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A RECONCEPTUALIZATION OF THE THEORETICAL
UNDERPINNINGS OF "THE INEVITABILITY OF
PATRIARCHY" AND A REINVESTIGATION OF THE
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE.

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A RECONCEPTUALIZATION OF
THE THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS
OF THE INEVITABILITY OF PATRIARCHY
AND A REINVESTIGATION OF
THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE

BY
STEVEN GOLDBERG

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1977

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PREFACE

It is in the nature of science that no scientific explanation ever attains truth (unless, of course, truth is defined as the furthest point that science has yet reached). Progress in science is measured by the increasingly close approximation of hypothesis to reality. Often this progress is attained by a honing of hypothesis permitting more accurate prediction of reality. Occasionally progress is manifested in an increase in predictive power that--while not more accurate--makes the correct predictions made previously plus new correct predictions.

A third type of scientific progress consists of a reconceptualization of an hypothesis such that new explanatory analyses of the mechanisms responsible for the hypothesized correlations permit greater comprehensibility, elegance, and fertility and less vulnerability to charges of ungroundability. It is such reconceptualization that this reformulation of my The Inevitability of Patriarchy¹ attempts to accomplish. As one might expect, a reconceptualization of this sort requires considerable empirical reinvestigation.

Readers familiar with Patriarchy will have no difficulty recognizing the theoretical elements that have

been recast or the newly investigated empirical areas. Other readers may find helpful a brief outline of the major differences between this dissertation and Patriarchy.

At their most basic, Patriarchy and the dissertation presented here argue that there are psychophysiological differences between males and females such that males are more strongly "motivated" towards hierarchical attainment and dominance in male-female relationships, that this differentiation is manifested in differences in male and female behavior, that the difference in behavior is observed by the population, and that all this gives direction to, and sets limits on, social possibility. In Patriarchy the psychophysiological differentiation was conceptualized as a difference in capacity. While that model is not, strictly speaking, incorrect, it does introduce confusion and the possibility of obfuscation unnecessarily. The chapter presented herein titled "The Differentiation of Dominance Tendency" (particularly the section on the iron and magnet analogy) and the chapter titled "Physiological Differentiation" avoid all such difficulties, while demonstrating that the argument presented here is translatable into whatever model the reader might favor (i.e., models speaking of "drive," "need," "capacity," "threshold," "ego strength," etc.).

The clarification engendered by the theoretical reconceptualization both made clear that a psychophysiological

analysis has wider empirical application than was apparent in Patriarchy and required considerable additional empirical investigation; this new material permeates this dissertation. Similarly, the section on the anthropological evidence has been greatly enlarged by consideration of societies not discussed in Patriarchy.

Finally, this dissertation permits a complete rewriting of Patriarchy. In retrospect, it is clear that much of Patriarchy bordered on the unreadable while most of the rest stole across the border. I believe that this dissertation is considerably more accessible.

Preface

Footnotes

¹Steven Goldberg, The Inevitability of Patriarchy (New York: William Morrow and Sons, 1973).

CHAPTER I

A QUESTION AND SOME GROUND RULES

The Question of Male and Female

Perhaps at the core of our certainty there are only questions. We can tolerate our lives, and our societies can endure, because we are rarely forced to encounter the uncertainty that underlies so many of our beliefs. But to acknowledge the unrest we feel when such uncertainty is exposed is not to prove that our beliefs were necessarily founded on incorrect assumptions. The introduction of doubt serves a powerful function, but it is one of raising questions, not of providing answers. That is the job of those for whom ideas are central to existence; if such people are rendered no less uncomfortable than anyone else when their most basic assumptions are challenged, at least they are forced to remember why society tolerates them at all. At this point they must leave the security of their esoteric studies and reconsider the questions that are integral not only to those studies but to the beliefs and practices of all mankind.

Until recently no one had even questioned the assumptions on which our conceptions of man and woman were based. Until recently, we tended to accept masculinity and femininity, and male and female functions, as somehow springing

from our male and female natures, and were satisfied to allow the strength of our beliefs to compensate for the depth of our ignorance. If for no other reason, the biologist, the anthropologist, the psychologist, and the sociologist are in debt to the new feminist movement. For if there is any single question at the center of all artistic and most scientific thought (to say nothing of our daily lives), it is this: what are men and women, and to what degree must male-female differences be manifested in societies' expectations, values, and institutions? It is to this question that I addressed myself and it is from the answer I found that the theory presented here has developed. It should be emphasized that when I refer to "feminists" or "environmentalists" I mean those who explain the sexually differentiated behaviors and institutions discussed in this book in primarily environmental terms and deny the central importance of the sexual psychophysiological differences emphasized here. In other contexts these terms are associated with other beliefs, and there are no doubt people who call themselves "feminists" or "environmentalists" and would not disagree with the thesis of this book; for example, the woman who agrees with what I write here while working to change sexually discriminatory laws might argue that she is a "feminist" who does not subscribe to the arguments I here attribute to the "feminist". Her use of the word is certainly as legitimate as mine, but it is irrelevant to the issues we discuss here.

Superiority and Inferiority

It seems that man has a penchant for perceiving differences in subjective terms. This is understandable, and perhaps necessary for family life, but it is the bane of science. The scientist may observe the attitudes of others in an attempt to explain them, but if he allows his own subjective attitudes to color his work, then it will be worthless. Therefore it is necessary to bear in mind throughout this book that at no point am I intimating that science can ever lead one to the general conclusion that one sex is superior or inferior to the other. It is as meaningless to say that one sex is superior to the other as it is to say that one society is superior to another, and for the same reason: a general judgment of inferiority has meaning only in the context of a subjective value system. It is not surprising that one's estimation of superiority will usually reflect one's sex or society, but for whatever reasons, some will view the other sex or another society as superior. In neither case are we dealing with science. We can, however, speak of superiority in specific areas. Men are superior at lifting heavy weights, while women are superior at singing the upper register. American society is superior to that of the Mbuti Pygmy in the ability to produce consumer goods, while Mbuti society is superior to American society in the ability to inculcate hunting skills in its members. Scientific objectivity is lost only if one says that men are superior in general or that the United States is superior in general, for to do this one must subjectively select a set of criteria.

Most men and women in every society realize this intuitively. Anthropologists have written at length about the areas in which women are unquestionably superior to men. It is through these abilities that the world's women have always fulfilled themselves, just as men have emphasized their singular abilities and identified with their manhood.

Indeed, while an essay on patriarchy must emphasize the factors that are emphasized here, and while societies would be patriarchal even if women were nothing more than less masculine men, the likelihood is overwhelming that feminine behavior and the institutions that are related to it are as inevitable as patriarchy and for the same reasons.

Possibly someone who wished to examine women's universal role of creator and keeper of society's emotional resources (rather than patriarchy and male dominance) could invoke a line of reasoning complementing that used in this dissertation. The author of such an examination could demonstrate that women will inevitably have the powers necessary for inculcating emotionality in the members of every society and, to a great extent, determining the very kind of people it is to produce.

Even if one limits oneself to the issue of "power" (in male-female and familial relationships), neither male dominance nor the other male characteristics we shall discuss necessarily imply that male behavior is more effective than female behavior. Although the factor that engenders political patriarchy does render impossible a political authority system not ruled by men (for reasons

that we shall examine), male dominance does not necessarily mean that males will achieve their goals more often than females in dyadic and familial relationships. (A dyadic relations is between two people--in this book a male and a female.) One could make an interesting case that, on a dyadic or familial level, women are more successful at utilizing feminine abilities to achieve their goals than men are at utilizing masculine abilities to achieve theirs. Indeed, the women of every society possess the emotional skills necessary to "get around" men and to "get their way," while acknowledging the authority of the male even on a dyadic level. However, a woman's feeling that she must "get around" a man (who is acknowledged by individual emotions and societal values to be dominant) is, as we shall see, a hallmark of male dominance. Some sociologists have defined power in these terms and have suggested that--even in societies and subcultures such as the Shtetl that maintain a high degree of male dominance--women are more powerful in familial and dyadic situations than the men, in whom authority is invested. The line of reasoning supporting this hypothesis would not necessarily conflict with any statement in this dissertation. An analysis of dyadic or familial groups which considers that "real" power is exercised through women's superior emotional powers is the virtual opposite of that put forward by environmentalists, behaviorists, and feminists. For such an analysis emphasizes the positive, powerengendering aspects

of feminity, and implies that the reduction in feminine behavior desired by the feminists would force women to deal with men on male terms which would inevitably lead to a reduction in women's real power. The feminist who denies the physiological basis of feminity and the likelihood that femininity is women's greatest strength for attaining dyadic or familial power is left with the conclusion that the women of every society have acted in a feminine way out of stupidity. I think not. Though an analysis which emphasized the informal, real power of feminity might take on Strindbergian overtones, it could proceed without theoretical contradiction or obvious factual inaccuracy. This cannot be said of the feminist line of reasoning, which we shall discuss.

I appreciate that those who define the qualities and roles associated with the male as somehow better than those associated with the female will find no solace in the inherent impossibility of the scientist ever declaring one sex superior to the other. I realize too that, because this dissertation concentrates on patriarchy and male dominance, anyone who reads it through feminist eyes will feel that the dissertation is biased in a male direction and will react against it. This is unavoidable because we are focusing on the very areas which have been emphasized by the feminists. If a woman feels that it is better to be relatively tall and muscular than relatively short and elastic, she will ignore the evidence presented by the physiologist who demonstrates that height and muscularity will be associated with the man

whether she likes it or not. The feminist can argue that when a society is endangered the women "get" the men to risk their lives while they remain safely at home, and she can argue that the women's longevity is superior to the male's dominance. But if she believes that it is preferable to have her sex associated with authority and leadership rather than with the creation of life, then she is doomed to perpetual disappointment. To make judgment of what is good and what is bad, what should be and what should not be, is outside the realm of science; science can never validate or invalidate subjective appraisals. Science speaks only of what is.

CHAPTER II

ANTHROPOLOGY AND THE LIMITS OF SOCIAL VARIATION

Mode of Investigation

Reassessing formerly unquestioned assumptions is a challenge to any one discipline's modes of inquiry; the analytic methods which have been developed to investigate successfully one large area of reality are often taxed when forced to deal with another. This applies to some extent when the sociologist tries to investigate the nature of patriarchy and male dominance, and is faced with the strong possibility that these may be inevitable social manifestations of human physiology. For in nearly all his investigations the sociologist deals with social behavior that falls within the limits of biological possibility, and he is rarely forced to examine the limits of human possibility or the forces that set these limits. In his study of political behavior, for example, he has always assumed that leadership in any society will be male dominated, and has concentrated on developing the methods of inquiry necessary for investigation within that theoretical framework. As a result, in our investigation of patriarchy, we will have to use the methods and findings of a number of disciplines.

It is important to emphasize that this is not a sociological, anthropological, or economic analysis per se. It is a theory which tries to show the limitations which are imposed on social possibility, and the impossibility of a society's failing to conform its institutions to these limitations. Within these limitations, considerable variation is possible. A sociological, anthropological, or economic analysis would attempt to describe and explain the configurations of factors that differ from one society to another in order to discover the differing etiologies of differing institutions in terms of methods of socialization, the social meanings attached to behavior by individuals, economic necessities, the structures of various systems within the various social systems and the connections between them, and all the other considerations which are the concern of the sociologist, the anthropologist, and the economist. The theory presented here is important to these kinds of analysis in that--if this theory of limits is correct--any analysis that hypothesizes elements that fall outside the limits of possibility described here, or implies that such elements could exist in a real society, would have to be wrong. Since every society that has ever existed comes within the limits described by this theory, no analysis of any particular society is demonstrated to be incorrect by this theory. Furthermore, if the theory presented here is correct it demonstrates that no theoretical analysis that limits itself to the sociological,

cultural and anthropological, or economic level can ever hope to explain the causation of the behavior and institutions we shall discuss.

Patriarchy Defined

The definitions of patriarchy and male dominance used in this book, while similar to the orthodox anthropological definitions, mean no more than is stated here. Patriarchy is any system of organization (political, economic, industrial, financial, religious, or social) in which the overwhelming number of upper positions in hierarchies are occupied by males. Patriarchy refers only to suprafamilial levels or organization: authority in familial and dyadic relations is a manifestation of the psychophysiological reality that is referred to in this book as male dominance.

In order to avoid the confusion that could arise from the fact that the terms patriarchy and matriarchy are used in a number of ways, it is necessary to enumerate the alternative definitions. None of these is inherently superior to the others, though agreement would be convenient. The reader is free to favor any of the alternative pairs of definitions as long as he appreciates that the terms will then be irrelevant to this book, so he will be forced to appropriate to invent other terms to substitute for patriarchy and matriarchy as I use the terms. The point is that authority and leadership are, and always have been, associated with the male in every society, and I refer to this when I say that patriarchy is universal and that there has never been a matriarchy.

The British and some American anthropologist use the terms patriarchate and matriarchate where I use the terms patriarchy and matriarchy, and all agree that there has never been a matriarchate. They use patriarchy and matriarchy to refer to lineage and residence, a matrarchy being a society that is both matrilineal and matrilocal. It is this usage, combined with the mistaken belief that there have been prehistoric matriarchies and Amazonian societies (discussed below), which accounts for the widespread misconception that there have been societies in which suprafamilial authority was not associated with the male. In matrilineal-matrilocal societies, as in all others, authority is associated with the male even within the family, though occasionally with the mother's brother, rather than with the father.

Sociologists often use patriarchy and matriarchy to refer to various aspects of familial authority. As we shall see, the ethnographic evidence demonstrates that, even if we use the terms in this sense, there has never been a matriarchy. The American press occasionally uses the term black matriarchy to describe a situation in which certain economic factors (such as welfare regulations that prohibit welfare for families in which the male lives in the household) force a minority of black women to assume authority in the home. This situation is not matriarchy in the sense we use the term (black political and religious leaders are nearly always male) nor is it even female

familial dominance the term female dominance would have meaning only if the family included a male adult but vested authority in the female. Obviously if there is no male in the household, authority will have to be vested in a female. The question we are dealing with is why no society or group anywhere ever associates authority with a female when an equivalent male is available. Finally, the term gynecocracy has occasionally been used to describe an (imaginary) society in which government is run by women.

The Universality of Patriarchy

Patriarchy is universal. For all the variety different societies have demonstrated in developing different types of political, economic, religious, and social systems, all anthropologists agree that there has never been a society which failed to associate hierarchical authority and leadership in these areas with men. Indeed, of all social institutions there is probably none whose universality is so totally agreed upon. Although most anthropologists consider the family, marriage, and the incest taboo universal--and believe that, while it is easy to imagine societies without one or more of these institutions, no real society could survive without them--with each of these institutions they will debate problems of definition and borderline cases. There is not, nor has there ever been, any society that even remotely failed to associate authority and leadership in suprafamilial areas with the male.

There have, of course, been queens in a small number of societies, but the existence of patriarchy even in such

societies is demonstrated by the fact that--as in England--queens rule only when there is no equivalent man available (just as there have been a few societies in which the royal families have ignored their societies' incest taboos in order to maintain the purity of the blood line). There have been "Queen Mothers" in a few African societies such as the Lovedu (see the Appendix), but, while these had a measure of autonomy denied other women in their societies and authority in secondary areas, in every case they were subordinate to a male king or chief in whom the society vested the highest authority. Again, there have been societies in which there were hierarchies from which men were excluded, but in every case these were subordinate to exclusively male hierarchies.² There have even been three cases of women attaining the highest positions of authority in democracies (Israel, India and Ceylon), though in the latter two instances the woman was the daughter and the widow, respectively, of a revered male leader and it is hardly likely that either would have otherwise attained power. The point of importance, however, is that even in such societies authority is still overwhelmingly associated with the male and the overwhelming number of upper hierarchial positions are still occupied by males. In Israel, for example, the other eighteen ministerial positions were filled by men, over ninety per cent of the Parliament is male, and the proportion of men at each level of the hierarchies is roughly the same as it is in the United States, Sweden, Cuba, Communist China,

and the Soviet Union. We shall examine patriarchy in these modern societies, but first it is necessary to discuss non-modern societies and the misconceptions that have given rise to the commonly held, but erroneous, belief that there have been non-patriarchal primitive and pre-industrial societies.

The Evolutionary Fallacy

Before this century the dearth of ethnographic studies enabled some theorists to maintain that all societies developed along a single evolutionary line. This belief in universal societal evolution, particularly when it confused the economic functions of an institution with its cause, made at least vaguely credible the argument that those institutions which had existed "all through history" owed their existence to economic and temporary social necessities and that they would decay when economic and technological change rendered them anachronistic. Some evolutionary theory could not pass even the test of internal logicity. For example, theories postulating that before males learned of their biological importance to conception there was a "matriarchal stage" of history were unable to explain what enabled men to "take over" once they had learned about their own biological role. Since women automatically understand their own importance, the males' discovery of the mechanisms of conception should have enabled them merely to share power equally if knowledge of biological role had been the determining factor. However, while there seems to be no reason

for believing that paternity is relevant to patriarchy once one has been forced to invoke some other factor, it must be admitted that one could, logically if not credibly, argue that knowledge of biological importance is a precondition for the attainment of power, but that once this has been met then some other factor--such as physical strength--becomes the determining factor. As long as there was little relevant ethnographic data, the question of evolution was forced to remain on this theoretical level. Evolutionary theory was not doomed until ethnographic studies demonstrated that every institution was either, like slavery, absent from some societies and therefore not evolutionarily necessary (unless one presupposes an unrecorded earlier stage in which every institution occurred in every society--in which case evolutionary theory is not theory, but metaphysics) or, if universal, like patriarchy, was found even when its cause was absent. The ethnographers found a number of societies in which males did not know of their biological importance, yet these societies were as patriarchal as all others. This demonstrates beyond question that knowledge of paternity has nothing to do with patriarchy.

There are other problems with social evolutionary theory: unless one is merely attempting to explain a particular characteristic, evolutionary theory is by its very nature ethnocentric and often racist. Deciding which factors constitute advancement is subjective--with the

possible exception of the factor of survival, in which case all surviving societies are equal.² It is not accidental that few evolutionary theorists saw any society but their own as the most advanced. Perhaps one could defend this by saying that the ability to propose evolutionary theory is a measure of advancement, but this criterion is most obviously based in the value system of the theorist. Lastly, it should be noted that the power of matriarchal social evolutionary theory to convince is not increased when we observe that primates demonstrate behavior that seems not unlike that which we refer to as male dominance, and that certain institutions have resisted every political attempt to change them and every theoretical attempt to explain their etiologies in terms of environment and economic function.

The "Prehistoric Matriarchies,"
the "Amazons," and Engels

Likewise, theories that hypothesized a matriarchal form of society at "an earlier stage of history" made a certain, if tortuous, sense until the findings of the past fifty years failed to uncover a single shred of evidence that such matriarchies had ever existed, and demonstrated the inability of all such theories to deal with reality. One constructs imaginary elements only when such an hypothesis helps to explain an observed reality better. For example, it made sense to hypothesize a male "aggressive instinct" before the discovery of the male hormone because this made it possible to explain an observed reality (men

rule in every society) in a way that was more plausible and logically tighter than any theory that had preceded³ it. There is no reason whatsoever for hypothesizing the existence of an as yet undiscovered matriarchy. Observation of empirical reality not only gives no reason to construct an hypothesis, but indicates with virtual certainty that it would be incorrect. I have consulted the original ethnographic materials on every society I have ever seen associated with matriarchy, female dominance, or the association of high-status, non-maternal roles with women. Like the authors of the compilations cited in this chapter, I have been unable to find one which represents any of these (see the Appendix). But it must be admitted that one cannot prove that matriarchy or anything else has never existed. If one wants to show that there has never been a centaur one can refer to the evidence of physiology and evolution to indicate the biological improbability of its ever having existed and demonstrate that the evidence to the contrary is worthless. If the reader insists on maintaining a belief in a once-existent matriarchical society, all we can do is demand evidence more convincing than his desire that there should have been one.

For the reasons we have discussed it is not surprising that, until their recent resurrection by feminists, the totally discredited matriarchal and evolutionary theories of Lafitau, Ward, Bachofen, McLennan, and Briffault (and a host of popularizations of their theories by Helen Diner

and others) had long been deservedly forgotten. There is no reason to detail yet once again the innumerable factual errors and logical fallacies particular to each of these works; suffice it to say that they all share the contradictions and lack of empirical evidence we have discussed, and to reiterate Panos Bardis' observation that ". . . these theories were soon rejected by all social scientists."⁴

This is not to say that matriarchal myths and legends have not served valid exaggerative and metaphorical purposes for writers from Homer, Diodorus, Herodotus, and Plutarch to Robert Graves. As literary devices they have often been used with devastating effect to ridicule men in societies in which male dominance was less institutionalized than in that of the authors. As myths they may well reflect the most basic male fears--every infant does indeed live in a matriarchy. As symbols they represent the matrilineal society in which the woman does "carry the throne" that will hold succeeding generations of men. But as anthropological descriptions of real societies they are nonsense. When such descriptions are not so metaphysical as to be unfalsifiable, they prove, without exception, to be totally fantastical.

These myths and legends provide the "evidence" advanced in a number of books that imply the former existence of matriarchies for the (usually unstated) purpose of casting doubt on any physiological explanation of sexual differentiation in social institutions.⁵ The

authors of these books rarely, of course, name a society that was not patriarchal or whose institutions did not conform to male dominance. They are aware that when they do, mere reference to any history book, to say nothing of the original source materials which these authors avoid as if they were contaminated, would immediately demonstrate that the society in question was ruled by men, that expectations and institutions conformed to male dominance, and that males occupied the high-status, non-maternal roles. Instead these authors advance evidence so selective that it would be dishonest were it not so ineptly handled. A marriage contract from one society is advanced along with a female holiday from a second, and a goddess from a third. One could equally well use myths to prove the existence of a society of centaurs. With this approach one need not even select evidence from more than one society; the story of Jack and the Beanstalk and the celebration of Mother's Day would be enough to "prove" that America was a society ruled by giant women.

Yet more serious than their totally uncritical mixtures of myth and isolated facts about real societies is the fact that such books do not make even theoretical sense--which makes it unnecessary for us to demonstrate the inadequacy of the empirical evidence provided by each individual book. The arguments advanced are, often without the authors being aware of it, based on the three assumptions which are implicit in Engels' fallacious and

empirically refutable evolutionary theory: if any one of the three is incorrect, then Engels' analysis is incorrect. These assumptions are that matrilineality precedes and must precede patrilineality, that the transformation from matrilineality to patrilineality is engendered by the advent of private property and class differentiation, and that the early stages of societal development are not merely matrilineal, but matriarchal. The matrilineality we find in various societies is alleged to be not only a residue of an earlier matrilineality, but of an earlier matriarchal stage. This matriarchal stage is seen by some as a reversal of patriarchy and by others as an equalitarian situation in which women received high status. We have seen that the first version is simply incorrect; there is no evidence that at any time there has ever been a society in which men did not rule, and there is great reason, as we shall see, to believe that none could have ever existed. The second version is not necessarily incorrect (so long as it merely asserts that maternal roles received high status and does not imply that the universals we discuss in this book were not present), but it is irrelevant to patriarchy, male dominance, and male occupation of high-status, non-maternal roles. As we shall see, it is true that certain matrilineal societies allow women very high status by giving very high status to roles that men are incapable of playing. This is of far greater significance to those who would put less emphasis on the female role than it is to our discussion

of institutions, to which the status given to female roles is irrelevant. The ideological component of this reasoning is illustrated by the fact that, rather than referring to a matrilineal society which at least gives women high status by giving their female roles high status, these authors continue to invoke Lewis Henry Morgan's Iroquois as a roughly equalitarian society despite the fact that, as we shall see, Morgan states that not only do the Iroquois prohibit women from ruling, but that they also consider them "servants."

Some of these authors have not even considered the ethnographic materials that are available; if they had, they would have seen the absurdity of looking to our antecedent societies for a matriarchy when none can be found among the thousands of societies to which we are not related and which are at "earlier stages of development" (whatever the yardstick) than those invoked and invented by these authors. They would not have even had to refer to the original ethnographic studies. George Murdock's definitive cross-cultural analysis, Social Structure,⁶ exposes Engels' three assumptions as not merely unjustified by the evidence, but as inarguably incorrect. Murdock demonstrates that there are a great many patrilineal societies for which there is no evidence that patrilineality was preceded by matrilineality; in other words even an evolutionary theory of lineage that does not imply the accompanying evolution of some second variable is refuted

by the evidence. More importantly, matrilineality is not dependent on any other variable; and such dependence gives meaning to Engels' evolutionary theory. Matrilineality is found in thriving societies with highly developed rights of private property, with elaborate stratification systems, with extensive political integration, and even with systems of feudal land tenure, as well as in societies in which these institutions are as minimally developed as possible. All of this can be said of patrilineality also. Most crucial, of course, is the fact that no change in any direction of any variable renders any society significantly less patriarchal than any other society.

The fact that none of the alleged Amazonian societies has ever existed has been demonstrated by a number of anthropologists,⁷ but it is none the less interesting to examine the internal logic of a report of the discovery of "the first Amazons" that appeared in a popular magazine.⁸ On the evidence of a few ideograms, a photographer developed a theory that an all-woman Lesbian society had existed long ago in the wilds of Brazil. It was supposed to have perpetuated itself by periodically raiding neighboring tribes, mating with captured males, and killing all the males and all male offspring. The theory is not taken seriously by any anthropologist, but let us for the moment imagine that this "society" did exist. If it is advanced as evidence for the possibility of a non-patriarchal society, certain questions arise. Why did these women have

to hide in caves? Why did they not merely attain positions of authority in the societies from which they came in the same manner as men have done in every society? More generally, we might ask all those who claim that there has ever been a matriarchy or an Amazonian society of any type why they cannot provide a single example from ethnographic evidence drawn from societies of virtually every conceivable type at virtually every conceivable line of development; if socialization explains why societies are patriarchal, there should be any number of societies in which leadership and authority are associated with women, and one should not have to invoke examples of non-patriarchal societies that exist only in myth and literature.⁹ (It is worthwhile emphasizing here that this dissertation is not concerned with either the rights given to women or the status accorded to maternal roles men are incapable of filling; discussed briefly in the section on cultural variation, these are subject to far greater variation than are patriarchy, male dominance, and male attainment.)

Patriarchy in Industrial
and "Revolutionary" Societies

Perhaps our emphasis on theory and on primitive societies has led the reader to doubt the relevance of all that has been said to modern industrial and "revolutionary" societies. Such doubts are easily dispelled if we examine political leadership in such societies.

In the United States there are no women senators: women constitute slightly more than one per cent of the majors of cities of 25,000 or more people, less than two per cent of the policy-makers in federal government, three per cent of the members of the House of Representatives, and five per cent of the members of the state legislatures.¹⁰

Whatever the alleged changes in our society's view of women, these have not been manifested in an increase in political power. For all the brave words and clenched fists, there are now fewer women in Congress than there were in 1962. I do not attach any particular significance to the decrease; the number of women in power is so small that it is doubtful that this fluctuation has any real meaning (though it is conceivable that a number of individuals who would not formerly have hesitated to vote for a woman candidate will hesitate once the focus is on women and the authority implicit in the leadership). In any case, there has certainly been no increase. There are still fewer women in positions of power and leadership in the financial and business world, unless one considers ownership (rather than executive power), where the hereditary nature of vast wealth enables some women to rank with the wealthiest men. This is somewhat comparable to land ownership in some matrilineal societies.

The political distribution of the sexes is no different in any other society. Even if we consider societies in which women constitute half of the labor force, or those

with an ideological commitment to sexual equalization in the hierarchies of authority, or those which have made sustained attempts to equalize sexual distribution in government, we find the same situation as in America. In Sweden all thirteen of the ministers with portfolio are men. In Cuba twenty of the twenty-one ministers and all fifteen members of the Political Bureau and the Secretariat of the Communist party are men. In Israel eighteen of the nineteen cabinet ministers are men and well over 90 per cent of the Parliament is male. In Communist China, which has been committed to equalization since the revolution, thirteen of the fourteen leaders of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, all seventeen members of the State Council, and all sixty-seven heads of the General Ministries are men; the only exception is the widow of Mao Tse-tung. In the Soviet Union, where even the theories of biology tend to deny the relevance of biology to behavior, 96.9 per cent of the members of the Central Committee are men.¹¹ The failures of the kibbutzim and every other Utopian attempt to alter sex-role differentiation in this area merely reinforces the conclusions indicated here.¹²

No doubt one can devise separate and different explanations for each of these societies' failure to deviate from the near total male occupation of positions of political authority. Each explanation could be made in terms of the particular social values and economic conditions

of the society whose failure is being explained and in terms of the residual strength of its "patriarchal" values (values common to every society) rather than in terms of an inevitable manifestation of biological reality. Let us disregard the fact that viewing each society only in its specific terms tends to demonstrate not why equalization has not been achieved, but why there has been any increase at all in the number of women in positions of authority, when there was any increase at all.¹³ A far more important point is that anyone who attempts to explain these failures in this manner is in the same position as someone who tries to explain patriarchy in four thousand different societies with an equal number of different explanations, each in terms particular to that society rather than in terms which could explain all four thousand cases. As we shall see, this is absurd even if theoretically defensible. The failure of these societies to alter political patriarchy does not of course, "prove" that patriarchy is inevitable any more than the universality of patriarchy "proves" it. I have mentioned the failures of these disparate societies, with very different economic systems, value systems, and traditions, only as presumptive evidence--very strong presumptive evidence, I believe--that there is a physiological factor that renders a non-patriarchal society impossible to achieve.

Male Dominance Defined

Up to now we have been discussing patriarchy, a reality that is easily defined and revealed in terms of the percentages of males in dominant positions in hierarchies. Because patriarchy can be so defined and revealed, the definition need not include the psychophysiological sexual differentiation of which it is a manifestation. Male dominance, the second societally universal reality that this work attempts to explain, is somewhat more difficult to define and reveal because the institutional manifestation of the psychophysiological differentiation relevant to male dominance is only almost universal, rather than universal. The psychophysiological differentiation itself is universal, and can be demonstrated by the fact that every society recognizes the differentiation informally in its own expressions, proverbs, songs, stories, and the like. But the formal manifestation of this differentiation is not quite universal, so we must define male dominance in terms of the differentiation itself.

Whereas patriarchy refers to hierarchical realities, male dominance refers to male-female encounters and relationships, to the feeling acknowledged by the emotions of both men and women that general authority in dyadic and familial relationships, in whatever terms a particular society defines authority, ultimately resides in the male. I realize that this is not the most gracious way of defining male dominance, but it is the most accurate. As

with patriarchy, male dominance is universal; no society has ever failed to conform its expectations of men and women, and the social roles relevant to these expectations, to the feeling of men and women that it is the male who "takes the lead."¹⁴

In all but a very few societies, evidence of male dominance is apparent from the customs of deference so well documented by the anthropologists; there is no difficulty in discussing dominance in terms of its manifestation in customs rather than the more abstract emotions that underpin these customs. It is only important to emphasize that dominance and deference refer not to the customs but to the feelings when one is examining the ten or twelve "chivalrous" societies, in which women seem to receive deference, or American society, in which customs of deference are minimal when compared to those of virtually any other society. Examination of the ethnographic materials on these "chivalrous" societies demonstrates that chivalrous male deference is seen in these societies as a complement to feminine fragility rather than as a reversal of male dominance. In American society, for example, a man's holding a door for a woman symbolizes masculine strength rather than female authority; a man's walking nearer to the curb acknowledges the male's feeling that the woman is to be protected rather than the female's dominance. Such chivalrous male deference is, clearly, not the equivalent of the acknowledgment of authority that female deference in non-chivalrous societies represents.

We can observe the feelings of male dominance most clearly during an argument, because it is in times of conflict that the emotional acknowledgment of male authority comes into male and female consciousness. Most of the time, when men and women are performing different roles which they and their society define as male and female roles, there is no conflict, and feelings of authority will not come into play. It is only when there is conflict that this feeling will be apparent to the male, who makes use of it, and to the female, who must get around it.

