

INFORMATION TO USERS

This was produced from a copy of a document sent to us for microfilming. While the most advanced technological means to photograph and reproduce this document have been used, the quality is heavily dependent upon the quality of the material submitted.

The following explanation of techniques is provided to help you understand markings or notations which may appear on this reproduction.

1. The sign or "target" for pages apparently lacking from the document photographed is "Missing Page(s)". If it was possible to obtain the missing page(s) or section, they are spliced into the film along with adjacent pages. This may have necessitated cutting through an image and duplicating adjacent pages to assure you of complete continuity.
2. When an image on the film is obliterated with a round black mark it is an indication that the film inspector noticed either blurred copy because of movement during exposure, or duplicate copy. Unless we meant to delete copyrighted materials that should not have been filmed, you will find a good image of the page in the adjacent frame.
3. When a map, drawing or chart, etc., is part of the material being photographed the photographer has followed a definite method in "sectioning" the material. It is customary to begin filming at the upper left hand corner of a large sheet and to continue from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps. If necessary, sectioning is continued again—beginning below the first row and continuing on until complete.
4. For any illustrations that cannot be reproduced satisfactorily by xerography, photographic prints can be purchased at additional cost and tipped into your xerographic copy. Requests can be made to our Dissertations Customer Services Department.
5. Some pages in any document may have indistinct print. In all cases we have filmed the best available copy.

University
Microfilms
International

300 N. ZEEB ROAD, ANN ARBOR, MI 48106
18 BEDFORD ROW, LONDON WC1R 4EJ, ENGLAND

8023681

WILSON, BASIL WINTHORPE

SURPLUS LABOUR AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN JAMAICA: THE
DIALECTICS OF POLITICAL CORRUPTION. 1966 - 1976

City University of New York

PH.D.

1980

University
Microfilms
International

300 N. Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, MI 48106

18 Bedford Row, London WC1R 4EJ, England

Copyright 1980

by

Wilson, Basil Winthorpe

All Rights Reserved

SURPLUS LABOUR AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN JAMAICA

THE DIALECTICS OF POLITICAL CORRUPTION. 1966 - 1976

by

BASIL WILSON

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate
Faculty in Political Science in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City
University of New York

1980


© COPYRIGHT BY

BASIL WILSON


1980


This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Political Science in satisfaction of the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.


_____ date



Chairman of Examining Committee


May 16, 1980
_____ date


Executive Officer








Supervisory Committee

PREFACE

A dissertation is not only a test of one's intelligence but even moreso a test of one's fortitude. As one goes through the process, one becomes aware of the loneliness of the long distance runner. Despite the isolation that is required, the completion of this manuscript would not have been possible without the intellectual support I received from other Ph.D. students , especially the members of the Minority Students Association. I am especially grateful to my colleagues, John Rashford, (Anthropology), Maureen Pierce and Lotus Dix (Psychology), Paulette Pierce and Arthur Lewin (Sociology), Roderick Thurton and Conrad Dyer (Political Science) and Louise Parks (Art History). Together they helped to make the walls of a white academic institution less stifling.

In addition to my colleagues at the Graduate Centre, I would like to hail my brethren from the country of my birth, Jamaica - Winston Chung, Vernon Bell, Joseph Banner, Narval Campbell, Conrad Small and "Bull Grant" Davis. Without those nights of reasoning, this exercise would not have led to any intellectual clarity.

My wife and my children somehow survived the years of neglect. I am grateful to them. I thank you, Phyllis, Natasha, Makonnen and Mabricio for giving me so much love when I was in a position to give so little.

B.W.E.W.

This dissertation is dedicated to my mother and father

Abstract

SURPLUS LABOUR AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE
IN JAMAICA: THE DIALECTICS OF POLITICAL
CORRUPTION. 1966 - 1976

by

Basil Wilson

Adviser: Professor L. Markovitz

Jamaica began experiencing a serious problem of surplus labour in the latter decades of the nineteenth century. This particular phenomenon forced workers to migrate to the urban centres outside of Jamaica. The massive exodus of workers to the United Kingdom during the 1950s helped to keep the unemployment rates from reaching dislocative percentages. After 1962, Jamaican workers could no longer migrate freely to the United Kingdom and the condition of the unemployed became even more desperate. By the middle of the 1960s, unemployment rates were hovering around 20-25 percent.

Internal self-rule and independence gave the political leadership the opportunity to engage in more energetic attempts to industrialize the economy. From 1944-1974 both the People's National Party and the Jamaica Labour Party pursued a strategy of industrialization by invitation with the expectation that the unemployment problem could be contained if not solved.

During those decades, Jamaica experienced unprecedented economic growth concomitant with high unemployment. By the middle of the 1960s, a mass of lumpen-proletariat concentrated around the urban complex of Kingston and St. Andrew, became quite restive and willing to challenge the legitimacy of the political system. There were more demands being placed on the democratic system that it was capable of accommodating. In response, the two dominant political parties vigilantly pursued the policy of political victimization, depending on which party had control of state power.

Political victimization has fostered intra-class conflict and political violence has now become endemic of the political system. This stifles the development of class consciousness and threatens to destroy the democratic political system that has been in place since 1944.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction: A Theoretical Overview	1
1. Surplus Labour and Migration	14
2. Political and Economic Changes 1944 to 1972	42
3. Michael Manley and the Politics of Democratic Socialism	82
4. Class and Culture	128
5. Early Political Violence in Jamaica	227
6. The Rise in Violent Crime During the 1960s	244
7. Political Violence in the 1967 Election	260
8. The 1972 and 1976 Election	288
9. Political Corruption: A Comparative Analysis	345

T A B L E S

- | | | |
|-------------|--------------|---|
| Chapter I | - Table 1. 1 | Summary of Population Movements in Jamaica 1844 - 1970 |
| | - Table 1. 2 | Jamaican Migration to the United States 1966 - 1974 |
| | - Table 1. 3 | Growth of Parish Populations 1921 - 1970 |
| Chapter II | - Table 2. 1 | General Elections 1944 |
| | - Table 2. 2 | Number of Farms by Size Groups 1958, 1961, 1968/69 |
| | - Table 2. 3 | Unemployment 1942 - 1960 |
| Chapter III | - Table 3. 1 | Percent Average of Wage Increases |
| | - Table 3. 2 | Balance of Payments 1974 - 77 |
| | - Table 3. 3 | Summary of External Trade |
| | - Table 3. 4 | The Budget 1975 - 77 |
| Chapter IV | - Table 4. 1 | Average Weekly Earnings in Large Establishments |
| | - Table 4. 2 | Percentage Distribution of Employed Labour Force By Income Groups 1968, 1973, 1974 and 1975 |
| | - Table 4. 3 | Labour Force by Occupation Group 1975 |
| | - Table 4. 4 | Unemployed Labour Force in Jamaica |

Chapter VI	- Table 6. 1	Total Number of Incidents Recorded In Violent Incidents 1960 - 69
	- Table 6. 2	Proportion of Casualties Caused by Firearms
	- Table 6. 3	Casualties Caused by the Gunfire of the Security Forces.
	- Table 6. 4	Crimes of Violence 1970 - 71
Chapter VII	- Table 7. 1	General Election Results 1944 - 76
	- Table 7. 2	Violent Prone Constituencies 1967
Chapter VIII	- Table 8. 1	Violent Prone Constituencies 1976

I N T R O D U C T I O N

Twice in the last ten years, states of emergency were declared by the government of Jamaica. In both cases the rationale for this emergency action, which suspended normal constitutional privileges, was that political violence had escalated to a point that social order could only be maintained by granting the security forces of the country these extra-punitive powers. A state of emergency was declared for the first time in October, 1966. The state of emergency then lasted for approximately one month.

The second time that a Jamaican government deemed it necessary to invoke a state of emergency was on June 19, 1976. The state of emergency introduced in 1976 was of a longer duration and the extra-punitive measures granted the government were not rescinded until May 1977. For the first time in the history of Jamaican politics, an election was held with a state of emergency in effect. The necessity for granting the security forces additional powers in order to contain political violence during election time reflects the escalation of political warfare between the two dominant political parties, the Jamaica Labour Party and the People's National Party.

By 1966 political violence had undergone a qualitative and quantitative transformation. The combatants were no longer content to use bricks or stones. The gun was now the principal weapon used whenever Party factions clashed in the streets. Political violence and organized terror were used to intimidate political opponents with the presumption that it would subsequently affect the outcome of close elections.

Why is it that in less than ten years, the JLP in 1966 and the PNP in 1976 deemed it necessary to suspend the constitution and invoke a state of

emergency? Why is it that in 1966 and again in 1976 the value consensus of Jamaican society had momentarily fallen apart and could only be kept together by governmental coercion? A critical factor in the large scale political conflagrations that took place in 1966 and thereafter is the inability of the Jamaican economy to create sufficient jobs to solve the country's chronic problem of surplus labour. By surplus labour I mean an excess of workers who are seeking employment, but they cannot be accommodated into the work-place because the labour force is growing much faster than the economy is creating new jobs. Nevertheless, this surplus labour problem did not begin in 1966. In fact, we could say that the only time in the history of Jamaica that there has ever been a state of full employment was during the era of slavery. The slave system was abolished in 1938 and by the latter decades of the 19th century the surplus labour problem became quite acute. In the latter decades of the 19th century and early 20th century the response of the surplus labour population was not to challenge the existing political system or resort to political violence, but to escape the wretched conditions through migration. Chapter I is a detailed analysis of this phenomenon of internal and external migration. In addition, the problem of surplus labour is compounded by an improvement in health-care that contributed to the increase in population that the country experienced at the turn of the 20th century.

After 1944, a modicum degree of political power was transferred to indigenous politicians and a more energetic attempt to develop the economy and to solve or alleviate the surplus labour problem were initiated by the Jamaica Labour Party. When the People's National Party won the elections

of 1955 and 1959 the task of economic development was also vigorously pursued. These attempts to develop the economy and to solve the problem of surplus labour are assessed in Chapters II and III.

There have been basically two strategies hitherto devised to accomplish these objectives. The first we will call industrialization by invitation which was subscribed to by both political parties from 1944 to 1974, a total of thirty years. Significant progress was made in modernizing the economy but high growth rates were concomitant with high unemployment rates. What is of some significance here for the movement of the surplus labour population was that the hub of the economic expansion and modernization took place principally in the urban complex of Kingston and St. Andrew and thus stimulated the movement of labour from the country-side to the cities. Eventually the concentration of workers who lived a marginal existence in the slums of the city would constitute a "danger class" that would pose a threat to the social order and the legitimacy of the state. By the 1960s Kingston and St. Andrew had become a turbulent third-world city with a mass concentration of unemployed workers scattered throughout this urban complex. This urban mass of lumpen-proletariat were far removed from the tremendous economic development taking place around them.

The second strategy of economic development was devised by the People's National Party two years after they defeated the Jamaica Labour Party in the 1972 election. Recognizing that the original strategy of economic development had not solved the surplus labour problem and had resulted in a concentration of wealth in the hands of the few, the Michael Manley government

rejected the strategy of industrialization by invitation and adopted the new strategy of democratic socialism to be used as a guide in constructing a new social order that would be more just and equitable and take into consideration the plight of the poor. The government would no longer restrict its activities to infra-structural development and regulating the economy but government would now play a direct role in the production of goods. It was presumed that this new thrust would accelerate economic development and alleviate the surplus labour problem. Despite the noble objectives of the Manley government there has been no expansion of production and the ranks of the unemployed have increased rather than decreased in the post-1974 period.

We have noted that the character of the society was changing with the development of an urban complex in Kingston and St. Andrew and the movement of people from the countryside to the cities. The cultural changes that the society goes through from the beginning of the modernization period, 1944 to the present are critical to our explanation why at this particular time (1966-76) political violence has escalated. In the latter decades of the 19th century, workers or would-be workers would seek to improve their social condition by migrating to Panama to work on the canal or in the 1950s thousands of workers migrated to work in the industrial sector of the British economy. This passion for external migration helped to alleviate social pressures and was a contributing factor to the tranquility that the society enjoyed during those decades. In 1962 the British passed the Commonwealth Immigration Act which made it extremely difficult for Jamaican workers to migrate to that country. Thus migration in the past served as a safety valve.

The changes in American immigration law in 1965 provided Jamaican workers with an alternative escape hatch. The class character of the migration to Britain differed from the migration to the United States. Migrants going to Britain were predominantly unskilled or blue collar workers while the migration to United States results in a brain drain because the way the law is written, preference is given to professionals with skills that are in short supply in the United States. Nevertheless, by the middle of the 1960s, the unemployed had become such a mass force that migration could no longer reduce its burgeoning ranks. But it is not just the size of the unemployed that is critical. By the middle 1960s concomitant with the phenomenon of urbanization, there emerged a sub-culture of violence among the lumpen-proletariat that precipitated dramatic increases in the rate of violent crime. Chapter IV examines the significance of class and culture in Jamaica and Chapters V and VI present evidence to substantiate the thesis that crimes of a violent nature preceded the escalation of political violence in 1966. The rise in violence did not take on a political character until 1966 when the candidates of both political parties running in the constituency of Western Kingston recruited street gangs and brought them into the political process. This development afforded the more notable purveyors of violence (gang leaders or top-ranking) among the lumpen-proletariat the opportunity of accumulating wealth providing one's party was in control of state power. Violence was not being used by a party that was advocating the overthrow of the existing social order. The political violence that ensued did not pit one class against the other such as bourgeois against proletariat or proletariat against lumpen-proletariat. The violence was not

of an inter-class nature but of an intra-class nature. It involved lumpen-proletariat in the service of the JLP fighting against lumpen-proletariat of the PNP. The violence took place under the orchestration of politicians engaged in a life and death struggle for control of state power. Elections took place under the rubric of a democratic political system but violence was used as a tool to improve the chances of the respective party particularly in the areas characterized by political volatility and where masses of lumpen-proletariat must have been willing to be used as tools of the established political parties with the expectation that individual wealth would accrue to them providing one's party attained power. This reflects the low state of political class consciousness in Jamaica and is reinforced by the multi-class nature of the two institutionalized political parties.

The democratic political system is highly institutionalized in Jamaica. From 1944 until 1976 there has been eight elections held under universal suffrage. The JLP triumphed in 1944, 1949, 1962 and 1967. The PNP won elections in 1955, 1959, 1972 and 1976. This means that state power has been peacefully transferred from one party to another on three occasions, 1955, 1962 and 1972. The democratic nature of the system forces both political parties to appeal to the poor who constitute the largest bloc of voters. Both political parties are forced to take a populist position and once in control of state power to implement programs that are of some benefit to the mass of the population. Elections are fiercely competitive and the demands coming from below are much greater than the political system can accommodate. How have the political parties dealt with this dilemma? Since the spoils that the government controls are insufficient to go around to provide the mass of the population with the basic

necessities of life, the party that controls the state apparatus distributes favors exclusively to party supporters and systematically victimize supporters of the opposition party. This pattern of political victimization has become institutionalized in the last ten years and is a contributing factor in the escalation of political violence.

The victimizing of supporters of the opposing party keeps the ranks of the lumpen-proletariat hopelessly divided and impedes the development of class consciousness. This scramble for spoils amongst the lumpen-proletariat is the principal cause of political violence in the western constituencies of Kingston and St. Andrew where one finds a large concentration of lumpen-proletariat and working class poor. This problem has become even more acute as the role of government since the post-independence period has expanded. A great deal of contention takes place over the distribution of low-income houses constructed by the government. During the ten years of JLP control of the government (1962-72), the low-income housing schemes in Tivoli Gardens and Wilton Gardens (Rema) were built and preference given not on the basis of need but to loyal supporters. The PNP defeated the JLP in 1972 and immediately after assuming power continued the populist policy of building low-income housing schemes, some of which were constructed in juxtaposition to Tivoli Gardens and Wilton Gardens for political reasons. These low-income homes were distributed to supporters of the PNP. This created highly politicized communities that have benefited from the largesse of respective governments situated in juxtaposition to each other. The residents of the respective zones not only identify emotionally with the party which provided them with benefits but because of the surplus labour problem and the lumpen-proletarian character of these communities, there has developed an extreme

dependency on the Member of Parliament for the constituency to provide the community with the additional necessities of life. The residents of these communities are heavily dependent on public work projects, government contracts, work on construction sites, etc. in order to eke out an existence. Unfortunately, these necessities of life can only be delivered if the respective party is triumphant at the polls. Politics then becomes a life and death struggle since it is known that the winner takes all and there are no spoils left behind for the vanquished.

This scramble for the spoils is beneficial to the political elites of the two established political parties. It means that the lumpen-proletariat and working class poor never confront the political system in the form of a united mass but expend their energies in intra-class warfare. Political corruption in the form of political victimization has become an institutionalized policy adhered to by both political parties and the expectation of spoils is used to generate party enthusiasm. Lumpen-proletariats join the party with the expectation that they will obtain some of the 'gravy' providing the party wins control of state power. Although this nefarious policy helps to preserve the status quo, it also is a spreading cancer in the body-politic. The level of violence could reach a state that the democratic political system is effectively shattered and the possibility of a civil war is not too farfetched. This is apparent when we note the necessity in 1966 and 1976 for the state to invoke expanded coercive powers in order to maintain social order.

Research on Political Corruption

Previous research on political corruption has focussed on how economic elites use their links to political elites to advance their mutual interests. Economic elites bribe political leaders and bureaucratic officials to expedite procedural matters and political elites and bureaucrats use their pivotal position to drain the wealthy of some of their capital reservoir. This form of corruption is very much prevalent in Jamaican politics, but that is not the aspect of corruption that we are concerned with. We are concerned with (1) the relationship that develops between the political elites and the impoverished mass of the population and (2) the endemic warfare that develops between people of the same class scrambling for the crumbs being brushed off the tables of government.

Two distinguished political scientists, Samuel Huntington and James Scott have argued that political corruption can contribute to political stability (See Chapter 1X).

In this Study, I will argue the converse. Our findings in Jamaica reveal that political corruption has not contributed to political stability, but has precipitated political violence and threatens the democratic system. In a one-party democracy where the state governs through coercion, corruption may contribute to political stability and economic efficiency. This is certainly not the case in a highly competitive to-party democracy where political corruption in the form of political victimization helps to destroy the social fabric of a democratic nation plagued by the chronic problem of surplus labour and a sub-culture of violence.

Definition of Terms

How does one define political corruption? Political corruption is defined in broad terms as the misuse of state power for personal monetary gain and/or for the benefit of a political organization. Specifically, we find a particular variant of political corruption - political victimization, a term that was made popular by the PNP in their successful campaign to remove the JLP from office in 1972. By political victimization, we mean the manner in which supporters of the opposition party are treated by the government party. Supporters of the opposition are systematically excluded from public work projects, low-income housing schemes and other spoils that are dispensed by the party in power.

Another term peculiar to the Jamaican lexicon is the term 'top-ranking'. A 'top-ranking' - is someone who has developed prowess in the dismal art of political violence and as a consequence of his dexterity at his profession, occupies an elitist position in the social hierarchy of highly politicized communities. The 'top-ranking' through his reputation has direct links with politicians and whenever his party is in power, he would be responsible for dispensing patronage among the party faithful. He uses his pivotal position to extract contracts and other benefits for himself and although he 'hangs out' in the ghetto, has managed to accumulate a substantial amount of wealth and engages in all the acquisitive status symbols of a consumer-oriented society. The success of the 'top-ranking' makes him a model for ghetto youth to emulate even though the dangerous life assures him of an early burial.

The term lumpen-proletariat is not used in the classical Marxist sense. When Marx used the term he meant prostitutes and pimps - the dregs of industrial society. In this study, lumpen-proletariat means the vast mass of unemployed workers who survive by outwitting the system. This may entail

fighting politics, selling ganja, hustling off the docks, robbing banks, etc. There are no moral compunctions and economic survival is what is paramount.

Summary

Let me summarize briefly the major points of the thesis.

- 1) From the latter decades of the nineteenth century Jamaica has suffered from a chronic problem of surplus labour. This surplus labour problem was partially alleviated by internal migration, the movement of workers from the countryside to the cities and by external migration to the more developed regions of the world.
- 2) The two strategies of economic development, industrialization by invitation and democratic socialism, that have been devised to develop the economy and absorb the surplus labour force have not been successful.
- 3) The strategies of economic development have only been successful in creating a modern industrial sector primarily centred in the urban complex of Kingston and St. Andrew where almost one-third of the population is presently concentrated.
- 4) The modernization of Jamaica has brought about fundamental changes in the division of labour and the emergence of a sub-culture antagonistic to the prevailing order has resulted in a decline of value consensus.

- 5) The failure to maintain full levels of employment in a competitive two party system has led to the institutionalization of a system of political corruption where spoils are dispensed by the party in power to the party faithful.
- 6) Loyalty to a political organization is far more developed than any sense of class consciousness. This condition of fierce political loyalty and the selective dispensation of spoils has created a serious problem of political 'tribalism' that triggers political violence during periods of heightened political activity.
- 7) Both political parties have used political violence to thwart the democratic process. This is particularly the case in keenly contested constituencies when the party which is successful in intimidating the supporters of the opposing party may make the difference between who wins and who loses.
- 8) Political victimization has helped to preserve the established political system even though it has failed to resolve the intractable problem of surplus labour. Rather than the lumpen-proletariat and impoverished poor becoming disillusioned with the existing system and looking receptively at revolutionary change, they expend all their energies in an unending intra-class struggle. Yet the violence has escalated in recent years that extreme measures have had to be taken (declaration of states of emergency) in order to maintain order. This means

that political violence has reached a stage that it is destroying the democratic political system and the social fabric of the nation.

- 9) It is not just the presence of surplus labourers, the selective dispensation of spoils and the competitive nature of the two party system that has caused the escalation in political violence. Political victimization is widely practised in rural areas while the problem of political violence is by and large confined to the urban centres. In recent decades there has developed a sub-culture of violence adhered to by a large section of the lumpen-proletariat concentrated in the urban complex of Kingston and St. Andrew. An explanation of political violence without including the cultural factor would be incomplete. It is the politicizing of the violent-prone lumpen-proletariat that has caused the increase in political violence.

- 10) In contrast to some of the assumptions made that political corruption contributes to political stability, I am suggesting that political corruption must be assessed in its social context. In a competitive two party system, political corruption leads not to political stability, but to political violence.

C H A P T E R I

SURPLUS LABOUR AND MIGRATION

The problem of surplus labour has plagued Jamaican society from the latter decades of the nineteenth century. In this chapter, we give an historical account of the age-old problem of surplus labour and the responses that people made to cope with this perilous situation. It is interesting to note that mass political activity did not begin in Jamaica until 1938 when the working class rebelled against a precipitous decline in the standard of living. This rebellion forced Great Britain to introduce changes in the colonial order in the Caribbean wherewith a system of political tutelage was established to groom indigenous leaders who would not constitute a threat to the mother country. The surplus labour problem was aggravated by the improvements in health care. The death rate had declined and the mortality rates had been reduced. This did not precipitate political violence. People responded to the situation in two ways (1) migrating to other regions of the world where employment opportunities were available (2) migrating from the countryside to the cities.

Historical Background

Caribbean society as we know it today only came into existence during the seventeenth century. As C.L.R. James points out in *Black Jacobins*,

"The history of the West Indies is governed by two factors, the sugar plantation and Negro slavery ... Wherever the sugar plantation and slavery existed, they imposed a pattern. It is an original pattern not European, not African, not a part of the American main, not native in any conceivable sense of that word, but West Indian, sui generis, with no parallel anywhere else. 1

Early Caribbean history is marked by the coercion of African labour and the rise of the plantation system. The tropical islands of the Caribbean were transformed into plantation economies and served as appendages to the metro-

politan economy of Britain. During these years of expanded world commerce marked by the early industrialization of Europe, the plantation economies of the Caribbean played a critical role in the further development of European capitalism. The economic surplus extracted from the slave trade and from the Caribbean plantations was used for the further expansion of the British economy. Eugene Genovese states quite clearly that it was the slave plantation that provided the metropolitan bourgeoisie with much surplus capital. ²

As Eric Williams sardonically stated, "Strange that an article like sugar, so sweet and necessary to human existence, should have occasioned such crimes and bloodshed." ³ It was during this age of mercantilism that the British who were in the vanguard of industrial civilization devised the protectionist colonial trade system. Williams argues that the independence of the thirteen colonies exploded the myth of protectionism. A free trade relationship developed between Britain and the newly independent United States in July 1783. ⁴ With the invention of the cotton gin, commerce between Britain and the United States increased phenomenally.

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, sugar production in the Caribbean was already in a state of decline. The British abolished the ignoble slave trade in 1807. The slave population already domiciled in the Caribbean was sufficiently capable of reproducing the labour needs of the plantations which in any case were no longer indispensable to the further development of British industry.

The economy of the British Caribbean islands was dependent on the trade with the thirteen colonies. After the Americans defeated the British, they were treated as foreigners and not allowed to trade with the British colonies. The Americans were now subject to the Navigation laws that the British had concocted in order to insulate the protectionist trading system. Certain basic foodstuffs that were initially imported direct from the United States could only get to the Caribbean through devious routes and naturally the cost factor soared.

The sugar plantations in Barbados and Jamaica were now forced to compete with the more recent sugar plantations in Saint Dominque and later on, in Cuba and Brazil. The yield per acre in Saint Dominque was much higher than that of Jamaica and French sugar cost one-fifth less than sugar produced in the British islands. ⁵

During the years 1771 to 1781, the plantations of the Long family in Jamaica earned on an average a profit of nine and a half percent, the profit in 1774 being as high as sixteen percent. In 1778 the net profit in Jamaica was four percent as compared with an average of eight to twelve percent in Saint Dominque. In 1775 Jamaica had 775 plantations; by 1791 out of every hundred, twenty-three had been sold for debt, twelve were in the hands of receivers, while seven had been abandoned, and the West Indian planters, indebted to the enormous sum of twenty millions, could be challenged on any principle to prove that any new system would involve them so deep, as that on which they had hitherto proceeded.

Saint Dominque's exports in 1778 were double those of Jamaica; in 1789 they were valued at over one-third more than those of all the British West Indies combined. In the period of ten years before 1789 the Negro population and total production of Saint Dominque almost doubled ... French colonial exports, over eight million pounds and imports, over four millions, employed 164,000 tons of shipping and 33,000 sailors; British colonial exports, five million pounds, and imports, less than two millions, employed 148,000 tons of shipping and

14,000 seamen. In every respect the sugar colonies had become vastly more essential to France than they were to England. ⁶

The British at this juncture began placing more emphasis on India than in the Caribbean. That vast throng of humanity in India constituted a potentially larger export market than what was available in the British Caribbean islands. The sugar plantations in the British Caribbean were already tattered and no longer critical to the financial well being of the British economy. The free trade between Britain and the United States centred around cotton. During the period 1826-30, the United States supplied three-quarters of Britain's cotton needs and by 1846-50, the United States was supplying four-fifths of the raw material. ⁷ As the trade link between Britain and the United States became increasingly important, trade with the West Indies was becoming rapidly infinitesimal. In 1821 Britain exported forty-three million pounds worth of goods but by 1832 this figure had leaped to sixty-five million pounds. In both instances 50 percent of British exports went to Europe. The East Indies and China combined imported in 1821 one-twelfth of all British exports and one-tenth in 1832. In contrast British exports to all the Caribbean islands amounted to one-ninth of the total exports and by 1832 that figure had been reduced to one-seventeenth.

The British economy had entered a new stage of development. Britain was the leading exporter of manufactured goods and the further expansion of the British economy could only take place by dismantling the closed market system of protectionism. To expand trade with Cuba, Brazil, India, etc., Britain would have to buy raw materials from these countries. The British

colonies of the Caribbean enjoyed a privileged position within the closed market system. West Indies sugar was assured of a market as long as sugar from Brazil, Cuba, and even India was forced to pay high custom duties. Non-West Indian sugar was permitted into Britain only for subsequent re-export purposes. But British sugar refineries were losing the virtual monopoly they had enjoyed previously. The cost of sugar production in the West Indies was simply too high.

The burgeoning bourgeois class was becoming increasingly hostile to protectionism and simultaneously influential in the English parliament. English industrialists recognized the benefits to be obtained from free trade and began attacking the sacrosanct West Indian interest.

By an odd quirk of history, it was the July Revolution of 1830, in France that set off the chain of events leading to revolution in Jamaica. From the rising of Paris a contagion of rioting spread to England. It was reflected in a stronger reform movement in Parliament, and in November 1830 the Tory Wellington government resigned and was replaced by a new coalition pledged to Parliamentary reform. In Britain, popular demand for reform was simultaneous with a renewed drive for slave emancipation. ⁸

The emancipation of the enslaved African was merely the first nail in the coffin of protectionism. The British parliament decreed on August 28, 1833 that enslaved Africans were to be given their freedom on August 1, 1834 but to smoothe the transition of enslaved labour to coerced labour, the African was to serve a period of apprenticeship three quarters of each week. Field slaves were to serve until August 1, 1840 and household slaves until August 1938. ⁹ Subsequently all the slaves were freed on August 1, 1838.

The West Indian colonies were allowed to continue to be protected by the closed market system that regulated the importation of sugar into Britain. In 1854, the system of protectionism that propped up the West Indian economies was done away with and at long last the free market forces had smashed the

West India interest in the British parliament.

The economic decline of the Caribbean islands gathered momentum. In fact the decline accelerated with the competition of the French colonies in the latter decades of the eighteenth century; the abolition of the slaves in 1883; and the dismantling of the protectionist trade system in 1854.

Of the sugar estates that had been the life of the island before the revolution one-third were gone by 1847 and one-half by 1865. Three-fourths of the coffee plantations had also become ruinate along with a quarter of the cattle pens. ¹⁰

An American visitor to the island of Jamaica in 1860 lamented, "I know of no country in the world where prosperity, wealth and a commanding position have been so strangely subverted and destroyed, as they have been in Jamaica, within the brief space of sixty years." ¹¹

The freed African wherever possible left the sugar plantation and established peasant communities on the hillside or on abandoned sugar plantations. Baptist missionaries played an instrumental role in organizing these peasant settlements. It is from this post-emancipation period that we have the genesis of what Philip Curtin calls the two Jamaicas - "the planters' Jamaica of the coastal plains and inland valleys, and the settlers' Jamaica of the mountain freeholds. The two were separated by culture and racial-caste, but even more by mutual ignorance." ¹²

Although the economy was in a state of decline, the bankruptcy of sugar plantations cannot be solely attributed to the freeing of the slaves. The West Indian economies, and the Jamaican economy in particular entered a period of economic deterioration prior to the freeing of African labour. Thus wage labour must be seen as only one factor in the economic downturn. There were

a number of sugar estates which were managed efficiently and continued to operate at a profit.

In the early century some estates had been planted on land suitable for sugar only under conditions of very high prices. These marginal producers were the first to go, while estates with better land continued to be profitable. Another group of survivors were estates with resident proprietors or lessees, who avoided the high fees of attorneys and overseers and perhaps profited from more careful management. Large estates had a better chance than small ones. After the 1830s an estate producing less than about 150 hogsheads of sugar annually had difficulty meeting the high fixed costs for management and machinery - and many Jamaican estates produced less. Debt service was another fixed cost that could be prohibitive. 13

The Jamaica planter had been spoilt by the early years of super-profits. Many planters were only concerned with making a "killing" overnight and return to England and live out the remaining days in neo-aristocratic splendour. The overseer and attorney who were left in charge had to ensure that the absentee-owner received his portion of the spoils. The Jamaican planter was not entrepreneurially inclined. He refused to adopt himself to the new conditions but kept cursing and blaming external forces. He lacked the vision to realise that mercantilism was anachronistic and that he would have to adjust to the new system of free trade. The planter recognized the injustice of slavery, but argued that without slavery the economy would be ruined. When African labour was emancipated, the planter futilely lobbied in the English parliament for continual protectionism.

It is obvious that a revolution had occurred in Jamaica after 1833. The tragedy is that the same ruling class that governed during the epoch of slavery continued to pilot the ship of state in an epoch of free labour which they had ungallantly opposed. Rather than dealing directly with the economic woes that confronted the island in the new era of free labour and

free trade, the Jamaican planter class kept blaming the missionaries and using state power to make it difficult for the emancipated African to acquire land. The Jamaican planter sought to keep the emancipated African in a subservient, landless position to the extent that the African would have no alternative but to sell his labour to the planter. No attempt was made by the British government to settle the freed Africans on lands owned by the Crown. In fact the Crown rewarded the planter class by bestowing upon them 20 million in compensation for the property lost after emancipation.

The freed African was equally determined to withdraw his labour from the sugar estates that by now had become a symbol of imperial exploitation. By 1865 approximately 50,000 ex-slaves were owners of small farms.¹⁴ The peasants constructed a separate economy and were more preoccupied with creating a subsistence economy rather than one geared to the world market. The newly established peasant communities planted fruits, yams, plantains, breadfruit, ginger, pimento and coffee. Surplus produce was sold on estates or in the market centres of towns and burgeoning cities.

Sugar exports in 1832 were valued at 2.6 million, yet in 1910, the sugar export crop had dwindled to 418.4 thousand.¹⁵ The sugar estates suffered from a shortage of labour and many planters presumed that the solution to this problem was in finding a new source of cheap labour to increase or to sustain sugar production and thus the planters looked to India for a substitute for African labour.

By 1864 some 24,000 people had been brought to Jamaica; but through death or departure only 5,279 remained and the expense was a considerable drain on the island's finances. Through 1844 alone, Jamaica had spent 150,000 in public funds or about 25 for every immigrant landed.¹⁶

The planters surmised that the crux of the economic downturn could be found in the land-labour ratio and a new rush of immigrants would lead to a rejuvenated plantation economy. The planter assumed that the influx of immigrants would depress wages and thus enable the planter to emerge with a profit.

With the passage of an Immigration Act in 1845, Indians were imported to boost the labour supply. The government paid the cost of transportation. Initially the Indians were indentured for three years but by 1858 the indentured time was increased to five years and the Indian was denied the option of returning until ten years residence. The planter agreed to pay the government 2.00 per year to defray the cost of transportation.¹⁷ Nevertheless, this scheme of imported labour did not lift the economic fortunes of the planter class.

The flight from the plantation was not the only reason for the scarcity of labour. There are other factors at work which prevented the planter class having a surplus of labour at their disposal. Medical care had deteriorated in the post-emancipation period as doctors fled from the new Jamaica. Tropical diseases were rampant and preventive medicine was still in an under-developed state. In 1844 the Jamaican population was estimated at 377,433 and in 1861, the population had increased to 441,264. During the intercensal interval there were 275,400 births. The death rate remained high at 224,400. But by 1871 we began to experience a significant decrease in the death rate and a rise in the birth rate. The death rate in 1871 decreased to 127,900 and by 1881, 139,200 were recorded. Nevertheless the birth-death ratio does

TABLE I

TABLE 1.4

SUMMARY OF POPULATION MOVEMENTS IN JAMAICA 1844-1970

Year of census	Census Population	Intercensal increase		Births, deaths and natural increase during intercensal interval		Natural Increase	Migration balance	Rates per 1,000 population		
		No.	Annual rate %	Births	Deaths			Birth	Death	Natural Increase
1844	377,433	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1861	441,264	63,800	0.92	275,400	224,400	51,000	+ 12,800	40	32	8
1871	506,154	64,900	1.38	184,800	127,900	56,900	+ 8,000	39	27	12
1881	580,804	74,600	1.38	208,200	139,200	69,000	+ 5,600	38	26	12
1891	639,491	58,700	0.97	224,200	140,700	83,500	- 24,800	36.7	23.1	13.6
1911	831,383	191,900	1.32	581,100	345,300	235,700	- 43,900	39.5	23.5	16.0
1921	858,118	26,700	0.32	320,200	216,400	103,800	- 77,100	37.9	25.6	12.3
1943	1,237,063	378,900	1.67	765,300	412,200	353,200	+ 25,800	33.2	17.9	15.3
1960	1,609,814	372,800	1.56	855,500	287,500	568,000	- 195,200	35.3	11.9	23.4
1970	1,848,512	238,700	1.39	676,500	141,300	535,200	- 296,500	39.1	8.2	30.9

Source: Recent Population Movements in Jamaica
World Population Year 1974, p6

not attain its zenith until the early 1950s when the modernization of the Jamaican economy was well underway and preventive medicine had improved considerably. (See Table I)

A contributory factor to the decline of mortality was the establishment in 1942 of a Public Health Training Centre, originally founded under the auspices of the World Health Organization to train Public Health Inspectors and Nurses in methods of disease prevention. The work of the Bureau of Health Education (established in 1946) in disseminating health propaganda throughout the island must also have had some effect in this regard. 18

It is with this development that surplus labour becomes a social problem in Jamaica.

Banana production replaced sugar as the leading export crop and restored some degree of prosperity to the Jamaican economy by 1890. By 1930 banana accounted for 57 percent of the total domestic exports. 19 The banana industry was severely damaged by the Panama disease and production fell from 23 million stems in 1938 to 6.5 million stems in 1949. 20 The increase in banana production helped to revive the economy but did not resolve the unemployment problem. Sugar is a crop that requires labour intensive techniques of production but the banana industry does not require similar labour intensive techniques of production.

Increase in the Rural Population

Woodville K. Marshall identified three stages of growth for the peasantry in the Caribbean. The first period of establishment lasted from 1838 to approximately 1850 or 1860. During these years the ex-slave created new villages and formed new fields despite the obstacles that were placed in his path by the planter-dominated legislature in Jamaica. In 1838 there were

2,114 persons who possessed holdings of less than 40 acres. In 1941, the figure increased to 7,919 and in 1945 there were 19,397 peasants with holdings less than ten acres.²¹ By the end of the period of establishment (1860) there were approximately 50,000 small farmers with holdings under fifty acres.

Marshall called the second stage the period of consolidation. The second stage lasted from 1860 to 1900. The second stage is marked by a further expansion of the peasant population and a shift from peasants primarily pre-occupied with the growing of subsistence crops to active participation in export production. In 1850 only 10 percent of export crops were sold by peasants but during this period of consolidation by 1890 the peasant share had increased to 39 percent.²² It is during this period that a prosperous middle peasantry emerged. The number of holdings with a size between five and forty-nine acres increased from 13,189 in 1880 to 24,226 and in 1902 to 31,038 in 1930.²³ The peasant communities had commenced playing a critical role in the diversification of Jamaican agriculture. The peasants grew food for local consumption and also for the export market.

Marshall estimated the period of saturation to range from 1900 to the present. Throughout the decades, the peasant population had increased beyond the land space available in a society where property was sacrosanct. The small land-holdings could not provide a living for the growing population. During the period of saturation there was an increase in the average amount of land that the middle peasantry controlled (5-25 acres) and a decrease in the amount of small holdings. In 1902 there were 24,226 farmers with

holdings from 5 to 50 acres; in 1930 that figure had increased to 31,038; in 1954 the figure increased to 53,237 but in 1961 decreased to 40,769. In 1902 there were 108,943 peasants with holdings under 5 acres. By 1930 that number was increased to 153,406 but by 1954 small farmers holdings less than 5 acres numbered 138,761 and by 1961 a further decrease to 113,239.

The population problem really crystallized after 1943. From 1844 to 1861 the population increased by 51,000. In the ten years from 1881 to 1891 the natural increase in population amounted to 83,500 but when we examine the figures at the middle of the twentieth century, the population increase became potentially socially disruptive. From the years 1891 to 1911 the population increased by 235,700 and from 1921 to 1943 this figure had soared to 568,000 and by 1970 to 535,200.

What accounted for the rapid population increase at the beginning of the twentieth century? Up until 1943 there existed some balance between births and deaths. Throughout the 19th century, deaths averaged over 20 per 1,000 of the population. We see the effect of improved health care taking effect around 1943 when the death ratio was reduced by 17.9 per 1,000 and by 1970, it was further reduced to 8.2 per 1,000 of the Jamaican population. This population boom was bound to have certain social consequences. As the peasantry reached the saturation point, the pressure for internal and external migration mounted.

External Migration

The construction of the Panama Canal provided the opportunity for the first mass exodus of workers who deemed it necessary to travel abroad in order

to find employment or to work for better wages. Jamaican workers comprised a large percentage of the workforce of the project undertaken by French contractors. The intercensal interval from 1881-91 revealed a net loss to the population of 24,000 caused principally by the migration of Jamaican workers to Panama.²⁵ At the turn of the twentieth century, the United Fruit Company dominated agricultural production in Central America and in the Caribbean. Caribbean workers were eager to sell their labour on foreign plantation where the wage scale was higher than the wages paid at home. With the expansion of sugar cultivation in Cuba, a number of Jamaican workers were also contracted to work in the canefields of Oriente Province. Net migration of Jamaicans to Cuba from 1911-21 is estimated at 22,000.²⁶

From as early as 1820, immigration statistics revealed a pattern of Caribbean workers seeking economic refuge in the United States. From 1820-1910, a grand total of 233,146 West Indians had migrated to the United States.²⁷ Between 1900 and 1930 it was estimated that some 300,000 West Indians migrated to the United States. This wave of Caribbean immigrants coincided with the migration of blacks from the agricultural south to the Industrial north. The outbreak of World War I disrupted the flow of European immigrants who perennially manned the factories of the industrial north-east. The entrepreneurs of the industrial north encouraged and recruited blacks from the southern states. Caribbean labour seized the opportunity created by war production and over 100,000 Caribbean workers migrated to the United States during the war years. These workers were recruited on a temporary basis but many found ways to remain permanently in the United States.

The escape hatch leading to the United States was closed to Caribbean workers in 1924. Reacting to the new wave of immigrants who came from Eastern and Southern Europe, the United States Congress passed legislation that gave preference to migrants who hailed from Nordic countries. It was presumed that the new immigrants were mentally inferior to the more cultured and refined Northern Europeans. After the collapse of the international economy in 1929, many of the Jamaican migrants who had followed the expansion of world commerce were forced to return home. The intercensal period from 1921-43 revealed no net emigration but a net return of about 25,000 workers. ²⁸ This return of migrants occurred in an era when the birth rate in relationship to the death rate had improved remarkably. The social tension created by the population increase and the return of migrants was reflected in the large scale rioting of workers in 1938.

World War II also provided another opportunity for Jamaican workers to migrate to another country. Britain had introduced a policy of war time conscription that included the colonial empire but in Jamaica there was no necessity for that as those who volunteered to serve far exceeded the manpower requirement. Over 10,000 men volunteered to serve in the British armed forces and approximately 7,000 served overseas, mostly with the Royal Air Force. In addition from 1943 to 1945 45,619 farm and industrial workers were recruited to work in the United States. ²⁹ Once the war ceased, the need for overseas labour was dramatically reduced. In 1945 a total of 23,153 Jamaican workers were recruited to work in the United States but in 1946 that number was reduced to 7,797. ³⁰

The end of World War II was indeed the beginning of the cold war between the Soviet Union and the United States of America. The fear of the "communist

conspiracy" had become omnipresent in the American body politic. As occurred in the 1920s, there was a rebirth of the spectre of immigrants bringing with them the "germ of bolshevism". In order to contain this problem, the McCarran Act was passed by the United States Congress in 1952. This act limited to 800 per year the number of immigrants that would be permitted to migrate from the colonies of Great Britain in the West Indies. The migration of Jamaican workers to the United States was reduced to a trickle. Without an outlet for its surplus labour, it would become more difficult to maintain social tranquility at home. Fortunately, the post-war economic recovery in Britain created the need for overseas workers in that country.

In an attempt to halt the westward march of the Red Army and to contain the Soviet Union, the Truman administration introduced the Marshall Plan to speed the economic recovery of Western Europe. It is this Marshall Plan that is partly responsible for the unprecedented prosperity that Britain experienced in the 1950s. The industrial expansion took place at such a rapid rate that Britain suffered from a scarcity of labour and Caribbean workers migrated in droves to join the ranks of the British proletariat. From 1953-62 approximately 162,000 Jamaicans migrated to Britain.³¹ But British hospitality to the alien proletariat was not to be lasting. At the beginning of the 1960s the British economy showed signs of sluggishness. The Empire was also in the process of being dismantled and Britain enacted the Commonwealth Immigration Act in 1962. This law put an end to the free movement of the colonial proletariat. Adults migrating to Britain thereafter needed an employment voucher which signified that the immigrant was coming to work in a job that had been approved by the authorities. The dependents of migrants already domiciled in Britain were, however, allowed to join their parents.

"Jamaica alone experienced a net exodus of 10,500 children during 1967-68 whereas 4,500 more adults returned from Britain than went there." 32

The migration of Jamaican workers to Great Britain in the initial years was comprised primarily of skilled workers but after 1956, unskilled workers began to migrate in increasing numbers. In their study of the external migration to Britain, Roberts and Mills wrote:

"In the initial years the movements involved for the most part skilled workers, but it appears that this aspect of emigration was approaching its maximum at the end of 1955, and that a levelling off, if not a definite decline, of emigration of skilled workers may be witnessed in 1956. On the other hand the unskilled workers were much less involved in 1953 and 1954, but began leaving the island in greatly increasing numbers in 1955. 33

Not all migrants were from the ranks of the unemployed. Many of the migrants had jobs but migrated because they were dissatisfied with the low living standards of the colonial working class and were cognizant that salaries and benefits in Great Britain were superior to that in Jamaica. Yet the structural problem of unemployment - of surplus labour - persisted, and is a determining factor in sustaining the traditional wanderlust of the West Indian worker. Providing there are escape routes available, whether to the United States or Britain, it means the would-be migrant does not focus on changing the political and/or economic system at home but seeks to overcome his distressful economic experience by leaving behind the wretchedness of underdevelopment.

American immigration laws were amended in 1965 to allow for the selection of immigrants on a non-discriminatory basis. Previously preference was given

to citizens of Nordic countries and the quota allotted to Southern Europeans and the Third World was limited. The new system was allegedly colour-blind. The newly independent countries in the Caribbean, such as Jamaica, were now to enjoy the same immigration privileges of other nations within the Western Hemisphere. During the 1960s, the Viet-nam war stimulated the United States economy to the extent that the country suffered from a manpower shortage in certain skilled and unskilled occupations. In 1968 there was an amendment to the 1965 Immigration Law. The 1968 Act restricted to 120,000 the amount of immigrants entering the United States from the Western Hemisphere. Large numbers of Jamaican workers started migrating to the United States in 1967.

Table 1.2 - Migration of Jamaicans to the United States

<u>1966</u>	<u>1967</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>
2,743	10,483	17,470	16,947	15,033
<u>1971</u>	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>Total</u>
14,571	13,427	9,963	12,408	115,045

Source: Adopted from U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service Reports

Summary

During the middle of the nineteenth century, the Jamaican government deemed it necessary to import Indian and Chinese labourers to work on the sugar plantations not because there existed in the country a shortage of labour, but because the freed African wherever possible had withdrawn his labour from the plantation system. During these years the population was increasing but the population increase was tempered by a high death rate. In the closing decades of the nineteenth century, Jamaica began to experience the problem of surplus labour and vast numbers of Jamaican workers migrated to work on the

Panama Canal and on the plantations of the United Fruit Company in Central America. It is at the turn of the twentieth century that the peasant communities entered the phase of saturation. From 1861 to 1871 the population increased by 58,700 but from 1891 to 1911 the population increased by 191,900. The migration of workers to the United States during World War I helped to alleviate the growing problem of surplus labour being concentrated in the Kingston and St. Andrew area. The collapse of the international economy in the 1920s and the return of thousands of migrants was a contributing factor to the large scale rioting that took place in 1938. Obviously the return of the migrants is not the only factor. There was the problem of low wages, a depressed economy, and a rapid rise in basic foodstuff. But when we examine the census data and recognize that the intercensal period from 1921-43, an addition of 25,800 workers in excess of those leaving returned home, we must attribute in part, the 1938 riots to this phenomenon.

The post World War II period marked the beginning of the modernization of the Jamaican economy and political system. By the 1950s there developed a marked reduction in the death rate. Whereas in 1861 the death rate was 40 per thousand by 1970, it had been reduced to 8.2 per thousand. The population increased and the concentration of workers in the Kingston and St. Andrew area did not become a social problem until the middle of the nineteen sixties. This problem could no longer be alleviated by external migration and was further compounded by internal migration. Let us now examine the phenomenon of internal migration.

Internal Migration

Linda Hewitt, the demographer has divided population movement within Jamaica into four periods, 1911-21, 1921-43, 1943-60, 1960-70. From as early

1911 there had already developed a movement of people to the cities of Kingston. Although Kingston and St. Andrew are classified as separate parishes, together they constitute the principal urban centre of Jamaica and an analytical differentiation makes no sense at all. Approximately 1,000 persons were moving annually to Kingston and approximately 400 to St. Andrew. These internal migrants came mostly from the parishes of Westmoreland, Manchester, St. Ann and St. Elizabeth. The city of Kingston became the capital in 1870. This movement preceded the development of modern industrial activity in the capital. At the time Kingston was the centre of commercial activities and endowed with excellent harbour facilities. During this period the parishes of Portland, St. Mary and St. Thomas also gained from internal migration. The banana industry was booming and workers were attracted to the parishes where production was expanding. These three parishes exported bananas from their respective docking facilities and it is presumed that some of the internal migrants used this contact with the international economy to obtain jobs with the United Fruit Company in Central America.³⁵ The agro-proletariat was leaving the land in search of a better livelihood. The decline of sugar cultivation especially in St. Ann precipitated the movement of agricultural workers to other rural parishes and to the commercial centre of Kingston and St. Andrew. The peasant population was already in search of lebensraum.

1921-43

This period of internal migration coincided with the collapse of the international economy in 1929 and the subsequent return of thousands of Jamaican workers who had gone to seek their fortunes abroad. Internal

migration increased during this period. 53,500 internal migrants moved to the parish of St. Andrew and 43,500 moved to the parish of Kingston.³⁶ Most of the internal migrants came from St. Mary, St. Catherine, St. Ann, St. Elizabeth and Manchester. The banana industry at the turn of the twentieth century was the second most important agricultural export and provided small farmers with an all-year income. Banana unlike sugar is not seasonal and does not require a vast outlay of capital or a large plantation. After 1938 to reiterate the banana industry was ravaged by the Panama and leaf spot disease. In 1938, 23.8m stems of banana were exported, but as a consequence of the disease in 1946 only 5.9 million stems were exported.³⁷ The decline in banana production, the continued slump in sugar production and an expanding population in the countryside are the principal reasons why internal migration increased to the urban centres of Kingston and St. Andrew.

1943-60

The British Government established the Moyne Commission to investigate the riots that swept the Caribbean in 1938. The Commission recommended increased political participation and greater governmental responsibility for the colonized people of Jamaica. In 1944 Jamaica was granted a new constitution that permitted universal suffrage elections. The year 1944 is usually taken as the commencement of modern politics in Jamaica - the genesis of the modernization process.

A total of 286,300 internal migrants were recorded during this period, an increase of 44 percent over the previous phase.³⁸ The population of St. Andrew was increased by 95,000 persons - 40,400 males and 55,000 females.

TABLE 1.3

GROWTH OF PARISH POPULATIONS - 1921-1970

Parish	1921	1943	1960	1970
Kingston	63,700	110,100	123,400	109,800
St. Andrew	54,600	128,100	296,000	421,700
St. Thomas	42,500	60,700	68,700	71,200
Portland	49,000	60,700	64,500	69,300
St. Mary	71,400	90,900	94,200	100,400
St. Ann	70,900	96,200	114,400	122,700
Trelawny	34,600	47,500	56,100	61,900
St. James	41,900	63,500	83,000	103,100
Hanover	38,200	51,700	53,900	59,400
Westmoreland	68,900	90,100	109,600	115,800
St. Elizabeth	79,300	100,200	116,700	127,800
Manchester	63,900	92,700	111,800	122,900
Clarendon	83,000	123,500	164,000	178,300
St. Catherine	96,600	121,000	153,500	184,200
TOTAL	858,500	1,237,000	1,609,800	1,848,500

Source: Recent Population Movements in Jamaica
World Population Year 1974, p24

The only parishes that recorded gains from the internal migration were St. Catherine, St. Thomas, Clarendon and St. James. The pattern of movement did not lead immediately to Kingston and St. Andrew, but often migrants moved from parish to parish and then eventually migrated to the urban complex of Kingston and St. Andrew. Clarendon is contiguous to St. Catherine and the latter is contiguous to St. Andrew. St. Thomas is contiguous to Kingston and it is this contiguity to the urban complex that may account for the negligible increase for those parishes. The parish of St. James recorded an increase of internal migrants of 700 and this is explained by the growing importance of the tourist industry which during this period was centred in Montego Bay, the capital of St. James.

1960-70

The annual estimate of internal migration during the period 1943-60 was 16,000 and in the period 1960-70, there occurred an additional increase of 7,000 - an annual total of approximately 23,000.³⁹ The parishes of St. Elizabeth, Westmoreland, St. Ann and St. Mary suffered from the outward movement. The internal migrants settled primarily in St. Andrew, St. Catherine, and St. James.

The farm population in 1954 was estimated at 900,000 and in 1961 that population had decreased by 160,000 (18%) to 840,000. In 1954 the number of workers in agriculture was 262,000 but by 1961 that figure had been reduced to 165,000, a decrease of 37 percent.⁴⁰

Whenever the industrial process is well underway, it is to be expected that the number of workers engaged in agriculture will be reduced and those

workers will be absorbed in the expanding industrial labour force. This was certainly not the experience in Jamaica. There was no mechanization of agriculture that preceded or was concomitant with industrialization. Urbanization proceeded at a pace that was much too swift for the Jamaican industrial trot. Jamaica agriculture remained stagnant and the economy became increasingly dependent on imported foodstuff. In 1950, a total of J\$9.8 million worth of food was imported and by 1968 this figure had climbed to J\$57.9 million. Thus we have the paradox in that a country which is losing its agricultural workers who are migrating to the cities is becoming increasingly dependent on imported food. It is not a question that people were being pulled to the cities, but that they were being pushed from the land. The peasant population had reached a point of saturation and was in search of lebensraum. Although agricultural production suffered from low productivity as a consequence of the plethora of non-viable small farms, the amount of under-utilized land in the country was estimated at 500,000 acres.⁴¹

The Jamaican peasant up until 1938 exhibited the characteristic of marked class subservience. There was no mass demand for redistribution of land or anti-colonial struggle. The peasant failed to mount any concerted effort for political change. To improve his lot, he sought refuge in internal or external migration. Those who remained in the countryside accepted the existing division of labour and posed no threat to the legitimacy of colonial institutions. Nevertheless, the movement of people from the countryside to the cities would eventually present the state with the serious problem of the maintenance of social order. The very economic policies introduced in post World War II period acted as an additional stimulus to internal migration. This meant that

by the 1960's vast hordes of unemployed workers were concentrated in the urban complex of Kingston and St. Andrew, living in the most wretched of economic conditions. These would-be workers questioned the legitimacy of the state and were instrumental in changing the character of domestic politics. The sons of the peasants now living in an urban complex were not marred by class subservience, but were willing to resort to violence of a social or political nature in order to have access to the basic necessities of life.

FOOTNOTES

1. C.L.R. James, Black Jacobins (Random House 1963) p.391
2. See Eugene Genovese, The World the Slaveholders Made (Vintage Books 1971)
3. Eric Williams, Capitalism and Slavery (Capricorn Books 1966) p. 27
4. Ibid, p. 124
5. Ibid, p. 122
6. Ibid, p. 122-123
7. Ibid, p. 128
8. Philio D. Curtin, Two Jamaicas (Atheneum 1970) p. 83
9. Ibid, p. 91-92
10. Ibid, p.107
11. Ibid, p. 107
12. Ibid, p. 116
13. Ibid, p. 116
14. Ibid, p. 111
15. Owen Jefferson, The Post-War Economic Development of Jamaica, (ISER 1972) p. 2

16. Philip Curtin, op cit, p 138
17. Ibid, p 140
18. Owen Jefferson, op cit, p 20
19. Ibid, p 2
20. Ibid, p 2
21. Woodville Marshall "Notes on Peasant Development in the West Indies", published in Readings in Government and Politics of the West Indies (University of the West Indies 1971)
22. Ibid, p 37
23. Ibid, p 36
24. Ibid, p 37
25. Roberts and Mills, "Study of External Migration Affecting Jamaica" 1953 - 55 Institute of Social and Economic Research June 1958, p 1
26. Ibid, p 1-2
27. Dennis Forsythe, "Black Immigrants and the American Ethos: Theories and Observations" published in Caribbean Immigration to the United States (Smithsonian Institute 1976) p 66
28. Roberts and Mills, op cit, p 2
29. Ibid, p 3
30. Ibid, p 3
31. David Lowenthal, West Indian Societies (Oxford University Press 1972) p 219
32. Ibid, p 221
33. Ibid, p 113
34. G. Roberts, (ed) Recent Population Movements in Jamaica (United National Publication 1974), p 30
35. Ibid, p 30
36. Ibid, p 34
37. Owen Jefferson, op cit, p 100

38. G. Roberts (ed) op cit, p 34
39. Ibid, p 39
40. Jefferson, op cit, p 82
41. Ibid, p 82

C H A P T E R I I

POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CHANGES, 1944 to 1972

In 1944 the British colonial office began the slow evolutionary process of transferring power to indigenous politicians. Formerly, the political process was closed to the masses and was left slightly ajar for the plantocracy. With the new constitution, the mass of the population were included in the democratic political system. Once decision-making powers were in the hands of indigenous politicians, concerted efforts to develop the Jamaican economy were attempted. Chapters II and III constitute a political and economic analysis of modern Jamaica from 1944 to 1976. Basically, there were two strategies of economic development - (1) industrialization by invitation, and (2) democratic socialism. The architects of the initial strategy - industrialization by invitation - presumed that by industrializing the economy would not only raise the standard of living for the mass of the population, but solve the chronic problem of surplus labour. The strategy of industrialization by invitation was successful in creating a modern economic sector that significantly expanded the island's capability to produce goods and services. The economy grew by leaps and bounds. Despite the new wealth created, the problem of surplus labour remained intractable with the character of that labour force changing as the mode of production in the society underwent fundamental changes. The modern economic sector was located in the urban complex of Kingston and St. Andrew and with the failure to modernize agriculture, more and more farm workers gravitated to the cities. This meant that a mass force of unemployed workers were being concentrated in the shanty towns that surrounded Kingston and St. Andrew. The unemployment situation became so acute in the 1960s that the government refrained from disclosing the official unemployment statistics.

Crown Colony Government

Prior to 1865, the colonial government of Jamaica was dominated by the conservative planter class. Members of the Legislature were elected through a privileged franchise and the elected representatives of the planter class were able to influence if not determine policy by the fact that they controlled the purse strings of the Governor. The planter class neglected to build up the infra-structure of the country. Schools, health care, roads, etc. were neglected. Any expansion of educational or social facilities would invariably have to come out of the pockets of the planter class who understandably were reluctant to tax themselves. This policy of social neglect was no doubt influenced by the moribund state of the economy. The rebellion of peasants in St. Thomas, known as the Morant Bay Rebellion in 1865 put an end to representative government in Jamaica. Thereafter the Crown Colony system of government was imposed by the British. The Legislative Assembly persisted but rather than elected members, they were now appointed by the British Governor. Thus under the Crown Colony government power was more concentrated in the hands of the Governor. It was presumed that the Governor would introduce changes that would benefit the lot of the impoverished peasantry. And there is some evidence for that in the sense that public health care improved, the civil service bureaucracy was made more efficient, and educational institutions were created. On this period of Jamaican history, Roy Augier writes:

Grant established the administrative apparatus of a modern state. Old departments were made more efficient, new ones were created. Rational procedures for the administration of the country's finances were introduced; detailed estimates of revenue were prepared, debts funded, tax collected. New courts were established to dispense justice to the poor. Abandoned land was declared forfeited to the Crown, and squatters were given titles. The public system of elementary education was started. So too was the public medical service. Roads and bridges were built.

