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Mighty In War:

The Role of Matilda of Tuscany in the War Between Pope Gregory VII and Emperor Henry IV.

Valerie Eads

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in History in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City University of New York.

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INTRODUCTION

In 1080 a long-simmering dispute between King Henry IV of Germany and Pope Gregory VII escalated into open war. Much of the strategically vital territory between the Alpine passes and Rome was controlled by a woman, one of the great lay magnates of Italy, Countess Matilda of Tuscany. For the next seventeen years Matilda of Tuscany provided the only consistent and reliable military support of Pope Gregory VII and his successors. The conflict between Henry IV and Gregory VII is part of a larger series of events known as the Investiture Controversy. The Investiture Controversy is one of the most-studied topics in medieval European history, but the campaign of active defense by which Matilda of Tuscany thwarted Henry IV's efforts to install in Rome a pope of his own selection has not been the subject of any modern military analysis.[1] This dissertation examines the

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[1]Few of the hundreds of titles in Lino Lionello Ghirardini, Bibliografia della èta matildico-gregoriana (Parma, 1970) discuss military issues and fewer still could be cited by a military historian working today.

question of how Matilda of Tuscany defeated Henry IV.

The military history of the Investiture Controversy was first and last studied over a century ago.[2] These early studies limit themselves to establishing the sequence of events and collating the sources, and are today seldom encountered outside the footnotes of the better-known works that remain the best exposition to date of the military actions of the Investiture Controversy.[3] They were not incorporated into any subsequent studies of medieval military history.

For Sir Charles Oman, writing in the late-nineteenth century, the thirty years between the Battle of Hastings and the launching of the first Crusade were a military wasteland with only the Battle of Dyrrachium (1081) worthy of comment, as an after-word to the Battle of Hastings.[4] Hans Delbrück's

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[2]Of the earliest works, Richard Hildenhagen, Heinrich IV. von 1090-1092 (Jena, 1876) and Christian Volkmar, Der dritte Römerzug Heinrichs IV. (Magdeburg, 1876) are obsolete. Paul Sander, Der Kampf Heinrichs IV. und Gregors VII. von den zweiten Exkommunikation des Königs bis zu seiner Kaiserkrönung (März 1080-März 1081 (Berlin, 1893) is still occasionally cited despite the lack of maps or index.

[3]Gerold Meyer von Knonau, Jahrbücher des deutschen Reiches unter Heinrich IV. und Heinrich V., 7 vols. (Leipzig, 1890-1907) and Alfred Overmann, Gräfin Mathilde von Tuscien: Ihrer Besitzungen, Geschichte ihres Gutes von 1115-1230 und ihre Regesten (Innsbruck, 1895) are still indispensable as are a few newer works, Die Urkunden und Briefe der Markgräfin Mathilde von Tuszien, ed. Elke Goez and Werner Goez, MGH Diplomata Laienfürsten 2 (Hanover, 1998) and H.E.J. Cowdrey, Pope Gregory VII: 1073-1085 (Oxford and New York, 1998). I.S. Robinson, Henry IV of Germany, 1056-1106 (Cambridge, 1999) became available after this dissertation was largely complete and is cited sparingly.

[4]Charles Oman, A History of the Art of War in the Middle Ages, 2nd ed., 1 (1924; reprint New York, 1969) pp. 166-67. The first edition was published in 1898.

volume on the Middle Ages includes a brief section on the battles fought by Emperor Henry IV, but limits the discussion to engagements of the campaigns against the Saxons (1073-75) and against the anti-king Rudolf of Rheinfelden (1077-1080) without mention of the Italian campaigns.[5]

By their silence Ferdinand Lot, J.F. Verbruggen and Philippe Contamine concur in the opinion that the Investiture Controversy contributed nothing to the theory of warfare. Lot's treatment closely follows that of Delbrück. He is disappointed by the indecisiveness of the Italian engagements fought by Henry IV and describes them as "sterile."[6]

Verbruggen's topical approach breaks with the chronological straight-line development of previous scholars. The result contains much that is of comparative or suggestive interest for the military history of the struggle between Gregory VII and Henry IV, but derives no examples from its actions.[7] Likewise, while granting Henry IV the status of a "military leader of high repute," Contamine specifically excludes him from the discussion of the trans-Alpine expeditions of the German emperors. Henry IV's crossing of the Alps in the winter of 1077, the journey to Canossa, is not a

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[5]Hans Delbrück, Geschichte der Kriegskunst im Rahmen der politischen Geschichte 3 (1923; reprint Berlin, 1964) pp. 132-149.

[6]Ferdinand Lot, L'art militaire et les armées au moyen âge en Europe et dans le Proche-Orient 2 (Paris, 1946) pp. 145-48.

[7]J.F. Verbruggen, The Art of Warfare in Western Europe during the Middle Ages, 2nd ed., rev., trans. Sumner Willard and Mrs. R.C. Southern (Woodbridge, 1997).

military action in the usual sense, and excluding it from a survey of medieval military history is understandable.

But Canossa is possibly the most discussed event in all medieval European history and has important implications for subsequent military actions. The failure to mention that the "almost solitary" crossing of 1077 had been twice repeated in the form of full-scale military expeditions is striking.[8] John Beeler alone finds any military actions of Henry IV's Italian campaigns worthy of mention.[9]

A prudent response to this century of almost total neglect would be agreement. There are, however, good reasons not to acquiesce. The first and most compelling is the sources. References to military actions are found in substantial portions of the papal registers, especially that of Gregory VII, charters--imperial, episcopal, comital and monastic--lay and ecclesiastical biographies, canonical collections, numerous monastic annals and chronicles, and a body of polemical literature from both sides of the controversy substantial enough to warrant its own series in the Monumenta Germaniae Historica.[10]

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[8]Philippe Contamine, La guerre au moyen âge, 3rd ed. (Paris, 1992) pp. 112, 116-121. This material is unchanged from the first edition of 1980.

[9]John Beeler, Warfare in Feudal Europe 732-1200 (Ithaca NY, 1971) pp. 205-206.

[10]Monumenta Germaniae Historica, libelli de lite imperatorum et pontificum saeculis XI et XII, 3 vols. (Hanover, 1891-97). Additional works have since been published; selected examples of the polemical literature are discussed in subsequent chapters.

War is a central theme in these polemics. Both sides use the ancient topos of accusing one's opponent of causing the war. Justifications for waging war, addressed to lay and ecclesiastical supporters, are prominent on the papal side. The frequency of martial themes in the abundant polemical literature indicates that contemporaries did not find these military actions inconsequential.[11]

A second reason to reconsider the war between Henry IV and Gregory VII is the change taking place in the field of medieval military history. For earlier generations of military historians the goal was to produce "not a book of annals, but a treatise on the Art of War." Only those actions that could illustrate the development of warfare, "the characteristic strategy, tactics, and military organization of a period" found a place.[12]

The theoretical framework was provided by Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831). Clausewitz' intention, of course, was not to study medieval warfare, although he clearly grasped its essential features, but to use it as an exemplar to set against the achievements of later times, a case study of the conduct of war being limited by the nature of the state producing the army.[13]

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[11]Ian Robinson, Authority and Resistance in the Investiture Contest (New York, 1978), pp. 89-100.

[12]Oman, History of the Art of War 1, pp. v-vi.

[13]Carl von Clausewitz, Vom Kriege, 16th ed., annotated by Werner Hahlweg (Bonn, 1952) bk. 6, chap. 8, pp. 861-63.

The effort to analyze the practice of the Middle Ages using the theory of the nineteenth century resulted in a historiography of exceptions.[14] Battles were seen as the essential military action because only battle could achieve the goal of war, forcing the enemy to comply with the victor's wishes.[15] The dictum that the essence of war is battle is difficult to apply to medieval military operations.[16]

Clausewitz also wrote that, while infantry was the most independent and therefore most important arm of a nineteenth-century army, in the Middle Ages, because of the inferiority of the foot soldiers, cavalry was the more effective and therefore most important arm.[17] The emphasis on heavy cavalry, invariably called knights, characterizes early writing on medieval military actions. Clausewitz, however, recognized the value of defensive strategies and the role of fortified positions and treated those subjects at some length, as his disciples writing on medieval warfare

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[14]For the problems inherent in describing medieval military actions within the theoretical framework of Clausewitz, Verbruggen, pp. 1-6; R.C. Smail, Crusading Warfare (1097-1193) (Cambridge, 1956) pp. 12-17. More recently, John France Victory in the East: A Military History of the First Crusade (Cambridge, 1994) pp. 29-30; Bernard S. Bachrach, "Medieval Siege Warfare: A Reconnaissance," Journal of Military History 58 (1994) p. 120, where the influence of Clausewitz is represented by the phrase "strategy of overthrow."

[15]Clausewitz, Vom Kriege, bk. 1, chap. 2, p. 120.

[16]Clausewitz, Vom Kriege, bk. 2, chap. 1, p. 167.

[17]Clausewitz, Vom Kriege, bk. 5, chap. 4, pp. 407, 411-12, 415.

did not.[18]

Few military actions of the Middle Ages are amenable to analysis as set-piece battles, the nineteenth-century standard for military actions. The Battle of Hastings, because of an impressive amphibious operation before the battle, the coordinated action of archers and cavalry during the battle, and the obvious political results after the battle, is ideal.[19] The military actions of the Investiture Controversy, characterized by a series of sieges, most of which were decided by payment and none of which can be described as decisive, are not.

Clausewitz specifically cites, as an example of the limited capacity of medieval states to wage war effectively, the continual campaigns of the German emperors into Italy for half a millennium without any complete conquest of the territory resulting, without even the intention that it should.[20] Clausewitz, of course, thought in national terms whereas in medieval thought the Guelph (pro-papal) and Ghibelline (pro-imperial) parties were not geographically

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[18]Clausewitz, Vom Kriege, bk. 6 passim, esp. chap. 8, pp. 545-562. The prominence of siege in medieval warfare was seen as a flaw in strategic thinking by Delbrück, Geschichte der Kriegskunst 3, p. 341; Oman, History of the Art of War 2, pp. 52-54; and specifically passed over by Lot, L'art militaire 1, p. 17.

[19]The literature on Hastings is vast. Stephen Morillo, ed., The Battle of Hastings: Sources and Interpretations (Woodbridge, 1996) includes excerpts from the historiography of the seventeenth through late-twentieth centuries.

[20]Clausewitz, Vom Kriege, bk. 8, chap. 3, p. 863.

defined.[21] During the conflict with Henry IV, Gregory VII actively recruited troops in Henry IV's own kingdom of Germany while the king's army during his expeditions to Italy was largely Italian.[22]

The solution to the question of why the German emperors campaigned in Italy for five centuries without prevailing is implied in Clausewitz' statement of the conundrum: it would be easy to dismiss this self-renewing failure as a delusion of the times, but more judicious to regard it as arising from a hundred complex causes which, although they may be investigated in detail, can never be understood by scholars as they were by those who had to deal with them in life, or in conflict.[23]

It is small wonder, given the opinion of Clausewitz, the most influential military theorist of their time, that scholars did not study Henry IV's trans-Alpine campaigns, which they could only view as exemplars of failure. This viewpoint also obviated any need to consider the resistance of Matilda of Tuscany and the awkward question of how a woman defeated the German emperor.

The paradigm of medieval military history began to change in the mid-1950s. Oman and Delbrück had noted the

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[21]The terms Guelph and Ghibelline were not in use during in the eleventh century, but are generally used to describe the pro-papal and pro-imperial parties.

[22]The sources of troops are discussed in chapter 2.

[23]Clausewitz, Vom Kriege, bk. 8, chap. 3, p. 863.

importance of fortifications and therefore of siege operations in medieval warfare, but considered this a defect in medieval strategic thinking.[24] Lot both noted and passed by this "essential part of the subject."[25] These writers assumed the centrality of battle as a military action and the primacy of heavy cavalry in medieval battles. "By the end of the eleventh century the supremacy of the mailed horseman was firmly established all over Western and Central Europe."[26]

The work of Verbruggen, the first by a scholar who was both a military officer and a trained medievalist, began the task of rediscovering the foot soldier and the fortified position, but maintained the emphasis on battles. Verbruggen's discussion of historiographic problems emphasized that previous writers, with the notable exception of Lot, were not trained medievalists and read the sources somewhat uncritically.[27] A fuller and more influential discussion of the problems of applying nineteenth-century concepts to the Middle Ages was provided by R.C. Smail. His conclusion, "The interpretation of events of one age in the

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[24]Oman, History of the Art of War 2, pp. 52-54; Delbrück, Geschichte der Kriegskunst 3, p. 341.

[25]Lot, L'art militaire 1, p. 17.

[26]Oman, History of the Art of War 1, p. 231.

[27]Verbruggen, Art of Warfare, pp. 1-18. The limited circulation of the original Dutch-language edition of 1954 and the lack of apparatus criticus in the abridged English translation of 1977 limited the impact of Verbruggen's work.

light of the assumptions and prejudices of another can never produce satisfactory history," questions the military assumptions, the framework of the field.[28] The warfare of the crusades cannot be satisfactorily accounted for in terms of decisive battles.

In the decades since the publication of Smail's work, many of the points made there about the warfare of the crusades have been profitably applied to medieval warfare in general. "Once the study of the methods of warfare is taken further than the battlefield, its scope is wider than the consideration of tactical developments."[29] Medieval warfare is now understood as a warfare of position turning on the possession of fortifications from which the resources of the city or of the surrounding countryside could be exploited. Systematic ravaging served both to supply the invader and to undermine the morale and the economic base of the defender. The need to forage also left invaders open to counterattack by a mobile defender. An invader tied down to a siege was as vulnerable as a defender to hunger, disease and counterattack.[30]

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[28]Smail, Crusading Warfare, pp. 12-17; quote, p. 15.

[29]Smail, Crusading Warfare, p. 15.

[30]Bernard S. Bachrach, "On Roman Ramparts" in Geoffrey Parker, ed., The Cambridge Illustrated History of Warfare (Cambridge and New York, 1995) presents the current view, which will be considered in detail in subsequent chapters, concisely. Idem, "Medieval Military Historiography," in Peter Bentley, ed., The Routledge Companion to Historiography (London, 1997) pp. 203-221 is both pointed and to the point. France, Victory, pp. 27-49 gives an overview of the methods of warfare at the

The value of large numbers of armored and mounted troops lay in their mobility rather than in massed charges in the field. A horse's range and speed in foraging, communications, and skirmishing was far more useful than its weight in what has been called mounted shock combat, the charge at speed of armored knights with lances couched, their weight securely supported by their stirrups. The opportunity for such combat, once considered the essence of medieval warfare, was limited. Medieval commanders, once seen as at best gallant and impetuous, are now understood to have been prudent and to have adhered to a strategy of battle avoidance, being fully aware of the risks and costs of battles. Even the heroic commanders much studied in earlier historiography have been re-evaluated and found to be far less eager to seek the judgment of God in open battle than had previously been thought. As merely the most striking example, Hastings was probably the first field battle that William the Conqueror commanded.[31]

Thus, the war between Henry IV and Gregory VII, which

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time of the First Crusade. An example of the new approach is the renewed interest in siege warfare. Jim Bradbury, The Medieval Siege (Woodbridge UK, 1992); R. Rogers, Latin Siege Warfare in the Twelfth Century (Oxford, 1992).

[31]France, Victory, pp. 50-79 on considerations of command at the time of the First Crusade; John Gillingham, "Richard I and the Science of War," in War and Government in the Middle Ages, ed. John Gillingham and J.C. Holt (Woodbridge and Totowa NJ, 1984) pp 78-91; idem, "William the Bastard at War," in Studies in Medieval History Presented to R. Allen Brown, ed. C. Harper-Bill, Christopher J. Holdsworth and Janet L. Nelson (Woodbridge, 1989) pp. 141-158.

centered on sieges, ravaging, and possession of fortified positions, and can boast only a few well-selected battles, is not an example of a stunted capacity for war, but a textbook example of the art of war in the West on the eve of the Crusades.

The third compelling reason to undertake a military analysis of the Investiture Controversy is the emergence of the field of women's history. Medieval military actions undertaken by women, standing as they do at the nexus of two historical fields, are not yet studied by either. The reasons for this are more complex than misogyny on the part of military historians (gendered masculine) or distaste for perceived militarism on the part of historians of women (gendered feminine), although these are contributing factors.

The general neglect of women by earlier generations of historians is well-known. There was no place for the study of oddities or exceptions in the work of nineteenth-century scientific historians intent on discovering the laws of human development, a development that they were certain was taking place. For most historians at that time those categories included anything to do with women. One effect of positivist approaches to history was the virtual disappearance of women from scientific historiography at the same time that the documents necessary for women's history were

being published.[32]

The historian's viewpoint of the value of women's history has changed to the point where it must be recalled that twenty-five years ago the field scarcely existed. A prodigious body of work on, for example, religious women has been produced within the past two decades.[33] Likewise, the means by which noblewomen achieved political power have long been a topic of interest to researchers in family history.[34] It is thought, however, that "Medieval society with its

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[32]Susan Mosher Stuard, ed., Women in Medieval History and Historiography (Philadelphia, 1987); for the specific case of Matilda of Tuscany, see Diane Owen Hughes, "Invisible Madonnas? The Italian Historiographical Tradition and the Women of Medieval Italy," pp. 25-57.

[33]A comparison of bibliographies is illustrative. Jo Ann McNamara and Suzanne Wemple, "Sanctity and Power: The Dual Pursuit of Medieval Women" in Becoming Visible: Women in European History, edited by Renate Bridenthal and Claudia Koonz (Boston, 1977) p. 118, note the reliance on nineteenth-century materials in a very brief reading list. The same books are still standard in a somewhat longer list given by Jane Tibbetts Schulenburg, "Women's Monastic Communities, 500-1100: Patterns of Expansion and Decline," Signs 14 (1989), reprinted in Sisters and Workers in the Middle Ages, edited by Judith M. Bennett, et al. (Chicago and London, 1989) p. 209, n. 1. Cf. the substantial bibliography in Jo Ann Kay McNamara, Sisters in Arms: Catholic Nuns Through Two Millennia (Cambridge MA and London, 1996).

[34]David Herlihy, "Land, Family and Women in Continental Europe, 701-1200," Traditio 18 (1962) pp. 89-120; Jo Ann McNamara and Suzanne Wemple, "The Power of Women Through the Family in Medieval Europe: 500-1100" in Clio's Consciousness Raised: New Perspectives on the History of Women, edited by Mary Hartman and Lois W. Banner (New York, 1974) pp. 103-118; idem, "Sanctity and Power"; Karl J. Leyser, Rule and Conflict in Early Medieval Society: Ottonian Saxony (Bloomington IN, 1979); Pauline Stafford, Queens, Concubines, and Dowagers: The King's Wife in the Early Middle Ages (Athens GA, 1983); Eleanor Searle, "Emma the Conqueror," in Studies in Medieval History Presented to R. Allen Brown, ed. C. Harper-Bill, Christopher J. Holdsworth and Janet L. Nelson (Woodbridge, 1989) pp. 281-88, begins with military activity undertaken by women, but is a study of power exercised within the framework of family alliances.

wars, territorial struggles, and violence, seems particularly hostile to the exercise of female initiative and power."[35] This leaves medieval noblewomen, members of a social class defined by the capacity for making war, with nothing to contribute but their genes. Yet the sources reveal a notable number of women who exercise initiative and seek power by military means.[36]

The study of the issue of women and war is to date largely the study of the representation of military women rather than of their actions. The implication is not that the military actions undertaken by women are unknown. Some of the papers raise the question of a factual basis for the representations.[37] Information on the military situation in which the women would have operated could be helpful in

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[35]Mary Erler and Maryanne Kowaleski, eds. Women and Power in the Middle Ages (Athens GA, 1988) p.1; Elke Goez, Beatrix von Canossa und Tuszien: Eine Untersuching zur Geschichte des 11. Jahrhunderts, (Sigmaringen, 1995) notes the difficulties faced by women in positions of rulership, pp. 72-74.

[36]Anne Echols and Marty Williams, An Annotated Index of Medieval Women (New York, 1992) in a limited survey of the secondary literature identify 105 women as "Soldiers." Although there is doubtless some overlap, others included in the categories of Politics, Crusade, and Rebellion may have been non-combatant only in the strictest sense.

[37]Sarah Westphal-Wihl, "The Ladies Tournament: Marriage, Sex and Honor in Thirteenth-Century Germany," Signs 14 (1989), reprinted in Judith M. Bennett, et al., eds., Sisters and Workers in the Middle Ages (Chicago and London, 1989) pp. 162-189; Helen Solterer, "Figures of Female Militancy in Medieval France," Signs (Spring 1991) pp. 522-549; Laura Rinaldi DuFresne, "Women Warriors: A Special Case from the Fifteenth Century: The City of Ladies," Women's Studies (1994) pp. 111-131; Anne Derbes, "Imagined Encounters: Amazons, Crusaders, and the Histoire Universelle Manuscripts from Acre," (Paper delivered at The 29th International Congress on Medieval Studies, Kalamazoo MI, 1994).

considerations such as those of Anne Derbes, Helen Solterer and Sarah Westphal-Wihl. For example, the chronic shortage of troops in the Latin East led to the utilization *in extremis* of specialized units such as those formed of healthy lepers.[38] Are the reports in both Latin and Islamic sources of women taking the field a related phenomenon or a literary device of the writers?

In a discussion of the differing approaches to this phenomenon in Latin and Islamic sources, Helen Nicholson adduces some possible reasons for these differences:

> So we are left marooned between two ideological standpoints. The Muslim historians noted that European Christian women did take part in the fighting, but they wished to stress the godlessness and barbarity of the crusaders and this is one part of that picture. The European Christian historians mentioned women only in passing and minimised their involvement; but they wished to defend the crusaders against charges of immorality so they played down the involvement of women in the crusade.[39]

Nicholson takes the interesting tack of studying the European writers critical of the crusaders, and comes to the conclusion that their silence indicates that the women most likely fought only "in emergency situations, as when the Muslims broke into the Christian camp, or in the desperate

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[38]Christopher Marshall, *Warfare in the Latin East, 1192-1291* (Cambridge, 1992) discusses the shortage of troops. Shulamith Shahar, "Les lépreux pas comme les autres: L'ordre de Saint-Lazare dans le royaume latin de Jérusalem," *Revue Historique* 287 (1982) pp. 19-41; Malcolm Barber, "The Order of St. Lazarus and the Crusades," *Catholic Historical Review* 80 (1994) pp. 439-456.

[39]Helen Nicholson, "Women on the Third Crusade," *Journal of Medieval History* 23:4 (1997) p. 348.

battle of 25 July 1190."[40]

It is also noted, if not emphasized, in the literature on religious women that abbesses, like other large landholders, bore the burden of military obligations. This does not imply that abbesses, or abbots, were expected to lead their contingents into battle. The obligation was to provide troops, supplies and transport. Through their family connections they could become involved in political matters that raised at least the possibility of military action.[41]

Two vital tasks have been accomplished by historians in recent decades. Numerous instances of military actions undertaken by women have been found in the historical record, and the family dynamics that gave women access to the military means of power and the opportunity to learn its uses and limitations are known. The study of the actions themselves is still at the information-gathering stage.[42]

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[40]Saladin had been attacking the crusaders laying siege to Acre. An attack against the Muslim encampment failed, incurring heavy losses. Imad al-Din and Beha' al-Din report the presence of women in this battle. Nicholson, "Women on the Third Crusade," pp. 338, 349.

[41]On the political and military burdens of abbesses see McNamara, Sisters in Arms, pp. 176-201; Janet L. Nelson, "The Church's Military Service in the Ninth Century: A Contemporary Comparative View?" in The Church and War, ed. W.J. Sheils (London, 1983) pp. 15-30; for Italy cf. Katherine Fisher Drew, "The Carolingian Military Frontier in Italy," Traditio 20 (1964) pp. 437-447.

[42]Valerie Eads, "Women's Military History: The First 3,000 Years," (Commentary presented at Conference on Women in NATO Forces: Historical Perspectives and Future Prospects, George Washington University, June 2, 1984) gives examples of military activity by women in medieval Europe that are sufficiently documented to warrant scholarly attention; Ltc. Patricia H. Jernigan, "George Washington University Sponsors Conference on Women in NATO Forces," Minerva: Quarterly Report on Women and the

Without an understanding of issues of class and family, earlier military historians were limited to the statement of where and when the military actions reported in the sources took place; they could not explain why a woman would undertake military actions. Given the almost exclusive emphasis on battles, there was little understanding of the context of many actions and thus no understanding of what military purpose the woman intended to accomplish or interest in how she went about it. The occasional report of a woman on the battlefield could be dismissed along with reports of the appearance of archangels in the same circumstance.[43] It was preferable to discuss the shortcomings of medieval historiography and medieval strategic thinking than to attempt to explain exceptional women.[44]

Another stumbling block to the serious consideration of the role of women in military actions was the impossibility of studying these actions by objective methods. Delbrück's classic study of Herodotus' account of the Battle of Mara-

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Military (Fall, 1984) pp. 3-9. A more comprehensive listing appears in Megan McLaughlin, "The Woman Warrior: Gender, Warfare and Society in Medieval Europe," Women's Studies (1990) pp. 193-209.

[43]Michael E. Jones, "The Historicity of the Alleluia Victory," Albion 18 (1986) pp. 363-73, provides an example of a battle account that, although couched in hagiographic terms, provides a comprehensible record of an action standard for the time and place.

[44]Martha Howell, "A Documented Presence: Medieval Women in Germanic Historiography," in Susan Mosher Stuard, ed., Women in Medieval History and Historiography (Philadelphia, 1987) pp. 102-127; E. Goez, Beatrix, describes known instances of ruling women as being "in each case a genuine exception," p. 73, especially n. 13.

thon, which describes the Greeks charging over a distance of 1500 meters, compares that account with the training exercises of contemporary infantrymen running with full packs. His conclusion is that such a charge is a physical impossibility.[45] There was no possibility of subjecting ancient or medieval accounts of women warriors to the same test. In his study of Marathon, Delbrück distinguishes between the capabilities of civilized and primitive peoples. Ancient accounts of women taking up arms, whether the Greek historians' reports of the Amazons or Plutarch's description of the battles of Aquae Sextiae and Vercellae in Roman Republican times, clearly deal with women who are not civilized. As Plutarch's descriptions do not provide sufficient information for tactical study, they can be discounted on that basis alone. In any case, no comparable body of women existed in nineteenth-century Germany.[46]

Thus, the presence of women, even in battles seen as important, could be safely passed over. At the battle of Dyrrachium, Sichelgaita, of the princely house of Salerno. rallied fleeing Norman troops. The significance of the engagement, however, as Oman saw it, was that it marked the

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[45]Delbrück, Geschichte der Kriegskunst 1, pp. 54-55, 67-71. Delbrück's first work of military history was written under female patronage, a biography of her grandfather, Neidhardt von Gneisenau, for Countess Hedwig Brühl.

[46]Delbrück, Geschichte der Kriegskunst 1, pp. 68-70, on "Naturvölker," p. 444, on Marius' battles. Plutarch, "Gaius Marius," in The Lives of the Noble Grecians and Romans, trans. John Dryden (New York, 1932) pp. 504-505, 510.

last appearance of massed infantry until the fifteenth century. The mention by a woman historian, Anna Comnena, of the "amazon" Sichelgaita who followed her husband, the Norman duke, Robert Guiscard, onto the field was not considered relevant.[47] That she had independently commanded sieges in Italy was irrelevant.[48] The point that, given Sichelgaita's social position, some of the "Normans" were probably her troops, even though her husband was directing field operations, seems to have been missed. Her actions indicate the limits of her husband's authority as much as her personal vigor.

Joan of Arc, usually seen as the paramount woman warrior of the Middle Ages, is not to be found in Delbrück, who cites the battles of Crécy and Agincourt only as examples of the defensive and offensive use of archers.[49] As an Englishman, Oman cannot pass so lightly over the Hundred Years War.

> That the appearance of Joan of Arc was the turning point in the whole matter is clear; her influence was of course moral rather than strategic.[50]

When not facing the conundrum of a militarily effective

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[47]Anna Comnena, The Alexiad of Anna Comnena, trans. E.R.A. Sewter (Harmondsworth, 1969) bk. 1, chap. 15, p. 66; bk. 4, chap. 6, p. 147. Oman 1, pp. 166-67.

[48]William of Apulia, Gesta Roberti Wiscardi, ed. R. Wilmans, MGH Scriptores 9 (Hanover, 1851) bk. 3, l. 670, p. 279.

[49]Delbrück, Geschichte der Kriegskunst 3, pp. 470-492.

[50]Oman, History of the Art of War 2, p. 393.

woman, Oman could find an explanation remarkably consistent with current thinking on Joan. Her successes are easily understandable once the French were no longer so demoralized that "ordinary competence" was beyond them; the English occupation forces had been stretched too thin and the support of the Burgundians was becoming uncertain.[51] As a charismatic with a specific appeal, i.e., to the demoralized French troops, Joan raises a very different set of questions than the competent aristocrats of earlier centuries.[52]

The ideas that battle is the pinnacle of warfare and that war, in any meaningful sense, is an exclusively male activity by no means departed with the nineteenth century. John Keegan's description of the effective refusal of battle in "Europe's wars of decolonization" contains a strong hint that the strategy was an admission of inferiority, without directly admitting who won those wars. "Military history, we may infer, must in the last resort be about battle." A more perfect example of the attitude toward medieval warfare described by Smail would be difficult to imagine.

Keegan's description of the role of women in warfare is

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[51]Oman, History of the Art of War 2, pp. 393-97.

[52]Anne Llewellyn Barstow, Joan of Arc: Heretic, Mystic, Shaman (Lewiston NY, 1986) on the charismatic elements of Joan's career; cf. Kelly DeVries, "A Woman As Leader of Men: Joan of Arc's Military Career," in Fresh Verdicts on Joan of Arc edited by Bonnie Wheeler and Charles Wood (New York and London, 1996) pp. 3-18; idem, Joan of Arc: A Military Leader, (Phoenix Mill, 1999). The sources for women and military actions decrease markedly after the thirteenth century, McLaughlin, "Woman Warrior," p. 205.

equally apropos: Those women who participate in war "in any military sense", i.e., fighting against men, are "the most insignificant exceptions."[53] If war is defined by battle, the physical confrontation between individuals or groups, the generally smaller size of women would preclude their effective participation. But, if warfare centers on position and logistics, as it did in Europe during the Middle Ages, the size factor diminishes, and class issues come into play. Although male authority in all military matters may be the usual situation, when it is lacking a woman of the right class can assume normally masculine roles.

As may be expected, the revised view of medieval military actions has occasioned rereading of the sources and a new interest in the role of women in military actions can be seen. The new interest in siege warfare has been especially productive.[54] Well-worn subjects such as the Norman Conquest also provide new insights into the role of women as do fresh

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[53]John Keegan, The Face of Battle (London and New York, 1976) pp. 16-17, 29; idem, A History of Warfare (London and New York, 1993) pp. 75-76.

[54]Bradbury, Medieval Siege, ad indicem, (the entry is incomplete) gives numerous instances and provides a lengthy bibliography. Stephen Morillo, Warfare under the Anglo-Norman Kings 1066-1135 (Woodbridge UK, 1994) p. 96, n. 11, notes the frequency of female castellans. ". . . the ability of women of the warrior class to defend themselves in times of need should not be underestimated." K.J. Leyser, "Early Medieval Warfare," in Communications and Power in Medieval Europe: The Carolingian and Ottonian Centuries (London and Rio Grande OH, 1994) p. 35, n. 7, provides some examples of "the difficulties encountered by women defending castles." If all such reports were of successful defenses, they would be suspect indeed.

readings of equally well-known sources.[55] Now that there is some understanding of the military milieu within which they operated, it is becoming more difficult to ignore reports of militarily active women.

Matilda of Tuscany was neither the first nor the last medieval noblewoman to defend a castle or lay siege to one. Nor was she the only woman who ordered troops into battle or rode with them. And she was certainly not the only one to worry about their morale, supplies, and pay. Matilda can now be understood as exceptional among militarily active women only in the length of her military career, the abundance of the sources for her career, and the long-term results of her efforts. What is exceptional about Matilda of Tuscany is not that she is a woman, but that she waged war against an emperor on behalf of the pope and succeeded.

The military explanation for the success of her long campaign must be recovered and interpreted from material imbedded in accounts devoted to other purposes.[56] References

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[55]J.O. Prestwich, "Military Intelligence under the Norman and Angevin Kings," in George Garnett and John Hudson, eds., Law and Government in Medieval England and Normandy: Essays in Honor of Sir James Holt (Cambridge, 1994) pp. 5-7, comments on the post-Hastings activities of Harold's mother, Gytha, which were described in the 1870s by E.A. Freeman. For female spies undertaking cross-channel assignments, p. 24; a female castellan on night watch, p. 17. Marjorie Chibnall, "Women in Orderic Vitalis," The Haskins Society Journal 2 (1990) pp. 107, 114, 115, 116 for further examples.

[56]Luigi Simeoni, "La Vita Mathildis di Donizone et il suo valore storicho-critiche," Atti e memorie della Deputazione de storia patria per le Antiche Provincie Modenesi. ser. 7, vol. 4 (1927) pp. 18-64, provides a pertinent example. Simeoni, however, shows a marked reluctance to discuss the military aspects of the Investiture Controversy.

to military actions in, for example, a saint's vita are intended to demonstrate the saint's sanctity and the efficacy of his prayers. Rather than analyzing a military action in his description of the battle of Sorbara (1084), Rangerius of Lucca describes the many dead left lying on the field exposed to the dogs and crows, a result attributed to the efficacy of Bishop Anselm of Lucca's prayers. He then concludes that, "Gentle faith, when it wishes, can be mighty in battle."[57] The surviving papal and episcopal registers, records of church councils, canon law collections, and the polemical literature also provide, however indirectly, information on military matters. Once the facts have been recovered, their importance must be interpreted in military terms.[58] Among other points, Canossa and the events immediately before and afterward will be reconsidered.

The campaign divides into clear segments. The sources for the prelude to war, the years when both sides actively

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Idem, "Il contributo della contessa Matilde al Papato nella lotta per le investiture," Studi Gregoriani 1, pp. 353-372.

[57]Rangerius of Lucca, Vita Anselmi Lucensis episcopi auctore Rangerio Lucensi, ed. Ernest Sackur, Gerhard Schwartz and Bernhard Schmeidler, MGH Scriptores 30.2 (Hanover, 1934) bk. 4, chap. 2, ll. 6561-62, 6614, pp. 1293, 1294. "Might in battle" (bellipotens) is simply a translation of the name Matilda (mecht-hild).

[58]Matteo Schenetti, "La Vittoria de Matilde di Canossa su Arrigo IV," Studi Matildici III, pp. 235-42, concludes that the key to Matilda's success was her willingness to take advice from more knowledgeable people, an important point, but hardly sufficient to explain twenty years of military actions. The work of Overmann, Gräfin Mathilde, and Meyer von Knonau, Jahrbücher Heinrich IV., demonstrates that the sources are adequate to permit a determination of troop movements throughout the Italian campaigns.

sought a negotiated settlement, provide information on military preparations as well. It is quite clear that at the beginning of hostilities Henry IV was an experienced and successful soldier whereas Matilda of Tuscany had at best limited military experience and had certainly never commanded troops in battle.[59] It is also clear that Gregory VII had not intended to rely on her support alone. The pope entered into arrangements with the Norman duke, Robert Guiscard, that did not turn out as he had planned.[60]

Whatever her lack of experience in the field, Matilda had inherited the chain of fortifications controlled by her family, including the formidable fortress of Canossa and the outlying Quattro Castelli as the central components of a system of defenses of the Apennines.[61] A first step is to map out these positions and note the strengths and weaknesses of the Apennine defenses. The renewed recognition of the

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[59]Valerie Eads, "Matilda of Tuscany" and "Beatrice of Lorraine," in Military Women Worldwide: A Biographical Dictionary, ed. R. Pennington (Westport CT, forthcoming) notes the contrast between the eleventh-century sources and later historiography.

[60]H.E.J. Cowdrey, The Age of Abbot Desiderius: Montecassino, the Papacy, and the Normans (Oxford, 1978) pp. 136-176.

[61]Leone Tondelli, "Scavi Archeologici a Canossa," Studi Gregoriani 4 (1952) pp. 365-371; Rocco Morretta, "L'apparato difensivo dei signori di Canossa nell'Appennino Reggiano," Atti e memorie della Deputazione di storia patria per le antiche provincie modenesi, ser. 9, vol. 4 (1965) pp. 489-500; Arnoldo Tincani, "Quattro Castella: zona limitanea di difesa," Quattro Castella, pp. 83-91; Aldo A. Settia, "Castelli e villaggi nelle terre canossiane tra X e XIII secoli," Studi Matildici III, pp. 281-307; Tonino Aceto, "L'apparato difensivo de Canossa," Studi Matildici III, pp. 369-373. Overmann, Gräfin Mathilde, gives a slightly inaccurate map of the then-known Matildine possessions in Italy.

importance of fortifications in medieval warfare reinforces the long-held opinion that this system was a key component of Matilda's strategic position.

The speed with which the first Italian campaign of Henry IV followed his defeat of the anti-king Rudolf of Rheinfelden in Germany shows clearly that the event had been planned for and Henry's Italian allies well prepared.[62] Even so, there are some questions about the strength of the army with which Henry IV marched to Rome and the security of the German kingdom during his absence.

The role of Matilda of Tuscany during these years is complex. She could not meet Henry IV in open battle and did not move against his position outside of Rome. She did, however, provide refuge for exiled Gregorian supporters and channeled both money and information to the pope. The sources also indicate offensive activity against Henry IV's supporters to a degree sufficient to warrant his lifting the siege of Rome at least temporarily for a punitive expedition against Matilda. Matilda's appropriation of the treasure of the abbey of Nonantola, a possession of the schismatic

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[62]Sander, Der Kampf, pp. 32-52; Lino Lionello Ghirardini, "La Battaglia di Volta Mantovana (Ottobre 1080)," in Sant'Anselmo, Mantova p. 232, accepts Bernold of Constance's date of October 15, 1080 for the opening action of the campaign without any consideration of the military implications of his choice. Valerie Eads, "The Battle of Volta, 15 October 1080 (or a Few Days Later)" (Conference on The Medieval World in Motion, City University of New York Graduate Center, February 28, 1997) shows that the dating of Bonizo of Sutri, "a few days after," is consistent with the sources and indicates careful planning rather than an inexplicable coincidence.

archbishop of Milan located within her territory, was the most dramatic but hardly the only such operation, and demonstrates the problems inherent in the siege of a major city with limited forces.[63] Henry IV could neither force her to accept battle nor contain her movements despite punitive ravaging in her territory.[64] Since Sander's comprehensive listing of the sources, a few additional points on Matilda's intinerarium have been filled in, but there is no published study of the strategic logic of her actions.[65] As both Rangerius and Benzo, representing opposite sides of the conflict, imply, Matilda's strongest contribution was simply that she made Henry look ineffective.

The first campaign was temporarily and partially successful. In 1083 Henry IV entered Rome, and the following year he received the crown of the Holy Roman Empire from his selected pope, Clement III. Even before he had left Italy it was clear that resistance was still active, as demonstrated by the failed siege of Moriana, the refuge of Bishop Anselm of Lucca. In the years after Henry's departure and after the death of Gregory VII, the two foci of the Gregorian party

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[63]Sander, Der Kampf, p. 105; Overmann, Gräfin Mathilde, p. 150. Cf. Benzo of Alba, Ad Heinricum IV imperatorem libri VII, ed. K. Pertz, MGH Scriptores 11 (Hanover, 1854) p. 658.

[64]Sander, Der Kampf, p. 116. Benzo, Ad Heinricum, p. 663.

[65]Valerie Eads, "The Contribution of the Countess Matilda During the Investiture Controversy: A Strategic Analysis" (29th International Conference on Medieval Studies, Western Michigan University, May 5-8, 1994) establishes the possibility of such an analysis.

were the court of Matilda, where much of the polemical literature of the struggle was produced, and the papacy of Victor III. H.E.J. Cowdrey's study of this interim period is is among the very few works that recognize the Investiture Controversy as a war.[66] Matilda's active support of the short pontificate of Victor III enabled the papal party to survive until the more secure pontificate of Urban II.

The polemical literature of this phase has been studied both in the context of the Investiture Controversy and as background to the Crusades.[67] The treatise of John of Mantua, addressed directly to Matilda and specifically treating the righteousness of waging persecutory war against heretics, is the most recently published and least-studied of these works. John's work makes clear the degree to which the papal party relied on Matilda's secular leadership and support.[68]

Henry IV's second Italian campaign, originated when Pope Urban II arranged the marriage of Matilda of Tuscany to

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[66]Cowdrey, Abbot Desiderius, esp. pp. 177-213; idem, "The Mahdia Campaign of 1087" The English Historical Review 92 (1977) pp. 1-29.

[67]Carl Erdmann, The Origin of the Idea of Crusade, trans. M. Baldwin (Princeton, 1977) pp. 201-268.

[68]John of Mantua. Iohannis Mantuani in Cantica Canticorum et de Sancta Maria Tractatus ad Comitissam Mathildam, ed. Bernard Bischoff and Burkhard Taeger. Freiburg, 1973; Sylvia Cantelli, "Il commento al Cantico dei Cantici di Giovanni da Mantova," Studi Medievali, ser. 3, vol. 26 (1986) pp. 101-184; Valerie Eads, "'Never Grieve That You Bear Arms:' Matilda of Tuscany, John of Mantua, and the Theory of Just War," (International Medieval Congress, University of Leeds, July 13-16, 1998).

Welf, the 17-year-old heir of the duchy of Bavaria, an alliance that threatened Henry IV's access to Italy.[69] The second campaign was harsher than the first one and fell entirely on Matilda's territory. In the end, the emperor's fears proved well-founded. Henry was cut off in Italy with only limited troops at his disposal and no longer able to influence events in either Rome or Germany. The campaign gives an opportunity to examine Matilda's operations in greater detail and to attempt to determine the value of the Welf alliance. The main source for this period, Donizone, is clearly partisan and neglects, for example, to mention the existence of Matilda's husband.[70] Certain points, however, stand out clearly. One is that Henry was burdened with the necessity of winning while Matilda had the advantage of needing only to avoid losing. The failure of morale rather than the severity of his defeat in 1092 ended his chances of forcing her surrender.

Matilda did not somehow survive to win the war by being

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[69]The campaign of 1090-97 is beyond the scope of this dissertation and is referred to only to comment on certain aspects of the campaign of 1081-84. The existing studies of this campaign, Hildenhagen, Heinrich IV., and Volkmar, Der dritte Römerzug, are obsolete. Lino Lionello Ghirardini, "'Madonna della Battaglia': lo scontro decisivo della lotta per le investiture (ottobre 1092)," Bolletino Storico Reggiano, 11 (April 1971) pp. 36-56, attempts a tactical analysis and locates the epicenter of the battle at the chapel called Madonna della Battaglia. Schenetti, "La Vittoria," focuses on the Council of Carpineta, 1092.

[70]Donizone, Vita Mathildis Comitissae, ed. L. Bethmann, MGH Scriptores 12 (Hanover, 1856) pp. 386-394. That Donizone can produce a coherent narrative without mentioning Duke Welf is, at the very least, suggestive.

exceptional, but by adroit control of a series of fortified positions from which she attacked Henry's supporters, threatened his communication and supply lines, relieved his opponents and refused battle under unfavorable conditions until, in the end, she had outlasted him. Matilda of Tuscany made war as any other competent medieval commander made war, like William the Conqueror and Richard the Lionheart and, like them, she was recognized in her own lifetime as "mighty in war."

Chapter 1: The Military Geography and Its Implications

An understanding of the role of Matilda of Tuscany in the war between Henry IV and Gregory VII requires an examination of the campaign as a whole as well as of those actions in which she was directly involved.

At the opening of hostilities in the Spring of 1081, Henry IV was in a certain sense undertaking operations on three fronts: The Saxon Rebellion made it necessary to leave his most loyal supporters behind in Germany and thus limited the number of troops that could be sent in Italy. The objectives of the campaign, chief among them obtaining the imperial coronation, could only be achieved at Rome. The main routes to Rome, the Apennine roads, were under the control of Pope Gregory's supporter, Matilda of Tuscany. Each of these fronts presented its own strategic problems.