The voluminous writings of the feminists attest to the fact that the feelings and emotional expectations that underpin the customs of every other society affect our behavior as surely as they affect that of the men and women of every other society. Thus the author of the feminist essay complains that she feels that she has somehow lost an argument with her husband, that somehow she was wrong, even when she knows intellectually that she had the better argument, that she was right, and that her husband was being emotionally dishonest. Thus the feminist novelist objects to the fact that it is somehow the male who "takes the lead" in endless situations as varied as crossing streets and choosing friends. The husband tends to "tell" ("my husband told me to take the TV to the repair shop") while the wife tends to "ask" ("my wife asked me to take the TV to the repair shop").

To be sure, women do, as these novelists acknowledge, have a great deal of power in that they make decisions in many areas, but it is the feeling that the husband lets them make such decisions (that he delegates authority, that he "allows") that annoys the feminist and that is the evidence of the presence of male dominance. Likewise the feminist points out that nearly all women (and men) associate authority with the father, save those few who begrudge their fathers their refusal to invoke male authority. Our acceptance of the feminist's description of her feelings and observations does not require that we attach a judgment to these feelings and observations or that we accept her assumption that this manifestation of sexual difference has its roots in social factors only.

It should be repeated that I am not rejecting the possibility that in dyadic relationships women using female means may attain their ends more often than men using male means (either universally or in some societies, perhaps the chivalrous ones), nor am I denying the obvious fact that, whatever qualities one considers masculine or feminine, every member of each sex will occasionally exhibit the behavior of the other. I am saying only that every society recognizes a particular emotional difference between men and women, that this difference always works in the same direction (i.e., no society feels that it is the woman who "allows"), and that every society associates authority in all areas that are not specifically delegated

to women with men.¹⁵ In other words, the male strength and dominance and the female gentleness and endurance portrayed in our novels and movies mirror not merely our society's view of the emotional natures of men and women, but the views of every society that has ever existed.

For our purposes, one's attitude towards male dominance is irrelevant; it does not matter whether the reader enjoys the idea that the male dominates and protects the female or detests it. The point being made here is that, as we shall see, the men and women of every society feel this way and acknowledge this feeling in their societies' institutions. Why this is the case and why, if male dominance does not result from some factor that is either suprasocial or inherent in the very nature of society, does no society reverse this or fail to manifest any sexual dominance at all?

The Universality of Male Dominance

Cross-cultural compilations of ethnographic materials demonstrate the universality of male dominance with the same conclusiveness with which they demonstrate that of patriarchy. While the greater subtleties of definition and discovery have led some of the anthropologists responsible for such compilations to use slightly qualified terms ("universality for all intents and purposes") when referring to the universality of male dominance, this scientific tentativeness does not indicate a belief that there is any society in which the members do

not demonstrate the feelings relevant to male dominance or in which authority in dyadic relations is not associated with the male. With one exception, all the authors indicate quite definitely that there is no exception to male dominance (as we define it).¹⁶

The exception is Dr. William Stephens, who does not deal directly with male dominance, but with authority in specific areas relevant to the household and the rearing of children. However, even if we accept Dr. Stephens's focus on familial rather than the dyadic, the universality of male dominance is not brought into question. Dr. Stephens suggests five possible exceptions to universality (in his terms): the Tchambuli (the society which is most often invoked and which we shall look at more closely), the people of Modjokuto (Java), the Berbers, the Jivaro, and the Nama Hottentot. Recourse to the original materials on which Dr. Stephens bases his assessment supports his contention that these societies delegate to women a certain authority in specific matters concerning the home and children, but by no stretch of the imagination could the men and women of these societies be said to fail to demonstrate the feelings relevant to male dominance. In every case the same ethnographic study that is used to support the assessment of "exception" explicitly states this. For example, the study of the Modjokuto people of Java states that the father "is expected to be, above all, patient and dignified (sabar) with his wife and children: he should lead them with a gentle though firm hand. . ."

Similar acknowledgments of male dominance can be found in every ethnographic study claimed to demonstrate the absence of male dominance in a particular society. For example, one often hears it claimed that Lewis Henry Morgan's work on the Iroquois demonstrated that, while patriarchy in Iroquois society is apparent from the fact that women were not permitted to fill positions of leadership, the Iroquois failed to manifest male dominance. That this was not the case is clear when Morgan writes: "The Indian regarded woman as the inferior, the dependent, and the servant of man, and from nurturance and habit, she actually considered herself to be so."

In the Appendix the reader will find similar ethnographic quotations on every alleged exception. The point is neither that male dominance makes it necessary for women to consider themselves inferior (while this may be the case with the Iroquois, it is not with many other societies) nor that male dominance is only attributable to "nurturance and habit." We shall discuss causation later. Here I am interested merely in noting the universality of male and female feelings of male dominance.

Moreover, whatever can be said about any alleged societal exception to the universality of male dominance can also be applied to American society. Indeed, it is doubtful whether any other society delegates to women the same degree of authority even in the home--and feminists are hardly anxious that American society should increase

women's authority and responsibility in the home. In our society men show chivalrous deference to women (by standing when a woman enters the room, for example), acknowledge female authority in most decisions concerning the household to such an extent that many women complain that the American male has abdicated his role as father in order to concentrate on suprafamilial pursuits, give women equal rights in reaching positions of leadership, and, with a few exceptions which are of primarily symbolic importance, equal rights of ownership and participation in economic life. Moreover, with the exception of land ownership in certain matrilineal societies--which does not lessen male control of suprafamilial or dyadic situations--no society gives women authority in any area in which she is not given authority in the United States.

It is unnecessary to examine the evidence from each of Dr. Stephens' societies in order to make the point that he has not discovered any exception to male dominance as we use the term here (though the reader who desires to do so will find the relevant material in the Appendix). Speaking of wives in American society, Dr. Stephens states that "If there are any exceptional societies (in which each family may freely choose--or fight it out--to determine who does what), our own society probably comes as close as any"¹⁹ and that, "In the allocation of power and privilege, our society--compared with other societies--treats its wives most generously."²⁰

The feminist who wishes to demonstrate that male dominance is not universal need not even mention Dr. Stephens, but if she does not she is left with only cross-cultural compilations that do not offer even a hint of an exception. In that case, she must find an exception on her own and this, we shall see, she will not be able to do. If the feminist does invoke one of Dr. Stephens' societies as an exception to the universality of male dominance, she not only faces the fact that none of these societies are exceptions (see the Appendix), but that, as his words suggest, she must invoke the United States (because none of his societies manifest male dominance any less). But if the feminist does so her cause is lost at once: to invoke the United States as an exception is to assert that it does not have male dominance and to admit the incorrectness of the central feminist premise. Since she will obviously not want to do this; she must acknowledge that none of Dr. Stephens' societies fail to acknowledge male dominance.

It is worth considering briefly the Tchambuli of New Guinea, not only because of all Dr. Stephens' societies it is the one for which the strongest case can be made for its being a society which fails to acknowledge male dominance, but because a number of popular writers have repeated Margaret Mead's questionable conclusions to her study of the Tchambuli without repeating her qualifying statements. While Dr. Mead did not claim that the

Tchambuli failed to acknowledge male dominance, she did imply that sex roles and sexual temperament for these people were so different from those exhibited in every society that the study caused something of an uproar.²¹ The excellent ethnographic data Dr. Mead presents enable the careful reader to see that her conclusions about the plasticity of sex roles do not follow from the observations she describes. For example, she points out that the Tchambuli boy's initiation consisted of his killing a victim and hanging the head in the ceremonial house as a trophy; it is difficult to see this as indication of "male femininity." Indeed, in response to one of her critics Dr. Mead wrote, "Nowhere do I suggest that I have found any material which disproves the existence of sex differences . . . This study was not concerned with whether there are or are not actual and universal differences between the sexes, either quantitative or qualitative."²² More recently, in a review of The Inevitability of Patriarchy Dr. Mead acknowledged that . . . "It is true . . . that all the claims so glibly made about societies ruled by women are nonsense. We have no reason to believe that they ever existed . . . men everywhere have been in charge of running the show . . . men have been the leaders in public affairs and the final authorities at home."²³ Those who so frequently invoke the Tchambuli (and occasionally the Mundugumor, also studied by Dr. Mead) as societies that do not exhibit the institutions under discussion must explain

why the ethnographer who studies them does not consider them to be exceptions.

I would stress that in this chapter, we are considering only empirical realities, in this case the universality of male dominance, and not the explanation of these realities. The explanations offered vary greatly from society to society. Thus, the Gahuku-Gama observe male dominance in their society and explain it as resulting from an initial male physiological inferiority.²⁴ Other societies have other explanations. These are of great interest in other anthropological contexts, but they are irrelevant here, as are the attitudes towards male dominance. For observations of the empirical reality we must look to the society; for an explanation of it we need not.

The Universality of Male Attainment

One often hears the Bamendas, the Hopi, the Iroquois, the Mbuti Pygmies, the Nayar, certain Philippine groups, the people of the kibbutz, or even the fictitious Amazons involved as exceptions to the universality of male dominance.²⁵ These alleged exceptions are merely societies that associate with women tasks or functions that we associate with men. They are not exceptions to the universality of male dominance, for male dominance in no way precludes the possibility that any task or function which we (as uninvolved outsiders) may choose to emphasize may be associate with women in one society or another. As with customs of deference, what is important here are the

attitudes of the members of the society in question. In every society, whatever the particular tasks performed by women, the members feel that women do "women tasks" (as defined by the particular society) either because only women are biologically capable of the tasks or because men perform functions that are more important.

This, then, is the third universal that this dissertation attempts to explain: male attainment. Every society gives higher status to male roles than to the non-maternal roles of females. To put it another, and I believe more illuminating, way: in every society males attain the high-status (non-maternal) roles and position and perform the high-status tasks, whatever those tasks are. Margaret Mead has written:

"In every known human society, the male's need for achievement can be recognized. Men may cook, or weave or dress dolls or hunt hummingbirds, but if such activities are appropriate occupations of men, then the whole society, men and women alike, votes them as important. When the same occupations are performed by women, they are regarded as less important."²⁶ [Emphasis added].

It should be clear that the roles filled by males are, in reality, not necessarily more important. (Obviously, no male role is more important than the female's reproductive role.) We are speaking here of the view held, the status accorded, by the society, rather than by the sociologist. Business executives are not more important than nurses, but they are given higher status and are usually male. In the Soviet Union, practicing

(as opposed to research) medical doctors tend to be women, but the role of doctor in the Soviet Union has lower status than in the United States.²⁷ If being a practicing doctor was given high status in the Soviet Union, the doctors would be men; as it is, men direct their energies towards other, high-status, roles.

The Soviet Union is often put forward as the society which most closely approaches sexual occupational equality (though China, which has far less such equality, despite constant declarations to the contrary, is becoming the fashionable incorrect example). In the Soviet Union there is "an almost perfect negative correlation between the average wage for a given sector of the economy and the proportion of women workers in that sector. The worst-paid sector, public health and physical education (listed as a single category in Soviet statistics), is the sector with the highest proportion of women, 85 per cent.²⁸ The same relationship between status-wage and sex will be found in any society the reader wishes to examine: for example, in France the chefs are men.

Two vitally important points must be made here. Firstly, nothing I have written so far implies that males perform better or have a greater aptitude for, male roles. Everything I have written concerns attainment of position and role, not performance in it. I do not argue that females cannot perform high-status roles as well as males, but only that they are not, for psychophysiological reasons we

shall discuss, as strongly motivated to attain the upper hierarchical positions and high-status roles. Second, male roles, whatever they are in a given society, are not given high status because they are male roles; males occupy the roles because the high status motivates the male more strongly, with the result that society comes to associate such roles with males. We shall see that this distinction is of great theoretical importance when we discuss the psychophysiological differentiation of the sexes.

A woman who is older, wealthier, from a higher class or "better" family, more intelligent, or more educated than a particular male may be given authority over him, any may even feel dominance over him, but she will have less status and authority than an equivalent male and will feel deference towards him. Thus in some societies an older woman whose husband has died rules the family, and the presence of an educated, wealthy woman may make the less wealthy and educated male feel insecure. But whatever variable one chooses, authority, status and dominance within each stratum rest with the male in contacts with equivalent females.

Men do not merely fill most of the roles in high-status areas, they also fill the high-status roles in low-status areas. The higher the level of power, authority, status, prestige, or position--whether the area be economic, occupational, political, or religious--the higher the percentage of males. Thus the percentage of women in the work

force in the U.S. has risen by 75 per cent since 1900, but the percentage of women in the high-status area of medicine has declined during this period. In the Soviet Union, where, as we have seen, medicine has a far lower status than in the United States, the majority of all doctors are women, but as one rises from the level of practical medicine to that of authority the percentage of males rises until, at the top, males constitute the overwhelming majority.²⁹

Of all the tasks one might think of or choose to emphasize, virtually every one, with the exception of those related to protection, fighting, and political authority, is associated with women in one society or another,³⁰ but in every society the roles filled by men are given high status. None of this, of course, denies that in every society women are responsible for the care and rearing of their young, the single most important function served in any society or in nature itself. Just as patriarchy, male dominance, and male attainment of high-status roles and positions are universal, so the association of nurturance and emotional socialization with the woman is universal, and these female roles are, in some societies, given the highest status.

Two Hypotheses Tested

There are two major works³¹ which, while their purpose was to test other theoretical constructs, shed

considerable light on universal manifestations of sex differences in society. While each of these called into question certain aspects of the theory it was testing, both indicate the correctness of the description of sexual role distinctions discussed here. Sigmund Freud and Bronislaw Malinowski agreed that in Western cultures male children harbored a rage against their fathers. The theorists disagreed on the cause of the rage. Freud saw the son's anger as an envy of the father's sexual rights to the mother; Malinowski believed this to be of little importance and saw the anger as response to the father's authoritarian role and the limitations it set on the son's autonomy. In Freud's Vienna, as in most societies, both of these roles were played by the father. Among the people Malinowski studies, however, the mother's brother played the authoritarian role to his sister's son and he, not the son's biological father, was, according to Malinowski, the recipient of the son's rage. Likewise, a theory of Talcott Parsons suggest that all the possible societies will give the father an "instrumental" role (solving the problems of society at large, serving as source of authority and discipline, receiving respect and hostility) and to the mother an "expressive" role (as a source of care and guardian of emotional development, and a receiver of warmth). Morris Zelditch found that in ten out of a sample of fifty-six societies the instrumental role was played by a male other than the father (though even in

these the father seemed relatively "instrumental" and the mother relatively "expressive"). The Freud-Malinowski "debate" and the Parsons-Zelditch works as still the subject of much argument, and I apologize for the oversimplification. I raise all of this only to indicate that, whatever other disagreements these theorists may have, their data have led them all to the conclusion that, if a male is included in the family, the dominant role will be played by a male even when it is not played by the father. If even matrilineal and matrilocal societies pass over the obvious selection of the mother as an authority figure in favor of her brother, is it not likely that there is some underlying imperative associating authority with the male?

It should be noted that I am not at any point in this chapter saying that every society includes a male in the family unit. I think that this is the case, but it does not matter for our purposes if there exist societies in which the family consists of only the mother-child dyad. My point is only that if a male is included in the family, authority will be associated with him by both male and female feelings and social expectations. Male dominance can manifest itself only when males and females come into contact. If there is no adult male in the family unit then, obviously, there will be no male dominance. If a role does not give males high status or some other reward (or is a high-status role is one for which males are at a biological disadvantage) then the role will not attract males and, since there will be no males, there will be no male

dominance. One need not even look to a society with a dyadic family; a number of matrilineal societies and American society indicate that when male time and energies are devoted to the pursuit of suprfamilial status the role of familial disciplinarian (the familial authority role) will in practice be delegated to the mother, who will fill this role in addition to her expressive role; in the matrifocal family type which marks such societies the male familial role may be relatively unimportant, but male dominance will nonetheless be manifested whenever males and females do meet.³²

Does Any Society Reverse Childhood Socialization?

In an article in the Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, Barry et al compared the socialization of boys and girls in a number of societies.³³ Two judges assessed the relative degrees of socialization in various areas of behavior in an attempt to discover to what extent these varied among different societies. In the area that is relevant to Patriarchy--socialization towards achievement--they found that 87 per cent of the thirty-one societies under consideration socialized boys more strongly towards achievement, three per cent socialized girls more strongly towards achievement, and ten per cent socialized boys and girls equally. One critic suggested that this implies that three per cent of all societies socialize girls more strongly than boys towards hierarchical attainment, but it would be incorrect to draw such a conclusion even on a literal reading of the article,

since the authors do not define socialization towards achievement in terms of socialization towards hierarchial attainment. Moreover, it would stretch one's belief to argue that in a society in which males occupy that vast majority of hierarchial positions (as they do in every society), females are more strongly socialized towards the behavior that is necessary for hierarchial attainment and towards hierarchial attainment itself. Most importantly, if we accept the dubious premise that there are societies that socialize females more strongly than males towards hierarchial attainment, we must then conclude that, since males actually attain the hierarchial positions in these societies, socialization plays absolutely no part in the attainment of hierarchial position. I might here make the additional point that the actual behavior of role models is a far more important aspect of socialization than any stated social values. Children see the father play the dominant role and the mother the nurturant role; this observation of what actually occurs would be far more important than any stated social values, even if such values did not conform to the observaton.

The Meaning of Universality

An institution is universal if it plays a crucial role in every society of which we have any knowledge, the total number of which is between approximately twelve

hundred (societies that were relatively isolated from other societies and have been studied directly by anthropologists) and over four thousand (groups that are definitely known to exist, or to have existed, but that have not studied directly by anthropologists). An institution is not universal if there is (or ever has been) a single society in which it does not (or at one time did not) occur. Universality need not, indeed usually does not, mean that every individual in every society exhibits the behavior that leads to (or is generated by), and is regulated by, the institution in question. Marriage is a universal institution (if we allow the anthropologist to worry about the one or two societies which some consider exceptions), even though some members of every society remain unmarried. Universality means that the general population of every society bases its behavior and expectations on the universal institution. It means that thousands of "experiments," for which we could have imagined a great number of other results, all turned out the same way. (If this book were about the universality of marriage, family, or incest taboo, I would not, of course, cavalierly dismiss possible exceptions to universality. I would, as I have done with patriarchy, attempt to demonstrate either that alleged exceptions are not exceptions or that the institution is not universal. Since, in this section, I am concerned merely with the meaning of universality, and not with demonstrating that any particular institution is universal, I do not involve

myself with alleged exceptions to the universality of marriage, family, or incest taboo. The reader who is interested in the universality of any of these institutions will find an enormous literature on the subject. I might merely mention here that those who question the universality of marriage and family emphasize the difficulty we have in defining these terms in such a way that they describe the societies that are suggested as exceptions; no anthropologist doubts the universality of the family if all that is meant by "family" is (at the very least) mother, child, and an adult male. While a few authors have suggested specific societies as lacking the incest taboo, and while it is clear that some very high-status individuals in a few societies escaped the restrictions of the incest taboo under certain conditions, I think it fair to say that very few (if any) anthropologists believe that we have evidence that there existed a society that did not prohibit nuclear incest for the general population.)

Let me make it clear that I am not implying that because an institution is universal it is necessarily inevitable. There are different reasons for universality, and by no means do they all imply inevitability. Perhaps the most obvious reason for universality, and the one for which no reasonable argument for its inevitability could be made, is technological ignorance or economic scarcity; certainly no one would argue that because no society has a

two hour work week such a work week could never be achieved by any society. However, while universality can never, by itself, prove inevitability, there are times when it combines with other evidence to strongly suggest it. The inevitability may flow from the nature of society in general, as opposed to the particular nature of a particular society, or from the very nature of human physiology. An example of the former is the incest taboo. One can imagine a society in which parent-child incest is a common form of sexual activity, but what we know about the effects of incest on social structure has led us to conclude that these effects alone would preclude the survival of such a society even though it is logically and (let us agree for argument's sake) biologically possible that such a society could survive. Even when we deal with the most basic limitations on societal possibility, those imposed by human physiology, universality alone does not prove inevitability. One would not say that in every future society (composed of men and women who are biologically constituted as they are now, and disregarding for now the possibility of new forms of childbirth) women will be the ones to give birth because they have always been the child bearers in every society in the past, but here the physiological factor is so apparent that the implication of inevitability cannot reasonably be questioned. Universality indicates that there has never been an exception (which would, of course, immediately disprove inevitability). Given the seemingly unlimited

plasticity of human beings and the seemingly endless variety of their societal institutions, the universality of an institution alerts the objective investigator to the possibility that there is an underlying factor which would explain this universality, and that if this factor is inseparable from the general nature of society or of human biology, the institution may be inevitable. If there were no physiological evidence relevant to patriarchy, male dominance and male attainment, then one might argue that the inevitability of these institutions was merely a fairly likely probability. I suspect that the anthropologist, who is impressed by the cultural diversity he finds and still more impressed when he discovers an institution which overrides this diversity, tends very strongly to believe that there is an as yet undiscovered factor that makes these institutions universal. An explanation of these institutions in terms of the specific values of a specific society may be fairly satisfactory if one is only studying a single society or a few related societies, but it loses its persuasive powers as more and more unrelated societies with unrelated, highly varied value systems all demonstrate only one of a number of logically possible institutional alternatives. On the other hand, sociologists, who more often concern themselves with societies in the Western tradition and who, I believe, too often see themselves as having a vested interest in a totally environmental approach to social reality, would hold out more strongly for an

explanation that did not imply inevitability. But universality is only part of the evidence for the argument which sees patriarchy, male dominance, and male attainment as inevitable. It is important because it demonstrates that there has been no exception to disprove the inevitability of these institutions, because it points the way to other kinds of evidence that may explain such universality, because universality represents an astonishing regularity in a world of variation, and because it is for the explanation of such regularity that the scientist searches.

For the cultural anthropologist nothing is lost when an admirable scientific conservatism leads him to describe in slightly qualified terms the universality of a universal institution. However, I am advancing the hypothesis that patriarchy, male dominance, and male attainment are inevitable, and it is important to emphasize that the conservatism of some anthropologists does not indicate their belief that there are any clear exceptions to total universality. Throughout this book I accept that one need find only one societal exception to the universality of an institution to prove that not only is the institution not inevitable, but that its presence in all other societies is not related to physiological factors. I do this to reinforce the correctness of the theory, and I can do so because there is not a single exception to the universality of patriarchy, male attainment, and male dominance. It is worth mentioning, however, that it is quite possible that

there are a number of secondary and tertiary biological factors that will nearly always be manifested in a particular institution but may be overridden in rare situations when complemented by extreme institutions that act as counterpoise only at the cost of introducing tension into the system by unusual suppression of the biological, or may be overridden only by rendering the components of the system very different from those of nearly all other social systems.

The Relevance of Cultural Variation

All social scientists agree that there are unchanging preconditions that must be met by any society that is to survive, as well as great variations from one society to another. Whether a social scientist is more impressed by similarities or variations may reflect his own personality--whether he sees the glass as half empty or half full. If he sees the glass as half empty, he will be sustained by the fact that no society has ever failed to develop games; if he sees the glass as half full, he will stand in awe of the wonderfully varied types of games the members of different societies have developed. If he sees the glass as half empty, he will note that man's emotions and the biological materials that underlie them have changed only very slightly, if at all, since our species first evolved. If he sees the glass as half full, he will devote his attentions to the ingenuity societies have demonstrated in developing the various institutional

mechanisms for satisfying the emotional needs of their members. The reality is that the glass contains water equal to half its capacity; the correctness of an analysis is threatened only when someone who considers it to be half empty (or half full) argues that it is less than (or more than) half full. This is what many social scientists do when discussing the institutions discussed in this book.

The nature of sociology is such that the sociologist often sees the glass as half full and emphasizes variation among societies; he analyses these in social and economic contexts in an attempt to explain cross-cultural variations relevant to particular institutions. He might, for example, study women's roles in America and India in order to discover the differing etiologies of differing roles and the differing mechanisms that sustain them. This approach is justified because the differences discussed in the analysis of these two societies reflect real empirical differences. There is a danger, however, that this customary sociological perspective may lead to over-estimating the variation that is found from society to society, to seeing the glass as more than half full. Indeed, many sociologists who are not aware of the universality of patriarchy, male dominance, and male attainment invoke cultural variation as "proof" that these institutions could not be inevitable. There is no such cultural variation.

As we have seen, when patriarchy is considered, there is virtually no variation at all. The number of

women in the highest positions of leadership and authority varies from zero to perhaps six or seven per cent as one spans the entire range of human societies--including, it should be noted, those societies in which women comprise half the work force. Calculation of the exact upper figure depends on how far down from the top one considers "leadership" to extend (state legislatures and unicameral legislatures may on occasion have considerably higher percentages than six or seven per cent while the highest political positions and the more competitive houses of bicameral legislatures rarely approach these figures); whether appointed positions are considered; and the relative status given politics (when politics is given low status relative to industrial, financial, and other hierarchical areas we might find that the percentages of women in political positions rises somewhat). In any case, the point is abundantly clear; no society fails to associate suprafamilial authority with males or fails to fill its authority positions with males. There is even some empirical and, if the theory presented here is correct, strong theoretical evidence that modernization (specialization, division of labor, bureaucratization, and the removal of hereditary barriers to mobility) restricts the possibility of women reaching positions of leadership even within the slight variation that is possible. There were more female heads-of-state in the first two-thirds of the sixteenth century than in the first two-thirds of the twentieth.

Likewise, there is very little variation among societies in the degree to which males occupy the non-maternal roles that are given high status (whatever these may be in any particular society). If male attainment of non-maternal, non-leadership roles is, in a few societies, not as apparent as male attainment of leadership roles, it is because, as we shall see in our discussion of the Mbuti, such societies have few such roles to attain.

Since we have defined "male dominance" in terms of the feeling of a society's men and women that an element of general authority resides in the male, and since we have seen that the ethnographic studies of every society that has ever been observed explicitly state that these feelings were present, there is literally no variation at all. If we examine variations in the extent to which such feelings are manifested in dyadic and familial institutions, we may well get bogged down in subjective considerations over which aspects to emphasize. I have suggested that the extent to which male dominance will be manifested will be lowest when a society's males are most preoccupied with high-status suprafamilial pursuits and when the paternal role is given low status. Even in such societies authority within the family will be invested in the male (usually the father, but the mother's brother in the case of some matrilineal-matrilocal societies), but male lack of interest and female ability to "get

around" males by "feminine means" will serve to give women a great deal of real power, though not authority, within the family. But beyond that, almost all we can say about variations from society to society in the degree to which male dominance is manifested in dyadic and familial institutions is to repeat that male dominance is present in every society. The societies that least manifest male dominance are the United States and a few matrilineal societies. If one believes that male dominance in the United States is extreme, then one must agree that there is very little variation in the degree to which different societies manifest male dominance (relative to the logically possible variations), because nearly all other societies manifest it to a greater degree. Nor can one argue that, within the variations that we do find, industrialization necessarily decreases manifestations of male dominance, because the other two or three societies that least manifest male dominance are primitive societies. While it is true that modernization has tended to reduce the manifestation of male dominance in the past two centuries in America, it would no doubt increase it in a matrilineal-matrilocal primitive society whose starting point is low male dominance.

We can now consider a point that is not only central to the question of alleged cultural variation, but also enables us to avoid the endless and needless confusion engendered by the phrase status of women, a

phrase we shall try to avoid in this book. Confusion develops because this term is used to include two or more factors that are not only not necessarily positively correlated, but which, if the above suggestions are correct, will often be inversely correlated. Some authors use this phrase to refer to rights, and find that there is a great deal of variation from society to society in the rights given to women; some societies give women virtually no rights at all, while in modern societies such as America women have virtual equality of rights. The feminist may abhor the few remaining laws that differentiate between the sexes, but surely she will admit that they are not a major cause of the disparity in the numbers of men and women in positions of power, and that they are not the primary focus of her criticism of contemporary society. If she will not admit this, then she will have to accept that equal rights legislation would satisfy all her criticisms. If all authors referred to rights when they used the phrase status of women, there would be no problem; we could admit that there is great variation here, but that it is irrelevant to this book because it has no bearing on patriarchy, male dominance, or male attainment.

However, a number of anthropologists have suggested that the "status of women" is highest in certain, though by no means all matrilineal-matrilocal societies. Here they are referring to the respect given to women.

If we focus on respect, we see, once again, that variation from society to society is very great. But once again this is irrelevant to our purposes because the great respect given to women does not reduce the degree of patriarchy, male dominance, or male attainment of high-status supra-familial positions; it reflects the high status of maternal and female lineage-related roles, and is perfectly compatible with the suggestion that male dominance will be somewhat subdued in societies in which male time and energies are directed towards suprafamilial pursuits to an unusual degree. In these societies men are typically outsiders in the matrilineal household, and interaction between the sexes is far less frequent than in our society. When these societies give high status to women's female roles, women's position is, in a very real sense, quite strong. Women are given great respect and a considerable degree of familial power. It is important to note, however, that these are made possible by the male supra-familial orientation and emotional detachment from the family. Women have few suprafamilial rights, patriarchy is as strong as in any other society, males attain all the suprafamilial high-status positions, and male dominance, while it may be somewhat subdued because of the male "visitor" status and the infrequency of male-female encounters, is unmistakably present in both the feelings of men and women and the expectations of the society.

The reader can no doubt already see the confusion that ensues when one uses the phrase status of women to include two separate factors, rights and respect. Women receive great respect in certain matrilineal societies that give them few rights; the respect derives from the fact that they fill high-status roles that men are incapable of filling. (There is nothing in the theory presented here that precludes the possibility that a society will give higher status to female roles that men are incapable of filling than to the roles occupied by males.) Women receive equality of rights in some societies in which they compete with men and in which the female roles men are incapable of playing are given relatively low respect. In both societies female attainment of high-status, suprafamilial positions is insignificant, so which society gives women "higher status"?

Were this the limit of the confusion engendered by the phrase status of women, the problem would be irrelevant to the universal institutions we discuss; we could merely suggest that those authors who are interested in the rights or the respect granted to women should discard the confusing phrase and specify the variable they wish to discuss. However, the problem is more serious than this. Some anthropologists acknowledge that there has never been a matriarchy, but, invoking variations of Engels' arguments, imply that there were once societies in which women's position was far higher than it has been

in any of the thousands of societies that have existed since the dawn of history.³⁴ It is not clear from these authors' writings exactly what they imagine prehistoric societies were like. If they only mean that they were like the matrilineal societies we have just discussed, then there is no necessary conflict between the theory presented here and their works; for if we are willing to admit that such societies now exist, we lose nothing by admitting that they existed long ago as well. The problem derives from their implication, quite possibly unintentional, that these societies did not manifest male attainment of high-status, non-maternal roles and positions of male dominance. This is not only incorrect, but leaves the impression that matrilineal societies are somehow closer to the feminist ideal than the modern industrial societies in which we live. A non-feminist woman might well prefer life in a matrilineal society, but such a society is a feminist's nightmare. A technological society that was matrilineal could not develop for a number of reasons, but if one did exist and resembled "prehistoric matrilineal societies" or contemporary matrilineal societies, it would differ most notably from our society in the total separation of male and female roles and prohibitions against women even entering the areas from which men derived their status, the impossibility of women's attaining status in any way but through maternal and lineage-related roles, and the lesser extent to which men would even

think about women. It is true that male dominance would be somewhat diminished, but only to the extent that males were absent from the family setting. This would still be dominated by a male, though he might be the mother's brother. This might all be satisfactory for the woman who did not care that the society manifested patriarchy, male attainment, and male dominance provided it gave her female roles high status, but it would be dreadful for the woman who sees women's value in terms of the supra-familial high-status roles and positions that males attain.

The real lesson to be learned from societies that give women equality of rights and from those that give women great respect is twofold: males attain the positions of authority and high status no matter what rights are given to women; and a reduction of the status and respect given to roles which only a woman can fill forces women who desire status to compete in areas in which the males' greater motivation is a precondition for attainment, and reduces the respect given to them. As we shall see, this means that a reduction of the status given to the roles which only a woman can fill changes a woman's situation from one in which she cannot lose to one in which she cannot win. The implications of this for the feminist movement and its attempt to improve women's situation by laying less emphasis on the roles that men are incapable of filling is profound.

In every stratum of every society the status of women is derived in part from the status accorded the roles only a woman can play and in part from the status of the husband or, in the few polyandrous societies, the primary husband.³⁵ This is not to deny that in many societies there are individual women who attain status by virtue of sheer ability and accomplishment. Nor is it to deny the theoretical possibility that maternal roles only a woman can fill could be given higher status than any male role. It is simply to make the point that the rule in every society is that women derive their status from lineage or husband. In no society do many women attain high-status roles and positions by successfully competing with men.