The Crown Colony constitution was amended to allow for a modicum of participation in 1884. By 1900, 14 seats within the legislature were elected, while the other served at the aegis of the Governor.² The conditions set for exercising the privilege of voting excluded the majority. In order to qualify to vote, one either had to pay ten shillings per annum in tax or had an income of 40 per annum. In 1935 there were only 66,000 registered voters or approximately 7 percent of the population.³ The elected representatives could exercise negative power. If nine elected representatives opposed a financial matter of all fourteen on any other issue, the Governor could only proceed by declaring the matter of paramount importance. But the Governor did not have to resort to his reserve powers that frequently. The elected representative with rare exceptions, had absolutely no affinity with the black masses of the island.

As already indicated, the 1930s was a turbulent decade throughout the Caribbean. A number of Caribbean emigrants were forced to return to their respective homelands due to the world depression. The primary exports of the Caribbean had declined precipitously on the world market and many of the imported necessities of life increased markedly. There occurred throughout the Caribbean a worsening of the already chronic problem of unemployment and a decline in the living standards of the average worker. Beginning in 1935 wage unrest spread throughout the Caribbean region. The rebellion by the workers was more intense in Jamaica than in any other region. The violent eruptions were spontaneous and at the time there were no islandwide trade unions or political organizations to temper the indignation of the working class.

The worker's rebellion of 1938 started at Frome Estate when the sugar workers demanded increase wages and spread throughout the island. The unrest lasted from April 29 to June 10, 1938.⁵ Who participated in the unrest? The demonstrators included sugar workers, banana workers, landless peasants, small farmers, dock workers, blue-collar workers in the city and the unemployed. It was the first time from 1865 that the masses had shown by their actions the contempt in which they held the established political and economic system. The unrest among the dock workers and the unemployed was brought under control by May, 28. The unrest in the countryside among the peasants was more protracted. There were numerous incidents where mobs attacked Chinese grocery stores or attacked Justices of the Peace or people driving motor vehicles. This revealed the class character of the rebellion as the Chinese symbolised the merchant class and a justice of the peace or someone driving a motor-vehicle in 1938 would indeed be a representative of the privileged middle class. The colonial government recognized that the rebellion was far too popular and widespread for the police to contain and called up six platoons of Sherwood Foresters, 5,000 Special Constables, volunteers, and two Cruisers of the Royal Navy before order was restored.⁶

The English Government appointed in the aftermath a West India Royal Commission to investigate the causes of the riots. The fact-finding team known as the Moyne Commission made recommendations to the British government how tranquility in the colonies could be restored:

"Serious discontent was often widespread in West Indian Colonies during the nineteenth century, as is indicated by the occasional uprisings that occurred, leading sometimes to considerable loss of life. But the discontent that

underlies the disturbances of recent years is a phenomenon of a different character, representing no longer a mere blind protest against a worsening of conditions, but a positive demand for the creation of new conditions that will render possible a better and less restricted life. It is the co-existence of this new demand for better conditions with the unfavourable economic trend that is the crux of the West Indian problem of the present day.⁷

Yet the Commissioners were disheartened by what they considered to be a widespread dependency complex. The Commissioners thought that there prevailed an extreme dependency on government and there had failed to develop a tradition of self-reliance.⁸ They were alarmed by the condemned state of the unemployed and on that subject stated:

"The plight of the unemployed, aggravated as it is by the seasonal character of employment, is serious to the point of desperation. There is no unemployment insurance in the West Indies and public assistance in the form of poor law relief is unusually confined to the old and infirm ... The belief that land is always available on which poorer people outside the larger towns can eke out a living is often illusory. Large numbers of labourers have a piece of land on which they can grow food crops. On the other hand there are many cases in which no food plots are obtainable or in which the land available is so rocky or hilly as to make cultivation almost impossible. With charitable organizations completely unable to do more than touch the fringe of the problem, the lot of the unemployed with no means of income to sustain life can well be imagined. When rates of earnings are inadequate, employment is seasonal and generally scarce, and public assistance is thus limited, there can be little wonder that the standard of life of many of the working people throughout the West Indies is deplorably low."⁹

The Moyne Commission clearly understood the problem but failed obviously to recommend the radical measures that were necessary to deal with land maldistribution and chronic unemployment. They recommended palliatives that did not tackle the root of the matter. The Commission recommended the establishment of trade unions and in countries like Jamaica, greater political participation.

In 1940 the British Government introduced the Welfare Development Fund which was tantamount to the admission of the bankruptcy of past laissez-faire economic policies in respect of the colonies and a greater responsibility on the part of the British government to assist in economic development. In 1944 the British gave to Jamaica a new imperial constitution. For the first time in the history of the Jamaican political system, elections were held in December 1944 under universal suffrage. The masses who had rebelled six years previously and who were systematically excluded from the decision-making process were for the first time included in the colonial system.

The 1944 constitution "reinstated a bi-cameral legislature. The Lower Chamber - the House of Representatives - was composed of thirty-two members elected by single member constituencies on the basis of full adult suffrage. The Upper House - the Legislative Council - was made up of fifteen persons, twelve of whom were unofficials, the remainder ex-officio".¹⁰ The executive of the government was comprised of five members of the House of Representatives, three colonial officials and two nominees of the Governor. It was the Governor who presided over the Executive Council. The five elected members of the Executive Council were to have quasi-ministerial responsibility.

The Jamaican political system had moved to a new stage of colonial paternalism. The voters had elected a government that governed only in appearance. An enormous amount of power was still concentrated in the office of the Governor. This meant that only the type of politics that was approved by the Colonial Office would be allowed the freedom to participate in this experiment. In this

regard the British ensured that the politics that evolved was commensurate with the national interest of Great Britain.

Alexander Bustamante

Bustamante had emerged after the rebellion of 1938 as the leader of the working class. He formed a blanket trade union in 1939, the Bustamante Industrial Trade Union, to organize the working class. During the war years, Bustamante was interned by Governor Richards for seventeen months on the premise that the labour leader was creating labour unrest at a time when Britain required optimal production from its colonies. It was an opportune time for Bustamante to be imprisoned as owing to the exigencies of war, the BITU was not capable of improving the living conditions of the workers they represented. Its membership had fallen substantially and dues paying membership was but a fraction of the total membership.¹² Governor Richards' interment created Bustamante into a martyr, a working class leader who had suffered at the hands of a colonial state for demanding justice for the workers.

Bustamante was one of the thousands of emigres who had returned to the island during the 1930s. He had lived abroad for over thirty years and returned with a strong sense of patriotism and a vehemence against the colonial system which was manifested in his barrage of letters to the Daily Gleaner. Bustamante identified himself with the poor masses and blamed the colonial government for the woeful living conditions that prevailed in the island. He was initially viewed as a rabble rouser and a revolutionary. The former he was, the latter he was not. Anticipating the new constitution, Bustamante formed in July, 1941, the Jamaica Labour Party, which became the political arm of the Bustamante Industrial Trade Union.

Bustamante was not someone who was familiar with ideas or political theory. He was a man of action who had developed, despite his years abroad, a keen sense of the common man in Jamaica. He was a man of gigantic stature who was always immaculately attired and who had mastered the art of communicating to the mass man in Jamaica.

Bustamante can be described as a nationalist although during the early years of his political career, he was not an advocate of self-government or independence. He charged the British with economical neglect of Jamaica and feared that self-government would absolve the British of this responsibility. This champion of the working class was totally unsympathetic to socialism and surmised that the free enterprise system of private ownership was the most efficacious to accelerate economic development in Jamaica. But Bustamante recognized the importance of a strong trade union movement to ensure that workers received their fair share of the profits. He was an advocate of business trade-unionism and had no interest or sympathy in changing the capitalist economic system.

The People's National Party, the other institutionalized political party in Jamaica was formed in 1938. Two political activists in the New York based Jamaica Progressive League, W.A. Domingo and Adolphe Roberts served as the catalyst for the formation of the People's National Party.¹³ The PNP from its genesis was an advocate of self-government and led the fight for self-determination at a time when many were skeptical of changing relationships with Great Britain. In the early years it was envisioned that the major task confronting the Party was to arouse the spirit of Jamaican nationalism. This

nationalist party was under the ideological influence of the British Labour Party and in 1940, at the annual Conference held at Coke Memorial Hall, the leader Norman Manley declared the Party a socialist organization. Manley stated:

"I am aware of the fact that there are already a few members of the party who consider themselves socialists. But I am also aware of the fact that the large body of the party membership have not regarded the party hitherto as a socialist organization and I am also aware of the fact that the vast mass of people of this country, and I include among them a considerable proportion of the more intelligent and supposedly better informed, have not got the faintest idea of what socialism means." 14

Manley was careful to differentiate the type of socialism he was advocating in contrast to that practised in the Soviet Union. The socialism that he advocated posed no threat to the British Empire. The socialism of the People's National Party was not anti-religious and certainly did not advocate revolutionary violence. On this subject Manley declared:

"But I do wish to make it clear that one is not committing this party or any of its members to a programme of revolutionary violence in any shape or form. That has never been the aim or the object of the party. It maybe that there are in the party people who are what I call intellectual communists (laughter); because there is no communist organization in Jamaica, their communism has to be a matter of the mind, not organization. Such people indeed are now in the party on the understanding that they work with and for the party, and not for secret aims of their own, be they socialist or otherwise." 15

Thus Norman Manley's ideological position was tantamount to the left wing of the British Labour Party. Manley did not see socialism as "a rigid dogma" 16 but "a principle of social organization which has to be applied to the particular place where you are trying to apply it because it must

depend on the particular conditions which obtain from time to time in that place." ¹⁷ He envisioned this brand of socialism would change the class nature of Jamaican society. On the subject of class, Manley stated:

"We are familiar with this because we were born into a society which is ordered in classes that more or less preserve their relative positions one to the other, and in which certain classes unquestionably enjoy enormous privileges which cannot be open to everybody under the existing system.

It is only socialism which is founded on a belief that it is possible to organize a genuinely egalitarian society, which is a society in which all opportunities will, so far as possible, be equal and open to all persons subject to the basic necessities of preserving society." ¹⁸

Manley did not at that time (1940) raise the question whether socialism was applicable to an underdeveloped colonial island and thus we must assume based on his statement that he believed in the effectiveness of the socialist model of development.

At the time of the first adult suffrage election held on December 14, 1944, Jamaica had two major political parties, the Jamaica Labour Party with a strong working class base provided by the Bustamante Industrial Trade Union and the People's National Party with a narrow working class base advocating national self-government and socialism patterned after the British Labour Party. Ironically, Bustamante the ideological conservative and firm believer in the free enterprise system had usurped the working class base from the socialist People's National Party. Bustamante's control of the agro-proletariat that worked on the sugar plantations and his reputation as a fighter for the poor among the peasants and urban worker, gave the JLP a mass base that ensured an easy electoral victory. The PNP's loyalty base was primarily among the white collar workers and intelligentsia who were impressed with the

erudition of Norman Manley, the Rhodes Scholar and eminent Barrister and who were contemptuous of Alexander Bustamante's lack of formal education.

General Elections 1944				
Total No. of Electors on Lists			663,069	
Total No. of Votes Cast			389,109 (58.7)	

	JLP	PNP	INDEPENDENT	OTHER PARTIES
No. of votes	144,661	82,029	104,814	17,623
Percent of votes	41.4	23.5	30.0	5.1
No. of candidates	29	19	68	9 (JDP)
No. of seats	22	5	5	0

TABLE 2.1

Source: Trevor Munroe, *The Politics of Constitutional Decolonization Jamaica 1944-62*, p42

A party representing the business sector, the Jamaica Democratic Party also contested the election. This economic elite was startled by the PNP's embrace of socialism and frightened of Bustamante's rabble-rousing rhetoric and trade unionism. The Party expended considerable sums of money in an advertising campaign in the pages of the Daily Gleaner but every candidate of the JDP lost his deposit and the Party did not survive long after the 1944 election.

An examination of the election returns will reveal the omnipresence of independent candidates who amassed 30 percent of the votes cast which was 6.5 percent more votes than that obtained by the PNP. But independent candidates divorced from political organizations were merely a holdover of pre-universal suffrage elections and by the next election held in 1949, the independents remained a historical but innocuous relic of another era.

There was dissatisfaction among elected representatives of the limited powers they were able to wield. Seemingly they were like the British monarch - they reigned but did not rule. A Select Committee of the whole House was appointed in July 1950 to recommend amendments to the Jamaican constitution to be submitted to the Secretary of State for the colonies. The work of the Committee was immobilised by the rivalry of the two political parties. The Committee had arrived at tentative agreement vis-a-vis the constitutional amendment but Bustamante was wary that any change in the 1944 constitution may trigger an early election and as the margin of victory by the JLP in 1949 was substantially reduced, he insisted on the condition that "if any of the proposals for amendment to the Constitution would create or cause a new election before 1954 that those proposals ... be deleted." ¹⁹ The political parties had reached a constitutional impasse.

The new Governor, Sir Hugh Foot seized the opportunity and initiated further discussion on the constitution. He was determined to give more powers to the elected representatives who served on the Executive Council. It was also presumed that the "centralization of administration in the Colonial Secretariat choked the governmental mechanism and caused delay in business about which the Legislative would invariably express disfavour." ²⁰ The changes to the 1944 constitution were inaugurated on May 5, 1953. ²¹ More governmental responsibility was placed in the hands of elected representatives who were members of the Executive Council. The Governor continued to be Chairman of the Executive Council and the chief colonial officials remained as members. The leader of the majority party was given the title of Chief Minister and the elected representative who served on the Council were Ministers in charge of their respective Ministries. The post of Chief

Minister was tantamount to that of a Prime Minister and the other Ministers served at the pleasure of the Chief Minister. The Chief Minister had the prerogative of dismissing Ministers provided the Governor assented. The Chief Minister could only be dismissed if the majority of all the members of the House of Representatives so voted. It must be noted nonetheless that the Governor retained the 'reserve powers' which he could use in case of an emergency. The bureaucratic apparatus of government was also decentralized and the separate Ministries for the first time were headed by indigenous personnel rather than expatriates. ²²

It is at this juncture that it can be said that the Jamaican political system had evolved to a state where there was some modicum of authority wielded by elective representatives. Whereas the English colonials had completely neglected to accentuate the economic development of the island, the indigenous political representatives energetically attempted to transform the Jamaican economy. The historical evidence reveals that England perceived the Caribbean as merely a sugar exporting region that was vital to England in the early stages of capital accumulation but by the turn of the nineteenth century, these colonial enclaves had become a burdensome relic. Britain was willing to offer the Caribbean colonies protective markets for inefficiently produced products but up until 1940 there was no capital available to stimulate economic growth in the region. This commitment to economic development did not come about until these countries struggled for responsible government.

The period of political tutelage in Jamaica lasted until August 6, 1962 when the island became an independent nation. The political structure

and culture that emerged were subtly imposed by the British. The task of the colonial Governor was to establish certain parameters based on the British political value system that Jamaican politicians could not go beyond. Political agitation that was disapproved by the British would arrest further constitutional concessions. It is the British who defined what was acceptable or not acceptable conduct in the political arena. Anyone in the Caribbean who went beyond the conventional wisdom as defined by British Governors was treated as a political renegade. This is not the appropriate place to discuss the shenanigans of the British in Guyana but the suspension of the Guyanese constitution in 1953 a few months after the People's Progressive Party triumphed in the first adult suffrage election in that country on the pretense that Jagan was a communist, vividly illustrates my point. The development of the Jamaican political system cannot be seen therefore as a self-determined process but one guided by the colonial Governor who was there to ensure that the politics that evolved was not only democratic but commensurate with British national interest. This is why the nationalism that emerged was not antagonistic to British imperialism. Norman Manley, the leader of the PNP did not see any contradiction that the National Party was under the influence of the British Labour Party. There was never any economic dimension to the nationalism articulated by the PNP. At no time did the Party examine the uneven economic relationship that existed between Britain and Jamaica. Bustamante who was detained by the British during World War II was no longer perceived as a threat to the established political order. Thus the period of tutelage politics ensured a crop of political leaders who were not hostile to Britain. The political system cultivated by the British colonial office was a prototype of the Westminster parliamentary system. Nevertheless, the

indigenous Jamaican politician despite his conservatism was bent on breaking out of the cycle of underdevelopment.

Industrialization by Invitation

The development strategy devised by the Jamaica Labour Party for the modernization of the economy was indeed, influenced by the theory of Professor W. Arthur Lewis. It was Bustamante and his four quasi-Ministers who devised the first Ten-Year Development Plan for Jamaica. This Ten-Year Plan was introduced to facilitate the allocation of funds to be received from the Colonial Development and Welfare grants which represented England's new approach to the economic development of the colonies.²³ Even before the Ten Year Plan an economic report by a special committee in 1943 indicated that to spur economic development in Jamaica more emphasis must be placed on the reorganization of agriculture and the expansion of the tourist trade. Not much hope was placed on the industrialization of the economy although it was recognized that the state would have to play a critical role in population control and to improve the education status of the workforce. A subsequent report filed by the Agricultural Policy Committee also stressed modernization of agriculture and social welfare but placed no faith in the success of an industrial program.

W. Arthur Lewis was critical of the above-mentioned reports. He was convinced that Caribbean countries had to come up with a development plan that would absorb the unemployed and the new annual additions to the labour force or the social order as presently constituted would face mass unrest. Lewis was aware that the Caribbean suffered from a dearth of surplus capital and technological know-how. In addition there did not exist an entrepreneurial class capable of establishing businesses and running them efficiently. Lewis

commented:

"We also have the paradox that a country may be overpopulated relatively to its capacities for industrial development. Some very small countries, like Jamaica or Mauritius, face the problem that their populations are much too large in relation to agriculture and at the same time much too small to support a wide range of industrial development. ²⁴

The decline of the sugar-cane industry coupled with an overall improvement in health-care were the instrumental factors in creating this problem of overpopulation in the rural communities. The situation in Jamaica is further complicated by the miniature nature of the island. The raw materials required to feed an industrial economy would not be found in abundance in a small country. Yet there was no alternative to industrialization. Only the development of industries could solve the persistent problem of unemployment. He recommended the passage of legislation that would lure foreign investors to the shores of Jamaica. It was presumed that foreign capital could be attracted to the island because of its proximity to the United States and that the wage rates in Jamaica were much lower than in the United States. Capital investors would be attracted by the abundance and availability of cheap labour and the expectation of a high profit rate. The industries established by foreign investors would generate sufficient jobs to decrease to manageable levels the explosive problem of unemployed labour concentrated in the cities.

And what of the role of government? The role of government was restricted to improving the infra-structure of the island. This entailed the building of roads, construction of harbour facilities, expansion of the educational system, improved health support services, and technical assistance to farmers. The country was an impoverished colony and the under-developed nature of the resources necessitated a limited function for the governmental sector - development of the national infra-structure. The risky game of profit and loss

was reserved for an idigenous entrepreneurial class and foreign investors.

The JLP's quasi-ministerial government enacted a Pioneer Industry Encouragement Law in 1949. In addition the House of Representatives enacted an Industrial Incentives Law and the Export Industry Encouragement Law. An Industrial Development Corporation was established in 1951 for the express purpose of promoting in the island and overseas the industrial programme of the government. The legislation passed was commensurate with the theory of economic development out lined by Prof. Arthur Lewis. The leader of the Jamaica Labour Party, Alexander Bustamante had no compunctions about adopting the strategy of industrialization by invitation. Bustamante stated categorically:

The policy of the Jamaica Labour Party is to work honestly, faithfully and sincerely to bereft ourselves of the bankruptcy we have taken over in the Jamaican Government, so that we can get this country in a healthy financial position. 25

The prevailing opinion in Jamaica is the only way this could be done is by attracting foreign capital, specifically investors from the industrialized United States. Bustamante diligently assured investors:

"We want them to invest so that they can make a fair percentage of profit upon their capital." 26

Only through industrialization by invitation could jobs be created for the unemployed. But on the subject of unemployment, Bustamante was not very optimistic. He thought it was possible to reduce unemployment but full employment was beyond the realms of possibility. Bustamante stated:

"I use the word reduce unemployment for let no one deceive you that every man and woman in this country can have full work. It has never been done - it cannot be done - it will never be done even though every one wants it. Even as we sit here and say that we want full employment for every man

we shall not see it in this House and our children will not see it. The most we can do is to reduce unemployment considerably." 27

Bustamante from these early years nevertheless recognized the critical importance for state authority to control 'pork barrel' projects in order to influence the political loyalty of the unemployed. He adroitly assumed control of those projects by becoming the first elected Minister of Communications which gave him jurisdiction to "determine the levels and allocation of public funds for public works and in the process control the distribution of work and employment opportunities." 28 He would further abuse his authority to further advance the cause of the Bustamante Industrial Trade Union and the Jamaica Labour Party by restricting employment on work projects and temporary employees of the public service to workers affiliated to the party or union. This is a very important point that will be further developed in later chapters as this precedent initiated by Bustamante will have a damaging effect on democratic institutions in Jamaica. It represents the genesis of political corruption in Jamaica.

Norman Manley and Economic Development.

The People's National Party defeated the incumbent Jamaica Labour Party in 1955 and Premier Norman Manley assumed control of the government. It has been mentioned heretofore that the PNP adopted a platform of democratic socialism in 1940. Manley was instrumental in establishing a Central Planning Unit. This revealed Manley's predilection for a planned economy but the new agency served more as a source for gathering data rather than as a super agency directing the economy. During his years in office, Manley did not deviate from the model of industrialization by invitation. The left faction

of the Party led by the four Hs, Richard Hart, Arthur Henry, Ken Hill and Frank Hill were purged in 1952. The left faction were not enthused about the approach to economic development that was introduced by the JLP. They were more receptive to a more doctrinaire socialist approach to economic development. 29

In office, Manley became impatient with his critics who believed literally in the Party's professed commitment to socialism. In a reply to his critics, Norman Manley said:

"There was no emphasis at all on public ownership and I will tell you why. It was because we were all agreed, rightly or wrongly, and if wrong, we are wrong in a great company ranging all over the world that what Jamaica needed was more basic development in every field - education, health, public services and a million things and that nationalisation of an established enterprise would divert money and time and energy which at that stage should be spent in other fields." 30

Manley's argument was that the conditions for the adoption of socialism simply did not exist in Jamaica. The country after centuries of colonial neglect was attempting to create wealth. Jamaica at this stage of economic development had no wealth to distribute. Furthermore any radical departure from the model of industrialization by invitation introduced by the JLP would lead to a flight of capital and arrest of the gradual movement towards self-government. It must be pointed out that prior to 1962, policy was being made under the watchful eyes of the Colonial Office and the Jamaican politicians wanted very much to impress the British.

Let us examine in a more detailed way the model of industrialization by invitation as it applied to Jamaica. From 1950 to 1968, the Jamaican economy recorded impressive growth rates. Real national income per capita increased at the rate of approximately 4.3 percent per annum. During the

years 1953-57 the economy went through a period of rapid expansion largely spurred by multi-national bauxite companies which had started mining operations after the 1950s. The Gross Domestic Product at factor cost increased from 70.1 million in 1950 to 252.5 million in 1962, an increase of 261 percent. ³¹

Before the 1950s the manufacturing sector produced a limited amount of consumer goods for local consumption and export and also processed local agricultural products. Cigars, sugar, rum, cigarettes, non-alcoholic beverages and food products were manufactured. After the 1950s the manufacturing sector became more diversified. New industries such as textiles, clothing, footwear, cement, paint and containers were introduced. Many of the new industries were based on imported raw materials which would subsequently disturb the balance of payment equilibrium.

The Jamaica Labour Party defeated the People's National Party in the independence election of 1962. Shortly thereafter the JLP published a five year independence plan which gives us marvelous insight as to how this newly independent government intended to deal with the problems of economic development and unemployment.

It was presumed that the growth in the manufacturing sector would eventually absorb the surplus labour in the cities. The Plan recognized the need to diversify the location of industries. There was also the realization that the new industries would have to be geared towards export because of the reliance on imported raw materials. The foreign exchange that the exports could earn would compensate for the foreign exchange

drainage that comes about with the purchase of raw materials from abroad. The industrial incentive legislation attracted twenty-three new industries in 1962 which amounted "to a total investment of 3,550,000 but anticipated employment amounted to only 1,460 persons." 32

Although the manufacturing sector was experiencing rapid growth, it was not sufficient to even make a dent in the unemployment problem. The other intractable problem that confronted the JLP was that there were other developing countries competing for overseas investment. Overseas investors preferred to speculate in countries that not only promised decades of stability, but sought a country with a working class without a tradition of trade unionism. The trade union tradition was deeply rooted among the Jamaican working class. In fact, such a tradition was supported by both political parties as an attempt to cultivate a mass base amongst the electorate. It was clear from then that other than the bauxite companies there would be no massive influx of foreign capital into Jamaica.

The JLP government nobly declared:

"The Government will give priority of attention to the employment problem which stands in the centre of its policies and programmes. Every effort will be made to raise the level of employment and to bring about a reduction in unemployment. The emphasis in the government's development projects, particularly in the first two years of the Five-Year Plan will be on the creation of employment opportunities. The measures designed to stimulate activity in the private sector are aimed at the provision of an increasing number of jobs from year to year.

In recognition of the fact that it is quite possible for national income to increase with little if any rise in employment, the Government will undertake, or provide incentives toward the carrying out of projects which are labour intensive ... In putting such projects into operation, the aim will be to give special attention to

areas of high unemployment or where there is a considerable amount of seasonal employment." ³³

In fact, Government was not confronting the real problem. The Bustamante administration knew that the manufacturing sector could not absorb the surplus labour and the tinkering of the state with alleged labour intensive projects did not constitute an assault on unemployment. They were very much aware that the 1962 Commonwealth Immigration Act would drastically reduce the number of workers migrating to Britain and thus the unemployment ranks would be swollen. Employment in Jamaica increased from 530,000 in 1957 to 566,000 in 1960. The years 1957-60 are years of high growth and only 36,000 additional jobs were created in a labour force that was expanding approximately 20,000 per year. Because of the exodus of workers who journeyed to London, the level of unemployment fell from 120,000 in 1957 to 82,000 in 1960. ³⁴

On the subject, the Five Year Plan stated:

The growth in the island's labour force was considerably reduced in the period between 1953 and 1962 by heavy migration to the United Kingdom. The introduction of controls on immigration by the Government of the United Kingdom in 1962 has resulted in a drastic reduction in emigration from Jamaica.

In the absence of the finding of new outlets for migration of significant numbers of persons, the labour force will now increase rapidly and with it the number of jobs which must be created in each year if unemployment is to be reduced or even to be kept from rising. ³⁵

The response of the JLP Government to the problem of unemployment was totally inadequate. The 1960s was characterised by impressive growth rates concomitant with increasing unemployment. In 1967 the Gross National Product was \$731.4 million; in 1968 the Gross National Product increased by 10.4 percent to

\$807.2 million, a percentage increase of 9.8 percent.³⁶ In 1968 National Income was estimated at \$665.4 million and in 1969 at \$721.5 million, an increase of 8.4 percent.³⁷ Import of capital goods in 1968 amounted to \$116.2 million and in 1969 this was increased to \$136.2 million. Consumer goods valuing \$114.4 million were imported in 1968 and increased to \$132.6 million in 1969, a percentage increase of 15.9 percent.³⁸ Jamaica, a developing economy with a serious unemployment problem was spending as much money importing consumer goods as it was spending on the importation of capital goods. It is the latter that is instrumental in transforming the economy, in increasing the productive capabilities of the economy and thus any serious effort at modernizing the Jamaican economy would have to give priority to capital goods over consumer goods. From the statistics on consumer imports we can see there had emerged a class with sufficient income to enjoy the 'niceties' of industrial life and enjoyed a standard of living far in excess of the economic capacity of the island.

Throughout the 1960s the economy remained buoyant, yet there were already signs of structural weakness. Imports exceeded exports and was allowed to continue because the tourist sector and capital inflows from abroad compensated for the deficit. Capital inflows in 1968 amounted to \$112.5 million, which was sufficient to erase the trade deficit of \$101 million. But in 1969 capital inflows decreased dramatically to \$78.7 million. This was insufficient to balance the import-export deficit and the reserves were decreased by \$11.5 million.³⁹

The Uneven Nature of Development

The economic modernization of Jamaica was of an uneven nature. The economic expansion occurred in the tourist sector, the mining sector and the manufacturing sector, but the agricultural sector amounted to 10.3 percent of Gross Domestic Product but by 1969 that percentage had declined to 9 percent. Despite feeble attempts by the government to get the agricultural sector moving, like a stubborn donkey, it refused to gallop:

The data indicates a considerable decline in the number of farms and in farm acreage between 1954 and 1968. The number of farms declined from approximately 199,000 to 185,000 while farm acreage declined from 1,788,660 acres to 1,507,397.⁴⁰

How did the JLP government approach the agricultural problem? It was very clear to the government that the poor living conditions in the rural area had encouraged a new generation of farm youths to migrate to the cities. For 25 years there had been in existence a Land Settlement Programme which was instrumental in establishing one hundred and ninety-one settlements with twenty-six thousand, three hundred and twenty-five settlers who were allotted approximately one hundred and thirty-seven thousand acres.⁴¹ In assessing the programme, the JLP government recognized that the settlements had not produced any marked increase in agricultural output. The five year Development Plan of the Jamaica Labour Party declared that the objectives in agriculture entailed the most efficient use of land and to raise the standard of living of the rural population.⁴² This would be accomplished through a grant and loan assistance to farmers and advice by agricultural extension officers. Government also decided to create a marketing corporation which would ensure proper marketing and reasonable prices. Government would attempt

to steer private capital into agriculture and to tax under-utilised land to encourage optimal production.

Governmental rhetoric concerning under-utilised land sounded quite radical:

"It is estimated that of the total of approximately 1.7 million acres of cultivable land, 150,000 to 200,000 acres of land on farms of over 100 acres in size may be regarded as idle or grossly under-utilised in relation to their potential.

Owners of currently under-utilised land will be affected by the continuation of the programme of valuation of properties on unimproved values and imposition of taxes on this basis." 43

The Land Reform programme of the JLP government went on to state:

"Where taxation on unimpaired values does not provide a sufficient stimulus to land-owners to put their unused lands into full production, and where owners are unwilling or unable either to put such lands into production or to lease them for agricultural purposes, it will be necessary for government to consider compulsory acquisition of such lands and their redistribution to persons who are competent and willing to bring the lands into satisfactory production." 44

The intent was noble, but the objectives were not realized. The rate of taxation on the unimproved value of the land was too low to have had an effect. The agricultural census in 1968-69 revealed that over 70% of the farmers with landholdings under 5 acres occupied only 11-16% of the total farm acreage and 300 to 350 large landholders representing 0.15% to 0.2% of the farm population had access to 38-45% of all the farm land. 45

Table 2.2

<u>Number of Farms by Size Groups 1958, 1961, 1968/69</u>					
Year	Under 5	5-25	25-100	100-500	500 +
1958	141,224	53,000	4,012	639	314
1961	112,426	41,053	3,785	766	347
1968/69	151,705	37,607	3,055	699	293

			All Farms	% under 5	% over 500
1958			199,489	70.7	0.15
1961			158,577	70.8	0.21
1968/69			193,359	78.3	0.15

Source: Agricultural Census 1965-69

From these statistics, one can discern that a large section of the rural population - 78.3% or 193,359 farms were under 5 acres. The miniature nature of these farms made it impossible for these farms to be productive and agricultural productivity had remained woefully low. The tradition of private ownership of land made most peasants unreceptive or suspicious of cooperative forms of farming under which it would be much easier to improve production by utilizing scientific methods. The reform policies of the Jamaica Labour Party during the first decade of an independent Jamaica simply did not improve the contracting agricultural sector. The intent to attract private capital to invest in agriculture did not produce any dividends. The investment of private capital concentrated on the manufacturing sector or on real estate speculation. The food import bill kept soaring and the farm population unabatedly kept

flocking to Kingston and St. Andrew. In 1950 Jamaica imported J\$9.8m worth of food and despite the noble objectives of the JLP government, the import food bill in 1968 cost \$57.9 million.⁴⁶ The agricultural policy of the JLP government was not effective.

How did the People's National Party react to the strategy of economic development employed by the Jamaica Labour Party? The economic expansion created a privileged class of white collar functionaries out of which the political elite hailed. The governmental party, irrespective of who had control of state power was awed by the high growth rates. And irrespective of which party constituted the opposition, that party would lament at the uneven distribution of wealth rampant in the society. Norman Manley's career personified this strange political ambivalence to the model of industrialization by invitation. In a budget debate in the House of Representatives in 1958, Premier Manley Snr. enthusiastically stated in respect of national income:

"In 1950 the total was 70 million; in 1954 it had risen to 119 million - a rise let it be admitted, that was significant, for we moved over 49 million in five years - that was a significant advance. It jumped in 1955 up to then the biggest jump of all, it jumped to 11 million to 136 million in 1955. It is the most exciting story that has ever happened in Jamaica."⁴⁷

As the Leader of the Opposition, Norman Manley perceived the Jamaican economy with a critical eye. In a radio broadcast on Sunday 19, February 1967 on the eve of the first post-independence election, he danced to a different drummer:

"In every village and town at least a half of the young men are out of work. In every village and town the young girls have babies whose fathers are out of work and very often have never had a chance to work in their lives."⁴⁸

Manley went on to say:

But what have we done in Jamaica? We are afraid to admit the poverty of the masses; we are afraid to look at the plight of our young men with honest open eyes." 49

High economic growth was thus concomitant with high unemployment rates. In 1968 the JLP government attempted to modify the model of industrialization by invitation in order to deal with the high rate of unemployment and the maldistribution of wealth by encouraging the development of a dynamic bourgeois class.

The Jamaicanizing of the Economy

The Trinidadian economist, William Demas published in 1965, The Economics of Development in Small Countries With Special Reference to the Caribbean.

Demas saw the weaknesses of laissez-faire industrialization by invitation and presumed that modifications would remove the persistent problem of high unemployment. Demas recognized that although Caribbean economies in the post World War two period had grown at a phenomenal rate, self-sustaining growth remained elusive. Demas proposed that there are two essential characteristics of self-sustaining growth (1) the generation of sufficient domestic savings to maintain growth rates and (2) transformation of the structure of production. For the latter Demas listed seven basic elements:

- 1) Transformation of political and social processes and attitudes.
- 2) unification of the national market
- 3) the changing distribution of the labour force from primary to secondary and tertiary activities
- 4) an increasing degree of independence among domestic industries and activities
- 5) changes in the importance and composition of foreign trade
- 6) the reduction of dualism in the economy

7) the development of appropriate institutions. 50

The small size of the Caribbean economy is seen as an impediment to the achievement of self-sustaining development. The resource base of the respective islands is highly skewed and in such a situation raw materials inevitably have to be imported for the manufacturing sector. The domestic market is so small that production must be oriented towards the export market. A small nation must export in order to maintain growth and thus exports will always constitute a high percentage of gross domestic product. 51 Demas comments that small economies like the Caribbean islands "are placed in various degrees of dependence in that their momentum of growth is not fully determined by decisions of domestic producer, consumers, and the local government. 52 Dependency then for Caribbean mini-states is a permanent condition and the growth of the economy remains contingent on external demand. The state of the world economy has a profound impact on the performance of the dependent Caribbean economy.

Within these structural constraints there still remained some amount of manoeuvrability on the part of political decision-makers. Demas stipulated that industrialization by invitation without modification led to distorted growth. The open-dependent-economy permits excessive importation of non-durable consumer goods that aggravate the balance of payments deficit. This laissez-faire approach or what Demas calls the open economy allows excessive wage demands which encourages the replacement of labour by capital intensive techniques for labour intensive techniques which further exacerbates the unemployment situation. The open economy usually ends up with resources allocated primarily to the metropolitan region and with the neglect of agriculture, rural folks drift to the cities. The consumption patterns developed do not encourage domestic savings and capital formation necessary to maintain high

growth rates.

What is the solution to the problem that Demas proposes? Demas is aware that the problem is particularly difficult to solve in a parliamentary democracy, but does not call for the abandonment of that political system. The existence of militant trade unions perennially demanding increased wages and benefits further complicates the problem. Demas views parliamentary democracy and an unfettered trade union movement as "the product rather than the concomitants of the developed process."⁵³ Their existence and institutionalization in the Caribbean present an impediment to rapid economic development. A militant trade union tradition, according to Demas "often do pursue policies which secure short-term gains in real wages and working conditions for their membership at the expense of the expansion of employment opportunities, capital formation and the government budget."⁵⁴ The limited power that government enjoys in a capitalist democracy prevents it from arresting the movement of people from the countryside to the cities. Government cannot focus on capital accumulation but must be responsive to the demands placed on the body politic. The Trinidadian economist concluded that the only way out for the Caribbean island is to form a larger economic union - a Caribbean common market. This would provide Caribbean countries with a larger internal market, and a resource base that would be less skewed. This would enable Caribbean territories to be less dependent on the world market. The Caribbean states would have to reduce the importation of inessential items and luxury goods.⁵⁵ Transformation of these economies can only be realised through the exportation of manufactured goods. The importation of raw materials for manufacturing geared

to the domestic market only increased the trade deficit. With the manufacturing sector earning foreign exchange, the balance of payments deficit would not be a constraint to further growth. To cope with the unemployment problem, Demas suggested expanding the construction sector which unlike the technology used in manufacturing, was labour-intensive.⁵⁶ To further absorb the surplus labour, it would be necessary to inaugurate public works programmes.

Demas' modification of industrialization by invitation recognizes the problem of dualism. He does not believe that the dualism that exist between the modern industrial sector and the backward agricultural sector can be easily mitigated. Demas states:

"Therefore the developmental strategy must seek to prevent the drift from rural to urban areas. While many hold that this drift cannot be stopped since it does not derive from an absence of employment opportunities in the rural areas, I believe that migration out of rural areas can be slowed down by making the countryside a better place in which to live. This implies measures to raise output per acre, as well as the provision of better public amenities and the development of community life."⁵⁷

Demas is well aware of the excessive demands placed on the democratic political system and the inability of the system to accommodate these demands given the level of economic development and the availability of resources. We have seen in the case of the JLP government that the problem was grasped but the proposed policies were ineffective. And one of the reasons for the inability of the Jamaican government to reduce the disparity between town and country has to do not only with the investment patterns of an underdeveloped capitalist society but that peasants as an interest group remain un-organized in contrast to trade unions in the core (developed) areas.

Demas recommended partially closing the openness of the banking system to discourage the investment of profits abroad at a time when these countries suffered from a dearth of capital. This can be done by introducing exchange controls. ⁵⁸ Also recommended is the harmonization of national developmental plans and that of multi-national corporations, but Demas does not recommend nationalization or expropriation. ⁵⁹

By the waning years of the 1960s, the JLP government recognized something had to be done to tackle the unemployment problem and the uneven distribution of wealth. The Minister of Finance, Eddie Seaga in the Shearer Cabinet introduced the policy of "Jamaicanization" of the Jamaican economy. This was an attempt to reduce the excessive dependency of the economy on foreign capital. The policy was designed to reduce the level of foreign ownership of the economy and place in the hands of an indigenous bourgeois class control of the means of production. It was an attempt to substitute the alien dynamic from without with an indigenous dynamic from within.

Eddie Seaga defined his policy of Jamaicanization as a partnership with foreign interests. Mr. Seaga was careful to qualify his policy of Jamaicanization that there were some foreign investments which were untouchable. Seaga's Jamaicanization was structured to minimize and if possible to prevent the flight of foreign capital. The Jamaicanization of the economy was distinguished from a policy of nationalization. Government was not hostile to foreign capital, but merely sought a complementary relationship through partnership with the indigenous private sector.

What were the objectives of Jamaicanization? The Minister of Finance sought 51 percent ownership of the banking system and other foreign enterprises.

This new policy was to be gradually phased in to avoid creating shock waves throughout the economy. Jamaicanization of the economy was to be achieved over a period of five years. The key sector of the Jamaican economy, bauxite was numbered among the untouchables and was to remain as a foreign monopoly. On the question of Jamaicanization of the economy, Seaga stated:

"The most desirable arrangement was one in which the foreign partner would be able to provide capital plus the market outlet capital, plus the technological know-how, with the domestic partner providing the remaining input factors." 60

Seaga was not in favour of government ownership of enterprises. The Minister of Finance and the other Cabinet members of the JLP government took the position that the private entrepreneurs could run the economy more proficiently than the public sector bureaucracy. The hierarchy of the Bustamante Industrial Trade Union, true to the Bustamante heritage, was comfortable with that position. Eddie Seaga concluded that the termination of foreign ownership would inevitably lead to inefficiency, isolation from technological innovation, and would make metropolitan markets inaccessible to Jamaican exports. 61

To further this process of indigeneous economic activity, a stock exchange was inaugurated in 1969. The opening of the stock exchange was to facilitate the Jamaicanization of the economy and to create an investment market. This mild policy of Jamaicanization created sufficient concern among foreign investors that capital inflows tapered off in 1969. The inflow of foreign capital was also affected by the conclusion of the expansion in the productive capacity of the bauxite-aluminum companies.

Income Distribution in Jamaica

Although Jamaica has a tradition of competitive trade unionism, the labour unions have not been successful in bringing about a fair share of the wealth for workers. Jamaica has always suffered from a maldistribution of wealth and in fact income distribution became more lopsided during the years of the Jamaicanization of the economy. In 1968 the top five percent of the labour force controlled 25% of the labour income and the bottom 60 percent controlled 25 percent of the labour income. By 1974, the top 5 percent increased its share to 40 percent while the share of the bottom 60 percent was reduced to 16 percent.⁶² The Jamaicanization that the Jamaica Labour Party introduced as a modification of the policy of industrialization by invitation did not lead to redistribution of wealth but an exacerbation of the said problem. The platoons of the reserve army of labour kept burgeoning and concentrated in the zones of the urban complex of Kingston and St. Andrew that were maculately reserved for the wretched of the earth. It was apparent by the late 1960s that the attempt to solve the unemployment problem through accelerated industrialization had failed. Official governmental statistics reveal the extent of the problem.

TABLE 2.3 - Unemployment 1942 - 1960

<u>Year</u>	<u>Labour Force</u>	<u>Unemployed</u>	<u>Never Worked</u>
1942	514,000	139,000	50,000
1953	625,000	111,000	20,000
1957	649,000	120,000	Not available
1960	648,000	82,000	45,000

Source: New World Group: Jamaica Pamphlet No. 3, September 1967

These figures indicate that some progress was made in reducing the intractable problem of unemployment in 1953 through the exodus of Jamaican workers to England during the 1950s. But what is disturbing is the huge number of "would be proletariat" who have never worked. The unemployed included over 6,000 craftsmen, and technical workers (motor mechanics, plumbers, electricians and carpenters).⁶³ In his analysis of unemployment in 1960, Norman Girvan indicated:

"Of the 382,000 men who were employed, a total of 93,000 - almost one out of every four - had worked for four days or less only during the past week Among the women, over 20 percent as well (52,000) out of 225,000) had worked only for four days or less during the week before the census."⁶⁴

After the 1960s the government refrained from publishing unemployment statistics. This was obviously not an oversight but a deliberate policy which indicated that the JLP government recognized the explosive nature of the problem. We do know that from 1960 to 1970 the labour force was expected to increase by 20,000 annually.

In October, 1974 there were 166,500 Jamaicans unemployed, 20.4 percent of the labour force; in October 1975, 184,300 were unemployed, 21.2 percent of the labour force. Of those presumed to be employed as many as 10.3 percent worked for less than 25 hours. During 1973-74 the growth rate of the economy averaged 3.5 percent per annum and decreased to a lamentable 1 percent in 1975.⁶⁶ The slow down in economic growth reflected as Demas pointed out, the precarious position of a small economy that is dependent on the state of the world economy. The strategy of industrialization by invitation had not been successful in absorbing the surplus labour that was increasingly concentrated in the urban complex of Kingston and St. Andrew.

In 1974, the People's National Party after defeating the Jamaica Labour Party in the election of 1972, rejected the approach to economic development that we call industrialization by invitation and instituted a new approach that they called democratic socialism. Hitherto, despite the noble intentions of the PNP, this new approach to economic development has neither produced new wealth nor significantly decreased the ranks of the unemployed.

As aforementioned, the political system was opened up to the mass of the population when universal suffrage was introduced in 1944. Although divided along the multi-class axis of the two institutionalized political parties, the PNP and the JLP, the Jamaican masses made more demands on the economic system than it was capable of accommodating. Because they comprised the overwhelming majority of the voters, it meant politics could not be conducted in an elitist manner. Both political parties had to develop policies that had mass appeal. With the chronic problem of unemployment, this meant that people were always appealing to politicians with the hope of obtaining gainful employment. Workers in the respective party organization expected to reap some material benefits providing their party triumphed at the polls. The only way the political party could satisfy these demands for jobs and houses, etc. was to distribute benefits on a discriminatory basis which meant reserving the finite amount of largesse for supporters of the party in power. In this way, it was presumed that more people would join the party with the expectation of gaining something and thus the appeal of the opposition party would be weakened. In addition, it was presumed that the might of the party would be demonstrated through this selective dispensation of spoils and the victimization of those who opposed, and thus enhancing the Party's chances

enhancing the Party's chances of re-election. It is not surprising that immediately after winning the first universal suffrage election in Jamaica in 1944, the leader of the JLP and the BITU, Alexander Bustamante assumed control of the crucial Ministry of Public Works, the ministry which controlled all projects of a pork-barrel nature.

Although this brutal policy of political victimization succeeded in dividing the mass of the population and kept them fighting over the crumbs brushed from the politician's table, the crumbs were never sufficient to satisfy the impoverished hordes. In other words, the demands being placed on the government exceeded its capability of supplying the necessary goods, even within the ranks of its own party. This meant that political victimization would subsequently become a festering sore that would contribute to the destruction of the social fabric of the nation. It would precipitate large scale violence amongst highly politicized communities. It would mean the legitimacy of the state would be questioned by approximately one-half of the population that was victimized by the party in power. People with this kind of political experience would be more willing to commit 'illegal' acts of political or social nature against the state. Jamaican politics is fiercely competitive and the politicized lumpen-proletariat supporters of the party who loses, will be virtually deprived of the necessities of life. In this type of desperate political setting where the problem of surplus labour remains intractable, it becomes nigh impossible to maintain a democratic political ethos. People are willing to plunder, to maim, to murder, to ensure that their political party triumphs at the polls.

1. Roy Augier "Before and After 1865" published in Readings in Government and Politics of the West Indies (U.W.I. 1971) p 72
2. James Carnegie, Some Aspects of Jamaica's Politics 1918 - 1938 (Institute of Jamaica 1973) p 15
3. Ibid, p 15
4. K.W.J. Post, "The Politics of Protest in Jamaica 1938" published in Readings in Government and Politics of the West Indies (U.W.I. 1971) p 198
5. The Daily News, Wednesday May 18, 1977. p 17
6. K.W.J. Post, op cit, p 202
7. West India Royal Commission Report, 1938, p 8
8. Ibid, p 35
9. Ibid, p 196
10. Trevor Munroe, The Politics of Constitutional Decolonization Jamaica 1944 - 62, (ISER 1972) p 45 - 46
11. Ibid, p 46
12. George E. Eaton, Alexander Bustamante and Modern Jamaica (Kingston Publishers Ltd.) p 77
13. Souvenir Journal of the Jamaica Progressive League 1978, p 14
14. Rex Nettleford (ed) Manley and the New Jamaica Selected Speeches and Writings 1938 - 1968 Clowes and Sons Ltd. 1971 p 60
15. Ibid, p 63
16. Ibid, p 62
17. Ibid, p 62
18. Ibid, p 61 - 62
19. Trevor Munroe, op cit, p 67
20. Ibid, p 68
21. Ibid, p 67

22. Ibid, p 69
23. George Eaton, op cit, p 98
24. W. Arthur Lewis, Theory of Economic Growth (London 1955) p 324
25. George Eaton, op cit, p 102 - 103
26. Ibid, p 103
27. Ibid, p 103
28. Ibid, p 115
29. Interview with Frank Hill, June 1976
30. Nettleford, op cit, p 92
31. Five Year Independence Plan 1963 - 1968, p 11
32. Ibid, p 16
33. Ibid, p 56
34. Ibid, p 34
35. Ibid, p 36
36. Economic Survey Jamaica 1969, p 13 .
37. Ibid, p 12
38. Ibid, p 28
39. Ibid, p 4
40. Owen Jefferson, op cit, p 80
41. Five Year Independence Plan 1963 - 68, p 105
42. Ibid, p 89
43. Ibid, p 113
44. Ibid, p 113
45. Don Robotham, Agrarian Relations In Jamaica, published in Essays in Power and Change in Jamaica (U.W.I. 1976) p 45

46. Jefferson, op cit, p 120
47. Rex Nettleford, op cit, p 238
48. Ibid, p 337
49. Ibid, p 338
50. William Demas, The Economics of Development in Small Countries With Special Reference to the Caribbean (McGill University Press 1965) p 8
51. Ibid, p 22
52. Ibid, p 38
53. Ibid, p 99
54. Ibid, p 98
55. Ibid, p 131
56. Ibid, p 133
57. Ibid, p 137
58. Ibid, p 146
59. Ibid, p 137
60. Daily Gleaner, November 8, 1978, p 7
61. Ibid, p 7
62. Current Economic Situation and Prospects of Jamaica. March 8, 1976 - Document of the World Bank, p 3
63. Norman Girvan "Unemployment in Jamaica" published in Readings in the Political Economy of the Caribbean (New World Pub. 1971) p 268
64. Norman Girvan, op cit, p 238
65. Economic and Social Survey of Jamaica 1975
66. Current Economic Situation and Prospects of Jamaica, op cit, p 1

C H A P T E R I I I

MICHAEL MANLEY AND THE POLITICS OF DEMOCRATIC SOCIALISM

In February, 1972 the JLP government was democratically swept out of office and replaced by the People's National Party which was headed by Michael Manley, the son of Norman Manley who retired as Leader of the Opposition in 1969. Immediately on assuming office, the PNP avoided making any dramatic changes in the economic course that was set by the JLP. Nevertheless, the international recession and the 1973 increase in oil prices jolted the Jamaican economy like the winds of a tropical storm. In 1973 the cost of fuel imported amounted to \$67 million and in 1974 that figure jumped to \$177.4 million and in 1975 imported fuel amounted to \$195.5 million.

During the years of rapid expansion, imports had always exceeded exports but the foreign currency earned from the tourist sector along with capital inflows from abroad was sufficient to cover the deficit and to increase foreign reserves. But by 1971 the expansion in the bauxite-alumina sector had ceased and the tourist sector had been damaged by the recession in North America.

The modernization of the Jamaican economy coincided with the uninterrupted growth of the world economy in the post World War II period. The unsettled state of the world economy in 1973 precipitated a crisis in the dependent economy of Jamaica. For politicians and citizens, this economic contraction was something unprecedented. The Manley government seized the opportunity to reaffirm the PNP's faith in democratic socialism. A new generation of PNP politicians under the idealistic leadership of Michael Manley had mustered the courage to abandon the policy of industrialization by invitation and to set Jamaica on the unventured path of democratic socialism. The Jamaican economy was experiencing growth pains, but even more threatening the capitalist system was being threatened by a rise in mass discontent. The Manley government was forced to respond to pressures from below. How did the PNP proceed

to define democratic socialism?

On July 4, 1968, the seventy-fifth birthday of Norman Manley, he announced his retirement from politics. On that occasion he stated:

My generation had a distinct mission to perform. It was to create a national spirit with which we could identify ourselves as a people for the purpose of achieving independence on the political plane. I am convinced, deeply convinced, that the role of this generation is to proceed to the social and economic reform of Jamaica. ¹

In his valedictory address to the People's National Party in 1969, Manley made a speech that indicated that his generation had accomplished their mission of political independence and the task of the new generation was to bring about economic emancipation for the masses of Jamaican people.

On that occasion he stated:

I say that the mission of my generation was to win self-government for Jamaica. To win political power which is the final power for the black masses of my country from which I spring. I am proud to stand here today and say to you who fought that fight with me, say it with gladness and pride. Mission accomplished for my generation. ²

The mission for the new Manley was a problem of a different kind. To accomplish the new mission of economic development and full employment, the PNP chose democratic socialism.

When the Michael Manley government was elected in 1972 it did not run on the proclamation of democratic socialism. It merely pointed out to the citizenry the inability of the JLP to solve the intractable problem of unemployment. The PNP accused the JLP of blatant political corruption and blamed governmental policy for the social decay and the increase in urban crime. The adoption of a manifesto of democratic socialism did not occur until the Party Conference of September, 1974. The PNP sought to modify

the economic system without trampling the democratic process which had been intact since 1944. The manifesto argued:

We reaffirm our rejection of capitalism as the system upon which to base the future of Jamaica. This system involves the exploitation of people and obliges individuals to pursue private gain at the expense of their fellow citizens without regard to any other interest. Therefore, our efforts will be directed, instead towards building Socialism.

We reaffirm our faith that cooperation is the basic method by which a society should be organized and that it is our duty to seek to replace the system of human cooperation. ³

The Manley government had rejected capitalism, yet a close reading of the Party's Manifesto revealed that the government had no intention of abandoning the private sector, but was merely working out a new modus operandi between the public sector and the private sector. In the basic principles contained in the same document (which I have called the Party's Manifesto on democratic socialism) is the Party's position on the role of the private sector.

We reaffirm the belief that Jamaica will flourish best under a mixed economy in which there is a clear and honourable role for responsible private business working in partnership with the public sector of the economy. ⁴

The document further states:

We reaffirm the belief that the government on behalf of the people has the responsibility to supervise the workings of the economy and the institutions of the society so as to ensure that they work together in harmony and provide the opportunities and the basic necessities of life for every man, woman and child. ⁵

The Manley government made the assumption that by involving the public sector into the key productive sectors of the economy would enhance not only

economic growth but effectively create a more just social order. The PNP treaded softly and were weary of arousing undue alarm. The Party manifesto on democratic socialism attempted to allay these fears by linking the precepts of fundamental Christianity with democratic socialism:

Socialism gives practical expression to the Christian belief in the equal value of human beings. Socialists are motivated by the Christian concern to ensure that all members of society act as their "brothers" keepers.⁶

The PNP recognized the tremendous influence of the Christian church and wanted to differentiate "atheistic communism" from the PNP's brand of socialism.

How extensive would be the government's involvement in the economy? The PNP saw it as a duty to ensure that basic food items were available at the lowest possible price and established the Jamaica National Holdings. Financial institutions were brought under national supervision. The government intended to directly own some banks but to continue the policy of peaceful coexistence with the private banks. The PNP government also saw the necessity to enter into partnership with the multi-national companies that were in control of Jamaica's bauxite. The contractual agreement with the bauxite companies were renegotiated and when negotiations were bogged down, the PNP government used the power of the state to declare a unilateral settlement. The renegotiation with the bauxite companies was already underway before the official announcement of democratic socialism. The initial agreement with the bauxite companies was signed in 1950 and Jamaica received 28 cents from each ton of bauxite mined. The agreement was renegotiated in 1957 and it was decided that the government would receive \$1.30 and over per ton depending on production and the price of aluminum. In 1966 a new agreement was signed which gave the

Jamaica government \$2.25 for exported ore to be paid as an income tax and a royalty of 25 cents per ton. This was indeed a bad agreement, as ore processed in Jamaica escaped the income tax levy and thus the companies only paid the royalty of 25 cents per ton. In 1969 Jamaica received revenues of \$20.7 million; in 1970, \$29.5 million; in 1971, \$30 million; in 1972, \$25.1 million and in 1973, \$24.4 million. In the new agreement concluded in 1974, Jamaica received 7.5 percent of all aluminum ingot, 8 percent in 1975 and 8.5 percent in 1976.⁷ Whereas the total revenues gained from bauxite and alumina companies totalled \$42,966 in 1971 and \$35,636 in 1972 and \$41,037 in 1973, with the new agreement the Jamaica government collected \$174,912 in 1974 and \$165,662.1 in 1975.

The Party Manifesto reflects the idealistic worldview of Michael Manley. He envisioned a classless, egalitarian type of society and presumed that democratic socialism was the best vehicle for that realization. Manley thought "the persistence of class stratification is unacceptable morally, divisive socially, obstructionist economically and a source of tension which is not removed, will inevitably provoke social instability."⁹ Manley recognized that the principal test confronting the government was unemployment and work was defined as a basic right.

.....A society must be so organized as to provide for every willing and able citizen an opportunity for work. The ability to earn a livelihood through the sweat of one's brow is the most fundamental of all the pre-conditions of human happiness.¹⁰

Could democratic socialism produce full employment? The PNP did not come to power through revolution. All the established institutions remained intact. Any attempt to transform the society would inevitably trigger

resistance from those who benefited and were at ease with the status quo. Manley was not an advocate of class conflict and surmised that the form of structural transformation that he advocated could be accomplished within the framework of the democratic system. What was critical, Manley presumed, was the mobilization of the masses.

The strategy of change must, accordingly operate at the psychological and attitudinal level which involves a concept of mass education; at the structural level which involves a concept of social and economic organization; at a political level which involves a concept of mobilization, and it must envisage the problems of transition which involves a capacity for tactical accommodation." 11

Manley believed in expanding the democratic process. By creating new avenues for participation and through the mobilization of the masses, the new society could be constructed. But Jamaica had developed since 1944 a tradition of two party democracy with both political parties having a base in the labour movement. The percentage points dividing both parties in any election were never that great. It is clear that the masses in Jamaica do not constitute a monolith and that party loyalties are sharply divided and cut across class lines. Unmindful, Manley stated:

The politics of change demand the creation of a mass political organization which is capable of organizing mass response, mass understanding and mass involvement in the processes of change. 12

Manley nevertheless was not operating in a political vacuum. The Jamaica Labour Party would definitely seek to exploit the new ideological thrust and seek to combat Manley through counter measures of mobilization. Not all the institutions were controlled by the Manley administration and those

institutions opposed to governmental policy would definitely work towards thwarting the efforts of building a socialist society.

