in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary is illustrated by Newman's ironic remarks at the close of the examples:

The exposure happened in March and April; but Protestantism is infallible, and the judgment of its doctors irreversible; accordingly, in the following June, the

newspaper I have mentioned thought it necessary to show that the Tradition was not injured by the blow; so out came the Tradition again, "though brayed in a mortar," not at all the worse for the accident, in that emphatic statement which I quoted when I opened the subject, and which I now quote again that I am closing it. (p. 118)

Now Newman is ready to cap this with the most ridiculous example of all, which, being contemporary and local, is meant to have the maximum effect upon his listeners. He tells of the self-appointed defenders of Protestantism who watched the construction of the Oratory at Edgbaston and came to the shocking conclusion that cells were being built underground for the purpose of secret murder. How was such a preposterous conclusion arrived at? Newman ironically shows how the Protestant smug sense of superiority to Catholicism prepared the way:

Judgments which had employed themselves on the high subject of a Catholic hierarchy and its need, found no difficulty in dogmatising on bedrooms and closets. (p. 120)

He recounts how a suspicious attitude induced by the tradition made the wildest imaginings possible:

There was much to suggest matter of suspicion, and to predispose the trespasser to doubt whether he had yet got to the bottom of the subject. At length one question flashed upon his mind: what can such a house have to do with cellars? cellars and monks, what can be their mutual relation? monks--to what possible use can they put pits, and holes, and corners, and outhouses, and sheds? (pp. 120-21)

Use of asyndeton creates the hurried rhythms and excitement of imaginings becoming actual fact:

A sensation was created; it brought other visitors; it spread; it became an impression, a belief; the truth lay bare; a tradition was born; a fact was elicited which henceforth had many witnesses.

Polyptoton now emphasize the false logic of jumping to

conclusions: "Those cellars were cells." Newman now pretends to go along with the conclusion in such a way that his words ironically underline its absurdity, i.e., by agreeing with the Protestant tradition in literature (which he has just exposed as false):

How obvious when once stated! and every one who entered the building, every one who passed by, became, I say, in some sort, ocular vouchers for what had often been read of in books, but for many generations had happily been unknown to England, for the incarcerations, the torturings, the starvings, the immurings, the muderings proper to a monastic establishment.

He heightens the absurdity by formally breaking the charge down into its four constituent parts so that he can emphasize the specious reasoning that went into every aspect of the charge. Under the first part, the accusation, Newman lists the bald assertion of the accuser "that the Catholics, building the house in question, were in the practice of committing murder." In the absence of definite proof, such a charge is libelous, but Newman notes that the accuser was immune from prosecution (the accusation was made on the floor of the House of Commons).⁵ To lend support to his charge in the absence of any coroner's inquest for possible foul play, the accuser also stated,

"It was not usual for a coroner to hold an inquest, unless where a rumour had got abroad that there was a necessity for one; and how was a rumour to come from the underground cells of the convents?" (p. 121)

Finally the accuser referring to the Oratory abuilding in Edgbaston, asserted that "'the whole of the underground was fitted up with cells; and what were those cells for?'" Newman has set up the accusation so that it is glaringly

obvious to the reader that the accuser has leapt to a wild conclusion of murder from an unproved premise of underground cells, the existence of which may or may not have anything to do with the matter in the first place. He then makes the argument even more ridiculous by pointing to the grounds of belief for the underground cells:

1. That the house is built level; 2. and that the plot of earth on which it is built is higher at one end than at the other.

By the time Newman comes to tell of the accusers themselves, the reader is expecting them to be ignorant, prejudiced persons who will snatch at any straw to support their wild arguments. But no, the accusers turn out to include highly educated men who are familiar with the locality and its goings-on; Newman is therefore entirely justified in calling them

men who deliberately, reiteratedly, in spite of being set right, charge certain persons with pitiless, savage practices; with beating and imprisoning, with starving, with murdering their dependents. (p. 122)

The accusation, the accusers, and the grounds of the accusation thus all turn out to be ridiculous, but what of the accused? He turns out to be Newman himself!--Newman, whose life has been an open book "in which nothing, I may say, can be hid; . . . under the eyes of numbers who are familiarly known to my accusers; . . . with our house open to all comers, and ourselves accessible, I may almost say at any hour" (pp. 123-24). The contrast could not be greater between the openness of moral goodness at work and the intrigues of its evil detractors, and Newman's character can only gain by it.

Now Newman, having divided up the argument into all its constituent parts so as to consider it in all its absurd aspects, is ready for the conclusion to which he has been building, namely, "considering the charge, and the evidence, and the accuser, and the accused, could we Catholics desire a more apposite illustration of the formation and value of a Protestant Tradition?" (p. 124). The wild accusation of murder, then, has played into Newman's hands by letting him use it as a modern, local, and personal example of the absurdity of the Protestant tradition of anti-Catholic prejudice.

But he is not content to let the matter rest here. His tone of outrage shifts to one of irony as he speculates on what might have happened had the charge gone unexposed. He plays on the fact that the charge had to do with subterranean excavations by personifying it, fittingly, as a child of darkness growing underground to manhood and only venturing outside into the light of day when all chance of contradiction was gone:

The nascent fable has indeed failed, as the tale about the Belgian sin-table has failed, but it might have thriven: it has been lost by bad nursing; it ought to have been cherished awhile in those underground receptacles where it first drew breath, till it could comfortably bear the light; till its limbs were grown, and its voice was strong, and we on whom it bore had run our course, and gone to our account; and then it might have raised its head without fear and without reproach, and might have magisterially asserted what there was none to deny.

Now, however, Newman brings in the factor of chance which upsets the best laid of plans, and brings them to destruction:

But men are all the creatures of circumstances; they are hurried on to a ruin which they may see, but cannot

evade: so has it been with the Edgbaston Tradition. His next sentence uses antithesis in parallel structure to bring across vividly and concretely the idea of its premature exposure:

It was spoken on the house-tops when it should have been whispered in the closets, and it expired in the effort. (p. 124)

Again he speculates ironically as to what might have happened but for this misfortune, fittingly stressing the underground nature of the fable's rise which culminates in a peak of the ridiculous:

Yet it might have been allotted, let us never forget, a happier destiny. It might have smouldered and spread through a portion of our Birmingham population; it might have rested obscurely on their memories, and now and then risen upon their tongues: there might have been flitting notions, misgivings, rumours, voices, that the horrors of the Inquisition were from time to time renewed in our subterranean chambers; and fifty years hence, if some sudden frenzy of the hour roused the anti-Catholic jealousy still lingering in the town, a mob might have swarmed about our innocent dwelling, to rescue certain legs of mutton and pats of butter from imprisonment, and to hold an inquest over a dozen packing-cases, some old hampers, a knife-board and a range of empty blacking bottles. (pp. 124-25)

Hence, through the example of the outrageous charge of underground cells at Edgbaston and his ironic speculations on its growth into a full-fledged fable, Newman has made vividly concrete, and therefore more believable, his contention that the Protestant tradition is an outgrowth of wild fabrication.

Each of the examples used from the three different Protestant traditions has thus fulfilled the definite purpose of bringing the Protestant reader by stages to a full acceptance of his scathing conclusion:

It is by wholesale, retail, systematic, unscrupulous lying, for I can use no gentler term, that the many rivulets are made to flow for the feeding of the great Protestant Tradition. (p. 126)

The first example of the fraudulent basis of Protestant historical scholarship may be relatively easy for the reader to accept, since it is presented humorously and is the concern, properly, of scholars. Though it is indicative only of sloppy scholarship and not of deliberate lying, yet it has the important effect of putting the reader in a suspicious frame of mind towards all Protestant accusations against the Catholic Church.

Similarly, in the next example, to say that the Catholic Church forgives sins on payment of money makes one guilty, not of deliberate lying, but only of misinterpretation of the evidence, as Newman himself admits. Yet what it does show powerfully is the self-deluding aspects of the Protestant tradition, which makes its adherents always ready to interpret Catholic activities in the worst possible light. But the charge that the excavations at Edgbaston were for the purpose of constructing underground cells in which secret murders were to be committed is so at odds with the common-sense explanation of an underground cellar, involving the acceptance of two major unproved premises (that cells were to be constructed in the first place and that secret murder was then to be committed in them) as to make the charge of deliberate lying the only plausible explanation of the accusation. Moreover, the fact that each of the three examples of the tradition of anti-Catholic prejudice which Newman

exposes as outrageous falsehoods are still being circulated as the truth after their exposure lends concrete substance to Newman's charge that the tradition is arbitrarily kept up simply for reasons of politics.

It is instructive to note that Newman makes the Protestant tradition of prejudice assume vivid concrete form through the repeated metaphor of a river being fed by tributary streams of falsehood; this becomes a unifying motif throughout the lecture. At the beginning, he asserts,

The mighty Tradition flows on, replenished and refreshed continually by rivulets which, issuing from new fountain-heads, make their way, in faithful and unfailing succession, into the main stream. I am going to put my finger on three of these small fountain-heads of the Tradition, --which, as I have already complained, are not commonly accessible;--

This metaphor of the "fountain-heads" makes possible the use of irony to foreshadow his later exposure of the tradition as absurd through chosen examples:

--they shall not be springs of a vulgar quality, but they shall represent the intelligence, the respectability, and the sense of English society. (p. 96)

In exposing the origin of the falsehood concerning St. Eligius, Newman comments, "And now we are approaching the fountain-head of the Tradition" (p. 102). In speaking of the Protestant tradition generally, he says (helped by an alliteration of "f's"),

So it has come down to us, so it will flow on; and the mighty flood of falsehood is continually fed and kept to the full by fresh and fresh testimonies, separate and independent, till scepticism is overcome and opposition is hopeless. (pp. 114-15)

About the clergyman's error of supposing that forgiveness of various sins could be purchased by payment of a specific

price, he states,

But the fates willed otherwise; the accessory was to join the main stream at once, and to its surprise to be tumbled violently into its bed. The noise drew attention; curiosity was excited; the windings of the infant rill were prematurely tracked to its source; so we can now put our finger on the first welling of its waters, and we can ascertain the composition of a Protestant tradition. (pp. 115-16)

In recounting the third example, the foundation excavation at Edgbaston, Newman says fittingly,

In this case, its fountain springs up, as it were, under our very feet, and we shall have no difficulty at all in judging of its quality. (p. 118)

Finally, in summarizing his conclusion about the tradition, he asserts,

It is by wholesale, retail, systematic, unscrupulous lying, for I can use no gentler term, that the many rivulets are made to flow for the feeding the great Protestant Tradition. (p. 126)

What is the effect of using this metaphor of a mighty river being constantly replenished by tributary rivulets? It communicates vividly and concretely the idea that the various falsehoods circulated about Catholics, in literature and commerce and politics, are all part of a much larger tradition of prejudice against Catholics in general, that they spring from the identical sort of prejudiced mentality in the same way that water is the same substance everywhere, and that this mentality supplies an inexhaustible source of new falsehoods much as springs of water constantly add to the volume of the river they flow into.

Thus, Newman's approach in this lecture is to combine the water metaphor as a unifying motif with exposure of the Protestant tradition of anti-Catholic prejudice in its

different aspects, i.e., as the underlying reason for sloppy historical scholarship, misunderstanding of Catholic doctrine (leading to ridiculous misapprehension of its actions), and wild accusations without the slightest foundation in fact (which end, in his hands, in denigration of the accusers). Moreover, because these aspects of the tradition are exposed in the order of least controversial to most, the reader's guard tends to be down. This affords the opportunity to undermine more and more as the lecture proceeds his faith in the general tradition of prejudice as truthful until he is led, hopefully, to accept Newman's final, scathing conclusion that the tradition is only maintained "by wholesale, retail, systematic, unscrupulous lying."

NOTES TO CHAPTER FIVE

1. Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church.
2. Trevor, p. 531.
3. "The Art of Controversy," 453.
4. Ibid.
5. See Letter to the Editor of the Morning Chronicle, May 15, 1851, Letters, XIV, 283.

Chapter Six. "Lecture IV. True Testimony Insufficient for
the Protestant View."

Newman's objective in the fourth lecture is to show how much the Protestant tradition of anti-Catholic prejudice relies on pure fable and slander to maintain its hold on the people. By isolating fables from facts, so that facts cannot be used to support fables, he tries to reduce the Protestant tradition to sheer scandalmongering. Equally important, he tries to show that the success of the Protestant tradition in maintaining its hold over the people is due only to a continual supply of fables and slander which pander to the psychological need of the public to have its "passions of curiosity, fright and hatred" gratified (p. 160). By careful choice of Protestant critics who can be exposed as insignificant, fraudulent, or simply as misunderstanding Church doctrine, Newman tries to insure that the reader will draw the proper conclusion, that the Protestant tradition lacks any true testimony to back it up, that it is based on pure fabrications which pander, for the most part, to base emotions, and that therefore the reader, if he is to retain his intellectual self-respect, must drop the tradition altogether as unworthy of a thinking person.

Yet to bring the reader to accept this conclusion, Newman must first reassure him that dropping his prejudice will not mean his conversion to Catholicism. Accordingly,

he is careful immediately to qualify his opening assertion that the Protestant tradition of anti-Catholic prejudice is based almost entirely on slander. His qualifications depend for their effectiveness on the fact that they are presented in anti-climactical order:

As soon as ever they disabuse their minds of what is false, and grasp only what is true,--I do not say they at once become Catholics;--

This should reassure Protestants as to one of their greatest fears, for so great was the hatred of Catholicism that converts to it were treated as social outcasts. (Newman's novel, Loss and Gain: The Story of a Convert, includes a vivid portrayal of the social ostracism such converts faced, not only from friends, but from their immediate family as well.) Newman continues,

--I do not say they lose their dislike to our religion, or their misgivings about its workings;--

This should reassure the Protestant reader that not even his theological objections will be removed. Newman now adds,

--but I say this, either they become tolerant towards us, and cease to hate us personally,--

This should appeal to the magnanimity of the reader who has been comforted by the thought that he has nothing to lose emotionally or intellectually by becoming tolerant of Catholics. Such magnanimity is now contrasted with the least that can be expected from dropping falsehoods:

--or, at least, supposing they cannot shake off old associations, and are prejudiced and hostile as before, still they find they have not the means of communicating their own feelings to others.

This assertion in effect challenges the reader to see if his

reason can triumph over his irrational prejudices, which are dependent on falsehood. Now through alliteration of "p's," Newman makes the sound reinforce the sense of his conclusion:

To Protestantism False Witness is the principle of propagation. (p. 128)

As an extreme example of this false witness, Newman uses the illustration of Protestant Reformers calling the Pope "Antichrist," so outrageous and startling a lie that men perforce had to believe it. But why need Protestants resort to lying in the first place?

Few persons tell atrocious falsehoods for the sake of telling them. If truth had been sufficient to put down Catholicism, the Reformers would not have had recourse to fiction.

This is a very harsh and uncompromising assertion. To increase the chances of its acceptability and forestall objections, Newman now concedes that "there are true charges which can be brought against us," such as that not all within the Church's ranks are "just and holy" (p. 129). Newman concedes only to refute, however, since he goes on to point out that the Church never claimed that all within her ranks were just and holy, for Jesus Himself proclaimed that the Church was to gather in all kinds of people (pp. 129-30).

Newman's syntax helps to emphasize this point, first through repetition of the verb "deny":

But this no Catholic asserts, every Catholic denies. Every Catholic has ever denied it, back to the very time of the Apostles and their divine Master; and He and they deny it. Christ denies it, St. Paul denies it, and the Catholic Church denies it;--

Newman can now argue by similarity that the present-day Catholic Church is the same one Christ founded:

--our Lord expressly said that the Church was to be like a net which gathered of every kind, not only of the good, but of the bad too. Such was His Church; it does not prove then that we are not His Church, because we are like His Church; rather our being like the Primitive Christian body, is a reason for concluding that we are one with it.

He now paradoxically can make a virtue out of the Church's defects because of Christ's express sanction:

We cannot make His Church better than He made her; we must be content with her as He made her, or not pretend to follow Him. He said, "Many are called, few are chosen;" men come into the Church, and then they fall.

Therefore, in antithetical phrases Newman can now demonstrate that evil is a result of individual perversity allowed by God and not of the Catholic Church as a whole:

Thus, not indeed by the divine wish and intention, but by the divine permission, and man's perverseness, there is a vast load of moral evil existing in the Church;--

A Scriptural allusion subtly makes clear that Satan is the enemy ultimately responsible for the evil:

--an enemy has sown weeds there, and those weeds remain among the wheat till the harvest. (p. 130)

The harvest, of course, refers to the Last Judgment when Jesus will separate the righteous from the damned (as in the Parable of the Tares of the Field--Matthew 13.37-43). This, then, is a way of saying that such evil as is within the Church is ultimately put there by supernatural means, and is therefore God's responsibility to be dealt with in His good time, and not the Church's.

Having established that evil exists within the Church by "divine permission, and man's perverseness" ultimately traceable to Satan, Newman can now admit that there are all

sorts of scandals in the Church which result from the evil doings of individuals without damaging his case. He reaches this conclusion:

Therefore, if Protestants wish to form arguments which really would tell against us, they must show, not that individuals are immoral or profane, but that the Church teaches, or enjoins, or recommends, what is immoral or profane; rewards, encourages, or at least does not warn and discountenance, the sinner; or promulgates rules, and enforces practices, which lead directly to sin.
(p. 131)

With this established, Newman can now meet head-on objections to Catholic teachings and regulations per se. He takes for an example the matter of celibacy and states, "it is plausibly objected that disorders not only sometimes do, but must occur, where priests are bound to celibacy" (p. 133). Newman's reply is a classic instance of paralipsis, of saying that one will not mention something and then mentioning it offhandedly:

Now I will not reply, as I might well do, by pointing out the caution which the Church observes in the selection of her priests; how it is her rule to train them carefully for many years beforehand with this one thought in view, that priests they are to be; how she tries them during their training; how she takes one and rejects another, not with any reflection on those who are rejected, but simply because she finds they are not called to this particular state of life; how, when she has selected a man, a hundred provisions and checks in detail are thrown around his person, which are to be his safeguard in his arduous calling; lastly, how, when he is once called to his high ministry, he has, unless he be wonderfully wanting to himself, the power of divine grace abundantly poured upon him, without which all human means are useless, but which can do, and constantly does, miracles, as the experience, not of priest merely, but of every one who has been converted from a life of sin, will abundantly testify;--I might enlarge on considerations such as these, but I put them aside, because I wish to address myself to the question of fact.
(pp. 133-34)

What is the "question of fact" to which Newman switches

the line of argument? Simply "whether celibacy has been and is, in comparison of the marriage vow, so dangerous to a clerical body" as Protestants would hold. Newman's answer is that marriage is no guarantee of purity, which "is just the very thing Protestants take for granted" (p. 134). How does Newman support this conclusion? First, he demonstrates that a philandering minister "has by matrimony but exchanged a bad sin for a worse, and has become an adulterer instead of being a seducer" (pp. 134-35). Isocolon drives the point home:

Matrimony only does this for him, that his purity is at once less protected and less suspected. (p. 135)

Newman then pays tribute to the morality of most Anglican clergymen, of which he has first-hand experience, and wishes to do so with those of the dissenting sects of whom he has no such knowledge:

I repeat, I know perfectly well, that there are a great number of high-minded men among the married Anglican clergy who would as soon think of murder, as of trespassing by the faintest act of indecorum upon the reverence which is due from them to others; nor am I denying, what, though of course I cannot assert it on any knowledge of mine, yet I wish to assert with all my heart, that the majority of Wesleyan and dissenting ministers lead lives beyond all reproach;--

Newman's comparison of "the faintest act of indecorum" to "murder" in the minds of "high-minded men among the married Anglican clergy" concretely and vividly establishes his credentials as a sincere person wishing to believe the best of non-Catholic clergymen. He can now refer to the common knowledge circulated in society and the newspapers without seeming to have an axe to grind:

--but still allowing all this, the terrible instances of human frailty of which one reads and hears in the Protestant clergy, are quite enough to show that the married state is no sort of testimonial for moral correctness, no safeguard whether against scandalous offenses, or (much less) against minor forms of the same general sin. Purity is not a virtue which comes merely as a matter of course to the married any more than to the single.

Since it is impossible to prove that Protestant clergy married are more pure than Catholic clergy celibate, Newman has as much right to his opinion as a Protestant, and hence can state his conviction that Protestants sin against the marriage vow at least as much as Catholics sin against celibacy (p. 135).

Now he goes on the offensive by suggesting that celibacy is superior to the married state as "the priest's vow is generally the occasion of virtues which a married clergy does not contemplate even in idea" (pp. 135-36). The allusion here, of course, is to the fact that the Catholic clergyman is wedded to the Church, rather than to a flesh and blood person of the opposite sex, and therefore must sacrifice the joys of normal married life for the sake of his vocation. This, then, puts him on a higher moral plane altogether than the Protestant clergyman who has no such sacrifice to make. Newman does not, however, offer proof of what the specific virtues of celibacy may be, since "I am on the defensive, and only insist on so much as is necessary for my purpose" (p. 136).

The proposition next logically follows that

if matrimony does not prevent cases of immorality among Protestant ministers, it is not celibacy which causes them among Catholic priests. It is not what the Catholic Church imposes, but what human nature prompts, which leads any portion of her ecclesiastics into sin.

And since it is frail human nature which leads certain Catholic clergy astray, the same frail human nature will be at work corrupting Protestant clergy from their duties as well. This observation gives Newman the chance to stress the advantage of celibacy through argument by analogy, using as an illustration the Protestant virtues of teetotalism and temperance to which many Protestant readers might readily assent:

On the other hand, there are numbers to whom there would be, not greater, but less, trial in the vow of celibacy than in the vow of marriage, as so many persons prefer Teetotalism to the engagement to observe Temperance.

The way is now clear for Newman's conclusion:

Till, then, you can prove that celibacy causes what matrimony certainly does not prevent, you do nothing at all. This is the language of common sense.

He sums up his argument in phrases carefully arranged in order of climax:

It is the world, the flesh, and the devil, not celibacy, which is the ruin of those who fall.
(p. 136)

Newman's conclusion that the devil is the being ultimately responsible for the moral corruption common to Protestant and Catholic alike enables him to indulge in his favorite rhetorical device of turning the argument of his accusers against themselves:

Why, then, do you throw in my teeth that . . . this priest ought never to have been a priest, and that nun was forced into religion by her father; as if there were none of these evils in Protestant England?
(p. 137)

He dramatizes the fact that Protestants are always ready to pounce on the faults of Catholics by ironically imagining

the reaction of Protestants to a Catholic scandal:

O light to the eyes, and joy to the heart, and music to the ear! O sweet tidings to writers of pamphlets, newspapers, and magazines; to preachers and declaimers, who have now a weary while been longing, and panting, and praying for some good fat scandal, one, only just one, well-supported instance of tyranny, or barbarity, or fraud, or immorality, to batten upon and revel in!
(p. 139)

The immense contrast between the highly stylized language appropriate to praising rhetorically the actions of great men and the sordid subject matter makes the Protestant scandal-mongers appear all the more ridiculous.

Now Newman makes the scandalmongering assume concrete form by personifying it as the "Spirit of false witness"; thus he vividly communicates to the reader the idea that the scandalmongers are prompted by the worst motives. Each of the following illustrations of the Spirit in action is exposed as false in turn, through a cumulative effect making the scandalmongers appear more and more base and the Protestant tradition as a whole thoroughly deceitful:

To and fro the Spirit of false witness sped. She dropped upon the floor of the Parliament House in the form of a gentleman of Warwickshire, and told how a nun had escaped thereabouts from a convent window, which in consequence had ever since been crossed with iron bars; but it turned out that the window had been attempted by thieves, and the bars had been put up to protect the Blessed Sacrament from them. Then she flitted to Nottingham, and, in the guise of a town newspaper's correspondent, repeated the tale with the concordant witness, as she gave out, of a whole neighborhood, who had seen the poor captive atop of the wall, and then wandering about the fields like a mad thing; but the Editor in London discovered the untruth, and unsaid in his own paper the slander he had incautiously admitted. Next she forced her way into a nunnery near London, and she assured the Protestant world that then and there an infant had suddenly appeared among the sisterhood; but the two newspapers who were the organs of her

malice had to retract the calumny in open court, and to ask pardon to escape a prosecution. (pp. 139-40)

But Newman is not content to stop here. Protestant slanders have given him the excuse he needs to search for the base motives behind the slanders. He asks why Protestants pounce on the faults of individual Catholics while remaining tolerant of the blemishes of many great Protestant institutions. The answer is that it is symptomatic of a far greater need:

The popular demand is for the prodigious, the enormous, the abominable, the diabolical, the impossible. It must be shown that all priests are monsters of hypocrisy, that all nunneries are dens of infamy, that all bishops are the plenitude of savageness and perfidy. Or at least we must have a cornucopia of mummery, blasphemy and licentiousness,--of knives, and ropes, and faggots, and fetters, and pulleys, and racks,--if the great Protestant Tradition is to be kept alive in the hearts of the population. The great point in view is to burn into their imagination, by a keen and peremptory process, a sentiment of undying hostility to Catholicism;--

Newman's earlier identification of the devil as the being ultimately responsible for the moral corruption found in Protestants and Catholics alike paves the way for an allusion to him as also ultimately responsible for anti-Catholic slander:

--and nothing will suffice for this enterprise but imposture, in its purest derivation, from him whom Scripture emphatically calls the father of lies, and whose ordinary names, when translated, are, the accuser and the slanderer [cf. John 8.44]. (pp. 140-41)

Having led the reader to draw the conclusion that the Protestant tradition is the devil's work, Newman now sets out to prove his bold assertion of deliberate lies and slanders on the part of the Church's enemies. Typically, he

does this by quoting testimony which would ordinarily be counted as the strongest possible evidence to be marshalled against the Church, that of ex-Catholic converts to Protestantism who presumably knew what the Catholic religion was really like and found it wanting. Yet Newman sets up the evidence of testimony only to demolish it. Significantly, the two converts whose testimony he employs only for the purpose of discrediting them are poles apart from each other, the one, Blanco White, a man of integrity and intellect, the other, Maria Monk, a slattern of no character or intelligence whatsoever.