In 1073 an armed uprising resulted from Henry's policies in Saxony.[1] The Saxon Rebellion kept him occupied in

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[1]Gerold Meyer von Knonau, Jahrbücher des deutschen Reiches unter Heinrich IV. und Heinrich V. 2 (Leipzig, 1894) 2, pp. 222-72, 286-300, 309-339, 413-16 for the events of 1073-75; on the issues of the Saxon

Germany for some years; 1073-75 and 1077-80 were years of active campaigning. The events of the rebellion have a close relationship to the course of the conflict between the king and the pope.[2]

Henry's insecure position in Germany during the first years of the rebellion led him to seek a settlement of his difficulties with the papacy, difficulties stemming from repeated simoniacal appointments and continuing contact with excommunicated councillors.[3] These problems began before the pontificate of Gregory VII.[4]

In August or September of 1073 Henry sent a letter to the newly-consecrated Pope Gregory VII in which he acknowledged his faults and promised to be guided by the pope. The letter so impressed Gregory that it was copied into the

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rebellion, K.J. Leyser, "The Crisis of Medieval Germany," in Communications and Power in Medieval Europe: The Gregorian Revolution and Beyond, edited by T. Reuter (London and Rio Grande OH, 1994) pp. 21-49; on the Saxon campaigns, Hans Delbrück, Geschichte der Kriegskunst im Rahmen der politischen Geschichte, 3 (Berlin, 1923) pp. 132-49.

[2]The bibliography of the Investiture Controversy is vast. Meyer von Knonau is most comprehensive for the sequence of events. Augustin Fliche, La Réforme Grégorienne, 3 vols. (Paris, 1934-37) and Gerd Tellenbach, The Church in Western Europe from the Tenth to the Early Twelfth Century, trans. T. Reuter, (Cambridge UK, 1993) emphasize theological aspects. Ian Robinson, The Papacy, 1073-1198: Continuity and Innovation (Cambridge UK, 1990) and H.E.J. Cowdrey, Pope Gregory VII: 1073-1085 (Oxford and New York, 1998) provide valauable discussion of specific points.

[3]Meyer von Knonau, Jahrbücher Heinrich IV. 2, pp. 198-99 on the excommunication of Henry IV's councillors by Alexander II.

[4]For detailed summaries of the earlier events Tellenbach, Church in Western Europe, pp. 135-205; Cowdrey, Pope Gregory VII, pp. 21-89.

papal register.[5] After a decisive victory in the battle at Homburg on the Unstrut (9 June 1075), Henry IV felt himself secure enough to begin seeking to restore his rights in Italy where imperial prestige had suffered during his minority as it had in Germany.[6]

A major point of contention in Italy was the appointment of the archbishop of Milan.[7] In 1070 Guido of Velate

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[5]Briefe, no. 5, pp. 8-9; Registrum 1.29a, p. 47. The pope's letter to Erlembald of Milan, Registrum 1.25 (27 December 1073) pp. 41-42, tells of "words full of sweetness and obedience" sent by Henry; Meyer von Knonau, Jahrbücher Heinrich IV. 2, pp. 268-70.

[6]Lambert of Hersfeld, Annales, Ed. V. Cl. Hesse, MGH Scriptores 5 (Hanover, 1844) pp. 222-28; Bruno of Magdeburg, Liber de bello Saxonico, ed. G.H. Pertz, MGH Scriptores 5 (Hanover, 1844) chap. 46, p. 345; Carmen de bello Saxonico, ed. O. Holder-Egger, MGH Scriptores 15.2 (Hanover, 1888) ll. 127 ff., pp. 1231-33. The battle on the Unstrut was decisive in that it ended the Saxon capability for waging war. That this situation was temporary was quickly shown. Delbrück's brief discussion, Geschichte der Kriegskunst 3, pp. 132-34, merely notes the discrepancies among the various accounts of the engagement and is critical of reports of the presence of foot soldiers. Given reports of the outrages perpetrated by the castle garrisons, and the reprisals in which rioting peasants desecrated the graves of Henry's family at the Harzburg, this point is in need of fresh consideration. Lambert of Hersfeld, Annales, a. 1073, p. 194, a. 1074, pp. 210-11; Bruno of Magdeburg, De bello Saxonico , chap. 16, p. 334, chap. 35, p. 341. Fears of violent repercussions could have caused even the "vulgus pedestre" to join the battle.

[7]The literature of the Milanese affair is considerable. H.E.J. Cowdrey, "The Papacy, the Patarenes and the Church of Milan," Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 5th ser., 18 (1968) pp. 25-48, provides a good summary. A lively if dated account is found in J. P. Whitney, Hildebrandine Essays (Cambridge, 1932) pp. 143-57. The importance attached to Milan by Gregory VII is shown by frequent references in his letters: Registrum 1.12 (29 June 1073) to Bishop William of Pavia; Registrum 1.15 (1 July 1073) to the "faithful" in Lombardy; Registrum 1.25 (27 September 1073) to Erlembald of Milan; Registrum 1.26 (9 October 1073) also to Erlembald; Registrum 1.27 (13 October 1073) to Bishop-elect Albert of Acqui; Registrum 1.28 (13 October 1073) to Bishop William of Pavia; Registrum 2.30 (7 December 1074) to Henry IV; Registrum 3.8 (8 December 1075) to the "cleric" Tedald of Milan; Registrum 3.9 (8 December 1075) to the suffragan bishops of Milan;

resigned his position as archbishop whereupon Henry appointed and invested Godfrey, Guido's protegé. Besides the canonical problem posed by one bishop resigning in favor of another, Guido's resignation was due to civil disturbances caused by the pataria, a movement dedicated to the enforcement of clerical celibacy and the extirpation of simony--the goals of the reform papacy--by force if necessary. Guido was known as a simoniac, and the pataria was unlikely to accept his chosen successor, especially without canonical election.

Godfrey was never able to establish himself in Milan, and was excommunicated by Pope Alexander II in 1073.[8] The patarene candidate, the cathedral clerk Atto, elected in 1072, was dragged from a celebratory banquet and forced to renounce his post. Atto was not of the nobility and thus even less acceptable to most Milanese than Godfrey. He went into exile at Rome where his election was recognized.

In the conciliatory letter written in the autumn of 1073, Henry had specifically admitted to being at fault and expressed a willingness to follow Gregory's direction in the Milan afair.[9] But as 1075 drew to a close the situation had changed. The Saxon threat was for the present ended. In

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Registrum 3.15 (April 1076) to Wifrid, Erlembald's successor.

[8]Meyer von Knonau, Jahrbücher Heinrich IV. 2, p. 103.

[9]Briefe, no. 5, p. 9. Et nunc in primis pro ecclesia Mediolanensi, que nostra culpa est in errore, rogamus, ut vestra apostolica districtione canonice corrigatur et exinde ad ceteras corrigendas auctoritatis vestre sententia progrediatur.

Milan the patarene leader Erlembald was killed on 5 April thus removing a vigorous and often violent supporter of papal policies. The Milanese, sick of civil unrest within the city, sent a delegation to Henry IV asking him to settle the question of who was archbishop. Rather than deciding between the claimants, Henry appointed Tedald, a young Milanese nobleman who had served in his chapel during the Saxon campaigns.

In the intervening two years, Pope Gregory's letters to Henry had gradually changed in tone until the letter of 8 December 1075 which was all but an ultimatum.[10] Not only had Henry failed to keep his promises to separate himself from advisors who were excommunicate, he had unilaterally made an appointment to Milan, meaning that there were now three claimants to the episcopal title of that city, including Atto, living at Rome and recognized by Pope Gregory as the canonically elected archbishop of Milan. Also without any consultation with the pope, Henry made appointments to the bishoprics of Fermo and Spoleto, which were within the Roman church's ecclesiastical province.

Finally, the king sent his chancellor for Italy, Bishop Gregory of Vercelli, and one of the long-excommunicate

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[10]Registrum 3.10 (8 December 1075) pp. 263-68; Epistolae vagantes 14, p. 38, written some months later describes verbal messages, somewhat harsher in tone, carried by the same messengers.

councillors, Count Eberhard of Nellenberg,[11] to confer with the excommunicated Norman duke of Apulia, Robert Guiscard, about being invested by Henry IV with the lands that the duke currently held from the Roman church.[12] Among the reasons for Robert's present excommunication were incursions into the regions of Fermo and Spoleto. Gregory's letter does not mention this high-level embassy, but he could hardly have been unaware of it, or of the threat represented by an alliance between Henry IV and the Normans.[13]

Gregory's letter reached Henry during his Christmas court at Goslar where Otto of Nordheim, one of the leaders of the Saxon rebellion, was reconciled to the king. The assembled lay and ecclesiastical magnates also recognized Henry's infant son, Conrad, as his successor.[14]

The king had a reasonable expectation of success when he responded to Gregory's letter by immediately calling a synod at Worms for 24 January 1076. During the years when Gregory VII and Henry IV were in seeming accord, the pope

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[11]The identification of Count Eberhard as Eberhard of Nellenberg has been questioned. I.S. Robinson, Henry IV of Germany, 1056-1106,(Cambridge, 1999) p. 125, n. 85.

[12]Amatus of Montecassino, Storia de' Normanni di Amato di Montecassino, ed. V. de Bartholomaeis, Fonti per la storia d'Italia 76 (Rome, 1935) p. 320-21. Meyer von Knonau, Jahrbücher Heinrich IV. 2, pp. 572-73. Cowdrey, Pope Gregory VII, p. 130.

[13]The papal-Norman alliance is discussed in chapters 2, 3.

[14]Meyer von Knonau, Jahrbücher Heinrich IV. 2, pp. 583-86. Lambert of Hersfeld, Annales, a. 1076, p. 241; Bernold of St. Blasien, Chronicon, ed. G.H. Pertz, MGH Scriptores 5 (Hanover, 1844) a. 1076, p. 431.

had made efforts to further his reform program in Germany. Even those bishops who were in sympathy with the goals of enforcing clerical celibacy and extirpating simony from ecclesiastical appointments were hard put to keep up with Gregory's expectations. Others openly resented the pope's direct intervention in affairs of the German church which they saw as infringing on their prerogatives.[15]

At Worms, the German bishops withdrew their obedience from Pope Gregory VII on the grounds of irregular election and abuse of office which had led to discord and turmoil within the the church.[16] The list of offenses was rounded out by accusations of over-familiarity with a woman, probably Matilda of Tuscany, and of allowing "a new senate of women" to govern the church.[17] The document was signed by 26 German bishops. Henry's role in this was to confirm the decision of his bishops, while adding grievances of his own to theirs. Although his letter merely calls on Gregory to

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[15]Ian Stuart Robinson, "'Periculosis homo': Pope Gregory VII and Episcopal Authority," Viator 9 (1978) pp. 103-131."

[16]Meyer von Knonau, Jahrbücher Heinrich IV. 2, pp. 622-26; "Concilium Wormatiense," MGH Leges 2, pp. 44-46.

[17]"Concilium Wormatiense," p. 45. " . . . de convictu et cohabitatione alienae mulieris familiori quam necesse est." The active role taken by Henry's mother, the dowager empress Agnes of Poitou, now in retirement at Rome, his aunt once removed, Beatrice of Lorraine, and her daughter, his second cousin, Matilda of Tuscany, in negotiations on behalf of the pope seems to have been especially galling to Henry. The parallel between the charges against Gregory and the goals of the reform program is no doubt deliberate.

resign, the threat is as clear as Gregory's had been.[18]

Further, the messengers conveying the decisions of the council to Rome, Bishops Burchard of Basel and Huzmann of Speyer as well as the long-excommunicate Count Eberhard of Nellenberg, were able to speedily convene a council at Piacenza where a number of Lombard bishops not only acquiesced in the actions taken at Worms, but withdrew their obedience from Gregory as well.[19]

Once again, even those bishops sympathetic to Gregory's ideas on clerical celibacy and the extirpation of simony had been angered by his encouraging the laity to take enforcement into their own hands.[20] In their view, he bore some

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[18]Briefe, no. 11, pp. 13-15.

[19]Meyer von Knonau, Jahrbücher Heinrich IV. 2, pp. 628-30. The Piacenza assembly is widely reported in the sources. Among others, Bernold of St. Blasien, Chronicon, a. 1076, p. 433; Berthold of Reichenau, Annales, ed. G.H. Pertz, MGH Scriptores 5 (Hanover, 1844) a. 1076, p. 282; Bruno of Magdeburg, De bello Saxonico, chap. 65, p. 351. The incident is also referred to in the polemical literature, Bonizo of Sutri, Liber ad amicum, ed. Ernst Dummler, MGH Libelli 1 (Hanover, 1891) pp. 606-07; Manegold of Lautenbach, Ad Gebehardum liber, ed. K. Francke, MGH Libelli 1 (Hanover, 1891) chap. 25, p. 358. The precise date of the Council of Piacenza is not known, but given that the assembly at Worms was convened on 24 January and Pope Gregory's Lenten synod on 14 February, the speed and routes needed to travel the distances from Worms to Piacenza to Rome in less than three weeks become problematic. Reinhard Elze, "Über die Leistungsfähigkeit von Gesandschaften und Boten im 11. Jahrhundert," in Histoire Comparée de l'Administration, published by Werner Paravicini and Karl Ferdinand Werner (Munich, 1980) pp. 3-10, suggests that summonses to Piacenza went out at the same time as those to Worms and that the meeting had already assembled to await news from Worms. Henry's activities in Italy the previous year made clear that further actions could be expected.

[20]Registrum 2.11 (26 October 1074) pp. 142-43 to Count Albert of Calw and his wife Hiltrud (daughter of Godfrey the Bearded of Lorraine and thus step-sister, sister-in-law and third cousin of Matilda of Tuscany) praises the pious laity and enjoins them to enforce the decrees

blame for the violence of the pataria which was active in other Lombard cities such as Piacenza and Cremona.[21] Gregory considered Erlembald to be a miles Christi and had encouraged Pope Alexander II, himself a Milanese nobleman, to send the patarene leader a papal banner in 1065. Many of the Milanese considered Erlembald and his armed band of followers common thugs.[22]

Finally, a public letter was sent to the clergy and people of Rome, traditional electors of the popes before the Papal Election Decree of 1059.[23] This last was particularly badly timed. At the midnight mass of Christmas 1075, Pope Gregory was violently attacked and abducted by Cencius Stephani who bore a grudge because he had not been appointed as prefect of Rome. The following morning a large body of Romans rescued the pope and razed the fortified tower in which he was held. Cencius was forced to flee the city.[24]

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of the Holy See against simoniacs and fornicators. Registrum 2.45 (11 January 1075) p. 283, to Rudolf of Rheinfelden, Berthold of Carinthia and Welf IV of Bavaria includes the commission to "prevent such men (simoniacs and the unchaste) from administering the sacred mysteries, by force if necessary." Robinson, "'Periculosus homo'"; idem, "Gregory VII and the Soldiers of Christ," History 58 (1973) pp. 169-192.

[21]Cowdrey, "Papacy, Patarenes," p. 36; Bonizo of Sutri, Liber ad Amicum, bk. 6, pp. 596-98.

[22]Cowdrey, "Papacy, Patarenes," pp. 35-39.

[23]Meyer von Knonau, Jahrbücher Heinrich IV. 2, p. 628; Briefe, no. 10, pp. 12-13.

[24]Meyer von Knonau, Jahrbücher Heinrich IV. 2, pp. 586-90; Cowdrey, Pope Gregory VII, pp. 326-28. Among many reports, Bonizo of Sutri, Liber ad amicum, bk. 7, p. 606; Lambert of Hersfeld, Annales, a. 1076, p. 242; Berthold of Reichenau, Annales, a. 1076, pp. 281-82; Bernold of St.

Although there was certainly a faction within the city that desired a return to the days of a papacy under the control of a few great families--Cencius Stephani was of a branch of the Crescenti--Gregory VII clearly had a strong base of support within the city.

Henry had, in any case, badly overestimated his position. After a sentence of excommunication and deposition was pronounced on 14 February 1076 at Gregory's Lenten synod, a number of the German bishops reconsidered their position. During the course of 1076, as a result of the excommunication, the situation in Germany changed markedly. As a purely practical matter, an excommunicate king could not govern. All christians were required to avoid any contact with an excommunicate. The sentence dissolved all oaths made to the king.[25] That a king, distinguished from other laymen by the royal unction, and the future emperor, the special protector of St. Peter, would be placed under excommunication raised serious questions of fitness to rule.[26] The German episcopacy remained divided throughout the conflict.

The prominence of bishops in the secular, including

Blasien, Chronicon, a. 1076, pp. 431-32.

[25]Registrum 3.10a, pp. 270-71; Cowdrey, Pope Gregory VII, pp. 14-42.

[26]The literature of sacral kingship is vast. The classic work is Fritz Kern, Kingship and Law in the Middle Ages, trans. S.B. Chrimes (Oxford, 1939); Gerd Tellenbach, Church, State and Christian Society at the Time of the Investiture Contest, trans. R.F. Bennett (New York, 1959) pp. 56-60, 69-76, gives a sound, briefer discussion.

military, affairs of the Empire is well known.[27] The impact that a divided episcopacy could have on Henry's military capacity is suggested by one of the rare medieval documents giving specific troop numbers, the Indiculus loricatorum of 981.[28] The indiculus is a short list of bishops, abbots and laymen with a notation giving the numbers of troops (loricati) each is expected to lead in person or to send to Otto II for his campaign against the Saracens in southern Italy. It probably represents Otto's second call-up and cannot by itself be used as an indication of his total troop strength, but it gives a good example of the importance of episcopal and abbatial contingents in imperial armies.[29] Of the total of 2228 loricati, 1102 are to be provided by the nineteen named bishops and 462 will come from the eleven named abbots, leaving the nineteen counts and dukes to add another 664. The ecclesiastics account for approximately 70%

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[27]Edgar Nathaniel Johnson, The Secular Activities of the German Episcopate, 919-1024. University of Nebraska Studies 30-31 (1930-31) emphasizes the reign of Conrad II and earlier. Timothy Reuter, "The 'Imperial Church System' of the Ottonian and Salian Rulers: a Reconsideration," Journal of Ecclesiastical History 33 (1982) pp. 347-374, includes a survey of scholarship on the topic. Benjamin Arnold, "German Bishops and Their Military Retinues in the Medieval Empire," German History 7 (1989) pp. 161-183, emphasizes developments in the twelfth century and later.

[28]"Indiculus loricatorum Ottoni II. in Italiam mittendorum," MGH Constitutiones 1, ed. L. Weiland (Hanover, 1893) pp. 632-33.

[29]Karl Ferdinand Werner, "Heeresorganisation und Kriegsführung im deutschen Königsreich des 10. und 11. Jahrhunderts," in Ordinamanti Militari, pp. 791-843. Werner bases much of his discussion on the indiculus, esp. pp. 805-13, 823-832.

of the call-up.[30]

The indiculus can be of only comparative or suggestive value for the armies assembled by Henry IV a century later. An attempt to determine the stance of those German bishops appearing in the indiculus proved unhelpful.[31] Even though Henry IV was able to make appointments to at least eight of these nineteen sees between 1076 and 1081, none provided troops for the Italian campaign. The question of appointment proved irrelevant as there are several examples of competing claims to a bishopric. In Augsburg, for example, Rudolf of Rheinfelden appointed Wigolt in 1078, but Henry IV was able to drive him out and name Siegfried in his stead.[32] Neither bishop was likely to be able to take an effective role in a campaign, but rather to need the support of his patron.

The contribution of German ecclesiastics to the polemical literature of the Investiture Controversy was far greater than their contribution to the military actions.[33] Whether this was due to the exigencies of the Saxon wars or to scruples about a civil war within the church is difficult to determine. What is clear is that German episcopal contin-

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[30]The manuscript is barely readable in some places and the editors have disagreed on the figures. Werner, "Heeresorganisation," pp. 834-35.

[31] Rudolf Bonin, Die Besetzung der deutschen Bistümer in den letzten 30 Jahre Heinrichs IV., 1077 bis 1105 (Jena, 1889) pp. 113-124.

[32]Meyer von Knonau, Jahrbücher Heinrich IV. 3, pp. 63, 122-23.

[33]I.S. Robinson, Authority and Resistance in the Investiture Contest (Manchester and New York, 1978) pp. 151-78.

gents did not accompany Henry IV to Italy in 1081.

During the course of the year, major realignments took place among the laity as well. Godfrey the Hunchback, Duke of Lower Lorraine, estranged husband of Matilda of Tuscany and Henry's loyal supporter, was murdered on 26 February.[34] By autumn, the Saxon rebellion revived in a more dangerous form.[35] Not only had Otto of Nordheim returned once more to the Saxon cause, but a number of Henry's former supporters made common cause with the Saxons: Rudolf of Rheinfelden, the duke of Swabia and Henry's brother-in-law twice over, Welf IV, duke of Bavaria, and Berthold of Zahringen, duke of Carinthia. Among them they controlled the eastern and central passes of the Alps.

In a meeting that took place from 16 October to 1 November with Henry and his supporters camped at Oppenheim

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[34]Cowdrey, Pope Gregory VII, pp. 130, 135, proposes Godfrey as the principle mover behind Henry's decision to confront the pope. Given the prominence of his estranged wife in Gregory's dealings with Henry, and Godfrey's obvious interest in gaining control of Matilda's lands, the idea is intriguing. If Henry were to open a campaign in Italy, Godfrey could expect to command his wife's troops and in effect take over the rule of her territory. Gregory's letters are discreet on the subject of Matilda's separation from her husband, but do not enjoin her to return to him. Registrum 1.40 (3 January 1074) pp. 62-63, and 1.47 (16 February 1074) pp. 71-76. Alfred Overmann, Gräfin Mathilde von Tuscien: Ihrer Besitzungen, Geschichte ihres Gutes von 1115-1230 und ihre Regesten (Innsbruck, 1895; repr. Frankfurt am Main, 1965) pp. 131-32. The new text given in Johanna Autenrieth, "Der bisher unbekante Schluß des Briefes Gregors VII an Mathilde von Tuscien vom 16. Februar 1074 (Reg. 1, 47)," Deutsches Archiv für Erforschung des Mittelalters, 13 (1957) pp. 534-38, adds only the pope's request that Matilda date her letters as he does, by month and day.

[35]Meyer von Knonau, Jahrbücher Heinrich IV. 2, 671-76, 679-80, 682-85, 713-15.

on the Rhine, and the majority of the princes of Germany camped several miles away across the Rhine at Tribur, Henry humbled himself to avoid the immediate election of a new king. Bishop Altmann of Passau and Abbot William of Hirsau acting as papal legates ratified the decision to allow the king a year-and-a-day to free himself of the excommunication.[36] It was agreed that the pope would travel to Germany to convene a general council at Augsburg on 2 February 1077 where the issue could be heard and a decision given.[37]

Despite the presence of papal legates, the alliance of the pope and the German magnates was more apparent than real.[38] Many of the princes, lay and ecclesiastic, were interested in replacing Henry IV because the king's moves to rebuild the royal power and prestige that had deteriorated during his long minority threatened their own position. The pope wanted a king who would assist or compel the bishops to carry out the papal reform program; he wanted obedience, but would have preferred that it come from a reformed and duly

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[36]Meyer von Knonau, Jahrbücher Heinrich IV. 2, pp. 729-35; Registrum 4.3 (3 September 1076) p. 298, advises the election of a new king if Henry does not reform; "Conventio Oppenheimensis," MGH Leges 2, p. 249.

[37]Meyer von Knonau, Jahrbücher Heinrich IV. 2, p. 734; Bernold of St. Blasien, Chronicon, a. 1076, p. 433.

[38]I[an] S[tuart] Robinson, "Pope Gregory VII, the Princes and the pactum 1077-1080," The English Historical Revue 94 (October, 1979) pp. 721-756.

penitent Henry IV.[39] With his enemies in control of the routes to Italy, and doubtless observing his movements, Henry undertook to humble himself again and left Germany in the dead of winter, travelling across the 2,000-meter-high Mont Cenis pass into the territory of his mother-in-law, Adelheid of Turin, the countess of Savoy.

Given that secrecy was a consideration, it is not surprising that the king's itinerarium is somewhat obscure. Henry left Speyer, whither he retired after Oppenheim-Tribur, shortly before Christmas. His next known position is Besançon in the territory of his kinsman Count William of Burgundy where he kept Christmas.[40] It is possible that Henry stayed as well in Montbéliard while covering the 280 km. (168 mi.) between Speyer and Besançon. Countess Sophia, the wife of Count Louis of Montbéliard, was also his kinswoman, but her daughter, Beatrice, was the wife of Berthold of Carinthia and her son, Frederick, appears frequently in the charters of his cousin, Matilda of Tuscany.[41]

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[39]Robinson, "'Periculosus homo'," discusses the importance of obedience in Gregory's letters.

[40]Meyer von Knonau, Jahrbücher Heinrich IV. 2, pp. 741-43; Lambert of Hersfeld, Annales, p. 255. Count William and Henry's mother, Empress Agnes, were cousins. Henry did not issue any documents in Besançon; his stay is noted in a charter of Count Hugh of Chalons, Diplomata Henry IV, no. 286, p. 373.

[41]Sophia, the full sister of Beatrice of Lorraine, was a niece and foster-daughter of Empress Gisela, Henry's grandmother. She and William were, respectively, aunt and uncle once removed. M[argherita] G[iuliana] Bertolini, "Beatrice di Lorena" DBI 6 pp. 352-363; Elke Goez, Beatrix von Canossa und Tuszien: Eine Untersuching zur Geschichte des 11. Jahrhunderts (Sigmaringen, 1995) pp. 11-13, 16, 35-36, 39, 74, 77;

The party then proceeded by way of Geneva into the Alps where Henry was met and received by his mother-in-law who took advantage of the opportunity to regain some of the considerable amount she had expended for the privilege of her daughter's imperial marriage.[42] The various locations proposed as the place of this meeting are situated near her northern borders, asssuming that she would most likely meet Henry just as he entered her territory. This would require that she cross the Mont Cénis pass twice. The sources, which emphasize the difficulty of the crossing for the queen, her young son and their attendants as well as the extraordinary harshness of the weather, do not note that the countess, in her mid-fifties, made the same crossing twice.[43] Adelheid is not known to have gone to the north side of the Alps on any other occasion.[44]

Henry then made his way via Turin to Vercelli, which was the seat of his Italian chancellor and loyal supporter,

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"Berthold," Lexikon des Mittelalters 1, col. 2026.

[42]Berthold of Reichenau, Annales, p. 288 for the stop in Geneva after Besançon; Lambert of Hersfeld, Annales, p. 255 for the meeting of Henry and Adelheid; Meyer von Knonau, Jahrbücher Heinrich IV. 2, pp. 749-50; C.W. Previté Orton, The Early History of the House of Savoy (1000-1222) (Cambridge, 1912) pp. 235-240; idem, "A Point in the Itinerary of Henry IV, 1076-77," English Historical Review 25 (July 1910) pp. 520-22.

[43]A number of sources comment on the severity of the weather that year. Lambert of Hersfeld, Annales, p. 255; Bernold of St. Blasien, Chronicon, p. 433, reports heavy snow throughout the kingdom from November to April. Meyer von Knonau, Jahrbücher Heinrich IV. 2, pp. 750-51.

[44]Previté Orton, "A Point in the Itinerary," p. 522.

Bishop Gregory, and to Pavia whose bishop, William, was also the king's supporter.[45] Lambert reports that numerous lay and ecclesiastical nobles, assuming that he came to take up arms against the pope, went to meet the king.[46] The excommunication was obviously not accepted by all.

Pope Gregory began the journey to Germany at about the same time, travelling from Rome via Florence and Lucca under the escort of Matilda of Tuscany.[47] His next known location

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[45]Meyer von Knonau, Jahrbücher Heinrich IV. 2, pp. 753-54; Gerhard Schwartz, Die Besetzung der Bistümer Reichsitaliens unter den Sächsischen und Salien Kaisern mit den Listen der Bischöfe, 951-1122 (Leipzig and Berlin, 1913; rpt. Spoleto, 1993) pp. 137-38, 144. Gregory of Vercelli, who had been a supporter of the anti-pope Cadalus of Parma, died suddenly in 1077. William of Pavia became a signatory to the raising of the anti-pope Wibert of Ravenna at Brixen in 1080. The bishop's previous dealings with Pope Gregory VII included a papal prohibition of the marriage of his sister, Matilda, to Azzo II of Este. Given that Azzo was then approaching 80 years of age, the prohibition of marital relations may have provoked as much amusement as resentment. Registrum 2.35, 2.36 (both 16 December 1074) pp. 171-72.

[46]Lambert of Hersfeld, Annales, p. 257. Similarly, Berthold of Reichenau, Annales, pp. 287-88, and Bernold of St. Blasien, Chronicon, p. 433. Elze, Leistungsfähigkeit," pp. 6-7, posits that messengers travelling separately from the king's party brought the word of his pending arrival to Italy thus allowing his adherents to assemble in Pavia. That smaller parties not only travel more quickly, but can also better elude watchers becomes a point.

[47]Meyer von Knonau, Jahrbücher Heinrich IV. 2, p. 739, cf. n. 98. The sources place the pope in both cities, but there is no reason to accept Jaffé's hypothesis that both documents refer to the same day, 28 December. The pope could have reached either place by that date had he left Rome immediately after Christmas. The date is taken from a document in which, at the request of Bishop Rainer, the pope undertook the protection of the church of Florence and confirmed its possessions, as had been done by his predecessors, the Tuscan popes Nicholas II (Gebhard of Florence) and Alexander II (Anselm I of Lucca). PL 148, p. 677. The anonymous Vita Anselmi states only that the pope came to the city, Vita S. Anselmi Lucensis episcopi a Bardone scripsit, ed. Roger Wilmans, MGH Scriptores 12 (Hanover, 1856) chap. 8, p. 15. Given that Florence is closer to Rome, he probably went there first. This is also a likely place for Matilda's escort to meet him. Bishop Anselm of Lucca,

is Mantua, where he arrived by 8 January.[48] Gregory was in Mantua awaiting word of the arrival of his escort from Germany when instead news reached him of Henry's arrival, along with the further intelligence that a number of Italian lay and ecclesiastical magnates had gone to greet the king, despite his status as an excommunicate. Matilda immediately removed the pope to the less comfortable but far more secure fortress of Canossa, located on a spur of the Apennines 67 km. (42 mi.) to the south-southwest.[49] For a habitual

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Gregory's supporter, was struggling to impose a communal life on his cathedral canons. Thus, a papal visit is not unlikely, even though this is not the most direct route to Mantua. The pope's next known location is Mantua on 8 January; there is no reason to allow 10 days for crossing the Apennines even in winter weather. To the contrary, harsh weather is good reason for a hasty trip, although stealth may well have been intended. Abbot Hugh of Cluny, Henry's godfather, was in Rome in December and also at Canossa in January. Whether he travelled with Gregory is not stated in the sources. Berthold of Reichenau, Annales, a. 1076, p. 287.

[48]A letter written by Gregory shortly before his departure from Rome states his intention to be in Mantua by that date. Epistolae vagantes, no. 17, pp. 46-48.

[49]Writing to the German princes after the meeting with Henry at Canossa, Gregory emphasizes that he had kept to the agreed upon schedule and reached Lombardy some 20 days before his German escort should have arrived at the narrows (clusas). While he was awaiting word of their arrival, the news of Henry's approach reached him and Matilda moved him to Canossa. If Gregory's letters are taken to mean that he actually reached Mantua by 8 January and his escort was supposed to meet him at Chiusa on 28 January, this would allow four days to reach Augsburg, a distance of approximately 230 km. (138 mi.) or a rate of travel of just under 56 km. (35 mi.) a day which is a rate of travel suitable to a papal train. Rates of travel are discussed in chapter 2, pp. 00-00. Further, the narrows above Verona are well outside of Matilda's territory. What may have been intended was that the German escort would send ahead a messenger once it had arrived at the narrows. The main body would continue southward somewhat more slowly. When the messenger arrived, Matilda would move out from Mantua toward Volta or Castel d'Azzano, her holdings closest to Verona and the exits from the mountain passes. Where the two groups would actually meet is a point of conjec-

horseman such as Gregory this would be a hard day's ride.[50]

Henry and his party arrived at Canossa on 21 January, which is the first specific date of his itinerarium after Christmas, and took up quarters at Bianello, a smaller outlying castle [1.5] km. to the north. For the next four days negotiators for both sides travelled between the two castles until on 25 January Henry presented himself in the dress of a penitent and was received within the second of Canossa's three walls where he remained standing all day, fasting. He repeated the penitential exercise for a second and third day.[51] In return for public penance and a promise of reform, Henry secured absolution and release from excom-

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ture, but the entire operation obviously presumes the cooperation of the archbishop of Verona and the bishops of Brixen and Trent among others. Registrum, 4.12, (late January, 1077) p. 311. Similarly, Epistolae vagantes, no. 19 (February-March 1077) pp. 50-55, emphasizes that the failure of the escort to arrive at the agreed time allowed Henry to meet the pope in Italy. Given that Henry was able to reach Canossa by 21 January this may be a slight exaggeration.

[50]In 1984, a medical examination of Gregory's remains determined that he had been a small but robust man and used to riding a horse. Cowdrey, Pope Gregory VII, p. 27.

[51]Lambert of Hersfeld, Annales, pp. 259. Leone Tondelli, "Scavi Archeologici a Canossa: le tre mura di cinta," Studi Gregoriani 4 (1952) pp. 365-371, verifies Lambert's description of the three walls at Canossa. The question of Lambert's credibility exercised many scholars in the later 19th century. Meyer von Knonau's Excurs I, Jahrbücher Heinrich IV. 2, pp. 791-851 includes a survey of the literature through 1894. Tonino Aceto, "L'apparato difensivo de Canossa," in Studi Matildici III, pp. 369-393, discusses the changes in topography caused by landslides and construction at the site. Naborre Campanini, Canossa: Guida Storica Illustrata, 4th ed. (1925; repr. Reggio-Emilia, 1975) remains valuable.

munication.[52] He also deprived his political opponents of their most powerful weapon, and a debate immediately arose as to whether or not the absolution restored him to kingship as well as to the church, a debate that continued into the twentieth century.[53]

The meeting of Gregory VII and Henry IV at Canossa is possibly the most-studied event in all medieval European history.[54] The drama of the midwinter crossing of the Alps and the perceived confrontation of Church and State has led to a focus on the two main actors, Henry and Gregory, and obscured the significance of Canossa in the conflict that later came about. Neither man came to Canossa alone.

In addition to his family, Henry was accompanied by his godfather, Abbot Hugh of Cluny, and Marquis Azzo II of

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[52]Registrum 4.12a (28 January 1077) p. 314, gives the text of the promissio.

[53]Augustin Fliche, "Grégoire VII, à Canossa, a-t-il réintégré Henri IV dans sa fonction royale?" Studi Gregoriani 1 (1947) pp. 373-386; H[enri]-X[avier] Arquillière, "Grégoire VII, à Canossa, a-t-il réintégré Henri IV dans sa fonction royale?" Studi Gregoriani 4 (1952) pp. 1-26; Karl F. Morrison, "Canossa, a Revision," Traditio 18 (1962), pp. 121-148; Cowdrey, Pope Gregory VII, pp. 608-617.

[54]The bibliography of Canossa is accordingly vast. The essential accounts are Registrum 4.12, (late January 1077) p. 311; Epistolae vagantes, no. 19 (February-March 1077) pp. 50-55; Lambert of Hersfeld, Annales, a. 1077, pp. 256-60; Donizone, Vita Mathildis Comitissae, ed. L. Bethmann, MGH Scriptores 12 (Hanover, 1856) bk. 2, chap. 1, pp. 381-83, for a version of the events that was acceptable at Canossa nearly 40 years later. The discussions most consulted are those of Meyer von Knonau, Jahrbücher Heinrich IV. 2, pp. 756-762; Fliche, La Reforme Grégorienne 2, pp. 303-307; Tellenbach, Church in Western Europe, pp. 242-43; Cowdrey, Pope Gregory VII, pp. 156-67. Harald Zimmermann, Der Canossagang von 1077: Wirkungen und Wircklichkeit (Mainz, 1975) on the changing views of the meeing over the centuries.

Este, whose territory largely lay between Adelheid's and Matilda's. Azzo was also the father of Gregory's supporter, Welf IV of Bavaria.[55] Adelheid's son Amadeus of Savoy was also present as were "several others of the first princes of Italy whose great support of the king was not to be doubted."[56] Berthold's speculation that, had Gregory not yielded to the supplications on Henry's behalf, the penitential journey might well have turned into a military action is not completely without merit.[57]

Berthold also reports that a Lombard marquis by the name of Otbert had conferred with Henry at Speyer, but died at Augsburg during the return trip.[58] Berthold was interested in the man's willingness to incur the penalties of contact with an excommunicate, but the record of trans-Alpine diplomacy from 1075 between two parties with grievances against the reform papacy is also relevant to the composition of the army with which Henry was to eventually move on Rome.

Gregory was under the escort of Countess Matilda of

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[55] M[argherita] G[iuliana] Bertolini, "Alberto Azzo" DBI 1, pp. 753-758.

[56] Lambert of Hersfeld, Annales, p. 258.

[57] Berthold of Reichenau, a staunch gregorian, is the source for Henry's intended treachery, Annales, pp. 287-88.

[58] Berthold of Reichenau, Annales, pp. 287-88. The name Otbert suggests that the man was a member of the extended Otbertine family that was allied with Henry IV, but it has not been possible to further identify him. Ferdinando Gabotto, "I marchesi Obertenghi fino alla pace di Luni," Giornale storico della Lunigiana 9 (1918) pp. 3-47.

Tuscany and, when no other escort arrived from Germany, he could not pass beyond her territory. Without her support he would have been hard put to travel even in Italy.[59]

The transfer from Mantua to Canossa was not a precipitate race to safety. Before Henry arrived, Gregory had already absolved a number of bishops and laity whom he had previously excommunicated. They had eluded the blockades on the narrows. Others attempting to make the same journey were taken prisoner by the king's opponents.[60] Since the pope had announced his intention to be in Mantua at a specific date, they may well have intended to meet him there, and were diverted to Canossa. Despite the obscurity of the respective itineraria, Matilda clearly had early knowledge of the king's presence. For example, a message sent by her cousins at Montbéliard, could have arrived at about the same time as Henry's messengers who set up the meeting at Pavia.[61]

Once Gregory was secure in Canossa there could be little possibility of approaching him by force. Canossa is a place notoriously resistant to sieges; it was in fact this security that initiated the rise to power of Matilda's ancestors. Her great-grandfather, Adalberto-Azzo, held the

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[59]Luigi Simeoni, "Il contributo della contessa Matilde al Papato nella lotta per le investiture." Studi Gregoriani 1 (1947) p. 354.

[60]Lambert of Hersfeld, Annales, p. 257.

[61]Frederick and Beatrice of Montbéliard, the children of Louis and Sophia, were Matilda's first cousins and, after the death of her mother in April of 1076, her closest living relatives.

castle from the bishop of Reggio. In 950 Adelheid of Burgundy, daughter of King Rudolph and widow of King Lothar, took refuge there from Berengar of Ivrea, yet another claimant to the crown of Italy.[62] Adelheid married the future emperor Otto I of Germany in 951. Otto rewarded Adalberto-Azzo with the counties of Modena, Reggio and Mantua. Matilda's grandfather, Tedald, acquired Brescia and Ferrara, and her father, Boniface, the marquisate of Tuscany.[63] Canossa was the centerpiece of a system of defense in depth extending from the Po Valley across the Apennines into Tuscany.[64]

If Henry had intended some kind of military action against Gregory at this point, Matilda's prompt action forestalled him. The situation became a standoff. A protracted siege could expose Henry to counter-moves in both Germany and Italy. Henry's German supporters could not come to his

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[62] M[argherita] G[iuliana] Bertolini, "Adalberto Azzo di Canossa," DBI 1, pp. 221-223. Donizone, Vita Mathildis, bk. 1, chap. 1, ll. 133-278, pp. 355-58, is the source for Adalbero Azzo's actions and the sieges of Canossa by Berengar. Luigi Simeoni, "La Vita Mathildis di Donizone et il suo valore storicho-critiche," Atti e memorie della Deputazione de storia patria per le Antiche Provincie Modenesi, ser. 7, vol. 4 (1927) pp. 52-55, discusses Donizone's use of his sources.

[63] Overmann, Gräfin Mathilde, p. 4. Odoardo Rombaldi, "Castra e curtes nel territorio reggiano nel sec. XI," in Studi Matildici II, pp. 327-61 traces some of the transaction by which Matilda's ancestors obtained their holdings.

[64] Rocco Morretta, "L'Apparato difensivo dei signori di Canossa nell'Appennino Reggiano," Atti e memorie della Deputazione di storia patria per le antiche provincie modenesi, ser. 9, vol. 4 (1965) pp. 489-500; Arnoldo Tincani, "Quattro Castella: zona limitanea di difesa," in Quattro Castella, pp. 83-92; Lino Lionello Ghirardini, "San Polo nel sistema strategico-difensivo dell'appenino canossiana," in Milleni Sampolesi: Atti del Convegno di Studi Storici (San Polo d'Enza 4-5-6 Maggio 1984), ed. Gino Badini (Reggio Emilia, 1985) pp. 99-115.

aid in Italy while their opponents held most of the passes. A lengthy detour through Countess Adelheid's territory, even if she would allow it, presented considerable logistical problems beyond the severity of the weather.[65] Finally, had large numbers of Henry's supporters gone to Italy to lay siege to Canossa, their own lands would be left vulnerable.

Once in Italy, they would be dependent on local supplies. If these failed, the subsequent ravaging of the countryside could quickly turn Italian support into opposition. If Henry attempted to besiege Canossa with the forces of his Italian supporters, he would be totally dependent on them for both troops and supplies, and still open to repercussions in Germany. A prolonged absence while he remained excommunicate would allow the deadline set at Tribur-Oppenheim to expire, and his opponents could simply elect a new king. The possible reaction of Italians other than Henry's supporters in the north to the spectacle of the pope under siege by an excommunicated king is an unpredictable element that must be considered, as is the possibility of intervention by the Normans of southern Italy who were eager to further their reach into the Empire. Time was not on Henry's side.

Conversely, if Gregory refused Henry's public peniten-

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[65]For Adelheid's activities apart from Henry IV and the journey to Canossa, Previté Orton, Early History, pp. 125-260; A.M. Patrone, "Adelaide," DBI 1, pp. 249-251; Tyler, The Alpine Passes: The Middle Ages (962-1250) (Oxford, 1930) pp. 40-42, gives a lucid précis of the logistical problems of mountain travel.

tial display, the pope risked further alienating those who were already troubled by his actions. It was not unthinkable that he could be deposed and replaced while trapped in Canossa. The example of Henry III's disposition of three papal claimants in 1046 and his own exile to Germany with the former Pope Gregory VI was unlikely to be forgotten. If Henry IV received the imperial coronation, even from an anti-pope, his position in Germany would be greatly strengthened and Gregory's irreparably weakened. Such considerations no doubt played a part alongside the entreaties of Matilda and Hugh of Cluny.

From the viewpoint of the war that was to come, Henry's and Gregory's actions after Canossa are of considerable interest. Henry first met with his Lombard supporters who were in Reggio waiting the outcome of the meeting. They were apparently unhappy.[66] One of Henry's first acts after being freed from excommunication was to confirm the inheritance of Azzo of Este's sons, Fulco and Hugo.[67] He also made substantial grants to Patriarch Sigehard of Aquilea, not previously a strong supporter, who had control of the eastern access routes to the Brenner pass.[68] In addition to showing himself exercising the functions of government, Henry was

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[66]Meyer von Knonau, Jahrbücher Heinrich IV. 2, pp. 764-65.

[67] Diplomata Henry IV, no. 289, pp. 377-79.

[68]Diplomata Henry IV, no. 293, pp. 384-85. Friuli was taken from the territory of the rebel Duke Berthold of Carinthia.

also strengthening his position for the struggle to come.

Some of his plans, such as receiving the crown of Italy, failed.[69] Henry returned to Germany in May of 1077, after receiving word that his opponents had elected Rudolf of Rheinfelden as king at Forchheim on 14 March. He and his household travelled unopposed through the Brenner pass, approaching from the east, via Aquilea.[70] Presumably the strategy of the rebel dukes did not include preventing the king's return as there is no record of any attempt to do so. It was to Rudolf's advantage to allow Henry to return so that the matter could be settled in battle rather than risking that the pope would give a judgement in Henry's favor. Forcing the king to return from Italy may well have been the purpose of the hasty election at Forchheim.