The Role of the Gleaner

Obviously, the private sector was apprehensive about the new proclamation of democratic socialism but the institution which would lead the attack on the new socialist thrust was the Daily Gleaner. This daily newspaper was founded in 1834 and has wielded an enormous influence over the social and political life of the island. It has survived so many generations that the words Gleaner and newspaper in the vocabulary of Jamaicans are synonymous. "It was respectable because of its age, tradition and management. Its board contained Ashenheims, Levys, DaCostas, deMercados, Milhollands, Delgados, the dominant Jewish commercial and professional families ..." ¹³ The ideology of the Daily Gleaner reflected the class composition of the Board of Directors. Nevertheless, it tried to present itself to the public as an objective organ which transcended party politics. This facade was easily maintained when the ideological differences between the PNP and JLP were so minimal that it did not produce any ripple-effect in the body politic. The embrace of democratic socialism forced the Gleaner to use its pages to launch a skillful propaganda campaign against the People's National Party. The opulent Chairman of the Board of Directors for the Daily Gleaner stated:

The Gleaner owes no affiliation or obligation to any Political Party or any section of the community. The Gleaner, as an independent organ, will always endeavour to support all causes and policies which it considers for the good of the country and to oppose sternly all policies detrimental thereto,

irrespective of the source of party from which the same may emanate. ¹⁴

But how does the Gleaner decide what is good for the country? Is that decision made in a vacuum or is the vested economic interest that members of the Board of Directors have in the established system determine the way they see the world? Successful private entrepreneurs who control such a powerful organ of opinion will invariably use that newspaper to protect their class interest and to oppose social change that threaten the privileged. We gain some insight into the ideology of the Gleaner when L.E. Ashenheim stated that the editorial philosophy of the Gleaner is founded on the notion that:

Human progress springs from the effort and enterprise of individuals exerted singly or in groups; and in the conviction that there is no system of Government or human relationship which provides any effective and satisfactory substitute for the hard work and ingenuity of individuals competitively applied. ¹⁵

That is a political statement commensurate with the creed of capitalism. The Daily Gleaner has consistently supported propertied interest. To illustrate my point, one can turn to the events of 1938. The Gleaner tried to undermine "the legitimate claims for striking that the workers had." ¹⁶ Headlines revealed the sympathy of the Gleaner for the colonial authorities - "Police Forced to Shoot Down Rioters." In its editorial, the Gleaner sided with management and castigated the workers for their "stupendous" wage demands. From the 1938 riots, we can discern the tendency on the part of the Gleaner to blame the discontent of the workers on "communist agitations." ¹⁸ One correspondent wrote:

Suspicion is growing among certain groups that certain communist money is being spent in Jamaica. The apparent

restiveness of labour in various sections of the island simultaneously is regarded as more than mere coincidence or the result of economic pressure. 19

Manley's Visit to Cuba

The Gleaner's attack on the PNP's democratic socialism coincided with the return of Michael Manley from a visit to Cuba in the summer of 1975. Paradoxically, Evon Blake, a former President of the Chamber of Commerce in the parish of Portland, writing under the pseudonym William Strong, spear-headed the attack. William Strong was alarmed by the "left wing" faction in the PNP which he defined as communist. Strong charged that the PNP's 'communist' had seized control of the Executive Council and the PNP's Youth Organization.

Their plan is to replace Michael Manley as Party President and Prime Minister and after the next election which they feel sure of winning...

Declare a Communist state with Housing Minister Anthony Spaulding as boss. 20

Matthew Strong continued with his hysterical warnings of the coming red peril. He was careful to proclaim his support of socialism and egalitarianism but thought it was his historical duty to prevent the Party from sinking deeper into the red quicksand, if it is to win back middle-class and upper-class support which he presumed it had lost almost to the last voting man. 21

I will not put on the muzzle of fear or indifference - and I do not intend to become an exile - while a handful of scheming, reckless, ruthless, immoral men with king-sized illusions in their pygmy-sized brains and daggers hidden up their political sleeves, plot, plan and hasten the opportune moment to duplicate Brutus in order to turn Jamaica into a Communist state. 21

How did William Strong view Communism?

Communism is the most disruptive political philosophy ever conceived by man. Fascism is tame compared to it, though Fascism produced Hitler and Mussolini.

Communism's intellectual fathers are two Russians (sic) named Marx and Lenin, both immortalized and heroized by their country which is one of the twin fountainheads of world Communism (the other Red China). 23

The columnist went on to charge that almost "all of what was once colonial Africa is now either Communist or pro-Communist." 24 Strong revealed his ignorance on contemporary communism by refusing to recognize the polycentric nature of communist ideology. That there are Marxists in the PNP is beyond question, but the PNP was always an eclectic political organization comprised of an amalgam of class elements primarily preoccupied with the winning of state power through the democratic process. The PNP included right wing elements, petit bourgeois, grand bourgeois, working class members, Marxists, etc. Strong was primarily addressing himself to the Jamaican middle and upper class who have traditionally enjoyed a privileged position in this under-developed society. His articles helped to create a climate of fear and served as a catalyst for the middle class immigration. The 'communist scare' was given further credence when Allan Isaacs, the Minister of Mining and Natural Resources who was deposed from the Manley Cabinet charged that the communist philosophy had taken root in the PNP and is being nourished from the island of Cuba. The other daily newspaper, The Daily News featured on its front page the headline in bold red print "Plan For Red TAKEOVER Here". 25 Allan Isaacs charged preposterously that the Manley government was featuring "division and hate in which the middle class is apparently to be liquidated when the right time comes, and race and colour will determine the line of battle." 26 Isaacs further accused the government of setting up a youth program, the Pioneer Corps, which was to serve as a political army and that

the upsurge of violence and destruction in the island could be attributed to a communist conspiracy. Coming from a member of the Manley Cabinet, Isaacs charges had a more resonant effect than those levelled at the government by the Gleaner columnist, Matthew Strong.

Allan Isaacs had been fired by Prime Minister Manley for non-performance in what was considered a crucial Ministry. There was obviously an ideological factor in the forced resignation of the former Minister of Mining and National Resources. Isaacs stated that he was basically at "variance with the Prime Minister and some of his closest associates and colleagues about political principles and policy direction, strategy and tactics in governmental and the political organization. " 27

The PNP attempted to maintain the calm by explicitly re-stating its commitment to the democratic system and to declare that it was socialist and not communist. Michael Manley made this distinction in this way:

... the Communist believes in class warfare as a necessary part of political strategy. In other words, the Communist does not view conflict between classes as something that may be inevitable because of the circumstances of a particular country but which nevertheless is a matter for regret.

On the contrary, the Communist sees class warfare as a positive aspect of strategy to be pursued even where the members of a privileged group might wish to co-operate to facilitate significant progress and change. 28

The PNP Manifesto on democratic socialism implies class harmony and rejects the Marxist notion of class warfare. The stated objective of democratic socialism was not the destruction of the democratic process, but its very expansion.

We do not ask whether a man is black or white or brown or Indian or Chinese or Arab or Jew, but only that he commit himself to Democratic Socialism. We do not ask whether a man is poor or rich, or upper class or middle class or working class, but only that, in spite of his class origins, he accept our goal of a society from which the idea of classes and the fact of class division has been banished.

That is why we accept within the ranks of the mass party that we are building farmers, doctors, engineers, accountants, hairdressers, businessmen, factory workers, field workers, lawyers, street cleaners, housewives, public servants - any and all categories who are willing to help the cause. 29

Manley was attempting to build a mass party that cuts across class lines.

Traditionally, the PNP has been an electoral machine that ceases to function in the post-electoral period. The strength of the Party - its multi-class nature - paradoxically was in fact its major weakness. There were many in the Party who were willing to support democratic socialism providing it was limited to rhetoric. But in fact the injection of a socialist creed in a society that was historically class conscious was bound to increase the level of class conflict, despite the idealism and notions of class harmony proposed by the PNP. Class conflict of a political nature would definitely petrify the middle class and Michael Manley recognizing this, attempted to alleviate this fear:

To suggest that we are against the middle classes is total madness. The middle classes are the vital repository of higher skills in a society. They are very often themselves the victims of the capitalist system. They have been our friends, members, allies and our supporters, and this will continue to be so as long as there is a People's National Party and until the time when we build a society of such justice and equality that the very notion of class itself has disappeared from human experience. 30

Indeed, the middle class voted overwhelmingly for the PNP in all elections before 1976. But Manley is incorrect when he states that the middle class are "very often themselves the victims of the capitalist system." This is certainly not the case in Jamaica. As a class, the middle class benefited from the development of industrial capitalism. They had access to cheap surplus labour and could afford an entourage of maids and "gardener-boys". In the years when the economy was "open and robust", they had access to the cherished consumer goods and had become adept at imitating the life style of opulence - motor cars, household gadgets, motor-boats, vacations to the metropolis, etc. With the deterioration of the balance of payments and the subsequent scarcity of foreign exchange, the economy was partially closed. The foreign exchange earned was sufficient only to purchase medicine, basic foodstuff, and raw materials for the manufacturing sector. A class that has always lived in comfort will never of its own volition give up an affluent life style, but will fight desperately to preserve its own class interest.

The Opposition Party, the JLP, also attacked the socialist policies of the PNP. The JLP tactics was to make the case that there was no difference between Socialism and Communism. Manley fought against this political demagoguery.

We do not regard Democratic Socialism as a transitional phase between Capitalism and Communism. On the contrary we believe that Democratic Socialism is an objective in itself to be explored with enthusiasm and final commitment. We believe that the great danger of the Capitalist system was its social consequence of exploitation. We also believe that the great danger of Communism is that there lurks always an inherent danger to individual liberty. 31

Nevertheless, the middle class was not genuinely concerned with liberty but the decline in living standards. The communist hysteria further exacerbated the economic situation. We have noted the dependent nature of a small economy like Jamaica and how much it is affected by the state of the international economy. The domestic changes introduced by the PNP created a crisis of confidence within the private sector which refrained from investing capital or expanding production despite the exhortations and assurances of the Manley administration. The private sector was left untouched although the government rejected capitalism as a method of social organization. How did the private sector react to democratic socialism and how did the apprehension in the private sector contribute to the economic downturn?

The Private Sector

As early as 1917 the planter class in Jamaica came together and formed the Jamaica Imperial Association. This organization fought against the attempts by the Crown Colony Government under the auspices of Governor Probyn to introduce the income tax and other income generating schemes. J.I.A knew that the well-to-do would be the ones who would have to pay. ³² Some of the members of the plantocracy possessed the foresight "to cover" the export-export trade on an island that was dependent on the importation of basic commodities. Members of this class were prominently represented in both the Legislative Council and the Executive Council of the Colonial Government.

When the 1938 working class rebellion pushed the British colonizers to give the Jamaican people a new constitution with the right of universal

suffrage, the economic elite competed for the votes of the masses in the 1944 elections. The Jamaica Democratic Party represented the well-to-do and obtained 14,123 or 4.1% of the votes. ³³ After that trouncing, the JDP was dissolved and members of the elite attempted to influence the polity through interest groups like the Jamaica Chamber of Commerce and the Jamaica Manufacturers Association. Influence is also exerted by financing the coffers of both the Jamaica Labour Party and the People's National Party. Members of the business class also dominate statutory boards and exerted decisive influence over the Daily Gleaner which influences public opinion.

This economic elite that possessed the foresight to control the importation of goods has demonstrated an enormous degree of flexibility. Both Peter Phillips and Stanley Reid in their research articles on the concentration of economic power among the families that form the core of this business elite agree that this affluent clique has moved from landownership to import-export trade to manufacturing with amazing alacrity. This class commenced as a comprador bourgeois class and as the economy moved into the early stages of industrialization, they in turn became an enterprising, dynamic, business class. They have forged links with foreign investors and have formed an interconnecting network of corporations. This further illustrates the duality of the Jamaica economy, a peasant agricultural sector where productivity is low and capital is scarce and a modern sector where capital intensive techniques are utilised and corporate power centralised.

By 1970, undistributed corporate profit and depreciation allowances accounted for 70 percent of gross national domestic savings ... and was contributed by 41 firms out

of 11,435 companies representing 4% of all companies active in Jamaica.

Corporate taxes accounted for 46 percent of income tax revenue in 1973-1974 and approximately 20% of all tax revenue in the same year. 34

The tentacles of this economic elite stretch into all the essential sectors of the Jamaican economy. This would include manufacturing, construction, the banking system, insurance, etc. A measure of their influence can be ascertained by their input into the drafting of the 1962 Jamaican constitution.

Six of the sixteen man committee who framed the Jamaican Constitution were lawyers, of whom the most important were closely involved with foreign enterprise and who were in fact directly connected with local enterprise and the present grouping of 21. 35

L.E. Ashenheim, a member of one of the most powerful business families was responsible for property rights being guaranteed from nationalization without compensation by the Jamaican constitution. The rationale for this was that foreign investors had to be assured of the protection of investment in order that the policy of industrialization by invitation would not be affected. This act also prevented state power from appropriating property for any particular reason.

On the subject of party financing, Peter Phillips wrote:

Indeed the size and regularity of these gifts make both parties about totally dependent on the goodwill of business groups or at least on the minimisation of their antipathy. This places severe constraints on the range of policy options open to any of the contending parties. For the espousal of drying up the sources of funds available to a party, but will open up new supplies to the competing party. 36

Yet the political vulnerability of this class was apparent from the election of 1944. In a democratic society, politicians are exposed to pressures from

below as well as from above. Political parties need the philanthropy of the wealthy, but even more important, they must compete for the mass vote if they are to have a chance at controlling state power. They must also respond to the pressures of the trade union movement. These forces haul and pull the political parties in a myriad of directions. Phillips placed the economic elite in this perspective:

In sum, the evidence suggests that the elite while not by any means monopolising legislative or executive office as is implied by the classic Marxian model, does by virtue of a number of largely informal mechanisms of control over the party machinery, exercise considerable and often decisive influence over the national decision-making process. The fact is, nevertheless, that the business elite must compete with other organised segments of the society for political influence. Its pre-eminence as against the other groups, rests, however, on its tightly cohesive form, its massive control over financial resources and its critical role as the financier of the parties. 37

The influence of the business elite up until 1974 was pre-eminent, but the economic might of the business elite under democratic socialism has diminished considerably. They constituted an oligarchy in the world of economics, but in the world of politics, although they exercised influence, they were always politically vulnerable. The political influence that they enjoyed was diminished with the commitment of the PNP to an expanded public sector. The private sector felt threatened by these changes and the economy suffered from a crisis of confidence.

As a response to the threat of democratic socialism, the private sector came together and formed a new interest group, the Private Sector Organization of Jamaica (P.S.O.J.). The existing pressure groups, like the Jamaica Chamber of Commerce and the Jamaica Manufacturing Association were perceived

as being inadequate to repelling the new socialist danger. The stated objectives of the organization are quite lofty and high-minded. PSOJ articulated its concern with the unemployed by stating as one of its objectives:

To coordinate the various resources within the private sector with a view to alleviating the economic problems of the country with specific emphasis on unemployment. 38

The PSOJ now sought to change the image of the 'capitalists' through a public relations campaign. This entailed making the case that the 'capitalist' was concerned with the poor and the unemployed and was indeed a modern Sir Lancelot, divested of chivalry. They wished to convince the public that the 'capitalist' was not just a 'rapacious' business man seeking the labour of the working class, but an innovator who created jobs, was about the business of production, and worked diligently and laboriously at his task. PSOJ sought to purge the Manley government of its vocal anti-capitalist left wing. The General Secretary of the PNP and Minister of Mobilization, Dr. D.K. Duncan who had become the symbol of the PNP left wing with his strident criticism of private capitalism, was the major target.

It was now extremely difficult for the private sector organizations to remain aloof from direct involvement with party politics. Douglas Vaz, President of the Jamaica Manufacturers' Association (JMA) in the early months of 1976, later resigned and triumphantly competed for Parliament in the December elections of 1976 as a member of the Jamaica Labour Party. While still holding the post of President of the JMA, Vaz was a strident critic of democratic socialism.

The policy of democratic socialism is still to a large extent, not understood, and frankly, the business community will never be able to conform within this type of framework where there is so much verbiage. Businessmen are pragmatists. They are accustomed to doing the things that need to be done in the order of priority in which they need to be done. That is why a successful businessman cannot exist by just chatting away.

And the whole policy of democratic socialism has been totally obscured in just wild rhetoric or idiotic rhetoric, and that is why it cannot function. 39

Vaz was also not complimentary to the politicians.

The politician is there for one thing. He is the representative of the people, the people have put him there. But that does not give him the right to dictate the will and the minds of the people.

He is there to provide roads, infrastructure, services, controls. He has the mechanisms of price control; he has the mechanisms of incomes control. He is there to be the public guardian, so he must get back to doing his work and stop obscuring his own inefficiency in volumes of rhetoric. 40

The President of the Jamaica Manufacturers' Association presumed because infra-structural development was the role government had played in the past, that there existed an irrevocable law of history which prevented government from developing a new perspective. Government according to Douglas Vaz, was there to serve the private sector and was not to become directly involved in the production of goods. Vaz, the spokesman for an interest group was telling the democratically elected PNP government what should be the function of government. Democratic socialism was simply dismissed as idle rhetoric that was disrupting the economy.

The Matalons are one of the more recognized business families in Jamaica. The Matalons have been traditionally supporters of the People's National Party

but during this period, were forced to be critical of the Manley government. The ideological debate was interpreted as one that endangered the business elite as an ongoing species. Matalon surmised that Jamaica from the middle of 1975 should have entered the second stage of industrial development.

In other words, we ought to have been going into the production of raw materials for industry. Saying to ourselves: well, we can't supply all the consumer goods, certainly not the cheap end of the market, but we can make the polyurethanes, textiles and such like raw materials. ⁴¹

But according to Aaron Matalon:

Who's going to put that sort of money into plant and machinery when there is all this constant abuse of private sector and capitalists and foreign investment? What Jamaican is going to dare go into that sophisticated stage of industry without a multi-national association? Without foreign capital and know-how? But we're abusing them. ⁴²

Matalon stated that the ideological cleavage was further compounded by the rampant violence and social indiscipline that had produced an epidemic of fear. Although Matalon does not hold an official position in the various interest groups in the private sector, his views were representative of the business elite.

The business community was particularly troubled about the relationship that the Manley government had developed with socialist Cuba. Prime Minister Manley had reiterated time and time again that the political heritage of Jamaica was different from that of Cuba and that the People's National Party was committed to the democratic form of government. Carlton Alexander, the President of the Private Sector Organization of Jamaica articulated the horror that the Jamaican capitalists had developed for the Cuban-Jamaican connection.

The picture that we are getting, and the reports that are coming back, including the report from no less a person than the Prime Minister of the country, would seem to suggest that all is well in Cuba and that there is a great deal that we need to learn from them.

Whilst it is true that there are, in fact, unique areas of achievement in Cuba, it is absolutely essential that we do not allow ourselves to lose sight of the fact that Cuba is an authoritarian communist client state of Russia, and that the Cuban revolution and the Cuban development process have been heavily influenced by Russian thoughts, money and methods. ⁴³

In Alexander's address to the Rotary Club, he went on to question the Manley government's commitment to democratic socialism as enunciated by the PNP. It was Alexander's contention that government maybe using state power to eclipse the private sector. This reflected the abhorrence of the business community, which suspected that democratic socialism was a temporary pause on the ineluctable road to an undemocratic Marxist-Leninist state:

As a matter of fact, last year alone a capital expenditure of \$25m was spent to finance these public enterprises, and with the drain on investment funds from the commercial banking system, it leaves one to wonder how much of this investment fund is being utilised to finance these enterprises which could very easily have been operated by the private sector. On the other hand, this could be a deliberate policy by Government to undermine the operation of the private sector by removing from the money market funds that could otherwise have been used for investment purposes by the private sector. The question I am forced to ask is "Is an attempt being made to de-stabilise" the private sector?

The word "destabilization" was fraught with emotion in the context of the Jamaican political ethos at the time. The Manley government had accused the Central Intelligence Agency of the United States of "destabilizing" the constitutionally elected government of Jamaica. Political violence had soared beginning in 1976 (this will be developed in Chapters V-VII) and the country was preparing for pending elections. Carlton Alexander was

directing the question towards the Manley government as if it were plausible for a government to undermine its own interest.

Winston Mahfood had succeeded Douglas Vaz as President of the Jamaica Manufacturer's Association. Vaz had resigned to become a JLP candidate for one of the constituency seats in St. Andrew. Under the leadership of Mahfood - the JMA continued its propaganda barrage at the government.

We have, as you well know, been battered by our crumbling national economy, harassed and slandered by an irresponsible and indisciplined group of politicians and fellow travellers. Under such a siege, it has been impossible to do anything more than to stand our ground and put all our efforts into keeping the country's manufacturing sector from disintegration. 45

The business community was not willing to be "a guest in the house of the people". It was not willing to be a junior partner to the state sector and used all the power at its disposal to undermine the programme of democratic socialism. Attempts by government to allay the fears of the business community simply did not work. The business community charged that the government by its socialist anti-capitalist rhetoric had pushed the social structure into a state of disarray. In a response to the government's attempt to expand production, a banker rejected the overtures to the private sector and proclaimed that the crisis of confidence was too far gone for the Manley government to restore its credibility:

A society like Jamaica is not an overnight creation. The society in which we live is the result of hundreds of years of evolution - not an overnight revolution - and we are the products of the institutions, customs, tradition and way of life that has evolved during the process ...

For honest people to consider them-selves being branded as exploiters, being abused and threatened by people (including some who abhor even an honest half-day's work) being condemned - rather than praised - for their achievements is a bitter pill. The fear of being eliminated one way or another, the fear of seeing the "restructuring of their society along lines using either the Cuban or the rich Soviet experience, the fear of not being able to live and continue their normal activities with reasonable assurances of peace and security, the fear of seeing all their efforts of past years and those of their fathers and grandfathers go to waste. It is this fear that has driven thousands of our finest Jamaican sons and daughters from our shores - some with their money or a part thereof, some leaving everything behind - to live in lands they do not even enjoy. It is this crippling fear that continues to haunt our society and to make many of our productive people virtually drop their hands as they ask what is the point of making any effort - for what? ⁴⁶

The business class vehemently fought against

- 1) the close relations between the Manley government and the Castro regime.
- 2) the epidemic of crime
- 3) and the ideology of democratic socialism.

The private sector in Jamaica felt threatened by the ideology of democratic socialism and simply refused to re-invest profits or expand production. The Daily Gleaner and its columnists kept the red sparks burning by conjuring up the spectre of communism, and The Jamaica Labour Party seized on the

"Communist bogeyman" and used it as the major issue of the 1976 campaign.

The business class was petrified of communism and voted for a restoration of the old order, but the small farmers and the workers in the cities voted overwhelmingly for the ideology of democratic socialism. How did the ideological rancor, the crisis of confidence amongst the business class affect the economy in concrete terms and thus the surplus labour problem?

To reiterate a small economy like Jamaica is forced to import some of the basic necessities of life and the state of the world economy has an enormous impact on whether the economy expands or contracts. Jamaican exports in 1973 increased by \$54 million, but imports for the same year increased by \$111 million.⁴⁷ The expenditures on imports reflects the increase in the cost of basic goods. In an address to Parliament, David Coore lamented:

Corn, a ton of which cost \$54.45 in December 1972 cost \$114.69 in December 1973. Soya beans, which is an essential ingredient in animal feeds and which cost \$144.32 in December 1972 had risen to \$268.14 in December, 1973. Wheat which in December 1972 cost \$68.91 per metric ton had risen - and observe that wheat is a product coming mainly from the rich industrialised countries of North America, in December 1973 was \$213.32 per metric ton. As against that increase ... in crude oil from \$2.33 per barrel in December, 1972 to \$5.66 per barrel in December 1973.⁴⁸

In 1973 the cost of imported fuel amounted to \$65.4 million and in 1974 that figure jumped to \$143 million.⁴⁹ The consumer price index increased by 30 percent.⁵⁰ It was recognized at this particular period that restrictions had to be placed on imports and exports had to expand if the country was to avoid a severe foreign exchange crisis.

Prime Minister Michael Manley renegotiated the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement and the price of bananas in the United Kingdom. The price of sugar increased to £83 per ton and banana increased on an average from £100 per ton to £135 per ton.⁵¹ The Manley government also renegotiated the contractual agreement with the multi-national bauxite companies aforementioned, that enabled the state to cope with the precarious foreign exchange situation.

TABLE 3.1

PERCENT AVERAGE OF WAGE INCREASES

	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>
Manufacturing	25.3	45.3	44.0
Transport, Storage + Communications	21.6	35.7	27.4
Electricity, Gas and Water	25.0	16.0	32.5
Building and Construction	25.0	-	55.0
Mining	51.2	-	-
Commerce	20.8	41.2	39.8
Other Services	18.5	39.2	20.4

Extracted from Annual Reports of the Bank of Jamaica, 1975

Despite the instability of the world economy, the Manley government was committed to improving the living conditions of the poor in Jamaica. In the 1973/74 year, the total governmental expenditures was \$452.4 million and the 1974/75 year governmental expenditure increased to \$721.8 million, an increase of \$269.4 million. The government was determined to allocate more funds in the category of social welfare. A special employment program for the unemployed was introduced and \$40.7 million allocated.

The Manley government was not only trying to reduce the chronic problem of unemployment, but it had to cope with the demands within the public sector for increased wages. For the 1974/75 budget, recurrent expenditure rose by 55.8% reflecting the increase in public salaries and social welfare programs. Governmental expenditure far exceeded the revenue intake. The deficit for the 1974/75 budget amounted to \$204.7 million in comparison to \$99.8 million in 1973/74.⁵² At the same time, the government was also committed to slow the rate of inflation down to 4 percent per quarter.⁵³

The inflationary spiral was initially triggered by external forces, but the internal forces in adjusting to the increase in basic commodities demanded wage increases which exacerbated the inflationary problem. Although the island is chronically plagued by a surplus of labour, there exist in Jamaica a highly institutionalized system of competitive trade unionism. Workers and trade union representatives demanded wage increases to keep up with the rising cost of goods. In 1975, the organized sectors of the labour force demanded and fought for these wage increases. The PNP government realized the effects that the costly wage settlements would have on the economy, yet the government

was reluctant to coerce labour to accept lower wage settlements as such action would be politically disastrous. Trade unions although affiliated to political parties are not subservient to party policy. The competition between the trade unions is fierce and the trade union leadership has no choice but to march alongside the militant tradition of working class economism. David Coore, a former Minister of Finance in the Manley Government stated rather aptly that government was attempting to impose an anti-inflationary policy and was very much like a brain surgeon in the operating theatre, but there is one important difference, the brain surgeon operates on a patient that is anaesthetised, but in a democracy there is no way of anaesthetising a country. 54

By 1975 the economy had entered a state of decline. For that year bauxite production was reduced by 13.5% and alumina production fell by 9.3%. There was also a downturn in the tourist sector which generates a portion of the foreign exchange that is critical to balancing the payment of goods received from abroad. A number of hotels were forced to close. The recession in the developed economies was having an adverse effect on tourism. The demand for bauxite and alumina on the world market had diminished and the decline in the number of visitors to the island reflected the economic downturn in the United States.

The Manley government in response announced a program to stimulate the Jamaica economy. The National Housing Trust was created to boost the labour intensive construction industry. Interest rates for saving deposits were increased in an attempt to discourage consumption and to encourage investment.

The wages of workers earning in excess of \$16,000 were frozen. In an attempt to distribute earnings on a more equitable basis, the government introduced a minimum wage of \$20.00 per week. Nevertheless, the government realized that the key to an economic recovery was through expansion in the private sector.

The Manley government through the auspices of the Bank of Jamaica provided loans to private entrepreneurs at the comparatively low interest rate of 10 percent "to finance the acquisition of local raw materials." ⁵⁶ The manufacturing sector employed 79,000 workers in October 1974, but by October 1975 that workforce had been decreased to 73,600. ⁵⁷ This sector of the economy was not effectively integrated with the other sectors, but was heavily dependent on the importation of raw materials. It was geared more towards meeting domestic needs rather than export markets. This meant that whenever the domestic demand increased to meet that demand, the manufacturing sector would have to import additional raw materials which would exacerbate the balance of payment situation since these goods had to be paid for with foreign currency. This effort on the part of the Manley government was to encourage the manufacturing sector to become more dependent wherever possible on indigenous sources of raw materials.

To encourage the expansion of exports, the Bank of Jamaica provided private entrepreneurs with a special rate of interest, 7 percent, on a revolving basis. The special credit privilege was for ninety days to ensure that the exporter did not suffer from cash flows which could hinder production. The Jamaica Development Bank also offered loans to the manufacturing, tourist, and agricultural sectors. Government allocated \$5 million in a special fund to loan to hotels in financial difficulties with up to twenty years maturity at

an interest rate of 7 percent. In addition, \$3 million was put aside specifically for the expansion of small businesses. The Small Business Loan Board, the Jamaica Industrial Development Corporation and the commercial banks along with the Bank of Jamaica were in charge of administering the fund.

To ensure that a worthwhile productive project would receive financing, any borrower in the private sector whose project was rejected by a commercial bank could appeal to the Bank of Jamaica for a reappraisal. Yet, the government realised that the private sector was becoming a lumpen-bourgeois class in the sense that entrepreneurs were not ploughing back profits in the enterprises, but were becoming dependent on government to provide the necessary risk capital.

Further economic deterioration occurred in 1976. The policy of democratic socialism had precipitated a flight in capital and there was a huge outflow of legal and illegal foreign exchange. Indications of this massive exodus of funds were apparent as early as 1975 when net foreign exchange outflows for the month of August amounted to \$60 million which hitherto was unprecedented.⁵⁸ Even though domestic credit was expanded in 1975, there did not result in any abnormal growth in money supply. "In fact the growth in money supply in 1975 was marginally below the 1974 growth rate which implies substantial leakage from the system."⁵⁹

The current account deficit in 1975 was estimated at \$231 million compared with \$152 million in 1974. Net capital inflows declined to \$168 million and the overall balance of payments deficit of \$74 million had to be financed from the reserves of the Bank of Jamaica. The year previously

1974, the country enjoyed a balance of payment surplus of \$54 million. ⁶⁰

The Manley government was forced to place a ceiling on imports in 1976. Imports for 1975 amounted to \$1 billion. Despite the reduction in imports, the island was still importing more than it was exporting. Exports in 1976 fell by 18.3% which would indicate that governmental programs to stimulate production had not taken effect. Sugar prices were booming in 1975 but by 1976 the price of sugar on the world market had collapsed. Jamaica earned \$139.7 million from sugar exports in 1975, but only \$56 million the following year. Foreign exchange earnings from banana decreased by 12 percent as prices plummeted despite an increase in the volume of exports.

The foreign exchange outflow deteriorated so rapidly that on December 22, 1976, transactions in foreign currency was temporarily closed and not reopened until January 6, 1977. What was the reason for this? Rumours abounded that the Jamaican dollar was going to be devalued. To further complicate the situation, those in control of large sums of capital anticipated that the government would be forced to restrict the free movement of funds. "At the end of 1976 the country's foreign exchange reserves suffered from a deficit of \$183.8 million compared with + \$56.7 million at the end of the previous year. ⁶¹

This necessitated further restriction on imports. The importation of goods for the year 1977 was limited to \$671.6 million. \$158.2 million less than in 1976 and \$349.8 million less than in 1975. Substantial savings were nonetheless recorded in the category of food. The food import bill was reduced to \$117.8 million from a high of \$178.4 million in 1975. Considerable

TABLE 3.2

Balance of Payments 1974 - 1977

A.	Merchandise	-106.9	-144.8	-119.9	142.3
	Exports (F.O.B) adjusted	630.7	736.7	599.7	727.9
	Imports (F.O.B)	737.6	881.5	719.6	585.6
B.	Services (net)	- 66.2	-136.0	-160.7	-134.3
	Foreign Travel	88.6	69.3	42.6	51.2
	Investment Income	- 61.5	- 93.5	-105.1	-104.1
	Other	- 93.3	-111.8	- 98.2	- 81.4
C.	Goods and Services (net)	-173.1	-280.8	-280.6	- 8.0
D.	Unilateral Transfers (net)	21.3	23.8	5.4	18.9
	Private	29.6	19.1	1.8	14.7
	Official	- 8.3	4.7	3.6	4.2
E.	Current Account Balance	-151.8	-257.0	-275.2	26.9
F.	Net Capital Movements	221.1	189.9	43.9	41.5
	Official	81.	112.9	72.0	27.2
	Private	139.2	77.0	- 28.1	- 68.7
G.	Overall Balances				
	A through F	69.3	- 67.1	-231.3	- 14.6
H.	Change in Reserves (increase)	- 54.1	73.6	238.1	14.6

Extracted from the Annual Reports of the Bank of Jamaica 1974-77

TABLE 3.3.

SUMMARY OF EXTERNAL TRADE

	1975	1976	1977
Exports (F.O.B) adjusted	740.6	575.8	633.6
Bauxite	98.7	112.6	107.6
Alumina	382.9	276.8	347.9
Sugar	139.7	55.9	57.0
Bananas	14.6	11.9	13.0
Other	104.7	118.6	108.1
Imports (C.I.F.)	1,021.4	829.8	671.6
Food	178.4	166.4	117.8
Mineral Fuels	195.8	188.4	195.5
Manufactured Goods	258.8	199.9	146.6
Machinery and Transport Equipment	227.0	143.8	78.4
Other	161.4	131.3	133.3
Balance of Trade	- 280.8	-254.0	- 38.0

Sources: Annual Report of the Bank of Jamaica, p9

TABLE 3.4

THE BUDGET

	<u>1975</u>	<u>1976</u>	<u>1977</u>
Total Receipts	514.1	364.5	453.1
Income Tax	130.4	127.0	128.9
Custom Duties	66.5	30.5	17.0
Excise Duties	37.0	32.5	37.0
Consumption Duties	47.0	77.0	98.0
Land & Property Tax	14.5	16.0	18.0
Stamp Duties	9.7	9.5	10.0
Motor Vehicle/Licences	5.6	5.0	8.5
Retail Sales Tax	5.5	4.2	1.1
Transfers from CDF	80.0	40.	110.0
Royalties	3.5	2.0	2.0
Entertainment Tax	-	0.6	0.1
Betting and Gambling	-	3.6	6.0
Telephone Tax	-	-	5.0
Non-Tax Revenues	9.9	14.4	8.9
Other Recurrent Revenues	-	2.2	1.4
Other	5.5	6.4	-
Loan Repayments	-	-	1.2
Total Expenditure	695.2	920.9	841.1
	<u>1975</u>	<u>1976</u>	<u>1977</u>
Recurrent	443.0	533.6	569.1
Capital	200.5	217.6	196.2
Transfer to Public Enterprises	-	27.0	26.1
Amortization	26.7	25.9	49.7
Repayment of B.O.J. Financing	25.0	105.0	-
Deficit (-) or Surplus	-280.1	-554.6	-388.0
Financing			
Domestic Borrowing	214.4	457.7	364.5
Foreign Borrowing	65.7	96.9	23.5

less sums of money was spent on Machinery and Transport Equipment. Import cost in this category amounted to \$227 million in 1975, but only \$78.4 million was spent in 1977. The shortage of foreign exchange thus had a deflationary and disruptive effect on the Jamaican economy. Manufacturers had difficulty in procuring the necessary foreign exchange to pay for imported raw materials. In real growth terms, the Gross National Product was reduced by 6.9 percent in 1976 and 6.4 percent in 1977. ⁶²

The balance of payment position improved in 1977, but at the cost of further economic deterioration. Remittances of capital or income to migrants fleeing the country were ceased on January 19, 1977 except on humanitarian grounds. Jamaican residents travelling abroad were only allowed the equivalent of \$50 American dollars. Students wishing to study abroad had to receive certification from the Ministry of Education signifying that the course offering was not available in Jamaica. Dividends and profits paid to non-citizens of Jamaica were limited to 7 percent of the net worth of the company. ⁶³

The deflationary state of the economy also had an adverse effect on governmental revenue to the extent that recurrent expenses beginning in 1976 was being met with borrowed capital. Total tax receipts in 1975 amounted to \$514.1 million and recurrent expenditures was \$445 million which meant government had an excess of \$71 million to contribute to capital expenditures. When capital expenditures are included the deficit of the governmental budget for 1975 came to - \$280.1 million. Recurrent expenditures in 1976 increased by approximately \$100 million while total tax receipts had decreased by

\$149.6 million to \$364.5 million. The deficit in the budget for that year amounted to a staggering figure of \$554.6 million. This deficit was financed by borrowing \$457.7 from the domestic market and \$96.9 million from the foreign market. In 1977 the recurrent expenses of the budget increased by only \$25.5 million while the total tax receipts increased by \$88.6 million to \$453.1 million, but still \$61 million less than the total tax receipts of 1975. The total governmental expenditures for 1977 came to \$841.1 million which was \$79.8 million less than the \$920.9 million spent in 1976. The deficit for 1977 was \$388.0 million, a decrease of \$166.6 million in comparison to the deficit of 1976.

The shortfall in revenue provided government with the choice of cutting back on recurrent expenditure which would include social programmes or increasing taxation. The Manley government committed to the objective of creating a more just social order which included reducing unemployment, chose to increase taxes. The consumption duty on gasoline was increased from J\$0.388175 to J\$1.064529 on regular gasoline.⁶⁴ The retail price of gasoline increased from J\$1.26 to J\$1.98 per gallon for premium and J\$1.16 to J\$1.88 per gallon for regular. Motor vehicle licences were increased by one-third. Government increased from 5 percent to 10 percent the bet winning tax on horse racing and the levy on bookmakers increased from 10 percent to 15 percent. A ten percent stamp duty was also imposed on betting vouchers. The protest from the bookmakers nevertheless forced the government to reconsider and on October 30, 1977, the levy on the bookmaker was reduced to 10 percent for local racing and 7½ percent for overseas racing, (such as English racing) for the first J\$2 million of the total amount of bets and 5 percent of the remainder of such total.

In April of 1977 the government increased its surtax on all incomes in the category of J\$20,000 to J\$30,000 from 60 percent to 70 percent and 80 percent on incomes that were in excess of J\$30,000 per year. Except for the gambling tax, the tax measures of the government fell upon those most able to pay. The increase in income tax for the middle class and the wealthy, limiting of US\$50 to Jamaicans travelling abroad were contributing factors in the alienation of these classes from the Manley government. Despite the increase in taxation, the Manley government still had to resort to the printing of Jamaican currency in order to finance the deficits. The recovery that the Manley government attempted to initiate was just not forthcoming and other options had to be entertained.

The foreign exchange situation had deteriorated abysmally and the Jamaican government was forced to devalue its currency. To soften the impact, the government experimented with a dual exchange rates which took effect April 22, 1977. The original rate of the Jamaican dollar in relationship to the American dollar was J\$1.00 = US\$1.10. This rate was retained for the transaction of essential imports, government business and for the bauxite sector. The new rate was J\$1.00 = US\$0.80 or US\$1.00 = J\$1.25. This was a devaluation of 37.5% of the Jamaican dollar. ⁶⁵

The socialist administration of Michael Manley opted to negotiate with the International Monetary Fund in an attempt to gain access to the capital markets of the developed countries in order to obtain the necessary foreign exchange vital to the Jamaican economy. The IMF and the Jamaican government reached an agreement in August of 1977 and J\$68 million over a 24 month period was authorized to stabilize the economy.

To achieve these objectives, the Government planned to bring about an increase in domestic production, to tighten further its demand management policies, to follow a restrained incomes policy and to pursue a flexible exchange rate policy. In addition, the undertaking was given to eliminate existing payments arrears and to liberalise the exchange and trade system. 66

Exacerbating the Unemployment Problem

The improvement in the balance of payment position for 1977 was attained at the cost of increased unemployment. In recent years the labour force has been in a state of flux. In 1973 the labour force increased by 23% to 807,200; in 1974 the increase was limited to 1.6%, an addition of 12,850. By 1975 the increase jumped to 37,600, which is 4.6% of the labour force to a grand total of 857,650. Again in 1976, the increase was high, 3.6% to a new high of 883,600. As the labour force increases, jobs must be found for those thrust into the competitive labour market in addition to absorbing those already unemployed. One of the principal reasons given by the PNP for the abandonment of industrialization by invitation and the embrace of democratic socialism was that the latter could tackle the task of economic development more energetically thereby reducing the unemployment rate. Under the brief years of democratic socialism, no spectacular gains have been made in reducing the percentage of people who are not gainfully employed. In 1972 there was 184,500 or 23.2% of the labour force unemployed. A slight reduction was experienced in 1973 when the unemployed numbered 176,400 or 21.9%. We observe the same trend in 1974 when the Manley government reduced the unemployment rate to 172,250 or 21.1% of the labour force. The absolute amount of those unemployed increased by 5,850 in 1975, but percentage wise, there continued to be slight improvement. The unemployment rate for that year was estimated at 20.7% of the labour force. 67

The decline of the Jamaican economy was apparent from the early months of 1976. 197,750 Jamaican workers were looking for employment in 1976 and simply could not find any jobs. This figure amounted to 22.4% of the labour force and in comparison to 1975 had increased by 22,350.⁶⁸ The economy in 1976 only managed to create 3,600 jobs and the labour force had increased for that year by 25,950.

Who are the unemployed? In 1975, 126,200 or 69.6% of the unemployed held a previous job. 55,100 or 30.4% had never been gainfully employed. By 1976 those who had never worked increased by 11,500 which would indicate the overwhelming majority are youngsters coming into the labour market after leaving school.⁶⁹ The unemployment rates for women is much greater than the rates for men. In 1976, 13.4% of the men were unemployed, but 33.3% of the women were without jobs.⁷⁰

Those in the age bracket 14-19 were severely affected by the chronic unemployment epidemic. 52,800 or 45.9% in 1975 and 62,200 or 54.3% in 1976 were classified as unemployed. Those in the 20-24 age bracket were always severely hit. Unemployment for the age group was estimated at 32.2 in 1978 and 37.5 in 1976.⁷² One must bear in mind that it is youngsters in these age brackets that commit most of the violent crimes in any urban society.

How do the unemployed survive? Of the 113,100 classified as unemployed in the age bracket from 14-24, 64% received some assistance from parents or guardians. Another 14% which included 15,300 women and 600 men were supported by their spouse or common-law partner. The remaining 22 percent seemed to lead a more precarious existence.⁷³

Summary of Strategies of Economic Development

The unemployment problem under both the Jamaica Labour Party and the People's National Party has remained an intractable problem. We see under the ten years, 1962-72 when the Jamaica Labour Party had control of state power, high growth rates were concomitant with high unemployment rates. The People's National Party were elected to power in 1972 and from that eventful year to 1978 have not been able to reduce significantly the age old problem of unemployment. Admittedly, the Manley government came to power at a time when the international economy was in a tattered state. The external forces in a small economy are always important, but the failure of the Jamaican economy to recover from the decline in 1975 cannot be attributed solely to external factors. The Manley administration was injecting new concepts of government as a response to the inflationary pressures from outside in an attempt to cope more effectively with these matters. Government or the public sector has now become more directly involved in the production of goods. It is the state that regulates import-export trade. All this meant not only an adjustment on the part of an unwilling, frightened private sector, but that the managerial capabilities of the public sector were stretched threadbare.

The Jamaican civil service was never noted for its efficiency, and was in fact, reputed to be capable of only coping with the routine. After all, the structure was inherited from the Colonial Office and throughout the modernization years (1944 - 74) served only to facilitate the private sector. The civil service was never a social force committed to economic development or even one tinged with a nationalist spirit. And the Party was not able to attract and mobilize sufficient numbers of the intelligentsia to the extent that the

democratic proposals of the Manley government could be vigorously implemented.

The Manley government failed to convince the private sector that they were not becoming an endangered species. Aware of their class interest, the private sector organized to send legal and illegal currency out of the country, further undermining the economy. They refused to embark on any new expansion of production and entered into a furious debate about the intentions of the government. In short, the private sector has been on strike since 1975. The peaceful co-existence that was to develop between the private sector and the public sector just did not materialise. Instead, both sectors found themselves in a state of disequilibrium. What becomes important here is the psychology of capital. Businessmen will not invest capital when the political climate is deemed risky. This demonstrates the enormous power of those who control capital in a democratic society.

Hitherto, the Manley government has not been successful in getting the economy moving again. The devaluation of the dollar and the consequent steep rise in the cost of basic goods have helped to undermine the mass support that the government enjoyed in December, 1976. The increase in unemployment has undercut the objective of building a new social order. The fierce competition for jobs has encouraged those who control state power to use that apparatus to procure jobs for the party's scavengers. This may placate some party supporters, but it helps to undermine the social order as it breeds intra-class violence. The inability of the economic system to create the conditions for full employment is a critical factor in the upsurge of political violence. The competitive nature of the democratic system and the fact that elections

are decided by the difference of a few percentage points contribute to a tense political ethos. Nevertheless, the loci for political violence is in the urban complex of Kingston and St. Andrew. Although there have been sporadic outbreaks of violence in the rural areas during elections, it cannot be compared to the large scale pandemonium that erupted in Western Kingston in 1966 and 1976. Political victimization is practised in the countryside as well as in the cities, but the degree of dependency on political largesse is much greater in the latter than in the former. There is one other decisive factor. Life in the countryside is characterized by class subservience. The peasant was not willing to demand a redistribution of land and accepted the status quo without protest. This willingness to accept material deprivation on the part of the peasant had to do with a belief system that stressed a metaphysical interpretation to social reality. Class submissiveness was reinforced by the metaphysical orientation and there had not developed in the post-emancipation period a tradition of political protest.

This class subservience changes as the peasant or agro-proletariat migrates from the countryside to the city. The peasant's culture does not undergo a complete transformation, but he is forced to make adaptations to the urban environment. What emerged is a synthesis of the old folk culture with the new urban culture. The transplanted peasant and his urban offspring have become less metaphysical and more influenced by the secularization that is concomitant with a modern society. There is less willingness to accept a position of class subservience, especially amongst the ranks of the lumpen-proletariat where there has developed a sub-culture of violence. In Chapter IV, we place culture on a historical continuum and analyze the cultural changes that the

society has undergone since the modernization period and how the cultural change is a factor in political corruption leading to large scale political violence.

FOOTNOTES

1. Rex Nettleford, Manley and the New Jamaica, Selected Speeches and Writings 1938-1968 (Clowes and Sons Ltd. 1971) p 365
2. Ibid, p 380
3. PNP Party Document, "Democratic Socialism for Jamaica" (undated) p 4
4. Ibid, p 4
5. Ibid, p 4
6. Ibid, p 1
7. Government Document "Jamaica and Bauxite" (undated)
8. PNP Party Document, "Democratic Socialism for Jamaica"
9. Michael Manley, The Politics of Change (Andre Dentsch Ltd. 1974) p 41
10. Ibid, p 53
11. Ibid, p 66
12. Ibid, p 170
13. James Carnegie, Some Aspects of Jamaica's Politics 1918 - 1938 (Institute of Jamaica 1973) p 168
14. The Sunday Gleaner, May 29, 1977 p 12
15. Ibid, p 12
16. Clarence Brodie, "The Attitudes of the Press in Jamaica in Times of Crisis 1938 and 1968" (unpublished paper 1972) p 5
17. Ibid, p 5
18. Ibid, p 6
19. Ibid, p 6
20. The Daily Gleaner, October 10, 1975, p 14

21. Ibid, October 8, 1975, p 8
22. Ibid, p 8
23. Ibid, October 3, 1975, p 12
24. Ibid, p 12
25. Daily News, January 22, 1976, p 1
26. Daily News, Ibid, p 1
27. Daily Gleaner, January 22, 1976, p 5
28. Daily Gleaner, October 5, 1975, p 9
29. Ibid, p 9
30. Ibid, p 9
31. Ibid, p 9
32. Peter Phillips, "Jamaican Elites, 1938 to Present" published in Essays on Power and Change in Jamaica (U.W.I. 1976) p 11
33. Terry Lacey, Violence and Politics in Jamaica 1960 - 70 (Manchester University Press 1977) p 48
34. Stanley Reid, "An Introductory Approach to the Concentration of Power in the Jamaican Corporate Economy and Notes on its Origin" published in Essays on Power and Change in Jamaica op, cit, p 50
35. Stanley Reid, op cit, p 56
36. Peter Phillips, op cit, p 111
37. Ibid, p 115
38. The Sunday Gleaner, Section C, p 1
39. The Sunday Daily News, May 16, 1976, p 4 and 5
40. Ibid, p 4
41. The Sunday Gleaner, March 7, 1976, p 10
42. Ibid, p 10
43. The Sunday Gleaner, June 13, 1976, p 12

44. Ibid, p 12
45. The Sunday Gleaner, October 15, 1978, p 23
46. The Jamaica Weekly Gleaner, May 10, 1977, p 16 and 24
47. Hon. David Coore, Minister of Finance, Budget Speech,
(Agency for Public Information 1974) p 6
48. Ibid, p 6
49. Annual Report, Bank of Jamaica, 1974, p 1
50. David Coore, Budget Speech, p 7
51. Annual Report, Bank of Jamaica, 1974, p 2
52. Ibid, p 20
53. David Coore, op cit, p 38
54. Ibid, p 47
55. Annual Report, Bank of Jamaica, 1975, p 1
56. The Daily News, October 9, 1975, p 13
57. Economic and Social Survey Jamaica 1975, p 138
58. Annual Report, Bank of Jamaica 1975, p 2
59. Ibid, p 1
60. Ibid, p 4
61. Annual Report, Bank of Jamaica 1976, p 3
62. Annual Report, Bank of Jamaica 1977, p 3
63. Ibid, p 39
64. Ibid, p 26
65. Ibid, p 2
66. Ibid, p 2
67. Economic and Social Survey Jamaica 1975, p 287
68. Economic and Social Survey Jamaica 1976, p 397

69. Ibid, p 398
70. Ibid, p 401
71. Ibid, p 409 - 410
72. Ibid, p 410
73. Ibid, p 411

CHAPTER IV
CLASS AND CULTURE

The mere presence of large numbers of unemployed concentrated in the region of Kingston and St. Andrew will not necessarily lead to violence of a political nature. Prior to the 1960s, those who could not find work in the society attempted to improve their material position through migrating abroad. Those who remained, either migrated to the cities or tried to eke out an existence in the countryside. Political victimization was just as widespread in the countryside as in the city. Why has political violence become a serious problem in the region of Kingston and St. Andrew while political violence in the countryside remains marginal? Undoubtedly, the degree of dependency that has developed between politicians and certain politicized lumpen-communities in the urban complex is much greater than in the countryside. Life for the unemployed is far more precarious in the city than in the countryside. At least in the latter food is not that much of a problem. But the critical factor why political violence is far more prevalent in Kingston and St. Andrew than in the rural parishes has to do with the sub-culture of violence that has emerged as a way of life for a segment of the lumpen-proletariat.

Jamaican society has undergone fundamental cultural changes in the last thirty years (1940-1970). When people migrate, they take with them their material possessions. They also carry with them their spiritual possessions - religion, customs, worldview, etc. This chapter examines the recent evolution of Jamaican culture from rural-folk to urban-folk and how the cultural changes have had a political impact on the society. And in particular, how the emergency of a sub-culture of violence is a factor in the political pandemonium that has twice in ten years threatened to tear

assunder the social fabric of the nation.

First, let me define what one means when one uses the term culture. Edward Taylor defines culture as "that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society."¹ A people's culture is always adapting to changes in the environment and must constantly incorporate external influences. This is particularly the case in Jamaica where people are constantly travelling back and forth to the metropolitan regions of the world. In addition, the economic system in Jamaica has undergone extensive changes in the last thirty years with the development of a modern industrial sector in the heart-land of Kingston and St. Andrew. The cultural system was bound to undergo changes as it adjusted to the new environment. Anthony Wallace puts it this way:

A culture, under certain conditions, during a period of time can be said to be an open system in a state of stable but moving equilibrium; that is, it maintains a boundary, accepts inputs and produces outputs at approximately equal rates, and changes continuously but gradually in internal structure. The import, in this case, are accepted innovations acquired by invention, acculturation or diffusion, the outputs, abandoned elements of culture.²

Return to the Source

The African who was carried in chains across the deadly Middle Passage left behind his homeland, but he carried with him the seeds of culture to be re-planted in the New World. An essential component of that African culture was religion. In fact, one could say that the African in the New World, like his counterpart in the Old World has not lost his fascination for the supernatural. In an attempt to answer the question why some countries develop more rapidly than others. Walter Rodney takes into account two

factors (1) the environment and (2) the superstructure of human society.³

Rodney in his work, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa makes the case that European imperialism thwarted the natural developmental process in Africa. The intrusion of Europeans and the coercive slave trade pushed the African continent in a state of disarray and triggered internecine warfare.

Rodney's theory of development is teleological but be that as it may, he is also aware that there were other factors that prevented African society from keeping abreast with the scientific changes that were underway in Europe. Rodney sees religion as having a stultifying effect on development:

Religion is an aspect of the superstructure of a society, deriving ultimately from the degree of control and understanding of the material world. However, when man thinks in religious terms, he starts from the ideal rather than with the material world (which is beyond his comprehension). This creates a non-scientific and metaphysical way of viewing the world, which often conflicts with the scientific materialistic outlook and with the development of society.⁴

It is this religiosity that permeated every stratum of African society that helped to hinder scientific development. Religion ceased to dominate the cultural system of Europe long before it occurred in Africa. This enabled European society to develop a greater receptivity to science and later on to apply science to productivity and gaining control of the physical environment. African society by the turn of the fifteenth century had developed expertise in soils, climate, animals and plants. African farmers had mastered the art of rotating crops, the terracing of hillsides and the use of animal manure. Iron tools were used in place of wooden and stone tools. But Walter Rodney points out that there was not a great deal of pressure for innovation as there existed in Africa an abundance of land. As a consequence, there did not develop an interest in scientific knowledge

in devising tools to improve labour productivity and African culture was inundated with metaphysics.

No serious examination of Jamaica's cultural heritage can circumvent the heritage of Africa and the crucible of slavery. We have already briefly dealt with the former and it is important to our analysis that we mention a few important details about the latter. Slavery is basically a system of violence in which the slavemaster tries systematically to dehumanize the worker in chains and the slave tried unrelentingly to assert, if not to preserve his humanity. The task of control was made slightly easier if the slavemaster could effectively convince the enslaved African that his position in the division of labour was one that is justly deserved. In this respect, the abundance of rebellions against the institution of slavery in Jamaica is an indication of the failure of the master class to convince the African that eternal bondage was his lot in a world of gruesome exploitation.

The Religious Propensity

Unlike the situation in the Spanish and Portuguese colonies in the New World, there was no serious attempt to christianize the African population in Jamaica until the nineteenth century. West African religion with the notion of a superior being and a pantheon of gods prevailed unchallenged by the established church. In 1816, the Jamaica House Assembly passed an act to consider the state of religion among the slaves and to carefully investigate the means of diffusing the light of genuine Christianity among them,⁵ but the planters felt threatened by the legislation and not much was accomplished by the official church. There were a number of non-official

Christian denominations that commenced proslytizing among the slave population from as early as the eighteenth century. The Moravians started in 1734, the Methodist in 1736, the Baptists in 1783 and the Presbyterians much later in 1823.⁶

It is interesting to note that Christianity did not make much headway before the termination of the slave trade in 1807. While the slave trade lasted, the influx of Africans from the continent served to rejuvenate old religious beliefs and customs. Once the slave trade ceased, the creolization of the African was made much easier as the linkage with Africa was severed. Of the non-conformist sects, the Baptists were the most successful in winning the soul of the African peasant. Two Afro-Americans, George Liele (1784) and Moses Baker (1787) were founders of the Baptist religion in Jamaica.⁷ It is the expressive manner of worship that is permitted in the Baptist religious worship that initially attracted the creolized African. These non-conformist sects were persecuted by the State and the established Church until the Africans were emancipated in 1838.

After emancipation, the African wherever possible fled the plantation and established communities in the hilly interior of the island. Missionaries of the non-conformist sects played a pivotal role in the creation of these new forms of habitat. The African had not completely rejected his pantheon of gods. The African belief system blended with Christian precepts and what crystallized was a new form of Afro-Christianity.

One must recognize that for the greater portion of human history, religion has constituted the core of human life and has determined the way man looks at the world.

The religion of Afro-American slaves, like all religion, grew as a way of ordering the world and of providing a vantage point from which to judge it. Like all religion it laid down a basis for moral conduct and an explanation for the existence of evil and injustice. ⁸

Eugene Genovese disagrees with the Nietzschean proposition that Christianity softened the impact of slavery by drawing the hatred from the soul of the bondsman and without hatred there can be no revolt. ⁹ Genovese sees Christianity as being a conservative as well as a rebellious force. For Genovese, the slaves in the New World were able to use religious belief to assert their humanity, but it was certainly not a revolutionary force.

The black variant of Christianity laid the foundations of protonational consciousness and at the same time stretched a universalist offer of forgiveness and ultimate reconciliation to white America; and it gave the individual slave the wherewithal to hold himself intact and to love his brothers and sisters in the quarters, even as it blocked the emergence of political consciousness and a willingness to create a legitimate black authority. The synthesis that became black Christianity offered profound spiritual strength to a people at bay; but it also imparted a political weakness, which dictated, however necessarily and realistically, acceptance of the hegemony of the oppressor. It enabled the slaves to do battle against the slaveholders' ideology, but defensively within the system it opposed; offensively, it proved a poor instrument. ¹⁰

The slaves used Christianity to undermine the legitimacy of the slave order. Christ was a master above and beyond the temporal slave master and possessed superior powers. It aided the slave in preserving his humanity and enabled him to create a world out of the reach of the plantocracy. Through Christianity he could assert his individuality and resist the systematic attempts to dehumanize him. But according to Genovese, the Christian identity did not provide the slaves with a collective will to fight

against the slave order. Christianity encouraged, even fostered individual resistance, but it did not lead to a culture of resistance which would challenge the division of labour that the plantocracy had institutionalized through his control of state power. In other words, the slaves were cognizant of the power of the slavemaster and the hegemony of the state but the just and egalitarian teaching of Christianity provided the slaves with sufficient insight that the power of the master did not move to the stage of legitimate authority.

Genovese uses this argument to explain why incidents of slave resistance in the United States were less frequent than in the Caribbean. He also reasons that slavery in North America was characterized by paternalism and "wherever paternalism exists, it undermines solidarity among the oppressed by linking them as individuals to their oppressors."¹¹ The fact that a majority of Afro-American slaves were on farms of less than twenty in number created the environment in which paternalism could thrive:

Paternalism created a tendency for the slaves to identify with a particular community through identification with its master; it reduced the possibilities for their identification with each other as a class. Racism undermined the slaves' sense of worth as black people and reinforced their dependence on white masters. But these were tendencies, not absolute laws, and the slaves forged weapons of defense the most important of which was religion that taught them to love and value each other, to take a critical view of their masters, and to reject the ideological rationalizations for their own enslavement.¹²

I see Genovese use of the term paternalism as grossly inappropriate.

Slavery is a system characterized by violence and thus cannot be described as paternalistic. But for our purposes what we are concerned with is the impact of religion on the culture of the New World African. Whether we

study the social life of blacks in Brazil, Haiti or Cuba, we find religion especially in the pre and post emancipation periods playing the dominant role.

Leonard Barret interprets the impact of christianity on the African quite differently from Genovese. Throughout the Caribbean and the Americas, there developed a synthesis of African and Christian religion. This Afro-American Caribbean syncretism differs in its particularity depending on the environment in which it is located. The African presence is far more pronounced in Haiti than in North America. The Haitians were the only New World Africans to stage a successful revolution. This occurred in the first decade of the nineteenth century and the control of state power placed the African in a position to preserve his supernatural heritage. The North American black man was more exposed to creolization and the form of Christianity that flourished in the Afro-American community although it is far more energetically expressed than orthodox worship, is not visibly African. The western influence is far more over-arching although relics of the African heritage can be depicted.