Newman now sets up his premise to be proved:

the truth spoken against us by the man of character is forgotten, and the falsehood spoken against us by the unworthy woman lives. If this can be shown, do you need clearer proof that falsehood, not truth, is the essence of the Protestant Tradition. (p. 142)

He subtly qualifies White's "truth," however, in such a way that no harm comes to the Church: he lets facts from White's own memoirs tell against his general credibility as a witness against Catholicism, while admitting the truth of certain minor charges which can then be dismissed as insignificant.

As a first step in this strategy, Newman frankly avows White's good points from his own personal experience so as to give an impression of extreme fair-mindedness:

I admired him for the simplicity and openness of his character, the warmth of his affections, the range of his information, his power of conversation, and an intellect refined, elegant, and accomplished. I loved him from witnessing the constant sufferings, bodily and mental, of which he was the prey, and for his expatriation on account of his religion. At that time,

not having the slightest doubt that Catholicism was an error, I found in his relinquishment of great ecclesiastical preferment in his native country for the sake of principle, simply a claim on my admiration and sympathy. (pp. 142-43)

Now that Newman has paid generous respect to White's virtues, he can also list his defects frankly. He does this by separating White's honesty in what he witnessed from the deductions he made concerning what he saw, thus leaving an impression of White's muddle-headedness without risking the charge of unfairness:

He was certainly most bitter-minded and prejudiced against everything in and connected with the Catholic Church; it was nearly the only subject on which he could not brook opposition; but this did not interfere with the confidence I placed in his honour and truth; for though he might give expression to a host of opinions in which it was impossible to acquiesce, and was most precipitate and unfair in his inferences and inductions, and might be credulous in the case of alleged facts for which others were the authority, yet, as to his personal testimony, viewed as distinct from his judgments and suspicions, it never for an instant came into my mind to doubt it.

Similarly, the recital he gives of White's religious history, though projecting an impression of objectivity through its very bareness, also gives an accompanying impression of White's underlying instability of character without Newman's directly saying so:

He had become an infidel before he left Spain. While at Oxford he was a believer in Christianity; after leaving it he fell into infidelity again; and he died, I may say, without any fixed belief at all, either in God or in the soul's immortality. (p. 143)

Then, too, the use of the word "infidel," though literally meaning a simple unbeliever in the context in which Newman uses it, also carries powerful connotations of one who positively and actively opposes Christianity, as the Saracens

at the time of the Crusades, the natural enemies of Christianity. (cf. the Oxford English Dictionary: "An adherent of a religion opposed to Christianity; esp. a Mohammedan, a Saracen [the earliest sense in Eng.]").

Newman now discredits White directly by recounting the circumstances of his joining, as an ordained priest, a circle of unbelieving clergy in Spain who hypocritically continued to perform their priestly offices while abandoning themselves to licentiousness. Using asyndeton and parallel structure, he builds to a climax of horror:

Earth could not show, imagination could not picture,
Satan could not create, a more horrible spectacle.
(p. 147)

Through a series of rhetorical questions that directly involve the reader, he then dramatizes the full implications of their heinous actions:

You will say, how was it possible? how could men who had, I will not merely say given themselves to God, but who had tasted the joy and the reward of such devotion, how could they have the heart thus to change? . . . these priests were in the very bosom of the Church; they served her altars, they were in the centre of her blessings; how could they forget Jerusalem who dwelt within her? how could they be so thankless towards her sweetness and brightness, and so cruel towards themselves? how could one who had realized that the Strong and Mighty, that the Gracious, was present on the Altar, who had worshipped there that Savior's tender Heart, and rejoiced in the assurance of His love, how could he go on year after year (horrible!) performing the same rites, holding his Lord in his hands, dispensing Him to His people, yet thinking it all an idle empty show, a vain superstition, a detestable idolatry, a blasphemous fraud, and cursing the while the necessity which compelled his taking part in it?
(pp. 147-48)

Use of the second person at the beginning of the series makes it appear as if the reader himself were asking the questions, and implies that these are the questions every

right-thinking reader would ask. Then the cumulative effect of the rhetorical questions dramatizes and brings home to the reader the enormity of the offense committed as seen through truly religious eyes. Since the reader is also assumed to be truly religious, he must agree to Newman's evaluation or lose his status. (Even Protestants who disagree theologically with Newman's statements should, nevertheless, agree to the hideous hypocrisy involved.) Thus, the only possible charitable explanation of such conduct is that White "never had discovered what religion was" (p. 148).

And, indeed, White, it turns out, was not religious by temperament and found religious practices irksome, but chose to join the Church simply to avoid an even more irksome career in business (p. 151). Now Newman uses this admission to back up his contention that White "never had discovered what religion was":

No wonder, under such circumstances, that Mr. Blanco White became an unbeliever; no wonder that his friends and associates became unbelievers, too, if their history resembled his. It was the case of active inquisitive minds, unfurnished with that clear view of divine things which divine grace imparts and prayer obtains.
(pp. 151-52)

By implication, White is unworthy because he is not a recipient of divine grace. Now having discredited White's character as non-religious to begin with, Newman points out that his evidence, however honestly reported, is very circumscribed and cannot be taken as indicative of the state of the whole Church in Spain. White's evidence actually amounts to no more than that a few priests he knew became

unbelievers under the influence of French philosophy (p. 153). He admitted he did not know anything of monks and friars, only suspected them of being "'gross and vulgar'" (p. 157), and that in his opinion nuns would have been better off married (pp. 158-59). Newman sums up White's evidence by saying that it boils down to the fact that a few corrupt individuals exist in the Catholic Church, as indeed, some do in the Anglican.

Next, Newman admits the truth of White's evidence, as opposed to his opinions, that a few corrupt individuals exist in the Catholic Church, but does it in such a way as to strengthen his own case. White's true testimony contrasts powerfully with the expectations of the Protestant tradition, and is, indeed, so commonplace that Protestants are guilty of what he says as well:

Here is no conspiracy of evil, no deep-laid treachery, no disguised agents prowling about, no horrible oaths, no secret passages, trapdoors, dungeons, axes, racks, and thumbscrews; no blood and fire, no screams of despair, no wailing of children, no spectres born of feverish guilt, and flitting before the mental eye. Here is little more than what happens every day in England; for I suppose that here in Protestant England there are secret unbelievers, and men who are fair and smooth, but inwardly corrupt, and many a single female wasted by weariness and sadness, and many a married woman cursing the day she ever took her vow; for these things must be, though they ought not to be, while the nature of man is the same. (pp. 159-60)

The very commonness of the examples should insure their acceptance, and hence Newman's conclusion that White's work was let go out of print by the Church of England's Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge because

it was after all tame; it did not do its work; it did not go far enough; it was not equal to the demand; it was not in keeping with the great Protestant Tradition.

Now Newman specifies what the Protestant tradition really requires:

No, it must contain something huge, enormous, prodigious, because the people love story books, and do not like dry matter of fact. . . . Therefore the poor Catholic is dressed up like a scarecrow to gratify, on a large scale, the passions of curiosity, fright, and hatred. (p. 160)

And that is why the book written by Maria Monk purporting to tell horrendous tales of life in a Catholic convent achieved such a large sale.

To discredit Maria Monk, Newman found out as much as he could about her true history. It appears she was a French Canadian girl who had suffered brain damage while young, and was subsequently discharged by a series of employers for bad conduct and petty thievery. She then went to New York with a lurid tale of life in a Montreal convent from which she had escaped. Maria was patronized by a group of New York Protestants and her purported experiences were published, only to be exposed later, for the most part, as a

mere republication of a work printed in the year 1731, under the title of "The Gates of Hell opened, or a Development of the Secrets of Nunneries." (p. 165)

Furthermore, investigation by a group of Protestants in Montreal showed that Maria's description of the nunnery in no way corresponded to the real description of it, but was, in fact, that of a penitentiary where she had been imprisoned for a time.

Yet Newman is not content with a recital of the bare facts to discredit Maria Monk. Instead, he vividly dramatizes her in all these situations mentioned, so that the

reader actually seems to experience the quality of her demented reactions to her surroundings:

Look at that poor degraded creature, strolling about from village to village, from settlement to farmhouse, among a primitive and simple population. She has received an injury in her head when young; and this has taken away, in part, her responsibility, while it has filled her brain with wild ideas, and given it a morbid creative power. Ere she is grown up she leaves her home, and flits here and there, the prey of any one who meets with her. Catholics are all round about her; as a child she has been in a Catholic school, and perhaps she has from time to time wandered into Catholic churches. She enters, she peers about; still and demure, yet with wild curious eyes, and her own wanton thoughts. She sees, at first glance, the sanctity and gravity of the ceremonial: she is struck with the appearance of modesty, whether in the sacred ministers or in the nuns; but her evil heart instantly suggests that what shows so well is nothing but a show, and that close under the surface lies corruption. She contemplates the whole scene, she cannot forget it; but she asks herself, What if it be but a solemn mockery clocking bad deeds? . . . The germ of a romance is already fermenting in her brain, and day after day it becomes more developed in its parts, and more consistent in its form. (pp. 161-63)

Newman's dramatizing of Maria's growth and development so that immediacy is imparted to her reactions tends to make real and immediate what are only plausible speculations as to the real state of Maria's mind. Newman admits as much but in such a way that what are really speculations woven around facts gain veracity simply by being associated with these facts:

My Brothers, in what I have been saying, I have but given substance in my own way to the facts recorded of her; but these facts are simply as I have stated them. (p. 163)

"Given substance in my own way" is a clear euphemism for "speculations."

Still, the bare facts are damning enough, and though the work should have been completely discredited by the uncovering of these facts, it still enjoyed a huge sale

among Protestants. Why? The work is given a surface plausibility by its accuracy of detail in describing particulars of convent life and Catholic practice, says Newman, only the conclusions drawn are false:

She makes the appearance of religion to be the presumption, not of reality, but of hollowness, and the very extravagance of her statements is their plausibility. The reader says, "It is so shocking, it must be true; no one could have invented it." (p. 168)

The success of the work in pandering to the appetite of the Protestant public, in gratifying "the passions of curiosity, fright and hatred," can be measured by the number of copies sold in only fifteen years, up to a quarter million, says Newman (p. 174). He reaches this conclusion regarding the differing receptions accorded the works of Blanco White and Maria Monk:

A writer of name, of character, of honour, of gentleman-like feeling . . . records his testimony against Catholicism; it is in the main true, and it fails:--a worthless stroller gets her own testimony put into writing; it is a heap of fables, and it triumphantly succeeds. Let, then, the Protestant public be itself the judge: its preference of Maria Monk to Blanco White reveals a great fact;--truth is not equal to the exigencies of the Protestant cause; falsehood is its best friend. (pp. 174-75)

To show that he has not chosen his illustrations unfairly, Newman now cites two examples, the calumnies of Jeffreys and Theodore, which have great impact upon the audience because they were local to Birmingham and happened very recently. Parallelism and polysyndeton reinforce the expressed idea of similarity in the circumstance of these men and their charges to those of Maria Monk:

Only two years have I been here, and each of these two have been signalled by accusations against Catholics,

similar, in the disreputableness of their authors, and in the enormity of their falsehood, and in the brilliancy of their success, to the calumnies of Maria Monk.

Again, parallelism and polysyndeton help to imply the conclusion that exposure inevitably follows wild accusations:

You recollect how Jeffreys acted his part, how he wept, and prayed, and harangued, and raised a whole population against an innocent company of monks; and how he was convicted of fraud, and confessed his guilt, and was sent to prison. (p. 175)

Irony is next tagged onto the exposure of Theodore to bring home the idea of the self-deluding aspects of the Protestant tradition:

You also recollect how an imposter, called Theodore, declaimed such shocking things, and wrote such indecent pamphlets against us, that they cannot have been intended for any other purpose than to afford merriment to the haunts of profligacy and vice; yet he was followed for a time, was admitted into Protestant places of worship, and honoured as a truth-telling oracle, till at length he was plainly detected to be what every one from the first would have seen he really was, were it usual to do the same common justice to Catholics which every Protestant considers his due;--

This ends logically with the conclusion, "--for falsehood is the basis of the Protestant Tradition" (pp. 175-76).

To balance examples, Newman now gives one of similarity to the truthfulness of Blanco White, a certain Steimnitz who left his novitiate with the Jesuits to write what he considered an expose of the order. Newman ironically plays on the popular Protestant belief of Jesuits as Machiavellian schemers to make Steimnitz the unwitting victim of the prejudice of the Protestant tradition:

He wrote to expose them, and abounded in bitterness and invective; but as to his facts, so little had he to produce from his own personal knowledge to the disadvantage of the Institution he was attacking, and

so severely did he disappoint the Protestants for whom he wrote, that they considered his work what they called a Jesuitical trick, and said that he was pretending to attack the good fathers in order really to set them off to advantage;--

The conclusion now neatly balances the one about Theodore: "--for truth does but prejudice the Protestant Tradition" (p. 176). Newman ends by turning these attacks on the Catholic Church to good advantage; he reminds his Catholic audience (through Scriptural allusion) of Christ's promise of blessedness to those who suffer persecution and slander for His sake in the Sermon on the Mount, the implication being that those who do the persecuting and slandering are doing the devil's own work:

Brothers of the Oratory, surely we shall succeed, because "they say all manner of evil against us falsely for His Name's sake" cf. Matthew 5.11.
(p. 176)

To summarize Newman's strategy in this lecture, then, by exposing the fraudulent basis of the Protestant tradition of anti-Catholic prejudice through carefully selected examples, he degrades Protestant accusations against Catholics into mere scandalmongering and name-calling. Furthermore, he demonstrates that the success of this campaign of abuse stems from its pandering to the contemptible need of the public to have "its passions of curiosity, fright and hatred" gratified. Newman therefore has given the Protestant reader two good reasons for dropping the Protestant tradition, first, that it is based on pure fable, and second, that it panders to base emotions; the Protestant reader, if he does not wish to associate himself with low, unthinking company, now has a powerful incentive for dropping the tradition altogether.

To this incentive must be added, so Newman implies, the guilty feeling that Catholics are martyrs for being the victims of this tradition.

A further effect must be noted here, which results from Newman's turning the Protestant argument of a corrupt Catholic Church, of celibacy, of the free-thinking priests of Blanco White and the fables of Maria Monk against the accusers. Exposing the arguments as false and hollow gives Newman the natural excuse to consider why such weak, absurd arguments were put forth to begin with. He can now very plausibly blame the Protestant tradition as the source of their inspiration, and the reader, if he is to maintain his intellectual self-respect, has another powerful motivation to drop the tradition which seems to have for its fruits only lies and slander, and is derived from the devil himself. In order to achieve this effect, Newman has very subtly shifted the entire ground of the arguments which he then turns against his accusers.

Chapter Seven. "Lecture V. Logical Inconsistency of the Protestant View."

Having brought the reader to the point where he should be ashamed to uphold the Protestant tradition because of its demonstrated reliance on sheer slander and fabrication, which pander to base emotions, Newman now plays on his self-respect as a thinking person; he details the logical inconsistency of the Protestant attitude towards Catholics, his thesis being that "they judge us by one rule; themselves by another; and they convict us of every sin under heaven for doing sometimes what they do every day" (p. 178). What is the underlying cause for this glaring contradiction between the way Protestants see themselves and the way they see Catholics? Newman is at pains to emphasize the fact that patriotism is inextricably bound up with Protestantism for the average Englishman, the monarch being, indeed, the duly constituted head of the Established Church. The mere fact of being a Catholic, then, is enough to incur the charge of treason. What Newman attempts to do, therefore, is to draw a distinction between being loyal and being Protestant, trying to communicate the idea that one could be patriotic though a Catholic, and to show that contradictions between Protestant thought and Protestant action in affairs of religion stem ultimately from this subservience of the Anglican Church to the needs of state policy.

Newman is at no loss for examples of Protestant contradiction in action. He points to education, where the Catholic Church asserts in Ireland the same principle which Protestantism asserts in England, "viz., that secular instruction should not be separated from religious." Newman dryly notes, however, that the authorities do "not feel the logical force of the fact," and adds, "and the same persons who find it so tolerable to indulge Protestantism in one country, are irritated and incensed at a Catholic people for asking to be similarly indulged in the other." The unspoken implication is that the absurd contradiction comes about because Protestantism is unthinkingly intertwined with and subservient to state policy.

Newman is not content simply to note the contradiction, however. He dramatizes it in concrete terms for maximum rhetorical effect:

But how is it that intelligent men, who can ascend in their minds from the fall of an apple to the revolution of a comet,--

At once the reader should recognize the allusion to Newton's marvellous discovery of the laws of gravitation, a triumph of logic induced from one of nature's most commonplace happenings

--who can apply their economical and political inductions from English affairs to the amelioration of Italy and Spain--

Here the reference evidently is to the disciplines of economics and political science which applied reason to the everyday affairs of men, the mockingly patronizing implication being that if reason were to be applied to the church-ridden societies of Italy and Spain, these countries would be the

better for it. Now Newman can sharply contrast the English Protestant's triumphant application of reason to nature and society to their sheer illogic in religious matters:

--how is it that, when they come to a question of religion, they are suddenly incapable of understanding that what is reasonable and defensible in one country, is not utterly preposterous and paradoxical in another? What is true under one degree of longitude, is true under another. (p. 179)

Use of the phrase "degree of longitude" arouses connotations of precision and accuracy, and vividly underlines the absurd lengths to which Protestantism is driven in an increasingly scientific age by its subservience to the needs of the state.

Newman can now apply the same principle of contradiction to a more emotional issue, that of image worship, and reasonably expect the reader to grant him a fair hearing on the strength of what he has just demonstrated. Nor does this exhaust Newman's psychological preparation of the reader's mind. He begins by flatly asserting, "A Protestant blames Catholics for showing honour to images; yet he does it himself." Immediately the Protestant reader should be intrigued: how can Newman possibly prove such an outrageous assertion? First he advances the logical proposition of a premise and its corollary, "that the two ideas of honour and dishonour so go together, that . . . where it is possible to apply the one, it is possible to apply the other." Now Newman applies this argument to the burning in effigy of Catholic clergy by Protestants, which is done for the express purpose of dishonoring them. If Protestants can so dishonor in effigy, why cannot Catholics honor in effigy? (p. 180).

But Newman is not content to prove his point by theoretical negative argument. He asserts that Protestants, too, fabricate images for the purpose of paying honor to dead heroes, and uses as a positive, concrete example a statue of King William erected in Dublin. Since the whole question of "image worship" is a bête noir to Protestants, however, provoking an unreasoning emotional response from them, Newman has to tread very carefully and catch the Protestant reader with his emotional guard down in order to present his proof effectively. The technique he uses to accomplish this end is that of irony, of saying one thing and meaning another, but letting the reader draw the proper conclusion. The passage in which the example of the statue of King William is used is now quoted at length, so that one may see exactly how Newman's masterful use of irony achieves its comic and then shocking effect through careful and precise diction:

Protestants actually set up images to represent their heroes, and they show them honour without any misgiving. The very flower and cream of Protestantism used to glory in the statue of King William on College Green, Dublin; and, though I cannot make any reference in print, I recollect well what a shriek they raised some years ago, when the figure was unhorsed. Some profane person one night applied gunpowder, and blew the king right out of his saddle; and he was found by those who took interest in him, like Dagon, on the ground. You might have thought the poor senseless block had life, to see the way people took on about it, and how they spoke of his face, and his arms, and his legs; yet these same Protestants, I say, would at the same time be horrified, had I used "he" and "him" of a crucifix, and would call me one of the monsters described in the Apocalypse, did I but honour my living Lord as they their dead king. (p. 181)

Newman begins with a bold, straightforward assertion, challenging the reader to see if he can prove his point.

He then repeatedly uses metaphors, "The very flower and cream of Protestantism," to describe those who gloried in the statue. Both "flower" and "cream" seem absurd as metaphors of praise, however, for repetition emphasizes their non-animate qualities, making the reader abruptly aware of how stale and hackneyed these figures of speech are. Hence the metaphors have a comic effect in conjunction with each other, and, as a result, doubt is thrown on the praiseworthiness of those who "glory in the statue." Then Newman's use of the word "shriek" to describe the response to the unhorsing of the statue suddenly makes the Protestants appear hysterical and undignified; their glorying in the statue likewise becomes ridiculous because of their absurd overreacting to its destruction.

Next, the perpetrator of the deed is described as "profane," from the verb meaning the irreverent treatment of what is sacred. Though the topic here is not religion but a statue, the statue is treated religiously, as an object of veneration. This is a necessary preparation for the contrasting comic effect that follows of the king being irreverently blown out of the saddle by the application of gunpowder. The statue then lands on the ground "like Dagon," the allusion being to the idol of the Philistines which was found flat on its face the morning after the captured Ark of God of the Hebrews was placed beside it (I Samuel 5. 1-16). It implicitly follows by similarity, then, that the Protestants who found the statue, like the Philistines who found Dagon face down on the earth, are worshipping an idol, and a

fallen one at that.

Now Newman comically describes the sympathy extended to this inanimate statue incapable of feeling to reinforce the idea that Protestants are taking a stone idol for a living presence:

You might have thought the poor senseless block had life, to see the way people took on about it, and how they spoke of his face, his arms and his legs.

This deftly prepares the reader for his final, shocking conclusion:

Yet these same Protestants, I say, would at the same time be horrified, had I used 'he' and 'him' of a crucifix, and would call me one of the monsters described in the apocalypse, did I but honour my living Lord as they their dead king.

The stark contrast between "living Lord" and "dead king" again powerfully underlines, by implication, the idea that Protestants are engaged in a false, idolatrous worship of the dead as against the true Catholic worship of Jesus, who rose from the dead and has eternal life. Furthermore, Newman has not simply discredited the Protestant belief that Catholics worship images instead of God; he has actually made Protestants and Catholics change sides, so that Protestants now stand accused of worshipping idols while Catholics are seen as worshipping the living God.

Newman has thus employed irony to turn his opponents' objections to image worship against themselves. This use of metastasis appears to follow clearly the purpose defined by Aristotle (applied in terms of the law courts): "The purpose is to discredit the prosecutor, who as a rule would have it appear that his character is better than that of the

defendant, a pretension which it is desirable to upset" (Rhetorica, II.23.1398^a). If one substitutes "Protestants" for "prosecutor" and "Catholics" for "defendant," one can readily see how relevant Aristotle's definition is to Newman's intent. Hence Newman's use of irony here is clearly explicable in terms of classical rhetoric.

Newman moves on to yet a third example of logical inconsistency on the part of Protestants, but is less successful here in making his point. He gives the historical instance of William of Orange replacing James II, in which the overwhelming majority of subjects justified their shift in allegiance by holding that their oath to the King was conditional upon the Monarch's good behavior, though there was nothing in the original oath to that effect. Similarly, says Newman, no one is shocked when a Catholic priest becomes a Protestant and marries, even though he has broken his Catholic vows, for the Protestant would say that Catholic vows are unlawful, and unlawful oaths are not to be kept. Let a Catholic merely assert that unlawful oaths are not to be kept, however, which is what a Protestant actually practices, "and he has furnished matter for half-a-dozen platform speeches, and a whole set of Reformation Tracts" (p. 182).

Why are these last two examples less successful than the first two in illustrating logical inconsistency on the part of Protestants? The answer is not far to seek, for it is bound up with the question of patriotism. James II is an unfortunate example of a monarch to use for the oath of

loyalty, because he himself was considered disloyal to his country and removed precisely because of his pro-Catholic leanings.

