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Borman, William Alan

**A CRITICAL INVESTIGATION OF MAHATMA GANDHI'S PHILOSOPHY OF
NON-VIOLENCE**

City University of New York

PH.D. 1982

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A CRITICAL INVESTIGATION OF MAHATMA GANDHI'S
PHILOSOPHY OF NON-VIOLENCE

by

WILLIAM BORMAN

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate
Faculty in Philosophy in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree
of Doctor of Philosophy, The City University
of New York.

1982

This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Philosophy in satisfaction of the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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PREFACE

Gandhi's work puts into a new context the debate on whether non-violence is always right or whether violence might sometimes be justified, and if it is, how and when. It is a question whether his concept, when rightly understood, rather inaugurates a new debate, the content and significance of which are not captured by the old terms. In the Western tradition the concept that "non-violence" is thought to cover is very different from what Gandhi's is found to be on close analysis. In the Eastern tradition the concept was not similarly applied in the absolute and universal way that Gandhi attempts. Gandhi in fact coined the term "non-violence". He calls for a reasoned understanding of the moral ideal of non-violence and its application, as intended by his new term.

The virtues of mercy, non-violence, and love in any man can be truly tested only when they are pitted against ruthlessness, violence, hate and untruth.

If this is true, then it is incorrect to say that Ahiṃsā [Skt. - lit., non-killing, non-harming] is of no avail before a murderer. It can certainly be said that to experiment with Ahiṃsā in the face of a murderer is to seek self-destruction. But this is the real test of Ahiṃsā...

It is another matter that our non-violence has not reached such heights. It would be wholly wrong for us to lower the standard of Ahiṃsā by reason of our own frailty or lack of experience. Without true understanding of the ideal, we can never hope to reach it. It is

necessary for us, therefore, to apply our reason to understand the power of non-violence.¹

The purpose of this inquiry is the critical exposition and evaluation of Gandhi's philosophy of non-violence.

However, Gandhi's concept, metaphysics, principles of action, methods, and criteria are only aspects of his mission to propagate non-violence as a practical rejoinder to the common sense argument for the justified use of violence or force. An adequate study of his philosophy of non-violent action must place the exposition of his concept, metaphysics, and methods in the context of the critical examination of his wider aim.

Gandhi's views and mission are ideological and absolute. Nevertheless, the present study shows how Gandhi's metaphysics and ethics, though absolute, can lead to and support a more moderate and common sense position on violence that does not equate it with evil and that accepts force as a last resort unquestionably justifiable in certain strictly circumscribed situations.

The present study thus shows the compatibility of Gandhi's general ethical and metaphysical views with a modified concept of violence and non-violence, and its outcome is a more realistic and more appropriate political view that is consistent with Gandhi's basic position. It accepts the common sense general commitment to non-violence with its prima facie case and

¹Mohandas K. Gandhi, In Search of the Supreme, comp. V.B. Kher (3 vols.; 1st ed.; Ahmedabad: The Navajivan Publishing House, 1961), II, p. 36, (Harijan, "H", 4/28/46).

and last resort arguments. Only the absolute dimension of Gandhi's position is removed. The present study finds that these common sense arguments may override the general commitment to non-violence, justifying the more practical outcome that common sense might arrive at by discounting Gandhi's ideological requirements and equations while retaining his more fundamental metaphysical and spiritual bases.

This critical exposition of Gandhi's work must therefore delineate, (1) his concept and the methods and criteria of its empirical application, (2) the metaphysical and moral bases of that practical application, (3) how his ideology limits his metaphysical, moral, and practical views, and (4) how an appropriately modified concept of violence and non-violence can be deduced from this examination. The argument is as follows:

On the basis of his ideological requirements, his application of them, and his assessments of his practice, Gandhi makes his radical empirical claims for universality and infallibility, and assuming the validity of these claims he draws an absolute practical conclusion. This conclusion is unwarranted by his metaphysical, spiritual, and ethical views without the interposition of his ideological interpretive apparatus, viz., the equation of violence with evil, the a priori universal applicability of non-violence, and the prescriptive analysis of moral authenticity and the ends-means convertibility. Gandhi imposes these ideological components on his concepts, methods, and evaluations. Therefore

this study focuses on his empirical claims which if valid should stand alone, apart from his ideological evaluation of them, and on this independent basis examines the problems raised by his mission against the justifiability of violence and the common sense position that violence may possibly have moral validity as a last resort, at least against incorrigible and otherwise insuperable evil. Gandhi's claim is that there is no such evil that is absolutely incorrigible and insuperable to the force he denotes by "non-violence".

It is concluded from the above that Gandhi's empirical and moral position, and his practical claims, based on the classical non-dual metaphysics, soul-centered spiritual view, and autonomous ethics of the Gītā and the Upanishads, need not be so absolute. Discounting his ideological assumptions and a priorisms yields a modified concept and methodology of non-violence, and a more practical and practicable political program, while remaining compatible with his basic metaphysics and non-violent ethics.

The paper is divided into two Parts, and three Chapters. Part One is expository. It comprises two chapters. The first chapter gives an exposition of Gandhi's concept, ideology, and metaphysics, and the second chapter examines the empirical application of these. The depiction of Gandhi's concept and its application in the first part suggests the cogency of his concept and the potency of his methods. Part Two is critical. It comprises one chapter that critically examines Gandhi's normative and prescriptive claims that non-violence is always

right and ought to be always applied. It focuses on Gandhi's empirical claim that non-violence is universally applicable and has perfect practical efficacy. In light of the critical evaluation of this claim, this chapter assesses the bearing of his work on the debate regarding the moral rightness of non-violence and the apparent empirical justifiability of violence.

The preparation in the first part allows Part Two to focus on the critical problem raised and crystallized by the exposition completed in the two chapters of Part One. Five sections comprise the third chapter. The first three sections define Gandhi's mission against the justifiability of violence, identify the problem of justification raised by that mission, and elaborate the elements of an objective standpoint for evaluating that mission. The fourth section applies this critical scheme to the concrete problems of Gandhi's views on the justifiability of war and the status of satyāgraha as its moral equivalent and complete substitute in the last resort. The fifth section suggests a modified conception and praxis of non-violence and a more limited contemporary practical application than the one advanced in Gandhi's radical empirical claim and his mission to demonstrate its validity.

Finally, it should be noted that Gandhi was primarily an activist and reformer. His statements were made on particular occasions to particular persons, for particular purposes. Because Gandhi wrote as a journalist and speaker, his speeches and writings present his thought on non-violence in an ideological form. Gandhi's ideological expression obscures the practical

and moral data he presents. This raises problems for clarifying his concept and evaluating his new challenge to the justifiability of violence. His statements therefore need to be rendered as explicit general claims, and their ideological components need to be exposed in order for them to be suitable for philosophical investigation. They are clarified and completed referring them to their setting and purpose, their underlying Indic conceptions, the perennial problems they are meant to resolve, and the texts they draw upon. This rational reconstruction is crucial to the purpose of this paper in that it is a prerequisite to giving an accurate analysis and evaluation of Gandhi's philosophy of non-violence. As this is intended to be a philosophical investigation, these influences are traced only to the extent needed for the immediate analytic purpose.

Here it remains to acknowledge the debts one has incurred in the course of producing the work. These acknowledgements only partially cancel the debt. Professor K. D. Irani gave encouragement and kindness, and specific philosophical and professional guidance in the earlier attempts at this paper. Professor M. Cohen was critical, forthright, patient, and withal sympathetic and supportive during its long middle period. He may not know that his persistence was so appreciated. Professor V. Held guided me to a concrete proposal and plan. Again, this was a step more significant for me than she may know, and know her part in it. Professor G. Ezorsky, my sponsor, took up my work at that point and gave me a crucial general

framework and much needed guidance to bring that proposal to this completion. Only the one helped knows the failings that those acknowledged have helped to avert. Public acknowledgement, published, in part allays this debt. In the wider field, and another kind of debt, there are those whom to acknowledge by publication would be to avoid the real acknowledgement and payment. These must be acknowledged silently. In both cases most of the debt must yet be unrecognized and is not summed or completed in the production of the paper.

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NOTE: Citation to Gandhi's writing and speeches customarily include date of publication or date of statement or both. Gandhi's many compilers and editors differ in style in which these dates are given, viz., order of month and day. In this paper the style of the compiler in each source has been retained. Thus of the five main compilers used Kumarappa, Kher, and Desai cite by day/month/year; and, Kripalani, and Hingorani cite by month/day/year. In a few citations by other authors or compilers the order is made clear in the footnote; e.g., while Narayan generally cites by day/month/year, the particular citations referred to in this paper, pp. 34-35, are given in the order Narayan uses in these cases, viz., month/day/year; the only citation from Bose is transcribed from his "5/11/31, to 5 Nov. 31, on p. 66 of this paper.

PART ONE
(Expository)

CHAPTER I

AN EXPOSITION OF GANDHI'S CONCEPT OF NON-VIOLENCE

Introduction

In this chapter, Gandhi's concept is presented through fourteen points which taken together give the core of his concept and ideology. Non-violence denotes a spiritual force and connotes a related moral ideology. This chapter outlines how Gandhi's ideology is constructed to explain the working of that force in its empirical application. Though Gandhi's work is highly experimental and pragmatic it is referred to as a "moral ideology" for reasons that are pointed out in this chapter. His concept of non-violence is situated in his wider philosophy and moral thought.

Section I: Gandhi's Non-violence,

A Non-empirical Concept

1. A Positive Denotation, Not a Simple Negation

The exposition of Gandhi's concept must center on the fact that "non-violence" denotes a substantive moral and spiritual force--the soul's force. According to Gandhi, non-violence "is a force which is more positive than electricity....

At the centre of non-violence is a force which is self-acting."¹ Gandhi is careful to emphasize the self-active quality and the non-empirical² nature of this force. He writes that just as the soul does not depend on the physical body for its existence "similarly, non-violence, or soul force, too, does not need physical aid for its propagation or effect. It acts independently of them. It transcends time and space."³ His concept and methods are constructed on the basis of attributes and powers he believes to be inherent in that force, and he conceives his activities to be channels for it. Activities that Gandhi describes as "non-violent" are those whose effectiveness consists in displacing violence by means of soul-force, thus nullifying evil.⁴

¹Mohandas K. Gandhi, The Law of Love, comp. Anand T. Hingorani (2nd ed.; "Pocket Gandhi Series"; Bombay: Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, 1962), No. 3, p. 11, (H, 3/14/36).

²N.B. - For purposes of this paper the definition of "empirical" is broadened to include experience of movement and perception of qualities in the mental sphere as well as in the physical sphere. This is in accord with Gandhi's view in which the line separating the empirical from the non-empirical shifts from the border between the mental and the physical to the border between the spiritual and the mental. Therefore, included within the scope of this definition of the empirical will be thoughts, beliefs, motives, intentions, and emotions.

³Ibid., p. 69, (H, 14/3/36); also, pp. 83-84, (H, 5/13/39).

⁴Material intended to be read here as a resource for the text and argument, and as significant enough to deserve placement as a footnote, is, because of its extensiveness, given as Appendix A, at the end of the study. Gandhi's entire conception and its practical application are presented by collecting and concentrating sources from Gandhi's writings that adumbrate his philosophy of non-violence specifically from the standpoint of its basis in a positive but non-empirical force, a spiritual force, viz., soul-force. A review of this material gives the correct perspective for the following analysis of Gandhi's concept.

2. Denoted by a Coined Term

Gandhi coined the term "non-violence" to translate "ahimsā". He writes that non-violence

...is the greatest and the activist force in the world. One cannot be passively non-violent. In fact 'non-violence' is a term I had to coin in order to bring out the root meaning of Ahimsā. In spite of the negative particle 'non', it is no negative force.¹

The negative construction describes a restraint of expected violence,² which Gandhi believes to be the chief and invariable effect of this spiritual force. He contrasts this "non-violence" with "un-violence":

It should be remembered also that non-violence comes into play only when it comes in contact with violence. One who refrains from violence when there is no occasion for its exercise is simply un-violent and has no credit for his inaction.³

3. Central Concept of a Moral Ideology (Its Ideological Character)

Gandhi's non-violence has specifically ideological characteristics.⁴ These characteristics are, use of dichotomy, the equation of violence with evil, its universal applicability, a moral definition of Truth, the equation of non-violence with

¹Mohandas K. Gandhi, Non-violence in Peace & War, Vol. I, comp. Mahadev Desai, Vol. II, comp. Bharatan Kumarappa (from here on, noted "N.V., I or II"), (2 vols.; Ahmedabad, Navajivan Publishing House, 1942), I, pp. 121-22, (H, 14/3/36).

²This is the basis of Gandhi's philosophy and method of non-retaliation; see Hingorani, ...Love, p. 54, (Young India, "YI", 8/12/26), p. 21, (YI, 3/9/20), and p. 22, (YI, 6/24/26).

³N.V., I, p. 107, (YI, 30/1/30).

⁴See Kher, II, p. 23; Gandhi refers to Truth and Non-Violence as "what is called the 'Gandhite' ideology and the means of propagating it...less by books than by actually living these principles." (H, 13/5/39, p. 121 at p. 122)

with Truth, and justification by definition.

"Violence/non-violence" is the principle dichotomy of his moral ideology. He insists that all analysis proceed in terms of this dichotomy.¹ This is the first characteristic.

The second characteristic is Gandhi's equation of "violence" with "evil". He writes that "in the sense in which I have defined violence its good use is inconceivable."² On the basis of this equation, Gandhi derives the normative claim that non-violence is always right and its obverse that violence is always wrong.³

The third characteristic of Gandhi's ideology is the programmatic aim of demonstrating the universal applicability of non-violence. He makes the empirical claim that non-violence is always effective in achieving its practical ends.⁴

¹Hingorani, ...Love, p. 31; Gandhi writes that "the commonest form of human intercourse is either violent or non-violent." (Ashrama Observances in Action, "AOA", p. 39).

²Ibid., p. 38, (YI, 5/21/25).

³See Hingorani, ...Love, p. 21; Gandhi writes in terms of retaliation being "nowhere obligatory but only permissible" in every scripture. (YI, 3/9/20). He writes, Ibid., p. 43, that "he who would understand Ahimsā, must understand the meaning of the inevitable Himsā one sees about oneself." (YI, 12/2/26). Thus, a large part of Gandhi's writings is devoted to exposing the subtle and confusing nature of this inevitable himsā and discovering ways of acting that diminish it.

⁴See Kher, II. p. 275; "My mission is to teach by example and precept...the use of the matchless weapon of Satyāgraha which is the direct corollary of non-violence and truth. I am anxious, indeed I am impatient, to demonstrate that there is no remedy for the many ills of life save that of non-violence." (YI, 2/7/25, p. 232). See Chapter II, p. 33, below, fn. #1, on Gandhi's claims for the universality and infallibility of non-violence in its empirical application.

The fourth characteristic of Gandhi's ideology is his definition of Truth as moral authenticity. Moral authenticity means the effort to bring inner states and outer conduct into congruence by speaking and acting on one's convictions.¹ Gandhi believes that this effort brings into the world the moral quality denoted by "Truth" and that this justifies his prescription for moral authenticity and forthrightness.²

The fifth characteristic of Gandhi's ideology of non-violence is the equation of Truth and Non-violence.³ He

¹Referring to his decision to end the life of a calf by means of administering a "quietus" because "the suffering of the animal was so great that it could not even turn its side without excruciating pain," Gandhi wrote, "I knew that public opinion especially in Ahmedabad would not approve of my action and that it would read nothing but himsā in it. But I know too that performance of one's duty should be independent of public opinion. I have all along held that one is bound to act according to what to one appears to be right, though it may appear wrong to others. And experience has shown that that is the only correct course." (Italics mine.) Mohandas K. Gandhi, All Men Are Brothers; Autobiographical Reflections, comp. & ed. Krishna Kripalani (New York: The Continuum Publishing Corp., 1980), p. 37, I:130, ("The Fiery Ordeal," VI, 1928).

²This moral definition of Truth has broad implications for the classical problem of defining "morally true acts", deciding whether there are any, and finding out how their logic could be depicted to capture the idea of truth-value. It also raises questions (often at issue in modern analytic philosophy following Wittgenstein and James) of the mutual dependence and inseparability of intentional states and their expression.

³Ibid., p. 67, II:74; "I claim to have no infallible guidance or inspiration. So far as my experience goes, the claim to infallibility on the part of a human being would be untenable, seeing that inspiration too can come only to one who is free from the action of opposites, and it will be difficult to judge on a given occasion whether the claim to freedom from pairs of opposites is justified. The claim to infallibility would thus always be a most dangerous claim to make. This, however, does not leave us without any guidance whatsoever. The sum-total of the experience of the sages of the world is available to us and would be for all time to come. Moreover, there are not many fundamental truths, but there is only one fundamental truth which is Truth itself, otherwise known as Nonviolence." (Italics mine; VI, 4/21/27).

usually speaks of non-violence as the means to realize Truth.¹ But he sometimes says also that though it is difficult or may even be impossible to decide what non-violence is on any given occasion, one can always follow truth as one sees it. He believes that this moral authenticity will surely lead to non-violence.²

Finally, Gandhi often defers to his definitions to answer arguments.³ This is a chief characteristic of ideo-

¹Ibid., p. 64, II:59; Gandhi equates Truth, God, and Nonviolence, through his belief in the convertibility of means and ends in every moral action, and his equation of nonviolence with love as the "only inevitable means" to realize Truth, or God who is Love. (Mahātma, "M", III, Speech, 1931).

²Ibid., pp. 66-67; "It seems to me that I understand the ideal of truth better than that of ahimsā, and my experience tells me that if I let go my hold of truth, I shall never be able to solve the riddle of ahimsā..." (An Autobiography). Also see, Mohandas K. Gandhi, God is Truth, comp. Anand T. Hingorani (2nd ed.; "Pocket Gandhi Series"; Bombay: Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, 1962), No. 1, pp. 4-5; "As I proceed in my search for Truth, it grows upon me that Truth comprehends everything. It is not in Ahimsā, but Ahimsā is in it. What is perceived by a pure heart and intellect is truth for that moment. Cling to it, and it enables one to reach pure Truth. There is no question there of a divided duty. But often enough it is difficult to decide what is Ahimsā. For instance, the use of disinfectants is himsā, and yet we cannot do without it. We have to live a life of Ahimsā in the midst of a world of himsā, and that is possible only if we cling to Truth. That is how I deduce Ahimsā from Truth." (H, 2/22/42); and; "Ahimsā is my God, and Truth is my God. When I look for Ahimsā, Truth says: 'Find it through me.' When I look for Truth, Ahimsā says: 'Find it out through me'." Ibid., p. 5, fn. #1, (YI, 6/4/25). And finally; Kripalani, p. 66, II:67; "As regards God it is difficult to define Him; but the definition of truth is deposited in every human heart. Truth is that which you believe to be true at this moment, and that is your God. If a man worships this relative truth, he is sure to attain the Absolute Truth, i.e., God, in course of time." (Diary of Mahadev Desai, "DD").

³See Hingorani, ...Love, pp. 35-38, (YI, 5/21/25), and pp. 28-33, (AOA, p. 30).

logical justification. However, Gandhi uses these definitions also to formulate a course of experimental moral action. Considering all action a struggle between forces of good and evil, he constructs his experiments in terms of the opposition of violence and non-violence (which by his ideological equation are "evil" and "good" respectively).¹

We see how Gandhi translates his moral analysis of Truth into a metaphysics of the active quality of non-violence and deduces his moral ideology from this as follows: Moral Truth consists in bringing a moral quality into the world by producing between subjective states and external acts a harmony that mirrors the timeless non-dual reality that Gandhi calls Truth, or God. This quality of oneness shows in feeling and will; it cannot be propositionally described but only pointed to as a fact of reality to be realized. Gandhi's

¹Gandhi claims that I am an Advaitist [believer in non-dual subsistent reality underlying all diversity] and yet I can support Dvaitism (dualism). The world is changing every moment and is, therefore, unreal; it has no permanent existence. But, though it is constantly changing, it has something about it which persists and it is, therefore, to that extent real. I have, therefore, no objection to calling it real and unreal and being called an Anekantavādi or a Syādavādi...I very much like this doctrine of the manyness of Reality." Hingorani, ...Truth, pp. 9-10, (VI, 1/21/26). Thus Gandhi accepts "manyness of viewpoints" on a single impartible reality; but for him the dual viewpoint of the empirical/non-empirical distinction has an inherent moral qualification, a tinge that thus affects all action and activity which stands in opposition to the One changeless Reality as the ever-changing empirical Reality; "I believe in Advaita (non-dualism). I believe in the essential unity of man and for that matter of all that lives.... When we descend to the empirical level, [Italics mine] we descend to the world of duality. In God there is no duality. But as soon as we descend to the empirical level, we get two forces--God and Satan..." Ibid., p. 9, fn. #1, (Conversations of Gandhiji: p. 37; "COG"). And, "The distinction [between Good and Evil] is not unimportant. Nor do these thoughts come haphazard. They follow some law, which the scriptures have

moral, social, and political methods of non-violence are intended as means to this realization. Thus from his definition of moral authenticity and his equation of Truth with non-violence, Gandhi feels justified in deducing the moral imperative that one ought to apply non-violence to every action and every movement of consciousness. The practical form of this imperative is the injunction to establish as one's only motive the manifestation of Truth and non-violence by making outer activities and subjective empirical states reflect the permanent self-aware state of the soul.

Gandhi's ideological definitions, and the normative claims he deduces from them, are saved from triviality by the fact that they are attached to an imperative of the will. Only the actual operation of this imperative in moral consciousness can complete the meaning of the terms involved. The moral terms in his usage are not mere logical counters or simple descriptive terms, but rather they are complex symbols which define a way of looking and feeling, and a direction of will, without which they are incomplete signs.

tried to enunciate. There are certain problems in mathematics, for the solution of which some workable assumptions have to be made. They help in the solution of the problem. But they are purely imaginary, and have no other practical use. Similarly, psychologists have proceeded upon the assumption that a pair of opposite forces is warring against each other in the universe, of which one is divine and the other devilish.... The distinction is made by all the scriptures of the world. I say this distinction is imaginary. God is one, without a second. He alone is...In reality, there is no God who is at war with Satan; but we have imagined that...war...It is we who entertain thoughts, and again it is we ourselves who repulse. We have thus to strive against ourselves...This duel is imaginary, not real. We can, however, sustain ourselves in the world only by assuming the existence of the imaginary duel to be real." (Gandhi's View of Life: p. 57, "GVL"). For Gandhi, this unavoidable and

The key to this universal and imperative application Gandhi found expressed in the texts "resist not evil" and "return good for evil". They give the essence of his ideology of non-violence and the basis of its empirical application. From these texts he deduces the principle of non-retaliation, which will be examined below.

4. Defined by Gandhi's Views of God and His Views on Good and Evil

The central aim of Gandhi's non-violence is the realization of God, and he believes that since "man's ultimate aim is the realization of God...all his activities, social political, religious, have to be guided by the ultimate aim..."¹ He identifies God with "What Is", and calls this Totality "Truth". This connects his metaphysics of Truth with his spiritual ideal, which together give his religion-based moral ideology. He identifies the force of non-violence ultimately with God, or Truth.

Though on the basis of his concept of Truth, Gandhi views the world as constituted entirely of forces of Good and Evil in constant struggle² and one's individual life as

constant engagment is the context of man's equally constant urge towards the spiritual aim of life--"The forms are many, but the informing spirit is one. How can there be room for distinctions of high and low where there is this all embracing fundamental unity underlying the outward diversity? For that is a fact meeting you at every step in daily life. The final goal of all religious is to realize this essential oneness." Kripalani, p. 63, II:58, (H, 12/15/33).

¹Kher, II, p. 279, (H, 8/29/36, p. 226).

²See p. 7, fn. #1, above.

a miniature of this struggle,¹ he believes also that evil is in fact unreal and that the distinction is ultimately imaginary. He believes that God is all Goodness and yet it is God who creates in this world what mental beings such as us would imagine as evil and would, as moral beings, actively struggle against. God creates this evil in mental consciousness to

¹Because of his moral interpretation of all empirical reality, therefore of all action and activity, Gandhi seeks a "moral" solution to the problem of being bound by the results of action, viz., the Law of Karma, or conservation, or equilibrium, by which all expended or projected energies are returned to and accounted for at their point of origin by the law of action and reaction. But Karma is a dynamic law of life so that action and reaction always function to awaken consciousness and to further spiritual, i.e., moral growth. Karma is not a determinism or a fatalism. Gandhi writes "I know that there is a school of philosophy which teaches complete inaction and futility of all effort. I have not been able to appreciate that teaching. In my humble opinion, effort is necessary for one's own growth." But the moral-spiritual principle of that effort and action must be followed consciously, deliberately--"It has to be irrespective of results;" Mohandas K. Gandhi, Gītā--My Mother, comp. Anand T. Hingorani (Bombay: Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, 1965), p. 88, (YI, 10/21/26). This is the central teaching, according to him, of the Bhagavad Gītā, which he took to be his primary guide and resource in spiritual and moral investigation and experiment. He quotes "'To work thou has the right, never to the fruit thereof'--is one of the golden precepts of the Gītā," Ibid., (H, 8/18/40); and, "To work you have the right and duty and not to the fruit thereof, says the Gītā;" Ibid., (YI, 3/3/27). This is the basis of his fundamental spiritual moral principle that transcends and founds even his ahimsā; viz., anāsakti, detachment, or non-attached and desireless action, conformity to which is a practice for moral consciousness, and a state to which the practice of ahimsā, is, according to Gandhi, the necessary ultimate means. Since in Gandhi's moral ideology of non-violence the moral and the practical are identical, though all action is tainted qua "empirical", and therefore qua "evil", right results are guaranteed to follow from right, i.e., detached or non-personal, action, where action is present but desire to limit or own its specific fruits is not--"The author of the Gītā has said that all undertakings are tainted. Therefore, all action should be performed with complete detachment," Ibid., p. 89, (H, 5/12/46), and, "To be detached from fruits of actions is not to be ignorant of them, or to disregard or disown them. To be detached is never to abandon action because the contemplated result may not

induce the activity, virtues, and discrimination that are pre-requisite to self-realization. Gandhi offers his moral methods of non-violence as the "sovereign" means for the real-

follow. On the contrary, it is proof of immovable faith in certainty of the contemplated result following in due course." Ibid., (YI, 3/15/28). This is purely a spiritual principle of action, having a necessary moral component and result; Gandhi writes that "I believe in the doctrine of renunciation, but I hold that renunciation should be sought for in and through action. That action is the sine qua non of life in the body...Life cannot go on even for a second without involving some sort of action...Renunciation can, therefore, in these circumstances, only mean detachment or freedom of the spirit from action, even while the body is engaged in action. A follower of the path of renunciation seeks to attain it not by refraining from all activity, but by carrying it on in a perfect spirit of detachment and altruism as a pure trust," Ibid., (YI, 10/25/28). As will become evident, Gandhi considers attachment to be the essence of desire and desire of violence so where there is attachment there is violence and violence he considers morally absolutely inadmissible; so despite the fact of struggle and conflict in embodied life, the renunciation delineated by the principle of non-attachment is the fundamental moral and spiritual desideratum. Moral aspiration must be for every minutest action to to be sought and inspired from the vantage point of spirit beyond the partializing pulls of the empirical opposites of duality (dvaita)--"Is not struggle the law in the natural world? If it is, much more so is it the law in the spiritual world. There is a spiritual law in the natural world and a natural law in the spiritual world. Life is a perpetual striving. There is always a tempest raging in us, and struggle against temptation is perpetual duty. The Gita says this at not less than three places," Ibid., p. 90, (Italics mine; H, 7/8/33). Further, since this struggle and moral duty attach to all activity and action, their practical translation is the basis of Gandhi's pragmatic conception of truth as experimental moral action---"To tread the path of Truth and to eschew all activity--this is a contradiction in terms. If a man is not active, how can we say anything about the path he has taken? To tread the path of Truth implies an active life in the world of men. In the absence of such activity, there is no occasion for either pursuing or swerving from Truth," (Italics: mine), Ibid., p. 91, (DD, p. 250) Gandhi continues that the devotee of Truth is therefore always active in service and so overcomes his likes and dislikes (an epitome of dvaita, the general sway of mutually opposing opposites, while the selfish actor loses all scruples as to means he employs for realizing personal interests. The reasons, motives, for action determine

ization of Truth through this moral struggle.¹

Section II: Gandhi's Non-violence,

A Spiritual and Moral Metaphysics

5. Exemplifies a Spiritual and Moral Metaphysics of Self, Freedom, Bondage, and Release

The chief originality of Gandhi's concept of non-violence is its analysis of violence and non-violence in terms of the reality of Spirit, and precedence of spiritual and

its moral quality and spiritual results, i.e., its binding or releasing potency--"This world is not something evil in itself, for only an active life in the world can help us to attain the goal of God-realization," Ibid., p. 92, (DD, p. 250). Again, evil has no existence except relative to the dualistic perspective in which the distinction between empirical and spiritual is thought by Gandhi to subsist. It is essential to remember that Gandhi's aim in all theory and action is spiritual realization, i.e., realization of Self, of God (the Greater Self), and of the identity of the two in an ultimate Reality, transcendent of all categories, of all dual reality; and, this constitutes Mokṣa (See below, Chapt. I, Sec. II, pt. #5) or release and liberation (N.B. - this latter is the principle doctrine of the Upanishads, Gandhi's principle source and the basis on which the Gītā elaborates its doctrine of detached or desireless action; viz., the ultimate identity of Ātman, Self or soul, and Brahman, God, Great Self, or Ultimate Reality, the Immortality of Spirit and the Eternality of Self-existence). In sum, "Karma is the only way, but that Karma should not be for self but for others. Action for one's own self binds, action for the sake of others delivers from bondage," Ibid., (YI, 9/1/27); and, "The detachment prescribed by the Gītā is the hardest thing to achieve, and yet it is so absolutely necessary for perfect peace and for the vision of both the Little Self and the Greatest Self," (Ibid., p. 115, (H, 2/6/36). (See Sec. II, below, esp. pt. #5, placing these metaphysical, moral, and spiritual considerations in context of the argument of this paper, re Gandhi's concept of violence and non-violence.)

¹Realization of this Truth involves various problems of the validity and status of reason, faith, and intuition (See Kher, I, Sections 2, and 3). Briefly, this realization means coming to a consciousness that one's soul is identical with God or Reality (see previous note, fn. #1, p. 10 ff, esp. p. 12) and so with all men and creatures. This realization is not

moral considerations in the study of human action, and its radical empirical claim for universal applicability and perfect practical efficacy. No other conception takes into account this inner reality and its experience as factors in analysis, method, and strategy of non-violence.

Gandhi conceives the ideal non-violent man (sthitaprajña--man of steady wisdom, or whose "understanding is secure"¹) on the model of the Bhagavad Gītā (Chapt. II:54-72), the principal text in Gandhi's development of his non-violence. The sthitaprajña is one whose consciousness is established in the Spirit above the mutual pulling and tearing of empirical forces. This man

...can speak from experience his innermost conviction that he is not this body but Ātman (soul) and that he may use the body only with a view to expressing Ātman, only with a view to self-realization. And from that experience he evolves the ethics of subduing desires, anger, ignorance, malice, and other passions.²

possible through the five senses or the mind, and the content of this realization is more real than the consciousness given by these empirical faculties. It is spiritual and not empirical experience and knowledge. The transformation called for is such that it can "only be done through a definite realization more real than the five senses can ever produce," Kripalani, I:9, p. 52, (YI, 10/11/28); and it comes about through "faith" which Gandhi conceives as a faculty, "a kind of sixth sense which works in cases which are without the purview of reason," Ibid., II:39, p. 59, (M, IV, 1937), and which gives an experience of Divine Presence, Reality, and accession to Power, of which it can be said "I am surer of His existence than of the fact that you and I are sitting in this room," Ibid., II:51, p. 62, (An Autobiography), and "I feel this living presence in every fibre of my veins. Without that feeling, I should be demented...so many events happen that would, without the realization of that Presence, shake me to the very foundation," Hingorani, ...Truth, pp. 79-80, (Bapu's Letters to Mira: p. 268)

¹See Hingorani, Gītā..., Chapt. X, esp. identity of the "ideal of a Sthitaprajña" as a Satyāgrahi; p. 70, (H, 4/14/46).

²Hingorani, ...Love, p. 22, (YI, 6/24/26).

The man of spirit has no empirical interest in action and its consequences, and so he takes a non-attached view of them (anāsakti). He does not "grasp" at results, and so he does not "tear" at reality, and by this exercise of restraint he progressively grows in the power to express non-violence even in his empirical make-up.

But Gandhi believes that this ideal is not attainable in outward life. This introduces an important ambiguity in Gandhi's concept. Though Gandhi often identifies non-violence as an absolute state and equates it with perfection and Truth, an end in itself, he also replaces it with the ideal of non-attachment (anāsakti), and relegates non-violence to the status of a comprehensive but still instrumental virtue. In the latter case non-violence and violence are opposed as empirical conditions while anāsakti is interpreted as a state of the Spirit, a state therefore untouched by the opposition of these two. This ambiguity points to a deep and critical paradox in Gandhi's conception. This will be examined for its full implications in Chapter III; its description is as follows:

Gandhi believes that freedom is an attribute of the soul, a quality of consciousness that the soul, when embodied, seems to lose. Subscribing to the Gītā's analysis of action, Gandhi believes that "it is beyond dispute that all action binds,... (that) all activity, whether mental or physical, is included in the term action,"¹ and that "all karmas [lit., actions,

¹Kher, III, p. 219, (VI, 6/8/31; Anāsaktiyoga, Intro. to Gandhi's translation and commentary on the Gītā).

work], all activity, all occupation of space involves violence in some form or other."¹ From this he concludes that since possession and use of the body, "eating, drinking and moving about necessarily involve some himsā (lit., killing, harming) he can never become entirely free from outward himsā."²

According to this reading, embodiment is itself fundamental violence, and the desire to maintain bodily existence results automatically in self-perpetuating bondage. Entanglement in violent action and counteraction is inherent in the empirical activity that body and mind can never for a moment be without. Gandhi believes the victory over violence, even by the anāsakti of the sthitaprajña, cannot be complete so long as the desire for bodily existence itself remains; but, that desire gone, the body must drop from the soul and dissolve.

Strictly speaking, perfect release from the bondage of action in terms of violence and non-violence as Gandhi conceives them, is possible only on dissolution of the body and the consequent deliverance from empirical activity. God-realization or realization of Truth, according to his concept, is possible only after this total release, inner and outer. It is the logic of this analysis of soul and action that forces Gandhi to conceive of non-violence as an unattainable

¹Ibid., II. p. 54, (YI, 24/9/25, p.327).

²Kripalanī, p. 85, IV:34 (An Autobiography).

ideal which must yet be constantly striven for as if achievable. Gandhi's ideological concept of non-violence defines and actually limits his conception of the spiritual aim-- "Mōksha [lit., release, liberation] is a bodyless super-physical state."¹ Gandhi accepts the extreme logical conclusion implied in these ideological dichotomies: "The fullest application of Ahimsā does make life impossible. Then let the truth remain though we may all perish."² For Gandhi there is no value in physical life per se. Soul is the life of the body and Truth is the life of the soul itself. Without Truth life is meaningless, and with Truth life is unnecessary. Gandhi's account cannot resolve this paradox.

6. Non-violence as Non-retaliation

"Non-retaliation" and "non-violence" denote the same non-empirical force. However, non-retaliation describes a particular power of this force which, according to Gandhi, is always manifest since evil is constantly fighting the good. But just as "non-violence" is not so full a term for soul-force as "Love", so "non-retaliation" is not so full a term as "non-violence" is for denoting the same force. But these distinctions have practical significance. In social and political action true non-retaliation is possible only to the extent that one has disciplined himself in Love.

Through the practical principle of non-retaliation, Gandhi connects non-violence as a moral force, method, state,

¹Kher, II, p. 52, (YI, 19/3/25, p. 98).

²Ibid.

and attitude. By his moral ideology developed in terms of non-retaliation Gandhi attempts to show the practical viability of the seemingly impracticable ideal of total non-violence. He believes that it is analysis of the operation of non-violent force in terms of its property of non-retaliation that is most useful in developing practical non-violent methods and in developing a non-violent attitude and mental state. He believes the soul's nature shows most clearly in this abstention from the return of violence for violence, and so non-retaliation well represents the spiritual aim and ideal of self-realization within and without.

Though by non-violence and non-retaliation Gandhi primarily means a force, secondarily he means the method which uses that force to achieve practical ends. Gandhi's general term for this method is "satyāgraha" [lit., insistence on Truth] which he uses also to connote the actual force of non-violence, the soul's force. His methods involve that mental state or attitude which can generate and propagate this force.

7. Not an Empirical Denotation

It must be repeatedly stressed that for Gandhi mental and emotional movements are empirical. The quality of these indicates the presence or absence of non-violent force. Goodness, love, and non-retaliation would indicate its presence.

Gandhi believed that the quality of evil is an empirical quality whose origin is in the mind, heart, and senses.

He believed that only a force whose origin is non-empirical and whose power is greater than that of any empirical force could displace violence, the evil quality inherent in empirical existence. Gandhi's methods do not work by rearrangement of empirical elements, but they draw into action this non-empirical force of the soul, which alone, he claims, has the power to change the quality of human relations. He thought of the non-violent struggle as taking place at the level of motives, intentions, and beliefs. Because non-violent force is stronger and works at this level its use is Gandhi's solution to the problem of the inability of the mind to curb its own passions.

Gandhi believed his moral psychology studies the laws of generating and directing the non-empirical force of non-violence by means of empirical activities. It studies the laws of transforming the subjective empirical elements and bringing them under direct command of the Spirit. Gandhi believed himself to have found in satyāgraha the beginnings of a science of this non-empirical force. His program of experimental non-violent action was intended to systematically explore the application of soul force to realize social and political ends. This claim will be examined in Chapter III.

8. As Non-killing and Non-tearing

For purposes of this study it is important to understand three senses he gives "himsā": "killing", "killing by inches", and "tearing". Though Gandhi uses "injury", "harm", and "suffering", rather than "tearing", this paper will speak of

hiṃsā as tearing, an interpretation supported by Gandhi's usage and texts.

Though ahiṃsā translates literally as "non-killing" Gandhi explicitly denied that this meant killing merely in the empirical sense of ending physical life, though it involves this as well. The life principle is Spirit, and "killing" or "injury" primarily refer to the soul, but the soul is imperishable. He defined hiṃsā as injury done or suffering caused, except for the wider benefit of the individual who would suffer the injury. According to Gandhi's concept, severing the body from the soul, where no other remedy is available for ending that soul's suffering, is equivalent to amputation of a limb for the sake of the whole body. It is merely the extreme remedy for the soul's otherwise irremediable suffering. He also defines hiṃsā as killing for the sake of the perishable body, which would include such activities as eating, breathing, and occupying space, which he believed killed innumerable beings. He considered life to be a sacred principle, the reflection of the soul. He considered the life of all creatures to be of equal value.

Gandhi also speaks of "killing by inches", by which he meant both obstruction of the soul's natural life and growth in the body and the resultant cumulative damage to the body. Terror, repression, humiliation, systematic false trade, starvation, and chronic undernourishment constitute such "killing". These all involve tearing of the body and suffering of the soul since he believed that no matter was unendowed

with soul, the life principle.

Essentially, whatever tears at one's empirical make-up is "violence". Gandhi believes the soul has a total sensitivity and it will register even the least such tearing, which may be far below the threshold of empirical consciousness.

Gandhi believed that both a subtle grasping and an unconscious retaliatory will were intrinsic to even the slightest empirical activity. Inherently restless empirical existence is characterized by tearing or violence. Gandhi's view is tantamount to a doctrine of original sin since one is morally liable for the violent friction, tearing, and killing involved in the very processes of life existence, viz. movement of air in the lungs, coursing of blood, sloughing of hair and nails, killing of cells. According to Gandhi's view one is morally liable for the mere will to live (abhiniveśa), to have a body through which alone desires may be fulfilled. He is morally liable for all the killing and suffering that this desireful possession of the physical and mental bodies entails. "Tearing" most clearly characterizes the quality of this embodied existence.

Gandhi believed the soul to be sensitive to this universal, if largely unconscious, tearing. The soul provides an absolute register of violence and non-violence. By interpreting violence as a universal quality of empirical existence, by interpreting non-violence as an independent non-empirical force, and by conceiving the soul to be an "ideal observer" of these both, Gandhi makes of "violence" and "non-violence" as ultimate moral categories. He believed that this ideal vantage

point of his theory and the categorical nature of his terms made his moral ideology independent of the individual's relative empirical judgments and rendered it objectively valid. He believed that though ultimately it was the quality of one's intentions that determined the quality and moral value of his actions, it was only soul or God that could judge intentions accurately, whereas man could only judge actions, and that too only provisionally and only to the extent needed for practical purposes of his own. According to Gandhi's theory, purity of intention is determined by its non-violence and its non-violence is known by the degree to which it possesses this non-tearing quality. Thus, ideally Gandhi's concepts are defined by intentions and motives, but practically they are defined by the quality of actions and results.

Gandhi's methods of action and thought were built on this dual definition of non-violence. They were meant to minimize this tearing quality in all empirical life by progressively purging it of violence. They were designed to induce this non-tearing quality of non-violence into social relations and political institutions. He believed this non-tearing quality would be conferred on empirical elements to the extent their activities were brought about by soul-force.

9. Defines a Moral Principle and a Social/Political Method

As a moral principle Gandhi's "non-violence" refers to the purification and strengthening of the will by effort at non-retaliation and constructive work. The flow of soul-

force thus generated cleanses and strengthens the various elements of one's empirical make-up. He believed that this force uprooted the violence-causing passions of self-interest, viz. greed, anger, vengeance, malice, hate, lust, possessiveness, fear, despondency, etc. One is strengthened by the effort and exercise involved in the activities generating this force.

Similarly, as a social/political means "non-violence" refers to actions (usually corporate) intended to draw this force into interpersonal, intergroup, and international relations. These relations are also purged of the evils of self-interest as they appear in communal intolerance, aggrandizement, exploitation, aggressiveness, imperialism, colonialism, hegemony, territorialism, expansionism, etc. These relations are strengthened by building moral bonds of truth, trust, non-violence, solidarity, loyalty, justice, respect, non-interference, non-alignment, etc.

On the basis of his theory of Truth, Gandhi believed methods of corporate and international action should be modeled on individual and domestic ones. In the social and political spheres non-violence involves the search for ways to bring about the "Good of All" (sarvodaya) by means of corporate activity. He believed that since the principle of "the greatest good for the greatest number" stops short of "all", it necessarily entails violence to "some". On this conception a rigid application of the majority principle reduces to the principle of "might is right" which for Gandhi

exemplifies the operation of brute force and violence in human affairs. "The Good of All", on the contrary, exemplifies the operation of soul force. Gandhi thus contrasts the principle of utility with the principle of sarvodaya as moral criteria, and proposes that "violent" and "non-violent" social methods be distinguished by which of these two principles they draw upon to explain their operation or to justify their use.

10. Law, Efficacy, and Moral Science

Gandhi identifies "non-violence" as the "law of one's being"--or, the soul's natural action in oneself. It is a pervasive force which operates as the law describes, and its operation is describable by the same law throughout the empirical universe. Gandhi equates this force with "God", "Life", "Goodness", and "Morals", claiming for this "Moral" law and force the peculiarity that its self-active and intelligent quality can only be described as a "conscious law" in which it seems the Law, the Lawgiver, and the Executive Power are "rolled into one". Thus according to Gandhi the entire universe is under Moral government, and its Law is not the narrow mechanical legislation of human concepts of justice but the expression of Divine justice. The Law of Non-violence is the self-conscious and intelligent expression of the soul's omniscience and omnibenevolence, and the Force of Non-violence is the expression of its omnipotence. These two cannot be separately understood.

Gandhi believed that morals without living faith in God are "lifeless" and that they cannot stand real tests. But true morals based on this living faith draw on the soul's force and so have an assured practical efficacy. He believed that knowledge of this law and its efficacy are matters for experimental verification and may thus serve as premises for developing a moral science. They are not products of mere speculative argument. The moral law studied in this science simply describes the powers of the force of the soul, while the "law of non-violence" describes one of its powers as it pervades the empirical existence and governs all empirical activity. This power uniformly and invariably causes that existence to behave in the way the law describes. Gandhi formulates this law according to his metaphysics of action and his concepts of Truth and Non-violence. For Gandhi, it is the Moral law through which the soul expresses its freedom. Moral law overrides the operation of empirical law upon life and matter; the law of "return of good for evil" overrides the law of retaliation, viz. "an eye for an eye". If empirical reality were the only reality then all action could only be made up of retaliatory reactions to the other impinging empirical forces. But Gandhi conceived the soul to be a superior reality having the power to restrain these reactions by considering feelings and standpoints other than its own. It is this restraint that can be described in general terms as "Moral law". As a practical doctrine Gandhi conceived non-violence as the law of the soul's freedom,

acting upon which gives one power over empirical reality. He calls this self-mastery or self-governance, "Swārāj" [lit., self-rule].

According to the above arguments a component of empirical efficacy is logically included in Gandhi's conception of non-violence as a spiritual and moral force. He claimed that "superiority over physical strength, however overwhelming, is the core of Ahimsā,"¹ and that for any empirical problem "if non-violence does not provide an effective antidote, it is not the active force of my conception," and he concludes, "non-violence is the supreme law."² For Gandhi "law" connotes this characteristic of perfect objective validity, uniform operation, and necessary efficacy of soul-force consciously applied. The present attempt to gain a complete, clear, and accurate depiction of his concept is thus essential for understanding Gandhi's practical methods (as will be seen in Chapter II), which derive from this practical component of his concept of non-violence. "Moral", for Gandhi, connotes this logical inclusion of a practical component. His non-violence is not merely the object of aesthetic or even ethical contemplation.

11. Denotes a Perfectly Non-coercive Force

Gandhi's analysis is novel in collapsing the distinc-

¹Desai, ...Peace & War, I, p. 268, (H, 61/40).

²Ibid., p. 183, (H, 24/12/38).

tion between "violence" and "force" that most accounts of violence and non-violence seek to consolidate. Gandhi conceives non-violence as absolute non-coercion because he defines "injury", and therefore "violence", in terms of the soul's inherent freedom and absolute sensitivity to the tearing that is inherent in pressures reflecting the operation of empirical forces. He defines as "coercive" any pressures originating externally to the soul and operating against or in disregard to the soul's dignity, freedom, and self-determination. "Coercion" is "violence to the soul". But it is also invariably injury to the body, however subtle, since in Gandhi's conception of Truth it is axiomatic that the macrocosm without reflects the microcosm within. He therefore finds in coercion an inevitable tearing of the empirical being. In coercion the empirical elements are forced from the activity and course of individual moral growth that would most naturally and harmoniously reflect and advance the spiritual development of the indwelling soul (jīvātmā),

12. Denotes a Wholly Non-personal Force

Gandhi believes that perfectly non-coercive action is possible only when one has absolutely no personal end to gain by his empirical activities. Personal interest contradicts the criterion of being motivated and guided only by the ideal of the "good of all", and so it is inherently "violent". According to Gandhi the "good of all" reflects the oneness of Truth, and personal interest reflects one's self-division from this moral unity. Because non-violence is an inherently

impersonal force, deriving as it does from the soul which is one and the same in all, it operates for the realization of this oneness of Truth. Translated in practical terms, soul force inherently seeks the "good of all", the non-injury of each.

13. And the Conscious Discrimination of "Doer" and "Deed".

Gandhi believes that the force of non-violence is drawn into one's activities only where a constant discrimination between the "doer" and his "deed" in all judgments and actions, has established in moral consciousness an active attitude of Love and the impersonal viewpoint of Truth. The principles of action, non-retaliation, non-resistance, and the "return of good for evil", that define ahimsā or Love, are not possible without this impersonal point of view and the active detachment that this discrimination make possible. This discrimination is possible only as a result of a similar discrimination of "self" and "not-self" in one's own consciousness. The latter discrimination separates "cognition of self" from "identification with its temporary empirical vehicles". In Gandhi's view, it is the realization of ātman [lit., self, soul] in oneself that alone enables one to effectively discriminate between the "doer" and "deed" in others. It is this discrimination which consequently gives the capability to non-violently engage the evil in the "deed" while "loving" and "not-hurting" the person, the "doer". Gandhi believed that it is this discrimination and attitude that

could alone enable one to maintain the poise and clarity that are necessary to see Truth and to persevere in the struggle to realize it in the midst of that engagement.

14. Interpreted by Equating Non-violence with Consciousness

Gandhi's "non-violence" may be defined as identical with "consciousness". Carefulness, intensity of awareness, and single-mindedness, are ordinarily equated with love. The expression "labor of love" evidences this connection of consciousness and love. The loving effort takes no work to be too great but seeks to give all the strength and attention the task demands. The loving effort attends to the smallest detail of the task as to the largest. This effort at careful, non-injurious, quick, but firm action enlarges and sharpens consciousness, while the effort to enlarge and focus awareness automatically makes one more careful and less violent. Gandhi believed that consciousness specially evolves by effort and attention put into active service of others. This type of activity particularly exercises the impersonal aspects of consciousness and brings into action the quality denoted by "love"--that quality of consciousness which Gandhi believed to be the result of the inundation of soul-force which those activities invoke.

This equation of consciousness with non-violence is a singular contribution by Gandhi to the theory of practical non-violence. He is able, through his moral doctrine of the convertibility of ends and means, to discover in non-violence

an active attribute of moral being which is also a moral quality of action. Because of the ends-means convertibility, this attribute and quality can be augmented by methods of practical action. The attempt to be more conscious in activity and relations automatically increases one's non-violence; one's efforts to be more non-violent, loving, careful, and attentive in action automatically increase consciousness. These are two aspects of the same thing.

But even this equation must fail to capture the quality of love in its completeness. Gandhi's theory collapses the distinction between "quality" and "quantity", but the identity of these two as one can only be acknowledged as the logical conclusion of theory and cannot be directly described. Gandhi believed that since love as non-violence is identical with Truth and God it is beyond description by a language evolved only to explain things in relative terms, whereas these "qualities" of love and non-violence represent "absolute quantities".

In the next chapter Gandhi's concept of non-violence as delineated above is examined from the standpoint of its empirical application.

CHAPTER II

SATYĀGRAHA: THE EMPIRICAL APPLICATION OF NON-VIOLENCE

Introduction

Because it provides the necessary focus for examining Gandhi's empirical application of his non-empirical force, satyāgraha provides the link between his concept and metaphysics of non-violence, examined in Chapter I, and his mission against the justifiability of violence, examined in Chapter III.

Satyāgraha is Gandhi's means of achieving spiritual realization through practical activity (a sādhana), and as such it connects the empirical and non-empirical realities in terms of non-violence and soul-force. Gandhi deduces his concept and methods of satyāgraha from his ideological notions of Truth and non-violence. He offers satyāgraha as a "complete substitute for violence" and on the basis of this supposition he opposes to the justifiability of violence even as a last resort, his claims for absolute practical efficacy and unconditional political utility of non-violence that he believes satyāgraha capable of demonstrating.

The last resort argument in justification of violent or forceful means of reform, redress, and defense, presupposes the translation of practical to moral necessity in the limiting case

of the general commitment to non-violent means. Gandhi believes that the ultima ratio argument for the justifiability of violence can be defeated by demonstrating that no such limiting case exists since no problem is unamenable to treatment by non-violent exact conduct.¹

Thus the focus of the present investigation is Gandhi's practical claim which rules out the translation of practical to moral necessity and which postulates the infallible potency of correctly formulated moral action.

Chapter II provides the transition from Gandhi's concept and ideology to the examination of his philosophy in terms of its practical implications and political outcome. The examination of his empirical application of non-violence by means of exact conduct provides the link between the exposition of his moral ideal and metaphysics and the critical examination of his work as an ideological reduction of these.

I. Satyāgraha as Exact Conduct

The central notion of satyāgraha is "exact conduct".² Gandhi's satyāgraha is distinguished from other methods of non-

¹"Satyāgraha" denotes an experimental inquiry into the form of non-violent exact conduct for solving every conceivable problem of human relations.

²Mohandas K. Gandhi, Non-violent Resistance (Satyāgraha), ed. Bharatan Kumarappa. (New York: Schocken Books, 1961), p. 198; Gandhi writes that in satyāgraha, "there is no bluster...no fireworks display; but there is...a simple determination to conquer by exact conduct." (YI, 24-9-25). Also, p. 147, writing about social boycott, Gandhi says "we must be scrupulously exact in our dealings with opponents," (YI, 8-12-20). Writing on the Bardoli Satyāgraha of civil resistance by non-payment of taxes,

violence by its intentionally unrealizable ideal of "exact" truthful and non-violent conduct (see above, Chapt. I, point #5, pp. 8-11), and by his radical empirical claims for the universal applicability and perfect practical efficacy of that non-violent conduct.¹

The notion of "exact conduct" performs a schematic function in Gandhi's philosophy and methods; on the one hand, truthful and non-violent exact conduct exhibits the ideal and force of non-violence, and on the other, it provides a moral method of action to achieve specifiable practical ends. Exact conduct exemplifies Gandhi's ideological requirement that outer conduct and inner states be made identical and that practical means be made convertible with moral ends (see above, Chapt. I, point #3, pp. 4-6). This prescription reflects his basic metaphysical notion that microcosm and macrocosm are identical aspects of a single reality that is "one" and impartible. Thus the exact conduct of satyāgraha is really only the outer and visible expression of an inner working of forces and an activity only on the surface of a subsisting unity of all being; but it is also a mechanism for both realizing and revealing that unity.

Gandhi says that by even "one single act of violence understood according to the stringent concept expounded above in Chapt. I they would have lost their cause," Ibid., p. 218, (YI, 16-8-28).

¹Kher, II, p. 314; Gandhi writes that "my politics concern themselves with internal growth but being of a universal nature they react upon the external in a most effective manner," (YI, 25/2/26, p. 77). Kumarappa, p. 342; "In referring to the universality of satyāgraha I have time and again observed in these columns that it is capable of application in the social no less than in the political field. It may equally be employed against Government, society, or one's own family, father, mother, husband

Gandhi derives his empirical claim of universality and perfect efficacy principally from the fact that the soul is the same in each and that therefore the power of non-violence is latent in all. The dynamics of the forces involved in the response of the empirical being to the force of the soul are also uniform and lawful. Realizing that perfect practical efficacy and universality of non-violence is thus only a question of drawing out that power. The classical Indic texts on which Gandhi drew in exploring and explaining these dynamics refer to the path of self-suffering used to draw out that power as tapascharya [lit. - "path of heat"; way of penance or austerity] .

1. Exact Conduct: Practical Efficacy of Penitential Self-Suffering

Gandhi's ideological prescription to exemplify the micro-macrocosmic identity in moral authenticity and the congruence of inner states and outer conduct, requires that in satyāgraha tapas take on a specific external form. The application of soul-force by means of exact conduct is a method of tapas, an empirical means of generating and accumulating spiritual power. Gandhi defines tapas as "the steps which one has to climb in order to practice an ideal."¹ Thus tapas in satyāgraha is the effort to maintain exact conduct of truth and non-violence by acceptance of the suffering that adherence to these ideals involves. Since

or wife...the beauty of this spiritual weapon [is] that when it is completely free from the taint of himsā and its use is actuated purely and solely by love it may be used with absolute impunity, in any connection and in any circumstance whatever," (YI, 1/3/28).

¹Mohandas K. Gandhi, The Selected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, ed. Shriman Narayan (Ahmedabad: Navajivan Publishing House, 1968), V (Selected Letters), p. 31, (to Maganlal Gandhi, after 3/14/15).

satyāgraha, 'holding to Truth', is a practical external method, its form as tapas is determined by the specific physical conditions of the satyāgrahi's effort to hold to the ideals of Truth and non-violence and the shape of the evil he meets. This use of exact conduct as tapas for achieving practical results by action based on spiritual principles is original with Gandhi.¹

To conform with his ideology, Gandhi specifies that all satyāgrahic tapas take the form of the self-suffering involved in the absolute non-retaliation required by the ideal of 'holding to truth' by non-violent means.²

Gandhi claims that the efficiency of non-violence depends only on the purity of the agent.³ Here "purity" means the innocence of complete non-retaliation, even in feeling. This purity results from suffering that is deliberately chosen in recognition of the principles of satyāgraha in full awareness of their implications for suffering as a method. All practical results of satyāgraha are the culmination of forces released by this suffering and purification and not the consequences of mere empirical

¹Kher, I, p. 241; Gandhi admonishes the reformer that "by his gentle and correct conduct, let him infect his immediate surroundings...let him have faith that his thought, surcharged with his own correct conduct will act more powerfully than the mightiest dynamo," (H, 29/3/33, p. 6). And, Ibid., p. 280, Gandhi refers to "satyāgrahic fasting, i.e. where you seek to influence people by fasting," (YI, 28/10/26, p. 371), and to "spiritual fasts...as tapas" which "invariably exerts purifying influence on those in whose behalf it is undertaken", i.e., its "zone of influence", Ibid., p. 318, (H, 9/9/33, p.4). Gandhi's classical sources, the Gītā and Upanishads, restrict austerities to a means of self-purification and do not extend its use to accomplishing specific practical results.

²Narayan, ...Letters, V, p. 33, (to Maganlal Gandhi, 7/25/18); "Non-violence consists in holding in check all impulses in the chitta [empirical consciousness]."

³Kumarappa, p. 112; Gandhi refers to satyāgraha as exempli-

activities. Certain classical Indic practices, e.g. fasting, social boycott, civil disobedience, and hijrat (migration) appear similar to Gandhi's methods but lack the spiritual ideology of his satyāgraha. He found it necessary throughout his career to carefully draw and redraw the distinction between his metaphysically and spiritually based moral methods of non-violence and similar looking empirical ones. His empirical application of the force of non-violence by means of exact conduct bears the whole weight of his metaphysics and moral ideology.

2. Empirical Operation of the Force of Non-violence

Gandhi's analyses of non-violent self-defense and of defense against armed aggression, proceed in terms of the same principles of purification of the empirical make-up and release of spiritually modified empirical forces. The interaction takes place not by moral posturing but by actual working of energies below the threshold of the empirically sensible, i.e. on the "moral plane". An unreconstituted empirical make-up would respond to aggression and draw strengthened counter-responses from the assailant. But an empirical make-up purified by the course of non-violence, truth, and self-control of satyāgraha would neither respond nor retaliate but would go out to meet, neutralize, and disengage the opposing energies from the opponent's person, rendering the evil impotent while dis-assembling their root

fying the "eternal law of suffering" and deduces that its progress and quickness are to be measured by the purity and amount of suffering undergone, (YI, 16/6/20). The satyāgrahi's "triumph" consists in "being imprisoned for no wrong whatsoever. The greater our innocence, the greater our strength and the swifter our

structures. Gandhi suggests that thousands might offer themselves as non-retaliating cannon-fodder to sicken and disarm an invading army. The effective factor for Gandhi is not the dramatic appeal but the purity of the participants and the innocence of their dying. In dying while retaliating, even in thought or feeling, they would only excite and feed the lower nature of the invading army instead of neutralizing it and awakening their higher nature. Such moral conversion is the aim, criterion, and operative principle in satyāgrahic non-violence, i.e. defusing conflict relations by the internal unilateral disarmament that self-purification and non-retaliation constitute. Such cases of self-defense and national defense provide the test cases for non-violence as a practical moral means.

3. Self-suffering Exact Conduct: Invulnerable and Infallible.

According to Gandhi the spiritual self-suffering constituting the tapas of satyāgraha is an end in itself. He found that the exultation of truly giving oneself to a larger cause or in propagating an eternal ideal transforms empirical suffering to a type of joy superior to and more powerful than the empirical suffering that it is founded on. The suffering inflicted by evil that assails or resists the satyāgrahi's exact conduct becomes the satyāgrahi's joy and protection, the better exemplifying the

victory," and "complete civil disobedience is based upon an implicit belief in the absolute efficiency of innocent suffering," Ibid., p. 172, (YI, 4/8/21). Contra an empirical concept of civil disobedience, Gandhi writes "we do not want to paralyze the government...by intimidation but by the irresistible pressure of our innocence" for which one purest one replaces multitudes, Ibid., p. 131, (YI, 16/3/22).

cause and the ideal of truth that he is fighting for. The cause of empirical defeat becomes the non-empirical means of empirical victory. Gandhi's empirical claims are thus explicated and validated in the limiting case from the empirical standpoint.

From the spiritual standpoint, Gandhi says that the fundamental condition of effective satyāgraha is recognition of helplessness, where, consequent on both internal and external renunciation of violence as a means to achieve anything, personal empirical force is replaced by the power of God in the form of soul-force. Ex hypothesi God is the omnipresent, omnipotent, and omniscient reality, and his powers and guidance infallible. Pure satyāgraha relies on this guidance and power, and the satyāgrahi strives to surpass his own ego-state in which the infusion of subtler and more potent energies is impossible. The suffering of exact conduct as tapas thus constitutes a necessary invocation and purgation.

4. Methods of Satyāgraha: Methods of Suffering

Gandhi evolved five basic types of method based on five types of purificatory suffering: (1) In civil disobedience one accepts the penalty of law, usually imprisonment, possibly attachment of property; (2) In civil resistance and non-co-operation one refuses the benefits of co-operation with the evil person or system. A type of non-co-operation involves giving more than is unjustly demanded, "an ell for an inch;" (3) In hijrat one gives up home and land; (4) In fasting one denies the flesh, senses, and mind; and, (5) In non-violent resistance or defense unto death without retaliation one gives life. There is no end

to ways of suffering but these are generic types that Gandhi worked with and emphasized; each is meant to neutralize evil by reducing the sustaining energies that are given it inadvertently by supportive or ignorantly co-operative action by the good or neutral. The chief condition is the same throughout; i.e., the operative principle of non-retaliation in thought, word, and deed, and the purity and innocence resultant from this. The triggering degree of purity cannot be given by a rule and therefore methods cannot be further defined.

II. Gandhi's Empirical Claims

Since spiritual Truth is all-inclusive, and since the divine element is present in each, therefore the empirical means of the search for that Truth should be universal and infallible. Thus an essential component of Gandhi's efforts for spiritual realization is his program to demonstrate that only the empirical translation of non-violence in exact conduct and non-retaliation as satyāgraha is capable of the universal application and perfect practical efficacy implied in the progressive realization of Truth.

This radical claim constitutes the differentia between Gandhi's satyāgraha and all other methods of non-violent action. Non-retaliation as the chief expression and principle mechanism of soul-force applies without exception to all empirical dimensions of activity, so it provides the absolute core of exact conduct in satyāgraha. Physical non-retaliation is a visible sine qua non. Empirical analyses translate satyāgraha to a set of inductive generalizations which, given the proper application conditions,

have a certain probability of yielding the practical results acted for. The empirical claim is generally: "One can usually construct actions that will conform to non-violent principles that are inductively supportable, which fit the practical situation, and which have some likelihood of working." Gandhi's claim is: "One can always discover that action which in the given practical situation expresses the eternal principles of Truth and non-violence, which will necessarily bring soul-force to bear, and which once initiated, will infallibly produce the practical result." (See below, Chapt. II, pp. 62-63, 67 ff)

Gandhi's claim for universality is prior to application. His claim for infallibility takes effect on condition of an empirical discovery, but once that discovery is made and correctly implemented, according to Gandhi empirical efficacy is assured. The difficulties with this claim are examined in Chapter III. The demonstration of this radical claim is part of Gandhi's ideological program, and he believes that since he derives this program from spiritual Truth understood as the "highest fact" and most basic Law, the demonstration constitutes a scientific deduction and its fulfillment supports a fully general claim and warrants its assertion as such. He deduces further that inapplicability or failure are always the result of ignorance of the actual application conditions or impurity in the agent. The law of non-violence and its operative principle of satyāgraha constitute for him a priori facts of moral action.

III. Ideology and Metaphysics

The analysis of the empirical application of non-violence by exact conduct, and Gandhi's radical claims for its empirical

efficacy based on these analyses, are merely the consequence of applying his ideological requirements to the non-dual metaphysics and Ātmic analysis of self, of classical Indic thought.

Through his ideological interpretation of that empirical application, on a metaphysical and spiritual basis, Gandhi assimilates the spiritual, the moral, and the practical, and he collapses thereby, the distinctions between the inner and the outer (subjective and objective), the real and the ideal, and the empirical and the non-empirical. These two logical moves yield a single uniform metaphysical reality, which while one and impartible nevertheless sustains a plural life principle and so requires Gandhi's strict analysis and application of non-violence as most stringent non-injury and non-retaliation. This ideologically modified metaphysics and ethics provides the basis for Gandhi's radical empirical claims for non-violence as a universal and infallible, and absolutely obligatory, practical moral means.

IV. Transition to the Examination of Gandhi's Mission Against the Justifiability of Violence

Gandhi's ideological assimilations lead to an over-valuation of life and a mis-valuation of death as a moral means. His metaphysical basis without ideological interpretation does not support this cluster of identifications and assimilations. He crosses categorical boundaries on the basis only of his ideological reading of the logico-metaphysical principle of the identification of micro and macrocosmic realities that prescribes in

exact conduct a type of action that would materially and sensibly manifest this oneness.

Though Gandhi is not a theoretician and not philosophically consistent (as is shown in Chapter III), he is ideologically highly consistent and potent in translating his metaphysical thought to creative effective moral action that exemplifies his ideal notions. The inconsistency of theory however, shows up in his attempt to argue and demonstrate that his empirical application is without condition and as if a universal law, and he thus tries to apply his theory to what prima facie appear to be limiting cases.

Chapter III shows how Gandhi's use of the maxim "two wrongs don't make a right", does not have the practical or moral force that he deduces unless his moral ideology is first assumed, i.e., "wrong" is equated with "violence", and "non-retaliation" with "non-desire". It is therefore necessary to investigate the justifiability of violence without this moralizing and absolutizing bias and to examine Gandhi's metaphysics and moral arguments in justification of his absolute practical claim, aside from their dependency on his ideological requirements and equations. His radical empirical claim is only the empirical and metaphysical counterpart of his absolute normative position and ethic of non-violence.

Gandhi's ideological requirements and dichotomous thinking oversimplify a complex problem, but his application and practical thought are complex and he raises deep issues and advances a new ideal. If his theory is only partially valid

he is not fundamentally wrong. On all counts non-violence is an ideal to be aspired for and there is an abiding general commitment to its practice and to the widening of its practical scope. Still it needs to be asked, did Gandhi accomplish what he wanted? Did he achieve peace in the world or even in India? No. Though the complete validity of his theory might need not be admitted, the demonstrative power of his methods and their large political implications suggest its modification¹ to a form more realistic given the present stage of human moral and spiritual evolution and the present world-state. The stringent praxis of non-violence as Gandhi evolved and demonstrated it may be possible as "a way" for "a Gandhi", but, as Chapter III shows, based on the exposition of his thought, methods, and practice in Chapters I and II, his claim is invalid that non-violence is the "only way" as he insists it is in his theory and practice of satyāgraha exact conduct.

¹See Arne Naess, Gandhi and Group Conflict: An Exploration of Satyāgraha, Theoretical Background (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1974), p. 20; for an excellent attempt at reconstructing Gandhi's work on a pragmatic and systematic basis. Naess's work does not however accept the close connection of metaphysics and pragmatics that the present study finds necessary to leave in tact as Gandhi does.

PART TWO
(Critical)

CHAPTER III

GANDHI'S EMPIRICAL CLAIM AND THE JUSTIFIABILITY OF VIOLENCE

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is the examination of Gandhi's claim that violence is never justifiable.

Logically, this claim is merely the obverse of Gandhi's absolute normative claim and prescription that non-violence is always right and ought always to be applied; but, empirically speaking, it lays bare the counter-intuitive character of Gandhi's practical position. In fact, Gandhi's concept of non-violence and his satyāgraha were meant as part of his mission to propagate non-violence as a practical rejoinder to the common sense argument for the justified use of force and violence.

Chapter III, first defines this orientation of Gandhi's mission; second, it depicts Gandhi's argument in terms of the new debate that his work created on the problem of the justification of violence; third, it analyzes several basic confusions inherent in his concept and its application, evaluates his views on justifiability in terms of rightness and necessity, and establishes the common sense counter-position, defining a criterion of moral necessity and delineating the conditions

of its practical application; fourth, the elements delineated in the foregoing critical analysis are applied to Gandhi's arguments against the justifiability of war, force, and violence, and to his claim that satyāgraha expresses an objectively valid and universal moral law thus completing his argument in the practical sphere; finally, based on the previous critical examination, the chapter presents a practical assessment of Gandhi's concept and weapon of non-violence, and recommendations for its contemporary application.

Section I: Gandhi's Mission

A. Gandhi's Empirical Claim and the Absolute Rightness of Non-violence

Gandhi's radical empirical claim is implicit in his concept, principles, and criteria of practical non-violence. He equates moral and practical results with moral and practical rightness. Thus for him rightness implies truth in its pragmatic and practical sense. These in turn imply the "ought" of rightness. Gandhi believes that his claim that non-violence is absolutely right and ought always to be applied is warranted by his analysis of non-violence as a spiritual force and by his practical experience with satyāgraha in applying that force.

B. Objective Validity: Discounting the Ideological Basis

If Gandhi is correct that this cluster of implications is warranted aside from the ideological bases that structure his argument, then it should be possible to evaluate his

ideology and methods by critically examining his empirical claim for the universal applicability and practicability, and the perfect practical efficacy of non-violence. This claim is not only the logical focus of his entire effort, theoretical and practical, ideological and programmatic, but it provides the differentia between his and other conceptions and methods of non-violent action, and so provides also the focus of the new debate that it initiates. A complete assessment of Gandhi's non-violence must ask "Is it true?", i.e., practically viable and reliable aside from and substantiating its subjectively and morally compelling ideological coherency? Does his analysis and claim consist with the facts--empirical, practical, moral, and spiritual?

Since Gandhi's concept of non-violence is derived from his moral ideology, since his principles and methods of action are derived from this ideologically constructed concept, and since his criteria only enunciate that ideology as it is empirically applied, therefore, the evaluation of these components of his philosophy of non-violence, and the assessment of its practical truth and its moral and theoretical validity are summed up in the question--Does Gandhi's radical empirical claim stand if it is divorced from its ideological basis in (1) the moral equation of violence with evil, (2) the programmatic aim of demonstrating the universal applicability of non-violence, and (3) the prescriptions of moral authenticity and moral faith that outer conduct and inner states be made identical, and that practical means be made convertible

with moral ends?

For Gandhi's non-violence to prove valid it must be warrantable on grounds that are independent of at least the equation of violence with evil, the focus and resolution of Gandhi's concept and ideology. The criteria of practical efficacy must be capable of being evaluated without interpretation through this axiomatic equation of Gandhi's moral theory, if those criteria are supposed to warrant his automatic extension of that moral theory to the practical sphere.

C. Gandhi's Mission: to Show the Unjustifiability of Violence

Gandhi took as his mission in life the exploration and propagation of non-violence.¹ Since he believed non-violence to be right, and rightness to be not separable from practical potency, Gandhi's mission is also to show that resort to violence is never justifiable even in the practical sphere.² He wished to totally undermine the prevailing belief³ that violence is justifiable and may even be morally required.

¹Kripalani, IV:43, p.87: I have been practising with scientific precision nonviolence and its possibilities for an unbroken period of over fifty years. I have applied it in every walk of life--domestic, institutional, economic and political. I know of no single case in which it has failed. Where it has seemed sometimes to have failed, I have ascribed it to my imperfections...I do claim to be a passionate seeker after Truth, which is but another name for God. In the course of that search the discovery of nonviolence came to me. Its spread is my life mission. I have no interest in living except for the prosecution of that mission. (YI, 3/17/27)

²Ibid., V:5, p. 99: My mission is to teach by example and precept under severe restraint the use of the matchless weapon of Satyāgraha which is the direct corollary of nonviolence and truth. (YI, 7/2/25)

³Ibid., IV:77, p. 96: I must continue to argue till

The problem of justifying violence is ordinarily that of finding circumstances, needs, and moral aims that are believed to override the general commitment to not seek gain by violent means, or to accomplish ends by violent means, or to act violently for the excitement of it or for any self-indulgent purpose. It is taken for granted that violence is at some point permissible if not required. Prior to Gandhi's work and the advent of the atomic bomb, vindication of the justifiability of violence was not ordinarily at issue. It was Gandhi's problem to vindicate his claims and assertions that this justifiability itself constituted a moral problem.¹ Further, because of his assimilation of the practical to the moral, he raised from a new point of view, the question of the practical justifiability of violence also.

Gandhi's radical claim is not naive (as has been shown above; pp. 39-40; see below, 62-63). It is a complex claim deriving from his sophisticated analysis of the relation of moral and practical reality, and of the operation of moral

I convert opponents or I own defeat. For my mission is to convert every Indian, every Englishman and finally the world, to nonviolence for regulating mutual relations whether political, economic, social or religious. If I am accused of being too ambitious, I should plead guilty. If I am told that my dream can never materialize, I would answer 'that is possible', and go my way...I must continue my experiments. (M, V; H, 1/13/40)

¹The peace churches, viz., Anabaptist, Mennonite, Brethren, Quaker, etc., did not speak to the issues of universal practicability and perfect practical efficacy of non-violence. They did not give non-violence a scientific analysis. Their "witness" was theological and ethical. The peace movements have restricted non-violence to tactical use for programmatic aims. Quaker social and political non-violent activism, aside from its peace witness, has likewise addressed only a few institutions and relationships specifically related to overt and large scale reforms.

consciousness. To make sense of the question of justifiability in opposition to the prima facie case against him (Chapt. III. p. 61), he needed to supply the founding concepts and equations of his ideology in terms of which to make sense of the claim to rule out a priori all question of the justifiability of violence. But his own position must be justified against the common sense and prima facie case for justified violence. His analysis must not only show that the force of the soul and the spiritual dimension of reality are objective factors that are not considered in the empirical prima facie case (e.g., use of violence against insuperable evil, or to thwart the agent of greater violence where abstention would amount to allowing that larger violence), he must show also that these factors actually cancel the empirical principles normally operative in such situations.

Further, it is in the nature of justification that what is "justification" for one must be justification for all. It must function to bring about an agreement in practice or action by allaying doubts raised by the prima facie presentation. Gandhi needed to give a practical demonstration making the ideologically conceivable practically viable as well. He needed actually to vindicate his moral and empirical claim by converting all parties to the side of non-violence. He constantly repeated that example is the only effective argument in practical ethics. Thus where ethics speaks to a practical problem, final conviction requires material demonstration of the viability of a whole class of actions hitherto considered

matters only for moral imagination and practical conjecture. Gandhi believed that by showing at least one example (and better, a whole series) of such practical success, the viability of the entire class would be proven; and conversion from general commitment to absolute faith in non-violence would be only a matter of momentum and time.¹

Gandhi's argument can be reconstructed as follows: violence is morally and practically an inherently negative concept. Destruction and harm are its necessary results and constitute its content and essential meaning. Violence would therefore require some positive and extrinsic justification. Evil is self-destructive in essence, and violence is evil. Use of violence therefore results in self-destruction and there are no positive results attributable to it qua "violence" that could possibly justify it. Therefore, violence is always unjustifiable. This is the ideological or theoretical part of his argument. It is clearly circular, relying on the equation of the empirical appearance of violence with the concept of pure or ideal evil.

The practical side of the argument is constituted by Gandhi's program for the demonstration of his empirical claim. Since it is ordinarily believed that violence may produce enough good to justify its properly limited use, or that it

¹Gandhi repeatedly says that language is inadequate to convey the whole living truth. He argues that only this full revelation could carry conviction in matters of importance. Arguments have limited use where the understanding and moral consciousness are already matured and where these problems already have deep ethical foundations and import. Example gives living Truth, and propagates it like a flower does its fragrance. Words cannot fully convey the reality and the reality alone is sufficient to inform the terms of argument and carry conviction.

it may be justified by the fact that there is no non-violent way to produce the same result that violence is supposed to-- a result which is deemed a practical necessity and a moral good; then, if Gandhi can demonstrate that non-violence is a universal and perfectly efficacious practical means, always applicable, . practicable, and successful, then he can draw on the general moral commitment to non-violence and assert that it only need be extended similarly to all practical cases. Therefore, non-violence ought always to be applied and violence can have no justification. In fact, as has been shown above, he goes farther, and argues that since the ideal concept of violence is wholly negative and essential evil and self-destructive, it could never produce a positive practical result and his demonstration would help to materially dispel the false belief that the moral and the practical are separable. It is because his claim is founded on the belief that non-violence is a law of Being and intrinsic to human self-consciousness that he asserts that there always is a non-violent solution. And because of this law, and on the basis of the rest of his moral ideology, he believes that it is always possible, even in the worst imaginable case, to conceive a non-violent solution (see above, p. 40). Gandhi seems to believe that since practical human reality is also moral reality, therefore it preëminantly lends itself to thought experiment in terms of his ideals and methods of truth and non-violence.

¹Kumarappa, p. 179, (YI, 24/4/24); and p. 115, (YI, 16/6/20).

The criteria of supra-empirical potency and necessary universal practical efficacy are built into the definition of his concept of non-violence of the strong. It is because his empirical claim derives from this criterion, which crosses and confuses two categories of reality, that vindication requires both an ideological argument and the practical component of demonstration of viability.

D. Gandhi's Argument: to Defeat the Proposal
of Violence as a Last Resort

The basic argument to justify violence is that it is necessary. It is argued that in many circumstances there is no non-violent way to defeat an evil that one feels the moral obligation to engage and overcome. One feels obligated to resist evil and to preserve and protect the good. It is believed that in itself violence may be evil, but its use is not intrinsically evil, though usually it is the instrument of evil. It may also be used by the good as a last resort. Its use is redeemed to the extent that it proves to be morally effective in overcoming the evil intended without moral loss from that use so great as to offset the moral gain. Expectation of success must be in a degree sufficient to override the natural moral desire not to be the agent of harm, to cause damage, or to destroy the peace. This is the ultima ratio criterion in justification of war,¹ i.e., violence as the last resort against an incorrigible evil.

¹Ellul, Jacques, Violence: Reflections from a Christian Perspective, trans. Cecila Gaul Kings, (New York: The Seabury Press, 1969), p. 6.

Gandhi's argument thus involves two components, an ideological and a practical one. It involves an ideological component of proving the universal rightness of non-violence as a positive moral force to be used and expressed in the smallest activities of thought, speech, and body. This is to vindicate his non-violence as an absolute category, imperative, and prescription, superceding the ordinary general commitment. This ideological component gives the rationale for establishing the spiritual basis and orientation he claims is necessary for asserting non-violence as a supreme moral principle and practical force.

His argument logically involves the practical component of his programmatic aim to prove the non-necessity of violence even as a last resort, its strongest case. To defeat this strongest case would be to defuse the final arguments for its justification and to dismantle the beliefs by which violence sustains itself through the reasoning of those who advocate it.

The next section presents a preliminary analysis of the elements of Gandhi's argument; first, in the context of the new debate they initiate; second, in the context of the general problem of justification as his arguments structure it; third, in the context of his empirical claim which focuses his two arguments meeting the problem of justification; and fourth, in the larger context of how they figure in the evaluation of his wider philosophy and program.

Section II: Context of Gandhi's Argument: A New Debate, and the Problem of Justification

Gandhi's ideology, methods of exact conduct, and especially his notable success in their practical application, bring into question the common sense justification of violence and the empiricist's prima facie case against Gandhi's empirical claim.

This section examines how Gandhi's mission entirely restructures the way violence is ordinarily looked at, by questioning absolutely its justifiability that is ordinarily taken for granted. Gandhi may prove to be mistaken in the final assessment, and his mission may thus prove to have been fundamentally misconceived, but the issues raised in assessing his efforts to vindicate his absolute position are vital to examine when faced with the absolute violence of the now humanly achievable self-annihilation by nuclear confrontation. This section contrasts Gandhi's absolute definition and valuation with the relative and categorical definition and valuation by the common sense empiricist analysis. It stresses that Gandhi's argument is based on arbitrary ideological elements, but also that his position gives a sound basis for elaborating and validating the general commitment by starkly and insistently raising the question of its limits.

The elements and grounds of Gandhi's argument that it

was his mission to vindicate are developed here in preparation for their critical evaluation in the following two sections; first, from the standpoint of the theoretical distinction between rightness and necessity by contrasting Gandhi's notion of necessity with that of the common sense standpoint, generated and clarified by meeting Gandhi's challenge; and, second, from the standpoint of their actual application and demonstration in Gandhi's views on the justifiability of war and the uses of satyāgraha as these exemplify Gandhi's misconception of the criteria of necessity and the last resort as these function in the debate as to the justifiability of violence.

A. Concept, Context, and Means

The new debate initiated by Gandhi's non-violence is directly the result of his concept and ideology of non-violence as a spiritual force, and his spiritual analysis of its nature and evaluation of its practical empirical application. These together imply and suggest his radical claim.

Having been long exposed to the idea of practical non-violence on a large scale and for political purposes, it is difficult today to realize what a novelty it was when Gandhi produced the first satyāgraha campaigns in South Africa at the turn of the century and later in India in the teens and twenties. It was neither the passivity of the Christian peace witness, nor the submerged anger of the suffragette or non-conformist. Gandhi's argument proceeded at a developed theoretic level (if only ideologically so) as a complete experi-

mental moral philosophy with aspirations to become a full science. A counter argument would now have to meet a developed metaphysical, spiritual, and empirical analysis, and extensive and significant practical results, besides meeting the traditional textual arguments based primarily on exegesis of the non-resistance and love of the enemy elaborated in the 'Sermon on the Mount' (Matt. 5:38, 5:43-44).

The context of the debate is also new, generated by several factors of world-wide significance for the question of the justifiability of the use of violence and the call to non-violence, viz. the rise of totalitarianism and neo-fascism and reaction to that in the form of international terrorism, the rise of neo-colonialism and its reaction in guerilla insurgency, the immediacy of global response¹ to local events, and the technological sophistication and desensitization of life. Gandhi claimed that he was preparing his non-violent weapon and social policy to meet just these historical necessities. But the principal new components of this context are the advent of the atom bomb on the one hand, and Gandhi's satyāgraha, on the other.² The atom bomb and the real possibility of nuclear conflict, raise the question of an ultimate or

¹Hingorani, Gītā..., p. 53, (H, 1/9/36).

²Wittner, Lawrence S., Rebels Against War: The American Peace Movement, 1941-1960, (Contemporary American History Series, Wm. E. Leuchtenburg, gen. ed., New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), pp. 282-83; (in conclusion)..."by 1960 two fresh developments gave mankind's age-old struggle against war a new perspective--the creation of alternative forms of social conflict and the overarching disaster awaiting humanity should it fail to adopt these...the new peace movement had begun to develop a political as well as a moral relevance. It sought to grapple in the political arena with two of the most perplexing

limiting case of violence, viz., self-annihilation as the intrinsic resultant of absolute evil. If the law of violence means that there is an ever greater retaliation to every violence perpetrated, then nuclear conflict is the limiting case of that escalation, and potentially the material demonstration of the equation of violence with evil. Gandhi believed that the atom bomb represented that limiting case proving "the futility of all violence".¹ But he asks the further most pertinent question; where has that spirit of evil and violence gone if violence not only cannot reach the root of evil but must increase that evil by the escalation of counter-violences. Gandhi says that it must inevitably lodge in the hearts of the victors.²

problem of the twentieth century: how to secure a large measure of justice without betraying human values; and how to avoid the mass slaughter which advances in science and technology portended."

¹N.V.: II, p. 55; "Look at Japan, look at Germany. The very violence which brought them to the pinnacle of power has razed them to the ground. And has not the atom bomb proved the futility of all violence?" (Poona, 3/3/46; H, 10/3/46); also, p. 157; "I have no doubt that unless big nations shed the desire of exploitation and the spirit of violence of which war is the natural expression and atom bomb the inevitable consequence, there is no hope for peace in the world." (H, 7/4/46); also, p. 237; "The West is despairing of a multiplication of the atom bombs because atom bombs mean utter destruction not merely of the West but of the whole world as if the prophecy of the Bible is going to be fulfilled and there is to be a perfect deluge." (H, 20/4/47).

²Wittner, pp. 18-19; Pacifists saw horrors of fascism but they saw in modern warfare only its perpetuation under other names; Hitler dead, Hitlerism would continue in the victor's own breast. Ellul makes the "fourth law of violence... not a moral judgement...but a factual experimental judgment based on experience. Wherever a violent movement has seized power, it has made violence the law of power. The only thing that has changed is the power who exercises violence...captured by the very thing it fights. To combat communist propaganda

From the viewpoint of the advocate of violence, satyāgraha, as the practical application of a spiritual force and absolute moral principle, is Gandhi's contribution to the traditional debate as to the justifiability of violence. From Gandhi's standpoint, satyāgraha ends the debate over justification and establishes the new debate, or rather it ends all debate as to the possibility or necessity of any such justification, given the reality of the atom bomb and the present state of incipient world conflict, and in view of the unlimited practical power he claims to have demonstrated to be inherent in non-violence spiritually conceived and religiously practiced.

Gandhi's claim includes the capability of non-violence to meet and defeat even atomic violence. Gandhi calls this the "age of the atom bomb" and he directly opposes non-violence to it as the "only force that can confound all the tricks of violence put together."¹ He writes that,

Before it (non-violence) the atom bomb is of no effect. The two opposing forces are wholly different in kind. The one moral and spiritual, the other physical and material. The one is infinitely superior to the other which by its very nature has an end. The force of the spirit is ever progressive and endless. Its full expression in the world makes it unconquerable.²

by 'good propaganda' is in fact to fall victim to the psychological violence of the enemy. The violent struggle against racism--at first against Hitler's racism--has caused the development of racism throughout the world...violence can never realize a noble aim, can never create liberty or justice. I repeat once more that the end does not justify the means, that, on the contrary, evil means corrupt good ends!" pp. 101-02.

¹N.V.:II, p. 137, (New Delhi 7/11/47; H, 16/11/47).

²Ibid., p. 90, (H, 10/2/46). Also, p. 247; "Violence can only be effectively met by non-violence. This is an old,

If the advent of the atom bomb is admitted to have changed the whole structure of the debate on the justifiability of violence, then Gandhi's claim for the universal and perfect empirical efficacy of non-violence in satyāgraha once again must radically metamorphose the debate by presenting the absolute counter-claim. The atom bomb cannot solve the problem of peace which its advent only makes the more urgent.¹

B. Problem of Justification

1. Not the Prima Facie Case

The categorical problem of justification thus raised by Gandhi is contra the claims of the general moral commitment to non-violence and the empirical prima facie case, both of

established truth. The questioner does not really understand the working of non-violence. If he did, he would have known that the weapon of violence, even if it was the atom bomb, became useless when matched against true non-violence, (New Dehhi, 25/5/47; H, 1/6/47).

¹Ibid., pp. 226-28; "An evil returned by another evil only succeeded in multiplying it, instead of leading to its reduction. It was a universal law, he said, that violence could never be quenched by superior violence but could only be quenched by non-violence or non-resistance. But the true meaning of non-resistance had often been misunderstood or even distorted...If the demand was backed by force, then the only course open to the non-violent man was to offer non-resistance against it as long as he was not convinced of its justice. He was not to return violence by violence but neutralize it by withholding one's hand and, at the same time, refusing to submit to the demand. This was the only civilized way of going on in the world. Any other course could only lead to a race for armaments interspersed by periods of peace which was by necessity and brought about by exhaustion, when preparations would be going on for violence of a superior order. Peace through superior violence inevitably led to the atom bomb and all that it stood for. It was the completest negation of non-violence and of democracy which was not possible without the former. (H, 30-3-47).

which are generated by moral common sense. If he is correct in his analysis of the logic of the escalation to nuclear conflict as an inevitable culmination of any initial, if apparently less limiting violence, ~~the~~ common sense argument cannot be admitted. The ultima ratio argument must in that case mean only resort to suicide.

Common sense, the prima facie case, and the general commitment, subscribe to the moral criteria that violence would be justified, (1) if a lesser violence will defeat the agent of greater violence without producing a greater evil in the process, or (2) abstention from violence would aid the evil that one feels obligated to engage and resist. This balance of moral results can be considered the distillation of the traditional argument in justification of violence. Gandhi's ideological equation of evil with violence materially rules out these criteria since according to his analysis based on that equation, they insure the escalation to self-destruction in atomic warfare.

For Gandhi the use of violence automatically involves the inadmissible generation of evil. According to Gandhi's conception the use of violence could only deepen the involvement of evil in the world. The present world situation and context, and its state of technological sophistication translates that generation and involvement directly into nuclear confrontation.

In sum, according to Gandhi, violence is what evil is. It necessarily results in harm and its good use for production

of good is unimaginable (Chapter I, above, p. 5).

2. Not a Naive Claim (See above, Chapt. II, Sec. II, pp. 39-40).

According to Gandhi, his empirical claim is in dispute of the supposed need ultimately to resort to violence for protection of the good, and is not a naive and vague moralism. It is intended to enunciate a general categorical analysis and a derivative and confirmed scientific law. Gandhi tries to model moral law on (1) physical law and necessity, and yet retain the notion of freedom that is definitive of moral action,¹ and, (2) the prescriptive form and force of the moral imperative. His claim represents not the naive ideological assertion but the scientific statement that given certain conditions, the appropriate form of action and release of energy must result necessarily in the consequences projected according to general laws. Failure of results must indicate insufficient regard for application conditions. The application conditions² refer to both spiritual and empirical states, the analysis of which rests on complex and sophisticated moral theory of the

¹Kripalani, XII:41, p. 158; "No action which is not voluntary can be called moral. So long as we act like machines, there can be no question of morality. If we want to call an action moral, it should have been done consciously and as a matter of duty. Any action that is dictated by fear or by coercion of any kind ceases to be moral." (Ethical Religion, 1930)

²Ibid., VI:18, p. 111; "Peace is not attained by part performance of conditions, even as a chemical combination is impossible without complete fulfillment of the conditions of attainment thereof." (H, 5/10/36).

categorical relation existing between them and the qualities inhering in their respective forces and in the moral will. The realities of the laws and the appropriate application conditions (including the correct modification and modulation of the moral will and the subjective empirical make-up) are givens.

Actual efficacy and results of action are dependent on one's accuracy and comprehensiveness of knowledge and judgment as they are with any scientific application. But the introduction of the spiritual facts as a necessary component of the analysis, experiments, and prescriptions, and of the admittedly new order of destructive violence inherent in atomic conflict, together give a new meaning to the problem of justifiability, introducing factors beyond the scope of common sense and its previously sufficient casuistry of the general commitment, viz. the prima facie arguments, ultima ratio, and balance of outcomes.

If Gandhi's claim represented simply the naive ideological dogma it first appears to, it could simply be discounted as a fortiori only a subjective moral preference. But since his ideology itself rests on categorical and absolute analyses of spiritual reality and destiny, identity and career, the empirical field of that career, the relations between these two and their meeting in human moral nature, therefore, his claim for perfect efficacy does at least initially bear interpretation as at once an absolute character of existent forces and a relative potency conditional on proper moral and self application.

3. Justification

When violence in and of itself is prima facie unjustifiable, arguments for its justification may refer to several extraneous elements, viz., necessity in the cause of the violence, character of results of the violence, practical success of violence, or motivation of the violence. When these have subjective reference they may be considered moral factors; when they have objective reference they may be considered practical justifications. If Gandhi's synonymy of the moral and the practical is assumed and he is correct in assimilating the spiritual, the moral, and the practical, then justification by results will be a single criterion whether the results are subjective or objective, moral or practical. The immediacy of moral results consequent on moral effort will assure the more remote and diffuse practical consequences, but the question is whether this synonymy and assimilation are valid? Does it answer to the facts of human spiritual evolution, moral consciousness, and practical will and action? Is the identity of them intrinsic or only apparent, imposed by the ideology with which Gandhi interprets and supports his claim?

4. Justifiability

If Gandhi's synonymy is not assumed then the problem of justifiability is raised over and above the problem of the morality of the initial intent and effort of will. The problem is again raised of proving the identical moral character of subjective and objective factors of motive and

results. This is the basic form of the debate between Gandhi and the advocates of violence outside of extensive technical considerations of strategy to stem atomic escalation, viz., deterrence, balance, and theatre strategies.

To Gandhi it is axiomatic that violence is intrinsic evil and cannot but add to the evil of the world whatever the apparently non-evil results. It must defeat its own claim to justification by results because its ultimate result is necessarily self-destruction and destruction of whatever depended on it for support, leaving no result to possibly justify what by itself is self-evidently evil and unjustifiable. But this necessarily self-defeating character of violence is precisely what is in question for the advocate of violence. From the empirical and common sense standpoint, this argument can only assume the equation of violence with evil; it must still prove or justify it. It is the standpoint of common sense that without ideological superstructure this inevitability of self-destruction and validity of the equation of violent form of action with intrinsic evil, is an empirical, and so an open question, rather than the self-evident moral axiom Gandhi claims it to be.

Through his equation of microcosmic and macrocosmic reality, Gandhi also equates violence, force and war, as all terms for the same evil.¹ The second part of his argument against the justifiability of violence is thus constituted by

¹For an extensive cataloguing of types and forms of violence, see Ellul, pp. 97-99, where he makes it a law of violence that every violence is identical with every other violence, and produce the same moral and practical results, brutalization, debility, and destruction or harm.

satyāgraha offered as a complete substitute for violence. He especially claims that non-violence thus translated to a practical instrumentation is even a substitute for war. Gandhi writes that,

Up to the year 1906, I simply relied on appeal to reason. I was a very industrious reformer. I was a good draftsman, as I always had a close grasp of facts which in its turn was the necessary result of my meticulous regard for truth. But I found that reason failed to produce an impression when the critical moment arrived in South Africa. My people were excited; even a worm will and does sometimes turn, and there was talk of wreaking vengeance. I had then to choose between allying myself to violence or finding some other method of meeting the crisis and stopping the rot, and it came to me that we should refuse to obey legislation that was degrading and let them put us in jail if they liked. Thus came into being the moral equivalent of war.¹

The neutralization of the violence of the world constitutes proof of the universal possibility and viability of non-violent solutions to the problem of violence and of materially defusing arguments for violence and war as justified by their practical necessity and expected empirical results.

If, on the basis of our general moral commitment to non-violence, it is admitted that violence should have an intrinsic moral justification aside from any extrinsic result, then Gandhi, by his equations of violence with evil and of violence, force, and war, provides two moral arguments against the justifiability of violence.

¹Bose, Nirmal Kumar, Selections From Gandhi, (Ahmedabad: Navajivan Publishing House, 1948), p. 146, #391, (VI, 5 Nov. 31). Also, N.V.:II, p. 89; Gandhi writes in comparing negotiations and satyāgraha, "But here we are not discussing preliminary peace parleys before appealing to the arbitrament of war. We are discussing a final substitute for armed conflict called war, in naked terms mass murder." (Simla, 2/5/46; H 12/5/46).

C. Two Arguments and A "Dependent"
Absolute Claim

Gandhi' argues for this unjustifiability by means of his theoretical analysis of the facts of violence and non-violence, and by his practical demonstration against the ultima ratio argument, in support of his non-naively dependent yet absolute claim for conditional and dependent yet "perfect" empirical efficacy of non-violence.

The first two chapters of the present study were intended to present in detail the best case for Gandhi's ideological and practical analyses of non-violence. In the present chapter his arguments will be only briefly alluded to in toto, but pointedly developed to show how certain specific elements are repeatedly drawn upon to support the various facets of his mission against the justifiability of violence. As has been shown, the elements of his ideology and the components of his arguments are simple and not numerous; but their elaboration in argument and theory, and their application in practice are rather complex. It is to unravel this complexity that the present analysis focuses on Gandhi's empirical claim in its theoretical role in elaborating the problem of justification, and in its practical role of elaborating that problem in the context of the new debate. Here the complexity of the claim itself and its two roles is examined, and in the following subsection the correspondingly mixed validity of his two inquires, scientific and ideological, is introduced based on the present analysis.

1. Theoretical (Examination of spiritual facts to vindicate a universal claim and prove the absolute rightness of non-violence)

Gandhi's ideology and praxis were developed specifically to vindicate the application of the spiritual analysis of reality to the problems of evil and violence. His aim was to give a material basis for his moral presentiment that non-violence constituted a universal and absolute moral principle. His argument is that if whatever the apparent disorder in the world, non-violence is the law of being and the basis of the self-evident fact that such a violent world nevertheless not only coheres but can be seen to progress and evolve, and if non-violence is especially the law of moral action for human-kind, as a self-conscious and spiritual being potentially aware of the sameness of Spirit, or identity of soul in all, and of the oneness of all life, then once that being is consciously tapped its force and law must, ex hypothesi, succeed in subverting all violent forces.

From this advaitic viewpoint of the soul's exclusive claim to reality, even its material possession, violent empirical forces are really only distortions of this only real force, observed at a less fundamental (therefore partial) and less self-knowing level of its activity. Thus non-violence is actually always operative, and evil or violence is only an appearance to unseeing human consciousness. Thus non-violence is potentially of universal application, given the factual existence of all as having the same soul and the same spiritual reality subtending, encompassing, overpassing merely empirical

outer appearance. These facts together with his ideological bases give Gandhi his claim for perfect universal applicability and efficacy.

2. Practical (Examination of the justifiability of violence by practical factors that prove its non-necessity)

Because the problem of justifiability logically involves a practical component, Gandhi proposed to fulfill his mission to define belief in the necessity of violence as a last resort by devising and demonstrating a non-violent sanction¹ capable of completely substituting for violent methods (see above, p. 66, and footnote) wherever they were claimed necessary for practical or moral purposes. Thus he evolved satyāgraha through his campaigns to produce one case (or better, a series of cases) representative of the whole class of evils believed to be incorrigible to non-violence, and therefore to produce one instance of ahimsā potent against the greatest conceivable himsā; i.e., self-defense against ravage, internal rioting and terrorism, and external aggression and war. Since the passive resistance of classical non-violence must be empirically weaker than the forces it opposes, having abdicated the opponent's means without replacing them with another positive force, its equal or greater, therefore, Gandhi's search was for just this substitutable force and sanction. He believed that the need for a positive potency where practical results were at issue was answered by

¹Brown, Judith M., Gandhi and Civil Disobedience: The Mahatma in Indian Politics, 1928-34, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), pp. 27, 29.

his discovery of soul-force, whose instrument is the non-violent action of satyāgraha.

3. Absolute "Dependent" Claim (Absolute claim for perfect empirical efficacy, non-naïve in granting its conditional and dependent nature)

Gandhi's radical claim rests first, on the conception of soul-force as factually a force superior to all empirical forces (necessarily violent, according to his conception), and second, on the actual possibility of bringing that force to bear on empirical reality to yield practical results. Thus his ideology is intended to describe the spiritual facts of this potency and its practical possibilities. His praxis is meant to materially demonstrate this practical viability. His claim thus has a necessary component putatively descriptive of the nature and laws of an existent force of fundamental reality, and a conditional component dependent on moral perception, will, and activity that self-consciously bring that nature and law to manifestation in practical terms.

Though according to his conception, the force of non-violence is ex hypothesi potentially indefeatable, Gandhi can offer an analysis of the conditions for bringing out that potentiality in actual tangible and determinate results. Thus ultimately the satyāgrahi can only fulfil the negative empirical conditions of adequacy of training and preparation (viz., the 18-point constructive program, and remembrance, repetition, and congregational chanting or singing of Rāma, the Name of God), intensity and accuracy of application (knowledge and wisdom), to sufficiently dismantle and restrain the ego-desire complex, and

to discern the truth or legitimacy of the means and the cause. The positive conditions of adequate faith, and accession to power, are the province of Divine Grace and purpose.

Gandhi says also that the truth of the cause and adequacy of the self-sacrifice,¹ are themselves conditions of that grace, and only the Lord can fully assess them and assure their consonance with the Good of All which is His constant will.² Gandhi's absolute claim insures compliance with moral law and with actually obtaining empirical conditions as these might express the law, and with projected actions as these might further manifest the law, viz., Truth or God

Thus the operation of moral law of non-violence is an existential postulate, true ex hypothesi, which the conditions of its manifestation as soul-force, under given empirical conditions, is a matter of judgment, experiment, and discovery. And Gandhi believes that since this force is moral, that therefore it is both lawful in its operation, i.e., objectively valid, and optional in its self-conscious activation and manifest use, i.e., a law of freedom.

D. Two Lines of Investigation: Science and Ideology

1. Core of Non-retaliation

Gandhi's problem of justification thus has two aspects requiring critical examination: (1) the area covered by the

¹Hingorani, ...Satyāgraha, p. 90, (YI, 3/19/25).

²N.V.:II, p. 205; "Gandhi said that he adhered to the position taken by him years ago that everything belonged to God and was from God. Therefore it was for His People as a whole, not for a particular individual." (H, 23/2/47).

the common sense general commitment and apparently the basic subject of Gandhi's general explanation and "science of satyā-graha", corresponding to his theoretical analysis of non-violence as the law of our being and species, and of moral or self-conscious action, and (2) the possibility of a limiting case, addressed by his practical experiments in test cases of extreme violence (particularly his plans for defense against Japanese invasion¹, his Noakhali "pilgrimage", and his Calcutta and Delhi fasts).

Non-retaliation, connecting the practical and the ideal, the empirical and the non-empirical (see pp. 17-18, above), provides the actual principle and core of both inquiries. If human existence is under constant assault by evil, or violence of inner passions and desires, non-retaliation must be the constant moral attitude and guide in spiritual introspection and self-inquiry. Its systematic use constitutes the essential practice of moral self-purification, since it provides an operational definition of love which is capable of molding the moral will. If all energy is fundamentally on an impartible continuum of reality, then this same principle must be equally required and equally effective in the physical realm, and ex hypothesi, it must be capable of meeting even the limiting case of all-out war and threat of nuclear conflict with exact conduct modeled on it. In meeting this limiting case, it would prove the supremacy of ahimsā, viz., the power of love. This successful

¹N.V.:I, pp.417-19, (On the train to Wardha, 5/4/42; H, 12/4/42).

demonstration would exemplify Gandhi's defining criterion of non-violence of the strong, viz., its theoretical sufficiency to every conceivable practical problem and violent conflict. It would have proven equal to the task of neutralizing and abating all actual violent force, and it would have tangibly demonstrated, by success through love of the enemy by only non-violently resisting him, that the power resorted to is the power of Truth, viz., the power also called Love in that it knows no distinction in its action just as Truth knows no distinction in being.

2. Science

A brief self-introspection and practice in non-retaliation in thought, word, and deed, is sufficient to prove the validity of Gandhi's principle of non-retaliation, and his moral science of non-violence for reconstituting moral consciousness, thus progressively stemming harmful and blinding empirical reaction that is inherent in sensory and mental life. Daily life experience is sufficient to demonstrate the validity of his general analysis of the vicious circle and escalation of violence, and the necessity for unilateral abstention as a self-evident moral first requisite. These analyses of escalation and the circle of violence, provide the moral and theoretical rationale for non-retaliation as the mechanism for realizing and extending the general commitment to non-violence as also a generally valid practical position.

3. Ideology

But it remains to examine Gandhi's ideological commitment to his exceptionless non-violent exact conduct of satyāgraha as sufficiently warranted to defeat the claims of the traditional limiting case argument of last resort and moral necessity. Gandhi's arguments for the general commitment to non-violence based on the ordinary functioning of non-violence as non-retaliation are derived from common experience and are admissible as reflecting the scientific and experimental attitude sufficiently to warrant the assertion of a general claim for the empirical efficacy Gandhi claims. But his argument for non-retaliating exact conduct as the exceptionless practical instrument delineated in his radical empirical claim, is deeply founded in his ideological thought.

Though his procedure of inquiry into the practical force of non-violence in these limiting cases may be acceptable as "scientific" as such a complex inquiry can be expected to be,¹ his interpretation of his findings and the claim he bases on this do not stand independently of their ideological foundations and superstructure, viz., truth as the identity of micro and macrocosmic reality and as the ideal convertibility of means and ends, the ascription to metaphysical duality of moral quality as fundamental evil, and the three moral elements of the equation of evil with violence, the universal demonstration of practical validity of non-violence, and the absolute pre-

¹Naess, p. 20; "When judging Gandhi's influence by the standards he himself set for empirical inquiry we must subject it to the same rigorous critical scrutiny that we apply to any piece of social research. But we should note too the enormous

scriptions to make the identity of micro and macrocosm manifest and to make means manifest ends in one's every act.

In the following section, the conditions of objectively evaluating this ideological component are established and applied to the inquiry into the validity of Gandhi's claim as it defines this ideological component by challenging the necessity criterion and last resort arguments that would limit non-violence to only a generally valid, and not absolutely valid moral practical principle.

complexity of Gandhi's experiments compared with ordinary experiments in say, social psychology. The number of unknown, or insufficiently known quantities is overwhelming; so much so in fact that no conclusion can really claim the title of "scientific". Nevertheless, not all worthwhile research need culminate in well-founded scientific conclusions, nor need the unavoidable uncertainty of a conclusion cause us to regret it." Also see Gandhi's disclaimer, N.V.:I, p. 36; "I am in the position of a scientist who is in the midst of a very incomplete experiment and who therefore is unable to forecast large results and large corollaries in a language capable of being understood. In the experimental stage, therefore, I must run the risk of the experiment being misunderstood, as it has been and probably still is in many places." (VI, 17/9/25). The issue is further complicated by the essential spiritual aspect which can have only a very partial empirical articulation; Kher, I, p. 283; "I for one believe that spiritual acts have clearly defined results precisely like combinations or processes in the natural sciences. Only as we have no such means of measurement in the former case as in the latter, we are not ready to believe or we only half-heartedly believe in the spiritual influences...we are inclined to be lenient to ourselves with the result that our experiments are unsuccessful...Thus untruth gets long lease on life." (AOA, pp. 13-22). See also Kher, I, p. 313, (H, 8/7/33, p. 4), on the intangible nature of spiritual results, and Gandhi's repeated allusions to the incalculable factor of faith at the root of satyāgraha action.

Section III: Standpoint of an Objective

Evaluation: Scope and Limits of

Gandhi's Non-violence

This section will first establish from a common sense position, an objective standpoint independent of Gandhi's ideological position and interpretation; and, second, from that standpoint, define the contrasting views of the necessity criterion as it enters the debate on justifiability of violence through the last resort argument.

This prepares the way for the substantial examination in Section IV, of Gandhi's unwarranted discarding of this criterion both in his concrete application of his ethical theory in arguments against the justifiability of war, and in the concrete application of his practical theory to supercede that criterion in arguments for the viable practical substitution by methods of satyāgraha.

A. Problem of Evaluation

1. Objective Standpoint

An objective evaluation must take as its vantage point some criteria or comprehensive view that stands independently of the ideology to be evaluated.

a) Internal Invulnerability of Ideology: From within his ideology, Gandhi's claims are invulnerable. Results of

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his experiments also cannot "prove" the validity of his ideology so far as these are interpreted only by his ideological terms and so long as its fundamental ideals are isolated in a separate category as regulative and conceived ex hypothesi to be not fully realizable in the empirical medium.

The critical examination of Gandhi's philosophy of non-violence requires ab initio discounting his ideology while evaluating his moral and practical claims and results, and making that ideology itself the subject of critical inquiry in the light of a wider more general philosophical investigation. It must be initially asked whether his ideological analysis is adequate to the facts of violence and non-violence, and whether these facts preclude the question of the justifiability of violence, force, and war, as he claimed?

b) Necessity of Practical Criteria: The question of this justifiability is a necessary one given that the practical justification of non-violence is a logical component of a moral ideology.

If Gandhi cannot assure one a priori that non-violence will work in every possible practical context, if he cannot independently justify his radical claim for non-violence, then the question of justifiability of violence is again opened, and inquiry is returned to the fundamental moral problem of drawing the line between violence and non-violence in practical yet morally supportable terms. Since the moral analysis of the distinction between violence and non-violence logically involves the justifiability of either an absolute claim on the

side of non-violence, or a conditional one on the side of violence. In either case the justification must be a moral one since the starting point of inquiry is the moral point of view, viz., the general commitment to non-violence on the basis of an original moral preferment.

2. Criteria

Beyond this fundamental agreement on a moral framework and starting point, there is need of further criteria in terms of which to evaluate Gandhi's work without assuming a counter ideology.

a) Experience, Common Sense, and the Test Case: Experience must provide the criteria in the shape of common sense justifications and its prima facie case. Experience is demonstrative and a common basis for judgment and action when it yields results that none would argue against on the basis of experience alone, i.e., without reference to ideological or theoretical rationale. In the present context, experience gives the criteria mentioned previously as the common sense basis for justification of violence against the moral presentiment and general commitment, viz., the ultima ratio, and balance of moral qualities in the practical outcomes. A third criterion might be choice of means that preserve the good.

Without going outside common sense and experience, the traditional criteria for just war give a comprehensive summary of this position that is difficult to disagree with without raising theological issues. Ellul summarizes these criteria

in his reflections on Violence,

...seven conditions must coincide to make a war just: the cause fought for must itself be just; the purpose of the warring power must remain just while hostilities go on; war must be truly the last resort, all peaceful means having been exhausted; the methods employed during the war to vanquish the foe must themselves be just; the benefits the war can reasonably be expected to bring for humanity must be greater than the evil provoked by the war itself; victory must be assured; the peace concluded at the end of the war must be just and of such a nature as to prevent a new war.¹

Ellul writes that the basis of this "dogmatic" position is "the conviction that man can retain control of violence, that violence can be kept in service of order and justice and even of peace, that violence is good or bad depending on the use or purpose it is put to."²

These seven criteria can be characterized as an analysis of conditions believed sufficient to guide the well intentioned party in realizing that "conviction" when violence does seem to him necessary. These seven criteria might then be reduced to the criterion of insuring that the outcome of the violence be a greater good than the evil of the means necessitated. In common sense terms, these are the two criteria that (1) a lesser evil, the good use of violence, should succeed in defeating the agent (intending) of greater violence; and (2) abstention should not aid the evil agent in perpetrating the violence he espouses to realize his own ends.

¹Ellul, Jacques, p. 6. His summary is from what he considers to be the theological view. From the standpoint of this paper, it is Ellul's analysis, in many ways at one with Gandhi's, that is ideological, while the theologians actually only modify the common sense position of fundamental moral experience and judgment.

²Ibid., pp. 5-6.

Unless survival is a sin, a basic evil, some such analysis justifying necessary violence as moral must be allowed. It has been shown (see above, Chap. 1, p. 16) that in some sense Gandhi takes just this position and makes a sin of embodied existence, and possessive attachment to the body and to corporeal life. According to that position, birth in physical form necessarily brings more violence into the universe; violence is ex hypothesi evil; therefore, life is inherently evil, or sin. According to this argument, enjoyment of life must be the greater sin as enjoyment implies greater activity, and greater mutual competition for use of limited resources, and for sheer occupation of space and domain. Greater activity is more violence, and more violence is more evil and greater sin. But this is at variance with the Upanishadic analysis that sees in the universe a place of play, abundance, and mirth, in which the realized being, even identifying himself with creation as 'food of food', finds in it preëminently the joy of taste, not the pain of violence.¹

¹The Taittirīyaka-Upanishad ends in such a chant of wonder and delight, revealing the transfixing aspect of even the most mundane; "...He who is this (Brahman) in man, and he who is that (Brahman) in the sun, both are one. (III:10:4) He who knows this, when he has departed this world, after reaching and comprehending the Self which consists of food, the Self which consists of breath, the Self which consists of mind, the Self which consists of understanding, the Self which consists of bliss, enters and takes possession of these worlds, and having as much food as he likes, and assuming as many forms as he likes, he sits down singing this Sāman (of Brahman): "Hāvu, hāvu, hāvu!" (III:10:5) "I am food (object), I am food, I am food, I am food! I am the eater of food (subject), I am the eater of food, I am the eater of food! I am the poet (who joins the two together), I am the poet, I am the poet! I am the first-born of the Right (ṛta). Before the Devas I was in the centre of all that is immortal. He who gives me away, he alone preserves me: him who eats food, I eat as food.

b) Universalizability, Heteronomy, and Confusion:

Aside from variance with his own sources, Gandhi's extreme position does not bear initial inspection on the universalizability criterion of general moral theory. Were all the good to suspend physical resistance and choose self-immolation, the sine qua non of satyāgraha, there would be no one left to be or to do good; evil, being violence in nature, is self-destructive; life's purpose under such a moral regime could only be self-destruction; making life itself intrinsically evil.

But Gandhi insists on absolute exemption from taking life¹ as the basis of morality as non-violence. Thus life appears to be Gandhi's highest value from the standpoint of his methods, while from the standpoint of his theory and cause, the aim and value of life is its exhaustion. Gandhi's moral position is fundamentally flawed by a heteronomy that is built into its structure by his attempt to make ends and means convertible and yet to emphasise and exploit their practical distinctness (see below, p. 164).

Granting the absolute nature of moral law and commitment the criterion of universalizability is there to help one to realize the material consequences of his actions in logical terms that reveal the full dimensions of that commitment and that action. Gandhi uses this criterion to meet practical

'I overcome the whole world, I, endowed with golden light. He who knows this, (attains all this).' This is the Upanishad". (III:10:6) The Upanishads, trans. Max Muller, (The Sacred Books of the East, vol. XV, 1879: New York; Dover Publications, 1962)p.68-9.

¹Except for spiritual surgery, in which 'taking of life'

arguments objecting to his practice and methods. But he ignores the consequences for his own arguments in support of that position and method.

Gandhi's ignoring, or only selectively emphasising the criterion of universalizability generates a cluster of confusions in Gandhi's philosophy of non-violence at both the theoretical and the practical levels. His arguments against the common sense and prima facie criteria depend on arbitrary postulates, axioms and assumptions, that reflect these confusions. Gandhi's equation of micro and macrocosm allows the criteria of the just war to be seen as criteria justifying the use of violence in general and thus are inadmissible to his theory. They leave open the question of where the line between violence and non-violence is to be drawn which he does not. To common sense this is always a matter of particular circumstances, individual, situation, and outcomes. But Gandhi's ideological notions blur distinctions, confuse categories, and misdirect valuations making categorical differences look equivocal. He thus appears to annul the need to draw such a line by justifying the exceptionless rule of non-violence. His justification follows only from ideological constructions formulated to support those assimilations and confusions of distinct terms and categorical realities.

The evaluation of Gandhi's philosophy of non-violence thus involves (1) demarcating the valid core of his concept and methods which coincides with the general commitment from the

to relieve the soul of suffering where no other means is possible, is like amputating a limb to relieve the whole body. Still, the physical result is the ending of life, which is all that is needed in the present argument.

empirical standpoint of common sense morality, which he uses to annul the common sense limitations to that critical basis;
 (2) examining the way in which Gandhi's methods of satyāgraha embody those confusions in attempting to justify overriding those criteria.

3. Valid Core of Two Inquiries: Non-retaliation

a) Correct Analysis of Violence as Retaliation: Gandhi's claim and consistent analysis of the circle of retaliatory violence and the principle of non-retaliation, as both the moral and the practical core of non-violence is his singular contribution to non-violence theory. Gandhi called it a self-evident principle¹ accessible to anyone with the capacity to reason. It is evident on almost every page of his voluminous writing, and he applies it without distinction, to the vast range of practical problems that he engaged over the course of his sixty year career as moralist and missionary to prove violence unnecessary and so unjustifiable.

Though Gandhi did not claim more than to have applied on as "vast" a scale as he could, the "ancient" principle, found in all religious texts, it must be remembered that before his efforts in non-violence, and the efforts of those who followed him, there was no general acceptance of non-retaliation as a general moral principle, and no entertainment of it as a moral law.

¹N.V.:II, p. 140; "Non-violence does not require any outside training. It simply requires the will not to kill even in retaliation and the courage to face death without revenge. This is no sermon on ahimsā but cold reason and the statement of a universal law." (New Delhi, 2/9/46; H, 8/9/46).

Gandhi was correct that the operative principle in human affairs is "an eye for an eye", and that vital belief in this principle and mistrust based on it, regardless of nominal moral professions to the contrary, is still the ruling fact in human relations, both personal and political. Nevertheless, Gandhi's clear analysis and incessant application make evident the true status of non-retaliation as the working and definitive principle realizing the general commitment to non-violence as a concrete practicable ethic of love.

b) Exploratory Instrument: The Last Resort Argument:
The use of this principle as an exploratory instrument greatly extends the last resort argument if it does not prove the idea of the last resort fallacious as Gandhi hoped. Nor need its failure as an absolute principle vitiate Gandhi's philosophy and method of non-violence in general, as here becomes clear. Granted the proven practical power and value of non-retaliation so far as Gandhi demonstrated it in his satyāgraha campaigns, he greatly widened the scope of the non-violence espoused in our general commitment and also put more force behind the last resort argument for those who might assert it after pushing the new non-violent methods to the limit.¹

B. Rightness and Necessity

The problem of justifying violence using arguments of last resort, balance of good results, and use of prima facie

¹The Gandhian argument that non-violence cannot be expected to succeed if operated only as a policy and a technique does not hold unless his ideology is accepted. The necessity

morally legitimated means, seems to involve a special kind of necessity, or the conferring of a moral quality on necessity. In assessing the problem of justifiability itself it is essential to become clear about the distinction between rightness and necessity, its bases and relevance, both as Gandhi understood it in terms of absolute non-violence, and as understood by proponents of the justifiability of violence in terms of violence and non-violence as relative categories.

The problem of characterizing this necessity provides the focus for understanding both the problem of the justifiability of violence and Gandhi's claims that the problem itself is generated by false views of the nature of violence and non-violence.

The next two subsections will examine why Gandhi thinks, on the basis of his ideology, that necessity is ruled out as a moral argument justifying violence, why his position is inadequate to the problem, and under what circumstances necessity is a moral argument for the use of violence. The last subsection examines how the necessity criterion must be applied to preserve its moral and justifying character.

1. Gandhi's Position: Defining Necessity by Dichotomy Confuses the Analysis of Violence

It is an important contribution to the new debate on justifiability that in his ideology Gandhi draws a radical distinction between "rightness" and "necessity" with respect

of identifying violence with hate and anger is the principal issue in the present evaluation, and his assumption of it is the only ground for his determining that non-violence cannot be given full scope so long as there is acceptance of the possible use of violence as a legitimate method. His analysis of faith also does not justify this distinction of policy and creed.

to violence. By identifying violence with evil he makes it a moral term and isolates it from the difficult arguments involving the complex logical and evidently neutral, notions of necessity.

a) Necessity and Self-Deception: In answer to the question did he believe there was moral progress in the world, considering the large scale violence that seemed to be itself growing without hindrance, he said that yes there was definite moral progress because at least now man did not justify his violence, but lamented his inability to abstain from what he knew to be wrong. Gandhi insists that one remain clear about what he is doing. Where there is Truth there is hope of finally defeating evil. He asserts that true moral self-consciousness robs evil of the strength that it gains through false justifying arguments. Recognition and acknowledgment are sufficient to disarm these tendencies whether in one's own moral consciousness or in a prevalent ideology. On the other hand, self-deception insures that the growing dominance by evil is ignored and allowed its full sway. Gandhi argues that violence is unjustifiable not only because it is prima facie evil, as admitted on all sides, but also because acknowledging claims that necessity can substitute for moral warrant leads to self-deception (essential untruth) and to the strengthening of the evil that was intended to be destroyed by that violence which was to be justified in the name of necessity. Arguing

in the name of necessity is itself, therefore, an instrument of self-destruction, and so an evil. This is Gandhi's ideological argument against accepting necessity as a justificatory argument legitimating violence--the brutalizing of oneself by use of violence and the material damage all around are not undone by sophisticated arguments.

Gandhi's development of the praxis of non-violence, and the method and history of satyāgraha, constitute his argument against the claim that non-violence cannot even hope to produce the tangible practical redress of wrong and defeat of aggressive evil that violence occasionally seems to. According to Gandhi, such practical necessity is itself the product of insufficient faith in non-violence, a self-fulfilling mis-faith which inevitably succumbs to arguments of practical necessity, instead of sustaining the non-violence past that apparent necessity to that point of moral effort and modulation of spiritual and empirical states where the force of non-violence first becomes effective on a practical level. Again, such arguments from "necessity" are evil by their interference with true non-violence, which alone is morally valid and finally effective in terms of permanent empirical results.

b) Simplifying Moral Reality: These arguments are based on Gandhi's initial ideological position which establishes a strict dichotomy and clear opposition. But such clarity is what is in doubt in practical application.

At the basis of his entire thought and methods is the ideological equation of violence with evil and the resultant characterization of "violence" as an "evil thing in itself", or

a thing in which "evil inseparably inheres". This is acceptable to the common sense position in support of a commitment to non-violence also. But the further assumption that its use by moral agents can never be good, or produce good, ~~claims~~ no such general agreement. The original equation can stand, but it does not support the second claim as Gandhi believes it implicitly does. He argues that "two wrongs don't make a right". But again that is what appears to be the open question to be investigated, and to evoke an argument not simply answerable by dichotomous thinking. The starkness of the ascription of evil to all violent activity may mislead where the factor of use by "external agency", i.e., moral determination not reducible to empirical terms, is essential to the analysis of action as distinct from description of activity. At the very least there would seem to be a complexity in types of ascription involved even if it were granted that moral dichotomy is sufficient to describe the moral mix of the situation. It is enough for the argument to note that the problem is fundamental and its solution cannot be assumed as Gandhi's analysis does. However, that the situation is "moral" and not reducible to merely empirical terms is a common ground for argument.

The starting point for both positions is the general moral commitment to non-violence, which cannot be overridden by any non-moral necessity, viz., a necessity where violence might be conceived as an end in itself. Gandhi's analysis closes the question of a limit to that commitment and he claims that a line cannot be legitimately drawn in terms of rightness and necessity. But again, this is the question to be investigated

and not ab initio foreclosed by ideological commitments.

Gandhi's ideology constructs a dichotomous view of a static existence of properties and qualities by its radical opposing of good and evil. This excludes the third element, basic to Gandhi's position also, the intervention of spirit (call it will) whose activity ex hypothesi is not conditioned by or explicable in terms of good and evil. Gandhi cannot rule out the question of justifiability and necessity when his dichotomous view does not address all categories involved. The spiritual reality¹ is not represented in this opposition, but it is fundamental to the analysis of the practical reality of violence and non-violence, since this is a problem of the empirical sphere of actions and agency. An opposition of categories drawn in terms of only properties and qualities, moral or otherwise, would be ex hypothesi inadequate to the analysis and interpretation of the dynamic reality, where action and use are implied over and above mere existence of qualities and properties, whether natural or moral.

c) The Critical Standpoint: Defining Real Necessity:

The question for critical examination of Gandhi's philosophical position is whether, given the complexity of the dynamic moral situation (whose admission is common to both Gandhi's ideology and the common sense general commitment), stark dichotomous arguments against the justifiability of violence can be sustained. The question for objective investigation

¹Gandhi admits the reality of spirit as the basis of his arguments against the allowability of violence: (1) that only the Divine is omniscient, and so alone is competent to

in pursuing this critical examination is what a justifying necessity must look like once the ideological bases and constraints are discounted. The common sense prima facie criteria for the balance of good and evil are the correct starting point. as it makes no presumption but looks at moral reality such as is presented in common experience. It has the backing of general non-ideological argument, viz., agreement in common uninterpreted experience. But the general commitment is very strong and relies on the same basic moral preference as does Gandhi's position. Gandhi has no extra-ideological grounding above this agreed moral preference for generally ruling out violence, and for completely ruling it out on any other than moral grounds. He offers no objective ground for insisting on conditionless rightness, especially if "rightness" for him conceptually includes "working" or "efficacy", and he cannot offer better than ideological assurance of an actual infallibility. His grounds for ruling out extension of necessity are categorical but his categorical analysis is based on real confusions. The same moral preference supports going beyond the general commitment to violence where it is believed a moral purpose can be served by means of it.

It is incumbent to ask what this limit might look like. It will have to be a radical compelling necessity to override such a fundamental moral commitment and prima facie unjust or harmful and destructive means. But its basis may be found

to punish; (2) the Lord alone can act on the law that evil can serve the good of the whole; he is omniscient and knows the whole while man knows only that good leads to good, and evil to evil; (3) the law of the spirit does not lose its nature when it is embodied.

in the original common sense criteria--the question of means brings in the factors of agency and results which are not covered by the dichotomy of good and evil. The common sense position requires that this necessity must be radically moral. The use of violence must itself be necessary, not only allowable but morally required, since the basis of having the general commitment at all is the moral presentiment that is foundational to the consciousness it represents. Yet this use must respect the evil nature of violence which is inexpungable and does not subside under influence of any external factor; it must be just this specific evil nature of violence that makes it morally required or the necessity involved will not be stringent enough on moral grounds. The violence resorted to must be just the thing needed, not admitting of any surrogate or substitute, in order to insure that the necessity is radical and overriding in moral terms. A necessity the absolute negation of the general but fundamental commitment can alone satisfy the moral stringency assumed in that commitment. The evil means, i.e., violence, must be chosen just because only that evil means, violence, is believed capable of serving a wider moral interest than that involved in the immediate ends/means transaction.

Thus Gandhi rightly insists that any justifying necessity would have to be required by the nature of violence as radically evil, and that less than this radically moral requirement would fail to respect the truth that all violence is evil in itself. Gandhi, however, believes that no good can be generated as an

emergent quality superceding and neutralizing the evil in the original means, so such arguments for the moral necessity of resorting specifically to violence as occasionally the only way to satisfy the moral requirement to protect and propagate the good, are really specious and self-deceiving.

d) Necessity of Fighting Evil: The question is, if it is agreed that violence is radically evil in itself, i.e., as an end in itself it must be morally condemned, then how does the question of justifiability and radical necessity arise from the common sense and experience grounded point of view?

The question arises not in contesting or defending passive acquiescence or claims of unavoidability or inevitability, and pleas to be excused, but from the challenge to justify the morally active and positive assertion that violence is necessary for fighting evil itself. Justification to be "moral" must be from conscious deliberate choice, as Gandhi also held,¹ and non-moral justification will not fit the radical requirements of justifiability of violence; viz., a means prima facie evil in itself, and unjustifiable and inadmissible without stringent overriding conditions of equally moral nature and superceding moral magnitudes and urgency. Claims of inadvertance, inevitability, or incapacity can only be "excuses", and will not be admissible as bases for agreement in positive action.

This is the focus of Gandhi's own claims against the justifiability of violence both in his positive ideological aim and argument, and its expression in his mission to undermine belief in violence by demonstrating the perfect viability of non-violence in the practical sphere. "Fighting evil", and particularly its overt and extreme form as war, is the limiting case that Gandhi seeks to override, but which the common sense view believes must be upheld even if Gandhi has significantly widened the scope of practical non-violence and definitely established its conditions and means well beyond any previous conception, and thus proved how extensive and active a power non-violence is when conceived on a spiritual basis, viz., satyāgraha.

The fight with evil is the focus of both his inquiries and lines of argument, viz., his valid core of inner moral exploration and moral self-culture in the inner battle with evil within, and of his attempt to explore and irradiate the supposed limits of practical and outer non-violence. This active fight with evil is thus the principal notion for examining Gandhi's ends-means distinction which is central to his philosophy of non-violent action, and which focuses the problems of the relation of macro and microcosms, and of moral will and moral action, viz., the equation of evil with violence.

The next section will examine Gandhi's arguments against the justifiability of war as representative in macrocosm of all violence, and as representative of his approach to the limiting case of moral necessity in the practical sphere in

in general. Examination of these views in the critique of satyāgraha in the next section will show how Gandhi's arguments and his assessments of method and practice in addressing the question of necessity are based on fundamental confusions. These confusions render his views invalid at the limits of his inquiry where their ideological character becomes manifest in self-contradictory valuations and practical propositions. Even after such critical review, his contribution to the debate¹ on the justifiability and use of violence remains substantial and valuable.

2. Common Sense Position:² Defining Moral Necessity, A Real Need for Violence.

a) Violence Morally Required by its Own Evil Nature:

"A House Divided...": Here it remains to characterize the radical necessity that would require the use of violence. It has been shown already that only the contest of fighting evil, which would call for active moral choice of violence, could initially justify the use of an intrinsically evil means, and that this violence is admitted ab initio (starting

¹It must be noted that Gandhi felt that his non-violence was no contribution until he could produce a substantial example of non-violence of the strong. He died believing he has not. N.V.:I, p. 265; "Admirers have given me credit I do not deserve. I am not able to testify that India furnished the world with a good example of non-violence of the strong and therefore as a substitute for armed resistance against an aggressor. India undoubtedly has shown the efficacy of passive non-violence as a weapon of the weak. But useful as it is as a substitute of terrorism, I claim no newness or merit for it. It is no contribution to the peace movement." (Sevagram, 5/12/39; H, 9/12/39). We need not be as perfectionist as he to appreciate his extension of the non-violent principle and means as a theory of action, regardless of its limitations in answering to his final criteria and concept.

²Common sense derived from tradition is more likely true

from the common ground of a general moral commitment) in and of itself evil.

The prima facie case is that use of violence with no further purpose than to act violently and do violence, and to be or feel violent, is a fundamental evil. As a negative concept without further qualification its only resultant is harm, both of the agent and the environs. Admitting pleasure as a good it could be acknowledged that in fact there is no possible resort to evil except in terms of the expression and feeling of power involved in the perpetration of the violence. It indulges in this power to gain that pleasure at the price of self-destruction. This would separate "use of violence" from "evil of violence" and suggest as equally viable the use of violent power for good, viz., the good of destroying the evil agency that would use violent power only for evil purposes..

Criteria are needed for establishing when violence is necessitated and justified by that necessity. In terms of the common sense criteria this will be when there results a balance of good over evil, viz., where evil is defeated by use of violence, or where abstention would increase the violence that that evil would do.

This only says that evil should be defeated but not

to experience and valid for practical affairs than any one man's theory; even when it is dressed in such an appealing moral ideological dress and is backed by sixty years of such an intense and wide moral inquiry and experimentation. If "non-violence" involves finally, comparison of intuitions of a legitimating balance of good over evil evolved through historical experience of whole races, vs. one man's experience and limited justifying ideology, clearly common sense must be preferred without even countering the "perfect proof and clarity" or moral self-evidence of the ideologue.

why violence is required. To satisfy the radical moral requirement for use of violent means, the means must be dictated by the nature of the evil itself. The form of evil is destruction with no purpose beyond destruction. Its pure form and inevitable result is self-destruction. Violence is its mechanism and the medium of its expression and operation. The defeat of violence would mean hastening evil's self-destruction and restricting the violence and resulting damage to evil's own vehicles.

"A House Divided...": The only assurance of defeat in battle is "when a house can be divided against itself." External means are intrinsically fallible. They leave success subject to chance. Defeat or stultification and minimization of evil cannot morally be left to chance methods where there is a principle available assuring defeat if its methods can be discovered and accurately employed. Evil must, in principle, be defeated if once turned against itself.

By parity of reasoning, this position represents the opposite of Gandhi's argument that "two wrongs don't make a right". Production of a positive right is not the only possible outcome of two violent actions which nevertheless, if considered in themselves are two evils. To avoid otherwise certain evil, viz., violence and destruction intended or already initiated by evil agencies, is also a legitimate moral or "right" outcome. In moral terms, such a result might be considered combinatory and not simply additive by analogy with a chemical reaction rather than mechanical mixture.

To introduce the ideas of "wrong" and "right" as simple pairs coordinate with "evil" and "good", as if they were similarly simple qualities or properties is to narrowly dichotomize while ignoring the complexity of the action situation, involving besides the quality of actions, the dynamics of motive, agency, action, aim and purpose, and results in their vital and plastic totality not simply as static factors analytically separable or as fixed ideological points.

b) Required to Control Evil by its own Methods; How Evil Functions, a Rationale: According to this argument, entirely counter to Gandhi's, violence, evil's tangible form and chief means, must be used against evil, and against intentional and aggressive violence in order to most nearly assure its defeat. As a philosophical principle rather than a moral or practical maxim, "A House Divided against itself cannot stand", does not depend on activation or accuracy of moral intuitions, themselves not clearly separable from moral sentiments, and it is not modified by variations in empirical conditions. Rather, it fills the dual role of a "dependent absolute" that Gandhi asserted of his empirical claim. Only the mechanism of its activation and operation in the empirical situation and against the particular empirical form of the evil's action is needed to guarantee its efficacy. Its logical status as a universal at least is not in doubt. But the status of Gandhi's moral principle of "two wrongs...", is doubtful as a universal and so is arguable as the present analysis illustrates. Its lawfulness is a postulate not an

analytic character.

By this argument deceit, as well as overt violence can be justified as valid moral means in the fight with evil, as ways of turning it against itself by enlisting its own methods. This is the theoretical argument. As a philosophical principle it applies universally to soul-force as well as to brute-force, even if de facto it has no relevant application to soul-force. Gandhi's exemptions are based only on his particular characterizations of force assignable through the exclusive categories he defines as brute and soul force. He has no universal warrant in support of this characterization, but rather he repeatedly defers to his own experience and to historical arguments to warrant categorical claims.

On the practical side, this principle takes a calculable form that clearly delineates the necessity involved. Gandhi considers deceit a violence because of the tangible damage that results. Damage is assessable and there seems no reason outside of the assumption of Gandhi's ideological position, why the balances involved in that assessment should not figure in the overall valuation of the action as morally justifiable (taking for granted that the interest is in a practical ethics and not an abstract theory of valuations). However, the principle behind the calculations must reflect the radical moral necessity criterion if their outcomes are to justify a particular action of violence or deceit. This is illustrated in the following:

An episode often brought in challenge to Gandhi's mis-

sion against the justifiability of violence and untruth for good ends is that of "Bali and Sri Rāma" in the Rāmāyana, the classical Indic epic and the most ancient in world literature, depicting the life of Brahma as Śri Rāma, the incarnation of God in his attribute of Truthfulness. In that epic there is an episode where Rāma kills Bali by shooting from behind a tree while Bali was engaged in another battle. This was not truthful open combat. Gandhi answers only that he could not vouch for the truth of everything in the epic but would deny that Rāma was the incarnation of Truth if he did, as an historical person, fight by such violent and untruthful means.

The story makes a fundamental point in the present context. Bali had chosen a boon that in any fight he would gain one half the opponent's strength and retain all of his own. Thus mathematically not even the incarnation of God could defeat him through ordinary empirical forces. To engage Bali in direct conflict would be for Rāma to surrender half of his own strength and so necessarily to succumb to the quotient of Bali's strength added to that half of his own. But the purpose of incarnation is the material defeat of evil irreversibly winning against good forces in the outer moral battle. Hence the necessity of Truth itself, the essence of goodness, to use deceit and violence is an indisputable mathematical necessity if once it is admitted that the good must be protected, and the truth of categorical limitations on operant forces must be respected; for that also

is truth, which if the play of dualities is to be maintained cannot be expunged. Existence as we know it depends upon maintenance of real distinction and limitation. Universalizing Gandhi's position and valuation would be tantamount to canceling all relative Truth, and hence created evolving existence, but as Gandhi acknowledges, maintenance of this play is the purpose of incarnation (Gītā, IV:7-8)¹

As a single event the story simply tells about a diabolical choice of boon, but its universal implication is patent. In relations of conflict and resistance, forces are divided equally through the transaction (force meets equal and opposite reaction). But where qualities and tendencies of good and evil are involved the materially superceding factors of will and intent redistribute the energies and modify the spread of forces. Ex hypothesi it is the nature of evil to take without limit, its desire and will to aggressive expression and aggrandizement of ego are insatiable. The fundamental category of its action is "all for me, none for all else." The essence of evil's existence is aspiration to realize a radical division and possession of the "goods" and "benefits" of existence and relations, exclusively for itself or for parceling as its dominion. The logical outcome of interaction between two such agents is mutual destruction. Ab initio the nature of the good is to give to the limit, viz., so far as it seems the giving is to the good of the whole, of all (see fn. 2, at p. 71, above). Thus while the good qua

¹See Desai, Gītā, p. 196; comment on IV:8; also, Hingorani, ...Gītā, p. 152, (DG, 8-44; comment on IV:7-8); and note that Gandhi makes Divine succour the basis of satyāgraha.

good, will freely give more than half of its force and resources to the limit of that belief that doing so is conducive to the good of all. The evil qua evil will take the half naturally extended and retain its own making realization of its own intent materially inevitable if goodness persists in its goodness without qualification. Ex hypothesi this intent is pure evil, pure will to destruction and self-aggrandizement and the non-resisting and unprotected good will naturally be its prey.

The principle of Gandhi's non-cooperation was the "moral truth" that evil has no existence apart from that lent it by the good. Need for protection of the good, whether helpless by lack of material strength, or non-resisting by choice and moral conviction, would be a criterion for use of violence if that violence alone would defeat the evil that intends destruction of the good. The dynamics of empirical force and materials require that the good, in confronting and engaging evil, abstain from its goodness as manifested in the characteristic and disposition to give freely. Gandhi admits that human nature is a mixture of good and evil. One can never know if evil is active and has such a diabolical power as Bali's. One does know that evil by definition takes all and gives nothing, that it excludes all freedom if not existence of all others in the limiting case; that it by nature aspires to that limiting case, and that it would if it could, choose to win the diabolical boon to its own purpose.

Gandhi also admits that humanity is still evolving. There is no principle to assure that all human bodies possess an evolved human brain and matured mind or moral sense. Violence and brutality or a demonic disposition, may be literally its delight, there being an active ego structure and desire principle but no material or mental basis yet for evolving reason or moral character, and for the restraint in favor of others that moral culture and social life imply and require. There may be no point of leverage for the self-suffering technique and soul-force of satyāgraha to take hold of and operate on. In such a case brute force alone can restrain brute force. Ex hypothesi Gandhi's satyāgraha requires an active mental medium intermediary between spiritual and brute elements.

Again victory is assured in principle only by dividing the nature against itself, i.e., use of evil means to destroy evil. Violence is the chief form of all evil's means as Gandhi rightly asserts; therefore, the good are obligated by moral necessity to use violence against evil, where even the mathematical necessities of the empirical situation support the moral analysis.

c) Gandhi's Rejoinder: Hate not the Doer but the Deed: Gandhi's argument is more complex however. He does not speak of using non-violence against evil itself. He advocates violence and even hate against the original evils of hate and passion¹. But according to Gandhi, the doer should not be

¹Hingorani, ...Gītā, p. 30, (YI, Dec. 1, 1921).

identified with the evil deed or with the evil that ensnares him. Hence non-violent methods of non-co-operation with evil should be devised that break the sustaining connection between the evil impetus and its present empirical vehicles and agencies. Gandhi argues that it is precisely the force of violence used by the good to resist evil (i.e., the force of its vehicles, empirical violence) that actually sustains the evil.

This does not cancel the argument from the principle of dividing the evil against itself. It only correctly indicates that the principle of evil must be taken to be unlimited in its aspiration to dominate by force, and in its wish for certitude in superceding strength are always operative. But since evil is never purely manifest the relative support given to evil by an opposing overt violence is precisely what is to be weighed against the damage that violent opposition inflicts on evil by severing evil's connection with the vehicles by which it is exercising its tendencies, giving strength and gathering force. As empirical categories, good and evil are on an equal footing. They both rely on empirical manifesting vehicles and the medium of empirical actions for their growth and maintenance. Therefore, calculations of the balance of good and evil must be made in terms of empirical effects upon their vehicles and activity. These are tactical and strategic considerations of means. They can be morally evaluated only in terms of the ends they serve, producing an ultimate balance of good or evil as the prevailing force in

the locale, or the world.

Gandhi argues that the force of non-violence acts directly on the evil principle. This argument is based only on his ideological interpretation of the categories of spiritual and empirical reality and their relations. Unless he can substantiate it with practical results, assertion of his argument is not warranted sufficiently to meet counter-ideological claims of the common sense position. Gandhi is arguing on the basis of a confusion of categories of force. He may say that ex hypothesi the force of spirit is finally the only reality and is necessarily more powerful than any combination of its partial empirical derivatives. But in the sphere of practical activity the categorical requirements of diverse forces which alone maintain dual nature in existence must be respected. In the practical sphere, violence and non-violence will only have relative values and potencies varying with empirical circumstances and with the specific situation and agents.

Gandhi states that if non-violence is not the law of our being and species then his argument falls to pieces (see below, Sec. IV:D, p. 190), and recrudescence of violence is inevitable. But there is no logical or textual guarantee that in fact this recrudescence is not inevitable and a necessary feature of the world we know as empirical. Rather, dispassionate analysis of experience without ideological bias shows that evil and good are co-necessary factors which sharpen, shape, and sustain each other, while progressively refining thought, feeling, and sensibility of their agents,

and bringing the soul to clearest self-expression.

As mentioned already, spiritual texts do not bear out Gandhi's position. He was at odds with the orthodoxy throughout his career. Science argues for entropy and possibly recurrent big blasts and disintegration cycles. Experience shows that the best of the good only comes out in response to opposition. There is validity to the quip "what would you do if all your problems were solved; what a bore it would be in a perfect universe!".

Human sensibility and moral sense progress by engagement with evil and it would seem not to be an unfortunate circumstance that evil were as much a necessary constituent and law of being of empirical evolution as is goodness, and the necessity to engage it with violence a limiting condition in the principle of non-violence, necessary to fully define it and to express its total potency which needn't be absolute in order to be morally stringent and spiritually efficient. Though the difficulty of applying Gandhi's principle is great, still the fact that there is a rule to apply without question that it is applicable and ought to be applied, rather removes one very significant and sharpening question from the problem of moral growth, and perhaps its basic question and primary mechanism.

This balance and opposition seems an essential feature of self-realization that Gandhi aims at through non-violence. Gandhi cannot claim that only his view and methods are valid, or that only his rule or something of the same absolute order must and ought be applied.

d) Gandhi's Partial Validity, But Non-Necessity:

Gandhi supports his argument that "two wrongs can't make a right" and that non-violent force alone can penetrate to the root of evil without creating counter-productive and self-defeating evil of violent reactions in its own vehicles, by referring to the intrinsic nature of the opposition of soul to brute-forces. They cannot be righted off and neutralized. A good act doesn't cancel the damage already done by the bad action. But that is to confuse force with the properties that manifest with its use, and with its application conditions. Since Gandhi subscribes to the advaitic, non-dual, view of reality, and so considers force to be fundamentally single and a continuum, therefore, the same force can manifest contradictory properties. That Gandhi has discovered a spiritual force which has the properties he claims and operates in the way he explains need not be discounted. He set out to discover a force fitting specific moral criteria on the basis of the particular metaphysical view of Truth, ideological interpretation of spiritual reality and creation, and certain hypotheses about the relation between spiritual, moral, and practical realities. That he discovered such a force and a mechanism of action does not justify his claim that this set of properties, and principles and methods of action, is the only one capable of realizing ultimate moral and spiritual aims, viz., those which have a reality and knowability outside of any categories through which they may be characterized and manipulated. Those conditions and constraints to which he

attaches "only" not only do not give his views the certainty that he asserts them with, but rather they point to those principles and criteria as deriving from and relying on only his categorically confused and materially unwarranted pre-suppositions.¹ On the basis of common sense and common un-interpreted experience and judgment, it may be concluded rather that there is a moral practical limitation to use of non-violent means beyond which abstention from violent means itself constitutes an evil, and the realization of which must be calculated in terms of categories, properties and results; characteristics of the practical reality that must be dealt with on its own terms if its defeat is to be assured, destroyed by its own means turned against itself.

However, Gandhi may be justified in asserting the assured efficacy of his own practice of non-violence, if it is admitted that karmic adjustment of external results and of moral and spiritual fruits is done by a Divine agency, according to faith (Gītā IX:25) and trueness to oneself, i.e. moral authenticity as the decisive moral consideration rather than the mere mechanical and numerical adjustment of empirical factors. But if one abstains from violence on formal and merely reasoned grounds without the authenticity of unabridgable faith in non-violence as a force of the Lord, then non-violent action cannot succeed beyond a definite point and will likely serve the cause of evil

¹Gandhi tries to support his categorical differentiation, practical and spiritual, by his interpretation of the rational ideal as a construction in moral consciousness having form and potency to guide practice on the basis of non-material principles.

if used blindly without either the faith Gandhi required, or the wide awake attention to tactical considerations, required on strategic terms. The focus of either on the means must be strong enough to assure their greatest sensitivity to circumstances and resultant greatest probability of success in practical terms. This all sounds like just common sense; but that is the point.

To the extent that Gandhi's methods depend on empirical conditions, to the extent that his empirical claims are dependent and practical, they must respect practical reality in operating with its forces.

e) Failure of Gandhi's Position to Respect Categorical Truths: The primary principle of action and the fundamental laws of force must be derived from the realities through which they operate. Assimilations of categories amount to abridgement of truth, regardless of ultimate identities of reality outside of the categories of active consciousness. Thus in empirical reality and practical affairs, the principle of self-division is a constitutive principle and supercedes moral maxims. Moral maxims can apply only by analogy and according to mediating conditions that must be satisfied to validate them. The analysis presented here points to both the moral and practical validity of the house-divided principle, and to the necessity of using evil means against evil, as more fundamental than Gandhi's principles of non-violence.

Gandhi's attempt to annul the prima facie claim for the necessity of violence to defeat evil as a last resort, must be considered invalid both morally and practically. Nevertheless,

the core of his non-violence as non-retaliation and the use of the principles to explain their limitations is not only valid but required by the structure of the new debate that is established by the dialectic of Gandhi's empirical claim with traditional arguments in support of justifiability of violence.

f) Gandhi's Failure of Common Sense: What leads Gandhi to support his position by choosing a moral axiom rather than a neutral examination of categorical realities? How does he support his position against the prima facie case in favor of the strongly counterintuitive claim that violence would not be justified against a Hitler and that non-violence would necessarily defeat a Hitler?

If the above argument is correct, a Hitler, an insuperable evil, can only be defeated by turning its own means against itself, dividing it against itself, in terms of the laws of forces active through the empirical medium, and the violence and deceit would be justified by the larger violence intended and prepared for by the agent of evil thus destroyed. This is so much non-violence as could be wished. There is no reason other than ideological preferment to suppress that periodic recrudescence of evil as malicious violence to assume that such violence is not the law of empirical reality, evil repeatedly reasserting itself after the principle of evil each time reconstitutes its vehicles, so the battle goes on with no millennial termination.

Since so far as human effort and moral evolution are concerned, goodness is the sustaining principle against evil,

The self-destructive principle. The question is what conditions define the necessity criterion in practical application in human affairs? This is the question which the criteria of the just war are meant to specify (see above, p. 53), viz., the balance of good and evil, last resort, and constraint of means.

3. Last Resort: Conditions of Applying the Necessity Criterion

a) Defining the Good Use of Violence: Preservation of Goodness: The conditions of applying the necessity criterion must be such as to insure not the greatest numerical human survival rate but to insure that the use of violence leaves the moral principle in tact by which even the minimum survival rate of two, could regenerate and evolve the race, and sustain the spiritual pursuit of realization. The moral principles are those which not only insure survival but insure also progress in quality of life, which is to say growth and refinement, and self-expression of the spiritual element¹, i.e., the permanent element reflected by character that supervenes over the continuous wash of the empirical over the moral reality, subjective and objective. The conditions for necessarily meeting evil with violence must be such as to insure the balance of good in the world after the engagement that would enable it to survive and sustain spiritual growth and

¹Kher I, p. 264; "Spirit is that moral being which informs the human body and which is imperishable. Spiritual progress is that which promotes the realization of that imperishable essence. What retards the progress of my neighbour must retard mine." (H, 11/3/33, p.2)

its moral prerequisites.

If morality has its tangible form in rules and articulated principles, the engagement and aftermath must be prosecuted in ways that preserve those rules in tact as a whole regardless of partial abridgement necessitated by the principle of meeting evil by its own means. This is the abridgement of moral rules for purely tactical purposes, where the opponent is incorrigibly evil and indefeatable by other means.

This condition defines the last resort criterion for assuring the moral character of the justification by necessity. Though the violence used is in itself evil and therefore, if enough strength is put behind it, uniquely capable of overcoming evil, the conditions of its use must reflect the wider good that is to be preserved by the partial or momentary and pointed suspension of "goodness" in its form as restraint or non-use of violence.

b) Sincerity and Clarity: Evil is characterized by its specific intent and readiness to use violence as a means to achieve any purpose it happens to entertain and believes violent use of force will accomplish, and without regard for collateral damage perpetrated by those means. Delight in the release of violent energy for its own sake, viz., the exhilaration coming from any release of energy, is the limit of evil's use of violence.

The good use¹ of violent energies, intended to destroy, must be opposite this. The violence must be a last resort,

¹Note that this use of the logic of opposition and reversal, defines good use of violent energies within the same category; Gandhi uses it to define the empirical aspects of non-violence by de facto negating the category.

sincerely, hesitatingly, and regretfully engaged, with full cognizance of its nature, its likely and unwished-for collateral effects, and the severity of the necessity involved, viz., that whatever violence is used must be fully believed to be necessary, and must be operated fully and only to the purpose of insuring that this use of violence result in less harm than would have occurred by not engaging violently with the evil, and that even in this engagement it be most narrowly constrained to the purpose of overcoming the particular evil opposed. This purpose legitimizes the intent.

Factual judgments of wisdom and sincerity, etc., are not at issue. They will always be questionable from without and subject to deception from within. In violent engagement with evil preparation of the moral will and clarification of the moral intent, are matters of "peacetime" and constant moral self-culture, just as is preparation for active satyāgraha, especially in the use of fasting. The fact of having constantly worked at such moral strength and clarity stands surity that one's wisdom and sincerity in crisis will be authentic and optimal; though the training beforehand cannot act as a criterion. Gandhi also argued that the force of satyāgraha was only a last resort necessitated by the incorrigibility of opposition and conflict. He stated that perhaps the final argument against challenges of uninformed or insincere application could only be a deferring to one's past constant efforts, and the accuracy of judgments and purity of will and intent, and moral integrity and depth, that can be assumed to have evolved with constancy of effort over time,

and variousness in scope of practice can alone give depth and credibility to the last resort justification, whether for use of violence or satyāgraha.

c) Patience and Restraint on Use of Violence: However, in terms of present criteria, the restraint involved before resorting to violence is to the degree possible, both test and proof of purity of that intent; one is to use "as much as one can, for as long as one can!", of non-violence. First, this will serve to awaken what good is there, possibly obviating the need to overtly fight evil with evil. Gandhi's empirical claim was without independent warrant, based on the belief that it had an absolute power of non-violent force to awaken the good in the vehicle, and to enlist it in non-co-operating with evil, thus subverting the agent of evil from within. Second, it assumes the purity of the resort and the moral character of the necessity and engagement, both to the agent and the opponent, and the neutrals or potential allies. Evil would not "take the pains" implied in the restraint of "long, hard" non-violence. Evil's aim is pleasure and self-aggrandizement, and minimization of suffering necessitated in gaining these. Third, this restraint defuses the defensive challenges of evil and stands out against counter-justifications by the material sacrifices involved, and maintenance of the moral beneficence required to sustain the restraint. These are similar conditions to those Gandhi puts on the last resort argument; only they do not postulate necessary abdication and forfeit of moral principle on entrance into the violent engagement as

Gandhi believed must occur automatically. They insist on the equal necessity of maintaining that moral status through the conflict.

d) Intelligence and Objectivity: Fourth, the use of violent force must be intelligent, viz., clear-sighted and to the moral purpose, to insure that the means are kept to that stringency of balance and assertion required by the necessity to be met. As Gandhi insists, hate and anger are essential subtle violence. Intelligent use of force is possible only when these are absent and perception understanding, and keenness, optimally objective and active. This insures that the violence is maximally restricted to the evil resisted.

e) Peace, an end and aim, Not a Means: The final condition is restitution of all that is possible to the harmed; the establishment of a just peace on a new positive co-operative basis. This is what is made possible by the morality maintained and retained in tact only by the judicious but positive partial abridgement of some of its rules as moral necessity has itself dictated. The just peace and new friendship are in fact the substance of justification by the last resort argument. Such use of violence is the last resort to save the maximum of the moral basis for maintaining and returning to the moral and spiritual evolution whose life, action, and existence, the upsurge of evil has challenged.

The moral appropriateness and practical effectiveness of these conditions for accurately applying the necessity criterion can be understood against Gandhi's claims only in

light of the categorical realities they anticipate, i.e., the law of empirical being which itself dictates this necessity to defeat evil by its own means in the limiting case. Though the demand of the prima facie case and the counter-intuitive practical position of Gandhi's non-violence make it easy to doubt the validity of his radical claims, the severity of the argument for necessary violence and the strength of the general commitment to non-violence make it difficult to accept the logical conclusion against Gandhi's appealing thesis.

It is necessary to examine why his position is confused and does not support the moral preference that he and we want to give it. His satyāgraha was meant only to demonstrate viability in order to defuse false belief, not to prove the validity of his position which only the logic and truth of his concept and arguments could do. But the study of his methods has been shown to be essential for gaining full insight into his concepts which include that practical component and aim. Examination of the context of war and the final resort to satyāgraha provide the necessary critique of Gandhi's confusions in his denial of a limit to our general commitment to non-violence.

The next section examines Gandhi's application of his ideological components to supercede the necessity criterion in the concrete cases, theoretical and practical, of his arguments against the justifiability of war and for satyāgraha as its viable non-violent substitute. It is shown how this application is fundamentally misconceived and generates both categorical and valuational confusions.

Section IV: Critical Examination of Gandhi's Views
on War and Satyāgraha: The Limiting Cases
of Conflict, Violence, and the Last
Resort Argument

(Real Necessity: Application of the Objective
Analysis of the Limiting Case)

The necessity criterion represents just those real limiting conditions on the application of non-violence which Gandhi wishes to annul and supercede in his ideological exploration. Gandhi's ideological components and the basic confusions inherent in his position have been adumbrated in outlining the objective standpoint of the present analysis and evaluation, and introducing the necessity criterion. These are arbitrary theoretical elements which it is acknowledged may suffice for giving a rationale to the general commitment; but here it is shown how the concrete application of them generates those confusions when the application is meant to supercede the limits inherent in that general commitment and understood by common sense.

This section examines in detail how Gandhi's views on the justifiability of war and his proposed substitute for war, fail to dispose of the necessity criterion which is a real necessity representing the inherent limits of the empiri-

cal and practical component of non-violence. The final section examines the possible contemporary role of non-violence, given the terms of this necessity as it structures the contemporary debate on the justifiability of violence.

A. Non-retaliation and the Ideological
Interpretation of the Maxim
"Two Wrongs Don't Make
a Right"

The rationale of Gandhi's arguments in justification of his empirical claim, ideological and practical, expressed in the maxim "two wrongs don't make a right" is fundamentally flawed as he applies it unconditionally, as he must, to explicate that claim and to defeat the last resort and necessity argument. Gandhi uses the maxim to express, generalize, and justify non-retaliation as the chief practical principle and core of his non-violence concept and methods, viz., ahimsā and satyāgraha.

It is necessary to ask why Gandhi's position is so appealing and yet repelling, apparently having the certitude of self-evidence and yet drawing doubt by opposing fundamental intuitions. The maxim "Two wrongs don't make a right" is the expression of moral truth that Gandhi repeatedly draws upon in arguing against the justifiability of any violence, and while insisting on the use of satyāgraha to solve conflicts. This maxim has the rhetorical force of mathematical certainty and the immediate appeal of a common sense truism.

Non-retaliation has been acknowledged to be the valid and effective basis and operative principle of his practical

methods, and to provide the theoretic rationale underlying his arguments in support of the empirical realization of the general commitment. This maxim, which non-retaliation translates to practical principle and action may be taken as foundational of Gandhi's non-violence.

However, the maxim hides a circularity when interpreted by Gandhi's ideological constructions and definitions. It is this circularity that gives the feeling of logical certitude reënforced by the fundamental sentiments stirred by the strong moral general commitment. This feeling leads to confusion when it is frustrated by equally basic intuitions that arise where the formula is used to justify, superceding the prima facie limit of that general commitment.

If the two "wrongs" are mutually retaliatory actions based on a will and intent to reprisal and injury, then they clearly cannot produce a "right", i.e., the end of retaliation as the good defined in terms of non-violence. In this case the two wrongs, violence, will necessarily lead to an escalatory chain of reprisals that end only in mutual exhaustion or mutual destruction, or toward a victor, leaves bitterness and a sense of injustice against personal arbitrary judgment and from vindictiveness. These are the seeds of the necessary counter-action when there is no principle of restraint operative.

Gandhi generalizes the principle to thought and speech activity, and argues that since these retaliations necessarily proceed from fear, anger, and hatred, accumulated from continuing reprisal and injury, there is no escape from the

cycle of violence except by the principle of unilateral¹ non-retaliation, the principle of moral action which Gandhi deduced from this factual analysis.² The original violence of aggression is clearly not morally justifiable, and if the only result of retaliatory violence (also aggressive in quality if not an original intent) besides immediate injury, is the escalating cycle of counter violence, there is no result left to possibly justify that secondary or defensive violence either. To Gandhi it is incumbent upon the one who knows better to break the chain.³ Professions of rightness or of redeeming aims are necessarily either hypocrisy and deception, or ignorance of the nature of retaliation as essentially an unredeemable violence.⁴ The retaliatory motive de facto excludes all other aims, regardless of appearance to the contrary. It is "logically", all-consuming, according to Gandhi. Therefore only a knowing renunciation of it in all its manifestations can lead to a "right". This is the basis

¹N.V.:II, 305; "He had no data to measure the guilt on either side. It was surely sufficient to know that both the sides were guilty. The universal way to have proper adjustment was for both the states to make a frank and full confession of guilt on either side and come to terms, failing agreement to resort to arbitration in the usual manner. The other and crude way was that of war. The thought repelled him. But there was no escape from it if there was neither agreement nor arbitration...This could not come about with the aid of the military. It could be done by return to sanity by the people concerned." (H, 28/9/47)

²It should be noted that Gandhi's ideology starkly illustrates the fallacy of deducing an "ought" from an "is", though in his conception he tries to do just the reverse. Here is can be clearly seen how any such deduction, even one striking so deeply at moral sentiments, is by its nature imposing and obfuscating if it is allowed to annul categorical distinctions.

of his satyāgraha, which the whole of chapter II, above is intended to elucidate, viz., non-violence as the knowing renunciation of all personal motives to action. Two blind retaliations "logically" cannot produce a good, according to this conception. Gandhi concludes that war, mutual escalating retaliation, is the form of violence at every level, and outer war is only the fullest manifestation of this fact,¹ encompassing the physical as well as the mental and verbal spheres of activity. Thus Gandhi felt justified in claiming

³N.V.:II, p. 372: "It was no answer to say that similar or worse things had happened in Pakistan...granting a larger scale...it would be improper to institute comparison in evil doing. Even if the whole world did wrong, should we do likewise?" (Birla House, New Delhi, 29/1/48; H, 8/2/48). Note this is Arjuna's argument in the Gītā for not entering the battle for justice (I:38-39), where "knowing better" becomes the argument for pacifism, where one's knowledge of a moral rule is translated to grounds for desisting from action. (see below, p. 140).

⁴N.V.:II, p. 308: "They could not secure justice by copying the evil ways of one another. If two men go out riding and one falls down, was the other to follow suit? That would merely result in breaking the bones of both. (Birla House, New Delhi, 1/10/47; H, 12/10/47).

¹Ibid., p. 308; "India knows, the world should, that every ounce of my energy has been and is being devoted to the definite avoidance of fratricide culminating in war." (Birla House, New Delhi, 29/9/47; H, 12/10/47). Note again the similarity with the situation depicted in the Gītā. Gandhi stresses the "logical" connection between practical options and outcomes. This is in consonance with his moral prescriptions based on the "ought" interpretation of the micro-macrocosmic relation. The following elaborate this basic point which is central for the present argument. p. 306; "Gandhiji said in his post-prayer speech that he had been an opponent of all warfare. But if there was no other way of securing justice from Pakistan, if Pakistan persistently refused to see its proved error and continued to minimize it, the Indian Government had to go to war against it. War was not a joke. No one wanted war. That way lay destruction. But he could never advise anyone to put up with injustice. If all the Hindus were annihilated in a just cause he would not mind it." (Birla House, N.D., 26/9/47; H, 5/10/47). But further, pp. 306-07; "He was wedded to non-violence

universal scope for his principle and, assuming the unchallengeable superiority of spiritual over mundane force, the perfect efficacy of methods devised to enlist soul-force for the achievement of this moral restraint, that would have the practical result of ending war (in every form, at every level, which is to say, all practical problems with self, and social relations, for which Gandhi takes war to be the prototype).

To accomplish this universalizing, Gandhi has to make the contents of the formula (viz., "two wrongs..."), and the circumstances of its empirical application, homogeneous at

for all time and could never advocate war...he was merely pointing out the various possibilities. India and Pakistan should settle their differences by mutual consultation and failing that fall back upon arbitration. But if one party persisted in wrong doing and would accept neither of the two ways mentioned above, the only way left open was that of war. They should know the circumstances that prompted his remark;" (Birla House, N.D., 27/9/47; H, 5/10/47); and, "...not a single mention of war in my speeches can be interpreted to mean that there was any incitement to or approval of war between Pakistan and the Union... I claim that I rendered a service to both the sister States by examining the present situation and definitely stating when the case of war could arise between the two states. This was done not to promote war but to avoid it as far as possible...was it wrong to draw public attention to the logical steps that inevitably followed one after another?...India knows, the world should, that every ounce of my energy has been devoted to the definite avoidance of fratricide culminating in war." (Birla House, N.D., 29/9/47; H, 12/10/47), pp. 307-08. It should be noted how carefully Gandhi maintains the balance of his statements to keep the distinction between "understanding" the conditions of war, its causes and circumstances, and advocating, justifying, or even allowing war. Yet, de facto, he does allow, and even advocate it with his very posture. It is also arguable that it was in his power to call for a general mutiny, or at least to intervene directly with the authorities. For purposes of the present argument it is enough to note that he considers the chains of events "logical" and "inevitable" given the present moral abdication of practical non-violence, and that he does not himself feel the non-violent power to break that "logic of events"; and, finally, that he does not "mind" the war for justice. All of this is tacit abdication of his empirical claim, and it is not nullified by qualifying disclaimers. His defacto inconsistency is patent here.

a level more fundamental than the facts and experience that the counter-intuitions of common sense and the prima facie case draw upon when they define a necessity that overrides the general commitment, and that seems to cancel the moral maxim.

This is the locus of that cluster of confusions that leads Gandhi to a prima facie untenable position, and which do not on clarification support retaining that position against the prima facie intuitions.

This section examines Gandhi's radical empirical claim and arguments against the limitation of the general commitment to non-violence and the justifiability of violence, as these are rooted in his confused and falsifying analysis of the moral and practical homogeneity of the spiritual and empirical spheres. Since in Gandhi's view war is the basic form and fullest culmination of violence, therefore, the appropriate context of this critical investigation is, (1) his analysis of its genesis as he derives it from the Gītā, and his judgments on the actual instances of it that he dealt with in terms of his concept of non-violence, during the sixty year span of his career as an active war-resister; and, (2) the basis of his satyāgraha, as this was intended to completely substitute for war (representing all violent methods in any conflict), in realization of his empirical claim to thus annul all counter-claims as to the limited viability of non-violence; and to thus universalize the general commitment to it.

This final examination aims at understanding in concrete contexts and in some detail, how Gandhi's ideological and homogenizing interpretation of the key maxim is bound in confusions and contradictions and how it fails to do justice to the real situation and moral questions.

B. Gandhi's Analysis of War in the Gītā, and Judgments of its Justifiability

1. Misuse of Logical Principles of the Identity of Micro and Macrocosmic Reality: the Generation of Confusion in Basic Distinctions

According to Gandhi's principle of micro-macrocosmic identity, "yathā pinde...", examining his views on war is equivalent to examining his views on violence in general. War is only the outermost and externalized form of violence (whose roots are always empirically internal, i.e. affections and dispositions of the subjective empirical make-up). But the shape and quality are the same. The same laws are found operative and the same moral rules and methods apply. It involves in outer form, the same entanglement in binding retaliations and escalation of violent reprisals that the Gītā elaborates to be found within as the escalation of the violence of desire and anger.

But the Gītā and the Mahābhārata are not only the source of Gandhi's analysis of war and violence and the justifiability problem, but they are the locus classicus of these issues. On the one hand, Gandhi finds there the depiction of the moral battle within, but on the other, what he finds there he elaborates in his judgments on physical war, and in his analysis of

the pacifist position and of the methods of war resistance.

Though it may not be incorrect for Gandhi to point out an analogy and parallel here, or even an identity from the standpoint of his principle, he is not warranted in reversing the direction of his application of this logical principle and using it to assert, from the standpoint of perception, that the "ideal" and the "real" are identical. That the Truth is the truth, and what is true within is reflected without, is a valid proposition.

a) Real and Ideal: Appearance and Reality: The question Gandhi wants to use this principle to solve is the identification of violence with intention and motive, and the proper characterization of violence and non-violence for moral application to practical purposes. It is a confusion to base a theory of practical moral truth on this application of a logical principle, unmodified for applying it from the practical standpoint as Gandhi does (shown in Chapter II) in formulating his satyāgraha and his empirical claim. He uses it not as an instrument of inquiry for guiding investigation and focusing and clarifying perception, but to determine moral definitions and practical principles of action. From an a priori moral standpoint, on the basis of his assimilation of the real to the ideal, Gandhi justifies his assimilation of the spiritual, practical, and moral. He seems to be incognizant of the categorical differences that enter when the assimilation is reversed and the significant difference becomes that of appearance and reality. He is aware of this as a fundamental problem in explanation and judgment when trying to convey

the difficult truth that the same act can be prompted and guided by entirely different motives which determine opposing qualities and sets of results.¹ This is an important recognition in terms of the present argument.

Supporting the inference from appearance to reality is a large problem on any theory but Gandhi does not address it on the theoretical level. He merely assumes the unmodified reversal of the micro-macrocosmic identity principle, and ignores the categorical truths by insisting on the primacy of absolute and ideal truth as if regard for the latter cancelled validity of the former. It ignores the non-commutivity conferred on the principle by the practical context of its application. For the core and most extensive part of his analysis, this assimilation functions validly since it is within the same category of empirical reality, and functions as Gandhi wishes, to raise one's sights towards guiding ideals. But it causes confusion and leads to contradictions in the limiting cases where he shifts categorical perspective without regard for categorical realities and the requirement of a cross categorical perspective where action and practice are the issue.

¹N.V.:I, p. 135; "The question raised...is of very great importance and has always caused me the greatest difficulty, not so much in deciding upon the action to be taken at a given moment but in justifying my conduct in terms of *ahimsa*. For the same action may outwardly be taken by the believer and the unbeliever. At these times the motive alone decides its quality." (H, 17/10/36); and, p. 106; "In spite of the greatest effort to be detached, no man can altogether undo the effect of his environment or of his upbringing. Non-violence of two persons occupying different positions will not outwardly take the same shape. Thus the non-violence of a child towards his father would take the shape of conscious voluntary submission to his violence when he loses his temper. But if the child has

b) Confused Valuation of Life: Peace at Any Price:

Because of this assimilation and confusion of categories, viz., the real and the ideal, the apparent and the real, Gandhi places too high a value on life, giving it an absolute value when it is only a relative category. In spite of recognizing the spiritual principle as fundamental existence he values transient life as if it were permanent existence, and makes its prosecution and quiescent state, i.e., non-violence and pacifism, his absolute values and aims.

In answer to the argument that he strained the Gītā into an allegory just to support this idealizing, Gandhi writes that though,

I have admitted in my introduction to the Gītā, known as Anāsakti Yoga, that it is not a treatise on non-violence nor was it written to condone war...What I have done is to put a new but natural and logical interpretation of the whole teaching of the Gītā and the spirit of Hinduism...to give an extended but in no way strained meaning...I hold that the logical outcome of the teaching of the Gītā is decidedly for peace at the price of life itself. It is the highest aspiration of the human species.¹

From this valuation Gandhi derives the imperatives for total non-violence and for proving the unjustifiability of war by any moral value, supposed necessity, or putative practical result.

The role of these categorical confusions and confused valuations in his analysis and judgments on war and violence will be examined in two sections: "Views on the Justifiability of War and Violence: a Vitiating Analysis", and "Life, the Chief Value: False View, and Wrong Aims and Method," both

lost his temper, the father's submission to the child's violence would be meaningless. The father would take the child to his bosom and instantaneously sterilize the child's violence. In each case it is of course assumed that the outward act is an expression of the inward intention." (H, 30/1/30)

¹Ibid., pp. 132-33, (H, 3/10/36).

2. Views on the Justifiability of War and Violence: Analysis Vitiated by Ideological Homogeneity from Wrong Use of Identity

This section looks at the above difficulties in Gandhi's theory in detail, as they appear in the concrete context of his analysis of war, and of war as investigated in the Gītā.

a) Justifiability: War is in No Way Justifiable:

Gandhi repeatedly states that he finds war to be an "unmitigated evil"¹ to which he is categorically opposed, and finds unjustifiable under any circumstances or for any cause, even for the defeat of insuperable evil--directly contrary to the prima facie criteria introduced above. To illustrate:

The tyrants of old never went so mad as Hitler seems to have gone. And he is doing with religious zeal. For he is propounding a new religion of exclusive and militant nationalism in the name of which any inhumanity becomes an act of humanity to be rewarded here and hereafter. The crime of an obviously mad but intrepid youth is being visited upon his whole race with unbelievable ferocity. If there ever could be a justifiable war in the name of and for humanity, a war against Germany, to prevent the wanton persecution of a whole race, would be completely justified. But I do not believe in any war. A discussion of the pros and cons of² such a war is, therefore, outside my horizon or province.

Gandhi's belief in the identity of the spiritual, moral, and practical, leads him to write even more specifically that,

I do not believe in short--violent--cuts to success... However much I may sympathize with and admire worthy motives, I am an uncompromising opponent of violent methods even to serve the noblest of causes. There is, therefore, really no meeting ground between the school of violence and myself.³

¹Ibid., p. 287, (Sevagram, 4/6/40; H, 8/6/40); also see, N.V.:I, p. 80; "I know that war is wrong, is an unmitigated evil. I know that it has got to go." (YI, 13/9/28).

²Ibid., p. 171, (H, 26/11/38).

³Ibid., p. 30, (YI, 11/12/24).

In his ultimate argument against the justifiability of war, Gandhi thus opposes to the putative moral worth of war as having only a temporary-value derivative specifically from and for this situation, his absolute moral value of non-violence, which he holds is universally valid and not temporally or empirically conditioned by practical or circumstantial provisos. On the basis of his interpretation of "yathā pinde...", Gandhi understands this value to be identical with true practical expedience and efficiency. Thus he believes that any supposed moral value or apparently justifying "good result" generated by a particular war, circumstance, or use of violence, will necessarily be cancelled in the long run. This is to say that non-violence, as an ultimate value, has the practical consequence that it alone produces a permanent break in the circle of violence, and that every violent attempt to do so, though "justified" on every other ground, must fail de facto to realize permanently that practical translation of ultimate value which is really the basis of any serious justifying arguments; according to Gandhi's assimilation of categories and valuations, "permanent breaking of the circle of violence" is the practical and physical counterpart of ultimate moral value. Peace and non-violence are the same thing on this reading.

Gandhi asserts that the practical result of ignoring the final claim and ultimacy of the value of non-violence (and non-war) is change only in the form of the violence, and extension and deepening of the original violent motivation "for ultimately, force, however, justifiably used, will lead

us into the same morass as the force of Hitler and Mussolini. There will be just a difference of degrees"¹ According to Gandhi, the root fact of violence is that no matter what justification and arguments are made from the standpoint of abstract valuation divorced from the equation of the moral, practical, and spiritual, what we call violence can only in fact instigate its opposition and mirror reaction in the opponent, and deepen the violent and brutal proclivities in agent and victim both.

For Gandhi, appeal to principle is identical with appeal to expedience--intrinsic evil cannot help but lead ultimately to bad results. He writes,

I appeal for cessation of hostilities, not because you are too exhausted to fight, but because war is bad in essence. You want to kill Nazism. You will never kill it by its indifferent adoption. Your soldiers are doing the same work of destruction as the Germans. The only difference is that perhaps yours is not as thorough as the Germans. If that be so, yours will soon acquire the same thoroughness as theirs, if not much greater. On no other condition can you win the war. In other words, you will have to be more ruthless than the Nazis. No cause, however just, can warrant the indiscriminate slaughter that is going on minute by minute. I suggest that a cause that demands the inhumanities that are being perpetrated today cannot be just.²

In terms of the new debate on the justifiability of violence generated by the advent of the atom bomb, nuclear threat, bluff, and deterrent strategy, etc., Gandhi reaches the same conclusions and points to the logic of the debate as also the final proof and unavoidable vindication of his argu-

¹Ibid., p. 176, (H, 10/12/38).

²Ibid., p. 297, from an open letter "to Every Briton", (New Delhi, 2/7/40; H, 6/7/40).

ments in the practical sphere. He wrote in 1946,

So far as I can see, the atomic bomb has deadened the finest feeling that has sustained mankind for ages. There used to be the so called laws of war which made it tolerable. Now we know the naked truth. War knows no law except that of might. The atom bomb brought an empty victory to the allied arms but it resulted for the time being in destroying the Soul of Japan. What has happened to the soul of the destroying nation is yet too early to see. Forces of nature act in a mysterious manner. We can solve the mystery by deducing the unknown result from the known results of similar events. A slave-owner cannot hold a slave without putting himself or his deputy in the cage holding the slave...

The moral to be legitimately drawn from the supreme tragedy of the bomb is that it will not be destroyed by counter-violence. Mankind has to get out of violence only through non-violence. Hatred can be overcome only by love. Counter-hatred only increases the surface as well as the depth of hatred.¹

And to the question:

"What was the antidote? Had it (the atomic bomb) antiquated non-violence? 'No,' was Gandhiji's reply. On the contrary, non-violence was the only thing that was left in the field. 'It is the only thing that the atom bomb cannot destroy. I did not move a muscle when I first heard that the atom bomb had wiped out Hiroshima. On the contrary, I said to myself, 'Unless now the world adopts non-violence, it will spell certain suicide for mankind!'"²

For Gandhi, the practical ultimacy of incipient atomic violence serves to throw into relief the ideal status and character, and the superior practical potency, of non-violent force, a spiritual force, and the ultimacy of non-violence values, a spiritually based ethics, axiology, and pragmatics. Thus, in Gandhi's view, the atom bomb had not only not "exploded" his "faith" in non-violence, but had

...clearly demonstrated...that the twins (Truth and Non-violence) constitute the mightiest force in the world. Before it the atom bomb is of no effect. The two opposing forces are wholly different in kind, the one moral and

¹N.V.:II, pp. 92-3, (Poona, 1/7/46; H, 7/7/46); (see also, New Yorker, Feb. issues, p. 47, col. 1, part 1)

²Ibid., p. 94, (New Delhi, 24/9/46; H, 29/9/46).

he has given of violence in general, he takes to be vindicated and demonstrated, by the logic of the atomic debate, in one sweeping practical display of the final poverty and impotence of violence and the corresponding potency, viability, and necessity of non-violence..

But Gandhi caused difficulty for other absolute pacifists by his not only allowing war¹, but supporting the call to training in arms and war, and himself participating in the Boer War, the Zulu Rebellion, and recruiting for the British in World War I.²

As shown in Chapter I, the fundamental value of Gandhi's idealism is Truth, and its first form is authenticity. Gandhi writes that though he participated as stretcher bearer and recruiter in three acts of war,

My repugnance to war was as strong then as it is today; and I could not then have, and would not have, shouldered a rifle. But one's life is not a single straight line; it is a bundle of duties very often conflicting. And one is called upon continually to make one's choice between one duty and another. As a citizen not then, and not even now, but a reformer leading an agitation against the institution of war, I had to advise and lead men who believed in war but who from cowardice or from base motives or from anger against the British Government, refraining from enlisting. I did not hesitate to advise them that, so long as they believed in war, and professed loyalty to the British constitution, they were in duty bound to support it by enlistment. Though I did not believe in the use of arms, and though it is contrary to the religion of Ahimsā which I profess, I should not hesitate to join an agitation for

¹In World War II, when he could have called for mutiny of the misused but important Indian troops in Europe and Burma, he did not. Also see fn. #5, p. 294-5, above.

²N.V.:I, p. 78;"...in the circumstances in which I found myself, I was bound to adopt the course I did both during the Boer War and the Great European War and for that matter the so-called Zulu 'Rebellion' of Natal in 1906." (YI, 13/9/28)

spiritual, the other physical and material. The one is infinitely superior to the other which by its very nature has an end. The power of the spirit is ever progressive and endless. Its full expression makes it unconquerable in the world.¹

According to Gandhi, there is thus possible not even the pretense of justification of violence and war, given the contemporary world situation of nuclear armament, immediate global impact and amplification of minor and local violence or conflict, and its rapid magnification and escalation in global and potentially nuclear terms. Further, according to Gandhi, the possibility of justifying violence and war by success, when used against large nations or super powers by oppressed and weak nations, is logically ruled out.

You cannot successfully fight them with their own weapons. After all you cannot go beyond the atom bomb. Unless we can have a new way of fighting imperialism of all brands in the place of the outward one of a violent rising, there is no hope for the oppressed races of the earth.²

Thus for Gandhi there is no possible justification for "war on war", or force, or violence, judged on any possible criteria of results, spiritual, moral, or practical. The thing itself is prima facie evil, and there is absolutely no ancillary consideration of results possible, therefore, no justification is possible (at least given the contemporary situation). Therefore, non-violence alone has the potency to solve the problems usually addressed by violence, aside from its general and normal use; and so non-violence ought always to be used! The suicide implicit in violence, is unavoidably visible in its nuclear expression, and the analysis

¹Ibid., p. 90, (H, 10/2/46).

²Ibid., p. 10, (Sevagram, 9/2/46; H, 17/12/46).

a repeal of the debasing Arms Act which I have considered amongst the blackest crimes of the British Government against India...And I have not hesitated only recently to tell Hindus that if they do not believe in out and out Ahimsā and cannot practice it, they will be guilty of a crime against their religion and humanity, if they fail to defend by force of arms the honor of their women. And all this advice and my previous practice I hold to be not only consistent with my profession of the religion of Ahimsā out and out, but a direct result of it.¹

Gandhi admits that his arguments in explanation of "choice of duties", or "necessary compromise" in the interests of the principle of non-violence, that he wanted thereby ultimately to someday govern all conduct, may be self-deceit.

Whatever I have done was not done from expedience as we understand the term. I claim to have done every act describe by me for the purpose of advancing the cause of peace. That does not mean that these acts really advanced the cause of peace. I am merely stating the fact that my motive was peace.

What is possible, however, is that I was then weak and am still too weak to perceive my error even as a blind man is unable to see that his neighbours are able to see. I observe daily how capable we are of utmost self-deception. For the time being, however, I am not aware of my self-deception.²

Or his reasonings may be badly expressed. He reiterates and insists that no result in action or argument can compromise the essential unjustifiability of war and violence. He wrote that, "there is no defense of my conduct weighed only in the scales of Ahimsā."³

¹Ibid., pp. 53-54, (YI, 5/11/25); see also, N.V.:I, p. 78; "Life is governed by a multitude of forces. It would be smooth sailing if one could determine the course of one's actions only by one general principle whose application at a given moment was too obvious to need even a moment's reflection. But I cannot recall a single act which could be so easily determined...Now violence works in a most mysterious manner. Often a man's actions defy analysis in terms of non-violence; equally often his actions may wear the appearance of violence when he is absolutely non-violent in the highest sense of the term and is subsequently found so to be. All I can

...for me the matter does not admit of reasoning beyond a point. It is one of deep conviction that war is an unmixed evil. I would not yield to anyone in my detestation of war. But conviction is one thing, correct practice is another. The very thing that one war resister may do in the interest of his mission may repel another war resister who may do the exact opposite, and yet both may hold the same view about war. This contradiction arises because of the bewildering complexity of human nature, I can only, therefore, plead for mutual toleration even among professors of the same creed.¹

My anxiety to avoid discussion of the question does not proceed from my lack of conviction, but it proceeds from the fear that I may not be able to make my meaning clear. and may thus create an impression about my attitude towards war that I do not desire. Often do I find language to be a poor vehicle for expressing some of my fundamental sentiments. I would therefore urge...fellow war resisters not to mind my faulty or incomplete argument and still less to mind my participation in war which they may be unable to reconcile with my professions about war. Let them understand me to be uncompromisingly against all war. If they cannot appreciate my arguments, let them impute my participation to unconscious weakness. For I would feel extremely sorry to discover that my action was used by anyone to justify war under any circumstance.²

Gandhi's chief argument for his participation in war was that,

...though as an individual I was opposed to war, I had no status for offering effective non-violent resistance. Non-violent resistance can only follow some real disinterested service, some heartfelt expression of Love...Being imperfect myself and needing toleration and charity, I tolerate the world's imperfections till I find or create an opportunity for fruitful expostulation. I felt that if by sufficient service I could attain the power and the confidence to resist the Empire's wars and its warlike preparations, it would be a good thing for me, who was seeking to enforce non-violence in my own life, to test the extent to which it was possible among the masses.³

claim for my conduct is that it was, in the instances cited, actuated in the interests of non-violence." (YI, 13/9/28).

²N.V.:I, p. 86-87, (YI, 7/2/29).

³Ibid., p. 78, (YI, 13/9/28).

¹Ibid., p. 86, (YI, 7/2/29).

²Ibid., p. 92, (YI, 9/5/29); see also, Ibid., p. 80, (YI, 13/9/28).

Unless he could totally non-cooperate with the government and "renounced to the utmost of...capacity the privileges it offered..."¹ he could not avoid direct participation and service that might shorten the war, and give him status for propagating non-violence. He believed that life in evil warring society was as deeply supporting that evil as direct participation in war, and since he could not without suicide non-co-operate with a society and government that he believed to be basically good for the world, therefore he must openly and directly² support it in its life and death struggle³. He places his war-participation in the same category as his helpless killing of any life by possession of and action in the human body. He explicitly equates war with all fundamental violence.

My opposition to and disbelief in war was as strong then as it is today. But we have to recognize that there are many things in the world which we do although we may be against them. I am as much opposed to taking of life of the lowest creature alive as I am to war. But I continually take such life, hoping some day to attain the ability to do without this fratricide.⁴

³Ibid., pp. 76-77, (YI, 15/3/28).

¹Ibid., p. 78, (YI, 13/9/28).

²Ibid., p. 74; "I do not believe that war can be avoided by taking part in it even as I do not believe that evil can be avoided by participating in it. This, however, needs to be distinguished from sincerely helpless participation in many things we hold to be evil or undesirable." (YI, 8/3/28).

³Ibid., p. 77, (YI, 15/3/28).

⁴Ibid., p. 77, (YI, 15/3/18); see also, p. 79, (YI, 13/9/28)..

Gandhi's aid to those sincerely believing in violent means was only so that they would be receptive to his true Ahimsā when they had become "bold and strong" through their own method, but had disavowed them when they found that their methods finally failed them.¹ From every possible angle Gandhi denies the equation of justifiability with any form of necessity, or factual circumstances, or of principle for whatever reason.

Denying justifiability of war he denies practical, moral, and spiritual efficacy to war and all violence. Even the complicity in war that is intended to further the ideal and force of non-violence cannot justify the violence. It cannot undo the evil or avert its necessary consequences. Injury once done is unmitigable according to Gandhi's valuation. The two components of Gandhi's view, argument and activity, have their logic and consequences in parallel and not in combination; therefore "two wrongs cannot make a right".

b) Gandhi's Interpretation of the Gītā as a Pacifist Document: Outer Form of the Moral Attack on Inner Causes: Thus against all orthodoxy, Gandhi argues that "the author of the Gītā never advocated violence. It is a sermon on non-violence."² In spite of Śrī Kṛṣṇa's direct command to Arjuna to fight (Gītā II:3, II:37, XVIII:59) to protect justice and fulfil his ksatriya (protector's) duty, in service of society,

¹Ibid., p. 87, (YI, 7/2/29; and, Ibid., p. 93, (YI, 9/5/29)

²Hingorani, Gītā..., p. 30, (YI, Dec. 1, 1921.

Gandhi writes that "I do not believe that the Gītā teaches violence for doing good,"¹ and, that "I have the courage of saying that Krishna never taught violence in the Gītā."²

Gandhi argues that the Gītā would be meaningless as a sectarian treatise describing a minor historical event and not worthy of being spoken by Lord Krishna.³ He argues that Kṛṣṇa's advice to Arjuna has to do with Arjuna's particular situation and dilemma of facing a war of fratricide, though clearly in protection of justice. Gandhi praises Kṛṣṇa as a teacher for giving Arjuna exactly what he needed in the historical situation, inciting him to duty in an age where the question of participation in war was raised only in terms of cast duty or cowardice.

Arjuna was not averse to killing in general, but only to killing his own relatives. Therefore, Krishna suggested that doing one's duty, one may not treat one's relations differently from other people. In the age of the Gītā, the question, whether one should or should not wage war, was not raised by any important person.⁴

Gandhi writes that war was no more looked upon as an abridgement of Ahimsā than cereal eating is today. War posed the problem of conflicts of duty in a forceful and poignant way but there is nothing intrinsic to the problem as action in the context of war. The duty of a warrior is a particularly vivid case and lends itself to poetic narration, as also it represents the universal struggle of common everyday experience that Gandhi takes as the archetype of conscious

¹Ibid., p. 29, (YI, 2/23/21); ²Ibid., p. 29, (YI, 5/25/21).

³Ibid., p. 33, (YI, 5/21/25); p. 34, (YI, 12/15/27); p. 30, (YI, 12/1/21).

⁴Ibid., p. 36, (DD, p. 93).

moral experience.

Gandhi avers that as an argument justifying participation in a small local war, one historical event, it would be meaningless. Gandhi reveres Kṛṣṇa rather for presenting the universal and eternal doctrine of ahimsā under such severe constraints. To Gandhi the eternal battle is the inner one against passions and the ego-sense. It is the moral battle inviting universal study. According to Gandhi the Gītā teaches the battle's science and practice as the Yoga of equability; i.e., renunciation of fruits of action, and non-attached duty for controlling the senses and the mind, thus destroying the passions and rooting out the very sources of violence and war.¹ He asserts that the purpose of the Mahābhārata is to depict the struggle of man in his eternal ascent, and to declare the way of right action. According to this interpretation of the Gītā the outer form merely depicts Arjuna's dilemma of duty in order to instruct those caught in the consequences of past actions and commitments. This raises no question of non-violence.

Gandhi considers Arjuna's arguments for pacifism to be valid if it is understood to support the universal moral doctrine of absolute non-violence and pacifism.

Only Gandhi believes that Arjuna has no status to raise these deeper questions because, as Śrī Kṛṣṇa rightly explains, Arjuna's aversion is not sincere and creedal arising

¹Ibid., p. 29, (YI, 2/23/21).

²Ibid., p. 53, (H, 9/5/36).

from urgent commitment to an eternal ideal, but only as expression of attachment and resultant fear of killing close relatives, friends, teachers, and elders. It is social reality in general that constitutes one's moral reality. Kinship cannot determine activity in terms of social norms; social duty must carry an overriding obligation if the large social unit is to survive. Arjuna is no believer in non-violence and pacifism as a universal ideal and law; he must at least be impartial in wielding violence and his battle skills, not for exclusive benefit of personal relations. The advice of Śrī Kṛṣṇa "to fight" speaks only to this moral minimum demanded of Arjuna in his particular circumstances, and this cannot be generalized, concludes Gandhi. He writes,

It was not in a spirit of Ahimsā that Arjuna refused to go to battle. He had fought many a battle before...He fought shy of killing his own kith and kin. Arjuna never discussed the problem of killing as such...Śrī Krishna...told him "Thou hast already done the killing. Thou canst not all at once argue thyself into non-violence. Finish what thou has already begun." If a passenger going in a Scotch Express gets suddenly sick of traveling and jumps out of it, he is guilty of suicide. He has not learnt the futility of traveling or traveling by a railway train. Similar is the case with Arjuna. But to say that the Gītā teaches violence or justifies war, because advice to kill was given on a particular occasion, is as wrong as to say that Himsā is the Law of Life, because a certain amount of it is inevitable in daily life.¹

Gandhi writes further, that,

Not that the actual physical battle is out of the question. To those who are innocent of non-violence, the Gītā does not teach a lesson of despair. He who fears, who saves his skin, who yields to his passions, must fight the physical battle whether he will or not; but that is not his Dharma [law, path of conduct in very wide sense]. Dharma is one and one only. Ahimsā means Mokṣa, and Mokṣa is the realization of Truth. There is no room for cowardice.

¹Ibid., pp. 64-64, (YI, 11/12/25).

and despair is not the way. Better for than cowardice is killing and being killed.¹

According to this reading, Arjuna's arguments are only counsels of fear and they bear no relation to moral argument.

They could not possibly support a universal teaching.²

Gandhi says explicitly that the analogy of Arjuna's position and that of a pacifist like Canon Sheppard which is very similar, is nevertheless significantly different because Arjuna's pacifism rises out of weakness and fear in response to distinctions of kin and enemy, while Sheppard's arises out of strength of conviction and recognizes no distinctions among human beings. Gandhi notes that Sheppard naturally preaches to his neighbours the doctrine of peace or love and goodwill towards men without exception.³

c) Confusion of Basic Categories: The Logic of Gandhi's Over Valuation of Life: 1) Arjuna's Pacifist Arguments Universalized - Gandhi accepts Arjuna's arguments on their own merit and uses them repeatedly to elaborate his own position (see fn. #3, p. 294, above), only he universalizes them by means of his ideology.

- (1) Arjuna sees no good in killing kin (I:31), and would not slay them even for heaven (I:35) much less the earthly kingdoms,⁴
- (2) How could he be happy killing kin (I:37); they are kin and with memory of such killing to get victory how could the fruits of that victory be enjoyed (II:5),

¹Ibid., pp. 55-56.

²This is, however, a doubtful argument. It makes too much of the large logical and physical forms of the problems, especially considering that the basis of Gandhi's Ahimsa in a Divine Will and Care to which no least movement of least life is out of ultimate value; and to how much of moral life does this teaching apply as a necessary stage, even if it

- (3) The very fruits of victory were wanted only for those who have renounced those fruits to fight for me, or whom I will kill to gain those fruits (I:32-35).¹
- (4) Sin and pain here and demerit in afterlife are the only results of killing kin.²
- (5) Even their guilt cannot justify one who knows better what are the results in doing likewise³ to them, for that can give no good results (since (4) is assumed true) (I:39-39), but only necessarily leads to destruction of the family, its virtues and traditions, the caste order, the ancestors passed away supported by family ritual, and Hell is the result for all--an end to the entire social and moral order so deeply and fully developed in Indic corporate consciousness, tradition, sentiment, and ideals (I:38-45)
- (6) And from these arguments, Arjuna draws the conclusion, based on fear and attachment, that Gandhi finds to be a universal moral injunction--better to die unresisting and unarmed with the happiness at least of not adding to evil and sin (I:46-47), better to forsake victory, fame, and every reward (II:5).

2) Confusion of the Moral with the Spiritual - Arjuna's final state is disabling grief and paralysis, unable to decide or act decisively (II:6-8). The essential result will be mass

applies for some to the "pure" form of moral being in the ultimate or penultimate stage of realizing a state clearly unimaginable to most at the present stage of human moral and spiritual evolution.

³N.V.:I, pp. 129-30, (H, 26/9/36).

⁴See Ibid., 359, (Sevagram, 2/9/40; H, 8/9/40)

¹Referring to France's surrender to Hitler, Gandhi wrote, "I think French statesmen have shown rare courage in bowing to the inevitable and refusing to be party to senseless mutual slaughter. There can be no sense in France coming out victorious if the stake is in truth lost. The cause of liberty becomes a mockery if the price to be paid is wholesale destruction of those who are to enjoy liberty." Ibid., p. 289, (Sevagram, 18/6/40; H, 23/6/40).

²Equating evil and violence, as Gandhi does.

³Gandhi's "two wrongs don't make a right."

fratricide or social suicide; kin-killing strikes at the very root of order and justice from the natural point of view, of which "family", blood and body relations, is the foundation. All of these arguments are based on calculations of desire and fear of result. With no higher standard there can be no decisive outcome. The dilemmas arise because worldly values cancel each other out in "moral calculations" based on them. Śrī Kṛṣṇa will go on in the rest of the Gītā to establish a necessary objective framework of values and of facts proving the validity of those valuations, so that action can have an objective basis outside of material or empirical social relations and motives. Social relations, motives, and institutions, have no permanent basis, and in the final analysis reduce to mere advocacy of changing, perceptions, decisions, aims, affectations, affiliations, and sentiments. Duty without attachment, anāsakti of Gandhi, is the practical form of that teaching.

Gandhi, however, by the confused use of the "yathā pinde..." principle reads from Śrī Kṛṣṇa's argument the doctrine of non-killing:

World is "brother"; killing brother is essential sin;
Killing any is killing "kin",
 Any killing is necessarily "sin"!

Delusion as to the Truth of Real Nature of Self-identity, viz., soul and spirit, ātman and Brahman, and their empirical reflection in the oneness of all life, leads to the false view that "kin/non-kin" determines "right/wrong". The practical doctrine and ethics of both social and self-realization that both the

Gītā and Gandhi derive from these fundamental spiritual facts, is that Truth of conduct by right effort at duty, is effort to fulfil one's role and station in larger social life in accordance with one's present empirical and spiritual status and state, and stage in moral and spiritual evolution (svadharma, Gītā III:8 & 19, XVIII:47; see Chapter II above, pages 167-68). Right effort at duty is possible only with objective perception, which implies unconcern about results, since one has no control over them (II:47, XVIII:13-15), and objective perception and pure impersonal reason are possible only with equability resulting from this renunciation of inner fixation on doubtful consequences and personal fruits (II:48). Such right effort at self-duty, regarding and serving wider Truth (anāsakti and yajña) alone lead to realizing the freedom (moksa) inherent in soul or Self-nature. But Gandhi adds that "Truth of conduct" can only be non-violence and absolute pacifism, because Truth of Existence and Life entails the brotherhood of all life without exception (Īśā-upanishad, #1)

3) Confusion of the Ideal with the Empirical - Gandhi interprets the first mantra of the Īśā enunciating this foundational fact. Citing this mantra and using the principle of "yathā piṇde...", Gandhi extends "ideal reality", as known in realization, to empirical reality, as met in action and conduct. It is essential to note that Gandhi cites the domestic model as both his ideal and his principle of discovery and inquiry of satyāgraha. Interpreting it as an expression of his logical principle of micro-macro identity, he assumes that it

is self-evident and self-validating as a moral principle and standard of conduct. Gandhi feels that his own experience warrants asserting its scientific universality, validity, and truth. On the basis of the same logical principle Gandhi justifies extending the assumed identity of the domestic ideal and experience, as the truth of corporate life, to larger social reality, including national and international relations.

This is the basic confusion of Gandhi's position. Assuming the ideal standpoint, he denies the truth of categorical (empirical and practical) reality. The micro-macrocosmic identity principle properly functions to clarify identities and distinctions, to become correctly aware of the true realities which are being realized as identical at a more fundamental level of their existence, and which then appear identical as they are assimilated to a progressively deepening perception.

The identity principle cannot be used as Gandhi attempts, to generate an a priori rule of action, presupposing the content of a perception that is not possible from the standpoint of ignorance and bondage. From that standpoint, the basis of the rule will be imagination and not perception. The problem of application of the ideal to the empirical reality, which was the topic of the entire second chapter above, depends on the accuracy of analogies brought to substantiate and warrant all equations, assimilations, and definitions upon which the final applicational formulae, and their concrete form as practical methods and techniques, are based. Thus

in his stipulation that svadharma be also ahimsic, Gandhi is arguing from analogy as if in the possession of the knowledge viewpoint of the realized man, while in fact, and as he acknowledges, his knowledge in these spheres is informational, gathered from study and reflection. Argument from analogy, and the guidance of experienced judgment, presuppose the knowledge standpoint and direct perception of the guide. Gandhi disclaims this for himself, and while acknowledging belief in the traditional doctrine of guruvāda (learning from a teacher with direct knowledge, experienced and realized) he disclaims the guidance, correction, and validation, by such a realized and knowing person.¹ While the Īśā may accurately express a foundational spiritual fact, the logical principle does not support Gandhi's use of this fact to make the practical world "kin", in his ideal sense of the term, as if the categorical reality did not exist. It is by this invalid commutative use of "yathā piṇde...", confusing the standpoint of appearance and intent with that of substance and action, that Gandhi assimilates the real and ideal and justifies assuming either standpoint as his argument and aims require for support of his ideal, ideology, and methods of non-violence. On the one hand, he erases the distinction between spirit and body or institution in order to justify his claim, ideology, and satyā-graha, and on the other hand, he reinstates the distinction in order to deny the validity of mundane violent methods.

¹See Kher II, p. 299, (VI, 17/6/26, p. 215); also note that Gandhi treads a fine line and maintains a keen balance

Thus Gandhi's ideology makes reality, viz., ideal and empirical, substance and appearance, homogeneous. From a categorical standpoint and reality that does not support a factual presentation of the unity of reality, he assumes that his dichotomies are comprehensive and mutually complementary. Not proceeding from factual judgments of perception or from guidance this dichotomous presentation does not correctly inform action, but it superimposes an arbitrary praxis putatively warranted by the comprehensiveness and rational clarity of the imposing ideology. Gandhi assumes an ideal of family behavior, a model of identical behavior towards non-identical reality.

There is simply no warrant for assuming Gandhi's model of family behavior. His experience is more to the point, but experience cannot warrant assertion of an eternal principle and exceptionless practical rule. It would be agreed that his loving ways are preferable to forceful ways on the basis of our general commitment to non-violence, whatever the basis of that commitment itself. But there is nothing in the spiritual facts of impartible existence and creation by a single Lord and Father, to warrant his assertion of the moral ideal of non-violence as interpreted by his domestic model. It cannot be presumed that by analogy with Gandhi's model

between the claims of reason, faith, and guidance. But finally, in opposition to the requirements of his basic epistemology and logic, he gives an unwarranted de facto status and role to reason in its ordinary exercise as if it were already the pure reason that answers to and reveals true precepts in the ideal state. While correctly insisting on its purity and urging constant self-purification, disclaiming it for himself, he yet theorizes, judges, applies, evaluates, dogmatically with it,

of brotherly treatment the ideal treatment of a stranger must be non-violent, unless one has first agreed that non-violent treatment on Gandhi's model is the domestic ideal and one's blood brother and kin must necessarily be so treated. This is the question not the solution. The "ought" has been read into the ideal on the basis of which the facts have been interpreted and so the question as to what empirical form the facts (action and envisaged results) should take is foreclosed instead of seriously investigated. This is merely the nature of praxis as the instrument of ideological investigation of the realm of the ideal and revisionary reduction to practice. Gandhi is perhaps unique in so thoroughly constraining himself to prescription of means and attitude, only very reluctantly and with self-conscious un-reality of poetic expression venturing descriptions of ideal outcomes¹, fully admitting their tentative, remote, and wholly suggestive character. But his advocacy of principle and means is tantamount to utopianism translated to the sphere of practice and action, and for programs of concrete reform propagated as immediate steps to definite, if not ruling, ideal end-states.

¹For example, N.V.:II, 106-7; "Independence must begin at the bottom. Thus, every village will be a republic or panchayat having full powers. It follows, therefore, that every village has to be self-sustained and capable of managing its affairs even to the extent of defending itself against the whole world. It will be trained and prepared to perish in the attempt to defend itself against any onslaught from without. Thus, ultimately, it is the individual who is the unit. This does not exclude dependence on and willing help from neighbours or from the world. It will be free and voluntary play of mutual force...In this

Here again responding from the ideological posture Gandhi has taken as an axiom what is principally in question. The simplicity and the fidelity of his doctrine to our own general commitment and the ideological and practical force he invests it with, give that general commitment a new and irresistible appeal. Nevertheless, its basis is arbitrary.

It seems that Gandhi has merely taken our general commitment to non-violence and turned that into a pure ideal so that it simply depicts the logical and practical limits of what is morally given and already accepted a fortiori. Nothing in the *Īsā* says what it is to be a "brother", nor not to kill one's brother. A rival ideal may be to fearlessly and lovingly take one's brothers to task when that is needed. At the limit of the general commitment the use of violent force may be argued to be the fulfillment of the ideal, which tests even filial love by its strength to use force without succumbing to its passion side effects. Either ideal is arbitrary with respect to spiritual facts as adumbrated. However, Gandhi's is the

structure composed of innumerable villages, there will be everwidening, never ascending circles. Life will not be a pyramid with the apex sustained by the bottom. But it will be an oceanic circle whose centre will be the individual always ready to perish for the village, the latter ready to perish for the circle of villages, till at last the whole becomes one life composed of individuals, never aggressive in their arrogance but ever humble, sharing the majesty of the oceanic circle of which they are integral units...I may be taunted with the retort that this is all Utopian and, therefore, not worth a single thought. If Euclid's point, though incapable of being drawn by human agency, has an imperishable value, my picture has its own for mankind to live. Let India live for this true picture though never realizable in its completeness. We must have a proper picture of what we want...in which the last is equal to the first, or, in other words, no one is to be the first and none the last." (Panchgani, 21/7/46; H, 28,7,46); also, two articles on his ideal socialism, pp. 265-67, July 1947, in which he claims that true socialism cannot be attained without Truth and Non-violence as he has conceived and practiced them!

assertion of a single if utterly devoted belief and investigation, while the latter is the product of generations of moral inquiry at all levels and from a necessarily very much wider range of circumstances, . . . whatever the special characteristics of Gandhi's larger scale and more magnified experiments.

4) Confusion of the Moral with the Practical - Gandhi does believe that moral justification is also a matter of practical justification and says that a moral principle that did not produce tangible practical results is meaningless. However, the results must be moral in order to satisfy this requirement and so the argument is circular. If his definition of the moral as the non-violent (ahimsic) is not assumed, then failure to defeat what would otherwise be called evil or an agent of greater violence must defeat his claim. He cannot rely on characterizing the force of satvāgraha as spiritual or on adumbrating the spiritual nature of foundational fact, since these also do not imply a necessary rule of behavior unless an ideal of action is presupposed in the analysis of the factual situation; but then that ideal cannot be proven by the facts alleged to support it.

There is constantly the unavoidable question; if a moral ideal is meaningless unless it can also produce results when acted on, then that ideal is valid only to the extent it proves itself in practice. No a priori efficiency can be asserted on its behalf so long as its action depends at all on the empirical medium and mechanism in and through which it manifests as practical effects.

3. "Non-violence/Violence", Not an Absolute Distinction: Right-making Factors:

a) Need for Accurate Analysis of the Action Situation;
Motive, Intention, Results: It is because Gandhi's assertions are grounded in the general commitment, rendered limitless by the micro-macro identity principle, and by his intense experiments of action as if this commitment was an absolute, that makes the maxim "two wrongs don't make a right" seem the self-evident and natural unchallengeable expression of the ideal and of the necessary moral validity of his non-retaliation. But the second "wrong" is not necessarily wrong unless there is warrant for asserting the identity of static fact and moral dynamical reality besides Gandhi's commutative use of "yathā pinde..." for insisting that moral reality must be identical with moral appearance, warranted without prior interpretation of appearance as "violence identical with evil", or "outer reality nothing more than expression of interpreted substance."

However, the situation is more complex than is understood in terms of Gandhi's homogenizing dichotomies. In the analysis of this situation there are factors of motive and of total results besides the immediate quality of the action. Scientific inquiry seeks to analyze and not to legislate the role and relevance of motive and total results in determining the full moral dimensions and consequences of situations and action.

Since Gandhi admits morality must be manifest in terms of production of good results over evil it is necessary to understand this same required resultant in the uninterpreted

context of the complexity of action which involves agency and use as independent factors. Violence may be intrinsically evil as a quality of action as the general commitment accepts, but under the wider uninterpreted view, it is not previously known that this quality is the only and final determinant of the good/evil quotient in the objective (vs. ideological) analysis of outcomes, and that other emergent factors may not be discovered in fact, equally or supercedingly determinate of that final quotient, indicating the real resultant quality of the total transaction qua moral. This analysis of the moral resultant as an outcome of multiple factors and possible emergent qualities, allows the possibility of showing how use of violent action can produce less evil.¹

Gandhi, in fact, himself goes behind the immediately evident quality of action and results when he asserts that non-violence should not be equated with mere non-killing, and that though often violent and non-violent action may look alike, motives are decisive of the moral quality and final outcome in terms of material consequences at every level.

It has been noted (Chapter I) that Gandhi admits motive and intention as definitive of non-violence from both the ideal and the deepest factual standpoints, but that only Divine judgment can know the reality of the quality of intent, and its real aim. For man this is ultimately a practical judgment of the immediate quality of the outer action.

¹Analysis of violence as a quality equated with evil and thus the absolute determinant of moral validity and sole basis of moral justifiability, is the result of assuming an a priori dichotomization; it is not the result of looking at the situation for its component parts, contributory causes, moments, and possible emergent and discoverable qualities.

or of the accumulating results progressively revealing the full moral dimensions and subtler moral qualities of the transaction. Similarly, in elaborating the character of his own participation in war or the character of any act in terms of violence and non-violence, and in analyzing its justifiability, Gandhi finds motive decisive, as has been pointed out above (see fn. 1, p. 125).

b) Motive and Intent are Real Factors: 1) Generation of Contradictory Criteria - Gandhi does not change his views on justifiability when he recognizes the problematic and often confusing difference between apparent quality of the act and its "real" quality determined by motive (according to his explanation). But the question is, should he not? He would rather forfeit argument and stand by conviction, if argument seems to betray his purposes in justifying that conviction. But Gandhi's equation of the moral and the practical makes it necessary that the motive or qualities, the criteria, have tangible counterparts in the form of practical empirical results. If life in the body is constant battle, and if practical life merely mirrors this, every act and state must be a compromise between non-violence and violence (according to Gandhi's strict interpretation of empirical reality as "violent" in nature), calling on the votary to act so as always to extend the scope of non-violence, and to push back the dividing line in justification of that particular act. He writes that,

Indeed life is made of such compromise. Ahimsā, simply because it is purest, unselfish love, often demands such

compromise. The conditions are imperative. There should be no self in one's actions, no fear, no untruth, and it must be in furtherance of the cause of Ahimsā. The compromise must be natural to oneself, not imposed from without.¹

Gandhi has made it unconditionally clear that there is no justification of violence ever, even if his argument seems to allow it, or his actions betray it. His arguments are to be discounted as inept if they do not clearly prove the

¹N.V.:I, p. 136, (H, 17/10/36); also, Kripalani, IV:34, p. 85; "Ahimsā is a comprehensive principle. We are helpless mortals caught in the conflagration of himsā. The saying that life lives on life has a deep meaning in it. Man cannot for a moment live without consciously or unconsciously committing outward himsā. The very fact of his living--eating, drinking and moving about--necessarily involves some himsā, destruction of life, be it ever so minute. A votary of ahimsā therefore remains true to his faith if the spring of all his actions is compassion, if he shuns to the best of his ability the destruction of the tiniest creature, tries to save it, and thus incessantly strives to be free from the deadly coil of himsā. He will be constantly growing in self-restraint and compassion, but he can never become entirely free from outward himsā." (An Autobiography); and, IV:64, p. 91; "In life, it is impossible to eschew violence completely. Now the question arises, where is one to draw the line? The line cannot be the same for every one. For, although, essentially the principle is the same, yet everyone applies it in his or her own way. What is one man's food can be another's poison...Evil and good are relative terms. What is good under certain conditions can become an evil or a sin, under a different set of conditions....At every step he has to use his discrimination as to what is ahimsā and what is himsā." (M:VII, 1946); and, IV:63, p. 91; "Life is an aspiration. Its mission is to strive after perfection, which is self-realization. The ideal must not be lowered because of our weaknesses and imperfections...One who hooks his fortunes to ahimsā, the law of love, daily lessens the circle of destruction, and to that extent promotes life and love; he who swears by himsā, the law of hate, daily widens the circle of destruction, and to that extent promotes death and hate." (H, 6/22/35).

N.B. - Though Gandhi emphasises the role of reason in his concept and methods of non-violence, even identifying the two (reason as an active principle, impartially expressing Truth) and here repeatedly calling for discrimination and not mechanical following of a "rule of ahimsā", by his empirical claim and mission against the justifiability of violence and war on any condition actually stultifies moral growth and refinement of discriminating capacities by removing from the sphere of its exercise the most basic and demanding question of justifiability and not merely applicability in the given circumstance.

the position that it is his chosen mission to propagate and which he has removed from the area of question. Gandhi insists that there can be only one criterion, one principle for drawing the line of justifiability of apparently violent uses of physical force, viz., that it be an act of love, and so of ahimsā, in its most basic sense that the only active motive is the good of the recipient of the act. That line is absolute.

Once you admit the lawfulness of the use of physical force for purposes other than the benefit of the person against whom it is used as in the case of a surgeon against his patient, you cannot draw an arbitrary line of distinction.¹

2) Ahimsā and Love Not Identical in Context of Justification: Ideological Construct vs. Motive Force, Non-violence a Self-Obfuscating Ideal - But Gandhi's criterion for compromise is the furtherance of ahimsā, and in this context it does not seem that the "act of love" can be directly equated with "furtherance" of an ideological ideal and program, even if that furtherance represents that love itself. Ahimsā and love are not identical. The criterion of furtherance of ahimsā cannot justify physical force in the way an act of ahimsā (love, surgery) can. According to Gandhi's strict definition even the furtherance of allegiance to that definition as the ideal should not be admitted as a moral justification. But according to Gandhi's rigorous ideology, there must be a practical counterpart to the pure love motivated act, and that practical component cannot itself help but have a quality and result of violence qua empirical (by his strict definitions). The motive itself, and the intentional state constitute an

¹N.V.:I, p. 128, (H, 26/9/31).

empirical formation and dynamism which cannot be active, or modulate, or impel, without violence as Gandhi conceives it (himsā as empirically inevitable destructiveness inherent in activity). On this reading, there can be no pure non-violent motive because there can be no purely non-violent intentional state because the moral motive and intent must have their subjective empirical formation and movement, and this must have its practical or empirical counterpart that is necessary to satisfy the equation of the moral and the practical. Strictly there could be no justification for any activity in terms of moral (non-violent) ideals, and Gandhi requires the strictest reading of his ideology to insure its purity and to protect the ideal from which it derives its strength. However, as is evident from the preceeding, this rigor has the untenable consequence that the ideal is de facto and de jure rendered inapplicable in practice.

3) Non-violence and Violence: Justification by Balance of Results - A modified reading would allow a type of justifiability by results, viz., a balance of good over evil, even in terms of non-violence and violence; though it would violate the strict ideology, unless Gandhi allows the motive of non-violence to have a sui generis quality and special empirical expression that is not liable to the same categorical characterization. This seems to be his meaning in referring to non-violence as a force, and to its ideal as having a creative power of initiating spontaneous action, i.e., not motivated by subjective empirical intermediary formations and impulsions.

In this case, "motive" would only denote a set of statements that are the inspired result of reflection on the action of that force in moral consciousness. This would answer to Gandhi's description of the irresistible inner voice that according to him is the inseparable cognitive adjunct of the conative and affective non-violent soul-force or love-force.

This, however, has the consequence that since the "motive" comes into practical play it must still have an overt empirical counterpart to satisfy the strict ideological equation, and this can only be expressed as a balance of such non-violently produced empirical components with regular mediate magnetized or agitated ones whose movement cannot but be tainted by empiricity, i.e., inherent violence and evil. The motive must in some way materially decide the outcome if it is to figure in the moral justification. Gandhi notes that many acts of non-violence are necessary to yield one visible practical resultant.¹ The motive materially decides

¹N.V.:I, p.p. 138-40: "Passive resistance...is a misnomer for non-violent resistance. It is much more active than violent. It is direct, ceaseless, but three-fourths invisible and only one-fourth visible. In its visibility it seems to be ineffective, e.g. the spinning wheel which I have called the symbol of non-violence. In its visibility it appears ineffective, but it is really intensely active and most effective in ultimate result. ...A violent man's activity is most visible, while it lasts. But it is always transitory...But the effects of...non-violent action persist and are likely to grow with age. And the more it is practised, the more effective and inexhaustible it becomes, and ultimately the whole world stands agape and exclaims, 'a miracle has happened'. All miracles are due to the silent and effective working of invisible force. Non-violence is the most invisible and the most effective...I may say all kinds of sweet words to you without meaning them. On the other hand, I may have real love in me and yet my outward expression may be forbidding. Then outwardly my action in both cases may be the same and yet the effect may be different. For the effect of our action is often more potent when it is

by definition each war would be necessarily an exercise in self-annihilation and the first and only one possible would long since have demonstrated its ideal purity and have left no empirical history to look back on and analyze as to whether it had been justifiable. Gandhi cannot dogmatize from a concept of ideological purity that all war must degenerate to an absolute barbarity, itself unrealizable, as is the ideal of non-violence. There is neither no more validity to his analysis of non-violence than to that of war, nor is there less to war than to his satyāgraha, so far as they must be treated on a par as equally ideal concepts or equally factual states

Gandhi has said of the Gītā, as a text on "eternal verities", that its logical outcome is "peace at the price of life itself", i.e., satyāgraha or ahimsā. He writes also that "the first condition of non-violence is justice all round in every department of life,"¹ and that peace is impossible without non-violence and truth. Then the outcome of justice must be more fundamental than that of peace, and a balance of justice, a materially just war, should be justifiable in terms of non-violence. It can be argued that in fact the world has gone on after war because whatever the appalling aspect presented in terms of violent means and physical suffering and devastation, nothing short of that could have destroyed incorrigible evil and saved the modicum of justice on which the succeeding order can be based and continue to

¹Ibid., p. 283, (Sevagram 30/4/40; H,4/5/40).

the quality and justifiability of the act because through it the resultants of many more acts than the present one alone are brought into combination. The final resultant will never be purely non-violent but it will necessarily have a distinctive action corresponding to the contributory motivations of preceding acts. The assessment of that balance is independent of any characterizations of single forces. Only results, viz., the practical expression or necessarily empirically accountable counterpart of the moral motives, are calculable since they signify the initiating (motive) ratios.

According to Gandhi's strict reading of the equation of moral and practical, this non-violence can legitimately be defined as this balance of total non-harm over immediately present harm, regardless of the appearance of the forces used (required). Gandhi mistakenly identifies "violence" with immediate results of force as if that were the whole phenomenon, but then answers "conundrums" as to the apparent failure of non-violence, in terms of the necessity of combining several resultants spread over time as they empirically mature to give one tangible non-violent result.

Gandhi requires that motive decides character of similar looking actions, but he gives no scientific analysis (in consonance with the rest of his ideological analysis and its

not patently known. Thus the unconscious effect you are making on me I may never know. It is, nevertheless, infinitely greater than the conscious effect. In violence there is nothing invisible. Non-violence, on the other hand, is three-fourths invisible, and so the effect is in the inverse ratio to its invisibility. Non-violence, when it becomes active, travels with extraordinary velocity, and then it becomes a miracle. So the mass mind is affected first unconsciously, then consciously. When it becomes consciously affected there is demonstrable victory...When the spirit of non-violence pervades the people and actually begins to work, its effect is visible to all. (H 20/3/37)

pragmatic and experimental investigation) of how this must occur and what implications it has for the problem of justification.

Though his definition of non-violence and his analysis of non-retaliation are reasoned on scientific lines, viz., real effects of moral qualities and forces governed by laws and predictably manipulable; he falls back on abstract and moralistic reasoning in problems of justification and application conditions of his practical doctrine. Motives must have real effects according to his own analysis and there is not the ideal homogeneity between categorical realities that his theory of justification requires. Gandhi gives no scientific analysis but always answers these questions from the moralist standpoint of ideology and formal dichotomy.

4) No "Ideal" War - Gandhi stressed that war is an unmitigable evil unjustifiable on any grounds and yet he acknowledges that it evokes admirable bravery and many other noble and intrinsically good qualities and actions. He writes that,

War is an unmitigated evil. But it certainly does one good thing, it drives away fear and brings bravery to the surface...Let us learn from these suffering nations of the West and banish panic from our midst.¹

If war had no redeeming feature, no courage and heroism behind it, it would be a despicable thing, and would not need speeches to destroy it.²

Gandhi acknowledges that war is a complex fact and that there is no unmixed evil in the world or in human nature. He

¹Ibid., p. 287, (Sevagram 4/6/40; H, 8/6/40).

²Ibid., p. 116, (YI, 31/12/31); see also, p.p. 395-96, (Train to Calcutta, 17/2/42; H, 22/2/42).

can conclude that war is an "unmitigated evil, absolutely unjustifiable" only if he assumes that war can produce evil effects that are of an ideal purity regardless of its non-ideal and empirical mechanism. If war is an empirical fact and does not have only ideal reality (i.e. if the inner battle is the only "real" war), it can only be considered absolutely disallowable by the imposition of an absolute dichotomy of real and ideal which superimposes an ideal quality on empirical action. Gandhi attempts to do this by means of his equation of violence with evil. If in the world there is no unmixed evil then real war must have some good, then on what grounds can the justifiability of war be analyzed as if it were an ideal existence. Without warrant Gandhi identifies the "concept" of war with the "fact" of war. Therefore, war in the real world might be justified by a real overbalance of facts of bravery, nobility, charity, etc., as its real outcomes.

Against this conclusion Gandhi argues that no cause could justify such indiscriminate slaughter¹ as he demonstrates to be the logical conclusion of all war, and which is so fully exhibited in the prelude and beginnings of World War II. But the logical extreme cannot be guaranteed in any empirical case, and fact has never been realized as Gandhi himself asserts in his arguments to establish that non-violence is the law of being². At some point the good must overbalance the evil or

¹Ibid., p. 297, (New Delhi 2/7/40; H, 6/7/40; esp. "on no other condition can you win the war. You will have to become more ruthless than the Nazis."

²Ibid., p.130-31, (H, 26/9/36)

evolve. Given the whole complex fact of war, its many actions, motives, operative intentional states, not to mention sheer physical magnitudes, etc., why does Gandhi withhold the logico-moral certification of "justified" from the complex reality of war. War indeed never does reach its logical conclusion, and admittedly has many noble aspects. If the aim is truly corporate and mass application, widening of the scope of non-violence in the world, and not individual propriety and salvation, analogies are available by which to ascribe the same love, motives and surgical activities, to large scale reality as to states of the individual. Such analogues are derivable from the criteria of the just war. The categories of good and evil applied through the dichotomy non-violence/violence, magnifies the outer destructive aspects of war and even its moral destructiveness, and gives a distorted but compelling depiction of the fruits of war and violence. Gandhi withheld ascription of "justified" by analogy with the just war model only because of his insistence on ideological purity embodied in his equation of violence with evil. But this equation itself only reflects his more basic assimilation of appearance to the ideal--and that too is itself based on the unwarranted imputation of commutative to the micro-macro identity principle applied to practical affairs. Gandhi's arguments pro and con justifiability thus are woven through with categorical confusions.

Gandhi argues finally, by idealizing the relation of means and ends as if here also a complex fact could not have

a meaningful outcome in moral terms. Gandhi gives the law of karma a simplistic punitive interpretation, and by interpreting war as a simple single wholly evil action, a totally bad end is assured, and logically no new order is possible. The ideal bad end also is impossible and Gandhi is again arguing ideal goods against ideal bads in terms of ideal realities and relations. He is thus again bypassing the categorical reality in terms of which the practical efficacy of non-violence must finally be calculated if the foundational equation of moral and practical is to be sustained.

Where Gandhi writes that not even a "noble end" could justify violence and war he adds the practical rider that "experience convinces me that permanent good can never be the outcome of untruth and violence."¹ But neither can experience teach that permanent evil is the definite outcome of violence. Neither result can be permanent as both are empirical results, necessarily transient, and experience cannot warrant assertions of logical absolutes--especially against the common sense and prima facie assertions to the contrary which are responsible logical assertions.

If Gandhi's claim stands on experience then it certainly cannot stand against the counter-claims of such an overwhelming historical and moral experience. If it is a logical claim, then it is open to all the charges of confusion so far advanced. He does not fulfil his program of scientific analysis beyond the point of applying his ideological constructs with logical

¹Ibid., p. 30, (YI, 11/12/24).

and practical severity. Yet his logical severity is always that of a practical activist, within the confines of the cases immediately at hand. Even so, he is patently inconsistent in making non-killing his central value and precept as if saving life were the highest value and outer violence the greatest violence. He judges that cowardice, as suppressed violence, is worse than killing or open warfare. Gandhi draws the distinction between inner and outer violence and prefers the outer violence which is clearly inconsistent. He is inconsistent as a general theorist, though in no simple way. Here it becomes evident that he does not carry his logic far enough, as opposed to the standard criticisms that find him rigid and blindly logical in the practical sphere.

Finally, Gandhi does allow, even require, moral support for the exploited victim against the exploiter and aggressor. His moral support extends naturally to non-violent assistance. He writes that,

If war is itself a wrong act, how can it be worthy of moral support or blessings? I believe all war to be wholly wrong. But if we scrutinize the motives of two warring parties, we may find one to be in the right and the other in the wrong. For instance, if A wishes to seize B's country, B is obviously the wronged one. Both fight with arms. I do not believe in violent warfare, but all the same, B, whose cause is just, deserves moral help and blessings.¹

The limitation to non-violent means is of course the ideological requirement but given the claim's acknowledgment of right at stake, the ideological commitment as to means stands out as arbitrary in greater contrast to the common sense

¹Ibid., p. 334, (Sevagram 12/8/40; H, 18/8/40); see also, p. 252; "Whilst all violence is bad and must be condemned in

position of the general commitment to non-violence. If the end is admittedly good how can any means that actually achieve it be considered to be wrong. This can only follow from a narrow view of what constitutes the action and its effects, such as Gandhi's ideological and arbitrary conception betrays in such cases.²

All of Arjuna's and Gandhi's arguments against war, based on identification of highest values with narrowly defined empirical results fail to win confidence for absolute pacifism as a valid or viable answer to the present necessities of impending war to protect justice.

4. Svadharma and Anāsakti: The Spiritual Content of Gandhi's Ideal

Gandhi misinterprets not only the empirical categorical reality but the spiritual as well by his interposition of the homogenizing moral dichotomy and principles. His misguided use of the micro-macro identity principle, and resultant confusion of appearance and reality, and of reality and ideality in terms of violence and non-violence, lead him to a contra-

the abstract, it is permissible for, it is ever the duty of a believer in Ahimsā to distinguish between the aggressor and the defender. Having done so, he will side with the defender in a non-violent manner, i.e. give his life in saving him. (Sevagram, 16/10/39; H, 21/10/31) Thus Gandhi sided with the allies against the Axis powers though noting Britain's own questionable war aims so far as justice and democracy were concerned in her own colonies!

²Today, where incitement to use atomic weaponry is inadmissible on any moral grounds, there can be no limit on strategic means of defeating intentional evil.. Here especially the clarity of intelligence fostered by good thought, feeling, and actions, comes into play in support of expert deceit of evil as a decidedly moral means if it preserves the larger morality.

dictory analysis of the moral standard as heteronymous and of anāsakti as a morally qualified state--viz., the state of dispassion, non-attachment, and equilibrium, that is the nature of spirit and ex hypothesi is not affected by modifications and movements in empirical reality. It is simultaneously the sine qua non of non-violence as means and the transcendent aim of non-violence as an end.

a) Fundamental Heteronomy: Formal and Universal Standard of Self-realization (Svadharmā), Ideological Standard of Empirical Non-violence: In the one direction, Gandhi imposes his moral ideal on practical reality and in the other direction, he imposes it on spiritual reality. His synonymy of spiritual, moral, and practical, does not represent the non-dual advaitic reality and the micro-macrocosmic logical principle, but the superimposition of an external form and standard. Thus the ideological assumption of the moralistic viewpoint results in that radical heteronomy introduced above (p. 81) in explicating Gandhi's overvaluation of life. This is the origin of that heteronomy of ethical standards, there shown to extend to the roots of Gandhi's philosophy of non-violence.

According to advaitic principles, "yathā pinde..." would be interpreted to reveal the same reality transcendent of and immanent in empirical existence and life. It would not extirpate the difference between the categories of being and becoming, ideal and real, existence and life, which have a function in practical and moral consciousness. The reflection

of this radical logico-moral identity principle and advaitic basis is properly the Gītā's principle of svadharma, that duty unique to oneself, which Gandhi accepts as the unique simultaneous means and expression of the individual's progressive self-realization. Freedom is the result of this self-less action.¹

According to the principle of svadharma the rightness of each action is totally and uniquely determined by the entire history of the jīvātmā (evolving self). The utility of

¹Hingorani, Gītā..., p. 192, (Gītā Discourse, Chapt. XXI, pp. 8-44: see also pp. 147, 150); "If each does his duty selflessly according to his nature, he will reach perfection. Therefore, one's own duty though it appears to be valueless, is better than the duty of another which seems to be easy. A man remains free of sin when he performs the task naturally allotted to him, as he is then free from selfish desires; the very wish to do something else arises from selfishness. For the rest, all actions are clouded by defects as fire by smoke. But the natural duty is done without desire for its fruits, and thus loses its binding force." See p. 143, above. Also, Ibid., p. 122; "A man who does the work that falls to his lot by the force of circumstances, can remain unattached to it. He does not get false attachment for such work. Real knowledge and true education can be had by devoted performance of one's duty." (Ashram Sisters, p. 112) It is argued above, in Chapter I, fn. #1 pp. 11ff, and pt. #5, p. 13ff, that since Gandhi gives the Gītā a moral interpretation, and thus identifies the empirical with the morally qualified, i.e., necessarily evil so far as manifesting a differentiation from impartible oneness of fundamental Reality. Empirical existence is characterized there as "movement", and movement as necessarily "violent", and therefore evil. Unless Gandhi admits that there can be activity, friction, etc., without there being an evil quality generated, then dutiful action, svadharma, even on strict lines without considering the difference from his heteronomous ethics of non-violence, also cannot result in free action and freedom from reaction or consequences. To hold the duty ethics of the Gītā, as a means of acting without binding results, the possibility is required of all immediate "tearing", "friction", "violence", that does seem inherent in activity, being completely cancelled either by the generation of an emergent counter-quality or by a neutralizing and balancing of forces observable when a larger resultant or wider perspective is assumed. The ideological equation of violence with evil with activity vitiates the attempt to establish a viable duty ethics that would produce free action as a means to spiritual realization.

the action is determined by the degree to which it bypasses or dismantles the ego-desire complex or strategically satisfies and strengthens it, in both cases geared to the single aim of immediate self-expression as means and ultimate self-realization as ends.

This interpretation makes spiritual utility and moral rightness identical on a purely formal basis, viz., the concept of an evolving manifestation of the individuated yet non-dual permanent spiritual principle. Only a principle of action determining empirical content, subjective and objective, completely by the total and unique self-evolution can have universal application. Only such a principle gives a standard of action and valuation that is wholly formal from the standpoint of every empirical formation, yet wholly determined from the standpoint of spiritual self as it looks out from that formation upon the totality of empirical reality as unity and totality.

But Gandhi's ideology interposes the moral form and standard of non-violent exact conduct which creates a second standard, not entirely formal, but with empirical requirements. This must at points oppose a standard which requires that there be no such external determination of the empirical content of action.

b) Anāsakti: Also Heteronymously Interpreted: Gandhi's spiritual position is directly self-contradictory. He writes that:

Anāsakti transcends Ahimsa. He who would be Anāskta (selfless) has necessarily to practice non-violence in order to attain the state of selflessness. Ahimsā is, therefore, a necessary preliminary, it is included in Anāsakti, it does not go beyond it...whilst we are in the flesh and tread the solid earth, we have to practice Ahimsā. In the life beyond, there is no Himsā or Ahimsā.¹

Anāsakti is Gandhi's name for the state beyond the guṇas, therefore beyond himsā and ahimsā, since these describe qualities actions, and forces. He defines himsā morally from the standpoint of motive and intent, so that,

Himsā is impossible without anger, without attachment, without hatred, and the Gītā strives to carry us to the state beyond Sattva, Rajas, and Tamas to a state that excludes anger, hatred, etc.²

Gandhi writes that in the "balanced state of mind, of mental equipoise"³ (Gītā II:55-72), himsā, violence and killing, are impossible because that state "can be achieved...after killing all your passions. It is not possible to kill your brother after having killed all your passions."⁴ And, "A man who is free from the action of the pair of opposites is incapable, like the perfect man of the Bible, of injuring any living thing on earth."⁵

¹Hingorani, Gītā..., p. 55, (H, 9/1/40).

²Ibid., p. 64, (YI, 11/12/25); see also, p. 49; "I have felt that in trying to enforce in one's life the central teaching of the Gītā, one is bound to follow Truth and Ahimsā. Where there is no desire for fruit, there is no temptation for untruth or himsā. Take any instance of untruth or violence, and it will be found that at its back was the desire to attain the cherished end." (YI, 8/8/31).

³Ibid., p. 39, (DMD, p. 105 - italics mine).

⁴Ibid., (Italics mine).

⁵Ibid., p. 30, (YI, 5/25/21 - italics mine).

Thus, by means of his analysis of Anāsakti, Gandhi reads into the state of gunātita (Gītā XIV:19-27; II:45), the moral opposition of violence/non-violence, which has its ideological basis in "violence" equally defined by the description of outer action as by motive and intentional state. Thus Gandhi reads into the factual state of gunātita the moral heteronymy that characterizes and distinguishes his non-violence. The correct interpretation of anāsakti must recognize its definitive character as beyond any quality or opposition at all, moral as well as natural. Its interpretation relative to moral purposes may explore its practical relation to moral action analyzed in terms of some favoured moral distinctions or properties. But the definitive character of the state cannot be assimilated to the interpretative framework or the factual difference is lost, i.e., the objective difference that was meant to be exploited by relation or use according to action based on the interpretive framework. This objective or factual understanding of anāsakti is that it is unaffected by activity of the gunas, prakṛti in the form of its three root qualities or activities of energy, which constitute the empirical environment, subjective and objective, intentional and extensional. Its very differentia from the empirical and moral states, as given in the Gītā and Upanishads (Gītā II:45, XIV:19-27, XVIII:40; Kathopanishad III:1:3; Svetāśvatara Upanishad IV:5; Chandogyopanishad VI:4:1), as its status beyond good and evil, and its realization independently of these as qualities of action, impulsion, and consequence, in all empirical activity. Gandhi superimposes on the

non-moral end state the moral means and criteria that are a prerequisite (not "cause", or definable condition) for its realization

c) Moral Imagination: Cannot Solve Moral Dilemmas, But Only Reënforce Falsifying Dichotomous Views: The essence of Gandhi's argument is that the Gītā teaches non-violence as an ideal and a means; the man of equability, sthitaprajña anāsakta, gunātita, cannot be imagined as violent. Gandhi's moral imagination cannot dissociate outer violent action and subjective empirical states of anger, hate, etc.,¹ that experience seems to show are invariably at its root.²

After describing the state of anāsakti as beyond the gunas and then contradicting himself that that "state excludes anger, hatred" (of rajoguna), Gandhi writes "I can even now picture to my mind Arjuna's eyes red with anger every time he draws the bow to the end of his ear."³ The question of moral truth is not only a question of the scope of one's individual moral imagination. Artistic or moral inspiration and imagination may lead to great discoveries in these fields but they cannot warrant ascription of "Truth" or substitute for scientific or logical inquiry. Regardless of their positive and valid content

¹Ibid., p. 39: "I should like to see that man dealing death who has no passions, who is indifferent to pleasure and pain, who is undisturbed by the storms that trouble mortal man." (II, 1/21/39).

²Ibid., p. 50; "Let it be granted that according to the letter of the Gītā it is possible to say that warfare is consistent with the renunciation of fruit. But after 40 years of unremitting endeavour fully to enforce the teaching of the Gītā in my own life, I, in all humility, feel that perfect renunciation is impossible without perfect observance of Ahimsā in every shape and form." (Ashrama Sisters p. 53).

³Ibid., p. 64, (VI, 11/12/25).

their limits and true scope must be determined independently of the essentially subjective instruments of inspiration, faith, and imagination, though these may initially (or also accompanying) orient and guide inquiry. Whatever the vividness of his moral imagination, the content, extensity, and duration of his moral experience and experiments, or the dramatic appeal of his rhetorical argument based on these, they are insufficient to sustain his ideologically rigid analysis (its bias, dichotomy, program, prescriptions, equation, demonstration, and imperatives) and his radical empirical claim based on it.

d) Confuses Outer and Inner Battles: Identifying violent appearance of activity with himsic violence (the inevitable expression of anger, hate, fear, etc.), and drawing the sharp contrast between inner and outer reality in terms of the equations of spiritual and moral on one side, and of empirical and evil on the other, Gandhi insists on the allegorical interpretation of the Gītā and says that "the author of the Gītā never advocated war or violence. It is a sermon on non-violence. Fight, without anger and passion, can only be spiritual."¹

This is to say that the "spiritual" is not a status outside of prakṛti and beyond determination by the gunas. He is describing categorical facts but again reading into his analysis the ideological dichotomy that makes a logical necessity of the equation of violence with evil motives. Gandhi

¹Ibid., p. 30, (YI, 12/1/21 - italics mine); and p. 39, Gandhi writing about the description of sthitaprajña (Gītā II:54-72) says that "these verses show that the fight Krishna speaks of is a spiritual fight." (H, 1/21/39).

goes so far as to state that realization of this state has (1) the subjective consequences that "where detachment governs our action, even the weapon raised in order to strike an enemy falls down out of our hand",¹ and (2) the objective consequence that though of "a humble man, who has reduced himself to zero it may be said that he does not kill though he kills, this does not mean that the man in spite of his humility may kill and yet be unaffected by the killing. For, no occasion can arise for such a man to indulge in violence."²

This analysis clearly does not leave the anāsakta indifferent to the presence or absence of the gunas (purity, light; passion, activity, sloth, inertia) as the state of gunātita requires. Gandhi, for whom struggle³ and the inner moral battle are the sine qua non of spiritual and moral growth and evolution, writes that since "The Bhagavad Gītā is a purely religious, not historical treatise...it deals with the war that is eternally waging between the forces of evil and good, Ormuzd and Ahriman, Hyde and Jekyll, in the human breast. We cannot do enough violence to all the evil passions that well up on that little Kuruksetra."⁴

Gandhi believes that "the Gītā represented the eternal dual between forces of evil and good, and inculcated the duty

¹Ibid., p. 152, (DG, 8-44, comments on Chapt. III).

²Ibid., p. 189, (comments on Chapt. XVIII - italics mine).

³Ibid., p. 90, (H, 7/8/33; also pp. 91-92; DMD p. 250).

⁴Ibid., p. 30, (YI, 12/1/21).

of eradicating evil within us without hesitation, without tenderness."¹ The real battle is only the one within, against the mind's submission to the prevailing distinctions and motives of "I" and "mine", and the attitude it gives rise to of attachment and repulsion, the roots of sin, and the radical origin of conflict, inner and outer.² The real battle is against compulsion by sense life and desire which without the vision and the assistance of the Lord are more powerful than any individual can withstand.³ The real battle is the individual effort to attain and maintain that "confidence in soul force" by which "everything else becomes easy as a matter of course. And desire and anger and their countless hosts hold no terror for him who has mastered the senses, the mind and the intelligence" by the soul which is "the greatest of all."⁴ According to Gandhi's reading of the Gītā, the inner battle is the only real battle and recourse to and reliance on soul force is the only real means of waging it. The condition of realizing the potency of and enlisting soul-force is the exact conduct of Truth and non-violence and the non-co-operation strategy of satyāgraha.

It may be admitted on the basis of the general commitment and the common sense prima facie reading, that

¹Ibid., p. 31, (YI, 5/29/24).

²Ibid., p. 142, commentary introduction, (DG, 8-44).

³Ibid., p. 145, Chapt. II, (DG, 8-44).

⁴Ibid., p. 151, Chapt. III:36-43, (DG, 8-44).

the inner battle is primary and must continue without let up. Unless the conversion and disarmament (realization and renunciation) take place there, external disarmament and negotiation will be of no avail considering the logic of the recrudescence and escalation of violence where the motives of competition that initiate and sustain conflict are not decisively and materially (i.e., within) dealt with.

But it is an arbitrary conclusion of Gandhi's analysis that this is the only battle and that only this inner battle is spiritual and moral and effective. If, as Gandhi has acknowledged the spiritual states of anāsakti is transcendent of all empirical states and is a position of natural master and control of empirical movements; viz., the vantage point from which soul-force actively intervenes in moral consciousness and practical reality, then there is nothing with which to counter the common sense analysis of a moral limit to the abstention from external violence outside of Gandhi's self-contradictory restriction of spiritual utility and moral rightness to subjective purity (sattva guna, and satyāgraha ahimsā). Rather the spiritual strategy of expanding the scope of non-violence and of diminishing that of violence would respect the categorical realities of the battle with evil and recognize the necessity at times of physically destroying the vehicles of evil by which that evil has throughout history and universally to human experience sustained its dominance over the good and perpetrated further violence in absence of any obstacle to its exercising its self-interested motives. There are many instances in Indic classical

literature where the paragon and exhibitor of the eternal ideals¹ (avatara) themselves call upon and command the passions of anger, from the inner standpoint of gunātita, of self-mastery beyond the passions, in order to sustain battle against evil on its own terms, turning evil against evil in the way Gandhi ideologically rules out.

C. Satyāgraha: Failure of Gandhi's Final Resort
and Complete Substitution

a) Gandhi's Moral Metaphysics Defeat his Practical Ethics: Reopens the Question of Balancing Good and Evil: Thus Gandhi's analysis of the external conduct of war and of the internal battle with the passions, and of the spiritual state and moral ideal in terms of which he argues for the unjustifiability of violence, are circular, having for their only warrant his own experience and the self-certifying logic of his otherwise arbitrary and ideological moral standpoint. The key to criticism of this position is the fact that by his analysis of the ideal state in terms of the gunas and the moral qualities of himsā and ahimsā, violence and non-violence, he actually negates the ideal overriding potency on the basis of which he justifies his radical claim.

¹e.g. Śrī Rāma calls anger to service in battle against demonic forces (Valmiki, Rāmāyana, Aranyakaṇḍa, Canto 26:12:5); Śrī Rāma, whom Gandhi looked upon as the personification of Truth and Non-violence. Gandhi reads such references as this and the Bali incident referred to above (p. 272, above) as interpolations, or, out of humility in acknowledgment of his limited understanding, he excuses himself from judging and maintains his views on "faith".

Without this assimilation of the ideal and real, and substantial moral content to outer appearance, the questions are again opened as to whether "two evils" cannot make a right", and produce a resultant good balance over the initial evil of violent means, when and where this may be the case, and where the line of justifiability defining the violence/non-violence distinction in material practical terms is to be drawn--if protection of life is not the ultimate value and automatic guiding moral principle?

b) Protection of Life: Value and Potency, the Key Equation in Gandhi's Argument: Gandhi's practical argument in defence of his claim that satyāgraha gives sufficient warrant against the necessity of and last resort to violence, depends on sustaining practical non-violence in the face of the greatest conceivable opposition by violence, making the protection of life (peace) the highest moral value and synonymously the most potent expression of spiritual reality and force.

Confusion of spiritual reality or the divine element in soul-force, ultimate moral values, and peaceful protection of life, as equally valid expressions for the same potency and practical mechanism is the key element in understanding the role of satvāgraha in Gandhi's argument as the sum and focus of these three in practical terms. The origin of this confusion and its role in Gandhi's argument of satyāgraha is examined below on the basis of the elements detailed in the above critical analysis and in terms of the role it confers on satyāgraha in Gandhi's mission to close the question of justifiability.

It is shown that Gandhi constructs his concepts of non-violence and his methods to apply them practically, on the basis or moral-metaphysical "laws" that he has merely generated to objectify his basic valuations and to validate his methods, practical philosophy, and empirical claim. This compounds his confusions and, trading on the general commitment and the fundamental moral sentiments it captures, further obscures the objective content and actual scope of his principles and their valid application. Finally, in a positive critique, it is shown that Gandhi's satyāgraha is a coercive force and therefore does not satisfy his own criteria of non-violence and does not operate in the way he presumes. It therefore constitutionally cannot fulfil the role Gandhi claimed for it in his argument of final resort and in his mission against the justifiability of violence.

1. Life, the Chief Value: Wrong Aim and Methods, and False Views

a) False Views and Values: 1) Assumes Equivalence of Highest Value and Supreme Potency-- If empirical reality is not simply analyzed as right or wrong, good or evil, violent or non-violent, and if war is therefore a complex fact not analyzable by these distinctions alone, or at least in no simple indubitably clear way, then any instance will have some good and some bad, and without arbitrary assimilations and valuations as Gandhi's ideology requires, who can say a priori what the moral balance will be? And where the line of justifiability is to be drawn?

Gandhi avoids the issue by assuming the equivalence of highest value and supreme practical potency so that a method expressing this value may be said a priori to be eminently practical and guaranteed success. This assumption rests on false views.

2) Factual Reality, a Moral Mix: Not Determinable a priori - Again, the basic confusion is a factual one derived from the wrong use of "yathā pinde...", and the wrong view of reality produced by the resultant confusion of categories.

Reality of action and of human nature are mixed and there is no a priori way to determine which element, good or evil, reason or unreason, non-violent or violent, divine or demonic, is going to be active at the moment, or if it will be susceptible to counter-action on ideologically determined non-violent lines.

The problem of justifying or morally supporting war depends on a complex analysis of justice and injustice, usually with no one side clearly just or in the right, and justice and rightness not symmetrically distributed by any simple and self-evident rule. Gandhi accepted that Hitler's claims against the allies had a good deal of justice on their side, and that the allies had caused much of the injustice to which his rise to power in Germany was an answer. They were themselves not ideal exhibitors of democratic principles and non-exploitation but on the contrary thrived on colonial exploitation and oppression, aside from the gross injustice of the Versailles treaty. But Gandhi draws the line at Hitler's refusal to use non-violent

means of adjustment of claims and to seek mutual negotiations or independent arbitration.¹ According to Gandhi's assessment, Hitler's claims may even be right but he is definitely wrong and a propagator of evil in his choice of violent means to adjudicate his claims.

3) Confusion of Material Destruction and Death of Body With Killing and Loss of Life - In line with Arjuna's arguments, Gandhi consistently points to the violent and destructive results, loss of life and destruction of property, as the primary proof of the futility of war.² Gandhi cites the entire epic of the Mahābhārata as the demonstration of the futility of war by pointing to the equal loss suffered by victor as by vanquished, and the almost total physical annihilation involved as well as the loss of a civilization.³ This is the result of his false view of the micro-macrocosmic identity principle and the confused view of reality produced by the invalid assimilation of the ideal and the real. Śrī Kṛṣṇa's argument in the Gītā makes clear the distinction between ātman and not-ātman by means of the grammatical proposition that the soul neither slays nor is slain (Gītā II:19-21, XVIII:17) But it has been shown that Gandhi imposes his moral

¹N.V.:I, pp.229-30, (Sevagram 11/9/33; H, 4/5/40).

²See N.V.:I, p. 283, (Sevagram 30/4/40; H, 4/5/40).

³Hingorani, Gītā..., p. 52; "The immortal author of the Mahābhārata, of which the Gītā is one - no doubt the brightest - of the many gems contained in that literary mine, has shown to the world the futility of war by giving the victors and empty glory, leaving but seven victors alive out of millions said to have engaged in the fight in which unnamable atrocities were used on either side." (H, 9/5/36).

interpretation of it as "anāsakti". Gandhi confuses the reality of the soul with its expression in life as he did with its moral expression in his ideal of anāsakti. This transfers values across categorical boundaries and generates both theoretical and practical contradictions, contradictions of aim and of method.

b) False Aims and Methods: It has been shown that though he argues for the highest reality of soul and the oneness of creation as the necessary basis of morality, Gandhi de facto assigns the highest value to life, and in support of absolute pacifism calls for "peace at the price of life itself."

1) "Law of the Sword"; not a Law - Gandhi called brute force and use of violence and its circle of retaliation, the "law of the sword". To call it a "law" is to introduce confusion with rhetoric. The "law" states that those who live by the sword die by the sword,¹ and provides an argument for non-violence and pacifism that has the popular appeal and reassuring self-certitude of the maxim that "two wrongs don't make a right".

But this is not "law" since it does not exclude dying by the sword if one does not live by it. There is no law-like connection between antecedent and consequent. Further, if it is accepted as a loose expression of the law of karma or of a "homely" maxim whose meaning is "clear enough", and valid as a "general guide", then it admittedly is not a "law"; and the question remains why worry about dying by the sword if one believes a higher value might be served by the risk (or even

¹N.V.:I, p. 225; "I have no hesitation in redeclaring my faith in reason, which is another word for non-violence, rather

certitude) of death in its use. To quote it as an ultimate guide to conduct is to make saving one's life the highest value since it makes the saving one's own life look like the only reason for refraining from the use of force in defense of anything.

Gandhi does not advocate this passive moral posture resulting from self-interest, but he retains the argument that life is the highest value and says that non-killing, refusing to wield the sword even for self-defense, is the highest expression of this value. However, it is critical to note that there are things that one would die for, and Gandhi used the moral weapon of "fast unto death". It is not simply "life" then that has the highest value per se, but particular life in particular circumstances, viz., one's own as a last resort. This de facto removes life from a "highest value" category, if ultimacy of value involves also universality of scope as Gandhi's scheme of valuation requires.

2) Non-retaliation: Self-defeating Principle at the Logical, Practical, and Moral Limits: According to the axiology of satyāgraha, for realization of any other value only self-immolation and self-killing are to be used, thus expressing respect for life as a value higher than any other end sought. The non-violent means so defined express ultimate value because in this case they are ends themselves as the only morally

than the arbitrament of war for the settlement of disputes or redress of wrongs. I cannot emphasize my belief more forcibly than by saying that I personally would not purchase my own country's freedom by violence even if such a thing were a possibility. My faith in the wise saying that what is gained by the sword will also be lost by the sword is imperishable." (Sevagram, 28/2/39; H, 2/9/39)

valid means to realize any other values and ends. It may not be violated to achieve an ulterior end or to realize another value, so as the only allowable means it paradoxically represents the highest value, viz., life itself gained by its giving.

Gandhi thus contradicts himself by making life the highest value and satyāgraha its practical expression as the only moral means. One must not kill yet one must kill oneself to fulfill the highest value for realization of which self-killing is the preëminently moral and practical means. He thus places self-killing in a separate category by making it logically the means of fulfilling an ultimate value.

3) Universalizability Criterion: Paradox of Highest Means Equated with Ultimate Ends (Fallacy of Assuming Their Ideal Identity) - The contradiction can be made evident in the reductio produced by universalizing. One can imagine that if all good people simultaneously used the method of self-immolation in defense against evil-up-in-arms there would be no one left in the world to be or do good. The good, dedicated to such an ideal and value of non-violence, would be de facto destroying the very good that their methods were meant to defend and realize. This blocks the argument that even if self-destruction were the only material result, still moral ennoblement of the world would justify the extreme method of non-violent defense.

Counter to the common sense prima facie case at the

limit of the general commitment, Gandhi argues that to die not trying to kill-in-return is of a sui generis moral order, while to die in the act of killing,¹ even in self-defense, is at best only an unfortunate fact expressing a moral weakness. But counter to common sense this seems to make a virtue of dying at the hands of evil.

Unless the equation of violence with evil and the identity of non-violence with exact conduct are assumed, the choice of death at the hands of evil has the absurd consequence (as appears by the universalization criterion) of pointlessly destroying the thing avowedly most valued, viz., the moral order, and of satisfying the agent of the material and violent opposition to the realization of that value.

4) Ideological Axioms Cannot Replace Common Sense Assessment - If there are values higher than embodied life, e.g., justice, which Gandhi acknowledges as the condition of peace, then destruction of other embodied life must be equally as justifiable as destruction of one's own in defense of that moral principle in order to materially realize it as an operative factor in human affairs, and it must be justifiable in any event because the higher legitimating value would then be justice. The argument that such violence necessarily has the result of producing a counteracting quality of evil that would insure self-defeating retaliations whatever the momentary appearance of justice so gained, depends again on assumption of Gandhi's equations. It has no warrant in general human experience

¹See N.V.:II, p. 153, (New Delhi 27/10/46, H, 3/11/46).

and the common sense position is testimony to just this denial. If Gandhi says that defense or protection by violence are impossible for the really perfect man who ex hypothesi alone could wield them without producing evil, the reply is that a higher ideal is available enunciated in the Gītā as Gandhi had inconsistently both acknowledged and denied (not only de facto but in theory as well).

According to the classical non-ideological interpretation of the Gītā, the gunātita, having no passionate motives in him, may nevertheless be inspired by motives of protection that derive from the requirements of the just and good life for the world in general. Serving this purpose may be the realized being's only purpose in maintaining the system of his empirical bodies, and it may move him to violence without personal desire or self-interest. This would not be himsā as Gandhi defines it, though he does not admit it as a possibility. However, that the world does sustain itself by both types of force is acceptable both to common experience and to Gandhi. That a realized man might be the vehicle for violent forces used against evil looks contradictory only against the background of Gandhi's ideological interpretation, i.e., if his moral ideology of non-violence is interpolated.

5) Textual Authority, Inadequate Warrant: Assumes Ideal it is Intended to Validate as Universal - Gandhi claims the support of all scriptures and saints for his interpretation.¹

¹N.V.:I, p. 130, (H, 26/6/36).

But, in fact, he stood against overwhelming opposition in terms of both hagiographical and textual arguments to the contrary. Agreement with his interpretation of the general commitment is not at issue. But his attempt to annul its limits are either confuted by textual history and hagiography, or at best only tangentially addressed, since Gandhi's experiments open new fields in the application of non-violence that are peculiar to his interpretation of its principles, empirical and universal. That there simply is not the universal avowal of life as the highest value and non-violence as its definite highest or purest expression that Gandhi claims is demonstrated by the nearly universal denial of his views. As was pointed out in Chapter II, the empirical claim may itself be taken as the differentia of Gandhi's from all other philosophies of non-violence, spiritually based as well as mundane.

The views of one knowing one may stand against the false views of 1,000,000, but also singularity is no criterion of Truth. Gandhi tried to put forth a new ideal and to entirely live up to it. He may be all wrong or terribly right. In any case his choice of examples of satyāgrahis--Socrates, Prahlād, Meera, Daniel--still only exemplify a chosen ideal. Citing these examples cannot prove the idealism's validity. It perhaps clarifies it and shows its beauty. Against these may be placed the examples of Rāma, Kṛṣṇa, and Jesus (in the temple), which cannot be explained away if explanation draws only on ideological a priorisms.

D. Law of Being: Gandhi's Basic Argument Against
Violence as a Last Resort

a) Faulty Claim to Scientific Validity: Satyāgraha
a Tool of Ideological Inquiry; Non-violence, No "Law" of
Being: It is necessary to see how Gandhi's arguments for satyāgraha and the universal claim depend on the unwarranted factual assumption that non-violence is a "Law of Being", and on his self-contradictory presumption that life is the highest value and exact conduct of exceptionless non-killing its perfect empirical means to realize and express that value.

In the critique of Gandhi's denial of limiting the general commitment, it has been shown that all of the ideological bases of Gandhi's arguments, its postulates, axioms, and assumptions, are arbitrary, based only on an extension by moral preference and on a presumed generally valid view which for the severe moral case of violence seems to cover all but the extreme limits. In sum, Gandhi supercedes those limits by means of his unwarranted interpolation of advaitic existential and epistemological principles. This is especially evident in his assimilation of the domestic and the political. On such a faulty logical basis, satyāgraha must be invalid as part of an argument for the validity of Gandhi's universal claim for expunging those limits, viz., the general common sense claim and prima facie case as expressed in the last resort argument of necessity of force and deceit or violent means to defeat evil in the real world.

Gandhi's final argument is that his ideological position expresses an inirradicable faith, so far substantiated in his

own experiments sufficiently to warrant further experiments in that direction. He considers direct logical arguments to the contrary to be indecisive. His claim is that in spiritual and moral scientific inquiry, just as in physical science, faith in previous experimental findings and in one's speculations based on them is needed to formulate concrete practical hypotheses and carry out experiments based on them in the face of differing concepts of "correct" practice or by direct theoretical opposition. But there is also an inherent limit to this claim

b) Parity of Reasoning: Counter Claims of Common Sense Faith - Gandhi de facto intends by satyāgraha to explore in action the consequences for practice of a theory built on the assumptions and precepts of his ideology. This gives the theoretical and practical form and implication of his faith.

It is necessary to see, as so far demonstrated, how his experimental practice itself is based on false views, values, and aims. His theory and practice of satyāgraha cannot validate a faith so faultily formulated and insufficiently warranted by any independent practical criteria. Gandhi's claim to the warrant of faith is especially non-warranting given the parity of reasoning in the counter claims of the orthodox Gītā position, and that of common sense, viz., action can demonstrate the validity of loving use of violence in protection of justice and the good only by faith that anāsakti is a transcendent state which does not exclude any empirical quality or activity; and, only by action based on that faith can the non-identity of

violence with evil be realized and effectively utilized for moral ends.

Though satyāgraha fails in itself at the limits of the common sense position, and proves its falsity as an absolute factor, it may in the context of the new debate be paradoxically considered a criterion and validation of the last resort and necessity argument for the justified use of force and violence. Its failure proves that this necessity is not to be overridden by an ideologically defined faith that real differences between the transcendent and the dual realities or between the ideal and the practical realities can be expunged by annulment of distinctions in moral consciousness, i.e. by invalid logico-ethical principles of inquiry. The arguments may be found compelling but they are invalid because Gandhi assigns too great a value to life out of religious respect for absolute Truth, but thereby disregards categorical truth when building practical methods on false views of the relation between the absolute and the categorical--he assimilates categories for theoretical consistency to justify his claim, but then he reifies them on ideological lines in order to deny justifiability to the limiting claims of common sense and the prima facie case.

With this background the present section examines the role of Gandhi's argument that non-violence is the "law of our being", as he uses it to support his universal claim through its practical expression in satyāgraha.

3) Gandhi's Admission: Argument Invalid if "Law of Love" Not the "Law of Our Being":- Gandhi writes that the strongest argument against his position on non-violence is the

...denial of non-violence or love as the law of the human race. If love or non-violence is not the law of our being, the whole of my argument falls to pieces and there is no escape from the periodical recrudescence of war, each succeeding one outdoing the preceding one in ferocity...¹

On Gandhi's own admission his argument for non-violence against the justifiability of any violence depends on the validity of his radical universal claims; this in turn must have its basis in fact if it is to prove valid for all practical purposes in fulfillment of that claim. Thus he translates the conceptual and categorical homogeneity that he derives from his dichotomous analysis into a universalizing "scientific law" constitutive of the empirical and practical realm. His argument for the validity of this translation shows already that it is only an expression of his moral presentiment, and not the result of scientific and philosophical inquiries. That if it is not so the "periodic recrudescence" of violence is the factual situation says nothing but that he would prefer a universe in which the periodic recrudescence is not a fact. The argument makes no statement demonstrating factual truth.

Gandhi defers giving a developed argument for his belief, but "venture(s) to make some relevant suggestions which may pave the way for an understanding of the law."² He gives a

¹Ibid., p. 130, (H, 26/9/36).

²Ibid.

summary substantiation of his views in which one may readily see the substitution of ideological and rhetorical elements for argued substance.

4) Gandhi's Basic Arguments: Specific Criticisms -

A review of his points and their criticism in terms of the previous critical analysis of his ideology will orient, focus, and complete the common sense counter to the practical component of his argument, viz., that satyāgraha is, as he claims, the universal sanction and sufficient substitute for the last resort to violence and force:

- (1) All the teachers that ever lived have preached that law with more or less vigour.
- (2) If love was not the law of life, life would not have persisted in the midst of death. Life is a perpetual triumph over the grave.
- (3) If there is a fundamental distinction between man and beast, it is the former's progressive recognition of the law and its application in practice in his own personal life. All the saints of the world, ancient or modern, were, each according to his light and capacity, a living illustration of that supreme law of our Being. That the brute in us seems so often to gain an easy triumph is true enough. That, however, does not disprove the law. It shows the difficulty of practice. How should it be otherwise with a law which is as high as Truth itself?
- (4) When the practice of the law becomes universal, God will reign on earth as He does in heaven. I need not be reminded that earth and heaven are in us. We know the earth, we are strangers to the heaven within us.
- (5) If it is allowed that for some the practice of Love is possible, it is arrogance not to allow even the possibility of its practice in all the others.
- (6) Not very remote ancestors of ours indulged in cannibalism and many other practices which we would today call loathsome. No doubt in those days too there were Dick Sheppards who must have been laughed at and possibly pilloried for preaching the (to them)

strange doctrine of refusing to eat their fellow men.

- (7) Modern science is replete with illustrations of the seemingly impossible having become possible within living memory. But victory of physical science would be nothing against the victory of the Science of Life, which is summed up in love which is the Law of our Being.
- (8) I know that it cannot be proved by argument. It shall be proved by persons living it in their lives in utter disregard of consequences to themselves. There is no real gain without sacrifice. And since demonstration of the Law of Love is the realest gain, sacrifice too must be the greatest required.¹

Here it is important to see that each of Gandhi's points assumes the law that he is reportedly demonstrating. The elements for meeting these points have been given in the foregoing critical analysis. On that basis the individual points of Gandhi's brief is countered in the following enumeration:

(1) This point is argued above, pp. 184-85.

(2) This only points to a principle of life (spirit), not identical with the empirical vehicles through which it manifests. Aside from this life element, the "law of decay, destruction, and death" is just as patent a fact. Without assuming that presence of spirit is equivalent to the existence of a constitutive law of empirical existence, there is no rule of life conduct or law of action implied in this fact.

(3) Assuming the law is there waiting to be recognized as a moral datum, this argument trades on the common sense distinction of man from beast by possession of distinctive faculties of scientific discernment, self-reference, self-culture, and the moral presentiment on which our general com-

¹Ibid., (numeration not in the original).

mitment to non-violence is founded. The ascription of "Law" to supercede the generally acknowledged distinction to make it an exceptionless objective condition is wholly rhetorical. The argument presenting saints as illustrations of this law likewise assumes that it is a "Law" rather than, say, a stage in spiritual evolution, or one line of practice leading to realization of that to which Gandhi ascribes "Law-ness" as in point #2. If all practicans of it were saints, still it would not prove it a "Law". We call "saints" those who live by a rule something like Gandhi's law, with severe and circumspect, refined and studious attention to the general commitment, but not necessarily to its most extreme applications implied in Gandhi's law-likeness. If not all are such saints, then a fortiori non-violence as Gandhi's conceives it is not the law of our species. If all were saints, as Gandhi conceives them, then who would be there to protect the saints, and with what means protect them from the evil whose chief object is their fall?

This distinction between brute and man (saint) confuses force and property. It is another example of Gandhi's confusions of category in consequence of his mis-interpretation of the micro-macrocosm identity principle. It has been repeatedly noted that Gandhi believes all force to be one continuum (on his advaitic principles). The "transfer of contrariety of properties" to the "contradiction of substantial forces" in which they inhere, makes the existential situation appear simply

partible and analyzable by Gandhi's ideological dichotomies as a homogeneous reality, when it is universally experienced in fact as a complex constantly shifting and variously combining and recombining mix of even contradictory properties. Appearance structured by ideological categories and thus reified under the form of "law" does not speak to the reality confronted in experiential and existential life reality.

(4) This again assumes that there is a "law" that can become universal in practice, and it trades rhetorically on the religious hope that such practice of God's law would win him to earth.

(5) This again assumes that there is a "law" that the "some" practice, and it trades on the fear of being judged "arrogant". This has nothing to do with the fact of lawfulness of the precept of love as non-violence. It might be argued that to the contrary it is arrogance to assume that oneself can practice such an ultimate law or precept which does in fact translate the highest advaitic realization through its affective aspect of limitless love. There is no factual reason to assume that there must be a fundamental similarity of capability among all to manifest that aspect in some consummate form, any more than that all are incipiently about to achieve that supreme spiritual consummation of cognitive realization regardless of the obvious vast factual differences in in spiritual and moral development that Gandhi's ideological homogenizing simply reads out.

(6) This shows an evolutionary tendency and does not demonstrate present validity of a law capable of superceding all evolutionary limitations as a real and immediate possibility. Again the presumption is in the direction of assuming law-likeness in challenge to the slowness and present incompleteless of that evolutionary tendency.

(7) This makes a double assertion of the presumed status of a "science of Life" on the basis of the assumed "Law of our Being". It rhetorically sets Gandhi's ideological aspirations on an equal footing with established science, trading on the objective force and status of the physical sciences. Even granted this status of established science, Gandhi gives no basis for believing that what is asserted of modern physical sciences ought to be and could be asserted of the putative "science" of life based on the "law" of ahimsā. Again it is assumed that ahimsā has already been discovered to be a "law" in the required formal and rigorous sense, and it is this that is in question.

(8) This argument talks as if the demonstration "in lives" had already been given, and need only be repeated, merely a multiplication of instances being needed to make the law self-evident to all. But the main point at this stage in the critical examination of Gandhi's argument is that he has not produced this demonstration against the last resort argument of common sense in the unavoidably convincing way he believes, and for which his entire science and practice of satyāgraha is intended.

The principle point of interest in the context of the present examination, and the point in common to all of Gandhi's arguments, is that in each case the "law of being" is actually only assumed a priori and is unwarrantedly described as a "law"; it is not demonstrated but only rhetorically expanded upon and inculcated.

5) Satyāgraha Argument Vitiating: Same Core of Categorical Confusions; Their Form in Practice and Method - The validity of satyāgraha as a main component in Gandhi's mission against the justifiability of violence depends on demonstration of its universal applicability and practicability,¹ and its assured efficacy in all contexts where violence might be advanced as a means. To fill this need Gandhi finds in non-retaliation and self-suffering a constitutive law, and derives from it a theory of human nature and moral responsiveness. This is where Gandhi's categorical confusions surface in context of satyāgraha as the practical component and complement completing his ideological and programmatic mission for non-violence. This is de facto an ideological derivation and superimposition, not a scientific finding regardless of the language used to relate its history and procedure.

¹Ibid., pp. 312-13; "There can be no meaning in my appeal to Herr Hitler to adopt non-violence. He is marching from victory to victory. I can only appeal to him to desist. That I have done. But to Britain, which is just now on the defensive, I can present the really effective weapon of non-violent non-co-operation. Let my method be rejected on merits, not by bringing inapt analogies or untenable argument. The issue raised by me, I venture to think, is of universal importance. The usefulness of non-violent method seems to be granted by all the critics. They gratuitously assume the impossibility of human nature, as it is constituted, responding to the strain involved in non-violent preparation. But that is begging the question.

The core of satyāgraha is the principle of self-suffering whose logical extreme and most potent practical form Gandhi claims to be some form of non-retaliating self-immolation.

Gandhi asserts that human nature, having the same soul or divine element in all, is "in its essence one", is everywhere, by nature and by law, responsive to the advances of love.¹

Hitler also must finally succumb to the "heat" generated by true non-violence of self-suffering. Gandhi writes,

that such non-violent suffering as Professor Niemoeller's failed to convert Hitler had not proved sufficient for melting Herr Hitler's heart merely shows that it is made of harder material than stone. But the hardest metal yields to sufficient heat. Even so must the hardest heart melt before sufficiency of the heat of non-violence. And there is no limit to the capacity of non-violence to generate heat.²

¹Ibid., p. 186; Gandhi reasons "But belief in non-violence is based on the assumption that human nature in its essence is one and therefore unfailingly responds to the advances of love." and therefore "Hitler and Mussolini" are not "beyond redemption ... It should be remembered that they have up to now always found ready response to the violence that they have used. Within their experience, they have not come across organized non-violent resistance on an appreciable scale, if at all. Therefore it is not only highly likely, but I hold it to be inevitable, that they would recognize the superiority of non-violent resistance over any display of violence that they may be capable of putting forth." (Sevagram 12/12/38, H, 24/12/28); also, p. 163; "If Hitler is unaffected by my suffering, it does not matter. For I shall have lost nothing worth. My honor is the only thing worth preserving. That is independent of Hitler's pity. But as a believer in non-violence I may not limit its possibilities. Hitherto he and his likes have built upon their invariable experience that men yield to force. Unarmed men, women and children offering non-violent resistance without any bitterness in them will be a novel experience for them. Who can dare say it is not in their nature to respond to the higher and finer forces? They have the same soul that I have." (Peshawar, 6/10/38).

²Ibid., p. 191, (train to Bardoli, 2/1/39; H, 7/1/39).

(Cont. from p. 195) I say, "you have never tried the method on any scale. In so far as it has been tried, it has shown promising results." (Sevagram, 17/7/40; H, 21/7/40).

This again is an expression of faith, not an argument or demonstration, or proof. But again, validity in asserting analogy requires knowledge of both components. Gandhi admits to fundamental ignorance¹ on the spiritual or ideal side from which he invokes an ultimate value, validity, and potency for his arguments and methods. Though when he applies this to the area covered by our general commitment and even extends its scope with a clearer analysis and more powerful methods than presented under any previous conceptions of non-violence and pacifism, he tresspasses his own limits when he applies the same analysis across the categorical boundaries represented by the prima facie case and common sense criteria in arguments against the justifiability of violence.

¹Ibid., Gandhi writes about the inherent recalcitrance of human action, and especially non-violent action, to rational analysis: "Every action is a resultant of a multitude of forces even of a contrary nature. There is no waste of energy. So we learn in books on mechanics. This is equally true of human actions. The difference is that in one case we generally know the forces at work, and when we do, we can mathematically foretell the resultant. In the case of human actions, they result from a concurrence of forces, of most of which we have no knowledge. But our ignorance must not be made to serve the cause of disbelief in the power of these forces. Rather is our ignorance a cause for greater faith. And non-violence being the mightiest force in the world, and also the most elusive in its working, it demands the greatest exercise of faith. Even as we believe in God in faith, so have we to believe in non-violence in faith." And further; "the tug-of-war will never end war, and that...will only end when at the crucial moment a body of pacifists have at any cost testified their living faith by suffering, if need be, the extreme penalty. I know the point for me to consider is not how to avoid the extreme penalty, but how to behave so as to achieve the object in view. Where the very disturbing but potent factor of faith is part of one's conduct, human calculations are of no avail. A true pacifist is a true satyāgrahi. The latter acts by faith and therefore is not concerned about the result, for he knows that it is assured when the action is true...In the coming test pacifists have to prove their faith by resolutely refusing to do anything with war whether of defence or offence." p. 217, (Rajkot, 9/4/39; H, 15/4/39).

6) Non-Universality of Satyāgraha: Principal Criticism of Gandhi's "Law of Being" Argument As Basis of Practical Methods and Argument (His Mis-analysis of Human Rational and Moral Nature) - Speaking specifically to those who argue against non-violence as a "Law of our Being", Gandhi writes,

The first argument (that there are some human beings who are incapable of responding to non-violence, and rather are provoked by it to greater violence), if it is valid, cuts at the very root of the anti-war movement, which is based on the assumption that it is possible to convert Fascists and Nazis. They belong to the same species as the so called democracies, or, better still, war resisters themselves. They show in their family circle the same tenderness, affection, consideration, and generosity that war resisters are likely to show even outside such circles. The difference is only of degree. Indeed Fascists and Nazis are a revised edition of the so-called democracies, if they are not an answer to the latter's misdeeds...The late war has shown that both combatants were guilty of falsehoods, exaggerations, and inhumanities. The Versailles Treaty was a treaty of revenge against Germany by the victors. The so-called democracies have before now misappropriated other people's lands and have resorted to ruthless repression. What wonder if Messrs. Hitler & Co. have reduced to a science the unscientific violence their predecessors had developed for exploiting the so-called backward races for their own material gain? It is therefore a matter of the rule of three to find out the exact amount of non-violence required to melt the harder hearts of the Fascists and Nazis, if it is assumed, as it is, that the so-called democracies melt before a given amount of non-violence. Therefore we must eliminate from consideration the first argument, which would be fatal if it could be proved to have any content in it.¹

Gandhi has not proved anything but again only asserted a condition of the validity of his argument and outlined how he should like the universe to be in fact, for his argument to go through. Aside from Gandhi's assertions it is ever an open question whether the violent opposition is susceptible

¹Ibid., p. 216, (Rajkot, 9/4/31; H, 15/4/39 - paren. mine). It should be noted that Gandhi presents a second line of defense more promising if not satisfying the radical empirical claim, viz. that even if one may not reach a Hitler, the German peoples, or the Japanese peoples, or any aggressor nation will undoubtedly in large measure respond to the finer forces of non-violence once the authoritarian oppression (which cannot last forever) is

at the limit of argument and not that within the scope of normal or strained conditions he is right that that they may not have similar behaviour patterns and affections. It is the constitutive limits of the patterns and affections, and their factual recalcitrance or even their reactivity, that is in question. Reassertion of the facts of coincidence over a certain range is no proof of universality. These arguments therefore, only reassert the conditions of faith that attach to Gandhi's methods, it seems as required to push their use and the demonstration of their factual potency to their true present limits, whatever the theoretical, or assertion of sentimentally hoped for, universality of scope.

Gandhi further delineates the form of the universality of non-violence, asserting that human nature is instinct with reason, the spirit of accommodation, and basic moral discrimination and urge to non-violence. He argues that the essence of non-violence is the natural ascendancy and acceptance of reason to examine and adjust conflicting claims¹ and also that experience

is lifted. (p. 339; Sevagram, 6/8/40; H, 18/8/40); or, in later generations, when the deeds of the present are seen for what they are (pp. 429-30, Ltr. to "Every Japanese"; Sevagram, 18/7/42; H, 26/7/42); the German nation no less than any other would not fail to respond to the human suffering of non-violence (p. 191, train to Bardoli, 2/1/39; H, 7/1/39); and finally, however hard hearted the leaders and generals, the troops in the field could not long stand the sight of rows of innocent men, women, and children readily and without malice, but in gentle appeal, presenting themselves to sword and bullet-- "The army would be brutal enough to walk over them, you might say...an army that dares to pass over the corpses of innocent men and women, would not be able to repeat that experiment." (Ibid., p. 117, YI, 31/12/31; and p. 417, train to Wardha, 5/4/42; H, 12/4/42).

¹Ibid., see fn. #1, p. 352-53, on Gandhi's faith in reason as another name for non-violence and the form of its functioning.

shows¹ that reason is often rutted and mired in wrong belief and prejudice. Gandhi asserts that this unreason can never be beyond remedy by the satyāgrahi's self-suffering which reaches directly into the heart and touches the soul of the opponent, awakening and cleansing from within, straightening and rejuvenating, by soul-force, which alone has these capabilities, the reasoning faculties distinctive of human nature. This is a reformulation and reassertion of his faith, in a more specific and detailed form, focused on the practical mechanism and operative factors postulated in his non-violent methods.

The fundamental question is whether all human form is constituted from human nature, or may (1) in fact be an outer deceit (the chief attribute of demonic proclivity, and the first means of desire in its exclusive pursuit of its own ends) by an intrinsic evil nature and force, or an incorrigible overbalance of evil tendencies and recalcitrant, well-exercised, passional elements in a human being, or (2) in fact, only an outer biological form which covers a very large span of spiritual evolution, including the very nearly brute and the very nearly divine elements. In either case, it is highly dogmatic

¹Kripalani, p. 82, IV:20; "...the refusal of the government to give a simple elementary redress of proved wrongs that we had asked for. And so, in 1920, I became a rebel. Since then the conviction has been growing upon me, that things of fundamental importance to the people are not secured by reason alone but have to be purchased with their suffering. Suffering is the law of human beings; war is the law of the jungle. But suffering is infinitely more powerful than the law of the jungle for converting the opponent and opening his ears, which are otherwise shut, to the voice of reason. Nobody has probably drawn up more petitions or espoused more forlorn causes than I and I have come to this fundamental conclusion that if you want something really important to be done you must not merely

to insist that human nature can be adequately analyzed by such simple dichotomies as Gandhi applies. If Gandhi's characterization were meant to define "humanity", and that range of rational faculties and moral consciousness generally covered by that term, and the real target of Gandhi's methods, there would be no argument. His methods may even be accepted as the ideal means for exercising that human element and evolving "humanity" towards its ideals of reason and graciousness. But Gandhi's claim is based on the insistence that all human form (appearance) has this incipiently responsive human content (reality) ever morally parturient. Gandhi does not believe himself to be recommending a form of analysis but stating the factual case. The factual situation has a direct bearing on the adequacy of Gandhi's methodological reduction of his ideological axioms and claims.

Gandhi phrases his own recommendations of non-violence with the rhetorical conditionals, e.g. if the world does not change its ways and Hitler succeeds, "it will be one more proof that the law of the jungle is still a great force in human affairs. It will be one more proof that though we humans have changed form we have not changed the manners of the beast."¹

satisfy the reason, you must move the heart also. The appeal of reason is more to the head but the penetration of the heart comes from suffering. It opens up the inner understanding in man. Suffering is the badge of the human race, not the sword."
(YI, 11/4/31)

¹N.V.:I, p. 230, (Sevagram, 11/9/39; H, 16/9/39); also p. 160; "Though we have the human form, without the attainment of the virtue of non-violence, we still share the qualities of our remote ancestors, the orangoutang." (H, 8/10/38).

6) Gandhi Acknowledges Human Incurability to Non-violence: Defeat of his "Law of Being" Argument, and Therewith his Total Practical Position - Behind such recommendations there is always the rhetorical force of judgment that "of course one wants to and could be truly human and responsive to non-violence, if only one did, as he ought, choose to be so." Gandhi's claims aside, his use of the term "humanity" is de facto commendatory as often as descriptive. The admission of latent animal tendencies that may not be responsive to non-violence is all the common sense view requires.

Gandhi, however, goes further,

I do not say that ("The August revolution caused a setback in the struggle for independence"). In the historical process the country will be found to have advanced towards freedom through every form of struggle, even through the August upheaval. All that I have said is that progress would have been much greater if we had shown the non-violent bravery of my conception.¹

He even directly acknowledges that human beings may be irredeemable, and require forceful, and even violent and destructive means to curb their evil and violent tendencies, and to frustrate their unremittingly self-interested actions and designs. He writes before beginning a fast unto death that he has

rehearsed...the possibility of a wide fratricide" following his action, as he recognized that in the Mahābhārata "the Yadavas had destroyed each other before Lord Krishna's death...but he (Gandhiji) was too insignificant a moral to produce such an effect. However, if the people had become indolent and vicious like the Yadavas and God saw that there was no way out but extermination, he might take even an ordinary person like him, the instrument of such a catastrophe."²

¹N.V.:II. p. 5, (on train to Madura, 2/2/46; H. 10/2/46).

²Gandhi, Mohandas K., Delhi Diary, (Ahmedabad: Navajivan Publishing House, 1948), p. 364, 21/1/48.

This is acknowledgment that there may be cases of incorrigible evil, incorrigible to non-violence, in which violence does become justifiable by moral necessity. The method of such extermination may be to turn evil violently against itself.

Gandhi might be thought to counter with the argument that God alone has moral right to destroy by violence what he has created and can re-create, and in the process of violent chastisement is in fact re-creating. This argument need not be met. All that is needed is the admission that in fact some things that look like human beings may not be so, or may be so little evolved, or so possessed of evil tendencies, that there is nothing in their constitution that has the capability of responding to soul-force in a non-violent way much less of responding to reason and moral gesture, or non-violent action. These are empirical matters that cannot be read out of existence by ideological inspiration, analysis, and program. It is such cases that are met by the prima facie criteria for using violence as a last resort--viz., when reason and moral sense have been probed, and tested, and cultivated beyond the point where even unreasonable doubt could hesitate. Where that point lies depends very heavily on perceptions, particular circumstances, and sensitivity of judgment but the principle is clear. That is enough for the present argument. Gandhi's claim is unwarranted that there is no creature irredeemable by non-violent force, and that therefore there is by laws of nature always available to be discovered non-violent means and precise degrees of self-suffering adequate to the task of conversion of the opposition and adjustment of conflicting claims. Gandhi's ideal

principles, their advisability, and the aspiration they represent are not in question, but only whether the factual basis of their present methodological reductions to practice obtains. If these claims fail, as it is evident they do, satyāgraha cannot have the universal application and perfect practical efficacy claimed, and it cannot fill the role Gandhi required of it in his mission against the justifiability and use of violence for every practical purpose whatever.¹

7) Critical Summary of Satyāgraha as the Practical Form of the Law of Life - The maxim "two wrongs don't make a right" clearly does not apply to violence as Gandhi believes, unless the second violence is retaliatory as delineated in his ideological analysis. If violence does not necessarily (per Satyāgraha) involve an evil motive of anger or hate and such evil reactive motives are displaced by a motive of duty or of moral obligation, a return of violence against violence or even the use of strategic deceive may produce a balance of right and its use thus prove wholly justified by an ultimate minimization of total violence. In such cases, but for direct intervention to counter incorrigible evil in its intentional use to harm, there would have been necessarily produced a balance in the other direction.

¹The final argument that non-violence is always right because self-suffering can always be chosen, assumes again that self-suffering is in a different category than killing others. But the universalizability argument shows the absurdity of this distinction. Further, the obligation of love at the basis of ahimsā asks "does the purity of this choice save others?" The practical component of Gandhi's non-violence itself requires maintenance of justice and life of others, and fight with evil. Here it has been shown that non-violence cannot claim always to suffice in that obligation.

It is wonderful how Gandhi can hold onto his simple and pure dichotomous views in the face of such imposing realities and impending destruction--how he cannot see that if life is the ultimate value he supposes, survival must itself be a good, and the motive of self-defense against incorrigible and insuperable evil must be in essence a right-making motive, having none of the necessary evil attachments that aggressive exploitive, reactive and retaliatory violence do have. His ambivalence about the virtue and value of life vs. its severe moral renunciation repeatedly and distinctly distorts his analysis, valuations, and assessments. Experience shows that there can be a moral motivation to violence. It is in almost everyone's experience an occasion of an active indignance on the side of justice or anger called up in service of love that not only does not blind, weaken, and bind, but chastens, sobers, and focuses and intensifies action and awareness; the very opposite that supposed in passive reactive and retaliatory anger that rises only out of desire and fear. The principle that "evil can be controlled or destroyed only by its own means", does not require, as Gandhi is lead to believe by his equation of inner substance and outer appearance of violence, that one assume evil motives and feelings of retaliation, anger, and hate, nor that one carry out ruthless or dishonorable actions to match those of the opponent. These would negate the advantage supposed to accrue to the weaker but just agent of a lesser force of violence, used intelligently and inspired by clarifying motives of love and justice. A match of evils

in every way, at all levels, would only cancel the wider goodness whose maintenance and protection were the object of the partial abridgment of moral rules that is implied in every use of violent means. The debate is over justifiability by use, and the principle is satisfied by the use of outer force against outer force, or restriction of subjective empirical forces by active intervention of soul-force, so long as the use of the forces is intelligently directed against the agency and vehicles of evil when no nominally more peaceful ways of protection, redress, or change are available or hopeful. The use is justified if it is sufficient to destroy the material vehicles and to frustrate the material strategies of the opposing evil. The use of violence in service of the good is not a fight with evil motives in the form of motives of the same quality and intent. It is only a contest in the application of force and material resources. Good use of force is easily conceivable as a proper means to the ends of subduing and controlling, or at least evading, evil's physical dominance and oppression. The moral conversion does indeed depend on the working of spiritual forces and transfer of spiritual qualities. But this violent material engagement and weakening is sometimes a necessary preparation for the subtler and enduring conversion by methods more overtly loving and reasonable.

2. Satyāgraha: A Coercive Force

a) Need for Positive Criticism: It may be admitted by the above critical examination that satyāgraha does not solve the practicalmoral problem posed in the last resort argument. This is a negative criticism expressing only what it fails to do by a standard perhaps external to it, if the radical claim could be so thought of. From Gandhi's standpoint it cannot be; but from the standpoint of the general critique of his satyāgraha, to understand its nature and use for other than doctrinal application, and to complete the program of the present critical examination and evaluation from the objective standpoint, it is necessary to give a positive critique as well.

Satyāgraha, contrary to Gandhi's analysis and to the canons of strict non-violence, is an essentially coercive force. If its use is to be recommended, as it will be under any but a strict non-resistance philosophy, its true nature and working should be known so that its use would be accurate and effective, measured and predictable.

b) Methods, Claims, and Facts: Gandhi's method of fasting is a focal point for examining the coercive character of his principles.

Gandhi gives detailed analyses¹ and repeated warnings² that fasting ought not to be taken up without careful consider-

¹Kher I, p. 285, (AOA, Chapt. I, ed., 1959, pp. 13-22.).

²Ibid., p. 297, (YI, 30/9/26, p. 342).

ation to eliminate all concomitants of coercive intent or effects, or even being mis-interpreted as coercive and so resulting in injury to the one who supposes the action to be offensive. But Gandhi's method of fasting was continuously challenged as coercive. He repeatedly rejected those charges and refuted them by drawing distinctions based on the satyā-grāha doctrine of self-infliction. Yet he admits coercive effects and those too of a large order in his own use of this his most potent weapon¹ of non-violence. He notes that fear of the beloved one's fasting may provoke good actions.² His fast against weakness on the part of colleagues in the untouchability campaign caused the "unintended consequences"³ of pressure upon the government to release him from jail. He thought it unfortunate that it went beyond the intention and coerced some people into giving a decision against their convictions."⁴

Gandhi believes that he escapes the charge of coerciveness by retreating to arguments about motive and intent. He writes that "in any examination of moral conduct, the intent is the chief ingredient."⁵ His intent was not to pressure government,

¹Ibid., p. 279, (H, 18/2/39, p.36 - to be used only as a last resort). Also, p. 321, (H, 21/4/46, p. 93; 310; (H, 4/3/33)

²Ibid., p. 284, (AOA, pp. 13-22_.

³Ibid., pp. 316-17, (H, 9/9/33)

⁴Ibid., p. 317.

⁵Ibid., p. 316.

or to compel agreement and ascent against conviction. But all disclaimers of coercive intent do not expunge the coercive effects and repercussions. Again, Gandhi wishes to undo real results with ideological distinctions of moral appeal.

c) Gandhi's Displaced Onus for Coercive Effects:

Methods Coercive in Principle and in Fact: Gandhi's use of fasting as non-violent weaponry in the positive practical sense of satyāgraha, is specifically intended to produce tangible effects and influences.¹ From the wider standpoint, there is all the force of Gandhi's tremendous reformist drive behind its use; this "insistence" is built into the concept and principles of its action. Though Gandhi recognizes the severity of the method and the imperative force generated, and though he admits the harm done by its wrong use and the extreme inadvertant effects of his own use, he nevertheless asserts that the method is non-coercive and legitimately non-violent--its basis he claims is self-suffering, and properly motivated, initiated, and guided, it can only harm the user if the cause turns out to have been an unjust one. He puts the onus on society which, in its weakness, succumbs to illegitimately undertaken or conducted fasts for private ends or "unworthy" ends, and says that "such fasts will be robbed of the taint of coercive and undue influences and like all human institutions...can be both legitimately and illegitimately used."²

¹Ibid., p. 280, (VI, 28/10/26, p. 342); "Satyāgrahic fasting, i.e., when you seek to influence people by fasting." Also, p. 318; "The fact is that all spiritual fasts always influence those who come within the zone of their influence. That is why spiritual fasting is described as tapas. And all tapas invariably exerts purifying influence on those in whose

But if his principle of ahimsā is radically and forcibly heteronymous, satyāgraha is the practical reflection of this heteronymy, and it is no less coercive because of Gandhi's disclaimers and ideological dichotomizing. The onus cannot be thus shifted.

Gandhi defines violence rigorously in terms of the synonymy of moral and practical, and in terms of the resultant correspondance between motive and objective effect of damage or injury. But this restrains moral judgment to motive alone and excuses patently violent and coercive results by rationalization in terms of his moral ideology. His distinctive reasonings seem compelling because of their rhetorical reliance on the general commitment. He rhetorically calls his actions the "coercive":

If it is agreed that my fast sprang from love, then it was coercive, only if love of parents for their children or the latter for the former, a love of husband for wife and wife for husband, or to take a sweeping illustration, love of Jesus for those who own him as their all, is coercion... And, if all this love could be regarded as coercion, than the love that prompted my fast, and, therefore, my fast, was coercion, but it was that in no other sense.¹

d) Coercive in Effect: Coercive in Principle: Therefore Coercive: No one would want to deny this argument on the basis of the careful analyses that Gandhi gives of his fasts and their correct motivation. But de facto questions cannot be divorced from that of principle. "Love" does not conceptually omit violence and coercion except under ideological interpretation. Gandhi's equating of moral and practical in con-

¹Ibid., P. 307, (H, 11/2/33, p.2).

siderations of non-violence represents the truth that one is not automatically morally excusable for results not comprehended in or even contrary to the originating motive and intent.

The maxims "know them by their fruits," and that "one cannot see one's own back," are patent. Gandhi is constantly aware that his own intense interpretation and effort at authenticity and fidelity to his ideals are also susceptible to the intrinsic limitations which these maxims caution one to be wary of and softened and humbled by.

Gandhi does not deny the coercive fruits but he either re-lables them according to his motives and intentions which are formulated in terms of non-violence, or he relies on the logical necessity of limited liability for morally imperfect beings. This is unobjectionable when looked at in theoretical terms or as matters of principle in the abstract; but, again, the real possibilities and conditions of application cannot be ignored when invoking principle and theory in terms of a practical philosophy and its real application. The indexicological situation is that the application must also be governed by fundamental principles, whereas Gandhi shifts to his theory of the ideal as a regulative idea when he faces the problem of application; this may protect the ideal but also renders it impotent but for the rationalist's faith required for its abstract invocation. Gandhi's foundational requirement of "Faith" in his ideals and methods is as much instinctual in response to this situation as theoretical in reflection on it. If the motive force is constitutively and in fact violent or coercive,

it is not rendered "non-coercive" by the theory under which it is initiated and operated.

e) Insistence on Coercive Methods: Terrible Pressure of Reformist Ideology: The especially difficult form of this assertion to counter (in which the common sense position is put on moral defense) is that "one ought not to be deterred from right action when one is sure of the rightness..."¹, and that "like everything that is good, fasts are abused That is inevitable. One cannot forbear to do good, because sometimes evil is done under its cover,"² and though he recognizes how

ridiculous fasts spread like plague and are harmful, when fasting becomes a duty it cannot be given up...what I do myself, I cannot prevent others from doing under similar circumstances. It is common knowledge that the best of good things are often abused.³

Gandhi not only admits the critic's arguments but, by means of the argument of universalizability, he enlists their sympathies for his moral obligation not to deter others who are, as he is, under compulsion of a "duty". But "duty" for Gandhi is used always as defined in terms of satyāgraha, and satyāgraha postulates the duty of "insisting" on Truth and Goodness as one sees it, just as if they were Truth and the Good absolute.⁴

¹Ibid., p. 278, (H, 24/12/47, p. 476).

²Ibid., p. 331, (H, 15/4/33, p.4). ³Ibid., p. 321, (H, 21/4/46)

⁴Kripalani, II:61, pp. 64-65; "What is Truth? A difficult question; but I have solved it for myself by saying that it is what the voice within tells you. How then, you ask, different people think of different and contrary truths? Well, seeing that the human mind works through innumerable media and that the evolution of the human mind is not the same for all, it follows that what may be truth for one may be untruth for another, and hence those who have made these experiments have come to the conclusion that there are certain conditions to be observed

The rhetorical devices do not support his position against charges of coercion but merely clarify his own translation of it in specifically practical terms.

That the conditions of satyāgraha fasting (and all satyāgraha methods) are narrow and imperative. They do not justify its use against charges of their coercive character and effects if that imperative force is only ideologically generated and totally internal to the conception from which the method and actions are derived and on the basis of which their motivation and practical effects are described and evaluated.

f) Sources of Coerciveness: 1) 'Terrible Pressure of Reform' - The de facto circumstance of the debate is that behind Gandhi's reasonings and practice is the constant and terrible pressure of reform. That it is claimed to be only a "moral pressure" and in no way obliging or materially compelling, and that it is intended to carry only such force as does not change the character or results of that force and of the program of its propagation from what can be accurately described as "non-violent" in the strictest terms. But given the average

in making those experiments...It is because we have at the present moment everybody claiming the right of conscience without going through any discipline whatsoever that there is so much untruth being delivered to a bewildered world." (YI, 10/27/21). Also; "Truth resides in every human heart, and one has to search for it there, and to be guided by truth as one sees it. But no one has a right to coerce others to act according to his own view of truth." II:62, p. 65; (H, 11/24/33); and I:130, p. 37; "I know that public opinion especially in Ahmedabad would not approve of my action and that it would read nothing but himsā in it. But I know too that performance of one's duty should be independent of public opinion. I have all along held that one is bound to act according to what to one appears right, though it may appear wrong to others. And experience has shown that that is the only correct course." ("The Fiery Ordeal", YI, 1928).

susceptibility to moral pressure, to moral praise and blame, and that this pressure is more subversive of moral autonomy because of its patent moral intent and theory, and because of Gandhi's personal moral status, the pressure involves the "insistence" that "āgraha" translates cannot be described as "non-coercive" in ordinary terms much less Gandhi's ideological stipulation.

2) Radical Heteronomy - There is a great pressure involved here (note how strong, pro and con, are reactions to Gandhi) and Gandhi's satyāgraha must be admitted to be greatly "coercive", but because of its particular coercive quality and not only adventitiously. Its coerciveness stems from the radical heteronomy that Gandhi's philosophy of non-violence and satyāgraha forces on moral consciousness. The heteronomous standard of non-violence is so thoroughly ideologically defined and so well fortified by its congruity with the common sense moral position as regards the use of violence and reason, that it compels self-judgment on principles and example, which is fundamentally contrary to what Gandhi admits is the basic moral principle, viz., autonomy and total moral responsibility and material liability.

3) Intent to Influence - Whether Gandhi's non-violence is coercive or not is a question of principle as well as effect. The concept of satyāgraha, he argues, includes the intent to influence and reform on the basis of a rational moral ideal.

4) Ideological Posture - But the theory of moral autonomy reflected in the spiritual aim of self-realization and its

moral and practical principle of svadharma, defines a human "material" absolutely individual and infinitely varied and rich. The moral and spiritual reality, according to Gandhi's account, ex hypothesi cannot be compassed by any narrow human concept and ideal based on it, no matter how formidable in practice or how forceful the personality that materially expresses it in that practice.

Gandhi, as has already been noted, argues that his ideals are in themselves inexpressible and that it is the ceaseless striving for the unrealizable ideal that confers spiritual force on one's thought and actions. He admits that one may be wrong in this translation to concept and practice. One may have a wrong belief and follow a wrong cause, so the first rule of non-violence is an alive and humble tolerance in the interests of truth, and a willingness to suffer and to never inflict suffering in propagating that translation of the ideal. He alleges that this is the beauty of satyāgraha, its built-in safeguard, viz., its wrong use and abuse recoil only on the user.¹ But there is already a strong coercive force in the very ideological posture that infects the gesture of exact conduct. There is a definite a priori limit and direction of what will be acceptable or exempt from judgment by the heteronymous standard; the reformist attitude itself constitutes a subtle judgment that answers to more than the immediate practical need and to the extent it supercedes that acknowledged necessity it constitutes a coercive or arbitrary and ancillary

¹Hingorani, ...Satyāgraha, p. 45, (H, 8/18/40).

force.

5) Moral Insistence - And if the satyāgrahi is wrong and the force of his suffering recoils on his own head, the force of his method against others is no less coercive; it is, if possible, more so, if the opponent is a beloved or well-wisher who is all the more helpless since the satyāgrahi is himself inflicting the suffering that he himself is insisting on. This leaves no recourse to the wronged party who also ex hypothesi does not want to yield force but now feels compelled to or to suffer quietly his mis-guided but sincere well-wisher's self-immolation. The "opponent" who could adopt the indifferent attitude recommended by Gandhi must himself be an advanced satyāgrahi. All others will suffer with the erring ahimsite. Because of the practicants unassailable morality, it is very difficult to defuse or defend against the de facto wrong or abusive use of the method. The beloved in whose behalf the satyāgraha was undertaken is often the weakest and most abused, the least capable of resisting such pressures, especially as the suffering falling on the practicant is recognized as needless.

6) Conformism to Great Ideas and Great Actions - The homogenizing force of propagation of and conformity to an idea that is implied in Gandhi's ideology and methods is de facto behind his practice and it required his constant defense and rationalization. Where not only principle and intended force are believed suspect (though arguably so much in line with common sense morality) but also the unintended effects are

manifestly and admittedly coercive, Gandhi is forced to argue on the offensive that "one may not be deflected from the right course for fear of possible but unintended consequences. If one were to be so deterred, it could be shown that hardly any great action could be undertaken."¹

This shows clearly the lacuna in reformist ideological and programmatic thought when it fails the indexicological test of self-reference in application. There is the presumption that such "great actions" are called for, and that the given ideal and reform is precisely the means prescribed by most fundamental truth and by all historical forces. That presumption is then justified on the basis of the manifest moral character and rational purity of an ultimate ideal that putatively captures the ideologue and is captured and applied by his ideology. The logic of the given position and praxis seems impeccable and is compelling, and the programmatic translation is urgent. The motive is constantly there to exhibit the favored ideal and thus to force events and persons to conform. It is unlikely that any one man's or group's ideology is adequate to analyze and control major historical processes and movements, or even large singular events.² Yet that is the avowed intent and constant pressure implied in the ideological posture and involved in its propagation. The moral onus added by the direct appeal to moral instead of only practical and political consciousness is even more radically imposing and distorting, regardless of its seeming wholly internal certification and recommendation.

¹Kher I, p. 317, (H, 7/9/33, p. 4)

²The single human being is far beyond ideological analysis; true and full science is required.

7) Social Norms - One condition Gandhi brings to insure his methods against coerciveness is that there should be no penance for inferential guilt.

There should be no room for doubt as regards the fault... one should not do penance for an act which he alone regards as wrong...the wrong must be one that is accepted as such by society...(that) is not penance but coercion where the wrong doer is not conscious of having done anything wrong."¹

This "wrong" is made relative to social norms. This has a social validity since the society must go on and standards behavior willy nilly maintained. But it is intrinsically a coercive mode of control measured by the standard of moral autonomy and by Gandhi's own absolute standard for what constitutes fundamental violence (See above, Chapt. I, pp. 20-21, and Chapt. II, pp. 31-32).

8) Public Opinion - The mechanism of enlisting public opinion, a large element in Gandhi's satyāgraha, directly appeals as a mode of fundamental coercion.

g) Ascetic Roots of Satyāgraha Coercion: In theory and intent some of Gandhi's fasts were instruments of self-purification with no ulterior motive, even of ideological purpose, that could possibly be a lever of coercion. But it has been shown that Gandhi models his methods on ascetic tradition practice, and ideals.² Gandhi says that as such they are direct appeals to God,³ and in fact are meant to compel his assistance.⁴

¹Ibid., p. 286, (AOA, I, 13-22).

²Ibid., p. 278, (H, 18/3/39); also pp.330-32, (H, 15/4/33,p.4).

³Ibid., (H, 24/12/47, p. 476); also, p. 300, (YI, 25/9/24, p. 319).

⁴Ibid., p. 310, (H, 4/3/33, p. 7).

This is the same attitude as found behind strikes and other satyāgraha non-co-operation methods. The object is coercion, whatever the disclaimer of intent or explanation of the operative mechanism; the principal motive is to have one's way, and the particular force enlisted to this purpose is totally adventitious, whether of a material or spiritual characterization. If Gandhi is consistent in considering all spirit material and all material spirit,¹ and all force to be of a continuum, then its use at all and to any purpose and intent (even to force divine succour) is the basic unavoidable fact, and this constitutes coercion. Its nature is therefore necessarily to draw equal and opposite reaction, and the self-centered intent, at whatever level, will be equally coercive, according to Gandhi's own stringent definition. The coercer, by definition, must become the coerced.

h) Gandhi's Definition of Coercion: Gandhi writes that,

If Bengal proves injustice, it will be an exception. In no case was there any idea of exercising coercion on any one. Indeed, I think that the word coercion would be a misnomer for the influence that was exerted by the fasts under criticism. Coercion means some harmful force used against a person who is expected to do something desired by the user of the force. In the fasts in question, the force was used against myself. Surely, force of self-suffering cannot be put in the same category as the force of suffering caused to the party sought to be influenced. If I fast in order to awaken the conscience of an erring friend whose error is beyond question,² I am not coercing him in the ordinary sense of the word.

¹Ibid., p. 291; "The answer is that just as there is identity of spirit, so is there identity of matter and in essence the two are inseparable. Spirit is matter rarefied to the utmost limit. Hence, whatever happens to the body must touch the spirit and whatever happens to one body must affect the whole matter and the whole of spirit." (H, 5/8/33, p.4)

²Ibid., p. 318, (H, 9/9/33, p.4).

This again is to re-assert his ideology in terms of a definition, and it does not answer the question raised.

The ordinary sense of the word merely says that the person is to be influenced against his will, restrained or compelled to do something or forego something. If there is an idea of harm in it, it is there implicitly in the self-centered nature of the motive that informs the coercive use of force. Ordinarily there need not be any active intent to harm. Gandhi defines his satyāgraha to obviate this condition which is not the central or essential factor in the ordinary sense. "Coercion", outside of Gandhi's non-violence ideology is usually not thought of in terms of harm or violence except as the method of the coercion or the regime that practiced it is essentially and overtly violent or brutal. This violence and harm is not tied into the definition as Gandhi does. Further, the idea of "using the force against himself" clearly has no place in the analysis of the ordinary term, and the categorical question he asks in relation to it is only a rhetorical one depending for its content and sense on the ideology he imports into his definition. Gandhi assimilates "harm" and "coercion", "violence" and "force"; he generates the distinction between force used against others vs. against himself; out of this he constructs his definition of "coercion". On the basis of this definition or recommendation, he may not be "coercing", but in terms of the ordinary sense he certainly is coercing, contrary to his claim for support by reference to the ordinary definition. It has been pointed out that empirical studies and ordinary usage

analyses (Chapter I, Section II, esp. Part C.) try to make out a clear distinction between "violence", "force", and "coercion", to avoid just these doctrinal assimilations, and to have a clear view of what materials are entering into our analyses and justifications of violence and non-violence from the common sense point of view on which we actually function. Gandhi's stipulative or commendatory definition needs to be examined in light of the ordinary usage and common sense sensitivities and understanding, just as earlier it was acknowledged that the latter needed to be widened and adjusted in light of Gandhi's work. if it was to become the basis for scientific investigation into the facts of action as it comes into question in the debate on justifiability. