INTERNATIONALISTS! THE RADICAL PARTY CHALLENGES THE ITALIAN LEFT, 1963-1995

by

NOAH SIMMONS

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in History
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy, The City University of New York

2012

© 2012

NOAH SIMMONS

All Rights Reserved

This manuscript has been read and accepted for the
Graduate Faculty in History in satisfaction of the
dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Dr. Robert David “KC” Johnson

_____ _____

Date Chair of the Examining Committee

Dr. Mary Gibson

_____ _____

Date Acting Executive Officer

Dr. George Andreopoulos

Dr. Michael Blim

Dr. Mary Gibson

Dr. Robert David “KC” Johnson

Dr. Peter Schneider

Supervisory Committee

THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK

Abstract

INTERNATIONALISTS! THE RADICAL PARTY CHALLENGES THE ITALIAN LEFT, 1963-1995

by

Noah Simmons

Adviser: Dr. Robert David “KC” Johnson

Marco Pannella and Emma Bonino’s Italian Radical Party was a small but influential liberal, non-Marxist political movement committed to upholding individual liberties at home and abroad. During the Cold War, the Radicals held that militarism produced authoritarian welfare states and was at the basis of domestic and global injustice. Antimilitarist pacifism and civil disobedience underpinned their battles for citizen rights, including ones in support of conscientious objection or the legalization of divorce and abortion. Such stances signaled a challenge to Communist and Socialist control over the politics of the left, due to the tendency of both Marxist parties to seek accords with political Catholicism. Radicals rejected Italy’s traditional coalition politics and sought to liberalize and simultaneously unify the left against the ruling Christian Democracy. They contrasted their libertarianism and issue-based politics with what they claimed was the tired statism and collectivism of the old left. In the seventies, Radicals interpreted the crisis of Keynesian economics as confirmation that the welfare state could no longer address human needs. They adopted aspects of neoliberalism that dovetailed

with their longstanding hostility to *welfare all'italiana*. After the Cold War, Radicals endorsed military interventions conducted to uphold international law; ethnocide in Africa and Europe motivated a qualification of earlier Radical espousals of nonviolent resistance, revealing a form of juridical pacifism. In their garb as both domestic political group and transnational non-governmental organization, they contributed to the establishment of the International Criminal Court at The Hague instated to try war criminals. Over several decades, Radicals participated in a transformation of global political culture associated with the antiauthoritarian and anti-governmental revolts of the sixties, seventies and eighties. Their antipolitics pitted individuals, self-managed communities, and markets against a declaredly immoral state. Straddling the left-right divide, the Italian Radicals personified both new left and neoliberal dimensions of the antistatist surge of the last third of the twentieth century. Their exaltation of individual rights and negative freedom and their downgrading of economic rights and positive liberty partook in a historical process which has produced freer yet less equal societies.

Acknowledgements

I owe a debt to Professor KC Johnson for his unstinting support and provision of direction during critical passages of my research. Professor Mary Gibson was instrumental in helping me form a splendid dissertation committee. Professors Andreopoulos, Blim and Peter Schneider contributed to a lively discussion during the dissertation defense that spoke to their passion for Italian postwar politics. I am indebted to all for an attentive reading and constructive critique of the dissertation.

I am grateful to Dr. Giovanni Mario Ceci for first suggesting that I focus my research on the Radical Party. I also benefitted from illuminating conversations with Professors Renato Moro, Salvatore Lupo and Leopoldo Nuti. Professors Jane Schneider and Peter Schneider kindly shared their contacts in Italy. Dr. Umberto Santino, a noted scholar on the Mafia, furnished insights derived from his experience in the Sicilian peace movement and provided access to the archives of the Centro Giuseppe Impastato housed in his residence. Dr. Gabriella Fanello Marcucci directed my research by helping me navigate and access the paper and internet archives of the Radical Party. Her scholarship and warmth were inspirational.

I am thankful for the generous help bestowed by scholars and archivists in the United States, Italy and the Netherlands. A special thanks to IKV archives staff for their gracious support and to Ms. Mary Roelse for volunteering to translate for my benefit Dutch documents.

Contents

Introduction 1

Chapter One: The Origins of Postwar Radicalism (1943-1972) 62

Chapter Two: Challenging the Historic Compromise (1972-1978) 131

Chapter Three: Anti-antifascists (1978-1981) 194

Chapter Four: Humanitarians (1981-1985) 255

Chapter Five: European Federalists and Transnationalists (1985-91) 331

Chapter Six: Interventionists (1991-95) 370

Conclusion 448

Archival Sources 456

Interviews and Periodicals Consulted 457

Bibliography 459

Introduction

Marco Pannella's new Radical Party emerged in 1963 from the wreckage of a homonymous and more moderate post-World War II political movement led by a group of anticlerical and liberal intellectuals. Though still active in Italian politics as an ally of the Democratic Party, the latest attempt to coalesce Italy's riotous left, Pannella's Radicals exerted their greatest impact on Italian domestic politics during the two decades preceding the collapse of world communism, and particularly between 1974 and 1983. Their intermittent influence on Italian foreign policy preceded by a few years the end of the Cold War and extended into the nineties.

The postwar Italian Radicals do not have exact counterparts in other European political systems, nor does their political trajectory fit into the familiar narrative of the mainstreaming of the new or old left. The Radicals never indulged in anti-Americanism, opposing instead aspects of US foreign policy or of their country's Atlanticism.[1]

They belittled Marxism, even while addressing one another as well as their political competitors on the left as "comrades" due to their ambition to coalesce a broad leftist force.[2]

---

[1] On the importance of distinguishing cultural anti-Americanism from criticism of US foreign policy, see Piero Craveri and Gaetano Quagliariello, preface to *L'antiamericanismo in Italia e in Europa nel secondo dopoguerra,* ed. P. Craveri and G. Quagliariello (Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2004), 9-41.

[2] In Italian, *compagni*. Marco Pannella, "La più rossa delle schede," *Notizie Radicali*, May 1970, transcript in the Online Historical Radical Archive (henceforth OHRA) available at the old website of *Radicali Italiani* by clicking on *archivio storico dal 1955*, http://old.radicali.it/. This particular document is available from http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=44761&lang=IT&cms=; Alexander Langer, "Non possiamo non dirci radicali," *il manifesto* (Rome), 7 Aug. 1985, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=48830&lang=IT&cms=.

They sought to redefine socialism by embracing "bourgeois" rights, in other words civil and human rights, or negative liberty.[3] The indictment of what they considered a corrupt party system at home or a nefarious concert of nation-states produced stances characterized by contemporary observers and later commentators as "antiparty" or "antipolitical."[4]

The formation's "Radical" label calls for definition, as in other national contexts radicalism bears varied connotations. Aspects of the two post World War II Radical parties harked back to the post-Risorgimento political traditions represented by the Far Left Party of Agostino Bertani and Felice Cavallotti or its reconstitution between 1904 and 1925 as the Italian Radical Party. Shared features included anticlericalism and a left-wing, progressive liberalism critical of the moderate left, as well as the virtual absence of socialist or Marxist ideology. Radical rivalry with an ascendant Socialist Party in the early twentieth century was echoed in the fifties by the ambition of a revived Radical Party (1955) to challenge the new hegemon of the left, the Italian Communist Party (PCI).[5] But due to the postwar dominance of political Marxism and Catholicism, Radicalism remained relegated to a minority status alongside two other political entities with a distinguished past, the Republican and Liberal parties. All told, perhaps

[3] Gianfranco Spadaccia, "Lettera a Riccardo Lombardi: a sinistra di chi?" *Notizie Radicali*, 28 Nov. 1975, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=45546&lang=IT&cms=; Indro Montanelli, "Auguri a Pannella," *Il Giornale* (Milan), 22 Apr. 1979, reprinted in *Il pugno o la rosa: I radicali: gauchisti, qualunquisti, socialisti?* ed. Valter Vecellio, (Verona: Bertani, 1979), 514-6; Roberta Tatafiore, "Quel dicembre del Settanta," *Noidonne*, Dec. 1990, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=52088&lang=IT&cms=. I will draw on Isaiah Berlin's concept of positive and negative freedom in his famous essay "Two Concepts of Liberty," reprinted in idem, *Liberty*, ed. Henry Hardy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 167-217.

[4] Federico Stame, "Referendum e antipolitica," *Argomenti radicali: Bimestrale politico per l'alternativa* , no. 6 (Feb.-Mar. 1978), OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=46463&lang=IT&cms= ; Salvatore Lupo, *Partito e antipartito: Una storia politica della prima Repubblica, 1946-78* (Rome: Donzelli, 2004), 8 ; Alfio Mastropaolo, *Antipolitica: All'origine della crisi italiana* (Naples: L'ancora, 2000), 55-61.

[5] On the emergence of the Italian Socialist Party in the late nineteenth century and its dominance over other leftist forces, see Christopher Duggan, *The Force of Destiny: A History of Italy Since 1796* (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2008), 350-73.

the most significant tie of the postwar Radicals to earlier political traditions was an impassioned rejection of *trasformismo*, or the tendency of the Italian left to compromise with conservative forces and interests. In the nineteenth century, "transformism" provoked revulsion among progressive intellectuals and politicians, forging a durable antiparty strain in Italian politics, which the postwar Radicals, and in particular Pannella, enthusiastically appropriated.[6] Radical antisystem stances, thus, did not primarily derive from a rejection of capitalism, as did those of the Marxist left.

True, Pannella's Radicals resembled Germany's Greens, both in terms of the timing of their emergence as a political force and on account of their issue-driven politics, most obviously but not solely in the areas of pacifism and antinuclear ecology.[7] Further, like Joschka Fischer, Italian Radicals endorsed armed humanitarian interventionism after the end of the Cold War. Radicals earlier demanded their country's exit from NATO, only to abandon such claims later.[8] But unlike certain *Grüne*, Pannella was never an admiring student of Mao.[9] His Radicals drew a sharp distinction between their antimilitarism and the anti-American pacifism which characterized the Marxist left. In contrast with the imagined or real violence practiced in the

[6] On such nineteenth century polemics, see Duggan, *The Force of Destiny*, 318-19; see also Giovanni Sabbatucci, *Il trasformismo come sistema: Saggio sulla politica dell'Italia unita* (Rome-Bari: Laterza, 2003); Carlo Tullio-Altan, *Populismo e trasformismo: Saggio sulle ideologie italiane* (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1989).

[7] Radicals preceded by several years the Greens' inaugural entry in 1983 into the Bundestag, Germany's lower chamber of parliament and equivalent of the Italian Chamber of Deputies; the Greens had to contend with the higher bar placed in West Germany for the minimum voter level allowable for entry into regional or federal parliaments (5%). See Paul Hockenos, *Joschka Fischer and the Making of the Berlin Republic: An Alternative History of Postwar Germany* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 159-60, 170-1; Angelo Panebianco, "The Italian Radicals: New Wine in an Old Bottle," in *When Parties Fail: Emerging Alternative Organizations*, ed. Kay Lawson and Peter H. Merkl (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 110-36.

[8] Marco Pannella, interview by author, July 2008, Rome, audioclip in possession of author, New York.

[9] Hockenos, *Joschka Fischer and the Making of the Berlin Republic*, 287.

name of Revolution by some new left groups, Pannella and his colleagues resorted to provocative but nonviolent techniques of civil disobedience pioneered by Mahatma Gandhi, Martin Luther King, and others.[10]

Radicals were expert practitioners of "political jiu-jitsu." Like adepts of nonviolent action elsewhere, they too sought a "change in the balance of political forces" despite unfavorable odds.[11] Unlike leftist idealists such as Fischer or Bernard Kouchner, however, Radicals never attained prominent positions of power.[12] Their party failed to become a major political force. During the period under study, Radicals did not exceed 3.5 percent of the vote in Italian general elections; they increasingly resorted to antiparty rhetoric, which failed however to boost their political standing. A recent Radical document depicts Italian political history as a

---

[10] Marco Pannella, "Pannella risponde a MGP," *Eureka*, 7 July 1977, OHRA, available from http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=45987&lang=IT&cms=; accessed on 12 May 2011; Enrico Deaglio, "I Radicali diventano Gandhi," *Epoca*, 10 Jan. 1988, OHRA, available from http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=49606&lang=IT&cms=; accessed on 12 May 2011; for the 20th century historical context of civil resistance and the power of nonviolent action, see Adam Roberts and Timothy Garton Ash, eds., *Civil Resistance and Power Politics: The Experience of Nonviolent Action from Gandhi to the Present* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009).

[11] On political jiu-jitsu, see April Carter, "The Literature on Civil Resistance," in *Civil Resistance*, ed. Roberts and Garton Ash, 31. See also David Cortright, *Peace: A History of Movements and Ideas* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 211-32 and Peter Ackerman and Jack DuVall, *A Force More Powerful: A Century of Nonviolent Conflict* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000). The term "political jiu-jitsu" was coined by Gene Sharp in *The Politics of Nonviolent Action* (Boston: Porter Sargent, 1973), 657-704, and is in turn an elaboration of Richard Gregg's influential concept of "moral jiu-jitsu" in *The Power of Nonviolence* (Nyack: Schocken, 1966). More than Gregg's psychological concept, Sharp's "political jiu-jitsu" describes the capacity of the seemingly powerless to undermine power structures, including through nonviolent coercion or by provoking the disintegration of regimes. Radicals opposed their nonviolent politics to what they claimed was "the violence of the regime." See Adelaide Aglietta, "Con la lotta in mezzo alla gente. È necessario tornare subito…" *Notizie Radicali*, 16 July 1977, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=45990&lang=IT&cms=; "Contro la violenza," electoral leaflet, transcript dated 21 Feb. 1977, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=45831&lang=IT&cms=; Aligi Taschera, "Appunti sulla nonviolenza," *Argomenti radicali*, Aug.-Nov. 1977, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=46098&lang=IT&cms=.

[12] Daniel Pierrejean, *Bernard Kouchner du Biafra au Kosovo* (Paris: Editeur indépendant, 2007); Paul Berman, *Power and the Idealists: Or, the passion of Joschka Fischer and Its Aftermath* (Brooklyn, NY: Soft Skull Press, 2005); Bernard Koucher, *Les guerriers de la paix: du Kossovo à l'Irak* (Paris: Grasset, 2004); Alain Guillemoles, *Bernard Kouchner: la biographie* (Paris: Bayard, 2002); Tim Allen and David Styan, "A Right to Interfere? Bernard Kouchner and the New Humanitarianism," *Journal of International Developments*, no. 12 (2000), 825-42.

concatenation of collusion and malfeasance.[13] Yet Radicals can rightly claim signal contributions to civil liberties and human rights, including roles in legalizing divorce in Italy or establishing the International Criminal Court.[14] Currently, they are active both in parliament and outside of it, including through a number of often effective civil society organizations created to address global and domestic libertarian causes.

At its outset, Pannella's Radical Party gave expression to a dual rebellion. One facet of revolt was rejection of the international system of the Cold War. More than their elders of the first Radical Party (1955-1962), the youngish Radicals who relaunched the party in 1963 believed that domestic and international politics were inextricably bound. Then as later their internationalist campaigns were driven by the conviction that the Cold War had fomented nationalism and antidemocratic, militarized domestic systems worldwide.[15] Antimilitarism, humanitarian interventionism or European federalism would find political expressions at different points in the party's history. Far from an afterthought, internationalism was central to the party's identity, though it was generally most prominent during acute international security crises.

---

[13] "La peste italiana. Dopo la rovina del Ventennio fascista il Sessantenio partitocratico di metamorfosi del Male. Una storia di distruzione dello Stato di diritto e della Democrazia e di (re)instaurazione di un regime (neo)totalitario," 24 Apr. 2009, http://old.radicali.it/view.php?id=141025; Valter Vecellio, *Marco Pannella: Biografia di un irregolare* (Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2010), 252.

[14] On the role of the Radical NGO No Peace Without Justice in furthering progress on the establishment of the Court, see William Korey, *NGOs and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: 'A Curious Grapevine'* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998), 528-9.

[15] Giuliano Rendi, "No al fascismo in Europa," *Il Radicale*, June 1962, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=44372&lang=IT&cms=; accessed on 9 May 2011. The young Radicals' rejection of the nuclear arms race and stalemate was part of a broader, global phenomenon, see Jeremi Suri, *Power and Protest: Global Revolution and the Rise of Détente* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003), 7-43, 132-3; Lawrence S. Wittner, *Resisting the Bomb: A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement, 1954-1970*, vol. 2 of *The Struggle Against the Bomb* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997), 291-306.

Inseparable from the critique of the Cold War was the party's refusal to countenance an alliance of the Italian left with the center-right. Like the first Radical Party, Pannella's new Radicals sought to unblock a political system stalled by a Christian Democracy (DC) ensconced in power due to the Cold War ban on the two oppositional parties of Marxist persuasion, the Socialists (PSI) and the Communists (PCI).[16] Unlike its parent party, Pannella's cohort supported a unity of the left inclusive of the PCI and adamantly opposed to the center-left coalition officially inaugurated in late 1963.[17] Radical stances entailed the demonization of the "DC regime." Such rhetoric appealed to growing swaths of the electorate in the sixties and seventies.[18] By 1970 Radicals and new left groups increasingly targeted Italy's other major party, the PCI. Pannella argued that Communist control of local administrations was equivalent to the DC's occupation of the state.[19] He contended that Italy's ills, including neglect of civil liberties, stemmed from the inveterate tendency of its political parties to pursue consensus rather than adversarial politics. Echoing nineteenth century political discourse, the solution the new Radicals envisaged was the congealing of two opposed political poles, one progressive and the other conservative, or what has been termed the Westminster model.[20]

---

[16] In Italian, *Democrazia cristiana* (DC), *Partito socialista italiano* (PSI), and *Partito comunista italiano* (PCI).

[17] Marco Pannella, "La sinistra democratica e il PCI," *Il Paese* (Rome), 22 Mar. 1959, transcribed as "La logica schiacciante della III Internazionale" in OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=44267&lang=IT&cms=; Marco Pannella, "Antiradicalismo viscerale," *Notizie Radicali*, 28 Jan. 1976, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=45593&lang=IT&cms=.

[18] Lupo, *Partito e antipartito*, 198-200; "Sconfiggere il regime DC con il divorzio e gli otto referendum," *Liberazione*, 28 Mar. 1974, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=45260&lang=IT&cms=.

[19] Lupo, *Partito e antipartito*, 205; Pannella, "La più rossa delle schede," *Notizie Radicali*, May 1970, OHRA; Marco Pannella, "Difendere la vittoria divorzista," *Notizie Radicali*, Dec. 1970, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=44809&lang=IT&cms=.

[20] Alfio Mastropaolo, *La Repubblica dei destini incrociati* (Florence: La Nuova Italia, 1996), 47-53; see also Mastropaolo, *Antipolitica*, 55-61; for an example of Radical views, see Angiolo Bandinelli, "Dalle elezioni

In parallel to efforts conducted on the legislative front in alliance with libertarian Socialists, the Radicals, more movement than party in the early seventies, sought to dislodge the ideological glue of the republic, notably antifascism. Initially, Radical "anti-antifascism" was imbued with anticlericalism and directed at the DC.[21] Radicals disputed the Catholic party's claim to a legitimacy founded on the containment of far right political currents, arguing that the latter were harmless phenomena and that the DC rather represented an obstacle to progress. They argued that Christian Democracy, not neofascism, represented true continuity with the prewar "clerico-fascist" regime and its signature act, the 1929 Lateran Pacts between Benito Mussolini and Pope Pius XI.[22]

After 1976, when four Radicals were elected for the first time to parliament and the DC and PCI forged a governance deal deemed "the historic compromise," the Communists became a prime target of Radical anti-antifascism. Other critics of varied political convictions also considered the historic compromise the alarming embodiment of an emerging regime.[23] Unlike in France, where the *Union de la gauche* between Socialists, left Radicals and Communists

---

corporative alla alternativa," *La Prova Radicale*, Spring 1972, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=44994&lang=IT&cms=.

[21] Unlike in France, in Italy antifascism was a consensus ideology, see Marc Lazar, commentary in *Il PCI nell'Italia repubblicana 1943-1991* by Roberto Gualtieri, ed. (Rome: Carocci, 2001), 371-2; Marc Lazar, "Totalitarianism and Communism in France and in Italy," *Journal of Political Ideologies*, no. 3 (Oct. 1998): 275-83. For a view underemphasizing the distinctions between Italian and French antifascism, see François Furet, *Le passé d'une illusion: Essai sur l'idée communiste au XXe siècle* (Paris: Robert Laffont, 1995), 643-710.

[22] Angiolo Bandinelli, "Regime, antifascismo e sinistre," *Socialismo '70*, Jan. 1972, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=44908&lang=IT&cms=; Marco Pannella, "Contro i repubblichini d'oggi," *Notizie Radicali*, Jan. 1972, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=44900&lang=IT&cms=; Angiolo Bandinelli, "La nota: l'alternativa alla DC," *Notizie Radicali*, Mar. 1972, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=44962&lang=IT&cms=; "Contro il regime," *Notizie Radicali*, 10 Jan. 1973, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=45080&lang=IT&cms=; Angiolo Bandinelli, "Chiarire le scelte," *Notizie Radicali*, 23 Jan. 1973, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=45101&lang=IT&cms=.

[23] For example, in 1978 Umberto Agnelli of FIAT warned against a looming regime. Simona Colarizi and Marco Gervasoni, *La cruna dell'ago: Craxi, il partito socialista e la crisi della Repubblica* (Rome-Bari: Laterza, 2005), 59.

revived antitotalitarian sentiment on the left, in Italy the DC-PCI alliance provoked a diffuse malaise not easily labeled.[24] It found its expression in the actions of groups ranging from the terrorist Red Brigades to the nonviolent Radicals.[25] Due to successful PCI efforts to represent itself as moderate and democratic and the consequent weakness of antitotalitarianism on the left, Radicals turned instead to circuitous routes or descent into wholesale rejection of the Italian party system.[26] They even resorted to pornographic satire which added more than a twist to Honoré Daumier's pear-shaped caricatures of King Louis Philippe: the cover of a confiscated Radical periodical represented Premier Andreotti with an erection culminating with the howling head of PCI leader Berlinguer.[27]

Increased competition between the parties of the Italian left coincided with ground-breaking elections in France in 1978, when the *Parti Socialiste* advanced past the Communist Party (PCF) for the first time.[28] After electoral decline of the PCI that year, Radicals and

[24] On the roots of the French left's antitotalitarianism and anti-Stalinism, see Ian H. Birchall, *Sartre against Stalinism* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2004) and Michael Scott Christofferson, *French Intellectuals against the Left: the Antitotalitarian Moment of the 1970s* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2004). On the relative weakness of antitotalitarianism and anti-Stalinism in postwar Italy, see Massimo Teodori, *Storia dei laici nell'Italia clericale e comunista* (Venice: Marsilio, 2008) and Victor Zaslavsky, *Lo stalinismo e la sinistra italiana: Dal mito dell'Urss alla fine del comunismo 1945-1991* (Milan: Mondadori, 2004).

[25] On the interconnection between the violent and nonviolent new left in Italy and West Germany, see Jeremy Varon, *Bringing the War Home: The Weather Underground, the Red Army Faction, and Revolutionary Violence in the Sixties and Seventies* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2004). In fall 1979, during the run-up to the Euromissiles parliamentary vote, US Ambassador Gardner met with Radicals Pannella and Emma Bonino to recommend that they refrain from acts of civil disobedience, see Richard Gardner, *Mission Italy: On the Front Lines of the Cold War* (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005), 236-7.

[26] On the weakness of antitolitarianism in Italy, see Christofferson, *French Intellectuals Against the Left*, 14-7.

[27] Antonello Trombadori, "Il PCI replica a Pannella: troppo vittimismo," *Corriere della Sera* (Milan), 14 Dec. 1976, reprinted in *Il pugno o la rosa*, ed. Vecellio, 301-5; Stefano Malatesta, "Noi, rompiscatole," *Panorama*, 5 Apr. 1977, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=45909&lang=IT&cms=.

[28] In French, *Parti communiste français* (PCF); Massimo Teodori, "Dopo la fine della grande speranza si apre una nuova era?", *Argomenti Radicali*, no. 7 (Apr.-May 1978), OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=46355&lang=IT&cms=; Marc Lazar, *Maisons rouges: Les partis communistes français et italiens de la Libération à nos jours* (Paris: Aubier, 1992), 137.

Socialists were emboldened to mount a challenge to the behemoth of the left; thereafter, calls for the unity of the left appeared increasingly perfunctory. Pannella ignited a debate on antifascism and the Resistance during the electoral campaign of 1979 that earned him unprecedented diatribes from the PCI and welcome media attention.[29] In the aftermath of the 1979 general elections marking a Radical advance and Communist retreat, a PCI loyalist, paintor Renato Guttuso, memorably declared: "I do not trust blue-eyed men such as Pannella."[30]

By the early eighties the unity of the Italian left was moot, despite the flurry of excitement which followed the 1981 presidential victory of François Mitterrand, leader of the French Socialist Party. PSI revival of a center-left coalition with the DC complemented the isolation in the opposition of the PCI and the marginalization of the Radicals. In 1985 Pannella raised the possibility of dissolving his party. He had aired the threat before, but on this occasion consequences would follow.[31] The party soon divested itself of the emblem obtained from Mitterrand, a rose held in a clenched fist, thereby abandoning its identity as a socialist force. In 1989, it formally dissolved in favor of an ill-planned transnational nongovernmental organization.

---

[29] Such polemics drew on the revisionism of historian Renzo De Felice and constitute a little-known anticipation of the wider national debate on Fascism and antifascism of the late eighties and nineties. On the latter, see James Edward Miller, "Who Chopped Down that Cherry Tree? The Italian Resistance in History and Politics, 1945-1998," *Journal of Modern Italian Studies* 4, no. 1 (1999): 37-54; Simone Neri Serneri, "A Past to Be Thrown Away? Politics and History in the Italian Resistance," *Contemporary European History* 4, no. 3 (Nov. 1995): 367-81; Borden W. Painter, Jr., "Renzo De Felice and the Historiography of Italian Fascism," *The American Historical Review* 95, no. 2 (Apr. 1990), 391-404.

[30] Maura Suttora, *Pannella: I segreti di un istrione* (Milan: Liber internazionale, 1993), chapter 9, "Il trionfo," transcript available from http://www.eclettico.org/cr/libri/suttora/cap19.htm.

[31] Piero Ignazi, *Il potere dei partiti: La politica in Italia dagli anni Sessanta ad oggi* (Rome-Bari: Laterza, 2002), 124.

The move harbored the political ambitions of Pannella and his desire to be free from constricting structures and cadres.[32]

Radical attempts to create a transnational "party," however, also reflected an almost utopian belief in the erosion of national boundaries and of mounting irrelevance of nation-states.[33] Such a credo was rooted in the wellsprings of Radical internationalism as well as in contemporary events, including European integration and the growing salience of transnational corporations and nonprofit entities.[34] After the end of the Cold War, the antimilitaristic component of Radical pacifism faded, permitting a controversial Radical endorsement of the American-led military effort during the first Gulf War. Intervention to uphold the "supranational rule of law" was perceived as a strike for a longstanding goal of Radicals and other like-minded pacifists: a new international order trumping national sovereignty and elevating the primacy of individual rights.[35]

Our account ends in the mid-nineties, when a new era for Italian politics seemed to emerge from the collapse under a cloud of scandal of the old party system. A recast party system held the promise of clear-cut polarization between a center-left led by the former PCI and a

---

[32] Massimo Teodori, *Marco Pannella: Un eretico liberale nella crisi della Repubblica* (Venice: Marsilio, 1996), 61-70. Radicals remained active in parliament under various labels.

[33] Ibid., 63, 86-90.

[34] On the growing numbers and influence of non-governmental organizations, see Akira Iriye, *Global Community: The Role of International Organizations in the Making of the Contemporary World* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004).

[35] Roberto Cicciomessere, "Guerra e pace," 20 Jan. 1991, electronic bulletin in OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=114343&lang=IT&cms=. The Radical endorsement of the first Gulf War intervention paralleled the evolution of Norberto Bobbio's positions on war and peace. Bobbio's eighties stances on the necessity to proscribe war in the atomic era morphed into a (conditional) endorsement of just war in the nineties. See Norberto Bobbio, *Il problema della guerra e le vie della pace* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1984); Norberto Bobbio, *Una guerra giusta? Sul conflitto nel Golfo* (Venice: Marsilio, 1991). On Bobbio, the Radicals, and juridical pacifism, see Danilo Zolo, *L'alito della libertà: Su Bobbio* (Milan: Feltrinelli, 2008), 85-98.

center-right coalesced by Silvio Berlusconi's new party, *Forza Italia*. Abandoning their frayed ties to the left, Pannella and Bonino jumped ship and joined Berlusconi's coalition in return for the promise of a role on the country's foreign policy team, even as a genocidal war unfolded across the Adriatic. Though the alliance dissolved and the Radicals eventually returned to the leftist fold, this period yielded perhaps the Radicals' most important transnational contribution: the premises for a permanent International Criminal Court. Unencumbered by the Cold War and its nuclear shadow, Radical pacifism emerged in clearer focus than hitherto as a form of judirical pacifism of Kantian extraction.[36] Such a definition was encapsulated in the appellation given by the Radicals to the civil society organization launched in 1994 to support their drive for a permanent court for war criminals: No Peace Without Justice.[37]

The story told in this dissertation is thus that of a political minority whose raison d'être at its origin was to challenge the Cold War order and its paralyzing effect on Italian politics. At one level, ours is an account of a little-known challenge from the left to the Marxist parties and their power-sharing schemes with the DC. In this respect, the dissertation depicts from an unusual angle the culture of the postwar Italian left. Further, while useful accounts of Italian Radicalism exist, historians have payed insufficient attention to the party's internationalism.[38] Radical internationalist battles were part and parcel of the party's attempts to destabilize and recast Italian political culture. Critiques of national liberation wars and of PCI pacifism are examples among others of such engagements on the terrain of intellectual politics. Tactically, the Radical movement-party created a brew of innovative political methods derived from

[36] Pietro Pàstena, *Breve storia del pacifismo in Italia* (Acireale-Rome: Bonanno, 2005), 147-52, 178-9.

[37] Information on this organization is available from http://www.npwj.org/About-NPWJ/Overview.html.

[38] See the historiographical section of the introduction.

transnational civil society movements or developed in the context of domestic parliamentary politics. The dissertation thus also addresses the call of historians of pacifism and of other transnational phenomena to investigate the intersection of domestic politics, diplomacy, and social movements.

Our contemporary context suggests two further contributions. Radical internationalism is symptomatic of a diffuse mindset which has emerged in broad daylight since the end of the Cold War. It is one that has shaped how globalization is both popularly and academically conceptualized.[39] Radical internationalism manifested from inception as antimilitarism, later taking the form of a campaign against world famine (1979-1985) and of zealous support for European political integration (1985-1989). After the Cold War, the Radicals endorsed military intervention to uphold international law and human rights, and helped establish international courts to try war criminals. The common denominator in these four areas entailed the identification of the nation-state, national sovereignty and even the welfare state as obstacles to the protection of human dignity.

Radical internationalism entailed an almost millenarian vision of progress as leading to the fading of national boundaries.[40] This conceptualization, one by no means unique to the Italian Radicals, has influenced scholarship.[41] To be sure, most historians and political scientists reject too teleological or simplistic a reading of transformations in act. Such scholars recognize

[39] Among popular journalistic interpretations of globalization is Thomas L. Friedman's *The World Is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-First Century,* 3rd edition (New York: Picador/Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2007).

[40] For an example of such thinking, see Emma Bonino, introduction to *Ernesto Rossi: Economista, federalista, radicale*, by Lorenzo Strik Lievers, ed. (Venice: Marsilio, 2001), 11-8.

[41] Akira Iriye's *Global Community* is one example discussed in the historiographical section.

the continued importance of nation-states or what Niall Ferguson aptly terms "empire-states" and the complicated and unpredictable ways in which processes of globalization take place.[42] But other works in the emerging field of transnational history underestimate the agency of nation-states and exaggerate the influence of nonstate entities such as global nongovernmental organizations in areas as varied as pacifism, human rights, ecology, or public health.[43] This comes as no surprise given the role of historical actors in helping shape a number of historiographical subdisciplines this dissertation touches upon: Italian political and diplomatic history, peace history, or the literature of civil resistance.[44]

The study of Radical internationalism over four decades suggests that the vision of a world without borders managed by enlightened leaders and virtuous nonstate organizations is in part the product of the imagination of embattled political minorities and of their Cold War struggles to gain influence. The impact on historians or journalists of nonstate actors, including humanitarians or organizations unaccountable to voters or to politicians, is itself a symptom of

[42] For the political and economic origins of the current debate on globalization, see the various contributions in *The Shock of the Global: the 1970s in Perspective*, ed. Niall Ferguson et al. (Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University, 2010), 1-21; on the imperial wellsprings of the U.N., see Mark Mazower, *No Enchanted Palace: The End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the United Nations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009); Akira Iriye, "Environmental History and International History," *Diplomatic History* 4 (Sept. 2008): 643-46; Daniel Sargent, "From Internationalism to Globalism: The United States and the Transformation of International Politics in the 1970s," Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 2008; for use of the term "empire-states" in a different context, see Niall Ferguson, *The War of the World: Twentieth Century Conflict and the Descent of the West* (New York: Penguin Press, 2006), xxxiii-lxxi.

[43] See for example Erez Manela, "Smallpox Eradication and the Rise of Global Governance," in *The Shock of the Global*, ed. Ferguson et al., 251-78 and Matthew Connelly, *Fatal Misconception: The Struggle to Control the World Population* (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2008).

[44] For example, for critical discussions of the activist perspective underlying some of the literature on pacifism or nonviolent movements, see Renato Moro, "Sulla 'storia della pace'," *Mondo Contemporaneo*, no. 3 (2006): 97-140 and, on the literature on nonviolence, see Adam Roberts, introduction to *Civil Resistance*, by Roberts and Garton Ash, eds., 1-24, April Carter, "People Power and Protest: The Literature of Civil Resistance in Historical Context," in *Civil Resistance*, 25-42, and Timothy Garton Ash, "A Century of Civil Resistance: Some Lessons and Questions," in *Civil Resistance*, 371-90.

dynamics within globalization. But care, as always, must be taken to extricate the writing of contemporary history from its political and ideological origins.

The relentless Radical exaltation of negative liberty over economic rights points to the broadest possible contemporary significance of the Italian party-movement. The Radicals partook in ideological and politico-economic transformations consequent to the crisis of the seventies which have resulted, in the words of one historian, in a world both more equal and less equal.[45] Their proclamation of the superiority of individual over collective rights informs a pressing contemporary debate on the relationship between democracy and capitalism.[46]

In order to introduce the interplay of domestic and international factors in the making of Radical politics, three sections follow. The first synthesizes political and geopolitical developments within the time-periods delimiting each core chapter. The second section examines three areas illustrating the Radical bid to transform Italian politics: the promotion of individual rights, the critique of the ideologies of the left, and the attempt to invent a new foreign policy. A historiographic discussion concludes the introduction.

[45] Thomas Borstelmann, "The Shock of the Global," in *The Shock of the Global*, ed. Ferguson et al., 351-4; Thomas Borstelmann, *The 1970s: A New Global History from Civil Rights to Economic Inequality* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012).

[46] Francis Fukuyama, "The Future of History," *Foreign Affairs* 91, no. 1 (Jan./Feb. 2012): 53-61; Charles A. Kupchan, "The Democratic Malaise," *Foreign Affairs* 91, no. 1 (Jan./Feb. 2012): 62-7; Schlomo Avineri, "The Strange Triumph of Liberal Democracy," *Foreign Affairs* 91, no. 1 (Jan./Feb. 2012): 68-74.

The first chapter narrates the origins of the Radical party-movement, leading up to preparations for direct engagement in parliamentary politics. Three elections framing the early Cold War (1946-1953) shaped Italy's postwar party system. The DC, PCI and PSI emerged as electorally dominant, though Cold War tenets kept the cabinet outside the reach of the closely allied Marxist parties. Small lay political formations emerged which would eventually play a role as adjuvants to DC power, due to the stigmatization of far right forces.[47] One prominent loser disbanded as early as 1947, the Action Party, which had harbored both socialist and liberal currents. The incipient decline of Cold War tensions in 1953 set the stage for the republic's second general elections, which marked a weakening of DC electoral power. One consequence was the search for a third force and non-Communist governing partner. The new trend gradually led to PSI autonomy and revisionism, but also produced a resurgence of Actionism and its partial expression in the 1955 founding of the first Radical Party.[48] The advent of the Kennedy administration and peaceful resolution of superpower confrontation over Berlin and Cuba facilitated a long-gestated alliance between DC and PSI inaugurated in 1963. The same year witnessed the resurrection of a new Radical Party harboring an activist civil society agenda and adamant opposition to the center-left coalition.

Chapter two opens in 1972, when Pannella's Radicals first defined a political platform which signaled the tiny party's ambitions at a time of surging leftism. By 1975, disillusionment

[47] The three principal lay parties to emerge in this period were the Italian Republican Party (*Partito repubblicano italiano*, PRI), the Italian Liberal Party (*Partito liberale italiano*, PLI) and the Italian Social Democratic Party (until 1951 *Partito socialista dei lavoratori italiani*, PSLI, thereafter *Partito socialista democratico italiano*, PSDI.) On the antifascist prejudicial and its impact on the neofascist party, see Lia Scarpa, "L'organizzazione del M.S.I. e degli altri movimenti di destra (1959-1984)," in *I partiti italiani tra declino e riforma: Struttura, organizzazione, finanziamento, base sociale, quadri, stampa, bibliografia, natura giuridica, movimenti femminili e giovanili, risultati elettorali dagli anni sessanta agli anni ottanta*, vol. 2, ed. Carlo Vallauri (Rome: Bulzoni Editore, 1986), 549-63.

[48] Piero Craveri, *La Repubblica dal 1958 al 1992* (Turin: UTET, 1995), 29-30.

with a succession of center-left governments rewarded the PCI with unprecedented electoral support. Three factors drove the swelling leftist vote of the seventies: superpower détente, the rise of civil society movements, and the crisis of capitalism.[49] One such party-movement, the Radicals, built on past civil liberties' campaigns and ran in the much-anticipated general elections of 1976. The goal of the combative group remained the unity of the left and an end to center-left coalition politics. For the PCI, to the contrary, Palmiro Togliatti's old dictum remained valid: "taking power with 51 percent of the vote […] besides being disingenuous, would be illusory."[50]

Present for the first time in parliament, the four-member Radical contingent opposed the antiterrorist legislation of the two successive DC cabinets externally supported by the PCI. In parallel, the Radicals garnered sufficient popular support for a barrage of referenda on libertarian themes. Two were held, marking a partial political success. In spring 1978, the kidnapping and murder by the Red Brigades of Aldo Moro, DC leader and architect of the historic compromise, inaugurated a divorce between the two principal parties of the Italian left. Following the cue of the Radicals, Bettino Craxi, the new leader of the Socialists, signaled support for negotiations with the Red Brigades to save Moro's life, in contrast to an intransigent PCI. By summer, divisions within the left were rife. In late 1978, as early elections appeared increasingly probable, the Radicals could credibly claim to represent a libertarian and socialist alternative to the PCI; one current within the party sought an accord with Craxi's PSI.

[49] On the seventies as the decade of civil society, see Giovanni Moro, *Anni Settanta* (Turin: Einaudi, 2007).

[50] Palmiro Togliatti [December 1962], cited in Craveri, *La Repubblica dal 1958 al 1992,* 192; on the PCI's Togliattian heritage, ibid., 189-209.

Chapter three discusses the intrusion of geopolitics into Italian affairs in the late seventies. In response to the crisis of capitalism and to the Soviet security challenge, the Western Powers forged schemes of economic and security interdependence, altering the international context of Italy's "duel on the left."[51] The PCI returned to the opposition and suffered an electoral blow in June 1979. Thereafter the party equivocated. Communists espoused pacifism and proclaimed the superiority of their Third Way over social-democratic capitalism or Soviet communism; yet they also tempered their oppositional stances, hoping to renew a governance deal with the DC. After some hesitation, the Socialists embraced Atlanticism by endorsing the deployment of new nuclear missiles; they supported European monetary harmonization, paving the way for an unprecedently prominent role in the cabinet as senior partners to the DC. The Radicals employed the political capital accrued from their best electoral result to date to promote a leftist agenda based on an original brand of Third Worldism and an ambitious referendum campaign. They hoped the latter would lead to a repeat of past successes by pitting a left clustered around their causes against the DC. The referendum consultation of May 1981, however, marked an incontrovertible Radical defeat when all their libertarian proposals were rejected by the electorate.

Chapter four encompasses the rise and decline of the Italian peace movement. From mid 1981, Pannella redirected his party's energies to the promotion of a campaign against Third World famine, hoping to leverage the important Italian peace movement which emerged in fall. The great pacifist wave instead all but eclipsed the Radical campaign; in response, Radicals repudiated what they described unfairly as a PCI-dominated peace movement. Nor did they

[51] Giuliano Amato and Luciano Cafagna, *Duello a sinistra* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1982).

obtain much electoral traction from their antiparty and antipolitical rhetoric, in no small part due to the PCI's partial return to Marxian antisystem stances. By early 1984, the Radicals tempered their politics, leading to the approval of a new law addressing world famine in March 1985.

Chapter five overlaps with the years of Craxi's apogee and of his triumph over his leftist rivals. The Socialist leader's foreign policy credentials were enhanced by his face-off with the Americans over the custody of terrorists at Sigonella, Sicily and a related espousal of the Palestinian cause in fall 1985. Craxi even earned the applause of the PCI, which had suffered a decisive defeat of its workerist agenda the same year. Between 1985 and 1987, Pannella sought anew collaboration with Craxi, to little avail. In parallel, the Radicals embraced the cause of European political integration; the transnational dimensions of their campaign inspired in part the party's decision to formally dissolve in 1989. Radicals dispersed, joining other parties or clustering around the leadership of Pannella and of his chief collaborator, Emma Bonino.

The sixth chapter focuses on Pannella and Bonino's attempts to influence Italian foreign policy. The end of the Cold War and the disappearance of the postwar party system in 1992-94 facilitated Bonino's debut in the first Berlusconi government and a role shaping Italian and EU diplomacy.[52] While Radicals were bitterly denounced by the left on account of the alliance with Berlusconi, their promotion of international justice was fully consistent with the group's libertarianism and their juridical pacifism.[53]

[52] EU or European Union.

[53] Paul Ginsborg uncharitably labels the Radicals at this point in their history as pseudo-libertarian, see idem, "Explaining Italy's Crisis," in *The New Italian Republic: From the Fall of the Berlin Wall to Berlusconi*, ed. S. Gundle and S. Parker (New York: Routledge, 1996), 52.

Three areas of activity illustrate how, in pursuit of the goal of "Radicalizing" the left, the Radical Party influenced Italian political culture.[54] In the first place, Radicals contributed to moving the individual closer to the center of the political process, both as an agent of change and as the object of libertarian or humanitarian campaigns. Like some new left groups, Radicals considered certain personal matters to be political; further, they believed in the power of individuals to transform politics against impossible odds.[55] The diffusion of unconventional, nonviolent political techniques in the late fifties appeared to second such hopes. Second, Radicals challenged the tenets of the old left, not through Marxist revisionism, but rather by questioning or proposing alternatives to the mainstream left's other ideological props, including pacifism, antifascism, and Third-Worldism. Third, Radicals conjured alternatives for Italy's international role that transcended Realpolitik and East-West confrontation. Such scenarios envisaged Italian leadership in disarmament, humanitarian aid, European federalism, or the promotion of international law. While Radicals contributed to important policy outcomes, the following discussion of three cross-cutting areas of engagement focuses on their more diffuse influence stemming ultimately from the ambitious attempt to reimagine the Italian left.

---

[54] Marco Pannella, interview, " 'Radicalizzare' una sinistra 'socialdemocratizzata'," *Nuova Repubblica*, Aug. 1966, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=44510&lang=IT&cms=.

[55] The Radicals often resorted to the new left slogan "the personal is political," particularly in the context of their close alliance with the Italian feminist movement; they collaborated with the Movement for the Liberation of Women (MLD) which had an important role in advancing Italian women's rights. The Radical Party was the first party to elect as party secretary a woman (A. Aglietta); two of the four Radical deputies elected to parliament in 1976 were women. Mercedes Bresso and Beatrice Mégevand, "MLD fra partito e femminismo," *Argomenti radicali*, June-July 1977, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=45947&lang=IT&cms=. For a general discussion on the Radical connection between the personal and the political, see A. Taschera, "L'antagonista radicale: (10) personale e politico," a contribution to the conference "'L'antagonista radicale'- La teoria e la prassi del partito nuovo, socialista e libertario; e lo statuto e l'esperienza del PR nella società e nelle istituzioni - Convegno del consiglio federativo del Partito Radicale - Roma, aprile 1978," http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=46319&lang=IT&cms=. On Pannella as embodiment of the slogan "the personal is political," see Ignazi, *Il potere dei partiti*, 86.

Pannella's Radicals are still remembered for the eccentric and sometimes outrageous manifestations of their political style. By way of introduction, one episode may serve as an emblematic illustration of their acrobatics. The stunt occurred during an appearance on television during the referendum campaign of spring 1978. For most of the airtime conceded, Radicals Pannella and Emma Bonino chose to appear to the public gagged and immobilized, to signal what they considered to be their chronic silencing by a press beholden to the "regime." Scribbled on a poster resting on Pannella's chest was the inscription: "The parliamentary commission on RAI-TV abrogates truth and information. Citizens! Defend immediately your rights!" A silenced Emma Bonino sported a poster calling on women to denounce the "gag of the state."[56] There was irony in their act, given the uphill battle waged for years to be heard by a wider public. It was, as pointed out by both critics and supporters, one manifestation among others of a show-business approach to politics (*politica-spettacolo*).[57] The Radical political way, vilified by a PCI supporter as a symptom of American individualism and as a sign of the crisis of Italian democracy, was rooted in the party's origins in the late fifties.[58] It ultimately stemmed from the determination by a group of youngish, left Radicals to preserve their party from the fate of the Action Party and its epigones.[59]

---

[56] "Rai Teche – Il Pr a 'Tribuna del Referendum'," 18 May 1978, videoclip in Online Archive of Radio Radicale (henceforth OARR), available on the website of Radio Radicale, www.radioradicale.it , click on *cerca and ricerca avanzata*, for this videoclip see http://www.radioradicale.it/scheda/209686/rai-teche-il-pr-a-tribuna-del-referendum; "I radicali si imbavagliano in tv," *La Stampa* (Turin), 19 May 1978; Giuseppe Fedi, "Per la ripartizione dei programmi. Referendum e spazio tv. Una protesta di Pannella," *La Stampa* (Turin), 27 May 1978.

[57] Angiolo Bandinelli, "Marco Pannella," January 1993, biographical sketch in OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=53967&lang=IT&cms=.

[58] Paolo Franchi, "Marco Pannella, un simbolo della crisi della nostra democrazia. Un radicale all'americana," *Paese Sera* (Rome), 6 Apr. 1979, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=46636&lang=IT&cms=.

[59] The founding members of the Radicals were of a different generation than the so-called Generation of '68, though subsequent members of the party's leadership, such as Emma Bonino, were. Bonino was born in 1948; Pannella in

In the sixties, Pannella's Radical Party introduced new forms of political participation to Italy. They were in part acquired from foreign protest movements, including the transnational nonaligned antinuclear movement that emerged in the late fifties. Charismatic leaders often led these new social movements; the latter, in the United States as elsewhere, generally escaped the control of mainstream political parties. Methods of contestation tended to be non-traditional. They were calculated to provoke a reaction from power structures and to thereby appeal to public opinion. Protests ranged from nonviolent mass demonstrations to individual hunger strikes; civil disobedience intentionally invited official censure or arrest. By casting individuals or "the people" as virtuous, peaceable agents of change, this approach to the expression of dissent highlighted the conservative and reactionary dimensions of the state. After partaking in the global antinuclear movement, which abated by 1964, the Radicals turned their attention to Italian civil liberties, fruitfully applying to the domestic sphere what they had gleaned elsewhere. Radicals eventually carved out a political niche on the left as the party of individual rights, at home and abroad.[60] This outcome originated from the efforts of left Radicals to transform a first Radical Party they had taxed as staid and ineffective.

In March 1959, Pannella, then a leader of the left wing of the first Radical Party, spoke at his party's congress. Drawing a parallel between political parties and newspapers, he warned of the danger of remaining without an audience: "we must strive to have in our party an instrument that reaches every day more citizens; ours is thus a problem of political practice […] otherwise

---

1930 and another party founder, Teodori, in 1938. Further, Pannella experienced Fascism as a youth, setting him aside from his younger colleagues and the Generation of '68.

[60] Silvio Pergameno and Sergio Stanzani, "L'antagonista radicale: (3) il modello del partito libertario e federativo nello statuto radicale," conference proceedings, Apr. 1978, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=46312&lang=IT&cms=.

the speeches which we applaud here will be like […] periodicals in which one finds apparently interesting essays, which lack however readers, because the will and preoccupation to earn them is lacking. This has been an inescapable defect of the milieu of the Italian democratic left, one which has translated into defeats, such as that experienced by the Action Party."[61] Underlying Pannella's speech was criticism of the tendency of the first Radical Party to restrict its politics to intellectual circles.[62] Weeks after the congress, in an illustration of what might be both in method and content a novel "political practice," Pannella captured media attention when he broke the postwar anticommunist taboo prevalent among lay parties. He called for a union of a democratic left comprising the PCI; by placing his proposal on the pages of a mainstream newspaper close to the Communists, he reached a wide audience. He provoked controversy and incurred the censure of moderates, including members of his own party. The debate, welcome by some in the Communist camp, was cut short by the peremptory intervention of Togliatti.[63]

Alongside the espousal of the unity of the left, the other distinguishing feature of the left Radicals was an intense interest in international issues. While still part of their parent party, the left Radicals demanded that a Radical foreign policy be defined and that new forms of activism

[61] Marco Pannella, "I congresso del Pr (2) intervento di Marco Pannella," congressional speech, Mar. 1959, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=44260&lang=IT&cms=.

[62] For another example of such criticism, see Marco Pannella, "Soluzione unitaria," from "Tribuna Radicale," pamphlet published on the occasion of the second congress of the party, Rome, 26/28 May 1961, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=44309&lang=IT&cms=. On the same topic, see the discussion of the July/Aug. 1963 correspondence between Ernesto Rossi and Pannella in Antonella Braga and Simonetta Michelotti, "Per una nuova stagione di studi," in *Ernesto Rossi: Un democratico europeo*, ed. A. Braga and S. Michelotti, (Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2009), 10-11.

[63] Marco Pannella, "La sinistra democratica e il PCI," *Il Paese* (Rome), 22 Mar. 1959, as "La logica schiacciante della III internazionale" in OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=44267&lang=IT&cms=; Palmiro Togliatti, "Togliatti risponde a Pannella," *Paese Sera* (Rome), 26 Mar. 1959, reprinted in *Notizie Radicali*, 11 March 1978, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=44275&lang=IT&cms=. Transcripts of a number of other articles written in response to or commenting on Pannella's article are also available in OHRA.

informed by civil resistance be endorsed as legitimate political tools.[64] The call for a new approach to the problem of the left had been rooted in Pannella's earlier experience in UGI, the successful non-Marxist leftist association of university students he had helped coalesce.[65] The interest in foreign policy and civil disobedience, on the other hand, was largely informed by contemporary developments in France and Great Britain, which soon found an echo in a nonaligned Italian peace movement.

Following his run-in with party leaders over his call for the unity of the left, Pannella, while remaining involved in Radical politics, took up a job as foreign correspondent in Paris for *Il Giorno*. While working there as a correspondent, he formed ties with French *gauchiste* circles critical of French Communists' stances on the war.[66] The PCF had been lukewarm in its opposition to the Algerian War, on account of Soviet foreign policy interests, the pursuit of an accord with the SFIO (the governing French socialist party) and reluctance to lose influence among a working class harboring racist and imperialist sentiments.[67] After the advent of de

[64] Marco Pannella and Giuliano Rendi, "Le mozioni del novembre 1960 al Consiglio nazionale," motion presented at the National council of the Radical Party, 19/20 Nov. 1960, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=44299&lang=iT&cms=; Marco Pannella et al., "Il Partito radicale per l'unità della sinistra democratica europea, per la federazione dell'Europa occidentale, contro la politica dei blocchi, contro l'involuzione reazionaria dei paesi europei," motion presented to the second congress of the PR, 26-28 May 1961, reprinted in *Sinistra radicale*, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=44316&lang+IT&cms=; Gianfranco Spadaccia, "Un dibattito non esplicito," *Sinistra radicale*, Nov. 1961, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=44332&lang=IT&cms=; Giuliano Rendi, "Per il disarmo europeo: eliminare gli eserciti," *Sinistra radicale*, Mar.1962, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=44357&lang=IT&cms=.

[65] *Unione gogliardica italiana*, UGI.

[66] Angiolo Bandinelli, "Sinistra radicale," dossier, 4 Dec. 1991, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=52806&lang=IT&cms=; Marco Pannella, interview, "Libertari ma anche conservatori," *Oggi*, July 1975, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=45505&lang=IT&cms= ; Vecellio, *Marco Pannella*, 101-10; Suttora, *Marco Pannella*, 39-46.

[67] Birchall, *Sartre*, 188; PCF stands for *Parti communiste français*, SFIO for *Section française de l'internationale ouvrière.*

Gaulle's Fifth Republic, the PCF continued to call for mass rallies to protest the war, but criticism of its oppositional tactics continued in leftist circles on account of the party's ambiguities and the perception that the French left was not doing enough to stop the war. In 1960, for the first time, a political current to the left of the PCF coalesced in opposition to the war.[68] The turning point occurred in fall, when an open letter known as the *Manifesto des 121* signed by numerous intellectuals, including Jean-Paul Sartre, but supported solely by one small party, the brand new PSU, embraced the right to "insubordination" in support of Algerian independence.[69] The PCF was not supportive.[70] The Manifesto endorsed the illegal acts of the Jeanson Network, whose members had illicitly channeled money and documents to the Algerian National Liberation Front and were then on trial by a military tribunal.[71] Massive demonstrations held in Paris and led by intellectuals and students marked a shift in how the left expressed opposition to the war.[72] A more moderate appeal calling for a negotiated settlement, signed

[68] Birchall, *Sartre*, 197.

[69] In French *Parti socialiste unifié* (PSU), or United Socialist Party, a new left party.

[70] Birchall, *Sartre*, 195-7.

[71] "Declaration on the Right to Insubordination in the War in Algeria," transcript available from http://www.marxists.org/history/france/algerian-war/1960/manifesto-121.htm.

[72] Carlo Bo, "I nazionalisti sfilano lungo i Campi Elisi. Migliaia di ex-combattenti manifestano a Parigi per l' 'Algeria francese' e contro gli aiuti ai ribelli. Alla dimostrazione ha partecipato il Maresciallo Juin. Sciolto il corteo senza incidenti, gruppi di fascisti hanno assalito la sede del settimanale di sinistra *l'Express* devastandone le vitrine – Dispersi energicamente dalla polizia mentre si dirigone verso l'Eliseo: quarantatrè gli arrestati, alcuni feriti – il Primo ministro Debrè annuncia dure sanzioni control gli intelletuali che hanno firmato il manifesto contro la renitenza. La legge e la verità," *La Stampa* (Turin), 4 Oct. 1960; Enrico Emanueli, 'I capi del 24 gennaio davanti al Tribunale Militare. Il 'processo delle barricate' forse non chiarirà gli equivoci ed i misteri della rivolta d'Algeria. Venti imputati (4 latitanti) risponderanno di complotto armato contro lo Stato e delle 22 vittime cadute in quella grottesca insurrezione […] L'atto di accusa non nomina tutti i responsabili, i militari incerti tra la sedizione e l'obbedienza – Eppure il processo si apre in un'atmosfera inquieta ed esasperata," *La Stampa* (Turin), 3 Nov. 1960.

among others by Roland Barthes, was disseminated the same month, further legitimizing mounting antiwar opinion.[73]

While the degree of influence of the French left upon the resolution of the war over the next two years is debatable, the fall 1960 events in Paris certainly held political lessons for Pannella.[74] The coalescing of a new left was one. Another was the spirit of the "appeal to insubordination" of the Manifesto. Its signatories proclaimed their "obligation to intervene," noting that "free movements have developed on the margins of all the official parties, without their assistance and, finally, despite their disavowal. Outside of pre-established frameworks and orders, by a spontaneous act of conscience, once again a resistance is born; seeking and inventing forms of action and means of struggle in a new situation where, either by inertia or doctrinal timidity, either due to nationalist or moral prejudices, political groups and journals of opinion agree not to recognize the true sense and requirements."[75] The *Manifesto des 121*

[73] Andrea Maori, *Gli eretici della pace* (Perugia: Labirinto Editrice, 1988), chapter 3, "Gli anni '60"; Jean-François Sirinelli, "Guerre d'Algérie, guerre de petitions?", in *La Guerre d'Algérie et les intellectuels français,* ed. J.-P. Rioux and J.-F. Sirinelli (Brussels: Editions Complexes, 1991), 265-306.

[74] One historian compellingly portrays the resolution of the war as the outcome of a contest conducted between US officials, French policymakers, and Algerian independentists and held before world public opinion. The same historian omits substantial discussion of the role of French domestic opinion and politics in ending the war, due to a revisionist stance which debunks the subsequent historical myth of a war fought by "*Frenchmen* to redeem the true, generous France by *giving* Algerians their independence." Still, more discussion of the role of the French new left would have been of interest. See Matthew Connelly, *A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria's Fight for Independence and the Origins of the Post-Cold War Era* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 272. A "self-deprecating" Sartre later dismissed the role of the French left, yet its role in pressuring de Gaulle may have been more important than usually acknowledged, argues Birchall in *Sartre against Stalinism*, 193-4. On the rise of a French new left and the Algerian War, see Massimo Teodori, *Storia delle nuove sinistre in Europa (1956-1976)* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1976), 48-77.

[75] "Declaration on the Right to Insubordination in the War in Algeria," transcript available from http://www.marxists.org/history/france/algerian-war/1960/manifesto-121.htm.

preached an approach and resorted to language that would be echoed in Radical politics for decades to come.[76]

The first year of the new decade also marked a shift on another antiwar front, the transnational antinuclear movement arisen to oppose escalating superpower confrontation. In England a young American leftist named Ralph Schoenman convinced Bertrand Russell, president of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) that only a concerted civil disobedience campaign would achieve policy change, not CND's alliance with the Labour Party and a related proscription of actions of civil disobedience. Russell soon resigned from CND to lead the newly founded Committee of 100 for the next couple of years, during which the group captured newspaper headlines, challenging the more staid CND.[77] In 1961, the 89-year old Russell drew world attention when he was condemned to jail for violating the archaic Defense of the Realm Act. During his trial, he declared that "we […] are prepared to suffer imprisonment because we believe that this is the most effective way of working for the salvation of our country and the world."[78] The techniques of the Committee of 100 included passive resistance, provoking authorities to respond with unjustifiable force or to otherwise victimize peaceful protesters by arresting and jailing them.[79]

[76] In an interview, Marco Pannella emphasized how foundational this time period was for him. Marco Pannella, telephone interview by author, March 2012, audioclip in possession of author, New York.

[77] Wittner, *Resisting the Bomb*, 185-90.

[78] Ibid., 189.

[79] Maori, *Gli eretici della pace*, chapter 3, "Gli anni '60."

In Italy, left Radicals qualified Russell's Committee, along with similar new left groups in other countries, as their sole "valid interlocutors on the left."[80] Such groups, the left Radicals believed, were components of a new international left that was neither communist nor social-democratic.[81] In January 1963, four Radicals, including Pannella, travelled as part of an Italian pacifist delegation to Oxford on the occasion of the Conference on Disarmament and Peace. There they met like-minded leftists, including members of the Committee of 100 and the Greek pacifist, Grigoris Lambrakis, who was clubbed to death later that year by far right extremists.[82] In an article explaining how nonviolent methods of civil disobedience would advance Radical objectives, a Radical antimilitarist noted that civil disobedience, if it had been effective in colonial India on account of the capacity to leverage English liberalism, would prove all the more so in democracies, as was currently the case for the civil rights movement in the United States: "the method of nonviolence is the most effective form of popular expression in a constitutional system as the Italian one; it contributes to reinforcing the democratic and civil society aspects of political struggle."[83] At the core of such protests was the individual, pitted against the state.

---

[80] "Un programma radicale," *Sinistra radicale*, Jan. 1962, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=44339&lang=IT&cms=.

[81] Gianfranco Spadaccia, "Partito Radicale," in *Annuario politico italiano 1964* (Rome: Edizioni di Comunità, 1964), OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=44441&lang=IT&cms=.

[82] Giuliano Rendi, "Partito Radicale e movimenti pacifisti in Italia e all'estero," *Supplemento Agenzia Radicale, Informazioni per il 3. Congresso*, 10 Dec. 1966, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=44529&lang=IT&cms=; Angiolo Bandinelli, "Antimilitaristi (1): cronache di 25 anni," *La Prova Radicale*, Autumn 1971, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=44868&lang=IT&cms=.

[83] Rendi, "Per il disarmo europeo," *Sinistra radicale*, March 1962, OHRA; on the inspiration which US activists elicited in the left Radicals, see Valter Vecellio, introduction to *Il pugno o la rosa* by Vecellio, 32.

The Italian peace movement which emerged after 1960 soon provided a forum for the left Radicals to practice their newfound ideas and techniques. Global antinuclear ferment inspired a new non-aligned approach in Italy, where hitherto the PCI had monopolized the cause of peace. In fall 1960, the Catholic nonviolent activist Aldo Capitini, inspired by CND, organized an ecumenical peace march from Perugia to Saint Francis's birthplace, Assisi.[84] The event was held on 14 September 1961, the same year as the US assault on Cuba and of renewed Soviet pressure on West Berlin, and even as the leaders of the two superpowers alternated threats with calls for disarmament and peace.[85] The Perugia-Assisi March appeared to embody both a new sort of nonaligned pacifism and the emergence of a new left. Joining the procession were thousands of Catholics, Communists, Socialists, and liberals of all color. The latter included left Radicals as well as a party elder, the internationalist and European federalist Ernesto Rossi.[86] Capitini later wrote that the procession "demonstrated that pacifism, that nonviolence, are not inert or passive acceptance of existing evils, but constitute activist and embattled stances […]"[87] Following the event, Capitini founded the Nonviolent Movement for Peace. The rainbow peace flag, displayed

[84] Maori, *Gli eretici della pace*, chapter 3, "Gli anni '60."

[85] Enzo Bettiza, "Una lettera del Primo Ministro russo a Nehru. Kruscev si dice pronto a trattare con Kennedy 'in qualsiasi momento'," *La Stampa* (Turin), 23 Sept. 1961; Antonio Barolini, " 'Discorso della fermezza e della ragione' all'Assemblea delle Nazioni Unite. Kennedy propone una 'tregua al terrore' e un disarmo totale controllato dall'ONU," *La Stampa* (Turin), 26 Sept. 1961.

[86] Miriam Mafai, "Eccezionale successo unitario della marcia della pace e della fratellanza tra i popoli. Ventimila marciano da Perugia ad Assisi rivendicando pace e disarmo universale. La mozione votata pone l'accento sulla lotta all'imperialismo e al colonialismo e sulla coesistenza – Capitini: 'Altre marce devono venire dopo questa' – Jemolo: 'Una manifestazione cara a ogni cristiano' – Piovene: 'Voglio dire alto e forte il mio no alla morte' – Guttuso: 'Italiani, aiutateci, fate che i vostri figli crescano felici per assaltare l'avvenire' – Ernesto Rossi: 'Una politica estera aderente alle esigenze popolari'," *l'Unità* (Rome), 25 Sept. 1961; Guido Piovene, "La marcia della pace," *La Stampa* (Turin), 27 Sept.1961; Ernesto Rossi, "Il costo di un compromesso: il centro sinistra," *Sinistra Radicale*, January 1962, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=44343&lang=IT&cms=; Wittner, *Resisting the Bomb*, 235-8.

[87] Aldo Capitini, with Piergiorgio Giacchè (ed.), *Opposizione e liberazione* (Milan: Linea d'ombra, 1991), 161-2; for an account by Capitini of the march, ibid., 150-62.

for the first time, would henceforth accompany Italian and West European pacifist events alongside the better known antinuclear emblem created by CND.[88]

But the left Radicals, while noting the success of the event and sharing Capitini's belief in the transformative role of nonviolence, doubted the march's political utility: "demonstrations should be more politicized, should address concrete objectives, so as to impact as much as possible the international situation."[89] The question of global demilitarization and of the unity of the left was their chief motivator, explaining the divergences that soon emerged between Pannella, Capitini and the PCI within the Council for Peace founded in 1962. Capitini was not interested in the use of pacifism for political ends; his goal was rather to change mores, one person at a time.[90] For the left Radicals, on the other hand, antimilitarism and other nonviolent and libertarian stances were means to a political end. Capitini resigned from the Council for Peace after receiving a letter from Pannella accusing him of not standing up to the Communists.[91] In 1964, newly constituted as the second Radical Party, Pannella and his sparse cohorts challenged the PCI by mounting a petition campaign directed at individual party representatives of all stripes in support of an Austrian Senator's antimilitarist disarmament proposals. While the campaign soon petered out, it anticipated in both content and style later political battles.[92]

---

[88] Sergio Romano and Marc Lazar, with Michele Canonica, *L'Italia disunita* (Milan: Longanesi, 2011), 139.

[89] Rendi, "Per il disarmo europeo," *Sinistra radicale*, Mar. 1962, OHRA.

[90] For the distinction between the "institutional" or "juridical" pacifism of Bobbio (and the Radicals) and "ethical-religious" pacifism, including that of Capitini, see Norberto Bobbio, *Autobiografia* (Rome-Bari: Laterza, 1997), 220-1.

[91] Pannella, interview by author, July 2008; Vecellio, *Pannella*, 60-1.

[92] Angiolo Bandinelli, "Progetto Thirring e 'nuova sinistra'," *Alternativa Nonviolenta*, 1 Sept. 1977, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=46002&lang=IT&cms=.

Like other groups associated to the transnational antinuclear movement, Radicals turned their attention to domestic issues after 1964, when superpower détente undercut the momentum of pacifism.[93] A range of Italian domestic issues attracted their interest, including the anticlerical objective of repealing the Concordat between the state and the Vatican, enshrined as article 7 of the Constitution, or the goal of achieving education reform. But rather than the latter, two other efforts were crowned with success. These were the drives to legalize divorce (1970) and conscientious objection (1972), primarily in alliance with Socialist politicians. In pursuing these objectives, the small group of Radical activists founded issue-focused nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and resorted to direct democracy techniques. They included facilitating citizens' submissions of petitions directly to parliamentarians, the resort to hunger and thirst strikes to extract specific political concessions, civil disobedience culminating in arrest, and unconventional public opinion campaigns, including the one on divorce conducted on the pages of a low-brow but widely circulated weekly, *Abc*.[94] An additional political tool particularly adapted to grassroots or "sidewalk" politics emerged after 1970 with the institution of the abrogative referendum, a hitherto dormant provision of the Constitution resuscitated by antidivorce Catholic groups.[95] Radical policy achievements were achieved in areas pertaining to personal liberties or negative freedom rather than in areas involving structural reform or positive

---

[93] Wittner, *Resisting the Bomb*, 442-62.

[94] For example, see Marco Pannella, "Divorzio: il primo sciopero della fame," *Il divorzista*, 8 Nov. 1969, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=44748&lang=IT&cms=; Maura Suttora, *Pannella: I segreti di un istrione* (Milan: Liber internazionale, 1993), chapter 10, "Il divorzio," available from http://www.eclettico.org/cr/libri/suttora/cap10.htm.

[95] On Radical "sidewalk" politics, see Marco Pannella, preface to *Underground: A pugno chiuso* by Andrea Valcarenghi (Rome: Arcana, 1973), transcript in OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=45133&lang=IT&cms=.

freedom. Such outcomes further distinguished the Radical brand of leftism from that of the old left.[96]

By the seventies, the political armamentarium of the Radicals was complete. It included techniques enumerated above as well as other unorthodox, attention-grabbing methods. Though the latter were decried by critics as histrionic and attributed with some justification to Pannella's excesses, they were essentially variations on an approach to politics forged in the sixties and predicated on the unity of the left. The Radical leader, we have seen, had first made a name for himself by proposing an alliance encompassing the PSI and open to the PCI. Given such premises, subsequent conflict with the main parties of the left may come as a surprise. In reality, however, Radical overtures concealed a competitive stance. Eschewing Marxian polemics, Pannella's Radicals chose instead to contest the republican and leftist credos of antifascism, pacifism and Third Worldism, while seeking to present themselves as sole genuine representatives of the left.

"Better to lose [such friends] than find them" declared an acid editorial of *l'Unità* in 1966.[97] The curt comment of the official daily of the PCI had come in response to an interview Pannella had conceded to a conservative periodical. While noting a laudable turnaround in PCI positions on the legalization of divorce, Pannella had indicted as dubious PCI revolutionary credentials and criticized their pursuit of a dialogue with "the Catholics." Italian Communists,

[96] "Mozione generale approvata dal XX congresso de Pr. Bari, 1, 2, 3, 4 e 5 novembre 1978," in "Le lotte, le conquiste, le proposte radicali attraverso i documenti congressuali e lo statuto," ed. M. Griffo, pamphlet published by the treasury of the Radical Party, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=46492&lang=IT&cms=. The focus on individual rights also derived from the party's Liberal origins. The first Radical Party had originated from a scission of the PLI (Partito liberale italiano) in 1955, see Mario Paggi, "Perchè nasce in Italia un nuovo partito politico," *Il Mercurio*, 24 Dec. 1955, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=44155&lang=IT&cms=.

[97] "Un Pannella demistificato," *l'Unità* (Rome), 24 Aug. 1966.

alleged Pannella, were undergoing a creeping "social-democratization." The latter statement was in part intended for his center-right interviewer, whose movement had long "underestimated" PCI democratic credentials. But it most of all constituted a criticism of the PCI. The social-democratic label was associated in Italian leftist circles with collusion with a reputedly corrupt DC and with the Cold War role of the Social-Democrats (PSDI) as a US-funded DC prop.[98] It had become a political slur employed to delegitimize a party's leftist credentials.[99] Radicals sought to occupy the terrain occupied by the PCI; in some sort, to be "more red" than the latter.[100]

Radical anticlericalism and antimilitarism, an appanage of the nineteenth century Italian left, or the eighties campaign against world famine and its Third Worldist overtones, were manifestations among others of the ambition to engage and simultaneously challenge the PCI. Even Radical antipolitical and antiparty rhetoric was from this angle an attempt to attract the vote of anticapitalist, antisystem, and maximalist PCI supporters. From a Communist viewpoint, Radical criticisms were initially perceived as provocations unworthy of a response; the Radical movement's leftist voluntarism, while occasionally lauded, hardly received mention in *l'Unità* in the sixties.[101] In this respect, the sharp retort of 1966 was an exception, pointing to a raw nerve

[98] *Partito Socialista Democratico Italiano*, PSDI.

[99] Pannella, interview, " 'Radicalizzare' una sinistra 'socialdemocratizzata'," *Nuova Repubblica*, Aug. 1966, OHRA; on the birth of the PSDI, see Paul Ginsborg, *A History of Postwar Italy: Society and Politics 1943-1988* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 104-5.

[100] Pannella, "La più rossa delle schede," *Notizie Radicali*, May 1970, OHRA; "Concluso il congresso del partito. I radicali vogliono l'unità delle sinistre. 'Il Partito radicale deve diventare un 'servizio' per la unità di tutte le sinistre' – La replica di Pannella sui temi in discussione – Giovanni [sic] Spadaccia eletto nuovo segretario," *l'Unità* (Rome), 15 May 1967; "Al Congresso radicale. Parri: il governo fa una politica neocentrista," *l'Unità* (Rome), 7 Nov. 1967.

[101] Angiolo Bandinelli, Silvio Pergameno and Massimo Teodori, "(5A) Libro bianco su il Partito radicale e le altre organizzazioni della sinistra – Il Partito radicale e i partiti della sinistra," transcript dated 1 Oct. 1967 in OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=44575&lang=IT&cms=.

exposed by Pannella: the contradictions of a Communist party which sought to wed an antisystem, revolutionary and utopian credo to the quest for respectability and collaboration with the ruling party.

Radical rivalry with the Communists concealed one with the Socialists. While it was more latent than explicit and did not produce fireworks, Radical-PSI competition for the leftist vote explains why the two parties never achieved a durable collaboration. Pannella did not disguise his Mitterrandian project to transform the PSI in much the way the *Parti socialiste* replaced Guy Mollet's lackluster SFIO in the late 1960s.[102] Such ambitions at times threatened the Socialist leadership, as when a Pannella speech given before a pre-electoral PSI congress in 1976 elicited thunderous applause.[103] Craxi oft let lose his irritation with Radical pretensions and only intermittently agreed to meet with the bothersome Radical.[104] But the pluralist structure of the PSI, in contrast to a monolithic PCI sporting "democratic centralism," meant that Radicals found allies among dissident Socialists, particularly before Craxi's taming of party factions in the eighties. Socialist-Radical relations were thus characterized by a see-saw pattern of tentative accords, unlike the more consistent acrimony coloring Radical-PCI ties.[105]

---

[102] Panebianco, "The Italian Radicals," in *When Parties Fail*, ed. Lawson and Merkl, 110-36,; Marco Pannella, "Organizzare l'alternativa contro l'unita' nazionale: il "Mein Kampf" di un nonviolento," in *Una "inutile strage"? Da Via Rasella alle Fosse Ardeatine*, ed. A. Bandinelli and V. Vecellio (Rome: Tullio Pironti, 1982), 23-51; Teodori, *Marco Pannella*, 46-7, 82-8.

[103] Antonio Ghirelli, "I violenti radicali della nonviolenza," *Stampa Sera* (Turin), 30 May 1977, reprinted in *Il pugno o la rosa*, by Vecellio, ed., 372-4; [M. Pannella,] "Il saluto del Pr al 40. congresso del Partito socialista," *Notizie Radicali*, 3 Mar. 1976, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it./search_view.php?id=45608&lang=IT&cms=.

[104] Franco Corleone et al., eds., *Radicali o qualunquisti?* (Rome: Savelli, 1978), 12-3.

[105] Colarizi and Gervasoni, *La cruna dell'ago*, 121.

While antagonism was a leit-motiv, two phases characterized PCI-Radical relations. The first lasted until around 1976; it overlapped with the rising appeal of the left and, from 1971, the crisis of capitalism. During the sixties and the first half of the seventies, Radicals directed the bulk of their political attacks at the DC and multiplied efforts to assert their leftism.[106] They attacked the Christian Democrats for employing the smoke-screen of antifascism to construct a "clerico-fascist" regime, which they claimed was characterized by collusion with economic interests.[107] Radicals denounced big capital, which they argued was at the basis of global militarism. Their anticapitalism was however distinct from the Marxist variety; it derived from the first Radical Party's critique of the postwar interpenetration of industry and a "clerical" Italian state, an allegation founded on the liberal critique of the Fascist state. "Corporative state" and "state capitalism" were both terms employed to disparage the Italian political economy. Pannella tied the social-democratic paradigm informing the Opening to the Left to the clientelistic practices of *welfare all'italiana* and claimed that Radicalism offered both a new brand of libertarian leftism and an alternative to DC rule. No attempt was made to forge an

[106] The Radical approach to the PCI in this period, however, did not protect Radicals from the accusation of being an anticommunist and reactionary force, as was illustrated in the above cited *l'Unità* 1966 article written in response to Pannella's interview in *Nuova Repubblica*.

[107] Marco Pannella, interview, "Radicali: bilancio di un congresso," *L'Astrolabio*, 21 May 1967, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=44567&lang=IT&cms= ; "La nota: il capitalismo di stato e l'affare Montedison," *Notizie Radicali*, 12 Oct. 1968, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=44699&lang=IT&cms=; "Mozione generale approvata dal VI congress del Pr. Milano, 1, 2, 3 e 4 novembre 1969," in "Le lotte, le conquiste, le proposte radicali attraverso i documenti congressuali e lo statuto, " ed. M. Griffo, OHRA; "Per una lotta Radicale," *Notizie Radicali*, 29 Apr. 1970, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=44760&lang=IT&cms=; Angiolo Bandinelli, "Antimilitaristi (2): cronache di 25 anni," *La Prova Radicale*, Autumn 1971, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=44870&lang=IT&cms=.

economistic, structural vision of reform, contrasting with the PCI's erection of a utopian alternative to social-democratic capitalism and Soviet communism, the Third Way.[108]

After 1976, Radicals redirected anti-antifascism at the PCI, on account of its collaboration with the DC as well as its support for potentially illiberal antiterrorist legislation.[109] They called for a reappraisal of historical Fascism, part of a longstanding effort to undercut the antifascist ideological glue of the republic.[110] During the 1979 electoral campaign, Pannella provoked Communist ire by questioning the legitimacy of Resistance violence. He provocatively linked such acts to the Stalinist roots of the PCI, contrasting it with the absolute profession of nonviolence of the Radicals.[111] Significantly though, Radical or Socialist attacks on the PCI did not entail a wholesale American or French-style antitotalitarian critique, which

---

[108] Marco Pannella, "Socialdemocrazia e riforme," *Corrispondenza socialista*, Dec. 1966, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=44518&lang=IT&cms=; Massimo Teodori, Piero Ignazi and Angelo Panebianco, *I nuovi radicali: Storia e sociologia di un movimento politico* (Milan: Mondadori, 1977), "Dalla società corporativa ai movimenti collettivi: natura e ruolo del Partito radicale," part 2, chapter 3, transcript in OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=46169&lang=IT&cms=. On welfare "Italian-style," see Stefano Guzzini, "The 'Long Night of the First Republic': Years of Clientelistic Implosion in Italy," *Review of International Political Economy*, no. 1 (winter 1995): 27-61.

[109] Marco Pannella, "Fascismo e antifascismo," commentary, Feb. 1978, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=46236&lang=&cms=.

[110] Angiolo Bandinelli, "Regime, antifascismo e sinistre," *Socialismo '70*, Jan. 1972, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=44908&lang=IT&cms=; Marco Pannella, "Contro i repubblichini d'oggi," *Notizie Radicali*, Jan. 1972, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=44900&lang=IT&cms= ; Gianfranco Spadaccia, "La lunga marcia contro la democrazia. Il colpo di stato permanente della Democrazia Cristiana," *Notizie Radicali*, 29 Mar. 1972, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=44974&lang=IT&cms=; "Contro il regime. L'11 febbraio, al Teatro Adriano di Roma, grande manifestazione radicale," *Notizie Radicali*, 10 Jan. 1973, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=45080&lang=IT&cms=; Angiolo Bandinelli, "Chiarire le scelte," *Notizie Radicali*, 23 Jan. 1973, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=45101&lang=IT&cms=; Marco Pannella, interview by Pier Paolo Pasolini, "Conversazione con Pier Paolo Pasolini," *Il Mondo*, July 1974, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=45314&lang=IT&cms=;
Angiolo Bandinelli, "Positività del fascismo?" *Il Poliedro*, Nov./Dec. 1976, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=45766&lang=&cms=.

[111] Articles from different sides of the debate are collected in Valter Vecellio, ed., *I radicali: compagni, qualunquisti, destabilizzatori?* (Rome: Edizioni Quaderni Radicali/5, 1981). Transcripts in OHRA.

remained foreign to Italian leftist traditions.[112] While both Socialists and Radicals increasingly indicted the PCI's Leninist past and its ties to the Soviet Union, they never claimed that the party itself constituted a totalitarian threat to Italian democracy.[113]

In contrast, Radicals relished confrontation with the Communists on the internationalist terrain of pacifism. Radical participation in pacifist initiatives in the early 1960s led to friction with the dominant PCI, whether on the occasion of the Perugia-Assisi Peace March or in the context of Capitini's short-lived Council of Peace. Radicals disagreed with the PCI emphasis on nuclear disarmament, arguing that a deeper, more systemic overall of the Cold War system was necessary. "Internationalism", wrote Pannella in 1966, "cannot fail to entail also a fight against the national state, particularly on account of the forms the latter takes. Such forms, it is high time we recognize, are common to 'Western' and 'Eastern' countries. Armies, police, subordinate justice systems […], armament industries, constitute similar shapes taken by both 'socialist' and 'bourgeois states'."[114] Speaking at an antimilitarist congress organized by the

---

[112] For a collection of Radical writings on antifascism, see Valter Vecellio, ed., *"'Noi e i fascisti': L'anti-fascismo libertario dei radicali* (Rome: Edizioni di Quaderni Radicali/1, 1980). Transcripts in OHRA.

[113] For example, Radical deputy Leonardo Sciascia attributed PCI reluctance to completely severe ties with the Soviet Union to fear of electoral decline, not to totalitarian characteristics. Beyond his resort to political rhetoric, Craxi acknowledged the significance of the PCI quarrel with Moscow and justified his continued reluctance to consider a union of the left with the PCI on electoral, not ideological grounds. See Sciascia, "Pci-Urss: il Pci spezza il filo con Mosca. Una nota del deputato Leonardo Sciascia," *Notizie Radicali*, 12 Jan. 1982, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=47726&lang=IT&cms=; Luca Giurato, "Il segretario del psi dopo la risposta comunista alla Pravda. Craxi: non sottovaluto la svolta pci rimane il settarismo di Berlinguer," *La Stampa* (Turin), 27 Jan. 1982; Luca Giurato, "Il segretario socialista smorza gli entusiasmi della sinistra socialista. Craxi: quando il psi sarà più forte parleremo di alleanza con il pci. 'Con i rapporti di forza attuali ci ritroveremmo con le gambe all'aria," *La Stampa* (Turin), 30 Jan. 1982. On the Socialist and Radical anti-Leninist and anti-Soviet offensive in summer of 1978, see Francesco Barbagallo, *L'Italia repubblicana: Dallo sviluppo alle riforme mancate (1945-2008)* (Rome: Carocci, 2009), 151. On Craxi's increasing use from 1983 of Mitterrand's antitotalitarian and anti-Soviet rhetoric, and his use of it to embarrass the PCI, see Silvio Pons, "Il socialismo europeo, la sinistra italiana e la crisi del comunismo," in Simona Colarizi et al., eds., *Gli anni Ottanta come storia* (Rome: Rubbettino, 2004), 215-29.

[114] Pannella, "La nota: 'I sottosviluppati dell'internazionalismo'," *Agenzia Radicale*, 25 Feb. 1966, transcript in OHRA.

Radical Party in 1969, Pannella explained that "[…] the left, through certain ideological analyses […] of the characteristics of national bourgeoisies […] has ended up alleging the revolutionary import of the ascent to power of military classes and casts." But in reality, continued Pannella, militarism and a burgeoning arms industry did not discriminate between the bourgeoisie and the working class. To illustrate his point, Pannella cited the example of Indonesia, where some 600,000 "communists in name" had been massacred with weapons made in Czechoslovakia, even as the former country switched its allegiance to the "US and the CIA." The real issue that the left refused to recognize, argued Pannella, was the proliferation of military regimes among the client-states of either superpower.[115]

Under the rubric of the Radical challenge to PCI pacifism belonged also the espousal of nonviolent resistance. The Radicals contrasted their stances with Communist support for national liberation wars, which in an apparent contradiction accompanied PCI professions of pacifism. Such a pattern became particularly salient after 1965, during the American escalation of the Vietnam War; the same period entailed the exclusion of the Radicals from the anti-Vietnam War peace movement and the isolation of their antimilitarist demonstrations.[116]

The revival of Italian pacifism during the Euromissile Crisis overlapped with the launch by the Radicals of their response to PCI Third Wordism, the campaign against world famine (1979-1985). Radical Third Worldism sought to differentiate itself from its rival by apportioning

---

[115] Cited in Bandinelli, "Antimilitaristi (2)," *La Prova Radicale*, Autumn 1971, transcript in OHRA; Pannella, "La nota: 'I sottosviluppati dell'internazionalismo'," *Agenzia Radicale*, 25 Feb. 1966, transcript in OHRA.

[116] Bandinelli, Pergameno and Teodori, "(5A) Libro bianco su il Partito radicale e le altre organizzazioni della sinistra – Il Partito radicale e i partiti della sinistra," transcript in OHRA; Bandinelli, "Antimilitaristi (1): cronache di 25 anni," *La Prova Radicale*, Autumn 1971, transcript in OHRA.

equal blame for the Global South's poverty to the capitalist West and socialist East.[117] Radicals also contrasted their technocratic calls for surgical interventions to save a quantifiable number of lives with the Marxist call for global palingenesis. They sprinkled their parliamentary speeches or their public appeals with the language of rights, emphasizing the individuality of famine victims, an approach distinct from the Marxian focus on the suffering of the proletarian masses.[118] They sought to abet the identification of Italians with their famished counterparts in the Third World through their own hunger strikes, building upon a public opinion phenomenon which had gathered momentum since the Biafra War in northern Nigeria (1967-70).[119] The international community, they proclaimed, had a "duty to interfere" including by violating national sovereignty in nation-states where "the authority of the central government could not guarantee normal living conditions."[120] Such a mindset conflicted with the PCI defense of sovereignty and the observation that interventionism of any kind may harbor imperial interests.[121]

---

[117] For an exposé of the contrary Marxian view, see for example "L'intervento del compagno Procacci alla conferenza scientifica di Berlino. La lotta delle sinistre per un nuovo ordine economico internazionale," *l'Unità* (Rome), 22 Oct. 1980.

[118] "La proposta di legge contro lo sterminio per fame," 15 Mar. 1984, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=48435&lang=IT&cms=.

[119] Adriano Sofri, "La più grande guerra. Uno, nessuno, e alcuni milioni," *Lotta Continua* (Rome), 27 Sept. 1981, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=47644&lang=IT&cms=; on the Biafra War, policymakers and public opinion, see Michael Cotey Morgan, "The Seventies and the Rebirth of Human Rights," in *The Shock of the Global*, ed. Ferguson et al., 243-4; Sargent, "From Internationalism to Globalism," chapter 4, "The Politics of Human Rights: the Cases of Biafra and Bangladesh"; Gaetano Dentamaro, interview by author, July 2008, Rome, audioclip in possession of author, New York; Pierrejean, *Bernard Kouchner du Biafra au Kosovo*.

[120] Gianfranco Dell'Alba, "Lo sterminio per fame e sottosviluppo nel mondo. Tre anni di politica radicale (1979-1982)," transcript dated 1 Jan. 1983 in OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=48086&lang=IT&cms=.

[121] For a later exposé of this viewpoint, see Antonio Gambino, *L'imperialismo dei diritti umani: Caos o giustizia nella societa' globale* (Rome: Editori Riuniti, 2001).

By 1985, thus, the Radicals were expert practitioners of nonviolent leftist tactics. Over more than two decades, they helped make civil liberties and negative freedoms a patrimony of the left and of Italian political culture in general. By challenging the shibboleths and taboos of the republic, they contributed to transforming national political culture and to eroding the appeal of the old left.[122]

A third dimension of the Radical attempt to reimagine the Italian left came in the form of proposals for an alternative Italian foreign policy. As early as November 1960, at the National Council of the first Radical Party, the left Radicals had called for the definition of an original diplomacy founded on antimilitarism. The young Radicals deplored the party's hesitation between Atlanticism and the foreign policies of the mainstream left. They called for unilateral and other systemic disarmament schemes which they distinguished from the antinuclear and pro-Soviet stances of the PCI or the ambiguously Atlanticist and neutralist ones of the PSI.[123] At the time of its founding in 1963, Pannella's new Radical Party thus claimed a distinct foreign policy vision which unlike that of its rivals was simultaneously leftist, libertarian and radically antimilitaristic.[124] It was one however associated to a tiny faction on the left that for the time being exerted no influence on foreign policy.[125]

---

[122] For an interpretation of such efforts, see Ernesto Galli della Loggia, "Pannella tra utopismo e ricerca di realtà," in *Una inutile strage? Da via Rasella alle Fosse Ardeatine*, ed. A. Bandinelli and V.Vecellio (Naples: Tullio Pironti Editore, 1982), OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=47860&lang=IT&cms=.

[123] Pannella and Rendi, "Le mozioni del novembre 1960," 19/20 Nov. 1960, OHRA; Bandinelli, "Antimilitaristi (1): cronache di 25 anni," *La Prova Radicale*, Autumn 1971, OHRA.

[124] Rolando Parachini, "Storia della 'Sinistra Radicale' dal 1952 al 1962," Thesis (tesi di laurea) submitted to Università degli Studi di Roma, 1978/79, chapter 5, "Sinistra radicale," transcript in OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=46518&lang=IT&cms=.

[125] The Radical attempt to mobilize Italians in support of Austrian Senator Thirring's proposals for demilitarized bands of territory surrounding Austria faltered upon inception. "Antimilitarismo per una politica di pace," *Agenzia*

The Radicals' first high profile attempt to forge a new Italian foreign policy emerged in 1979. Under Craxi's leadership, the PSI unambiguously embraced Atlanticism and sported from 1980 a minister of defense firmly committed to the deployment of new nuclear weapons, the Euromissiles. The PCI, on the other hand, practiced a two-sided pacifism which concealed the objective of preserving its foreign policy legitimacy. Radicals hoped to leverage the new peace movement arisen in 1981 to advance their own campaign and distinctive leftist internationalism. Secretary Rutelli reported that in the Netherlands "in the last elections […] were systematically rewarded, in each party, the candidates contrary to the missiles," raising the possibility of a decisive shift in the country's Atlanticist diplomacy.[126] Perhaps a similar outcome was possible in Italy. At the core of the Radical blend of antimilitarism and Third Worldism was their concept of "unwaged war" (*guerra nonguerregiata*). Radicals argued that the high mortality from famine in the Global South was connected to the delapidation of scarce resources on expensive weaponry imported from the North as well as deleterious agricultural and trade practices.[127] In Italy, argued Rutelli, awareness of international challenges was low, due to "the provincialism and myopia of the ruling class" and the passivity on foreign policy issues of the populace. In order to address the task of building a "great popular movement […] as in other European countries" the Radicals would have to forge and disseminate a new "theoretical approach to

---

Radicale, 31 May 1966, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=44501&lang=IT&cms=; G. Rendi, "Partito Radicale e movimenti pacifisti in Italia e all'estero," *Supplemento Agenzia Radicale*, 10 Dec. 1966, OHRA; Bandinelli, "Progetto Thirring e 'nuova sinistra'," *Alternativa Nonviolenta*, 1 Sept. 1977, OHRA.

[126] A majority of Dutch parliamentarians expressed their opposition to missile deployment, leading to postponement of a decision. See Franco Papitto, "Maggioranza contro i missili nel nuovo parlamento olandese," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 28 May 1981.

[127] See the more detailed exposition of these notions in Roberto Cicciomessere, *L'Italia armata* (Milan: Gammalibri, 1982) and Francesco Rutelli, *Per il disarmo* (Milan: Gammalibri, 1982).

questions of international politics."[128] A Radical foreign policy would draw on an "original and modern internationalism based […] primarily on the analysis and denunciation of nationalisms." Opposition to Soviet totalitarianism did not call for an arms race, but rather a challenge fought on the terrain of "what has been defined as 'human rights'." "It is the contagion of democracy, of pluralism, of freedoms" continued Rutelli, " […] that can allow the escape from totalitarianism of the countries of Eastern Europe: the events in Poland speak clearly […] An aggressive, autonomous, unilateralist initiative on the terrain of disarmament and the fight against world famine […] are two facets of the same medal."[129]

The gap between Radical aspirations for a different Italian foreign policy and reality was soon made plain. Radical efforts gave fruit in March 1985, when parliament approved a new law allocating significant resources to a new foreign aid program.[130] Radicals however disowned the law's flawed implementation plan, predicted multiple opportunities for graft, and therefore refused to endorse it. Such doubts were justified, as later scandals involving corruption and a disfunctional program would reveal. Italy almost trippled its foreign aid by 1989, but a

[128] Istituto di ricerche per il disarmo, lo sviluppo e la pace (IRDISP), *Quello che i russi già sanno e gli italiani non devono sapere* (Rome: IRDISP, 1984).

[129] Francesco Rutelli, "Relazione politica del segretario del Partito Radicale," 5 June 1981, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=47576&lang=IT&cms=. The "provincialism" of Italians on foreign policy issues was also a subject of discussion among pundits. See Gianni Baget Bozzo, "L'errore dei radicali," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 25 June 1980, praising the Radical campaign on world famine as educating Italians, and calling on the Radical Party to take on the issue of disarmament; before September 1981, commentators had noted the indifference of public opinion and the absence of a strong Italian peace movement. See for example Vladimiro Odinzov, "Cruise e Pershing in alto mare. Crescono le riserve contro il programma di ammodernamento missilistico varato alla fine del '79 e Washington corre ai ripari promettendo una pronta ripresa dei Salt," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 29/30 Mar. 1980; Rutelli, "Lottare per il disarmo non è 'follia giovanile'," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 8 Aug. 1981; Andrea Barbato, "Dov'è la cultura della pace?" *La Stampa* (Turin), 29 Aug. 1981.

[130] Luca Giurato, "La maggioranza, in attesa del voto, preferisce non fissare accordi sulle giunte. Forte sottosegretario contro la fame poi il vertice rinvia i temi scottanti," *La Stampa* (Turin), 9 May 1985.

clientelistic party system appropriated and corrupted what should have been the basis for an innovative foreign policy.[131]

From 1985, the Radicals refocused their internationalism on achieving political, as opposed to solely economic, European integration. Pannella had been closely associated to the efforts of famed European federalist Altiero Spinelli, who had helped propel new dynamism into European integration in the early eighties. The two leftists collaborated as leaders of the European Parliament's Institutional Affairs Committee, which was at the basis of the decision of the EEC in 1985 to draft a Single European Act which eventually led to the Maastricht Treaty of 1992.[132] But despite their efforts, Radicals did not succeed in imposing Spinelli and Ernesto Rossi's old federalist dream of a "United States of Europe" comprising a politically powerful European Parliament. Instead, the European Union which ultimately emerged remained an economic giant and political dwarf, with problematic consequences.[133]

The Radical contribution in the nineties to the institution of international courts for war criminals constituted the group's first significant achievement in the arena of Italian foreign policy, if measured by a high correlation between desired objectives and outcomes. The Radical diplomatic role was facilitated by the party's endorsement of Italian military intervention in the Persian Gulf in 1990-91 as well as participation in Berlusconi's center-right governmental

---

[131] Paul Ginsborg, *Italy and Its Discontents: Family, Civil Society, State: 1980-2001* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 237-9; Pierangelo Isernia, "Bandiera e risorse: la politica estera negli anni Ottanta," in ed. Maurizio Cotta and Pierangelo Isernia, *Il gigante dai piedi di argilla: La crisi del regime partitocratico in Italia* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1996), 174-81; for a detailed account of postwar Italian foreign aid, see Pierangelo Isernia, *La cooperazione allo sviluppo* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1995).

[132] Ginsborg, *Italy and Its Discontents*, 244-6.

[133] Ferguson describes the seventies, which seeded the subsequent process of European integration, as a hotbed for future shocks or backlashes, due in his view to the failure to align national legislations with increasing global interdependence, see Niall Ferguson, "Crisis, What Crisis? The 1970s and the Shock of the Global," in *The Shock of the Global*, ed. Ferguson et alt, 1-21.

coalition of 1994. According to the Radicals, the end of the Cold War had marked the emergence of a new international order and thus the promise of a supranational rule of law which could justifiably be defended by force. Such reasoning entailed the qualification of earlier professions of antimilitarism and of nonviolence. On the domestic front, Radicals claimed that the disappearance of the postwar party system between 1992 and 1994 heralded a new, virtuous political era pitting two political poles against one another, a longstanding goal of the party. The supposed advent of "Westminster" politics seemed to justify the alliance with Berlusconi. From the perspective of the Italian state and its wardens, Radical embrace of the recourse to force during the Gulf War had consecrated the group's foreign policy credentials. It led the way for the carefully delimited diplomatic role afforded to Bonino, first as an Italian delegate to the UN, and subsequently as European Commissioner.

The dissertation touches upon two major historiographic areas of inquiry: (1) the history of Italian political culture; and (2) post-World War II international history. In the light of the overlap between the two fields, the study of Italian postwar politics presented until two decades ago surprising characteristics. Despite the interconnections between the Cold War and the party system or the country's location on the confines of the two ideological blocs, historians paid limited attention to the interplay of domestic and international factors in determining historical outcomes. To this day, some of the best political histories of postwar Italy contain minimal references to the international context.[134] Further, Italian diplomatic historians were long few in

[134] Examples include Aurelio Lepre, *Storia della prima Repubblica: L'Italia dal 1943 al 2003* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2004); Craveri, *La repubblica dal 1958 al 1992*; Pietro Scoppola, *La repubblica dei partiti: Profilo storico della democrazia in Italia (1945-1990)* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1991); Ginsborg, *A History of Contemporary Italy*.

numbers, a development linked to the influence of postwar punditry. One widely disseminated political and journalist trope was that of DC subordination to American power; another was the exaggeration of PCI autonomy from the Soviet Union. Arguably, a third element undermining the development of diplomatic studies was the style of Christian Democratic diplomats. Rather than displaying Gaullist braggadocio, DC policymakers exerted their metier with discretion. Their low-profile foreign policy was a function of Italy's prewar foreign policy blunders. It was also driven by the contemporary imperative to preserve a fragile domestic consensus even while advancing Italy's sizeable aspirations in the international arena.

The leftist conceit of subordination to American imperialism and the style of Italian diplomats thus contributed to the low status afforded to Italian foreign policy, and consequently its study. Historians perceived foreign policy as a mere repository of party interests, denying agency to diplomats, overstating the influence of domestic politics, or simply neglecting diplomacy altogether.[135] But beginning in the eighties, a growing cohort of historians began to describe on the basis of painstaking research the complex web of interconnections between foreign factors, domestic politics and Italian diplomacy.[136] A more interesting picture of the relationship between the party system and its wider context has consequently emerged, one that cannot easily be reduced to schematic depictions of Italian politics as predetermined by foreign

---

Ginsborg's latest survey, however, includes a discussion of Italian foreign policy, though separately treated rather than integrated into his political and social narrative, see *Italy and Its Discontents*, 235-42.

[135] Norman Kogan, *The Politics of Italian Foreign Policy* (London: Pall Mall Press, 1963); Norman Kogan et al., eds., *Realtà e immagine della politica estera italiana: Una ricerca diretta da Carlo Mongardini* (Milan: Giuffrè, 1980); Norman Kogan, *A Political History of Italy: The Postwar Years* (New York: Praeger, 1983).

[136] A contributing factor to the emergence of the new Italian diplomatic history may also have been the assertive foreign policy style of Bettino Craxi's new Socialists.

influence or of Italian diplomacy as solely shaped by domestic politics.[137] For example, historians now recognize that international developments such as détente constituted factors of dynamism that empowered domestic forces, contrary to the intent of superpower policymakers.[138] The field of Italian diplomatic history has grown, acquiring unprecedented dignity.[139] The growing availability of primary documents since the end of the Cold War is not the sole factor driving the internationalization of Italian postwar history. Also instrumental has

[137] Umberto Gentiloni Silveri, *L'Italia sospesa: La crisi degli anni Settanta vista da Washington* (Einaudi: Turin, 2009); Leopoldo Nuti, "Politica estera e politica interna negli anni del centro-sinistra," in *Un ponte sull'Atlantico: L'alleanza occidentale 1949-1999*, ed. A. Giovagnoli and L. Tosi, (Milan: Guerini e associati, 2003), 169-80; Silvio Pons, "L'URSS e il PCI nel sistema internazionale della guerra fredda" and Roberto Gualtieri, "Il PCI, la DC e il vincolo 'esterno'. Una proposta di periodizzazione," in *Il PCI nell'Italia repubblicana,* ed. R. Gualtieri (Rome: Carocci, 2001), 3-46 and 47-99.

[138] Mario Del Pero, *The Eccentric Realist: Henry Kissinger and the Shaping of American Foreign Policy* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2010), 9-11; Silvio Pons, *Berlinguer e la fine del comunismo* (Turin: Einaudi, 2006), 36; Mario Del Pero, "I limiti della distensione. I Stati Uniti e l'implosione del regime portoghese," *Contemporanea*, no. 4 (December 2005): 621-50; Roberto Gualtieri, "The Italian political system and détente (1963-1981)," *Journal of Modern Italian Studies*, no. 4 (Winter 2004): 428-49; Agostino Giovagnoli, *Il partito italiano: La Democrazia Cristiana dal 1942 al 1994* (Rome-Bari, Laterza, 1996), 5.

[139] For example, see Leopoldo Nuti, ed., *The Crisis of Détente in Europe: From Helsinki to Gorbachev, 1975-1985* (New York: Routledge, 2009); Leopoldo Nuti, *La sfida nucleare: La politica estera italiana e le armi atomiche 1945-1991* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2007); Andrea Spiri, ed., *Bettino Craxi, il socialismo europeo e il sistema internazionale* (Venice: Marsilio, 2006); Luigi Goglia, Renato Moro and Leopoldo Nuti, *Guerra e pace nell'Italia del Novecento: Politica estera, cultura politica e correnti dell'opinione pubblica* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2006); Colarizi et al., eds., *Gli anni Ottanta come storia*; Agostino Giovagnoli and Silvio Pons, eds., *L'Italia repubblicana nella crisi degli anni Settanta*, vol. 1: *Tra guerra fredda e distensione*, (Rome: Rubbettino, 2003); Piero Craveri and Gaetano Quagliariello, eds., *Atlantismo ed Europeismo* (Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2003); Massimo de Leonardis, ed., *Il Mediterraneo nella politica estera italiana del secondo dopoguerra* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2003). Ennio Di Nolfo, ed., *La politica estera italiana negli anni Ottanta* (Manduria-Bari-Rome: Piero Lacaita, 2003); Agostino Giovagnoli and Luciano Tosi, eds., *Un ponte sull'Atlantico: L'alleanza occidentale, 1949*-1999 (Milan: Guerini e associate, 2003); Luciano Tosi, ed., *Politica ed economia nelle relazioni internazionali dell'Italia del secondo dopoguerra: Studi in ricordo di Sergio Angelini* (Rome: Edizioni Studium, 2002); Mario Del Pero, *L'alleato scomodo: Gli USA e la DC negli anni del centrismo (1948-1955)* (Rome: Carocci, 2001); Giuseppe Romeo, *La politica estera italiana nell'era Andreotti (1972-1992)* (Rome: Rubbettino, 2000); Roberto Gualtieri, "Nazionale e internazionale nell'Italia del dopoguerra (1943-50)" in *Novecento italiano: Studi in ricordo di Franco De Felice*, ed. Silvio Pons (Rome: Carrocci, 2000), 229-55; Ennio Di Nolfo, *Storia delle relazioni internazionali 1918-1999* (Bari: Laterza, 2000); Valter Coralluzzo, *La politica estera dell'Italia repubblicana (1946-1992): Modello di analisi e studio di casi* (Milan: Francoangeli, 2000); Leopoldo Nuti, *Gli Stati Uniti e l'apertura a sinistra: Importanza e limiti della presenza americana in Italia* (Bari: Laterza, 1999); Antonio Varsori, *L'Italia nelle relazioni internazionali dal 1943 al 1992* (Rome-Bari: Laterza, 1998); Giovanni Formigoni, *La Democrazia cristiana e l'alleanza occidentale (1943-1953)* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1996); Luigi Vittorio Ferraris, *Manuale della politica estera italiana 1947-1993* (Rome-Bari: Laterza, 1996).

been the waning of the influence of the party historians who long shaped historiography, and their displacement by a new breed of historians more inured to the biases of domestic factions.[140]

If the foreign policy of a party which long dominated the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was until recently neglected, it stands to reason that the internationalism of the Radical Party would be understudied. What was true until recently for the scholarship of far more powerful parties such as the DC, PSI, or PCI, namely a parochial quality, is all the more so for a minor party with little influence over foreign policy and without access to the Socialist International or to the network of ruling parties of the Socialist Bloc.[141] More surprising is the dearth of studies on the relationship between the Radicals and their rivals on the Italian left.[142] As an integral part of their attempt to gain influence, the Radicals criticized and engaged with Communists, Socialists and the small parties of the new left, producing a trove of polemics that provides insights into the

[140] See the following comments on the influence of parties and ideology on the historiography of Italian political history and the necessity to move beyond it: Guido Formigoni, "La Democrazia Cristiana," in *I partiti politici nell'Italia repubblicana: Atti del Convegno di Siena 5-6 dicembre 2002*, ed. G. Nicolosi (Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2006), 55-89; Pons, *Berlinguer e la fine del comunismo*, xxii-xxiii; Elena Aga-Rossi, "L'influenza sovietica in Italia nel periodo staliniano," in *Un ponte sull'Atlantico*, ed. A. Giovagnoli and L. Tosi, 111-39; Leopoldo Nuti, commentary in *Il PCI nell'Italia repubblicana* by Roberto Gualtieri, ed., (Rome: Carocci, 2001), 341-45; Silvio Pons, *L'impossibile egemonia: L'Urss, il Pci e le origini della guerra fredda* (Rome: Carrocci,1999), 12; Nuti, *Gli Stati Uniti e l'apertura a sinistra*, ix-xii; Elena Aga-Rossi and Victor Zaslavsky, *Togliatti e Stalin: Il PCI e la politica estera negli archivi di Mosca* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1997), 18-9; Formigoni, *La Democrazia Cristiana e l'alleanza occidentale*, 14.

[141] Gerardo Nicolosi, "Il 'secondo' Partito Radicale: idea di partito e organizzazione" in *I partiti politici nell'Italia repubblicana: Atti del Convegno di Roma 5-6 dicembre 2002*, ed. G. Nicolosi (Rome: Rubbettino, 2006), 331-64; David Busato, "Il Partito radicale in Italia da Mario Pannunzio a Marco Pannella 1954-1974" Thesis (*tesi di laurea*) submitted to Università degli Studi of Siena, 1995/96; Lorenza Ponzone, *Il Partito Radicale nella politica italiana: 1962-1989* (Fasano, BR: Schena, 1993); Panebianco, "The Italian Radicals: New Wine in an Old Bottle" in *When Parties Fail*, ed. Lawson and Markl, 110-36; Annalisa Zanuttini, "L'organizzazione del Partito Radicale (1962-1985), in ed. Carlo Vallauri, *I partiti italiani tra declino e riforma* […]," vol. 1 (Rome: Bulzoni, 1986), 499-511; Parachini, "Storia della 'Sinistra Radicale' dal 1952 al 1962" Thesis, 1978/79, transcripts in OHRA; V. Zeno Zancovich, "Caratteri originali della organizzazione e della iniziativa del Partito Radicale e dei movimenti federati nella lotta politica italiana (1959-1976)" Thesis (*tesi di laurea*) submitted to the Universita' degli Studi of Rome, 1977/78, transcripts in OHRA; Teodori, Ignazi and Panebianco, *I nuovi radicali*; Francesco Morabito, *La sfida radicale: Il Partito Radicale da Pannunzio a Pannella* (Milan: SugarCo, 1977).

[142] The Mitterrandian strategy of the Radical or Socialist parties is quite frequently referenced in the historiography, but a comprehensive analysis of the Radical relationship with the other parties of the left is lacking.

political culture of the Italian left.[143] On both accounts, Radical internationalism and the related confrontation with the parties of the left, the present study attempts a first overarching interpretation. Rather than treating Radical internationalism as a distraction from domestic objectives, the study analyzes how Radicals used their internationalism to address domestic goals and how their approach to domestic politics was shaped by external influences.

The extraordinarily rich multimedia online archive of *Radio Radicale* and that of the party itself constitute the primary documentary basis for this study, in addition to two interviews with the party's leader, Pannella. The expansive sources of online documentation available on Radical websites include text, audio and video evidence not solely pertinent to the party's history, but also illustrative of several decades of Italian social and political life. The online archives are a product of the party's longstanding dedication to information dissemination and open political debate, best encapsulated by a favorite Crocian dictum, *conoscere per deliberare*.[144] Concerning Pannella, no account of Radical politics can skirt the question of his unusual personality and of his preponderant role in determining the party's trajectory. With a possible exception, however, narratives of his political life are either hagiographic or hostile, and short on historical

[143] Selections of articles pertaining to such debates have been gathered in *Radicali o qualunquisti?* ed. Franco Corleone et al. (Rome: Savelli, 1978), *Il pugno o la rosa*, ed. Vecellio, and in *Una "inutile strage"?* ed. Bandinelli and Vecellio. Also useful in this regard are the volumes gathering selected speeches by Pannella. See Marco Pannella and Lanfranco Palazzolo, *A sinistra del PCI: interventi parlamentari 1976-1979* (Milan: Kaos, 2007); Marco Pannella and Lanfranco Palazzolo, *Contro i crimini di regime: interventi parlamentari 1980-1986* (Milan: Kaos, 2007); Marco Pannella, *Scritti e discorsi 1959-1980* (Milan: Gammalibri, 1982).

[144] A phrase often employed by the Radicals and attributed to Benedetto Croce which can be translated as: "know the facts so that you may decide." A comprehensive selection of online archival documents of the Radical Party is available from http://old.radicali.it/; the text, audio and video archives of Radio Radicale are available from: http://www.radioradicale.it/. See also Gabriella Fanello, ed., *Radio Radicale, Archivio Sonoro: Archivio del parlamento, delle istituzioni, dei partiti e movimenti politici: Documenti sonori in digitale* (Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2003).

analysis.[145] In the present study, his unconventional tactics are assessed rather than condemned or exalted. His role is acknowledged, but is not allowed to discount that of his collaborators or to obscure a broader historical context. The dissertation, thus, tackles relatively uncharted waters even as it draws on a reservoir of little tapped sources.

A restricted number of political historians have focused on the antipolitical and antiparty rhetoric of Pannella and his colleagues. Alfio Mastropaolo and Salvatore Lupo describe how Pannella was a protagonist of a wave of seventies leftist contestation which appropriated the vocabulary if not the ideology of an earlier rightwing politician, Guglielmo Giannini, leader of the Front of the Ordinary Man in the forties, and that a liberal commentator, Giuseppe Maranini. From the former Pannella notably borrowed the term "hexarchy" (*esarchia*), a term of opprobium used by Giannini to describe the six-party directory of the wartime Committee of National Liberation. From Maranini, Pannella borrowed the term "partitocracy" (*partitocrazia*) to describe the allegedly nefarious rule of parties in postwar Italy. Radical rhetoric was in this sense a left-wing variant of an antipolitical tradition with right-wing, liberal and even Christian-Democratic antecedents.[146] According to Mastropaolo and Lupo, Pannella's use of antipolitical rhetoric in combination with the abrogative tool of the referendum initially yielded democratic outcomes, particularly in the area of civil rights. But ultimately the party, disappointed by its failure to successfully challenge mass parties, degenerated into a purely antisystem entity. No

[145] Teodori's account attempts with some success to be even-handed (*Un eretico liberale nella crisi della Repubblica*, Venice: Marsilio, 1996). Other more partial accounts, often informative but poorly documented and therefore of limited use, are Valter Vecellio, *Marco Pannella: Biografia di un irregolare* (Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2010); Mauro Suttora, *Pannella e Bonino Spa* (Milan: Kaos, 2001); Suttora, *Marco Pannella;* Gigi Moncalvo, *Pannella il potere della parola* (Milan: Sperling & Kupfer, 1983). Emma Bonino, whose career amply merits a historian's attention, is the subject of a book which consists essentially of excerpts and comments made throughout her career, arranged alphabetically. See Cristina Sivieri Tagliabue, *Emma Bonino: Alfabeto Bonino* (Milan: Bompiani, 2010).

[146] Lupo, *Partito e antipartito*, 7, 91-2, 198-200, 281-2; Mastropaolo, *Antipolitica*, 55-61.

wonder, argues Mastropaolo, the Radicals converged with Berlusconi, the greatest "expression of national antipolitics." As in other advanced democracies, in Italy too individual leaders have supplanted mass parties as the protagonists of the new, post-Cold War order. But, concludes Mastropaolo, the new form of politics may be worse than the old; Italy, confirming its Cold War-era bellwether status, may yet prove to be the harbinger of a globalized and dubiously democratic form of populism.[147]

Lupo and Mastropaolo also argue that antipolitical discourse helped delegitimize Italian democracy and had at least some part in bringing down the party system in 1992-94. However one assesses the causes of that political meltdown, Italian antipolitical currents have certainly unduly influenced other accounts of postwar Italian history. Paul Ginsborg describes such narratives as espousing a "morality tale" pitting a corrupt state versus a "thriving economy and […] society."[148] They maintain that a virtuous political tradition coexisted alongside the essentially antidemocratic, authoritarian or even the "totalitarian" political traditions of "clerical" and "communist" Italy. A closely related interpretation opposes a cleptocracy of mainstream parties against honest minorities or a blameless civil society.[149]

---

[147] Mastropaolo, *Antipolitica*, 52, 57-8, 136-8; see also on this topic Paul Ginsborg, *Berlusconi: Television, Power and Patrimony* (New York: Verso, 2004).

[148] Ginsborg, *Italy and Its Discontents*, 137; see also Ginsborg, "Explaining Italy's Crisis," in *The New Italian Republic*, ed. Gundle and Parker, 19-39.

[149] Examples of works influenced by the antipolitical or antiparty strain in Italian politics include Teodori, *Storia dei laici*; Colarizi and Gervasoni, *La cruna dell'ago*; Craveri, *La Repubblica dal 1958 al 1992*; Angelo Panebianco, introduction, in Giuseppe Maranini, *Storia del potere in Italia, 1848-1967* (Milan: Corbaccio, 1995); Sabbatucci, *Il trasformismo come sistema*. For an approach that rejects too simplistic an indictment of the party system and acknowledges the nineteenth century roots of antipolitical sentiment, but still indicts a flawed party system for the meltdown of 1992-94, see Paolo Pezzino, *Senza Stato: Le ragioni storiche della crisi italiana* (Rome-Bari: Laterza, 2002). For the role of antipolitical public opinion, see Marcello Fedele, *Democrazia referendaria: L'Italia dal primato dei partiti al trionfo dell'opinione pubblica* (Rome: Donzelli, 1994). For further discussions on the influence of antiparty discourse on historiography or its historical roots, see Alessandro Pizzorno, *Le radici della politica assoluta* (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1994), 43-81**;** Ginsborg, "Explaining Italy's Crisis," in *The New Italian*

Historians such as Ginsborg, Lupo or Mastropaolo dispute such portrayals of Italian postwar history. Lupo points out that leaving aside the economic benefits of a postwar boom attributable to exogenous factors, Italy was the sole country in the southern Mediterranean not to experience illiberal regimes or civil war. This exception to the norm was in no small part due to the tolerant stances of its two largest parties, the first ensconced in power, the second relegated to permanent opposition. Despite American and Vatican pressures, the DC refused to ban the PCI, an act which might have precipitated civil conflict and would have certainly entailed a violation of basic rights. Rather than impose conservative policies on a progressive electorate as sometimes maintained, the DC met the left more than half-way.[150] A counterexample highlights the democratic and progressive core values of the DC. Across the narrow Ionian Sea lay Greece, a country also characterized by strong left-wing traditions. There, in March 1951, communist party member Nikos Nikiforidis and six colleagues were executed on account of an "effort to distribute subversive ideas," namely by subscribing to the 1950 Stockholm Appeal of the World Peace Congress.[151] Such a comparison is not intended to minimize the occasional brutality of the Italian Cold War state. The latter's undemocratic acts, however, tended to be aberrations rather

---

Republic, ed. S. Gundle and S. Parker, 19-39**;** Mauro Calise, *Il partito personale* (Rome-Bari: Laterza, 2000). See also Ernesto Galli Della Loggia's counter to Teodori's argument in the his book *Storia dei laici*. Della Loggia, in disagreement with Teodori, points to the democratic and "lay" contributions of political Catholicism in "Presentazione del libro 'Storia dei laici nell'Italia clericale e comunista' di Massimo Teodori", 13 November 2008, audioclip in OARR, http://www.radioradicale.it/scheda/266696/presentazione-del-libro-storia-dei-laici-nell-italia-clericale-e-comunista-di-massimo-teodori.

[150] Lupo, *Partito e antipartito,* 20-3; for another similar, positive assessment of the role of parties in Italian postwar history, see Mastropaolo, *La Repubblica dei destini incrociati*.

[151] Dimitrios Tsakiris, "State Repression against Peace Movements in Greece, 1950-1967", in *Peace Movements in Western Europe, Japan and the USA during the Cold War*, ed. Benjamin Ziemann, (Essen: Klartext Verlag, 2008), 152.

than official policy.[152] Similarly, the PCI discarded extremist options and embraced Italian democracy, whatever its motivations. Democracy may have transformed the PCI more than the reverse, and Stalin certainly shaped the party's foreign policy during his lifetime. But Italian communism was, to employ Marc Lazar's effective expression, a "failed totalitarianism."[153] Togliatti's stances produced more, not less democracy. Finally, the concept of the postwar rule of a nefarious regime ruled by the two largest parties and their allies is flawed on at least two accounts. First, while the PCI long sought out collaboration with the DC, a governmental pact in which the PCI indirectly exerted executive power was only in place during the period of the national solidarity governments (1976-79). Second, the allegation of a divide between a corrupt partitocracy and a virtuous civil society is erroneous. Large swaths of the citizenry participated in political clientelism or tax evasion, from one extremity of the Peninsula to the other.[154]

The question of the connections between domestic rights advocacy and the international human rights movement remains largely unexplored; the present dissertation explores such links as revealed by the case-study of one party-movement.[155] In an intriguing side-comment in his

[152] In this respect, the Italian postwar state also compares favorably with the Gaullist one. In Oct. 1961, during the Algerian War, the prefect of Paris Maurice Papon apparently ordered the murder of between 40 and 200 peaceful protesters, scores of whom were thrown dead into the Seine, a mere stone-throw from the Cathedral of Notre-Dame and the democratic institutions of the French Republic. See Jean-Paul Brunet, "Police violence in Paris, October 1961: historical sources, methods, and conclusions," *The Historical Journal*, no. 1 (2008): 195-204; Connelly, *A Diplomatic Revolution*, 265. That said, there is much we still do not know about the occult history of the Italian Cold War state and its links to rightwing extremism. See Hervé Rayner, "Protéger, subir et réprimer: la délicate 'gestion' du terrorisme par l'État italien during 'les années de plomb," in *L'Italie des années de plomb: Le terrorisme entre histoire et mémoire*, ed. M. Lazar and M.-A. Matard-Bonucci (Paris: Éditions Autrement, 2010), 36-49.

[153] Marc Lazar, commentary in *Il PCI nell'Italia repubblicana* by Gualtieri, 363-74.

[154] Ginsborg, *Italy and Its Discontents*, 50-1, 100-2, 137-8, 252. For a defense of the mass party and discussion of antiparty discourse, see Ernesto Bettinelli, "Partiti e rappresentanza, in *Le idee costituzionali della Resistenza: Atti del Convegno di studi Roma 19, 20 e 21 ottobre 1995*, ed. C. Franceschini, S. Guerrieri and G. Monina (Rome: Istituto Poligrafico e Zecca dello Stato, 1997), 289-302.

[155] There is an affinity betweeen the Radicals embrace of civil rights and libertarian internationalism and the career of Aryeh Neier. But, as noted by Moyn, Neier, an eminent US civil rights advocate turned internationalist does not

book on Italian antipolitics, Mastropaolo muses that the NATO 1999 intervention in Kosovo, one unleashed under the banner of human rights, may have been the first war of the "new antipolitical" politicians against old-style politicians such as Slobodan Milosevic.[156] Across the Atlantic, a scholar reconstructing the historical circumstances of the emergence of human rights in the seventies connects their triumph in the post-Cold War era to the failure of other utopias, notably socialism and its foundations in the doctrine of national sovereignty and solidarity. "Human rights" writes Moyn "are best understood as survivors: the god that did not fail while other political ideologies did. If they avoided failure, it was most of all because they were widely understood as a moral alternative to bankrupt political utopias."[157]

There is a parallel between the trajectory of the Radicals and those of the Cold War dissidents and international organizations Moyn describes.[158] Mastropaolo's comment suggests a connection between the domestic and international agenda of such groups, one informed by a mindset which identified nation-states, mass parties and in some cases welfare states as obstacles to the attainment of a greater good.

The dissertation also contributes to a subfield of international history, the history of peace movements. The study's contribution derives from a focus on Radical debates on questions of peace, justice and war; such controversies illustrate aspects of the permutations of the postwar

---

provide a explanation of the trajectory. Moyn, *The Last Utopia*, 292, note 97**;** but see also Neier, *Taking Liberties: Four Decades in the Struggle for Rights* (New York: PublicAffairs, 2003), 168, where he credits his civil rights background for making him "reluctant to draw sharp distinctions between abuses against political activists and other violations of the rights of the powerless that did comparable harm to the victims."

[156] Mastropaolo, *Antipolitica*, 34, note; on the NATO intervention in Kosovo and human rights interventionism, seen from a critical perspective, see Gambino, *L'imperialismo dei diritti umani*, 85 and passim; Zolo, *L'alito della libertà*, 96-8.

[157] Moyn, *The Last Utopia*, 132, 5.

[158] Ibid., 148-9.

Italian left. Peace historians, some of whom have an activist background, have traditionally sought to prove the policy impact of peace movements, countering their dismissal by Realist pundits or neglect by traditional diplomatic historians.[159] In this sense, though the Radicals attained foreign policy outcomes, their antimilitarist internationalism or "juridical pacifism" is also of interest in terms of its diffuse influence on Italian political culture.[160] As Benjamin Ziemann argues, "the significance of peace protests is mainly to be seen in the way they affected their respective polities in the widest sense of the word, implying not only the constitutional and institutional setting, but the implicit rules, shared assumptions and concepts which regulate political participation."[161]

Radical politics touched upon several of the phenomena discussed by Ziemann. Radicals altered the terms of political participation, moving beyond exclusive state and party mediation of citizen's needs and rights; they introduced new forms of democratic expression. Through their civil liberties efforts and internationalist campaigns, Radicals expanded political inclusion and elevated individual rights above the nation-state. In so doing, they tackled Cold War ideologies by proposing alternatives, focusing in particular on the dogmas of the old left. Their emphasis on individual rights and related polemics with currents in pacifism that prized stability, nuclear arms control and détente over other considerations reflected the gradual replacement of pacifist

[159] Lawrence S. Wittner, *One World or None*, vol. 1 of *The Struggle Against the Bomb* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1993); Wittner, *Resisting the Bomb*; Lawrence S. Wittner, *Toward Nuclear Abolition: A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement, 1971-Present*, vol. 3 of *The Struggle Against the Bomb* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University, 2003); Guido Grünewald and Peter van den Dungen, eds., *Twentieth-Century Peace Movements: Successes and Failures* (Lewiston/Queenson/Lampeter: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1995). For a discussion of the influence of pacifist activism on peace history and the need to move beyond an activist perspective, see Moro, "Sulla 'storia della pace'," *Mondo Contemporaneo*, no. 3 (2006): 97-140; Renato Moro, *Storia della pace: Idee, movimenti, istituzioni* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2004).

[160] Pàstena, *Breve storia del pacifismo in Italia,* 177-81.

[161] Benjamin Ziemann, "Situating Peace Movements in the Political Culture of the Cold War: Introduction," in *Peace Movements*, ed. Ziemann, 20.

concerns with the cause of individual rights. Further, Radicals sought to question and expand dominant definitions of war and peace. They did so not so much by conjuring scenarios of apocalyptic nuclear war, the domain of antinuclear activists and PCI pacifists, but rather by pointing to the hidden costs of the Cold War, including famine in the Global South. They employed religious overtones and resorted to Easter Marches. Like civil society leaders elsewhere, Pannella resorted to charismatic posturing.[162]

The study of Radical internationalism speaks to another debate occupying peace historians. It concerns the relationship between domestic and international developments. One anecdote may serve as an illustration of the complexity of the interplays between local and global politics. Observed from afar, the Marathon Peace Marches held near Athens in 1963 are striking for their resemblance to other Easter Marches associated with the nonaligned antinuclear peace movement, notably the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament's trend-setting Aldermaston marches in England. Similar antinuclear banners flew at the head of throngs of chanting protesters invoking peace.[163] At one level, the Greek peace marches exemplify the transnational diffusion of a social movement pitting pacifists against nuclear militarism. But dig a little deeper and a more complicated picture emerges. Greek pacifists harbored nationalistic demands for *Enosis*, or union of Cyprus with the Greek homeland; their pacifist protest was also directed at a compromise solution favored by right-wing political leaders in accord with NATO and the US. Even anti-Americanism, another common trait of peace movements, donned local colors: during

[162] Ibid., 11-38.

[163] Striking reconstructions can be glimpsed in Konstantin Kostas-Gavras' movie "Z" (1969).

a 1964 march, Greek pacifists burnt an effigy of Lyndon Johnson in Turkish costume.[164] Such an image constitutes a cautionary tale, suggesting that scholars of transnational history who skirt domestic politics or diplomacy do so at their peril. Radical antimilitarism, for example, while in part inspired by transnational civil society movements, had also national roots and was integral to a domestic challenge to the mainstream parties of the Italian left.

The recently-coined sub-field of transnational history calls for the transcendence of national frameworks when seeking to explain phenomena which are regional or global in geographic reach. Nationalism, linguistic barriers and other factors, maintain practitioners of the discipline, have long limited the study of interconnected global developments and unduly influenced historians of international relations.[165] A national approach may sometimes be appropriate, they concede. The forging of common European institutions, for example, was prevalently a process "created from above" by nation-states, as opposed to one "created from below."[166] But in other areas of study, transnational historians urge more study of the impact social movements or NGOs. The boundaries of nation-states, long the reference points of

[164] Tsakiris, "State Repression against Peace Movements in Greece, 1950-1967," in *Peace Movements*, ed. Ziemann, 147-64; Ziemann, "Situating Peace Movements in the Political Culture of the Cold War: Introduction," in *Peace Movements*, ed. Ziemann, 37-8.

[165] Padraic Kenney and Gerd-Rainer Horn, "Introduction: Approaches to the Transnational," in *Transnational Moments of Change: Europe 1945, 1968, 1989*, ed. P. Kenney and G.-R. Horn (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004), ix-xix.

[166] Kenney and Horn also propose a distinction between comparative history and transnational history, on account of the former's tendency to emphasize differences rather than connections and similarities between phenomena in different countries. In other words, according to their definition, comparative history tends to accentuate national boundaries and obscure transnational diffusion. See Padraic Kenney and Gerd-Rainer Horn, "Introduction," in *Transnational Moments of Change*, ed. Kenney and Horn, x-xi, note. On the central role of nation-states and the origins of European integration, see Alan S. Milward, *The European Rescue of the Nation-state* (London: Routledge, 2000).

practitioners of international or comparative history, must be transcended, as should the primacy of the state and of a historiography shaped by the mindset of policymakers.

There is much to commend in the transnational approach. It encourages the observer to investigate patterns of parallelism, structural change, or influence and diffusion across borders that might remain undetected if the observer primarily focuses on state policy or diplomacy.[167] Lawrence Wittner's scholarship constitutes an excellent example of such work. Leaning primarily on circumstantial evidence rather than diplomatic or political documents, Wittner argues that a transnational peace movement significantly impacted policymakers across the globe, in an instance of history from below.[168] Among scholarly journals, *Diplomatic History* has been a prime advocate of the new diplomatic history, publishing in this respect groundbreaking articles by young scholars.[169] The transnational approach is also helpful when examining patterns of crossborder diffusion that do not necessarily have a major policy impact, but are nevertheless of interest because they entail change in other arenas, as shown by the experience of the Italian Radicals.

Yet the transnational approach is also subject to caveats, particularly when applied to the topic of global governance. Care should be taken to avoid ignoring on principle the agency of states, the complexity of domestic politics, and the interaction between policymakers and civil

[167] These are the three categories highlighted in Kenney and Horn, "Introduction," in *Transnational Moments of Change*, ed. Kenney and Horn, xi. See also the work of Iriye for compelling arguments on the necessity to expand the scope of diplomatic history in his *Global Community*. For an interpretation in historical context of twentieth-century internationalism, see Akira Iriye, *Cultural Internationalism and World Order* (Baltimore, Maryland: The John Hopkins Press, 1997).

[168] Wittner's thesis may yet be also corroborated by hard evidence of the influence of peace movements on policymakers, for example once the presidential documents of a prime case-study for such a thesis, Ronald Reagan, are more fully made available to scholars.

[169] See Akira Iriye, "The Transnational Turn," *Diplomatic History*, no. 3 (June 2007): 373-6.

society components. A text-book example of potential pitfalls is Jeremi Suri's *Power and Protest*. In the latter, Suri argues that détente, as practiced by policymakers in nation-states as diverse as the United States, West Germany or China, was essentially a conservative response to transnational protest. Historians have criticized Suri's book for a reductive approach to domestic politics in each of the nation-states discussed and for a portrayal of détente that fails to take into account international variants. For example, one historian takes issue with his glossing over of the distinction between Kissinger's détente, aimed at shoring up US power, and Willy Brandt's "dynamic" variant, *Ostpolitik*, which conjugated the aim of peace and stability with that of transformation of Cold War tenets and eventual German unification.[170] Another historian has even discerned transformative elements in Kissinger's version of détente.[171] In a subsequent attempt to grapple with the revolutionary implications of the human rights provisions of the Helsinki Final Act, the brainchild of nation-states, Suri unconvincingly argues that the espousal of individual rights did not contradict policymakers' goal of global stability and superpower entente.[172] Instead of admitting that the evidence nuances his stark contraposition of state and civil society, of détente and protest, Suri fits the evidence to match his thesis.

Another example of a debatable approach to transnational history is the interpretation of the human rights movement proposed by Samuel Moyn, an intellectual historian. Unlike Suri, Moyn does not skew domestic politics or international diplomacy to fit his argument, but tends

[170] Pons, *Berlinguer e la fine del comunismo,* 14, note.

[171] Thomas A. Schwartz, "Legacies of détente: a three-way discussion," *Cold War History*, no. 4 (Nov. 2008): 513-25.

[172] Suri, *Power and Protest*; Jeremi Suri, "Détente and human rights: American and West European perspectives on international change," *Cold War History*, no. 4 (Nov. 2008): 527-45. On the role of nation-states in formulating the human rights provisions of the Third Basket, and the resulting destabilizing effects for the international order, see Daniel C. Thomas, *The Helsinki Effect: International Norms, Human Rights, and the Demise of Communism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001).

rather to minimize their role. Contesting ahistorical accounts which portray human rights as rooted in the more or less distant past, Moyn makes a convincing case for the abrupt emergence of human rights as a cultural, political and diplomatic phenomenon in the mid-seventies. Misleadingly though, Moyn slights the contribution of domestic politics and of international diplomacy in order to better exalt the role of nonstate actors.[173] The broader ideological context for the emergence of human rights, he argues, was the displacement of other utopias, notably the socialist ones of the old left. According to Moyn, the primary agents for this displacement were individuals and NGOs, including Soviet and Latin American dissidents and Amnesty International. Significantly, if considered outside of the pall of political and diplomatic history, Moyn's book appears original. However, the relatively sudden emergence of human rights in the seventies is no secret or surprise to historians; it is a development increasingly documented and analyzed, and is one in large part attributeable to states and policymakers.[174] Moyn's minimization of their role suggests a bias and the persistence of an unhelpful dichotomy between state and society in the historiography.

Rather than elevating the agency of one category over the other, the task at hand ought to be the empirical study of the causal interplay between state and nonstate actors. It stands to reason that the first wave of accounts of transnational developments that emerged in the nineties tended to assume or overstate the significance of nonstate actors or to cast the global role of the latter in liberal terms. In some cases, such works were authored by activists, in much the way

[173] Moyn, *The Last Utopia*, 148-9.

[174] Sargent, "From Internationalism to Globalism"; Robert David Johnson, *Congress and the Cold War* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006); David P. Forsythe, *Human Rights and US Foreign Policy: Congress Reconsidered* (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1988)**;** Gaddis Smith, *Morality, Reason, and Power: American Diplomacy in the Carter Years* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1986); Thomas M. Franck and Robert Weisband, *Foreign Policy by Congress* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979).

peace history literature was once the domain of pacifists or political history that of party historians.[175] Among scholars, political scientists were perhaps quickest to discern the importance of nonstate actors and to reject too dichotomous a conceptualization of the relationship between nonstate actors and states.[176] The more theoretical approach of political science, however, necessarily eschews the fastidious disentanglement of historical causality. The latter task belongs foremost to historians.

The liberal and activist bias which periodically emerges from historians' accounts of the rise of global civil society and the alleged eclipse of nation-states has even influenced a doyen of diplomatic history, Akira Iriye. In *Global Community*, Iriye proposes a definition of NGOs that excludes political parties, religious associations, or terrorist groups. While the call to isolate categories of nonstate actors is understandable in view of the enormous range of political, social and cultural phenomena involved, the distinction is all told unhelpful. It tends to isolate liberal nonstate actors from illiberal ones; in other words, ones we like from those we don't. It also separates nonstate movement or organizations from liminal cases such as political parties. Iriye ends his book by noting that the "community [of NGOs] has tended to develop with its own momentum, on a separate level of existence from the international system defined by sovereign states […]," concluding that present trends appear to indicate a convergence. But doubts might

[175] Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, *Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998); Korey, *NGOs and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;* Ralph B. Levering and Miriam L. Levering, *Citizen Action for Global Change: The Neptune Group and the Law of the Sea* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1999); Jackie Smith, Charles Chatfield, and Ron Pagnucco, eds., *Transnational Social Movements and Global Politics: Solidarity beyond the State* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1997). See the review essay by Mark H. Lytle, "NGOs and the New Transnational Politics," *Diplomatic History*, no. 1 (Winter 2001):121-8.

[176] John Boli and George M. Thomas, introduction to *Constructing World Culture: International Nongovernment Organizations since 1875* by Boli and Thomas, eds. (Palo Alto: Standord University Press, 1999), 1-2. For a more recent work which addresses such issues in the introduction, see George Andreopoulos, Zehra F. Kabasakal Arat and Peter Juviler, eds., *Nonstate Actors in the Human Rights Universe* (Bloomfield Press, Conn.: Kumarian Press, 2006).

also be raised on the latter statement, because of an implied separation between two categories which may have always been less divergent than assumed. It can also be objected that state control of national territory was perhaps always more aspiration than reality, or that the role of each nation-state is best measured by the degree of effective power wielded.[177] More recently, leaders in the transnational field, including Iriye, have tempered their approach, which was, it should be told, intended to revivify a once staid discipline of diplomatic history long dominated by the statist optic of policymakers.[178] Some historians however continue to support an approach which insulates nonstate organizations from governments or political frameworks and asserts the primacy of nonstate actors.[179]

Words spoken by a policymaker may stand as a prologue to our account of Radical internationalist politics. In a 1995 farewell address to her colleagues delivered after her appointment as EU commissioner, Bonino reflected on the internationalist experience of the Radical party-movement. She did not disguise the group's substantial failure to attain earlier foreign policy objectives or the organizational difficulties of its ambitious and idealistic INGO,

[177] On this point, see George Andreopoulos, Zehra F. Kabasakal Arat and Peter Juviler, introduction to *Nonstate Actors in the Human Rights Universe,* by G. Andreopoulos, Z. F. Kabasakal Arat and P. Juviler, eds., xvi. On the interconnections between what we now term economic globalization, nation-building and the foundations of the welfare state, see Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time* (Boston, Mass.: Beacon Press, 2001).

[178] Iriye, *Global Community*, 1-8, 209. One excellent example of the new approach which takes into account the complicated interactions of diplomacy, politics, and public opinion without falling into a dialectical pattern is the work of Daniel Sargent, a student of Iriye. See his Ph.D. thesis, "From Internationalism to Globalism." In another field of study, see the debate on transnationalism in Judith Surkis, "Sex, Sovereignty, and Transnational Intimacies," *The American Historical Review*, no. 4 (October 2010), 1089-96 and in Dagmar Herzog, "Syncopated Sex: Transforming European Sexual Cultures," *The American Historical Review*, no. 5 (Dec. 2009), 1287-1308.

