HISTORY, MEMORY, AND IDENTITY: REMEMBERING THE HOMELAND IN EXILE

by

NIDA BIKMEN

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Social/Personality Psychology in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City University of New York

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Abstract

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by

Nida Bikmen

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This dissertation investigated how constructions of a group's history affect members' attitudes toward and relationships with outgroup members. Incorporating Halbwach's (1950) concept of collective memory --defined as a shared sense of history-- to Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), I conceptualized collective memories as the content of collective identities. I suggested that outgroup attitudes are determined not only by the strength or importance of a group identity but also by the cultural narratives that construct the history of intergroup relations and on which these group identities are grounded. Bosnian refugees and immigrants who left their country during or after the 1992-1995 war and who resettled in the U.S. were participants in the study. Following Weine (1999), I identified two versions of the history of intergroup relations (collective memory narratives) in the Bosnian context through a literature review and preliminary interviews. One version that I called *narratives of coexistence* emphasized harmonious multiethnic living (deriving from the official ideology of "Yugoslavian brotherhood and unity"); the other, *narratives of threat*, revived the memory of previous ethnic conflicts during the two World Wars (used by nationalist leaders). It was hypothesized that the endorsement of narratives interacts with the degree of ethnic

identification to predict outgroup attitudes. In addition, it was expected that group members would remember the Bosnian war in ways that would favor the ingroup (i.e., attributing more responsibility to outgroups for starting the war and committing war crimes). Life story interviews with 8 Bosnian immigrants and refugees and a quantitative survey of 94 Bosnians (mostly Bosnian Muslims) in the United States were conducted to gather data in addition to observations and informal conversations in community organizations. The results showed that collective memory (specifically, narratives of coexistence) moderated the relationship between ethnoreligious identification and attitudes toward one of the outgroups for Bosnian Muslims, the Croats, as expected. However, collective memory (attributions for war) mediated the relationship between ethnoreligious identification and attitudes toward the other outgroup, Serbs. Further, the ethnic makeup of the immigrant communities (homogenous vs. multiethnic) had an impact on how the past was remembered and how members of outgroups were evaluated. Still, the effect of collective memory narratives remained limited due to the fact that many participants had both narratives available to interpret their experiences as shown by shifts between narratives in life story interviews and a lack of correlation between the endorsement of the two narratives. The findings were discussed in relation to literatures on transnational political participation and reconciliation.

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Introduction

> *"…there is a temptation on the part of social psychologists to draw a simple analogy between methods used to reduce intergroup conflicts in the real world and those employed in the classical social psychology experiment by Sherif (1966) –but the boys in Sherif's study had no long-term history of animosity as do people in many of today's intergroup conflicts. Nor presumably did the feeling of dislike between the two groups of boys reach depths akin to those that led to genocide for example in Kosovo, or in Rwanda." (Cairns & Roe, 2003, p. 4).*

Intergroup conflict has been an issue of great interest to social psychologists who have applied their knowledge of individual and group behavior to help remedy the ills of an increasingly war-torn world. Many influential theories of intergroup relations, which focus more on conflict than on harmony between groups, have been developed and interventions have been designed and implemented (e.g., Hadjipavlou, 2004; Hicks & Weisberg, 2004; Kelman, 2001, Stephan, Hertz-Lazarowitz, Zelniker, & Stephan, 2004). However, as Cairns and Roe (2003) suggested, these theories take little account of the historically situated nature of real life conflicts. Groups that are in conflict with each other often share a physical and, sometimes, social environment for a long period of time and the history of their interactions informs the conflict and their attitudes toward each other. The way groups represent their history and how these representations become markers of group identities is missing from major social psychological theories of intergroup relations.

In this research I take a closer look at the transformation of social relations and national/ethnic identities as a result of social/political destruction of homeland and migration to a new country. Specifically, I study the experiences of Bosnian refugees in the United States. The 1992-1995 Bosnian war was fought between the three major ethno-religious groups living in Bosnia --Serbs, Croats, Muslims—and resulted in an estimated 200,000 people dead and 1,200,000 people internationally displaced (Cousens & Cater, 2001) out of a prewar population of 4 million. Bosnians began to arrive in the United States in the early 1990s and most have resettled there. A decade after the end of the war, many Bosnians are still in the United States. Although the war ended, political and economic instability still prevails in Bosnia, which now consists of two entities, the Serbian Republic and the Muslim-Croat Federation. According to recent estimates, unemployment is 40% in Bosnia and most residents rely on black market to survive (Silber, 2005, New York Times). Meanwhile, some of the main actors of the Bosnian war are being tried at the U.N. war crimes tribunal[1] while others are still at large. Interethnic relations in Bosnia are seriously damaged but very slow and gradual improvement is also being observed (Biro, Adjukovic, Corkalo, Djipa, Milin, & Weinstein, 2004). Arguably, for Bosnian refugees, it is a time associated with considerable ambivalence about their homeland.

The Bosnian war was fought for territory and power, but it was framed in identity terms, that is, in terms of differences and inequalities between the major ethnic groups in Bosnia. Although these three groups came together under the communist government as Yugoslavs and Bosnians, these superordinate identities did not prevent the war after the

[1] The former president of Yugoslavia Slobodan Milosevic who was largely held responsible for the wars and atrocities in Bosnia, Croatia and Kosovo died in prison late March 2006.

collapse of Communism. Thus the case of Bosnians provides us with the opportunity to study relations between groups who lived together but who also fought against each other more than once in their history, and who are now sharing the experience of uprootedness. I make use of a number of social psychological theories and perspectives to frame my questions, but my focus is on the collective memory (Halbwachs, 1950/1992, 1980; Billig, 1997; Middleton & Edwards, 1990) of the Bosnian war and of Bosnia in general as determinants of intergroup relations and that are attitudes as most commonly studied within Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Tajfel, 1981, 1982). More specifically, I explore how the war and the events that led to it are remembered, how Bosnia before and after the start of the war is remembered, and what effects these memories have on national/ethnic identities and on intergroup relations in exile.

Theoretically, I aim to develop a conceptualization and operationalization of the notion of "collective memory" in order to be able to include it in the social psychological study of collective identities and intergroup relations. In the literature review below I follow others who defined memory as the content of identities and argue that collective memory forms the content of collective identities and that it should be studied with methods specific to particular socio-historical contexts for a better understanding of the consequences of identification with a collective, especially in terms of intergroup relations and individual meaning-making processes.

I begin with a brief history of Bosnia and the war and discuss the prevalent interpretations of the Bosnian history as held by its various constituents. There are two kinds of narratives about prewar Bosnia: one focuses on multiethnic living as promoted by the communist regime and experienced in daily interactions by most Bosnians. The

other is based on memories of the most recent as well as the previous conflicts between the groups and was fueled by the nationalist leadership. It is important to note that while these narratives were ideological tools for leaders, they were based on real experiences of the Bosnian population.

Following that, I review research on collective identity, collective memory and intergroup relations, and establish theoretical connections between these concepts. I argue that the nature of intergroup attitudes and relations depends on the type of stories (memories) that ethnic/national identities are grounded on. Hence, I examine the relationship between ethnic/national identification, endorsement of narratives about the history of Bosnia and current attitudes toward members of outgroups in exile. Following recent research on collective guilt and attributions of historical behavior (Doosje & Branscombe, 2003; Branscombe & Doosje, 2004) I investigate how Bosnians explain the war and who they hold responsible for starting it and for committing war crimes. I also explore how the make-up of immigrant communities (i.e., ethnically diverse vs. homogeneous) shapes these relationships.

The hypothesized relationships were studied using both qualitative (life story interviews) and quantitative (questionnaire) methods. Although the initial purpose of the study was to survey Bosnians of all three ethnicities, recruiting participants of Croat and Serb ethnicities proved very difficult for reasons discussed in the epilogue, hence most analyses were conducted only with Bosnian Muslims. This resulted in very limited data about the different ways in which history is remembered by members of each ethnic group. However, I was able to establish some of the theoretical links between identity, memory and outgroup attitudes. The results are discussed in relation to recent literatures

on reconciliation and transnationalism, that is, how reconstructing the memory of life in the homeland and war can affect the transnational political participation of Bosnians and how these findings could inform reconciliation efforts in the diaspora as well as the homeland.

CHAPTER I

BOSNIA: WAR, MEMORY, AND IDENTITY

A short history:

The history of the Balkans in general and of Bosnia in particular is complicated. From the early 15th to the late 19th century Bosnia was under Ottoman rule, an era during which a considerable number of Bosnians converted to Islam, mostly to enjoy the privileges of being a Muslim citizen in a Muslim state. In the late 19th century a waning Ottoman Empire lost Bosnia to Austro-Hungarian Empire, and Bosnia remained under the Austro-Hungarian rule until the end of the World War I, which was also the end of the two empires that ruled in Bosnia. The first Yugoslav state, "the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes", was founded as the war ended and lasted until the Second World War (in 1928 it was renamed “Yugoslavia”). In 1943 the second Yugoslav state, based on class rather than nationality, was founded as a socialist federation under the Communist Party. Communism was thought to be a binding element between the different nations and republics of Yugoslavia, which consisted of six republics --Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia, Macedonia and Montenegro-- and two autonomous provinces, Kosovo and Vojvodina.

With the death of the Yugoslavian Communist leader Tito, who suppressed the expression of ethnic identities among the people of Yugoslavia in order to enhance the "Yugoslavian brotherhood and unity" as a superordinate category (Sherif, 1966), nationalist and separatist currents gained momentum in the 1980s. In 1986 Slobodan Milosevic rose to power in Serbia with his nationalist agenda. Following the collapse of the Communist Party, Slovenia and Croatia, the two wealthiest republics of the

federation, declared their independence in 1990. The Yugoslav National Army (JNA), which by that time was dominated by Serbian officers, invaded both countries, thus starting the war that resulted in the destruction of Yugoslavia.

The Bosnian war began in April 1992 when Bosnia's Muslim president Alija Izzetbegovic declared the country's independence from now Serb-dominated Yugoslavia as a result of a national referendum in February where Bosnian Muslims and Croats strongly endorsed independence while Serbs refused to vote. The war was interpreted as the outcome of the Serbian nationalist agenda to create a Greater Serbia and the subsequent reaction of Croatian nationalists with their own agenda to create a Greater Croatia by adding the Bosnian territory to their respective countries (Malcolm, 1996; White, 1994). Due to the efforts of both the nationalist politicians and the international community, which remained passive until it was too late, the war lasted over three years. All three groups fought against each other at different points but Croats and Muslims soon resumed their alliance through the efforts of American diplomats. The war was widely broadcast in the international media and is considered to be the most horrendous conflict in Europe since the World War II, especially with the use of mass rape as a war weapon. The war ended in December 1995 with the Dayton Peace Accord signed by representatives of the three parties, Muslims, Croats and Serbs, with the intervention of the U.S. government. The accord assigned 51% of the Bosnian territory to the Muslim-Croat Federation and 49% to the Serb Republic. It included a new constitution and various regulations for the protection of human rights, return of the refugees, reconstruction of the economy, and the deployment of NATO troops to supervise the transition to civil life and any residue of interethnic hostilities (Malcolm, 1996; Cousens

& Cater, 2001). Many refugees, however, stayed in the countries of refuge still fearing for their safety, or because they no longer had a home to go back to (Cousens & Cater, 2001), or simply because they now had new lives.

The 2000 U.S. census reported that nearly 100,000 individuals who were born in Bosnia-Herzegovina live in the United States. The actual number is probably much higher since the International Organization of Migration claims to have helped around 70,000 refugees from Bosnia to resettle in the East Coast alone (estimated number used by a former Yugoslav expatriate community organization in New York City). Large Bosnian refugee communities can be found in New York City, Chicago, St. Louis, Iowa, Indiana and Vermont. Several studies have explored the experiences of these individuals in the United States. (see Weine, 1999; Miller, Worthington, & Muzurovic, 2002; Keyes & Kane, 2004; Owens-Manley & Coughlan, 2003). Miller and his colleagues (2002), for example, collected narratives of Bosnian refugees who resettled in Chicago. They asked the refugees about their lives in Bosnia and in the United States, and argued that it is not possible to understand the experience of exile without knowing about the lives of refugees prior to their displacement. For displaced individuals, life before exile becomes a reference point to evaluate life after the exile. The memory of large social networks, social roles and activities in Bosnia made the isolation and lack of meaning in daily life in the United States even more salient for the refugees. Some, especially those who suffer most from war-related trauma chose to isolate themselves from other Bosnians in order to avoid painful memories. Overall, in addition to the loss of networks and social roles, these refugees suffered from loss of life projects, of control over their physical and social environment, lack of sufficient income, and health problems that were not previously

experienced in Bosnia. Leaders of an expatriate organization in New York City indicated to me that other than the relatively young and educated Bosnians who benefit from the offerings of the new country, the communities live isolated, usually along ethnic lines, and continue their patriarchal traditions.

Collective Identity and Memory in Bosnia

Bosnia was the only republic of the former Yugoslavia that did not bear the name of the major constituent group and that did not have an overwhelming ethnic majority group. According to the census data, in 1991 43.7% of the population was Muslim, 31.3% Serb, and 17.4% Croat. Only 5% of the Bosnian population self-identified as "Yugoslav" in 1991, with a 26.5% decrease in such identification as compared to the 1981 census. Until 1961, however, "Muslim" was not an identity option in the census because it was considered a religious rather than an ethnic identification. Muslims in the Yugoslavian territory had to declare themselves as belonging to one of the large nationalities, such as Serb-Muslim, Croat-Muslim, or Yugoslav-undeclared until the 1961 census, the first one that included the category "ethnic Muslim" (Botev, 1994; Bringa, 1995; Malcolm, 1996; Robinson, Engelstoft, & Pobric, 2001).

The origins of all three groups are the Slavic populations of the Balkans (Malcolm, 1996; Eriksen, 2001; Boose, 2002). The Muslims converted to Islam during the Ottoman era. Malcolm (1996) reports that it was not until late 19th century that Serbs and Croats started to call themselves as such and claimed that Muslim Slavs were actually either Muslim Serbs or Muslim Croats, supposedly an attempt to legitimize their desire to dominate the Muslim-populated areas of the former Yugoslavia, especially of Bosnia. The Bosnian Muslim identity, on the other hand, was defined more on the basis

of shared environment, culture, and practices (especially religion) than on shared blood, origins, and territory (Bringa, 1995; Robinson et al., 2001).

A common way that Bosnian refugees start their stories is by claiming "we all lived together" (Mertus, Tesanovic, Metikos, & Boric, 1997; Weine, 1999). Karahasan (1994) described how ethnic groups residing in separate neighborhoods in Sarajevo, Bosnia's capital, came together in the marketplace, to work and live together. His description of the city life makes it clear that life in Sarajevo before the war was not blind to ethnic differences, but that it was possible for these groups to coexist harmoniously. It is commonly stated that interethnic marriage, as an index of social integration, was very common in Bosnia. However, Botev's (1994) analysis of census data showed that between 1961 and 1989 exogamy in Bosnia remained relatively stable at approximately 11% of all marriages, not different than other republics of the former Yugoslavia, and not particularly high either. When exogamy did happen, Christian groups (Serbs and Croats) tended to stick together while Muslims, who were usually a highly endogamous group, were more open to interethnic marriage in Bosnia compared to other republics (Botev, 1994), especially in Sarajevo. Thus, although to say that there was complete integration in Bosnia before the war would be to romanticize the pre-war life, apparently the groups did live together without major problems. Pre- and post-war literature in Bosnia portrays the Bosnian cultural identity consisting of the heritage of all ethnic groups living in Bosnia --Serbs, Croats, Muslims, and Jews (e.g., Karahasan, 1994; Mehmedinovic, 1993; Hemon, 2000). In his memoirs of the siege of Sarajevo, Bosnian Muslim writer Dzevad Karahasan (1994) related his interview with an American journalist who visited him in his apartment. A shelling started when the journalist was there and they ended up in the

basement of the building with Karahasan's neighbor to wait for the shelling to be over. While there, the journalist asked why the Sarajevans were opposed to the partition of the city and the country if that could bring peace.

> "I replied that I wholeheartedly agreed, if he could only propose the way to divide Bosnia and Sarajevo. As my neighbors were taking shelter in the basement, I could concretely demonstrate to the American a sample of the ethnic structure of Bosnia and Sarajevo within our building. Pointing to my fellow tenants out, one by one, I showed that only one out of ten married couples occupying the ten apartments in the building is of the same ethnicity. I myself noticed that fact only then.
>
> 'How could you possibly divide that?' I asked. If Sarajevo were to be divided, I could not have a bath because the tub would remain in the Serb province of my wife; my Serb wife could not wash her face, though, because the washbasin would remain in my province. The same goes for nine out of ten apartments in our building." (p. 46-47).

The Bosnian war was commonly perceived to be the result of "centuries old ethnic hatreds" in the Balkans (Malcolm, 1996; White, 1996). In his often cited history of Bosnia, Malcolm (1996) suggested that this argument about the causes of Bosnian war lying in "ancient ethnic hatreds" is a very simplistic one; it was because of this perception that the Bosnian war was considered a civil war by the international community which remained indifferent for a long time, hoping it to be resolved on its own. Instead, according to Malcolm (1996), the war was planned by forces outside of Bosnia, mainly Serbian and Croatian nationalists, and the memory of ancient events was only used by these forces to manipulate Bosnian groups. Other scholars have expressed similar views

(Bennett, 1997; Brown, 1997; White, 1994; White, 1996; Zimmermann, 1996). Futher, White (1996) indicated that since the field battle of Kosovo in 1389, an extremely important event for the national memory of Serbs (Boose, 2002) in which the Ottoman Turks conquered the Serbian territory and began the colonization of the Balkans, to 1941, there was no fighting between Serbs and Croats, thus ruling out the prominent idea that the recent war in Bosnia was rooted in "ancient ethnic hatreds".

Although one cannot support the argument that ethnic hatred was the main cause of the Bosnian war in light of historical evidence, the deliberate manipulation of old animosities by the major actors of the war points to the fact that a certain level of distrust existed and may still help us understand the motives of individuals who joined the war on different sides. The memory of World War II when atrocities were committed by all groups was repressed by the communist regime under Tito, but not erased. This is one reason why it was easy for Serbian nationalists to manipulate Bosnian Serbs by telling them that Muslims were preparing to attack. Once the war started that memory was brought back, not only by deliberate attempts of certain sides, but also by the processes of collective remembering. Bowman (1994) described how Serbian and Croatian nationalists used the suppressed memory of previous conflicts as part of their nation formation activities based on the exclusion/extermination of the "others" in the 1980s. For example, both sides made use of photographs of WWII depicting mutilated bodies of one's people by the other, or recently discovered mass graves of old massacres. Previously silenced stories of atrocities by one group were put into circulation by the nationalist leaderships. Bowman (1994) described the manipulation of memory as a "discursive shift" which "allowed peripheralized and muted memories to become the

central point of new definitions of identities" (p. 150), thus making enemies out of previous neighbors.

The narratives of refugees are filled with such family memories where they tell about a father or a grandfather brutally killed by another group member during the previous wars (Mertus et al., 1997; Weine, 1999). In his work with Bosnian refugees resettled in the United States, psychiatrist Weine (1999) suggested that because of the suppression of memory, Yugoslavians failed to learn the dangers of ethnic nationalism, how to recognize it, and how to fight against it. In his analysis of the psychological causes of the war on the part of Serbs, White (1996) emphasized the fear felt by Serbs of living as a minority in the same country with Muslims and Croats. Quoting several interviews by Glenny (1994), White (1996) demonstrated how especially the uneducated, rural Serbs adopted Milosevic's propaganda about fundamentalist Muslims preparing to create an Islamic state or of Croats preparing to start the massacres the Ustashas[2] committed during WWII. Although, according to White, there was some basis for these fears (400 hundred years of subordination under the Ottoman rule, and mass killings of Serbs by Croats who allied with the Nazis during WWII, and to a smaller extent by Muslims), they were obviously mistaken in their fears, especially since the Muslims in the Balkans are among the most secular in the world. White (1996) explained how this fear worked to create its horrible outcome by referring to the concept of assimilation, that is, incorporation of information into preexisting beliefs:

> "The Serbs illustrate it [assimilation of information into preexisting beliefs] when, in their obsession with their own history, they are overready to interpret the present

[2] Ustashas were the Croatian troops who sided with the Nazis during the Nazi occupation of Yugoslavia in WWII. They were known for their brutality against Serbs.

> as a rerun of the past. They look at the Croats of today and see Ustashas. They look at the Muslims of today and see an invasion of Europe like that mounted by the Ottoman Turks in 1389." (p. 124).

Similarly, in an ethnography of a predominantly Serb city, Foca, and a predominantly Muslim city, Gorazde, in post-war Bosnia, Jones (2002) found that the dominant discourses about the war emphasized a fear of living under the other's rule in both communities, and that both groups blamed each other for the war. The war came as a surprise to the Muslims, a theme found in other studies as well (Weine, 1999), and they still believed in a multi-ethnic Bosnia, although they were ambivalent about the return of Serbian refugees. Serbs of Foca, on the other hand, believed that Muslims who were planning an Islamic takeover started the war, and that ethnic cleansing was a necessary self-defensive strategy. They also claimed that the atrocities committed by Serbs were the acts of a couple of lunatics and exaggerated by the human rights reports. These discourses were adopted by adolescents in each community.

In the post-war era, the situation does not seem to be getting any better. An analysis of history textbooks in Bosnia-Herzegovina showed that school systems in Muslim, Croatian and Serbian administrative divisions adopted different textbooks with an ethnocentric approach in each (Baranovic, 2001). The books present one's own nation as having been the victim of aggressors, having suffered throughout the history, and having fought only for self-defense, thus contributing more to the formation of an ethnocentric identity than to reconciliation and reintegration. Robinson and his colleagues (2002) analyzed the "remaking of Sarajevo" as a construction site for Bosnian Muslim identity and found that the national identity of Bosnian Muslims is being recreated by the selective invocation of certain events of the recent and remote history.

Changing the Serbian street names and removing old signs in Cyrillic script, remembering key events of the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian periods, issuing banknotes and stamps bearing the portraits of writers, poets, and artists from Bosnia's past, rebuilding the National Theatre and creating the National Museum from the State Museum, and finally an increase in the use of the Bosnian name (e.g., Bosnian language instead of Serbo-Croatian, Bosnian coffee instead of Turkish coffee) are all symbolic communications of a nationalist Bosnian identity. Rebuilding certain monuments is of tremendous importance for national identity: as one Sarajevo native said "I cried three times during the war -when my father was killed, when the library burned, and when the bridge was bombed" (Pollack, 2003).[3] This last quotation points to the embeddedness of spatial identities in national identities and exemplifies how the physical destruction of the homeland and its historical heritage is linked to and understood in terms of personal suffering.

Identifying memory narratives

Bosnians experienced both harmonious coexistence and conflict with members of other ethnic/religious groups. An examination of previously published interviews with Bosnian refugees (Mertus et al., 1997; Tekavec, 1995; Weine, 1999), the history of Bosnia (Malcolm, 1996; White, 1996), and my preliminary interviews with Bosnian refugees in New York City reveals these two experiences, hence, two major discourses in relation to history of intergroup relations. One is a theme Weine (1999) called "We all lived together", a reflection of the idea of the "Yugoslavian brotherhood and unity". This

[3] The National Library (built by the Austro-Hungarian Empire) and the Stari Most Bridge (built by the Ottomans) in Mostar were cultural sites of great pride for the Bosnians. Both were destroyed during the

discourse minimizes ethnic differences in pre-war Bosnia and emphasizes the blindness of Bosnians to the ethnic backgrounds of their friends and neighbors. I call this theme "narratives of coexistence".

> "I never saw my friends as Serbs. They were just my best friends. I don't think they saw me as a Muslim girl" (Fatima, Muslim from Sarajevo).
>
> "I know all religious holidays and respect them all because that was how we used to live" (Nizima, Muslim from Janja, in Mertus et al., 1997, p. 34).

This theme is often countered (or in many cases accompanied) by another which draws attention back to the memory of the previous wars and conflicts, to the betrayal of friends in the recent war, and to the resulting lack of trust between groups. Weine (1999) noticed that in the aftermath of war family memories were reconstructed in ways that highlighted longstanding ethnic conflicts. One of his informants, a Muslim from Foca, told the story of his grandfather who was brutally murdered by a Serb he knew in World War II.

> "We thought, OK, we will respect the Serbian minority. We thought we will give democracy to everybody and live together like before. Like always. Now I see that it meant only the last fourty years… In my family we always knew who killed my grandfather in World War II, but we tried to push it back to the back of our minds, to regard it like something that is history and that will never happen again. We thought of that as the dark side of Yugoslavia.
> …I must say that we always had a sense that the Serbians know how to do barbaric crimes. Because of my grandfather. Because they cut off his head on the bridge in the middle of the town. He was one of the richest, and the guy who killed him was a poor Bosnian Orthodox he had supported all his life. And we had the sense that they knew how to do things that are very strange –not always of a clear mind. I did know that, but we didn't put that first." (interview quoted in Weine, 1999, p. 9-10).

The main theme of this discourse can be put as "we knew they would do this". I call this theme "narratives of threat". A good example of this distrust in the "other" and expectations of antagonism as a result of previous conflicts can be seen in the words of

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war.

one of my informants. After relating how an aunt was saved as a child from the mass killings of Muslims by Serbs during World War II by hiding in a carpet while the rest of the household was killed, my informant said

> "I would never marry a Serb. Never. And it has nothing to do with religion. My mom would never want me to marry a Serb because she would say 'how will I know if his grandparents or other relatives did not kill one of my relatives?'". (Almila, Muslim from Sarajevo).

I argue that these themes/discourses provide the content of ethnic/national identities in Bosnia and inform attitudes toward outgroups as suggested by the above quotes. The theoretical links between collective memory, identity, and outgroup attitudes are discussed in the next chapter.

Research on ethnic distance conducted in 1989 and 1990, right before and during the breakup of former Yugoslavia, found very little distance between different ethnonational groups in the area, and almost none in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Pantic, 1999, cited in Biro et al., 2004). The situation changed drastically during the war and afterwards. By the late 1990s, only 20% of Bosnian Muslims accepted Serbs as kin by way of marriage, and only 25% accepted Croats (Siber, 1997, cited in Biro et al., 2004). More recently, Biro and his colleagues (Biro, et al., 2004) conducted two surveys of attitudes and beliefs of residents of Mostar and Prijedor, two cities in Bosnia and Herzegovina where Muslims lived with Croats and Serbs, respectively. Administering the survey first in 2000 and 2001, and then again in 2002, and they found that distrust of the “other”, even in friendship, prevailed in both cities. Nevertheless, there was some room for optimism, because when people were surveyed again in 2002, there were decreases in distrust in all groups except for Croats in Mostar. Positive experiences with

the members of opposing groups in each city also increased over time, although to different extents in each city and in each ethnic group.

In this study I looked at intergroup attitudes in the host country. It is possible that, once outside the country of conflict, Bosnian immigrants and refugees would resume their multiethnic living in a new country where they share the experience of uprootedness. In contrast, it is also plausible that they would cling to the ethnoreligious boundaries drawn by the war and establish separate communities in the host country. As will be seen in the results section, both patterns were observed in this study.

CHAPTER II

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND: COLLECTIVE MEMORY AND IDENTITY

Many social psychological theories help to explain the Balkans tragedy. The Bosnian war was fought for territory and power. Bosnians refused to stay in a Serb-dominated Yugoslavia and claimed independence, and the Serbian leaders refused to give up Bosnian territory. Croatian leaders, on the other hand, attempted to take over Herzegovina, the Croat-inhabited parts of Bosnia. Hence, it was a realistic conflict (Sherif, 1966), fought over real resources. However, it was framed in identity terms by the nationalist leaders and the media by highlighting the differences between "us" and "them". Identifications were shifted from more inclusive national labels such as "Yugoslav" or "Bosnian", to ethnoreligious labels such as "Muslim", "Serb", and "Croat". The boundaries between the groups were made salient by manipulating people into believing that the "others" were preparing to take over. In that regard, processes of social identification and categorization are relevant (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Bosnians had high levels of contact with each other as mentioned in the previous chapter. They shared a physical environment, worked together, and often times intermarried. Contact theory suggests that equal status, and positive contact that is institutionally supported facilitate intergroup harmony (Allport, 1954; Pettigrew, 1998). In Bosnia, this did not prevent war or genocide. Neither did more inclusive identities such as Yugoslav or Bosnian, as suggested by theories of superordinate identification (Sherif, 1966) or the Common Ingroup Identity Model (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2001), even though the identities were adopted enthusiastically by large sections of the society. Hence, while social psychological theories explain certain aspects of the Bosnian war, they remain limited in explaining why it was so easy to manipulate identities and feelings of threat despite the

suggested protective factors such as intergroup contact and common identities. In this chapter, I introduce the literature on collective memory, provide a conceptual definition, and argue that the stories and memories in which collective identities are grounded provide frameworks for individuals to understand their experiences with members of outgroups and, hence, determine the nature of intergroup attitudes and relationships.

Collective identity

Collective identity is defined as the subjective claim of membership in a social category that includes people that the individual may not have met, such as nationality, profession, and gender, and that is acknowledged by the individual as a defining characteristic of his/her sense of self (Ashmore, Deaux, & McLaughlin-Volpe, 2004). In this project I focus on national and ethnic identities of groups from Bosnia and define this type of identification as, following others (Kelman, 1997; Phinney, 1990), individuals' attachment to the system of values, beliefs and expectations constructed by members of their groups and transmitted to them through socialization agents, such as family, formal education, and the media.[4]

Working at the personal level, Breakwell (1986) suggested that identity structure is composed of a content dimension, which consist of those characteristics that the individual considers to make him/her a unique person, and a value dimension, which consists of the evaluations of those characteristics. Breakwell (1986) also suggested that the contents of an identity are registered by the processes of assimilation and accommodation, which she defined as a memory system (Breakwell, 2001). In other

[4] It is extremely difficult to separate ethnic and national forms of identities among people of the former Yugoslavia. Most of the so-called ethnic groups are actually religious groups; further, ethnicity is used as the basis for nation-building by power holders in each group. Currently, Bosnia consists of two entities, the Bosnian-Croat Federation and the Serbian Republic, which also contributes to the understanding of the

words, the contents of a person's identity are his/her personal memories that are retained and incorporated into the identity structure in a selective manner. For example, people tend to remember in ways that increase their self-esteem or that give them a sense of uniqueness. Following Breakwell, Lyons (1996) argued that the structure of group identities is similar to personal identities in that it also consists of a content and an evaluative dimension, and that groups tend to reconstruct their history (or collective memory) in ways that provide them with collective self-esteem, distinctiveness, continuity over time, self-efficacy and group cohesion.