There is, of course, much more variation within a society in male status and in the status derived by women from male status than there is in the status derived by women from the roles only women can fill (for example, a janitor's wife derives much lower status from her husband than does a doctor's wife, but as much status from the roles only she can fill as does the doctor's wife). Thus a decrease in the status accorded the roles only a woman can fill will result in a situation in which: (a) there will be a net loss of status accorded women; (b) males will, for all the reasons we shall discuss, continue to be the attainers of status and positions of authority; (c) the wives of such attainers (whose feminine abilities are

primarily responsible for their attaining the marital positions from which they derive high status) will continue to be the highest status females; (d) other women will see their status lowered to the degree that the status accorded the roles only a woman can play is lowered.

In any case, numerous anthropologists, sociologists, psychologists, and even psychoanalysts have attempted to invoke cultural variation to reject the possibility of a physiological basis of the universal institutions under discussion. They are free to invoke cultural variation in order to refute a physiological explanation of institutions that do vary, and to argue that the theory proposed here is incorrect, which would mean that someday there could exist a society that failed to manifest one of the universal institutions. But if they attempt to invoke variation among societies that exist or have existed--or the real variation that exists at the superficial level of tasks performed--in order to counter the implications of an analysis based on the absence of variation found in the universal realities under discussion --then they are, to be quite blunt, ignoring the evidence and are wrong. By focusing on patriarchy, male dominance, and male attainment of high-status suprafamilial roles and positions, three criteria that avoid the confusion engendered by vague and misleading paradigms like "the status of women," we discover that there is not now, nor has there ever been, any variation large enough to cast

the slightest doubt on the universality of these institutions or on the possibility that they represent three inevitable manifestations of psychophysiological sexual differentiation. This book is, in essence, an attempt to discover why these three institutions are universal and to assess the possibility of their being inevitable.

Grounds for an Empirical Refutation

The theory that I shall present in the next chapters assumes three, and only three, universal realities: patriarchy, male attainment, and male dominance. The discovery or development of a single society that lacked one of these realities would be sufficient to refute the theory on two grounds. (As we shall see in the "First Digression," this is something of an oversimplification, but it is one which the empirical universality allows.) Firstly, since the empirical reality that the theory attempts to explain is the universality, a single exceptional society would demonstrate that the claimed universality did not exist, in which case there would be nothing to explain. Secondly, the psychophysiological differentiation of males and females that the theory considers determinative is the same in every society, and therefore could not explain why the exceptional society lacked the institutions.

It is important to emphasize, however, that empirical refutation can result from the discovery or development only of a society that lacks one of the three institutions we discuss here. I stress this because a

number of critics invoked cultural variation in some other reality. Such an approach can never refute the theory presented here because I am perfectly willing to grant, for argument's sake, that there is variation in every other area and institution and that the universals discussed here are the only universals. Thus, attitudes vary tremendously from society to society and from era to era in a single society. Patriarchy and male dominance were valued by the American people a hundred years ago, while today many Americans dislike these empirical realities. But the critic cannot invoke variation in attitudes as evidence for the possibility of variation in the realities that are the objects of the attitudes. Indeed, the very fact that patriarchy and male dominance are as well represented in societies that dislike these institutions as in societies that value them indicates the irrelevance of attitudes. The critic cannot invoke societies in which women have special areas of autonomy or in which there is a reciprocity of male and female roles somewhat different from that found in our society; he cannot allude to historical development, or cite the fact that many other aspects of male and female roles (and many male and female tasks) are reversed in other societies. No matter how peaceful or unassertive a society's values, it will manifest patriarchy, male attainment, and male dominance. Women have areas of autonomy in every society and in every society male and female roles are reciprocal; but in no

society are women autonomous to the extent that the vast majority of women do not come under the authority of a husband or brother, and in no society does this fail to represent a reciprocity between males in whom authority is vested and females in whom it is not. (There are societies in which laws do not reflect this, but the expectations of the members of the society and the values of the society always do.) There are many societies in which women do tasks that are more strenuous and of (objectively) greater economic importance, many in which kinship and residence are determined through the female, and many in which the women are nominal owners of most of the property; but in none of these do men fail to attain the upper hierarchical positions, the high-status roles and tasks, or dominance and authority in male-female relationships. In no society, anywhere or at any time, have these realities been absent. The great variation in other areas and institutions makes the universality of patriarchy, male attainment, and male dominance so astonishing, and it is this which the next three chapters attempt to explain.³⁶

Chapter IIFootnotes

¹Perhaps the closest approximation to a non-patriarchal society was Iroquois society, in which women did serve in an important role, analogous to that of nominating the male leader. We shall discuss male dominance in Iroquois society later; here I wish merely to make the point that one cannot argue that the Iroquois were non-patriarchal when women were not even permitted to hold positions in the leadership hierarchy.

²It is legitimate to speak of social evolution with reference to a specified criterion as long as there is no implication that this criterion represents some general evolutionary or moral advance or that a society must reach the specified evolutionary stage. For example, one may say that a literate society is more advanced than a non-literate society when discussing urbanization--literacy being a necessary condition for urbanization--as long as one does not imply that urbanization is an inevitable stage in a society's evolution, that it represents some objective moral advance, or that it is a sign of some general evolutionary advancement.

³The fact that from 1860 to 1890 many anthropologists--Victorian anthropologists no less--accepted the idea of matriarchy and devised unnecessary theories to explain it casts serious doubt on the feminist charge that male anthropologists refuse to admit that there were once matriarchies because they are threatened by the possibility.

⁴Panos Bardis "Synopsis and Evaluation of Theories Concerning Family Evolution;" Social Science, 38:50 (Jan., 1963). Interested readers might further consult virtually any introductory text in anthropological theory and M.F. Ashley Montagu's introduction to Marriage Past and Present: A Debate Between Robert Briffault and Bronislaw Malinowski (Boston: Porter Sargent, 1956--the debate took place in 1931).

⁵As we shall see in our discussion of cultural variation, serious Marxist scholars like Kathleen Gough have acknowledged that no matriarchy has ever existed. While such anthropologists place far greater emphasis on the economic factor than I do, there is no direct conflict between their work and the theory presented here; they do not maintain that there has ever been a society that lacked patriarchy, male dominance, or male attainment of high-status supra-familial roles and positions. I am bothering to discuss the presentations of works alleging the former existence

of matriarchies not because they deserve discussion on their intellectual merit--they are uniformly inaccurate and incompetently done--but because they are occasionally invoked by laymen. The works are: Elizabeth Gould Davis, The First Sex (London: Dent, 1973); Helen Diner, Mothers and Amazons (New York: Julian Press, a 1965 translation of a work originally published around 1930); M. and M. Vaerting, Dominant Sex (London: Doran, 1923); Nancy Reeves, Womankind (Chicago: Aldine, 1971); Evelyn Reed, Is Biology Woman's Destiny? (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1972); Phyllis Chesler, Woman and Madness (London: Allen Lane, 1973); and Emanuel Kanter, The Amazons (Chicago: Charles Kent, 1926).

⁶See George Murdock, Social Structure (New York: Free Press, 1949), pp. 184-207.

⁷"Since the Amazons never existed, but are a mythical group first mentioned by Herodotus and soon doubted by Strabo, their social organization need not further detain us except perhaps as an enduring example of the will to believe." (Montagu, op cit, p. 88.) "The fabled Amazon women are just that--a fable. Even in societies which are organized about women, in societies which follow matrilineal descent and inheritance and matrilocal residence, power tends to be held by males in the female lineage. Power is usually held by the mother's brother from the viewpoint of ego, by the maternal uncle. Male dominance, or at least a tendency towards it appears to be one of those basic features of human existence that culture cannot completely contradict. A minority of societies are organized around female lineage, but even among them, power, status and property tend to be held by males." (Leslie, Gerald, The Family in Social Context (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967) p. 52. Marvin Harris (Culture, Man, and Nature, New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1971) writes: (p. 328) "...certainly there was never any matrilineal 'stage' in this general evolution of culture. The basic reason for this is that men have always been politically and economically dominant over women. ... Despite the persistent popular notion that the presence of matrilineal descent groups reflects the political or economic domination of men by women, it is the men in these societies no less than in patrilineal societies who control the corporate kin group's productive and reproductive resources," and (p. 582) "Matriarchy has never existed," and (p. 585) "... anthropology lends no support to the view that there are no innate differences between males and females." Lastly we should note that Kathleen Gough, a leading anthropologist who certainly looks favorably upon the feminist movement, has written "... matriliney does not involve 'matriarchy' or female dominance, either in the home or in society, as Engels tended to believe. Matriarchy, as the reverse of patriarchy, has in fact almost certainly

never existed ... men predominate as heads of households, lineages and communities in matrilineal as in patrilineal societies, and women experience greater or less authority from their mother's brothers, elder brothers, or even their grown sons. Some degree of male dominance has, in fact, been universal to date in human society, although matrilineal systems are usually kinder to woman."--"An Anthropologist Looks at Engels in Nona Glazer Malbin and Helen Youngelson Waehrer, eds., Women in a Man-Made World (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1972), p. 115.

⁸Time, December 27, 1971, p. 54.

⁹However, one may perhaps speak meaningfully of "masculine" and "feminine" societies or "masculine" and "feminine" periods in a particular society's development if one uses these merely as relative terms, describing aggressive values as "masculine" and relatively nurturant values as "feminine." We shall come close to doing this in Chapter 5 when we discuss the factors that determine the extent to which male aggression is manifested in any given society. But such relative terms are applicable only within the limits described in this book. No society was ever so "feminine" that authority and dominance were not associated with males, and that no society was ever so "masculine" that child-rearing was primarily the responsibility of males (except as with the Marquesan Islanders, who practiced female infanticide, when there was a great shortage of women). Some historians, using this terminology, have referred to societies which would be "feminine" as "matriarchies." Since they do not imply that the societies were not patriarchies (in my terms) or that they did not exhibit male dominance, this does not conflict with the analysis presented here.

¹⁰New Republic, 25 December 1971, p. 6.

¹¹The figures for Sweden, Cuba, Israel, and China were compiled from listings on The Europa Yearbook: 1971 (London: Europa Publications Ltd., 1971) and The Far East and Australia: 1971 (London: Europa Publications Ltd., 1970). The figure for the Soviet Union is from N.T. Dodge, Women in the Soviet Economy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1966), p. 214. These figures need some updating, but the point they make remains just as valid.

¹²A number of sub-societal groups have attempted not only to explain reality in terms that assume that logic is the only factor defining social possibility, but to implement this view by developing new "societies." Because logic is not the only limitation which defines social possibility, every

such experiment had to fail completely or, like the kibbutz, fail in just those areas where the inexorable pull of sexual and familial biological forces eventually overcame the initial thrust of nationalistic, religious, ideological, or psychological forces that had made possible the temporary implementation of Utopian ideas.

¹³For example, the devastation of the Soviet Union in World War II created such a dearth of qualified people in every area that the competitive aspects of the attainments of position were reduced.

¹⁴For the sake of convenience I shall occasionally use the term male dominance to refer not merely to the feelings of the members of a society, but also to those dyadic and familial institutions in which these feelings are manifested. Thus when I speak of one society's exhibiting more male dominance than another, I mean that its institutions emphasize or utilize these feelings more than those of another. Furthermore, it should be noted that "male dominance" is a relative term. One might be tempted to introduce the hypothesis that differing social conditions have resulted in the women of one society becoming more dominant than the men of another. Such a hypothesis would be irrelevant. Dominance and deference are relative terms that refer to the feelings and institutions relevant to dyadic and familial relationships in a single societal context.

¹⁵The different meanings of male dominance, male authority, and power should be clear by now. Male dominance refers to a feeling acknowledged by both male and female emotions. Male authority refers to society's associating general authority in dyadic relationships with the male. Both male dominance and male authority are universal. In every society authority is delegated to women in a number of areas; there is no conflict as long as each sex stays in its own area. When there is conflict, the feelings of male dominance will always come into play and general male authority will sometimes be invoked in some societies and always in others. Power is the capacity for affecting the actions of others and for attaining one's end. Women in dyadic situations often have the power advantage, but this advantage does not flow from their invoking authority, and is attained by overcoming the feelings of male dominance through feminine means, intelligence, etc. The importance of these distinctions is apparent when we examine Robert O.

Blood and Donald M. Wolfe's seminal study of dyadic power in America, Husbands and Wives (New York: Free Press, 1960). For this study 731 wives in Detroit were interviewed. After assessing dyadic power in eight areas of decision-making (decisions concerning husband's job, family car, insurance, vacation, house, wife's work, family doctor, and food), the authors conclude that, while husbands maintain a significant power advantage overall and a complete advantage in decisions relevant to their jobs, the American family is roughly equalitarian rather than "patriarchal." This is an important point if one is, like the authors, interested primarily in power, but its meaning is not clear. The increasing extent to which women share in the decisions that the authors examine may well, as we shall see, represent a male abdication of the husband-father role in favor of suprafamilial pursuits, a delegation of familial authority; this would seem to be indicated by the authors finding that, of all wives, wives in wife-dominant marriages (marriages in which wives have the power advantage in these decisions) are the least satisfied with their marriages. Feelings of male dominance, while they are always present and invest all male-female interaction, become manifest only when there is conflict. Most of the time, when men are dealing with decisions that the society sees as "male" and women with those that society sees as "female," there is no conflict. That women make the decisions about choice of a family doctor or what to serve for dinner in no way means that feelings of dominance are absent. Male dominance will manifest itself in such an area only if, for example, a wife insists on serving food that the husband does not like. If conflict ensues the feelings relevant to male dominance will come into play. The wife may well end up getting her way, but it will be through her "feminine" approach which gets around her (and her husband's) feelings that authority resides in the male and not because either she or her husband failed to experience the feelings of male dominance. That the equalitarianism found by Blood and Wolfe is irrelevant to the feminist analysis is apparent for two reasons. First, authority in the household is scarcely the prime feminist goal. Second, where the authors see equalitarianism, the feminists see male dominance. Both the authors and the feminists are correct; the former are looking at decision-making and the latter at male dominance and its manifestation.

¹⁶For extended discussion of the anthropological data relevant to the universality of male dominance, the reader might wish to consult: Gerald Leslie, op cit; M.F. Nimkoff, Comparative Family Systems (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1965); Ira L. Reiss, The Family System in America (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1971); and William N. Stephens, The Family in Cross-Cultural Perspective (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1963).

¹⁷Hildred Geertz, The Javanese Family (New York: Free Press, 1961, p. 107.

¹⁸Lewis Henry Morgan, League of the Ho-dé-No-Sau-Nee or Iroquois (New York: Dodd, Mead and Co., 1901), p. 315.

¹⁹All references to Dr. Stephens' work refer to Stephens, op cit., pp. 300-6.

²⁰Two interesting points emerge when we examine those societies in which there is a relatively low degree of male dominance. The first is one that we would expect if we view dyadic relationships in the terms of this book: women in these societies are successful because they make use of "feminine" abilities to counter the societal expectations which conform to male aggression or, to use Dr. Stephens' words, "In the face of ... [the male advantage] ... a wife--if she wishes to fight back--must employ characteristically female weapons." The second point of interest is that a low degree of male dominance seems to occur when there is a strong societal emphasis on some suprafamilial male functions. This is not to say that societies that emphasize some such factor will necessarily demonstrate a relatively low male dominance (i.e. give the women authority in certain familial areas, Dr. Stephens' "exceptions"), but that societies which do demonstrate a relatively low male dominance, which do give women authority in these familial areas, will place an unusually strong emphasis on some suprafamilial area. For example, the male obsession with work and career in the United States has been documented by sociologists since Weber; the Jivaro male sees warriorship as the purpose of life. Perhaps this implies that a relatively low degree of familial male dominance and authority may occur where the paternal role is not thought to contribute to high status, with a resulting male lack of interest in the paternal role. This is analogous to a situation we will observe shortly: when a suprafamilial position is given high status by a society, men will occupy it; when it is given low status, men will attempt to attain other (high status) positions. This would explain the fact that the relatively low degree of familial male dominance in the American family is combined with a moderately high degree of patriarchy in the political and economic areas. A decrease in the strength of the work ethic and a resulting increase in the American male's interest in the paternal role may lead to an increase in familial male authority, with the male invoking dominance in an area he had formerly ignored in favor of his work. In other words, it is likely that the increased emphasis on women's filling suprafamilial roles, and the reduced emphasis on maternal roles urged by the feminists, may combine with a weakening of the male work ethic not to

increase women's authority in suprafamilial areas (where the positions of authority will be attained by males as they have in every society--even those without a strong emphasis on suprafamilial male functions), but only to increase the degree of male dominance at home.

²¹See Margaret Mead's Sex and Temperament in Three Primitive Societies (New York: William Morrow, 1935).

²²Letter, The American Anthropologist, 39 (July-September 1937) pp. 558-61. The reader who wishes further evidence that Dr. Mead's implication (that the Tchambuli sex roles do not conform to the limits demonstrated by every other society) is supported only by her own choice of adjectives and not at all by the data she presents, should consult the following analyses of Sex and Temperament: Jessie Bernard, "Observation and Generalization in Cultural Anthropology," The American Journal of Sociology, 50 (January 1945) pp. 284-91; Richard Thurnwald, "Oceania and Africa," The American Anthropologist, 38 (October-December 1936) pp. 663-7; Victor Barnouw, Culture and Personality (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press, 1963), pp. 85-91; and Marvin Harris' brief criticism in The Rise of Anthropological Theory (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969) pp. 413-14.

²³Redbook, October 1973, p. 48. Emphasis added.

²⁴Kenneth E. Read, "Nama Cult of the Central Highlands, New Guinea" in L.L. Langness and John C. Weschler (eds.) Melanesia, Readings on a Culture Area (Scranton, Pa: Chandler, 1971).

²⁵For a more extended discussion of alleged exceptions to male dominance see the Appendix.

²⁶Margaret Mead, Male and Female (London: Penguin Books, 1970), p. 168.

²⁷For data relevant to status in the Soviet Union see "The Social Evaluation of Occupations in the Soviet Union" in Slavic Review (28,4); "Soviet Women and Their Self-Image in Science and Society" (39,3) and Dodge, op cit.

²⁸Current History; 67, 398, p. 174.

²⁹See William J. Goode, World Revolution and Family Patterns (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), pp. 57-66.

³⁰While there are no exceptions in these three spheres (every society's military and leadership functions are served primarily by men), it should be noted for the record that in the mid-nineteenth century the army of Dahomey included a corps of female warriors (different authors estimate their percentage of the total number of warriors as being between five and fifteen per cent) and that at one time Iroquoian women served a vital political function in selecting male leaders (though women were not permitted to lead). Contrary to popular misconception, Israeli women do not serve in combat roles.

³¹The interested reader might wish to consult: Bronislaw Malinowski, Sex and Repression in Savage Society (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1927), and Morris Zelditch, "Role Differentiation in the Nuclear Family: A comparative study," in Talcott Parsons and Robert F. Bales, eds., Family, Socialization, and Interaction Process (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1956). Dr. Zelditch's definition of "instrumental role" differs in some respects from our definition of "male dominance." As a result he lists the Manus (alone among fifty-six societies) as giving the father a slightly less instrumental role than the mother. That this does not indicate that the Manus male is not dominant is apparent when Zelditch writes (p. 337): "Father holds the authority in the family, but it is through the mother evidently that he disciplines the child--that is he disciplines the mother and she is responsible for the child's behavior."

³²I make this point in response to R.T. Smith's suggestion that the family in British Guiana begins as a nuclear family, but soon develops into just the mother-child dyad. For reasons too numerous to go into here I do not consider that Dr. Smith's illuminating study refutes the argument that a permanent, stable society must be built around a family consisting of at least mother, child, and one adult male; but even if one accepted the possibility of a society's family system being based on only the mother-child dyad such a society would cast no doubt on the universality of male dominance in male-female encounters and relationships. See R.T. Smith, The Negro Family in British Guiana: Family Structure and Social Status in the Villages (London: Kegan Paul, 1956).

³³Herbert Barry III, Margaret K. Bacon, and Irvin L. Child, "A Cross-Cultural Survey of Some Sex Differences in Socialization" in Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 55 (November 1957), pp. 327-32.

³⁴See Kathleen Gough, op cit., pp. 107-18, and Eleanor Burke Leacock's introduction to Engels' The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State (New York International Publishers, 1972), pp. 7-67.

³⁵I include in roles only a woman can play both the high-status, lineage-determined roles for which males are at a physiological disadvantage--for example, high-status maternal roles in a matrilineal society--and lineage-determined roles for which there is no available male--e.g. the woman who becomes queen because there is no royal male.

³⁶As we shall see in the section entitled "The Irrelevance of Exceptions," one cannot invoke as refutation individuals who are exceptions, for example, the woman who has an exceptionally strong dominance tendency. The theory proposed here is a theory of societies--i.e. it predicts that there could not be a non-patriarchal society--and it is only on this level that it is absolute. The theory is statistical on the level of individuals; a refutory exception on this level is not the exceptional woman, or thousand women. An exception on this level would be a society in which there were as many women with strong dominance tendencies as men; such a society would be non-patriarchal, and the theory would therefore be refuted on both levels.

CHAPTER III

DIFFERENTIATION OF DOMINANCE TENDENCY

The Need for a Simple Explanation

In the preceding chapter I have not attempted to explain anything, but merely to demonstrate an empirical fact:¹ that in every society that has ever existed one finds patriarchy (males fill the overwhelming percentage of upper hierarchical positions in political and all other hierarchies), male attainment (males attain the high-status roles, whatever these may be in any given society), and male dominance (both males and females feel that dominance in male-female encounters and relationships resides in the male, and social expectations and authority systems reflect this). To discover why these realities are universal is the purpose of this dissertation.

The answer must be simple, if by simple we mean parsimonious.² I make this point because I am well aware that any explanation which sees physiology as the determining factor will automatically be criticized as simplistic or reductionist. To attempt to explain cultural variation by physiology (assuming there is no correlated physiological variation) is simplistic and reductionist (as it would be, for example, to try to explain the fact that the British political system is parliamentary rather than congressional by physiology). But if one is attempting, as I am, to offer

a sufficient explanation of universality, of the limits to which all societies conform, rather than of differences and variations within those limits, then the explanation must be simple. The simplicity lies in the empirical reality we wish to explain, and our explanation must reflect that simplicity; a more complex explanation of universality would not be superior, but inelegant. Intuition forces one to reject an explanation of patriarchy that "explains" patriarchy in the United States in terms of capitalism, in China in terms of socialism, in Watusi society in terms of the superiority that size gives to males in a hunting society, in Great Britain in terms of British historical tradition, and in thousands of other societies in hundreds of other terms. Such an explanation would be unacceptable even if we did not have one that possessed the desired simplicity, and that explained the fact that all societies are patriarchal in terms of one causal factor. (We shall examine possible alternative parsimonious explanations of universality--i.e. explanations that do not invoke physiological differentiation--at length later.)

Similarly, some critics accused Patriarchy of "biological determinism." If by this they mean that it is reductionist, this section will serve as a response to their criticism; if they do not mean that the theory is reductionist, then I would accept their assessment, but without seeing it as a criticism. Sometimes biological determinism is correct. A theory that predicted that

because males are taller than females, the best basketball teams in every society will be comprised of males and that socialization will conform to this reality, and will increase the male-female difference in basketball ability, is "biological determinism;" it is also correct.

The Differentiation of Dominance Tendency

Stated a bit more loosely, but perhaps a bit more accessibly, than I have stated it to this point, the central thesis of this work is this: patriarchy, male attainment, and male dominance are social manifestations of the fact that male physiology is such that the environmental presence of a hierarchy, high-status role, or member of the other sex makes the male, more often and more strongly than the female, (1) feel feelings of competitiveness and need for attainment and dominance, (2) suppress other feelings and sacrifice other rewards, and, therefore, (3) exhibit whatever behavior is necessary in any given society to attain position, status role, and dominance in male-female relationships. (Two points will become clear in the next chapters: (1) the physiological differentiation that is central to the theory presented here is not the obvious anatomical and reproductive differentiation, but a neuroendocrinological differentiation that will be described in detail; (2) the words "male" and "female" are--when used to describe psychophysiological differences--always statistical terms.

In Patriarchy I referred to the hierarchical and dyadic dominance tendency as "aggression." I had in mind the use of the word "aggression" as it is used in "He's an aggressive businessman who will get to the top." I think that this use of the word demonstrates that the general population observes the importance of a dominance tendency in the attainment of hierarchical and dyadic dominance. However, many readers interpreted "aggression" as necessarily implying physical aggression or, yet more confusing, as implying territoriality, male bonding, or killer instincts (concepts that, as we shall see, have nothing to do with the theory presented here). I avoid the confusion by using the term "dominance tendency;" this chapter is devoted to defining the term and to describing some of the behavior in which the tendency is manifested. It is worth pointing out, however, that physical aggression is not irrelevant to what we discuss here. Let us consider that in situations in which physical aggression can be invoked (whether by human beings or in other mammalian species) the important psychophysiological element is not the physical aggression per se, but the tendency, the "motivation," that moves the individual to use physical aggression. Physical aggression is merely the means to an end, a means that will not be used if it can be avoided. This point is missed by those who acknowledge that male physiology is such that males are more easily moved to physical aggression, but

who argue that this is irrelevant when physical aggression is prohibited. For even when the means is no longer permitted, the end is still attainable. In other words, if the male tendency towards dominance is greater, males will tend more strongly to invoke physical aggression in the pursuit of dominance if physical aggression is an alternative; if physical aggression is not an alternative males will tend more strongly to behave in whatever ways are permitted that lead to dominance.³

I prefer the term "dominance tendency" to describe the emotional-behavioral differentiation that results from physiological differentiation and is responsible for patriarchy, male attainment and male dominance. It avoids problems of tautologicality, vitalism, and teleologicality inherent in the terms "motivation" and "need," and a host of other problems that will probably occur only to the logician, but that can be avoided with only stylistic difficulty by speaking of the male's "greater tendency for hierarchical and dyadic dominance." The reader will note that I occasionally use the term "motivation" to avoid stylistic infelicity; those bothered by this term should note that the unobjectionable paradigms of "tendency" or "threshold" can always be substituted. It is important to note that one may substitute other terms and may conceptualize the emotional-behavioral differentiation in terms of another paradigm without affecting the argument being presented here. There are theoretical differences

between the paradigms listed below, and certain logical difficulties with some of them, but these are irrelevant for our purposes. Thus, one can conceptualize the "male's greater dominance tendency" as" (a) a lower male threshold for the release of dominance behavior; (b) a greater male need for dominance (or a male hierarchy of needs in which the need for dominance ranks higher than the need for dominance ranks in the female hierarchy of needs); (c) a greater male drive towards dominance; (d) a greater male readiness to learn (or propensity for learning) dominance behavior; (e) a stronger (or more easily released) male status need (or status drive); (f) a weaker male ego (which needs shoring up through dominance more than does the stronger female ego); (g) a stronger male tendency for responding to dominance-eliciting environmental stimuli; (h) a greater male aggression; (i) a male aggression that is more active than the female's quantitatively equal, but passive aggression; (j) a stronger male competitiveness (this is probably the most suitable everyday word for the tendency that is differentiated); (k) a stronger male motivation for dominance.

All that matters for our purposes is that whichever paradigm one favors will recognize that a male-female differentiation of tendency exists (it cannot fail to do so because this is the empirical reality which it is there to explain) and that this differentiation of tendency is rooted in neuroendocrinological differentiation. Perhaps

the reader will see the point being made here most clearly if he considers the analogy of the tendency that we loosely describe as the "sex drive." Is this a "drive" or a "need"? While the word chosen may well affect our attitude ("drive" seems more powerful, "need" more vulnerable) they are simply different ways of saying precisely the same thing.

Whatever the terminology used, the important point, and the central argument presented in this book, is that differences in the male and female neuroendocrinological systems are such that the environmental stimulus of hierarchy, status, or a member of the other sex elicits from the male a stronger tendency to give up whatever must be given up--time, pleasure, health, physical safety, affection, relaxation--for the attainment of a higher hierarchical position, for a social role which is rewarded by greater status, and for dominance in male-female relationships. This differentiation of tendency, and a population's observation of the behavioral differentiation through which it is manifested is the "causal" connection between physiological differentiation on the one hand, and differentiation in the social values, socialization, and institutions we wish to explain on the other. (We shall discuss the role of "feedback" and the role of socialization in increasing the differentiation of dominance tendency later; here my point is merely that the differentiation of tendency is primarily a result of

neuroendocrinological differentiation, and that, together with a population's observation of the behavioral differentiation through which it is manifested, it is the primary "cause" of the differentiation in social values, socialization, and institutions.)

Even the feminists do not deny that dominance tendency determines attainment and dominance, or that males exhibit it far more strongly and more often. Feminist writings document extensively the greater male dominance tendency when incorrectly explaining it in terms of socialization. We shall discuss the difficulties they run into later; here we need merely note that there is no disagreement over its existence but only over the explanation for it.

When I say that differences between male and female physiology are such that the presence of hierarchy, status, or a member of the other sex tends to elicit dominance behavior more strongly from the male than from the female, I am saying that--to use a less accurate but more common terminology--males are more strongly "motivated" to exhibit whatever behavior is necessary to achieve position, status, or dominance. I am not saying that the specific action is determined by physiology, only that the "motivation" is. The voice of our hormones is expressed in feeling, and such emotions are not primarily learned. But the language in which the voice speaks--the actions that satisfy the feelings--must be

learned. Thus, if fighting ability is a necessary condition for hierarchical attainment, males will be more strongly "motivated" to develop their fighting ability; if it is looked down upon, but cooperation is given high value, then they will be more strongly "motivated" to at least seem more cooperative. There is tremendous cross-cultural and historical variation in the qualities and behaviors which societies expect from their leaders, but whatever they may be they will be more often exhibited by males, since males are more strongly "motivated" towards the dominance that perfection of that quality makes possible. Males feel more strongly the "need" for dominance--and will more often give up other day-to-day sources of satisfaction in order to attain it--because, as we shall see in the next chapter, they are built that way. Modern males do not manifest the behavior necessary for becoming leading politicians any less strongly or less often than the males of primitive societies manifest that which is necessary for becoming members of the tribal council; the specific behavior changes, but male physiology and male "need" does not.

The theory I present here predicts that in every society it will be males who, far more strongly and more often than females, exhibit whatever behavior--fighting, kissing babies for votes, or whatever--is necessary for hierarchical attainment; it could be falsified by the discovery or development of a single hierarchical society in which the upper positions in the hierarchy are not

overwhelmingly occupied by males. It is not possible to predict what the necessary behavior will be in any given society, because this will be determined by social factors; but whatever it may be, it will be manifested by males.

However, I do not think that, in practice, we need remain so general. We can go a long way towards specifying the behavior by noticing, as have virtually all observers of political behavior, that the most important element in hierarchical success is dominance tendency, and that there are certain actions that always represent the tendency and that virtually always facilitate hierarchical attainment, whether the actions are in themselves positively sanctioned by the society or not. Thus, long hours devoted to developing political skills, "staying late at the office," attaching greater importance to success than to virtue, and similar manifestations of hierarchical dominance tendency will nearly always facilitate hierarchical attainment, even if the society finds such behavior too "aggressive" in the abstract--which merely leads the individual with a strong dominance tendency to camouflage his behavior and appear to exhibit whatever behavior is considered desirable and virtuous. "Dominance tendency" means the willingness to give up the objectives of other tendencies, to endure pain, frustration, tension, and defeat to satisfy a strong "need" to attain position. The upper hierarchical positions (and here I do not just mean politicians, but executives of even small companies)

are relatively few in number and are occupied by those most willing to give up other satisfactions in order to attain them. Attainment of such positions demands a "motivation" possessed only by the small minority of people who have the strongest dominance tendency. This minority, like the minority of people who are six feet tall, will be composed primarily of men.

It is crucial to note that what is important here-- and is a function of physiological differentiation--is not just the behavior, but also the environment that is capable of eliciting it, of "motivating" the individual. One might well argue that a woman whose child is endangered will be as strongly "motivated" to do whatever is necessary to protect her child as the male is to attain hierarchical position; as we shall see in the "analogy" below, environment is intimately involved with physiology in generating the tendency. However, it should be clear that "environment" does not mean mere socialization. The presence of any hierarchy is sufficient to elicit dominance "motivation" and the resulting behavior (whatever the social values relevant to hierarchical dominance), just as any threat to the child is sufficient to elicit protective "motivation" and its resulting behavior (whatever the social values relevant to protective behavior). That males are more strongly "motivated" than females by hierarchy and females are (I assume, but do not argue here; see ⁽⁶⁾ below) more strongly motivated than males by a threat to the child

results from differences in male and female physiology.