[179] Erez Manela, "Smallpox Eradication and the Rise of Global Governance," in *The Shock of the Global,* ed. Ferguson et al. , 251-78; Connelly, *Fatal Misconception*.

the Transnational Radical Party. But she also praised recent work in helping establish the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, or that laying the groundwork for a permanent world court. These results, she pointedly emphasized before members of the zealous party-movement, were due to an important extent to the rootedness of Radicals within a domestic system and their presence on a nation-state's foreign policy team.[180] Her experience corroborated the insight of a political scientist, who the previous year had made a case for the power of ideas to affect policy when mediated by both domestic structures and transnational coalitions.[181]

[180] Emma Bonino, "XXXVII congresso del Partito Radicale," 8 Apr. 1995, address, audioclip in OARR, http://www.radioradicale.it/scheda/73222/73292-xxxvii-congresso-del-partito-radicale.

[181] Thomas Risse-Kappen, "Ideas do not float freely: transnational coalitions, domestic structures, and the end of the Cold War," *International Organization*, no. 2 (1994): 185-214.

Chapter One: The Origins of Postwar Radicalism (1943-1972)

The emergence of postwar Radicalism derived from two principal characteristics of Italy's first postwar party system (1943-1994).[1] The first was the dominance of Catholic and Marxist political parties and the eclipse or weakness of "lay" political traditions. Such dynamics were in full evidence during the first elections of 1946, when the promising left-wing Action Party met with crushing defeat. Its disappearance foreshadowed the subsequent minority status of what come to be known as lay politics, but did not quell the ambition of liberal intellectuals to forge an alternative left. The first Radical Party (1955-1962), a formation of intellectuals associated with the periodical *Il Mondo*, would attempt to resuscitate a left-wing liberalism tied to Actionism.[2]

The second feature of postwar domestic politics that helped shape Radicalism, particularly in its second incarnation, was the tendency of the Marxist parties to eschew adversarial politics and to pursue accords with their Christian-Democratic rival. In 1963, the left wing of the defunct Radical Party regrouped as a new formation in opposition to a governing deal between the PSI and the ruling DC. By the early seventies, Marco Pannella's group emerged as one of the most durable and effective of the political movements offering an alternative to the old left. Much like the small parties and movements of the new left, Radicals

[1] The postwar period to 1994 is sometimes referred to as the "First Republic." In lieu of this convention, I will usually refer to a first postwar party system; the latter was incontrovertibly transformed by 1994, while it is by no means clear that a second republic ensued.

[2] Left-liberal and radical-socialist political currents were present in both the Action Party and the first Radical Party (1955-1962). See "Italia. Crisi del Partito radicale," *Tempi Moderni*, July-Sept. 1962, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=44376&lang=IT&cms=; Giuseppe Bedeschi, *La fabbrica delle ideologie: Il pensiero politico nell'Italia del Novecento* (Rome-Bari: Laterza, 2002), 312-5; Massimo Teodori, *Storia dei laici nell'Italia clericale e comunista* (Venice: Marsilio, 2008), 271-80; Salvatore Lupo, *Partito e antipartito: Una storia politica della prima Repubblica, 1946-78* (Rome: Donzelli, 2004), 133-40.

engaged in both "sidewalk" and parliamentary politics; unlike other "comrades," Radicals rejected Marxism and revolutionary violence.[3] The second portion of this chapter tells the story of the party-movement's initial impact on Italian politics, concluding in 1972 as the group ramped up its political ambitions on the basis of a newly instituted instrument, the abrogative referendum.

The Italian postwar party system traced its origins to wartime. The fall of Mussolini on 25 July 1943 and his replacement with Marshall Badoglio was followed on 8 September by an armistice signed with the Allies. During the following days, King Victor Emanuel III and Badoglio were threatened by their former Nazi allies and fled Rome for southern Italy. In parallel, the six principal anti-Fascist groups formed the CLN, constituting an alternative political pole. Represented on the CLN were six parties that played roles over the next three years and, with two exceptions, beyond: the PCI, the Action Party, the Italian Socialist Party of Proletarian Unity (PSIUP), the DC, the Italian Liberal Party (PLI), and Democracy of Labor.[4] Of these six political groups, the Communists, Actionists, and Socialists, in descending order, had been important components of the clandestine anti-Fascist struggle previous to Mussolini's fall.[5] Among the ranks of the Action Party were some of the most adamant opponents to recognition of the Badoglio government. Their stances anticipated the political culture of postwar Radicalism.

---

[3] Marco Pannella, "Perchè siamo popolari," *Panorama,* 23 Oct. 1975, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=45522&lang=IT&cms=.

[4] *Partito socialista italiano di unità proletaria* (PSIUP) shortened in 1947 to *Partito socialista italiano* (PSI); *Partito liberale italiano* (PLI); *Democrazia del lavoro* (DL).

[5] Paul Ginsborg, *A History of Contemporary Italy: Society and Politics 1943-1988* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 12-17.

Before proceeding with an account of the formation of the postwar party system, a few remarks elucidating the significance of Actionism are in order.

Though small and short-lived, the Action Party exerted influence on the postwar period; its radical vision of change was perpetuated by former members after the party's dissolution in 1947. A polemic in September 1945 between Action Party leader Ferruccio Parri and Benedetto Croce, famed philosopher and leader of the PLI, illustrates Actionism's distinctive traits. Parri held that the Risorgimento had produced a flawed and undemocratic country; Fascism in this sense had been a logical outcome of a compromised national unification. Croce, in contrast, maintained that Fascism had been an aberration interrupting a promising transition from the old oligarchical order signaled by the introduction of universal suffrage in 1911. A further distinction concerned the Actionists' and Liberals' relationship with Communists and Socialists. Whereas Croce and like-minded politicians emphasized the authoritarian threat of the Marxist parties, Actionists sought an alliance with them, not least due to the espousal of a libertarian form of socialism and of anticapitalism.[6]

Actionist prescriptions for change, however, were riven by contradiction. Socialist and anticapitalist trend within the party coexisted uneasily with a current which prized individual rights and private entrepreneurship. A related disaccord existed between partisans of the creation of a socialist party with a focus on class-based discourse and others favoring a bourgeois party of professionals centered on libertarian causes.[7] Both facets of Actionism thus featured appetite for

[6] Bedeschi, *La fabbrica delle ideologie*, 306-15.

[7] Bedeschi, *La fabbrica delle ideologie*, 306-15; Giovanni De Luna, *Storia del Partito d'Azione* (Turin: UTET, 2006), 175-83; Giovanni Quagliariello, "I liberali e l'idea di partito nella stagione costituente," in *Le idee costituzionali della Resistenza: Atti del Convegno di studi Roma 19, 20 e 21 ottobre 1995*, ed. C. Franceschini, S. Guerrieri and G. Monina (Rome: Istituto Poligrafico e Zecca dello Stato, 1997), 268-88.

cathartic change, whether informed by socialistic anticapitalism or by libertarian antistatism. The unifying trait of the party was an almost moralistic antipathy for the established order, a feature which would be one of its most lasting bequests. The Actionist and later Radical Ernesto Rossi would describe Christian Democratic rule as the linchpin of a corrupt and clerical regime with essential continuities with the Fascist predecessor.[8]

The Action Party's indeterminate foreign policy was a reflection of its fragmented ideological orientation; it contrasted with the well defined foreign policies of the Marxist and Catholic parties. One prominent Actionist, however, was deeply preoccupied with international issues. Ernesto Rossi had been the principal author alongside Altiero Spinelli of the *Manifesto di Ventotene*, a document written while in internal exile in 1941 for anti-Fascist activities on a tiny island. The Manifesto envisaged a "United States of Europe" designed to eclipse the nationalistic militarism at the origin of World War II. After the war, argued the document, neither capitalist nor socialist states could guarantee the retreat of the inequality and democratic deficits occasioned by monopolistic capitalism or totalitarianism; nor would a toothless and disarmed re-edition of the League of Nations suffice.

Rossi's internationalism, however, did not markedly influence Actionism or its heir, the first Radical Party; nor did it prove immediately influential. The European Federalist Movement Rossi founded in 1947 in collaboration with Spinelli disbanded in the fifties. The first Radical

---

[8] Ernesto Rossi, "La lotta contro i monopoli: pescicani nella rete," *Il Mondo*, 21 Feb. 1956, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=44175&lang=IT&cms=; Mario Boneschi, Leopoldo Piccardi and Ernesto Rossi, "Verso il regime […] scheda libraria," OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=44248&lang=IT&cms=; Lupo, *Partito e antipartito*, 133-40.

Party would not develop a coherent foreign policy stance, much to Rossi's regret.[9] On the other hand, the notion that militaristic nation-states were at the origin of democratic shortcomings would revive with the second Radical Party.[10]

Having sketched the Actionist roots of Radicalism, we must now return to the origins of the major postwar parties and of their foreign policy stances. Christian Democrats, Socialists and Communists forged a political framework which would prove far more resilient to domestic and international challengers than France's Fourth Republic.

After the fall of Mussolini in 1943, the question of the relationship between the CLN and the Badoglio government emerged as Italy's paramount domestic and international issue. Within the CLN, Actionists, Communists, and Socialists demanded the constitution of a new government drawing exclusively on the parties of the CLN and excluding the Badoglio cabinet. Shortly after his return from exile in Moscow, however, Palmiro Togliatti announced in an April 1944 speech known as "the turning point of Salerno" that the PCI would opt for the moderate course of integration into the existing government. The decision swayed the CLN and isolated the Actionists, who continued to reject a compromise.

---

[9] Ernesto Rossi, "Il costo di un compromesso: il centro sinistra," *La Sinistra Radicale*, Jan. 1962, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=44343&lang=IT&cms=.

[10] On the Manifesto di Ventotene and Ernesto Rossi, see "Federalismo europeo: il Manifesto di Ventotene," August 1941, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=15931&lang=IT&cms=; Angiolo Bandinelli, "Storia e teoria del federalismo," *La Pallacorda*, summer 1984, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=48608&lang=IT&cms=**;** Antonella Braga and Simonetta Michelotti, eds., *Ernesto Rossi: Un democratico europeo* (Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2009); Antonella Braga, *Un federalista giacobino: Ernesto Rossi pioniere degli Stati Uniti d'Europa* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2007); Lorenzo Strik Lievers, ed., *Ernesto Rossi: Economista, federalista, radicale* (Venice: Marsilio, 2001); Giuseppe Fiori, *Una storia italiana: Vita di Ernesto Rossi* (Turin: Einaudi, 1997); Roberto Petrini, ed., *Capitalismo inquinato: Ernesto Rossi* (Rome: Laterza, 1993); Altiero Spinelli, *Il Manifesto di Ventotene* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1991).

Historians have long debated the circumstances of Togliatti's about-face. Until the partial opening of Soviet archives in the nineties, the PCI version of events heavily influenced historical narratives.[11] Supposedly, Togliatti had decided independently to accept the Badoglio government as legitimate. His shift signaled the recasting of the PCI as a patriotic and democratic force which had moderated its maximalist and Jacobinist traits; the turning point of Salerno became the virtuous founding act of the *partito nuovo*.[12] Yet even previous to the uncovering of new documentation, at least one discerning historian had noted the almost identical early trajectory of PCI and PCF foreign policies and their conformity with Stalin's shifting priorities; such observations undermined Italian claims to originality, suggesting the formative role of the Soviet ally.[13] Subsequently, historians suggested on the basis of new evidence that Togliatti's decision may have been the simple product of a Stalin directive. While Togliatti claimed to have left Moscow in February 1944, before the Soviet decision had been made, the diaries of Georgi Dimitrov, the Bulgarian Communist leader, indicate that he met with Stalin and his collaborators shortly before his departure for Italy.[14]

Due to the absence of a memorandum of the Stalin-Togliatti meeting, diehard defenders of the notion of absolute PCI autonomy stand their ground, in one instance simply dismissing the

[11] Elena Aga-Rossi and Victor Zaslavsky, *Togliatti e Stalin: Il PCI e la politica estera staliniana negli archivi di Mosca* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1997), 18-9.

[12] On the Jacobinist traits of the PCI, see Marc Lazar, *Maisons rouges: Les partis communistes français et italiens de la Libération à nos jours* (Paris: Aubier, 1992), 266.

[13] Lazar, *Maisons rouges*, 51.

[14] Giorgi Dimitrov and Ivo Banac, *The diary of Georgi Dimitrov, 1933-1949* (Princeton: Yale University Press, 2003), 303.

evidence.[15] But overall, revisionist historians have largely deflated old controversies. A less polarized debate now asks whether Stalin imposed policy on Togliatti or whether the latter had some role in its elaboration. On one side, Silvio Pons argues that the latter possibility cannot entirely be excluded. Togliatti had after all requested the meeting with Stalin. It remains plausible that Soviet foreign policy was not predetermined; official recognition of Badoglio by the Soviets emerged only on March 14.[16] More trenchant are the views of others. Drawing on the Dimitrov diary and circumstantial evidence, they conclude that Stalin imposed his views on a recalcitrant Togliatti. Such a conclusion conforms to the outcomes of the October 1943 Conference of Foreign Ministers, when Moscow's sole request regarding Italy had been that the Badoglio government be widened to include the CLN. Further, the policy of forging wide coalitions with moderate parties within occupied countries was a common feature of Soviet foreign policy until the turning point of 1947.[17]

Seeking to move beyond the polemics over PCI autonomy, Aga-Rossi has more recently suggested that a broad commonality of purpose between Togliatti and Stalin is perhaps most germane to an understanding of PCI policies in the Stalinist period, particularly in area of foreign

---

[15] Giuseppe Vacca, preface to *Il PCI nell'Italia repubblicana 1943-1991* by Roberto Gualteri, ed. (Rome: Carocci, 2001, xi-xxvii. There are numerous gaps in the documentary record regarding early PCI-PCSU relations. The 1943-1953 files of the PCI documenting foreign affairs and relations with the Soviet Communist Party were sent for storage to the Soviet Union but despite efforts to locate them they have been found. Also contributing to gaps in the documentation was the PCI practice not to write down crucial secrets. See Elena Aga-Rossi, "L'influenza sovietica in Italia nel periodo staliniano," in *Un ponte sull'Atlantico: L'alleanza occidentale 1949-1999,* ed. A. Giovagnoli and L. Tosi (Milan: Guerini e associati, 2003), 113; Aga-Rossi and Zaslavsky, *Togliatti e Stalin,* 11.

[16] Silvio Pons, *L'impossibile egemonia: L'Urss, il Pci e le origini della guerra fredda (1943-1948)* (Rome: Carocci, 1999), 155-63.

[17]Aga-Rossi and Zaslavsky, *Togliatti e Stalin,* 49-74; Renzo De Felice, *Rosso e Nero* (Milan: Baldini & Castoldi), 71-2; Marc Lazar, "La strategia del PCF e del PCI dal 1944 al 1947: acquisizioni della ricerca e problemi irrisolti," in *L'altra faccia della luna: I rapporti tra PCI, PCF e Unione Sovietica,* ed. E. Aga Rossi and G. Quagliariello, (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1997), 79-100; Aga-Rossi, "L'influenza sovietica," 111-39; Georges-Henri Soutou, *La guerre de Cinquante Ans: Le conflit Est-Ouest 1943-1990* (Paris: Arthème Fayard, 2001), 62-5, 111-59

policy.[18] More interesting to the latest cohort of historians than the Cold War debate over PCI autonomy is the party's deep rootedness in Italian society and yet a simultaneous allegiance to the Soviet "City on a Hill." In his book on the trajectories of the two largest West European communist parties, Marc Lazar situates them in their domestic context and compares their degrees of alignment with Soviet foreign policy. Both the PCI and PCF, he writes, achieved a unique synthesis of East and West even while mirroring their respective national cultures. Borrowing an art historical metaphor, Lazar likens Italian communism to a dazzling Ravenna mosaic. Such a composition evokes from afar the impression of a "heavily laden vessel stranded in the sands of the Adriatic with its Byzantine cargo." But draw a little closer, and the mosaic reveals a composite artefact with both domestic and Eastern features.[19]

As Cold War ideological battles fade, historians appraise with greater equanimity the puzzle of PCI or PCF internationalist patriotism. To contemporaries, however, such questions were both vital and divisive. Early on, the PCI proved highly successful in establishing a public image as patriotic and democratic. From 1948, anti-Americanism and pacifism camouflaged the controversial question of PCI-Soviet relations, even as an improbable representation of the USSR as democratic and progressive won over working-class masses and leftist intellectuals.[20]

---

[18] Elena Aga-Rossi "PCI e URSS nel periodo staliniano (1944-1953)," in *I partiti politici nell'Italia repubblicana: Atti del Convegno di Siena 5-6 dicembre 2002*, ed. G. Nicolosi (Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2006), 91-115; Elena Aga-Rossi and Victor Zaslavsky, "The Soviet Union and the Italian Communist Party, 1944-8," in *The Soviet Union and Europe in the Cold War, 1943-53*, ed. F. Gori and S. Pons (London: Macmillan, 1996), 161-84.

[19] Lazar, *Maisons rouges*, 185; for a discussion of PCI and PCF relations with Moscow, see ibid., 303-27; for a magisterial discussion of the internationalist, but also domestic, social, political and cultural foundations of the PCF, see Marc Lazar, *Le communisme, une passion française* (Paris: Perrin, 2005).

[20] Lazar, *Maisons rouges*, 67-8.

In Italy, more than in France, the acute crisis of the West European left consequent to de-Stalinization and to Soviet intervention in Hungary in 1956 rapidly subsided.[21]

Alongside the question of PCI autonomism, Christian Democratic links to the United States also emerged as a postwar point of contention. The left relished portraying Italy as an American lackey, "the Bulgaria of NATO."[22] Elsewhere on the political spectrum, critics with centrist views denounced beneath the surface of Atlanticism DC leanings for pacifism and neutralism, traits common to both the Catholic and Marxist left. While such leftist or centrist critiques were not completely unfounded, they often verged on caricature and were above all politically useful. They long stood in the way of dispassionate historical analysis.

Presently the representation of the DC as a US stooge or the exaggeration of the power of US policymakers to direct Italian politics is no longer current. Historians agree that the DC contained demands from its allies, whether the Vatican or the United States; Christian Democratic politicians manipulated to their advantage American or papal anticommunism without ceding to destabilizing requests. Further, the alliance between the DC and Washington developed haltingly, solidifying only after the elections of April 1948. The United States was long suspicious of the DC's confessional foundations or of its conflicting foreign policy objectives.[23] Divergent positions within the DC meant that joining NATO proved a belabored

[21] Giampiero Carocci, ed., *"Il Mondo": Antologia di una rivista scomoda* (Rome: Editori Riuniti, 1997), 274-7. As a matter of policy, the PCI advertised its wide support among intellectuals. See for example "Perchè votano PCI," *l'Unità* (Rome), 8 June 1962. On this topic, see Nello Ajello, *Il lungo addio: Intellettuali e PCI dal 1956 al 1991* (Rome-Bari: Laterza, 1997), 3-14; Lazar, *Maisons rouges*, 90-100.

[22] Guido Formigoni, *La Democrazia Cristiana e l'alleanza occidentale (1943-1953)* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1996), 14.

[23] Formigoni, *La Democrazia Cristiana e l'alleanza occidentale*, 48.

process riddled with neutralist sentiment.[24] Far from being "the American party" as it was often vilified during the Cold War, the DC remained a quintessentially Italian one.[25]

The figure of DC leader Alcide De Gasperi, minister of foreign affairs in 1944-46 and 1951-53, and premier from late 1945 through mid 1953, looms large in any discussion of the genesis of Italian postwar diplomacy. During De Gasperi's tenure as policymaker, the DC asserted itself as the principal Italian party and forged a lasting foreign policy. De Gasperi's undoubted ability, though, did not entirely account for the success of Italy's confessional party; previous historical developments had layed the groundwork. In 1929, the signing of the Concordat removed the principal bones of contention between the Italian State and the Vatican, releasing political Catholicism from its anticlerical Risorgimento fetters.[26] After the fall of Mussolini, the DC built on the rootedness in Italian society of Catholic political strains and on the Vatican's dense network of NGOs.[27] During the national collapse of authority in 1943, the Church of Rome grew in stature on account of its stabilizing and reassuring role, much as had been the case during the late fifth century eclipse of imperial authority and the foundational papacy of Gregory the Great.[28] The DC made use of the new links forged between the bourgeoisie, religion and nationalism during Fascism; after the war, it benefited from the antifascist proscription of far right politics. Though declaredly secular, the DC drew on the

[24] Ibid., 16.

[25] Giovagnoli, *Il partito italiano.*

[26] Ibid., 33-40.

[27] I will periodically refer to religious associations connected to the Catholic Church as non-governmental organizations (NGOs). A broad definition of the term allows for the recognition of the time-honored role of nonstate historical actors, including ones allied to religious, political, or state interests and institutions.

[28] Richard Krautheimer, *Rome: Profile of a City, 312-1308* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press), 59-87.

useful if overbearing support of the Vatican, years before the Americans advanced their endorsement; the fate of a prewar predecessor, the non-confessional *Partito Popolare Italiano* of Luigi Sturzo, was thus avoided.[29]

By 1946, the lasting characteristics of the DC were in place. Like the PCI, it was a mass party drawing on a range of social classes. Unlike the PCI, its electoral base leaned more to the right than its leadership. On the occasion of the referendum consultation of 1946, seven out of the eight million DC voters, many of them southerners, voted in favor of maintaining the monarchy. Among party cadres, a pattern mirrored that within the PCI: top DC leaders leaned to the left, whereas the PCI brass looked to the political center.[30] The DC, according to De Gasperi's famous definition, was a "centrist party marching leftward."[31] While the DC is often referred to below as conservative, on account of its definition as such by the left, its progressive vocation is beyond question.[32]

The first postwar general election held to appoint a constituent assembly occurred in June 1946; in parallel, a referendum sanctioned the advent of Italy's first republic. The relatively late date of the elections—coming a full year after the end of the war—had been the doing of De Gasperi, appointed premier in November 1945 after the failed tenure of Actionist Ferruccio Parri. Electoral consultations signaled the implosion of the Action Party, which only received 1.5

[29] Giovagnoli, *Il partito italiano*, 33-40; on the circumstances of Luigi Sturzo's resignation under papal pressure from the leadership of the PPI, see Gabriella Fanello Marcucci, *Luigi Sturzo: Vita e battaglie per la libertà del fondatore de Partito popolare italiano* (Milan: Mondadori, 2004), 132-40.

[30] Ginsborg, *A History of Postwar Italy*, 50, 90-1; Giorgio Galli, *I partiti politici italiani: 1943-2000* (Milan: Rizzoli, 2001), 43-4.

[31] Cited in Galli, *I partiti politici italiani*, 55.

[32] Jan-Werner Müller, *Contesting Democracy: Political Ideas in Twentieth-Century Europe* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2011), 1-6.

percent of the vote; the party's dissolution the following year led to the dispersal of its members to other formations. Among the lay parties, the PLI obtained 6.8 percent of the vote, a disappointing result for a party which had nurtured outsized postwar ambitions based on a promising past and the illustrious patronage of Croce. Another lay formation with venerable Risorgimento roots, the Republican Party, received 4.4 percent of the vote.[33] Electoral outcomes were excellent for the DC (35.2 percent), and good for the allied PSIUP (20.7 percent) and PCI (19 percent). The robust electoral performance of the Socialists, who for the first and last time obtained more votes than the PCI, masked deep divisions. The party was torn between a wing inclined to collaboration with the PCI and another favoring autonomy.

The elections also produced a significant, albeit shortlived, right-wing political phenomenon: the Front of the Ordinary Man (UQ). The party, led by the outspoken and charismatic comedian Guglielmo Giannini, obtained 5.3 percent of the vote.[34] UQ drew support from rural southerners harboring hostility to the Resistance and the left. Rather than fascist, the group was counter-ideological and anti-institutional, resembling the later phenomenon of *Poujadisme* of France's Fourth Republic.[35] But despite further gains in the local elections of fall 1946, UQ faded by the general elections of 1948, outmaneuvered by De Gasperi.[36] The phenomenon of *qualunquismo* suggested a covert revival of right-wing politics; soon after the

[33] *Partito Repubblicano Italiano*, PRI.

[34] *Fronte dell'uomo qualunque*, UQ.

[35] Carlo Maria Lomartire, *Il qualunquista: Guglielmo Giannini e l'antipolitica* (Milan: Mondadori, 2008); Ettore La Serra, *Abbasso tutti: Giannini e il qualunquismo* (Rome: Settimo Sigillo, 1990); Sandro Setta, *L'Uomo qualunque* (Rome: Laterza, 1975).

[36] Galli, *I partiti politici italiani*, 50-2.

eclipse of UQ, a durable neofascist party emerged, the Italian Social Movement (MSI).[37] *Qualunquismo* would also prove of some significance on account of Pannella's later appropriation of Giannini's antipolitical and antiparty vocabulary, if not his reactionary ideas.[38]

Following the elections, a redoubled economic crisis eroded the popularity of the second De Gasperi government. International developments also intruded into the domestic sphere, compounding the premier's difficulties.[39] Rather than mounting tensions between the Great Powers, an unpopular draft Peace Treaty provoked popular discontent, due to the imposition of terms deemed damaging to Italy's interests.[40] Criticism of the Peace Treaty derived notably from right-wing and Catholic sectors as well as from internal neutralist currents of the DC favorable to the maintenance of the colonies and of prewar borders, including territories claimed by Yugoslavia.[41] The question of Trieste also posed enormous difficulties for Togliatti, who had to find a way to reconcile his alignment with Yugoslavia's territorial demands and the effort to represent the PCI as patriotic.[42] An international compromise emerged by June 1946 and was ratified in early 1947; it entailed the internationalization of Trieste, provoking the outrage of

[37] *Movimento sociale italiano*, MSI; see the excellent account by Piero Ignazi, *Il polo escluso: Profilo storico del Movimento Sociale Italiano* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1989).

[38] Lupo, *Partito e antipartito*, 281-2; Marco Pannella, "Quell'esarchia è extraparlamentare," *La Prova Radicale*, July-Aug. 1976, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=45724&lang=IT&cms=.

[39] Formigoni, *La Democrazia Cristiana e l'alleanza occidentale*, 75.

[40] Ibid., 61.

[41] Ibid., 74-5.

[42] Soutou, *La guerre de Cinquante Ans*, 62-3; Leonid Gibiansky, "La questione di Trieste tra i comunisti italiani e jugoslavi," and Marcello Flores, "Il PCI, il PCF, gli intellettuali: 1943-1950," in *L'altra faccia della luna*, ed. Aga-Rossi and Quagliariello, 173-208 and 101-17.

portions of Catholic opinion.[43] Italy's status of defeated Axis power had left De Gasperi little maneuver space.[44] Neither Togliatti nor De Gasperi, despite their competing diplomatic activism, had been able to affect outcomes determined elsewhere.[45]

In January 1947, even as the ratification of the Peace Treaty loomed, Socialist rapprochement to the PCI precipitated a break-up of PSIUP and the resignation of Socialist Foreign Minister Pietro Nenni. His departure in turn permitted the dissolution of De Gasperi's second cabinet.[46] The so-called scission of Palazzo Barberini occurred when a large Socialist

[43] Formigoni, *La Democrazia Cristiana e l'alleanza occidentale,* 75.

[44] Vyacheslav Molotov, "Statements to Council by Italian and Yugoslav Representatives," in "The second session of the Council of Foreign Ministers, first part, Paris, April 25-May 16, 1946," *Foreign Relations of the United States* (henceforth *FRUS*), *1946. Council of Ministers,* Vol. II (United States Department of State, US government Printing Office: Washington DC, 1946), 228-9; Ilaria Poggiolini, "Negotiating a Settlement for Italy and the Minor Axis Powers: Peace Diplomacy and the Origins of the Cold War, 1945-7," in *The Soviet Union and Europe in the Cold War*, ed. Gori and Pons, 383-94; "The Italian Prime Minister (De Gasperi) to the Secretary of State [Byrnes]," 20 June 1946, *FRUS, 1946. Council of Ministers,* Vol. II (United States Department of State, US government Printing Office: Washington DC, 1946), 569; "The chargé in Italy (Key) to the Acting Secretary of State," 2 July 1946, *FRUS, 1946. Council of Ministers,* Vol. II (United States Department of State, US government Printing Office: Washington DC, 1946), 728; Formigoni, *La Democrazia Cristiana e l'alleanza occidentale,* 75-6; Alcide de Gasperi, "Eleventh Plenary Meeting, August 10, 1946, 4pm," *FRUS, 1946. Paris Peace Conference : proceedings (1946),* Vol.III (United States Department of State, US government Printing Office: Washington DC, 1946), 174-85.

[45] "Arida cerimonia senza parole. La pace è stata firmata. Anche i delegati della Jugoslavia hanno apposta la firma al trattato," *La Nuova Stampa* (Turin), 11 Feb. 1947; Pietro Ingrao, "10 febbraio," *l'Unità* (Rome), 11 Feb. 1947; " 'L'Italia non subirà oltraggi ai suoi diritti'," *La Nuova Stampa* (Turin), 25 June 1946; "Orlando e De Gasperi invocano la concordia di fronte alla minaccia di una pace che mutilerebbe la Patria," *La Nuova Stampa* (Turin), 26 June 1946; "I comunisti di fronte al Governo e ai problemi politici e economici," *La Nuova Stampa* (Turin), 25 July 1946; Ottavio Pastore, "Cose vuole l'on. De Gasperi?" *l'Unità* (Rome), 13 Aug. 1946; Mario Montagnana, "Una critica inevitabile," *l'Unità* (Rome), 14 Aug. 1946; "La clamorosa iniziativa del leader comunista. Il governo unanime respinge la proposta di cedere Gorizia in cambio di Trieste," *La Nuova Stampa* (Turin), 8 Nov. 1946; Palmiro Togliatti, "La politica dei calci nel sedere," *l'Unità* (Turin), 10 Nov. 1946; "La risposta di De Gasperi all'attacco di Togliatti," *La Nuova Stampa* (Turin), 12 Nov. 1946; "Un'intervista del compagno Togliatti. Da un'efficace azione diplomatica dipende che Trieste resti all'Italia," *l'Unità* (Rome), 13 Nov. 1946; "La strada è aperta alla nostra diplomazia. Trieste sotto la sovranità italiana. Una nota dell'organo centrale del Partito Comunista Jugoslavo," *l'Unità* (Rome), 16 Nov. 1946; "La rissa politica riprende," *La Nuova Stampa* (Turin), 23 Nov. 1946; "L'Italia paga le colpe del fascismo. Domani a Parigi firma del trattato," *l'Unità* (Rome), 9 Feb. 1947; Soutou, *La guerre de Cinquante Ans*, 111-59; Formigoni, *La Democrazia Cristiana e l'alleanza occidentale,* 78-83.

[46] Galli, *I partiti politici italiani*, 45-7; "Le dimissioni di Nenni da ministro degli Esteri," *La Nuova Stampa* (Turin), 18 Jan. 1947.

faction led by Giuseppe Saragat left to found the Socialist Party of Italian Workers (PSLI).[47] Initially describing itself as anticapitalistic and Marxist, the party later known as the PSDI would play a "squalid role" as an ally of the DC in the fifties and beyond, adding its number to the lay parties (PRI and PLI).[48] But at the time, on account of almost half of Socialist delegates joining the new party, centrist contemporaries diagnosed a severe blow to the Stalinist left and saluted the possible emergence of a democratic liberal left reminiscent of the British Labour Party.[49]

Previous to his dissolution of the cabinet in late January 1947, De Gasperi had travelled to the United States.[50] Such timing prompted Togliatti to accuse De Gasperi of playing to the American fiddle: "[…] it was inevitable that one should think that the decision, if not imposed, was at least suggested from abroad […]"[51] Togliatti's words helped construct a narrative on the left purporting DC subordination to American will.[52] Evidence however points rather to the premier's efforts to obtain economic aid as well as an explicit endorsement of his party, which the Americans had been loath to concede; no proof of a direct link between a US directive and De Gasperi's dissolution of his coalition government has emerged.[53]

---

[47] *Partito socialista dei lavoratori italiani*, PSLI. On the occasion, PSIUP renamed itself *Partito socialista italiano* (PSI).

[48] Ginsborg, *A History of Postwar Italy*, 86.

[49] Filippo Burzio, "L'ora di Saragat," *La Nuova Stampa* (Turin), 14 Jan. 1947; Ginsborg, *A History of Postwar Italy*, 104-5**;** on the initially anticapitalistic stances of the PSLI, see Galli, *I partiti politici italiani,* 63.

[50] "Dimissioni del Ministero De Gasperi. Stamane il Capo dello Stato inizia le consultazioni per la soluzione della crisi," *La Nuova Stampa* (Turin), 21 Jan. 1946.

[51] Palmiro Togliatti, "Il tamburino e il tamburo," *l'Unità* (Rome), 28 Jan. 1947; Formigoni, *La Democrazia Cristiana e l'alleanza occidentale,* 128.

[52] Ginsborg, *A History of Poswar Italy,* 102-3; Scoppola, *La repubblica dei partiti,* 144.

[53] "Memorandum of Conversation, by the Appointed Ambassador to Italy (Dunn)," *FRUS, 1947*, Vol. III.,*The British Commonwealth; Europe* (US Printing Office, United States Department of State: Washington DC, 1947), 838-41; Formigoni, *La Democrazia Cristiana e l'alleanza occidentale,* 125.

The meeting inaugurated a gradual solidification of DC-US relations.[54] Unlike the relationship between Togliatti and Stalin, that between De Gasperi and US policymakers was of recent vintage and reflected a shared circumspection between the Christian Democrats and the Americans. Among the topics of disaccord was the colonial question: one of De Gasperi's postwar goals had been to restore some degree of Italian control over its former colonies.[55]

Upon his return from the East Coast, De Gasperi set about the task of reconstituting a governing coalition. He favored forging an alliance with the lay parties and the PSLI, but the refusal of both PRI and PSLI to countenance the exclusion of Communist and Socialists led to the reconstitution of a third cabinet of national unity.[56] Soon however economic policies, economic crisis and international developments precipitated another cabinet dissolution. Combating inflation through deflationary policies entailed the necessity to expel the Marxist left from the coalition. The Truman Doctrine had recently provided a stirring narrative for anticommunists everywhere; in France, moves to exclude the PCF from the ruling coalition led by Socialist Prime Minister Ramadier came to a head on May 4.[57] After the cabinet disbanded in

---

[54] Filippo Burzio, "Attesa," *La Nuova Stampa* (Turin), 18 Jan. 1947; "De Gasperi reca agli Italiani il monito e l'incoraggiamento dell'America. La relazione del viaggio al Capo dello Stato," *La Nuova Stampa* (Turin), 18 Jan. 1947; "The Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs (De Gasperi) to the American Ambassador (Kirk)," from "Proposals for Revisions of the Italian Armistice Agreements and for a Preliminary Peace Treaty with Italy," *FRUS: diplomatic papers, 1945. Europe,* Vol.IV (US government Printing Office, US Department of State: Washington DC, 1945), 991-2; "The Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs (De Gasperi) to the Secretary of State [Byrnes]," *FRUS: diplomatic papers, 1945. Europe,* Vol.IV (US government Printing Office, US Department of State: Washington DC, 1945), 1025-9; Formigoni, *La Democrazia Cristiana e l'alleanza occidentale,* 48-56.

[55] Formigoni, *La Democrazia Cristiana e l'alleanza atlantica 1943-1953,* 62-3; on De Gasperi's judicious foreign policy and his channeling and containment of nationalism, see Luciano Tosi, "La politica di cooperazione internazionale dell'Italia: autonomia, interdipendenza e integrazione," in *Politica ed economia nelle relazioni internazionali dell'Italia del secondo dopoguerra: Studi in ricordo di Sergio Angelini*, ed. L. Tosi (Rome: Edizioni Studium, 2002), 87-140.

[56] Ginsborg, *A History of Postwar Italy,* 110-2.

[57] Lazar, *Maisons rouges,* 48.

May, Italian policymakers found new ways to convince circumspect Americans. After the Truman administration's domino theory enshrined the geostrategic importance of Italy, Italian diplomats sensed an opportunity to embellish their pleas for support. When their ambassador appealed for more economic help, he spoke in terms bound to focus American minds. He evoked a domino effect "if Moscow succeeds in establishing a communist Italy."[58]

Following the formation of a fragile minority DC cabinet on May 31, the US administration offered some support, at last meeting De Gasperi's request for public endorsement, albeit discreetly.[59] Secretary of State Marshall's June speech announcing the European Recovery Program (ERP, also known as the Marshall Plan) provided another boost to De Gasperi's Fourth Government.[60] In the moderate and conservative sectors of Italian opinion, coming as it did in the wake of the Soviet-sponsored defenestration of Hungarian Prime Minister Ferenc Nagy, ERP was immediately recognized as an instrument to "stop Russian expansionism in Europe."[61] American officials though expressed continued disappointment with the failure of DC politicians to strike a deal with the PSLI. In a cable to the US ambassador in Rome,

---

[58] "Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State [Marshall]," 16 May 1947, *FRUS, 1947: The British Commonwealth, Europe,* Vol. III (US government Printing Office, US Department of State: Washington DC, 1947), 904-8; see also "The Ambassador in Italy (Dunn) to the Secretary of State," 6 May 1947, *FRUS, 1947: The British Commonwealth, Europe,* Vol. III (US government Printing Office, US Department of State: Washington DC, 1947), 893-4; Aga-Rossi and Zaslavsky, *Togliatti e Stalin,* 223.

[59] "The Ambassador in Italy (Dunn) to the Secretary of State," 6 May 1947, *FRUS, 1947: The British Commonwealth, Europe,* Vol. III (US government Printing Office, US Department of State: Washington DC, 1947), 906.

[60] On the lingering guardedness of the US relative to the DC, see Formigoni, *La Democrazia Cristiana e l'alleanza occidentale,* 136-7, 142**;** Filippo Burzio, "Il Ramadier d'Italia?" *La Stampa* (Turin), 31 May 1947; "Il Ministero è fatto," *La Stampa* (Turin), 31 May 1947; "The Ambassador in Italy (Dunn) to the Secretary of State [Marshall]," 8 June 1947, *FRUS, 1947: The British Commonwealth, Europe,* Vol. III (US government Printing Office, US Department of State: Washington DC, 1947), 920.

[61] "Il piano di Marshall per contrastare l'espansione della Russia in Europa," *La Stampa* (Turin), 7 June 1947.

Secretary of State Marshall urged as much: "With C[hristian] D[emocratic] leaders, you might point out need, which applies to all European Govts [sic] today, for support of democratic left and of fullest possible representation working classes. To both [parties], you might convey impression of US hope that way may yet be cleared for eventual PSLI participation in [government]."[62] Happily, the reconstitution of the Soviet Cominform in fall and parallel PCI calls for mass demonstrations severed the lingering ties of PSLI leader Saragat and the Republicans to the parties of the Marxist left.[63] In December 1947, De Gasperi was at last able to attract the support of the PRI, PLI and PSLI, shoring-up the unstable DC government.

The hastily conceived Marshall Plan would prove a watershed for Italian politics. Initially, Togliatti had hoped that the Marxist left would rejoin the cabinet once the acute phase of the political and economic crisis was over. The PCI, reflecting initial silence in Moscow and a favorable response in Poland and Czechoslovakia to US invitation of all interested parties to the Paris ERP conference, at first equivocated.[64] But by July 1947 a directive of the Soviet Central Committee settled any ambiguity, highlighting the strict limits of autonomy of all communist parties.[65] The Soviet policy favoring the formation of national fronts in alliance with bourgeois parties in France and Italy now came to an abrupt end. Italian and French communists, who alone among Western communists were included in a newly constituted Cominform,

---

[62] "The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Italy," 6 June 1947, *FRUS, 1947: The British Commonwealth, Europe,* Vol. III (US government Printing Office, US Department of State: Washington DC, 1947), 919; Aga-Rossi and Zaslavsky, *Togliatti e Stalin*, 224.

[63] Galli, *I partiti politici italiani*, 64-8; on the coordination of Soviet foreign policy and PCI and PCF strategies, see Soutou, *La guerre de Cinquante Ans*, 186-7.

[64] Soutou, *La guerre de Cinquante Ans*, 178.

[65] Formigoni, *La Democrazia Cristiana e l'alleanza occidentale*, 149; Aga-Rossi and Zaslavsky, *Togliatti e Stalin*, 202.

became a prime focus for the Soviet architects of the policy shift. On the occasion of the organization's preparatory meeting in Szlarska Poreba (Poland) in September, Stalin's close collaborator Andrei Zhdanov harshly attacked French and Italian representatives on account of their policies, even though the latter had been established by the Soviets themselves.[66] Denunciation and the consequent self-criticism of culpable and contrite communists came as no surprise. Both were well-established Stalinist rituals.[67] Soviet rejection of ERP ultimately diminished the appeal of the parties of the left and marked the definitive eclipse of Italy's national unity governments.[68]

The Italian general elections of April 1948, "one of the most important events of the Cold War," delivered a defeat for the Democratic Popular Front of the PCI and PSI and a never equaled again quorum of 48.5 percent of the vote for the DC. During the electoral campaign, for the first time, the US unequivocably engaged in Italian politics, channeling funds to the DC, PSLI and other anticommunist forces in what amounted to the CIA's first covert operation.[69] Expecting victory to the last, the PCI was stunned by defeat. The Popular Front obtained only 31 percent, considerably less than the combined votes of the Communists and Socialists in 1946; as would often be the case, unification on common electoral lists of Italy's fragmented left produced diminishing returns. Little internal discussion of the defeat ensued, though the PCI leadership knew that the unfavorable contrast between US foreign aid and Soviet unflinching

[66] Soutou, *La guerre de Cinquante Ans*, 181-4; Lazar, *Maisons rouges*, 63-4.

[67] Aga-Rossi and Zaslavsky, *Togliatti e Stalin,* 225-7.

[68] Pons, *L'impossibile egemonia,* 23, 34; Aga-Rossi and Zaslavsky, *Togliatti e Stalin,* 200, 223-5.

[69] Soutou, *La guerre de Cinquante Ans*, 196.

demands for war reparations had been a determining factor.[70] Stalin's support for Tito's territorial claims had further mined PCI standing and fueled native anticommunism.[71] The outcome came also as a surprise for US policymakers, who had not anticipated the magnitude of the DC victory, due to their lingering reservations on the party's capabilities.[72]

The first policy briefs to be issued by the recently constituted US National Security Council (NSC) had concerned Italy, confirming high American interest in Italian affairs. The main tenets of NSC Italian policy included (1) the anticipation of a possible victory of the Popular Front and a lack of confidence in the DC; (2) the belief that economic conditions fueled PCI success and the belief that the PCI was a simple puppet of the Soviets; (3) the necessity for contingent plans in case of a Popular Front victory, tempered by the fear of getting too involved; such plans included peripheral military occupation of the Italian Mediterranean islands and support for an underground anticommunist network, but not all out resort to force; and (4) the belief, derived from the domino theory, that Italy's geopolitical importance was linked primarily to its location in the Mediterranean. The US policy response to such challenges was twofold: to encourage the promotion by Italians of economic reform funded through the Marshall Plan, and to encourage domestic repression of the PCI. US policy would oscillate between the two approaches. On both accounts, American policymakers would encounter the resistance of

[70] Aga-Rossi and Zaslavsky, *Togliatti e Stalin*, 237-40.

[71] Soutou, *La guerre de Cinquante Ans*, 63.

[72] Del Pero, *L'alleato scomodo*, 25.

Italians, belying contemporary or subsequent representations of DC passivity and of American omnipotence.[73]

Due to their exagerration of the role of the Marshall Plan in the Christian Democratic electoral triumph, American policymakers would subsequently overestimate their capacity to shape Italian politics. In the short run, they failed to note the weakening of the lay parties which favored New Deal approaches to economic reform. Further, De Gasperi's increased negotiating power consequent to his crushing win created obstacles for US policies, soon leading the Truman administration to express disappointment over the Italian employ of ERP aid. By March 1949, the ERP Country Report for Italy criticized the country's failure to pursue expansionist economic policies and its preference for the reduction and stabilization of the country's debt. The same report also testified to a shift in American stances, anticipating a retreat from a reformist approach to Italian instability and a future preference for a repressive approach to the alleged Italian communist threat.[74] But even as Americans continued to pressure Italian policymakers on various accounts, they would increase their leveraging power and boost their resistance, in a classic instance of the asymmetrical power of dependent allies.[75]

By 1949, Italy's accession to the newly constituted NATO had completed De Gasperi's efforts to recover a degree of Italian sovereignty and some security from external threats.[76] Italian inclusion in the alliance had not been a foregone development. Domestic political

[73] Ibid., passim.

[74] Nuti, *Gli Stati Uniti e l'apertura a sinistra*, 13; Chiarella Esposito, *America's Feeble Weapon: Funding the Marshall Plan in Italy and France , 1948-1950* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1994).

[75] Del Pero, *L'alleato scomodo*, 55-64.

[76] Formigoni, *La Democrazia Cristiana e l'alleanza occidentale*, 437.

opposition included the neutralist wing of the DC, and naturally the left, which resorted to obstructionism in Parliament. Abroad, the northern European founding members of NATO initially resisted Italian accession, due to geostrategic concerns, fears of creating a precedent for Greece and Turkey, Italian social and political vulnerability, and scarce consideration for Italian diplomacy. The Truman administration, driven in part by concerns over the trajectory of Italian domestic politics, was more favorable, though the president himself was initially opposed. France broke the logjam and opened the way for the inclusion of the Italians, in a shift driven by the objective to balance *les Anglo-Saxons* in the alliance and to include the southern Mediterranean, and thus Algeria, in NATO's security perimeter.[77]

NATO accession ended a first phase in the development of US relations with the Christian Democrats. De Gasperi, having shored up Italian foreign policy at the price of the sacrifice of neutralist aspirations, was now in a better position to resist and manipulate US power. The thesis of a American "empire by invitation" is applicable to the Italian case, provided it is nuanced by an appreciation of the country's management of its ally, including the dismissal of unwanted pressures.[78]

The republic's first legislation (1948-1953) overlapped with the Sovietization of Eastern Europe and several war scares, including the Soviet blockade of West Berlin, the quarrel

[77] Soutou, *La guerre de Cinquante Ans*, 207-10.

[78] Del Pero, *L'alleato scomodo*, 29-34, 64-82; for an extended restatement of Lundestad's thesis, see Geir Lundestad, *The United States and Western Europe since 1945: from "Empire" by Invitation to Transatlantic Drift* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). The DC rejected repression of the PCI on account of three considerations: fear of civil conflict, fidelity to the Constitution, and rejection of the American Manichean approach to the Cold War. Formigoni, *La Democrazia Cristiana e l'alleanza occidentale*, 156. In addition to foreign pressures, De Gasperi, who nurtured relatively good relations with the Communists, had to contend with an internal right-wing opposition backed by the Vatican. On the DC reformist project to coopt over the long term a part of the social-communist bloc, see Lazar, *Maisons rouges*, 299; on the Holy Office's campaign to outlaw the PCI, see Scoppola, *La Repubblica dei partiti*, 224-5.

between Stalin and Tito, and the outbreak of hot war in Korea in 1950. The PCI shifted into permanent opposition and participated in all major Stalinist internationalist campaigns against NATO or the Europeanist Schuman Plan; pacifism became a central aspect of PCI internationalism. Communist recourse to the organization the Partisans of Peace began in earnest in 1949 and intensified the following year; opinion campaigns were characterized by anti-American propaganda casting US policies as war-mongering and the Soviet Union as peace-loving.[79] While the DC consolidated its hold on power and De Gasperi crafted a foreign policy anchored to the West, the Marxist left constructed a dissident and antisystem political culture based on antifascism, pacifism, anti-Americanism, and pro-Sovietism. Among other uses, antifascism and pacifism helped disguise the PCI's alignment with Soviet foreign policy by constructing an alternative patriotism, thus deflecting doubts about the party's loyalties. As successful as the DC was in the realm of executive power, so was the PCI in the realm of ideas, ensuring the party a large share of the vote and of the support of intellectuals.

With Nenni's help, the PCI ensured the subordination of the Socialists. A double-membership policy initiated by Togliatti in 1947 continued to be in effect. After the electoral defeat of 1948 the PSI briefly veered to the center, asserting the distinction between the interests of the Italian working class and those of the Soviet Union and declaring its support for the implementation of the Marshall Plan. But the pendulum soon swung back, beginning with the PSI party congress of May 1949 and culminating with the victory of the pro-Communist left

[79] Aga-Rossi "PCI e URSS nel periodo staliniano" in *I partiti politici nell'Italia repubblicana*, ed. Nicolosi, 113-4**;** Ruggero Giacomini, *I partigiani della pace: Il movimento pacifista in Italia e nel mondo negli anni della prima guerra fredda* (Milan: Vangelista, 1984); Formigoni, *La Democrazia Cristiana e l'alleanza occidentale*, 157-8; Lazar, *Maisons rouges*, 67-8; Lawrence S. Wittner, *One World Or None: A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement Through 1953*, vol. 1 of *The Struggle Against the Bomb* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1993), 180-4, 217.

wing of the PSI in 1951, the same year Pietro Nenni received the Stalin Peace Prize. In 1952, Nenni travelled to Moscow to accept the prize from the hands of the autocrat; he was the last Western leader to meet with him before his death. Three years later, in a pattern illustrating the oscillations of the postwar PSI, Nenni returned the prize.[80]

Italian Communists, more even than the Socialists, identified with the Soviet Union. The relationship between Togliatti and Stalin, a key foundation of PCI-Soviet relations, has not yet been the subject of a detailed study, due in part to the continuing dearth of primary documents. An episode of 1951 illustrates both the depth of ties between the two leaders and the degree of autonomy enjoyed by Togliatti, though the lack of evidence obscures its meaning. In a letter to Stalin in January 1951, Togliatti justified his rationale for rejecting Stalin's invitation to head the Cominform as motivated by concern for the trajectory of domestic Italian politics and the impact his departure would have on the PCI. Other motivations for the refusal remain obscure. Historians have speculated that Stalin may have wanted to replace Togliatti with rivals Luigi Longo and Pietro Secchia, whose hardline stances conformed more closely to Soviet policy.[81] Togliatti's response to Stalin's offer is also of interest on account of a detail noted by two historians. Togliatti used quotation marks in describing himself as an Italian national to Stalin, seemingly exalting his internationalist identification with the Soviet Union even as, in an apparent contradiction, he refused Stalin's offer of the job. Aga-Rossi and Zaslavsky have interpreted this detail as proof of a complete identification with the Soviet Union.[82] But their

[80] Aga-Rossi and Zaslavsky, *Togliatti e Stalin,* 251.

[81] A crucial PCI document that might have thrown light on this episode has vanished: the memorandum of the PCI directory authorizing, in Togliatti's absence, his assignation to the Cominform position. See Lazar, *Maisons rouges*, 79, 84-6.

[82] Aga-Rossi and Zaslavsky, *Togliatti e Stalin*, 254-63.

point may be overdrawn, as it is doubtful that Togliatti thought of his internationalism as contradicting his patriotism; more likely, he wished to sweeten the rejection of a formidable patron's request.

On the DC front, by 1951 De Gasperi's strategy of forging a centrist path was in crisis due to electoral decline in the south. The premier responded with a law vilified by the left as a swindle and approved in March 1953 in the face of Socialist and Communist obstructionism.[83] The law would assign in forthcoming general elections sixty-five percent of seats in the Chamber of Deputies to the alliance of parties and electoral lists that obtained more than half of of the popular vote. It has been described by one historian in dark tones as one of a series of exceptional laws abridging civil liberties and as constituting a concession to the pressures of the Vatican, the right, and US ambassador Clare Boothe Luce.[84] But it is also true that the so-called swindle law can be interpreted as an attempt to preserve Christian Democratic centrism and the party's progressive vocation by containing potentially dangerous US and Vatican pressures. Briefly put, the DC refused to swap its antifascist identity for an anticommunist one.[85]

Electoral outcomes in the general elections of June 1953 narrowly defeated DC objectives. The electoral alliance encompassing the DC, PRI, PLI, PSDI and two small factions obtained 49.8 percent of the vote, just short of the sought quorum. The DC and especially its lay allies lost considerable electoral support; opponents to the law on the far left and far right gained terrain. While major credit for the outcome belongs to the Socialist and Communist opposition,

---

[83] It came to be known as the "swindle law," in Italian *legge truffa.*

[84] Ginsborg, *A History of Postwar Italy*, 142-3.

[85] Scoppola, *La repubblica dei partiti*, 239-40.

it was also attributeable to two tiny electoral formations assembled by lay dissenters opposed to their parties' alignment with the DC.[86] The dissident factions jointly obtained about one percent of the vote, enough to derail De Gasperi's plan if added to the votes mustered by the Marxist left.[87] Their affirmation illustrated the importance of tiny minorities in Italy's fragmented political system. Among the ranks of the two dissident factions were prestigious figures of Italian liberalism and of the vanished Action Party, including Ferruccio Parri, Tristano Codignola and Piero Calamandrei.[88] In retrospect, opposition to the "swindle law" marked the emergence of a political current concerned about the consolidation of a "DC regime" and of a "partitocracy" (*partitocrazia*).[89] The emergent antiparty sensibility, we have seen, was ultimately rooted in a nineteenth century critique of transformism.[90]

The 1953 fiasco ended De Gasperi's career as well as a phase in Italian political history, imposing the question of Christian Democratic dialogue with the Socialists. A prolonged

[86] Lazar, *Maisons rouges*, 87.

[87] The two small formations were *Unità Popolare* and *Alleanza Democratica Nazionale.*

[88] The prestigious liberal periodical Il Mondo, founded in 1949 by a future member of the first Radical Party, Mario Pannunzio, remained divided on the question. See Antonio Cardini, "Il 'partito' de 'Il Mondo': liberali, 'terza forza', sinistra democratica, radicali," in *I partiti politici nell'Italia repubblicana*, ed. Nicolosi, , 313-30; Teodori, *Storia dei laici*, 259; Bedeschi, *La fabbrica delle ideologie,* 350-1.

[89] Giuseppe Maranini, "Paese reale e paese legale" of 1954, "Partitocrazia" of 1952, and "Il regime dei partiti" of 1955, in his *Miti e realtà della democrazia* (Milan: Edizioni di comunità, 1958), 170-9, 203-6, 220-4; Lupo, *Partito e antipartito*,91-2; Mastropaolo, *Antipolitica*, 46-7; Giovagnoli, *Il partito italiano*, 62.

[90] Lazar, *Maisons rouges*, 299; for the nineteenth-century roots of this political dynamic, and its sequels in twentieth century Italian politics, see Carlo Tullio-Altan, *Populismo e trasformismo: Saggio sulle ideologie italiane* (Milan, Feltrinelli, 1989). Such patterns remain an aspect of Italian politics, as demonstrated by the tendency of the center-left coalition governments in power between 1996 and 2001 to accommodate through benign neglect Silvio Berlusconi's media interests. See Paul Ginsborg, *Silvio Berlusconi: Television, Power and Patrimony* (New York: Verso, 2004), 87-93.

transitional period began which would eventually produce the Opening to the Left.[91] The DC's political shift had also diplomatic implications. Since the Atlantic alliance had been an artifact of the DC sharply contested by the opposition, the crisis of DC centrism revived alternative foreign policy orientations, including neutralism.[92] Also in 1953, the death of Stalin and the end of the Korean War at the hands of President Eisenhower sealed an acute phase of the Cold War and raised hopes of international détente.[93]

US-Italian relations in the Eisenhower era are overly identified with the tenure of the hardline anticommunist US ambassador to Italy Clare Boothe Luce, but were rather divided into two distinc phases corresponding to President Eisenhower's first and second terms. Luce's ambassadorship (1953-1956) entailed firm opposition to any rapprochement between the DC and the Socialists. Her resignation in 1956 due to an illness, combined with the impact on Italian politics of incipient de-Stalinization in the USSR, was followed by a softening of intransigent stances; such an evolution anticipated the turning point represented by the successive Kennedy administration.[94] Over this arc of time, three dynamics characterized US-Italian relations. The first entailed the intensification, particularly during the Luce Ambassadorship, of US pressure on the DC to implement anticommunist measures.[95] The second was a related adversarial stance on

[91] Nuti, *Gli Stati Uniti e l'apertura a sinistra*, 30-1; Scoppola, *La repubblica dei partiti*, 332; Galli, *I partiti politici italiani*, 83-8; Umberto Gentiloni Silveri, *L'Italia e la nuova frontiera: Stati Uniti e centro-sinistra 1958-1965* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1998), 25.

[92] Agostino Giovagnoli, "Un paese di frontiera: l'Italia tra il 1945 e il 1989," in *Un ponte sull'Atlantico*, ed. Giovagnoli and Tosi, 102.

[93] Soutou, *La guerre de Cinquante Ans*, 265-314.

[94] Nuti, *Gli Stati Uniti e l'apertura a sinistra*, 104-5, 560-1, 669-76; see also Gentiloni Silveri, *L'Italia e la nuova frontiera*, 7-17, 28-56.

[95] Mario del Pero, "American Pressures and Their Containment in Italy during the Ambassadorship of Clare Boothe Luce, 1953-1956," *Diplomatic History*, no. 3 (June 2004), 407-39.

the question of DC openings to the Socialist left and opposition to a premature reunification of the PSI with the smaller PSDI. Such policies were increasingly challenged by allied US and Italian constituencies favorable to the Opening to the Left.[96] A third dynamic involved the growing political use of security and nuclear questions by Italian and American policymakers to either exorcize or favor the Opening to the Left. For the first time, nuclear politics intruded on Italian domestic affairs, establishing a recurring pattern.[97]

The incoming Eisenhower administration judged the outcomes of the 1953 Italian elections a confirmation of opinions already held, namely that combating the growth of Italian communism was not best accomplished through developmental economic policies. Such conclusions had been foreshadowed by measures taken over the last year by Truman.[98] Newly appointed Ambassador to Italy Clare Boothe Luce made it her business to force the revamped US policy on the recalcitrant Italians. She had been a fervid sustainer during the electoral campaign of Presidential candidate Dwight Eisenhower and was linked by friendship and ideological conviction to Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and his brother Allen Dulles, the

---

[96] For a detailed account by a participant of the complex interplay of the constellation of US and Italian domestic constituencies on different sides of the policy debate, see Leo J. Wollenborg, *Stelle, strisce e tricolore : Trent'anni di vicende politiche fra Roma e Washington* (Milan: Mondadori, 1983), 19-112.

[97] For an exhaustive treatment of this complex topic over the entire postwar period, see Leopoldo Nuti, *La sfida nucleare*: *La politica estera italiana e le armi atomiche 1945-1991* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2007).

[98] In February 1952 the Psychological Strategy Board had formulated of the "D-15/b Demagnetize" plan. The plan prescribed pressuring the Italian government to harass the PCI, including by curtailing its sources of funding, undermining the Socialist-Communist union it controlled, the CGIL, and banning PCI-backed international organizations. Apparent signs of compliance by De Gasperi emerged the same year, when in the wake of new law promulgating to prohibit the reconstitution of the National Fascist Party, De Gasperi ambiguously stated that it could be directed against any "totalitarian movement." But little in the way of action followed. In large part due to international developments such as Stalin's death and Soviet Prime Minister Malenkov's international peace offensive of 1953, which contrasted unfavorably with the new Eisenhower Administration's announced arms buildup, anticommunist sentiment within the DC and its allies declined. Nuti, *Gli Stati Uniti e l'apertura a sinistra*, 14; Giovagnoli, *Il partito italiano*, 59, 63; Nuti, *Gli Stati Uniti e l'apertura a sinistra*, 7-8.

Director of the CIA. In April 1954 the Operations Coordinating Board, a new entity created by Eisenhower to coordinate foreign policy, formulated an NSC memorandum tying American foreign aid to Italian governmental repression of domestic communism.[99] In accordance, Ambassador Luce pressured Italian Prime Minister Mario Scelba to act on his promises to implement anticommunist measures. According to one account, Scelba responded by seeking to placate Luce through resounding yet innocuous actions, in a modern instance of the time-honored approach of colonial entities to imperial dictate.[100] The Italian premier warned Luce that prudence was imperative, lest a civil war break out; he sought assurances of American military support in such an eventuality, highlighting grave risks to the American administration. Policies to improve standards of living were also necessary, insisted Italian interlocutors, evoking earlier US policy.[101]

In the event, American diplomacy elsewhere proved more persuasive than ham-fisted attempts to impose domestic anticommunism. On the question of Trieste, which due to US outreach to the rebel communist leader Tito had fueled anti-American and neutralist sentiment, the US brokered a compromise apportioning the two buffer zones carved out by the 1947 Peace Treaty to Italy and Yugoslavia respectively. Luce facilitated Italy's admission to the UN and the relocation to northern Italy of a renamed Southern European Task Force (SETAF), the US army

[99] "Draft Statement of Policy Proposed by the Planning Board of the National Security Council, March 12, 1954" *FRUS, 1952-54, vol.VI, part 2, Western Europe and Canada* (Washington, DC: US government Printing Office, 1952-54), 1656-60.

[100] Wollenborg, *Stelle, strisce e tricolore,* 24.

[101] "The Ambassador in Italy (Luce) to the Under Secretary of State (Smith), April 8, 1954," *FRUS, 1952-54, vol.VI, part 2, Western Europe and Canada,* (Washington, DC: US government Printing Office, 1952-54), 1660-3.

corps displaced from Austria after that country's Neutrality Treaty of May 1955.[102] There is little doubt that the military redeployment had a geostrategic dimension, but the speediness with which the Italian government approved it was also indicative of the objective of Italian centrist forces to slow a rapprochement in act between the PSI and the left wings of the ruling coalition parties. Deployment of the nuclear-equipped SETAF reinforced the Atlanticist dimensions of Italian foreign policy, driving a wedge between a neutralist PSI and the non-Marxist parties. Not for the last time, foreign policy and its military and nuclear dimensions fulfilled a domestic political agenda, while simultaneously boosting the stature of Italian diplomats.[103]

By 1955, the US administration and its Rome ambassador could claim a degree of success. In January, Eisenhower expressed his satisfaction with the seeming toughening of Premier Scelba's anticommunist measures.[104] In this self-congratulatory climate, however, the election of Christian Democrat Giovanni Gronchi as Italian President in April came as a shock, seemingly undermining recent accomplishments and calling into question Luce's grasp of the Italian scene: Gronchi was thought to be favorable to a DC-PSI coalition government. The *New York Times*, reflecting the range of views present within the US, dismissed anticommunist alarmism in an editorial: "the future is uncertain in some respects, but there is certainly no reason whatever at this date to fear that Italy's hard-won and greatly prized democracy is going to keel over leftward into the Communist abyss."[105] The Eisenhower administration disagreed and

[102] Alessandro Brogi, "Ike and Italy: The Eisenhower Administration and Italy's 'Neo-Atlanticist' Agenda," *Journal of Cold War Studies*, no. 3 (Summer 2002): 5-35; Nuti, *Gli Stati Uniti e l'apertura a sinistra,* 5-24.

[103] Nuti, *Gli Stati Uniti e l'apertura a sinistra,* 44-5.

[104] Ibid., 35-6.

[105] "Gronchi speaks up," *New York Times,* 13 May 1955.

continued to express firm opposition to an opening to the Socialists.[106] Luce made rejection of any concessions to Nenni a dogma, as CIA operative William Colby found out when he suggested a shift to a different approach.[107]

American hardline stances derived in part from the PSI's unique status in the panorama of European socialism. Many West European socialist parties had replaced neutralism with firm anticommunism and alignment with the United States; others, such as the West German Social-Democratic Party (SPD), were poised to do so.[108] To the contrary, Nenni was convinced that another way was possible, which included neutrality in the Cold War conflict and a Third Way which was neither social-democratic nor Bolshevik. Departing Moscow by plane, Nenni had once noted: "it is not a terrestrial paradise that I leave behind. I am not unaware of the limits or errors of the system. But these red stars under the wing of the airplane that climbs are the beacon of the triumphant proletarian revolution."[109] In 1955, as a tentative détente emerged, Nenni thought once more to be on the winning side of history. Holding views which anticipated those of Enrico Berlinguer, the PCI leader (1972-1984) and artisan of Eurocommunism, Nenni hoped Italy might be the harbinger of new international order "beyond the logic of the blocs." He did not believe that he needed to moderate his leftism; rather he considered that centrist parties were bound to shift leftward. On the same account, Socialist foreign policy was exempted from any

[106] "The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Offices, June 29, 1953," *FRUS, 1952-1954, vol.VI,part 2, Western Europe and Canada* (Washington, DC: US government Printing Office, 1952-54), 1620-1.

[107] Nuti, *Gli Stati Uniti e l'apertura a sinistra*, 24-5, 35.

[108] Paul Hockenos, *Joschka Fischer and the Making of the Berlin Republic: An Alternative History of Postwar Germany* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 45-7; Nuti, *Gli Stati Uniti e l'apertura a sinistra*, 33; Donald Sassoon, *One Hundred Years of Socialism. The West European Left in the Twentieth Century* (London: IBTauris, 1996), Chapter 9, "Between Neutralism and Atlanticism."

[109] Cited by Nuti, *Gli Stati Uniti e l'apertura a sinistra*, 33.

significant revisionism, yielding a puzzling commixture of Atlanticism and neutralism which would persist until a shift consequent to Bettino Craxi's nomination as party secretary in 1976.[110]

The Eisenhower administration interpreted Nenni's ambivalence as outright double-dealing masking a Soviet plot. For their part, Italian lay critics of the Marxist left such as Niccolò Carandini, the first secretary of the Radical Party, attributed Nenni's maddening ambiguities to outright fear of his ally. On the occasion of a meeting with Ambassador Luce, he conveyed an impression gained from meetings with Nenni: he argued that the latter sought a break with the PCI, but "did not have the physical courage to do so."[111]

The creation of the first Radical Party in late 1955 was one among other symptoms of a climate of change then permeating Europe. After a Great Powers summit in Switzerland, a "Spirit of Geneva" seemed to announce a new era of superpower détente.[112] In Italy, the relaxation of Cold War tensions added momentum to the search for a reformist force on the left which might break the political stalemate. Hopes, to be sure, centered primarily on the evolution of the Socialists. The cautiously reformist language which marked the proceedings of a 1955 PSI congress seemingly corroborated the new trend.[113] And even as Nenni nursed his ambiguities and battled internal opponents, his autonomist party faction gained adepts in the wake of the international developments of 1956, notably the revelations of the XXth congress of

[110] Colarizi, *Storia politica della Repubblica,* 126-7.

[111] Nuti, *Gli Stati Uniti e l'apertura a sinistra,* 41-2, 52, 55-6. Carandini citation on page 55.

[112] Soutou, *La guerre de Cinquante Ans*, 265-314.

[113] Enzo Forcella, "Il 'nuovo linguaggio' di Nenni. La situazione politica dopo il congresso socialista. Cauta ripresa di contatti tra la democrazia cristiana e il PSI – Social-democratici e repubblicani reagiscono duramente. La chiave del problema," *La Stampa* (Turin), 5 Apr. 1955.

the Soviet Communist Party, "normalization" in Poland, and the Soviet invasion of Hungary.[114] Such developments dealt a blow to the Stalinist left and raised the hopes of all liberal leftists.

The Radical Party originated from the scission of the left wing of PLI after the latter's rightward turn in 1954 under the leadership of Giovanni Malagodi.[115] The new party adopted the appellation of a similarly named early twentieth century anticlerical party, which in turn had roots in Risorgimento far left politics.[116] Also affirmed by the party's founders was inspiration from a nineteenth-century British radical reformism derived from the tensions between European conservatism and the ideals of the French Revolution: the Radicals adopted as their symbol a French revolutionary effigy, Liberty in a Phrygian Cap.[117] Among the party's founders, in addition to left Liberals and other lay intellectuals, were former Actionists: Guido Calogero, Leo Valiani, Ernesto Rossi, and others.[118]

The Radical Party of Italian Liberals and Democrats, as it was formally denominated, proposed to "activate the Constitution and the effective implementation of a lay and liberal state,

---

[114] Soutou, *La guerre de Cinquante Ans*, 319-36; Nuti, *Gli Stati Uniti e l'apertura a sinistra*, 53-4; Federico Cohen, *Sinistra Italiana Sinistra Europea: Le ragioni di un'anomalia* (Rome: Gangemi, 1997), 34-6; Sassoon, *One Hundred Years of Socialism*, 266-7.

[115] Two years earlier, in 1952, PLI luminary Benedetto Croce had died. "Perchè nasce in Italia un nuovo partito politico," *Il Mercurio*, 24 Dec. 1955, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=44155&lang=IT&cms=; "Fondazione del Partito Radicale," *Aggiornamenti Sociali*, Feb. 1956, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=44176&lang=IT&cms=.

[116] Giovanni Orsina, *Anticlericalismo e democrazia: Storia del Partito radicale in Italia e a Roma, 1901-1914* (Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2002).

[117] "L'esperienza di un partito nuovo," *Il Radicale*, 2 Mar. 1957, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=44205&lang=IT&cms=; Orsina, *Anticlericalismo e democrazia*.

[118] Teodori, *Storia dei laici*, 271.

a state […] that guarantees actual liberty from governmental or police arbitrary power."[119] The leaders of the new party detected an "unoccupied chair" in the crowded arena of Italian politics. They justified the launch of yet another third force lay party by what they represented as the failure of Liberals, Republicans and Social-Democrats to forge an alternative to Christian-Democratic power or to the hegemony of Communists and Socialists over the opposition. Recent socio-economic change, argued party leader Leopoldo Piccardi, had opened up electoral opportunities; thirty percent of Italian workers had entered the service economy; they might prove less sensitive to class-based political appeals. Piccardi hoped that Radicals could play a critical role as a magnet for votes or at least serve as catalyzer for reform through conferences organized by the party's close ally, the periodical *Il Mondo*.[120] Though expressing support for a potential center-left government, Radicals sought "the liberal reform of society […] Otherwise the fate of Italy will be ineluctably marked by the merging of a fundamentalist Christian Democracy and a nationalizing and dirigiste Socialist Party."[121] Playing the squallid role of yet

[119] "Dichiarazione programmatica del Partito Radicale dei Liberali e dei Democratici Italiani," Dec. 1955, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=44151&lang=IT&cms=.

[120] Leopoldo Piccardi, "La sedia vuota," *Il Mondo*, 10 Jan. 1956, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=44160&lang=IT&cms=; Guido Calogero, "Una lettera di Calogero," *Il Mondo*, 24 Jan. 1956, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=44163&lang=IT&cms=; Leopoldo Piccardi, "Sulla attività del Comitato Studi. Relazione al Consiglio Nazionale," report dated 6 July 1957 in OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=44218&lang=IT&cms=. Close to the Radical viewpoint was also *l'Espresso*, a periodical founded in 1955 by Eugenio Scalfari. *Il Mondo* folded in 1966, while *l'Espresso* would become and remains an influential and mass-circulated leftist weekly. A founder of the first Radical Party, Scalfari, after a run as a Socialist politician, launched in 1976 *La Repubblica*, the first daily on the left not to reflect a party line. It would prove sufficiently influential as to lead contemporaries and posterity to hypothesize a "party of Scalfari," the would-be kingmaker of the Italian left during the last two decades of the Cold War. Eugenio Scalfari, *La sera andavamo in Via Veneto: Storia di un gruppo dal 'Mondo' alla 'Repubblica'* (Milan: Mondadori, 1986); Mastropaolo, *Antipolitica*, 100-1; Eugenio Scalfari, *L'uomo che non credeva in Dio* (Turin: Einaudi, 2008); Maurizio Stefanini, *Il partito 'Repubblica': Una storia politica del giornale di Scalfari e Mauro* (Milan: Boroli, 2010).

[121] Mario Paggi, "Perchè nasce in Italia un nuovo partito politico," *Il Mercurio*, 24 Dec. 1955, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=44155&lang=IT&cms=.

another small party preoccupied with the preservation of its tiny slice of power should by all means be avoided, emphasized Piccardi.[122]

The first incarnation of postwar Radicalism merged Crocian liberalism with Actionist suspicion of the collusion of parties with conservative interests.[123] But unlike Pannella's later formation, anticommunism and opposition to popular front policies predominated among the first Radicals, excluding the possibility of accords with the PCI.[124] Their electoral politics involved initially a series of alliances in local elections with the Republicans, Social-Democrats, Socialists, and *Unità Popolare*, a faction which had helped defeat the DC's electoral 1953 "swindle law."[125] The party's platform was anticlerical: Radicals sought the repeal of the Concordat and a more pronounced separation between state and church. They denounced excessive bureaucracy or the collusion of state and business interests; unlike Pannella's later party, however, they endorsed New Deal reformism.[126] Other objectives included the defense of individual liberties, school

[122] Piccardi, "La sedia vuota," *Il Mondo*, 10 Jan. 1956, OHRA.

[123] Leopoldo Piccardi, "Una lettera di Piccardi," *Il Mondo*, 24 Jan. 1956, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=44164&lang=IT&cms=; Paolo Pavolini, "Scadenza imminente," *Il Mondo*, 29 Jan. 1957, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=44203&lang=IT&cms; Paolo Pavolini, "Un partito liberato," *Il Mondo*, 19 Feb. 1957, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=44204&lang=IT&cms=; Leopoldo Piccardi, "Un programma Radicale," party pamphlet printed 22 Mar. 1958, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=44228&lang=IT&cms=.

[124] "I giorni contati," *Il Radicale*, 2 Mar. 1957, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=44207&lang=IT&cms=.

[125] Nicolò Carrandini, "Esordio Radicale," *Il Mondo*, 29 May 1956, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=44188&lang=IT&cms=; Federico Mancini and Antonio Santucci, "I laici dopo le elezioni," *Il Mulino*, June 1956, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=44189&lang=IT&cms=; "Relazione della giunta esecutiva al II Consiglio nazionale del Partito Radicale," June 1956, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=44191&lang=IT&cms=; "Una piattaforma per la Sinistra democratica," *Il Radicale*, 2 Mar.1957, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=44197&lang=IT&cms; "Relazione della Giunta esecutiva al V. Consiglio nazionale del Partito Radicale," Dec. 1957, party document, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=44231&lang=IT&cms=.

[126] Ernesto Rossi, "Erba trastulla," *Il Mondo*, 7 Feb. 1956, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=44172&lang=IT&cms=; Ernesto Rossi, "La lotta contro i monopoli: pescicani nella rete," *Il Mondo*, 21 Feb. 1956, OHRA,

reform, urban planning, and a more independent media at a time when the state and the DC controlled the sole existing television channel and political parties determined the biases of all major dailies.[127] But electoral failures in 1956-1958 almost immediately led to divisions within party ranks.[128] On one side stood a group around Piccardi and Eugenio Scalfari calling for a close alliance to the autonomist wing of the Socialists. On the other side stood *Il Mondo*'s Radicals, who were favorable to continued electoral alliance with the Republicans and above all the pursuit of reform outside of party channels through investigative journalism and issue-based conferences.[129]

The conferences organized by *Il Mondo* were inseparable from Radical politics.[130] The magazine had been launched in 1949 by Mario Pannunzio and other Crocian, liberal intellectuals

---

http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=44175&lang=IT&cms=; Ernesto Rossi, "Vaticano e civiltà moderna," *Il Radicale*, 2 Mar. 1957, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=44209&lang=IT&cms=.

[127] Antonio Cederna, "I vandali a Roma," May 1956, party booklet, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=44184&lang=IT&cms=; "Taccuino: il comitato degli imbecilli," *Il Mondo*, 15 May 1956, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=44186&lang=IT&cms; Massimo Salvadori, "Radicalismo e libertà," Dec. 1956, party document, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=44196&lang=IT&cms=; Guido Calogero, "Orientamenti di politica scolastica," Oct. 1957, party document, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=44225&lang=IT&cms=; Adolfo Battaglia, "Parità di propaganda," *Il Mondo*, 15 Apr. 1958, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=44235&lang=IT&cms=; Ernesto Rossi, "Per l'indipendenza della R.A.I. – l'alta vigilanza," *Il Mondo*, 6 Jan. 1959, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=44245&lang=IT&cms=; Paolo Pavolini, "La stampa del regime," *Il Mondo*, 19 May 1959, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=44291&lang=IT&cms=. In 1961 a second public television channel was added and eventually assigned to the PSI.

[128] Paolo Pavolini, "Un paese immaturo," *Il Mondo*, 3 June 1958, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=44236&lang=IT&cms=; Niccolò Carandini, "L'appello dei giovani," *Il Mondo*, 10 June 1958, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=44237&lang=IT&cms=; "Relazione della Giunta esecutiva. Consiglio nazionale del Partito Radicale," June 1958, party document, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=44238&lang=IT&cms=.

[129] Teodori, *Storia dei laici*, 274-6.

[130] Antonio Cardini, *Tempi di ferro: "Il Mondo" e l'Italia del dopoguerra* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1992); Paolo Bonetti, *"Il Mondo" 1949-66: Ragione e illusione borghese* (Rome-Bari: Laterza, 1975); Mauro Del Bosco, *I radicali e "Il Mondo"* (Turin: ERI, 1979); Scalfari, *La sera andavamo in Via Veneto*; Massimo Teodori, Piero Ignazi and Angelo Panebianco, *I nuovi radicali: Storia e sociologia di un movimento politico* (Milan: Mondadori, 1977), part I, chapter 1, "Dai vecchi ai nuovi radicali," transcript in OHRA,

and often engaged in historical polemics with the Socialists and Communists over the merits of pre-Fascist Italy, echoing a postwar debate. *Il Mondo*'s contestation of Communist claims to incarnate Italian liberal democracy frequently attracted the fulminations of Togliatti in the pages of *Rinascita*.[131] A linchpin of the magazine's brand of antitotalitarianism was frequent denunciation of the PCI's acquiescence to Soviet foreign policy; yet, it can also be argued that the periodical's anticommunism remained immune from dogmatism.[132] For example, the reformist significance of Nikita Krushchev's report to the XXth congress of the PCSU was recognized, even as it was qualified.[133] A prominent Radical intellectual, Gaetano Salvemini, collaborator of *Il Mondo* and longtime opponent of the PCI, on at least one occasion expressed optimism regarding the unity of the Italian left. He hoped "to give up towards [the Communists] a hostility that weighs upon us, because our hostility is permanent towards the fascists and the clerico-fascists, and not against the Communists."[134] Such words announced the greater openness to the PCI of Pannella's left Radicals.

---

http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=46141&lang=IT&cms=. Conferences included as themes the ills of monopolistic capitalism and its collusion with political power, allegedly exemplified by Enrico Mattei and his control of ENI, the state energy conglomerate. The conferences propagated the need to liberalize the economy; to implement school reform; to combat clerical influence on the DC and the tendency of the latter to become a "regime"; the defense of a free press. See Teodori, *Storia dei laici,* 262-5; Eugenio Scalfari, "Breve storia degli 'Amici del Mondo'," *Il Radicale,* 2 Mar. 1957, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=44212&lang=IT&cms=.

[131] Teodori, *Storia dei laici,* 261-2.

[132] Mario Paggi, "Protagonisti Radicali," *Il Mondo,* 17 Jan. 1956, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=44161&lang=IT&cms=; Teodori, *Storia dei laici*, 227-37, 259-70; Bedeschi, *La fabbrica delle ideologie,* 345-51.

[133] Mario Boneschi, "Dopo il rapporto Krusciov: l'illusione del buon tiranno," *Il Mondo,* 3 July 1956, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=44193&lang=IT&cms.

[134] Citation in Lupo, *Partito e antipartito* ,140; see also Carocci, ed., *"Il Mondo",* xxiv, xxvi-xxvii; Massimo Teodori, who is committed to an antitotalitarian interpretation *à la François Furet* of the role of lay political traditions in Italian postwar political history, overlooks this aspect of Salvemini's thought in his chapter on the intellectual: see his *Storia dei laici,* 249-58.

The Eisenhower administration for its part remained weary of the synergy between détente and the gathering momentum in Italy towards an Opening to the Left that it continued to perceive as a communist plot. Following the 1955 Geneva summit a memorandum issued by State Department bemoaned that the Spirit of Geneva favored Nenni's contradictory behavior of alignment with the PCI and rapprochement to the governmental parties.[135] US officials did not favor an immediate break between the PCI and PSI; if premature, they feared it might prove lead to a dangerous re-integration of the PSDI into the PSI, before the latter was completely detached from the Soviet Union.[136] Still, toward the end of Ambassador Luce's tenure, a new tone was discernable in American pronouncements. Luce herself appeared to alter her approach, contemplating, albeit hypothetically, funding for the PSI as a way to wean it off dependence on PCI and Eastern European funds.

In late fall 1956, the sequels of Soviet intervention to quell a Hungarian rebellion empowered autonomist currents within the PSI. While the vigor of autonomist trends soon subsided, the aftermath of Budapest had a lasting impact on Socialist relations with the DC and the PCI.[137] Nenni's condemnation of Soviet foreign policy at the 1957 Socialist congress struck

---

[135] Indeed, Nenni's tergiversations were once again in evidence after Khrushchev's congressional speech. The Italian Socialist published articles signaling growing disaccord with Soviet positions, and therefore implicitly PCI stances; but he also wrote to Khrushchev, reasserting mutual ties, and met with Togliatti to tell him he did not seek a break. "US Has The Text. Will Make It Public—Bitterness Amazes Aides in Capital," *New York Times*, 4 June 1956; Nuti, *Gli Stati Uniti e l'apertura a sinistra*, 44-5, 53-6.

[136] In seeking to slow down the reunification of the two Italian socialist parties, US policymakers resorted on this occasion as on others to the Socialist International. A majority of Western European socialists and social-democrats concurred with American positions, isolating French and English socialists favorable to the union of the two Italian parties. Austrian and Dutch socialists denounced the PSI for its alleged subordination to Nikita Khrushchev's new line of peaceful coexistence. For Krushchev's new policy, announced at the twentieth congress, and the West's response, see Soutou, *La guerre de Cinquante Ans*, 323-30.

[137] Nuti, *Gli Stati Uniti e l'apertura a sinistra*, 93; Pietro Nenni, *Tempo di guerra fredda: Diari 1943-1956* (Milan: SugarCo, 1981), 756.

contemporary observers as revolutionary steps towards a new political order, even though no significant ideological revision ensued.[138]

But perhaps more than events in Moscow, Poland or Hungary, the 1956 Suez Canal Crisis affected Italian domestic politics and diplomacy. The fiasco of the Anglo-French attempt to dictate terms to Egyptian leader Gamal Nasser constituted a terminal blow to the two countries' lingering colonial ambitions. The US veto to Anglo-French objectives spelled "the end of the nineteenth century" and to the two countries' postwar dominance of Western European diplomacy.[139] French and English discomfiture created an opening for Italian policymakers; in response, they crafted a relatively ambitious foreign policy known to contemporaries and historians as Neo-Atlanticism. Since the end of WWII economic recovery and the security provided by American military power had helped revive Italian self-confidence, setting the stage for a revived pursuit of national interests in the southern Mediterranean and Middle East. Presently, firm alignment with the US during the Suez crisis entitled Italian diplomacy to a more prominent role. Military ties with the US were reinforced and a cameo role afforded by the Americans to Italian diplomacy in the Middle East.[140] On the terrain of domestic politics, center-right forces hoped that a higher profile diplomacy would retard a DC-PSI accord; at minimum, closer military ties with the US would expunge any neutralist temptations that

---

[138] Vittorio Gorresio, "I commenti romani," *La Stampa* (Turin), 8 Feb. 1957; Paolo Pavolini, "Scadenza imminente," *Il Mondo*, 29 Jan. 1957, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=44203&lang=IT&cms=; Paolo Pavolini, "Un partito liberato," *Il Mondo*, 19 Feb. 1957, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=44204&lang=IT&cms=; Sassoon, *One Hundred Years of Socialism*, chapter 10, "The Foundations of Revisionism."

[139] Soutou, *La guerre de Cinquante Ans*, 341.

[140] Brogi, "Ike and Italy: The Eisenhower Administration and Italy's 'Neo-Atlanticist' Agenda," *Journal of Cold War Studies*, no. 3 (Summer 2002): 5-35.

might ensue from an eventual center-left government. But by the same token, by exorcizing neutralism, Neo-Atlanticism held the potential to accelerate a DC-PSI accord.[141]

In the run-up to the general elections of 1958, US policymakers stuck to their traditional policy of supporting the DC and the PSDI. In May, electoral outcomes rewarded the DC with a solid 42.4 percent of the vote; the PSDI only advanced slightly, a meager reward given American investments. The Neo-Atlanticist and left-leaning DC leader Amintore Fanfani was appointed premier; he also appropriated the office of foreign minister, provoking the ire of party colleagues.[142] Fanfani's advent appeared to confirm the judiciousness of American strategy, which aimed to shore up a moderately left-leaning centrist government favoring the gradual development of autonomist tendencies within the Socialists. Fanfani and the Eisenhower administration also conducted talks over shared access to nuclear weapons. The agreement entailed the deployment of a new generation of land-based nuclear missiles known as Jupiters, awarding the Italians with eagerly sought modern nuclear deterrents.

By tightening military links with the United States, Fanfani hoped to assuage US worries over a feared resurgence of neutralism.[143] He calculated that the Jupiter nuclear missiles would allow for an activist but only moderately autonomist foreign policy acceptable to the Americans. Further, since Italy's reinvigorated diplomacy included engagement in the Middle East, sympathy and support from Socialists or left-leaning policymakers such as Christian Democrat

[141] Nuti, *Gli Stati Uniti e l'apertura a sinistra*, 91-105.

[142] Nuti, *Gli Stati Uniti e l'apertura a sinistra*, 91-105; Guido Formigoni, "Democrazia Cristiana e mondo cattolico dal neoatlantismo alla distensione, " in *Un ponte sull'Atlantico*, ed. Giovagnoli and Tosi , 141-67; Nuti, *Gli Stati Uniti e l'apertura a sinistra*, 165-88.

[143] Nuti, *Gli Stati Uniti e l'apertura a sinistra,* 158-61.

President Gronchi would presumably be forthcoming. But while Fanfani's approach earned the praise and support of the Eisenhower administration, his vigorous leadership style alienated opponents within his own party, notably the conservative Scelba. As a result, the latter successfully conspired to undermine Fanfani.[144] His cabinet was replaced by a coalition externally supported by the right wing parties and led by Premier Antonio Segni. The sudden reversal now appeared to indicate that US policies in place since 1956 had failed.[145]

In spring of 1960, after Segni failed to coalesce a broader coalition, a minority DC cabinet led by Premier Fernando Tambroni was finally formed, but solely thanks to the external parliamentary support of the neofascist MSI.[146] The US Department of State did not view this development favorably; ministers of the Christian Democratic left resigned, further shifting the cabinet rightward. Next came the ill-advised decision of the MSI to hold its July congress in Genoa, sacred terrain on the left on account of being the locus where the Resistance had first openly declared itself against the German invaders. Antifascist riots broke out there and in other cities. According to one interpretation, the neofascists, on the verge of long-sought legitimation, had fallen into a Machiavellian trap prepared by the DC left.[147] Following the chaos and indiscriminate resort to force by police in "red" Genoa, Reggio Emilia and other cities, the

[144] Nuti, *Gli Stati Uniti e l'apertura a sinistra*, 165-78; "Editorial Note. "The Political Outlook in Italy," National Intelligence Estimate 24-58," 4 November 1958, *FRUS, 1958-60, vol.VII, Part 2, Western Europe*, 484-5.

[145] Nuti, *Gli Stati Uniti e l'apertura a sinistra*, 247-58.

[146] For the first time, a minority DC cabinet was supported externally by the sole neofascists, an event of symbolic import. See Piero Ignazi, *Il polo escluso: Profilo storico del Movimento Sociale Italiano* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1989), 92.

[147] Nuti, *Gli Stati Uniti e l'apertura a sinistra*, 292-8; Ginsborg, *A History of Postwar Italy*, 256-8; Ignazi, *Il polo escluso*, 92-9. Ignazi supports the thesis that the MSI fell into a political trap prepared by an able maneuver of the DC left. This interpretation is different from the one furnished by Ginsborg, who salutes the revival of antifascism.

Tambroni government resigned, ushering in a re-edition of a cabinet led by the proponent of the Opening to the Left, Fanfani.

For contemporaries as for historians, the events of 1960 marked a major turning point in Italian politics.[148] The postwar antifascist consensus had re-emerged in force, condemning the Italian right to another season in the political wilderness.[149] Further, the failure of the atypical Christian Democratic flirt with the right decisively shifted the political compass to the left quadrant.

Among other repercussions, the events of 1960 accelerated a trend within the Radical Party to forge closer ties with the PSI. Commenting on the rightward drift of the DC in early 1960, *Il Mondo* denounced a new fascism, comparing and contrasting it with the old variety: "the fascism of action squads, of activist violence, of extreme nationalism is over; but what subsides to some extent is an antidemocratic spirit, an authoritarian tendency, and the pressure of economic interests; new is the ecclesiatic hierarchy's will to dominate, […] in a political context controlled by Catholic forces […]"[150] But later the same year, in local elections unexpectedly called by the DC in November after the defeat of its internal right wing, the Radicals ran for the first time on Socialist electoral lists. Justifying the decision, *Il Mondo* argued: "[we] do not think there is any need to explain to our readers the political import of this accord. The Radical Party,

[148] "Fascismo '60," *Il Mondo*, 16 Feb. 1960, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=44294&lang=IT&cms=; "La grande estate," *Il Mondo*, 21 June 1960, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=44296&lang=IT&cms=; Pietro Craveri, *La Repubblica dal 1958 al 1992* (Turin: UTET, 1995), 63-73.

[149] Ignazi, *Il polo escluso*, 92-9, 101-2; Lia Scarpa, "L'organizzazione del M.S.I. e degli altri movimenti di destra (1959-1984)," in *I partiti italiani tra declino e riforma: Struttura, organizzazione, finanziamento, base sociale, quadri, stampa, bibliografia, natura giuridica, movimenti femminili e giovanili, risultati elettorali dagli anni sessanta agli anni ottanta*, vol. 2, ed. Carlo Vallauri (Rome: Bulzoni Editore, 1986), 549-63.

[150] "Fascismo '60," *Il Mondo*, 16 Feb. 1960, OHRA.

as is well known, is not a party of socialist inspiration, it is not a mass party, it is not a class-based party nor of course a Marxist one. It is a movement of opinion, it is party which derives its origins from the great Risorgimento traditions of liberal and progressive democracy […] If today the Radicals, wholly autonomously, run alongside the Socialists in local elections […] it is because they judge the political situation ripe for a new, vigorous initiative of transformation and rupture."[151] In another article, the Radical periodical retreated from earlier characterizations of the DC as a reactionary force at the basis of a "clerico-fascist" state, presently arguing that a center-left coalition which included the PSI could abet progressive and reformist forces within Catholic ranks.[152] The election outcomes delivered several dozen county council positions to the Radicals, marking the party's first important electoral success, but also laying the groundwork for its dissolution. Joining the PSI increasingly subsumed Radical hopes for reform, sowing discord among the party faithful and undermining the rationale for the continued existence of the tiny formation.[153]

The first two years of the new decade witnessed continued Italian political wrangling over DC-PSI rapprochement interwoven with a dense web of consultations with the country's closest ally. Across the Atlantic, the advent of the Kennedy administration facilitated the two parties' convergence. The new US administration, under the counsel of historian and policymaker Arthur S. Schlesinger Jr., revived the New Deal-era economistic and reformist approach to the Italian question. Support for the inclusion of the Socialists in government

[151] "Socialisti e radicali," *Il Mondo*, 27 Sept. 1960, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=44297&lang=IT&cms=.

[152] "Fascismo '60," *Il Mondo*, 16 Feb. 1960, OHRA; Federico Gozzi, "Socialisti e comunisti," *Il Mondo*, 18 October 1960, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=44298&lang=IT&cms=.

[153] Teodori, *Storia dei laici*, 274-6.

conformed to the Kennedy's determination to cast the US as a supporter of "democratic revolutions." Kennedy's New Frontier was part response to Soviet depictions of the US as a reactionary force standing in the way of progress in the Third World, part revival of Wilsonian and Rooseveltian globalism.[154] Support for the Opening to Left was however not a foregone conclusion, due to disagreements within the US foreign policy team.[155] Nor did the studious avoidance by Italian Socialists of ideological revisionism facilitate the task. On the other hand, a latent affinity existed between Socialist neutralism and opposition to Italian control of nuclear weaponry and the new and as yet veiled security policies of the Kennedy administration. The incoming administration aimed to reverse Eisenhower's efforts to provide trusted allies with greater control over Europe-based nuclear weapons through the "double-key" activation mechanism which permitted a degree of ally control over weaponry.[156] But until 1962 and the Cuban Missile Crisis, such a consonance had little role in clinching American acceptance of the PSI.[157]

The period of international crisis constituting the backdrop to the Opening to the Left had been inaugurated in late 1958, when Soviet General Secretary Khrushchev called into question the status of West Berlin, addressed an ultimatum to the West, and raised the risk of global nuclear war to a pitch which remains to this day underestimated. The motives for the Soviet

[154] Soutou, *La guerre de Cinquante Ans*, 427-9; Nuti, *Gli Stati Uniti e l'apertura a Sinistra*, 313-6.

[155] For the best and most documented account, see Nuti, *Gli Stati Uniti e l'apertura a sinistra*, 313-536.

[156] The latter provided a degree of allied control over the use of nuclear weapons stationed on national territory. On the alarm elicited in Soviet ranks by Eisenhower's double-key nuclear policies, particularly with respect to West Germany, see Soutou, *La guerre de Cinquante Ans*, 349-50. On the degree of discontinuity between the foreign policies of the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations, see Leopoldo Nuti, "Continuità e rottura nella politica estera americana da Eisenhower a Kennedy," in *Atlantismo ed europeismo*, ed. P. Craveri and G. Quagliariello, (Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2003), 543-66.

[157] Nuti, *Gli Stati Uniti e l'apertura a sinistra*, 442-3.

move are disputed; Khrushchev appears to have been driven by both defensive and offensive motives aimed ultimately at forcing the West to accept two sovereign, denuclearized and neutral Germanies. By January 1959, the Soviet leader called off his brinkmanship; a renewed period of détente now appeared imminent.[158] But following his boycott of the planned Four Powers' peace summit of 1960, international tensions revived. They would be further raised by the failed US invasion of Cuba and redoubled by renewed conflict in Berlin in 1961 and in Cuba in 1962.[159]

Meanwhile, in Italy, February 1962 had marked a milestone preparing the ground for Socialist participation in a DC cabinet. That month, the fourth Fanfani government benefited for the first time from the external parliamentary support of the PSI; the Socialists helped formulate the cabinet's program. Though muting opposition to the new government, US policymakers maintained a certain reserve; the State Department investigated whether the reputedly neutralist industrialist Enrico Mattei had had a role in the cabinet's formation.[160] In time, supporters of the Opening to the Left within the US administration worked to convince a cautious Kennedy to stake a more affirmative stance. Socialists travelled on invitation to the United States; in June, Nenni met US Ambassador Reinhardt at his Rome residence, an event which appeared to signal the legitimation of the Italian Socialists.[161] Finally, in October, the near-lethal Cuban Missiles Crisis created new circumstances which finally ushered into power the PSI.[162]

---

[158] Soutou, *La guerre de Cinquante Ans*, 367-77.

[159] The hair-raising Berlin crisis of 1961, long overshadowed by the Cuban Missile Crisis, is now better documented and given its due by Frederic Kempe in his *Berlin 1961: Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Most Dangerous Place on Earth* (New York: Putnam, 2011).

[160] Nuti, *Gli Stati Uniti e l'apertura a sinistra,* 459.

[161] Ibid., 465.

[162] Ibid., 537-55.

Since the late fifties, a non-aligned global peace movement driven by atomic fears had garnered unprecedented following, one manifestation among others of the growing prominence of nuclear politics in domestic systems across the world. But in October 1962, at the height of the Cuban Missile Crisis, Kennedy struck a secret agreement with Krushchev to withdraw nuclear missiles from Turkish and Italian soil, in exchange for the withdrawal of the Soviet missiles from Cuba. Subsequently, the US president rapidly jettisoned his predecessor's policy of providing trusted allies with a degree of control over land-based nuclear weapons. A process of nuclear disarmament ensued; it included the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963 and cut down to size European nuclear ambitions, with the exception of France.[163] More generally, the Cold War entered a stable phase due the settlement of major European points of contention.[164]

In Italy, nuclear disarmament and superpower détente removed lingering domestic and diplomatic barriers to PSI accession to power. The Socialists' Byzantine blend of neutralism and Atlanticism now ceased to be a liability in American eyes. Center-right Italian opponents to the Opening to the Left had sought to exploit the fig-leaf offered by the US to its European allies in counterpart for the withdrawal of nuclear missiles: a nuclear-equipped naval force known as the Multilateral Force (MLF). But the proposed military pact's uncertain contours and a dubious US commitment to its implementation proved instead advantageous to the Socialists.

Altiero Spinelli, the European federalist, helped Nenni forge a Socialist foreign policy formula which astutely refrained from rejecting the MLF while endorsing both détente and

---

[163] Ibid., 417-8.

[164] Marc Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1999).

NATO, including the latter's vaguely termed "previous commitments." The Kennedy administration played along, omitting to insist on a more explicit Socialist acceptance of MLF.[165] Finally, in December of 1963, the first DC-PSI-PSDI-PRI coalition cabinet was formed under the leadership of Premier Aldo Moro (DC). Among other aftermaths of a momentous epoch was the decline of the transnational antinuclear peace movement, which would only revive in the late seventies.[166]

Nineteen-sixty-three also witnessed the birth or rather resurrection of a political force that would eventually play a disproportionate role in Italian politics relative to its size: Marco Pannella's Radical Party. Its predecessor had disbanded in fall 1962, due principally to a split between partisans and adversaries of the Opening to the Left. [167] Dissolution was precipitated by the revelation by historian Renzo De Felice that the Radical Leopoldo Piccardi had been present during an Italian-German conference on race held in Vienna in 1939.[168] The underlying motive for the party's crisis, however, was the looming DC-PSI accord and doubts as to the viability or utility of a minuscule party of intellectuals.[169] The break-up entailed intra-party tensions which could partly be traced back to Actionism and the refusal to countenance compromise with

---

[165] Nuti, *Gli Stati Uniti e l'apertura a sinistra*, 606-55.

[166] Wittner, *Resisting the Bomb*, 442-62; Lawrence S. Wittner, *Toward Nuclear Abolition: A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement, 1971 to the Present*, vol. 3 of *The Struggle Against the Bomb* (Stanford.: Stanford University Press, 2003), 21-40.

[167] Pannella and Rendi, "Le mozioni del novembre 1960 al Consiglio nazionale," 20 Nov. 1960, OHRA; Domenico Astuni, "I Radicali: il dialogo fra cattolici e marxisti non ha bisogno di catalizzatori," *Tempo Nuovo*, Mar.-Apr. 1958, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=44234&lang=IT&cms=.

[168] Mario Pannunzio, "Il 'caso Piccardi'," letter dated 23 Mar. 1962, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=44353&lang=IT&cms=; "Cattani segretario-Rossi lascia 'Il Mondo'," *Sinistra Radicale*, Feb. 1962, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=44349&lang=IT&cms=.

[169] Michele Pellicani, "I Radicali o il PSI," *Giustizia*, 28 Nov. 1962, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=44379&lang=IT&cms=.

conservative forces.[170] While the senior members of the party leadership dispersed, a minority left-wing faction led by Pannella opted to reconstitute on a new basis.[171]

Two traits distinguished the new Radicals from the old, encapsulating a more pronounced leftism. The first was adamant opposition to Socialist alliance with the DC and support for the unity of a left that might even comprise the PCI. The second was commitment to an internationalist and antimilitarist stance sharply critical of the Cold War order. The left Radicals sought the dissolution of military pacts and the conversion to civilian use of military structures in both Cold War blocs.[172]

A distinct Radical left had first emerged in public view in 1959.[173] Pannella had then called for the left to unite and to starkly oppose the DC rather than pursue policies of coalition and compromise.[174] In an article published in March 1959 Pannella evoked an alliance of lay parties, Socialists, and Communists against the DC. After denouncing the communist liquidation of socialist forces in Eastern Europe, Pannella affirmed that the past ten years had nevertheless not passed in vain. Not so much on account of the international situation which was still grave,

---

[170] "Italia. Crisi del Partito radicale," 15 Sept. 1962, *Tempi Moderni*, July-Sept. 1962, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=44376&lang=IT&cms=.

[171] Lorenza Ponzone, *Il Partito Radicale nella politica italiana: 1962-1989* (Fasano, BR: Schena, 1993), chapter 1, "I primi passi," transcript in OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=53847&lang=IT&cms=; Rolando Parachini, "Storia della 'Sinistra radicale' dal 1952 al 1962" (Thesis [*tesi di laurea*], Rome: Università degli Studi, 1978-79), chapter 3 and 4, transcripts in OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=46516&lang=IT&cms= and http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=46517&lang=IT&cms= respectively.

[172] "Mozione politica generale approvata dal consiglio nazionale di Bologna," party motion, Mar. 1963, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=44381&lang=IT&cms=; "Partito radicale," *Annuario politico italiano 1964* (Centro italiano ricerche e documentazioni-Edizioni Comunità: Rome, 1964), transcript in OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=44441&lang=IT&cms=.

[173] Parachini, "Storia della 'Sinistra radicale' dal 1952 al 1962," chapter 3, transcript in OHRA.

[174] Achille Occhetto, "Una nuova generazione radicale," *Nuova generazione*, Mar. 1963, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=44384&lang=IT&cms=.

he added, but due to domestic developments. He argued that the internationalist loyalties or ideology of the PCI were now secondary considerations before the imperative of Italian democratic renewal, concluding: "it is in any case urgent to begin to discuss a common politics between Communists and democrats. No confluence, no solution is a sure thing in history or politics; the logic of things is not per se creative; men's logic should animate, second, and direct it." [175] His words illustrated the indefatigable voluntarism which would characterize Pannella's life in politics.

As was likely intended, his article provoked a spirited debate.[176] Both Togliatti and lay political leaders dismissed his call for an alliance against the DC.[177] In complete denial of the record, but in accord with the PCI's official narrative, Togliatti opened by indignantly rejecting Pannella's "reasoning […] on the fate of democrats of the left and social-democrats where we communists have been in power for many years."[178] He then reaffirmed the coherence and continuity of PCI policies, denying that any sort of reorientation was in act. In closing, he reiterated the centrality of his party's pursuit of an accord with "organized Catholics" and other

[175] "La sinistra democratica e il PCI," *Il Paese* (Rome), 22 Mar. 1959, as "La logica schiacciante della III Internazionale" , OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=44267&lang=IT&cms=.

[176] Transcripts of a number of articles written in response to or commenting on Pannella's and Togliatti's articles are available in OHRA, dated between 22 Mar. and 23 Apr. 1959.

[177] "La situazione politica interna," *La Voce Repubblicana* (Rome), 24 Mar. 1959, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=44273&lang=IT&cms=; "Gli echi all'articolo di Pannella. Vivace polemica fra PSDI e PRI," *Il Paese* (Rome), 25 Mar. 1959, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=44274&lang=IT&cms=; "Il dialogo," *Il Paese* (Rome), 27 Mar. 1959, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=44279&lang=IT&cms=.

[178] For a good synthesis of current interpretations of Stalin's Eastern European foreign policy in 1946-1948, see Soutou, *La guerre de Cinquante Ans*, 128-32; on US policy towards Eastern Europe during this period, see Geir Lundestad, *The American Non-policy towards Eastern Europe 1943-1947* (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1978).

political forces.[179] In so doing, he obliquely invoked a revival of a frontist alliance of Socialists, Communists and Christian Democrats, setting off a new round of recriminations, this time directed at his person.[180] On the Radical front, an editorial of *Il Mondo*, presumably written by a party elder, characterized Pannella's initiative as an "alliance of cretins" which would inevitably favor the frontist strategy of the Communists.[181] Sympathetic reception of Pannella's initiative was however forthcoming in at least one leftist periodical close to the PCI, possibly pointing to an underlying generational gap within Radical and other leftist political groups: "after reading repeatedly in *Il Mondo* that one has to fight monopolies and observing that, unphased, monopolies continue to issue pink slips, suspending [such practices] not when articles […] appear but when workers occupy factories or miners wells, Pannella and his friends have understood that the gap between beautiful words and a crude reality must be addressed. One has to make up one's mind to get out and join those who struggle […] How is it that the Radicals, instead of acting skittishly and ridiculously, are not glad to have in their ranks a group of youths who intend to face reality as it is, without being paralyzed by prejudice?"[182]

---

[179] Palmiro Togliatti, *Paese Sera* (Rome), 26 Mar. 1959, reprinted as "Togliatti risponde a Pannella" in *Notizie Radicali*, 11 Mar. 1988, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=44275&lang=IT&cms=.

[180] "Manovre frontiste," *Il Messaggero* (Rome), 27 Mar. 1959, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=44280&lang=IT&cms=; "L'unità delle sinistre al centro del dibattito. Vivace discussione in corso fra i partiti," *Il Paese* (Rome), 29 Mar. 1959, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=44283&lang=IT&cms=.

[181] "L'alleanza dei cretini," *Il Mondo*, 7 Apr. 1959, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=44286&lang=IT&cms=.

[182] Mauro Melloni, "Passato e avvenire," *Il Paese* (Rome), 5 Apr. 1959, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=44285&lang=IT&cms=; see also the article by a future leader of the PCI who would preside in 1989-91 over the latter's transformation into the Democratic Party of the Left (PDS): Occhetto, "Una nuova generazione radicale," *Nuova generazione*, Mar. 1963, OHRA.

The project of the unity of the left which Pannella's Radicals opposed to the center-left formula had been rooted in the youthful experience of Pannella and a group of collaborators in UGI, a liberal university association founded in 1945-47.[183] UGI opposed the efforts of parties to control campus politics through their respective organizations. While generally sympathetic to lay politics, UGI students took a dim view of what they viewed as a tendency of all parties to act as adjuvants to DC power. In a 1952 congress, Franco Roccella, a future collaborator of Pannella, had stated that UGI favored "not the unity of lay forces (among us are also Catholics), but the lay unity of forces as a foundation for democracy." In the same speech, he denounced the "partitocracy" and called for university politics to be freed from the control of parties.[184] In 1953, Pannella and Roccella prodded UGI to break with "clerical" student groups, to bypass DC control and to reach out to Catholic students. UGI subsequently redoubled outreach efforts to the weaker CUDI, the student association of the Marxist left, managing to absorb the latter by 1957. Unlike the Marxist political parties, CUDI had failed to attract a broad swath of adherents; it was further weakened by the crisis of communism consequent to the events of 1956, a development which may have signaled a generational disaccord between youthful and older PCI supporters. UGI's spectacular success in the milieu of campus politics thus constituted an ideal outcome for the future Radicals, one in complete contrast with the course of national politics.[185] The association is also of historical note in that it would prove the launching pad for some of postwar

[183] *Unione goliardica italiana*, UGI.

[184] Cited in Parachini, "Storia della 'Sinistra radicale' dal 1952 al 1962," chapter 1, transcript in OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=46514&lang=IT&cms=.

[185] Unlike in the French Fourth Republic, national Italian political parties enjoyed a broad legitimacy that would only begin to falter after 1976. Gaetano Quagliariello, "La transizione alla democrazia in Italia e in Francia," in *L'altra faccia della luna*, ed. Aga-Rossi and Quagliariello, 51-78.

Italy's most influential leftist politicians, including Bettino Craxi and Achille Occhetto, future leaders of the PSI and PCI respectively.[186]

In 1955, UGI leaders Pannella, Roccella and others had decided to enter national politics by joining the newly founded Radical Party; the contingent would constitute the core of the left Radicals who relaunched the party in 1963. Among their number were Sergio Stanzani, Massimo Teodori, and the antimilitarist Giuliano Rendi.[187] While generally younger than Radical party elders such as Mario Pannunzio or Ernesto Rossi, the left Radicals were at the time of their party's launch in 1963 in their mid twenties or in their thirties, and for this reason as well as for ideological ones cannot be properly categorized as belonging to the "1968 generation" or perhaps even as "new left."[188]

Another precedent which shaped the leftist identity of the new Radicals was Pannella's personal experience in the early sixties as Paris correspondent for *Il Giorno*, the newspaper of the left-leaning industrialist Enrico Mattei. He had sought the job after the hostile reception to his 1959 article proposing the unity of the left. Though Pannella resigned in 1962 following

---

[186] Massimo Teodori, "Radicali e Socialisti: la diffidenza di Craxi e il narcisismo di Pannella," paper presented during the conference held in Rome and organized by the Craxi Foundation, "Craxi, il riformismo e la sinistra italiana," 5 Oct. 2006, available from http://www.massimoteodori.it/saggi/RADeSOC.pdf; Marco Pannella, interview by Alberto Statera, "Voglio una dittatura alla romana. Datemi 6 mesi, e vi cambierò l'Italia," *La Stampa* (Turin), 21 Apr. 1993; Gaetano Quagliariello, "La formazione della classe politica in Italia (1945-1956)," 31-73; Giovanni Orsina and Gaetano Quagliariello, "L'Unuri e la formazione della classe politica italiana," 325-45; Giovanni Orsina, "'Ricostruire con l'unità d'una generazione l'unità della nazione.' La nascita dell'Unione gogliardica italiana (1945-1953)," 383-424, in G. Orsina and G. Quagliariello, eds., *La formazione della classe politica in Europa (1945-1956)* (Manduria-Bari-Rome: Piero Lacaita, 2000).

[187] Teodori, *Storia dei laici*, 272-3; Rolando Parachini, "Storia della 'Sinistra radicale' dal 1952 al 1962," chapter 2, transcript in OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=46515&lang=IT&cms=.

[188] For example, Sergio Stanzani was born in 1923, Marco Pannella in 1930, and Massimo Teodori in 1938. The Radicals might be defined as new left only if a more expansive use of the term is employed, such as that employed by Massimo Teodori in his *Storia delle nuove sinistre in Europa (1956-1976)* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1976). A second cohort of party members would join in the seventies; it can be more properly described on demographic grounds as being a part of the 1968 movement, notably the feminist Emma Bonino.

divergences with Mattei's editorial line, his time in Paris during part of the endgame of the Algerian War powerfully shaped his political maturation. A francophone on account of his mother's Swiss origins, he forged links with leftist forces opposed to Gaullism and the Algerian War and critical of the PCF's lukewarm antiwar stances.[189] November of 1960 had marked the emergence of a heteroclite antiwar movement led by intellectuals and the leftist student union, UNEF.[190] The new left coalition mounted a credible challenge to the war through mass demonstrations and petitions, including the Manifesto of the 121. The mainstream parties of the left, the PCF and SFIO, disavowed the protesters, while a recently formed new left party, the United Socialist Party (PSU), declared its support.[191] At the heart of the dissenting approach was the proclamation of the right to civil disobedience and insubordination, and the legitimacy of soldiers' desertion. In contrast, Maurice Thorez, secretary general of the PCF, remained wedded to his view that the "communist soldier participates in any war, even a reactionary one, in order to better pursue thereof the struggle against war. He operates wherever he has been placed. If this weren't so, we would be staking positions which are purely moral […] and deleterious to ties with the masses."[192] Thorez' statement reflected PCF ideology, strict alighment with Soviet foreign policy, and his party's dependence on a working class often exhibiting racist, nationalist or colonialist sentiments.[193]

---

[189] Marco Pannella, interview, "Libertari e anche conservatori," *Oggi*, July 1975, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=45505&lang=IT&cms=.

[190] *Union nationale des étudiants de France*, UNEF.

[191] *Parti socialiste unifié* (PSU), founded earlier that year.

[192] Cited in Teodori, *Storia delle nuove sinistre*, 63; for an account of the rise of a French new left opposed to the war, see ibid., 48-77; on the Manifesto of the 121 and the Jeanson Network, see Ian H. Birchall, *Sartre against Stalinism* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2004), 187-98.

[193] Birchall, *Sartre against Stalinism*, 188; unlike the PCI, the PCF's major electoral constituency was the industrial working class, a reality which in turn differentiated the postwar evolution of PCF ideology from that of the PCI. See

The link forged by Pannella with French antiwar activists gave fruit to a short-lived left Radical initiative, the association "Nuremberg for Fascism and Colonialism." The latter proposed to reinforce UN supranational powers to intervene to investigate and punish "crimes against the rights of man" committed during "colonial and fascist repression." In conjunction, the left Radicals published an article by Jacques Vergès that had been censored in France. The anti-colonialist lawyer argued that the Eichmann trial constituted a "dangerous precedent for colonialists […] [because] all criminals are equivalent."[194] The common ground shared by the young Radicals and Vergès exemplified a time-delimited coincidence of interests between anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist Marxists and liberal or libertarian supranationalists. Ideology did not account for the alliance; it was rather driven by shared opposition to the lingering or revived oppression by foreign powers of autochtonous populations.[195]

Unlike national liberation adepts, the internationalist Radicals harbored a deep suspicion of the state, whatever its ideological hue. The circumstance of Pannella's departure from *Il Giorno* was itself illustrative of an uncompromising and principled libertarian mindset. His resignation was occasioned by the refusal of Enrico Mattei's daily to publish three draft articles sent from Algiers in 1962 in which he criticized the Front of National Liberation for its torturous treatment of prisoners, deemed as reprehensible as the murderous practices of the colonial

---

Lazar, *Maisons rouges*, 187-302. The Soviet Union favored a strong military in France to counterbalance British, German and American power. On the postwar alignment of PCF and PCI with Soviet foreign policy, see the various contributions of scholars in *L'altra faccia della luna*, ed. Aga-Rossi and Quagliariello, and in *The Soviet Union and Europe in the Cold War, 1943-53*, ed. Gori and Pons.

[194] Jacques Vergès, "Norimberga per i crimini colonialisti," *Sinistra radicale*, Nov. 1961, in OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=44333&lang=IT&cms=.

[195] For a discussion of the convergence of the cause of human rights and of anti-colonialism in the 1950s and 1960s, see Samuel Moyn, *The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History* (Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2010), 84-119.

regime. Such denunciations did not sit well with the politically powerful Mattei or ENI, the national energy conglomerate he directed, on account of vested interests in the new Algeria.[196]

Previous to their constitution as a party, Pannella's left Radicals had as early as the late fifties defined a new internationalism as being at the core of their politics. Central to it was the notion that the national state, as currently constructed, was the cause for political decay, in Italy as elsewhere. In a speech given at the first congress of the Radical Party in 1959, Pannella regretted his party's neglect of international affairs and called for the adoption of a foreign policy defined by European supranationalism. He drew a parallel between contemporary events in France and Italy: "I think in fact that we Radicals can also learn from the French experience, because the limit of [Pierre] Mendès France [premier and foreign minister during the Fourth Republic and member of the French Radical Party,]—the limit of men so close, all told, in character and affect to the Italian Radicals—has precisely been due to their endorsement of essentially isolationist or nationalistic traditions […] Mendès France cannot deny that he has resuscitated the specter of de Gaulle, because it is the French left itself which has invoked in the context of domestic political wrangling the concept of the *grandeur de la France*, of the *grandeur* of the French state, all notions at complete odds with European citizens' demands for the fundamental renewal of politics."[197]

Pannella's denunciation of the new nationalism that in Italy went under the label of Neo-Atlanticism was more fully articulated in a motion which the left Radicals presented at a party

[196] Marco Pannella, telephone interview by author, March 2012, audioclip in possession of author, New York.

[197] Marco Pannella, "I congresso del Pr (1) intervento di Marco Pannella," 28 Feb. 1959, speech given at first congress of the Radical Party, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=44252&lang=IT&cms=.

meeting in November 1960.[198] Declaring foreign policy to be of paramount importance, the left Radicals called for the "intransigent defense of the UN and its progressive empowerment; the constitution of a European federation […] through direct elections; the atomic and conventional disarmament of the entire European area with the consequent abolition of armies in all countries in the area […]; consequently, the renunciation of the NATO military pact (the non-renewal of the institution in 1961) and of the Western European Union; the proclamation of the right to insubordination and civil disobedience of all citizens who do not accept policies of rearmament, of war, of division and competition by national states controlled by their class enemies, who pursue ends necessarily in contrast with the international unity of the democratic and working classes; the federation or at minimum commun organization of all socialist, popular, revolutionary movements that contend for a regime of democracy and liberty in western Europe."[199] The tone and vocabulary of the motion was distinctly leftist, but by pointing to the national state and its army as principal culprits for European democratic deficits the left Radicals also differentiated their internationalism from that of the other parties of the left.[200]

---

[198] Rolando Parachini, "Storia della 'Sinistra radicale' dal 1952 al 1962," chapter 3, transcript in OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=46517&lang=IT&cms=; such proposals would be reiterated by the left Radicals in a motion presented at the second congress of the Radical Party of May 1961, see Marco Pannella, Giuliano Rendi, Gianfranco Spadaccia, Giuseppe Loteta and Luca Boneschi, "Il Partito radicale per l'unità della sinistra democratica europea, per la federazione dell'Europa occidentale, contro la politica dei blocchi, contro l'involuzione reazionaria dei paesi europei," transcript dated 28 May 1961 in OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=44316&lang=IT&cms=.

[199] Pannella and Rendi, "Le mozioni del novembre 1960 al Consiglio nazionale," 20 Nov. 1960, transcripts in OHRA.

[200] Pannella's European federalism was directly inspired by that of an ally of his among party elders, Ernesto Rossi, who also clamored for the definition of a Radical foreign policy. See Rossi, "Il costo di un compromesso: il centro sinistra," *La Sinistra radicale*, Jan. 1962, in OHRA. Marco Pannella, "La nota: 'i sottosviluppati dell'Internazionalismo'," *Agenzia Radicale*, 25 Feb. 1966, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=44471&lang=IT&cms=; "Antimilitarismo per una politica di pace," *Agenzia Radicale*, 31 May 1966, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=44501&lang=IT&cms=.

De Gaulle's "anachronistic" solution to the superpower nuclear stalemate, argued the left Radicals, was the latest manifestation of an authoritarian and conservative militarism which flourished East and West, impeding the development of socialism and liberty.[201] Acting on the belief that the international system and the Italian political order were closely intertwined, Radicals advanced purportedly interconnected solutions: the unity of the left, the protection of civil liberties and the promotion of total international disarmament.[202]

Radical antimilitarism drew on Italian nineteenth-century traditions largely jettisoned by the mainstream left, but also on the influence of the transnational peace movement active between 1957 and 1963.[203] In fall of 1961, left Radicals marched in Italy's first major pacifist demonstration not organized by the PCI, the Perugia-Assisi Peace March of Catholic nonviolent activist Aldo Capitini. In early 1962, the left Radicals joined Capitini's Council for Peace (*Consulta per la pace*), which also included the PCI's Italian Movement for Peace. The goal of the ecumenical Council for Peace was the constitution of a multilateral movement of a type present elsewhere in Western Europe, notably Britain's Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND).[204] The same year, two left Radicals travelled to Moscow to attend as nonaligned

---

[201] "Operare per la pace," *Il Radicale*, June 1962, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=44369&lang=IT&cms=; "La nota politica: la 'force de frappe' francese," *Agenzia Radicale*, 30 July 1963, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=44430&lang=IT&cms=; Angiolo Bandinelli, Silvio Pergameno, Massimo Teodori, "(4) Libro Bianco su il Partito radicale e le altre organizzazioni della sinistra-alcune iniziative," Oct. 1967, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=44574&lang=IT&cms=.

[202] On Nov. 4 1965 Radical militants Lorenzo and Andrea Strik Lievers were arrested and jailed for over 12 days in Milan by the "laws and men of the fascist State", culpable of distributing antimilitarist tracts supporting disarmament and the institutionalization of conscientious objection during a national holiday celebrating the end of World War I. See "La nota politica: Lorenzo e Andrea Strik Lievers in carcere," *Agenzia Radicale*, 18 Mar. 1966, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=44477&lang=IT&cms=.

[203] Andrea Maori, *Gli eretici della pace: Breve storia del pacifismo antimilitarista dal fascismo al 1979* (Perugia: Labirinto Editrice, 1988), passim; David Cortright, *Peace: A History of Movements and Ideas* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 264.

[204] For a brief account of CND in this period, see Wittner, *Resisting the Bomb*, 185-96.

delegates the World Congress for General Disarmament and Peace (9-14 July 1962), a high-water mark of collaboration between the congress's organizer, the Soviet-sponsored World Peace Council, and the non-aligned peace movement.[205] Also participating was Bertrand Russell's CND breakaway Committee of 100. Left Radicals stances were particularly close to those of Russell's group on account of a subscription to nonviolent civil disobedience and to a systemic critique of the Cold War that went beyond antinuclear protest.[206]

In January 1963 Pannella and three colleagues attended the Oxford Conference for Disarmament and Peace organized by a group of nonaligned civil society organizations. The conference was intended to launch an international federation of peace movements. In a document presented by the Italian delegation, one shaped by the Radical viewpoint but adopted only in minimal part in the conference's final statement, delegates were urged to look beyond official diplomacy and nuclear arms control for the recasting of the fundamental underpinnings of the Cold War bipolar system: "in either societies […] military structures constitute one of the principal foundations of the state […] The antinuclear campaign, further, highlights the fundamental contradiction of those, whether policymakers or politicians, who attempt to substitute nuclear weapons through the boosting of conventional weaponry, or, at minimum, the maintenance and modernization of national armies […]"[207]

---

[205] Giuseppe Boffa, "Il congresso del disarmo," *l'Unità* (Rome), 5 July 1962; Augusto Pancaldi, "Lanciato ai popoli dal Congresso di Mosca. Appello per il disarmo. Su 2800 delegati solo due contrary e sette astenuti," *l'Unità* (Rome), 15 July 1962; "Il congresso di Mosca," *l'Unità* (Rome), 15 July 1962.

[206] Wittner, *Resisting the Bomb*, 315-8; Giuliano Rendi, "Partito Radicale e movimenti pacifisti in Italia e all'estero," *Supplemento Agenzia Radicale, Informazioni per il 3. congresso*, 10 Dec. 1966, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=44529&lang=IT&cms=.

[207] Angiolo Bandinelli, "Antimilitaristi (1): cronache di 25 anni," *La Prova Radicale*, autumn 1971, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=44868&lang=IT&cms=; for an account of the background to the Oxford

Pannella's Radicals applied similar objections to what they dismissed as pacifist conventional wisdom during a lesser international conference "for peace, disarmament and the anticolonial struggle" held in Florence in February 1964. In contrast with the motion presented by the other parties of the left demanding a pact of non-agression between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, the Radicals, in alliance with English and American non-governmental groups, called for the dissolution of all military pacts.[208] The same year, the Radicals took issue with the Socialists' growing support for MLF; the latter, argued the Radicals, masked the further militarization of "right-wing or reactionary" regimes in France, West Germany or Spain.[209]

After the dissolution of the Italian peace movement into its component parts, the Radicals organized in fall 1964 a petition calling for Italian participation in Hans Thirring's proposals for a demilitarized zone surrounding neutral Austria and straddling the two Cold War blocs. Thirring was an Austrian Social-Democratic senator who had been active for years on issues of

---

conference, see Wittner, *Resisting the Bomb*, 302-4. Such words constituted an informed critique of contemporary policymakers' attempts to overcome the nuclear stalemate through alternative forms of rearmament. In the American camp, the new military thinking was illustrated by Kennedy's policy of replacing Eisenhower's massive nuclear retaliation with a staged nuclear response equipped with an ever expanding range of sophisticated nuclear weapons paired with a boosting of conventional forces in Western Europe. See Soutou, *La guerre de Cinquante Ans*, 383-5.

[208] Angiolo Bandinelli, Silvio Pergameno, Massimo Teodori, "3.3 Pacifismo, antimilitarismo e internazionalismo" in "(3) Libro Bianco su il Partito radicale e le altre organizzazioni della sinistra—temi radicali," Oct. 1967, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=44573&lang=IT&cms=.

[209] Angiolo Bandinelli, "Antimilitaristi (1): cronache di 25 anni," *La Prova Radicale*, autumn 1971, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=44868&lang=IT&cms= .

disarmament; his proposal was intended as the first step towards a demilitarized Europe.[210] The Austrian senator's appeal made very little headway, in part due to its timing.[211]

The Thirring Appeal was more than a quixotic scheme propounded by political eccentrics. It was also an echo of the recent geopolitical fluidity of Europe, one difficult to envision for a generation born after 1960 and raised during the seemingly static Cold War of the Brezhnev Era. The Radical Angiolo Bandinelli would later write that "the years between 1960 and 1964 were […] years of debates, during which were discussed topics of considerable breadth, such as political questions […] as European disarmament and departure from NATO, the German question, the politics of the [Cold War] blocs, [then] considered still manifestations of an unstable equilibrium and ones thus subject to possible political initiatives […]"[212] The fifties and early sixties had witnessed the formulation of numerous schemes reflecting a variety of geopolitical interests or more idealistic aspirations. They often involved proposals for neutral, demilitarized or denuclearized zones as potential means to address Europe's security dilemmas, which centered on the unsolved problem of Berlin and the divided Germanies. Examples of such schemes included Stalin's 1952 proposal for a unified and neutral Germany, George Kennan's proposal of a demilitarized Central Europe, Polish Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki's proposals for a denuclearized Central Europe, recycled by Krushchev in 1958, and, as late as spring 1962, a controversial Kennedy proposal for international condominium over Berlin, put forth in the

[210] "Un senatore viennese propone il disarmo totale dell'Austria," *La Stampa* (Turin), 13 Dec. 1963.

[211] Giuliano Rendi, "Partito Radicale e movimenti pacifisti in Italia e all'estero," *Supplemento Agenzia Radicale, Informazioni per il 3. congresso*, Dec. 1966, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=44529&lang=IT&cms=; Wittner, *Resisting the Bomb*, 227-8, 235-8.

[212] Bandinelli, "Antimilitaristi (1): cronache di 25 anni," *La Prova radicale*, autumn 1971, OHRA.

midts of a grave crisis with the Soviets.[213] Placed in historical context, neutralism, denuclearization and even demilitarization were far from the utopian ideas they would seem to a subsequent generation.

American acceptance of ambiguous Socialist foreign policy stances in late 1963 proves the point: Socialist neutralism, hitherto deemed so threatening, was presently rendered innocuous by the "European Settlement" achieved that year.[214] By 1964, alternatives to the division of Berlin and of Europe appeared unrealistic to both policymakers and left oppositions. But on the fringes of the Austrian or Italian left they retained their interest, and not least their utility.

In Italy, the Thirring Appeal campaign had also a domestic intent; it challenged PCI hegemony over the left by contesting its control of the peace movement. The Radical initiative succeeded in garnering support from a number of local party representatives, including an unsuspecting Stalinist such as Vittorio Vidali. Thus, although no policy outcome ensued, the small band of Radicals deemed the initiative a success.[215] The PCI leadership reportedly did not welcome the initiative, as Thirring's proposal for complete, including conventional, disarmament of Eastern Bloc neighbors of Austria did not match the objectives of Soviet foreign policy.[216] But

---

[213] Kempe, *Berlin 1961*, 491-2; Soutou, *La guerre de Cinquante Ans*, 354-5, 395-7; Nuti, *Gli Stati Uniti e l'apertura a sinistra*, 155-6; Sassoon, *One Hundred Years of Socialism*, 215; George Kennan, "Disengagement Revisited," *Foreign Affairs*, no. 2 (Jan. 1959): 187-210**;** Ronald Steele, *Walter Lippman and the American Century* (Vintage: New York, 1980), 509-10.

[214] To my knowledge, the term was coined by Trachtenberg in *A Constructed Peace*.

[215] "Appello per una iniziativa di pace. Comitato per il disarmo atomico e convenzionale dell'area europea," Sept. 1964, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=44448&lang=IT&cms; "Antimilitarismo per una politica di pace," *Agenzia Radicale*, 31 May 1966, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=44501&lang=IT&cms=.

[216] Pannella interview Rome, 2008; Bandinelli, Pergameno and Teodori, "4.2 La proposta Thirring," in "(4) Libro Bianco su il Partito radicale e le altre organizzazioni della sinistra—alcune iniziative," transcript dated 1 Oct. 1967 in OHRA. I have not been able to identify a PCI source on this Radical initiative. For a discussion of Khrushchev's pacifist offensive of 1958, see Soutou, *La guerre de Cinquante Ans*, 354-5.

beyond briefly and modestly challenging Communist control of the politics of pacifism, the Radical initiative was most significant in anticipating the party's future resort to petitions and public opinion campaigns in support of wedge issues likely to garner a broad leftist following.

After 1964, the Radicals refocused their antimilitarism on the domestic legalization of conscientious objection. Overall, their internationalism retreated to the background, and domestic issues pushed to the fore, echoeing patterns elsewhere.

In the late fifties and early sixties, the nonaligned peace movement had channeled and rendered visible the dissent of a movement often qualified as "new left." The latter had originated, as did CND in 1958, outside of the mainstream parties, often taking the form of a new internationalism.[217] A common feature of the new movement was the critique of the authoritarianism, militarism, or the colonialism of reactionary and imperialistic states, definitions applied by contemporary critics to virtually all the nation-states around the globe.[218] As détente took hold in 1963, antinuclear pacifists everywhere redirected their focus. For example, looking back on his experience in the antinuclear movement, Soviet dissident Andrei Sakharov would argue that ensuring international security was not just a matter of arms control, but also involved a resolution of fundamental "military-political and ideological confrontation" and the protection of human rights from authoritarian states.[219]

Alongside the Radicals and other dissident groups which refocused on domestic liberties, the new concern with systemic and societal issues often acquired anti-American and

[217] Teodori, *Storia delle nuove sinistre in Europa*, 21-47.

[218] Bandinelli, "Antimilitaristi (1): cronache di 25 anni," *La Prova Radicale*, autumn 1971, OHRA.

[219] Cited in Wittner, *Resisting the Bomb*, 460.

anticapitalistic connotations which appeared distant from nonaligned stances. Above all, the American intervention in Vietnam powerfully shaped the optic of Italian pacifists.[220] The war accentuated their anti-Americanism and galvanized their support for national liberation struggles.[221]

Between 1965 and 1967 Radicals sought participation in PCI-organized antiwar marches, but were rejected on account of their demands that they help shape the events' political documents. After the quashing of the Prague Spring by Soviet tanks, Pannella and three Radical colleagues travelled as representatives of the INGO World Resisters International to Sofia, Bulgaria. They were arrested there as they distributed flyers with inscribed in Bulgarian: "No to NATO, No to the Vietnam War, No to the Occupation of Czechoslovakia."[222] Shut out of the peace movement, over the next decade the isolated antimilitarist groups and their Radical allies nevertheless continued to organize demonstrations and initiatives, which however were barely noticed by the public.[223] Beyond such activities of symbolic import or the internal discussions which occupied meetings debating the distinct brand of Radical internationalism, Radicals primarily focused on Italian issues and the promotion of civil liberties, deemed abrogated or threatened by a "clerical and authoritarian state."[224] Two such efforts proved particularly

[220] Ibid., 455-62.

[221] Support for national liberation wars had been first proclaimed as a paramount goal of the international communist movement by Khrushchev in a speech of Jan. 1961. See Soutou, *La guerre de Cinquante Ans*, 403.

[222] Giuseppe Loteta, "Un giorno a Sofia," *L'Astrolabio*, 6 Oct. 1968, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=44695&lang=IT&cms=.

[223] Bandinelli, "Antimilitaristi (1): cronache di 25 anni," *La Prova Radicale*, autumn 1971, OHRA; Angiolo Bandinelli, "Antimilitaristi (2): cronache di 25 anni," *La Prova radicale*, autumn 1971, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=44870&lang=IT&cms=.

[224] Carlo Oliva, " 'Proposte Radicali per una politica internazionalista della sinistra europea' I Commissione – Rapporto di Carlo Oliva,", May 1967, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=15935&lang=IT&cms=;

successful: in 1970 divorce was legalized, and in 1972 came the turn of conscientious objection. On account of the internationalist roots of the campaign for the legalization of conscientious objection, it will be discussed first.

The approval of the new law on conscientious objection in late 1972 was attained through a combination of extra-parliamentary pressure exerted by the tenacious band of Radicals and their NGO allies and the support offered by a range of centrist and leftist parties since the late sixties. In 1972, seeking to cut short the prolonged iterations of a draft law which had at last emerged for parliamentary deliberation, Pannella and a colleague resorted to the often effective tool of the hunger strike, while Radical antimilitarist Roberto Cicciomessere sought and obtained arrest by declaring his resistance to the draft.[225] Such ploys added to political pressure to approve the draft law by the end of the year. Due to the compromising characteristics of the law which ultimately emerged, however, both the Radicals and Capitini's Nonviolent Movement declared it unsatisfactory. The following year, Radicals helped create the League for Conscientious Objection (LOC) which had as goal to improve and liberalize further the newly instituted alternative civilian service.[226] While the Radical role in helping institute a law on conscientious

---

Luca Boneschi and Carlo Oliva, "Politica anticlericale e diritti civili," *Fascicolo per il IV Congresso Nazionale del Partito radicale-Firenze 3-5 novembre 1967*, Nov. 1967, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=44577&lang=IT&cms=.

[225] "Processo per obiezione di coscienza a Roberto Cicciomessere," May 1972, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=45000&lang=IT&cms=; Angiolo Bandinelli, "Il digiuno di Alberto Gardin e di Marco Pannella," party leaflet, Oct. 1972, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=45055&lang=IT&cms=; "Obiezione di coscienza: cronaca del dibattito parlamentare," *Azione Nonviolenta*, Nov./Dec. 1972, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=45078&lang=IT&cms=.

[226] "Votata la legge truffa sull'obiezione di coscienza," *Azione Nonviolenta*, Nov./Dec. 1972, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=45077&lang=IT&cms=; "Un esercito di obiettori," *Loc Notizie 4*, supplement of *Notizie Radicali*, 13 Nov. 1973, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=45229&lang=IT&cms=; for a detailed account of the subsequent role of LOC, which would eventually be repudiated by the Radicals on account of its allegedly diminished role as manager of the civilian service conceded by the state, see Maori, *Gli eretici della pace.*

objection, whatever their reservations on its implementation, was an undoubted success, it was the battle on divorce and its political consequences which established the notoriety of the small party-movement and set the stage for its subsequent prominence on the domestic stage.

The decriminalization of divorce, achieved in 1970, had been the outcome of a prolonged campaign first launched in the mid-sixties by Radical activists in collaboration with Socialist deputy Loris Fortuna. In December 1965 the Radical Party organized a public roundtable on divorce presided by Fortuna, who had recently submitted in Parliament, but to little avail, a pro-divorce draft law. Initially, the PCI opposed a separate law on divorce, arguing that such legislation should be part of a comprehensive family law reforming "archaic, obsolete [legislation] based on bourgeois conceptions and class exploitation." Fortuna and the Radicals, for their part, criticized the Communist stance, describing it as a recipe for the indefinite postponement of urgently needed legislation.[227]

In April 1966, the Radicals founded the Italian League for the Instituting of Divorce (LID). With at its helm Pannella, LID would play a critical role in the divorce campaign and effectively subsume the bulk of Radical political activism over the next few years.[228] Within a few months of the Radical NGO's founding, the PCI reversed its opposition, subsequently playing a major role alongside the Socialists and lay forces in helping secure the cause of

---

[227] "A una tavola tonda promossa dai Radicali. Acceso dibattito a Roma per il divorzio in Italia," *La Stampa* (Turin), 13 Dec. 1965.

[228] "Il documento istitutivo della lid-liga italiana per l'istituzione del divorzio e gli organi," transcript dated 4 Apr. 1966 in OARR, available from http://www.radioradicale.it/exagora/il-documento-istitutivo-della-lid-lega-italiana-per-listituzione-del-divorzio-e-gli-organi.

legalizing divorce.[229] After five years of efforts punctuated by an innovative public opinion campaign spearheaded by LID, the so-called Fortuna Law enshrining the legalization of divorce was at last approved in November 1970 with broad center-left support. As soon as ratified, however, the new law was challenged by a counterattack of Catholic groups seeking its repeal; the issue of divorce would remain a leitmotif of Italian politics through 1974.