After the Great Revival that took place in Jamaica in 1860-61 three distinct forms of Afro-Christian syncretism were created (1) Pukumina which is mostly African in its rituals and beliefs (2) the Revival Cult which is partly African and partly Christian and (3) Revival Zion which is mostly Christian and the least African. The leaders of the plethora of religious sects are known as the shepherds or shepherdesses and play a critical role in the maintenance of the social system. These faith leaders interpret existence for the rural masses. A shepherd's life is shrouded in

a great deal of magic and mysticism to maintain the awe and the "true believer" posture of the spellbound flock. Barrett estimates that during this period over 90 percent of Jamaican peasants depended on faith healers to meet their medical and psychological needs. It is important to point out that even though the life of the Jamaican peasant was wrapped in tiers of religiosity in the pre and post emancipation period, his acceptance of the Afro-Christian belief system did not prevent him from working for his own liberation. In Jamaica, the frequency and intensity of revolts increased after 1800, a period when the bondsman was exposed even moreso than heretofore to the Christian worldview. During the early years of the nineteenth century in the Caribbean there took place a major rebellion against the institution of slavery every decade. The slave rebellion that occurred in the western half of Jamaica in 1831 was led by Sam Sharpe, a member of the Baptist faith and recognized among the slaves for his passionate eloquence. "Sharpe according to the account he gave the Wesleyan missionary, Henry Bleby who had several conversations with him when he was in jail, did not plan armed rebellion, but mass passive resistance." ¹³ Sharpe's religious faith may have influenced his decision to refrain from a violent confrontation with the slave-owning class. Nevertheless the religious commitment of the majority of slaves did not prevent them from acting collectively against those who sought to keep them in a subjugated position. Whenever slaves got the opportunity to fight the slave-owning class, they were willing to risk their lives for liberty. Therefore it is clear in the case of Jamaica, that Christianity did not serve as an impediment to collective action against their slave condition.

As mentioned previously, the slaves left the plantation in droves to form communities in the less fertile and hilly interior. Despite the militancy of the slaves in the nineteenth century up to the time of emancipation in 1838, once freedom was attained, there was no concerted effort to challenge the social order. The fertile flatlands continued to be in the hands of the ex-slave-owners. The peasant class did not raise the cry of land to the tiller. He was aware of how his labour was being exploited and wherever there existed an alternative to the plantation, he left his tracks behind. The peasant clung to a cultural system that can be characterized as pre-bourgeois metaphysics even though he functioned in an agrarian plantation economy in which science was being applied to productivity. His material position had not improved but he was free. The militancy of the pre-emancipation period dissipated with the dawn of freedom. The challenge to slavery was not an attempt to overthrow bourgeois society but to seek a place in it where one would be entitled to sell one's labour at a particular price or if one desired to engage in self-sufficient farming. It is thus not surprising that the social order was maintained despite the immiseration of the peasant. The Afro-Christianity which constituted the major component of the peasants cultural system did not comprise a counter culture that would question the legitimacy of the social order. It undermined the legitimacy of slavery but it did not envision a new social order that would question property ownership that prevailed in the bourgeois society extant in Jamaica.

Afro-Christianity was forced to compete with the new pentecostalism that emanated from the United States. Ironically this alien religious

challenge to indigenous Jamaican religiosity coincided with the great material crash of 1929. First to appear in the island was the Church of God, headquartered in Cleveland, Tennessee. Then followed the Church of God in Christ and the Apostolic Faith and finally all the Pentecostal churches known in America. ¹⁴

There are many similarities that link Pentecostals to Revivalism. The leaders of the Pentecostals encourage "spirited" worship and church leaders are normally colorful. Stress is placed on baptism and through the power of God given to his representatives, the ailing true believer can be healed. With the 'spirited' celebration of God one is expected to enter a trance-like state and to speak in tongues. Much emphasis is placed on the use of musical instruments, drums, guitar, etc. to create an ethos conducive to being touched by the Creator. Nevertheless, there remains essential differences. Barrett takes the position that for the Pentecostals, the Bible is the essence while to the Jamaican Revivalists the Bible is peripheral. There is a puritanical streak that runs throughout the Pentecostal life style. They refrain from liquor and tobacco, dancing and sex. The Revivalists spurn puritanism and use white rum and ganja quite liberally to get in touch with the Spirit. Through this energetic expenditure of movement the Revivalists and the Pentecostals satisfy the spiritual needs of the masses. In fact, Barrett sees them as a dynamic revolutionary force:

.... it is in these Revival yards that the real Jamaican folk tradition was nourished and preserved. From the folk-religion came the charismatic leaders to take over the political leadership of the island before the educated elite succeeded them: from these yards folk painters, sculptors and musicians emerged. ¹⁵

In contrast the Jamaican middle and upper classes looked with contempt at this tempestuous form of mass worship. The middle and upper classes revealed a preference for the more established religions (Roman Catholicism, Anglican, Presbyterian) that worshipped with a minimum of rancor.

The Paul Bogle Rebellion

Barrett interprets the Morant Bay Rebellion of 1865 as another historical example of the revolutionary tradition of the Afro-Christian heritage. Paul Bogle, a native Baptist Minister was the leader of the Morant Bay Rebellion. This uprising is a response by the peasants of St. Thomas to their deteriorating material position since the emancipation period.

In 1862, George William Gordon, a wealthy businessman and Member of the House of Assembly sent an angry letter to Governor Eyre protesting the appalling conditions of the blacks in the parish. Gordon had previously converted from the Presbyterian faith to the Native Baptist Church. Although he was a wealthy businessman, he identified with the rural poor and tried to represent their interest in the colonial parliament. For his effort, Gordon was dismissed from his post as Magistrate of St. Thomas and ostracized by the official Church and the plantocracy.

In a visit to Jamaica in 1865, Mr. Edward B. Underhill wrote a letter to the Secretary of State for the Colonies in which he stated:

Crime has fearfully increased. The number of prisoners in the penitentiary and gaols is considerably more than double the average, and nearly all for one crime - larceny. Summons for petty debts disclose an amount of pecuniary difficulty which has never before been

experienced; and application for parochial and private relief prove that multitudes are suffering from want, a little removed from starvation. ¹⁶

Underhill went on to further describe the deprived conditions of the people. People were walking around in rags and the economy was in a state of disarray. He estimated that on an island of four hundred thousand, only thirty thousand were employed on the sugar estates. He recommended to the Secretary of the colonies that an inquiry be held into the conduct of the Jamaican legislature; the necessity to develop new products; and novel ways to be found to utilize the land for agriculture other than in the planting of cane and sugar. He encouraged the diversification of agriculture and saw that it was the task of government to provide farmers with the incentives to grow spices, tobacco, coffee, cotton, etc. ¹⁷

William Gordon received a copy of Underhill's letter and this provided him additional arsenal for his fight against the privileged classes. Bogle and Gordon were religious compatriots. On October 7, 1865, Paul Bogle led a march of two hundred men into Morant Bay to protest against the hard times that the peasants were experiencing. Bogle's show of force frightened the powers that be that a warrant was issued for his arrest. A contingent of police officers was sent to apprehend him, but the officers were severely beaten by the peasants who supported Bogle.

Bogle went on the offensive on October 10, 1865 and attacked the vestry of Morant Bay. Eighteen persons were killed, 31 wounded and 51 prisoners were freed. He returned triumphant to Stony Gut. The state mobilized its forces and declared martial law in St. Thomas and the

adjoining parish of Portland. Bogle and his band of recalcitrants were devastated. It is estimated that over one thousand people were killed by the militia forces.¹⁸ William Gordon was hanged on October 22, 1865 and Paul Bogle suffered a similar fate two days after. Nonetheless, Britain was forced by the rebellion to improve conditions in the plantation colony and on December 22, 1865, the 202 year old representative institution that fought against social change ended and Jamaica became a Crown Colony.

It is the events described above that supposedly furnishes Barrett with the evidence that Afro-Jamaican Christianity embodies a revolutionary tradition.

Whereas in the earlier days, upheavals were caused by the religious dynamics of the Native Baptist Church, the dynamics of the present day are a revival of the same, only in this case the fuel comes from a newly awakened doctrine - Ethiopianism. The new movement also reinforces the theory that it is in the religious teachings which exist outside the established churches that political pressures are brought on behalf of social change.¹⁹

What does Barrett mean by Ethiopianism? He means the emergence of religious organizations that identify with the African root. Specifically he is referring to the Rastafarian Movement which he sees as a part of this revolutionary tradition. We will discuss the Rastafarian Movement when we assess contemporary Jamaican culture. At present, we are still looking at the culture developmentally, in terms of its ancestral roots. Barrett does not define clearly what he means when he use the term revolutionary. The Afro-Christianity heritage represents a departure from the culture of the ruling elite and at times is instrumental in giving an impulse to the struggle against the established order. An intermittent challenge is not

by itself an indication of a revolutionary culture. A revolutionary culture would invariably seek to transform the existing political system. Afro-Christianity merely represents a sub-culture in the dominant order. In fact, it is a sub-culture that encourages adaptation to the existing order moreso than confrontation and/or fundamental change. Barrett merely looks at certain incidents in Jamaican history and make sweeping generalizations without looking at the role that religion plays in the day to day life of the Jamaican masses.

Class and Culture in Traditional Jamaica

Madeline Kerr in her study, Personality and Conflict in Jamaica does just that. It is interesting to note that Kerr's work was originally published in 1952. Basically, the author is studying the rural country of Jamaica prior to the period of rapid industrialization and urbanization. At the time Jamaica was still an agrarian colony of Great Britain. This work serves our purpose since we are concerned in looking at culture developmentally. In other words, placing culture on a continuum and analyzing social changes from a historical perspective.

Madeline Kerr sees the omnipresence of religion playing four essential functions in Jamaica (1) Wish Fulfillment (2) as an emotional outlet (3) serving a recreational purpose (4) provides an opportunity for leadership. 20

1) Wish Fulfillment During the 1940s the stagnant economy with growing population provided the rural peasants with almost no avenues for upward mobility. The material condition for the masses of peasants was so impoverished that they developed a preoccupation with the after life. The after life was envisioned to be more glorious than the terrestrial

experience. In such a situation, Kerr argues that much emphasis is placed on being saved. In addition a worldview of this kind would make the existing social order much more palatable. One would perceive one's lot despite its arduousness as merely temporary and to be followed by one that would be characterized by holy grace.

2) Emotional Outlet When the rural peasant gathers together to praise His Almighty, this is done with a tremendous outpouring of energy. Kerr argues unconvincingly that during her research period she had observed that interpersonal relations were characterized by a lack of emotion. (I think Kerr is incorrect, but that is not what is critical at this point). Kerr sees this emotional release as sapping the "great potential creativeness of the peasant." ²¹ All the creative vitality of the peasant is used up in his transcendental activity and thus none is left for secular purposes.

3) Recreation Life in the countryside is characterized by a stifling monotony. There are almost no facilities for recreation. Revivalist meetings then add a degree of spice to the would be monotonous lives of the peasants. The peasant is not a mere spectator at these meetings, but becomes emotionally charged and takes a direct part in this celebration of the Creator by singing hosannas and getting the spirit and at times if the spirit moves you, speaking in tongues. This serves as activity that is physically and emotionally gratifying. Hence the revivalist meetings serve as the quintessence of recreation..

4) Leadership Madeline Kerr joins a number of other scholars who make the case that peasant life in Jamaica is "extremely individualistic." ²²

Sidney Mintz in his essay assessing the Caribbean as a socio-cultural region remarks that one of the major characteristics of this type of New World society is pronounced individualization.²³ Mintz deduces that the plantation has engineered this fierce individualism and cultural fragmentation. The plantation although situated in the countryside is viewed as a modern unit of production. Mintz qualifies his notion of individualism in the Caribbean by stating:

The point is not that group-based or community-based activity does not occur in Caribbean lower-class life, but that the patterns and traditions for such activity differ significantly from what might be expected by observers of poor, rural, agrarian communities in underdeveloped societies.²⁴

Mintz brings further clarity to his argument by declaring that different cultural traditions, social histories and contemporary economic and political conditions affect the degree of individualism that is forged in particular cases.²⁵ In the specific case of the Caribbean, which would be applicable to Jamaica, Mintz notes -

Whereas Europe and the United States have been able to develop a heavily individualistic emphasis in social relations, they have done so from the vantage-point of long-established institutional forms of group integration. It is perhaps of some interest, then, that those aspects of modern western society regarded as most depersonalizing and "anti-human" - the view of persons as things and as numbers interchangeable, expendable, and faceless - have a very lengthy history in the Caribbean area, and developed there in a context of very imperfect transfer of European social institutions.²⁶

But as Kerr and Barrett have observed, the transfer of European social institutions was not wholesale and in fact had a very marginal impact on mass culture. The upper and middle class are forced to grapple with that predicament. The plight of the rural masses is not the im-

perfect transfer of European social institutions but that the institutions that emerge, especially those of an ecclesiastical nature, avoid political and secular issues. In that respect, these institutions indirectly contribute to the maintenance of social order. Influentials in the society in order to realize their potential do not opt to fight the police and reconstruct the social order, but to form a multiplicity of religious cults.

How does this cultural system that we have described affect political behaviour? The religious worldview that the masses of peasants have internalized and which dominates the cultural system determines political behaviour. The peasant leaves his fate in the hands of gods and his class fortune to the machinations of bourgeois politicians. The dependency on God encourages class submissiveness. The westernized individualism would also make group action or the development of class solidarity exceedingly difficult.

A member of the House of Representatives is supposed to take over all the difficulties of his constituency. He is blamed for everything which the people consider should be done and is not done. 27

There is also the tendency to view the secular leader as if he is endowed with magical powers. Politics taking place in such a cultural milieu would be devoid of interest groups that articulate and are willing to fight for the needs of the rural peasant. The peasant shows a willingness to be led, a willingness to follow "Bustamante 'till we die" which was a campaign song of the Jamaica Labour Party. Man is not the maker of

his own history but reality is explained away by magic and can be influenced through faith and balmyard healers.

The Caribbean agro-proletariat (the farmworker on the plantation) is definitely a part of the modern world. He works in a vast economic unit of production which goes about the business of producing goods in a scientific way. But there are other aspects of his being:

Part of his life takes place in the technological Europeanised world and part in another world where miracle, faith healing, and sorcery is possible. This means that he gives what is in fact lip service only to the concepts which underlies a technological society. If medicine and agricultural science fail or are not available, he can always turn to magic.

On account of this, it is difficult for him to belong completely to either system. This leads to confusion and the development of conflicting sets of attitudes. 28

Kerr overstates her case when she argues that the Jamaican peasant is in a state of quandary because he does not belong to either system. In other words, his bestraddled position leads to confusion. Jamaica is no exception. All modern societies entail a mixture of the old with the new. The modern bourgeois society has not managed, even if it so desired, to expunge society of metaphysical thinking. Ecclesiastical institutions persist and show no signs of withering away. In fact, one can go further, it is the natural condition of man to occupy simultaneously these multiple worlds. What is significant in the case of Jamaica, as Mintz would argue, is its peculiar religious tradition that obviously encourages class submission by completely avoiding political issues like the plague.

I would like to make it quite clear that it is not religion per se that determines the subservience of the Jamaican peasant, but the particular form that religion takes in the case of Jamaica. Religion is not incompatible with a tradition of struggle. Nevertheless, it does carry with it seeds of reaction. The superstitious anti-scientific worldview of the Caribbean slave did not prevent him from developing a tradition of violent resistance to the social order of the slavemaster. Pronounced individualism did not preclude slaves from banding together and fighting the English militia. But once emancipation was attained, that revolutionary tradition gave way to a cultural system that placed much emphasis on religion and simply accommodated itself to the political superstructure. It failed to develop autonomous political institutions that would articulate the needs of the peasant folks. When the period of political modernization commenced in 1944, politics was easily dominated by middle class elements. The rural peasant still contained the capability of mass rebellion as occurred in 1865 (Bogle Rebellion) and in 1938 (islandwide rebellion). These incidents were spontaneous reactions of a people who although predisposed to metaphysics, were obviously a part of the material world. In both these instances, the protest was triggered by deteriorating living conditions and for a brief moment "the cup had runneth over." These incidents disrupted the social order and were responsible for fundamental constitutional changes. The Bogle Rebellion forced the British to suspend the internal autonomy that the planters enjoyed and replaced it with a new colonial constitution that expanded the powers of the English Governor who was ordered to improve the machinery of government to improve

the life possibilities of a peasant class whose standard of living had declined since emancipation. And in 1938, the working class uprising by agro-proletariat and industrial proletariat was the major factor in the new constitution of 1944 giving more power to indigenous leaders and creating the climate for the construction of modern political parties and the hodgepodge of bureaucratic institutions necessary to run a modern state. These modern institutions were dominated not by rural folks. The Jamaican peasant participated in a new political system wherein he had the potential of dominating the system, but his participation was easily managed by the middle class who were being prepared by the English to assume the mandate from heaven which was slipping out of the hands of 'bwana'. Jamaica up until the 1950s was an agrarian society characterized by class deference that made the task of maintaining social order relatively easy for the middle class elements that had moved into positions of control that they would completely assume after the period of tutelage by the colonial British.

It is M.G. Smith, the anthropologist who argued that mid-twentieth century Jamaican society constitute a plural society. They were basically three distinct cultural sections (1) the whites (2) the browns (3) the blacks. There existed a correlation between race and class. When Smith examined the division of labour in Jamaica, invariably those doing the most menial task and with very little chance of upward mobility are those constituting the black section. The black section has developed its own cultural world which differs markedly from that of the other sections. Although numerically predominant, the black section is powerless and their

religious predisposition helps to reinforce this low social position. The martial customs, religious practice and sexual morality of the black section reflect the African heritage. Smith sees the culture of the black section as an impediment to political change.

The majority of the lower section were accustomed to thinking about their position in fatalistic racial and magico-religious terms, and did not respond to Manley's rationalistic economic program or to his advocacy of nationalism and constitutional reforms. Bustamante's charisma and bread-and-butter union leadership suited them better. ²⁹

What is critical for Smith is the network of institutions that shape the worldview of the distinctive cultural sections. Smith is more comfortable with the term cultural section than with the term social class.

Although usually described as a social class, the population which practices a distinctive set of institutions is best described as a cultural or social section. ³⁰

How does Smith define an institution?

An institution is a form or system of activities characteristic of a given population. Institutional activities involve groups and these groups generally have clearly defined forms of relations among their members. Moreover, institutional activities and forms of grouping are also sanctioned by normative beliefs and ideas, and social values are expressed in institutional rules. The basic institutions of a given population are the core of the people's culture, and since society consists of a system of institutionalized relations, a people's institutions form the matrix of their social structure. ³¹

In other words, one can gain some insight into political behavior by focussing on the basic institutions which form the core of a people's culture. It is this cultural complex that will influence political behavior. It is this network of cultural forces which will determine class relations.

Smith further stated that a plural society is held together through coercion:

The integration of these three sections within the larger society has never been very high; and for cohesion Jamaica has depended mainly on those forms of social control implicit in the economic system and explicit in government. ³²

But if the social relations between the various sections are characterized by deference, then the amount of coercion used to maintain social order can be kept at a minimum. Providing the core institutions of the lower section varies from the intermediate and upper sections only in terms of religion and family modes, then social order despite the cultural contradictions will prevail. Whenever the lower section begins to question the division of labour and the sanctity of existing land ownership at that point social order can only be maintained through the repressive machinery of state power. In his work, M.G. Smith fails to make this critical distinction. Institutions are discussed as if they were timeless and not subject to change.

Maintaining social order in Jamaica prior to rapid urbanization did not require a gargantuan coercive effort. But culture is not stagnant. It must adjust to changes in the economic environment. Once Jamaica moves beyond the realm of a pre-colonial agricultural society, the theoretical insights of Kerr and Smith become anachronistic.

Adam Kuper's study, Changing Jamaica is an analysis of contemporary Jamaican society. Kuper did not limit his research to urban Jamaica, but also studied the culture of the countryside. He rejects the studies of the 1950s which depict Jamaica as a plural society marked by distinct cultural

sections. The picture that Kuper presents of Jamaican society is one that is not marred by strong class antagonism. He argues that class lines are not rigidly drawn and are in fact much more fluid and flexible than is indicated by the literature of the 1950s. ³³ He further stated:

... stratification models of Jamaica tell one little about the social realities and such approaches have inevitably led to the sterile debate about how the society coheres - whether such disparate 'groups' or 'classes' or 'social sections' are held together through consensus or the use of force. ³⁴

He observed that the influence of religion remains a powerful force in the countryside; the Bible is interpreted from a fundamentalist perspective; death is near, the end of the world is at hand; the blessed will be saved, the wicked damned. ³⁵

Religion in the contemporary period helps to limit class antagonism and biblical prophecy is used to rationalize differential rewards in the division of labour. Difference in wealth and status are justified by the will of God. It is perceived that people are terrestrially successful because they are ecclesiastically righteous.

The wealthy and successful can therefore dismiss the poor as failures. Godless, illiterate and idle, who through bad behaviour have forfeited their chances both in this world and in the next. ³⁶

Although religion continues to be pivotal in the countryside in determining social and political behaviour, we have seen that with the secularization of the society in the contemporary period, religion is now forced to explain or rationalize the secular. Religion must also compete with educational and political forces which combine to make up the core institutions

of the peasant. At the point in time when Kerr did her research, democratic politics was recently introduced into the island. By the 1970s, politics had become such an integral part of social life that it served both as a cohesive as well as a divisive force. Political alliances transcended class barriers and big farmers, small farmers, the landless all belonged to this eclectic two party political system.

Rather than just clinging to the religious identity and divorcing oneself from the realm of politics, political affiliation in contemporary Jamaica has become critical in terms of how people define themselves. Party loyalty is held with an indescribable passion to the extent that it affects social relations. Why are political loyalties held so tenaciously in Jamaica? Michael Manley tried to answer it in this way:

I suspect that there you are dealing with the absence of social cohesiveness because of the nature of colonialism... all the enormous displacement of the psyche and of all the, sort of, institutional relationships of a naturally evolving culture and society - all this is totally eroded by colonialism, leaving people adrift with nothing to believe in; no basis for social cohesiveness. I think that when the political parties emerged in 1938 and then 1943 that there was probably suddenly a focus for loyalty of a sort that was desperately needed. Because the truth of the matter is the loyalties are absolutely phenomenal: Party loyalties in Jamaica are tangible things that you can eat. You talk about bankable assurances. I mean - a party can absolutely betray everything imaginable, make the most horrendous errors and have that bedrock that is not something that just comes out every four years like a Democrat maybe in the states ... But is a palpable thing it has to do with the living of man morning, noon and night ... he will eat, and breathe it - and Sundays and right through the week, and ... and that must be because its answering some deeply felt need for a focus of loyalty expressed in group terms - that of course, is a very great strength from one point of view because I think

it has given to the Jamaica political process a sort of bedrock stability, a predictability, if I may use the term, which has served the country well in many ways. It now has its negative side - in that it means that politics in Jamaica can very quickly deteriorate into tribal squabbling where you're not really competing for anything except just to say that your party is in power ... 37

Political affiliation is now an important part of identity formation. Yet politics in the countryside has not hitherto taken on an antagonistic class character. Small farmers are not confronting wealthy landowners. Landless peasants are not as a class engaged in a political struggle with landholders. In fact, the transclass basis of the two major political parties, PNP and JLP supports Kuper's contention that class relations in Jamaica are not as rigid or as plural as M.G. Smith and other writings during an earlier period would contend. But let us examine the cultural system in the cities and compare it to the countryside. In that respect we can discern how the culture has evolved in recent decades.

It is very clear that M.G. Smith's "typology is useful in describing the main social strata in the immediate post-emancipation period of Jamaican society but it is of limited utility in describing the contemporary social structure of Jamaica". 38

Class and Culture in the Modern Period

Modernization was specially concentrated in the urban complex of Kingston and St. Andrew. Not only have we observed the emergence of new cultural forms, but the post-emancipation class structure has been irretrievably altered. Kingston and St. Andrew by the 1960s had developed into a

bustling third world metropolis. Labour in a modernizing economy is forced to become increasingly specialized and differentiated than would be the case in a plantation economy. In addition, urban workers and would-be workers acquire the taste for consumer goods. What is of paramount value in this materialist setting is the accumulation of wealth. As Carl Stone suggests, money or the amount of income a worker commands determines his social status in urban Jamaica. Race, education, and class acculturation are still factors in determining the position that an individual holds in the division of labour but what is valued most of all in the new materialistic ethos, is the wealth of the individual. That is what is paramount. Everything else is secondary.

From his empirical research, Stone deduced that the main problem confronting the urban Jamaican is not a concern with race or culture, but the majority of respondents were preoccupied with economic concerns. Based on these findings Stone argued:

The above findings lend impressive support for the view that the primacy of material goals and values in societal conflict in urban Jamaica requires a class analysis of social cleavages rather than the cultural analysis that grows out of social anthropological perspectives of M.G. Smith. ⁴⁰

Stone here is criticizing Smith's model of cultural pluralism. Smith does treat the question of culture as if it were timeless and lacking a material base. Culture is not developed in isolation from the economy of a country. Culture influences economic development and is in turn influenced by the economic environment. The fact that materialism, as Stone suggests, has attained a position of primacy merely indicates the cultural changes that

have taken place in this developing country in recent years. It is not a question that the cultural analysis is no longer useful, but how it is to be used to explain social phenomena. Although materialism is in the ascendancy, what form the class cleavages within the society takes will not unilaterally be determined by materialism, but by what Smith calls the core institutions that determine how people view themselves and how they see the world. Thus we must refrain from seeing economics isolated from culture or culture isolated from economics but how they affect each other.

In looking at urban Jamaica, Stone rejects the Marxist dichotomy of capital vs. labour. The Marxist analysis is seen as too rigid and not reflective of the differentiation that has taken place among the proletariat and the bourgeoisie.

Marx had assumed that both levels of class antagonism were identical because of the prediction of the increasing immiserization of the working class, and the secular tendency towards a homogeneous labour force sharing a common condition of acute material impoverishment. In urban Jamaica the fragmentation of labour into several strata with distinctly different levels of material affluence severely question this assumption and repudiates the prediction. ⁴¹

The author further states:

Instead of revolutionary politics of bi-polarized class conflict, the stratification pattern produces alliances and coalitions which shape the direction of mass politics. ⁴²

Thus Carl Stone used the stratification model to explain social cleavages in urban Jamaica rather than a class analysis or cultural pluralism. What Stone is saying is that because certain members of the working class enjoy a privileged position in the division of labour and are rewarded accordingly

that there is an absence of class consciousness. The stratification model is indeed further refining of the class model. Nevertheless, Stone is incorrect when he states that the working class in Jamaica is fragmented, implying that it is the differential rewards that is the cause of this fragmentation.

It is incorrect to state that labour is fragmented in Jamaica. There has developed a tradition of blanket trade unions which are indirectly affiliated to the two major political parties. The two major trade unions, the Bustamante Industrial Trade Union and National Worker's Union are affiliated to the Jamaica Labour Party and the People's National Party respectively. In 1974, the BITU had a total membership of 140,488. 90,219 were due paying members and 50,269 were non-paying members. The National Workers Union had for the same year a total of 176,000 members, but only 44,000 were dues paying members while 152,000 did not pay membership fees. When the Trade Union Congress is included, the total trade union membership for the major unions amounted to 327,197 out of a labour force of approximately 857,000.⁴³ From 1972-76 there occurred 2,231 industrial disputes that were reported to the Ministry of Labour. 40% of the disputes were related to wages and conditions of work, 36% were attributed to bargaining rights, 15% were caused by dismissals and suspensions and 9% to miscellaneous causes.⁴⁴

The fact that labour has reached a stage that is characterized by a high degree of specialization and differential income-rewarding does not indicate that the working class is fragmented. The working class in Jamaica is divided politically and there has developed a tradition of trade union

economism. The trade unions are not fundamentally opposed to capitalism. They merely seek a larger share of the pie and even that non-revolutionary pursuit, conflict between capital and labour is inevitable. Because of the economism of the trade unions this industrial unrest does not spill over into the realm of ideological politics. Trade unions act as an interest group to further the needs of the working class in the institutionalized tradition of economism. That is how they perform today, but that is not necessarily how they will act tomorrow. That will depend on whether the economy expands or contracts, whether the ideological trade unions which are presently minute, grow in significance in the decades ahead.

Stone divides the urban work force into seven occupational strata (1) big businessmen (2) professionals (3) small businessmen (4) white collar workers (5) self-employed artisans (6) blue collar workers and (7) lower class workers.⁴⁵ But the stratification system that has developed as an outgrowth of modernization has not led to any dramatic redistribution of wealth. "In the mid 1960s, Jamaica had the highest rate of income inequality in the world, the upper 5 percent receiving 30 percent of the national income and the lowest 20 percent receiving 2 percent of the total."⁴⁶ In 1969, 61.83% of the labour force were earning less than \$10. In 1973 that figure had been reduced to 36.6 of the labour force. Over 87% of the labour force in 1973 were earning less than \$50 per week. The average weekly earnings in large establishments in 1977 was the following:

Table 4.1 - Average Weekly Earnings in Large Establishment

	<u>1977</u>
Mining	\$200.84
Manufacturing	76.10
Electricity	175.47
Construction	87.89
Distribution	69.97
Transport & Communication	108.60
Financial & Bus Services	127.31

Source: Department of Statistics, Employment Earnings and Hours in Large Establishments 1977

TABLE 4.2

Percentage Distribution of Employed Labour Force by Income Groups 1968, 1973, 1974, 1975

Income Group (Average Per Week)	<u>1968</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>
Under \$10.00	61.83	36.6	24.8	21.0
\$10 to under \$20	12.74	28.9	24.4	22.5
\$20 to under \$30	4.68	11.8	17.1	15.1
\$30 to under \$40	-	6.8	9.3	11.2
\$40 to under \$50	1.15	3.6	5.8	7.2
\$50 to under \$100	.64	4.7	9.4	13.7
\$100 and over	1.00	1.6	3.0	3.7

Comprised from Annual Reports of The Labour Force

Department of Statistics, Kingston, Jamaica.

It is not the stratification system that has prevented the development of political class consciousness, but the fact that the working class is divided organizationally through highly institutionalized trade unions committed to economism and which in turn are indirectly and directly affiliated to political parties that are non-revolutionary.

Despite the presence of Stone's stratification labour system, Jamaica is sharply divided along class lines, especially in the urban complex of Kingston and St. Andrew where class relations since the 1960s have entered an antagonistic and volatile stage. M.G. Smith's concept of pluralism even though accurate at the turn of the twentieth century, is at present dated and class in Jamaica is simply not as fluid as Adam Kuper makes it out to be. The development of a stratified division of labour has cushioned class antagonism but has not negated class conflict. Members of the skilled working class who earn satisfactory wages may very well identify with and support the status quo but the uneven distribution of wealth signifies that the majority of workers are not adequately compensated. The skilled workers may constitute a labour aristocracy, but the majority of workers are paid pittance wages not to mention the large reserve army of the unemployed.

The Upper and Middle Class

Despite the differentiation that has occurred in the labour force, the upper and middle class still constitute a minority in the society. Nevertheless, they effectively control the core institutions of the society. The upper class is disproportionately sprinkled with racial and ethnic minorities. The Chinese constitute approximately 0.6% of the population,

Syrians, a mere 0.1%, Europeans, 0.8% and the influential Jewish community is comprised of a few hundred families. The upper class is no longer exclusively white or comprised of aliens. Quite a number of successful black businessmen could now be classified as members of the upper class.

It is this upper class that dominates the private sector of the economy but although exerting some political influence, cannot dictate terms to the political decision-makers. A case in point would be the PNP's rejection of the capitalist path to development. (See Chapter III)

Up until the 1960s the term middle class was reserved for people who did not engage in manual labour and who normally held a white collar position in the division of labour. The middle class individual was not only expected to hold a secure job that provided him with more than the necessities of life but was presumed to be able to speak the Queen's English and to have education beyond the elementary level.

The middle class never developed a distinct indigenous culture. The value system of the middle class was grafted from colonial metropolitan culture and transplanted in a tropical setting. What originated in Jamaica was deemed worthless and something of value had to originate from abroad. One's sense of aesthetics, politics, social relations, etc. were derived from bourgeois society in Europe and America.

As Madeline Kerr has demonstrated religion served as the bedrock of rural society in the 1940s. The form that religion takes has altered in recent years. Jamaican society has become increasingly materialistic. The Christian value system although continuing to possess some symbolic

significance, has been pushed aside by the crass materialism of a modernizing society. Christian worship is reduced to a symbolic gesture and does not determine social or political relationships.

C.I.R. James writing on the middle class in the Caribbean stated:

They are not a defective set of people. In intellectual capacity, i.e. ability to learn, to familiarise themselves with the general scholastic requirements of Western civilization, they are and for some time have been unequalled in the colonial world. 47

James was convinced that they knew nothing about economic development and historically were excluded from the circles of industry, commerce and banking.

Knowledge of production, of political struggles, of the democratic tradition, they have had none. Their ignorance and disregard of economic development is profound and deeply rooted in their past and present situation. 48

Having embraced a Eurocentric worldview, the middle classes could not develop or lead a national movement. Nevertheless they spearheaded the negotiations for independence but without a clear conceptualisation of what new societies they intended to create. They were not a people who had developed a philosophical predisposition or felt comfortable with ideas.

James further stated:

I do not know any social class which lives so completely without ideas of any kind. They live entirely on the material plane. In a published address Sir Robert Kirkwood quotes Vidia Naipaul who has said of them that they seem to aim at nothing more than second-rate American citizens. It is much more than that. They aim at nothing. Government jobs and the opportunities which association with the government gives, allows them the possibility of accumulating material goods. That is all. 49

What James meant was that once sovereignty was granted the middle class political leadership would be incapable of involving the mass of the population in the agonizing task of nation building. They provided the leadership of a new nation yet they were far more comfortable living in the white metropolis than in their own country.

The middle class in the United States are in a much more secure situation than in the Caribbean. The middle class in the Caribbean and specifically in Jamaica, do not constitute the majority of the electorate. The economies of the Caribbean are not well endowed with natural resources and in fact have suffered from a severe decline in the standard of living of all classes since the 1970s. In a society where vast numbers are excluded from gainful employment, where a maldistribution of wealth is rampant, the only way the middle class can maintain extant privileges is to hope that the traditional deference of the lower classes would prevail in the modernization period. This has not been the case and thus the middle class live in a state of siege with burglar bars and iron railings which provide some comfort at nights. It is a class that recognizes the need for social change but is not willing to give up a privileged way of life.

The Working Class

There is some disagreement regarding the size of the working class which is based on various definitions as to who qualifies as working class. Ralph Gonzalves limits the working class (1974 data) to 288,700 or 35.4% of the total labour force and remarks that the working class in Jamaica when compared to an advanced capitalist countries is quite small. ⁵⁰ He

concludes from this that the minuteness of the working class is a limiting factor on the working class movement and the advance of socialism. But the size of the working class per se tells us absolutely nothing about the state of consciousness or the political culture.

Cecil Nelson (pseudonym) stating the official position of the Workers Party of Jamaica, a Marxist-Leninist political organization, defines working class in very narrow terms. WPJ calculates that the industrial proletariat amounts to no more than 126,125.⁵¹ The Party is even wary of that figure since it includes workers in small, backward plants, those in light consumer goods or those who are scattered in isolated places throughout the countryside. Should agricultural workers be classified as belonging to the working class? Richard Frucht argues that what we find in the Caribbean is a type of worker who is neither peasant nor proletariat but a little of both.⁵²

The agro-proletariat in Jamaica have a history of working class militancy and as indicated earlier were instrumental in precipitating the island-wide rebellions in 1938. But WPJ takes the position that although the agro-proletariat works for wages, they have one foot imbedded in the plantation and the other on a small plot of land.

We know that the heart of the agricultural proletariat, its overwhelming majority, consists of the plantation workers and workers on large farms producing export crops such as sugar and bananas. But even here there is still a great deal of temporary labour, and quite a large percentage of these workers return to their own farm or engage in petty bourgeois pursuits out of season.⁵³

The agro-proletariat in 1974 who could be classified as permanent agricultural workers were estimated at 43,050. ⁵⁴ If one includes the industrial working class and the agro-proletariat, the percentage of the combined figure would be approximately 27% of the employed labour force.

The category known as service occupation amounted to 129,400 in the 1975 Labour Force data. This would include those who work as domestic servants, waiters in restaurants, etc. Then there is the middle strata or middle class who technically work for a living. The middle strata are approximated to be 85,000. The Marxist theoreticians of the Worker's Party of Jamaica (WPJ) do not see the white collar middle strata as having acquired a reliable proletarian outlook. But they do concede and grapple with Carl Stone's stratification scheme that the middle strata have been polarized during the modernizational period. It is recognized that those on the lower rungs of the middle strata do not earn incomes much above that of skilled workers but "tenacious" attitudes, prejudices and backward social practices still have a firm hold on this strata." ⁵⁵

The labour militancy manifested in 1979 was led not by industrial workers but by civil servants and other elements of the middle class strata who were demanding wage increases to keep above the high rate of inflation. But WPJ is aware that labour militancy is not the same as advocating a revolutionary position.

The middle strata are further seen as capitalist functionaries and serve to preserve bourgeois society since so many are found in key sections

TABLE 4.3

LABOUR FORCE BY OCCUPATION GROUP 1975

<u>Occupation Group</u>	<u>Total Labour Force</u>
Professional Tech. Adm. Exec. Managerial and Rel. Occupations	64,800
Clerical and Sales Occupations	106,400
Self-Employed and Ind. Occupations	249,100
Service Occupations	129,400
Craftsmen, Production Process and Operating Occupations	126,000
Unskilled Manual and Gen. Occupations	135,700
Occupation Not Specified	2,100
	TOTAL
	813,500

of the labour force, i.e. teachers, journalists, priests and ministers, etc. Thus it is the industrial proletariat that WPJ see as constituting the core of the working class. "The industrial working class is the directly productive class of capitalist society." ⁵⁶ It is this class that is forced to be disciplined that constitute a revolutionary force. Other classes and strata are seen as secondary and are not given that much organizational emphasis. WPJ in wanting to remain consonant with classical Marxism argues that the Party must devote most of its energies to organizing the industrial proletariat. WPJ in avoiding the pitfalls of romantic Marxism state quite clearly:

The role that the working class is able to play is determined by the extent and depth of its self-organization into unions and political parties in the struggle with other classes, by its consciousness of the need to overthrow capitalism by the extent to which it is able to represent the broad masses, the overwhelming majority of the people, in the struggle against imperialism, local reaction and capitalism. ⁵⁷

The Workers Party of Jamaica recognize that the working class in Jamaica are already locked into the tradition of union economism and trade unions which espouse radical politics like the Independent Trade Union Council only have a membership of 6,000 workers. Is there any evidence to support WPJ's "scientific faith" in the revolutionary potential of the Jamaican industrial proletariat? The leading cadres in the WPJ are not from that strata of the working class but from the same "white collar strata" that have for years enjoyed the material and cultural benefits of society. The error that WPJ makes is that the Party begins with a Marxist premise that is adhered to regardless of the practice or the evidence to the contrary.

This to me seems to be a violation of a cardinal principle of scientific inquiry and is more akin to metaphysics. When one studies the political conduct of the working class in Jamaica there is virtually no evidence to support the thesis that non-industrial workers because of their position in the division of labour fail to develop "proletarian traits". Cecil Nelson and the Worker's Party of Jamaica define working class in much too mechanical and rigid a manner. As a society industrializes the division of labour becomes increasingly complex, and the type of politics that is manifested by wage workers will be determined not simply by their occupational position but by the core institutions that help to shape how they see the world and of course, the objective conditions. We see where the latter has deteriorated and it has given rise to labour militancy but because core institutions like the trade unions are locked into economism, workers are not out in front demanding revolution, but are demanding wage increases.

WPJ do not take into consideration the special nature of a small island economy:

It is the materialist approach to economics and politics that protects us from this petty bourgeois' hot air, that enables us to steer a clear proletarian course in a country which has hardly any heavy industry, which has a relatively undeveloped proletariat existing in a sea of petty-bourgeois economy, whose ideological influence constantly threatens to swamp the seeds of proletarian organization and consciousness. 58

WPJ analysis of the Jamaican contemporary politics is that the working class is numerically small and influentially (in a revolutionary sense) insignificant. The Party thus resists the more adventurous rhetoric typical

of Maoists and Trotskyites. Yet the use of heavy industry is thrown in indiscriminately without seriously taking into consideration as to whether a small island economy can ever develop a viable heavy industrial sector. How is the nature of the workforce affected in an island that depends on obtaining significant sums of foreign exchange from a service oriented tourist sector? But what do the WPJ mean when they use the term 'petty-bourgeoisie'? Translated literally, the term means small businessman although Jamaican Marxist tend to use the term in a very vulgar, elastic way. The Jamaica labour force has an extraordinary large category designated Self-Employed and Independent Occupations which working from the 1975 base figure amounts to 249,000 people. This figure includes not only small independent businessmen, but a large group of 'higglers' who must hustle to survive. Survival would entail selling peanuts, candy, juice, coconuts, cane-juice, and million other miscellaneous items. Based on the "constructionist" Marxist approach WPJ reject this class of "petty bourgeoisie" as having no revolutionary potential. The mammoth size of the petty-bourgeoisie gives us some insight into the precarious existence that is the lot of most of the working class and the inability of the economy to provide meaningful jobs. One must be wary not to be captured by the rigidity of categories. Given the nature of the Jamaican economy, there is constant movement from industrial proletariat to unemployed, to self-employed. That is a fact that is often omitted from official statistics but unquestionably critical to how the Jamaican worker views the world. What is even more useful than a mechanical definition of working class would be an assessment of working class culture and to see how that culture has changed in recent years and to discern whether the culture differs from strata to strata.

Working class culture differs quite distinctly from that of the middle class. The middle class always adhered piously to the creed of "respectability". They valued monogamous relationships that were consecrated in church and children born out of wedlock were perceived as a cultural anathema. The working class never adhered to sexual piety and marital unions were customarily delayed until couples had lived together for a protracted period. The fact that marital unions were not ceremonially consecrated was not an indication they were not stable. The literature on the family in the Caribbean furnishes some evidence for us to assert cautiously that common-law unions are stable in integrated peasant communities.⁵⁹ Common-law unions tend to become more unstable in the unintegrated highly individualistic plantation environment. Within the urban environment, common-law unions would be expected to be adversely affected by the stress and strain of industrial life. The precarious economic position of the urban working class would be an additional factor for undermining the traditional common-law stability. Although Erna Brodber's empirical research on the Abandonment of Children in Jamaica is dated (published in 1974 but the data was collected between October 1968 and January 1970) it reveals a trend that the abandonment of children is far more prevalent in the urban complex of Kingston and St. Andrew. This in a society that has traditionally nurtured an enormous love for children. "Where lonely old people in England take in dogs or cats", remarks a West Indian, "lonely old people in Jamaica take in children".⁶⁰ In the traditional Jamaican household, it was customary to have three generations living together and there would always be a grandmother or grand-aunt to take care of children. Though multi-genera-

tional households will persist in the early stages of industrialization, in the later stages multi-generational households will become less prevalent. The large scale migration of working class people to Great Britain in the 1950s did have a destabilizing effect on the family unit. "From the whole British Caribbean during the 1950s only one emigrant in twenty was a child, and by 1960, 250,000 children had one or both parents in Britain".⁶¹

External migration not only disrupts the family but it has become an indelible part of working class consciousness. To improve one's position in life, one seeks to escape from Jamaica and "go a foreign" where living conditions are presumed to be superior.

This transcontinental linkage has also triggered an enormous craving for goods made abroad. Madeline Kerr mentioned that almost everyone she met in the countryside had some relative living abroad or who had worked in a foreign country. Jamaicans living abroad are primarily concentrated in New York and London. The superior living conditions of the Jamaican working class domiciled in metropolitan regions helps to preserve what WPJ would call the prevailing petty bourgeois mentality. This does not mean that the workers of Jamaica lack a militant tradition of unionism. It is the militancy of trade unions that has helped to breakdown the subservient working class deference that formerly prevailed in traditional Jamaica. Once this class deference is shattered, the conflict between employer and employed becomes even more antagonistic. This type of exacerbated class relations has a dysfunctional impact on the society and may very well impede

economic growth but does not ineluctably lead to a revolutionary situation.

Working class culture is rooted in the materialism of industrial society. Material consciousness does not necessarily mean, as WPJ presumes, a commitment to a revolutionary change of bourgeois society. The crass materialism of the Jamaican middle class also permeates down into the working class. The preoccupation with material acquisition is commensurate with the tradition of trade union economism. Workers develop a degree of class consciousness, become aware of the antagonistic relationship between labour and capital but that antagonism is acted out in terms of increase wages and the search for employment security on a plant by plant basis. The reformist trade union institutions that influence the lives of the workers nonetheless remain loyal to the existing bourgeois system.

Anthropologists like Sidney Mintz theorize that Caribbean life is characterized by pronounced individualization and in comparing the region with Europe argues:

Whereas Europe and the United States have been able to develop a heavily individualistic emphasis in social relations, they have done so from the vantage-point of long established institutional forms of group integration. It is perhaps of some interest, then, that those aspects of modern western society regarded as most depersonalizing and anti-human" - the view of persons as things and as numbers interchangeable, expendable, and faceless - have a very lengthy history in the Caribbean area, and developed there in a context of very imperfect transfer of European social institutions. ⁶³

Mintz wrote this in 1966 and was specifically referring to rural life in the Caribbean which he viewed as not typically peasant life but seeing plantation society as an integral part of modern society. Mintz and Wolf,

among others who have done field research in the Caribbean, harp on the theme of Caribbean individualization. But Mintz's blatant ethnocentrism is quite obvious. What does he mean when he speaks of "the imperfect transfers of European social institutions"? When are transferring of institutions ever perfect and aren't institutions to adapt to their specific locale? When Mintz writes of the heavily individualistic emphasis in social relations but lack of group integration that prevails in the Caribbean, I would like to state categorically that that has not been my experience in the Caribbean and in particular Jamaica. There is a tendency to place too much emphasis on formal institutions. It would be absurd to argue in the case of Jamaica that there exist an absence of institutional nexus. The church, the trade unions, the political parties, etc. do form an institutional nexus. In an industrial society, despite the abundance of institutions that promote group interest, there does develop a strong sense of individualization. In an underdeveloped economy like Jamaica, workers are preoccupied with the perils of the market place and treasure the job security that a strong union movement provides. The trade union movement in Jamaica links the mass of workers to the established political parties. There has developed a tradition of working class militancy which is reflected in the antagonistic relationship that exist between labour and capital. But this dialectical relationship takes place within an institutional matrix that is non-revolutionary and where the notion of political loyalty is already highly entrenched. Martin Lipset has stated:

A working class which has developed an early ... loyalty to democratic political and trade-union movements which have successfully fought for social and economic rights will not easily change its allegiance. ⁶⁴

This is certainly the case in Jamaica where the modernization of the economy was concomitant with the establishment of political parties and trade union organization. Nevertheless, one must keep in mind the distinction that Ralf Dahrendorf makes in differentiating the political state from industrial production.⁶⁵ There is no question that inter-relationships exist but the specific form the relationship takes is a matter of empirical research. In European and American society, both Dahrendorf and Lipset explain the non-revolutionary nature of the working class on the notion that developed industrialized societies have successfully institutionalized upward mobility and this class fluidity prevents the emergence of two antagonistic blocs bent on the suppression or liquidation of each other. Instead we have the decomposition of labour and capital characterized as a stratified labour force competing for differentiated rewards and not confronting the system as clearly dichotomized interest groups. They argue that this has led to the stability of the capitalist political system and the decline of revolutionary fervor. Recent events in Europe make this thesis quite problematic and quite unconvincing.

What about the case of Jamaica? How apt is this thesis by Dahrendorf and Lipset vis-a-vis the situation in Jamaica? What we find in Jamaica are the necessary structures for social order. There is intact a competitive two party system and two blanket trade unions committed to economism and the democratic process. But the stability of the 1950s and early 1960s has proven to be ephemeral. At the present stage of economic development, the extractive and distributive capabilities of the Jamaican economy are not comparable to the developed world. The working class in Jamaica but for an exceptional stratum do not enjoy a standard of living that would make

them die-hard defenders of the status quo. Upward mobility in Jamaican society is so infinitesimal that the working class is not under any grand illusions that if they work hard they will eventually accumulate wealth. The deterioration of the economy that has occurred from 1973 would be sufficient to shatter these illusory dreams if in fact they did exist.

Dahrendorf argues that social analysis should not be static and should try to incorporate the changing nature of society.

Social structures, however carry within them the seed of other structures that lie beyond their (fictitious) borderlines. They reach, so to speak, beyond themselves; at any given point of time they either are no longer or not yet what they appear to be. Process and change are their very nature and indicate therefore superordinate categories of analysis. Although in biology the analysis of the evolutionary process can rest on structural analysis. Such analysis must, in sociology, be subordinate to the analysis of process of change of structural patterns. ⁶⁶

A small economy can never insulate itself from the larger world economy. The Jamaican economy has been severely battered by the increase in oil prices and the inflation imported from metropolitan countries. This development has forced the Jamaican worker to demand wage increases in order to maintain his accustomed standard of living. These demands further exacerbate the inflationary spiral and pushes the economy further into a state of disequilibrium. One must take into consideration the possibility that with the deterioration of the Jamaican economy, workers could become disillusioned with the established political and economic system thus becoming more receptive to an alternative ideology. Nevertheless, the Jamaican working class has as yet manifested no deviation from the line of economism even though the possibility of preserving the old order certainly does not look good.

The Lumpen-Proletariat

Eric Wolf points out that it is absurd to presume there is one culture per society or one sub-culture per social segment. A human being is not a mechanical object and does make choices. One has to take into consideration what Anthony Wallace calls the personality system - the element of human manoeuvrability in which individuals adhere to different cultural forms. In this regard Eric Wolf states:

I believe that it is possible for a human group to carry more than one culture, to diversify its approach to life, to widen its field of manoeuvre through a process of generalization to specialize, to restrict itself to one set of cultural forms, and to eschew all possible alternatives. ⁶⁷

This is in fact the case amongst Jamaica's lumpen-proletariat where we find basically more than one form of culture (1) a sub-culture of violence (2) the Rastafarian Brethren. Although we make this distinction between the two sub-cultural forms, there is movement between the two cultural forms and the working class. Given the precarious state of the Jamaican working class, a loss of a job may force a particular worker to join the ranks of the unemployed. During this period of joblessness, the individual may opt for the Rastafarian life style or choose to take up the gun in order to ensure his survival. If the opportunity arises, the individual may seize the time and return to the ranks of the working class. So there is constant movement between the working class and lumpen-proletariat. There is not much movement between unskilled working class and the white collar middle class. To move into the ranks of the middle class becomes more difficult since one of the criteria for middle class status entails a degree of educational accomplishment and that is not something that is easily attained.

T A B L E 4.4

Unemployed Labour Force in Jamaica

	Total				
	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>1976</u>	<u>1977</u>
	179,600	166,500	184,300	216,400	218,700
	<u>Age Group</u>				
14-24	90,900	82,000	92,100	123,200	118,900
25-34	34,700	31,500	38,500	45,400	43,500
35-44	27,300	25,100	22,000	25,600	25,000
45-54	14,600	15,400	17,800	17,700	16,400
55-64	8,800	8,900	9,700	7,700	9,400
65 and over	3,300	3,600	4,200	6,900	5,500
	<u>Male</u>				
Total	59,900	56,000	56,600	71,800	71,900
14-24	35,500	32,900	32,500	41,500	44,400
25-34	9,300	7,900	10,800	12,800	11,800
35-44	6,700	6,300	5,200	6,800	6,400
45-54	3,700	3,900	4,110	5,100	3,700
55-64	3,000	3,000	2,500	2,000	2,600
65 and over	1,700	2,000	1,600	3,600	3,000
	<u>Female</u>				
Total	119,700	110,500	127,700	144,600	146,800
14-24	55,400	49,100	59,600	71,600	74,500
25-34	25,400	23,600	27,800	32,600	31,700

35-44	20,600	18,800	16,800	18,800	18,600
45-54	10,900	11,500	13,700	12,600	12,700
55-64	5,800	5,900	7,200	5,700	6,800
65 and over	1,600	1,600	2,600	3,300	2,500

Source: Dept. of Statistics. The Labour Force in Jamaica 1977

We can have an idea of the size of the lumpen-proletariat from Table IV.4.

In 1973 the tally of the unemployed mounted to 179,600 (22.4%) in 1974-184,300 (20.5%) in 1975 - 184,300 (21.2%) in 1976 - 216,400 (24.2%) and in 1977 - 218,700 (23.8). It is obvious from these figures that the unemployed in Jamaica are not marginal but constitute a mass force. In recent years, the amount of workers as well as the percentage of the labour force who are classified as unemployed have been increasing.

In which parishes are the unemployed concentrated? The highest rate of unemployed is found not in Kingston or St. Andrew, but in Trelawny, Portland and St. James. ⁶⁸ In 1975 the unemployment rate in Kingston was estimated at 24.3% and in St. Andrew, it was 21.9%. The position of the urban unemployed is quite different from the rural unemployed. The level of tempers-uousness in the urban areas far exceeds that of the countryside. The point that must be made here that it is not the rate of unemployment that will necessarily lead to the development of lumpen characteristics, but the cultural ethos of the urban environment which is remarkably different. The influence of the church especially for the generation born in the ghettos has diminished considerably. There is no land to eke out an existence and the man

in the urban environment is rooted more in a secular tradition and develops all the modern cravings for material acquisition and when that is being denied by the inability of the society to provide all workers with certain basic necessities of life, the specific adaptation that takes place is often one that undermines the social order and forces the state to become increasingly repressive.

Another point of interest regarding the unemployed is that the majority of those who cannot find work are females yet the problem of political and social violence is for all intents and purposes a problem of the masculine gender. This would indicate that there exist not only human manoeuvrability but certain cultural forms often become distinctly dominated by a particular gender.

We get some idea of the fluidity of the unemployed when we examine the figures more closely. In 1977 of the 218,700 classified as unemployed, 131,600 were classified as non-seekers of jobs and 87,100 were still hopeful and looking for work. Only 1,900 had received no formal education and the vast majority 165,600 had received only a primary education and 48,400 had been to schools beyond the primary level. 63,700 of the unemployed had never worked while 155,000 had sometime or the other held a previous job. Of the 137,600 non-seekers of unemployment, 91,900 had held a previous job. When the factor of age is taken into consideration, unemployment as the table reveals affects the young more severely. In the age category 14-19, 58.4% of young people were unemployed in 1977, in the category 20-24, 36.3% were unemployed.⁶⁹

How do the unemployed survive? In 1977 the unemployed listed the following as means of support - Parent or Guardian 79,400, Spouse or Common-law -Partner 61,600. Other Relative 30,800, Friends 17,100, Personal Savings 20,300, Other 5,000. Not Stated 4,500.⁷⁰

Stone develops an undynamic analysis of the lumpen-proletariat that is much too rigid, much too stereotypic.

The lumpen-proletariat in Kingston should not be confused with either the lower class or the unemployed. It represents that sector of the unemployed which is no longer available for employment even where such employment opportunities arise. Because it is permanently detached from the labour market, it survives mainly through petty and organized crime, gambling, prostitution and trade in illegal commodities such as ganja (marijuana). This detachment is not merely a consequence of an unwillingness to work, but grows out of high levels of unemployment within the power sections of the city, which produce over time able-bodied men and women who become unemployable because of long periods of unemployment.⁷¹

Stone estimates that 10 percent of the population of Kingston and St. Andrew or roughly one-third of the unemployed can be classified as constituting the lumpen-proletariat. But one must be careful not to presume that because at a particular moment an individual functions as a lumpen that he remains in that class permanently. There is constant movement from the ranks of the lumpen-proletariat to working class. The lumpen community in some instances is spatially isolated from working class neighbourhoods, for example in the case of squatter settlements. A number of these squatter settlements emerged in the early years of the modernization period. Kuper's research on squatter settlements indicate that most squatters are urban born.⁷² But often one finds lumpen living in the same communities as poor working class.

Carl Stone's analysis of lumpen culture seems heavily influenced by the American literature that depicts the culture of poverty as being pathological. According to Stone, lumpen behaviour is characterized by "very low deferment of gratification, unstable and disorganized family patterns, an obsession with sex, and interpersonal violence as sources of individual prestige and a high level of individualism in political behaviour".⁷³ Stone who is noted for his empiricism is making these claims from an impressionistic vantage point. Although studies in the Jamaican family have concentrated mostly on the peasant population and not much research has been done on the urban family, research on the former indicates quite clearly that common-law marriages were quite stable. Whether urbanization has had a disintegrating effect on the family in Jamaica, we simply do not know as the research has not been done.

In his study of squatter settlements, Kuper paints a different picture. He discovered that many of the residents were successful fishermen, carpenters, blacksmiths, potters, and traders in the underworld of ganja. Many of the female squatters were higglers, washerwomen, bar-maids, and some were prostitutes.⁷⁴ What Kuper discerns to be distinctive about these people is that they are in a position to decide where and when they interdict with the economic system. They enjoy an autonomy to the extent that they are not systematically involved in a subordinate position to capital.

Kuper concedes that there exist gangs amongst the lumpen who commit crimes but he argues the crimes are committed elsewhere and intra-community violence was indeed a rarity.⁷⁵ These people were not a part of conventional society and had developed their own cultural forms that gave these communities

internal coherence. But Adam Kuper declares that:

... despite the ideology of rejection and retreat, Rastafarianism, which is particularly popular among younger men, for whom it is an idiom for the assertion of defiance and independence vis-a-vis the society at large, the values of the broader society are to a surprising degree accepted and acted upon. ⁷⁶

Since the lumpen-proletariat constitute a sub-culture it is not surprising that they accept some of the values of the larger society but Kuper in an attempt to fit his model of non-antagonistic class relationships, overstates his case. A sub-culture implies that there exist certain patterns of behaviour that are distinct from the dominant culture. In recent years, the lumpen sub-culture has developed to the point that it could be classified as a counterculture. A political and social system can always accommodate sub-cultures but a counterculture poses a serious threat to established society.

Marvin Wolfgang refers to two types of sub-cultural values (1) tolerant concordant values (2) untolerated discordant values. Both the sub-culture of the working class and lumpen-proletariat could be classified as discordant values. The struggle of the working class to improve its living conditions is apparent with the frequency of work stoppages. That type of discord can be accommodated by the political system and even though it is disruptive, it is not threatening to the system per se providing the labour movement adheres to the ideology of democratic capitalism. The challenge that the lumpen pose is of a different nature and can only be contained by expanding the coercive machinery of the state. We are arguing that there are basically two cultural forms that persist within the lumpen-proletariat, the 'badness' syndrome and the Rastafarian Brethren.