Claims which are neither Assumed nor Implied

I think it necessary here to make clear beyond the possibility of misunderstanding that the differentiation of dominance tendency does not imply the correctness of any of the following hypotheses. Some of these may well be correct, but it is irrelevant whether they are or not.

(1) It is not implied that males perform better than females in the positions and roles they attain. It is argued that male physiology is such that males are more strongly "motivated" to become, say, politicians, and are therefore more likely to make the necessary sacrifices; it is not implied that males make better politicians than females (though, of course, one cannot be a good or a bad politician until one has become one). One might argue that the dominance tendency relevant to attainment is valuable in performing a leadership role, but that argument is not made here: one might, on the other hand, argue that the weakness dominance tendency which precludes large numbers of women from attaining upper hierarchical positions would make women better leaders, but that argument is not made here either. (I will suggest, in an argument which is separate from the theory of patriarchy proper, that certain cognitive differences between males and females are rooted in physiological differences, and that this implies that--statistically speaking--each sex may be

expected to perform certain roles better than the other, but this need not concern us here.) (2) It is not implied that women who do attain hierarchical position have a weaker dominance motivation than men who attain equivalent positions. The female politician is just as motivated as her male equivalent, just as the six-foot-tall woman is as tall as the six-foot-tall man. The statistical theory presented here argues only that male physiology makes it more often males who are "motivated" sufficiently to attain the position, just as male physiology is responsible for the fact that most six-footers are male. Thus, there is no implication that Golda Meir differed in any relevant way from any male leader.

(3) Nor, as we shall see in the section on exceptions, is there any implication that Golda Meir differs physiologically from other women (there are non-physiological factors that increase dominance motivation). It is implied only that Golda Meir is, like the woman who is six feet tall, much more of an exception for her sex than the male leader is for his, and that this is based on physiological differences between the sexes.

(4) It is not implied that a strong dominance "Motivation" is sufficient for hierarchical attainment, only that it is necessary (or, more precisely that it is a strong facilitator). Clearly, there are always other necessary conditions. No black man is likely soon to be prime minister of South Africa. No illiterate is likely to

become President of General Motors. But someone who lacks motivation for attaining hierarchical positions is as unlikely to occupy them as a five-footer is to make a professional basketball team (whatever his other qualities). Thus, there are many societies in which only four or five per cent of the population meets the various hereditary, economic, or social necessary conditions, but within this group strong dominance motivation is necessary for hierarchical attainment.

(5) It is not implied that there are tendencies which are found only in the members of one sex, or that there is any quality which is more represented in the member of one sex who exhibits it the least than in the member of the other sex who exhibits it the most. Clearly, just as there are many women who are taller than many men, there are many women for whom hierarchy elicits a stronger dominance tendency than it does from many men, and many men from whom the child in distress elicits a stronger protective tendency than it does from many women. We shall discuss this at length in the section on exceptions; here I wish merely to emphasize that throughout we are discussing the statistical differences between men and women that are manifested in the social realities whose explanation is the purpose of this dissertation.

(6) It is not implied that women have a stronger, physiologically-rooted nurturant tendency than men, though I cannot imagine that anyone seriously doubts that this

is the case. I refrain from doing so because it need not be so for the theory presented here to be correct (the male's greater dominance tendency is sufficient to explain patriarchy, male attainment, and male dominance). Clearly, however, the presence of such a female tendency complements the male dominance tendency and increases the hierarchical discrepancy; if a woman is more strongly "motivated" to respond to her infant, she is that much less "motivated" to satisfy her "need for dominance."

(7) Similarly, it is not implied that there is any physiologically-rooted female tendency to prefer male dominance, though observation (rather than ideological claims) would lead one to believe that this is the case. There is, after all, a general belief that women prefer "dominant" men, which feminists decry and explain in terms of socialization. Again one can accept the feminist observation without accepting its "explanation," and again I would emphasize that I need not assume a female tendency of this sort; its presence would complement male dominance and increase the differentiation of the sexes, but it is irrelevant whether or not such a factor exists (either with reference to dyadic relationships, which seems likely, or male hierarchical attainment, which seems less likely).

The Iron and Magnet Analogy

There is a tendency for contemporary readers to picture physiologically-rooted physiological tendencies

(be they the dominance tendency that interests us, the "sex drive," or whatever) in terms of an hydraulic analogy. This analogy, which depicts an internal reservoir of anger, or aggression, or sexuality or whatever "pouring out," with various factors affecting the size of the reservoir and the strength of the flow, is satisfactory for many purposes --often because memory "internalizes environment" (as when fantasy generates sexual arousal), so that one may proceed as if environment played no initiative role--but is less than accurate when considering the differentiation of dominance tendency. I suggest that the reader would do better to think of the inherent attraction of iron to a magnet. Iron does not have an inherent "need" or "drive" to find a magnet, but the tendency to respond to a magnet is inherent in its physical make-up. The analogy is an appropriate one, at least as far as tendencies towards hierarchial dominance and high-status roles are concerned. The analogy accepts the crucial role of environment (the magnet in the analogy and the hierarchy or high-status role in the reality we wish to explain) without confusing the necessary environmental stimulus-cue with mere socialization (any hierarchy or high-status role is sufficient "environment" to cue the physiologically-rooted tendency and give it play) and without implying that the tendency devolves from environment--the dominance tendency needs a stimulus, but it is physiology that determines that one reacts with dominance tendency rather

than, says thirst.⁴

First Digression: The "Non-patriarchal
Society" as Refutation

The reader may remember that I described my statement that the theory could be refuted by the discovery or development of a single non-patriarchal society as "an oversimplification, but one which the universality of patriarchy permits." It should now be clear why the qualification was necessary. The analogy we have just examined makes it clear that every physiologically-rooted psychological tendency, every "motivation" of the type we discuss, required an environmental cue and an environment in which the cued behavior can be manifested.⁵ One might argue for the possibility of a society that lacked hierarchies altogether and therefore lacked the environmental arena necessary for patriarchy. I have tried to show that no such society has ever existed and I shall argue that--because every society must have a value system of some sort, and because any value system entails some sort of hierarchy, some individuals exhibiting the valued qualities and behavior more than others--no such society could exist. However, it is necessary to make the point that, while any society in which there was a significant amount of hierarchy and in which males did not attain the overwhelming number of upper positions in that hierarchy would refute the theory presented here, a non-hierarchical society would not be sufficient for

refutation. This is because the non-hierarchical society, the society that lacked the necessary environmental cue and arena, would not be sufficient to demonstrate the possibility of a society that did have hierarchy, but whose hierarchy was not patriarchal. Once there is hierarchy, the hierarchy will cue dominance tendencies more strongly in the male. But, again, there has never been any non-hierarchical society and there is, as we shall see, strong theoretical reason to believe that there never could be one. (If we think of the hierarchical dominance tendency as "competitiveness" we see that this is recognized even in everyday language. When we refer to a person as "competitive" we do not necessarily mean that he searches out competitive situations or attempts to create them where they do not exist, but that a competitive environmental situation cues this individual's "motivation" to attain or to win strongly than that of a less competitive individual.)

Moreover, the modern societies in which virtually all human beings will live for the foreseeable future are virtually defined by the extensiveness of their hierarchies. As I suggested earlier, one might well argue that modern societies--with their extensive hierarchies, extensive specialization, extensive division of labor, and status that is achieved rather than ascribed--must be more "masculine" than some primitive societies which limit hierarchy--and the environmental stimulus it represents--to an extent that is not possible in modern society.⁶

Chapter IIIFootnotes

¹Some would prefer to term patriarchy in a given society an "empirical fact" and to term the universality, the fact that every society is patriarchal, an "empirical generalization" (a generalization of "empirical facts"). The distinction is unimportant here.

²For an explanation of the term "parsimonious," see note 1 of chapter 6.

³In Patriarchy I left the dominance tendency and behavior we shall discuss pretty much unspecified, i.e. I did not include most of what is written in this chapter. I relied on the correlation between male physiology and patriarchy and used "aggression," meaning "dominance tendency," as a more or less undefined nexus term. I thought this devilishly elegant and a clever way of avoiding the problem of differing paradigms that I consider in a moment. Unfortunately, not a single reader agreed.

⁴This analogy is helpful in many other contexts. For example, one might depict the decreasing age of menarche in American girls in these terms and see the earlier sexual environment encountered by contemporary girls as cueing the earlier onset of menstruation. The psychoanalyst will quite rightly object that this analogy does not represent the situation--often encountered by him--in which a neurosis-producing environment produces an individual for whom an environmental stimulus cues an inappropriate tendency (for example, the individual who responds with fear when most would respond with sexual arousal). These statistically unusual cases are not crucial here. By depicting the male as iron and the female as nickel, a substance that is usually less magnetic than iron, but which can be made more magnetic under certain conditions, we have a good, though not perfect, analogy for the differentiation of dominance behavior, a differentiation that is statistical, rather than absolute--in other words, the tendency is stronger in most males than in most females, but there are some females with a stronger dominance tendency than some males. Readers of Patriarchy will note that the iron-magnet paradigm overcomes the problem of whether to conceptualize dominance tendency in terms of a "capacity" that is greater in males or in terms of a "threshold" that is lower in males. The magnet analogy makes it clear that the threshold paradigm is preferable and that I need not

have spent so much time on the issue in Patriarchy. Readers interested in the development of a theory might find it worth reading the discussion of paradigms in Patriarchy, but other readers will find it a waste of time.

⁵Remembering that, as in the case of sexual arousal, memory, and fantasy based on memory, can serve as "internalized environment" and cue the tendency.

⁶As we shall see in the section entitled "The Limits of Possibility," I am not suggesting that no primitive or non-modern society has extensive hierarchy, only that it is possible for a primitive society to have far less hierarchy than a modern society, whose social and economic system requires extensive hierarchy. This argument is difficult to carry further in the context of this work, since every primitive society has sufficient hierarchy to cue the male tendency and result in patriarchy. We shall consider this somewhat further in our discussion of the Mbuti; here I will end by emphasizing, at the risk of repetitiveness, that the "environment" of which we speak is not mere social values or socialization, but the very presence of hierarchy (any hierarchy). The environment that is necessary for patriarchy is inherent in society itself.

CHAPTER IV

PHYSIOLOGICAL DIFFERENTIATION

Introductory Note

This chapter is not, by any stretch of the imagination, meant to be a definitive discussion of the physiology of sexual differentiation of dominance behavior. Even were I qualified to undertake such a task, the volume of evidence which demonstrates how sexual neuroendocrinological differentiation determines the sexual differentiation of dominance tendency would preclude the possibility of full discussion here. The purpose of this chapter is merely to demonstrate that there is overwhelming evidence for the physiological basis of the differentiation of dominance tendency that the anthropological evidence would force us to postulate even if there were no direct physiological evidence. While I have made every effort to make this chapter completely accurate, there is little that is original in it; if this work makes an original contribution, it is in its discussion of the logical and theoretical aspects of the role of physiology in setting limits on social life, and not in its discussion of physiology per se.

Two semantic points are worth stressing. (1) Throughout this chapter and this work, the word "physiology," as well as the occasionally-used "biology," refers to the neuroendocrinological differentiation relevant to dominance

tendency, and not to anatomy, physical size, or reproductive system. (2) The word "environment" refers to social and economic environment and to socialization; it does not refer to unusual fetal environments that affect physiology in gross and direct ways. These kinds of "environment" are important in rare cases, and they are often most helpful in increasing our understanding of physiological differentiation, but they are unimportant to an explanation of a sexual differentiation that is found in every society. Thus, it has been shown that an exceptionally fraught environment can affect a pregnant rat in such a way that her female offspring are physiologically masculinized and exhibit the dominance behavior of a male. But, clearly, no one would suggest that the male's greater dominance tendency is attributable primarily to maternal shock.

Needless to say, I could not possibly have prepared this chapter without the advice of biochemists, biologists, endocrinologists, and psychologists who are too numerous to mention. I am particularly grateful, however, to Drs. Frank Beach and David Edwards of the University of California, Bruce McEwen and David Blizard of Rockefeller University, John Money of Johns Hopkins University and Geoffrey Raisman of Oxford. If there are any errors in this chapter, they are, of course, mine.

The Meaning of the Physiological Evidence

I have suggested that the anthropological evidence forces us to claim that the sexual differentiation of dominance tendency is of central importance to an explanation of the universality of patriarchy, male attainment and male dominance; and that both logic and anthropological evidence would seem to suggest very strongly indeed that sexual neuroendocrinological differentiation is of central importance to the differentiation of dominance tendency itself (even if we had not direct neuroendocrinological evidence whatsoever). In this chapter I will suggest that we need not posit the importance of neuroendocrinological evidence on hypothetical grounds alone. There is an enormous amount of evidence which demonstrates beyond doubt that the testicular-generated fetal hormonalization of the male central nervous system promotes earlier and more extensive maturation of the brain structures that mediate between male hormones and outward behavior; this makes the male hypersensitive to the presence later on of the hormones which energize dominance emotions and behavior, and result in his stronger tendency to respond to the environment with dominance behavior. This is the only physiological difference between the sexes the existence of which is necessary in order for the theory presented in this work to be correct.¹ (Once again, those who object to such terms as "energize" and "emotions" can easily translate what is being said here into the terms of the paradigm they prefer.)

Before we discuss the physiological evidence, it is necessary to make clear what we are not discussing. We are not discussing any sort of "territoriality" or "male bonding." We will examine these concepts in the second "digression;" here I merely want to emphasize that it would not matter to the theory presented here if there were no reality corresponding to these terms. Likewise, there is no implication that there are any human "instincts" (a term that is inadequate for a number of reasons), let alone an "aggressive instinct" or "killer instinct;" we are only discussing the hierarchical and dyadic dominance tendency.

I am not making an evolutionary or functional argument nor am I trying to explain why men and women have evolved the way they have, or what functions the mammalian differentiation of dominance tendency has served. Such evolutionary analyses are fascinating and important, but they are, by their nature, far more speculative than is necessary here. Here I am discussing only the directly specifiable, observable, and describable neuroendocrinological differences between the sexes and the behavioral tendencies (the emotions and "motivations") which these neuroendocrinological differences can be shown to engender. I am in no way implying that there is some law of nature which requires that the males of a species should dominate. Each species' physiology develops in concordance with its environment. The association of dominance tendencies

with the male serves obvious survival functions for mammalian species; one male can impregnate a thousand females, so males are far more expendable (each female lost means a loss of offspring). But while it is true in all primates, and in virtually all other mammalian species that male behavior is analogous to that found in man (we shall discuss possible exceptions below), it would make no difference to the line of reasoning used in this work if the females of all non-human species exhibited behavior analogous to dominance behavior. There is no reason to dismiss the possibility that unusual evolutionary environmental conditions could engender in even a mammalian species a physiological differentiation which led to the female having a stronger dominance tendency. Certainly there are a number of non-mammalian species in which females exhibit what would be male behavior in mammalian species, and vice versa. We should no more expect this to have any bearing on the effects of human physiology on human tendency and behavior than we would expect men to fly because birds have wings. Human physiology is what is relevant to patriarchy. When I invoke non-human evidence it always (with the one exception noted below) concerns direct neuroendocrinological alteration of mammals whose neuroendocrinological systems are similar to ours.

I do not, therefore, use any ethological evidence (evidence derived from the study of non-human animals in

their natural environments); although it strongly supports my theory, such evidence is not necessary for it and-- since it invariably elicits the objection that it represents unwarranted anthropomorphism--is ignored here. Similarly, I ignore both the powerful evidence of controlled, non-neuroendocrinological studies of primates² and well-documented studies which demonstrate the feminizing effects of castration on human and non-human primates and other mammals.

It is understandable that many sociologists should abhor any explanation of behavior which invokes physiology. This is not merely because some sociologists feel that they have a vested interest in purely social explanations, but is attributable to the host of inadequate and teleological evolutionary analogies with which the history of sociological theory is replete, and even more so to the horrors of slavery and Nazism, both of which made use of bogus biological evidence in the service of fallacious arguments. To these sociologists I would repeat that:

- (1) Such arguments are almost always of the "evolutionary analogy" rather than "direct physiological" type.
- (2) No scientific analysis of empirical relationships can ever entail a social policy (i.e. what is cannot entail what should be).
- (3) No scientific argument can be refuted on the basis of the uses to which it is put, but only on logical and empirical grounds. The biological arguments of Nazis and slaveowners were not incorrect because they

were put to horrendous uses, but because they failed on logical and empirical grounds; the argument that slavery is inevitable for some physiological reason is easily refuted by demonstrating that most societies do not have slavery. (4) To deny the correctness of one physiologically-rooted theory because another is faulty is as silly as denying the validity of a scientific argument on social or moral grounds. Some physiologically-rooted theories are correct and others are not. To reject them all because some have been incorrect is to put oneself in the position of denying that physiology has something to do with the fact that no society expects leadership from its one-year-olds.

Human Hermaphrodites

It should not be necessary to say that there have not been planned experiments in which hormones of the other sex have been introduced into normal human embryos or fetuses; such experimentation would not be ethical. However, accident has provided the researcher in this area with the hermaphrodite. Ironically, until a very few years ago hermaphrodites provided the strongest argument for the totally environmental theory of sex-role development; for there is a type of hermaphrodite who is genetically male, but who is born without external male genitalia. Such hermaphrodites are often raised as girls and develop into normal, though infertile, women. This seems strong evidence indeed that physiology is unimportant to the development of sexual temperament and behavior. However,

research in the past few years, particularly that of Dr. John Money of Johns Hopkins University, has demonstrated beyond question that such hermaphrodites do not merely lack male genitals; they also never received the hormonal stimulation of the brain by the male hormone, which all normal males receive fetally and again in puberty. The masculinization of the fetal brain is programmed by the testes (which develop on instruction from an XY chromosomal program). If a mistake causes a break in the chain so that fetal testes do not develop, as in the case with the genetic male hermaphrodites who lack external male genitals, there will be no masculinization of the brain (no generation of testosterone, the "male" hormone) and it will be possible to raise the genetic male as a female. In other words, the genetic male hermaphrodite with female external genital morphology can be raised as a female and will have no discordance between brain and the anatomy that determines socialization.

So many authors have misunderstood Dr. Money's work, and have misrepresented it as demonstrating the entirely social etiology of dominance tendency, that it is necessary to demonstrate at some length that Dr. Money's work cannot be legitimately interpreted as demonstrating this, and that to the extent that Dr. Money's work casts light on dominance tendency, it indicates that the male-female

differentiation of dominance tendency is rooted in neuroendocrinological differentiation.

The crucial empirical relationship that is at the heart of the theory advanced in this work is the relationship between male hormonalization and the stronger and more easily released male dominance tendency. For the vast majority of people, of course, hormonalization is mirrored by anatomy, gender self-conception, and gender social identification. But it is the male hormonalization that is primarily responsible for the greater male dominance tendency. Even if it were possible (and ethical) to get an experimental group of normal males, ignore their anatomy and raise them as females, those males, who, unlike the hermaphrodites, have had a normal hormonal development, would exhibit male behavior (at least with reference to the dominance behavior that concerns us). This is because-- as the evidence we shall discuss demonstrates conclusively-- dominance tendency is primarily a result of hormonal development and not primarily of anatomy, gender identity, or the socialization that reflects anatomy and gender identity. The experimental individuals might well perceive themselves as females who had dominance tendencies that were unusually strong for females, but this need not concern us here; it is the dominance tendency that is relevant here.

We are not concerned with gender identity--the conception of oneself as male or female. It is the confusion of gender identity with dominance tendency that

has led to misunderstanding. For the theory presented here it would not matter if gender identity had a purely social cause. An analogy should make this clear: if one argues that male hormonalization plays a crucial role in muscular development--as I argue that male hormonalization plays a crucial role in the development of dominance tendency--one makes no claim about gender identity; whether or not the chromosomal female who undergoes fetal and pubertal hormonal masculinization sees herself as a male or as a muscular female is irrelevant to the argument. It is the muscular development that is relevant here. As we shall see, gender identification does play an important secondary role in that it increases sexual differentiation; male identification makes it more likely that an individual will lift weights, and less likely that he will suppress dominance tendency. But the association of greater muscular strength and greater dominance tendency with males, and the direction of male and female socialization, are determined by physiological differentiation.

If one includes dominance tendency in gender role/gender identity, then one cannot--and Dr. Money does not--conclude that gender role/gender identity has purely social causes. At least with respect to the sexual differentiation of dominance tendency and the behavior that reflects it--which is all that concerns us in this work--one must conclude that neuroendocrinological differentiation plays

a crucial role. Dr. Money writes:

Gender identity in adulthood is the end product not of an either-or determinism of heredity versus environment, but of the genetic code in serial interaction with environment. From the time of conception, the genetic code unfolds itself in interaction, first with the intrauterine environment, then the perinatal environment, the family environment, and eventually the more extended social, biological, and inanimate ecological environment. Interactionism is a key principle, but an even more basic key is the principle of serial sequence of interaction.

Serial interactionism means that interaction between the genetic code and its environment, at a critical or sensitive developmental period in an individual's existence, from conception to death, may leave a permanent, ineradicable residue upon which all else is subsequently built. This residue may be so indelible or insistent in its influence as to resemble the potency of the genetic code itself. Moreover, such indelibility or insistence may be residual to what has traditionally been referred to as learning-- in which case learning should be referred to as imprinting, in recognition of the persistence and durability of its influence.³

The sequence begins with the dimorphism of the genetic code as manifested in the XX and XY chromosomal dimorphism. From the genetic code, sexual dimorphism is translated into the dimorphism of embryonic differentiation of the gonads, which, through their hormonal secretion, in turn differentially regulate the dimorphism of first the internal reproductive structures and then the external genitalia. At the same time in embryonic life, gonadal secretion dimorphically regulates the differentiation of structures in the brain, specifically the hypothalamus, that in turn will regulate the sex-related functioning of the pituitary. In all probability gonadal secretion at this same time also dimorphically regulates other structures of the brain that will eventually be involved in the regulation of certain aspects of sexually dimorphic behavior, namely, those aspects that are phyletically widely distributed (like motherly attentiveness to the new-born or coital postures and movement).⁴

The prenatal determinants of gender identity can be perhaps not entirely overridden, but they can be and are incorporated into the postnatal programme of

differentiation ...⁵ The evidence ... shows rather conclusively that there are in human beings some gender dimorphic behavior differences based on antenatal hormonal history, but that these differences do not automatically dictate or totally preordain the course of postnatal dimorphism of behavioral differentiation.⁶

This is all that the theory presented in this book assumes about physiological differentiation as far as the sexual differentiation of dominance tendency is concerned. The only neuroendocrinological differentiation posited by the theory presented here--and the only one necessary for it to be correct--is that which is responsible for, first, the male's stronger tendency to react to the environmental presence of a hierarchy, status role, or member of the other sex with dominance behavior, and second, the differentiation of social values, socialization, and institutions (the "postnatal programme of differentiation") that reflects, and increases, the differentiation of dominance tendency. It would not matter for the theory presented here if every other aspect of sexual differentiation had purely social causes.⁷

It is crucial to note that I do not deny the importance of social reality and socialization, of the "postnatal programme of differentiation;" indeed, the purpose of this work is to explain why this "programme" always associates dominance with the male. The point is not that the social reality is unimportant, but that it is not, in any important respect, the independent variable; social values, socialization, and institutions (and the other elements that constitute the "postnatal programme")

are given their limits and direction by people's observation of the differentiated behavior of men and women generated by neuroendocrinological differentiation. We shall discuss the senses in which environment is the independent variable. These are either irrelevant for our purposes (the long-term evolutionary conformation of physiology to environment) or unimportant ("feedback"). To be sure, socialization increases the differentiation of tendency and behavior by making qualitative, separate, and absolute ("men are aggressive," "women are passive") a psychophysiological reality that is quantitative, continuous, and statistical (the statistical difference in dominance tendency). But socialization gets its direction and limits from the physiological differentiation and observation of its behavioral manifestations. There is no outside experimenter in society.⁸

Tomboyism

The aspect of Dr. Money's work that most interests us concerns "tomboyism," a rare situation in which genetic females experience a hormonal masculinization of the CNS (central nervous system) during the fetal stage. We are particularly interested in those individuals whose fetal masculinization was such that the CNS was altered, but not the anatomy--in other words, individuals who were identified and socialized as females. Such individuals lacked the enthusiasm for motherhood that marked the control group with which they were compared; demonstrated

a greater interest in a career and a lesser interest in marriage, and showed a preference for "male" toys like guns and little interest in "female" toys like dolls. In short, they manifested an interest in the objects and goals associated with masculinization rather than feminization. This cannot be explained in terms of socialization, because these individuals were identified and socialized as females. Dr. Money writes: "The most likely hypothesis to explain the various features of tomboyism in fetal/masculinized genetic females is that their tomboyism is a sequel to the masculinizing effect on the fetal brain."

Dr. Money mentions that these individuals were no more "aggressive" than normal females. A number of critics invoked this as demonstrating that the masculinization does not produce dominance tendencies, yet none of them felt it necessary to point out that Dr. Money was referring here to fighting behavior and that his very point was that the correct term for the differentiated behavior is dominance assertion, striving for position in the dominance hierarchy--precisely the variable that is relevant here. Fighting behavior, per se, is irrelevant.⁹

While there is nothing in Dr. Money's work that deals directly with the question of the development of the system of social values and socialization that determines the nature of the postnatal program by which a society's males and females will be socialized (he merely states that it incorporates the prenatal determinants),

it is worth noting that, as the above quotation indicates, he stops short of saying that socialization can ever completely override prenatal determinants even in individual cases (to say nothing of it doing so in many cases in a given society that there were no longer the observable differences in the behavior of males and females which determine the limits and direction of the socialization system). It is also worth noting, for those who are interested in individual cases rather than the statistical realities that are relevant to patriarchy, that there is only one type of case out of all those mentioned by Dr. Money that could imply that the socialization might be capable of overriding the prenatal determinants in a normal individual; this is the case of the hormonally normal male who lost his penis in a circumcision accident and who was not subsequently given hormonal treatment. In all other cases of all types prenatal hormonal development was ambivalent and it is certainly possible that such individuals can be successfully socialized to the behavior of the other genetic sex where normal, physiologically univalent individuals cannot be; successful socialization of such individuals no more necessarily implies that socialization has this power in normal individuals than the fact that a female hermaphrodite can be successfully socialized (i.e. told) to grow facial hair implies that a normal woman could grow facial hair if that were the way she were socialized. (That

normal women can be hormonalized to grow facial hair, or to manifest male behavior demonstrates the importance of male hormonalization to growing facial hair and to manifesting male behavior, and supports our assumption of the importance of male hormonal development to male behavior.)

Dr. Money presents only one example of the only type of case (the circumcision accident victim) that could imply that socialization is capable, in individual cases of normal human beings, of completely overriding the prenatal determinants. This individual has been surgically, but not hormonally, feminized and has been raised as a girl. (Hormonal feminization will be introduced at puberty.) Dr. Money reports that this girl "was often the dominant one in a girl's group" and exhibited tomboy behavior. Obviously this one case does not constitute a large enough sample to allow any generalizations to be drawn, but I think it worth noting that this individual, who was socialized so successfully that she manifested the behavior and characteristics of a normal girl in almost every respect, also manifested the dominance behavior that is associated with male hormonalization. I mention this not as demonstration of the importance of hormonal differentiation to sexually differentiated hierarchical and dyadic dominance behavior, but merely to show that one may disregard this particular case or one may see it as tentative evidence

for the impossibility of socialization completely overriding the hormonal factor. However, one cannot invoke it as evidence that socialization is capable of completely overriding the hormonal factor.

In any case, I do not argue that environmental factors can never override hormonally-rooted tendencies. We shall see that environmental factors, certain familial situations, for example, are capable of engendering in some women hierarchical and dyadic dominance behavior greater than that which hormones engender in some males--though they engender in some men hierarchical and dyadic dominance behavior greater than that which is manifested in any women. The argument advanced in this book is that the quantitative and continuous statistical reality of differentiation of hormonally generated behavior is made qualitative and discrete by the social values and socialization that are given their direction by the observed (hormonally directed) behavioral differentiation. Note that the environmental factors that are capable of overriding the hormonal factor in some women do not include socialization; no group socializes its women (relative to its men) towards hierarchical and dyadic dominance.

This hierarchical and dyadic dominance behavior is the only type of behavior that is relevant to the theory I present; that the individual under discussion socialized as an average female in any or all other respects is irrelevant to the theory. If there were a large enough

sample of such individuals to allow experimentation, and if such experimentation were ethical, we might hypothesize that in a group comprising ten such individuals and ten normal females, the former would tend to dominate the group. There is nothing surprising about this: we already know from Dr. Money's studies of "tomboyism" that even when the hormonal masculinization is partial, male behavior is exhibited. We should certainly expect it when the individuals have--like the circumcision victim--experienced a normal fetal masculinization.

Testosterone and Dominance Tendency

My primary purpose for invoking Dr. Money's work is not to demonstrate the neuroendocrinological origins of the differentiation of dominance tendency per se, but to present a general description of the role of physiology in the sexual differentiation of tendencies in general, and to show that this findings are completely compatible with everything that I say in this work. As we have seen, where Dr. Money's work touches on the subject of dominance tendency, or on those tendencies which seem to be closely related to it, it indicates that neuroendocrinological differentiation plays a crucial role. But the differentiation of dominance tendency is not his primary concern, and if his work were the only evidence we had on the subject one would be correct in assuming that the role of physiology in the differentiation of dominance tendency remained an open question (provided one ignored the anthropological evidence already discussed).

However, there is another line of evidence with a bearing on the subject, namely the direct psychophysiological study of mammals which resemble human beings in the physiology of the system being studied.¹⁰ Such studies minimize the influence of unwarranted anthropomorphism, always a danger in ethological studies. Readers who categorically dismiss even the direct study of non-human mammals as irrelevant should ignore this section; I trust that the anthropological evidence and that provided by human hermaphrodites will convince them of at least the strong possibility of the determinativeness of physiological differentiation. But I would remind such readers that nearly all medical research supports the validity, and the relevance to human beings, of studies of the type presented here, and that such readers acknowledge the validity and relevance every time they take medical treatment of any kind.

The role of hormones in the etiology of dominance tendency is exceedingly complex. It is a gross oversimplification, at best, to speak merely of hormone levels. Dominance tendency results from the interaction between a fetally-prepared central nervous system and the presence of endogenous testosterone. This explains the possibility of the rare species in which the effect of testosterone on the male is the reverse of that in humans, with the result that dominance behavior is associated with the female. It is by no means clear that there are any such

exceptions at all among mammals; certainly there are none among the species most closely related to man. It has been suggested that the golden hamster is the single experimental exception to the development of sexual differences in aggression outlined here,¹¹ but this has recently been brought into question.¹² Even if the female hamster is an exception, this does not indicate an unwarranted selectivity on our part when we consider the mouse, the rat, and all the other animals for which dominance is associated primarily with the male, as analogues of the human male, and exclude the hamster. For, unlike the mouse, rat, and other experimental animals, the hamster female is also larger than the male. This would seem a good indication that the entire CNS (Central Nervous System) hormonal development of the hamster is the reverse of that in the other experimental animals so that, if one wants to consider the hamster rather than the other animals, as analogous in its development to humans, one must not only show that the human female is more aggressive than the human male, but also that she is larger.¹³

With all this in mind, I refer the reader to a number of experiments that indicate beyond a shadow of doubt that, at least among rats, mice, and many other mammals, testosterone is related not only to sexual differentiation but to dominance tendency itself. In paired tests, females treated with exogenous testosterone during the crucial period just after birth will develop a dominance

tendency as adults, if appropriately hormonally treated as adults, equal to that of the male who receives neonatal testosterone stimulation of the CNS endogenously from his own testes. Females treated with androgen on the tenth day following birth will, as adults, demonstrate a dominance greater than that of the normal female, but less than that of neonatally treated females or normal males. Neonatal experiments, particularly a series by David Edwards, demonstrate that testosterone does not create the neural mechanisms for aggression (if it did, the female would be totally incapable of dominance behavior and would be passive) but that such fetal or neonatal stimulation affects the ultimate sensitivity of the CNS to androgenic stimulation later in life, thereby rendering the postpubertal male more likely to react to the environment with dominance behavior than the female. Dr. Edwards concludes:

... the commonly observed male-female dimorphism, with respect to fighting in mice, has as its basis, the fact that males develop with testes and females do not. In the male, early testicular secretions probably effect some change in brain mechanisms for aggression such that most adult male pairs will fight in the presence of endogenous or exogenous testosterone. In females this change is not effected due to the absence of testes and correlated testicular secretions.