Collective Memory: Defining the concept

Ashmore et al. (2004) defined the content of a collective identity as a narrative that tells the "story of my group" (p.45) along with other elements such as self-stereotypes and the group's ideology. Thus, the content of a group identity is composed of the history of that group as remembered and/or reconstructed and is transmitted to the next generation by members of the group. This view is similar to sociologist Maurice Halbwachs' (1950/1992) notion of collective memory, which can be defined as a sense of common history shared by members of a group that gives the group its identity and allows for group cohesion. Halbwachs' perspective on the collective nature of memory has been widely adopted by anthropologists, sociologists, and historians. There is now a large body of research on various aspects of the phenomenon of collective memory, from the transformation of the histories of specific nations or groups (Bodnar, 1992; Schudson, 1992; Schwartz, 1986, 1991, 1996; Zerubavel, 1995) to works that provide more general, theoretical claims (Connerton, 1989, Hobsbawm, 1983; Nora, 1989; Shils, 1981;

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groups as national rather than ethnic or religious. Hence, rather than choosing one term I will use the terms interchangeably while noting the general difference between the two.

Zerubavel, 2003), although there are disagreements on the definitions, methodologies, and even the usefulness or explanatory power of the concept (Gedi & Elam, 1996).

In a comprehensive review of these works, Olick and Robbins (1998) pointed to functions of memory practices in terms of consolidating social identities and dominant discourses. Accordingly, memory is manipulated and often exploited by the nation states or power groups in order to legitimize their existence, or that of a particular social system. Wertsch's (2002) recent work showed how collective memory is constructed and transmitted by the socialization agents of the nation state, power groups, governments and educational institutions in Russia after the breakup of the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, an absolute consensus on versions of history is not easily reached because, as Halbwachs argued, different social groups with different interests have different memories. Thus memory can and does demarcate group boundaries. Further, as Zerubavel (1997) argued, belonging to a particular social group requires us to add to our memory events that occurred long before we joined the group and that we did not experience personally. In that sense, according to Zerubavel, socialization is a mnemonic process, that is, "a mnemonic socialization" into "mnemonic communities" (p. 87-91). It is this process through which we acquire our social identities.

Psychologists' interest in collective memory is more recent[5]. Pennebaker, Paez and Rimé (1997) published a volume on collective memory of political events that focused on how political events are remembered by individuals who may or may not experience them personally and how the memory for these events get distorted. British

[5] Although work on the collective nature of memory seems recent, the role of sociocultural factors in remembering and forgetting have been well acknowledged in the history of psychology. The early work of Frederic Bartlett (1932) demonstrated the reconstructive nature of memory as a social activity. Bartlett's ideas, forgotten for several decades of cognitive emphasis in the study of memory, were later revived in the

social psychologists David Middleton and Derek Edwards (1990) suggested shifting the focus from memory as an individual property to remembering and forgetting as social activities. Accordingly, as individuals share their experiences with each other, they "reinterpret and discover features of the past that become the context and the content for what they will jointly recall and commemorate on future occasions" (p. 7). Thus, the act of remembering produces a meaning that not only commemorates the past and makes sense of the present, but is also oriented toward the future.

Recent conceptualizations of collective memory adopt discursive approaches and suggest that collective memory focuses on "connections between personal memory, narrative practices, and larger political and social formations" (White, 2001, p. 494). Individuals use narrative practices to make the past and the present comprehensible, to resist or erase alternative stories about the past, and to reconstruct their personal experiences in ways that fit the larger collective histories (White, 2001). In a special issue of the journal Culture and Psychology on "Narrative and Cultural Memory", Brockmeier (2002) suggested that narrative discourse links the individual to the culture and thus transforms both the individual and the culture.

Breakwell (1986, 2001) conceptualized identity as shaped by social representations that are prevalent in a group. Social representations are consensual ways of interpreting events and objects (Moscovici, 1984). They are shared by large segments of a society, or by subgroups in a society. Breakwell (2001) suggests that as a social representation gets incorporated in one's cognitions, emotions, and behavior, it becomes a personal representation. However, individuals differ in their awareness, understanding,

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work of Ulric Neisser (1982), who argued for studying memory in its natural context, that is, everyday lives of people, rather than in laboratories.

and acceptance of the social representations. They do not necessarily accept them in their totality but instead they work with them depending on their personality and group memberships. One can suggest that shared versions of history are specific types of social representations[6]. Thus collective memories, as other social representations, both shape and are determined by individual identity construction processes, depending on the personality and group memberships of a person.

Duveen (2001) argued that the content of collective identities is hardly ever studied in social psychology, which instead is focused on the consequences of identifications. However, the consequences may be better predicted if we know the subjective meanings of identities. Recently, there have been some attempts to explore how content of group identities relate to intergroup outcomes. In observational research conducted during the soccer tournament EURO 2004, Stott (2005) described how the social context of the tournament in different match cities (i.e., low vs. high profile policing) informed the content of identity as a fan (identity defined in terms of non-violent norms, perceived similarities with fans of other nations and legitimate outgroup relations versus identity defined in terms of perceived unfairness towards one's group), which in turn determined participation in violent conflict (i.e., self-policing vs. hooligan behavior). In the context of the Northern Ireland conflict, Livingstone and Haslam (2005) argued that the link between identification and negative behavioral intentions toward an outgroup depended on the content of identity. They suggested that forms of identity content in Northern Ireland included the importance of avoiding outgroup activities and the belief that expression of outgroup identity is threatening to ingroup

[6] In fact, Social Representations Theory (Moscovici, 1984) and Halbwachs' (1950) notion of collective memory have their common roots in Durkheim's concept of "collective representations".

identity. They found that the identifications of Catholic and Protestant Northern Irish university students predicted negative behavioral intentions toward outgroups (e.g., objecting if an offspring decides to marry an outgroup member) only when identity content was high, for example, when they strongly believed in the importance of avoiding outgroup activities.

Shared memories of the past are thought to be one factor that give group identities their meanings, mark group boundaries, and define the present and future actions of the group. Thus, there is need for theorizing and methodologies to make collective memory part of the study of collective identities.

Billig (1997) argued that collective memory should be one of the major topics of social psychology because it tells us about how a community (in his argument, a nation) imagines and reproduces itself through the processes of collective remembering and forgetting (Billig, 1995; 1996). The creation of national histories almost always accompanies the formation of nation-states. But there are usually competing stories, "unofficial" ones that strive to be told. As the power balance changes within a society, national stories are retold and rewritten. These stories then become constant reminders (although, according to Billig, out of conscious awareness) of our group identities in addition to other reminders such as "the national flag hanging outside of a public building" (p. 6).

In line with the recent turn to discourse in the study of collective memory (Billig, 1997, 1996, 1995; Edwards & Middleton, 1990; Wertsch, 2002) I define collective memory as *a cultural narrative or discourse that reveals a group's interpretation of its history that can (and often does) serve ideological purposes*. To what extent these

discourses are endorsed by different subgroups and individuals, what purposes they serve, and how they affect current behaviors and attitudes of group members are questions I attempted to answer in this project.

Social Identity Theory and Collective Memory

In psychology, collective identity and intergroup relations have been commonly studied using Social identity theory (SIT) (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Tajfel, 1982). The theory argues that individuals strive to maintain a positive identity by identifying with highly valued groups. The positive social identity is accomplished through favorable social comparisons with relevant other groups. If a favorable comparison is not possible, the theory predicts certain strategies for members to take such as disidentification with the group, changing the criterion for evaluations, or taking collective action to improve the conditions of the ingroup (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Recent research in this tradition has also shown that one way of maintaining positive social identity is to make causal attributions for social events that favor one's own group (Dietz-Uhler & Murrell, 1998; Hewstone, Jaspars, & Lalljee, M., 1982; Kuhl, 1997; Pettigrew, 1979).

Following Halbwachs' argument that collective memory sets group boundaries and forms the content of group identity, one would expect members of various groups to differ in the way they remember a common past. For example, individuals would be expected to remember the past in ways that would put their group in more favorable positions. Research on the relationship of collective identity and collective memory has been sparse. Nevertheless, some recent attempts have been made to study this neglected aspect of collective identity. Scholars have extended SIT by demonstrating that different groups in a society remember the same past events in different ways depending on the

needs of the present. Liu (1999), for example, found that the events in the history of New Zealand were remembered differently and described with different words by the indigenous and Anglo populations in the country (e.g., the British "conquered" vs. "discovered" New Zealand). Gaskell and Wright (1997) found differences between lower and the upper class British in the quality of memory (as measured by clarity, importance and emotional reaction to the memory) for Thatcher's resignation. Cairns and his colleagues (1998) compared the memory of British- and Irish-identified people of Northern Ireland for recent social and political events. Although the two groups' memories for recent public events did not differ[7], being reminded of the events led participants to increase their identifications with their respective groups. Finally, pointing to the significance of physical environment in maintaining national identity, Devine-Wright and Lyons (1997) found that different social groups (traditional vs. non-traditional) in Ireland associate different values and feelings with historical landmarks because they remember the history of these places in different ways. For example, Trinity College, the oldest university in Ireland, which did not open its doors to Roman Catholics until the 1960s, was associated with feelings of shame, confusion, and anger by the traditionalists, whereas the same place revealed hope, pride, and fascination for the non-traditionalists.

Thus there seems to be a strong link between collective identity and collective memory. Working within the framework of psychodynamic theory, Ross (2001) talked about a similar concept, psychocultural interpretations, and defined them as “shared,

[7] The absence of differences in memory is likely to be a result of the way in which memory was measured in this study. Cairns et al. (1998) showed video films of 12 events and asked their participants to indicate the date of the events, a questionable way to study collective memory. While being able to date the events correctly might be considered a sign of the importance of these events for each group, the important issue

deeply held worldviews that help groups make sense of daily life and provide psychologically meaningful accounts of a group's relationship with other groups, their actions and motives". Group narratives are especially significant in understanding and resolving ethnic conflict according to Ross because they contain important information about "the deep fears and threats to identity that drive ethnic conflict", how the community explain conflict and what kind of motives they attribute to others' behaviors in the conflict. Doosje and Branscombe (2003) looked at the types of attributions the Dutch made for their colonization of Indonesia and the German invasion of the Netherlands (i.e., historical situations where the Dutch were the aggressors in the former case and the victims in the latter). When the Dutch were the victims, they were more likely to make internal attributions for the negative behavior of Germans (e.g., Germans are aggressive by nature). However, when they were the aggressors in Indonesia, they made more external attributions (e.g., "it is important to consider the acts of the Dutch in a historical context"). Furthermore, this pattern was strengthened by national identification. The stronger the Dutch identity was, the more internal attributions for the outgroup's negative historical behavior and the more external attributions for the ingroup's negative historical behavior were made.

In other research, Branscombe and her colleagues have shown that the concern with a positive social identity lead group members to justify and protect the ingroup when confronted with past harms done by the ingroup to other groups (Branscombe & Miron, 2004; Branscombe & Doosje, 2004), that members of high status groups are more likely to feel collective guilt when inequality between groups is framed as in-group privilege

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in collective memory studies is what these events mean to each group, how they are interpreted and transmitted to the future generations.

(e.g., White privilege), as opposed to outgroup disadvantage (e.g., Black disadvantage) (Powell, Branscombe, & Schmitt, 2005), and that categorizing oneself at a more inclusive level (e.g., humans vs. North Americans Jews and Native Canadians) resulted in more forgiving attitudes toward the members of groups that had harmed the group in the past (Germans and White Canadians) (Wohl, & Branscombe, 2005). These works provide strong evidence for the relationship between categorization, identification, understanding history, and feelings for one's group and for outgroups.

In line with these findings, I expect that Bosnians will remember the events before their arrival to the U.S. in ways that favor their own group. Participants will attribute more responsibility to members of the other two groups for starting the war and claim that more war crimes were committed by the others. A word of caution is needed here: Many historians agree on the fact that Serb nationalists did start the war and they did commit more crimes than the other two groups (Malcolm, 1996; White, 1994; Zimmermann, 1994). Thus assuming less responsibility on the part of Muslims and Croats would not be an outcome of processes related to the maintenance of a positive social identity but would be stating the simple truth. However, I expect the tendency to attribute more responsibility to the others and less to the ingroup will increase with the strength of ethnic identity.

Extensive research on social identity in the last three decades has shown that in-group favoritism is not necessarily related to outgroup derogation (Brewer, 1999). Rather, negative attitudes and behaviors toward out-group members are dependent on the social and structural conditions of an intergroup context such as competition over resources, claims of moral superiority, and politicization of groups, that is, deliberate

manipulation by group leaders to maintain power (Brewer, 1999; 2001). Thus, in real life groups, intergroup behaviors and attitudes depend on the history of relations between groups and socialization into existing social beliefs in one's group about the outgroup. These social beliefs would arguably be informed by the interpretation of the history of intergroup relations. Therefore, perceptions of history or collective memory in groups become an important place to understand intergroup hostility.

I argue that the relationship between ethnic identity and outgroup derogation will not lie solely on the strength of ethnic identity, but will also depend on the content of ethnic identity. Following the above review, I conceive of collective memory/cultural discourse as the content of collective identities. Thus, differential endorsement of certain cultural discourses (or of versions of history) by ethnic groups will mark group boundaries. Further, at the individual level, differential endorsement of cultural discourses by individuals within a group will interact with strength of ethnic identification to produce different outcomes in terms of outgroup evaluations. Endorsement of cultural discourses that promote cooperative and harmonious relationships between groups (narratives of coexistence, "We all lived together") will interact with a strong ethnic identity to produce positive attitudes toward outgroups, whereas endorsement of those discourses that promote antagonism and distrust (narratives of threat, "We knew they would do this") when combined with a strong ethnic identity will lead to extremely negative evaluations of the outgroup.

Collective Identity as Life Story

Drawing on the work of Vygotsky, which was later developed by Scribner (1985/1997), Dien (2000) suggested that the development of cultural identities, that is, the history of the cultural identity of an individual, should be understood in relation to three other levels of history: (1) the general history of humanity, (2) the history of individual societies, and (3) the life history of the individual in a given society. In other words, the possibilities for identity construction are limited to what is available to an individual living a particular life, in a particular society, at a particular point in time. In response to Dien's conceptualization, scholars added that not only are self-identities shaped by historical circumstances, but people also choose to highlight certain historical events when they describe themselves the way they do (Ferdman, 2000). Identity as life story can be constructed in an endless number of idiosyncratic ways by different individuals with different personalities, interests and abilities, within the same sociohistorical context (Phinney, 2000).

Shared versions of history provide individuals with collective narratives on which they base their own stories. Freeman (2002) suggested that cultural stories affect autobiographies even when we are not aware of them. He proposed that psychologists should study what he called the "narrative unconscious" and defined as "those culturally-rooted aspects of one's *history* that have not yet been part of one's *story*. They are hidden […] in the sense of that which remains unthought and is thus not yet part of my own story" (p. 202). According to Freeman (2002) the cultural/historical narratives of the groups to which we belong are available to us through contemporary forms of story telling, such as movies, novels, documentaries or photographs, and become part of our autobiography even though they remain unconscious or unexamined until some event

brings them to the forefront of our conscious. In response to Freeman's significant but rather vague claims, Raskin (2002) suggested that the narrative unconscious as constituted by culturally constructed stories should be studied to understand how individuals, once aware of the cultural constructions, modify them to suit their purposes. Thus, people are not only passive recipients of these stories but they are also active agents in reproducing and refiguring them. This is in line with Breakwell (2001), who suggested that individuals modify social representations as they appropriate them and make them personal representations.

In line with these researchers, Chase (2002) indicated that when we listen to people's stories, we not only learn about their lives, the society they live in, and how they and their groups make sense of their experiences, but also about the "cultural, ideological, historical resources" that they draw on, resist, and transform. According to Chase cultural ideologies are not interesting in their own right since as members of particular societies, we already know about them. It is when people use ideologies to understand and narrate their experiences that they become interesting, and narrative is the only way of exploring how ideologies are used personally.

Thus, people resist or modify collective narratives. Rapoport, Lomsky-Feder, and Heider (2002), for example, demonstrated how Russian Jewish refugees in Israel and Germany positioned themselves in relation to the master narrative of anti-Semitism. The collective memory of victimization of Jews throughout history produced a discourse in which Jewish refugees are depicted as helpless victims of anti-Semitism, in need of protection and guidance by the host societies. The refugees, on the other hand, used various narrative strategies to "normalize" their anti-Semitic experiences by, for example,

accepting group discrimination but not personal discrimination, or by trying to understand the aggressor's point of view. In this way, the refugees defined themselves as individuals with agency and control over their lives and their migration as opposed to needy and dependent victims thrown out of their countries.

In this project I attempt to explore the relationships between collective stories and personal stories. I investigate how Bosnian refugees use cultural discourses (collective memory) to make sense of their personal experiences of war and interethnic conflict.

Social Context and Identity

Group identities are developed and enacted in social contexts. Social contexts provide both support and limits for the enactment of social identities. Deaux and Martin (2003) have identified two levels of social context: social category (i.e., being a member of a certain group), and interpersonal networks. While the former provides a set of meanings that characterize group membership and a potential network of fellow members, the latter provides interactions where more concrete behaviors as defined by category membership are performed. Day-to-day interactions between members in the networks "allow for a more dynamic interpretation of the meanings that these identities will hold in a local context". These networks provide social support for members who claim an identity and depending on the level of support they provide they may lead to the strengthening or weakening of an identity. Thus, in these smaller-scale contexts (relative to the larger context of category membership) members redefine the meaning of a collective identity through frequent exchanges.

Thus, arguably, group norms in local contexts would redefine the meaning of identities. Jetten, Spears and Manstead (1996) showed that in the minimal group paradigm, introducing a norm of fairness to the ingroup considerably reduces ingroup bias. In one of the rare studies that take contextual factors into account, Kinket and Verkuyten (1999) examined intergroup evaluations of Turkish and Dutch school children in the Netherlands. They found that children in classes where the teacher pays attention to issues of ethnic discrimination and harassment among pupils and where these issues are discussed as part of the instruction were more positive in their evaluations of the outgroup and showed less ingroup favoritism. Apparently, these children perceived intergroup tolerance as the norm in the classroom and conformed to it. Finally, Klein and colleagues (2003) found that although the meaning of Greek identity was very much intertwined with expressing prejudice toward Turks, their participants were more ready to express such prejudice when the audience was Greek than when they were European (i.e., where the norms would not tolerate prejudice).

Thus, intergroup evaluations and behaviors depend to a great extent on the social context that defines the meaning of a group identity and determines the norms that are suitable in a given situation. Certain contexts may foster prejudicial evaluations and hostile behaviors towards members of the outgroup whereas others may encourage harmonious relations between groups.

Markovic and Manderson (2003) found that refugee women from the former Yugoslavia who resettled in Australia limited their contact to their own ethnic group for fear of exclusion from the community established by previous migrants from Yugoslavia. Previous mass immigration from Yugoslavia happened in the years following the rise of

Tito to power after the WWII. These migrants were against Tito's policies and his ideology of "Yugoslavian brotherhood and unity". They were either exiled or left voluntarily because they did not want to live in a unified Yugoslavia where their ethnic identity would be suppressed (Malcolm, 1996; Bowman, 1994). In Australia they promoted a strict policy of endogamy along ethnic lines and excluded members who did not comply with the norms regarding ethnic boundaries (Pallotta-Chiarolli & Skribis, 1994, cited in Markovic & Manderson, 2003). The newly arrived entered these communities and had to conform to their norms by maintaining the war-related ethnic boundaries, not always out of their own desire but often because of dependence on the social and economic support[8] that these communities provided. Thus, Serbs stuck to Serbs, Croats to Croats, and so on.

A similar issue was raised in interviews I did with community leaders in New York City. Many refugees were either sponsored by organizations founded by previous immigrants and/or they were supported by them after their arrival. These kinds of interpersonal/organizational contexts may promote certain discourses while discouraging others. For example, a community organization aiming at reconciliation and peace would stress the coexistence discourse while an ethnic organization might stress the threat discourse. The refugees can choose to participate in these networks or, more likely, they just find themselves in them by chance or by necessity. Nevertheless, participation in these networks will affect the content of an ethnic identity through the different discourses they promote.

[8] It is important to distinguish this kind of support from the social support for a claimed identity that Deaux and Martin (2003) talk about. While the former refers to support for the physical and emotional well-being of the members, the latter refers to the support for claiming and performing a group identity. However, it is

Even without membership in formal organizations, residential segregation along ethnic lines (i.e., all Muslim or all Serb neighborhoods with limited or no contact with each other) would have a similar effect. Collective memory is based on collective reminiscing, that is collectively constructing the past through communication (Middleton & Edwards, 1990, Pasupathi, 2001). Social segregation would result in limited intergroup communication and thus in the construction of a one-sided collective memory that may take an extreme form. It is conceivable, then, that refugees who live in ethnically segregated environments would be more likely to endorse the threat narrative and more unfavorable toward the outgroups.

Summary of the Objectives and Hypotheses

This study aimed at understanding how individuals from a war-torn country make sense of their experiences and how they currently relate to each other while building new lives in a new country. The main goal was to demonstrate the effects of different versions of history as constructed by different stakeholders and adopted to varying degrees by individuals on their relationships with members of outgroups and their meaning-making processes. I specifically studied (1) what national/ethnic identities are available for Bosnian immigrants and refugees and how they account for these identities, (2) to what extent narratives about the history of interethnic relations in Bosnia are endorsed by immigrants and refugees, and how they remember and attribute responsibility for the recent war in Bosnia, and (3) what are the current attitudes toward

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conceivable that the two kinds of support lead to similar outcomes: increase in identification and adoption of group norms that may in turn lead to outgroup rejection.

Bosnians of different backgrounds, and how identities, endorsement of narratives, attributions and social context shape these relationships and attitudes.

1. Identities: Several different identities are available for Bosnian immigrants and refugees. At the most inclusive level, they can identify as Yugoslav or as Bosnian. At the least inclusive level they could identify with their ethnoreligious group only. Further, they can shift their identity to the new country and identify as American or as hyphenated American. I explored what identities are adopted by Bosnian immigrants and what the subjective meanings of these different labels are.

2. Collective memory: Temporally, two forms of collective memories were examined: One pertained to life before the war. This may include the person's own experiences or those that are not personally experienced, but transmitted through family or socialization agents in general. Specifically, the extent to which Bosnians endorsed narratives of coexistence and narratives of threat was assessed in the questionnaire. In the interviews, attention was paid to how informants talked about their pre-war lives and their relationships with outgroup members, and what purposes the narratives (threat vs. coexistence) served in their talk.

The second form of collective memory studied was the memory of the most recent war. Why the war happened, to what extent each party was responsible for starting the war and for committing war crimes were explored. Consistent with literature on collective guilt (Branscombe & Doosje, 2004), it was expected that group members will attribute little responsibility to their own group and that this tendency will strengthen with increased identification.

3. Outgroup Attitudes: Although a link between identification and outgroup derogation was not one of the original arguments of social identity theory (Turner & Reynolds, 2004), subsequent research showed that the tendency to favor the ingroup or dislike outgroups increased as the subjective importance of the ingroup increased (e.g., Bourhis, Turner, & Gagnon, 1997). I further argue that outgroup derogation (prejudice toward Bosnians of different ethnic backgrounds) depends on the type of narrative or ideological discourse that informs the individual's ethnic identity. Specifically, if being a Bosnian Muslim (or Croat, or Serb) subjectively means endorsement of the "coexistence" discourse, then a strong ethnic identity would not necessarily be related to negative attitudes toward outgroups. However, if the same ethnic identity is grounded on a discourse of "threat", then the person would be less favorable toward outgroup members. Thus, strength of ethnic identity and endorsement of collective memory narratives would interact to determine outgroup attitudes.

In line with the conception of identity as life story, I explored how the cultural discourses (coexistence vs. threat) are used by Bosnian refugees to understand their personal experiences with war and members of outgroups. The cognitive work required for making sense of one's experience in a way that fits the cultural discourses can be better understood using narrative methods. Thus, in addition to exploring the endorsement of cultural discourses and its consequences in terms of intergroup relations, I also examined the ways in which these themes are used to make sense of life experiences by conducting life story interviews.

In terms of social context, I expect that more ethnically homogenous immigrant communities will endorse narratives of threat more strongly, attribute more responsibility

to the outgroups for the war and war crimes, and in general be less favorable toward members of outgroups, as compared to those communities that include all three Bosnian ethnicities. Because this is correlational research, I do not make assumptions about the direction of causality (i.e., whether prejudiced people choose to stay in homogenous communities or homogenous contexts promote threat narratives over coexistence narratives and lead members to conform to them). Overall, I expect to find a relationship between the type of social context (immersed vs. isolated), the ideology (coexistence vs. threat) endorsed, and the nature of outgroup attitudes.

CHAPTER III

METHODOLOGY

Overview

The questions asked in this research required combining qualitative and quantitative modes of inquiry. In order to enter the community I began contacting community organizations in New York City in Spring 2003. I did not do ethnographic work; however, I was able to participate in several community events and to have conversations with community leaders and members. These observations and conversations informed my design and research questions. In order to explore how the war and migration experiences were told and understood by the refugees, I did life story interviews with eight Bosnians living in the New York area. The purpose of the interviews was to identify collective themes in narratives and analyze the relationship between collective stories and personal stories, that is, how collective themes (discourses) are used when one tells his/her life story. Finally, in order to investigate the theorized paths between collective identity, endorsement of collective memory narratives, and outgroup attitudes I collected questionnaire data from 94 Bosnian refugees and immigrants.

Informal conversations and observations

As an outsider I needed to find an entry point into the community. I was aware of two former Yugoslav or Bosnian community organizations in New York City. One had a website that supplied contact information, and I paid a visit to talk about my project. I was referred to the founding director of the organization, with whom I formed a lasting friendship. In our first meeting she found my ideas very interesting and was very

supportive of the way in which I formulated my research questions. From then on, she tried to help me by putting me in contact with other Bosnians and inviting me to the events of the organization where she thought I might meet more people who would want to participate in my study. Although not all of these events were pleasant experiences for me, as will be described later, they were crucial as entry points and in terms of getting a sense of the community life.

The other organization was harder to reach and tougher to get into. The board members whom I contacted were very busy but never openly refused to help. Eventually, one of my informants put me in contact with the administrator of the organization, a very friendly woman in her 50s who spent a few years in Turkey before she moved to the United States as refugees with her family. Through her, I got in contact with the some of the board members and received permission to collect questionnaire data in the organization (after some rough time that I describe in the epilogue). I spent several weekends and weeknights sitting in (and occasionally assisting in teaching) English classes in this organization. I had talks with students who had very few opportunities to practice English. Most of these students also filled out my questionnaire and they passed it to their families and friends.

In addition, I had e-mail exchanges and phone conversations with Bosnian immigrants and refugees who lived in other cities in the United States, and in one case, I even helped a graduate student write a course paper on "change in Bosnians' values as a result of war" via e-mail. Often times, these seemingly impersonal exchanges provided almost as much insight into the Bosnian experience as did a face-to-face interview.

Finally, I visited shops and businesses and had conversations with owners in Astoria, Queens, where there is a large Bosnian community.

Interview Study

Eight Bosnian immigrants (2 men and 6 women) agreed to do a life story interview with me. The interviews had to be conducted in English due to my lack of knowledge of the Serbian/Croatian/Bosnian language. Hence, they had to be limited to Bosnians who were fluent enough to tell their stories in English. All interviews were tape recorded and transcribed. Of these eight interviewees five were Bosnian Muslims and three were Bosnians of Serb-Muslim mixed marriages. Their ages ranged from 25 to 33 at the time of the interview. Except for two (a couple), all had at least a college degree or were working towards one. They were all from urban areas of Bosnia, Tuzla and Sarajevo, except for one informant who was from a small town in northern Bosnia, which is now part of the Bosnian Serb Republic. Table 1 summarizes the background of my informants. Short biographical sketches are provided in Appendix A.

The interviews were conducted in various places. Emir, Almila, and Emira[9] invited me to their homes. Fatima, Sanja and Alija could only meet with me either after work or during a lunch break at a restaurant or café nearby work. Dijana who lives in New Jersey, drove to the City on a weekend to meet with me at a bookstore, and we did the interview sitting on the floor between bookshelves. Finally, I met with Vesna several times in her school building and we talked either in the cafeteria or in an empty classroom. Interviews lasted from 90 minutes to 3 hours, depending on how comfortable we were at our location and/or how busy the informant's schedule was.

The life story method has been used in various disciplines to understand how individuals give meaning to their life experiences (e.g., Atkinson, 2002; Denzin, 1989; Lieblich & Josselson, 1997; Runyan, 1989). A life story is seen as a construct rather than a chronological history of one's life based on what really happened (Atkinson, 2002; McAdams, 1996; Riesmann, 2002; Rosenthal, 1993). Life story researchers are not interested in confirming what is told in the story, but rather in understanding why the story is constructed the way it is by the teller. Most researchers using life stories take a phenomenological stance (Smith, 1996; Rosenthal, 1993; Widdershoven, 1997), privileging the individual's own understanding of his/her life.

My participants were asked to tell their life stories, focusing on the war and migration experiences. The interviews were semi-structured. I told the interviewees that I wanted to hear their life story and that I was especially interested in learning about their lives before and after the war, as well as their experiences as refugees and immigrants in the United States. Because I told them about my interest in war and migration, most informants began their stories starting at the time of the war or migration. In these cases, after hearing the war- or migration-related stories, I asked them to go back to their lives before the war. I also asked about their relationships with people from different ethnicities, and if there were any conflict experiences before, during or after the war, if these were not mentioned already by the informant. Similarly, if not already supplied by the informant, I asked about their social identities, that is, how they defined themselves ethnically or nationally. I also asked why they thought the war happened. Finally, I asked about their lives in the United States and about their future plans.

All names are pseudonyms.

The survey study

Ninety four Bosnian refugees living in the United States (mostly New York, Chicago, and Atlanta) participated in the survey part of the study. All respondents had come to the United States after 1990 and were at least 15 years of age on arrival. Initially, I planned to recruit approximately equal numbers of participants from each of the three major ethnic groups (Muslims, Croats, and Serbs). However, the sample ended up being disproportionately Muslim (82 of 94). The ethnic distribution of the remaining 12 was as follows: four were Serbs, two were Croats, two were of Muslim-Serb mixed parentage, one was Muslim-Croat mixed parentage, and one was Serb-Croat mixed parentage. The ethnicity of two other participants could not be determined because they did not answer the religion or ethnicity questions. As their religious affiliation, 83.5% said Muslims, 11% claimed to be atheist, agnostic, or "not religious", two participants were Orthodox Christian, and three identified as Catholic. Because of the insufficient number of respondents from non-Muslim groups, the analyses were conducted with the data from Muslim sub-sample mostly. Supposedly, my background as a Turkish Muslim researcher combined with the general unwillingness of Bosnians to talk about war resulted in a mostly Muslim sample. This issue will be further discussed in the epilogue.

Participants were recruited through personal contacts and snowballing techniques. Most were from New York tri-state area (33.4%), Atlanta (19.4%), or Chicago (31.2%). But others from Washington D.C., Kentucky, Philadelphia, and Richmond, VA also participated.

The sample consists of 53 women and 40 men (one respondent did not indicate gender). Their ages ranged from 18 to 72 with a mean of 39.02. Seventy two percent of

the participants were married. They were relatively highly educated: 62.8% had at least a college degree and only one participant did not finish elementary school. The sample was almost equally divided in terms of finishing the last degree in the United States (38.4%) or in Bosnia or elsewhere in former Yugoslavia (44.5%). They were also relatively well off economically. Almost 60% picked the two highest options in the perceived socioeconomic status scale: "I/we have no problem buying the things we need and sometimes we can buy some extra things" (42.6%), and "I/we have enough money to buy everything" (17.0%).

In terms of community involvement, of the 76 participants who said that there were Bosnian community organizations in their areas, 49 were members of some organization. Almost half frequented the organization at least monthly. On average, 37.2% of their friends also attended the same organizaiton.

In terms of transnational ties to their homeland, half of the sample reported sending money or material goods to their family or friends in Bosnia at least several times a year; 13.6% sent something every month. More than 40% listened to or watched Bosnian radio or TV at least two or three times a month (29% weekly). Forty two percent read Bosnian newspapers weekly, and almost half had contact with their family and friends in Bosnia every week. Hence, the sample was well connected to the homeland. However, visits were not as frequent. More than 70% had made 4 or fewer visits to Bosnia since they moved to the United States.

Seventy seven percent of the participants came to the United States as refugees. Of the 21 who did not come as refugees, 8 had applied for refugee status but were not granted.

Questionnaire: The questionnaire consisted of measures of collective identity, collective memory, social context, and intergroup attitudes (toward Muslims, Croats, Serbs), as well as detailed demographic questions (see Appendix B). The questionnaire was translated to Serbian-Croatian-Bosnian and back translated to English by two bilingual Bosnians. In this way, it was possible for respondents who were not fluent in English to participate in the study.

Measures

Ethnic/National Identity. Ethnic/national identity was measured using Phinney's (1998) Multi-ethnic Identity Measure (MEIM). The MEIM begins with an open-ended question about primary ethnic group identification. Following are 12 statements about a person's feelings and relationships about his/her membership of the indicated ethnic groups, such as " I have a strong sense of belonging to my own ethnic group" or " I have a clear sense of my ethnic background and what it means for me" answered on a 4 point scale (1= strongly disagree, 4= strongly agree).

Collective Memory. Collective memory was assessed in two ways: (1) attributions of responsibility for starting the war and for the crimes committed during the war, and (2) endorsement of discourses about the past.

Attributions: Respondents were first asked to describe briefly why the war happened in Bosnia in an open-ended question. They were then asked to indicate to what extent each group (Serbs, Muslims, Croats) was responsible for starting the war (using percentages) and to what extent each was involved in war crimes (on a 5 point scale, 1=not involved at all, 5=completely involved).

Endorsement of discourses: Two vignettes were created based on my preliminary interviews and other published interviews with Bosnian refugees (Mertus et al., 1997; Weine, 1999; Tekavec, 1995). The vignettes were presented to the respondents as excerpts from interviews with two Bosnian refugees. The first of the vignettes emphasized the "coexistence" theme and the other emphasized the "threat" theme.

> Excerpt 1:
> "Before the war in Bosnia we lived happily together. I never thought about the ethnicity or religion of my friends or neighbors. I didn't know who was what. That was not important. We were all Bosnians. We celebrated all religious holidays, that's how we used to live. Once the war started, we were all stuck in that together. Our friends from different ethnicities helped us survive the war and leave the country. Bosnia was a multi-ethnic society. It should have stayed that way".
>
> Excerpt 2:
> "Although different people lived together in Bosnia, we sometimes suspected that the other groups were planning things against us. Elderly in my family used to tell us stories about previous wars in Bosnia and how the other groups attacked us. I think we were always afraid that it would happen again. We knew that we had to separate. Once the war started our friends and neighbors from other groups changed their behavior toward us completely. They were no longer our friends. My neighbor lives in my house now."

Following each excerpt, three questions asked the respondents to indicate how similar the excerpt was to (a) their own experience; (b) the experience of other Bosnians they knew; and (c) the experience of most Bosnians in general. Each question was answered on a 5-point scale (1= not similar at all; 5= very similar).

Intergroup evaluations. Three measures of outgroup attitudes were obtained: a measure of perceived intergroup distance, a feeling thermometer, and a scale of contact willingness. These measures corresponded roughly to affective (feeling thermometer), cognitive (perceived distance), and behavioral (contact willingness) components of intergroup attitudes.

A measure of perceived intergroup distance was developed from Tropp and Wright (2001) "Inclusion of the ingroup in the self" measure (itself adapted from Aron, Aron, & Tudor, 1991, "Inclusion of the other in the self" measure). This measure uses three Venn-diagrams, each representing an ethnic group from Bosnia. The three diagrams were visually depicted in six different ways, depending on the overlap between the groups. The respondents were asked to indicate which of the six depictions best represented the relationships between groups. A large amount of overlap is thought to represent very close relationships while no overlap is thought to represent more distant relationships.

Feeling thermometer (Stephan & Stephan, 1985) was used to measure personal attitudes toward each of the groups. The respondents were provided with a pictorial depiction of a thermometer and asked to indicate how warm they felt toward each of the three groups on a scale of 0 (very unfavorable) to 100 (very favorable).

Finally, a modified form of Social Distance scale (Bogardus, 1928) was used to inquire about different types of interpersonal relationships the respondents had formed with members of each group. The relationships ranged from having group members as coworkers or neighbors, to inviting them to one's house, having them as close friend, kin, date, and marriage partner. The participants answered questions such as "I invite Bosnian

Serbs to my house" on a 5-point scale ranging from "totally disagree" (1) to "totally agree" (5). Ratings for each contact situation were added up and then averaged for each group to obtain an index of contact willingness. Higher numbers in this index mean greater desire to have contact with a given group. The reliability coefficient for this measure was $\alpha = .91$.

Social context: Social context was assessed with a number of questions about the respondents' membership in Bosnian community organizations, the perceived percentage of other Bosnians living in the same neighborhood, and percentage of Bosnians from each ethnic group among one's friends and workmates.

Analytical Strategies and Organization of Results Chapters

Because I employed multiple methods (qualitative interviews and quantitative survey), it was important to analyze the data generated through different modes of inquiry so that they informed each other and to report them as one coherent story. My major theoretical questions concerned the links between collective identity, memory and intergroup relations. Thus, the reading of interview transcripts and statistical analyses of the questionnaire data focused on these concepts. In terms of interpretation of life histories, I used a focal (i.e., focusing on one or a few aspects of an individual's life) reading of my data rather than a comprehensive reading (i.e., analyzing the interrelationships of different aspects of the life in its entirety, and understanding how the person became who he or she is) (Rosenwald, 2002). This concern inevitably led to leaving out some very interesting data in the life stories because they were not directly relevant to the purposes of this research. Nevertheless, I tried to use a comprehensive interpretation, though to a minimal extent, by providing biographical sketches of the

informants (see Appendix A) and establishing links between their responses to certain questions and their overall life experiences.

Further, analyses of one form of data answered questions that arose from the analysis of the other form of data. For example, in Chapter IV, the questions that arose from a disagreement between two of my informants on the meaning of an identity label (Bosniac) were clarified by a statistical analysis of the survey data for the correlates of that label. In Chapter V, the interviews provided evidence for the dialogical nature of collective memory narratives, which were suggested by the lack of correlation between the endorsement of coexistence and threat narratives in the survey.

Finally, Riesmann (2002) suggested that a life narrative could be analyzed as a performance, that is, in terms of what the story does for the teller. My analysis also considered the performative aspect of telling life stories. I paid attention to why certain events were included in the story while others were ignored, and how they were interpreted.

Following the organization of my objectives and hypotheses (pp. 36-37), the results of the study are reported in three interrelated chapters. The first chapter focuses on the collective identities that were available to refugees and immigrants from Bosnia and Herzegovina and the subjective meanings of these identities. I analyzed the interviews to see which identities were claimed and how they were accounted for as suggested by Verkuyten and deWolf (2002). These researchers studied the discursive construction of bicultural identities in talk among Chinese immigrants in the Netherlands. They identified three ways of "accounting" for identities: "being" which emphasizes the biological essence of an identity ("my parents are Chinese, I was born in China, that's

who I am"); "feeling" which stresses a subjective understanding of identity ("I feel both Ducth and Chinese"); and "doing" which focuses on the performative aspect of identities such as speaking the language, eating ethnic food, etc. Because my informants have resettled in the United States, and many obtained citizenship or were on the way to citizenship, "American" could be another option for them. Hence, I explored to what extent they perceived themselves as Americans and how they accounted for their "Bosnian" and "American" identities. Finally, I analyzed the questionnaire data for strength of identification with each category (e.g., Yugoslavian, Bosnian, Muslim, American) and the correlates of identification, such as community involvement.

The second chapter explores collective memory in the Bosnian American community through two variables: endorsement of narratives and attributions for war. The questionnaire data were analyzed to investigate to what extent each narrative was endorsed, how the war was explained (attributions of responsibility), and what the correlates of endorsement of each narrative and of attributions were. Interviews were analyzed to understand how narratives were used, and what purposes they served in talk.

Finally, the last chapter of the results section reports tests of the hypothesized connections between major study variables, specifically, identification, collective memory, and outgroup attitudes. In the interviews I examined how attitudes toward members of outgroups and relationships with them were expressed. The hypothesized interaction effects of identification and collective memory on outgroup attitudes were statistically tested, and models explaining attitudes toward each of the outgroups were developed. Further, the effects of immigrant communities (e.g., ethnic makeup of the

immigrant community, involvement in the community) on attitudes toward members of the outgroups were assessed.

Initially, a major purpose of this study was to compare ethnic groups from Bosnia in terms of endorsement of discourses and understanding of the recent war. This goal could not be accomplished as recruiting non-Muslim Bosnians proved to be extremely difficult. However, the survey sample included 12 non-Muslim and mixed ethnicity respondents, most of whom were young and educated Bosnians. After excluding two Bosnian Croats and one ethnically unidentifiable respondent who were older than the remaining non-Muslims and who were recruited through a mostly Muslim community organization, the number in the non-Muslim subsample dropped to 9. Although statistical analyses obtained from such a small sample should be taken with great caution, it was still possible to match this sample with a Muslim subsample of similar demographic background and to explore similarities and differences between the two groups qualitatively. These comparisons are presented in Appendix D.

CHAPTER IV

IDENTITIES

For Bosnians, several different collective identifications were possible in the former Yugoslavia. At the least inclusive level, they could have identified with their ethnic/religious group and called themselves Serb, Croat or Muslim. Alternatively, ignoring ethno-religious differences, they could have simply called themselves Bosnians. At the most inclusive level, "Yugoslavian" was available as a superordinate identity, encompassing all South Slavs belonging to different ethnicities who lived in the federation. Bringa (1995) reported that these three levels of identification were experienced at different spheres of Bosnians' lives: Ethnoreligious identities at home, mosque, church, and in family interactions; national (Bosnian) identity in the larger community such as neighborhood, village, or work; and the superordinate identity (Yugoslavian) in educational and military settings. As a result of the breakup, some of these identities changed meaning and others lost their relevance. This first chapter of results deals with how my participants defined themselves in terms of ethnicity or nationality, and what the different labels meant to them.

Ethnic and national identifications were measured in several different ways: (a) The Phinney Multi-ethnic Identity Measure (MEIM), which contained an open-ended question along with scaled items; (b) a set of scaled questions that asked the respondents to what extent they considered themselves to be Yugoslavian, Bosnian, Bosnian Muslim, Bosnian Serb, Bosnian Croat, and American; and (c) a forced-choice item that asked the respondents to pick only one identity among these. This chapter reports the analyses of these choices and the meanings of some of these identities as expressed in the interviews,

I also discuss parallels with Bringa's ethnographic work in Bosnia to assess the representativeness of my sample.

I. Open-ended identifications:

Survey respondents were asked to indicate their ethnic group membership in an open-ended question on the first page of the questionnaire. Almost half of the respondents (48.9%) put some form of "Bosnian", either in the Serbian/Croatian/Bosnian language (e.g., Bosanac, Bosancem, Bosanka, Bosnjak, etc.) or in English. Another 30% (n=28) self-identified as Bosnian and Muslim (of these 17 put the national identity first and 11 put the religious identity first) and only 1 as Bosnian-American. Nine were only "Muslim" identified, 2 were "Croat" (one being both Croat and Catholic), 1 "Serb", 1 "Serb-Croat", and 3 were "Yugoslavs" (or "former Yugoslav"). Thus the majority (80%) identified as Bosnians with approximately one third (37.3%) of these qualifying Bosnian identity with ethno-religious identity.

Three forms of identifications

An important distinction should be made between the different words used in Serbo-Croatian for "Bosnian". Although many sources name Bosnian Muslims as "Bosnjak" (or Bosniak), the term has different connotations for different people. For many it becomes a national name for Bosnian Muslims who until shortly before the war were considered only a religious group; for others it signifies the Islamic orientation of Bosnians who self-identify as such. Alija, a 25 year old Bosnian immigrant from a mixed marriage of a Serbian mother and a Muslim father politely informed me about the

political connotations of the term when I used it to mean "Bosnian of Muslim descent" in a more general sense.

> "A. During this time, we have developed a new expression that was really not accepted by anyone, but people continued to use it. The one you referred to, Bosniak.
> N. Oh! That… that was created during the war? I didn't know that.
> A. Yeah, that exactly was created during the war and it refers to the Bosnians with Muslim orientations. Religiously being oriented to Islam.
> N. Oh, okay. That's good to know!
> A. But I would not think of it as correct… I don't think it's adopted by…
> N. I read it in a couple of places…
> A. You will find it being used a lot. I'm not sure…
> N. I just thought that it's probably Serbo-Croatian for "Bosnian". Because it's very similar to the Turkish word for Bosnian: It's "Boşnak".
> A. [laughs] The term did not exist before. It was created during the war. So umm.. yes, you could… If you go there you could use this and people would understand definitely.
> N. But it has a certain political tone, is that what you say?
> A. Yeah, of course. That's why it was created. […]. They could not use the word Bosnian. It refers to citizen of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which could be either one of the three [religious groups].

On the other hand, Dzevat, a 33 year old Bosnian refugee of Muslim background and a community leader in a mostly Muslim Bosnian organization in New York, defended the use of the term when I told him about Alija's interpretation: *"You know I would disagree with that. I would actually think that "Bosnjak" is even less religious because you don't say "Muslim". I'm not religious myself, so I would say I'm Bosnjak, instead of Muslim or Bosnian Muslim. Bosnjak also refers to Muslim people who live outside of Bosnia. For example, Muslims in Montenegro call themselves Bosnjak too."*

The term was not created during the war as Alija suggested. Bringa (1995) provided an elaborate account of this identification in her ethnography of a Bosnian village only a few years before the war. In this account, she explained that the national identity of Bosnians became a debated issue at the end of 1980s and early 1990s and that several alternatives were considered. One option was to revive the Bosnjak category

instead of the more regional category of "Bosanac" (both terms translated as "Bosnian" in English), originally suggested by the Austro-Hungarian governor of Bosnia-Hercegovina at the end of the 19th Century. The term was coined to imply "Bosnianhood" (Bosnjatsvo) as a reaction to Serbian and Croatian nationalism and their claims in Bosnia-Hercegovina. Although the term was meant to include all three ethnicities, it was especially the Muslims and to a lesser extent the Croats who took it on. Later "Bosnjak" came to be equated with Muslim and the late president of Bosnia-Hercegovina Alija Izzetbegovic supported this view.

Yet another identity some Bosnians suggested as a way to self-define Bosnians of Muslim descent at that time, Bringa (1995) reported, was using "Muslim" as a national identity. Those who supported this position argued that the concept of "Bosnjatsvo" (Bosnjak) was similar to "Yugoslavism" in the sense that it was meant to include all three ethnicities. Hence, "Muslim" was a clearer term to refer to members of this ethnoreligious group according to this point of view.

These different ideological positions were represented in my dataset. An examination of Muslims' responses to the open ended MEIM question yielded three categories of identifications similar to those specified by Bringa (1995): (1) Those who identified with being Bosnian (in English or in Serbo-Croatian-Bosnian, n=16); (2) those who identified with being Bosnjak (in Bosnian language, n=26); and (3) those who chose a hyphenated identity, Bosnian-Muslim, Bosnjak-Muslim, Muslim-Bosnian, or just Muslim (n=37).

Analysis of variance yielded significant differences between these three groups in terms of educational level and national and religious identification. Those who identified

as "Bosnian-Muslim" were significantly less educated than either Bosnian and Bosnjak identified participants, $F(2, 78)=13.888, p<.001$. No significant differences were observed on Muslim identification, Yugoslavian identification, or MEIM scores. Bosnjaks, however, identified most strongly with the Bosnian nation (How much do you consider yourself to be Bosnian?), $F(2, 73)=3.25, p=.045$. They did not differ significantly from "Bosnian-Muslim" identified in national (Bosnian) identification (p=.41), but they did so compared to the "Bosnian"-identified (p=.05).

These results suggest that, contrary to Alija's interpretation and in line with Dzevat's comments, the term Bosnjak did not necessarily imply a religious orientation. Rather, it seems to suggest a more nationalist orientation. This tendency was evident in the differences between the groups in interpreting the war and in their attitudes toward the outgroups[10].

II. Degree and meaning of identifications

The sample identified most strongly with being Bosnian (mean=4.51), followed by Muslim identification (4.24). Table 2 shows the mean and standard deviations of strength of identification for the total sample and the Muslim subsample with various identity categories. It also shows the frequencies with which each of these categories was picked as the most defining identity.

[10] "Bosnian-Muslim" identified respondents were the most unfavorable toward the outgroups, and the "Bosnian" identified the most favorable. The Bosnjak were in between and not significantly different from either. Interestingly, in terms of attributions for the war and war crimes, the "Bosnjak" group attributed more responsibility to Croats and less to Serbs. "Bosnian" identified, on the other hand, were more likely to attribute responsibility to outside sources (international community, other countries, etc.) than members of the other two groups. Although no between group differences were found in overall endorsement of either narrative in this sample, within groups, "Muslims" endorsed "threat" to a significantly greater extent than they endorsed "coexistence' [t(1, 34)==2.190, p<.05], "Bosnians" endorsed coexistence more than

As the means suggest, the sample was strongly Bosnian and Muslim identified. Yugoslavian identification was very low, even lower than American identification. No Muslim respondent picked "Yugoslavian" as the most defining identity. For Muslims, the MEIM score correlated positively and to the same degree with both Bosnian and Muslim identities (both $r(65)=.31$, $ps<.05$).

Identities were considerably polarized for Muslim respondents. Twenty-two out of 82 Muslim participants did not respond to the question "How much do you consider yourself to be Yugoslavian?" Of those 60 who responded, 49 picked "1", that is, "not at all". No respondent picked 5 (completely) for this question. There were fewer missing values for Bosnian and Bosnian Muslim identifications (5 and 7 respectively). In each question, over 70% of respondents picked 5 (i.e., completely Bosnian or Bosnian Muslim) as representing their degree of identification (76.6% and 73.3% respectively). Interestingly, Bosnian and Bosnian Muslim identifications were not correlated, $r(70)=.12$, $p>.05$. Further, those who picked Bosnian over Bosnian Muslim in the forced identity question were significantly more educated, had a lower percentage of Bosnian neighbors in the United States, and had more friends and neighbors from outgroups than those who picked "Bosnian Muslim". These two identities differed in terms of their ideological underpinnings as will be mentioned in Chapter 5. Hence, as Bringa (1995) suggested in her ethnographic work, Bosnian and Muslim identities corresponded to separate levels of identification, national and ethnoreligious, respectively, in the current sample as well.

Not surprisingly, ethnic identification, as measured by MEIM, was significantly and positively related to the percentage of Bosnian friends, $r(70)=.31$, neighbors

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they endorsed threat (3.3 and 2.8 respectively, but the difference is not significant), and "Bosnjaks"

r(70)=.35, and co-workers, *r*(70)=.46 (all *p*s< .01) that one had in the United States. Interestingly, none of the other indices of collective identities (e.g.,Yugoslavian, Bosnian, Muslim) were associated with any measure of Bosnian entourage, except for a positive correlation between Muslim identification and percentage of Bosnian neighbors, *r*(75)=.23, *p*<.05.

The meaning of Yugoslavian identity

In ethnographic work Bringa (1995) reported that Bosnians who received their formal education in the 1950s and 1960s, that is, when the Communist Party and Tito's ideology of brotherhood and unity were strongest, were more likely to identify as Yugoslavian than were later generations. On the basis of this implicit age hypothesis, I classified the sample into three age groups: Those over 45, who went to school in the 1950s and 1960s; those between 31 and 44, who received their first years of formal education in the 1970s; and those between 16 and 30, who began school in the 1980s and the 1990s. An ANOVA the age category as the independent variable and Yugoslavian identification as the dependent variable confirmed Bringa's observation. The oldest group was significantly more Yugoslavian identified than the younger two [Means= 1.88, 1.00, 1.08 respectively, *F*(2, 56)=12.471, *p*<.001.[11] The age groups did not differ from each other on any other identification measure.

For the total sample, Yugoslavian identity was negatively correlated with Bosnian identity (*r*=-.45, *p*<.001) and with the MEIM score (*r*=-.29, *p*<.05). These correlations,

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endorsed both equally.

[11] This group (oldest) was also significantly more willing to have contacts with Serbs than the youngest group [Means= 2.92, 2.27, and 2.05, F(2, 67)=3.262, p<.05] and marginally more endorsing of coexistence narratives [Means=3.33, 2.84, and 2.64, F(2, 76)=2.581, p=.083].

however, were not significant when non-Muslim respondents were excluded from the analyses. This is due to the fact that a few non-Muslim participants added more variability to the scores than Muslims alone as suggested by the difference in standard deviations of Yugoslavian and Bosnian identities between Muslims and the total sample (see Table 2).

When only Muslim respondents were considered, Bosnian Muslim identity was negatively correlated with Yugoslavian identity, $r(60)=-.23$, $p=.08$. Taken together, these findings suggest that for this sample, Yugoslavian and Bosnian identities were not reconcilable. In the total sample Yugoslavian identity was also significantly correlated with Serb identity ($r=.65$, $p<.001$). It is possible that identifying with Yugoslavia was considered a betrayal of the ideal of an independent Bosnia for these participants. It is also possible that when thinking about Yugoslavia, the respondents did not think of the Yugoslavia that included Bosnia as a federal republic of equal status with the others, but instead thought of Serbia and Montenegro, which was what remained of Yugoslavia after the breakup. Thus, only five respondents in the total sample picked "Yugoslav" as the most defining identity (none was Muslim), as opposed to almost half of the sample that picked "Bosnian".

Some of the interviews with Bosnian Muslims provide support for this idea. Fatima, a 28 year old refugee, reacted emphatically to my question about her national identity, that is, whether she considered herself as Bosnian, Yugoslavian, or American: *"Bosnian! God! Not Yugoslavian. NO!"* Strongly believing that Bosnia had to be an independent country and that Yugoslavia was getting in the way of that goal, Fatima "never thought I had to [identify as Yugoslavian]".

While offering her own interpretation of why the war happened, Emira, another young refugee, also provided an account of Yugoslavian identity:

> "I feel that Yugoslavia always used to stand out from other Eastern European countries as sort of umm better off, more progressive, more open, and umm… Tito had his own form of socialist state and you know, even though it was communist, it wasn't as hard core as you know Soviet Union. So, then when Soviet Union split up, I think then Yugoslavians started using their own identity I think. Because we compared ourselves to them. We'd always used to say we're not like them. But when we lost somebody to compare ourselves to we started losing our sense of who we are. And we… now that I think about it, I mean Yugoslavia was put together you know, all these different nationalities, religions, different languages and everything. I think it's amazing that it stayed together for such a long time. But umm.. you know, now, when, it broke up, I don't really want to have Yugoslavia back together as it used to be. You know, I think it's fine that every republic has now its independent state. But I just think that, you know, they still have to open more towards each other in terms of politics and economics, because we're neighbors, you know."

Emira also related that in the census or other demographic reports she declared her ethnicity as Yugoslavian (as did only a minority of Bosnians), along with her family who "felt" Yugoslavian. Nevertheless, once that identity lost its relevance as a source of positive self-evaluation (because the comparison point –the Soviet Union-- no longer existed), Emira along with her fellow Yugoslavs felt that it was no longer needed. Social comparisons (Festinger, 1954) lie at the heart of Social Identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Group members need comparisons that provide favorable outcomes for a positive social identity. In the absence of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavian identity did not have a relevant outgroup to compare itself to. Hence, identification shifted from the larger group to smaller ones to create new relevant outgroups. Even though Emira herself did not believe that the war was needed to achieve that, she had no problem with the end product.

Finally, a small minority felt strongly (and nostalgically) Yugoslavian. One survey participant answered the open-ended MEIM question as "Yugoslav –an extinct

nation". One of my life story informants, Vesna, *is* or at least *was* Yugoslavian when it was possible to be one. Bosnia is the place she chooses to tell people she is from. But Yugoslavia is

> "…A paradise lost. 'Cause I'm thinking like there was this whole like, former Yugoslavia it was so idealistic and I think I was so like ... like I was a product… Like I was exactly what they came up with when they wanted to design the system. Raised by parents who are very socialist, communist, but not, very Marxist but not like umm… not into politics. Not involved in politics. Just like ideologically very… because they were born into that system. Like you know raised to be like, if somebody attacks your country you would just go and you'd like… Like I think if somebody attacked the country from outside I would have joined the military at that time. I don't think I will ever, now or in the future, ever again would feel like… I don't know maybe if we were attacked by aliens, I would have the same kind of feeling. I think that's the only time I would have like… now it would have to be the entire world attacked by somebody for me to have that kind of feeling. But I think it's like, before the war, if somebody like any foreign country came and attacked us, I would probably join and go and like defend it.

As she elaborated more on what it felt like to be Yugoslavian, she also gave an analysis of why she felt more Yugoslavian than Bosnian, and what kind of people would identify more with the republic they lived in rather than Yugoslavia as a superordinate category. This account is similar to Eriksen (2001) who suggested that ideologies and collective identities they form should be relevant to personal experiences to be adopted.

> "But I think before the war I strongly felt like I'm a Yugoslavian person. And it wasn't like literally… I think it's probably the same sense in which American people feel like "I'm an American". You can live in Texas, you can go to like Washington, you can go to Vermont, whatever but you are sort of an American, like even within that… Umm.. sort of that kind of identity. Like I'm Yugoslavian, I might go live in Croatia, I might go live in Serbia, like I know I was just applying to universities in Zagreb and Belgrade just because I wanted to live in the city. That was like it didn't really matter. I felt like if I go to the sea, to the coast, I'm at home. I go to the mountain, I feel at home. So, I feel since my identity was so tied to this unit that was Yugoslavia, when Yugoslavia fell apart, it's like my identity just left. And I think a lot of people felt that way before the war, and then they reattached their sense of identity to one of the countries. I think there was a lot of people who felt very kind of Yugoslavian, in general. But then, because I think, and it's maybe just because I lived in two different parts, I ended up being directly the opposite. It was, it's harder to tie yourself just to one. Like if you lived in one town your whole life, like your whole family is in that one area, and you all lived there, you went to school there, you met your, whatever, spouse there, and your kids were born there… I think it's easier to identify yourself with that space."

Vesna was a "product" of the Yugoslavian system. She felt close to the two republics (Serbia and Bosnia) she lived in and did not want to choose between the two. Thus, the Yugoslavian identity provided her with an alternative that included both, and even more. Being Yugoslavian no longer meant the same thing that it did before she lost it, but the nostalgia is obvious, as it was for other Yugoslavians who believed that Yugoslavia was an experiment, but one that was nicely put together.

Meaning of Bosnian-American

Most refugees were not strongly identified with being American, but they were still more American than they were Yugoslavian (see Table 2). Shortly after rejecting a Yugoslavian identity as a possibility and declaring herself to be "Bosnian", Fatima qualified that with a hyphen: *"Of course, Bosnian-American. For sure I will always be Bosnian. There is no doubt about it. I can always try to live like American, haha!"* Hence, Fatima used the discourses of "being" and "doing" for the different components of her national identity (Verkuyten & de Wolf, 2002). She *is* Bosnian, and there can be no doubt about that since she was born in Bosnia to Bosnian parents and lived there most of her life. But "American" is an identity that she *performs*, although, maybe not always so successfully. As Verkuyten and de Wolf (2002) suggested, these quotes point to a view of the culture of origin as what one really *is*, whereas the acquired culture is something that one *does*.

On the other hand, Sanja, another community leader in New York, used the discourse of "feeling" to account for her national identity. She declared herself to be

"Bosnian-American" before I even asked. Then I asked her whether this kind of identification depended on one's status as a U.S. citizen or not.

> "Honestly, I think a large number of people would say that they are Bosnians [and not Bosnian-Americans] even if they had citizenship. I'm just very politically correct, [laughs], very aware of these things. Honestly, that's how I feel. I mean, I do feel like a Bosnian-American."

Right afterwards, perhaps because the language of "feeling" does not provide sufficient justification (Verkuyten & de Wolf, 2002), she engaged in an explanation of why she *feels* the way she does: "*I do a lot of work for Bosnia. I believe in Bosnia. That's where I come from. That's where my family is now. And I would do anything to help. But as an American, I have a duty to my new country"*. In this account Bosnian identity is explained with a combination of discourses: Where one comes from (being), what one believes in (feeling), and what one works for (doing). American identity, on the other hand, is seen in terms of "duty", what one should to "do" for the country that rescued one from the atrocities at home.

Although these findings are limited due to the fact that these relatively recent migrants are not yet "bicultural", to some extent they replicate those reported by Verkuyten and de Wolf (2002) and Wiley (2006) on "accounting for" bicultural identities.