Any account of the emergence of the left Radicals as a small but vital force of the Italian left by the early seventies must emphasize the diminutive size of the group. During the sixties, the Radical "party" numbered a few hundred individuals primarily clustered in Milan and especially Rome, Pannella's place of residence and the seat of parliament. More than party, the Radicals at this stage operated much as an NGO or pressure group, as was illustrated by the divorce and other campaigns. In order to second their efforts, Radicals set up a grass-roots press agency, *Agenzia radicale*, which published a regularly issued type-written and mimeographed newsletter which doubled as press release. Among topics of investigation was the political influence of ENI, the energy conglomerate, or the illicit collusion of ecclesiastic interests with the welfare state.

Even as they operated on the margins of parliamentary politics as a group focused on single issues, the Radicals never lost sight of Pannella's original project to reshape the Italian left.[230] But their political activities, as opposed to the campaigns on divorce or conscientious objection, had a barely discernable impact, and as such are only discussed summarily and by way of conclusion. One of first acts of the new Radicals in 1964 was to endorse in local elections of

[229] Pannella, " 'Radicalizzare' una sinistra 'socialdemocratizzata'," *Nuova Repubblica*, Aug. 1966, OHRA.

[230] Marco Pannella, "I Radicali: partito o movimento?" *Panorama*, 3 Aug. 1972, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=45021&lang=IT&cms=.

the new PSIUP, a dissident faction of the PSI formed that year in protest of the Opening to the Left. Radicals ran on PSIUP electoral lists in the local elections of 1966, which resulted in the appointment of a few members to provincial and municipal posts. They steadfastly opposed the Opening to the Left as well as the 1966 unification of the PSI and PSDI as the short-lived PSU (Unified Socialist Party).[231] By then, Radical stances echoed a trend in leftist public opinion, particularly after the abandonment of reformist efforts by the Socialists following intimations of a right-wing coup in summer of 1964. Pannella's small band of Radicals also found inspiration in events in France, where François Mitterrand, although defeated by de Gaulle, did unexpectedly well in the 1965 presidential elections as the candidate of a united left comprising the PCF and the SFIO. On the occasion, the French social-democratic party had broken with centrist propensities assiduously practiced during the Fourth Republic.[232] Yet, while the unity of the left remained a professed goal, the Radical tribe did not find veritable common ground with the most powerful party of the left, the PCI.[233]

A Radical Party congress was held in 1967; it was numbered as the third in order to mark continuity with the new party's predecessor. An important hallmark in its history, it reasserted the political ambitions of the movement.[234] Not unlike the mainstream parties, the Radicals remained at the margins of the student and worker protests which rocked the country in 1967-69. Later, Radicals would seek to dispute the largely successful Communist effort to capture the

[231] As it was popularly known: *Partito socialista unificato*, (PSU).

[232] Guy Mollet, interview, "L'intervista con Guy Mollet," *Agenzia Radicale,* 2 Oct. 1966, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=44515&lang=IT&cms=.

[233] Teodori, Ignazi and Panebianco, part I, chapter 2 "La solitudine di una minoranza," in *I nuovi radicali: Storia e sociologia di un movimento politico* (Milan: Mondadori, 1977), transcript in OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=46145&lang=IT&cms=.

[234] Ibid.

protests' lingering momentum. After the disaggregation of the PSU into its component parts in 1969, Radicals invited supporters to vote for a restored PSI in the local elections of 1970, declaring the Socialists to be their main ally on divorce and other libertarian issues.[235] As the PSI slowly disentangled itself from the encumbering alliance with the DC, the Radicals continued to weigh their electoral preferences. On the occasion of the general elections of 1972, Radicals called on voters to abstain, both to contest the legal obligation to vote and to protest "swindle" elections called in part to postpone a looming referendum on divorce.[236]

All told, the sixties strategy of Radical aloofness from party politics and yet fiery engagement on civil rights causes payed off, as was becoming apparent by around 1972. Dedication to single-issue campaigning helped the tiny party-movement forge an original leftist platform and achieve national notoriety.

In November 1972, the party's most ambitious political program to date emerged during the annual congress. It entailed the promotion of a series of abrogative referenda.[237] The referendum strategy wedded libertarian causes to the overarching goal to challenge the "regime" by subjecting its laws to public scrutiny; Radicals also hoped to pit a united left opposition against the DC.[238] The chief instrument of the new strategy, the abrogative referendum, had first

---

[235] "L'accordo elettorale del P.R. con il P.S.I.," compilation of documents, May 1970, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=44766&lang=IT&cms=; Pannella, "La più rossa delle schede," *Notizie Radicali*, May 1970, OHRA.

[236] Mauro Mellini, 'Noi ci asterremo," *Notizie Radicali*, 29 Mar. 1972, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=44973&lang=IT&cms=.

[237] "Mozione generale approvata dal XI congresso del Pr. Torino, 1, 2 e 3 novembre 1972," congressional motion, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=45062&lang=IT&cms=.

[238] Massimo Teodori, "Referendum contro il regime (1) Perchè i referendum abrogativi," *La Prova Radicale*, Aug./Sept. 1973, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=45160&lang=IT&cms=.

emerged in 1970 after the approval of the law on divorce.[239] Following its legalization, Catholic organizations pressured the DC to ensure the activation of the abrogative referendum, hitherto a dormant provision of the Constitution. Subsequently, in short order, ecclesiastic groups won approval of a referendum proposing to reverse the Fortuna Law.

The legality of the planned referendum was initially contested on constitutional grounds by the left, including the Radicals.[240] The latter however soon changed tack, sensing ahead of the mainstream parties an opportunity to delve a blow to the DC and, not least, to attack from the left the PCI and other parties deemed culpable of excessive moderation.[241] For their part, the Christian Democrats, egged on by Premier Fanfani, whose politics had turned conservative, forged ahead with the referendum, which would be held in April 1974.[242]

[239] Approval of each abrogative referendum was also subject to examination by the courts; further, an approved referendum could also be avoided through the approval of intervening remedial legislation. For a historical account of the abrogative referendum, see Anna Chimenti, *Storia dei referendum: Dal divorzio alla riforma elettorale 1974-1999* (Bari: Laterza, 1999).

[240] Marco Pannella, "Una risposta alla sfida clericale," open letter, Mar. 1971, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=44826&lang=IT&cms=.

[241] "Mozione generale approvata dal X congresso del Pr, Roma 31 ottobre, 1, 2 novembre 1971, congressional motion, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=44878&lang=IT&cms=; Loris Fortuna, "Voci di accordi Dc-Pci – Discorso dell'On. Fortuna – Comunicato LID," *Notizie Radicali*, 16 Nov. 1971, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=44887&lang=IT&cms=.

[242] Giorgio Galli, "Proviamo i referendum per l'alternativa," *La Prova Radicale*, Aug./Oct. 1973, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=45179&lang=IT&cms=; Marco Pannella, "Vade retro referendum," *l'Espresso*, Jan. 1974, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=45237&lang=IT&cms=; Maurizio Ferrara, "I comunisti rispondono a Pasolini su Pannella," *Corriere della Sera* (Milan), 18 July 1974, reprinted in *Il pugno o la rosa: I radicali: gauchisti, qualunquisti, socialisti?*, ed. Valter Vecellio (Verona: Bertani, 1979), 205-7.

Chapter Two: Challenging the Historic Compromise (1972-1978)

The time period spanned by the next three chapters (1972-1985) witnessed the Radicals' debut in Parliament and the peak of their influence on Italian domestic politics. During a critical passage of the Cold War, the Radicals challenged the mainstream parties of the Italian left on the terrains of ideology, international security and political economy.

In the seventies emerged as the juggernaut of the left. The Communist strategy of seeking a governing deal or historic compromise with the DC, however, elicited distrust among Italians of various political persuasions. The antisystem Radicals, among other groups, sought to exploit such sentiments. After 1971, an intractable crisis of capitalism eroded the postwar social contract; by 1979, revived Cold War tensions threatened international policies of détente and arms control. In response to these economic and security crises, Radicals requalified their leftism. In the eighties, they adopted aspects of neoliberalism and redoubled their identification of statism as an Italian malady. They contended that at home an authoritarian, bureaucratic and "partitocratic" regime stood as chief obstacle to citizens' aspirations for liberty and prosperity; abroad, they indicted a concert of militaristic nation-states, blaming both superpowers for nuclear rearmament and world famine.

The sixth (1972-76), seventh (1976-79), and eighth Italian legislations (1979-1983) overlapped with an epochal crisis of capitalism. It could be traced to a mounting US balance-of-payment deficit and a consequent abandonment of the Brettons Wood system of managed currency exchange rates by President Nixon in 1971. The Nixon Shock was followed by the two Oil Shocks of 1973 and 1978; each unleashed a wave of inflation, further compounding Western

economic stagnation.[1] Oil-dependent Italy was hit particularly hard; more even than elsewhere in the West, political and social crisis deepened. The seemingly intractable downturn eroded faith in the welfare state and mined postwar economic certainties. Initially, liberal and conservative policymakers on either side of the Atlantic applied Keynesian prescriptions for recovery, but to little avail. Their failure drove a search for alternatives.

Two responses to crisis emerged by mid-decade. The first was loosely labelled by its leftist opponents as neoliberalism; it prescribed internationally coordinated monetarist policies, government deregulation of domestic markets, and the embrace of the so-called free-market. The major parties of the Italian and French left, on the other hand, elaborated a different response to the end of the "Golden Age."[2] In France, the leader of the *Parti socialiste* and architect of the Union of the left, François Mitterrand, burnished a *Programme commun* crafted earlier in collaboration with the PCF. In Italy, the PCI, seconded by the left wing of the PSI, advanced its Third Way.[3] Either approach preached nation-based solutions entailing demand-side economics and control of transnational capital flows; both held the promise of socialism, as opposed to capitalistic social-democracy or Soviet-style communism.[4]

---

1 Georges-Henri Soutou, *La guerre de Cinquante Ans: Le conflit Est-Ouest* (Paris: Fayard, 2001), 636; Daniel Sargent, "From Internationalism to Globalism: The United States and the Transformation of International Politics in the 1970s," Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 2008, 213-77.

[2] For use of this term, see Eric Hobsbawn, *The Age of Extremes: A History of the World, 1914-1991* (New York: Vintage, 1994), 403-32.

[3] On Berlinguer's conviction that the crisis of capitalism pointed to the need for an alternative, see Francesco Barbagallo, "Il PCI di Berlinguer nella crisi italiana e mondiale," in *Gli anni Ottanta come storia*, ed. Simona Colarizi et al. (Rome: Rubbettino, 2004), 103-18.

[4] On the distinctiveness of Mitterrand's socialism and his call for a break with capitalism, see Sandro Guerrieri, "Da Mitterrand a Jospin. Il Partito socialista francese alla prova di governo," in *Revisionismo socialista e rinnovamento liberale*, ed. P. Borioni (Rome: Carocci, 2001), 105-29.

While the ideas of libertarian economist Milton Friedman influenced the new economic thinking, the latter had various sources.[5] Neoliberalism would come to be associated to right-wing politics due to the timing of global economic recovery, which occurred during the tenures of the two conservative free-market zealots who helped define the eighties: US President Ronald Reagan and UK Premier Margaret Thatcher. Such a view however obscures a more complex genesis.[6] President Jimmy Carter, a Democrat, implemented deregulation, fiscal conservatism, and monetarist policies, the latter through the appointment of Paul Volcker as chairman of the Federal Reserve in 1979.[7] The neoliberal approach was also associated to efforts to manage global interdependence. One such scheme resulted in the G-7; Italy, always the feisty straggler, elbowed its way into the new economic club of Great Powers.[8] By the end of the decade, the two Continental powerhouses, France and West Germany, launched monetary integration, leading to

[5] Silvano Andriani, "I problemi reali che stanno dietro una astratta disputa ideologica. Liberismo, programmazione, mercato," *l'Unità* (Rome), 6 Oct. 1978. Neoliberalism drew its origins, more generally, from a crisis of governance, see Jan-Werner Müller, *Contesting Democracy: Political Ideas in Twentieth-Century Europe* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2011), 6, 210-1.

[6] It also conceals the subsequent patchy and contradictory application of neoliberal prescriptions and its commixture with Keynesianism and a continued expansion of the welfare state in Western Europe, as Milton Friedman denounced years later. Milton Friedman, "Io, l'antikeynes," interview by Paolo Mastrolilli, *Liberal* (Rome), 20 Sept. 1999, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=138445&lang=IT&cms=.

[7] Judith Stein, *Pivotal Decade: How the United States Traded Factories for Finance in the Seventies* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2010), 225-31. Soon enough, Western European socialists embraced neoliberal prescriptions for growth, prompting critics to question their leftism. See Eric Hobsbawm's criticism of the Thatcherism of Italian and Spanish Premiers Bettino Craxi (1983-87) and Felipe Gonzalez (1982-96) in Eric Hobsbawm, "Intervista a Eric Hobsbawm. Il mondo in questi 50 anni è cambiato sotto ogni aspetto. Il capitalismo produce ricchezze ma penalizza l'ambiente e la giustizia. Tre valori da rilanciare: libertà innanzitutto, e poi eguaglianza e fraternità. Addio, vecchia, cara rivoluzione. Benvenuta nuova sinistra del Duemila," interview by Giancarlo Bosetti, *l'Unità* (Rome), 29 June 1989. After the failure of his economic policies by 1982, Mitterrand followed suit by adopting aspects of economic neoliberalism.

[8] Paul Ginsborg, *Italy and Its Discontents: Family, Civil Society, State: 1980-2001* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 1.

the approval of a European Monetary System (EMS) in 1979. EMS sought to address currency instability and the high rates of inflation which had characterized the decade.[9]

The West's efforts to manage crisis through interdependence had also security dimensions. Until 1975, international security had donned the garb of East-West cooperation, culminating that year in the Helsinki Final Act.[10] But thereafter Soviet emphasis on the offensive aspects of its policy of peaceful coexistence altered Western perceptions of security.[11] Beginning in 1977, the USSR began to deploy a new generation of nuclear missiles, the SS-20s, capable of destroying in short order major NATO targets. As a consequence, the Soviets exarcerbated traditional Western European fears of decoupling from the US nuclear security umbrella and provoked rifts within the transatlantic alliance. By early 1979 NATO allies recomposed their differences at a summit held at Guadeloupe. The meeting lay the groundwork for the so-called dual-track decision to deploy in Europe within four years new intermediate range nuclear missiles dubbed "Euromissiles," should negotiations to achieve a balanced reduction of all such weapons fail.

Our narrative of the Radical challenge to the Italian parties of the left opens with the June 1976 general election. A background discussion of salient events leading to June 1976 follows,

[9] Niall Ferguson, drawing on statistical data, but also a British perspective, argues that the crisis of the 1970s was one primarily of perception. Such perceptions, however, as he himself points out, drove policies which powerfully shaped the global political economy. See "Crisis, What Crisis? The 1970s and the Shock of the Global" in *The Shock of the Global: The 1970s in Perspective*, ed. N. Ferguson et al. (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University, 2010), 1-21.

[10] Soutou, *La guerre de Cinquante Ans*, 559-65.

[11] Ibid., 530-5, 561-5, 567-74, 605-7.

focusing on the Radical bid since 1972 to enter the parliamentary fray. Discussion of the Radicals' first two years of activity in Parliament (1976-78) completes the chapter.

As Italians prepared for a historic vote on June 20, 1976, *Time* magazine sported on its front cover a somber-looking effigy of Berlinguer, announcing the general elections in terms bound to boost sales: "Italy: the Red Threat." Inside, the lead article summed up the implications of vote in more measured terms, reflecting opinions as divided in the United States as in Italy.[12] Following the success of the PCI in local elections in June 1975, in which the party obtained its best result yet, only two points shy of achieving parity with the DC, Secretary of State and National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger had compared the PCI to the hardline Portuguese communists, dismissing the relevance of PCI autonomy from Soviet influence, asserting the party's incompatibility with the western alliance, and invoking a communist domino effect across southern Europe.[13] In January, the Moro government had collapsed when word emerged that the CIA had channeled funding in support of anticommunist candidates; three months later, Kissinger issued his strongest statement yet, directly warning against PCI entry into a future cabinet and provoking the recriminations of the centrist and leftist Italian press alleging interference in Italian affairs.[14] Christian Democratic leaders had earlier prodded the US State

[12] Alvin Shuster, "Italian Business Escalates Role in Anti-Communist Party Fight," *New York Times*, 1 June 1976; Steven V. Roberts, "Italian Mix: Catholicism, Communism," *New York Times*, 7 June 1976; Alvin Shuster, "Whether Italian Communists Get in the Government or Not, the Outlook Is That Troubles Will Persist," *New York Times*, 10 June 1976; "Pci al governo. Che ne dite?" *La Stampa* (Turin), 12 June 1976; Alvin Shuster, "Italian Election Campaign Grows Increasingly Bitter," *New York Times*, 13 June 1976; Guido J. Paglia and Giuseppe Sangiorgio, "Confronto Dc, Pci, Psi. Ordine pubblico, problemi economici e politica estera," *La Stampa* (Turin), 13 June 1976; "Italy: Don Enrico bids for power," *Time* (US edition), 14 June 1976.

[13] Silvio Pons, *Berlinguer e la fine del comunismo* (Turin: Einaudi, 2005), 89; Jussi Hanhimäki, *The Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 400; Henry Kissinger, *Years of Renewal* (New York: Touchstone, 2000), 626-9.

[14] "Il silenzio è d'oro," *La Stampa* (Turin), 21 Mar. 1976; "Inconcepibile silenzio del ministero degli Esteri dinanzi ai ricatti di Kissinger e di John Volpe. Vivaci critiche alle 'nevrotiche' ingerenze USA," *l'Unità* (Rome), 22 Mar.

Department to be more vocal on the Communist question; presently, faced with an adverse domestic reaction, they reversed their stance, asking and obtaining more discretion in the two months preceding the election.[15] In the US, some sectors of opinion, particularly in the Democratic camp, viewed with greater equanimity than Kissinger the prospect of PCI electoral affirmation.[16] Overall, international and domestic assessments reflected the remarkable success of the Communist postwar construction of an autonomous, democratic and Western image, even while it preserved its winning leftist identity. PCI strategy included a prudent, reticent approach to the question of a future role in government, rejection of the option of a left-only cabinet, and Berlinguer's public endorsement of NATO in a June 9, 1976 interview in *Corriere della Sera*.[17]

The electoral campaign was acrimonious, yet masked a tacit understanding between the DC left and the PCI. As earlier during the electoral campaign for local elections in 1975, the PCI prepared for collaboration with the DC even as it denounced its corruption.[18] Revelations of a major international bribery scandal involving Lockheed provided a venue; in 1975, a US

1976; Raymond L. Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1994), 541-2.

[15] Leslie H. Gelb, "Italian Leaders Prompted US Stand on Communists," *New York Times*, 13 June 1976.

[16] Peter Lange, "What is to be done about Italian Communism," *Foreign Policy*, no. 21 (Winter 1975-76): 224-40; C.L. Sulzberger, "Who's That Knocking At My Door?" *New York Times*, 20 Mar. 1976; C.L. Sulzberger, "Thinking the Unthinkable," *New York Times*, 21 Mar. 1976; Vittorio Zucconi, "Articolo-intervista dedicato al segretario del Pci. Berlinguer dice al New York Times che cosa vogliono i comunisti italiani," *La Stampa* (Turin), 21 Mar. 1976; Vittorio Zucconi, "Il N.Y. Times su Usa e comunisti," *La Stampa* (Turin), 24 Mar.1976.

[17] Berlinguer had already, within party circles, endorsed NATO in a Central Committee meeting of December, 1974. See Silvio Pons, "La politica internazionale di Berlinguer negli anni dell' 'unità nazionale': eurocommunismo, NATO e URSS (1976-79)," in *Un ponte sull'Atlantico: L'alleanza occidentale 1949-1999*, ed. A. Giovagnoli and L. Tosi (Milan: Guerini e associati, 2003), 181-97; for the best and most recent account of the PCI invention and leadership role in Eurocommunism, the ad hoc alliance of the Italian, Spanish and French communist parties, see Pons, *Berlinguer*, 21-92.

[18] Simona Colarizi and Marco Gervasoni, *La cruna dell'ago: Craxi, il partito socialista e la crisi della Repubblica* (Rome-Bari: Laterza, 2005), 8; Simona Colarizi, *Storia politica della Repubblica: Partiti, movimenti e istituzioni, 1943-2006* (Bari: Laterza, 2007), 126-7.

congressional investigation had revealed illegal payouts by the American military aircraft manufacturer to Italian and other foreign politicians.[19] For its part, the DC reciprocated with anticommunist rhetoric, which however masked political openings.[20] In the event, while the June elections marked a high-water mark for the PCI, the Christian Democrats won the day with 38.7 versus the Communists' 34.4 percent of the vote. The Catholic party had benefited from reflexive anticommunist voters, despite a lack of popular enthusiasm. Indro Montanelli, founder and director of the respected conservative daily *Il Giornale Nuovo*, famously recommended that voters hold their nose and vote DC, a dictum borrowed from the Actionist intellectual, Gaetano Salvemini.[21] The polarization of the vote, in a manner reminiscent of 1948, squeezed the lay parties as well as the neofascists of MSI-DN.[22] But the biggest loser was the PSI.

The Socialist vote declined to 9.6 percent, the same, mediocre result obtained in 1972. The outcome was disappointing in the light of recent developments, which had seemed to reverse an electoral slide consequent to voter disillusionment with the sixties Opening to the Left and the

[19] Robert M. Smith, "Lockheed Documents Disclose A $106-Million Saudi Payout. Agents Fees' Cited in Testimony at Senate Panel," *New York Times*, 13 Sept. 1975; Alvin Schuster, "Italy's Top Party Forming Cabinet; Long Crisis Ends. Christian Democrats Will Govern Country Alone—Red Gain Is Averted," *New York Times*, 11 Feb. 1976; Guido Guidi, "Secondo i documenti giunti dagli Stati Uniti. Un 'presidente del Consiglio' prese gli soldi della Lockheed?" *La Stampa* (Turin), 22 Apr. 1976; Piero Craveri, *La Repubblica dal 1958 al 1992* (Turin: UTET, 1995), 682-3; Aurelio Lepre, *Storia della prima Repubblica: L'Italia dal 1943 al 2003* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2004), 254.

[20] "The Right is the target in Italy now," *The Economist*, 12 June 1976, 28; Colarizi, *Storia politica della Repubblica*, 126-7.

[21] Paul Ginsborg, *A History of Contemporary Italy: Society and Politics 1943-1988* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 375. Montanelli had been a collaborator of *Il Mondo* in the immediate postwar period; his center-right *il Giornale Nuovo*, founded in 1974, was the first paper to be completely independent from political parties, preceding Scalfari's *la Repubblica*. *Il Giornale* has more recently acquired by former Premier Silvio Berlusconi and turned into a mouthpiece for his political and economic interests. See Aurelio Lepre, *Storia della prima Repubblica. L'Italia dal 1943 al 2003* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2004), 273.

[22] Colarizi and Gervasoni, *La cruna dell'ago*, 18; Simona Colarizi, *Storia dei partiti nell'Italia repubblicana* (Bari: Laterza: 1997), 503-5.

fiasco of PSU disaggregation in 1969. Victory in the 1974 referendum had pitted most parties against the DC and reinvigorated the Socialist faction of Riccardo Lombardi, who opposed Berlinguer's convergence with DC leader Aldo Moro and supported an "alternative of the left" unifying PSI and PCI.[23] The same year, the near-success of Mitterrand, the *Union de la gauche*'s candidate, in French presidential elections appeared to validate the formula of leftist unity; in Italy, local elections in 1975 saw a Socialist advance, indicating that a surge then driving politics was lifting all boats on the left. But PSI leader Francesco De Martino was loath to loosen moorings with the DC; only on the last day of 1975 did he announce the intent to withdraw external parliamentary support for the DC-PRI governing coalition.[24] His move triggered early elections, but proved too tardy to recoup the party's tarnished image on the left.[25] Consequently, we have seen, Communists reaped the lion's share of the country's leftist vote in 1976. A gap of twenty-five percentage points now separated the two parties of the Italian left: the largest ever.[26] The disaster prompted the nomination as party leader of Bettino Craxi, the partisan of Socialist autonomy and heir to Nenni, an event that would prove a turning point for the Italian left. For

[23] "I primi timidi no a Berlinguer," *Liberazione*, 13 Oct. 1973, OHRA http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=45209&lang=IT&cms= ; Lamberto Furno, "Un lucido intervento del capo socialista. Nenni: la dc è ad un bivio rinnovamento o restaurazione," *La Stampa* (Turin), 13 Dec. 1974; Colarizi and Gervasoni, *La cruna dell'ago*, 4-5.

[24] Lamberto Fumo, "Lo ha deciso stanotte la direzione del Psi. I socialisti rinviano la crisi ma il governo Moro potrebbe cadere sulla legge sull'aborto," *La Stampa* (Turin), 12 Dec. 1975; "Aborto: referendum possibile decide la Corte Costituzionale," *La Stampa* (Turin), 13 Dec. 1975; Luca Giurato, "Parla De Martino," *La Stampa* (Turin), 31 Dec. 1975; Bruno Faussone, "Il leader compresso tra democristiani e comunisti. De Martino: per il psi l'habito è troppo stretto," *Stampa Sera* (Turin), Jan. 3 1976; Giovanni Trovati, "Il psi contratacca," *La Stampa* (Turin), 9 Jan. 1976; Giovanni Trovati, "Referendum inevitabile?" *La Stampa* (Turin), 4 Apr. 1976; Colarizi and Gervasoni, *La cruna dell'ago*, 4-5; Craveri, *La Repubblica dal 1958 al 1992*, 631-3.

[25] Craveri, *La Repubblica dal 1958 al 1992*, 663.

[26] Colarizi and Gervasoni, *La cruna dell'ago*, 4-7, 11-13, 18; Massimo L. Salvadori, "Il 'nuovo PSI'," in *Revisionismo socialista e rinnovamento liberale* , ed. P. Borioni (Rome: Carocci, 2001), 145-73.

the time being, however, Craxi took his time, not least due to his narrow power base within the party.[27]

The elections had thus witnessed an increased political polarization linked to DC-PCI competition, squeezing third force parties. A modest exception was entry into Parliament of two far left parties; the Radicals and a coalition of fractious new left forces, Proletarian Democracy (DP).[28] The Radical Party obtained 1.1 percent of the vote and four Chamber deputies; DP drew 1.5 percent, which represented six deputies. From the point of view of the Radicals and the workerist new left, the affirmation reversed losses in the general elections of 1972, when close to one million votes cast in favor of a cluster of parties to the left of the PCI had not yielded a single deputy.[29] Divisions however would continue to splinter DP, weakening a diminutive representation. According to the Radicals, who did not hesitate to seek allies within the new left faction *Lotta Continua*, a DP component, three characteristics debilitated the Italian new left: a maximalist, revolutionary credo; an obsolete workerist vision that however drew little support in factories; and a tendency to recast in miniature a Leninist form of party.[30] Whether the Radicals

[27] Colarizi, *Storia dei partiti,* 506-13.

[28] *Democrazia proletaria*, DP.

[29] Not feeling prepared for the early elections called in 1972 for the first time in postwar history by the major parties to avoid a confrontation over the looming referendum on divorce (elections entailed postponing the latter by one year), and to protest the decision, the Radicals did not run in 1972, inviting voters to cast a null ballot. Lorenza Ponzone, *Il Partito Radicale nella politica italiana: 1962-1989* (Fasano, BR: Schena, 1993), chapter 2, "Le battaglie per il divorzio," transcript in OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=53851&lang=IT&cms=; Gianfranco Spadaccia, "Dove porta la paura del referendum, *La Prova Radicale*, Jan. 1972, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=44926&lang=IT&cms=.

[30] Massimo Teodori, "Extraparlamentari: il fallimento del partito leninista," *Argomenti Radicali: Bimestrale politico per l'alternativa*, Apr.-May, 1977, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=45862&lang=IT&cms= . *Lotta Continua* was an extra-parliamentary group with a hard-to-translate name, which can be rendered as "Unending Struggle." Following the arrival in Frankfurt around 1970 of some of its militants sought by the Italian police, its slogan "We Want Everything!" and the group's factory-floor tactics proved influential on the West German new left group Revolutionary Struggle (*Revolutionärer Kampf*) which Joshka Fischer joined. See Paul Hockenos, *Joschka*

would do better than their new left colleagues was an open question; their ideological make-up, no doubt, was different.

In the run up to the June 1976 elections, the Radicals had sought unsuccessfully to position their new party emblem obtained from Mitterrand's *Parti Socialiste* in the upper left corner of electoral lists, the traditional appanage of the PCI.[31] The intended symbolism was clear; Radicals wished to emphasize their leftist credentials, sporting a fresh image contrasting with a lackluster PSI or a hegemonic PCI distrusted by the new or libertarian left. They represented themselves as a genuine socialist force unsullied by compromise with the DC.[32] During the electoral campaign, the Radicals had tendered to the Socialists a proposal to present common lists on the basis of an agreed program, but had been turned down; they had subsequently made a similar offer to DP, with similar results.[33] Collaborative offers made to the PSI had punctuated the recent past, based on longstanding affinity, the shared experience of political battles on libertarian issues, and the hope that the Socialists would jettison their coalitions with the DC.[34] But Radicals had also often criticized the Socialists for colluding with the DC.

Fischer and the Making of the Berlin Republic: An Alternative History of Postwar Germany (New York: Oxford University Press), 100, 111.

[31] Pannella obtained the use of the effigy from Mitterrand circa 1975. Marco Pannella, interview by author, July 2008, Rome, audioclip in possession of author, New York**;** Massimo Teodori, Piero Ignazi, and Angelo Panebianco, *I nuovi radicali: Storia e sociologia di un movimento politico* (Milan: Mondadori, 1977), part I, chapter 6, "Per una rivoluzione democratica," transcript in OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=46161&lang=IT&cms=. The new party symbol was officially adopted during the 17th party congress (Naples, November 1976). See Ponzone, *Il Partito Radicale nella politica italiana*, chapter 3, "Dalle piazze al parlamento (1967-1976)," transcript in OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=53855&lang=IT&cms=.

[32] Marco Pannella, "Liste radicali alle elezioni," *Stampa Sera* (Turin), 12 Apr. 1976.

[33] Teodori, Ignazi and Panebianco, *I nuovi radicali*, part 1, chapter 6, "Per una rivoluzione democratica," transcript in OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=46161&lang=IT&cms=.

[34] "Un accordo con i socialisti," *Il Mondo* (Milan), 6 Nov. 1975, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=45539&lang=IT&cms= ; "Il saluto del PR al 40. congresso del Partito

In 1972 the Radical politician Massimo Teodori, a scholarly observer of the Western left, had unfavorably contrasted PSI leader De Martino's policy of alliance with the DC with Mitterrand's new course of leftist unity. Their differences, he argued, were amply illustrated by their travel choices. While De Martino "meets with [Nicolae] Ceaușescu, president of a national-paleocommunist republic, Mitterrand goes to Chile to study a fragile but significant case of reformism," he wrote.[35] The following year, the 1973 electoral affirmation of Chilean President Allende's union of the left, *Unidad Popular*, pointed to a global trend, another Radical held.[36] Also in 1973, Pannella travelled to Paris to report on the French general elections for the widely circulated weekly *l'Espresso*. Commenting on the unprecedented success of the united left in the first round, Pannella concluded his article with a jab at the "worn-out 'openings' of pseudoreformers" at home, a reference to what he considered the compromised politics of Italian Socialists and Communists. Praising Mitterrand's approach, Pannella did not exclude an electoral victory of the French left in the second round, concluding "we will see then, in such a case, what other prospects are possible […] not only in France but also here at home."[37] Later, on the eve of the 1974 presidential elections in France, a Radical commented that "for over ten years the Radical Party has obstinately proposed for Italy a policy of opposition analogous with

---

socialista," *Notizie Radicali* , Mar. 1976, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=45608&lang=IT&cms= ; "Un milione di firme per una Carta delle libertà e dei diritti civili," *Notizie Radicali*, 3 Mar. 1976, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=45609&lang=IT&cms=; Craveri, *La Repubblica dal 1958 al 1992*, 672.

[35] Massimo Teodori, "De Martino e Mitterrand," *La Prova Radicale*, Jan. 1972, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=44925&lang=IT&cms=; Teodori had written extensively on the new left, for which he provided an expansive definition which encompassed the Radicals. See Massimo Teodori, *The New Left* (London: J. Cape, 1970); Massimo Teodori, *The New Left: A Documentary History* (London: J. Cape, 1970); Massimo Teodori, *Storia delle nuove sinistre in Europa (1956-1976)* (Bologna, Il Mulino 1976).

[36] Angiolo Bandinelli, "Verso il bipartitismo. Speranze alternative in Francia dialoghi 'subalterni' in Italia," *Notizie Radicali*, 8 Mar. 1973, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=45115&lang=IT&cms=.

[37] Marco Pannella, "Quanto vale Mitterrand," *L'Espresso*, 11 Mar. 1973, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=45117&lang=IT&cms=.

that followed with success by the French left: a policy of struggle against the regime, to block corporatist […] interests that find in Italy their expression in the DC."[38] Later that year the Radicals articulated their goal of catalyzing a "socialist and libertarian component […] representing at least twenty percent of the Italian electorate […], establishing a unitary and autonomous relationship alongside the PCI; otherwise the polemics on the historic compromise, on Togliattian politics […], on the co-sharing of power in Parliament and society, risk for lay and socialist forces becoming alibi for their own impotence."[39]

The PCI's "Togliattian politics" had received a powerful validation on 11 September 1973, when in a coup General Pinochet destroyed Chilean President Allende's socialist government, formed after the 1970 watershed presidential victory as candidate of *Unidad Popular* over Conservative and Christian Democratic candidates.[40] Though in a distant country, Italian leftists considered the quashing of the Chilean Way as directly relevant to their politics, on account of a similar ideological polarization of the party system, fears of violent right-wing reaction and a shared, potentially lethal Cold War context.[41] Radicals wondered whether

[38] Gianfranco Spadaccia, "La via francese alla democrazia", *Liberazione* (Rome, Radical daily), 13 May 1974, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=45283&lang=IT&cms=.

[39] "Mozione generale approvata dal XIV congresso del Pr," 4 November 1974, congressional motion, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=45372&lang=IT&cms=;

[40] Peter Kornbluh, *The Pinochet File: A Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and Accountability* (New York: The New Press, 2003).

[41] In Spanish, *Via Chilena*. "Comunicato della Direzione del PCI," *l'Unità* (Rome), 13 Sept. 1973; "Clamorose ammissioni: il governo USA sapeva del golpe 48 ore prima", *l'Unità* (Rome), 14 Sept. 1973. Such fears were not unsubstantiated nor entirely a product of anti-Americanism—webs of collusion between far right and neofascist groups with the Italian secret services (SID), and the military and with covert elements of the US government appear to have been present at least until 1974, date of the Watergate scandal and the fall of the right-wing dictatorships in Greece and Portugal. But the precise nature of such links remains indeterminate and the conspiratorial notion of a "strategy of tension" or a well-coordinated grand master plan to destabilize center-left Italian coalition governments remains uncorroborated. The documented, historical study of the links between red and black terrorism, the Italian state, and foreign interests is still in its infancy. See Hervé Rayner, "Protéger, subir et réprimer: la délicate 'gestion'

Allende's demise would prove a setback to the cause of leftist unity; Communists found confirmation of convictions already held.[42] In short order, in three articles published in *Rinascita* in October 1973, Berlinguer rejected the hypothesis of the rule of a united left, invoking a "historic compromise" with the DC.[43]

Radicals however soon found reason to believe leftist unity against the DC remained possible. Victory of the united front of left and lay parties in the May 1974 referendum on divorce was a major defeat for the DC at the hands of all the progressive parties. The legality of divorce had been upheld; the outcome galvanized the Radicals and established their national reputation as a credible political force on the left.[44] The referendum tool, appropriated from its original Catholic sponsors and brandished during the Radical Party's 1972 congress, was reaffirmed as the standard for future domestic battles. Its sole permitted application, the abolition of existing legislation, as well as the requirement that the citizenry underwrite each referendum proposal, made it a uniquely appropriate instrument for media-savvy adepts of street politics such as the Radicals.

Yet the blow to the DC right in the referendum also empowered partisans of the historic compromise. Aldo Moro, chief representative of the DC left, presently signaled his support for a

---

du terrorisme par l'État italien durant 'les années de plomb," in *L'Italie des années de plomb: Le terrorisme entre histoire et mémoire*, ed. M. Lazar and M.-A. Matard-Bonucci (Paris: Éditions Autrement, 2010), 36-49.

[42] "Allende. Laico socialista, nonviolento rivoluzionario," *Liberazione* (Rome, Radical daily), 16 Sept. 1973, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=45148&lang=IT&cms=; "Nasce un dissenso nel PCI?", *Liberazione* (Rome-Radical daily), 13 Oct. 1973, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=45206&lang=IT&cms=.

[43] Geoff Eley, *Forging Democracy: The History of the Left in Europe, 1850-2000* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 410.

[44] "Il NO ha vinto!" *Liberazione* (Rome, Radical daily), 13 May 1974, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=45276&lang=IT&cms=; Massimo Teodori, Piero Ignazi and Angelo Panebianco, part I, chapter 3, "La campagna per il divorzio," in *I nuovi radicali*, transcript in OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=46149&lang=IT&cms=.

governing deal with the PCI, albeit in his characteristically opaque verbiage. By the time of the elections of June 1976, the historic compromise had thus become a shared political project of Italy's two largest parties, displacing Radical, new left, and left Socialist preference for the unity of the left.[45]

Placed in a global context, the Italian vote of June 1976 constituted the latest episode of a Cold War historical drama: the question of the legitimation of the left and the terms of its advent to power. Though considered by other forces of the Italian left as symptomatic of all that was wrong in Italian democracy, the PCI strategy of rejecting the unity of the left and of gaining legitimacy through alliance with a ruling conservative party was by no means unprecedented. Closest to home was the analogy with the path undertaken by the PSI in the fifties, which had given fruit to the Opening to the Left and legitimized the party. Elsewhere in Western Europe, the PCI strategy was comparable to the strategy of the West German SPD, which led to their alliance with the union of Christian Democrats in the *Grosse Koalition* of 1966-69; the latter then opened the way for SPD rule in alliance with the smaller Free Democratic Party under the chancellorship of Willy Brandt.[46] A similar approach based on coalitions with a conservative party led the Austrian Social-Democratic Party (SPÖ) to power in 1970.[47]

The differences between the PCI case and the SPD or SPÖ cases, however, were as significant as any similarities. The PCI sought a way through the "eye of the needle" of Italian

[45] Giovanni Trovati, "Un cristiano pessimista," *La Stampa* (Turin), 20 July 1974; Alberto Rapisarda, "Il governo e il pci," *Stampa Sera* (Turin), 16 Sept.1974; Giovanni Trovati, "Dopo il rischio di mercoledì alla Camera. Moro: il governo non può vivere sempre in agonia," *La Stampa* (Turin), 21 Dec. 1974; Lepre, *Storia della prima Repubblica*, 262-3.

[46] Eley, *Forging Democracy*, 417-9.

[47] *Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs*, SPÖ. Günter Bischof, Anton Pelinka , Oliver Rathkolb, eds., *The Kreisky Era in Austria* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transactions, 1994).

Cold War politics through consensus politics, without however undertaking a fundamental ideological revision.[48] Both the SPÖ and SPD had renounced Marxism and anticapitalism early in the game (1958 and 1959 respectively). Atlanticist respectability was achieved in 1960 by the SPD, when it endorsed NATO; the SPÖ could dispense with abjuring neutralism, since the latter was the official policy of the Austrian state. In contrast, the PCI never renounced its Marxist identity. The latter was rather updated and recast as Eurocommunism or the Third Way; the preservation of a maximalist leftist identity tempered Berlinguer's parallel professions of Atlanticism. It was a winning formula which produced the spectacular advances of the PCI; given such attainments, the PCI could hardly be faulted for remaining wedded to its roots.

The June 1976 elections produced a so-called government of national solidarity entailing an all-DC cabinet supported through parliamentary votes of abstention by the five other mainstream parties: the PCI, PSI, and the three lay parties. Together, the six parties tallied over 90% of the vote. The coalition was referred to as constituted by "the parties of the constitutional arc," on account of their role in drafting the 1948 Constitution; recourse to the sobriquet also served as sort of talisman during a period of acute economic and political crisis punctuated by terrorism and lawlessness.[49] Berlinguer hoped the coalition would constitute the antechamber to a successive government comprising Communist officials in executive capacities. The irreverent

[48] The expression "eye of the needle" is borrowed from Colarizi and Gervasoni's book title, *La cruna dell'ago,* which describes Bettino Craxi's own efforts to break the logjam of Italian politics.

[49] Colarizi, *Storia dei partiti,* 476-7.

Pannella, borrowing from his colorful antipolitical lexicon, immediately labeled the coalition a "hexarchy" and claimed that Italian democracy risked destruction without an active opposition.[50]

Over the course of the legislation, Radical deputies played the role of spoilers, both through unconventional parliamentary maneuvers and, from 1978, through their fierce defense of the court-approved Radical libertarian referenda. Their parliamentary activism did not always have an obvious legislative objective and was judged by critics as irresponsible. But it is best undertood as an integral part of the party's challenge to the dominant parties and an attempt to attract the protest vote. Not least, the exiguous Radical contingent sought to breach the media silence which habitually accompanies the deeds of small and powerless political minorities.

Upon their instatement in Parliament in July 1976, the four freshman Radical deputies (by design, two men and two women: Marco Pannella and Mauro Mellini, Emma Bonino and Adele Faccio) insisted on taking position in the upper left of the Chamber, the so-called "mountain" of French Revolutionary connotation and traditional emplacement of the far left of the PCI.[51] The demand led to altercations with PCI deputies and to the temporary expulsion of the Radicals by Pietro Ingrao, the first Communist to hold the post of President of the Chamber.[52] Such quarrels were intended to signal to voters that the Radicals were the sole genuine opposition to the "hexarchy" or "partitocracy," given the abdication of the institutional

[50] Marco Pannella, "Quell'esarchia è parlamentare," *Prova Radicale*, July-Aug. 1976, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=45724&lang=IT&cms=; the use of the term was borrowed from Guglielmo Giannini, leader of the Front of the Ordinary Man, used pejoratively to describe the six parties of the CLN and to equate anti-fascism with Fascism.

[51] In Italian, *montagna*. "Radicali e PCI – È vero: siamo i 4 sederi dell'apocalisse. Ma il problema dei posti in Parlamento, dice Pannella, si può risolvere anche senza violenza," *Tempo*, Milanese periodical, 17 Oct. 1976, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=45753&lang=IT&cms= .

[52] "Ingrao alla Camera espelle i Radicali," *Corriere della Sera* (Milan), 8 Oct. 1976, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=45745&lang=IT&cms=.

left of an oppositional role.[53] Other unconventional parliamentary tactics included the decision to rotate Radical deputies half-way through the scheduled term, by late 1978; the act was intended to desacralize the post of deputy regarded by most politicians, argued Radicals, as a sinecure rather than a service rendered to citizens, the implication being that Radicals themselves were not mere professional politicos.[54] As often happens in periods of social and economic crisis, politicians were vulnerable to popular disfavor; Radicals both abetted and sought to capitalize on mounting public discontent. The youth, gender and dress-code of at least one of the freshmen Radicals signaled the intent to break with politics as usual; twenty-eight-year-old Bonino, sharp speaker and feminist, wore informal clothing, arguably seeking and most certainly eliciting disapproval from her more staid colleagues.[55]

Politically-motivated resignations were also part of the Radical armamentarium; such acts were usually retracted once political objectives had been attained. Resignation furnished the occasion to indict the indifference of the powerful for what Radicals designated as the common good. Justifying her departure from the Chamber and her earlier decision to undertake a hunger strike, Bonino condemned governmental inaction on prison reform: "I do not intend to experience as a dichotomy my identity as parliamentarian on the one hand, and as activist

---

[53] Massimo Teodori, "Partiti, società, stato," *Argomenti radicali*, Feb./Mar. 1978, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=46297&lang=IT&cms=.

[54] Such stances as well as ones in the same vein preceded and resembled those of Joschka Fischer's Greens, see Hockenos, *Joschka Fischer and the Making of the Berlin Republic*, passim. For an account of Radical parliamentary tenure during the seventh legislation, see Ernesto Bettinelli, "Quattro radicali a Montecitorio: primo bilancio di una stagione parlamentare per la rivoluzione democratica," *Argomenti radicali*, Apr./May 1977, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=45869&lang=IT&cms= and Mauro Mellini, "Il gruppo parlamentare Radicale nella VII legislature," *Libere Frontiere*, 12 May 1979, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=46690&lang=IT&cms= .

[55] Stefano Malatesta, "Noi, rompiscatole," *Panorama*, 5 Apr. 1977, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=45909&lang=IT&cms=.

(*militante*) on the other […] In good conscience I know that I have done everything I could: [parliamentary] interrogations, interpellations, motions, studies, elaborations, presentations of draft laws, interventions in the Chamber, across the nation, meetings with the prime minister, with ministers and undersecretaries […] More than this I cannot do […] It is my duty to resign as deputy […] since little else appears to stand in defense of life in this country but for the bare, essential force which our ideas represent and which we as nonviolent Radicals embody—in the literal sense of the word," concluded Bonino with a reference to the sixties slogan linking the personal to the political.[56]

Radical behavior in Parliament was shaped by the group's dual identity as both social movement and party. In an appraisal of their first months in Parliament, Gianfranco Spadaccia, a party veteran, asserted that the group's distinctiveness was intact: "I think that recent events have disproven all those who predicted, feared or hoped that following the elections the Radical Party would abandon its nature of an activist, self-determined, libertarian, and nonviolent party, that it too [would become] an institutional party, penetrated by the institutions, [a party] which lets institutions change and corrupt it, rather than one that to the contrary transforms them." After denouncing a predominating "corporatist, authoritarian and clerical" order, Spadaccia affirmed that the Radical Party represented "the indispensable protagonist of socialist refoundation and renascence" that could "free political democracy from the stranglehold of the corporatist spoils-system or from the threat of class-based authoritarian expropriation." Radicalism, he continued, offered an alternative, but "not through the desperate and suicidal approach of revolutionary violence", to "the millions of [persons] in this country who are marginalized, oppressed, without

[56] Emma Bonino, 22 Mar. 1977, *Atti Parlamentari, Camera dei Deputati, VII legislatura, Discussioni, Seduta del 22 marzo, 1977,* 6072-3,http://legislature.camera.it/_dati/leg07/lavori/stenografici/sed0106/sed0106.pdf .

a voice, without power, without defense […].” He concluded by noting that the party would combine street activism with a stubborn engagement with the political process “through a unitary political project that makes us the obligatory interlocutors of the institutions.”[57] Such a project, in the form of the proposal for ten referenda, soon reduced to eight, was announced during the XVIIth party congress of October-November 1976 and officially approved in January 1977.[58] In parallel, the Radicals ratcheted up their critique of the PCI strategy of collaboration with the DC, arguing that earlier promises by Berlinguer to nevertheless continue to exert the role of an opposition were an obvious sham. Regrettably, stated Spadaccia, the PCI risked repeating the disappointing performance of the Socialists during the Opening to the Left of the sixties.[59]

The eight Radical referenda included topics previously targeted by unsuccessful referendum bids. The current referenda sought the abrogation of (1) the 1929 Concordat between the Vatican and the Italian State; (2) the peacetime military code; (3) military justice ordinances; (4) a special tribunal permitting indicted parliamentarians to escape ordinary judgment; (5) repressive aspects of the Rocco penal code dating back to the Fascist era; (6) the confinement of the mentally ill in institutions; (7) 1974 legislation awarding public financing for parties; and finally (8) the Reale Law of 1975, which extended preventive arrest and introduced

[57] Gianfranco Spadaccia, “Spadaccia: una strategia contro il compromesso,” *Notizie Radicali*, 13 Oct. 1976, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=45750&lang=IT&cms= .

[58] “Mozione generale approvata dal XVII congresso del Pr. Napoli 31 ottobre, 1, 2, 3, e 4 novembre 1976,” in “Le lotte, le conquiste, le proposte radicali attraverso i documenti congressuali e lo statuto,” ed. M. Griffo, pamphlet published by the Radical Party (Nov. 1985), http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=45768&lang=IT&cms=; “Le decisioni del Consiglio federativo sui referendum,” *Notizie Radicali*, 15 Jan. 1977, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=45815&lang=IT&cms=; “Otto firme per un solo grande referendum. Appello di Marco Pannella,” Apr. 1977, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=45903&lang=IT&cms=.

[59] Gianfranco Spadaccia, “Molto fronte, poco cervello,” *Notizie Radicali*, 15 Jan. 1977, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=45813&lang=IT&cms= .

other controversial measures to combat terrorism.[60] Radicals also hoped their referendum seeking the decriminalization of abortion would be held as planned; it had been approved during the previous legislation and postponed due to the early elections.[61] While some Socialists expressed qualified support for the Radical referendum program, the PCI expressed its adamant opposition, arguing that Parliament ought to be the seat for legislation, not popular consultations which risked undermining republican institutions.[62]

The Radical referendum campaign of 1977 is associated with an episode emblematic of the bloodshed of Italy's "Leaden Years."[63] The previous year had seen a crescendo of political violence of all stripes; the current one would worsen the record. Alongside a surge in terrorist and criminal activities, growing protests swept the nation, some of which degenerated into violence. Such variegated acts by leftist students came to be known as the "Movement of '77," an echo and in retrospect epilogue of the protests of the late sixties. On one such occasion, an unarmed protester of *Lotta Continua* was shot dead by a trigger-happy policeman.[64] Following a rash of episodes of politically motivated street violence culminating with the murder of a police officer, DC Minister of the Interior Francesco Cossiga instated an emergency decree prohibiting any public demonstrations for the duration of forty-five days. Pannella's Radicals, then engaged

---

[60] Lorenza Ponzone, *Il Partito radicale nella politica italiana* (Fasano, BR: Schena, 1993), chapter 5, "I radicali tra azione diretta e parlamento," transcript in OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=53863&lang=IT&cms=.

[61] "Il progetto di legge radicale sull'aborto," *La Prova Radicale*, July/Aug. 1977, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=45726&lang=IT&cms=.

[62] Flavio Colonna, "Il nostro dissenso sugli otto referendum," *l'Unità* (Rome), 4 Oct. 2011.

[63] In Italian, *Anni di Piombo*. A similar expression, "the Leaden Time" (*die bleierne Zeit*) was used to describe a period of street and terrorist violence in 1977 in West Germany. See Hockenos, *Joschka Fischer and the Making of the Berlin Republic*, 123-8.

[64] Ginsborg, *A History of Contemporary Italy*, 381-3.

in a last-ditch attempt to gather the necessary quorum for their referendum proposals, opted to ignore a ban which they considered illegal. In defiance of authorities, they organized a demonstration on 12 May 1977, the anniversary of the victory in the divorce referendum three years earlier.[65] The public event was endorsed by two new left groups and Lombardi's wing of the PSI.[66] But despite intentions, it almost immediately degenerated, as police officers and undercover agents clashed with violent extremists reportedly infiltrated among the new left and Radical demonstrators. Shots were fired, and a nineteen year-old female student, a member of *Lotta Continua*, was killed.

Ensuing polemics pitted the Radicals against the Andreotti government. Radicals accused Cossiga of being directly responsible for the employ of agents disguised as extremists, one or more of who, they claimed, had used live ammunition.[67] Cossiga rejected the accusations, pointing to the moral responsibility of the Radicals for holding a demonstration in the first place and for unintentionally permitting its penetration by extremists. The PCI struck a middle ground, deploring the Radicals' "adventurist initiatives" but also the drastic prohibition of demonstrations by the state.[68] Radical denunciations of the minister of interior fit into a narrative depicting the state as a malignant and oppressive force; it was a portrayal which resonated with

---

[65] Marco Pannella, "Le armi del Partito radicale," *Lotta Continua* (Rome), 8/9 May 1977, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=45937&lang=IT&cms=.

[66] Luca Giurato, "La manifestazione a Roma per gli otto referendum. I radicali vogliono il convegno ma permane il 'no' del governo. Un decreto vieta riunioni pubbliche fino al 31 maggio – Pannella insiste: 'La dimostrazione si farà' – Aderiscono 'Lotta Continua', 'Avanguardia operaia' e mezzo psi," *La Stampa* (Turin), 11 May 1977.

[67] Alberto Bevilacqua, "Sono autentici i filmati degli interventi di Roma," *Corriere della Sera* (Milan), 6 Nov. 1977; on Cossiga, "incarnation of the culture of secret and the ambiguities of the DC" and the Italian state's unconfirmed obfuscations of the frequent episodes of extremist violence in this period, see Rayner, "Protéger, subir et réprimer."

[68] "Teso dibattito a Montecitorio sugli incidenti di Roma. La Camera condanna le nuove violenze. Appello del PCI all'unità democratica," *l'Unità* (Rome), 14 May 1977.

leftist opinion but that some criticized as dangerously reminiscent of the language of subversive groups.[69] Though subsequent investigations failed to identity the killer of the young woman, to this day a solemn bronze plaque affixed by the site of the killing on a Roman bridge commemorates the event, baldly attributing the youth's death to the "violence of the regime."[70]

In July 1977, Radicals vehemently denounced the national solidarity government's ratification of a governmental program which the PCI had helped formulate for the first time since 1947. While *l'Unità* saluted the historic milestone, the Radicals, on account of new public safety measures, darkly warned of a "police state" in the making, one supposedly long planned by the DC, but now realized thanks to PCI support.[71]

The mounting antipolitical accents of Italian Radicalism did not go undetected among party members, one of whom explored possible implications. In discussing the options of the

---

[69] Marco Pannella, interview by Salvator Tropea, "Pannella spara sul PCI: 'Boicotta i referendum.' Intervista-sfogo del leader radicale,", *Gazzetta del Popolo* (Rome), 19 Dec. 1977, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=46201&lang=IT&cms=.

[70] Carlo Rivolta, "Gravissimi incidenti dopo il divieto di Cossiga alla manifestazione del 12 maggio. Ancora guerra a Roma. Una studentessa di 19 anni uccisa e molti feriti dopo le cariche della polizia contro i radicali," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 13 May 1977; Marco Pannella, "Roma a ferro e fuoco," *Lotta Continua* (Rome), [n.d., May 1977], OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=45941&lang=IT&cms=; " Il tempo dei lupi è venuto," declaration of Marco Panella during a RAI-1 television program, Tribuna Politica, 25/26 May 1977, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=45954&lang=IT&cms= ; Franco Corleone and Lorenzo Strik Lievers, "I referendum, il 12 maggio, quelli che firmano e quelli che sparano," *Argomenti radicali*, June-July 1977, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=45945&lang=IT&cms=; Camilla Cederna, "Una strage di verità"; Antonello Trombadori, "Il divieto era 'democratico e di lotta'. È vostra la responsabilità della tragedia"; "Parola di ministro," *Il Messaggero* (Rome), 14 May 1977; Marco Pannella, "Un delitto di Stato," articles from *Libro bianco del Partito radicale sull'uccisione di Giorgiana Masi e sui fatti del 12 Maggio 1977: 'Cronaca di una strage'* (Rome: Centro di iniziativa giuridica Piero Calamandrei, 1979), OHRA, available respectively from http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=46615&lang=IT&cms= , http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=46626&lang=IT&cms= , http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=46625&lang=IT&cms= , http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=46617&lang=IT&cms= . A photograph of the commemorative plaque is available from http://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/Giorgiana_Masi.

[71] "Si apre una fase nuova nella vita politica italiana. La Camera approva la mozione dei partiti. L'accordo entra nel programma di governo," *l'Unità* (Rome), 16 July 1977; Gianfranco Spadaccia, "Battere la logica della guerra civile. Contro i accordi di regime," *Notizie Radicali*, 16 July 1977, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=45991&lang=IT&cms= .

small Radical contingent even as a new governmental crisis intensified in late 1977, the Radical pointed to the import of the Radical referendum proposing to abrogate the public financing of parties. It in particular, argued Lorenzo Strik Lievers, would provide the opportunity to mobilize civil society against a political system no longer able to convey people's aspirations. "The Radicals," opined Strik Lievers, "by virtue of their role as promoters of the referendum and sole adversaries of the compact bloc of all the parties of the regime will benefit on this occasion as never before […] from the full attention of public opinion. It is evident that on the occasion of the campaign [the Radicals] will not confine themselves to the circumscribed topic at hand, but will also raise the broader question of the relationship between party structures, institutions and society, in other words the current conflict in our country between the political system and civil society."

However, warned the same author, "to base a campaign against 'the party of parties' and its regime […] limiting oneself to denounce generically the new fascism and its corruption, would signify probably for the Radicals to lose much of their credibility on the left […]; what is worse, it would mean to remain powerless in what is shaping up to be a great libertarian and reformist battle over the coming years."[72] Resort to antipolitics risked becoming an end rather than a means, Strik Liever implied. The challenge of the Radicals, he stated in concluding remarks, was to avoid rejecting politics as such, and rather to "convey the notion that these parties can no longer incarnate […] such hopes; that regional autonomy, union power, [institutional] assemblies of various sorts, whether local or parliamentary, are ever less sites of democracy, autonomous or authentic representation, and ever more sites of manipulation,

[72] Lorenzo Strik Lievers, "La crisi e i radicali," *Argomenti radicali*, (Feb./Mar. 1978), OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=46295&lang=IT&cms=.

capillary control and occupation by the bureaucracies of parties."[73] But sticking to a focused critique of institutional and political frameworks without ceding to the temptation of a more indiscriminate antipolitical stance would prove a hard act to follow.

By early 1978, four of the parties in the national solidarity government, notably the PCI, provoked a crisis. The Communists demanded a more prominent role in government.[74] A major political challenge facing a reconstituted government would the avalanche of referenda which the Radicals, in a tour de force, had managed to submit for review to the courts in July 1977; in addition, the government faced the postponed referendum on abortion.[75] Though a handful of the eight Radical referenda were declared unconstitutional in mid-January 1978, the remaining four plus the long postponed one on abortion were to be held within months, if not rendered moot in the interim by corrective legislation.[76] By March, after two months of political wrangling

---

[73] Ibid.

[74] Gerardo Chiaromonte, "Un movimento unitario per un cambiamento reale," *l'Unità* (Rome), 15 Jan. 1978; "La relazione di Napolitano ai delegati comunisti delle fabbriche. Una maggiore consapevolezza della gravità della crisi," *l'Unità* (Rome), 4 Mar.1978.

[75] "Contro la violenza," 21 Feb.1977, political flyer, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=45831&lang=IT&cms=; "Otto firme per un solo grande referendum. Appello di Marco Pannella," Apr. 1977, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=45903&lang=IT&cms=; "Firma per l'abrogazione della legge Reale e delle altre norme fasciste, clericali, militariste e democristiane. La prossima volta potrebbe accadere a te," political flyer, OHRA,, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=45929&lang=IT&cms=; Marco Pannella, "La necessità del referendum," *La Stampa* (Turin), 9 June, 1977; Adelaide Aglietta, "Con la lotta in mezzo alla gente," *Notizie Radicali*, 16 July 1977, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=45990&lang=IT&cms=.

[76] Mauro Mellini, "Opinioni. La dc, il pci e i referendum," *La Stampa* (Turin), 3 Dec. 1977; Marco Pannella, "Esarchia, Partito Radicale, informazione," *Notizie Radicali*, 1 January 1978, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=46218&lang=IT&cms=; Luca Giurato, "Andreotti attende la decisione della dc e del pci. La crisi di governo chiesta da 4 partiti. Le forze politiche concordano che occorre rivedere l'accordo a sei sottoscritto in luglio – il punto da risolvere è l'esecutivo che dovrebbe realizzare la nuova intesa," *La Stampa* (Turin), 5 Jan. 1978; Lamberto Furno, "L'11 gennaio 'vertice' dc. Governo: si profila una crisi guidata," *La Stampa* (Turin), 8 Jan. 1978; Giovanni Conso, "Referendum Radicali. Domani l'ultima parola alla Corte Costituzionale," *Stampa Sera* (Turin), 16 Jan. 1978; Alessandro Natta, "La sentenza sui referendum e il dovere del Parlamento," *l'Unità* (Rome), 20 Jan. 1978; Marco Pannella, "…peste li colga," interview, *L'Opinione*, 24 Jan. 1978), OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=46233&lang=IT&cms= ; "Un governo di necessità," *La Stampa* (Turin), 5 Feb. 1978.

punctuated by what *l'Unità* deplored as US interference, the coalition parties appeared ready to vote in a new cabinet.[77]

On 16 March 1978, however, an event occurred which would prove as shocking and memorable to Italians as had been President Kennedy's murder to Americans. On his way to Parliament to vote on the constitution of a new government, Aldo Moro was seized and his entire police escort massacred by the Red Brigades. In an emotional session held the same day, the legislation's second government of national solidarity was precipitously approved. It was once again constituted by an all Christian-Democratic cabinet, led as earlier by Giulio Andreotti, but presently seconded by outright parliamentary votes of support from four parties: the PCI, PSI, PSDI, and PRI. Berlinguer temporarily set aside his demands for executive Communist role.[78] The Liberals, sensing an opportunity to build on the anticommunist and center-right protest vote, shifted to the opposition.[79]

For the first time since the ratification of the Constitution, the Communists had entered into what was termed the "area of government." Though still short of their main goal, progress was in act, despite or perhaps even thanks to the terrorism crisis. The latter would provide an opportunity for the PCI to burnish its legitimacy as a bona fides governmental party. At the

---

[77] "Un'indiretta ammissione del ministro degli esteri Forlani. L'ingerenza USA nella crisi italiana è stata sollecitata da settori dc? La presa di posizione del dipartimento di Stato criticata anche da esponenti democristiani e dai repubblicani. Un'interrogazione del PSI – Dichiarazione di Pajetta: 'Uno schiaffo all'Italia' – I commenti a Parigi e a Washington," *l'Unità* (Rome), 14 Jan. 1978.

[78] Colarizi, *Storia dei partiti.* 481-2.

[79] Gianfranco Franci, "Dal Parlamento fiducia massiccia per il Governo," *La Stampa* (Turin), 17 Mar. 1978; Alfredo Venturi, "Presentato a Milano da Malagodi e Zanone. Il 'nuovo corso' dei liberali ha aperto le liste ai cattolici. Il pli tenterà un'intesa con quei dc 'non aperti verso il comunismo," *La Stampa* (Turin), 28 Mar. 1978.

same time, however, the Moro affair would also constitute a venue for new left, Socialist and Radical challenges to the hegemonic party of the left.

The question of whether or not to negotiate Moro's release emerged within days, raising legal and political questions.[80] The PCI was as prompt as the DC to reject negotiations. One prominent Communist asserted on March 17 that "there is no negotiating with the Red Brigades."[81] Initially, the terrorists refrained from such a request, announcing intead in their first communiqué that Moro would be judged by the "people's tribunal." Moro, they wrote, was the "undisputed 'strategist' of a Christian-Democratic 'regime' which has oppressed the Italian people for thirty years." "This regime, this party" continued the communiqué "is today the national outpost […] of the greatest criminal multinational [entity] that humanity has ever known," one led by its principal power-brokers, the "United States and West Germany." The kidnapping of Moro "was more than just a symbol," wrote the self-styled "fighting communist party;" it was the spark that would ignite a "movement of aggressive resistance."[82]

A few days after the release of the communiqué an autograph letter written by Moro was released, indirectly revealing the intent of the terrorists. Moro pleaded with Cossiga to reject an intransigent defense of raison d'état and to consider an exchange of hostages, one perhaps mediated by the Holy See. "The sacrifice of innocents in the name of an abstract principle of legality is inadmissible, when undoubted necessity should rather motivate [the state] to save

[80] "Se le Br chiedono lo scambio cosa succederà in udienza," *La Stampa* (Turin), 19 Mar. 1978; Giovanni Conso, "Scambio Moro-Br nonsenso giuridico," *La Stampa* (Turin), 20 Mar. 1978.

[81] Lamberto Fumo, "Appello della Dc ai cittadini per sostenere la democrazia," *La Stampa* (Turin), 18 Mar. 1978.

[82] "Il testo del delirante volantino contro la democrazia. Così 'ragionano' le Brigate Rosse," *La Stampa* (Turin), 19 Mar. 1978.

them," Moro wrote.[83] In response, the DC and PCI reiterated the rejection of any opening to the expected blackmail of the Red Brigades. *L'Unità* emphasized the coercion under which Moro's letter was written, denying its legitimacy and value. "What is truly at stake is the future of the republic. Our task is arduous, but simple: the democratic regime cannot cede to terrorism."[84] *Il Popolo*, the official daily of the DC, concurred: "it is impossible to accept the blackmail imposed by the Red Brigades."[85] The other parties of the ruling majority followed suit in rejecting negotiations.[86]

At this early stage, an exception to the near unanimous refusal to negotiate with the terrorists derived from the Radical position. The Radicals were the only deputies not to applaud the emotional peroration of Benigno Zaccagnini, Moro's political heir.[87] One day into the Moro crisis, Pannella abandoned the Chamber in protest when Andreotti, while advocating for alteration of the Reale Law, described the Radical abrogative referendum on the law as "almost a plebiscite pro or against criminality." A few days after the event, the parties of the heterogeneous and narrow opposition (Radicals, PLI, DP, and MSI-DN) demanded a plenary debate on the

[83] Paolo Gambescia, "Fatta trovare ieri sera a Roma, Milano, Genova eTorino. Una tragica lettera di Moro. Dice di scrivere costretto dalle 'BR' accenna a torture e chiede lo scambio," *l'Unità* (Rome), 30 Mar. 1978.

[84] "Fermezza," *l'Unità* (Rome), 31 Mar. 1978.

[85] Citation from Lamberto Fumo, "No della Dc al ricatto," *La Stampa* (Turin), 31 Mar. 1978; Aldo Rizzo, "La Dc: 'Non si può accettare il ricatto delle Brigate rosse'," *La Stampa* (Turin), 31 Mar. 1978; "La Dc ripete: nessuna trattativa. Le 'Br' giunte da Torino e Milano," *La Stampa* (Turin), 1 Apr. 1978.

[86] "La Repubblica non può cedere al terrorismo. I partiti democratici respingono il ricatto e le minacce delle 'BR'," *l'Unità* (Rome), 31 Mar. 1978.

[87] Gianfranco Franci, "Il Parlamento ha già dato il voto di fiducia per mettere il governo in grado di operare," *La Stampa* (Turin), 17 Mar. 1978.

Moro case, rather than the more restricted committee debate desired by the majority.[88] The Radicals proposed that the debate be integrated into a broader one on the question of public order. The present danger, argued Pannella, "certainly does not derive from some armed band, a symptom and consequence, not a cause: it proceeds rather from inside the palace [of power]." As for Moro, Pannella argued that "the life of any man must be in any case defended. This political class and this government, which are incapable of respecting their own laws, do not have the right to invoke the principle of legality by refusing negotiations with the Red Brigades."[89] Pressed by the submission of numerous interrogations, the Andreotti government agreed to respond to queries during a plenary hearing on the kidnapping. The Radical request for a wider, integrated debate on public order was rejected; instead, the majority opted to pursue, after the plenary hearing on the Moro case, the modification of existing legislation and to thereby seek to avoid the pending Radical referenda, including the one on the antiterrorism Reale Law.[90]

The Red Brigades timed the release of a fourth letter from Moro at the very outset of the plenary parliamentary session. The letter, addressed to his DC colleagues, implored them to pursue an exchange of "political" prisoners.[91] It had little effect, however, on the tenor of the debate, out of which emerged once again an official commitment to a policy of intransigence.[92] A softening of some elements of the DC was noted by the press, but it did not significantly affect

[88] In 1972, the neofascist MSI had been renamed *Movimento sociale italiano-Destra nazionale*, MSI-DN). See Piero Ignazi, *Il polo escluso: Profilo storico del Movimento Sociale Italiano* (Bologna: Il Mulino), 148-61.

[89] "Camera: non c'è ancora un accordo per il dibattito sul 'caso Moro'," *La Stampa* (Turin), 30 Mar. 1978.

[90] Gianfranco Franci, "Martedì alla Camera dibattito su Moro," *La Stampa* (Turin), 1 Apr. 1978.

[91] "La lettera estorta a Moro," *La Stampa* (Turin), 6 Apr. 1978.

[92] Lamberto Fumo, "La Camera scassa reagisce. I partiti compatti con la Dc," *La Stampa* (Turin), 6 Apr. 1978.

the official line.[93] Pannella devoted most of his speech to an indictment of the grand coalition for refusing to debate what were in his view the veritable issues facing the nation.[94] Intercepted afterwards by a journalist, Pannella stated that "never as now Moro merits trust, respect…We who opposed [in the past] with our refusal, […] with our hunger strikes, the violent politics of the majority, have today the duty to defend Aldo Moro."[95]

On April 16, the Red Brigades announced that Moro's "trial" had yielded a death verdict.[96] Throughout his ordeal the PCI remained an intransigent opponent to any negotiation, with no apparent dissent emerging from its ranks, contrasting with hesitation within other parties of the majority.[97] The Radicals claimed censorship by the government and the mainstream press of their request for a renewed parliamentary debate on his plight. In early May, the Radical motion pressing the government to consider options to save Moro's life was rejected.[98] In the nation at large, public opinion grew more nuanced than official party lines of intransigence,

[93] "I democristiani trattano per liberare Aldo Moro?" *La Stampa* (Turin), 5 Apr. 1978; "Il Vaticano ha scelto di trattare per Moro?" *La Stampa* (Turin), 11 Apr. 1978.

[94] Marco Pannella, "Interrogazioni sul rapimento del deputato Aldo Moro e sull'uccisione degli agenti della sua scorta (Svolgimento)," 4 Apr. 1978, *Atti Parlamentari, Camera dei Deputati, VII Legislatura , Discussioni, Seduta del 4 aprile 1978*, 14688-92, http://legislature.camera.it/_dati/leg07/lavori/stenografici/sed0259/sed0259.pdf .

[95] Lamberto Fumo, "La Camera scassa reagisce. I partiti compatti con la Dc," *La Stampa* (Turin), 7 Feb. 1978.

[96] "L'infame 'condanna' accresce l'angoscia," *La Stampa* (Turin), 17 Apr. 1978.

[97] Alberto Rapisarda, "Il Pci: perchè lo Stato non deve scendere a patti con i terroristi," *La Stampa* (Turin), 12 Apr. 1978; "Il Pci: no – il Psi: sì," *La Stampa* (Turin), 21 Apr. 1978; Vittorio Zucconi, "Salvarlo, nel rispetto dello stato," *La Stampa* (Turin), 21 Apr. 1978.

[98] Marco Pannella, "Moro: dichiarazione di Marco Pannella di sabato 29.4.78 ore 14 censurata da tutta la stampa," 29 Apr. 1978, public declaration, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=46344&lang=IT&cms=; "Per la fissazione della data di discussione di una mozione," 2 May 1978, *Atti Parlamentari, Camera dei Deputati, VII Legislatura, Discussioni, Seduta del 2 Maggio 1978*, 16673-6, http://legislature.camera.it/_dati/leg07/lavori/stenografici/sed0275/sed0275.pdf.

proving sensitive to humanitarian appeals to save Moro's life.[99] A legal scholar expressed skepticism with respect to the raison d'état argument for sacrificing Moro's life. Liberal-conservative jurist Alessandro Passerin d'Entrèves questioned the soundness of the argument, drawing a distinction between raison d'état and rule of law: "[…] unfortunately the state that we have known and experimented in these years has not always been what we had planned […] It has proven instead an inept and inert one, characterized by procrastination and base expedients; too often errors and faults have remained unpunished. If such an experience informs the 'reason' from which our leaders should now draw inspiration, I fear that yet grimmer times await us."[100]

On 9 May 1978 Moro's corpse was found in the trunk of a car parked in central Rome, precisely halfway between the headquarters of the PCI and of the DC. In the days before and after his murder, Radicals conducted an all-out parliamentary battle in alliance with DP to preclude the governing coalition from amending the Reale Law. They pointed out the contradictions of a Communist party which now defended the Reale Law but had as recently as 1975 strongly opposed its passage due to libertarian concerns.[101] Radicals resorted to similar

[99] Roberto Reale, "Ipotesi di scambio tra Moro e Br. Giudizi e incertezze del cittadino," *La Stampa* (Turin), 2 Apr. 1978.

[100] Alessandro Passerin d'Entrèves, "La ragion di Stato e lo Stato di diritto," *La Stampa* (Turin), 8 Apr. 1978. Passerin d'Entrèves's book *Natural Law: An Introduction to Legal Philosophy (Library of Conservative Thought)*, rev. ed. (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction, 1994) has exerted influence on postwar Anglo-American legal thought.

[101] in May 1975, left-wing magistrates had criticized the proposed law as being "of authoritarian and fascist stamp" and as constituting "an attack on democracy," see "Critiche di magistrati alla proposta di Reale," La Stampa (Turin), 6 May 1975. On PCI opposition in 1975 to the Reale Law, see "Da oggi alla Camera la battaglia sulle misure del 'progetto Reale'. Rigorosa azione dei comunisti a difesa dell'ordine democratico," *l'Unità* (Rome), 5 May 1975; "Grottesco ma pericoloso," *l'Unità* (Rome), 5 May 1975; "Sulla legge governativa. Il PSI conferma le proprie valutazioni," *l'Unità* (Rome), 6 May 1975; Gianfranco Franci, "In un'aula quasi vuota," *La Stampa* (Turin), 6 May 1975;; Gianfranco Franci, "Per ordine pubblico si ricerca un accordo tra la maggioranza," *La Stampa* (Turin), 16 May 1975; Gianfranco Franci, "Ieri il sì definitivo della Camera. Votata la nuova legge per l'ordine pubblico," *La Stampa* (Turin), 22 May 1975; "Legge 'Reale'- '75: il PCI diceva di no," *Notizie Radicali*, 26 May 1978), OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=46372&lang=IT&cms=; "Legge 'Reale' – come nacque," *Notizie Radicali*, 26 May 1978, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=46370&lang=IT&cms=; "Legge 'Reale' – quello che dice," *Notizie Radicali*, 26 May 1978, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=46373&lang=IT&cms=.

arguments to fend off attempts to amend the law and avoid the referendum. Resorting to obstructionism, as had earlier the PCI, Radicals submitted thousands of amendments and employed dilatory tactics. Consequently, the ruling majority ran out of the legally delimited time and had to abandon the effort, opening the way for the referendum consultation in June.[102] Further pressed by the Radicals, the ruling coalition was forced to call for a governmental vote of confidence to secure approval of an additional antiterrorism law.[103]

The demise of Moro weakened the PCI. An ally was lost within the DC and a blow dealt to its image on the left only partially offset by a law and order stance agreeable to centrists.[104] PCI intransigence was driven by conviction and the goal of democratic legitimation, but it ended up unintentionally reviving the authoritarian reputation of the party.[105] Within its ranks, the traumatic event catalyzed not only a reflexive alignment with the state, but also a more

---

[102] "Camera invischiata nelle manovre dei radicali sulla 'legge Reale'," *La Stampa* (Turin), 3 May 1978; Franco Mimmi, "Legge Reale in grave ritardo e si va verso il referendum," *La Stampa* (Turin), 12 May 1978; Franco Mimmi, "Legge Reale: troppo ostacoli forse la discussione in aula," *La Stampa* (Turin) 13 May 1978; Giovanni Conso, "Perchè è opportuno il voto popolare sulla 'legge Reale'" *La Stampa* (Turin), 15 May 1978; Franco Mimmi, "I partiti sono costretti a cedere all'ostruzionismo: referendum anche sulla nuova legge Reale," *La Stampa* (Turin), 20 May 1978; Franco Mimmi, "Questa la storia delle due leggi per le quali si fa il referendum," *La Stampa* (Turin), 21 May 1978; Franco Mimmi, "Referendum: si voterà su tutta la legge Reale," *La Stampa* (Turin), 23 May 1978; Franco Mimmì, "La Cassazione conferma due referendum legge Reale e finanziamento ai partiti," *La Stampa* (Turin), 25 May 1978; Mauro Mellini, "Un bis per la legge Reale," *Notizie Radicali*, 26 May 1978, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=46368&lang=IT&cms= ; Roberto Cicciomessere, "Un Parlamento squillo?" *Notizie Radicali*, 26 May 1978, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=46367&lang=IT&cms=; "Legge Reale: cos'è?" *Stampa Sera* (Turin), June 3, 1978.

[103] "Disegno di legge (Seguito della discussione e approvazione): Conversione in legge, con modificazioni, del decreto-legge 21 marzo 1978, n. 59, concernente norme penali e processuali per la prevenzione e la repressione di gravi reati *(approvato dal Senato),*" 16 May 1978, *Atti Parlamentari, Camera dei Deputati, VII Legislatura, Discussioni, Seduta del 16 maggio 1978*, 17652-98, http://legislature.camera.it/_dati/leg07/lavori/stenografici/sed0286/sed0286.pdf.

[104] Nello Ajello, *Il lungo addio: Intelletuali e PCI dal 1958 al 1991* (Bari:Laterza,1997), 195.

[105] Ibid., 176-80.

introspective meditation on the connections between red terrorism and leftist ideology.[106] Contributing to this soul searching was also criticism from dissidents of the Marxist left. The most notorious came from new left intellectual Rossana Rossanda, the founder of the newspaper (and short-lived political party) *il manifesto*. Rossanda had been expelled in 1969 for her criticism of the PCI's silences on the Soviet crackdown in Prague.[107] An article of hers published on 28 March 1978 remarked on the kinship between the vocabulary of the Red Brigades and that of the PCI: "in truth, whoever was a Communist in the fifties recognizes at a glance the new language of the Red Brigades. It's like browsing through a family album: all the ingredients from the famed Stalin and Zhdanov courses are present."[108] Predictably, Rossanda's words provoked ire. PCI leaders indignantly affirmed the absolute distance between Communist progressivism and recourse to violence and terrorism.[109] Deflecting the counter, Rossanda redirected the focus of the debate to what was, arguably, her major concern: the historic compromise. The latter had led to a muddying of political waters, she argued. Having struck a deal with its adversary, she continued, the PCI now felt compelled to demonize as "a terrorist" any dissident on the left having the temerity to term the DC as "the party of the bourgeoisie."[110]

---

[106] Paolo Bufalini, "Tirarsi su le maniche," *l'Unità* (Rome), 26 Mar. 1978; Umberto Cerroni, "La sinistra deve liberarsi da molti miti. Società di massa e violenza 'rossa'," *l'Unità* (Turin), 26 Mar. 1978.

[107] Rossana Rossanda, *La ragazza del secolo scorso*, (Turin: Einaudi, 2005), 377.

[108] Rossana Rossanda, "Il discorso sulla Dc," *il manifesto* (Rome), 28 Mar. 1978.

[109] Emanuele Macaluso, "La discussione sul terrorismo e lo Stato. Qualche risposta ai 'garantisti' e a Galloni," *l'Unità* (Rome), 1 Apr. 1978; Aldo Tortorella, "Le responsabilità," *l'Unità* (Rome), 2 Apr. 1976; Antonello Trombadori, "Le radici e i caratteri dell'eversione antidemocratica. Discutiamo del 'complotto'," *l'Unità* (Rome), 6 Apr. 1978.

[110] Rossana Rossanda, "L'album di famiglia," *il manifesto* (Rome), 2 Apr. 1978.

To some historians, the Moro tragedy marked a virtual endpoint in the history of the republic. According to their narrative, thereafter an irremediably blocked political system degenerated, leading to the implosion of 1992-94.[111] While such an interpretation appears too teleological and deterministic, the Moro affair and a cluster of other contemporary events signaled a widening disaccord between the two principal parties of the Italian left and the potential emergence of a Radical contender.[112] Such developments included Craxi's assertion on a number of fronts of autonomist stances, the losses of the PCI in local elections held shortly after Moro's murder, and the partial success of the two subsisting Radical referenda in June.

The remainder of 1978 would be marked by heightened tensions between the Socialists and the Radicals on one side and the Communists on the other. Events in France appeared to signal a broader trend; relations between the PS and PCF had frayed since 1977, when Georges Marchais, leader of the PCF, abandoned the *Union de la gauche* in the wake of his party's electoral decline. In May 1978, while continuing to assert that "a socialist society cannot be constructed without the contribution of communists," Mitterrand blamed the PCF for the defeat of the left in the general elections of March 1978 and threatened to launch what he termed a "socialist project" in lieu of the *Programme commun.*[113]

---

[111] Craveri, *La Repubblica dal 1958 al 1992,* 635-804; Colarizi, *La cruna dell'ago*, 81; Gaetano Quagliariello, "Gli anni Ottanta: gli aspetti politico-istituzionali: Un'interpretazione," in *Gli anni Ottanta come storia*, ed. Colarizi et alt, 267-80.

[112] Francesco Barbagallo, *L'Italia repubblicana: Dallo sviluppo alle riforme mancate (1945-2008)* (Rome: Carocci 2009), 151; Ajello, *Il lungo addio*, 186.

[113] Augusto Pancaldi, "La sinistra francese non esce dalla spirale delle polemiche. Più profondo il solco tra PS e PCF. Alla convenzione socialista Mitterrand è giunto ad accusare Marchais di 'tradimento' – Un 'progetto socialista' sarà contrapposto al programma comune – La sfilata del primo maggio a Parigi," *l'Unità* (Rome), 1 May 1978.

For his part, after almost two years of preparation, PSI secretary Craxi consolidated his leadership during the spring 1978 Turin congress, held as the Moro drama unfolded.[114] Congressional proceedings included the adoption of the new party symbol of a red carnation, a throw-back to a nineteenth-century emblem which now dominated a diminutive hammer and sickle.[115] The congress marked the beginning of the unification of factions whose disputes had bedeviled the party and been a source of damaging scissions; centralization around the charismatic figure of the leader was now gradually introduced.[116] Craxi's line prevailed during the congress thanks to an opportunistic alliance with Signorile, which on the surface appeared to be an endorsement of the latter's goal of forging an alternative of the left to DC power.[117] In reality though, it was Craxi's slogan of a "socialist alternative" which won the day, a nod to an autonomist stance. *La Stampa* opined that the Socialist congress had effectively buried the unity of the left favored during the previous congress of 1976.[118]

Another outcome of the PSI congress was a softening on the question of negotiations with Moro's kidnappers. During the proceedings, Moro's first letter had been released by his captors, provoking redoubled DC and PCI firmness. In contrast, Craxi signaled an opening to the libertarian wing of his party. While Lombardi asserted that "one must never cede to

---

[114] Alberto Rapisarda, "Craxi chiude oggi un congresso che ha dominato senza difficoltà," *La Stampa* (Turin), 2 Apr. 1978; Alberto Rapisarda, "Il nuovo Psi di Craxi-Signorile barriera a un Pci pigliatutto," *La Stampa* (Turin), 4 Apr. 1978.

[115] Alberto Rapisarda, "Psi verso una nuova maggioranza. Cerca uno spazio tra la Dc e il Pci," *La Stampa* (Turin), 1 Apr. 1978.

[116] Giovanni Trovati, "Craxi, Lombardi, De Martino tre 'verità' per un partito," *La Stampa* (Turin), 1 Apr. 1978.

[117] Antonio Caprarica and Vanja Ferretti, "Con la republica di Craxi e l'elezione del nuovo CC si chiude stasera l'assise. Il problema degli schieramenti interni domina la conclusione del Congresso Psi. Polemico Signorile verso gli esponenti della minoranza – Incontro tra le correnti – Momenti di tensione," *l'Unità* (Rome), 2 Apr. 1978.

[118] Giovanni Trovati, "Ideologia e politica," *La Stampa* (Turin), 31 Mar. 1978.

blackmail," Giacomo Mancini, a stalwart supporter of the battles for divorce, an opponent of antiterrorist emergency laws, and an interlocutor of the Radical and new left, argued that "as socialists we have to first of all think about life, because […] every single life is more important than politics." Claudio Martelli, the youthful right-hand man of Craxi, upended the main argument for intransigence, declaring that "one must do what is possible to save Moro and with him, the state."[119] Craxi's shift on Moro constituted a coded attack on the historic compromise, signaling growing aloofness from the PCI and an opening to other foes of the DC-PCI duopoly.[120] He and his party allies were bitter over what they justifiably considered as marginalization by the Communists over the course of the legislation.[121] The Socialist leader also directed criticism at the Radical camp, as was consistent with his determination to grow the PSI at the expense of all of its rivals. He declared that Radicals "would have done better to remain a movement" and could not hope for long to monopolize libertarian causes also "underwritten by Socialist parliamentarians."[122]

Craxi's autonomist stance was soon boosted by the first Socialist electoral affirmation since 1975. Partial local elections held days after Moro's demise were characterized by high turnout; they delivered a blow to the PCI, rewarded the DC, and elevated the PSI to an average of 13.1 percent of the vote.[123] Socialist success was linked to the attenuation of vote polarization

[119] Vittorio Zucconi, "L'ombra della lettera pesa anche sul congresso del Psi," *La Stampa* (Turin), 31 Mar. 1978.

[120] Ginsborg, *History of Contemporary Italy*, 385; Colarizi and Gervasoni, *La cruna dell'ago*, 59-62.

[121] Ginsborg, *History of Contemporary Italy*, 376-8.

[122] Cited in Gianfranco Spadaccia, "Una risposta a Bettino Craxi," 3 April 1978, statement, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=46306&lang=IT&cms=.

[123] Marco Tosatti, "Spostamenti superiori al previsto nelle parziali amministrative. Elezioni: successo per dc e psi. Forte calo del pci rispetto al '76," *La Stampa* (Turin), 16 May 1978.

and the reemergence of third party forces, including the lay parties, which also regained lost terrain. In PCI ranks, electoral decline led to a degree of self-doubt.[124] The Radicals did not participate, as was often the case in local elections and on account of their single-minded focus on the looming referenda.

Another boost for Craxi's standing emerged the following month. In June, President Leone was forced to resign on account of an alleged linkage to the Lockheed bribery scandal. The PCI had demanded and obtained Leone's resignation, in a move taxed by some as demagogic. Leone's fall testified to both growing citizen outrage over corruption and to a re-emergent PCI populism which had been in recent years most evident in the rhetoric of the Radicals and of the far right.[125] Berlinguer declared that Communist demand for Leone's defenestration was a product of his party's "deep ties with a working class that demands justice and morality."[126] The Radicals also had a role in Leone's fall through Bonino's submission of denunciations for alleged fiscal fraud; they later saluted his departure as a "great democratic success" obtained by the entire left.[127] During the parliamentary horse-trading that traditionally marked a presidential appointment, a weakened DC was forced to withdraw all of its candidates.

---

[124] Luca Giurato, "Si allontana il bipolarismo," *La Stampa* (Turin), 16 May 1978; "Quali sono i complessi significati di un 'test' elettorale? Tra dc e pci si è riaperto un distacco di sedici punti," *La Stampa* (Turin), 17 May 1978; Giuseppe Galasso, " Il 'compromesso' anche dopo le elezioni. Pci: un pò di autocritica ma non si cambia strada," *Stampa Sera* (Turin), 5 June 1978.

[125] On the left-wing populism of the PCI, see Marc Lazar, "Du populisme à gauche: Les cas français et italiens," *Vingtième Siècle: Revue d'histoire* 56 (Oct.-Dec. 1997), 121-31.

[126] Giorgio Ravasi, "Le reazioni dell'opinione pubblica al gesto del Capo dello Stato. Si discute sulle dimissioni di Leone," *La Stampa* (Turin), 17 June 1978; Paolo Garimberti, "Perchè Berlinguer chiese l'atto 'risolutore.' L'umore della base del pci fù determinante per Leone? Il segretario comunista a Bologna ha detto che la capacità di iniziativa del suo partito viene 'dai legami profondi con la classe operaia che esige giustizia e moralità'," *La Stampa* (Turin), 18 June 1978.

[127] "In seguito alla denuncia presentata da Emma Bonino. Indagini della magistratura sui rediti '73-'74 dei Leone," *La Stampa* (Turin), 13 June 1978; Fabrizio Carbone, "Valanga di accuse, finora nessuna provata," *La Stampa* (Turin), 16 June 1978; "Mozione generale approvata dal XX congresso del Pr. Bari 1,2,3,4 e 5 novembre 1978," November 1978, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=46492&lang=IT&cms=.

In overwhelming numbers, the Senate and Chamber's electors appointed the independently-minded Socialist Sandro Pertini, a highly respected figure of the Resistance. Considered as being above politics, he would rapidly become Italy's most beloved leader.[128] All told, his designation constituted another success for the Socialist leader, who had supported his candidacy over that of a PCI alternative.[129]

By summer of 1978, Craxi could claim that the PSI was in a far better place than when he had taken over two years earlier. Having shored up his base within the party, he now turned to the question of ideology. In August, he published an article in *l'Espresso* instating the French nineteenth-century libertarian socialist Pierre-Joseph Proudhon as a new PSI lodestar. The article asserted the existence of an unbridgeable gap between socialist pluralism and Leninism. Though not intended as a complete break with Marxism, the text constituted a rebuttal of an earlier interview in which Berlinguer had decried as the Socialists' Achilles Heel: the indeterminate quality of their ideology.[130]

In June 1978 Radicals could also claim a partial political success when two of the four court-approved referenda were held: the first proposed to abrogate the Reale Law, the second the public financing of parties.[131] In view of the efforts of the ruling parties to deflect them, Radicals

[128] Colarizi, *Storia dei partiti*, 486-7.

[129] Luca Giurato, "La svolta nella battaglia per il Quirinale annunciata da Craxi. Pertini il candidate delle sinistre," *Stampa Sera* (Turin), 3 July 1978; Gianfranco Franci, "Ancora il rito delle astensioni," *Stampa Sera* (Turin), 3 July 1978; Lamberto Furno, "È diventato settimo presidente della Repubblica il 'galeotto numero 6955'. Sandro Pertini, vita come romanzo," *La Stampa* (Turin), 9 July 1978; Colarizi and Gervasoni, *La cruna dell'ago*, 70; Lepre, *Prima Repubblica,* 286.

[130] Bettino Craxi, "Il Vangelo Socialista," ghost written by Luciano Cafagna in *l'Espresso*, 27 August 1978, see Colarizi and Gervasoni, *La cruna dell'ago*, 68-75; Ajello, Lungo addio, 187-92.

[131] The balance of two and the referendum on abortion were not held on account of the passage of corrective legislation since January 1978.

sought to capitalize on their political victory against the "partitocracy," regardless of referendum outcomes.[132] Teodori even expressed optimism on the prospects for the evolution of the left, in view of the recent electoral decline of the PCI. Still, he argued, a quandary common to the left of "Latin countries" remained. Echoing Mitterrand, he opined that in Italy as in France, the left appeared condemned to remain in the opposition unless it could muster the support of the "masses that follow the communist parties."[133]

The campaign leading up to June 11 1978 referendum vote presented the unusual spectacle of a coterie of dissimilar opposition parties (the Radicals, DP, the MSI-DN, and the PLI) pitted against the five parties of a governing coalition representing more than eighty-five percent of the electorate. In fact, official Socialist opposition to Radical referendum aims concealed a more ambiguous stance. In a recent meeting of the PSI's central committee, Lombardi had obtained that Craxi's call for a "no" to abrogation in the referendum vote be nuanced; Socialist voters would rather be invited to vote as they saw fit. The concession was yet another testimony to the mounting PSI disaccord with the PCI. The Communists, to the contrary, invested a considerable effort into their campaign for the "no" to abrogation in both referendum consultations.[134]

---

[132] "I vertici del PCI propongono di abrogare i referendum. Abbiamo solo 'cento giorni per la Costituzione," *Notizie Radicali*, 6 September 1977, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=46078&lang=IT&cms=; "Aboliamo il finanziamento pubblico," *Notizie Radicali*, 26 May 1978, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=46359&lang=IT&cms=.

[133] Massimo Teodori, "Dopo la fine della grande speranza si apre una nuova era?", *Argomenti radicali*, Apr.-May 1978, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=46355&lang=IT&cms=.

[134] The neofascist MSI-DN opposed the Reale Law on the grounds that it might be directed at neofascist politics; as was consistent with its new antipolitical stance, which beginning in 1979 began to displace its traditional anticommunism, MSI-DN voted for the abrogation of public financing to parties. See Ignazi, *Il polo escluso*, 209. The Liberals recommended the "no to abrogation" vote for the referendum on the Reale Law, but a "yes" vote on the

On the eve of the vote, Pannella declared that Radicals "belong to a socialist, liberal and even communist-utopian current."[135] Radicals argued that the Reale Law, besides abridging civil liberties, had been ineffective in curtailing terrorism and had led to unintended consequences, such as the accidental shootings of innocents by the police.[136] Greater police efficiency would rather be served by reforms, including the improvement of the working conditions of officers and better coordination between the state and the military police. As for the 1974 law on public financing for parties, Radicals maintained that it had failed to moralize politics as intended. Rather than making funding available to party bureaucracies in proportion to electoral draw, alternative legislation was necessary, entailing for example governmental funding for direct electoral costs, made "available to all citizens."[137] On the issue of the financing of parties, the Radicals were not as isolated as appeared at first sight, due not only to the support of the DP and

---

suppression of public financing for parties. Franco Mimmi, "Referendum: si voterà su tutta la legge Reale," *La Stampa* (Turin), 23 May 1978; Lamberto Fumo, "La relazione di Craxi al Comitato centrale. Psi sempre più autonomo dai comunisti e dalla dc," *La Stampa* (Turin), 25 May 1978; "Legge 'Reale'-'75: il Pci diceva no," *Notizie Radicali*, 26 May 1978, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=46372&lang=IT&cms=; Lamberto Fumo, "Una sottile polemica tra i partiti sul 'no' o il 'sì' nei referendum," *La Stampa* (Turin), 30 May 1978; "L'11 giugno vota Sì. Per abrogare il finanziamento pubblico e la legge Reale. Per una grande vittoria popolare come nel '74 per il divorzio," (electoral insert funded by the Radical Party), *Stampa Sera* (Turin), 5 June 1978; Valerio Zanone (General Secretary of the PLI), "Liberali: I motivi di un sì e di un no," *La Stampa* (Turin), 6 June 1978.

[135] Marco Pannella, interview, "Povertà come forza," *O.P.*, 6 June 1978, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=46379&lang=IT&cms=.

[136] Adelaide Aglietta, "No al gioco del massacro," *Notizie Radicali*, 24 Feb. 1977, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=45833&lang=IT&cms=. Historians tend to credit the law and other similar ones with having had a role in defeating red terrorism. See Rayner, "Protéger, subir et réprimer," 48.

[137] Adelaide Aglietta (general secretary of the Radical Party), "Opinioni. Perchè i radicali chiedono di dire 'sì' ai referendum," *La Stampa* (Turin), 28 May 1978. Adamant opposition to public financing had created considerable organizational difficulties for the Radicals, as they had applied their principles to their own party operations. Due to the refusal to resort to governmental funding for party costs, distributed to them after the June 1976 elections and set aside unspent, the Radical Party had been forced to shut down national party activities after gathering the necessary signatures for the referenda in July 1977. A subscription campaign to raise funds directly from party members fell woefully short of needs. In Jan. 1978, a further shutdown of party operations was mandated, leaving in place only a bare-bones structure. See "Autofinanziamento: non una lira dallo Stato," *Notizie Radicali*, 26 May 1978, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=46374&lang=IT&cms=; Ponzone, *Il Partito radicale nella politica italiana*, chapter 5, "I radicali tra azione diretta e parlamento," transcript in OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=53863&lang=IT&cms=.

PLI but also, judging from the fears of opponents of the referenda, on account of a diffuse indifference or hostility to parties of many Italians.[138] As for the referendum proposing to abrogate the Reale Law, the Radicals drew the support of prominent intellectuals. Some two hundred of them, including Natalia Ginzburg, Leonardo Sciascia and Norberto Bobbio, signed an appeal for the law's elimination.[139] The document stated that the law "had proven completely ineffective to counter criminality, fascist subversion, terrorism […] and encouraged police abuses and shootings in which dozens of citizens and officers have lost their lives […]" The appeal also claimed that the parties, by seeking to head off abrogation, "are attempting, using the wave of emotion elicited by terrorism, to obtain a plebiscite which would be equivalent to a defeat of democratic forces."[140]

Days before the referendum consultation, *l'Unità* published an editorial by a Communist official accusing the Radicals of enacting a "premeditated attack on institutions and democracy, for a purpose not dissimilar from the objectives of the subversive maneuvering for some time in act in our country." Another article in the same issue denounced the "radical-fascist"

[138] *La Stampa*, mirroring the old left, taxed this attitude as *qualunquismo*, an expression derived from Giuseppe Maranini's 1940s party *Fronte dell'Uomo Qualunque*, or Front of the Ordinary Man. See "Le ragioni del 'no' ai referendum," *La Stampa* (Turin), 31 May 1978.

[139] Radical causes had over the years attracted the sympathy and support of leftist intellectuals such as Pier Paolo Pasolini, see his article "Appriamo un dibattito sul caso Pannella," Corriere della Sera (Milan), 25 July 1974, reprinted in *Il pugno o la rosa: I radicali: gauchisti, qualunquisti, socialisti*? ed. V. Vecellio (Verona: Bertani, 1979), 199-204.

[140] Citation from Lamberto Fumo, "Una sottile polemica tra i partiti sul 'no' o il 'sì nei referendum," *La Stampa* (Turin), 30 May 1978.

obstructionism which had impeded a revision of the Reale law, forcing the holding of a referendum during a national emergency.[141] The Radicals responded with libel suits.[142]

The outcome of the vote on the Reale Law failed to meet Radical expectations and was greeted as a triumph by the Communists: only twenty-three percent of the electorate voted "yes" to abrogation. [143] Still, Radicals portrayed outcomes as a success, arguing that many votes from supporters of other parties had accrued to their cause. A more tenable conclusion was that voters valued security and stability more than real or alleged state threats to their personal liberties. The referendum on public financing, on the other hand, drew more support, sending a warning signal to the ruling parties. A surprising forty-six percent of the electorate voted in favor of abrogation, despite contrary party directives. The vote spoke to public disenchantment with parties and politicians.[144] Radicals celebrated the outcome, dubbing it a blow to the "regime." Bonino noted the confluence of new left and centrist votes in support of Radical stances.[145] The

[141] Luigi Longo, "Scelta per la democrazia," *l'Unità* (Rome), 4 June 1978; "I referendum costituiscono un appuntamento importante per tutte le forze democratiche e per i lavoratori. Fra sette giorni alle urne per votare No," *l'Unità* (Rome), 4 June 1978.
[142] "Referendum legge Reale: la denuncia contro il Pci," *Notizie Radicali,* 5 June 1978, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=46378&lang=IT&cms=.

[143] "Il Paese ha respinto l'insidioso attacco al sistema democratico. Vittoria del NO massiccia per l'ordine pubblico meno netta per il finanziamento. Compatto e decisivo apporto dell'elettorato comunista – Sulla percentuale dei 'sì' all 'abolizione del finanziamento pubblico ha pesato un diffuso malessere verso il modo di governare di alcuni partiti – Sensibili differenze nel voto nelle diverse aree geografiche – Rilevanti le schede bianche," *l'Unità* (Rome), 13 June 1978; Alfredo Reichlin, "La forza comunista," *l'Unità* (Rome), 13 June 1978.

[144] Arturo Gismondi, "Il compromesso storico e la politica di solidarietà nazionale," in *Il Parlamento italiano 1861-1992*, vol. 22, 1976-1979, *Dal centro-sinistra alla solidarietà nazionale: Il rapimento e l'assassinio di Moro* (Milan: Nuova Cei, 1993), 45. For an example of Pannella's use of antiparty rhetoric during the referendum campaign, see Marco Pannella, "Pannella spiega perchè vuole le firme," *Il Resto del Carlino* (Bologna), 9 June 1977, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=45972&lang=IT&cms=.

[145] Marco Tosatti, "Radicali in festa a piazza Navona," *La Stampa* (Turin), 13 June 1978.

PCI, for its part, interpreted the results of the referendum on public financing as a popular rebuke directed at the governing style of other parties, rather than at the historic compromise.[146]

In the realm of intellectual politics the PCI's marriage of pragmatism (the historic compromise) with leftist utopianism (the Third Way) had for some time been the subject of scrutiny.[147] By way of introduction to the intellectual aspects of the "duel on the left" of the seventies, a brief exploration of aspects of Norberto Bobbio's political thought is in order.[148] An independently-minded leftist thinker, Bobbio had spearheaded an effort since the mid-seventies to provoke debate on Italian Marxism. While closer to the Socialist milieu, Bobbio was agnostic on the question of which of the two main parties of the left was preferable; he had aptly summed up the Italian predicament during a conference organized by the prestigious Socialist periodical *Mondoperaio* in 1976: "in our country there is a strong socialist party, but it is not the Socialist Party."[149] Bobbio's political goal was the unity of a democratized left, and in this sense there was kinship between him and the Radicals. Unlike the Radicals, however, the political theorist chose the terrain of Marxist ideology to challenge Communist and Socialist mindsets and strategies.

Bobbio's critique of Italian Marxism was part of a broader process of revisionism internal to the left. From 1973, under the directorship of Federico Cohen, a new series of *Mondoperaio* tackled questions such as the relationship between Marxism and the state, socialism and

[146] "Il Paese ha respinto l'insidioso attacco al sistema democratico […] Sulla percentuale dei 'sì' all 'abolizione del finanziamento pubblico ha pesato un diffuso malessere verso il modo di governare di alcuni partiti – Sensibili differenze nel voto nelle diverse aree geografiche – Rilevanti le schede bianche," *l'Unità* (Rome), 13 June 1978.

[147] Warnings of the dangers of a looming "regime" represented by the historic compromise were not confined to the left, as was illustrated by comments proffered the same year by prominent FIAT industrialist, Umberto Agnelli, see Colarizi and Gervasoni, *La cruna dell'ago,* 59.

[148] Giuliano Amato and Luciano Cafagna, *Duello a sinistra* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1982).

[149] Cited in Colarizi and Gervasoni, *La cruna dell'ago,* 24.

democracy, as well as other issues directly relevant to contemporary Italian politics. The seventies marked a period of immense prestige for leftist ideals; consequently, Socialist intellectuals strove to revise Marxism without repudiating it, including by highlighting the antidemocratic nature of the Soviet regime and by pressuring the PCI to unambiguously repudiate the USSR.[150] From 1975, the intellectual debates in *Mondoperaio* were widely echoed in the mainstream press.[151] Bobbio publicly engaged in a benign but rigorous critique of Italian Marxism, mining with implacable logic and lucid prose the contradictions of the Italian way to socialism.[152]

One of Bobbio's primary concerns was to dispel a belief pervasive within the Marxist left, to wit that political or individual rights were of little central concern in a socialist society. To the contrary, he wrote in 1973, "the dangers which threaten democracy in a capitalist society are the same ones which undermine or will undermine the process of democratization in a socialist society." At the basis of a fundamental misconception within Marxism, he insisted, was a faulty theory of the state deriving from inappropriate extrapolations from Karl Marx's slim volume on the 1871 Paris Commune.[153] Also erroneous was Marx's prescription for the fading away of the state, and flawed the underestimation and dismissal of postrevolutionary politics as mere superstructure. Because communist parties put off the question of how to organize the state, they

[150] Federico Cohen and Paolo Borioni, *Le cassandre di Mondoperaio: Una stagione creative della cultura socialista* (Venice: Marsilio, 1999),15.

[151] Colarizi and Gervasoni, *La cruna dell'ago,* 54-5; see Cohen and Borioni, *Le cassandre di Mondoperaio,* passim. In 1973, Bobbio had published an article which contained many of the ideas, which found a wider echo beginning in 1975, concerning the relationship between democracy and socialism. See "Democrazia socialista?" originally published in *Omaggio a Nenni, Quaderno di Mondoperaio,* (1973), reprinted in Norberto Bobbio, *Quale socialismo? Discussione di un'alternativa* (Turin: Einaudi, 1976), 3-20.

[152] Colarizi and Gervasoni, *La cruna dell'ago,* 36-7.

[153] Karl Marx, *La Commune de Paris: Karl Marx, La Guerre Civile en France* (Rome: Savelli, 1976).

risked, as had happened in the Soviet Union, to become the state itself, argued convincingly Bobbio.[154] Marx's illusion, he reiterated in 1976, was that it was possible to avoid posing the problem of governance by conjuring a transitional dictatorship of the Proletariat. But the problem of political power remained, and there was no alternative to its management through "institutions tested by time, through the centuries, during which little by little the liberal democratic state has been constructed."[155] The debates that ensued in response to Bobbio's pithy essays rotated around the central question of the relationship between socialism and democracy.

Beginning in 1975-76, as the historic compromise between PCI and DC took shape, the debates reached a larger audience, provoking what would arguably be one of postwar Italy's most interesting politico-intellectual debates.[156] Taking issue with attempts to affirm the pluralism of the Soviet state, Bobbio defined contemporary pluralism as a combination of antistatist restraints on a preponderant state and of state-led moderation of the tendency toward the atomization of society by groups or individuals.[157] Bobbio's socialist attachment to collective

[154] See "Democrazia socialista?" originally published in *Omaggio a Nenni, Quaderno di Mondoperaio* (1973), reprinted in Norberto Bobbio, *Quale socialismo? Discussione di un'alternativa* (Turin: Einaudi, 1976), 3-20.

[155] "Il marxismo e lo stato. Il dibattito aperto nella sinistra italiana sulle tesi di Norberto Bobbio," originally published in *Quaderni di Mondoperaio* (new series, 4 (1976)), reprinted in Bobbio, *Quale socialismo?* 32-41.

[156] Participating politicians included Pietro Ingrao (PCI), Ugo La Malfa (PRI), Antonio Giolitti (PSI), Flavio Orlandi (PSDI), Valerio Zanone (PLI). See for example Pietro Ingrao, "Il pluralismo," *La Stampa* (Turin), 7 Oct. 1976, in which he warned of "disgregating" tendencies in pluralism; Ugo La Malfa, "Pluralismo e socialismo," *La Stampa* (Turin), 9 Oct.1976, in which the PRI leader and chief proponent outside of the DC and PCI of the historic compromise, asserted democratic progress on the party of the PCI, a notion accepted in a subsequent article by Bobbio; and Antonio Giolitti, "Pluralismo e compromesso," *La Stampa* (Turin), 12 Oct. 1976, which examined how much pluralism the historic compromise might allow.

[157] Norberto Bobbio, "Che cos'è il pluralismo," *La Stampa* (Turin), 21 Sept. 1976; Norberto Bobbio, "Come intendere il pluralismo," *La Stampa* (Turin), 22 Sept. 1976; Norberto Bobbio, "Marx pluralista?" *La Stampa* (Turin), 28 Nov. 1976; Norberto Bobbio, "Concludendo sul pluralismo. Essere liberi oggi," *La Stampa* (Turin), 1 Dec. 1976. These articles and many others were reprinted, though not necessary under the original titles, in Norberto Bobbio, *Le ideologie e il potere in crisi: Pluralismo, democrazia, socialismo, comunismo terza via e terza forza* (Florence: Felice Le Monnier, 1981).

rights distinguished his thought from the stances of the libertarian Radicals, who tended to regard the social-democratic state with indifference or even hostility.[158]

Such debates reflected contemporary politics. The discussions on pluralism, for example, were a response to the historic compromise in act from 1976; the latter conjured the vision of a one-party system due to the relegation of oppositional forces to less than ten percent of the electorate. Consensus should not prevail to the point that it risked suffocating dissent, wrote Bobbio in February 1977.[159] Commenting on the PCI's Third Way, Bobbio regretted that even as the PCI gradually distanced itself from Leninism, it took great care not to be "seduced" by social-democracy. Nor did he spare the Socialists, whose hesitations he noted, adding that the PSI continued to keep its distance from social-democracy, even while taking care not to fall into Leninism. But, declared Bobbio, "the Third Way does not exist" and there is no alternative to social-democracy.[160] If capitalism is popular, he argued elsewhere, how else pursue socialism except through social-democratic means, an option even Socialists continued to decry?[161]

The discredit of social-democracy, we have seen, was a shared feature of the Italian left, characterizing the views of parties as diverse as the PCI, the PSI and the Radicals. As in France, it spoke to a maximalism deriving from two factors: the seemingly unstoppable rise of leftism in the sixties and the crisis of the welfare state in the seventies.

---

[158] For example, see the following passage, which sets up a prescriptive dichotomy: "the welfare state is no longer relevant [, one must now choose between] "welfare" [and] "democracy" in Franco Corleone et al., *Radicali o qualunquisti?* (Rome: Savelli, 1978), 101-2.

[159] Norberto Bobbio, "Obbedir tacendo," *La Stampa* (Turin), 15 Feb. 1977.

[160] Norberto Bobbio, "La terza via non esiste," *La Stampa* (Turin), 1 Sept. 1978.

[161] Norberto Bobbio, "La via democratica," *La Stampa* (Turin), 3 Sept. 1978.

The loudest rebuttals to Bobbio's claims came from the Communist left. The role of the working class in advancing democracy was undeniable, and key to its further transformation, argued Ingrao, the PCI president of the Chamber of Deputies. Capitalism must be transcended, and since the social-democratic model is in crisis it cannot therefore be a reference, stated another PCI official, alluding to the difficulties of the Swedish model or of Labour in England.[162] The topic of the Third Way also occasioned a debate between the PCI and PSI organized by *Mondoperaio* in fall 1978. The conference confirmed a growing divergence between the two parties. On the Communist side, forty-two-year-old Achille Occhetto argued that the legitimation of the European left could only be achieved by transcending capitalism and thereby "transforming society through freedom." The only alternative was "neoliberalism," an order reflecting "predominant forces." Another Communist warned that newfound Socialist antagonism to the PCI risked reviving anticommunist prejudice and took into little account the party's evolution. On the Socialist side, Martelli, Craxi's right-hand man, argued that the unity of the left would never be achieved unless the PCI irrevocably renounced Leninism. He unfavorably compared PCI stances to those of Santiago Carrillo, leader of the Spanish Communist Party (PCE) and fellow Eurocommunist.[163] Echoing the growing intrusion of international developments in the domestic arena, Martelli reproached the PCI for not demanding the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia on the tenth anniversary of the repression

[162] "Ingrao affronta il grande tema di una terza via al socialismo," *l'Unità* (Rome), 3 Sept. 1978; L. Lombardo Radice, "Eredità di Lenin, modello sovietico, socialdemocrazia. Le ragione di una 'terza via'," *l'Unità* (Rome), 8 Sept. 1978.

[163] *Partido Comunista de España*, PCE.

of the Prague Spring, as the PCE leader had. Centrist *La Stampa* concluded that the *Mondoperaio* conference had marked an escalation of acrimony between the two parties.[164]

The widening divide between the two major parties of the left did not sit well with Bobbio. He had been opposed to Craxi's consolidation of his leadership of the party at the spring 1978 congress and had disapproved of his charismatic style and his push for autonomy from the PCI. He feared that it would lead to the return of the PSI to its traditional mediator role, rather than that of catalyzer of a reformed and united left. Bobbio was also critical of Craxi's ideological offensive on the PCI; he objected to anti-PCI invective, prefering a more subtle approach, as he would later express in a letter to Craxi.[165] In retrospect, however, the efforts of *Mondoperaio* intellectuals were bound to fail on account of the scarce interest of both Socialist and Communist interlocutors. With the exception of Giorgio Napolitano, the PCI evinced disdain for Craxi and little interest in revisiting its own ideology.[166] Nor is there any evidence that Craxi believed in the viability of the unity of the left. His confrontational political style soon led to a formal break between him and the *Mondoperaio*.[167]

Growing PCI-PSI animosity in fall 1978 occurred in a context of mounting superpower tensions.[168] The Socialist leader increasingly resorted to the bludgeon of the anti-Sovietism,

---

[164] Paolo Garimberti, "Il Psi: l'alternativa di sinistra possibile soltanto se il Pci rinuncia al leninismo," *La Stampa* (Turin), 8 September 1978; "Con la partecipazione di Macaluso e Occhetto e di Cicchitto e Martelli. Dibattito PCI-PSI sulla 'terza via," *l'Unità* (Rome), 8 Sept. 1978.

[165] Norberto Bobbio, *Autobiografia* (Rome-Bari: Laterza, 1997), 194-6.

[166] Colarizi and Gervasoni, *La cruna dell'ago,* 36-55, 62-8; Giorgio Napolitano, *Dal Pci al socialismo europeo: Un'autobiografia politica* (Rome-Bari: Laterza, 2006).

[167] Colarizi and Gervasoni, *La cruna dell'ago*, 61-8; Cohen and Borioni, *Le cassandre di Mondoperaio,* 19-20.

[168] Angelo Matacchiera, "Conferenza stampa a Stoccolma al Congresso socialista. Brandt: 'Approfondiamo la distensione," *l'Unità* (Rome), 26 Sept. 1978.

attacking for instance Berlinguer for his ill-timed trip to Moscow that fall.[169] In response to the continued and still credible Communist bid for executive power, the Socialist leader highlighted the contradictions of a party which occupied the Italian social-democratic space even as it denounced social-democracy. Communists responded angrily, strengthened in their resolve by lingering concord with the DC and the misguided conviction that isolation was no longer as much of a threat as it had been during the darker days of the Cold War.[170] They continued to press for entry into the cabinet, even as they quietly prepared for possible early elections.[171]

Radical-Socialist relations, in contrast, held more promise. Over the course of 1978, they had gone through ups and downs, ranging from Craxi's scornful characterization of the Radicals during the Turin congress as mere social movement to the limited rapprochement consequent to the Socialist leader's openings to the libertarian wing of his own party. After the half-success of the referendum consultations in June, the Radical Party was in a search of a new mission and of allies, even as it struggled with a financial crisis consequent to the commitment not to draw on state funding. In November 1978, as rumors of a looming governmental crisis circulated,

---

[169] "Oggi Berlinguer giunge nella capitale jugoslava. Il documento sui colloqui fra PCI e PCUS. Lungo colloquio tra Breznev e il segretario generale del PCI. Ampio scambio di opinioni sui principali problemi internazionali," *l'Unità* (Rome), 10 Oct. 1978; Colarizi and Gervasoni, *La cruna dell'ago*, 77-78; Pons, *Berlinguer e la fine del comunismo*, 146.

[170] Colarizi and Gervasoni, *La cruna dell'ago*, 78-82.

[171] Luca Giurato, "Sulla situazione parlano Craxi, Bodrato, Natta, Saragat. Governo: tutti contro la crisi ma quanti però e condizioni," *La Stampa* (Turin), 28 Oct. 1978; "Parla Claudio Signorile vice segretario del psi. 'Insufficiente l'azione del governo ma c'è la possibilità di recuperare," *La Stampa (*Turin), 3 Nov. 1978; "Intervista di Berlinguer in TV. Lavora per la crisi chi viola gli accordi. Ci sono forze nella DC che operano per sabotare il programma – Altri temi affrontati: terrorismo, elezioni europee, rapporti con il PCUS, 'centralismo'," *l'Unità* (Rome), 10 Nov. 1978; "Acceso dibattito alla direzione socialista. Per Craxi la situazione 'si è venuta logorando," *La Stampa* (Turin), 23 Nov. 1978; Alberto Rapisarda, "Riunito il comitato centrale del partito. Il pci, in gran segreto, si prepara al congresso," *La Stampa* (Turin), 6 Dec. 1978; Alberto Rapisarda, "La situazione politica esaminata dalla direzione. Il psi crede che in gennaio ci sarà la crisi del governo. Anche se Signorile precisa che 'non saranno i socialisti ad aprirla.' Lo scoglio per il presidente del Consiglio sarebbe il 'piano triennale'," *La Stampa* (Turin), 21 Dec. 1978.

Gianfranco Spadaccia expressed his conviction that Socialists and Radicals could be allies in a constructing "a great non-subordinate socialist force."[172] The possibility of Radical-Socialist collaboration and perhaps electoral alliance was entertained by the Mancini-Martelli wing of the PSI, reopening a season of intermittent accommodations and tensions that had also characterized the electoral campaign of 1976.[173]

On the other side of the Radical debate collaboration with the PSI stood Bonino, who took the floor during the party's fall congress. "The old and new PSI are not different," she declared. Even when agreeing on the importance of trying to save Moro's life, she reminded her colleagues, Socialists had resisted Radical demands that the parliamentary debate be broadcast on television. Nor had Bonino much praise for the other parties of the left. She condemned both the PCI, whose contribution to the passage last spring of a compromise law decriminalizing abortion constituted a "complete sell-out of ten years of womens' struggles." She did not spare the new left, considered too subordinate to the Communists.

La Stampa commented pessimistically on the tenure of Radical congressional debates: "[…] presently the Radicals seem proud to be alone. They expect no help for the creation of a great socialist libertarian party reaching twenty percent of votes; neither from the PCI, nor even from the PSI, nor from some of the groups of the far left […] But the premises for the achievement of such a goal appear a bit inadequate: one percent in the elections of '76; four deputies; less than two thousand members; and a program yet to be defined. There is little doubt

[172] F[ranco] M[immi], "S'inizia il congresso a Bari. Tra radicali e socialisti asse preferenziale?" *La Stampa* (Turin), 1 Nov. 1978.

[173] Colarizi and Gervasoni, *La cruna dell'ago*, 87-8.

that secretary Adelaide Aglietta and the president of the federal council Gianfranco Spadaccia […] have their work cut out for them."[174]

The contrast between Bonino's skeptical stance and Spadaccia's calls for collaboration with the Socialists reflected the two identities of the Radicals, a group wedded to methodologies typifying leftist grassroots movements yet also nurturing the ambition to establish a great Mitterrandian party of the left. Pannella himself had appeared to personify the contradictions of the party when in the wake of the Radicals' first electoral affirmation of June 1976, during an extraordinary congress convened to discuss questions of strategy and organization, he had cryptically called on party colleagues to "scientifically disorganize."[175] The same congress had decreed the placement in escrow of public funding proceeding from the elections until such a date when a Radical legislative reform would result with the redirection of funding to political activities rather the substinence of party bureaucracies.[176] Others in the party were critical of such policies and stances, supporting the imperative to strengthen party structures, including by boosting regional and local party representations or through the participation in local elections.[177]

Teodori, a critic of Pannella's approach to organizational issues, was a prudent proponent of closer ties to the Socialists. In fall and winter of 1978, he organized a debate on the pages of

[174] Franco Mimmi, "Duro l'attacco dei radicali ai socialisti. Vecchio e nuovo psi non sono diversi," *La Stampa* (Turin), 5 Nov. 1978.

[175] Marco Pannella, "XVI congresso radicale: intervento di Marco Pannella," speech, July 1976, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=45707&lang=IT&cms=.

[176] "Mozione generale approvata dal XVI congresso (straordinario) del Pr (Roma, 16, 17 e 18 luglio 1976)," party motion, July 1976, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=45710&lang=IT&cms=.

[177] Ponzone, *Il Partito radicale nella politica italiana,*chapter 5, "I radicali tra azione diretta e parlamento," transcript in OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=53863&lang=IT&cms=.

his periodical *Argomenti radicali* which was also taken up in *Mondoperaio*. In an introductory piece, Teodori provided historical background explaining the simultaneously collaborative and conflictual relationship between Radicals and Socialists. He explained that the second Radical Party had been founded to oppose the center-left governments of the sixties and to propagate the notion that no reform of Italian society was possible if conducted in collaboration with the DC. Unlike the Socialists, wrote Teodori, Radicals maintained that political parties acted alongside other corporate entities, including unions, to displace the ability of citizens to participate in democracy. It was true that at times Socialists had found common ground with Radicals on specific causes, but they also had, unlike the Radicals, always maintained alongside the PCI that structural reform was what mattered most. Consequently, they did not endorse as a political priority the single issue approach championed by Radicals. Though Craxi's new course represented a promising turning point and a possible basis for Radical-Socialist collaboration, added Teodori, caveats remained in place. Dismissing the ideological dispute over Proudhon, taxed as solely significant at a political level in that it signaled renewed Socialist autonomy, the Radical reported that it remained to be seen whether the PSI would refrain from its propensity to infiltrate the state and parastatal structures for party gain. The question at hand was not whether the Socialists were "becoming social-democratic," but whether they would band together with the Radicals to address single, pressing issues, including the nuclear energy question, party control of the media, or civil liberties.[178]

In order to thrash out differences and congruences, Teodori organized a debate with the Socialist Martelli. From it emerges a shared pessimism on the future of Italian democracy in

[178] Massimo Teodori, "Dopo la svolta craxiana: radicali e socialisti," *Argomenti radicali*, (June/Sept. 1978), OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=46355&lang=IT&cms=.

light of DC and PCI dominance. Martelli emphasized the challenge of increasing electoral support for the Socialists, one in intermittent decline since voters' desertion began in the sixties. Teodori, on the other hand, dismissed the question of electoral gains, estimating that any small gain for one or the other party would not effectively alter the Italian political landscape. Rather, he argued, change would have to come through the pursuit of transversal factors of change, such as those targeted by Radical referenda.[179] Another Radical commentator dismissed a recent Socialist proposal to address Italy's political problems: institutional reform, centering on a stronger executive directly elected by the citizenry, as current in the French or American presidential systems. A preferable solution was the promotion of "conflictual democracy," through the coalescing of a large libertarian and socialist party encompassing Radicals, Communists and Socialists.[180]

Socialist talk of institutional reform would become a recurrent theme over the next decade and beyond. It stemmed in part from Craxi's rejection of a Mitterrandian PSI-PCI coalition as long as the Communists remained a disportionately stronger partner. Unlike in France, Italy did not have a popularly elected president with vast powers. Mitterrand could make use of a more favorable institutional setup, as had been demonstrated by his good showing in 1965 and his near success in the presidentials of 1974. Awareness of Mitterrand's structural advantage informed Craxi's push for institutional reform, including proposals for a popularly

[179] Massimo Teodori and Claudio Martelli, "Socialisti e Radicali un dibattito fra Claudio Martelli e Massimo Teodori," *Argomenti radicali*, Oct./Dec. 1978, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=46528&lang=IT&cms=.

[180] Ernesto Bettinelli, "Esecutivo forte o partito libertario," *Argomenti radicali*, Oct./Dec. 1978, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=46527&lang=IT&cms=.

elected president or an enhanced premiership modelled on the West German chancellorship.[181] Another, less obvious advantage Mitterrand could claim was France's independent foreign policy and its nuclear *force de frappe*. In this respect, Craxi would soon have an opportunity to leverage nuclear politics, which would in part compensate for the failure to effect institutional change.

International issues had not figured prominently on the agenda of Italian policymakers during the seventh legislation. Two important events touching upon Italian foreign policy are however of note in light of future developments. The first was the Neutron Bomb controversy. Between July 1977 and April 1978 the Carter Administration's declared intent to produce a new tactical nuclear bomb adapted to European war scenarios, the so-called Neutron Bomb, provoked political controversy and popular protest.[182] Such unintended consequences contributed to Carter rescinding his decision in April 1978.[183] In Italy, the Neutron Bomb controversy did not have the same resonance it had elsewhere in Europe. But the debate conducted in summer of 1977 in *l'Unità* remains of interest, in that it announced subsequent polemics over Euromissile deployment.

The second foreign policy development discussed below was the December 1977 vote by the six coalition parties in support of a document on Italian foreign policy. The latter event appeared to inaugurate an unprecedented foreign policy consensus; it was saluted in *l'Unità* as

[181] Colarizi, *Storia politica della Repubblica*, 157.

[182] Tito Sansa, "Battaglia d'estate a Bonn per la bomba," *La Stampa* (Turin), 27 July 1977; Lawrence S. Wittner, *Toward Nuclear Abolition: A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement*, vol. 3 of *The Struggle Against the* Bomb (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), 22-5.

[183] Soutou, *La guerre de Cinquante Ans*, 599.

"an important stepping stone […] towards the convergence of democratic forces."[184] The critical Radical response to the six-party agreement announced the party's later proposals for an alternative antimilitarist diplomacy.

Raniero La Valle, a left-wing Catholic allied with the PCI and a senator of the Independent Left parliamentary group, inaugurated the debate on the Neutron Bomb in July 1977, after the US announcement of the intention to build the bomb. His article, along with one by the famed novelist and pacifist Carlo Cassola in *Corriere della Sera*, broke the silence of the press and of Italian intellectuals on the issue.[185] The first half of La Valle's article was an evocation of Palmiro's Togliatti's calls for the unity of Communists and Catholics to counter the dangers of a nuclear holocaust in two speeches of 1954 and 1963. La Valle questioned the congruence of Carter's sponsorship of human rights in light of his intent to build the new weapon, arguing that the Neutron Bomb represented a qualitative shift in nuclear warfare annulling the "radical difference and absolute discontinuity between conventional and nuclear weapons." Further, beyond the goal of arresting rearmament, resistance to the new weapon presented the opportunity, as had been implied by Togliatti, for a "historic encounter between the great popular masses."[186]

Other *l'Unità* articles reiterated familiar arguments. One was the depiction of the bomb as a typical American product, in that it was supposedly driven by amoral considerations, notably

[184] "Importante convergenza alla Camera. Voto unitario sulla politica estera. La risoluzione approvata contiene l'impegno per l'integrazione europea, la distensione, la pace nel Medio Oriente—Gli interventi di Cardìa, Segre e Bottarelli," *l'Unità* (Rome), 2 Dec. 1977.

[185] Ernesto Treccani, "La campagna contro la bomba N. Il pericolo è ancora grande," *l'Unità* (Rome), 11 Aug. 1977; Carlo Cassola reiterated his views later in "La discussione sulla bomba N. Per un disarmo unilaterale," *l'Unità* (Rome), 18 Aug. 1977.

[186] Raniero La Valle, "Invito a una discussione. Bomba N e destino dell'uomo," *l'Unità* (Rome), 31 July 1977.

cost-effectiveness.[187] Another was the allegation was that the creation of the new bomb was a symptom of revived US hegemonic ambitions and of its inveterate imperialism. Leaning on the description of the weapon as "obscene" by a UN official days earlier, an editorial argued that it went further than those unleashed on Japan; it was not only deadly, but also "humiliates" man through its preservation of edifices and objects.[188] Other articles emphasized the threat to European populations, denounced a divergence between American and European interests, and called for more European autonomy.[189] As the international debate intensified in parallel with a major Soviet-sponsored opinion campaign, Carter postponed a decision to procede with production to fall 1977.[190] The debate prompted other pundits to consider the implications for détente and the potential impact on an emerging foreign policy consensus in Italy between left and right.[191]

The daily of the PCI hosted divergent views on the Neutron Bomb question. A unilateral disarmament and antimilitarist proposal written by Carlo Cassola, who held views close to those

[187] Carlo Bernardini "Il pericolo del silenzio sulla bomba N," *l'Unità* (Rome), 8 Aug. 1977; Felice Ippolito, "La discussione sulla bomba ai neutroni. Lo scienziato non può essere un robot," *l'Unità* (Rome), 14 Aug. 1977.

[188] Citation from "Il pericolo del silenzio sulla bomba N," *l'Unità* (Rome), 9 Aug. 1977; GB Zorzoli, "La discussione sulla bomba ai neutroni. Una scelta di carattere aggressiva," *l'Unità* (Rome), 13 Aug. 1977; Francesco Pistolese, "La discussione sulla bomba N. Piano Baruch 'rivisitato'?" *l'Unità* (Rome), 15 Aug. 1977.

[189] Enzo Enriques Agnoletti, "Sterminare gli europei per difendere l'Europa?" *l'Unità* (Rome), 7 Aug. 1977; Enzo Santarelli, "Il dibattito sulla bomba al neutrone. Puntare sull'Europa come forza di pace," *l'Unità* (Rome), 20 Aug. 1977.

[190] The Neutron Bomb controversy and its dénouement marked a success for Soviet foreign policy. See Soutou, *La guerre de Cinquante Ans*, 571, 598.

[191] "Il president Carter ha rinviato la sua pronuncia. A settembre la decisione finale sulla 'bomba N'," *l'Unità* (Rome), 18 Aug. 1977; Cleto Boldrini, "Il dibattito sulal bomba 'N'. Distensione e pace le scelte della sinistra," *l'Unità* (Rome), 22 Aug. 1977; Antonio Rubbi, "La discussione sulla bomba N. Soprattutto non compromettere la distensione," *l'Unità* (Rome), 26 Aug. 1977; Franco Calamandrei, "Sulle obiezioni alla campagna contro la bomba N," *l'Unità* (Rome), 7 Sept. 1977; Renato Proni, "Gli alleati europei meno ostili alla 'bomba neutronica' Usa," *La Stampa* (Turin), 29 Sept. 1977.

of the Radicals, was published on August 18.[192] On the opposite side of the spectrum, an article by Stefano Silvestri, a nuclear strategist who would during the next legislation advise Italy's first postwar Socialist minister of defense, criticized pacifist stances. The Italian left "and much of the European one", wrote Silvestri, had long suffered from a lack of seriousness when it came to strategic issues. Now that the left was poised to enter the halls of power, he argued, it would have to make up for lost time. Silvestri dismissed allegations of the immorality of the Neutron Bomb relative to other nuclear weapons. He disputed its characterization as quintessentially offensive, pointing out that it also was a defensive and deterrent weapon. The weapon preserved physical structures, but such a trait did not per se make it worse than other existing nuclear devices often more destructive of both lives and things. Further, the new bomb's lowering of the nuclear threshold could only properly be evaluated in the context of all existing tactical weapons, both Soviet and American. If the PCI wished to enter the cabinet, it would have to honestly confront such issues and renounce a propagandistic and selective approach to military strategy, concluded Silvestri.[193]

Roberto Cicciomessere, the Radical Party's in-house expert on military matters, weighed in on the debate in September, agreeing with Silvestri's analysis but coming to an opposite conclusion. Cicciomessere noted the lack of echo in the press of the debate on the Neutron Bomb, *l'Unità* aside. He connected disinterest to what he termed a persuasive if cynical point made by Silvestri, namely the contradiction between PCI endorsement of NATO's nuclear dissuasive force and the denunciation of the supposedly more atrocious nature of the new bomb.

[192] Carlo Cassola, "La discussione sulla bomba N. Per un disarmo unilaterale," *l'Unità* (Rome), 18 Aug. 1977.

[193] Stefano Silvestri, "La discussione sulla bomba N. Un vuoto di analisi strategica," *l'Unità* (Rome), 12 Aug. 1977.

The mainstream media and general public, opined Cicciomessere, did not draw a stark distinction between nuclear weapons, old or new. "It is evident" he continued "that the PCI and of the historic left in general, having progressively appropriated NATO's military policy and the strategy of dissuasion […], is uncomfortable before a new military strategy that, even in its tragic dimensions, has the 'merit' of clarifying […] the ineluctable consequences of military policy, of dispelling the equivocations, mystifications and clichés which are a consequence […] of the renunciation [of the left] to antimilitarist stances." "We must therefore" concluded Cicciomessere "have the force and courage to […] propose with conviction the historic antimilitarist question: what would happen, instead, if we were disarmed?"[194]

The debate over the Neutron Bomb never became salient in Italy, unlike the later one over the deployment of other advanced nuclear devices during the Euromissiles Crisis. Due to Carter's change of heart, the issue was not even debated in Parliament.[195] A probable motive for the relatively low profile of public debates was the domestic agenda of the PCI. On December 1, 1977 the Chamber approved a comprehensive foreign policy program which for the first time in the history of the Republic attracted PCI support. Wishing to promote a foreign policy counterpart to the historic compromise, it was not in the interest of the Communists to agitate divisive issues.

After an earlier favorable vote in the Senate, Minister of Foreign Affairs Forlani (DC) submitted the governing coalition's new foreign policy program for debate and approval in the

[194] Roberto Cicciomessere, "La rivoluzione? È la bomba ai neutroni. Corsa agli armamenti: la bomba intelligente non piace al PCI," *Alternativa Nonviolenta*, 1 Sept. 1977, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=46074&lang=IT&cms=.

[195] Alberto Jacoviello, "Una decisione che aiuta la distensione nel mondo. Carter sospende la bomba N," *l'Unità* (Rome), 8 Apr. 1978.

Chamber. The five principal points he sought support on were as follows: (1) progress on European integration, including the promotion of a popularly elected Parliament, (2) the defense of détente and disarmament within the framework of the Helsinki process, including provisions for the safeguard of human rights, (3) support for the Middle East peace process, (4) a mediating role for Italy in the Horn of Africa and the pursuit of the elimination of apartheid in South Africa, and (5) the development of a North-South global policy to address economic destitution in the Third World, in the context of increased economic cooperation between the EEC and COMECON, the organization charged with coordinating economic policies in the Socialist Bloc.[196] On December 1, the motion in support of the government program written by representatives of all six parties of the ruling coalition was approved by a wide margin.[197] Sole nuance in the PCI's support was a vote of abstention on a Proletarian Democracy (DP) amendment. The latter requested that the Italian government specifically recognize, in the context of its involvement in the Middle East peace process, the Palestinian Liberation Organization as the official representative of the Palestinian people.[198]

The six-party accord on foreign policy would in the future be evoked by Christian Democrats, Socialists and Communists as a golden standard, even as the foreign policy consensus strained under the pressure of renewed Cold War tensions after 1979. For their part,

---

[196] Arnaldo Forlani, "Comunicazioni del Governo sulla politica estera," 29 Nov. 1977, *Atti Parlamentari, Camera dei Deputati, VII Legislatura, Discussioni, Seduta del 29 novembre 1977*, 12802-12, http://legislature.camera.it/_dati/leg07/lavori/stenografici/sed0228/sed0228.pdf; "Importante convergenza alla Camera. Voto unitario sulla politica estera. La risoluzione approvata contiene l'impegno per l'integrazione europea, la distensione, la pace nel Medio Oriente—Gli interventi di Cardìa, Segre e Bottarelli," *l'Unità* (Rome), 2 Dec. 1977.

[197] "Seguito della discussione sulle comunicazioni del Governo sulla politica estera," 1 December 1977, *Atti Parlamentari, Camera dei Deputati, VII Legislatura, Discussioni, Seduta del 1 dicembre 1977*, 12935-68, http://legislature.camera.it/_dati/leg07/lavori/stenografici/sed0230/sed0230.pdf.

[198] "Importante convergenza alla Camera. Voto unitario sulla politica estera. La risoluzione approvata contiene l'impegno per l'integrazione europea, la distensione, la pace nel Medio Oriente—Gli interventi di Cardìa, Segre e Bottarelli," *l'Unità* (Rome), 2 Dec. 1977.

the Radicals would represent it as yet another demonstration of the abdication of the left of an innovative and independent foreign policy. During the December 1977 debate, Radical deputies Faccio and Pannella presented their dissenting views. The latter anticipate Radical thinking on foreign policy over the next decade.

In opening, Pannella lamented "the absence of the will to enlighten Parliament on the real problems of the international politics" facing the nation. He then proceeded to outline the core Radical theory of international relations. Evoking in name President Eisenhower and his celebrated words on the threat posed to democracy by military industries, Pannella expounded on the Radical belief that in Italy as in the United States military and industrial complexes determine foreign policy, claiming that they had "succeeded in thrusting the United States into war in Vietnam without congressional endorsement […]". Radicals, explained Pannella, held as ineffective balanced and progressive disarmament, because the latter simply translated into the substitution of obsolete weapons for more advanced ones. Rather, continued Pannella, unilateral disarmament was called for, one that might be modeled on the mid-sixties proposals of Austrian Senator Hans Thirring. Such an initiative might take the form of an Italian long-term policy proposal, though not necessarily one precisely implemented as proposed; such an innovative diplomacy might through a chain of events deflate the military stalemate at the basis of a militarized and undemocratic Cold War order.