In addition, there appears to be a critical period for the androgen-influenced organization of a neural substrate for aggression. This period may be tentatively characterized as a period of time, in the development of the mouse, during which endogenous or exogenous androgen stimulation will enhance adult sensitivity to androgens with respect to the arousal of the tendency to display aggression. Furthermore, the data indicate that the period of development during which androgen stimulation will produce maximal sensitivity in the adult occurs in

the first few postnatal days of development. Androgen stimulation before or after this optimal period will enhance adult sensitivity to androgens but to a lesser extent.¹⁴

Dr. Edwards's findings and those of other behavioral biologists, endocrinologists, developmental psychologists, and researchers in related fields showed with a high degree of certainty that sexual differences in dominance are a function to testosterone and the hormonalization of the fetal brain. The specific morphological changes in the CNS engendered by this hormonalization, however, had never been seen and could be only inferred ("some change in brain mechanisms"). Recently, however, Dr. Geoffrey Raisman and Dr. Pauline M. Field, of Oxford's Department of Human Anatomy, photographed the preoptic area of the male and female central nervous systems and demonstrated that in this area, which is known to be crucial to sexual behavior, there is an extensive sexual dimorphism; the sexes differ in the distribution of synapses on the dendritic spines. Having seen that testosterone was directly related to dominance, and that the central nervous system of the sexes differ morphologically in an area of the brain necessary for male behavior, all that was needed was a direct demonstration that it was testosterone that effected the morphological changes. That testosterone is the determining factor here has been inferentially demonstrated many times in the past dozen years, as we have seen. Direct evidence has been provided only in recent years--at the

conference on the Neurobiology of the Amygdala in Bar Harbor --at which Dr. Raisman delivered his findings that testosterone does generate specifiable morphological sexual dimorphism in the brain.¹⁵

To be sure, the Raisman-Field photographs were not of human beings and, certainly, there is much that science has yet to learn about the exact manner in which sexual differences in the arrangement of the central nervous system are manifested in differences in dominance. None the less, it is simply preposterous to attempt, as have many feminists, to portray the overwhelming evidence that testosterone is crucial to dominance tendency as mere isolated findings that have no apparent significance for sexual differences in behavior. Only the most fanatic purist or the behaviorist for whom such a conclusion would be intolerable would deny us the right to strongly suspect that, within ten years, the same central nervous system differences found in experimental animals will be found to exist in the brains of men and women. Those who now refuse to admit the persuasiveness of the considerable evidence provided by the hermaphrodite and the voluminous amounts of evidence provided by the studies of experimental animals will continue to do so when our knowledge of hormones has doubled or tripled. None the less, even at this point the tightening web of evidence allows no escape from the conclusion that human sexual differences in "aggression" are strongly related to irreversible differences in the central nervous systems of men and women that are

generated before birth.¹⁶

The Irrelevance of Exceptions

When we speak of men and women we speak in virtually absolute terms; with the exception of the hermaphrodite, everyone is unambiguously a male or a female. When we speak of masculine and feminine characteristics we speak in statistical terms, with the result that we expect to find many "exceptions."¹⁷ This would all seem too obvious to mention, but so many authors have invoked exceptions in attempts to deny the neuroendocrinological basis of the sexual differentiation of dominance behavior that is worth emphasizing the point here.

It does not matter whether the exception is invoked on the behavioral level (women who exhibit greater dominance tendency and behavior than some men) or on the physiological level (women who have higher testosterone levels than some men).¹⁸ Even when we speak of a characteristic whose etiology is virtually purely hereditary, such as height, we expect to find many exceptions.¹⁷ It would be absurd to argue that, because some women are taller than some men, the general male height advantage must result from environmental factors. It is similarly absurd to argue--as have many critics--that the fact that the range within a sex in a given characteristic is greater than the difference between the means of the two sexes somehow demonstrates the irrelevance or importance

of physiology. The range of height (i.e. the difference between the shortest and tallest) is much greater within the group of males (or females) than is the difference between the males and females means; but the sexual difference is maintained at each level, and one should not expect the best basketball team to contain any women or the best high school basketball teams to contain more than one woman. I would guess that a good third of the objections raised to Patriarchy could have been avoided if the critic had simply asked himself whether his point could as well have been made with respect to height and if, when finding that it could and that it would not lead him to deny the role of physiology in the sexual differentiation in height, he had refrained from raising his objection.

If we expect exceptions even when the characteristic in question is almost purely hereditary, we can certainly expect them for a characteristic, like dominance tendency, which is determined not only by physiological factors, but by non-physiological ones (like early familial experiences) as well. Such non-physiological factors engender in some women a dominance tendency stronger than that found in most men. Similar factors combine with the male's physiologically-rooted stronger dominance tendency to give some males a stronger dominance tendency than all other males and all females. Because dominance tendency is the result of both physiological and non-physiological factors, every society

will have a minority of women who exhibit greater dominance tendency than some men and a minority of men who exhibit a weaker dominance tendency than some women. This would be the case even if there were no overlap on the physiological level.

In reality, of course, the "physiological" and "non-physiological" etiological components of dominance tendency are not causally independent. The non-physiological elements, which can produce the exceptions, far more often increase the differentiation. Consider the analogy of muscular strength. Male physiology is such that most males are physically stronger than most females, though there are many exceptions. This is recognized by the members of every society, and physical strength is associated with males (though, as we shall see, males will not necessarily do work requiring greater strength). Social values and socialization reflect this general rule, so that, for example, males are encouraged to lift weight far more than females. This increases the differentiation of physical strength. Logically, it would be possible for women to do five hours of calisthenics while the men remained sedentary, and this would eradicate the sexual differences in physical strength. However, this is not possible in reality because the non-physiological is in general given its direction by the physiological.

It is worth noting here that, as a general rule, statistical realities tend to be reinforced by marital

selection; women tend to choose men who are taller and exhibit a greater dominance tendency than themselves. As I have mentioned, it would make sense, and would be compatible with the evidence, to suggest that female neuroendocrinology plays a role in this female choice, but this need not concern us.

Feedback and Suggestion

The example of physical strength and calisthenics demonstrates the possibility that environment can alter physiology ("feedback"). Environmental stimuli and situations can, similarly, alter testosterone levels. Dr. Irwin Bernstein and associates have demonstrated that, to oversimplify somewhat, testosterone levels not only result from internal mechanisms, but from environmental situations as well; specifically, they have shown that a new hierarchical setting can influence testosterone level.²⁰ They provided each of four rhesus monkeys with a group of receptive females and found each of the four assumed dominance of his respective group. The plasma testosterone levels of each of these males increased two- to threefold in the new environment. These males were then placed in male groups in which they were subjected to sudden and decisive defeat. This resulted in a drop in these males' plasma testosterone levels. Two of the males were later reintroduced to the female groups and their testosterone levels returned to their previous high levels.

Now some readers misinterpreted this research and inferred that it demonstrated that the relationship of testosterone level and dominance behavior/position represents nothing more than the conformation of hormone level to environment. It is not clear that the research demonstrates this even for males; the males in the research were introduced into already formed groups which presented the newly introduced males with the resistance of the entire group--a stimulus that is, as the researchers demonstrate, capable of defeating the new males and driving down their testosterone levels. However, this still does not tell us what it is that generates the behavior that enables males in relatively stable groups to attain dominance positions (and high testosterone levels). More importantly for our purposes, the research does not imply that environmental stimuli are capable of lowering a male's testosterone level to that of the female, or raising the female's level to a male level; indeed it shows that when males are reintroduced to female groups their dominance returns and their testosterone levels return to the old level. Why does no environmental stimulus result in either female dominance or female levels of testosterone equal to the levels of even the lowest-level males? This research indicates that it is not a question of strength, size, or pugnacity. The most reasonable answer is that the fetal masculinization renders males more sensitive to the testosterone-affecting environmental stimuli. Thus,

environment does affect male testosterone levels and dominance, but environment is not, in these studies, capable of engendering a lowering of male testosterone levels to anything approaching the female level. And even if this were not the case, we would ask anyone who argues that feedback somehow demonstrates the unimportance of fetal sexual physiological sexual differentiation to dominance tendency the usual question: why does the environment, which he sees as the independent variable, always initiate a male rise in testosterone? Attempts to answer this question will encounter the same insurmountable problem which faces all non-neuroendocrinological explanations of the universality of patriarchy (we shall discuss these at length later).

We might ask the same question of those who invoke Schachter and Singer's well-known demonstration that the behavioral effects of epinephrine tend to reflect suggestion (i.e. individuals given adrenalin will be fearful or exhilarated, depending on the behavior of those around them). Even if we ignore such obvious dissimilarities between testosterone and epinephrine as the fact that a fetal differentiation of CNS structures plays a crucial role in determining the effects of the former (but not the latter), and even if we ignore the fact that it is absurd to assume the malleability of the effects of one substance on the basis of another (would anyone argue that the effects of

insulin are as varied as epinephrine?), we still find that to invoke suggestion as an explanation of male dominance is begging the question: why does every environment suggest male dominance?

Physiology and Within-Sex Differences

The theory advanced here does not imply that physiology is at all involved in differences in dominance tendency and behavior within the group. While I happen to think it quite likely that the small differences between different males' central nervous systems and testosterone levels do contribute to differences in the strength of their dominance tendency (and that the same is true of females), it would be irrelevant to the theory advanced here if differences within the sexes were caused by non-physiological factors alone. All this would indicate is that once the physiological differentiation is removed as a variable (i.e. once the physiological "necessary condition" is met), then physiology is no longer relevant. If the reader can stand one more physical analogy: the fact that weight is irrelevant to differences in boxing ability among men who weigh over 200 pounds hardly demonstrates that weight is not crucial to becoming a heavyweight boxer, or to the fact that all such boxers are men. Moreover, even if physiological factors are relevant to differing dominance propensity, such differences are not anatomically observable by the population and, therefore, cannot be associated with categories of people or manifested in the

socialization system. If the difference in dominance behavior between brown-haired men and blond-haired men were like the difference in dominance behavior between men and women, this would be reflected in the socialization system.²¹

Dominance Behavior in Boys and Girls

Socialization is the process by which society prepares children for adulthood; that it conforms to the reality of physiology can be seen quite clearly when we consider boys and girls, rather than men and women. Boys and girls have roughly equal testosterone levels, yet boys clearly demonstrate a stronger dominance tendency, as well as a greater tendency for rough and tumble play, fighting, and other male behavior. This fact is often invoked by those who deny the importance of physiological differentiation to the differentiation of dominance behavior. Now, in fact the boys' greater dominance tendency results primarily from their physiology. We have seen that it is a gross over-simplification to speak only of hormone levels; it is the fetal masculinization of the CNS (and the increased sensitivity to the dominance-related properties of whatever testosterone is present that the masculinization generates) that is of primary importance.

But let us for the moment pretend that the only physiological factor relevant to dominance tendency is testosterone level. The boy's greater dominance tendency would then result only from socialization. But this does not demonstrate that socialization is not conforming to

physiological reality (i.e. the adult male's higher testosterone level). Socialization reflects adult realities, and the reality is that after puberty the male has a much higher testosterone level. We shall speak about socialization later, so I shall make only two basic points here. (1) By "socialization" I do not mean simply the consciously recognized values transmitted by parents to children (like "stealing is bad"), but the constant recognition of adult realities that is transmitted simply as a result of the parents' observation and experience. When parents tell the little girl that "boys are more 'agressive'" they are socializing the girl more strongly away from "aggressive" behavior, but they are also transmitting their observation of reality; men are more "agressive" than women. (2) My point is not that parents should do this. While I do think that with many types of behavior it is necessary (the girl who comes to depend on fighting is going to be in serious trouble after pubertal male growth has left her a great disadvantage), my point is here that there will always be at least a loose concordance between reality and what parents tell their children about the world. To what extent they should do this and to what extent they could get away with misrepresenting the world to children (who are not blind) is a question the reader is as well prepared to answer as I am.

A Crucial Question Left Unanswered

The view of the universe which is fundamental to this work (and, I would argue, to all science) is that of the physicalist. This means simply that all reality is, in theory, reducible to physical components, and that all reality is, in theory, predictable, at least in the statistical terms of the physicist, from the actions of sub-atomic particles. This view is, of course, merely a philosophical position. No one expects the historian to write the history of England in terms of the interplay of atoms, or to describe the positions of the atomic constituents of Romeo and Juliet; no one denies that, given the nature and limits of the human central nervous system, Macaulay and Shakespeare give us a far deeper understanding than would some kind of atomic description. Nor does the physicalist view deny the necessity of incorporating physical realities into non-physical constructs like "government" and "class," or the necessity of terms that represent neurochemical-electrical activity ("love," "fear"). What the physicalist abhors are non-physical constructs that are claimed to exist in reality ("soul") and nonexplanations ("miracle"). I realize that many find this view life-denying or godless. Here I can merely suggest that they fail to see the dance of matter, which has a far greater beauty than any man-made "spirit" could possess. I bring up the issue of physicalism here merely to introduce a question which this dissertation

raises, but does not solve. (I should add that a number of logicians with whom I have discussed the question find no problem and accept the first "solution" offered below. I cannot, however, shake off a feeling or dissatisfaction with it.)

The question is simply this: how can a hierarchy, an abstraction, affect an individual's central nervous system? There is no problem when we speak of male dominance or sexual arousal; perception of another individual and an alteration of the CNS is easily seen in purely sense-data and physical terms. But how does a hierarchy bring about an alteration of the CNS? I can think of only two responses: (1) a "hierarchy" is simply our abstractive term to describe the resolution of a sort of "vertical tournament" fought between pairs of men; the human capacity for memory and abstraction enables one to generalize about these "battles," but the basic environment stimulus is another human being; or (2) we, and many other species, have some CNS programming which enables us to recognize the abstraction we term a "hierarchy;" however, this "answer" is so unsatisfying to they physicalist that it is perhaps worse than no answer at all.

Physiological Evolution

While acknowledging the role of feedback, I have argued throughout this chapter that physiological

differentiation is basically an independent variable that sets limits on, and gives direction to, environmental factors. It is of course true that in the evolutionary long run environment is basically the independent and physiology the dependent variable. Should physiological evolution erase the neuroendocrinological differences responsible for patriarchy, then, of course, males would not attain the overwhelming number of hierarchical positions. I would argue that such males and females would be so different on a neuroendocrinological level from men and women as we know them that they would not be "men" and "women" in any meaningful sense, and that "patriarchy" refers to hierarchies in societies composed of men and women. I realize that some will see this defense as tautological; to them I can merely point out that every scientific theory is tautological in the sense that it must, at some empirical perimeter, invoke a ceteris paribus clause. Given the fact that a genetic male or female who undergoes other-sex hormonalization is (if untreated) hermaphroditic and sterile, I do not think I invoke the ceteris paribus clause in an unreasonably narrow sense. More important, however, is the fact that those who blithely speak of evolutionary or pharmacological eradication of CNS differences grossly underestimate the depth and extent of the differences. We are not speaking here of such superficialities as skin or eye color, or even of (perhaps mutable) differences in capacity; we

are speaking of the basic "motivational" properties of the male and female brains and central nervous systems. This differentiation developed long before our species walked the earth and there is, as we have seen, no evidence that it is diminishing.

Second Digression: Race and IQ,
Territoriality, and Male Bonding

We live in a time when many academics like to believe that the variations of human behavior and social institutions are virtually unlimited. This explains the readiness to invoke cultural variation as evidence of human malleability whenever possible, while ignoring, and leaving unexplained, the universality of the institutions discussed here (a universality that seems all the more astonishing when one considers the extent of the cultural variations that such academics can draw upon). An analysis such as this which concludes that our psychophysiological nature sets immutable limits to human malleability and institutional possibilities, meet strong resistance from those who favor the prevailing view. One form of this resistance is the tendency to bracket together all analyses which stress the importance of physiology to behavior, and to treat them as if they all exhibited the weaknesses of the weakest among them. Thus, many have failed to differentiate between analyses of very differing degrees of persuasiveness. I have already

considered both evolutionary and ethological analyses and have made the point that, suggestive as they often are, such analyses are by their nature far more speculative and far more open to logical and evidential criticisms than those which can invoke the types of precise evidence that are available for an explanation of patriarchy. It is necessary to make some crucial distinctions here in order to make the point that neither the validity of the reasoning nor the correctness of the conclusions of any of these sorts of investigations has any bearing on the correctness of the theory advanced in this book.

The most controversial of the investigations which emphasize the importance of physiology to social life, and the first to be lumped together with the analysis presented here by those opposed to all physiologically-rooted analyses, are those which claim that racial differentiation in IQ scores have a genetic basis. I am not qualified to assess the validity of these arguments, though the fact that I, too, do not like the idea that IQ depends primarily on heredity is hardly much of an argument against it. I would, however, mention some differences, which I am certain the authors of these works would acknowledge, between the kinds of evidence available to those attempting to explain racial differences in IQ and to those attempting to explain the universality of patriarchy.

The evidence concerning race and IQ is, by and large, based on one minority living under very special conditions

in one society (blacks in the United State). For the basis of evidence of the IQ argument to be equivalent to the evidence relevant to sexual differentiation of dominance tendency, all societies that have ever existed--with all their varied social, economic, political, and religious systems--would have to be half white and half black, and in every one whites would have to surpass blacks on IQ tests.

And even if this were the case, the genetic argument could "merely" (but most persuasively) be hypothetical; no one could specify the physiological factors relevant to the differentiation of IQ in the way that we can specify those relevant to the sexual differentiation of dominance behavior. And even if we could do this, we would still be speaking of capacities, which are probably more malleable and of less importance to social life than the behavioral tendencies that "motivate" the members of a society.

The race and IQ arguments are limited by the available evidence and by our knowledge of genetics; whether ultimately correct or not, they are cogent and well argued. The same cannot be said of the various works positing a human "territoriality." The problem with such works is not that they have the audacity to suggest that our physiology has something to do with our behavior, or even that they suggest that the "territoriality" that seems to be programmed into lower animals may be relevant to human beings, but that they fail to specify not merely the

physiological elements, but also--with any precision--the behavioral and social manifestations allegedly resulting from them. It would not necessarily be illegitimate to postulate the existence of (as yet undiscovered) physiological factors if this made possible a more plausible explanation of an observed empirical reality; indeed, I have argued that the empirical anthropological evidence is such that we would be forced to posit the importance of differentiated physiological factors to patriarchy even if we did not have the direct CNS-hormonal evidence. However, while patriarchy (the ultimate manifestation of the differentiation of dominance tendency and the physiological differentiation that underlies it) is easily identified by merely counting the relative numbers of men and women in hierarchies, the alleged manifestations of territoriality are so loosely defined that it is never clear what is being explained or even if there is anything to explain that is not more plausibly explained in social terms. My theory specifies the characteristics of the empirical realities it explains (patriarchy, male attainment, and male dominance), the motivational nexus that links the physiological and the institutional (the differentiation of dominance tendency--behaviorists can ignore this step), and the physiological factors (the CNS-hormonal differentiation we have discussed). In short, theories of human "territoriality," while they may be suggestive, are as unfalsifiable as the theory presented

in this dissertation is falsifiable. At best they demonstrate that human beings have the capacity for doing certain things that human beings do; this is true by definition and need not be demonstrated. What gives a physiologically-rooted social theory meaning is the demonstration that physiology engenders tendency.

While it seems to me that theories that post a male tendency to "bond" are more interesting and more likely to be productive than those concerned with "territoriality," these too suffer (though less seriously) from an inability to specify with much precision either manifestations of the male bonding tendency or direct physiological evidence. (These theories invoke physiological evidence relevant to sexual differences in dominance, but not to male bonding itself; in other words, while there is a wealth of evidence demonstrating that other-sex hormonalization directly affects dominance behavior, there is little such evidence on male bonding.) In any case, I wish here merely to stress that male bonding has nothing whatsoever to do with the theory advanced here, a point missed by many critics.

Chapter IVFootnotes

¹Because I am looking for a sufficient explanation of the universality of patriarchy, male attainment, and male dominance (see first section of Chapter III), I ignore the role of female physiology--both that which leads the female to favor other tendencies over dominance tendency and that which, if such exists, leads the female to favor and select for dominant males. The male physiological tendency towards dominance would be sufficient to explain the universality even if women differed physiologically from men only in the physiological underpinnings of dominance tendency. To the extent that the many unique aspects of female physiology do, in fact, complement male physiology and contribute to the institutions discussed here, the argument presented here is that much stronger. But a sufficient explanation can assume that there is no such female physiological contribution.

²For example, Harry F. Harlow and Stephen J. Suomi have demonstrated that monkeys reared in isolation will, when brought together, exhibit the play behavior expected of normal monkeys; male play behavior is far more aggressive than female play behavior (as is the case with human children). Since the monkeys were reared in isolation they could not have learned this mode of behavior from other monkeys. The indication is very strong that the aggressive play is a behavioral manifestation of innate male aggression. See Harry Harlow and Stephen J. Suomi, "Social Recovery by Isolation-Reared Monkeys," Proceedings of the National Academy of Science, 68 (July 1971) pp. 1534-8.

³John Money, "Matched Pairs of Hermaphrodites: Behavioural Biology of Sexual Differentiation from Chromosomes to Gender Identity," Engineering and Science (California Institute of Technology), 33:34, 1970. Special Issue: Biological Bases of Human Behaviour.

⁴John Money, "Sexually Dimorphic Behaviour, Normal and Abnormal," Environmental Influences on Genetic Expression: Biological and Behavioural Aspects of Sexual Differentiation (Fogerty International Centre Proceedings No. 2, U.S. Government Printing Office), 1971, p. 209.

⁵John Money, and Anke Ehrhardt, Man and Woman, Boy and Girl (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1972), p. 114.

⁶Ibid., p. 117.

⁷In addition to the cue-stimulus role (discussed in the previous chapter) environment may also play a crucial role in an imprinting process that is a necessary condition for the development of dominance tendency. This seems to be the case with the development of female nurturant tendencies. This does not, as some have inferred, imply that the tendencies are learned in the usual sense of the word, but only that extreme enough environmental deprivation during the critical imprinting period will preclude the development of the tendency. Thus the female primate who receives no maternal nurturing at all will be incapable of nurturing her offspring. However, among normal primates who do not suffer this deprivation, females will exhibit stronger nurturant tendencies than males and the differentiation will be owed primarily to physiological differentiation. Such cases of extreme environmental deprivation are clearly irrelevant to behavior that is exhibited by the vast majority of people in every society.

⁸In an attempt to demonstrate that fetal hormonalization is not crucial to engender identity (a point that is not central to our discussion) Jessie Bernard (Women and the Public Interest (Chicago: Aldine-Atherton, 1971) pp. 17-18) has prepared a matrix based on the published case studies of Robert Stoller (Sex and Gender, New York: Science House, 1968). After examining Stoller's cases in terms of genetic sex, internal anatomy, external anatomy, gender assignment, and gender identity, Dr. Bernard concludes that there is an "... independence of gender identity from either heredity or anatomy." The conclusion that flows from her material is just the opposite of this; excluding the category of individuals for whom all variables save gender identity were female, we see that a male gender identity never developed in the absence of fetal male hormonalization, but that it did develop even when a fetally masculinized male was socialized as a female. (Technically, of course, accidental fetal hormonalization of a female is not "heredity," but the implication for the development of gender identity in normal humans is that hereditary male hormonalization is determinative to male gender identity.) The one excluded category must contain an error, for the claim that a male gender identity develops when a normal female is socialized as a female implies that the male gender identity in this case has no cause at all; this is not possible. What this category most strongly indicates is that socialization is not determinative to gender identity. It is possible that some rare psychological factors proved capable of overriding

both heredity and socialization for this category, but it would seem more likely that there was an undetected fetal hormonalization.

⁹Money and Ehrhardt, op. cit., pp. 98-103.

¹⁰"Resemblance" here means that the physiological system being studied resembles its human equivalent both physically and in the ways it responds to a wide range of chemical substances and environmental stimuli.

¹¹C.H. Phoenix, et al., "Sexual Differentiation as a Function of Androgenic Stimulation," in Perspectives in Reproduction and Sexual Behaviour, M. Diamond, ed. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1969), pp. 33-49.

¹²Leonore Tiefer, "Gonadal Hormones and Mating Behaviour in the Adult Golden Hamster," Hormones and Behaviour, 1 (1970), pp. 189-202. "It is said in the literature (e.g. Phoenix et al., 1968) that female hamsters are more aggressive than males. The fact that adult female hamsters are larger than males and under appropriate conditions usually take the role of aggressor with males and prove victorious cannot be taken to mean that under some conditions males are not at least as aggressive as females. For example, experimental males tested with stimulus males in the present study initiated fights as often as did experimental females tested with males."

¹³Not coincidentally, this is exactly the situation one finds if one looks for an exception among the primates. While none of the three primate species for which it has been suggested that the males do not exhibit dominance are even vaguely homologous, species Sanguinus, Aotus, and Callicebus have been suggested as exceptions to the association of dominance with the male in all primates. As with the hamster, it may well be incorrect to assume that because the male of these species behaves in a "female" way in some other areas he is not dominant. In these three species alone, the male cares for the young (though the female, of course, suckles them). This does not necessarily imply that even for these species fighting is not primarily male behavior (see Adolph Schultz, The Life of Primates, London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1974). But, for argument's sake, let us assume that these species do represent exceptions. If they have taken evolutionary paths somewhat divergent from those taken by all other primates, if they differ from the other primates as the hamster differs from the other experimental animals, if the etiology of CNS-generated dominance for these species differs from that in all other primates as that of the hamster

differs from that of the other experimental animals, in short, if we have a right to consider these three species as not homologous while the other experimental animals are accepted as homologous), then we might expect that, as was the case with the hamster, for these three species, but for none of the others, the female would be larger than the male. This is precisely the case. Of the thirty-two species of primates listed by Napier, only for Saguinus and Aotus is the female larger than the male. No Callicebus female has been measured, but because Callicebus is so closely related to Saguinus and Aotus, it is fair to assume that this holds for Callicebus also. Even though I am not including primate evidence in the line of reasoning I use in this work, this point is worth making. Those who would deny the relevance of primate studies to an understanding of human dominance often imply that those who advance primate evidence pick and choose their subject species in order to support their case. I have tried to show that this criticism is without merit. Even if we assume that the females of the three primate species mentioned are dominant, even if we do not consider them so little homologous as to be irrelevant, even then we see that there is complete justification for considering the sexual differentiation in dominance for these species as not analogous to that of man while we consider the differentiation found in all other primates as analogous to that found in man. (See J.R. Napier, A Handbook of Living Primates (New York: Academic Press, 1967)).

¹⁴David A. Edwards, "Early Androgen Stimulation and Aggressive Behaviour in Male and Female Mice," Physiology and Behaviour, 4 (1969) p. 338. There is such an abundance of evidence leading to the conclusion that sexual hormonalization determines CNS development and aggressive behavior that it is possible here to give merely a sampling; these will lead the interested reader to hundreds of similar studies. General discussions of the relevant research can be found in: Richard E. Whalen, "Differentiation of the Neural Mechanisms Which Control Gonadotropin Secretion and Sexual Behaviour," in Diamond, op. cit., pp. 303-40, and the contribution of C.H. Phoenix, R.W. Goy, and W. Young to Neuroendocrinology: Volume II, L. Martini and W.F. Ganong, eds. (New York: Academic Press, 1967), pp. 163-96. Somewhat dated, but more accessible to the general reader are Seymour Levine's "Sex Differences in the Brain" and Alan Fisher's "Chemical Stimulation of the Brain," both in Psychobiology (San Francisco: W.H. Freeman and Co., 1967). The journal Hormones and Behaviour provides the ambitious reader with over a hundred similar studies.

- ¹⁵Geoffrey Raisman and Pauline M. Field, "Sexual Dimorphism in the Preoptic Area of the Rat," Science (20 August 1971) pp. 731-3. As I write, the findings that Dr. Raisman delivered at Bar Harbor have not yet been published. No doubt they will have been by the time this is read.
- ¹⁶While the evidence is not as extensive as that demonstrating the effects of testosterone on aggression, there is considerable evidence that estrogen (the "female hormone") increases submission behavior. See: Murray S. Work and Hilliard Rogers, "Effect of Estrogen Level on Food-Seeking Dominance Among Male Rats," Journal of Comparative and Physiological Psychology, 79 (1972), p. 3.
- ¹⁷Two points: (1) This assumes, of course, that there are not so many exceptions that the "rule," the statistical hypothesis, can no longer be maintained. (2) The word "exception" is used loosely here. A statistical hypothesis includes the "exceptions." If we predict that it will rain one day out of every four and it does, the days that it rains are not exceptions, but are predicted by the hypothesis.
- ¹⁸Two further points: (1) A woman whose testosterone level is even half that of a normal male displays obvious signs of hirsuteness and general virilization. The concentration of plasma testosterone in young adult males ranges from 0.44 to 0.96 mcg. per 100 ml. (mean 0.65 mcg. per 100 ml.) and the concentration in women varies from 0.034 to 0.101 mcg. per 100 ml. (mean 0.054 mcg. per 100 ml.) Textbook of Medicine, Paul B. Beeson and Walsh McDermott, eds. (Philadelphia: W.B. Saunders Co., 1971), p. 1805. (2) It will be remembered that fetal preparation of the CNS is as important as the later level of testosterone acting on that CNS; thus, even a (previously normal) female with a male-level CNS is not male with respect to the neuro-endocrinology of dominance tendency.
- ¹⁹There are nutritional elements in the etiology of height, and other environmental factors play a role, but these are insignificant when compared to the role of heredity.
- ²⁰Irwin Bernstein, et al, "Plasma Testosterone Levels in the Male Rhesus: Influences of Sexual and Social Stimuli," in Science, 178 (10 November 1972) pp. 643-5.
- ²¹Those who argue that the fact that within-group differences exceed between-group differences somehow demonstrates the unimportance of between-group differences, seem to

invoke this fallacious argument only when the causation is primarily physiological. They do not (and should not) argue that the fact that income differences within the group of males or within the group of females is greater than the difference between the average income of men and the average income of women demonstrates the unimportance of the difference between the average incomes.

CHAPTER V

SOCIAL CONFORMATION TO PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGICAL REALITY

Socialization

Physiology deals in probabilities, and societies are composed of large numbers of individuals. Patriarchy, male attainment, and male dominance are manifestations of the statistical reality of the male's dominance tendency. The social values and socialization that mediate between the dominance tendency and social institutions are given their direction by observation of the differentiated behavior of men and women and the expectations which it generates. The argument that males exhibit dominance behavior because they are socialized to do so merely begs the question: why is it males in every society who are so socialized? Claiming socialization as a primary cause is equivalent to arguing that the best boxers are male because little girls are told that boxing is unladylike. Indeed, begging the question in this way--and assuming that social values and socialization are independent of, and can render irrelevant, the physiologically-rooted tendencies which give social values and socialization their limits--is the central environmentalist-feminist error. The frequently heard argument that we cannot know how important physiological

differentiation is until we have a society that does not differentiate, that "treats everyone as an individual," is simply silly: if physiological differentiation is fundamental it will be observed and reflected in socialization and institutions, and a society without differentiation will not develop. One might as well argue that we cannot know whether physiology is responsible for the fact that women give birth until we no longer associate it with them.

On a theoretical level, patriarchy, male attainment, and male dominance are causally independent of each other. Male dominance is not merely a "filtering down" of patriarchy and patriarchy is not merely a generalization of male dominance. It is true that if only one of these three institutions were a resolution of biopsychological differentiation, the other two would "automatically" follow suit: even, if for example, only male dominance in male-female relationships was the resolution of biopsychological differentiation, it is likely that authority in the hierarchical area would reflect the dyadic-familial experience and expectation. However, each of these three is the resolution of the differentiation of motivation and each would develop in the absence of the other. The implications of the experimental evidence are quite clear on this: males who have never been in male-female encounters will exhibit hierarchical dominance behavior, and males who have never been exposed to other

males will exhibit dominance behavior in encounters with females. In reality, of course, the three institutions tend to reinforce one another.