Mixed ethnicities

Finally, a note on mixed ethnicity individuals. I interviewed 3 Bosnians who were born to parents in Muslim-Serb mixed marriages and the survey sample contained 6 respondents who had mixed parentage. Although these numbers are too small to make any general claim, a consistent tendency for these individuals (especially those in the interview sample) was a resistance to being categorized in ethnic/religious terms. For

example, Vesna's well-thought answers to the questions about self-definitions in terms of nationality or ethnicity revealed how well aware she was of the socially constructed nature of these categories:

> "I don't like to define myself. Because … it's like.. if you say whatever, let's say "I'm half Muslim, half Serb" what does that exactly mean? I mean I don't even know what exactly it means to say anything, that you're something.
> …. I mean all my documents that state you know my identity issues [laughs], are non-descript. I think I generally resent labeling. I don't put anything for race. If I could avoid putting anything for gender I would. Like I'd prefer not to. But I don't think it would matter.."

She was also aware of the context-dependent nature of her ethnic identities:

> "It really depends on where I am, because I really feel like, like if people around me are very anti-Muslim, I feel more Muslim. Not in the religious sense but in a more ethic sense. If people around me are very anti-Serb, I feel more Serb. But the thing is like, I keep running into these people being like either way… I don't… it's really not… It's not even that I feel more one, I feel a need to defend the side that is being attacked. So I feel I need to sort of like stand up and say something."

While Vesna did her own social constructionist analysis of being of mixed heritage, Alija and Almila refused my attempts to put them into categories:

> Nida: "Are you Muslim?"
> Alija. "No. My parents are in a mixed marriage and… we're not religious."

and,

> Nida: "I didn't know that your parents were in a mixed marriage actually. So, how would you define yourself? As both Muslim and Serb, or just Muslim, just Serb?"
> Almila: "I told you before, it wasn't like that. We didn't live religiously My father never said "you have to go to mosque", my mother never said "you have to go to church". […] I know God is there, he looks at us, he knows everything about us. […] But it is not the most important thing in your life. When I went to my mother's parents everybody's same. When I went to my father's parents, it's same. Everybody speaks the same language, everybody looks the same."

These accounts show that differences in background are seen just as differences in religious descent (which they are), and in a communist country they can easily be disregarded. Among survey participants, four of the six mixed ethnicity respondents

defined themselves as either Bosnian or Yugoslavian, that is, in terms of more inclusive national identities rather than ethnoreligious ones. Hence, these individuals dismissed the language of nationalism that stresses "essential" differences between groups and were able to see those categories as constructed ones.

Summary

Although the sample was limited in size and representativeness, the fact that the three ideological positions on Bosnian Muslim identity specified by Bringa (1995) were evident in the current data set points to some degree of representativeness, at least in terms of identification. Bosnian Muslim respondents defined themselves as either "Bosnian" (Bosanac), or Bosnjak, or Muslim / Bosnian-Muslim. People who held these identities differed in their educational level, national and religious identifications, understanding of the war, and outgroup attitudes. While "Bosnian" was in general a more inclusive and tolerant identity, "Bosnjak" tended to be more nationalistic (scoring higher on "Bosnian" identification), and "Muslim" more ethnoreligious (scoring higher on "Bosnian-Muslim" identification) and unfavorable of outgroups.

Further, there was evidence that "Bosnian" and "Bosnian Muslim" were different types of collective identities, that is, national and ethnoreligious respectively, as suggested by Bringa (1995). There was no correlation between the strength of these two identities, and participants who picked either one on a forced choice question differed on a number of demographic and social context variables, as well as endorsement of ideological narratives as will be seen in the next Chapter.

Respondents almost unanimously rejected a Yugoslavian identity. It was no longer relevant and even antithetical to their new national identity as Bosnians. Nevertheless, older respondents, that is, those who received their formal education in the 50s and 60s, when the Titoist ideology was strongest, were more Yugoslavian than the younger groups, in line with Bringa's (1995) pre-war observations.

Finally, the few participants of mixed ethnicity were also more likely to identify as Yugoslavian or as Bosnian, and in general, refused to be categorized in terms of ethnicity or religion. Having ties to more than one group and not willing to choose between them, these individuals were the embodiment of the "Yugoslavian ideal". The destroyed identity was still an option for them because to choose another more exclusive identity would be a betrayal of not only a cultural but also a family heritage.

CHAPTER V

COLLECTIVE MEMORY

The major theoretical aim of this research was to incorporate collective memory as the content of collective identities into the study of intergroup relations. I suggested that collective identities are grounded on stories about the group's history and the history of its relationships with other groups. These stories are created and communicated in social interaction and transmitted to future generations. Often times, competing stories represent the interests of different groups in a society or community. Some groups, however, have more power in determining which stories are circulated, taught in schools, and published/broadcast in the media.

My argument is that representations of the history of interethnic relations inform the content of collective identities, as Bosnian Muslims, Serbs, and Croats and affect attitudes toward and relationships with the members of the outgroups. In the Bosnian case these representations can be contradictory because the community's experiences include harmonious relations with the "others" as well as violent conflict and betrayal. The ideological discourses constructed and disseminated, first by the Communist Party and then by nationalist leaders, provide frameworks for individuals to understand their own experiences with members of the outgroups and with war and displacement in general. It is suggested that individuals will differ in their endorsement of these discourses or versions of history, depending on their personal background, experiences, and current needs. Hence, the purpose of this chapter and next chapter is to look for these links between collective narratives and individual understanding of the war and of the outgroups.

I looked at two ways of "remembering" or interpreting the collective past. The first, assessed by the endorsement of interview excerpts (collective memory narratives), is a rather general memory of life in prewar Bosnia, as constructed by the Communist Party and, alternatively, by the post-1980 nationalist governments. It is important to stress that while these ideologies were constructed by the power groups, they could not have been effective unless they were somehow relevant to the experiences of the people they were intended for. In his account of the role played by national and ethnic identities in intergroup conflict, specifically in the Bosnian case, Eriksen (2001) suggested that

> "The boundaries between the groups may seem arbitrary. However, the large, 'national' groups are clearly embedded in smaller, local networks based on kinship and informal interaction, as well as being culturally founded in religious schisms, collective myths or memories of treason and resistance under Ottoman rule, massacres, deception and humiliation. Although it is tempting to argue that any so-called cultural trait can be exploited in the formation of national and ethnic groups, it is obvious that not just anything will do. Nothing comes out of nothing, and strong collective identities --such as the ones revealed during the war in Bosnia— are always embedded in personal experiences. [……] Their foundation must be sought not in the biology of kinship, as some might want to argue, but in the phenomenology of social experience, the raw material of personal identity." (p. 50-51).

Hence, the ideological stuff of collective identities is not a given for individuals belonging to that collective. Rather, it is their personal experiences, socialization and interactions that make them more likely to endorse one ideology than another. To understand the phenomenology of social experience that Eriksen suggested, I looked at both the relationships between endorsement of narratives and personal background variables, such as degree of ethnic/national identification, age, education, socioeconomic background, and city of origin, as participants reported in the survey, and the way they used these narratives in the interviews when they recounted their lives in Bosnia. What kinds of experiences inform national/ethnic identities? What makes certain individuals

resist one discourse and adopt another? And what purposes do narratives serve in conversation? That is, how and why do individuals use them in talk? These are the questions around which this chapter is organized.

A second way of "remembering" the past was to attribute causality to the war and to the behaviors of members of each group. This conceptualization of collective memory is informed by the recent body of research on attributions of groups' historical behavior and collective guilt (Branscombe & Doosje, 2004). I investigated how Bosnian Muslims explain the war and attribute responsibility for it. I also looked at how and if these specific attributions about the recent past (late 1980s and 1990s) are related to endorsement of discourses about the more general and relatively distant past (starting from at least the 1940s). Ideological discourses might be used by individuals to justify blaming outgroups for the war or defending them. If this were the case, one would expect a correlation between attribution measures and endorsement of narratives in the survey data. Alternatively, endorsement of discourses and attributions may be independent, which suggests that making sense of the more recently and personally experienced past is relatively unaffected by more general ideological discourses about history, and/or that a rupture occurred in the understanding of Bosnia before the start of the war and after.

I. Ideological discourses

> "In every place in Bosnia. It was freedom, it was…. If you have a house, and I knock on the door "Oh Hi, I'm here, can I sleep in your house?" "Oh yes, sure!" everybody would say you like this, you know. You didn't ask "who are you", or "Oh hi, you are Nida [*a Muslim name*], you are not umm Stephan or something", you know. Why it [*the war*] happened? I don't know." (*Almila, Muslim/Serb mixed ethnicity, from Sarajevo*).

> "People started to write some graffiti. One time I see something like..
> like…Somebody, probably from the Serbs, write "We will kill the Croats". So,

> couple of days later, I see the new symbol of the Croats. It was a nationalist symbol. Fifteen days later, that panel was filled with a lot of graffiti. Like, Serbs nationality… popular graffiti. Chetnik holds the knife in the hand, he holds it to hit somebody. It was in the picture, he wants to hit somebody that has Croatian symbol on the hand [???] I see something goes wrong. But very soon, it was out.[*meaning erased by the soldiers*]" (*Emir, Muslim, born in Montenegro, moved to Sarajevo at 14*).

Almila and Emir lived in Bosnia throughout the war and got married in 1998, a year before they moved to New York. They had differing views about why the war happened and what life was like in pre-war Bosnia. Almila romanticized pre-war Bosnia by reproducing the discourse of "we all lived together" (coexistence) and emphasizing Bosnians' blindness to ethnic differences. The life story of Fatima another young refugee from Sarajevo, was similar to that of Almila and those I heard from a number of other young people who lived in the big cities of Bosnia. Their life stories involved a lot of other people, family, friends, neighbors, and the frequent use of "we" and "us". Like many other young people, Fatima reproduced the coexistence discourse by talking about the close, harmonious relationships between urban Bosnians of different ethnic/religious backgrounds.

> "…I went to school with lots of them. I mean I had the best of friends with Serbs. I mean, I never saw them as Serbs, they were my best friends. And I don't think they saw me as a Muslim girl, or whatever."

Emir, on the other hand, had fought in the war and witnessed the deaths of many friends. In 1988, right before the breakup of Yugoslavia, Emir served his military duty in the Yugoslavian Army in Serbia. The quote above is a memory from that time. The use of the word "Chetnik" instead of Serb or Serbian suggests equating Serb soldiers in the army with those of the elite troops of the Royal Army of the Kingdom of Serbia in World War I who were known for their brutality and the war crimes they committed. The word Chetnik is used by many Bosnians to refer to Serb soldiers or sometimes Serbs in general.

In his account of the beginnings of the war, Emir implied that Serbs had been planning this for a long time, that "they were always altogether in the army", and he related stories of discrimination of Muslims in the army by Serbs.

The interview excerpts used for assessing the endorsement of these two versions of history (coexistence vs. threat) were constructed based on interviews with Bosnian refugees (see Chapter 3) conducted by me and by others (Weine, 1999, Mertus et al., 1997). Participants were asked to rate the extent to which each excerpt was similar to (1) the experiences of Bosnians in general, (2) the experiences of Bosnians they know, and (3) their own experiences. Inter-item reliability analyses were conducted for each set of three questions that measured the endorsement of the two versions of history. For both sets, the reliability coefficients were over .80 (α=.85 and α=.84 respectively). Further, factor analyses of each set of three questions showed that each set loaded on a single factor. By averaging each set of questions, a mean score of endorsement was obtained for each version of history that ranged from 1 (not similar at all) to 5 (almost the same).

Table 3 shows the means and standard deviations of endorsement scores for each version of history. No significant differences were observed between the endorsement of the discourses in the total sample or the Muslim subsample. Endorsement of the two discourses was independent (r(77)=-.10 for Muslims and r(88)= -.16 for the total sample). Discourse endorsement did correlate, however, with some of the identification measures. For Bosnian Muslims, identifying as Yugoslavian or as Bosnian was not related to endorsement of either discourse. Strength of identification as a Muslim, however, was negatively related to the endorsement of "coexistence", $r(72)= -.25$, $p < .05$, and positively related to the endorsement of "threat", $r(74)=.25$, $p< .05$. Similarly, MEIM

score was also negatively associated with endorsement of "coexistence" $r(66)=-.304$, $p<.05$, and unrelated to "threat". These results suggest that in the current sample, Bosnian Muslim identity was grounded more on a narrative of fear, betrayal, and distrust, that is, "threat" than on a narrative of coexistence. This is also supported by significant differences on endorsement of collective memory narratives between those who picked "Bosnian Muslim" as opposed to "Bosnian" in the forced-choice identity question. Compared to "Bosnian Muslims", "Bosnians" were significantly more endorsing of coexistence, *means*= 2.46 and 3.18 respectively, $F(1, 61)=6.85$, $p<.05$, and less endorsing of narratives of threat, *means*= 3.50 and 2.97 respectively, $F(1, 62)=4.23$, $p<.05$.

Endorsement of discourses correlated only marginally with demographic variables such as age, perceived socio-economic status, and educational level. Older participants were slightly more likely to endorse narratives of coexistence, $r=21$, $p=.06$. Those who were less educated and lower on SES were more likely to endorse narratives of threat, rs= -.20 and -.21, ps<.10). Being educated in the United States or in Bosnia did not make a difference in the endorsement of narratives. Also, participants' city of origin, that is, whether they were from a mostly Muslim city or a more diverse city in pre-war Bosnia, did not correlate with the endorsement of either discourse.

Hence, interestingly, demographic background variables had little or no effect on "remembering" pre-war Bosnia. Post-migration contexts, on the other hand, stood out as stronger correlates of endorsement of ideological narratives. Being a member of a community organization in the United States was negatively associated with endorsing narratives of coexistence, $r= -45$, $p<.001$). Residing in Chicago, on the other hand, positively correlated with endorsement of narratives of threat, $r=.32$, $p<.01$. The ethnic

make-up of post-migration contexts was also somewhat related to the endorsement of narratives. Endorsement of coexistence narratives was negatively related to the percentage of Bosnian co-workers one had in the United States, $r(76)=-.26$, $p<.05$, and unrelated to all other indicators of social interactions. Endorsement of threat narratives was positively correlated with the percentage of Bosnian co-workers, $r(78)=.24$, $p<.05$, and the percentage of Bosnian neighbors, $r(79)=.27$, $p<.05$. Hence, the more respondents were surrounded by other Bosnians, most of whom were co-ethnics, the more they tended to endorse a threat narrative. There was also a highly significant interaction effect of coexistence narratives and Bosnian identification (MEIM) on the percentage of Bosnian co-workers. Figure 1 shows this interaction effect. Those whose Bosnian identification was weak had very few Bosnian co-workers, whether they endorsed coexistence or not. Among those who were highly Bosnian identified, however, the less one endorsed coexistence, the more likely they were to work with other Bosnians [*R2*=.34, *beta*= -.349, *SE*=4.565, *t*=-3.257, $p<.01$]. Considering that the majority of these coworkers were co-ethnics, it could be said that this was the group that was most immersed in the community. The relative importance of post-migration contexts will be discussed further in the next chapter.

The lack of correlation between the endorsement of either discourse was an important finding in terms of understanding the complexity of individuals' relationship with ideology. Although many repondents endorsed one discourse over the other, a large group of respondents (almost 33% of Muslims) endorsed the two narratives almost equally. As mentioned earlier, it is likely that these people had both kinds of experiences. Having lived in both Tito's and Milosevic's Yugoslavia and having gone through the

war, many Bosnians have memories of both multiethnic living and betrayal of friends and neighbors from other religions. In interviews and conversations, some said they once believed in "brotherhood and unity', that they were all the same and that ethnoreligious differences were not important. The war brought bitterness and disillusionment, however, and they gave in to the more exclusionist, distrusting discourses of the nationalist era. Hence, this lack of correlation between the two discourses makes theoretical sense. This point will be further discussed below when presenting interview data on collective memory.

II. Understanding the war and Attributing responsibility

Responsibility for starting the war and committing crimes:

Respondents were asked to indicate what percentage of responsibility for starting the war belonged to each ethnic group. They were also asked to indicate on a 5-point scale the extent to which they thought each group was responsible for the crimes committed during the war. Table 4 shows the mean responses by Muslims to these questions.

As expected, Bosnian Muslims attributed very little responsibility for starting the war to their own group. They attributed significantly more responsibility to Serbs and somewhat more responsibility to Croats, $F(2,77)=238.12$, $p=.000$. They also attributed little responsibility for committing war crimes to their ingroup, while blaming the two outgroups for being involved in war crimes to greater extents, especially the Serbs, $F(2, 76)=88.382$, $p=.000$]. The variability in attribution scores was low, indicating general consensus in the sample in explaining what happened during the war.

I hypothesized that attributions of responsibility to the outgroups for the war and war crimes would be associated with the strength of one's identification with the ingroup. This hypothesis was only partially confirmed. For Bosnian Muslims, neither ethnoreligious (Muslim) nor national (Bosnian) identification was related to attributions of responsibility to the outgroups for starting the war or war crimes except for greater attribution of involvement of Croats in war crimes as Bosnian identification increased, $r(76)=.24$, $p<.05$. However, Bosnian identification was significantly and negatively correlated with attributions of responsibility to the ingroup for starting the war and committing war crimes. The more identified individuals were as Bosnians, the less they found their group to be responsible for starting the war $r(74)= -.33$, $p<.01$ and for committing war crimes, $r(73)=-.35$, $p<.01$. A similar pattern was observed between Muslim identification and attributions of responsibility for war crimes to the ingroup, $r(70)= -.28$, $p<05$.

The percentage of Bosnian friends, neighbors, or coworkers in the United States had no effect on how the war was interpreted (i.e., attributions). However, the diversity among one's Bosnian friends had some effect on attributions. Although the ratio of one's Serb, Muslim or Croat friends did not correlate with any of the attributions of responsibility to the outgroups, having more Serbs, $r(71)=.34$, $p<.01$, and to a lesser extent, more Croats, $r(71)=.21$, $p<.08$, among one's friends was associated with greater attributions of responsibility to Muslims, the ingroup.

In sum, respondents who were strongly or weakly Bosnian and/or Muslim identified were equally likely to blame the outgroups for the war. However, their attributions for the behavior of the ingroup were associated with collective identification.

As identification weakened, the ingroup lost its innocence in the eyes of its members as well. This tendency was more pronounced for those who had more outgroup friends in the United States.

Explaining why the war happened

As these analyses show, there was general consensus among the Muslims about who was most responsible for starting the war and committing war crimes. A more nuanced analysis of these attributions needs to consider whether the respondents understood the behavior of the outgroup members during the war as being due to, for example, their dispositional characteristics and motives as a group or to external manipulation or propaganda. Alija, for example, did not question Serbian responsibility in the war but explained it in terms of brainwashing and propaganda, rather than the motives or national characteristics of Serbs in general:

> "That's [*propaganda*] exactly what Milosevic used to start the war in Yugoslavia. And, he was so powerful that my own aunt was living in Belgrade, Serbia, was convinced that it was actually Bosnia who was attacking Serbia. […] And my mom called her sister to see how she was doing. She asked my mother "What the hell are you people doing?" You can imagine now, your own family can be so brainwashed not to know what was going on. My mom actually got so pissed off, she got so mad, she actually hung up on her. It's the example I always use to tell, to explain someone how much people were brainwashed in that country. They cut them out completely. The only broadcasting news were the local news, there was no international news, no access to internet, no access to anything. You cannot get out, you cannot get in. The only news is the local news. And we were able, cause it's like, it's some local air [?]. We were able to pick up the channel and see like whenever they destroyed something in Bosnia, they'd be saying, "oh these bridges, were hit heavily by the Bosnian side or the Croatian side, blah blah blah". And we knew, we knew who was attacking everything. So, they kept telling that to their people and they kept asking them to wake up and take up, you know guns, rifle, whatever, to go out there and defend their country before they become defeated. And that's how they got people to fight."

An examination of the open-ended survey question that asked respondents to briefly explain in their own words why the war in Bosnian happened made it possible to

understand *why* the respondents thought the members of outgroups behaved the way they did. A first coding of these answers was done by identifying (1) external attributions, that is, explanations that interpreted the cause of the war and the behavior of Bosnian Serbs and Croats in terms of outside factors such as nationalist propaganda, or the fall of communism and the rise of nationalist movements in Eastern Europe, and (2) internal attributions, that is, explanations that blamed Bosnian Serbs and Croats for hatred of Muslims, desires of power, and being inherently aggressive. Many answers contained elements that were both internal and external to the outgroups. Hence the coding was repeated by rating the internality and externality of the attribution on a 5-point scale on which 1 was "purely internal", that is only about the characteristics and motives of Bosnian Croats and Serbs, and 5 was "purely external", that is about reasons that were purely external to Bosnian Croats and Serbs. (See Appendix C for more details about the coding of this question).

Overall, participants tended to make more internal attributions than external, as suggested by the sample mean for this variable: M=2.06 (SD=0.87). Expectedly, those who made external attributions for the war tended to attribute less responsibility for starting the war and committing war crimes to Serbs, $r(67)$=-.38 and $r(69)$=-.41 respectively, p<.001, and more to the ingroup $r(68)$=.32 and $r(65)$=.50 respectively, p<.01. This score was significantly correlated with Muslim identification, $r(65)$=-.34, p<.01, such that more strongly Muslim-identified respondents were less likely to make external attributions for the war.

No association was found between discourses and attributions, except for a weak correlation between endorsement of narratives of coexistence and Muslim war crimes

$r(73)=.25$, $p<.05$. As participants endorsed narratives of coexistence, they attributed more responsibility for committing war crimes to the ingroup. Otherwise, endorsement of either discourse was independent from all measures of attributions, including the coded internal-external attributions measure. This suggests some rigidity in the understanding of the war. Regardless of how participants remembered interethnic relations in pre-war Bosnia, they explained the war and attributed responsibility for it in relatively similar ways. The fact that attributions for outgroups did not correlate with identification measures, except for the correlation between Muslim identity and internal-external measure, further supports this idea.

On the other hand, some attribution measures correlated with percentages of Serbs and Muslims among one's Bosnian friends in the United States. As the percentage of Serb friends increased, respondents were more likely to make external attributions, $r(66)=.28$, and to attribute less responsibility to Serbs for war crimes, $r(74)=-.27$, and more to Muslims r(71)=.34. Similarly, as the percentage of Bosnian Muslim friends in the United States increased, more internal attributions for the war were made, $r(66)=-.27$, and less responsibility for war crimes was attributed to the ingroup, $r(71)=-.32$. Finally, attributing more responsibility to the ingroup for starting the war was associated with a higher ratio of Serb coworkers $r(31)=.51$, $p<.01$) and a lower ratio of ingroup coworkers, $r(31)=-.42$, $p<.05$.

Combining these two sets of correlations, that is, (a) attributions with discourses and identities (or lack thereof), and (b) attributions with social interactions, it can be suggested that the understanding of what happened during the war was more likely to be affected by the immediate post-war, post-migration surrounding of refugees than by

ideological discourses or ethnic identification. Collective memory gets created in social interaction (Middleton & Edwards, 1990). As refugees engage in friendly interactions with members of different ethnicities, they learn about others' experiences and perspectives and form a more balanced view of the past. Conversely, when they are limited in their social interactions to co-ethnics only, as a group, they construct a one-sided version of the past.

The direction of causality for these relationships can go either way. Those who are already feeling bitter towards Serbs because of their understanding of the war may limit their social contacts to co-ethnics only. Equally plausible, those who befriend and/or work with Serbs may have knowledge of their point of view and interpret the war in less accusatory ways. Most likely, the process is circular. Bitterness leads to the avoidance of outgroups and to the search for comfort with co-ethnics, which in turn leads to reinforced views of the past and then to more bitterness. If this cycle is broken by contact with outgroup members, whether by necessity such as work or by choice such as friendship, it is likely that one's interpretation of the war changes as well. For the purposes of this research, the important point is that understanding the past is essentially related to social contacts. People remember and make sense of their memories in groups. Homogeneous groups will construct a one-sided version of the past, while diverse groups will leave room for contradictions, ambiguity and disagreements.

Finally, Riesmann (2002) suggested that silences around certain issues will most likely reflect the lack of a collectively agreed upon discourse on that issue. For example, in response to a question about war crimes committed by Muslims, a Bosnian Muslim informant gave a sharp "*No, we don't talk about them*", followed by a few seconds of

awkward silence broken by my next question. Apparently this topic is extremely sensitive for members of a community who have been portrayed (for good reasons) as the main victims of the Bosnian war. The fact that some members of this group committed crimes as well is confusing for other members and is most likely handled by suppressing it, or by minimizing its relative importance, as another community member, Edib did, in emphasizing that "*of course it happened, but it was nothing compared to what the others did*".

III. Connecting the collective to the personal

As mentioned earlier, endorsements of collective memory discourses were not correlated. I suggested that this was most likely due to the existence of both kinds of experiences for Bosnians. Many refugees believed in coexistence until they saw the destruction of their homeland and the betrayal of people whom they thought were friends. Others were lucky enough not to be betrayed or persecuted themselves but were not blind to the experiences of those who were. My informants tended to switch from one discourse to another depending on their purpose in the conversation. Sometimes one discourse was used to refute the other. Other times, they used different narratives to explain different events or experiences. Because my interview sample consisted of young, educated refugees and immigrants mostly from Sarajevo and Tuzla, the two most diverse cities in Bosnia, narratives of coexistence were overrepresented. Further, consistent with the survey data that showed correlations between narratives and immersion in the co-ethnic immigrant community (narratives of threat being more strongly endorsed by those who were surrounded by more Bosnians), most of the

interviewees were not highly immersed in the immigrant community. Those who were interacted almost equally with Bosnian co-ethnics and the larger former Yugoslav community. In their attitudes toward and relationships with members of outgroups, these refugees seemed to be mostly endorsing narratives of coexistence, however, but switches from one discourse to the other were observed even in this relatively selective group.

The life stories showed that ideologies were more than mere political tools. They were interpretive frameworks to reconstruct the past and the present. Some of my interviewees, for example, remembered their childhood in Bosnia as being the best childhood possible and equated this personal past with the achievements of socialist Yugoslavia under Tito. The following quote by Alija, in response to my question as to what he thought about "brotherhood and unity", provides an example of the links between collective narratives and personal stories:

> "I think it was a great thing! I think… you know, we could have advanced ourselves so well, and we were already more advanced than any other Eastern bloc countries. I'm just telling you, the way I was having my life, it was great! I've had everything I wanted… almost. I've had a great childhood, I've had… we've had a great education system. I can say I had the thing going!
> So um… you know we traveled around, we were not limited to anything… And, I think it would have been great if it could have continued to last… and people didn't destroy it."

When I told Alija that many scholars think that "brotherhood and unity" was based on suppressing ethnic memory and identity and did not leave room for reconciliation, he switched to the narrative of threat, not as his own opinion but to show awareness of its existence and to defend "brotherhood and unity" (the underlined sentences are those that express the idea most clearly).

> "I know. Tito really wanted to keep reminding people of a lot of the fallen victims and to use that to prepare the country for something like that could happen again. <u>I know, I remember my mom always saying "live as nothing will happen tomorrow, but be prepared as if the war will start tomorrow"</u>. Meaning that always have supplies in the house, but not just like a few but you know, have plenty of supplies.

> And that was actually Tito's ideology. That's why former Yugoslavia had umm.. was the third country in the world with the strongest army. When you think of the forces such as U.S., and Russia, and then to have someone like us being third… He must have done a lot of things to make that happen. […] So I think it has to do a lot with him, setting up things around the people in a way to remind them, and organize the educational system to constantly talk about it, and visits to the fallen victims such as building up memorials all over former Yugoslavia, and making kids, you know, children, trips to those places, educating them, reminding them about that. Basically he was like relaying the message from one generation to another not to, never go in that direction, to prepare yourselves so that this would never happen again. So, that is why, we did not forget so quickly about it because we were always reminded. And on the other hand, it wasn't that long ago. I mean <u>if my grandfather could tell me stories about that, that means I was educated about it, whether I like it or not</u>. So it was not that long ago, but once again, I think it was this big ideology that he had, I mean Tito had, to talk about it constantly."
> Nida: "Do you remember the stories your grandfather told you?"
> Alija: "<u>All I was concerned about was like how big was his gun, or what did he do</u>… you know, I don't think you would really wanna hear about that!"

In the above excerpt, Alija is using narratives of threat strategically to support "brotherhood and unity", rather than to express endorsement of them. Being the son of a mixed couple, Alija was very supportive of the "Yugoslavian ideals" and used coexistence narratives many times in his interview, as did other mixed-ethnicity Bosnians to whom I talked. When the ideology from which these narratives derived was questioned, Alija showed his awareness of the history of conflict and the stories through which this history was transmitted even in his own family "whether he liked it or not". Nevertheless, he undermined the personal importance of these stories by denying attention for the ethnic content of the stories but by expressing his boyish interest in the rather neutral trivia ("how big his gun was").

Interestingly, he was less reserved, although still hesitant, about using the threat narrative at another point in the interview, in response to the same question about the role of suppression of ethnic memories under brotherhood and unity in the war.

> "That [imposing of brotherhood and unity] could have been one of the reasons as well. Although, I… I don't know, I grew up in a completely different environment. So I don't think that would affect me that much. But umm.. even

> until today like my… both my mom and dad say that they can't believe it, you know their best friends left without saying goodbye, you know without warning them of the things that were coming, that they knew about. They just, they cannot face it, because they knew the people so well, and they didn't share any information with them. And until today, they haven't seen them. Some they have seen and they claimed that they never knew, that they only left because they felt they were getting insecure, that they actually had no idea that the war was coming up. So, people are confused, they don't know what to think, and when you feel that kind of panic you know, so many big leaders said that it's the easiest way to rule is when you have two arguing or fighting. That was exactly what they did. They needed the people not trust each other umm to rule them.

Alija seemed to be more accepting of the threat narrative in this excerpt because it fit his parents' disappointment with their friends. However, he then went on to explain why the friends did what they did (confusion and fear because of political manipulation) and hence resisted the threat narrative once again.

Similarly, in response to my specific question about the transmission of interethnic conflict memories in families, Emira expressed her agreement with my hypothesis but also distanced herself from the phenomenon.

> N. Do you think that in some families, the memories of WWII were always transmitted or kept alive? Some grandfather killed in the hands of another group…
> E. Huhumm, definitely, I think this was the case. Definitely. My grandparents weren't alive during the war in Bosnia but umm… I had friends whose grandparents were alive and who said things like "this is just history repeating itself". "Hey! Again, the Serbs, attacking us" You know the conflict between Serbs and Croats, and Muslims. But I really cannot talk about it. I don't really have an experience with it.