Newman next considers the charge that the Catholic Church is a persecuting church. His point of attack is an ingenious one. Rather than try to defend the Church against specific charges, he goes on the offensive by asking whether Protestants are guilty of persecution, too. Characteristically, Newman puts the question in concrete metaphorical terms for greater impact:

let us consider whether the multitude of men are not, to say the least, in the same boat with us;--

He now uses an allusion to Scripture to dramatize the hypocritical position of Protestants:

--and therefore, whether, with this theoretical indignation of persecution on the one hand, and this practical sanction of it on the other, they are not in the very position of that great king, in his evil hour, who sentenced a transgressor, when he himself was "the man."
(p. 183)

The allusion, of course, is to Nathan reproving David for having Uriah the Hittite killed when David waxed indignant over the theft of a poor man's lamb, and sentenced the rich thief responsible for it to death (II Samuel 12. 1-9). Thus an assertion too strong to be stated openly, that a Protestant hypocrite is equivalent to a self-righteous murderer, is made implicit through the allusion.

Newman now takes the time to build up a long catalogue of specific charges of Catholic persecution. Instead of being on the defensive by replying to the specific charges, as the reader may have been led to expect by their accumulation, however, Newman takes the offensive. He points out

with devastating logic,

that the acts imputed to Catholics, whatever be their character, so very closely resemble in principle what is done by Protestants themselves, and in a Protestant's judgment is natural, explicable, and becoming, that Protestants are just the very last persons in the world who can with safety or consistency call Catholics persecutors, for the simple reason, that they should not throw stones who live in glass houses. (p. 184)

The reader realizes with a shock, thanks to the vividness of the metaphor in which he sees a glass house shattered by retaliatory stoning, that the charges Newman has just enumerated against Catholics apply with equal justice to Protestants.

Giving the reader no respite, Newman now offers proof that Protestants persecute quite as much as Catholics. He quotes Dr. Whately, "the present Protestant Archbishop of Dublin, one of the first writers of the day, and a most violent opponent of Catholicism," who nevertheless in a book against the "'Romish Church'" concedes that persecution did not originate with Catholics, but springs from man's evil nature (p. 184). The Protestant reader should assent to the proposition by virtue of the Protestant authority quoted, whom Newman has been careful to establish as impeccably anti-Catholic in his credentials, and the fact that persecution is presented as a failing Protestants and Catholics share with mankind in general and not ultimately traceable to one's religion.

Having established that sinful human nature leads Protestants as well as Catholics to persecute, Newman now asks whether the Protestant, if he could but "see himself in a looking glass . . . would not mistake himself for a Catholic" (p. 185). This is a striking metaphorical way of

underlining the hypocrisy of Protestants on the issue of religious freedom without resort to repellent name-calling. Newman now gives substance to his assertion by describing scenes of persecution which are ordinarily overlooked, but which should strike the Protestant reader uncomfortably close to home because they take place within the Protestant family circle itself. In doing so, he succeeds in turning the issue around to such a degree that the Protestant reader, instead of admitting to an equality of persecution, should now be on the defensive.

Newman makes his charges specific and concrete by inventing a typical unrelenting Protestant father punishing a son who has converted to Catholicism. He forestalls objections that this is pure fabrication on his part by a cleverly worded disclaimer, which nevertheless distracts from the fact that it is a fictional device, and indeed, implies that it has the truth of a scientific law:

Of course there are exceptions; but in most cases his conduct is so uniform, so suggestive of a general law, to which particular cases belong, that I almost fear to describe it, lest, what is farthest from my wish, I seem to be personal, and to be indulging in satire, when I am but pursuing an argument.

Monologue of a self-righteous, sermonizing nature invests the whole with the dramatic immediacy of reality, and the reader should unconsciously take it as such, at least to a certain degree, especially as the father is initially restrained and believable in his comments:

"My dear John or James," the father says, calling him by his Christian name, "you know how tenderly I love you, and how indulgent I have ever been to you. I have given you the best of educations, and I have been

proud of you. There is just one thing I cannot stand, and that is Popery; and this is the very thing you have gone and taken up. You have exercised your right of private judgment; I do not quarrel with you for this; you are old enough to judge for yourself; but I too have sacred duties, which are the unavoidable result of your conduct. I have duties to your brothers and sisters;-- never see my face again; my door is closed to you. It wounds me to come to this decision, but what can I do? My affection for you is as strong as ever it was, but you have placed yourself under influences hostile to your father's roof and your own home, and you must take the consequences." (p. 185)

This realistic initial restraint on the part of the father should help to pave the way for reader acceptance of his later extreme thoughts which are actually very unconvincing, unreal and even satirical:

"Such a base, grovelling, demoralising religion, unworthy of a man of sense, unworthy of a man! I could have borne his turning Drummondite, Plymouth-Brother, or Mormonite. He might almost have joined the Agape-mone. I would rather see him an unbeliever; yes, I say it deliberately, Popery is worse than Paganism. I had rather see him dead. I could have borne to see him in his coffin. I cannot see him the slave of a priest." (pp. 186-87)

To silence possible objections of Protestants that he is misrepresenting the situation, Newman replies that they are incapable of imagining their sons and daughters turning Catholic in the first place, since "the very supposition irritates them" (pp. 187-88). This in turn is an implicit confirmation of the truth of his representation of an outraged father's thoughts. Newman ironically sums up:

Such is a Protestant's practical notion of freedom of opinion, religious liberty, private judgment, and those other fine principles which he preaches up with such unction in public meetings, and toasts so enthusiastically at public dinners. (p. 189)

Nor is such persecution a family matter alone. Domestic, factory workers and clerks who are discovered to be

Catholics are dismissed from their posts without redress, to fend for themselves as best they are able. Can such persecutions in any way be ascribed to the influence of Catholicism? Newman replies with crushing logic dressed up in vivid metaphor:

On the contrary, they come out of the very depths and innermost shrine of the Protestant heart; it is undeniable, the very staunchest Protestants are the actors in them: nay, the stauncher they are, the more faithfully do they sustain their part. (pp. 190-91)

Now Newman clinches the argument by describing how Protestants would react in indignation if they were told of similar persecutions of Protestants by Catholic families in Italy or Spain (p. 191), and the looking glass image is complete. The argument, then, depends for its effectiveness on the very intimacy it describes for the reader, i.e., the fact that persecution can take place within the bosom of the family, and not just against outsiders who can scornfully be thought of disloyal.

To bring home the cost in human terms of Protestant persecution of Catholic converts, Newman invites the reader to relive mentally the fate of such converts, who suddenly find themselves social outcasts. A wealth of specific detail about the economic and psychological effects of such ostracism of converts in every walk of life adds veracity to the process. Asyndeton piles each detail on top of the other in a hurried rhythm that reinforces the sense of continuous individual disasters:

The convert to Catholicism is dismissed by his employer; the tradesman loses his custom; the practitioner his patients; the lawyer has no longer the confidence of

his clients; pecuniary aid is reclaimed, or its promise recalled; business is crippled, the shop cannot be opened; the old is left without provision, the young without his outfit--he must look about for himself; his friends fight shy of him; gradually they drop him, if they do not disown him at once. (pp. 191-92)

He contrasts such ostracism with former happy times for greater emphasis:

There used to be pleasant houses open to him, and a circle of acquaintance. People were glad to see him, and he felt himself, though solitary, not lonely; he was by himself, indeed, but he had always a refuge from himself, without having recourse to public amusements which he disliked.

Asyndeton again is used, this time to help convey a feeling of being abruptly cut off from all society:

It is now all at an end; he gets no more invitations; he is not a welcome guest. He at length finds himself in Coventry /i.e., excluded "from the society of which he is a member on account of objectionable conduct," according to the Oxford English Dictionary /;--

The melancholy aftermath of slander exposes the vicious quality of the Protestant tradition, helped by an alliteration of "m's":

--and where his presence once was found, now it is replaced by malicious and monstrous tales about him,--

metaphor,

--distorted shadows of himself,--

and concluding parallel phrases in apposition,

--freely circulated, and readily believed.

Finally, anti-climax underlines the injustice of the situation:

What is his crime?--he is a Catholic among Protestants.

(p. 192)

Having established the fierce, though unpublicized,

persecution of Catholic individuals, Newman can now touch on persecution practiced by the Catholic Church itself. But

his emphasis is on the fact that an outcry is raised by Protestants because the government at Rome refuses to sell land for Protestants to build a church, when these same Protestants would stop Catholics from buying land in England to build a church if they could:

Do not tell me, then, that they are in earnest when they speak of the "intolerance of Catholics" abroad; they ought to come into Court with clean hands. (p. 193)

The impact of the whole court metaphor depends on a court's being a place where justice is expected to be given the innocent party. Then, too, "clean hands" also alludes to the Scriptural "clean hands and a pure heart" (Psalms 24.3) of those who would serve and worship the Lord righteously.

Newman now expands this idea of the unrighteousness of Protestants to include hypocrisy:

They do just the same themselves, as far as they can; only, since they cannot do it to their mind's content, they are determined it shall form an article of impeachment against us; and they eagerly throw a stone that comes to hand, though it is only by accident that it does not fall back on themselves. (p. 193)

The concrete image of stone throwing dramatizes the abstract idea that Protestants are out-and-out hypocrites. Again, this turning of the opponents' argument against themselves (metastasis) follows the purpose defined by Aristotle:

to discredit the prosecutor, who as a rule would have it appear that his character is better than that of the defendant, a pretension which it is desirable to upset. (Rhetorica, II.23.1398^a)

Now Newman moves on to the question of "gratitude" supposedly owed Protestants by Catholics:

Gratitude for what? What favours have we received? the Frenchman's good fortune, and nothing else. When he boasted the king had spoken to him, he was naturally

asked what the king had said: and he answered that his Majesty had most graciously cried out to him, "Fellow, stand out of the way."

At first glance, the story is completely unconnected with the question of religious persecution, and the reader can appreciate its humor. But he must also accept the logical application of its moral to the question of Protestant intolerance as well:

Statemen would ignore us if they could; they recognize us in order to coerce; they cannot coerce without recognizing; therefore at last they condescend to recognize. (p. 194)

As a concrete example of such Protestant coercion, Newman refers to an Act of Parliament recently passed in reaction to the re-establishment of the Catholic Hierarchy in England,¹ and asks,

Can a clearer proof be required that not our political intrigues--for we are guilty of none--but our moral and argumentative power, is the real object of apprehension and attack? (p. 196)

He brings forward as evidence that Protestants are fearful of such power the fact that they have not engaged in controversy with their opponents, but prefer to rely on coercion instead as a means of dealing with a sect that outdoes "in zeal every other Religion." Newman logically adds,

But this, surely, ought to be no offense, but a praise: that Religion which inspires the most enthusiasm has a right to succeed.

Now he ironically goes Protestant illogic one better:

If to cherish zeal, if to deal the blows of reason and argument, if this be political, if this be disloyal, certainly we deserve worse punishment than the deportation suggested by one member of Parliament, and the £500 penalty proposed by another. (p. 197)

Thus, through irony Newman has succeeded in bringing Protestant

intolerance to a reductio ad absurdum where Catholics are punished for being virtuous.

He next asserts that Protestants "have only made concessions under the influence of fear," and alludes to the Biblical story of "The Rich Man and Lazarus" (Luke 16. 19-31) to drive home his point that Protestants do not deserve credit for any toleration extended to Catholics:

Small thanks for scanty favours; such thanks as Lazarus's for the rich man's crumbs which could not help falling from the table: it is no virtue to grant what you cannot deny. (p. 198)

Because the moral is so concretely illustrated by the story, it comes across with much greater impact.

Newman now expands on the idea that "it is no virtue to grant what you cannot deny" by considering how toleration came about in England:

They [i.e., Protestants] establish the great principle of toleration, not at all for our sakes, simply for the sake of each other, one and all devoutly wishing that they could tolerate each other without tolerating us. We, born Britons and members of the body politic as much as they, accidentally come under the shadow of a toleration which was meant for others. When they find that common sense and fairness are too strong for them, and that they cannot keep us out, and, moreover, that it is dangerous to do so, they make a merit of letting us in, and they wish us to be grateful for a privilege which is our birthright as much as it is theirs. (pp. 198-99)

Here Newman emphasizes religious toleration as the natural birthright of Englishmen, something which Catholics hold in common with Protestants; this is a subtle emotional appeal based on patriotism and fair play to which the reader should be receptive.

Now the exaggerated response of Protestants to Catholics claiming what is after all their birthright must seem

ridiculous to the reader. Anaphora and asyndeton produce the hurried rhythms that help build this response up to a mock heroic climax of absurdity:

That we should have an opinion, that we should take a line of our own, that we should dare to convince people, that we should move on the offensive, is intolerable presumption, and takes away their breath.

Hyperbole now exaggerates the absurdity:

They think themselves martyrs of patience if they can keep quiet in our presence, and condescending in the heroic degree, if they offer us any lofty civility. (p. 199)

This attitude of barely grudging toleration carries over into controversy as well, where reason and logic are the weapons expected to be used, for the Protestant is exposed as a simple bully:

So it is with your Protestant controversialist, even when he shows to best advantage; his great principle of disputation is that he is up, and the Catholic is down; and his great duty is to show it. . . . It is a standing rule with him to accuse his opponent of evasion and misstatement; and, when in fault of an argument, he always can impugn his motives, or question the honesty of his professions. (pp. 199-200)

To drive the point home, Newman gives as a concrete example of this a rude and overbearing letter sent to Cardinal Wiseman by "one of the most distinguished Protestant theologians of the day" (p. 200), which he brings forth as "an instance in detail of the Protestant Tradition" (p. 201).

He next quotes Dr. Whately's argument against the use of insult, libel and mockery in religious controversy:

since no man can be bound in conscience to employ such weapons: they have manifestly no tendency to advance the cause of truth; they are, therefore, analogous to the slaughter of women and children, and other non-belligerents, which is regarded by all civilized nations as a violation of the laws of war. (p. 202)

Thus he is able to contrast what a leading Protestant clergyman says with what Protestants actually do in a long recital of Protestant outrages against Catholics, each outrage prefaced with the anaphora of "I appeal," which builds to a climax of physical violence against innocent Catholics:

Oh, the one-sided intellect of Protestantism! I appeal in evidence of it to a great banquet, where, amid great applause, the first judge of the land spoke of trampling Cardinal Wiseman's hat under his feet. I appeal to the last fifth of November, when jeers against the Blessed Sacrament and its rites were chalked up in the Metropolis with impunity. . . . I appeal to the mock processions to ridicule, and bonfires to burn, what we hold most venerable and sacred. . . . I appeal to those ever-growing files of newspapers, whose daily task . . . has been to cater for the gross palate of their readers all varieties of disgusting gossip. . . . I appeal to the buckram nuns. . . . I appeal to the outrageous language. . . . I appeal to the weekly caricatures. . . . I appeal to the cowardly issue of a cowardly agitation, to the blows dealt in the streets of this very town upon the persons of the innocent, the tender and the helpless . . . to the ladies and the schoolgirls, who . . . because they are Catholics, have been the victims of these newspaper sarcasms, and these platform blasphemies. I appeal to the stones striking sharply upon the one, and the teeth knocked out of the mouths of the other. (pp. 205-07)

Through this accumulation of specific examples, Newman is able to expose vividly and concretely the glaring contradiction of furious mob action in the name "of a Religion which makes it its special boast to be the Prophet of Toleration" (p. 207).

Now Newman turns to attack Dr. Achilli and does so with a masterful use of irony:

The Protestant world flocks to hear him, because he has something to tell of the Catholic Church. He has a something to tell, it is true; he has a scandal to reveal, he has an argument to exhibit. It is a simple one, and a powerful one, as far as it goes--and it is one. That one argument is himself; it is his presence which is the triumph of Protestants; it is the sight of

him which is a Catholic's confusion. It is indeed our great confusion, that our Holy Mother could have had a priest like him. He feels the force of the argument, and he shows himself to the multitude that is gazing on him. "Mothers of families," he seems to say, "gentle maidens, innocent children, look at me, for I am worth looking at. You do not see such a sight every day. Can any Church live over the imputation of such a birth as I am?" (pp. 207-08)

However effective this attack may have been with the original audience, yet what followed was held to be libelous in court, since Newman did not have satisfactory proof of Achilli's alleged crimes to back up his specific accusations.² Moreover, from a rhetorical point of view, after his powerful emotional attack on Achilli, Newman's summing up of the arguments against him seems tepid and anti-climactic because these arguments are strictly logical propositions with no emotional appeal; it might be geometric theorems which he is proving.

Newman should perhaps have realized that in attacking a Protestant idol of the magnitude of Dr. Achilli he would have to have concrete evidence if he were to make his charges stick before a naturally prejudiced Protestant jury.³ As it was, the unfavorable outcome of the Achilli trial meant that he had to remove passages considered libelous from later editions of the Lectures.⁴ While it is true that Newman later considered he had won a moral victory over Achilli despite the unfavorable trial verdict, as evidenced by the editorial support he received in the Times,⁵ nevertheless his attack on Achilli must be considered a mistake from the standpoint of rhetorical strategy.

Be that as it may, Newman now moves on to set the

historical record straight on the Inquisition, the traditional bête noir of Protestants, which Achilli in his Dealings with the Inquisition had painted in lurid colors. He points out that the Roman Inquisition under the jurisdiction of the Popes was never known to give sentences of capital punishment, and that the more notorious Spanish Inquisition, though originally authorized by the Pope, quickly became a political organization responsible only to the King of Spain; the Pope then fiercely opposed its abuses and went to great lengths to save persons who were the objects of its severe judgments (pp. 210-12). The humane advantages that accrue from a church independent of state control are thus implied.

Having shifted the onus for the worst excesses of the Inquisition from the Papacy onto the Spanish government, Newman can now deal on equal terms with Achilli's charge that he was "imprisoned by the Inquisition for preaching in Rome against the religion of Rome" by asking the rhetorical question, "has no one ever been put in prison, or fined, or transported, or doomed to death in England, for preaching against the religion of England?" Next, he turns around the argument that to embrace Catholicism is to rebel against the state by asking, "has Dr. Achilli had nothing to do with a party not only dangerous, but actually and contemporaneously subversive of the Pontifical Government?" The conclusion is pointed: "It seems never to occur to a Protestant, that he must not do in his own case what he blames in another."

Though there is a weakness in Newman's argument, since

the English government had not imprisoned Catholics for practicing their religion since 1791,⁶ while the Roman government was still imprisoning voluble anti-Catholics like Achilli, he is astute enough to make as little of this disparity as possible:

Should he [i.e., a Protestant] at any time leave off a practice, he is surprised that every one else has not left it off at the same moment, and he has no mercy on any that has not;--like converted prodigals, who are sternly unforgiving towards the vices they have only just abandoned themselves. (p. 214)

Use of the word "prodigals" should immediately bring to the reader's mind the story of the Prodigal Son (Luke 15.11-32) who, though utterly undeserving, was the recipient of sublime forgiveness. Of anyone, the Prodigal Son was in the least position to take a self-righteous attitude towards the behavior of other sinners. Newman's allusion to the story, then, brings home the absolute hypocrisy in the conduct of Protestants who, though they have only just ceased to persecute Catholics on a legal basis, are furiously indignant that Catholic legal persecution of Protestants still exists.

To reinforce the impression that legal persecution has only very recently been given up and that Protestants have nothing to be self-righteous about, Newman gives examples of such persecution "within my own memory" as when a "popular writer" was fined and imprisoned "for parodying passages of the Anglican Prayer Book," and Unitarian congregations sentenced to transportation abroad because their creed was considered a felony (pp. 214-15). Now he can equate

such acts as fining a person for his religious beliefs with burning him at the stake by quoting Dr. Whately, an eminent Protestant Divine, to the effect that "if the civil magistrate . . . have no rightful jurisdiction whatever in religious concerns, it is quite as much an act of injustice, though of far less cruelty, to fine a Socian, as to burn him'" (p. 215). Here, perhaps, there is an error in rhetorical strategy; while Whately's argument may be logically true, there are still degrees of injustice. The average person would unhesitatingly disagree with Newman and Whately, and rank the taking of a human life as an infinitely greater injustice than a mere fine.

Newman immediately goes on, however, to talk about the burning of Catholic martyrs during the reigns of Elizabeth and James I. This is followed by the assertion, "Nay, it is only quite lately, that heavy penal inflictions have been taken off the daily acts of our religion," a juxtaposition which tends to equate the savagery of burning innocent martyrs with "heavy penal inflictions." But these "heavy penal inflictions" actually consisted of laws against the importation of Catholic religious artifacts and the wearing of them in public, laws which Newman admits were a dead letter, anyway. To cover up the weakness of his argument for present-day legal persecution of Catholics, then, Newman immediately refers these laws back to the reign of the "bloody Elizabeth" when they were not a dead letter, and possession of Catholic religious artifacts was held to be a crime punishable by death (pp. 215-16). The intent of

this subtle juxtaposition of the nineteenth century with the sixteenth is to make the reader tend to equate the merely bigoted Protestants of Newman's own day with the extremely bloodthirsty ones of Elizabeth's time. Calling Elizabeth "bloody" in the same way that Protestants called her elder half sister Mary "bloody" for persecuting Protestants to death may compel the reader, by force of the allusion, to see Elizabeth in a new light, as a vengeful persecutor of a hapless religious sect, rather than the "good Queen Bess" of Protestant history books.

Wringing the utmost advantage out of this juxtaposition of the sixteenth century with the nineteenth, tales of pure pathos follow, as Newman contrasts the sublime Christian behavior of the Catholic martyrs with the demonic savagery of their Protestant persecutors. These tales are all the more impressive because Newman scrupulously refrains from any self-righteous comment, but is content to let the facts speak for themselves in chilling and gory detail, as Charles Frederick Harrold notes.⁷

He now asks, "What will the Protestants bring against the Holy See comparable to atrocities such as these?", and then quickly forestalls possible objections based on persecution of Protestants during Queen Mary's reign by making this appear an internal political issue for which the Pope was not responsible, and indeed, had strenuously opposed through his papal legate (p. 218). The reader is left with the impression that the Protestant history of persecution involving death sentences is more monstrous than the Catholic

history of persecution under control of the Popes. Again, the gain to humanity that comes from a church independent of the state is thus dramatically implied.

Newman keeps the reader's focus on the persecuting history of Protestants by next asking how Protestants excuse their persecution, and promptly answering for them:

Strange to say, they make it their plea of exculpation, and the actual difference between Catholics and them, that they condemn persecution on principle. Now I grant them, I am far from disputing it, that a man who holds a right principle, and occasionally, nay often, offends against it, is better than he who holds the opposite wrong principle; but that is not the present case.

This explanation involves questionable reasoning which nevertheless tends to be accepted by the reader because of the following juxtaposition of key phrases which has the effect of equating the sixteenth century with the nineteenth:

The case before us is that of persons who never once have acted on the principle they profess--never once; for they cannot produce their instance, when Protestants, of whatever denomination, were in possession of national power for any sufficient time, without persecuting some or other of their polemical antagonists. So it has been, so it is now. Three centuries ago Protestantism in England set off on its course with murdering Catholic Priests; only a few months have passed since a clergyman of the Establishment gave out to his congregation that transportation was too good for us, and he thought we all ought to be put to death. (p. 219)

There is, of course, a great difference between a Protestant government actually putting individual Catholics to death, as happened in Queen Elizabeth's time, and an individual Protestant clergyman in Queen Victoria's time merely saying that they should be put to death; yet from the fact that no reaction of shock occurred on the part of the Protestant public, and that a second Protestant

clergyman repeated what the first had said, the implication is drawn that a majority of Protestants still favored such sentiments. Newman reinforces this impression when he links the sentiments of the two Protestant clergymen to those of sixteenth century zealots:

Doubtless they gave their reasons for wishing it, sufficient in their own judgment, and so too did the Protestant Elizabeth, so too did Gardiner and the other advisers of the Catholic Mary; but still such was the upshot of their reasons, death to every Catholic priest. (pp. 219-20)

Through this linkage with the past when such sentiments were actually translated into action, he can now draw the following conclusion:

The present case then is not that of an individual, or a ruler, or a body politic laying down a good principle, and not being able at times and under circumstances through passion or policy, to act up to it; no, it is the case of a religion saying one thing, and on every actual and possible occasion doing another. (p. 220)

This conclusion can now also let Newman explain why it is that Protestants continually persecute in spite of all their professions of toleration:

It is because their doctrine of private judgment, as they hold it, is extreme and unreal, and necessarily leads to excesses in the opposite direction. They are attempting to reverse nature, with no warrant for doing so; and nature has its ample revenge upon them. They altogether ignore a principle which the Creator has put into our breasts, the duty of maintaining the truth. (p. 221)

He then refers back to the Protestant Whately "to the effect that the Religion which forbids private judgment in matters of Revelation is historically more tolerant than the Religions which uphold it," and offers as proof Whately's own statement that "'The Popes, armed with a tribunal of intolerance have scarce spilt a drop of blood; Protestants and

philosophers have shed it in torrents'" (p. 222).

Newman thus uses the conclusion of a leading Protestant clergyman and historian to sum up dramatically his own case for the Catholic Church, which has remained independent of any temporal authority, and his own case against the Anglican Church, which has been subservient to the state from its inception. Throughout this lecture he has demonstrated the glaring and too often cruel contradiction between principles and actions into which Protestants are led by their subservience to the state; he therefore leads the reader, by implication, to the conclusion that a church independent of the state has advantages for humanity, and that a person belonging to that church need not, on that account, automatically be considered disloyal to the state, but can actually be looked upon as one who stands against inhumane excesses in the name of the state or its official religion.

NOTES TO CHAPTER SEVEN

1. Newman is evidently referring to the Ecclesiastical Titles Act which had recently been passed by Parliament because of popular clamor against the re-establishment of the Catholic Hierarchy, and which forbade members of that hierarchy from assuming the ancient titles proper to Catholic Sees. ("Ecclesiastical Titles Act," Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church).
2. The Present Position of Catholics in England, p. 208, n. 6. For the libelous material itself, see Appendix 3, Letters, XIV, 501-03.
3. See Appendix 5, Letters, XIV, 508-11, in which he describes his failure to get the authenticated evidence he needed to refute the libel charge. Newman admitted, "When the affidavit was drawn up, there was one thing I objected to; it stated that I promised to prove everything that was said: this I said I could not swear to considering the documents had not come, or any account of what they contained" (p. 510).
4. In a letter to Edward Badeley of November 11, 1851, Newman admitted as much:

Lewin writes me word he thinks I should not reprint the libel. Give me your opinion. The second edition is now going through the press. I am sorry to think it is not to be reprinted. I think the moral effect will be bad (Letters, XIV, 421).

5. See Letter to F. W. Faber, June 25, 1852, where Newman says in a postscript,

You must bear this in mind, viz that we always thought the verdict would be unfavourable--and relied on the moral effect of the evidence--now the article in today's Times is sufficient to prove that we have attained the moral effect.
(Letters, XIV, 107-08)

The Times article said in part:

We consider that a great blow has been given to the administration of justice in this country, and Roman Catholics will have henceforth only too good reason for asserting, that there is no justice for them in cases tending to arouse the Protestant feelings of judges and juries (Letters, XV, 108, n. 1).

6. See "Catholic Relief Acts (also Catholic Emancipation Acts)," Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church.

7. "Newman lets the facts speak without comment; he himself remains almost inhumanly neutral." John Henry Newman: An Expository and Critical Study of His Mind, Thought and Art (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1945), p. 199.

Chapter Eight. "Lecture VI. Prejudice the Life of the
Protestant View."

In this lecture Newman is concerned with defining prejudice as it relates to the Protestant tradition. In doing so, he goes far beyond the bare dictionary definition of prejudice as "a bias or leaning to one side; an unreasoning predilection or objection" (Oxford English Dictionary); he gives the reader his own personal version of how Protestant prejudice originated, how it grew upon the Protestant mind, and how it affects the behavior of present-day Protestant bigots. By expanding the definition of prejudice to include all its ramifications in the Protestant tradition, Newman thus imposes his own subjective definition upon the word, and by leading the reader to accept this definition, he is able to have the reader experience his own personal vision of what Protestant prejudice is and how it affects both its subjects and objects. Thus, his use of rhetoric in this lecture is predominantly "romantic" rather than "classical" in that the reader is persuaded mainly by his subjective vision of Protestant prejudice and its ramifications rather than by a reasoned attack exposing its contradictions.

Indeed, Newman begins the lecture by accusing his Protestant opponents of using the same technique, imposing a subjective vision upon the people, which he will later

use upon the reader! He asserts that reasoned, philosophical arguments against Catholicism are lost on the mass of the common folk "who have never learned to exercise their minds, to compare thought with thought, to analyse an argument, or to balance probabilities" (p. 224). How then can their minds be reached so as to sway them against Catholicism? Newman presents a convincing argument for the origin of the Protestant tradition of anti-Catholic prejudice by devices not found in classical rhetoric, that is, by suggesting special meanings for certain words and by placing certain words in proximity so that the reader will tend to draw the desired conclusion:

Catholicism appeals to the imagination as a great fact, wherever she comes; she strikes it; Protestants must find some idea equally vivid as the Church, something fascinating, something capable of possessing, engrossing, and overwhelming, if they are to battle with her hopefully; their cause is lost, unless they can do this. It was then a thought of genius, and, as I think, preternatural genius, to pitch upon the expedient which has been used against the Church from Christ's age to our own; to call her, as in the first century, Beelzebub, so in the sixteenth, Anti-Christ; it was a bold, politic, and successful move. It startled men who heard; and whereas Anti-Christ, by the very notion of his character, will counterfeit Christ, he will therefore be, so far, necessarily like Him; and if anti-Christ is like Christ; then Christ, I suppose, must be like Anti-Christ; thus there was, even at first starting, a felicitous plausibility about the very charge, which went far towards securing belief, while it commanded attention.
(p. 224)

In referring to Catholicism as a "great fact," Newman has in mind much more than the idea that the Church exists as a great religious organization. He has been careful at the start of the lectures to build up the Church in the eyes of Protestant readers by quoting Protestant historians to the effect that the Church saved Christianity at the start

of the Middle Ages (p. 15) and was a force for good during the Middle Ages (p. 16), by quoting Blanco White, a Protestant convert, as to the beneficial works of the Jesuits (pp. 18-19), and later by describing the courageous and sublime behavior of Catholic martyrs during the reign of Queen Elizabeth (pp. 215-18). Thus, the reader is not simply aware of the "great fact" of Catholicism as a religious organization, but as one with a long and glorious history of Christian martyrdom and service. It is the Church with this accompanying history, therefore, which is well suited to impress the imagination as a "great fact."

Newman uses the word "imagination" in his own special sense, as a faculty for receiving complete ideas and being struck or possessed by them, rather than in the usual active sense of "forming a mental concept of what is not actually present to the senses" (Oxford English Dictionary). Newman's characteristic conception of the imagination seems to be essentially passive, seeing it simply as a receiver of outside impressions and ideas rather than as the creator of mental concepts, for elsewhere he writes, "The heart is commonly reached, not through reason, but through the imagination, by means of direct impressions, by the testimony of facts and events, by history, by description,"¹ and also, "Public opinion especially acts upon and appeals to the imagination; it does not convince, but it impresses."²

This passive conception of the imagination is reinforced when Newman says that "Protestants must find some idea equally vivid as the Church, something fascinating, something

capable of possessing, engrossing and overwhelming." An image is thus created of the imagination as a receptive mental faculty. This concept is vital to Newman's argument by antecedent and consequence, for it sets up the presupposition (of minds passively waiting to be filled) to the argument that "Protestants must find some idea equally vivid" if they wish to fight against Catholicism with any chance of success.

Newman now shrewdly lauds the Machiavellian skill with which the Protestants hit upon the "expedient" of calling the Church "Anti-Christ" for the deliberate purpose of swaying the masses. His praise implies that such a deliberate intent lay behind the name-calling without his having to demonstrate it, for praise of an enemy generally implies an admission of a self-evident truth too great to be denied. Nor does the damning rhetorical effect of Newman's praise end here. He carefully chooses the word "preternatural" (meaning "out of the ordinary course of nature; beyond, surpassing, or differing from what is natural" [Oxford English Dictionary]) to describe the already superlative "thought of genius" which unerringly hit upon the very "expedient which has been used against the Church from Christ's age to our own," i.e., the term "Anti-Christ." The effect of such lavish praise is subtly to suggest some powerful superhuman agency at work inspiring Protestants to find the precise slur they need to discredit the Church.

Now Newman draws a parallel by similarity between

this term and that of "Beelzebub" or devil (cf. "N.T. designation of Beelzebub as 'prince of demons'" [Oxford English Dictionary]), and drives his point powerfully home by carefully chosen allusion. The reference to calling the Church "Beelzebub" in "Christ's age" alludes to Jesus' sending out His Disciples, as the first members of the Church, to announce the coming of the Kingdom of Heaven, warning them that they should be expected to be reviled for His sake, but adding by way of mitigation, "If they have called the master of the house Beelzebub, how much more shall they call them of his household?" (Matthew 10.25).

To call the Church "Anti-Christ," then, is to engage in the same sort of slander as calling Jesus and His Disciples "Beelzebub," with the result that odium is placed on the name-callers who suffer from the comparison. (The name-callers who used "Anti-Christ" in the sixteenth century and those who used "Beelzebub" in the first are actually equated by similarity, since both terms are part of the same "expedient" employed to discredit the Church.) Moreover, Newman's drawing a parallel between the Church being slandered with the name "Anti-Christ" in the sixteenth century and the early Church of the Disciples being villified by the name "Beelzebub" in the first also accomplishes another important end, to reinforce the idea of the Catholic Church as Christ's true representative and heir on earth. The parallel does this by making the reader recall the Church's unbroken descent from the Apostles, and by showing that like the early Church, the later Church must also suffer calumnies though

innocent. Equally damning, the proximity of the term "Beelzebub" to the adjective "preternatural" (used to describe the "thought of genius" which decided on calling the Church "Anti-Christ") tends to make the reader suspect that the designation "Anti-Christ" may have been inspired by the devil himself.

The rest of Newman's argument achieves plausibility by praise of the Protestant enemy for his cunning in using the idea of "Anti-Christ" to seize the imagination of the masses. The praise is eminently fitting, given the passive character of the "imagination" already established ("It was a bold, politic, and successful move . . . [that] startled men. . . . it commanded attention"); it is sly, Newman suggests, to appeal to a traditional belief that the Anti-Christ is necessarily like Christ ("a felicituous plausibility"). That the term "Anti-Christ" was consciously used to prejudice the masses against the Church, this praise implies, is self-evident and needs no demonstration. The reader is left with the impression, therefore, that the Catholic Church was the victim of a shrewd and deliberate calumny, i.e., "Anti-Christ," on the part of the Protestant reformers, and with a strong inference that the attack was inspired by the devil himself.

This impression has thus been arrived at in part by Newman's imposition of special meaning on certain words and placing of key words close to each other for the purpose of drawing an inference, devices which go beyond the principles of classical rhetoric. Moreover, use of certain terms in

Newman's own special senses gives rise to inherent ambiguities of diction; the words suddenly give off a fluctuating complex of meanings, the generally accepted ones of the dictionary and Newman's own particular ones in conjunction. The effect of the ambiguity, however, is to communicate an experience of Newman's own private vision of the "great fact" of Catholicism and of the "imagination," while making the reader simultaneously aware of the more commonplace definitions of these terms as part of an objective reality. The blurred distinction between subjective and objective meanings of these terms, i.e., "imagination" and "great fact," encourages the belief that the Church was deliberately slandered with the name of "Anti-Christ," possibly because of the influence of the devil on Protestant Reformers, and that the charge was sustained only through the use of lies, distortions, and defamations on a grand scale.

Yet why are such slanders, which fly in the face of reason, so readily believed? Newman places the blame on the fact of prejudice which predisposes the mind to belief and proceeds to analyze it, what it is and how it operates, thus subtly imposing his own definition in the process. Characteristically, he begins with a concrete example which vivifies his abstract statement; he gives the illustration that when a known thief is charged with a new theft, the inclination is to think him guilty of the charge, whereas an ordinary person charged with the same offense can bring character witnesses to sway the jury the other way. It is similar with Catholics, says Newman. By hearing nothing but

evil of them, people will naturally be inclined to believe the worst sort of lies about Catholics. On the other hand, he points out, prejudice is at most an inference and not infallible as concrete evidence would be; yet Protestants will make their tradition "practically infallible, as if it had settled the view they are to take of the subject of it, once and for ever" (p. 229).

Why? Newman says it is because prejudice is something more than "a mere act, it is a habit or a state of mind" (p. 229). He goes on to show that this state of mind is created like any other habit, by constant repetition. The continual slanders and fabrications of the Protestant tradition, therefore, inexorably build up an unshakeable prejudice against Catholics in the popular mind. Typically, Newman drives the point home by vivid metaphor: "This is what is meant by the proverb, 'Fling dirt enough and some will stick'" (p. 231).

His use of metaphor does not end here. He calls the meetings at which such slanders are loudly proclaimed

immense factories for the creation of prejudice,--
an article, by means of these exertions, more care-
fully elaborated, and more lasting in its texture,
than any specimens of hardware, or other material
productions, which are the boast of a town such as
this is. (p. 231)

The metaphorical description of prejudice as the best and longest-lasting product of local industry (particularly apt because Birmingham was a leading manufacturing town), gives it a mechanical, unthinking quality, something automatically stamped out. This reinforces in a vivid, concrete way the

idea that prejudice grows not by reasoned argument, but by repeated, mechanical impressions on the mind.

Next, to communicate the idea that prejudice is independent of its origins, Newman resorts to a homely comparison:

Now the peculiarity of these mental impressions is, that they do not depend afterwards upon the facts or reasonings by which they were produced, any more than a blow, when once given, has any continued connexion with the stone or the stick which gave it. To burn the stick will not salve the sore; and to demolish the argument, as I have already said, does not obliterate the prejudice. (pp. 231-32)

As an example, he relates how even if a slander be proved false in a court of law, overtones of it still cling to the person to his detriment. Again he uses a popular saying, this one derived from history, to drive the point home and lend credence to what he asserts: "It was a saying of the greatest of the Romans, 'that Caesar's wife should not be suspected.'"

Newman now uses metaphor to describe vividly the effect of slander upon the mind; "The slander has, as it were, stained the minds of the hearers, and only time, if even time, can wipe it out." This metaphor raises connotations of stubborn stains on clothing which even repeated washings may not clean; time thus becomes a concrete cleaning agent like soap. Having now shown how prejudice works upon the mind by the metaphor of staining, Newman can define it in general terms and be confident that the reader will more readily accept the definition as following logically from the way prejudice works. As part of the definition, he asserts it can only be gradually eradicated, in line with the stain metaphor:

This, then, is properly a prejudice,--not an opinion which is at our own disposal, and dependent for its presence or its dismissal on our will, but an impression which reason can indeed act upon, and the will can subdue, but only by degrees and with trouble.

Newman next uses antecedent and consequence to give the effect of further logical argument, again following the stain metaphor:

It sank into the mind by the repetition of untrue representations, it must be effaced by an opposite process, by a succession of thoughts and deeds antagonistic to it. (p. 232)

Yet, says Newman, prejudice itself is a passive thing dependent on the will: "The will goes with a prejudice; there is no compulsion or necessity; those who have prejudices are unwilling to give them up" (p. 233). Now if prejudice depends on the will, then the will "cannot be, innocent, because it is directed, not against things, but against persons, against God's rational creatures, against our fellows, towards all of whom we owe the duties of humanity and charity." Indeed, says Newman, "There is a natural law, binding us to think as well as we can of everyone; we ought to be glad when imputations are removed and scandals cleared up" (p. 234).

Having elaborated on the fact that man's natural propensity is to think well of his fellows, Newman now uses this as a sharp contrast to what happens in reality: "I do not know how any one can deny the justice of these remarks; but observe what a melancholy comment they form on the treatment which Catholics receive in this Protestant country." The reader, who naturally wants to think of himself as a

decent, kind-hearted person, now should accept this logical corollary, and wince at the series of rhetorical questions which Newman promptly directs at him:

Where are the tender hearts, the kind feelings, the upright understandings of our countrymen and countrywomen? where is the generosity of the Briton, of which from one's youth up one has been so proud? where is his love of fair play, and his compassion for the weak, and his indignation at the oppressor, when we are concerned? (p. 235)

He next plays on the difference between paying compliments to the virtuous decorum of Englishmen, on the one hand, and then describing their actual conduct in the matter of prejudice on the other to make Protestants seem ridiculous:

The most sensible people on the earth, the most sensitive of moral inconsistency, the most ambitious of propriety and good taste, would rather commit themselves in the eyes of the whole world, would rather involve themselves in the most patent incongruities and absurdities, would rather make sport, as they do by their conduct, for their enemies in the four quarters of the earth, than be betrayed into any portion-- I will not say of justice, I will not say of humanity and mercy, but of simple reasonableness and common sense, in their behavior to the professors of the Catholic Religion; so much so, that to state even drily and accurately what they do daily is to risk being blamed for ridicule and satire, which, if anywhere, would be simply gratuitous and officious in this matter, where truth most assuredly, "when unadorned," is "adorned the most." This risk, as far as I am incurring it myself in these Lectures, I cannot help; I cannot help if, in exposing the prejudice of my countrymen, I incur the imputation of using satire against them. (pp. 235-36)

By stating that he will expose Protestant prejudice as so ridiculous that he will be accused of satire, Newman accomplishes two things: (1) he challenges the Protestant reader to see if he can prove the absurdity of the prejudice, and (2) if successful in his proof he will give the Protestant reader a powerful incentive to drop his own prejudice,

since no one likes to be taken for a fool indulging wholeheartedly in something absurd.

Newman is careful to exclude from his subsequent description of the Prejudiced Man, the Protestant religion as such or Protestants who do not indulge in Catholic baiting, as he does not wish to give the reader any reason for not laughing at the description: "and observe, that nothing I have said, or shall say, is levelled at the matter or the rites of Protestant worship." Inversion of nouns and adjectives helps to underline the distinction:

I am concerned with Protestants themselves; moreover, not with Protestants quiescent and peaceable, but with Protestants malevolent, belligerent, busy and zealous in an aggression upon our character and conduct.

In proceeding to analyze the Prejudiced Man, Newman asserts as the guiding principle of such a person that not only does he feel himself to be in firm "possession of divine truth . . . but that we, who differ from him, are universally imposters, tyrants, hypocrites, cowards and slaves" (p. 236). Anything which panders to this prejudice he will believe, anything which discredits it, even when backed up by unshakable facts, will be dismissed as patent falsehood. If the Prejudiced Man is finally cornered and cannot deny the facts, however,

he draws himself up, looks sternly at the objector, and then says the very same thing as before, only with a louder voice and more confident manner. He becomes more intensely and enthusiastically positive, by way of making up for the interruption, of braving the confrontation, of showing the world that nothing whatever in the universe will ever make him think one hair-breadth more favourably of Popery than he does think, that he has ever thought, and that his family ever thought before him, since the time of the fine old English gentleman.

(p. 238)

The repetition of the Prejudiced Man who "says the very same thing as before" together with the epistrophe of "think . . . thought . . . thought" underscores the extreme rigidity of the Prejudiced Man's responses as unthinking habits passed down from generation to generation. Thus the Prejudiced Man has been reduced, by Newman's portrait, to a ridiculous mechanical man who gives off a set of automatic reactions to stimuli. His very name, which describes an abstract quality rather than a particular person, helps to reinforce the impression of a mechanical robot only capable of a very limited set of responses. It is a fact of humor, of which Newman seems intuitively aware, that it is always comic to perceive the mechanical in human actions (cf. Henri Bergson: "Any arrangement of acts and events is comic which gives us in a single combination, the illusion of life and the distinct impression of a mechanical arrangement.").³ Newman's famous metaphor which likened the prejudiced reaction of Anglican clergyman to Catholicism to the ringing of bells in Lecture II is another instance of his reduction of human response to mechanical reaction for comic effect.

An accumulation utilizing anaphora and asyndeton now underlines the closed mind of the Prejudiced Man on the subject of Catholicism, his inability even to consider the views of the other side:

About our state of mind, our views of things, our ends and objects, our doctrines, our defense of them, our judgment on his objections to them, our thoughts about him, he absolutely refuses to be enlightened:--

Simile brings home almost physically the idea that he instinctively withdraws from any discussion of the matter because it would cost him too much emotional anguish to have his world of prejudice upset:

--and he is as sore if expostulated with on so evident an infirmity of mind, as if it were some painful wound upon him, or local inflammation, which must not be handled ever so tenderly. He shrinks from the infliction. (p. 238)

Newman also uses simile to degrade the Prejudiced Man for his unthinking response by comically comparing him to Goliath:

And, as the huge giant, had he first been hit, not in the brain, but in the foot or the shoulder, would have yelled, not with pain, but with fury at the insult, and would not have been frightened at all or put upon the defensive, so our Prejudiced Man is but enraged so much the more, and almost put beside himself, by the presumption of those who, with their doubts or their objections, interfere with the great Protestant Tradition about the Catholic Church. (p. 239)

The reader in remembering the Bible story (I Samuel 17. 4-54) must, by the force of the simile, equate Catholics who protest against the Protestant tradition with David, who felled Goliath with his slingshot. The simile thus reduces the Prejudiced Man to a vain boaster whose argumentative position will come crashing down like Goliath once reason, like David's slingshot, is applied to it.

Newman continues to degrade by simile to show the Prejudiced Man, in line with his mechanical character, as stupidly unreflecting:

If, for instance, a person cannot open a door, or get a key into a lock, which he has done a hundred times before, you know how apt he is to shake, and to rattle, and to force it, as if some great insult were offered to him by its resistance:--

The parallel construction of "to shake, and to rattle, and to force" slows down the reader since the object of all these prepositional phrases, "it," comes at the end of the series and the reader must hold the prepositional phrases in his mind until he reaches their object and makes a complete unit of thought. Thus, the ridiculous scene is deeply etched in his mind, as it were.

Next, Newman draws a parallel to this picture which degrades the unreflecting Prejudiced Man even more by analogy:

--you know how surprised a wasp, or other large insect is, that he cannot get through a window-pane; such is the feeling of the Prejudiced Man when we urge our objections--not softened by them at all, but exasperated the more;--

He concludes in a state of mock despair with a perfectly logical argument rather plaintive in tone:

--for what is the use of even incontrovertible arguments against a conclusion which he already considers to be infallible? (p. 240)

What makes the Prejudiced Man's stubbornness suddenly seem ridiculous, however, is its earlier comparison to the man unthinkingly trying to go through the locked door and the insect's attempting to go through the window, both manifest physical impossibilities and therefore the height of absurdity.

To give the reader an idea of the utter self-sufficiency of prejudice, Newman now uses the vivid simile of the sun undisturbed by the elements from taking the same course each day. The sun in turn is personified by quoting Milton's poetic fancies about it (Lycidas, 168-171); these offer concrete images of self-renewal and self-sufficiency which are transferred, by the force of the simile, to

prejudice itself. The simile of the sun is logically, and therefore, wittily, led into by expanding on the metaphor of a "falsehood" showing its "face":

We were tempted, perhaps, to say to ourselves, "What will they have to say in answer to this? now at last the falsehood is put down for ever, it will never show its face again?" Vain hope! just the reverse: like Milton's day-star, after sinking into the ocean, it soon "repairs its drooping head,"

"And tricks its beams, and with new-spangled ore
Flames in the forehead of the morning sky."

Certainly; for it is rooted in the mind itself; it has no uncertain holding upon things external; it does not depend on the accident of time, or place, or testimony, or sense, or possibility, or fact; it depends on the will alone. Therefore, "unhurt amid the war of elements," it "smiles" at injury, and "defies" defeat? for it is safe and secure, while it has the man's own will on its side. (pp. 240-41)

Nor is the simile of likening prejudice to the self-sufficiency of the sun in its daily course exhausted yet. It is next used to vivify the idea of the endless fertility of prejudice. Newman begins with the abstract statement, two phrases in strict apposition, he wishes to make concrete:

Such is the virtue of prejudice--it is ever
reproductive;--

He then moves on to specific instances of prejudice continually cropping up, by implicit metaphor comparing them to the sun each morning:

--in vain is Jeffreys exposed; he rises again in Theodore; Theodore is put down; in vain, for future story-tellers and wondermongers, as yet unknown to fame, are below the horizon, and will come to view, and will unfold their tale of horror, each in his day, in long succession;--

For more striking effect, Newman also personifies prejudice as the active agent which instigates slander and distorts a man's whole outlook, building up to this conclusion

climactically through a definition of its attributes that utilizes polysyndeton:

--for these whispers, and voices, and echoes, and reverberations, are but the response, and, as it were, the expression of that profound inward persuasion, and that intense illusion, which wraps the soul and steepes the imagination of the Prejudiced Man. (p. 241)

Since the soul is metaphorically wrapped in illusion, there are connotations of its being helplessly insulated from the truth, and here again one can see Newman's own conception of the imagination as an essentially passive faculty, for it takes on the color of prejudice, as it were, by being "steeped" in it.

Newman now brings the position of the Prejudiced Man to a reductio ad absurdum. He asserts that even if the particular slander were proved to be false, the Prejudiced Man would take it as an example of the sinister Machiavellian subtlety of Catholics for proving it so! The simulated actuality of monologue, as if a real person were speaking instead of a figment of Newman's imagination, makes the absurdity seem all too real:

"What clever fellows these Catholics are!" he says. "I defy you to catch them tripping; they have a way out of everything. I thought we had you, but I fairly own I am beaten. This is how the Jesuits got on; always educated, subtle, well up in their books; a Protestant has no chance with them." (p. 241)

Next, Newman's portrayal of the Prejudiced Man's attitude towards the undeniable growth of Catholicism in England shows how the prejudiced mind can always evade the truth even when confronted by the facts. The Prejudiced Man's first reaction is to deny "the fact of any conversions taking place at

all." Forced to concede this fact, he will next maintain that the converts were weak, worthless persons or converted for the wrong reasons. If shown this is not the case, he will then insist that "they are sure to come back," that "they have come back," that their characters have deteriorated, or that they have become unbelievers. Finally, if all this is shown to be untrue, he will simply forget that the converts ever existed (pp. 243-45).