The evocation of an Italian foreign policy that upheld the primacy of human rights was the other, complementary, facet of Radical internationalism, continued Pannella. "Sure" he stated, "to evoke Soviet dissent in Carter's wake does not cost [Foreign Minister Forlani] much […] but we will see if our policies are founded on [human rights]. We will see it in things which cost us,

not in those which do not cost us! We will see it in fact in our relations with Iran where […] we are told the rights of man are continuously violated and yet where Agusta [an Italian military manufacturer] and others continue to send supplies."[199] The theme was more fully developed by Adele Faccio. Radicals, she argued, favored a foreign policy based on the promotion of "civil rights" in Europe and elsewhere, and specifically in Iran, where was in act one of "most dramatic examples of repression and violence of the state against citizens." Citing reports by Amnesty International of some one hundred thousand political prisoners, she called on the Italian government to act concretely by forbidding the sale to that country of military hardware. Predictably, the Radical motion was rejected.[200]

Pannella and Faccio's proposals for an alternative Italian foreign policy foreshadowed the tenets of the Radical campaign against world famine of 1979-1985. Radicals held that militarism dominated nation-states worldwide, leading to the violation of individuals' political or other basic rights, including what they would later call "the right to life," or the right to minimal subsistence.[201]

Other aspects of Radical internationalism also re-emerged around this time, including the longstanding critique of the nation-state and of national sovereignty. The latter would find expression in the Europeanist federalist campaign which began in 1985 as well as in the founding of the Transnational Radical Party in 1989. Radical intellectual Angiolo Bandinelli

[199] Marco Pannella, "Comunicazione del Governo sulla politica estera (Seguito della discussione)," 30 Nov. 1977, *Atti Parlamentari, Camera dei Deputati, VII Legislatura, Discussioni, Seduta del 30 Novembre 1977,* 12897-904, http://legislature.camera.it/_dati/leg07/lavori/stenografici/sed0229/sed0229.pdf.

[200] Adele Faccio, Seguito della discussione sulle comunicazioni del Governo sulla politica estera," Dec. 1 1977, "*Atti Parlamentari, Camera dei Deputati, VII Legislatura, Discussioni, Seduta del 1 Dicembre 1977*, 12957-8, http://legislature.camera.it/_dati/leg07/lavori/stenografici/sed0230/sed0230.pdf.

[201] Marco Pannella linked famine with the Shah of Iran's profligacy in his Nov. 30 Chamber speech.

explained during a 1978 conference that a Radical domestic goal had always been to catalyze a united, left opposition which might "recover certain essential traits of the historic right," namely the legal right to essential liberties protected by law from the infringements of an authoritarian state. But this goal could only be achieved in the context of parallel efforts made at the supranational level. Multinational economic interests, continued Bandinelli, had long since trumped the national framework. Such global developments necessitated a corresponding supranational political response to address the issues that mattered to Radicals. Radical support for European federalism would revive, predicted Bandinelli, in light of the recent decision made by the EEC to organize for the first time direct popular elections in the European Parliament in June 1979. He added that an apparent return of nation-states to protectionism and rearmament was actually a symptom of the terminal crisis of the national state and of its impending "fading away."[202]

Resurgent Radical interest in foreign affairs was also manifest in Pannella's successful September 1977 hunger strike in Spain, which led directly to the legalization of conscientious objection in that country.[203] On the occasion of the 1978 November congress, Pannella imposed the Frenchman Jean Fabre as Radical Party secretary: for the first time an Italian party would be led by a foreigner. *La Stampa* attributed Fabre's appointment to upcoming direct elections for the European Parliament and to Radical interest in tackling supranational issues. The latter,

[202] Angiolo Bandinelli, "I radicali e le istituzioni (relazione introduttiva)," in "L'antagonista radicale. La teoria e la prassi del partito nuovo, socialista e libertario; e lo statuto e l'esperienza del Pr nella società e nelle istituzioni. Convegno del consiglio federativo del Partito radicale. Roma, aprile 1978," Apr.1978, conference proceedings, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=46326&lang=IT&cms=.

[203] "Obiezione di coscienza in Spagna: appello al Re," *Notizie Radicali*, 24 September 1977, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=46122&lang=IT&cms=; Pietro Pàstena, *Breve storia del pacifismo in Italia: Dal Settecento alle guerre del terzo millennio* (Acireale-Rome: Bonanno, 2005), 142-3.

reported the daily, included nuclear energy, the growing power of multinationals, and the role of NATO and the Warsaw Pact.[204] The antimilitarist Frenchman had recently been condemned to four months of jail in his country for evading the draft.[205] He was a wanted man in his country, a status welcome among the Italian Radicals, who prided themselves for the arrests they cumulated over the years on account of various forms of civil disobedience.

A revamped internationalism and the ubiquitous antipolitical accents of Radical rhetoric were closely correlated. The November 1978 congressional motion denounced in characteristic verbiage the "corporatist […] configuration of the regime which, to mask its crisis, must do more and worse violence against the Constitution and democracy […]". The motion concluded by noting a renewed engagement on the international front, charging the secretary-elect to direct preparations for the looming European elections and to revive the "antimilitarist, pacifist and internationalist" commitments of the Radical Party.[206] During the same congress, a desperately needed shoring-up of party finances was achieved through the decision to employ under delimited conditions the public financing which had been put in escrow two years earlier. It was not however to be used for direct or indirect organizational party costs, but rather for electoral or referendum campaigns and information dissemination, including the operating costs of *Radio*

[204] Giovanni Conso, "Affidiamo agli stranieri la vita politica italiana?" *Stampa Sera* (Turin), 20 Nov. 1978.

[205] F[ranco] M[immi], "Francese e obiettore il segretario radicale," *Stampa Sera* (Turin), 6 Nov.1978; Alberto Rapisarda, "Curiosità, dubbi giuridici per il segretario radicale," *La Stampa* (Turin), 7 Nov. 1978.

[206] "Mozione generale approvata dal XX congresso del PR. Bari 1, 2, 3, 4 e 5 novembre 1978," 5 Nov. 1978, party motion, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=46492&lang=&cms=.

Radicale. Financial difficulties, however, would continue to plague the party, on account of continued reliance for operating costs on inadequate grassroots fund-raising efforts.[207]

In a contemporary article, Pannella pointed to the Radicals' internationalist vocation, which he strove to distinguish from the allegedly sham internationalism of the Socialists or Communists: "to be internationalists without also being structurally international or transnational seems impossible to me: the Communist and Socialist parties prove it, since their internationalism boils down to the inter-national [sic] nature of their leaders' personal rapports with foreign counterparts or the diplomatic and financial interests of their leaderships, whether Leninist or Proudhonian, even while practicing party-power politics devoid of any historical or ideal substance."[208]

As the three parties of the Italian left that interest us readied themselves for new political battles in fall of 1978, the outlines of their distinct approaches to domestic and international challenges were increasingly apparent. The PCI proposed a Third Way garnished with utopian, pacifist and neutralist accents, while cultivating Realpolitik in foreign affairs and seeking a governing accord with the DC. Craxi's Socialists upped the ante of their foreign policy and ideological attacks at the PCI, without however as yet defining their own internationalism; similarly, uncertainty continued to pervade their approach to the political economy, reflecting the hesitations of a formation split between the support of a shrinking worker base and that of the professional classes. The Radicals brandished an alternative leftism. They represented their ecclectic mix of domestic and international libertarian causes as a program for political change.

---

[207] Ponzone, *Il Partito radicale nella politica italiana,* chapter 5, "I radicali tra azione diretta e parlamento," transcript in OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=53863&lang=IT&cms=.

[208] Marco Pannella, "Internazionalisti," *Il Giorno* (Milan), [n.d.], November 1978, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=46488&lang=IT&cms=.

Chapter Three: Anti-antifascists (1978-1981)

By late 1978, it appeared probable that the seventh legislation was headed for an early conclusion. All participating parties bore responsibility for the faltering of the latest government of national solidarity, but the Communists had particular cause for deserting it. Decline in the local elections of May 1978 had signaled voter discontent with their policies; by late fall, hopes for positions in the cabinet waned.[1] Though fretful over new elections on account of potential losses, reconnecting with the party base was vital; not least, earlier rather than later elections gave the PCI a leg up on an unprepared PSI.[2] Return to the opposition would be temporary, or so was the hope; alliance with the DC remained the PCI's approach to both the Italian crisis and party legitimation. But on no account would a historic compromise be again countenanced without the desired qui-pro-quo: an executive role in government.[3]

On the DC front, diminishing incentives for collaboration with the PCI derived from the completion of austerity measures and the weakening of the party's left wing due to Moro's demise.[4] While the Socialists would have preferred later elections, they too had little interest in

[1] Simona Colarizi, *Storia dei partiti nell'Italia repubblicana* (Bari: Laterza, 1997), 487, 520.

[2] Francesco Santini, "Berlinguer: 'sono possibili maggioranze senza il pci'," *La Stampa* (Turin), 5 Mar. 1979; Simona Colarizi and Marco Gervasoni, *La cruna dell'ago: Craxi, il partito socialista e la crisi della Repubblica* (Bologna: Laterza, 2005), 85-6.

[3] Aldo Rizzo, "Pensando alla dc, cara nemica," *La Stampa* (Turin), 25 Feb. 1979; Roberto Bellato, "Al Congresso critiche e consensi per Berlinguer. Il pci esclude altri 'appoggi': al governo o all'opposizione," *Stampa Sera* (Turin), 2 Apr. 1979.

[4] In spring of 1979, the death of PRI secretary Ugo La Malfa constituted a further blow to the PCI. La Malfa had been favorable to a PCI executive role, and was charged by President Pertini in March 1979, weeks before his death, to make a final attempt to recompose a cabinet which would include the PCI. Luca Giurato, "Un improvviso vertice tra dc e pci. La Malfa si reca oggi in Quirinale," *La Stampa* (Turin), 2 Mar. 1979; Colarizi, *Storia dei partiti*, 491-4; Richard N. Gardner, *Mission Italy: On the Front Lines of the Cold War* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005), 137-8.

preserving the status-quo; Craxi had grown increasingly resentful of the marginalization of the PSI.[5] For their part, the lay parties feared the continued erosion of voter support due to their perceived irrelevance.[6] The opposition, notably the Radicals, hoped to capitalize on their hostility to an unpopular historic compromise.

A deteriorating international climate also had a role in altering the conditions which had earlier favored the DC-PCI accord.[7] More specifically, the decline of détente strengthened the hand of Italian and foreign opponents to the historic compromise.[8] Early in the Carter administration, certain elements in US foreign policy circles had countenanced a hypothetical PCI presence in the cabinet, believing that inclusion might actually advance US interests by completing PCI social-democratization. Retreat from this viewpoint began in March 1977, when National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski adopted a hardline anticommunist stance and tried to convince President Carter that the Italian predicament constituted a major liability for the US.[9] For a time however, due to policy inconsistencies, Brzezinski's ally US Ambassador to Italy Richard Gardner continued to be cast on either side of the Atlantic as pro-PCI, to his frustration.[10] Brzezinski's calls for toughness on the Communist question were resisted by his

[5] Colarizi and Gervasoni, *La cruna dell'ago*, 76-85; Paul Ginsborg, *A History of Contemporary Italy: Society and Politics 1943-1988* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 377-8.

[6] Colarizi, *Storia dei partiti*, 503-5.

[7] Silvio Pons, *Berlinguer e la fine del comunismo* (Turin: Einaudi, 2006), 21-92.

[8] Agostino Giovagnoli, *Il partito italiano: La Democrazia Cristiana dal 1942 al 1994* (Bari: Laterza, 1996), 193-8.

[9] Pons, *Berlinguer*, 93-6.

[10] Gardner, *Mission Italy*, 61-6.

rival, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance.[11] Finally, on 12 January 1978, the State Department settled American ambiguities by declaring in a public communiqué: "the United States and Italy share profound democratic values and interests, and we do not believe that the Communists share those values and interests."[12] Such a statement was bound to empower domestic adversaries of the PCI.

The degree of influence American intervention had in stalling PCI participation in the cabinet remains controversial. On one side of the debate are "policy entrepreneurs" Gardner and Brzezinski, who argue that their acts were decisive.[13] In the foreword to Gardner's memoirs, Brzezinski declares that "the response of the Carter administration to the Italian Communist problem had larger strategic implications that have been missed, surprisingly, by most historians of the Cold War."[14] The book's content support a similar point.[15] A recent account by a historian is more nuanced, warning against resort to facile assertions of US power over the "autonomous choices" of Italian policymakers.[16] Still, the structure of his book and its almost plaintive tone

[11] Vance, after meeting with Mitterrand, was concerned over a backlash in France, where a PS-PCF coalition ran in local elections in spring of 1977. Ibid., 48-9, 66-8.

[12] Umberto Gentiloni Silveri, *L'Italia sospesa: La crisi degli anni Settanta vista da Washington* (Turin: Einaudi, 2009), 206-7. The statement also invited Western European leaders to avoid alliances with communist parties—a suggestion unwelcome in France, where the *Union de la gauche* was in full-blown crisis; see "Polemica in Francia sul caso Usa-Italia-pc," *La Stampa* (Turin), 14 Jan. 1978; Vittorio Gorresio, "La Francia, Carter e le ingerenza," *La Stampa* (Turin), 1 Feb. 1978.

[13] I borrow the expression "policy entrepreneur" from John Prados, who applies it to President Reagan's advisors in *How the Cold War Ended: Debating and Doing History* (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 2011), 47-75.

[14] Cited by Gentiloni Silveri, *L'Italia sospesa,* 198.

[15] See Gardner's letter to Vance of April 20, 1977, cited in Gardner, *Mission Italy*, 68: "There is no other major country in the world in which American policy has a greater impact on internal political developments than it does in Italy."

[16] Gentiloni Silveri, *Italia sospesa,* 229.

suggests American responsibility for the failure of the historic compromise.[17] Umberto Gentiloni Silveri seems to concurs, though from a different political angle, with the contention that the United States exerted a major influence. Another historian downplays Carter's attentiveness to, and influence on, Italian affairs; it is true that the US president's foreign policy agenda was an exceedingly crowded one.[18] Overall, it seems fair to conclude that US impact on the dénouement of the historic compromise was one factor among several others, rather than the decisive one.

The decline of détente was rooted in earlier developments. Since around 1975, even as the Helsinki Final Act was ratified, three dynamics began to undermine superpower relations. The first two can only be mentioned here: renewed superpower competition in the Third World and the emergence of human rights as a political, diplomatic, and public opinion concern.[19] It

[17] Ibid., passim. Gentiloni Silveri's account ends with a discussion of the Carter administration shift on the PCI role in government, with the arguably more consequential Moro affair summarily appended.

[18] Irwin Wall, "L'amministrazione Carter e l'eurocomunismo," *Ricerche di storia politica*, no. 2 (Aug. 2006), 181-96. For a succinct account of Carter's foreign policy, see Sean Wilentz, *The Age of Reagan: A History 1974-2008* (New York: Harper, 2009), 99-126.

[19] For contemporary Italian commentaries on the impact of human rights and of superpower tensions in the Third World during the Carter administration, see "Indicato come responsabile un 'funzionario insubordinato' del Dipartimento di Stato. Contorta sconfessione di Carter della dichiarazione su Sakharov. Il Presidente finge di non conoscere il portavoce ufficiale del Dipartimento di Stato – 'Cioè che egli ha detto, però, corrisponde al mio attegiamento', precisa Carter – 'I Sovietici vogliono fare il possibile per migliorare le relazioni'," *l'Unità* (Rome), 1 Feb. 1977; Alberto Jacoviello, "Carter Sakharov e altri problemi," *l'Unità* (Rome), 22 Feb. 1977; "Ponendo in rilievo 'gravi errori di calcolo.' La stampa USA critica Carter per il mancato accordo di Mosca. L'amministrazione viene accusata di aver presentato ai sovietici richieste troppe ambiziose e di aver mutato le precedenti posizioni – Kissinger sottolinea la 'necessità di continuità nella politica estera'," *l'Unità* (Rome), 7 Apr. 1977; Paolo Garimberti, "Cresce la tensione per il conflitto nel Corno d'Africa. Usa-Ussr: la diplomazia del telefono rosso," *La Stampa* (Turin), 12 Feb. 1978; Furio Colombo, "Come Washington è arrivata all' 'ultimatum' di Vance," *La Stampa* (Turin), 12 Feb. 1978. On the Helsinki Act, the policy impact of human rights and the crisis of détente, see Raymond Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan*, rev. edition, (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1994), 556-98, 673-8, 695-719; Daniel C. Thomas, *The Helsinki Effect: International Norms, Human Rights, and the Demise of Communism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001); Robert David Johnson, *Congress and the Cold War* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 191-241; Vladimir Zubok, "The Soviet Union and détente of the 1970s," *Cold War History* 4 (November 2008): 427-47; Daniel Sargent, "From Internationalism to Globalism: The United States and the Transformation of International Politics in the 1970s," (Ph.D. diss. Harvard University, 2008), 394-419; Svetlana Savranskaya, "Human rights movement in the USSR after the signing of the Helsinki Final Act, and the reaction of Soviet authorities," in *The Crisis of Détente in Europe: From Helsinki to Gorbachev, 1975-1985*, ed. L. Nuti (New York: Routledge, 2009), 26-40. On superpower conflict

was a third development however which buried détente: the Western decision to deploy Euromissiles, NATO's response to the ongoing Soviet deployment of SS-20 nuclear missiles.[20] The Euromissiles Crisis, which only emerged in broad daylight in fall of 1979, was not however a major factor in the decline of the Italian counterpart of détente, the historic compromise. Rather than the later nuclear security crisis, PCI disaccord with the DC over an emerging scheme to shore-up Western economic security provided the trigger and pretext for its desertion of the governing coalition in early 1979. Our narrative begins with the debates over Italian participation in EMS.

Disagreement between the DC and PCI over an emerging European monetary scheme came to a head in December 1978. The European Monetary System (EMS), a currency plan devised to counter inflation and stagnation brought to the fore latent differences between the two mainstays of the historic compromise, including their diverging political responses to the international crisis of capitalism.

After the failure of an earlier summit in Brussels, by December 1978 West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt had convinced DC Premier Andreotti of the imperative to ensure speedy Italian participation in a new monetary system.[21] Underlying the project was a West

---

in the Third World, see Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 218-87.

[20] On the centrality of European questions in reviving the Cold War, see Leopoldo Nuti, "Introduction" to *The Crisis of Détente in Europe: From Helsinki to Gorbachev, 1975-1985*, ed. L. Nuti (New York: Routledge, 2009), 1-8.

[21] "Il presidente del Consiglio propone un'adesione immediata dell'Italia. Andreotti muta posizione sullo SME. Stamane vertice della maggioranza. Il PCI e il PSI confermano il propio atteggiamento – Consensi alla svolta da parte delle destre, del PRI e del PSDI – Contrasti anche all'interno del Consiglio dei ministri – Riunioni e incontri proseguiti fino a tarda notte," *l'Unità* (Rome), 13 Dec. 1978.

German and French deflationary agenda and the goal of economic stability through increased European interdependence.[22] Schmidt considered the monetary project as essential to the survival of the European Common Market.[23] EMS sought to build currency harmonization among the nine European Economic Community (EEC) members; among other objectives, it sought to attenuate the high exchange rates harming West German exports as well as the runaway inflation undermining weaker economies such as Italy's.[24] EMS, it was hoped, would provide shelter from the vagaries of the dollar and inflationary pressures consequent to increases in the price of oil.

Initially, Socialists and Communists did not oppose EMS, demanding rather time to negotiate better terms. But Andreotti's unexpected request for its immediate adoption precipitated a contentious parliamentary debate which concluded on December 13, 1978. All told, the premier's proposal passed by a slim margin; Republican support saved the day. The PSI

---

[22] EMS belies the notion that the seventies were a period of "Eurosclerosis." See Maria Eleonora Guasconi, "Europe and the EMS challenge. Old and new forms of European integration in the 1970s," in *Crisis of Détente in Europe*, ed. Nuti, 177-89; Georges-Henri Soutou, *L'alliance incertaine: Les rapports politico-stratégiques franco-allemands 1954-1996* (Paris: Fayard, 1996), 351-69. On Italy's foreign policy in the seventies, see Luciano Tosi, "La strada stretta. Aspetti della diplomazia multilaterale italiana (1971-1979)," in *L'Italia repubblicana nella crisi degli anni Settanta*, vol. 1: *Tra guerra fredda e distensione*, ed. A. Giovagnoli and S. Pons (Rome: Rubbettino, 2003), 241-52, and Antonio Varsori, "Il contesto europeo della distensione internazionale," in *L'Italia repubblicana nella crisi degli anni Settanta* ed. Giovagnoli and Pons, 331-50.

[23] "Un'Europa con doppio serpente perchè l'Italia possa farne parte. Dovrebbero essere previste due fasce di oscillazione, di cui una più ampia, per le monete più deboli – La soluzione potrebbe trovare d'accordo la Gran Bretagna," *La Stampa* (Turin), 3 Nov. 1978.

[24] The weakness of the Italian lira and its periodic devaluations, however, were also an advantage for Italian exports, which despite high wage costs and low productivity could better compete with West German exports. At this point in time, Italy had a 12 percent rate of inflation versus the West German rate of 2.1 percent. Accommodation for weak currencies such as the Italian or Irish would comprise the concession of a wider band of fluctuation. See Claus Dertinger, "Lo 'Sme' dietro le quinte," *La Stampa* (Turin), 7 Feb. 1979.

abstained, while the PCI voted against immediate ratification.[25] The four Radical deputies reserved their votes for their own motion. In an apparent contradiction duly noted by Andreotti, Radicals combined support for EMS with denunciations of NATO and what they darkly depicted as an international system dominated by multinationals. They rejected the "inadequacy and illusions of any national isolationism," a reference to the PCI's Third Way, even as they criticized the allegedly military-industrial dimensions of European integration. Pannella opposed to the latter the virtuous federalism of a Radical forbearer, Ernesto Rossi, the partisan of a United States of Europe.[26] Resorting to leftist verbiage which reflected his libertarian and ecological brand of anticapitalism, Pannella later declared: "Schmidt, more dangerously even than Fanfani or Cossutta, is the purveyor of a civilization of plutonium and politics of multinationals and armaments."[27]

Unlike the Radicals, the two principal parties of the left objected to EMS on account of their working class electoral base, attachment to Keynesian economics, and Marxist ideological underpinning. The deflationary policies which were sure to accompany fiscal rigor called into

[25] "Una decisione sbagliata strappata alla solidarietà nazionale. No del Pci e astensione socialista. Lo Sme è passato con soli 270 voti," *l'Unità* (Rome), 14 Dec. 1978.

[26] "Comunicazioni del Governo (Seguito della discussione)", 13 Dec. 1978, *Atti Parlamentari, Camera dei Deputati, VII legislatura, Discussioni, Seduta del 13 dicembre 1978*, 25025-6, 25039-41, http://legislature.camera.it/_dati/leg07/lavori/stenografici/sed0383/sed0383.pdf. Ernesto Rossi's Europeanism, as expressed in the Manifesto of Ventotene co-authored with Altiero Spinelli, identified and condemned the militarism of nation-states, but supported the concept of a European supranational army. See also Alfredo Canavero,"Identità europea e alleanza atlantica: gli europeisti di fronte al Patto Atlantico," in *Un ponte sull'Atlantico: L'alleanza occidentale 1949-1999*, ed. A. Giovagnoli and L. Tosi (Milan: Guerini e associati, 2003), 271-88.

[27] Luca Giurato, "Intervista con il leader del partito radicale. Pannella: 'Tutti ci attaccano con l'inganno e con la mensogna.' 'Noi siamo tolleranti, collaboreremo anche col pci se si convertisse alla linea radicale, che prevede la sinistra, se maggioritaria, al governo," *La Stampa* (Turin), 1 June 1979.

question the automatic wage increase mechanism (*scala mobile*) which sheltered workers' wages but, some argued, also compounded inflation.[28]

PSI abstention reflected hesitation on what appears in retrospect a critical policy decision made at a juncture in the crisis of capitalism of the seventies. The Socialists did not wish to alienate a portion of their electorate and were as yet torn on questions of ideological or politico-economic orientation; their stances testified to the continued hold of the party's left wing. The PCI's rejection of EMS, on the other hand, was linked to espousal of its alternative nation-based approach, the Third Way.[29] By the same token, PCI invocation of Italian exceptionalism implied criticism of the political economy of the Soviet Union. Opposition to EMS did not imply PCI jettisoning of hard-won foreign policy credentials; nor did it signal the abandonment of Europeanism, a patrimony of the party's evolution in the seventies.[30]

Opposition to EMS, however, occasioned PCI desertion of the governing alliance in January 1979.[31] The very same month, a high-level summit of the leaders of the US, Great

[28] "Chiesto un incontro al governo. Critiche dei sindacati per l'adesione del Sme. Necessari provvedimenti per il Sud – Evitare una 'stretta' nel credito e negli investimenti pubblici – Difesa della scala mobile – Direzione Dc rinviata," *l'Unità* (Rome), 15 Dec. 1978; Mario Salvatorelli, "Inflazione, scala mobile tasse. Che cosa significa entrare nello Sme," *Stampa Sera* (Turin), 18 Dec. 1978.

[29] On the PCI's conjuring of a national solution to the crisis, see Roberto Gualtieri, "L'ultimo decennio del PCI," in *Revisionismo socialista e rinnovamento liberale*, ed. Paolo Borioni (Rome: Carocci, 2001), 178.

[30] Aldo Rizzo, interview of Giulio Andreotti, "Nostra intervista al Presidente del Consiglio sui grandi problemi europei. Andreotti: perchè credo nel Sme. Siamo arrivati al Consiglio di Bruxelles senza avere definito alcuni punti importanti – con più tempo a disposizione avremmo potuto evitare le riserve dei comunisti e dei socialisti – L'atteggiamento del pci non va inteso come affievolimento dello spirito europeistico – La storia vincerà gli egoismi nazionali – Risaneremo l'economia," *Europa*, January 1979, monthly supplement of *La Stampa* (Turin), 9 Jan. 1979; Pons, *Berlinguer*, 147-9; for a discussion of the Italian domestic debate over EMS, see Peter Ludlow, *The Making of the European Monetary System: A Case Study of the Politics of the European Community* (London: Butterworth Scientific, 1982), 205-17. On the PCI's Europeanism, see Donald Sassoon, "La sinistra, l'Europa, il PCI," in *Il PCI nell'Italia repubblicana*, ed. R. Gualtieri (Rome: Carocci, 2001), 223-49.

[31] Alberto Rapisarda, "Il pci ripete le accuse alla dc. Incertezza sul vertice a cinque," *La Stampa* (Turin), 18 Jan. 1979; Luca Giurato, "È la crisi di governo. Rottura tra dc e pci," *La Stampa* (Turin), 25 Jan. 1979; Luca Giurato,

Britain, France and West Germany convened on the Caribbean island of Guadeloupe to address new security challenges. The international summit would be at the origin of additional sources of domestic divisions.

In January 1979 representatives of the "four Western Great Powers," *La Stampa* reported, convened at Guadeloupe to address the security risks faced by the Western alliance. West Germany had recently gained access to the restricted club of nation-states charged with repairing a frayed Atlantic partnership.[32] Predictably, the exclusion of Italy incensed Socialist President Sandro Pertini; he conveyed his discontent privately to US Ambassador Gardner, tactfully blaming the slight on the French.[33] Pertini's anger was rooted in traditional Italian fears of marginalization from the concert of Great Powers.[34] The principal decision that emerged from the Guadeloupe summit was to equip European NATO countries with intermediate-range, land-based nuclear missiles, the Euromissiles. Over the course of 1979, Pertini's support for Italian nuclear rearmament and a favorable Socialist parliamentary vote in December would help put Italy back into the big league; the Italian president's response to exclusion from the Guadeloupe

---

"Una crisi lampo evita le elezioni?" *La Stampa* (Turin), 26 Jan. 1979; Pons, *Berlinguer e la fine del communismo*, 148-51.

[32] Ennio Caretto, "L'equilibrio mondiale proposto da Guadalupa," *La Stampa* (Turin), 9 Jan. 1979.

[33] Gardner, *Mission Italy*, 206-7.

[34] Pierangelo Isernia, "Bandiera e risorse: la politica estera negli anni Ottanta," in *Il gigante dai piedi di argilla. La crisi del regime partitocratico in Italia*, ed. M. Cotta and P. Isernia (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1996), 161. For Italy's hankering for nuclear weapons and the Great Power status the latter entailed, see Leopoldo Nuti, *La sfida nucleare: La politica estera italiana e le armi atomiche 1945-1991* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2007) and Leopoldo Nuti, 'Me too, please': Italy and the Politics of Nuclear weapons, 1945-1975," in *Diplomacy and Statecraft* 1 (March 1993): 114-48.

summit accelerated an ongoing convergence of international developments and Italian domestic politics.[35]

The coterie of French, English, West German and American leaders had gathered on the Caribbean island to discuss progress on multilateral relations, including economic ones.[36] Schmidt cast the Guadeloupe gathering as an "opportunity to institutionalize the interdependence of parliamentary democracies envisaged for the first time by Henry Kissinger, but never realized."[37] On the security front, he affirmed the "obligation to by all means shore-up détente with Moscow," displaying little enthusiasm for new missiles, both on account of domestic pacifist sentiment and a guttural distrust of Carter after the Neutron Bomb fiasco.[38] Contrary to at least one portrayal, Schmidt was not an enthusiastic proponent of the Euromissiles, though he had been the first to highlight the necessity to respond in some way to the Soviet deployment of a new generation of nuclear missiles beginning in 1977.[39] It was French President Giscard d'Estaing instead who helped broker a compromise Schmidt could accept and that became

[35] Aldo Rizzo, "Pertini a Bonn insiste sul contributo dell'Italia alla sicurezza europea," *La Stampa* (Turin), 20 Sept. 1979; Gardner, *Mission Italy*, 233-4.

[36] EMS was the subject of separate bilateral talks between French President Giscard d'Estaing and West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, see Ennio Caretto, "Guadalupa: nato un nuovo vertice fra Stati Uniti ed Europa 'forte'," La Stampa (Turin), 7 Jan. 1979.

[37] Citation in Ennio Caretto, "I quattro grandi dell'Occidente affrontano il futuro a Guadalupa," *La Stampa* (Turin), 5 Jan. 1979; On the global shift of nation-states to interdependence in the 1970s, a development contemporaries debated, see Charles Maier, " 'Malaise': The Crisis of Capitalism in the 1970s, " in *The Shock of the Global: the 1970s in Perspective*, ed. N. Ferguson et al. (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University, 2010), 25-48, and Daniel J. Sargent, "The United States and Globalization in the 1970s, " in *The Shock of the Global*, ed. Ferguson et al., 49-64.

[38] Caretto, "Guadalupa: nato un nuovo vertice fra Stati Uniti ed Europa 'forte'," La Stampa (Turin), 7 Jan. 1979; Ennio Caretto, "I 'quattro' sono già al lavoro dopo il vertice di Guadalupa." *La Stampa* (Turin), 8 Jan. 1979; Renato Proni, "La Nato chiederà all'Italia di ospitare nuovi missili americani a medio raggio," *La Stampa* (Turin), 13 Mar. 1978.

[39] Jeffrey Herff's portrayal of Schmidt as a Cold War warrior does not stand up to the evidence. Cf. Jeffrey Herf, *War by Other Means: Soviet Power, Western Resistance, and the Battle of the Euromissiles* (New York: Free Press, 1991).

known as the dual-track decision on account of its provision for disarmament talks. Under its terms, the so-called Euromissiles would be deployed by 1983, if negotiations with the Soviets failed.[40] Further, summit participants concurred on the importance of finalizing the SALT II strategic nuclear arms accord with the Soviets, though on a proposed SALT III the French refused to countenance inclusion of their nuclear arsenal in negotiations. In lieu of concessions on the *force de frappe*, Giscard proposed a conference on disarmament.[41]

The Soviet deployment of new nuclear weapons that had sparked Western anxieties had not been driven solely by an inevitable modernization of weaponry but had also the tacit intent of sowing political divisions in the Western camp.[42] Western blunders lent a hand to Soviet policymakers, particularly Carter's 1978 Neutron Bomb reversal. The decision to deploy new missiles spoke in part to a redoubled American will to repair damaged transatlantic relations with a substitutive deployment; for their part, while Western European leaders quietly welcomed the new missiles on account of geostrategic considerations, they also knew they would prove unpopular among voters attached to détente. None was more sensitive to the pitfalls of nuclear politics than Schmidt, who faced a potent pacifist constituency within his own party, the SPD.[43] The casting of deployment as dual-track reflected such considerations. The prudence of Western

[40] Leopoldo Nuti, "The origins of the 1979 dual track decision – a survey," in *The Crisis of Détente in Europe: From Helsinki to Gorbachev, 1975*-1985, ed. L Nuti (New York: Routledge, 2009), 57-71; Pons, *Berlinguer*, 149-50; Valery Giscard d'Estaing, *Le pouvoir et la vie*, vol. II, *L'affrontement* (Paris: Compagnie 12, 1991), 363-85.

[41] Ennio Caretto, "L'equilibrio mondiale proposto da Guadalupa," *La Stampa* (Turin), 9 Jan. 1979.

[42] Soutou, *La guerre de Cinquante Ans*, 598-99.

[43] "Un aspro dibattito ha diviso il congresso. SPD: poco entusiasmo per gli euromissili. Approvata la produzione dei 'Pershing' insieme alla trattativa con l'Urss. Aperta opposizione della sinistra del partito – Brandt e Apel sulle pressioni Usa," *l'Unità* (Rome), 6 Dec. 1979; Nuti, "The origins of 1979 dual track decision—a survey," in *Crisis of Détente in Europe*, ed. Nuti, 57-71.

policymakers was also illustrated by the whittling down of the number of missiles to be deployed in Italy to the politically acceptable, regardless of military requirements.[44]

The dual-track decision constituted one aspect of a broader policy goal to shore-up the Western Alliance through increased economic and military interdependence.[45] Italian policymakers were keenly attuned to the high stakes of such diplomatic maneuvers. Determination not to be left behind had been patent in Premier Andreotti's efficient orchestration of Italian EMS membership. Presently, despite his longstanding and publicly avowed pacifism, President Pertini responded to Italian exclusion from the security summit of Guadeloupe with alacrous political and diplomatic activism aimed at ensuring Italian nuclear rearmament.[46]

By mid-March, the Italian press publicized the decision by NATO to deploy new missiles, including in Italy.[47] It remained unclear what would be the response of the factious Socialists. The Communists, on the other hand, were quick to burnish their internationalism even as they

[44] Euromissile deployment drew its origins origins from pre-existing plans for a new generation of European land-based nuclear missiles, on the drafting board since since 1973 at the latest. Contrary to how it was sometimes represented by contemporaries or even historians, the decision to deploy the Euromissiles was neither exclusively American nor European in its origins, but rather a combination. It was neither a case of "empire by invitation" nor part of an US hegemonic master plan. Deployment was rather the outcome of a complex set of circumstances. To simplify: Soviet deployment of the SS-20s acted as a trigger on a latent process of Western nuclear modernization. As had often happened, the Soviets overreached and provoked a Western response which ended up reinforcing Atlantic cohesion, contrary to Soviet intentions. Leopoldo Nuti, *La sfida nucleare*, 347-57; Vincent Dujardin, "From Helsinki to the missiles question: A minor role for small countries? The case of Belgium (1973-1985)," in *Crisis of Détente in Europe*, ed. Nuti, 72-85. For a different view influenced by contemporary pacifism, see Diana Johnstone, *The Politics of Euromissiles: Europe's Role in America's World* (London: Verso, 1984).

[45] Caretto, "I quattro grandi dell'Occidente affrontano il futuro a Guadalupa." The period from 1973 has been identified as a "third postwar wave of institution building" by Fred C. Bergsten, "Interdependence and the Reform of International Institutions," *International Organization*, no. 2 (spring 1976): 361-72.

[46] Gardner, *Mission Italy*, 205-6, 233-4.

[47] Renato Proni, "La Nato chiederà all'Italia di ospitare nuovi missili americani a medio raggio," *La Stampa* (Turin), 13 Mar. 1979.

geared up for the looming electoral contest.[48] Pacifism re-emerged as a major political theme. It was a topic of discussion in internal party discussions; behind closed doors, Berlinguer blamed the deterioration of détente on the United States.[49] In late March, he placed pacifism at the forefront of his address to the party congress; in public, he proved more balanced in attributing superpower faults.[50]

Attentiveness to foreign developments and the political will to leverage them were also manifest in a new internationalist cause adopted by the Radical Party. The intent to relaunch Radical internationalism had been already in evidence the previous fall, when Pannella had appointed as party secretary an antimilitarist Frenchman, Jean Fabre. In February 1979, drawing inspiration from the UN's proclamation of 1979 as Year of the Child as well as new national legislation on aid to developing countries, Pannella announced a Radical initiative against world famine.[51]

The initiative was first evoked almost as an after-thought in a text denouncing Catholic antagonism to Radical efforts to fully liberalize abortion.[52] Radicals opposed the 1978 law which

[48] Aldo Rizzo, "Il pci guarda alle elezioni," *La Stampa* (Turin), 30 Mar. 1979; Franco Mimmi, "Il tripartito presentato al Senato e alla Camera. Andreotti chiede il voto ma è sicura la sfiducia. Il presidente respinge l'appoggio dei demonazionali – Il governo dovrebbe durare sino alle elezioni di giugno e intanto frenare l'inflazione – Craxi però vuole un diverso esecutivo per fare le consultazioni politiche in autunno," *La Stampa* (Turin), 30 Mar. 1979.

[49] Pons, *Berlinguer e la fine del communismo*, 151-4.

[50] "Il rapporto di Berlinguer al XV Congresso del PCI," *l'Unità* (Rome), 31 Mar. 1979.

[51] Marco Pannella, "Digiuno contro la fame nel mondo", press conference, 14 Feb. 1979, audioclip, OARR, http://www.radioradicale.it/scheda/199/200-digiuno-contro-la-fame-nel-mondo.

[52] Marco Pannella, "La nostra lotta per la vita," *Notizie Radicali*, 1 Feb. 1979, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=46569&lang=IT&cms=. See also the statement by Radical Deputy Maria Adelaide Aglietta, a veteran of the Radical battles for the legalization of divorce, abortion and for women's rights, in her speech before the Chamber of Deputies on 7 January 1980, "Mozioni e interpellanze concernente la fame nel mondo (seguito della discussione)," *Atti Parlamentari, Camera dei Deputati, VIII legislatura, Discussioni, Seduta*

had partially legalized abortion, on account of restrictions which they argued continued to result in thousands of illegal and thus dangerous abortions. The new legislation had been the result of a political compromise struck between the coalition parties in order to head off the Radical referendum proposing to completely decriminalize abortion. Like the Radicals, Catholic circles sought the law's repeal, but had as a goal the recriminalization of abortion. The Italian Episcopal Conference (CEI), employing incendiary language which would inspire Pannella, described abortion as having led to the state-sponsored murder of more (unborn) individuals than had died in World War I, In January, in response to threats of excommunication proffered by bishops against practitioners of abortion, Pannella sarcastically inquired whether punitive measures would also be applied to parliamentarians who had approved large military budget increases. Such funds, he asserted, might instead save the lives of "fifteen million children which, according to the UN, are about to be assassinated through starvation and due to the responsibility of those who, having propagated the necessity of their birth, decree their daily annihilation by abandoning them."[53] Alongside his reiterated support for an abrogative (and liberalizing) Radical referendum on abortion, Pannella called for a "pro-life" campaign to save the lives of millions of children estimated to die each year of starvation, comparing the estimated total annual toll from starvation to the number of dead in World War II and describing it as a "holocaust."[54]

---

del 7 gennaio 1980, Resoconto Stenografico, 6938-42, http://legislature.camera.it/_dati/leg08/lavori/stenografici/sed0091/sed0091.pdf.

[53] "Continua la polemica con i vescovi sull'aborto. Pannella: 'C'è la scomunica anche per le spese militari?' Una nota vaticana afferma che il discorso del Papa sulla fedeltà coniugale e sul rispetto della vita 'si colloca ad un livello unicamente morale e religioso," *La Stampa* (Turin), 3 Jan. 1979. See also Liliana Madeo, "Nuovo attacco dei radicali al Cardinale Benelli. L'accesa polemica per l'aborto si estende adesso al Concordato. Il magistrato di Camerino, che ha denunciato l'arcivescovo di Firenze, ritiene opportuna 'una pausa di meditazione': si dice preoccupato per le 'manifestazioni rissose' seguite al suo atto," *La Stampa* (Turin), 7 Jan. 1979.

[54] Pannella, "La nostra lotta per la vita," *Notizie Radicali*, 1 Febr. 1979, OHRA.

During the press conference of mid February 1979 which officially launched the new initiative on famine, Pannella put his newly adopted cause to political use. But rather than focus on Catholic conservatism, he targeted the Marxist left. Without naming it, he directed criticism at the PCI for its silence on the millions of "proletarian deaths" from starvation in the Third World. It contrasted, he argued, with loud denunciation of the far fewer "class victims" of right-wing regimes.[55] Subverting Marxian verbiage, the Radicals would often described their campaign against world famine as "class-based" internationalism superior to the PCI variety.[56] On the occasion of a March 1979 speech given in anticipation of the coming elections, Pannella directly addressed his counterpart at the helm of the PCI: "Comrade Berlinguer, it is on the issue of values that can be united Catholics, Socialists and Communists! On battles for life, not support for the Reale Law or NATO diplomacy! Comrade Berlinguer, this is the left!"[57] Earlier, he had signaled the Radical determination to defy the traditional parties of the left in upcoming elections when he announced the transformation of the "Radical antagonist" into a "socialist protagonist."[58]

Radicals sought to distinguish their humanitarian brand of leftist internationalism in another respect: the technical approach to foreign aid. The appeal of their initiative to the Italian

[55] Marco Pannella, "Digiuno contro la fame nel mondo", press conference, 14 Feb. 1979, audioclip, OARR, http://www.radioradicale.it/scheda/199/200-digiuno-contro-la-fame-nel-mondo.

[56] The Radicals sought to cast the problem of famine as a global "class" issue pitting the industrialized West and East against the global South. See Marco Pannella, "Arrestare subito lo sterminio," speech given at the World Council on Nutrition at Ottawa in Sept. 1979, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=46796&lang=IT&cms=.

[57] Marco Pannella, "Organizzare l'alternativa contro l'unità nazionale: il 'Mein Kampf' di un nonviolento,", speech given on the occasion of the opening of the Radical XXI[st] extraordinary congress held in Rome, 31 Mar. 1979, reprinted in *Una 'inutile strage'? Da Via Rasella alle Fosse Ardeatine*, ed. A. Bandinelli and V. Vecellio (Rome: Tullio Pironti, 1982), 40.

[58] Pannella, "La nostra lotta per la vita," *Notizie Radicali*, 1 February 1979, OHRA.

public which soon emerged was in large part attributeable to Radicals' stark and simplistic framing of the problem of global famine. In the first place, Radicals insisted on the tangible yet morally unacceptable problem of famine and of its millions of victims; the effectiveness of their appeal built on the growing exposure of the public to television and press images of famine ever since the Biafra Wars of the late sixties.[59] Unlike the mainstream left, Radicals avoided engaging in the complex questions of neocolonialism, dependency theory or "asymmetrical interdependence" favored by leftist intellectuals, electing instead the simple and effective language of moral outrage. Second, Radicals called for a seemingly straighforward solution to the scandal of mass starvation: a massive increase of funding. The claim that increased resources would address the issues at hand had the advantage of positing an appealingly simple approach to a complicated problem; further, every increase in state allocations would accrue political capital to the Radicals. Third, Radicals insisted on the extreme urgency of desired interventions and resorted to enumerating the daily, monthly or yearly toll in numbers of dead from governmental dithering; such a ploy created political pressure and public support for immediate action. They insisted that their effort was not a feel-good or charitable gesture, but rather a program offering a solution to a supposedly political, not technical problem. Fourth, Pannella and his cohorts would resort to the EEC Parliament and other international fora to place pressure on an Italian foreign policy establishment anxious, we have seen, to enhance its status.

[59] Gaetano Dentamaro, interview by author, July 2008; Daniel Pierrejean, *Bernard Kouchner du Biafra au Kosovo* (Paris: Editeur indépendant, 2007); Sargent, "From Internationalism to Globalism," Ph.D. dissertation, chapter 4, "The Politics of Human Rights: the Cases of Biafra and Bangladesh."

Combined, these Radical tactics would explain the substantial increase in subsequent years of Italian foreign aid.[60]

From inception, for all the anticlerical invective characterizing his pro-abortion rhetoric, Pannella's famine campaign was also calculated to attract the broad swaths of left-leaning Catholics who populated the ranks of both the PCI and the DC.[61] Pannella's charismatic posturing and his intermittent appeals to Pope John Paul II denoted an inflection of his leftism that would ultimately yield an attenuation of Radical anticlericalism. Such an evolution possibly reflected the contemporary belief that voting patterns in coming elections would not necessarily follow the old left-right divide.[62] The accentuation of the "prophetic" tendencies of the Radical leader, it was also observed, was linked to a crisis of mass parties and to Pannella's intuitive grasp of contemporary trends.[63]

The early phase of the campaign culminated in an Easter March from Porta Pia, lieu of the Risorgimento state's decisive breach of the (then papal) Aurelian walls in 1870, to the epicenter of Catholicism, St Peter's Square. If not comparable to Communist rallies in terms of attendance, the event was widely and mostly favorably reported by the press.[64] At the Quirinal

---

[60] I follow closely here Pierangelo Isernia's analysis of the Radical approach, see Isernia, *La cooperazione allo sviluppo*, 101-3; see also, for an early outline of Radical goals and approach, Marco Pannella and Mauro Bubbico, 17 Mar. 1979, "Sterminio per fame: la Marcia di Pasqua," Teleroma (TV) debate, OARR, http://www.radioradicale.it/scheda/667/668-sterminio-per-fame-la-marcia-di-pasqua; see also Francesco Rutelli and Marco Pannella, 15 Mar. 1979, "Sterminio per fame: la marcia di Pasqua," audioclip no. 3, OARR, http://www.radioradicale.it/scheda/666/667-sterminio-per-fame-la-marcia-di-pasqua.

[61] Marco Pannella, "Noi laici e voi cattolici saremo uniti per la vita," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 14 Apr. 1979.

[62] Colarizi and Gervasoni, *La cruna dell'ago*, 91.

[63] Angelo Panebianco, "Carisma e Partito radicale: alcune riflessioni," *Argomenti radicali: Bimestrale politico per l'alternativa*, Nov. 1979/Jan. 1980, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=46970&lang=IT&cms=.

[64] Marco Pannella, interview by Eugenio Scalfari, " 'Ecco, mentre ti parlo muoiono 3000 bambini',", *La Repubblica* (Rome), 25 Mar. 1979; Eugenio Scalfari, "Preghiere laiche in San Pietro," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 11 Apr. 1979;

palace, seat of the Italian presidency, President Pertini addressed participants, declaring from a balcony: "it is necessary before all to fight for disarmament […] Let us therefore pursue complete and controlled disarmament. It would signify real peace for humanity; drawing on resources currently wasted on the arms' race one would truly address world famine." Pope John Paul II saluted the procession on arrival, though the Radicals were disappointed by his omission of explicit words of support for their initiative.[65]

In Parliament, Radical deputies adopted Pannella's new cause and merged it with their longstanding efforts to reduce the military budget. During a first stage of the famine campaign through 1981, Radicals focused on building public support for their campaign; rather than propose new laws, they pressured the legislature to conform to existing international norms or to render operative domestic legislation such as a recently approved foreign aid law, notably through the substantial increase of the hitherto miserly funds. They sought to politicize issues which parties had traditionally neglected, notably the new law on aid to developing countries. The recent legislation's principal innovation had been to create a Department of Cooperation for Development within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. But the new entity lacked adequate resources and leadership, and in this sense continued to reflect the low priority placed by postwar Italian policymakers on foreign aid.[66] Radical deputies proposed reallocating portions of the

---

"Oggi la 'marcia della pace' dal Quirinale a San Pietro," *La Stampa* (Turin), 15 Apr. 1979; Domenico Del Rio, "I laici oggi a S. Pietro," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 15/16 Apr. 1979; Eugenio Scalfari, "È questa la sfida che noi preferiamo," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 15/16 Apr. 1979; Marco Tosatti, "L'iniziativa di Pannella per la vita e la pace. Ai marciatori Pertini dice 'Lottiamo per il disarmo.'Due-tremila persone hanno seguito, domenica, i radicali e gli altri promotori per le vie di Roma-Le tappe al Quirinale, a Palazzo Chigi e a San Pietro," *La Stampa* (Turin), 17 Apr. 1979; Ruggero Guarini, "Fede, speranza e vanità," *Il Messaggero* (Rome), 18 Apr. 1979.

[65] Tosatti, "L'iniziativa di Pannella per la vita e la pace," *La Stampa*, 17 Apr. 1979; Isernia, *La cooperazione allo sviluppo*, 98-9, 102-3.

[66] Law no. 38 of 9 Feb. 1979. See Emma Bonino, "Mozioni ed interpellanza sul problema della fame nel mondo," 19 Sept. 1979, *Atti Parlamentari, Camera dei Deputati, VIII legislatura, Discussioni, Seduta del 19 settembre 1979,*

national military budget to foreign aid.[67] Citing an OCSE report, they denounced Italy's meager contribution of 0.1 percent of its GDP to foreign aid. The latter was among the lowest percentages contributed by industrial nations, well short of the 1970 UN General Assembly resolution no. 2626, which had recommended a minimum of 0.7 percent.[68] Radicals demanded that the Italian government urge an emergency meeting of the Security Council of the UN to discuss world famine.[69]

In spring 1979, after repeated attempts to recompose a governing coalition, President Pertini reluctantly decreed that early general elections would be held. Craxi blamed the DC and PCI for the premature end of the legislation and called on voters to support his party's bid to breach the bipolarism of Italian politics.[70] Facing criticism for alleged electoral manipulation, Pannella interruped a hunger strike undertaken to pressure the government into taking action on famine.

Resoconto stenografico, 1587, http://legislature.camera.it/_dati/leg08/lavori/stenografici/sed0023/sed0023.pdf; Isernia, *La cooperazione allo sviluppo*, 93-6.

[67] Roberto Cicciomessere, 28 Feb. 1979, "Stanziamenti per la fame," *ordine del giorno* presented to the Chamber of Deputies, summary, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=22218&lang=IT&cms=; "Pannella chiede soccorsi per 15 milioni di bimbi," *La Stampa* (Turin), 15 Feb. 1979; Giuseppe Fedi, " 'Troppe spese militari poche contro la fame'," *La Stampa* (Turin), 20 Mar. 1979.

[68] Roberto Cicciomessere, Franco De Cataldo, Mauro Mellini and Maria Luisa Galli, 28 Feb. 1979, *Atti Parlamentari, Camera dei Deputati, VII legislatura, Discussioni, Seduta del 28 febbraio 1979*, 27888-96, http://legislature.camera.it/_dati/leg07/lavori/stenografici/sed0406/sed0406.pdf.

[69] Isernia, *La cooperazione allo sviluppo*, 100-1, 103-5, 151 (note 38).

[70] Luca Giurato, "Il pci lascia la maggioranza. Finita l'era del monocolore?" *La Stampa* (Turin), 27 Jan. 1979; Luca Giurato, "Berlinguer duro con la dc però lascia uno spiraglio," *La Stampa* (Turin), 5 Feb. 1979; Franco Milli, "I presidenti del Parlamento si recano in Quirinale. Pertini deciderà stamane. Elezioni ormai quasi certe," *Stampa Sera* (Turin), 2 Apr. 1979; Franco Mimmi, "In otto anni è la terza legislatura che finisce in anticipo. Pertini ha sciolto le Camere. Elezioni forse il 9-10 giugno. Il Presidente della Repubblica si è detto 'addoloratissimo' per la decisione – Fanfani era contrario, Ingrao favorevole – Oggi o domani il governo fisserà la data delle consultazioni – Craxi critica dc e pci. Il Quirinale: non c'era altra scelta," *La Stampa* (Turin), 3 Apr. 1979.

More than ever before, the electoral campaign was marked by acrimony between the parties of the left. Observers described the electoral test as a popular verdict on the PCI's recent governing accord with the DC.[71] While outwardly critical of the DC, Communist electoral rhetoric was unabashedly anti-Socialist and anti-Radical, eliciting an in-kind response.[72] In clear defiance of the Communist continued bid for an executive role in government, Craxi asserted that solely Socialists could ensure governmental stability (*governabilità*).

Radical-Communist pre-electoral polemics proved particularly bitter.[73] To foreign and domestic observers, the two parties' conflicts, adorned with the entertaining figure of Pannella, dubbed by *the Economist* the "mouse that roared," presented one of the few elements of interest of Italy's latest round of early elections.[74] Eager to present themselves as a leftist alternative to the PCI, the Radicals held their pre-electoral meeting in conjunction with the PCI congress. In contrast to the Communists' choice of the monumental setting of the *Palazzo dello Sport*, the Radical tribe gathered at the University of Rome, the site two years earlier of student protests and of a tense confrontation between new left militants and PCI ranks. Such events had been a

[71] Paolo Spriano, "Il nuovo qualunquismo," *l'Unità* (Rome), 3 May 1979.

[72] Luca Giurato, "Intervista con il segretario del psi, Craxi. 'Mancano ancora condizioni per un'alleanza tra pci e psi,' I comunisti 'sono assurdamente aggressive nei nostri confronti e i democristiani 'insofferenti' – Rapporti di parità per un'intesa di governo con la dc. Eurosocialismo: 'Controversie con altri partiti solo su problemi particolari'," *La Stampa* (Turin), 29 May 1979; Colarizi and Gervasoni, *La cruna dell'ago*, 85-6.

[73] "Tra i radicali e i comunisti battaglia di querele," *La Stampa* (Turin), 29 May 1979; Vincenzo Zeno, "Un giornale? No, e' la fabbrica della menzogna. L'Unità: falsi, inganni, linciaggi," *Notizie Radicali*, 15 July 1979, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=46750&lang=IT&cms=.

[74] Gaetano Scardocchia, "I molti petali della rosa radicale," *Corriere della Sera* (Milan), 15 May 1979; "The Mouse That Roared," *The Economist*, 5 May 1979.

humiliating event for Luciano Lama, leader of CGIL, the Socialist and Communist union, as he had been forced to abandon the podium due to furious heckling from the floor.[75]

In what was probably an intentional provocation, Pannella inserted into his congressional speech an attack on the violence of the Resistance. Knowingly infringing a postwar taboo, he denounced as a pointless act of terrorism the 1944 detonation of a bomb planted by Resistance fighters at Via Rasella in Rome. The explosion had killed soldiers of the German army; in retaliation, the occupying force had executed ten individuals for each soldier killed at a location known as the Ardeatine Caves and since consecrated as a national shrine. Pannella's comments unleashed a storm of outrage.

His denounciation of the violence at Via Rasella indirectly called into question the doctrine of revolution shared by wartime Resistance fighters, the PCI, and contemporary leftwing terrorists. While the PCI, unlike the Red Brigades and similar groups, had long renounced revolution as a means to power, Communists continued to consider violence legitimate in Third World national liberation struggles. Such an espousal, combined with the party's pedigree, rendered it vulnerable to attack on account of what had been famously described as a shared "family photo album" with domestic or Bolshevik terrorism. Further, the PCI's intransigent stance on the question of negotiating Moro's release and its subscription to the primacy of *raison d'état* had unintentionally resurrected its old image as an authoritarian and illiberal force. A year earlier, Pannella had harshly criticized the PCI during the kidnapping of Aldo Moro. Presently, he reminded his audience that "the communist and anti-Fascist Togliatti

[75] Giuseppe Fedi, "In vista delle quasi certe elezioni anticipate in giugno. I radicali vogliono collaborare con la 'Nuova sinistra' e il psi. Secondo il pr la prossima legislatura può sancire due strade: quella della svolta costituzionale o quella dell'alternativa – Protesta di Pannella nella sede del 'Gr2' – L'intervento di Spadaccia," *La Stampa* (Turin), 31 Mar. 1979; Ginsborg, *History of Postwar Italy*, 382.

was between 1936 and 1940 the torturer of the memory and humanity of Trotsky, Bukharin and of all his communist comrades, becoming in such a manner, for reason of state, of party and of communism, an ally of the hangman."[76]

Such rhetoric marked a ratcheting-up of the Radical critique of Italian Communism.[77] Significantly though, Pannella did not employ the antitotalitarian language practiced by the Italian right or by the left-wing critics of the *Union de la gauche* in France. The Radical circuitous critique of the PCI focused on the latter's past; no claim was made that contemporary Italian Communism constituted a totalitarian threat to democracy.[78] The weakness of Italian left-wing antitotalitarianism, one tied to the democratic credentials of the PCI and to the immense prestige of the party among intellectuals and the working class, precluded a frontal attack. In the seventies, French antitotalitarianism revived in response to the *Union de la gauche*. In Italy, the alleged threat to democracy derived rather from the historic compromise, which conjured images of a partitocratic "regime," not an empowered and maximalist united left as in France.[79]

---

[76] Marco Pannella, "Organizzare l'alternativa contro l'unita' nazionale: il 'Mein Kampf' di un nonviolento," speech, Radical congress Mar. 29-Apr. 2, 1979, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=47847&lang=IT&cms=.

[77] Lieta Tornabuoni, "Migliaia di persone, in piedi, hanno gridato la loro ostilità al leader radicale. I congressisti pci fischiano Pannella, il grande nemico," *Stampa Sera* (Turin), 2 Apr. 1979; Flavio Fusi, "Il caotico congresso radicale," *Rinascita*, 6 April 1979, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=46637&lang=IT&cms=.

[78] In 1979 as in 1976, Pannella rejected PCI definitions of his movement as anticommunist, see Marco Pannella, "Pannella al PCI: perché ce l'avete con noi?" Corriere della Sera (Milan), 12 Dec. 1976, reprinted in *Il pugno o la rosa: I radicali: gauchisti, qualunquisti, socialisti?*, ed. V. Vecellio (Verona: Bertani, 1979), 313-8.

[79] On French antitotalitarian leftist traditions and their weakness in Italy, see Michael Scott Christofferson, *French Intellectuals Against the Left: The Antitotalitarian Moment of the 1970s* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2004), 14-7; for the Italian case, see Victor Zaslavsky, *Lo Stalinismo e la sinistra italiana: Dal mito dell'URSS alla fine del comunismo 1945-1991* (Mondadori: Milan, 2004).

Pannella's anti-antifascist offensive sought to desacralize the cover which antifascism provided for the historic compromise.[80] "We are all fascists, seven days a week," Pannella provocatively declared, suggesting that the real adversary of democracy was contemporary political practice, not the marginalized and powerless MSI-DN or a distant Fascist past.[81] A greater peril, he argued, was the contemporary "fascism" manifest in the repressive laws still in place from that the Fascist era (the Rocco Law), the new ones upheld by the DC-PCI duopoly (the Reale Law), or laws protecting the "will of men over the life of women" on the issue of abortion.[82] Radical outreach to the MSI-DN or to its leader Giorgio Almirante antedated and would continue after the 1979 electoral campaign; it too was part of a Radical effort to upend conventional definitions of fascism and antifascism.[83] Drawing on the revisionism of historian Renzo De Felice, Pannella stated that historical Fascism had had its dignity, a manner of arguing that its demonization served principally the purpose of justifying the present status quo.[84] Lethal

[80] Marco Pannella, interview, "Il polo comunista e il polo radicale," *Playboy*, Italian edition, May 1979, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=46652&lang=IT&cms=.

[81] Five years earlier, PRI leader Giovanni Spadolini had criticized Pannella's equivalence of antifascism with fascism as a utopian and antipolitical revolt which did not however correctly identify the veritable threats to Italian democracy. See Giovanni Spadolini, "La battaglia dei radicali," *Corriere della Sera* (Milan), 25 July 1974, reprinted in *Il pugno o la rosa: I radicali: gauchisti, qualunquisti, socialisti?*, ed. V. Vecellio (Verona: Bertani, 1979), 220-4.

[82] Pannella, "Organizzare l'alternativa contro l'unita' nazionale: il 'Mein Kampf' di un nonviolento," speech given at Radical congress of Mar. 29-Apr. 2, 1979, OHRA.

[83] Such gestures culminated in 1982, when Pannella attended the MSI-DN's XIIIth congress, see Piero Ignazi, *Il polo escluso: Profilo storico del Movimento Sociale Italiano* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1989), 220.

[84] Ugoberto Alfassio Grimaldi, "Resistenza: crollano infine le apologie rituali," *Quaderni Radicali*, no. 10, reprinted in *Una 'inutile strage'?*, ed. Bandinelli and Vecellio, 111; Domenico Tarizzo, "Legittimazione e parricidio," *Quaderni Radicali*, no. 10, reprinted in *Una 'inutile strage'?*, ed. Bandinelli and Vecelli, 124. In 1975, Renzo De Felice had published an influential essay arguing for a more dispassionate approach to historical Fascism, see Ignazi, *Il polo escluso*, 222.

contemporary manifestations of red terrorism facilitated such iconoclastic talk; an additional motive may have been the intent to cannibalize the youthful neofascist antisystem vote.[85]

Following his pointed speech, Pannella paid a visit to the PCI congress, where he was booed and subjected to withering speeches by party leaders. Lama, the union leader, cried that "the Socialists cannot ally themselves with men like Pannella; between him and the left there is no clear affinity but rather a deep divide." Another party official defined Pannella's congressional speech as patently fascist.[86] In parallel, the Radicals broadcast on *Radio Radicale* the congressional speeches of Berlinguer and his colleagues, announcing their radio diffusion through paid advertisements in mainstream Roman dailies such as *Il Messaggero* or *Il Tempo*. Public divulgation conformed to the party's Crocian commitment to information dissemination. But also apparent was an effort to propagate polemics central to the Radical strategy of challenging despite impossible odds the dominant party of the left.[87]

[85] Between 1978 and 1983, according to Piero Ignazi, the MSI-DN perceived the Radicals as a threat to their electoral base. Both parties resorted to antipolitical rhetoric to attract voters. Paralleling in some ways the Radicals, the MSI-DN shifted its strategy during this time from anticommunism to greater emphasis on antisystem, antiparty and antipolitical rhetoric. See Ignazi, *Il polo escluso*, 209-11. The deadliest of the neofascist extremists' bomb attacks came one year later, in 1980, at Bologna train station, when over 80 bystanders were murdered. Historians, however, consider 1974 a turning point marking the beginning of the decline of "black" terrorism and an apparent fading of the as yet obscure story of the Italian Cold War state's and international, possibly American, collusions with far right extremism. Agostino Giovagnoli, "Penser l'affaire Moro: un tournant dans l'histoire de le République?" in *L'Italie des années de plomb: Le terrorisme entre histoire et mémoire*, ed. M. Lazar and M.-A. Matard-Bonucci (Paris: Autrement, 2010), 178-91.

[86] Tornabuoni, "Migliaia di persone, in piedi, hanno gridato la loro ostilità al leader radicale," *Stampa Sera* (Turin), 2 Apr. 1979.

[87] Portions of the PCI XVth congress proceedings can be heard in audioclips preserved in OARR (the location of the congress is erroneously indicated as Milan). Commenting on the aftermath of Pannella's appearance at the PCI congress, one journalist wrote: "Thus Pannella has made it: once again he has carried off a coup, once again he has attained his eternal objective, to be featured in the dailies, on radio, on television," see Tornabuoni, "Migliaia di persone, in piedi, hanno gridato la loro ostilità al leader radicale," *Stampa Sera* (Turin), 2 Apr. 1979.

Pannella's heresies also sparked a more dispassionate debate among Socialist intellectuals. For the most part, there was agreement on the timeliness of a reexamination of antifascism and of the myths of the Resistance, and more generally the ideological foundations of the republic. The relationship between violence and justice was also the subject of some discussion. Pannella had seemed to suggest that the resort to violence was unjustified in any circumstance. Norberto Bobbio, one of a handful of Italian thinkers interested in the relationship between peace, war and justice, concurred with his call for a reflection on violence. Drawing on Karl Popper, he agreed that violence always produces greater violence. But he also highlighted the necessity to distinguish historical from political judgment and the importance of not condemning the protagonists of a different era by contemporary parameters. A ruthless act of terrorism such as the bombing at Via Rasella may have been necessary in context, and yet was regrettable.[88] Bobbio concluded by wishing for the advent of the sort of world conjured by the Radicals, where punishment might be meted out with mercy and in accordance with the rule of law everywhere. On the same issue, another commentator criticized the prescriptive dimensions of Radical stances. He noted that a nonviolent approach to the problem of justice was problematic; by way of hypothesis, he noted that had Mahatma Gandhi faced the Nazis rather than the British civil service, his nonviolence would have surely failed.[89]

---

[88] Norberto Bobbio, "A quando, la libertà dagli 'spietati doveri'?" *Quaderni Radicali*, no. 7, reprinted in *Una 'inutile strage'?*, ed. Bandinelli and Vecellio, 68-69.

[89] Ernesto Galli della Loggia, "Pannella tra utopismo e ricerca della verità," *Quaderni Radicali*, no. 8/9, reprinted in Bandinelli and Vecellio, eds., *Una 'inutile strage'?* 82-5. Both the polemics on PCI antifascism and the Resistance preceded by several years the "anti-antifascist" ideological offensive on the PCI and the myths of the Resistance by Renzo De Felice in 1987, later formulated in his book *Rosso e Nero* (Milan: Baldini e Castoldo, 1995). While Michael Scott Christofferson does not discuss the Radical anti-antifascist offensive of the seventies, dating such polemics rather to the later eighties and the decline of PCI ideology, their political context confirms his thesis that concepts such as antitotalitarianism or what is termed here anti-antifascism were primarily the product of domestic politics, not the product of a separate intellectual sphere or external influences. See his *French Intellectuals Against the Left*, 14-6.

Communist attacks on the Radicals grew in intensity as the June elections approached. The Turin section of the PCI divulged the allegation that Pannella had run on the electoral list of a right-wing movement a decade earlier.[90] The accusation set off a libel suit by Pannella, mirroring ones directed at him on account of his statements on Via Rasella.[91] Diatribe invariably informed the Communist responses to the Radical challenge; the party cast the Radical phenomenon as a symptom of an ongoing political degeneration. The latter was supposedly rooted in a resurgence of right-wing Italian political culture associated to an alarming convergence with American-style politics. For Paolo Spriano, the prolific and capable historian of the PCI, the seventies permutation of Italian Radicalism constituted a dangerous and desperate new form of *qualunquismo*.[92] The Radicals, he claimed, intended to exploit contemporary disillusionment and crisis for electoral gain: "it is symptomatic that [the Radical Party] has already felt the need to warn voters that the current electoral confrontation […] is merely theater, a sham, intended to simply deceive naïve supporters. In fact […] doesn't it claim that the last three decades in their entirety have witnessed merely the collaborative pillaging of power by DC and PCI?"[93] Others followed a line of attack often reserved for Craxi: the accusation of being too

---

[90] "Accuse e contraccuse. Radicali contestano volantino comunista," *Stampa Sera* (Turin), 18 May 1979.

[91] "Chi ha detto il falso? Oggi il pretore decide. 'Il pci dimostri che Pannella è stato in lista con Pacciardi.' Il giudice ha invitato i legali dei comunisti a provare il presunto rapporto tra il leader radicale e il movimento di destra 'Nuova Repubblica'," *La Stampa* (Turin), 29 May 1979; "Tra i radicali e il pci battaglia di querele," *La Stampa* (Turin), 29 May 1979; "La 'guerra' Pannella-Berlinguer," *Stampa Sera* (Turin), 29 May 1979; "L'epilogo della causa per il volantino diffamatorio. I radicali chiederanno al pci 500 milioni di risarcimento. Nella motivazione dell'ordinanza, si osserva che Pannella aveva diritto a dolersi di essere 'messo sottobraccio a Borghese," *La Stampa* (Turin), 1 June 1979.

[92] A term derived from the forties antisystem party, *Fronte dell'uomo qualunque*, or Front of the Ordinary Man. See also Arturo Gismondi, "Aperta da Giannini la polemica di Pannella," Paese Sera (Rome), 7 May 1979, reprinted in *Il pugno o la rosa*, ed. Vecellio, 522-4.

[93] Paolo Spriano, "Il nuovo qualunquismo," *L'Unità* (Rome), 3 May 1979.

"American," a dubious qualification on the left.[94] The editor of *Rinascita*, the theoretical PCI journal, likened Pannella to a US politician who makes able use of mass-media, and in particular television. In a comment which now reads as a truism but was then a form of anathema, he reported that: "[he acts so] because he is convinced that it is here that people's opinion is formed and that being at the center of attention is most important." Elaborating on Berlinguer's characterization in the PCI congress of Pannella as a court jester, the pundit concluded that he is a "symptomatic personage of a period of deep democratic crisis […] and the potential protagonist of its further deterioration."[95] Taking the analogy further, another commentator compared Pannella to a former socialist also known for his histrionics: Benito Mussolini.[96] The centrist press, on the other hand, noted that a virulent, "disproportionate" PCI reaction to Radical challenges pointed to newfound electoral insecurity.[97]

Still, the defection of a few leftist intellectuals and politicians to Radical ranks, including one PCI Chamber deputy, provoked little concern and much scorn. The PCI still held a solid lead in the allegiances of intellectuals, justifying complacency in this regard.[98] The most prominent intellectual to join the Radicals was the Sicilian writer Leonardo Sciascia, a former

---

[94] For the discussion of a similar attack on Craxi and the PSI, see Colarizi and Gervasoni, *La cruna dell'ago*, 96-7.

[95] Paolo Franchi, "Marco Pannella, un simbolo della crisi della nostra democrazia. Un radicale all'americana," *Paese Sera* (Rome), 6 Apr. 1979, reprinted in *Il pugno o la rosa*, ed. Vecellio, , 512-4.

[96] Aniello Coppola, "L'imbevibile cocktail radicale," *Rinascita*, 4 May 1979, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=46673&lang=IT&cms=.

[97] Tornabuoni, "Migliaia di persone, in piedi, hanno gridato la loro ostilità al leader radicale," *Stampa Sera*, 2 Apr. 1979.

[98] "Anche un deputato del Pci passa al Partito radicale," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 25 Apr. 1979; Lucio Lombardo Radice, "Se si perde anche la speranza," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 29 May 1979; Nello Ajello, *Il lungo addio. Intellettuali e PCI dal 1958 al 1991* (Bari: Laterza, 1997), 197-201. Alessandro Tessari, former PCI deputy from Treviso, ran as Radical candidate and was elected deputy to the Chamber. One PCI response was to dismiss the event by sarcastically depicting the Radical Party as the party of "discards" and Pannella as a garbage collector. See Fortebraccio, "Nel partito degli scarti," *L'Unità* (Rome), 10 May 1979.

PCI member elected Palermo city councilor in 1975.[99] After 1976, Sciascia had become a harsh critic of the historic compromise and in particular of the refusal to negotiate to save Moro's life. In a controversial book on his kidnapping and murder, Sciascia criticized the DC but reserved his harshest words for PCI intransigence.[100] During the 1979 electoral campaign, Pannella succeeded in convincing him to run as an independent on the Radical ticket, following Sciascia's rejection of a Socialist offer. In a public exchange with his friend and longtime Communist, the well known painter Renato Guttuso, Sciascia defended his decision by pointing out that Communists did not hold a monopoly on truth: "[…] this is the real underlying and unfortunate reason […] for your letter of last Saturday: you think of yourself as living in the truth and perceive me, your friend, as being distant from it."[101] Interviewed in Palermo on the occasion of a campaign stop of Pannella, Sciascia declared that "[…] the problem is that the PCI might end up crowding out any residual libertarian space."[102]

---

[99] Lanfranco Palazzolo, ed., *Leonardo Sciascia deputato radicale, 1979-1983* (Milan: Kaos, 2004), 12, note 8.

[100] Leonardo Sciascia, *L'affaire Moro* (Paris: Bernard Grasset, 1978); Ajello, *Il lungo addio,* 182-3.

[101] Leonardo Sciascia, "Caro Guttuso, amico inquisitore…" *La Repubblica* (Rome), 8 May 1979, reprinted in *Il pugno o la rosa*, ed. Vecellio, 537; for Guttuso's letter, see Renato Guttuso, "Caro Sciascia, perchè con Pannella?" *La Repubblica* (Rome), reprinted in *Il pugno o la rosa*, ed. Vecellio, 533-5. Sciascia would be elected deputy to both the Italian Chamber in the elections of June 3-4 and to the European Parliament on June 10. After a single appearance during the inaugural session of the European Parliament on 17 July 1979, he resigned to dedicate himself in the Italian Chamber to the chief reason that had drawn him into politics: namely, the Moro affair and the fight against mafia and terrorism. He served on parliamentary Moro Commission investigating the statesman's murder, presenting a minority report on 22 June 1982. By 1982 he rarely attended Chamber sessions and drifted away from the Radical Party, growing closer to the Socialists as did a number of other disgruntled Radicals at a time of internecine fighting which led to a mini-scission at the Radical Party congress of October 1982. Sciascia soon left politics altogether. He had always expressed skepticism towards political parties and the political process, a position that doubtless had initially helped bring him closer to Pannella. See Lanfranco Palazzolo, introduction to *Leonardo Sciascia* ed. Palazzolo, 9-16.

[102] Francesco Santini, "Una folla di cinquemila persone l'ha applaudito in piazza. Pannella, dialogo in Sicilia. Dice Sciascia: 'Lo costringono a presentarsi con violenza, lui è un non violento. Bufalini (pci): 'Prenderà voti, specie tra i giovani. Il pericolo è che in venti blocchino il Parlamento.' Il leader radicale: 'Ecco il diverso, il drago: ma facciamo politica.'," *La Stampa* (Turin), 16 May 1979.

The issue of liberty was evidently an electoral hot button, echoing debates in the arena of intellectual politics. A major theme of the PCI congress was the relationship between socialism, freedom and democracy.[103] In late May, *l'Unità*, the official daily of the PCI, published an appeal signed by prominent jurists urging a Communist vote to safeguard civil rights from the onslaught of terrorism, but also from the clutches of "[…] the Christian-Democratic system of power based on the arrogant domination of a party over the state."[104] Such libertarian and antisystem accents were symptomatic of the return of the PCI to a more purely oppositional role, even as it tacitly clung to its strategy of seeking a deal with the DC.

If to outside observers the Italian elections appeared inscrutable or alternatively of scarce interest, to the Socialists, Radicals or a reorganized new left they constituted a test of their ambitions to challenge the PCI. The fragmented nature of the non-Communist left however presented a challenge. Early in the electoral campaign, the Radicals reached out to new left groups and to Socialists, proposing to forge a common front. In her speech given at the Radical congress, Luciana Castellina, leader of the recently constituted new left Party of Proletarian Unity (PdUP), expressed her openess to collaboration, which she qualified however by adding that "[…] unity is indispensable; to reach it, more than denouncing the line of the PCI or PSI, one must work to transform it."[105] PdUP had emerged from the union of elements of Proletarian Democracy (DP) and of the new left movement and daily *il manifesto*. It had as a political goal the unity of the left, but unlike the Radicals was Marxist and tended to limit its critique of the PCI to a condemnation of the historic compromise. Castellina's allegation of an intractable

[103] "Il rapporto di Berlinguer al XV Congresso del PCI," *l'Unità* (Rome), 31 Mar. 1979.

[104] "Appello di giuristi: un voto al PCI come garanzia di sviluppo dei diritti civili," *l'Unità* (Rome), 27 May 1979.

[105] Fedi, "In vista delle quasi certe elezioni anticipate in giugno, " *La Stampa,* 31 Mar. 1979.

Radical antagonism towards the other parties of the left, despite talk of unity, appeared on target, in light of Pannella's final congressional allocution. During the delivery of the latter, after denouncing the DC and PCI, Pannella regretted that "Craxi feels the need for continuous meetings with [other] political forces but never listens to us Radicals. It begs the question whether he is or not a genuine libertarian [socialist.]"[106] Despite the apparent interest of elements of the PSI, no electoral accord emerged between the Socialists and the Radicals, whether on acccount of Socialist indifference or of Radical suspicions of a likely PSI-DC accord; nor did one emerge between the Radicals and PdUP.[107]

In contrast with the failure to forge Radical-Socialist coalition, some representatives of the new left joined the Radicals. The heterogeneous nature of their political proposals, which included as customary an ambitious referendum program, facilitated confluence on issues of common interest.[108] Most consequential was the rallying to Radical lists of Mimmo Pinto of DP and Marco Boato of the dissolved new left party *Lotta Continua*; both would be elected deputies as independent candidates. Along with the adhesion of Socialist Aldo Ajello or Communist Alessandro Tessari, Pinto and Boato's presences lent some credence to the Radical intent to

[106] Giuseppe Fedi, "Lungo e applaudito discorso del leader radicale al Congresso di Roma. Pannella attacca Berlinguer e Craxi 'Chi votava per loro voterà per noi.' I delegati si sono recati davanti a Palazzo Madama per consegnare una petizione sugli stanziamenti per la fame nel mondo – Landolfi: 'Il psi è favorevole a presentare liste comuni'," *La Stampa* (Turin), 1 Apr. 1979.

[107] Vanna Barenghi, "I socialisti hanno accettato di allearsi con i radicali," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 1-2 Apr. 1979; Colarizi, *Storia dei partiti nell'Italia repubblicana*, 525.

[108] Giuseppe Fedi, "Aperto a Roma il congresso. Quali alleanze per i radicali? Ripetuto l'invito per 'accordi tecnici che consentano di non disperdere voti' nelle elezioni," *La Stampa* (Turin), 30 Mar. 1979; Giorgio Galli, "A che serve votare radicale," *Panorama*, 15 May 1979, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=46694&lang=IT&cms=.

create a catch-all or "omnibus" party.[109] Also reiterated was the longstanding Radical policy of encouraging double party memberships, a practice discouraged or forbidden by other parties. On the eve of the election, certain polls attributed to the Radicals projections of outcomes of over five percent of the vote, in which case, party members mused, their strategy would be to recast the Radical Party as a "true socialist party" capable of displacing the Socialists and challenging the Communists. Such optimistic projections were tempered by other polls forecasting an outcome below four percent. Among the Socialists, some feared their party's electoral erosion at the hands of the Radicals; others hoped to breach the psychologically important ceiling of ten percent.[110]

The general elections of June 3 and 4 sanctioned an incontrovertible defeat of the PCI, which lost four percentage points relative to 1976, retreating to 34.4 percent. Even as the DC held at 38.3 percent and the PSI stagnated at 9.8 percent, the advance of the Radicals to 3.5 percent of the vote appeared to be an achievement, albeit one short of Pannella's hopes.[111] A Radical analysis of the vote attributed gains to a shift in PCI and MSI-DN voter allegiance.[112] One observer noted two salient political outcomes: Radical advance and Communist retreat.[113] Eighteen Radical deputies were elected to the Chamber; two to the Senate. In the first direct

[109] "La mozione generale approvata dal XXI congresso (straordinario) del Pr (Roma, 29, 30, 31 marzo, 1 e 2 aprile 1979," party motion, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=46628&lang=IT&cms=.

[110] "Pannella cerca voti nell'area socialista. Craxi sicuro di evitare il 'pugno' radicale," *Stampa Sera* (Turin), 17 May 1979.

[111] For a detailed analysis and breakdown of the vote, see Pietro Ignazi, "Una analisi del voto radicale," and Laura Ceccolini, "Dossier risultati, voti, seggi, preferenze alle elezioni Camera, Senato, Europee," *Argomenti radicali*, Apr.-Sept. 1979, 129-92.

[112] At least one historian concurs that most of the lost PCI vote went to the Radicals. Aurelio Lepre, *Storia della prima Repubblica: L'Italia dal 1943 al 2003* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2004), 295.

[113] Aldo Rizzo, "E adesso che fanni i radicali?" *La Stampa* (Turin), 24 June 1979.

elections to the EEC Parliament in Strasbourg held on June 10, three Radicals were elected deputies.[114]

The relative Radical success could be interpreted as announcing future trends on the Italian left, given voter dissatisfaction with PCI strategy and apparent voter indifference to the autonomist turn of the Socialists. But, noted one journalist, the Radical phenomenon might also be a mere manifestation of voter disillusionment with politics. The most significant characteristic of the consultation had been voter fatigue: one million fewer voters showed up compared to 1976; another million cast null ballots.[115] PCI losses alarmed the party's leadership because they seemed to announce a reversal of the confluence of "bourgeois" votes that had benefited the PCI over the past decade. On the Socialist front, the outcome cast into serious doubt Craxi's leadership, relaunching Signorelli, the leader of the party's left wing favorable to collaboration with the PCI and the constitution of a left alternative to DC power. Although a personal success for Castellina, the 1.4 percent of PdUP confirmed the difficulties of the new left to assert itself as a vital force to the left of the PCI.[116] The three small lay parties (Social-Democrats, Republicans and Liberals) recouped losses experienced during the previous legislation, spelling the attenuation of the bipolarism which had characterized the previous general election.

---

[114] Luca Giurato, "Per l'Europa ha votato l'85,9 percento degli italiani: primato fra i nove Paesi. Aumentano liberali socialisti. Un nuovo calo del pci e della dc. Anche radicali e social-democratici hanno migliorato le posizioni rispetto alle politiche di una settimana fa – Lieve flessione del pri- Per il parlamento di Strasburgo i socialisti saranno i più numerosi, nonostante le sconfitte in Germania, Inghilterra e Danimarca," *Stampa Sera* (Turin), 11 June 1979.

[115] "Le ipotesi: 'unità nazionale, centro sinistra, quadripartito dc-laici.' E adesso tocca ai partiti. Una lezione," *Stampa Sera* (Turin), 5 June 1979.

[116] During the next 1983 general elections, PdUP would ally itself with the PCI; in late 1984, it folded itself back into the PCI. See "La relazione di Angius sulla confluenza del PdUP," *l'Unità* (Rome), 1 Dec. 1984.

As parties pondered their role in the uncertain post-electoral political climate, an observer, mindful of Radicals' propensities for antisystem stances, reflected on their options: if the Radical Party applies its "force in a certain way, paralysis of Parliament and the definitive blockage of the system might ensue. But if it employs it in another manner, it could furnish a serious contribution to a new articulation of the lay, liberal-socialist area, exerting a potentially important influence on the PCI itself." In part, continued the journalist, the direction chosen would depend on the outcome of a tacit quarrel between two veteran party leaders. On one side, was the predominant Pannella, who "dreams of 'disemboweling' the Socialist Party, of reassembling the non-Communist left into a new, great Action Party, a hegemonic party [of the left]." On the other side, continued the commentator, was Massimo Teodori, who though denying any internecine rift, held a higher opinion of the Socialist leadership, was less "megalomaniac," and more open to political compromise on specific projects. A foreign political context, clarified the journalist, was essential to an understanding of Radical ambitions. The latter were "inspired explicitly by the French example, namely the recasting of a socialist force by Mitterrand, a leader who was, not coincidentally, of radical extraction […]". But intransigence on the question of possible Socialist collaboration with the DC constituted a serious obstacle, given the impossibility of achieving an oppositional coalition of over fifty percent of the vote: "if the design of the recomposing of the left is pursued coherently, it is possible that this initial intransigence will fade. If so, the Radical enigma will resolve itself positively for the blocked Italian political system. Otherwise, it will constitute yet another and possibly decisive contribution to generalized confusion."[117]

[117] Rizzo, "E adesso che fanno i radicali?" *La Stampa* (Turin), 24 June 1979.

While the Radical phenomenon invited pundits'speculation, the task of forging a governing coalition fell to the traditional parties. Despite the PSI's mediocre performance, PCI electoral decline placed it in the position of arbiter. On their side, the Communists continued to seek out the DC, regarded as the sole realistic antechamber to power. Forming an oppositional left alternative alongside the PSI had now become an even more remote possibility on arithmetic terms, leaving aside other considerations. After the elections, Berlinguer confirmed his repudiation of social-democratic currents within the party championed by Napolitano, precluding a convergence with Socialist autonomism and revisionism.[118] He flippantly dismissed the evolution sought by Bobbio and accused Craxi of Americanizing Italian politics.[119] Seeking to capitalize on Craxi's difficulties, Communists reached out to the PSI left for support for a new deal with the DC. Craxi, however, soon recovered lost terrain when requested within weeks of the elections by President Pertini to form a coalition government. Although he had to abandon the attempt after three weeks of wrestling with the joint opposition of PCI and DC, the assignation restored his status. Pertini now turned to a Christian-Democrat; by August, a DC-led coalition government had emerged under the premiership of Francesco Cossiga. Though it included two Socialist ministers in key positions, it was a caretaker solution, pending a more definitive political settlement.[120] As summer of 1979 waned, Italy's political landscape remained as uncertain as it had been before the elections.

[118] Giorgio Napolitano, *Dal Pci al socialismo europeo: Un'autobiografia politica* (Rome-Bari: Laterza, 2006), 161-5.

[119] Colarizi, *La cruna dell'ago*, 97-8.

[120] "Ignorando i problemi del paese. Governo varato: e già parlano del dopo-Cossiga. DC, PSDI, e PRI all'opera per preparare i 'nuovi equilibri' – Un articolo di Pietro Longo," *l'Unità* (Rome), 14 Aug. 1979.

PCI electoral decline, while stiffening Berlinguer's resolve to secure his party's identity and electoral base, also produced a degree of introspection among intellectuals. In July *Rinascita* dedicated an entire section to what was defined as "the radicalism of the 1970s."[121] Etchings by Maurits Cornelis Esher illustrated the articles, visually conjuring the Italian political labyrinth, but also, as novelist and intellectual Umberto Eco noted, Communist disorientation.[122] In his introductory piece, a commentator opined that the Radical Party was an epiphenomenon of a broad societal transformation in act since 1968. Other political manifestations of the crisis of "late-capitalist" society included the new left movements. Socially, he maintained, the crisis produced "new forms of antagonism" between "the governed and those who govern, between man and woman, young and old, between untrammeled growth […] and the preservation of the natural biological equilibrium. But also [present] within the fundamental conflict between capital and salaried workers is […] a new form of antagonism between demands for leisure and the need to work." The Radical Party itself would be unlikely to provide a response to new societal needs. Just like other manifestations of radicalism, it had taken an unusual form in Italy due to the hegemony on the left of a strong workers' movement ensconced in a blocked political system. Alongside "humanistic, nonviolent, technocratic" aspects which it shared with other European radical political traditions, the Radical Party displayed factionalism and anti-institutional attitudes common to "leftist extremism." The Italian Radicals, argued the commentator, combined deep antagonism with the inability to "express politically the will for another order." Concluding with a metaphor, the Communist intellectual declared: "the owl of

[121] "Il radicalismo degli anni settanta," *Il Contemporaneo*, supplement of *Rinascita*, 20 July 1979, 11-28.

[122] Umberto Eco, "Anche Pannella è un compagno, però…" *L'Espresso*, 5 Aug. 1979, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=46792&lang=IT&cms=.

Minerva […] has anticipated a new day and glimpsed ideas, expectations, representations of the world [but has however] not yet produced a social and institutional vision."[123]

The PCI allegation of the lack of a Radical political program complemented the characterization of Radicals as mere antipolitical force.[124] Both Communists and Socialists often criticized Pannella and his cohort for not articulating an approach to address the nation's crisis. Radicals sought to rebut such charges by claiming that other parties made promises they could not maintain and that their party, to the contrary, was focused on single, attainable objectives which mattered to citizens.[125] Radical reliance on referenda, countered Communists, had severe limitations. "The referendum cannot become the core of a different type of democracy", because it is not enough to ask voters to approve or reject the abrogation of an existing law—the referendum "abolishes something in existence […] it does not construct anything" and cannot constitute the heart of a political vision or program. The reality, continued a Communist critic, was that the Radical referendum strategy aimed to "break the left […] The common thread, after June 20 [1976] has been the critique of the 'privileged DC-PCI relationship', the 'regime', etc. The aim has been to weaken the rapport of the PCI with the masses […] [But] it seems impossible for me to discern a Radical project [addressing] the morass of contradictions of mature capitalism." "Not only because there is refusal of a program. But also because I do not

[123] Massimo Boffa, "Nota introduttiva," in "Il radicalismo degli anni settanta," *Rinascita*, 20 July 1979.

[124] Aniello Coppola, "Un partito contro i partiti," in "Il radicalismo degli anni settanta," *Rinascita*, 20 July 1979.

[125] Giuseppe Fedi, "In vista delle quasi certe elezioni anticipate in giugno. I radicali vogliono collaborare con la 'Nuova sinistra' e il psi. Secondo il pr la prossima legislatura può sancire due strade: quella della svolta costituzionale o quella dell'alternativa – Protesta di Pannella nella sede del 'Gr2' – L'intervento di Spadaccia," *La Stampa* (Turin), 31 Mar. 1979.

see an 'alternative' to the transformational project of the workers' movement," concluded Natta, referring to his party's own approach to the crisis of capitalism, the Third Way.[126]

Teodori, the Radical Party's leading theoretician, organized a response to *Rinascita*'s articles that included commentary by Communists and Socialists. In one article, the Radical Angiolo Bandinelli, asked to define the differences between Radicals and Communists, pointed to the role of the state, implying that Communists tend to rely on it to resolve societal problems. In contrast, Bandinelli argued, Radical politics were founded on the promotion of individual rights.[127] Bandinelli argued that the current global crisis had impaired the capacity of the state or of institutions such as unions to operate effectively. Hence the need to find other policy instruments. But by concluding that the Radical Party remained to date "a mysterious object," Bandinelli unwittingly raised doubts on the capacity of Radicals to address contemporary challenges.[128] Massimo Cacciari, an independently-minded Communist, agreed with Bandinelli's assertion of the need to place contemporary politics in the context of the end of the postwar boom and of the crisis of Keynesianism. But he also reiterated the need of redefining a governmental policy to address the fiscal crisis of the Italian state, one linked to both massive tax evasion and the energy question—it would not do, he warned, to present a laundry list of issues with little evident connection between them, as did the Radicals. Only were the left able to come

[126] Alessandro Natta and Fabio Mussi, "La sinistra italiana e l'unilaterita' Radicale. Intervista a Alessandro Natta," in "Il radicalismo degli anni settanta," *Rinascita,* 20 July 1979.

[127] A point also made by Angelo Panebianco, "Il conflitto fra il cittadino e lo stato," in "Il radicalismo degli anni settanta," *Rinascita,* 20 July 1979.

[128] Angiolo Bandinelli, "Il confronto si fa in politica," *Argomenti radicali,* Apr./Sept. 1979, 20-7.

up with an effective approach to governance (*cultura di governo*) would leftist unity and the attainment of power be conceivable.[129]

In another response to the debate sparked by *Rinascita*, Radical Lorenzo Strik Lievers introduced his argument by conceding an ambiguity in Radical positions. Radicals had historically championed the unity of the left against the DC, but also frequently espoused causes which led to more conflict with the left or echoed Catholic humanitarian sensibility, as witness the new campaign against world famine. Seeking to resolve such contradictions, Strik Lievers affirmed that Radical politics were chiefly characterized by the challenge to power structures; his was a frank admission of the oppositional and protest nature of the Radical program. Significantly, without genuinely addressing the question of a Radical lack of a governance culture, Strik Lievers pointed to the party's new humanitarian internationalism as a promising area of activity. He concluded by referencing with a touch of sycophancy the campaign against world famine: "With extraordinary conviction, Pannella's initiative forces us […] to face in real terms the issue of the relationship between the global North and South; a problem which the left, not only in Italy, has always commented with more or less brilliant analyses, producing however few concrete policies [...]"[130]

[129] Massimo Cacciari, "Crisi politica, alternative e progetto, cultura di governo," *Argomenti radicali*, Apr./Sept. 1979, 27-34; for a similar, earlier criticism of the Radical referendum approach to policymaking, see Flavio Colonna, "I nostro dissenso sugli otto referendum," *l'Unità* (Rome), 6 May 1977, reprinted in *Il pugno o la rosa*, ed. Vecellio, 365-7.

[130] Lorenzo Strik Lievers, "I Radicali e una 'cultura di governo' della sinistra," *Argomenti radicali*,Apr./Sept. 1979, 47-57.

After the elections, the Radicals met to hammer out a plan for the new internationalist which would complement the referendum program.[131] Also over the summer, Radical deputies called for extraordinary joint sessions of Parliament. The initiative included an effort to prod the Italian government to raise the issue of famine in international fora. The latter included an upcoming conference of the UN World Council on Nutrition to be held in Ottawa on 6 September, a UN General Assembly scheduled a fortnight later, and upcoming European parliamentary sessions in Strasbourg. As a consequence of Radical pressures, a higher level of Italian representation than originally planned attended the Ottawa UN conference. The Italian government also acceded to the Radical request to attend the same meeting as an Italian delegation representing a political party. With support from PSI and DC parliamentarians, Radicals also obtained that a special session of the Senate convene on September 17 to discuss the question of world famine. While the quorum necessary to convoke a special session in the Chamber was not attained, the issue was placed on the agenda for later deliberation.[132]

At Ottawa, speaking before conference attendants, Pannella criticized the medium to long term approach habitually applied to the problem of world starvation and demanded the launch of immediate interventions to prevent millions of deaths; he denounced that on the verge of yet another UN-proclaimed "decade of development" famine continued to threaten millions annually and reiterated his comparison between an ongoing holocaust and the one perpetrated by Nazis.[133]

---

[131] "Sterminio per fame (seminario del gruppo parlamentare radicale)," 16 Aug. 1979, audioclip, OARR, http://www.radioradicale.it/scheda/622/623-sterminio-per-fame.

[132] "Fame: richiesta di convocazione straordinaria del Parlamento," 30 Aug. 1979, audioclip, OARR, http://www.radioradicale.it/scheda/648/649-fame-richiesta-di-convocazione-straordinaria-del-parlamento.

[133] Marco Pannella, "Intervento al Consiglio mondiale per l'alimentazione dell'Onu," 6 Sept. 1979, OARR, http://www.radioradicale.it/scheda/433/434-intervento-al-consiglio-mondiale-per-lalimentazione-dellonu; Marco Pannella, "Consiglio mondiale dell'alimentazione," 6 Sept. 1979, audioclip, OARR,

Upon their return to Italy, Radicals took credit for commitments taken by the Italian governmental representative at Ottawa to increase the national annual foreign aid allocation as well as a commitment to allocate a supplementary contribution in 1979 on the occasion of the UN Year of the Child.[134]

During the special session on famine held by the Senate on 17 September 1979 and deliberations in the Chamber days later, representatives from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs outlined commitments made by the government at Ottawa. These included doubling in 1980 of Italian foreign aid and the attainment within three to four years of the average rate of aid provided by developed countries (0.33 percent of GDP).[135] During the parliamentary debates, Radicals faced criticism from Communists, who argued that Radical humanitarian internationalism derived from a Catholic matrix and entailed a demagogic manipulation of an issue which the PCI had long sought to address. A Communist senator called for an end to the current global "ancien regime" dominated by the "capitalistic great powers" and "great multinationals." PCI domestic proposals of austerity, he suggested, were part and parcel of a necessary North-South redistribution of wealth.[136] In contrast to Communist calls for structural change, speaking before a Senate depleted by the absence of most of the original DC or PSI

---

http://www.radioradicale.it/scheda/7229/7246-consiglio-mondiale-dellalimentazione; Anna Maria Macciocchi, "Conclusioni del Consiglio mondiale per l'alimentazione dell'Onu," 8 Sept. 1979, audioclip, OARR, http://www.radioradicale.it/scheda/444/445-conclusioni-del-consiglio-mondiale-per-lalimentazione-dellonu.

[134] Massimo Teodori, "Conclusioni del Consiglio mondiale per l'alimentazione dell'Onu," 20 Sept. 1979, audioclip, OARR, http://www.radioradicale.it/scheda/449/450-conclusioni-del-consiglio-mondiale-per-lalimentazione-dellonu.

[135] Adolfo Sarti, "Mozioni ed interpellanze sul problema della fame nel mondo (Discussione)," 19 Sept. 1979, *Atti Parlementari, Camera dei Deputati, VIII legislatura , Discussioni, Seduta del 19 settembre 1979, Resoconto stenografico*, 1573-80, http://legislature.camera.it/_dati/leg08/lavori/stenografici/sed0023/sed0023.pdf.

[136] "Scarsa presenza dei promotori nella seduta straordinaria. Fame nel mondo: voto unitario del Senato. La relazione di Malfatti e gli interventi – Procacci (PCI): bisogna cambiare il sistema delle relazioni economiche internazionali – Il governo invitato a incrementare i contributi al Sud del mondo," *l'Unità* (Rome), 18 Sept. 1979.

supporters of the Radical initiative, Radical Gianfranco Spadaccia demanded immediate action. He requested clarifications on why no governmental action had yet been taken to meet the standards of UN resolution no. 2626.[137] He urged the drafting of plans to forestall the "extermination" through famine of some "fifty million" annually, of which "seventeen million" were children. Radicals also asked that commitments made by the government at Ottawa be further articulated and substantiated.[138] The demise of millions was neither inevitable nor a fatality, he claimed, but rather a political fact necessitating a political solution. All human beings belong to an interconnected global community, he stated; the argument that Italians should tend to their own poverty problems was "superficial."[139]

In her Chamber peroration which followed, Emma Bonino emphasized the individuality of each one of the millions of victims of famine, denouncing as racism a sole focus on birth control in the Third World. In response to criticism of the Radical approach, she argued that the Radicals had also studied the structural causes underlying famine and how they might be addressed. She called for a renegotiation of the terms of the Lomé Convention between the EEC and APC, an association of some forty African, Caribbean and Asian developing countries. The Lomé Convention, she declared, continued to privilege colonialist patterns of extraction of primary goods from the South and export of finished products from the North. In agreement

[137] Alberto Rapisarda, "Soltanto ottanta (su 332) i parlamentari presenti in aula. Fame nel mondo: dibattito in un Senato quasi deserto. La convocazione era stata chiesta da 109 parlamentari: oltre la metà erano assenti. Votato un documento che sollecita il governo a intervenire in favore dei Paesi poveri," *La Stampa* (Turin), 18 Sept. 1979.

[138] "La politica italiana di fronte al problema della fame nel mondo," 17 Sept. 1979, audioclip, OARR, http://www.radioradicale.it/scheda/1391/1402-la-politica-italiana-di-fronte-ai-problemi-della-fame-nel-mondo; Gianfranco Spadaccia, "La politica italiana di fronte ai problemi della fame nel mondo," 17 Sept.1979, *Senato della Repubblica, VIII legislatura, 19a seduta pubblica, Resoconto stenografico, Lunedì 17 settembre 1979*, 924-5, 932-6, http://www.senato.it/service/PDF/PDFServer/BGT/332348.pdf.

[139] Spadaccia, "La politica italiana di fronte della fame nel mondo," 17 Sept. 1979, *Senato della Repubblica, VIII legislatura, 19a seduta pubblica, Resoconto stenografico, Lunedì 17 settembre 1979*, 935-6.

with the PCI, she pointed to the use of food as a "nutritional weapon," as illustrated by the American manipulation of wheat prices.[140] As evidence of the impact of such policies, Bonino pointed to the steep decline of food production since World War II in Third World countries.[141] But the insistence to spar with the PCI on an internationalist issue harboring potential points of agreement was evident elsewhere. Radical deputy Franco Roccella drew a link between the call for immediate action on famine and Radical support for unilateral disarmament. The arms control process linked to détente has solely produced "controlled rearmament," he stated, for which the countries of "real existing socialism" were primarily responsible; in a similar fashion, foreign aid has merely masked the continued pauperization of the Global South. Military force might be redirected for humanitarian intervention in needy countries; it need not constitute a neocolonialist interference, affirmed Roccella, countering an habitual objection to intervention of the Marxist left. Addressing directly a Communist deputy, Roccella stated that "it might be objected that there are countries which refuse the presence of other armies. Our answer is that an independentist stance, which mobilizes before a flag but remains passive before a massacre by

[140] "Scarsa presenza dei promotori nella seduta straordinaria […]" *l'Unità* (Rome), 18 Sept. 1979.

[141] Emma Bonino, "Mozioni e interpellanze sul problema della fame nel mondo (Discussione)," 19 Sept. 1979, *Atti Parlamentari, Camera dei Deputati, VIII legislatura, Discussioni, Seduta del 19 settembre 1979, Resoconto stenografico*, 1580-90, http://legislature.camera.it/_dati/leg08/lavori/stenografici/sed0023/sed0023.pdf. Bonino made similar comments on birth control in her pronouncements one month later at the European Parliament, rejecting comments to that effect by another deputy, see Emma Bonino, 25 Oct. 1979, "Lotta contro la fame nel mondo," European Parliament, Strasbourg, audioclip no. 3, OARR, http://www.radioradicale.it/scheda/8140/8157-lotta-contro-la-fame-nel-mondo. The Lomé convention had come into force in 1976; renegotiations were ongoing. In 1976, a contemporary scholarly appraisal had noted the psychological and political breakthrough of the EEC convention with APC, but also its limits in terms of veritable real of wealth between the global North and South. See Isebill V. Gruhn, "The Lomé Convention: Inching Toward Interdependence," *International Organization*, no. 2 (spring 1976): 240–62.

famine at home, is a nefarious manifestation of nationalism […] and a symptom of the complicity of the political classes of certain Third World countries."[142]

Upon the conclusion of the Senate debate, the Radicals withdrew their maximalist resolutions and adopted that proposed by the majority. Spadaccia noted that the approved resolution expressed only general support for a gradual governmental increase in aid and did not address the issue of the North's protectionism at the root of Third World poverty. Still, he continued, it was nevertheless acceptable due to the promise of supplementary foreign aid funds.[143] Radical compromise reflected the objective to build consensus on an issue which was evidently not a major policy priority for the absenteist deputies of the governing parties.

Radical-PCI polemics on the respective merits of their approaches to foreign aid illustrated a contraposition between two internationalist mindsets. On one side was the PCI's austere, anticapitalistic and anti-American vision of global palengenesis.[144] National liberation struggles, a fundamental restructuring of the world economy, and the proscription of "any sort of neocolonialist" intervention remained central to the PCI vision of a more equitable world order.[145] Radicals concurred on the responsibilities of the developed world for fomenting the poverty of the Global South. But unlike the Communists they held the industrialized and

---

[142] Franco Roccella, "Dichiarazioni del Governo, mozioni ed interpellanze sul problema della fame nel mondo (Seguito della discussione)," 20 Sept. 1979, *Atti Parlamentari, Camera dei Deputati, VIII legislatura, Discussioni, Seduta del 20 settembre 1979, Resoconto stenografico,* 1713-9, http://legislature.camera.it/_dati/leg08/lavori/stenografici/sed0024/sed0024.pdf.

[143] Gianfranco Spadaccia, "La politica italiana di fronte ai problemi della fame nel mondo," 17 Sept. 1979, *Senato della Repubblica, VIII legislatura, 19a seduta pubblica, Resoconto stenografico, lunedì 17 settembre 1979*, 965-6.

[144] On Berlinguer's view of modernity as decadence, see Paul Ginsborg, *Italy and Its Discontents: Family, Civil Society, State: 1980-2001* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 158.

[145] "Oggi si conclude il dibattito alla Camera. Il PCI chiede aiuti più massicci per i paesi che soffrono la fame. Gli interventi dei compagni Rubbi e Alinovi – Non basta l'assistenzionalismo – Anche a Montecitorio assenti molti fra i promotori della convocazione straordinaria," *l'Unità* (Rome), 20 Sept. 1979.

socialist East equally responsible. Further, their critique of American foreign policy or of global capitalism was not primarily driven by an ideological or Marxist stance. The almost puritan Communist disdain for consumerism was absent. Rejecting national liberation wars, Radicals endorsed nonviolent humanitarian intervention and the potential infringement of what they considered the shibboleth of national sovereignty. Not least, Radical stances reflected the competitive and adversarial posture of a much smaller party harboring inordinate domestic ambitions.

Alongside the effort on famine, Radicals prepared for a new, far-reaching referendum campaign. The motion of the XXII[nd] congress of the Radical Party, held in November 1979, officially announced the launch of the initiative proposing ten popular consultations. The campaign would absorb the bulk of Radical energies until May 1981, even as in parallel legislation on famine continued to be sought. The motion also fostered the hope that national controversies tied to a looming parliamentary vote on the Euromissiles dual track decision would somehow boost the political profile of the Radical antimilitarism as well as the cause of attenuating world famine.[146]

Days before the parliamentary Euromissiles vote scheduled in December 1979, Radicals organized a debate on a local private television channel between a Communist, a Socialist and a Radical to discuss the looming security crisis and its implications. The PCI representative characterized his opposition to deployment as based on moral grounds as well as concern over

[146] "Mozione generale approvata dal XXII congresso del Pr. Genova, 31 ottobre, 1, 2, 3 e 4 novembre 1979," Oct./Nov. 1979, congressional motion, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=46860&lang=IT&cms=; Arrigo Levi, "Quali e quanti sono nelle mani di Urss e Nato. La mappa degli euromissili. Secondo l'Istituto di studi strategici, a fronteggiare i 2005 vettori nucleari dell'alleanza atlantica i sovietici ne schierano 5364 – Tra questi i nuovissimi SS-20 capaci di colpire con precisione obiettivi lontani 5 mila chilometri – Come l'Europa occidentale intende colmare il divario – Le forze aeree in campo," *La Stampa* (Turin), 17 Oct. 1979.

the waste of resources; Communists would demand in parliament a six-month suspension of any vote on the dual-track decision to allow further negotiations with the Soviets. He expressed pessimism regarding the outcome of the upcoming vote; the only factor that could alter outcomes was an awakening of public opinion similar to that in the Netherlands. After all, he concluded, pacifist sentiment predominated in Catholic, Communist, Socialist, and Radical ranks. Like his PCI counterpart, Roberto Cicciomessere expressed Radical opposition to the dual-track decision, but simultaneously disavowed the arms control process associated to détente and criticized the acceptance of NATO. Arms control, he argued, concealed a process of controlled rearmament; current allegations of an imbalance between NATO and Warsaw Pact nuclear weaponry were specious, because an accurate measurement of weaponry on either side of the Cold War divide remained elusive. Unilateral withdrawal from NATO, to the contrary, might destabilize and transform the Cold War system by provoking disarmament in the cash-strapped East.[147] On the Socialist versant, a member of that party's Central Committee rejected both Communist and Radical views and signaled Socialist support for Euromissiles deployment. It was unrealistic to consider unilateral withdrawal from NATO, because that would mean submission to the Warsaw Pact, he claimed. Reiterating the argument of a lack of balance occasioned by the Soviet SS-20s, he addressed Cicciomessere: "I wish the world were as you say," he stated, implying Radical naïvete, but the other side "has three guns and us two." Nor were PCI proposals for a six-month delay on the decision desirable, because once negotiations began it would be diplomatically too provocative to interrupt them with a decision to deploy. The Socialist concluded by likening his

[147] Radical antimilitarist proposals were similar to ones put forth by nonaligned pacifist movements elsewhere, notably Petra Kelly's West German Greens and their concept of a demilitarized "Europe of regions." See Paul Hockenos, *Joshka Fischer and the Making of the Berlin Republic: An Alternative History of Postwar Germany* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 188.

party's rationale to to that of Schmidt's SPD: the decision on the production of the Euromissiles would proceed, but deployment itself be only implemented in four years if negotiations with the Soviets failed.[148]

The Socialists' favorable vote on December 6 (Chamber) and December 10 (Senate) ensured Italian endorsement of the dual-track decision. As anticipated, the Radicals voted down the legislation alongside the new left and the Communists.[149] Craxi ably orchestrated his party's vote; his success had by no means been preordained, due to the lingering power of the party's left wing. PSI endorsement of the dual-track decision was the ultimate result of negotiations held over the course of the entire year. Such political and diplomatic wrangling involved President Pertini, Socialist party cadres, Chancellor Schmidt and US ambassador Gardner, among others, constituting an interesting case study of alliance politics which can only be referenced here.[150] Schmidt had demanded Italian support alongside West Germany for a rearmament policy which was highly controverted within the SPD. Italian participation would, he hoped, both strengthen the Western alliance and shore-up his own shaky political standing. For his part, Pertini helped ensure Italy's return to the club of Great Powers, meeting an age-old foreign policy objective eternally in question. Ambassador Gardner and his Washington patron, National Security Advisor Bzrezinski, enhanced one another's' standing in the US foreign policy

[148] Roberto Cicciomessere, Vittorio Origlia and Giuseppe Tamburrano, "L'installazione dei missili 'Pershing'," 3 Dec. 1979, Teleroma (TV) audioclip, OARR, http://www.radioradicale.it/scheda/392/393-linstallazione-dei-missili-pershing.

[149] "Un 'sì' pericoloso per la pace ma con divisioni e incertezze. Alla Camera la mozione sugli euromissili passa col voto determinante del PSI – Dissenso di esponenti socialisti – Il documento del PCI votato anche da indipendenti di sinistra, PDUP e PR," *l'Unità* (Rome), 7 Dec. 1979; "Il Senato accentua dubbi e riserve sull'accettazione degli 'euromissili.' Un sì tormentato – Bufalini: una decisione che ostacola la distensione – Il dc Granelli propone un'iniziativa diplomatica autonoma e immediata dell'Italia verso l'Unione Sovietica – Difficoltà nel PSI," *l'Unità* (Rome), 12 Dec. 1979.

[150] Gardner, *Mission Italy*, 225-48.

bureaucracy, staking positions predicated on anti-Sovietism and indiscriminate anticommunism. Finally, Craxi consolidated his hold over the fractious PSI, without as yet attaining full control.

After the Italian vote, NATO officially endorsed the dual-track decision on December 12, in a meeting, boasted *La Stampa*, characterized by Italy's "unhesitant" support for deployment alongside West Germany and Great Britain. Such determination, reported the daily, contrasted with the reservations expressed by the smaller countries of Belgium and Holland.[151] As for the PCI, its opposition to the dual-track decision had not called into question the party's fundamental subscription to the 1977 foreign policy consensus.[152] Nor did the effect on public opinion of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan that followed the NATO decision greatly damage the party's domestic standing. The Communists condemned the invasion and demanded Soviet withdrawal, even while catering to their base by dissenting with the governing parties on the question of retributive sanctions.[153]

[151] "A Bruxelles approvata l'adozione di 468 Cruise e 104 Pershing. Sì della Nato agli euromissili ma non c'è consenso unanime. Senza incertezze l'impegno di Germania, Gran Bretagna, Italia – L'Olanda ha chiesto che la decisione sia presa fra due anni, il Belgio condiziona l'adesione ai progressi delle trattative con Mosca . L'Alleanza ha annunciato il ritiro unilaterale di mille testate atomiche e l'avvio di negoziati con l'Urss," *La Stampa* (Turin), 13 Dec. 1979.

[152] In late Nov. 1979, the press had reported on a possible split of the foreign policy vote on the dual track decisions designed to avoid a rupture between the DC and PCI. A first resolution would affirm loyalty to NATO and receive PCI support; the latter's contrary vote would only involve a second resolution, that endorsing the dual track decision. See "I partiti si preparano al dibattito alla Camera del 4 dicembre. Forse due votazioni sugli euromissili per evitare fratture tra la dc e il pci. La prima, di fedeltà alla Nato, avrebbe l'appoggio dei comunisti – La seconda, sui missili, sarebbe approvata senza il loro voto – Le pensioni, nuovo scoglio per il governo," *La Stampa* (Turin), 27 Nov. 1979.

[153] Giuseppe Fedi, "Alla Camera unanime condanna dell'intervento sovietico. Tutti i partiti chiedono al governo iniziative in favore dell'Afghanistan. Il pci contrario all'ipotesi che l'Europa si associ alle misure di ritorsione control l'Urss – 'Altre invasioni non sono state altrettanto condannate," *La Stampa* (Turin), 10 Jan. 1980.

Meanwhile, Radicals tenaciously pursued their campaign against famine inside and oustide parliament through hunger strikes, demonstrations and press conferences.[154] But public and political attention was elsewhere. It was focused on the Euromissile decision and rising superpower tensions, which reached a new climax with the Soviet decision to invade Afghanistan.[155] At home, the challenge of erecting a more stable, multiparty coalition in lieu of Cossiga's caretaker government occupied most politically-minded Italians.

In early 1980, Radicals tried to put famine back on the policy agenda, but once again faced a deserted Parliament.[156] The following Easter, they sought to recapture momentum by organizing a procession to St. Peter's Square.[157] In parallel, Bonino called on the Italian government to conform to a winter 1979 Strasbourg Parliament's resolution prompted by Radical efforts, calling on all EEC states to voluntarily allocate at least 0.7 percent of GDP to foreign aid

[154] Marco Pannella and Franco Roccella, "Digiuno contro lo sterminio per fame," 19 Sept. 1979, press conference, audioclip, OARR, http://www.radioradicale.it/scheda/426/427-digiuno-contro-lo-sterminio-per-fame; Aldo Ajello and Emma Bonino, "Mozioni ed interpellanze concernente la fame nel mondo (Discussione)," 21 Dec. 1979, *Atti Parlamentari, Camera dei Deputati, VIII legislatura – Discussioni – Seduta del 21 dicembre 1979*, 6664-82, http://legislature.camera.it/_dati/leg08/lavori/stenografici/sed0086/sed0086.pdf; Marco Pannella and Emma Bonino, "La battaglia radicale contro lo sterminio per fame," 29 Dec. 1979, press conference, audioclip, OARR, http://www.radioradicale.it/scheda/358/359-la-battaglia-radicale-contro-lo-sterminio-per-fame.

[155] On the relationship between the NATO decision and the Soviet decision in Afghanistan, Vladislav M. Zubok, *A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev* (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 259-64.

[156] "Mozioni e interpellanze concernienti la fame nel mondo (seguito della discussione)," 3 January 1980, *Atti Parlamentari, Camera dei Deputati, VIII legislatura , Discussioni, Seduta antimeridiana del 3 gennaio 1980, Resoconto stenografico,* 6725-32, http://legislature.camera.it/_dati/leg08/lavori/stenografici/sed0087/sed0087.pdf; "Mozioni e interpellanze concernente la fame nel mondo (seguito della discussione)," 8 January 1980, *Atti Parlamentari, Camera dei Deputati, VIII legislatura, Discussioni, Seduta dell'8 gennaio 1980*, 7029-32, http://legislature.camera.it/_dati/leg08/lavori/stenografici/sed0092/sed0092.pdf.

[157] "Stamane marcia organizzata dai radicali da Porta Pia a San Pietro. Sfilano davanti ai 'palazzi del potere' per ricordare chi muore per fame nel mondo. Ci saranno il sindaco comunista di Roma, laici, cattolici e seguaci di 'Hare Krishna'," *La Stampa* (Turin), 6 Apr. 1980.

efforts.[158] In addition, the Radical demanded a supplementary contribution of 0.7 percent, in compensation of past Italian neglect of UN resolution no. 2626.[159] In subsequent months, Radicals submitted multiple parliamentary interrogations in an effort to keep up the pressure.[160]

Critics of the Radicals questioned the dilapidation of precious political capital on an intractable issue; they pointed out the lack of realism of the Radical request to convoke the UN Security Council to debate global famine.[161] Voicing a common refrain, one commentator of the Marxist left dismissed Radical initiatives as mere charity and a weak substitute for national liberation.[162] Disgruntlement with party policies and Pannella's leadership also grew within the party, as first apparent during the fall 1979 congress.[163] Opponents voiced objections to an excessive reliance on the contrarian approach represented by both the referendum and famine

[158] The Radicals had submitted a series of earlier, more demanding resolutions; they abstained on the one ultimately approved. One immediate outcome of the resolution was the instituting of a Strasbourg parliamentary workgroup charged with developing a solution to world famine; it was presided by an Italian Communist and counted Pannella among its participants. See Isernia, *La cooperazione allo sviluppo*, 104-5.

[159] Emma Bonino, "Fame: mobilitazione straordinaria di una settimana," 31 Mar. 1980, press conference, audioclip, OARR, http://www.radioradicale.it/scheda/58/58-fame-mobilitazione-straordinaria-di-una-settimana.

[160] For example, see "Interpellanze e interrogazioni (Svolgimento)," 30 June 1980, *Atti Parlamentari, Camera dei Deputati, VIII legislatura, Discussioni, Seduta del 30 giugno 1980,* 15511-2, http://legislature.camera.it/_dati/leg08/lavori/stenografici/sed0176/sed0176.pdf.

[161] Giorgio Bocca, "È permesso questa volta parlar male del partito radicale?" *La Repubblica* (Rome), 25 January 1980; Giorgio Galli, interview, 22 Mar. 1980, audioclip, OARR, http://www.radioradicale.it/scheda/97/98-sterminio-per-fame-nel-mondo.

[162] Angiolo Bandinelli and Giovanni Franzoni, 1 April 1980, debate, audioclip, OARR, http://www.radioradicale.it/scheda/60/60-lo-sterminio-per-fame.

[163] Marzio Fabbri, "Malessere tra gli iscritti del partito radicale. Milano: contestano Pannella 'però gli restiamo fedeli' Il leader ha detto che non si recherà al Congresso regionale in Lombardia – I motivi? 'Gli attacchi continui e diffamatori ai dirigenti'," *La Stampa* (Turin), 17 Oct. 1979; Gianni Pennacchi, "Il congresso radicale a Genova elegge il nuovo segretario Rippa. I figli ripudiano Pannella?" *Stampa Sera* (Turin), 5 Nov. 1979.

campaigns.[164] Some demanded participation in the local elections of June 1980 and the constitution of a regionally strong party, rather than an effectively highly centralized one dependent on decisions taken in Rome by a clique centered on Pannella.

During a congress convened in view of the upcoming local elections, Pannella and his allies brushed off party dissidents and ensured the party's absence from the electoral consultation. Underlying the decision was a political deal struck between Pannella and Craxi, despite differences over the Euromissiles; in exchange for Radical electoral non-participation, Craxi offered support for the referendum project. The PSI's uphill battle to grow electorally drove an appetite for even the modest electoral dividends which might derive from a Radical endorsement.[165] The congress also witnessed Pannella's formulation of a motion celebrating civil disobedience and absolute nonviolence. It would be soon be appended to the party's statutes as a preamble proscribing in absolute terms recourse to violence "even in the case of legitimate defense."[166] Pannella's idealistic rhetoric signaled the continuing effort to distinguish Radical internationalism, including in ways calculated to attract Catholic pacifists. In parallel, Radicals resorted to tough parliamentary tactics in their effort to redirect financial resources to foreign aid.

[164] Giuseppe Fedi, "Concluso il 23. Congresso nazionale a Roma. I radicali: 10 referendum e niente amministrative?" *Stampa Sera* (Turin), 10 Mar.1980.

[165] "E Bettino firmò tre volte," *Notizie Radicali*, 17 June 1980, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=47107&lang=IT&cms=; Gianni Baget Bozzo, "L'errore dei radicali,' *La Repubblica* (Rome), 25 June 1980.

[166] "Mozione generale approvata dal XXIII congresso (straordinario) del Pr (Roma, 7, 8 e 9 marzo 1980," Mar.1980, congressional motion, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=47031&lang=IT&cms=.

In April, they temporarily blocked through obstructionism approval of the annual financial law, submitting at one point some two hundred amendments, without however attaining any result.[167]

In view of the meager results of the famine campaign and its divisive effects on the party, June 1980 brought a much-needed success: the attainment of the necessary quorum of signatures for the referendum proposals.[168] As hoped by Pannella, the nod of support from an increasingly powerful Craxi had proven helpful.[169]

By spring 1980 Craxi had at last obtained what the CIA correctly diagnosed as his first major victory, when Christian Democrats accepted as many as nine Socialists in a new coalition cabinet. While the favorable vote on the dual track decision had boosted Craxi's standing as statesman, it had not marked his triumph over party rivals. As recently as December 1979 *La Repubblica*'s influential director Eugenio Scalfari assured his readers that Craxi would never prevail over internecine adversaries.[170] But a contested vote of the PSI Central Committee in January 1980 soon confounded doubters; a last minute defection of a key figure of the party's left wing, Gianni De Michelis, an oversized, brilliant and arrogant politician, handed Craxi a

[167] Emilio Pucci, "Il provedimento sarà ratificato oggi o domani dal Senato. La Camera approva la legge finanziaria tra insulti, urla e proteste dei radicali. Al momento della discussione il pr ha praticato un mini-ostruzionismo, chiedendo di poter fare dichiarazioni di voto – Respinte tutte le proposte sulla giustizia e la fame nel mondo," *La Stampa* (Turin), 22 Apr. 1980.

[168] "Si apre la fase di verifica di idoneità. Referendum: chiusa la raccolta delle firme," *l'Unità* (Rome), 26 June 1980.

[169] Massimo Teodori, "Elezioni, referendum, prospettive politiche," *Argomenti radicali*, Feb.-May 1980, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=47108&lang=IT&cms=; Giuseppe Rippa, "I conti con i referendum," *Notizie Radicali*, 28 June 1980, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=47131&lang=IT&cms=.

[170] Colarizi and Gervasoni, *La cruna dell'ago*, 109-10; contemporary uncertainty on the outcome of the PSI Central Committee meeting is also apparent in an interview of Giuseppe Saragat, former President and leader of the PSDI, see Luca Giurato, "Nostra intervista con l'ex Capo dello Stato. Saragat: 'Fanfani faccia il presidente del Senato.' Contrario a un governo istituzionale – Non ritiene ancora pronto il pci, per ora nella coalizione dovrebbero entrare gli independenti di sinistra – Auspica una vittoria di Craxi al Comitato Centrale," *La Stampa* (Turin), 27 Dec. 1979.

crucial majority.[171] Around the same time, another intra-party development, one equally colored but not predetermined by the Euromissiles vote, enhanced Craxi's standing. In February 1980, during the DC annual congress, a center-right alliance of party delegates hostile to PCI inclusion in the cabinet prevailed over the party's left wing.[172] The outcome widened the gulf between the DC and PCI; it empowered Craxi's autonomist Socialists by rendering them indispensable to the constitution of a stable coalition governement.

Thus, in April, a re-edition of a Cossiga cabinet composed of a DC, PSI and PRI richly rewarded the Socialists, including through the key assignment of the Defense Ministry to Lelio Lagorio.[173] The concession signaled DC surrender to Craxi's demand of a grossly disproportionate share of power relative to the respective electoral weights of the two parties. To celebrate the event, on a radiant morning typical of the Roman spring, he gathered his top brass on the upper terrace of Hotel Raphael. The latter, an elegant ivy-bestrewn palace in the heart of Baroque Rome, was the Milanese's lieu of residence in the capital. As the sun climbed above sparkling pinnacles and cupolas, smartly attired Socialist ministers-to-be celebrated their victory. Pointing to the rising sun and resorting to a Napoleonic dictum, one exclaimed: "it's the Sun of

[171] Colarizi and Gervasoni, *La cruna dell'ago*, 109-10; Norberto Bobbio, *Autobiografia* (Rome-Bari: Laterza: 1997), 194-5; this outcome was confirmed in a later CC meeting held in late March; see Luca Giurato, "Divisione, non spaccatura al Comitato centrale socialista. Craxi ha vinto e il psi ritornerà al governo. Il 58 per cento del partito con il segretario – Il 41 per cento s'è astenuto: voleva un secco 'no' al pentapartito, Craxi si è opposto – Nessuna pregiudiziale per trattare – Si profila un governo dc-psi con adesione o appoggio del pri," *La Stampa* (Turin), 22 Mar. 1979. See also Francesco Barbagallo, *Enrico Berlinguer* (Rome: Carocci, 2006), 360.

[172] Giorgio Rossi, "Colpo di scena al congresso, Zaccagnini e Andreotti in minoranza. La Dc sbanda a destra. Piccoli, Fanfani e Donat Cattin si alleano per impedire un governo aperto ai comunisti," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 20 Feb. 1980; Giorgio Rossi, "Eletto il Consiglio nazionale della Democrazia cristiana. Il vincitore è Fanfani. Al Centro-destra 96 seggi, alla sinistra 66 per il segretario i giochi sono aperti," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 21 Feb. 1980.

[173] Colarizi and Gervasoni, *La cruna dell'ago*, 117-8.

Austerlitz!" in an illustration of the exuberant style of the new Socialists.[174] Around the same time, Norberto Bobbio, a longtime supporter of the unity of the left, resigned in disgust his position on the PSI's Central Committee. Berlinguer denounced Craxi's desertion of the PCI.[175]

Craxi's successful drive for control over his party brought about the final alienation of the *Mondoperaio* intellectuals who had proven central to the Socialist renascence. As we have seen, Bobbio and his colleagues had grown increasingly hostile to Craxi's new course as evidence mounted of his rapprochement to the DC, a process considered a sordid recasting of the Opening to the Left. Socialist intellectuals were critical of Craxi's autocratic style, as they had envisaged a more collegial decision-making process and had played a key role during earlier Socialist congresses. Lately, they had turned a critical and inopportune eye, from Craxi's perspective, on revelations of corruption involving Socialists.[176] Tensions came to a head when Craxi threatened *Mondoperaio* with closure through the withholding of party funds, leading to the resignation of Bobbio and a number of his colleagues. The columns of the periodical would henceforth increasingly focus on international affairs and the assertive foreign policy implemented by Lagorio.[177]

---

[174] Lelio Lagorio, *L'ora di Austerlitz: 1980: La svolta che muto' l'Italia* (Florence: Polistampa, 2005), 28; on the ostentatious lifestyle of the new "Milanese Socialists", see Ginsborg, *Italy and Its Discontents*, 151.

[175] "Bobbio si dimette dal Comitato centrale psi," *La Stampa* (Turin), 22 Mar. 1980; "A Berlinguer non va la posizione di Craxi," *La Stampa* (Turin), 21 Mar. 1980.

[176] Colarizi and Gervasoni, *La cruna dell'ago*, 100-1. Federico Cohen and Paolo Borioni, *Le cassandre di Mondoperaio: Una stagione creativa della cultura socialista* (Venice: Marsilio, 1999), 19-20; Bobbio, *Autobiografia*, 194-6.

[177] Lelio Lagorio remained foreign minister from mid-1980 through mid-1983, and takes credit for a resurgence in Italian national pride associated to a recast foreign policy. See Lagorio, *L'ora di Austerlitz*. On the shift of *Mondoperaio* to a focus on international affairs, see Cohen and Borioni, *Le cassandre di Mondoperaio*, 23; Colarizi and Gervasoni, *La cruna dell'ago*, 114-6.

Craxi's rising star was confirmed in the local elections of June 1980, when his party at last reaped an electoral reward, growing to a national average of 12.7 percent of the vote, almost 3 percentage points more than in the earlier general elections. The outcome was to a small extent the fruit of the qui-pro-quo struck with the Radicals. Pannella campaigned for Craxi in the latter's hometown, Milan, where the PSI attained as much as 20 percent of the vote.[178] During the same elections, the PCI suffered further electoral decline.[179]

The PCI response to an increasingly unfavorable political climate came the following fall. In the wake of renewed economic crisis, automaker FIAT had sought large cuts in its workforce, setting off rounds of giant strikes and demonstrations.[180] In September, Berlinguer seized the opportunity to reconnect with the party's workerist roots by picketing alongside strikers before the FIAT Turinese autoplant, Mirafiori. He even pledged his support should workers occupy factories.[181] *L'Unità* wedded "workers" to "the nation" and proclaimed that together they would prevail.[182] An unexpected dénouement however soon unfolded; on October 14 a counter-demonstration of FIAT managers and employees supporting the freedom to work produced a demonstration in Turin which came to be known as the March of the Thirty

[178] Colarizi and Gervasoni, *La cruna dell'ago,* 118-9; "La grande menzogna di Pannella indica la fuga e la chiame lotta," *l'Unità* (Rome), 1 June 1980; "Ecco chi cerca la rissa nella sinistra. Pannella: leggi Berlinguer-Mussolini. Per Craxi è soltanto una 'forzatura'," *l'Unità* (Rome), 7 June 1980.

[179] Piero Ignazi, *Il potere dei partiti: La politica in Italia dagli anni Sessanta ad oggi* (Rome-Bari; Laterza, 2002), 87.

[180] "Dal Nord a Sud pieno successo della giornata generale di lotta. In dieci milioni hanno scioperato. Controparte di Agnelli è adesso tutto il mondo del lavoro […]," *l'Unità* (Rome), 11 Oct. 1980.

[181] Sergio Devecchi, "Mancano dieci giorni all'inizio dei licenziamenti. Fiat: se ne occupa il governo. La dura sfida di Berlinguer. Il presidente del Consiglio invita le parti a tenersi pronte per riprendere i contatti – Forse oggi nuovo incontro – Piccoli definisce 'avventurista' la posizione dei comunisti che si dichiarano pronti ad appoggiare l'occupazione dell'azienda – Carniti: 'Il pci non si illuda di prevaricare il sindacato," *La Stampa* (Turin), 27 Sept. 1980.

[182] Gerardo Chiaromonte, "Debbono vincere gli operai e il paese," *l'Unità* (Rome), 12 Oct. 1980.

Thousand.[183] The unusual event ultimately helped subdue the unions; compromises offered by management were accepted, mining the unity of workers.[184] Historians would later describe such events as a major turning point in Italian labor-industrial relations and more generally in the policy approach to the country's political economy. One commentator even opined that Berlinguer had committed political harakiri before the FIAT gates; but such an assessment may be excessively colored by hindsight.[185] Berlinguer's workerist populism made sense in its contemporary context. After all, the verdict on how to counter the crisis of capitalism was still out. Six months after the setback for Italian industrial workers and their Communist ally, François Mitterrand was triumphantly elected French president. He and his resurrected Union of the Left won on the basis of a platform pledging socialism through extensive nationalization and demand-side economics, including substantial wage increases.

In November 1980 the aftermath of a disastrous earthquake in southern Italy propelled the PCI further down the path of populist indictement of power structures. The catastrophe which hit the Irpinia region exposed the incapacity of the Italian state to mobilize aid. Condemnations of a lackluster response were pervasive, uniting in outrage President Pertini, the media, and public opinion, and further damaging the public image of the "DC system of power."

---

[183] Claudio Cerasuolo, "Nella lunga crisi di Torino si affacciano due avvenimenti imprevisti. In trentamila contro i picchetti Fiat. Il magistrato: sbloccare i cancelli. Nessuno si aspettava una manifestazione di protesta così clamorosa – Il corteo dei campi, impiegati e operai Fiat ha attraversatola città senza incidenti – L'ordinanza della Procura di Torino, in vigore da questa mattina, vuole garantire l'entrata in fabbrica a chi intende lavorare – Dura reazione della Flm – A Roma febbrili trattative nella notte," *La Stampa* (Turin), 15 Oct. 1980.

[184] " 'La FIAT può ritenersi soddisfatta i lavoratori no, i sindacati meno.' È uno dei pareri espressi in consiglio provinciale sulla conclusione della vertenza – Scontro verbale tra il dc Martina e il pci Fassino," *La Stampa* (Turin), 23 Oct. 1980; Giancarlo Fossi, "Vogliono contare di più dentro e fuori la fabbrica. I 'capi' cercano alleati," *La Stampa* (Turin), 19 Nov. 1980; Mario Pirani, "Requiem per un programma," *La Stampa* (Turin), 21 Mar.1981; Vanni Cornero, "A colloquio con il presidente dell'Unionquadri, Rossitto. Che cosa vogliono i 'capi'," La Stampa (Turin), 29 Mar.1981; Ignazi, *Il potere dei partiti*, 87; Ginsborg, *History of Postwar Italy*, 403-5.

[185] Cf. Luciano Cafagna, *La grande slavina: L'Italia verso la crisi della democrazia* (Venice: Marsilio, 1993), 94.

The PCI responded with redoubled denunciation of the Catholic party, raising what it termed the moral question and increasingly occupying the antisystem space the Radicals had sought to exploit.[186] The new course of the PCI, grandiloquently labeled "the second turning point of Salerno" on account of the location of a Berlinguer speech, purported a reformulation of party strategy. Communist leaders even tended an olive branch to the Socialists and announced that they would seek a "democratic alternative;" *l'Unità* optimistically noted a weakening of the DC center-right.[187] But overtures to the Socialists proved fruitless, in part because Craxi's PSI was now firmly wedded to autonomism and alliance with the DC.[188] Closer scrutiny at the PCI proposal for a "democratic alternative" at any rate dispels a first impression of novelty. The new plan purported to unite Communists, Socialists, and "selected" Christian Democrats in a grand coalition which would include the PCI in the cabinet. All told, the new formula was little more than a reedition of the historic compromise in new wrapping, a political solution for which few besides the Communists had appetite.[189]

In theory, the advance of the Socialists constituted a positive development for the Radicals. Socialist support for the Radical referendum campaign appeared to point to an

[186] Ignazi, *Il polo escluso*, 197-218.

[187] Enrico Berlinguer, interview by Alfredo Reichlin, "Intervista a Berlinguer. La nostra proposta di governo. Il PCI ha compiuto una svolta strategica? – Perchè la DC non può più guidare il paese – Come la nostra proposta parla al PSI e alle sinistre – È possibile costruire un'alternativa al regime degli scandali e della crisi? Sistema di potere dc, morale, governabilità, crisi delle istituzioni, rischio di elezioni anticipate – Il ruolo che possono svolgere le forze intermedie," *l'Unità* (Rome), 7 Dec. 1980; Candiano Falaschi, "La DC non parla più di 'prembolo' ma non sa con quale linea sostituirlo. Piccoli offre un compromesso alle minoranze di partito. Le linee della relazione al CN approvate dalla sinistra – La 'sfida' al PCI e le Giunte – La 'spinosa' questione morale," *l'Unità* (Rome), 7 Dec. 1980.

[188] Oct. 1980 marked the definitive defeat the PSI left during a Central Committee meeting. Ginsborg, *Italy and Its Discontents*, 158.

[189] Colarizi and Gervasoni, *La cruna dell'ago*, 122-3.

emerging coalition on the left. But the hypothetical Mitterrandian coalition faced obstacles which included the critical postures taken by Radicals with respect to the party system, Pannella's refusal to accept submission to another formation's exigencies, and Craxi's tendency to delegate to his collaborator Martelli contacts with Pannella, rather than personally engage in a serious effort to build an alliance.[190]

The first few months of 1981 witnessed a mix of Radical setbacks and advances. In January, Pannella and his faithful were energized by their apparent role in convincing the Red Brigades to release unarmed a magistrate.[191] Around the same time, the Radicals obtained in parliament the allocation of sizeable supplementary funds to foreign aid, garnished with pledges of increases over the following two years. Such outcomes, though short of their demands, marked a first substantial policy outcome of the famine campaign.[192] But in parallel, the Radical referendum project was weakened by the elimination on various accounts of what were considered by some the most valid of the proposed referenda, including the proposals to decriminalize drug use, to forbid nuclear energy or to eliminate repressive libel laws.[193]

---

[190] Antonio Ghirelli, "Una rosa tante spine," *Il Mattino* (Naples), 17 Feb. 1981, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=47419&lang=IT&cms=; Gianfranco Pasquino, "Che cosa hanno da perdere radicali e socialisti," *Il Messaggero* (Rome), 21 Feb. 1981, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=47423&lang=IT&cms=; Colarizi and Gervasoni, *La cruna dell'ago*, 121.

[191] The magistrate in question was Giovanni D'Urso, see Danilo Granchi, "Come i radicali cavalcano la crisi," *Il Giornale Nuovo* (Milan), 27 Jan. 1981; Marco Pannella and Paolo Guzzanti, "Una partita a scacchi che abbiamo vinto," *Il Giornale* (Milan), 17 Dec.1990.

[192] Gianfranco Dell'Alba, "Lo sterminio per fame e sottosviluppo nel mondo. Tre anni di politica radicale (1979-1982)," January 1983, OHRA; Isernia, *La cooperazione allo sviluppo*, 104.

[193] Francesco Rutelli, "I dieci giorni che sconvolsero la Corte," *Notizie Radicali*, 1 January 1981, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=47357&lang=IT&cms=; Gianni Baget Bozzo, "Tra Craxi e Pannella non mettere il dito," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 11 Feb. 1981.