Like Alija, Fatima resisted narratives of threat by providing counter evidence for them:

> Everybody says here that this war was between Muslims and Serbs but I don't believe it. Just because, I had friends, that were Serbs, that were in the Bosnian army. I think this war was between Bosnia and Serbia. I think so. Why? Just because in ex-Yugoslavia, they wouldn't let us be an independent country. And for us to be an independent country we have to fight for our rights. And that's why that happened. In Bosnia, in Bosnian army, everybody who were fighting for their family, everybody who were fighting for their country believed we had a great country, and everybody was fighting for their own home, you know. You

> know Bosnia has a majority of Muslim, and of course you will have an army where the majority is Muslim population, but you have the Croats, you have Serbs, you know. That's the way I thought.
>
> *Nida: Did many people believe that Bosnia had to be an independent country? Or did they want to stay as part of Yugoslavia?*
>
> Fatima: Well, I believed it. I don't know. I'm not saying that, that, I think, and I think that we had a better life in peace, when we were living in peace. But um, to become a free country, I guess, an independent country, I don't wanna say you have to go through this, but… definitely, this could be escaped. I mean, this shouldn't have happened at all. I mean, we're all, you know, normal people. It's just that people, I think, uneducated people were for war, those idiots, they were followers. They were following politicians to go to war. I don't know. All normal crowd, normal people, I don't think they were for war.

Fatima started by rejecting the narrative of threat suggested by "everybody here" using examples of multicultural solidarity of Bosnians even during the war to support "coexistence". Nevertheless, she established the distinction between Bosnians and Yugoslavians by the use of pronouns as in "*they* would not let *us* be an independent country". Being the republic that was most seriously hit in the war, Bosnia was the real victim. The other republics, like Croatia and Serbia, did not end up breaking up the way Bosnia did, which again, confirms the separate fate of Bosnia from the rest of Yugoslavia. Fatima rejected a Yugoslavian identity (see Chapter 4), and hence her endorsement of coexistence did not extend beyond the borders of Bosnia.

Fatima's voice became more and more hesitant towards the end of her account. Even though she described war as hell on earth at a later point in her interview, she almost defended it as an inevitable path that Bosnians had to take to become independent. The moment she heard herself say that, however, she stepped back and gave an account of what kind of people go for war. Ethnicity is again absent in this account. "Normal" people don't fight; it is "the uneducated, the idiots, and the followers" that would go for

war. This way, war and ethnic cleansing were normalized: It is only normal for uneducated idiots to follow politicians who preach nationalist propaganda. Others whom I interviewed used similar arguments of "brainwashing" and "propaganda accompanied by a censoring of news from the outside world" to explain the war involvement or antagonism of otherwise reasonable people. Later in the interview Fatima gave a more direct interpretation of motives behind the aggressors' actions: "*And just because of the greed, trust me, I don't think they were fighting because of Yugoslavia or big Serbia. NO! You can see them on the TV. They were fighting just to steal, to rape, to get drunk, to get drugs. It's sick. It's just sick.*" Although these were internal attributions, they were not meant to define the motives or characteristics of the outgroup but of only a small, deviant segment of it.

As an endorser of coexistence, Fatima had a particular way of accounting for her conflict experience with friends of different ethnicities that makes the experience fit the ideology. In the excerpt below, Fatima told of one such experience with a presumably Serb friend, but refused my interpretation of the event as an ethnic one and attributed the cause to something other than "ethnicity".

> And, there was one guy, um, the first barricade that was done in Sarajevo that was like in March, like a month before the war. I was like going out of school, with my friends… I was hanging out with my friends, and um, one of my friends, I was like "where are you going?" he was like "oh I'm going, you know, behind the school" and I'm like "what're you gonna be doing?" so, he shows me the knife, this big, he put it underneath my neck. I… I took it as a joke, but then on the end, I'm like, "was he really joking?" He didn't do anything, and then I'm like I'm like "what're you doing? why you're like, you know, putting that knife underneath my..", "Oh I'm just joking, I'm going to", like, how do you say that? Keep guard. Yeah, and I'm like so why do you need the knife for? Why do you put it on my neck? You idiot! Huh! He was like oh no, no, like, he was just trying to be like a macho, you know, playing stupid. But I was like, I wasn't comfortable, … nobody puts a knife underneath my neck. You know.
>
> *N. Do you think he was trying to see if he could do it when the time comes?*

> He's an idiot! No, he wouldn't do anything. I mean, in the middle of the day. I don't think he would do anything, I think he was just trying to .. like I'm the man, you know. I have a knife and I'm the macho, you know. He was a kid, from my block. I know him, I grew up with him. He's an idiot. He was just trying to be like.. I don't, really bother me, I'm like not that time, I took it as a joke, but now I think about it, I'm like, nobody has the right to put a knife underneath my neck. I don't care who you are. And, that's the only conflict I ever had really.
>
> *N. Do you know what happened to him?*
>
> No, I don't care. I mean, I've never heard of him. We were, we were never good friends, we were like neighbors, just, you know we went to school together, that's it. Like he was probably somewhere over there, maybe he's like, I don't know.

Fatima attributed the causes of her conflict experience to the stupidity of her friend, to his machismo, that is to things other than his Serbness, and eventually distanced herself from him by saying that they were never good friends, although she began by telling me that she knew him since childhood. The conflict experience did not fit the "we all lived together" theme, and thus cognitive and narrative work was required to make it fit. It is also telling that Fatima never mentioned which ethnicity her friend was. We can assume he was a Serb friend, considering that the event was told in response to a question about conflict with friends of other ethnicities and that she lived in a mostly Serb neighborhood. The fact that she didn't mention ethnicity points to her interpretation of the conflict as non-ethnic. She was still upset while telling the story, but also careful not to depict it as a story about "ethnic violence".

As Eriksen (2001) suggested, the ideological narratives constructed by power holders are not consumed or endorsed by the people unless they relate to their personal experiences. For urban Bosnians the "brotherhood and unity" ideology fit well with their experience of harmonious multicultural existence. Having lived in an especially diverse section of Sarajevo, Fatima interpreted her experience of conflict in non-ethnic terms and

did not have hard feelings against other Serbs. Memories of peaceful multiethnic living were Fatima's and many other Bosnians' shield against nationalist propaganda. However, even though it was intended to be a unifying meaning system for all South Slavs, for many Bosnians it remained limited to the people of Bosnia. For example, when asked about the diversity of the Bosnian community in New York, Sanja, a community leader, explicitly and proudly used narratives of coexistence:

> "It's everybody. One thing we're very proud of is that ethnicity doesn't exist. As long as you declare yourself as Bosnian or Bosnian American, it's not an issue at all. It doesn't matter what religion, what ethnicity you declare, it's not an issue. And that's something we're really proud of."

The limits of this coexistence became evident, however, when later she was asked about the differences in opinions about the war between the Serbian and Bosnian communities in the United States:

> "I think the issue with Serbian community in New York has always been that, that if they are hanging out with Serbian community they would be very pro-war, they'd be not recognizing the atrocities that happened down there. A lot of people in the Serbian community are kind of [??] with that claim. But those who don't, if you don't think like that you can't be a part of the Serbian community and that is also another issue. And that's why those people who are, you know, see themselves ethnically Bosnian but see themselves as Serbs, Serbians and Bosnian nationals, they are with the Bosnian community. You cannot see yourself as Bosnian and be part of the Serbian community. That's not gonna happen.
> N. So how you interpret the war, what you think about the war as a Serb depends on your relationship with the Bosnians or with the Serbian community?
> S. Absolutely. How big of a Serb you are.

To a certain extent, Sanja's endorsement of coexistence can be called assimilationist. One can be Bosnian as long as s/he accepts the dominant views in the community and limits her/his interactions with the "outsiders".

Dijana is an example of how many Bosnians who lived with members of other groups believing in "coexistence" turned bitter and cynical as a result of war. She grew

up in a predominantly Serb town and had good relationships with them. However, war changed everything in her town:

> "The guy across the street had a little grocery store. But to make sure that umm Muslims don't walk in umm he put a sign on the door: No Muslims and dogs! Unbelievable! It was really bad because… these are my … this is my nanny you know! People who cared [?] me out, people, when my parents go out, they'd drop me off at... You know what I'm saying, people you grew up with. Kids you played with. Every time I go back, and I see this guy who I know was beating up other people. And not just me, everybody knows. But, nothing happened in his life, he's just pretending that nothing happened. So, it was the war! It's like saying… like the war gives you permission to do anything and go unpunished. That's what it is. That's war, in their definition."

In this excerpt Dijana expressed how disappointing and painful had been the shift from "coexistence" in peaceful times to the "threat", betrayal and violence of war times.

As a Global Affairs major Dijana was very aware of and insistent on explaining the many complex reasons surrounding the war, such as the end of Cold War, loss of geopolitical importance on the part of Yugoslavia, and the rise of nationalism all over Eastern Europe. Nevertheless, she made use of the narrative of threat to make her account more powerful.

> "[…]You had to be an intellectual to follow all this. But I was in Canada in 88-89, I came to visit my family in Canada. And they were saying "you guys are gonna have a war. You have a Chetnik in power now". To me that was impossible. We know what happened in WWII, there's no way it will ever happen another war. That was only 3 years before Chetnik takeover you know. So you had that geopolitical and historical context changing now. It resulted in economic crisis. Inflation skyrocketing. You know, we had to stand in line for oil, detergent, water, even cotton. I mean it became bad. Every economic crisis breeds social crisis. And pointing fingers began."

Dijana implied that her family in the diaspora was better able to understand what was going on in Bosnia, perhaps because they were not blindfolded by the experience of living together in the post World War II period the way she and her parents were.

Finally, the young couple from Sarajevo, Almila and Emir, used both narratives in their stories but each for different purposes. Almila is a native of Sarajevo, born to a Muslim father and a Serb mother. Emir, on the other hand, did not consider himself a "real Bosnian" because he was not born there. He lived as a Muslim minority until the age of 14 in Orthodox-dominated Montenegro. Even though he remembered Tito with admiration, he did not seem to have ever bought the idea of "brotherhood and unity". He began his life story by recounting discrimination by Serbian teachers in Montenegro who helped Orthodox but not Muslim kids, and how his schooling experience changed for the better when he moved to Sarajevo and was taught by Bosnian Muslim teachers. He completed his military duty in the Yugoslavian Army right before the breakup of Yugoslavia. Three years later, his undergraduate education was interrupted to fight against the Yugoslavian Army to defend Bosnia. Emir was aware of the multiethnic living in Bosnia: "*They all lived together there, a lot of mixed marriages*."[12] However, when he was recounting how the war began he refuted coexistence: *"We thought the army will start the problem but the people will go on the streets and stop the army. But something very different happened. Serbs over there, they were all together in the army*..." He explained the war by making internal attributions to Serbs: "*Serbs wanted to have power. If you have power, you will have everything. So they were altogether in the army, everywhere.*"

Almila, on the other hand, was very careful when she was talking about ethnicity. As quoted in Chapter 4, she refused to be categorized as either Muslim or Serb but insisted that "*everybody looked the same, spoke the same language*" and that "*it was not important*". As mentioned earlier in this chapter, she remembered pre-war Bosnia as a

[12] Interestingly, I did not learn that he was in a mixed marriage too until I interviewed Almila.

"free land" where people did not pay attention to each other's religion. Hence, she used narratives of coexistence when she talked about her own experiences. When relating post-war life and Emir's experiences, however, she too began refuting coexistence.

> "When war finished, the politics over there wants to make people live together again. After war, after so much hard time. They want to make people live together. Not everybody but most people doesn't want to live together. Actually, me. I didn't lose anybody from my family, you know. I lost relatives, friends, you know, but not my mother, my father, brother. And I'm looking different from them. But Emir, he was a soldier. He was watching so many people who died. He lost good friend. And then he lost his job because somebody took him and put some Serbian, Croatian in his place, you know…."

For Almila, coexistence was her lived experience but not her husband's or that of others' who suffered more than she did during the war. This narrative switch was used by other informants who endorsed coexistence but acknowledged the limits of its persuasiveness for people who lost close ones. For example, Alija said: "*You certainly wouldn't feel the same if they had killed, God forbid, your mother and your father […] .I'm not sure, I don't know if I'd be able to feel the same way if I had lost someone. Because probably my anger would have been greater, much greater than it is right now.*" This switching of narrative is intended to express empathy with those who suffered the most, hence for whom coexistence lost its power.

My interviewees used narratives to interpret personal experience, to define "Bosnian" identity, to refute or resist either narrative, and to express empathy for those Bosnians with different experiences than themselves. Depending on what they were trying to accomplish in talk, my informants made use of both narratives, which somewhat explains the lack of correlation between the endorsement of either narrative in the survey.

Summary

This chapter explored the ways in which pre-war life in Bosnia and the war were remembered or reconstructed. Overall, participants endorsed narratives of coexistence and narratives of threat almost equally. The endorsement of either discourse was independent. While some endorsed one narrative more than the other, a large group endorsed both equally, that is, they remembered pre-war Bosnia as both the land of multi-ethnic coexistence and of unvoiced fears and doubts. An analysis of the interview data provided evidence for shifts between narratives in a single person's talk.

Bosnian Muslims blamed Serbs, and to a lesser extent Croats, for starting the war and committing war crimes, whether or not they were strongly identified, and whether they endorsed coexistence or threat narratives. This was not surprising as historical accounts suggest the same. However, as ingroup identification (Bosnian and/or Muslim) lessened, more responsibility was attributed to the members of the ingroup for participating in war crimes, if not for starting the war.

Interestingly, pre-migration (diversity of the city of origin) and demographic factors (education, SES, country of education, age) had little or no effect on how either recent or distant history was perceived. Instead, post-migration contexts, specifically membership in Bosnian community organizations and the ethnic makeup of one's social network in the United States, had a stronger effect on both endorsement of collective memory narratives and attributions for the war. Overall, interacting primarily with co-ethnics was associated with greater endorsement of the threat narrative and lesser endorsement of coexistence; interacting with members of outgroups in the United States

was associated with attributing more responsibility to the ingroup and making more external attributions for the behavior of outgroups.

This last point is important. Although pre-war life experiences should be important in conceptualizing who will endorse each ideological narrative and how the war will be interpreted, apparently their influence depended more on a person's current networks in the country of refuge. It is plausible that homogenous communities reconstruct a one-sided version of the past, while diverse communities allow room for conflicting perspectives.

CHAPTER VI

OUTGROUP ATTITUDES

Research by Biro and his colleagues (2004, see Chapter II) suggests some amelioration of intergroup attitudes and relations as groups resume living together again in peace in the homeland. It is conceivable that once outside the country of conflict, refugees may come together in the experience of uprootedness and continue their multicultural existence by forming diverse immigrant communities in host countries. It is equally plausible, however, that the bitterness and dismay of war continue and that refugees limit their interactions to only co-ethnics in the host country. In the absence of living together, the images that refugees have of their homeland and their understanding of the war and outgroups may get stuck in war-torn Bosnia of the early 1990s. This chapter provides descriptive data on intergroup attitudes and demonstrates relationships between attitudes, versions of history and collective identity.

In general, analyses in this chapter aim to show how collective memory moderates and/or mediates (or sometimes simply adds to) the relationship between collective identity and outgroup attitudes. The underlying assumption is that one's attachment to his/her group does not necessarily result in negative feelings toward outgroups (Brewer, 1999). Rather, the relationship between these two phenomena depends in part on the meaning and content of identity which, in this study, is conceptualized as collective memory and operationalized as the endorsement of narratives about history and the attributions for the war.

I begin by discussing how relationships with members of outgroups in the United States were described in interviews. Following that, I report descriptive data on attitudes

from the survey and I test the hypothesis about the role of collective memory in shaping the relationship between collective identity and outgroup attitudes. Finally, I explore the effects of post-migration contexts on attitudes.

1. Expressing attitudes

My informants were mostly young, urban Bosnians who interacted frequently with members of outgroups. Hence, negative attitudes were not heard often in the interviews with these young people; when they did express negativity, they usually specified which segment of the outgroup they were unfavorable toward. For example, Fatima made a distinction between Bosnian Serbs who fought in the Bosnian Army (instead of the Yugoslavian army which was Serb-dominated) and those who fought "*just to steal, to rape, to get drunk, to get drugs. It's sick. It's just sick!"*

Negative attitudes were more easily uttered when there was no tape-recorder. Edib, an older refugee, refused to be tape-recorded but encouraged me to quote his words when he said "*I don't think that I hate Serbs. My hatred of Serbs is mental gymnastics for me. Yes, you can write this without giving my name. Hating Serbs is mental …what do you call that…gymnastics… exercise for me. I have to remind myself constantly what they did, what they can do. So that I'll always be ready.*" While maintaining relationships with members of outgroups in exile, Edib was also very cynical about these relationships. For example, he thought that his Serb colleagues in the international NGO where he worked were spreading gossip that he was a fundamentalist Muslim. When looking for a restaurant in a Bosnian neighborhood in New York, he refused my suggestion, saying "I don't go to [name of restaurant] anymore. Too many Serbs

there…" Finally, when I asked how he felt about Croats as opposed to Serbs, he said: "You know what? My wife would say 'they are the same shit!'"

I must emphasize that Edib's words were the harshest I heard from the Bosnians with whom I talked. For many others, positive relationships were possible, albeit on certain conditions. As put by another older refugee with whom I talked informally: "*I have friends, Serbs, Croats… I don't mind them. As long as they accept everything that happened.*"

Hence, in general there was a silence about feelings for outgroups. Another silence occurred when young Bosnians of different backgrounds came together both before and after the war: They avoided talking about the war and each group's responsibility in it. Vesna, a young woman with Serb and Muslim parents, was very open about how she needed to "keep her mouth shut" when she talked to friends of different backgrounds and experiences during the war. Emira, who left Bosnia when she was very young and went to high school in the United States, recalled how happy her reunions with her friends were when she visited home during summer vacations right after the war. However, the past was not a topic of discussion in these meetings.

> E. […] We had like our own youth organization like to try to connect.. I just feel lucky that I happened to be in such a healthy environment. You know. That wasn't sooo nationalistic, and you know we still had friends from different religions or nationalities.
>
> *N. Were there any conflicts between your friends from different nationalities or religions?*
> E. No, none that I heard or experienced truly.
>
> *N. Did you used to talk about the war with your friends? Why it happened, what was happening? During the war?*
> E. No.
> *N. You didn't talk about it?*
> E. We never really talked about it. When we started the youth group, we talked about the future. We never really talked about the past, what happened, or why. We were just kind of at the same stage. Now we needed to move on. Whatever

> happened.. you know, now it was time to come back together. We realized we needed each other. We have to live together.
>
> *N. Uhhumm. So, you never talked about why it happened.*
> E. No because, to us that was almost clear, already. Because whether it's… like for the Serbs… The first time we actually talked about it was with my friend from Belgrade in the boarding school here in New York. And we did get in a conflict, you know, talking about it because their propaganda, you know, all saying like how Bosnian Army was attacking Serbs in Bosnia, haha… We heard something different, you know haha.

In the excerpt above, Emira began her explanation as to why she and her friends were silent about the war by presenting a non-conflict related reason: It is useless to get stuck in the past, one should look at the future and move on. That was the recipe to live together. However, upon my insistence, she admitted that talking about the past creates trouble between friends. At the same time, she claimed that the causes of the war were clear to her and her friends and hence did not need to be talked about any further. Nevertheless, the sentence she began and did not finish, *"…like for Serbs…"*, and the conflict experience with the Serbian friend in New York that she related immediately after suggest that no interpretation of the war is agreed upon, even between close friends, and that maintaining silence is the only way to avoid problems.

Sanja, who described herself as very bitter when she came to the U.S. as a teenage refugee, overcame her hatred by working in a theater performance with Bosnians of other backgrounds.

> S. Yeah. We were about 20 of us in our group. And we all thought like that [i.e. unfavorably of each other]. And it was yet another formative experience of unlearning all the bad things, learning the [???]
> *N. Were there people who couldn't do it?*
> S. Yeah. There was one Serbian girl. She couldn't do it. She couldn't deal with it. She left in a short while, like after a week. …….Because she would be.. During these times we would be very apolitical. We were not talking about political reasons, we were just kind of keeping it at a level.. individually. And she would get very political. I personally never got into any conflict with her, as shaking as it is for me to get into politics to ???? or something, umm but I, I mean from what I heard, she has said that certain events never occurred during

> the war, or they were not done by Serbs, are proven to be done by Serbs, you know, like Srebrenica massacre or ???, everybody in their right mind would agree that it happened, she was sitting there and telling us to our face that it wasn't, and it's like , you can't do that. If you're gonna talk about it, you gotta talk of some facts. [laughs]. So… And she couldn't do it. She left in a week…

Sanja's account again shows how reluctant young people were to talk about the war, at least at a "political level", presumably at the level of ethnic groups. This story also illustrates what happens when the youth were confronted with views that they deemed unacceptable. Sanja was still angry for having to hear this young woman's arguments. At the same time, the other woman probably felt frustrated and marginalized because of the lack of recognition of her own viewpoint, which was shared by many among her co-ethnics, as a legitimate one in this new environment[13]. Frustration and anger on both sides prevented healthy discussion and reaching a consensual story.

Because multiethnic coexistence is such a source of pride for young urban Bosnians, as Sanja indicated when talking about the Bosnian community in New York (see Chapter V), it is plausible that when answering questions from a foreigner (me) about the community relationships and their attitudes toward others, my informants remained reluctant to express any unfavorable feelings they might have had and instead tried to reflect an image of multicultural understanding and solidarity. This can also be seen as a defense mechanism of young Bosnians against accusations of many in the international community who dismissed the war as resulting from "ancient ethnic hatreds" among the people of the Balkans and who essentialized the conflict by attributing it to the aggressive, intolerant national character of the parties.

[13] In 2003 The Serbian Republic of Bosnia acknowledged the Srebrenica massacres; in 2004 it formally apologized for Bosnian Serbs' role in it.

Answers to the questionnaire, however, revealed more polarized attitudes, probably due to the relatively more representative sample and the impersonal nature of the survey procedures. The mean ratings and standard deviations of responses to feeling thermometer and contact willingness scales by Muslims are shown in Table 5[14]. These results show how unfavorably Bosnian Muslim immigrants generally view their fellow Serbs and to a lesser extent Croat immigrants. The remaining analyses will focus on the determinants of these attitudes, such as the effects of collective memory, identification, and the make-up of immigrant communities.

2. Effects of identity and collective memory on attitudes

The main purpose of the present research was to explore the links between collective identities, collective memory, and outgroup attitudes. Table 6 shows the correlations between identities, collective memory narratives, attributions and attitudes toward in- and out-groups. Bosnian identification did not correlate significantly with any of the outgroup attitude variables and hence it was not shown in this table. Muslim identification was most strongly correlated with both types of attitudes toward the

[14] In addition, participants were asked to pick one out of 6 pictorial representations of ethnic relations in Bosnia. These representations consisted of 3 circles, each representing an ethnic group, in various amounts of overlap (or lack thereof) (see methods section). Most Bosnian Muslims picked either almost complete overlap (15.0%) or some overlap (33.8%) between the groups. Another 36.3% picked the picture with no overlap between the three groups. Because only a few people picked the high overlap picture, this category was combined with the some overlap category. Analyses of variance with pictorial representation (overlap vs. no overlap) as the categorical variable did not reveal any significant differences between groups in terms of endorsement of collective memory narratives or their level of identification. The groups did differ, however, in terms of outgroup attitudes. The overlap group was significantly more favorable toward Serbs (M=20.08) and toward Croats (M=41.28) than the no overlap group (M=5.92 and M=19.26 respectively). They were also more willing to have contact with Serbs (M=2.68) and with Croats (M=2.97) than the no overlap group (M=2.03 and M=1.98, respectively). This pictorial measure therefore had correlations with the other outcome measures, but not with any of the predictor variables. Hence, it was dropped from the analyses.

outgroups, whereas Yugoslavian identity and the MEIM score correlated most strongly with contact willingness with both outgroups scores.

Answers to open-ended questions on understanding the war and scaled attributions of war crimes to the ingroup seemed to be the strongest correlates of attitudes toward the ingroup and the outgroups. As participants attributed more responsibility for war crimes to the ingroup, their feelings toward the outgroups tended to be more favorable and they desired more contact with them (*r*s=.41 and .29 for feeling thermometer for Serbs and Croats respectively, and .49 and .48 for contact willingness). They also expressed less favorable attitudes toward the ingroup, r=-45, p<.001 for feeling thermometer]. The same pattern was found for open-ended questions coded on an "internal-external" attributions continuum. As the behaviors of outgroups during the war were attributed more to external than to internal factors, they were viewed more favorably and were more likely to be desired as social interaction partners, *r*s for feeling thermometer: .50 and .38, for contact willingness: .47 and .46, for Serbs and Croats respectively]. The ingroup, on the other hand, was evaluated less favorably, r=-.41 for feeling thermometer.

The narratives were associated with outcomes in the expected directions. Endorsement of the narrative of coexistence was positively correlated with contact willingness with both ingroup (r=.21, p<.10) and outgroup (*r*s=.44 and .40 for Serbs and Croats respectively, all *p*s<.001), but not with favorability of attitudes toward any group (except for a marginally significant correlation for feelings for Croats, r=.20, p<.10). Endorsement of the threat narrative was negatively correlated with favorability of attitudes toward outgroups (r=-22 for Serbs, p<.10, and r=-.28 for Croats, p<.05),

positively correlated with contact willingness with the ingroup (r=.34, p<.001), and unrelated to favorability of the ingroup or contact willingness with the outgroups. Overall, narratives of coexistence seemed to correlate more strongly with contact measures, while narratives of threat correlated more strongly with the affective measure of attitudes toward outgroups. This point will be further discussed later in the chapter.

By themselves, narratives were not strongly correlated with outgroup attitudes. However, as will be shown, their effect depended to a great extent on their interaction with collective identification.

Finally, favorability of the ingroup was consistently correlated with almost all measures of attributions for war and war crimes, except for responsibility attributed to Croats. Attributing greater responsibility to the ingroup and lesser responsibility to Serbs for war and war crimes was associated with decreased favorability of the ingroup. Similarly, external attributions for the behavior of outgroups during the war were also associated with diminished favorability of attitudes toward the ingroup.

Interaction of collective memory with collective identity:

I predicted that if national or ethnic identities are grounded on narratives of coexistence (brotherhood and unity), then stronger identification would lead to more favorable attitudes toward outgroups. However, if identities were grounded on narratives of distrust, fear and betrayal, then stronger identification would be associated with more unfavorable attitudes.

Statistically, I expected an interaction effect between endorsement of narratives and collective identification on outgroup attitudes. That is, the effect of identification was expected to depend on the level of ideology endorsed (high vs. low endorsement of

coexistence, for example). In order to test this assumption, a series of regression analyses were run with collective identification (Bosnian, Muslim, or MEIM score) and endorsement of either narrative (coexistence or threat) as predictors, and various outgroup attitude measures as the dependent variable. An interaction effect was obtained if the product of the identification and endorsement of either narrative was entered into the model together with main effects and the model came out significant. These regressions also assessed the relative predictive power of identification and narratives.

The single item Muslim identity score ("To what extent do you consider yourself to be Muslim") was a much stronger predictor of outgroup attitudes than either Bosnian identity or the MEIM score. By itself, it predicted 32% of the variance in contact willingness with Croats and Serbs, 25% of the variance in favorability of feelings for Croats, and 12% of the variance in favorability of feelings for Serbs. In three of these analyses, even though Muslim identity remained the stronger predictor, adding the collective memory variable into the equation significantly increased the explained variance. Table 7 shows summaries of these independent effects.

As mentioned earlier, an examination of correlations shown in Table 6 suggested that narratives of coexistence were associated with contact measures of outgroup attitudes (i.e., more behavioral and interactional), whereas narratives of threat were better predictors of affective measures. The same pattern was observed when the effect of Muslim identity was controlled for in the multiple regression analyses shown in Table 7. Although these two different measures of outgroup attitudes were highly correlated, r(Contact Serb* Feeling Serb)=.55, p<.01; r(Contact Croat* Feeling Croat)=.76, p<.001, apparently the phenomena they capture are affected by different ideologies, in addition to

ethnic identification. In the multiethnic urban Bosnia from which most of the respondents came, coexistence is the daily experience of living and it still informed, to a certain extent, attitudes toward contact with members of outgroups in exile. When asked about their feelings for outgroups without thinking of specific situations or specific members of outgroups, however, the participants' answers were more affected by narratives of threat that depersonalize the outgroups and highlight the intergroup boundaries.

When the interaction term (the product of identity score and endorsement of either narrative) was entered into the equation, one model was significant. Muslim identity and the coexistence narrative interacted to predict warmth of attitudes toward Croats [*beta*=.232, *SE*=2.136, *t*(3, 69)=2.119, *p*=.038]. This equation accounted for 34.1% of the variance. Figure 2 illustrates this interaction effect. Endorsement of the coexistence narrative altered the feelings of both high- and low-identified Muslims for Croats, but more so for the former than the latter**.** The same interaction was not significant when the outcome was the warmth of attitudes toward Serbs. Rather, a mediation effect was at work for attitudes toward Serbs, as will be outlined later.

The interaction of endorsement of coexistence narratives with Muslim identification on contact willingness with Croats did not reach conventional levels of significance (*p*=.13), but it was in the expected direction. Endorsing coexistence was associated with increased contact willingness with Croats for both low and high identified Muslims, but more so for the high-identified [*R2*=.40, beta=.165, *SE*=.12, *t*(3, 60)=1.51, *p*=.13].

In summary, collective memory variables added to the explained variance above and beyond Muslim identification. When MEIM scores, instead of Muslim identification, were used as the identification variable, another marginally significant interaction effect between identity and narratives was obtained. [*beta*=.243, *SE*=.230, *t*(3, 57)=1.801, *p*=.08]. Figure 3 shows this interaction. This equation contained one main effect (MEIM score) in addition to the marginally significant interaction effect. However, it should be noted that this model accounted for only 22.8% of the variance in contact willingness with Serbs, as opposed to 38.7% explained by the combined main effects of Muslim identity and endorsement of coexistence narrative. Thus, even though it is in the hypothesized direction, this interaction effect of Bosnian identification with the threat narrative was not the best predictor of contact willingness with Serbs.