Henry immediately began to assemble his forces for the coming war. He called a meeting of his supporters at Regensburg in Bavarian territory and, after formally declaring his grievances, reminded them of their obligations and gave generous gifts from the treasure he had brought with

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[69]Meyer von Knonau, Jahrbücher Heinrich IV. 2, pp. 769-70.

[70]Henry also took the precaution of leaving his son in Italy, a visible sign of his dynastic right to rule and safe from the war that was likely to take place in Germany. Elke Goez, "Das Thronerbe als Rivale: König Konrad, Kaiser Heinrichs IV. älterer Sohn." Historisches Jahrbuch 116 (1996) p. 7.

him from Italy.[71] By the end of the month at Ulm Welf of Bavaria was formally deposed according to Swabian law.[72] On 11 June at Nuremburg Henry gave Istria and Carniola to the Patriarch of Aquileia, with the concurrence of Liutold of Eppenstein who had recently replaced the rebel Berthold as duke of Carinthia.[73] Two days later grants were made to the church of Brixen, also strategically located south of the Brenner pass.[74] Henry was clearly courting the bishops of sensitive districts.

Pope Gregory remained in northern Italy until mid-September. His numerous letters show that he still hoped to hold a general synod in Germany and to mediate between Henry and Rudolf. Although he sent legates with specifically limited commissions--the cardinal deacon Bernard from Rome and Abbot Bernard of Saint-Victor of Marseilles were present at Forchheim--on numerous occasions during the three years after Canossa, he himself never made the trip.[75] Henry, once free of the excommunication that had made him so vulnerable,

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[71]Meyer von Knonau, Jahrbücher Heinrich IV. 3, p. 23; Berthold of Reichenau, Annales, a. 1077, p. 294. In light of the analysis of K.F. Werner, "Heeresorganisation," Berthold's statement that the king quickly raised 12,000 troops can no longer be dismissed out of hand.

[72]The Welfs were of Swabian origin. Meyer von Knonau, Jahrbücher Heinrich IV. 3, pp. 36-37.

[73]Diplomata Henry IV, nos. 295, 296, pp. 387-90. The exact date of Liutold's accession is not known.

[74]Diplomata Henry IV, no. 297, pp. 390-91.

[75]Cowdrey, Pope Gregory VII, pp. 167-194, gives a detailed summary of the diplomacy of these years.

had little need for the pope's support. He could blunt the opposition of the reform-minded German bishops by avoiding the blatantly simoniacal appointments of the earlier years while still filling offices with his supporters. A military victory over Rudolf was preferable to a papal judgement.

Rudolf had greater need of Gregory's approval as his election at least in part derived from Gregory's 1076 deposition of Henry. When that recognition did not come, his party had little incentive to bring Gregory to Germany and risk his giving judgement in favor of Henry. After Canossa they had little trust in the pope, and, like Henry, put their faith in arms, while keeping up contacts with with Gregory and sending representatives to his Lenten synods.

The appeal to arms was likewise indecisive. Numerous actions, such as Rudolf's abandoned siege of Augsburg in 1077, were undertaken.[76] On 7 August 1078 a bloody battle was fought at Melrichstadt. Neither side could claim a victory, but the heavy losses were more damaging to Rudolf who had to withdraw further to the northeast leaving Henry in control of the south with the river Main as the line between them.[77] While Pope Gregory sent more legates to

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[76]The numerous actions, for which the sources are meager, are given in Meyer von Knonau, Jahrbücher Heinrich IV. 3, ad annum.

[77]Meyer von Knonau, Jahrbücher Heinrich IV. 3, pp. 137-46; Delbrück, Geschichte der Kriegskunst 3, pp. 135-37. The Saxon campaigns need fresh study. Delbrück's remarks are typical of earlier views of medieval military actions in that he attributes numerous failures of strategic and tactical thinking to the peculiar characteristics of knights (Rittern), while noting that Henry achieved his presumed objec-

attempt to arrange for a general council, civil war disrupted Germany, especially Saxony.

It was nearly a year-and-a-half after Melrichstadt when Henry IV mounted another campaign, perhaps heartened by defections from Rudolf. Among others, Magnus and Hermann Billung and Wipert of Groitsch promised Henry at least neutrality if not support.[78] When the battle was joined at Flarchheim on 27 January 1080, it was Rudolf who held the field after heavy losses on both sides.[79]

At the Lenten synod of 1080 both sides sent their by now customary delegations. Gregory's legates presented their respective reports; there was, yet again, no progress toward the general meeting desired by the pope. It is not completely clear why Gregory finally took action and accepted Rudolf as king and excommunicated Henry IV a second time. Perhaps he had come to realize that Rudolf was in no position to hinder a meeting had Henry desired one. Rudolf's envoys had been consistent in their assurances of his willingness to accept the pope's judgement. Rudolf had also been quick to claim victory at Flarchheim, something Henry had yet to achieve. The combination of Rudolf's protestations of obedi-

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tive of preventing the Saxon contingents of Rudolf's army from joining with the Bavarians and Swabians. Nor does he comment on the reported contingents of peasants in this battle of knights.

[78]Meyer von Knonau, Jahrbücher Heinrich IV. 3, p. 236.

[79]Meyer von Knonau, Jahrbücher Heinrich IV. 3, pp. 238-40; Delbrück, Geschichte der Kriegskunst 3, pp. 137-38.

ence and an apparent sign of God's judgement in battle may have tipped the balance.

Also, the effects of the war on the German church by deaths and displacements were considerable. Bishop Werner of Magdeburg was killed in the battle of Melrichstadt;[80] Archbishop Udo of Trier in the siege of Tübingen.[81] At the Lenten synod of 1079, Bishops Altmann of Passau, who frequently acted as Gregory's legate, and Hermann of Metz told of being expelled from their sees.[82] All of these things would urge Gregory to action. Perhaps the pope simply considered three years a long enough grace period to allow Henry to keep the promises made at Canossa.[83]

The reaction was predictably swift since Henry no longer had anything to gain from a policy of restraint. On 31 May a synod was convened in Mainz where Gregory's crimes were enumerated and the election of a new pope called for.[84] The synod of Brixen assembled on 25 June for that purpose.[85]

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[80]Meyer von Knonau, Jahrbücher Heinrich IV. 3, p. 143.

[81]Meyer von Knonau, Jahrbücher Heinrich IV. 3, p. 152.

[82]Meyer von Knonau, Jahrbücher Heinrich IV. 3, pp. 131, 171-81; Berthold of Reichenau, Annales, a. 1079, p. 316. Bernold of St. Blasien's report of the Lenten synod, Chronicon, a. 1079, pp. 435-36, does not mention Hermann's speech.

[83]Registrum 7.14a, pp. 483-87. Gregory's sentence specifies that excommunication was ultimately incurred by preventing the assembly. This was a breaking of the oath given at Canossa.

[84]Meyer von Knonau, Jahrbücher Heinrich IV. 3, p. 277.

[85]Meyer von Knonau, Jahrbücher Heinrich IV. 3, p. 284-296.

The location was chosen so that the dissident Lombard bishops could conveniently attend. In point of fact, most of the bishops present were Italians. The war in Germany made travel difficult for many, and Rudolf's supporters would risk being taken prisoner had they tried to do so.[86] On 30 June Archbishop Guibert of Ravenna was elected as pope.[87] The Roman cardinals, electors of the pope since the Papal Election Decree of 1059, were represented only by the excommunicated Hugh Candidus, who had also been present at Worms in 1076. The newly-elected pope then returned to Italy to await the time when Henry would escort him to Rome for his consecration, something that obviously could not be attempted while Rudolf's faction was still active.

The rebellion suffered a heavy setback with the death of the anti-king Rudolf of Rheinfelden at the Battle on the Elster (15 October 1080), but the key magnates who had set up the anti-king were still a threat.[88] In February of 1081 Henry asked for and was refused a truce. The Saxon leaders, in particular Otto of Nordheim, were all too aware that Henry sought the truce because of the impending Roman cam-

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[86]Meyer von Knonau, Jahrbücher Heinrich IV. 3, p. 281. The German gregorians found themselves vulnerable and isolated.

[87]"Synodus Brixinensis," MGH Leges 2, pp. 50-52.

[88]Meyer von Knonau, Jahrbücher Heinrich IV. 3, pp. 337-40; Delbrück, Geschichte der Kriegskunst 3, pp. 139-149; Paul Sander, Der Kampf Heinrichs IV. und Gregors VII. von den zweiten Exkommunikation des Königs bis zu seiner Kaiserkrönung (März 1080-März 1084) (Berlin, 1893) pp. 29-32.

paign and not in an effort to resolve the issues between them. Henry achieved a truce that lasted only until June.[89]

The Saxon rebellion did not regain the strength it had before Rudolph of Rheinfelden's death; the next anti-king, Hermann of Salm, was not elected until August of 1081, well after Henry had left for Italy, and never attracted the level of support Rudolph had enjoyed.[90] Even so, there could be no repeat of the campaigns of Otto II against the Saracens in southern Italy a century earlier when that emperor summoned successive German armies across the Alps.[91] Henry's supporters in Germany were needed there.

Since Canossa, Henry had been making gifts and episcopal appointments that would guarantee the access routes between Germany and Italy and counter the threat posed by gregorian supporters such as Welf IV of Bavaria who had attempted to prevent his reaching Italy in 1077.[92] After the

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[89]Meyer von Knonau, Jahrbücher Heinrich IV. 3, pp. 347-349.

[90]Meyer von Knonau, Jahrbücher Heinrich IV. 3, pp. 417ff. Bruno of Magdeburg, De bello Saxonico, pp. 327-384. Hugo Müller, Hermann von Luxemburg, der Gegenkönig Heinrichs IV. (Halle, 1889).

[91]Werner, "Heeresorganisation," pp. 805-09. There is no evidence that Henry III or Henry IV had fewer troops at their disposal than Otto II. Henry III could act more freely and effectively in Italy than his son because he did not have to fight a lengthy civil war.

[92]Henry had had a number of opportunities to make appointments. Meyer von Knonau, Jahrbücher Heinrich IV. 3, in 1077, Henry of Aquileia, pp. 65-66, Siegfried of Augsburg, pp. 62-64; in 1078, Meginward of Freising, pp. 119-120, Thiepald of Straßburg, p. 132, Sigewin of Cologne, pp. 154-55; in 1079, Norbert of Chur, Udo of Hildesheim and Gunther of Naumburg, pp. 231-33. Rudolf also had the opportunity to appoint bishops, Wigolt of Augsburg in 1078, pp. 122-23.

death of Rudolf, Henry's appointments were designed for the dual purpose of installing his supporters and of exploiting divisions within the ranks of the opposition.[93] But the failure of the truce meetings showed that there still was an active opposition. This meant that the campaign in Italy would be undertaken with Italian troops. Events in Italy show that Henry had made arrangements for just this case.

The objectives of the campaign could only be accomplished at Rome. The city was the second front. Henry's situation was far different from that faced by his father, Henry III, 35 years earlier. He was not coming to settle a dispute among contenders for the papal throne, but to depose a sitting pope with considerable support within the city.

Since investing or storming a city the size of Rome was clearly out of the question, the action became one of waiting, with the attendant logistical problems of feeding and controlling an idle army, while entrance into the city could be negotiated. In addition to the ever-present threat of disease, Henry's army was vulnerable to attack by the pope's ally, the Norman duke of Apulia, Robert Guiscard.

The third front lay in the expanse of lands between Rome and the Alpine passes, the Po Valley and the mountainous regions of the Apennines. This considerable area was under the control of a papal ally far more reliable than the

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[93]Meyer von Knonau, Jahrbücher Heinrich IV. 3, pp. 349-51; Cowdrey, Pope Gregory VII, 207-09.

Norman duke, Henry's kinswoman, Matilda of Tuscany. Henry achieved success in his campaigns against the Saxons. He gained entry into Rome in 1083 and received the imperial coronation from Wibert of Ravenna, who had been consecrated as Pope Clement III, on Easter 1084. But he never succeeded in ending the opposition of Matilda of Tuscany who continued to oppose his policies after the newly-crowned emperor left Italy, even after the death in exile of Gregory VII in 1085.

The basis of Matilda of Tuscany's military capacity lay in her large landed possessions. In addition to the march of Tuscany, her inheritance, which had been confirmed by Henry III in 1055, included the counties of Reggio, Modena, Mantua, and Brescia.[94] The counties of Ferrara and, possibly, Perugia were held as fiefs of the Roman church.[95] More significant than the comital and marchesal offices were the numerous fortifications placed so as to monitor and facili-

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[94] The catalogue of the matildine possessions established in Overmann, Gräfin Mathilde, pp. 4-40 remains indispensible. Overmann's investigation aimed at establishing which possessions were allodial and which were held as fiefs of the Empire, and does not emphasize fortifications.

[95] Only two documents show Matilda to have authority in Perugia; on 7 July 1072 and 9 July 1072, Beatrice and Matilda held a placitum "in villa, que vocatur Colle de Uignolis in comitatu Perusie," Urkunden Mathilde, nos. 3, 4, pp. 39-44. Matilda's gift on 26 September 1078 of her portion of the castle of Diècimo to Anselm of Lucca was issued at "Sancto Cipriano prope Perusiam," but this is a donation rather than a judicial document, Urkunden Mathilde, no. 26, pp. 97-100. Overmann, Gräfin Mathilde, pp. 4, 126, 143. Her father Boniface, likewise, is recorded in Perugia only once, while travelling with Conrad II on 20 March 1038. The sources note only his presence. Falce, Bonifacio di Canossa: Padre di Matilda 2 (Reggio-Emillia, 1927) p. 57. It seems unlikely that Matilda held comital rights there.

tate, or oppose, movements through the Po valley or the trans-Apennine routes leading to Rome.[96] In times of peace castles provided checkpoints for the collection of tolls, secure places for the conducting of courts and other administrative business; in times of war they were bases of military operations and refuges for the rural populations.[97]

A number of roads dating back to Roman times and earlier crossed the level plain of the Po valley. The Via Aemilia on the right, or south, bank of the Po passed from Piacenza through Parma, Modena, Bologna and Faenza to reach the Adriatic coast at Rimini and join the Via Flaminia.[98] Raven-

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[96]Aldo A. Settia, "Castelli e villaggi nelle terre canossiane tra X e XIII secoli," Studi Matildici III., pp. 281-307, concentrates on those places identified as castrum or castellum in the sources and makes extensive use of new document collections not available to Overmann. The study is limited to the Po Valley. Gina Fasoli, "Note sulla feudalità canossiana," Studi Matildici I, pp. 217-229 points out the value of studying documents issued by known matildine vassals to gain a broader picture of her actions and possessions. Maria Bertolani del Rio, I castelli reggiani (Reggio Emilia, 1959) provides numerous photographs of the extant sites in the area.

[97] Adolf Schaube, Handelsgeschichte der Romanischen Völker des Mittelmeergebiets bis zum Ende der Kreuzzüge (Munich and Berlin, 1906) esp. pp. 43-97, discusses the varieties of trade and the various tolls and taxes as well as the road system on which this commerce travelled. Given the importance of water transport in the Po valley and the activity of the Italian seaports the lack of mention of water transport in the military actions of the Investiture Controversy is striking. The point will be discussed below where relevant. Henry IV, of course, had no navy. Fasoli, "Feudalità," pp. 220-21, provides a brief, discussion of the business side of castles; similarly, E. Goez, Beatrix, pp. 78-89.

[98]Livy, Ab Urbe Condita, bk. 39, chap. 2, in Livy in Fourteen Volumes with an English Translation 11, The Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge MA and London, 1965) pp. 221-223, on the military importance of the Via Aemilia. Heinrich Kiepert, Atlas Antiquus, 12th rev. ed. (Berlin, n.d.) plate VII, for the Roman roads. Konrad Schrod, Reichsstrassen und Reichsverwaltung in Königsreich Italien (754-1197) (Stuttgart, 1931) presents the sources for the essential continuity of

na is a short coastal march to the north along the Via Popillia-Annia. The Via Postumia originates at Genoa, meets the Aemilia at Piacenza and crosses to the left, or north, bank of the Po at Cremona, then continues on to Verona, Vicenza, Padua and Aquilea.

The main road from Germany is that via the Brenner Pass which, because of its relatively low altitude of 1375 m., is usually passable even in winter. The Brenner system meets with the Via Claudia Augusta in the Adige Valley and arrives via Brixen, Bolzano and Trent in the Po Valley at Verona. This road continues on to ford the Po at Ostiglia and meets the Via Aemilia at Modena."[99] Alternately, travellers going westward could follow the Postumia from Verona.

The Brenner was the pass of choice for the trans-Alpine expeditions of the German emperors. The German emperors from Otto I to Frederick II crossed the Alps 72 times; 43 of these crossings were through the Brenner pass system.[100] The Brenner is the only pass that enters into the military history of the war between Henry IV and Gregory VII. Henry IV selected another route only once, in December of 1076, when the majority of the German magnates were allied against

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the Roman road system in the Middle Ages.

[99]J.E. Tyler, The Alpine Passes, pp. 111-133 describes the main Brenner route and the routes feeding into it from all directions as a tripartite system. The easy access increases the attraction of the lower altitude.

[100]Tyler, The Alpine Passes, p. 117.

him and would certainly have tried to prevent his crossing. Despite the drama inherent in the winter crossing of a high mountain pass with women presumably not accustomed to climbing and at least one small child in the party, the central problem of such travel is not the rough terrain but logistics. The availability of food is the limiting factor.[101] Regardless of the number of troops that could be raised, the problem remained that they must also be fed.

Once on the the Lombard or Venetian plain, there were a number of lesser routes available in addition to main roads like the Aemilia and Postumia. Their existence is well-attested in the sources for economic and commercial history, but the known itineraria for the popes and emperors frequently give only major stopping points and say nothing of the specific roads taken.

The Apennines have never provided an absolute barrier to invaders, whether Celts, Romans, Magyars, or Germans, but the number of routes across, especially those accessible by large groups, is limited and the terrain rugged. In Livy's words, "loca montana et aspera," a region designed to keep armies sharp; a place where "there was nothing but arms and men who put all their trust in arms."[102] Livy's description of innumerable sieges and shortages of supplies has its echoes in the medieval sources as does the strategic impor-

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[101]Tyler, The Alpine Passes, pp. 40-42.

[102]Livy, Ab Urbe Condita, bk. 39, chaps. 1-2, pp. 218-223.

tance of the Roman roads that were built at this time, the Via Aemilia and the Via Flaminia Minor.[103] Both roads were built for the purpose of facilitating the passage of the legions, but the Aemilia quickly became a connecting route for the towns that sprang up in the Po valley; the Flaminia Minor travelled through mountainous terrain that would not support the commerce of the richer lowlands and served mainly as a shorter and quicker route to Rome from the north.

There are two main pass systems across the Apennines to Rome from the Po valley.[104] In the west, roads from Parma, Piacenza and Pavia converge on the Cisa (Monte Bardone) pass and emerge north of Lucca, the seat of the marquesses of Tuscany, in the region known as the Garfagnana. In medieval times, the Via Francigena, continuing from the western trans-Alpine routes by way of Pavia and Piacenza assumes greater importance.[105]

To the east, the trans-Apennine routes lead south from

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[103]Livy, Ab Urbe Condita, bk. 39, chaps. 1-2, pp. 218-223; Livy is discussing campaigns against the Ligurians in 187 BCE.

[104]Adolf Hofmeister, "Markgrafen und Markgrafschaften im Italienischen Königreich," Mitteilungen des Instituts für österreichische Geschichtsforschung 7 (1907) p. 387 gives a detailed description.

[105]Ludwig Schütte, Der Apenninenpass des Monte Bardone und die deutschen Kaiser, Historische Studien 27 (Berlin, 1901) pp. 57-62; Schaube, Handelsgeschichte, pp. 58-62; Schrod, Reichsstrassen, pp. 19-39, on the Garfagnana, pp. 20-23; Werner Goez, Von Pavia nach Rom: Ein Reisebegleiter entlang der mittelalterlicher Kaiserstraße Italiens (Cologne, 1978) pp. 20 ff. describes the route of the Via Francigena.

Bologna. The route of the Via Flaminia Minor runs through the Reno valley to Pistoia, Florence and Arezzo where it joins the via Cassia to Rome. Another road goes more directly south over the Futa pass entering the Sieve valley at Mugello. The Sieve meets the Arno 16 km. (9.8 mi.) above Florence in the direction of Arezzo.[106] There are numerous lesser routes, such as that via Foce delle Radici and the monastery of Frassinoro, passable by individuals or small groups, but since there are no sizable towns in the mountains, supply becomes a problem. Larger groups need to cross before their supplies run out. If the main roads that ordinarily facilitate this timely passage are not accessible, the alternative is a forced march across rough country.[107]

The March of Tuscany, lying as it does across the access routes to Rome from the north, and thus also at the back of any besieging army, was of obvious importance to the German emperors, and the support or opposition of the marquis could be felt. A lost confirmation of immunities for Ravenna issued by Otto I suggests that the opposition of Marquis Hubert of Tuscany caused the king to avoid that region while travelling to Rome for his imperial coronation

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[106]Schrod, Reichsstrassen, pp. 24-26; Hofmeister, "Markgrafen und Markgrafschaften," p. 388; E. Goez, Beatrix, p. 86.

[107]Appendix, fig. 1, shows the major rivers, cities, roads, and passes.

in 962.[108] On his return as the newly crowned emperor, Otto spent a significant amount of time in Tuscany. Marquis Hubert had fled.[109]

Otto arrived in Italy in September 961, and spent the winter in the north, celebrating Christmas in Pavia whence he dispatched Hatto, abbot of Fulda, to Rome to prepare for his arrival. He arrived in Rome on 31 January 962 meaning that the charter for Ravenna was issued sometime between September 961 and January 962.[110] Otto's itinerarium between Christmas 961 and 31 January 962 is not known. Liutprand of Cremona merely states that after establishing order in the north by driving out his rivals, Berengar II and his son, Adalbert, Otto proceeded to Rome where he was enthusiastically welcomed and crowned as emperor.[111] To assume that Otto

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[108]Rudolf Köpke and Ernst Dümmler, Kaiser Otto der Grosse (Leipzig, 1876) pp. 327-28; Ludo Moritz Hartmann, Geschichte Italiens im Mittelalter 3:2 (Gotha, 1911) p. 259. A charter of the imperial emissary Heccico of 970 refers to a confirmation of privileges and immunities issued by Otto for the archbishop of Ravenna, Regesta imperii 2.1, Die Regesten des Kaiserreichs unter Heinrich I. und Otto I. 919-973, ed. Johann Friedrich Böhmer-Emil von Ottenthal (1893; rpt. Hildesheim, 1973) no. 309, p. 149.

[109]Köpke and Dümmler, Kaiser Otto der Grosse, pp. 336 ff.

[110]Regesta imperii 2.1, p. 149.

[111]Liutprand of Cremona, Liber de rebus gestis Ottonis magni imperatoris, ed. G.H. Pertz, MGH Scriptores 3 (Hanover, 1839) chaps. 2-3, p. 340. Liutprand's uncharacteristic discretion may reflect the fact that Hubert was later reconciled to Otto. Cf. idem, Antapodosis, ed. G.H. Pertz, MGH Scriptores 3 (Hanover, 1839) bk. 3, chap. 20, p. 306. Liutprand, however, does not write anything further about Hubert. C.W. Previté-Orton, Cambridge Medieval History 3, (1922; repr. Cambridge, 1976) pp. 161-62 notes Otto's opportune detour; Gina Fasoli, I re d'Italia (Florence, 1949) comments on the value of Hubert's support to his father, King Hugh, pp. 138, 144-45, but not on his opposition to

spent an entire month crossing the Apennines raises a considerable logistics problem. To supply an army of any size with its support personnel and animals would require the resources of the Tuscan cities such as Lucca, Pisa or Florence. There is no record that Otto was in Tuscany during this month. Neither is there any indication that the lengthy stay during February of 962 was the second visit within a few months.

The large port of Ravenna, however, would be able to supply significant provisions, and the archbishop, Peter IV, was known to Otto and had been to the German court.[112] Given the hostility of Marquis Hubert, who at the very least would refuse to supply him, it is quite likely that a detour via Ravenna recommended itself. The alternative, a forced march through rough country in winter to arrive in Tuscany and face the necessity of laying siege to the cities that should have supplied him, would have meant greater delay and arriving at Rome after a fighting march with an army that was unruly at best. The possibility of a disastrous defeat during a winter campaign in the mountains could not be ignored. The Ravenna detour provided the quickest and most direct route to Rome under the circumstances. The changed situation after the imperial coronation indicates that

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Otto although this is implied in the reconciliation, p. 196; similarly, Carl Guido Mor, L'éta feudale 1 (Milan, 1952) pp. 183-85, 297, 304.

[112]Schwartz, Besetzung, p. 151.

Otto's decision was correct.

Under different circumstances, the route across the Apennines and into Tuscany was to be preferred. The emperor Henry III, arriving in Italy in 1046 was largely supported by the Italian magnates, including the marquis of Tuscany, Matilda's father, Boniface, who had been placed in this pivotal position by Conrad II by 1028.[113] Boniface, through his marriage to Henry's first cousin and foster-sister Beatrice of Lorraine, also had ties of kinship to the imperial house and the ducal houses of Lorraine and Swabia.[114] The itinerarium of Henry III, who probably travelled in company with Boniface, shows that the king held synods and courts in Pavia from 25-28 October 1046, travelled thence to Piacenza, where he met with Pope Gregory VI, and to Parma. From Parma he turned south across the Apennines, via the Cisa pass, and arrived in Lucca on 25 November.[115] Although the marquis later went his own way in papal politics, in 1046 he accompanied the king to Rome and was present at Sutri and at Rome for the consecration of Suidger of Bamberg as Pope Clement II and Henry's subsequent imperial corona-

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[113]M[argherita] G[iuliana] Bertolini, "Bonifacio di Canossa," DBI 7, pp. 96-113.

[114]Bertolini, "Bonifacio," p. 103. The last record of Richildis, Boniface's first wife, is from February 1036 while the first notice of Beatrice in Italy is 1040; idem, "Beatrice di Lorena," DBI 6, pp. 352-363.

[115]Ernst Müller, Das Itinerar Kaiser Heinrichs III. (1039 bis 1056) mit besonderer Berücksichtung seiner Urkunden, Historische Studien 26 (Berlin, 1901) p. 59-61; Bertolini, "Bonifacio," p. 106.

tion.[116]

The position of the marquis was, of course, not unassailable. In February of 1027 the then-marquis Rainer shut the gates of Lucca against Conrad II, an action that resulted in his deposition and replacement by Boniface.[117] The contrast between the examples of Otto I and Henry III gives some idea as to the magnitude of the problem posed by Matilda of Tuscany's opposition to Henry IV. Like Otto I, Henry will approach Rome by way of Ravenna. Since one of the objectives of his journey to Rome was to place the archbishop of Ravenna on the papal throne, this might seem a ceremonial visit, but the realties of the military geography cannot be ignored. The countess controlled all major trans-Apennine routes, and thus the routes taken by Henry IV across this territory remain "somewhat in the dark,"[118] which at least suggests that he did not cross it. Henry, like Otto, bypassed the Apennine routes; he arrived at Rome by way of Ravenna and a froced march across the eastern apennines to Vallombrosa in the upper Arno valley.

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[116]Bertolini, "Bonifacio," p. 106; Falce, Bonifacio di Canossa 1, pp. 173-76, 252-55; Ernst Steindorff, Jahrbücher des deutschen Reiches unter Heinrich III. 1 (Leipzig, 1874) pp. 311-14.

[117]Bertolini, "Bonifacio," p. 99; Falce 1, p. 108; Harry Bresslau, Jahrbücher des deutschen Reiches unter Konrad II. 1 (1879; repr. Berlin, 1967) pp. 137-38. Bresslau did not have access to the documents used by Falce and assumed that Rainer was soon reconciled to Conrad and thus kept his title. Wipo, Vita Chuonradi imperatoris, ed. G.H. Pertz, MGH Scriptores 11 (Hanover, 1854) chap. 15, p. 265.

[118]Schrod, Reichsstrassen, pp. 23-24, 33.

In contrast with Hubert and Rainer, Matilda will be neither reconciled to the king nor replaced. She continued her opposition after Henry entered Rome and received the imperial crown from Clement III; she continued her opposition after the death of Gregory VII in 1085; she continued her opposition until, during the pontificate of Urban II, Henry was forced to undertake a second campaign into Italy specifically to deal with Matilda and her second husband, Welf V, the son of his longtime opponent Welf IV of Bavaria.[119]

Although Henry formally removed Matilda from her position as marquesa of Tuscany, she operated against him from the numerous fortified positions she controlled throughout the Apennines until Henry was forced to abandon the siege of Rome to move against her, without success.[120]

Because Matilda died without direct heirs, and had willed her allodial lands to the papacy, there is an unusually rich record of her holdings left by the more than a century of dispute over the inheritance.[121] Overmann's investigation turned up numerous sites, approximately 80% of which could still be located, that had been matildine pos-

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[119]The campaign of 1090-97 is beyind the scope of this dissertation, and is referred to only to illustrate certain aspects of the earlier campaign, see chapter 4, pp. 201-203.

[120]The siege of Rome and the punitive expeditions against Matilda of Tuscany are discussed in chapter 3.

[121]Overmann, Gräfin Mathilde, pp. 43-119.

sessions. Although his interest was not in military history, the number identified as castrum or castellum is substantial. The Po valley, especially on the right bank, between Parma and Bologna contains numerous sites. The tributary rivers flowing from the Apennines are also well covered, especially at the headwaters. The courses of the Enza, Secchia and Panaro are especially rich in matildine possessions. Fewer are found along the lower Reno, but the upper reaches and tributaries have numerous sites. On the other side of the Apennines, the headwaters of the Serchio north of Lucca, the region known as the Garfagnana, held most of the matildine possessions within Tuscany.[122]

The left bank of the Po has fewer sites, but these are located at points of recognizable significance; eg, Rivalta and Governolo north and south of Mantua on the Mincio, Volta where the via Postumia crosses the Mincio. Revere, on the right bank, faces the ford of the Po at Ostiglia. The picture is clear: a centrally located region and a concentration of well-positioned fortifications in the hands of one person.

The specifics are somewhat less clear. Certain sites are attested only in later documents. Settia's list of matildine castles, based with only a few exceptions solely

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[122]Margherita Giuliana Bertolini, "Enrico IV e Matilde di Canossa di Fronte alla Città di Lucca" in Sant'Anselmo, Vescovo, pp. 331-389, notes the strategic importance of the locations given in the surviving Matildine documents for Lucca. Given the function of castles, it is, of course, not surprising that they are found along major roads.

on sources contemporary with or predating the Great Countess, differs on a number of locations from that compiled by Overmann, who accepted later documents as establishing that a given location had belonged to Matilda.[123] On the basis of location, elevation, position relative to other fortified sites, and onomastics, other scholars have included locations listed by neither Overmann nor Settia as castles in their discussions of matildine fortifications.[124]

The problems associated with the exercise are well-known. After nine centuries more than 20% of the sites documented by Settia can no longer be precisely located although the locations can be estimated.[125] Further, the same place name appears in different locations. There may be no serious confusion between Prato in Tuscany, near Florence, and Prato in Emilia, a much smaller town between Reggio Emilia and Carpi, but the four closely-placed Gessos provide more of a challenge.[126] Overmann selected a location on the Tresinaro,

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[123]Overmann relied heavily on the collection of Augustin Theiner, Codex Diplomaticus dominii temporalis Sancti Sedis, 3 vols. (Rome, 1861-62) which includes many documents of later centuries that describe a place as having belonged to Matilda.

[124]In addition to Overmann Gräfin Mathilde, pp. 4-40, and Settia, Castelli e villagi," pp. 304-306, see Morretta, "L'Apparato difensivo;" Rombaldi, "Castra e curtes;" Tincani, "Quattro Castella: zona limitanea di difesa;" and Alberto Tedeschi, "I castelli matildici nel territorio di Quattro Castella," in Quattro Castella, pp. 245-252; and Ghirardini, "San Polo."

[125]Settia, Castelli e villagi," pp. 304-306.

[126]They are: 1) 38 14 N 15 28 E, 2) 42 41 N 13 38 E, 3) 43 54 N 12 30 E, 4) 44 17 N 11 31 E. U.S. Board on Geographic Names, Gazeteer 182, Italy: Official Standard Names Approved by the U.S. Board on Geographic

a left-bank tributary of the Secchia (unfortunately labelled the Panaro on his map) without further explanation.[127]

Absent any archeological evidence for the presence of a castle in the appropriate time period, such conjectures as that of Ghirardini concerning Guardazone, on the left bank of the Enza across from San Polo D'Enza, as deriving from "guardia di Attone o Azzone" and, thus, having been fortified by Matilda's great-grandfather Adalbero-Azzo, must be carefully considered.[128] Among other possible objections, Azzo or Atto is a very common name. Neither Overmann nor Settia has found this location to be identified as a castle in the documents they examined, nor San Polo itself for that matter.[129]

Another point that might be profitably reconsidered is the terminology used to describe castles. The opinion of Verbruggen that castrum and castellum were used interchangeably understandably carries great weight, but has been strongly challenged by Bachrach.[130] The question has not been

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Names (Washington DC, 1956).

[127]Urkunden Mathilde, p. 567, locates Gesso (Gissum) 9.5 km. (15.2 mi.) west of Bologna.

[128]Ghirardini, "San Polo," p. 103, on the need for caution in drawing conclusion given the complexity of the problem, p. 104, n. 1.

[129]The location is suggestive and perhaps a more thorough consideration of the terrain will prove fruitful. Some individual locations will be discussed in the context of the associated military actions.

[130]J. F. Verbruggen, "Note sur le sens des mots castrum, castellum, et quelques autres expressions qui désignent des fortifications," Revue Belge de Philologie et d'Histoire 28 (1950) pp. 147-155. Bernard S.

investigated for the descriptions of fortifications relevant to the military history of the Investiture Controversy and, given the broad provenançe of these sources, much might be learned.[131] Ghirardini notes, correctly, that Canossa is referred to as oppidum as well as both castrum and castellum and concludes that the terminology is fluid.[132] But, of the four writers who mentioned Canossa--Arnulf of Milan, Berthold of Reichenau, Lambert of Hersfeld and Donizone--probably only Donizone had ever seen the castle, and his panegyric purposes have been widely noted. Canossa was itself the narrator of his poem. The close relationship between the locations of castra and curtes has already been noted.

The basic picture established by Morretta in 1965 remains unchanged in its broad outline, despite Ghirardini's objections. The numerous castles were not isolated strongholds, but part of a defensive system. Each small outpost was in communication with another, often by line of sight.[133]

Bachrach, "Early Medieval Fortifications in the 'West' of France: A Revised Technical Vocabulary," Technology and Culture 16 (1975) esp. pp. 531-36. Whether Bachrach's observations will hold for Italy remains to be examined.

[131]Alberto A. Settia, Castelli e villagi nell'Italia padana: popolamente, potere e sicurezza from IX e XIII secolo (Naples, 1984) pp. 189-246, on what is known of the materials and terminology of the incastellemento. Many of the sites are still fortified in Matilda's day.

[132]Ghirardini, "San Polo," p. 102.

[133]The graphs and drawings are valuable. Morretta, "L'Apparato difensivo," pp. 490, 497, 498.

To lay siege to Canossa would be to invest the Apennines themselves.

Prior to Morretta, the study of Canossa had been dominated by the encounter of Henry IV and Gregory VII that took place there. Archeologists were motivated to uncover a site of great religious and political significance. The original purpose of the structure, and the reason why the famous encounter took place at Canossa, was all but forgotten.[134]

Less attention has been paid to matildine fortifications outside the Canossa area. Only Overmann interested himself in the entire range of Matilda's holdings. Settia's investigation of the Po area showed that many matildine castles first come into the record as such during her father's time. Boniface was quite interested in securing the connections between both portions of his considerable holdings as the concentration of castles along the trans-Apennine routes indicates.

As Bertolini has noted, matildine studies suffer from a kind of gemination in which the lady of Canossa, whose interests and influence are centered in the Po valley, is separated from the marquesa of Tuscany who represents the

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[134]Tondelli, "Scavi," refers to the earlier studies of Chierici, whose views as to the importance of Canossa he shares fully, p. 366, n. 2. An evaluation of the results of these earlier investigations, and more recent depredations, is found in Aceto, "L'apparato difensivo," who provides numerous illustrations of his reconstruction of the matildine defenses, thus revising Campanini, Guida Illustrata.

public authority in the region of Lucca, Pisa and Florence.[135] For the study of Matilda's role in the war between Henry IV and Gregory VII both aspects of her domain must be taken into consideration. When this is done, it becomes clear that the mountainous region connecting the Po valley and Tuscany is of the utmost importance. Henry was supported by the bishops of Verona, Milan, Pavia and Piacenza. He was welcomed by the citizens of Lucca, and Pisa quickly joined in. He succeeded against even the massive walls of Rome where gold and war-weariness eventually opened the gates. But he seldom entered the regions of the Apennines under Matilda's control until he withdrew from Rome in 1084. Within weeks of the king's departure Matilda's army began operations against Henry's adherents with a bloody raid on the encampment at Sorbara.[136] Despite the efforts of the king and his supporters, her army remained intact, alert and combat ready.

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[135]Bertolini, "Enrico IV e Matilde," p. 332.

[136]For the battle at Sorbara, see chapter 4, pp. 180-90.

Chapter 2: The Order of Battle

Henry IV's Italian campaign opened in Autumn of 1080, some months before the king actually arrived in Italy. The engagement, which took place at Volta, 20.5 km. (12.3 mi.) northwest of Mantua, is reported in two single-sentence notices that agree only on the outcome, the defeat of the troops of Gregory VII's most important and reliable ally in northern Italy, Matilda of Tuscany. The battle was probably precipitated by the arrival in Italy of news of the death of the anti-king Rudolf of Rheinfelden who died of his wounds at the Battle on the Elster, 15 October 1080.[1]

Because of the paucity of the sources, the battle at Volta is not one that immediately suggests itself as a choice for strategic and tactical analysis, but a consideration of the conflicting accounts of the engagement and of the circumstances in which it took place is informative in developing a picture of the campaign as a whole.

Rudolf's death dates the account of Bernold of St.

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[1]For Rudolf's rebellion, see chapter 1, pp. 42, 55-61.

Blasien:

> On the same day as his death, in Lombardy the troops of the most prudent duke (ducis) Matilda were put to flight by the army of nearly all of Lombardy at Volta near Mantua.[2]

Bonizo of Sutri's version is:

> A few days after these things were done, his son fought with the army of the most excellent Matilda and obtained a victory.[3]

Bonizo's "these things" also refers to the Battle on the Elster and the death of Rudolf. "His son" is a son of King Henry. As Henry IV is only 30 years old in 1080, and his surviving legitimate son, Conrad, is six years old, the son mentioned here must be a rather young illegitimate son.[4] At most, he could have been declared of age, as Henry IV had been shortly before his fifteenth birthday.[5] Although Bonizo

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[2]Bernold of St. Blasien, Chronicon, ed. G.H. Pertz, MGH Scriptores 5 (Hanover, 1844) a. 1080, p. 436.

[3]Bonizo of Sutri, Liber ad amicum, ed. Ernst Dummler, MGH Libelli 1 (Hanover, 1891) bk. 9, p. 613.

[4]Henry IV's firstborn legitimate child was the short-lived Adelheid, in 1070; a Henry was born and died in 1071; Agnes ca. 1072 and Conrad in 1074. The birth of Henry V is now dated to 1086. I.S. Robinson, Henry IV of Germany, 1056-1106, (Cambridge, 1999) p. 301, n. 29.

[5]Historians have assumed that this is the same illegitimate son of King Henry who was killed at the siege of Monteveglio twelve years later, but the sources are not clear on this point. Donizone, Vita Mathildis Comitissae, ed. L. Bethmann, MGH Scriptores 12 (Hanover, 1856) bk. 2, chap. 7, ll. 663-67, p. 392 is the only source for the siege. Guido of Ferrara, De schismate Hildebrandi, ed. R. Willmans and E. Dümmler, MGH Libelli 1 (Hanover, 1891) p. 536, n. 1; Gerold Meyer von Knonau, Jahrbücher des deutschen Reiches unter Heinrich IV. und Heinrich V. 3 (Leipzig, 1900) p. 297, n. 12, p. 316; ibid. 4, p. 377, n. 13; Lino Lionello Ghirardini, "La battaglia de Volta Mantovana (ottobre 1080)," in Sant' Anselmo, Mantova," p. 234. Conversely, Paul Sander, Der Kampf Heinrichs IV. und Gregors VII. von den zweiten Exkommunikation des Königs bis zu seiner Kaiserkrönung (März 1080-März 1084) (Berlin, 1893)

is atypically restrained concerning this son, Guido of Ferrara gives the details of the adolescent rutting of Henry IV, who "while bound by the chain of matrimony had several mistresses," and the "acknowledged offspring" thereof.[6] Manegold of Lautenbach elaborates that Henry not only acknowledged his children, but embraced and advanced them publicly, much to Manegold's disgust.[7] The sources do not give the boy's name or mention who his mother was, what his connection to northern Italy was, or describe any role in the action at Volta.

Bernold and Bonizo give conflicting reports as to the date of the action: either "on the same day" or "a few days after" the battle on the Elster and the death of Rudolf. Because the action at Volta is linked to the Battle on the Elster, there is an additional question of date because the sources for the battle are unclear about when it occurred. According to Bruno of Magdeburg, who may have been an eyewitness, Rudolf of Rheinfelden won the battle but was so badly wounded, including a very meaningful loss of his right

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p. 25, n. 2 and p. 52, n. 3, accepts that the king gave Conrad as a hostage following the synod of Brixen where the intercession of the child and Queen Bertha is reported in a confirmation of the possessions of the archiepiscopal church of Ravenna. Diplomata Henry IV, no. 322, pp. 422-24. On conrad's presence in Italy, Elke Goez, "Das Thronerbe als Rivale: König Konrad, Kaiser Heinrichs IV. älterer Sohn." Historisches Jahrbuch 116 (1996) pp. 11-13. The son of Henry IV killed at Monteveglio was certainly not Conrad who died in 1101.

[6]Guido of Ferrara, De schismate Hildebrandi, chap. 3, p. 536.

[7]Manegold of Lautenbach, Ad Gebehardum liber, ed. K. Francke, MGH Libelli 1 (Hanover, 1891) chap. 19, p. 363.

hand, the oath hand, that he died. Bruno places the battle on the ides of October--which for October is the 15th--a Thursday, not specifying the day of Rudolf's death; nor does he mention the battle in Italy which was of no interest to the Saxons.[8]

Bernold states clearly that Rudolf died on the 15th, one day after the battle, meaning that the battle took place on the 14th.

> Now in the middle of October Henry, preparing another campaign into Saxony, was put to flight by the troops of Rudolf for one day's march although in the same meeting King Rudolf of blessed memory was laid low. He, I say, another Maccabee, as he pressed into the foes among the first, earned martyrdom in the service of St. Peter, and one day later with all his business put in order properly, he is not to be doubted to have gone to God on the ides of October.[9]

Bonizo's description of the Battle on the Elster, like Bernold's, immediately precedes his statement on the action at Volta, and provides details not given elsewhere:

> But because the many counsels of the Lord are an abyss, through the providence of the ineffable God, Henry, who wondrously joined pride to his wickedness, received not the scourges of the Lord in accordance with what he had deserved, but success. For not a long time later (i.e., after the synod of Brixen) he entered Saxony in great strength and with a powerful force. Rudolf hastened against him, and a very hard battle having been brought

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[8]Bruno of Magdeburg, Liber de bello Saxonico, ed. G.H. Pertz, MGH Scriptores 5 (Hanover, 1844) chap. 124, p. 381.