All this should have its effect on the Protestant reader. As he sees more and more the absurdity of the unreasoning and mechanical reactions of the Prejudiced Man to facts which do not fit in with his preconceived prejudices, the reader should be less and less inclined to identify with him. Instead of talking about prejudice in abstract generalities, then, Newman has shrewdly painted for the reader a single, hypothetical "Prejudiced Man" in action, so that the reader can see for himself the absurd lengths to which a prejudiced man is driven in ignoring the truth for the sake of maintaining his prejudices. The effect of such a concrete, detailed portrait is to expose the Prejudiced Man as a fool; an intellectual discussion of prejudice in abstract terms could not do so in such an effective manner. So seemingly faithful is Newman's portrait to reality, in fact, that the reader should tend to forget that the "Prejudiced Man" is only a creation of Newman's satiric imagination, despite his artful disclaimer, and instead, take him for a real person.

To complete the process of the reader taking satire for fact, Newman now appeals to the ethos of the speaker;

since he is held to be a man of integrity by his Catholic audience, he now has the opportunity of contrasting what actually happened at his conversion and what Protestants, blinded by their prejudice, thought must have happened. One intention is that the Protestant reader, admitted as a kind of unseen witness who overhears what is meant for others, will believe him unquestioningly also, since Newman would appear to have no motive for deceiving a friendly audience on his side.⁴ The purpose in appealing to his own experience is to offer a real-life example of the way in which prejudice distorts reality, "to show "that there is no exaggeration in what I have been saying" (p. 245), or, in other words, to offer additional proof that the reader should not take the Prejudiced Man as satire but as the plain, unvarnished truth.

Newman now relates how when he was converted, it was first supposed that he was mad; second, that he then had differences with Cardinal Wiseman; third, that he soon quarrelled with the Catholic authorities in Rome and Birmingham; and finally, that he did not really believe in Catholic doctrines after all. What is the one overriding reason for all these outright lies?

Men are determined they will not believe that an educated Protestant can find peace and satisfaction in the Catholic Church; and they invent catastrophes for the occasion, which they think too certain to need testimony or proof. (p. 247)

Men, in other words, see what they want to see; their prejudice determines their interpretation of the facts. Newman's fine use of irony, "They invent catastrophes for

the occasion, which they think too certain to need testimony or proof," points up the obvious self-deluding fallacy of immediately treating as true fictive events which offer comfort to the mind since they act to confirm prejudices.

To make the point in concrete terms that the Prejudiced Man sees only what his prejudice tells him to see, Newman imagines him traveling about in Catholic Europe and blaming all social ills whatsoever on Popery. Metaphor is enlisted to make this appear as ridiculous as possible:

Why do the Roman labourers wheel their barrows so slow on the Forum? why do the Lazzaroni of Naples lie so listlessly on the beach? why, but because they are under the malaria of a false religion.

(p. 249)

Malaria, immediately apparent as the real cause of the people's weakness, is treated metaphorically as the effect of a false religion which physically causes the weakness-- a patent absurdity because of the obvious confusing of the spiritual and physical spheres, and one which graphically shows the preposterous beliefs to which prejudice drives its possessor.

The distortion of belief which prejudice causes also leads to ludicrous mistakes of apprehension, even on the part of esteemed men, as Newman remarks of one of them who tactfully remains unidentified:

He was positive he had seen Pope Joan in Rome,--I think, in St. Peter's; nay, he saw the inscription on the monument, beginning with the words, "Joannæ Papissæ." It was so remarkable a fact, and formed so plausible an argument against the inviolateness of St. Peter, that it was thought worth inquiring into.

(p. 251)

The reader, recognizing the inscription as Latin for "Pope John," sees the great man alluded to as made incredibly

foolish by reason of his prejudice, a feeling which is heightened by the ironical sentence which follows.

To reinforce his point that prejudice determines what we see, Newman now quotes from a Protestant journal the impressions of a Catholic service by one of its contributors. Newman, knowing intimately the Benediction of the Blessed Sacrament which the Protestant observer describes, is able to contrast with devastating effect what really happened with what the Protestant observer says happened. He quotes the observer that one part of the service "'showed a real piece of magic art,'" and then surprises the reader by not reacting in indignation but by humorously praising the observer:

Now what makes this so amusing to the Catholic is, that, as far as the priest's actions go, it is really so accurately described. It is the description of one who has his eyes about him, and makes the best of them, but who, as he goes on, is ever putting his own absurd comment on everything which occurs in succession. (p. 259)

It is apparent that Newman has built up only to tear down. He goes on to quote the observer to the effect that the "'magic art'" consisted of a bell hidden inside a candlestick on top of which was a gold star, and that the congregation, unaware of the hidden bell, marvelled that the sound came from the star itself. But, as Newman points out, the congregation knew perfectly well that the sound came from a bell rung by an attendant at one side which the Protestant observer failed to see (p. 260). What the congregation was really marvelling at was the Benediction of the Lord God at the ceremony, not the ringing of the bell which merely signified His presence. What, then, is

a profound religious rite to a Catholic is ludicrously misinterpreted as a magic show by a biased Protestant.

Having shown how prejudice deludes the typical Protestant into reaching absurd conclusions and playing the fool, thus giving the Protestant reader a powerful incentive to disassociate himself from the tradition of prejudice, Newman focuses on the dark side of the tradition. He asserts:

Perhaps it is wrong to compare sin with sin, but I declare to you, the more I think of it, the more intimately does this prejudice seem to me to corrupt the soul, even beyond those sins which are commonly called most deadly, as the various forms of impurity or pride. And why? because, I repeat it, it argues so astonishing a want of mere natural charity or love of our kind. (pp. 262-63)

He expands on this abstract statement with an accumulation of specific examples in parallel structure which contrast the charitable Protestant attitude towards social outcasts and even non-human creation with the unbelievably harsh one towards Catholics, using asyndeton to produce the hurried rhythms that build to a climax:

Oh, is it conceivable that they can be considerate in all matters of this life, friendly in social intercourse, indulgent to the wayward, charitable to the poor and outcast, merciful towards criminals, nay, kind towards the inferior creation, towards their cows, and horses, and swine; yet, as regards us, who bear the same form, speak the same tongue, breathe the same air, and walk the same streets, ruthless, relentless, believing ill of us, and wishing to believe it! (p. 263)

Newman now expands in turn on his conclusion, again using asyndeton (and anaphora) to build to a climax:

They are tenacious of what they believe, they are impatient of being argued with, they are angry at being contradicted, they are disappointed when a point is cleared up; they had rather that we should be guilty than they mistaken; they have no wish at

all we should not be blaspheming hypocrites, stupid idolaters, loathsome profligates, unprincipled rogues and bloodthirsty demons. They are kinder even to their dogs and cats than to us. (pp. 263-64)

Having carefully prepared the way with specific examples of the terrible effects of Protestant prejudice, Newman can now end his indictment with a series of rhetorical questions that argue impressively, because logically, from the nature of the evidence that has gone before, that Protestants have lost an essential part of their humanity:

Is it not true? can it be denied? is it not portentous? does it not argue an incompleteness or hiatus in the very structure of their moral nature? has not something, in their case, dropped out of the list of natural qualities proper to man? (p. 263)

Next, in an obvious reference to the recent "No Popery" campaign of violence and outrage, Newman, in his role of the injured innocent, comments,

We are never secure against the access of madness in that people, whose name and blood we share. Some accident,--a papal bull, worded as papal documents have been since the beginning of time, a sudden scandal among our priests or in our convents, or some bold and reckless falsehood, may raise all England against us.

Newman now compares the situation of Catholics in England to that of the Primitive Christians in the Roman Empire:

Such also was our condition in the first age of the Church: the chance of the hour brought the Pagan Romans upon us. A rash Christian tore down an Imperial manifesto from its place; the horrible Dioclesian persecution was the consequence. A crop failed, a foe appeared, it was all through the poor Christians. (p. 264)

If English Catholics are like Primitive Christians, then the English Protestants who persecute them must be as Pagan Romans, though Newman is careful to let the reader draw this conclusion for himself. The comparison is not

stated openly but left to be inferred by the earlier juxtaposition--

some bold and reckless falsehood, may raise all England against us. Such also was our condition in the first age of the Church: the chance of the hour brought the Pagan Romans upon us.

Then, too, as the Pagan Romans were ready to believe the worst of the early Christians, their unspoken comparison to modern-day Protestants lends credence to Newman's hyperbolic assertion that

We are regarded as something unclean, which a man would not touch, if he could help it; and our advances are met as would be those of some hideous baboon, or sloth, or rattlesnake, or toad, which strove to make itself agreeable. (p. 265)

Newman uses the same technique of unspoken but implicit comparison in ending the lecture with an actual example from history, the false Popish plot fabricated by Titus Oates in which the whole country hysterically believed. He makes an explicit comparison which contains the implicit one:

Oates and Bedloe were the Maria Monk, the Jeffreys, the Teodore, the Achilli of their hour, on a larger field; they spoke then as Protestant champions speak now, to the prejudices of the people: they equalled our own slanderers in falsehood and assurance,--in success they surpassed them.

Even though Newman now admits that "We live in a happier age than our forefathers," the comparison still makes the reader tend to equate present-day slanderers with those of the Popish plot not only in intention but also with the accompanying horrendous crimes they caused. Thus the evil effect of the present-day slanderers is magnified beyond the actual mob violence they incite to include the "deeds of blood . . . the hangings, and embowellings, and

the other horrors of which innocent Catholics were in due course the victims" (p. 269) in the plot allegedly discovered by Titus Oates.

In sum, through the juxtaposition of key phrases and imposition of special meanings on certain words to let the reader draw inferences, the use of personification, metaphor and simile to degrade, the employment of monologue to give a sense of actuality, and the utilization of the mechanical for comic effect, Newman succeeds in communicating to the reader vividly and concretely his own subjective vision of anti-Catholic prejudice as a stupid, unthinking reaction without a shred of reason to justify it, and one that causes its unsuspecting possessor to appear by turns ridiculous and inhumane.

NOTES TO CHAPTER EIGHT

1. Essays and Sketches, II, 204.
2. Ibid., 277.
3. "Laughter" in Wylie Sypher, ed. An Essay on Comedy by George Meredith, Laughter by Henri Bergson (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1956), p. 105.
4. Elder Olsen makes this point in "Rhetoric and the Appreciation of Pope," p. 40.

Chapter Nine. "Lecture VII. Assumed Principles the Intellectual Ground of the Protestant View."

Having shown anti-Catholic prejudice to be an unthinking, mechanical reaction which renders its possessor absurd, Newman can now move on to deal with intellectual objections to Catholic doctrine and expect a readership especially susceptible to the force of logic for fear of being made to seem fools by clinging to irrational notions. What are these intellectual objections? Newman states the case frankly:

It is the whole system of Catholicism; our miracles, and our relics, and our legends of saints; and then our doctrine of indulgences, and our purgatory; and our views of sin, and of the virtue of penances; and our strange formalities in worship; in a word, all is extravagant, strained, unnatural, where it is not directly offensive, or substantially impossible. (p. 273)

He underlines the main objection to Catholicism causing this conclusion:

observe the course of the argument;--Catholic Priests are infidels, are hypocrites, are rogues, why? simply, because Protestants think Catholic doctrine and Catholic worship irrational. (p. 274)

How will Newman overcome this grave objection of Protestants which strikes at the heart of Catholicism in an increasingly scientific age? Everything will turn on the question of definition. What do Protestants mean by "irrational"? What do they mean by "reason"? Are their objections truly rational ones or ultimately a reflection of their own unthinking bias? If the latter, how can Newman

present his argument so as to catch the Protestant reader with his guard down so that he will admit the truth of what he is saying? First, Newman turns to the use of irony, of saying one thing and meaning another, but letting the reader draw the conclusion for himself. A good example of this is the way Newman presents the Protestant argument for the irrationality of Catholic worship:

The instinctive rising of the mind, of the intellect, of the reason (so they would say themselves . . .), opposes itself to the Catholic system. (pp. 274-75)

The proposition of the "instinctive [*italics my own*] rising of the mind, of the intellect, of the reason," a contradiction in terms emphasized by three rational (i.e., "non-instinctual") terms in apposition, acts like a delayed time bomb to explode an ironic meaning over the whole Protestant assertion.

Second, and perhaps more subtly, Newman employs his own definitions at the outset of each turn of the argument, which tend to be accepted uncritically by the reader, but then lead logically, given the initial premises, to conclusions favorable to Catholicism. A good illustration of this is his establishment of the self-evident proposition that an argument must start somewhere, i.e., there must be First Principles for the very practical reason that

If you trace back your reasons for holding an opinion, you must stop somewhere; the process cannot go on for ever; you must come at last to something you cannot prove; else life would be spent in inquiring and reasoning, our minds would be ever tossing to and fro, and there would be nothing to guide us. (p. 279)

From this proposition Newman infers that First Principles are by their very nature absolute, stating the case in

a series of neatly balanced antitheses in parallel structure which personify the abstract idea and make it concrete and vivid:

They are the means of proof, and are not themselves proved; they rule and are not ruled; they are sovereign on the one hand, irresponsible on the other; they are absolute monarchs, and if they are true, they act like the best and wisest of fathers to us; but, if they are false, they are the most cruel and baneful of tyrants. (p. 283)

He now makes the point that because of the very intimacy between a man and his First Principles, he is not likely to be cognizant of them:

You cannot see yourself; and, in somewhat the same way, the chance is that you are not aware of those principles or ideas which have the chief rule over your mind. (p. 284)

This means that not only are arguments futile when First Principles are not agreed upon (pp. 284-85), but also that two persons of superficially similar tastes and outlooks may reach diametrically opposite conclusions in a religious crisis.

How to explain this? Newman apparently alludes to the liberal strain in the Anglican Church which appears to lead to the denial of sin:

For instance, suppose the one holds that there is such a thing as sin; the other denies it,--denies it, that is, really and in his heart, though at first he would shrink from saying so, even to himself, and is not aware he denies it.

Newman's conclusion subtly discredits Anglicanism as a viable alternative to Catholicism by implying that the thought of its liberal wing, if carried out to extremes, would lead to the denial of sin and thence to unbelief:¹

At a certain crisis, either from the pressure of controversy or other reason, each finds he must give up the form of religion in which he has been educated; and then this question, the nature of sin, what it is, whether it exists, comes forward as a turning-point between them; he who does not believe in it becomes an unbeliever; he who does, becomes a Catholic. (p. 286)

Hence, Newman also implies that there is no halfway house between Catholicism and unbelief for those courageous enough to trace their beliefs back to their First Principles.

He concludes by underlining the paradox of the irrationality of First Principles which form the basis for all logical thought:

Such, then, are First Principles; sovereign, irresponsible, and secret;--what an awful form of government the human mind is under from its very constitution! (p. 287)

Here, too, through the syntax Newman plays on the contradiction between the tyrannical government of the mind, "sovereign, irresponsible, and secret," and its freedom to think by punning on the word "constitution," which from its position in the sentence can mean at the same time (1) "The way in which anything is constituted or made up," and (2) "The system or body of fundamental principles according to which a nation, state or body politic is constituted and governed" (Oxford English Dictionary). The second meaning would have overtones to an Englishman of the English Constitution and the liberties it guaranteed.

Newman now begins subtly to educate the reader as to how the validity of First Principles can be determined. He points out that there are First Principles

which are common to the great mass of mankind, and are therefore true, as having been imprinted on the human mind by its Maker. Such are the great truths of justice, truth, and temperance. (p. 287)

In other words, there are First Principles which can be assumed to be true because they are well-nigh universal. Newman immediately contrasts such with those which pertain to individuals only, though spread over a wide area by means of proximity; accordingly, he can show a First Principle as wrong even though held by a whole nation. The example he carefully chooses to illustrate this is the one to which Protestants would be as sympathetic as Catholics and therefore give their assent, i.e., the persecution of the early Christians by the ancient Romans on erroneous First Principles:

Thus, for instance, it was the opinion of the ancient pagan Romans, that every one should follow the religion of his own country, and this was the reason why they persecuted the first Christians. (p. 287)

Newman now drives the magnitude of the Roman error home by showing the terrible consequences of acting logically on fallacious First Principles:

They thought all this exceedingly sensible, and, in fact, unanswerable; statesmen of all parties and all the enlightened men and great thinkers of the Empire gave in their adhesion to it; and on this First Principle they proceeded to throw our poor forefathers to the beasts, to the flame, and to the deep, after first putting them to the most varied and horrible tortures. (p. 288)

The syntax is so ordered as to underscore the horrible contradiction of reasonable men taking the part of savage, irrational murderers in the name of rationality: "They thought all this exceedingly sensible, and, in fact, unanswerable" has all the overtones of an axiom of formal

logic which is self-evident. Next, "statesmen," "enlightened men," and "great thinkers" have connotations of disciples of pure reason majestically above the grip of base human passions; this is followed by "proceeded," giving off connotations of commencing an act in a deliberate, stately manner suitable to the position of philosopher statesmen. This dignified phrase is then explosively contrasted with the metonymy and generalized statement of "to throw our poor forefathers to the beasts, to the flame, and to the deep, after putting them to the most varied and horrible tortures," which suggests just enough for the reader's imagination to conjure up a monstrous spectacle of torture and murder all the more horrible because carried out in the dignified manner, i.e., "proceeded," appropriate to the reasoned actions of philosophers.

Newman next shows how wrong the best of Roman philosophers could be when confronted by the values of Christianity, to demonstrate his conclusion that First Principles may be entirely false though held by the supposedly best and wisest of men:

would the Christian system itself have pleased the countrymen of Cato at all better? On the contrary, they would have started with his First Principle, that humiliation was immoral, as an axiom. . . . Fancy a really candid philosopher, who had been struck with the heroic deaths of the Martyrs, turning with a feeling of good will to consider the Christian ethics; what repugnance would he not feel towards them on rising up from the study! to crouch, to turn the cheek, not to resist, to love to be lowest! Who ever heard of such a teaching? It was the religion of slaves, it was unworthy of a man; much more of a Roman. (pp. 288-89)

The irony of the passage depends on the whole-hearted logic with which Newman, given the First Principle enunciated, embraces the pagan Roman view. The effect on the Christian reader, however, is the opposite of what the logic points to, thus bringing home vividly the primary importance of First Principles, as opposed to logic, in determining one's point of view.

Having established the premise of judgment by First Principles through the example of the early Christians, a point of common ground with Protestants and therefore sympathetically assented to by them, Newman can now draw the conclusion that as we judge the early Christians by their own First Principles, so we should judge Catholicism by its own First Principles if we are to understand it properly, and the Protestant reader is meant to agree despite himself by the force of the parallel. To drive the point home, Newman draws yet another parallel between the pagan Romans and present-day liberal Protestants:

The same thing takes place now. A dispassionate thinker is struck with the beauty and the eloquence of the rites and ceremonies of the Catholic Church; he likes to be present at them, but he says they are addressed of course only to the imagination, not to the reason. They are indefensible in the eye of reason. (p. 290)

The modern "dispassionate thinker" adhering strictly to "reason" bears an uncomfortably close resemblance to the Roman philosophers who assented to and actively participated in the torture and murder of the early Christians in the name of "reason"; he should therefore be thoroughly discredited by the force of this more ominous parallel which

Newman has subtly prepared for the reader to draw in his own mind. The metaphor, "the eye of reason," also plays a part in the discrediting, ironically implying that "reason" (as Protestants employ the term) is blind to higher realities.

Next, Newman moves on to define a term which will be crucial for his argument as to how to determine which First Principles are true:

As Prejudice is the rejection of reason altogether, so Bigotry is the imposition of private reason,-- that is, of our own views and theories, of our own First Principles, as if they were the absolute truth, and the standard of all argument, investigation, and judgment. (pp. 291-92)

Furthermore, he points out that private judgment by its very nature is precluded from being made into a universal law and therefore Protestants, of all people, should be most tolerant of other viewpoints (p. 293). Thus, through the application of the Protestant principle of private judgment, Newman works to force the Protestant reader into granting respect for those persons who have used their private judgment to arrive at Catholic First Principles, if the Protestant reader is not to admit to logical inconsistency.

As an example of the illogic of trying to prove Catholicism false by Protestant First Principles, Newman uses vivid illustrations drawn from business, almost a second religion to many Protestants:

While yours [i.e., First Principles] are yours it is self-evident, indeed, to you, that ours are false; but it is not the common way of carrying on business in the world, to value English goods by French measures,

or to pay a debt in paper which was contracted in gold. Catholicism has its First Principles, overthrow them, if you can; endure them, if you cannot.
(p. 294)

From the syntax it is clear that "English goods" and the debt "contracted in gold" allude to Catholic principles, while "French measures" and "debt in paper" allude to Protestant ones. Under cover of logically arguing for toleration of differing First Principles, Newman implies the superiority of Catholic ones, for what Protestant experienced in the ways of the marketplace would not have an instinctive distrust of "French measures" to take the value of "English goods," or admit that paper was superior to gold?

He now takes the offensive, implying through empirical argument that Catholic Principles are superior because they have done longer service for mankind:

Why may not my First Principles contest the prize with yours? they have been longer in the world; they have lasted longer, they have done harder work, they have seen rougher service.

Then Newman damns Protestant First Principles with faint praise, implying a bookish religion derived from philosophical tenets that are completely divorced from reality:

You sit in your easy-chairs, you dogmatize in your lecture-rooms, you wield your pens; it all looks well on paper; you write exceedingly well; there never was an age in which there was better writing; logical, nervous, eloquent, and pure,--

He challenges its upholders to

--go and carry it all out in the world. Take your First Principles, of which you are so proud, into the crowded streets of our cities, into the formidable classes which make up the bulk of our population; try to work society by them. (pp. 294-95)

He continues to appeal to empirical argument to imply the superiority of Catholic First Principles:

My principles, which I believe to be eternal, have at least lasted eighteen hundred years; let yours live as many months.

The enormous discrepancy of twelve to one is underlined because the syntax forces the reader to make it in his own mind.

At this point Newman shifts his attack from empirical argument to ridicule: he makes sport of those men of limited imagination who jump to conclusions about Catholicism on the basis of woefully inadequate reasoning:

We call them, and rightly, men of contracted ideas, who cannot fancy things going on differently from what they themselves witnessed at home, and laugh at everything because it is strange. They themselves are the pattern men; their height, their dress, their manners, their food, their language, are all founded in the nature of things; and everything else is good or bad, just in that very degree in which it partakes, or does not partake, of them. (p. 295)

Again he makes the "pattern men" comical by reducing them to a mechanical state in which a dull routine is constantly repeated, or one idea applied obsessively to every situation, the very opposite of thought (pp. 295-97).

Contrasted to this, Newman now places the attractive figure of the philosopher well traveled and well read who investigates all things with an open mind. Of course the Protestant reader should want to identify himself with the philosopher rather than the mechanical (and therefore unthinking and comical) "pattern men," but to do so he must also agree with Newman's conclusion, that the philosopher will not ignore principles he disagrees with, but try to

understand and analyze them. Therefore, the philosopher will not put Catholic First Principles to one side, but recognize their existence and deem them worthy of study, even though they do not agree with the First Principles of his own age (p. 297).

To help the Protestant reader take the plunge and begin the study of Catholicism without feeling that it is ridiculous to do so, Newman is at pains to explain the true Catholic doctrine on miracles, a subject which most Protestants find absurd. For Newman, the reason for this attitude stems from First Principles which Catholics uphold and Protestants negate. The common ground of both are the miracles of the Apostles from which opposing First Principles are drawn, Protestants holding that "What God did once, He is not likely to do again," while Catholics hold that "What God did once, He is likely to do again."

Newman employs ellipsis to sum up succinctly the difference:

They say, It cannot be supposed He will work many miracles; we, It cannot be supposed He will work few. (p. 301)

The reason for the Protestant attitude of disbelief towards present-day miracles is tersely stated through alliteration as well: "his First Principle blocks belief" (p. 302). Newman expands on this idea by means of a striking simile, striking because it is a graphic description which forces the reader to experience the action described in his own mind:

It is as impossible that the notion of the miracle should gain admittance into his imagination, as for a lighted candle to remain burning, when dipped into a vessel of water. The water puts it out. (p. 303)

Nor does the effect end here. The many references in the New Testament to Christ and Christianity as "light," particularly light coming from a candle,² and the devil and evil as "darkness," make the simile imply that Protestant First Principles are allied to the forces of darkness or the devil, as Catholic notions of a miracle are allied to the "light" or true Christianity.

Moreover, for the Protestant to advance his side of the argument, he would necessarily have to prove his First Principle about miracles to be true. But the Protestant does not do this; rather he takes his First Principles for granted. Since he will not admit of miracles happening in the post Apostolic Age, the result is that he attributes stories of miracles in the Catholic Church to the enormous gullibility of the congregation, on the one hand, and the monstrous deceitfulness of the clergy on the other (pp. 304-05).