Collective memory as mediator

Although Muslim identification and narratives had some effect on feelings toward Serbs (as measured by the feeling thermometer), their added effect explained a small amount of variance (13%-15%), compared to the larger variance accounted for in feelings for Croats (30-40%). Apparently, discourses about versions of history had a very limited effect on how this outgroup was regarded. Because Serbs, and not Croats, were seen as the primary perpetrator in the 1992-1995 war, it is likely that attitudes toward them would be affected more by how their role in the war was remembered rather than the more general discourses about pre-war life in Bosnia. Hence, an assessment of how the most recent war was remembered and interpreted should be part of the model explaining attitudes toward Serbs. In order to test this possibility, favorability of feelings for Serbs

was regressed on Muslim identity and either the scaled war and war crimes responsibility questions or the open-ended assessment of attributions for war (internal-external). In general, these models did not add to the variance accounted for above and beyond that explained by Muslim identification. However, two partial mediation effects were obtained for favorability of feelings for Serbs predicted by (1)Muslim identity and the kind of explanations given for war (i.e., internal vs. external attributions), and (2) Muslim identity and the extent to which war crimes were attributed to the ingroup.

According to Baron and Kenny (1986, also see Kenny, Kashy, & Bolger, 1998) a mediation effect should satisfy three requirements: (1) the independent variable and the mediator should be related; (2) the mediator should be related to the dependent variable; and (3) when controlled for the effect of the mediator, the previously significant relationship between the independent variable and the dependent variable should no longer be significant. Figure 4 shows the first of the mediation effects with standardized betas for each relationship. When together, Muslim identity was no longer a significant predictor of favorability toward Serbs (p=.151), but the explanations for war was significant (p=.004) and proved to be a significant mediator of the relationship between identity and attitudes. This model accounted for 20.4% of the variance in favorability of feelings for Serbs, and thus was the model that best predicted these feelings.

Similarly, in the second partial mediation effect Muslim identity was no longer a significant predictor of feelings for Serbs when attributions for war crimes by Muslims were entered into the model. With ingroup's involvement in war crimes as a mediator, the direct effect of Muslim identification was no longer significant [*beta*=-.192, p=.12]. This model accounted for 18% of the variance in favorability of feelings for Serbs.

Together, Muslim identity, internal vs. external attributions for war, and war crimes attributed to Muslims explained 23.4% of variance in favorability of feelings for Serbs.

These analyses suggest that the effect of Muslim identity on attitudes toward Serbs was partially mediated through an understanding of the war. Individuals who were highly Muslim-identified tended to make internal rather than external attributions for the behavior of Bosnian Serbs during the war and attributed less responsibility to the ingroup for atrocities during the war, both of which in turn led to less favorable feelings toward them.

These mediation effects are in line with the major assumption of this study. I predicted a moderating role for collective memory narratives (coexistence and threat), which was partially confirmed in the case of attitudes toward Croats. For Serbs, however, collective memory (as measured by attributions for the war and war crimes) mediated the relationship between identity and attitudes. Although statistically the models are different, conceptually they confirm the important role played by collective memory in understanding the relationship between identification and intergroup attitudes. Depending on the outgroup, perceptions of history either shape the relationship between identification and attitudes (Croats) or form the link between them (Serbs).

3. Post-migration contexts

Many investigators have described the acculturation of refugees and immigrants into a host culture (Berry, 1989; Bourhis, et al., 1997; Birman, 2005), and it would be possible to ask in similar ways, how Bosnian refugees did or did not integrate into the U.S. culture. My aim in this section, however, is somewhat different. I am interested in

understanding how post-immigration contexts shape views of home, war, and intergroup relations with fellow Bosnians. More specifically, how is the make-up of immigrant/refugee communities (e.g., the ethnic breakdown of one's friends, neighbors, and colleagues in the United States) related to narratives about the past? Do certain communities endorse one version of history more than the other?

As mentioned in Chapter 3, Bosnian refugees often enter already established communities. As they receive the material and social/emotional support of these communities, they also adopt their values or conform to norms which often involve avoidance of the "other" or segregation along ethnic lines. Bosnian Serbs and Croats entered Serbian and Croatian communities established by previous waves of migration. However, as Sanja, a community leader in New York City put it, there was little community when the first Bosnian Muslims came in:

> "What has happened in the U.S., before Bosnians, or Bosnian Muslims started immigrating, there existed a really strong Serbian community and Croatian community, but not Bosnian Croatian or Bosnian Serbian just Serbians from Serbia, Croats from Croatia. And they already had their churches, their community centers, pretty much everything established. […] And, then again, the information that they were getting about the war, what was going on there, they'd be much filtered by whatever filters they had. So what has happened when the Bosnians started coming over, depending on which ethnic group they see themselves belonging to that's where they went. And, umm, it became very difficult….
> …Everybody was struggling and it's a new immigration. There was no one here before. But there's a Croatian community, there's a Serbian community but there was no Bosnian community here to establish the roots for us, tell us where to go what to do…"

As a consequence, refugees established their own communities. Some avoided fellow Bosnians, regardless of ethnicity, in order to forget about what happened in Bosnia. The low level of response to my survey was presumably one indication of this desire to forget. Many others, however, could not help talking and thinking constantly about the war, as one Muslim woman learning English in a community organization told

me in broken English. Collective memory or versions of the past get reconstructed as people talk to each other about their experiences, thoughts, and feelings (Middleton & Edwards, 1990; Pasupathi, 2001). If one is surrounded by co-ethnics who share one's views, those views get validated and become stronger. If one is exposed to different views through friendly contact with outgroup members, the person may be likely to adopt those new views. Because the present data are correlational I do not suggest a causal direction. It is quite plausible that people's beliefs guide their choices of interaction partners and communities. However, in the case of refugees who often find themselves in communities by chance rather than choice, it is likely that the direction of causality is from contact to endorsement of narratives rather than vice versa.

As mentioned in Chapter 5, endorsement of collective memory narratives was more influenced by post-migration contexts (e.g., working with other Bosnians, being a community organization member, residing in Chicago) than by some of the background variables (e.g., city of origin, level of education, country of education, age, and SES). In this section I investigate whether differential endorsement of collective memory narratives and/or different attributions for the war in different Bosnian immigrant communities in the United States results in variations in intergroup attitudes.

Bosnian entourage and outgroup attitudes

In general, Muslim refugees from Bosnia were surrounded by their fellow Bosnians, but not exclusively so. According to their own estimates, on average, 58.2% of their friends, 21.2% of their neighbors, and 12.2% of their co-workers were from Bosnia. Thus, in general their interactions with other Bosnians were limited to the private sphere, that is, friendship and, to a lesser extent, neighborhood. These friends, neighbors, and co-

workers were typically other Muslims (percentages of ingroup and outgroup friends: 83% vs. 17%; neighbors: 82% vs.18%; and coworkers 71% vs. 29%). While the private sphere was reserved for the ingroup, among those who worked with other Bosnians (only 31 respondents in this sample, of which 29 are Muslim), there was a move toward outgroup members even though the great majority of co-workers were still Muslim. (Percentages of Muslim, Serb, and Croat co-workers were 70%, 12%, and 18%, respectively). The relationships between Bosnian networks, collective identities and collective memory were described in the previous chapters. Briefly, ethnic identification (as measured by the MEIM) was positively correlated with the number of Bosnians (friends, neighbors, and coworkers) in one's surroundings in the United States. Higher percentages of Bosnians among one's neighbors and coworkers were associated with greater endorsement of the narrative of threat and lower endorsement of the narrative of coexistence. In this section, I explore the effects of the concentration of Bosnians and of co-ethnics in one's environment in the United States on the attitudes of participants toward members of the outgroups.

Table 8 shows the correlations between measures of outgroup attitudes, the percentage of Bosnian friends, neighbors, and coworkers, and the percentage of members of each ethnic group among one's Bosnian friends. Ethnic makeup of neighbors and coworkers is not taken into account in this analysis as the sample size becomes increasingly small.

This table shows that the concentration of Bosnians in a person's environment is negatively associated with attitudes toward outgroups, most likely because the majority of the Bosnians are members of the ingroup. However, friendship with members of

outgroups in the United States was correlated with more favorable feelings and higher contact willingness with outgroups. Socializing mostly with members of the ingroup, in contrast, was consistently and negatively related to all indices of outgroup attitudes.

Organizational contexts and attitudes

Another goal of this research was to learn how organizations in the immigrant community shape collective memory and intergroup attitudes. Upon their arrival, many refugees receive help from immigrant community organizations or from American or international/interfaith organizations. Some refugees continue their contact with these organizations, others do not. Still others, especially those who come with more preparation and with relatives already in the United States, limit their contacts to family members or to a few close friends and avoid further involvement in the community. Do those who get involved in the community differ from those who do not in terms of their attitudes toward outgroups, collective memory or identification? Are there differences between organizations in different cities in these terms?

Most of the present data was gathered through contacts with community organizations. However, not all respondents acknowledged this connection when asked in the questionnaire. Some were friends or relatives of members who did not themselves attend the organization. Hence the analyses in this section first focus on differences between those who reported being a member of a community organization and those who did not, and then on differences between the members of three major organizations located in three U.S. cities.

Eighty four percent of the respondents (Muslims only) stated that community organizations existed in their area. Forty six respondents (56.1% of Muslim respondents) said that they were members of the organization in their area. Analyses of variance revealed only two significant differences between those who were organization members and those who were not. First, unsurprisingly, organization members had stronger ethnic identification as measured by MEIM scores (*Means* 3.32 and 2.86 for members and non-members, $F(1, 65)=12.866$, $p=.001$). Second, members of organizations endorsed narratives of coexistence to a significantly lesser degree than non-members (*Means* 2.5 and 3.53, $F(1, 71)=17.269$, $p<.001$). There were no significant differences in attitudes toward outgroups or the ingroup, explanations and attributions for the war, social identifications, or any other demographic or attitudinal indicator.

Hence, in general, organizational involvement was associated with stronger national identification and with lower endorsement of coexistence narratives. However, these differences did not result in any variation in attitudinal measures. Overall, members and non-members equally liked (or disliked) outgroups and the ingroup, explained the war in similar terms, and attributed responsibility to the same actors.

The second step was to explore possible differences between organizational settings. The 46 people who reported being a member of community organization came from one of three organizations located in Chicago, Atlanta, and New York. Even though I do not have ethnographies of these organizations, some overall differences between the organizations could be obtained from members' responses to survey questions. The significant differences between the three organizations are shown in Table 9. To increase power, everybody from a particular city, regardless of membership

status, was included in these analyses. This decision is justified by the fact that no major differences between members and non-members in each city were found on the selected variables.

Overall, Bosnians residing in the three cities differed in terms of educational and economic status. The Atlanta group was the most educated, and the New York group was the least well off in a measure of social status. In terms of community relations, members of the New York group were the least connected with their fellow Bosnians. They had far fewer Bosnian friends in the United States as compared to the immigrants in the other two cities. Participants in Chicago, on the other hand, shared the same occupational and residential environments with their fellow Bosnians to a larger extent than did people in the other two cities, in addition to being friends mostly with other Bosnians. Both Atlanta and New York participants lived in mostly non-Bosnian neighborhoods and worked with others who were not Bosnians.

The Atlanta participants were the least identified in terms of ethnoreligious group identities. They also endorsed narratives of threat to a lower degree compared to the other group. The Chicago participants were the most identified. This should not be surprising since most of this group was recruited among mosque attendants. The New York group tended to be slightly more Yugoslav-identified than the other two.

Participants from these three cities also differed in terms of their attitudes toward the outgroups as shown in Table 10. People in Atlanta were the most favorable toward Croats. New Yorkers were slightly more favorable toward Serbs and significantly less favorable toward their Muslim ingroup. In terms of contact willingness, members of the Chicago community were the most unwilling to have contact with both outgroups, while

members of the New York community were slightly less willing than Chicagoans to have contact with the ingroup.

An important assumption of this study was that the social contexts of the refugees determine their attitudes toward outgroups through the use of discourses. Contexts that emphasize coexistence would have affiliates with favorable attitudes toward members of outgroups and vice versa. As the previous analyses showed, there were differences between participants from each of the three communities in the United States in certain antecedent variables, including the endorsement of threat narratives. An analysis of covariance showed that when Muslim identification, endorsement of threat narratives, and percentage of Bosnian neighbors were controlled, the difference between cities in contact willingness with Serbs was no longer significant, $F(2, 54)=2.81$, $p>.05$. This suggests that the relationship between U.S. city of residence and contact willingness with Serbs was partially mediated by these variables. However, the difference between the cities in attitudes toward Croats remained significant even after almost all antecedent variables, such as education, SES, narratives, ethnic identification, and the percentages of Bosnian neighbors and coworkers, were controlled.

These results are intriguing. The extremely negative tone of attitudes toward Serbs did not differ to a great extent from city to city and when it did, the difference was at least partially explained by differences in endorsement of narratives, identification, and Bosnian entourage. However, the larger fluctuations in attitudes toward Croats were not mediated by any of the antecedent variables. Because it is not plausible to assume that a person has favorable feelings for Croats due to the mere fact of residing in Atlanta, it could be concluded that the measures in the questionnaire did not adequately capture the

differences between the communities in different cities. It is also possible that variations between communities in variables not measured in this research, such as war trauma, or specific experiences with members of outgroups during the war, are the underlying elements of outgroup attitudes in that community. Unfortunately, current data do not allow testing for these possibilities.

Chapter Summary

The main purpose of this chapter was to establish the links between identity, collective memory, and outgroup attitudes. The two operationalizations of collective memory, that is, narratives about the history of ethnic relations in Bosnia (coexistence and threat) and interpretations of the most recent war in Bosnia (attributions), both exerted an influence on outgroup relations. However, narratives (the distant past) had more impact on attitudes toward Croats, while interpretation of the war (the recent past) had more impact on attitudes toward Serbs. The narrative of coexistence determined the shape of the relationship between ethnoreligious identification and attitudes toward Croats, while attributions for the behavior of Serbs during the war (internal vs. external) and for the ingroup's involvement in war crimes formed the link between ethnoreligious identification and attitudes toward Serbs.

This pattern most likely reflects the fact that Serbs were the main aggressor in the recent war, and the memory of this war is still fresh and painful. Bosnian Muslims show little ambiguity when they interpret the war and the role of Serbs in it: They are guilty. What made a difference was whether they believed that Serbs behaved the way they did because they are "bloodthirsty Muslim haters" or because they were brainwashed by the

nationalist propaganda and used by outside forces. The case of Croats, however, was more ambiguous. Although they did aggress against Muslims both in the recent war and in the past, they also shared a victim status with Muslims in the war, and they are now sharing a federation in Bosnia with Muslims. This ambiguity leaves more room for the impact of narratives about the past, as evidenced by the interaction effect of Muslim identity and coexistence narrative on feelings for Croats that partially confirms the second hypothesis.

Ethnoreligious identity (Muslim) was the best predictor of outgroup attitudes, but in many cases, adding narratives to the equations increased the predictive power of the models. For all four measures of outgroup attitudes (feelings toward and contact willingness with Serbs and with Croats), the regression models that explained the most variance included endorsement of one of the narratives. Although only one significant interaction effect was obtained with Muslim identity, endorsement of collective memory narratives had independent effects above and beyond Muslim identification.

Bosnians from different cities in the United States varied in terms of the ethnic composition of their social life. While those in Chicago were surrounded by other Bosnians both in private (friendship) and public (neighborhood, work) spheres, those in New York and Atlanta typically lived and worked in more diverse environments. These communities also differed in educational and socioeconomic level, ethnic identification, endorsement of narratives of threat, involvement in the ethnic community and attitudes toward ingroup and outgroups. However, differences between communities in the United States in their attitudes toward outgroups were only modestly explained by endorsement

of threat narratives, ethnic identity, or the social context variables for Serbs, and not at all for Croats.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

The morning I began writing this concluding chapter, the death of Slobodan Milosevic in a United Nations cell near the International Tribunal for War Crimes in The Hague where he had been on trial for over four years, was on the front pages of major newspapers around the world. Milosevic was only a few weeks away from the completion of his trial, and, possibly, of being convicted for crimes against humanity. His supporters blamed the tribunal for denying appropriate medical care to an ailing man. His opponents were disappointed because a dead man cannot be convicted. We do not know at this point what each of these groups will make out of his memory. According to one news report, a resident of Vranje in Southern Serbia where Milosevic's Socialist Party has a stronghold said: "*Too bad for the guy. He was a big Serb. Maybe he made a few mistakes like not accepting Yugoslavia be turned into a confederation, and perhaps avoiding war. But those charges for genocide, that's baseless.*" (Simons & Crouch, The New York Times, March 13, 2006). The same news report also quoted the Serbian foreign minister, an opponent for whom Milosevic had an order of assassination: "*I am not ready to establish a link between the destiny of Milosevic and the destiny of Serbia.[…] I can only say that it is a pity that he did not face justice.*" These quotes illustrate much of what I explored in this dissertation.

My major goal was to extend theories of collective identity and intergroup relations by incorporating newly emerging perspectives on identity content. Identity content has been mostly conceptualized as self-stereotypes of groups (Haslam, Oakes, & Reynolds, 1999). Ashmore, Deaux and McLaughlin-Wolpe (2004) added to that group

ideology and group narratives as other forms of identity content. Of course, it is conceivable that narratives and ideology inform self- and other-stereotypes in intergroup contexts. The content of self-stereotypes, that is, what characteristics or traits are attributed to the ingroup, are determined in part by how the group's history is constructed. In the Serbian case, for example, Milosevic benefited from the construction of a self-stereotype of forever unappreciated, victimized and used Serbs beginning with the 1389 field battle of Kosovo which started the Ottoman Turkish conquest of the Balkans. A Serbian immigrant in New York who lectured me on Bosnian history expressed this feeling of frustration for being externally manipulated throughout their history: "*The thing about us is that we are very stupid! Somebody will tell us to go and fight, we'll do it. Turks told us to fight, we did. Austrians told us to fight, we did… We're so stupid. We don't think what is good for us.*" The same person had tears in his eyes when he talked about the current Kosovo conflict in relation to the battle of more than 600 years ago and said "*You have to understand that we can't let Kosovo go.*"

In this research I conceived the content of ethnic and/or national identities as informed by the constructions of group history. Group history is constructed in different ways by different interest groups in a society. Hence, I explored how identity content (group history) was negotiated following violent intergroup conflict. Although the perspective is primarily that of one party in the conflict, specifically Bosnian Muslims, it nevertheless provided evidence for the significance of considering the meaning of identities in addition to the strength of identification in explaining attitudes toward outgroups. I argued that focusing on content contextualizes intergroup relations and leads to better prediction of intergroup outcomes.

Summary of findings and theoretical implications

The study explored which identities were available to refugees and immigrants from Bosnia and Herzegovina in the United States. Although the sample was too small to grant valid generalizations about the Bosnian community in the United States, some parallels with ethnographic work on Bosnian Muslim identity before the war (Bringa, 1995) suggest a certain level of representativeness. Bosnian Muslims defined themselves as either Bosnian, or Muslim, or both. They also used the Serbian/Croatian/Bosnian term "Bosniak". "Yugoslavian" identity was chosen only by the few mixed ethnicity and non-Muslim respondents. Finally, as a recent immigrant group, "American" identity was not yet strong, though it was stronger than Yugoslavian identity. Hence this immigrant group was not yet "hyphenated" to a large degree.

Ethnoreligious identity (Muslim) was the strongest predictor of attitudes toward the outgroups. The other more inclusive identities (Bosnian and Yugoslavian) had negligible effects on intergroup attitudes. As suggested by Bringa (1995), "Bosnian" and "Bosnian Muslim" referred to separate levels of identity with different ideological underpinnings. The latter label was strongly related to attitudes toward members of other ethnoreligious groups and the former was not.

Although the effect of cultural narratives remained small compared to that of ethnoreligious (Muslim) identity, endorsement of either narrative added to the explained variance above and beyond Muslim identification on at least one attitude measure for each of the outgroups. The hypothesized interaction between identification and endorsement of narratives was found only for attitudes (as measured by feeling thermometer) toward Croats. This result most likely stemmed from a shortcoming of the

study design. Individuals differ in propensity to endorse either type of theme (coexistence vs. threat) due to specific personal experiences, political ideology, social context, etc. Some people might be more likely to perceive threat in intergroup encounters, others may be more willing to give the benefit of doubt to outgroups. In this study, 25% endorsed narratives of coexistence more than narratives of threat, while 42% showed the reverse pattern. However, as the lack of correlation between the endorsement of each narrative suggests, a large group of respondents, almost 33% of Muslims, endorsed both narratives equally. For many Bosnians, experiences of both peaceful coexistence with outgroups and betrayal and hostility were available. What makes a person use one narrative rather than the other to interpret his/her experience at a given time should, then, be situationally determined. Interviews provided some evidence for this suggestion. Bosnians used both narratives in their talk depending on their purposes in storytelling, such as showing awareness of alternative explanations for the conflict, and/or refuting them, and expressing empathy for others' experiences. Some interviews pointed to a certain ambivalence about endorsing different constructions of history.

Others who have used discourse analysis methods have reported similar findings. Reicher, Hopkins, and Condor (1997) have shown that Scottish representatives in the Parliament, who belonged to different political parties and who varied in opinion on Scottish independence strategically used self-stereotypes of the "Scottish" to advance their policies. Self-stereotypes varied within the group from member to member. For example, while a Labor Party member stressed the "egalitarian and socialist" character of the Scots, a Conservative Party candidate emphasized their "steadfast and thrifty" nature. Further, the authors showed that the same person used conflicting stereotypes to advance

different aims, as was done by a Conservative who used the "communitarian Scot" stereotype to explain past electoral defeat and the "thrifty and careful Scots" stereotype to explain why they should now vote for the Conservative Party. Finally, the researchers showed that the same person can use conflicting stereotypes to the same aim: As an example, one Conservative first denied that Scots have a distinctive national identity to suggest that they do not *merit* an independent parliament, and then indicated that "Scots resent authority. They don't like being talked down to" (p. 110) to suggest that they do not *need* a Parliament.

These findings suggest that the context in which identities are enacted and expressed is extremely important, and that the effect of ideological discourses (self-stereotypes, group ideology, and group memory) can be best examined through situational activation (priming). In a study of attitudes toward immigration and multiculturalism among the Dutch, for example, Verkuyten (2005) first identified the various ways in which categories of immigrants were constructed through discourse analysis. He found that major discourses portrayed immigration either as a matter of "personal choice" or "lack of choice" on the part of immigrants to the Netherlands. These constructions seemed to be differentially related to attitudes toward multiculturalism. He then primed either discourse in an experimental study and found that constructing immigration in a way that highlights personal choice as opposed to lack of choice results in lower endorsement of multiculturalism.

In the present study, at least for those Bosnians who endorsed both narratives equally, being asked about their endorsement of each narrative at the same time probably decreased the effects of narratives on outgroup attitudes. A better way of studying the

influence of collective memory narratives, in any context, would be to experimentally manipulate the salience of each theme and investigate how it moderates the relationship between identification and intergroup outcomes.

Another interesting finding was that although attitudes toward either outgroup were highly correlated, they were explained by different models. In the case of Croats, interaction of ethnoreligious identification with coexistence narratives explained the most variance in attitudes (significantly for the feeling thermometer measure, not significant but in the expected direction for contact willingness). Endorsing coexistence was associated with increased favorability of Croats for both low- and high-identified Muslims, but more so for the latter. However, a mediation model explained favorability of feelings for Serbs. The effect of ethnoreligious identity was mediated by attributions made for the reasons behind Serbs' behaviors (internal vs. external) and the ingroup's involvement in war atrocities. The more ethnoreligiously identified participants were more likely to make internal attributions for Serbs ("they hate Muslims", or "they want power") and to attribute less responsibility to Muslims for war crimes, both of which, in turn, were associated with decreased liking of Serbs. (This pattern was not found in attitudes toward Serbs as measured by the contact willingness scale, as discussed below). One possible reason for these differences may be the relative ambiguity of the positions of Serbs and Croats during the last war. Although Croats did aggress against Muslims both in the past and in the most recent war, they also shared a victim status with Muslims and are now sharing the Muslim-Croat federation in Bosnia. Because their responsibility in starting the war is explained mostly as a reaction to Serbian nationalism, attributions regarding their involvement in the recent war did not have as much effect on their liking

ratings as did collective memory narratives about pre-war life in Bosnia. The ambiguity of their "outgroup" status leaves room for the effect of narratives. Serbs, in contrast, were the main aggressors. Bosnian Muslims perceive nothing ambiguous about their situation. The vividness of the memory of the recent war probably prevented respondents from considering their pre-war relations with Serbs. Rather, they focused primarily on their role in the recent war which was uniformly perceived as that of perpetrator.

These findings suggest different paths to take in reconciliation work with different groups. While intergroup reconciliation efforts might benefit from reviving memories of pre-war coexistence in the case of Muslim-Croat relations, they would have to address issues of responsibility and justice for improving relations between Muslims and Serbs.

Another interesting finding was that narratives had different effects on different measures of attitudes. For both outgroups, narratives of threat had a main effect on liking for the groups (marginally so for Serbs), but narratives of coexistence had their principal effects on contact willingness. As suggested in Chapter 6, it is possible that the more behavioral and contextual contact measure elicited memories of interactions with specific members of the outgroups in prewar Bosnia. However, when asked about their feelings for outgroups without thinking of specific situations or specific members of outgroups, their answers were more affected by narratives of threat that depersonalize outgroups and highlight intergroup boundaries.

Finally, the ethnic makeup of immigrant commuities (interacting mostly with other Bosnians, ratio of ingroup to outgroup friends) was related to both endorsement of narratives and attitudes toward outgroups, and more so than other background variables such as the ethnic makeup of city of origin in Bosnia, educational level, or age. This

point suggests that the immediate context in which collective memories and attitudes are negotiated may be even more important than past experiences. Diverse communities take different perspectives into account when "remembering" while homogenous communities hold fast to a single interpretation with no openness to others' memories. There were differences between the three major U.S. cities where most of the data were gathered in terms of attitudes toward outgroups, ethnoreligious identification, endorsement of threat narratives, percentages of Bosnians around, and educational and socioeconomic levels. However, while differences in attitudes toward Serbs between the study cities were partially explained by differences in identification, endorsement of threat narratives, and Bosnian entourage, no model explained the larger differences in attitudes toward Croats. These intriguing results could be attributed to the small sample size, an inability of the measures to capture qualitative differences between the cities, or to variables that were not assessed in the study for ethical or other reasons, such as war trauma.

Suggestions for future research: Diaspora, homeland politics, and reconciliation

Scholars of transnationalism study how immigrants who live outside of the boundaries of their homeland but maintain their ties transform their home countries economically and/or politically (Basch, Glick-Schiller & Szanton-Blanc, 1994). Some have begun studying the effects of diaspora activism on homeland politics in the form of democratization or peace building (Guarnizo, Portes, & Haller, 2003; Smith & Guarnizo, 1998). For example, Greek and Turkish Cypriots in England who were first displaced in the 1940s mainly for economic reasons, and later in the 1960s and 1970s for political reasons are politically organized and strive to exert an influence on their countries'

political situation. Cypriots of both Turkish and Greek descent live and work together in London, unlike the situation in the island that was partitioned in 1974 between the South (Greek) and the North (Turkish) (Bertrand, 2004; Ostergaard-Nielsen, 2003). Diasporan organizations change in their bi-communal vs. nationalistic orientation. Even though there is no evidence of these organizations' impact on homeland politics, political parties in Cyprus enjoy their support, while resenting the dissenting views of some diaspora members. As an example, consider the words of a member of the main opposition party in Northern Cyprus that favors ending the partition, in response to those expatriates who support Northern Cyprus' then-longtime conservative government that advocate separation:

> "…They left and now from London they are giving us advice… Turkish Cypriots in London support Denktas [NB: former president of Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) with a extremely uncompromising line of nationalism] and do not see the relevance of EU membership but they already have the benefits of living in an EU country. We see how Turks and Greeks live together in London, trade with each other, and go to each other's parties and picnics. There is no fighting, their children go to the same schools, they are good friends, and then in terms of policy they try to pull us apart. This hurts us to see" (interview excerpt from Ostergaard-Nielsen, 2003, p. 690).

Half of the present sample sends remittances to Bosnia. Most are in weekly contact with their relatives and friends in Bosnia and try to visit Bosnia regularly depending on their socioeconomic status. Do their views on ethnic relations parallel those of Bosnians in Bosnia? Or are they more open to interethnic contact than those who stayed behind because the relationships between communities in exile are more collaborative and friendly? Perhaps they are even more negative than those who stayed home because they have lost their homes. Diaspora Bosnians can vote in homeland elections. Do they have any impact on homeland politics and social movements

regarding interethnic relations and reconciliation, and if so, how? These transnational issues were not the focus of my research but the findings have implications for these questions. Comparative research in Bosnia that would focus on transnational relations could provide insight as to how the Bosnian diaspora exerts an influence on homeland economics, politics, and social life.

Although this research did not investigate the engagement of Bosnian refugees in their home country politics, it presented evidence of their attitudes regarding ethnic relations that may provide directions for future research on activism among diaspora Bosnians for reconciliation in the homeland. Some individual Bosnians and organizations find the idea of reconciliation between ethnicities meaningless after everything that happened. Others try to keep the memory of coexistence alive and organize their activities around the theme of reconciliation. In New York, as I witnessed, organizations that serve the former Yugoslav and specifically Bosnian communities differ in their ideologies. Nevertheless, they are in contact and sometimes in collaboration with each other, a process which, I was told, developed over time by slowly building trust.

It is also important to study how acculturation to a new country affects perceptions of the homeland, war and outgroups, and attitudes toward reconciliation. Many Bosnians who interact with members of the American mainstream (or majority populations in other host countries) adopt a different perspective through which they look at their country and interpret the war. Adopting the Western countries' norms of tolerance or, at least, their concern with political correctness on issues of interethnic relations may change the ways in which Bosnians or immigrants from other war-torn countries express interethnic attitudes. However, with specific reference to Muslim

Bosnians, the increasingly negative view of Muslim immigrants in the West may obstruct the integration of this otherwise "White" immigrant group to the majority culture. Theoretical models that link the host society's attitudes, refugee acculturation and transnational participation in homeland politics and reconciliation efforts should be tested with empirical research.

Reconciliation, of course, cannot be accomplished without justice (Opotow, 2001; Rouhana, 2004). It requires addressing the questions of "what happened, why, to whom, and what are the sources of responsibility" on all parts involved in order to reach a shared narrative (Opotow, 2001). This project attempted to answer these questions primarily from the perspective of Bosnian Muslims. Additional research is needed to add voices of Bosnian Croats and Serbs to the story. What is more important, however, is to address the issue of "impunity". Opotow (2001) stressed that reconciliation requires more than re-establishing coexistence. It requires justice for the past and current wrong doings. Legal attempts to reconciliation include international or national war crimes tribunals, truth commissions, public apologies and reparations among others. Many criminals of Bosnian war are being tried at The Hague; however, the two highest ranking, Radovan Karadzic, the war time political leader of Bosnian Serbs and General Ratko Mladic, the commander of Bosnian Serb Army, are still at large. The length of Milosevic's trial (over 4 years with no conclusion) was disappointing to many in the community, and his death caused even more frustration. At the same time, the Bosnian Serb Republic is taking steps to recognize its responsibility in the war and war crimes such as Srebrenica massacres. How these developments affect the community and contribute to individual and group level reconciliation both at home and abroad are important topics of research.