Left standing most prominently was the referendum on abortion. The latter risked being misunderstood by the progressive electorate due to its proposal to abrogate the new law decriminalizing abortion. While Radicals argued that the law continued to force women to undertake illegal and dangerous abortions, and that its jettisoning would clear the way for improved legislation, it was not clear whether the leftist electorate would distinguish the Radical referendum from a rival Catholic one also proposing abrogation.[194] A PCI observer insightfully noted that this time around, instead of leading the left against conservatism as had been the case during the battle for divorce, the Radicals might find themselves isolated and pitted *against* the left and the "great popular masses."[195] "The Radicals," denounced *l'Unità* resorting to anticapitalistic rhetoric redolent of their critique of neoliberalism, wished to create a "free market" for abortions.[196]

As predicted, sound defeat during the referendum consultation dealt a blow to Radical ambitions to lead the left. On May 17, 1981 the electorate unambiguously rejected the four subsisting Radical referendum proposals as well as the Catholic one. The latter outcome marked a setback for the DC, which had willy-nilly followed the lead of groups allied to the Vatican.[197] The PCI represented the outcome as a great victory for women and for Communist leadership of

---

[194] Marco Pannella, "Pannella e l'aborto," *Paese Sera* (Rome), 21 Feb. 1981, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=47420&lang=IT&cms=; Ginsborg, *History of Postwar Italy*, 394.

[195] Franco Rodano, "Aborto solo per i ricchi. La proposta radicale," *Paese* [*Sera*? (Rome)], 25 Feb. 1981, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=47426&lang=IT&cms=; on the PCI position on the referenda, see "Comitato Centrale. La relazione di Natta. La posizione e l'impegno del PCI sui referendum," *l'Unità* (Rome), 13 Feb. 1981.

[196] "Radicali: un 'libero mercato' pagato dalle donne," *l'Unità* (Rome), 22 Mar. 1981.

[197] Fausto Ibba, "Il referendum come un ciclone sul blocco elettrorale della DC. La sconfitta del Movimento della vita rivela sgrettolamenti clamorosi specie nel Sud e nelle 'zone bianche' – L'onda lunga del '74 si è estesa dai centri urbani a tutto il resto del paese," *l'Unità* (Rome), 20 May 1981.

the democratic opposition.[198] Radicals also interpreted their fiasco as a victory for the PCI, rather than one for the ruling coalition, even though the latter had also largely opposed the Radical referenda. Party Secretary Francesco Rutelli argued that the PCI had "succeeded […] in seizing the general leadership of the lay alliance on the basis of moderate stances, thus reversing [the effect of the referendum on divorce of] 1974, when due to Radical initiatives and that of the civil rights movement […] [the PCI] was not allowed to compromise with the DC and the other parties."[199] Radical discomfiture was fully justified; the PCI emerged from the electoral consultation as the defender of women's rights and could not this time be credibly cast as culpable of collusion with the DC.[200] Sequels for the Radicals would include a retrenchment on their world famine campaign and a redoubled prominence of Pannella's charismatic style of leadership.

The Radical Party's subsequent full-throttle turn to issues of disarmament, antimilitarism and world famine, described in the next chapter, followed a time-honored pattern.[201] It did not signal retreat from the ambition to recast the left and in the process transform Italian politics, as later argued by an observer; rather, Pannella and his faithful, stimied on the domestic front,

---

[198] "Una grande festa a S. Giovanni con il PCI e Berlinguer. Il voto e l'Italia reale. Matura una alternativa democratica. Le donne, grandi protagoniste della vittoria, hanno confermato di rapprentare una forza decisiva per il progresso – Nel 68 percent che ha votato 'No' sta anche uno schieramento che aspira a un cambiamento – Quando abbiamo parlato di alternativa democratica abbiamo colto una verità che avanza. Una vittoria delle donne per le donne," *l'Unità* (Rome), 20 May 1981.

[199] Francesco Rutelli, "Relazione politica del segretario del Partito radicale," 5 June 1981, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=47576&lang=IT&cms=.

[200] Giuseppe Chiarante, "Ragionando sulla crisi della DC," *l'Unità* (Rome), 20 May 1981.

[201] Michelangelo Notarianni, "Pannella, il politico," *il manifesto* (Rome), 7 June 1981, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=47583&lang=IT&cms; "Mozione generale approvata dal XXV congresso (straordinario) del Pr (Roma, 5,6 e 7 giugno 1981)," 7 June 1981, congressional motion, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=47579&lang=IT&cms=.

seized upon internationalist means to reach their political objectives. Whether the embrace of the famine campaign constituted an error and a distraction from what ought to have been a domestic focus is certainly arguable, but is a different matter of contention.[202]

May 1981 also witnessed a grave setback for the DC. Revelations emerged that the Christian Democratic Minister of Justice was a member of the P2, a Masonic lodge connected to anticommunist circles and suspected of covert, anti-democratic activities, included linkage to right-wing terrorism. *L'Unità* seized the opportunity to slander the Radicals on account of their brief contact with the DC minister during recent negotiations leading D'Urso's liberation by the Red Brigades, a dubious allegation, considering Radical convictions and practices.[203] The P2 affair brought down the government; as crisis lingered, Berlinguer declared the moral degeneration of the political system unprecedented. He reiterated his openness to the Socialists, though in view of his yawning divergences with Craxi and the latter's now indisputed leadership of the PSI, his declarations appeared increasingly pro-forma.[204]

---

[202] Cf. Angelo Panebianco, "…Europa con cautela," *Notizie Radicali*, 31 December 1987, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=16168&lang=IT&cms=. The new emphasis on internationalism was not shared by all contemporary party members, some of whom would have preferred to continued focus on domestic issues through the resort to more referenda. See Franco Corleone [Radical secretary for Lombardy], "Anche per i radicali 'definirsi o sparire'," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 5 June 1981.

[203] "La resistibile ascesa dell'ex ministro della Giustizia Adolfo Sarti. Dalla 'nuova DC' alla lista della P2. La domanda per entrare nella Loggia è dell'ottobre '80 – Il cedimento ai terroristi e i rapporti privilegiati con i radicali durante il 'caso D'Urso' – Lasciò Fanfani per un posto di sottosegretario," *l'Unità* (Rome), 24 May 1981. Radical Teodori subsequently authored a minority report in which was argued that "P2 was not a deviant outgrowth from a basically health political and institutional system […] but an intrinsic part of the system itself." As reported by Ginsborg, *Italy and Its Discontents*, 147. For a discussion of the P2 masonic lodge, ibid., 142-8.

[204] "Berlinguer: il caso P2 mette a nudo la degenerazione del potere gestito dalla DC. Occorrono uomini, metodi, indirizzi nuovi. Irresponsabile il gioco al rinvio nella crisi di governo. Comizio a Genova – Il dovere di Forlani – L'enorme portata istituzionale, politica e morale dello scandalo della loggia – Si preparano provocazioni anticomuniste? – Il PSI dinanzi alla scelta: sostenere il sistema di potere dc oppure lavorare a un'alternativa di rinnovamento," *l'Unità (*Rome), 7 June 1981; Colarizi and Gervasoni, *La cruna dell'ago*, 128.

A new government coalition led by Republican Giovanni Spadolini was at last formed in June 1981. For the first time since 1945, a non-DC premier was in place, a sure symptom of DC vulnerability. Though Craxi had sought the post for himself, Spadolini's appointment proved that the Socialist leader's strategy of pressing the DC into ceding important posts to its allies was operative.[205] The coalition of five governing parties (DC-PSI-PSDI-PRI-PLI) was quipped the *pentapartito*, reflecting the hope or illusion that the coalition represented a major turning point in postwar politics.[206] Such notions were shared even by the excluded PCI; they were colored by events in France. Mitterrand's election as president in May was followed by the crushing affirmation of his recomposed *Union de la gauche* in general elections. The victory of the united French left led to the inclusion in the prevalently Socialist cabinet of Communist ministers. *L'Unità* declared such developments "historic," exalting the emergence of an "unprecedented governmental program in the West." Outraged dismissal in Paris of American attempts to exert a veto raised PCI hopes for a similar scenario in Italy.[207] The Radicals, despite their profound discomfiture following the referendum fiasco, also found reason to rejoice in Mitterrand's triumph.

---

[205] "Colpo di freno alla 'fretta' di Spadolini. Governo: Craxi preferisce parlarne dopo le elezioni. Se anche in Italia, come in Francia, i socialisti ottenessero grossi successi, la stessa presidenza del Consiglio potrebbe essere messa in discussione," *Stampa Sera* (Turin), 16 June 1981; "Oggi riunione dei segretari dei cinque partiti. Spadolini fra gli spogli della guerra per i posti. Visentini non entrerà: ha rifiutato il Tesoro – Craxi sottolinea i limiti del governo. La sinistra del PSI per una linea alternativa – Misasi: 'La DC è senza politica'," *l'Unità* (Rome), 26 June 1981; "Il nuovo governo sta per nascere con pesanti condizionamenti. Spadolini sarà costretto ad aumentare i ministri? La lista del nuovo governo pronta oggi o domani – Anche Baffi avrebbe rifiutato il Tesoro – Voi ed indiscrezioni sui portafogli ministeriali – Il segretario della DC solleva al 'vertice' la questione delle Giunte," l'Unità (Rome), 27 June 1981; Colarizi and Gervasoni, *La cruna dell'ago*, 136-8.

[206] "Il documento della Direzione," *l'Unità* (Rome), 12 June 1981.

[207] Augusto Pancaldi, "I ministri comunisti nel governo Mitterrand. La svolta francese cambia l'orizzonte della sinistra europea. Ampie trasformazioni politiche e sociali a una scelta internazionale attiva e responsabile sono i punti qualificanti di un programma di governo inedito per l'Occidente," *l'Unità* (Rome), 25 June 1981; Franco Fabiani, "Mitterrand ha respinto le pressioni americane. Ha incontrato Bush (vice di Reagan) poco dopo la prima seduta di governo," *l'Unità* (Rome), 25 June 1981; [Giorgio] Napolitano, "Un programma vicino alle nostre posizioni," *l'Unità* (Rome), 25 June 1981.

Chapter Four: Humanitarians (1981-1985)

François Mitterrand's election as President in May 1981 as well as the inauguration of the Reagan administration months earlier injected elements of nationalism into ongoing efforts to strengthen Western interdependence. While embracing aspects of the policies developed by his conservative predecessor, Mitterrand rejected their neoliberal domestic implications, pursuing instead nationalizations and demand-side economics originally prescribed by the *Programme commun*. On security issues, however, he began to reverse the nationalization of French security implemented by De Gaulle in the sixties. By endorsing a dual-track decision which did not directly concern France, Mitterrand signaled his staunch support for the Western alliance. Not least, firmness vis-à-vis domestic pacifism and Soviet foreign policy fortified his party's dominance over its coalition partner, the PCF, even while shoring up moderate support for the *Parti Socialiste*'s version of the Third Way. Reagan's nationalism, on the other hand, manifested more in foreign policy than in his economic approach, which resembled in part that of his predecessor.[1]

In the international arena, Reagan's assertiveness added an explosive mix to both superpower confrontation and transatlantic relations. His rhetoric elevated the Cold War conflict to an almost metaphysical plane, both through his Manichean pitting of American

[1] On Carter and the new monetarism, see Daniel J. Sargent, "The United States and Globalization in the 1970s," in *The Shock of the Global: The 1970s in Perspective*, ed. N. Ferguson et al. (Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University, 2010), 61-2. Overall, though the discontinuity between the economic policies of the Carter and Reagan administrations should not be exaggerated, Reagan's bullish patriotism was significant enough in terms of its impact on Italian domestic politics. On the degree of continuity between the Carter and Reagan administrations, see Georges-Henri Soutou, *La guerre de Cinquante Ans: Le conflict Est-Ouest 1943-1990* (Paris: Fayard, 2001), 628-30; also Mark Atwood Lawrence "Containing Globalism: The United States and the Developing World in the 1970s," in *The Shock of the Global*, ed. Ferguson et al., 205-19.

exceptionalism against absolute Soviet evil and through unilateral and massive rearmament schemes which obscured the memory of sizeable increases announced late in the Carter administration.[2] His unilateralism also manifested through diplomatic mishaps, as when he terrified Europeans by casually noting the possibility of a nuclear war limited to the Continent; such musings, derived from the closed boardrooms of security analysts, where not usually aired publicly. His words and policies had the unintented effect of frightening public opinion and of making life more difficult for Western European policymakers.[3] They also sowed a dangerous panic in the Soviet adversary, as Reagan belatedly realized. From 1984, he turned to the revival of détente and tempered his outspoken approach to diplomacy. But before then, the impact of his style was strongly felt in West Germany, contributing in 1982 to Schmidt's loss of control over a pacifist SPD and in turn the party's loss to the Christian-Democrats (CDU) of Helmut Kohl.[4]

In Italy too Reagan helped bolster an often anti-American peace movement, which emerged in force by fall 1981. Yet, despite impressive street showings through 1983, Italian pacifism never exerted substantial power, due to the unwavering Atlanticism of the PSI, but also PCI ambiguities.[5] The Radicals, for their part, rejected both Realist diplomacy and Marxian internationalism; they stubbornly pursued in near isolation their alternative approach. The latter preached the invention of a new foreign policy entailing immediate intervention to address the North-South divide and its alleged product, Third World famine.

---

[2] Soutou, *La guerre de Cinquante Ans*, 628-30, 633-4; Gaddis Smith, *Morality, Reason and Power: American Diplomacy in the Carter Years* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1986), 234-7.

[3] Soutou, *La guerre de Cinquante Ans*, 637.

[4] *Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands*, CDU.

[5] On the efforts of the PCI not to let its foreign policy drift too far left, see Antonio Rubbi, *Il mondo di Berlinguer* (Rome: Napoleone, 1994), 317.

Through the end of 1981, Radicals redoubled their efforts to elevate the visibility of their famine campaign in Italy and abroad through street actions, parliamentary interventions, and public appeals. Thereafter and into 1983, they furiously lobbied the Italian and Strasbourg Parliaments to act on proposals or enact draft legislation they had helped formulate. They contended with a public opinion distracted by the mounting nuclear security crisis. On the political front, their Eurodeputies encountered the hostility of the European Commission; in Rome, they faced the ideological opposition of the Communists or the irritation of a Socialist leader dead-set on obtaining the premiership. The third and final phase of the Radical famine campaign began in 1984, after the party determined to moderate its antipolitical excesses and maximalist demands in favor of compromise. As a result, substantial legislation emerged by March 1985, one which however bore the stamp of the governing parties and their time-honored clientelistic approach to resource allocation and foreign aid.[6] Our narrative of the key phases of the Radical campaign against world famine and its interface with the peace movement opens in August 1981, in the wake of the referendum fiasco.

On August 7, 1981 the Italian government announced the planned location of the Euromissiles at a disused military airport outside Comiso, a small town in southern Sicily.[7] Two days later, the Reagan administration communicated the full resumption of the production of the Neutron Bomb, earlier postponed by President Carter; combined, the two announcements helped

[6] Paul Ginsborg, *Italy and Its Discontents: Family, Civil Society, State 1980-2001* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 237-9; Pierangelo Isernia, *La cooperazione allo sviluppo* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1995), 104-17.

[7] Guido Bimbi, "Dal Consiglio dei ministri. Per i Cruise scelta Comiso. Immediate proteste in tutta Sicilia," *l'Unità* (Rome), 8 Aug. 1981; Antonio del Giudice, "I provvedimenti varati ieri dal Consiglio dei Ministri. Sarà costruita in Sicilia la base dei missili Nato," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 8 Aug. 1981.

unleash by fall an imposing peace movement.[8] In the immediate, facing criticism in the leftist press, recently appointed Prime Minister Spadolini denied previous knowledge of President Reagan's decision.[9] The disclaimer however failed to abate allegations of Italian subordination to the United States; the purported American disregard of its ally's sovereignty revived a debate on the imperative to counterbalance US power with a more united Europe.[10] Initially, the Radical, new left and Communist oppositions found common ground in response to rearmament. They demanded that Parliament break the summer recess and convene at once.[11]

Ensconced within the ruling five-party coalition, the PSI's rejection of its own antimilitarist and pacifist heritage and its adoption of a Realist foreign policy stood in contrast with the internationalist counterproposals of the left opposition. But, while at first glance similar, the pacifist stances of the Radical Party, the PdUP and the PCI were distinct, reflecting competing domestic and ideological agenda. All three parties embraced East-West disarmament and highlighted the urgency of redirecting global policy priorities to yawning North-South

[8] Leslie H. Gelb, "Reagan orders production of two types of neutron weapons for stockpiling in the US," *New York Times,* 9 Aug. 1981.

[9] "Spadolini prende le distanze 'Non ci hanno consultati'," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 11 Aug. 1981; "La scelta di fabbricare la bomba N si aggiunge al nodo dei missili in Europa. Si aggravano tutte le tensioni. Imbarazzato ed elusivo il governo italiano. Una nota di Palazzo Chigi si limita a negare 'la consultazione preventiva degli alleati' – immediata iniziativa del PCI: il governo dichiari fin d'ora la sua assoluta indisponibilità all'installazione degli ordigni nel nostro paese," *l'Unità* (Rome), 11 Aug. 1981; Marco Tosatti, "Pci e Pr: riapriamo la Camera per discutere Cruise e bomba N," *La Stampa* (Turin), 12 Aug. 1981.

[10] Eugenio Scalfari, "Forse de Gaulle aveva ragione…" *La Repubblica* (Rome), 15 Aug. 1981; Rodolfo Brancoli, "Reagan vuole premere sull'Europa perchè accetti la nuova arma Usa," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 11 Aug. 1981; "Washington decisa ad avviare presto colloqui con gli alleati. Weinberger: 'metteremo la 'N' in Europa' Il ministro della Difesa afferma esplicitamente che la decisione è stata unilaterale proprio per aggirare le obiezioni degli altri paesi atlantici-il 'Washington Post' teme una crisi della Nato," *l'Unità* (Rome), 12 Aug. 1981; Pietro Ingrao, "Sovranità e indipendenza hanno ancora un senso?" *l'Unità* (Rome), 12 Aug. 1981; Angelo Panebianco, "La società militarizzata. Missili, scandali, inchini. La politica estera italiana e l'alternativa radicale," *Argomenti radicali: Bimestrale politico per l'alternativa*, Oct. 1979-Jan. 1980, 23-36.

[11] Marco Tosatti, "Polemiche per i missili in Sicilia. Comunisti e radicali 'ci opporremo'," *La Stampa* (Turin), 9 Aug. 1981; "Dopo la decisione di installare i missili in Sicilia e il via di Reagan alla bomba N Iniziativa PCI: convocare al più presto le Camere Proteste e mobilitazioni in tutto il Paese," *l'Unità* (Rome), 12 Aug. 1981; "Polemiche su bomba 'N'," *Stampa Sera* (Turin), 12 Aug. 1981.

disparities. However, while the PCI moderated its pacifism to preserve its vulnerable foreign policy legitimacy and thus its domestic political options, the Radicals and PdUP preached the rejection of both NATO membership and compromise with the Christian Democrats. Ideology, in turn, set apart the Radicals from the new left party and the Communists. The Radicals rejected their Marxism, condemned the espousal of national liberations wars, and questioned the primacy of national sovereignty at the basis of anticolonialism.

The PCI-PdUP-Radical request for an early convocation of Parliament was denied. Instead, the five-party ruling coalition agreed to hold joint sessions of the Senate and Chamber Committees of Defense and Foreign Affairs on August 20 and 21.[12] Unlike PdUP and the Radicals, the PCI renounced its call for early convocation and endorsed the compromise, acting on the recommendation of its moderate current led by Giorgio Napolitano. Radical Roberto Cicciomessere argued that the Communist retreat was "political" and attributeable to concerns of appearing pro-Soviet; as was often the case, he claimed, PCI pacifism was disingenuous. The Communists, he predicted, would continue to harbor a soft line on rearmament, even while trumpeting opposition in public.[13] Later, on the occasion of a planned Joint Committee Hearings, which coincided with the US downing of two Lybian jets south of Sicily, Radical Spadaccia argued that current international tensions were attributeable to "naked imperialist interests and power [plays] on both [Cold War] sides." *L'Unità*, commenting on the Radical's speech,

[12] "Dibattito sul riarmo," *Stampa Sera* (Turin), 14 Aug. 1981; Marco Tosatti, "Sui missili appoggio al governo Impegno per il dialogo Usa-Ussr," *La Stampa* (Turin), 22 Aug. 1981.

[13] Roberto Cicciomessere, interview, "Bomba N ed euromissili: il dibattito in Parlamento," 21 August 1981, audioclip, OARR, http://www.radioradicale.it/scheda/2386/2399-bomba-n-ed-euromissili-dibattito-in-parlamento.

regretted that dominating such legitimate criticism of superpower excesses were incessant attacks on the PCI.[14]

An outcome of the late August joint committee meetings was the decision to schedule plenary parliamentary sessions on foreign policy, but not until after an upcoming trip to the UN of Foreign Minister Emilio Colombo and an official visit to Rome of Chancellor Helmut Schmidt.[15] A shoring up of the foreign policy entente between the five-party ruling coalition and the PCI was accompanied by a clarification issued by the party of Premier Spadolini regarding Reagan's Neutron Bomb decision. The deployment of Euromissiles was one matter, reported party organ *La Voce Repubblicana*, implying shared Atlantic responsibilities. The decision to produce the Neutron Bomb, however, was another; it had been taken autonomously by the US without entailing any obligations for its European allies. The implication was that Italy would assess its security options solely on the basis of national interests.[16]

Since spring, Pannella and his colleagues had worked to energize their campaign against world famine, including by connecting it to their traditional antimilitarism. The Radical campaign proceeded at two levels: the Italian and EEC parliaments in Rome and Strasbourg, and

[14] Gianfranco Spadaccia, cited in "Il dibattito alle commissioni Esteri e Difesa del Senato Bombe N e Comiso: scelte drammatiche. Forte critiche del PCI al governo per la sua linea del tutto inadeguata alla situazione internazionale," *l'Unità* (Rome), 21 Aug. 1981; Mary Onori, "Il drammatico duello aereo sopra il Golfo della Sirte aggrava le tensioni internazionali Ansia per lo scontro nel Mediterraneo Abbattuti da caccia USA due aerei libici Scambio d'accuse," *l'Unità* (Rome), 20 Aug. 1981; "Alle soglie di casa nostra," *l'Unità* (Rome), 20 Aug. 1981.

[15] "Il dibattito alle Commissioni della Camera sulle questioni internazionali. Trattative subito e rifiuto della bomba 'N' Pajetta rivolge un appello unitario per una concreta iniziativa italiana," *l'Unità* (Rome), 22 Aug. 1981; Lucio Caracciolo, "L'Italia chiede trattative con l'Urss. Il Pci non insiste per un voto in aula. 'Sì ai Cruise no allo scontro.' Ribadita alla Camera la linea del governo," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 22 Aug. 1981.

[16] "Reazioni alla bomba 'N'," *Stampa Sera* (Turin), 11 Aug. 1981.

public opinion in Italy and abroad.[17] In both parliaments, Radicals pressed governments to increase funding for programs addressing famine. The opinion campaigns that seconded parliamentary activism included street demonstrations and various forms of public appeals, including the characteristic recourse to hunger strikes.[18] Drawing on his international connections as Strasbourg parliamentarian, Pannella mustered the support of international scientists and intellectuals for his "Manifesto of Nobel Prize Winners for Development and against Extermination through Famine" and founded a new association, Food and Disarmament International. In June 1981 the Manifesto was subscribed to by several dozen Nobel-laureates and released simultaneously in Paris, Rome, New York, Brussels and Geneva.[19] It depicted famine in the global South as "an unprecedented holocaust," defining it not as an inevitable calamity but the result of a specific world disorder that was politically determined, and could therefore be addressed through a political will. Ineffective, feel-good charitable approaches to development would need to be reconsidered, as would the "cruel and sterile utopias which sacrifice contemporary humans for the sake of the [collectivist] project." The Manifesto called for "inert" world opinion to relinquish indifference and to enforce the "rights of people and of

[17] Francesco Rutelli, "Cosituzione [sic] 'Associazione per la vita, la pace e il disarmo'," 5 July 1981, audioclip 1, OARR, http://www.radioradicale.it/scheda/2222.

[18] The Easter march for peace and against world famine organized in previous years was not held in 1981; instead, the Radicals paid for a full page appeal published in Italy's most widely circulated left wing newspaper, *La Repubblica* (Rome), on 17 Apr. 1981. A less ambitious antimilitarist march against world famine was held in early May in Rome. See "Sterminio per fame [quest'anno non ci sarà la Marcia di Pasqua]," 18 Apr. 1981, audioclip, OARR, http://www.radioradicale.it/scheda/1979/1992-sterminio-per-fame-questanno-non-ci-sara-la-marcia-di-pasqua; "Marcia antimilitarista e contro la fame organizzata dal Pr," 1 May 1981, audioclip, OARR, http://www.radioradicale.it/scheda/2021/2034-marcia-antimilitarista-e-contro-la-fame-organizzata-dal-pr; "Marcia antimilitarista e contro la fame organizzata dal Pr, " 3 May 1981, audioclip, OARR, http://www.radioradicale.it/scheda/2162/2175-marcia-antimilitarista-e-contro-la-fame-organizzata-dal-pr; Giovanni Negri, interview by Adelaide Aglietta, "Sterminio per fame: Pannella rinvia l'inizio del digiuno,"4 July 1981, audioclip, OARR, http://www.radioradicale.it/scheda/2220/2233-sterminio-per-fame-pannella-rinvia-linizio-del-digiuno.

[19] Isernia, *La cooperazione allo sviluppo*, 105.

peoples, and first of all […] the right to life […] through recourse to its few but effective weapons—those of political democracy and of nonviolent Gandhian actions […]"[20] By late July, the Radicals had earned the approval of a parliamentary motion committing the Italian government to formulate by mid-September a concrete plan to address famine in the Third World.[21]

In early July several Radicals gathered in Florence to debate Radical internationalism and more specifically the connection between world famine and rearmament. Among them were Party Secretary Francesco Rutelli and Roberto Cicciomessere, both experts on disarmament and antimilitarism, as well as Angelo Panebianco and Angiolo Bandinelli, two intellectuals whose interests included foreign policy.[22] Rutelli opened deliberations by denouncing the absence of an original foreign policy on the left, arguing that Radical proposals for unilateral disarmament and the world famine campaign constituted the basis for an alternative. But both causes, the first a longstanding but lapsed one, the second a recent Radical battle, needed to be better articulated, not least due to divisions and confusion within Radical ranks. "Some say" Rutelli continued that

[20] "Il Manifesto-appello dei premi Nobel", June 24, 1981, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=47597&lang=IT&cms=; Marco Pannella, interview, "Manifesto-Appello contro lo sterminio per fame nel mondo. Collegamento con Marco Pannella," 26 June 1981, audioclip, OARR, http://www.radioradicale.it/scheda/187017/manifesto-appello-contro-lo-sterminio-per-fame-nel-mondo-collegamento-con-marco-pannella.

[21] "Risoluzione 1-00149 (Bianco Gerardo, Labriola, Reggiani, Battaglia, Bozzi, Bonalumi)," and "Risoluzione 1-00140 (Aiello, Aglietta, Baldetti, Boato, Bonino, Cicciomessere, Crivellini, De Cataldo, Faccio, Melega, Mellini, Pinto, Rippa, Roccella, Sciascia, Teodori, Tessari Alessandro, in "Mozioni e interpellanze concernenti la fame nel mondo (discussione)," 30 July 1981, *Atti Parlamentari, Camera dei Deputati, Resoconto Stenografico, 363. Seduta di giovedì 30 luglio 1981*, 32134-5, 32127-30, http://legislature.camera.it/_dati/leg08/lavori/stenografici/sed0363/sed0363.pdf; Isernia, *La cooperazione allo sviluppo*, 105.

[22] Their writings on foreign policy include: Angiolo Bandinelli, *Il radicale impunito: Saggi di politica militante* (Rome: Stampa alternativa, 1990); Roberto Cicciomessere, *L'Italia armata* (Milan: Gammalibri, 1982); Angelo Panebianco, "Missili, scandali, inchini. La politica estera italiana e l'alternativa radicale," *Argomenti radicali*, Oct. 1979-Jan. 1980), 23-36; Francesco Rutelli, *Per il disarmo* (Milan: Gammalibri, 1982).

"the [real] issues are war and peace, however the Radical approach to famine is our manner of approaching questions of peace and war […] The originality of the Radicals is to point out that world famine is a form of war and a threat to peace; not only is our objective moral, but it also constitutes a security imperative."[23] Cicciomessere, for his part, confirmed the decline of Radical action on antimilitarism after the legalization of conscientious objection in 1972 and reiterated the need to relaunch it. The real possibility of limited war in Europe and the millions that had demonstrated across the Continent provided an opportunity, even though for now "in Italy there is utter silence." Further, Radicals should not only promote the right to life in the developing world, but also civil liberties in the East Bloc, on "which we have insufficiently focused on." The best approach to the latter issue, he concluded, might be the "juridical one": calling to task governments for conforming to their own commitments.[24] A third participant agreed with the opinion that the era of the Radical focus on domestic civil liberties was over; henceforth international issues would have to be central to the party's mission.

"Our internationalism," stated Bandinelli, is not "an afterthought, but our very essence", and the world famine campaign its fundamental "metaphor", without which there could be "no party, no policy." Bandinelli bluntly asserted that "our adversary is the left and the national state", for in reality "there had been no [real] internationalism since the late 1940s on the left, as the building block has remained the national state." The Radical intellectual concluded that "nowadays the model of national sovereignty is in question, and our battle is [what Jacques]

[23] Rutelli, "Cosituzione [sic] 'Associazione per la vita, la pace e il disarmo'," 5 July 1981, audioclip 1, OARR; the Radical concept of "unwaged war" (*guerra non guerregiata*) is described in Rutelli, *Per il disarmo*, 7-9.

[24] Roberto Cicciomessere, "Cosituzione [sic] 'Associazione per la vita, la pace e il disarmo'," 5 July 1981, audioclip in OARR.

Attali [calls] the duty to intervene where there is famine. We agree, because we refuse the national mold."[25]

At this point in time, before the noisy emergence of the peace movement, Radicals concurred that nuclear fears were warranted, even while hoping they would not dominate other concerns. Cicciomessere acknowledged that the deployment of Euromissiles was a dangerous new departure. The missiles constituted a technological innovation that increased the possibility of war; the two superpowers might be willing to fight "over the prostrate body of Europe" in order to maintain their hegemony. Both were claims close to those held by the Marxist left. Euromissiles deployment, he added, also empowered dictatorial and militaristic systems. More than countering with more weapons the ongoing deployment of Soviet missiles, the goal of Western foreign policy should be to encourage the development of the autonomy of Soviet client-states and the empowerment of their civil societies.[26] The Radical unilateralist and antimilitarist stance, argued another Radical, constituted an attempt to transform the nuclear standoff into a political question—for example through a bold diplomatic move it was conceivable that Italy might force others under the pressure of their public opinions to relinquish the arms race.[27] Radicals frequently reiterated that their stances were intended to stimulate a debate and confrontation with the other parties of the Italian left on issues of peace and war, and

[25] Angiolo Bandinelli, "Cosituzione [sic] 'Associazione per la vita, la pace e il disarmo'," 5 July 1981, audioclip 4, OARR, http://www.radioradicale.it/scheda/2222. Jacques Attali had helped found in 1979 the INGO *Action internationale contre la faim*, now known as *Action contre la faim* (Action Against Hunger).

[26] Roberto Cicciomessere, " 'Mai più Hiroshima, no ai missili Cruise' manifestazione del Pr il 6 agosto," 1 August 1981, audioclip 1, OARR, http://www.radioradicale.it/scheda/2328/2341-mai-piu-hiroshima-no-ai-missili-cruise-manifestazione-del-pr-il-6-agosto.

[27] Emma Bonino, " 'Mai più Hiroshima, no ai missili Cruise' manifestazione del Pr il 6 agosto," 6 August 1981, audioclip 1, OARR, http://www.radioradicale.it/scheda/2343/2356-mai-piu-hiroshima-no-ai-missili-cruise-manifestazione-del-pr.

in particular the Communists' instrumental acceptance of NATO.[28] As a vigorous peace movement emerged in fall 1981, Radicals would increasingly emphasize their differences with what they termed "generic pacifism," eventually muting the nuclear alarmism they had initially shared with mainstream pacifists.[29]

In addition to helping trigger a revival of pacifism, the Neutron Bomb announcement by Reagan reignited a simmering debate on the left over the issue of Italian and European independence from the US. Security issues were at the heart of remonstrances for greater autonomy from a supposedly overbearing ally, but political and economic grievances had also an influence. In the domain of security, resumed production of the Neutron Bomb fueled the suspicion that nationalistic and imperialistic Americans sought to "call to order" Europe. As in the sixties, transatlantic tensions fueled European neutralism, including its nationalistic, Gaullist by-product. An unorthodox commentator on the left, Antonio Gambino, regretted the "confused" pacifist response of Europeans and called for a neo-Gaullist European solution writ large.[30] "Maybe de Gaulle was right" rejoined the influential director of the leftist daily *La Repubblica*; European nuclear autonomy might be a desirable solution to the current crisis and

[28] Francesco Rutelli, " 'Mai più Hiroshima, no ai missili Cruise' manifestazione del Pr il 6 agosto," 2 August 1981, audioclip 1, OARR, http://www.radioradicale.it/scheda/2333/2346-mai-piu-hiroshima-no-ai-missili-cruise-manifestazione-del-pr-il-6-agosto; Emma Bonino and Francesco Rutelli, " 'Mai più Hiroshima, no ai missili Cruise' manifestazione del Pr il 6 agosto," 6 August 1981, respectively audioclip 1 and 3, OARR, http://www.radioradicale.it/scheda/2343/2356-mai-piu-hiroshima-no-ai-missili-cruise-manifestazione-del-pr; Roberto Cicciomessere, "Installazione di missili a Comiso e la 'bomba N'," 12 August 1981, audioclip 1, OARR, http://www.radioradicale.it/scheda/2366/2379-installazione-di-missili-a-comiso-e-la-bomba-n.

[29] Francesco Rutelli, "Il P.R. e il 'nuovo' movimento. 'Pacifismo', un lusso che non ci riguarda," *Notizie Radicali*, 15 December 1981, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=47711&lang=IT&cms=.

[30] Antonio Gambino, "Un fantasma neutralista si aggira per l'Europa," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 1 August 1981. Gambino drew on comments by Charles Chenu, Mitterrand's Minister of Defense, to the effect that France had solved these problems in the 1960s.

even an antechamber to an eventual dissolution of NATO.[31] On the geopolitical front, in June, *La Repubblica* had reported tensions in Franco-American relations over the inclusion of the PCF members in Mitterrand's cabinet. "NATO," commented the paper in an editorial, was "not the Warsaw Pact", "a fact the US should internalize better."[32] Contemporaneously, the monetary policies of Paul Volcker's Federal Reserve sent US interest rates skyrocketing, triggering capital in-flows and a consequent flight from the French franc and Italian lira. In Italy, Volcker's anti-inflation measures were interpreted as hostile acts directed against Europe.[33] Its autonomy, claimed *l'Unità*, was menaced by the "attack of the dollar."[34]

Radicals engaged in the foreign policy debate, seeking to carve out an original stance which might address both calls for greater Italian and European autonomy and concerns over military escalation. Fighting for disarmament did not constitute "juvenile folly" nor was it unrealistic, wrote Rutelli in response to Gambino and Scalfari; their neo-Gaullism was not the sole alternative to "servile Atlanticism" or to "acritical pacifism." The current Realpolitik of the

[31] Eugenio Scalfari, "Forse de Gaulle aveva ragione…" *La Repubblica* (Rome), 15 Aug. 1981. See also Felice Ippolito, "L'Europa s'è desta…" *La Repubblica* (Rome), 19 Aug. 1981. Ippolito disagrees on one point with Scalfari; in his view the Neutron Bomb was a factor of destabilization, making a limited regional war in Europe more, not less likely, as had been argued by Scalfari, who distinguished the destabilizing effects of the Euromissiles from a possibly stabilizing effect of the Neutron Bomb.

[32] "Alleati ma con pari dignità," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 25 June 1981; Barbara Spinelli, "Scontro Mitterrand-Reagan sui comunisti nel governo. La Casa Bianca minaccia: 'Le nostre relazioni saranno intaccate. Parigi avverte: 'La Francia decide da sola'," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 25 June 1981.

[33] Paul Volker had been appointed by President Carter in August 1979. Barbara Spinelli, "Reagan contro l'Europa," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 9 June 1981; Giorgio Rufolo, "L'impero americano e la sfida europea," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 18 June 1981; Barbara Spinelli, "Mitterrand Reagan due politiche a confronto Il summit di Ottawa," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 19/20 July 1981; Stefano Cingolani, "Nuovo boom del dollaro. Un caro prezzo per l'Europa," *l'Unità* (Rome), 5 Aug. 1981.

[34] Aniello Coppola, "Il vertice di Ottawa registra le divisioni tra i sette paesi più industrializzati dell'occidente. Reagan non attenua l'attacco del dollaro e chiede agli alleati di ridurre il commercio con Mosca. Insofferenza americana per gli spazi di autonomia acquistati dagli europei – Vaga disponibilità USA a ridiscutere la questione degli alti tassi in una sede specifica – La Thatcher critica la Casa Bianca per il Medio Oriente," *l'Unità* (Rome), 21 July 1981.

ruling parties was ultimately destructive because it fueled a potentially dangerous arms race. Another interventionist and autonomous foreign policy was possible, one which would replace military confrontation with "real existing communism" with the nonviolent promotion of democracy and human rights, accompanied by punitive economic boycott. Rutelli called for a more coherent foreign policy than Reagan's, whose militarily confrontational style was contradicted by his repeal of Carter's boycott of wheat exports to the Soviets.[35] Further, innovative approaches to demilitarization should include more than merely opposing the deployment of the Euromissiles; for example, the Italian public was entitled to know that more than one thousand nuclear devices were already stationed on Italian soil.[36]

Unlike proponents of neo-Gaullist or alternatively antimilitarist solutions to European insecurity, PCI representatives elevated as a paramount imperative disarmament talks with the Soviet Union. Pietro Ingrao, a popular leader among the Communist youth, stated in his characteristic impassioned style that the new arms race "calls into question the very fate of this planet and its life forms." To accept technical arguments for the deployment of new weapons was absurd, given the possibility of a global conflagration; it was essential to pursue immediate talks with the Soviets to avoid the risks of catastrophe. Other considerations, implied Ingrao, were secondary.[37] Raniero La Valle, a Catholic member of the Independent Left, a parliamentary

[35] "L'embargo voluto da Carter per rappresaglia dopo Kabul. Oggi Reagan annuncia: 'Tolto il blocco del nostro grano ai russi'," *La Stampa* (Turin), 24 Apr. 1981. In December, Rutelli would describe Radical foreign policy as both "anti-Reagan" and "anti-Soviet." See Francesco Rutelli, "La guerra viene dall'Est. Il rischio di una nuova Monaco," *Notizie Radicali*, 15 Dec. 1981, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=47713&lang=IT&cms=.

[36] Francesco Rutelli, "Lottare per il disarmo non è follia giovanile," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 8 Aug. 1981.

[37] Pietro Ingrao, "Sovranità e indipendenza hanno ancora un senso?" *l'Unità* (Rome), 12 Aug. 1981; in a response to Ingrao, Gambino agreed with his call for negotiations, but reasserted the importance of Realpolitik, ie. countervailing nuclear capability; the optimum solution, given doubts about American actions, would be for Europe to have its own nuclear forces. See Antonio Gambino, "Se l'Europa, armata e sovrana…" *La Repubblica* (Rome), 20 Aug. 1981.

group close to the PCI, fretted over the emergence of a new political and public legitimatization of nuclear weaponry, as manifest in the moral acceptance of the Neutron Bomb by the Italian government, signaled by the sole caveat of Italian approval for any future deployment on national soil. Despite recent signs of awakening of an Italian peace movement, continued La Valle, the lack of an autonomous Italian foreign policy and a related lack of public foreign policy debate were still in evidence. Further worries derived from the Reagan administration's extremist positions. Citing the American Sovietologist Stephen Cohen, La Valle reported that the Reagan administration refused to countenance the Soviet Union in its present form, as a "power having [legitimate] world responsibilities and interests." The Americans harbor policies that pursue "the end of communism everywhere." Secretary of State Alexander Haig, continued La Valle disapprovingly, has stated that "peace is not the most important thing in the world."[38]

By fall, a commanding peace movement had emerged, one comparable in scale to the better established and politically potent Northern European movements.[39] The rise of a major social movement posed both opportunities and challenges to the parties of the left.[40] Craxi remained mindful of the lingering pull of his party's traditional pacifism and the ties of its left wing to the PCI; also of concern was the portrayal by the opposition of the government's foreign

---

[38] Raniero La Valle, "Perchè adesso non basta contare i missili Dare voce alle ragioni della pace," *l'Unità* (Rome), 23 Aug. 1981.

[39] Cecilia Mastrantonio and Giuliana Sgrena, "Un pacifismo non ancora in movimento. Dai cinquecentomila del 24 ottobre alle marce di Comiso," *Pace guerra*, no. 27 (January 1983): 34-6; Lawrence S. Wittner, *Toward Nuclear Abolition: A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement, from 1971 to the Present* Vol. 3 of *The Struggle Against the Bomb* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), 159-60.

[40] Paolo Guzzanti, "Per un'Europa senza missili. È nato nel Vecchio continente un grande movimento contro il riarmo nucleare. Sfila a Roma un immense corteo pacifista. Anche a Londra trecentomila manifestanti," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 25/26 Oct. 1981; Ennio Polito, "C'è anche una nuova idea di Europa nel movimento per la pace," *l'Unità* (Rome), 27 Oct. 1981; Mino Fuccillo, "I partiti spiazzati dal movimento. Craxi dovrà correggere la rotta?" *La Repubblica* (Rome), 27 Oct. 1981.

policy as subordinate to foreign powers.[41] The PCI embraced the new peace movement, but it too had to take into account politics. Pacifism would help the party reconnect with its base, but it threatened the party's foreign policy legitimacy.

Earlier in September, Berlinguer had concluded the annual PCI festival (*Festa de l'Unità*) by announcing that his party would henceforth focus on the Third Way, the moral question in Italian politics, and peace.[42] In a letter sent to the organizers of the Perugia-Assisi Peace March, Berlinguer wrote that ""[…] one can detect in the spirit of your demonstration, as in others in act in other countries of Europe and of the world, a manifestation of universal import: the intromission of the great masses driven by the will to maintain viable the conditions for a peaceful development of human civilization: the beginnings, in embryonic form, of a sort of 'diplomacy' of peoples that can have the power to render inevitable negotiation and the accord between states and governments to overcome tensions in international relations […]"[43] Communist leaders were conscious of the ecumenical appeal of peace to Catholics, Radicals and sundry non-Communists. In an effort to preserve and strengthen the multilateral dimension of the movement, the PCI participated in the movement through its local and youth networks, rather than fully engaging its highly centralized national hub; this approach had also the advantage of

[41] Marco Tosatti, "Il dibattito oggi si sposta dal Senato alla Camera. Lagorio: la N in Italia solo col nostro consenso. Comiso sarà l'unica base dei Cruise (saranno installati 112 missili e 28 lanciatori) – Colombo: 'Così si favorisce la riapertura del dialogo.' Sodisfatti i partiti della maggioranza, mentre il pci esprime riserve," *La Stampa* (Turin), 21 Aug. 1981; Alfredo Venturi, "Ascoltato a Bologna da una platea percorsa da umori autonomistici. Craxi è polemico con Berlinguer nella città dello scontro pci-psi," *La Stampa (*Turin), 27 Sept. 1981.

[42] Giovanni Valentini, "Berlinguer e il suo popolo. Il segretario ha concluso domenica a Torino la festa nazionale de l'Unità. La pace, la terza via, la questione morale ma non una parola sui possibili alleati," *l'Unità* (Rome), 22 Sept. 1981.

[43] Enrico Berlinguer, 27 Sept. 1981, autograph letter sent to the "Comitato organizzatore della Marcia della Pace Perugia-Assisi," *Carte Lucio Lombardo Radice, Scatola Disarmo Nucleare, Cartella Movimenti per la Pace,* Istituto Gramsci Roma (PCI Archives, Rome).

keeping the movement at arm's length. An added incentive was provided by the political goal not to undermine the joint PCI-PSI local coalitions dating back to the high-water mark of the seventies leftist surge, the local elections of 1975.[44]

On September 27, a wide range of pacifist and antimilitarist groups, representatives of parties of the center and the left, including the Radicals, participated in the Third Perugia-Assisi Peace March. Several dozen thousand participants turned out, more than anticipated. Next, on October 11, thousands of protesters from all over Italy clamored for peace in Comiso (Sicily), the planned site for the Euromissiles. But most spectacular was the demonstration held in Rome on October 24. It was attended by several hundred thousand, leading commentators to draw comparisons with the imposing demonstrations held the same month in Berlin, London, Brussels or Paris.

The Perugia-Assisi March had been held twice before: in 1961 during the last acute Cold War security crisis and in 1978 in the wake of the Neutron Bomb controversy. Its re-edition seemed to announce the emergence of a strong nonaligned peace movement.[45] Radicals hoped the latter would boost their campaign against world famine and help muster support for their efforts in Parliament to drastically increase foreign aid. Consequently, most Radical parliamentarians participated.[46] The procession was well attended and had a considerable impact

[44] "Schema della relazione del compagno Ledda sulla lotta per il disarmo, al gruppo di lavoro per la pace e ai segretari regionali," Sept. [?] 1981, *Carte Lucio Lombardo Radice, Scatola Disarmo Nucleare, Cartella Movimenti per la Pace*, Istituto Gramsci Roma (PCI Archives, Rome).

[45] Renzo Trivelli, "Nota sui problemi del movimento della pace," 13 June 1982, *Note a Segreteria, mf 508 2136-2154*, Istituto Gramsci Roma (PCI Archives, Rome); Roberto Cicciomessere, "Commenti alla marcia della pace Perugia-Assisi," 28 Sept. 1981, audioclip 7, OARR, http://www.radioradicale.it/scheda/2466/2479-commenti-alla-marcia-per-la-pace-perugia-assisi; " 'Deplorevole' l'atteggiamento della TV sulla Marcia," *l'Unità* (Rome), 29 Sept. 1981.

[46] "Politici, sindacalisti e tanti, tanti giovani," *Stampa Sera* (Turin), 28 Sept. 1981.

on public opinion, despite the scarce coverage by state television. Pannella, on hunger strike since September to mobilize opinion and political will to act on world famine, flew back from Brussels to participate. Adelaide Aglietta, head of the Chamber parliamentary group, hoped the event would lead to a constructive face-off between the Radicals and the PCI, "which abandoned [questions of disarmament] for so many years." A dialogue was possible, provided the sole focus would not merely be to re-establish a new equilibrium of terror at a lower level, which only produced never-ending renegotiations of levels of armament.[47] But the PCI, she reported, had already rejected a Radical proposal to demonstrate jointly in Moscow in protest of the Soviet SS-20s.[48]

As was predictable, the dominant presence of PCI militants in the procession from Perugia to Assisi obscured other pacifist and antimilitarist groups. The Radicals held clusters of blue balloons to distinguish themselves in the sea of red flags. Participating Radical politicians emphasized the good turnout of Radical Party members and sympathizers (estimated at between one and two thousand) and sought to underline in their radio dispatches their visibility amidst the tens of thousands of PCI partisans.[49] Rutelli claimed that the procession had been the largest of its kind ever in Italy and that it was similar to ones on Northern Europe; he argued that it was of another order than the huge peace marches of the late fifties organized by the PCI front group,

---

[47] See for example statement of Pannella, in commenting on the close connection between antimilitarism and pacifism and the world famine campaign, but warning that "one must never emphasize fear, fear is a lever for fascism," in Marco Pannella, interview by Adriano Sofri, "Pannella è pazzo? Forse. E noi?" *Lotta Continua* (Rome), 27 Sept. 1981, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=47640&lang=IT&cms=.

[48] Adelaide Aglietta, "Il Partito Radicale e l'attualità politica," 25 Sept. 1981, audioclip, OARR, http://www.radioradicale.it/scheda/2460/2473-il-partito-radicale-e-lattualita-politica.

[49] See Gianfranco Spadaccia and Francesco Rutelli, "Commenti alla marcia della pace Perugia-Assisi," 28 Sept. 1981, audioclip 4 and 6, OARR, http://www.radioradicale.it/scheda/2466/2479-commenti-alla-marcia-per-la-pace-perugia-assisi; "Politici, sindacalisti e tanti, tanti giovani," *Stampa Sera* (Turin), 29 Sept. 1981.

the Partisans of Peace.[50] One participant of the Independent Left who had joined the Chamber Radical group argued that peace was "no longer an empty vessel." Thanks to the Radicals, the "unwaged war" represented by world famine was present among the concerns of participants, he optimistically reported. Also significant, in his view, was the participation of numerous Catholics, despite a DC boycott. The latter, unlike most political parties, had not endorsed the initiative.[51]

Commenting on the new movement, *l'Unità* opined that it was not characterized by the pro-Soviet unilateralism of fifties-style pacifism, "which we nowadays reject." Italian Communists surmised that the movement sweeping Europe had the potential to "reshuffle the cards of international politics." They drew a parallel with the American peace movement of the second half of the sixties that had "upended the certainties of Johnson's America." Far from fueled by "evil anti-Americans," as anticommunist political adversaries claimed, the movement, continued *l'Unità*, represented the legitimate aspiration of Europeans for an autonomous role. "Something is happening in Europe: people are learning that they have power," enthused the journalist.[52] Alongside articles evoking the promise of a new pacifism, *l'Unità* reported on the denunciation of nuclear weapons by the Socialist International or the Swedish Social Democratic

[50] Francesco Rutelli, "Commenti alla marcia della pace Perugia-Assisi," 28 Sept. 1981, audioclip, OARR, http://www.radioradicale.it/scheda/2466/2479-commenti-alla-marcia-per-la-pace-perugia-assisi.

[51] Pio Bardelli, "Commenti alla marcia della pace Perugia-Assisi," 28 Sept. 1981, audioclip, OARR, http://www.radioradicale.it/scheda/2466/2479-commenti-alla-marcia-per-la-pace-perugia-assisi; "Marcia della pace Perugia 'invasa'," *Stampa Sera* (Turin), 26 Sept. 1981; Gabriella Mecucci, "Domani Perugia capitale della lotta per la pace La marcia di annuncia grandiosa Attese da tutta Italia decine di migliaia di persone – Adesione di personalità di ogni orientamento – Appello da Assisi," *l'Unità* (Rome), 26 Sept. 1981; "Ancora adesioni alla 'marcia' di Perugia," *l'Unità* (Rome), 26 Sept. 1981; Ruggero Conteduca, "La pacifica marcia su Assisi," *La Stampa* (Turin), 27 Sept. 1981.

[52] Ennio Polito, "Il fatto nuovo è questo slancio che scuote l'Europa," *l'Unità* (Rome), 29 Sept. 1981.

Party's choice of a Third Way drawing on neutralist and pacifist foreign policy stances.[53] The new peace movement, or so was the hope, held the promise of facilitating the advent of the PCI's own version of the Third Way.[54] In a related development, in early October, the PCI Central Committee held a meeting to discuss its draft Charter on Peace and Development, a restatement of the party's internationalism largely inspired by the Brandt Commission Report.[55] But given the tendency of the party base to revert to pro-Sovietism and anti-Americanism, the peace movement also presented political risks.[56]

The emerging Italian peace movement was a conveyor of variegated political perspectives and aspirations. The center and right proffered their traditional allegations that

[53] *Sveriges Socialdemokratiska Arbetareparti*, SAP.

[54] Augusto Pancaldi, "L'Internazionale socialista: no alle nuove armi nucleari all'Est e all'Ovest," *l'Unità* (Rome), 26 Sept. 1981; Sergio Talenti, "Neutralismo e pace come scelta strategica per i social-democratici svedesi. Il Congresso ha adottato la linea di Palme. Dal giudizio sui rapporti internazionali alla intuizione di una 'terza via' – Il ruolo decisivo dei movimenti popolari," *l'Unità* (Rome), 29 Sept. 1981; Sergio Taleni, "Nuove vie per la sinistra. In Svezia un'altra democrazia?", *l'Unità* (Rome), 4 Oct. 1981.

[55] Alberto Stabile, "È anche colpa dell'Urss se tira aria di guerra. Il dibattito di politica estera al Comitato centrale comunista. Ma Cossutta continua a difendere Mosca," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 7 Oct. 1981. The PCI Charter on Peace and Development had first been presented in draft form to the party's 15th congress (Mar.-Apr. 1979). Paolo Bufalini, "Riunione della Direzione del 25-26 Novembre 1981, Seduta antimeridiana, Bufanili relatore: '3. Questioni internazionali e movimenti per la pace," page 241, 25/26 Nov. 1981, *Direzione mf506 8205 238-258*, Istituto Gramsci Roma (PCI Archives, Rome); Silvio Pons, *Berlinguer e la fine del comunismo* (Turin: Einaudi, 2006), 211-2.

[56] On November 25 or 26, during a meeting of the PCI directory, Pietro Ingrao stated that the PCI base was still too uncritical of the USSR, see "Riunione della Direzione del 25-26 Novembre 1981, Seduta antimeridiana, Bufalini relatore: '3.Questioni internazionali e movimento per la pace'," page 252, *Direzione mf506 8205 238-258*, Istituto Gramsci Roma (PCI Archives). This tendency, alongside the ones leaning towards indiscriminate anti-Americanism, undermined the goal of the PCI to abet a multilateral, broad, unitary peace movement, a goal outlined in Oct. 1981 in "Schema della relazione del compagno Ledda sulla lotta per il disarmo, al gruppo di lavoro per la pace e ai segretari regionali," *Carte Lucio Lombardo Radice, Scatola Disarmo Nucleare, Cartella Movimenti per la Pace*, Istituto Gramsci Roma (PCI Archives, Rome). See also "La relazione di Romano Ledda al CC e alla CCC. Pace e sviluppo cardini della lotta per un nuovo assetto mondiale, " *l'Unità* (Rome), 6 Oct. 1981. Giorgio Napolitano was the most outspoken critic of the party's pro-Soviet, anti-American, and anti-Craxian tendencies. See for example his notes criticizing unilateral condemnations of US foreign policy during preparations for the peace demonstrations of 5 June 1982. The latter were held in Rome on the occasion of a visit of President Reagan: Giorgio Napolitano, "Memorandum of Giorgio Napolitano to the Secretariat," 3 June 1982, *Note a Segreteria, mf 508 2134-2135*, Istituto Gramsci Roma (PCI Archives, Rome).

pacifism served Soviet interests; General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev's enthusiastic endorsement of the Perugia-Assisi March was helpful in this respect.[57] On the left, even as the movement increasingly attracted popular enthusiasm and politicians' attention, old divisions remained, despite the hopes of ecumenically-minded peace activists. The Radicals were the first to withdraw their support, criticizing the endorsement of national liberation struggles as "aggressive" or the sloganeering of Communist militants as too anti-Reagan or anti-Craxi.[58] They retracted their endorsement of the common declaration of the event organizers.[59] While a potent mass mobilizer, nuclear fear and the type of pacifism it conjured obscured other considerations that mattered to the Radicals, such as the call to confront Soviet authoritarianism or to strip bare a peace concealing the death by famine of millions of individuals in the Third World.[60]

A parliamentary plenary session on Italian foreign policy, demanded earlier by the Radicals and its leftist allies but postponed to a later date, was held in October, even while

[57] Guido Ceronetti, "Pace e Dies irae," *La Stampa* (Turin), 30 Sept. 1981; Lorenzo Strik Lievers, , "Commenti alla marcia della pace Perugia-Assisi," 28 Sept. 1981, audioclip 3, OARR, http://www.radioradicale.it/scheda/2466/2479-commenti-alla-marcia-per-la-pace-perugia-assisi; " 'Amicizia e rispetto' nel messaggio di Breznev," *Stampa Sera* (Turin), 28 Sept. 1981.

[58] Francesco Rutelli and Roberto Cicciomessere, "Commenti alla marcia della pace Perugia-Assisi," 28 Sept. 1981, audioclips 6 and 7, OARR, http://www.radioradicale.it/scheda/2466/2479-commenti-alla-marcia-per-la-pace-perugia-assisi.

[59] Sandro Medici, "Perugia Riuscirà un corteo di massa a diventare un movimento? Per ora nella sinistra sulla pace si litiga. Annunciati Pajetta, Lama, Pannella," *il manifesto* (Rome), 26 Sept. 1981.

[60] "Il Manifesto-Appello dei Premi Nobel," 24 June 1981, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=47597&lang=IT&cms=; Ruggero Conteduca, "Ad Assisi, in 50 mila 'Il mondo vuole pace'," *Stampa Sera* (Turin), 28 Sept. 1981; Eugenio Manca, "Bobbio: tragica scalata che la gente può fermare. Il giudizio del filosofo dopo la marcia di Assisi. È importante l'esistenza di un'opinione pubblica che manifesta le sue angosce e la sua volontà – Un mondo diverso rispetto alla marcia del 1961, ma la paura resta," *l'Unità* (Rome), 29 Sept. 1981; Alberto Jacoviello, "La paura della guerra," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 18/19 Oct. 1981; for a full exposition of the Radical concept of rightful peace and peace as "unwaged war" (*guerra non guerregiata*) see Rutelli, *Per il disarmo*.

superpower disarmament talks proceeded.[61] The Chamber debate opened on the first of October, on the same day that *l'Unità* announced in cubical letters a "colossal" US arms buildup.[62] Underlying the debate on international developments was political wrangling within the five-party ruling coalition, pitting currents within the PSI and PRI favorable to a rapprochement with the PCI against opponents. Earlier in September the Socialists had criticized Communist "demagogic" support for the peace movement. Presently, on account of tensions within the ruling coalition between Socialists and Christian Democrats, a wink and a nudge in the direction of the PCI was in order.[63] Socialist deputy Claudio Martelli, the youngish right-hand man of Craxi, praised the conciliatory approach to Italian foreign policy of the PCI, noting that despite the contrary vote in 1979 on the Euromissiles double-track decision, the PCI had of late demonstrated a laudably soft opposition on foreign policy matters; he called for a renewal of the spirit of national consensus of 1977. Socialist maneuvers did not reflect a fundamental political

[61] Emilio Colombo (Foreign Minister, DC), "Comunicazioni del governo sulla politica estera," 1 Oct. 1981, *Atti Parlamentari, Camera dei Deputati, Resoconto Stenografico, Seduta di giovedì 1 ottobre 1981*, 33545-59, http://legislature.camera.it/_dati/leg08/lavori/stenografici/sed0384/sed0384.pdf#page=77&zoom=95,0,70;"Il Cremlino è polemico," *La Stampa* (Turin), 30 Sept. 1981; "Usa-Urss riaprono il dialogo non il processo di pace," *La Stampa* (Turin), 30 Sept. 1981; "Secondo incontro Haig-Gromyko ma cala in vento dell'optimismo," *La Stampa* (Turin), 29 Sept. 1981; Aniello Coppola, "È deciso: trattativa a novembre L'annuncio di Haig e Gromyko solleva nuove speranze. A Ginevra gli incontri sui missili e il disarm," *l'Unità* (Rome), 25 Sept. 1981; Ennio Caretto, "Negoziato tra Usa e Urss il 30 novembre a Ginevra," *La Stampa* (Turin), 25 Sept. 1981; Rodolfo Brancoli, "Fra America e Urss il ghiaccio è rotto. I due ministri degli Esteri hanno parlato per 4 ore. Primo accordo Haig-Gromyko sulla trattativa per gli euromissili," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 24 Sept. 1981.

[62] Aniello Coppola, "Reagan dà il via a un colossale piano per il riarmo strategico Dopo la decisione sulla bomba N e gli euromissili Saranno costruiti i missili 'MX' per una spesa di ottantamila miliardi di lire, la cifra più alta mai preventivata per un singolo ordigno – Ogni bombardiere B-1 costerà 250 miliardi di lire-L'annuncio sarà dato domani dal president," *l'Unità* (Rome), 1 Oct. 1981; *La Stampa*, a centrist paper, was less emotional in its assessment. See Ennio Caretto, "Reagan decide per i prossimi 5 anni il maggior riarmo della storia Usa," *La Stampa* (Turin), 1 Oct. 1981. The leftist press tended to emphasize the menace represented by Reagan's rearmament plans: see for example Rodolfo Brancoli, "La nuova sfida di Reagan vincere la guerra nucleare. Il presidente americano vara un gigantesco piano di riarmo," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 3 Oct. 1981.

[63] Claudio Martelli, "Comunicazioni del governo sulla politica estera," 1 Oct. 1981, *Atti Parlamentari Camera dei Deputati Resoconto Stenografico 384. Seduta di giovedì 1 ottobre 1981*, 33588-92, http://legislature.camera.it/_dati/leg08/lavori/stenografici/sed0384/sed0384.pdf#page=77&zoom=95,0,70; "Nuove accuse del Psi alla 'demagogia comunista'," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 9 Sept. 1981; Miriam Mafai, "Euromissili a Comiso oggi voto alla Camera. Sulla politica estera avvicinamento Pci-Psi," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 2 Oct. 1981.

realignment, but rather a short-term tactic to erode Christian Democratic resistance to Craxi's advance.

Within the PCI, oscillations were also in act between a faction favorable to an untrammeled embrace of the peace movement and one led by Napolitano favorable to a moderate line convergent with the Socialists.[64] In his Chamber allocution, one PCI deputy took a middle road, presumably reflecting Berlinguer's views. While criticizing the government and noting the intent of his party to present the following day a resolution calling for the postponement of Euromissile deployment and a ban from Italian territory of the Neutron Bomb, he noted the kinship of Communist and Socialist stances. Turning to the divisive question of rearmament, and citing as an authority *Newsweek*, he rejected the accusations hurled at the PCI of "catastrophism." The American periodical, he implied, held similar views as the PCI on the credible threat of a devastating atomic war. The technological innovations represented by the Euromissiles and the Neutron Bomb made a war limited to Europe possible: "peace is the decisive problem," the Communist emphasized.[65]

---

[64] See the call of one party member ("Minucci") for a firm endorsement of the peace movement and his criticism of Napolitano for taking dissident views that weakened the party" under attack from all sides." In response, Napolitano reiterated the need for engagement in the political process and dialogue with the PSI. Minucci, ""Riunione della Direzione del 10 Settembre 1981-seduta antimeridiana-"1. Situazione internazionale e situazione politica italiana Relatore: Minucci," 10 Sept.1981, *Direzione, mf 506 8205 1-59*, Istituto Gramsci Roma (PCI Archives, Rome). Napolitano had called in albeit ambiguous terms for collaboration with the PSI in August. See Giorgio Napolitano, "Perchè è essenziale il richiamo a Togliatti," *l'Unità* (Rome), 21 Aug. 1981. Napolitano would remain a critic of PCI "propagandistic" tendencies on the Euromissiles question, often amplified in his opinion in the pages of *l'Unità*. See for example Giorgio Napolitano, "President of the Chamber Parliamentary Group, letter to Macaluso and Ledda," 15 Nov. 1983, *Sezioni di Lavoro, mf 557 2449-2451*, Istituto Gramsci Roma (PCI Archives, Rome).

[65] Giancarlo Pajetta, "Comunicazioni del governo sulla politica estera," 1 Oct. 1981, *Atti Parlamentari, Camera dei Deputati, Resoconto stenografico, 384. seduta di giovedì 1 ottobre 1981*, 33592-601, http://legislature.camera.it/_dati/leg08/lavori/stenografici/sed0384/sed0384.pdf#page=77&zoom=95,0,70; Vera Vegetti, "Governo senza idee Pajetta: un ruolo attivo per il disarmo. Alla Camera la politica estera dell'Italia. Piatta esposizione di Pajetta che è giunto a ignorare le decisioni USA-Divergenze nella maggioranza: Martelli riconosce il valore delle scelte PCI," *l'Unità* (Rome), 2 Oct. 1981; " 'Bisogna fare subito, per la pace'," *l'Unità* (Rome), 2 Oct. 1981.

Contrasting definitions on how best to secure peace as well as assessments of the new peace movement peppered the speeches of other deputies. Mirko Tremaglia, of the far right MSI-DN, seconded editorialist Scalfari's opinion that the Neutron Bomb decreased the possibility of war in Europe.[66] Insisting that the Soviet SS-20s had created a dangerous imbalance, Tremaglia dismissed PCI claims that an accurate nuclear equilibrium was hard to calculate and criticized its "new great propagandistic weapon," the peace movement.[67] The latter was little more than proof of its Soviet loyalties—why, he asked, had not the PCI launched a peace movement in 1977, when a "warmongering" Soviet Union began installing nuclear missiles?[68] Flaminio Piccoli (DC) also attacked the peace movement, accusing it of being partial. "Why do they not march for Poland? Why do they not march for the independence of Afghanistan? […] These are not rhetorical questions, they reveal a real problem." The Christian Democratic politician called for a need to forge a middle road between militarism and a "fallacious pacifism [*irenismo*]," because as "De Gasperi said: 'peace is not simply the absence of war, it is human solidarity, the will of international cooperation, […] free discussion and understanding between peoples; if there is no such spirit, peace is threatened and a potential state of war exists'." Paraphrasing and upending an earlier comment by a PCI deputy, Piccoli

---

[66] Scalfari, "Forse de Gaulle aveva ragione…" *La Repubblica*, 15 Aug. 1981.

[67] Tremaglia referred to a Paolo Bufalini (PCI) article: Paolo Bufalini, "Euromissili e SS20 Proposte nuove ci sono, perchè non negoziate?" *l'Unità* (Rome), 26 July 1981.

[68] Mirko Tremaglia, "Comunicazioni del governo sulla politica estera," 1 Oct. 1981, *Atti Parlamentari, Camera dei Deputati, Resoconto stenografico, 384. seduta di giovedì 1 ottobre 1981*, 33578-88, http://legislature.camera.it/_dati/leg08/lavori/stenografici/sed0384/sed0384.pdf#page=77&zoom=95,0,70.

concluded that the Communist position in substance amounted to letting the Soviet Union off the hook; the SS-20s too, after all, were a concrete and terrifying threat.[69]

Tremaglia and Piccoli's criticisms illustrated the difficult balancing act attempted by the Communists. The PCI had earlier argued that it was better for Europe's security to accept Breznev's offer of a moratorium on the further deployment of SS-20s; the latter would at least limit the number of deployed Soviet missiles in exchange for the non-deployment of Euromissiles. But in so doing, the PCI appeared to dismiss the destabilizing effect of the already deployed SS-20s, even while magnifying the threat of the planned Euromissiles, a position which in effect played into the hands of Soviet policymakers.[70]

During the same parliamentary debate, representatives of PdUP and the Radical Party took care to demarcate their stances from what Lucio Magri (PdUP) termed "generic pacifists." Magri enunciated positions in many ways similar to those of the Radicals: he mocked Italian foreign policy as subservient to the US, resorted to a balanced denunciation of the imperialism of both superpowers, warned of the dangers of technological innovation in nuclear weaponry, demanded Italian departure from NATO, and proposed direct negotiations of Europe with the Soviet Union for a denuclearized zone from Portugal to Poland. But despite similitarities on the issue of disarmament, a significant difference between PdUP and Radical pacifism derived from the United Proletarians' Marxism. Its corollary was avoidance of the aggressive anti-Soviet

[69] "Comunicazioni del governo sulla politica estera," 1 Oct. 1981, *Atti Parlamentari, Camera dei Deputati, Resoconto stenografico, 384. seduta di giovedì 1 ottobre 1981*, 33601-11.

[70] Paolo Bufalini, "Euromissili e SS20. Proposte nuove ci sono perchè non negoziate?"*l'Unità* (Rome), 26 July 1981.

verbiage resorted to by the Radicals; Pannella, paraphrasing Cato, had recently declared hyperbolically that Soviet totalitarianism should be destroyed.[71]

Cicciomessere, during his parliamentary allocution, distinguished Radical positions from those of all other parties. Radical denunciation of the equilibrium of terror as a precondition for peace, stated Cicciomessere, was at the heart of the originality of the party's pacifism. Seeking to explain why Northern European countries harbored vigorous peace movements, he speculated that there "the concept that equilibrium and peace are founded on terror [is rejected]. No wonder there is talk [there] of unilateral disarmament; this is the cultural and political goal for which people mobilize […]" He disputed the PCI focus on solely the Euromissiles or the Neutron Bomb and reiterated the familiar criticism of Communist neglect of "another 1500 nuclear warheads with far more devastating effects." After noting that during the previous year ten thousand Italian conscientious objectors had come forth, Cicciomessere referred approvingly to another sign of the times: a statement of Monsignor Bettazzi, Bishop of Ivrea, affirming that "any defense which involves necessarily the death of those defended is immoral."[72]

Cicciomessere elaborated on the difference between democracies and "so-called socialist countries." In the former, militarism, the organizing principle of the Cold War system, was linked to "violent societies." In the East, militarism was linked to "a violent state." The violence

[71] Marco Pannella, interview by Adriano Sofri, "Pannella è pazzo? Forse. E noi?" *Lotta Continua* (Rome), 27 Sept. 1981, OHRA; Lucio Magri, "Comunicazioni del governo sulla politica estera", 1 Oct. 1981, *Atti Parlamentari, Camera dei Deputati, Resoconto Stenografico, Seduta di giovedì 1 ottobre 1981*, 33564-71, http://legislature.camera.it/_dati/leg08/lavori/stenografici/sed0384/sed0384.pdf#page=77&zoom=95,0,70. For an account of PdUP pacifist stances, see PdUP, Palermo, "Una piattaforma di analisi e proposte per rilanciare riqualificato il movimento," *Segno*, no. 28 (Dec. 1981).

[72] Roberto Cicciomessere, "Communicazioni del governo relative alla politica estera," 2 Oct. 1981, *Atti Parlamentari, Camera dei Deputati, Resoconto stenografico, 385. seduta di venerdì 2 ottobre 1981,* 33685-6, http://legislature.camera.it/_dati/leg08/lavori/stenografici/sed0385/sed0385.pdf.

and militarism of democratic countries might be addressed, he continued, through civil society pressure exerted from within. But the absence of civil and political freedoms in socialist countries deprived one of such levers; consequently, nonviolent intervention through resort to international treatises such as the Helsinki Final Act was necessary. Summarizing his utopian vision for an alternative Italian diplomacy, Cicciomessere concluded that if Italy chose disarmament and mobilized effectively to ensure the safety from famine of millions, we "might have the possibility, the strength, the capacity, the authority to demand the respect of international treaties, and to request […] also from other countries political and economic sanctions against countries which do not respect international accords […]" "It is for this reason" he continued "that problems of security cannot only be placed in a military context: we have always said so and then discovered that the Carter Commission [on World Hunger] too agrees with this affirmation."[73]

Radicals also sought to buttress their bona-fide leftism by criticizing domestic and foreign "militarists." Cicciomessere directed his sarcasm at the ruling Socialists and Christian Democrats for posing as pacifists while claiming disingenuously that "the Neutron Bomb will never, ever be deployed or used on Italian territory." Also criticized in strong terms was the Reagan administration for not consulting with European allies: "the government of the United States has demonstrated disdain for its allies not only with the Neutron Bomb decision, a weapon that can be only used on European territory, but also, for instance, with the events in the Gulf of

[73] Roberto Cicciomessere, "Comunicazioni del governo sulla politica estera," 1 Oct. 1981, *Atti Parlamentari, Camera dei Deputati, Resoconto Stenografico, Seduta di giovedì 1 ottobre 1981*, 33614-5, http://legislature.camera.it/_dati/leg08/lavori/stenografici/sed0384/sed0384.pdf#page=77&zoom=95,0,70. For the text of the Carter Commission, see Report of the Presidential Commission on World Hunger, published as *Overcoming World Hunger: The Challenge Ahead* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1980).

Sidra […] the United States went into that Gulf [in Lybia] for the sake of provocation […]"[74] Criticism of US foreign policy had the advantage of deflecting potential accusations of being uncritically pro-American, a despised stance associated with conservative constituencies.

October was crowded with peace demonstrations. After Perugia, a major demonstration was held in Comiso on October 11.[75] Sicilian opposition to deployment was unexpectedly strong, drawing not only on the organizational capacity of the island's Communists but also on grassroots organizations, including Catholic parishes and small Protestant denominations.[76] The Radicals were not involved in such events. The previous August, after the announcement of the planned location for the Euromissiles, Rutelli had travelled to Sicily, where the Radicals did not maintain a meaningful presence; he had initially hoped to forge alliances with the local PCI and other interested parties around a series of initiatives.[77] But little came of the proposal.

---

[74] See for example Vanna Vannuccini, "Schmidt e Spadolini intesa per la pace. Pieno accordo a Roma fra i due capi di governo. 'Reagan deve ascoltare l'Europa'," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 12 Sept. 1981. US policy in El Salvador also met with disapproval, particularly on the left. See for example the Radical motion 6-00056 submitted on 2 Oct.1981, at the conclusion of the debate on foreign policy: "Communicazioni del governo relative alla politica estera," *Atti Parlamentari, Camera dei Deputati, Resoconto Stenografico, Seduta di venerdì 2 ottobre 1981,* 33670-1, http://legislature.camera.it/_dati/leg08/lavori/stenografici/sed0385/sed0385.pdf.

[75] By one account, a crowd expected to include 10,000 participants actually numbered some 35-37,000, see Giacomo Cagnes, "Comiso, appuntamento per la pace," *Segno*, no. 28 (Dec. 1981); "La marcia di Comiso per una base di pace. Oggi la Sicilia manifesta contro i missili," *l'Unità* (Rome), 11 Oct. 1981; Roselina Salemi, "Oggi invasione pacifica a Comiso per dire no ai missili e alla guerra. Socialisti, Pci, senza tessera, cristiani da tutta Italia alla marcia contro i 'Cruise'," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 11/12 Oct. 1981; Bruno Marasà, *Gli anni di Comiso* (Palermo: Istituto Gramsci Siciliano, 1986), 34-5.

[76] Laurens Hogebrink, (Staff, Department on Church and Society, board member of IKV [Dutch Interchurch Council]), "Memorandum of a visit to the new peace movement in Sicily, October 1981," 11 Nov. 1981, *Contacten met andere organisaties-Europa tot 1983-Italië, 1978-1983 pak,* Archief Interkerkelik Vredesberaad 's-Gravenhage (IKV Archives), Institute of Social History, Amsterdam.

[77] Francesco Rutelli, "Armi: la 'bomba N' e gli euromissili," 10 Aug. 1981, audioclip, OARR, http://www.radioradicale.it/scheda/2358/2371-armi-la-bomba-n-e-gli-euromissili. Rutelli suggested at the time that Comiso might be a "trap" set up by the government to distract the public from other possible deployment locations. The Radicals proposed joint action with the local PCI or others interested on 3 courses of action (1) a consultative (not legislatively binding) regional Sicilian referendum on deployment, (2) harsh opposition at the county level modeled on effective Radical tactics employed in central Italy at Montalto di Castro to stop the construction of a nuclear plant, and (3) coordination of an "offensive" by Comiso county authorities to reclaim the Magliocco Airport

Henceforth, Radicals justified their absence from Sicily by arguing that political and civil society action should focus on Rome, whence the decision to deploy had come and where decisions could be affected through Parliament.[78]

In September, the governmental deadline to develop and present to parliament a program on the question of world famine had slipped by, prompting Radicals to submit over two hundred interrogations demanding plans to "spare from certain death" at least ten thousand individuals in each one of several delimited localities in the Third World.[79] In an attempt to attract the flagging attention of the media and the public to their famine campaign, the Radicals organized a demonstration in Rome for "life, peace and disarmament." It was held on October 17, two days after World Nutrition Day, and took as its point of departure the world headquarters of the UN's Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), located in Mussolini's sprawling limestone complex formerly housing the Ministries of the Colonies. Weeks earlier, Eurodeputy Pannella had secured the approval in Strasbourg of a resolution recommending a major increase in 1982 of funding allocated by member states to the developing world.[80] As was customary, the Radicals protested the lack of interest of the Italian media, contrasting it unfavorably with the Belgian or

---

(designated for missile deployment) for commercial purposes. Francesco Rutelli, interview, "Installazione di missili a Comiso," 11 Aug. 1981, audioclip, OARR, http://www.radioradicale.it/scheda/2363/2376-installazione-di-missili-a-comiso.

[78] Marco Pannella and Francesco Rutelli, "Comiso tradita?" 30 Nov. 1982, audioclips 1 and 2, OARR, http://www.radioradicale.it/scheda/3926?format=32.

[79] "Interrogazioni a risposta orale," 24 Sept. 1981, *Atti Parlamentari, Camera dei Deputati, Resoconto stenografico, 379. seduta di giovedì 24 settembre 1981*, xvii-cxxviii, http://legislature.camera.it/_dati/leg08/lavori/stenografici/sed0379/sed0379.pdf.

[80] Marco Pannella, "Sterminio per fame nel mondo. Il Parlamento europeo approva la risoluzione proposta dai radicali, conferenza stampa di Marco Pannella," 29 Sept. 1981, press conference, audioclip , OARR, http://www.radioradicale.it/scheda/187054/sterminio-per-fame-nel-mondo-il-parlamento-europeo-approva-la-risoluzione-proposta-dai-radic; "Celebrata ieri in 140 paesi la giornata contro la fame," *l'Unità* (Rome), 11 Oct. 1981.

French press; they pointed out that *Le Monde*, for example, had published an article on Pannella's campaign.[81] Though it was true that the Italian press often ignored incessant Radical efforts to publicize their agenda, the issue of world famine itself was relatively prominent in the news and presumably present among public opinion concerns.[82] On this occasion as on others, Radical laments were part of their relentless effort to gain a wider audience. One journalist commented on "the Radicals, who have made of the question of television attentiveness to them, and of their presence on television, a matter of scientific inquiry applied to political doctrine."[83] Their October 17 demonstration drew perhaps 5,000 participants; in a last minute decision, the PCI endorsed the Radical rally, but with little effect on attendance.[84] The number of participants could not hope to rival even the lesser peace demonstrations organized by Communists.[85]

On October 24, UN World Disarmament Day, once again in Rome, the fall's major peace demonstration drew a turnout of between 150 and 300 thousand participants, the largest street protest in the capital since 1969, according to *La Stampa*. President Reagan unwittingly

---

[81] "Digiuno di Pannella contro la fame (articolo di 'Le Monde')," 14 Oct. 1981, audioclip, OARR, http://www.radioradicale.it/scheda/4171/4184-digiuno-di-pannella-contro-la-fame-articolo-di-le-monde.

[82] "Mitterrand e Schmidt appoggiano il progetto italiano contro la fame," *La Stampa* (Turin), 24 Oct. 1981; Gerard Viratelle, "Edgar Pisani 'Il 2000, un'apocalisse: la fame condanna 70 milioni di uomini'," *La Stampa* (Turin), 20 Oct. 1981; Guido Bimbi, "Contro la fame, per la pace drammatico appello di Brandt Celebrati a Roma e in 140 paesi la Giornata mondiale dell'alimentazione," *l'Unità* (Rome), 17 Oct. 1981; Ennio Polito, "Come risponde l'Europa al dilemma riarmo-sviluppo," *l'Unità* (Rome), 17 Oct. 1981; "Sterminio per fame (speciale del Tg1)," 19 Oct. 1981, RAI 1 video recording, audioclip, OARR, http://www.radioradicale.it/scheda/2508/2521-sterminio-per-fame-speciale-del-tg1.

[83] Vittorio Gorresio, "Dopo la marcia della pace," *La Stampa* (Turin), 27 Oct. 1981. See also Luca Giurato, "Fallita un'intesa con i radicali. Volevano una tribuna tv al giorno," *La Stampa* (Turin), 9 Oct. 1981.

[84] "Contro la fame fiaccolata a Roma," *La Stampa* (Turin), 18 Oct. 2010; "Marcia contro lo sterminio per fame (organizzata dal Pr)," 17 Oct. 1981, audioclip, OARR, http://www.radioradicale.it/scheda/2506/2519-marcia-contro-lo-sterminio-per-fame-organizzata-dal-pr.

[85] For example, the one held on 16 Oct. in Rome. It reportedly drew some 30,000 participants, see M. Giovanna Maglie, "Pace, i giovani tornano in piazza 30.000 a Roma 'Non affidiamo il nostro futuro a chi prepara la guerra'," *l'Unità* (Rome), 16 Oct. 1981.

contributed to the outcome. On 21 October Italian newspapers reported that Reagan, stumbling into the arcane discipline of nuclear strategy in response to a question, had reported that under certain circumstances he saw "where you could have the exchange of tactical weapons in the field without it bringing either one of the major powers to pushing the button." By "field" Reagan meant Europe; his statement set off a storm. To little avail were attempts the next day by Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger to offset the damage. Brezhnev happily scored a point by stating that recourse to nuclear weapons was simply inconceivable, given the consequences.[86]

Commentators noted the array of parties and civil society organizations participating in the Rome peace demonstration of October 24: PCI and PdUP, but also Radicals and the pacifist wing of the PSI. Representatives of the Catholic Church and of Protestant denominations were present, alongside the Jewish community, feminists, gays, anarchists, and OLP supporters. But also noted were the prevalence of anti-Reagan slogans and the relative dearth of statements critical of Soviet foreign policy. The dominance of PCI partisans, in which "Pannella's army" disappeared, was once again in evidence.[87] *La Repubblica* opined that it was a "primarily anti-

[86] Richard Halloran, "Weinberger Seeks to Assure Allies on Reagan Remark on Atomic War," *New York Times*, 21 Oct. 1981; Mary Onori, "Reagan: possibile una guerra atomica limitata al territorio dell'Europa Breznev: se scoppia un conflitto nucleare tutto il mondo sarà coinvolto. Allarme e condanna in molte capitali per le paurose dichiarazioni del presidente USA Per la prima volta questa dottrina viene enunciate così esplicitamente in sede politica – Fonti ufficiali americane tentano di attenuare le affermazioni – Il governo olandese chiede chiarimenti a Washington – Proteste nella SPD e tra il laburisti britannici – Ma Lagorio minimizza," *l'Unità* (Rome), 21 Oct. 1981; "Una novità tremenda," *l'Unità* (Rome), 21 Oct. 1981; Renzo Trivelli, "Una ragione di più per le manifestazioni di sabato nelle capitali europee," *l'Unità* (Rome), 21 Oct.1981; Andrea Robilant, "Lo scudo atomico Usa non copre più l'Europa. Possibile una guerra nucleare limitata al vecchio continente. Allarmante dichiarazione di Reagan," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 21 Oct. 1981; "L'Europa s'interroga alarmata. Germania sotto choc, mentre Parigi tenta di capire," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 21 Oct. 1981; Fabio Galvano, "Breznev polemico risponde a Reagan sulla 'guerra N'," *La Stampa* (Turin), 21 Oct. 1981; Andrea Robilant, "Reagan fa marcia indietro 'L'Europa non resta sola.' Il presidente Usa abandona la teoria della guerra limitata. Ma nella Nato si accentuano i contrasti," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 22 Oct. 1981; Mary Onori, "Sulla guerra in Europa Reagan costretto a fare marcia indietro. Resta però intatto l'allarme per la minaccia. Dopo l'ondata di proteste dalle capitali europee il presidente ha definite 'illazioni' le sue dichiarazioni – Nuove opposizioni alla vendita di 'Awacs'," *l'Unità* (Rome), 22 Oct. 1981.

[87] But Mino Fuccillo argued that there was no one-party dominance of the demonstration, see his "I partiti spiazzati dal movimento. Craxi dovrà corregere la rotta?" *La Repubblica* (Rome), 27 Oct. 1981; for comments and a live

US demonstration."[88] In disagreement over the contents of the demonstration's common declaration, the Radicals withdrew their endorsement, as they had in Assisi.[89]

The political import of the new movement was confirmed by the October 24 event; its strength though harbored unpredictable effects on the apparent PCI-PSI rapprochement. On the one hand, it facilitated amity, as the PSI still nurtured a pacifist vocation. On the other, too much pressure from the street might undermine the PCI goal of preserving the foreign policy consensus and could create obstacles for Italian diplomacy, now partly controlled by the Socialists.[90] Weeks earlier, the West German SPD had experienced severe divisiveness consequent due to pacifist pressures. During the party's congress, Chancellor Schmidt faced an empowered left opposition led by former Chancellor Willy Brandt.[91] In Italy, pundits and politicians speculated on the consequences of a transnational civil society movement favorable to European neutralism or autonomy.[92] Mitterrand, however, bucked the trend and acted decisively to secure a majority vote in favor of Euromissile deployment within the divided Socialist International.[93]

---

recording of slogans proffered during the demonstration, see "Manifestazione per la pace," 24 Oct. 1981, audioclip, OARR, http://www.radioradicale.it/scheda/2528/2541-manifestazione-per-la-pace.

[88] Paolo Guzzanti, "Per un'Europa senza missili. È nato nel Vecchio continente un grande movimento contro il riarmo nucleare. Sfila a Roma un immenso corteo pacifista," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 25/26 Oct. 1981.

[89] Cecilia Mastrantonio and Giuliana Sgrena, "Un pacifismo non ancora in movimento. Dai cinquecentomila del 24 ottobre alle marce di Comiso," *Pace e guerra*, no. 9 (27 Jan. 1983), 34-6.

[90] Miriam Mafai, "Euromissili a Comiso. Oggi voto alla Camera. Sulla politica estera avvicinamento Pci-Psi," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 2 Oct. 1981; Giorgio Rossi, "Craxi e Spadolini hanno evitato la contrapposizione con i comunisti. Riconfermata a Montecitorio la vocazione pacifista e nazionale della sinistra," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 2 Oct. 1981.

[91] "SPD divisa su pace e disarmo," *l'Unità* (Rome), 4 Oct. 1981.

[92] Vanna Vannuccini, "Schmidt e Brandt ormai a ferri corti sul nuovo pacifismo e sul riarmo Nato," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 3 Oct. 1981; Gianni Baget Bozzo, "Movimento per la pace. In Germania e Italia," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 23 Oct. 1981; Rodolfo Brancoli, " 'Né Reagan né Breznev il Pci è per l'Europa che si batte per la pace.' Bilancio internazionale in un'intervista con Berlinguer dall'America latina," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 24 Oct. 1981; Barbara Spinelli, " 'No alla trappola pacifista' il Ps francese accusa Mosca. Evocando Winston Churchill il congresso di

The Radical Party was also rent between partisans of internationalist engagement and supporters of more pragmatic domestic concerns. The party's annual congress (October 28-November 1) witnessed a face-off between an internationalist majority and a minority which sought better ties with the Socialists and greater attention to domestic issues, including socio-economic ones. Pannella's internationalist line won the day; hitherto the unchallenged but unofficial leader, he now claimed for the first time in fourteen years the title of party secretary.[94] As a partial concession to his critics a political program addressing the revenue grievances of pensioners was drafted, and the posts of four vice-secretaries created. The new left wing of the party, represented chiefly by Boato and Pinto, both of whom had joined the catch-all party of the 1979 elections, voiced their dissent; continuing internecine conflict would lead to their departure and a party mini-scission one year later. As far as relations with the other major parties of the left went, even while continuing to proclaim the ideal of a united left, the Radicals criticized the Socialists on account of the "militarism" of Minister of Defense Lelio Lagorio and what they argued was a dubious diplomacy fueled by military-industrial interests. The PCI came in for the

---

Valenza condanna il neutralismo," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 24 Oct. 1981; Bernardo Valli, "I socialisti europei si schierano contro il neutralismo in Europa," *La Stampa* (Rome), 24 Oct. 1981; Mino Fuccillo, "I partiti spiazzati dal movimento Craxi dovrà corregere la rotta?" *La Repubblica* (Rome), 27 Oct. 1981; Franco Vernice, "A Milano il Psi in piazza per la pace. Ma il Movimento diffida dei partiti. Sabato due marce: al mattino gli studenti da soli, poi insieme con sindacati e forze politiche. Schiaffi in assemblea, il voto condanna la linea dura," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 29 Oct. 1981; Saverio Tutino, "Breznev-Reagan contro l'Europa?" *La Repubblica* (Rome), 29 Oct. 1981; Franco Vernice, "Milano, unita, festeggia la pace. Anche i socialisti alla manifestazione che pure ha visto slogan polemici verso i Cruise, Lagorio e il governo. Centomila in piazza contro i missili americani e russi. Studenti, partiti, sindacati in una girandole di cortei," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 1/2 Nov. 1981.

[93] Pons, *Berlinguer e la fine del communismo*, 239-40.

[94] Marco Pannella, "Riflessioni, annotazioni," *Notizie Radicali*, 15 Dec. 1981, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=47707&lang=IT&cms=.

usual criticism on account of its allegedly opportunistic pacifism and lingering ties to the Soviet Union.[95]

Weighing the outcomes of the Radical congress, *l'Unità* speculated that a crisis was in act within the party consequent to the waning of the "era of civil liberties." If so, opined the paper, then the world famine campaign risked proving a diversion and an alibi for the continued leadership of the charismatic but also increasingly contested Pannella.[96] More sympathetic was the appraisal by Gianni Baget Bozzo, a Catholic, left-leaning intellectual interested in both the Radical phenomenon and the peace movement. The famine campaign, he argued, was Pannella's response to the growing disillusionment of Italians with their parties, even as Italian civil society grew stronger. The Radical Party was both party and "anti-party"; Pannella's leadership a metaphor for a contemporary amalgamation of antipolitics and politics. The Radical leader, argued Baget Bozzo, had sensed the need to reach beyond mundane politics for something that might resonate with citizens; the topic of world famine "arose from the intuition" of a need to

[95] Giorgio Battistini, "Rutelli: 'Se Craxi non cambia i radicali apriranno una guerra elettorale col PSI.' Polemiche e autocritica nella relazione al Congresso," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 29 Oct. 1981; Alberto Rapisarda, "I radicali rompono con il Psi ma criticano anche I comunisti," *La Stampa* (Turin), 29 Oct. 1981; Antonio Caprarica, "Il PR duro col PSI: 'svende i valori del socialismo.' La relazione di Rutelli al congresso," *l'Unità* (Rome), 29 Oct. 1981; Antonio Caprarica, "Pannella rincara la dose contro il PSI. Con dichiarazioni ai giornalisti in appoggio alla dura relazione del segretario Rutelli. Il capo radicale vuole imporre al partito come unico impegno l'appoggio alla sua iniziativa sulla questione della fame nel mondo- Ha mostrato diffidenza e una punta di disprezzo per le marce della pace," *l'Unità* (Rome), 30 Oct. 1981; Antonio Caprarica, "Anatemi e minacce di Pannella per frenare I dissensi interni. Sarcastico ma preoccupato intervento al congresso PR di Firenze. Il tentativo di fronteggiare gli attacchi dei molti oppositori esaltando l'azione dimostrativa contro la fame – Bersagliato dalle assise il vice-segretario del PSI, Spini," *l'Unità* (Rome), 31 Oct. 1981; Alberto Rapisarda, "Pannella attacca d'anticipo per bloccare l'opposizione," *La Stampa* (Turin), 31 Oct. 1981; Antonio Capranica, "Pannella nuovo segretario dei radicali? Per ricomporre la spaccatura interna," *l'Unità* (Rome), 1 Nov. 1981; Giorgio Battistini, "Tre candidati alla segreteria ma forse torna Marco Pannella. Al congresso l'opposizione chiede una politica più equidistante tra Pci e Psi," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 1/2 Nov. 1981; Giorgio Battistini, "Pannella si riprende il Pr per portarlo alle elezioni. Il congresso si è concluso con la nomina di quattro vicesegretari," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 3 Nov. 1981; Angiolo Bandinelli, "Firenze. L'unità vince il congresso," *Notizie Radicali*, 15 Dec. 1981, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=47715&lang=IT&cms=.

[96] Antonio Caprarica, "Ed ora anche per i radicali appuntamento con la politica. Bilancio di un congresso inquieto ma forse non inutile," *l'Unità* (Rome), 3 Nov. 1981.

respond on a higher plane, beyond politics or the state, "to the problem of the 'defense of life'." This was a time in history, had argued the same author in an earlier article on pacifism, when foreign affairs, "for the first time since 1948," were a matter of daily concern to common citizens. It was no accident, he added in his column on the Radical congress, that despite the anticlerical traditions of his party, Pannella often referred favorably to Pope John Paul II. The latter was apparently his ideal interlocutor, more than politicians Craxi or Berlinguer. Not least, as the PSI shifted rightward, concluded Baget Bozzo, Radicals sensed an opportunity; they hoped to capitalize on the votes of disgruntled supporters of the left wing of the PSI.[97] Baget Bozzo's appraisal was on target, and Radical hopes not wholly unfounded. In fall 1981, the direction of Italian politics remained uncertain, Spadolini's premiership contested, and Radicals were not alone in banking on yet another round of early elections.[98]

Electoral considerations also underpinned the PCI's delicate balancing act between pragmatism, Marxian internationalism and the domestic promise of the Third Way. In fall 1981, the party's draft Charter on Peace and Development was finalized. At the origin of the document had been Enrico Berlinguer's speech on the connection between peace and development during the XVth congress of 1979, which had marked the party's reengagement with pacifism. The content of the Charter was heavily influenced by the report by the Independent Commission on International Development Issues chaired by Willy Brandt, usually referred to as the "Brandt

[97] Gianni Baget Bozzo, "Perchè Pannella è tornato al suo partito," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 3 Nov. 1981; Giorgio Battistini, "Pannella pensa a nuove elezioni e attenua la polemica con il Psi. Prima conferenza stampa da segretario del partito radicale," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 4 Nov. 1981; Gianni Baget Bozzo, "Movimento per la pace In Germania e Italia," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 23 Oct. 1981.

[98] Giorgio Battistini, "Pannella pensa a nuove elezioni e attenua la polemica con il Psi. Prima conferenza stampa da segretario del partito radicale," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 4 Nov. 1981.

Report."[99] Both Berlinguer and Brandt sought other solutions to world crisis than those brandished by monetarism and neoliberalism.[100] Brandt's SPD had often been a close interlocutor of the Italian party since a first secretive meeting in 1967; in recent years, Brandt and Berlinguer had met at least twice to discuss how to save détente.[101] The Brandt Report evinced a contemporary preoccupation with growing global interdependence and with the necessity to address the gap in prosperity between the North and the global South. Formulated at a time of deteriorating East-West relations by the creator of *Ostpolitik*, the Report was also an attempt to alter the feared trajectory of international relations. It argued that peace was a pre-condition for development but also that it was not solely defined by the absence of East-West conflict. Mining it was endemic poverty in the Third World, one compounded by the transfer of costly military technology to pauperized countries. Report recommendations included emergency alleviation of famine and structural, long-term reform, a make-over of the international monetary system to facilitate the transfer of capital to the Third World, and new energy provision policies.

[99] Written between 1977 and 1979 and published in book form as *North-South: A Programme for Survival: Report of the Independent Commission on International Development Issues* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1980). The so-called Brandt Report was widely circulated and received abundant international attention, though it had little impact on policy. The connections between the Charter and the Report are noted by Agostino Giovagnoli, "Berlinguer, la DC e il mondo cattolico," in *Enrico Berlinguer, la politica italiana e la crisi mondiale: Atti del convegno organizzato a Sassari, 18-19 giugno 2004, dal Centro studi Enrico Berlinguer e dal Dipartimento di Storia dell' Università di Sassari,* ed. F. Barbagallo and A. Vittoria, (Rome: Carocci, 2007), 103.

[100] Francesco Barbagallo, "Enrico Berlinguer, la crisi italiana e il conflitto mondiale," in *Enrico Berlinguer, la politica italiana e la crisi mondiale*, ed. Barbagallo and Vittoria, 15-6.

[101] Fiamma Lussana, "Il confronto con le socialdemocrazie e la ricerca di un nuovo socialismo nell'ultimo Berlinguer," *Studi Storici*, no. 2 (Apr.-June 2004), 462; Silvio Pons, "La politica internazionale di Berlinguer negli anni dell' 'unità nazionale': eurocommunismo, NATO e URSS (1976-79)," in *Un ponte sull'Atlantico. L'alleanza occidentale 1949-1999,* ed. A. Giovagnoli and L. Tosi (Milan: Guerini e associati, 2003), 190.

The PCI's own Charter on Peace and Development followed the Brandt Report in most respects, with the exception of an important nuance. While both approaches predicated the notion of sustainable development, Berlinguer's vision of the good society was fundamentally anticapitalistic.[102] In hindsight, his position appears contradictory: while embracing development, he rejected capitalism due to its alleged role in fostering imperialism and world poverty. Further, he overestimated its epochal crisis, failing to anticipate the emergence of post-Fordist economies. His assessment of the capacity of "real existing socialism" to reform itself and provide an alternative paradigm for a more equitable world proved mistaken. While in the realm of diplomacy Berlinguer now squarely attributed the breakdown of détente to intemperate Soviet actions, his analysis of the world's political economy remained unaltered.[103] The kinship between Brandt and Berlinguer disguised a divide between the two parties that reflected ideological diffferences but also the PCI's lack of governance experience, aside from its limited role supporting the austerity measures of the governments of national solidarity of 1976-78.[104]

Similarities between the Brandt Report, the PCI Charter on Peace and Development, the Radical antimilitarist approach to world famine, and Jimmy Carter's Report on World Hunger point to a broad contemporary consensus on issues of war, peace and development. Common denominators included a sense that growing global interdependence entailed the moral obligation

[102] Fiamma Lussana, "In confronto con le socialdemocrazie e la ricerca di un nuovo socialismo nell'ultimo Berlinguer," in *Enrico Berlinguer, la politica italiana e la crisi mondiale*, ed. Barbagallo and Vittoria, 147-72.

[103] Lussana, "Il confronto con le socialdemocrazie," 461-88; Enrico Berlinguer, "Per una carta della pace e dello sviluppo" in *Idee e lotte per la pace: Raccolta d'interventi sulle questioni della pace, del disarmo e di un nuovo internazionalismo 1979-1984*, ed. E. Berlinguer and P. Folena (Naples: Cuen, Centro napoletano per la pace della Federazione giovanile comunista napoletana, 1986**).** On PCI intraparty debates on international stances during the fall of 1981, see Pons, *Berlinguer e la fine del communismo*, 208-14.

[104] On the impact of the lack of PCI experience in government, see Roberto Gualtieri, "L'ultimo decennio del PCI," in *Revisionismo socialista e rinnovamento liberale*, ed. P. Borioni (Rome: Carocci, 2001), 175-206.

of industrialized nation-states to aid less fortunate ones. Also shared was the ambition to transcend Cold War definitions of security. In the Carter Report, for example, US national security goals were redefined to include the search for a solution to world famine.[105] Of the variants of internationalism then circulating on the left on either side of the Atlantic, Radical internationalism most closely resembled aspects of Carter's foreign policy, on account of a humanitarian focus on world hunger and the promotion of individual rights.[106]

After a fall colored by public alarm over deteriorating East-West relations, the long postponed debate on world famine was at last held during the first three days of December 1981; the Chamber convened to deliberate the Radical-sponsored, so-called Abbate motion which had been unexpectedly underwritten by no less than 170 deputies. It mandated the immediate increase of foreign aid to 0.7 percent of GDP as well as additional funding for an emergency program against famine; as such, the motion created a serious challenge for Premier Spadolini, because its approval would have forced a re-assessment of the annual budget and entailed a governmental crisis. Sponsorship of the proposed motion may have reflected a degree of momentum behind the Radical campaign, but more significantly signaled an opportunistic coalition of political forces seeking to undermine the ruling coalition.[107]

---

[105] Presidential Commission on World Hunger, *Overcoming World Hunger*, 4-6; Lawrence, "Containing Globalism: The United States and the Developing World in the 1970s," in *The Shock of the Global*, ed. Ferguson, 205-19.

[106] Other similarities included a shared antipolitical sensibility, see Sean Wilentz, *The Age of Reagan: A History 1974-2008* (New York: Harper, 2008), chapter 3, "Jimmy Carter and the Agonies of Anti-Politics," 73-98.

[107] Over the course of fall, Pannella had garnered sizeable international support for his campaign; in addition to the Sept. Strasbourg resolution recommending that member states increase aid, in November he obtained the support of 150 Eurodeputies (including Willy Brandt) for a petition addressed to member states pleading for action on the Sept. resolution. See Isernia, *La cooperazione allo sviluppo*, 106.

Foreign Minister Emilio Colombo (DC) opened parliamentary deliberations by defending his government's alternative and exceedingly modest proposal, known as the Bianco Gerardo motion. Noting the pressure of public opinion to act on world famine, Colombo cautioned that it was necessary to act with realism and knowledge of the facts on the ground. He expressed the government's commitment to bring Italian contribution up to 0.7 of GDP within the decade, or earlier if possible, and asserted the importance of not only focusing on immediate emergency aid, but also on long term structural reform. Socialist Loris Fortuna, the longtime ally of the Radicals, was the first deputy to speak. The Abbate motion, contrary to press reports, was not just a Radical initiative, he stated. It was supported by a wide range of political forces, as well as by prominent members of the political class and civil society, including President Pertini and Pope John Paul II. Fortuna called on Parliament to renounce what he termed a "corporative" approach to politics and to embrace a new moral order based on solidarity for individuals everywhere, no utopian endeavor, but in fact the proper task of politics and policy. The libertarian Socialist deputy denounced a conception of peace limited to the West, while elsewhere catastrophe loomed. Nuclear conflagration was not the only way worlds might collide, he warned.

Radical Emma Bonino spoke next. She regretted Colombo's outright rejection of the immediate allocation of 0.7 of GDP to foreign aid. Next, she addressed critics of the Radical approach by arguing that immediate and urgent intervention was not mere stop-gap charity, as it included the call for an integrated approach to rural agricultural development, given the tendency of poor countries to rely for revenue on export foods. The point of the Radical insistence on urgency was that aid to development should be built on the immediate protection of the threatened lives of millions of children, women and men rather than mere deference to often

ineffective long term structural reform. Radicals, she concluded, were largely in agreement with the Brandt Report, but were also aware of the past failures of development schemes.

Achille Occhetto, a Communist who would later lead the PCI during its post-Cold War permutation, opened his speech by noting the wide coalition on the left in support of the struggle against global famine. A critical distinction, however, separated the Communists from others; it entailed, he continued, the PCI's unambiguous identification of capitalism and imperialism as chief culprits for world poverty. A "neo-imperialistic" offensive led by American-backed "transnational companies" was in act, he warned, as proven by a recent Reagan statement. The PCI, he continued, did not oppose urgent action on famine, but sought to ensure the effectiveness of measures and the seamless coordination of short- and long-term efforts. In concluding, Occhetto praised Mitterrand's rejection of neoliberalism; evidencing a zero-sum conception of the global economy, Occhetto evoked the PCI proposal to redirect the proceeds of potential Western austerity measures to aid the Global South.[108]

Presented with the challenge of the widely subscribed Abbate motion, the ruling majority called the bluff on its camouflaged internal opponents, resorting to a confidence vote held on December 3. Faced with the prospect of bringing down the government, most of the supporters of the Radical motion retreated, revealing their half-hearted support. The approved Bianco Gerardo majority motion defined in vague terms future foreign aid policies; its passage thus had little policy significance. Bonino's parting warning in her Chamber speech to the effect that

[108] Emilio Colombo, Loris Fortuna, Emma Bonino, Achille Occhetto, "Comunicazioni del Governo sullo stato di attuazione delle iniziative intraprese contro la fame nel mondo e discussione delle mozioni: Abbate (1-00164), Bianco Gerardo (1-00160), Labriola (1-00162), Milani (1-00165)," 1 Dec. 1981, *Atti Parlamentari, Camera dei Deputati, Resoconto Stenografico, 416. Seduta di martedì 1 dicembre 1981*, 36793-9, 36799-805, 36805-12, 36827-34, http://legislature.camera.it/_dati/leg08/lavori/stenografici/sed0416/sed0416.pdf.

rejection of the Abbate motion would result "in an almost definitive defeat" of efforts to effectively address world famine was only a slight exaggeration. Parliament would not approve robust legislation on the matter until March 1985.[109]

The ad hoc alliance of the Radicals with the Communists on the Abbate resolution or their shared opposition to a contemporary Italian peacekeeping mission to the Sinai to back-up the Camp David Peace Accords between Israel and Egypt did not efface differences between the two parties' approaches to foreign policy.[110] Commenting in mid-December recent political developments, Gianfranco Spadaccia and Francesco Rutelli highlighted the distinctiveness of Radical positions. After attacking government policies mandating the increase of military expenditures, Spadaccia announced that the following year the Radicals would continue their parliamentary offensive on the budget approval process, including through obstructionist tactics and despite PCI disapproval.[111] Commenting on Communist parliamentary behavior, Rutelli cast PCI pacifist objectives as mere containment of the arms race. The weaknesses of the PCI

[109] Alberto Rapisarda, "Dibattito sulla fame nel mondo, 200 l'hanno voluto, 30 presenti," *La Stampa* (Turin), 2 Dec. 1981; Alberto Rapisarda, "Fame nel mondo, governo ha chiesto il voto di fiducia," *La Stampa* (Turin), 3 Dec. 1981; "Fiducia al governo su fame nel mondo," *La Stampa* (Turin), 4 Dec. 1981; on the instrumental subscription of deputies to the Abbate motion, see statement by Famiano Crucianelli (PDUP), "Comunicazioni del Governo sullo stato di attuazione delle iniziative intraprese contro la fame nel mondo e discussione delle mozioni: Abbate (1-00164), Bianco Gerardo (1-00160), Labriola (1-00162), Milani (1-00165) . (Seguito della discussione)," 3 Dec. 1981, *Atti Parlamentari, Camera dei Deputati, Resoconto Stenografico, 418. seduta di giovedì 3 dicembre 1981,* 37111, http://legislature.camera.it/_dati/leg08/lavori/stenografici/sed0418/sed0418.pdf.

[110] Giorgio Napolitano affirmed his party's support for the Abbate motion, but reiterated disagreement with aspects of Radical positions, see his declaration of vote, "Comunicazioni del Governo sullo stato di attuazione delle iniziative intraprese contro la fame nel mondo e discussione delle mozioni: Abbate (1-00164), Bianco Gerardo (1-00160), Labriola (1-00162), Milani (1-00165) . (Seguito della discussione)," 3 Dec. 1981, *Atti Parlamentari, Camera dei Deputati, Resoconto Stenografico, 418. Seduta di giovedì 3 dicembre 1981,* 37123-5, http://legislature.camera.it/_dati/leg08/lavori/stenografici/sed0418/sed0418.pdf. On the peacekeeping mission to Sinai, the PR generally voted alongside the PCI against Italian participation; see "Il governo non modifica la decisione sul Sinai," *l'Unità* (Rome), 19 Dec. 1981.

[111] Berlinguer supported the transfer of such funds. See Aurelio Lepre, *Storia della prima Repubblica: L'Italia dal 1943 al 2003* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2004), 289-90.

position on this point had recently been demonstrated by Reagan's Zero Option proposal to eliminate the new missiles on both Cold War fronts. The latter, he claimed, had created difficulties for the PCI because it was "more advanced than those proposed by the Italian Communists." "Pacifism," summed up the Radical, "is a luxury that does not regard us."

The proclamation of martial law in Poland by General Wojciech Jaruzelski on December 13, 1981 provided a litmus test for the reportedly nonaligned characteristics of the Italian peace movement. Pope John Paul II, who had been deeply engaged in a long term public campaign to raise awareness of the catastrophic consequences of nuclear war, was moved to condemn "a certain pacifism that leads to a totalitarian pseudo-peace."[112] The pronouncement reflected the influence of geopolitical considerations on the Vatican's traditional pacifism. Berlinguer also responded incisively to developments. On December 15, in a famous speech delivered on public television, Berlinguer declared that a new historical phase was now in place and that events in Poland clearly demonstrated that the momentum of socialism in the Eastern Bloc "or at least some of its countries" had run its course.[113] Berlinguer's statement led to an acrimonious exchange between the PCI and the PCSU, some of it conducted publicly on the pages of *Pravda*

[112] Marco Tosatti, "Papa Wojtyla condanna 'un certo pacifismo che conduce alla pseudo pace totalitaria'," *La Stampa* (Turin), 22 Dec. 1981; though he deplored the heightened risks of nuclear war, the pope had also earlier maintained a studied ambiguity on the question of Euromissiles deployment. See Giovanni Mario Ceci, " 'Pace nella sicurezza' o 'sicurezza nella pace'. Il mondo cattolico italiano e la Democrazia Cristiana di fronte alla crisi degli euromissili," *Mondo contemporaneo*, no. 2 (2005): 67-95 and Giovanni Mario Ceci, "Il mondo cattolico italiano e la crisi degli euromissili," in *Guerra e pace nell'Italia del Novecento*, ed. L. Goglia, R. Moro and L. Nuti (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2006), 437-60.

[113] Citation from "Berlinger: con l'esaurirsi a Est della capacità di rinnovamento si deve aprire una fase storica nuova. Conferenza stampa in TV – La distensione e un nuovo socialismo a Ovest sono le condizioni anche per lo sviluppo democratico nei Paesi dell'Europa orientale," *l'Unità* (Rome), 16 Dec. 1981; see also "Berlinguer condanna il socialismo reale. Il segretario del Pci intervistato a 'Tribuna politica'," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 16 Dec. 1981.

and *l'Unità*. It yielded a break (*lo strappo*) between the Soviet and Italian communist parties.[114] Their quarrel apparently led to the diversion of Soviet covert financing of the Italian party to the pro-Soviet faction led by Armando Cossutta.[115]

L'Unità's coverage of the Italian peace movement's response to the coup revealed regret over the lack of vigor of pacifist protests. Editorials sought to mobilize pacifists to denounce the crackdown in Poland; the Communist daily happily reported on the few pacifist protests that it was able to report.[116] *La Stampa* reported on a split pitting the PCI youth groups and the majority of its leadership against the worker base. The latter was generally indifferent or in some cases favorable to the communist state's offensive against the Polish union Solidarity, demonstrating the staying power of decades of propaganda depicting "real existing socialism" as the paradise of workers.[117] One observer on the left, Antonio Gambino, criticized Berlinguer's statement as too little and too late, raising the question of what kind of role the "momentum of the Bolshevik Revolution" had had in the Soviet invasions of 1956 or 1968, or why Berlinguer would not extend his reevaluation of Bolshevism all the way back to choices made by the PCI in 1948.[118] A Communist politician responded defensively, stating that Berlinguer's statement was not, nor

---

[114] "Risposta alla Pravda. Le nostre posizioni scaturiscono dai fatti," *l'Unità* (Rome), 26 Jan. 1982; Alberto Stabile, "Berlinguer contro Mosca. Ormai irreversibile il distacco dal Cremlino del più grande partito comunista d'Occidente. Secca replica di Botteghe Oscure alla scomunica di Breznev. 'In Unione Sovietica non c'è nè democrazia nè socialismo'," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 26 Jan. 1982.

[115] Pons, *Berlinguer e la fine del communismo*, 233.

[116] "Perchè pochi operai e molti studenti nei due cortei di ieri a Milano?" *l'Unità* (Rome), 15 Dec. 1981; "Berlinguer: con l'esaurirsi a Est della capacità di rinnovamento si deve aprire una fase storica nuova," *l'Unità* (Rome), 16 Dec. 1981; "Per la Polonia, la pace, la libertà," *l'Unità* (Rome), 19 Dec. 1981; Giovanni Giudici, " 'Con tanti guai in Italia…' Sì, parliamo di Polonia," *l'Unità* (Rome), 20 Dec. 1981; Gianfranco Pasquino, "Dove sono i movimenti per la pace che hanno scosso tutta l'Europa?" *l'Unità* (Rome), 17 Jan. 1982.

[117] Ezio Mauro, "È giustificabile il golpe in Polonia?" *La Stampa* (Turin), 16 Dec. 1981.

[118] Antonio Gambino, "La Polonia e il Pci," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 18 Dec. 1981.

should be, a repudiation of the alternative socialism of the PCI, implying that a rejection of Bolshevism tout court would call into question Berlinguer's Third Way.[119] Defensiveness also pervaded the tone of PCI deputies in the ad hoc debate on foreign policy organized in the Chamber on December 14, 1981.

On the latter occasion, an interrogation submitted by the PCI condemned Polish developments but also warned against any foreign interference, a reference to both a potential Soviet invasion and a probable Western punitive embargo. The Radical query, to the contrary, endorsed intervention and supported the ruling coalition's provisions for economic sanctions.

In his address, Premier Spadolini disputed that Italy's "cooling" of relations with Poland was an infringement of national sovereignty; he argued that it was consistent with the spirit of the Helsinki Final Act and of Western European definition of détente as a democratizing and transformative process. The issue of sovereignty also came up in Bonino's addresss. While declaring the Radicals as "in agreement with the principle of non interference", Bonino struggled to redefine the concept: "we are not in agreement when this principle translates in reality into de facto collaboration with a coup-prone regime […]" On the PCI front, deputy Giancarlo Pajetta disputed majority opinion and its call for an embargo, "because it would be catastrophic not only for Poland, but for peace in Europe and in the world."[120] While both condemned the coup, the Radical Party and the PCI disagreed on the questions of intervention and sovereignty as well as

[119] Lucio Lombardo Radice, "Scendere in piazza per la Polonia," *l'Unità* (Rome), 23 Dec. 1981.

[120] Giancarlo Pajetta, "Interrogazioni urgenti sugli avenimenti in Polonia," 14 Dec. 1981, *Atti Parlamentari, Camera dei Deputati, Resoconto Stenografico, 424. Seduta di lunedì 14 dicembre 1981*, 37588-611, http://legislature.camera.it/_dati/leg08/lavori/stenografici/sed0424/sed0424.pdf#page=1&zoom=95,0,70. Days after the coup, the official daily of the PCI had warned of "an international crisis of incalculable proportions" should there be a foreign intervention, see "La riflessione deve andare fino in fondo," *l'Unità* (Rome), 15 Dec. 1981.

on their respective conceptualization of peace. Pajetta's nervous invocation of "peace in Europe and in the world" appeared intended to exorcize a Western embargo rather than a Soviet military intervention, which was presently less probable than at any recent point in time, due to General Jaruzelski's ability to forestall Soviet contingent plans.[121] Pajetta's alarmism may have reflected an attachment to a postwar status quo which the PCI owed its existence to, or at minimum a lingering attachment to the Eastern socialist regimes that did not exclude criticism but ultimately refrained from unambiguous condemnation of longtime allies. In all fairness, PCI stances on Poland also resembled the positions of Helmut Schmidt, who worked to contain damage to West German relations with Moscow and to preserve what was left of détente, in contrast with the more Atlanticist and hawkish stances of Premier Spadolini and Foreign Minister Colombo.[122]

Nineteen-eighty-two marked the definitive distancing of the Radicals from the peace movement, even as they tirelessly sought to recast Italian foreign policy along antimilitarist and humanitarian lines. Despite their setbacks the previous December, Radicals still hoped to build upon the lingering momentum of a Strasbourg Parliament resolution which had called on

[121] John Prados, *How the Cold War Ended: Debating and Doing History* (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 2011), 9-10.

[122] The PCI response to the military crackdown in Poland illustrates the quandaries of the PCI in this period in more ways than one—even while Berlinguer announced that that the momentum of the Boshevik Revolution was spent, Pajetta reiterated the dogma that capitalism was doomed. See Nello Ajello, *Il lungo addio: Intellettuali e PCI dal 1958 al 1991* (Bari: Laterza, 1997), 242-8. The question of punitive sanctions divided the Communist left; some PCI members or sympathizers called for them, others were opposed. See Alberto Rapisarda, "Pajetta e Buffalini frenano Berlinguer sulla Polonia," *La Stampa* (Turin), 23 Dec. 1981. The same issue also provoked tensions between Reagan and some of his European allies. Chancellor Schmidt was contrary to sanctions, unlike Premier Spadolini and Emilio Colombo, the Italian foreign minister. In early Jan. 1982, the EEC Council of Foreign Ministers rejected the call for sanctions. See Andrea Robilant, "Oggi Schmidt affronta l'irritazione Americana. Incontro alla Casa Bianca," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 3/4 Jan. 1982; Arturo Barioli, "La CEE non segue gli USA," *l'Unità* (Rome), 5 Jan. 1982; Andrea Robilant, "Schmidt si avvicina a Reagan. Il Cancelliere minimizza le divergenze con la Casa Bianca, ma tace sull'adesione alle sanzioni. La Germania attenua il suo dissenso dalla linea dura," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 6 Jan. 1981.

member states to increase their foreign aid funding.[123] During Italian parliamentary hearings held in March, Radicals reiterated calls for the reallocation of military expenditures and the constitution of an extraordinary fund against world famine. The true motivation for the current increase of the military budget, argued in the Chamber deputy Cicciomessere, since it could not be justified on purely militarily grounds and exceeded NATO requirements, must be linked to economic interests, including illicit ones. As a concession to demands within the party that socio-economic domestic issues also be addressed, included in their budget counterproposals was the increase of the low-income pensions. But Radical requests had little chance of exerting influence, given PCI disengagement. In contrast to the previous fall, the Radicals' solitude now appeared absolute. [124]

Isolation in Parliament dovetailed with estrangement from the peace movement. An influential article in the spring 1982 issue of *Foreign Affairs* had proposed the reversal of NATO's longstanding first nuclear strike doctrine, considered in the light of new nuclear technologies dangerously destabilizing; to compensate for loss of the deterrent, the article's authors, including George Kennan, the father of the Cold War doctrine of containment, proposed a major increase in NATO's conventional deterrent to offset Soviet conventional superiority. Radicals seized upon the article as proving the validity of their antimilitarist arguments on the ineluctable connections between the conventional and nuclear arms races. Dismissing the

---

[123] Isernia, *La cooperazione allo sviluppo*, 106.

[124] Roberto Cicciomessere, "Disegno di legge: (Seguito della discussione) S-1583-Disposizione per la fomazione del bilancio annuale e pluriennale dello Stato (legge finanziale 1982) (approvato dal Senato) (3043)," 29 Mar. 1982, *Atti Parlamentari, Camera dei Deputati, Resoconto Stenografico, 485. Seduta di lunedì 29 marzo 1982,* 43035-44, http://legislature.camera.it/_dati/leg08/lavori/stenografici/sed0485/sed0485.pdf; "Interpellanza 2-01735," 30 Mar. 1982, *Atti Parlamentari, Camera dei Deputati, Resoconto stenografico, 486. Seduta di martedì 30 marzo 1982,* 43229-30, http://legislature.camera.it/_dati/leg08/lavori/stenografici/sed0486/sed0486.pdf; Cicciomessere, *L'Italia armata,* 487-91.

Byzantinisms of nuclear punditry associated to the disarmament schemes of "generic pacifism," Radicals argued that it was essential to recast security in other terms than strictly military ones.[125]

After a failed last attempt to organize a joint procession in March in coordination with the Joint Committee of the Peace Movement, Radicals called off participation in the peace demonstrations which after a hiatus of a few months reemerged in spring 1982.[126] Instead, they organized sparsely attended protests against famine to support of their efforts in Parliament. A Radical public opinion campaign, initially quipped "Operation Survival '82" culminated in an Easter March "to save millions of lives now" led by Nobel Prize laureate Lord Philip Noel Baker.[127] The new initiative, which later took the form of draft legislation, repackaged the proposal to allocate more than three trillion lira to emergency interventions in the Third World;

[125] Roberto Cicciomessere, "Se vuoi lavorare prepara la Guerra," *Notizie Radicali*, 28 May 1982, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=47820&lang=IT&cms. Cicciomessere discusses the implications of a conventional military build-up implied by the famous article proposing a renunciation to the doctrine of first strike by McGeorge Bundy, George F. Kennan, Robert S. McNamara and George C. Smith, "Nuclear Weapons and the Atlantic Alliance," *Foreign Affairs* (Spring 1982): 753-68 ; Francesco Rutelli ,"Un movimento contro la pace?" *Notizie Radicali*, 28 May 1982, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=47814&lang=IT&cms.

[126] Francesco Rutelli, "Un movimento contro la pace? Bilancio, dopo un anno di manifestazioni stile anni '50," *Notizie Radicali*, 28 May 1982, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=47814&lang=IT&cms=.

[127] "Manifestazione per la vita a Roma. Il Pr invita al 'digiuno collettivo' Il corteo sfilerà oggi da piazza San Pietro fino al Quirinale," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 2 Jan. 1982; Paolo Guzzanti, "Marcia della pace cinquemila a Roma. Un corteo 'dolce' per la pace. È stata forse la prima manifestazione in Italia di tipo anglosassone-nordeuropea. Migliaia in piazza a Roma contro la fame. Insieme radicali, cattolici e sinistra," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 3/4 Jan. 1982; "Marcia di Pasqua contro lo sterminio per fame," 11 Apr. 1982, videoclip, OARR, http://www.radioradicale.it/scheda/2971/2984-marcia-di-pasqua-contro-lo-sterminio-per-fame; "Scheda cronologica su: contro lo sterminio per fame," April 1989, OHRA, http://www.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=50760&lang=IT&cms=.

by early summer, proponents had succeeded in mustering the support of over a thousand mayors and several dozen thousand citizens across the country the "Law of the Mayors."[128]

Over the course of the first trimester of 1982, observers of the Italian peace movement had noted its abatement, attributed by some to the aftermath of events in Poland; oft regretted was the partiality of a pacifism that appeared to contradict the promise of an autonomous movement transcending Cold War politics.[129] By April, however, a PCI-organized peace demonstration gathered numerous participants in Comiso, reenergizing Italian pacifists.[130]

Still, many observers, including members of the PCI leadership, doubted its nonaligned nature. Anti-American and even pro-Soviet accents were present during two demonstrations held in Milan and Rome, in mid April and early June respectively. In Milan, the PCI organized a demonstration "for peace, disarmament, liberty and independence." Before a very large crowd, Berlinguer condemned the Soviet Union in no uncertain terms, praising Leninism only once and in the context of a condemnation of Soviet foreign policy. He conveyed his party's pride to be a

---

[128] Gianfranco Dell'Alba, "Lo sterminio per fame e sottosviluppo nel mondo. Tre anni di politica radicale (1979-1982)," January 1983, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=48086&lang=IT&cms= ; Isernia, *La cooperazione allo sviluppo*, 106-7.

[129] Andrea Barbato, "Divisi davanti a Varsavia," *La Stampa* (Turin), 2 Jan. 1982; Gianfranco Pasquino, "Dove sono i movimenti per la pace che hanno scosso tutta l'Europa?" *l'Unità* (Rome), 17 Jan. 1982; Gianni Vattimo, "Pacifisti pentiti," *La Stampa* (Turin), 6 Mar. 1982; "A Comiso 50 mila persone per dire 'no ai missili'," *Stampa Sera* (Turin), 5 Apr. 1982. On the view of the peace movement as a potential European challenge to both superpowers, see also Mario Mineo, "Un'Europa unita ed autonoma al centro di una piattaforma politica del movimento per la pace e il disarm," *Segno*, no. 30 (Mar. 1982): 65-8. The impact of Polish events on the peace movement was also acknowleged by Berlinguer, see his speech of 17 Apr. 1982, "Per la pace e il disarmo," audioclip, OARR, http://www.radioradicale.it/scheda/2991/3004-per-la-pace-e-il-disarmo.

[130] Saverio Lodato, "Oggi a Comiso l'Europa che vuole la pace. Torna protagonista il movimento per il disarmo Pajetta: trattare subito, il pericolo è immediato," *l'Unità* (Rome), 4 Apr. 1982; Giuseppe Cerasa, "Torna a Comiso il movimento per la pace e il disarmo. Oggi cinquantamila persone da tutta Europa contro i missile," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 4/5 Apr. 1982; "A Comiso 50 mila persone per dire 'no ai missili'," *Stampa Sera* (Turin), 5 Apr. 1982; Alberto Stabile, "La Sicilia ha messo in moto un movimento di pace europeo. L'opposizione alla base di Comiso trova d'accordo intellettuali e partiti che a Roma son invece divisi," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 30 Apr. 1982.

part of the broad, spontaneous and pluralistic world peace movement, one even praised by "George Kennan, one of the most authoritative representatives of the American Democratic political scene."[131] Stony silence, however, greeted Berlinguer's jabs at the Soviet Union, his mention of oppression in Poland, his several positive references to US opposition figures. Anti-American and pro-Soviet written slogans adorned the crowd; in response to a question asked by a *Radio Radicale* interviewer, one protester responded that the Socialist Bloc could not be held responsible for a world famine which was principally the product of American imperialism.[132] Radicals, for their part, sought to counter such a mindset with actions on foreign soil intended primarily for an Italian audience. In April, Radical militants were arrested in several Eastern European capitals while attempting to distribute flyers inscribed with the words "peace, disarmament, famine" and denouncing the lack of non-military economic aid of Socialist Bloc countries to developing countries.[133]

The year's most imposing peace demonstration occurred in June, on the occasion of a visit to Rome of President Reagan. Though intended to replicate the unity and success of the giant October 24 demonstration, divisions were increasingly in evidence. The confederated

---

[131] Enrico Berlinguer, "Per la pace e il disarmo," 17 Apr. 1982, speech, audioclip, OARR, http://www.radioradicale.it/scheda/2991/3004-per-la-pace-e-il-disarmo.

[132] Marzio Fabbri, "Berlinguer attacca anche l'Urss ma la folla non sembra convinta," *La Stampa* (Turin), 18 Apr. 1982; "Per la pace a Milano una folla gigantesca," *l'Unità* (Rome), 18 Apr. 1982; Franco Vernice, "In 200.000 sfilano a Milano molti slogan filosovietici. Imponente manifestazione per la pace organizzata dal Pci. La manifestazione conclusa dal comizio di Berlinguer. Duecentomila a Milano tutte le 'anime' del Pci in piazza per la pace," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 18/19 Apr. 1982; "'Per la pace e il disarmo' (manifestazione organizzata dal Pci)," 17 Apr. 1982, street interviews, audioclip, OARR, http://www.radioradicale.it/scheda/2993/3006-per-la-pace-e-il-disarmo-manifestazione-organizzata-dal-pci.

[133] Roberto Cicciomessere, 21 Apr. 1982, *Atti Parlamentari, Camera dei Deputati, Resoconto Stenografico, 495. Seduta di mercoledì 21 aprile 1982*, 44831, http://legislature.camera.it/_dati/leg08/lavori/stenografici/sed0495/sed0495.pdf#page=1&zoom=95,0,70; Dell'Alba, "Lo sterminio per fame e sottosviluppo nel mondo. Tre anni di politica radicale (1979-1982)," January 1983, transcript in OHRA.

unions (CGIL-CISL-UIL) boycotted the event, denouncing a "unilateral initiative"; only the PCI-controlled portion of CGIL participated. Neither the Radicals nor the leftist Italian Christian Workers' Association (ACLI) partook.[134] Anticipating criticism, the organizers, including the FGCI, the PCI youth association, and the new left parties PdUP and DP, pledged that anti-Americanism would not characterize the demonstration, which instead would protest both superpowers as well as the Anglo-Argentine Falkand War.[135] But while new left party delegations generally stuck to slogans denouncing equally the Warsaw Pact and NATO, such equanimity remained an exception. Subsequent reports confirmed the ubiquity of anti-American slogans and the often one-sided aspects of the peace demonstration. The most frequently heard slogan was "Reagan [is a] hangman!', while criticism of Soviet foreign policy remained rare. One participant attributed the anti-American tone to the incontrovertible fact that "we are under America."[136]

A chanted slogan suggested that a first victim of the missiles had already fallen: Pio La Torre, PCI representative in Sicily and pointman of the island's peace movement, murdered on April 30.[137] A causal connection between the transnational mafia and missile deployment in

---

[134] *Associazioni Cristiane dei Lavoratori Italiani*, ACLI.

[135] The FGCI (*Federazione Giovanile Communisti Italiani*) was the youth organization of the PCI, it was charged with the coordination of the peace movement. DP (*Democrazia Proletaria*) was a small new left party which sometimes collaborated with the Radicals.

[136] "Marcia per la pace 'anti-Reagan'," 5 June 1982, audioclip, OARR, http://www.radioradicale.it/scheda/3161/3174-marcia-per-la-pace-anti-reagan.

[137] In Italian, "Reagan boia!": "Marcia per la pace 'anti-Reagan'," 5 June 1982, audioclip, OARR; "Agguato omicida al compagno La Torre. 1 Maggio insanguinato da un barbaro delitto politico-mafioso. Cade al suo fianco il compagno Di Salvo. Scioperi e proteste in Sicilia e nel Paese," *l'Unità* (Rome), 1 May 1982; Eugenio Cirese, "Sabato Marcia per la pace. Il Psi polemico non ci sarà. Corteo a Roma in occasione dell'arrivo del presidente degli Stati Uniti," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 3 June 1982; "A Roma perchè la pace è di tutti. Raccolte un milione di firme per Comiso. Il corteo da piazza Esedra (ore 15) a Piazza del Popolo – Soste davanti alle sede diplomatiche degli USA e dell'URSS," *l'Unità* (Rome), 5 June 1982; Eugenio Manca, "A Roma uno straordinario corteo," *l'Unità*

Comiso, one perhaps mediated by the US government, was alleged by Sicilian and other Communists.[138] At the party leadership level, some cautioned avoiding "making facile connections between NATO, CIA, etc, Comiso bases, mafia, the killing of La Torre."[139] Another PCI leader had earlier declared in the heat of the moment that "the CIA is involved, as is Comiso […] This is mafia terrorism."[140] In the La Torre case as in general, PCI leaders were not able to

---

(Rome), 6 June 1982; Giuseppe Fedi, "Marcia per la pace a senso unito. Gli slogans solo contro gli Usa," *La Stampa* (Turin), 6 June 1982.

[138] The question of whether the murder of La Torre was connected to his pacifism remains nebulous; no hard evidence has emerged. La Torre had sat on a parliamentary antimafia commission until 1970, participated in the first PCI conference on the mafia in 1979, and had recently returned to Sicily driven by his lifelong dedication to build a strong Sicilian PCI, at the time of his return to Palermo in crisis. See Giovanni Burgio, *Pio La Torre: Palermo, la Sicilia, il PCI, la mafia* (Palermo: Centro di studi ed iniziative culturali Pio La Torre, 2010), 124-30, 160-80, 182-96. For photographs documenting La Torre's involvement in the peace movement, see Vincenzo Consolo, *Pio La Torre, orgoglio di Sicilia* (Palermo: Centro di studi ed iniziative culturali Pio La Torre, 2009). The salient point for our purposes was the tendency of some Italian Communists to attribute sinister motives to all aspects of US foreign policy and to neglect Soviet faults. See for example Paolo Gentiloni, Alberto Spampinato and Agostino Spataro, *Missili e Mafia: La Sicilia dopo Comiso* (Rome; Editori Riuniti, 1985); Claudio Fava and Miki Gambino, "La Mafia a Comiso. Missili a canne mozze," *I Siciliani*, (June 1984): 52-6; Umberto Santino, , "Affare Comiso. Mafia, speculazione e base NATO," July 1983, *CSD dossier 1*, Archives of the Centro Siciliano di Documentazione "Giuseppe Impastato", Palermo; Marasà, *Gli anni di Comiso*, 31-2. A member of the governmental antimafia commission later revealed that two local mafia families with transatlantic connections had bought land in Comiso, a revelation that emerged out of General Alberto Dalla Chiesa's investigations into La Torre's murder, see Riccardo Orioles, "Referenziato Serio Ariano Cercasi per guerra nucleare," *I Siciliani*, (June 1983): 62-9; "Report: IMAC Dossier summer 1983," *556 Stukken betreffende het COMISO-Comité Nederland*. 1982-1985, IKV Archives, International Institute of Social History, Amsterdam. See also on such issues Laura Conti, "Reagan contro l'Apennino. La nostra terra è già allo stremo," *Pace e guerra*, no. 3 (16 Dec. 1982):17; Sebastiano Messina, "A Comiso arrivano gli 'yankee' comincia la caccia ai dollari. Undicimila domande di assunzione, corsa agli affitti, appalti a catena," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 26 Apr. 1983; Antonio Mazzeo, "Come la Mafia sta mettendo le mani su Comiso," IMAC Newsletter (1 July -30 Sept. 1983): 13-8, copy in *fasc.60, Cartella/Busta 2, Fondo Bruno Marasà*, Istituto Gramsci Siciliano (PCI Archives, Palermo). In July 1983, as deployment loomed, *Red Star*, the periodical of the Red Army, participated in the ideological assault on NATO's plan for Comiso borrowing such arguments, see Rodolfo Brancoli, "Da Mosca per Comiso un attacco all'Italia. 'Missili, mafia e droga'," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 8 July 1983.

[139] Ugo Pecchioli, quotation translated from in "Riunione di direzione del 5 maggio 1982" –"Situazione del Partito in Sicilia," 5 May 1982, files *Direzione mf 508 8210 51-87*, Istituto Gramsci Roma (PCI Archives, Rome); on the lack of a clear connection between his murder and his pacifism, see Ben Thompson "END Special Report. Comiso by Ben Thompson," pamphlet published by END (European Nuclear Disarmament), London 1982, pages 13-5, files *fasc. 33, Cartella/Busta 1, Fondo Bruno Marasà*, Istituto Gramsci Siciliano (PCI Archives, Palermo).

[140] Paolo Bufalini, "Riunione staordinaria di direzione del 30 aprile 1982", 30 Apr. 1982, files *Direzione, mf 508 8210 45-50*, Istituto Gramsci Roma (PCI Archives, Rome).

control the tendency of the party base or of some party leaders to indulge in knee-jerk anti-Americanism, undermining the party's objective to abet a nonaligned peace movement.

Days before the Rome peace demonstration, Napolitano had written a note to the Party Secretariat. He deplored in frank terms the unilateral and narrow constituencies represented in the upcoming demonstration, which had led to the critical declaration and withdrawal of ACLI and of the confederated unions. Napolitano also reported that the Joint Committees of the Peace Movement had not adequately addressed concern that their communiqué on the upcoming event was too unilateral in apportioning blame for the world crisis; he concluded that the list of adherents illustrated just how narrow the peace movement's constituency had become and how this would surely harm the the pacifist cause.[141]

Boycotting what Pannella qualified as revivals of fifties-style pacifism, Radicals now focused their energies entirely on the famine campaign.[142] In late June 1982 the Committee of Foreign Affairs of the Chamber began deliberations on the Radical proposed legislation, the "Law of the 1300 Mayors." The proposed law, if approved, would engage the government to allocate three trillion lira to save "at least three million persons" during the current year.[143] During the ensuing debates, Radical Maria Adelaide Aglietta reiterated that "this should be the central issue of our time, and should draw directly the action of our government […] to avoid

[141] Giorgio Napolitano, "Memorandum to the Secretariat," 3 June 1982, files *Note a Segreteria, mf 508 2134-2135*, Istituto Gramsci Roma (PCI Archives, Rome).

[142] Eugenio Cirese, "Sabato marcia per la pace. Il Psi polemico non ci sarà. Corteo a Roma in occasione dell'arrivo del presidente degli Stati Uniti," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 3 June 1982.