[9]Bernold of St. Blasien, Chronicon, a. 1080, p. 436. Iam autem mediante Octobri, Heinricus expeditionem in Saxoniam iterum parans, a militibus Ruodolfi itinere unius diei fugatur, quamvis in eadem congressione Roudolfus rex piae memoriae occubuerit. Ille, inquam, alter Machabeus cum inter primos hostibus instaret, in servitio sancti Petri occumbere promeruit, et postea uno die superstes, omnibus suis rite ordinatis, ad Dominum migrasse non dubitatur Idibus Octobris.

about, Henry shamefully showed his back; in which battle the victor, Rudolf, fell. Rudolf died, not as cowards are accustomed to die, not struck down fleeing and seeking hiding places, but he was found wounded by his people on a heap of the enemy, on the bodies of the dead. His death was announced to Henry, hiding in a certain castle and thinking about flight, eight days later. Who thereupon raising his horn to the sky and speaking iniquity against God, not recognizing the strategies of Satan, he believed his sin to have pleased God.[10]

Bonizo does not specify a date for the battle, merely noting that it happened "not a long time" after the synod of Brixen (25-30 June 1080). Bruno and Bernold leave a dating question. When did the battle take place, the 14th or the 15th, and when, therefore, did Rudolf die, the 15th or the 16th? Did the battle at Volta thus take place on the 14th, the 15th, the 16th, or a few days--whatever Bonizo may mean by a few days--after any one of those dates?[11]

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[10]Bonizo of Sutri, Liber ad amicum, bk. 9, p. 613. Sed quia consilii Domini abyssus multa, ineffabili Dei providentia non flagella Domini, secundum quod meritus erat, suscepit Heinricus, sed successum, qui mirabiliter adderet nequicie sue superbiam. Nam non longo post tempore intravit Saxoniam in potentatu magno et manu robusta. Cui ex adverso occurrit R[udolfus], et accerrimo bello commisso Heinricus turpiter terga vertit; in quo prelio victor R[udolfus] occubuit. Non sicut solent mori ignavi, mortuus est Rudolfus, non fugiens vel latibula querens occisus, sad super strages inimicorum et super cadavera mortuorum plagatus a suis inventus est. Cuius mors Heinrico post VIII dies in quodam castro latitanti et de fuga cogitanti nunciata est. Qui mox extollens in altum cornu suum et loquens adversus Deum iniquitatem, non recognoscens sathane callidates, credidit Deo suum peccatum placuisse.

[11]Bonizo of Sutri, Liber ad amicum, bk. 8, p. 611, uses the same phrase to date the return of Gregory VII to Rome in mid-September of 1077 to "a few days after" the murder of Cencius Johanni (Cencius the Prefect) and its bloody aftermath, events that are datable only to the summer of the same year. Berthold of Reichenau, Annales, ed. G.H. Pertz, MGH Scriptores 5 (Hanover, 1844) a. 1077, p. 291. Meyer von Knonau, Jahrbücher Heinrich IV. 3, pp. 81-82.

The date of 15 October for the battle on the Elster is supported by a charter of Henry IV, dated 14 October 1080, granting the properties of Waiblingen and Winterbach to the episcopal church of Speyer and its cathedral chapter.[12] That King Henry hastily issued a charter just as he was going into a battle is less likely than that he made the donation knowing that battle was imminent. The evidence of the charter and of Bruno support the date of 15 October against Bernold's implied date of 14 October.

Regardless of the date of the battle on the Elster, the battle at Volta almost certainly did not take place on the same day.[13] Accepting Bernold's precise date implies either that Henry IV knew well in advance the exact day on which he would join battle and was absolutely certain of the outcome or that Henry's Italian supporters opened hostilities with-

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[12] Diplomata Henry IV, no. 325, p. 427. The charter lacks a place of issue which is consistent with a document issued in the field with battle imminent. It may have been intended as an offering for a favorable outcome.

[13] In the only consideration of the question in recent years, Ghirardini, "La battaglia de Volta Mantovana," p. 231, summarizes the opinions of a number of earlier German and Italian historians on the matter and adds his own weight on behalf of Bernold "both for his customary precision and because he specifies 'it is not to be doubted.'" How specificity in dating the death of Rudolf would support the date given for a battle taking place several hundred miles to the south is unclear. The phrase non dubitatur does not, however, refer to the date of the death but to the result: that Rudolf went to God is what is not to be doubted, not the date on which he did it. Bernold emphasizes this point precisely because there were many who did doubt it while no one questioned that Rudolf of Rheinfelden had truly died or on what date. Ghirardini does not consider the military implications of the choice of authorities on Volta or note the differing opinion of Sander, Der Kampf, p. 52, n. 2, and Meyer von Knonau, Jahrbücher Heinrich IV. 3, p. 316, n. 145.

out any certainty that the king would be able to take advantage of their gains or come to their support, things he could not do with a rival still in the field in Germany.

The first conditions are clearly impossible; the king could not know in advance that a battle would take place on 15 October, much less that would emerge both victorious and alive, and thus could not plan with his Italian adherents to initiate hostilities on the same day. While the second set of conditions is possible, it is also risky. Absent any compelling reason for the Italians to take such risk, Bonizo's "post paucos vero dies," must be considered.

What does the phrase mean? Clearly, Bonizo was less interested in the date of Rudolf's death than in the manner of it. Henry was prideful, deluded, and cowardly; Rudolf was pious and heroic. Henry is alive and Rudolf is dead; the counsels of the Lord are an unfathomable abyss. Bonizo also gives divine inscrutability as the explanation for the defeat of Pope Leo IX at Civitate in 1053.[14]

Bernold and Bonizo link these events in time because they are defeats for the gregorian cause. Bernold had been a monk at St. Blasien, a foundation closely associated with the family of the lords of Rheinfelden.[15] The Chronicon is dated to 1091, at which time Bernold was at the monastery of

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[14]Bonizo of Sutri, Liber ad amicum, bk. 5, p. 589. G[iovanni] Miccoli, "Bonizone," DBI 12 (1970) p. 251.

[15]Meyer von Knonau, Jahrbücher Heinrich IV. 1, p. 654.

All Saints in Schaffhausen, a time when things in Italy were going very badly for the gregorian party.[16] Placing the two disasters on a single day enables Bernold to treat the death of the heroic Rudolf and the defeat of the prudens Matilda as a single event. She shares in his martyrdom and reward; he in her continuing struggle for the cause he died for.

Bonizo was the bishop of Sutri in central Italy. He was driven from his see in 1082 because of his pro-gregorian stance and after escaping or being released from captivity took refuge with Matilda.[17] The Liber ad amicum was written shortly after the death of Gregory VII in 1085,[18] a time when the gregorian party was very concerned to keep her support.

For Bonizo, linking the events reinforces the obscurity of the divine plan and makes Volta not a military failure but a fragment of a large picture that only God sees completely. Most important, the event need not be interpreted, especially by Matilda, as a judgement of God against Pope Gregory. By feeding Henry seeming successes, God is giving the king and his anti-pope only more rope with which to hang themselves.

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[16]Bernold of St. Blasien, Chronicon, p. 388; "Bernold," Lexicon des Mittelalters 1, col. 2007-08. In 1090, Henry IV undertook another Italian campaign directed agaisnt Matilda of Tuscany and her second husband, Welf V of Bavaria. In 1091 he took Mantua as well as a number of her castles; chapter 4, pp. 201-203.

[17]Miccoli, "Bonizone," p. 247, col. 2.

[18]Bonizo of Sutri, Liber ad amicum, p. 569.

Neither of these works was exactly contemporaneous with the battle, and the writers had had ample time to find out the dates of events had this been a concern. Bonizo wrote at Matilda's court and probably for presentation to her. It is one thing for Bernold in his Alpine monastery to polish the account by the device of having events coincide; it is quite another for Bonizo to do so writing among those directly involved.[19]

Conversely, there is good reason to be cautious with Bonizo; his immoderate language (although almost sedate in comparison with the invective of Benzo of Alba) and blatant partisanship are things that inspire distrust. Bonizo is definitely not careful about dates. He dates, for example, the death of Duke Godfrey the Bearded of Lorraine to "a few days" before the enthronement of Hildebrand as Gregory VII, an error of three-and-a-half years.[20] Carelessness that substitutes "days" for "years" is reason to be cautious in using Bonizo, but he sometimes gives details that others do not, details useful enough not to disregard out-of-hand his

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[19]The improbability of the coincidence has been noted. Sander, Der Kampf, p. 52, n. 2, notes the propensity of "popular imagination" to make great events coincide; similarly, Meyer von Knonau, Jahrbücher Heinrich IV. 3, p. 316, n. 145.

[20]Bonizo of Sutri, Liber ad amicum, bk. 7, p. 601. In an even less comprehensible error, he reports that at the time of the Synod of Brixen Gregory VII had ruled the church peacefully for five years; the correct figure is, of course, seven years, bk. 9, p. 612. In contrast, Bonizo correctly dates the synod of Worms in 1076 to the third year of Gregory's pontificate, bk. 7, p. 606.

comments on Volta.[21]

For Bernold and Bonizo, the timing of the two battles has its logic in God's plan. That is the meaning of both "the same day" and "after a few days." But the coincidence or near-coincidence of the two actions must also be explicable in military terms. For the Italians to undertake any action before knowing that Henry was victorious in Germany would be extremely risky. Rudolf of Rheinfelden was a competent soldier; Henry's victory was far from a foregone conclusion.[22] If the Lombard bishops were to enter into open war on behalf of an excommunicated king who was then defeated and perhaps killed, their position would become untenable. Without Henry's protection, Pope Gregory's sentences of deposition and excommunication would be effective. It would be expected that the pope would require of Rudolf all the obedience that had been promised in order to gain Gregory's support, and Rudolf would undoubtedly oblige.[23] His election

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[21]E.g., Bonizo's description of the Battle of Aquino as the first servitium performed by Matilda for St. Peter, Liber ad amicum, bk. 6, p. 599. Bonizo is also the main source for the life of Wibert of Ravenna before his election at Brixen. Ingrid Heidrich, Ravenna unter Erzbischof Wibert (1073-1100) (Sigmaringen, 1984) p. 40.

[22]Rudolf had, for example, contributed significantly to Henry's victory at Homburg on the Unstrut in 1075. Meyer von Knonau, Jahrbücher Heinrich IV. 2, pp. 499-502; Lexikon des Mittelalters 7, cols. 1070-71.

[23]On Rudolf's efforts to gain Gregory's support, H.E.J. Cowdrey, Pope Gregory VII: 1073-1085 (Oxford and New York, 1998) pp. 167-94. On the importance of obedience in Gregory's view of secular rulers, I.S. Robinson, "Gregory VII and the Soldiers of Christ," History 58 (1973) pp. 169-192; idem, "'Periculosis Homo': Pope Gregory VII and Episcopal Authority," Viator 9 (1978) pp. 103-131; "Pope Gregory VII, the Princes and the pactum 1077-1080." The English Historical Revue 94 (1979) pp.

as king in Germany gave him no claim to the kingdom of Italy. To win it by conquest with the pope's blessing would be a logical step toward claiming the imperial dignity. These circumstances strongly suggest that the action at Volta was precipitated by the arrival in Italy of news of the death of Rudolf.

Bonizo places Volta "a few days after" both Henry's defeat and eight days of cowardly indecision. Since Henry fled the field, and Rudolf is agreed to have survived at least a short time after the battle, it is not improbable that the death of Rudolf was not immediately known.[24] In any case, Henry did not follow up his advantage, giving the Saxons time to regroup.[25] By the time of the truce talks in February they were aware of how costly the battle on the Elster had been for Henry IV. This awareness is no doubt part of the reason that Henry gained nothing but a truce of

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721-756. Gregory intended that whoever succeeded Rudolf as king would swear an oath of obedience, Registrum 9.3 (March 1081) pp. 575-76.

[24]Bernold of St. Blasien, Chronicon, a. 1080, p. 436; Bruno of Magdeburg, De bello Saxonico, chap. 124, p. 381. The Annales Pegavienses et Bosovienses, ed. G.H. Pertz, MGH Scriptores 16, (Hanover, 1859) a twelfth-century compilation, agree that Rudolf's death was not immediately known, p. 242. Sander, Der Kampf, pp. 160-70, details the problems presented by the Pegau annals. Rudolf's followers may well have tried to hide the fact of his death while they decided what to do.

[25]Sander, Der Kampf, p. 32, considers that news coming from Italy, i.e., the defeat of Matilda at Volta, would reach Henry sometime in November and may have contributed to the decision not to begin a fresh campaign in Saxony.

four months.[26]

A message coming from the region of the Battle on the Elster could have reached Italy within a week, a space of time reasonably described as "a few days." This would not require prodigious feats such as that of Henry II of England, who in 1173 covered the 284 km. (180 mi.) between Rouen and Dol in a bit over 24 hours, or of Richard the Lion Heart who bettered him in 1195 by covering the 304 km. (190 mi.) from Vaudreuil to Issoudun, also in one day.[27] Information is readily available on the speed of messengers and embassies travelling the route between Germany and Italy at this time.

On 1 January 1076 at Goslar Henry IV received a letter from Pope Gregory VII that greatly angered him.[28] The letter is dated 8 December 1075 in the papal register meaning that the messengers had covered 1700-1800 km. (1020-1080 mi.), depending on the pass used, and crossed the Alps in December

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[26]On the events post-Elster and the truce talks, Meyer von Knonau, Jahrbücher Heinrich IV. 3, pp. 345-50. That any truce was granted can be attributed to the war-weariness and divided leadership of the Saxon cause.

[27]J.O. Prestwich, "Military Intelligence under the Norman and Angevin Kings," in Law and Government in Medieval England and Normandy: Essays in Honor of Sir James Holt, ed. George Garnett and John Hudson (Cambridge, 1994) p. 25; nn. 87, 88. Henry's feat is recorded by Robert of Torigny; Richard's by Roger of Howden. Richard's sprint is particularly interesting because the chronicler tells us that this was normally a three-day trip. Admittedly, these feats did not require crossing the Alps. The gold-standard of the medieval world was the 250 miles a day of the Byzantine imperial post, which was still considered impressive when matched by the Pony Express in the nineteenth century.

[28]Chapter 1, pp. 34-35.

at an average of 74-78 km. (46-48 mi.) a day.[29] Henry immediately summoned his bishops to a council scheduled for 24 January at Worms. Among those summoned was Archbishop Bruno of Verona, the only Italian bishop at Worms.[30] The two legs Goslar-Verona and Verona-Worms come to 1752 km. (1095 mi.), with an Alpine crossing on each leg, for an average stint of 83 km. (nearly 50 mi.) a day.[31]

It is possible to refine Elze's calculations. An episcopal train, even one travelling expeditiously, even assuming a relatively young and hale archbishop, probably moved more slowly than the king's messengers.[32] The benchmark for travellers like the archbishop who were in haste but perhaps not able to perform up to the standard of a royal messenger, or of a king acting on the latest military intelligence, is 48-53 km. (30-33 mi.) a day.[33] That figure is based on trav-

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[29]Reinhard Elze, "Über die Leistungsfähigkeit von Gesandschaften und Boten im 11. Jahrhundert," in Histoire Comparée de l'Administration, published by Werner Paravicini and Karl Ferdinand Werner (Munich, 1980) p. 4.

[30]Gerhard Schwartz, Die Besetzung der Bistümer Reichsitaliens unter den Sächsischen und Salien Kaisern mit den Listen der Bischöfe, 951-1122, (Leipzig and Berlin, 1913; repr. Spoleto, 1993) p. 67.

[31]Elze, "Leistungsfähigkeit," p. 5.

[32]What is known of Bruno of Verona's life does not allow an estimate of his age. He was appointed by Henry IV in 1072 and was murdered on a 9 February sometime between 1076, just after Worms, and 1080, shortly before Brixen. Schwartz, Besetzung, p. 67. That he was able to make such a winter journey and did not die of natural causes suggests, but does not prove, that he was not an old man.

[33]Marjorie Nice Boyer, "A Day's Journey in Medieval France," Speculum 26, (1951) pp. 597-608.

ellers such as merchants who often had reason to hurry, but not to the point of killing their horses. At that rate, the archbishop of Verona would have taken 13-14 days to reach Worms which leaves the king's messengers eight days to cover the approximately 822 km. (514 mi.) from Goslar, a speed of about 103 km. (62 mi.) a day. This is just about the rate of travel that Roger of Howden, who described Richard the Lionheart's race to Issoudun as "a journey of three days completed in one day," thought of as normal for a military courier.[34]

Not only the date, but also the he location of the Battle on the Elster is not precisely known. Delbrück puts it across the Elster from Zeitz.[35] According to the sources, Henry fled "one day's march"[36] in an unspecified direction

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[34]Prestwich, "Military Intelligence," p. 25, n. 88. Roger admittedly is not discussing a messenger crossing the Alps in January. The distances were calculated with a measuring wheel using modern road maps. Such modern features as the Alpine tunnels and passes that were not in use in the eleventh century were avoided; secondary roads were freely used.

[35]Hans Delbrück, Geschichte der Kriegskunst im Rahmen der politischen Geschichte 3 (Berlin, 1923) pp. 142, 146-48, details the difficulties of deciding among the different designations of the location of the battle. It is also referred to as the Battle on the Grüne, Meyer von Knonau, Jahrbücher Heinrich IV. 3, pp. 337-39, both following Bruno of Magdeburg, De bello Saxonico, chap. 122, p. 380; and the Battle of Hohen-Mölsen, Sander, Der Kampf, pp. 30-32, following Annales Pegavienses, p. 241. These places are not widely separated insofar as they can be determined. The king's location is not again surely known until 6-7 December at Speyer when further gifts were made to the church. Meyer von Knonau, Jahrbücher Heinrich IV. 3, p. 341. Diplomata Henry IV, nos. 326, 327, pp. 428-31.

[36]Bernold of St. Blasien, Chronicon, a. 1080, p. 436.

to "a certain castle."[37] Since Henry was in a region where Rudolf had considerable support, there is also the question of how he gained possession of the castle. The stance of Bishop Gunther of Naumburg, a supporter of Rudolf who also had episcopal jurisdiction over Zeitz, supports Delbrück's conjecture that Zeitz had refused entry to Henry.[38]

Assuming with Bonizo that Henry remained there until he heard of Rudolf's death, whether after one day or eight, the messengers could have covered the distance from Zeitz to Verona, to continue with that example, about 672 km. (420 miles), in six to seven days travelling at the speed of 104 km. (65 miles) per day established as the norm for military couriers. The figures for time and distance assume travel through the Brenner pass.[39] Bishop Sigebod of Verona was a supporter of Henry IV and a signatory to the proceedings at Brixen. Once the word reached Italy, it became a matter for

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[37]Bonizo of Sutri, Liber ad amicum, bk. 9, p. 613; cf. Bruno of Magdeburg, De bello Saxonico, chap. 122, p. 380. Studies of the itineraria of the German kings show frequent stops at Zeitz and nearby Naumberg. A study of the relevant royal and episcopal sources might discover the location of fortifications in the area of the battle. Hans Jürgen Rieckenberg, "Königsstraße und Königsgut in Liudolfinger und Frühsalischer Zeit (919-1056)," Archiv für Urkundenforschung 17:1 (1941) pp. 23-154.

[38]Delbrück, Geschichte der Kriegskunst 3, p. 148; Rudolf Bonin, Die Besetzung der deutschen Bistümer in den letzten 30 Jahre Heinrichs IV., 1077 bis 1105, (Jena, 1889) p. 122.

[39]Since Henry had been able to hold a synod at Brixen only a few months previously there is no reason to presume that the Brenner would not be available to his messengers. Welf IV of Bavaria was dispossessed in 1077, and Henry IV had since kept Bavaria and Swabia in his own hands. Meyer von Knonau, Jahrbücher Heinrich IV. 3, pp. 36-37.

local communications. Alternatively, messengers going to Tedald of Milan using the Septimer or one of the lesser passes would have a distance of approximately 790 km. (474 mi.) to cover and a journey of seven to eight days.[40]

The castle of Volta is located on a spur of the Alps. It is ideally situated to observe traffic entering and leaving Italy via the Brenner Pass system as well as traffic on the plain along the Via Postumia, i.e., along the route most likely to be taken by Henry IV as he arrived from Germany and travelled westward across the Po Valley to the usual mustering place of the German emperors, the plain of Roncaglia outside Pavia. This is one of few locations where there is sufficient grazing for a sizable army.[41] Volta is only a short distance from the point where the Via Postumia crosses the Mincio and has a commanding view of the area.

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[40]On the central Alpine passes, J.E. Tyler, The Alpine Passes: The Middle Ages (962-1250) (Oxford, 1930) pp. 74-86. Henry's appointment in 1079 of Norbert of Chur, Meyer von Knonau, Jahrbücher Heinrich IV. 3, pp. 232-33, guaranteed access to the northern end of this pass system while Milan under Tedald guaranteed the southern exits. The route to these passes from Zeitz passes through territory still under the control of Henry's enemies, but as has been seen this does not preclude communications. Single riders can pass where larger groups can not, and the king had his supporters even within regions where his enemies were strongest. The news of the death of Rudolf would also cause shifting of loyalties within Germany.

[41]Tyler, Alpine Passes, p. 40. Ferdinand Güterbock, "Die Lage der Roncalischen Ebene," Quellen und Forschungen aus Italienischen Archiven und Bibliotheken 9 (1906) pp. 197-220 argues that the mustering place probably lay upriver to the northwest of Piacenza near Somaglia. The sources cited are later than Henry IV, but the geographic arguments on the basis of accessibility of fords and protection of the campsite would hold for the earlier period.

The castellum at Volta was among Matilda's possessions.[42]

The sending of a message implies that there were recipients prepared to act on it. Henry IV could not plan for a simultaneous attack, but he could plan for a coordination of efforts. Communications between Henry and the northern Italian lay and ecclesiastical magnates who came to his support in 1077 did not simply stop when he returned to Germany to deal with the anti-king. Like Henry and Rudolf, the Italians had reason to prefer the military solution to the question of the German kingship. A papal judgement would leave the victor subject to the papacy and in no position to take up their quarrel with the papal initiatives that were

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[42]In January 1053, Beatrice and her son, still a child, gave the curtis of Volta, which included cultivated fields, a castle and a chapel, to the church of St. Peter in Mantua in return for a mass being sung every other day by the bishop for the soul of her husband Boniface who was murdered in 1052. There is no mention of Matilda in this charter which forbad alienation and provided for reversion if the conditions were not met. Regesto Mantovano: le carte degli archivi Gonzaga et di stato in Mantovana e dei monasteri mantovani soppressi, ed. Pietro Torelli (Rome, 1914) no. 74, pp. 52-53. Twenty years later on 10 September 1073, Beatrice and Matilda gave "half of the curtis and castellum of Volta with its church and all appurtenances" to the cathedral chapter of St. Peter at Mantua. On 8 July 1079 Matilda added a list of 85 specified male and female serfs from Volta and Pletula. Her cousin, Frederick of Montbéliard, was a witness to both charters. Urkunden Mathilde, no. 11, pp. 61-63; no. 27, pp. 100-104. Alfred Overmann, Gräfin Mathilde von Tuscien: Ihrer Besitzungen, Geschichte ihres Gutes von 1115-1230 und ihre Regesten, (Innsbruck, 1895) pp. 130, 145; Ghirardini, "La Battaglia di Volta Mantovana," p. 230, nn. 4, 5; Aldo A. Settia, "Castelli e villaggi nelle terre canossiane tra X e XIII secoli," in Studi Matildici III, p. 306. Why the donation was re-issued in 1073 and how, or if, between July 1079 and October 1080, Volta came back into Matilda's hands remains unclear. Presumably the countess and the cathedral shared the revenue of the curtis and the expense of the upkeep of the castle while the cathedral was to benefit from the labor of the serfs. The arrangement allowed Matilda some continued control at an important site.

unrest to their cities.[43] Given the readiness with which the Italian bishops responded to his summons to the synod of Brixen, it is not unreasonable to assume that, in addition to the delegations to Gregory's annual lenten synods, Henry and his Italian supporters regularly exchanged communications. Once the word of the second excommunication of Henry and of Gregory's declaration for Rudolf reached the north, it would be clear that the agreement made at Canossa was ended. Planning for Henry's second journey to Italy began no later than at that time, together with preparations for the synod of Brixen. It is not unthinkable that the delegation had been sent with instructions on how to proceed if things went badly at Rome.

What is unthinkable is that, having elected an anti-pope, the electors simply went home after the synod without any planning for future events. Bonizo again supplies the sequence of events, almost by accident. His concern is with the absolute irregularity of the Brixen proceeding, a papal election conducted by Lombards and Germans. Where were the Roman cardinals at the election of their bishop? Only the excommunicate Hugh Candidus represented them. After making sure that all the improprieties were noted, Bonizo ends by mentioning that Guibert with his confederates, bearing with them the papal robes, returned to Italy.[44] Nothing further

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[43]Chapter 1, pp. 37-38.

[44]Bonizo of Sutri, Liber ad amicum, bk. 9, pp. 612-13.

could be done until Henry IV was able to come again to Italy; Guibert's task was presumably to prepare for the king's eventual arrival. And the presence of his young son reinforced the seriousness of the king's intention to do so. This is the purpose of the youngster's presence in Italy.[45]

Where better to raise the needed troops than among those who had been his electors at Brixen, the Lombard bishops? Milan and Ravenna also had numerous suffragans. The suffragans of Ravenna included the bishops of Piacenza, Parma, Reggio, Modena, Bologna, Imola, Faenza, Forli, Forlimpoli, Cesena, and Ferrara, a solid wall of supporters along the length of the Via Aemilia.[46] Italian bishops, like their German counterparts had access to substantial bodies of troops, especially in the cities where the bishop was the public authority as well as the ecclesiastical authority.[47] Guibert's suffragans remained largely loyal throughout the conflict, and Matilda of Tuscany's efforts to replace them

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[45]The accord between Henry and Gregory reached at Canossa had disappointed the king's Italian adherents just as it had disappointed the Saxons who supported Gregory. They may well have demanded guarantees before undertaking any initiative against the pope. Conrad's election as Henry's successor would make his presence all the more valuable. Also, Henry was perfectly aware of the uncertainly of war. Having Conrad safe in Italy would allow the young king to take up the struggle when he came of age if his father should fail. But, Conrad's presence at Volta is not proven. An older, even illegitimate, son could represent his father's interest as well and be less vulnerable to the sudden death that so often befell children. Goez, "Das Thronerbe," pp. 11-13.

[46]Heidrich, Ravenna, pp. 107-118.

[47]Piero Rasi, "Exercitus Italicus" e milizie cittadine nell'alto medioevo (Padua, 1937) for the long history of this situation.

with gregorian supporters during the long struggle were largely unsuccessful.[48]

So Bernold's phrase "the army of almost all Lombardy" may have a good bit of truth in it. The archbishops of Milan and Ravenna with their suffragans could dispose of a significant number of troops.[49] Even so, a large muster awaiting the opportunity to take action is extremely unlikely given the problems of discipline and logistics posed by idle armies.[50] A heightened state of readiness with the stockpiling of supplies and equipment in conjunction with bringing garrisons up to strength is more likely.

A further hint as to preparations for Henry's arrival is given by Bonizo who states that Henry's delegation to the Lent synod of 1080, which included Bishops Liemar of Bremen and Rupert of Paderborn, returned from Rome via Tuscany and Lombardy. In Tuscany they met with two named nobles, Marquis Adalbert and Count Boso, and roused the people against

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[48]Heidrich, Ravenna, p. 160. Ironically, Bonizo is also the major source for the life of Guibert of Ravenna before his election at Brixen.

[49]A great deal more work is needed before estimates can be made. The sources make few references to specific numbers. Those that are given will be mentioned in the appropriate place. Tedald of Milan sent 1,000 men to the siege of Rome, Landulf Senior, Historia Mediolanensis, ed. L.C. Bethmann and W. Wattenbach, MGH Scriptores 8 (Hanover, 1848) bk. 3, chap. 32, p. 99; Meyer von Knonau, Jahrbücher Heinrich IV. 3, p. 461-62.

[50]Bernard S. Bachrach, "Some Observations on the Military Organization of the Norman Conquest," Anglo-Norman Studies 8 (1986) pp. 1-25 quantifies the problems of supply and sanitation.

Matilda.[51] If Henry were planning an expedition to Rome, it was vital to secure Tuscany. These men, along with a Marquis Rainer are numbered by Bernold as among "the heads of the schismatics."[52] These three appear along with a Marquis Hugo in a number of Henry IV's Italian charters from July 1081 until May 1084, i.e., they were with him throughout the campaign.[53]

Unlike the numerous archbishops, bishops, abbots and abbesses who appear in these documents, the laity are more difficult to identify.[54] Marquis Hugo is possibly Hugo del

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[51]Bonizo of Sutri, Liber ad amicum, bk. 9, p. 612. Sander, Der Kampf, p. 21.

[52]Bernold of St. Blasien, Chronicon, a. 1085, p. 443. Overmann, Gräfin Mathilde, p. 236, refers to all three as vassals of Matilda, but his sources, Henry's charters, do not describe them as such. Alfred Gawlik, Intervenienten und Zeugen in den Diplomen Kaiser Heinrichs IV. (1056-1105) (Kallmünz, 1970) p. 59, follows Overmann.

[53]Three marquises, Rainer, Adalbert and Hugo, appear in Henry's documents issued 20 July 1081 at Lucca, Diplomata Henry IV, nos. 338, 339, pp. 445-448; a Marquis Adalbert, son of the late Marquis Aubert, and Count Boso appear with numerous others in a charter issues on 3 December 1081 at Parma, no. 340, pp. 448-50; on 14 December the same Adalbert, son of Aubert, gave the castrum and curtis of Pizzo with all appurtenances into the hand of the king who in turn invested with it the archdeacon John of the cathedral chapter of Parma. Among those present was Count Boso, vassus and signifer of the church of Parma, no. 341, pp. 450-51; The marquises Adalbert, Rainer and Hugo were present 23 July 1082 at Pavia (this charter repeats that of 20 July 1081 for which they were also present) no. 345, pp. 456-57; the same group appears in a charter issued at Sutri on 23 May 1084, but in this charter Hugo is called count while Adalbert and Rainer are designated marquis, no. 359, pp. 477-79.

[54]Rosanna Pescaglini Monti, "Nobilità e instituzioni ecclesiastiche in Valdinievole tra XI e XII secolo," in Aluccio da Pescia (1070c.a.-1134). Un santo laico dell'età postgregoriana: Religione e società nei territori di Lucca e della Valdinievole (Rome, 1991) p. 225-27. The paucity of studies and the age and uneven quality of those that exist are relevant factors in the study of the nobility touched by the war

Mansi, a son of Azzo II of Este, whose inheritance was confirmed by Henry IV in 1077.[55] In the intervening years, however, Marquis Azzo had withdrawn to his eastern lands, whence the family name of Este, and became either a papal supporter or at least enough of a non-supporter of Henry IV to earn the opprobrium of an anonymous henrician who referred to him as "Azo iniquissimus, qui semper perstat impius."[56] Furthermore, a "Marquis Azo" shows up among those present at a judgement given by Matilda in Ferrara on 20 September 1080, only a few weeks before Volta.[57] Hugo had

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paucity of studies and the age and uneven quality of those that exist are relevant factors in the study of the nobility touched by the war between the pope and the emperor.

[55]Diplomata Henry IV, no. 289, pp. 377-79. Azzo's advanced age would preclude active campaigning, and his other son Fulco, who actually inherited the Italian possessions, may have already taken over active administration. Hugo made an unsuccessful attempt to claim the county of Maine through his mother, Garsenda of Maine, in France and is thus known as del Mansi rather than d'Este. Robert LaTouche, Histoire du comté du Maine pendant le X^{e} et XI^{e} siècle (Paris, 1910) pp. 35-38. He remained active in Italian affairs until the death of his father in 1097 when he last appears in the sources. M[argherita] G[iuliana] Bertolini, "Alberto Azzo." DBI 1 (1960) pp. 755, 757. According to Donizone, in 1091 he treacherously informed Henry IV of an impending attack. Donizone, Vita Mathildis, bk. 2, chap. 6, ll. 550-599, pp. 390-91.

[56]Petri Crassi defensio Heinrici IV. regis, ed. L. de Heinemann, MGH Libelli 1 (Hanover, 1891) p. 434; Heidrich, Ravenna, p. 84, n. 50.

[57]There is some question as to the date of this document because of a discrepancy between the papal regnal year and the indiction number. There is, however, no doubt about the document deciding the balance of this case a few months later. Current opinion is that both date from 1080. Urkunden Mathilde, nos. 31, 32, pp. 112-115. Matilda was in Bricole in the Val d'Orcia on 17 September 1079; Urkunden Mathilde, no. 28, pp. 104-07. It would have required very rapid travel to have reached Ferrara in time to hold court on 20 September, and it is unusual that the balance of the decision would be reserved for more than a year. Further, a daughter of Marquis Azzo was with Matilda in 1086 and benefitted from one of the miracles performed by Anselm of Lucca after

married a daughter of Robert Guiscard in 1078;[58] if he is not the Marquis Hugo in the following of Henry IV nothing is known of his activities in these years. In 1097 his brother, Fulco, was released from the royal ban by Conrad. The reason for the ban, presumably imposed by Henry IV, is not stated, but the assumption is that Fulco was at the very least not among Henry's supporters.[59]

Another candidate for the position is "Hugicio" of the Cadolingi who took part in the insurrection against bishop Anselm of Lucca.[60] The Cadolingi were, however, of comital rather than marquesal rank, and Hugo is called marquis in most of the royal charters. Also, Hugicio did not remain Henry's supporter for long, while Hugo appears in the royal charters until 1084.[61] But, the possibility remains that Hugo del Mansi is the Marquis Hugo of Henry's charters while the Cadolingi count is the Count Hugo of the charter of 23

Scriptores 12 (Hanover, 1856) chap. 69, p. 32.

[58]Bertolini, "Alberto Azzo," p. 756, col. 2.

[59]Diplomata Henry IV, Konrad, no. 2, pp. 672-73.

[60]Rangerius of Lucca, Vita Anselmi Lucensis episcopi auctore Rangerio Lucensi, ed. Ernest Sackur, Gerhard Schwartz and Bernhard Schmeidler, MGH Scriptores 30.2 (Hanover, 1934) ll. 4799-4800, p. 1257; Epistolae vagantes, no. 43, pp. 104-107; M[argherita] G[iuliana] Bertolini, "Enrico IV e Matilde di Canossa di Fronte alla Città di Lucca." In Sant'Anselmo, Vescovo, p. 374; Erich Kittel, "Der Kampf um die Reform des Domkapitels in Lucca im 11. Jahrhundert," in Festschrift Albert Brackmann: Dargebracht von Freunden, Kollegen und Schülern, ed Leo Santifaller (Weimar, 1931) pp. 233-34.

[61]Bertolini, "Enrico IV e Matilde," p. 374, n. 120. That Hugicio was already seeking absolution in 1081, although the pope refused it, indicates that he was a somewhat lukewarm henrician.

May 1084. A third candidate is the Guidonid Ugo, designated Ugo III by Bresslau, a great-grandson of the marquis Rainer of Tuscany dispossessed in 1028 in favor of Matilda's father, Boniface. This assumption would also take care of Marquis Rainer, as a cousin, Rainer III, was also living and held the duchy of Spoleto and the march of Fermo from Henry IV.[62] This suggests a considerable degree of support. Rainer of Bagnaria (on the river Staffora, south of Pavia) witnessed a confirmation of specified properties made by Marquis Adalbert to Bobbio on 3 April 1077, but as this witness is further identified as one of the vassali of Monte Araolo, he is unlikely to be Marquis Rainer.[63]

The identification of Marquis Adalbert presents a number of problems.[64] Adalbert appears in Henry's charters with Rainer and Boso, one or both always being present when Adalbert is, and is usually given precedence of place among

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[62]Harry Bresslau, Jahrbücher des deutschen Reichs unter Konrad II. 2 (Leipzig, 1879; repr. Berlin, 1967) pp. 444-51, accepts that Rainer III is the Marquis Rainer who appears in several charters of Henry IV, but does not refer to Ugo III in this context. As Bresslau is writing about the reign of Conrad II, the henrician documents are peripheral. Similarly, Gawlik, Intervenienten, p. 67; Meyer von Knonau, Jahrbücher Heinrich IV. 3, pp. 393-94.

[63]Ludovico Antonio Muratori, Delle Antichità Estensi ed Italiane, 1 (Modena, 1717) pp. 250-51.

[64]In addition to Muratori, Ferdinand Gabotto, "I marchesi Obertenghi fino alla pace di Luni," Giornale storico della Lunigiana 9 (1918) pp. 3-47, provides detailed discussion of the sources.

the laity.[65] He is usually designated simply "Marquis Adalbert," but in the charters issued at Parma on 3 December and 14 December 1081 the descriptive phrase "filius quondam Auberti marchiones (sic)" is added.[66]

In the charter of 3 December, Adalbert is followed in the list by "Count Boso;" in that of 14 December "Lord Boso, count of Sablona, vassus and signifer of the church of Parma" appears as first among the laity.[67]

A further point in time is provided by Bernold who reports that the marquises Adalbert and Rainer as well as Count Boso, Archbishop Tedald of Milan and the bishops of Parma and Reggio died in the floods and famine of the year

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[65]The exceptions are Diplomata Henry IV, nos. 338, 339, pp. 445-48, where Rainer is listed first. As these documents are issued at Lucca, this is a further indication that Rainer is of the Tuscan nobility.

[66]This may be simply due to the lengthy list of persons present, including several Adalberts. In the charter of 14 December the phrase is "filius quondam Alberti marchionis." This document survives in neither the original nor the early copies used by previous editors, Affò and Drei, whose editions are the source for this charter. In those cases where the original survives, such as the charter of 3 December, these editions have been shown to be inaccurate; for the charter of 14 December they disagree as to the name of the father. Under such circumstances the evidence of the original is given greater weight. Diplomata Henry IV, no. 340, pp. 448-50; no. 341, pp. 450-51; Gawlik, Interve-nienten, p. 146 ff.

[67]Sablona, the present-day Sabbioneta, lies north of the Po, 28 km. southwest of Mantua. Urkunden Mathilde, p. 581. There are similarly named locations in the region such as Sabbione, southeast of Reggio, identified by Overmann, Gräfin Mathilde, pp. 7, 113, as a matildine allod. This man is presumably not Boso of Montclar whose son, another Albert, appears in a number of Matilda's charters beginning in 1080. Urkunden Mathilde, ad indicem.

1085.[68] The date is independently confirmed for Tedald of Milan,[69] but Bernold is the only source for the deaths of Eberhard of Parma[70] and Gandulf of Reggio.[71] The date of 1085 is also problematic for Marquis Rainer as the Guidonid Rainer III is alive in 1090.[72]

Bernold's evidence on the date of Adalbert's death requires a reconsideration of the centuries-old identification made by Muratori who identified him as Adalbert, son of Marquis Oberto Obizo, a member of the extended family of the Otbertines to which Azzo of Este and his sons also belonged.[73] That Marquis Adalbert lived until 1097.[74]

The basic assumption, that Marquis Adalbert belonged to the Otbertine kindred, remains sound. The name is frequently

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[68]Bernold of St. Blasien, Chronicon, a. 1085, p. 443. Ipsa etiam capita schismaticorum eo tempore, heu! misere in locum suum abiere, videlicet Parmensis et Regiensis exepiscopi, Theodaldus Mediolanensis non archiepiscopus set antichristus, Adelbertus et Reginherius marchiones, et comes Boso, et alii innumerabiles, quorum factione tota pene Italia contra domnum papam et sanctum Petrum se erexit.

[69]Schwartz, Besetzung, p. 83.

[70]Schwartz, Besetzung, p. 187.

[71]Schwartz, Besetzung, p. 198.

[72]Bresslau, Jahrbücher Konrad II. 2, p. 450.

[73]Muratori, Antichità Estensi 1, pp. 242-248. Muratori's identification is accepted without further comment by Luigi Simeoni, Vita Mathildis celeberrimae principis Italiae: Carmine scripta a Donizone presbytero, ed. Luigi Simeoni (Bologna, 1930-40; repr. Turin, 1973) p. 67, note on l. 340.

[74]Muratori, Antichità Estensi 1, p. 251.

used in that family,[75] and the proximity of their holdings to Matilda's would be a further motivation to ally themselves with the king whom she openly opposed. Further, the first Otbertines had supported Berengar and Adalbert as kings of Italy while the rise of Matilda's family was due to support for their opponent, Lothar, and later for Otto I.[76] It is possible that there was rivalry between the Otbertines, whose family line can be traced to a brother of Charles Martell,[77] and the descendants of the upstart castellan of Canossa, but even without this element an opportunity was clearly presenting itself.

If the son of Oberto Obizzo is eliminated by reason of Bernold's evidence, the only candidate of the appropriate age is a distant cousin, Adalbert the Red.[78] This man, born ca. 1040, last appears alive in the sources in June of 1085, although he is not clearly reported as dead until 1094 in a donation charter of his widow, Giulitta. Unfortunately, his father is also named Adalbert.[79] Since the elder Adalbert

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[75]Gabotto, "I marchesi Obertenghi," between pp. 46-47, gives a detailed family tree; in one branch of the family there are four, possibly five, generations of successive Adalberts.

[76]M[argherita] G[iuliana] Bertolini, "Adalberto Azzo di Canossa," DBI 1 (1960) pp. 221-22; Gabotto, "I marchesi Obertenghi," p. 3; Chapter 1, pp. 68-71, supra.

[77]Gabotto, "I marchesi Obertenghi," p. 4.

[78]U[baldo] Formentini, "Adalberto (Alberto Rufo)," DBI 1 (1960) pp. 216-17.

[79]Formentini, "Adalberto (Alberto Rufo)," pp. 215-16; Bresslau, Jahrbücher Konrad II. 2, pp. 420-21.

had died by 1080, he cannot be the marquis who appears in the royal charters of 1081-84, and his father was also named Adalbert. A problem is thus posed by the evidence of the Parma charters which describe Adalbert as the son of Aubert, presumably a variant spelling of Obert.[80]

Gabotto finds that the Adalbert who appears in the Parma charter of 3 December 1081 was indeed Adalbert the Red,[81] but makes no comment on the other royal charters in which Marquis Adalbert appears nor does he wonder at the omission of the cognomen "Rufo" which was already in use by 1080.[82] There are, however, only the two adult Adalberts in the family at that time.

The charters from Henry IV's Italian campaign of 1090-97 further confirm Bernold's evidence. Rainer, Boso, Adalbert and Hugo are not present.[83] There is a mention of an "Auberto marchione" at the head of a long list of persons

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[80]The names Adalbert and Obert are clearly distinct as early as the tenth century. "Adalbertus et Obertus germani marchiones, filii b. m. Otberti marchio et comes palatii . . . ." appear in a charter of 975, Bresslau, Jahrbücher Konrad II. 2, p. 415; Gabotto, "I marchesi Obertenghi," p. 9.

[81]Gabotto, "I marchesi Obertenghi," p. 22, quotes the 18th-century edition of Affò which calls him "Albertus marchio filius quondam Alberti marchionis," thus avoiding the problem of the name of the parent. This edition is considered flawed by modern scholars. Diplomata Henry IV, p. 448.

[82]Gabotto, "I marchesi Obertenghi," p. 21.

[83]The significance of the absence of Hugo, whom Bernold does not report as dead, depends on which Hugo is chosen. The later campaign took place entirely in the north so the Tuscans might well be absent even if still living. Hugo del Mansi took an active role on Henry's side in that campaign. Donizone, Vita Mathildis, bk. 2, chap. 6, l. 386, p. 391.

present when in 1091 Henry and Conrad decide a case in favor of Abbot John of St. Euphemia in Brescia,[84] but there are several Otbertine Obertos alive in that year, and a more precise identification is not possible without further evidence.

The question is further complicated by Muratori's identification of the same Adalbert, i.e., the son of Oberto Obizzo, with the marquis defeated at the battle of Sorbara in 1084 and also with the royal standard bearer unhorsed in the battle before Canossa in 1092. The battle of Sorbara is described in four sources, but only Donizone gives a name to the marquis, "Oberto," who, after striking a single blow, ignominiously fled the field.[85] In the same rout, the bishops Eberhard of Parma and Gandulf of Reggio are taken prisoner by Matilda.[86] Also according to Donizone, the royal standard bearer, "natus Oberti," is unhorsed and loses the royal standard at the battle before Canossa in 1092 which precipitates a rout of the royal army.[87] Muratori's identification requires the assumption that Donizone was in error when he gave the name Oberto to the marquis defeated at

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[84]Diplomata Henry IV, no. 419, pp. 558-561.

[85]Donizone, Vita Mathildis, bk. 2, chap. 3, ll. 338-65, pp. 386-87. Simeoni, Vita Mathildis, pp. 67, 183.

[86]This circumstance tends to confirm the association with Parma suggested by the charters of December 1081 which may have contributed to Muratori's decision that Donizone had erred.

[87]Donizone, Vita Mathildis, bk. 2, chap. 7, ll. 705-709, p. 393.

Sorbara."[88]

In the royal charters the name of Henry's supporter is given consistently as some variant of Adalbert. Assuming that Donizone, writing nearly 30 years after the battle, misnamed the loser does not eliminate the problem posed by the evidence of Bernold. Adalbert, son of Oberto Obizzo, was alive in 1097. Further, although Donizone did not write his account until 1114, he was a monk at Canossa as early as 1086. Besides simply hearing about Sorbara from those a few years older, he clearly knew the earlier accounts which include that of a possible eyewitness. He was present during the battle before Canossa in 1092.[89] Muratori's assumption requires that a man in a position to have timely and accurate information confused two distinct names.[90]

Although Bernold began his account only seven years after the battle, he was writing at some distance from the events he relates, and could have confused either a name or a date. As was seen in his account of Volta, Bernold may have wished to polish his account a bit, in this case by having the deaths of a number of schismatics take place

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[88]Muratori, Antichità Estensi 1, p. 249.

[89]P[aolo] Golinelli, "Donizone," DBI 41 (1992) pp. 200, 202.

[90]Gabotto, "I marchesi Obertenghi," p. 21. The linguistic sophistication of scholars who insisted on the identity of the names Adalbert and Obert, an identity apparently not recognized in the sources, may have compounded the confusion. Cf. the indices of Meyer von Knonau Jahrbücher Heinrich IV., and Overmann, Gräfin Mathilde, where only Adalbert is indexed while sources specifying Oberto or Aubert are accurately quoted.

during the same manifestation of divine judgement, but not to the point of stating that a man who is still alive at the time he is writing--Adalbert son of Oberto Obizzo--had died several years earlier. If Bernold confused either the Marquis Oberto who was defeated at Sorbara with the Marquis Adalbert who was in the following of Henry IV or the two Adalberts with one another, this would allow Muratori's identification to stand insofar as the royal charters are concerned and eliminate the problem posed by Adalbert the Red and his homonymous father.

The possibility that both Adalberts are represented in different royal charters cannot be eliminated; this would mean that Adalbert the Red, who is not known to be living after mid-1085, may be the marquis reported by Bernold as dying in 1085 while the son of Oberto Obizzo appears in the Parma charters of 1081.

Another Oberto, a younger brother of Adalbert the Red, could have been at Sorbara in 1084 and also left a son who could have been present at Canossa in 1092.[91] A man who is so little noted in the sources is not the most satisfactory solution, but as a younger brother his motivation to support Henry is more obvious.

Until more evidence is found or better editions of the known sources clarify some points, the identity of Marquis

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[91]Gabotto, "I marchesi Obertenghi, p. 21, genealogy, n.p.; for Sorbara, see chapter 4, pp. 180-90.

Adalbert remains an open question. Further study of all sources pertaining to both men may provide a better picture of their respective holdings and offices which could in turn resolve the question.

Whoever the individuals may have been, if the Adalbert and Boso mentioned by Bonizo are indeed an Otbertine marquis and Boso of Sablona, the presence of these northern Italian noblemen in Tuscany at the time of the lenten synod is a further indication of the extent of the communication between Henry IV and his Italian adherents.

That Matilda early occupied Henry's attentions is not surprising. If Henry were planning an expedition to Rome, it was vital to secure Tuscany as significant opposition in the region would pose a grave threat to operations at Rome.[92] Even more worrisome was the close cooperation between Matilda and the bishop of Lucca, Anselm II, a staunch supporter of the pope and Gregory's legate in the north. Because not only Anselm but also his biographers were part of the matildine circle the lives of Anselm are exceptionally important sources for the events of Matilda's life as well.[93]

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[92]The military geography is discussed in chapter 1.

[93]The writer of the prose Vita Anselmi was with Matilda and blessed her troops before the battle at Sorbara in 1084, chaps. 23-24, pp. 20-21. That the writer was not the primicerius Bardo was proven by Bernhard Schmeidler, "Der so-gennante Bardo ist nicht der Verfasser der prosaischen Vita Anselmi," Neues Archiv der Gesellschaft für ältere deutsche Geschichtskunde 43 (1922) pp. 527-37. Several hundred lines of Rangerius of Lucca, Vita Anselmi, a lengthy poetic work by Anselm's

A series of Matilda's charters dating from 1077 to 1079, four of the seventeen surviving documents dealing with Lucca and its immediate vicinity, transfer all or part of specified castles to Anselm of Lucca.[94] On 6 June 1077 and 14 June 1077 portions of the castle and curtis of Montecatini were transferred to Anselm. Montecatini is located on the road travelling from Lucca to Pistoia and Florence.[95] On 26 September 1078 Matilda gave her portion of the castle of Diécimo to the bishop of Lucca, so long as he has been canonically elected.[96] Diécimo is located at the junction of the Pedogna with the Serchio a short distance

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second successor, are devoted to praises of Matilda. Alfred Overmann, "Die Vita Anselmi Lucensis episcopus des Rangerius," Neues Archiv der Gesellschaft für ältere deutsche Geschichtskunde 21 (1895-96) p. 408. Although the vita was known to have been written, no copy of the manuscript was found until the nineteenth century. Giuseppe Colucci, Un nuovo poema Latino dello XI secolo: la vita di Anselmo da Baggio e il conflitto fra il sacerdozio e l'impero (Rome, 1895) pp. 1-8 details the discovery and destruction of the manuscript and the subsequent hunt for the transcription. Because Rangerius' unorthodox spelling reflects the pronunciation of Latin in his native Spain, the earliest edition regularized the spelling and is thus not accurate. It is, however, cited in all older scholarship since the Monumenta edition was published more than 50 years later. Sancti Anselmi Episcopi Lucensis Vita, a Rangerio Successore Suo, Sæculo XII Ineunte, Latino Carmine Scripta, ed. Vincentio de la Fuente (Madrid, 1870). A second anonymous prose vita of the twelfth century, Anselmi episcopi Lucensis vitae primariae fragmenta, ed. Wilhelm Arndt, MGH Scriptores 20 (Hanover, 1868) pp. 693-96, is of less interest. The more recent scholarship on these vitae is given in Edith Pàztor, "La 'Vita' anonima di Anselmo di Lucca. Una rilettura," in Sant'Anselmo, Vescovo, pp. 207-22, and Paolo Golinelli, "Dall'agiographica alla storia: le "vitae" di Sant'Anselmo di Lucca," in Sant Anselmo, Mantova, pp. 27-60.

[94]Urkunden Mathilde, no. 20, 21, pp. 81-85.

[95]Bertolini, "Enrico IV e Matilde," p. 341.

[96]Urkunden Mathilde, no. 26, pp. 97-100.

upstream from the episcopal castle of Moriana."[97] On 17 September 1079 Matilda gave Castiglione Berardesco in the valley of the Cornia to the bishopric of Lucca."[98] The location today can only be estimated as Castiglione, 13 km. (7.8 mi.) northwest of Massa Maritima."[99] The giving of these fortified places, especially with the restrictions concerning canonical election, was no doubt intended to strengthen Anselm's position in his struggle with his cathedral clergy, but they could also be used to hinder Henry IV's planned operations at Rome.

Further, Henry had evidence of Matilda's willingness to act directly on Anselm's behalf. Three papal letters, of increasing severity, provide a chronological framework. The first, dated 11 August 1077, reminds the canons of earlier admonitions about simoniacal possession of benefices and forbids entry into the cathedral until satisfaction should be made.[100] A letter of 20 November 1078 returns directly to the subject of communal life. The canons had apparently

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[97]Bertolini, Enrico IV e Matilde," p. 343.

[98]Urkunden Mathilde, no. 28, pp. 104-07; Bertolini, "Enrico IV e Matilde," pp. 343-44.

[99]Urkunden Mathilde, pp. 105, 561.

[100]Registrum 5.1, pp. 348-49. This letter, oddly, does not mention the communal life explicitly. Gregory may be threatening inquiry into simoniacal dealings unless the situation is remedied by adopting the communal life which would constitute, in effect, restitution of what was wrongly obtained, the benefices. Similarly, the reference to the time he spent among them the previous year may be an oblique reminder that he knows the situation well.

failed to appear as ordered at a recent synod and are instructed to assume the communal life or give their prebends into the bishop's hands.[101] Finally, on 1 October 1079 Gregory wrote to the clerics and people of Lucca informing them of the excommunication of the contumacious canons and requiring their expulsion from the territories of Lucca. The letter quotes from texts attributed to the martyrs Fabian and Stephen decreeing reduction to servitude for clerics plotting against their bishop.[102]

It is uncertain when the excommunication was pronounced. The presumption is that it took place sometime after the synod of November 1078, at which the canons failed to appear, but not at the lenten synod of 1079. The records of the lenten synod do not refer to events at Lucca although Bishop Anselm was present.[103] Whenever the sentence of excommunication and removal from office was handed down, it would then have been up to Matilda as the secular authority in Lucca to see to the enforcement of the sentence, but the precise date on which she issued the ruling is not known and no record of the proceeding survives outside the two Anselmian _vitae_.[104] A further deliberation was held, again on

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[101] _Registrum_ 6.11, pp. 412-13.

[102] _Registrum_ 7.2, pp.460-462.

[103] Kittel, "Der Kampf," pp. 223-225.

[104] _Vita Anselmi_, chap. 8, pp. 15-16; Rangerius of Lucca, _Vita Anselmi_, bk. 3, chap. 3, ll. 1761-66, p. 1194.

an unknown date, in the presence of a papal legate, the cardinal bishop of Albano, the renowned Petrus Igneus, who also ruled against the canons.[105]

The sequence of events is not completely clear, and this has led some scholars to question the description of Matilda's intervention.[106] Kittel bases his explanation on presumed misunderstandings by Anselm's biographers.[107] This does not take into account that the writer of the prose vita describes events that took place in his lifetime and that he was present at many of them.[108] Rangerius also knew Matilda and appears in two of her charters.[109] There is no reason to think that the life of his predecessor that he celebrated at such length was never a topic of conversation between them. It is equally unlikely that Matilda never read Rangerius' work. Both the Vita Anselmi and the Liber de anulo et baculo are mentioned in Donizone's Vita Mathildis, a strong indication that both works were available at the monastery of

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[105]Vita Anselmi, chaps. 8,9, p. 16; Rangerius of Lucca, Vita Anselmi, bk. 3, chap. 3, ll. 1803-14, p. 1195.

[106]Bertolini, "Enrico IV e Matilde," pp. 378-79; Kittel, "Der Kampf," pp. 225-26.

[107]Kittel, "Der Kampf," p. 226.

[108]The writer, delegated by Anselm to Matilda's service, was present and transmitted Anselm's blessing before the battle at Sorbara on 2 July 1084, Vita Anselmi, chap. 23, p. 20.

[109]Urkunden Mathilde, nos. 58, 59, pp. 181-84.

Canossa during Matilda's lifetime.[110] That Rangerius embellished his poem and treated Matilda as an exemplary figure need not be questioned, but that he did it by describing actions that never took place could be interpreted as reproach rather than praise in that she was not able to do what she should have been able to do. It is preferable to simply note that the Anonymous and Rangerius, who were both in a position to obtain accurate information, are the only sources for Matilda's judicial proceeding against the canons of Lucca. The result of that action was that these men went into exile rather than accept the sentence of servitude.

The balance of Kittel's conclusion, that the uprising in Lucca against Matilda did not stem from her actions against the canons is on firmer ground.[111] In addition to episcopal politics, there was a faction in the city that had long been hostile to marquesal rule.[112] When in the following year Henry IV took action against Matilda and removed her from her office, he also promised that no other marquis of Tuscany would be appointed without consulting the the citi-

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[110]Donizone, Vita Mathildis, bk. 2, chap. 3, ll. 389-438, pp. 387-88; Simeoni, Vita Mathildis, notes to pp. 65, 69.

[111]Kittel, "Der Kampf," p. 225-26.

[112]Pescaglini Monti, "Nobilità," provides genealogical tables of a number of leading Lucchese families as well as maps of their possessions. Like their counterparts in Lombardy, they were well positioned to take advantage of the rupture between Henry and Matilda, but they were by no means uniformly opposed to the gregorian party.

zens.[113] This point had undoubtedly been agreed on beforehand, and was of considerable importance to the Luccans.

Matilda had not spent a great deal of time in Italy in the years after being confirmed as Boniface's heir by Henry III in 1055. Little is known about where she spent her childhood or youth; even the date of her marriage is not known. The first clear reference to Matilda as the wife of Godfrey the Hunchback comes only in 1069 at the death of Godfrey the Bearded.[114] At that time she was 23 years old. She spent the next three years in the Lorraine with her husband while her mother acted on her behalf in Italy. Even after leaving Godfrey and returning to Italy, Matilda continued to share her official duties with her mother. It was not until the middle of 1075 that Matilda regularly held court on her own, and Beatrice also continued to act independently until the month before her death.[115] Matilda was then 30 years of age.

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[113] Diplomata Henry IV, no. 334, pp. 437-39; cf. the privileges given to Pisa, no. 336, pp. 442-43. Meyer von Knonau, Jahrbücher Heinrich IV. 3, pp. 394-97.

[114] Overmann, Gräfin Mathilde, pp. 125, 241-42.

[115] In the eighteen charters issued by Matilda before the death of Beatrice, she appears alone in only three of the fourteen dated before mid-1075. In one of these it is specified that the charter was issued in the court of Beatrice and her daughter Matilda, in the presence of Matilda. Urkunden Mathilde, no. 13, p. 67. Very little is known of the last months of Beatrice's life, and she may have been too ill to continue official duties. Elke Goez, Beatrix von Canossa und Tuszien: Eine Untersuching zur Geschichte des 11. Jahrhunderts (Sigmaringen, 1995) pp. 232-35, where many of the latest entries are of unknown date and April 1076 merely marks the terminus ante quem.

The events leading to Canossa brought Matilda into the center of imperial politics, and shortly after Canossa she began to act decisively to support Anselm's position in Tuscany. Matilda's vigorous actions on behalf of Anselm signalled to the Luccans her intention to exercise her office in Tuscany as surely as her protection of Gregory had made clear to Henry, and to his allies in northern Italy, that she would not support the king in any undertakings against the pope. Henry and the anti-reform cathedral canons and the anti-marquesal faction had in common a desire to be rid of the marquesa. A move against Matilda would remove the strongest support of a gregorian bishop, while removing Anselm would allow a bishop hostile to both Matilda and Gregory to be installed. Henry was obviously aware of the military geography of Italy and took steps to secure his route.

The effectiveness of Henry's policy is difficult to assess. A letter written by Pope Gregory in the Spring of 1081 to his supporters in Germany, Bishop Altmann of Passau and Abbot William of Hirsau, suggests that the king's measures were successful. Gregory brings up the possibility that Matilda's troops would be unwilling to oppose the king and asks that they assure her of their support.[116] Writing of

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[116] Registrum 9.3 (March 1081) p. 574. Si vero filie nostre M., cuius militum animos ipsi perpenditis, a vobis suffragatum non fuerit, quid aliud restat, nisi ut, cum sui resistere non recusaverint, quam utique hac in re pro insana habent, ipsa vel coacta paci illius adquiescat aut, quicquid possidere videtur, ammittat? Quam ob rem summopere niti vos oportet eamque reddere, an ex vobis presidium expectare firmitur debeat. Similarly, Vita Anselmi, chap. 21, p. 20.

events that take place a year later in 1082, Benzo of Alba gives a mocking portrait of Matilda--stuck in Canossa, wringing her hands and weeping for her lost possessions--that, combined with Gregory's letter, gives the impression that she had been effectively neutralized.[117] The picture of Matilda heroically standing alone against overwhelming odds has endured for centuries. Speaking of Gregory's journey northward in 1076, Simeoni concludes that

> If Matilda had shared the sentiments of hostility to the reform of the majority of the Tuscan and Lombard bishops, not to mention the lay feudality, the kingdom of Italy, from Mantua to the gates of Rome, including Emilia and Tuscany, would have been totally against the pope. Gregory would not have been able to leave Rome, the encounter with the king would have happened not at Canossa, but in a different place and manner, perhaps never.[118]

Matilda had been able to protect the pope in 1076, despite the hostility of any number of powerful neighbors.[119] But in 1076, Henry IV was an excommunicate and penitent. By 1080 the situation had changed considerably. In 1080, the king was challenging a second sentence of excommunication as having been handed down by a false pope, and he would be

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[117]Benzo of Alba, Ad Heinricum IV imperatorem libri VII, Ed. K. Pertz, MGH Scriptores 11 (Hanover, 1854) bk. 6, chap. 4, p. 663 on Matilda's angustia.

[118]Luigi Simeoni, "Il contributo della contessa Matilde al Papato nella lotta per le investiture." Studi Gregoriani 1 (1947) p. 354. Simeoni goes to considerable length to avoid any discussion of military actions and minimizes such discussion when it cannot be avoided.

[119]Cf. the protection provided by her mother, Beatrice, for Alexander II in 1064 at the synod of mantua in 1064, Meyer von Knonau, Jahrbücher Heinrich IV. 1, pp. 379-85; E. Goez, Beatrix, pp. 160-61.

coming to Italy, fresh from a decisive victory over the anti-king backed by that pope, ready to pursue the military solution that had been urged on him by the Italians years before.

Many of those who owed Matilda military service owed it to her as count or marquis. These are imperial offices, bestowed on her ancestors by emperors and confirmed to Matilda by Emperor Henry III. Were she to fail in the duties inherent in those offices, not to mention opposing the emperor-apparent in arms, she would be dispossessed and any who had taken part in her treason could expect to take part in her downfall. That many of these men also held land of the bishops who supported Henry, as did Matilda herself, was an added complication.

Further, there is a question as to what services were actually owed. There was a considerable difference between what was owed for the local defense and in what case and to what extent service was owed for more distant campaigns.[120] It should not be surprising that Matilda's vassals were reluctant to oppose Henry.

Yet Matilda did oppose him, and clearly she did not do

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[120]Boniface's gastald, Cantaro, could threaten dispossession to any who did not answer the call-up for local defense; the document is of uncertain date. Antonio Falce, Bonifacio di Canossa padre di Matilda 2 (Reggio nell'Emilia, 1927) pp. 145-46. The counts of Bertinoro owed the archbishop of Ravenna 100 milites in case of war, 50 milites and at least 300 pedites in case of siege, but only 20 pedites for campaigns across the Po. Heidrich, Ravenna, p. 59. Details of specific obligations are notoriously difficult to assess, but marching to Rome to oppose the heir of the previous emperor is an unlikely obligation.

so alone.[121] So the source of her troops must be considered. The record of Matilda's surviving charters shows only two names that appeared both before and after Henry IV's campaign. Paganus of Corsena and his sons Roland and Hildebrand appear steadily from the time of Boniface until 1111.[122] Her cousin Frederick of Montbéliard appears from 1071 to 1083 in charters of Beatrice and Matilda.[123] Other than these there is no continuity in the names appearing in Matilda's charters before and after the first Italian campaign of Henry IV. The possibility remains that some of this discontinuity reflects deaths in the war, but further investigation is needed on this point. The words of Bernold (army of nearly

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[121]Nor was Matilda the only one to do so. In 1082 Henry will campaign against Guido of Sezze as well as Matilda. Benzo of Alba, Ad Heinricum, bk. 6, chap. 4, p. 663; Meyer von Knonau, Jahrbücher Heinrich IV. 3, pp. 456-58.

[122]Lino Lionello Ghirardini, Storia Critica di Matilde di Canossa: Problemi (e Misteri) della Più Grande Donna della Storia d'Italia (Modena, 1989) pp. 53-108 gives a listing of the witnesses to Matilda's charters with information on the dates and frequency of their participation, but the limited apparatus also limits the use that can be made of this work.

[123]Urkunden Mathilde, no. 63, pp. 61-63; nos. 27, 28, pp. 100-07; 36, pp. 124-28. Frederick's wife was a granddaughter of Adelheid of Turin, Henry's mother-in-law. Because of her control of the western Alpine passes Adelheid was an important figure in Henry's policy. She apparently withheld herself from any active role and supported neither emperor nor pope; at the beginning of the war Adelheid was approaching 60. Benzo of Alba, Ad Heinricum, bk. 6, chap. 4, p. 663, describes her as trying to mediate with Matilda. As all of her children had predeceased her, Adelheid considered Frederick her heir, but he died six months before she did, in June of 1091. Henry IV claimed her possessions for his son Conrad, Adelheid's grandson, rather than for Frederick's sons who were her great-grandsons. Robinson, Henry IV, p. 287; Previté-Orton, Savoy, pp. 249-51, E. Goez, "Das Thronerbe," p. 23. This would prove to be a mistake when shortly afterward Conrad turned against his father who found himself effectively trapped in Italy.

all Lombardy) and of Gregory's letter (Henry . . . whom almost all Italians support) is further confirmed by the discontinuity of the names in Matilda's charters. Most of the Italians supported Henry IV.[124]

There is no indication as to what form Gregory expected the suffragatum and presidium of Altmann and William to take. They are instructed that, should Henry enter Lombardy, which by March of 1081 he was certainly going to do, they are to remind Duke Welf of Bavaria of the promises he made to St. Peter some years earlier when he was promised the inheritance of his father.[125] Whether or not Welf would feel that the truce granted to Henry IV in February of 1081 would prohibit his taking part in military actions in Italy while it was in effect, he would be reluctant to leave Germany with the question of a successor to Rudolf of Rheinfelden still unresolved. Altmann's prominence as a proponent of the pope's reform program and as an opponent of Henry IV would make him a target for the king's supporters who cannot be

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[124]" . . . of almost all Italy only that house resisted . . . ." Vita Anselmi, chap. 20, p. 19.

[125]Registrum 9.3 (March 1081) p. 574. Welf's father was Azzo of Este. As the eldest son of Azzo's first marriage, Welf might well have expected to inherit his father's possessions and titles, but he had already received the Welf inheritance through his mother, and his half-brothers, Fulco and Hugo, had been confirmed in their father's Italian possessions by Henry IV in 1077. As has been shown, Azzo was not one of Henry's supporters and apparently Fulco was placed under the ban of Empire by Henry, p. 102, supra. The pope's letter suggests that the situation was somewhat different in the Spring of 1081 unless Gregory was using the word patris in the sense of ancestors. The duchy of Bavaria, which was ot a heritable title, was in the hands of Henry IV.

presumed willing to stand by and simply watch while troops assembled and went into Italy.[126] Financial support is a different matter, and money comes to both sides of the conflict from a number of sources.[127]

The danger that Gregory foresaw, the loss of Matilda's possessions did come to pass in a formal pronouncement issued by Henry IV in the summer of 1081, probably at Lucca where he held court on 19-20 July,[128] without ending her capacity to oppose him. A likely basis of this capacity is the ability to raise money to pay hired troops to replace those who refused to stand against the king.

Donizone hints that this is the case:

> Gens Alemanna quidem sibi gratis servit ubique.
> Russi, Saxones, Guascones atque Fresones,
> Arverni, Franci, Loteringi, quinve Britanni,
> Hanc tantum noscunt, quod ei sua plurima poscunt.
> Post ipsam gentes hae mittunt saepius enses.
> Omnibus ex istis equites habet alta Mathildis;
> Responsum cunctis haec dat sine murmure turbis.[129]

Donizone does not give any context for his observations on the composition of Matilda's following, but presumably

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[126]Leopold Auer, Die Schlacht bei Mailberg am 12. Mai 1082 (Vienna, 1976) pp. 1-2 summarizes Altmann's actions and position.

[127]For the importance of financial matters, see chapter 3.

[128]The surviving sources for Henry's court in Lucca do not include his actions against Matilda. Meyer von Knonau, Jahrbücher Heinrich IV. 3, pp. 394-97. Both Rangerius of Lucca, Vita Anselmi bk. 3, chap. 2, ll. 4805-10, p. 1257, and the anonymous Vita Anselmi, chap. 21, p. 20, report the proceedings. Further, when Henry seized Matilda's holdings in the Lorraine he referred to the earlier Italian action. Overmann, Gräfin Mathilde, pp. 149, 152, 232-238.

[129]Donizone, Vita Mathildis, bk. 2, ll. 34-40, p. 380.

the swords were sent because of Matilda's willingness and ability to pay for them. The subject of money arises frequently as both sides struggle pay for the war.[130] Henry receives money from Emperor Alexius I; Gregory receives money from both the Normans and Matilda. Benzo of Alba, obviously interested to put the actions of the king's opponents in as bad a light as possible, emphasizes the appropriation of monastic resources and speaks of Anselm and Matilda stripping monasteries at Hildebrand's instigation.[131] But Benzo's invective ignores a more obvious and far more substantial source of Matilda's revenue, the network of castles that she controlled.

Henry's sentence of deposition deprived her of the income of cities such as Lucca and Pisa that supported him, but not all of the Tuscan cities did so. Florence opposed the king. And the sentence did not automatically turn over her possessions to Henry's supporters. Those who wished to benefit from Matilda's sentencing would have to fight for what they wanted. Henry dispossessed her legally; to physically remove her would require a good deal of fighting, town by town and castle by castle.[132] That Matilda lost some castles is shown by the sources demonstrating her recovery

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[130]The question of finances is discussed in chapter 3.

[131]Benzo of Alba, Ad Heinricum, bk. 6, chap. 4, p. 663.

[132]This is, in fact, what Henry attempted in the campaign of 1090-97; chapter 4, pp. 201-203.

of them in the years after Henry's departure.[133] Interestingly, there is no record that Volta was retaken which suggests that the action did not include a storming or siege of the castle. Matilda's army was "put to flight" as was Henry's at the Battle on the Elster, but there is no mention of the castle.[134] So long as the castles were in her hands, Matilda had the source of the revenue needed to supply and to pay the troops that held them.

The prominence of paid troops, as opposed to levies of fiefholders, in the sources for military actions during the war between Henry and Gregory has long been noted.[135] That this was not a peculiarity due to the special circumstances of the Investiture Controversy, or a phenomenon limited to Italy, is suggested by studies of France and the Anglo-Norman kingdom showing that paid service was neither unusual nor ignoble.[136] The pejorative connotations of "mercenary" do not apply to eleventh-century stipendarii.

Although there is little contemporary information about

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[133]Chap. 4, pp. [ ].

[134]Bernold of St. Blasien, Chronicon, a. 1080, p. 436; Bruno of Magdeburg, De bello Saxonico, chap. 123, p. 381.

[135]Georg Waitz, Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte 8 (Kiel, 1878) pp. 165 ff. notes that the use of paid troops first became significant in Germany during the Investiture Controversy.

[136]Jacques Boussard, "Services féodaux, milices, et mercenaires dans les armées, en France, aux Xe et XIe siècles," in Ordinamenti Militari, pp. 131-168; Marjorie Chibnall, "Mercenaries and the familia regis under Henry I," History 62 (1977) pp. 15-23. That no similar studies exist for Germany is probably explained by the existence of the ministeriales which would seem to obviate the need for stipendarii.

the army that accompanied him to Italy, Henry certainly used paid troops. Money brought back from Italy after the journey to Canossa paid the troops he gathered for the campaign against Rudolf of Rheinfelden.[137] The Annales Pegavienses mention a contingent of 60 soldiers and their arms brought by Wiprecht of Groitsch and another 300 sent by Wratislav of Bohemia with his son Borowoi, along with a considerable amount of money. These troops were to be paid.[138] That the army also included ministeriales is likely given the association of that group with military activities.[139] In Italy, where paid troops are frequently mentioned in the sources, the importance of urban militias must also be taken into consideration.[140]

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[137]Meyer von Knonau, Jahrbücher Heinrich IV. 3, p. 23; Berthold of Reichenau, Annales, a. 1077, p. 294.

[138]Meyer von Knonau, Jahrbücher Heinrich IV. 3, pp. 352-53. Annales Pegavienses, p. 237.

[139]Sander, Der Kampf, pp. 60-61. Meyer von Knonau, Jahrbücher Heinrich IV. 3, p. 353, n. 6. The problems associated with the existence in Germany of a military class of unfree status are discussed in John B. Freed, "The Origins of the European Nobility: The Problem of the Ministerials," Viator 7 (1976) pp. 211-241, where the earlier scholarship is summarized. Idem, "Nobles, Ministerials, and Knights in the Archdiocese of Salzburg," Speculum 62 (1987) pp. 575-611. Freed notes that in Salzburg, a pro-papal stronghold during the Investiture Controversy, the meaning of the word miles begins to shift from a rarely-used term designating a free vassal to one that could be used for an unfree member of the archbishop's familia who performed military service. Ministerialis did not come into use until the twelfth century, pp. 584-587. Whether other local studies will show the same pattern that Freed found at Salzburg remains an open question. The sources cited by Sander, Der Kampf, p. 60, n. 5, are all of later date.

[140]Piero Rasi, "Exercitus Italicus" e milizie cittadine nell'alto medioevo (Padua, 1937) pp. 172-216.

Finally, the objectives of the campaign could only be carried out at Rome. Matilda had done what she could to ensure that Henry arrived at Rome in as unfavorable a position as possible. Once there he faced an obstacle more formidable than the Apennines, Rome's walls. The walls of Rome were approximately 18 km. (10.8 mi.) in length and 15 m. (49.2 ft.) high.[141] Henry had nowhere near the troops or materiàl required for a siege of Rome in the sense of investing the city and either starving it out or eventually storming the walls. And Gregory had taken measures intended to make the neighborhood of Rome too dangerous for a prolonged siege. Early in 1080, probably began just before the Lenten synod, Gregory had begun negotiations--with Abbot Desiderius of Montecassino as intermediary--to settle his disputes with the Normans.

On 10 June at Ceprano Gregory received an oath from Jordan of Capua, and by 29 June from Robert Guiscard.[142] Gregory in effect conceded the seizures of papal lands that had brought about multiple excommunications of Robert Guiscard and his nephew, Robert of Loritello,[143] although the

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[141]Richard Krautheimer, Rome: Profile of a City, 312-1308. (1980) for the physical description of Rome. The figures given are for the Aurelian walls. Description and photo of the remains of the Aurelian walls, p. 6; of the Leonine walls, p. 119.

[142]Cowdrey, Pope Gregory VII, pp. 433-34; Sander, Der Kampf, pp. 32ff; Registrum 8.1a-c, pp. 514-17.

[143]Cowdrey, Pope Gregory VII, pp. 425-432 for a summary of Gregory's earlier dealings with the Normans.

concession was hedged about with conditions preserving the honor of God and St. Peter. To have made such concessions after holding out for so long shows that Gregory was fully aware of his situation. No matter how hopeful he may have been of Henry's coming to terms again, the pope was making provision for the other possibilities.

Immediately after Brixen, Gregory wrote to the bishops of the Norman lands to seek their support as well.[144] He intended a campaign against Guibert of Ravenna.[145] It is unclear what role Matilda of Tuscany was expected to play in this endeavor; Gregory's letter mentions only "leading persons" from Rome and Tuscany along with his new supporters, Robert Guiscard and Jordan of Capua. The help that Gregory had asked for was as slow to materialize as it had been when in 1074 the Normans were the object of the projected campaign. On 15 October as Rudolf of Rheinfelden died of his wounds, Gregory sent further letters seeking troops for his campaign against Guibert.[146]

The military intervention at Ravenna never took place. Possibly the only result of Gregory's efforts is the battle that took place at Volta when word of Rudolf's death reached

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[144]Registrum 8.5 (21 July 1080) pp. 521-23; Registrum 8.6 (25 July 1080) pp. 523-24 calls them to the aid of "Michael VII;" Registrum 8.7 (Summer 1080) summons the princes of southern and central Italy against Guibert. Meyer von Knonau, Jahrbücher Heinrich IV. 3, pp. 524-25.

[145]Cowdrey, Pope Gregory VII, pp. 204-05.

[146]Registrum 8.12, 8.13, pp. 531-34.

Italy. Volta has not been analyzed because the sources do not tell what happened there; neither do they explain why the battle happened. The impossibility of coordinating a military action in Italy with one in Germany is obvious; less obvious, perhaps, is that there would have been no point in doing so. Why then were there two opposing armies in the field at Volta as soon as word of Henry's victory reached Italy? Because the Battle of Volta and the Battle on the Elster were fought in close succession, many scholars accepting that the two battles took place on the same day whether by design or coincidence, the two have been linked without any examination of why or how. The explanation of the Battle of Volta lies in Gregory's plans for Ravenna.

Neither Matilda of Tuscany nor Henry's supporters would have undertaken to assemble an army of any size for an action to take place at an indeterminate future date. The problems of supply, sanitation and discipline were prohibitive.[147] But, if Matilda had gathered troops for Gregory's intended campaign against Ravenna, the region of Volta would have been a logical place to encamp them. The plain provides adequate grazing, and the roads facilitate supply. Moreover, the castle on the heights gives a good view of any traffic approaching this accessible area.

Such preparations could hardly have been made in secret. If Gregory was preparing to march against Ravenna,

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[147]See p. 99, supra.

Guibert was no doubt preparing to defend it, and would have requested help from the king's other supporters, such as Tedald of Milan or Sigebod of Verona. Rudolf's death precipitated a clash between two forces that would have met in any case, but the death did not cause the war in Italy.

Volta will never count as a "great" or "decisive" battle, but it had important results. Once it was known that Henry had been vindicated by the judgement of God in battle and that the supporter of the "false monk Hildebrand" had also been defeated, others dissatisfied with the political status quo took action. Matilda was the strongest support of Anselm of Lucca who was in turn a staunch supporter of Pope Gregory. After Volta her ability to support Anselm no doubt seemed less effective than it had been. By the end of 1080, Anselm was driven from his see,[148] and any possibility that Matilda would be able to hold Tuscany against Henry was lost. Volta disturbed a long-established balance at Lucca and severely limited the help that could be expected from one of Gregory's most loyal allies.

By the end of 1080, the picture of the coming campaign was in place. Henry IV had a great deal of support in Italy, but the situation in Germany was such that he would arrive

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[148]Kittel, "Der Kampf," p. 227. On 14 October, Anselm was still functioning as bishop. His last known charter was issued on 13 December from the episcopal castle of Moriana. Anselm is believed to have joined Matilda by spring of 1081 when efforts to take the castle began. Anselm probably left to avoid being trapped in Moriana which will remain a point of resistance throughout Henry's campaign.

with only a small following of his own. Gregory VII enjoyed less widespread support, but was well-liked in Rome. Henry did not have the capacity to overcome the city's walls, and while camped outside Rome was vulnerable to counterattacks and the infamous climate. The king had taken measures to neutralize his most dangerous opponent, Matilda of Tuscany, who had lost her control of the Tuscan cities and was preoccupied with protecting her holdings. She was limited to barring the Apennine routes. Henry's efforts to deal with the pope's allies, the Normans, were limited by Robert Guiscard's dislike for imperial overlordship. As matters turned out, Robert Guiscard was an unreliable ally, but at the end of 1080, Henry did not yet know this, and the Norman policy of Gregory VII must have caused some concern as the king weighed the possibilities. He decided on diplomatic overtures to both the Normans and the Saxons, and prepared to depart for Italy the following spring.

Chapter 3: The Campaign of 1081-1084

Henry IV arrived in Italy to celebrate Easter at Verona on 4 April 1081. The campaign had been under way for some months, and a number of important objectives had already been achieved. The king's situation was nonetheless strategically problematical. Henry was in a certain sense undertaking a campaign on three fronts: Germany, Rome and the territory in between, the Apennines.

Because of the still unsettled conditions in Germany the number of troops that could be spared for the Italian campaign was limited. No matter how encouraging the news out of Italy about the failure of Gregory's plans for a campaign against Guibert of Ravenna, the defeat of Matilda of Tuscany and the driving out of Anselm of Lucca, Henry was doubtless sobered by the fact that he had been unable to keep Christmas at Goslar; a quickly-mobilized Saxon army barred the

way.[1]

Representatives of both parties, including five bishops from each side, assembled at Kaufungen in early February, but the only result was a truce of four months.[2] Despite the death of the anti-king, Rudolf of Rheinfelden, the Saxons had taken fewer losses than Henry's army in the battle at the Elster, and were hardly ready to surrender. Conversely, they were in no position to undertake a new campaign, and there was less unity among the rebels than suggested by the bellicose words attributed by Bruno of Magdeburg to Otto of Nordheim.[3] In any case, Henry determined to depart for Italy. Given the ties between Pope Gregory and the Saxons, settling his problems with the papacy was probably the best way to settle the turmoil in Germany as well, and the king staked a great deal on being able to accomplish this.[4]

Before leaving, Henry made necessary dispositions for

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[1]Gerold Meyer von Knonau, Jahrbücher des deutschen Reiches unter Heinrich IV. und Heinrich V. 3 (Leipzig, 1900) p. 343. Bruno of Magdeburg, Liber de Bello Saxonico, ed. G.H. Pertz, MGH Scriptores 5 (Hanover, 1844) chap. 125, p. 381.

[2]Meyer von Knonau, Jahrbücher Heinrich IV. 3, pp. 346-48. It is unclear whether the four months is all Henry asked for or all the Saxons were willing to give; if the former, he may have misunderstood the situation in Italy or underestimated Gregory's determination to resist.

[3]Bruno of Magdeburg, De Bello Saxonico, chaps. 126-28, pp. 381-83. It is generally recognized that many of the words Bruno puts into the mouths of his heroes are more symbolic than accurate.

[4]According to Bruno of Magdeburg, de Bello Saxonico, chap. 128, p. 383, Otto of Nordheim considered the pope the to be the leader of the Saxon cause despite the strained relations since Canossa. I[an] S[tuart] Robinson, "Pope Gregory VII, the Princes and the Pactum, 1077-1080," The English Historical Revue 94 (1979) pp. 721-756.

the defense of his kingdom, rewarding defectors from the Saxon cause and dispossessing his opponents. Ekbert II of Meissen and Ekbert's brother-in-law, Henry of Lower Lusatia, received back the lands they had lost.[5] Henry's supporter, Wratislav of Bohemia, who had been holding both territories, was compensated with the holdings of Liupold of Austria, who had withdrawn his fealty from Henry to support the papal legate Altmann of Passau.[6] The duchy of Swabia, taken from Rudolf of Rheinfelden in 1077, was in the hands of Henry's son-in-law, Frederick of Büren.[7] Carinthia was held by Henry's kinsman, Liutold of Eppenstein, and Henry had kept Bavaria in his own hands since the deposition of Welf IV.[8]

Some of these provisions would have to be ratified on the battlefield,[9] but Henry had sufficient control of his own kingdom to be able to hold his muster on the upper Donau in March. He departed for Italy, albeit with a limited following of royal ministeriales and paid troops, confident

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[5]Meyer von Knonau, Jahrbücher Heinrich IV. 3, pp. 350-51. The youth of both men seems to have been a factor.

[6]Meyer von Knonau, Jahrbücher Heinrich IV. 3, pp. 350-51.

[7]Meyer von Knonau, Jahrbücher Heinrich IV. 3, pp. 194-95. Henry's daughter, Agnes, was at the time of her betrothal to Frederick seven years old.

[8]Meyer von Knonau, Jahrbücher Heinrich IV. 3, pp. 37-37.

[9]Wratislav of Bohemia defeated Liupold of Austria at Mailberg on 12 May 1082, effectively ending Altmann of Passau's capability of aiding the gregorian cause. Meyer von Knonau, Jahrbücher Heinrich IV. 3, pp. 464-467; Leopold Auer, Die Schlacht bei Mailberg am 12. Mai 1082. Militärhistorische Schriftenreihe 31 (Vienna, 1976).

that his eastern borders and the accesses to the Alpine passes were secure. Other than a small contingent under Wiprecht of Groitsch and 300 in the following of Wratislav of Bohemia's son, Borowoi, nothing is known of the troops accompanying the king.[10]

In February, as Henry attempted to come to terms with the Saxons, Gregory VII tried to revive his planned campaign against Guibert of Ravenna. The pope wrote to Desiderius of Montecassino asking that the abbot sound out Robert Guiscard about a possible campaign after Easter; if the duke could not be persuaded to take part himself, perhaps he will provide troops for the militia familiaris of St. Peter. In the same letter, however, Gregory noted that Duke Robert had yet to keep promises to restrain the incursions into church lands by his nephew, Robert of Loritello.[11]

Duke Robert, however, had other campaigns in mind.[12] He had long been interested in Byzantium if only because his opponents in southern Italy had often fled overseas to

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[10]Meyer von Knonau, Jahrbücher Heinrich IV. 3, pp. 352-53.

[11]Registrum 9.4 (Beginning of February 1081) pp. 577-79. Gregory also remarks in this letter that what little news he has from Germany reports that Henry's position in Germany is at its worst.

[12]Ferdinand Chalandon, Histoire de la domination normande en Italie et en Sicile, 2 vols (Paris, 1907) places the career of Robert Guiscard and the alliance with Gregory VII within the larger context of the Norman rise to power in Italy and Sicily. Hughette Taviani-Carozzi, La terreur du monde: Robert Guiscard et la conquête normande en Italie: Mythe et histoire, (Paris, 1996) discusses Robert's ambitions in Byzantium and the papal alliance with ample quotations from the sources, chaps. 9-10, pp. 389-485.

refuge in the east. The betrothal in 1074 of his daughter, who was given the Greek name Helena, to Constantine, a son of the emperor Michael VII Dukas, was intended to end this situation. But in October of 1078 Michael was deposed by Nicephorus III Botaniates who annulled the Norman treaty and placed the little girl in a convent.[13] While Robert was still trying to negotiate with the Byzantine court, yet another coup took place, and Alexius I Commnenus became emperor.

Gregory VII was also interested in Byzantine affairs. His planned campaign to the East in 1074 had as one objective the ending of the schism of 1059, a goal that Michael VII seemed to share.[14] Thus the pope and the Norman duke had a common interest in supporting Michael VII. When an imposter claiming to be the deposed emperor appeared in Italy, the pope wrote, even as his own campaign against Ravenna faltered, urging the bishops of southern Italy to assist

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[13]H.E.J. Cowdrey, The Age of Abbot Desiderius: Montecassino, the Papacy, and the Normans (Oxford, 1978) p. 133; Donald M. Nicol, "Byzantium and the Papacy in the Eleventh Century," Journal of Ecclesiastical History, 13 (1962), repr. in Donald M. Nicol, Byzantium: Its Ecclesiastical History and Relations with the Western World (London, 1972) p. 13; Taviani-Carozzi, La terreur du monde, pp. 393-98, 424-25.

[14]H.E.J. Cowdrey, "Pope Gregory's 'Crusading Plans' of 1074" in Outremer: Studies in the History of the Crusading Kingdom of Jerusalem Presented to Joshua Prawer, ed. B.Z. Kedar, H.E. Meyer and R.C. Smail, (Jerusalem, 1982) pp. 27-28; idem, Abbot Desiderius, p. 133; Nicol, "Byzantium and the Papacy," p. 13.

Robert Guiscard in his efforts to re-install Michael.[15]

Nothing came of these plans, and when, in April 1081, word came that Alexius Commnenus had taken power in Constantinople, Robert Guiscard saw an opportunity to take advantage of the turmoil following the coup. The duke may have made one symbolic march to Tivoli as a show of his support for Gregory, but on 20 May as Henry IV approached Rome, Robert Guiscard, while leaving instructions with the guardians of his son, Roger, that they were not to deny any aid they could bring to the pope, crossed the Adriatic to campaign against Alexius Commnenus.[16]

Matilda's activities during this time are unclear. Around mid-March, Anselm of Lucca had departed from Moriana to join Matilda's entourage.[17] The castle, however, was left garrisoned by Anselm's supporters.[18] Matilda may have grant-

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[15]Registrum 8.18 (18 September 1080) pp. 526-27; H.E.J. Cowdrey, Pope Gregory VII: 1073-1085 (Oxford, 1998) p. 434; Nicol, "Byzantium and the Papacy," p. 14, accepts Anna Commnena's opinion that Robert Guiscard engineered the imposture; Anna Comnena, The Alexiad of Anna Comnena, trans. E.R.A. Sewter, (Harmondsworth, 1969) bk. 1, chap. 12, pp. 58-61. Anna's account emphasizes the youth of Constantine to whom she herself was later betrothed, but does not mention that Helena was an infant when the betrothal agreement was made; Taviani-Carozzi, La terreur du monde, pp. 425-31.