Although opinions differ as to what is actually achieved by war crimes tribunals or truth and reconciliation commissions in other contexts such as South Africa (Gibson, 2004; Statman, 2000; Vora & Vora, 2004), the powerful story told by a young refugee, Dijana, whose hometown is within the current borders of Bosnian Serb republic, shows how perceptions of injustice transform one's attachment to the homeland and inform decisions about going back.

> "When I went to visit one summer, I was sitting in a café with a friend of my dad. He was so badly beaten [in the war] that his kidney was gone. He lost it. And he had surgery, and surgery, and he was showing me. You know how sometimes people love to show you their scars? Whatever. But umm we were sitting in a café, and a friend of mine who I went to high school with, who was my little sweetheart in kindergarten was riding by with a bike. And my dad's friend said "that's the one who beat me up"…. You hope that Karadzic will be caught. But it really doesn't mean anything to me. It just means nothing. I'd like him to be caught. That's not gonna take care of the fact that the guy who beat up my dad's friend is riding a bike, owned a store, has a kid going to school. Nothing is gonna happen to him. You have to kill a hundred, more than a hundred to end up in the Hague. You know the little guys, those people, nothing happens to them. It's worse, when they see you, when you go back, they pretend nothing happened. "Where have you been? Oh! How's America? Are you doing great there?" Nothing happened! As if nothing happened. And when you bring it up, you'd say "what bizarre world do you live in? Hello?" "Well, honey, that was war. War is terrible!" Are they crazy? Like my parents had a barbecue when they moved back into the neighborhood. I said "who came?" My dad said "everybody". I said "what about this guy across the street with the sign thing?" [*NB: previously, Dijana told the story of this person who put a sign on the door of his store that said "No dogs or Muslims"*]. Dad said "oh yeah, he took the sign off long time ago. Of course he came. He even brought a liter of brandy [?]". It's unbelievable! As if NOTHING happened! A lot of people who are guilty of –you know what's the smallest crime, killing two? You know that's war. It's unpunishable! You don't get punished for those murders, even if they were children.
>
> […] No punishment. People who were beating up other people. My mom… My mom was a teacher. High school teacher. And last summer we were sitting in front of the house having coffee. And umm… A guy was passing by and he says "Hello Professor". "Oh Hello!'. And I ask her "who's that?" And my dad says "Chetnik" [??]. So he tells me the story about this guy. "He was responsible for burning [name of family] family house, and a witness survived, and they filed a report and the report is in the Hague. But the crime is not grave enough –you know he killed this family- the crime is not grave enough for him to be indicted! You can't indict 20000 people, or 30000 people, or whatever. So those people are normal. That's why I can't go back!"

It will not be possible for every individual to reconcile with or to forgive others, but it is critical that at the state level past crimes are acknowledged and responsible parties are identified and tried for creating a general sense of justice. Without a sense of justice, reconciliation is not possible, and without reconciliation, "threat" narratives dominate the collective memory of groups and hold the potential for further conflict and violence in the future.

Final note on Collective Memory

Scholars of collective memory have taken different epistemological approaches in defining the concept. Within the social cognition (e.g., Bangerter, 2002; Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, & Manstead, 1998; Weldon & Bellinger, 1997) or cognitive sociology (e.g., Di Maggio, 1997; Schwartz & Kim, 2002; Zerubavel, 1997) paradigms, collective memory is conceptualized as a cognitive schema, that is, a mental representations of the past informed by the larger social representations (e.g., Haas, 2002; Liu & Hilton, 2005) of a particular group or culture, vulnerable to distortions due to group processes (Baumeister & Hastings, 1997; Pennebaker, Paez, & Rime, 1997). Those with a discursive psychology approach (Middleton & Edwards, 1990; Billig, 1990; Tschuggnall & Welzer, 2002; Wertch, 2002) are interested in how collective memories are constructed in social interaction and what purposes they serve in conversation. I did not delve into these epistemological debates. Rather, I focused on what collective memory can do as a theoretical and empirical tool for students of intergroup relations. I made use of both kinds of approaches (i.e., cognitivist as well as discursive) in generating as well as analyzing my data.

Going beyond this pragmatic approach, I need to emphasize that these seemingly irreconcilable paradigms capture different aspects of the phenomenon of collective memory. The study of representations or dominant discourses about history provide us with an understanding of the general patterns of reconstructing history in a certain setting (i.e., answers the question "what is?"). A schema approach provides an account of individual level consequences of particular versions of history that are made contextually salient, and hence activated in individuals' minds (i.e., answering the question "so what?"). Similarly, conversational analyses demonstrate how history is jointly created in interaction and how individuals use themes about history to advance certain claims (answering the questions "how?" and "why?"). A comprehensive study of the collective memory of a particular group is one that captures all these different aspects and answers all of these questions.

In this dissertation, I relied on representations or dominant discourses of Bosnian history as identified by others (e.g., Boose, 2002; Eriksen, 2001; Mikula, 2003; Weine, 1999) and replicated in my interviews. Hence, I began with a ready-made answer to the question "what?" I attempted to answer the questions "so what?" by identifying the links between identity, collective memory and intergroup relations, and to a lesser extent, "how?' and "why?" by identifying the correlates of narrative endorsement, and examining the different uses of narratives in talk. As the results of my study pointed to a significant effect of current social interactions and context (rather than past experiences in the homeland) in the endorsement of memory narratives, the importance of studying exactly how groups negotiate history in day-to-day interactions and how collective memory becomes a socialization tool is clear. As history can be used by groups to create

feelings of group superiority, injustice and victimization, vulnerability, and distrust, that is, belief systems that drive intergroup conflict (Eidelson & Eidelson, 2003), identifying the processes through which individuals come to adopt these beliefs and developing methodologies that capture these processes are crucial.

EPILOGUE

ON METHODS AND SPEEDBUMPS

In my first year at the Graduate Center, my advisor got me a copy of Mary C. Waters' *Black Identities* so that I could familiarize myself with the West Indian immigrant population that we were preparing to study. The appendix of Waters' book detailed the process of her ethnographic research in New York. When I read that it took her 8 years to plan the research, collect and analyze the data, and finally publish it, I said to myself "No way I'm spending 8 years on a single project!" Well, here I am, not 8 but 5 ½ years since I first thought of doing this research. And I am far from publishing a book!

Weis and Fine (2000) used the term "speedbumps" to describe the unexpected difficulties that researchers encounter during fieldwork that make them slow down or step back and think about methods and ethics in relation to their research questions. I have had my share of speedbumps during the last three years while I collected my data and I learned tremendously about research methods and ethics during that time. I believe this dissertation would be incomplete without a description of some of those lessons/speedbumps. Because not only do they say a lot about Bosnians' interpretation of history, but they also address issues that many researchers have to deal with in research with community samples. Hence, here is my personal contribution to this literature.

When I first began to think about doing this research, I knew that my ethnic background as a Turkish Muslim woman would be a disadvantage in data collection. I knew that many people would be reluctant to talk to me, especially Christian Bosnians, and I knew that issues relating to intersubjectivity would inevitably be a concern. Not

only would my background affect who would be willing to talk to me but also how the stories would be told to me by members of different groups and endorsers of different ideologies. Ottoman colonial history left deep scars in the collective memory of the people of the Balkans, as explained by one of my survey participants:

> "I think that Serbs never forgave Turks for being in Bosnia for 5 centuries. During that time they had an inferior status. Unfortunately, Turks are a synonym for the current Muslim in Bosnia"

Thus, it was expected that I would be reminded of that history and not be trusted easily.

As it turned out, even my cautious attitude was too naïve. Although it did prove much easier for me to reach Bosnian Muslims than Christians, as I expected, often times I had to go through "tests" to prove my trustworthiness. One community leader –who later was extremely helpful- "interviewed" me about the aims of my research, my views on the Bosnian war, and finally, openly asked why he should trust me. Often I had to write long e-mail messages or letters, explaining that I was not taking sides or political stances, but just trying to develop a theory of intergroup relations, before I even had a chance to meet the potential helpers to convince them to spare time for me. In another community organization, my questionnaire created an outrage: Why should a Turk study Bosnians? If I am so curious to learn about intergroup relations, why don't I study how we treat the Kurds in Turkey? After long negotiations (and telling them that I had already studied attitudes toward Kurds in Turkey), this organization also agreed to help me.

Other reactions have been more upsetting and frustrating. In one instance, I was treated by a community worker as an insensitive opportunist trying to make a career for herself out of other people's suffering, even though I was invited to the organization's

event by her supervisor. In a church, I was stood up many times by the religious clerk who promised to help me until I finally gave up. I sat through a three hours confirmation ceremony only to learn that the person whom the priest promised to put me in contact with had not shown up. In another church, the best intentions of the reverend to help were not enough when it came to convincing his community to talk to me or fill out my questionnaire. Finally, in another annoying instance, a self-proclaimed "Turcophile" who met with me twice for an interview (which he never gave) made romantic advances right after he informed me how happy his marriage was.

In contrast to all these frustrating experiences, there were also others who have been very supportive, helpful, and open, sometimes to such an extent that I asked myself "Why are they doing this for me?" Distrust must be contagious!

Eventually, I was able to collect enough data to conduct statistical analyses and test the models as I planned, even though my final sample was much smaller than I had hoped and much less homogeneous. However, the whole experience taught me the importance of establishing trust when doing research with traumatized and/or war-afflicted communities. I thought I already knew that. However, I did not take into account how long it takes to establish trust and that, sometimes, it never happens. In addition, Bosnians have been studied extensively by psychiatrists and clinical psychologists. They are "tired of filling out surveys every other week" as one restaurant owner in Astoria said while dismissing me. Others do not want to be seen as "refugees" anymore, after spending a decade in the new country and becoming American citizens with American lives. But most important of all, they do not want to remember. Aisha, a young refugee from Prijedor who helped me reach participants put it very simply:

> "To tell you the truth, I do not think I ever shared my experience of pure genocide in my hometown even with my best, non-Bosnian friends here in the U.S. The reason is probably because those experiences are very painful, hard to describe, and highly humiliating. The same reason explains why it is so hard for many Bosnians to give their responses and thoughts on war, genocide, and politics and yes, even to complete one simple survey."

Sharing the results has not been much easier. In my first attempt to get feedback from community leaders on my findings, I found that although community members with some academic leaning were supportive and interested, the majority of the audience which consisted of social workers and therapists resisted my findings either silently or aloud. The critiques had two major points: First, that my sample was not representative (which I never claimed it to be); and second, that I was an outsider using as my starting point Bosnian collective memory identified by another outsider, Stephan Weine (1999). The first point had no relevance in my view as in this kind of research one can only have a sample of people who are willing to talk about painful memories, which would be far from a random/representative sample. The second point could have deserved better attention if they had articulated to me what it was exactly that I (or Weine) was missing by being an outsider. The remarks did not go further than arguing that things are much more complicated than I depicted in this research, and did not detail how so. I replied that even in my non-representative small sample things proved to be far from simple and that my analyses actually demonstrated that. I do not know to what extent they were convinced.

I found it a pity that so much of the critical effort on the part of the audience was focused on resisting me rather than helping me and making use of my findings in their own work. The second time I presented my research to some of the original group, more than a year later, I was received much better and my findings were said to "resonate"

with the community's experiences. Nonetheless, I should note that the resistance I encountered in the first meeting illustrates the embitterment of a community about being defined by outsiders, being seen as a "case", being told by others what their experience means.

In his book on the social psychology of ethnic identity Maykel Verkuyten (2005) reflected on the debate as to whether the researcher should be an insider to her population to understand their perspective better, or an outsider to remain objective. He suggested that researchers usually occupy both positions in relation to the population they study. Even when one studies his/her own community, there might be other positions, such as having a Ph.D., or an upper class lifestyle, that make the researcher an outsider. Similarly, an outsider can share certain experiences of her subjects, for example, the experience of immigration, cultural similarities, or superordinate identities, such as people of the Balkans in my case. During the process of doing this research I came to realize that my initial understanding of my position as an outsider was a faulty one. Yes, I was an outsider in the sense that I was not from Bosnia or former Yugoslavia, I did not speak the language, and I did not go through the war. However, I was an insider when I was offered Turkish coffee in almost every household or community organization I visited, when some Bosnians talked to me in Turkish, or when older refugees informally chatted with me, as they would do with friends' daughters in the homeland, and inquired about my marital status: "So smiley and not married? How is that possible? And you are all alone here? We'll find you a nice Bosnian boy!" Finally, I was a "disliked insider" when I was reminded of the Ottoman colonization of the Balkans, and the indirect role Turks played in the most recent war.

In research with war-afflicted, traumatized, or uprooted populations, one needs to always be aware that these are not the only experiences that define a person. In our interview Vesna, knowingly or not, tried to remind me that she was not only a Bosnian immigrant who escaped the war and its aftermath. I told people I interviewed that I'd like to hear their life stories. But because they also knew that I was interested in the war and migration experiences, they started with those. Vesna started like a biographer who first sets the stage with the parents, how they got involved, and how the person was born or what s/he was born into. The first 45 minutes of her interview consisted of childhood memories, I was obsessing about whether I would have enough tapes to record the more "important stuff". However, because Vesna took the "life story interview" very seriously (apparently more seriously than I did), she thought everything about her life was important and relevant. In one of our talks after our interviews she told me how she got scolded by one of the Bosnian community organizations for not doing enough work for the community and said "Well, I do work for this gay and lesbian theater, and *this* is my community now". I needed to be shaken by those words and her insistence to let me know, probably not deliberately, that she had a whole life with all sorts of experiences, to take my methodology more seriously.

A similar point was made by Emira who, in response to my question about her future plans, made a list of all the interesting things she would like to do, such as teaching or shooting documentaries, but not necessarily NGO work:

> "I realized after college or during senior year in college I got an offer… I used to work with orphans from Bosnia, and umm.. in Germany. I worked with American Red Cross in Philadelphia and the German Red Cross. They had this program for three weeks for orphans from Bosnia, Gorazde, and you know basically taught them English, communicational skills, and conflict resolution, and community building, and all that. And… During that time, it was really great to work for them, to really care [unclear] But then, later, when they offered

> me the position at Red Cross, I said "No, you know, I would really prefer to be surrounded by something more beautiful to work". I kind of realized… I felt like I paid my duty. It was almost like you know "Well, let's see what else I'm about."

It is important to stay in control of the research process and not get lost in the richness of experience as they are told in life stories, but it is also important to recognize that one's informants have full lives and that they are "about a lot of other things" in addition to the phenomenon one is researching. We have to be cautious about not reducing individuals to the topic of our dissertation.

APPENDIX A

Table 1: Demographic characteristics of life story informants

Name	*Age (at the interview)*	*Ethnicity*	*Age at arrival*	*City of origin in Bosnia*	*Education*	*Occupation at the time of the interview*
Fatima	28	Muslim	20	Sarajevo	College	Hotel management
Sanja	28	Muslim	20	Tuzla	M.A. student	Real Estate
Emir	33	Muslim	29	Sarajevo	Some college	Building superintendent
Almila	28	Muslim/Serb	24	Sarajevo	High school	Housewife
Alija	25	Muslim/Serb	22	Tuzla	College	NGO worker
Vesna	27	Muslim/Serb	20	Tuzla	Ph.D. student	Part-time faculty
Emira	24	Muslim	16	Tuzla	College graduate	Business
Dijana	33	Muslim	22	Bosna Gradiska	Ph.D. student	Higher education administration

Table 2
Means (and standard deviations) of identifications, and frequencies of most important identity

	Forced-choice frequencies (total sample)	Identification as (5 pt. scale) (Total sample)	Identification as (5 pt. scale) Muslims
Yugoslavian	5 (6%)	1.52 (1.00)	1.28 (0.69)
Bosnian	43 (50.6%)	4.51 (0.92)	4.68 (0.68)
Muslim	25 (29.4%)	4.24 (1.29)	4.44 (1.04)
Serb	2 (2.4%)	1.18 (0.65)	NA
Croat	1(1.2%)	1.17 (0.76)	NA
American	3 (3.5%)	2.51 (1.22)	2.57 (1.24)
MEIM (4pt. scale)	--	3.06 (0.59)	3.14 (0.55)

Table 3
Means and (standard deviations) of endorsement of discourses about history by each group.

	Coexistence	*Threat*
Muslims (N=82)	2.94 (1.17)	3.17 (1.10)
Non-Muslims (N=12)	3.30 (0.96)	2.12 (0.73)
Total sample (N=94)	2.99 (1.15)	3.04 (1.12)

Table 4
Means and (standard deviations) for attributions of responsibility for starting the war and for committing war crimes by Muslim respondents only.

	% responsibility for starting the war	Responsibility for war crimes (5 pt.)
Serbs	75.03 (17.36)	4.83 (0.41)
Croats	20.85 (15.22)	3.90 (0.78)
Muslims	3.59 (12.04)	1.84 (0.69)

Table 5
Means (and standard deviations) of attitudes toward the ethnic groups by Bosnian Muslims.

	Feeling thermometer	*Contact willingness*
Muslims(ingroup)	90.39 (14.64)	4.67 (0.62)
Serbs	13.33 (20.14)	2.39 (1.22)
Croats	31.05 (24.47)	2.59 (1.32)

Table 6
Correlations between identities, collective memory variables and intergroup attitudes variables.

		Feeling thermometer			*Contact Willingness*		
		Serb	Croat	Muslim	Serb	Croat	Muslim
Identities	Yugoslavian	.10	.13	-.32*	.43**	.35**	-.18
	Muslim	-.34**	-.50**	.18	-.57**	-.58**	.10
	MEIM	-.11	-.29*	-.29*	-.39**	-.37**	-.03
Narratives	Coexistence	.17	.20	-.09	.44**	.40**	.21~
	Threat	-.22~	-.28*	.08	-.13	-.11	.34**
Responsibility for starting the war attributed to …	Serbs	-.32*	.06	.34*	-.14	-.06	.20~
	Croats	-.18	-.13	-.22~	-.02	-.09	-.06
	Muslims	.16	.00	-.26*	-.10	-.14	.09
Responsibility for war crimes attributed to …	Serbs	-.18	.06	.35**	-.14	-.10	-.03
	Croats	-.07	-.27*	.10	-.17	-.15	-.11
	Muslims	.41**	.29*	-.45**	.49**	.48**	-.17
Open ended attributions	Internal-external	.50**	.38**	-.41**	.47**	.46**	-.15

~: p<.10; *: p<.05; **: p<.001

Table 7
Regression summaries of attitudes toward outgroups on Muslim identity and collective memory narratives.

	ß	SE	t	p	R^2 change	Adj. R^2
Feeling thermometer Serb						
Muslim identity	-.34	2.16	-2.897	.005	.13	.11
Coexistence narrative	.06	1.99	.488	.627	.003	
Muslim identity	-.29	2.08	-2.564	.013	.12	.13
Threat narrative	-.20	2.02	-1.681	.097	.04	
Feeling thermometer Croat						
Muslim identity	-.53	2.442	-4.984	.000	.29	.28
Coexistence narrative	.06	2.250	.539	.592	.00	
Muslim identity	-.44	2.391	-4.272	.000	.25	.28
Threat narrative	-.23	2.326	-2.214	.030	.05	
Contact willingness with Serbs						
Muslim identity	-.52	.114	-4.876	.000	.34	.37
Coexistence narrative	.22	.110	2.049	.045	.04	
Muslim identity	-.56	.115	-5.097	.000	.33	.31
Threat narrative	-.07	.121	-.665	.508	.01	
Contact willingness with						
Muslim identity	-.58	.124	-5.398	.000	.39	.39
Coexistence narrative	.14	.123	1.350	.182	.02	
Muslim identity	-.57	.129	-5.185	.000	.33	.31
Threat narrative	-.03	.132	-.310	.758	.00	

Table 8
Correlations between outgroup attitudes and indices of community immersion.

		% of Bosnians among one's…			*% of each group among one's friends*		
		Friends	Neighbors	Coworkers	Serbs	Croats	Muslims
Feeling thermometer	Serbs	-.14	-.23*	-.13	.40***	.15	-.31**
	Croats	-.03	-.25*	-.16	.24*	.35**	-.34**
	Muslims	.07	.13	.24*	-.16	.02	.08
Contact Willingness	Serbs	-.17	-.33**	-.25*	.27*	.34**	-.34**
	Croats	-.08	-.36**	-.33**	.19	.39**	-.33*
	Muslims	.18	.03	.14	.07	-.32**	.16

*: p<.05; **: p<.01; ***: p<.001

Table 9
Differences between major study cities on antecedent variables

	Chicago (n=29)	Atlanta (n=18)	New York (n=24)	F	p
Demographics					
Educational level	2.62	1.78 a, **c**	2.92	4.67	.01
Social status	2.86	2.94	1.92 **a, b**	11.72	.000
Context					
% Bosnian friends	77.59	63.89	29.60 **a, b**	18.49	.000
% Bosnian neighbors	30.34 **b, c***	15.00	15.00	2.52	.09
% Bosnian co-workers	26.90 **b, c**	6.11	2.61	9.14	.000
Transnational ties					
Likelihood of return	3.55	3.39	2.57	3.73	.03
Watch TV-radio	4.45	2.33 **a, c**	4.65	12.04	.000
Contact friends Bosnia	4.86	5.44	3.87 **a*, b**	6.23	.003
Narratives					
Threat	3.64	2.91 **a**	3.32	3.55	.03
Identification					
Yugoslavian	1.08	1.24	1.58 a	2.81	.07
Muslim	4.90	3.72 **a, c***	4.44	8.37	.001
MEIM	3.47 **b, c**	2.83	3.04	9.67	.000

*: $p<.10$

Table 10
Differences between major study cities on outgroup attitudes

	Chicago (n=29)	Atlanta (n=18)	New York (n=24)	F	p
Feeling thermometer					
Serbs	9.63	9.06	18.75	2.126	.13
Croats	19.26	48.33 a, c	28.75	10.293	.000
Muslims	93.93	93.33	82.92 a, b	4.469	.02
Contact Willingness					
Serbs	1.56 b, c	2.77	2.70	7.799	.001
Croats	1.46 b, c	2.92	3.26	14.757	.000
Muslims	4.88	4.71	4.47 a	2.597	.08

Figure 1: Interaction effect of national identification (MEIM) and coexistence narratives on % of Bosnian co-workers.



Figure 2: Feeling thermometer for Croats as a function of endorsement of coexistence narrative and Muslim identification.



Figure 3: Contact willingness with Serbs as a function of endorsement of threat narrative and Bosnian identity (MEIM scores).



Figure 4: Mediator effects of explanations for war on the relationship between Muslim identity and favorability of feelings toward Serbs. (Betas within parentheses are betas before Muslim identity and explanations for war were entered together into the regression as predictors)



***: p<.001
**: p<.01

APPENDIX A
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES OF LIFE STORY INFORMANTS

Fatima, interviewed May 2003, age 28

Fatima was born in Sarajevo and lived there until she and her family escaped to a Croatian island on the Adriatic during the war and from there came to the United States as refugees. Fatima's family is Muslim and they lived in a mostly Serb (Orthodox) area of the city. She was in high school when the war started in April 1992. After their building was bombed the family began moving to different apartments throughout the war, each time the City finding them an apartment only to take it away a couple of months later.

After an uncle died in the war and her brother got drafted, Fatima's father decided to apply for refugee status in the United States. It was already the end of the war and Fatima strongly protested leaving Sarajevo and the decision to move to the United States. She also did not want to leave her boyfriend. The family decided that the two should get married so that the boyfriend also could be granted refugee status. Hence, they got married at age 20.

The family arrived in New York in June 1996. Both Fatima and her husband worked in hotels, doing different jobs, and at the same time they received degrees from a community college. At the time I interviewed her, Fatima was living in Brooklyn with her husband and her 16 months old daughter. Her parents lived nearby. Although she and her husband started at the same time with similar jobs, she made more progress in her career than he did: She was an office manager, he was a bellman.

When I met with her a year later, she and her husband were back in school, this time for a four-year degree. Her first attempt to move back to Bosnia (so that her daughter could have as beautiful a childhood as she did) failed because she was overqualified for most jobs there. She changed her job to real-estate and was about to move to a new house in Queens bought with her husband.

Sanja, interviewed June 2003, age 28

Sanja left Tuzla, Bosnia in November 1995 with her sister "*for future opportunities*"and came to New York to live with an uncle. Once she found a job as a secretary and was able to pay rent, she and her sister moved to their own apartment. They both went to college. Sanja was in a graduate program at a private university and was working full-time when I interviewed her. She was very active in the Bosnian and former Yugoslav communities, on the board of several organizations, doing a lot of work for both the immigrant community and the homeland. My impression of her was that of a very hardworking, disciplined and helpful person.

Sanja lost many friends and relatives during the war, and for a long time she was very bitter and hostile toward members of outgroups. She and her sister were diagnosed with PTSD and depression related to the war trauma. Yet, once in the United States, she overcame her bitterness through friendship and working with former Yugoslavs of

different ethnicities. At the time of the interview she was living with her Croatian American boyfriend and was very much in love. A year later, the couple married.
Sanja was not thinking of ever going back to Bosnia. She was happy with the opportunities she had in the United States, with the fast pace of life and with her accomplishments, even though she missed the closeness and casualness of friendships in Bosnia.

Emir, interviewed September 2003, age 33
Emir was born in Montenegro and moved to Sarajevo when he was 14 to attend high school. His father thought that because of the discrimination he was experiencing in Montenegrin schools as a Muslim minority he did not have good chances for success. Hence, he moved to Bosnia and had an immediate change in his schooling experience for the better.

Emir was studying traffic engineering at the University of Sarajevo when the war began. He had completed his military service immediately before the breakup of Yugoslavia, and he was now back in the army to defend Bosnia. He quit his education to work as a counterterrorism specialist. His family did not hear from him for a very long time and thought that he was dead. He became tearful when he recounted the moment he heard his mother's voice on the radio, the only communication medium with the outside world in war-time Bosnia, and he had a hard time convincing her that it was actually him. During that time he met his wife Almila. They got married in 1998, a year before they moved to the United States.

After the war, Emir continued his work in the police force. He even came to the United States for a few weeks to receive training. However, he thought that he was being treated unfairly. Eventually he lost his job to an outgroup member (never specified if he was Croat or Serb). After that, through his connections in the United States, he made arrangements to come to New York with Almila. They arrived when Almila was 9 months pregnant. Both of their daughters were both born in New York, and they have not left the country since. At the time of the interview, Emir was working as a superintendent in a Manhattan building. He finds the United States full of opportunities for somebody who wants to work and has no intention of going back to Bosnia.

Almila, interviewed September 2003, age 28
Almila was from a mixed marriage of a Muslim father and a Serb mother. It was surprising for me to hear that because her husband Emir did not mention it to me. I did not think of him as someone who could marry a half Orthodox person, as he was somewhat bitter because of his war experiences, and because he mentioned that he was a man of faith. Almila did not mention her ethnicity until well into our interview.

Almila's mother died before the war started. Deeply affected by this loss, she decided not to go to college but to start working. As the war began immediately after, work became even more important for Almila, even though she was making very little money, because she thought it was "*better for me than staying home all day and think what's*

gonna happen." She was very much affected by the destruction going on around her during the siege of Sarajevo. However, she met Emir during the war and the two began a long romance that lasted, on and off, throughout the war and several years after. When Emir lost his job and wanted to move to New York, she objected vehemently, not wanting to leave his father alone. However, as future opportunities did not look too bright and she was 8 months pregnant with an unemployed husband, she went along with his decision. Although she misses her father and Bosnia terribly, she thinks her place is with Emir and their children now. She stays home taking care of her two little kids, one 4, the other only a few months old, and learning English by watching TV.

The couple live relatively isolated lives in New York, interacting mostly with a few close Bosnian friends.

Alija, interviewed November 2003, age 25

Althought Alija "*tried as many ways as I could to get out of Bosnia*" during the war and after, including trying to convince his girlfriends of other ethnicities to marry him so that they could apply to refugee programs as a mixed couple, he was able to make it to the United States only in 2001, shortly before September 11. The son of a mixed couple himself (Muslim father, Serb mother), he spent the war years in Bosnia as a junior high student.

Like all the other young people from Bosnia, Alija had very difficult times during the war, especially in contrast to his life before the war when "had the thing going" with good grades in school, which pleased his parents and as a successful athlete which meant "a lot of girls." His older sister left for Sweden before the war for a college education. When the war started he followed her only to find out that he would have to stay in an orphanage until he was 18 and could stay with his sister. Devastated, he made it back to Bosnia after a scary trip in which he almost got killed. At several points in his interview, Alija repeated that while it was hard for him and his family to go through the war, it was even harder for his sister, who had not heard from them for months at a time while receiving all the news about atrocities going on in Bosnia. I wondered if he was defending her preemptively against accusations of abandoning her family during the war.

Alija had a witty way of talking about his war experiences -- typical Balkan sarcasm. Later, he interrupted his education to work for the international community doing humanitarian and legal work in Bosnia. Starting to work at such a young age and quitting his studies upset his parents and relatives; however, they were unable to exert strong pressure on him to go back to school in the uncertain conditions of post-war Bosnia. Eventually, he found his current job as computer specialist for an international NGO and came to New York. At the time of the interview, he was working full-time and attending college at nights and on Saturdays, leaving only Sunday for himself. In his busy schedule, he still managed to have an American girlfriend whom I met

Armin was keeping in close contact with his friends in Bosnia because he was thinking of eventually going back to the area since "*the Mediterranean is the ideal place to live*."

However, he thought he might do this after getting better things for himself here, as he still felt bitter about his life being shattered at such a young age by homeland politics

> "Although I might have felt that I should have stayed and be a patriot in my country and rebuild the country… I felt, you know, "forget it!" Cause the people who started the war, you know, they got richer. And people who didn't want war to happen become poor. So, why would I now stay there and build that country, you know, waste my life. I only have one life, and it's very short, I might as well live it."

The last time I saw him in June 2005 at a community event, he was still in New York and not thinking of going back yet.

Vesna, interviewed November 2003, age 27

I was put in contact with Vesna by Sanja. She was one of the very few friends of Sanja's who replied to my message expressing her interest in participating in my study. We decided to meet briefly before we had a formal interview to get to know each other and to talk more about the details of my research. I learned in that first meeting that no meeting could be brief with Vesna: She is a talker. She likes telling stories with all the details and because her mind is racing while talking, one detail reminds her of a whole other story and she ends up telling them all as they come to her mind. It is exhausting to listen to her at first because you have to keep up with her free-associating. After a while, you get used to her style and start distinguishing the original story from what it reminds her of.