We have discussed all this already. In this section I wish to consider, so far as is necessary for our purposes, the role of socialization. I am limiting myself here to socialization of children because it is most important to conceptions of masculinity and femininity. "Socialization" in general refers to the process by which adults, as well as children, internalize social values, social roles, etc.; it should be clear that here it does not merely refer to the transmission of fully verbalized rules, but, more importantly, also the cues and conceptions of the world which determine one's view of reality. There are at least three determinants of the nature of socialization, the first of which is all that really need be mentioned in a sufficient explanation of the universality of patriarchy.

1. Socialization is limited by the observation of physical or behavioral manifestation of psychophysiological factors, and it is these limits which concern us. Even if it were possible for socialization to ignore the psychophysiological reality--and for children to be socialized to believe that fathers were not dominant and tall, mothers not nurturant and short--the physiological factors responsible for these realities would still be at work and fathers would still be dominant and tall, mothers nurturant and short. Socialization is simply not that

important a causal factor as far as the realities under discussion are concerned, and even if it were not given its direction by observation of psychophysically-differentiated behavior, it would not eradicate or even considerably reduce the sexual differentiation of dominance behavior.

2. While the sociologist is quite correct in seeing parents as the agents who transmit society's values to children, the mother who tells her eight-year-old daughter that "fighting is unladylike" is not primarily concerned with transmitting society's value, but with preparing her daughter for a world in which fighting is unladylike (i.e. fighting is usually done by men), and in which her daughter, who might do quite well in fights against boys her own age, will be a big disadvantage if fighting ranks high among the methods with which she hopes to cope with adult life. In real life most parents want to prepare their children for the real world, and are unwilling to sacrifice them to the demands of ideology--which is what they do when they grossly misrepresent the world and leave their children unprepared for life--even if such a sacrifice were not, for the reasons mentioned above, doomed to failure.

3. While every society follows many imperatives that are not efficient by rationalistic standards, there is, in the very nature of human experience, a tendency, ceteris paribus, towards efficiency. If, for example, women do have

a greater nurturance tendency (i.e. if they react to a child in distress more strongly and more quickly than males), it is difficult to imagine a society associating child care with males. If human beings were totally instinctual animals there would be no socialization. But we are not instinctual and males do not instinctively know how to fire a rifle or women how to prepare baby food. Socialization does not consist primarily of parents telling little boys to be "aggressive" and little girls to be nurturant--these tendencies exist without socialization--but of developing the skills and attitudes that make best use of such tendencies as already exist. Socialization is the process by which society utilizes the reality of differentiated tendencies. Note that "society" here is not some outside experimenter, but the members themselves. If males have a dominance tendency that is stronger than their nurturance tendency and females a nurturance tendency that is stronger than their dominance tendency, they will be drawn to hierarchical pursuit and nurturance activity respectively even without the spur of socialization.

The role of observation is seen clearly when we consider the stereotype. Like socialization, the stereotype is rooted in some reality; it is not arbitrary. There is not, and could not at present be, a stereotype of the American Jew as a great soldier. Stereotypes are pictures abstracted from reality; they are quintessential versions of reality

and they must represent it. This is not to say that stereotypes cannot change; they can change as much as the realities they represent. A stereotype is invariably accurate as observation; it may be woefully inaccurate as causal explanation. A change in social values and social conditions could, as in Israel, lead to American Jews placing a value on, and developing an ability at, soldiering; eventually a stereotype associating fighting ability with American Jews would emerge. But the stereotype cannot change until the reality changes and, while it can reinforce the reality, is never its primary cause. This is not to deny that stereotypes can be unjustly invoked when applied to members of the stereotyped group who do not display the necessary characteristics, nor that the "exceptions" to a stereotype may outnumber those whose behavior generates it. (For example, violent crime is associated with American blacks despite the fact that the vast majority of American blacks have never committed any crime; the stereotype is correct in that a greatly disproportionate amount of violent crime is committed by blacks, but it is incorrect in its association of crime with blacks in general, and it would be incorrect if it explained the difference in criminal behavior in hereditary terms.) I make this point because there is a contemporary penchant for dismissing stereotypes out-of-hand as being incorrect or for assuming that the causes of the reality observed by a stereotype are purely

social. In doing this one is proceeding in precisely the opposite direction from that which science demands, whereby we make observations and then explain the reality that is observed.

In short, stereotypes and socialization can be altered, but only to the extent that the reality behind them can be altered. To the extent that the psychophysiological differentiation we have discussed is responsible for sexual differences in behavior that are observed and incorporated in stereotypes and socialization, the stereotype and socialization must represent the psychophysiological differentiation.

But all of this is, I repeat, irrelevant to our purpose of discovering why all societies are patriarchal or why, to put it another way, socialization always associates dominance behavior with males. For our sufficient explanation we need merely make the point that socialization conforms to the limits and directions set by observation of the differentiated dominance behavior resulting from the sexual differentiation of dominance tendency. This is sufficient to explain the universality of patriarchy.

Two Additional Aspects of Socialization

I suspect that I shall be criticized for paying insufficient attention to socialization, and I would emphasize that nothing I have written so far is meant to deny the role of socialization or the extent to which social values

and socialization vary. At the very least these make qualitative, discrete, and absolute a sexual difference that is, on a psychophysiological level, quantitative, continuous, and statistical. Thus, the psychophysiological reality (that most men usually exhibit a stronger dominance tendency than most women) becomes the stereotype that "men are 'aggressive'" and "women are passive." This works to the detriment of those men and women who are exceptions. But, as we saw in the section entitled "The Irrelevance of Exceptions," this no more demonstrates the primarily social basis of dominance behavior than the fact that a strong female weightlifter is ridiculed, while a male is not, demonstrates the primarily social basis of strength. In any case, socialization is important within the limits set by psychophysiological differentiation, while it is only the limits and their manifestations that need concern us.

I suspect that I shall also be criticized as having suggested that society should emphasize sex differences in its socialization. What society should do is a question that cannot be answered on scientific grounds and it is one that I do not concern myself with here. Whether it is better to minimize as far as possible the emphasis placed on sex differences in order to "maximize individual potential," or whether it is better to present boys and girls with well-defined models of masculinity and femininity in order to enable them to develop the strongest possible sense of themselves as individuals following

physiological as well as social imperatives, is a question each reader must decide for himself. The evidence provided in this dissertation is only relevant to such a decision if the reader wishes to eradicate sex-role differentiation in a way that the evidence indicates to be impossible. To believe that males should not have a stronger dominance tendency or that members of society and the socialization system should pay no attention to it, is to hope for the impossible.

The Mbuti Pygmies

We have seen (in the First Digression) that the extent to which the differentiation of dominance tendency manifests itself depends on the extent to which the social system acts as the necessary environmental cue and provides a "playing field" in which the cued behavior can be manifested. It will be remembered that "environment" here does not refer to socialization, but to the presence of hierarchies, any hierarchies. The point being made was that, while there has never been a society without hierarchies and while there is, as we shall see, good reason to doubt whether there would be such a society, the existence of a primitive society that lacked hierarchies (and, of course, patriarchy) would not indicate that a society could exist which had hierarchies, but not patriarchal ones. Perhaps it would be helpful to examine a society in which sex-role differentiation is as little manifested as possible.

Some authors, having misconstrued Colin Turnbull's more popular works on the Mbuti Pygmies, have claimed that the Pygmies fail to demonstrate male dominance or even sex-role differentiation. Reference to Dr. Turnbull's definitive work on the subject leaves no doubt that male dominance and patriarchy do exist.¹ Authority, when it is invoked, is in the hands of the best hunter or an elder male; disputes are settled by discussions among groups of men (though women do play an advisory role); status is related to hunting skill; most importantly, the molimo--the ritual performed in times of great crisis--is the reserve only, or primarily, of males.² Nonetheless, it may conceivably be true that sex-role differentiation in suprafamilial areas is less pronounced among the Pygmies than in any other society, and may well be not far above the minimal threshold necessitated by the hormonal differences between men and women. Before concluding that the degree of sex-role differentiation demonstrated by the Pygmies is all that is required by the differentiation of dominance tendency however, we must examine the effect of the psychophysiological factor on behavior in the contexts of different social environmental realities.

The differentiation of dominance tendency is least important in a society, such as that of the Pygmies, where everyone, male and female, plays more or less the same economic role; the fact that the man holds the net will not result in a great deal of extra status. But now let us

suppose that the society develops to the point where only half the population is needed for the hunt, and let us assume that women are as capable of hunting as men. If the theory presented here is correct, if what is true of all other societies proves to be true of this society, and if hunting is given high status, then we would expect men to develop the skills necessary for attainment of this high-status role, and that the hunters would be men. Indeed, among those Pygmies who are archers (as opposed to the net hunters we are discussing), this is precisely the case. We would expect that members of the society would soon come to associate the role with men and to see it as a "male" role until--for whatever reason--it lost status, at which point men would pursue other roles that had higher status. Note that, as we have seen before, a "male role" is not given high status merely because it is a male role (ditchdiggers have low status); it is a "male" role because it has--for whatever reason--a high status to which men are drawn more strongly than are women.

While in every society the male dominance tendency will manifest itself in dominance and authority, it can be least important in a society, again such as that of the Pygmies, in which the existence of small, fluid hunting bands results in a minimal degree of formal organization and authority being necessary. The importance of psychophysiological factors is a function of social realities, so that sex-role differentiation greater than that of the

Pygmies is not necessarily artificially exaggerated, but is inevitable under conditions that enable such factors to manifest themselves more easily, or for which such factors have a positive value for survival and success.

The Limits of Possibility

I am not, of course, suggesting that primitive societies necessarily have such limited hierarchical systems; many have extensive hierarchical systems, and these are patriarchal. My point is merely that it is possible for a primitive society to have a far more limited hierarchical system than any modern society. A modern society cannot limit the cues and the opportunities (inherent in hierarchies) given to the male dominance tendency. In an industrial society members do not all play the same economic role, nor are the vast majority necessary for, or capable of, playing the highest status roles. Diversity of economic roles and bureaucratic organization are the very hallmarks of an industrial society. Whereas the Pygmies have minimal formal organization, industrial societies composed of millions of people must have economic-role differentiation and formal organization if they are to survive and function. In other words, where the Pygmy society minimizes the effect of the male dominance tendency, the very nature of modern, industrial society forces such a society to give it relatively free play. We cannot even say that industrial society exaggerates this aggression;

given the nature of its economic and social realities, the minimal possible effects of the psychophysiological factor will be very great in determining the degree of sex-role differentiation. Nor will lovely, gentle societies, such as that of the Pygmy, survive when challenged by societies whose methods of organization and whose authority systems render them more efficient.

Similarly, I am not suggesting that modernization and an increase in hierarchy will necessarily increase the importance of the male dominance tendency or that there is an absolute correlation between a society's economic situation or degree of homogeneity and the extent to which it allows male dominance tendency to manifest itself in social institutions. As has been true throughout this work, I am speaking only of the limits of possibility within which a society must operate, and the psychophysiological forces that it must utilize or attempt to counteract. Within these limits, of course, there is an enormous, but not unlimited, range of possible alternatives, and this allows for the diversity of societies that the anthropologist encounters. The degree to which a society limits the manifestation of the male dominance tendency in its value system (how close it comes to the maximum possible reduction of sex differentiation) in any area depends not only on the limits set by physiology, but also on a complex of values, traditions, and environmental necessities that are more or less specific to

that particular society. Therefore, we should not be surprised to learn that there are some primitive societies in which women have extremely low status. I am saying only that the degree to which a society could limit the manifestation of male attainment and the degree to which it could minimize sex-role differentiation will be much greater if it is a primitive rather than a bureaucratic, industrial society. The United States, in other words, could not limit the social manifestations as much as a primitive society (such as the Pygmies).

Only a society which completely segregated males and females, had no values of any kind, and lacked hierarchies altogether could override the "advantage" given to males by their greater dominance tendency. Such a society would accomplish this by withholding the environmental stimuli which cue 'the male's propensity for dominance behavior--and could exist only in fantasy. A priest may be celibate for moral reasons, but--for the vast majority of the members of society--intellect works in the service of emotion. As long as human psychophysiology determines that men and women are drawn to one another, complete sexual segregation seems unlikely. As long as societies equip their members with world views of any kind, they will provide them with hierarchies of desired qualities (values); whatever a society values and whatever leads to status and position in that society--age, youth, appearance, social position, business aptitude,

fighting ability, the ability to give birth and nurture the young, etc.--will result in some individuals being more highly valued by society than the rest. As long as societies need any kind of organization they will have relatively formal hierarchies of some sort.

Social Exaggeration of the Physiological

However, we can speak of a given society exaggerating the values relevant to male dominance tendency while acknowledging that the direction of those values is determined by the hormonal factor. Exaggeration could not be determined merely by comparing that particular society with another, for this would force one to conclude that all societies save that of the Pygmy exaggerate the tendency. To decide whether a society's values exaggerate the tendency, we must compare the degree to which they reflect the tendency with the minimum extent which would be possible for that sort of society. I think that all would agree that, in all areas except those which concern abortion, Japan's value system is more male-oriented than that of the United States. Because, very roughly speaking, both Japan and the United States are highly bureaucratized, democratic, industrial societies with the same threshold of minimal possible emphasis on the male dominance tendency, one might say that Japan exaggerates the tendency in that its values reflect a general male authority more than do those of the United States (and that this exaggeration, therefore, must result not from

physiology and the general nature of industrial society, but from specific Japanese values). One could similarly say that the United States exaggerates the male dominance tendency (though not as much as Japan), but one must then measure the degree of exaggeration against a hypothetical minimum which is far greater than in a non-modern society such as that of the Pygmy. We could reduce the extent to which male dominance tendency is manifested in American society to the minimum possible for an industrial society, though this is unlikely to happen; we could, theoretically, reduce it to that found in Pygmy society if we were willing to give up science, industrialization, hospitals, and other advances for which extensive hierarchy is a necessary condition. But even if we did this, we would still find that there is a minimal threshold below which no society can limit the manifestations of male dominance tendency in its social system.

Discrimination of a Sort

It is not inconceivable that the dominance tendency of which we speak is relevant not only to the attainment of position, but to performance as well: when the executive is described as "aggressive," his performance as well as his ambition is being praised. However, the relevance of male tendencies to performance need not be posited in an explanation of why males attain hierarchical positions, and it is not assumed here that men are, even in the statistical sense in which we are speaking, physio-

logically any better prepared for performance than women. If one defines as "discrimination" a situation in which males occupy virtually all the upper hierarchical positions despite the fact that women would perform them equally well, one has to conclude that such "discrimination" is inevitable.

Moreover, even if the male's greater dominance tendency were overridden and large numbers of women placed in positions of authority, it is unlikely that stability could be maintained. Even in our present male bureaucracies problems arise when a subordinate is more "aggressive" than his superior and, if the more "aggressive" executive is not allowed to rise in the bureaucracy, delicate psychological adjustments must be made. Such adjustments are also necessary when a male bureaucrat has a female superior. Very exceptionally, adjustments can be made without any great instability occurring, particularly if the woman in the superior position possesses sensitivity and femininity. It seems likely, however, that if women shared equally in power at each level of the bureaucracy, chaos would result for two reasons. Even if the bureaucracy were a closed system, male dominance tendency would soon manifest itself in men either moving quickly up the hierarchy or refusing to acknowledge female authority. But a bureaucracy is not a closed system, and the discrepancy between male dominance in private life and bureaucratic female dominance (from the point of view of the male whose superior is a woman)

would soon engender chaos. The minute minority of women in positions of high authority at present expend enormous amounts of energy trying not to project the commanding authority that is seen as the mark of a good male executive. It is true that the manner in which authority is manifested will be affected by the values of the society in general and the nature of the field of competition in particular; authority in an academic environment is camouflaged far more than in an executive one. One might put forward the theoretical argument that women could attain positions of authority and leadership by countering the male's advantage with feminine abilities. Perhaps, but the equivalents of the executive positions in every area of suprafamilial life in every society have been occupied by men, and there seems no reason to believe that feminine means will be suddenly capable of neutralizing male authority in these areas. And, in any case, an emphasis on feminine abilities is hardly what the feminists desire. (It is interesting to speculate on what would happen if hierarchical leadership were given low status. Would males be drawn to the upper hierarchical positions (i.e. is it the positions that attract?) or would they devote their energies to whatever was given high status? It is inconceivable that any society would attach low status to its leadership roles, so this question is probably unanswerable.)

This is not, of course, to gainsay that there is much real discrimination against women. Many women have had the experience of seeing men with less talent and a weaker dominance tendency promoted over them. The fact that this injustice can be explained by expectations and attitudes that reflect real statistical realities offers little satisfaction to the woman who is being treated unjustly even by the criterion that accepts the justice of promotion reflecting dominance tendency. While one cannot be sanguine about the ease with which anti-discrimination laws can eradicate this injustice--dominance tendency in individual cases is not easily demonstrated and so neither is misassessment of it--such laws will no doubt go far towards reducing this real discrimination.

The Future

I shall suggest that patriarchy, while perhaps unfair to the woman who is an exception and has a strong dominance tendency, is ultimately fair in that the sex with the stronger tendency towards dominance dominates. I do not know whether it makes sense to describe the inevitable as fair or unfair, but if it does, then what could be more fair than that the sex which is more willing to sacrifice other satisfactions for dominance should attain it? Those who decry patriarchy like to think of themselves as the avant garde, but they most remind me of the Victorians, who denied physiological sexual imperatives and saw virtue in such a denial, just as the feminists deny

the physiological roots of the male's stronger dominance tendency and see virtue in so doing. A hundred years ago values and attitudes favored "aggressiveness" and despised sexuality, while today this is reversed. But if there is one thing that the evidence we have examined tells us, it is that values and attitudes are of little causal importance to the institutions whose universality we wish to explain.

None of this implies that there will not be great changes in the future, but only that such changes will not be relevant to the universal institutions discussed herein. It is one thing to claim, perhaps correctly, that the realities of increasing population and increasing technology make social life less and less congruent with our physiological natures and quite another to assert, unquestionably incorrectly, that our physiological natures no longer determine our behavior and institutions. It is one thing to point out that the world is overpopulated and quite another to imply that this will somehow lead to the demise of patriarchy. We shall always need to propagate the species; even if contraception eradicates the overpopulation problem, we shall still need to produce a next generation, as did all the societies of the past; and it will still be women who give birth. And even if an artificial substitute for the mother was developed and even if women wanted this substitution to be made at a widespread level (an unlikely probability), patriarchy

would exist unless biological adaptation led to the disappearance of sexual hormonal differences. For the hormonal differences alone would still engender patriarchy, male dominance, and male attainment of status.

Let us descend to the level of the probable. There will be changes in the next few centuries, indeed in the next few decades; whether these are "revolutionary" or minor depends again on whether one sees the glass as being half full or half empty, whether one emphasized the physiological reality to which social reality conforms or the myriad variations possible within the limitations imposed by the physiological. There is no doubt that the institutions of American society, for example, will soon accommodate large numbers of women who no longer need devote their entire lives to child rearing, as have many societies that needed virtually all of their women in the labor force. While feminists often discuss this possibility in terms that assume that every woman is capable of a career in nuclear physics, and that this is the option every woman should be able to weigh against the emphasis on the home, the reality is that most individuals, male and female, have average capabilities and average jobs. It is not self-evident that most women would choose to devote to such jobs, rather than to their families, the lifelong expenditures of energies which men devote to their jobs and which are necessary for attainment in most occupational areas. It seems likely that most American

women will gravitate towards those areas where there is the greatest need and where they need not compete with men-- both because no one is now performing those functions and because those areas (social workers, elementary school teachers, etc.) do not have a particularly high status that would attract male competition. No doubt there will be an increase in the number of women in the lower authority positions and perhaps an increase in the number of women in the higher authority positions in low-status areas. If, for example, day-care centers become a major factor in American life, women will unquestionably fill the overwhelming number of lower-level authority positions and perhaps the higher ones as well. This generalization of motherhood will be possible because the area will have low status for males who will not compete for the positions, because there are no males now filling those roles, and, dare I leave my theoretical position long enough to advance this point, because women will desire these roles and will be better at filling them than men would be. Any increase in the number of women in high-status position in high-status areas, however, will be slight and "token." For this is the area in which dominance tendency counts the most, and men will succeed at attaining the high positions of power, status, and authority as they always have in every society.

Nothing I have written should be construed as implying that modern women do not face the most serious

problems. Increasing longevity, a reduced desire for large families, the TV dinner, and the fragility of the family in a frantic society create a context in which the potential for female anomie is very great. To an extent, the women's movement has garnered what support it has because, like any social movement, it can replace feelings of individual meaninglessness with ones of group strength and belonging. If I do not write at length of economic discrimination it is not because such discrimination does not exist, but because, important as this issue is, it is beyond our scope. If I have ignored the residual laws that discriminate between the sexes it is because, whatever their symbolic importance, such laws are obviously not the source of the energy that engenders male attainment. The masculine nature of modern industrial and bureaucratic society and a reduced emphasis on the family create problems of meaning for the women that are only marginally related to laws and other factors which are not inevitable manifestations of male aggression. If the few remaining laws that differentiate between the sexes are removed, it will become clear in time that such laws had merely reflected society's acknowledgment of sexual differences but had not caused them. Equal rights legislation will have little effect on either the inevitable "discrimination" we discussed earlier or on discriminatory attitudes.

In the near future America will have a female

leader, but we shall never see a time when males fail to attain the overwhelming percentage of hierarchical positions. What we shall see, and what is most pressing, are opportunities for women, who no longer need devote the major part of their lives to home and children, to enter areas formerly closed to women. There will be an eradication of one-sex occupations and something of an opening up of the middle hierarchies. None of this will satisfy the feminist, but it will, I think, satisfy the majority of women, whose frustration does not result from male domination of upper hierarchical positions, but from the lack of a meaningful life. In any case, the seriousness of the problems facing women in contemporary society may tempt us to ignore or even deny that dominance tendency determines hierarchical attainment, but we have not justification whatsoever for doing so. It is an American trait to believe that every problem has not just a partial, relative solution, but one that will satisfy every desire. The desire of the majority of women for meaningful work will be satisfied (at least to the extent that it is for men). The desire of the feminist that males no longer dominate will not.

Chapter VFootnotes

¹See Colin M. Turnbull, The Mbuti Pygmies: An Ethnographic Survey (New York: The American Museum of Natural History Anthropological Papers, Volume 50: Part 3, 1965).

²It may be that in primitive societies that have little hierarchy an unstructured extension of male dominance results in decision-making being as much controlled by males as when more formal structures exist. Feminists often complain that even within groups claiming to support women's rights, in which women are equally represented, males in fact tend to dominate. However, since no society lacks hierarchies, and since assessment of such unstructured authority would be more open to question, we need not concern ourselves with this here.

CHAPTER VI

THE INADEQUACY OF A NON-PHYSIOLOGICAL EXPLANATION

The Weight of the Evidence

At its most basic, the hypothesis at the core of the theory presented here simply states that there are neuroendocrinological differences between men and women that engender different male and female responses to the environment and, therefore, different male and female behavior, and that these differences set limits on, and give direction to, the social institutions whose explanation is the purpose of this book.

Now, it is probably not too bold to say that there is not a single other non-trivial hypothesis in all sociology for which one can invoke both anthropological universality and direct neuroendocrinological evidence. Is there not something a bit bizarre about contemporary sociology's accepting innumerable dubious conclusions from silly little studies, the inadequacy of which can be spotted with a cursory logical glance, while rejecting, on ideological grounds, an hypothesis which can draw upon anthropological universality and direct physiological evidence in its support?

Even if one is not totally convinced that patriarchy, male attainment, and male dominance are inevitable, one must acknowledge that the evidence pro-

vided only by anthropology, or only by human hermaphrodites, or only by the direct neuroendocrinological study of other mammals suggests that it is an exceedingly strong possibility. When all three converging lines of evidence are taken together the argument for purely environmentalist analysis disintegrates and the physiological hypothesis becomes overwhelmingly compelling. Those who then insist on maintaining their belief in an environmentalist analysis whose internal illogic and empirical inadequacy are manifest, while demanding of the infinitely more probable physiological analysis a deductive conclusiveness which is precluded by the very nature of science, do not do so for scientific reasons. There is no such thing in all science as deductive conclusiveness, the "proof" that the feminist demands. It is axiomatic that science deals in "probabilities" and always acknowledges the possibility that a future observation will demonstrate that a theory is incorrect. A scientific theory can never be "proved." Science always leaves open the possibility that tomorrow a mountain will float into space or that we shall discover a matriarchy. We have not "proved" that $E=mc^2$ or that smoking leads to cancer.

As we have seen, there is one sense in which the scientist does, and should, proceed as if science discovers immutable truths: he states an hypothesis in terms which imply that it will always be true precisely because he wishes to specify the conditions under which it will

be surrendered. He wants the hypothesis to state conditions that cannot occur in nature, so that if they do occur it will be shown to be incorrect. It was for this reason that I called my book The Inevitability of Patriarchy--the theory presented in the book claims that there could not be a society that lacked patriarchy, and the discovery or development of a society that lacked patriarchy would, ipso facto demonstrate the incorrectness of the theory presented here.¹ (As we saw in the First Digression, this is a slight over-simplification. A society that has extensive hierarchy, but which is not patriarchal, would demonstrate the incorrectness of the theory, but a primitive society that had no hierarchy would not demonstrate the irrelevance of physiological differentiation for any society that did have hierarchy; it would not demonstrate the possibility of a society that had hierarchy, but lacked patriarchy. This is academic, since there is no primitive society that lacks patriarchy.)

Because science is always uncertain, always open-ended, continual empirical testing is an integral part of the scientific method. But to invoke this feature of science in order to dismiss the overwhelming likelihood that patriarchy is inevitable is scientifically untenable and can be explained only in the emotional terms of the logic of desperation. Radical interpretation should imply a better way of explaining what is observed,

not closing one's eyes so as not to observe. The over-emotional analysis of an intellectual problem which forces people to disregard observation can have only catastrophic results for objective inquiry. That even a few academic intellectuals have accepted the feminist analysis with its illogic and its misrepresentation of fact is explicable only in the terms of emotional necessity. It is intellectually defensible in no terms at all.²

The insoluble problem with the feminist analysis, and, indeed, with all totally environmental explanations, is not that it necessarily posits logical impossibilities or that it is necessarily internally contradictory, but that it fails to explain empirical reality. There is rarely only one logical theoretical explanation for an observed reality. Because every physiological sex difference which affects behavior will be reflected in every society's social system, one will always be able to say that men and women act the way they do because their society tells them to. Because men have greater dominance tendencies, boys will be socialized towards dominance behavior and girls will be told that it is unladylike to attempt to attain their goals through such behavior. Those who wish to claim that what we tell boys and girls is responsible for differences in behavior between the sexes will always be able to do so. If they are aware that their explaining a thousand virtually disparate observations with a thousand particular explanations rather than with a single

explanation is a logical barbarism, and that they must find some underlying factor comparable to the physiological one, they will be able, by means of tortuous, but not illogical, reasoning, to develop a theory that makes no reference to the physiological factor. I have no idea what form such a theory would take, but no doubt it could be developed. For if one were prepared to accept more and more convoluted and irrelevant hypotheses one could still believe in the existence of phlogiston and ether and ignore all the theories of twentieth-century science that explain reality so much more convincingly. These hypotheses could be as logical as they were absurd.

The Environmentalist's Dilemma

This is what one will be forced to do if one insists on adhering to a totally environmental or economic theory to explain universal patterns of sex-associated dominance behavior. For such a theory cannot suggest a possible initiative of patterns that invariably work in one direction that is nearly as logically and theoretically compelling as that provided by demonstrable evidence indicating a strong relationship between hormones and behavior. Such environmental theory attempts to deal with the physiological evidence by ignoring it, thereby refusing to acknowledge the determinative influence of sexual hormonal differences not only in humans (with

their societal environment), but in the non-human mammals whose endocrine systems are similar to man's and for whom a totally non-hormonal explanation of behavior is patently ridiculous. The denial of the physiological factor takes the form of either ignoring the universality of patriarchy, male dominance, and male attainment and pretending that such universality does not need explanation, or of explaining it in environmental terms that are either, or both, internally illogical or empirically refutable.

My point is not that the boy is not socialized differently from the girl or that this does not run very deep. I do not doubt those environmentalists who claim that by the time an infant is three months old the nature of the socialization it receives from its parents will be determined by its sex; shortly after their birth we dress male infants in blue and female infants in pink. While it is unlikely that this makes much difference to new-born infants, it does show that differential socialization by the parents begins at birth. But this simply indicates the strength and importance of sexual hormonal reality and the necessity of any society's socialization conforming to this reality. For the environmentalists to demonstrate that the physiological reality does not underlie the directions in which societies socialize the young, he must demonstrate not merely that socialization runs deep, but that it would be possible to

socialize boys away from, and girls towards, dominance. No society has ever done this, nor could any society ever do it.³

This is the environmentalist's dilemma: he faces the task of explaining, without begging the question by invoking socialization, and without invoking the psychophysiological differentiation that is seen here as the determining factor, why it is the males in every society who attain hierarchical and dyadic dominance, and why no society associates dominance with women. His explanation must be parsimonious and for this he must find a universal factor comparable to the neuroendocrinological factor. Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, such an explanation must not avoid any relevant physiological evidence and must be plausible.

Alternative Explanations of Universality

There are three commonly-heard explanations of the universality of patriarchy, male attainment, and male dominance that are both parsimonious⁴ and avoid invoking neuroendocrinological differentiation; all three fail both because they lack plausibility when examined closely and because they simply ignore the mass of neuroendocrinological evidence we have discussed. The explanations are those which emphasize the male's physical strength, the female's maternal role, and the effects of modern technology. (Clearly, no one would deny that these factors have important social implications or that they may increase sex differences, but they fail to explain these sex differences.)

Those who emphasize the universal fact that males are physically bigger and stronger than females not only ignore experimental evidence indicating that, in species in which males dominate, even males which are no larger than females dominate them; they also ignore the fact that among human males there seems to be little correlation between physical strength and attainment--while it is quite obvious that there is a crucial relationship between the kinds of behavior I describe as "dominance behavior" and attainment.⁵ Indeed, we correctly describe the superior executive as an "aggressive" man who will "get to the top" rather than as someone who is physically strong. The importance of dominance tendencies and the behavior they facilitate is implicitly acknowledged by the feminist when she emphasizes the differing motivations and behaviors of men and women and, incorrectly, attributes them to differences in socialization.

The "physical strength" explanation often acknowledges that physical strength is of little importance to attainment in modern society, but argues that at one time strength was necessary for securing food and for attaining position and that the association of maleness and dominance is maintained to this day. We have discussed the myriad difficulties encountered by all such evolutionary theories, but I should repeat that there are a great many primitive societies in which women do heavier and economically more important (but lower-status work than men and many societies in which it is the

women who secure the food.⁶ None of these societies lack the institutions we discuss. The women in them may "expend more energy" than the men, but not for dominance. It is precisely the sexual difference in the "motivation" to expend "energy" for dominance, rather than for some other satisfaction, that is the manifestation of the neuroendocrinological differentiation we discuss. (If we were to set up an experimental one-generation society of the infant sons of small parents and the infant daughters of large parents (so that the females of this society were as large as the males), we would still find that this society developed into a patriarchy. If, however, we peopled our experimental society with genetic male infants whose fetal masculinization had been blocked and genetic female infants who had accidentally been virilized in utero, we would find that the genetic females ruled, that authority was associated with them, that they attained the positions of high status, that they were dominant in dyadic relationships, and that socialization came to conform to all this.) It is true that many societies explain patriarchy by male physical strength but once again I would point out that we look to other societies for empirical evidence, not for an explanation of empirical reality.