[16]Cowdrey, Pope Gregory VII, p. 435; idem, Abbot Desiderius, p. 145; Meyer von Knonau, Jahrbücher Heinrich IV. 3, pp. 374-77.

[17]Cowdrey, Pope Gregory VII, p. 305; Paul Sander, Der Kampf Heinrichs IV. und Gregors VII. von den zweiten Exkommunikation des Königs bis zu seiner Kaiserkrönung (März 1080-März 1084) (Berlin, 1893) p. 89, n. 4; Rangerius of Lucca, Vita Anselmi Lucensis episcopi auctore Rangerio Lucensi, ed. Ernest Sackur, Gerhard Schwartz and Bernhard Schmeidler, MGH Scriptores 30.2 (Hanover, 1934) p. 1197, n. 7.

[18]See pp. 161-62.

ed an immunity from tolls and taxes on goods, especially textiles, passing through Lucca and Pisa to the monks of Montecassino. The surviving copy of the grant is not dated. Most scholars have placed it in the period between the end of 1080 and Matilda's deposition in July 1081, but Elke Goez and Werner Goez have recently argued for a date of 1100.[19]

The reasons they give for the later date are not compelling. The first is that the distinctive phrase, "Matilda dei gratia si quid est," which is used in Matilda's signature seldom appears in the intitulatio of her charters, and most of those uses are of a later date. Only one example, in a slightly variant form, is known to predate 1080-81.[20] The second reason is that the cities of Lucca and Pisa were not firmly under Matilda's control, even before her formal deposition. Under such circumstances the gift seems meaning-

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[19]Sander, Der Kampf, p. 94; Alfred Overmann, Gräfin Mathilde von Tuscien: Ihrer Besitzungen, Geschichte ihres Gutes von 1115-1230 und ihre Regesten, (Innsbruck, 1895; repr. Frankfurt am Main, 1965) p. 148; Cowdrey, Abbot Desiderius, p. 11. All date the grant to 1080-81. Cf. Urkunden Mathilde, no. 62, pp. 188-190.

[20]A charter of fall 1079 uses the phrase, "M(atilde) gratia dei quicquid est." The next use in an intitulatio, rather than in a signature, is in a letter dated 1083. It does not appear again until 1090 and, again in a slightly variant form, in 1095. From that point it is used more frequently. Urkunden Mathilde, no. 29, p. 109, no. 37, p. 129, no. 43, p. 140, no. 46, p. 146. The authoritative study of Matilda's signature is Werner Goez, "'Matilda Dei gratia si quid est': Die Urkunden-Unterfertigung der Burgherrin von Canossa," Deutsches Archiv für Erforschung des Mittelalters 47 (1991) pp. 379-394. Caterina Santoro, "Le sottoscrizzioni dei Signori di Canossa," in Studi di paleografia, diplomatica, storia e araldica in onore de Cesare Manaresi (Milan, 1953) pp. 261-289, provides photographs.

less.[21]

Several objections can be raised to this reasoning. Matilda clearly did not accept her deposition when it occurred, and continued to dispose of her property. There is no reason that she would refrain from exercising her office in the face of opposition. There is also no reason to think that such a grant would not be honored even if Matilda were to be deposed. Henry IV was as anxious as the pope for the good will of the abbot of Montecassino. He had his own Norman policy.[22] It is much more likely that the king would confirm such a gift, or reissue it in his own name, rather than revoke it. Even if the grant were of no immediate practical use, it could be recalled and put to use years or generations later. The giving of such rewards to a valued ally seems a logical move on Matilda's part. The acceptance of it would imply recognition of her right to give it.

Montecassino was no stranger in Tuscany. The monastery had a daughter house in Lucca and another daughter house and several churches on Sardinia. These holdings made an immunity in Tuscany doubly valuable.[23] Despite the precariousness of Matilda's position, the dating of 1080-81 is reasonable

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[21]Urkunden Mathilde, p. 189, date the breaking away of Pisa from Matilda to March of 1081, without citation. The generous grant of privileges issued by Henry IV for Pisa proves that the city supported the king, but does not give a date for any specific act of rebellion against Matilda. Diplomata Henry IV, no. 336, pp. 442-43.

[22]See p. 140.

[23]Cowdrey, Abbot Desiderius, pp. 10-11.

for this immunity.

Another letter from Gregory to Desiderius records more of Matilda's activities on the pope's behalf. Henry IV had contacted Robert Guiscard and proposed a marriage alliance between his son and another of the duke's numerous daughters with the march of Fermo as a further inducement. The pope had this information from Matilda who in turn had obtained it from someone among the king's intimates (a familiaribus ipsius).[24]

The same letter passes along Gregory's knowledge of Henry's army and is the only description of the king's forces at this time. He has only a small following from Germany and Lombardy[25] and is collecting his army from Ravenna and the march of Fermo. Gregory's comments on Henry's supply problems have been questioned because the king quickly arrived at Rome, and the sources say nothing about shortages of food.[26] If Gregory meant that Henry would

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[24]Registrum 9.11 (May 1081), pp. 588-89. Since the king no doubt had finished his recruitment by that time, Gregory's letter must date from the first ten days of May.

[25]After his stay in Verona, Henry travelled to Milan where his presence is recorded on 14 April, and then to Pavia. The precise date of his stay is Pavia is not known. He was in Ravenna by early May and left again shortly after May 8 which is the last date on which Archbishop Guibert's presence is recorded. Given this time frame, the troop callup was probably begun by the archbishop.

[26]Registrum 9.11, p. 588. "Quod fieri minime credimus, quoniam nec etiam fotrum (ab his), per quos transitum habet, habere potest." The question turns on the interpretation of the phrase "ab his" which is inserted above the line in a different hand.

be refused supplies, he was wrong since almost all of the cities of Tuscany supported, or at least did not actively oppose the king.[27] He was thus presumably adequately supplied. If, however, the pope was merely commenting on the lack of available supplies between Ravenna and Vallombrosa on the upper Arno, where Henry stopped in mid-May, he was quite correct. Since Gregory knew that Henry planned to celebrate Pentecost at Rome,[28] and was doubtless familiar with the territory between Ravenna and Rome as well as the time frame, he could easily guess the route to be taken as well as the difficulties involved.

Rangerius is the only source for Henry's stop at Vallombrosa, and his description of the king travelling quickly by difficult routes and arriving, tired, to set up his camp in Vallombrosa is consistent with the terrain.[29] Since Henry was obviously supplied in Ravenna, the problem was not lack of food, but the limits on what could be car-

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[27]Robert Davidsohn, Geschichte von Florenz 1 (Berlin, 1896) pp. 264-270; Meyer von Knonau, Jahrbücher Heinrich IV. 3, pp. 398-400.

[28]Registrum 9.11, p. 588; Benzo of Alba, Ad Heinricum IV imperatorum libri VII, ed. K. Pertz, MGH Scriptores 11 (Hanover, 1854) bk. 6, preface, p. 656.

[29]Rangerius of Lucca, Vita Anselmi, bk. 3, chap. 1, ll. 4271-72, p. 1246. Alfred Overmann, "Die Vita Anselmi Lucensis episcopus des Rangerius," Neues Archiv der Gesellschaft für ältere deutsche Geschichtskunde 21 (1895-96) pp. 430-31, and Meyer von Knonau, Jahrbücher Heinrich IV. 3, pp. 380-81, place the event in May; Overmann's argument for May on the basis of terrain and the king's known itinerarium for July, when Vallombrosa was not on his direct route, is convincing. Sander, Der Kampf, did not have the evidence of Rangerius and concludes that Henry escorted Guibert to Rome, p. 81, n. 2.

ried across the mountains. The army needed to move quickly and reach pasturage before their available supplies ran out. Rangerius also reports that a delegation out of Lucca came to the king at Vallombrosa to ask his confirmation of the subdeacon Peter as bishop of Lucca, which was granted.[30] It is likely that Henry had also made arrangements to be resupplied at Vallombrosa. Another likely point on his itinerarium is Arezzo where a certain Teuzo, son of Guimild of Dorna, asked Henry to restore land that Matilda had unjustly taken from him and his brothers.[31]

Rangerius does not mention the large monastery at Vallombrosa. The monks were vigorous supporters of reform and had once forced the removal of a bishop supported by Beatrice and Godfrey, Peter Mezzabarba of Florence, on the grounds of simony.[32]

Rangerius also notes that Archbishop Guibert was not at Vallombrosa.[33] The date of Guibert's arrival at Rome is

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[30]Rangerius of Lucca, Vita Anselmi, bk. 3, chap. 1, ll. 4275-80, p. 1246; Meyer von Knonau, Jahrbücher Heinrich IV. 3, pp. 381-82.

[31]Diplomata Henry IV, no. 332, p. 436. Meyer von Knonau, Jahrbücher Heinrich IV. 3, pp. 395-96, n. 84.

[32]Yoram Milo, "Dissonance between Papal and Local Reform Interests in Pre-Gregorian Tuscany," Studi Medievali, 3rd ser., 20 (1979) pp. 69-86.

[33]Rangerius of Lucca, Vita Anselmi, bk. 3, chap. 1, l. 4273, p. 1246.

uncertain, but he was there by Pentecost, 23 May.[34] He is not recorded at Ravenna from 8 May to December.[35] Neither is the precise date of Robert Guiscard's show of force at Tivoli known, but it had to be between early May, when Gregory wrote to Abbot Desiderius to ask for Robert's action, and 20 May, when Robert departed for the east. Tivoli was well fortified, and Archbishop Guibert would eventually establish his headquarters there. Norman troops based in Tivoli could have opposed Henry's approach or used it as a base to harass his camp outside the city. The king's forced march across the mountains may have been decided on when he heard that Robert Guiscard was at Tivoli. Rangerius specifies that Guibert of Ravenna was not at Vallombrosa. The assumption is that the archbishop travelled along the Via Flaminia, the main road, at a more sedate pace. Henry's reconnaissance would assure that the road was open.

Since both routes approach Rome from the north, the purpose of dividing his forces could not have been to out-

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[34]Presumably the other ecclesiastics at Henry's Pentecost court, held in his camp in the Fields of Nero outside Rome, travelled with Guibert. Benzo of Alba, Ad Heinricum, bk. 6, preface, pp. 656-57, mentions, in addition to himself and Guibert, Tedald of Milan and the deposed Manasses of Rheims. Since one of Benzo's purposes is to contrast the peaceful king with the warlike pope, there is no mention of any troops that came with these bishops. Sander, Der Kampf, pp. 81-82; Meyer von Knonau, Jahrbücher Heinrich IV. 3, p. 386, n. 71, assumes that, in addition to the bishops, the nobles who appear in Henry's later Italian charters and his son Conrad were present at Rome in 1081 although they do not appear in the charters that Henry issued at Rome.

[35]Ingrid Heidrich, Ravenna unter Erzbischof Wibert (1073-1100) (Sigmaringen, 1984) p. 74.

flank any opposition based at Tivoli. Presumably the king arrived sometime before the archbishop in order to have his camp established in time to hold a Pentecost court, and this was accomplished while the second force remained some distance away but ready to provide relief if needed. As it turned out, there was no opposition. Robert Guiscard was on his way across the Adriatic to attack the cities along the coast of Byzantium, and Pope Gregory had to rely on the considerable protection afforded by the walls of Rome and the good will of the Roman people who had so enthusiastically proclaimed him pope.[36]

Henry also hoped for the good will of the Roman people. His approach to the city was by means of diplomacy rather than siege engines of which, apparently, he had none.[37] Instead, a letter was sent to the clergy and people of Rome.[38] The king expresses gratitude for the good will that the Romans had shown to his father and blames his long minority (etatis inbecillitas) and the rebellion in Germany (furor tyrannice perfidie) for his failure to come to Rome sooner. He wonders why the Romans had not sent the customary delegation of greeting when his legates announced his coming.

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[36]Cowdrey, Pope Gregory VII, pp. 27-74 details Gregory's long career at Rome. He thus had the considerable advantage of being considered a Roman by the Romans.

[37]Cowdrey, Pope Gregory VII, p. 213; I[an] S[tuart] Robinson, Henry IV of Germany, 1056-1106 (Cambridge, 1999) p. 213.

[38]Briefe, no. 16, pp. 22-23.

Rather than threatening war he assures them of his desire for the peaceful end to the discord between the Empire and the papacy (discordia regni et sacerdotii).[39] Neither Gregory VII nor Guibert of Ravenna is mentioned by name. This has led scholars to conclude that the king was keeping his options open to the point that he would abandon the claims of Guibert of Ravenna if Gregory VII would consent to lift the excommunication and perform the imperial coronation.[40]

What Henry intended to accomplish at this juncture is unclear. He may have been lead to underestimate Gregory's position at Rome, either by the excommunicated cardinal, Hugh Candidus, or by the success of his dealings in Lombardy and Tuscany.[41] It is not likely that he expected the powerful Roman families that had formerly controlled the papal office to rise up in favor of Guibert of Ravenna, nor is there evidence to suggest that Henry would favor a return to the situation that existed when his father intervened to appoint the first reform popes. That he had made approaches to likely allies within Rome is unquestioned, but in the summer of 1081 these efforts had had no results.

Henry was an experienced military leader and had been

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[39]Royal propaganda laid great emphasis on the contrasting images of Henry IV as a lover of peace and the pope as warlike and unwilling to accede to reasonable conditions. I[an] S[tuart] Robinson, Authority and Resistance in the Investiture Contest (New York, 1978) pp. 89-99.

[40]Cowdrey, Pope Gregory VII, p. 213; Robinson, Henry IV, p. 213.

[41]For Hugh Candidus see chapter 1, p. 60; on Henry's Tuscan policy, see chapter 2, pp. 99 ff.

laying plans for an Italian expedition for some years; he had not set out for Rome without knowledge of the situation. He came with no siege engines because in 1081 he had no intention of undertaking a siege. If the negotiations with Robert Guiscard had been successful, the Normans would have provided siege equipment. An offer of marriage into the imperial family seems a high price for such military support, but for the moment the Normans, especially Robert Guiscard, were the only force able to threaten Henry's operations at Rome. After having negotiated a marriage into the Byzantine imperial family, Robert could not accept one of Henry's illegitimate sons. Henry had only one legitimate son while Robert had several daughters. The problem was that Conrad was still a child of seven; it would be years before the promised marriage could take place, and Robert knew from experience that much could happen in that time. He may well have estimated that if Henry failed in his mission at Rome his position in Germany would be so threatened that the March of Fermo would be relatively easy to take, perhaps with the blessing of a grateful pope. The duke also realized that without his siege engines, the king had no chance to seriously threaten Rome's defenses. By not allying himself with Henry, Robert Guiscard had already done a great deal in the pope's defense; he would not miss the opportunity that Byzantine affairs offered merely to save Gregory an uncomfortable summer.

As it turned out, Henry's stay outside Rome in 1081 was brief. He arrived on 21 May and his last known action at Rome was to grant a number of important privileges for Lucca on 23 June.[42] After leaving Rome the king travelled through Tuscany, stopping at Siena where, on 10 July, he had to undo what had earlier been done at Arezzo by returning to the cathedral chapter of Arezzo the land granted to Teuzo of Dorna who claimed that Matilda had unjustly dispossessed him. The chapter also received a number of privileges including a release from the duty of supplying the fodrum.[43] Henry next went to Pisa where a number of privileges, similar to those already granted to Lucca, were given.[44]

The king is next reported at Lucca on 19-21 July. In addition to deposing and dispossessing Matilda,[45] Henry assigned the march of Fermo and the duchy of Spoleto to Rainer II of the Guidonid family.[46] Robert Guiscard had missed his chance. Ugiccio of the Cadolingi put his troops at the

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[42]Diplomata Henry IV, no. 334, pp. 437-39.

[43]Diplomata Henry IV, no. 335, pp. 439-41.

[44]Diplomata Henry IV, no. 336, pp.442-43. The date is uncertain; the king is assumed to be travelling the most obvious route from Rome to Lucca.

[45]Meyer von Knonau, Jahrbücher Heinrich IV. 3, pp. 394-97; chapter 2, p. 123, n. 128.

[46]Meyer von Knonau, Jahrbücher Heinrich IV. 3, pp. 393-94; on the Guidonids, chapter 2, p. 103.

king's disposal.[47] Peter was invested as bishop of Lucca, and given command of the militia of the city.[48]

Henry then disappeared from the record for more than four months; his next known location is Parma in December. He was presumably trying to enforce his decrees against Matilda of Tuscany. Sources from both sides of the conflict agree that Matilda rather than Gregory bore the brunt of Henry's campaign. Benzo of Alba mockingly describes Matilda stuck in Canossa, wringing her hands and mourning for her lost possessions. Things are going to get worse, he predicts. The king deprives her of castles, curtes and monasteries; Matilda loses so much that Benzo's pen cannot write it all down; he is not from the region and doesn't know the names of the places.[49]

Benzo is not attempting to provide a chronologically

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[47]Rangerius of Lucca, Vita Anselmi, bk. 3, chap. 2, ll. 4799-4800, p. 1257. Rangerius speaks well of Ugiccio despite this action because he quickly repented; chapter 2, pp. 102-03.

[48]Rangerius of Lucca, Vita Anselmi, bk. 3, chap. 2, ll. 4789-4794, p. 1257. Rangerius also reports, ll. 4825-29, p. 1257, that Guibert of Ravenna consecrated Peter, but it was unlikely to have been at the same time as the archbishop does not appear among the numerous ecclesiastics and laity in the charters that Henry issued at Lucca.

[49]Benzo of Alba, Ad Heinricum, bk. 6, chap. 4, p. 663.
Post hec transit per Mathildam, stantem in Canussia,
Contorquentem manus suas pro amissa Tuscia;
Sed adhuc expectat eam acrior angustia.
Ad se traxit rex castella, cortes et cenobia;
Cui rerum serviebat diversarum copia,
Huic, rege faciente, adsistit inopia.
Tanta perdidit Mathilda, residens in cellula,
Quanta nequit explicare mea scribens pennula,
Quia sum ignarus loci, non sum de gubernula.

consistent narrative. The actions described took place in 1082,[50] but the taking of valuable revenue-producing possessions, castles, curtes and monasteries, are what would be expected in 1081 as well.

Benzo also tells only one side of the story. According to Rangerius, Matilda is not spending much time in her little room, passively enduring the king's attacks. She is on the offensive. Indeed, she is the reason his presence at Rome has been ineffective. Henry wants to subdue Rome, but, Matilda, whom he fears, thunders at his back, and he hesitates to commit himself to uncertain war.[51]

Rangerius' description is sound. The possibility of a relief attack is one of the constant weaknesses in the position of any besieging force, the other being the need to procure supplies. Matilda suffered a defeat some months previously, and she had lost control of a number of important cities, but significant bases of operations and sources of revenue, her numerous castles, were still in her possession. Rangerius describes the most obvious use to make of her remaining military capacity.

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[50]See pp. 154 ff.

[51]Rangerius of Lucca, Vita Anselmi, bk. 2, chap. 3, ll. 3545-3550, p. 1231.

Ergo furente manu quasi vento et sulphuris ygne
Henricus fauces occupat Italiae
Et, quamvis cupiat capud orbis perdere Romam
Et faciant illi sola secunda moram,
Sustinet incerto se non comittere Marti,
Dum tonat a tergo femina, quam metuit.

The sources do not describe any attack made on Henry's encampment; Henry's Italian allies do not appear in the charters he issued during his stay outside Rome. One possible explanation is that they were occupied with efforts to neutralize Matilda. The marquises Adalbert, Rainer and Hugo first appear in the charters issued at Lucca on 20 July.[52] After a month outside Rome, the king went north to secure his position in Tuscany and to eliminate his only active opponent, first by a judicial sentence and then by arms.

The only description of these actions comes from Rangerius. As can be expected, he does not describe a fretful, hand-wringing Matilda. Instead, she is hitting Henry's supplies by night, carrying off food virtually at will, thus feeding her own people and safeguarding her own plunder.[53]

Rangerius may paint too rosy a picture of the day-to-day business of war, but the activities described are cer-

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[52]Diplomata Henry IV, nos. 338-339, pp. 445-448. A number of royalist bishops also first appear in these charters. Some, like Tedald of Milan, were also at the Pentecost court outside Rome. Only Burchard of Lausanne, the imperial chancellor for the kingdom of Italy, appeared throughout; he had apparently accompanied the king from Rome. Guibert of Ravenna is not mentioned. The identity of Adalbert, Rainer and Hugo is discussed in chapter 2, pp. 99-111.

[53]Rangerius of Lucca, Vita Anselmi, bk. 2, chap. 3, ll. 3779-86, p. 1236.

Porro Matildae praedas de nocte videmus,
Unde cibum tollat quilibet ordo domus.
Tollit ab Henrico nocturna strenuitate,
Unde suos pascit et tegit atque suas,
Dum videt Henricum per tot mala facta perire
Et Guibertinum cernit abesse malum;
Quos dum persequitur et praemonet esse cavendos,
Mundat in illorum sanguine laeta manus.

tainly among the most common practices of eleventhth-century warfare. Matilda's effectiveness is shown by the report that in 1082 Henry's supporters forced him to lift the siege of Rome in order to go north to campaign against Matilda.[54] Thus Benzo's chortling over her tears and anguish because of the reprisals.

Both Henry and Matilda fought a campaign of destructive raids that served both to deprive the other of supplies and to weaken the morale of the opposition by demonstrating one's own effectiveness and the enemy's vulnerability. The king's long-term planning built a network of supporters that was sufficient to prevent Matilda from making any direct attack on his line of march or his encampment. She, however, remained effective enough to defend her holdings and attack the king's supporters. The failure of the attempt to win the Normans to his side left the king unable to undertake any offensive actions at Rome. Gregory's supporters within Rome, such as the Pierleoni and the Frangipani, could not undertake independent action.[55] The situation was a stalemate.

If Henry was to be able to undertake an attack on Rome the following year, he had to subdue Matilda of Tuscany. The remainder of the year was spent in the kind of tedious and difficult mountain campaigning described centuries earlier

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[54]See pp. 157-60.

[55]Cowdrey, Pope Gregory VII, p. 7, 51-52; Demetrius Zema, "The Houses of Tuscany and of Pierleone in the Crisis of Rome in the Eleventh Century," Traditio 2 (1944) pp. 155-175.

by Livy. The Apennines were described as a harsh and mountainaous region seemingly designed to keep armies sharp, where "there was nothing but arms and men who put all their trust in arms." The same enemy had to be defeated over and over; if the Ligurians were forced to abandon one fortified position, they took up another.[56]

That none of these actions has left any specific record suggests that both sides refrained from violence against religious persons or property. Partisan writers such as Benzo of Alba or Rangerius would be expected to either leave out unpleasant details, or to emphasize the outrages perpetrated by their opponents, but there is no mention of such violence from either side. The monastic records are equally silent, suggesting that both sides exercised restraint. This eliminates one valuable source of information. Henry's whereabouts are unknown from late July until early December. Matilda's itinerarium for 1081 is unknown.

While Henry campaigned in the Apennines, Hermann of Salm was elected as anti-king in Germany early in August.[57] Hermann's election was to prove irrelevant to the struggle between Henry IV and Gregory VII. His only contribution to the war was that for a time gregorians in Italy expected

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[56]Livy, Ab Urbe Condita, bk. 39, chaps. 1-2, pp. 218-223, in Livy in Fourteen Volumes with an English Translation 11, The Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge MA and London, 1965).

[57] Bruno of Magdeburg, De Bello Saxonico, chaps. 130-31, p. 384, ends his narrative with Hermann's coronation; Meyer von Knonau, Jahrbücher Heinrich IV. 3, p. 417.

that he would come to their aid, but he never established himself securely enough to do so.[58]

Another factor now came into play, the Byzantine emperor, Alexius Comnenus. Fully aware of what he faced, Alexius acted on many fronts to ward off the Norman invasion, and proved a match for Robert Guiscard, despite an initial defeat on 18 October at Durazzo (Dyrrachium).[59] Gregory VII congratulated Robert on his victory and reminded him of his duty to St. Peter.[60] Alexius took a number of measures intended to weaken Robert Guiscard's ability to further encroach on Byzantine territory. In the summer of 1081 he brokered a truce with the Seljuk Turks and tried to hire them to fight against the Normans. He entered into an agreement with the Venetians that paid for naval support with trading concessions. Alexius, clearly well-informed about Italian politics, encouraged unrest in Robert's Italian territories. Finally, Alexius formed an alliance with Henry

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[58]Bernold of St. Blasien, Chronicon, ed. G.H. Pertz, MGH Scriptores 5, a. 1082, p. 437, reports Hermann's desire to go to Rome. Cowdrey, Pope Gregory VII, pp. 217-18; Robinson, Henry IV, pp. 208-210, shows Hermann, previously unknown, to be a compromise candidate elected due to the rivalry between Otto of Nordheim and Welf of Bavaria.

[59]William B. McQueen, "Relations between the Normans and Byzantium 1071-1112," Byzantion 56 (1986) pp. 427-476, places the invasion of 1081 in the broader context of Norman-Byzantine relations. The initial reaction to the Normans' rise to power in Italy was to try to bring them under Byzantine influence and control.

[60]Registrum 9.17 (18 October 1081) pp. 597-98. Gregory also writes that there is no seal on the letter due to the danger of theft and forgery.

IV that put large amounts of money into Henry's hands.[61]

The level of conflict rose in 1082. Henry returned in February, better prepared to undertake operations at Rome. His letter to the Romans blames Gregory VII, "Lord Hildebrand," for the current state of affairs which he, Henry, is most willing to end. He asks the Romans to force Hildebrand to face judgement for his wrongdoing. He cites the failure of Rudolf of Rheinfelden's rebellion as a judgement of God against Hildebrand's attempt to depose a lawful king. He calls upon the Romans to show him the fidelity they showed his father and grandfather or to give the reasons for their refusal. He then calls upon Gregory not to be ashamed to humble himself to end the scandalum of a church divided in arms, and not to fear justice as he, Henry, will guarantee a fair hearing.[62] The Romans did not open the gates.

This time Henry was prepared to enforce his requests, and began a siege of the city and consequent ravaging of the countryside. An attack on the Leonine city was repelled

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[61]Cowdrey, Abbot Desiderius, p. 149; idem, Pope Gregory VII, p. 436. The information on the emperor's dealings is supplied by Anna Comnena, Alexiad, bk. 3, chaps. 10-11, pp. 126-130. Jonathan Shepard, "'Father' or 'Scorpion'? Style and Substance in Alexios's Diplomacy," in Alexios I Komnenos, vol. 1, Papers, Margaret Mullett and Dion Smythe, eds. (Belfast, 1996) pp. 68-132, gives an overview of Alexius's diplomacy which was a sophisticated blend of the carrot and the stick. The alliance with henry will eventually fail. T.C. Lounghis, "The Failure of the Germano-Byzantine Alliance on the Eve of the first Crusade," in XVe Congrès international des études Byzantines: Athens 1976 (Athens, 1980) pp. 198-207, puts the alliance of Henry IV and Alexius Comnenus into the long history of Germano-Byzantine diplomacy.

[62]Briefe, no. 17, pp. 24-26; Cowdrey, Pope Gregory VII, pp. 218-20, notes the similarity to Henry's position at Canossa.

although the wall was breached.[63] Specific dates are known for only a few of the events of the 1082 campaign, but working from this limited base allows a more complete picture to be constructed. Henry did not stay long at Rome. On 17 March he was at the imperial monastery of Farfa, northeast of Rome, 23 km. (13.8 mi.) south-southwest of Rieti, where he was received by the monks and restored to Abbot Bernard a castle that had been taken by Rusticus Crescentius.[64] The king celebrated Easter at Albano, southeast of Rome. Desiderius of Montecassino reluctantly obeyed the king's summons to the Easter court although he refused as diplomatically as possible to break the prohibitions on contacts with excommunicates and, especially, to receive his abbey from the king's hands.[65]

Sometime before Easter, Henry had also scored a major diplomatic success. Jordan of Capua broke ranks with Robert Guiscard and accepted his lands as an imperial fief, giving

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[63]Bernold of St. Blasien, Chronicon, a. 1082, p. 437; Benzo of Alba, Ad Heinricum, bk. 6, preface, p. 658; Bonizo of Sutri, Liber ad amicum, ed. Ernst Dummler, MGH Libelli 1 (Hanover, 1891) bk. 9, p. 613. A number of questions arise from these varied sources for the king's itinerarium. Sander, Der Kampf, pp. 187-91; Meyer von Knonau, Jahrbücher Heinrich IV. 3, pp. 432-33.

[64]Gregory of Catino, Historiae Farfenses, ed. L.C. Bethmann, MGH Scriptores 11 (Hanover, 1854) p. 561; Meyer von Knonau, Jahrbücher Heinrich IV. 3, p. 440.

[65]Cowdrey, Abbot Desiderius, pp. 154-58, details the abbot's difficult position and his considerable political skills.

his son as a hostage along with a large sum of money.[66] In addition to the Norman tribute Henry received a large sum of money from Alexius Comnenus, good, old silver coins equivalent to 144,000 pieces of gold and many other valuable gifts, with the promise of an additional 216,000 gold pieces when Henry took an oath that had previously been agreed upon.[67] The alliance was intended to distract Robert Guiscard from his campaign in the East by enabling Henry to undertake operations against Gregory's ally, Robert, on his home territory. The armed presence of a king with a good claim to the same territory could be a rallying point for those dissatisfied with the rule of Robert Guiscard.

Anna Comnena's lengthy quotation from her father's letter describing the gifts sent to Henry IV is placed with her description of the events of 1081, but since the letter refers to prior negotiations that could not have taken place before Alexius assumed the imperial title in April of 1081, the sending of the gifts must date to 1082 or even 1083.[68]

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[66]William of Apulia, Gesta Roberti Wiscardi, ed. R. Wilmans, MGH Scriptores 9 (Hanover, 1851) bk. 5, p. 293; Meyer von Knonau, Jahrbücher Heinrich IV. 3, pp. 441-446; Cowdrey, Pope Gregory VII, p. 437; Robinson, Henry IV, pp. 218-220. Robinson's statement that Jordan was a faithful supporter of Henry for the rest of his life, p. 219, contrasts with Cowdrey's description of Jordan's support for Desiderius when the abbot succeeded Gregory VII as pope in 1086, Abbot Desiderius, pp. 192-93, 195. Henry IV still supported Guibert of Ravenna.

[67]Anna Comnena, Alexiad, bk. 3, chap. 10, pp. 126-128.

[68]Cowdrey, Abbot Desiderius, p. 152 dates the sending of the money to 1082; Robinson, Henry IV, prefers 1083, pp. 222-23. Benzo of Alba, Ad Heinricum, bk. 6, chap. 4, p. 664, describes Alexius's gifts after his discussion of the events of the summer of 1082,

Alexius's plans worked. The city of Durazzo fell to the Normans on 21 February. Robert Guiscard then returned to Italy in April of 1082, leaving his son, Bohemond, to hold out against Alexius Comnenus. The reason for Robert's hasty return was news of unrest in Apulia, stirred up by Alexius and encouraged by Henry's presence. Robert feared the possibility of an alliance between his opponents in Italy.

There was no encounter between Henry IV and Robert Guiscard. Henry left the region of Rome to go north to campaign against Matilda of Tuscany. Benzo of Alba reports that Henry's army insisted on this move.[69] What Benzo does not give is the reason for such insistence. Simple greed, the desire to take possession of Matilda's holdings, does not explain the timing. It is much more likely that Matilda had resumed the offensive, and was threatening their own holdings. That this was not simply a continuation of the previous year's warfare is suggested by an event that took place at Rome on 4 May when Gregory's efforts to raise money for his defense were rebuffed by his own supporters.[70] Canon law clearly forbad the selling of church property "for the purpose of resisting Guibert, the archbishop of Ravenna, who is attempting to invade the Roman see," an invasion that was

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[69]Benzo of Alba, Ad Heinricum, bk. 6, preface, p. 658.

[70]Zelina Zafarana, "Sul 'conventus' del clero romano nel maggio 1082," Studi Medievali, ser. 3, vol. 7 (1966) pp. 398-403; Sander, Der Kampf, pp. 203-206.

considered "secular warfare."[71]

Matilda of Tuscany and Anselm of Lucca moved to supply the needed money. There is no record of Gregory's asking for the money, but Benzo of Alba, ever alert for an opportunity to expose Gregory's perfidy, records that he instructed "the two Habbakuks" who stripped the monasteries and handed over the wealth to "Prandellus."[72]

There are two records of the operation. On 18 October 1102, in the presence of a papal legate, Matilda gave three castles, two curtes and other property in the county of Ferrara to the abbey of Nonantula as a recompense for its losses (ad restaurationem thesauri) during the time when the Holy See was beset by armed opposition.[73] The other monastery known to have contributed to Gregory's war chest was that of St. Apollonius at Canossa where Matilda's grandparents and great-grandparents were buried. The valuables of the church, when melted down, produced seventy pounds of silver and nine of gold.[74]

The precise date of Henry's departure from Rome is not

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[71]Zafarana, "Sul 'conventus'," pp. 402-03, gives the full text.

[72]Benzo of Alba, Ad Heinricum, bk. 6, chap. 4, p. 663. The varied meanings of "opes," including military and political resources were doubtless known to Benzo.

[73]Urkunden Mathilde, no. 71, pp. 208-212.

[74]"De Thesauro Canusinae Ecclesiae Romam transmisso et di compensatione Ecclesiae Canusinae facta," in Vita Mathildis Celeberrimae Principis Italiae: Carmine Scripta a Donizone Presbytero, ed. Luigi Simeoni, RIS² 5.2 (Bologna, 1930-40; rpt. Turin, 1973) pp. 190-110.

known, but it would have to have been by early summer. After the Easter court in Albano his next precisely known location is Pavia on 23 July.[75] The Roman operation was left in the hands of Guibert of Ravenna, based at Tivoli. The irony of the pope supported by the peaceloving king conducting military operations did not escape the barbs of Bonizo of Sutri who, paraphrasing I Maccabees 7.21, describes Guibert who "like Alcimus did enough for his bishopric."[76] The king went north by way of Rimini.[77] The route suggests that Henry avoided crossing the Apennines where Matilda was strongest and attacked her holdings in the north where cutting off her revenues would weaken the morale of her troops.

Benzo also reports that the king's mother-in-law, Adelheid of Turin, attempted to act as a mediator between the king and Matilda. The only specific action mentioned is that undertaken against Guido of Sezze, but whether this was on his own behalf or that of Adelheid is unclear. Guido, of the family of the Aleramids, was at one time an ally of the countess Adelheid.[78] The sequence of these events, related

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[75]Diplomata Henry IV, no. 345, pp. 456-57. The king repeated a grant to the church of Aquileia.

[76]Bonizo of Sutri, Liber ad amicum, bk. 9, p. 613. That "satis ago" can also mean paying off a creditor was no doubt intended.

[77]Only Benzo of Alba, Ad Heinricum, bk. 6, chap. 4, p. 663, mentions the route via Rimini.

[78]Benzo of Alba, Ad Heinricum, bk. 6, chap. 4, p. 663; Meyer von Knonau, Jahrbücher Heinrich IV. 3, p. 458; Petri Crassi defensio Heinrici IV regis, ed. L. De Heinemann, MGH Libelli 1, verse 17, p. 434, also mentions Guido among the enemies of the king; for Adelheid see,

only by Benzo, is uncertain.[79]

While Henry was trying to subdue Matilda, whether by arms or by diplomacy, Matilda sent substantial amounts of precious metal to a cash-starved Gregory. This would no doubt have been harder to accomplish if Henry's full strength were focused on Rome. It is difficult not to assume that the offensive actions that had caused Henry's followers to insist on the campaign against Matilda were undertaken for exactly that purpose. The king thus paid a high price for the castles and monasteries he took from Matilda.

Henry was at Pisa on 2-4 August.[80] This is the best evidence that his campaign against Matilda was as determined, and successful, as Benzo claims. In order to reach Pisa from Pavia within the time available, the king must have travelled by the Via Francigena. Matilda was no longer able to bar this route to him. Matilda's only surely known position in the summmer of 1082 is Zola Predosa, 10.5 km. (6.3 mi.) west of Bologna, where on 7 July, she issued a charter making a number of land grants for rent payments in the region of Nonantola.[81]

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chapter 1, pp. 44-46.

[79]For Benzo's chronology, see p. 164.

[80]Diplomata Henry IV, no. 346, pp. 457-58.

[81]Urkunden Mathilde, no. 34, pp. 120-23. Since the castle and curtis of Zola Predosa was called "Cellula" at that time, Benzo's description of Matilda "residens in cellula" may be quite accurate, although he also describes her only six lines previously as "stantem in Canussia" so there may be no wordplay intended. The timing of the

Henry's presence at Pisa also gives an approximate date for the unsuccessful siege of Florence reported by the earliest historians of that city.[82] The gregorian polemicist, Bishop Bonizo of Sutri, was driven from his see and taken prisoner in 1082.[83] Whether this was connected to Henry's presence in Tuscany is not known. Sutri lies closer to Rome and Guibert of Ravenna may have thought it prudent to remove a vocal opponent.

That Matilda would have wanted to turn Henry away from Tuscany is suggested by Rangerius's description of the siege of Moriana. This episcopal fortress just upriver from Lucca was still held by supporters of the exiled Bishop Anselm. Anselm had left the castle garrisoned when he departed to join Matilda's entourage in 1081.[84] Rangerius tells how Anselm supplemented the castle's walls and towers with

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charter is suggestive. Perhaps a detailed investigation of the areas and persons involved would reveal a connection between the land transactions and the commandeering of Nonantola's valuables. Nonantola was a possession of the archbishops of Milan, but lay well within Matilda's territory. The irony of taking valuables from Tedald to send to Gregory was no doubt appreciated.

[82]Meyer von Knonau, Jahrbücher Heinrich IV. 3, pp. 454-55; similarly, Robert Davidsohn, Forschungen zur älteren Geschichte von Florenz, (Berlin, 1896; rpt. Osnabruck, 1973) Sander, Der Kampf, p. 96, prefers 1081. The dating of this action to late July is no longer tenable. Sources not available in the 1890s show that Henry IV was in Pavia at this time, Diplomata Henry IV, no. 346, pp. 457-58, but the change is a matter of a few weeks.

[83]Bernold of St. Blasien, Chronicon, a. 1082, 437; G[iovanni] Miccoli, "Bonizone," DBI 12, p. 247.

[84]Cowdrey, Pope Gregory VII, p. 305; Sander, Der Kampf, p. 89, n. 4; Rangerius of Lucca, Vita Anselmi, p. 1197, n. 7.

numerous relics. When the schismatic bishop, Peter, undertook a siege of Moriana, the defenders sent for help. Anselm's reply was that they were too much fearful and too little faithful. He had already provided all the help needed.[85]

Neither Henry IV nor Matilda came to Moriana, although Rangerius notes that the countess grieved for the besieged as though they were her children. He also reports the presence of a "strong troop of Normans."[86] Jordan of Capua was presumably fulfilling his promises to Henry.

The attackers set their siege engines in a fortified camp in a bend of the river which was, in midsummer, running very low.[87] Thus, when a surprise storm erupted from the cloudless sky, they were unprepared for the flash flood that swept the camp away. "Thus let them learn that Anselm can move God."[88]

Henry's activities in the autumn of 1082 were focussed on heading off an expected attack from Germany. He spent the

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[85]Rangerius of Lucca, Vita Anselmi, bk. 3, chap 2, ll. 4857-4966, pp. 1258-60; the gathering of the relics, ll. 4879-4884, pp. 1258-59; the plea for help and Anselm's response, ll. 4917-4932, pp. 1259-60.

[86]Rangerius of Lucca, Vita Anselmi, bk. 3, chap. 2, ll. 4905-06, p. 1259. Henry sent the Normans; therefore, he was not present himself. Matilda's grief, ll. 4925-26.

[87]Rangerius of Lucca, Vita Anselmi, bk. 3, chap. 2, ll. 4873-76, p. 1258; l. 4922, p. 1259.

[88]Rangerius of Lucca, Vita Anselmi, bk. 3, chap. 2, ll. 4947-4966, p. 1260. Anselm's ability to effect miracles by prayer, when he was not present himself, is a recurring theme in Rangerius; see chapter 4, pp. 00-00.

latter part of the year in Verona seeing to the security of the Alpine passes.[89] The march of Verona and the duchy of Carinthia were in hands of Henry's ally Liutold of Eppenstein. Things were going well in Germany. Hermann of Salm had gathered little support as anti-king and, after a victory at the Battle of Mailberg on 12 May, Henry's ally, Wratislaw of Bohemia, had the march of Austria firmly in his control. He then returned to the west and met with Tedald of Milan. Satisfied that his rear was protected, Henry returned to the siege of Rome at the end of the year.[90]

The gaps in what is known of Henry's location allow differing interpretations of his actions, but the overall picture is clear. At the behest of his followers, Henry undertook actions against Matilda. As a result she lost a great deal in terms of her material possessions although almost nothing is known of the specific locations. Henry also tried a diplomatic approach through his mother-in-law, Adelheid of Turin. Neither the timing, before or after the punitive expedition, nor any particulars of this effort, or whether the two women actually met, is known.

Even less is known of Matilda's whereabouts. There is no evidence that she left Lombardy at any time. She sent a

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[89]On 6 November Henry IV was at Palosco, southeast of Bergamo. By 15 November he was at Verona. Diplomata Henry IV, nos. 347, 348, pp. 459-61. The Verona charter is in favor of Bishop Henry of Trent whose see is located along the main route from the Brenner Pass. The king's location from August to November is not known.

[90]Meyer von Knonau, Jahrbücher Heinrich IV. 3, pp. 461-62.

shipment of precious metal to Gregory in Rome, but Henry's attacks ended her capacity for offensive actions.

The warfare against Matilda is reported in a number of sources, but only Benzo of Alba gives any details. His chronology is confusing. After reporting the king's departure from Rome by way of Rimini, Benzo first describes the actions against Matilda, whom he may place in two different locations. He then mentions the destruction of Sezze which he says took place in autumn.[91] Afterward comes the meeting of Adelheid and Henry, followed by the sending of treasure to Pope Gregory by Matilda and Anselm. Since Henry is known to have been in the north in both July and November, it is possible that Benzo is reporting the sequence of events accurately. The sending of treasure to Rome could have taken place while Henry was occupied in seeing to his security against attacks coming from Germany.

Conversely, and more likely, the attacks against Matilda and Guido of Sezze may be related one after the other as examples of Henry's military success. The dating of the action against Guido then distinguishes it from those against Matilda that presumably took place earlier, in midsummer. The sending of the treasure to Gregory, which need not have been accomplished in one large shipment, could have taken place during the summer or later in the year. The

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[91]Benzo of Alba, Ad Heinricum, bk. 6, chap. 4, p. 663. Ab aestate separato iam iam solis radio.

sources do not specify any date or season.

Similarly, the meeting with Adelheid could have taken place either in mid-summer or autumn. Adelheid's position on the western Alpine passes would make good relations with her vital beyond any capacity to broker a truce with Matilda. Even after the death of her husband, Godfrey the Hunchback, duke of Lower Lorraine, Matilda had lands inherited from her mother, Beatrice of Lorraine, and family connections in the Lorraine. That she was able to obtain revenue from these holdings and support from gregorians in the region is likely.[92] The position of Adelheid's territory on the passes between the Lorraine and Italy is seen as one factor in the marriage between Henry IV and Adelheid's daughter, Bertha.[93]

Matilda also had close kin in the county of Montbéliard which lies along the same route. Her cousin, Frederick, appears as a witness in Matilda's charters through 1083.[94] He was also Adelheid's grandson-in-law.[95] That the meeting between Henry and Adelheid had anything to do with Frederick's

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[92]On an unspecified date in 1083, Matilda confirmed the sale of some of her allodial property in the Lorraine to the abbey of St. James of Liège. Urkunden Mathilde, no. 37, pp. 129-30. She had, of course, been legally dispossessed of this and all of her property two years earlier. There is no indication of when the sale took place or of how and to whom the price was transferred.