[143] By the provisions of a 1970 law, the submission for parliamentary deliberation of this proposed law, subscribed to by at least 50,000 citizens, was admissible. "Camera dei Deputati n.3363. Proposta di legge d'iniziativa popolare," 24 April 1982, *Atti Parlamentari, Camera dei Deputati, VII Legislatura, Disegni di legge e relazioni Documenti*, http://legislature.camera.it/_dati/leg08/lavori/stampati/pdf/33630001.pdf.

that the acceptance of the holocaust […] become the qualifying fact that will mark indelibly our times, just as the acceptance of the Nazi holocaust marked indelibly the history of the first half of our century." Francesco Roccella reported the failure of twenty years of development policies, due to an overemphasis on structural reform which in reality concealed the pursuit of commercial interests. He called for an inversion of priorities, a recasting of the paramount objective of foreign aid: "it is not admissible that people die of hunger. This, in ultimate and elementary terms, is the objective of any development policy: to save human lives. Well, let us begin here, and turn upside down the logic of development policy. Our approach is simple: let us begin by appropriating as a measure of progress for any development policy mortality rates and the consequent initiatives intended to reduce them," one person at a time.[144]

While nurturing antisystem stances, the Radical Party needed allies to obtain policy outcomes. In July 1982, after a renewed drive to dispel political isolation, the Radicals earned the support of a heavyweight, Giulio Andreotti, in his capacity as President of the Committee of Foreign Affairs of the Chamber. The Christian Democrat proposed an acceptable compromise on the proposed law, as it preserved the short-term allocation of the extraordinary fund of three trillion lira and the appointment of a High Commissioner for Famine, a new demand of the Radicals.[145] Pannella, speaking on a Radical local television channel before a photograph of St

[144] Maria Adelaide Aglietta, Roberto Cicciomessere, Emma Bonino and Francesco Roccella, "Svolgimento di interpellanze e interrogazioni sul problema della fame nel mondo," 28 June 1982, *Atti Parlamentari, Camera dei Deputati, Resoconto stenografico, 522. seduta di lunedì 28 giugno 1982,* 48838-50, http://legislature.camera.it/_dati/leg08/lavori/stenografici/sed0522/sed0522.pdf.

[145] Enrico Berlinguer and Emma Bonino, "Sterminio per fame: incontro Pci-Partito Radicale," 12 July 1982, audioclip, OARR, http://www.radioradicale.it/scheda/3287/3300-sterminio-per-fame-incontro-pci-partito-radicale; Marco Pannella, "Pannella dopo la pausa tecnica riprende con lo sciopero della sete," *Corriere della Sera* (Milan), 13 July 1982; Marco Pannella, "Ma oltre alla fame uccide il silenzio," *La Gazzetta del Mezzogiorno* (Bari), 13 July 1982; Franco Roccella and Marcello Crivellini, "La battaglia radicale contro lo sterminio per fame nel mondo," 14 July 1982, audioclip, OARR, http://www.radioradicale.it/scheda/3234/3247-la-battaglia-radicale-contro-lo-sterminio-per-fame-nel-mondo; "Le critiche a Pertini. Il Psi attacca Pannella," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 15 July 1982;

Peter's Square, implored John Paul II to call for a "passage from words to action" on world famine.[146] In July, Claudio Martelli, Craxi's right-hand man, signaled a possible shift of a hitherto hostile PSI in an article in the party's daily, *Avanti!* However, Craxi soon dismissed the Radical initiative as "demagogic mystification." His on-and-off-again support for Radical proposals was reaffirmed, pointing to the dubious value of Martelli's support. Craxi's present veto was linked to the crisis of the Spadolini government and his attempts to wrest more power from the DC; Radical interference was not appreciated.[147] Despite Pannella's resort to a protest hunger strike that brought about a physical breakdown necessitating medical attention, only an emasculated version of the proposed Radical law ensued. It lacked the critical prescription of immediate, sizeable funding or the appointment of the High Commissioner. The defeat of their draft laws constituted a major setback for the Radicals, who now entered a period of acute crisis.[148]

During the Radical Party congress of October-November 1982, internecine tensions came to a boil, leading to the departure of members critical of Pannella's monothematic and to some monomaniacal focus on world famine. On the first day of the congress, a former party secretary,

---

Enrico Berlinguer, interview, "L'iter parlamentare della proposta di legge contro la fame," 24 July 1982, audioclip, OARR, http://www.radioradicale.it/scheda/3272/3285-liter-parlamentare-della-proposta-di-legge-contro-la-fame.

[146] Marco Pannella, "Sopravvivenza 1982," 25 July 1982, videoclip, OARR, http://www.radioradicale.it/scheda/3324/3337-sopravvivenza-1982.

[147] Isernia, *La cooperazione allo sviluppo*, 106-7.

[148] Dell'Alba, "Lo sterminio per fame e sottosviluppo nel mondo. Tre anni di politica radicale (1979-1982)," January 1983, OHRA; Marco Pannella, "Le dichiarazioni di Craxi sono indecorose. Risponderò alle 17.30 ma non possono tacere nemmeno le altre forze politiche al diktat indecente di un frustrato. Dichiarazione di Marco Pannella," 15 July 1982, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=47935&lang=IT&cms=; Marco Pannella, "Dal divorzio alla fame," *il manifesto* (Rome), 25 July 1982; Marco Pannella, "Sterminio per fame: le proposte del governo," 3 Aug. 1982, audioclip, OARR, http://www.radioradicale.it/scheda/3283/3296-sterminio-per-fame-le-proposte-del-governo; "Pannella 'Prognosi riservata'. Polemiche tra radicali," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 5 Aug. 1982; Giorgio Galli, "Pannella: fine di una stagione," *Panorama*, 9 August 1982, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=47976&lang=IT&cms=.

Giuseppe Rippa, departed with other dissidents, in protest of what they argued was a predetermined congress agenda. All seven congressional commissions had been assigned to different aspects of the struggle against world famine, in lieu of the range of issues, including domestic ones, proposed by opponents to Pannella's line. Another point of contention was the relationship with the PSI, currently at a low point. Days before the congress, Rippa had provoked Pannella's ire when he discretely met with Craxi at Hotel Raphael. The congress marked the desertion from Radical ranks of Pinto and Boato, confirming the crisis of the "omnibus" coalition of 1979. The Radical Chamber contingent was now reduced to thirteen members from the original eighteen. But as had been the case during the previous congress, Pannella was handily elected party secretary, and the world famine campaign reconfirmed once again as the party's principal raison d'être.[149]

Radical troubles were widely discussed in the press. Salvator Sechi, a Communist intellectual who had previously expressed sympathy for the Radicals, argued that "having lost the capacity of being the palimpsest of social change, the Radicals are no longer in fashion. Their crisis is not however [solely] an internal matter, or reduceable to their quality as the 'last of the

[149] "Battaglia nel Pr," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 19 Oct. 1982; Marco Boato, "Replica di Marco Boato a Marco Pannella," 21 Oct. 1982, press release, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=48045&lang=IT&cms=; "Pannella nega la crisi del Pr e punta ancora alla segreteria. A Bologna, dal 28 ottobre, il congresso radicale," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 24/25 Oct.1982; Giorgio Battistini, "Rivolta contro Pannella la minoranza lo abandona. Rippa e De Cataldo lasciano il congresso del Pr," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 29 Oct. 1982; Giorgio Battistini, "Pannella durissimo con il dissenso interno. Non uno ma due ostili congressi radicali," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 30 Oct. 1982; "Mozione generale approvata dal XXVII congresso del Pr," 1 Nov. 1982, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=48054&lang=IT&cms=; Giorgio Battistini, "Nel nome di Pannella il Pr dimentica la crisi. Il congresso ha scelto: il leader succede a se stesso. Un voto plebiscitario ha concluso una lunga maratona oratoria per giorni dominata dal dissenso e dagli abandoni. Proseguirà la lotta contro la fame nel mondo," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 2 Nov. 1982; Marco Pannella, press communiqué, "Pannella su conferenza stampa di Rippa," 4 Nov. 1982, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=48059&lang=IT&cms=; "Pannella brinda all'addio di Pinto. Mentre il dissidente Rippa incontra Craxi," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 5 Nov. 1982; Francesco De Vito, "San Marco scaccia il diavolo," *l'Espresso*, 14 Nov. 1982, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=48070&lang=IT&cms=**;** "Radicali: a confronto dissidenti e pannelliani," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 5/6 Dec. 1982.

Mohicans' of non-politics *(non-politica)*. It regards us all to an extent. The goal of dismantling the 'partitocratic' way of politics […] is in a blind alley […] Ever since the season of referenda on civil liberties (divorce, abortion, […]), moral questions have flourished: the fight against famine, military expenditures, and the right to life. These are 'non-negotiable' ends, as write sociologists. But if one does not wish to relate means to the ends, might as well not run in elections […]"[150]

An estranged Radical wrote that due to the appropriation by civil society and other parties of the lay, civil rights causes brandished by Radicals in previous years, Pannella was engaged in an attempt to regain the initiative through a completely different approach: "thus is born progressively the 'new', 'religious' Radical Party, which, having accentuated further its charismatic, centralizing and autocratic organizational characteristics, is dedicated […] to the great epochal battle against world famine […] This is why the interlocutors and subjects of Radical politics change: the alliance with the conservative Catholicism of Pope Wojtyla on the topic of famine becomes the principal objective of the new party, not the search for more consensus in the lay-progressive, liberal-socialist or new left areas […]"[151] An editorial published in the same daily by Rutelli the previous day had sought to address such criticism. He wrote that he had been struck by allegations that the Radicals had, with their famine campaign, fallen into the trap of a moralizing blind alley. He reminded *l'Unità* readers that in the past Italian Communists had dismissed Radical civil rights battles as merely "superstructural." The

[150] Salvatore Sechi, "Una pericolosa trasformazione," *Il Secolo XIX* (Genoa), 24 Oct. 1982, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=48053&lang=IT&cms=; see also a similar critique of the Radical Party and Pannella's leadership in Paolo Flores D'Arcais, "Ma la 'speranza radicale' rimane," *Il Messaggero* (Rome), 10 Nov. 1982.

[151] Giulio Ercolessi, "Partito Radicale. Che strepitosa riconversione, da laico a 'religioso'," *l'Unità* (Rome), 30 Oct. 1982.

Radical Party, he argued, would continue to seek a common program for the left on the themes of life and peace, humanitarianism, and demilitarization, in part driven by the conviction that "pro-life culture" should not be abandoned to conservative Catholicism.[152] Elsewhere, Pannella denied, not entirely convincingly, that he wielded a leadership style which quelled dissent within his party.[153]

The unity of a socialist and libertarian left remained the declared goal of the Radicals.[154] Yet Sechi's view that this objective was undermined by the solipsistic and antagonistic dimensions of the Radical approach was valid.[155] Subsequent developments would confirm the basic incompatibility of the Radicals with other political forces, whether of the left or of the right. Perhaps the best way to make sense of Pannella's stubborn pursuit of the world famine campaign and his parallel resort to antipolitical verbiage and political stunts, despite electoral decline and other losses, is to place his politics in the context of the party's history. The quixotic attempt to forge a left internationalism based on the defense of individual rights and single issues necessitated a leader impervious to failure, unconvinced by contradictions, and disinterested in reasonable accommodation. Radical internationalism remained as earlier inseparable from its domestic objective of reshaping the Italian left and by implication postwar politics; resort to

---

[152] Francesco Rutelli, "Partito Radicale. Invito il PCI ad aprire con noi un vero confronto," *l'Unità* (Rome), 29 Oct. 1982; see a similar defense of Pannella and Radical politics in MassimoTeodori, "Dove abita la 'speranza radicale'," *Il Messaggero* (Rome), 13 Nov. 1982.

[153] Marco Pannella, "Pannella: 'ho sempre consentito a tutti di dissentire," *Il Secolo XIX* (Genoa), 25 Oct. 1982.

[154] Marco Pannella, "Lettera aperta a Enrico Berlinguer e a Bettino Craxi," *Notizie Radicali*, 30 Dec. 1981, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=47721&lang=IT&cms=; Francesco Rutelli, "Partito Radicale. Invito il PCI ad aprire con noi un vero confronto," *l'Unità* (Rome), 29 Oct. 1982; Marco Pannella, "Querci sull'Avanti," 10 Nov. 1982, press release, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=48064&lang=IT&cms=; Teodori, "Dove abita la 'speranza radicale'," *Il Messaggero* (Rome), 13 Nov. 1982.

[155] Sechi, "Una pericolosa trasformazione," *Il Secolo XIX*, 24 Oct. 1982, OHRA.

charismatic posturing, as well as other unorthodox political approaches, we have seen, stemmed back to the genesis of the second Radical Party in the early sixties. In more ways than one, Pannella's Radical Party remained a product of that era.

Meanwhile, superpower disarmament talks initiated in fall 1981 continued; as the deadline for deployment of fall 1983 approached, Italian pacifists sought to revive a flagging peace movement. Italian commentators noted the effectiveness in Denmark of parliamentary opposition to deployment, in contrast to Italy, where it seemed to have been foreordained by politicians.[156] In November 1982, a committee of intellectuals, asserting their independence from political parties and equidistance from the two superpowers, organized a Milan-Comiso peace march.[157] But contrary to their wishes, participants prevalently included members of the PCI or of leftist parties and groups allied to it. Numerous Catholics held back; the bishops of Foligno and Terni cancelled at the last minute their participation in a related peace roundtable organized in Perugia on December 8.[158] The procession (which necessarily included portions on trains and buses) was for the most part sparsely attended; it reached Comiso in mid-December in an atmosphere of indifference, according to *La Repubblica*. Luciana Castellina, secretary of PdUP and chief representative of the Italian peace movement abroad, declared the experience useful. She also opined that the new focus of the movement should be to organize nonviolent direct

[156] Pietro Barrera, "La Danimarca ha bocciato la spesa per i missili. Ma l'Italia quando ha deciso?" *Pace e guerra,* no. 4 (23 Dec. 1982): 4.

[157] "La Milano-Comiso, i comitati, la lunga campagna 1983," *Pace e guerra,* no. 3 (16 Dec. 1982).

[158] Ettore Masina, "La mia esperienza del pacifismo sommerso dei cattolici italiani," *Pace e guerra,* no. 5/6 (6 Jan. 1983): 18-9.

actions in Comiso, testifying to the wide resonnance of the Greenham Common acts of civil disobedience enacted by English pacifists.[159]

The Radicals did not participate in the Milan-Comiso March, showing up instead solely on its inaugural day in Milan to distribute flyers propagating fiscal objection to military expenses. Disputing the growing consensus that direct nonviolent action in Comiso should be a primary focus of the movement, the Radicals continued to argue for political and other initiatives in Rome, the seat of parliament. There, as in past years, they renewed attempts to amend the 1983 national budget.[160] "The first task of a politician," had noted Pannella, "is to identify the flow of money and to try to modify it."[161]

In February 1983, Cicciomessere was expelled from the Chamber Commission of Defense on account of his adamant opposition to the Commission's approval of the military budget.[162] In conjunction with the hearings on the annual budget, the peace movement organized

[159] "Da Milano a Comiso contro tutti i missili. Parte sabato la marcia per la pace," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 25 Nov. 1982; "Parte oggi la marcia della pace. Da Milano a Comiso," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 27 Nov. 1982; "Poca gente contro i missili a Comiso. Si è conclusa con una fiaccolata la lunga manifestazione contro la base atomica della Nato. La marcia della pace finisce nell'indifferenza," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 19/20 Dec. 1982; Paolo Gentiloni, "La Milano-Comiso, dall'Irpinia all'Italsider. La pianta della pace cresce, ma ha radici ancora deboli," *Pace e guerra*, no. 4 (23 Dec. 1982); Claudio Riolo, "A Comiso è arrivata una marcia ma non ancora un movimento pacifista," *Pace e guerra*, no. 5/6 (6 Jan. 1983): 47; "Azione diretta non violenta. La formula magica coniata dai pacifisti inglesi è rimbalzata fino a Comiso," *Pace e guerra*, no. 7 (13 Jan. 1983): 10-1; Rosario Digrandi, "Cronaca della lotta per Comiso," *Segno*, (January 1983): 73-9.

[160] Sergio Andreani and Sergio Vetta "Marcia antimilitarista da Catania a Comiso," Jan. 1, 1983, audioclip, OARR, http://www.radioradicale.it/scheda/4140/4153-marcia-antimilitarista-internazionale-da-catania-a-comiso; "Marcia della pace partono in 20 mila. Prima tappa da Milano a Pavia," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 28/29 Nov. 1982; "Marcia Catania-Comiso," *Agenzia Notizie Radicali*, 3 January 1983, bound copy in Archives of the Radical Party, Rome.

[161] Marco Pannella and Francesco Rutelli, "Comiso tradita?" 30 Nov. 1982, audioclips 1-6, OARR, http://www.radioradicale.it/scheda/3926?format=32.

[162] "Commissione Difesa. Cicciomessere: solo un presidente stalinista poteva garantire alla maggioranza l'eliminazione fisica dalla commissione dell'unica opposizione […]," *Agenzia Notizie Radicali*, 11 Feb. 1983, bound copy in Archives of the Radical Party, Rome; "Commissione difesa. Militarizzata la Commissione difesa: finalmente Lagorio ha trovato il suo ascaro fedele capace di riportare ordine e disciplina in parlamento-Angelini sarà

a demonstration demanding the freeze of military expenditures to the level of the previous year. The event proved a rare exception to the isolation of the Radicals.[163] The latter took credit for the convening of a mass protest on a topic which had been rarely a focus of Italian pacifists. One new left supporter declared the turnout quite good, considering that the topic was not of traditional interest to the working class.[164] In the Chamber, Cicciomessere prodded the PCI, after praising it for endorsing the demonstration, to break with customary practices and face down the ruling majority with a hardline, obstructionist opposition to the military budget, as it had decades ago on topics such as Italian participation in NATO.[165] A Communist deputy countered that Radical tactics would be fruitless because they were excessively maximalist. The best way to obtain results in Parliament, he argued, was to propose moderate cuts and reallocations of the budget, in order to attract support from the governing coalition.[166] Predictably, Radical efforts failed; final approval of the budget emerged by late March.[167]

---

accolto con fanfare e onori a Beirut in ringraziamento della sua opera," *Agenzia Notizie Radicali*, no. 32 (Feb. 1983), bound copy in Archives of the Radical Party, Rome.

[163] "Spese militari. Il Pr aderisce ufficialmente alla manifestazione di sabato 19 marzo contro l'aumento delle spese militari indetta dai comitati per la pace," *Agenzia Notizie Radicali*, 16 Mar. 1983, bound copy in Archives of the Radical Party, Rome.

[164] Bruno Luverà, "Manifestazione contro gli armamenti," 19 Mar. 1983, audioclip, OARR, http://www.radioradicale.it/scheda/4528/4541-manifestazione-contro-gli-armamenti; Francesco Crucianelli (PDUP), "Manifestazione contro gli armamenti," 19 Mar. 1983, audioclip, OARR, http://www.radioradicale.it/scheda/4530/4543-manifestazione-contro-gli-armamenti.

[165] Roberto Cicciomessere, "Disegni di legge (seguito della discussione congiunta) […]," 15 Mar. 1983, *Atti Parlamentari, Camera dei Deputati, VIII Legislatura, Discussioni, Seduta antimeridiana del 15 marzo 1983, Resoconto stenografico 645*, 60156-63, http://legislature.camera.it/_dati/leg08/lavori/stenografici/sed0645/sed0645.pdf.

[166] Silviero Corvisieri, "Manifestazione contro gli armamenti," 19 Mar. 1983, audioclip, OARR, http://www.radioradicale.it/scheda/4530/4543-manifestazione-contro-gli-armamenti; see also Silviero Corvisieri, "Contro le spese militari inutili migliaia in piazza oggi a Roma. La manifestazione indetta dal Coordinamento nazionale dei Comitati per la pace. Appuntamento alle 15 a piazza Esedra – Adesione dei sindacati Cgil, Cisl e Uil, dei radicali e della gioventù aclista – Perchè la proposta del ministro Lagorio (12 mila miliardi per la difesa nel 1983) è discutibile," *l'Unità* (Rome), 19 Mar. 1983; Gianni Marsilli, "Il pacifismo torna protagonista 'Diminuiamo le spese militari'. Decine di migliaia, in gran parte giovani, per ore in corteo a Roma," *l'Unità* (Rome), 20 Mar. 1983.

During the first half of 1983, Radicals also clashed with the Communists on the question of Italian military intervention. For the first time since World War II, in 1981 Socialist Minister of Defense Lelio Lagorio had approved substantive Italian participation in multilateral peacekeeping operations in the Sinai Peninsula; Lebanon followed in 1982-84. Italian foreign interventions on this scale were unprecedented, and as such provoked controversy as potentially infringing article 11 of the 1948 Constitution.[168] The new interventionism was an element in the muscular diplomacy favored by Craxi, reflecting a Socialist bid to defy postwar Christian Democratic dominance of foreign policy. Communists had opposed the Sinai expedition, but following the Sabra and Shatila massacre of hundreds of Palestinian civilians in September 1982, in January of the following year they voted in support of a peacekeeping mission to Lebanon.[169] Around the same time, the PCI was rewarded for its substantial convergence with the ruling majority on foreign policy, despite differences over the dual-track decision. For the first time, a Communist was appointed president to the prestigious Chamber Committee of Defense.[170] Radicals, on the other hand, opposed all of the Italian peacekeeping operations of the eighties.

---

[167] Giuseppe Calderisi, "Disegni di legge (seguito della discussion congiunta […],"14 Mar. 1983, *Atti Parlamentari,Camera dei Deputati, VII Legislatura, Seduta pomeridiana del 14 marzo 1983, Resoconto stenografico 643,* 60041-6, http://legislature.camera.it/_dati/leg08/lavori/stenografici/sed0643/sed0643.pdf.

[168] Article 11 proscribed the recourse to force as a means to resolve international disputes. For the innovative dimensions of the new interventionist Italian foreign policy, see Leopoldo Nuti, "Linee generali della politica di difesa italiana (1945-1989), " in *Guerra e pace nell'Italia del Novecento,* ed. Goglia, Moro and Nuti, 500.

[169] "Interpellanze e interrogazioni sulla partecipazione italiana alla forza multinazionale di pace nel Libano (svolgimento)," 31 Jan. 1983, *Atti Parlamentari, Camera dei Deputati, VIII Legislatura, Seduta del 31 gennaio 1983,* 57306-8, http://legislature.camera.it/_dati/leg08/lavori/stenografici/sed0618/sed0618.pdf.

[170] Sebastiano Messina, "Sorpresa in commissione Difesa. È del Pci il nuovo presidente. Vito Angelini eletto grazie a tre franchi tiratori. È la prima volta nella storia della Repubblica che un comunista viene eletto a questa carica […]," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 20 Jan. 1983.

In light of the Radical post-Cold War endorsement of military interventions, earlier opposition calls for scrutiny. In 1981, Radicals had found common ground with the Communists in opposing the Italian expedition to the Sinai.[171] Revelatory of their mindet were the words of Radical Senator Spadaccia, who had asserted during hearings: "I am a convinced unilateralist, but one that always moves in the direction of peace."[172] Radical positions on military intervention, whether in the Sinai or in Lebanon, were driven by an intransigent antimilitarism associated with their profession of nonviolence, elevated to an absolute value in the preamble to the party statute approved during the fall congress of 1980.[173] In September 1982, in the aftermath of the Sabra and Shatila massacres of hundreds of Palestinian refugees by Christian Falangists, an indignant Pannella denounced war in absolute terms, rather than identifying culprits or taking into consideration the humanitarian utility of international intervention. His stance could not be attributed to the traditionally pro-Israeli Radical stance, as the party had earlier condemned the invasion of Lebanon.[174] Commenting on Lebanese developments days after the massacre, Pannella wrote: "A clean war? Only liars know of one, irresponsible imbecils.

---

[171] Vera Vegetti, "Militari italiani in Sinai: 'sì del governo? Sarà probabilmente oggi l'annuncio che la richiesta USA è stata accolta. Molte capitali arabe hanno cercato di dissuadere Roma dal partecipare ad un'iniziativa che serve a completare l'accordo di Camp David – Divisioni tra i governi della CEE (Grecia contraria) – Da Colombo il segretario della Lega araba," *l'Unità* (Rome), 30 Oct. 1981; "Svolgimento di interpellanze e interrogazioni sull'invio di un contingente militare italiano nel Sinai," 11 Nov. 1981, *Senato della Repubblica, VIII Legislatura, 329. seduta (pomerid.), Assemblea, Resoconto stenografico 11 novembre 1981*, 17265-7, http://www.senato.it/service/PDF/PDFServer/BGT/332503.pdf.

[172] Gianfranco Spadaccia, "Svolgimento di interpellanze e interrogazioni sull'invio di un contingente militare italiano nel Sinai," 11 Nov. 1981, *Senato della Repubblica, VIII Legislatura, 329 Seduta (pomerid.), Assemblea, Resoconto stenografico, 11 novembre 1981*, 17264, http://www.senato.it/service/PDF/PDFServer/BGT/332503.pdf.

[173] "Mozione generale approvata dal XXIV congresso del Pr. Roma, 31 ottobre, 1, 2, 3 e 4 novembre 1980," congressional motion, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=47305&lang=IT&cms=.

[174] Aldo Ajello, "Interpellanze sulla situazione in Libano (svolgimento)," 11 June 1982, *Atti Parlamentari, Camera dei Deputati, VIII Legislatura, Seduta del 11 giugno 1982, Resoconto Stenografico*, 48012-105, http://legislature.camera.it/_dati/leg08/lavori/stenografici/sed0512/sed0512.pdf ; Gianfranco Spadaccia and Stanzani Ghedini, "Interrogazione 3-02032," 11 June 1982, *Senato della Repubblica, VIII Legislatura, Seduta del 11 giugno 1982*, 23633, http://www.senato.it/service/PDF/PDFServer/BGT/332640.pdf .

Only those who have concealed in mind or heart, in their guts or instincts, their own 'just war', their own 'clean' war […] A war humanly possible, politically acceptable, is the implicit, base and leaden assumption of those who continue to vote or pass rearmament budgets, and to destine the resources of the country to armaments and army, undermining the quality and dignity of the lives of workers, of the unemployed, the pensioned, the homeless."[175] In 1983, the Radicals voted down, once again, the envoy of an Italian expeditionary force, demonstrating at this stage in their development a principled, but also contingent, subscription to nonviolence.

The Italian military interventions of 1981-84 were humanitarian in scope. While not conducted under the aegis of the UN, participating Italian forces were part of multilateral forces invited by host countries. Certain jurists deemed such expeditions to be consistent with international law. Yet the Radicals adamantly opposed such interventionism.[176] A decade later, the end of the Cold War, the transformations of Italian politics, as well as the dogged will of the Radicals to exert an influence on Italian foreign policy would all play roles in spelling the attenuation of the party's antimilitarism and the requalification of earlier professions of absolute nonviolence.

---

[175] Marco Pannella, "La guerra è la guerra," *il manifesto* (Rome), 22 Sept.1982, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=48020&lang=IT&cms=.

[176] See Lelio Lagorio, "Il New Deal italiano degli anni Ottanta. La spedizione militare in Libano 1982-1984," *Rivista Marittima*, (Autumn 2003), transcript from http://avamposto63.blogspot.com/2010/12/il-new-deal-italiano-degli-anni-ottanta.html; Roberto Cicciomessere, "Ostaggi! I soldati italiani in Libano nelle mani degli assassini," *Notizie Radicali*, 25 Nov. 1983, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=48364&lang=IT&cms= ; Francesco Rutelli " 'Destino nazionale' e scelte di riarmo," *Notizie Radicali*, 30 June 1982, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=47892&lang=IT&cms=; Roberto Cicciomessere, "Se vuoi lavorare, prepara la guerra," *Notizie Radicali*, 28 May 1982, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=47820&lang=IT&cms=; Rutelli, "Il P.R. e il 'nuovo' movimento. 'Pacifismo': un lusso che non ci riguarda," *Notizie Radicali*, 15 December 1981, OHRA.

During the first half of 1983, the Radicals continued to promote their famine campaign. They launched another popular petition intended to propose a recast Law of the Mayors, but the brewing crisis of the Spadolini government and a new round of early general elections defeated once again their efforts.[177]

More than an affirmation for the Socialists, the general elections of June 26, 1983 which inaugurated the ninth legislation marked a heavy defeat for the DC, which for the first time obtained less than thirty-five percent of the vote. Its decline was in part the fruit of public outrage over the scandals that had repeatedly rocked the party, and particularly the revelations that members of the party had been participants in the secret anticommunist masonic lodge, P2. For its part, the PCI recouped its heavy losses of 1979, seemingly validating Berlinguer's decision to return to the opposition and to combine populist, workerist and pacifist stances with a veiled pursuit of a renewed political deal with the DC. In the run-up to the elections, PdUP decided to place its candidates on the lists of the PCI, judging that it had sufficiently moved away from the politics of compromise of 1976-79. The move set the stage for the small party's subsequent amalgation into its parent party. The PSI advanced, but more modestly than Craxi had hoped; on the other hand, the unprecedented weakness of the DC meant that the Socialists and their leader were now more indispensable than ever.

The Radicals obtained 2.2 percent of the vote. They had as recently as May announced that they would not run and had called for blank protest votes, only to reverse their decision at the last minute, in what appeared to be Pannella's latest excentricity.[178] The outcome confirmed

[177] Isernia, *La cooperazione allo sviluppo,* 107.

[178] Eugenio Scalfari, "La rosa langue il pane manca Pannella vuole la scheda Bianca. La 'scelta dei radicali'," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 24 May 1983.

the fading of the party as a credible alternative on the left, definitively relegating it to a minor role, notwithstanding the continued capacity of Pannella, and later Bonino, to maintain a high visibility on the political scene. Among the lay parties, the clear winner of the electoral contest was the PRI, on account of Spadolini's popularity as premier.[179] But Craxi proved the true beneficiary of the elections; he was appointed prime minister by summer, an office he had long sought but that had eluded him on account of his numerous adversaries. His subsequent permanence in office for four years (a long tenure by the standards of the republic) made him the undisputed winner of the competition on the Italian left in act since the 1970s. Paradoxically the same could not be said about his party, for its electoral draw continued to grow only modestly.

A ratcheting up of international tensions in fall of 1983 and the looming vote on Euromissile deployment brought once again record crowds into the streets of Italy, West Germany and elsewhere. More invisible were dangerous tensions within nation-states' security apparatuses, particularly in the Socialist Bloc. Mounting Soviet panic over Reagan's confrontational style was compounded by an ill-timed NATO military exercise. Historians now concur that fall of 1983 witnessed one of the Cold War's most dangerous moments, on account of real Soviet fears of a pre-emptive nuclear strike from NATO.[180] The panic of "peaceniks," it turns out, was justified.

In Italy, Berlinguer, embittered by Craxi's appointment as Premier, embraced pacifism with greater abandon; in parallel, Craxi reached for Mitterrand's antitotalitarian critique of

---

[179] The Republicans obtained over 5 percent, making them the fifth national party behind the far right MSI-DN.

[180] Beatrice Heuser, "The Soviet response to the euromissiles crisis," in *The Crisis of Détente in Europe: From Helsinki to Gorbachev, 1975-1985*, ed. Leopoldo Nuti (New York: Routledge, 2009), 137-49; Prados, *How the Cold War Ended*, 53-9.

Soviet foreign policy to embarrass the PCI.[181] The two leftist leaders would henceforth rarely engage in political dialogue.[182]

On the occasion of an October 9 peace march organized in Assisi by FGCI, Berlinguer insisted that PCI pacifism was devoid of anti-Americanism; he sought to demarcate party stances from those of the pro-Soviet internal current led by Armando Cossutta.[183] Pacifist activists also sought to counter identification of their movement with Soviet interests, including by reaching out to Eastern European dissidents.[184] The massive October 22, 1983 Rome demonstration was underwritten by ACLI, the Christian Workers' Association; sympathetic dailies on the left emphasized the range of support for the cause of peace. A procession expressly marched past both the US and Soviet embassies.[185] Ecumenical claims were comforted by a poll reporting that a clear majority of Italians opposed missile deployment.[186]

---

[181] Silvio Pons, "Il socialismo europeo, la sinistra italiana e la crisi del comunismo," in *Gli anni Ottanta come storia*, ed. S. Colarizi et al. (Rome: Rubbettino, 2004), 224. One historian notes that Berlinguer's opposition to Euromissiles deployment was "not virulent": see Francesco Barbagallo, *Enrico Berlinguer* (Rome: Carocci, 2006), 354.

[182] Ajello, *Il lungo addio*, 288.

[183] Paolo Pagliaro, "Marcia della pace ad Assisi, il 22 manifestazione a Roma. E il segretario comunista fa appello ai cattolici," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 11 Oct. 1983. On the Assisi march, see also "Assisi: Berlinguer a pranzo dai frati," *La Stampa* (Turin), 9 Oct. 1983; Paola Sacchi, "Oggi si svolge a grande marcia fino alla Rocca. Berlinguer parla di pace coi francescani di Assisi," *l'Unità* (Rome), 9 Oct. 1983; Gianni Baget Bozzo, "E Berlinguer andò a pranzo dai frati," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 11 Oct. 1983. On the tensions between the anti-American, pro-Soviet Cossutta and Berlinguer, see Ezio Mauro, "Il caso Cossutta. oggi in direzione Pci sono esclusi provedimenti disciplinari," *La Stampa* (Turin), 11 Oct. 1983.

[184] "Documento di intellettuali italiani e pacifisti dell'Europa orientale. Dai due blocchi appello per la pace," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 19 Oct. 1983; Mino Fuccillo, "Ma i pacifisti si mobilitano. Il movimento pacifista italiano si prepara alla prova di forza," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 20 Oct. 1983. In June, observers of the PCI and FGCI had abandoned the Soviet-led World Peace Conference in Prague, to protest police repression and arrest of Charter 77 representatives wishing to participate in the conference, see Paolo Soldini, "Gli osservatori del PCI e della FGCI abbandonano la conferenza di Praga," *l'Unità* (Rome), 24 June 1983.

[185] Mino Fuccillo, "In Italia partiti di maggioranza e governo sembrano al riparo della protesta pacifista, ma Craxi vuol dare prova di non aver lasciato nulla di inventato. E anche Roma vedrà i cristiani in piazza," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 21 Oct. 1983; Mino Fuccillo, "Ecco la galassia del pacifismo. Comunisti, cattolici, 'verdi' insieme contro le

Yet the seeming recomposition of a nonaligned Italian peace movement was belied by a widening fracture in Catholic support. In 1981, even as the position of the Vatican remained ambivalent, Catholics had demonstrated unprecedent unitary backing for the peace movement.[187] But in fall 1983, Guido Formigoni, leader of a political group close to the DC, launched an alternative peace movement which rallied in Milan on November 7.[188] The counter-demonstration, gathering some ten thousand participants, carried symbolic import, not least because marching alongside Italian intellectuals were Eastern European dissidents. Formigoni's movement undermined the legitimacy of the larger peace movement far more effectively than could the isolated Radicals. For Italian observers of pacifism, a movement which included as much Catholic support as possible was essential lest it be no more than a partisan and left-wing affair. In Italy, concluded Baget Bozzo, "peace is not a national passion," unlike in Belgium, Holland, Denmark, or West Germany.[189] "With the Milan peace demonstration," reported *La*

---

atomiche," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 22 Oct. 1983; Maria Giovanna Maglie, "La giornata del 22 ottobre in Italia e nel mondo contro i pericoli del riarmo nucleare. Straordinaria marea pacifista. Un milione e forse più dilaga nelle strade di Roma. Si fa più forte la voce che dice no a tutti i missili. Due immense cortei si sono mossi nel primo pomeriggio per confluire in un'unica manifestazione-La protesta sotto le ambasciate dell'Usa e dell'Urss-Alle 17 al suone delle sirene simulata la morte nucleare-Una partecipazione segnata da un eccezionale pluralismo di organizzazioni politiche, sindacali, religiosi e di massa," *l'Unità* (Rome), 23 Oct. 1983; Alberto Jacoviello, "Dove volano le colombe," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 23/24 Oct. 1983; Antonio Cianciullo and Mino Fuccillo, "I molti e diversi volti del pacifism italiano sovrapposti e mischiati in una manifestazione imponente. Forte presenza di comunisti, cristiani e 'verdi'. 'In nome della pace, arrendetevi'. Contro Usa e Urss la marcia dei cinquecentomila a Roma," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 23/24 Oct. 1983.

[186] "Sondaggio di 'Panorama'. In Italia il 58.1 non vuole i Cruise," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 16/17 Oct. 1983.

[187] Ceci, " 'Pace nella sicurezza' o 'sicurezza nella pace'. Il mondo cattolico italiano e la Democrazia Cristiana di fronte alla crisi degli euromissili." On Vatican ambiguity during the Euromissiles Crisis, see also Andrea Riccardi, "La Santa Sede fra distensione e guerra fredda: da Paolo VI a Giovanni Paolo II," in *L'Italia repubblicana nella crisi degli anni settanta*, vol. I, *Tra guerra fredda e distensione*, ed. A. Giovagnoli and S. Pons (Rome: Rubbettino, 2001), 145-55.

[188] Antonio del Giudice, "Circa diecimila persone ieri sera a Milano all' 'altra marcia' per la pace. 'A Usa e Urss noi diciamo: via gli SS20, stop ai Cruise," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 8 Nov. 1983.

[189] Gianni Baget Bozzo, "E Berlinguer andò a pranzo dai frati," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 11 Oct. 1983; Vanna Vannuccini, "I congressi regionali della socialdemocrazia perannunciano un rifiuto del riarmo Nato. La Spd divorzia da Schmidt. Un 'no' ai missili è ormai inevitabile," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 5 Oct. 1983; Francesco Alberoni,

Stampa, "is thus born pacifism Italian-style; with two faces, and typical." Formigoni stated that he too was against the deployment of both Soviet and US missiles, but that "recently, pacifism has been a one-way street. Certain fundamental aspects of the problem have been censured." Namely, he argued, the question of human rights, one insufficiently addressed by the mainstream peace movement. Formigoni also dismissed claims of a strong Catholic participation in the recent Rome demonstration: "evidently some like to act as a spare tire."[190]

Meanwhile, discord and dejection characterized the Radical fall 1983 congress. Such a predicament was unsurprising, argued one critic, given unrelenting Radical attacks on the pacifist movement and the Radical boycott of the peace camps in Comiso or the mass demonstrations held in the fall.[191] During congressional proceedings, secretary-elect Roberto Cicciomessere sought to deflect attention to the failure of the Italian peace movement, reaching for his customary indictement of PCI pacifism. Even as international tensions reached a dangerous level, he argued that Euromissile deployment was at any rate a minor issue; he denounced "the emotional fear of nuclear holocaust" underlying the peace movement, declaring that he "often read in the literature of pacifism […] that the Cruise missiles modify the balance of nuclear power, which is a stupidity." The call for a 'no first strike' nuclear security policy was nonsense,

---

"Pacifisti dell'anno Duemila," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 25 Oct. 1983; "Imponente la manifestazione di Bruxelles. I pacifisti belgi hanno spaccato in due il governo Martens," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 25 Oct. 1983; Vincenzo Lanza, "Chiesto un rinvio per le basi dei missili. Il Parlamento danese vota contro le decisioni Nato," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 5 Nov. 1983.

[190] Giovanni Valentini, "Cattolici e laici, democristiani e socialisti preparano la risposta alla grande manifestazione di Roma. A colloquio con Roberto Formigoni. 'Aspettiamo la risposta del Pci'. 'Disarmo sì, ma non a senso unico per questo lunedì saremo in piazza'," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 3 Nov. 1983; Lieta Tornabuoni, "Pacifismo e pentiti lottizati," *La Stampa* (Turin), 10 Nov. 1983; on the disunion of Catholics on pacifist questions by fall 1983, see Ceci, " 'Pace nella sicurezza' o 'sicurezza nella pace'" and Ceci, "Il mondo cattolico italiano e la crisi degli euromissili."

[191] Letter from Marco Pannella and editor's response, "Pace/disarmo: 'abrogate' i radicali," *il manifesto* (Rome), 19 Oct. 1983.

as illustrated by a precipitous endorsement by the Soviets, who enjoyed conventional superiority. The Communist left and its ally, the peace movement, continued Cicciomessere, had rejected Radical antimilitarism because it did not solely exalt peace rhetorically but also negated the legitimacy of the recourse to war, including for causes such as national liberation. Pacifism and the PCI had found common ground by endorsing national liberation wars or the objective of preserving military infrastructure and domestic jobs or economic interests. But solutions to global injustice could solely derive from challenging the dogma of national sovereignty and strengthening international law, claimed the Radical.[192]

In November, approval in Parliament by the five-party coalition of immediate Euromissile deployment was a foregone conclusion. In the Chamber pro-forma deliberations stretched over three days before largely empty stalls.[193] As was often the case on critical matters of Italian foreign policy, parliamentary debates were of interest on account of their content rather than because they yielded unexpected outcomes. The PCI reiterated its arguments for postponing deployment in order to permit for more negotiations, predicting that the Soviets would reduce their nuclear weaponry if offered an olive branch. Occhetto reasserted the "profound" differences between contemporary pacifism and that of the fifties; the new pacifists, he argued citing the theses of Norberto Bobbio, were driven by awareness of the cataclysmic nature of nuclear warfare. For its part , the independent new left, now chiefly represented by

[192] Roberto Cicciomessere, "XXIX congresso del Partito Radicale Commissione: 'Iniziative per la vita e il disarmo'," 29 Oct. 1983, audioclip, OARR, http://www.radioradicale.it/scheda/8177/8194-xxix-congresso-del-partito-radicale-commissione-iniziative-per-la-vita-e-lantimilitarismo; Giorgio Battistini, "Aperto a Rimini con una relazione-fiume il congresso radicale. 'Mosca delenda est' gridò infine Pannella," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 29 Oct. 1983; Giorgio Battistini, "Cicciomessere leader di un partito diviso. Moltissime astensioni nel voto per il nuovo segretario. Vince a fatica l'uomo di Pannella," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 1 Nov. 1983.

[193] Giorgio Battistini "Oggi il Parlamento italiano sancirà con un voto l'installazione dei Cruise. I dc: 'La Nato ci difende' Ingrao: 'Scelta gravissima'. Ma i deputati disertano il dibattito" *La Repubblica* Nov. 16, 1983.

Proletarian Democracy (DP), reiterated familiar arguments, arguing for non-deployment, but denouncing the contradictions of PCI proposals for a moratorium and the simultaneous support for NATO. Franco Russo (DP) praised an emerging European "unilateralism" that sought independence from both superpowers. In his view, European pacifism was a manifestation of a promising, novel phenomenon, and dissenters in the Socialist Bloc its natural ally. Russo reported on the "official declaration" of a representative of the Polish dissident group KOS denying, as was often alleged in the Western press, that it was a movement that "attacks continuously the European pacifist movement." Russo cited the KOS representative as having stated that "[t]he request for dialogue with the pacifists stems from another premise, that of the transcendence of the two blocs. At the base of the collaboration between the movements of opposition [in the Socialist Bloc] and the Western left […] should be a connection made between civil rights in the East and general disarmament in Europe, in the context of a transcendence of the "logic of Yalta." "Thus we [also]", continued Russo "recognize the possibility of developing a common ground between dissident movements and the oppositions of both East and West for a united, democratic, self-directed Europe."[194]

Following Russo's speech, Gianfranco Spadaccia strove to distinguish his position from that of his new left colleague. The Radical disagreed with Russo's comparison of Eastern dissidents with Western pacifists. The former, he argued, were powerless, whereas the latter had had moments of "high institutional resonance." The Radical stated that he belonged to a "political group that has no illusions about what happens in the East" thus implicitly rejecting

[194] Achille Occhetto and Franco Russo, "Comunicazioni del Governo sugli euromissili e discussione delle mozioni Pajetta ed altri (1-00022), Berlinguer ed altri (1-00023) e Gorla (1 -00027) (Seguito della discussione)," 15 Nov. 1983, *Atti Parlamentari, Camera dei Deputati, IX Legislatura, Discussioni, Seduta del 15 novembre 1983*, 3416-22, 3435-43, http://legislature.camera.it/_dati/leg09/lavori/stenografici/sed0046/sed0046.pdf.

Russo's apparent belief of the reformability of Eastern Bloc socialism. "That is why" he continued "I consider that the left should have had a policy in support of the rights of peoples and human rights in the countries of so-called real [existing] socialism." The previous day Rutelli had evoked the need for an "aggressive human rights [foreign] policy" and the "courage to [foment] a disequilibrium which might destabilize the East." Spadaccia's call for destabilization of the East was far shriller than Russo's tolerant conception of moving beyond the "logic of Yalta" in the context of an emerging European autonomy. The Proletarian Democrat had concluded his speech by calling for a new socialism of independent European states and by stating: "[…] we are not ashamed to declare that we want a socialist Europe, a socialism which is identical with direct democracy as has been experimented and planned by *Solidarnosc* in Poland and by workers' councils in Italy."[195]

Favorable votes for Euromissile deployment in the Italian and West German parliaments were followed by the Soviet decision to abandon disarmament negotiations, increasing global tensions already at record highs after the US invasion of tiny Granada and the downing of a South Korean Jumbo Jet by the Soviet airforce.[196] Consequently, the following year would

[195] Gianfranco Spadaccia and Franco Russo,"Comunicazioni del Governo sugli euromissili e discussione delle mozioni Pajetta ed altri (1-00022), Berlinguer ed altri (1-00023) e Gorla (1 -00027) (Seguito della discussione)," 15 Nov. 1983, *Atti Parlamentari, Camera dei Deputati, IX legislatura, Discussioni, Seduta del 15 novembre 1983*, 3445-6, 3443, http://legislature.camera.it/_dati/leg09/lavori/stenografici/sed0046/sed0046.pdf; Francesco Rutelli, "Comunicazioni del Governo sugli euromissili e discussione delle mozioni Pajetta ed altri (1-00022), Berlinguer ed altri (1-00023) e Gorla (1 -00027) (Discussione)," 14 Dec. 1983, *Atti Parlamentari, Camera dei Deputati, IX legislatura, Discussioni, Seduta del 14 novembre 1983*, 3331, http://legislature.camera.it/_dati/leg09/lavori/stenografici/sed0045/sed0045.pdf. Many on the West European left shared the conviction that Solidarity and other opposition groups in Poland would transform the communist regime and lead to "socialism with a human face." See Lepre, *Storia della prima Repubblica*, 289-90.

[196] Alberto Jacoviello, "Segnali di Guerra," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 26 Nov. 1983.

continue to be marked by the mobilization of the European peace movement, despite its failure to forestall deployment.[197]

In Sicily, missile installation began in March 1984, a few months behind schedule, due to technical delays. The Italian peace movement reorganized and hosted in Perugia the prestigious European Nuclear Disarmament (END) annual conference in July, but nevertheless soon lost steam. As was predictable, the Radicals were excluded from the organizing committee of the END conference, which was dominated by Luciana Castellina and groups allied to the new left and the PCI.[198] Italian pacifism was virtually dormant by 1985, when new Soviet leadership launched a new détente which would lead within a couple of years to the dismantlement of the Comiso and other Euromissiles.

Throughout 1983, the Radicals had wavered between antipolitical stances and periodic attempts to break out of their isolation and advance their agenda on famine. The latter tendency won out in early 1984. On January 14 and 15 the party's Federal Council met to discuss a fresh party strategy for the faltering famine campaign. An incentive derived from revelations of implementation weaknesses in the foreign aid legislation approved in 1979; ensuing polemics provided an opening for a Radical call for legislative overhaul.[199] The Radicals presently declared their intention to reach out to all interested social and religious forces, and in particular

---

[197] Wittner, *Toward Nuclear Abolition*, 329-33.

[198] Francesco Rutelli, "Convegno annuale dei pacifisti a Perugia (disarmo nucleare),"18 July 1983, audioclip, OARR, http://www.radioradicale.it/scheda/9076/9093-convegno-annuale-dei-pacifisti-a-perugia-il-disarmo-nucleare; Pietro Ingrao and Domenico Rosati, "Terzo convegno annuale dei pacifisti a Perugia (disarmo nucleare)," July 21, 1983, audioclip, OARR, http://www.radioradicale.it/scheda/9098/9115-terzo-convegno-annuale-dei-pacifisti-il-disarmo-nucleare.

[199] Isernia, *La cooperazione allo sviluppo*, 107-8.

to seek allies within the parties of the ruling majority. Their approach paid off, even as in parallel conflict with the PCI grew.[200] Over the course of the new year new legislation on foreign aid took shape. The PCI applied their own medicine to the Radicals, accusing them of selling out to the ruling majority; Radicals countered by blaming the failure to obtain their priority demands on famine on PCI lack of support during the proposed legislation's numerous iterations in Parliament.[201]

The law on foreign aid of March 1985 which at last emerged was the outcome of a compromise brokered by the parties of the governing coalition between two distinct approaches proposed by the two parties of the left opposition, the Radicals and the Communists. The Radicals, leaning on the unfavorable experience of the failed legislation of 1979, favored a new program separate from existing foreign aid efforts; in addition, they insisted, the program should be run by an independent and powerful figure: a high commissioner for famine. [202] The latter would be habilitated to conduct international treaties with UN agencies and to report to an especially convened parliamentary committee. His responsibility would be to implement targeted interventions in designated world regions to forestall starvation and thus save a quantifiable number of human lives within a specific time period. Communists sought instead integration of the proposed program into existing foreign aid structures and programs focused on altering structural impediments to development. According to the chief PCI specialist on

[200] Gianfranco Spadaccia, "E Berlinguer pose il veto," *Notizie Radicali*, 28 Mar. 1984), OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=48514&lang=IT&cms=.

[201] Gianfranco Spadaccia, "Il ricatto comunista. PCI: una maggioranza neocolonialista," *Notizie Radicali*, 2 Jan. 1985, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=48753&lang=IT&cms= .

[202] Gianfranco Spadaccia, " Il testo della nuova legge contro lo sterminio per fame," 3 Mar. 1984, audioclip, OARR, http://www.radioradicale.it/scheda/8428/8445-il-testo-della-nuova-legge-contro-lo-sterminio-per-fame.

international affairs, "there would be no salvation for the starving unless the fundamental characteristics of northern developed societies change […]"[203]

But rather than the creation of the post of high commissioner demanded by the Radicals, the new law, as approved, appointed an under secretary reporting to the minister of foreign affairs. A reduced but still significant budget of 1.9 trillion lira was made available to address world famine over the following eighteenth months.[204] Despite its reduced scope relative to Radical aims, the program undoubtedly represented a significant innovation for Italian foreign policy.[205] Yet Radicals withheld their favorable vote; they abstained, affirming that their original proposal had been watered down and that the law as a consequence would not be effective.[206] Pannella's request of the position of under-secretary for famine went unheeded, despite broad support ranging from PSDI, PSI and DC ranks; the post was instead awarded to a Socialist, Francesco Forte.[207] Pannella's standing had been damaged by his earlier call to destitute Andreotti, the DC foreign minister and overseer of the new department. Such calls presumably dampened Andreotti's inclination to accept the troublesome Radical for the job.[208]

---

[203] Antonio Rubbi (Dec. 1984), cited in Isernia, *La cooperazione allo sviluppo*, 111.

[204] A detailed account can be found in ibid., 108-17.

[205] Ginsborg, *Italy and Its Discontents*, 237-9.

[206] Giovanni Negri, "Iter parlamentare della legge contro lo sterminio per fame la posizione del partito radicale," 6 Mar. 1985, audioclip, OARR, http://www.radioradicale.it/scheda/10690/10708-liter-parlamentare-della-legge-contro-lo-sterminio-per-fame-la-posizione-del-partito-radicale.

[207] Gianluigi Melega, "Radicali al governo? Sarebbe ora!" *La Repubblica* (Rome), 9 Apr. 1985.

[208] "Craxi esamina l'autocandidatura del leader pr per la gestione dei fondi sulla fame. Pannella vice ministro di Andreotti?" *La Stampa* (Turin), 4 Apr. 1985; " 'La mia candidatura scade tra 48 ore' Ultimatum di Pannella per entrare nel governo," *La Stampa* (Turin), 11 Apr. 1985; "In polemica con il gruppo dc della Camera. Pannella sottosegretario 'Ritiro la candidatura," *La Stampa* (Turin), 13 Apr. 1985.

Radicals refused to take any responsibility for the approved legislation and warned of a future misuse of funds. They called for vigilance in coming years, and would in fact occasionally exert their self-appointed role of watchdog.[209] But their lack of interest in actively engaging in efforts to reform foreign aid would also contribute to the subsequent decline in political will to improve Italian foreign aid practices. The waning of a hitherto significant focus of public opinion on the question famine did not help either.[210]

Radical efforts had unquestionably been a determining factor in the passage of the new legislation.[211] They had appropriated an issue which was in 1979 a low priority for policymakers. By relentlessly thrusting global famine at the forefront of public concerns and through their tireless activism, Radicals had imposed on policymakers their internationalist agenda, despite being a tiny political minority. But alongside the humanitarian motives of the architects of the new legislation had also been pragmatic considerations. The Radical campaign, we have seen, was from inception part of an attempt to challenge the parties of the left. Further, the final refusal to vote in favor for the new legislation was not solely driven by disapproval of its content; it was also linked to the goal to reap political capital without assuming the risks of

[209] Giovanni Negri, Giuseppe Calderisi and Francesco Rutelli, "Iter parlamentare della legge contro lo sterminio per fame la posizione del partito radicale," 6 Mar. 1985, audioclip, OARR, http://www.radioradicale.it/scheda/10690/10708-liter-parlamentare-della-legge-contro-lo-sterminio-per-fame-la-posizione-del-partito-radicale.

[210] Francesco Rutelli, "Fame: una nuova 38, peggiore della vecchia," *Notizie Radicali*, 10 Jan. 1987), OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=49215&lang=IT&cms=; Isernia, *La cooperazione allo sviluppo*, 117-9.

[211] Ginsborg, *Italy and Its Discontents*, 238; Isernia, "Bandiera e risorse: la politica estera negli anni Ottanta," in *Il gigante dai piedi di argilla*, ed. Cotta and Isernia, 174-81; Isernia, *La cooperazione allo sviluppo*, 96-117.

ownership of a necessarily problematic implementation. Incidentally, the ambiguous Radical vote of "benevolent abstention" also helped along warming relations with Premier Craxi.[212]

On the Socialist front, the benefits of the passage of the new foreign aid law were more material, though they too were of a political nature. The long economic crisis had created a pent-up demand for foreign markets; foreign aid provided ample opportunities for political graft. Craxi, by 1985 nearing the apogee of his power, sought to strengthen his party's connections to Italy's industrial base, an integral aspect of his reach for greater power and influence in the face of the snail pace of his party's electoral growth. He sought to place himself, in the words of an unsympathetic commentator, as a spider at the center of the system of financing for parties.[213]

In the years following 1985, the Radicals took on a new internationalist cause, European federalism. For its part, the implementation of the new foreign aid legislation confirmed Radical reservations, producing inept programming, corruption, and immoral diplomatic dealings with circles close to the Somalian dictator Siad Barre.[214] But even as Radicals recused ownership of the fruit of six years of efforts, they sought a political accord with its Socialist implementors. In 1985, a tentative alliance between Craxi and Pannella emerged once again; it harbored promise, given the ascendant star of the Socialist premier and his tug of war with a common adversary, the

[212] A similar argument is employed by Isernia to explain the Radical insistence that the problem of famine derived from political, not technical or structural causes, or their casting the issue in simplistic terms which could be addressed through immediate and well-funded intervention. See Isernia, *La cooperazione allo sviluppo,* 102. On the "benevolent abstention" of the Radicals as a gesture of political amity towards Craxi, see Isernia, "Bandiera e risorse: la politica estera negli anni Ottanta," 174-81.

[213] Luciano Cafagna, *La grande slavina: L'Italia verso la crisi della democrazia* (Venice: Marsilio, 1993), 105-6. See also Isernia, "Bandiera e risorse: la politica estera negli anni Ottanta," 174-81.

[214] Ginsborg, *Italy and Its Discontents,* 237-9.

PCI.[215] The Communists continued their struggle to emerge from a sterile opposition, even as they clung to their Third Way. Two years earlier, however, Mitterrand's own efforts to offer an alternative to neoliberal prescriptions for recovery had resulted in failure, marking the apparent triumph of a new politico-economic orthodoxy.

Mitterrand's nation-based scheme to boost the French economy was trumped by a concurrent hiking of interests rates by Paul Volcker's Federal Reserve, the last of a long string of measures to defeat inflation and economic stagnation.[216] Faced with disastrous capital flight, by 1983 President Mitterrand abandoned the promise or delusion of the French way to socialism and returned to economic policies similar to those of his predecessor, including privatization and deregulation. Little besides a charismatic leadership style and Pharaonic public projects remained of ambitions to transform France and implement what *l'Unità* had once termed a revolutionary program. What leftist critics decried as neoliberalism now dominated mainstream economic thinking; as applied, though, its prescriptions would lead to future instability.[217] In the shorter term, the effects of the Volcker Shock benefited President Reagan, who proved luckier than his predecessor and was triumphantly reelected in 1984. His supreme self-confidence now turned infectious, rather than threatening. His good fortune included a Soviet foreign policy reversal following Soviet General Secretary Konstantin Chernenko's death in March 1985.[218]

---

[215] Marco Pannella, "Il Bettino sono me. Esclusivo/Craxi raccontato da Pannella," interview by Filippo Ceccarelli, *Panorama*, 17 Aug. 1986), OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=49071&lang=IT&cms=.

[216] Daniel J. Sargent, "The United States and Globalization in the 1970s," in *The Shock of the Global*, ed. Ferguson, 61-2.

[217] See the comments by Milton Friedman denouncing the continued life of Keynesianism and of the welfare state, Milton Friedman, interview by Paolo Mastrolilli, "Io, l'antikeynes," *Liberal* (Rome), 20 Sept. 1999, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=138445&lang=IT&cms=; Niall Ferguson, "Crisis, What Crisis? The 1970s and the Shock of the Global," *The Shock of the Global,* ed. Ferguson, 1-21.

[218] Soutou, *La guerre de Cinquante Ans*, 631-7.

Chapter Five: European Federalists and Transnationalists (1985-91)

Malaise permeated the Radicals' fall 1985 congress. Radical Senator Mario Signorino lamented that the party had become an "ugly, flat and faded photocopy of its leader […] the problem is that we are not able to add anything to his inventiveness […] We continue to denounce the monstruosity of the partitocracy without finding new solutions to the crisis of the political system." Signorino's proposals for a change of course, however, found few adherents. A majority of party members supported the motion and resolution seconded by the party's charismatic leader and the reappointment as party secretary of his ally Giovanni Negri. Conceding a crisis in the party's raison d'être, Pannella characteristically suggested drawing up plans for dissolution within a year should the party fail to implement an alternative to the current "antidemocratic game."[1]

Despite the Radicals' irrepressible antiparty rhetoric, among the congress' guests were three prominent Socialists: a habitué, Claudio Martelli, "Bobbo" Craxi, the son of the PSI leader, and Francesco Forte, who had been assigned the post of undersecretary for famine in Pannella's lieu. For the first time in twenty-two years a Republican party secretary attended, the current Minister of Defense and former Premier Giovanni Spadolini. He noted that beyond their differences, Republicans and Radicals shared a common commitment to "absolute" European

[1] Marco Pannella, "Risoluzione approvata dal XXXI congresso del Pr (Firenze 30, 31 ottobre, 1, 2 e 3 novembre 1985)," Nov. 1985, congressional resolution, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=48875&lang=&cms=; Giuseppe Fedi, "Al congresso di Firenze s'affacciano gli oppositori alla segreteria. Autocritica nel partito radicale. 'Siamo una copia di Pannella'," *La Stampa* (Turin), 1 Nov. 1985.

federalism.[2] Pannella also invited an esteemed veteran of the Italian left: Altiero Spinelli, the lifelong European federalist and member of the Strasbourg parliament. He urged Radicals in an impassioned speech to refocus their energies on an internationalist cause: European unification, then at a critical juncture.[3] It would soon become a focus of the Radicals. In domestic politics, meanwhile, the party continued its descending trajectory. Declining relevance however contrasted with the political activism of Pannella, who continued to court the Socialist leader and repeatedly sought a prominent position in government.

Bettino Craxi, if not his party, had by 1985 emerged as unquestioned winner of the contest on the left in act since the seventies. That year, the Socialist leader faced and successfully navigated two major political challenges. The first was in the area of domestic policy. Craxi defeated a Communist attempt to abrogate through a referendum the anti-inflationary law curtailing the automatic wage index (*scala mobile*). The PCI's proposal was the culmination of its efforts since 1980 to advance a workerist and populist alternative to neoliberalism. The second challenge faced by Craxi involved an unprecedented foreign policy confrontation with the United States at Sigonella military airport over the custody of terrorists who had murdered an American citizen. While significant for Craxi's political fortunes, the long-term import of both events is debatable. It is doubtful that curtailment of the *scala mobile* had much more than a short term economic impact, though it did in the longer term mark the

[2] G[iuseppe] Fe[di], "Ultimatum di Pannella, fischi a Spadolini, applausi a Martelli. Il congresso radicale cerca l'unità. Tortora presidente del partito?" *La Stampa* (Turin), 3 Nov. 1985.

[3] Marco Pannella, "L'Europa si consacri all'utopia federalista," *Il Tempo* (Rome), 29 May 1985, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=16116&lang=IT&cms=; "Mozione generale approvata dal XXXI congresso del Pr (Firenze, 30, 31 ottobre, 1, 2 e 3 novembre 1985). Per il diritto alla vita e per la vita del diritto," congressional motion, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=48871&lang=&cms=; the concluding part of Spinelli's speech can be heard in a photomontage videoclip of the Radio Radicale channel on Youtube, see http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F425ZovRoyw.

decline of union power.[4] The Italian economy, echoing global trends and benefiting from the creativity of small-scale domestic entrepreneurs, was already on the upswing. In the area of foreign policy, the diplomatic confrontation with the Americans was little more than a lovers' quarrel.

However, Craxi's affirmations were in the immediate of great political use. His image as purveyor of economic prosperity and of political stability was enhanced. Facing off Uncle Sam burnished his patriotic credentials. The latter had been established earlier through confrontation with the Soviet Union over the Euromissiles or, contrariwise, when he stunned Atlanticists in May 1984 by unexpectedly suggesting a détente-friendly moratorium on Euromissile deployment. Craxi's uninhibited diplomatic maneuvers lent some credibility to Socialist ambitions to wield an independent foreign policy distinct from the supposedly supine policies of Christian Democratic policymakers.[5]

The irony of Communist promotion of an abrogative referendum on the automatic wage index was not lost on contemporaries. The PCI had long opposed Radical resort to the same instrument, arguing that the referendum should not be wielded as a political tool by parties but

[4] Paul Ginsborg, *Italy and Its Discontents: Family, Civil Society, State: 1980-2001* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 152-3.

[5] It should be noted that Giulio Andreotti, a Christian Democrat, was Craxi's able foreign minister for the duration of the 9th legislation (1983-7), see Ginsborg, *Italy and Its Discontents*, 235-6. It was Craxi, however, who floated the idea of a moratorium on Euromissiles deployment to relaunch détente with the Soviets. See Ezio Mauro, "Obiezioni sia sul merito che sul metodo dell'iniziativa annunciata a Lisbona. Malumori e critiche nella maggioranza per le dichiarazioni di Craxi sui missili. La Malfa: 'Lo squilibrio tra i due fronti è tale che sarebbe pericoloso fermare l'installazione solo perchè riprendono le trattative.' – Pare che lo stesso Forlani non fosse a conoscenza della iniziativa craxiana – Giudizio positivo del pci," *La Stampa* (Turin), 5 May 1984. Craxi was the first leader of a NATO country to meet with the new Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, see Fabio Galvano, "La lunga giornata di Craxi nella 'sala Caterina' del Cremlino. Gorbaciov: Urss e Italia un dialogo costruttivo. Il presidente del Consiglio: i rapporti economici devono svilupparsi equilibrandosi, i sovietici sono disponibili – Battuta scherzosa del leader russo sulla voluminosa cartella di Andreotti," *La Stampa* (Turin), 30 May 1985.

rather as a corrective tool at the service of civil society.[6] From a Communist perspective resort to the extra-parliamentary approach was justified on account of the party's spirited defense of workers' rights; brandishing the referendum was also a political assault on Craxi.

Communist opposition to tinkering with the automatic wage index, it will be recalled, had been at the basis of the party's opposition to SME; the present political battle originated in 1984, when Craxi imposed an anti-inflation decree which cut back by a few points the wage index. The measure was approved with difficulty, due to lukewarm DC support and a tenacious PCI opposition which included resort to obstructionist tactics.[7] Elements of the DC joined the Communists in accusing Craxi of *decisionismo*, a hard-to-translate term suggesting the fault or quality of decisiveness.[8] Following the decree's passage, the Communists immediately

[6] Giorgio La Malfa, "Lettere al direttore. L'uovo di Pannella. La Malfa dice no," *La Stampa* (Turin), 27 Apr. 1985; Anna Chimenti, *Storia dei referendum: Dal divorzio alla riforma elettorale 1974-1999* (Bari: Laterza, 1999), 76.

[7] Luca Giurato, "Alla vigilia del congresso che si apre oggi a Roma. La dc chiede di modificare il decreto sulla scala mobile. Se a fine anno l'inflazione superasse il 10 percent i lavoratori dovrebbero essere risarciti – Sollecitato anche un intervento del governo perchè tutte le banche riducano il costo del denaro," *La Stampa* (Turin), 24 Feb. 1984; Eugenio Palmieri, "Il sen. Rubbi precisa che le proposte sono quelle contenute nell'accordo. Il pri contesta le modifiche dc al decreto per la scala mobile," *La Stampa* (Turin), 25 Feb. 1984: "Sempre più aspro l'ostruzionismo dei comunisti. Sulla scala mobile Craxi forse chiede la fiducia," *Stampa Sera* (Turin), 16 Mar. 1984; Alberto Rapisarda, "Martedì Craxi deciderà se porre la fiducia per sbloccare la situazione. Scala mobile, nuova iniziativa pci per ritardare il voto dei senatori," *La Stampa* (Turin), 18 Mar. 1984; Giorgio Frasca Polara, "Ieri al Senato aspra battaglia e incidenti per i colpi di mano della maggioranza. Vogliono strozzare la discussione. L'opposizione di sinistra fermamente determinata a difendere il Parlamento e i diritti dei lavoratori. Una decisione antiregolamentare del vicepresidente socialista scatena le proteste – Cossiga ha contingentato d'autorità i tempi del dibattito sugli odg. Non si è voluto sanare l'anomalia della mancata copertura finanziaria – Domani Craxi pone la fiducia per impedire ogni modifica al decreto?" *l'Unità* (Rome), 20 Mar. 1984; Stefano Lepri, "Respinte alla Camera le pregiudiziali delle opposizioni. Ora il decreto bis si gioca su un punto della scala mobile. I comunisti potrebbero rinunciare (dopo l'intervento di Lama) al recupero dei tre punti – Però insistono perchè non venga tagliato anche il quarto, che non era previsto," *La Stampa* (Turin), 5 May 1984; Alberto Rapisarda, "Irritazione nella maggioranza per le troppe assenze alla Camera. Sul decreto bis il governo ottiene la seconda fiducia," *La Stampa* (Turin), 22 May 1984.

[8] "Roma, riunione a porte chiuse dei segretari provinciali e regionali. Insofferenti i quadri dc. 'Non dobbiamo avere paura di Craxi, se abbiamo voce tiriamola fuori.' 'Finchè dura la presidenza socialista non possiamo accontertarci solo di battere le mani' – 'Nelle prossime elezioni europee si gioca la leadership politica in Italia'," *La Stampa* (Turin), 7 Apr. 1984. Craxi had appropriated the term as a banner signaling his effectiveness. See Ginsborg, *Italy and Its Discontents*, 156.

announced the intention of seeking the law's abolition through a referendum.[9] The same year, in another move which also confirmed the party's espousal of left-wing populism, the PCI had sought without success a special, nonbinding referendum on the ongoing deployment of Euromissiles.[10] Then, unexpectedly, on June 11, 1984 Enrico Berlinguer died. His demise helped assure a resounding Communist affirmation in the European parliamentary elections held a few days later. For the first time, electoral outcomes placed the Communists ahead of the DC by a few fractions of a point.[11] Popular emotion and a relatively low-stakes election had facilitated a success which galvanized the party and set in stone the decision to press ahead with the referendum. In mid-1984 and into 1985 it remained conceivable that the PCI might reclaim its former standing on the basis of traditional stances.

The PCI's appropriation of its old antisystem garb had narrowed the field for the Radicals, whose electoral affirmation in mid-1979 had been linked, we have seen, to voter disenchantment with the PCI's strategy of historic compromise with the DC.[12] The Radicals had also to contend with the rivalry of MSI-DN. Since 1979, the neofascists had toned down their

[9] "Scala mobile, i comunisti chiedono il referendum," *Stampa Sera* (Turin), 30 June 1984.

[10] "Missili: 'no' del governo al referendum," *l'Unità* (Rome), 31 Mar. 1984.

[11] Giorgio Frasca Polera, "Secondo le prime proiezioni della notte si delinea un profondo mutamento nei rapporti di forza politici. Ha vinto il PCI. La DC ferma all'83, insuccesso del PSI. Severa sconfitta del pentapartito. In Europa, esclusa la Francia, la sinistra vince ovunque. Clamorosa avanzata in Gran Bretagna, Olanda e RFT. Ha votato l'83,9 percent degli elettori – PLI e PRI perdono sulle politiche dimostrando il fallimento della loro alleanza elettorale – I radicali recuperano. Il PSDI, che è stato penalizzato anche dalla questione morale, e il MSI in flessione – Deludente l'effetto della presidenza socialista – Negli altri paesi sono state premiate le forze che hanno combattuto con più vigore contro le armi nucleari – Splendido risultato della lista 'verde' in Germania Ovest," *l'Unità* (Rome), 18 June 1984.

[12] PCI stances had long accounted for the party's electoral success, one equally due to the able self-representation as a democratic, patriotic and moderate force. For an excellent comparative treatment of the PCI and PCF distinct abilities to appeal to their respective electorates, see Marc Lazar, *Maisons rouges: Les partis communistes français et italiens de la Libération à nos jours* (Paris: Aubier, 1992), passim.

anticommunist rhetoric while redoubling their antipolitical and antiparty denunciations.[13] In response to such challenges, from 1985 Pannella sought out with renewed energy an alliance with the Machiavellian Craxi, demonstrating that Radicals too could juggle with agility contradictory politics.[14] The Radical leader combined outreach to the Socialists with criticism of Craxi's engagement in clientelistic power politics. Socialist policies, he wrote on one occasion, had come at the cost of corrupting the sprawling ranks of the party's freshman cadres. However, he claimed, the PSI had not yet experienced a "genetic mutation," unlike a PCI which he depicted as "nationalized" and "bureaucratized," a candidate to "become the state, a pilaster of the existing order."[15]

Radicals declared their opposition to the Communist anti-decree referendum. Pannella even urged voters to desert the polls, leading a contemporary commentator to note as unprecedented the Radical boycott of a referendum. If less than half the electorate showed up, the referendum would be invalidated, Pannella pointed out.[16] Italy's greatest problems, he declared, were no longer fueled by clerical interests, but an unsustainable Communist approach to the political economy.[17] Borrowing neoliberal arguments, he berated the PCI for its refusal to

---

[13] Piero Ignazi, *Il polo escluso: Profilo storico del Movimento Sociale Italiano* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1998), 197-218.

[14] On the "contradictions" of the PCI, see Massimo Teodori, "Radicali e comunisti: le ragioni vere del conflitto," *Argomenti Radicali: Bimestrale politico per l'alternativa*, Apr.-May 1977, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=45866&lang=IT&cms=.

[15] Marco Pannella, "Radicali e socialisti all'ora della verità," *Il Giorno* (Milan), 25 Mar. 1985, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=48783&lang=IT&cms=. The same tortured logic depicting the PCI, in reality ensconced in fruitless opposition, as "the state" characterizes other Radical documents. See for instance Lorenzo Strik-Lievers, "PCI, bastione di regime. Stato-partito o stato di diritto?" *La Prova, Supplemento di discussione*, supplement to *Notizie Radicali*, 2 June 1985, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=48803&lang=IT&cms=.

[16] Chimenti, *Storia dei referendum*, 77-8.

[17] Marco Pannella, "Referendum: non votiamo," *Reporter*, 10 Apr. 1985, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=48788&lang=IT&cms=; Marco Pannella, "Non cerco elettori tra i morti per

countenance the reform of the cost of labor or the problem of public debt.[18] Elsewhere, in a paean to Radical-Socialist collaboration, Pannella declared that "there are two miracles in Italian and European politics. One is the PSI, which with less than ten percent, produces a president of the republic, a premier, mayors, presidents of regions, of banks […]. The other miracle is the Radical Party, which with less than three thousand members, has succeeded for the past two decades to always be on the right side in the major battles for civil rights; many heads of state in the Third World consider it the most authentic representative of Europe."[19]

Pannella's referendum boycott proposal was initially entertained by Craxi as well as by two of the three national unions as a possible strategy to defeat the PCI. The Socialist prime minister, however, in a move intended to mobilize the electorate, soon declared the outcome of the vote a verdict on his government. In so doing, he increased the stakes of the confrontation and stood poised to reap a potential political windfall, even as he denounced elements in the DC that plotted his fall.[20]

---

fame d'Africa. Parla il leader pr candidato sottosegretario per gli aiuti Terzo Mondo," interview by Vittorio Feltri, *Corriere della Sera* (Milan), 12 Apr. 1985, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=48789&lang=IT&cms=; Marco Pannella, " 'Se scendi in campo tu, mi ritiro io,'" *Il Giornale* (Milan), 14 Apr. 1985, OHRA, available from http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=48791&lang=IT&cms=.

[18] Pannella, "Referendum: non votiamo," *Reporter*, 10 Apr. 1985. The nature of the interconnections between the issues of public debt, the cost of labor, economic recovery and inflation is debatable. The political import of the outcome of the referendum, however, was certain. Pannella was right to point to rising public debt as a looming and major policy issue, but wrong in identifying the culprits: on Premier Craxi's watch, public debt increased from 73 percent to 93 percent of GDP; the salaries of public functionaries rose circa 30 per cent in 1985-7, and the Socialist "seemed as much committed to perpetuating a spectacular version of patron-client relations as fighting for efficient and equitable administration," (Ginsborg, *Italy and Its Discontents*, 152-4). Such stances, arguably, anticipated those of his political heir, Silvio Berlusconi.

[19] Pannella, "Non cerco elettori tra i morti per fame d'Africa. Parla il leader pr candidato sottosegretario per gli aiuti Terzo Mondo," interview by Vittorio Feltri, *Corriere della Sera* (Milan), 12 Apr. 1985, OHRA.

[20] "Il leader radicale invita gli elettori a disertare le urne. Proposta Pannella anti-referendum più riserve che aperti consensi," *Stampa Sera* (Turin), 10 Apr. 1984; Giancarlo Fossi, "Il presidente del Consiglio: una guerra che nessuno vuole combattere. Referendum, Craxi non si arrende e prepara nuove carte da giocare," *La Stampa* (Turin), 12 Apr. 1985; "Un messaggio di Carniti a Lama e Benvenuto. Firmiamo appello a disertare il referendum," *Stampa Sera*

Craxi's gamble payed off; he emerged as the victor of the June 1985 referendum consultation, dooming the PCI's latest attempt to derive political momentum from a shrinking base of industrial workers, and, not least, spelling the death-knoll of the Third Way.

The promise of the Italian way to socialism would nevertheless have an important sequel.[21] In June 1984 Mikhail Gorbachev, then number two figure of the Soviet Communist Party, had attended Berlinguer's funeral.[22] Gorbachev was deeply moved by an emotional crowd numbering by some accounts one million people.[23] *L'Unità* reported on an undulating sea of red flags carpeting the immense square surrounding Rome's cathedral, St John Lateran, and the singing in the "one thousand dialects" still spoken on the Peninsula of the stirring Resistance-era anthem, *Bandiera rossa* (Red Flag).[24] The Italian leader's popularity and the success of his brand

---

(Turin), 24 Apr. 1985; La Malfa, "Lettere al direttore. L'uovo di Pannella"; "Referendum: si va alle urne. Dc, Psi, Psdi, Pri e Pli per il no. Pci Dp e Missini sono per il sì," *Stampa Sera* (Turin), 28 May 1985; "Il 9 giugno. Polemica per la sortita di Martelli. La Dc è contrariata 'non politicizzare questo referendum," *Stampa Sera* (Turin), 31 May 1985; Alberto Rapisarda, "Il radicale Pannella a Craxi 'Se vincerà il sì cada il governo' Per il psi voto poco sentito – Pci e missini: è troppo politicizzato," *Stampa Sera* (Turin), 3 June 1985; Luca Giurato, "Domani e lunedì mattina si vota per il referendum sulla scala mobile. Sì e no, i leader nella mischia. Tutti i segretari dei partiti impegnati in uno scontro che si è trasformato in una battaglia politica sul governo. Continua la polemica tra Craxi e la dc – Citando una frase attribuita a Donat-Cattin il presidente del Consiglio dice: non sono pochi gli esponenti democristiani che sono tutt'altro che entusiasti dell'attuale equilibrio politico. Un falso scenario," *La Stampa* (Turin), 8 June 1985.

[21] For a collection of reprinted, critical articles by Norberto Bobbio on the Third Way, see his *Le ideologie e il potere in crisi: Pluralismo, democrazia, socialismo, comunismo terza via e terza forza* (Florence: Felice Le Monnier, 1981); on the rejection of capitalism and social-democracy by the PCI, see Jacques Lévesque, *The Enigma of 1989: The USSR and the Liberation of Eastern Europe* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 253.

[22] Maria Giovanna Maglie, "Zhao, Arafat, Gorbaciov, leader da tutto il mondo. Decine di delegazioni straniere per l'ultimo saluto a Berlinguer – Marchais: di lui ho tanti ricordi – Il numero due del Pcus: una perdita grande per tutti i lavoratori italiani. Applausi a cinesi e palestinesi – Iglesias e Carrillo nella rappresentanza spagnola," *l'Unità* (Rome), 14 June 1984.

[23] Lietta Tornabuoni, "Una folla sterminata ha dato l'ultimo addio al leader del partito comunista. Un milione e mezzo per Berlinguer. Sul palco il capo dello Stato, Craxi e i rappresentanti di tutti i partiti comunisti – I discorsi della Jotti, di Dankert e di Pajetta – Pertini si è chinato a baciare la bara – Dopo la cerimonia i familiari hanno accompagnato il feretro al cimitero di Prima Porta dove è stato sepolto vicino al padre," *La Stampa* (Turin), 14 June 1984.

[24] Rocco Di Blasi, "L'enorme piazza ammutolisce. Poi lo chiama: 'Enrico, Enrico.' Un'attesa di ore per l'uomo della lotta e della speranza. L'ingresso a San Giovanni del corteo funebre – Migliaia erano lì dal primo mattino

of communism helped shape Secretary General Gorbachev's optimism on the prospects for reform of Soviet communism, with fateful consequences.[25] His faith in the viability of reformed communism also led him to press Alessandro Natta, Berlinguer's successor, not to alter his party's designation. Such pressures, paradoxically, restrained the PCI's own reformist vocations.[26]

Craxi's referendum victory over the PCI was soon complemented by a foreign policy success. The Sigonella Crisis between the United States and Italy began in the early hours of 11 October 1985. Shortly after midnight, two US fighter jets forced an Egyptair passenger jet to land at Sigonella military airport in Sicily, leading to a tense stand-off between Italian and US military over control of the pro-Palestine terrorists ensconced in the plane. The four young terrorists were held responsible for the recent hijacking of the Italian-flag bearing cruise ship "Achille Lauro" and the murder of one passenger among hundreds held hostage. Following Egyptian and Italian negotiations with the captors in Port Said, where the cruise ship had anchored, the passengers had been released and the terrorists entrusted to the custody of the PLO. Craxi later stated that when he learnt that a hostage had been killed he had promptly requested extradition of the culpable to Italy, including by placing a direct call to Yasser Arafat. At any rate, the terrorists, led by two PLO negotiators, were scuttled onto an Egyptair plane, which in short order took off with as destination Tunis, then the headquarters of the PLO. While

---

sfidando un sole torrido – 'Siamo venuti a ricambiare quello che avete fatto per noi' – Da Mantova a Cosenza: il ricordo di quanti gli avevano parlato – 'Addio, grazie'," *l'Unità* (Rome), 14 June 1984.

[25] Robert D. English, *Russia and the Idea of the West: Gorbachev, Intellectuals and the End of the Cold War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 183, 315-6 (note 146); see also the excellent account of Gorbachev's attempt to save through reform Soviet communism and the unintended effects that ensued in Lévesque, *The Enigma of 1989.*

[26] Roberto Gualtieri, "L'ultimo decennio del PCI," in *Revisionismo socialista e rinnovamento liberale*, ed. P. Borioni (Rome: Carocci, 2001), 191.

in flight, the airplane was intercepted by American fighter jets and forced to land at Sigonella. Upon landing, the plane was surrounded by a ring of Italian military. Thereupon, a corps of US Special Forces emerged from two just-landed military transport planes and surrounded the Italians, demanding that the terrorists be handed over to US custody. Compounding the surreal quality of this quarrel between allies, the American military were in turn encircled by a second Italian contingent, while President Reagan sought to convince Craxi to hand over the terrorists. Particularly insistent were demands for the custody of Abu Abbas. Abbas was the second-hand man of Arafat, was already the subject of a life sentence in Italian courts, and was suspected by the US of complicity in the hijacking. Instead, the next day, after escorting the Egyptair plane to Rome, the Italian authorities let Abbas and an accompanying PLO official depart on a flight to Belgrade; the four hijackers were consigned to the Italian justice system.[27]

Reagan and Craxi's reconciliation followed in quick order; it failed however to forestall the collapse of the governing coalition.[28] Three Republican ministers, including defense minister Spadolini, deserted the government, in protest of the pro-Palestinian stances of Craxi and his foreign minister, Andreotti.[29] By November, a recasting of the Craxi government was in place,

[27] "I pirati sulla 'Lauro' hanno 420 ostaggi," *Stampa Sera* (Turin), 8 Oct. 1985; "La 'linea rossa' fra Reagan e Craxi," *La Stampa* (Turin), 12 Oct. 1985; Ennio Caretto, "Così è scattato il blitz," *La Stampa* (Turin), 12 Oct. 1985; Ezio Mauro, "Craxi: non potevamo che dire 'sì'," *La Stampa* (Turin), 12 October 1985; "L'Italia processerà i pirati," *La Stampa* (Turin), 12 Oct. 1985; "Squarci nella tela diplomatica tra Europa, Usa e Medio Oriente," *La Stampa* (Turin), 15 Oct. 1985; "Craxi racconta 'la verità italiana'," *Stampa Sera* (Turin), 17 Oct. 1985; "L'autodifesa alla Camera in una relazione di cinquanta minuti. Craxi: vi racconto tutto," *La Stampa* (Turin), 18 Oct. 1985; "Così gli aerei della Saratoga agirono nel cielo di Sigonella," *La Stampa* (Turin), 29 Nov. 1985.

[28] E.J. Dionne, "President sends conciliatory note to Italian leader. An effort to repair ties. Craxi, after receiving letter, says he plans to attend gathering in New York," *New York Times*, 20 Oct. 1985; "Reagan's letter to Craxi," *New York Times*, 20 Oct. 1985; "Craxi is positive on US relations. Italian leader says he does not blame Washington for his government's fall," *New York Times*, 25 Oct.1985; Ginsborg, *Italy and Its Discontents*, 153, 236-7.

[29] Roberto Bellato, "Spadolini contro Craxi 'Politica velleitaria'," *Stampa Sera* (Turin), 12 Oct. 1985; Luca Giurato, "Cresce la polemica sulla liberazione di Abbas e sul raid Usa. Scontro fra Spadolini e Andreotti sulla liberazione dei palestinesi. Il ministro della Difesa ha chiesto di bloccare il rilascio dei due membri dell'Olp. – Il responsabile degli Esteri: 'Mi dispiace, è già tutto deciso' – Pli e Psdi chiedono la cosnvocazione del consiglio di gabinetto – Il pci

though in a speech given during consultations leading to reinstatement, Craxi angered Spadolini once again. The premier declared that recourse to armed struggle by the PLO was understandable even if objectionable due to its ineffectiveness. Such words elicited the applause of Communist and Democratic Proletarian ranks; *Stampa Sera* printed a caricature depicting a gleeful Craxi ensconced in a throne born by Mazzini, Garibaldi and Yasser Arafat. Having obtained the desired effect, in a follow-up speech given during a decisive Senate vote two days later, Craxi moderated his tone, condemned terrorism and appealed for a peaceful resolution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. The spate with the US attracted Communist praise, even though parliamentary support for Craxi's reinstatement was not forthcoming and the Socialist premier did not reciprocate partial political openings of the PCI.[30] Still, *l'Unità* highlighted the systemic fragility of the five-party coalition, reflecting dogged PCI hopes to end its exclusion from power.[31]

---

pronto ad appoggiare il governo," *La Stampa* (Turin), 13 Oct. 1985; Gianni Pennacchi, "Cade Craxi. Riferisce in Parlamento, poi va da Cossiga per le dimissioni – Irremovibile il pri: all'unanimità la decisione di uscire dal governo. Il presidente del Consiglio succederà a se stesso? E Andreotti?" *Stampa Sera* (Turin), 17 Oct. 1985; Giovanni Spadolini, " 'Le ragioni del Pri non hanno niente a che fare con le ragioni della Casa Bianca.' Spadolini: non sono un falco. 'Testimonianza ed estradizione sono cose diverse: volevo che Abbas fosse interrogato dalla magistratura, non mi sono mai pronunciato per la sua colpevolezza' – 'Il terrorismo, lo diceva con ragione Pertini, ha connessioni internazionali e l'Olp ci è entrata'," *La Stampa* (Turin), 22 Oct. 1985.

[30] "Craxi col batticuore…Le condizioni di democristiani, liberali e repubblicani per votare la fiducia in Senato – Pertini: 'Lo conosco, non ritratterà niente'," *Stampa Sera* (Turin), 8 Nov. 1985; Giuseppe Fedi, "Sorpresa e malumore di liberali e social-democratici. E Spadolini s'infuria. Il segretario pri: 'Chi vuole rompere la coalizione se ne assuma la responsabilità'," *La Stampa* (Turin), 7 Nov. 1985; Alberto Rapisarda, "Craxi ottiene la fiducia della Camera ma la sua replica suscita dure polemiche. 'Capisco la lotta armata dell'Olp.' L'affermazione ha sorpreso i partiti della maggioranza mentre ha provocato calorosi applausi di pci e dp – Commenti negativi dei leader dc e laici – Il presidente risponde che non intende mutare nulla di quello che ha detto – Ma verso sera annuncia che oggi è pronto a chiarire il suo pensiero al Senato. Un voto controvoglia," *La Stampa* (Turin), 7 Nov. 1985; Alberto Rapisarda, "Con una pacata replica il presidente del Consiglio ottiene la fiducia anche dal Senato. Craxi promosso al bis. 'Siamo contro il terrorismo, la via maestra è quella negoziale' – Il leader socialista cita, a suo sostegno, anche Papa Montini – 'Amo Mazzini più di quanto lo amasse Garibaldi' – Spadolini: 'Ci vuol poco, Garibaldi lo odiava'," *La Stampa* (Turin), 9 Nov. 1985.

[31] Enzo Roggi, "È soltanto un armistizio armato," *l'Unità* (Rome), 9 Nov. 1985.

Craxi's foreign policy was less groundbreaking than claimed by Socialist boosters.[32] True, it signaled an outwardly more assertive diplomacy, already manifest in the stance on Euromissiles deployment or peacekeeping missions to the Sinai and to Lebanon.[33] Such policies reconnected with Italy's time-honored quest for Great Power status.[34] But Italian postwar diplomacy had always demonstrated independence, albeit one couched with discretion. The new foreign policy evinced a more nationalistic accent; its novelty, though, was arguably more a matter of style than substance.[35]

Most importantly, Craxi's acts and rhetoric provided a handy recipe for domestic consumption: a blend of Atlanticism garnished with nationalistic, neutralist and Third-Worldist smatterings. Craxi's declaration of support for a national liberation struggle particularly dear to the left was directed at PCI voters and spoke to his strategy to grow a frustratingly narrow electoral base. The Radicals too expressed their "positive judgment" on the government's position during the Achille Lauro affair, although they withheld their vote of support for the

[32] Ludovico Incisa di Camerana, *La vittoria dell'Italia nella terza guerra mondiale* (Rome: Laterza, 1997); Lelio Lagorio, *L'ora di Austerlitz: La svolta che mutò l'Italia* (Florence: Polistampa, 2005).

[33] Ginsborg writes: "however it may be judged, the confrontation between American marines and Italian soldiers on the landing strip of the Sicilian base represented the first awakening of an independent Italian foreign policy in the Mediterranean. So, too, did the refusal in 1986 to let the USA use Italian NATO bases during the bombing of Tripoli." Leopoldo Nuti also emphasizes the discontinuity represented by the Italian interventionism of 1982-4, see his "Linee generali della politica di difesa italiana (1945-1989), " in *Guerra e pace nell'Italia del Novecento: Politica estera, cultura politica e correnti dell'opinione pubblica*, ed. L. Goglia, R. Moro and L. Nuti (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2006), 500. See also Gaetano Quagliariello, "Oltre il 'terzaforzismo'. Craxi e le relazioni transatlantiche (1976-1983)," in *Bettino Craxi, il socialismo europeo e il sistema internazionale*, ed. A. Spiri (Venice: Marsilio, 2006), 23-47.

[34] Ernesto Galli della Loggia, "Il Mediterraneo e la politica estera italiana. Mare 'vostrum'," *La Stampa* (Turin), 19 October 1985.

[35] Giuseppe Romeo, *La politica estera italiana nell'era Andreotti (1972-1992)* (Rome: Rubbettino, 2000), 19-79.

reinstated Craxi government. Their reticence conveyed a reprimand of lackluster Socialist commitment to the demands of a minuscule party in full blown identity crisis.[36]

In his speech given during the fall 1985 Radical congress held after the Sigonella Crisis, European Federalist Altiero Spinelli had made a pitch to a Radical Party in search of a mission: "I think that if you put some of the effort you confer in your various domestic battles into the Europeanist one, you might attain good results in the current climate of openness [to European integration]. […] Support for European federalism […] is one rooted culturally in the Radical optic. It is no coincidence that perhaps the greatest of your luminaries, Ernesto Rossi, was also one of the founders of the European Federalist Movement. Know then to take on this cause while bringing to it your fervor and not least a touch of your folly *(grano di follia).*" Spinelli suggested that the Radicals, though a small minority, could have on a European scale the impact they had had in the seventies during the battle for divorce: "Don the garb of missionaries […], take action in other countries [...] I think that you will find also other political forces, for instance the Federalist Movement, with which you might ally, but make sure too that political action is accompanied by pressure exerted through petitions and agitation. Find any way, including political threats you might conjure at coming elections […]" By way of introducing his argument, Spinelli identified the "mythology of the sovereign nation-state" as at the origin of "national jingoism, protectionism, xenophobia, racism" and claimed that none of the great challenges of the time could be addressed through "national instruments." Concerning American

[36] Mario Signorino, "Comunicazioni del governo. Seguito della discussione e approvazione di risoluzione," 8 November 1985, *Senato della Repubblica, IX legislatura, 360. Seduta pubblica, Resoconto stenografico, Venerdì 8 novembre 1985*, 28-9, http://www.senato.it/service/PDF/PDFServer/BGT/317355.pdf; see also Marco Pannella, "Comunicazioni del governo (seguito della discussione)," 6 Nov. 1985, *Atti Parlamentari, Camera dei Deputati, IX legislatura , Discussioni , Seduta antimeridiana del 6 novembre 1985, Resoconto stenografico*, 32807-9, http://legislature.camera.it/_dati/leg09/lavori/stenografici/sed0373/sed0373.pdf.

hegemony, Spinelli stated that "imperial unity under the American aegis is certainly very humiliating for our peoples but is superior to nationalism because it [at least] harbors an answer to the problems of European democracies […]" "European unity," concluded Spinelli, "is in reality the only alternative to imperial unity."[37]

Following Spinelli's speech, Pannella orchestrated the inclusion in the congressional motion of provisions for a Europeanist campaign.[38] In an additional resolution which he personally drafted, Pannella denounced Italian democracy as characterized by the evaporation of "elementary constitutional guarantees, […] rights, […] the equality of citizens before the law." The Radical leader concluded by calling for a plan to wind down the party one year thence, should no alternative be found to "legitimizing the antidemocratic game."[39] To mark its commitment to an equitable justice system, the libertarian party nominated as its president television personality Enzo Tortora, who had been elected European deputy in 1984 on the party's electoral lists and had been recently been condemned on dubious charges to ten years of jail.[40]

---

[37] Altiero Spinelli, speech given to the 31st Radical Party congress (Florence, 30 Oct. - 3 Nov. 1985), reprinted as "L'aria fritta del nazionalismo" in *Notizie Radicali*, 28 Nov. 1985, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=50735&lang=IT&cms=.

[38] "Mozione generale approvata dal XXXI congresso del Pr (Firenze, 30, 31 ottobre, 1, 2 e 3 novembre 1985)," congressional motion, Nov. 1985, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=48871&lang=IT&cms=.

[39] Pannella, "Risoluzione approvata dal XXXI congresso del Pr (Firenze 30, 31 ottobre, 1, 2 e 3 novembre 1985)," congressional resolution, Nov. 1985, OHRA.

[40] Tortora was a popular TV host arrested in 1983 and condemned in Sept. 1985 to ten years of jail for supposed criminal activities, on the basis of questionable and as it would turn out unfounded allegations made by Neapolitan criminals seeking a curtailment of their sentences. See Roberto Cicciomessere, "Enzo Tortora: la giustizia tradita," *Panorama*, 27 Aug. 1986, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=49082&lang=IT&cms=; Riccardo Bocca, "Così mentii su Tortora," *l'Espresso*, 25 May 2010, http://espresso.repubblica.it/dettaglio/cosi-mentii-su-tortora/2127631//0.

Pannella had worked closely with Spinelli on the issue of European integration for a number of years in the Strasbourg parliament. After the first popular European elections of 1979, the pair led in tandem the parliamentary Institutional Affairs Committee, with Pannella acting as deputy to Spinelli. The Committee was charged with developing a new treaty for the European Economic Community (EEC); it was the first significant one since the founding acts of 1957. Though the Single European Act (SEA) that would result by 1987 did not reflect the policy objectives of Spinelli or Pannella, much of the initial impetus behind its formulation came from the Committee and enthusiastic Europeanists such as Pannella and his allies. The historical role of zealous federalists at this juncture, despite their failure to impose the vision of a politically unified Europe led by an empowered parliament, is well recognized.[41]

Spinelli's lifelong goal had been a federal Europe founded on the respect for individual rights and the defense of social justice. These objectives, according to him, would be best be achieved by a powerful European parliament; he considered impediments to his goals national sovereignty and its vessel, the nation-state. In his view, the power of the latter over the Strasbourg parliament was perpetuated by the EEC intergovernmental bodies, the Commission and the Council. Spinelli and likeminded federalists also opposed the conception of the EEC as a limited and purely economic entity, as championed in particular by British Premier Margaret Thatcher and her then-allies, Denmark and Greece. In order to provide some historical perpective on the ties between Spinelli, Radicalism and European federalism, it is necessary to briefly reach back to the World War II era.

[41] On this critical period in the EU's history, see Desmond Dinan, *Ever Closer Union* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Riener, 1999), 81-102; on Spinelli and the role of the Institutional Affairs Committee's roles, ibid., 98-100.

Spinelli's optic had been forged during the Fascist Era. While confined to the tiny Tyrrhenian island of Ventotene in 1941 for anti-Fascist activities, Spinelli had secretly redacted the Manifesto of Ventotene in collaboration with Ernesto Rossi, a founder, we have seen, of the first Radical Party. The declaration identified nationalism, militarism, and totalitarianism of all political stripes as interconnected evils that could solely be addressed through a strong European federalism.[42] The Manifesto was also an antimilitarist tract, in so far as it identified the militarism of nation-states as the crucial factor in precipitating war or preparing it in times of peace. It was not however a pacifist tract, at least not in the absolute sense given to the word; the Manifesto called for the formation of a European army.[43] The latter would provide a European federation with foreign policy credibility and political independence. European federalism would form the basis for, in a distant future, the "political unity of the entire globe."[44] Spinelli, like the Radicals, envisaged a supersession of the nation-state and the advent of supranational institutions that would transcend national sovereignty and warrant world justice. The US was expected to continue to act as a hegemonic nation-state, but its flawed universalism was not deemed an alternative to a potentially superior European variant.

[42] Ernesto Rossi and Altiero Spinelli, "Il Manifesto di Ventotene," Aug. 1941, document, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=155056&lang=IT&cms=.

[43] Spinelli, as well as the Radicals, endorsed a form of "juridical" pacifism of Kantian filiation, which held justice, not peace to be a supreme value, but which rejected war, violence, and militarism, associating the latter to illiberal states and the sacred cow of national sovereignty. The juridical underpinning of Radical antimilitarist pacifism would emerge in full view after the end of the Cold War, when Radicals conditionally endorsed military intervention. Another thinker on the left who held similar views was Norberto Bobbio. According to peace historian Pietro Pàstena, the Radicals were the "true inheritors" of the nineteenth century Italian liberal pacifists, who valued liberty as much as peace. See his *Breve storia del pacifismo in Italia: Dal Settecento alle guerre del terzo millennio* (Acireale-Rome: Bonanno, 2005), 177-81. The concept of juridical pacifism is close to Martin Ceadel's definition of what he terms "pacificism" in his categorization of different forms of pacifism, see his book *Thinking about Peace and War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987).

[44] Rossi and Spinelli, "Il Manifesto di Ventotene," August 1941, document, transcript in OHRA.

After World War II, Spinelli sought to advance his cause by founding the European Federalist Movement. But the Cold War limited its success. The Socialists withdrew their initial support, aligning with a yet Stalinist PCI which cast Europeanism as a capitalist ploy. Spinelli's cherished project of a European army as the basis for political union foundered in 1954, when the French parliament rejected the European Defense Community. In place of the federalist dream, a minimalist form of European cooperation emerged with the Treaties of Rome of 1957. The latter sanctioned economic and technological cooperation; only embryonic political union was present, including provisions for an indirectly elected parliament. Nevertheless, unlike Ernesto Rossi, who turned to domestic politics, Spinelli pursued his battle, initially as European commissioner, a title he received in recognition of his pioneering work. After the PCI endorsed the European project as its own in the seventies, he reenrolled in a party he had left in 1937 over Stalin's crimes.[45] He was subsequently elected PCI Eurodeputy in 1979 in the first European elections held by universal suffrage. In July 1981, after promoting since 1980 an informal and politically diverse working group known as the "Crocodile Club" after the Strasbourg restaurant where it met, Spinelli established the creation within the Strasbourg parliament of the already mentioned Institutional Affairs Committee. In February 1984, the Committee's resolution articulating the terms of substantial European integration was adopted by a large majority in one of the European parliament's "most famous votes."[46] Hours before the historic vote, Radicals had successfully sponsored a resolution in the Italian parliament that engaged the Italian

[45] "Il nostro futuro è con l'Europa. Il contributo del PCI nelle dichiarazioni di Altiero Spinelli," *l'Unità* (Rome), 6 June 1976.

[46] Dinan, *Ever Closer Union*, 100; for a contemporary Radical comment, see Emma Bonino, interview, "Il Parlamento europeo approva la 'proposta di unificazione' si tratta del progetto Spinelli,", 15 Feb. 1984, audioclip, OARR, http://www.radioradicale.it/scheda/8366/8383-il-parlamento-europeo-approva-la-proposta-di-unificazione-si-tratta-del-progetto-spinelli.

government to support it. In his speech given to the Chamber of Deputies on that occasion, Giovanni Negri called for Italian support for Spinelli and Pannella's federalist project, defining the current EEC as driven by "business politics, politics of mere mercantilism which have made Europe not a political actor, nor a protagonist on the international scene, but instead only a large space of exchange for meager, mediocre economic and commercial operations."[47]

By March 1985 plans for European economic integration had taken shape, but little progress on the political integration sought by Spinelli and Pannella was apparent; the Strasbourg Parliament found itself increasingly marginalized from the poles of decisionmaking in Brussels. Radicals and their federalist allies organized street protests in various European cities that month urging compliance with the parliament's original draft treaty, even as the EEC's Council of Ministers met in Brussels. They organized demonstrations once again in June, as the Council met again in Milan at the end of the Italian six-month council presidency term.[48] On that occasion, in a surprise move, Craxi forced the issue and the Council decisively voted to finalize the treaty. The vote pitted seven country representatives against three Euroskeptics, including a furious British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, and representatives of Denmark and Greece. A decision ensued to convene an intergovernmental conference (IGC). The latter would meet on six occasions in Luxemburg from early September through January 1986, producing the SEA by 1987.[49]

---

[47] Giovanni Negri, "Comunicazioni del Governo concernenti la Comunità economica europea (Seguito della discussione)," 14 Feb. 1984, *Atti Parlamentari, Camera dei Deputati, IX legislatura , Discussioni, Seduta del 14 febbraio 1984*, 7336-7, http://legislature.camera.it/_dati/leg09/lavori/stenografici/sed0089/sed0089.pdf.

[48] "Scheda cronologica su: Stati Uniti d'Europa", informational document, Apr. 1989, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=16325&lang=IT&cms=.

[49] Dinan, *Ever Closer Union*, 103-26.

The Radical congress of November 1985 had thus been held as IGC deliberated the final content of the draft SEA. Also in November, the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Chamber voted to demand the award of greater powers to the Strasbourg Parliament in exchange for Italian support of SEA.[50]

Following the Radical congress, in a Strasbourg parliamentary debate held in December 1985, Pannella harangued fellow Europarliamentarians, urging them to contest the ambiguous language employed in the draft SEA by Jacques Delors, then president of the European Commission.[51] The act that emerged subsequently from the summits however disappointed the Radicals and other federalist supporters of political integration. Nevertheless, the Radicals soldiered on, seeking changes to SEA through a campaign they planned to promote all the way to the next scheduled European parliamentary elections of 1989. They proposed to take the vote to the people in member states and to demand a greater role for Strasbourg, primarily by promoting national, consultative referenda asking voters whether they favored a "United States of Europe."[52] Radicals hoped the referenda would restore momentum to the federalist project. While knowing that a thorough revision of the SEA was improbable, they sought to create a climate of opinion through all political means at their disposal, calculating that such actions

[50] Ginsborg, *Italy and Its Discontents*, 244-5.

[51] Marco Pannella, "Europa: le conclusioni del vertice dei capi degli Stati Cee," 12 Dec. 1985, audioclip, OARR, http://www.radioradicale.it/scheda/12619/12641-europa-le-conclusioni-del-vertice-dei-capi-degli-stati-cee.

[52] "Vertice dei leader degli Stati Cee manifestazione del Partito Radicale e del Mfe," 26 June 1986, audioclip, OARR, http://www.radioradicale.it/scheda/14602/14624-vertice-dei-leader-degli-stati-cee-manifestazione-del-partito-radicale-e-del-mfe.

might conceivably force the EEC to make concessions reflecting the spirit of the original resolution of 1984.[53]

In 1987, Radicals campaigned in Italy and Belgium for the desired referenda; similar initiatives were held in Spain, France and Greece. In February 1988, a Radical resolution was approved by the Committee of Foreign Affairs of the Italian Chamber demanding that the next European parliament be afforded "constituent powers" to alter the terms of the SEA. The resolution also called for an "Estates General" of Europe that would gather the newly elected Eurodeputies alongside all the deputies of EEC member states and permit the direct election of the presidents of the European Council of Ministers and of the Commission, in lieu of the existing intergovernmental nomination process. Additional clauses called for the devolution of two percent of national defense budgets to support civil and human rights in Europe and the world and in conformity with the Third Basket of the Helsinki Accords, as well as the symbolic inclusion in the two aforementioned elections of the non-EEC members of the Assembly of the Council of Europe.[54] In parallel, a Radical opinion campaign continued with the gathering of some one hundred thousand signatures across Europe for a petition supporting political union and a stronger role for the Strasbourg parliament. In May, the Strasbourg parliament approved two Radical-sponsored "declarations." The first reiterated the call for the "Estates General" to coincide with the next European elections and the bicentenary of the French Revolution. The

[53] Gianfranco Dell'Alba, " 'Stati Uniti d'Europa subito!' organizzato dal Partito radicale," 23 Mar. 1987, audioclip, OARR, http://www.radioradicale.it/scheda/64274/64343-stati-uniti-deuropa-subito-organizzato-dal-partito-radicale; "Scheda cronologica su: Stati Uniti d'Europa", OHRA.

[54] "Stati generali: la risoluzione della Commissione esteri della camera dei deputati," *Notizie Radicali*, 11 Mar. 1988, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=16190&lang=IT&cms=; Sergio Stanzani and Gianfranco Dell'Alba, "Stati Uniti d'Europa: organizzazione della manifestazione radicale," 10 Feb. 1988, audioclip, OARR, http://www.radioradicale.it/scheda/25823/25850-stati-uniti-deuropa-organizzazione-della-manifestazione-radicale.

second recommended holding national referenda across Europe during the forthcoming elections.[55] However, a subsequent summit in Hanover confirmed once again the refusal of the executive branch of the EEC to countenance any alteration to the SEA; the Strasbourg declarations were not even deliberated. In protest, the Radicals took out full page announcements in two French and West German newspapers, *Le Monde* and the *Frankfürter Allgemeine*, denouncing the Jacques Delors and the Commission.[56] To little avail would also be the nonbinding propositive referendum sponsored by the Radicals in Italy, the sole country to hold one.[57] While an overwhelming majority of voters supported the proposal of European political union, the outcome remained wholly symbolic and had no policy impact.[58]

The Radical Europeanist initiative had overlapped with the decision of the party to transform itself, first announced by Pannella in 1985 and confirmed during the 1986 congress. After the general elections of 1987, which yielded a small advance relative to 1983, the Radicals regrouped in parliament under the banner of a self-styled European Federalist Movement, signaling both commitment to Europeanism and movement towards a permutation of the party.[59]

---

[55] "Scheda cronologica su: Stati Uniti d'Europa", OHRA; Victor Ciuffa, "Europe: un pas en avant vers l'intégration," translation into french from *Corriere della Sera* (Milan), 3 May 1988, *Nouvelles Radicales*, 1 May 1988, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=49874&lang=&cms=; Sergio Stanzani, Roberto Cicciomessere and Francesco Rutelli, "Gli Stati Uniti d'Europa organizzata dal Partito radicale," 4 May 1988, OARR, http://www.radioradicale.it/scheda/27064/27091-gli-stati-uniti-deuropa-organizzata-dal-partito-radicale.

[56] "Scheda cronologica su: Stati Uniti d'Europa," OHRA.

[57] "I risultati del referendum diranno se gli italiani sono favorevoli. Più potere all'Europarlamento," *Stampa Sera* (Turin), 19 June 1989.

[58] "Più poteri al Parlamento europeo; è un plebiscito. Sì alla Costituente," *La Stampa* (Turin), 20 June 1989; Anna Chimenti, *Storia dei referendum: Dal divorzio alla riforma elettorale 1974-1999* (Bari: Laterza, 1999), 96-7.

[59] The Radical Party received 2.56 per cent of the popular vote in the Chamber, obtaining 13 seats, and 1.77 percent in the Senate, or 3 seats. See Emilio Pucci, "Festa in casa radicale, si temeva la concorrenza delle liste ecologiche. Pannella: compromesso storico battuto," *La Stampa* (Turin), 16 June 1987; Arturo Colombo, "No, caro Pr, i

The elections had been precipated by Craxi's resignation; the Socialist was forced to cave into pressure from the DC, which held him to an earlier deal to concede the premiership.[60] Another motive for his resignation was disagreement within the governing alliance on whether to hold the latest barrage of referenda promoted by the Radicals.[61] But Craxi regarded his depature from the premiership as temporary. Electoral outcomes rewarded the PSI with 14.3 percent of the vote, an accomplishment which, though short of hopes, reflected its leader's popularity. The DC largely recovered from the losses of 1983; the PCI lost ground. But it still continued to garner almost twice the Socialist vote, seemingly corroborating Craxi's doubts regarding the advent of a Mitterrandian scenario in Italy.[62]

Electoral arithmetic produced a re-edition of the five-party coalition of the previous legislation, this time under the leadership in rapid succession of a protégé of the DC leader and then Ciriaco De Mita himself, Craxi's chief rival within the DC. After entertaining illusions about their possible participation in the new government, Radicals grew increasingly disenchanted with Craxi's apparent determination not to deviate from his political strategy. The

---

'federalisti europei' sono altri," *Corriere della Sera* (Milan), 20 July 1987, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=49387&lang=IT&cms=.

[60] "Elezioni. Le temono, ma ne parlano…Spadolini: 'Abbiamo già lanciato un grido d'allarme' – Martelli: 'La staffetta ci sarà' – Due italiani su tre sono contrari," *Stampa Sera* (Turin), 31 Jan. 1987; Alberto Rapisarda, "Domani il presidente del Consiglio apre la crisi: la dc punto sul ministro degli Esteri. Andreotti o elezioni anticipate. Craxi a De Mita: 'Sono già stati fatti molti passi falsi, non c'è molto spazio per accoglierne altri'," *La Stampa* (Turin), 2 Mar. 1987; Marcello Sorgi, "Il pli propone un vertice a 5, ma l'idea sfuma subito. Scontro sulle elezioni. De Mita: 'Se un governo ha la possibilità di durare, certamento è uno nuovo e non questo' – Craxi vuole il dibattito in Parlamento senza intese preventive," *La Stampa* (Turin), 4 Apr. 1987.

[61] Francesco Barbagallo, *L'Italia repubblicana: Dallo sviluppo alle riforme mancate (1945-2008*) (Rome: Carocci, 2009), 191-2.

[62] Ginsborg, *Italy and Its Discontents*, 156-7. On Craxi's failure to seriously pursue a Mitterrandian strategy, see Luciano Cafagna, *Una strana disfatta: La parabola dell'autonomismo socialista* (Venice, Marsilio: 1996), 132.

latter seemed to entail a permanent exclusion of the Radicals, who were now driven to seek out the PCI.

In 1988 the Radicals announced the candidature of Pannella to the post of European commissioner, one of two such positions then open to Italians. On this occasion, the party obtained wide support for the bid from both political parties and intellectuals.[63] The PCI, though initially sporting its own candidates, joined forces with the Radicals in lobbying parliament for a debate on appointment procedures. The two parties jointly sought to challenge the existing process based on political horse-trading between the ruling parties, arguing that it violated the Italian Constitution and European normatives.[64] The Communists in the end even endorsed Pannella's candidacy, testifying to the rapprochement between the two parties. In November, Radical party secretary Sergio Stanzani issued a legal warning (*diffida*) seeking to impede Prime Minister De Mita from proceeding "unlawfully" to the nomination of the commissioners.[65] Craxi's once again withheld his support for the Radicals; reportedly, the Socialist leader would not countenance Pannella in the role of potential spoiler of the SEA.[66] Consequently, De Mita nixed Pannella's candidacy.[67]

---

[63] "Commissario CEE: le dichiarazioni a favore della candidatura di Marco Pannella," *Notizie Radicali*, 30 Nov. 1988, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=50158&lang=IT&cms=.

[64] For example, see the statement by Giorgio La Malfa (PRI), press conference of 25 Nov. 1988, "Europa: criteri per nomine dei commissari CEE da parte del governo organizzata dal PRI," audioclip, OARR, http://www.radioradicale.it/scheda/30390/30417-europa-criteri-per-nomine-dei-commissari-cee-da-parte-del-governo-organizzata-dal-pri.

[65] "Commissari Cee: Diffida del primo segretario del Partito radicale, Sergio Stanzani al Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri De Mita: niente colpi di mano, in violazione dei trattati Cee, per le nomine dei commissari," 16 Nov. 1988, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=155274&lang=IT&cms=; Marco Pannella, "Europa: legge elettorale e candidature comissone [sic] CEE (Pannella)," 14 Nov.1988, press conference, audioclip, OARR, http://www.radioradicale.it/scheda/29489?format=32.

[66] Gianni Pennacchi, "Commissario Cee. Nonostante le autorevoli sponsorizzazioni (da Montanelli a Biagi, Da Valiani a Bobbio) è sempre più difficile che il leader radicale possa raggiungere lo scranno di Bruxelles. Bettino ha

The Europeanist strategy of the Radicals had failed to relaunch the party, concluded *Stampa Sera*. When interviewed in late 1988 after the long string of political defeats, Pannella appeared unperturbed. He mused openly about the option of forming new "antipartitocratic" electoral lists of "democratic unity" on single issues such as the mafia or the legalization of illicit drugs, topics which he speculated were sure to attract enough votes in coming elections for "at least a couple of deputies."[68] His insouciance with the fate of his party was not new. Exclusion of the Radicals from the ruling, five-party coalition which reemerged from the general elections had redoubled Pannella's determination to press ahead with a "transnational" recasting of his party.[69]

In his report to the XXXII[nd] party congress of 1987, in which was articulated the rationale for the transnational project, Party Secretary Giovanni Negri argued that "today, more than ever, the decisive questions in our lives and our societies demand transnational parties and specifically the assertion of individual rights and of international institutions…The nation-state is nowadays

---

posto il veto. Craxi non vuole Europe vietata per Pannella. Scontro al calor bianco: qual è la posta in gioco nello scontro tra i due big che pure un tempo s'erano tanto amati? Difficile la 'conversione' del leader psi," *Stampa Sera* (Turin), 17 Nov. 1988; Marco Pannella, "De Mita e Craxi isolati," *Notizie Radicali*, 30 Nov. 1988, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=50154&lang=&cms=.

[67] "Il dc Filippo Maria Pandolfi e il socialista Carlo Ripa di Meana rappresentano l'Italia. Scelti i commissari Cee, il pri s'arrabbia. La Malfa: 'De Mita non ha agito secondo criteri di collegiabilità del governo' – I due nomi sarebbero stati concordati tra Andreotti e Craxi – Pannella, che era candidato alternativo, parla di 'cafonaggine istituzionale', pci di 'beffa al Parlamento'," *La Stampa* (Turin), 26 Nov. 1988.

[68] "Pannella: ridotti come il Wwf. 'Con la differenza che ci occupiamo anche di uomini.' 'Se la crisi precipita, potrei anche inventarmi altre liste.' La sconfitta della candidatura Cee," *Stampa Sera* (Turin), 27 Nov. 1988.

[69] Gianni Pennacchi, "Ministri? Pannella e radicali continuano ad avere fiducia. Nessun partito della maggioranza osa assumersi la responsabilità di dire ufficialmente di 'no'. E la 'rosa nel pugno' ha già un nome da proporre…" *Stampa Sera* (Turin), 24 July 1987; Gianni Pennacchi, "Marco Pannella sull'esclusione dei radicali dal governo di Goria. 'Questo ragioniere è pericoloso, farà la staffetta del pentapartito," *Stampa Sera* (Turin), 25 July 1987; Gianni Pennacchi, "Intervista al capo pr sul nuovo corso craxiano. Pannella: io e il psi quale tradimento?" *Stampa Sera* (Turin), 30 Nov. 1987; Paolo Mieli, "Il congresso di Bologna (2-6 gennaio) sancirà la nascita del partito 'transnazionale.' Il radicale varca le Alpi. Campagna per il tesseramento dall'Urss al Portogallo – Negri: 'Oggi tutti i poteri sono internazionali, debbono esserlo anche le battaglie politiche' – 'In patria siamo stranieri' – Pannella accusa Craxi," *La Stampa* (Turin), 29 Dec. 1987.

a mere vessel of the past: peace and security, the right to life in the Third and Fourth Worlds […], rights and guarantees […], are all crucial questions which cannot be addressed at [its] scale."[70] Months later, Negri addressed the question of the party's looming transformation in a meeting convened to plan the transition. He reiterated the belief at the basis of Radical transnational ambitions: faced with issues such as the nuclear catastrophe at Chernobyl or famine in the developing world, solutions elaborated through national legislations were insufficient.[71] Negri explained that the party's transition necessitated an overhaul of its identity; the existing party symbol, perhaps even its denomination, might be jettisoned. The emblem of a rose held in a fist was obsolete, argued Negri, because the transnational identity of the party was no longer necessarily socialist.[72]

The planning process which accompanied the transnational project interests us less for its mechanics than for its underlying antinationalist and antistatist mindset. To be sure, Pannella's pragmatic desire to gain freedom of maneuver played a role in the dissolution of the Radical Party.[73] But the shift was also informed by convictions that it was imperative to transcend the

[70] Giovanni Negri, "Relazione al 32. congresso del segretario del Partito radicale Giovanni Negri. 32. congresso del Partito radicale. Seconda sessione. Roma – 26-27-28 febbraio – 1 marzo 1987," 26 Feb. 1987, congressional document, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=49304&lang=IT&cms=.

[71] In the light of the disaster in Chernobyl the previous year, the Radical referendum against nuclear energy was approved by a wide margin in Nov. 1987, galvanizing the Radicals. "Guerra ai giornalisti nei piani di Pannella," *Stampa Sera* (Turin), 10 Nov. 1987; Marco Pannella, "La sconfitta di Pirro dei nostri avversari. Marco Pannella polemizza con foga contro una campagna di stampa che copre oscuri intrighi," *Avanti!* (Rome), 11 Nov. 1987, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=49500&lang=IT&cms=.

[72] Giovanni Negri, "Assemblea del Partito radicale trasnazionale," 2 Oct.1987, address, audioclip, OARR, http://www.radioradicale.it/scheda/23896/23923-assemblea-del-partito-radicale-trasnazionale.

[73] Massimo Teodori, *Marco Pannella: Un eretico liberale nella crisi della Repubblica* (Marsilio: Venice, 1996), 55-60.

nation-state and the framework of domestic political parties in order to address contemporary challenges.

The Radical intellectual and politician Angiolo Bandinelli was the chief apologist for the transnationalist project. His writings encapsulate the thinking informing the transnational experiment. Bandinelli portrayed the nation-state as a malignant vessel for Fascism and other pernicious nationalisms.[74] He did not exempt social-democracy from his fulminations, blaming the old left, whether Marxist or revisionist, for its nationalism and addiction to a "neocorporative" welfare state. Questioning the contemporary validity of Emile Durkheim's notion that the progressive state had helped liberate individuals, Bandinelli characterized its current structures as hopelessly "corroded" by "domestic inflation and the recasting of labor and of international markets." He speculated whether another path to human freedom was possible.[75]

Bandinelli's prescriptions for change had two facets. One would turn out to be on target; it drew on the Radical belief in the indispensable normative role of politics over economic processes. Bandinelli shared the Federalist critique of a prevalently economic European integration process, and termed a mistake plans to institute a European Central Bank without a strong and controlling federalist political authority.[76] Other aspects of Bandinelli's transnationalism though veared on utopianism, on account of a caricatural portrayal of the nation-state and its handmaiden, the welfare state. The outcome of a polemic largely directed at

[74] Angiolo Bandinelli, "Stato-nazione e riti di sangue" (1982), reprinted in *Il Radicale impunito: Saggi di politica militante* by A. Bandinelli (Rome: Stampa alternativa, 1990), 119-22.

[75] Angiolo Bandinelli, "Nazionalismo e sinistre" (1984), reprinted in *Il Radicale Impunito* by Bandinelli, 115-8.

[76] Angiolo Bandinelli, "La sovranità assoluta. Un mito" (1988), reprinted in *Il Radicale Impunito* by Bandinelli, 83-5; on the perils of a purely economistic vision of European unification and praise for Altiero Spinelli and Ernesto Rossi's European federalism, see Amartya Sen, "L'euro fait tomber l'Europe," *Le Monde* (Paris), 2 July 2011.

the old left was a nebulous and poorly articulated vision of transnational alternatives to nationhood.

Other Radicals expressed skepticism regarding the transnational experiment. Their dissent revealed conflicting views on the party's identity and trajectory. Critics expressed concern over the party's abandonment of its domestic moorings. Massimo Teodori drew a sardonic parallel between Pannella and Che Guevara, comparing the transnational move to the "generous illusion of Che, who tired of the suffocating climate of Cuba, opted for the forest" and met with disaster. Other party members objected that the transformation of a corrupt domestic edifice needed to be accomplished from "the basement, not the roof" and that the transnational effort was best undertaken once a more solid domestic foundation for the party was in place. The mustering of "a few dozen" new members abroad, others objected, would prove insufficient to legitimize a "transnational adventure."[77] Of particular interest were the musings of one intellectual on what we now term globalization, or what was then referred to interdependence.

Angelo Panebianco, a political scientist active in Socialist and Radical circles, outlined in an article the theoretical and historical grounds for his reservations.[78] After apologizing for his "conservatism," Panebianco expressed his disagreement with the view that contemporary

[77] Mieli, "Il congresso di Bologna (2/6 gennaio) sancirà la nascita del partito 'transnazionale.' Il radicale varca le Alpi. Campagna per il tesseramento dall'Urss al Portogallo – Negri: 'Oggi tutti i poteri sono internazionali, debbono esserlo anche le battaglie politiche' – 'In patria siamo stranieri' – Pannella accusa Craxi," *La Stampa* (Turin), 29 Dec. 1987.

[78] Bandinelli, *Il Radicale impunito* ; see also the articles by other authors favorable to the transnational project, for example : Sebastiano Moffettone, "Un partito del liberalismo come impegno e movimento," *Notizie Radicali*, 31 Dec. 1987, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=49556&lang=IT&cms=; Marco Pannella, "Appunti per il congresso," *Notizie Radicali*, 31 Dec. 1987, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=49565&lang=IT&cms=; Lorenzo Strik Lievers, "Partito transnazionale," *Notizie Radicali*, 31 Dec. 1987, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=49550&lang=IT&cms=; Giulio Giorello, "Europa: un vuoto da riempire," *Notizie Radicali*, 31 Dec. 1987, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=49562&lang=IT&cms=.

challenges were primarily "supranational, international and transnational." "National political arenas" were still important, he wrote, first of all because a good number of conflicts emerged from and are resolved within a domestic context. But even in times in which interdependence increasingly determines the relations between states, it was hazardous to write off the nation-state. He noted that "Europe has already known a phase which, according to many analysts, was characterized by a very high economic interdependence: the period of British economic dominion at the end of the last century. That epoch however did not bring about the end of national states nor did it render entirely moot policies forged at the domestic level."[79]

Panebianco also offered an overarching interpretation of the party's fluctuations between domestic and international engagements. He distinguished two trends within the party. The first, which he labelled the nonviolent strain, had led to internationalist commitments such as the campaign against famine. The second trend, which he attached to liberal political traditions akin to English nineteenth century radicalism, had manifested in Radical politics as the closely wedded battles for civil liberties and the unity of the left. Such battles had been in evidence in the seventies and again in 1985-87, when the party had sought to forge a "lay-socialist" front, reform the electoral system, and introduce "the principles of an individualist ethic of liberal extraction within a national political culture dominated by collectivist ethics." But, wrote Panebianco, the elections of 1987 had marked another turning point spelling the eclipse of hope for Italian reform. As a consequence, the internationalist and nonviolent strain of Radicalism had surged. Panebianco concluded by warning that Radicalism had been most effective when

[79] Angelo Panebianco, "…Europa con cautela," *Notizie Radicali*, 31 Dec. 1987, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=49559&lang=&cms=. For an illuminating discussion of the relationship between capitalism, institutions and governance in the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth centuries and a book which puts into a much-needed historical perspective current debates on globalization, see Karl Polanyi, T*he Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time* (Boston, Mass.: Beacon Press, 2001).

focused on the Italian "anomaly" and when a balance between its liberalism and internationalism had been in place.[80]

Panebianco's article was a salutary reminder of the pitfalls of the antipolitical, antinationalist and antistatist leanings of the Radicals. His reservations proved founded; his reflections on what we now term globalization remain insightful.[81] His distinction between the internationalist and domestic currents within Radicalism should however be placed in the context of the party's genesis. Both currents, the internationalist and the domestic, were closely tied to the party's identity as a social movement and its origins in the transnational pacifism of the early sixties; both were the expression of an embattled dissident group vying for influence. For many Radical supporters of the transnational project, Radical dualism was not so much defined by opposition between a pragmatic domestic project and a utopian internationalist agenda, as by the group's dichotomous identity as party and civil society movement.

As articulated in a party document written in 1987, the transnational project was an opportunity to renew with the wellsprings of the party-movement's success. Radical accomplishments, the argument went, had been apparent before engagement in parliamentary politics: "the question becomes how, where, and with which political instruments one may be effective when one renounces to have an autonomous presence [as party] within the institutions. Our point of reference should be first of all the pre-1976 Radical experience, because it was the season of our greatest victories (divorce, abortion, conscientious objection, the vote for eighteen-

[80] Panebianco, "…Europa con cautela," *Notizie Radicali*, 31 Dec. 1987, OHRA.

[81] Years later, Radical leaders would acknowledge the failure of the transnational experiment. See Lorenzo Strik Lievers, "Interviste a dirigenti radicali sulla storia del Partito Radicale a margine della presentazione del libro, '25 anni di lotte radicali a Cremona' Palazzo Cattaneo," 14 Nov. 1998, audioclip, OARR, http://www.radioradicale.it/scheda/106757/107254-interviste-a-dirigenti-radicali-sulla-storia-del-partito-radicale-a-margine-della-presentazione-del.

year olds…) As such our thinking, rather than dwell on the Radical Party, should focus on the LID [the Italian League for Divorce], or rather the LID-Radical relationship. How and in which way are the latter formulas to be renewed on a transnational scale?"[82] The Radical document suggested that a parallel existed between the role of an NGO at the domestic level and that of a transnational or international non-governmental organization (INGO) at the international level. Also implied was the existence of a separate and virtuous civil society sphere separate from that of compromised inter-governmental or domestic institutions.

The plan to formally disband the party was confirmed during the Bologna congress of January 1988. The party would shed its national garb in favor of a "transnational political subject," in other words an INGO which would coordinate the political activities of dispersed Radicals. The latter would be free to join or create other political parties or movements in Italy and abroad.[83]

The party's dissolution was officialized during the XXXVth congress held in Budapest in April 1989. The congress marked the official abandonment of the party's Mitterrandian emblem and its replacement with an effigy of Mahatma Gandhi. In April 1989, while reporting to Italian reporters on the transnational project following its launch in Budapest, Party Treasurer Paolo Vigevano alleged the "political success" of the initiative but reported also cripling financial difficulties. Only 450 members had enrolled from outside Italy, out of a total of less than 2000

[82] "Partito Trasnazionale (1). Progetto preliminare di lavoro sulla costruzione del Partito Radicale Trasnazionale. Documento Commissione 87," 30 Apr. 1987, party document, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=49355&lang=IT&cms=.

[83] "Mozione generale approvata dal 34. congresso del Partito radicale, Bologna 2-6 gennaio 1988. 'Attraverso le frontiere, i partiti, gli Stati nazionali, per l'Europa del diritto e della nonviolenza," Jan. 1988, congressional motion, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=49582&lang=IT&cms=.

subscriptions, a number woefully insufficient to assure the financial stability of the party. Another handicap the new entity faced was the lack of coverage from state media, dominated as always by the big parties, claimed the Radicals.

During the same press conference, Sergio Stanzani emphasized the necessity of better coordinating the transnational project with the "transparty" strategy. The latter was intended to permit a continued presence in Italian politics—either through the creation of new movements or by encouraging the migration of Radicals to novel or veteran political formations.[84] Francesco Rutelli, a close collaborator of Pannella, helped found the Rainbow-Greens party and was one among numerous party cadres to seek new venues.[85] Other Radicals, including Pannella and Bonino, maintained a presence in parliament through the end of the legislation under the label of the European Federalist group. In the run-up to the European elections of 1989, Pannella even sought to relaunch his reduced contingent's political fortunes by forming an alliance with the Liberals and Republicans in a "lay federation." But mediocre electoral outcomes signaled once again political defeat.[86] All in all, the dispersion of the Radicals weakened an already diminutive political movement, rather than boosting it as had been the apparent intention.

Around the same time as the dissolution of the Radical Party, Craxi's political star appeared once again resurgent. In July 1989, he and his DC allies, Andreotti and Arnaldo Forlani, successfully plotted De Mita's downfall. The latter was replaced with Andreotti, whose

---

[84] Paolo Vigevano, Sergio Stanzani and Emma Bonino, "Pr presentazione del I. congresso transnazionale in Italia," 12 May 1989, press conference, videoclip, OARR, http://www.radioradicale.it/scheda/31894/31924-pr-presentazione-del-i-congresso-transnazionale-in-italia.

[85] For another example, see Lorenzo Strik Lievers, "Ora siamo iscritti anche al PSDI," *Notizie Radicali*, 1 Feb. 1989, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=50527&lang=IT&cms=.

[86] Paolo Mieli, "Craxi e le due dc. I partiti minori usati per dividere i democristiani," *La Stampa* (Turin), 1 July 1989.

two governments filled the remainder of the legislation, marking his fifth and sixth postwar premierships.[87] Nicknamed by his adversaries "the Prince of Darkness," his career exemplified the exceptional longevity of the the republic's political class.[88] The alliance between Craxi, Andreotti and Forlani became known by the acronym CAF, derived from the politicians' surnames. The apparent governmental stability which marked the remainder of the tenth legislation would be assured, in the apt rendition of one historian, by "Italy's most aggressive politician, its most subtle one, and the one who epitomized best the time-honoured qualities of mediation and immobility."[89] Their efforts had succeeded in removing from power a reform-minded politician who had once albeit with limited success sought to renovate the DC.[90]

Nineteen-eighty-nine also marked the momentous transformation of Italy's great party of the left. Or rather, historical circumstances precipitated options which had long been available. Following the death of Berlinguer, Alessandro Natta, a party veteran, had been appointed secretary. He did not however succeed in restoring momentum to the party lost after the 1985 referendum setback. Following a sizeable loss in the general elections of 1987, further declines in local elections the following year raised fears of terminal decline and conjured the depressing

[87] Paolo Passarini, "Superati gli ultimi scogli: il pri ottiene il riferimento al '92, il psdi l'iscrizione di Romita al psi. Nasce il governo Andreotti-Martelli. Oggi la lista finale dei ministri, divisa la sinistra dc," *La Stampa* (Turin), 22 July 1989.

[88] John Hooper, "Prince of Darkness," *The Guardian* (London), 19 Feb. 2009. The article discusses the movie *Il Divo*, an entertaining but caricatural and Kissingerian portrayal of the politician by Claudio Sorrentino.

[89] Ginsborg, *Italy and Its Discontents*, 164.

[90] On De Mita's reform efforts, which he abandoned after the DC electoral defeat of 1983, see ibid., 148-50.

prospect of electoral parity with the PSI.[91] Consequently, in June 1988 a representative of a younger generation, Achille Occhetto, was promoted party secretary.[92]

Seeking to renew the staid image of PCI politicians, Occhetto travelled to the United States and had himself photographed kissing his wife, prompting sarcastic allegations of a perfunctory adoption of American-style politicking.[93] Occhetto also engaged in revisionism; prominent victims of the Stalinist trials of 1936-38 were rehabilitated. Even Togliatti came in for criticism.[94] A top PCI leader attended the unveiling of monument to Imre Nagy in Paris; *l'Unità* published documents on the Budapest repressions of 1956.[95] Fittingly, Occhetto had been a leader of the party's youth group, FGCI. Over the years, he had crossed paths with the Radicals, joining in the fifties UGI, the lay university student association led by Pannella and other left Radicals, or writing a letter expressing praise of the latter's opening to the Communists.[96] During the PCI's XVIIIth congress of March 1989, the first held under his leadership, Occhetto endorsed several libertarian themes dear to Socialists and Radicals, including women's and other citizenship rights. Nonviolence was proclaimed a guiding

[91] Sebastiano Messina and Alberto Stabile, "A sinistra è quasi un testa a testa," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 31 May 1988; Simona Colarizi and Marco Gervasoni, *La cruna dell'ago: Craxi, il Partito socialista e la crisi della Repubblica* (Rome-Bari: Laterza, 2005), 219; Ajello, *Il lungo addio*, 353.

[92] Ajello, *Il lungo addio*, 360.

[93] Ibid., 365-6, 377; "Quei baci di Occhetto 'non c'è scandalo'," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 29 June 1988.

[94] Ajello, *Il lungo addio*, 379.

[95] Ibid., 361.

[96] Achille Occhetto, "Una nuova generazione radicale," *Nuova generazione*, Mar. 1963, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=44384&lang=IT&cms=. Subsequently a Radical reported that Occhetto did not respond to Radical outreach efforts. Occhetto had been charged by his party to manage relations with the Radicals, see Gianfranco Spadaccia, 10 Sept. 1967, "Verbali della riunione di direzione del 9 e 10 settembre 1967. Relazione informativa di Spadaccia," OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=44569&lang=IT&cms=.

principle of the PCI, the unity of the left invoked, and an olive branch offered to the Socialists.[97] Craxi declared that he was not convinced; Socialists acidly reported that Occhetto's speech gushed with enthusiasm for General Secretary Gorbachev's new course. His words, they claimed, demonstrated lingering distrust of social-democracy and a conviction that reform communism remained the crown jewel of the global left. Pannella, on the other hand, initially expressed support for the new PCI.[98]

Occhetto's juggling acts and his indeterminate ideology reflected an unresolved internal debate between left and right currents, now emerging as distinct wings of the party in light of the abandonment of democratic centralism. On the left, the dominant PCI partisans of Gorbachev's new course continued to reject social-democracy, not least due to a visceral loathing of Craxi and

[97] Giancarlo Bosetti and Bruno Ugolini, "Un applauso lunghissimo ha accolto la relazione del segretario generale che ha aperto l'assemblea del Palasport. Un nuovo corso per la sinistra. Occhetto accende il congresso del Pci. Un partito che 'non è più sulla difensiva' che 'non è spaccato al suo interno' e che 'lavora per la sua ripresa'. Con due ore e venti minuti di una relazione accolta da un lunghissimo applauso. Achille Occhetto ha fornito l'identità di un partito che vuole arrivare all'apuntamento dell'alternativa facendo rispettare la propria identità e ha posto l'obbietivo del rinnovamento dell'intera sinistra," *l'Unità* (Rome), 19 Mar. 1989; Alberto Asor Rosa, *La Sinistra alla Prova: Considerazioni sul Ventennio 1976-1996* (Turin: Einaudi, 1996), 120-2.

[98] "La Malfa cauto, Pannella applaude. Il segretario pri: sui problemi economici il pci è ancora molto lontano da noi – il leader radicale: Occhetto è sulla via giusta," *La Stampa* (Turin), 19 Mar. 1989; Paolo Passarini, " 'Il congresso si sta spellando le mani solo per gli attacchi ai socialisti.' Craxi: questo pci mi ha già deluso. 'Saremo puntuali alla sfida davanti agli elettori.' Nessun fischio dai delegati per rispettare l'invito di Fassino – Forlani: persino la proposta di collaborazione con il psi è formulata in modo polemico – Spadolini: alternativa più lontana," *La Stampa* (Turin), 19 Mar. 1989; Pasquale Cascella, "Fastidio per la frase sull'alternativa in mano agli elettori e per la replica su Bruxelles. Ignorate le aperture unitarie di Occhetto 'Vuole uno schieramento senza o contro il Psi.' Craxi irritato: 'È roba vecchia.' Se ne sta lì, nella prima fila della tribuna degli ospiti, immobile e taciturno, incurante della gran ressa di giornalisti e delle telecamere che trasmettono in diretta tv. Craxi attende che Occhetto concluda per poi sparare ad alzo zero: 'Deludente, molto deludente, il segretario comunista ci ha datto appuntamento di fronte agli elettori e noi ci arriveremo puntuali.' Gli altri socialisti? Fanno da coro," *l'Unità* (Rome), 19 Mar. 1989. On the moderating effect that Gorbachev's reformism exerted on the PCI's own process of transformation from 1986, see Roberto Gualtieri, "Il PCI, la DC e il 'vincolo esterno'," in *Il PCI nell'Italia repubblicana 1943-1991,* ed. R. Gualtieri (Rome: Carocci, 2001), 96. See also Massimo L. Salvadori, "Il 'nuovo PSI'," in *Revisionismo socialista e rinnovamento liberale*, ed. Borioni, 166.

socialism, Italian-style.[99] On the right, leaders such as Napolitano preached endorsement of social-democracy and veritable dialogue with the Socialists.[100] Occhetto struck a middle road; even as he endorsed change, he praised Gorbachev and conjured the makings of a convergence between reform communism and the West, earning broad support from the party base.[101] However, in fall, the unexpected unraveling of socialism in Eastern Europe forced his hand.[102]

Days after the stunning events at the Berlin Wall, Occhetto abruptly announced that the PCI would shed its name and undertake a process of fundamental transformation. For the first time, he denounced "totalitarianism," yet at the same time continued to draw a distinction between the Italian way to socialism and a European social-democacy deemed in crisis.[103] Forging a new identity would prove arduous and come only over the course of considerable time and at the cost of divisions which undermined the standing of the party. On over one year later, after agonizing debate, would "The Thing," as the party came to be mockingly referred to, be reborn as the Democratic Party of the Left (PDS), an anodyne appellation which masked ideological disarray and continued defiance of the PSI.[104]

---

[99] Gorbachev's reformism rekindled the faith of PCI supporters in the Third Way, see Carlo Ripa di Meana, "Bettino Craxi e il dissenso: Una lunga e grande storia," in *Bettino Craxi, il socialismo europeo e il sistema internazionale*, ed. Spiri, 197-8.