What do we mean by the 'badness' syndrome or the culture of badness? We are suggesting that there does exist a sub-culture of violence that is adhered to by some lumpen-proletariat elements that is an essential feature of peer socialization and in turn confronts the society as organized groups. This is a particular adaptation that crystallized in the middle of the 1960s largely because of the inability of the economy to provide a particular mass of workers with the necessities of life at a time when the dominant culture had become increasingly permeated with materialistic values. My research contradicts Kuper's findings that intra-community violence is rare. Intra-community conflict and violence are present at all times although easier to contain than inter-community violence. Adherents of this cultural form or faith develop a potent sense of community identity. Their identity takes the form of the particular community in which they live, be it Brown's Town, Rae Town, Rollington Town, Rockfort, Concrete Jungle, etc. This provincial identity takes on the form tantamount to that of a tribe. It becomes the duty of that "brethren" to fight and protect other members of the community from alien "tribes". Providing the communities are not highly politicized, adults seldom take part in these kinds of community warfare. The antagonistic relationship is generally perpetuated by young lumpen elements who find excitement and some *raison d'etre* in these community or gang feuds. Violence is usually precipitated by things of a trivial nature.

Adherents of the sub-culture of violence are engaged in a war on two fronts, (1) a fratricidal warfare among themselves and (2) a war against the larger society. The larger society is not perceived as just. This cultural

form completely rejects the legitimacy of the social order. Just as how nation states refuse to recognize other states in this internal class dialectic, individuals based on their deprived position in the division of labour and the cultural form they have assumed, refuse to recognize the legitimacy of the state. They do not prescribe to the mores or norms of established society and are willing to engage in all forms of skullduggery.

Within the sub-culture of violence there is an irreverence for life. Life is not perceived as something of value. To plunder, to rape, or to kill is taken in stride. Adherents to the sub-culture of violence treat the privileged in the society in the same contemptuous manner that the dispossessed are treated. Their relationship to the larger society is a predator relationship. They constitute a mass of vultures that pick at the "living carcass of bourgeois society". They connote terror in the minds of the affluent elite who become terrified at the existing state of insecurity and in search of security of person demand stringent suppression of crime and expansion of the coercive machinery of the state. But adherents of the sub-culture of violence are as elusive as political guerrillas. They decide when to commit transgressions and the size of the lumpen proletariat population and the state of the economy makes the task of the police similar to that of Sisyphus.

In such an environment, the skills that are valued differ markedly from those that are heralded by the established society. One must muster the art of pugilistic prowess although with the introduction of the gun which is an equalizer, this attribute becomes dispensable. What is indispensable is the

willingness to risk danger. Those who amass a record of confronting danger and emerge unscathed, receive the acclaim and esteem of those who adhere to the sub-culture of violence. The leader of a particular gang is usually someone who has a track record of risking danger and serves as a model figure for the initiated to imitate.

The violent gangs are willing to confront the police but their political objectives are not clearly formulated. By their deeds, it is obvious that they manifest the same fascination for material acquisition as the middle class or working class. The difference is that they are not willing to abide by the sanctioned rules of the game. Their life style places them in constant conflict with the police. The police represent the coercive arm of the state and it would not be an exaggeration to say that there exist a state of war between the police and the lumpen purveyors of violence. The enshrined custom of this sub-culture is not to cooperate with the police. One does not volunteer information of any kind to the representatives of the "unrecognized state". People of this cultural form providing they are non-politicized, take no part in the electoral process. The political process is perceived as fun and games, an activity that does not change their deplorable material existence. Not everyone who experiences these depraved conditions subscribe to the sub-culture of violence. It is merely one particular cultural adaptation which has become intriguing to the children of the ghetto. Once instituted it takes on a life of its own and even if objective conditions change, it will not necessarily mean that the sub-culture of violence would disappear over-night. Nevertheless, this social cancer can be more effectively arrested in a system that maintains full employment.

The rise of a sub-culture of violence reflects the inability of the economy to absorb the chronic surplus labour problem and the willingness of lumpen-youths to use illegal measures in order to acquire the necessities and the luxuries of the secular age. Lumpen-elements are no longer meek and mild. Established institutions are no longer perceived as sacrosanct. They have shown that they do not accept the existing division of labour which systematically excludes them. Lumpen-youths have no compunctions about using violence to acquire things even if it means fighting the police. They reflect the secularization of Jamaicna culture. In looking at rural culture, we argued that religion was a factor in the willingness of the peasant to accept his position in the social hierarchy. Lumpen youths do not exhibit this penchant for a religion that rewards the believer in the after life. He demands his rewards now and is willing to take the necessary risks to obtain them. The propensity for metaphysics remains but it has taken on new forms. To gain futher insight as to how organized religion has diminished in importance, let us examine the impact of the Rastafarian Movement.

The Rastafarian Movement

The Rastafarian Movement represents the persistence of religion in the cultural life of the Jamaican people but in a new form. Marcus Garvey is considered as the precursor of the Rastafarian Movement. Garvey was convicted in 1925 for mail fraud in the United States and sent to a federal prison in Atlanta. Garvey was pardoned in 1927 and immediately deported to the island of Jamaica and was banished from re-entering the United States.

The Immigration and Naturalization Service declared Garvey to be an undesirable alien. During his brief sojourn in the United States, Garvey built a mass movement that transcended state boundaries. He was instrumental in raising the issue of self-determination for all African people. Garvey viewed his organization as representing the legitimate interest of black people and was tantamount to that of a government in exile. In fact he sought recognition of his organization from the League of Nations, but this obviously was denied.

What is crucial to our purposes is that Garvey defined the position of black people in the New World as condemned to a state of powerlessness which would not change until Africa was liberated from European colonialism. A free united Africa would take its place among the constellation of world powers and be able to protect the rights of Africans domiciled in the diaspora. Garvey was also a strong advocate of repatriation. He felt that black people in the western hemisphere had acquired scientific know-how that could be used to accelerate economic development in Africa. Thus repatriation, the return to the motherhood was an essential plank in Garvey's appeal to people of African descent.

The Garvey Movement had been severely jolted by his arrest and conviction. Isolated from his mass base in the United States, the Movement declined and was compounded by factionalism and financial woes. While in Jamaica, Garvey tried a new organizational thrust. He formed a political party, People's Political Party, in 1929 and contested elections in Jamaica.⁷⁹

At this time, the franchise in Jamaica was limited to property owners and the mass of the population were excluded from exercising the right to vote. Garvey's success in electoral politics was quite limited. He won a seat as a Councillor in the Kingston and St. Andrew Corporation Parish Council Elections. But the political system at the time was dominated by the Jamaican plantocracy and there was little that Garvey could accomplish. Disillusioned, Garvey left Jamaica for Britain in 1935 in an attempt to revive the Universal Negro Improvement Association paradoxically in the heartland of the British Empire.

The Garvey Movement had planted not only the seed of anti-colonialism but the seed of black nationalism had also taken root. It has become quite an enormous task to differentiate what Garvey said factually or fictionally in contemporary Jamaica. It is repeated so persistently in Jamaica that one of the many 'prophetic' utterances of Garvey is that he prognosticated that a king would be crowned in Africa who would liberate black people from the oppressed conditions that they were forced to endure in the New World.

In 1930, Ras Tafari, "the great grandson of King Saheka Selassie of Shoa, was crowned Negus of Ethiopia".⁸⁰ Ras Tafari renamed himself Haile Selassie, which meant the Might of the Trinity. The Daily Gleaner covered the coronation of the Ethiopian King on its front pages. One must remember that in 1930, only two African countries were independent, Liberia and Ethiopia. The latter had a noble and splendid past that a colonized black man seeking some identity other than that of Europe could hold aloft and denounce the preposterous notion that civilization has its origins in Europe.

Four Garveyites, Leonard Howell, Joseph Hibbert, Archibald Dunkley, and Robert Hinds were struck by the coronation and interpreted the event as the fulfilment of biblical prophecy.⁸¹ A number of biblical references were used to justify the notion that Ras Tafari or Haile Selassie was the returned Messiah. There is Revelation, Chapter 19, verse 16, in Daniel, Chapter 7 verse 9, and perhaps the most telling is Revelation Chapter 5, verse 2-5.

And I saw a strong angel proclaiming with a loud voice. Who is worthy to open the book and to loose the seals thereof? And no man in heaven, nor in earth...was able to open the book, neither to look thereon ... And one of the elders saith unto me, Weep not: behold the Lion of the tribe of Judah the Root of David, hath prevailed to open the book, and to loose the seven seals thereof.

The Rastafarian Movement originated in the deprived communities of Kingston. Howell later on tried to establish a base in the eastern parish of St. Thomas. Barrett reported that during these years Leonard Howell had developed six basic principles (1) hatred for the white race (2) the complete superiority of the black race (3) revenge on whites for their wickedness (4) the negation, persecution and humiliation of the government and legal bodies of Jamaica (5) preparation to go back to Africa and (6) acknowledging Haile Selassie as the Return Messiah.⁸³

Howell had the greatest impact during this early period. He was arrested in January 1934 for sedition. The position of this founder of the Movement was that it made more sense for Jamaicans of African descent to pay homage to an Ethiopian Emperor rather than the Queen or King of England.

Howell was sent to prison for two years. In another incident Archibald Dunkley was charged with disorderly conduct while holding a meeting between Bond Street and Spanish Town Road in Western Kingston on September 11, 1934. Dunkley was further arrested on 20th February, 1935 and confined to Bellevue Hospital for the insane. He remained confined for 5 months and 21 days.⁸⁴ From this we can deduce that in the formative period, the Rastafarian Movement was harassed by the state and perceived as a potential threat to the imperial order.

After his release from prison, Howell created a Rastafarian commune at Pinnacle, which is close to Sligoville. It is estimated that about 1,600 followers resided at Pinnacle.⁸⁵ Howell seemed to have organized the Rastafarian settlement along authoritarian lines and was referred to as Gangunga Maraj or Ging. The settlers planted agricultural crops and grew ganja as the primary cash crop.

The police raided Pinnacle in 1941 and arrested 70 Rastafarians and 28 were eventually sent to prison. Howell who had escaped the initial police dragnet was subsequently apprehended on July 25, 1941. Once again Howell was sentenced to two years in prison. After his release from prison the second time, Howell returned to Pinnacle and resumed his position as the gong of the commune. He set up a security system with guard dogs and 'Niyabingi' warriors keeping watch. This settlement survived until 1954 when the police attacked and completely destroyed the estate. Howell along with 163 brethren were apprehended but Howell was eventually exonerated in the Appeals court.⁸⁶ Howell was eventually confined to a mental institution in the 1960s.

With Pinnacle disbanded, most of the followers of Howell went to live in the squatter communities of western Kingston. George Simpson who did the first serious analysis of the Rastafarian Movement estimated that in 1953 there were twelve groups of Ras Tafari Brethren meeting in Kingston with membership ranging between twenty and one hundred and fifty.⁸⁷

Members came into conflict with the state primarily over the possession of ganja which was regarded by the brethren as heightening religious consciousness.

Although the six principles stated by Leonard Barrett gives the impression that the Rastafarians were committed to militant if not violent action, the image of the 1950s was that of a devout, righteous man who had rediscovered his humanity and was clear regarding his position in the society. Rastafarians greeted each other and non-believers with the words "Peace and Love". At this time the Rastafarian did not constitute a mass force in the society. They were a small, isolated sect who were viewed as a nuisance but not constituting a serious threat to social order. The Rastafarian was adamant about his anti-colonialist position. Colonialism was perceived as a wicked and evil system. Black man was living in a state of captivity and European domination could not be circumvented without black people returning to Ethiopia (Africa). Jamaica was designated to be a contemporary Babylon and Rastafarians as much as was feasible withdrew their participation from the official society. The state was not seen as being a legitimate institution but one used to oppress and exploit black people. Therefore the Rastafarian took no part in electoral politics and providing it was possible, refused to sell his labour to capital. Many tried to survive by selling ganja, coal, juices, etc. or worked as artisans. The ideal was not to work for someone who would be in a position to exploit one's labour. This was not a Marxist

position but one held by people who were historically aware of how black labour had been mis-used by colonial society. In any case, many members of the Movement would have found it impossible to obtain work if they had sought employment. The growing of one's locks and beard was seen as an anti-social act which was rewarded with further ostracism.

Rastafarian Brethren would meet in small groups where they would simply 'hang out' and smoke 'weed' together. A site of this kind was called a 'camp' and the key figure in the camp would be the 'cutter' - the individual who sold the ganja. This congregating would take place primarily at nights and brethren would sing songs reflecting the pathos of the black condition accompanied to the beat of drums. There was no urgency or need for political activity because it was presumed that at the time appointed the Emperor would stretch forth his hands and reclaim the lost children of Israel. Much solace was found in the Old Testament and Rastafarians saw themselves as the true children of Israel. Africa was Zion and with repatriation the suffering of the black masses would be alleviated.

Throughout the period the Movement adhered to an acephalous structure. In this regard the authoritarianism of Howell was no longer typical of the Movement. There were influentials but there was no one individual who dominated the movement that he could be called the leader. Within the movement there were very strong anti-authority attitudes. The brethren were in search of a saviour not a master. Because there existed no organized structure no one had the right to dictate or impose his views of Ras Tafari on another.

In certain areas there did exist a consensus. Everyone believed that Haile Selassie was God, the Returned Messiah. There was no dissensus about the reverence for ganja and everyone was convinced that salvation could only come with repatriation. No one questioned the anti-colonial, anti-European nature of the Movement. The Rastafarian Movement redefined the black man and in its own peculiar way placed him on a special pedestal where blackness was exalted.

Rastafari can be interpreted as a variant of Christianity. For the Brethren, they presumed they had made a clean break with European Christianity and their interpretation of the Bible differed fundamentally from the colonizers who had used it in the past to keep black people in a state of class subservience. There was great suspicion of the King James Version of the Bible, but the Brethren felt that they had discovered the truth. Interestingly, a black nationalist movement that is definitely anti-colonial still clung to the scriptures. It was religion in a new form, but it illustrates the hold that metaphysics has on the mass of the population. The form that Christianity took under the Rastafarians contributed to the undermining of the social structure. It was a Movement that stressed the spiritual nature of man and rejected materialism. The preoccupation with material things was seen as vulgar. There was no great admiration for industrial society that presumably led to a polluted world. Rastafari is a search for the idyllic, a return to African communalism wherein man can establish and maintain a just social order devoid of maldistribution of wealth and exploitation of another man's labour. In other words a retreat from industrial society.

In 1955 word was received from the Ethiopian World Federation Inc. in New York that the Emperor of Ethiopia had set aside 500 acres of fertile and rich land for blacks living in the West who desired to return to the continent of Africa. This offer by Haile Selassie was interpreted by Rastafarian Brethren as further evidence that the Emperor of Ethiopia was indeed the Redeemer, the Return Messiah. In addition the offer boosted the credibility of the Movement at a time when migration was very much on the minds of Jamaicans with waves journeying to Britain in search of improved living conditions.⁸⁸ Around the mid-fifties, George Simpson observed that the Afro-Christian forms of worship, such as pocomania were in fact on the decline in the poor, dispossessed communities of western Kingston. Pocomania "has steadily lost ground before expanding American Protestant missions, especially the Church of God Movement financed originally from the United States"⁸⁹. The pocomania appeal was also giving way to the increasing influence of the Rastafarian credo. It was not just a religion, but a movement that articulated the grassroots sentiment of a colonized people living in an urban environment where vast numbers are excluded from gainful employment. It dealt with the question of race and class which was something with which the Revivalist movements were not concerned. Despite the Ethiopian content of Afro-Christian synthesis, it never dealt with the questions of slavery, race, class or industrial society. Rastafari gave the dispossessed a new sense of manhood, a new worldview that could be used to resist cultural and economic imperialism.

What is paradoxical about the Rastafarian Movement is that it rejected the metaphysical and superstitious nature of conventional Christianity.

It rejected the notion of resurrection and the idea that God was invisible. In that regard it was a Movement trying to confront reality. It rejected traditional metaphysics, but invented its own illusions. Rastafarians rejected the notion of death and presumed that one died only because one deviated from the path of righteousness. Despite the dependency on Selassie, man was seen as being at the centre of the universe. But because of the stress on repatriation, there was no serious attempt to change the social reality of which they were a part. As they were fond of saying, "The Lion of Judah will break every chain". And thus even though their concept of the society had changed drastically, the chains remained unbroken.

Rastafarians in Kingston held a convention in March 1958. The Brethren met in Back-O-Wall, a squatter settlement in Western Kingston and for the month of March played drums, smoked 'weed' and paid homage to Selassie. On March 24, 1958 approximately 300 Rastafarians hoisted flags in Victoria Park and declared that they had captured the city of Kingston. The Police mobilized their forces and forcefully evicted the Rastafarians from their symbolic capture of Victoria Park. ⁹⁰

The Henry Debacle

In 1959, Rev. Claudius Henry, a Jamaican who had been living in the United States and active in the Ethiopian World Federation Inc. became disaffected with that organization and returned to the island. He resumed active participation in the Ethiopian World Federation in Jamaica, but in April - May, 1959, Mr. Cecil Gordon published a letter in the Star announcing that the E.W.F. was not associated with Claudius Henry. The Reverend had

returned with objectives to mobilize a Movement around the issue of repatriation. He published a leaflet which declared:

Pioneering Israel's scattered Children of African Origin back home to Africa this year 1959, deadline date October 5th this new Government is God's Righteous Kingdom of Everlasting Peace on Earth, "Creations Second Birth". Holder of this Certificate is requested to visit the Headquarters at 78 Rosalie Avenue, off Waltham Park Road, August 1st 1959, for Our Emancipation Jubilee commencing 9 a.m. sharp. Please preserve this Certificate for removal. No passport will be necessary for those returning home to Africa. Bring this Certificate with you on August 1st, for "Identification". We are sincerely "The Seventh Emanuel's Brethren" gathering Israel's Scattered Children for removal, with our Leader, God's Appointed and Anointed Prophet, Rev. C.C. Henry, R.B. (Repairer of the Breach) ⁹¹

Claudius Henry was a representative of religious Ethiopianism and a firm advocate of repatriation. Nevertheless, he was not a Rastafarian as he did not recognize the divinity of the Emperor. In any case, the Repairer of the Breach attracted a number of militant Rastafarians who were eager to support anyone willing to confront the state on the question of repatriation. Terry Lacey's research reveals that Claudius Henry's African Reform Church had links with the First African Corps, a church located in Bronx, New York. The hierarchy of the First Africa Corps has assumed military titles and were committed to black liberation.⁹²

The Jamaican Security Forces perceived the Henry organization as constituting a threat to social order. On the appointed day, hundreds of faithful believers, including many who had sold their belongings gathered at 78 Rosalie Avenue awaiting the apocalyptic redemption that the Repairer of the Breach had promised. Henry explained that he was misunderstood and that October 5, 1959 was really the day that the Jamaican government would be forced

to explain how they would meet the demand for repatriation.⁹³ The security forces apprehended Henry on a minor charge for which he was fined £100 and ordered to keep the peace for one year.

The African Reform Church did not fall apart after the aborted repatriation apocalypse but the tone of the organization became more strident, more challenging to governmental authority. In April of 1960 the police raided the headquarters of the African Reform Church and discovered 2,500 electrical detonators, 1,300 detonators, a shotgun, a 32 calibre revolver, a number of machets, sharpened on both sides and placed in sheaths, cartridges and several sticks of dynamite.⁹⁴ Subsequently Claudius Henry was indicted for treason and was sentenced to six years in prison.

The son of Claudius Henry, Ronald Henry, concerned with the plight of his father journeyed to the island accompanied with other militants from the New York organization. It is apparent that Ronald Henry presumed that the colonial government of Jamaica did not enjoy mass support and there was sufficient disaffection to overthrow the government by force. Ronald Henry and his compatriots set up an army camp in Red Hills, St. Andrew and commenced training 'revolutionary' cadres in guerilla tactics. The topography of Jamaica is ideal for guerilla warfare. The majority of the population resides in the coastal areas. The interior of the country is mountainous and densely vegetated. The vegetation in the Cockpit country is nigh impenetrable. It is this topography that the Maroons used to harass the British in the seventeenth century until the British were forced to grant these 'runaway' Africans autonomy. Ronald Henry, it is apparent, intended to launch

a similar operation that would topple the Jamaican government, at the time dominated by Englishmen and in the process, free his father from incarceration. But his clandestine operation had been infiltrated by the Security Forces. He recruited his guerillas from his father's organization which had already been infiltrated by intelligence agents and informers of the Jamaica Constabulary Force.

When Ronald Henry discovered that the guerilla camp had been infiltrated, he executed three Rastafarians who were buried in shallow graves.⁹⁵ A contingent of 250 Jamaican policemen, and members of Britain's Royal Hampshire Regiment were engaged in training manoeuvres in the Red Hills. In keeping with the laws of the country, the British troops carried rifles but without ammunition. A patrol of unarmed British soldiers stumbled into a guerilla ambush and two were killed and two wounded.⁹⁶

The Norman Manley government mobilized the armed forces of the state and radio appeals were made to citizens not to cooperate with Henry and his band of guerillas and to give information to the police. Ronald Henry and four compatriots were subsequently apprehended and charged with murder. Henry was hanged shortly after he was found guilty of murder.

The historical significance of this incident is that even though the Rastafarians constituted an apolitical force, the government realized that the Movement could no longer be perceived as exotic or quaint, but the demands of the Brethren had to be taken seriously. Premier Norman Manley appointed three distinguished scholars from the University of the West Indies, Rex Nettleford, M.G. Smith and Roy Augier to do a study of the Rastafarians and

to submit recommendations to the government. The three scholars made the following recommendations to the Norman Manley government:

- 1) The government of Jamaica should send a mission to African countries to arrange for immigration of Jamaicans. Representatives of Ras Tafari Brethren should be included in the mission.
- 2) Preparations for the mission should be discussed immediately with representatives of the Ras Tafari brethren.
- 3) The general public should recognize that the great majority of Ras Tafari brethren are peaceful citizens, willing to do an honest day's work.
- 4) The police should complete their security enquiries rapidly, and cease to persecute peaceful Ras Tafari brethren.
- 5) The building of low-rent houses should be accelerated, and provision made for self-help cooperative building.
- 6) Government should acquire the principal areas where squatting is now taking place, and arrange for water, light, sewerage disposal and collection of rubbish.
- 7) Civic centres should be built with facilities for technical classes, youth clubs, child clinics, etc. The churches and the U.C.W.I. should collaborate.
- 8) The Ethiopian Orthodox Coptic Church should be invited to establish a branch in West Kingston.
- 9) Ras Tafari brethren should be assisted to establish cooperative workshops.
- 10) Press and radio facilities should be accorded to leading members of the Movement. ⁹⁷

In addition, Smith, Nettleford and Augier concluded that the Rastafarian Movement was not seditious and by discriminating against the Rastafarians for wearing the dreadlock hairstyle only exacerbated the relations between cult

members and conventional Jamaica. They perceived a particular segment of the Brethren of advocating violence, but tempered that accusation with the notion that the majority of Rastafarians were peace loving and did not support Henry's violent attempt at overthrowing the colonial government.⁹⁸

The Norman Manley government sent a mission to Africa on 4th April, 1961. Including in the delegation were Dr. L.G. Leslie, Advisor; Mr. Vic Reid, Co-Advisor and noted Jamaican author, Hon E.H. Lake from Antigua and Minister of Social Welfare in the West Indies Federal government, Dr. B.M. Douglas and M.Z. Munroe-Scarlet of the Afro-West Indian Welfare Leagues, Mr. W. Blackwood of the United Negro Improvement Association, Mr. Cecil Gordon of the Ethiopian World Federation, Inc. and three Rastafarians, Mr. Douglas Mack, Mr. Philmore Alvaranga and Mr. Mortimo Planner.

The task of the delegation was to explore the possibilities for migration to Africa. The delegation spent one week in Ethiopia, two weeks in Nigeria, one week in Ghana, six days in Liberia, one week in Sierra Leone, and returned to Jamaica on the 2nd June, 1961. All the countries visited with the exception of Sierra Leone were receptive to the idea of repatriation but stressed the need for skilled migrants. There was the realization that the influx of migrants with an alien culture would present a problem of cultural assimilation and that the matter had to be handled delicately with an advance mission preceding a massive influx. The Rastafarian filed a minority report which reflected the particular religious orientation of the Movement. The delegation visited Sheshamani, the area of land given to Africans living in the West desirous of repatriating to Ethiopia. At the time, James and Helen Piper,

originally from the Caribbean island of Montserrat and members of the Ethiopian World Federation, Inc. were living on Sheshamani. The Pipers had become Ethiopian citizens and operated a corn mill which ground corn for farmers in the neighbourhood for a fee.¹⁰⁰

In the minority report, the Rastafarians placed much religious symbolism in their visit to Ethiopia. For the Rastafarians, it was not a matter of government to government negotiations that had brought about the mission but the fulfillment of biblical prophecy.

Our meeting with H.I.M. Emperor Haile Selassie I is likened spiritually to the visit of the three wise men who journeyed from the West to the East to visit the Baby Jesus bringing with them gold, frankincense and myrrh to offer H.I.M...Only the Rases presented gifts to H.I.M. and the rest of the mission left us in the palace, fulfilling the parable of the ten virgins - five had oil in their lamps and five had none.¹⁰¹

After the pioneer mission to Africa, there were to be additional exploratory talks, but the Norman Manley government lost the 1962 independence elections and the new Prime Minister, Alexander Bustamante did not view repatriation to Africa as a priority item of his administration and simply abandoned the preliminary efforts. In 1962, Great Britain enacted the Commonwealth Immigration Act which made it difficult for members of the British Commonwealth to enter the heartland of the Empire. This meant that Britain would no longer absorb Jamaica's surplus labour. The mission to Africa had bestowed on the Rastafarian Brethren a degree of respectability. The teachings of the Brethren appeared realizable rather than farfetched. Since there were no ready outlets for unemployed youths, the Movement benefited immensely from the internal migration and the inability of the economy to absorb the increasing young population.

In the 1960s, Third World peoples were rapidly taking their place among the nations of the world. Nationalism became a potent force throughout the colonized world. Although the PNP were a nationalist party, it never incorporated racial nationalism. The Rastafarian creed filled that void and appealed especially to the poor and dispossessed in the urban enclaves of Kingston and St. Andrew. It created a religious creed of hope to those who were forced to confront the harsh realities of urban existence not by confronting the state, but by presuming that blissfulness would be obtained once the exile African returned to Ethiopia. Such a vision of the future was consonant with the religious cultural tradition of Jamaica and with a strong tendency long since rooted in the society to seek salvation through migration.

In the middle of the 1960s there were a number of Rastafarian groups that functioned as organizational units although a majority of the Brethren remained outside of these structured organizations. Among them were (1) The Human Rights Brethren of Barbican, St. Andrew (2) The Rastafarian Movement (3) The Rastafarian Repatriation Association of Jamaica (4) The Ethiopian African Congress and Rastafari Melchezedec Orthodox Church and (5) The Rastafarians Brethren United Front. Only Sam Brown's Rastafarian Movement could be considered to have developed a political program. The remaining groups were expressly religious and cultural, clamoring only for repatriation. Douglas Mack's group in Eastern Kingston, The Rastafarian Repatriation Association of Jamaica circulated a manifesto that demanded:

- 1) To promote the repatriation to Africa of our members
- 2) To promote the spiritual and religious knowledge of the Solomonic dynasty ...

- 3) To promote educational progress of the African continent, its languages, culture, and history.
- 4) To recognize the hurt suffered by the Continent of Africa through colonialism and will devote time and energy toward the development of Africa by whatever contributions we can make.
- 5) To promote the general welfare of our members
- 6) To assist members in recuperating from ill health and all cases where medical attention is necessary.
- 7) This association will ask for subscription and voluntary contributions to carry out its progress. 102

These demands highlight the contradictory nature of the Rastafarian Movement. The Brethren do not see Jamaica as being economically viable, but being domiciled in that island until 'Ethiopia stretch forth her hands' Rastafarian groups attempt to ease the material plight of the Brethren.

The Ethiopian African Congress and Rastafari Melchezedec Orthodox Church of all the other organized groups mentioned, manifest the closest affinity to Revivalism. Members of this congregation aspired to be self-supporting and normally were attired for church services in white head wraps of the pocomania variety. Prince Edward, the leader of this unit of approximately 50 members serves in the similar fashion of the Pocomania Shepherd.

Sam Brown's Manifesto

The Rastafarian Movement under the leadership of Sam Brown broke with the apolitical tradition of Rastafari and competed for state power in the 1962 general election. Brown scraped only 85 votes and was not supported by Rastafarians who viewed his political activity as a futile involvement with 'Babylon'. Sam Brown published as his political platform 21 points titled Foundations of the Rastafarian Movement:

- 1) Members of the Rastafarian Movement are an inseparable part of the Black people of Jamaica
- 2) As such we cannot and do not proclaim any higher aims than the legitimate aims and aspirations of the Black people of Jamaica.
- 3) The Rastafarian Movement consists of the most advanced, determined and uncompromising fighters against discrimination, ostracism and oppression of Black people in Jamaica.
- 4) The Rastafarian Movement stands for freedom in its fullest sense and for the recovery of the dignity, self-respect and Sovereignty of the Black people of Jamaica.
- 5) Many deplore and accuse the black people of raising the colour question in this island. But white supremacy was the official policy of this Island for hundreds of years and white supremacists never regarded black men as good as the dogs in their yards.
- 6) To white supremacy has been added Brown-man supremacy and the mongel children of the Black woman came to think and behave contemptuously of Black people.
- 7) Time has removed some of the grosser aspects of white and brown man supremacy: but discrimination, disrespect and abuse of the black people are still here in many forms.
- 8) For instance, in their employment policies, the big guns get generous salaries, house allowance, travelling expense and bonuses. The poor black man working in the same industry or enterprise cannot get adequate food money, and has to accept poor treatment and insults as part of the price of holding the job.
- 9) In their housing policy, they have houses for the rich, housing for the middle class and housing for the underprivileged. 'Underprivileged' is only another name in Jamaica for poor black people.

- 10) God did not say 'come let us make underprivileged man, middle class man and rich man'. He said 'come let us make man'. The existence of underprivileged man in Jamaica is, a product of white and brown man supremacy.
- 11) The Rastafarian Movement has its chief aim, the complete destruction of all vestiges of white supremacy in Jamaica, thereby putting an end to economic exploitation and the social degradation (sic) of the black people.
- 12) The Rastafarian Movement stands for repatriation and power and for the fullest co-operation, and intercourse between the Governments and people of Africa and a free and independent people of Jamaica.
- 13) The Rastafarian Movement for the furtherance of these ends must have the backing of its support to, or lead, a political movement of its own.
- 14) The Rastafarian Movement has the backing of no party. We are subject to persecution and discrimination.
- 15) The Rastafarian Movement has lent its support to the two big Parties, this support has been in vain because no improvements has taken place in our condition. Neither are we offered or do we see any hope.
- 16) The Rastafarian Movement therefore has decided to actively join the political struggle and create a political movement with the aim of taking power and implement measures for the uplift of the poor and oppressed.
- 17) Because we have no other aims than the legitimate aims of the black people in this Island as stated in Clause 2, this Movement is open to all black people, irrespective of class, religion or financial standing.
- 18) We are not declaring against the political leadership of white men and brown men because of their colour; but because of the wickedness that they represent and invite them to repentance.

- 19) Consequently, if a man be as black as night, his colour is in our estimation of no avail if he is an oppressor and destroyer of his people.
- 20) All men therefore are free irrespective of colour to join this political crusade. The only condition is that he must abandon evil.
- 21) Suffering black people of Jamaica, let us unite and set up a righteous Government, under the slogan of Repatriation and power. 103

Sam Brown's 21 demands reveal the racial and class character of the Rastafarian Movement. There is nothing metaphysical or messianic about these demands. It becomes very clear that Brown was objecting to the powerless class position of poor and black people in the society. The Brown Manifesto represented a new departure for the followers of Haile Selassie. Although not abandoning completely the policy of repatriation to Africa, Sam Brown sought to fundamentally change the social structure of the society. The document revealed that the Rastafarian Movement was not advocating black supremacy or merely replacing white power, with black power, but was concerned with creating a more 'righteous society'. What emerges is not just Pan-African nationalism, but the notion that Rastafarians are an inseparable part of Jamaica. In other words, Brown takes a nationalist position, one that recognizes real politik which is a position that the majority of Rastafarian Brethren have tried to avoid. In his article No. 3, Rastafarians are characterized as 'determined uncompromising fighters' against oppression. And who are they fighting against? The white and brown man who together constitute a power monopoly, controlling the wealth and the politics of the country respectively. When Brown used the term 'brown man' he means the middle class who at the time dominated the state bureaucracy and the political parties.

Thus Sam Brown's Manifesto can be seen as an attempt to demystify the Rastafarian Movement and to force the Brethren to actively participate in the political struggle for power. At this juncture 1961-2, the Rastafarian Movement was not yet a mass force in the society. Brown's attempt to politicize the mystical Brethren failed to alter the apocalyptic nature of Rastafari. His position was vehemently opposed and the overwhelming majority of Rastafarians held fast to the notion that man was not responsible for his own fate; that politics was the way of Babylon which meant evil and wickedness; and at the time appointed the Emperor of Ethiopia would free blacks who were in a state of bondage.

The Visit of Haile Selassie

On April 21, 1966, His Imperial Majesty Haile Selassie I of Ethiopia paid a state visit to Jamaica. All the fastidiousness of state protocol was in place, but when the Emperor's plane landed at Kingston's International airport, pandemonium broke loose. One hundred thousand black nationalists and Rastafarians dispensed with the decorum and surrounded the plane of the Emperor. The police could not contain the jubilation of the crowd and it was left up to Mortimo Planno, one of the influentials of the Movement to restore some semblance of order to enable Haile Selassie to alight safely from the aircraft.

A number of rumours surround Haile Selassie's visit. One of the most telling incidents of the visit is the fact that it was drizzling prior to the 'touch down' of the aircraft and as the plane landed the rain ceased. This was interpreted as proof of Haile Selassie, the return Messiah's power over the elements. ¹⁰⁴ A Rastafarian sympathizer told me in 1975 that a non-believer

who was about to light a ganja pipe, proclaimed that Haile Selassie was not God and was immediately struck down and expired. What is significant is that Selassie's visit gave the Movement renewed credibility and respectability. With the material conditions afore-mentioned, this messianic Movement served as an escape outlet especially for young, urban, lumpen elements in search of a racial identity. They were rebelling against European civilization and a capitalist society in which wealth was maldistributed and unemployment extremely high.

The Rastafarian Movement in recent years has not undergone any radical organizational change or altered the pattern of its belief system. Rather than recruiting exclusively from the ranks of the poor, many youngsters from middle income families disillusioned with the crass materialism and sterility of middle class life, have become converted to the religion. The new organization that has emerged is the Twelve Tribes of Israel which is presently the most systematically organized of the Rastafarian groups. The Twelve Tribes of Israel has added a little more mysticism to the Rastafarian creed by placing much symbolism on the number 12. The ruling body of the organization is comprised of 12 men, 12 women plus one. Adherents meet regularly and dues are paid to the organization. The Twelve Tribes have sent a few members of their organization to take up residence in Sheshemani, Ethiopia. The position of the Twelve Tribes of Israel, unlike the other Brethren is not to expect Selassie to return them to Ethiopia, but that this must be done on their own initiative. The Brethren who were previously sent to pioneer the way are expected to engage in agriculture and build up the settlement.

Although attaining a new height in mysticism, the Twelve Tribes have also added a degree of realism. The founder 'Gad Man' encourages members to acquire technical skills that are of some utility value in Africa. The centralization of power in the Twelve Tribes of Israel is a departure from the acephalous and democratic nature of the Movement. 'Gad-Man' is not perceived as an influential but as the leader, the teacher of this new gospel. The precepts of the organization are derived directly from 'Gad-Man'.

The Twelve Tribes have been forced to explain the removal of Haile Selassie from the throne and his subsequent assassination. This is done by interpreting the Emperor's fate as another example of the crucifixion of the righteous by the wicked. The present Marxist-Leninist government in Ethiopia is perceived as just a temporary phenomenon that will not last and will eventually be replaced by the restoration of the monarchy. They advocate a theocratic form of government and take no part in the politics of 'Babylon'.¹⁰⁵

When Leonard Barrett published his research on the Rastafarians in 1968, he observed that they fulfilled five functions (1) members tend to be self-supporting (2) afforded members the opportunity for political activity (3) provided a recreational function (singing, dancing, drumming, etc.) (4) provided a sense of identify and (5) gave the believer some status. Barrett depicted dysfunctional aspects to the Movement.

It impedes a great mass of the people from activity sharing in an effort to better the situation. Their addiction to ganja may lead them to more addiction of a worse type, thus making a large segment of the population incapable of a day to day normal living. This may create more economic strain

on a program of rehabilitation. Their presence and attitude to the police creates an ever present danger for serious clashes resulting from any tactical blunder, occasioned accidentally by their more activists leaders. 106

The notion that ganja indulgence would lead to drugs of greater potency and addictiveness has proven to be sheer poppycock. There has not developed a problem of hard drugs among the Rastafarian Brethren as they remained steadfast in their holy ritual of imbibing ganja.

Lumpen-Revolutionaries

Clashes between the police and Rastafarians as a group are quite rare. The antagonism between the police and criminal lumpen elements is far more intense than between police and Rastafarians. What muddles the situation is that many criminals adapt the 'dreadlocks' hair style and make the claim that they are believers yet are not concerned with any spiritual fulfillment. They seek only to prey and to plunder against the possessed in the society. But what disturbs Barrett considerably is the fear that in the long run possibility that the extreme element may eventually deteriorate into a terrorist type organization, like the Mau-Mau of Kenya, with serious consequences for Jamaica. 107

There was some evidence in September, 1978 to indicate that alleged 'criminals' do not see themselves as mere 'criminals' but like to think of themselves as political revolutionaries. The Wareika Hills in Eastern Kingston has from the 1950s served as a haven for lumpen elements. The hilly terrain and its proximity to the Kingston area makes it a convenient squatting area for the poor who wish to avoid the burden of rent. It is

in this part of Kingston that the Rastafarian Repatriation Association of Jamaica is headquartered. Approximately in 1967-68, 'The Heaven Gang' led by Dennis 'Copper' Barth was formed. The Heaven Gang was comprised of a new breed of lumpen elements committed to gaining wealth through armed robbery.

Barth was born on July 9, 1951 and left school at the tender age of 12. At the age of 18, he was convicted for the murder of a policeman. Because of his age, he was sentenced to life imprisonment rather than hanged. On November 7, 1969 he was again convicted for robbery with aggravation and sentenced to 20 years. On November 14, 1969, Barth was again convicted of two counts of wounding with intent, one count of shooting with intent at the police, two counts of illegal possession of firearm and was sentenced to another life imprisonment.

This wily robber escaped from St. Catherine District Prison on February 2, 1973 and was captured in a shoot-out with the police in April of the same year. On March 26, 1977 Barth and five other dangerous criminals escaped once more from St. Catherine District Prison while playing a soccer match designed to rehabilitate the incarcerated. Barth was killed in a gun battle with the police on April 29, 1978 in the course of a robbery aimed at stealing the days proceedings from Caymanas Park race track. One hundred and one rounds of ammunition, two fully loaded submachine gun magazines and two revolver holsters were taken from his body. ¹⁰⁸

Dennis Barth never perceived himself as a common thief or murderer. He thought of himself as a 'Robin Hood' and a revolutionary. Whenever Barth robbed successfully, a portion of the proceeds was turned over to the impoverished community in which he was born. ¹⁰⁹ He personified the new streak of

viciousness that took hold of adherents in the sub-culture of violence. Barth not only robbed from the wealthy but he had developed an enormous amount of hate for the police and got a special delight from attacking them. This reflected the deep-seated antagonism between the police and the lumpen-proletariat.

In September 1978 a combined police army contingent raided the Wareika Hills at Rock Spring in search of remnants of Dennis Barth's guerillas. Revolutionary literature, explosives, medicines, radio equipment and weapons were uncovered. ¹¹⁰ The men were perceived by the police and the state as a bunch of criminals. It is obvious that there is some attempt to politically educate lumpen elements in revolutionary theory to overthrow the state. Many of these 'guerilla criminals' identify with the Rastafarian Movement. Thus we see the complexity of the situation and the difficulty in distinguishing the purveyors of violence from the purveyors of gospel, both often overlapping but yet remaining quite distinct.

The believing Rastafarian will not engage in criminal conduct. Nevertheless, he is not sympathetic to bourgeois society and view the police with trepidation. A part of the culture of the lumpen-proletariat is not to volunteer information to the police. The committed Rastafarians will be abhorred at the rapes and murders of the criminal element within the lumpen-proletariat, but he sees this as a fulfillment of prophecy, the further decay of an unjust society.

In his most recent published study of the Rastafarians (1977), Barrett reassesses his earlier appraisal of the Movement and is less concerned with its impact on established society. He now believes in the revolutionary

potential of the Movement and proclaims:

We have proved a point that a social movement of transformation is most likely to succeed when that movement attaches itself, even though unconsciously to traditional elements in the cultural milieu, and that, if this traditional residue is sufficiently grounded, its power to threaten the status quo often triggers a negative response from the privileged classes of the society. In this over-reaction, the privileged classes often create a climate of growth and acceptance for the Movement from the oppressed class. If a social movement such as the Rastafarians is able to refine its ideology and sustain a viable opposition, maintaining its independence from cooptation, its possibility for bringing about social change in the society may be achieved. 111

The development of the Rastafarians into a mass force in Jamaica has nothing to do with the negative response or over-reaction of the privileged. It is the inability of the economic system to absorb the surplus of workers concentrated in the urban centres which force would-be-workers to seek some alternative means of survival and Rastafari serves as a sub-cultural system. Yet there is some indication that the Rastafarians are not only refining the credo, but may end up redefining the religion in its entirety. This will entail, not as Barrett insists the maintaining of continuity with what he calls Ethiopianism, but a radical departure from this religious heritage.

Rastafari and the Eastern Caribbean

In recent years the Rastafarian Movement has spread throughout the Eastern Caribbean. The birth of the Movement in that region is a post - 1970 phenomenon which meant that its impact only became significant after the 1970 Black Power uprising in Trinidad. The 'dread' Movement in Dominica, Grenada and other parts of the Caribbean are directly involved in radical politics.

In Dominica a black power movement commenced political agitation in the 1970s. Desmond Trotter, a Rastafarian was instrumental in the founding of a black nationalist organization called Manicou and edited their paper Black Cry.¹¹² In July, 1971 The Movement For A New Dominica (MND) was formed. Among the activists were members of Manicou, students, graduates, and unemployed. MND published a journal which was edited by Trotter. Many of the unemployed youths in Dominica have recently adopted the Rastafarian culture. The 'dread' element in MND subsequently divorced itself from the parent organization and retreated to the hills to engage in subsistence farming. Trotter simultaneously advocated black power and socialist transformation and developed some influence among the less privileged workers. The state felt so threatened by the young Rastafarians that Trotter was suspended from his civil service job.¹¹³

On 21st November, 1974 the Dominican government passed a law cited as the Prohibited and Unlawful Societies and Association Act which outlawed the dread movement. The Rastafarians were declared members of an unlawful association. Article 5 of the law states:

Any member of an unlawful association who appears in public or elsewhere wearing any uniform, badge or mode of dress or other distinguishing mark or feature or manner of wearing their hair, shall be guilty of an offence, and shall be arrested without warrant by any member of the police force.¹¹⁴

The Act also sanctioned the right of a police officer to kill or wound members of this Association any time of day or night inside a dwelling house. When a white American tourist, John Jirasek was murdered during the Carnival celebrations of February, 1974, Desmond Trotter and Roy Mason were charged

for the murder. The latter was acquitted and the former found guilty and sentenced to be executed. Desmond Trotter Defence Committees were formed to pressure the government to establish an independent commission of inquiry based on the fact that the entire government case revolved around the testimony of Camella Francis who testified that she overheard Trotter boasting about the murder. On March 30, 1976 Camella Francis swore on an affidavit in Antigua that she had so testified because the Dominican police had threatened and bribed her.¹¹⁵ On April 2, the Mercy Committee of Dominica reprieved Trotter from the death sentence. Trotter was given a life sentence and there are still earnest attempts being made to absolve this political Rastafarian of the alleged murder. (Trotter was recently released from prison)

One also sees the political nature of the Rastafarian Movement in the Eastern Caribbean when one examines the revolution that took place in Grenada on 13th March, 1979. Of the estimated 700 dreads living in Grenada 400 fought with the army clandestinely formed by the New Jewel Movement, the socialist political party which overthrew the corrupt government of Eric Gairy.¹¹⁶ It is clear that the Rastafarian Movement in the Eastern Caribbean is far more political than the Movement in Jamaica. Hitherto, the Rastafarians in Jamaica have resisted all forms of politicization and await the apocalypse. The difference lies with the epoch in which the respective movements were established and institutionalized. The Movement in Jamaica originated in the 1930s prior to decolonization and the right of self-determination was perceived as a farfetched notion for African peoples.

Even though the Rastafarians were anti-colonial and certainly nationalistic, the assertiveness took the form of religious nationalism and sought redemption from the god of Ethiopia. It reflects the extent to which religion had permeated the cultural system of Jamaica rather than a break with white Christianity. Nevertheless, the Rastafarian Movement reflects the urban nature of a modernizing polity and the attempt to synthesize the old with the new. Whereas religion dominated the life of the rural peasant, that preoccupation with religion was not abandoned as he migrated to the cities in search of industrial or service employment. Culture is always affected by the changing environment and the Rastafarian religion can be viewed despite its preposterous claims, as being more relevant to the needs of urban man. It is not a scientific or a rational explanation of the predicament of man, yet it grapples with the topical issues of class, racial identity, and the meaning of existence.

The Movement in the Eastern Caribbean is of recent vintage and has been influenced by the new radical political forces blowing throughout the Caribbean archipelago. Lumpen elements were attracted to the Rastafarian way of life but the Movement developed a new political form necessitating the Eastern Caribbean governments to view it as a threat to the state and in the case of Dominica to pass legislation outlawing its existence. There were attempts to politicize the lumpen-proletariat in Jamaica, but this was initiated in 1966 at a time when there was no radical debate in the Caribbean on the efficacy of socialist ideology which made it much easier for the violent members of the lumpen-proletariat to develop deep-seated loyalties to conventional or established political parties.

Summary

Although the African in the Caribbean, particularly in Jamaica, developed a tradition of violent resistance to slavery, after the abolition of slavery that revolutionary tradition was abandoned and the free African established new communities in the mountainous interior of the island. Wherever possible the African whose labour had been formerly coerced moved away from the plantation and eked out an existence by practicing subsistence farming. Once free, the peasant accommodated himself to a political system that completely ignored his material needs. Except for the Paul Bogle rebellion, there was no ongoing movement to demand structural changes that had its roots in the mass of the population. Even though land was maldistributed, there was no violent protest for land reform. The Jamaican peasant accepted his assigned place in the division of labour and expended most of his creative energies in the world of the supernatural. Christianity constituted the determinant component of the peasant's culture. This penchant for metaphysics, this propensity for a religion that did not emphasize protest or struggle is the reason why the political history throughout the nineteenth century and early twentieth century was characterized by the subservience of the peasant to established authority. Rather than demanding land reform, the peasant plagued with overcrowding, simply resorted to internal or external migration.

The movement of labour from the countryside to the cities was much greater than the industrializing sector of the economy could absorb. With the closing of the British window in 1962 (Commonwealth Immigration and Nationality Act) it meant that Great Britain would no longer serve as the

reservoir for Jamaica's surplus labour population. Workers who had developed a marginal relationship to production were now concentrated in the slums of Kingston and St. Andrew with nowhere to go. People migrated with their material possession in one hand and their cultural 'baggage' in the other. This rural-folk culture imbedded in an urban environment was forced to undergo certain changes. Religion remained a strong component of the cultural system, but that religion took on a new form. By the middle 1960s the Rastafarian Movement and its unique worldview had become a mass movement with thousands of believers accepting the notion that Haile Selassie was the return Messiah and in due season would redeem the children of Israel.

The Rastafarian religious interpretation completely rejects the authority of the 'Babylonian state'. The tendency within the Movement that has sought to make Rastafarians pay more attention to the political system has been historically weak. The vast majority of the Brethren have messianic visions of political change. This religious teaching absolves the believer from action and leaves the destruction of the 'wicked state' in the hands of Ras Tafari (Haile Selassie) who will proclaim judgement at the time appointed. We have observed that the Movement in the Eastern Caribbean came into being only in the 1970s and is more concerned with real politik than 'shadow boxing'. The Movement in Jamaica abhors politics and is coloured by a metaphysical fixation and nurtured by an apocalyptic obsession. Although the Rastafarian Movement in Jamaica is not explicitly political, they have helped to undermine the legitimacy of authority that is vital to any state if it is to maintain social order. It is not a Movement that fosters class subservience or accommodates itself to the division of labour. The black nationalist character of the

Movement and its concern with equal rights and justice help to create a spirit of resistance among the mass of the population. Having no concrete political program, the influence of the Rastafarians is much more extensive in the realm of music and other aspects of cultural expression. This would include the way people speak, hairstyles that become fashionable, etc. In short, they represent a sub-culture that poses a serious challenge to established authority despite the fact that there is no centralized organization to articulate the interest of the Brethren.

The emergence of the Rastafarian Movement reflects the differentiation that has taken place within the society in the last thirty years. The class structure has become more complex and as Stone suggests, is characterized by stratification. The stratification of the working class has not tempered the militancy of the trade union movement and the downturn in the economy has helped to exacerbate relations between labour and capital. The Jamaican working class is presently represented by trade unions which are committed to economism and thus despite the frequent labour disputes do not represent an organized force for revolutionary change. I want to stress that although that is the case at present, it will not necessarily be the case in another decade. The phenomenon of inflation is quite new to Jamaica and if the labour movement is affected by an erosion in the standard of living, then that reformist bent could very well give way to demands for revolutionary change.

The group in the society that has the capacity to tear asunder the social fabric of the nation is the lumpen-proletariat who adhere to the

sub-culture of violence. Many lumpen youths pay homage to Rastafari but are far more concerned with material survival. There exist a generation of lumpen youth who have grown up in a secular society where the mass of people are consumer oriented but the economy cannot satisfy the material acquisitiveness of all. These youths are bred in an urban environment and are simply not awed by the free-wielding authority of the police. Lumpen-youths in Jamaica or those condemned to a marginal position in the society do not constitute a subservient minority but a mass force that is contemptuous of those who have acquired property and very much willing to use the arsenal of weapons at their disposal to acquire the needs and wants created in a modernizing society. Obviously such a force makes the maintaining of social order a trying task if not a futile one.

Although there are sections of the lumpen-proletariat who are quite removed from the political process, beginning in the 1960s, both political parties were instrumental in politicizing lumpen gangs. The politicizing of lumpen gangs added a violent dimension to Jamaican politics. Lumpen-youths who remained outside of the political process, harassed the society by committing violent crimes that was instrumental in creating a state of insecurity among those who enjoyed a privileged existence. This had a dysfunctional impact but was not as destructive as the political violence that began in 1966. Then a new vista was opened up to elements who had been excluded from the productive sectors of the economy. The surplus labour population was now to be used as mercenaries by ambitious politicians in the mad scramble for control of state power. This meant that certain sectors of the lumpen-proletariat had been co-opted by the institutionalized political

parties. The lumpen-proletariat would develop a vested interest in his or her political party maintaining control of state power with the expectation that once the battle had been fought, all spoils would be reserved for the victors. Since the lumpen-population is so huge and dependent on political largesse, this meant that conventional politics became critical to the well-being of politicized lumpen-communities. In the following chapters that development will be meticulously examined.

FOOTNOTES

1. Anthony Wallace, Culture and Personality (Random House Inc. 1970)
p 6
2. Ibid, p 183
3. Walter Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa (Bogle - L'Ouverture Publications 1972) p 16
4. Ibid, p 42
5. Leonard Barrett, The Rastafarians, Sounds of Cultural Dissonance (Beacon Press 1977) p 20
6. Ibid, p 20
7. Orlando Patterson, Sociology of Slavery (McGibbon and Kee 1976)
8. Eugene Genovese, Roll Jordon Roll (Vintage Books 1972)
9. Ibid, p 163
10. Ibid, p 284
11. Ibid, p 5
12. Ibid, p 6
13. Mary Reckford, "The Jamaica Slave Rebellion of 1831" published
in Black Society in the New World (Random House 1971) p 54
14. Leonard Barrett, op cit, p 25
15. Ibid, p 28
16. Ibid, p 56

17. Ibid, p 56
18. Ibid, p 161 - 62
19. Ibid, p 91
20. Madeline Kerr, Personality and Conflict in Jamaica (Sangsters Bookstore Ltd. 1973) p 135
21. Ibid, p 135
22. Ibid, p 135
23. Sidney Mintz, "The Caribbean As a Socio-Cultural Area" published in Peoples and Culture of the Caribbean (Natural History Press 1971) p 20
24. Ibid, p 41
25. Ibid, p 41
26. Ibid, p 41 - 42
27. Madeline Kerr, op cit, p 157
28. Ibid, p 173 - 174
29. M.G. Smith, The Plural Society in the British West Indies (University of California Press 1974) p 315
30. Ibid, p 163
31. Ibid, p 163
32. Ibid, p 175
33. Adam Kuper, Changing Jamaica (Kingston Publishers Ltd. 1976) p 61
34. Ibid, p 61
35. Ibid, p 88
36. Ibid, p 88
37. Richard Hillman, "Interview with Michael Manley" Everybody's Magazine, December 1978, p 26 - 27
38. Carl Stone, Class Race and Political Behaviour in Urban Jamaica (ISER 1973) p 8
39. Ibid, p 11
40. Ibid, p 14

41. Ibid, p 20
42. Ibid, p 21
43. Ralph Gonsalves, "The Trade Union Movement in Jamaica. Its Growth and Some Resultant Problems" published in Essays on Power and Change in Jamaica (U.W.I. 1976) p 239
44. Economic and Social Survey Jamaica 1976, p 385 - 386
45. See Carl Stone's Class Race and Political Behaviour in Jamaica, op. cit, Chapter IV
46. Irving Kaplan et all Area Handbook for Jamaica (Library of Congress, 1976) p 104
47. C.L.R. James, "The Middle Classes" published in Consequences of Class and Color West Indian Perspective (Doubleday Anchor Books 1973) p 79
48. Ibid, p 82
49. Ibid, p 84
50. Ralph Gonsalves, op, cit, p 231
51. Cecil Nelson, "Some New Data on the Jamaica Working Class" published in Socialism Vol. 2 No. 10 October 1975, p 30
52. See Article by Richard Frucht, "A Caribbean Social Type "Neither Peasant Nor Proletarian" published in Peoples and Cultures of the Caribbean
53. Cecil Nelson, op, cit. p 32
54. Ibid, p 32
55. Ibid, p 27
56. Ibid, p 23
57. Ibid, p 27
58. Ibid, p 36 - 37
59. See Michael Horowitz's People's and Cultures of the Caribbean op, cit.
60. David Lowenthal, op, cit, p 107
61. Ibid, p 220

62. Sidney Mintz, op, cit, p 37
63. Ibid, p 41 - 42
64. Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man, The Social Basis of Politics (N.Y. Doubleday & Co. Inc. 1960) p 91
65. See Ralf Dahrendorf Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society (Stanford University Press 1959) p 142
66. Ibid, p 121 - 122
67. Eric R. Wolf "Specific Aspects of Plantation Systems in the New World. Community Sub-Cultures and Social Classes" published in People's and Cultures of the Caribbean, op, cit, p 172
68. Department of Statistics, Jamaica, The Labour Force, 1975, p 8
69. Department of Statistics Jamaica, The Labour Force, 1977, p 92 - 98
70. Ibid, p 98
71. Carl Stone, op, cit, p 146
72. Adam Kuper, op, cit, p 93
73. Carl Stone, op, cit, p 146
74. Adam Kuper, op, cit, p 94
75. Ibid, p 94
76. Ibid, p 94
77. Murvin Wolfgang and Francis Ferracuti, The Sub-Culture of Violence Towards An Integrated Theory in Criminology Tavistock Publishers 1967
78. See Marcus Garvey, Philosophy and Opinions of Marcus Garvey.
79. See John Henrik Clark (ed) Marcus Garvey and the Vision of Africa (Vintage Books 1974)
80. Leonard Barrett, op, cit, p 80
81. Ibid, p 81
82. Ibid, p 93
83. Ibid, p 85

84. M.G. Smith et al, The Rastafari Movement in Jamaica (ISER 1960)
p 38
85. Ibid p 8
86. Ibid, p 9
87. Ibid, p 10
88. Ibid, p 13
89. Ibid, p 13
90. Leonard Barrett, op. cit, p 94
91. M.G. Smith et al, op. cit, p 16
92. Terry Lacey, Violence and Politics in Jamaica 1960 - 70, p 82
93. Leonard Barrett, op. cit. p 97
94. Ibid, p 98
95. Leonard Barrett, Soul-Force (Anchor Books 1974) p 171
96. Ibid, p 171
97. M.G. Smith et al, op. cit, p 38
98. Ibid, p 35 - 36
99. Leonard Barrett, The Rastafarians. A Study in Messianic Cultism in Jamaica (Institute of Caribbean Studies 1968) p 90
100. Report of Mission to Africa (Government Printing Office 1961) p 5
101. Ibid, p 22
102. Leonard Barrett, The Rastafarians. A Study in Messianic Cultism in Jamaica, op, cit, p 111
103. Ibid, p 103 - 105
104. Ibid, p 123
105. Information from interviews held with members of the Twelve Tribes of Israel in 1979
106. Leonard Barrett, The Rastafarians. A Study in Messianic Cultism in Jamaica, p 175

107. Ibid, p 176
108. The Jamaica Weekly Gleaner, May 8, 1978, p 31
109. An interview with a former member of the Heaven Gang, January 1978
110. Jamaica Weekly Gleaner, October 9, 1978 p 6
111. Leonard Barrett, The Rastafarian Sounds of Cultural Dissonance, op. cit., p 101 - 102
112. Race Today June/July 1977 p 89
113. Caribbean Dialogue January, 1977, p 22
114. Dominica Act No. 32 of 1974. Gazetted 21st November, 1974. Government of Dominica
115. Caribbean Dialogue, January 1977, p 24
116. Interview with Ambassador Raddix, Co-founder of the New Jewel Movement, April, 1979

C H A P T E R V

EARLY POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN JAMAICA

Political violence in Jamaica did not begin with the bloody battles that were fought in Western Kingston in October, 1966. The period from 1945-52 was marked by a fierce struggle between politically affiliated trade unions competing for control of the working class movement. Although this period was bloody, the early political violence differs qualitatively from the violence that erupted in 1966 and that continued there afterwards necessitating a state of emergency in June, 1976. The early political violence had to do with the control of the working class. Once the trade unions accepted the democratic principle of representational polls so that workers themselves by secret ballot could decide which union they wanted to represent their interests to management and once the Ministry of Labour developed the necessary machinery to conduct the poll taking, the violence among rival trade unions diminished to the extent that everyone concerned accepted the democratic process. Early political violence took place at a time when the lumpen-proletariat communities were not as sizeable as they are today. During the 1950s they did not constitute the mass force that they presently represent in the urban complex of Kingston and St. Andrew. In any case, the migration of Jamaicans to Britain served as a safety valve for possible political unrest. Many of the migrants going to Britain were unskilled workers who could not find employment in a modernizing Jamaica. It is this reason why the unemployment rates in the 1950s averaged 10-12% while the unemployment rates in the 1960s mushroomed to the staggering figure of 25% of the labour force. One other

factor that differentiates early political violence from the violence that erupted in 1966, is that Jamaica remained a colony until 1962. The party which occupied the seat of government was accountable to the colonial office and the prerogatives of governing remained tightly controlled by the British. One must take into consideration that the size of the budget in pre-independent Jamaica was relatively small in comparison to the 1960s and later period. This meant that the spoils although administered in a corrupt way did not have a rippling social impact. There was no capital available in the pre-independent period to construct low-income housing schemes for the poor and to dispense with the housing only to party loyalists. The spoils available remained minute. Nevertheless the precedence of political victimization was established from the genesis of universal suffrage politics in 1944.