Now Newman is ready to expose the illogic of this Protestant position. He asks what could be a greater miracle than the Incarnation, the fact that God became Man in the person of Jesus Christ, believed in by Protestants as well as Catholics:

No miracle can be so great as that which took place in the Holy House of Nazareth; it is indefinitely more difficult to believe than all the miracles of the Breviary, of the Martyrology, of Saints' lives, of legends, of local traditions, put together; and there is the grossest inconsistency on the very face of the matter, for any one so to strain out the gnat and to swallow the camel, as to profess what is inconceivable, yet to protest against what is surely within the limits of intelligible hypothesis. (p. 305)

Straining the gnat and swallowing the camel refers, of course, to Jesus' condemnation of the hypocritical Pharisees (Matthew 23.24); by allusion, therefore, Newman equates the illogic of Protestant First Principles to the hypocrisy of the Pharisees without risking the antagonism an explicit comparison would arouse.

Following the course of logical argument, Newman next applies the Doctrine of the Incarnation, believed by Protestants and Catholics alike, to the Doctrine of Miracles, and draws this conclusion in support of the Catholic position:

When we start with assuming that miracles are not unlikely, we are putting forth a position which lies imbedded, as it were, and involved, in the great revealed fact of the Incarnation. (p. 306)

Now Newman can draw still another conclusion from the premise of the Incarnation:

Miracles are not only not unlikely, they are positively likely; and for this simple reason, because for the most part, when God begins He goes on. . . . If the Divine Being does a thing once, He is, judging by human reason, likely to do it again. This is surely common sense. (pp. 306-07)

Next, the concrete experience of putting the individual reader, through the force of the rhetoric, in the position of actually witnessing a miracle, "Nay, suppose you yourselves were once to see a miracle," compels him to accept the logic that the experience would predispose him to accept future miracles also. Newman now equates seeing with believing, and by similarity, later miracles with earlier ones:

then I ask what is the difference of the argument, whether you have seen one or believe one? You believe the Apostolic miracles, therefore be inclined beforehand to believe later ones.

As Newman continues, the Protestant reader should suddenly realize that he is developing the argument logically from what Protestants already believe in, that, in fact, "those who believe" can refer to Protestants as well as Catholics:

Thus you see, our First Principle, that miracles are not unlikely now, is not at all a strange one in the mouths of those who believe that the Supreme Being came miraculously into this world, miraculously united Himself to man's nature, passed a life of miracles, and then gave His Apostles a greater gift of miracles than He exercised Himself.

Furthermore, since the Protestant reader is in the position of the bystander, as it were, who overhears what is actually meant for a Catholic audience, Newman addressing the audience as if it were Protestant, he may tend not to argue with the conclusion, as he would if he himself were directly and challengingly addressed, but rather to accept it from the simple force of the logic. If one now accepts the premise that God creates an ongoing system of miracles, one can also logically reach the conclusion

that there are two systems going on in the world, one of nature, and one above nature; and two histories, one of common events, and one of miracles; and each system and each history has its own order.
(p. 307)

Moreover, once the miraculous system is admitted, miracles are to be judged on probabilities, as are common facts (pp. 308-09).

Newman now frankly catalogues all the miracles he personally believes in to avoid charges of evasiveness and deliberately raise the strongest possible Protestant objections against him:

I firmly believe that saints in their life-time have before now raised the dead to life, crossed the sea without vessels, multiplied grain and bread, cured incurable diseases, and superseded the operation of the laws of the universe in a multitude of ways. Many men, when they hear an educated man so speak, will at once impute the avowal to insanity, or to an idiosyncrasy, or to imbecility of mind, or to decrepitude of powers, or to fanaticism, or to hypocrisy. They have a right to say so, if they will;--

He can now triumphantly demolish these Protestant objections, however, with an argument by definition immediately followed by an a fortiori argument from the greater to the less possibility:

--and we have a right to ask them why they do not say it of those who bow down before the Mystery of mysteries, the Divine Incarnation. If they do not believe this, they are not yet Protestants; if they do, let them grant that He who has done the greater may do the less. (p. 313)

The effect of the argument is to make the extreme Protestant accusations suddenly look foolish through the rigorous application of logic. Hence Protestant pretensions to self-righteous superiority on the issue of miracles also suddenly collapse in the same way as a balloon when pricked.

Throughout this lecture, Newman's rhetorical intent has been to expose the irrational foundations on which Protestant principles of "reason" rest, so that the reader will come to realize that Protestantism as a religion is no more "reasonable" than Catholicism, and indeed, may even be less "reasonable." Primarily through the use of irony and definition, the reader is led to draw conclusions exposing the Protestant use of "reason" as a flimsy superstructure resting on foundations of irrational prejudice, and to perceive Catholic doctrines of worship as essentially

rational, given the premises of Christian belief in Apostolic Times on which both Catholics and Protestants are in practical agreement.

NOTES TO CHAPTER NINE

1. See Newman's note on Liberalism, found in Martin J. Svaglic, ed., Apologia Pro Vita Sua, pp. 254-63, especially the following propositions which he "earnestly denounced and abjured:
 1. No religious tenet is important, unless reason shows it to be so. . . .
 2. No one can believe what he does not understand. . . .
 3. No theological doctrine is any thing more than an opinion what happens to be held by bodies of men. . . .
 4. It is dishonest in a man to make an act of faith in what he has not had brought home to him by actual proof" (p. 260).
2. Cf. especially Matthew 5. 14-15,

Ye are the light of the world. A city that is set on a hill cannot be hid. Neither do men light a candle, and put it under a bushel, but on a candlestick, and it giveth light unto all that are in the house,

and Luke 11. 33-36,

No man, when he hath lighted a candle, putteth it in a secret place, neither under a bushel, but on a candlestick, that they which come in may see the light.

The light of the body is the eye: therefore when thine eye is single, thy whole body also is full of light; but when thine eye is evil, thy body also is full of darkness.

Take heed, therefore, that the light which is in thee be not darkness.

If thy whole body therefore be full of light, having no part dark, the whole shall be full of light, as when the bright shining of a candle doth give thee light.

Chapter Ten. "Lecture VIII. Ignorance Concerning Catholics
the Protection of the Protestant View."

Newman's rhetorical intention in this lecture is to destroy the ethical as well as intellectual respectability of the Protestant critical method for investigating and judging the Catholic Church, so that no obstacle is left in the reader's mind to appraising Catholicism for himself by unbiased inspection at first hand. To do this without arousing reader antagonism, however, Newman carries the reader back, through a series of logical steps made intriguing by metaphor, irony and definition, to the First Principles of the Protestant critical method which can then be exposed as utterly irrational. At the same time, he attempts to gain respect for Catholic First Principles of theology as contrasting favorably with Protestant ones, and thereby put the reader in the right frame of mind to investigate the claims of Catholicism.

He begins by reiterating that the theological difference between Protestants and Catholics goes back to First Principles. Since Protestants offer no proof for their First Principles from which they ultimately draw their conclusions, Catholics must inevitably lose in any debate with them. Newman brings this abstract idea vividly across to the reader through the use of military metaphors, which, being non-controversial and non-religious, tend to gain reader acceptance. These metaphors also display his keen strategic

sense in controversy, seeing it as a battle to be won by the proper argumentative moves, and one for which his Catholic audience therefore needs to be trained in the arts of controversy, much as soldiers are trained in the arts of war:

if we are betrayed into the inadvertence of passing them [*i.e.*, Protestant First Principles] over without remark, we are forthwith defeated and routed, even before we have begun to move forward to the attack,--

Simile now makes the generalized idea concrete and graphic:

--as might happen to cavalry who manoeuvred on a swamp, or to a guerilla force which ventured on the open plain. (p. 315)

What is the result of maneuvering on grossly unsuitable terrain? In his mind's eye, the reader should see horses and riders floundering helplessly in the swamp, easy prey for any sharpshooters lurking camouflaged in the undergrowth who can pick the riders off one by one without any loss to themselves, or lightly armed irregulars out in the open, defenseless against heavy artillery or the volleys of massed troops which can cut them to pieces from hundreds of yards away. Thanks to the use of the simile, then, the mind of the reader carries to an imaginative conclusion in concrete terms the bare, tantalizing hints of fighting on unfavorable terrain, and the idea of being beaten even before one starts to fight comes across with tremendously vivid impact.

Newman illustrates this crucial importance of First Principles to the outcome of debate by the example of Protestant argument which begs the question by assuming in the premise the conclusion to be proved; parallel structure helps to reinforce the sense of circular reasoning:

Protestants in fact do but say that we are superstitious, because it is superstitious to do as we do; that we are deluded, because it is a delusion to believe what we believe; that we are knaves, because it must be knavery to teach what we teach.

Ironic praise of this circular reasoning as having the least drawbacks of any Protestant argument underscores its inadequacy; since all Protestant arguments which depend on proof turn out to be false, the last resort is to fall back on opinion, which requires none (p. 316).

Having exposed the acceptance of Protestant First Principles as constituting an unfair advantage, and having discredited them as dependent on circular reasoning, Newman can now advance Catholic First Principles on a par with the Protestant; but he carefully refrains from asserting their superiority:

All the world knows that Catholics hold that the Apostles made over the Divine Revelation to the generation after them, not only in writing, but by word of mouth, and in the ritual of the Church. We consider that the New Testament is not the whole of what they left us; that they left us a number of doctrines, not in writing at all, but living in the minds and mouths of the faithful; Protestants deny this. They have a right to deny it;--

Merely asserting equality for Catholic First Principles in the absence of Protestant proof to the contrary also prepares the reader to accept his conclusion as to the illogic of the Protestant position:

--but they have no right to assume their denial to be true without proof, and to use it as self-evident, and to triumph over us as beaten, merely because we will not admit it. (p. 317)

This conclusion also leads Newman to expose the

fallacy involved in the Protestant Rule of Faith . . . that its upholders fancy, most unnaturally, that the accidental and occasional writings of an Apostle convey to them of necessity his whole mind. It does not occur to them to ask themselves, whether, as he has in part committed his teaching to writing so possibly he may not have expressed it in part through other channels also. (pp. 318-19)

He then catches Protestants contradicting their own principles, making their adherence to their "Rule of Faith" seem hypocritical without actually saying so:

Very different this from their mode of acting in matters of this world, in which nothing are they more distrustful of, or discontented with, than mere letter-writing, when they would arrive at the real state of a case in which they are interested.

Newman now exposes another defect peculiar to the New Testament, and draws a logical conclusion:

It is not worded with the scientific precision of a formal treatise, a creed, or a last will and testament. Now works written in this natural style are especially liable to receive an interpretation, and to make an impression, not in correspondence with the writer's intention, but according to the private principles and feelings of the reader. (p. 319)

He gives examples of the common experience of persons turning out completely different from the impression conveyed by their writing, and applies this notion, by similarity, to the writings of the Apostles, drawing yet another logical conclusion:

And thus Scripture, in like manner, though written under a supernatural guidance, is, from the nature of the case, from the defect of human language, and the infirmity of the recipient, unable by itself to convey the real mind of its writers to all who read it. Instead of its forcing its meaning upon the reader, the reader forces his own meaning upon it, colours it with his own thoughts and distorts it to his own purposes; so that something is evidently needed besides it, such as the teaching of the Church, to protect it from the false private judgment of the individual. (p. 321)

In contrast, he then demonstrates on how inadequate a Scriptural foundation Protestantism is built through terms emphasizing incompleteness which nevertheless supposedly guarantee the truth:

Picked verses, bits torn from the context, half sentences, are the warrant of the Protestant Idea, of what is Apostolic truth, on the one hand, and, on the other, of what is Catholic falsehood. (p. 322)

Newman next compares this fragmentary interpretation of Scripture with the reality of the Primitive Church out of which the Scriptures came to dramatize the absurdity of the Protestant critical method:

The first Christians were a living body; they were thousands of zealous, energetic men, who preached, disputed, catechized, and conversed from year's end to year's end. They spoke by innumerable tongues, with one heart and one soul, all saying the same thing; all this multitudinous testimony about the truths of Revelation, Protestants narrow down into one or two meagre sentences, which at their own will and pleasure they select from Saint Paul, and at their own will and pleasure they explain, and call the Gospel. (pp. 322-23)

By identity of activities described in the same words, Newman can now imply a continuation of the early Church in the form of present-day Catholicism:

They, as their forefathers, the first Christians, are a living body; they, too, preach, dispute, catechize, converse with innumerable tongues, saying the same thing as our adversaries confess, all over the earth.

He can also then contrast the living reality of Catholicism thus described with the absurd second-hand way in which Protestants judge it:

Well, then, you would think the obvious way was, if they would know what we really teach, to come and ask us, to talk with us, to try and enter into our views, and to attend to our teaching. Not at all; they do not dream of doing so; they take their

"texts;" they have got their cut-and-dried specimens from our divines, which the Protestant Tradition hands down from generation to generation;--

By similarity, Newman extends this fragmentary method of picking "texts" to the intellectual justification of Protestant prejudice, which in turn brings this arbitrary method to the reductio ad absurdum of contradicting not only the Primitive Church but also the living Catholic Church whose continuity with the authentic Primitive Church has just been implied:

--and, as by the aid of their verses from Scripture, they think they understand the Gospel better than the first Christians, so, by the help of these choice extracts from our works, they think they understand our doctrine better than we do ourselves. (p. 323)

The Protestant preconceived notions of Catholicism thus keep them from personally knowing Catholics, and accounts "for the hatred and contempt shown towards the Catholics of England by their fellow-countrymen" (p. 324).

How to break down these preconceived notions which form the basis of anti-Catholic prejudice? Newman does it by arguing from definition in such a gradual and subtle way that the typical Protestant ideas of Catholic Tradition and Doctrine are imperceptibly worn away through the use of metaphor, metaphor which carries the reader along step-by-step into the full concrete realization of the Catholic meaning of these words. He begins his indirect attack on Protestant preconceived notions by introducing the idea that to really know something, one has to experience it in its living reality. To gain acceptance of this idea, Newman uses a non-controversial, non-religious example, long-time

residence in a foreign country where erroneous first impressions are corrected and one's knowledge is derived from first-hand experience of the people. By analogy he can now argue that

This is what Catholics mean by Tradition, and why they go so much by it. It does not prove our doctrines to the man in question, but it will tell him, in a way no other informant can tell him, what our doctrines are. It has a substance and a reality peculiar to itself; for it is not a sample or specimen of us merely, but it is we, our thinking, speaking, acting self; our principles, our judgments, our proceedings. (pp. 325-26)

Newman next uses a striking metaphor to convey the impossibility of putting certain human realities into words:

--you can have no daguerreotype [i.e., an early type of photograph] of intellect, affection, and will; at best you have but a few bold strokes recorded for the benefit of others, according to the skill of the individual artist.

As sketching is to photography in its much more limited ability to reproduce reality, so does writing about a tradition stand in relation to the tradition itself; the metaphor thus vividly conveys the incomplete nature of writing. He now refines the sketching metaphor further:

Those who write books about a people or a school of men are hardly more than extempore sketchers; or they paint from memory;--

Connotations are aroused of a hasty spur-of-the-moment performance which must necessarily omit a good deal of essential matter, or of trusting to a memory which is necessarily selective and may well be faulty. Asyndeton now produces the hurried rhythms which give the impression of vibrant life:

if you would have the real thing, what the men are,
 what they think, what they do, close your books,
 take a ticket by the first train, cross the Channel,
 plunge in among them, drink them in.

The painting metaphor is then led to a triumphant conclusion:

This is what is called painting from
 the life;--

To sketch is to abstract on the basis of a few details; to
 paint from memory is to trust to one's remembered impression.
 To paint from life, however, is to have the opportunity of
 capturing the actual living presence of the model in full
 and glorious detail. The metaphor thus builds to a climax,
 spotlighting vividly the difference between writing about
 an experience abstracted from life, and the life itself.

Since the metaphor is non-religious and non-controversial,
 the Protestant reader may accept it as true. Once having
 accepted it, however, he should also accept the identifi-
 cation Newman makes between life and the Catholic Tradition:

--and what is here called life the Catholic calls
 Tradition, which eclipses and supersedes, when and
 where it can be had, the amplest collection of
 "texts" and extracts about our doctrine and polity
 which was ever put together by the ablest of com-
 pilers. (p. 326)

Thus the reader suddenly realizes that in talking about
 Catholic Tradition, Newman is really talking about life
 itself in all its fullness.

Newman expands on this idea by quoting from an earlier
 work (Prophetical Office, Lecture I), all the more impres-
 sive as testimony because it was written "in controversy
 with Catholics" while he was still a Protestant (p. 326).
 In this work he defines the attributes of tradition con-
 cretely by simile and metaphor:

"It is silent, but it lives. It is silent like the rapids of a river, before the rocks intercept it."

The rocks stand for those disturbances of custom which necessitate the formal enunciation of what had hitherto been unquestioningly accepted, as the flow of a river is unquestioningly accepted and only consciously noted when broken by rapids. This comparison of tradition to the rapids of a river gives off connotations of an on-going flow or process beyond totally conscious apprehension and reduction to writing by abstraction, leading naturally to Newman's expanded definition of tradition which he also quotes from his earlier Prophetical Office:

"Tradition in its fulness is necessarily unwritten; it is the mode in which a society has felt or acted, during a certain period, and it cannot be circumscribed, any more than a man's countenance and manner can be conveyed to strangers in any set of propositions."
(p. 328)

Here again one can see Newman's belief in the power of the concrete, as opposed to the abstract, to persuade. To understand Catholic Tradition one must first experience it in all its living reality, as one can only grasp "a man's countenance and manner" by experiencing his actual presence.

Newman now attempts to convince the reader to experience the tradition rather than merely reading Protestant opinions about it by an a fortiori argument, "Which party is more likely to be in possession of what Catholics believe, they or we?", and an appeal to "a maxim commonly accepted, that 'Every one is to be trusted in his own art.'" He draws the logical conclusion "that as Frenchmen are the

best masters of French, and pilots the best steersmen on the river, Catholics ought to know Catholicism better than other men" (p. 329). The reader is meant to accept unquestioningly the maxim, which may be fallacious, as stating a universal truth because it appears so plausible. Since the first two examples of its application are non-religious and non-controversial, he should tend to accept them as well, but then the logical extension of the analogy may lead him to accept the third example also.

Again, Newman is quick to continue to relate the assertion that "Catholics ought to know Catholicism better than other men" to non-controversial examples in order to increase the chances of its acceptance. These, however, are of a more pointed nature, implying that the critics of a particular institution are rendered absurd by their uniformed criticism. He first uses understatement, "Military men do not show particular respect for the criticisms of civilians" to imply that civilians do not know what they are talking about in military matters, though such a conclusion is really a non sequitur. His next example implicitly compares, by logic of the maxim, Catholicism to the village nurse and Protestant critics of it to superficially clever dabblers in medicine:

As for amateur physicians, I suppose most of us would rather be doctored by the village nurse, who blindly goes by tradition and teaching, than by a clever person, who, among other things, has dabbled in family vademecums [*i.e.*, "A book or manual suitable for carrying about with one for ready reference"] and materia-medicas [*i.e.*, "the remedial substances used in the practice of medicine" (Oxford English Dictionary)],
abounds in theories and views, and has a taste for experiments.
(p. 329)

Though the analogy is a specious one, nevertheless the implications which arise from this comparison are that "the village nurse" is interested in curing people and the "clever person" in experimenting for his own amusement; so, too, Catholics are sincerely interested in true religion while Protestants merely dabble at it, a conclusion too strong to be stated openly.

Newman also degrades the Protestant critic through metaphor:

Ignorance in his case is the mother, not certainly of devotion, but of inconceivable conceit and preternatural injustice. (p. 330)

The polypton and play on words of "inconceivable conceit" makes the reader hold in his mind simultaneously the three ideas that ignorance gives birth to the most fantastic "conceit" in the sense of (1) egotism, and (2) fanciful thinking, and (3) that this "conceit" is so fantastic that it cannot be "conceived," i.e., created or imagined (Oxford English Dictionary), a contradiction of meanings (1) and (2). "Preternatural injustice" in the sense of something outside the scale of the natural world completes the picture of extremes so absurd as to be completely outside the realm of normal human experience, which arise from ignorance.

He then succinctly sums up the fault of Protestant critics of Catholicism: "he who wishes to know us must condescend to study us." "Condescend" ironically underlines the self-evident proposition that to know something one must study it, and by implication, makes the Protestant who "condescends" ridiculous for supposing himself above the

laws of reality and parading a false sense of superiority. Next, Protestant reductionism of Catholic doctrine becomes absurd by vivid metaphoric understatement:

The Catholic doctrine is after all too great to be comfortably accomodated in a Protestant nutshell; it cannot be surveyed at a glance, or refuted by a syllogism. (p. 332)

Newman now argues by induction that miracles, a major stumbling block to Protestants, when seen in context have their own power, not of proof, but more subtly, of provoking astonishment, as a result of the concrete experience of simply reading about them:

One isolated miracle looks strange, but many interpret each other; this or that, separated from the system of which they are a part, may be perfectly incredible; but when they are viewed as portions of a whole, they press upon the inquirer a feeling, I do not say absolutely of conviction, but at least of wonder, of perplexity, and almost of awe.

His conclusion is strictly limited in its claim in view of the impressive accumulation of evidence, and should therefore be convincing and acceptable to the Protestant reader. Yet isocolon subtly emphasizes the fundamental change in point of view caused by reading "the lives of certain of our saints":

You have ceased to condemn, you have learned to respect. (p. 333)

Newman now expands on this new-found respect for Catholicism by challenging the reader to dip into books dealing with the private lives of various eminent Catholic personages, books which bring

you, so to say behind the scenes, where all pretense is impossible, and where men appear what they are: it is simply impossible, or at least it would be as

good as a miracle, for any one to study such works, and still consider that the Pope was a man of sin, and the Mother of Saints i.e., the Catholic Church/ a Jezebel. (p. 334)

Look at actual Catholics, is Newman's constantly reiterated theme, in line with his belief in the power of the concrete to persuade. If the reader did but do this, he would see for himself how human, and at the same time, how holy these individuals really are; Newman supports his assertion with examples of the sublime conduct of three Popes under trying circumstances (pp. 334-38).

Yet he also frankly admits "that at all times there was a certain remnant scattered about of priests who did not live up to their faith and their profession" (p. 339). Newman's admission is not quite as bad as it first appears, however, for his technique here is actually "to praise with faint damn." Use of the word "remnant" in this context should remind the reader of the saving "remnant" of Israel whom God promised to spare from the general destruction of their country as punishment for their sins (Ezekial 6.8-9). The Biblical allusion is thus to a faithful few; in the context in which Newman uses the word, however, "remnant" is to a faithless few. The Catholic Church can only gain from the comparison, for the implication is that while only a few remained loyal to the Lord in the days of the Ancient Hebrews, the Catholic Church is overwhelmingly loyal because only a few of its clergy went astray.

Newman now makes this point positively and explicitly: on the whole, they had been, as a body, the salt of the earth and the light of the world, through the

power of divine grace, and that thus, in spite of the frailty of human nature, they had fulfilled the blessed purposes of their institution. (p. 339)

The reader should immediately recognize in "the salt of the earth and the light of the world" a reference to the Sermon on the Mount in which Jesus carefully balanced praise of human potentiality for doing good with a realistic appraisal and warning of human frailties to be guarded against, along with an admonition to do good (Matthew 5. 13-16). Newman's assertions that the Catholic clergy "in spite of the frailty of human nature . . . had fulfilled the blessed purposes of their institution" imply that the clergy are the heirs of the multitude which Jesus addressed, and are faithfully carrying out His instructions.

Now Newman is ready for the conclusion up to which he has been leading:

But not in one or two points merely, but in everything we think and say and do, as Catholics, were we but known, what a reformation would there not at once follow in the national mind in respect to us! British fair dealing and good sense would then recover their supremacy. (p. 339)

In the context, his use of the word "reformation" appears slyly ironic; it implies a true reformation of the mind in terms of "fair dealing and good sense" which were thrust aside at the time of the original Reformation by Protestant anti-Catholic prejudice. Then, too, by speaking of these qualities as recovering their "supremacy," Newman also slyly alludes to the "Act of Supremacy" in which Henry VIII proclaimed himself, and not the Pope, head of the English Church, thereby subtly implying that this Act did away with "fair dealing and good sense."

Now Newman ironically enumerates the obstacles to Protestants realistically viewing "what they so interminably argue about." These are the failings caused by Protestant prejudice, which, by implication, degrade those who fondly hold onto them:

first comes in the way that very love of arguing and of having an opinion, to which my last words have alluded. Men would be sorry indeed that the controversy should be taken from the region of argument and transferred to that of fact.