[100] Simona Colarizi, *Storia politica della Repubblica: Partiti, movimenti e istituzioni. 1943-2006* (Bari: Laterza, 2007), 176.

[101] Colarizi and Gervasoni, *La cruna dell'ago*, 231-2.

[102] Colarizi, *Storia politica della Repubblica*, 175; on the unintended side-effects of Gorbachev's domestic and foreign policy reforms, and the surprise constituted by the collapse of socialism in the East, see Lévesque, *The Enigma of 1989*, passim.

[103] Occhetto disingenuously claimed that his decision had little to do with the Fall of the Berlin Wall. See Massimo L. Salvadori, *La sinistra nella storia italiana* (Rome-Bari: Laterza, 2000), 217-8.

[104] Ginsborg, *Italy and Its Discontents*, 159-62; Colarizi and Gervasoni, *La cruna dell'ago*, 243-4.

As late as March 1989, *l'Unità* had illustrated its triumphalistic coverage of the PCI's last congress under the communist label with a caricature of the hated Craxi. A crumbling Roman bust bearing the effigy of a bespectacled and rotund Mussolini look-alike threatened to bury any passerby, wishfully conjuring the waning of Craxi's political fortunes.[105] In reality though, the latter still stood high in 1989, and the tenth legislation (1987-92), for the first time since 1968, ran almost its full term.

Certain historians have cast the tenth legislation in such unflattering light that the subsequent catastrophic unraveling of the party system in 1992-94 appears virtually ineluctable.[106] At the time however a newfound political stability impressed contemporaries. Important and necessary reforms were accomplished, on account of the technical and intellectual capacities of members of the legislation's coalition governments.[107] And, paradoxically, it was partly due to the implementation of such overdue change that the postwar political class subsequently lost its grip on power.

The decision by Andreotti in 1990 to situate the Italian lira in the narrower band of currency fluctuation of EMS and the greater autonomy afforded to the Bank of Italy to establish interest rates curtailed the power of the parties. They lost their capacity to control the electorate through their clientelistic practices, which had translated into a runaway public deficit.[108]

---

[105] *L'Unità* (Rome), 19 Mar. 1989, page 4.

[106] For example, see Maurizio Cotta and Pierangelo Isernia (eds.), *Il gigante dai piedi di argilla: la crisi del regime partitocratico in Italia* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1996); Piero Craveri, *La Repubblica dal 1958 al 1992* (Turin: UTET, 1995), 960; Colarizi, *Storia politica della Repubblica*, 170.

[107] Ginsborg, *Italy and Its Discontents*, 165-6.

[108] Ginsborg, *Italy and Its Discontents*, 165-9. This seemingly perennial characteristic of the Italian political economy remains in place. See Rachel Donadio, "Austere Italy? Check the traffic," *New York Times*, 15 Sept. 2011.

Another, more visible blow to the ruling parties came in the form of a 1991 referendum proposing to alter the voting system. Despite Craxi's infamous invitation to voters to ignore the referendum and "go to the beach" instead, the quorum necessary to validate outcomes was easily met; an overwhelming majority of voters (95.6 percent) endorsed the abrogation of multi-preference voting, a linchpin of parties' ability to practice patronage. The referendum was the sole one approved by the courts of three originally proposed, all of which had sought from different angles to modify Italy's purely proportional electoral system.[109]

On the face of it, the referendum outcome spoke to fulfillment of the longstanding Radical objective of electoral reform. Pannella had been an early proponent of change in electoral practices in the mid eighties, when he founded a League for Electoral Reform and helped set off an influential public debate on the merits and disadvantages of the proportional system. A Radical goal had long been the establishment of an "Anglo-Saxon" party system pitting a conservative pole against a progressive one; among other measures, Radicals sought the modification of the proportional system even though it had enabled them to repeatedly stand in parliament despite never surpassing the four percent mark. In 1987, they had submitted to parliament a draft law proposing to alter the multipreference voting system which allowed parties to cherrypick candidates of their own chosing; later, Pannella was a sponsor of original draft of the 1991 referendum. But he subsequently declared his opposition when the courts altered its content.[110] Rather than Pannella, Mario Segni, a maverick Christian Democrat and

[109] Anna Chimenti, *Storia dei referendum: Dal divorzio alla riforma elettorale 1974-1999* (Bari: Laterza, 1999), 117-25.

[110] Marco Pannella, interview by Andrea Marceraro, "Vi servirò un voto all'inglese. Rivoluzioni istituzionali/Marco Pannella fonda la Lega per un nuovo sistema elettorale," *L'Europeo*, 8 Mar. 1986, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=49001&lang=IT&cms=; Marco Pannella, "C'è ancora qualcuno che vuole ingessare il sistema politico?" *Reporter*, 21 Mar. 1986, OHRA,

newcomer to the swelling ranks of Italy's dissident and antisystem politicians of all ideological persuasions, was the main driving force behind the referendum. He too, like Pannella, was a supporter of effective governance in lieu of what he considered to be corrupt party politics.[111] His meteoric political career in the early nineties was one among other signals of a declining ability of the ruling parties to control the political process.[112] It was also an indication that the independent, outspoken, iconoclastic and media-savvy political type which Pannella had pioneered in the seventies was increasingly commonplace.[113]

---

http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=49009&lang=IT&cms=; Marco Pannella, "No, nessun dottor stranamore riuscirà a convincermi ad appoggiare la Controriforma del sistema elettorale," *Corriere della Sera* (Milan), 19 Aug. 1986, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=49074&lang=IT&cms=; Angelo Panebianco, "Riforma politica? È il voto all'inglese," *Notizie Radicali*, 10 January 1987, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=49216&lang=IT&cms=; Marco Pannella, "Pannella a Galli della Loggia. Riformare il sistema. Si può: con il fronte dei partiti laici," *La Stampa* (Turin), 16 Mar. 1987; Marco Pannella, [et al.], "Riforma uninominale del sistema elettorale. Proposta di legge d'iniziativa dei deputati: Pannella, […]," 2 July 1987, *Atti parlamentari, Camera dei deputati, X Legislatura, Disegni di legge e relazioni, Documento n. 409*, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=49379&lang=IT&cms=; Karl Popper, "Articolo del filosofo Karl Popper. 'Democrazia tradita dalla proporzionale,'" *La Stampa* (Turin), 7 Aug. 1987; Marco Pannella, "Perchè non ci interessa la contro-riformetta di Craxi," *Il Giornale d'Italia* (Rome), 28 Nov. 1987, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=49502&lang=IT&cms=; Massimo Teodori, "Il referendum," *Notizie Radicali*, 2 Mar. 1990, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=51768&lang=IT&cms=; Fabio Inwinkl, "Il gruppo promotore si trasforma in un movimento per le riforme ma si divide sulle preferenze. Pannella: 'Quesito insignificante…" Segni critica la Dc e sollecita una mobilitazione dei cittadini. Impegno di Barbera (Pci), delle Acli e del Pli perchè vinca il 'sì.' È scontro sull'ultimo referendum. Si spacca il 'comitato', i radicali se ne vanno," *l'Unità* (Rome), 27 Jan. 1991; Giovagnoli, *Il partito italiano*, 158.

[111] Ginsborg, *Italy and Its Discontents*, 173-4.

[112] On longer term views of the loss of control of the political parties of the political process, ones which sometimes vear on too teleological a perspective, see the contributions in *Il gigante dai piedi di argilla*, ed. Cotta and Isernia.

[113] One aspect of the new politics that would emerge in the 1990s was politicians' resort to direct, populist and often crass or even vulgar language which contrasted with the cryptic, Byzantine circumlocutions of, for example, an eminent representative of the *ancien régime*, Aldo Moro—as Kissinger noticed with annoyance during meetings with the Italian politician. The two rhetorical styles have respectively been dubbed *gentese*, derived from the Italian word for people, and *politichese*. *Politichese* was well-adapted to the complicated Cold War coalition politics of the so-called first republic. A figure such as Umberto Bossi, on the other hand, pioneered in pure form *gentese* in the early 1980s, when his political movement first emerged (later known as the Northern League). Pannella, whose rhetorical volubility is legendary, can be said to have been a transitional figure in the development of postwar Italian political language. On the one hand, Pannella was verbose, long-winded, and elaborate in his reasoning to the point of being at times bewildering. On the other hand, he evinced a new political style in his insistence on addressing informally interlocutors (with the Italian familiar form *tu* rather than the formal *Lei*) or his appeals to civil society and condemnations of political corruption. On *politichese* and *gentese* as manifestations of the first and second postwar party systems, see Osvaldo Croci, "Berlusconi's triumph. Language and politics in Italy: from Moro to

While in retrospect the outcome of the 1991 referendum announced cracks in the political edifice, at the time Craxi and his allies confidently looked forward to years more of shared power.[114] In contrast, Occhetto continued to grapple with the problematic recasting of his party. He bitterly commented: "Bettino in the end has chosen to strike a deal with the DC, far from seeking the unity of the left […] he has no interest in any alternative."[115] Another party member and future party secretary noted: "what a strange country is Italy. All say that change is necessary. But change is most of all invoked and praised when it appears improbable and distant. The more assured one is that change will not come, the more its ineluctable necessity is proclaimed."[116] The PCI's difficulties were compounded by the necessity to forge a response to a foreign policy crisis which filled headlines beginning in August 1991. A war in the Persian Gulf would revive pacifism and anti-Americanism, sowing further internecine strife and undermining attempts to cast the new party as a modern force of the Western European left.[117]

Berlusconi," *Journal of Modern Italian Studies*, no. 3 (2001): 348-70. See Henry Kissinger on Moro in his *White House Years* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1979), 101. On a contemporary appraisal of Pannella's political style, see Gigi Moncalvo, *Pannella: Il potere della parola* (Milan: Sperling & Kupfer, 1983).

[114] " 'Non considero esaurita la collaborazione e sono pronto a assumermi responsabilità.' Craxi: nuovo patto con la dc. E si candida per Palazzo Chigi," *La Stampa* (Turin), 16 Nov. 1991; Ginsborg, *Italy and Its Discontents*, 169-78, 249.

[115] " 'Bettino tradisce l'alternativa.' Occhetto: e così fa il gioco di Forlani e delle leghe," *La Stampa* (Turin), 16 Nov. 1991.

[116] Massimo D'Alema, "La vecchia illusione di Bettino Craxi," *l'Unità* (Rome), 17 Nov. 1991.

[117] Colarizi and Gervasoni, *La cruna dell'ago*, 234-5; Ajello, *Il lungo addio*, 415; Agostino Giovagnoli, *Il Partito Italiano: La Democrazia Cristiana dal 1942 al 1994* (Rome-Bari; Laterza, 1996), 254-5.

Chapter Six: Interventionists (1991-95)

The first Gulf War, inaugurated by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in summer 1990 and officially concluded in February 1991, was the last major foreign policy crisis of Italy's so-called first republic. Political controversies associated with the war centered on the question of an Italian contribution to the UN-endorsed and US-led multilateral response to Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein's power grab. While militarily insignificant, Italian participation sparked a lively domestic debate on questions of war, peace and justice. The war and the anti-American pacifism which emerged in its wake occurred as the PCI sought to cast in stone its Western identity. Armed conflict also sowed divisions in the Radical camp, ultimately leading Pannella and his associates to endorse armed intervention to uphold international law and to qualify their longstanding antimilitarism and espousals of nonviolence. The shift also helped legitimize Radical foreign policy credentials. In combination with the domestic political meltdown of 1992-94 and mounting outrage over the lackluster international response to mayhem in the former Yugoslavia, it paved the way for a Radical diplomatic role.

In the early morning of 2 August 1990 the Iraqi army invaded in a surprise move neighboring Kuwait. Coming months after the relatively bloodless collapse of the Socialist Bloc, the invasion shockingly reinserted the recourse to force into international affairs. Hussein's blitzkrieg quashed illusions about a nascent international order based on consensus and the peaceable resolution of conflict. Simultaneously, the prompt and concerted reaction of the international community raised hopes that an emergent world government would address

violations of international law.[1] Some observers on the left, however, feared renascent American hegemony.

Breaking the summer recess, Italian parliamentarians met on August 22 and 23 to debate and vote on a governmental decision to participate in an embargo on Iraq in conformity with UN resolutions. Minister of Foreign Affairs Gianni De Michelis inaugurated deliberations in the Senate. The flamboyant Socialist highlighted the exceptional nature of Iraq's act of war and the unprecedented reaction of the international community. In response to Hussein's bid to challenge sovereign borders in the Middle East, the Security Council had unanimously backed a resolution declaring null the forced annexation of Kuwait. Not since 1945, he argued, had the utopian prospect of a "global government" been so manifest. Italy, currently holding the rotating presidency of the EEC, had taken a leadership role in adhering to UN sanctions by rapidly approving the embargo; it was the first EEC country, boasted De Michelis, to convene its Parliament in plenary sessions. Acting on the premise that firmness and credibility were essential to a negotiated resolution of the crisis, Italy would contribute warships to the embargo, in the hope a negotiated solution would nevertheless ensue.[2]

Lorenzo Strik Lievers, a Radical Party veteran now ensconced in the mixed European Federalist and Ecological senatorial group, presented an alternative motion to that of the ruling coalition. After condemning Kuwait's invasion, he reproached Italy and other nation-states for their longstanding military and other support for Hussein, notwithstanding his numerous criminal

[1] Nicola Tranfaglia, "Un primo passo verso il governo mondiale," *l'Unità* (Rome), 27 Aug. 1990; Ernesto Balducci, "La comunità mondiale al primo vagito," *l'Unità* (Rome), 28 Aug. 1990.

[2] The reference was to UN resolution 662 declaring illegitimate and null the annexation of Kuwait. Gianni De Michelis, "Comunicazioni del Governo sulla crisi nel Golfo Persico e sulle conseguenti decisioni adottate dal Consiglio dei ministri," 22 Aug.1990, *Senato della Repubblica, X Legislatura, 430° Seduta pubblica, Resoconto stenografico*, 4-22; http://www.senato.it/service/PDF/PDFServer/BGT/318028.pdf.

acts.[3] Only now were the Italian government and the West reacting, Strik Lievers lamented, after remaining silent during the Iraq-Iran war or while the Iraqi dictator massacred Kurds. Drawing a line between Radical antimilitarism and other pacifist currents on the left, Strik Lievers characterized the former as aggressive and as addressing the causes of wars.[4] An opportunity beckoned to strengthen European political union while Italy held its presidency. The UN-endorsed embargo, he argued, must also be accompanied by a tightened coordination of EEC policies, including ones addressing the regulation of arms sales, energy provision and the convening of a "Conference on the Security, Cooperation and Affirmation of Human Rights in the Mediterranean and the Middle East."

After Premier Andreotti's government accepted as recommendations parts of their motion, the European Federalists and Ecologists withdrew their own and voted to abstain on the majority motion.[5] Presumably abstention rather than outright endorsement was due to the presence of Marxist politicians in the parliamentary group Strik Lievers belonged to.

PCI senators expressed qualified support for the majority resolution, though they emphasized the need to address the plight of the Palestinians and the importance of adhering to

[3] In the eighties, the Radical Party had repeatedly intervened in Parliament to protest arms procurement to Iraq or to draw attention to the plight of the Kurdish refugees. See for example Roberto Cicciomessere, "Guerra Iran-Iraq. Camera, Interpellanza," 22 Sept. 1980, summary of parliamentary iterations, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=23160&lang=IT&cms=; Emma Bonino, "Profughi curdi. Camera, interrogazione a risposta orale," 4 Jan. 1983, summary of parliamentary iterations, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=25433&lang=IT&cms=.

[4] Lorenzo Strik Lievers, "Discussione sulle comunicazioni del Governo sulla crisi nel Golfo Persico e sulle conseguenti decisioni adottate dal Consiglio dei ministri," 22 Aug, 1990, *Senato della Repubblica, X legislatura, 430° Seduta pubblica, Resoconto stenografico*, 34-7, http://www.senato.it/service/PDF/PDFServer/BGT/318028.pdf.

[5] "Discussione sulle comunicazioni del Governo sulla crisi nel Golfo Persico e sulle conseguenti decisioni adottate dal Consiglio dei ministri," 22 Aug. 1990, *Senato della Repubblica, X Legislatura, 430. Seduta pubblica, Resoconto stenografico*, 32-8, http://www.senato.it/service/PDF/PDFServer/BGT/318028.pdf; "Senato- Crisi Golfo Persico: le decisioni del Consiglio dei Ministri," 22 Aug. 1990, audioclip, OARR, http://www.radioradicale.it/scheda/36882/36916-crisi-golfo-persico-le-decisioni-del-consiglio-dei-ministri.

UN authorization for any military action.[6] One senator portrayed her vote of abstention as one of confidence in the government, hoping lingering differences would be resolved.[7] The PCI's conciliatory approach, which took the form of a vote of abstention, was not unanimous. Occhetto's pro-Soviet critic, Armando Cossutta, opted rather for rejection of the governmental resolution. He justified his objections on account of American "unilateral military action" and the Italian decision to send naval forces without an incontrovertible mandate from the UN.[8] The split within the PCI was symptomatic of dissent on foreign policy stemming back to Berlinguer's endorsement of NATO in 1976. Its public expression, however, was a novelty, a product of the official abandonment of the practice of democratic centralism during the congress of 1989.[9]

The crisis in the Gulf had been the topic of an article published the day before the Senate debate by former Radical Francesco Rutelli, a founder of the Rainbow-Greens party.[10] The presence in the ranks of his new party of former members of Proletarian Democracy (DP) conferred a stronger Marxist component than would be otherwise expected in a formation of

---

[6] Roberto Boffa, "Discussione sulle comunicazioni del Governo sulla crisi nel Golfo Persico e sulle conseguenti decisioni adottate dal Consiglio dei ministri," 22 Aug. 1990, *Senato della Repubblica, X legislatura, 430. Seduta pubblica, Resoconto stenografico*, 75-80, http://www.senato.it/service/PDF/PDFServer/BGT/318028.pdf.

[7] Giulia Tedesco Tatò, "Discussione sulle comunicazioni del Governo sulla crisi nel Golfo Persico e sulle conseguenti decisioni adottate dal Consiglio dei ministri," 22 Aug. 1990, *Senato della Repubblica, X legislatura, 430. Seduta pubblica, Resoconto stenografico*, 103-5; http://www.senato.it/service/PDF/PDFServer/BGT/318028.pdf.

[8] Armando Cossutta, "Discussione sulle comunicazioni del Governo sulla crisi nel Golfo Persico e sulle conseguenti decisioni adottate dal Consiglio dei ministri," 22 Aug. 1990, *Senato della Repubblica, X legislatura, 430. Seduta pubblica, Resoconto stenografico*, 113-4; http://www.senato.it/service/PDF/PDFServer/BGT/318028.pdf.

[9] Alberto Asor Rosa, *La sinistra alla prova: Considerazioni sul ventennio 1976-1996* (Turin: Einaudi, 1996), 120-2; Bruno Ugolini and Sergio Criscuoli, "Pci dopo lo strappo del 'no'," *L'Unità* (Rome), 25 Aug. 1990; Francesco Rutelli, interview, "Crisi nel Golfo Persico: l'Iraq invade il Kuwait ruolo della CEE e la divisione del PCI nel voto alla Camera," 26 Aug. 1990, audioclip, OARR, http://www.radioradicale.it/scheda/36865/36899-crisi-nel-golfo-persico-liraq-invade-il-kuwait-ruolo-della-cee-e-la-divisione-del-pci-nel-voto-alla-c.

[10] The Italian Rainbow-Greens (they later merged with the pre-existing Greens) never emerged as a significant political force, unlike the German *Grüne*.

Radical extraction. In his article, however, Rutelli did not hesitate to risk a rift with his new left colleagues. He termed the US response necessary, given the difficulty of gathering a UN multilateral force and the need to act in earnest to confront Hussein's aggression. "How come," asked Rutelli "the Soviet Union judges the US presence in the Persian Gulf more leniently than certain authoritative representatives of the PCI?" A latent anti-Americanism on the left was the principal reason, he suggested. But he also cautiously added that the role of the naval units deployed by Italy, though only playing a "decorative" role, would need to be carefully evaluated as events unfolded.[11]

Rutelli's moderate support for intervention met a vehement repudiation during the Senate debate from a Rainbow-Greens party colleague. The latter predicted that ongoing events would lead ineluctably to a war motivated by the interests, principally, of the US. "Dissuasion [of Hussein] must be strong, but should be accomplished by civilized men, not by men who defend exclusively the logic of the dollar and of oil […] There is a friend of mine, or rather a former friend, the former deputy Rutelli, who yesterday […] claimed that Italians have the syndrome of Pontius Pilate. In point of fact, Rutelli suffers from the American syndrome […], which is why he hails the American intervention as necessary and useful in this particular instance. Well, Europe must remain autonomous and not just follow in the footsteps of America […]"[12] The Rainbow-Greens deputy's view, like that of some PCI members, testified to divisions on the left. While to some the mobilization of the international community promised the advent of new

[11] Francesco Rutelli, "Ma io penso che la presenza americana nel Golfo sia giusta," *l'Unità* (Rome), 21 Aug. 1990.

[12] Guido Pollice, "Discussione sulle comunicazioni del Governo sulla crisi nel Golfo Persico e sulle conseguenti decisioni adottate dal Consiglio dei ministri," 22 Aug. 1990, *Senato della Repubblica, X legislatura, 430. Seduta pubblica, Resoconto stenografico*, 39-44, http://www.senato.it/service/PDF/PDFServer/BGT/318028.pdf.

world order characterized by international law, to others it concealed revived American imperialism.

Deliberations held the next day in the Chamber witnessed Radicals, under the label of the European Federalist group, vote in favor of the embargo on Iraq, after the government accepted aspects of their motion. Its linchpin, the request to organize an international public relations offensive against Hussein to seek to head off a military confrontation and to attempt to stimulate an internal revolt to his rule, was however rejected. However unlikely to achieve the desired effect, it testified to the group's attachment to nonviolent interventionism and non-military policy tools. In her speech, Emma Bonino echoed Strik Lievers' speech in the Senate when she stated that Radicals "have always been […] supporters of nonviolent but 'ferocious' interventionist policies; and have never been participants in 'generic pacifism'." Radicals, she continued, long opposed Italy's major role in the world arms trade and presciently identified North-South tensions as a future source of conflict supplanting East-West confrontation.

Bonino did not mince her criticism of Socialist Foreign Minister De Michelis, berating him for his past policies towards Iraq and for recent budget cuts of Italian aid to the Third World. Defunding, she argued, had compounded the inept, corrupt or commercially-motivated expenditure of foreign aid, thoroughly subverting Radical famine campaign objectives.[13] She also commented on an earlier speech by Occhetto, agreeing that Italy should act only under the umbrella of the UN, but also expressing concern over an overemphasis on the matter. PCI focus on the UN framework was linked to distrust of US unilateralism and fears of military

[13] Emma Bonino, "Comunicazioni del Governo sulla crisi nel Golfo Persico e sulle conseguenti decisioni del Consiglio dei ministri," 23 Aug. 1990, *Atti Parlamentari, Camera degli Deputati, Resoconto stenografico*, 68819-22, http://legislature.camera.it/_dati/leg10/lavori/stenografici/sed0514/sed0514.pdf; Marco Pannella, "Una 'cannoniera' da inviare a Bruxelles," *La Stampa* (Turin), 21 Aug. 1990.

escalation.[14] Unlike the Communists, the Radicals could countenance an interim American role; they hoped that alongside the US might develop "another political entity capable of effective and credible intervention on the problem of world security."[15]

Further, even though Bonino and her group did not explicitly endorse the use of force to roll back Hussein, their silence on the risk of a devastating war was significant. In the eighties, Radicals had adamantly opposed any Italian military participation in peacekeeping or humanitarian interventions, labeling them as driven by interests or nationalism. No such language was now present in their pronouncements. A permutation was in act, implicitly calling into question the lofty preamble added to Radical Party statutes in 1980, proclaiming the imperative of absolute nonviolence "even in case of legitimate self-defense."[16]

PCI leader Occhetto had been the first to respond to the opening communiqué of the government during the Chamber session. As had his colleagues in the Senate, Occhetto strove to find a middle ground between the warring factions in his party. His speech emphasized the role of the UN as sole source of legitimacy for any intervention, criticized as precipitate the actions of the Italian government, and warned against the grave risks incurred by American unilateralism. Responding to an article critical of the PCI abstention vote in the Senate that had just appeared in the new left daily *il manifesto*, he stated that "nobody is abstaining before [the prospect of] war,

---

[14] Achille Occhetto, "Se le Nazioni Unite contano davvero," *l'Unità* (Rome), 26 Aug. 1990.

[15] Roberto Cicciomessere, "Comunicazioni del Governo sulla crisi nel Golfo Persico e sulle conseguenti decisioni del Consiglio dei ministri," 23 Aug. 1990, *Atti Parlamentari*, *Camera degli Deputati*, *Resoconto stenografico*, 68853, http://legislature.camera.it/_dati/leg10/lavori/stenografici/sed0514/sed0514.pdf. For another expounding of Radical views, see Roberto Cicciomessere, "Armati di nonviolenza," 27 Aug. 1990, electronic discussion forum, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=113984&lang=IT&cms=.

[16] "Mozione generale approvata dal XXIV congresso del Pr Roma, 31 ottobre, 1, 2, 3 e 4 novembre 1980," 4 Nov. 1980, party motion, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=47305&lang=IT&cms=; "Mozione generale approvata dal XXIII congresso (straordinario) del Pr (Roma, 7, 8, e 9 marzo 1980," 9 March 1980, party motion, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=47031&lang=IT&cms=.

as has been asserted in defamatory manner in a newspaper. Ours is an earnest pacifist and nonviolent initiative […]" While most PCI deputies abstained rather than oppose the government's motion, internal opposition to Occhetto's position was as vehement as that expressed earlier by Senator Cossutta.[17] Pietro Ingrao, for example, voted against the governmental motion, arguing that the UN alone should counter Hussein and thereby his claim to legitimacy in the Arab world. His speech was exalted the absolute value of peace: "You [the government] still do not see and do not accept that peace is achieved through peace […]"[18] Opinions voiced in the Chamber by other forces of the Marxist or ecological left were variants on the same theme.[19]

During this first phase of the debate over the Italian role in the Gulf, leftist critics of intervention assailed the Radicals rather than directly attack the PCI majority. Father Eugenio Melandri, Eurodeputy of DP, called publicly for the Radical INGO, the Transnational Radical Party, to remove the effigy of Gandhi from its banner: "the truth is […] that you [Radicals] don't give a damn about nonviolence. You are only interested in maintaining a special connection with Israel […] You are interested in a sort of bourgeois alliance with pink-skinned privileged folk, while willing occasionally to wax sentimental over world famine, taking care not to throw

[17] Achille Occhetto, "Comunicazioni del Governo sulla crisi nel Golfo Persico e sulle conseguenti decisioni del Consiglio dei ministri", 23 Aug. 1990, *Atti Parlamentari, Camera degli Deputati, Resoconto stenografico*, 68814, http://legislature.camera.it/_dati/leg10/lavori/stenografici/sed0514/sed0514.pdf.

[18] Pietro Ingrao, "Comunicazioni del Governo sulla crisi nel Golfo Persico e sulle conseguenti decisioni del Consiglio dei ministri," 23 Aug. 1990, *Atti Parlamentari, Camera degli Deputati, Resoconto stenografico*, 68909-11, http://legislature.camera.it/_dati/leg10/lavori/stenografici/sed0514/sed0514.pdf.

[19] For other comments on the left contrary to intervention, see Giovanni Russo Spena (DP), Raniero La Valle (Independent Left), Franca Bassi Montanari (Greens), "Comunicazioni del Governo sulla crisi nel Golfo Persico e sulle conseguenti decisioni del Consiglio dei ministri," 23 Aug. 1990, *Atti Parlamentari, Camera degli Deputati, Resoconto stenografico*, 68824-30 , 68830-4, 68836-8, http://legislature.camera.it/_dati/leg10/lavori/stenografici/sed0514/sed0514.pdf.

into crisis the forces that cause it."[20] In response, Radicals pointed out that Gandhi had condemned the 1938 peace accords at Munich as "an act of violence" and had refused while imprisoned during the war to denounce the British war against the Nazis, as demanded by other independentists. Faced with a major crisis, the nonviolent individual must take a stance, in 1938 as now, argued Cicciomessere, the veteran antimilitarist once jailed on account of draft dodging.[21]

A Catholic priest, Father Melandri, participated in a debate initiated by *l'Unità*. The day after the Chamber debate, an open letter of his was published on the second page of the paper. "Dear Pietro [Ingrao]" he wrote "[…] I fear this sort of collective folly conjuring the ghosts of war […] Your speech at *Montecitorio* marked perhaps one of the greatest moments in the history of our parliament […] In the Bible there is mention of the few, a small group of persons who, despite abandonment by the masses, continue to maintain the faith […] There is much soul-searching on the crisis of the PCI […] [but your speech] demonstrates that within [the party]— despite tough times— the values of democracy, peace, of solidarity between peoples still exist." Beneath the text, a cartoon representing two characters summed up the state of the party: in response to the question of one "But is the PCI divided?" the response of the other was "To which of the two are you referring?"[22]

---

[20] "Golfo e nonviolenza: Melandri (DP) chiede ai Radicali di togliere Gandhi dal simbolo del partito," electronic bulletin, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=157632&lang=IT&cms=; "Nonviolenza Pannella e DP troncano il dialogo," *l'Unità* (Rome), 30 Aug. 2010.

[21] "Via Gandhi dal simbolo," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 30 Aug. 1990; Roberto Cicciomessere, "Radicali interventisti," electronic forum, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=113992&lang=IT&cms=.

[22] Eugenio Melandri, "Lettera aperta a Pietro Ingrao," *l'Unità* (Rome), 25 Aug. 1990. Montecitorio refers to the building housing the Chamber of Deputies in the center of Rome. Internecine dissent with the PCI majority position on the Gulf crisis disoriented the party base: see "Pci, la frattura sul Golfo subito di scena alla festa," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 2 Sept. 1990.

In a dissenting response to Melandri's elevation of the primacy of peace over other considerations, another Catholic intellectual, Father Ernesto Balducci, argued that the present crisis presented a historic opportunity to usher in a new era: " […] August [6] marked a decisive step. The UN has produced, despite inauspicious precedents, the embryo of a world community. The event is possible because of the end of East-West confrontation. It is now a certainty: each nation (including Israel) knows that it will be accountable to the world community for its actions […] As the prophet says, we must force a new dawn to break." The next day, in the columns of the same paper, Occhetto commented that he shared with both priests fears over a possible war: "[…] A peaceful solution: this is what we want above all. But the possibility of a pacific resolution […] would in no way have been possible without the opening provided by the UN."[23] A preeminent role for the UN and rejection of US unilateralism constituted the common ground between Occhetto and dissent on his left.[24] Whether the PCI would ultimately endorse a resort to force remained doubtful.[25]

Another left-leaning Catholic pundit, Gianni Baget Bozzo, who during the Euromissile Crisis had opposed deployment and exalted the primacy of peace, summed up the significance of the contemporary debate between Melandri and Balducci: "interestingly, we now have a split

---

[23] Balducci, "La comunità mondiale al primo vagito," *l'Unità*, 28 Aug. 1990; Achille Occhetto, "Lettera aperta a Ernesto Balducci," *l'Unità* (Rome), 29 Aug. 1990.

[24] See the article by Pierluigi Onorato (senator of the Independent Left), "Ma non viene dall'Onu una piattaforma comune per la sinistra?" *l'Unità* (Rome), 1 Sept. 1990.

[25] According to critics on the left, the US move of sending ships to the Gulf in the immediate aftermath of UN resolution 661 decreeing the embargo was a unilateral move (seconded by the Italians among others) that compromised Mikhail Gorbachev's goal of ensuring a collective response to the crisis. Pierluigi Onorato, "Ma non viene dall'Onu una piattaforma comune per la sinistra?" *l'Unità* (Rome), 1 Sept. 1990.

within pacifism, between the yes and the no [to Italian military participation […].” Baget Bozzo concluded by presenting his own view, which represented a considerable shift from ones expressed a decade earlier during the revival of nuclear fears: “The position expressed by Balducci is unproblematic, unlike that of Melandri, who espouses an absolute form of pacifism […] A pacifism that renounces on principle to any recourse to force is not one derived from Christianity: the Church has always rejected it,” he added in a reference to the doctrine of just war.[26] As war with Hussein loomed, however, the Vatican would take a very different stance.

By fall, as war appeared increasingly probable, differences between the Communist and the Catholic camps continued to narrow, ushering in unity around the banner of peace.[27] In October 1990, pacifists marched from Perugia to Assisi. Contrasting with earlier hand-wringing over the disunion and invisibility of the peace movement in response to the invasion of Kuwait, commentators noted its newfound compactness. For example, the Greens recomposed their differences with former Radical Rutelli, who abandoned his earlier support for intervention in the Gulf.[28]

---

[26] Gianni Baget Bozzo, “Disarmati contro Saddam?”, *La Repubblica* (Rome), 2 Sept. 1990; compare to Gianni Baget Bozzo, Giuseppe Boffa, Arrigo Levi, Paolo Sylos Labini “Discutiamo di pacifismo. Quale movimento nell’era della possible guerra nucleare?” debate presided by Ferdinando Adornato, *l’Unità* (Rome), 21 Oct. 1983. Baget Bozzo eventually abandoned his leftist convictions and joined Silvio Berlusconi’s *Forza Italia* in 1994, the same year Bonino and Pannella forged an alliance with the media mogul. Unlike the Radicals, and like Berlusconi, Baget Bozzo would endorse George W. Bush’s 2003 invasion of Iraq, denouncing, in terms which recalled his pronouncements of 1990, “absolute pacifism”. See Gianni Baget Bozzo, “L’abolizione della politica,” *Il Giornale* (Milan), 18 Feb. 2003.

[27] Baget Bozzo, on the other hand, maintained his hard line critique of mainstream pacifism. See Gianni Baget Bozzo in “L’onore e la Guerra,” *La Repubblica* (Rome), 9 Nov. 1990: “Absolute pacifism is the worst type of fundamentalism because it negates the legitimacy of norms that make a distinction between [gratuitous] violence and the legitimate recourse to force, a distinction that has made possible human civilization.”

[28] Ninni Andriolo, “ ‘Dov’è finito il movimento pacifista’,” *l’Unità* (Rome), 30 Aug. 1990; Giampiero Rasimelli, “Dove sono finiti i pacifisti? Eccoli qui, vivi e vegeti,” *l’Unità* (Rome), 1 Sept. 1990; Ninni Andriolo, “In cammino per la pace ‘La guerra non risolve nulla’,” *l’Unità* (Rome), 8 Oct. 1990; N[inni] A[ndriolo] “Balducci: ‘È un nuovo inizio’,” *l’Unità* (Rome), 8 Oct. 1990; “Ventimila ad Assisi a dire no alla guerra,” *La Repubblica* (Rome), 7 Oct. 1990; “Alla Marcia Perugia-Assisi centomila contro la Guerra,” *La Repubblica* (Rome), 9 Oct. 1990.

The Radicals, as had been the case since 1981, boycotted the peace march, confirming their rejection of mainstream pacifism.[29] Their dissent, however, was of a different nature than in the past. During the Euromissile Crisis, nonviolent or pacifist Radicals, Catholics and Communists may have disagreed on what defined a righteous peace and whether nuclear disarmament was a priority trumping a more radical antimilitarism. Never in question, however, had been a consensus that the best way to resolve superpower conflict was nonviolent mediation and nuclear or comprehensive disarmament.[30] The waning of the Cold War and the "new" hot wars which followed had now introduced a debate among pacifists over whether the use of force by the West to uphold international law might be in some circumstances be necessary and legitimate.

In late September, the Chamber of Deputies convened again to approve decrees passed in August.[31] Deliberations opened with a speech by Franco Russo, an ally of the Greens. He portrayed Italy's role in the embargo as a military act violating an article proscribing the recourse to force abroad in the 1948 Constitution, pointing out that among contributed equipment were

---

[29] "Marcia Perugia-Assisi: dopo dodici anni il Pr – con la segretaria Emma Bonino e il presidente Marco Pannella-aderisce," 23 Sept.1993, electronic bulletin, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=160139&lang=IT&cms=.

[30] There was a contradiction in the pacifist stances of the Marxist left that was often pointed by the Radicals in the 1970s and 1980s, consisting in the espousal of revolutionary violence to address injustice in the Third World (but not Soviet intervention, after 1968). By the time of the PCI's drafting of its *Charter on Peace and Development* in the early 1980s, this doctrine of revolutionary, violent change was however underemphasized.

[31] Law Decree no. 220 of 6 Aug. 1990, enforcing seizure on Iraqi properties, and Law Decree no. 247 of 23 Aug. 23 1990, regarding the financing of the Italian naval expedition in the Gulf. See "Discussione congiunta dei disegni di legge: Conversione in legge del decretolegge 6 agosto 1990, n. 220, recante misure urgenti relative ai beni della Repubblica dell 'Iraq (5055); Conversione in legge del decreto legge 23 agosto 1990, n. 247, recante provvedimenti urgenti in ordine alla situazione determinatasi nel Golfo Persico (5062)," 26 Sept. 1990, *Atti Parlamentari, Camera degli Deputati, X legislatura, Discussioni, , Resoconto Stenografico, Seduta del 26 settembre 1990*, 69413, http://legislature.camera.it/_dati/leg10/lavori/stenografici/sed0517/sed0517.pdf.

bellicose instruments such as the jet fighter planes Tornado and Interceptor Strike. The US response was described as an act of force by the subsisting superpower enacted under the cover of an "extorted" UN resolution. Rejecting other historical parallels made by his opponents, Russo warned that the best comparison was with American use of UN cover in Korea in the fifties. Far from being a step toward world government and the affirmation of the international rule of law, the war would consolidate American power and sow the seeds for future global instability. Addressing directly the Radicals, he asked that they not cede to Eurocentrism—an oblique reference to their pro-Israel stances.[32]

Cicciomessere criticized both pacifist and governmental stances. While retorting that Italy's course of action had been legitimized by the UN resolution, he conceded that the Tornado fighter jets were inappropriate for tasks of reconnaissance and recalled that the triumphs of democracy in Eastern Europe the previous year had not been achieved by the deployment of nuclear missiles, but by the force of attraction of Western democracy. Even as he endorsed the necessity of a firm response to Hussein, the Radical emphasized alternatives to armed conflict. He compared the unleashing of war to a careless police raid on hostage takers during a bank robbery.[33]

But when the time to vote came, Radicals expressed their support. Bonino stated that she would avoid any further polemics in the name of unity and of a wide consensus on an important

[32] Franco Russo (Gruppo Misto), "Discussione […]", 26 Sept. 1990, *Atti Parlamentari, Camera degli Deputati, X legislatura, Discussioni, , Resoconto Stenografico, Seduta del 26 settembre 1990*, 69415-9, http://legislature.camera.it/_dati/leg10/lavori/stenografici/sed0517/sed0517.pdf. In the same venue, Giovanni Russo Spena (DP) reiterated many of the same points, including support for a vote on the unconstitutionality of the use of military force. 69419-22.

[33] Roberto Cicciomessere and Alessandro Tessari (Gruppo Federalista Europeo), "Discussioni […]" September 26, 1990, "Discussione […]", 26 Sept. 1990, *Atti Parlamentari, Camera degli Deputati, X legislatura, Discussioni, , Resoconto Stenografico, Seduta del 26 settembre 1990*, 69448-53, 69479-82.

foreign policy challenge.[34] PCI deputies abstained, warning that any use of warplanes by the Italian military was a dangerous move that would bring about their firm opposition.[35] As in previous parliamentary sessions, fiery denunciations of official policy came from the ranks of the new and ecological left, now increasingly incensed by the ambiguous PCI stance: "It is unbelievable that the general-minister De Michelis, having enrolled in Bush's *marines*, thinks that warships and warplanes will resolve the Middle-Eastern quandary. Furthermore, it is grave that the Communist Party has given carte blanche to the government on questions of war and peace. There are moments when one should not abstain, when one should say: no, I am opposed, I am on the other side!" Appropriating old Radical slogans, he concluded: "We […] are committed to […] disarmament, antimilitarism, [and] the launch of a radical pacifism."[36]

The Chamber convened again in December 1990 following a UN resolution setting a mid-January deadline for Iraqi troop withdrawal from Kuwait.[37] The UN authorized member states to use "any means necessary" thereafter to enforce previous resolutions. Deemed by some members of the Italian left as a declaration of war, UN resolution no. 678 prompted the submission of a number of parliamentary interrogations and inquiries.[38] The discussions,

---

[34] Emma Bonino, "Disegno di legge di conversione (Seguito della discussione congiunta e approvazione)," 27 Sept. 1990, *Atti Parlamentari, Camera degli Deputati, X legislatura, Discussioni, Seduta del 27 settembre 1990, Resoconto Stenografico*, 69581-3, http://legislature.camera.it/_dati/leg10/lavori/stenografici/sed0518/sed0518.pdf.

[35] Giulio Quercini (PCI), Disegno di legge di conversione (Seguito della discussione congiunta e approvazione)," 27 Sept. 1990, *Atti Parlamentari, Camera degli Deputati, X legislatura, Discussioni, Seduta del 27 settembre 1990, Resoconto Stenografico*, 69594-6, http://legislature.camera.it/_dati/leg10/lavori/stenografici/sed0518/sed0518.pdf.

[36] Giovanni Russo Spena (DP), "Disegno di legge di conversione […]," 27 Sept. 1990, *Atti Parlamentari, Camera degli Deputati, X legislatura, Discussioni, Seduta del 27 settembre 1990, Resoconto Stenografico*, 69580-1.

[37] UN resolution no. 678 of 28 Nov.1991.

[38] Parliamentary Inquiry 2-01235, submitted by Giovanni Russo Spena, Patrizia Arnaboldi, Luigi Cipriani (DP), 7 Dec. 1990, *Atti Parlamentari, Camera dei Deputati, X legislatura, Discussioni, Seduta di venerdì 7 dicembre 1990, Resoconto Stenografico*, 76053-4, http://legislature.camera.it/_dati/leg10/lavori/stenografici/sed0562/sed0562.pdf.

conducted in a climate of extreme international tension, further clarified the distinction between the positions of Radicals and other non-Socialist leftists. Bonino exalted the primacy of rights over other considerations, including peace. The Greens and DP, on the other hand, reasserted the paramount importance of peace and questioned the legitimacy of the recent UN resolution. The PCI, still struggling to hold onto a middle ground, scolded the government for its failure to abet a UN unified command of all armed forces.[39]

Countering the claims of the ecological and new left, Bonino reiterated the legitimacy and legality of UN resolutions authorizing the use of force. Addressing Raniero La Valle, the Catholic representative of the Independent Left, she stated: "I read in a paid announcement certain statements of our colleague La Valle, in which it was affirmed that peace must also be attained at the cost of rights and principles of freedom and justice. This is a position that I not only do not share but also consider analogous to that followed for years by nation-states in foreign policy; one which translates into the tragic logic of Realpolitik. Such positions […] are connected to interests, for instance economic ones."[40] After praising La Valle's good intentions, Bonino added that the recent liberation of hostages was not the result of his mission to Bagdad with a group of Italian parliamentarians, but was rather due to the pressure exerted by the Security Council, including an implicit threat of violent reprisals. For once, she continued, firmness had been exhibited in the face of an aggression on rights, even though it was also probably motivated also by economic and other interests. The international community's

---

[39] Parliamentary Inquiry 2-01193, submitted by Giulio Quercini, Giorgio Napolitano, Antonio Rubbi, Luciano Violante, Germano Marri (PCI), 7 Dec. 1990, *Atti Parlamentari, Camera dei Deputati, X legislatura, Discussioni, Seduta di venerdì 7 dicembre 1990, Resoconto Stenografico*, 76052-3.

[40] Emma Bonino, "Interpellanze e interrogazioni sulla crisi del Golfo Persico," 7 Dec. 1990, *Atti Parlamentari, Camera dei Deputati, X legislatura, Discussioni, Seduta di venerdì 7 dicembre 1990, Resoconto Stenografico*, 76105, http://legislature.camera.it/_dati/leg10/lavori/stenografici/sed0562/sed0562.pdf.

response remained a precious opportunity to establish stronger foundations for international law. Two lessons derived from current events, she concluded. The first was that the defense of rights was not a mere option to be applied selectively. Violation of rights and international law had also occurred on the occasion of American and Soviet actions, most recently in Panama and Afghanistan. The second was that the preventive promotion of democracy was the only way to address international instability, and should be the basis for a new foreign policy not limited to the export to dictators of "goods, garbage, and military aid."[41]

The arguments presented by a Greens deputy in favor of withdrawing Italian military forces from the Gulf may stand as an illustration for similar positions on the far left. "We Greens […] have been guided by this principle and this policy: not to surrender to war. Even when faced with the worst abuses of the rule of law or the rights of persons […], we consider that dialogue is at any rate preferable to war." The Greens deputy argued that the recent release of hostages removed the basis of the dispute of the international community with Hussein, and that presently there was "no further reason to die for oil." He invoked the antiwar testimonies in Congress of Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. and Robert S. McNamara, as well as a recent *New York Times* article noting emerging US public opposition to the impending war.[42] Finally, he rejected the legitimacy of the UN ultimatum to Iraq, asserting that the organization's role should be to

[41] Ibid., 76104-6.

[42] Perhaps a reference to R.W. Apple Jr. "Standoff in the Gulf; The Collapse Of a Coalition," *New York Times*, 6 Dec. 1990. Earlier, a noted Italian press correspondent had reported, citing his telephone conversation with Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., the apathy of American public opinion before the prospect of war. See Vittorio Zucconi, "L'America tace sulla guerra di Bush," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 11 Nov. 1990.

preserve the peace without giving in to US pressures: "The 'right to war' cannot migrate from sovereign states to the UN […]"[43]

Final parliamentary debates on Italian participation in the war were held in mid-January as the American intervention began.[44] The Chamber Radicals of the European Federalist group presented their own resolution reiterating their call for a nonviolent alternative solution; arguably however, it constituted a mere cover for their actual vote for military intervention. In contrast, most deputies of the non-Socialist left, including the Communists, voted against the majority resolution.

Once again, noted Radical deputy Giovanni Negri, stretching the concept of nonviolence to include military intervention, an issue of pacifism versus nonviolence split Communists and Radicals.[45] He provided a new definition of Radical pacifism: "Our definition of peace, […] nonviolence, must be of a different sort. Peace for us is a political concept; one that allows people to benefit from life and the right to a continuum which spans survival, freedom and their full realization as persons. For us […] there is no such concept of peace that does not encompass

---

[43] Franco Russo (Gruppo Misto), "Interpellanze e interrogazioni sulla crisi del Golfo Persico," 7 Dec. 1990, *Atti Parlamentari, Camera dei Deputati, X legislatura, Discussioni, Seduta di venerdì 7 dicembre 1990, Resoconto stenografico*, 76065-7; http://legislature.camera.it/_dati/leg10/lavori/stenografici/sed0562/sed0562.pdf.

[44] For the sake of brevity, the debate of January 16-17 in the Senate is not discussed. Confirming an earlier pattern in the Senate, former Radical deputy Strik Lievers of the Gruppo Federalista Ecologico Europeo and other former Radicals abstained rather than vote favorably for the governmental motion, perhaps on account of the mixed nature of their parliamentary group, which included Greens and members of DP. The vote pattern of the PCI and the other small parties of the non-Socialist left followed same patterns as in the Chamber. On the Radical vote, see Lorenzo Strik Lievers (Gruppo Federalista Europeo Ecologista), "Comunicazioni del governo sulla situazione nel Golfo Persico. Seguito della della discussione," 17 Jan. 1991, *Senato della Repubblica, X legislatura, 478 seduta, Resoconto stenografico, Giovedì 17 gennaio 1991*, 43-5, 67-9, http://www.senato.it/service/PDF/PDFServer/BGT/318080.pdf.

[45] Giovanni Negri (Gruppo Federalista Europeo), "Comunicazione del Governo e discussione di mozioni concernenti la situazione nel Golfo Persico," 16 Jan. 1990, *Atti Parlamentari, Camera dei Deputati, X legislatura, Discussioni, Seduta di mercoledì 16 gennaio 1991, Resoconto stenografico*,77884, http://legislature.camera.it/_dati/leg10/lavori/stenografici/sed0574/sed0574.pdf.

the safeguard of rights or democracy. The latter are not abstract, ontological concepts, but physical, concrete ones: structures."[46]

Bonino's speech echoed previous pronouncements, reiterating the distinction made between Radical nonviolence and pacifism. A member of the ecological left had just concluded his declaration by addressing another Radical as follows: "I think that in our Constitution there is a pacifist option, just as I think quite simply, honorable Cicciomessere, that pacifism signifies peace first and above everything else, while nonviolence signifies the exclusion of violence. In consequence, the choice must not between cowardice and violence, but another way."[47] In response, Bonino sarcastically congratulated the Greens deputy for having correctly defined the pacifist as "someone who accepts and wants peace at any cost." She then provided her own definition of the nonviolent person as he "who demands, perhaps at any cost, the application and respect of international rights." Words followed outlining her conception of the proper approach to international justice. "The nonviolent" she stated "is an individual who might be faced with difficult situations such as the current one, in which perhaps little remains to be done because his proposals are not accepted […] due to countering policies. [Faced with such a reality] a nonviolent person tries to gain one centimeter or one millimeter more, one more step in the construction of instruments that will guarantee, at least next time, the respect of international law and the unacceptability of power abuses or annexations or similar acts."[48] Regardless of the questionable interests driving the United States or the sale in the past of Italian weapons to Iraq,

[46] Ibid., 77833.

[47] Franco Russo (Verde), 16 Jan. 1990, *Atti Parlamentari, Camera dei Deputati, X legislatura, Discussioni, Seduta di mercoledì 16 gennaio 1991, Resoconto stenografico,* 77861-6.

[48] Emma Bonino, 16 January 1990, *Atti Parlamentari, Camera dei Deputati, X legislatura, Discussioni, Seduta di mercoledì 16 gennaio 1991, Resoconto stenografico,* 77866-70.

she continued, the current response to Iraqi acts represented "the first time that [the respect] for the [international] rule of law has been acted on."[49]

Radicals still tried to reconcile their new interventionism with nonviolence, representing military response as the sole remaining solution in a war which they argued had in actual fact broken out on the day Iraq invaded Kuwait. Cicciomessere expressed his preference for a peaceful outcome, but significantly concluded his statement as follows: "If there will be no possibility of forcing Saddam Hussein to retreat from Kuwait and if what we have requested will not be taken into consideration [an international public opinion campaign aimed at destabilizing the Iraqi regime], and if the country [the US] which has taken on—Thank God—the main responsibility in this crisis determines that it cannot any longer postpone the resort to violence and military force, what position—I ask—should one take? In this respect I can only recall what Gandhi once affirmed in relation to analogous situations; he recommended the resort to violence in cases in which the only alternative is cowardice."[50]

During the same parliamentary sessions, the PCI rejected intervention and denied that the UN resolution constituted an ultimatum requiring the recourse to force.[51] Occhetto now conjured apocalyptic outcomes. His fears were partly founded; the position of the Marxist left in Italy and for that matter that of the majority of the Democratic Party in the US were driven by

[49] Roberto Ciccciomessere and Emma Bonino, 16 Jan. 1990, *Atti Parlamentari, Camera dei Deputati, X legislatura, Discussioni, Seduta di mercoledì 16 gennaio 1991, Resoconto stenografico*, 77853, 77968-9.

[50] Roberto Cicciomessere, 16 Jan. 1990, *Atti Parlamentari, Camera dei Deputati, X legislatura, Discussioni, Seduta di mercoledì 16 gennaio 1991, Resoconto stenografico*, 77851-5.

[51] Achille Occhetto, 16 Jan. 1990, *Atti Parlamentari, Camera dei Deputati, X legislatura, Discussioni, Seduta di mercoledì 16 gennaio 1991, Resoconto stenografico*, 77765.

understandable concerns.[52] The prospect of a potentially uncontrollable hot war in the Middle East was alarming. Events in the Gulf region came to a head in early 1991 around the time Soviet tanks were crushing a nationalist rebellion in Vilnius, the capital of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Lithuania; the latter event figured prominently in the speeches of Italian parliamentarians. Worry over a potential Soviet involution was pervasive, even though the USSR had supported the UN resolutions on Kuwait.[53] Occhetto, in his declaration of vote, warned that this was "one of the gravest crises since World War II" and evoked the diffuse opinion "which the pope has made his own, that war could be an adventure of no return."[54] US President George H. Bush himself, in a sense, shared such concerns, as witness his prudence and his efforts to prevent uncontrollable developments. Such considerations, combined with the echo in world public opinion of the butchery of retreating Iraqi soldiers, led him to wind down the war as soon as possible. His actions then, unlike those of his son later, spoke to different sensibility on questions of war and peace than would later emerge.[55]

---

[52] Adam Clymer, "Confrontation in the Gulf; Congress Acts to Authorize War in Gulf; Margins are 5 Votes in Senate, 67 in House," *New York Times*, 13 Jan. 1991.

[53] See for example the statement of Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti (DC), "Comunicazione del Governo e discussione di mozioni concernenti la situazione nel Golfo Persico," 16 Jan. 1991, *Atti Parlamentari, Camera dei Deputati, X legislatura, Discussioni, Seduta di mercoledì 16 gennaio 1991, Resoconto stenografico*, 77772, or, in the same venue, deputy Arnaldo Forlani (DC), 77772; Henry Kissinger, "'Ci serve una concezione stabile delle relazioni Est-Ovest, non basata su singole personalità.' Con Gorbaciov ma anche senza. Kissinger sulla svolta conservatrice dell' Urss," *La Stampa* (Turin), 20 Jan.1991.

[54] Achille Occhetto, "Comunicazione del Governo e discussione di mozioni concernenti la situazione nel Golfo Persico," 16 Jan. 1990, *Atti Parlamentari, Camera dei Deputati, X legislatura, Discussioni, Seduta di mercoledì 16 gennaio 1991, Resoconto stenografico*, 77764.

[55] George [H.] Bush and Brent Scowcroft, *A World Transformed* (New York: Vintage, 1998), 357-487. On George W. Bush's different approach to foreign policy, see Tony Smith, *A Pact with the Devil: Washington's Bid for World Supremacy and the Betrayal of the American Promise* (New York: Routledge, 2007).

One week into the bombing campaign the Radicals presented a resolution to the Chamber Commission of Foreign Affairs requesting a unilateral suspension of hostilities to permit renewed negotiations. It was a motion of symbolic import with little chance of passing, but also spoke to the continued effort to reconcile Radical interventionism with the group's antimilitarism and subscription to nonviolence.[56]

The Gulf War complicated Occhetto's endeavor to transform his party.[57] Party unity was insistently proclaimed during the lead-up to the critical XXth congress, which began on 31 January even as US bombing ravaged the Iraqi army. During its proceedings, Occhetto proclaimed that the renamed Party of the Democratic Left (PDS) refused to choose between peace and liberty.[58] The party's antiwar dissent, he argued, was due to a difference of opinion on how to attain both in the Gulf, but did not derive by any means from a rejection of the UN-sanctioned "necessity to reestablish the international rule of law."[59] Occhetto's opposition to the bombing pitted him against Giorgio Napolitano, whose disagreements with the party leadership extended to the new identity of the party.[60]

---

[56] "Sospensione ostilità nel Golfo Persico. Camera, risoluzione autonoma in comm[issione]," 22 Jan. 1991, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=28413&lang=IT&cms=.

[57] Achille Occhetto, "Crisi nel Golfo Persico: il PCI contrario all'intervento armato," 15 Jan. 1991, audioclip, OARR, http://www.radioradicale.it/scheda/65046/65115-crisi-nel-golfo-persico-il-pci-contrario-allintervento-armato; "Occhetto: 'no all'intervento armato, trattare ancora.' Il segretario del Pci: 'Insistiamo con l'inasprimento delle sanzioni contro l'Irak. Altrimenti vengono meno le ragioni della presenza italiana nel Golfo," *l'Unità* (Rome), 16 Jan. 1991.

[58] *Partito Democratico della Sinistra*, PDS.

[59] Fabrizio Rondolino, "Occhetto leva l'ancora del Pds. 'Tra la pace e la libertà scegliamo tutt'e due," *l'Unità* (Rome), 1 Feb. 1991.

[60] Giorgio Napolitano, *Dal Pci al socialismo europeo: Un'autobiografia politica* (Rome-Bari: Laterza, 2006), 251-3.

In shedding its communist mantle, the PDS rejected a socialist or social-democratic appellation, signaling a continued competition with the PSI that Napolitano opposed.[61] The PCI sought the centrist connotation associated with the democratic label; in a stunning turn-around, Italy's traditionally anti-American party sought the mantle of a venerable American political tradition.[62] But notwithstanding his bid for democratic respectability, on the right or among centrists Occhetto's refusal to endorse Italian participation in the war effort prompted jeers or disappointment. Political adversaries reiterated the old claim that the party remained unfit for a governing role due to its foreign policy stances. Other critics, including sympathetic ones, noted the reemergence of timeworn and retrograde professions of anticapitalism, Third-Worldism, pacifism and dogmatic anti-imperialism.[63]

Compounding Occhetto's plight, the PDS'pacifist stances failed to assuage its left flank. During the XXth congress, Cossutta and a substantial number of delegates left to establishe a new formation, *Rifondazione Comunista* (RC). The party of the unreconstructed communist left fought hard to appropriate the old party symbol, which had been replaced by the PDS with an oak emerging from a cameo hammer and sickle. Cossutta's formation would attain a respectable electoral outcome in 1992, delving the PDS a body blow and rendering vain Occhetto's efforts to preserve unity.

---

[61] Mauro Anselmo, "Napolitano sfida Occhetto," *La Stampa* (Turin), 3 Feb. 1991.

[62] The new appellation was a retort to Craxi, who had recently ventilated the idea of renaming his party "Socialist Unity", raising the specter of the absorption of a PCI in the throes of a perilous transition. Massimo L. Salvadori, *La Sinistra nella storia italiana* (Rome-Bari: Laterza, 2000), 209; Francesco Barbagallo, *L'Italia repubblicana: Dallo sviluppo alle riforme mancate (1945-2008)* (Rome: Carocci, 2009), 199.

[63] Giovanni Maria Bellu, "Accecati dalla ragione delle armi," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 30 Jan. 1991; Giorgio Bocca, "Quei giri di valzer," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 30 Jan. 1991; Mario Pirani, "Adesso il 'no' canta vittoria," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 2 Feb. 1991; Eugenio Scalfari, "La farfalla che aveva paura di volare," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 5 Feb. 1991.

The PCI/PDS's embrace of pacifism had been facilitated by Catholic pacifism and the pope's limpid condemnation of the resort to war.[64] At the outset of the crisis, John Paul II had come in for criticism by Radical deputy Mauro Mellini on account of his omission of words of condemnation for Saddam Hussein's seizure of hostages.[65] The pope subsequently issued an explicit condemnation of Hussein's actions, but throughout fall intimated that he would not support the recourse to military action.[66] On the eve of the expiry of the UN deadline for Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait, he declared that "the recourse to force for a just cause [...] is permissible only if this recourse is proportional to the desired result, and if the consequences of military actions, rendered ever more devastating by modern technology, are calculable [...]" Given the impossibility of doing so, he concluded, "the exigencies of humanity demand that we proscribe in absolute terms the recourse to war."[67] As noted by contemporary and subsequent observers, positions taken by the Catholic Church were influenced by geopolitical considerations and often paralleled those taken by former Communists. Among the considerations driving Vatican stances was the goal to preserse good relations with the Islamic World, including over the Palestinian question.[68]

---

[64] Domenico del Rio, "La svolta pacifista del Papa decisa da questa Guerra," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 10 Feb. 1991.

[65] The Radical Mauro Mellini (Gruppo Federalista Europeo e Ecologista) referred on 23 Aug. 1990 to an article in the Vatican's *Osservatore Romano*, see his comments in "Comunicazioni del Governo sulla crisi nel Golfo Persico e sulle conseguenti decisioni del Consiglio dei ministri, " *Atti Parlamentari, Camera degli Deputati, X legislatura, Discussioni, Seduta del 23 agosto 1990*, 68864-5, http://legislature.camera.it/_dati/leg10/lavori/stenografici/sed0514/sed0514.pdf.

[66] Alceste Santini, "Anche il Papa condanna Saddam Hussein," *l'Unità* (Rome), 27 Aug. 1990; Domenico del Rio, "L'appello di Wojtyla: 'Evitate la guerra'," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 2 Sept. 1990; "Wojtyla chiede ai vescovi più impegno per la pace," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 2 Oct. 1990; Orazio La Rocca, " 'Il conflitto è senza ritorno'," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 27 Dec. 1990.

[67] Dario Cresto-Dina, "Il Papa: la pace è ancora possible," *La Stampa* (Turin), 13 Jan. 1991.

[68] Mino Fuccillo, "Ma non c'è il fantasma di Lenin dietro il Pds pacifista e cattolico," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 27 Feb. 1991; Giorgio Bocca, "Se avesse vinto il tiranno di Bagdad…", *La Repubblica* (Rome), 5 Mar. 1991; Valerio Valesi, "Alla Festa dell'Unità anche uno stand per i frati," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 25 July 1991; Angelo Panebianco,

The course and aftermath of conflict sparked a lively debate between pacifists and its critics in the press. Oppositional stances to the war were often cast in apocaliptic or religious terms reminiscent of Cold War pacifism.[69] One commentator argued for an extended embargo as an alternative to war, as supported by "authoritative US congressmen."[70] After the war, another pundit reflected on the failure of the peace movement to stop military intervention. He regretted that the Italian pacifist movement had not clearly articulated an alternative to intervention, surely a difficult task. But what was more, the movement had also undermined its claim to impartiality and moral superiority by failing to protest Hussein's August onslaught. Furthermore, he lamented, pacifists had remained silent in mid-January 1991 as Hussein bombarded inert Israeli civilians with Scud missiles.[71] A retort published the next day by Father Balducci glossed over such undeniable incongruences in pacifist stances. Similar contradictions would also characterize pacifist responses to the wars which would soon ravage a disintegrating Yugoslavia.[72]

Supporters of military intervention in the Gulf War, on the other hand, displayed an acceptance of war unusual in a country which in the aftermath of Fascism and the world war had enshrined pacifism into its Constitution.[73] Among such leftist hawks, pacifism was held to be

---

"Chiese, sinistra e uso delle armi," *Corriere della Sera* (Milan), 8 Feb. 1999; Marco Politi, "Wojtyla: il dialogo, non le armi," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 23 Sept. 2001; Lucio Carracciolo, "Papa," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 30 Mar. 2003.

[69] They are discussed summarily in Pierluigi Battista, "Un anno dalla guerra: le armate della parola. Pacifismo o intervento: politici, intelletuali, religiosi divisi. Gara alla previsione più catastrofica. Gli slogan dell'apocalisse," *La Stampa* (Turin), 15 Jan. 1992.

[70] Gianni Vattimo, "Le ragione della prudenza. L'uso delle armi è la preistoria. Bisogna costruire un'alternativa," *La Stampa* (Turin), 13 Jan. 1991.

[71] Luigi Manconi, "Perchè noi pacifisti siamo stati sconfitti," *l'Unità* (Rome), 5 Mar. 1991.

[72] Ernesto Balducci, "Vinceremo noi pacifisti. Fosse anche fra mille anni," *l'Unità* (Rome), 6 Mar. 1991.

[73] "La guerra? Il male minore," *La Stampa* (Turin), 13 Jan. 1991; Sergio Romano, "Le ragioni della forza," *La Stampa* (Turin), 13 Jan. 1991.

incapable of addressing contemporary challenges. The doctrine of "peace at all costs" revealed, according to one prominent thinker, the poverty of pacifism and its incapacity to address the question of democracy, rights and justice; it also spoke to continued dependence on the Communist and Catholic pacifist traditions.[74] A respected periodical on the left dedicated an issue to the expounding of the interventionist position, provoking the public resignation of four contributors.[75] Historian Renzo De Felice criticized resurgent pacifism as a mystical and religious phenomenon deriving from the decline of ideology.[76]

Before the US unleashed Desert Storm, Norberto Bobbio had endorsed with qualifications the application of the concept of just war to the looming intervention, provoking controversy, as such a stance appeared to contradict ones he had articulated during the Euromissile Crisis.[77] After US operations wound down, Bobbio argued that pacifism had not precisely been defeated by war. Rather what he termed a "sentimental" form of pacifism, not the "critical" variety, had proven useless before the challenge presented by Hussein. "Critical pacifism," argued Bobbio, poses the question of the origin of war while acting before the aggression of a bully. "The alternative" he argued "would be to just accept the permanent dominion of the strongest, a bit as conjured by the fashionable early Cold War slogan: 'better red than dead.' What would have thought our progeny if we, a few years earlier, had chosen that path arguing 'better Nazis than dead?"[78] Bobbio's

[74] Ernesto Galli della Loggia, "Pace a tutti i costi," *La Stampa* (Turin), 13 Jan. 1991.

[75] *MicroMega: Le ragioni della sinistra*, Apr.-May 1991; "La guerra del Golfo divide ancora: 'fondamentalisti sarete voi'," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 23 Apr. 1991. The four departing contributors to the magazine were Franco Carlini, Marco D'Eramo, Luigi Pintor and Danilo Zolo.

[76] "De Felice risponde ai pacifisti 'Ragazzi, sono soltanto slogan'," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 25 Jan. 1991.

[77] Franco Marcoaldi, "Machiavelli direbbe pace," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 11 Nov. 1990.

[78] "Il pacifismo non sconfitto dalla guerra," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 17 May 1991.

definition of "critical" pacifism was close to the Radical one; both stemmed from a commitment to rights and international law.[79]

Not to be outdone by the chorus of critics of mainstream pacifism, Radicals resorted to strong language. Pannella claimed in *Corriere della Sera* that pacifism "has had catastrophic effects" in the current century, contributing to the rise of Nazism and communism.[80] But even as Radicals sought attention, an aspect of the perennial struggle of a tiny political faction to be heard, their interventionist positions could not fail to provoke a degree of hangwringing among their nonviolent and pacifist ranks. The Radical vote for war provoked dismay, however couched in the verbiage of nonviolence. Within one ecological formation populated by former Radicals, opposition to intervention jostled with at least one vote of support.[81] Rutelli reversed his earlier interventionist stance; while continuing to contest aspects of pacifism, he concluded, echoing the pope, that the negative consequences of the Gulf War would by far exceed its benefits. He definitively parted way with his former colleagues Bonino and Cicciomessere, beginning his political migration to the shores of the Catholic left.[82]

The III[rd] "Italian" congress of the INGO the Transnational Radical Party (TRP), held in mid-February 1991, although occupied primarily by intraparty debates on plans for a

[79] Pietro Pàstena, *Breve storia del pacifismo in Italia: Dal Settecento alle guerre del terzo millennio* (Acireale-Rome: Bonanno, 2005), 177-81. See also Marco Pannella, interview by author, July 2008, Rome, audioclip in possession of author, New York. In the interview, Pannella noted similarities between Bobbio's ideas and those of the Radicals.

[80] Marco Pannella, interview by Paolo Franchi, "Pannella: il pacifismo va messo al bando,"*Corriere della Sera* (Milan), 20 Feb. 1991.

[81] Rosa Filippini (Greens), "Comunicazioni del Governo e discussione di mozioni concernenti la situazione nel Golfo Persico," 16 Jan. 1991, *Atti Parlamentari, Camera dei Deputati, X legislatura, Discussioni, Seduta di Mercoledì 16 gennaio 1991, Resoconto Stenografico*, 77965-6, http://legislature.camera.it/_dati/leg10/lavori/stenografici/sed0574/sed0574.pdf.

[82] Francesco Rutelli, "Guerra, nonviolenza, pacifismo, chi risponde meglio a Saddam?" *l'Unità* (Rome), 26 Jan. 1991.

reconstituted domestic party, included discussions of Radical internationalism. One participant suggested polemically that the 1980 preamble to the party statute, which had elevated nonviolence to an absolute value, be revoked as a consequence of the vote in favor of intervention.[83] The antimilitarist and security expert Cicciomessere attempted to wed Radical interventionism to the controversial preamble, by arguing that the latter was not an endorsement of nonviolence as a supreme, transcendent value. The preamble, he claimed, had implied that a violent response to wrongful violence was not justifiable when exerted by individuals or nation-states, in which case it was indistinguishable from revenge. However, a response which included the resort to force was legitimate if it drew on international law and was sustained by supranational institutions. The latter would ensure the rule of law and have the added benefit of preventing future abuses.[84] The establishment of a "second Nuremberg trial" to try Hussein was debated at some length; it drew on an idea floated by the US Department of State.[85] Rather than a trial by national assizes, Radicals emphasized the importance of establishing a supranational court to prosecute Hussein and other war criminals.

Bonino discussed the divisive impact of the Gulf War on the Radicals, pointing out that others had presented them with a stark choice which had forced their hand. But rather than delve on the issue, she recommended focusing on a new course of action, namely to establish international conditions whereby a response to international abuse would not be limited to the

[83] Antonio Totarofila, "III Congresso Italiano del Partito Radicale," 17 Feb. 1991, statement, audioclip 1, OARR, http://www.radioradicale.it/scheda/38740?format=32.

[84] Roberto Cicciomessere, "III Congresso Italiano del Partito Radicale commissione 'Golfo Persico'," 16 Feb. 1991, statement, audioclip 2, OARR, http://www.radioradicale.it/scheda/38743/38778-iii-congresso-italiano-del-partito-radicale-commissione-golfo-persico.

[85] Arturo Zampaglione, "Una nuova Norimberga per Saddam," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 1 Sept. 1990. The article reports on plans by the US government to indict Saddam Hussein for crimes against humanity, following a "Panamanian" strategy that would allow for extradiction to US courts.

choice between "peace without rights" or "rights without peace." The TRP might be the means to such an end, she declared, through small but concrete steps, as had been the case during the successful domestic battles for the legalization of divorce in the sixties and seventies. Lately, she added, she had not spent much time on the Gulf War; rather, as in the years of struggles for civil liberties, she and her collaborators had been gathering contact information of parliamentarians from across the globe as the basis for a new rights campaign. Its goal would be to form and empower a transnational lobby backing nonviolent means to ensure accountability for war criminals, including by challenging the national sovereignty which sheltered and fueled state crimes. A "monopoly of violence" in the form of a multinational army ought to be created as the armed branch of legitimate supranational entities, she continued. Only thus would violence retreat, inch by inch, around the globe. Also critical would be the shaming of Western Powers who supported dictators. Bonino invoked the mobilization of dozens of national parliaments coordinated by the TRP in collaboration with the New York-based INGO Parliamentarians for Global Action. The diffusion of multilingual blueprints for parliamentary motions on shared transnational objectives would facilitate the task.[86]

Meanwhile, on the domestic front, the Radicals sought with little success to regain their footing by reaching out to the non-Socialist left. Since 1987, building on a common hostility to

[86] Emma Bonino, "III Congresso Italiano del Partito Radicale," 13 February 1991, audioclip 1 and 2, OARR, http://www.radioradicale.it/scheda/38738?format=32; Emma Bonino had joined the INGO Parliamentarians for Global Action (PGA); for an example of a joint effort with PGA to support the Partial Test Ban Treaty, see "Nazioni Unite: inizia lunedì 7 gennaio The Partial Test Ban Treaty Amendment Conference, ossia un tentativo affinchè siano messi al bando tutti gli esperimenti nucleari ivi compresi quelli sotto terra," 6 Jan. 1991, electronic bulletin, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=157812&lang=IT&cms=; for more information on PGA, see http://www.pgaction.org/aboutus.aspx.

the Socialists, the PCI and the Radicals had intermittently found common ground.[87] In January 1990, Occhetto attended a Radical council meeting.[88] During the PCI/PDS XIXth congress, party members evoked the necessity to launch a "mass radical party."[89] But the dispersion of the Radical cohort, lamented in fall a former Communist, did not help in defining a shared platform.[90] In September, following an invitation issued to him to attend the annual *Festival dell'Unità*, Pannella's sudden and inopportune attack on the historical faults of Italian Communism offended his interlocutors. In a communiqué transmitted to an Italian press agency hours before his attendance, Pannella provocatively rehashed the old trope of the connections between the "crimes" of the Resistance at Via Rasella, the Stalinism of Togliatti, national liberation wars and the violence of the Red Brigades.[91] Such gestures called into question the sincerity of Radical overtures.

In a speech of February 1991, given during Craxi's brief attendance of a Radical congress, Pannella relaunched his old project of coalesce the left, now quipped a "democratic

[87] "Il Pr chiede a Occhetto un incontro di 'almeno due giorni'," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 22 Aug. 1990; Marco Pannella, "Vi racconto il Partito Radicale e vi chiedo di salvarlo," *l'Unità* (Rome), 10 Oct. 1990.

[88] Marco Pannella, interview by Ugo Magri, "Vi dico una cosa," *Epoca*, 13 Sept. 1990), OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=52026&lang=IT&cms=.

[89] Piero Ignazi, *Dal Pci al Pds* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1992), 132, 157.

[90] Gianfranco Spadaccia, interview by Roberto Iezzi, "Rapporti Pci-Pr, pacifismo, nonviolenza crisi nel Golfo Persico, polemiche tra gli Arcobaleno," 4 Sept. 1990, audioclip, OARR, http://www.radioradicale.it/scheda/36953/36987-rapporti-pci-pr-pacifismo-nonviolenza-crisi-nel-golfo-persico-polemiche-tra-gli-arcobaleno.

[91] Pannella's provocative statements were not inopportune from another perspective, however. As reported by journalist Ugo Magri, the ensuing polemics placed Pannella back in the center of the media's attention, as Pannella himself declared: "It had been twenty-one months that the *Corriere della Sera* did not dedicate a single title to me. Now I exist once more also for them", see Marco Pannella, "Vi dico una cosa," interview by Ugo Magri, *Epoca*, 13 Sept. 1990, OHRA. On this episode, see also Bruno Ugolini, "Pannella, sei un provocatore […] La Festa di Modena," *l'Unità* (Rome), 6 Sept. 1990; Marco Pannella, "Io Radicale per rilanciare il Pr e aiutare la Cosa," *l'Unità* (Rome), 5 Sept. 1990.

constituent." He accompanied renewed openings to the Socialists, however, with denunciation of the party system, an act ill-appreciated by the powerful Socialist boss. In parallel, contradictory stances continued to permeate relations with the PCI/PDS. Pannella stated that he looked forward to an "antiparty" coalition and would seek membership in the PDS; on the other hand he once again lambasted the former Communists for their pacifism and Stalinist pedigree.[92] Radicals were incensed by the PCI/PDS decision to forbid in new statutes membership in more than one party; the new PDS, they asserted, was a mere re-edition of its epigone.[93] Subsequent openings made by both sides proved fruitless. The pattern of fundamental incompatibility between the parties of the Communist, Socialist and Radical left held, despite global and domestic transformations.

Notwithstanding the rallying of Radicals to governmental foreign policy during the Gulf War, the standing of the rump party continued to decline as the tenth legislation drew to a close. The dispersal of party members and the disappointing results of the transnational experiment bore consequences. Nor did Radicals draw political dividends from the overwhelming approval by the citizenry of the abrogation of Chamber multipreference voting in June 1991 referendum. Rather, Mario Segni, a Catholic reformer in provenance from DC ranks emerged as the reformist antiparty hero of the hour. Borrowing language reminiscent of the Radicalism of the seventies,

---

[92] Stefano Bocconetti, "Il leader radicale present ail congress Pr guardando alla proposta Occhetto 'Costituente? Parta davvero.' Pannella: 'Vi concede ancora credito'," *l'Unità* (Rome), 13 Feb. 1991; Stefano di Michele, "Aperto ieri il congresso 'italiano' dei radicali. 'Il nostro obiettivo è la costituente democratica.' Pannella: 'Costruiamo la sinistra liberale.' […]", *l'Unità* (Rome), 15 Feb. 1991.

[93] Marco Pannella, " 'Unità', PDS: dove andate se del Pr vi dimenticate?", *l'Unità* (Rome), 12 Jan. 1991; "Il Pr non sarà presente al congresso del Pci: il testo della lettera inviata da Stanzani, Vigevano, Bonino, Pannella e Zevi all'Unità," 30 Jan. 1991, electronic bulletin, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=52126&lang=IT&cms=;Giorgio Battistini, "Il congresso che dice addio al Pci," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 31 Jan. 1991; Marco Pannella,"Achille, te lo sei voluto ma ora ti salverò," interview by Paolo Guzzanti, *La Stampa* (Turin), 6 Feb. 1991; Emma Bonino, "Rifiutare la militanza multipla significa solo avere paura della propria 'diversità'," *l'Unità* (Rome), 6 Mar. 1991.

L'Unità speculated on the emergence of a "transversal party" cutting across all political lines and supported by the 95.6 percent of the participating electorate that had voted for change in the referendum. The daily noted that not even the Radicals or Pannella had proven immune to the divisive effect of the referendum upon "professional politicians."[94] By mid-year, however, a new foreign policy crisis had erupted in Yugoslavia, providing new opportunities for Pannella to stem Radical decline by brandishing the cause of international justice.[95]

Our account of Radical engagement in Yugoslav affairs will focus on two developments. The first was the media-savvy action of Pannella and a few of his colleagues, who spent Christmas and New Year of 1991-92 in Croatian frontline trenches at Osijek, in Eastern Slavonia. The second was the more consequential effort spearheaded by Bonino from 1992 to promote courts for war crimes committed in Yugoslavia and elsewhere. As was the case during the first Gulf War, Radicals struggled to reconcile their nonviolence with their call to counter mounting war atrocities through armed intervention. They would ultimately find in the project to instate supranational justice courts a perfect match for their juridical brand of pacifism.

Weeks after the cease-fire proclaimed by President George H.W. Bush wound down the first Gulf War, international attention shifted to expected declarations of independence by

[94] Fabio Inwinkl, "Domani alle urne. Manifestazione all'Adriano di Roma. Segni: 'Attenti, quest'occasione non ritorna.' Appello di Occhetto. E Craxi non va in tv. Borgoglio (Psi): 'Astenersi non è un dovere.' Stretta finale per il referendum. De Mita ammette: 'Se vince il sì sarà uno stimolo'," *l'Unità* (Rome), 8 June 1991; Vittorio Ragone, "Ancora pochi voti. Lo storico socialista: 'In direzione l'avevo detto che non conveniva prendere di petto questo referendum.' Si apre una questione interna? Mancini: 'Vedremo.' Baget Bozzo: 'Tanta eccitazione per così poco.' Il giorno più amaro per il Psi. Craxi tace. Tamburrano: 'È stato un azzardo'," *l'Unità* (Rome), 10 June 1991; Fabio Inwinkl, "Stavolta è vittoria. Travolto l'astensionismo: ha votato il 62,5 percent. Per la prima volta i favorevoli sono la maggioranza assoluta dell'intero corpo elettorale. E dopo il quorum, una marea di sì. Il 95,6 percent chiede di cambiare, è stato un referendum-record," *l'Unità* (Rome), 11 June 1991; Bruno Ugolini, "Occhetto e Segni, gli industriali e i neocomunisti, cattolici e repubblicani: un'alleanza inedita: Durerà? E dale urne spuntò un nuovo 'partito trasversale'," *l'Unità* (Rome), 11 June 1991.

[95] Filippo Ceccarelli, "Pannella, un digiuno per rinascere," *La Stampa* (Turin), 14 Oct. 1991.

Croatia and Slovenia, feared to be harbingers of a Yugoslav breakup.[96] The Italian Senate convened on May 21, 1991 to review a number of interrogations on the subject submitted by parliamentarians. The Italian left split on the question of recognition. Radicals and their Senate allies argued that Yugoslav developments were not an internal matter to be relinquished to federal authorities in Belgrade; they petitioned the Italian government to clarify how it proposed to uphold through EEC institutions the right to self-determination of Slovenes and Croatians. Senators of the PDS on the other hand, in conformity with Italian official policy, emphasized the perils of disgregating interference and the importance of putting diplomacy to use to shore up Yugoslav unity. How could Italy help its "friend and neighbor" Yugoslavia deflect dangerous nationalisms, they asked?[97] A long history of amicable relations with Yugoslav officials furnished the party with ties.[98] After meeting with a high Yugoslav official, Napolitano, "shadow foreign minister" of the PDS, urged Italian and European authorities to work to avoid a breakup.[99] But the Yugoslav crisis worsened the next month. On June 25 Croatia and Slovenia proclaimed their independence. In response, the US and the Western European nations, excepting Austria and a recently unified Germany, voiced their opposition to separatism.[100]

---

[96] Mauro Montali and Giuseppe Muslin, "Un altro strappo in Jugoslavia: se ne va la Croazia," *l'Unità* (Rome), 20 May 1991.

[97] Lorenzo Strik Lievers, Franco Corleone, Mariotti, Massimo Boato, Domenico Modugno (*Gruppo Federalista Europeo Ecologico*), "Interrogazione 3-01499, " and Boffa, Tedesco Tatò, Bufalini, Pieralli, Margheri (PDS), "Interrogazione 3-01500," 21 May 1991, *Senato della Repubblica, X legislatura, 522. Seduta pubblica, Resoconto stenografico, Martedì 21 maggio 1991*, 54-5, http://www.senato.it/service/PDF/PDFServer/BGT/318130.pdf.

[98] For example, se "Il discorso del rappresentante della Lega dei comunisti. Vlahovic: importante il contributo del PCI allo sviluppo delle relazioni fra Italia e Jugoslavia," *l'Unità* (Rome), 25 Jan. 1971.

[99] "Napolitano: Italia e Cee scongiurino la disgregazione," *l'Unità* (Rome), 22 May 1991.

[100] Giuseppe Muslin, "Le due Repubbliche proclamano l'indipendenza. Il parlamento federale si appella all'esercito. Allarme e preoccupazione in Europa. Anche gli Stati Uniti contrari alle secessioni. Jugoslavia a pezzi. Croazia e Slovenia lasciano Belgrado. È proprio finita. Slovenia e Croazia hanno sancito la disgregazione della Jugoslavia. I

The Radicals reiterated their criticism of prevailing Italian, European, and American policies. They urged the immediate recognition of the two republics, dismissing common objections to their independence. Writing from Ljubljana, the Slovenian capital, days after Yugoslav tanks rolled into the republic, Pannella argued that withholding recognition would actually worsen violence and provide a cover for the "authoritarian chauvinism of Serbia" and the acts of the "paleocommunists of Belgrade." To the contrary, he held, expeditious international recognition would dampen Serbian aggressivity. Further, the two republics, he pointed out, had requested independence within a new confederal Yugoslavia and in the context of eventual accession to the CEE.[101] Around the same time, Napolitano, in harmony with the governing majority, reiterated his recommendation to pursue dialogue with Belgrade and to avoid rash action.[102]

A few days later, during a Chamber debate held on July 3, after the Yugoslav National Army violently intervened in Slovenia, both the Italian government and the PDS began to alter their positions.[103] Cicciomessere seized the opportunity to attack Foreign Minister De Michelis. The Radical denounced his statement made in the aftermath of the Croatian and Slovenian

---

due parlamenti hanno posto fine a un'unione durata oltre 46 anni. A Belgrado l'assemblea federale esorta l'armata a intervenire a tutela dell'unità della Jugoslavia. Allarme, preoccupazione e dissociazione in Europa. Gli Stati Uniti non riconosceranno l'indipendenza delle due repubbliche," *l'Unità* (Rome), 26 June 1991; David Binder, "US Deplores Moves," *New York Times*, 26 June 1991; Alan Riding, "Europeans Warn on Yugoslav Split," *New York Times*, 26 June 1991.

[101] " Gianni de Michelis: 'L'Italia non accetta queste secessioni," *l'Unità* (Rome), 27 June 1991; Marco Pannella, "Pannella su Jugoslavia: perchè subito riconoscere le due repubbliche e sostenere la loro politica, europeistica e antistalinista," 27 June 1991, electronic bulletin, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=158175&lang=IT&cms=; Marco Pannella, "Da Lubiana Marco Pannella. Communicato-stampa," 30 June 1991, press communiqué, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=114822&lang=IT&cms=.

[102] "Roma: 'non usate la forza'," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 28 June 1991.

[103] Paolo Garimberti, "Il golpe rosso," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 3 July 1991; "L'Italia cambia linea 'Sì all'indipendenza se l'esercito attacca," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 4 July 1991.

declarations of independence, to the effect that Italy would never recognize the two countries; such a pronouncement had provided a "blank check in favor of the Serbian military." In response, De Michelis defended the actions of the government, denying claims that it had opposed the independence of the two countries; a middle road, he argued, was needed to preserve the country from violence. Flaminio Piccoli (DC) criticized Yugoslav federal authorities, calling for their recognition of the independence of the two republics within a framework of confederation and EEC institutions. Antonio Rubbi, a PDS foreign policy expert, marked in his speech a shift of his party to prudent support for autonomy within a confederal structure. He also demanded greater clarity in Italian foreign policy, berating the "oscillations" of De Michelis. His speech, however, moderated criticism of Yugoslav Federal authorities.[104]

By fall, the situation in Yugoslavia had further deteriorated; however, instead of accelerating official recognition, extreme violence dampened European will. The Radicals, who had long been attentive to Yugoslav developments, continued to cultivate their contacts with the Slovenian and Croatian opposition; high ranking officials of both breakaway republics joined the Transnational Radical Party.[105] Pannella maintained in an article that Italian neutrality was a

[104] Gianni De Michelis (Minister of Foreign Affairs, PSI), Flaminio Piccoli (DC), Antonio Rubbi (PDS) and Roberto Cicciomessere, 3 July 1991, *Atti Parlamentari, Camera dei Deputati, X legislatura, Discussioni, Seduta del 3 luglio 1991, Resoconto stenografico*, 85059-80, http://legislature.camera.it/_dati/leg10/lavori/stenografici/sed0652/sed0652.pdf.

[105] Pannella's interest in Italy's neighbor went back to the immediate postwar period and to the controversies over Trieste. More recently, as Eurodeputy, he had often clamored for what then appeared as the utopian idea of Yugoslav accession to the EEC, sole solution, he believed, to the country's acute economic crisis of the eighties. After the transnational project was underway in 1987, Italian and Yugoslav Radicals helped organize demonstrations both within and outside Yugoslavia clamoring for the country's EEC accession. In spring of 1989, the Radicals chose Budapest as the locale of the congress launching their transnational project, but only after Yugoslav authorities had earlier rejected their request to hold it in Zagreb. While Yugoslav authorities had first not objected to Radical plans, a veto soon emerged. Belgrade rejected the Radical proposal for Yugoslav accession to the EEC, dismissing the support expressed by the Slovenian and Croatian sections of the League of Yugoslav Communists. But Radical engagement with the Yugoslav question continued, particularly through dialogue with the Slovenian and Croatian oppositions and through resolutions presented before the Strasbourg Parliament. The Radicals sought to balance their support for the growing demands for independence of Slovenians and Croatians with expressions of

repulsive echo of EEC equidistance with respect to both the Yugoslav tragedy and the recent coup against Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. Rather, Pannella argued, Italy should follow the example of Denmark, a country which had demonstrated leadership through its early recognition of the Baltic Soviet Republics.[106]

During a September 20 Senate hearing, De Michelis denied the intent to preserve the status quo in Yugoslavia. The goal of Italy and the EEC was rather not to precipitate a civil war through premature recognition; a PDS senator concurred, criticizing German and Austrian pressure to recognize the two republics. Europe, he argued, needed to stay out of a civil war in which culprits were on all sides.[107] In a Chamber hearing held a couple of weeks later, a Radical

---

concern over the groundswell of nationalism sweeping through the federal country. The lion's share of Yugoslav adherents to the Radical transnational organization appeared to be denizens of the Slovenia and Croatia, reflecting historic ties and fueling Belgrade's suspicion that the Radical INGO favored separatism. Marco Pannella, "Jugoslavia. Discussioni del Parlamento europeo," 8 Mar. 1983, speech dated, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=48156&lang=IT&cms= ; Gianfranco Dell'Alba, "5 anni a Strasburgo," *Notizie Radicali*, 24 Mar. 1984), OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=16102&lang=IT&cms= ; Marco Pannella, "Iugoslavia. Intervento di Marco Pannella al Parlamento europeo," 19 Jan. 1988, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=49624&lang=IT&cms=; Marco Pannella, "Alla ricerca del dialogo," transcript of television interview, *Notizie Radicali*, 30 Nov. 1988, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=50171&lang=IT&cms= ; "Jugoslavia: precisazioni della segreteria PR sulla manifestazione al confine italo-jugoslavo," 6 Oct. 1988, electronic bulletin, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=155193&lang=IT&cms= ; "Cee-Jugoslavia: consiglio di cooperazione Cee-Jugoslavia: la Jugoslavia non chiedera' l'adesione. Dichiarazione di Giovanni Negri," 20 Dec. 1988, electronic bulletin, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=155372&lang=IT&cms= ; Marco Pannella,"L'ampliamento della communità. Intervento di Marco Pannella al Parlamento Europeo," 18 Jan. 1989, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=50400&lang=IT&cms=; Sergio Stanzani, "Nazionalismo e democrazia," *Vjesnik* (Zagreb), daily of the Croatian League of Yugoslav Communists, article translated into Italian from the Serbo-Croatian, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=51704&lang=IT&cms=; "Consiglio federale Pr: si iscrive il vice premier del governo croato," 23 Sept. 1991, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=114940&lang=IT&cms=; Olivier Dupuis, "Ex Jugoslavia: cronaca di un impegno. Il Partito radicale, la Jugoslavia e la ex-Jugoslavia," July 1993, electronic bulletin, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=16755&lang=IT&cms=.

[106] Marco Pannella, "Le ragioni dei popoli, l'egoismo dei dodici," *Il Giorno* (Milan), 28 Sept. 1991.

[107] Strik Lievers, Corleone, Boato, Modugno (Gruppo Federalista Europeo Ecologico), De Michelis (Minister of Foreign Affairs, PSI), Marco Boato (Gruppo Federalista Europeo Ecologico) , Boffa (Communisti-PDS), Pollice (Misto-Federazione Verdi), 20 Sept. 1991, *Senato della Repubblica, X Legislatura, 569. Seduta Pubblica, Resoconto Stenografico, Venerdì 20 settembre 1991*, 9-62, http://www.senato.it/service/PDF/PDFServer/BGT/318181.pdf; Giuseppe F. Mennella, "De Michelis: 'L'unica via è diplomatica'. Il Ministro degli Esteri interviene al Senato. Soddisfazione del Pds per la linea del governo," *l'Unità* (Rome), 21 Sept… 1991.

retorted that the war in act was not a civil one, but consisted rather of the aggression of one state against others. An ally of the Radicals denounced the continued inaction of De Michelis, contrasting it with Pannella's ongoing hunger strike.[108] He argued that the passivity of the government and of the EEC, even as Mig warplanes bombed the Croatian presidential palace in Zagreb, was equivalent to complicity with Serbian aggression.[109] Two days later, in Strasbourg, Eurodeputy Pannella vigorously seconded the efforts of his colleagues in the Italian Parliament: "One cannot continue to claim one is neutral, when the Commission and Council establish a blockade against Yugoslavia. Shame on you! That blockade might have had a meaning. Shame on you! You have created ceasefires which have deliberately and culpably given time to the army of coups-d'états, not the [so called] federal army, to occupy fifty percent of Croatia."[110]

As violence mounted in Yugoslavia, the question of military intervention arose. The US made clear its disinterest in intervening in the conflict.[111] There was talk of a European force of interposition, one perhaps coordinated by an embryonic army, the European Western Union. But the proposal was stillborn, due to the conflicting loyalties to Croatia and Serbia respectively of the two major continental powers, Germany and France, and divisions over the question of

---

[108] Ceccarelli, "Pannella, un digiuno per rinascere," *La Stampa*, 14 October 1991.

[109] Roberto Cicciomessere, Giuseppe Calderisi (Gruppo Federalista Europeo), René Andreani (Verdi), "Sulla situazione in Jugoslavia," 8 Oct.1991, *Atti Parlamentari, Camera dei Deputati, X legislatura, Discussioni, Seduta di martedì 8 ottobre 1991, Resoconto stenografico,* , 87658-63, http://legislature.camera.it/_dati/leg10/lavori/stenografici/sed0688/sed0688.pdf.

[110] Marco Pannella, "Intervento di Marco Pannella nel corso del dibattito sulla situazione in Iugoslavia che si e' svolto al Parlamento europeo il 10 ottobre 1991," 11 Oct. 1991, electronic bulletin, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=114954&lang=IT&cms=.

[111] Misha Glenny, *The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War* (New York: Penguin Books, 1993), 222.

intervention among policymakers. Recourse to NATO or the UN remained the sole remaining options, baring European political and military impotence.[112]

The debate in the press over Western response to the war included commentary on the passivity of pacifists before the Serbian onslaught. Once again, the credibility of pacifism was in question.[113] Presently, the Vatican nuanced positions staked during the Gulf War, signaling a possible erosion of its non-interventionist and pacifist stances. While the pope continued to rhetorically exalt peace, he received at the Vatican Franjo Tudjman on October 4.[114] By December, the Church had abandoned its policy of non-recognition, recently applied to the case of Catholic Lithuania in 1990.[115] The shift reflected historic ties to the two Adriatic Catholic peoples and, not least, the declining influence of Moscow in European affairs.

Even while holding firm to their interventionist stances, Radicals sought to conciliate their nonviolent credo with interventionism. During a European Parliament debate Pannella stated that he would fight in Croatia and Slovenia were he not dedicated to nonviolence and were

---

[112] Giuseppe Muslin, "In Jugoslavia oggi si spera. L'Europa invia le truppe?", *l'Unità* (Rome), 19 Sept. 1991; Silvio Trevisani "Oggi l'Europe decide sulla forza di pace Lord Carrington: 'Più utili gli osservatori'", *l'Unità* (Rome), 19 Sept. 1991; Paolo Soldini, "Mitterrand e Kohl a consulto sulla guerra 'È necessario un arbitraggio internazionale' Visita del presidente francese a Bonn, nessun accenno alla 'forza di interdizione' Ueo," *l'Unità* (Rome), 19 Sept. 1991; Franco Papitto, "L'invio dei soldati divide l'Europa," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 19 Sept. 1991; Leopoldo Fabiani, " 'Perchè rischiare la vita di soldati europei?', *La Repubblica* (Rome), 20 Sept. 1991; Gianni Baget Bozzo, " Morire per Zagabria? Sì, ne vale la pena," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 22 Sept. 1991; Arturo Zampaglione, "De Michelis: riformare l'Onu," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 28 Sept. 1991.

[113] Eugenio Scalfari, "È guerra alle porte d'Italia," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 15 Sept. 1991; Miriam Mafai, "Serbi o croati per me pari sono…", *La Repubblica* (Rome), 24 Sept. 1991.

[114] Leopoldo Fabiani, "E De Michelis attacca il Papa 'filo-croati'," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 25 Sept. 1991; "Papa Wojtyla: 'fermate questa guerra'," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 4 Oct. 1991; Alceste Santini, "Il Papa a Tudjman: 'La pace inanzitutto.' Civiltà Cattolica critica il nazionalismo […]," l'Unità (Rome), 4 Oct. 1991.

[115] Alceste Santini, "La Santa Sede prende atto con soddisfazione della decisione dei Dodici. Il Vaticano segue l'Europa. 'Riconosceremo le repubbliche'," *l'Unità* (Rome), 21 Dec. 1991.

it not for the fact he did not believe in the efficacy of weapons.[116] Two weeks later, in an interview published in a Slovenian newspaper, he responded to an interviewer who argued that if Slovenia had not had some sort of army, "all would have been lost." Pannella disagreed, arguing that had Slovenia opted to disarm "unilaterally and renounce having an army, it might have become a legend […] I am not a pacifist; nonviolence must be organized as a force in order to succeed in its fight against violence."[117] One month later, in an apparent contradiction which possibly reflected escalating violence in eastern Slavonia, Pannella declared that he was "armed with nonviolence, fights with hunger strikes" but were he a denizen of "Vukovar, he would fight with a machine gun."[118]

Radical action soon took the form of the symbolic enrollment of Pannella and a handful of colleagues as "soldiers" on the eastern Slavonian front at Osijek.[119] The Radical move, noted approvingly one journalist, contrasted with the stony silence of Italian pacifists.[120] In November, Serb artillery had bombed to smitherings the neighboring Slavonian town of Vukovar, eliciting international shock and outrage.[121] In a letter sent to allied pacifist and ecological political groups in various Yugoslav republics, including Serbia, Emma Bonino and Sergio Stanzani

---

[116] Marco Pannella,"Una comunita' europea erede di Chamberlain e Daladier," 7 Oct. 1991, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=16434&lang=IT&cms=.

[117] Marco Pannella, "Con la nonviolenza contro la violenza," *Delo* (Ljubljana), 21 Oct. 1991, translated from the Slovenian into Italian, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=52716&lang=IT&cms=.

[118] Marco Pannella, interview by Silvije Tomasevic, "Tutti a Maastricht!", *Slobodna Dalmacija* (Dubrovnik), 30 Nov. 1991, translated from the Serbo-Croatian into Italian, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=52799&lang=IT&cms=.

[119] Pierangelo Sapegno, "La tragedia della Croazia. Brindisi in trincea sotto i tiri dei becchini serbi. Capodanno sul fronte di Osijek. Una granata apre uno squarcio nel tetto della cattedrale. In divisa da croato Pannella visita i soldati schierati in prima linea," *La Stampa* (Turin), 2 Jan. 1992.

[120] Enzo Bettiza, "Pacifisti dove siete?", *La Stampa* (Turin), 8 Jan. 1992.

[121] Leonardo Cohen, "Vukovar cade e teme un massacro," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 19 Nov. 1991.

explained that the Radical expedition was directly inspired by Gandhi's 1906 voluntary enrolment as a military medic. The Radical intent was to signal the rejection of neutrality and to take sides, not against the Serbian people, but against militarism and injustice. "The enemy, as is often the case, is behind you, not in the frontline," declared Bonino.[122] Radicals portrayed the conflict in Yugoslavia as a re-edition of the Spanish Civil War of 1936-39. The pacifism that accompanied non-engagement and neutralism, the democracies which refused involvement, were accomplices of dictators, just as in the prewar period, they claimed.[123] Extending the historical parallel to the Cold War period, Pannella argued that Western non-interference in the name of a cynical Realpolitik had had then as "precious allies […] certain types of 'pacifists,' those of 'Picasso's dove', the so-called Partisans of Peace, but also the 'antinuclear' types of the Cold War, who just like their predecessors took equidistant positions between democracies and dictatorships […] [unlike] the nonviolent pacifists who, on the contrary, engage in the struggle for the political freedom of peoples and of individuals, even as the tactic of dictators is that of presenting a peaceful visage in the international arena in order to better oppress and destroy the liberty of their own."[124]

The Radical symbolic act at Osijek was problematic on one account. The nationalistic rhetoric of the Croatian president and the numerous atrocities committed by his military raise questions about how judicious the media stunt was. Arguably, Radical actions in the winter of

[122] Emma Bonino and Sergio Stanzani, "L'azione nonviolenta a Osijek," Dec. 1991, open letter, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=52811&lang=IT&cms=.

[123] Pierangelo Sapegno, "Il pacifista ha messo la divisa," *La Stampa* (Turin), 10 Jan. 1992.

[124] Marco Pannella, "Gli occidentali della 'democrazia reale'," *Vjesnik* (Zagreb), 26 Dec. 1991, translated from the Serbo-Croation into Italian, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=52829&lang=IT&cms=; Marco Pannella, "Premesse, riflessioni, ragione sparse, (anche) per l'azione diretta nonviolenta' in Croazia. A futura memoria," 26 Dec.1991, electronic bulletin, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=52825&lang=IT&cms=.

1991 are best situated in their immediate context; at the time, Croatia was perceived in the West as victim of aggression, not a perpetrator.[125] To be sure, the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina that emerged the following year would provide a clearer dichotomy between butchers and their victims, making the case for intervention more tenable in the eyes of public opinion and of posterity, though certain Muslim Bosnian military leaders would later be found to have been implicated in war crimes.

Radicals accompanied their mission to Osijek with appeals to the Serbs and the insistence that even though they would voluntarily don the garb of the Croatian military, their gesture did not signal the abandonment of antimilitarism nor opposition to violence: "we will not be armed but we still intend to demonstrate how much we support the Croatian people, as well as those movements and groups that have chosen peace and nonviolence in the former Yugoslavia, including those that certainly exist in Belgrade."[126] Present at Osijek over New Year's Eve were Italian and Strasbourg parliamentarians Pannella, Cicciomessere, Alessandro Tessari, Lorenzo Strik-Lievers and various other party members, one of whom emulated Gandhi by serving as a nurse at a hospital which was the frequent target of Serbian artillery.[127] While in Osijek, the Radicals attempted to mobilize Italian policymakers; they pleaded with the President of the

[125] Leopoldo Fabiani, "L'Italia cambia linea 'Sì all'indipendenza se l'esercito attacca," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 4 July 1991; Gianni Baget Bozzo, "Morire per Zagabria? Sì, ne vale la pena," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 22 Sept. 1991; "Pannella sul fronte croato. 'Brigate nonviolente.' Il leader radicale in missione 'non armata'," *l'Unità* (Rome), 30 Dec. 1991.

[126] "Rassegna stampa croata degli ultimi tre giorni," 31 Dec. 1991, electronic bulletin, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=158515&lang=IT&cms=; see also Marco Pannella, "Appello ai serbi," 29 Dec. 1991, electronic bulletin, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=52833&lang=IT&cms=.

[127] "Comunicato stampa e dichiarazione di Marco Pannella […]," 31 Dec. 1991, electronic bulletin, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=158514&lang=IT&cms=.

Chamber of Deputies, Nilde Iotti (PDS) and of the Senate, Giovanni Spadolini (PRI) to send a high-level group of parliamentarians to Osijek.[128]

The image of Pannella in military fatigues at Osijek contrasts suggestively with photographs taken of him during the Easter peace marches of the eighties, his handsome face gaunt from hunger strikes, whitened mane and tall frame in flowing garments, hands grasping palm leaves. Still, the visual contrast should not obscure a lingering Radical reluctance to endorse the resort to force. Even as the Radicals "deployed" on the Slavonian front, they insisted that theirs was a disarmed and nonviolent mission. [129]

On January 15, 1992 Brussels officially recognized the independence of Croatia and Slovenia, preceded two days earlier by the Vatican.[130] Like the Vatican, Germany or Austria had also sought early recognition on account of historical ties. The relatively bloodless dissolution of the Soviet Union had attenuated fears of a generalized conflict; Russian power receded, empowering other geopolitical or humanitarian considerations, which however failed to produce decisive Western military action. As the military effort of the Serbs shifted to Bosnia-Herzegovina, a contingent of UN troops deployed to Sarajevo, proving however powerless to

[128] "Jugoslavia. Parlamentari radicali ad Osijek scrivono a Iotti e Spadolini," 2 Jan. 1992, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=158517&lang=IT&cms=; Emma Bonino, Marco Pannella, Sergio Stanzani and Paolo Vigevano, "Lettera ai parlamentari," Jan. 1992, open letter, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=52837&lang=IT&cms=.

[129] "Contro tutti gli eserciti," *Il Partito Nuovo*, 17 Feb. 1992, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=52930&lang=IT&cms=; see the image of Pannella in military fatiguesat http://digilander.libero.it/lajugoslaviavivra/hr.html.

[130] Domenico del Rio, "Il Vaticano anticipa l'Europa e riconosce Croazia e Slovenia," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 14 Jan. 1992; Pietro Veronese, "Zagrabia perderà i territori occupati," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 17 Jan. 1991; Angelo Panebianco, "Iraq no, Kosovo sì. I due pesi di Wojtyla. Chiesa, sinistra e uso delle armi," *Corriere della Sera* (Milan), 8 Feb. 1999; Angelo Panebianco, "La frattura religiosa," *Corriere della Sera* (Milan), 29 Mar. 2003.

stop ethnic Serbs' attacks.[131] The long siege of Sarajevo and of Bosnia-Herzegovina began, forging a Western consensus that Milosevic and his Bosnian henchmen were the principal culprits for the war.[132]

In parallel, an unprecedented discredit of Italian pacifism emerged, one facilitated by new Vatican interventionism.[133] The crisis of pacifism was in evidence as early as 1992. That year, in the wake of a timid UN response to Serb forces, Pannella sarcastically predicted a revival of Cold War pacifism, should the "Amerikans", seconded by the UN and perhaps the Italian state, punish the aggressors.[134] Gianluigi Melega, a journalist and former Radical parliamentarian, predicted: "as soon as the Americans make a move to try to stop the massacres, dormant pacifists will awaken instantly."[135] Walter Veltroni, a PDS leader newly appointed director of the party's struggling daily, lamented the deafening silence of the Italian peace movement before the crimes committed across the Adriatic. In contrast to the days of the Gulf War, he wrote in an editorial, there were "no solemn processions, no appeals by intellectuals, no solidarity concerts […] Pannella has done a lot, one has to recognize. But as for the rest? […] War is in Europe, in the heart of the Old Continent, thousands lie dead. But nobody is to be seen on the squares of

[131] "Bosnia verso la guerra. Assedio serbo a Sarajevo," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 4 Mar. 1992; Piero Benetazzo, "Sarajevo, una sfida per l'Onu," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 14 Mar. 1992.

[132] Dino Frescobaldi, "L'imbroglio jugoslavo," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 29 Apr. 1992.

[133] Angelo Panebianco, "Iraq no, Kosovo sì. I due pesi di Wojtyla. Chiesa, sinistra e uso delle armi," *Corriere della Sera* (Milan), 8 Feb. 1999.

[134] Luciana di Mauro, "Finalmente l'ONU ha punito l'aggressore. Noi l'avevamo chiesto da tempo," *L'Unità* (Rome), 3 June 1992.

[135] Gianluigi Melega, "Jugoslavia: dov'è il pacifismo?" *L'Espresso*, 14 June 1992, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=115846&lang=IT&cms=.

Italy."[136] The dependable pacifist Pietro Ingrao responded the next day somewhat defensively, admitting pacifist passivity, but improbably laying some of the blame on *l'Unità* for spotty coverage of the movement and on the Gulf War for rehabilitating the instrument of war.[137] Another commentator berated pacifists for not questioning the universality of their credo, given its disregard for human rights. He concluded: "[…] if ugly Yugoslav events have cast shadows on the real universalism of pacifism, they also raise a crucial question: what rapport can there be between the general aspiration for peace […] and the pacifist precondition to act always and only with nonviolent methods […] Particularly when confronted with ethnic and civil wars, should not pacifism recognize its limits […] and avoid delegitimizing policies […] intended to stop aggressions?"[138]

In seeking an explanation for the silence of the peace movement, commentators speculated on the role of anti-Americanism. Since the enemy was not American, little excitement had ensued, opined one journalist.[139] "Let us imagine for a moment" wrote leftist intellectual Miriam Mafai, "that those 'dead for bread' of Sarajevo, the poor, bloodied martyred remains of old women and children, had been the victims of an American bombing. The next day we would probably have had near spontaneously mass protests across Italy, in schools and factories." The silence of the peace movement was no surprise, she argued, given that the Italian

[136] Walter Veltroni, "Movimento per la pace, dove sei finito?" *l'Unità* (Rome), 1 June 1992; see also the following article, praising Pannella as one of a few politicians keeping the national focus on events in Yugoslavia: Marco Pannella, interview by Luciana Di Mauro, "Finalmente l'Onu ha punito l'aggressore. Noi l'avevamo chiesto da tempo," *l'Unità* (Rome), 3 June 1992.

[137] Pietro Ingrao, "L'Unità e i pacifisti," *l'Unità* (Rome), 2 June 1992; "Serbia 'guerra' fra Pds e pacifisti. Veltroni, dove siete?" *La Stampa* (Milan), 3 June 1992.

[138] Furio Ceruti, "La 'guerra balcanica'," *l'Unità* (Rome), 3 June 1992.

[139] Enzo Bettiza, "Silenzio per la Bosnia. Pacifisti vedovi d'Amerika," *La Stampa* (Milan), 5 June 1992.

pacifist movement was historically rooted in anti-Americanism, anticapitalism and Third-Worldism. Further, she added, the public was bewildered before a "reality far more complex than any of us could have ever imagined."[140] Pacifist indifference, argued a political scientist, pointed to latent antidemocratic sentiments in Italy.[141]

Papal stances buttressed the growing respectability of interventionism among pacifists and antimilitarists. In 1991 shared Catholicism had driven papal pressure for early recognition of Slovenia and Croatia; presently, that of maintaining dialogue with the Islamic world drove the call for intervention in Bosnia, alongside humanitarian concerns. The resurgence of the doctrine of just war was linked to contingent events and to the Vatican's evolving appraisal of its interests; it did not constitute a definitive jettisoning of traditional pacifism, which might once again be brandished in altered circumstances.[142]

On the other hand, in the midts of the mounting denigration of pacifism, one theologian critical of the novel appeal of military interventionism commented sarcastically: "In my not so brief life I can say that I have only seen fought always and only wars of liberation, disinterested wars conducted with the exclusive goal of benefiting humanity. The last one, that of the Gulf, we have with more affectation than the others proclaimed "a war", but, properly speaking, it should rather be termed "a peace." Even bombs have become intelligent […] the very word 'war' has been replaced, as had predicted Carl Schmitt in the fifties, by the expression

---

[140] Miriam Mafai, "Silenzio sulla Bosnia," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 9 June 1992. The puzzled response top contemporary events is illustrated by the article by Alberto Jacoviello "Poliziotti del mondo?" *La Repubblica* (Rome), 12 July 1992.

[141] Angelo Panebianco, "Pacifisti giù la maschera," *Corriere della Sera* (Milan), 11 Nov. 1992.

[142] Angelo Panebianco, "La guerra del Papa," *Corriere della Sera* (Milan), 15 August 1992; Angelo Panebianco, "Iraq no, Kosovo sì. I due pesi di Wojtyla. Chiesa, sinistra e uso delle armi," *Corriere della Sera* (Milan), 8 Feb. 1999.

"international policing operation." […] What in my day was the "Ministry of War" is in fact now known as the "Ministry of Defense", but times are ripe for it to finally assume the denomination of "Ministry of Peace." Bellicose acts have in reality become peace operations: the clearing of corridors to bring help to civilians […] All that's left for us to do is to try to change in name the word "violence," and to alter the purpose of armies."[143] In more ways than not, though not cast in a positive light, such views correctly anticipated the altered conceptualization of peace and war in the post-Cold War world.[144]

In late fall 1992, polemics flared between Bonino and Chiara Ingrao, PDS Chamber deputy and daughter of Pietro Ingrao. In response to the refugee crisis in Bosnia, Chiara Ingrao, in collaboration with the Association for Peace, had issued a public call to all Italians to make available their second homes to Bosnian refugees. Responding in an open letter, Bonino dismissed the initiative as demagogic and ineffective. She asked, "what use are armies, including ours, if no one is willing to employ them to stop massacres such as those in Yugoslavia? It is as if we employed police to contemplate passively all sorts of street crimes. The Association for Peace has so protested the risks of military adventurism abroad that it does not realize that in the entire West politicians and the military are all too reluctant to use force in the only instance in which it is justified: to enforce rights. […] This is what should be demanded,

[143] Sergio Quinzio, "Cambiar nome alla violenza. Guerra e violenza, giustificazione nella storia," *Corriere della Sera* (Milan), 18 Aug. 1992.

[144] Mary Kaldor, *Human Security: Reflections on Globalization and Intervention* (Malden, MA.: Policy Press, 2007); Mary Kaldor, *New & Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era* (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2006); Martin Shaw, *The New Western Way of War: Risk-transfer War and Its Crisis in Iraq* (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2005); Martin Shaw, *War & Genocide* (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2003).

immediately."[145] In December, Bonino clashed again with Chiara Ingrao over the governmental proposal to send an Italian humanitarian contingent in a mission to Somalia authorized by the UN and led by the US. In the Chamber, the majority resolution was supported by the Radicals, though past Italian foreign policy came in for customary criticism. The PDS voted to abstain, requesting that any military participation be conducted under the exclusive mandate of the UN. Bonino protested the lingering strains of PDS neutralism: "since the end of the Cold War, I cannot bear any longer dogmatic anti-Americanism. If one does not accept the culture of active nonviolence, at day's end military intervention becomes indispensable if one is to protect rights […] If the USA act like the cops of the world it is because others do not come forth."[146]

But before turning to Bonino's campaign to institute courts for war crimes, it is necessary to provide some background on the momentous transformations undergone by the Italian political system over the course of the two eventful years which marked the eleventh legislation (1992-94). As was noted in the previous chapter, in early 1992 politicians and pundits expected Italian politics to continue much as before. Craxi, for example, confidently looked forward to the presidency or to a renewed term as premier. While a bribery scandal broke out in Milan in February 1992, involving the arrest of a Socialist politician caught on tape accepting a routine

[145] Maria Grazia Bruzzone, "Una proposta umanitaria suscita polemiche," *La Stampa* (Turin), 8 Nov. 1992; Maria Grazia Bruzzone, Emma Bonino and Chiara Ingrao, "Lettera aperta di Emma Bonino a Chiara Ingrao […]," 8 Nov. 1992, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=53724&lang=IT&cms=; Gian Carlo Walch, "Emma Bonino: Cara Chiara, io non ci stò," *Il Giorno* (Milan), 12 Nov. 1992.

[146] Maria Grazia Bruzzone, "Yankee go home? Io dico: bravi Emma Bonino contro Chiara Ingrao e i neutralisti," *La Stampa* (Turin), 9 Dec. 1992; Emma Bonino and Massimo D'Alema, "Communicazione del Governo sull'invio di forze armate italiane in Somalia," 10 Dec. 1992, *Atti Parlamentari, Camera dei Deputati, XI legislature, Discussioni, Seduta di giovedi 10 dicembre 1992, Resoconto stenografico*, 7803-17, http://legislature.camera.it/_dati/leg11/lavori/Stenografici/Stenografico/33726.pdf#page=50&zoom=95,0,70.

kickback, it was not immediately perceived as an earth-shattering event.[147] Such events were relatively common and had been a recurring feature of Italian politics. In the eighties, other scandals had besmirched the PSI and the parties of governing coalitions, to little effect, on account of voters' support for a newfound stability but also due to the political intimidation of magistrates.[148] Sole major sequel of the periodic revelations of the malfeasances of Socialists and other members of the governing class was a creeping discredit of the ruling parties, mediated in part by the Radicals, but also, after 1979, by the far right MSI-DN and the PCI.[149] In March 1992, much as he had years earlier, Craxi dismissed revelations of Socialist corruption as the workings of mere rogue operators.[150]

The outcomes of the general elections of April 1992, though, managed to send a jolt through the spine of the political system. The DC experienced a dramatic decline, reaping for the first time just under thirty percent of the vote. The PSI declined for the first time in years, to 13.6 percent; it was however all told a relatively modest retreat, conceivably signaling the party's imperviousness to scandal. The PDS suffered from its 1990 scission, garnering only 16.6 percent; Cossutta's breakaway did well, drawing 5.6 percent of the vote and signaling the continued appeal of maximalist far left stances. Most significantly, the separatist and xenophobic protest party, the Northern League of Umberto Bossi, scored 8.7 percent of the

[147] The name of this minor politician was Mario Chiesa, see Paul Ginsborg, *Italy and Its Discontents: Family, Society, State: 1980-2001* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 254.

[148] Simona Colarizi, *Storia politica della Repubblica: Partiti, movimenti e istituzioni. 1943-2006* (Bari: Laterza, 2007), 159; Simona Colarizi and Marco Gervasoni, *La cruna dell'ago: Craxi, il partito socialista e la crisi della Repubblica* (Rome-Bari; Laterza: 2005), 186.

[149] For the populist turn of the neofascists of MSI-DN, which coincided with the attenuation of their anticommunism and a tentative and incomplete revisionism of their Fascist pedigree, see Piero Ignazi, *Il polo escluso: Profilo storico del Movimento Sociale Italiano* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1998), 197-218.

[150] Ginsborg, *Italy and Its Discontents*, 254.

national vote, reaping astonishing percentages of up to 25.1 in northern regions. The press proclaimed electoral outcomes a parting of the waters, though what was portended for the future remained unclear.[151] Observers noted the large number of voter abstentions, a seeming product of the political disillusionment of the electorate.[152]

In the run-up to the general elections, Pannella had hurriedly recomposed a political formation named after him, the *Lista Pannella*. His electoral campaign touched on a potpourri of familiar and new themes; it was summarized by one paper as "Pannella against everyone," though the Radical leader also casually remarked "that he would not disdain the position of foreign minister."[153] A journalist commented that his favorite term of opprobium, the partitocracy, was now widely in use.[154] Sole political figure spared by Pannella's blanket condemnations was Oscar Luigi Scalfaro, a respected Christian Democratic outsider; Pannella favored his candidacy for the presidency over that of a member of the CAF trio (Craxi, Andreotti, and Forlani).[155] Pannella's ad hoc formation obtained only 1.24 percent of the vote and 7 deputies in the Chamber, less than that obtained by an influential new anti-mafia formation, former Palermo mayor Leoluca Orlando's *La Rete.*[156] It was also less than the 1.5

---

[151] Alberto Rapisarda, "Battuto il Quadripartito, trionfa la Lega, crollano dc e pds. Elezioni, un terremoto. Lieve erosione per il psi, crescono repubblicani e liberali, stability msi e psdi. Successo di Rifondazione, la Rete sfonda a Palermo, migliorano i 'Verdi'," *La Stampa* (Turin), 7 Apr. 1992; Ginsborg, *Italy and Its Discontents*, 255.

[152] Colarizi and Gervasoni, *La cruna dell'ago*, 117-20.

[153] "Pannella gioca ancora contro tutti," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 29 Mar. 1992.

[154] Emma Bonino, interview, "Anglosassoni per scelta. Intervista. La radicale Bonino polemizza con Segni," *Paese Sera* (Rome), 3 Apr. 1992, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=19103&lang=IT&cms=. The term *partitocrazia* was coined in the 1940s by PLI member Roberto Lucifero, see Salvatore Lupo, *Partito e antipartito: Una storia politica della prima Repubblica, 1946-78* (Rome: Donzelli, 2004), 29-30.

[155] Marina Cassi, "Polemico comizio del leader radicale in via Garibaldi. Pannella contro tutti. Attacca La Malfa, 'salva' Scalfaro. 'Droga e Aids, nuove emergenze'," *La Stampa* (Turin), 13 Mar. 1992.

[156] Ginsborg, *Italy and Its Discontents*, 255.

percent garnered by the Action Party in the general elections of 1946, possibly signaling the terminal decline of postwar Radicalism.

Following the elections, the four-party coalition which had governed during the last phase of the previous legislation was poised to do so again on account of electoral math. But first the question of a vacant presidency had to be solved. CAF naturally hoped to obtain the appointment of one in its number. However, in the weeks and days preceding presidential parliamentary balloting, the Chiesa kickback affair unexpectedly snowballed into a scandal of unprecedented dimensions, implicating several Socialists and Christian Democrats, including Craxi's brother-in-law and the national administrative secretary of the DC. After the general elections, parliamentary deputies of the long proscribed neofascists joined Northern League members in noisily denouncing the ruling political elites as thieves, while in parallel the media gave them wide coverage and reported in detail the spiraling corruption investigations.[157] Such developments undermined CAF plans; yet ballotting continued in the well-tried pattern of the ancien regime. On May 23, an external shock forced a vote: the motorcade bearing the antimafia magistrate Giovanni Falcone was blown up, killing him, his wife and members of their escort as they drove to Palermo. Two days later, all political parties agreed to nominate Scalfaro as president of the republic in recognition of reputation as an honest and capable political figure.[158] The outcome was in some sort a consolation prize for Pannella, who had alone months earlier promoted his candidacy at a time when Craxi was still a mighty player.[159] Scalfaro's

---

[157] Ibid., 258.

[158] Ibid., 259-60.

[159] Massimo Gramellini, "Pannella il vincitore fa il timido. 'Il successo di Scalfaro? È soltanto una cosetta'," *La Stampa* (Turin), 26 May 1992.

appointment would prove consequential, as despite his friendship with Craxi he proved a principled statesman. In June 1992, he appointed Giuliano Amato to the premiership instead of one of Craxi's cronies. Though a Socialist, Amato was widely respected.[160]

The astonishing unravelling of the party system that occurred over the next two years had both long term and proximate causes. Distal causes included Italy's growing commitment to European institutions, which limited the capacity of the Italian state to control the country's political economy. Other long-term developments included the transformation of the PCI, which weakened the DC's essential role as anticommunist moat, as well as the diffusion of antipolitical and antiparty sentiment, which weakened the legitimacy of the political class.[161] Proximate causes included three main clusters of events. The first two have been mentioned: first, the expanding scope of judicial investigation into political malfeasance, which began in Milan but later encompassed the entire country; second, the actions of a political minority headed by Mario Segni, who promoted a new series of referenda in 1993 that dealt a final blow to the party system. The third factor was an economic shock inaugurated in fall of 1992.

In September 1992, the lira, along with the British pound, was forced out of the European Monetary System (EMS). Andreotti had earlier placed Italy in its narrower band of currency fluctuation, a move which at the time appeared to be a triumph of Italy's Europeanist foreign policy ahead of the planned ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, but also did not in any way

---

[160] Ginsborg, *Italy and Its Discontents*, 263-4.

[161] Ginsborg, *Italy and Its Discontents*, 251; Lupo, *Partito e anti-partito*, passim; Alfio Mastropaolo, *Antipolitica: All'origine della crisi italiana* (Naples: L'ancora, 2000), passim.

address the state's ballooning public deficit.[162] In 1992, upon instatement, Prime Minister Amato had attempted to address the yawning gap between the benchmark interest rates of Italy and Germany. The Bundesbank could have in theory reduced its interest rates, but Germany had recently reunified and its federal bank was loath to risk inflation to accommodate its reputedly profligate southern neighbors. In response, the Italian premier rushed through spending cuts and orchestrated an unprecedented compromise between the state, industry, and unions which resulted in the complete abolition of the automatic wage index. Following a failed German attempt to prop up the lira through currency purchases, Amato sought to broker a controlled devaluation of the lira. But markets decided otherwise and the lira and British pound were forced out of EMS. The currency's "Black Wednesday" on September 16 signaled Italy's relegation to the second tier of European nations, a scenario long associated with national humiliation. Domestic consequences included a long overdue but rapid and drastic tightening of public spending which brought about the following year what was by some measures Italy's worst postwar recession. Economic depression further discredited politicians.[163]

Meanwhile, judicial proceedings against the political class had proceeded at a dizzying pace. Craxi, altering his earlier approach of blithe dismissal, initially advanced that most investigations concerned an illegal but widely accepted approach to the financing of parties. Such practices should be condoned, he proposed. In parallel, he sought to discredit one of the leading magistrates, a tactic which had proven effective in the past. Neither approaches, however, pleased an increasingly enraged public. Prominent Socialists, along with Christian

[162] Ginsborg, *Italy and Its Discontents*, 168-9.

[163] Ginsborg, *Italy and Its Discontents*, 263-7, 271-3; Aurelio Lepre, *Storia della prima Repubblica: L'Italia dal 1943 al 2003* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2004), 348.

Democrats and members of the other ruling parties, were soon under investigation. Among top Socialists, Gianni De Michelis led the way on July 14, followed by Craxi in December 1992 and subsequently by Claudio Martelli, his designated successor and frequent interlocutor of the Radicals.[164] The target of an avalanche of charges, Craxi would never recover his political standing.[165] By 1993, about one third of the members of the parliament were under investigation, including Andreotti, the latter on allegations of collusion with the Sicilian mafia.[166] The Amato government, which had proven competent but was nevertheless taxed with a degree of coddling of investigated parties and politicians, finally collapsed in spring 1993, after the holding of a new round of abrogative referenda.[167]

The April 1993 referenda were held on a timetable which could not have been worse for the ruling parties.[168] The eight consultations included time-honored Radical causes, including proposals to abolish the financing of parties, to decriminalize the use of illicit drugs, and to alter the purely proportional voting system in place for the elections of senators, which allowed

[164] Ginsborg, *Italy and Its Discontents*, 267-9, 274-6.

[165] Craxi escaped in 1994 to exile in Tunisia, where he died in 2000, having been condemned in absentia on various accounts.

[166] Ginsborg, *Italy and Its Discontents*, 275-6, 279; Andreotti was years later exonerated on account of the expiry of the statutes of limitation; see Federica Fantozzi, "Andreotti assolto. Per non aver commesso il fatto. Processo Pecorelli, dalla Cassazione la sentenza definitiva. Il senatore a vita: 'Sapevo che finiva così'," *l'Unità* (Rome), 31 Oct. 2003.

[167] Eugenio Scalfari, "Il governo dello scippo," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 7 Mar. 1993; Ginsborg, *Italy and Its Discontents*, 275.

[168] Marco Pannella, "Ma questi partiti non servono più. Opinione di Marco Pannella," *Panorama*, 14 Feb. 1993), OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=19235&lang=IT&cms=; Mauro Anselmo, "L'allarme del segretario: bisogna battere le trame di chi vuole affossare la democrazia. 'I partiti non sono clan criminali.' Martinazzoli: attenti, qui è in gioco la libertà di tutti. 'Temo l'affermarsi dell'idea che identifica le forze politiche come associazioni a delinquere'," *La Stampa* (Turin), 3 Apr. 1993.

leeway for parties' power to determine appointments.[169] But "the father of all referenda" was no longer at the forefront of the reform movement; the latter was led, as in 1991, by Mario Segni. The objective to assemble around the Radicals a "transversal party" founded on public endorsement of referendum causes had failed.[170] Pannella claimed that Segni's success had come on account of an "instrumental media campaign;" but more even than his ascendant political star, Pannella feared the PDS would reap the benefits of referendum outcomes.[171] The governing parties disingenuously endorsed the referenda in near unanimity, in an eleventh-hour attempt to garner public support and lend credibility to pledges to reform. To no avail, however; after an overwhelming vote for change in the referenda, Amato was forced to step down and the ruling parties continued their terminal decline.[172]

Even more than the preceding one, the new cabinet that followed was largely composed of technocrats and non-political experts, notably Premier Carlo Azeglio Ciampi, former governor of the Bank of Italy. For the first time since 1946, members of the formerly maximalist left, in other words three PDS members and one former Radical, the Greens party leader Rutelli, were invited to join a cabinet. But in the wake of the refusal of the Chamber to lift Craxi's parliamentary impunity, which would have allowed for prosecution by the justice system, all

[169] "Regolamenti, consequenze del voto, indicazioni dei partiti. Come leggere le otto schede. Referendum, una guida per votare. Ecco cosa succederà se vinceranno i sì o i no," *La Stampa* (Turin), 18 Apr. 1993.

[170] Laurence Morel, "Le riforme istituzionali: dall'iniziativa dei partiti ai referendum," in *Il gigante dai piedi di argilla: La crisi del regime partitocratico in Italia*, ed. M. Cotta and P. Isernia (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1996), 364.

[171] Marco Pannella, interviewed by Pierluigi Battista, "Pannella: troppe mani su questo voto. 'Occhetto non ci deve scippare la vittoria del Sì, il PDS è la forza politica meno attrazatta ad affrontare la crisi," *La Stampa* (Turin), 17 Apr. 1993; Francesco Grignetti (interviews Pannella), "Pannella: ma il primo referendario sono io," *La Stampa* (Turin), 29 Oct. 1992.

[172] Marcello Sorgi, "I partiti a rimorchio," *La Stampa* (Turin), 20 Apr. 1993; Ezio Mauro, "Per il nuovo Senato 83 percent, depenalizzata la droga. Lira e Borsa più forti. Trionfo del Sì, cambia l'Italia. Spallata al vecchio sistema," *La Stampa* (Turin), 20 Apr. 1993.

four cabinet members promptly resigned, depriving the Ciampi government of a portion of legitimacy.[173] Ciampi would later comment that their departure amounted to an abdication at the origin of the defeat of the left in the early general elections held the following year.[174]

Nevertheless, his cabinet recomposed and governed over the next year in relatively effective manner. Reforms were achieved in the areas of labor-industry relations, public administration and not least, the electoral system. The postwar proportional electoral system was thoroughly modified. Seventy-five percent of parliament would henceforth be elected on a majority basis; a bar of a minimum of four percent of the vote for small parties would be approved for the twenty-five percent of the vote computed on a proportional basis.[175] Longstanding Radical and other reformists' objectives had apparently been attained.[176] The avoidance of a two-turn electoral system, however, and the partial preservation of proportional representation, meant that the bipolarization of the new emerging party system would be attenuated and a continued life-line to small parties extended.

---

[173] Achille Occhetto, "Per fermare il nuovo spingono all'avventura," *l'Unità* (Rome), 30 Apr. 1993.

[174] Giovanni Valentini, "Ciampi, il primo giorno di 'libertà'," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 18 Apr. 1994.

[175] Ginsborg, *Italy and Its Discontents*, 276-84.

[176] Marco Pannella, interviewed by Marco Berti, "Pannella, un 'sì' per voltare pagina," *Il Messaggero* (Rome), 29 Mar. 1993; Valeria Gandus, "Marco vuò fà l'americano. Campagna elettorale/il caso Pannella," *Panorama*, 22 Mar. 1992, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=52998&lang=IT&cms=; Emma Bonino, interviewed by Pietro Treccagnoli, "Vogliamo elezioni all'americana con due forze politiche in lizza," *Il Mattino* (Naples), 20 Mar. 1992, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=53006&lang=IT&cms=; Federico Orlando, "All'inglese, rozzo ma efficace. Marco Pannella al 'Giornale': sulla elezione diretta del sindaco no ai papocchi che nascerebbero dalla procedura d'urgenza. 'Martelli mi ha detto: combatterò fino in fondo nel PSI la battaglia per l'uninomale secca e anche al vertice DC c'è chi è pronto a fare altrettanto' – nè il 'mercato delle vacche' alla francese nè lo 'sbarramento tedesco,' nè la lega ci salverebbero dalla partitocrazia," *Il Giornale* (Milan), 10 July 1992; Marco Pannella […], "Riforma uninominale del sistema elettorale. Proposta di legge d'iniziativa dei deputati […], " 2 July 1987, draft law, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=49379&lang=IT&cms=; Marco Pannella, interviewed by Andrea Marceraro, "Vi servirò un voto all'inglese. Rivoluzioni istituzionali/Marco Pannella fonda la lega per un nuovo sistema elettorale," *L'Europeo*, 8 Mar. 1986, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=49001&lang=IT&cms=; Giorgio Galli, "Occhio ai Radicali, Bettino. Le opinioni," *Panorama*, 23 Feb. 1986, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=48977&lang=IT&cms=.

One of the most remarkable outcomes of this revolutionary period in Italian politics was the disappearance of almost all of the postwar political parties. The disintegration of a party system in an established democracy, barring a context of war, was unprecedented—that of the French Fourth Republic, for example, had occurred during a colonial war.[177] Following the opening of judicial investigations on both Craxi and his ventilated successor, Martelli, prospects for the PSI had plummeted. By December 1993 Italy's venerable party of the left dissolved in utter disarray.[178] The DC also foundered, though, unlike the PSI, it left in its wake a successor. The reformer Mino Martinazzoli was appointed to save the party, but opted instead to start over and name a new party after Luigi Sturzo's prewar formation, the Italian Popular Party.[179] It too though, like its Communist rival two years earlier, would fragment and fail to recover its formerly hegemonic place in Italian politics. Hit hard by the judicial investigations, the three lay parties (PSDI, PRI and PLI) disbanded.[180]

The fibrillation of the political system during a time in which anything seemed possible was more than matched by Pannella's own acrobatics, leaving potential supporters disoriented. At one point in spring 1993, a poll placed *Lista Pannella* in fourth position among the

[177] Stephen Gundle and Simon Parker, "Introduction: the new Italian Republic," in *The New Italian Republic: From the Fall of the Berlin Wall to Berlusconi*, ed. S. Gundle and S. Parker (New York: Routledge, 1996), 1-15.

[178] Lelio Lagorio, *L'esplosione: Storia della disgregazione del PSI* (Florence: Edizioni Polistampa, 2004), 179-80; Ginsborg, *Italy and Its Discontents*, 281-2. The best account of the long term roots of the downfall of Craxi's PSI is Luciano Cafagna's *Una strana disfatta: La parabola dell'autonomismo socialista* (Venice: Marsilio, 1996).

[179] *Partito Popolare Italiano*, PPI. Dario Cresto-Dina, "La guerre di Martinazzoli 'Si cambia, per rinascere.' Il perchè del nuovo nome," *La Stampa* (Turin), 16 Apr. 1993.

[180] Ginsborg, *Italy and Its Discontents*, 280-2.

electorate's preferences, pointing to its apparent potential.[181] But Pannella's tergiversations puzzled colleagues, observers and presumably voters.[182] Already in early 1992, his determination to present an independent list in the looming elections had led to a bitter break with longstanding Radical party members. Subsequently, while enjoying a high profile in the media (though in competition with other antisystem leaders such as Umberto Bossi of the Northern League on the right or Mario Segni on the left), Pannella staked ostensibly contradictory stances. While welcoming the judicial investigations, he also warned of potential abuses by magistrates. He rejoiced in the destruction of the party system yet endorsed the Amato government and defended investigated parliamentarians. After asserting that he no longer considered himself a leftist and declaring that such categories were no longer valid, he sought the leadership of a foundering PSI or a possible new lay formation, even while he lambasted the PDS and sought out an alliance with rightist Umberto Bossi and an emerging political player, media tycoon Silvio Berlusconi. Or, resorting to an old ploy, he intimated that he would retire from politics, even as his INGO, the Transnational Radical Party, prepared a last ditch subscription campaign to forestall an announced dissolution.[183] Pannella's maneuvers were familiar to longtime observers of the

[181] Berti, "Pannella, un 'sì' per voltare pagina," *Il Messaggero*, 29 Mar. 1993; Massimo Teodori argues that this period was marked by Pannella's squandering of an opportunity to rebuild the Radical Party into a major force for reform, see his book, *Marco Pannella: Un eretico liberale nella crisi della Repubblica* (Venice: Marsilio, 1996).

[182] Piero Ignazi, *Il potere dei partiti: La politica in Italia dagli anni Sessanta a oggi* (Rome-Bari: Laterza, 2002), 155.