On taking office in 1944, Bustamante immediately assumed the portfolio of the ministry of Works. This Ministry was responsible for determining the amount of public funds allocated for public works and made the decision as to who would or would not be employed on governmental projects. Bustamante was in complete control of the 'pork-barrel' and used it to advance the cause of the Jamaica Labour Party and the Bustamante Industrial Trade Union. This point is of extreme importance. At the genesis of mass participation in electoral politics, the Chief Minister of Jamaica, Alexander Bustamante, hero of the working class, initiated the policy of excluding members of the Opposition Party from enjoying the spoils of government.

Bustamante was placed in the unenviable situation of being in control of the first elected government at a time when mass expectations ran extremely high. Bustamante, an astute rabble-rouser, could no longer ride the crest of protest. He had to produce, to deliver in a concrete way or see his popularity plummet and the allegiance of the masses transferred to up and coming stalwarts. Since he knew he could not satisfy mass expectations and that the enthusiasm among party supporters could not be sustained unless they could point to some material gain, Bustamante introduced the policy of victimization. It served as a reward mechanism for the party in control of state power and punished those who had the audacity to oppose the Party's quest for power. At this early date, the ability of the government to produce spoils was quite limited. Nevertheless Jamaica was still very much an agrarian society and although rural folks sought governmental spoils to improve their material condition, it was not a matter of life and death. Most could eke out a living from small farms or from the nearby plantations. The dependency on governmental largesse came into being during the 1960s with the establishment of sprawling lumpen-communities primarily concentrated in Western Kingston. Although the embryonic lumpen-communities were critical of the status quo, a sub-culture opposed to the extant political system had not developed to a force that one could say that the society's value consensus had been shattered. During the 1950s from a cultural viewpoint, Jamaica constituted a cohesive whole. Let us examine in detail early political violence that was centred

around labour disputes.

There were 145 labour disputes in 1945 and 39 minor complaints were referred to the Ministry of Labour.

Of the 145 disputes reported, 97 resulted in strikes involving some 11,600 workers and a time loss of upwards 91,650 man-days. Over half of the strikes (53 percent) occurred in agriculture reflecting a testing by the B.I.T.U. of its new-found power as well as a drive for 'closed-shop' agreements to exclude the T.U.C. ¹

The ranks of the B.I.T.U increased from 30,000 to 40,000 ² while the T.U.C saw its ranks depleted from 14,000 to 10,000. Workers with the B.I.T.U received preference as Bustamante insisted that the Sugar Manufacturers should employ workers from his Party. It was possible for the B.I.T.U to wage strikes and to pursue a policy of labor militancy in respect to the private sector. In the public sector, government was the employer and it was in this sector that the T.U.C posed its most serious challenge to Bustamante's regime.

In January, 1946 the T.U.C. served Notice on the Bustamante government. The Railway Employee's Union represented by the T.U.C . demanded higher wages and shorter working hours. In the following month of 1946, the workers at the Mental Hospital (Asylum) in Kingston represented by Government Hospital and Prison Employees Union, an affiliate of the T.U.C. went out on strike:

As a result of the strike, Kingston was

overrun by escaped mental patients some of them dangerous. The police reportedly in sympathy with the strikers, did not act with alacrity to round up escapees. Bustamante taking the position that the strike was against his government, advised the Governor by telegram, "With regard to the strike at Mental Hospital a large body of nurses belong to my union. You are to take an iron hand in this matter. No sympathy whatsoever must be shown". 3

Bustamante interpreted the T.U.C. actions as a personal challenge to his government and recommended using the 'iron-hand' of the state to crush the unrest of the workers. The military was brought in to man the asylum.

On Saturday February, 17, 1946 the Minister of Social Services and Welfare visited the Mental Hospital but was prevented from entering the premises by the pickets. Later the same morning, Alexander Bustamante arrived on the scene and was allowed to walk through the gate of the Asylum. On his way to the hospital a patient threw a stone that hit Bustamante. The incensed Bustamante went straight to the docks where the B.I.T.U commanded the loyalty of the port workers and marched with a group of JLP enthusiasts to the scene of the labor unrest. Frank Gordon, an eyewitness of the event reported:

Sometime late, we saw a march coming toward the hospital. It was later recognized that a large throng of port workers were being led by Mr. Bustamante and Mr. Pixley with pieces of wood in their hands.

The crowd by then a mob had beaten up the pickets at the Paradise Street gate and moved up Paradise Street towards Windward Road and the main gate. On the way they

encountered many motorists but one of them John Nicholas they identified as a PNP man. He was dragged out of the car and when he got out he tried to run away from the mob but they pursued him and backed him up at the gate of a house. He then drew his revolver and fired a shot in the air. But this only infuriated them and he was again attacked. He shot one of his attackers dead before he was beaten to death by the mob. The mob continued their rampage and several other people including the pickets were badly beaten. ⁴

The situation escalated and the T.U.C. called out on strike the prison guards, firemen and railroad workers to support the Union's effort. An inmate of the institution started a fire "which gutted the epileptic ward and fifteen helpless inmates were burned to death". ⁵ The Governor declared a State of Emergency. The dispute was eventually settled in March, 1946 when the strikers returned to the job and the State of Emergency was lifted. A police investigation of the incident led to the indictment of Alexander Bustamante, Chief Minister and Frank Pixley, Minister of Social Welfare and they were both charged with manslaughter in the death of J. Nicholas. The prosecutor's indictment of Bustamante and Pixley was based on the fact that both Ministers of Government left the scene and returned at the head of a mob that resulted in the death of a citizen. The case was tried in St. Mary but both politicians were found not guilty by the jurors.

The T.U.C continued with their confrontation tactics against the Bustamante government. They organized workers and unemployed to protest against the 'iron hand' of Government. The

T.U.C organized marches around the issue of political victimization. The response by the Bustamante government to the confrontation tactics of the T.U.C. was to pass legislation that would restrict this form of political conduct. In May, 1947 the Bustamante government introduced and passed in the Legislature a bill to prohibit marches within a prescribed distance of the Labour Department, the executive offices of the Kingston and St. Andrew Corporation (the Municipal government) and Headquarters House which was the seat of the National legislature.

In January, 1948 labour violence occurred again. The affiliated T.U.C. Tramway Transport and General Workers Union called the bus workers out on strike in an attempt to obtain recognition of the Union. To disrupt the Jamaica Utilities Company Ltd. the workers kept the ignition keys and refused to return the buses to the terminal depot. In addition the Conductors impounded the Company's petty cash. The parties involved in the dispute met at Kings House, the Governor's official residence. The Company refused to recognize the Union and attempted to re-establish the bus routes with the experienced operators still out on strike.

On March 1, a home-made bomb exploded on a bus and one passenger was seriously injured and eleven others required hospital treatment. The incensed workers stoned and fired upon the buses in service. One driver was shot to death and three striking employees were accused of the murder.

In February, 1950, the T.U.C. challenged the B.I.T.U. for the representational rights of workers employed at Myrtle Bank Hotel in Kingston. After the B.I.T.U. refused to a poll of the workers, the T.U.C. proceeded to call a strike. It was in this dispute that the T.U.C. first employed professional pickets to assist the striking effort. The situation became so explosive that the Riot Act was read and teargas used to disperse the strikers. The dispute was settled by an arbitrator who ruled that a secret poll be conducted and representational rights decided by a majority. The poll was conducted by the Officers of the Ministry of Labour. This strike established a precedence for representational disputes, one of the principal causes of labour violence during these years. Fifteen polls of this kind were conducted by the Ministry of Labour in 1950 without much rancor.

The T.U.C. had made inroads into the B.I.T.U.'s control of the labour force in the urban areas and in 1950 challenged the Bustamante's control of the sugar-estate workers. The two estates targeted were Worthy Park Estate and Lluidas Vale.

As B.I.T.U. supporters armed with machetes poised to cross the picket lines, the T.U.C. hurried truck-loads of picket reserves from outside areas, and the estate took on the appearance of a battlefield. In the 1st week of December, young citrus plants were wantonly destroyed and cane-fields set a-fire. The Riot Act was read early in January, 1951 and police, using tear-gas on T.U.C. picket lines, carried strike-breakers through the lines. Bustamante's car was stoned and he returned shots from his revolver. The strike was called off as a result of continued efforts of Church leaders, prominent citizens and the Labour Department. After agreement was reached to take a poll

at that estate, the T.U.C claimed representational rights at several others. The B.I.T.U hitherto the undisputed boss in the sugar industry, agreed to negotiate jointly with the T.U.C. for the 1951 crop and also that the Labour Department should take polls at sixteen of twenty-three sugar estates where the T.U.C. claimed majority rights. The T.U.C gained majority rights on only two of the sixteen estates polled. 9

The involvement of church leaders in labour disputes was reflective of the society's concern with working class violence. Even Bustamante at the beginning of the 1950s became amenable to conciliation and recognized the bargaining rights of the rival T.U.C. Nevertheless the Bustamante government continued to rely on legislation to defuse the situation. Professional pickets were outlawed in 1952. Compulsory arbitration was required for labour disputes affecting essential services. Essential services included much of the workforce over which the T.U.C. wielded influence - water, health, postal, transport telegraph and railroad workers. It is at this juncture that the labour movement entered into a period of routinization. The machinery of the established state was able to resolve disputes through the taking of secret polls and the B.I.T.U. and the T.U.C. were willing to co-exist with each other.

What further contributed to the routinization of labour disputes was the purging of the leading organizers in the T.U.C. Frank Hill, Ken Hill, Richard Hart and Arthur Henry were purged from the P.N.P for ideological transgressions in 1952. There

is an international dimension to this purge which I will state briefly. The T.U.C. was affiliated to the World Federation of Trade Unions which came increasingly under the influence of Marxist trade unionists. The British T.U.C. withdrew from the W.F.T.U. in 1949 charging that the organization was dominated by communists. There had also been close relationship between the People's National Party in Jamaica and the T.U.C. in England. The T.U.C. placed pressure on the P.N.P to have the T.U.C. in Jamaica withdraw its membership from W.F.T.U. and to become attached to the International Confederation of Trade Unions which was formed to give trade union support to the cause of the capitalist regimes that dominated the international economy. The T.U.C. in Jamaica was forced to withdraw from the W.F.T.U. but they refused to join the I.C.F.T.U.

The National Workers Union was formed in September 1952 and replaced the T.U.C as the working arm of the P.N.P. The N.W.U. received support from I.C.F.T.U., the British T.U.C., the U.S.W.A. and the Cuban Workers' Federation.¹⁰ The N.W.U was perceived as a safe non-communist union. With the reduction in the strength of the T.U.C. labour relations were devoid of any ideological rancor and disputes could be resolved by the machinery developed in the Ministry of Labour.

The tradition of trade unionism directly link working class activity to party politics and in the period being discussed (1945-52) violence during the time of elections was not uncommon.

The street corner meeting is the cornerstone of electoral activity in Jamaica. If a particular party cannot hold outdoor rallies, then it is denied its most important medium of communicating with the electorate. Without the street corner meeting, the party's campaign cannot develop the enthusiasm and mass momentum essential for electoral victory. The street corner meetings also serve as a catharsis for fervent party supporters, a place where loyalty can be reaffirmed.

"Boss" Wright, a PNP activist complained that during the 1940s the group meetings held by the PNP were constantly harassed by members of the JLP. "As soon as you lit a lamp in support of the PNP you would be stoned by members of the JLP".¹¹ The PNP accused the JLP of sabotaging their meetings and preventing them from having access to the mass electorate. The PNP responded by establishing a Pioneer Group that had as its primary function the protection of party meetings. Boss Wright, a member of the group assessed the historical significance of the group.

The group grew to 360 members, and we used to scout out meeting sites, make sure of refuge and assistance if the meetings were attacked and generally provided security from attack. Soon we could hold most of our group meetings and street meetings without molestation although the violence still continued.¹²

Another famous PNP strong-arm group during this period was Group 69, named after the street number of the headquarters on Matthews Lane in Western Kingston. Group 69 was not only a self defense unit of the PNP but they were a group committed to the

building of socialism and were linked to the T.U.C. In answer to the question why Group 69 was formed, Lester McKenzie, a member of the group reiterated at the PNP's 40th Anniversary:

Group 69 was formed for the purpose of staying off the many attacks launched against PNP people, particularly in Central Kingston. As vanguards of the PNP we contributed considerably to protecting our brothers and sisters from the tyranny of the then majority party, whose intention it then was to drive us off the streets of Kingston and to make it impossible for us to keep meetings and therefore to cripple our organization. 13

The most violent political battle during this early period took place in October, 1947, when the campaign for the first municipal elections under universal suffrage was held. Then as now, this vicious battle took place in Trench Town, Western Kingston. Before 1947, there existed a council comprised of eight Councillors who were elected to three year terms, Members of the House of Representatives in that specific area, and the Custos of the Parish. Members of the House and the Custos were classified as ex-officio members. The Councillors were also responsible for electing Aldermen for a one year term and both the Councillors and Aldermen elected the Mayor and the Deputy Mayor. The reorganization that took place in 1947 eliminated the Aldermen and Councillors were directly elected on the basis of universal suffrage.

The incident involving the supporters of both political parties is now known as the Battle of Rose Town. On that bloody night in October, 1947, the JLP held a meeting in Jones Town at Thompson and Asquith Streets and the PNP held their meeting in

Rose Town at Nathan and Duff Streets. Mrs. Gladys Ellington, a PNP activist recalls that the JLP meeting which had attracted more people attacked the PNP meeting. Another PNP meeting being held somewhat further away on North Street was informed of the incident and marched to the rescue of their beleaguered compatriots. The battle between the two supporters lasted through the night. By the time the sun rose the following morning, four people were dead and more than two hundred wounded.

The Battle of Rose Town was a strategic victory for the PNP, because it meant that for the first time the PNP could take to the streets without harassment from the JLP. The PNP had learnt the principles of effective self-defence.

That was the lesson of Rose Town and history records that the PNP won 11 out of 13 seats in the Corporation Council with Comrade Ken Hill victorious in Trench Town. The PNP took control of the KSAC for the first time. This marked the beginning of the end of JLP power in Kingston. 14

The PNP demonstrated strength in Western Kingston in 1947 during the Kingston and St. Andrew Corporation elections forced Bustamante to abandon the constituency of Western Kingston which he won in 1944 and opted for a safe seat in Clarendon, where he could depend on the unceasing loyalty of the sugar workers initially organized by the B.I.T.U. This reveals the vicissitudinal nature of politics in the most wretched section of the city, Western Kingston. Every election from 1944 to 1962, the Member of Parliament for Western Kingston failed to retain his seat. In other words, no candidate in Western Kingston won the constituency in consecutive elections. It was not until 1967 that Edward Seaga

shattered that tradition by winning in 1967, an event that we will describe in great detail when we examine the political violence of 1966-67.

SUMMARY

From the inception of mass politics in Jamaica in 1944, the two major political parties realised that the party which controlled or had attained dominance among the working class would be the Party that would triumph at the polls. The PNP-affiliated TUC took an aggressive position on the question of challenging the JLP affiliated BITU for control of the island's working class. The violence associated with the labour movement declined considerably once the parties involved accepted the right of the Ministry of Labour to conduct democratic polls in order to decide who would represent the workers in their confrontation with management. By 1952, the trade union movement had reached a stage wherein disputes were settled by an institutionalized process. Political violence occurred during the heat of electioneering but the weapons used were limited to sticks and stones. There was obviously some conspiratorial attempts to disrupt meetings and both the JLP and PNP indulged in the recruiting of strong arm loyalist. It was during this period that the emotional identification with a particular party had its roots. People thought of themselves primarily as JLP or PNP. This party identity was far more salient than any national

identity. Strong feelings for a particular party preceded the obtaining of independence and a sense of Jamaican nationalism has remained up to this day, extremely weak.

The spoils available to party cadres remained infinitesimal due to the limited state powers that the Party in office could wield and the undeveloped state of the economy. Despite the limited nature of the spoils, Bustamante established the precedence of political victimization by assuming control of the pork-barrel Ministry of Works and allocated contracts and employment exclusively to those who rallied to the JLP's flag in a futile attempt to advance the cause of the Party and the union. Already, we observe the volatile nature of politics in Western Kingston. The people in Western Kingston demonstrated their dissatisfaction with the status quo by successfully removing from office the incumbent representative after every election. No political Party held their loyalty for more than five years. Not until the 1960s when the JLP in the post-independence period introduced the low-income housing scheme of Tivoli Gardens that Party loyalty deepens and that constituency is stripped of its former political volatility. But there were more demands being placed on the system than the system could supply. There were more people seeking governmental housing than there were units being constructed. Only die-hard JLP supporters received the spoils of government. This brutal policy created intra-class divisions among the mass of the population. Political

victimization had now been institutionalized in independent Jamaica. The Party that had control of state power could decide whether the living standards of a certain section of the population improved or not. Politics in Jamaica had become a life and death struggle.

FOOTNOTES

1. George E. Eaton, Alexander Bustamante and Modern Jamaica (Kingston Pub. Ltd. Jamaica, 1975) p 115
2. Ibid, p 116
3. Ibid, p 118
4. The Sunday Gleaner, April 2, 1978, p 10
5. George Eaton, op cit, p 120
6. Ibid, p 121
7. Ibid, p 129
8. Ibid, p 136 - 137
9. Ibid, p 137
10. Jeffrey Harrod, Trade Union Foreign Policy. A Study of the Activities of American and British Trade Unions in the Caribbean (Anchor Books 1972) p 38
11. The Sunday Gleaner, April 2, 1978, p 16
12. Ibid, p 10
13. Ibid, p 20

C H A P T E R VI

THE RISE IN VIOLENT CRIME DURING THE
1960s

By the middle 1960s, we witness a decline in the value consensus of Jamaican society. New social groups, like the Rastafarians and violent gangs who adhered to a sub-culture of violence began to emerge. People will not adhere to the dominant value system unless they are convinced that they are deriving some benefits from the existing division of labour. In a pre-modern society, a rural environment is usually characterized by low material expectations and a high degree of celestial fulfillment. The rise in crime and social rebellion reflected the cultural changes that the mass of the population living in the urban complex of Kingston and St. Andrew had undergone. Material values were now highly coveted and even though that penchant for religiosity persisted, religion took on a new form as expressed by Rastafarians and served to undermine the legitimacy of the state.

The statistics on crime compiled by the Department of Statistics fail to differentiate between violence of a political nature and violence that is of a social or economic nature. Undoubtedly social or economic violence is an indication of inequities in the political system but for our purposes I am not concerned with that. For our analytical purpose, I wish to distinguish violence of a political nature from armed robberies, murders, shootings etc. that may only be indirectly political. In this Chapter I am only concerned with the latter to prove that a sub-culture of violence did precede the large scale political turmoil that erupted in 1966 and that crimes against the person became a serious social problem by the middle of the 1960s.

The English scholar, Terry Lacey has argued quite unconvincingly why Jamaican society has become so violent. He attributed the non-political violence to frustration which was "always near the surface in many family and personal situations and that the underlying social and economic reasons for this frustration related mostly to the family pattern in a particular economic context".¹ Lacey listed a number of these incidents to illustrate his point. These included (1) a man was chopped to death by his half-brother with a machete during family dispute about whether the children should go to school or work on the farm (2) a man shot his son dead during a row over gambling losses and over the use of the car and then shot himself (3) a young girl murdered another over the ownership of a dress or skirt (4) a man killed a friend during domino game by hitting him on the head with a piece of board (5) and a motorist dragged another driver from his car after a minor collision and shot him.

What Lacey fails to point out is how the character of the violence changed during the mid-nineteen sixties. It was not just family disputes that accounted for the increasing crime rate, especially crimes of violence. Burglaries, armed robberies, rapes, shootings, murders, increased phenomenally during these years. To explain this by stating that the society was always violent and at times brutish is to say nothing.

Another social scientist, Aggrey Brown digs into the historical past to explain the violent predilection of Jamaican society:

the fact that slavery and colonialism were midwives of contemporary Jamaican society must be an important desideratum in any analysis of violence in the society. Not only because both phenomena determined the socio-economic structure of the society but also because they were both violent phenomena. That the Jamaican people suffered both for well over 300 years may well be testimony to their resiliency. Cultural nationalists seeking to exhort the Jamaican people to greatness would perhaps see it that way. Those wishing to understand and manage violence in contemporary Jamaica, however cannot afford to ignore the psychological linkages between both phenomena and what appears to be an endemic condition in the body-politic. 2

The Jamaican people resisted quite violently the institution of slavery until this dastardly system was abolished in 1834. But as I have explained in Chapter IV that the spirit of resistance that was cultivated during the era of slavery gave way to a spirit of accommodation to the colonial order. Except for the Paul Bogle Rebellion of 1865, the peasant population did not challenge the established division of labour. Interest groups among the peasantry were not formed for the express purpose of demanding a sweeping land redistribution program. There is no evidence to support the thesis that rural society in Jamaica is characterized by a great deal of inter-personal violence. Violent crime only reached epidemic proportions when a large body of lumpen-elements were bottled up in the wretched and teeming shanty towns that adorn the urban complex of Kingston and St. Andrew. Brown has gone further and asserted that the socialization of children, meaning specifically the tradition of flogging that is widely an accepted way to discipline children "have had effects on the collective consciousness of Jamaicans, many

of whom even today see the solution to the nation's problem³ in this regard as increasing the ante of state violence". The socialization of children could be a factor in creating a predisposition of violence but the flogging of children did not commence with the 1960s and dates as far back as during the era of slavery. We are arguing that the flogging of children does not explain why there was such a phenomenal increase in violent crimes during the 1960s.

An analysis of the lyrical contents of reggae music provides us with an insight into the cultural changes that the society was undergoing. Reggae music is basically a social history of Jamaican society in the last two decades. Since most of the reggae artists come from the working class poor or from the ranks of the lumpen-proletariat, the music that they compose reveal the new lumpen sub-culture.

The Rude Boy Phenomenon

The sub-culture of violence is often referred to as the rude boy phenomenon. Commenting on this development, Rex Nettleford stated:

Theirs is a secular social and political 'philosophy' that invokes the right to work, stresses the obligation that society has to the individuals born into it, demands equitable distribution of wealth with special consideration for the deprived black majority and calls for universal justice. 4

Nettleford presents the 'rude boy' in idealistic terms that is in fact contradicted by the 'rudies' passion for violence. The rude boy was not concerned with universal justice. He was preoccupied with his own economic survival and was not governed by any moral precepts. He was structurally excluded from gainful employment and the skills that he had acquired living in the 'ghetto' were not saleable in the marketplace but he could use his acquired ruthlessness to usurp or to appropriate the property of the more prosperous citizens. In many respects the rude boy and his passion for violence is an outgrowth of a developing society plagued by a chronic problem of surplus labour.

A popular reggae song during the 1960s was Desmond Dekker and the Aces' 007.

007, 007,
at ocean's eleven
rude boy a go wail
cause them out a jail
rude boy cannot get bail

Them a loot, them a shoot
them a wail, a shanty town
rude boy de pon probation, shanty town
rude boy a bomb up de town

Another case in point, Rupie Edwards' Rudie Get Bail glorifies the machismo image of the 'rude boy'.

Rudie don't fear
Rudie don't fear
Strong like lion
We is like iron
Rudies don't fear, no boy
Rudies don't fear

Peter Tosh's I'm the Toughest also lauded the jingoism of the 'rude boy'.

Anything you can do
I can do it better
I'm the toughest
I can do what
you can do
Never try to do
What I do
I'm the toughest.

The rude boy is reknown for his daring and is not terrified by the police or the state. As far as he is concerned, the state lacks legitimacy as it does not provide for his material needs. The 'rudie' is willing to challenge the system on an individual or a gang basis. The rudie fights the state of 'war' with youths from adjacent communities. Status in such an environment is related to cultivating a reputation for viciousness. There is very little sense of class consciousness. What is pronounced is a sense of turf, a willingness to defend turf or a member of the community.

In commenting on the connection between the sub-culture of violence and the Rastafarian, Nettleford states:

Many a rude boy consciously shared Rastafarian beliefs and practices and meandered quite comfortably between the religious escapism of Repatriation, Rastas and the secular and materialistic anarchy of the rudie youth. 5

The rude boy was fascinated by Rastafarian religiosity but he was a creature of a materialistic age and had to plunder

in order to satiate his material cravings. The religious folk culture did not correspond to the rude boy's contemporary environment. Divorced from any moral compunctions, the rude boy used violence to attain his objectives.

The state felt compelled to take drastic measures to cope with the upsurge of violent crime. Throughout Bustamante's political career, he had an ongoing battle with the police who he harangued for not being sympathetic to the Jamaica Labour Party. The security forces were overwhelmingly pro-People's National Party. In the 1967 general election the security forces voted 65.4 per cent for the PNP and 32.1 per cent for the JLP, the party who had control of state power at the time. 2.5 per cent of the ballots were deemed spoilt.⁶ Once Hugh Shearer assumed the office of Prime Minister in 1967, he tried to improve the relationship between the JLP and the police. With the increasing incidents of crime, the morale of the police department was critical to any effort to decrease crime. In a speech delivered at the Ward Theatre in May, 1967, Hugh Shearer gave the police the blessings of the State to take aggressive action against criminals.

I am a no-nonsense Prime Minister...
(I have) given orders to the police to proceed without reservation and without restrictions to tackle the problem of violence and to bring the wrong-doers to justice in whatever way it can be done. 7

In an address to the Police Federation, Prime Minister Shearer further stated 'When it comes to handling crime in this country I do not expect any policeman, when he tacks a criminal, to recite any Beatutude to him'⁸. Shearer and the police presumed that drastic action would reduce the rise in violent crime but as the statistics of the 1970s indicate despite harsh measures, crime has continued to rise. (See Table 6.4)

The situation deteriorated so badly in April, 1969 that the President of the Jamaica Employers Federation, Leslie Ashenheim called on the government to declare a State of Emergency. Ashenheim was fearful that crime would affect the investment climate:

I think the Government should be told that the general public of all classes is thoroughly fed up with the state of violent siege in which it now lives, that Government is daily losing support because it gives no evidence of any definite and effective action and that Government would have the entire country behind it in any action which gave promise of an immediate short-term remedy for the situation. Not only is life at danger, but business is threatened and our tourist positive character. 9

The then leader of the Opposition, Michael Manley reflected the state of fear that prevailed in the society and appointed a task force to study crime on a non-partisan basis under the chairmanship of a Roman Catholic priest, Father Roy Campbell. 10

Whereas the 'rude boy' phenomenon had at its disposal ratchet knives, by the late 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s, gun crimes had become prevalent. Many of the guns used in robberies were captured from private citizens. Senior Superintendent Richard Levy revealed to the public that in almost every instance a firearm was recovered from a criminal, the firearm was either lost or stolen from the responsible citizen. From 1965 to 1970 602 guns had been lost or stolen from citizens. Although Levy did not mention it, a fair percentage of the weapons and ammunition that circulate in the underworld are supplied by the Army and the police who sell hardware for profit.

In Table 6. 2 a proportion of the casualties caused by firearms from 1960 to 1969 is given. From 1960 to 65, the number increases from 19 to 52. From 1966 to 1969, the number of casualties from 1966 to 1969 in comparison to the earlier period reflect the political nature of the violence. Table 6.3 contains the figures of casualties caused by the security forces of the state would include the army and the police. Total casualties from police shooting increase from 1960 to 1965 and thereafter, the amount of casualties simply take-off. Again, we can use 1966 as a demarcation year. The data from Table 6.3 reflect the deteriorating relationship between the working class and non-working class poor and the state. There are more people challenging the authority of the state and the state is forced to take increasing measures of repression. One must understand that Jamaican policemen were not armed until the middle of

the 1960s when social order could only be maintained by arming the police force and using the army to assist an overworked police force. The data in Table 6.4 is more contemporary and shows the quantum leap of crimes of violence. These figures represent the shattering of the society's value consensus. The section of the lumpen-proletariat that adhered to a sub-culture of violence was becoming increasingly bold and the number of violent incidents was increasing every day. The economy was growing by leaps and bounds but so was the ranks of the lumpen-proletariat. This meant increasing numbers of people turned to crime as a livelihood or to politics hoping to benefit from the vicious policy of political victimization providing one's party was in power. A politicized gang whose party was in power could refrain from armed robberies as there might be sufficient spoils being filtered down by the party in the form of contracts, construction sites, public works projects etc. to satisfy the needs of the most favoured and influential members. But the favoured position that these people enjoyed was at the same time creating animosity among those who were supporters of the Party that did not control state power. Such a condition would definitely contribute to increase levels of violence. In addition the political gang would have to resort to other untoward measures in order to survive, further undermining the social fabric of the nation. A child growing up in the ghetto would observe that the more vicious, violent-prone members of the community were the ones who received the political or

TABLE 6. 1

Total Number of Casualties Recorded in Violent
Incidents 1960-69

Year	Incidents Without Reported Casualties	Incidents With Reported Casualties	Total Incidents	Percentage of Total 1960-69
1960	16	17	33	1.70
1961	27	37	64	3.30
1962	58	46	104	5.37
1963	57	57	114	5.89
1964	22	85	107	5.53
1965	34	112	146	7.55
1966	107	156	263	13.59
1967	115	352	467	24.13
1968	55	213	268	13.85
1969	53	316	369	19.07
Total	544	1,391	1,935	100.0

Source: Terry Lacey Violence and Politics in
Jamaica, 1960-70, Internal Security in
a Developing Country, P. 67

TABLE 6. 2

Proportion of Casualties Caused By
Firearms 1960 - 69

<u>Year</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>
1960	19	70.4
1961	26	51.0
1962	37	33.6
1963	48	45.7
1964	31	27.9
1965	52	32.9
1966	119	39.4
1967	202	44.2
1968	143	58.1
1969	206	51.6
Total	883	44.9

Source: Terry Lacey op cit, p. 70

TABLE 6. 3

Casualties Caused By The Gunfire of The Security
Forces

<u>Year</u>	<u>Total Casualties From Police Shooting</u>
1960	5
1961	15
1962	21
1963	21
1964	15
1965	14
1966	28
1967	44
1968	57
1969	79
Total	299

Source: Terry Lacey, Op cit, p. 72

TABLE 6. 4

Crimes of Violence 1970 - 71

<u>Year</u>	<u>Crimes of Violence</u>	<u>Murders</u>
1970-71	5,713	152
1971-72	11,093	145
1972-73	11,474	188
1973-74	15,869	232
1974-75	12,949	207
1975-76	12,864	291

Sources: Compiled from the Jamaican Yearbook
of Statistics 1970-76

non-political rewards and thus aspire to imitate that form of behaviour.

I am suggesting that although it is analytically useful to distinguish between direct political violence and social, economic violence on the other hand, they are inter-related. Political gangs that are removed from having access to state power are forced to commit economic crimes and usually attack gang rivals who are enjoying the fruits of the Party in power. It becomes very difficult for class based politics to emerge in this type of political setting. The mass of the population are divided among themselves, fighting for the crumbs that fall from the tables of exalted politicians. The status quo is being preserved at the same time that the status quo is being undermined. The politicians themselves recognize the deteriorating situation but are so caught up in the fierce competition for control of the state that they are willing to sanction any deed if it increases the chance of the Party emerging the victor at the next election.

A sub-culture of violence did emerge prior to the politicizing of the lumpen-proletariat but the coopting of this social class has given the political system a violent dimension that during the periods of heightened political activity, order can only be maintained through the use of extra-constitutional measures. In Chapter 7, we shall examine how political victimization and political violence have corrupted the democratic system.

FOOTNOTES

1. Terry Lacey, Violence and Politics in Jamaica 1960-70
Frank Cass and Co. 1977 p. 75
2. Aggrey Brown's Review of Terry Lacey's Violence and Politics
in Jamaica 1960 - 70. Transaction, Inc. Sept/Oct 1978, p.93
3. Ibid, p. 93
4. Rex Nettleford, Mirror, Mirror, p. 96
5. Ibid, p. 96
6. Terry Lacey, op. cit, p. 137
7. Ibid, p. 138
8. Ibid, p. 138
9. The Daily Gleaner, 30 April, 1969
10. The Daily Gleaner, 12 November, 1969
11. The Daily Gleaner, 14 Jan. 1970

C H A P T E R V I I

POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN THE 1967 ELECTION

The 1967 Election was the first held in the post-independent period. The Jamaica Labour Party had obtained a majority of the seats in Parliament in the 1962 Election that was held to decide which Party would be the first to govern the sovereign nation of Jamaica. This meant that the Party in power for the first time could govern without being accountable to the colonial office. The Jamaican government was free to perform as an actor on the stage of international politics. The state could embark on a more energetic attempt at developing the economy and in seeking developmental loans abroad.

In a competitive two party political system like Jamaica, the Party in power is mindful that the policies adopted will ensure the Party's re-electability when they face the electorate the next time around. On assuming office in 1962 the Jamaica Labour Party pursued in a systematic way the policy of political victimization. The role of the state had expanded in the independence period and this meant that there would be more 'spoils' to go around for party supporters. A decision was made by the JLP government to begin construction on a low-income housing scheme to be constructed in the constituency of Western Kingston. This was to be a million dollar scheme. There would not only be money for contractors and work for construction labourers but the finished product would be reserved for party loyalists. I am suggesting that the paramount concern of the governing party was not to alleviate the wretchedness of housing conditions in Western Kingston but to construct a political base for the Jamaica Labour Party that would make that constituency a safe seat for the

JLP in the future elections. It was presumed that those who were excluded from getting any of the governmental largesse, would simply tuck-in their tails and begin to support the Party that wielded this enormous amount of power. Rather than this occurring, what in fact was the consequence of this policy of victimization was that those who were discriminated against would be willing to vehemently fight against this form of political genocide. This was tantamount to a declaration of war. One's political affiliation could decide one's material well-being.

If members of the lumpen-proletariat were convinced that there were alternative means available other than obtaining 'favours' through the Party in power, this policy of victimization would not have led to such bloody consequences. Despite the high economic growth rates of the 1960s, the unemployment ranks were swelling. Lumpen elements saw the opportunities available in political activity. This was the way to escape the economic misery of the ghetto and they eagerly latched on to the politician's pantaloons. People in a desperate situation were literally fighting for their lives and the policies especially in Western Kingston and St. Andrew took on a violent complexion. The situation developed its own momentum to the extent that it became impossible to engage in political activity in that section of the urban complex without the support of lumpen-gangs. It is important to point out that once people are recruited to fight politics, it does not mean that after the election is over they will return to a state of being meek and mild. The gun used to fight politics can be used in other illicit activities.

Were the politicians mindful of that? The politicians and the rival political organization were not concerned with that. These parties were formed for the primary purpose of winning elections and the behaviour of both political parties from 1966 to 1976 confirms that thesis. The parties involved in the violent incidents blamed each other, each professing his own innocence. This chapter presents a brief overview of elections in Jamaica from 1944 to 1976 and examines the bloody elections of 1967. It is during this first post-independence elections that we are suggesting that political violence undergoes serious qualitative changes.

Political Elections in Jamaica 1944-76

Jamaica has developed a strong two party system and competition for control of state power gets exceedingly fierce. There exist some evidence that the democratic system is institutionalized and already on three occasions (1955, 1962 and 1972) power has been transferred peacefully from one party to another. In addition the founders of the JLP and the PNP, Alexander Bustamante and Norman Manley respectively are deceased yet both political parties have continued to command the loyalty of the Jamaican electorate. Both the democratic system and the political parties are deeply rooted in the society.

There has hitherto been a total of eight universal suffrage elections held on the island, five during the colonial period (1944, 1949, 1955, 1959 and 1962) and three during the independence period (1967, 1972 and 1976). The JLP won elections in 1944

TABLE 7.1
General Election Results 1944-76

	<u>Votes</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Seats</u>
<u>1944</u>			
JLP	144,661	41.4	22
Ind.	104,814	30.0	5
PNP	82,029	23.5	5
JDP	14,123	4.1	-
Others	3,500	1.0	-
<u>1949</u>			
PNP	203,048	43.5	13
JLP	199,538	42.7	17
Agriculture & Industry Party	4,683	1.0	-
United Party of Jamaica	1,120	0.2	-
Independents	58,790	12.6	2
<u>1955</u>			
PNP	245,750	50.5	18
JLP	198,929	39.03	14
National Labour Party	6,004	1.23	-
Farmer's Party	19,629	3.91	-
People's Freedom Movement	1,737	0.36	-
Right Party	108	0.02	-
Independents	24,089	4.95	-

Continuation of Table 7.1

	<u>Votes</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Seats</u>
<u>1959</u>			
PNP	305,642	54.8	29
JLP	247,149	44.3	16
Independent Labour	4,595	0.82	-
Others	408	0.08	-
<u>1962</u>			
JLP	288,130	50.04	26
PNP	279,771	48.59	19
PPP	4,955	0.86	-
Independents	2,9333	0.51	-
<u>1967</u>			
JLP	224,180	50.65	33
PNP	217,207	49.08	20
Others	1,185	0.27	-
<u>1972</u>			
PNP	417,768		47
JLP	318,180		13

Source: Compilation of Chief Electoral Officer Reports - 1944-72

1949, 1962 and 1967. The PNP triumphed at the polls in 1955, 1959, 1972 and 1976. Thus there has developed a pattern in Jamaica that governments are changed approximately every ten years. In a meticulous study of the Jamaican political system, Sydney Reid surmised at the beginning of the 1960s that "the political climate is a very healthy one and all factors point to a greater development and strengthening of politics and the two party system..if effective, intelligent and democratic leadership is maintained"¹. Although the two party system is entrenched, beginning in the 1967 election, politics in Jamaica has become increasingly violent and dysfunctional.

Beginning in 1949, the PNP commanded the loyalty of the majority of voters in the Kingston and St. Andrew region. In that election PNP won five of the six seats in Kingston and St. Andrew. Because of the internal migration of people to the cities, a greater number of seats had to be proportioned to the Kingston and St. Andrew region. While in control of state power, the JLP have been careful to limit the amount of representation allotted to the cities. In 1962, the Kingston and St. Andrew region was allotted 10 seats out of a total of 45. In 1967, the House of Representatives was expanded to 53 constituencies but of the additional eight seats only one was allotted to the Kingston and St. Andrew region. The PNP defeated the JLP in 1972 and increased the number of seats in Parliament to 60. Of the additional 7 seats created, 4 were allotted to the

Kingston and St. Andrew area where the PNP are traditionally strong and the JLP abysmally weak.

Whichever party is in control of state power at the time of a general election, constituency boundaries are drawn in such a manner as to enhance the possibility of victory at the polls. This is an age-old practice in electoral democracies and by itself, the peculiar carving of constituency boundaries is not tantamount to political corruption but rest somewhere in the grey area of authority manoeuvring. From the electoral results (See Table 7.1) the returns reveal that from 1949 the PNP polled more votes than the JLP but won only 13 seats to the JLP's 17. This percentage increase for the PNP continued until 1962 when they managed to obtain only 48% of the vote in comparison to the JLP's 50%.

The leader of the PNP in the 1950s, Norman Manley supported the notion of Pan-Caribbeanism and was one of the architects of the West Indian Federation. The rancor that developed over the extent of powers to be concentrated into the hands of the federal government caused many Jamaicans to doubt the wisdom of the Federation. The politically astute Bustamante withdrew his support for the Federation and demanded that Jamaica seek independence on its own. The Jamaican electorate never really understood the nuances of Federation and were apprehensive about

this venture sponsored by the British colonial office. By withdrawing support from the Federation, Bustamante and the JLP captured the nationalist movement from the PNP and in the Referendum held on the question of Federation in 1961, the majority of voters reject the advice of the PNP and opted for withdrawal.

The rejuvenated JLP came to power in 1962 taking 26 of the 45 contested seats. Of the 10 seats contested in Kingston and St. Andrew the JLP was able to win only two - Western Kingston and South-Western St. Andrew. In the constituency of Western Kingston, there were 14,023 registered voters and 11,451 votes were cast. The JLP won 5,851 votes and the PNP 5,171 which meant that the JLP candidate won by a margin of 680 votes. The remaining votes went to two other third party candidates. In South-Western St. Andrew (this constituency is adjacent to Western Kingston) there were 29,133 registered voters and a total of 21,795 votes cast. Of these the PNP won 8,951 and the JLP candidate polled 11,913.² The JLP candidate won by a margin of over 2,000 votes.

In 1967, the JLP won 33 seats to the PNP's 20 although they obtained only 50.65 per cent of the vote in comparison to the PNP's 49.08. By 1967, the JLP had become a besieged party which could only maintain control of state power by tampering with the democratic right of citizens to exercise their franchise. In 1962 there was a total of 796,476 registered voters on the

electoral list. Yet by 1967, only 543,307 people remained on the electoral list, a decrease of 253,169. In actuality 580,517 voted in 1962 while in 1967, 446,815, a reduction of 134,702. One must take into consideration that this was occurring at a time when the population was increasing and the British government had passed legislation making it extremely difficult for Jamaicans to migrate to Britain as they did during the 1950s.

The constitution stipulates that any Jamaican citizen over the age of 21 years or a citizen of the Commonwealth who has resided in Jamaica more than one year is entitled to the right to vote. In 1963 the JLP government introduced and passed an amendment to the Representation of the People Law which gave the government the right to declare specific areas of the country as 'prescribed areas'. What this meant was that the system of uniformly registering voters was abandoned. In areas designated 'prescribed areas' the prospective voter would have to be finger-printed, photographed, and then registered. In non-prescribed areas, finger-printing and photographs were not necessary. The rationale the JLP government gave for this new system of registration in 'prescribed areas' was to eliminate the prevalence of bogus voting which they claimed was rampant in the Kingston and St. Andrew region. The corporate area (Kingston & St. Andrew) was designated a prescribed zone. This cumbersome system of registering voters afforded the JLP the opportunity to disenfranchise voters deemed PNP loyalists by refusing to register them or conveniently losing the necessary papers. In addition, the reduction in registered

voters in Kingston and St. Andrew would negate the necessity to apportion additional seats to the growing metropolis. This tampering with the registration system is an illegitimate use of power and an example of the abuse of state power by a party in an attempt to perpetuate itself in office.

The fierce electoral competitiveness forced the JLP government to further abuse state power in order to remain in office. We have already noted the importance that Bustamante attached to the pork-barrel Ministry of Works that he personally assumed the portfolio of that Ministry. With modernization of the economy, the size of the government's budget also increased, enabling the public sector to undertake programmes that would improve to some extent the living conditions of the masses of poor people. Although the JLP adhered to a conservative philosophy of government to maintain credibility they had to foster an image of populism. Provision was always made in the budget to spend a certain sum of money on public work projects around Christmas time. Undoubtedly there were always more people chasing these jobs than they were jobs available. In 1964, the Riot Squad had to be summoned to maintain order over the allocation of four hundred 'bushing' jobs. In 1965, the JLP government allocated £300,000 for Christmas work but only allotted £54,000 for the metropolitan region of Kingston and St. Andrew which was dominated by the PNP. This was clearly a policy of victimization aimed at limiting the spoils of government trickling down to the voters in the corporate area. The JLP government was using these programmes to consolidate the strength of the party and to punish PNP loyalists.

The year 1966 was characterized by a litany of strikes. On April 4, 1966 the National Worker's Union called a postal strike and the JLP government sacked the strikers and recruited 'scabs'. A number of violent incidents took place at Half-Way-Tree, Cross Roads and on Hagley Park Road.

In an attempt to consolidate power, the JLP pursued a policy of giving work only to members of the Bustamante Industrial Trade Union on construction sites under the auspices of the state. The leader of the Trade Union Congress, Hopeton Caven militantly opposed this policy of victimization and in the company of 500 unemployed construction workers, he marched on a construction site in Harbour Street where the government was building new administrative offices for National Insurance which at the time fell under the portfolio of the Ministry of Labour. The workers demanded to be hired and the Jamaica Defense Force was mobilized and the unemployed workers dispersed. These enraged workers went on a two hour rampage, smashing six government buildings. The headquarters of the BITU was attacked and the seat of the Legislature - Gordon House was invaded. The Government Employment Bureau was left in a state of shambles.

The Acting Prime Minister Donald Sangster issued a statement exhorting the police to deal firmly with violators of the law.

We have labored to build a stable society in Jamaica in which all persons are free to walk the streets of our country on their legitimate business at any time of the day or night without being molested and threatened.

To revitalize the area of Western Kingston, the JLP government intended to construct the low-income housing scheme of Tivoli Gardens and an industrial park complex. This meant thousands of squatters who were living on the Foreshore Road which included Back-O-Wall would have to be removed. It was the JLP's contention that the squatter settlement of Back-O-Wall was a stronghold of the PNP. The destruction of the settlement and the displacement of the lumpen-proletariat would secure the constituency of Western Kingston for the JLP. The destruction of the settlement and the displacement of the lumpen-proletariat would secure the constituency of Western Kingston for the JLP. As we noted previously, no candidate before 1967 had won that constituency consecutively. The squatters along the Foreshore Road were given notice to move but having no where else to go they decided to resist.

On June 14, 1966, political gangs fought a battle on the streets exchanging dynamite and molotov cocktails. ⁸ A contingent of 100 policemen was rushed to quell the disorder. The Member of Parliament for the constituency of Western Kingston and Minister of Development and Welfare interpreted the violence in this way:

The police should know the background of violence in West Kingston, featuring for the first time in our history the use of dynamite as a weapon against people. This outbreak began over the past week-end between two PNP gangs, one located in the squatter section of the Foreshore Road (where the vote is 90% PNP) and the other in the Boys Town Settlement of squatters. There was no political motive behind this occurrence at that time, the clash was based purely on a domestic conflict between these gangs. ⁹

The Minister of Development and Welfare found it prudent to warn the PNP vis-a-vis their aggression:

The JLP has not retaliated to this unprovoked attack which could have had mass killings but I hope the PNP will find someone's shoulder to cry on if they are taught the hard way that what falls from their heads will roll on their shoulders.

People cannot be expected to sit back and watch peaceful persons slaughtered like fish by dynamite in West Kingston and I accuse the PNP of starting something merciless and cruel - the end result of which is unknown and may very well provoke massive retaliation and death. Because I know the seriousness of the consequences involved, I have tried to exercise control over any threats of retaliation, but I doubt that I will be able to continue to do so if there are further provocations of this type from the PNP. 10

The PNP caretaker for the constituency of Western Kingston, Dudley Thompson was also concerned about the escalating nature of the violence. Thompson declared:

The position has become very dangerous. There is a close link between a growing criminal wave of terrorism and political machinations. I am giving a loud and clear warning that unless, now, immediately, strong steps were taken - Jamaica is going to see her good name destroyed in disgrace in the eyes of all right thinking Jamaicans. I have been uttering the warning for over eighteen months. the harm and destruction will not be limited to one section of this city. 11

Both Seaga and Thompson were aware of the deteriorating situation yet they failed to arrive at a modus vivendi. They recognize how damaging the widespread violence would be on the constituency and ultimately on the society. Nevertheless, they were two men competing for control of the same turf. Aside from rhetoric, both men were capable only of identifying with the narrow

interest of his respective political organization. As tension mounted between the two competing factions, the respective supporters were making sure that they were adequately armed. In this regard, we can discern at this particular juncture in 1966, a qualitative change in the history of Jamaican political violence. The weapons change hands from sticks and stones to a systematic use of revolvers and dynamite. The pressure increased on the Party organizations in the community to acquire guns and ammunition for their strong-arm supporters.

On June 22, 1966, the Daily Gleaner reported that a PNP gang invaded the ongoing building scheme at Tivoli Gardens and protested against the policy of victimization being practised by the JLP government. The houses that were already completed on the low-income housing scheme were exclusively allotted to JLP supporters raising the ire of PNP supporters. The security forces deployed a surprise pre-dawn raid on the shanty town at Foreshore Road and apprehended 35 persons including the chairman of the Rastafarian Movement, Sam Brown.¹² The 3,000 squatters were served further Notice that the area would be bull-dozed in ten days. Dudley Thompson, Dr. B.M. Douglas, President of the Council of Afro-Jamaican Affairs, and Church leaders called for a deferment until plans for the proper rehabilitation of the displaced were finalised. The Prime Minister temporarily postponed the eviction Notice. Nevertheless the violence continued and the Gleaner reported July 1, 1966 that two gangs clashed in Western Kingston along Wellington Street, Tulip Lane and Charles Street. Six persons suffered wounds from machetes and gunshots. The JLP government moved against the squatters on July 12, 1966. Dr. Leonard Barrett witnessed the event and reported:

On the morning of July 12, 1966, at precisely 9.00 A.M. a regiment of 250 police from all over the city assembled at the Denham Town Police Station, opposite Back-O-Wall. Armed with guns, bayonets, pistols and

clubs, the scene resembled a preparation for battle. Squatters caught without notice saw several bulldozers roaring down the street toward their dilapidated shacks and, with the sharp deployment of the police at key points in the area, the government "clean-up" campaign began. When it finally dawned on the "shantyites" that judgment day had arrived, many made a mad rush to save their few belongings. For the most part, others stood in amazement and watched their homes of many years reduced to rubble by the giant machines. 13

Housing the Poor

Tivoli Gardens was the first low-income housing scheme constructed by the government since the early 1940s. A private construction company, West Indies Contractors Ltd. built a low-income housing scheme in Duhaney Park in the mid-nineteen sixties. The first phase of that project consisted of 1,500 units and the second phase entailed 815 two-storeyed terraced homes and 67 bungalows. The Duhaney Park Housing Scheme is located in North-western St. Andrew and the allotment of housing was not tinged with political corruption.

The largest of the private housing schemes was Harbour View constructed in Eastern Kingston for the middle income. The Harbour View development covered 387 acres which encompassed a shopping centre and 1,859 detached homes. 14 Other private schemes included Pembroke Hall and Elletson Flats. These schemes were made possible by the Mortgage Insurance Law 26, which was passed in 1960. This law created the Development Finance Corporation "through 15 which the Government guaranteed mortgage for privately developed housing". Despite the seeming boom in housing construction, it was not keeping pace with the expanding population.

The Town Planning Department estimated

that between 1961 and 1971, 5,000 new houses would be required each year merely to keep pace with population growth, excluding construction needed to reduce over-crowding and replace deteriorated housing which affected some 60, 000 of the metropolitan population in 1962. The actual number of conventional dwelling built between 1961-65 fell short of the requirement by almost 18,000.¹⁶

A plethora of shanty towns emerged in Kingston and St. Andrew. The shanty towns lack the amenities of urban civilization. The homes or shacks are usually devoid of piped water and toilet facilities. A single stand-pipe usually serves the needs of hundreds of people. It was the Member of Parliament for West Kingston, Mr. Eddie Seaga who stated that "housing needs are the major requirements of Western Kingston ...".¹⁷ Low-income housing was a desperate need of the working class and non-working class poor. Politicians used this desperate need to build constituencies with impregnable power base. Housing would be distributed to supporters of the party in control of state power. It meant that the party supporter could point to some concrete benefit that he had derived from the party organization which could serve to further entrench his loyalty. The party supporter was aware of the scarcity of these "spoils" and his developed passion for political activity was not based on changing the social structure or a more equitable distribution of wealth. For the party loyalist, that must have appeared abstract. He was engaged in his own battle for survival and the rules of the game had been set by those who made the laws and his duty was to manoeuvre to the best of his ability to procure the necessities of life. It meant that his survival was dependent on the largesse derived from the party and thus he was willing to perform any deed in order to secure the position of privilege that he enjoyed having established a 'life-line' to the halls

of power. Obviously such a pivotal position could only be occupied by a few and even among party supporters the offerings from the state were woefully insufficient as the demand far exceeded the supply. The distribution capabilities of a society still in the early stages of industrial development cannot suffice the demand being placed on the political system even in the case of Jamaica when the state distributes benefits such as low-income housing, contracts, jobs etc. preferentially to party supporters. Corruption of this form alienates those who are excluded from the spoils system and sets up an explosive antagonistic relationship between rival political groups that detonate into chronic violence especially when those groups are living in juxtaposition to each other and the prevailing sub-cultural system is pre-disposed towards violence.

The building site where the low-income houses were being constructed in Tivoli Gardens was frequently under attack in 1966. Not only was work on the site given only to members of the BITU., but homes on completion were distributed only to JLP loyalist. On July 29, 1966 the Gleaner reported that a gang wielding machetes attacked the Tivoli Gardens construction site and two people were injured. Violence in West Kingston, South-west St. Andrew and South St. Andrew continued until up to the general elections held in February 1967. To give some insight into the intensity of the violence we will present the information in the form of a chronicle of events as gleaned from the Daily Gleaner.

1. August 15, 1966 - Gleaner reported that a group of men identified as PNP were observed taking new revolvers from a carton box marked Nutrament.
2. August 17, 1966 - 36 year old Alexander Brown of 11½ Ralph Lane, New Town was shot in the right thigh.
3. Broadcast by Eddie Seaga, Member of Parliament for West Kingston. The Cancer in West Kingston - no way to deal with it but with a surgeon's knife.

4. Winston Blake, 24, handyman charged with the murder of Albert Brown, a JLP supporter.
5. August 29, 1966 - two incidents of shootings reported in the Denham Town - Trench Town area.
6. August 31, 1966 - 22 year old Claudie Massop of 22 Victoria Street, Rae Town, wounded in the chest after a gang of five gunmen in the Red Rooster Club, Tower Street, attacked him. Massop was charged with shooting Leaford Raphael of 33 Wellington Street who was shot in the chest in mid-August.
7. September 6, 1966 - three more shooting incidents occurred in Denham Town. Both the JLP and PNP Headquarters were attacked.
8. September 17, 1966 - Inspector Donald Powell in charge of Western Kingston revealed that since June 1, 1966 there were thirty-nine cases of shootings with intent and four people had died of gunshot wounds. Lloyd Bramwell of 2 Trinity Lane, Denham Town Norman Smith of Regent Street were arrested for having 2 calibre 38 pistols in their possessions. The PNP caretaker for the West Kingston constituency, Dudley Thompson defended the accused.
9. October 1, 1966 - Mr. Rudolph Lewis otherwise known as 'Zackie', otherwise known as the "High Priest" and recognized as the leading JLP gunman in West Kingston was shot dead. Rudolph 'Zackie' Lewis lived in the Jones Town area at 39½ Poyatt Street and on his way home around 4 o'clock in the afternoon he was attacked by four armed men. He ran into Poyatt Street and drew his revolver and started firing. The barrel of 'Zackie's' guns fell out and he was gunned down.

October 3, 1966 - Douglas Campbell also known as "Little Keith", a leading member of the Viking gang found murdered with a 38 revolver and four rounds of ammunition. Campbell was alleged to be one of the four men who murdered Rudolph Lewis. A bomb exploded in Queen's Theatre and injured thirteen persons. Twenty other persons were injured during that night of escalating violence. Obviously the escalation of the violence was related to the death of 'Zackie' Lewis, a JLP 'topranking'.

October 4, 1966 - The JLP government declared a State of Emergency in West Kingston. The Emergency zone included Milk Lane in the west, Tulip Lane in the north, Oxford Street in the East and Charles Street in the south. The entire area was placed under curfew from 10.00 p.m. to 6.00 a.m. The army was called in to assist the police. The security forces were given the power to block roads, divert traffic, stop, search and detain persons, to enter houses, offices, business without warrants. In other word the civil liberties enshrined in the Jamaica Constitution were temporarily suspended for the residents of the politically torn region. The Security forces were given permission to raid the party headquarters

of the PNP and JLP in the cordoned off area. The Minister of Home Affairs Anthony McNeil refused to disclose what was found at the respective party headquarters.

October 9, 1966 - The police and military cordon lifted around the Trench Town section of the Emergency area of Western Kingston.

October 10, 1966 - Norman Manley, leader of the PNP Opposition in support of the JLP government's action stated:

The first thing we have to do for the future when all this violence is stamped out is to bind the wounds of the past and heal the spirit of the nation and try to bring a little unity into Jamaica. A house divided against itself cannot stand. Jamaicans shooting down Jamaicans is a danger for the future. I do not know where we will end. This is a wicked policy that when a government gets into power, it seeks to destroy everybody in the other side; it only supports its people and leaves everybody to starve.

October 12 - 1966 - Dudley Thompson officially barred from entering the area of West Kingston. Thompson had attended the funeral of 'Little Keith' Campbell.

October 19, 1966 - Donald Sangster, the Acting Prime Minister for the ailing Bustamante rationalised the political violence in West Kingston when he stated "All violence, all the activities in Western Kingston have stemmed from a desire to remove the incumbent member of Western Kingston not by peaceful ballot but by violence". The Acting Prime Minister spoke as if he were oblivious to the policy of political victimization, a long standing party practice incidentally instituted by the founder of the JLP.

October 13, 1966 - The Ministry of Home Affairs released the contents of what was found at the Party Headquarters of the JLP and PNP respectively. At the Headquarters of the JLP on Wellington Street the following items were found:

- 4 cutlasses
- 4 lengths of plaited electric cable
- 1 home-made bomb
- 1 milk tin containing grey powder, stone and metal
- 2 spent cartridges
- 1 38 revolver
- 1 32 revolver
- 1 toy gun
- 1 life size replica of a 9 mm luger
- 2 pistol butt plates
- 1 cane knife

- 1 spent home-made bomb
- a large quantity of charred thunderbolt cases
the powder having been extracted
- 1 sheet of plywood with the figure of a man
drawn on it and pierced with 5 bullet holes
- 4 spent cartridges with bullets reinserted
- 1 empty 38 cartridge case
- 2 unfired bullets

The following items were found at the PNP Headquarters on Regent Street.

- 1 home-made bomb
- 1 milk tin filled with glass, stones and chinese crackers
- 7 machetes
- 4 ratchet knives
- 1 stick of dynamite
- 6 molotov cocktails
- 1 detonator
- 1 long baton weighted with metal

No one was found at the JLP Headquarters when the raid was carried out yet 35 people were apprehended, 15 of which had criminal records when the Security forces raided the PNP Headquarters. This is not fortuitous but is an indication that the JLP supporters had knowledge of the raid beforehand. This information could either be gotten from JLP government officials or by the monitoring of the security forces broadcast. The deployment of troops in West Kingston and the extraordinary powers given the joint police-military operations put a temporary end to the political violence. A total of 400 suspects were held at the Denham Town Police Station, 110 were released after interrogation. Detention orders were issued against 45 persons, 50 firearms seized, 800 ammunition and 66 sticks of dynamite were discovered. In addition, the Security forces seized -

- 3 detonators
- 2 lengths of safety fuse for exploding dynamite
- 83 ratchet knives
- 4 blackjacks
- 2 knuckle dusters
- 8 home-made bombs

8 molotov cocktails
a great number of machetes and knives
a number of toy guns.
a quantity of ganja and chillum pipes

Norman Manley addressed the subject of violence in the House of Representatives on October 19, 1966. Manley recalled the early years of political violence and how Bustamante and himself had issued a joint statement which was a factor in putting an end to the violence. Manley mentioned that the elections held in 1949, 1955, 1959 and 1962 were characterized by fierce
18
combativeness but were indeed peaceful.