[93]Robinson, Henry IV, p. 108.

[94]Chapter 2, p. 121. Urkunden Mathilde, no. 36, pp. 124-28.

[95]Robinson, Henry IV, p. 287. Frederick's son, Peter, was 10 years old when Frederick died in 1091. Therefore he was at this time already married to Adelheid's granddaughter and, despite the open warfare between Henry IV and Matilda, still witnessing his cousin's charters.

absence from Matilda's later charters cannot be determined from the sources. There is no explicit evidence that Frederick was involved in the war against Henry IV, but his presence with Matilda is suggestive.

The anti-king Hermann of Salm was of the Luxemburg family.[96] His family's lands were thus close to those of Matilda's maternal kin. If the anti-king Hermann were to appear in Italy, it would be embarrassing to Henry IV and make his position much more difficult. If nothing else, with Hermann in the field, the morale of the pope's supporters would improve. Thus, the meeting with Adelheid can also be seen as one part of Henry's efforts to protect himself against attacks coming from Germany. As matters turned out, the death on 11 January 1083 of Otto of Nordheim ended any possibility of unity among the king's opponents in Germany and simultaneously ended the threat of attack by Hermann.[97]

Robert Guiscard spent the summer of 1082 in his own territories securing his position.[98]

The focus of the campaign now shifts back to Rome where infusions of money to both sides along with the return of Robert Guiscard intensified the level of the conflict.[99]

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[96]Robinson, Henry IV, pp. 208-09.

[97]Meyer von Knonau, Jahrbücher Heinrich IV. 3, pp. 470, 501.

[98]Cowdrey, Abbot Desiderius, pp. 153-54.

[99]The sequence of events is given in Cowdrey, Pope Gregory VII, pp. 221-232; idem, Abbot Desiderius, pp. 165-172; Robinson, Henry IV, pp. 222-235.

Matilda of Tuscany is largely absent from the sources until mid-1084. What is known of her movements shows that she remained in the north. On 25 February 1083, at Carpineta, a castle high in the Apennines, she made land grants for rent payments in the region of Zola Predosa; on 10 May at Mantua she made gifts of land to the church of St. Michael.[100]

Henry IV returned to Rome during the winter of 1082-83. The exact date is uncertain, but that the king remained at Milan to hold a Christmas court is likely. Starting from the region of Milan, the logical route would have been by way of the Via Francigena and the Cisa Pass, routes that he had not used before the campaigns against Matilda. Conversely, a winter march through the mountains with a substantial number of troops and horses raises supply problems independent of any possibility of attack and the king may have travelled the longer route along the Po to Ravenna and then down the coast to tne Via Flaminia.[101] The presence of 1,000 troops sent by Tedald of Milan and his suffragans shows one result of Alexias Comnenus's financial help.[102] In January, however,

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[100]Urkunden Mathilde, nos. 35, 36, pp. 122-28. The lands donated to St. Michael of Mantua were in Canilia and Cazzano. The location of Canilia is not known. Cazzano is a short distance from Verona and thus far from Matilda's strongest positions. The march of Verona was held by Henry's supporter, Liutold of Eppenstein. A gift to the church of Mantua was likely to be respected despite Matilda's deposition.

[101]Sander, Der Kampf, p. 128, n. 2, discusses the conflicting sources for the dating of Henry's arrival at Rome.

[102]The number of troops (militibus mille) is specified by Landulf Senior, Historia Mediolanensis, ed. L.C. Bethmann and W. Wattenbach, MGH Scriptores 8 (Hanover, 1848) p. 99; Meyer von Knonau, Jahrbücher

Pope Gregory was able to travel to Benevento.[103] He may have hoped to persuade Robert Guiscard to move against Henry, but Robert was still unsatisfied with conditions in the south and did not come to Rome in 1083. Instead he sent the pope a large sum of money--30,000 gold solidi according to Lupus Protospatarius.[104]

Robert's efforts were directed instead against Henry's ally, Jordan of Capua. By June, Robert's efforts had paid off and he and Jordan were reconciled.[105]

Gregory's journey south suggests that Henry did not arrive at Rome in the dead of winter as Landulf's description of the frozen Po would suggest, but he was certainly there before March, well in time to interfere with the holding of a Lent synod.[106]

A further element must be considered, diplomacy. The Romans were by now sick of even a half-hearted siege, and

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Heinrich IV. 3, p. 461-62.

[103]Meyer von Knonau, Jahrbücher Heinrich IV. 3, p. 471.

[104]Lupus Protospatarius, Chronicon, ed. G.H. Pertz, MGH Scriptores 5, (Hanover, 1844) p. 61.

[105]Cowdrey, Abbot Desiderius, p. 165; cf. Robinson, Henry IV, p. 227, who finds that Robert and Jordan were still at odds in 1084; Meyer von Knonau, Jahrbücher Heinrich IV. 3, pp. 484-85, describes the campaign in Apulia, including a punitive expedition against Jordan, but no reconciliation.

[106]Registrum 9.35a, pp. 627-28; Meyer von Knonau, Jahrbücher Heinrich IV. 3, p. 473. In a later letter about the failed synod of November 1083, Gregory noted that Henry IV had hindered three Lent synods.

the existence of a peace party can be discerned.[107] Further, Henry was still interested in a diplomatic solution, and sent Bishop Benno of Osnabrück to conduct negotiations with Gregory.[108] Henry's godfather, Abbot Hugh of Cluny, who had intervened in his behalf at Canossa in 1077, also traveled to Rome as a mediator, but not until after Henry's troops had entered the city.[109]

Henry's forces, logically, remained concentrated around the Leonine City, a separate area across the Tiber and outside the larger central area of Rome.[110] On 3 June 1083, Henry gained access to the Leonine City, as much by Roman negligence in Gregory's words, or by bribery, as by force of arms.[111] Henry set up his court near St. Peter's in the palace of the Caesars, and began to reward his supporters.[112]

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[107]Bernold of St. Blasien, Chronicon, a. 1083, p. 438, speaks of the war-weariness of the Romans. After the taking of the Leonine City, Henry's dealings with the Romans become much clearer. Meyer von Knonau, Jahrbücher Heinrich IV. 3, p. 486-87; Robinson, Henry IV, 224-25.

[108]Meyer von Knonau, Jahrbücher Heinrich IV. 3, pp. 471-72; Cowdrey, Pope Gregory VII, p. 221; Robinson, Henry IV, p. 223.

[109]Cowdrey, Abbot Desiderius, p. 167.

[110]Appendix, fig. 2.

[111]Registrum, 9.35a, p. 628; Meyer von Knonau, Jahrbücher Heinrich IV. 3, pp. 472-478; Cowdrey, Pope Gregory VII, p. 222; Robinson, Henry IV, pp. 223-24. An anonymous henrician poem in honor of the occasion specifically mocks Matilda of Tuscany's failure to save Gregory either by money or force of arms, Petri Crassi defensio, verses 14-15, p. 434.

[112]Diplomata Henry IV, nos. 350, 351, pp. 461-64. The first of these charters is a donation to the abbey of Farfa, giving particular thanks to its patron, the Virgin Mary, for his victory. The second rewards the long and faithful service of Bishop Liemar of Bremen with the gift of the abbey of Elten and the renewing of other donations to

Alexius Comnenus sent further gifts.[113]

This was an inglorious end to a dull but workmanlike campaign, except that Gregory did not give up. The pope was safe, if trapped, in the Castel Sant'Angelo, and continued calls for diplomacy--a general synod to hear the case--and military action, but Robert Guiscard did not come to Rome.[114]

As was usual, Henry departed from Rome when the summer heat set in. He went north once again to campaign against Matilda. In July he set siege to her castle at Carpi, north of Modena.[115] Matilda's location at this time is not known. Henry was far safer campaigning in Lombardy than remaining at Rome. Before he left, Henry fortified the Palatiolus, a hill near St. Peter's that provided a view of the Castel Sant'Angelo. During the summer, the German garrison was wiped out by disease, and the Romans, despite the hostages that Henry held, razed the fortification.[116]

The planned synod, held in November, failed, due at

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his bishopric. For Liemar's role in the campaign, see chapter 2, p. 99.

[113]Meyer von Knonau, Jahrbücher Heinrich IV. 3, pp. 481-483.

[114]Epistolae vagantes, no. 51, pp. 122-25; Meyer von Knonau, Jahrbücher Heinrich IV. 3, pp. 484-85; Cowdrey, Pope Gregory VII, pp. 222-24.

[115]Meyer von Knonau, Jahrbücher Heinrich IV. 3, p. 491; Overmann, Gräfin Mathilde, p. 150. The section of the Chronicon Mutinensis cited by Meyer von Knonau and Overmann in the eighteenth-century edition of Muratori does not appear in subsequent editions. Cf. John of Bazzano, Chronicon Mutinensis, ed. Tommaso Casine, RIS² 15.4 (Bologna, 1917) pp. xiii-xiv.

[116]Meyer von Knonau, Jahrbücher Heinrich IV. 3, pp. 489-90; Cowdrey, Pope Gregory VII, p. 225.

least in part to Henry's concerted effort to keep Gregory's supporters away.[117]

Henry, however, was becoming less confident. The cost of the expedition, even with Alexius' help, led him to exact contributions from Germany wherever he was able to do so.[118] He finally abandoned hope of forcing Gregory to accept his terms and prepared to have Guibert of Ravenna consecrated as pope.

In February of 1084, Henry made a march into the Campania, toward Robert Guiscard's territory, but Robert did not respond to the provocation. Neither did he make any moves on Gregory's behalf.[119]

Gregory's support within Rome finally began to fail. A number of the cardinal clergy turned to support Guibert of Ravenna; others fled.[120] Guibert of Ravenna was consecrated as Pope Clement III on 24 March, and a week later, on Easter, Henry and Bertha received the imperial coronation.[121] Despite the relatively easy entry into Rome there was sporadic violence, and Henry had to offer compensation, but the

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[117]Registrum 9.35a, pp. 627-28; Meyer von Knonau, Jahrbücher Heinrich IV. 3, pp. 495-98; Cowdrey, Pope Gregory VII, pp. 225-26.

[118]Cowdrey, Pope Gregory VII, p. 227.

[119]Cowdrey, Pope Gregory VII, p. 227.

[120]Cowdrey, Pope Gregory VII, p. 228.

[121]Meyer von Knonau, Jahrbücher Heinrich IV. 3, pp. 529-35.

bad will lingered.[122]

It was only at this point that Gregory's appeals to Robert Guiscard were answered. Robert was satisfied that things were secure in Apulia and he had reason to fear Henry's ascendancy at Rome. It would at least endanger the hopes he still cherished for further expansion into Byzantine territory. Henry, having no further reason to stay, simply left the city on 21 May.[123] As Gregory VII had taken refuge in Castel Sant'Angelo, Clement III moved out to Tivoli to wait out the storm. Robert did rescue Gregory from Castel Sant'Angelo, and restored him to the Lateran palace, but when the duke encountered hostility from the Romans his troops looted and burned the city.[124] Some of the blame for the vilence inevitably fell on the pope.

Robert did make efforts to regain papal lands, and Gregory was able to perform some functions at Rome, but the anti-pope was safe in Tivoli, Robert Guiscard failed to take it, and the Romans were enraged. When Robert left in July, Gregory perforce went with him.[125]

It is only at this point that Matilda of Tuscany re-enters the picture. Shortly after Gregory's departure she sent a letter "to all the faithful in Germany" warning them

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[122]Cowdrey, Pope Gregory VII, pp. 228-29.

[123]Cowdrey, Pope Gregory VII, pp. 230.

[124]Cowdrey, Pope Gregory VII, pp. 229-30.

[125]Cowdrey, Pope Gregory VII, pp. 230-31.

to beware of possible trickery on Henry's part. He had the pope's seal; therefore, no communication was to be trusted that did not come from her.[126] In addition, Matilda sent news from Rome. The cardinal-bishop, John of Porto, had joined Henry's party and can no longer be trusted, and Gregory VII had regained Sutri and Nepi. From this it is obvious that despite her absence from active campaigning, Matilda had been functioning as the pope's line of communication. That she could expect her straightforward report of the theft to be accepted and her order to be acted on, that her word would be trusted implicitly, indicates a long-standing relationship with the intended recipients.

Clement III's position was far from secure, but it is impossible to determine what Gregory might have done to reinstate himself. He died in exile at Salerno on 25 May 1085, and Robert Guiscard died a few months later, on 17 July, on campaign in Byzantine territory.[127]

The drama of the failure of aid from Robert, and the disastrous results when it came, obscure the positive results of Gregory's Norman policy which is generally seen as an unmitigated disaster.[128] Certainly Robert Guiscard helped the pope on his own terms. Yet for this very reason he had his own odd reliability. He did not ally himself with Henry,

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[126]Urkunden Mathilde, no. 38, p. 130.

[127]Meyer von Knonau, Jahrbücher Heinrich IV. 4, pp. 65-71.

[128]The notable exception is Cowdrey, Pope Gregory VII, p. 439.

and when Jordan of Capua made such an alliance, Robert intervened. He wanted no imperial overlord. Because he had a self-serving interest in some kind of rapprochement with the papacy, Robert actually protected Gregory's southern borders from other predators. He could at least be relied on to keep the other Normans under control.

The Normans were also but a single element in a multi-faceted strategy. Gregory reached, or attempted to reach, into France and Germany for troops. Matilda of Tuscany guarded the approaches to Rome, threatening Henry's supplies and communications. Her effectiveness was limited by Henry's threats to her own supporters and the eagerness of some of her neighbors to enrich themselves at her expense. Like Robert Guiscard she had to keep what was hers before she could come to the defense of St. Peter.

Robert Guiscard had the same problem with his neighbors, in addition to larger ambitions. It was these wider ambitions that brought the Byzantine emperor into the war, on Henry's behalf. That the defense of his own territory also threatened the pope's defenses probably did not cost Alexius Comnenus much sleep when Gregory's difficulties provided a means of getting rid of the Normans. The stalemate lasted until another term of the equation, the Romans, shifted into Henry's camp, forcing Robert Guiscard into action.

Henry IV, who had as much experience of the risks of

battle as any medieval general, simply left. The balance had been restored. Then Robert Guiscard lost control of his troops. The anti-pope was trapped in Tivoli; Henry IV was gone. There was no one but Gregory to bear the brunt of the outrage of the Romans at the violence done by the pope's allies. Gregory had lost the one element in his defenses that he could not replace, the Roman people. Robert Guiscard's intervention had come at a high price.

Chapter 4: The Inter-bellum

The Italian campaign ended as it had begun, without the presence of Henry IV. After his hasty departure from Rome, the newly crowned-emperor travelled north by way of Pisa, Lucca and the Cisa Pass. At Lucca, Bishop Peter asked that he make an attempt to wrest Moriana from the control of the exiled Anselm's supporters. There was also a peace party in the city, and a group of notables approached Henry advising that he seek a peaceful solution.[1]

Rangerius's description of the situation at Moriana is informative despite his convoluted poetic diction.[2]

> Howsoever the field pressed upon the camp, that blind
> Hand of the proud people fears to touch the grains.
> Religious hunger flourishes while the horse starves,

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[1]Rangerius of Lucca, Vita Anselmi Lucensis episcopi auctore Rangerio Lucensi, ed. Ernest Sackur, Gerhard Schwartz and Bernhard Schmeidler, MGH Scriptores 30.2 (Hanover, 1934) bk. 4, chap. 2, ll. 6437-56, p. 1290, is the only source for Henry's stay at Lucca.

[2]Rangerius of Lucca, Vita Anselmi, bk. 4, chap. 2, ll. 6447-50, p. 1290.

> Cumque seges castris incumberet, illa superbi
> Caeca manus populi tangere grana timet.
> Religiosa fames viret esuriente caballo,
> Et ridet in culmen luxuriosus ager.

And the luxuriant field smiles at the heights.

Rangerius is punning on the multiple meanings of seges (field) and manus (hand). Seges can mean the crop as well as the field and also a tightly packed group of things or people such as a military formation. Comparable metaphors would be a thicket of swords or a hedge of spears. Manus is commonly used for a group of soldiers. Thus the camp of the besiegers is surrounded by a luxuriant crop, or an opposing force, that they cannot touch. The horse, and presumably the rider as well, starves, while the hunger for religion, Anselm's teaching, flourishes like grain in a sunny field.

Rangerius may here be describing a situation common in long sieges, the destruction of food supplies either by besiegers foraging or by defenders seeking to deny supplies to the besiegers. He provides a clue to one of Matilda's activities, that of systematically depriving the forces of the anti-bishop of supplies.[3]

What degree of pressure was maintained at Moriana after the flash flood that destroyed the siege camp in 1082 is not known.[4] Moriana and any outlying castles such as Diècimo or Montecatini that remained in the hands of Anselm's supporters could have provided a network of fortified positions on which operations against Peter and Henry's other supporters

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[3]Rangerius of Lucca, Vita Anselmi, bk. 2, chap. 3, ll. 3779-86, p. 1236; see chapter 3, pp. 150-51.

[4]Rangerius, Vita Anselmi, bk. 3, chap. 2, ll. 4873-76, p. 1258; l. 4922, p. 1259; see chapter 3, p. 162.

could be based.[5] A tight siege would require a consistent level of supply which was vulnerable to the kind of raiding that Rangerius described. Further, the possibility of outbreaks of disease rises in direct proportion to the length of the siege.[6] Although the number of horses at Moriana would not be comparable to that in William the Conquerer's camps at Dives-sur-Mer and Saint Valéry, the problems of supply and sanitation remain. Rangerius gives no infomation on these points. Lucca, being a port, would be expected to be able to supply itself, but how supplies would be transported to Moriana given the irregular flow of the river, or protected on site, is nowhere discussed. Neither does he indicate how the garrison of the castle was supplied. This leads to the conclusion that the siege, if maintained at all, was not tight. It is more likely that Moriana and other nearby castles were used as bases for attacks on Bishop Peter and his allies. Small wonder there was a peace party in the city.

Rangerius is much less obscure about the result: Henry fears to delay at Lucca lest Robert Guiscard come after him, and he departs leaving Peter "almost under the knife." Rangerius shows Henry trying to save face, seeking recom-

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[5]A number of Matilda's donations to Anselm involved strategically located castles; see chapter 2, pp. 112-13.

[6]Bernard S. Bachrach, "Some Observations on the Military Organization of the Norman Conquest," Anglo-Norman Studies 8 (1986) pp. 1-25, gives a detailed description of the problems of maintaining encampments.

pense from Matilda for Robert's sins.[7] That measures to be taken against Matilda were discussed as Henry travelled from Rome is likely.

Despite the descriptions in hostile sources of the emperor in headlong flight from Robert Guiscard, his itinerarium indicates that this was not the case. Henry departed from Rome on 21 May. He arrived at Pisa by 5 June with stops in Sutri and Borgo San Valentino. The charters he issued show that the emperor was accompanied by his long-time supporters, the marquises Adalbert, Rainer and Hugo, and a number of ranking ecclesiastics.[8] This has little of the flavor of a rout.

After the stay in Pisa, however, Henry moved much more quickly and had arrived at Verona by 17 June, making it obvious that he never actually undertook an attack on Moriana.[9] The contrast of the leisurely pace between Rome and Lucca with the speed at which Henry crossed through Matilda's territory is suggestive.

The emperor departed from Italy via the Brenner pass in mid-June.[10] As was the case in Germany in 1081, many of the

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[7]Rangerius of Lucca, Vita Anselmi, bk. 3, chap. 2, ll. 6451-56, p. 1290. Just as plausibly, it is Henry who is almost under the knife. Robert Guiscard, of course, never approached Lucca.

[8]Diplomata Henry IV, nos. 359-362, pp. 477-82. Hugo is designated count rather than marquis.

[9]Diplomata Henry IV, nos. 363-366, pp. 482-89 were issued at Verona on 17-18 June.

[10]Meyer von Knonau, Jahrbücher Heinrich IV. 3, pp. 568-69.

provisions that Henry IV had made in Italy would have to be ratified on the battlefield. Unlike the situation in Germany, in Italy his supporters would lose. Within weeks of the king's departure, the troops of Matilda of Tuscany won an impressive victory over the followers of Henry IV at Sorbara, near Nonantola.

Sorbara is unusual in that there are no less than four reports of the battle, including that of a possible eyewitness:[11]

> Henry having fled the city at once returned himself to Germany, first stirring up nearly all of Lombardy against the aforementioned lady and against her holy advisor (Anselm), and against all the catholic unity. Behold, not long afterward the bishops and marquesses have joined with many others, who, having advanced with great force and fury, invaded the land of the countess, thinking to conquer all of her wealthy possessions there. Then, therefore, ours gathered, if few, since they had been informed scarcely one day before. Nevertheless, they were very much comforted because our holy lord, Bishop Anselm, sent his blessing to them through our smallness, commending this to us especially in [his] commissions, so that if they had communicated with the excommunicates first we would absolve them, and then we would bless them all together through the apostolic authority and his own, instructing them in what manner and with what intention they must do battle, and thus against the remission of all their sins we set the danger of imminent battle.
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> The contest having been joined, these enemies quickly showed their backs and thereupon the bishop of Parma was captured and many nobles, and lesser men truly without number; but the number of the dead has not been counted. Three of ours died, and few were wounded, by which thing you, all the faithful, can perceive the glory of God and the power of the blessing of the most reverend bishop. From this time the assemblies of the heretics were disordered, and their lofty arrogance

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[11] Vita S. Anselmi Lucensis episcopi a Bardone scripsit, chaps. 23-24, ed. Roger Wilmans, MGH Scriptores 12 (Hanover, 1856) pp. 20-21.

> exceedingly fallen; however all catholics rejoiced and were comforted, especially that unconquerable house which our holy bishop Anselm guarded thereafter, and kept always for the catholic faith. And he, formerly bishop of one city, expelled however innocently, was made the distinguished bishop of many cities. The lord pope committed to him his power and his office throughout Lombardy, where the bishops were not considered catholics . . . .

The description is straightforward enough. Shortly after Henry's departure, a group of his supporters mobilized to enforce his judicial sentence against Matilda and to remove her by force of arms. Matilda's forces gathered to resist the attack. The most important point is that this was accomplished within one day. Although her forces were of necessity limited, the speed with which they were able to respond shows that she had maintained readiness throughout.

The account then shifts to a description of the spiritual preparations for battle. Absolution was granted, Anselm's blessing was conveyed, and the troops were instructed about going into battle with the right intention.

The attention given to these spiritual matters is in keeping with the hagiographic purposes of the _vita_. Anselm's extant works deal extensively with questions of the right use of the temporal sword.[12]

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[12]The importance of the treatment of just war in Anselm's canonical collection is recognized by Carl Erdmann, _The Origin of the Idea of Crusade_, trans. M. Baldwin (1935; trans. Princeton, 1977) pp. 229-268; for a general discussion of the development of the concept of just war, Frederick Russell, _The Just War in the Middle Ages_ (Cambridge, 1975). Because of the complex manuscript tradition, there is not, and probably never will be, a standard edition of the books of Anselm's collection that are most relevant to Matilda of Tuscany's wars. Kathleen G. Cushing, _Papacy and Law in the Gregorian Revolution: The Canonistic Work_

The battle itself is briefly described. The enemy fled taking heavy losses; Matilda lost only three men. Thus, the efficacy of Anselm's blessing, even when not personally present, is proven.[13] Matilda's whereabouts are not noted.[14] Neither is the date or location of the battle.

Chronologically, the next account is that of Bernold of St. Blasien.[15]

> At that time the soldiers (milites) of the most prudent duke (ducis) Matilda fought strongly in Lombardy against the partisans of Henry and the enemies of St. Peter, from among whom they captured the bishop of Parma and six lords (capitaneos) with another one hundred good soldiers (militibus). They had (as booty) more than five hundred horses, much armor, and all the tents of the enemy, who were put into her power com-

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of Anselm of Lucca (Oxford, 1998) pp. 179-200. Cushing's observations on the battle at Sorbara, p. 136, n. 54 and p. 138, n. 59, are incorrect. Edith Pàsztor, "Lotta per le investiture e 'ius belli': la posizione di Anselmo di Lucca," in Sant Anselmo, Mantova, pp. 375-421, discusses Anselm's sources and gives generous quotes from the canonical collection and other polemical works; of these, one of the most important is Anselm of Lucca, Liber contra Wibertum, ed. E. Bernheim, MGH Libelli 1 (Hanover, 1891) pp. 517-28; Robert Somerville, "Anselm of Lucca and Wibert of Ravenna," Bulletin of Medieval Canon Law 10 (1980) pp. 1-13, shows that the crucial passages about Matilda of Tuscany are not in the earlier versions of this polemic. The representation of Matilda of Tuscany by Anselm and his biographers is discussed in Conclusions.

[13]Anselm's ability to influence events when he is not personally present is a recurring theme in his vitae. See chapter 3, pp. 161-62.

[14]The nature and degree of Matilda's personal participation in military actions is discussed in Conclusions.

[15]Bernold of St. Blasien, Chronicon, ed. G.H. Pertz, MGH Scriptores 5 (Hanover, 1844) a. 1084, p. 441. Bernold began his account ca. 1091. Besides the Gregorian sympathies of this monastery, it had long connections to the family of the anti-king Rudolf of Rheinfelden. Matilda made a grant of her property in Deidesheim, 29 km. (17.4 mi.) northwest of Speyer, to St. Blasien. Urkunden Mathilde, dep. no. 58, pp. 428-29; Hansmartin Schwarzmaier, "Mathilde von Tuszien und ihre Besitzungen in Deidesheim," in Palatia Historica: Festschrift für Ludwig Anton Doll zum 75. Geburtstag, ed. Pirmin Spieß (Mainz, 1994) pp. 49-71.

pletely by the victory (pleniter potiti victoria).

Although Bernold also does not specify the date or location of the battle, his further details give some idea as to the size of the opposing forces and the degree of Matilda's success. The bishop of Parma, Eberhard, was a strong supporter of Henry IV.[16] The number of horses is suggestive as well. A mounted soldier (miles) required more than one. The most expensive kind, trained war horses, could not be ridden continually in a long-lasting battle so a mounted combatant would need at least two. Such horses could not be ridden for transportation, so a riding horse was required as was a squire or servant to care for all the horses. Depending on the rate of march, the servants might have to be mounted as well, requiring more horses.[17] Since the number of the dead is not specified in the Vita Anselmi, it can only be observed that the 107 persons listed by Bernold would account for as many as 320 horses, even assuming that the bishop did not make use of a war horse. This does not count pack animals or any mounts provided for servants. The "common herd," whether of animals or people is not counted.

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[16]Gerhard Schwartz, Die Besetzung der Bistümer Reichsitaliens unter den Sächsischen und Salien Kaisern mit den Listen der Bischöfe, 951-1122 (Leipzig and Berlin, 1913; repr. Spoleto, 1993) p. 187.

[17]The observations of R. Allen Brown, "The Status of the Norman Knight," in War and Government in the Middle Ages, ed. John Gillingham and J.C. Holt (Cambridge, 1984) pp. 28-29, hold true for any mounted soldier. A description of the complex training of warhorses is given by Carroll Gillmor, "Practical Chivalry: The Training of Horses for Tournaments and Warfare," Studies in Medieval and Renaissance History 13 (1992) pp. 7-29.

Rangerius describes a lively, epic battle.[18] Spears and shields are broken, and the combat is joined at close quarters. The clamor rises to the stars. Then the followers of Satan are thrown into confusion and scatter. From that point his account tallies with those of Bernold and the anonymous vita. The bishop of Parma and a number of great lords and distinguished persons are captured along with an uncounted number of the "common herd." Rangerius adds reflections on the number and fate of the dead who, presumably because they were considered heretics, were left unburied on the field, exposed to the dogs and the crows.[19]

> You would not be able to count the common herd.
> Countless perish, and throughout the fields
> Exposed to the dogs and crows they lie.
> . . .
> Now let them be consumed, let them learn by battle and blood
> That gentle faith, if it wishes, can be mighty in war.

Although Rangerius is here praising the power of Anselm's prayers, he also praises Matilda whose name means "mighty in

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[18]Rangerius of Lucca, Vita Anselmi, bk. 4, chap. 2, ll. 6551-68, pp. 1292-93. The account was written ca. 1099. That Rangerius met Matilda and thus may have recieved information from her is shown by his appearance in two of her charters issued during his episcopate. He further had access to the episcopal archives, and could have spoken to others who were personally involved in the events of Anselm's life. Urkunden Mathilde, nos. 58, 59, pp. 181-84.

[19]Rangerius of Lucca, Vita Anselmi, bk. 4, chap. 2, ll. 6560-62, 6613-14, pp. 1293, 1294.

> De grege, quam multos nec numerare queas.
> Innumeri vero pereunt passimque per agros
> Expositi canibus alitibusque iacent.
> . . .
> Sed iam tabescant, iam bello et sanguine discant,
> Quam sit bellipotens, cum velit alma fides.

war." Matilda's army, having lost only three men, returns rejoicing.

The final account is that of Donizone, Matilda's biographer.[20] Writing at the end of Matilda's life, nearly thirty years after the battle, Donizone gives a number of details, such as the time, date and location of the engagement--dawn, 2 July, at Sorbara, 13 km. (7.8 mi.) northeast of Modena--that were not given in the earlier accounts. Unfortunately, he begins with an obvious error, misdating the death of Gregory VII to 1086. This makes his entire chronology suspect, but although Donizone's account of the battle comes after his account of Gregory's death it also comes after his account of the election of Gregory's next two successors, Victor III and Urban II. It seems likely that Donizone grouped together his comments about the popes for whom Matilda fought, and then returned to the description of her deeds. Rangerius has been accused of the same error, of misdating Gregory's death, although he describes Gregory consulting with Anselm and Matilda after the battle of Sorbara.[21] Clearly, neither man is as concerned about making the chronology clear as he is with extolling the virtues of his subject and the workings of God's judgement.

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[20]Donizone, Vita Mathildis Comitissae, ed. L. Bethmann, MGH Scriptores 12 (Hanover, 1856) bk. 2, chap. 3, ll. 338-65, pp. 386-87; Paolo Golinelli, "Donizone," DBI 41 (1992) pp. 200-03.

[21]Rangerius of Lucca, Vita Anselmi, bk. 4, chap. 2, ll. 6567-68, pp. 1293.

As a description of a military action, Donizone's account makes a great deal of sense. A dawn raid on a sleeping camp would be expected to produce the high number of dead that all sources agree on. Rangerius describes a clamor rising to the stars, which may still be visible just at dawn. Both sources agree as to the time of the battle.

The anonymous vita, written by the priest who absolved and blessed the troops, says that the raiding party assembled with one day's notice. There is no indication as to where they assembled, but if the attack took place at dawn, the attackers obviously had to travel by night to reach the camp at Sorbara. Sorbara is located on the plain, a short distance from Modena and Nonantola. It is an obvious camping place for traffic along the Via Aemilia which passes by Modena. Matilda had a number of castles within reach of Sorbara. Even Canossa or one of the quattro castelli, four smaller outlying castles that guard the approaches to Canossa, at about 45 km. (28 mi.) is just within the realm of possibility given the flat terrain.[22] The distance would provide the added security that a location so far from the present position of the attackers is less likely to be observed. Presumably she had lost Carpi, 16 km. (9.6 mi) northwest of Modena, the year before.[23] There are several

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[22]On rates of travel, chapter 2, pp. 91-93.

[23]On Carpi, see chapter 3, p. 170. Sorbara was not a hit-and-run action. The prisoners and the booty had to be disposed of. The bishop of Reggio was only taken prisoner three days after the battle. If Carpi was

other possibilities.

The sequence of events that led to the action is not discussed in any of the sources. The line of march of the attackers was presumably along the Via Aemilia from Parma to Modena. According to Donizone, Bishop Gandulf of Reggio was also part of the group.[24] Sorbara is centrally located in Matilda's Po valley territory. Since any traffic along the Via Aemilia is easily seen from the network of castles on the northern face of the Apennines,[25] Matilda had likely been aware of the presence of the invading army for some time. The attack in haste suggests that she acted on intelligence reports, i.e., that she had scouts shadowing their movements and spying on the encampments. One possibility is that, since they had crossed the Po valley from Parma to Modena unopposed, the attackers had begun to be careless about keeping watch. Donizone's statement, "They are resting at night, holding sleep in their eyes," could refer either to the bulk of the camp asleep at night, as expected, or to

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in enemy hands the garrison obviously did not feel up to the task of challenging Matilda's troops. The possibility that reinforcements followed behind the first strike cannot be discounted. This would be prudent given the plunder and the proximity of those friendly to Henry.

[24]Donizone, Vita Mathildis, bk. 2, chap. 3, ll. 361-62, p. 387; Schwartz, Besetzung, p. 197-98.

[25]Rocco Morretta, "L'Apparato difensivo dei signori di Canossa nell'Appennino Reggiano," Atti e memorie della Deputazione di storia patria per le antiche provincie modenesi, ser. 9, vol. 4 (1965) pp. 489-500.

guards dozing when they should have been alert.[26] If the leaders considered Matilda unable or unwilling to undertake an open battle, this failure of intelligence could contribute to laxness.

A stealth attack on a well-guarded encampment must remain a possibility, but such an operation is much more difficult, and does not help to explain why the attack was undertaken in such haste and at that specific time. The description in the anonymous Vita Anselmi is of a hastily assembled troop taking advantage of an unspecified opportunity rather than a well-planned and coordinated operation. That the opportunity was a report of lax security in the camp is again consistent with the high casualties reported.

Donizone also gives a name to the secular commander of the defeated, Marquis Oberto. The description of Oberto is not heroic; his vocalizations are compared to those of a pig and an old woman. Before taking flight, without honor, Oberto struck a single effective blow.[27] The marquis, unlike the bishops, thus avoided capture.

Oberto was once believed to be identical with that Marquis Adalbert who appears in the Italian charters of Henry IV from 1081-84, a member of the Otbertine family whose

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[26]Donizone, Vita Mathildis, bk. 2, chap. 3, l. 349, p. 387.

[27]Donizone, Vita Mathildis, bk. 2, chap. 3, ll. 340, 356-59, pp. 386, 387.

lands were mostly to the west of Matilda's.[28] Two of the royal charters in which Adalbert appears dealt with the business of the bishopric of Parma which tends to strengthen the identification.[29] It has not been possible to find an Adalbert who fits all the criteria of time and place.[30]

One reason may be that the assumption that Adalbert and Obert are one man is wrong. Although the two names are linguistically identical, this identity is not recognized in the sources.[31] In the royal charters, the name of the marquis in the following of Henry IV is consistently given as some form of Adalbert. The assumption that Donizone confused two distinct names raises more questions than it solves. Although he did not write his account until nearly thirty years after the battle, Donizone had been a monk at Canossa since 1086.[32] In addition to hearing about the battle from those only a few years older, he had access to the accounts

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[28]Ludovico Antonio Muratori, Delle Antichità Estensi ed Italiane 1 (Modena, 1717) p. 249. Subsequent scholars have accepted the identification. Ferdinando Gabotto, "I marchesi Obertenghi fino alla pace di Luni." Giornale storico della Lunigiana, 9 (1918) p. 20; Luigi Simeoni, Vita Mathildis celeberrimae principis Italiae: carmine scripta a Donizone presbytero, ed. Luigi Simeoni, RIS² 5.2(Bologna, 1930-40; repr. Turin, 1973) p. 67, n. for l. 340.

[29]Diplomata HIV, nos. 340, 341, pp. 448-51.

[30]For the identity of Marquis Adalbert, see chapter 2, pp. 103-11.

[31]The names Adalbert and Obert are distinct as early as the tenth century. "Adalbertus et Obertus germanii marchiones . . . ." appear in a charter of 975. The extended family of the Otbertines, to which Marquis Adalbert belonged, regularly used both names over several generations. Gabotto, "I marchesi Obertenghi," p. 9, family tree between pp. 46-47.

[32]Golinelli, "Donizone." p. 200.

of Rangerius and the anonymous Vita Anselmi.[33]

Marquis Oberto is mentioned a second time. At the battle before Canossa in 1092, his son (natus Oberti), the royal standard bearer, was unhorsed and the royal standard captured. The loss of the standard precipitated a rout of Henry's army.[34] Donizone was present at the battle which took place just outside the walls of Canossa.[35] Assuming that he misnamed Oberto would require multiple errors on the part of someone who was in a position to have timely and accurate information.

There is an Oberto of the Otbertine family who could have been at Sorbara in 1084 and who left a son who could have been present at the battle before Canossa in 1092 Oberto was born between 1040 and 1050 and died before 1101; his son, Ugo, was born between 1070 and 1080 and died after 1122.[36] Men who are so little noted in the sources are unsatisfactory solutions to a question, but their status as cadet members of a large family does much to explain their motivation to support Henry IV.

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[33]Donizone, Vita Mathildis, bk. 2, chap. 3, ll. 390 ff. pp. 387-88, quotes from Rangerius, Liber de Anulo et Baculo.

[34]Donizone, Vita Mathildis, bk. 2, chap. 7, ll. 705-09, p. 393.

[35]Lino Lionello Ghirardini, "Madonna della Battaglia': lo scontro decisivo della lotta per le investiture (ottobre 1092)," Bolletino Storico Reggiano, 11 (April 1971) pp. 36-56, places the "epicenter" of the battle at Madonna della Battaglia, in the valley between Canossa and Bianello.

[36]Gabotto, "I marchesi Obertenghi," p. 21, genealogy, n.p.

Because Henry IV was not present and the battle of Sorbara was fought in northern Italy rather than at Rome, it has not been studied.[37] The results were not so striking as the flight of Gregory VII from Rome, the consecration of Guibert of Ravenna as Pope Clement III and the subsequent coronation of Henry IV as Holy Roman Emperor. The victory served notice, however, that the distant emperor could not protect his adherents, and doubtless raised the morale of the supporters of Gregory VII. The pope's flight into exile and the circumstances under which he fled the city must have shaken the faith of all but the most committed.

That the gregorian party looked to Matilda for secular leadership and protection is shown by subsequent events. Her whereabout for the remainder of 1084 are not known. She may have undertaken a siege of Nonantola.[38] Whether the brief chronicle notices represent a misunderstanding of the circumstances of the battle at Sorbara or are reports of a different action entirely cannot be determined. If such a siege was undertaken it was, as Overmann observed, likely related to the sending of valuables from the monastery to

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[37]There are no journal articles on Sorbara.

[38]According to Sicard of Cremona, Chronica, ed. O. Holder-Egger, MGH Scriptores 31 (Hanover, 1903) p. 161, Matilda besieged Nonantola in 1083, but Sicard also dates the famine of 1085 to 1084 so the siege of Nonantola, if it took place, was probably in 1084. Luigi Simeoni, "Il contributo della contessa Matilde al Papato nella lotta per le investiture," Studi Gregoriani 1 (1947) p. 358, places the siege of Nonantola after Sorbara, although none of the accounts of that engagement refer to Nonantola.

Rome in 1082, but in what way or who had taken control of the town cannot be determined.[39]

By the following year, Matilda's position had improved to such a degree that she was able to take advantage of several opportunities. The flooding and subsequent famine of 1085 carried off a number of Henry's strongest supporters including Archbishop Tedald of Milan. Eberhard of Parma and Gandulf of Reggio, both taken prisoner at Sorbara also died that year, as did three of Henry's lay supporters, the marquises Rainer and Adalbert and Count Boso. Bernold further reports that, thanks to Matilda's recovery of her power (potestatem) and her support for the church, "catholic pastors were appointed" in Modena, Reggio and Pistoia.[40]

Matilda, like Henry, had to enforce her decisions. The henrician Heribert of Modena functioned as bishop of that city as late as 1092. Benedict, the gregorian appointee, must have relied on Matilda's protection until he was able to establish himself in Modena. He was present at the deathbed of Anselm of Lucca, and was probably himself of Luccan origin.[41]

Since Gandulf of Reggio was dead, his successor, Heribert, was more successful and established himself as

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[39]Alfred Overmann, Gräfin Mathilde von Tuscien: Ihrer Besitzungen, Geschichte ihres Gutes von 1115-1230 und ihre Regesten, (Innsbruck, 1895) p. 151-52.

[40]Bernold of St. Blasien, Chronicon, a. 1085, p. 443.

[41]Schwartz, Besetzung, p. 183-84.

bishop of Reggio until his death in 1092.[42] In Pistoia, Peter succeeded another gregorian, Leo, who was of the Guidonid family, and therefore probably also had the support of Marquis Rainer, appointed by Henry IV as marquis of Fermo and duke of Spoleto, as well as the support of Matilda.[43] Given the location of Pistoia, Rainer's support was doubtless crucial.

In 1085, another prominent gregorian, Bishop Hermann of Metz, was deposed by Henry IV and came to Italy to join Matilda's circle.[44] Anselm of Lucca had been with Matilda since 1081; Bonizo of Sutri since 1083.[45] All of these men were of the nobility. What degree or what kind of support their family connections could provide is not known, but it could have been considerable.

The death of Gregory VII on 25 May 1085 must have badly shaken his supporters, and Matilda of Tuscany would be no exception. What her doubts or concerns were is nowhere recorded; what is known is that she continued to support the gregorian cause while restoring her own position.

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[42]Schwartz, Besetzung, p. 198.

[43]Bernold's report of Rainer's death in 1085 is erroneous. See chapter 2, pp. 103, 105.

[44]Overmann, Gräfin Mathilde, p. 152.

[45]On Anselm's exiling, see chapter 2, p. 130; on Bonizo's imprisonment and flight, see chapter 3, p. 161.

Gregory's successor was Desiderius, abbot of Montecassino.[46] Although Desiderius was not elected until 24 May 1086,[47] and not consecrated until 9 May 1087,[48] shortly after Gregory's death he told the other Roman cardinals to correspond with Matilda about the choosing of a new pope.[49] That Matilda and, until his death on 18 March 1086, Anselm of Lucca were acting to facilitate a papal election is shown by a letter written to her, in April or May of 1087, by Bishop Hugh of Lyon, Gregory's legate and one of three possible successors named by the pope in his last days.[50] The other two named were Anselm of Lucca and the cardinal-bishop Odo of Ostia.

Matilda's activities continued without letup after Anselm's death. Word of miraculous healing of the wounded at the hospital in Mantua was brought to her during the siege

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[46]The events surrounding the election and pontificate of Desiderius are discussed by H.E.J. Cowdrey, The Age of Abbot Desiderius: Montecassino, the Papacy, and the Normans in the Eleventh and Early Twelfth Centuries (Oxford, 1978) pp. 185 ff.

[47]Cowdrey, Abbot Desiderius, pp. 194-95.

[48]Cowdrey, Abbot Desiderius, p. 206.

[49]Chronica monasterii Casinensis, ed. W. Wattenbach, MGH Scriptores 7 (Hanover, 1846) bk. 3, chap. 65, p. 748. The difficulties presented by this multi-author compilation are discussed in Cowdrey, Abbot Desiderius, pp. xvi-xix, and pp. 251-62, where a number of passages, but not those reporting Matilda's actions, are analyzed in detail.

[50]The letter from Hugh of Lyon is preserved in Hugh of Flavigny, Chronicon, bk. 2, ed. G.H. Pertz, MGH Scriptores 8 (Hanover, 1848) pp. 466-68.

of "a certain castle," presumably near Mantua.[51]

That she was recovering more than a few castles is hinted at in the sources for the campaign against the Muslim town of Mahdia, undertaken by Pisa and Genoa in the summer of 1087.[52] Matilda had no authority in Genoa, and had lost power in Pisa by 1081. Presumably, the family of the viscounts of Pisa lost their authority as well when the marquesa was deposed. Although Matilda did not return to her Tuscan possessions until 1096, she was active in Pisan affairs in the intervening years.

At her request, in 1091 Pope Urban II made Corsica subject to the Bishop of Pisa, then Daimbert, who later became patriarch of Jerusalem. The following year, also at her request, Pisa was raised to the status of archbishopric.[53] Daimbert's political position is unclear as was that of his predecessor, Gerard, who held office during the turbulent years from 1079-85.[54] The ambiguity suggest considerable political skill. If, as Cowdrey speculates, Daimbert was

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[51]Vita Anselmi, chap. 51, p. 27. Matilda held a number of castles near Mantua, including Volta, but there is no way to determine which was meant.

[52]H.E.J. Cowdrey, "The Mahdia Campaign of 1087" The English Historical Review 92 (1977) pp. 1-29. Cowdrey sees the Mahdia campaign and Matilda's own expedition to Rome in the same year as part of the newly-consecrated Pope Victor III's efforts to restore the prestige of the gregorian papacy, p. 7.

[53]Urban II, Epistolae et privilegia, PL 151, nos. 51, 63, cols. 330-31, 344-46. Pope Urban II owed much to Matilda of Tuscany for her devotion to the papal cause. See p. 201.

[54]Schwartz, Besetzung, pp. 217-18.

imposed by Henry IV with the intention that the bishop would be his agent in the city, the effort failed. By 1091, and probably sooner, Daimbert was working comfortably with Matilda and Gregory's successor.[55]

A further hint of Matilda's backing is given by the presence of a Bishop Benedict on the campaign. Benedict of Modena, whose appointment in 1085 was backed by Matilda, was uanble to take possession of his see while Henry's supporter, Bishop Heribert, lived, and was the only Italian bishop of that name known in 1087.[56]

During the same year, Matilda went in person to Rome to help Desiderius, by then consecrated as Pope Victor III, to secure the city.[57] The consecration had been delayed for a full year after the election by a combination of Desiderius's reluctance to accept the papal office and Norman politics. Jordan of Capua, a supporter of Desiderius, was at odds with Robert Guiscard's heir, Roger Borsa, and Roger's mother, Sichelgaita of Salerno. Jordan supported the claim of Robert's eldest son, Bohemond, a seasoned veteran of his father's campaigns.[58]

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[55]Cowdrey, "Mahdia Campaign," pp. 14-15, 16. Presumably, the family of the viscounts, whose authority depended on that of the marquesa, discreetly guarded their mutual interests when she could not be present. The viscount Hugh led the campaign.

[56]Cowdrey, "Mahdia Campaign," p. 16-17.

[57]Chronica Casinensis, bk. 3, chap. 69, p. 750.

[58]Cowdrey, Abbot Desiderius, pp. 179-80.

To make matters even more complex, Sichelgaita's brother, the exiled Prince Gisulf of Salerno, was very active in gregorian counsels. For an unspecified reason, he opposed the consecration of Alfanus II, the candidate favored by Sichelgaita and Roger Borsa, as bishop of Salerno. In retaliation for the refusal to consecrate Alfanus, they released one of Henry IV's officials, the imperial prefect, Wezilo, who had been taken prisoner by Robert Guiscard in 1084. Wezilo arrived in Rome with sufficient money to rouse the supporters of Guibert of Ravenna to action, even though the anti-pope had departed from Rome in 1085.[59] Victor III left the city four days after his election. Desiderius had been unwilling to accept the election; the violence in the city confirmed his own feelings.

The following year, Guibert of Ravenna returned to Rome in the spring, encouraged no doubt by Wezilo's activities.[60] A gregorian council was convened at Capua during Lent. Normans of both factions were present, and Desiderius was persuaded to accept the election of the previous year.[61] Only after Norman affairs had been settled, did the pope-elect undertake to return to the city under the escort of

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[59]Cowdrey, Abbot Desiderius, pp. 172, 193-94, 197; Meyer von Knonau, Jahrbücher Heinrich IV. 4, pp. 74-75, 153-57.

[60]Cowdrey, Abbot Desiderius, p. 201; Meyer von Knonau, Jahrbücher Heinrich IV. 4, p. 181.

[61]Cowdrey, Abbot Desiderius, pp. 201-04; Meyer von Knonau, Jahrbücher Heinrich IV. 4, pp. 179-81.

Jordan of Capua and Gisulf of Salerno. Military assistance from Matilda of Tuscany was also expected.[62]

The Leonine City was occupied by supporters of Guibert of Ravenna. There is no description of the operation by which Pope Victor's Norman allies gained control of St. Peter's, but an orderly and regular papal consecration took place there on 9 May 1087.[63] During the mass after his consecration, Victor III suffered a severe attack of dysentery.[64] After eight days at Rome, he returned to Montecassino.

Matilda of Tuscany now re-entered the picture. Shortly after his return to Montecassino, the pope received an invitation to return to Rome, brought by envoys of Matilda who had established herself there on the Tiber Isle. The question as to why Matilda was not present for the consecration, but arrived shortly after the pope left the city, and was able to establish herself securely enough that she felt confident of her ability to protect the pope requires consideration. Obviously, Victor's Norman allies had sufficient strength to allow him to enter the city and take up residence, but he left shortly afterward. Whether this was due

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[62]Cowdrey, Abbot Desiderius, p. 206.

[63]Bernold, Chronicon, a. 1087, p. 446; Chronica Cassinensis, bk. 3, cap. 68, p. 750; Cowdrey, Abbot Desiderius, p. 206.

[64]Cowdrey, Abbot Desiderius, p. 206, n. 90. The number of sources that mention this point, and the importance given to it by Victor's opponents is striking. Meyer von Knonau, Jahrbücher Heinrich IV. 4, pp. 182-83, n. 36 gives numerous quotes.

to failing health or to continued outbreaks of violence at Rome is not known. Possibly there was lingering resentment against the Normans since the destruction caused by Robert Guiscard's rescue of Gregory VII in 1084. Pope Victor quickly returned at Matilda's invitation. This indicates a considerable degree of confidence in her judgement and capability.

The account of this action contains one of the few references to a sea voyage. Victor did not travel overland from Montecassino, but came by ship, apparently without Norman escort. This raises the possibility that Wezilo's ability to mobilize support for Guibert of Ravenna had more to do with the memory of Robert Guiscard's sack of the city than with concerns for canonical papal elections or the right relationship of regnum and sacerdotium.

Under Matilda's protection, the pope entered St. Peter's and celebrated mass there on 11 June. He followed her forces through the Trastevere and into Rome, where he seemed to have had considerable support. On 28 June a guibertine counterattack was mounted. Neither papal claimant could say mass in St. Peter's church on St. Peter's feast day, 29 June, but by 30 June Victor III was once again able to say mass in the church. The following day, Guibert withdrew again from the Leonine City, leaving Victor III, and

Matilda of Tuscany, in full control.[65] The battles for the control of Rome were essentially battles for the right bank of the Tiber where the Leonine City and the Trastevere lie, with the larger city of Rome itself something of a suburb where forces gathered and indivicual fortified positions were maintained. The Castel Sant'Angelo, which controls the access to the Leonine City from Rome, was a stronghold of inestimable value that remained in the hands of the gregorian party throughout the years of intermittent warfare.[66]

Victor III left Rome again after about two weeks. It is not known when Matilda of Tuscany left Rome, but her withdrawal may have contributed to the pope's departure. Similarly, the reasons for Matilda's departure--whether due to the pope's decision to leave, to military considerations or to the dangers of the Roman summer--also cannot be determined. No matter why he left Rome, Pope Victor remained active at Montecassino and at Benevento where he convened a council in late August. During this council, he became gravely ill and died at Montecassino on 16 September.[67]

The death of Victor III is a fitting end point for this analysis of Matilda of Tuscany's military actions in the war

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[65]Chronica Cassinensis, bk. 3, cap. 68, p. 750; Cowdrey, Abbot Desiderius, p. 207; Meyer von Knonau, Jahrbücher Heinrich IV. 4, pp. 183-85. That Bernold did not know of Matilda's intervention is troublesome.

[66]See Appendix, fig. 2.

[67]Cowdrey, Abbot Desiderius, p. 208; Meyer von Knonau, Jahrbücher Heinrich IV. 4, pp. 186-89.

between Henry IV and Gregory VII. The election of Urban II at Terracina on 12 March 1088 took place without her presence or intervention.[68] Urban's demands on her were not for troops, but for something she had successfully avoided for thirteen years. In 1089 she remarried.[69]

Her husband was Welf V, a grandson of Azzo of Este, and heir to the duchy of Bavaria.[70] He was 17 years old and, possibly, a nephew, three times removed.[71] The result was a situation that Henry IV had also long-avoided. Both sides of the Brenner Pass system were in the hands of his enemies.[72] Henry returned to Italy in 1090 to undertake a campaign against Welf and Matilda.[73]

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[68]Meyer von Knonau, Jahrbücher Heinrich IV. 4, pp. 193-95.

[69]Meyer von Knonau, Jahrbücher Heinrich IV. 4, p. 274; I.S. Robinson, Henry IV of Germany, 1056-1106 (Cambridge UK, 1999) pp. 279-81.

[70]Bernold Chronicon, a. 1089, p. 449, reports that the marriage took place not because of incontinentia, but so that she could fight virilius for the Roman pontiff. Given the differences between the partners, not only in age but in experience of war, Bernold's choice of words can be presumed ironic.

[71]The degree of kinship between Matilda and Welf is uncertain. The genealogical table given by Nora Duff, Matilda of Tuscany: la gran donna d'Italia (London, 1909) p. 297, shows common ancestors in Matilda's great-great-grandfather, Siegfried of Lucca, and Emperor Otto I. Paolo Forni, "Studi sulla tavola geneologica ascendentale della contessa Matilde di Canossa," Studi Matildici [1], pp. 259-279, shows that in the male line the relationship was much more distant. The question cannot be settled without a similar analysis of the female line on both sides.

[72]On the importance of the Brenner Pass system and Henry's efforts to keep this strategic area under his control, see chapter 1, pp. 56, 65-66.

[73]The major source for this campaign is Donizone, Vita Mathildis, bk. 2, caps. 4, 6, 7, 9, pp. 388-89, 390-91, 391-94, 394-95. The scholarly literature is well over a century old and obsolete. Richard

This campaign was different than that against Rome. It was fought against Matilda on her own territory. Henry proceeded in in a methodical and effective manner, pushing her back city by city and castle by castle into the mountains. Then a combination of the weather, the terrain and Matilda's vigilance inflicted on him a defeat from which his prestige never recovered.

In October of 1092, Henry returned to Canossa, apparently hoping to pin Matilda in the castle while he negotiated with her few remaining supporters. She, however, was aware of his approach. She quickly left Canossa with some of her troops and rode to Bianello, one of the smaller outlying castles, only 1.5 km. (0.9 mi.) away. Henry's troops became confused when a thick fog rose suddenly, and a sortie by both garrisons set on them. The royal standard bearer was unhorsed by a common foot soldier, and Henry's army fled. Matilda shadowed the retreat across the Po, picking up the abandoned valuables of the defeated.

After the battle before Canossa, the king's support dwindled. He was cut off in Italy with limited forces at his disposal, unable to influence events either in Germany or at Rome. Henry IV was still in Italy in 1096, but could only listen to the news that Matilda, accompanying Pope Urban II

Hildenhagen, Heinrich IV. von 1090-1092 (Jena, 1876); Christian Volkmar, Der dritte Römerzug Heinrichs IV. (Magdeburg, 1876). Meyer von Knonau, Jahrbücher Heinrich IV. 4, ad annum, is far more useful. Robinson, Henry IV, pp. 281-85 places the campaign in the larger political context. The entire campaign is in need of a fresh study.

on his return to Rome from the triumphant preaching of the First Crusade, had re-entered her Tuscan possessions.

Conclusions

Matilda of Tuscany is one of the very few women whose place in history is that of a military power. The war she took part in was fought at the highest levels of medieval European society, between Pope Gregory VII and Emperor Henry IV of Germany. For this reason, the conflict and the issues surrounding it were widely commented on. The sources frequently mention the actions taken by Matilda of Tuscany.

The war was part of a larger sequence of events, commonly called the Investiture Controversy, that includes some of the most-studied events in medieval European history. The scholarly literature of the Investiture Controversy is accordingly vast. The war between the pope and the emperor has been little studied, as a war, and the role of Matilda of Tuscany within the war even less. There are two main reasons for this.

The first and most obvious is Matilda's sex. Warfare is a very strongly gendered activity, and the assigned gender is masculine. Feminist scholars are only beginning to study

the military activities of women in the Middle Ages.[1] The career of Joan of Arc, long considered the archetypal woman warrior of the Middle Ages, has recently been re-evaluated by military historians who describe her contribution to the Hundred Years War in military rather than social or religious terms.[2]

There is also a new interest in the work of Joan's contemporary, Christine de Pizan, who wrote on military theory. Formerly considered merely an inaccurate translator of Vegetius, Christine is now recognized as a contributor of some originality to military theory.[3]

Such studies immediately suggest further research. Joan of Arc was not the only woman involved in military actions during the Hundred Years War. Joan of Montfort and Joan of Penthièvre, supported by England and France respectively, contested the inheritance of the duchy of Brittany in the mid-fourteenth century. The War of the Two Joans has never been studied as such, although the importance of the disput-

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[1] Papers that discuss women and war as opposed to warrior images of women include Megan McLaughlin, "The Woman Warrior: Gender, Warfare and Society in Medieval Europe," Women's Studies (1990) pp. 193-209; Helen Nicholson, "Women on the Third Crusade," Journal of Medieval History 23:4 (1997) pp. 335-349. Marjorie Chibnall, "Women in Orderic Vitalis," The Haskins Society Journal 2 (1990) pp. 106-121 includes references to military women in a more general study.

[2] Kelly DeVries, Joan of Arc: A Military Leader (Phoenix Mill, 1999).

[3] Christine de Pizan, The Book of Deeds of Arms and of Chivalry, trans. Sumner Willard, ed. Charity Cannon Willard (University Park PA, 1999).

ed succession in the early years of the Hundred Years War is well known.[4] The study of actual military actions undertaken by women in the Middle Ages is only beginning.

The problems raised by the participation of women in warfare are considerable and cannot be lightly passed over. Females as a group are smaller than males; size and strength are important attributes in any physical confrontation. If a woman is described in the sources as waging war against men, this point must be explained. Further, the weapons of the eleventh century were not simple to learn. Noble men who went to war had spent much of their childhood learning the art. To expend a great deal of time and energy training a child who will never make use of the training is a great waste of limited resources. If a woman was trained to arms, there must have been a reason.

In the case of Matilda of Tuscany, there is no mention in the sources that she was trained to arms. It can therefore only be assumed that she did not personally engage in combat. All such reports are based on the imaginings of much later writers.[5]

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[4]Kelly DeVries, Joan of Arc, p. 11, n. 13; idem, Infantry Warfare in the Early Fourteenth Century (Woodbridge, 1996) pp. 137-44.

[5]The prime example is Lodovico Vedriani, Historia dell'antichissima citta' di Modona, 2 vols. (1666; rpt. Bologna, Forni, 1966). The lively description of the 15-year-old Matilda taking part in a battle along with her stepfather and husband is repeated by popular writers such as Antonia Fraser, The Warrior Queens (New York, 1989) pp. 131-150. Paolo Golinelli, Matilde di Canossa nella letteratura italiana da Dante a Pederiali (Reggio Emilia, 1997).

The career of a soldier who never literally bore arms is not a topic that would have recommended itself to early writers on medieval military history. The study of medieval warfare was, like all military history before the mid-twentieth century, the history of battles.[6] The war between Henry IV and Gregory VII has little to recommend it to students of battle. No major battle was fought; the vast majority of the recorded actions are sieges, frequently ended by bribery or treachery rather than storming, punitive raids and foraging expeditions.[7] A strategically uninteresting campaign complicated by accounts of a militarily effective woman was a subject for novelists rather than historians.[8]

The belief that medieval patterns of warfare reflected a defiency in strategic capabilities was challenged in the mid-1950s. R.C. Smail and J.F. Verbruggen pointed out that in the circumstances that prevailed in the Middle Ages, the strategy of seeking resolution by battle was not necessarily

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[6]These points on the development of medieval military history are summarized by Stephen Morillo, "Battle Seeking: Some Notes on the Political and Symbolic Contexts of Medieval Strategy," Res Militaris 1 (2001) forthcoming; Clifford J. Rogers, "Vegetian Strategy and the Science of War in the Middle Ages," Res Militaris 1 (2001). I am indebted to both authors for a pre-publication copy of their papers on the role of battle in medieval strategic thinking.

[7]Henry IV's campaign of 1081-84 is an example, see chapter 3.

[8]Introduction, pp. 17-20.

the best choice.' A new view developed in which logistics rather than tactics was at the center of military thinking.

This warfare was based on the possession of fortified positions on which operations in the surrounding countryside can be based. Invaders must deal with these fortifications in order to protect themselves from attack by the defenders. At the same time they must provision themselves from the surrounding countryside. Foraging parties and attackers in a siege camp are vulnerable to counterattack, especially if fortified positions are placed so as to be able to support one another.

Conversely, while the defenders are shut up in the fortification, the destruction of the countryside weakens both the defender's economic base and the morale of the population subjected to the looting and destruction. A well-planned defensive system would keep potential invaders pinned down at unproductive sieges until shortages of supplies forced their departure or counterattacks from fortifications beyond the invader's ability to lay siege to them drove away or destroyed the invading force. A successful invasion would have to provide for both supplies and safety

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[9]R.C. Smail, Crusading Warfare (1097-1193) (Cambridge, 1956); J.F. Verbruggen, De Krijgskunst in West-Europa in de Middeleeuwen, IXe tot begin XIVe eeuw (Brussels, 1954). Because most scholars do not read Dutch, and the first English-language translation was abridged and lacked the extensive apparatus of the original, Verbruggen's influence was limited until the publication of an almost complete translation with the apparatus restored, The Art of Warfare in Western Europe during the Middle Ages, trans. Sumner Willard and Mrs. R.C. Southern (Woodbridge, 1997).

from counterattack while a tight siege was maintained until the defenders were forced to surrender.

This paradigm, based as it is on the workings of the Roman civitas and the surrounding countryside, owes much to Roman strategic thinking, especially the theories of the late-Roman writer Flavius Vegetius Renatus.[10] One of the foremost proponents of the Vegetian theory of medieval warfare is Bernard S. Bachrach whose extensive research on the early Angevins shows an acute awareness of Vegetian principals and the possession of copies of this work.[11] A corollary of the now-standard siege-centered theory of medieval warfare is the strategy of battle-avoidance.[12] In most cases, the risks of battle outweigh the possible gains, and battles are to be avoided unless the circumstances are very unequal.

As with most orthodoxies, this one is being revised. Clifford J. Rogers finds that the threat of battle, which

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[10]Vegetius Renatus, Flavius. Flavi Vegeti Renati Epitoma rei militaris, 2nd ed. Ed. Charles Lang Leipzig, 1885; repr. 1967. Citations in this dissertation are to the translation of N.P. Milner, Vegetius: Epitome of Military Science (Liverpool, 1993).

[11]Bernard S. Bachrach, Fulk Nerra, the Neo-Roman consul: A Political Biography of the Angevin Count (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1993) contains citations of the author's numerous earlier papers; idem, "On Roman Ramparts," The Cambridge Illustrated History of Warfare, ed. Geoffrey Parker (Cambridge and New York, 1995) pp. 64-91, is a basic exposition of the basis of Vegetian theory.

[12]Matthew Strickland, War and Chivalry: The Conduct and Perception of War in England and Normandy, 1066-1217 (Cambridge , 1996) p. 43, n. 69, observes that battle avoidance has moved from revisionism to orthodoxy.

implies a readiness and willingness to actually undertake battle, is an effective strategic weapon and that military historians need to revise the Vegetian paradigm to include battle as a viable option for medieval commanders.[13] Stephen Morillo notes many similarities between the thinking of Vegetius and that of other ancient writers on warfare, especially Sun Tzu, and calls for a broadening of the study of medieval warfare to include peoples outside of western Europe who faced similar conditions of limited agricultural production and seasonal patterns.[14] Both writers note instances when offering or accepting battle was a good and successful strategy.

There are thus two questions to be considered. Did the war between Henry IV and Gregory VII unfold as Vegetian theory would predict? And, what role could Matilda of Tuscany, a woman almost certainly not trained to arms, play in the war?

As has been noted, the war was largely ignored by earlier writers on medieval military history because it lacked any interesting or decisive battles, indeed it would be difficult to find an action that could be characterized as a battle.[15] Henry IV had a great deal of military experi-

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[13]Rogers, "Vegetian Strategy," n. 5, supra.

[14]Morillo, "Battle Seeking," n. 5, supra.

[15]It must be noted that H.E.J. Cowdrey, although he does not write military history, is well aware of the military aspects of the conflict between Henry and Gregory and discusses military actions with great

ence before the Italian campaign. In addition to the long campaigns of the Saxon rebellion, he fought against the Hungarians on his eastern borders. In these campaigns he also experienced the uncertainties of battle. Henry was the loser at Melrichstadt (7 August 1078) and at the Elster (15 October 1080) yet he won the war. The victory of his opponent, Rudolf of Rheinfelden, at Melrichstadt was costly in terms of Rudolf's followers' lives, and his military capacity was reduced by the expensive victory. At the Elster, Rudolf paid for the victory with his own life.[16]

The Saxon wars and the campaign in Italy took place under different circumstances. In Germany, Henry was being challenged by a rival for his throne. A dramatic victory in battle would provide not only proof of his own military competence, but of the favor of God.[17]

There were a number of constraints on the Italian campaign. The Saxon rebellion, still active despite the death of Rudolf of Rheinfelden, limited the number of troops that could be taken into Italy. The king needed his most reliable supporters in Germany. Because he had to rely on Italian support and hired troops, his actions in Italy could not be such as to anger his supporters. He had to supply and

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insight.

[16]The effect of the The Saxon wars on Henry IV's Italian policy is discussed in chapters 1 and 2.

[17]Kurt-Georg Cram, Iudicium Belli: Zum Rechtcharakter des Krieges im Deutschen Mittelalter (Münster and Cologne, 1955) pp. 139-148.

pay his troops, but could not rely on foraging or looting to do it. Henry was not coming as an invader, but as a king to claim what was rightfully his, the imperial coronation.

He had further taken the position that the blame for the war was to be laid on the pope. In the royal polemics, Gregory was depicted as a fomenter of war, largely on the basis of his support for Rudolf of Rheinfelden.[18] The sources give few accounts of Henry's actions other than the assault on the walls of the Leonine city in 1083, an action that might have been aided by payments, and punitive measures against Matilda of Tuscany.[19]

The attacks on Matilda, who had been deposed from all her imperial offices, served as much to provide income as to punish a rebel. As part of the deposition, the king claimed her property and was attempting to enforce the sentence. Benzo of Alba's report of these actions specifically mentions castles and monasteries.[20] Attacks on castles have an obvious purpose as they are both bases of military operations and revenue centers.[21] Since no monastic chronicle reports an attack by the king, Benzo may be reporting Henry's attempts to collect payments in cash or in kind that

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[18]I.S. Robinson, Authority and Resistance in the Investiture Contest (Manchester and New York, 1978) pp. 89-100.

[19]See chapter 3, pp. 148-49, 163-64.

[20]Benzo of Alba, Ad Heinricum IV imperatorem libri VII, ed. K. Pertz, MGH Scriptores 11 (Hanover, 1854) bk. 6, chap. 4, p. 663.

[21]See chapter 1, pp. 63-64.

would have normally gone to Matilda. Given the revenue that would have come to him from the control of all of Matilda's possessions, plus the opening of the Apennine roads, it would have been very much in Henry's interest to force Matilda to accept battle.

She, conversely, had little to gain by taking such a risk. Until Henry actually gained entrance into the Leonine City, and even for a while afterward, Pope Gregory was in no immediate danger while Henry was expending large amounts of money and running increasing risks that his extended stay in Italy would strengthen the still-active rebellion in Germany. By keeping open Gregory's communications and getting funds to him she was doing a great deal. Matilda's military actions at this time, as described by Rangerius, were confined to raids on Henry's supply lines and supporting the resistance to the anti-bishop, Peter of Lucca.[22]

Henry's capacity to force a battle was limited. This is one purpose of the destructive raiding that characterized medieval warfare, but Henry was not an invader. He was not campaigning in enemy territory. Even though he viewed Matilda as a lawfully judged and sentenced criminal, he could not enforce his decision by large-scale destruction of her possessions in order to deprive her of them. Since his

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[22]Rangerius of Lucca, Vita Anselmi Lucensis episcopi auctore Rangerio Lucensi, ed. Ernest Sackur, Gerhard Schwartz and Bernhard Schmeidler, MGH Scriptores 30.2 (Hanover, 1934) bk. 3, chap. 3, ll. 3779-86, p. 1236; Chapter 3, pp. 150-51.

objective was at Rome, he also could not undertake the kind of concentrated and directed campaigning that would be needed to force her into battle or to surrender. Under these circumstances, Matilda's defensive position was too strong, and Henry had to settle for limiting her activities as much as possible. During the campaign of 1090-97, the war was directed against Matilda, and Henry's methods changed accordingly.[23]

Once the emperor had left Italy, the war became a purely local matter. Gregory VII was in Salerno under the capable protection of Robert Guiscard. Matilda was left to defend her territory against those of her neighbors who wanted to enrich themselves at her expense.

At the battle of Sorbara, conditions were in her favor. The enemy encampment was not in good order. She knew their movements and their weakness; they obviously had less timely information on her whereabouts and degree of readiness for battle. By undertaking a battle in a relatively low risk situation she had a great success.[24] She avoided battle under unfavorable circumstances by taking advantage of fortified positions and rugged terrain. She gave battle under favorable circumstances, taking advantage of the enemy's mistakes. In that way she withstood a much stronger

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[23]See chapter 4, pp. 201-03.

[24]Sorbara is technically a raid rather than a battle since the losing side obviously had no choice but to "accept battle," chapter 4, pp. 180-90.

and more experienced opponent, and defeated those less capable.

This result is as Vegetian theory predicts. That the approach to warfare built "on Roman ramparts" was still as valid in Italy as it was in Anjou is perhaps also to be predicted. But it is unlikely that the man who dedicated his treatise on the military art to the emperor Theodosius I had in mind a woman when he wrote it.[25]

The final point to be considered is what Matilda's actual role was. The sources are almost silent on this question. There is no evidence that she had the training to take part in actual fighting. The opposite position, that she was not a military woman in any active sense, but merely financed the war must also also be rejected.

There is no clear evidence that Matilda accompanied her troops into the field. Neither is there clear evidence that she did not. But there is a hint. On one occasion it is quite clear that Matilda was not present. At the battle of Tricontai in 1091, her troops were badly defeated by Henry IV. In his description of the action, Donizone squarely places the blame on Hugo del Mansi, a son of Azzo of Este.[26] Hugo was also half-brother to Welf IV of Bavaria, the father

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[25]There is debate as to which emperor was the intended dedicatee. N.P. Milner, Vegetius: Epitome, pp. xxvii-xxix, presents the arguments for Theodosius. There is no evidence in the sources that Matilda of Tuscany know the work of Vegetius.

[26]On Hugo and Azzo, see chapter 2, pp. 100-102.

of Matilda's second husband, Welf V. Donizone performs the considerable literary feat of telling the story without mentioning Matilda's husband, but makes clear that the defeated returned to report to Matilda.[27]

The incident clearly shows one serious problem faced by absentee commanders, treachery. The betrayal by Hugo strongly suggests that Matilda was an active commander, frequently present in the field. That she had associates is unquestioned. It is not likely that her entire strength ever assembled at one place, but remained dispersed throughout the network of fortifications that she held. Therefore, she had to delegate authority.

There is no description of her in the field. That she was a competent rider is unquestioned. That she protected herself by wearing armor is likely. Whether she wore it openly or discreely under a travelling dress is a difficult question. Wearing women's clothes would make it easy to identify her and increase the risk of capture in addition to hampering her movements in rugged terrain. Whether appearing in armor would have brought her censure is also a difficult question. A consideration of her representation in the sources throws some light on the point.

The same sources that reveal the details of Matilda of Tuscany's warfare on behalf of Gregory VII also reveal much

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[27]Donizone, Vita Mathildis Comitissae, ed. L. Bethmann, MGH Scriptores 12 (Hanover, 1856) bk. 2, chap. 6, pp. 390-91.

as to how contemporaries perceived a woman waging war.

There are only a few representations of Matilda in the sources originating with the supporters of Henry IV.

Benzo of Alba mocks Matilda whom he describes as passively enduring Henry's successful attacks on her possessions. The losses are no extensive that Benzo cannot describe them; he is not from that area and doesn't know the names of the places.[28] Inadvertently, Benzo reveals a weakness in Henry's capabilities. Matilda, although trapped in Canossa and ineffectively wringing her hands, is quite safe from the king who brings in his mother-in-law to mediate.

Benzo then goes on to describe Matilda in a more active mode. Together with Anselm of Lucca, she strips the monasteries to send treasure to "Prandellus" at Rome. He calls Matilda and Anselm "two Habbakkuks," and describes them as being a swine (de porcarana) and a belch (de ructeria).[29]

An anonymous henrician crows that Matilda could not protect Rome from Henry IV, and chides the pope for his evil alliance with "stinking Matilda" (putride Machtildae).[30]

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[28]Benzo of Alba, Ad Heinricum, bk. 6, chap. 4, p. 663.

[29]Benzo of Alba, Ad Heinricum, bk. 6, chap. 4, p. 663. Perhaps Matilda's kinship to Henry IV (second cousin) curtailed Benzo's scatological punning at her expense. He refers to Rudolf of Rheinfelden as "Merdulf" and Gregory VII, Hildebrand, as "Merdeprand."

[30]Petri Crassi defensio Heinrici IV regis, ed. L. De Heinemann, MGH Libelli 1 (Hanover, 1891) p. 434. On Petrus Crassus, Robinson, Authority and Resistance, pp. 75-87. Gregory's alliance with Matilda did leave him open to criticism, H.E.J. Cowdrey, Pope Gregory VII: 1073-1085. (Oxford and New York, 1998) p. 137.

The Vita Heinrici Imperatoris mentions Matilda only in the context of the campaign of 1090-97. She was an ambitious woman who wished to claim almost all of Italy. Henry is described as turning over to his heir, Conrad, the task of dealing with Matilda who soon corrupted the young king and turned him against his father.[31] The campaign of 1081-84 is a triumph culminating with the storming of the city and Henry's imperial coronation. There is no mention of Matilda.[32]

Understandably, the king's supporters speak of Matilda in defeat, but in doing this they admit that she was a force to be reckoned with.

Pope Gregory's supporters are, also understandably, more fulsome and less shy about Matilda's military successes which they view as signs of God's favor.

Bonizo of Sutri ended his account with a call to the soldiers of God to emulate the most excellent Matilda, the daughter of blessed Peter, who is prepared to die rather than break the law of God, and into whose hand, Bonizo believed, Sisara would be delivered.[33] The citation of Judges 4 is an obvious choice and is used frequently in

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[31]Vita Heinrici Imperatoris, ed. W. Wattenbach, MGH Scriptores 12 (Hanover, 1856) chap. 7, p. 276. On Conrad, Elke Goez, "Das Thronerbe als Rivale: König Konrad, Kaiser Heinrichs IV. älterer Sohn," Historisches Jahrbuch 116 (1996) pp. 1-49.

[32]Vita Heinrici Imperatoris, chap. 6, p. 275.

[33]Bonizo of Sutri, Liber ad Amicum, Ed. Ernst Dummler, MGH Libelli 1 (Hanover, 1891) bk. 9, p. 620.

reference to Matilda.[34]

It is puzzling that Bonizo made no reference to the battle at Sorbara. His account extended to the death of Gregory VII in 1085 and, as he was at Matilda's court since 1083, he presumably knew about it. Bonizo is particularly interesting because later in life he turned against Matilda. His canon law collection, Liber de vita christiana, cites canons forbidding women to hold magistracies or military commands.[35]

The lives of Anselm of Lucca are also rich sources for the life of Matilda. Not only do they give information as to the military actions against Henry IV, but they provide some insight as to how she was perceived. In the anonymous prose Vita Anselmi, she is the dutiful temporal ruler.[36]

That such rulership involves conflicting roles is understood. Matilda, in private, is a very religious woman. In the world, however, it must be admitted that she openly

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[34]The biblical references cited in works addressed to or about Matilda of Tuscany need fuller study. It is hoped that this brief commentary will give some idea of the range of means used by religiously motivated writers to represent the woman who fought on their behalf.

[35]Bonizo of Sutri, Liber de vita christiana, ed. H. Perels, Texte zur Geschichte des römischen und kanonistischen Rechts in Mittelalter 1 (Berlin, 1930); Paul Fournier, "Bonizo de Sutri, Urbain II, et la comtesse Matilde d'aprés le Liber de vita christiana de Bonizo de Sutri," Bibliothèque de l'École des Chartes 76 (1915), pp. 265-298.

[36]Vita S. Anselmi Lucensis Episcopi a Bardone Scripsit, ed. Roger Wilmans, MGH Scriptores 12 (1856) chap. 7, p. 15.

led the life of a soldier.[37]

Rangerius is a major source for Matilda's military actions. His account is a biography of Anselm of Lucca. Events peripheral to that life, such as the siege of Rome, are mentioned briefly if at all. Rangerius was in a position to have met and spoken with Matilda. He gives the only description of the fighting in the region of Lucca, the hit-and-run actions on supply stores.[38] Because Anselm blessed the soldiers, although through a representative, Rangerius gives an account of the battle at Sorbara. He puns on her name.[39] Like Matilda's biographer, Donizone, whose panegyric purposes have long been noted,[40] Rangerius wrote after the war was over. Both celebrated a victory that had already happened.

Anselm of Lucca died before the story ended. He also knew Matilda well, as her confessor. In his reply to a lost letter written by the anti-pope Guibert of Ravenna, Anselm angrily denies accusations of deceiving Matilda whom he describes as prepared to expend not only all her earthly

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[37]Invitat tandem sui studii adiutricem marchionissam domnam Mathildam moribus ac genere nobilissimam; quae spiriualis et religiosissima in occulto, secularem aut, ut verius dicam, militarem agebat vitam in manifesto . . . .

[38]Rangerius, Vita Anselmi, bk. 3, chap. 3, ll. 3779-86, p. 1236.

[39]See Chapter 4, pp. 185-84.

[40]Luigi Simeoni, "La Vita Mathildis di Donizone et il suo valore storicho-critiche," Atti e memorie della Deputazione de storia patria per le Antiche Provincie Modenesi, series 7, vol. 4 (1927) pp. 18-64.

wealth in the defense of justice, but to contend even to blood (usque ad sanguinem), until God would deliver his enemies into the hand of a woman.[41]

Finally, there is the work of John of Mantua.

> Never regret, heavenly spouse, that you bear arms, and at the same time devote yourself to contemplation and complete by your sword, used against the . . . of depraved heretics, what is lacking in the preaching of saintly clergy (sanctorum catholicorum).[42]

John of Mantua wrote, so he tells us, his Treatise on the Song of Songs and the Book on the Virgin Mary at the request of Matilda of Tuscany who called on him as "one who does not despise the wheel of the world."[43] The Treatise, an exhortation to perseverance in war addressed to a woman, is a unique document. It connects Matilda's military activities on behalf of the papacy to the type of the active life, the Bride of the Canticle, and to its exemplar, the Virgin Mary. John assures Matilda, who presumably would have preferred to remain in contemplation, that her path to the rewards, the sweetness, of contemplation, goes across the battlefield.

John's exposition begins at the beginning:

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[41]Anselm of Lucca, Contra Wibertum, ed. R. Wilmans, MGH Scriptores 12 (Hanover, 1856) p. 5.

[42]John of Mantua. Iohannis Mantuani in Cantica Canticorum et de Sancta Maria Tractatus ad Comitissa Mathildam, ed. Bernard Bischoff and Burkhard Taeger. (Freiburg, 1973), p. 52, 11. 4-7. The ellipsis is in the text.

[43]John of Mantua, In Cantica Canticorum, p. 25. This has led to some speculation that John was a layman, but the question is not resolvable given the little that is known of him.

> Let us see, therefore, what the title of this work signifies. Here begin the Canticles of Canticles.[44] . . . I think we must not omit that he uses canticles in the plural, for through this Solomon shows that those whom he sees occupied in the sweetness of contemplation do not praise God in one aspect alone. He is indeed praised with regard to all creation, He is praised for the punishment inflicted upon the evil, for the glory of the just, even for the fall of the angels and the maintenance of the good. He is praised in the rendering of thanks and in the inspiration of every good. They (the contemplatives) see all things to be of benefit which they see God to do or to allow. This is the way by which an enemy is loved and a friend is honored. They feel, indeed, that even our enemies are of a great benefit to us when they realize that they (the enemies) were not created for their own sake, but are useful toward the completion of the number of the elect.[45]

Further:

> Do not therefore feel burdened (or oppressed), O blessed woman (o beata femina), that you should suffer persecution at the hand of the One from whom you justly expect to receive a crown (God), for you would be diminished in this future crowning if you were to be deprived of persecution from Him, for fire is going to prove your gold, hence it should be cherished. Should anyone deprive you of it, it ought to displease you . . . It is then obvious: if you do not feel abundant love for Him in the course of the very persecution that you assume for Him on behalf of the weaker members of the church, you are not participating as you should in this part of contemplation.[46]

The persecutions that Matilda bore were substantial. As Gregory VII wrote in March of 1081 to his supporters in Germany, she risked the loss of all she possessed, and she was dispossessed of her imperial offices and her property

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[44]John of Mantua, In Cantica Canticorum, p. 27, 11. 19-20.

[45]John of Mantua, In Cantica Canticorum, p. 28, 1. 29-p. 29, 1. 9.

[46]John of Mantua, In Cantica Canticorum, p. 29, 11. 11-19.

confiscated."[47] The contrasting reports of Benzo of Alba and Rangerius of Lucca complete the picture. On the literal level, both Henry and Matilda are fighting a campaign of destructive raids that serve both to deprive the other of supplies and to weaken the morale of the opposition by demonstrating one's own effectiveness and the enemy's comparable vulnerability.

John, of course, is operating on a different level:

> Catch for us these young foxes who are tearing apart our vineyards: for our vines are in flower. (Cant. 2, 15) Foxes are the heretics who in the slyness of their ways lay traps for the unwary."[48]

Who are the heretics? John has already made that quite clear. The Lombard bishops who by their "hypocrite behavior pretend to be humble and to have little interest in mundane things." Yet they support Henry IV and the anti-pope Guibert of Ravenna against Pope Gregory thus spreading the heresies, the poisons, of simony and nicolaitism. Because they are excommunicate, they are within the power of Satan, but the devil is too clever to drive them to the most shameful sins which would reveal them for what they are."[49] In their seeming holiness they can do great damage to the crop, they can mislead the people.

Therefore, do not hesitate to catch these foxes, o

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[47]See chapter 2, pp. 123-25.

[48]John of Mantua, In Cantica Canticorum, p. 63, 11. 24-26.

[49]John of Mantua, In Cantica Canticorum, p. 38, 11. 19-22; this is not a direct quote.

> catholica potestas, and to hinder them in any way you can. It is the spouse whom you craved in the innards of your heart who asks, who instructs, who commands you to protect his vineyards with all your power.[50]

In this section, John shifts his exposition of the Bride from the contemplative soul to the Church. Ever the grammarian, he writes:

> We must also observe the Bridegroom talking in the plural to the Bride, saying, 'Capite!' This means, 'You, Bride, catch them!' (cape), but (italics mine) through those whom you have appointed by your authority. For this reason, he says, 'Capite!' since she should bear herself thus that she may always flourish (semper vigeat), and draw up (or bring together) others to capture because of her authority and excellence.[51]

John cites II Thessalonians 2, 3-8: Unless dissension shall come first, the day of the Lord will not come. And then when the falling away occurs, the evil one will be revealed whom the Lord Jesus will slay by the breath of his mouth, i.e., the Antichrist. John points out that, as it has been a long time since many nations were subject to the "King of Rome," as he calls the German emperor, the reference must be to a falling away from the catholic pope who, wielding the imperium of Peter, holds together catholics throughout all lands. To date no heresy has prevailed against him since he had the help of the members of the whole church. If, however, the separation of the members should occur, the Antichrist may be able to arise and force-

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[50]John of Mantua, In Cantica Canticorum, p. 64, 11. 15-18.

[51]John of Mantua, In Cantica Canticorum, p. 64, 11. 5-8.

fully promulgate his heresy before the pope can call together the "orthodox and weighty men" (catholicos et auctorabiles viros) who would, united, deal with this heresy as easily as they have dealt with all heresies, until now. The Bride-Ecclesia calls upon the contemplative Matilda whose Bride-Soul God is purifying by fire, for a very important task, nothing less than to prevent the coming of the Antichrist.

> Now, servant and spouse of truth, if you see this falling away occurring, will you hesitate to hinder it by counsel and arms (consilio et armis)? You know for sure that the said bishops of the Lombards and all who resemble them throughout the world are paving the way for the Antichrist. They separate and by their crimes force whomever they can to separate with them. And if God had not set you and other saintly powers against their evil, you would have witnessed secession from holy Gregory, pope and Roman emperor, taking place. . . . Now, therefore, miles catholica, stand up and act to delay this secession while the members are still strong who will sustain the onslaught of Antichrist. . . . You will be called felix (a title for a victorious emperor) and blessed for generations (beata per secula).[52]

Considerations of Just War may seem superfluous in such circumstances, but the Gregorian camp was sensitive to the propaganda of Henry IV, painting Gregory VII as a fomenter of war.[53] John has carefully established the conditions specified by Augustine: There is a lawful authority declaring the war--the pope-emperor, thus the imperium of Peter, given by Christ. There is a just cause, the destruction of

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[52]John of Mantua, In Cantica Canticorum, p. 65, ll. 6-10, 16-20.

[53]Robinson, Authority and Resistance, pp. 89-99.

the vineyards, the attacks upon the members of the church, upon the church itself, and, waiting in the wings, the Antichrist. And there is right intention, established from the outset, the contemplative soul's affection for the trials sent by God, trials that will bring the soul to the rewards of contemplation, the union with its spouse. "This is the way by which an enemy is loved," as Augustine required.[54]

John's work is an extravagant mixing of the mystical and the martial. He reminds Matilda of the merits of the warrior St. Martin of tours, patron of Lucca; in the Liber de Sancta Maria he holds out to her the possibility of joining Mary and Elizabeth in a trio of blessed active women.

> O blessed woman, in whose familia (under whose protection) resides the bride of heaven, the mother of God, the daughter of God! . . . Ha, ha, felicissima, if to these two you can be made a third . . . .[55]

Any one of these works could be dismissed as speaking metaphorically. To dismiss so many praises of powerful and martial women addressed to Matilda of Tuscany by those who knew her is much more difficult to justify. Behind the biblical and mystical imagery lies a very real appreciation of the military skills of a woman who waged a long and hard and often discouraging war of resistance againsta militarily

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[54]Frederick H. Russell, The Just War in the Middle Ages (Cambridge, 1975, pp. 16-39.

[55]John of Mantua, In Cantica Canticorum, p. 182, 11. 18-21.

powerful and vastly more experienced opponent.

Matilda of Tuscany never defeated Henry IV. She made it impossible for him to win his objectives in Italy. There is no way to determine what role her successful defiance played in Henry's eventual loss of power in Germany, but she made it quite clear that he did not control Italy. Matilda, miles Petri, would not surrender to an excommunicate king, and his inability to either defeat her or force her to accept his authority made Henry IV look weak and ineffective. No king can survive that.

Appendix



Fig. 1: The main routes across the Apennines.



Fig. 2: Rome. The position of the Leonine City, the papal enclave, is both exposed and protected. It can be attacked or besieged without the necessity of subduing the entire city of Rome, but is in turn subject to reprisals. Within the larger city there were both large uninhabited areas and fortifications such as the Arch of Constantine (2) fortifed by Gregory VII. The pope's support was strongest on the right bank of the Tiber, in the Trastevere and the Tiber Isle (1).

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DBI	Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani, 60 vols. Rome: Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana, 1960-.
Epistolae vagantes	The Epistolae Vagantes of Pope Gregory VII. Ed. and trans. H.E.J. Cowdrey. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1972.
Diplomata Henry IV	Die Urkunden Heinrichs IV. Edited by Dietrich von Gladiss and Alfred Gawlik. MGH Diplomata 6:1-3. Weimar and Hanover, 1941, 1959, 1978.
MGH	Monumenta Germaniae Historica
Constitutiones	Legum, sectio 4. Constitutiones et acta publica imperatorum et regum
Deutsches Mittelalter	Deutsches Mittelalter: Kritische Studientexte für ältere deutsche Geschichtskunde
Diplomata	Diplomata regum et imperatorum Germaniae
Epistolae selectae	Epistolae selectae in usum scholarum ex MGH separatim editae
Laienfürsten	Laienfürsten- und Dynasten-Urkunden der Kaiserzeit
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