The Church is subtly likened to St. Paul, here on earth to instruct and interpret Christian Doctrine, and so can only gain by comparison to bigoted Protestant efforts at interpretation:

They like to think as they please; and as they would by no means welcome St. Paul, did he come from heaven to instruct them in the actual meaning of his "texts" in Romans iii. or Galatians ii., so they would think it a hardship to be told that they must not go on maintaining and proving, that we were really what their eyes then would testify we were not. (p. 340)

Finally, metaphor is used to degrade Protestant prejudice to a degree not credible or acceptable if done directly:

And then, too, dear scandal and romancing put in their claim; how would the world go on, and whence would come its staple food and its cheap luxuries, if Catholicism were taken from the market? Why it would be like the cotton crop failing, or a new tax put upon tea. And then, too, comes prejudice, "like the horseleech, crying, Give, give:" how is prejudice to exist without Catholic iniquities and enormities? prejudice, which could not fast for a day, which would be in torment inexpressible, and call it Popish persecution, to be kept on this sort of meagre for a Lent, and would shake down Queen and Parliament with the violence of its convulsions, rather than it should never suck a Catholic's sweet bones and drink his blood anymore.
(pp. 341-42)

Metaphorically comparing Catholicism to a necessary

commodity on the world market for the feeding of personified "scandal and romancing" implies depraved human appetites, while metaphorically comparing Protestant prejudice to a horseleech degrades its possessors further as being slaves of the most disgusting animal appetites, the awful results of which Newman vividly describes. Though hyperbolic and unjustifiable in terms of its implications, the latter description tends to be accepted because it is recognized as part of a metaphor.

Newman now brings home the forced isolation of Catholics by Protestants by ironically comparing them to Biblical figures who are unreachable because they lived in the distant past:

Personal intercourse, then, being practically just as much out of the question with us, as with the Apostles themselves or the Jewish prophets,--

In a reductio ad absurdum of Protestant attitudes, Newman now argues ironically that such isolation justifies Protestants in dealing with Catholics as with other long-gone religious phenomena; his archeological metaphors imply that not only do Protestants take a partial, distorted view of Catholicism, but actually go to the ultimate absurdity of treating living Catholicism as some museum fossil:

--Protestantism has nothing left for it, when it would argue about us, but to have recourse, as in the case of Scripture, to its "texts," its chips, shavings, brickbats, potsherds, and other odds and ends of the Heavenly City, which form the authenticated and ticketed specimens of what the Catholic Religion is in its great national museum. (p. 342)

To communicate the idea that only Catholics can properly interpret Catholicism, Newman again uses the strategy of seeking common ground with his opponents. He takes as an example the national institution of Parliament which governs the civil lives of both Protestants and Catholics and points out with the logic of common sense that the phrase, the "Omnipotence of Parliament," is not to be taken literally, but in the sense in which Members of Parliament use it:

Parliament is omnipotent, as having the power to do what it will, not in France, or in Germany, or in Russia, much less all over the earth, much less in heaven, but within the United Kingdom;--

The proposition has the virtue of being self-evident to an Englishman, and concretely illustrates the point that the word "omnipotent" is properly used in one narrow sense as defined by the persons who apply it to their particular institution. Newman can now argue by analogy that calling the Virgin Mary "omnipotent" is also not to be taken literally, but in the sense that Catholics use the phrase:

--and, in like manner the Blessed Virgin is called omnipotent, as being able to gain from God what she desires by the medium of prayer. (p. 344)

Having agreed to the logic of the non-controversial first example which is common to the experience of both Catholics and Protestants, the reader may be led also to agree by analogy to the second.

He now develops the idea that reason alone cannot judge Catholicism, that it must "be interpreted by the understandings and habits of the Catholic people," by making an ironic comparison of Protestant critics to the philosophers of Laputa in Swift's Gulliver's Travels

who carried their head under their arm. These sagacious persons seldom made direct use of their senses, but acted by reason; a tailor, for instance, who has to measure for a suit of clothes, I think, is described, not as taking out his measures, but his instruments, quadrant, telescope, and the like. He measured a man as he would measure a mountain or a bog; and he ascertained his build and his carriage as he might determine the right ascension of Sirius [the dog-star] or the revolution of a comet. It is but a vulgar way to handle and turn about the living subject who was before him; so our Laputan retreated, pulled out his theodolite [i.e., a surveyer's instrument for measuring horizontal and vertical angles, according to the Oxford English Dictionary] instead of his slips of parchment, and made an observation from a distance. It was a grand idea to make a coat by private judgment and a theodolite; and depend upon it, when it came home it did not fit. (pp. 349-50)

The obvious clue to the irony in this passage is, of course, the fact that the philosophers "carried their head under their arm." Next, the phrase, "These sagacious persons seldom made direct use of their senses, but acted by reason," makes the reader anticipate carrying the use of reason to ludicrous lengths in defiance of common sense. The instruments employed, "quadrant, telescope and the like," are commonly associated with measuring the distance between the earth and heavenly bodies for the purpose of navigation at sea, necessarily approximate measurements. But to put a man standing at arm's length away in the same category, as far as measurement is concerned, with heavenly bodies millions of miles away is to show in the most dramatic way possible a massive confusion not only of degree, but also of kind. The reason given for doing this, "It was but a vulgar way to handle and turn about the living subject before him" sums up the philosopher's ludicrous transformation of a living, breathing human being into an inert

scientific object of investigation which must be measured in the most abstract way possible.

Newman can reverse expectation created by ironically approving diction: "It was a grand idea to make a coat by private judgment and a theodolite; and depend on it, when it came home it did not fit." Here Newman's genius for making the abstract concrete manifests itself as he shows the practical result of trusting to reason unchecked by common sense. Moreover, since "private judgment" clearly alludes to Protestant championing of this theological point, by implication, Protestant critics are comically degraded to the same level of fantastic incompetence as the Laputan tailor-philosophers.

Comic degradation begun by this allusion is next continued by metaphor, in surveying terms appropriate to scanning the Heavens:

Our Protestants wield the theodolite too; they keep at a convenient distance from us, take the angles, calculate the sines and cosines, and work out an algebraic process, when common sense would bid them ask us a few questions. They observe latitude and longitude, the dip of the needle, the state of the atmosphere; our path is an orbit, and our locus is expressed by an equation.

The same massive confusion of kind as the Laputan philosophers is evident in the way Protestants approach Catholics, observing them as if they were some strange, far-off phenomena decipherable only by abstruse methods of science rather than fellow human beings to whom one can go for first-hand information. Use of surveying terms comically associated with Laputan philosophers thus makes Protestant critics equal to them in comic incompetence by force of the common metaphor.

Since the comparison of Protestant critics to the wooly-headed philosophers of Laputa is so ludicrous, the Protestant reader now has a clear reason for shunning the abstract methods of Protestant critics in favor of a human approach to Catholicism.

Newman then subtly turns Protestant critical method into a reductio ad absurdum through the implications of his carefully chosen diction:

They communicate with us by gestures, as you talk to the deaf and dumb; and they are more proud of doing something, right or wrong, by a ceremony of this kind which is their own doing, than of having the learning of the Benedictines or the Bollandists, if they are to go to school for it. (p. 350)

It follows that if Protestants insist on treating Catholics as strange creatures who do not talk their language (underscored by Newman's reference to "the deaf and dumb"), they can only hope to communicate with them by simple gestures of very limited meaning. These gestures exemplify the most primitive use of reason, however, and easily harden into a "ceremony" or ritual which by definition refers to a series of predetermined acts in strictly prescribed order, a reduction of reason to the mechanical which imitates instinct, the very antithesis of reason. Newman can now devastatingly contrast Protestants as more enamored of "ceremony" because of the simple egotistical motive that it "is their own doing," than of respectable scholarship of the highest type, as exemplified by the Benedictines and Bollandists,¹ and the degradation of the Protestant critical method is complete.

He next provides an incentive for approaching Catholics

on the human level by painting a very human picture of the Catholic practice of Confession and how it therapeutically benefits the individual:

How many are the souls in distress, anxiety or loneliness, whose one need is to find a being to whom they can pour out their feelings unheard by the world?
(p. 351)

Typically, Newman is able to describe a spiritual experience in solid, concrete terms that convey a sense of its inescapably real transforming effect upon the penitent by translating the "idea" into the "fact":

If there is a heavenly idea in the Catholic Church, looking at it simply as an idea, surely, next after the Blessed Sacrament, Confession is such. And such is it ever found in fact,--the very act of kneeling, the low and contrite voice, the sign of the cross hanging, so to say, over the head bowed low, and the words of peace and blessing. Oh what a soothing charm is there, which the world can neither give nor take away! Oh what piercing, heart-subduing tranquility provoking tears of joy, is poured, almost substantially and physically upon the soul, the oil of gladness, as Scripture calls it, when the penitent at length rises, his God reconciled to him, his sins rolled away for ever! This is confession as it is in fact; as those bear witness to it who know it by experience.
(pp. 351-52)

He then contrasts the reality of this practice with the absurd distortion of critics. Newman uses simile to make the reader actively draw the conclusion that the typical Protestant critic is "blind" to the merits of the Confessional:

listen to his ravings, as far as I dare quote them, about what he knows just as much of as the blind know of colours.
(p. 352)

Clearly, by the end of the lecture, then, Newman's persistent rhetorical intent has been, if not to impose the First Principles of Catholic theology on the reader

to the exclusion of Protestant ones, at least to gain a footing of equality for them. Some of these First Principles are the equal rank of Catholic Tradition with Scripture, the infallibility of the Church on questions of doctrine, the Catholic teaching that miracles have occurred since the Apostolic Age and are still occurring, and Confession as a legitimate part of religious practice. The concrete, vivid manner in which these First Principles are presented should not only intrigue the reader to the point where he investigates Catholicism for himself, but also cause him to weigh its claims in terms of respect rather than of abuse. Furthermore, Newman's graphic demonstration of the limits of abstract reason to deal adequately with something as concrete as Catholic religious tradition and the ridiculous results that follow from attempting to do so, should also lead the reader to investigate this tradition through personal contact with its upholders, as Newman has persistently urged.

NOTE TO CHAPTER TEN

1. According to the Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church, Benedictines were noted for "preserving . . . the ideals and practice of true scholarship," while Bollandists were the Jesuit editors of a meticulously researched "critical edition of the lives of the Saints, based on authentic sources."

Chapter Eleven. "Lecture IX. Duties of Catholics Towards the Protestant View."

Having shown the Protestant tradition to be fraudulent and built on fable, and therefore vulnerable to exposure, Newman now offers a definite plan for reducing anti-Catholic prejudice which will take advantage of this grave weakness. In his concluding lecture, his belief in the power of the concrete to persuade stands forth clearly; he urges his audience to make themselves personally known to their Protestant neighbors so that they will be forced to contrast the living reality of Catholicism with the insubstantial delusions of the Protestant tradition.

How does Newman fix this plan of action firmly in the mind of his audience? Throughout the lecture he often assumes the pose of a general, albeit one of Christian virtues, instructing his troops on the proper tactics to employ in the upcoming battle with the Protestant enemy. Here again one sees how for Newman the art of controversy resolves itself into the proper sequence of argumentative moves to make, not merely to win the issue at hand, but to discredit thoroughly one's opponent, much as the goal in warfare is not merely to win, but to achieve an overwhelming victory by utterly routing the enemy. Then, too, by addressing members of his audience as if they were soldiers, Newman seeks to raise their morale (crucial to the outcome of any military campaign) by dramatizing the struggle for

toleration as if it were a life-and-death battle in which every Catholic layman must fight heroically. This also gives him the opportunity of referring to the Christian martyrs of the past as "soldiers" who should be emulated, thus providing the idea of martyrdom with an inspiring, rugged image rather than the more ascetic and somewhat insipid one of tradition.

As any good general would, Newman begins by first defining his overall campaign strategy:

I have not been aggressive, but on the defensive; and what is the first step of those who are getting ready for their defense against a foe? to reconnoitre him. It is simply this that I have been engaged upon in these Lectures.

This, I say, has been my object, a reconnoitring or survey of a strong and furious enemy, undertaken with a view to self-defense.

By treating prejudiced Protestants frankly and matter-of-factly as the enemy, Newman implicitly dramatizes his defensive strategy as a fully justified struggle against evil. Use of military metaphors not only gives him the image of a commanding general instructing and inspiring his troops, from which his audience should take heart, but also is meant to force the Protestant reader to see himself as the enemy with his faults glaringly exposed.

What are the results of Newman's "reconnaissance" in the preceding lectures? Antithesis helps to point up the paradox that Protestants find strength in their ignorance:

I find he is in a very strong position, but that he takes a very incorrect view of us, and that is his strength and our danger.

Metaphor now makes the paradox more explicit:

Different from the case of actual warfare, in which ignorance is weakness, here ignorance is power.

Prejudiced notions of Catholicism become battle maps by metaphor also:

He has got old pictures and old maps made years and years ago, which have come down to him from his fathers; and instead of deigning to look at us, and learn anything about us, he adheres to them as if it were a point of faith to do so. (p. 365)

Implicitly, then, Newman demonstrates that Protestants are vulnerable to a counterattack based on the reality of living Catholicism, and so raises the morale of his "soldiers" who heretofore may have thought Protestant prejudice invincible.

He next points out that this distorted view of Catholicism is caused by the establishment of Protestantism, but makes this fact comical instead of awesome, so that his audience will gain rather than lose heart. He does this by comparing the establishment of Protestantism to a necessary physical function of the body, which reduces it to the mechanical, thereby creating a comic effect undercutting the impressive description:

Thus there is an incessant, unwearied circulation of Protestantism all over the whole country, for 365 days in the year from morning till night; and this, for nearly three centuries, has been almost one of the functions of national life. As the pulse, the lungs, the absorbents, the nerves, the pores of the animal body, are ever at their work, as that motion is its life, so in the political structure of the country there is an action of the life of Protestantism, constant and regular. (p. 366)

Newman continues to emphasize the mechanical effect of prejudice in the automatically antagonistic response of Protestants to Catholic appeals to reason; the feared

Protestant enemy is thereby comically degraded to the level of an unthinking robot:

The public will not recognize us; it interrupts and puts us down. Men close their ears and throw up dust in the air when we begin to speak: they close their eyes when we come forward, and begin pelting us at random. Far less will they come near us, and ask us questions, and listen to our answers. (p. 367)

Speaking in the same vein, Newman uses metaphor to compare Protestant prejudice to protection against fever, thus degrading Protestant spiritual principles to the level of the physical:

When a person goes to a fever ward, he takes some essence with him to prevent his catching the disorder; and of this kind are the anti-Catholic principles in which Protestants are instructed from the cradle.

Simile then underscores the irrational, mechanical character of Protestant prejudice:

For instance, they are taught to get by heart without any sort of proof, as a kind of alphabet or spelling lesson, such propositions as these:-- "miracles have ceased long ago;" "all truth is in the Bible;" "any one can understand the Bible;" "all penance is absurd;" "a priesthood is pagan, not Christian," and a multitude of others. These are universally taught and accepted, as if equally true and equally important, just as are the principles "it is wrong to murder or thieve," or "there is a judgment to come."

Simile now also robs these learned "maxims" of their moral significance by turning them into a merely useful commodity for making Protestants immune to Catholic arguments:

When then a person sets out in life with these maxims as a sort of stock in trade in all religious speculations, and encounters Catholics, whose opinions hitherto he had known nothing at all about, you see he has been made quite proof against them, and unsusceptible of their doctrines, their worship, and their reasoning, by the preparation to which he has been subjected. (p. 369)

Why is this inoculation of prejudice able to remain so effective? Newman puts his finger on the cause using parallel terms in apposition:

Protestantism is fierce, because it does not know you; ignorance is its strength; error is its life.

Asyndeton produces the hurried rhythms which reinforce the sense of Newman's strategy for attack upon prejudice:

Therefore bring yourselves before it, press yourselves upon it, force yourselves into notice against its will. Oblige men to know you; persuade them, importune them, shame them into knowing you.

He paints a picture of all-too-human Protestants as cowardly prisoners of their own prejudices, thus subtly changing them from objects of fear to objects of contempt, to encourage his "soldiers" to carry out his strategy:

There are, many of them, half conscious they have been wrong, but fear the consequences of becoming sure of it; they will think it best to let things alone, and to persist in injustice for good and all, since they have been for so long a time committed to it; they will be too proud to confess themselves mistaken; they prefer a safe cruelty to an inconvenient candour.

Yet as any good commander would, Newman now anticipates the fears such a bold strategy of seeking out personal acquaintance with the enemy will arouse in his followers, and reassures them of its effectiveness and simplicity:

I know it is a most grave problem how to touch so intense an obstinacy, but, observe, if you once touch it, you have done your work.

Alliteration reinforces the sense of an easy route to victory:

There is but one step between you and success. It is a steep step, but it is one.

Newman shows the psychological advantage that will accrue from such an approach, thus demonstrating his grasp of strategy, again as if he were applying the art of warfare to controversy:

It is a great thing to know your aim, to be saved from wasting your energies in wrong quarters, to be able to concentrate them on a point. (p. 372)

The limited aim of such a strategy demonstrates its utter realism, and therefore, its implicit effectiveness, while reassuring the reader that it will not result in his own conversion to Catholicism:

You have but to aim at making men look steadily at you; when they do this, I do not say they will become Catholics, but they will cease to have the means of making you a by-word and a reproach, of inflicting on you the cross of unpopularity. Wherever Catholicism is known, it is respected, or at least endured, by the people. (pp. 372-73)

His further instructions to Catholics not only reassures the reader that he has nothing to fear from such encounters, but also reassures the audience that the fierce response of prejudiced Protestants is actually a good sign, not one to be dissuaded by, since it is a reaction to the deadly effectiveness of such a strategy:

I am not advocating, as you will see presently, anything rude in your bearing, or turbulent, or offensive; but first I would impress upon you the end you have to aim at. Your one and almost sole object, I say, must be, to make yourselves known. That is what will do everything for you: it is what your enemies will try by might and main to hinder. They begin to have a suspicion that Catholicism, known to be what it really is, will be their overthrow. (p. 373)

What would be the reaction of Catholics stood up for themselves? Newman now ironically addresses the audience from the point of view of prejudiced Protestants, thus

enabling him to spotlight the monstrous misapprehension of Catholics which they hold, and underscore the injustice of their response to Catholics simply asserting their rights as Englishmen (p. 374). Furthermore, to encourage the audience to stand up aggressively for its rights, he goes on to show that recent educated converts are an embarrassment to Protestants because they are a living refutation of Protestant ways of dealing with Catholics. These converts know how to defend themselves, being used to controversy (an allusion to Newman himself from whom the audience should take heart!), while the old Catholics, leading obscure lives, do not and are easy prey for Protestants. Therefore Newman, rhetorically addressing Catholic-baiting Protestants, advises them to have nothing to do with these converts, if they would "keep up that profound ignorance of the Catholic Religion which the ascendancy of Protestantism requires" (p. 377), but instead, concentrate on defenseless Catholics who cannot fight back.

This ironic address to Catholic-baiting Protestants should have the effect on the Protestant reader of making them seem cowardly bullies who cannot defend themselves. In order not to seem a cowardly bully, or a fool bound by an absurd tradition, then, the Protestant reader should naturally welcome contact with Catholics. To make the Catholics seem even more heroic in Protestant eyes, Newman dramatizes the strategy of desperation, which should also raise the morale of his "soldiers":

Bear in mind, then, that, as far as defamation and railing go, your enemies have done their worst. There is nothing which they have not said, which they do not daily say, against your religion, your priests, and yourselves. They have exhausted all their weapons and you have nothing to fear, for you have nothing to lose. . . . You have the strength of desperation, and desperation does great things. They have made you turn to bay. Whatever occurs, if there be a change at all, it must be a change for the better; you cannot be disadvantaged by the most atrocious charges, for you are sure to be the objects of such, whatever you do. You are set loose from the fear of man: it is of no use to say to yourselves, "what will people say?" No, the Supreme Being must be your only Fear, as He is your only Reward.
(pp. 378-79)

Having painted the worst, Newman can now slip in grounds for hope and gain by the contrast. He notes that "it is not so bad as it seems," and proceeds to analyze just who the Catholic persecutors are. (This analysis is also important because it demonstrates Newman's fervent belief in the power of the concrete to triumph over the abstract as a means of winning men's minds.) He points out that they consist, in large part, of certain influences in the metropolis of London:

first, a great proportion of members of both Houses of Parliament; next, the press; thirdly, the Societies whose haunt or home is Exeter Hall; fourthly, the pulpits of the Establishment, and of a good part of the Dissenters.
(p. 379)

He lumps all the accusers together under "the whole power of the Metropolis" (p. 380), and shows how this power is essentially impersonal:

No one is known in London; it is the realm of the incognito and the anonymous; it is not a place, it is a region or a state. There is no such thing as local opinion in the metropolis; mutual personal knowledge, there is none; neighborhood, good fame, bad repute, there is none; no house knows the next door.
(pp. 380-81)

Because it is impersonal, it cannot be changed by personal contact:

You cannot make an impression on such an ocean of units; it has no disposition, no connexion of parts.

Newman now sums up his whole belief in the power of the concrete to persuade:

The great instrument of propagating moral truth is personal knowledge. A man finds himself in a definite place; he grows up in it and into it; he draws persons around him; they know him, he knows them; thus it is that ideas are born which are to live, that works begin which are to last.

By extension, he argues that

It is this personal knowledge of each other which is true public opinion; local opinion is real public opinion;--

In contrast,

--but there is not, there cannot be, such in London.

What is the reason? Newman says it is the abstract quality of life which a great city engenders:

How is a man to show what he is, when he is but a grain of sand out of a mass, without relations to others, without a place, without antecedents, without individuality? Crowds pour along the streets, and though each has his own character written on high, they are one and all the same to men below. And this impersonality, as it may be called, pervades the whole metropolitan system.

The result of this abstract atmosphere is that

A man, not known, writes a leading article against what?--things? no; but ideas. He writes against Catholicism:-- (p. 381)

Newman now argues by definition negatively to demonstrate that the anonymous man is inventing a concept, "Catholicism," which has no basis in reality:

--what is Catholicism? can you touch it? point at it? no, it is an idea before his mind. He clothes it with certain attributes, and forthwith it goes all over the country that a certain idea or vision, called Catholicism, has certain other ideas, bad ones, connected with it. You see, it is all a matter of ideas, and abstractions, and conceptions. (pp. 381-82)

He next points out that the mere act of giving individual Catholic priests "the name of rogues, or of liars, or of tyrants" does not hurt them:

they themselves, the owners of them, in their own persons are not at all the worse for it, but eat, sleep, pray, and do their work, as freely and easily as before.

What does name-calling achieve in effect?

London cannot touch them, for words hurt no one; words cannot hurt us till--till when? till they are taken up, believed, in the very place where we individually dwell. Ah! this is a very different kind of public opinion; it is local opinion.

Newman thus states as a general principle

that popular opinion only acts through local opinion. The opinion of London can only act on an individual through the opinion of his own place. (p. 382)

Therefore, it follows that it is necessary

to get each place in particular to accept what the great Metropolis says, and the Empire believes, in the general.

But what if the locality feels itself more expert than the Metropolis on the issue? Newman uses as an example a commodity in which Birmingham was preeminent, iron. This allows him to play subtly on the local pride of the audience through understatement, and by extension, on that of the reader:

Did London profess to tell us about the price of iron generally, if it gained its information from Birmingham, and other iron markets in particular, well and good; but if it came forward with great general views of its own,

I suspect that Birmingham would think it had a prior voice in the question, and would not give up its views at the bidding of any metropolitan journal. (p. 383)

Since the reader should agree to the logic of the example which is non-controversial and non-religious, by analogy Newman can now apply the argument to Catholicism and expect assent to his equally logical chain of reasoning:

And the case is the same as regards Catholicism; London may declaim about Catholics in general, but Birmingham will put in a claim to judge of them in particular; and when Birmingham becomes the judge, London falls into the mere office of accuser, and the accused may be heard in his defense. Thus, a Catholic of Birmingham can act on Birmingham, though he cannot act on London, and this is the important practical point to which I have been coming all along. (pp. 383-84)

He now emphasizes the concreteness of local opinion as opposed to the opinions built on abstractions of the Metropolis:

I wish you to turn your eyes upon that local opinion, which is so much more healthy, English, and Christian than popular or metropolitan opinion; for it is an opinion, not of ideas, but of things; not of words, but of facts; not of names, but of persons; it is perspicuous, real and sure.

The only real effect is the effect of local opinion, which is capable of being acted on in turn:

London cannot act on me except through Birmingham, and Birmingham indeed can act on me, but I can act on Birmingham.