The decrease in political violence in the troubled area so impressed the government that the State of Emergency which was declared October 4, 1966 was lifted on November 2, 1966. The departure of the Security force from the area merely enabled the politicized lumpen-proletariat to settle old scores.

November 15, 1966 - Kenneth 'Rashie' Green, PNP supporter was murdered at James Bond Lawn at 32 Fleet Street. 'Rashie' Green was one of the leading strong-arm PNP supporters.

November 19, 1966 - Desmond Page of 12 Elgin Street, Denham Town was charged with the murder of Kenneth 'Rashie' Green. Page was turned in by his father after being threatened by PNP supporters.

December 5, 1966 - Four shot dead at a dance in West Kingston. The Gleaner reported that the motive was robbery and not political but by this time it had become difficult to distinguish gang conflict of a non-political nature from political violence as most of the gangs had been politicized.

January 26, 1967 - At a JLP meeting at Half-Way-Tree, Eddie Seaga sustained a deep cut on the right forehead after the crowd reacted violently to an arrest made by a police officer. The crowd attacked the police and Seaga threw himself on top of the policeman and was injured by a bottle aimed at the police officer.

January 29, 1967 - Two shootings were reported in West Kingston.

February 2, 1967 - The branch office of the JLP was bombed on Drummond Street and soon thereafter the PNP head office was also bombed.

February 3, 1967 - In an attempt to restore political tranquility the candidates in the more explosive constituencies of Central Kingston, Dudley Thompson (PNP) Eddie Seaga (JLP) South-west St. Andrew Hopeton Caven (PNP) Clem Tavares (JLP) South St. Andrew Vernon Arnett (PNP) Eugene Parkinson (JLP) signed a 'peace' telegram which stated:

My Party and I myself personally hereby denounce violence as a part of Jamaica's national politics and as any part of the forthcoming general election and I call upon all my supporters and followers to help in putting a complete stop to political lawlessness and violence.

This was indeed a charade. The desire for peace did not go to the root of the matter but was idealism completely divorced from realpolitik. The politicians involved had already set something in motion which they themselves even if they wanted to could not immediately stop. The intra-class dialectic initially precipitated by parties competing for state power, had developed a life of its own. The lumpen-proletariat involved simply paid no heed to the telegram which was intended for middle class consumption and to preserve the integrity of the candidates involved.

February 4, 1967 - A mob attacked the pay office of Marley and Plant Ltd. at the building site at Tivoli Gardens. The man threw stones, bottles and home-made bombs.

February 5, 1967 - four men and a boy were shot during a clash between PNP and JLP supporters.

February 7, 1967 - PNP supporters once again returned to Tivoli Gardens building site demanding the right to work. In addition to that incident two men were hospitalised with gunshot wounds and two others treated. Wayne Smellie of 13 Rose Lane was shot in the left leg but managed to escape when he was chased by a group of JLP supporters (Smellie was later killed in a shoot-out in Brooklyn). At the time of his shooting, Wayne Smellie was posting up PNP propaganda posters along the walls and fences of the street.

February 11, 1967 - Eight suspects wanted for political violence in Western Kingston were apprehended by the police. Claudie Massop, a leading JLP gunman was charged with shooting with intent at Balfour Mighty at Regent Street and Charles Street. Carlton Laing was arrested for shooting with intent at Wayne Smellie. The police also arrested Roy Dacres, who absconded bail and Leroy 'Hunchie' Tyrell was arrested for a breach of the Public Order.

February 13, 1967 - A motorcade passing through West Kingston, led by Norman Manley was fired on. Six to eight shots were fired at the motorcade. Horace Campbell, 19 years old was shot in the right arm. The police riot party retaliated with tear gas.

Elections were held on February 21, 1967 and the JLP although failing to win a majority of the votes cast, won a majority of the constituencies. The electoral results for the four violent prone constituencies were:

Table VII -2 - Violent-Prone Constituencies 1967

Central Kingston

Michael Manley	PNP	4,367
E. K. Powell	JLP	4,324
Plurality of		43

West Kingston

Eddie Seaga	JLP	4,729
Dudley Thompson	PNP	1,957
Plurality of		2,772

South-west St. Andrew

Clem Tavares	JLP	7,485
Hope-ton Caven	PNP	4,152
Plurality of		3,333

South St. Andrew

Eugene Parkinson	JLP	4,170
Vernon Arnett	PNP	3,522
Plurality of		548

Source: Report of the Chief Electoral Officer 1967

When one examines the contest in West Kingston, one is surprised at the significant margin won by the Member of Parliament for the constituency

Mr. Eddie Seaga. The PNP were narrowly defeated in West Kingston in 1962 when they obtained 5,171 votes to the JLP's 5,851. Because the constituency boundaries were carefully carved to benefit the JLP candidate, with the bulldozing and destruction of PNP strongholds, and the placing of JLP supporters in the low-income housing scheme of Tivoli Gardens, by 1967 West Kingston had become a highly impregnable JLP fortress.

Although strong arm tactics were used, E. K. Powell, JLP candidate in Central Kingston lost to Michael Manley. In the election of 1962, the constituency of Central Kingston was divided into East Central and West-Central. For that election the PNP had the state prerogative of drawing and splitting constituencies. The constituencies were merged as Central Kingston in the 1967 election. Powell strong arm tactics made it a very close race. The JLP had neglected the traditional PNP constituencies of East and Central Kingston and if Powell had some concrete benefits to give members of the constituency beyond the routine, he certainly would have been able to defeat Michael Manley.

The violence of the 1967 election demonstrated closely how much the society had changed in the post-independence period. The JLP attempted not only to corrupt the lumpen-proletariat but during these years there is much interference with the army and the police. The army troops who were deployed in West Kingston were under the command of Inspector Joe Williams. This Inspector, was in charge of the Denham Town Police Station and Williams was a supporter of the JLP. In performing his duty, Williams made certain not to alienate Eddie Seaga. In fact during the course of the election, a particular candidate in West Kingston was caught by an army officer in the act of handing out ammunition to his guerilla' warriors at Chocomo Lawn. Because of civilian

control of the army and the fact that army officers do not have the power of arrest, the candidate was not charged with this dastardly crime. The army officer was immediately transferred from the troubled area and the matter laid to rest.¹⁹ The hierachy of the army and the police were aware of these violations of law but they held their silence. Officers were more concerned with careerism which would be damaged if they protested against the manner in which the army and the police were used in West Kingston during the 1967 election.

Politics had entered the army and the police force and factions of the respective security force provided the party of choice with top secret information. The JLP had access to army and police communication sets and there were able to keep one step of the security forces at all times. It can be assumed that a number of guns and ammunition were made available to gunmen fighting for a JLP electoral victory. It is not surprising that when the PNP won the 1972 election, Inspector Joe Williams was promptly replaced with a PNP loyalist.

Political violence in 1967 did not constitute a series of isolated incidents. From the cooperation that Eddie Seaga received from the police and the army, one can deduce that this was sanctioned party policy approved by the Prime Minister and Cabinet. It is not surprising that whenever JLP spokesmen addressed the issue of political violence no mention was made of political victimization. This policy was now critical for the JLP to maintain control of state power. The notion that 'parson mus christen him pickney first' had become standard operating procedure. Political parties of the conventional type are formed with the express purpose of winning

control of state power. There is an organizational dynamic to this, to the extent that the control of state power becomes the *raison d'etre*. In such a competitive milieu, the party organization is not concerned with national interest. It is preoccupied with obtaining power and democratic principles are secondary to this pursuit of power. From what we have discerned in Jamaica, violence is one tactic that is used in some constituencies in order to win an election. Nevertheless political violence was restricted to the constituencies that were extremely competitive and where a mass of lumpen-proletariat were concentrated. Victimization was practised in the rural constituencies but that did not precipitate large scale unrest. All the factors that we have mentioned heretofore were not present in combination in the rural constituencies or in the predominant middle class constituencies of St. Andrew.

Corruption in the higher echelons and lower echelons of the JLP, the increasing incidents of violent crime and growing unemployment had damaged the credibility of the governing party. Those who obtained benefits remained loyal to the Party but obviously the favoured few only constituted a small fraction of the electorate. Those who were excluded, were alienated from the Party. At the beginning of the seventh decade, the disaffection from the JLP had become more massive and there was no question that despite the arsenal of skulduggery available to the JLP, that their days of control were numbered. What was critical, was what kind of policies would the new PNP government introduce? Would they continue the genocidal policy of 'christening parson pickney first'? Any attempts at institutionalizing political victimization would further inflame the intra-class internecine warfare.

It is not surprising that during the 1972 elections the leader of the PNP Michael Manley waged a campaign against rampant JLP corruption and specifically against political victimization. Yet on assuming office the PNP under the leadership of Michael Manley pursued a vigorous policy of victimizing JLP supporters.

FOOTNOTES

1. Sidney Reid, A Contemporary Study of Politics and Government of Jamaica (unpublished P.H.D. dissertation, Univ. of Mass) p 104
2. Jamaica Handbook 1978, p 61 and 62
3. Terry Lacey, op. cit. p 80
4. Ibid, p 88
5. The Daily Gleaner, May 4, 1966, p 20
6. The Daily Gleaner, May 6, 1969, p 13
7. Ibid p 13
8. The Daily Gleaner June 14, 1966
9. The Daily Gleaner, June 17, 1966, p 1
10. Ibid, p 8
11. The Daily Gleaner, June 20, 1966
12. The Daily Gleaner, June 23, 1966
13. Leonard Barrett, The Rastafarian Sounds of Cultural Dissonance op. cit, p 156
14. Ann Norton, "Shanties and Skycrapers" (Working Paper No. 13 ISER 1978) p 39
15. Ibid, p 39
16. Ibid, p 23
17. The Daily Gleaner, July 16, 1966
18. The Daily Gleaner, October 19, 1966, p 21
19. Confidential conversation with an army officer deployed in the area.

C H A P T E R VIII
THE 1972 AND 1976 ELECTION

The 1976 Election was the bloodiest in the history of Jamaican politics. In contrast the election in 1972 which resulted in a change of government was not that marred by political violence. Why was the election in 1972 relatively peaceful? Constituencies that were formerly volatile and had developed a reputation for violence, such as Western Kingston, were no longer 'up for grabs'. The Parliamentary representative for Western Kingston, Eddie Seaga, through his organizational efforts and the low-income housing scheme of Tivoli Gardens that had become a JLP fortress, completely controlled that constituency and the PNP recognized that it was futile to wrest that seat from the JLP. The way the constituencies were gerrymandered, another constituency in South St. Andrew which encompassed the low-income housing scheme of Wilton Gardens had also become a safe JLP constituency. In other words the JLP could muster superior forces in Western Kingston and the serious challenge that the PNP mounted were in areas that were not as quintessentially lumpen and less prone to violence. Furthermore the PNP electoral strategy stressed the organizing of rural constituencies, especially in the Western county of Cornwall which traditionally had been a swing area. In addition, the PNP electoral strategy focused on the leadership capabilities of Michael Manley. Manley was portrayed as the biblical figure, Joshua, who would lead the Jamaican populace into the promised land away from the political violence of yesteryear. The PNP adopted a puritan platform, 'holier than thou', portraying the JLP as the corrupt infidels. Violence on the part of PNP supporters would only blemish that image of an immaculate conception.

Then why were the elections of 1976 the bloodiest ever? Despite the professed ideals of the PNP, once the party assumed control of state power immense pressure was brought to bear by party supporters who for ten years were

in the wilderness and had been affected by the JLP conspiracy of victimization. These grassroots party supporters demanded that the party practice a policy of vindictiveness against JLP supporters. Out of power, the PNP could afford to be magnanimous. Once in power, the party implemented policies, like the JLP that satisfied party loyalist and to ensure re-electability. Another factor that contributed to the bloodletting in 1976 was that in 1974 the PNP reaffirmed its commitment to democratic socialism and thereafter developed a working relationship with the Communist Party of Cuba. The feverish issue of ideology was now injected into Jamaican politics and this added to the desperate nature of political agitation. Although both the PNP and JLP are multi-class based political parties, the election of 1976 comes closer than any other in being a class struggle. The upper and middle class voters abandoned the PNP and voted overwhelmingly for the anti-communist JLP. The peasants and agro-proletariats voted overwhelmingly for the PNP, the party that advocated land reform. The lumpen-proletariat in 1976 remained sharply divided with past loyalty being more critical than the emergence of class conflict. But even more significant than the reasons previously mentioned, was that under the PNP, low-income housing schemes were used to further the political sails of the incumbent party. Low-income housing schemes were constructed in Western Kingston and St. Andrew in juxtaposition to the scheme previously built by the JLP during the ten years (1962-72) when they enjoyed control of state power. These newly created communities were just as tightly organized into PNP enclaves as their JLP counterparts. Thus there develops a 'spacial' dimension to the violence - highly politicized communities confronting each other. In times of highly charged emotions like during a pending election, only one incident need serve as the spark to start the prairie fire.

The 1972 Election

The PNP geared its propaganda appeals to the growing discontent among the mass of the population. The unemployment figures kept climbing and had become such a liability that government seized the publication of official statistics. Insecurity of person had become a serious problem especially in Kingston and St. Andrew where almost every middle class home was adorned with burglar bars. Reggae songs reflected the unpopularity of the Shearer regime and feeling besieged, the government banned songs that turned out to be a political embarrassment.

The Shearer administration was plagued by dissension within the Cabinet. The Minister of Housing, Wilton Hill and the Minister of Trade and Industry, Sir Robert Lightbourne feuded with the Minister of Finance, Eddie Seaga over monetary matters. Both Hill and Lightbourne resented the enormous power concentrated in the hands of the Minister of Finance and sought to limit Eddie Seaga's veto power over-spending in their respective Ministries. Mr. Hill was successful in obtaining the Prime Minister's and the Attorney General's approval for establishing a Housing Fund over which¹ the Minister of Housing exercised sole jurisdiction.

There was the general feeling in the country that corruption was rampant among governmental ministers. After the JLP lost the election of 1972, the PNP appointed an official Commission of Enquiry which documented the wide-²spread nature of the corruption. The testimony before the Commission revealed the 'kick-back' system in the Ministry of Education that was required of contractors who were selected to build the new schools in the government's expanding educational programme.

It is estimated that 24.5% of those eligible to vote in 1972 were excluded from the ballot. "The figure for Kingston and St. Andrew was much higher with 42 percent for Kingston and 45 percent St. Andrew. Among those without votes were an estimated 60,000 young people who had come of age after registration for the Elections had closed".³

As in 1967, the JLP used the ruse of "prescribed areas" to disenfranchise voters in what was to be a futile attempt at clinging to control of state power. Voters in the prescribed areas had to be enumerated, finger-printed and photographed to complete the elaborate registration process. Registration was not an ongoing process and there were no fixed places for enumeration. The prospective voter had to be enumerated in his home.

Once enumerated, the citizen then had the responsibility to go to a special mobile unit to be photographed and finger-printed. Here, mechanical difficulties often contrived with human frailties, for units were not always in areas announced, equipment broke down, photographs were spoiled and so on. Thus only the most politically-conscious citizen even bothered to attempt the registration process.⁴

The pleas by the Opposition to re-open registration in March 1971 to facilitate voters who met the age qualification and were constitutionally eligible to vote in the next election fell on deaf ears. The last registration for the February, 1972 election was held in October, 1967. In this respect "no one under 23 years old had a vote".⁵

Despite rampant governmental graft, the systematic disenfranchisement of voters and the practice of political victimization, the 1972 election was far less violent than the 1967 election. What was the reason for this?

Aforementioned, we indicated that the violence in 1967 occurred primarily in West Kingston, Central Kingston, South St. Andrew and South-west St. Andrew. In the constituency of West Kingston, Eddie Seaga had managed to consolidate his hold on the area that the PNP candidate knew he was merely going through futile motions. The PNP candidate, John Maxwell took a principled stand and did not attempt to arm lumpen-youths.⁶ In fact one cannot refer to a contest of this kind as an exercise in competitive democracy. Maxwell could not campaign in Tivoli Gardens, wherein the majority of the voters had become highly organized political fiefdom for the JLP. Of the 6,966 accepted in that constituency, only 1,450 were cast for the PNP candidate. Eddie Seaga won the constituency quite easily with 5,516 votes.

In Central Kingston, Michael Manley's opponent was Errol Anderson, a trade unionist. The former JLP candidate E.K.Powell was renominated to contest the seat and that was a factor in limiting the extent of campaign violence in that constituency. Manley won the seat quite comfortably with 4,596 votes to Anderson's 2,942. In South-western St. Andrew, the JLP's Minister of Housing, Wilton Hill had consolidated his party's control of the constituency by constructing the housing scheme, Wilton Gardens (Rema) and distributing the largesse to party supporters. Wilton Hill won 7,261 votes to 4,020 earned by the PNP candidate. The seat for Southern St. Andrew was more fiercely contested and the candidate was separated by a mere 102 votes. The PNP's Tony Spalding received 3,658 votes and the JLP incumbent lost with 3,556 votes.

As a campaign strategy, the PNP concentrated on the County of Cornwall, traditionally known as a swing county. Of the 15 seats contested in the

County of Cornwall, the PNP swept 14. This focus on the countryside could have been a factor in the decreased level of political violence in 1972. But even more decisive, was that a number of the candidates associated with political violence did not compete for office and the more violent-prone constituencies were already under the organizational control of incumbents which simply removed the tempestuousness from the grapple for power.

New Policy on Crime

When the Michael Manley government assumed office in 1972, the Party took quite an 'enlightened' position regarding the crime problem. The new government reacted anti-thetically to the previous administration and argued that repression was not the solution. Under the JLP government (1962-72) a defendant convicted for possession of marijuana (ganja) received a mandatory sentence of eighteen months. The PNP changed the law and possession of marijuana was reduced to a fine and Judges were now given discretionary powers.

The PNP seized the opportunity of the goodwill that their stunning electoral majority had generated and proclaimed a 21 day amnesty for those in illegal possession of guns. Guns could be turned in at a number of designated churches. Approximately 700 unlicensed weapons were surrendered.⁷ But this period of goodwill was ephemeral. By 1972 the Manley government declared a war on gunmen who were terrorizing the city. In July, 1973, the PNP demoted Noel Silvera, Minister of Home Affairs who the police had become critical of, as Silvera publicly criticized them for their involvement in the export of ganja and other forms of corruption. Mr. Silvera had alienated the rank and file of the police and was replaced by the successful industrialist Eli Matalon. The new Minister embarked on an energetic crusade against gun crimes

and the international ganja trafficking.

The shift from a liberal view of criminality to one of harsher enforcement of the penal code had been forced upon the PNP. There was no dramatic decrease in unemployment and the chronic problem of surplus labour plagued the PNP as it had the JLP. A special Gun Court was established in April, 1974 to deal with the problem of gun crimes. Anyone apprehended for a crime committed with a gun or found in possession of an illegal revolver or shotgun was tried in this special court where proceeding took place in camera. Unlike the normal court process wherein major crimes were presided over by a Judge and verdicts were the responsibility of jurors, in the gun court, the jury system was eliminated and three Judges presided and convicted the accused. Emphasis was placed on the speed of arrest and culmination of trial which presumably would have had a deterrent effect. The accused found guilty of a crime in Gun Court was detained indefinitely in prison. The constitutionality of the law was tested and the Privy Council declared certain aspects of the Gun Court, specifically the provision of indefinite detention to be unconstitutional. The law was thus amended to life imprisonment if found guilty of committing a crime with a gun or in illegal possession of a gun. The Gun Court did have some shock effect but that did not last for more than six months. Despite the harsh measures, gun crimes continued unabated. At this point, gun crimes are of a social and economic nature and did not develop a disruptive political dimension until 1975.

What is of extreme importance is the realization by Prime Minister Michael Manley of the harm that could come to the country if political victimization was perpetuated by his administration after ten years of

TABLE VIII. 1

1976 General Election - Violent-Prone Constituencies

	<u>No. of Electors on List</u>	<u>Total No. of votes cast</u>	<u>Total No. of Votes Accepted</u>	JLP	PNP
Kingston West Central	11,867	10,495	10,383	2,716	7,667
Kingston East Central	11,752	10,630	10,521	2,370	8,151
Kingston Western	11,104	10,414	10,393	8,075	2,318
St. Andrew Southern	17,267	17,225	17,058	3,131	13,927
St. Andrew South Western	11,323	18,731	17,960	4,376	13,584

Source: Report of Chief Electoral Officer 1976

JLP rule. At the 34th Annual Conference of the PNP held in November, 1972

Manley stated:

I am not having victimization continue
in Jamaica because if there is victimization
there is no hope for justice in Jamaica. ⁸

Manley further stated prophetically:

I know if we continue a policy of victimization
in Jamaica nothing but bloodshed
will come to this country one day. ⁹

It is obvious that Michael Manley, the astute politician recognized the intra-class violence that could be caused by the persistence of the policy of victimization by the new PNP government. During the election of 1972 and thereafter Manley committed himself to the elimination of this form of political corruption. If Manley anticipated the violent consequences why did he deem it necessary to pursue the practise of giving jobs to party supporters and screening out those who were JLP supporters or took a neutral political position. It is not a question of decency vs. indecency. It is apparent that tremendous pressures are placed on elected officials by rank and file of the party in control of state power. Party supporters demand the spoils of government. They presume that this is their 'lot' for making the necessary sacrifices so that the party could triumph at the polls. If the rank and file of the opposing party could find jobs elsewhere, then the situation would not be as explosive. Even under an administration as ideologically committed to production being controlled by the private sector, we see that in a developing country with mass pressure coming from below government if it is to maintain its credibility must introduce policies that benefit the poor who constitute the majority of the electorate. The political activist see his connection to the party as providing some economic

security in a rather unpredictable and precarious economic environment. He is sufficiently sophisticated to know that he can only obtain his share if others are excluded from obtaining the limited benefits that the party in control of state power has to offer. The politician realises that to be re-elected he must satisfy the most enthusiastic party supporters. Politicians and political organizations are in the business of competing for state power not for the pursuit of noble causes.

In a society plagued with the chronic problem of surplus labour, political victimization becomes a useful weapon that is used by political parties to remain in control of state power. Thus despite Manley's awareness of the destructive consequences of political victimization, being the consummate political animal that he is, he allowed the practice of political victimization to be instituted once the PNP wrested control of state power from the JLP.

The JLP never accepted the responsibility that it was the duty of government to maintain full levels of employment. They acted on the philosophical precept that 'an expanding private sector' would provide the necessary jobs and when that seemed not to be the case, the JLP refrained from publishing unemployment statistics. A political party committed to socialism could not take that position. The PNP promised during the 1972 election that on becoming the government of Jamaica they would seek to reduce the rate of unemployment. Initially the Manley government hoped the excess capacity in industry would improve the unemployment situation but by 1974 there had been no substantial decrease.

The Special Employment Programme

In 1974 the PNP government decided on "the creation of a sizeable public employment programme to ease the existing burden while awaiting the more lasting impact of their production plans for the revitalization of agriculture to provide a long-term solution.

10

By 1976 the Manley government allocated J\$33.2 million towards this special employment programme. Emphasis was placed on labour intensive projects. The principal projects undertaken were road repairs and beautification projects, flood control and drainage, soil conservation and forestry development. The special employment programme created approximately 20,000 full time jobs. A disproportionate amount of the jobs were created in the greater Kingston area and it was feared that such a policy would only aggravate the problem of internal migration. The technical committee that administered the Special Employment Programme, generally known as the Crash Programme, advised "that funds be distributed either in proportion to the number of unemployed in each parish but preferably in rural areas in order to generate income opportunities where the unused agricultural resources exist".

11

This recommendation by the technocrats in the civil service was not accepted. The political decision-makers felt that unemployment in the Kingston metropolitan area was 'potentially' more explosive and capable of producing social violence and therefore expenditures should continue to be concentrated

12

in Kingston. Even the Private Sector Organization of Jamaica recognized the explosive situation and although critical of the way in which the Special Programme was being administered stated in a list of recommendations submitted to government on how to reduce unemployment mentioned:

Unemployed males, in the wrong environment often resort to crime and violence and can damage a country's entire productive apparatus. Giving them jobs is, therefore also an important means of social defence. 13

The Special Employment Programme did have some limited impact. It provided unemployment especially for women and young people. But the amount of new entrants into the labour force was also increasing. In 1974 and 1975 combined, 68,200 would-be workers were added to the labour force. In the competitive party rivalry that exist in Jamaica, politicians grasped at the opportunity to use the project to provide jobs for party supporters. With the advent of the SEP, the councillors elected to local government bodies increased in importance. These councillors were always given some funds at Christmas time for public work projects. It became the responsibility for the councillors to administer the programme in the constituency in which they were elected. Yet the accountability process is non-existent. The Special Employment Programme was used to further the cause of the Party by restricting hiring to party supporters. Opposition councillors did receive their share of allotments but because they were in the minority, the largesse that they had to go around was quite minimal in comparison to the majority party. The councillors appointed strong supervisors whose duties entailed the hiring of workers, on the job supervision, and payment of workers. Skulduggery has been rampant. Supervisors often hire less than the required amount of workers and claim the full allotment. In this way the supervisors 'pocket' a number of the cheques. Such a poorly supervised programme also affords the opportunity for collusion to take place between elected officials and appointed field supervisors.

In almost all cases, supervisors are loyal to the elected official.

The supervisors wield an enormous amount of power and their selection is based on the political hierarchy of the particular constituency. What one finds is that a number of those placed in a supervisory capacity are 'top-ranking' party loyalist whom the party has become dependent on given the violent nature of Jamaican politics. In this respect, a symbiotic relationship develops between the politicized lumpen-proletariat and elected officials. This is particularly the case in the western constituencies of the greater Kingston area where political violence is quite widespread. ¹⁴

The General Election of 1976

Before the Jamaica Labour Party lost state power in 1972, construction had already started on a low-income housing scheme in South St. Andrew. On assuming office, the PNP expanded this scheme and had the opportunity to assign party supporters to decent housing. This low-income housing scheme in South St. Andrew was named Arnett Gardens after the retired PNP politician and former Minister of Finance, Vernon Arnett. To the south of Arnett Gardens, the JLP had previously constructed Wilton Gardens. The area of Wilton Gardens is a JLP enclave although it is not as tightly organized as Tivoli Gardens. Nevertheless it meant that Arnett Gardens (Concrete Jungle) and Wilton Gardens (Rema) were built in juxtaposition to each other. Thus you had two opposing political communities living side by side. These political fiefdoms are not only loyal to the party from which they received these coveted benefits but the economic viability of the community is often dependent on which party has control of state power.

The Wilton Gardens community has suffered from malign neglect from the PNP won the election in 1972. The residents of Wilton Gardens were made to

suffer for having voted for the Jamaica Labour Party. A Jamaican journalist Claudius Boothe visited Rema and wrote quite vividly of the insanitary conditions that prevailed:

The houses are poorly maintained dirt and grime stain the walls and large pieces of cardboard and other types of materials are used to block window spaces as well as door openings.

The plumbing system is bad. One resident Miss Ina Stewart said that in her building when the toilet is flushed on the third floor the contents pour down to the first floor.

Pools of stagnant water are popular features of the paved yards. In some yards male residents use pails to remove the water while in others the water remains murky and infested with mosquitos; children play in these pools of murky water and as a result are constantly in an unhealthy state. 15

Wilton Gardens (Rema) was in a state of ruins. The JLP was out of power and the PNP sought to punish the JLP fiefdom by limiting the amount of services available to the residents of the 30 three storey community. Such a situation encourages politics to be a life and death struggle. If the residents of Rema are going to prosper, their party must control state power. Whenever that party loses control of the state, the residents of Rema know they will starve. The fortune of the community rises or sinks depending on the state of politics. Thus these communities are artificial constructs created by politicians who control the life-line of the community and wield as much power as the slavemaster on the plantation except that this is an urban setting.

In an attempt to displace the Member of Parliament for West Kingston, the PNP constructed a low-income housing scheme adjacent to Tivoli Gardens and distributed the spoils to trusted supporters. Unlike Arnett Gardens this was a scheme of a smaller scale. Like the situation in South St. Andrew where Rema and Concrete Jungle were in juxtaposition to each other, a similar situation was created with Tivoli Gardens, a JLP community and Lizard Town, a PNP community constructed adjacent to each other. The JLP residents in Tivoli Gardens constituted a majority in the constituency of West Kingston and the PNP entertained designs of constructing additional low-income housing scheme as a means of 'smoking out' Eddie Seaga but the violent opposition of the JLP supporters in the constituency simply prevented further construction. The reverse was the case in the constituency of Southern St. Andrew. The boundaries were drawn in such a way that Arnett Gardens and Wilton Gardens constituted South St. Andrew. This meant that the people of Wilton Gardens were a minority in a majority PNP constituency. When one examines the 1976 General Election results (See Table VII.1) and isolate the constituencies of Kingston West Central, Kingston East Central (formerly Central Kingston but split in two), Western Kingston, Southern St. Andrew and South Western St. Andrew, all the victors win by huge margins to the extent that one could ascertain that elections in these constituencies are no longer competitive and the democratic process is non-existent. What I mean by this is that these communities are so tightly organized that the 'minority' candidate opposing the incumbent is not allowed to communicate freely with the electorate. The PNP candidate, Wilkins who opposed Eddie Seaga in Western Kingston managed to obtain only 2,318 votes of the 10,393 that were accepted. Wilkins was not allowed to campaign in Tivoli Gardens or other JLP strongholds. The JLP candidate Ramsay who opposed Tony Spalding, Minister of Housing and

and Member of Parliament for Southern St. Andrew was not allowed to campaign in Arnett Gardens. Neither was Tony Spaulding allowed to carry his message to the voters of Wilton Gardens. This is what I mean by the democratic process in these constituencies simply does not prevail. The strong arm supporters have so intimidated the Opposition within that respective constituency that for that particular area for all intents and purposes what really exist is a one party dictatorship enforced through the candidate who has a monopoly on coercion.

The violence during the election year of 1976 was preceded by a number of by-elections in 1975 that were marred by strong arm tactics.

A series of by-elections were held for parish council seats in 1975. It afforded the voters in these constituencies an opportunity to indicate their position on the ideological dimension to Jamaican politics. The PNP reaffirmed the Party's commitment to democratic socialism in 1974 and in the by-election they could measure the voter reaction. In addition the Jamaica Labour Party annoyed at its poor showing in the 1972 election, elected Mr. Eddie Seaga as the leader of the Party. Eddie Seaga brought new enthusiasm and immediately set about preparing the party for forthcoming elections. The PNP won the parish council by-elections in Westmoreland and Trelawny in July 1975. Another by-election to elect a parish councillor was held in October, 1975. Another PNP candidate triumphed at the polls but the Jamaica Labour Party charged the PNP with having corrupted the voting process and having used the Garrison Gang to intimidate JLP voters.

The acts of atrocities committed in the St. Mary campaigns took to extreme levels, corrupt practices which had

already begun to appear in the Westmoreland and Trelawny by-elections of July.

These clearly establish that the PNP has now perfected a corrupt machinery geared to ensure that whatever be the will of the people it can manufacture sufficient votes to suppress that will in order to perpetuate their hold on power. 16

The Labour Party accused the PNP of a systematic campaign of terror and intimidation. 17 Specifically the JLP objected to the presentation of a supplementary voters list two days before the by-election which allowed hundreds of PNP supporters to vote and omitted hundreds of JLP supporters. The Secretary General of the PNP, D.K.Duncan spearheaded the campaign in St. Mary accompanied by PNP strong arm men or top-ranking.

The JLP Opposition refused to contest the by-election in Eastern Kingston in protest against the undemocratic malpractices that allegedly were rampant in the previous by-elections. It seemed that the decision-making body of the Jamaica Labour Party decided that the Party would no longer be intimidated by the PNP. The JLP attributed the defeats in the by-election to bogus voting and intimidation tactics and were thus in a position to rationalise any "counter-terrorism" that the Party intended to mount.

The Workers' Liberation League published in their theoretical journal Socialism an editorial, "Our People are in Danger" which accused the JLP of trying to shoot their way to power. This Marxist-Leninist group presumed that the bourgeoisie in the PNP, the JLP and U.S. imperialists had conspired to destabilise the Manley government:

... the reactionaries have now laid plans to terrorise the masses by political assassinations, armed raids against working class communities and ultimately a police military overthrow of the government ...

Only last week plans by the JLP leadership for a campaign of political assassination carried out under the banner of anti-communism using modern automatic weapons and drawing hundreds of thousands of dollars from U.S. imperialism, have been exposed in South-west St. Andrew. This exposure followed a recognition by the standing Committee of the JLP at its meeting of October 23 that it can no longer take power through the ballot. 18

Although the editorial referred to the constituency of South-west St. Andrew when the boundaries were redrawn for the 1976 election that section of South-west St. Andrew known as Wilton Gardens (Rema) became part of Southern St. Andrew. One of the Deputy Leaders of the JLP and BITU trade union organizer, Pearnel Charles was appointed the caretaker of the South-west St. Andrew constituency. The South-west St. Andrew Citizens Association, a group of independent socialist youths led by Ben Munroe published an undated pamphlet in October 1975 which accused Pearnel Charles of organizing the top-ranking in Rema to terrorise the non-JLP residents of the community. The S.W.S. -A-CA pamphlet informed the public that Charles held a meeting on Sunday October 12, 1975 at the Hugh Sherlock All Age School with 120 youths. Charles is quoted as having said:

You know man must dead that man live. All who nah defend what we a defend must dead ... 105 people who a fight we here and here and here must dead! Shine must dead! Straan must dead! \$400 fi any man who kill any a them! Norma from Fourth Street must dead! Blacka from Seventh Street must dead! Cocks from Seventh Street must dead! Coco from Sixth Street must dead! 19

The South-west St. Andrew Citizens Association published in the same pamphlet that at the end of the meeting Pearnel Charles called seven youths - Bembey, Bull, Guto, Darby, Coolie Paul, Lexie, Barrington Sales into the rest room and furnished them with guns and ammunition. A second undated pamphlet detailed that two of the seven mentioned in the initial pamphlet, Rexie and Bull kicked open a door at 32 Sixth Street in an attempt to assassinate a political opponent marked for death but the occupant or occupants were not at home. In addition, SWA -A - CA charged that from Charles commenced his campaign to be the next Member of Parliament for the constituency over one hundred youths of Rema have lost their lives, imprisoned or maimed.

20

South-west St. Andrew Citizens Association implored the government to indict Pearnel Charles. On October 22, 1975 a number of left-wing groups including the PNP Youth Organization collaborated in a street demonstration against the alleged violence of the Deputy Leader of the JLP. SWA-A -CA charged that Charles went to Rema and Tivoli Gardens where he got together JLP strong arm men with the intention of attacking the demonstrators but the pro-PNP demonstrators had already moved from their point of assembly. The JLP mob attempted to destroy SWS - A - CA's community center and attacked the Maragh Garden Youth Club where members of the Pioneer Corps, a government youth programme, usually meet.

How authentic are the pamphlets released by the independent socialist South-west St. Andrew Citizens Association? The leader of the group Ben Munroe is not known for his political integrity. In a rather dubious pamphlet, SWA - ACA revealed detailed information about JLP and CIA complicity:

During the early months of this year \$18 million was given to the JLP by the CIA through banks in the United States. Additional funds have also been given through multinational corporations operating in Jamaica. Seventeen top CIA agents have also been sent into Jamaica to advise the JLP leadership on the strategy to be followed for the overthrow of the Government. Details of the plot revealed so far as follows:

1. \$25 million is to be spent within the ranks of the Jamaica Defense Force within two years to carry out a coup;
2. \$1,000 is to be spent weekly in each polling division throughout Jamaica to maintain 30 gunmen in each polling division;
3. The gunmen in each polling division must be assigned to assassinate front line PNP fighters and selected members of the PNP Youth Organization and various other socialist and progressive organizations including Workers Liberation League and youth clubs under the umbrella of Social Development Commission;
4. Youths recruited are to be trained in urban guerilla warfare. 21

When SWS - A - CA publishes information pertaining to events in its own constituency, one recognizes that that is within the capabilities of the organization. A group like SWS - A - CA with the "street contacts" that they possess can easily monitor events within the South-west St. Andrew constituency. When it begins to detail the links between the American Central Intelligence Agency and the Jamaica Labour Party, I doubt the authenticity of the information revealed because the organization simply does not have the resources or the international connections to be privy to that type of international intrigue.

No one has been able to document that the Jamaica Labour Party and the Central Intelligence Agency in the United States conspired to destabilize Jamaican society. There is no question that the Ford administration was alarmed at the socialism that was propagated by Michael Manley and felt further threatened when Jamaica asserted its sovereignty and re-negotiated the bauxite treaties with the multi-national corporations. It is quite obvious that the C.I.A was operating in Jamaica. Whether or not they were merely monitoring the situation or engaged in tactics of destabilizing, I simply do not know. What I do know is that no one explained the violence of 1967 election on the presence of the Central Intelligence Agency. The violence as I have explained was precipitated by the internal dynamics of Jamaican politics. The widespread violence that began in December, 1975 would have taken place with or without the presence of the American C.I.A or the Cuban D.G.I.

What seemed to be critical in the political violence that immediately preceded the 1976 election was the ouster of Hugh Shearer from the leadership of the Jamaica Labour Party and his replacement by Eddie Seaga, the incumbent Member of Parliament for Western Kingston who had created a political machine in Tivoli Gardens comprised of lumpen-elements who were capable of engaging the PNP's lumpen forces concentrated in Concrete Jungle (Arnett Gardens) in urban guerilla warfare.

Both political parties recognized that elections could not be won solely by violence. Yet violence could tip the scale in a close election by preventing intimidated voters from going to the polls, disrupting the street campaign of political opponents, and, controlling polling stations that afforded the opportunity for ballot stuffing. The political opposition

was also cognizant that a government that is incapable of maintaining stability, its esteem is lowered in the eyes of the electorate which can also make the difference over who wins or loses control of state power. But also of extreme importance is that a political party must be in a position to justify its use of violence. JLP propaganda refused to differentiate democratic socialism from communism and mobilization of party supporters was inspired by exhorting them to struggle against an alien atheistic and totalitarian foreign ideology. The JLP leadership could point to the intimidatory tactics used in the by-elections of 1975 to make the case that the PNP were using terror in order to win the next election. This type of rationalization would not be necessary for the recruitment of 'guerrilla' soldiers to defend the party cause. The 'guerilla' soldiers were concerned with the benefits gained from doing the dirty work of politicians while in pursuit of power and the spoils that invariably flowed once the party gained control of the state. It was nonetheless necessary to convince the electorate of the noble intentions of the JLP and ignoble intentions of the PNP.

There are a number of violent incidents that occurred in 1975 that in fact set the stage for the large scale community violence that erupted in January 1976. Senator Pearnel Charles had raised a series of questions in Parliament on April 11, 1975 concerning the activities of the Garrison Gang, who were comprised of lumpen-elements loyal to the PNP government. Charles' questions were addressed to the Minister of State in the Ministry of National Security and Justice. The questions were largely rhetorical. The JLP Senator and caretaker of the Southern St. Andrew constituency implied that on Thursday, February 27, 1975 that the Garrison Gang led by Skully had invaded a construction site on the Kingston Waterfront under the auspices of Marley and Plant. The gang of men demanded all workers on the site from

the constituency of Western Kingston be dismissed. The gang returned on February 28 and again on March 3. They demanded that NWU, the affiliated PNP union be recognized as the exclusive bargaining agent for the workers and the harassment by thugs would cease. Pearnell Charles also an Islandwide Supervisor for the BITU contended that his union had previously "made application for a poll to establish its representation as bargaining agents of the workers"²². The JLP Senator questioned the impartiality of the police in the matter and posed the question, "Does the Prime Minister agree that the Police Force is being subjected to carrying out the political instructions of the PNP rather than carrying out the law?"²³ Charles' reason for posing the rhetorical question was based on his accusation that these acts were committed in the presence of armed police who took no action.

On March 14, 1975, Winston 'Burry Boy' Blake, a known strong-arm PNP supporter was assassinated. The body of 'Burry Boy' was made to lie in state at PNP Headquarters and at his funeral on March 23, 1975, members of the PNP hierarchy attended the funeral including Prime Minister Manley. On route to the gravesite in May Pen Cemetery, the procession passed by the JLP stronghold of Tivoli Gardens. During the procession a gun battle raged along Spanish Town Road, Darling Street, Ebenezer Lane and Bustamante Highway. Eight citizens were wounded. The police moved in with tear gas and disbanded the combatants.

The 'Burry Boy' incident became a political issue as columnists of the Daily Gleaner and the JLP queried why the funeral of a prominent gangster was honored by the presence of state leaders. Evon Blake, writing under the pseudonym William Strong:

Didn't Mr. Manley realise beforehand, and has he realised since that the presence of himself, his wife, cabinet members and other Government officials at the funeral of a known criminal and political gangster would be interpreted as giving psychological aid and comfort to crime and political gangsterism at a time when crime and gun violence among political factions is escalating in the Corporate-area and filling hospital wards and morgues with bodies"? 24

The Prime Minister's reply gives us some insight into the connection of politicians and gangsters:

Winston Blake was a strong supporter of the People's National Party, who had stood by the Movement for many years in areas where it takes raw courage of an exceptional kind to be identified as a PNP supporter ...

Because of his known courage in the face of terrorism by political opponents in Western Kingston, he was more than just a member of the Party and had become symbolic of a kind of courage without which the Party cannot exist in some parts of Jamaica ... My wife and I were there because we remembered the time in 1972 when I was walking in hail of gunfire from opponents of the People's National Party. We will never forget how Winston Blake put his arms around me and said "Leader, let them kill me but they will not touch you".

We were there because we will never forget the meeting in 1972 in Coronation Market when dynamite was being thrown by opponents of the People's National Party in Western Kingston and when they had destroyed all the power-lines into the meeting that we were being bombed with dynamite in darkness. When thousands were running in the fright and confusion of the moment, Winston Blake was prominent among

those who took the woman who is now
my wife and led her to safety
under a shop piazza." 25

Prime Minister Manley did not perceive "Burry Boy" as a 'badman' or a political gangster but as a Party stalwart who was indispensable in the rough and tumble of Jamaican street politics. Manley was aware of what he called the assassinated man's checkered background but rationalised that by stating that he was not wanted by the police at the time of his death and was a hard-working independent contractor. And I may add, benefitting from the spoils of government that came his way for past contributions to the PNP.

The PNP Senator Ben Clare depicted a pattern of political assassinations. Before the assassination of 'Burry Boy', Astley Chin and Fedlan Walsh, two prominent members of the People's National Party, were also murdered.²⁶ On December 12, 1975 'Feather Mop' a top-ranking PNP supporter was assassinated while drinking in a bar on Tower Street. At the time of his death, 'Feather Mop' had ^xfiled a law-suit against the Kingston and St. Andrew Corporation for payment of work performed that was being disputed. 'Feather Mop' would be another example of lumpen-elements who had accumulated wealth based on links to those in control of state power and for past services rendered to the Party organization. He did not receive the accolades given to 'Burry Boy' by the Party hierarchy since at the time of his death he had developed into an avaricious creature and was out of favor. These series of killings seem to indicate that there did exist a conspiracy to assassinate PNP top-ranking to the extent that when elections were finally held the Party would be in a weakened position and could not withstand the violent assaults of political opponents.

On Sunday, December 28, 1975 Edward Townsend, a brother of Tony Welsh a PNP political leader in Arnett Gardens was shot in an incident with the police. It led to a clash between the police and the residents of Arnett Gardens. ²⁷ Another clash took place on Wednesday, December 31, 1975. The police discovered a cache of bombs and weapons in an empty lot adjacent to the Examination Depot on Spanish Town Road on Monday, December 29, 1975.

In his book written to absolve his alleged complicity in political violence, Pearnel Charles mentioned that between Thursday night of January 1, 1976 and January 2, three persons were murdered in violent clashes, one of which was a shoot-out with law enforcement officials. ²⁸

On Sunday January 4, a man accused of being a supporter of the Jamaica Labour Party was killed by a Party of gunmen in the presence of his child.

Monday January 5, the Prime Minister and PNP Councillors visited the battle scene in an attempt to contain the outbreak of political violence. 'Warfare' erupted between the JLP political gang in Rema and the PNP political gang in Concrete Jungle (Seventh Street serves as the border that divides the two highly politicized communities of Rema and Concrete Jungle).

Tuesday January 6, The situation had deteriorated. For three hours the sounds of exploding bombs could be heard. Fires were set at Seventh Street, Thompson Street, Asquith Street and Peckover Street. Men armed with 303 rifles were reported to have set the fires. What had developed was a full scale war between the adjacent communities. At this point, the PNP gang from Concrete Jungle was pushing their way into Rema but the latter received support from their compatriots in Tivoli Gardens to stem the tide. ²⁹

The conflagration coincided with the new voters enumeration for the pending election. The Jamaica Labour Party in fact controlled only two areas in the western belt. The people in Tivoli Gardens knew that Rema comprised a buffer zone and if Rema collapsed, the PNP would be right at their doorsteps. It would mean at the next election the PNP would be in control of the streets and this would have a demoralising impact on the strong-arm cadres of the JLP. It meant that the enumeration process, especially in these volatile constituencies, would not be honest.

The violence also coincided with the opening of the International Monetary Fund's Conference in Jamaica which had attracted journalists from North America. Reporting on the violence in the American mass media would reduce the amount of tourist coming in for the season already underway. (This in fact was the case) Thus it presented the opponents of the Manley regime with the opportunity to embarrass the socialist government which was already experiencing severe foreign exchange problems.

The more radical PNP Youth Organization (PNPYO) picketed the IMF Conference in protest against the seating of the South African representative. That evening a few stones were hurled at the American Embassy. Even more startling, the two constables guarding the Embassy that night were attacked at close range. District Constable Clarke was fatally wounded in the head and District Constable Minto survived the assassination attempt. Fires again raged in the Rema area the same night. Five persons were shot, one fatally and several hundred residents fled in fear of their lives. Firemen were attacked with stones and bottles and were prevented from bringing the fires under control. The same night two policemen guarding a construction site on Marcus Garvey Drive were murdered. A third who feigned death

survived the wanton slaughter. The dead officers and the wounded were relieved of their guns. In many respects, it had become a triangular war. Rival political gangs were fighting against each other and both were engaged in a war against the police. The police showed their disgust with the situation when the squad formed specifically to quell riotous situations protested against the death of the two police officers. Prime Minister Manley had to appear on the scene to convince the police that there would be no political interference in the fight against gunmanship.³⁰ There is no question that in the suppression of the conflict, the government took into consideration the interest of the PNP. When a curfew was declared in the area, Arnett Gardens was excluded³¹ while police patrols were sent into Tivoli Gardens.

How did the PNP government interpret the escalation of violence in January of 1976? Keble Munn, the Minister for National Security who succeeded Eli Matalon stated that the character of the violence was unprecedented. He claimed that the security forces had discovered information which indicated that persons were being trained in military tactics. He further stated:

We are satisfied that this sudden escalation of violence at this time was planned, organized and deliberately timed with a view to damaging the economy, causing hardship and suffering and therefore discrediting the Government.³²

The spreading nature of the conflict was obvious when 19 out of 30 strong arm men operating in Western St. Andrew were apprehended. Yap Sam, a businessman had become the JLP caretaker for that constituency. David Coore Minister of Finance was the Member of Parliament for that constituency, An

examination of the violence in this constituency dramatises the importance of the personality factor vis-a-vis political violence in Jamaica. Western St. Andrew was classified as a safe PNP seat that in the past was relatively free of political turbulence. Coore remained aloof from his constituency and did not seek to create the constituency into a political fiefdom to the extent that it would make it impossible for a political opponent to mount a viable candidacy. Once Yap Sam was appointed caretaker, he took advantage of Coore's aloofness by recruiting a number of thugs. They proceeded to disrupt the organized PNP units within the constituency through victimization and violence. When a contingent of PNP loyalist led a delegation to David Coore, the Minister of Finance was not alarmed. Coore did not seek to respond to the violence of his opponent. In contrast to Coore, the PNP councillor in the constituency, Carl Thompson was willing to meet the Yap Sam thunder with PNP thunderbolts. It is not surprising that for the 1976 election the constituency was sub-divided and David Coore was given the tranquil constituency of Western Kingston St. Andrew. Thompson's constituency encompassed the area of the Yap Sam fighters. Yap Sam, being a wealthy businessman was in a financial position to bribe lumpen-elements in the futile attempt to gain power and protest his interest from what he perceived as the encroachments of a socialist government. Thompson, a man of modest means had to use crash programme tickets to recruit his 'defence' forces. A politician of the David Coore mold simply will not engage in that form of political corruption in order to obtain or retain a seat in Parliament. They simply do not possess the temperament of steel and ruthlessness required for survival in violent politics. This is why, especially in the western belt, there are particular personality types that are found running for office. One must possess what Michael Manley calls raw

courage and a zeal for power. We find that the representatives of these constituencies are people with an amoral attitude to politics. The John Maxwells simply do not survive in this violent political ethos.

Prime Minister Michael Manley had lost the insight that he had gained during his tenure as leader of the Opposition and incidentally that he still possessed immediately on gaining office. After five years in office, Manley was locked into an organizational position and was pre-occupied in advancing the cause of the PNP. In a radio broadcast on January 9, 1976, Manley assessed the situation:

The Security Forces are satisfied that there are now hired gunmen who are well paid. They receive their guns from people with a pernicious intent who organise and enable them to supplement their income in their spare time by robbery. The men who are doing these things obviously have access to large amounts of money to equip and pay these gunmen. 34

The Prime Minister was partially correct. In addition, the question of ideology was once again a burning issue and contributed to the heat of the battle. Yet the Jamaican Prime Minister insisted on being intellectually dishonest. Nothing was said about political victimization and the politicians in power simply pretended that it did not exist. Harvey DaCosta who had been appointed Chairman of a Commission by the Manley government to study corruption in the JLP (1962-72) wrote in a letter addressed to the Editor of the Daily Gleaner:

In Jamaica the election of a government does not merely determine who is to rule the country but also the

question of those who will have bulging bellies and pocket-books and those who will move near the verge of starvation. While this state of affairs continues people are going to behave like animals. 35

The destruction by arson of the PNP's office in Islington, St. Mary prompted Prime Minister Manley to call for the formation of a party defence group that would provide security for over 2,000 sites where group meetings were held in addition to the 53 constituency headquarters. The JLP objected vehemently to the formation of a PNP defence group and interpreted this new development as an up-grading of the Garrison Gang. Both political parties refused in public statements to acknowledge the support of political gangs which played an important role during heightened periods of electioneering. The problem of political violence was perennially dealt with in a partisan manner. It was a matter of one party trying to score points over the other party with very little awareness as to how this problem was eating at the fibers of the democratic political system.

The Security Forces were also alarmed at the Prime Minister's suggestion of a defence force and the specialized anti-riot squad, the Mobile Reserve engaged in a brief strike but on assured that the proposed defence group would just be a watchman force and not compete against the police, the men returned to work. ³⁶ The Jamaica Manufacturer's Association, the Farquharson Institute of Public Affairs also came out against the proposed defence force. This was seen as the "institutionalization" of private armies which would further escalate the political war between the JLP and PNP.

A contingent of soldiers were placed on Seventh Street separating the warring communities of Rema(JLP) and Concrete Jungle (PNP). Soldiers armed with machine guns were also stationed at the demarcation line that divided Tivoli Gardens from Lizard Town. Nevertheless the violence resumed in February to coincide with the new date that was to set for enumeration.

February 2, 1976 -Two police officers from Mobile Reserve were shot by gunmen at the intersection of Fourth Street and Collie Smith Drive. Another police officer Orville Ralston Brown was fatally shot through his head and his revolver stolen. A civilian, Samuel Clarke was killed by the police. Five shotguns were recovered in a day marked by the renewed large scale battles between warring political factions throughout the Trench Town-Jones Town area. ³⁷

February 3, 1976 - Kenneth Maragh and his eight year old son were murdered while they were in bed. Maragh who lived at 53 Spanish Town Road was a friend of Constable Brown and an eyewitness to the killing, was slain by four armed gunmen as a precautionary measure to ensure that there were no witnesses to the killing. Political gangs were reported roaming the western belt and in face of the breakdown in civility, hundreds of tenants fled the area.

A police officer was shot at the intersection of Charles Street and Spanish Town Road. The men were chased by other police officers and the would-be assassins 'melted' into the Tivoli Gardens community. It is apparent that police interpreted the attacks on them as originating from Tivoli Gardens. That night a number of police officers from the specialized Echo Squad invaded Tivoli Gardens and fired approximately 600 rounds of ammunition. One resident of Tivoli, Sydney Gillespie was killed by the police and several others suffered gunshot wounds. ³⁸

The renewal of political violence in the western belt forced the government to undertake drastic action to contain the pandemonium. The entire area of Arnett Gardens, Wilton Gardens, as far east as Regent Street and as far west as Collie Smith Drive was placed under the curfew. The area was designated a trouble zone and placed under the jurisdiction of the Suppression of Crime Act. This enabled the security forces to search and detain citizens of the area. For all intent and purposes, the civil rights and civil liberties enshrined in the Jamaican constitution was suspended for the inhabitants of the cordoned area. An Advisory Council on National Security comprised of a cross section of scholars and legal practitioners was established. In addition the Prime Minister established a special sub-committee of the Cabinet comprised of the Prime Minister, Minister of Finance, David Coore, Minister of National Security, Mr. Keble Munn, Minister of Justice, Carl Rattray and Attorney General, Leacroft Robinson.

The more zealous and presumably non-partisan attack on political violence was revealed when the security forces raided the PNP's office of South St. Andrew at 16 Crook Street, Jones Town. Charley Smith, 76 a former member of the PNP executive and constituency secretary, was charged with illegal possession of firearms and ammunition. In addition, four other PNP loyalists were arrested. The security forces found on the premises -

- 2 home-made shotguns
- 1 home-made pistol
- 5 cartridges
- 6 molotov cocktails
- a number of bottles containing petrol with wicks attached.

39

Despite the stringent measures applied by the State the urban guerilla war continued although on a much smaller scale.

The Orange Street Massacre

The violence shifted to Central Kingston when on May 19, 1976 there was a huge fire that inflamed the tenement buildings at 182-184 Orange Street. This yard contained a total of 223 rooms and was recently bought by the Ministry of Housing. While people slept, the place was set on fire by gas bombs and in the aftermath 11 persons died, mostly children who failed to flee out of the 'wood framed houses'. There is some confusion about whether this incident was an example of political violence or more gang war divorced from inter-party squabbling. ⁴⁰ It is known that the residents of the big yard in 1972 evenly divided their votes between PNP and JLP in a constituency where the former traditionally dominated. There have been basically three explanations of the Orange Street massacre. The official PNP explanation is that the incident is an orchestrated attack by a JLP political gang aimed at destabilizing the Manley government. This reasoning goes further and proclaims that "the throwing of babies" into the blazing fire is not a Jamaican inspired act. It is more in keeping with the massacre of the villagers of Vietnam. In other words, some CIA duplicity is suggested. ⁴¹

The Deputy Leader of the Jamaica Labour Party, Senator Pearnel Charles interpreted the vicious incident quite differently:

The JLP has noticed a trend in the chain of events that leads to the destruction of life and property especially in areas of St. Andrew and where JLP supporters live in large numbers. It has also happened in Sixth and Seventh Avenues in Rema, South-west St. Andrew on Brotherton Avenue, Central Village and many other places. The first step is the serving of Notices to vacate the area. The next step is the terrorising of the occupants of the premises by armed gunmen, as in Paisley Avenue where they actually

started small fires.
The final step is the burning down of the houses as was the case in Rema and later in Fletcher's Land and now along Orange Street...
The vast majority of people affected are strong supporters of the JLP. As a result they are scattered all over the place with the hope that they will not be around to vote in the next election. It makes us suspect that the so-called destruction is caused by supporters of the Government. The victims are JLP supporters. We assert that the victims, JLP supporters, could never instigate their own destruction. ⁴²

It was the Senator's theory that the Party in power is in a much better position to carry out organized violence. He contended that the PNP could use government funds, contracts and other state programmes to employ mercenaries while the opposition party would not have those resources at its disposal. ⁴³ Why would a government destabilize itself? Charles ingenuously answered that the PNP was destroying the country in order to justify the inauguration of a communist regime. ⁴⁴

The other interpretation and one supported by the testimony before the one-man Commission of Enquiry is that there was an ongoing gang war between the PNP Jones Town gang and the JLP Fletcher's Land gang. The reason for the conflict was in part political. The Ministry of Housing had recently constructed some housing in the area and there did develop a struggle over which of the gangs would control the construction site. Since the houses were being built in the Fletcher's Land community in Central Kingston, the 'top-ranking' from Fletcher's Land felt they were entitled to the 'spoils'. The Jones Town gang felt that since their party was in power that the PNP loyalist should have control and reap the economic benefits. This power struggle was apparently compounded by incidents that stemmed more from a life

style of violence rather than incidents that were overtly political. The incident that precipitated the Orange Street massacre occurred at Tropical Theatre, a movie house in Central Kingston. The two gangs clashed and Errol Pothman was killed and the Jones Town gang chased the Fletcher's Land fellows into the big yard on Orange Street and in retaliation the houses were set on fire. What makes this interpretation somewhat unconvincing is that Colin Vaughn, a 15 year old youth was found dead at the scene of the crime with a sawed-off shotgun and a live cartridge in his pocket. The shotgun was stolen from Mr. Tomlin Medley of 20 Kingston Lane, Fletcher's Land whose home was burglarised on October 17, 1975. Vaughn was living only a few chains from Medley when the gun was stolen and was reportedly a member of the JLP Fletcher's Land gang.^{45.} The building was surrounded by 20 armed men and when the Fire Brigade was summoned, the armed gangsters attacked the fire-fighters. When the police arrived on the scene, the men withdrew in a fashion that signified they had received military training. Based on the evidence that I have seen, the third explanation seems to be the most convincing.

The State of Emergency

The security situation continued to deteriorate. Between January 1 and June 19, 1976, a total of 170 citizens were killed including 19 police officers.⁴⁶ By June, the PNP government became increasingly convinced that the violence was conspiratorial and aimed at discrediting the Manley regime. Yet the PNP produced no evidence to substantiate the charges that the American CIA was in fact masterminding the destabilization of a socialist government that was democratically elected.

Michael Manley admitted that he did not have the evidence to convict

the CIA , but that he noticed an inexplicable upsurge of industrial unrest; a spate of letters to the press; orchestral articles written to damage Jamaican tourism and to prevent the inflow of foreign capital; entanglement of foreign aid from the United States. At the 10th Annual Conference of the Central Kingston constituency held on June 13, 1976, the Prime Minister stated:

I am not saying I can prove in a court of law that the CIA is here, but some very strange things are happening in Jamaica that we have never seen before. ⁴⁷

Manley also suspected that the Mafia was trying to destabilize Jamaica since they had tried and failed to use the island as a "major trans-shipment centre for hard drugs". ⁴⁸ In addition, he accused the affluent who had migrated to the United States and Canada because they opposed the socialist thrust of the government, of being in league with these external forces.