Many of these same points lead one to find implausible the explanation which emphasizes the female's maternal role. It seems plausible when one thinks of the

traditional American women whose maternal duties tied her to her home, but implausible when one thinks of the hundreds of societies in which women take off a few days to give birth and then return to the fields, while men continue with their physically less difficult, high-status roles. Again we might ask why these energies are expended in virtually every suprafamilial area except for those associated with dominance; if the women of a society spend their lives doing heavy, non-maternal work in the fields, then their not devoting their "energies" to dominance-related areas cannot be explained by their being in the home. (Securing food is a male task in many other societies, so one cannot argue that women are responsible for securing food and that this explains their not attaining dominance.) And again this explanation simply ignores the mass of neuroendocrinological evidence relevant to dominance. To those who argue that it is not the physical reality of the maternal role, but the "posture of submissiveness" (in one critic's phrase) which the maternal role allegedly necessitates, we would stress the neuroendocrinological evidence demonstrating that the hormonally masculinized female, who appears to be a normal female and is socialized as a normal female, manifests the dominance tendency expected of a male; such females are socialized to the "posture of submissiveness," yet, because they are hormonally male, they exhibit male dominance behavior. Moreover, we repeat that no

explanation emphasizing socialization accounts for male dominance in non-human mammals. Thus, even if men were not larger and stronger than women and even if all women decided not to have children, the neuroendocrinological differentiation relevant to dominance tendency would be sufficient to guarantee the continuation of patriarchy, male attainment, and male dominance.

This point is important to remember when we consider below the third alternative explanation of patriarchy, that which emphasizes economic factors and modern technology. Whether such an explanation emphasizes the fact that women can now control reproduction, or the fact that machines now render physical strength unimportant, it implicitly explains patriarchy in terms of causal factors (be they physical strength, maternal roles, or whatever) which have nothing much to do with the causation of patriarchy and are not of sufficient importance to act as a counter-cause.

While some critics of The Inevitability of Patriarchy favored explanations in terms of physical strength or the maternal role, the majority of them supported the economic-technological explanation of patriarchy. They argued that patriarchy (and male attainment and male dominance) are "no longer necessary" and that they will be eradicated in modern technological society,⁷ and they tried to refute the theory presented here by merely ignoring it--in other words by simply assuming and asserting

that economic-technological changes will override the psychophysiological factor. If the theory presented here is incorrect, then these predictions may prove correct. But they give us no reason to doubt the central importance of the psychophysiological by refusing even to consider the argument for its being determinative. There is not much that I can say in reply to such criticism except to repeat that: (1) There is not an iota of evidence that any change in social, economic, or technological factors significantly reduces the percentage of males in hierarchies. The most modern society is virtually as patriarchal as the most primitive. There is some variation in the degree to which male dominance manifests itself in dyadic and familial relationships (though no society lacks such social manifestations of male dominance), but such variation depends more on such factors as the amount of interaction of men and women and the family structure than on modernization. What does vary tremendously, and what is often confused with patriarchy and male dominance and is often invoked in the criticism under discussion, is the attitude of the society towards patriarchy and male dominance. Thus, a hundred years ago our society valued "aggression" and placed little value on sexuality while today this is reversed. (Similarly traditional China and Russia applauded traditional sex roles, whereas post-

revolution China and Russia constantly issue declarations favoring complete sexual equality in the hierarchy.) But these changes in attitudes, like changes in technology, have no effect on the proportion of males in hierarchies. Indeed, the very point of this theory is that no social factor is of much causal importance to patriarchy or can act as a counter-cause to the psychophysiological. Thus, when these critics assert that "physiology is no longer important," that "human being are not animals," and that "man is sufficiently adaptable to overcome patriarchy," one can only reply with a rather ungracious "says who?" and a reminder that technological progress and increased adaptability facilitate rather than counteract psychophysiological tendencies. (2) Claims that social change will eradicate the institutions under discussion simply ignore the neuroendocrinological evidence and the overwhelming likelihood that neuroendocrinological differentiation, and not any social-technological factor, is the primary causal factor responsible for patriarchy. (3) Societies are not patriarchal because patriarchy is socially "necessary" or "good," but because patriarchy is a social manifestation of a sexual psychophysiological differentiation, one which is not significantly reduced by any social or technological change and which will not be significantly reduced as long as males and females are neuroendocrinologically constituted as they are now. (4) Nearly all of these critics invoked variation in

qualities and institutions that have nothing to do with the theory presented here; we discussed the inability of this line of attack to damage the theory in the section entitled "Ground for Empirical Refutation."

A great many critics committed the fallacy of "explaining" the institutions I discuss in terms of socialization, thereby begging the question, failing to ask why socialization proceeds as it does, and ignoring the possibility that to a great extent socialization reflects observation (i.e. boys really are more "aggressive" and girls more nurturant) and that the differentiation of the behavior that is observed is primarily the result of psychophysiological differentiation. Another version of this criticism committed the fallacy of "explaining" patriarchy in terms of "patriarchal values," thereby begging the question by failing to explain why such values are "patriarchal." We have discussed the difficulties facing these question-begging approaches at great length. It was, incidentally, these critics who most often claimed that the theory presented here is simplistic, reductionist, or deterministic (a criticism considered in the chapter on psychological aspects of psychophysiological differentiation) and criticized the use of the word "inevitability" in the title of the work.

Apart from those just referred to, the most commonly-levelled criticism of this work was that which

took exception to my not describing sexual psychophysiological differentiation in terms used by the discipline of the particular critic. Thus, a social psychologist complained that it is one of "readiness" to learn dominance behavior,⁸ a Freudian that it is one of "drive" for dominance, a developmental psychologist that it is one of the threshold for dominance behavior, another Freudian complained that it is one of ego strength (i.e. the female's stronger ego does not need shoring up through attainment), a sociologist that it is one of "need" for dominance and a therapist that it is one of the "motivation" for dominance. A number of critics complained that it is qualitative (males have an "active dominance motivation" and females an equally strong "passive dominance motivation"), while many others complained that it is instead quantitative. In the chapter on differentiation, I tried to make it abundantly clear that, for our purposes, all that matters is that there is a psychophysiological differentiation. Once one accepts this (which one must if one's paradigm is to explain the empirical reality under discussion), one may, for our purposes, use any paradigm one likes.

Throughout this dissertation I have clarified those other points that have been criticized or misunderstood in journals. I need not answer such criticisms again in this section, but the reader may wish to know what these were. At the risk of being repetitive, I shall mention the more common ones here and refer the reader

to the chapters in which I consider them.

A number of critics attributed unjustifiable implications to the theory. Whether such implications are correct or not is irrelevant, since the theory does not imply their correctness or incorrectness. Thus it was claimed that the theory implied that men perform hierarchical roles better than women, that women who attain hierarchical positions have weaker dominance tendencies than men who attain equivalent positions, that strong dominance motivation is sufficient (rather than necessary) for hierarchial attainment, that dominance tendency is found only in males, that females have a stronger nurturant propensity, and that there is a physiologically-rooted female tendency to prefer male dominance. I consider all of these in the chapter on the differentiation of dominance tendency, along with the criticism that the fact that women behave as violently to protect their infants as men do to attain dominance somehow demonstrates that physiological differentiation plays no role (a criticism which misses the point that what is "built in" is the tendency to react with the necessary behavior to a particular environmental stimulus, be it a hierarchy or an infant in distress).

Some critics ignored the statistical nature of any physiological reality and argued that the exception proves the unimportance of physiological differentiation or that this unimportance is demonstrated by the fact

that differences within the sexes are greater than those between the sexes (arguments they would never make if we were discussing height). Others confused gender identity (which is irrelevant here) with dominance tendency. Still others, often those who argued that "patriarchy is no longer necessary," failed to distinguish between direct physiological evidence and more speculative evidence and challenged evolutionary theories of territoriality and male bonding, the correctness of which is irrelevant to the theory presented here. Finally, some critics raised individual points, such as: if I am to argue that physiology determines differences between the sexes, I should also show that the same applies within the sexes; "feedback" and the fact that environment can alter physiology somehow demonstrate its irrelevance; the fact that suggestion can sometimes channel the psychophysiological somehow demonstrates the determinativeness of social factors, and the fact that the testosterone levels of girls equal that of boys while boys manifest a greater dominance tendency somehow demonstrates the irrelevance of testosterone to dominance tendency. All of these criticisms are replied to at length in the chapter on physiological differentiation.⁹

Finally I might mention that a great number of critics argued that the theory presented here, even if correct, would have unfortunate social results. When invoked as an argument for the incorrectness of the theory presented

here, this is clearly an ad consequentium fallacy. When not used in this way, I can merely repeat that one cannot legitimately argue that the scientific analysis presented here entails any policy of any kind, that my whole argument is that socialization and laws are only of secondary importance to the institutions I attempt to explain, and that I believe that no consideration of the possible effects of a scientific analysis ever justifies its misrepresentation or suppression.

The Fallacy of the Irrelevant Experiment

Few people argue that men and women do not differ in the qualities of temperament and cognition considered here. Disagreement concerns the causes of the differentiation, not its existence. The environmentalist does not deny that, for example, males have a lower threshold for dominance behavior (are "more aggressive"); he denies that the differentiation has a primarily physiological etiology. There are, however, possible sex differences that this book does not discuss whose existence is denied by a line of reasoning, the incorrectness of which is worth discussing here. For subtle versions of this reasoning infect many sociological and psychological studies of sex differences. Perhaps because of the fashionable conclusion they illegitimately reach, it is just such studies that most quickly find their way into newspapers and popular magazines, thereby accelerating the

avalanche of misinformation that threatens to inundate us. (I would emphasize that in this section we are discussing only the presence or absence of certain sex differences in temperament and behavior and not the causation--be it primarily physiological or social--of those differences; and that I am not interested here in whether such differences--which are not those with which we are concerned in the work--exist or not, but only in the logic of a certain attempt to deny that they exist.)

I am referring to the argument which invokes the evidence of a test, survey, or experiment that claims to discriminate a quality (for example a temperamental tendency or a cognitive aptitude), and then to find that the sexes do not differ in the quality, when, in fact, the test demonstrates nothing more than its inability to so discriminate. This problem does not arise when the quality is easily defined and measured. If, to use an absurd example to make the point, the quality we are interested in is height and we wish to know whether males and females differ with reference to this quality (and whether the stereotype that sees men as taller is correct), we need merely to measure a sample group of men and women with a yardstick. The yardstick test does measure the quality we observe as height, and we will find that, indeed, men are taller and that the stereotype is correct. If, however, someone claimed that men were not taller after testing

the sample men and women not with a yardstick, but with a (irrelevant) test of the ability to speak French, he would be committing the fallacy that concerns us here; he would be claiming to measure a quality when, in fact, his tool of measurement discriminated another (irrelevant) quality.

Clearly, no one would make this sort of error when discussing a quality as easily described and measured as height. But the psychological and cognitive terms that we use every day--and that are represented in stereotypes such as "women are more perceptive" and "men are more logical"--are far more difficult to describe, far more subtle, and far less concrete than a quality like height. As a result, it is far more difficult to tell whether a test is testing the stereotyped quality.

Now it is important to note that the psychological and cognitive terms are not defined by the tests that claim to measure them; they are operationally defined by our use of them and by the informal tests imposed by our observations. If we say that "women are perceptive," we do not mean that we have rigorously tested their psychological perception but that, statistically speaking, they display a series of aptitudes that we observe and call perception. Even if we were completely unable to articulate in our attempts to define the terms and to describe the aptitudes we observe, this would not

render the term meaningless or indicate that we were not observing an empirical reality. For the fact that we independently agree on which people are more perceptive than others means that, even if we cannot articulate the qualities we refer to, we know them when we see them; otherwise there would be no agreement on which people manifest them. Consider, for example a group of fifty acquaintances. Were we to ask four members of this group to list independently the ten most perceptive (or logical or nurturant) members of the group, there would be agreement of a high statistical significance. This is, ipso facto, evidence that the term means something, that there is agreement on its meanings, and that we can select those who most strongly exhibit the qualities under consideration. If someone gave a test that he claimed to measure "perception" to the group of acquaintances and found that those who had been listed by the observer-members as most "perceptive" scored no higher than other members of the group, we would correctly assume that the test was not measuring the "perception" observed by the observer-members; the test-giver would have no way of explaining how the observer-members had been able to agree independently on the ten most perceptive members. If we had asked the four observers to list the ten most "fnorcal" members of the group--even assuming that each observer independently made up a meaning for "fnorcal"

and assessed the members in terms of the meaning--there would be no agreement on which members most exhibited "fnorcality." "Fnorcal," unlike "perceptive," "logical," etc., has no meaning prior to the test (this is demonstrated by the lack of agreement by the observers) and can be defined only in terms of scoring high on the test of "fnorcality" (if at all). If some people consistently scored high on a test of "fnorcality" the definition of "fnorcality" would be nothing more than 'the ability shown on a test of "fnorcality"'--until we found, as we no doubt would, that "fnorcality" was a synonym for some word (like "perception") whose meaning can be established prior to the test; if no regularity were found in tests of "fnorcality," then the term would lack even a test-operational definition.

Thus when a psychologist announces a test that discriminates logical aptitude and that finds no difference between men and women, he has not necessarily demonstrated that the general belief that men are more logical is incorrect or based on faulty observation. Certainly he has refuted the hypothesis whereby men will score higher on a test that he claims measures the quality that the general population terms "logical aptitude." Certainly his findings cannot be invoked as evidence that the sexes do differ in the quality that the general population terms "logical aptitude." But it may well be that he is presenting us with a subtle version of the attempt to deny a sexual difference in height on the

basis of a French test. After all, we do have considerable prior evidence that the sexes do differ in "logical aptitude" (as the general population uses the term). This evidence includes the stereotype that sees men as "more logical" (one is hard-pressed to find a strong stereotype that--whether its origins are primarily physiological or social--is not or was not a basically correct observation; there is not stereotype of Japanese as great basketball players or American Jews as great farmers); the tasks that require strong logical aptitude are primarily performed by men (there are few female mathematicians and theoretical physicists); even most environmentalists do not deny the reality of sexual differences in logical aptitude, but merely offer a non-physiological explanation of its presence.¹⁰ We might make these same points with references to any test that failed to find a differentiation in a quality for which we had considerable prior evidence.

I realize that the argument I present in this section may strike some readers as trying to have my cake and eat it. Some readers are disturbed by my considering tests that find an expected difference as evidentially more important than tests that do not. To such readers I would make a few additional points: (1) We do demand of an hypothesized sex difference strong prior evidence of the type we have discussed. We do not accept the presence of a sex difference

simply because someone claims that it exists. (2) Strong prior evidence leads to the questioning of negative test results in many areas of science. If an illness behaves in many ways like a bacteria-caused disease, we will not assume that bacteria are not involved merely because a test fails to find them; we will often, correctly, assume that the test is too crude to identify the bacteria and that more discriminating tests will succeed. (3) In reality we are never so inarticulate that our prior definitions are demonstrated only by our agreement and ability to reach an independent empirical identification; we are quite capable of at least roughly defining "logical aptitude," "nurturance," etc. (4) We always look for tests that can discriminate the quality and reflect the differences indicated by the prior evidence. Most importantly, in reality we nearly always develop such tests. In reality, when tests such as those described in this section fail to find differences, other tests can differentiate between the sexes (statistically speaking, of course) on the basis of the quality that prior evidence and indicated to be sexually differentiated-- though the newspapers reporting the former tests rarely mention this. When one test finds a difference and another does not, the two tests do not cancel each other out. The reasonable assumption is that one test, like that which uses French to measure height, fails to discriminate the quality, while the other, like the yardstick test does so.

After all, it is an empirical fact that some sex difference is being manifested in the second test.¹¹ (5) While one cannot assess the adequacy of a test from a newspaper report of it, even a cursory examination of the tests and questionnaires that claim no sex difference with reference to a quality for which there is strong prior evidence of its existence usually exposes their inadequacy. Readers who have taken such tests or answered such questionnaires are no doubt aware of how often they fail to have anything to do with what they claim to measure.

Even though tests of the sort described here are not relevant to the evidence provided in this work, I think the discussion worthwhile. No doubt the reader reacted with scepticism to popular reports of studies claiming that there are no sex differences in a quality that the reader knows perfectly well to be more strongly represented in one sex, for whatever reason. In all likelihood, such reports were of studies that were unable to discriminate the qualities they claimed to discriminate, and the reader was quite correct to trust his observation.

Chapter VIFootnotes

¹All this can be said, mutatis mutandis, of male attainment and male dominance. Thus a society that separated males and females save for brief sexual encounters would not be expected to manifest male dominance (which requires male-female interaction). There has never been such a society.

²The political ideologue has never cared about ideas, logic, or the integrity of intellectual pursuit. The layman who seeks to rationalize an emotional necessity has always embraced the most improbable explanation for as long as it catered to his needs while demanding of the unpalatable theory a proof that the very nature of scientific theory precludes. The intellectual dabbler has always reacted to the unfashionable with an incredulity based not on a discrepancy between the theory he encounters and its facts, logic, or relevance to the reality it explains, but on that between the theory and the ideology he espouses--an ideology founded on wish and sustained by the mutually reinforcing ignorance of its adherents.

³A few behaviorists have generalized from experiments (which for argument's sake we will assume were as successful as described) in which behavior is altered through high-intensity conditioning, and use this as "evidence" that male and female behavior has only an environmental, and not a physiological determinant. How, besides being unable to explain what element in the cultural environment of every society corresponds to this conditioning, this analysis erroneously implies that because high-intensity conditioning can force one to behave as if, even to think as if, one had no "sex drive," then these "drives" are not physiological in nature. Indeed, we know that some people have been forced to behave in this way not as a result of high-intensity conditioning, but simply because of the extremes of a Victorian cultural environment. The real implication of the behaviorists' experiments is not that sexual behavior is environmentally caused, but that theoretically at least, even the most basic physiologically-rooted tendency can be overridden if the conditioning is extreme enough. The important point to remember is, however, that there is no outside experimenter who can invent any conditioning he likes for society as a whole. The social values by which the members of a society are conditioned are not infinitely variable: they are limited by a population's observation

of the behavior of men and women that is differentiated as a result of their differentiated psychophysiology.

⁴When I refer to these explanations as parsimonious, I mean only that they are capable of explaining the universal realities in terms of factors that are present in every society, so that these explanations need not offer twenty explanations of patriarchy in twenty different societies.

⁵Although I happen to think that it is the case, it is not implied here that the subtle neuroendocrinological differences among males influence their attainments. I have stressed the fact that it does not behoove one who sees a great between-group difference in some factor as determinative, to see slight within-group differences in this factor as determinative. My point here is merely that when we look at individuals who attain upper hierarchical positions (nearly always males), we see that physical size and strength is irrelevant while "dominance behavior" is crucial.

⁶Mead, Male and Female, p. 195.

⁷For examples of this sort of criticism see: Mary Ellmann, "Women's Work," The New York Review of Books (November 1, 1973; p. 18), Margaret Mead, "Does the World Belong to Men--Or to Women?" in Redbook (October 1973, pp. 46-52) and Eleanor Maccoby's review in Science (November 2, 1973, Volume 182, Number 4111).

⁸Virtually all Eleanor Maccoby's criticism (Science, op cit.) of my discussion of dominance tendency rests on the misconception that a change of paradigm changes reality.

⁹In Patriarchy I was quite concerned with the possible criticism that the theory advanced was tautological. In retrospect, I can see that I need not have worried. The theory is clearly not tautological; I think that this is made clear in the last three paragraphs of the section entitled "The Differentiation of Dominance Tendency."

¹⁰The environmentalists cannot deny the sex difference in this aptitude there are many tests that can discriminate it and that do find the sex difference. In this section, however, I wish only to make the point that the lack of such tests would not demonstrate the absence of the sex difference.

¹¹When two different researchers administer the same test and one finds a sex difference while the other does not,

then, of course, there is a methodological problem of some sort.

CHAPTER VII

CONFUSION AND FALLACY IN THE FEMINIST ANALYSIS

The Necessity of Theory

Falsity of assumption cannot be balanced by a doubling of emotional investment. The biochemical realities that lie at the core of all social situations involving men and women cannot be eradicated by claiming that one is not interested in theory. All social and political theory is built on conceptions of the nature of man, and this is true even if the theorist is unaware of this and confuses his ignorance with objectivity. When one accepts the necessity of theory, as one does when one puts forward alternative political, economic, or social systems, one must begin not with a vision of what one would like reality to be like, but with observation. One must either accept and explain such observation or demonstrate convincingly that it is not trustworthy or not inevitable. The concept of the "inherent childishness" of the black man is criminally nonsensical not because we like to believe that the black man is born the equal of the white, but because observation of this and other societies indicates that the behavior described by whites as "childish" is not inherent or universal but a particular response to a particular environmental situation. Likewise, all those "inevitable" feminine characteristics that

turn out to be socially rather than physiologically determined can be exposed by anthropology. This has not been accomplished, however, with patriarchy, male dominance, or male attainment of high-status roles and positions, and so the feminist must attempt to refute the determinativeness of the physiological factor on a theoretical level. It is pointless for her to ignore the theoretical in order to "concentrate on the political and the economic"; doing so is analogous to explaining the dearth of women boxing champions by discussing only economic and political discrimination against women boxers. This analogy seems extreme not because there are many more women in the highest positions of power and attainment--there are not--but because the reader has no emotional resistance to the acknowledgment of male physical strength while he resists with all his energy the reality of the male dominance advantage. If the political and economic systems do not conform to the limitations set by hormonal differentiation, it is incumbent on the feminist to demonstrate this.

The Feminist Assumption

The view of man and woman in society that implicitly underlies all the arguments of the feminists is this: there is nothing inherent in the nature of human beings or of society that necessitates any role or task (save those requiring great strength or the ability to give birth) being associated with one sex or the other,¹ there

is no natural order of things decreeing that dyadic and social authority must be associated with men, nor is there any reason why it must be men who rule in every society. Patriarchy, matriarchy, and "equiarchy" are all equally possible and--while every society may invoke "the natural order of things" to justify its particular system--all the expectations we have of men and women are culturally determined and have nothing to do with any sort of basic male or female nature, and nothing to do with the sort of psychophysiological differentiation which is seen here as determining patriarchy, male attainment, male dominance and the cognitive differentiation that this work attempts to explain.

The best presentation of the feminist assumption is unquestionably John Stuart Mill's The Subjection of Women. As an impassioned plea for women's rights Mill's essay is both moving and illuminating. As an attempt to explain the etiology of sexually differentiated behavior and institutions it is indefensible. One is tempted, given the fact that the author of the essay was Mill, to ascribe its inadequacies to the fact that little of the relevant anthropological evidence and none of the relevant hormonal evidence was available at the time. But the weakness of Mill's analysis is attributable even more to the fallacious reasoning that his preconceived conclusions demanded. For example, Mill argues that we can have no conception of the limits of possibility

imposed by innate sexual differences, or even of whether such limits exist, because no society has been composed of one sex; thus he does not even attempt to explain why the conceptions of male and female held by his society are not reversed in any other society. Similarly Mill attempts to dismiss the possibility of the determinativeness of innate sexual differences by invoking the irrelevant fact that slave owners defended slavery with the invocation of physiological racial differences that do not exist; this fact is correct, of course, but it casts no more doubt on the likelihood that innate sexual differences are determinative to sexual differences in behavior and institutions, than it does on the certainty that physiology is determinative to the ability to give birth. Mill's reasoning has been accepted without question by modern feminist writers. We shall examine this reasoning at length throughout this work.

There is nothing contradictory in such an hypothesis; indeed, it is an ideal place from which to begin an empirical investigation into the nature of man, woman, and society. However, the feminist does not use this as a heuristic first step but accepts it as true.

Four Fallacies

Our comparison of the feminist line of reasoning with that of the fundamentalist is particularly illuminating when we examine feminist attempts to explain away the anthropological and physiological evidence we have

examined. Virtually every feminist theoretical argument could be as easily, and no more absurdly, advanced to deny the existence or determinativeness of those physiological sexual factors we loosely refer to as the "sex drive" and to deny the inevitability of every society's conforming its institutions to this drive. Since there is no exception to the universality of societal conformation to the "sex drive" one could argue that many individuals deny this drive in themselves, that many men are insecure enough to exaggerate it in a constant attempt to prove its presence, that its universality does not "prove" that such acknowledgment is inevitable, that we have not proved--and could never prove--with deductive conclusiveness that it exists, that no society has ever even tried to deny to a large number of its members institutional channels for its satisfaction, that the socialization of every society assumes its existence and that capitalists exploit it. This line of reasoning differs from that of the feminist only in that the feminist has no emotional barrier preventing her from seeing the absurdity of fundamentalist reasoning.

It is often suggested that we should ignore the illogic of feminist analyses since it represents merely the "excesses" that must be expected of a social movement. I do not think one has the right to ask even this of the theorist, but the problem we deal with here is much more serious. For the fallacies we discuss are not peripheral

or unimportant, but are central to the entire feminist line of reasoning. There are great differences among feminists in tone, in political approach, and in reasonableness; but all those who do not ignore the anthropological and physiological evidence altogether begin with the incorrect assumption that sexual hormonal differences are irrelevant to behavior and institutions, and try to compensate for this incorrect assumption by invoking one or more of four basic lines of fallacious reasoning. This being the case, we need not dwell on each individual feminist analysis. Since we have discussed (or will discuss in this chapter) the internal contradictions which are central to the analyses of every feminist writer who has attempted to deal with the anthropological and physiological evidence, a cursory examination is sufficient here to expose these four fallacies.

The first of these admits that the evidence is basically correct, but argues that the existence of individuals who do not conform to universal societal norms proves that such norms are not inevitable. We have discussed the pointlessness of invoking the exception to disprove the inevitability of the rule, so here we can only repeat that this line of reasoning would force one to argue that because some members of every society will deny the sexual forces within themselves and remain celibate, it is not inevitable that every society must provide institutional channels for our species' sexual

needs. As we have seen, statistical inevitability for the whole not only need not, but usually will not, imply inevitability for every individual when physiology is a causal factor; the existence of some women who are taller than some men does not diminish the fact that there is a physiological reason why the men of every society are taller than the women.

The second feminist fallacy involves one of more of various lines of reasoning that assume that two entities that have some aspects in common are, therefore, functionally identical; this is the sort of reasoning that sees a man and a table as identical because both have legs. Thus the crucial relevance of male fetal hormonalization to dominance behavior is denied because there are cyclical aspects to both male and female biology. Thus the importance of those types of cognitive and psychological tests that can discriminate between the sexes is denied because other types of cognitive and psychological tests cannot so discriminate. Thus the inevitability of qualitatively different forms of socialization of the sexes is denied because sexual differences in the physiological materials relevant to dominance tendency are quantitative (for example women are not without testosterone nor are they passive; men, too, are vulnerable to the cries of an infant--quantitative and continuous sex differences become qualitative and discrete only when they are manifested in social conceptions). A number of feminists have raised

the point that we cannot tell the sex of a person from his skeletal remains.² This is not true, but let us assume that it is. What difference would this make? To say that male and female bones are identical hardly casts doubt on the determinative effect of the male and female hormonal systems. Similarly fallacious reasoning is involved when the feminist points out that women perform roles in other societies which we consider male roles. Now we have seen that in nearly every case this is because such roles have high status in our society and low status in others, so that in our society men "use" their energies to attain such roles while in others they use their energies to attain other (high-status) roles. But let us assume that some roles (or qualities) in our society are associated with the male for purely arbitrary reasons and are not related to the factors we have spoken about. Of what importance is this to the question of physiological differentiation? To focus on these aspects rather than on the universality of patriarchy, male dominance, and male attainment of high-status roles in order to deny the importance of sexual differentiation is to mimic the lawyer who argues, "Certainly you have four witnesses who saw my client commit the crime, but I have twelve who didn't."

This fallacy has been invoked to deny differences in temperament between men and women; because our society's association of emotional expressiveness and

demonstrativeness with the female is reversed in other cultures, innate sexual differences in temperament are denied. This demonstrates that it is by no means inevitable that the men of a society will be "less emotional" than the women (that the males will be less demonstrative in expressing their male emotions than women are in expressing their female emotions) but it casts no doubt on the possibility of innate differences in male and female hierarchies of emotions.

The third fallacious method of rejecting distasteful evidence is the invocation of a sophistic tool that one might call "the fallacy of the glancing blow." In committing this fallacy, those who cannot face the implications of a basically sound theory, reasonable premise, or trustworthy observation, totally dismiss them by focusing only on their excesses and perverted uses, and would have us believe that such a glancing blow is lethal. These excesses and perverted uses are often quite real, and their exposure often quite clever, but there is no more reason to reject the basic ideas that lie behind them than there is to reject physics because its predictive power is less than absolute or because "physicists make bombs." This fallacy can be seen today in many areas not related to feminism. Many reject the possible intellectual validity of psychoanalysis altogether merely because the nature of mind and behavior precludes the attainment of a level of certainty possible for the physical

sciences (thereby raising the real possibility that theoretical constructs will become self-fulfilling prophecies). Others reject even the possibility that homosexuality can be meaningfully described as abnormal simply because we now know that a certain amount of the homosexual's unhappiness results not from his homosexuality, but from societal ostracism. Still others declare the whole concept of normality altogether meaningless as a description of an individual's ability to deal with his environment because a distorted definition of normality may be used as a device for political oppression. This is not to say that there can never be valid arguments for rejecting psychoanalysis, accepting homosexuality as normal, or considering all behavior normal, but that such attacks must strike at the heart to be fatal.

Thus today feminists ask us to dismiss the possibility that hormonal differentiation determines behavior and institutions merely because bogus biological arguments have been invoked against women and other groups in the past. As a result they refuse to even consider the hypothesis that the differing hormonal systems of men and women might reasonably be thought to result in differing propensities and behavior merely because a hormone-behavior relationship has never been "proved" with a certainty that the "inductive" approach of science can never, even theoretically, achieve. The feminist rejection of scientific evidence usually takes the form of branding

any work that refers to hormones as "pseudo-scientific," much as Vice-President Agnew used to refer to any statement he disliked as "pseudo-intellectual;" the feminists usually demonstrate about as much understanding of the scientific method as the Vice-President of the intellectual approach. Both tend to refer to any logic that they cannot handle as "sophistry."

The glancing-blow evasion occasionally involves invoking an endless number of criticisms, some of which may have a certain validity under certain circumstances, but which cast no doubt on the basic soundness of what is being criticized. For example, critics point out that, in certain types of research, there has been shown to be a tendency for the researcher to over-estimate the evidence in support of an hypothesis; this has been invoked to dismiss the findings of anthropologists that patriarchy is universal. This tendency is occasionally relevant when dealing with certain types of sophisticated research, but is hardly relevant to patriarchy (which can be demonstrated by merely counting the number of men and women in positions of suprafamilial authority). In its crudest form, this use of the "glancing blow" dismisses anthropological evidence because "all the ethnographers have been men." The point is not so much that this is not true, but that this criticism betrays the ideological nature of the feminist's intellectual approach. Only someone whose commitment is totally

ideological could seriously believe that any anthropologist would spend two years in another culture and then lie about the percentages of men and women in authority positions. Furthermore, if an anthropologist were to lie, he would certainly lie in the other direction; fame is the sure reward of any anthropologist who discovers a society without patriarchy. This is not to say the differing perspectives and mentalities of male and female anthropologists do not result in differing interpretations of some of the exceedingly complex aspects of social life, but it is nonsensical to argue that any anthropologist, male or female, would see matriarchy or female dominance where none exists--and, indeed, no ethnographer ever has. (Moreover, the feminist criticism ignores the fact that in the last century--before the theoretical and empirical evidence rendered the belief untenable--many anthropologists believed that matriarchies had existed.)

Similarly, in challenging the theory presented here one might attempt to exaggerate such methodological considerations as the difficulty of developing a precise description of the institutional manifestations of male dominance, the lack of standardization in ethnographic studies, the small size of Dr. Money's sample, and the dangers that are always implicit in the generalization to the human level of experimental studies of non-human animals. While none of these criticisms is anywhere near lethal even in its own area, each has a partial validity.

If the theory presented here rested on the evidence of just one of these areas, then perhaps the challenge, while not overwhelming, would be worthy of serious consideration. But to attempt to dismiss a theory that can sacrifice the evidence from any one of these areas without damaging that provided by the others, is to commit the "fallacy of the glancing blow."