To demonstrate the point in a vivid manner and thus gain assent, Newman uses an example of obvious impossibility to which the reader should agree:

A Member of Parliament in London might say that I had two heads, and refuse to retract it, though I solemnly denied it. (p. 384)

By this use of hyperbole, Newman can allude to the wild

charges made against him over the years, while plausibly expanding the example to a climax of absurdity to reinforce his point; his audience, in fact, represents "local opinion" and will instantly recognize the absurdity, and, therefore, its own power:

All the world might believe it; it might be the theme of country meetings; the Prime Minister might introduce it into the Queen's speech; it might be the subject of most eloquent debates, and most exciting divisions; it might be formally communicated to all the European courts; the stocks might fall, a stream of visitors set in from Russia, Egypt, and the United States, at the news; it would not be believed in Birmingham; local opinion would carry it hollow against popular opinion.
(pp. 384-85)

Following up on his advantage, Newman now logically calls for the limitation and concentration of effort at the place where his audience is capable of affecting change, i.e., on "local opinion." Military terminology then dramatizes the campaign for toleration as a life-and-death struggle (which it is not) to inspire the audience:

If, then, a battle is coming on, stand on your own ground, not on that of others; take care of yourselves; be found where you are known; make yourselves and your religion known more and more, for in that knowledge is your victory. Truth will out; truth is mighty and will prevail.
(p. 385)

Characteristically, Newman now proves the abstraction by concrete and contemporary example for greater impact:

We have an instance of it before our eyes; why is it that some persons here have the hardihood to be maintaining Maria Monk's calumnies? because these calumnies bear upon a place over the ocean; why did they give up Jeffreys? because he spoke of a place close at hand.
(pp. 385-86)

He reserves the most striking example of the invincibility of local and concrete truth for last, his own personal testimony:

An enemy might say in his heart, "Here is a priest fool enough to show his game!" I have no game; I have nothing to conceal; I do not mind who knows what I mark out for you, for nothing can frustrate it. I have an intense feeling in me as to the power and victoriousness of truth. It has a blessing from God upon it. Satan himself can but retard its ascendancy, he cannot prevent it. (p. 386)

In relying on the strength of his own subjective feeling to persuade the audience, Newman again reveals himself at opposite poles from Aristotle on the art of rhetoric, for Aristotle asserted,

The modes of persuasion [i.e., "attempts at logical argument" (Rhetorica I.1.1354^a, n.3)] are the only true constituents of the art; everything else is merely accessory (Rhetorica I.1.1354^a).

Newman now dramatizes what the effects of such a strategy would be, how Protestants might still believe the general assertions reported in the newspapers but would make exceptions for the local Catholics in their own communities. He then concludes with a metaphor which brilliantly illustrates how such a strategy exposes the illusory nature of sweeping, generalized charges against Catholics, and implicitly encourages the audience to try his strategy for the reward of making fools of the Protestant opposition:

And thus, my Brothers, the charges against Catholics will become a sort of Hunt-the-slipper, everywhere and nowhere, and will end in "sound and fury, signifying nothing." (p. 388)

The reader, remembering the full quotation from Macbeth,

it [i.e., life] is a tale
Told by an idiot, full of sound and fury
Signifying nothing, (V.5.17-19)

sees the Protestant accusers degraded to the level of idiots

by the force of the allusion, and should thus be discouraged from joining in the wild charges himself.

Newman's following advice to his fellow Catholics to "beware of parties . . . beware of alliances . . . Be content to have your conscience clear, and your God on your side," should be reassuring to the Protestant reader because it makes it clear that his willingness to meet Catholics in personal contact will not be taken advantage of for partisan political purposes. Then Newman's next admonition should make the Protestant reader feel admiration for these Catholics in that they appear to be like Primitive Christians going into the pagan world armed only with righteousness:

Your strength lies in your God and your conscience; therefore it does not lie in your number. It lies not in your number anymore than in intrigue, or combination, or worldly wisdom. (p. 388)

Again he makes the abstract concrete by specific examples employing antithesis and epistrophe:

It is not giants who do most. How small was the Holy Land! yet it subdued the world. How poor a spot was Attica! yet it has formed the intellect. Moses was one, Elias was one, David was one, Paul was one, Athanasius was one, Leo was one. (p. 389)

Anaphora and asyndeton then produce the repetition and hurried rhythms which underline and make exciting his accumulation of illustrations, punctuated by specific, graphic detail:

Grace ever works by few; it is the keen vision, the intense conviction, the indomitable resolve of the few, it is the blood of the martyr, it is the prayer of the saint, it is the heroic deed, it is the momentary crisis, it is the concentrated energy of a word or a look, which is the instrument of heaven. (pp. 389-90)

The following admonition can only increase the

Protestant's reader's respect for the Catholics he might meet as well-educated persons eminently worth engaging in conversation:

I want an intelligent, well-instructed laity; I am not denying you are such already; but I mean to be severe, and, as some would say, exorbitant in my demands, I wish you to enlarge your knowledge, to cultivate your reason, to get an insight into the relation of truth to truth, to learn to view things as they are, to understand how faith and reason stand to each other, what are the bases and principles of Catholicism, and where lie the main inconsistencies and absurdities of the Protestant theory. (p. 390)

Newman urges members of the audience always to be open and straightforward in dealing with Protestants, and to behave like gentlemen no matter what the provocation, because, ultimately, it is the best strategy, again revealing his superb grasp of the art of controversy:

It is not only more religious, not only more becoming, not only happier, to have these excellent dispositions of mind, but it is far the most likely way, in the long run, to persuade and succeed. (p. 392)

Now, however, Newman, in telling his audience of what to expect in the way of ridicule, makes the tactical blunder of attacking a definite Protestant sect instead of faceless Protestants who manipulate opinion from London:

Indeed, I am disposed, in one sense, to allow the maxim of the unbeliever, which has before now given rise to so much discussion--viz., that ridicule is the test of truth. Methodism is ridiculous, so is Puritanism; it is not so with the Catholic religion. (p. 393)

While the assertion may be a self-evident proposition to a Catholic, it is far from being so to a Protestant. Indeed, for a Protestant to assent to such a proposition, he would first have to be convinced of the necessity of converting to Catholicism. Yet Newman's lectures have not been on the

subject of the truth of the Catholic Faith, but merely on the absurdity of the Protestant tradition of anti-Catholic prejudice. For Newman at the close of the lectures to make the uncharitable and unproved assertion that Methodism is ridiculous is simply to destroy, in the Methodist reader's eyes and those of the members of the powerful Evangelical Wing of the Established Church sympathetic to Methodism, all of Newman's claim to credibility and his painstaking efforts to make the Protestant reader more open-minded towards Catholicism. That Newman could make such a blunder again leads one to believe that the very friendliness of the audience tempted him to go beyond the bounds of propriety in emotional appeal, and thereby weaken, for Protestants, the rhetorical force of his main argument.

Next, to rally his audience to his strategy, Newman reminds them that "Not every age is the age of Saints, but no age is not the age of Martyrs"(p. 395), the double negative underlining the constant suffering and abuse which Catholics must endure at all times. He then contrasts the age of the great saints not only to his own time but also to that of the early Christians; by similarity his own age will gain by the comparison:

So was it in the first age too: they were scorned and hated as we are; they were without the effulgence and the celebrity of later times. Yet had they nothing at all to show? were they without their glory? it was emphatically the age of Martyrs. (p. 396)

He is also careful to point out the commonness of those first Christians who were ennobled to martyrdom by faith alone:

they were for the most part common men; it was not they who did the deed, it was not what was matured in them, it was that unfathomable ocean of faith and sanctity which flowed into, and through, and out of them, unto those tremendous manifestations of divine power.

The metaphor of "unfathomable ocean of faith and sanctity" portrays vividly individuals in the grip of a mysterious power far greater than they, and makes believable the concrete instances which follow of the martyrdom of common people:

It was the soldier of the ranks, it was the jailer or hangman suddenly converted, it was the spectator of a previous martyrdom, nay, it was even the unbaptized heathen, who with a joyful song rose up and washed their robes, and made them white in the blood of the Lamb. (p. 397)

Newman's allusion to the vision in Revelation 7.14 to "they which came out of great tribulation, and have washed their robes, and made them white in the blood of the lamb," and now stand before God's throne, encourages the audience with a promise of glorious heavenly life to follow martyrdom. To make the point stronger that ordinary human beings can be martyrs, Newman is now at pains to show the limitations and even the faults of saints (p. 398). Thus the ordinary Catholics addressed by Newman should not only be encouraged, but also gain in stature in the Protestant reader's eyes by their believable potential comparison to the martyrs of the Church.

Since Newman has succeeded in raising his audience to the heroic stature of potential martyrdom, he exhorts them accordingly:

Let them exterminate us, as they have done before, kill the priests, decimate the laity; and they have for a while defeated the Pope. They have no other way; they may gain a material victory, never a moral one.

Of course, Newman does not believe that English Catholics will literally be massacred, as he himself tacitly admits earlier:

There is only one way of success over us, possible even in idea,--a wholesale massacre. (p. 401)

Yet the general effect is to win credit for himself and his audience as heroically aspiring to martyrdom (even though the chances of its actually being carried out are slight), and the Protestant reader should be suitably impressed.

Finally, Newman directly addresses Protestants in the audience asking them "to think over what I have said, even though they have not been altogether pleased at my manner of saying it." He apologizes if he has offended them, excusing himself on the grounds of the hostility which the subject invariably arouses, and the "imperfections which are incident to the doings of every mortal man." By admitting to an imperfect nature, Newman gains acceptance for his carefully qualified assertion,

I do trust there is a substance of truth in what I have said, which will last, and produce its effect somewhere or other. (p. 402)

He takes upon himself any criticism to be received or exposure of his faults as a necessary price to pay, thus subtly giving the impression that he is a martyr for a cause:

Good is never done except at the expense of those who do it; truth is never enforced except at the sacrifice

of its propounders. At least they expose their inherent imperfections, if they incur no other penalty; for nothing would be done at all, if a man waited till he could do it so well that no one could find fault with it. (pp. 402-03)

Newman also ends the Lectures with an ethical appeal presenting himself as a man of deep humility and sincerity:

Under these circumstances, then, what can I desire and pray for but this?--that what I have said well may be blest to those who have heard it, and that what I might have said better, may be blest to me by increasing my dissatisfaction with myself: that I may cheerfully resign myself to such trouble or anxiety as necessarily befalls anyone who has spoken boldly on an unpopular subject in a difficult time, with the confidence that no trouble or anxiety but will bring some real good with it in the event, to those who have acted in sincerity, and by no unworthy methods, and with no selfish aim. (p. 403)

The Protestant reader thus should be left with the impression of a man whose integrity is matched by his humility, who has no personal ends to serve, and whose sincerity is unquestionable. Furthermore, Newman's identification of his audience with the early martyrs of the Church is intended to make the Protestant reader see that not only does he have nothing to fear from personal contact with Catholics, but, hopefully make him ashamed to use Protestant weapons of abuse and prejudice on such people.

In sum, Newman's strategy for Catholics of seeking out personal acquaintanceship with Protestants in order to dispel the delusions of the Protestant tradition stems ultimately from his firmly-held belief in the power of the concrete to triumph over the abstract; he most graphically demonstrates this in the example of the power of local opinion to refute unerringly anti-Catholic slanders made up in metropolitan London by the anonymous editor of a

newspaper.

Yet why is local opinion strong and vital enough to conquer metropolitan opinion? Newman points out that local opinion, in sharp contrast to its rival which depends in the last analysis on abstractions, gets its power from being grounded firmly in the concrete, for "it is an opinion, not of ideas, but of things; not of words, but of facts; not of names, but of persons; it is perspicuous, real and sure" (p. 384). Therefore, Catholics need only reach out and make themselves known to Protestants in their neighborhood to have an immediate effect for toleration and good will, in line with Newman's dictum elsewhere that "what is concrete exerts a force and makes an impression on the mind, which nothing abstract can rival" (Grammar of Assent, p. 36).

Chapter Twelve. Summary and Conclusion.

Newman's Lectures on the Present Position of Catholics in England illustrates his subtle, indirect approach to controversy when faced with the problem of persuading an antagonistic readership that Catholicism is worthy of open-minded, respectful investigation; he uses techniques that catch the reader unawares and lead him, step-by-step, to his own viewpoint. This is immediately apparent in Newman's choice of audience and subject matter. He states in the Preface "that his object has not been to prove the divine origin of Catholicism, but to remove some of the moral and intellectual impediments which prevent Protestants from acknowledging it" (p. x). Such a limitation should at once put the Protestant reader off his guard since only his prejudice, and not his vital religious beliefs, are being investigated. Then, too, Newman's pose as the injured innocent is accepted at once by his friendly Catholic audience; he need waste no time justifying himself or his religion, but can immediately go on the offensive as the aggrieved party to investigate "why it is, that . . . we Catholics are so despised and hated by our own countrymen" (p. 1). The Protestant reader, in the position of a bystander who overhears what is meant for others, can only accept the basic premise of Newman's position.

Newman therefore gains a great initial advantage in

shifting the entire ground of debate from religious controversy to a historical inquiry into the origins of Protestant anti-Catholic prejudice; in the process of analyzing the roots of the prejudice, he can expose its absurdity, and thereby powerfully motivate the reader, who does not wish to be taken for a fool, to drop his own prejudice. Moreover, since the reader will be expecting a historical analysis guided by logic and reason, his guard will tend to be down, leaving Newman the opportunity to employ subtly rhetorical devices which persuade by appealing to non-rational feelings or implicitly lead the reader to draw conclusions favorable to the cause of Catholic toleration.

Thus, Newman's rhetorical strategy in dealing with an initially hostile readership is to preempt the grounds of debate at the very outset of his Lectures, so that, given this position, he may systematically lead the reader around to his own point of view. That he is keenly aware of the crucial importance of doing so is made apparent when he openly says in Lecture VIII,

Protestants and Catholics each have their own ground, and cannot emerge on any other; the question in dispute between them is more elementary than men commonly suppose; it relates to the ground itself, on which the battle is legitimately and rightfully to be fought; the first principles assumed in the starting of the controversy determine the issue. */italics my own/*
(pp. 315-16)

Newman's shifting of the entire ground of the argument at the onset of debate to a position from which he can insure a favorable outcome is most clearly shown in Lecture IV. Here he shifts responsibility for any corruption in the Catholic Church away from the Church itself--a basic

Protestant principle--to sinful human nature, using as his authority Jesus Christ Himself who said that the Church was to gather in all sorts of men. Therefore the Catholic Church can be held responsible for corruption within its ranks only if it can be shown that it encourages or at least condones "practices, which lead directly to sin" (p. 131). Hence priests who break the laws of celibacy merely show themselves to be corrupt individuals on a par with Protestant clergymen who philander, and the criticism of the Protestant reader over celibacy as leading to corruption in the Catholic Church should be effectively disarmed.

A favorite device which Newman often employs to shift the entire basis of the argument in a way which achieves the willing acquiescence of the reader is that of stating a principle with which the reader is eager to agree, but which then leads logically to an outcome favorable to Newman's case. A striking example of this is in Lecture VIII, when he says that the phrase, the "'Omnipotence of Parliament'" should not be interpreted literally, but only in the special sense in which Members of Parliament use it. Such a proposition should be self-evident to Protestants, who respect Parliament as their governing institution, yet Newman can now argue logically by analogy that calling the Virgin Mary "omnipotent" is also not to be taken literally, but in the special sense that Catholics use the phrase, and the reader must agree or be caught in his own contradiction (pp. 343-44).

A more subtle way in which Newman achieves willing

aquiescence in the basic grounds of the argument which will ultimately prove favorable to his case is simply to present a seemingly innocuous story, fable, or anecdote, filled with vivid, graphic details and accompanied by a moral, which the reader tends to accept for itself as he would any well told story. A good example of this is the Fable of the Man and the Lion which ends with the moral, "There are two sides to every thing." Newman then brings its logical application into play, "there is a Catholic side of the argument, and there is a Protestant" (p. 4), and the reader must agree or else contradict what he has just accepted as fact, namely, that "There are two sides to every thing."

The use of stories, anecdotes, and fables, in line with Newman's belief in the power of the concrete to persuade, also lets him employ another subtle rhetorical device; under cover of presenting a story, he leads the reader, through irony, metaphor, and allusion, to draw conclusions favorable to the cause of Catholic toleration and against the Protestant tradition of prejudice, conclusions so strong they might antagonize the reader if stated openly. In the story of the Russian Protest Meeting, for example, the Protestant reader is led to draw several highly disconcerting and unflattering parallels between himself and the boorish Russians; in the story of the statue of King William, irony and allusion lead the reader to equate Protestants with heathen idol worshippers and Catholics with true believers.

Then, too, the use of stories, anecdotes, and examples

allows Newman to bring the many facets of the Protestant tradition of prejudice to a reductio ad absurdum, and thereby achieve a comic effect which captures the reader unawares, and may cause him to laugh at his own prejudice despite himself. The metaphorical comparison of Anglican clergymen to bell ringers and the automatic, stereotyped responses of the Prejudiced Man reduces them both to robots unthinkingly carrying out the tradition of prejudice; this reduction to the mechanical is unfailingly comic, as Bergson notes.¹

Drawing on examples from history also allows Newman to imply guilt by association: discrediting one instance of Protestant historical scholarship about what St. Eligius did or did not say has the practical effect of discrediting the entire tradition of Protestant historical scholarship, as Chesterton notes.² A variation of this on a smaller would be the placing of words in proximity to each other so that the reader will tend to draw the desired conclusion. Speaking of how Protestants are naturally biased because they hear only one side of the story, Newman adds, "A case may be made out for any one or any thing. . . . There are writers who dress up vice till it looks like virtue" (p. 5). His examples of such works by famous writers lead the reader by unspoken analogy to suspect that Protestant prejudice may be similarly dressed up.

Newman also suggests special meanings for certain words to work in conjunction with the placing of words in proximity to each other to imply the desired conclusion. Use of the

word "imagination" in the sense of a passive faculty for receiving and being possessed by outside impressions, together with the proximity of the term "Beelzebub" to the adjective "preternatural," makes Newman's description of the Reformers' use of the epithet "Anti-Christ" imply that the epithet was used deliberately to denigrate the Church, and that its use was probably inspired by the devil himself (p. 224).

Finally, Newman's belief in the power of the concrete to persuade is nowhere better exemplified than in his exhortation to his audience to "Oblige men to know you" (p. 372), and in his championing of "local opinion" over that of the metropolis (pp. 381-84). To this end he has worked throughout the Lectures, attempting to demonstrate that Protestant prejudice is based on fables bearing no resemblance to concrete reality, and that the prejudice will be dropped only when Protestants are confronted by flesh and blood Catholics.

Nor does Newman's championing of the concrete, the personal, and the immediate end here. He has a personal vision of the Catholic Church which he wishes the reader to re-experience in his own mind so as to be imaginatively possessed by it and thereby changed to Newman's way of thinking, bypassing altogether the mind's rational faculties on which so much of classical rhetoric depends. This vision of what the Church really is had been with him from an early age, for while still a young man he had written,

With Christians, a poetical view of things is a duty,-- we are bid to color all things with hues of faith, to see a Divine meaning in every event, and a superhuman tendency. Even our friends around are invested with unearthly brightness--no longer imperfect men, but beings taken into Divine favour, stamped with His seal, and in training for future happiness.³

His belief in the power of this vision, which is, after all, only true subjectively, is nowhere more strikingly evidenced than in his last lecture, when in speaking of his strategy for Catholics to make themselves personally known to Protestants, he asserts,

I do not mind who knows what I mark out for you, for nothing can frustrate it. I have an intense feeling in me as to the power and victoriousness of truth. It has a blessing from God upon it. Satan himself can but retard its ascendancy, he cannot prevent it.
(p. 386)

Thus, Newman uses the power of subjective feeling, an extreme example of the concrete which is peculiar to one person (as opposed to abstract general ideas common to many), to make a point with irresistible force over the heart as well as the mind. Furthermore, his use of metaphor, simile, and allusion in concrete fashion, his placing of certain words in proximity to each other, and his giving of special meanings to certain words lead the reader himself to draw conclusions too controversial to be stated openly and to infer conclusions which Newman does not have to prove, both of which would be impossible under the logical system of classical rhetoric as expounded by Aristotle. Direct confrontation with the claims of abstract reason is thus avoided, and Newman can build up his poetical vision of the Catholic Church step-by-step until he gains assent

by having the reader fully re-experience the vision in his own mind, as well as experiencing the vision of its Protestant detractors as prejudiced and evil men.

Yet what of the larger issues raised by Newman's Lectures, issues not narrowly concerned with rhetorical techniques but with the larger question of respect for the truth itself? Has Newman, in his eagerness to make his points by any and all rhetorical means at his disposal, lost sight of the fact that many of his basic arguments may be specious? Several disturbing instances come to mind. To argue, for example, that sinful human nature is the cause of any corruption to be found in the Catholic Church and that the Church is therefore not responsible for it is to evade the greater issue of corporate responsibility, the obligation of the church organization as a whole to police the actions of its members and to discipline miscreants. This was one of the burning issues of the Reformation, and indeed, helped to bring the Protestant movement about, but nowhere does Newman come to grips with this aspect of the Reformers' charges against the Catholic Church.

Moreover, to call Protestant objections to Catholicism on grounds of doctrine "the Protestantism of the few" which has "no influence with the many" (p. 87), making it appear that the anti-Catholic feeling of the populace at large is due to prejudice alone, is to evade the very real issue of doctrinal differences which legitimately caused a large part of the anti-Catholic feeling (though this was inextricably bound up with and contributed to the prejudice). One of

these legitimate doctrinal differences was the question of Papal sovereignty over the Church. Indeed, the re-establishment of the Catholic Hierarchy in England led to an uproar primarily because of its political implications, as can be seen in the Prime Minister's letter to the Bishop of Durham in which he spoke of the action as "the pretension of supremacy over the realm of England."⁴ Newman himself admitted in correspondence that the "row" over Wiseman's letter on the re-establishment of the Hierarchy was basically caused by these differences since it "has but brought out what all sober people know, though one is apt to forget it--that the English people is not Catholicly-minded." Significantly, he then added, "I dislike smoothing over the nation's aversion to our doctrines, just as I dislike smoothing over these doctrines themselves."⁵ Yet nowhere in the Lectures does Newman deal frankly with questions of doctrine as contributing to anti-Catholic feeling but rather flatly denies that they are a primary contributing factor. Indeed, he attempts to draw a red herring across the whole issue of Papal sovereignty by arguing in Lecture V that a church independent of the state is more apt to take a stand against inhumane excesses committed in the name of the state than one politically subservient to it.

Furthermore, though Newman complains bitterly in Lecture III that Protestants constantly make wild charges against Catholics which are believed though they could not be proved in a court of law, by implication he makes equally

wild charges against Protestants which he also does not prove, e.g., that the epithet "Anti-Christ" was deliberately used to denigrate the Church and was probably inspired by the devil himself, and that Protestants, by venerating the statue of King William, are, in effect, heathen idol worshippers while Catholics are true believers. What is so insidious about Newman's technique of accusation by implication is that the reader is led to draw the conclusion for himself that Protestants are guilty of the implied charge, and that, therefore, the reader does not tend to look for definite proof, as he would if classical rhetorical methods were used.

Then, too, Newman is less than candid in dealing with the issue of religious toleration, another question of doctrinal difference which greatly contributed to anti-Catholic feeling. The fact is that the English government had not imprisoned Catholics for practicing their religion since 1791,⁶ while the Roman government was still imprisoning outspoken anti-Catholics like Achilli. Yet Newman in Lecture V attempts to minimize this fact by emphasizing the savage Protestant persecution of Catholics during the Reformation and present-day anti-Catholic laws (which were very largely a dead letter), and implying that voluble anti-Catholic sentiments of a few Protestant clergymen represent the opinion of the overwhelming majority of the population (which, if true, would logically lead to the revoking of Catholic Emancipation Acts by Parliament, the representative of the people).

Finally, Newman's whole argument in Lecture VII that to understand Catholicism properly one must first accept its First Principles is an exercise in circular reasoning. If to understand a murderer properly means that one has to accept his First Principles, i.e., that it is justifiable to murder, then any basis for independent judgment is immediately destroyed. Newman is more convincing when he argues logically from First Principles which both Protestants and Catholics hold in common to begin with, i.e., belief in the miracle of the Incarnation and the miracles of the Apostles as evidence of the continuing occurrence of miracles.

In sum, Newman's frank use of circular reasoning in showing Catholic First Principles the equal, if not the superior of the Protestant, his attempts to disguise the greater religious toleration granted in England than in Rome, his drawing a red herring across the valid issue of Papal sovereignty, his ignoring of the other very real doctrinal differences that contributed to anti-Catholic feeling and his attempt to lay the blame for this feeling on prejudice alone, and his excusing the Catholic Church for any responsibility for corruption within its ranks by the simple expedient of blaming sinful human nature, all demonstrate that he was none too scrupulous in his regard for larger truths at the expense of the rhetorical points he wished to make so convincingly.

NOTES TO CHAPTER TWELVE

1. "Laughter," p. 105.
2. "The Art of Controversy," 453.
3. Poetry, with Reference to Aristotle's Poetics, pp. 24-25.
4. Quoted in Trevor, p. 531.
5. Letter to Mrs. Wood, Dec. 7, 1950, Letters, XIV, 160.
6. See "Catholic Relief Acts (also Catholic Emancipation Acts)," Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church.

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