The Minister of Housing, Anthony Spaulding proclaimed that in the past three months, 21 supporters of the PNP had been murdered. Spaulding denied that it was victimization and the allocation of housing that was the cause of political violence. The Minister of Housing insisted that no one was in a position to state that he had ever distributed guns to PNP supporters. Yet Spaulding vehemently declared:

They can't pass Seventh Street
we are Cuba, and anywhere Angola
takes place, South St. Andrew will
be going there. ⁴⁹

The Member of Parliament for South St. Andrew was referring to the demarcation line that separated Rema from Concrete Jungle. The 'Junglist' tightly controlled by ^{Toky} Spaulding had become as critical to the PNP as

Eddie Seaga's control of the lumpen in Tivoli Gardens. There was a faction in the PNP that felt that the JLP's control of Rema and Tivoli could be terminated by the superior strength of the PNP. But the internecine warfare continued with no particular party capable of liquidating the other. The intra-class guerilla war was disrupting the economy and the social order with no sign that there would be an end to the bloodletting. The Manley government declared a State of Emergency June 19, 1976. This meant that the fundamental rights and freedom guaranteed by the constitution had been suspended. The government possessed the power to arrest and detain persons suspected of urban terrorism.

The JLP denounced the State of Emergency as a corrupt act. They argued that it was not invoked by the inability of the government to maintain order but designed to disrupt the political activities of the JLP and to thwart the will of the Jamaican people from ousting the PNP from office. What prompted the PNP to declare a State of Emergency?

Herb Rose, an organizer for the JLP, resigned from the Party and gave as his reason, the fact that the JLP was organized in a violent conspiracy to disrupt the social order. Rose is a rather interesting political activist. He returned to Jamaica in 1969 after living in the United States for a number of years. He was an organizer for the PNP in the 1972 election. Thereafter he worked the adult literacy programme (JAMAL). He had serious policy differences with the PNP administration and resigned from the Party. He joined a third party recently created by the former JLP Minister of Trade and Industry, Robert Lightbourne. Lightbourne had resigned from the JLP immediately after the 1972 election. It was not long before Rose became

disenchanted with a third party that failed to stir the imagination of the Jamaican masses. Rose promptly joined the JLP under the tutelage of Eddie Seaga. He served as a member of the JLP's National Council, the National Executive and on the JLP Organizing Committee. Rose's revelations of the JLP conspiracy to destabilize the society was a critical factor why the PNP government decided to proclaim a state of emergency.

I have organized in the PNP from 1969 to 1972 and during this period, at no time have I seen or heard a person within that institution using violence or sending individuals to commit crimes as a means of fostering political organization. I have never carried a gun and I have never travelled with a gunman in my car. I have never been associated with gunmen in the period that I organized the PNP ... From my inner knowledge of the Labour Party I am now satisfied that its whole strategy is based upon violence and the use of violent means to obtain victory at the polls. I have seen young men being trained and brain-washed to commit murders, to destroy property and personnel effects of innocent and impoverished people who are singled out only because they are of a different political persuasion ... I have seen persons in position of top leadership give ammunition to half-starved and maltreated youngsters and encourage them to take up a life of crime and violence. I have seen some of them in pursuing this violent life get maimed, some even killed, yet those who sent them into the battle have taken it for granted that they are expendable material and have not even given them proper funeral rites ... I know that as the election approaches it is planned that this violent pattern will escalate. This will result in the elimination of hundreds of innocent people. This plan is, that as the election approaches, violence will gain in momentum and ferocity. When the election is called, this country will witness almost civil disobedience ...

I have heard a leading spokesman and candidate of the Jamaica Labour Party addressing a group of young men and telling them that rather than lose the election, a whole area of the Corporate Area would be flattened. To quote him "Before the PNP wins we must be able to see from Rema straight to Half-Way-Tree clock". 50

Rose's revelations adds credence to the WPJ's accusation published in the December 13, 1975 issue of Struggle and in Socialism, the groups theoretical journal dated November 1975 that the JLP having lost the by-election in Bethel Town, Islington and Hampstead chose to pursue a campaign of political assassination to be carried out under the banner of anti-communism. This course of action was allegedly decided in October 23 by the Standing Committee. In addition the rise in political violence coincides with the deposing of Hugh Shearer and the ascendancy of Eddie Seaga to the JLP leadership. The difference between correlation and causation is very clear to this writer. Nevertheless it is obvious that individuals who could be considered political fire-brands were now strategically placed in the JLP leadership. The character of the political violence is dramatically altered. Whereas prior to 1976 political violence operated as a side-show that buttressed the struggle for control of state power, in the first six months of 1976 violence shaped and determined the nature of political activity. It was apparent that the violence rather than being the peculiarity of constituencies of the western belt, was becoming a national plague enflaming the entire island. One of the findings of this work is that the JLP did engage in a conspiracy to disrupt the social order but as a response to the strong-arm, intimidatory tactics of the PNP's Garrison Gang. That was the justification that the JLP used. Politics is never a clear cut choice between right and wrong or a conflict between angels and

devils. It is seldom ever that simple.

In his address to Parliament why he had called the State of Emergency, Manley stated that his intelligence sources had amassed information which indicated a new wave of violence would be staged in June or July of 1976. There is much consternation about the authenticity of these intelligence sources. Albert Robinson, a scoundrel of no mean order confessed after the fact in September 1978 that he had gone to the Prime Minister with a tortuous tale that he had been supplied with a gun by the JLP leadership. Robinson initially confessed that he was sent by the PNP to spy and to disrupt the activities of the Jamaica Labour Party. The Commission of Enquiry appointed by the Prime Minister in 1979 to examine Robinson's charges has revealed that Robinson is a notorious liar who merely preyed on gullible politicians in order to raise 'quick bucks'.⁵¹ Robinson supplied information to the security forces about the political violence perpetrated by the JLP. Unlike Rose, Robinson is just a 'samfie' man whose testimony cannot be trusted. It is apparent that Robinson's allegations were a factor, among other factors, for the invoking of the State of Emergency.

The position of the JLP was to discredit Rose's damaging revelations.

The Party Secretary of the JLP, Bruce Golding stated that Rose was hired as an organizer in June 1975 but in fact the disgruntled Rose wanted to be the candidate for Eastern St. Catherine in the next election. The JLP made it known to him that that was out of the question. Rose is depicted as a man seeking a prominent position in the Party but since the leadership was not impressed with his capabilities, his aspirations remained unfulfilled. Mr. Rose wanted to be in charge of the all-island campaign but was assigned

to conduct workshops for scrutineers throughout the island. This political nomad experienced difficulties with prospective JLP candidates and was instructed to confine himself to the corporate area of Kingston and St. Andrew. The JLP Caretaker in the Corporate area allegedly found Mr. Rose unbeatable. Rose's authority was further diminished when he was ordered to confine himself to supervising scrutineers in just one constituency but even the scrutineers were repelled by Herb Rose and his assignment was changed to be the liaison officer with the Electoral Office. Mr. Golding argued that on May 28, 1976 that he passed a confidential memo to the leader of the Party requesting what should be done with Mr. Rose. On June 9, Eddie Seaga informed Herb Rose that he would be placed on leave and subsequently the Party's Central Executive would be called on to ratify the dismissal of the political nomad at its week-end seminar to be held in Montego Bay in the latter part of June. It is alleged that Rose got word of the decision and tendered his resignation on Friday June 18, 1976, one day before the State of Emergency was declared. Mr. Golding further announced:

Mr. Rose has never been a member of any executive body of the JLP. He was a minor employee who was for a period invited to attend meetings of the Central Executive, since his assignments during this period related to matters under discussion. Over many months he had not been invited to any meetings because his attitude demonstrated that he was carrying a personal vendetta against certain members of the JLP. The malicious charges made by Mr. Rose represent a revengeful attempt to discredit the JLP since he had so discredited himself in the JLP that it had been decided to dispense with his services. Finding himself in this position, it is not surprising that he is rejoining the PNP to whom he proved to be attractive bait.

We challenge Mr. Rose to test the validity of his charges in a court of law so that he can be called upon to provide the evidence which will enable the country to judge the truth of his statement. 52

Mr. Golding's rebuttal is not convincing and does not address the basic issue of political violence. That Rose was a restless soul is reflected in his movement from the PNP to the United Party and then to the JLP. On leaving the PNP and the UP, Rose did not engage in any vendetta-like statements. What he spoke about was not something in fantasyland but the frightening problem of political violence that had caused an incredible amount of disruption to the two-party democratic system of Jamaica.

The declaration of a State of Emergency was accompanied with the detention of the leading figures associated with political violence on the JLP's side of the aisle. A number of JLP's executive members were detained including Ferdie Yap Sam, the candidate for West Central St. Andrew, Peter Whittingham, candidate for Central St. Catherine. (Whittingham was later convicted in Florida for the smuggling of marijuana by aircraft), Pearnel Charles, Deputy Leader, George Lazarus, Honorary Manager of the West Kingston Trust, Olivia Grange, a member of the Public Relations Committee of the Party, Pat Stephens, a member of the Executive Committee, Peter Rogers, Fellorto Reynolds, JLP supporter in St. Catherine. Other JLP political organizers detained were Eulalie Lawrence, Earl Spencer, Steadman Findlay and Victor Troupe.

The Leader of the Opposition argued that the powers entrusted to the government was abused during the State of Emergency. The detention power was

used to detain members of the JLP's Election Campaign[Ⓞ] Personnel and this had an intimidatory effect on others who would have been willing to volunteer their efforts. The JLP further charged that on election day, December 15, 1976, thousands of the Party's supporters were apprehended until after the polls had closed. Vehicles carrying supporters and supporters of the Jamaica Labour Party were stopped and the occupants detained and the vehicle seized for the day. ⁵³ I am certain incidents of this kind occurred but the Party failed to give a detailed listing and I am certain the accusations are wildly exaggerated to make it appear that the PNP only won the election by skulduggery. It is a fact that those detained, especially from the standpoint of political organizers, were primarily JLP. The detainees can be divided into two categories. They were political organizers, mostly from the JLP ranks who were detained because of their alleged complicity in fostering political violence. These detainees were predominantly classified as belonging to the "respectable" or "middle-class" and were isolated from other detainees. This revealed the class nature of Jamaican society. Not only is class differentiation a factor in every social relationship but that the politics is monopolized by the "respectable middle class" and the masses of poor people are excluded from the hierarchy of both political parties. The security forces placed the "respectable middle class" detainees in a special section of the camp that became known as Red Fence. The other category of detainees, the allegedly violent combatants were held in the compound known as Wire Fence. These were members of the rival political gangs known to the police as the purveyors of political violence. The accommodations available to the Charles and the Yap Sams were denied the Tony Welsh[Ⓞ]s and the Claudie Massops. The place of abode reserved for the gang members was far more wretched. Even in prison, the middle class are privileged. In the

confines of the Wire Fence, the political hate was so intense that the JLP faction was separated from the PNP faction by a four foot high fence of barbed wire. ⁵⁴ There were only 20 citizens detained at Red Fence, including 6 women and Edwin Bolasingh, the PNP Caretaker for South Clarendon while over 200 detainees were incarcerated at Wire Fence. The JLP charged that when the political affiliation of the detainees at Wire Fence are taken account of 49 were in the PNP section and over 250 persons in the JLP ⁵⁵ section. These figures are difficult to verify as new recruits were constantly brought in and old detainees were being released. Did the disproportionate number of JLP reflect the political nature of the State of Emergency? There is no question that the State of Emergency did have a political dimension. The PNP Minister of Housing, Tony Spaulding was not detained. Based on Spaulding's speech of June 18, 1976 there were grounds for his detention. The Leader of the Opposition was not detained even though George Lazarus, an active member of his constituency was incarcerated. The decision not to detain Eddie Seaga was actually a political decision as the PNP did not want to make the MP for Western Kingston into a martyr. It is not surprising that more JLP supporters were apprehended than PNP. The position of the Manley government was that the Opposition Party was engaged in a violent conspiracy to embarrass the government. But it is clear that the 'sufferer' supporters of the PNP, like Tony Welch of Concrete Jungle, were incarcerated.

The State of Emergency did have some effect on the JLP campaign. They were not prevented from mounting a vigorous campaign yet the action definitely tarnished the image of the Party. The Party was identified with a violent conspiracy and did suffer some loss of face which I would

imagine did impact on the 1976 election. Nevertheless that was an indirect cause of the State of Emergency. The violence of the first six months of 1976 had become uncontrollable and it was the duty of government to bring the situation under control. The democratic process had been eroded and this necessitated the temporary abandonment of the Jamaican Constitution. The Manley government was convinced that there was a violent conspiracy with international connections attempting to undermine the society and the government took the drastic action to restore peace in the society. The irony of the situation is that the Prime Minister was witnessing the fulfillment of what he himself had prophesied at the PNP convention in 1972. (See Quotation on page 296).

The Election of 1976

Parliament was dissolved on November 15 and December 15 was set as the date of the new election. For the first time in the history of independent Jamaica, an election was held under a State of Emergency. An indication as to the fervor of the election was given when on the same day Parliament was dissolved, the police had to use tear-gas when an over-enthusiastic crowd of PNP supporters converged on Gordon House. What is significant about the 1976 election is that political violence had become a national plague. In the rural constituency of West Central St. Mary, the JLP Headquarters was gutted and two party supporters sleeping in the back of a jeep in the East Central constituency office of St. Mary were assassinated. Mr. Errol Anderson, the JLP candidate claimed that his supporters were harassed throughout the four weeks of the election. In West Central St. Mary, eyewitnesses to the burning stated that the building was attacked

by an estimated 1,000 members of the 'Pioneer Gang' and other supporters of the PNP. ⁵⁶

There was an attempted assassination of Bob Marley, the international reggae singer who had consented to give a free performance at the National Heroes Circle to pay homage to the support he had received in the past from his fans in Jamaica. The concert was being promoted under the auspices of the Prime Minister's Office and even though Marley had no political motive, it appeared that the concert was part of the PNP's effort to win the next election. No one has been brought to justice for the crime but it is not farfetched to surmise that as the excitement of the elections drew near, a Bob Marley concert under the auspices of the Prime Minister's Office was interpreted by the JLP zealots as damaging to the chances of the Party winning the next election. The problem becomes even more urgent when it is recognized that all the polls revealed the inability of the JLP to appeal to the young voter who for the first time was voting in an election since the electoral law permitted 18 year old to vote. Marley's appeal to the youth was widely known and a triumphant concert would further alienate youths from the JLP and reduce the chances of an electoral victory. So despite the official non-political nature of the concert, it was felt among the would-be assassins that the concert had to be halted. Bob Marley survived the assassination attempt but received gun-shot wounds in his hand. Nevertheless the concert was held anyway. A series of shooting incidents marred the campaign. The PNP candidate for North-west St. Ann, Senator Arnold Bertram was shot at, shattering his windscreen. The bullet originated from one of the cars in a 12 vehicle JLP motorcade. What really occurred in this incident is unclear as the eyewitnesses at the scene interpret what occurred based on

party affiliation. The JLP proclaimed that four JLP supporters were shot,
57
one in critical condition.

On the same day another violent incident occurred with a JLP motor-
cade in West Central Kingston. JLP and PNP supporters altercated with a
vicious exchange of stone throwing. The police intervened and were attacked
by the enraged mob. Four people were shot and only reinforcements from the
Mobile Reserve prevented the incensed citizens of West Central Kingston from
58
storming the police station on Great George Street. Between December 8
and December 9 three more people were killed in politically related incidents
and two were nursing gunshot wounds in the hospital. All these incidents
59
took place in the parish of St. Catherine.

On December 9, 1976, Earl Woodburn, a clerical worker employed to
the JLP newspaper The Voice was abducted and stabbed to death in the consti-
60
tuency of South-west St. Andrew.

On December 11, 1976, the PNP candidate for East Central St. Catherine
Ferdie Neita was shot in the abdomen while he was in the act of erecting a
platform for a campaign meeting. On December 13, Colin Williamson, the JLP
candidate for West St. Andrew fired shots from his gun in order to defend
61
himself from an unsympathetic crowd.

On December 12, 1976, the Area Secretary of the BITU, Alexander
Vincent for St. Catherine was murdered after having chaired a public meeting
for the former Prime Minister, Hugh Shearer.

The Minister of National Security, Keble Munn faced with a deteriorating situation invoked the public Order Act and banned all public meetings. This act prohibited the parties in question from holding motorcades, processions, political rallies etc.

The Jamaica Council of Churches persuaded the Prime Minister and Leader of the Opposition to sign a pledge of peaceful coexistence which was conspicuously displayed in the Daily Gleaner, December 15, 1971.

Before God and all mankind
we pledge to work sincerely, actively
and creatively to bring reconciliation
and peace to Jamaica, to foster goodwill
amongst all the people of Jamaica
and to develop a spirit of National Unity
in our country, whichever Party is
chosen by the electorate. 62

All this was done in the interest of brotherhood. The irony is that the signatures of the political leaders came belatedly after another bloody election. This peace pledge occurred after the battle had been fought and in striking contrast to the propaganda used in the election. A JLP full page advertisement in the Daily Gleaner, December 8, 1976 raised the question, "Who are the Violent Ones?" and went on to list series of violent attacks on JLP supporters. In implying the attackers were PNP, the advertisement asked rhetorically JLP supporters are the victims, who are the attackers? On November 20, 1976, a PNP advertisement appeared in the Daily Gleaner. The gist of the propaganda accused the JLP of chronic red-baiting. The advertisement commenced with the election of 1944 when the JLP accused the PNP that they intended to burn down churches; in 1949 that the PNP would take away the goats and cows of the peasants; in 1962 that there were Russian

ships outside of Kingston Harbour awaiting the outcome of the elections; in 1972 that there were Cuban troops about to land in Jamaica; and in 1975 that the PNP would capture the savings of the 'little man'.

The PNP were returned to power in a landslide. The socialist party won 47 of the 60 contested seats. The JLP had been decisively defeated and in a moment of graciousness, the leader of the JLP, Eddie Seaga stated, "I think the PNP scored a very clear and decisive victory".⁶³

Summary

Not only was the year of 1976 the bloodiest in the history of Jamaican politics but for the first time an election was held under a State of Emergency. The State of Emergency that was declared in October, 1966 was lifted approximately one month after and even though the election was a violent one, it was held without giving the Security forces the constitutional right to use extraordinary powers. The JLP has charged that the State of Emergency was used to undermine the organizational efforts of the Party and hampered their mounting of an effective campaign. The declaration of a State of Emergency did serve to associate the JLP with conspiratorial violence directed at the state, but I have argued that conditions in Western Kingston and St. Andrew were tantamount to a state of war. The situation could not have been brought under control without some drastic measures such as the apprehension of known political gun fighters. Nevertheless a democratic society cannot invoke these draconian measures everytime there is an election campaign and the resort to a State of Emergency is a reflection of the fragile nature of democractic institutions in Jamaica despite the enviable record of conducting eight universal suffrage elections in the space of thirty-five years wherein power has been transferred peacefully on three occasions.

The 1976 Election revealed the increasing influence of the lumpen-proletariat in the nation's political system. Both political parties depend on lumpen-elements in their periodical mobilizational efforts. This has not only affected the democratic system but it has resulted in the manifold increase of political corruption. A symbiotic relationship has developed between members of the lumpen-proletariat and the politician in his quest for power. Heretofore, lumpen-elements have remained loyal to the Party that has provided them with concrete benefits. This emotional identification with party has retarded the development of class consciousness. The lumpen-proletariat despite their political influence, is locked into a system that does not cater to their needs but merely create an upper crust of lumpen who accumulate vast amounts of wealth and leave the community in its chronic state of dependency. This culture of 'badness' or sub-culture of violence thrives in this type of setting and a violent intra-class struggle is now a perennial feature of Jamaican politics. There is no question that the political elite in both parties recognize the monstrosity they have created but are like men on a galloping horse that has already developed its own momentum, heading straight to the abyss.

Whereas in the 1966-67 election political violence occurred primarily in the Western constituencies in the urban complex of Kingston and St. Andrew, in the election of 1976 the data that we have presented show that political violence is now quite widespread. The wounding of Ferdie Neita, the PNP candidate in St. Catherine, the murder of two JLP supporters in St. Mary, among numerous other incidents support that assertion. It is apparent that both the JLP and the PNP depend heavily on the respective lumpen-fortress of Tivoli Gardens and Arnett Gardens respectively. It is from these strongholds

that aspiring 'top-ranking' are sent to other constituencies to intimidate political opponents and hopefully to tip the scales in a close election. In addition, the sub-culture of violence or the culture of badness may have its origins in the urban areas but these cultural attitudes are becoming quite influential among youths in the countryside. If this trend continues and the surplus labour problem remains acute in the countryside, then political violence could become so devastating in proportion that the maintaining of social order would be beyond the capacity of the security forces.

The 1976 Election not only re-affirms the decline in value consensus that began from the 1960s but reveals the decline in ideological consensus. Although the PNP included radical elements from the Party's inception, people of a revolutionary persuasion were purged in 1952 and the differences between both political parties were as clear as tweedle-dee and tweedle-dum. All through the fifties and sixties, both parties subscribed to the economic gospel of salvation, industrialization by invitation. Since this economic strategy was successful in producing new wealth but failed to absorb the excess of unemployed workers, the PNP abandoned that strategy and reaffirmed the Party principle of democratic socialism while vehemently taking an anti-capitalist position at home and an anti-imperialist position abroad. This meant that the victor of the 1976 Election would not only decide who would prosper amongst the divided lumpen communities, but whether the private sector in the words of Michael Manley would become "a guest in the house of the people" or would remain unfettered. Politics was not only a life and death struggle for the politicized lumpen-proletariat but the Jamaican bourgeoisie also interpreted the 1976 election in those terms. Obviously the section of the lumpen-proletariat loyal to the JLP felt that the bourgeois

interest represented in the Party did not constitute a threat to their interest. This is one of the paradoxes of Jamaican politics. Once ideology was injected into the political arena, the business class abandoned the PNP in droves. The white collar middle class identifying with the status quo also abandoned the Party they had formerly supported. This is an indication that the upper and middle classes are far more politically sophisticated than the working class and the sub-class of lumpen-proletariat. The upper and middle class have a clear sense of their class interest but this type of intellectual clarity has not been reached by the Jamaican working class and lumpen-proletariat. The latter do not confront the system as a united mass but as individuals using politics as the runway for upward mobility. It is obvious the ideological schism gave the 1976 Election a histrionic ethos that contributed to the random bloodletting.

We have witnessed in the last thirteen years, a decline in thrust between both political parties. Charges and counter-charges thrown around quite widely irrespective of the damage done to the democratic system. The primary concern is to get as much propaganda mileage out of a charge in order to discredit the opposing party. The irony is that corruption is widespread among both parties, that one does not have to engage in a diligent search to come up with ample propaganda material. This provides us with an insight into the nature of political parties in a highly competitive two party system. It is political power that is coveted at all cost. The political party as witnessed in Jamaica, is formed for the specific purpose of controlling state power. The 'horse-race' nature of the two party system encourages the search for ways, legitimate or devious that can ensure victory for one party or the other. Both parties have in the past engaged in bogus voting, the gerrymander-

ing of constituencies, and the most explosive the policy of political victimization. In the post-independence period political victimization was introduced by the Jamaica Labour Party and on attaining state office in 1972, the People's National Party perpetuated the policy of politically victimizing the opponents of the rival party. Thus we have gotten to a stage in Jamaica where we can say that political victimization has become institutionalized. It has become part and parcel of Jamaican politics, as impregnable as the mountains that add so much to the aesthetics of the island. Political parties have been forced to use victimization as a tool to keep supporters happy and the lumpen-proletariat divided largely because they have been unable to come up with the answers to resolve the endemic problem of surplus labour. This policy might have preserved the status quo in the past and prevented the emergence of revolutionary politics but the blood-letting in the 1976 Election point to the fact that political victimization is destroying the social fabric of the nation.

Footnotes

1. Olive Senior, The Message is Change: A Perspective on the 1972 General Elections (Kingston Publishers 1972) p 23
2. See Report of Commission of Enquiry into the Award of Contracts. The Grant of Work Permits and Licences and Other Matters (Kingston, Government Printing Office, 1973)
3. Olive Senior, op. cit. p 42
4. Ibid, p 43
5. Ibid, p 43
6. John Maxwell, "Thunder on the Right" The Jamaica Daily News, February 2 1977, p 16
7. The Daily Gleaner, December 10, 1976, p 34
8. The Daily Gleaner, November 13, 1972, p 1
9. Ibid, p 1
10. Robert Girling and Sherry Keith, "Jamaica's Employment Crisis. A Political Economic Evaluation of the Jamaica Special Employment Programme" (March 1977), Center for Economic Studies (Palo Alto, California) p 18
11. Ibid, p 52
12. Ibid, p 65
13. P.S.O.J. Paper on the Special Employment Programme
14. Information on the Special Employment Programme was gleaned from a number of technocrats and a few parish councillors who were willing to be candid.
15. Claudine Boothe "Hygiene Conditions at Rema". The Jamaica Weekly Gleaner, May 1, 1978, p 18
16. JLP Ten Page Text published in the Daily Gleaner October 28, 1975, p 2
17. Ibid, p 28
18. Socialism, November, 1975. Vol. 2 No. 11, p 6
19. "South West St. Andrew Citizens Demand Pearnell (sic) Charles Arrest for Conspiracy to Murder 105 "Citizens of the Community" undated pamphlet.

20. South West St. Andrew Citizens Association, undated pamphlet
21. South West St. Andrew Citizens Association pamphlet published in Caribbean Dialogue, Vol. 2 No. 2, March 1976, p 18
22. The Jamaica Daily News, April 16, 1975
23. Ibid, April 16, 1975
24. The Daily Gleaner, April 14, 1975, p 10
25. The Daily Gleaner, March 24, 1975, p 25
26. The Daily News, April 16, 1975
27. Pearnel Charles Detained (Kingston Publishers 1977) p 24
28. Ibid, p 25
29. Interview with a combatant conducted January 11, 1978.
30. The Daily Gleaner, Thursday, January 8, 1976
31. Pearnel Charles, op. cit. p 26
32. Keeble Munn's Statement in Parliament January 13, 1976. Published in the Daily Gleaner January 14, 1976.
33. Interview with a PNP organizer in the constituency of Western St. Andrew, June 1978
34. Prime Minister's Broadcast over Jamaica Broadcasting Service, January 9, 1976
35. The Daily Gleaner, January 16, 1976
36. The Daily Gleaner, January 13, 1976, p 1
37. The Daily Gleaner, February 2, 1976, p 1
38. The Daily Gleaner, February 4 & 5, 1976, p1
39. The Daily Gleaner, February 11, 1976, p 1
40. The Daily Gleaner, May 1, 1976, p 11
41. The New Nation (official organ of the PNP) June 5, 1976.
42. The Daily Gleaner, May 21, 1976, p 1
43. Pearnel Charles, Detained, op.cit. p 20
44. Ibid, p 28

45. The Daily Gleaner, Wednesday September 14, 1979, p 6 (Excerpts from the Small Commission).
46. The Daily Gleaner, December 10, 1976, p 34
47. The Daily News, Monday June 14, 1976, p 1
48. The New Nation, June 5, 1976
49. The Daily Gleaner, June 18, 1976
50. The New Nation, June 30, 1976
51. See The Jamaican Weekly Gleaner, September 4, 1978 p 20 and 31
52. The Daily Gleaner, June 22, 1976
53. Pearnel Charles, Detained, op.cit. p. 184
54. Ibid, p. 104
55. Ibid, p. 84
56. The Daily Gleaner, December 1, 1976
57. The Daily Gleaner, December 8, 1976
58. Ibid, p.1
59. The Jamaican Weekly Gleaner, December 21, 1976, p.3
60. Ibid, p. 4
61. Ibid, p. 8
62. The Daily Gleaner, December 15, 1976
63. The Daily Gleaner, December 16, 1976

C H A P T E R IX

POLITICAL CORRUPTION: A COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS

Jamaica's political institutions cannot be characterized as being weak. There exist a strong competitive two party system with both the conservative Jamaica Labour Party and the socialist People's National Party organizationally linked to blanket trade unions that represent the working class. As discussed above, there has been eight universal suffrage elections held in the country and on three occasions power has changed hands peacefully. Thus it would be absurd to assume that corruption in Jamaica can be attributed to the lack of political institutionalization or the weakness of political parties. Corruption and violence stem from the inability of the economic system to provide full employment and the consequent dependency of lumpen-proletariat on the largesse that politicians skillfully distribute.

In his theoretical contribution to our understanding of corruption, Samuel Huntington explore the relationship that develops between modernization and corruption. He perceived corruption as the product of the distinction between public welfare and private interest which comes with modernization.¹ Nevertheless, Huntington has professed that there is some virtue in political corruption. Reflecting his pre-occupation with political order, Huntington wrote:

Corruption in this sense is a direct product of the rise of new groups with new resources and the efforts of these groups to make themselves effective within the political sphere. Corruption may be the means of assimilating new groups into the political system because the system has been unable to adapt sufficiently fast to provide legitimate and acceptable means for this purpose.²

This is precisely the case in Jamaica. By the middle of the 1960s the mass of lumpen-proletariat concentrated in the urban complex of Kingston and St. Andrew emerged as a new group in the configuration of power in Jamaica. Illicit measures were used to assimilate this new group into the political system. The surplus labour population was reproducing itself much more rapidly than the capability of the economy to create jobs. Lumpen elements in this regard represented a destabilizing force if not a revolutionary force. Destabilizing in the sense that their desperate search for survival entailed committing armed robberies, mugging, etc., that certainly was having an effect on the business sector and forcing the state to expand its security machinery to cope with this new sub-culture of violence that infected the body politic. They did not constitute a revolutionary force largely because they saw survival from an individual measure rather than in terms of group interest. As much energy that was expended on disrupting the system was spent on petty gang warfare. Since this expendable labour force could not be absorbed within the established economic system and since they constituted a large voting bloc, both political parties sought to assimilate them by making them an integral part of conventional politics. The enthusiasm of lumpen elements for conventional politics could only be lasting, if this wretched class obtained some concrete benefits. Those benefits came in the form of low-income housing, public works employment, etc. but because of the problem of scarcity, could only be distributed to 'key influentials' in the lumpen and working class communities or to party supporters.

Huntington has argued that this form of corruption serves to postpone revolution and buys time for the system. He is aware of the connection that

exist between political corruption and political violence, but argues that violence will only occur in a corrupt polity if political institutions are weak. This is obviously not the case in Jamaica where political participation is high and political institutions firmly rooted: Let us further examine Huntington's argument:

Corruption may thus be functional to the maintenance of a political system in the same way that reform is. Corruption itself may be a substitute for reform and both corruption and reform may be substitutes for revolution. Corruption serves to reduce group pressures for policy changes, just as reform serves to reduce class pressures for structural changes.³

Certainly in the case of Jamaica, corruption and reform have served as substitutes for revolution. The lumpen-proletariat find themselves caught up in conventional politics and thus seldom give much thought to revolutionary change. They do not confront the system as an excluded mass, but like people with something at stake and with a vested interest in its preservation. The tragedy in Jamaica is that political corruption in the form of political victimization is the principal cause of political violence and has reached the point where it no longer serves to stabilize the system, but serves to create large scale pandemonium that leads to wanton bloodletting and could eventually lead to the system's destruction.

Convinced of the efficiency of corruption, Samuel Huntington has argued that if governmental bureaucracy is corrupted in the interest of the party, political development will be helped rather than hindered. Patronage is perceived as an essential attribute in the building of a strong party organization and to support his thesis, he cited the following historical examples:

In the 1920s and 1930s, Ataturk used the resources of the Turkish government to foster the development of the Republican's People's Party. After its creation in 1929 the Mexican Revolutionary Party similarly benefited from governmental corruption and patronage. The formation of the Democratic Republican Party in Korea in the early 1960s was directly helped by the use of governmental personnel. In Israel and India governmental patronage has been a major source of strength for Mapai and Congress. The corruption in West Africa derived in part from the needs of the political parties. And, of course in the most obvious and blatant case of all, communist parties, once they acquire power, directly subordinate governmental bureaucracies and governmental resources to their own purposes. ⁴

Obviously the consequences of political corruption must be assessed contextually. The cases that Huntington has outlined are political systems in which one party is predominant. In a state dominated by just one political party and where power is controlled through coercion, political corruption may not precipitate violence and may even contribute to the building of a strong party organization. In the case of Jamaica this is certainly not the case. I am suggesting that in a competitive two party democracy where both political parties command mass support, political corruption in the form of political victimization precipitates political violence and weakens the democratic system. There is also two factors that Huntington does not take into account (1) the class character of the party and (2) the size of the unemployed. Certainly, sections of the lumpen-proletariat have been assimilated into the conventional political parties. This has increased the influence of lumpen-elements in the political system and 'top-ranking' gunfighters play a leadership role in these communities owing to their reputation as violent men. In the case of Jamaica, this has led to intra-class warfare and the institutionalization of political intolerance.

The reserving and dispensing of jobs only to political loyalists may not be detrimental in a polity wherein there is a scarcity of labour and if people are overlooked for patronage jobs, they can find employment elsewhere. In a country like Jamaica, where the unemployed constitute anywhere from 20-30% of the labour force, political jobs can decide who suffers and who prospers, especially in highly politicized working-class and lumpen-proletariat communities.

James Scott's research also reveals the pre-occupation of scholars with corruption between economic elites and political elites. The case studies that provided the empirical component of Scott's inquiry into the phenomenon of corruption included Thailand, Philippines, Ghana, England, the United States, India, Haiti, and Indonesia. Scott supported Huntington's findings and has argued that corruption may serve to resolve disputes which otherwise could generate violence.

In some settings, then, it may be appropriate to view machine corruption as a sort of half-way house between violence and constitutionality - a means by which some of the demands generated by a vast increase accommodated within a political system whose formal institutions are as yet inadequate to the task. By increasing the governments de facto capacity to meet certain demands and by reducing the likelihood of political violence the corruption that accompanies machine politics may contribute to the stability both of a particular regime and the electoral system itself. 5

This was the experience in Thailand and the Philippines. Political corruption in Thailand takes the form of businessmen bribing the governmental bureaucracy to obtain licences or to expedite other business transactions. This form of corruption between elites, aims at transcending the red-tape of

official bureaucracy and it is argued, contributes to economic efficiency. This type of corruption is similar to the chicanery that prevailed in early Stuart England. Wealthy elites had little formal access to political power and resorted to bribing government officials to advance economic interest. In Thailand, the Chinese minority constitute a powerful economic elite while state authority is controlled by the indigenous Thais. Within the political elite of the Thais, there are competing cliques that are constantly jockeying for power. All decision-making posts in the bureaucracy are filled on the basis of clique patronage which makes the appointee indebted to his powerful 'godfather'. His loyalty is not to the state, but to the individual who engineered his appointment.

Corruption in Thailand is highly institutionalized. "The Thai elite deals with a relatively small and cohesive Chinese elite who can negotiate for much of the Chinese community, while the Chinese, for their part, are dealing with a small number of Thai power figures who, by their authority, can provide fairly regular and reliable protection." ⁶ There are certain accepted rules to the game and transactions along with competitiveness are carried out with a great deal of decorum and a minimum of disruptiveness. In contrast, corruption in Indonesia were in much of a hurry largely because of the tentative nature of the coalition that governed. One had to accumulate wealth in as short a time as possible. This meant that the political coalition did not have the centralized clout to curb "the increasingly disastrous inflationary spiral from 1961 to 1965...". ⁷ What was required was an austerity budget, but that would entail the destabilization of a brittle

coalition of corrupt politicians who governed. Corruption in Indonesia, unlike Thailand, did not contribute to political stability or economic development. The body politic was much too fragmented.

James Scott differentiated political corruption that takes place in undemocratic regimes from a polity that is characterized by competitive elections. In a competitive party system, the party must attempt to siphon off as much financial contributions from wealthy elites to mount the campaign necessary to sway the minds of the masses. This places the economic elite in an advantageous position once the party achieves power. Donors to the party's purse are in a special position to demand special favors from those who control state power. Nevertheless, what develops is a triangular relationship and the party must also introduce legislation that benefits the majority of voters.

Scott has argued that the importance of money was apparent in the Philippines in the early 1960s when the democratic political system was still intact. In that country, direct per capita campaign expenditures were the highest in the world. Each Senator has at his disposal 400,000 pesos and a Congressman 200,000 to be used for electoral purposes.⁸ Parties actually engage in vote buying and it is estimated that 10-20 percent of the electorate offer their votes for sale to the highest bidder. Commenting on elections in the Philippines, James Scott has drawn conclusions about the effect of corruption in electoral competition:

It is not astonishing, then, that the growth of corruption surrounding elections in developing nations may in fact indicate the growing effectiveness of popular democracy. The decline of terrorism and outright fraud in Philippine elections was accompanied by a quite noticeable increase in vote-buying by candidates.⁹

The experience in the Philippines sharply contrast with that of Jamaica. The use of pork-barrel legislation and other benefits to party supporters have not led to a decline in violence or terrorism. It is in fact the promoter of political violence with people killing each other for expected spoils that will flow when their party achieves or retains power.

Scott has taken into consideration the social context in which machine politics is occurring. He outlined basically three states:

- 1) Political ties are determined largely by traditional patterns of deference (vertical ties) to established authorities. Material, particularistic inducements to cooperation play a minor role except among a limited number of local power-holders.
- 2) Deference patterns have weakened considerably in a period of rapid socioeconomic change. Vertical ties can only be maintained through a relationship of greater reciprocity. Competition among leaders for support, coupled with the predominance of narrow parochial loyalties, will encourage the widespread use of concrete, short-run, material inducements to secure cooperation. The greater the competitive electoral pressures, the wider the distribution of inducements is likely to be. Influence at the enforcement stage is common.
- 3) New loyalties have emerged in the process of economic growth that increasingly stress horizontal (functional) class, or

occupational ties. The nature of inducements for political support are accordingly like to stress policy concerns or ideology. Influence at the legislature stage becomes more appropriate to the nature of the new political loyalties. ¹⁰

Scott forewarned that the stages were not deterministic, but were based on the empirical experience of the United States, England, and the new nations. Indeed, the early politics of Jamaica was characterized by vertical deference and even though dispensation of benefits was introduced from 1944, it played a minor role until the granting of independence in 1962 when the state structure was free to expand. We have indicated in Chapter IV how deference patterns weakened immensely as the society became increasingly urbanized. It is apparent that Scott does not recognize the bloodletting that can result when a state enters the second stage. The struggle for spoils is a desperate game and drives deep wedges into opposing communities. Contemporary Jamaican politics is somewhere betwixt the second stage and the third stage. Although there has developed in recent years increased stress on horizontal ties in Jamaica, the support of the major parties include both horizontal and vertical ties. The division within the working class helps to sustain this muddled picture. The injection of ideology in 1974 by the PNP with the renewal of the Party's commitment to democratic socialism has made class into a far more explicit political issue than heretofore. The question of class in social relationships has always been omnipresent, but because of the political division in the trade union movement and the persistence of class deference, clear class politics has not crystallized. The injection of

ideology has brought about certain shifts in class forces such as the abandonment of the PNP by the middle class frightened of democratic socialism, but as significant as class is politically, past party loyalty in the Jamaica context still determines how the voter will cast his ballot.

A theoretical discussion on corruption without examining the research of the English historian, J.H. Plumb would be incomplete. A student of seventeenth century England, Plumb argued that the violence that plagued English politics from 1675 to 1725 was over the spoils that Parliament and the Crown had to dispense. At the time, there existed two political parties, the Tories and the Whigs vying for control of the English Parliament. This struggle for power was also precipitated by the fears that the gentry had about power being concentrated in the hands of the Crown. Thus throughout the seventeenth century there was this tug-of-war between the English Parliament and the Crown and a struggle within Parliament between the Whigs and the Tories.

The gentry used violence and bribery to win elections.¹¹ It was critical to the businessmen in the city or in the countryside to have influence in government because without that support the arbitrary power of government could be used against him in the form of land tax, tariffs, etc. The cost of an election campaign soared to the extent that only the wealthy could afford to run for office. Plumb contended that the cost of elections is perhaps the most important factor in the development of oligarchy.¹²

There are other factors that contributed to stability and reduced the internecine warfare between the commercialized gentry. The bureaucracy was expanding rapidly, especially after 1718 and thus there was more and more patronage to go around. Because of Britain's position in the world economy at the time, there was the necessity for a standing army and an expanding navy that not only provided the upper class with additional patronage, but it was recognized that this military capability was essential for Britain to protect its economic interests. Employment in the colonies and the development of a foreign service also served as outlet valves which decreased the amount of domestic conflict. By 1725 the Tories were discredited as political traitors and ceased to be a national political force. On this development, Plumb theorized:

The evolution of political stability had gone hand in hand not only with the diminution and close control of the electorate and a more thorough exploitation of patronage, but also with the evolution of single-party government and the proscription of political opposition. Single-party government, combined with proscription of opposition, using proscription in its widest sense, that is ostracism from power, political or social has, of course helped to bring about political stability in other countries than England such as Mexico or Russia, and maybe it will be as effective in the new states of Africa. 13

Under the leadership of Sir Robert Walpole, violence diminished and the system was held together through patronage. The internecine warfare between the gentry ceased and Parliament and the Crown pursued common commercial interests which led to mutual enrichment.

Although violence was very much characteristic of English politics during the seventeenth century, political participation was limited to the

gentry and aristocracy. In other words politics was competitively obligarchical and excluded the mass of the population. At the time England did not possess a democratic polity. As the commercial gentry became increasingly class conscious, they became a cohesive class using state power to ensure and to enhance economic objectives at home and abroad. Throughout this period of unrest, the mass of the English population remained remarkably stable. This meant that they did not constitute an independent force from below making demands on the political system. Once the gentry and the Crown arrived at a rapprochement, an age of stability crystallized. The situation in Jamaica is quite different. Jamaica is a democratic polity with two highly institutionalized political parties with loyal support that cuts across class lines. The mass of the population is tuned into politics and making demands on the system that hitherto the system has not been able to accommodate. Patronage rather than leading to political stability has contributed to political violence. Political violence in Jamaica is occurring simultaneously with rapid social and cultural change that further undermines the social order. The fostering of a nationalist spirit, the development of an empire and the wealth created were indispensable to the attainment of domestic tranquility in Britain. The Jamaican situation is just the converse. Jamaica's position in the international economy in the post-1973 period has become increasingly disadvantageous and rather than this leading to a fostering of a nationalist spirit or the expansion of patronage, the cleavages have become more antagonistic and the amount of funds available for patronage has shrunk drastically.

Nevertheless, this study has attempted to look at politics as ongoing activity. Politics is indeed a study of motion. A political system is like

a living organism constantly adapting to changes in the environment. Although the lumpen-proletariat in Jamaica presently do not constitute a revolutionary force and are locked in a combative situation, there are indications that this internecine warfare will eventually come to an end and lumpen-elements could confront the system as a united mass. A case in point is the Peace Movement that emerged in January, 1978 through the initiatives of the rival political gang leaders. It is important to point out that this was a Movement that came from below and not from above. In other words, it is not the politicians who initiated the truce. It was the gang leaders with grassroots support from the respective communities that finally grew tired of the chronic guerrilla warfare. There are a number of factors that triggered the peace initiative (1) the dialectic between 'top-ranking' and those who control state power (2) benefits from the party are never sufficient to satisfy the demand (3) growing class consciousness in the society.

The political parties have become quite dependent during election time on 'top-ranking' gunfighters, yet these are the same men that state authorities had to apprehend in order to reduce the level of violence in 1976. We have seen how the PNP has been forced to pass quite draconian legislation vis-a-vis gun crimes. Rigid enforcement of these laws makes the life of a 'top-ranking' quite precarious. In order to maintain social order and not to alienate the security forces, the governing party cannot dispense special favours when known supporters violate the law. The governing party is far more dependent on its police force and army corps than its political gangs. This has resulted in some disaffection among gang leaders whenever they collide with the repressive machinery of the state.

Only the favoured few become wealthy through party patronage and this creates discontent among those who are excluded from the process. Thus patronage engenders support as much as it alienates. In recent years the Jamaican economy has been severely affected by the state of the world economy, the increase levels of social and political violence and the flight of capital by those who fear the reforms of the PNP. This has meant that the Jamaican economy is going through a period of contractions rather than being in a state of expansion where 'spoils' could be increased. Inflation has severely lowered the living standards of the working class poor and made it difficult for the lumpen-proletariat to eke out an existence. Discontent in the society is far more widespread and it is not unusual to hear someone say "Whether PNP or Labour in power, poor people still catch hell." ¹⁴ As benefits are reduced, people realize that their material position has not changed even though his or her party is in power.

The ideological debate between the two parties has not only contributed to the ferocity of the politics, but it has resulted in a greater degree of class consciousness. 'Top-ranking' political gunfighters experienced indefinite detention during the State of Emergency that was declared in June 1976 and perceived how the middle class politicians were kept in different compounds, irrespective of party affiliation from alleged political street fighters. The class debate taking place in the society affects every discussion on the street corners and the masses have become increasingly conscious of class interest. It is this development that was instrumental in lumpen-communities

coming together and declaring a truce much to the chagrin of the politicians who feared the guns would now be turned against them.

The Peace Movement of January 1978 put a temporary halt to the guerrilla warfare in Western Kingston and Western St. Andrew and even put an end to a number of non-political gang wars. Unfortunately, the leaders of the Peace Movement were men already linked to the respective political parties and still depended on the respective party for a source of income. To have survived, they would have had to develop a clear political line to the extent that they would constitute an autonomous force within the society making revolutionary demands. The leaders were not politically sophisticated and gradually shifted back to a position of being party loyalists. Although the truce is still in effect, there is already a gathering storm for the elections of 1981 and I am certain that those gale force winds will blow so ferociously that what is left of the Peace Movement will be shattered and the election of 1981 will perhaps be bloodier than the 1976 election.

FOOTNOTES

1. See Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies. (New Haven, Yale University Press 1968)
2. Ibid, p 61
3. Ibid, p 64
4. Ibid, p 70
5. James C. Scott, Comparative Political Corruption (N.J. Prentice-Hall Inc, 1972) p 146
6. Ibid, p 74
7. Ibid, p 8
8. Ibid, p 97
9. James Scott "The Analysis of Corruption in Developing Nations" Comparative Studies in Society and History, June 11, 1969
10. James Scott, Comparative Political Corruption, op. cit. p 105
11. J.H. Plumb, The Growth of Political Stability in England 1665-1725, p 34
12. Ibid, p 94
13. Ibid, p 173
14. Conversation with a 'top-ranking' in Tivoli Gardens, January 1978.

B I B L I O G R A P H Y

The Caribbean

- Barrett, Leonard E. The Rastafarians, Sound of Cultural Dissonance. Boston, Beacon Press 1977
- Soul Force New York. Doubleday S. Company Inc. 1974
- The Rastafarians. A Study in Messianic Cultism in Jamaica. University of Puerto Rico, Institute of Caribbean Studies 1968.
- Beckford, George (ed) Caribbean Economy. Jamaica, ISER 1975
- Beckford, George. Persistent Poverty (ISER - Oxford 1972)
- Brown, Aggrey. Color, Class and Politics in Jamaica New Jersey, Transaction Inc. 1979
- Carnegie, James. Some Aspects of Jamaica's Politics 1918-1938. Jamaica. Institute of Jamaica 1973.
- Charles, Parnel. Detained. Kingston. Kingston Publishers Ltd. 1977
- Comitas, Lambros and Lowenthal, David (eds) Slaves, Free Men, Citizens New York.- Doubleday Anchor Books 1973
- The Aftermath of Sovereignty. New York Doubleday Anchor Books 1973
- Work and Family Life. New York. Doubleday Anchor Books 1973.
- Consequences of Class and Color. New York Doubleday Anchor Books 1973
- Curtin, Philip. Two Jamaicas. New York. Antheneum 1970
- Demas, William P. The Economics of Development in Small Countries With Special Reference to the Caribbean. Montreal, McGill University Press 1965.
- Eaton, George. Alexander Bustamante and Modern Jamaica. Kingston. Kingston Publishers Ltd. 1975

Frucht, Richard. Black Society in the New World.
New York. Random House 1971

Furnivall, J.S. Colonial Policy and Practice. Cambridge
University Press 1948

Garvey, Amy Jacques (ed) Philosophy and Opinions of Marcus
Garvey. New York Atheneum 1969

Girvan, Norman. Foreign Capital and Economic Under Development
in Jamaica. Kingston. UWI. ISER 1971

Hurrod, George. Trade Union Foreign Policy. New York Doubleday
S. Company 1972

Hill, Frank. Bustamante and His Letters. Jamaica. Kingston
Publishers Ltd. 1976

James, C.L.R. The Future in the Present. Selected Writings
London. Allison and Busby 1977

James, C.L.R. Facing Reality. Michigan. Garvey Institute (no date)

Jefferson, Owen. The Post-War Economic Development of Jamaica.
Jamaica. ISER 1972

Jefferson, Owen and Girvan, Norman. Readings in the Political
Economy of the Caribbean. Kingston. New World Group Ltd. 1971

Hoefink, H. The Two Variants in Caribbean Race Relations. New York.
The Natural History Press 1971

Horowitz, Michael M. Peoples and Cultures of the Caribbean.
New York. The Natural History Press 1971

Kaplan Irving et al. Area Handbook For Jamaica. Washington,
U.S. Government Printing Office 1976

Kerr, Madeline. Personality Conflict in Jamaica. Jamaica Sangsters
Ltd. 1973

Kuper, Adam Changing Jamaica, Jamaica; Kingston Publishers 1976

Lacey, Terry. Violence and Politics in Jamaica 1960-70. New Jersey.
Frank Cass & Co. 1977

Lewis, Gordon K. The Growth of the Modern West Indies. New York.
Monthly Review Press 1968

Manley, Michael. A Voice at the Work Place. Great Britain
Andre Deutsch Ltd. 1975

Manley, Michael. The Politics of Change. Great Britain
Andre Deutsch 1975

Munroe, Trevor. The Politics of Constitutional Colonization
Jamaica 1944-62. Kingston. ISER 1972

Nettleford, Rex. Mirror, Mirror, Jamaica. Collins-Sangster 1973

- (ed) Manley and the New Jamaica. Selected Speeches
and Writings 1938-68. Great Britain. Clowes and Sons Ltd. 1971

Norris, Katrin, Jamaica. The Search For An Identity. London Oxford
University Press 1962

Owens, Joseph. Dread, The Rastafarians of Jamaica. Kingston.
Sangsters Ltd. 1976

Patterson, Orlando. The Sociology of Slavery. London. McGibbon
S. Kee 1976

- The Children of Sisyphus. Kingston. Bolivar Press
1974

Roberts, Adolphe (ed) Recent Population Movements in Jamaica.
United Nations. CICRED Series 1974

Robotham, Don. Our Struggle. Kingston. Workers Liberation League
1975

Rodman, Hyman. Lower - Class Families. The Culture of Poverty in
Negro Trinidad. New York. Oxford University Press 1971

Rodney, Walter. How Europe Underdeveloped Africa. London.
Bogle L'Ouverture Press 1972

Rodney, Walter. The Grounding With My Brothers. London.
Bogle L'Ouverture Press 1969

Senior, Olive. The Message is Change. A Perspective on the 1972
General Elections. Jamaica, Kingston Publishers Ltd. 1972

Smith, M.G. The Plural Society in the British West Indies. California,
University of California Press 1974

Smith, M.G. et al Report on the Rastafari Movement in Kingston,
Jamaica. Mona, U.C.W.I. 1960

Stone, Carl and Brown, Aggrey (eds) Essays in Power and Change in Jamaica. University of the West Indies 1976

Stone, Carl. Class Race and Political Behaviour in Urban Jamaica. Jamaica ISER 1973

Williams, Eric. Capitalism and Slavery. New York. Capricorn Books 1966

POLITICAL CORRUPTION

Bayley, David. H., "The Effects of Corruption in a Developing Nation".
Western Political Quarterly XIX, December 1960

Divinedy, Sarendranath and G.S. Bhargava, Political Corruption in India, Delhi: Popular Book Services 1967

Gardner, John and Olson, David. Theft of the City. Bloomington.
Indiana University Press 1974

Gosnell, Harold F., Machine Politics: Chicago Model 2nd ed.
Chicago, University of Chicago Press 1968.

Greenstone, J. David. "Corruption and Self-Interest in Kampala and Nairobi,"
Comparative Studies in Society and History VIII. No. 2
January 1966

Heidenheimer, Arnold J. Political Corruption: Readings in Comparative Analysis: New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc. 1970

Key, V.O. Jnr. The Techniques of Political Graft in the United States.
Chicago, University of Chicago Libraries

Le Vine, Victor. Political Corruption: The Ghana Case, Stanford,
California, Stanford University. Hoover Institution Press 1975

McKittrick, E.I. "The Study of Corruption." The Sociological Review,
IX, July 1961

Nye, Joseph S. "Corruption and Political Development: A Cost
Benefit Analysis: APSR 61 No. 2, June 1967

Plumb, J.H. The Growth of Political Stability in England 1675-1725
(Baltimore, Maryland, Penguin Books 1967)

Scott, James C. "The Analysis of Corruption in Developing Nations"
Comparative Studies in Society and History, II, June 1969

Scott, James C. "Corruption, Machine Politics and Political Change"
APSR LXIII, December 1969

Scott, James C. "Comparative Political Corruption", N.J. Prentice
Hall Inc. 1972

Stave, Bruce M. Urban Bosses, Machines and Progressive Reformers,
Massachusetts. D.C. Heath and Company 1972

Weiner, Myron. The Politics of Scarcity. Chicago, University of Chicago Press 1962

Werlin, Herbert. "The Consequences of Corruption: The Ghanaian Experience", Political Science Quarterly 88 No. 1, March 1973

Werlin, Herbert. "The Roots of Corruption: The Ghanaian Enquiry" Journal of Modern African Studies Vol. 10, No. 2 1972

Wilson, James. "The Economy of Patronage", Journal of Political Economy, August 1961

Wraith, Ronald and Edgar Simpkins, Corruption in Developing Countries, London, George Allen and Union Ltd. 1963

Articles and Unpublished Manuscripts

Blackman, Courtney. "Ideological Obstacles to Economic Development in the English-speaking Caribbean "(unpublished paper 1978)

Bradley, C. "Mass Parties in Jamaica, Structure and Organization" published in Social & Economic Studies Vol. 9, No. 4 December 1966

Brodber, Erna. "A Study of Yards in the City of Kingston", Institute of Social & Economic Research 1975

Fraser, Aubrey H. "The Legal Basis For Socialist Measures in Jamaica and Guyana" (unpublished paper 1977)

Garvey, Amy Jacques "The Political Activities of Marcus Garvey in Jamaica, Jamaica Journal Quarterly of The Institute of Jamaica

Girling, Robert and Keith, Sherry. "Jamaica's Employment Crisis, A Political Economic Evaluation of the Jamaican Special Employment Program"

Employment Program California, Center for Economic Studies, March 1977

Hillman, Richard "Legitimacy and Change in Jamaica" (unpublished paper)

Kane, Arthur. "Social Action and the Church in Jamaica" published in Caribbean Development and the Future of the Church, Guyana Institute For Social Research and Action 1969

Lewis, Patrick, "The Social Factors Which Helped to Produce Riots in the British West Indies, published in Journal of Ethnic Studies, Hampton Institute Vol. IV. November 1977

Lindsay, Louis. "The Myth of Independence - Middle Class Politics and Non-Mobilization in Jamaica" published by Institute of Social and Economic Research, U.W.I. Mona, Working Paper No. 6, 1975

Matthews, Harry. "Some Obstacles to Development in the Caribbean"
(unpublished paper 1975)

McLaughlin, "The Challenge of Third Force Parties in Jamaican Politics
Since 1944-62" (unpublished paper)

Nardin, Terry "Violence and the State. A Critique of Empirical
Political Theory" Sage Publications Inc. 1971

Nettleford, Rex. "Aggression, Violence and Force Containment and
Eruption in the Jamaican History of Protest" (unpublished paper)

Norton, Ann. "Shanties and Skyscrapers, Growth and Structure of Modern
Kingston", ISER, Working Paper No. 13, 1978

Reid, Sydney. A Contemporary Study of the Politics and Government
of Jamaica (unpublished PH.D University of Massachusetts 1960)

Roberts, G.W. and Mills, D.O. "Study of External Migration Affecting
Jamaica 1953-55" ISER Vol. 7 No. 2 1958

Robertson, Paul. "Political Behaviour at the Grassroots Level. A
Study of Electoral and Party Politics in Jamaica" (unpublished Msc
Thesis 1971 UWI

Taylor, Frank. "Jamaica, The Welcoming Society Myths and Reality",
ISER Working Paper No. 8 1975

GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS AND PUBLICATIONS

Agency for Public Information

Coore, David. Minister of Finance, Budget Debate Speech, 1974 and 1975

Manley, Michael. Prime Minister, Budget Debate Speech 1973

Bank of Jamaica

Annual Reports 1973 - 1978

Department of Statistics

The Labour Force 1974 - 77

Employment Earnings and Hours in Large Establishments 1977

Government Printing Office

Report of Mission To Africa 1961

Economic Survey Jamaica, 1969. Prepared by Central Planning Unit

Five Year Independence Plan, 1963 - 1968. A Long Term Development Programme for Jamaica

Green Paper on Industrial Development Programme - Jamaica 1975 - 1980

Five Year Development Plan, 1978 - 82, National Planning Agency, Ministry of Finance and Planning

Economic and Social Survey Jamaica 1974 - 77, National Planning Agency

The Jamaican (Constitution) Order in Council 1962

Commission of Enquiries

Report on Commission of Enquiry into the Award of Contracts, The Grant of Work Permits and Licences and Other Matters.

Report on Commission of Enquiry into Incidents Which Occurred at St. Catherine District Prison, 27 December, 1974

Report of the Chief Electoral Officer Jamaica, General Election 1972, 1976.

I N T E R V I E W S

Hon. P.J. Patterson, Minister of Trade and Industry. June 1976

Frank Hill, Journalist and former Trade Unionist. August 1976

- PNP Group Leader, West Central St. Andrew, June 1978

Pearnel Charles, Deputy Leader of the Jamaica Labour Party. April 1977

- JLP Community Leader, Tivoli Gardens, Western
Kingston, January 1978

- Councillor of South West St. Andrew. January 1978

Paul Burke, PNP Youth Organization, Secretary, January 1978

- Community Activist, Central Kingston. January 1978

- Officer of Jamaica Defence Force during State of
Emergency in October 1966. Assigned to Western Kingston

- (deceased) JLP supporter in Central Kingston,
August 1976

- JLP supporter, Tivoli Gardens, Western Kingston,
January 1978

NEWSPAPER AND JOURNALS

Caribbean Dialogue

Daily Gleaner

Daily News

Everybody's Magazine

Jamaica Chamber of Commerce Journal

Jamaican Manufacturer

Jamaica Journal, Quarterly Institute of Jamaica

New World

Race Today

Social and Economic Studies

Socialism

Struggle