[183] Eugenio Scalfari, "Pannella il picconatore. Scalfari risponde," *Venerdì di La Repubblica*, supplement to daily, 16 Apr. 1993; Marco Pannella, "Cari giudici, quante ommissioni!" *Panorama*, 21 Febr. 1993, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=54095&lang=IT&cms=; Marco Pannella, "Ma questi partito non servono più. Opinione di Marco Pannella," *Panorama*, 14 Feb. 1993, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=19235&lang=IT&cms=; Antonio Padellaro, "San Marco, salvaci tu. Torna il culto di Pannella. E lui attacca i giudici," *l'Espresso*, 14 Feb. 1993), OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=54076&lang=IT&cms=; Gian Antonio Stella, "Marco il garantista, sete di verità e rischio di strumentalizzazione," *Corriere della Sera* (Milan), 8 Feb. 1993; Marco Pannella, interview by Antonella Coppari, "Il Marco rivalutato. Parla Pannella: 'Noi, gli unici oppositori'," *La Nazione* (Florence), 7 Feb. 1993; Marco Berti, "Pannella, la politica può essere nobile," *Il Messaggero* (Rome), 5 Feb. 1993; Marco Pannella,

Radical, an unconventional politician now fully liberated from institutional constraints. His zigzags were a reflection of the uncertain direction of Italian politics, which exacerbated Pannella's predilection for polemics and disorienting, and according to him, empowering contradiction.

In all fairness, Pannella's principled libertarianism also informed his stances. While reform of corrupt Italian politics and punishment of dishonest political operators were long overdue, abuses by a less than perfect Italian justice system were also in plain sight, as they had been earlier during the fight against terrorism and criminality. It was a tragic irony that an earlier

---

interview by Antonio Mira, "'Io erede di Bettino? Ho altre gatte da pelare.' Pannella: candidatura tramontata in ventiquattr'ore," *Avvenire* (Milan), 2 Feb. 1993, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=53980&lang=IT&cms=; Sergio Turone, "Il Garofano nelle mani di Pannella? Una provocazione ma parliamone," *Paese Sera* (Rome), 2 Feb. 1993; Marco Pannella, "I nodi vengono al pettine. Coraggio, giudici. Coraggio, Bettino," *Corriere della Sera* (Milan), 16 Dec. 1992; Marco Pannella, interview by Fernando Proietti, "Pannella: 'D'accordo con Amato. Demanio e Treni restino allo Stato. Servono tre altre manovre severe.' L'intervista. Netto no alle crisi al buio," *Corriere della Sera* (Milan), 10 Dec. 1992; Marco Pannella, "Qualche proposta alla Lega per stare insieme," *L'Indipendente* (Milan), 27 Nov. 1992, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=19206&lang=IT&cms=; Luigi Irdi, "Tutti in fila dietro il pifferaio magico," Europeo, 27 Nov. 1992, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=53781&lang=IT&cms=; Marco Pannella, interview by Giancarlo Perna, "Se non vado resto per fare un governo. 'Basta, lascio la politica.' In questa intervista, il guru radicale annuncia l'abbandono. Certo. Certissimo. A meno che…" *Europeo*, 19 Nov. 1992, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=53758&lang=IT&cms=; "Pannella replica a Spadolini. Intervistato ad 'Italia domanda' il leader radicale difende a spada tratta l'uninominale," *Il Giorno* (Milan), 15 Nov. 1992, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=53747&lang=IT&cms=; Marco Pannella, interview by Marco Berti, " 'Quest'opposizione è peggio del governo.' Intervista al leader radicale dopo l'intesa con il presidente del Consiglio per la revisione della legge antidroga. Pannella spiega perchè difende Amato. 'Non sarò la sua stampella. Quest'opposizione è peggio del governo'," *Il Messaggero* (Rome), 10 Nov. 1992; Marco Pannella, interview by Paolo Guzzanti, " 'Amato raccoglie quello che ho seminato io.' Per il leader radicale 'il presidente del Consiglio ha colto il problema dei referendum.' Pannella: la parola 'sinistra' è come 'destra', non l'amo più," *La Stampa (*Turin), 9 Nov. 1992; Marco Pannella, interview by Carlo Fusi, "Pannella in campo contro gli sfascisti. Intervista al leader radicale che rilancia la sua proposta di riforma ed invita a raccolta i refendari," *Il Messaggero* (Rome), 25 Oct. 1992; Filippo Ceccarelli, "E Marco dice sì 'Ecco una notizia'," *La Stampa* (Turin), 10 Oct. 1992; Pierluigi Battista, "Pannella: no, caro Claudio, io non faccio ammucchiate. 'Ecco perchè sto fuori dal suo harem'," La Stampa (Turin), 15 Sept. 1992; "Radicalmento sragionando e scusandoci per il disturbo," *il manifesto* (Rome), 5 Apr. 1992, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=53166&lang=IT&cms=; 23 Sept. 2011; Marco Pannella, interview by Andrea Marcerano, "Ve lo do io il buon governo," *Epoca*, 25 Mar. 1992, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=53018&lang=IT&cms=; Marco Pannella, "Pannella su Lima e gli altri. Lettera aperta," *L'Indipendente* (Milan), 20 Mar. 1992, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=53005&lang=IT&cms=; Marco Pannella, "La sinistra peggio della destra (la crisi italiana)," *L'Indipendente* (Milan), 26 Feb. 1992, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=52972&lang=IT&cms=.

reform intended to protect the rights of defendants such as the provision for issuing informational notices to suspects became, in an overheated political climate, a sentence of culpability which led to suicides and ruined lives.[184] Pannella displayed intellectual honesty and courage when he defended the legal rights of indicted politicans and denounced citizens' hypocrisy, pointing out that iniquity was not a monopoly of the political class: fraud, tax evasion, and the soliciting of political favors extended into the far reaches of Italian civil society.[185] But one has also to conclude that Pannella's equivocal trajectory did not contribute to solidifying his reputation as a statesman. Nor did it facilitate his bids for a government post, despite his experience, his insight, and an unquestioned dedication to justice and human dignity, particularly that of despised and vulnerable minorities.

As the eleventh legislation careened towards a close in the early months of 1994, Pannella accelerated his controversial rapprochement to an emerging center-right coalition forged by Silvio Berlusconi. In early 1994, the media Moghul and longtime friend of Craxi created virtually overnight a political party and forged a broad center-right coalition with the Northern League and the MSI. *Forza Italia* drew its ranks from a range of politicians, including Radicals, some of whom ran on its electoral lists. Common causes uniting the disparate formation included opposition to the PDS, the wish to contain the "Jacobin" investigations of magistrates into political corruption, or an embrace of Berlusconi's supposedly Thatcherite

[184] The judicial notices were termed *informazioni di garanzia*. Ginsborg, *Italy and Its Discontents*, 267-9.

[185] Marco Pannella, "Politici corrotti, nazione infetta," *Panorama*, 3 Jan. 1993, OHRA, available from http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=53893&lang=IT&cms=.

neoliberalism.[186] Berlusconi's main interest in including Radicals in his government was driven by image. Inclusion in the ruling coalition of the neofascists of MSI required a balancing act.[187]

While the left expected to win the general elections of March 1994, Berlusconi made good use of his media skills, immense resources, and stranglehold on Italian private television networks established with Craxi's help in the eighties. He pulled off an upset victory, after running, wrote one historian, "an American-style campaign without any of the American checks and balances."[188] *Lista Pannella* received less than four percent of the proportional portion of the vote and was thus disqualified, but fortunately the inclusion of single Radicals in *Forza Italia* lists yielded a handful of parliamentary appointments that would not otherwise been forthcoming. A major contributing factor to the defeat of the PDS and its allies had been the refusal of the recomposed Catholic parties, the PPI and the Pact for Segni, to join forces in a progressive alliance. Berlusconi's ruling coalition would nevertheless be short-lived, ending abruptly in November 1994, when he was forced to resign after it was announced that he had become the object of a judicial investigation.[189]

---

[186] Marco Taradash, "'Perchè io radicale non starò con la sinistra'," *L'Indipendente* (Milan), OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=55333&lang=IT&cms=; Ginsborg, *Italy and Its Discontents*, 289-91. For an account of this period from the viewpoint of adversaries of the left, see Stanton H. Burnett and Luca Mantovani, *The Italian Guillotine: Operation Clean Hands and the Overthrow of Italy's First Republic* (Boston: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1998).

[187] Andrea di Robilant, "Perplessi i funzionari del ministero: Qui ci serve un uomo autorevole e competente. Pannella: sogno la Farnesina. Il Cavaliere e Bossi non si sbilanciano," *La Stampa* (Turin), 2 Apr. 1994; Maria Teresa Meli, "Il Cavaliere apre al Patto e ad Ad, ma Fini scalpita: deve guardare a destra. Berlusconi: governo di centro. 'E Pannella ha ragione sull'uninominale secca'," *La Stampa* (Turin), 11 Apr. 1994.

[188] Adrian Lyttelton, cited by Ginsborg, *Italy and Its Discontents*, 292.

[189] Ginsborg, *Italy and Its Discontents*, 285-99; Alexander Stille, *The Sack of Rome; How a Beautiful European Country with a Fabled History and a Storied Culture Was Taken Over by a Man Named Silvio Berlusconi* (New York: The Penguin Press, 2006), 191-204.

In justifying their controversial decision to join forces with Berlusconi in late 1993, Pannella and Bonino resorted to several arguments. The first was that the PDS represented a new incarnation of the defunct partitocracy. The former Communists, they claimed, would ensure the continued collusion of the state with special interests such as those of unions or state industries, whereas Berlusconi's coalition would embrace, they believed, a salutary neoliberal and managerial approach to the political economy. Economic and political reform, hoped the Radicals, would ensue.[190] The second rationale for joining *Forza Italia* was the necessity to balance the weight of the far right MSI in Berlusconi's coalition. In late 1993, the Radicals had criticized Berlusconi's support for the neofascist leader Gianfranco Fini's bid for mayor of Rome in opposition to Rutelli, the former Radical.[191] Later, they justified their support for Berlusconi's coalition on account of their own role as a "moat against authoritarianism."[192] The third, and arguably paramount, motive for Radical collaboration with Berlusconi was the long frustated

[190] Ciro Sbailò, "Pannella: deregulation e certezza di diritto," *L'Opinione*, 9 Apr. 1994), OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=55437&lang=IT&cms=; Emma Bonino, interview by Paola Orefice, "Bonino: leghista io? Macchè, contano le idee," *Il Messaggero* (Rome), 23 Feb. 1993; Marco Pannella, "Pannella: avanti verso la grande riforma. Porte aperte al dialogo con Senatùr e Cavaliere, decisa opposizione al 'trasformismo' di Fini. Il leader radicale chiama a raccolta contro 'lo strappotere conservatore della sinistra'," *Il Giorno* (Milan), 8 Feb. 1994, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=19344&lang=IT&cms=; Mauro Suttora, "Oplà: Pannella fa un altro giro di valzer. E bravo Marco che sorride a destra. Con Berlusconi e Bossi. Per rinviare le elezioni. E opporsi alla sinistra vincente. Dove vuole arrivare il leader radicale?" *l'Europeo*, 12 Jan. 1994, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=55217&lang=IT&cms=.

[191] Marco Pannella, " 'Caro Silvio, su Fini hai sbagliato. Ripensaci. Lettera a sua emittenza," *Corriere della Sera* (Milan), 1 Dec. 1993. In the event, Rutelli won the elections and was appointed mayor of Rome.

[192] Francesco M. Bei, " 'L'Italia liberale? La garantiamo noi.' Alla convenzione dei Riformatori, il leader radicale si propone come argine all'autoritarismo. Pannella: 'Solo grazie alla nostra partecipazione il Paese potrà presentarsi in Europa con il volto della continuità, da de Gasperi a Spinelli.' Il pattista Mario Baldassari: 'Se verrà meno il connotato di destra, potremmo assumerci dirette responsabilità nel prossimo esecutivo'," *L'Indipendente* (Milan), 10/11 Apr. 1994, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=55440&lang=IT&cms=; the presence of Fini and National Alliance in Berlusconi, which broke old anti-fascist taboos, occasioned international criticism. See "Mussolini is dead—for the moment," *The Economist*, 11 June 1994.

objective of obtaining high-ranking governmental positions in areas of interest to the Radicals, particularly foreign policy.[193]

The Radicals would be proven wrong on the new political phenomenon of *Berlusconismo*. If not in word then in fact, they would themselves recognize as much by eventually returning to the fold of the left. Berlusconi's attempts to reform the Italian economy failed upon inception.[194] By late 1994 investigations into his business practices cast in doubt Radical belief in the reformist potential of his political movement. With the benefit of hindsight, it is apparent that Berlusconi's politics represented continuity with the worst traits of the ancien regime far more so than did the PDS. The fiscal prudence or even "neoliberal" approach to policy and economics sought by the Radicals would rather be essayed during the second half of the nineties by the Olive Tree, an alliance which included the former Communists under the successive premierships of Catholic reformist Romano Prodi, former Communist Massimo D'Alema, and former Socialist Giuliano Amato.[195] The Radicals were also off target regarding their second justification for joining the Berlusconi alliance, the need to counterbalance MSI. Renamed National Alliance in 1995, the party would under Fini's leadership eventually acquire the respectable garb of a "normal" conservative party, at any rate more convincingly than

---

[193] Mauro Mita, "Se Zorro va al governo," *L'Opinione*, 9 Apr. 1994, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=55439&lang=IT&cms=.

[194] Berlusconi's attempt to "impose reform by fiat" collapsed almost immediately in 1994 when confronted with union revolt and the opposition of coalition allies, see Paul Hirst, "Has Globalization Killed Social Democracy?" in *The New Social Democracy*, ed. A. Gamble and T. Wright (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), 93.

[195] Ian Fischer, "Italy Wonders: Is Prodi Calm or Weak? Fans Hail His Serenity, but Critics Fear He Wont' Be Able to Lead," *New York Times*, 17 Apr. 2006. European Commissioner Bonino played an important role in lobbying the EU to accept Italy despite its failure to meet the conditions of the Maastricht Treaty. On the accomplishments and short-comings of the Center-left coalition of 1996-2001, see Ginsborg, *Italy and Its Discontents*, 302-16 and Donald Sassoon, "European Social Democracy and New Labour: Unity in Diversity?" in *The New Social Democracy*, ed. Gamble and Wright, 19-36.

Berlusconi's hybrid political formations or Bossi's racist, xenophobic, and separatist Northern League.[196]

Still, in partial defense of the Radicals, it should be said that such developments only came into full view over time.[197] Nor do Radicals deserve one historian's disparaging label of "pseudo-libertarians." If one definition stuck to them throughout their permutations, it was certainly that of libertarianism.[198] In 1994, a new era in Italian politics had appeared to dawn, and Radicals, no less than other political operators, believed in its promise.

Having outlined the endgame of the first party system, we may now return to our account of the Radical effort to institute international courts for war criminals. In late 1992, while Pannella was struggling to find a footing for his tiny political formation, Bonino had become increasingly involved in an emerging UN proposal to establish an international court to judge war crimes. A feminist, she belonged to a different generation than Pannella and his co-founders of the second Radical Party, which she joined in 1975 during its effort to decriminalize abortion. She was one of four deputies in the first Radical contingent to enter Parliament in 1976 and was reappointed during successive legislations. From 1979 she applied her considerable talents to the campaign against world famine. Appointed president of the INGO Transnational Radical Party

[196] In 1988, while upholding the party's Fascist pedigree, recently appointed secretary Gianfranco Fini refused to adopt the xenophobic and racist platform that had proven so instrumental for the success of Jean-Marie Le Pen's far right *Front National* in France. On the entry into government and recasting of MSI into *Alleanza Nazionale* (AN), see Piero Ignazi, *Il polo escluso: Profilo storico del Movimento Sociale Italiano* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1989), 411-52 and Paul Ginsborg, *Silvio Berlusconi: Television, Power and* Patrimony (New York: Verso, 2004), 66-7, 132-3; on Fini's denounciation of historical Fascism in 2003, see ibid., 181-2.

[197] Radicals were not alone in seeking Berlusconi's support. Segni's reformist political formation also contemplated collaborating with Berlusconi after a lackluster showing in the elections. See Alberto Rapisarda, "Nel Patto 'attenzione' alle proposte politiche della maggioranza, no alle pressioni personali. Il Centro tentato da Berlusconi. Rivera, fedelissimo di Segni: 'I giuda si moltiplicano.' I Popolari confermano, ma con fatica: 'Opposizione'," *La Stampa* (Turin), 20 Apr. 1994.

[198] Ginsborg, "Explaining Italy's Crisis," in *The New Italian Republic*, ed. Gundle and Parker, 52.

in 1989 and its secretary in 1993, under her stewardship the nongovernmental organization redressed its finances. Subsequently, Radicals contributed their first signal contributions to a transnational cause: the establishment of a permanent international criminal court.[199] Officially inaugurated in 2002, the permanent court was preceded by ad hoc tribunals for war crimes committed in the nineties, including in the former Yugoslavia.

In a newspaper article published in November 1992, Bonino outlined the thinking behind its establishment. "The new international order requires a new international body of law," and an international court would constitute an essential first step, she argued. "The Cold War is buried," she wrote, "until it lasted states had at least a referential framework. We have lived what I call the indifferent, opulent, white and Nordic peace of Europe, an iniquitous one, but one which at least ensured order through terror. Presently the terror is gone and walls have collapsed, and we are witnessing the explosion of myriads of conflicts."

Acting on her words, in collaboration with Parliamentarians for Global Action, Bonino helped organize an international conference to be held in early December 1992 in Siracuse, Sicily. It was intended to flesh out an action plan for the institution of an international criminal court, building on an October 6 UN resolution. The latter, UN Security Council Resolution 780, had solicited the creation of an international commission against violations in Bosnia of the Geneva Convention. The call for the instituting of a commission, argued Bonino, constituted a

[199] For an account of progress through 1997 towards establishing the International Criminal Court and the ad hoc tribunals which preceded it, and which emphasizes the role of NGOs, including the Radical NGO No Peace Without Justice, see William Korey, *NGOs and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1998), 521-46.

decisive stepping stone towards building the foundations for an international criminal court. "Such as proposition" wrote Bonino, "[…] was for years confined to the internal disquisitions of the Judirical Committee of the UN, and was blocked by the opposition of the US and USSR, which both sought to resolve alone the internal crises in their respective areas of influence defined in Yalta. Gorbachev was the first one to shift gears in 1987 and push for change." The Siracuse conference, to which were invited policymakers, politicians, jurists and intellectuals from some forty countries, "would be no mere academic exercise," assured Bonino; its goal was to hammer out a plan to pressure the Judirical Committee of the UN to produce on time a draft statute for the new international court.[200]

Subsequently, Bonino outlined the outcomes of the conference in an email sent to her correspondents worldwide. She employed the Radicals' electronic messaging service, launched in 1989 to "overcome physical, political and linguistic barriers that divide countries and continents, and thus Radicals of different nationalities."[201] Rather than the longer term project of a permanent court, reported Bonino, the Siracuse conference had focused on the immediate establishment of an ad hoc tribunal for Yugoslavia. The necessity to "intensify the investigative work on the alleged war crimes in Yugoslavia" was also emphasized in proceedings, in order to

[200] Emma Bonino, "Una Norinberga permanente," *Il Giornale* (Milan), 19 Nov. 1992, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=53760&lang=IT&cms=; "Conferenza mondiale per la creazione di una corte criminale internazionale presso le Nazioni Unite," 30 Nov. 1992, electronic bulletin, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=159435&lang=IT&cms=; "'Conferenza Mondiale per la creazione di una Corte Criminale Internazionale presso le Nazioni Unite' org. dall'Istituto Superiore Internazionale di Scienze Criminali e dai Parlamentarians for Global Action," 2 Dec. 1991, audioclip, OARR, http://www.radioradicale.it/scheda/50931/50994-conferenza-mondiale-per-la-creazione-di-una-corte-criminale-internazionale-presso-le-nazioni-unite-or; "Conferenza Mondiale per la creazione di una Corte Criminale Internazionale presso le Nazioni Unite," 4 Dec. 1992, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=116323&lang=IT&cms=.

[201] Caterina Caravaggi and Roberto Cicciomessere, "Una piazza per la babele radicale," *Notizie Radicali*, 14 Nov. 1989, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=51398&lang=IT&cms=.

prepare the groundwork for the ad hoc tribunal. The venue for such a tribunal had been a topic of controversy, wrote Bonino, due to concerns that China might exert its veto in the UN Security Council. Some participants had expressed a preference that the tribunal be established in the context of the Conference on the Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), as provided by the Helsinki Final Act. But ultimately the conclusion emerged that it would be preferable for the tribunal to be put in place by the UN in order to be representative of the entire international community. Only if both the Security Council and the UN Assembly failed to act soon would the project would be taken to the CSCE.[202]

On February 22, 1993 the UN Security Council resolved to establish an international tribunal to judge those culpable of crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia since 1991, charging the UN Secretary General to submit within sixty days a blueprint for action.[203] In a concurrent declaration that was also a warning to Belgrade, US ambassador to the UN Madeleine Albright declared before the plenum that the spirit of Nuremberg had been revived.[204]

In Italy, Bonino pressured her government to advance the UN agenda. She worked with the minister of justice and an ad hoc committee to present to the UN the proposition to host the tribunal. The Italian approach, argued Bonino, was more appropriate than the Swedish or French ones, because it was more rigorously "judicial": it excluded absentee trials, proscribed the death

[202] Emma Bonino, "Ex-Jugoslavia: a proposal for action. A War Crimes Tribunal," 11 Dec. 1992, electronic bulletin, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=116334&lang=IT&cms=.

[203] UN Resolution no. 808.

[204] Franco Pantarelli, "Una Norimberga per la guerra jugoslava. Le Nazioni Uniti votano all'unanimità il tribunale," *La Stampa* (Turin), 23 Feb. 1993; Madeleine Albright was a proponent of a more muscular US role in the former Yugoslavia well ahead of the doves that predominated in the Clinton administration. See David Halberstam, *War in a Time of Peace: Bush, Clinton and the Generals* (New York: Touchstone, 2002), 376-86.

penalty, and included rape as a potential war crime.[205] Commenting on an approaching deadline set by the Security Council for the submission of a proposal, Bonino worried that without a site or funding established for the tribunal, the project would falter and momentum would be lost.[206] Happily, on May 5 UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali presented his proposal to the UN Security Council, drawing on elements of the Italian, French and Swedish submissions, though the critical issues of financing and location remained unresolved.[207] In late May, the Security Council unanimously approved the project.[208] Following a visit to New York the same month, Bonino reported back on her meeting with Boutros-Ghali; the latter had expressed appreciation for the efforts of the Radicals and moderate optimism on the fate of the project, calling for the continuing support of global civil society groups and their domestic political allies.[209]

Radicals and other partisans of an international tribunal for war crimes had to contend with a movement of opinion opposing its institution on the grounds that it might create obstacles for a peace settlement between warrying factions in the former Yugoslavia, or constitute a distraction from the effort to muster foreign intervention to stop the war. Some argued that, like Nuremberg, it was a dubiously legitimate tribunal of the victors and a tool of US foreign

[205] "Bosnia: Pr rivendica a Italia sede tribunale crimini guerra," 5 Apr. 1993, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=159778&lang=IT&cms=; see also Arturo Zampaglione, "Bosnia, l'Onu non sospende gli aiuti," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 20 Feb. 1993.

[206] Emma Bonino, interview, "Qualcuno non vuole quel tribunale," *La Stampa* (Turin), 7 Apr. 1993.

[207] "Ghali; 'un Tribunale sui crimini di guerra'," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 6 May 1993; "Boutros Ghali presenta il progetto per il Tribunale sui crimini di guerra," *l'Unità* (Rome), 6 May 1993.

[208] "L'Onu vara il Tribunale. I serbi: lo boicotteremo," *La Stampa* (Turin), 27 May 1993.

[209] "New York – Emma Bonino incontra Boutros Ghali," 19 May 1993, electronic bulletin, OHRA, available from http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=159883&lang=IT&cms=; "Visita di Emma Bonino alle Nazioni Unite," 21 May 1993, press communiqué, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=159892&lang=IT&cms=.

policy.[210] In January 1993, even as Prime Minister Amato announced Italian support for the tribunal, Minister of Foreign Affairs Emilio Colombo (DC) had travelled to Belgrade, breaking the international isolation of Serbian President Milosevic. The apparent contradiction raised eyebrows and provoked protests within both the governing majority and opposition.[211] The Republicans declared that "the fact that the Council [of Ministers] invites to Rome the Mayor of Sarajevo and studies a proposal for the much-talked-about Tribunal for [war] crimes will perhaps cause Marco Pannella to rejoice. But it cannot repair the damage done by [Colombo's] mission to Belgrade."[212] Some suspected that governmental support for the tribunal masked a more cynical Realpolitik.[213]

While engaged in such efforts, Bonino was charged by Pannella with finding a solution to the intractable financial crisis of the Transnational Radical Party (TRP). The latter had failed to attract sufficient Italian members; its numerous foreign members mostly included Eastern Europeans who could only contribute modest fees.[214] In early February 1993, Bonino, after being appointed secretary of the organization, organized a last ditch effort to garner on short notice at least thirty thousand new members. In a speech given before a TRP congress, she baldly asserted the substantial failure of the transnational NGO, both on account of its incapacity to be

[210] Bernardo Valli, "Ma il tribunale non è imparziale," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 4 Apr. 1992; Vanna Vannuccini, "Quell'inutile Norinberga," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 14 Nov. 1993.

[211] Leopoldo Fabiani, "Norinberga per i serbi," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 23 Jan. 1993.

[212] Andrea di Robilant, " 'Un regalo ai serbi' per Martelli e Andò. Il ministro: una visita decisa in accord con i mediatori Cee. Per Belgrado processo a Colombo. Mezzo governo critica l'incontro con Milosevic," *La Stampa* (Turin), 23 Jan. 1993.

[213] Stefano Rodotà (PDS), cited in Pierluigi Battista, "Il caso i delitti contro l'umanità," *La Stampa* (Turin), 24 Jan. 1993.

[214] Marco Berti, "Pannella a caccia dell'ultima magia. 'Non vorrei vendere i gioielli di famiglia per far sopravvivere il Pr'," *Il Messaggero* (Rome), 8 Feb. 1993.

financially sustainable and its failure to impact policy. She passed a similar judgement on the earlier internationalist campaign against world famine, which, she argued, had only obtained modest outcomes, if measured by the declared objectives of dramatically increasing and improving foreign aid.

Radical transnational objectives, she stated, as defined in the founding 1989 congress of Budapest, had purported to "insert in the process of decision-making of international organizations or the 'foreign policy' of states another subject, the transnational party, which would be sufficiently disconnected from national electoral imperatives and priorities as to be able to place a sufficient attention on international priorities. Also imperative would be to remain tightly connected to national parties, institutions and movements by way of a strong presence among parliamentarians and […] in public opinion." These were lofty goals, Bonino conceded, but past Radical successes had only resulted when practical and measurable objectives had been hammered out and painstakingly met, such as the decriminalization of divorce and abortion. A similar approach, she implied, would need to be applied to any transnational objective. First, though, she affirmed, necessary funding would have to be identified.[215]

By mid-March, thanks to Bonino's indomitable energy and organizational skills, but also on no small account to Berlusconi's offer of low cost or free air time on his extensive television networks, thirty-five thousand new citizens' subscriptions had shored up the organization's finances.[216]

---

[215] Emma Bonino, "XXXVI Congresso Pr-Emma Bonino: il transnazionale: un progetto ragionevole – un contraltare al deficit di democrazia – il congresso deve prendere atto di una sconfitta subita o se si possono rischiare i tempi supplementari," 7 Feb. 1993, speech, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=159597&lang=IT&cms=.

[216] The collaboration with Berlusconi had had a precedent in 1986, during the party's last acute financial crisis, when the television magnate had helped the Radicals raise funds from ten thousand contributors by offering free airtime

Following the fund-raising effort, Bonino established effective parameters for TRP's transnational agenda in a meeting held in Sofia, Bulgaria in July 1993. Proceedings set the organization on a more realistic course after the years of uncertainty and crisis that had marked the transition from national party to transnational entity. Bonino imposed three main conditions which would be met for all proposed initiatives. The first was that concrete outcomes be attainable within a determined arc of time. The second was that costs be measurable and met by fundraising. The third that any new initiative should not aim to expand further the scope of supranational agencies or entities. It should rather furnish the latter with democratic legitimacy and legal tools. Such principles imparted much needed limits and definition for all proposed transnational initiatives. Highlighed among the latter was the establishment of an international tribunal for war crimes committed in Yugoslavia, a first step towards a new supranational juridical order.[217]

Over the course of the summer and into fall 1993, Radicals pursued their efforts to advance the project in Italy and abroad, often facing a skeptical audience. But Bonino welcomed media controversies over the institution of the tribunal, believing they might actually abet

---

on his private network in exchange for an exclusive interview of party member, and victim of the Italian justice system, Enzo Tortora. Emma Bonino, interview by Adriana Pannitteri, "Ricominciamo da trentacinquemila," *La Discussione*, 13 Mar. 1993, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=54172&lang=IT&cms=; Emma Bonino and Marco Pannella, "La candidatura di Emma Bonino alla segreteria del PR," 8 Feb. 1993, statement, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=54030&lang=IT&cms=; Ezio Mauro and Paolo Mieli, "L'ultima capriola radicale. La parola d'ordine è: per avere più iscritti non fermarsi di fronte a nulla," *La Stampa* (Turin), 9 Dec.1986.

[217] Emma Bonino, interview by Marco Berti, "Bonino: 'la sfida è costruire un miglior ordine mondiale.' Sofia, iniziati i lavori del consiglio federale e dell'assemblea dei parlamentari trasnazionali," *Il Messaggero* (Rome, Abruzzi ed.), 16 July 1993, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=54620&lang=IT&cms=; Emma Bonino, "Linee d'iniziativa politica. Riunione dell'Assemblea dei parlamentari e del Consiglio federale. Sofia, 15/18 luglio 1993," July 1993, statement, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=54599&lang=IT&cms=.

solutions by forcing public opinion to face the Yugoslav tragedy, rather than look away.[218] Real peace, she insisted, could at any rate not be established on the foundation of injustice and forgetfulness.[219] In an editorial published in *La Stampa*, Sergio Romano, a former ambassador to NATO and to the USSR, disagreed that the proposed tribunal would inaugurate "year one of international justice." It was rather, he wrote, a re-edition of the flawed and partial Nuremberg trials: a tribunal of the victors.[220] Bonino retorted that she was not unaware of the hypocrisy or elements of Realpolitik wrapped, for example, into the decision not to try absentee suspects. Nor did she naïvely assume that UN Security Council approval of the project would be actually followed by implementation; it might die a natural death, as had many such previous ones. But she still firmly upheld the importance and novelty of the proposed tribunal. World War II winners had instituted the Nuremberg trials on the basis of an exiguous body of international law. Since then, a robust body of international law had emerged affirming the human rights of individuals and trumping the primacy of national sovereignty. Still missing was a supranational institution that would guarantee the implementation of the rule of law. "Ambassador Romano," appealed Bonino "can we count on your support to win this difficult battle?"[221]

In parallel, turmoil in the former Yugoslavia and elsewhere continued to erode traditional pacifism. Late in 1992, the unreconstructed Marxist left, including Cossutta's party and currents of opinion close to the new left daily *il manifesto* reacted in disbelief when Alberto Asor Rosa, a

[218] Emma Bonino, "Metti che domani parta il processo contro un Sesely…" *Il Giorno* (Milan), 27 May 1993.

[219]Luca Liverani, "Bosnia, sì al tribunale ONU," *Avvenire* (Milan), 24 Sept. 1993.

[220] Sergio Romano, "I dubbi sui processi contro i nazisti e le nuove assise per i crimini di guerra di oggi. Norimberga II, quali giudici? Ex Jugoslavia: l'unico tribunale è l'Onu," *La Stampa* (Turin), 3 June 1993.

[221] Emma Bonino, "Tribunale Onu per i crimini di guerra. Interviene la Bonino, Romano risponde. Punire gli strupri in Bosnia non è una Norinberga II. Oggi esistono norme internazionali che garantiscono i diritti umani," *La Stampa* (Turin), 9 Sept. 1993. The exchange between Bonino and Romano recalls that between Aryeh Neier and the historian Istvàn Deak, who was at the time opposed to the concept of a tribunal, see Neier, *Taking Liberties*, 235.

respected Marxist intellectual, endorsed the US intervention in Somalia. Asor Rosa's desertion of the pacifist camp anticipated other ones, notably new left intellectual Rossana Rossanda three years later.[222] Within the PDS, even Ingrao's impassioned anti-interventionist pacifism lost traction.[223] In June 1993 *La Stampa* reported that Daniel Cohn Bendit, the 1968 new left hero, after opposing the 1991 Gulf War, now urged immediate resort to force in Bosnia.[224]

Recognizing real change among Italian pacifists, the Radicals, for the first time since 1981, participated in the Perugia-Assisi March held in September 1993. "Never have the pacifists been so united" reported *La Stampa*.[225]

In November 1993, a group of tribunal proponents that included Bonino and Aryeh Neier, a founder of Human Rights Watch, met in New York with Boutros-Ghali to plea that no peace accord stand in the way of the planned tribunal. Neier had recently been appointed president of billionaire financeer George Soros' Open Society Institute, a transnational philanthropic organization based in New York and Budapest.[226] The UN Secretary-General

[222] Stefania di Lellis and Vincenzo Nigro, "E alla fine arrivano i nostri," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 10 Dec. 1992; Goffredo Buccini, "Rossanda benedice i raid," *Corriere della Sera* (Milan), 7 Sept. 1995.

[223] Giorgio Battistini, "Il tormento di Ingrao solo la figlia lo segue," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 8 May 1993.

[224] Pierluigi Battista, "Il caso un tabù infranto. 'No alla pace se vuol dire morte'," *La Stampa* (Turin), 1 June 1993.

[225] Pierangelo Sapegno, "Ventimila in marcia da Perugia chiedono un Tribunale sui crimini dell'ex Jugoslavia. Sarajevo chiama Assisi: pace subito," *La Stampa* (Turin), 27 Sept. 1993; on the shift of Italian public opinion to support international armed intervention in Bosnia, see Pierangelo Isernia, "Italian public opinion and the international use of force," in *Public Opinion and the International Use of Force,* ed. P. Everts and P. Isernia (New York: Routledge, 2001), 104-8.

[226] Neier had played a leadership role when he called in summer 1992 for an an International Criminal Tribunal, see Aryeh Neier, *Taking Liberties: Four Decades in the Struggle for Rights* (New York: PublicAffairs, 2006), 230-6.

expressed his full agreement with the tribunal proponents.[227] At last, on November 17, 1993, the tribunal, based in The Hague, was officially inaugurated. Its eleven member judges appointed an acclaimed Italian jurist, Antonio Cassese, as president of the officially designated International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.[228]

But the tribunal continued to face hurdles. First and foremost was the question of stable financing, a question mired in UN General Assembly debates. Radicals and their domestic allies successfully lobbied the Italian government to immediately allocate part of the promised funding; without an immediate allocation of monies, they warned, the tribunal risked a premature shuttering.[229] Radicals argued in New York and elsewhere that longer term financing should be drawn from the general UN budget, not from the single contributions of states, as was the case for peacekeeping operations. Ad hoc state allocations, they insisted, subjected the continued existence of the tribunal to the whims of the General Assembly, a state of affairs favored by nation-states so as to safeguard their sovereign prerogatives.[230]

---

[227] "Giuristi, parlamentari," *1994-Il Quotidiano Radicale*, 12 Nov. 1993, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=54983&lang=IT&cms= ; "Contro i signori della guerra," *1994-Il Quotidiano Radicale*, 12 Nov. 1993, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=54972&lang=IT&cms= .

[228] "Intervista per il giornale 'Il Partito Nuovo' ad Antonio Cassese, presidente del Tribunale Internazionale per i crimini commessi nell'ex Jugoslavia," 3 Dec. 1993, electronic posting, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=117099&lang=IT&cms=.

[229] "La Bosnia in Tribunale," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 14 Nov. 1993; Marco Ventura, "L' ONU non riesce a trovare i fondi necessari rischia di saltare la 'Norinberga' Jugoslava," *Il Giornale* (Milan), 11 Jan. 1994; Emma Bonino, "Lettera inviata da Emma Bonino al Ministro degli Esteri Beniamino Andreatta," 15 Jan. 1994, open letter, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=117173&lang=IT&cms=; Emma Bonino, "Subito sotto processo i criminali di guerra!" L'Indipendente (Milan), 10 Feb. 1994, abridged transcript in OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=117228&lang=IT&cms=; "Camera: approvato decreto tribunal internazionale ex Jugoslavia," 10 Feb. 1994, ANSA (Italian press agency), OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=160303&lang=IT&cms=.

[230]"Sganciate i dollari," *L'Europeo*, 13/20 Apr. 1994, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=55451&lang=IT&cms=.

Similar arguments drove the Radical effort to institute a permanent criminal court.[231] An international criminal court would obviate for the need for more ad hoc tribunals and circumvent the veto power of national governments.[232] In February 1994, the Radicals announced the institution of a committee later constituted as an INGO, No Peace Without Justice.[233] Its central goal was the institution of a permanent court. When John Shattuck, US secretary of state for human rights, proposed an ad hoc tribunal to try those responsible for the genocide in Rwanda, Radicals expressed support but reiterated the question: "how many ad hoc tribunals? […] There is urgency: creating a permanent tribunal."[234] They developed a blueprint of a resolution demanding action on the permanent court, to be sent to their international network of parliamentarians and presented to national legislations.[235]

Radicals obtained a resolution of the Foreign Policy Committee of the Italian Chamber committing the Italian government to sustain the institution of a permanent court during an

---

[231] Emma Bonino, "Nuove regole, nuovo diritto," *Il Partito Nuovo*, 27 July 1993, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=54661&lang=IT&cms=.

[232] Cherif Bassiouni, interview, "Ma che sia un vero tribunale," *Il Partito Nuovo*, 27 July 1993, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=54671&lang=IT&cms=.

[233] "Non c'è pace senza giustizia. Subito il processo ai criminali della ex Jugoslavia. Dal tribunale sui crimini della ex Jugoslavia al tribunale permanente," 26 Feb. 1994, electronic bulletin, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=117279&lang=IT&cms=. More information on No Peace Without Justice is available from http://www.npwj.org/.

[234] "ANSA—9 maggio," 9 May 1994, press dispatch, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=117617&lang=IT&cms=; Filippo di Robilant and Danilo Quinto, "Questo l'intervento del Comitato 'Non c'è Pace senza Giustizia' […]," 9 May 1994, electronic posting, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=117614&lang=IT&cms= ; Filippo di Robilant and Danilo Quinto, "Un tribunale ad hoc per il Ruanda?" *L'Opinione*, 10 May 1994, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=55486&lang=IT&cms=; Emma Bonino, "Subito un tribunale permanente per non lasciare 'strumento inerte' la convenzione sul genocidio. Ruanda: dichiarazione di Emma Bonino, segretaria del Partito radicale," 9 May 1994, electronic posting, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=160334&lang=IT&cms=.

[235] "Transnational/Satyagraha" (Numero 1 del 9 maggio 1994)," 9 May 1994, electronic bulletin, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=55478&lang=IT&cms=.

upcoming UN session. In July 1994, months after the election which sanctioned Berlusconi's triumph, *Forza Italia* deputy Bonino was once again in New York promoting a permanent court alongside Parliamentarians for Global Action before the UN International Law Commission, the institution charged with drafting its statutes. The same month, a prosecutor, the South African Richard Goldstone, was at last appointed to the Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, a critical but long delayed step due to foot-dragging of UN members. The appointment was facilitated by the intercession of the Italian government, acting on a deal struck between Pannella and Bonino with Berlusconi as a qui pro quo for Radical participation in his coalition.[236] Earlier, Bonino had been denied by a narrow vote the prestigious position of president of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Chamber, leading to redoubled Radical pressures on Berlusconi to concede a foreign policy post.[237]

An Italian Chamber debate on the global abolition of the death penalty held in July 1994 merits discussion, as it illustrated the tactics employed by the Radicals to advance their multifaceted transnational agenda.[238] Radicals had made it a cardinal principle that the death penalty be excluded from all international tribunals or courts for war crimes. Having secured (as one part of a broad transnational alliance) the principle, the Radicals noted an opportunity for linkages between their global campaign against the death penalty and the one for international criminal courts. In her speech to the Italian Chamber, Bonino explained: "the ad hoc tribunal, as

---

[236] "Finalmente il PM per gli orrori della ex Jugoslavia," 11 July 1994, electronic posting, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=117928&lang=IT&cms=.

[237] Paolo Biondi, "Il Cavaliere ci dia ascolto. Intervista alla radicale Emma Bonino, dopo la bocciatura alla commissione Esteri," *L'Informazione*, 27 May 1994, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=55507&lang=IT&cms=.

[238] The third one was the anti-prohibitionist one, as defined in Bonino, "Linee d'iniziativa politica," 15 July 1993, OHRA.

conceived, has been voted unanimously by powers that are part of the Security Council—I am referring to the United States and […] China—which however preserve in their own legal order the death penalty. This is a first contradiction—in our view a positive one—that emerges in this international debate. The US minister of justice is in an awkward position when, faced with the enormity of crimes such as that of genocide, his country votes […] for the inapplicability of the death penalty while maintaining it in [the American] order, applying it perhaps to pregnant women, minors or the mentally disabled, or at any rate for crimes that are surely all deeply shameful, but certainly less grave [than genocide]."[239]

Fall 1994 marked further progress towards the instituting of a permanent court. In October, Bonino was charged by Berlusconi to present Italian positions on the Court at the UN.[240] In New York, she spoke before the Sixth Committee on Judicial Affairs of the UN, stating: "it is unthinkable—and certainly not desirable—for the Security Council to proceed in the direction of instituting various 'ad hoc' Tribunals: for the simple reason that such institutions, because of their very nature, do not act as a 'deterrent' but merely follow 'in the wake' of genocide and war crimes."[241] In an interview later that month, Bonino explained that the permanent members of the Security Council preferred ad hoc tribunals so as to preserve their sovereign right to a veto; further, as shown in the case of the fight to establish a tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, the institution of courts in general was received with ambivalence, due to the

[239] Emma Bonino, "Discussione della mozione sull'abolizione della pena di morte," 20 July 1994, speech given in the Chamber of Deputies, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=19839&lang=IT&cms=.

[240] Furio Colombo, "L'umanità giudichi i carnefici del mondo," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 30 Oct. 1994; "L'esponente radicale da New York. Emma Bonino ringrazia 'Nuovo slancio alla campagna contro i crimini di guerra," *l'Unità* (Rome), 29 Oct. 1994.

[241] Filippo Di Robilant, "Draft of speech that Emma Bonino will pronounce in [sic] the VI committee on the issue of the international criminal court," 24 Oct. 1994, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=118524&lang=IT&cms=.

perception that they constituted obstacles to peace negotiations. Bonino included criticisms of US Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger's Realist stances: "I know well the position of Eagleburger […] but it is not convincing […] There cannot be a lasting peace without justice."[242]

Bonino accepted in late October an appointment as EU commissioner for consumer affairs, and successively sought and obtained that for humanitarian affairs as well as the highly contentious one of commissioner for fisheries. A fierce Pannella extorted her nomination as commissioner from the recalcitrant Berlusconi, in return for Radical support of the premier's fraying coalition. Berlusconi had to retract his previous offer of the position to a leader of the opposition, Napolitano. On receiving news during UN talks in New York of her nomination, Bonino welcomed it as a contribution to the campaign for a permanent war crime tribunal.[243] She would continue to be indirectly involved in the effort to institute the permanent court through her organization No Peace Without Justice, as well as through the TRP. As EU commissioner for humanitarian affairs she followed closely developments in the former Yugoslavia, and in particular the question of war refugees.[244] Her work as EU commissioner helped establish her reputation in Italy and abroad as a dedicated civil servant and efficient manager.[245]

---

[242] Anna di Lellio, " 'Voglio una corte per i crimini internazionali.' La radicale, in corsa per Bruxelles, a New York si batte per un Tribunale penale permanente e contro la pena di morte," *L'Indipendente* (Milan), 28 Oct. 1994, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=118581&lang=IT&cms=.

[243] Alessandro Galliani, "I commissari europei. Il Cavaliere chiede scusa al candidato dell'opposizione. L'ex presidente della Camera: 'Vicenda all'italiana.' Berlusconi incorono Bonino. Salta Napolitano: 'Mi ero impegnato con Pannella.' […]", *l'Unità* (Rome), 29 Oct. 1994.

[244] "Bonino: 'I profughi non torneranno più a casa. Ci vogliono nuove città," *l'Unità* (Rome), 10 Dec. 1995.

[245] Emma Bonino, "Il ciclone Bonino. Sarò l'occhio dell'Unione Europea in Bosnia e Ruanda," *Corriere della Sera* (Milan), 26 Jan. 1995; Gianluigi Melega, "La mia guerra si chiama halibut. Impegni, grane e scomesse di Emma Bonino, commissaria UE," *l'Espresso*, 17 Mar. 1995, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=15775&lang=IT&cms=; Silvano Guidi, "Una 'corsara' a Bruxelles," *Famiglia Cristiana*, March 1995, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=15779&lang=IT&cms=; Emma Bonino, interview by Giorgio Ferrari, "L'Europa blocca gli aiuti a Kigali," *Avvenire* (Milan), 27 April 1995, OHRA,

Epilogue

When Bonino's term as EU commissioner ended in 1999, she and Pannella formed an Italian electoral list which drew 8.5 percent in the European elections, a historic high for the Radicals and a confirmation of her personal popularity.[246] Domestically, the political orientation of the Radicals, reconstituted in 2001 as a domestic party denominated *Radicali Italiani*, continued to oscillate between flirts with Berlusconi and with the left. Recently (2008), the Radicals forged an alliance with the latest permutation of the old PCI and DC left, the Democratic Party, without however merging with it.[247]

The International Criminal Court was established in 2002 by the Rome Statute and sited in The Hague. UN Secretary General Kofi Annan announced its ratification from the magnificent hilltop Quirinal Palace, former summer quarters of the papacy and current seat of the Italian presidency, thus acknowledging Italy's role in helping establish a milestone of supranational jurisprudence. On the occasion, one of the Court's most determined proponents, Emma Bonino, expressed confidence that both Russia and the United States would eventually ratify it. She explained to a journalist that the US is "traditionally slow [on such matters]; it took

---

http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=69703&lang=IT&cms=; "Emma Bonino denuncia: 'Un genocidio.' Spariti a migliaia nei lager dei serbi," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 17 July 1995; H.J. Bloom, "Emma Bonino, Bruxelles e la passione per la politica," *Het Financieele Dagblad* (Amsterdam), 12 Dec. 1995, translated from the Dutch into Italian, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=70386&lang=IT&cms=; Ylva Nilsson, "La Bonino si batte per i consomatori," *Svenska Dagbladet* (Stockholm), 12 Feb. 1996, translated from the Swedish into Italian, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=70550&lang=IT&cms=; Andrea Bonanni, "Il 'miracolo Bonino' continua," *Corriere della Sera* (Milan), 21 Feb. 1996.

[246] "Nel centro-sinistra exploit dei democratici, An è in lieve calo, la Lega scende ancora. Vincono Forza Italia e Bonino. Azzurri primo partito, in calo i ds," *La Stampa* (Turin), 14 June 1999.

[247] Emma Bonino, interview by Ugo Magri, "Bonino: dialogo con D'Alema Berlusconi vuole solo dividerci," *La Stampa* (Turin), 10 Aug. 1999.

them thirty years to ratify the Treaty against the Discrimination of Women."[248] Punctually, in August of the same year, the Bush Administration presented a formal request to the Italian government, demanding that American citizens be excluded from the Court's jurisdiction. Contrasting with the response of Premier Berlusconi, who diplomatically deferred to consultation with the EU, Gianfranco Dell'Alba, Radical Eurodeputy and director of No Peace Without Justice, protested that "the Americans are trying to devalue the Statute of Rome […] It is not admissible that Italy accept such a design." A deputy of the Democrats of the Left, at the time the principal heir of the PCI, concurred.[249]

[248] Jacopo Iacoboni (interviews Bonino), "Kofi Annan annuncia oggi dal Quirinale la nascista del Tribunale internazionale. Bonino: anche la Russia entrerà nella Corte penale internazionale. 'Al governo ho proposto di invitare a luglio i paesi membri a Roma.' 'Gli Stati Uniti? Prima o poi supererrano i dubbi, li convincerà Powell'," *La Stampa* (Turin), 11 Apr. 2002.

[249] Maurizio Molinari, "L'emissario di Bush ha presentato la domanda ufficiale alla Farnesina. Corte Penale Internazionale, pressing Usa sull'Italia. 'Esentate gli americani dalla sua giurisdizione'," *La Stampa* (Turin), 8 Aug. 2002; Andrea di Robilant, "Le feluche del Ministero degli Esteri in una strettoia. La Farnesina: risponderemo in accordo con i partner Ue. 'Pronti a mostrare apertura a Washington, ma non possiamo indebolire un'istituzione varata proprio a Roma.' L'Ulivo: sarebbe dannosissimo," *La Stampa* (Turin), 8 Aug. 2002.

Conclusion

Italian Radicalism was largely shaped by its domestic context. The party's critique of the welfare state, for example, derived primarily from defiance of the so-called partitocracy and rejection of Italy's clientelistic political economy, not ideological embrace of Thatcherite free-market economics. Yet key aspects of the group's trajectory over four decades evoke broader transformations in Western political culture. The permutation of Radical antimilitarism and nonviolence after the end of the Cold War illustrates the contingent and political nature of most forms of pacifism and of nonviolent resistance. Altered historical circumstances stripped Radicalism of its antimilitarism and exposed a form of juridical pacifism ultimately rooted in nineteenth-century Italian liberalism.[1] Most significant, however, are two other aspects of the Radical experience. First, Radicals participated in the recasting of the Western left through their valorization of individual rights or negative freedom. Second, Radical identification of the state and of national sovereignty as obstacles to the attainment of a greater good dovetailed with a growing underestimation of the modern state's contribution to human well-being through its promotion of positive freedom.[2]

Over several decades, the Radicals mounted a challenge to the parties of the Italian left founded on a program focused on civil and political rights. The strains of nuclear destruction of the sixties inspired Pannella's new Radicals to dust off antimilitarism, a dormant tradition of the

[1] Pietro Pàstena, *Breve storia del pacifismo in Italia: Dal Settecento alle guerre del terzo millennio* (Acireale-Rome: Bonanno, 2005), 180-1.

[2] I follow here the definitions of negative and positive freedoms given by Isaiah Berlin in "Two Concepts of Liberty," reprinted in idem, *Liberty*, ed. Henry Hardy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 167-217.

Italian left.[3] At the forefront of the antimilitarist battle was the figure of the conscientious objector and his right to defy the state and refuse to bear arms; Radicals rejected the pacifism of the PCI or the PSI in part on account of their espousal of the collective duty of citizens to serve in national armies. Later, as the legalization of divorce (1970) or of conscientious objection (1972) became a shared patrimony of the Italian left, Radicals could with justification claim leadership in promoting individual liberties ahead of the mainstream parties. The same could credibly be maintained for the policy tool of the abrogative referendum. Though activated by Catholic groups, the Radicals almost immediately appropriated it and made it their favorite political instrument. The curtailment of laws deemed inimical to liberty reinforced their identity and public image as purveyors of individual rights. Simultaneously, Radicals continued to claim bona fides leftist credentials by brandishing a libertarian form of socialism opposed to degenerate statism.[4] Such was the underlying message of Radical calls in spring of 1978 to renounce reason of state and to negotiate with the Red Brigades to save Aldo Moro's life.

In Italy, the anti-authoritarian revolt of the sixties lingered in altered circumstances into the seventies. From 1971, the crisis of capitalism discredited the social-democratic state, which could now be represented as not solely harboring authoritarian propensities, but also as failing to manage the allocation of resources. Radicals redoubled their critique of *welfare all'italiana*. In the eighties, they lent a left-libertarian accent to free market thinking, maintaining that the crisis of Keynesianism announced a new era in which human needs would not and could not be met by

[3] The term is borrowed from Jeremi Suri, *Power and Protest: Global Revolution and the Rise of Détente* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2003), 7-43.

[4] The other dimension of the Radical claim to leftism or socialism was the rejection of center-left or historic compromise coalition governments.

the dirigiste state. Affinities with Milton Friedman's libertarianism extended to other causes, such as antiprohibitionism.[5]

Radical espousal of aspects of neoliberalism was grounded in domestic realities, not a profound reflection on world capitalism. It drew on the group's longstanding anticorporatism and was a response to the Italian political economy and its problematic meshing of state, industry and party interests. After 1985, Radicals abandoned their self-characterization as socialists and appropriated the more versatile labels of "European federalists" and of "transnationalists." In response to the quickening of interdependence and of European integration, they ramped up their claim that nation-states were ill-suited to address global or even domestic challenges. Murderous ethno-nationalism in the nineties in Europe and Africa appeared to confirm the decay of national forms of governance. Radical underestimation of nation-states' role in advancing a comprehensive as opposed to a minimalist construction of rights, however, also spoke to the universal limitations of libertarianism.

The Radicals' antipolitical propensity to disparage the Italian welfare state was symptomatic of the erosion since the seventies of the belief that governmental promotion of economic rights is essential to human well-being.[6] In parallel, the crisis and collapse of "real

[5] Marco Pannella, "Proibizionismo delle droghe. La legge del profitto," *Notizie Radicali*, 31 August 1987, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=49423&lang=IT&cms=; Milton Friedman, interview by Paolo Mastrolilli, "Io, l'antikeynes," *Liberal* (Rome), 16 Sept. 1999, OHRA, http://old.radicali.it/search_view.php?id=138445&lang=IT&cms=.

[6] On the centrality of equality to leftist identity and the related distinction between left and right, see Norberto Bobbio, *Destra e Sinistra: Ragioni e significati di una distinzione politica* (Donzelli: Rome, 1995).

existing socialism" seemed to cast in stone the democratic legitimacy of an economistic fundamentalism associated with nineteenth-century liberalism.[7]

More recently, the growth of a global economy driven by information technology has provided further ammunition to adversaries of welfare states and antistatist boosters of globalization. In an influential book, journalist Thomas Friedman displays an almost unbounded faith in the capacity of a new, "flat" world economy unchecked by national boundaries to both emancipate and enrich peoples. He reserves his most pointed criticism for the social-democracies of Western Europe, "which drift for a long time without biting the bullet" of reform.[8] One might concur with him with respect to aspects of the political economies of Greece or even Italy, but his barbs are more indiscriminate.[9] Significantly, despite a stated interest in its educational system, he neglects to discuss Germany, a populous nation-state sporting not only an oppulent and export-oriented economy, but also an equitable one. Friedman's silence perhaps derives from that country's experience, which disproves the impossibility of wedding welfare policies to economic productivity in the era of globalization. His conceit of a flat world in which welfare states, unions, and other "collectivist conspiracies" constitute walls which must and will

[7] For a still indispensable politico-economic account of the roots of (so called) laissez-faire economics, see Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time* (1944; Boston: Beacon Press, 2001), chapter 12, "Birth of the Liberal Creed," 141-57.

[8] Friedman, *The World is Flat*, 430.

[9] Friedman compares Western Europe to "an assisted-living facility, with an aging population lavishly attended to by Turkish nurses," an possible reference to Germany, ibid., 411.

be dismantled sounds familiar to the trained ear.[10] His vision of a greater good may be yet another fruit of the anti-authoritarian and antistatist revolts of previous decades.[11]

However, as Norberto Bobbio affirmed in the seventies when criticizing the PCI's Third Way, there is no alternative to the formula wedding social-democracy to capitalism, if individual liberty, prosperity and social justice are simultaneously sought.[12] To date, solely democratic welfare systems ensconced in territorial states have ensured high levels of both individual freedom and collective equality.[13] Yet, for several decades, such evidence has been contested. The crisis of the seventies fostered, alongside anticapitalistic utopian thinking, another influential set of prescriptions, notably libertarian and free market ideologies. While distinct, the latter are hereto associated, in so far as both endorsed a minimalist definition of human rights and a moralizing approach to the state.[14]

---

[10] I have borrowed the term "collectivist conspiracy" from Polanyi; for a discussion of this nineteenth-century liberal myth, see Polanyi, *The Great Transformation*, 151-70.

[11] No doubt, aspects of the emerging global economy shaped by accelerated offshore sourcing and the internet are novel, but Friedman's blanket and cheery appraisal of their social and political consequences certainly is not, as witness Karl Polanyi's description of the mindset informing nineteenth-century liberal boosters of the Industrial Revolution: "Nowhere has liberal philosophy failed so conspicuously as in its understanding of the problem of change. Fired by an emotional faith in spontaneity, the common-sense attitude toward change was discarded in favor of a mystical readiness to accept the social consequences of economic improvement, whatever they may be. The elementary truths of political science and statecraft were first discredited then forgotten." Polanyi, *The Great Transformation*, 35.

[12] Norberto Bobbio, *Quale socialismo? Discussione di un'alternativa* (Turin: Einaudi, 1976); Norberto Bobbio, *Le ideologie e il potere in crisi: Pluralismo, democrazia, socialismo, comunismo terza via e terza forza*, Florence: Felice Le Monnier, 1981.

[13] For a related discussion, see Norberto Bobbio, "Liberalism Old and New," in Norberto Bobbio, *The Future of Democracy* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), 98-117.

[14] On the seventies and eighties as an antipolitical era hostile to the social-democratic model, and the relationship between new left and neoliberal antipolitics, see Jan-Werner Müller, *Contesting Democracy: Political Ideas in Twentieth-Century Europe* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2011), chapter 6, "Antipolitics, and the Sense of an Ending," 202-42, 210-1.

In his autobiography, Aryeh Neier, whose affinity to and collaboration with the Radicals has been noted, terms economic and social rights illegitimate and undemocratic. He argues that "the language of universal rights should be reserved for matters where it is possible to insist on adherence to the same criteria everywhere." Since notions of what constitute adequate provisions for citizens' standard of living are a function of resources and vary from place to place, he insists that positive freedom cannot be countenanced as a universal right. Further, granting the sanction of rights to positive freedoms risks empowering the authoritarian state or "platonic guardian" to also curtail negative freedoms "in accordance with local and temporal standards," as necessarily done in the social and economic arena.[15] The authoritarian state's propagandistic use of its patronage of economic and social freedoms to abrogate civil and political rights is amply demonstrated by the experience of the Soviet Union or of China. Therefore, the definition and protection of positive freedoms, unlike that of universal civil rights, is best left to the political process. "Commitment to human rights," he concludes, is "[…] a less dangerous faith than most others because it is not about the exercise of power."[16]

Neier's dismissal of positive freedom and his minimalist definition of rights build a virtually unassailable judicial and ideological moat around his cause. Like Radical and other contemporary forms of libertarianism, the development of his mindset partook in a complex historical process which over the last decades has produced societies more just, and yet less so,

[15] Alongside the influence of Isaiah Berlin and Amartya Sen, the influence of Karl Popper in *The Open Society and Its Enemies*, 2 vols. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1966) is also evident in Neier's reasoning.

[16] Aryeh Neier, *Taking Liberties: Four Decades in the Struggle for Rights* (New York: PublicAffairs, 2003), xxx-xxxiv.

because more unequal.[17] But if the cause of human rights is our latest faith or utopia, as claimed by Neier and intellectual historian Samuel Moyn, it is fortunate that the libertarian approach to rights has been largely rejected by the human rights community and by the mainstream left, particularly in Western Europe.[18]

While no such intention may be present, the demotion of economic rights by libertarians is prescriptive. It provides ideological fodder to the minimization of the redistributive role of the state. Though limited, resources are fungible; their allocation is a function of the ideologies which help shape the political and economic order.[19] Neier's stated goal is to insulate the legal sphere from the unstable and frequently immoral political and economic arena; nevertheless, the elevation of political rights over economic ones has an unwelcome policy impact. Amartya Sen has shown that civil rights produce economic growth; it is however also arguable that there is a correlation between economic inequality and authoritarianism.[20] The panorama of modern Western history offers cautionary tales in this respect. The collapse of the liberal order previous to World War II, for example, produced various forms of authoritarian welfare states. Then too conservative liberals placed excessive faith in the self-regulatory politico-economic process; they

[17] Thomas Borstelmann, "The Shock of the Global," in *The Shock of the Global: The 1970s in Perspective*, ed. N. Ferguson et al. (Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University, 2010), 351-4; Thomas Borstelmann, *The 1970s: A New Global History from Civil Rights to Economic Inequality* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012).

[18] Samuel Moyn, *The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History* (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2010), 222-3. Moyn however regrets the erosion of Neier's minimalist definition of rights, see ibid., 227.

[19] On the enormous influence of ideologies and political ideas on the course of twentieth-century history, see Müller, *Contesting Democracy*.

[20] Amartya Sen, *Development as Freedom* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999); Neier, *Taking Liberties*, xxxi-xxxii.

too resisted a more expansive definition of the state's role in promoting human freedom.[21] A "liberal complacency" which refuses to address the economic roots of authoritarianism risks relinquishing the political field to illiberal champions of of equality.[22]

[21] Polanyi, *The Great Transformation*, 210-68.

[22] Müller, *Contesting Democracy*, 4.

Archival Sources

Paper Archives

Archief Interkerkelik Vredesberaad ‘s-Gravenhage (IKV Archives, Institute of Social History, Amsterdam).

Archivio del Centro Siciliano di Documentazione “Giuseppe Impastato”, Palermo (Archives of the “Giuseppe Impastato” Research Center, Palermo).

Archivio del Partito Radicale, Roma (Radical Party Archives, Rome).

Istituto Gramsci Roma (PCI Archives, Rome).

Istituto Gramsci Siciliano (PCI Archives, Palermo).

Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Swarthmore, Pennsylvania.

Online Electronic Archives

Archivio Digitale di Radio Radicale (Online Archive of Radio Radicale, OARR), available from the website of Radio Radicale, www.radioradicale.it.

Archivio Storico dei Radicali Italiani (Online Historical Radical Archive, OHRA), available from the old website of Radicali Italiani, old.radicali.it.

Interviews and Periodicals Consulted

Interviews

Marco Pannella (2)

Gaetano Dentamaro

Note: I also benefited from informal conversations with Gianluigi Melega, a journalist and former Radical MP.

Periodicals consulted

Note: online access greatly facilitated research, particularly with respect to *l'Unità* and *La Stampa/Stampa Sera*, which are now searcheable by keyword and for the entirety of their publication history. Most other major dailies also have online archives, though less complete. The online archives of the Radical Party (OHRA and OARR) include transcripts of numerous other periodicals, including Radical ones, which thus also informed the research and are cited in the footnotes. All translations from the Italian or French are mine unless otherwise noted.

Dailies

La Repubblica (Rome)

La Stampa (Turin)

L'Unità (Rome)

Stampa Sera (Turin)

Radical Periodicals and Newsletters

Agenzia Notizie Radicali

Argomenti Radicali: Bimestrale Politico di Politica e Cultura

L'Asino

Quaderni Radicali

Other periodicals

Alternativa Nonviolenta

I Siciliani

Mondoperaio

Pace e guerra

Rinascita

Rocca

Segno

Testimonianze

Bibliography

Ackerman, Peter and Jack DuVall. *A Force More Powerful: A Century of Nonviolent Conflict*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000.

Ajello, Nello. *Il lungo addio: Intellettuali e PCI dal 1958 al 1991*, Bari: Laterza, 1997.

Aga-Rossi, Elena. "L'influenza sovietica in Italia nel periodo staliniano." In ed. Agostino Giovagnoli and Luciano Tosi, *Un ponte sull'Atlantico: L'alleanza occidentale 1949-1999*, 111-39. Milan: Guerini e associati, 2003.

_____. "PCI e URSS nel periodo staliniano (1944-1953)." In ed. Gerardo Nicolosi, *I partiti politici nell'Italia repubblicana. Atti del Convegno di Siena 5-6 dicembre 2002*, 91-115. Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2006.

_____ and Gaetano Quagliariello, eds. *L'altra faccia della luna: I rapporti tra PCI, PCF e Unione Sovietica*, Bologna: Il Mulino, 1997.

_____ and Victor Zaslavsky. "The Soviet Union and the Italian Communist Party, 1944-8." In ed. Francesca Gori and Silvio Pons, *The Soviet Union and Europe in the Cold War, 1943-53*, 161-84. London: Macmillan, 1996.

_____ and Victor Zaslavsky. *Togliatti e Stalin: Il PCI e la politica estera negli archivi di Mosca*, Bologna: Il Mulino, 1997.

Agosti, Aldo. *Bandiere rosse: Un profilo storico dei comunisti europei*, Rome: Editori riuniti, 1999.

Allen, Tim and David Styan. "A Right to Interfere? Bernard Kouchner and the New Humanitarianism,"*Journal of International Developments*, no. 6 (August 2000): 825-42.

Allin, Dana H. *Cold War Illusions: America, Europe and Soviet Power, 1969-1989*, New York: St Martin's Press, 1995.

Amato, Giuliano and Luciano Cafagna. *Duello a sinistra*, Bologna: Il Mulino, 1982.

Andreopoulos, George, Zehra F. Kabasakal Arat and Peter Juviler, eds. *Nonstate Actors in the Human Rights Universe*, Bloomfield Press, Conn.: Kumarian Press, 2006.

Asor Rosa, Alberto. *La sinistra alla prova: Considerazioni sul Ventennio 1976-1996*, Turin: Einaudi, 1996.

Bandinelli, Angiolo. *Il radicale impunito: saggi di politica militante*, Rome: Stampa alternativa, 1990.

_____ and Valter Vecellio, eds. *Una 'inutile strage'? Da Via Rasella alle Fosse Ardeatine*, Rome: Tullio Pironti, 1982.

Barbagallo, Francesco, ed. *Caro Berlinguer: Note e appunti riservati di Antonio Tatò a Enrico Berlinguer, 1969-1984*, Turin: Einaudi, 2003.

_____. "Il PCI di Berlinguer nella crisi italiana e mondiale." In ed. Simona Colarizi, Piero Craveri, Silvio Pons and Gaetano Quagliariello, *Gli anni Ottanta come storia*, 103-18. Rome: Rubbettino, 2004.

_____. *Enrico Berlinguer*. Rome: Carocci, 2006.

_____. "Enrico Berlinguer, la crisi italiana e il conflitto mondiale." In ed. F. Barbagallo and A. Vittoria, *Enrico Berlinguer, la politica italiana e la crisi mondiale*: *Atti del convegno organizzato a Sassari, 18-19 giugno 2004, dal Centro studi Enrico Berlinguer e dal Dipartimento di Storia dell' Università di Sassari*, 15-16. Rome: Carocci, 2007.

_____. *L'Italia repubblicana: Dallo sviluppo alle riforme mancate (1945-2008),* Rome: Carocci 2009.

_____ and Albertina Vittoria, eds. *Enrico Berlinguer, la politica italiana e la crisi mondiale: Atti del convegno organizzato a Sassari, 18-19 giugno 2004, dal Centro studi Enrico Berlinguer e dal Dipartimento di Storia dell' Università di Sassari*, Rome: Carocci, 2007.

Bedeschi, Giuseppe. *La fabbrica delle ideologie: Il pensiero politico nell'Italia del Novecento,* Rome-Bari: Laterza, 2002.

Bergsten, Fred C. "Interdependence and the Reform of International Institutions," *International Organization*, no. 2 (spring 1976): 361-72.

Berghahn, Volker R. *America and the Intellectual Cold Wars in Europe: Shepard Stone Between Philanthropy, Academy, and Diplomacy*, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2001.

Berlinguer, Enrico and Pietro Folena. *Idee e lotte per la pace: Raccolta d'interventi sulle questioni della pace, del disarmo e di un nuovo internazionalismo 1979-1984*, Naples: Cuen, Centro napoletano per la pace della Federazione giovanile comunista napoletana, 1986.

Berman, Paul. *Power and the Idealists: Or, the passion of Joschka Fischer and Its Aftermath,* Brooklyn, New York: Soft Skull Press, 2005.

Bernstein, Carl and Marco Politi. *His Holiness John Paul II and the Hidden History of Our Time*, New York: Doubleday, 1996.

Bettinelli, Ernesto. "Partiti e rappresentanza." In ed. Claudia Franceschini, Sandra Guerrieri, and Giancarlo Monina, *Le idee costituzionali della Resistenza: Atti del Convegno di studi Roma 19, 20 e 21 ottobre 1995*, 289-302. Rome: Istituto Poligrafico e Zecca dello Stato, 1997.

Birchall, Ian H. *Sartre against Stalinism*, New York: Berghahn Books, 2004.

Bischof, Günter, Anton Pelinka, Oliver Rathkolb, eds. *The Kreisky Era in Austria*, New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transactions, 1994.

Blim, Michael. *Made in Italy: Small-Scale Industrialization and its Consequences* (New York: Praeger, 1990).

_____. *Equality and Economy: The Global Challenge*, Walnut Creek, Calif.: AltaMira Press, 2005.

Bobbio, Norberto. *Quale socialismo? Discussione di un'alternativa*, Turin: Einaudi, 1976.

_____. *Le ideologie e il potere in crisi: Pluralismo, democrazia, socialismo, comunismo terza via e terza forza*, Florence: Felice Le Monnier, 1981.

_____. "A quando, la libertà dagli 'spietati doveri'?" In A. Bandinelli and V. Vecellio eds., *Una 'inutile strage'? Da Via Rasella alle Fosse Ardeatine*, 68-69. Rome: Tullio Pironti, 1982.

_____. *Il problema della guerra e le vie della pace*, Bologna: Il Mulino, 1984.

_____. *The Future of Democracy: A Defense of the Rules of the Game*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987.

_____. *Una guerra giusta? Sul conflitto nel Golfo*, Venice: Marsilio, 1991.

_____. *Destra e sinistra: Ragioni e significati di una distinzione politica*, Rome: Donzelli,1995.

_____. *Autobiografia*, Rome-Bari: Laterza: 1997.

Boli, John and George M. Thomas. *Constructing World Culture: International Nongovernment Organizations since 1875*, Palo Alto: Standord University Press, 1999.

Bonino, Emma. Introduction to *Ernesto Rossi: Economista, federalista, radicale*, ed. Lorenzo Strik Lievers, 11-18. Venice: Marsilio, 2001.

Bonetti, Paolo. *"Il Mondo" 1949-66: Ragione e illusione Borghese*, Rome-Bari: Laterza, 1975.

_____, ed. *Revisionismo socialista e rinnovamento liberale*, Rome: Carocci, 2001.

Bortstelmann, Thomas. "The Shock of the Global." In ed. Niall Ferguson, Charles S. Maier, Erez Manela and Daniel J. Sargent, *The Shock of the Global: The 1970s in Perspective*, 351-54. Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University, 2010.

_____. *The 1970s: A New Global History from Civil Rights to Economic Inequality*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012.

Boyer, Paul. *Fallout: A Historian Reflects on America's Half-Century Encounter with Nuclear Weapons*, Columbus, Ohio: Columbus State University Press, 1998.

Bracke, Maud. *Which Socialism, Whose Détente? West European Communism and the Czechoslovak Crisis, 1968*, Budapest: Central European University Press, 2007.

Braga, Antonella. *Un federalista giacobino: Ernesto Rossi pioniere degli Stati Uniti d'Europa*, Bologna: Il Mulino, 2007.

_____ and Simonetta Michelotti, eds. *Ernesto Rossi: Un democratico europeo*, Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2009.

Breyman, Steve. *Why Movements Matter: The West German Peace Movement and U.S. Arms Control Policy*, Albany: State University of New York, 2001.

Brzezinski, Zbigniew. *Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser 1977-1981*, New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1983.

Brogi, Alessandro. "Ike and Italy: The Eisenhower Administration and Italy's 'Neo-Atlanticist' Agenda," *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 3 (Summer 2002): 5-35.

_____. "Tra ruolo e identità: una chiave interpretative delle relazioni Italia-Stati Uniti negli anni Cinquanta." In ed. Agostino Giovagnoli and Luciano Tosi, *Un ponte sull'Atlantico. L'alleanza occidentale 1949-1999* (Guerini e associati: Milan, 2003), 201-15.

Brunet, Jean-Paul. "Police violence in Paris, October 1961: historical sources, methods, and conclusions," *The Historical Journal*, no. 1 (2008): 195-204.

Bukovsky, Vladimir. *Illusion in the West: Pacifists Against Peace*, Santa Monica: California Seminar on International Security and Foreign Policy, 1984.

Bundy, McGeorge. *Danger and Survival: Choices About the Bomb in the First Fifty Years*, New York: Random House, 1988.

_____, George F. Kennan, Robert S. McNamara and George C. Smith. "Nuclear Weapons and the Atlantic Alliance," *Foreign Affairs*, (Spring 1982): 753-68.

Burgio, Giovanni. *Pio La Torre: Palermo, la Sicilia, il PCI, la mafia*, Palermo: Centro di studi ed iniziative culturali Pio La Torre, 2010.

Burnett, Stanton H. and Luca Mantovani. *The Italian Guillotine: Operation Clean Hands and the Overthrow of Italy's First Republic*, Boston: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1998.

Busato, David. "Il Partito radicale in Italia da Mario Pannunzio a Marco Pannella 1954-1974," Thesis (*tesi di laurea*) submitted to Università degli Studi of Siena, 1995/96.

Bush, George [H.W.] and Brent Scowcroft, *A World Transformed*, New York: Vintage, 1998.

Cafagna, Luciano. *La grande slavina: L'Italia verso la crisi della democrazia*, Venice: Marsilio, 1993.

_____. *Una strana disfatta: La parabola dell'autonomismo socialista*, Venice: Marsilio, 1996.

_____, Agostino Giovagnoli, Gennaro Sasso and Giuseppe Vacca. *Le culture della prima repubblica*, Milan: Reset, 1998.

Calise, Mauro. *Il partito personale*, Rome-Bari: Laterza, 2000.

Canavero, Alfredo. "Identità europea e alleanza atlantica: gli europeisti di fronte al Patto Atlantico." In ed. Agostino Giovagnoli and Luciano Tosi, *Un ponte sull'Atlantico: L'alleanza occidentale 1949-1999*, 271-88. Milan: Guerini e associati, 2003.

Capitini, Aldo and Piergiorgio Giacchè. *Opposizione e liberazione*, Milan: Linea d'ombra, 1991.

Cardini, Antonio. *Tempi di ferro: "Il Mondo" e l'Italia del dopoguerra*, Bologna: Il Mulino, 1992.

_____. "Il 'partito' de 'Il Mondo': liberali, 'terza forza', sinistra democratica, radicali." In ed. Giacomo Nicolosi, *I partiti politici nell'Italia repubblicana: Atti del Convegno di Roma 5-6 dicembre 2002*, 313-30. Rome: Rubbettino, 2006.

Carocci, Giampiero, ed. *"Il Mondo": Antologia di una rivista scomoda*, Rome: Editori Riuniti, 1997.

Carter, April. *Peace Movements: International Protest and World Politics Since 1945*, London: Longman, 1992.

Castelli, Jim. *The Bishops and the Bomb: Waging Peace in a Nuclear Age*, Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1984.

Ceadel, Martin. *Thinking about Peace and War*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987.

Ceccarelli, Filippo. *Il letto e il potere*, Longanesi: Milan, 1994.

Ceci, Giovanni Mario. " 'Pace nella sicurezza' o 'sicurezza nella pace'. Il mondo cattolico italiano e la Democrazia Cristiana di fronte alla crisi degli euromissili," *Mondo contemporaneo*, no. 2 (2005): 67-95.

_____. "Il mondo cattolico italiano e la crisi degli euromissili." In ed. Luigi Goglia, Renato Moro and Leopoldo Nuti, *Guerra e pace nell'Italia del Novecento*, 437-60. Bologna: Il Mulino, 2006.

_____. *Renzo De Felice storico della politica*, Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2008.

Chernus, Ira. *Nuclear Madness: Religion and the Psychology of the Nuclear Age*, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991.

_____. "The Word 'Peace' as a Weapon of (Cold) War," *Peace Review*, no. 4 (1998).

Chernus, Ira. "Operation Candor: Fear, Faith, and Flexibility," *Diplomatic History*, no. 5 (2005): 799-803.

_____ and Edward Tabor Linenthal. *A Shuddering Dawn: Religious Studies and the Nuclear Age*, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989.

Chimenti, Anna. *Storia dei referendum: Dal divorzio alla riforma elettorale 1974-1999*, Bari: Laterza, 1999.

Craig, Campbell. *Glimmer of a New Leviathan: Total War in the Realism of Niebuhr, Morgenthau, and Waltz*, New York: Columbia University Press, 2003.

Christofferson, Michael Scott. *French Intellectuals against the Left: The Antitotalitarian Moment of the 1970s*, New York: Berghahn Books, 2004.

Cicciomessere, Roberto. *L'Italia armata*, Milan: Gammalibri, 1982.

Cohen, Federico. *Sinistra Italiana Sinistra Europea: Le ragioni di un'anomalia*, Rome: Gangemi, 1997.

_____ and Paolo Borioni, *Le Cassandre di Mondoperaio: Una stagione creativa della cultura socialista*, Venice: Marsilio, 1999.

Colarizi, Simona. *Storia dei partiti nell'Italia repubblicana*, Bari: Laterza, 1997.

_____. *Storia politica della Repubblica: Partiti, movimenti e istituzioni. 1943-2006*, Bari: Laterza, 2007.

_____ and Marco Gervasoni. *La cruna dell'ago: Craxi, il partito socialista e la crisi della Repubblica*, Bologna: Laterza, 2005.

_____, Piero Craveri, Silvio Pons and Gaetano Quagliariello, eds. *Gli anni Ottanta come storia*, Rome: Rubbettino, 2004.

Connelly, Matthew. *A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria's Fight for Independence and the Origins of the Post-Cold War Era*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2002.

_____. *Fatal Misconception: The Struggle to Control the World Population*, Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2008.

Consolo, Vincenzo. *Pio La Torre, orgoglio di Sicilia*, Palermo: Centro di studi ed iniziative culturali Pio La Torre, 2009.

Coralluzzo, Valter. *La politica estera dell'Italia repubblicana (1946-1992): Modello di analisi e studio di casi*, Milan: Francoangeli, 2000.

Corleone, Franco, Angelo Panebianco, Lorenzo Strik Lievers and Massimo Teodori, eds. *Radicali o qualunquisti?* Rome: Savelli, 1978.

Cortright, David. *Peace: A History of Movements and Ideas*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008.

Cotta, Maurizio and Pierangelo Isernia, eds. *Il gigante dai piedi di argilla: La crisi del regime partitocratico in Italia*, Bologna: Il Mulino, 1996.

Craveri, Piero. *La Repubblica dal 1958 al 1992*, Turin: UTET, 1995.

_____. "Dopo l' 'unità nazionale' la crisi del sistema dei partiti." In ed. Simona Colarizi, Piero Craveri, Silvio Pons, and Gaetano Quagliariello, *Gli anni Ottanta come storia*, 11-29. Rome: Rubbettino, 2004.

_____. "Perchè il PCI non poté mai diventare forza egemone del sistema politico italiano." In ed. Gerardo Nicolosi, *I partiti politici nell'Italia repubblicana: Atti del Convegno di Siena 5-6 dicembre 2002*, 117-34. Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2006.

_____. "Le ragioni della politica estera nell'azione politica di Bettino Craxi." In ed. Andrea Spiri, *Bettino Craxi, il socialismo europeo e il sistema internazionale*, 95-107. Venice: Marsilio, 2006.

_____ and Gaetano Quagliariello, eds. *Atlantismo ed Europeismo*, Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2003.

_____ and Gaetano Quagliariello, eds. *L'antiamericanismo in Italia e in Europa nel secondo dopoguerra*, Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2004.

Croci, Osvaldo. "Berlusconi's triumph. Language and politics in Italy: from Moro to Berlusconi," *Journal of Modern Italian Studies*, 3 (2001): 348-70.

D'Agata, Raffaele. "Il contesto europeo della distensione internazionale." In ed. Agostino Giovagnoli and Silvio Pons, *L'Italia repubblicana nella crisi degli anni Settanta: Tra guerra fredda e distensione*, 299-330. Rome: Rubbettino, 2003.

De Felice, Franco. *La questione della nazione repubblicana*, Rome-Bari: Laterza, 1999.

_____. *Rosso e Nero*, Milan: Baldini e Castoldo, 1995.

De Grazia, Victoria. *Irresistible Empire: American's Advance through 20th Century Europe*, Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005.

Del Bosco, Mauro. *I radicali e "Il Mondo"*, Turin: ERI, 1979.

de Leonardis, Massimo, ed. *Il Mediterraneo nella politica estera italiana del secondo dopoguerra*, Bologna: Il Mulino, 2003.

della Porta, Donatella. *Movimenti collettivi e sistema politico in Italia 1960-1995*, Rome-Bari: Laterza, 1996.

_____. *The Global Justice Movement: Cross-national and Transnational Perspectives*, Boulder: Paradigm, 2007.

Del Pero, Mario. *L'alleato scomodo: Gli USA e la DC negli anni del centrismo (1948-1955)*, Rome: Carocci, 2001.

_____. "Containing containment: rethinking Italy's experience during the Cold War," *Journal of Modern Italian Studies*, no. 4 (2003): 532-55.

_____. "Distensione, bipolarismo e violenza: la politica estera americana nel Mediterraneo durante gli anni Settanta. Il caso portoghese e le sue implicazioni per l'Italia." In ed. Agostino Giovagnoli and Silvio Pons, *L'Italia repubblicana nella crisi degli anni settanta: Tra guerra fredda e distensione*, 123-44. Rome: Rubbettino, 2004.

_____. "American Pressures and Their Containment in Italy during the Ambassadorship of Clare Boothe Luce, 1953-1956," *Diplomatic History*, no. 3, (2004): 407-39.

_____. "I limiti della distensione. I Stati Uniti e l'implosione del regime portoghese," *Contemporanea*, no. 4 (December 2005): 621-50.

_____. *The Eccentric Realist: Henry Kissinger and the Shaping of American Foreign Policy*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2010.

De Luna, Giovanni. *Storia del Partito d'Azione*, Turin: UTET, 2006.

Dimitrov, Giorgi and Ivo Banac. *The diary of Georgi Dimitrov, 1933-1949*, Princeton, New Jersey: Yale University Press, 2003.

Dinan, Desmond. *Ever Closer Union*, Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Riener, 1999.

Di Nolfo, Ennio. *Storia delle relazioni internazionali 1918-1999*, Bari: Laterza, 2000.

_____, ed. *La politica estera italiana negli anni Ottanta*, Manduria-Bari-Rome: Piero Lacaita Editore, 2003.

_____. "La fine della Guerra Fredda e l'Italia," *Mondo contemporaneo*, no. 1 (2006): 99-118.

Di Scala, Spencer M. "Bettino Craxi e la normalizzazione della politica italiana: sfida al PCI e riorientamento della politica estera." In ed. Andrea Spiri, *Bettino Craxi, il socialismo europeo e il sistema internazionale*, 49-65. Venice: Marsilio, 2006.

d'Onorio, Joël-Benoît. *La diplomatie de Jean Paul II*, Paris: Les Editions du Cerf, 200.

Dujardin, Vincent. "From Helsinki to the missiles question: A minor role for small countries? The case of Belgium (1973-1985)." In ed. Leopoldo Nuti, *The Crisis of Détente in Europe: From Helsinki to Gorbachev, 1975-1985*, 72-85. New York: Routledge, 2009.

Duggan, Christopher. *The Force of Destiny: A History of Italy Since 1796*, New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2008.

Ellwood, David. "Gli antiamericanismi in Europa nel Novecento: fasi e temi." In ed. Piero Craveri and Gaetano Quagliariello, *L'antiamericanismo in Italia e in Europa nel secondo dopoguerra*, 73-83. Soveria Mannelli, Rubbettino, 2004.

Eley, Geoff. *Forging Democracy: The History of the Left in Europe, 1850-2000*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2002.

English, Robert D. *Russia and the Idea of the West: Gorbachev, Intellectuals and the End of the Cold War*, New York: Columbia University Press, 2000.

_____. "Power, Ideas, and New Evidence on the Cold War's End," *International Security*, no. 4 (2002): 70-92.

Esposito, Chiarella. *America's Feeble Weapon: Funding the Marshall Plan in Italy and France , 1948-1950*, Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1994.

Evangelista, Matthew. *Unarmed Forces: The Transnational Movement to End the Cold War*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999.

Everts, Philip and Pierangelo Isernia, eds. *Public Opinion and the International Use of Force*, New York: Routledge, 2001.

Fanello [Marcucci], Gabriella, ed. *Radio Radicale, Archivio Sonoro: Archivio del parlamento, delle istituzioni, dei partiti e movimenti politici: Documenti sonori in digitale* (Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2003).

_____. *Luigi Sturzo: Vita e battaglie per la libertà del fondatore de Partito popolare italiano*, Milan: Mondadori, 2004.

Fedele, Marcello. *Democrazia referendaria: L'Italia dal primato dei partiti al trionfo dell'opinione pubblica*, Rome: Donzelli, 1994.

Ferguson, Niall, *The War of the World: Twentieth Century Conflict and the Descent of the West*, New York: Penguin Press, 2006.

_____, Charles S. Maier, Erez Manela and Daniel J. Sargent, eds., *The Shock of the Global: The 1970s in Perspective*, Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University, 2010.

Ferraris, Luigi Vittorio. *Manuale della politica estera italiana 1947-1993*, Rome-Bari: Laterza, 1996.

Finetti, Ugo. *Storia di Craxi: Miti e realta' della sinistra italiana*, Milan: Boroli, 2009.

Fiori, Giuseppe. *Una storia italiana: Vita di Ernesto Rossi*, Turin: Einaudi, 1997.

Formigoni, Guido. *La Democrazia cristiana e l'alleanza occidentale (1943-1953)*, Bologna: Il Mulino, 1996.

_____. "Democrazia Cristiana e mondo cattolico dal neoatlantismo alla distensione." In ed. Giovanni Giovagnoli and Luciano Tosi, *Un ponte sull'Atlantico. L'alleanza occidentale 1949-1999*, 141-67. Milan: Guerini e associati, 2003.

_____. "La Democrazia Cristiana." In ed. Gerardo Nicolosi, *I partiti politici nell'Italia repubblicana: Atti del Convegno di Siena 5-6 dicembre 2002*, 55-89. Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2006.

Forsythe, David P. *Human Rights and US Foreign Policy: Congress Reconsidered*, Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1988.

Franck, Thomas M. and Robert Weisband, *Foreign Policy by Congress*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1979.

Friedman, Thomas L. *The World Is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-First Century*, 3rd edition, New York: Picador/Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2007.

Furet, François. *Le passé d'une illusion: Essai sur l'idée communiste au XXe siècle*, Paris: Robert Laffont, 1995.

Galli, Giorgio. *Il bipartitismo imperfetto*. Bologna: Il Mulino, 1966.

_____. *I partiti politici italiani: 1943-2000*, Milan: Rizzoli, 2001.

Galli della Loggia, Ernesto. "Pannella tra utopismo e ricerca della verità." In Angiolo Bandinelli, and Valter Vecellio, eds., *Una 'inutile strage'? Da Via Rasella alle Fosse Ardeatine*, 82-85. Rome: Tullio Pironti, 1982.

_____. *Vent'anni d'impazienza: Scritti di politica e di battaglia*, Florence: Liberal, 2001.

Gambino, Antonio. *L'imperialismo dei diritti umani: Caos o giustizia nella societa' globale*, Rome: Editori Riuniti, 2001.

Gardner, Richard N. *Mission Italy: On the Front Lines of the Cold War*, Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005.

Garthoff, Raymond. *Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan*, rev. edition, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1994.

_____. *The Great Transition: American-Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War*, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1994.

Gentiloni, Paolo, Alberto Spampinato and Agostino Spataro. *Missili e Mafia: La Sicilia dopo Comiso*, Rome; Editori Riuniti, 1985.

Gentiloni Silveri, Umberto. *L'Italia e la nuova frontiera. Stati Uniti e centro-sinistra 1958-1965*, Bologna: Il Mulino, 1998.

_____. *L'Italia sospesa: La crisi degli anni Settanta vista da Washington*, Turin: Einaudi, 2009.

Giacomini, Ruggero. *I partigiani della pace : il movimento pacifista in Italia e nel mondo negli anni della prima guerra fredda*, Milan: Vangelista, 1984.

_____. "I movimenti per la pace nell'Italia repubblicana." In ed. Salvatore Minolfi, *L'Italia e la NATO: Una politica estera nelle maglie dell'alleanza*. Naples: Cuen, 1993.

Gibiansky. Leonid. “La questione di Trieste tra i comunisti italiani e jugoslavi,” in ed. Elena Aga and Gaetano Quagliariello, *L’altra faccia della luna: I rapporti tra PCI, PCF e Unione Sovietica*, 173-208. Bologna: Il Mulino, 1997.

Ginsborg, Paul. “Explaining Italy’s Crisis.” In ed. Simon Gundle and Stephen Parker, *The New Italian Republic: From the Fall of the Berlin Wall to Berlusconi*, 19-39. New York: Routledge, 1996.

_____. *A History of Contemporary Italy: Society and Politics 1943-1988*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003.

_____. *Italy and Its Discontents: Family, Civil Society, State: 1980-2001*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003.

_____. *Silvio Berlusconi: Television, Power and Patrimony*, New York: Verso, 2004.

Giovagnoli, Agostino. *Il partito italiano: La Democrazia Cristiana dal 1942 al 1994*, Bari: Laterza, 1996.

_____. “Un paese di frontiera: l’Italia tra il 1945 e il 1989.” In Agostino Giovagnoli and Luciano Tosi, *Un ponte sull’Atlantico. L’alleanza occidentale tra il 1949 e il 1989,* 95-110. Milan: Guerini e associati, 2003.

_____. *Il caso Moro: Una tragedia repubblicana*, Bologna: Il Mulino, 2005.

_____. “Berlinguer, la DC e il mondo cattolico.” In ed. Francesco Barbagallo and Albertina Vittoria, *Enrico Berlinguer, la politica italiana e la crisi mondiale: Atti del convegno organizzato a Sassari, 18-19 giugno 2004, dal Centro studi Enrico Berlinguer e dal Dipartimento di Storia dell’ Università di Sassari***,** 77-104. Rome: Carocci, 2007.

_____. “Penser l’affaire Moro: un tournant dans l’histoire de le République?” In Marc Lazar and Marie-Anne Matard-Bonucci, *L’Italie des années de plomb: Le terrorisme entre histoire et mémoire*, 178-91. Paris: Éditions Autrement, 2010.

_____and Silvio Pons, eds. *L'Italia repubblicana nella crisi degli anni Settanta: Tra guerra fredda e distensione*, vol. 1, Rome: Rubbettino, 2003.

_____and Luciano Tosi, eds. *Un ponte sull’Atlantico: L’alleanza occidentale 1949-1999*, Milan: Guerini e associati, 2003.

Gismondi, Arturo. “Il compromesso storico e la politica di solidarietà nazionale.” In *Il Parlamento italiano 1861-1992*, vol. 22, *1976-1979, Dal centro-sinistra alla solidarietà nazionale: Il rapimento e l’assassinio di Moro,* 45. Milan: Nuova Cei, 1993.

Glenny, Misha. *The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War*, New York: Penguin Books, 1993.

Goglia, Luigi, Renato Moro and Leopoldo Nuti. *Guerra e pace nell'Italia del Novecento: Politica estera, cultura politica e correnti dell'opinione pubblica*, Bologna: Il Mulino, 2006.

Gori, Francesca and Silvio Pons, eds. *The Soviet Union and Europe in the Cold War, 1943-53*, London: Macmillan, 1996.

Gregg, Richard. *The Power of Nonviolence*, Nyack, New York: Shocken, 1966.

Groppo, Bruno and Gianni Riccamboni. "Le Parti communiste italien face aux crises du 'socialisme reel'," *Communisme*, 3 (1983): 65-83.

Gruhn, Isebill V. "The Lomé Convention: Inching Toward Interdependence," *International Organization*, no. 2 (1976): 240–62.

Grünewald, Guido and Peter van den Dungen, eds. *Twentieth-Century Peace Movements: Successes and Failures*, Lewiston/Queenson/Lampeter: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1995.

Gualtieri, Roberto. "Nazionale e internazionale nell'Italia del dopoguerra (1943-50)." In ed. Silvio Pons, *Novecento italiano. Studi in ricordo di Franco De Felice*, 229-55. Rome: Carrocci, 2000.

_____. "L'ultimo decennio del PCI." In ed. P. Borioni, *Revisionismo socialista e rinnovamento liberale*, 175-206. Rome: Carocci, 2001.

Gualtieri, Roberto, ed. *Il PCI nell'Italia repubblicana 1943-1991*, Rome: Carocci, 2001.

_____. "Il PCI, la DC e il 'vincolo esterno': Una proposta di periodizzazione." In ed. R. Gualtieri, *Il PCI nell'Italia repubblicana 1943-1991*, 47-99. Rome: Carocci, 2001.

_____. "The Italian political system and détente (1963-1981)," *Journal of Modern Italian Studies*, no. 4 (2004): 428-49.

_____. "L'impatto di Reagan. Politica ed economia nella crisi della prima repubblica (1978-1992)." In ed. Simona Colarizi, Piero Craveri, Silvio Pons and Gaetano Quagliariello, *Gli anni Ottanta come storia*. Rome: Rubbettino, 2004.

_____. *L'Italia dal 1943 al 1992: DC e PCI nella storia della Repubblica*, Rome: Carrocci, 2006.

Guasconi, Maria Eleonora. "Europe and the EMS challenge. Old and new forms of European integration in the 1970s." In ed. Leopoldo Nuti, *The Crisis of Détente in Europe: From Helsinki to Gorbachev, 1975-1985*, 177-89. New York: Routledge, 2009.

Guerrieri, Sandro. “Da Mitterrand a Jospin. Il Partito socialista francese alla prova di governo.” In ed. P. Borioni, *Revisionismo socialista e rinnovamento liberale*, 105-129. Carocci: Rome, 2001.

Guillemoles, Alain. *Bernard Kouchner: la biographie*, Paris: Bayard, 2002.

Guiso, Andrea. "L'Europa e l'Alleanza Atlantica nella politica internazionale del PCI degli anni '50 e '60. Tra lealtà sovranazionale e collocazione reale." In ed. Piero Craveri and Gaetano Quagliariello, *Atlantismo ed europeismo*, 205-47. Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2003.

_____. “Il PCI e la sua storia: come cambiano i paradigm.” In ed. Gerardo Nicolosi, *I partiti politici nell’Italia repubblicana: Atti del Convegno di Siena 5-6 dicembre 2002*, 135-94. Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2006.

Gundle, Stephen and Simon Parker, eds. *The New Italian Republic: From the Fall of the Berlin Wall to Berlusconi*, New York: Routledge, 1996.

Guzzini, Stefano. “The ‘Long Night of the First Republic’: Years of Clientelistic Implosion in Italy,” *Review of International Political Economy*, no. 1 (winter 1995): 27-61.

Halberstam, David. *War in a Time of Peace: Bush, Clinton and the Generals*, New York: Touchstone, 2002.

Hanhimäki, Jussi. *The Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2004.

Hecht, Gabriella. *The Radiance of France: Nuclear Power and National Identity after World War II*, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998.

Herff, Jeffrey. *War by Other Means: Soviet Power, West German Resistance, and the Battle of Euromissiles*, New York: Free Press, 1991.

Herzog, Dagmar. “Syncopated Sex: Transforming European Sexual Cultures,” *The American Historical Review*, no. 5 (December 2009), 1287-1308.

Hirst, Paul. “Has Globalisation Killed Social Democracy?” In Andrew Gamble and Tony Wright, eds., *The New Social Democracy*, 84-96. Oxford: Blackwell, 1999.

Hitchcock, William I. *France Restored: Cold War Diplomacy and the Quest for Leadership in Europe, 1944-1954*, Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1998.

_____. *The Struggle for Europe: The Turbulent History of a Divided Continent, 1945 to the Present*, New York: Anchor, 2003.

Hockenos, Paul. *Joshka Fischer and the Making of the Berlin Republic: An Alternative History of Postwar Germany*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.

Horn, Gerd-Rainer and Padraic Kenney. *Transnational Moments of Change: Europe 1945, 1968, 1989*, Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004.

Horn, Gerd-Rainer. *The Spirit of '68: Rebellion in Western Europe and North America, 1956-1976*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2007.

Ignazi, Piero. *Il polo escluso: Profilo storico del Movimento Sociale Italiano,* Bologna: Il Mulino, 1989.

_____. *Dal Pci al Pds*, Bologna: Il Mulino, 1992.

_____. *Il potere dei partiti: La politica in Italia dagli anni Sessanta ad oggi*, Rome-Bari; Laterza, 2002.

Ilari, Virgilio. *Storia militare della Prima Repubblica*, Ancona: Nuove ricerche, 1994.

Il marxismo e lo Stato: Il dibattito aperto nella sinistra italiana sulle tesi di Norberto Bobbio, Florence: Nuova serie dei quaderni di Mondoperaio, 1976.

Incisa di Camerana, Ludovico. *La vittoria dell'Italia nella terza guerra mondiale*, Rome: Laterza, 1997.

Independent Commission on International Development Issues. *North-South: a Programme for Survival: Report of the Independent Commission on International Development Issues* ["The Brandt Report"], Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1980.

Iriye, Akira. *Cultural Internationalism and World Order*, Baltimore, Maryland: The John Hopkins Press, 1997.

_____. *Global Community: The Role of International Organizations in the Making of the Contemporary World*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004.

_____. "The Transnational Turn," *Diplomatic History*, no. 3 (2007): 373-76.

_____. "Environmental History and International History," *Diplomatic History*, no. 4 (September 2008): 643-46.

Isernia, Pierangelo. *La cooperazione allo sviluppo,* Bologna: Il Mulino, 1995.

_____. "Bandiera e risorse: la politica estera negli anni Ottanta." In ed. Maurizio Cotta and Pierluigi Isernia, *Il gigante dai piedi di argilla: La crisi del regime partitocratico in Italia*, 139-88. Bologna: Il Mulino, 1996.

Isserman, Maurice and Michael Kazin. *America Divided: The Civil War of the 1960s*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2000.

Istituto di ricerche per il disarmo, lo sviluppo e la pace (IRDISP). *Quello che i russi già sanno e gli italiani non devono sapere*, Rome: IRDISP, 1984.

Johnson, Robert David. *Congress and the Cold War*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006.

Johnstone, Diana. *The Politics of Euromissiles: Europe's Role in America's World*, London: Verso, 1984.

Judt, Tony. *Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945*, New York: The Penguin Press, 2005.

Kaldor, Mary. *New & Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era*, Malden, Mass: Polity Press, 2006.

_____. *Human Security: Reflections on Globalization and Intervention*, Malden, Mass.: Policy Press, 2007.

Keck Margaret E. and Kathryn Sikkink, *Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998.

Kempe, Frederic. *Berlin 1961: Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Most Dangerous Place on Earth*, New York: Putnam, 2011.

Kennan, George. "Disengagement Revisited," *Foreign Affairs*, no. 2 (January 1959): 187-210.

Kenney, Padraic and Gerd-Rainer Horn, eds., *Transnational Moments of Change: Europe 1945, 1968, 1989*, New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004.

Kertzer, David. *Comrades and Christians: Religion and Political Struggle in Communist Italy*, Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1980.

Kissinger, Henry. *White House Years*, Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1979.

_____. *Years of Renewal*, New York: Touchstone, 2000.

Kogan, Norman. *The Politics of Italian Foreign Policy*, London: Pall Mall Press, 1963.

_____. *A Political History of Italy: The Postwar Years*, New York: Praeger, 1983.

_____et al. *Realtà e immagine della politica estera italiana. Una ricerca diretta da Carlo Mongardini*, Milan: Giuffrè, 1980.

Kornbluh, Peter. *The Pinochet File: A Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and Accountability,* New York: The New Press, 2003.

Korey, William. *NGOs and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: 'A Curious Grapevine',* New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998.

Kouchner, Bernard. *Les guerriers de la paix: du Kossovo à l'Irak,* Paris: Grasset, 2004.

Krautheimer, Richard. *Rome: Profile of a City, 312-1308,* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Lagorio, Lelio. *L'ultima sfida: Gli euromissili,* Florence: Loggia dè Lanzi, 1998.

_____. "Il New Deal italiano degli anni Ottanta. La spedizione militare in Libano 1982-1984," *Rivista Marittima,* (Autumn 2003).

_____. *L'esplosione: Storia della disgregazione del PSI,* Florence: Polistampa, 2004.

_____. *L'ora di Austerlitz: 1980: La svolta che muto' l'Italia,* Florence: Polistampa, 2005.

_____. "Anni Ottanta. I mutamenti di politica estera e la svolta di political militare." In ed. Andrea Spiri, *Bettino Craxi, il socialismo europeo e il sistema internazionale,* 67-71. Venice: Marsilio, 2006.

La Serra, Ettore. *Abbasso tutti: Giannini e il qualunquismo,* Rome: Settimo Sigillo, 1990.

Lazar, Marc. *Maisons rouges: Les partis communistes français et italiens de la Libération à nos jours,* Paris: Aubier, 1992.

_____. "La strategia del PCF e del PCI dal 1944 al 1947: acquisizioni della ricerca e problemi irrisolti." In ed. Elena Aga Rossi and Gaetano Quagliariello, *L'altra faccia della luna: I rapporti tra PCI, PCF e Unione Sovietica,* 79-100. Bologna: Il Mulino, 1997.

_____. "Du populisme à gauche: Les cas français et italiens," *Vingtième Siècle: Revue d'histoire,* Oct.-Dec. 1997: 121-31.

_____. "Totalitarianism and Communism in France and in Italy," *Journal of Political Ideologies,* no. 3 (1998): 275-83.

_____. Commentary. In ed. Roberto Gualtieri, *Il PCI nell'Italia repubblicana 1943-1991,* 371-72. Rome: Carocci, 2001.

_____. *Le communisme, une passion française,* Paris: Perrin, 2005.

_____ and Marie-Anne Matard-Bonucci, eds. *L'Italie des années de plomb: Le terrorisme entre histoire et mémoire,* Paris: Éditions Autrement, 2010.

Lawrence, Mark Atwood. "Containing Globalism: The United States and the Developing World in the 1970s." In ed. Niall Ferguson, Charles S. Maier, Erez Manela and Daniel J. Sargent, *The Shock of the Global: The 1970s in Perspective*, 205-19. Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University, 2010.

Lepre, Aurelio. *Storia della prima Repubblica: L'Italia dal 1943 al 2003*, Bologna: Il Mulino, 2004.

Levering, Ralph B. and Miriam L. Levering. *Citizen Action for Global Change: The Neptune Group and the Law of the Sea*, Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1999.

Lévesque, Jacques. *Italian Communists versus the Soviet Union: the PCI Charts a New Foreign Policy*, Berkeley: Policy Papers in International Affairs, Institute of International Studies, University of California Press, 1987.

_____. *The Enigma of 1989: The USSR and the Liberation of Eastern Europe*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997.

Lipschutz, Ronnie D. *After Authority: War, Peace, and Global Politics in the 21st Century*, Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 2000.

Lomartire, Carlo Maria. *Il qualunquista: Guglielmo Giannini e l'antipolitica*, Milan: Mondadori, 2008.

Loth, Werner. *Overcoming the Cold War: A History of Détente, 1950-1991*, New York: Palgrave, 2002.

_____. "The Road to Vienna: West German and European Security from 1969 to 1973." In ed. Wilfred Loth and Georges-Henri Soutou, *The Making of Détente: Eastern and Western Europe in the Cold War, 1965-75*, 153-67. New York: Routledge, 2008.

Ludlow, Peter. *The Making of the European Monetary System: A Case Study of the Politics of the European Community*, London: Butterworth Scientific, 1982.

Lundestad, Geir. *The American Non-policy towards Eastern Europe 1943-1947*, Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1978.

_____. *The United States and Western Europe since 1945: from "Empire" by Invitation to Transatlantic Drift*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.

Lupo, Salvatore. *Partito e antipartito: Una storia politica della prima Repubblica, 1946-78*, Rome: Donzelli, 2004.

Lussana, Fiamma. “In confronto con le socialdemocrazie e la ricerca di un nuovo socialismo nell’ultimo Berlinguer.” In ed. Francesco Barbagallo and Albertina Vittoria, *Enrico Berlinguer, la politica italiana e la crisi mondiale: Atti del convegno organizzato a Sassari, 18-19 giugno 2004, dal Centro studi Enrico Berlinguer e dal Dipartimento di Storia dell’ Università di Sassari*, 147-72. Rome: Carocci, 2007.

Lytle, Mark H. “NGOs and the New Transnational Politics,” *Diplomatic History*, no. 1 (Winter 2001): 121-8.

Mafai, Miriam. *Dimenticare Berlinguer: La sinistra italiana e la tradizione comunista*, Rome: Donzelli, 1996.

Maier, Charles. "Consigning the Twentieth Century to History: Alternative Narratives for the Modern Era," *American Historical Review*, no. 3 (2000): 807-31.

_____. "The Cold War as an era of imperial rivalry." In ed. Silvio Pons and Federico Romero, *Reinterpreting the End of the Cold War*, 13-20. New York: Frank Cass, 2005.

_____. “‘Malaise’: The Crisis of Capitalism in the 1970s.” In ed. Niall Ferguson, Charles S. Maier, Erez Manela and Daniel J. Sargent, *The Shock of the Global: The 1970s in Perspective*, 25-48. Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University, 2010.

Manela, Erez. “Smallpox Eradication and the Rise of Global Governance.” In ed. Niall Ferguson, Charles S. Maier, E. Manela and D. J. Sargent, *The Shock of the Global: The 1970s in Perspective*, 251-278. Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University, 2010.

Maori, Andrea. *Gli eretici della pace*, Perugia: Labirinto Editrice, 1988.

Maranini, Giuseppe. *Miti e realtà della democrazia*, Milan: Edizioni di comunità, 1958.

Marasà, Bruno. *Gli anni di Comiso*, Palermo: Istituto Gramsci Siciliano, 1986.

Marx, Karl. *La Commune de Paris: Karl Marx: La Guerre Civile en France*, Rome: Savelli, 1976.

Mastropaolo, Alfio. *La Repubblica dei destini incrociati*, Florence: La Nuova Italia, 1996.

_____. *Antipolitica: All’origine della crisi italiana*, Naples: L’ancora, 2000.

Mazower, Mark. *Dark Continent: Europe’s Twentieth Century*, New York: Vintage, 2000.

_____. *No Enchanted Palace: The End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the United Nations*, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2009.

McCarthy, Patrick. *The Crisis of the Italian State: From the Origins of the Cold War to the Fall of Berlusconi and Beyond*, New York: St Martin's Press, 1997.

Miller, James Edward. "Who Chopped Down that Cherry Tree? The Italian Resistance in History and Politics, 1945-1998," *Journal of Modern Italian Studies*, no. 1 (1999): 37-54.

Milward, Alan S. *The European Rescue of the Nation-state*, London: Routledge, 2000.

Moncalvo, Gigi. *Pannella il potere della parola*, Milan: Sperling & Kupfer, 1983.

Morabito, Francesco. *La sfida radicale: Il Partito Radicale da Pannunzio a Pannella*, Milan: SugarCo, 1977.

Morel, Laurence. "Le riforme istituzionali: dall'iniziativa dei partiti ai referendum." In ed. Maurizio Cotta and Pierluigi Isernia, *Il gigante dai piedi di argilla: La crisi del regime partitocratico in Italia*, 337-72. Bologna: Il Mulino, 1996.

Moro, Giovanni. *Anni Settanta*, Turin: Einaudi, 2007.

Moro, Renato. *Storia della pace: Idee, movimenti, istituzioni*, Bologna: Il Mulino, 2004.

_____. "Sulla 'storia della pace'," *Mondo Contemporaneo*, no. 3 (2006): 97-140.

Moyn, Samuel. *The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History*, Cambridge, Mass: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2010.

Müller, Jan-Werner. *Contesting Democracy: Political Ideas in Twentieth-Century Europe*, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2011.

Napolitano, Giorgio. *Dal Pci al socialismo europeo: Un'autobiografia politica*, Rome-Bari: Laterza, 2006.

Neier, Aryeh. *Taking Liberties: Four Decades in the Struggle for Rights*, New York: PublicAffairs, 2003.

Nenni, Pietro. *Tempo di guerra fredda: Diari 1943-1956*, Milan: SugarCo, 1981.

Neri Serneri, Simone. "A Past to Be Thrown Away? Politics and History in the Italian Resistance," *Contemporary European History*, no. 3 (November 1995): 367-81.

Nicolosi, Gerardo. "Il 'secondo' Partito Radicale: idea di partito e organizzazione." In ed. Gerardo Nicolosi, *I partiti politici nell'Italia repubblicana: Atti del Convegno di Roma 5-6 dicembre 2002*, 331-64. Rome: Rubbettino, 2006.

_____, ed., *I partiti politici nell'Italia repubblicana: Atti del Convegno di Siena 5-6 dicembre 2002*, Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2006.

Njolstad, Olav. "The Carter Administration and Italy: Keeping the Communists Out of Power without Interfering," *Journal of Cold War Studies*, no. 3 (2002): 56-94.

_____, ed. *The Last Decade of the Cold War: From Conflict Escalation to Conflict Transformation*, Portland, Oregon: Frank Cass, 2004.

Nuti, Leopoldo. 'Me too, please': Italy and the Politics of Nuclear weapons, 1945-1975," in *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, no. 1 (March 1993): 114-48.

_____. "L'Italie et les missiles Jupiter." In ed. Maurice Vaïsse, *L'Europe et la crise de Cuba*, 123-57. Paris: Armand Colin, 1993.

_____. *Gli Stati Uniti e l'apertura a sinistra: Importanza e limiti della presenza americana in Italia*, Bari: Laterza, 1999.

_____. Commentary in ed. Roberto Gualtieri, *Il PCI nell'Italia repubblicana,* 341-45. Rome: Carocci, 2001.

_____. "The United States, Italy,and the Opening to the Left, 1953–1963," *Journal of Cold War Studies*, no. 3 (2002): 36-55.

_____. "Continuità e rottura nella politica estera americana da Eisenhower a Kennedy." In ed. Piero Craveri and Gaetano Quagliariello, *Atlantismo ed europeismo*, 543-66. Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2003.

_____. "L'Italia e lo schieramento dei missili da crociera BGM-109 G 'Gryphon'." In ed. Ennio Di Nolfo, *La politica estera italiana negli anni Ottanta*, 41-75. Manduria-Bari-Rome: Piero Lacaita Editore, 2003.

_____. "Politica estera e politica interna negli anni del centro-sinistra." In ed. Agostino Giovagnoli and Luciano Tosi, *Un ponte sull'Atlantico: L'alleanza occidentale 1949-1999*, 169-80. Milan: Guerini e associati, 2003.

_____, "Italy and the Battle of the Euromissiles: The Deployment of the US BGM-109 G 'Gryphon', 1979-83." In ed. Olav Noljstad, *The Last Decade of the Cold War: From Conflict Escalation to Conflict Transformation,* 332-59. New York: Frank Cass, 2004.

_____. "On recule pour mieux sauter, or 'What needs to be done' (to understand the 1970s)." In ed. Silvio Pons and Federico Romero, *Reinterpreting the End of the Cold War: Issues, Interpretations, Periodizations*, 38-51. New York: Frank Cass, 2005.

_____. "Linee generali della politica di difesa italiana (1945-1989)." In ed. Luigi Goglia, Renato Moro and Leopoldo Nuti, *Guerra e pace nell'Italia del Novecento: Politica estera, cultura politica e correnti dell'opinione pubblica*, 463-503. Bologna: Il Mulino, 2006.

_____. *La sfida nucleare: La politica estera italiana e le armi atomiche 1945-1991*, Bologna: Il Mulino, 2007.

_____, ed. *The Crisis of Détente in Europe: From Helsinki to Gorbachev, 1975-1985*, New York: Routledge, 2009.

Orsina, Giovanni. "'Ricostruire con l'unità d'una generazione l'unità della nazione.' La nascita dell'Unione gogliardica italiana (1945-1953),", in Giovanni Orsina and Gaetano Quagliariello, eds., *La formazione della classe politica in Europa (1945-1956)* (Manduria-Bari-Rome: Piero Lacaita, 2000), 383-424.

_____. *Anticlericalismo e democrazia: Storia del Partito radicale in Italia e a Roma, 1901-1914*, Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2002.

_____ and Gaetano Quagliariello, "L'Unuri e la formazione della classe politica italiana," in Giovanni Orsina and Gaetano Quagliariello, eds., *La formazione della classe politica in Europa (1945-1956)* (Manduria-Bari-Rome: Piero Lacaita, 2000), 325-45.

Painter, Borden W. Jr. "Renzo De Felice and the Historiography of Italian Fascism," *The American Historical Review*, no. 2 (April 1990): 391-404.

Palazzolo, Lanfranco, ed. *Leonardo Sciascia deputato radicale, 1979-1983*, Milan: Kaos, 2004.

Panebianco, Angelo. "The Italian Radicals: New Wine in an Old Bottle." In ed. K. Lawson and P. H. Merkl, *When Parties Fail: Emerging Alternative Organizations*, 110-36. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988.

_____. Introduction. In Giuseppe Maranini, *Storia del potere in Italia, 1848-1967*, Milan: Corbaccio, 1995.

Pannella, Marco. *Pannella su Marco Pannella*, Rome: Magna, 1977.

_____. *Scritti e discorsi 1959-1980*, Milan: Gammalibri, 1982.

_____ and Lanfranco Palazzolo. *A sinistra del PCI: Interventi parlamentari 1976-1979*, Milan: Kaos, 2007.

_____ and Lanfranco Palazzolo. *Contro i crimini di regime: Interventi parlamentari 1980-1986*, Milan: Kaos, 2007.

Parachini, Rolando. "Storia della 'Sinistra Radicale' dal 1952 al 1962," Thesis (*tesi di laurea*) submitted to Università degli Studi di Roma, 1978-79.

Passerin d'Entrèves, Alessandro, with Cary J. Nederman. *Natural Law: An Introduction to Legal Philosophy* (Library of Conservative Thought), rev. ed., New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction, 1994.

Pàstena, Pietro. *Breve storia del pacifismo in Italia*, Acireale-Rome: Bonanno, 2005.

Petracchi, Giorgio. "L'Italia e la Ostpolitik." In ed. Ennio Di Nolfo, *La politica estera italiana negli anni Ottanta*, 293-318. Manduria-Bari-Rome: 2003.

Petrini, Roberto, ed. *Capitalismo inquinato: Ernesto Rossi*, Rome: Laterza, 1993.

Pezzino, Paolo. *Senza Stato: Le ragioni storiche della crisi italiana*, Rome-Bari: Laterza, 2002.

Pierrejean, Daniel. *Bernard Kouchner du Biafra au Kosovo*, Paris: Editeur indépendant, 2007.

Pizzorno, Alessandro. *Le radici della politica assoluta*, Milan: Feltrinelli, 1994.

Polanyi, Karl. *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time*, Boston, Mass.: Beacon Press, 2001.

Poggiolini, Ilaria. "Negotiating a Settlement for Italy and the Minor Axis Powers: Peace Diplomacy and the Origins of the Cold War, 1945-7." In ed. Francesca Gori and Silvio Pons, *The Soviet Union and Europe in the Cold War, 1943-53*, 383-94. London: Macmillan, 1996.

Pons, Silvio. *L'impossibile egemonia: L'Urss, il Pci e le origini della guerra fredda*, Rome: Carrocci, 1999.

_____, ed. *Novecento italiano: Studi in ricordo di Franco De Felice*, Rome: Carrocci, 2000.

_____. "L'Italia e il Pci nella politica estera dell'URSS di Breznev." In ed. Agostino Giovagnoli and Silvio Pons, *L'Italia repubblicana nella crisi degli anni settanta*, vol. I: *Tra guerra fredda e distensione*, 63-87. Rome: Rubbettino, 2001.

_____. "L'URSS e il PCI nel sistema internazionale della guerra fredda." In ed. Roberto Gualtieri, *Il PCI nell'Italia repubblicana 1943-1991*, 3-46. Rome: Carocci, 2001.

_____. "Meetings between the Italian Communist Party and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Moscow and Rome, 1978-80," *Cold War History*, no. 1 (October 2002): 157-66.

_____. "La formazione della politica internazionale di Berlinguer: Europa, NATO e URSS (1968-1976)." In ed. Piero Craveri and Gaetano Quagliariello, *Atlantismo ed europeismo*, 589-609. Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2003.

_____. “La politica internazionale di Berlinguer negli anni dell’ ‘unità nazionale’: eurocommunismo, NATO e URSS (1976-79).” In ed. Agostino Giovagnoli and Luciano Tosi, *Un ponte sull’Atlantico: L’alleanza occidentale tra il 1949 e il 1989*, 181-97. Milan: Guerini e associati, 2003.

_____. "Il socialismo europeo, la sinistra italiana e la crisi del comunismo." In ed. Simona Colarizi, Piero Craveri, Silvio Pons and Gaetano Quagliariello, *Gli anni Ottanta come storia*, 215-29. Rome: Rubbettino, 2004.

_____. *Berlinguer e la fine del comunismo*, Turin: Einaudi, 2006.

_____ and Federico Romero, eds. *Reinterpreting the End of the Cold War: Issues, Interpretations, Periodizations*, New York: Frank Cass, 2005.

Ponzone, Lorenza. *Il Partito Radicale nella politica italiana: 1962-1989*, Fasano: Schena, 1993.

Popper, Karl. *The Open Society and Its Enemies*, 2 vols., Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1966.

Prados, John. *How the Cold War Ended: Debating and Doing History*, Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2011.

Quagliariello, Gaetano. “I liberali e l’idea di partito nella stagione costituente.” In ed. Claudia Franceschini, Sandra Guerrieri, and Giancarlo Monina, *Le idee costituzionali della Resistenza: Atti del Convegno di studi Roma 19, 20 e 21 ottobre 1995*, 268-88. Rome: Istituto Poligrafico e Zecca dello Stato, 1997.

_____. “La formazione della classe politica in Italia (1945-1956),” in Giovanni Orsina and Gaetano Quagliariello, eds., *La formazione della classe politica in Europa (1945-1956)* (Manduria-Bari-Rome: Piero Lacaita, 2000), 31-73.

_____. "Prospettiva atlantica e prospettiva europea nel pensiero e nell'azione di Charles de Gaulle." In ed. Piero Craveri and Gaetano Quagliariello, *Atlantismo ed europeismo*, 95-133. Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2003.

_____. "Gli anni Ottanta: gli aspetti politico-istituzionali: Un'interpretazione." In ed. Simona Colarizi, Piero Craveri, Silvio Pons, and Gaetano Quagliariello, *Gli anni Ottanta come storia*, 267-80. Rome: Rubbettino, 2004.

_____. "Oltre il 'terzaforzismo'. Craxi e le relazioni transatlantiche (1976-1983)." In ed. Andrea Spiri, *Bettino Craxi, il socialismo europeo e il sistema internazionale*, 23-47. Venice: Marsilio, 2006.

Rayner, Hervé. “Protéger, subir et réprimer: la délicate ‘gestion’ du terrorisme par l’État italien during ‘les années de plomb.” In Marc Lazar and Marie-Anne Matard-Bonucci, eds., *L’Italie des années de plomb: Le terrorisme entre histoire et mémoire*, 36-49. Paris: Éditions Autrement, 2010.

Rey, Marie-Pierre. "The Mejdunarodniki in the 1960s and first half of the 1970s. Backgrounds, connections, and the agenda of Soviet international elites." In ed. Werner Loth and Georges-Henri Soutou, *The Making of Détente. Eastern and Western Europe in the Cold War, 1965-75*, 51-65. New York: Routledge, 2008.

Reynolds, David. *One World Divisible: A Global History Since 1945*, New York: Norton, 2000.

Riccardi, Andrea. "La Santa Sede fra distensione e guerra fredda: da Paolo VI a Giovanni Paolo II." In ed. Agostino Giovagnoli and Silvio Pons, *L'Italia repubblicana nella crisi degli anni settanta*, vol. I: *Tra guerra fredda e distensione*, 145-55. Rome: Rubbettino, 2001.

Rieff, David. *At the Point of a Gun: Democratic Dreams and Armed Interventions*, New York: Simon & Schuster, 2005.

Ripa di Meana, Carlo. "Bettino Craxi e il dissenso: Una lunga e grande storia." In ed. Andrea Spiri, *Bettino Craxi, il socialismo europeo e il sistema internazionale*, 191-218. Venice: Marsilio, 2006.

Risse-Kappen, Thomas. “Ideas do not float freely: transnational coalitions, domestic structures, and the end of the Cold War,” *International Organization*, no. 2 (1994): 185-214.

_____, Stephen C. Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink, eds., *The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change*, Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

Riva, Valerio. *Oro da Mosca: I finanziamenti sovietici al PCI dalla Rivoluzione d'ottobre al crollo dell'URSS*, Milan: Mondadori, 1999.

Roberts, Adam and Timothy Garton Ash, eds. *Civil Resistance and Power Politics: The Experience of Nonviolent Action from Gandhi to the Present*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2009.

Romano, Sergio and Marc Lazar, with Michele Canonica. *L’Italia disunita*, Milan: Longanesi, 2011.

Romeo, Giuseppe. *La politica estera italiana nell'era Andreotti (1972-1992)*, Rome: Rubbettino, 2000.

Roveri, Alessandro. *Il socialismo tradito: La Sinistra italiana negli anni della guerra fredda*, Scandicci: La Nuova Italia, 1995.

Rubbi, Antonio. *Il mondo di Berlinguer*, Rome: Napoleone, 1994.

Rutelli, Francesco. *Per il disarmo*, Milan: Gammalibri, 1982.

Sabbatucci, Giovanni. *Il trasformismo come sistema: Saggio sulla politica dell'Italia unita*, Rome-Bari: Laterza, 2003.

Salvadori, Massimo L. *La Sinistra nella storia italiana*, Rome-Bari: Laterza, 2000.

_____. "Il 'nuovo PSI'." In ed. Paolo Borioni, *Revisionismo socialista e rinnovamento liberale*, 145-73. Rome: Carocci, 2001.

Santino, Umberto. *L'alleanza e il compromesso: Mafia e politica dai tempi di Lima e Andreotti ai giorni nostri*, Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 1997.

_____. *Storia del movimento antimafia: Dalla lotta di classe all'impegno civile*, Rome: Editori Riuniti, 2000.

Sargent, Daniel J. "From Internationalism to Globalism: The United States and the Transformation of International Politics in the 1970s," Ph.D. diss. Harvard University, 2008.

_____. "The United States and Globalization in the 1970s." In ed. Niall Ferguson, Charles S. Maier, Erez Manela and Daniel J. Sargent, *The Shock of the Global: The 1970s in Perspective*, 49-64. Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University, 2010.

Sassoon, Donald. *One Hundred Years of Socialism: The West European Left in the Twentieth Century*, London: IB Tauris, 1996.

_____. *Contemporary Italy: Economy, Society and Politics since 1945*, New York: Longman, 1997.

_____. "European Social Democracy and New Labour: Unity in Diversity?" In ed. Andrew Gamble and Tony Wright, *The New Social Democracy*, 19-36. Oxford: Blackwell, 1999.

_____. "La sinistra, l'Europa, il PCI." In ed. Roberto Gualtieri, *Il PCI nell'Italia repubblicana 1943-1991*, 223-49. Rome: Carocci, 2001.

Savranskaya, Svetlana. "Human rights movement in the USSR after the signing of the Helsinki Final Act, and the reaction of Soviet authorities." In ed. Leopoldo Nuti, *The Crisis of Détente in Europe: From Helsinki to Gorbachev, 1975-1985*, 26-40. New York: Routledge, 2009.

Scalfari, Eugenio. *La sera andavamo in Via Veneto: Storia di un gruppo dal "Mondo" alla "Repubblica,"* Milan: Mondadori, 1986.

_____. *L'uomo che non credeva in Dio*, Turin: Einaudi, 2008.

Scarpa, Lia. "L'organizzazione del M.S.I. e degli altri movimenti di destra (1959-1984)." In Carlo Vallauri, ed., *I partiti italiani tra declino e riforma: Struttura, organizzazione, finanziamento, base sociale, quadri, stampa, bibliografia, natura giuridica, movimenti femminili e giovanili, risultati elettorali dagli anni sessanta agli anni ottanta*, vol. 2, 549-63. Rome: Bulzoni Editore, 1986.

Sen, Amartya. *Development as Freedom*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1999.

Setta, Sandro. *L'Uomo qualunque*, Rome: Laterza, 1975.

Schneider, Jane C. and Peter T. Schneider, *Reversible Destiny: Mafia, Antimafia, and the Struggle for Palermo*, Berleley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2003.

Schwartz, Thomas A. "Legacies of détente: a three-way discussion," *Cold War History*, no. 4 (November 2008): 513-25.

Sciascia, Leonardo. *L'affaire Moro*, Paris: Bernard Grasset, 1978.

Scirocco, Giovanni. "Il PSI dall'antiamericanismo alla riscoperta dell'Europa (1948-1957)." In ed. Piero Craveri and Gaetano Quagliariello, *Atlantismo ed europeismo*, 135-204. Soveria Mannelli: Rubbetino, 2003.

Scoppola, Pietro. *La repubblica dei partiti: Profilo storico della democrazia in Italia (1945-1990)*, Bologna: Il Mulino, 1991.

Sharp, Gene. *The Politics of Nonviolent Action*, Boston, Mass.: Porter Sargent, 1973.

Shaw, Martin. *War & Genocide*, Malden, Mass.: Polity Press, 2003.

_____. *The New Western Way of War: Risk-transfer War and Its Crisis in Iraq*, Malden Mass.: Polity Press, 2005.

Silber, Laura and Allan Little. *Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation*, New York: Penguin Books, 1997.

Simich, Laura. "Comiso: The Politics of Peace in a Sicilian Town," Ph.D. diss. Columbia University, 1988.

Sirinelli, Jean-François. "Guerre d'Algérie, guerre de petitions?" In ed. Jean-Pierre Rioux and Jean-François Sirinelli, *La Guerre d'Algérie et les intellectuels français*, 265-306. Brussels: Editions Complexes, 1991.

Sivieri Tagliabue, Cristina. *Emma Bonino: Alfabeto Bonino*, Milan: Bompiani, 2010.

Smith, Gaddis. *Morality, Reason and Power: American Diplomacy in the Carter Years*, New York: Hill and Wang, 1986.

Smith, Jackie, Charles Chatfield, and Ron Pagnucco, eds. *Transnational Social Movements and Global Politics: Solidarity beyond the State,* Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1997.

Smith, Tony. *A Pact with the Devil: Washington's Bid for World Supremacy and the Betrayal of the American Promise*, New York: Routledge, 2007.

Soddu, Paolo. "Ugo La Malfa e il nesso nazionale/internazionale dal Patto Atlantico alla presidenza Carter." In ed. Piero Craveri and Gaetano Quagliariello, *Atlantismo ed europeismo,* 381-402. Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2003.

Soutou, Georges-Henri. *L'alliance incertaine: Les rapports politico-stratégiques franco-allemands 1954-1996,* Paris: Fayard, 1996.

_____. *La guerre de Cinquante Ans: Le conflict Est-Ouest 1943-1990*, Paris: Fayard, 2001.

Spinelli, Altiero. *Il Manifesto di Ventotene*, Bologna: Il Mulino, 1991.

Spiri, Andrea, ed. *Bettino Craxi, il socialismo europeo e il sistema internazionale*, Venice: Marsilio, 2006.

Steele, Ronald. *Walter Lippman and the American Century,* New York: Vintage, 1980.

Stefanini, Maurizio. *Il partito 'Repubblica': Una storia politica del giornale di Scalfari e Mauro,* Milan: Boroli, 2010.

Stille, Alexander. *Excellent Cadavers: The Mafia and the Death of the First Italian Republic,* New York: Pantheon Books, 1995.

_____. *The Sack of Rome: How A Beautiful European Country with A Fabled History and A Storied Culture Was Taken over by A Man Named Silvio Berlusconi*, New York: Penguin Press, 2006.

Strik Lievers, Lorenzo, ed. *Ernesto Rossi: Economista, federalista, radicale*, Venice: Marsilio, 2001.

Suri, Jeremi. *Power and Protest: Global Revolution and the Rise of Détente*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2003.

_____. *Henry Kissinger and the American Century*, Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2007.

_____. "Détente and human rights: American and West European perspectives on international change," *Cold War History*, no. 4 (2008): 527-45.

Surkis, Judith. "Sex, Sovereignty, and Transnational Intimacies," *The American Historical Review*, no. 4 (October 2010), 1089-1096.

Suttora, Mauro. *Marco Pannella: I segreti di un istrione*, Milan: Liber, 1993.

_____. *Pannella e Bonino Spa*, Milan: Kaos, 2001.

Tannenwald, Nina. *The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Nonuse of Nuclear Weapons Since 1945*, Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2007.

Tarizzo, Domenico. "Legittimazione e parricidio." In ed. Angiolo Bandinelli and Valter Vecellio, *Una 'inutile strage'? Da Via Rasella alle Fosse Ardeatine*, 124. Rome: Tullio Pironti, 1982.

Teodori, Massimo. *The New Left*, London: J. Cape, 1970.

_____. *The New Left: A Documentary History*, London: J. Cape, 1970.

_____. *Storia delle nuove sinistre in Europa (1956-1976)*, Bologna: Il Mulino, 1976.

_____. *Marco Pannella: Un eretico liberale nella crisi della Repubblica*, Venice: Marsilio, 1996.

_____. *Storia dei laici nell'Italia clericale e comunista*, Venice: Marsilio, 2008.

_____, Piero Ignazi and Angelo Panebianco. *I nuovi radicali: Storia e sociologia di un movimento politico*, Milan: Mondadori, 1977.

Thomas, Daniel C. *The Helsinki Effect: International Norms, Human Rights, and the Demise of Communism*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001.

Tosi, Luciano. "La politica di cooperazione internazionale dell'Italia: autonomia, interdipendenza e integrazione." In ed. Luciano Tosi, *Politica ed economia nelle relazioni internazionali dell'Italia del secondo dopoguerra: Studi in ricordo di Sergio Angelini*, 87-140. Rome: Edizioni Studium, 2002.

_____. "L'Italia fra la NATO e l'ONU." In ed. Agostino Giovagnoli and Luciano Tosi, *Un ponte sull'Atlantico: L'alleanza occidentale 1949-1999*, 217-51. Milan: Guerini e associate, 2003.

_____. "La strada stretta. Aspetti della diplomazia multilaterale italiana (1971-1979)." In ed. Agostino Giovagnoli and Silvio Pons, *L' Italia repubblicana nella crisi degli anni Settanta,* vol. I: *Tra guerra fredda e distensione*, 241-52. Rome: Rubbettino, 2003.

Trachtenberg, Marc. *A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963,* Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1999.

Tranfaglia, Nicola. *Labirinto italiano: Fascismo, antifascismo, gli storici,* Scandicci: La Nuova Italia, 1989.

Tsakiris, Dimitrios. "State Repression against Peace Movements in Greece, 1950-1967." In ed. B. Ziemann, *Peace Movements in Western Europe, Japan and the USA during the Cold War,* **PP?.** Essen: Klartext Verlag, 2008.

Tullio-Altan, Carlo. *Populismo e trasformismo: Saggio sulle ideologie italiane,* Milan: Feltrinelli, 1989.

United States Presidential Commission on World Hunger. *Overcoming World Hunger: The Challenge Ahead: Report of the Presidential Commission on World Hunger*, Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1980.

Vacca, Giuseppe. Preface. In ed. R. Gualtieri, *Il PCI nell'Italia repubblicana 1943-1991*, **PP?.** Rome: Carocci, 2001.

Vaïsse, Maurice, ed. *L'Europe et la crise de Cuba,* Paris: Armand Colin, 1993.

Valcarenghi, Andrea. *Underground: A pugno chiuso,* Rome: Arcana, 1973.

Varon, Jeremy. *Bringing the War Home: The Weather Underground, the Red Army Faction, and Revolutionary Violence in the Sixties and Seventies*, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2004.

Varsori, Antonio. *L'Italia nelle relazioni internazionali dal 1943 al 1992,* Rome-Bari: Laterza, 1999.

_____. "Il contesto europeo della distensione internazionale." In ed. A. Giovagnoli and S. Pons, *L'Italia repubblicana nella crisi degli anni Settanta,* vol. 1: *Tra guerra fredda e distensione*, 331-50. Rome: Rubbettino, 2003.

_____. "Scelta atlantica e scelta europea nella politica estera italiana." In ed. A. Giovagnoli and L. Tosi, *Un ponte sull'Atlantico: L'alleanza occidentale 1949-1999,* 253-269. Milan: Guerini e associate, 2003.

_____. "L'Italia e l'integrazione europea: l'occasione perduta?" In ed. S. Colarizi, P. Craveri, S. Pons and Gaetano Quagliariello, *Gli anni Ottanta come storia*, 155-84. Rome: Rubbettino, 2004.

Vecellio, Valter, ed. *Il pugno o la rosa: I radicali: gauchisti, qualunquisti, socialisti?* Verona: Bertani, 1979.

_____, ed. *"'Noi e i fascisti': L'anti-fascismo libertario dei radicali,* Rome: Edizioni di Quaderni Radicali/1, 1980.

_____, ed. *I radicali: compagni, qualunquisti, destabilizzatori?* Rome: Edizioni Quaderni Radicali/5, 1981.

_____. *Marco Pannella: Biografia di un irregolare*, Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2010.

Wall, Irwin. "L'amministrazione Carter e l'eurocomunismo," *Ricerche di storia politica*, 2 (August 2006): 181-96.

Walz, Michael. *Arguing About War*, New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2004.

Weber, Eugen. *Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870-1914,* Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1976.

Westad, Odd Arne. "Beginnings of the End: How the Cold War Crumbled." In ed. S. Pons and F. Romero, *Reinterpreting the End of the Cold War: Issues, Interpretations, Periodizations*, 68-81. New York: Frank Cass, 2005.

_____. *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times,* New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007.

Wilentz, Sean. *The Age of Reagan: A History 1974-2008,* New York: Harper, 2008.

Wittner, Lawrence S. *One World or None,* vol. 1 of *The Struggle Against the Bomb,* Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1993.

_____. *Resisting the Bomb: A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement, 1954-1970*, vol. 2 of *The Struggle Against the Bomb*, Stanford, Calif., Stanford University Press, 1997.

_____. *Toward Nuclear Abolition: A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement, from 1971 to the Present*, Vol. 3 of *The Struggle Against the Bomb*, Stanford, Calif.: Standford University Press, 2003.

Wollenborg, Leo J. *Stelle, strisce e tricolore: Trent'anni di vicende politiche fra Roma e Washington*, Milan: Mondadori, 1983.

Zancovich, V. Zeno. "Caratteri originali della organizzazione e della iniziativa del Partito Radicale e dei movimenti federati nella lotta politica italiana (1959-1976)" Thesis (*tesi di laurea*) submitted to Universita' degli Studi di Roma, 1977-78.

Zanuttini, Annalisa. “L’organizzazione del Partito Radicale (1962-1985).” In ed. Carlo Vallauri, ed., *I partiti italiani tra declino e riforma: Struttura, organizzazione, finanziamento, base sociale, quadri, stampa, bibliografia, natura giuridica, movimenti femminili e giovanili, risultati elettorali dagli anni sessanta agli anni ottanta,* vol. 1, 499-511. Rome: Bulzoni, 1986.

Zaslavsky, Victor. *Lo stalinismo e la sinistra italiana: Dal mito dell’Urss alla fine del comunismo 1945-1991*, Milan: Mondadori, 2004.

Ziemann, Benjamin. “Situating Peace Movements in the Political Culture of the Cold War: Introduction.” In ed. Benjamin Ziemann, *Peace Movements in Western Europe, Japan and the USA during the Cold War*, 11-38. Essen: Klartext, 2008.

_____, ed. *Peace Movements in Western Europe, Japan and the USA during the Cold War*, Essen: Klartext, 2008.

Zolo, Danilo. *L’alito della libertà: Su Bobbio*, Milan: Feltrinelli, 2008.

Zubok, Vladislav M. *A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev*, Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 2007.

Zubok, Vladimir. “The Soviet Union and détente of the 1970s,” *Cold War History*, no. 4 (2008): 427-47.