The fourth and most crucial of the feminist fallacies involves the confusion of cause and function. We need not involve ourselves in a detailed discussion of causation here; a simple example should suffice. A jockey is small because physiology made him that way. There may be an element of feedback here in that the jockey might well weigh more if society did not reward his weighing as little as possible, but the reasons for his being able to become a jockey are certainly primarily physiological. The function that his size plays in society, its manifestation in his role of jockey, is not physiological, but society's putting his size to use. Likewise, the economic functions that sexual differentiation requires do not cause the differentiation. The physiological element relevant to dominance tendencies will manifest itself in any economic system. It is useless for the Marxist to attempt to disprove the inevitability of male attainment of authority and status positions by demonstrating that males attain such positions only in a capitalist society; the same occurs in societies with

primitive, feudal, and socialist economies. Because social and economic variables must conform to the physiological, we can change any variable and patriarchy will not be diminished. Political rule is male whether the institutions relevant to private property, control of the means of production, and class stratification are as minimal as possible or as advanced as those found in any society. It is male whether a society is patrilineal, matrilineal, or bilateral; patrilocal, matrilocal, or neolocal; white, black, or heterogenous; racist, separatist, or equalitarian; primitive, pre-industrial, or technological; Shintoist, Catholic, or Zoroastrian; monarchical, totalitarian, or democratic; Spartan, Quaker, or Bourbon; ascetic, hedonist, or libertine. It makes no difference whether a society has a value system that specifically forbids women from entering areas of authority or, like Communist China, an ideological and political commitment to equal distribution of authority positions. One cannot "disprove" the inevitability of physiological factors manifesting themselves by demonstrating the function that they serve in a political or economic system. No system could operate that did not conform to, and utilize, the reality that constitutes it. In short, the fallacy here is the reasoning that concludes that men rule because of the nature of the political-economic system and ignores the reality that the possible varieties of political-economic systems are limited by, and must conform to, the nature of man.

Incidentally, the reader who is interested in seeing virtually every feminist fallacy--both those described here and those discussed in the section on the irrelevant experiment--committed in just a few pages might like to read Naomi Weisstein's "'Kinde, Kuche, Kirche" as Scientific Law: Psychology Constructs the Female" which appears in virtually every feminist anthology. Dr. Weisstein presents us with a veritable catalogue of the mis-statements of fact and the fallacious reasoning that are the hallmarks of the feminist attempt to explain social reality. She proceeds on the assumption that to show that psychological and psychiatric tests are incapable of discriminating between male and female subjects is to show that there are no crucial psychological differences between men and women. It is quite true that there are many psychological tests that do not differentiate men from women in their results because they measure one of the many areas in which men and women do not differ. It is those areas in which men and women do differ that are of interest to us, and a demonstration that they do not differ in other areas is irrelevant; demonstrating that men and women do not differ in memory does not indicate that they do not differ in abstract reasoning. There are many tests on which one sex does far better than the other; the differences in male and female results on these tests cannot be explained by bias on the part of the experimenter because the questions are of the multiple-choice type. If male

and female answers to the questions consistently differ, there must be some reason for their doing so. Why they differ is another question; differences in test answers demonstrate only that they do differ. The most important point, however, is this: even if it were true that no test were capable of distinguishing between men and women, this would reflect only on the value and capabilities of the tests, not on the presence or absence of male-female differences (see section entitled "The Fallacy of the Irrelevant Experiment"). If Dr. Weisstein asks us to deny that men and women are different in their psychophysiological make-up simply because psychological tests cannot reflect sexual differences, she asks us to deny not merely the evidence advanced in this work and the observations of the psychiatrists she quotes with derision, of our own experience, and of our greatest writers, but those of every feminist author as well. For the feminist authors do not deny the presence of a female world view and female attitudes; indeed they give us lengthy descriptions of the female mind that differ from those of the psychiatrists quoted by Dr. Weisstein not primarily in what is seen, but in the opinion of what is seen and in the explanation of its causes. Where the psychiatrist admires nurturant attitudes and behavior, which he sees as flowing from a female physiological substrate, the feminist authors see submission engendered by social oppression. In the latter part of her essay Dr. Weisstein

argues not that there are no important male-female behavioral differences, but that such differences are not universal and that the physiological evidence is either faulty or irrelevant. She invokes the finding of S. Schachter and J.E. Singer that the effect of adrenalin on behavior is to an extent a function of suggestion, i.e., subjects treated with adrenalin will be euphoric or fearful depending on the actions of others in the room. This is an interesting and valuable fact about adrenalin, though it would seem that anyone who has felt love and fear at different times would know that adrenalin can attach itself to more than one emotion. Absurdity threatens only when one attempts to transfer this insight into the nature of adrenalin to other physiological materials. Would Dr. Weisstein have us believe that insulin is as malleable in its effects? Is there any reason at all to believe that the fetal stimulation of the male brain by fetal testicular testosterone and the presence of high levels of testosterone in the adult male are merely physiological catalysts for social suggestion? And again the same question, which invariably asserts itself: if one so argues, why does no society suggest female dominance to its members? (See section entitled "Feedback and Suggestion.") That Dr. Weisstein is aware of this theoretical problem is apparent from the fact that she claims that Margaret Mead has discovered a number of societies in which male dominance is not manifested in social institutions; we have seen that

Dr. Mead went out of her way to deny ever having said this and that, in any case, it would not be true even if she had. Dr. Weisstein carries her method to the primate level and invokes all the illogic we were forced to deal with in the discussion of primates. She concludes that "... since primates are at present too stupid to change their social conditions by themselves, the 'innateness' and 'fixedness' of their behavior is simply unknown." As I have said, it would make no difference at all to the line of reasoning I invoke if dominance in all non-human primates were associated with the female or if it had not been shown that primate male dominance manifests itself even when primates are raised in isolation (thus removing the possibility that primate male aggression can be explained by socialization). But one cannot resist asking why, if there is no physiological basis to the differences in dominance between primate males and females, half the groups of each species of primate are not led by females?

Vulgarized Marxism

This fourth fallacy is central to all those analyses which are derived from Engels' work and all those which treat women as a class. There are, to be sure, a number of Marxist writings on the subject of sex-role differentiation that do not commit this fallacy; these either do not disagree with the theory presented in this essay, or admit that the hormonal factor is relevant, but argue that

it need not be; in the latter case we cannot, as we have seen in our discussion of human malleability and the nature of society, logically disprove the theoretical possibility of a society without values, stratification, or status differentiation, but can only point out the utopian nature of such a hypothesized society, repeat that the same argument could be made by the fundamentalist for the possibility of a society that overrode the "sex drive" of the majority of its members, and admit that, if there were no government and no hierarchies of any kind, then there would be no patriarchy. The better known contemporary feminist works, such as Sexual Politics, The Female Eunuch, and Shulamith Firestone's The Dialectic of Sex,³ all invoke either aspects of Engels' reasoning or an approach that the authors believe to be an adaptation of a Marxist analysis, but with which, I suspect, no serious Marxist would associate himself. By denying or ignoring sexual hormonal differentiation, these authors force the histories of all human societies into the framework of economic determinism in order to confuse the conformations of economic systems to the reality of male and female physiologies with the physiological determinants of differing sexual roles. While the two latter books show the same ignorance of the relevant anthropological and physiological facts and the same total ignorance of what theory is all about that permeates Sexual Politics, Dr. Millett's book is the most annoying to the serious

scholar; for, unlike Sexual Politics, The Female Eunuch and The Dialectic of Sex do not try to camouflage their intellectual inadequacy behind a facade of scholarship and a misconception that a profusion of footnotes compensates for a lack of the hard logic and the hard mental work of real scholarship.

Since any analysis of patriarchy must either accept the determinativeness of physiological differentiation or demonstrate that such differentiation need not engender patriarchy, we need not detain ourselves with the Marxist analyses that consider only the economic and ignore the physiological. That which views women as a class is too silly for us to bother with: it is sufficient to point out that the members of one class are not hormonally different from the members of another, and that the individuals of one class do not pair off in head-to-head encounters with the individuals of another (thereby rendering each member of each class more tightly bound to a member of the other class than to any member of his own).

When the Marxist feminist attempts to deal directly with the question of biology we can expect the arrival of Glancing Blow's ne'er-do-well sibling, Red Herring. In her otherwise commendable piece, "Women: The Longest Revolution," Juliet Mitchell acknowledges the necessity for the Marxist to deal with the biological factor, but presents this not in terms of hormonal differentiation,

but in terms of the family. She implies that the institution of the family, or at least its relevant aspects, may not be inevitable and, therefore, that patriarchy may not be inevitable. Now there are quite strong anthropological arguments for claiming that no society could be built on any other foundation than the family and that, even if one could, the family would represent not oppression of the female but women's greatest triumph. But this is not my point here. For Dr. Mitchell to demonstrate that physiology is not insurmountable, that patriarchy is not inevitable, she must demonstrate that sexual hormonal differentiation does not render patriarchy inevitable. No attack on the family or any other red herring--even if it were successful--can lessen the probability of the correctness of the theory presented herein. No analysis that attempts to explain the causation of sex-role behavior or sexually-differentiated institutions in purely economic terms can refute one that uses the hormonal factor to explain the limits of social reality; such an analysis may go far towards clarifying how the roles, socialization, meanings, values, and ideologies of a society conform to the limits set by the hormonal factor or how they vary within those limits, but it cannot explain the limits themselves, much less demonstrate that there are no such limits. The Marxist attempt to explain patriarchy, male attainment, and male dominance in terms of the economic functions served by these is as absurd as an attempt to

explain male boxing superiority by demonstrating that male boxers earn big salaries, that males are socialized towards boxing, or that our ideology associates boxing with males. One might argue that an alternative value system might outlaw boxing (thereby eradicating male attainment in this area), but to then argue that a society could similarly eradicate patriarchy, male attainment, and male dominance by eradicating group values, stratification, government and dyadic dominance is once again to invoke Utopia.

Vulgarized Marxism not only fails theoretically by ignoring all the biological and anthropological evidence; it also fails empirically in that it must explain the failures of each socialist society to reduce patriarchy in terms of each individual socialist society. As we have seen, there is not a scintilla of evidence that patriarchy, male attainment, and male dominance are reduced in socialist societies.

The Failure to Ask "Why?"

Like those we have just discussed, a number of traditional economic and sociological analyses ignore physiology and cross-cultural anthropology altogether (or treat them with a superficiality that is tantamount to ignoring them) and concentrate on the manifestations of physiology in socialization (boys are encouraged to compete,

become scientists, etc., while girls are encouraged to develop their nurturant qualities, etc.) and in economic reality (males constitute the overwhelming number of politicians, leading businessmen, department chairmen, scientists, etc.) Some of these works, such as Elizabeth Janeway's Man's World, Woman's Place, Jessie Bernard's Women and the Public Interest, and Cynthia Fuchs Epstein's Woman's Place are honest and intelligent, while others are shoddy and a waste of the reader's time. But they are all irrelevant to the general questions addressed in this book; no primarily economic or sociological analysis --no matter how high its quality--can ever explain the causes of patriarchy, male dominance, and male attainment of high-status roles and positions. Such works merely document the presence of these universals in this society, a presence that human physiology renders inevitable in this and every other society. The more the feminists produce such documentation, the deeper they dig the grave for their basic assumption that these institutions are not inevitable.

Here we see the ultimate failure of the feminist analysis. Even the best of the feminist works are grounded in the erroneous assumption that demonstrating that a society attaches different values and expectations to men and women (or showing that men have often said that men and women are different) somehow proves that these different values and and expectations are totally arbitrary and are not the social manifestations of physiology (or that

women have behaved in a feminine way simply because men have told them to--in which case one might ask why it is the women of every society who listen to the men and never the other way around). Because these works fail even to acknowledge the problem of causation by asking "why?" (why does every society socialize boys towards, and girls away from, competition, why are the non-maternal roles of women never given high status by any society, why does every society associate authority with the male, why is it women who are socialized away from the sciences?), they cannot be considered theory, but, at best, merely description. One does not need a sociologist to tell one that boys are dissuaded from playing with dolls or girls from fist-fighting or that most politicians and leading businessmen are men. As long as the feminist attempt at theory ignores all the hormonal evidence or simply claims that such evidence is unimportant, as long as it ignores and leaves unexplained the universality of patriarchy, male attainment, and male dominance, and as long as it ignores the fact that no society fails to socialize males towards dominance and females away from dominance, it will illuminate little and explain less.

But to ask why, to look for theory in order to understand rather than selective description in order to justify ideology, to attempt to answer questions rather than to beg them, requires one to lay before the reader all one's facts, assumptions and reasoning, and,

only then, all one's conclusions so that--if one is wrong--the reader can track down and identify one's mistake just as the electrician tracks down the short on the circuit board. This is what theory is all about; it differs from what may be a brilliant and perceptive non-theoretical work in that one may choose any sentence and follow its thought to its logical conclusion, do the same with any other sentence, and find that the logical extensions not only do not contradict each other, but create harmonies that explain even more than the two sentences taken individually. This is the minimum requirement of any work demanding to be taken seriously. But this the feminist dares not do lest the inaccuracy of her facts, the fallaciousness of her reasoning, the incorrectness of her conclusions, and the general inadequacy of her analysis be exposed for all to see.

Chapter VIIFootnotes

¹"It is time that we realized that the whole structure of male and female personality is entirely imposed by social conditioning. All the possible traits of human personality have in this conditioning been arbitrarily assigned into two categories; thus aggression is masculine, passivity feminine ..." [Emphasis added]. (Kate Millett, Barnard Alumnae, Spring, 1970, p. 28.) This statement expresses the assumption which underpins all of Dr. Millett's Sexual Politics (London: Hart-Davis, MacGibbon, 1971). In the four hundred pages of Sexual Politics she offers only four bits of evidence in support of this crucial assumption: (1) She quotes Dr. Robert Stoller's definitional distinction between biological "sex" and societal "gender" and leaves the strong impression that Dr. Stoller believes that "sex" need not be relevant to behavior. The true flavor of his thesis is better summarized by Dr. Stoller himself a few pages past the point where Dr. Millett stopped quoting: "A sex-linked genetic biological tendency towards masculinity in males and femininity in females works silently but effectively from fetal existence on, being overlaid after birth by the effects of environment, influences working more or less in harmony to produce a preponderance of masculinity in men and femininity in women" [Robert Stoller, Sex and Gender (London: The Hogarth Press, 1969) p. 74]. The point here is not whether Dr. Stoller is correct in his assessment, but that, if scientists are in the kind of disagreement over the importance of sexual biology to behavior which Dr. Millett claims they are, one would not think that she would find it necessary to misrepresent the views of a scientist who does believe that sexual biology is crucial. (2) Dr. Millett includes a footnote that refers the reader to a Rockefeller University publication that is only tangentially relevant to this issue. (3) There is an out-of-context quotation from a work of Dr. John Money. We need not examine this here because we have seen that it is Dr. Money's own work, more than that of any other scientist working with humans (as opposed to experimental animals), which indicates the crucial importance of sex hormones to behavior. (4) Finally she states that "the best medical research points to the conclusion that sexual stereotypes have no bases in biology." As we shall see, this statement is absolutely indefensible unless one defines stereotype not in the terms of probability that the biologist uses but in terms so rigid that the point becomes irrelevant and unless one defines best medical research as "research which points to the conclusion that sexual stereotypes have no bases in biology." (This assumes that there is some

medical research pointing in this direction; my investigations have uncovered none.) If anyone presented a thesis in an uncontroversial area to a graduate department in the social sciences or the physical sciences and attempted to get away with this kind of intellectual dishonesty he would receive ridicule rather than a Ph.D. in literature from Columbia University. When Dr. Millett is not energetically planting fallacies among the wild inaccuracies, she is dressing discarded conspiratorial and evolutionary theory in drag and presenting it as new. Her entire analysis is predicated on the belief that stating a disagreeable fact or argument in derisive terms results in alteration of the fact or refutation of the argument. Much of her book consists of an analysis of D.H. Lawrence and other male authors. I would not presume to question the accuracy of Dr. Millett's presentation of these authors' representations of women. One wonders, however, whether she intends to imply that these views of women are representative of those held by nearly all male authors (or nearly all men). If not, then why are they relevant? One could "prove" oppression of the whale by using only Moby Dick as evidence. If these representations of women are invoked as representative of those of nearly all male authors, then why do so many of those very individuals who are acknowledged to see most deeply into the nature of things all see the same thing? Dr. Millett realized that these questions would arise and this is why she has gone to such lengths to confuse and misrepresent the relevant biological and anthropological evidence.

²Dr. Germaine Greer (The Female Eunuch, London: Hart-Davis, MacGibbon, 1970) is something of a master at introducing irrelevant factors and making it sound as if she were proving a point. Her attempt to dismiss physiological considerations appears in her first paragraph. "Perhaps when we have learnt to read the DNA we will be able to see what the information which is common to all members of the female sex really is, but even then it will be a long and tedious argument from biological data to behavior: (p. 15). To the reader who is not knowledgeable in this area this sentence no doubt sounds as if it means something. But let us once again use the analogy of boxing. Dr. Greer's logic would force us to say that we will have no idea whether biology is relevant to male superiority in boxing until we learn to "read the DNA." When we learn to do so we will know how the male genetic "programme's" direction--that the male will develop superior strength--is encoded in the genetic materials, but we hardly need to "read the DNA" in order to know that it is so encoded. If one considers boxing and agrees that a certain level of strength is a condition for prowess at it, then the biological element is apparent from the greater muscularity of the male; to see the connection between sexual biology and

behaviour in this area one does not need to "read the DNA." Likewise, we know the hormonal evidence relevant to dominance. Nothing much will be added to our knowledge of the importance of hormones to dominance when we can precisely describe the genetic etiology of the hormonal development. The use of boxing as an example of behavior to which sexual biology is relevant also allows us to deal with the attempt to dismiss biological considerations by emphasizing that women as well as men produce testosterone (though of course in lesser amounts and not in a context of a "masculinized" CNS). Women also have muscles (though smaller ones than males), and, just as women are aggressive (though less so than males), so they could box. In both cases the quantitative differences become qualitative when society conforms its socialization practices to biological probability. While some women could no doubt become better boxers than some men, society must, for reasons we have discussed, socialize women away from such behavior. If it did not, if women attempted to attain their goals through force, they would lose in almost every case. That Dr. Greer is aware of the theoretical problems in her work is apparent from the fact that whenever contradiction threatens, she abruptly ends the chapter.

³Shulamith Firestone, The Dialectic of Sex (London: Cape, 1971). Miss Firestone's book begins with the advantage (over those of Drs. Millett and Greer) of an at least tentative admission that men and women are different from each other. Her acknowledgment of physiology is, however, limited to the woman's reproductive role and no mention is made of the determinative hormonal differentiation. Like Simone de Beauvoir's infinitely better book, The Second Sex (London: Cape, 1968), Miss Firestone's book admits the universality of patriarchy without giving the reader any reason to doubt that the forces that have engendered patriarchy will continue to do so. Where Dr. de Beauvoir is immune to the criticism that she does not introduce the hormonal evidence we have discussed (little of which had been discovered when Dr. de Beauvoir wrote), Miss Firestone chose merely to ignore the evidence that renders her theory irrelevant. Dr. de Beauvoir's book fails only when it deals with the etiology of patriarchy, male attainment, and male-dominance; elsewhere it offers a great deal that is of value. Miss Firestone's book is both an unsubstantiated assertion that for some reason physiology is no longer determinative and a fantasy of suggested social changes whose probabilities range from the miniscule to the non-existent.

⁴New Left Review, 40 (November-December, 1966) pp. 11-37.

APPENDIX

In this Appendix I consider every society I have ever heard suggested as a possible example of a society that failed to exhibit patriarchy or male dominance. It is not without significance that in no case has the anthropologist who studied the group alleged it to be an exception. The claim is invariably made by someone, rarely an anthropologist, with a theoretical interest in finding such an exceptional society. This is, of course, perfectly legitimate if the exception is an exception. In this Appendix I attempt to demonstrate that whenever one returns to the source cited by the author one finds that the society described is in no way an exception. Unless otherwise noted, the source I quote or refer to is the same as that invoked by the author claiming it to be an exception. When I do not quote or refer to the source invoked by the author it is because it is verbal or unpublished, in which case I rely on the best available source. Stephens refers to William N. Stephens, The Family in Cross-Cultural Perspective (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1963).

Alorese

Cora Du Bois, The People of Alor: A Social-Psychological Study of an East Indian Island (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1944), page 144:

... marriage means for women far greater economic responsibility in a social system that does not grant them status recognition equal to that of men while at the same time it places on them greater and more monotonous burdens of labor.

Balonda

A few readers of Patriarchy remembered reading of David Livingstone's description of his encounter with a Balonda female chief and wondered whether the Balonda might represent an exception to male dominance or even matriarchy. They did not give sources. Reference to the available sources indicates that the chief whom Livingstone met was the sister of the (male) "greatest Balonda chief." Since this is the only mention of a female chief, I think it fair to assume that much of the status and power of the female chief (which so impressed Livingstone) is owing to her relationship to the greatest chief, and not to a general female equality of authority. See David Livingstone, Missionary Travels and Researches in South Africa (London: John Murray, 1857).

Bamenda

Phyllis M. Kaberry, Women of the Grassfields (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office; Colonial Research Publications, Number 14, 1952), page 148. "Women are not eligible for the headship of kin or political groups."

Berbers

Stephens implies that it is "possible" that the Berbers do not associate familial authority with the male. He indicates that the ethnographic materials do not imply that the Berbers fail to associate familial authority with the male (p. 301); his basis for raising the possibility that they may be an exception is information obtained in an interview with a graduate student in archeology who had observed a particular Berber group in the Rif Mountains while on an archeological dig (personal communication). Since the informant has not published on this subject, it is not possible to demonstrate in her own words that the group she observed does not represent an exception to the universality of male dominance. Furthermore, the term Berber refers to a large number of social groups whose languages are similar. Since there is no way of knowing which of the Rif Mountain groups was observed, it is not possible to invoke someone else's ethnographic study of the group. One would doubt the absence of male dominance simply because all Berber groups are Moslem. Moreover, Murdock, in his compilation covering all Berber groups writes: "Nuclear families are reported to be independent social groups only among the Mzab [not a Rif group]. Elsewhere they are aggregated into patrilocal extended families, each with a patriarchal head" [Emphasis added]. George Peter Murdock, Africa: Its People and Their Cultural History (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1959), p. 117.

Catal Hüyük

A poet has suggested that the excavation at Catal Hüyük provides evidence of a neolithic group that was female-headed. In a letter to the New York Review of Books (October 4, 1973, pp. 37-8), Steven Webster responded:

... as Mellaart (the leader of the excavation) would be the first to admit, the archeological evidence of female oriented ritual at Catal Hüyük is no more a substantial demonstration of matriarchy than some future excavations of a contemporary shrine of La Virgen de Guadalupe (or some other cult of the Madonna) might uncover ...

Gahuku-Gama

See text.

Hopi

Edward P. Dozier, "The Hopi-Tewa of Arizona," University of California Publication in American Archeology and Ethnology, 44, 3, (1954) pp. 259-376.

Page 320:

... it seems that brothers are assumed to be senior to sisters, and entitled to respect as such, in the absence of evidence to the contrary." (Dozier quoting Barbara Freire-Marrerco, "Tewa Kinship Terms from the Pueblo of Hano, Arizona," American Anthropologist, n.s. 16: pp. 269-87).

Page 339:

Within the family, the mother's brother, or, in his absence, any adult male of the household or clan, is responsible for the maintenance of order and the discipline of younger members.

Iroquois

Lewis Henry Morgan, League of the Ho-De-No-Sau-Nee or Iroquois (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1901),

page 315:

The Indian regarded woman as the inferior, the dependent, and the servant of man, and from nurturance and habit, she actually considered herself to be so.

See also: Cara B. Richards, "Matriarchy or Mistake: The Role of Iroquois Women Through Time," in Cultural Stability and Cultural Change (Annual Meeting of the American Ethnological Society in Ithaca, New York, 1957), pp. 36-45. Martha C. Randle, "Iroquois Women, Then and Now," Bureau of American Ethnology Bulletin 149 (Smithsonian Institution, undated).

Jivaro

Stephens presents two contradictory ethnological views of the Jivaro. One pictures a strong male dominance. The other, on which Stephens bases his suggestion that the Jivaro male is not dominant, is R. Karsten, The Headhunters of Western Amazonia (Helsinki: Centraltry-cheriet, 1935). I assume that the text is identical to R. Karsten, The Headhunters of Western Amazonas: The Life and Culture of the Jibaro Indians of Eastern Ecuador and Peru (Helsingfors: Finska Vetenskaps-societen Helsingfors; Commentationes Humanarum Litterarum VII, 1935), in which Karsten writes (page 254):

Of the relations between husband and wife it may be proper to say that it is regulated according to the principle "the man governs, but the woman holds sway.

Kibbutz

See text.

Lovedu

Eileen Jensen Krige and J.D. Krige, The Realm of a Rain-Queen (London, 1943).

While under the titular leadership of a "rain queen" Lovedu society comprises virtually autonomous groups headed by chiefs and district heads who are (nearly always) males and in which most of the decisions are made by the males of the Khoro.

Manus

See note 23 to Chapter 2, p. 211.

Marquesans

R. Linton, "Marquesan Culture" in A. Kardiner, The Individual and His Society (New York: Columbia University Press, 1939). Pages 69-70: "She [the Marquesan woman] does not take the role of disciplinarian." Page 184:

The gods were almost all male. Theoretically, women could hold the highest rank, but in practice few women were actually household heads, rulers of tribes or inspirational priests. In rare cases the eldest daughter of a chief would become a chieftainess and rule in her own right, although as a rule the chief adopted a boy if his eldest child was a girl. Such a woman might be deified, but the most powerful deities were invariably male.

Mbuti (Bambutu)

Discussed in text.

Modjokuto

Stephens provides unclear evidence to support Modjokuto as "matriarchy" (i.e. female authority in the home). Quoting Hildred Geertz, "Javanese Values and Family Relationships," 1956 Radcliffe Ph.D. thesis, and

The Javanese Family (New York: Free Press, 1961), he says that the man is shown deference in that he gets the better food, must often be the first to eat, and receives "formalized deference," but that the woman tends to have real household dominance. But Beertz states (page 107):

The relationship with the mother remains as strong and secure as before--and lasts throughout the individual's life. While mothers are described as "loving" (trisnya) their children, fathers are expected only to "enjoy" (seneng) them. The mother is seen as a bulwark of strength and love to whom one can always turn. In contrast, the father is distant and must always be treated respectfully. It is the mother who instructs the child in social forms, who makes countless decisions for him, and who administers most punishments. The father is usually only a court of last appeal and a model for imitation. He is expected to be, above all, patient and dignified (sabar) with his wife and children: he should lead them with a gentle though firm hand, not interfering with their petty quarrels, but being always available to give solemn sanction to his wife's punishments of disobedient children. Only during the one early phase of the child's life is this aspect of the father's role set aside [Emphasis added].

Mundugumor

See text discussion of Tchambuli.

Nama Hottentot

As Stephens (p. 298) points out (quoting I. Schapera, The Khoisan Peoples of South Africa (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1930), p. 251), the woman does have considerable authority in the home and over the children, but "... she plays a subordinate role in matters pertaining to tribal life, and in public always walks several paces behind her husband ..."

Navaho

Clyde Kluckhohn and Dorothea Leighton, The Navaho
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1946), page 55.

Formally, from the Navaho angle, the "head of the family" is the husband. Whether he is in fact varies with his personality, intelligence, and prestige.

Nayar

E. Kathleen Gough, "The Traditional Kinship System of the Nayars of Malabar." Manuscript, Social Science Research Council Summer Seminar on Kinship, Harvard University, 1954, quoted in Stephens, p. 317:

The Karanavan mother's brother was traditionally unequivocal head of the group. ... He could command all other members, male and female, and children were trained to obey him with reverence ...

Philippines

C.L. Hunt, "Female Occupational Roles and Urban Sex Ratios in the United States, Japan, and the Philippines" in Social Forces, Volume 43, Number 3, March 1965, page 144.

This combination of patterns has brought the Filipino woman to a point where, although denied some of the adventurous freedom of the male, she may be even better prepared for economic competition. The acceptance of the boredom of routine work may be seen as part of "patient suffering" which is said to characterize the Filipino female to a greater extent than the male. Her responsible role in the household means that the wife is charged with practical affairs while the husband is concerned to a greater extent with ritualistic activity which maintains prestige.

Semai

Robert Knox Dentan, The Semai: A Non-Violent People of Malaya (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1968),

page 68:

No rule prevents women from being influential, and some women are. Most of the time, however, Semai women are primarily concerned with the petty affairs of hearth and home. As a Semai proverb puts it, "men's loincloths are long, women's loincloths are short," that is, men are concerned with major problems, women with minor ones. Furthermore, Semai women feel "embarrassed" to take a prominent part in public debate, although a woman often exercises influence through her husband.

Tasaday

The Tasaday group is now being studied by anthropologists, but the few published reports are all by journalists and leave much to be desired. For example, the group is usually referred to as having no religious rituals and also as having practices designed to "keep away witches." The group is invariably described as "Stone Age," but what this means is never made clear. The similarity of Tasaday language to that of many other groups and the fact that the entire "society" comprises only twenty-seven individuals would seem to make it unlikely that this "society" has existed as a separate entity since the Stone Age: it would seem more likely that a male and a female were separated from another group a few centuries ago and that the Tasaday are their descendants. "Stone Age" may, however, correctly describe the fact that their culture demonstrates no institution or invention not present in the societies that existed during the Stone Age.

The published reports usually refer to the Tasaday as "unaggressive" in an admitted effort to cast doubt on

theories positing a propensity for war-making that is inherent in humans. I do not take exception to this-- though these reports leave the "aggressive" which is absent as vague and undefined as the theory they oppose leaves the "propensity for war-making" vague and undefined--nor do these reports touch on the complexities of the area of human behavior of which they speak. For example, they do not consider the possibility that the "aggression" which they discuss (whatever it is) is a function of environmental necessity acting on physiological capacity so that other societies living under other conditions could not survive with the value system and behavior that suffices for the Tasaday.

But all of this is irrelevant to Patriarchy; the "aggression" of which the reports speak is not the hierarchical and dyadic dominance behavior that I subsume under the term, but something closer to "warlikeness." I introduce the subject only because one report (a television documentary) referred to one of the older Tasaday women as "probably the most influential member of the group" and as one whose husband "the Tasaday saw as henpecked." One reader asked why this society was not a matriarchy. My immediate answer was that this group consisted of only twelve adults (and fifteen children) so that it is not in any meaningful sense a society. There are many groups of this small size in which a woman is the most influential member even in societies with the most

patriarchal of values. The Tasaday might legitimately be presented as at least a possible matriarchy if the Tasaday social structure traditionally associated the position of the "most influential individual" with a female or if Tasaday culture possessed values associating dyadic authority with females. There is no evidence that the former is the case; if the latter were the case it would not seem likely that a woman would be described as having a husband who is "henpecked"--such a description would seem to reflect an expectation that most women will not behave towards their husbands in the same way as the "influential" woman. "Influential" implies that the individual does not have institutionalized mechanisms of authority at her disposal, but attains her power through personal and individual means; this is precisely what all of the world's women have done by invoking the "feminine means" that serve as counterpoise for male "aggression" and its institutionalized manifestations. Even if we accept the dubious assumption implicit in these reports that there is no adult hierarchy in Tasaday society, we cannot accept this as evidence of the irrelevance of male "aggression" to social structure without also accepting the premise that a society of a thousand or a million members could also lack a hierarchy; this assumption we cannot accept. For if societies larger than that of the Tasaday must have hierarchies, and if such hierarchies cue in the male sooner or more strongly than in the female the behavior which is

a precondition for hierarchical attainment, then it is inevitable that males will attain the positions of authority and that socialization will conform to this. We might consider the Tasaday analogous to a small group comprising only males; perhaps such a setting will not cue sexual behavior in males, but this does not imply that a large group of males and females could fail to exhibit sexual behavior. The presence of members of the other sex would cue the "sex drive" that (we are assuming for analogy's sake) need not be cued in an all-male group just as the presence of a hierarchy will cue the male hierarchical attainment behavior that need not be cued when a group is so small that there is no hierarchy. (All of this accepts the correctness of the reports; I suspect that anthropological research will show that there is at least a rudimentary patriarchy and an orthodox male dominance even among the Tasaday.)

Tchambuli

Discussed in the text.

Yegali

This tribe is alleged to have existed in Madagascar in Harold Hodge's introductory sociology text, Conflict and Consensus (New York: Harper and Row, 1971). Dr. Hodges writes (personal communication) that he heard of this group from the late Donald Bender. Investigation has not uncovered a single mention of this group in either anthropological or popular publications.

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