After that first meeting and an almost 3-hour interview (of which only two hours were recorded because I did not think I would need more tapes!) a week later, we met many more times. She helped me develop my questionnaire and do translations to and from Serbian/Croatian/Bosnian. We spent a lot of time together working on my project. I cannot say we were friends, as this project was the reason and the extent of our relationship, but I did like her.

Vesna is a graduate student in theatre where she landed after studying math and psychology. She has a master's degree in dramaturgy. She also performs at a women's theatre with a mostly gay repertoire. In addition, she teaches part-time at a public college. She has a lot on her plate but she is very hardworking and responsible and from what I saw when we were working together. She is a bit of a perfectionist.

Vesna is from a mixed marriage of a Serbian mother and a Bosnian Muslim father who met in medical school in Serbia. After her father finished medical school (her mother never did) when Vesna was 6, they moved to a village nearby Tuzla in Bosnia where the father found a permanent job.

In Serbia, the family lived with Vesna's maternal grandmother who lived in a village near Belgrade. Vesna loved her life in Serbia and missed it a lot when they moved to her father's village near Tuzla to live with his parents, and then to their own apartment in Tuzla which she described as an industrial city with a small town mentality. Vesna found the people more conservative and elitist (the mother of one of her boyfriends did not find her respectable enough to be with her son "which was funny because her son was doing

drugs and everything and I was being just… crazy!"), and the city much more limited in its cultural offerings than the more cosmopolitan Belgrade.

After that, other than the time they moved back to Belgrade for her father's graduate studies, Vesna lived in Bosnia until she left for the United States The problems between her parents were exacerbated during the war, and eventually they got divorced. Verna stayed in Tuzla with her mother. In her interview she described several incidents of discrimination against her mother and herself in war-time Bosnia. She eventually decided that she had no future in Bosnia, and she applied for refugee status. She was denied because, she thought, she "didn't cry enough." Finally, she made it to the United States on a student visa. At the time of our interview she was waiting for her green card.

Emira, interviewed December 2003, age 23

Emira came to the United States in 1996 as a high-school student on an education exchange program, and stayed with an American family in her first few years. Because she was a Muslim, the program administrators placed her with a Muslim American family whom she found to be too conservative and holding a different worldview. Later she was placed with another family.

Emira spent the war years with her family in Bosnia. She frequently visited and kept in touch with her friends there after she moved to the United States and while she was living in Europe for shorter periods. Her family now lives in Croatia and Emira was planning to move to Europe (but not to Croatia or Bosnia) sometime in the future to be closer to her family.

When I interviewed her, she was fresh out of college and working in a small business in New York "learning a lot." Even though she worked for the Bosnian community and international humanitarian organizations, she was very happy to be learning the business, doing something very different that was not related to war or politics to see "what else am I about?" because she felt she got "comsumed by politics" at a very young age. When I saw her about 18 months later at a community event, however, she was back working for a humanitarian organization.

Dijana, interviewed May 2004, age 34

Dijana is a Muslim refugee from Bosna Gradiska, a Serb-majority small town in northern Bosnia which is now part of Bosnian Serb Republic. She was a student in the University of Zagreb, Croatia, when the war started and lost contact with her family. Further, all of a sudden she became a "foreign student" in Croatia as the country seceded from Yugoslavia. She went through many hardships during the war including malnutrition caused by poverty; hiding from the dormitory staff who would have put her ou had they found out she was staying there; staying in refugee camps with her father, a doctor who lost his job after having been accused of making Bosnian Serb women sterile, her mother in wheelchair because of a stroke she had when Dijana was younger, and her grandmother; and witnessing the everyday violence in her hometown during her visits.

Dijana came to New York after she was almost done with her undergraduate degree. She had only four exams to complete when foreign students in Croatia were asked to pay 2000 (German) Marks as tuition. As nobody had that kind of money in war times, Dijana began an activist group that contacted the local authorities and finally Open Society of Soros, which paid tuition for everybody who wanted to be helped. By that time, she got in contact with an educational initiative for Bosnian university students that arranged her arrival to the United States, and she finished her degree at a private college in New York. At the time of our interview she was doing in a Ph.D. in Global Affairs, and working as an administrator at a prestigious university. She was also in the process of applying for immigrant status in Canada because she did not want to live in the United States any longer.

As a Global Affairs major, Dijana was very aware of all the complex reasons behind the breakup of Yugoslavia and the Bosnian war, and very willing to talk about them all. She was disappointed about the way justice was being implemented in Bosnia and The Hague and she had many stories about that. She was an outspoken and very straightforward woman who did not try to sugarcoat her criticisms or opinions, as when she told me that 90% of Bosnian folk songs are about swearing to Turks.

APPENDIX B
QUESTIONNAIRE

Instructions

Thank you for participating in my study. This study is investigating how refugees and immigrants from Bosnia and Hercegovina remember the war and how they relate to other Bosnians from different ethnic backgrounds. This booklet contains questions about your ethnic identity, your memories and understanding of the war, and your attitudes toward members of different ethnic groups from Bosnia and Hercegovina. Please respond to all questions honestly. There are no right or wrong answers. I just want to learn what you really think about these issues. If you have suggestions and/or comments about the questionnaire or the study, please write them on the space provided in the last page. Thank you again for helping me in this study.

People come from a lot of different countries and cultures, and there are many different words to describe the different backgrounds or ethnic groups that people come from. The following questions are about your ethnicity or your ethnic group and how you feel about it or react to it.

1. Please fill in:

In terms of ethnic group, I consider myself to be

_____

2. Use the numbers given below to indicate how much you agree or disagree with each statement.

1: Strongly disagree **2: Disagree** **3: Agree** **4: Strongly agree**

I have spent time trying to find out more about my own ethnic group, such as its history, traditions, and customs. _____

I am active in organizations or social groups that include mostly members of my own ethnic group. _____

I have a clear sense of my ethnic background and what it means for me. _____

I think a lot about how my life will be affected by my ethnic group membership. _____

I am happy that I am a member of the group I belong to. _____

I have a strong sense of belonging to my own ethnic group. _____

I understand pretty well what my own ethnic group membership means to me, in terms of how to relate to my own group and other groups. _____

In order to learn more about my ethnic background, I have often talked to other people about my ethnic group. _____

I have a lot of pride in my ethnic group and its accomplishments. _____

I participate in cultural practices of my own group, such as special food, music, or customs _____

I feel a strong attachment towards my own ethnic group. _____

I feel good about my cultural or ethnic background. _____

3. Please indicate to what extent you consider yourself to be (for each group, circle the number that best represents your opinion).

	Not at all	a little	To some extent	To a great extent	Completely
Yugoslavian	1	2	3	4	5
Bosnian	1	2	3	4	5
Muslim	1	2	3	4	5
Croat	1	2	3	4	5
Serb	1	2	3	4	5
American	1	2	3	4	5

4. If you had to pick one of the categories below to describe yourself, which one would you pick? (check one)

____ Yugoslavian
____ Bosnian
____ Muslim
____ Croat
____ Serb
____ American
____ Other: ……

EXPLANATIONS FOR THE WAR

People have different opinions about the causes of the Bosnian war. The following questions are about how YOU interpret the Bosnian war.

1. Please explain briefly why you think Bosnian war happened.

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

2. In your opinion, what percentage of responsibility did each of the ethnic groups from Bosnia below have for starting the war? (The 4 percentages should add up to 100)

Muslims	Serbs	Croats	Others (specify:…….)
____ %	_____ %	_____%	_____%

3. To what extent do you think each of the groups below were involved in the crimes committed during the war? Please circle a number on the scale below for each group.

	Not involved at all	Only a little bit involved	Involved to some extent	Involved to a great extent	Completely involved
Bosnian Muslims	1	2	3	4	5
Bosnian Serbs	1	2	3	4	5
Bosnian Croats	1	2	3	4	5
Others (specify:	1	2	3	4	5

…….)

Below are excerpts from interviews done with two Bosnian immigrants. Please read each excerpt carefully and answer the questions following each excerpt using the scales provided.

Interview 1

"Before the war in Bosnia we lived happily together. I never thought about the ethnicity or religion of my friends or neighbors. I didn't know who was what. That was not important. We were all Bosnians. We celebrated all religious holidays, that's how we used to live. Once the war started, we were all stuck in that together. Our friends from different ethnicities helped us survive the war and leave the country. Bosnia was a multi-ethnic society. It should have stayed that way".

Please indicate **how similar** this person's experience is to each of the following:

	Not similar at all	Only a little similar	Somewhat similar	Very similar	Almost the same
The experience of Bosnians in general	1	2	3	4	5
The experience of Bosnians that you know (friends, relatives, neighbors)	1	2	3	4	5
Your own experience	1	2	3	4	5

Interview 2

"Although different people lived together in Bosnia, we sometimes suspected that the other groups were planning things against us. Elderly in my family used to tell us stories about previous wars in Bosnia and how the other groups attacked us. I think we were always afraid that it would happen again. We knew that we had to separate. Once the war started our friends and neighbors from other groups changed their behavior toward us completely. They were no longer our friends. My neighbor lives in my house now."

Please indicate **how similar** this person's experience is to each of the following:

	Not similar at all	Only a little similar	Somewhat similar	Very similar	Almost the same
The experience of Bosnians in general	1	2	3	4	5
The experience of Bosnians that you know (friends, relatives, neighbors)	1	2	3	4	5
Your own experience	1	2	3	4	5

ATTITUDES TOWARD OTHER GROUPS

The following questions deal with your contact with members of other ethnic groups from Bosnia who are in the U.S. now. Please indicate to what extent you agree with each of the sentences using the scale provided (Circle the number that indicates your level of agreement).

I invite to my place…

	Totally disagree	Disagree	Don't know	Agree	Totally agree
Bosnian Croats	1	2	3	4	5
Bosnian Serbs	1	2	3	4	5
Bosnian Muslims	1	2	3	4	5

I have close friends among…

	Totally disagree	Disagree	Don't know	Agree	Totally agree
Bosnian Croats	1	2	3	4	5
Bosnian Serbs	1	2	3	4	5
Bosnian Muslims	1	2	3	4	5

I date/have dated…

	Totally disagree	Disagree	Don't know	Agree	Totally agree
Bosnian Croats	1	2	3	4	5
Bosnian Serbs	1	2	3	4	5
Bosnian Muslims	1	2	3	4	5

I have family member(s) who married

	Totally disagree	Disagree	Don't know	Agree	Totally agree
Bosnian Croats	1	2	3	4	5
Bosnian Serbs	1	2	3	4	5
Bosnian Muslims	1	2	3	4	5

I married/can marry a

	Totally disagree	Disagree	Don't know	Agree	Totally agree
Bosnian Croat	1	2	3	4	5
Bosnian Serb	1	2	3	4	5
Bosnian Muslim	1	2	3	4	5

Below are some pictorial representations of how you might be viewing the relations of ethnic groups from Bosnia. Each circle represents an ethnic group from Bosnia. They may be closely related to each other or widely apart. Please choose the picture that best represents your view of the relationship between groups. (Choose only one by circling the number next to the drawing).

1.



2.



3.



4.



5.



6.



Below are three feeling thermometers, one for each of the ethnic groups from Bosnia. Please indicate how warm your feelings for each of the groups are by circling a number on the thermometer.

Bosnian Serbs



Bosnian Muslims



Bosnian Croats



SOCIAL CONTACTS IN THE U.S.

We are interested in learning about your social contacts in the U.S. The following questions are about your friends, neighbors, workmates, and the organizations that you may be involved in.

1. Approximately what % of your friends in the U.S. is from Bosnia? (circle one percentage)

10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

2. Approximately what % of your neighbors in the U.S. is from Bosnia? (circle one percentage)

10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

3. Approximately what % of your workmates in the U.S. is from Bosnia? (circle one percentage)

10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

4. How many of your Bosnian friends in the U.S. belong to each of these groups? (give an approximate number)

Bosnian Serbs	Bosnian Muslims	Bosnian Croats
____	_____	_____

5. How many of your Bosnian neighbors in the U.S. belong to each of these groups? (give an approximate number)

Bosnian Serbs	Bosnian Muslims	Bosnian Croats
____	_____	_____

6. How many of your Bosnian workmates in the U.S. belong to each of these groups? (give an approximate number)

Bosnian Serbs	Bosnian Muslims	Bosnian Croats
____	_____	_____

7. Are there Bosnian community organizations in your area?

Yes **No**

7a. If yes, are you a member?

Yes **No**

7b. If yes, what is name of the organization: _____

7c. If you are a member, how often do you go to this organization?

___ Weekly
___ 2 – 3 times a month
___ Once a month
___ Several times a year
___ Once or twice a year

7d. What percent of your Bosnian friends also visits this organization? (circle one percentage)

10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

7e. What kind of activities do you engage in at this organization?

_____

_____

8. Were you sponsored by an organization in the U.S. as a refugee?

Yes **No**

8a. If yes, what is the name of the organization?

_____

8b. Are you still in contact with this organization? **Yes** **No**

8c. If yes, how often? (Check one)

___ Weekly ___ Several times a year

___ 2 – 3 times a month ___ Once or twice a year

___ Once a month

8d. How does this organization help you? (e.g. finding housing, job, financial aid, English classes, etc.)

_____

_____

9. When you first arrived in the U.S., did any other organization (church, refugee aid organizations, community organizations, etc.) help you adjust to life in the U.S., such as finding housing, job, financial aid, English classes, etc.?

Yes No

9a. If yes, what is the name of the organization **(if different than the above ones)**?

_____

9b. Are you still in contact with this organization? Yes No

9c. If yes, how often? (Check one)

___ Weekly ___ Several times a year

___ 2 – 3 times a month ___ Once or twice a year

___ Once a month

9d. How does this organization help you? (e.g.: finding housing, job, financial aid, English classes, etc.)

_____

_____

BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION

Please provide the following information about yourself as fully as possible

1. Your age _____

2. Your gender. (Circle one) **Male** **Female**

3. Were you born in Bosnia and Hercegovina? (Circle one) **Yes** **No**

4. **If born in B&H**, in what city/town/village were you born?

_____

5. **If <u>not</u> born in B&H**, where were you born? _____

6. **If <u>not</u> born in B&H**, when did you move to Bosnia? _____

7. **If <u>not</u> born in B&H**, which city/town/village did you move to in Bosnia?

_____

8. Your marital status (circle one):

Married Single Divorced Widowed

9. Your religious descent: (circle one)	Muslim	Orthodox Christian	Catholic	Jewish	Other (specify: ……..)
10. Your father's religious descent: (circle one)	Muslim	Orthodox Christian	Catholic	Jewish	Other (specify: ……..)
11. Your mother's religious descent (circle	Muslim	Orthodox Christian	Catholic	Jewish	Other (specify: ……..)
12. If you are married, your spouse's religious	Muslim	Orthodox Christian	Catholic	Jewish	Other (specify: ……..)
13. If you have kids, your children's religion	Muslim	Orthodox Christian	Catholic	Jewish	Other (specify: ……..)

14. In what year did you arrive in the U.S.? _____

15. What is the highest level of education you have completed? (Check one)

___ Graduate
___ College
___ Some college but did not graduate
___ High school
___ Finished elementary school
___ Completed 4 grades of elementary school
___ No schooling

16. In what country was this level of education completed?

_____

17. Present occupation:_____

18. Who else from your family is also resettled in the U.S.? Please list, e.g. father, cousin, aunt, etc.

_____

_____

_____

19. Which one of the following statements best describes you and/or your family's situation in the U.S.? (check only one)

___ I/we have a hard time time buying the things I/we need.

___ I/we have just enough money for buying the things I/we need.

___ I/we have no problem buying the things I/we need, and sometimes we can also buy special things.

___ I/we have enough money to buy pretty much anything we want.

20. Approximately how many times have you visited B&H since you moved to the U.S.? _____

21. If you visit, where do you most often stay? (Check all that apply)

___ Hotels/motels/guest houses, etc.
___ Friends
___ Relatives
___ Other: _____
___ Never/don't visit

22. What is the likelihood that you will someday return to live in B&H ? (Circle one number)

Very unlikely				Very likely
1	2	3	4	5

23. Where do you consider your home to be?

1 in B&H
2 in the U.S.
3 in both places
4 nowhere
5 somewhere else: _____

24. Do you or your family own property in B&H? Yes No

If yes, briefly describe the nature of the property

_____

25. How often do you send money and/or material goods to family and/or friends in B&H? (Check one)

___ Never
___ Once or twice a year
___ Several times a year
___ Once a month
___ 2 – 3 times a month
___ Weekly

26. How often do you listen to or watch Bosnian radio or television programming? (Check one).

___ Never
___ Once or twice a year
___ Several times a year
___ Once a month
___ 2 – 3 times a month
___ Weekly

27. How often do you read Bosnian newspapers and/or use the Internet to read them? (Check one).

___ Never
___ Once or twice a year
___ Several times a year
___ Once a month
___ 2 – 3 times a month
___ Weekly

28. How often are you in contact with friends and/or relatives in B&H? (Check one)

___ Never
___ Once or twice a year
___ Several times a year
___ Once a month
___ 2 – 3 times a month
___ Weekly

29. Did you come to the U.S. as a refugee? YES NO

30. **If not**, did you apply for being granted refugee status? YES NO

31. Please write, in a few words, what the word "refugee" means for you:

_____

_____

_____

THANK YOU FOR COMPLETING THIS QUESTIONNAIRE. YOUR HELP IS GREATLY APPRECIATED.

APPENDIX C

CODING SYSTEM FOR OPEN-ENDED "EXPLANATIONS FOR WAR' QUESTION.

(1) Examples for explanations that were almost purely external (4 and 5 on the scale), that is, external to Bosnian Serbs or Croats are:

> "Higher interests of big countries and unclear situation surrounding the WWII, the return of nationalism…."

This answer was coded as 5-purely external because no relevant outgroup was blamed.

> "At the end of the Cold War the outside tensions that help keep Yugoslavia stable dissolved, at the same time internal tensions based on the quest for power on behalf of the various national leaders grew stronger. The national leaders (Milosevic, Tudjman, Izzetbegovic primarily but others helped as well) with the help of media induced feelings of terror into the population by unilateral reporting of the events and by taking individual incidents and explaining them with "they are here to get us" logic."

This account was coded as 4, that is external but not purely because even though the respondent puts the blame mostly on national leaders and not the people, leaders are elected by the people. Hence there is some internality in the attribution.

> "I cannot give you a short answer to this. But if you want me to list all the complicated reasons, it should be something like this (not in order of importance, however): global restructuring of powers after the cold war, destruction of the east block, loss of a strategic geo-political position of Yugoslavia, economic crisis, death of Tito, "revival" (not really a revival, since it was always there, since the beginning of the modern project through socialism) of ethnonationalisms, media production of fears and insecurities…"

This answer was also coded as 4 because, although mostly mentioning external factors, the respondent acknowledges the existence of ethnonationalisms among the people, and thus attributes some responsibility to them.

(2) Purely internal attributions (1 and 2 on the scale) were answers that blamed Serbs or Croats for their aggressiveness and hatred of others. Below are some examples:

> "Centuries old hatred toward Muslims carried from generation to generation by Serbs with the glad help of Croats surfaced in Bosnia" (coded 1)
>
> "Serbs killed my father, mother and elder brother –they are guilty for everything." (coded 1)
>
> "There was a clash between two factions: One for secession of Bosnia (from ex-Yugoslavia) and the other for staying integral. Serbian side resorted to the old ways: 'root out Bosnjak so we acquire the territory for ourselves'" (coded as 2)

Finally, many answers provided a more balanced account of external and internal factors as causes of the war. An example is a relatively elaborate account by a Bosnian Muslim. This account also illustrates most of the different reasons given by the total sample.

> "The developed world, Europe and the U.S., has, in order to bring down "the communism" decided to support anyone in Yugoslavia, including the nationalists and the criminals like Milosevic and Tudjman. Slovenians declared independence, Croatians after them. Milosevic had expected this and had been for years using Goebels-like media propaganda to develop in people (especially rural uneducated) strong nationalism and hatred toward anything non-Serbian. In conjunction with this he "Serbianized" JNA [NB: Yugoslavian National Army] because he assumed he'd need it. At a specific moment he started the military machinery against Croatia and then against BiH. The only goal was the Greater Serbia, with the great sea, parts of Croatia and Bosnia. He used nationalism and religious hate only as a war opiate for the primitive part of the population, which was anyway for years thought various "Serbian heroic and hajduk's songs/poems." Then he spread that hatred with the help of money and criminals through the rest of the population. As a reaction and as the result of fear, nationalism is born in Croats, and even in Muslims (to much lesser extent). When it came to Bosnia, Milosevic and Tudjman played a little war, and then agreed about the split. Muslims? Well, kill, exile or Christianize. The developed world (USA, Europe) and Russia wrongly estimated that this would not last long, and with positive results: no more Muslims in Europe, and Europe and the USA kept their hands clean. This was a mistake. Muslim and other Bosnian patriot resistance was stronger than anyone expected. Unfortunately the crime was larger than anyone expected as well."

This account makes use of all kinds of attributions (external: the developed world, manipulation by Serbian and Croatian leaders; and internal: "the primitive part of the

population which anyway for years thought various "Serbian heroic and hajduk's songs/poems"), hence it was coded as 3.

A particular type of answer that was quite common in the sample was the reference to Serbian and/or Croatian national ideologies of Greater Serbia and/or Greater Croatia. These explanations could be seen as both internal and external. They are external because they could be seen as ideologies of Serbia and Croatia and not of Bosnian Serbs and Croats because they are Bosnian and not from Serbia or Croatia. Many Bosnians would make this distinction and blame Serbs from Serbia and not from Bosnia for the war. However, others would not differentiate strongly between these groups and would see Bosnian Croats' and Serbs' main attachments as being to Croatia and Serbia and not to Bosnia. Hence in coding these answers special attention was paid to whether the attribution was made to the countries of Serbia and/or Croatia, or to all Serbs or all Croats. When the answer suggested that the ideologies were shared by Bosnian Serbs and/or Croats it was coded as 2, that is, more internal.

> "Serbians and Bosnian Orthodox Christians wanted to create Greater Serbia. Croatians and Bosnian Catholics used that as an example to expand Mother Croatia, and the Western (Christian) world embraced it since they saw it as a chance to stop spreading of Muslims who lived in Bosnia."

When the attribution of these expansive ideologies seemed to be limited to Serbia and Croatia, or to nationalist leaders, it was coded as 3, that is, more towards the external end of the scale.

> "In Bosnia the war happened because of the bloodthirsty aggression of Serbia with a goal to commit genocide over the Muslims and to usurp the territories in order to create the Greater Serbia"

> "The war was a clear aggression with a goal to eradicate Bosniaks. Genocide was performed. One of the goals was to expand Serbia and Croatia to the territory of B&H".

It should be noted that in the majority of these explanations it was the Serbs/Serbians who were blamed rather than Croats/Croatians. Thus, it is expected that the effect of these attributions would be stronger on attitudes toward Serbs than toward Croats.

Four people did not answer the open-ended question, and another 8 were not coded because they were vague in terms of locating the cause of the war in an agent. For example, "Historical and religious intolerance" could not be coded because the respondent did not specify whose intolerance was at work. The following response was not coded for the same reason, but it illustrates how painfully confused some Bosnians still are about what happened:

> "For personal interests. In this war, everyone, and I mean everyone, is a loser. Everyone has a story and each story is different. Everyone thinks s/he is right. Maybe some day our children or grandchildren will know the truth".

APPENDIX D

GROUP COMPARISONS

The non-Muslim respondents for this analysis were younger than 35 years of age, mostly college educated in the U.S. (77.8%), and relatively well-off (67% picking the highest level as representing their current socioeconomic status). In order to create a matching Muslim sample, I picked Muslim respondents with similar qualifications. This yielded a selected Muslim subsample of 30 respondents. Other than size, the two groups differed in certain respects. First, most Muslims were refugees (23 out of 30) while only 1 out of 9 non-Muslims was. Second, while 6 out of 9 non-Muslims (66.6%) identified as atheist, only 2 of the 30 Muslims did so. Finally, while only 2 in the non-Muslim group chose an ethnic (e.g. Serb) rather than a national identity (e.g. Yugoslavian, Bosnian), none of the Muslims identified as Yugoslavian and only 30% identified as Bosnian. The rest identified as either Bosniak (30%), or Bosnian-Muslim or just Muslim (40%).

Hence, even after attempts to match the samples in terms of educational background, age, and socioeconomic status, differences in religious and ethnic identifications remained. As a second step for a better match between the non-Muslim and Muslim samples, I included only those Muslims who identified as “Bosnian” rather than “Bosnjak” or “Muslim” in the select sample. This exclusion resulted in a sample of 9 respondents, comparable in size to the non-Muslim sample. Table 11 shows results of oneway ANOVAs on differences between the groups on study variables. Only analyses with a maximum of two missing values are represented in this table. Notice that even after adjusting the sample in terms of Bosnian identification on the open-ended measure,

differences on the one-item of Bosnian identification question and on the MEIM scale were still significant. Any of these differences, however, should be interpreted cautiously due to very small sample size and the more heterogeneous nature of the non-Muslim sample. Had this group been composed of only Serbs or only Croats the results would have looked very different.

Table 11

Comparisons of select Muslim and non-Muslim samples (only analyses with no missing values included).

		Mean (SD)	*F*	*p*
Coexistence	Muslim	2.96 (1.14)	1.168	.296
	No Muslim	3.48 (0.88)		
Threat	Muslim	2.81 (0.91)	4.209	.06
	No Muslim	2.00 (0.76)		
MEIM	Muslim	3.05 (0.46)	4.660	.05
	No Muslim	2.48 (0.64)		
Bosnian	Muslim	4.11 (0.93)	4.612	.04
	No Muslim	2.88 (1.36)		
% resp Serb	Muslim	67.67 (22.11)	3.062	.10
	No Muslim	44.76 (30.38)		
% resp Muslim	Muslim	3.11 (6.58)	11.285	.005
	No Muslim	20.47 (13.70)		
% resp Croat	Muslim	19.78 (10.57)	0.061	.81
	No Muslim	21.19 (12.19)		
Serb crime	Muslim	4.89 (0.33)	6.070	.03
	No Muslim	4.38 (0.52)		
Muslim crime	Muslim	2.25 (0.71)	14.000	.002
	No Muslim	3.75 (0.89)		
Croat crime	Muslim	3.89 (0.78)	0.088	.77
	No Muslim	4.00 (0.76)		
Explanation war	Muslim	2.78 (1.09)	4.599	.05
	No Muslim	3.75 (0.71)		
Warm Serb	Muslim	24.44 (24.55)	9.082	.008
	No Muslim	60.00 (25.50)		
Warm Muslim	Muslim	81.11 (18.33)	3.801	.07
	No Muslim	61.11 (24.72)		
Warm Croat	Muslim	43.33 (21.21)	2.266	.15
	No Muslim	58.89 (22.61)		
CWSerb	Muslim	2.83 (1.16)	27.451	.000
	No Muslim	4.98 (0.07)		
CWCroat	Muslim	3.53 (1.23)	9.756	.007
	No Muslim	4.84 (0.31)		
CWMuslim	Muslim	4.75 (0.55)	0.049	.83
	No Muslim	4.80 (0.32)		

The differences between the two groups can be better seen by examining their responses to the open-ended question on the reasons of the war. In general, the non-Muslim group refrained from blaming any of the ethnic groups for the war. Instead, they attributed the reasons to more neutral causes such as "higher interests of big countries", the fall of communism, a declining Yugoslavian economy, and the death of Tito as a unifying authority. These explanations were followed by blame to political leaders, especially Milosevic, but also to who revived nationalism and manipulated the masses. A minority of responses included "rooted hatred" among Balkan nations, "unclear historical situation surrounding WWII" and intolerance in general as causes, but without pointing to any group. These accounts also acknowledged the multiplicity and complexity of causes. Below are two rather elaborate explanations by non-Muslim respondents:

> "At the end of the Cold War the outside tensions that help keep Yugoslavia stable dissolved. At the same time, internal tensions based on the quest for power on behalf of the various national leaders grew stronger. The national leaders (Milosevic, Tudjman, Izzetbegovic primarily but others helped as well) with the help of media induced feelings of terror into the population by unilateral reporting of the events and by taking individual incidents and explaining them with 'they are here to get us' logic"

> "Economic circumstances following Tito's death became more and more dire. From a political standpoint, it became complex to run a system that was based on one person holding a life-long presidency and not basing the economy on its own profits, but mainly loans from the World Bank to ptomote a sense of well-being and instill faith in the regime. On the other hand, you had 6 republics to deal with. Slovenia was the most economically advanced. Tito's regime was further supported by a strong policing system (if you disagreed with the way things were, you got to go to Goli Otok). Self-censorship was also very strong. All of this somehow managed to function while Tito was alive, but after his death it was difficult to maintain it and economy went into a disaster state with inflation skyrocketing. In this situation, it was really easy for politicians of all sides to manipulate people's ethnic identities as the sole identifier and make them believe that it was the "other" that was the reason for their poor economic standing. Hence the war. (if I have to be this short)."

Muslim respondents, although aware of all the complicated reasons, tended to attribute the war to mostly Serbian and/or Croatian ideology, "Serbian desire for power" and a general hostility toward Islam and Muslims. Sixteen out of 27 responses stressed these causes.

> "Serbians and Bosnian Orthodox Christians wanted to create the Greater Serbia. Croats and Bosnian Catholics used that as an example to expand Mother Croatia and the Western (Christian) world embraced it since they saw it as a chance to stop spreading of Muslims who lived in Bosnia."

> "…A greed for land can be associated with Serbs. In my opinion, Serbian appetite for a larger territory, a better strategic position and political power were the major reasons for the Bosnian war."

In general, non-Muslim respondents emphasized more global and external factors in accounting for the war. They showed a tendency that Branscombe and her colleagues have observed in a number of studies (refs), that is, making external attributions for the negative historical behavior of their group. These respondents constructed a version of history that attributed responsibility in a more balanced way to all three groups. The reality, however, was not balanced. Muslims, as the main victims of the war, focused on hostility toward themselves and the intentions of the outgroups. Nadler and Liviatan (2004) identified two socio-emotional barriers to reconciliation: "a feeling of collective victimhood that motivates the ingroup to rectify the past offenses" and "a feeling of distrust which is the emotional outcome of years of conflict" (p. 218). Muslim respondents displayed both kinds of feelings.

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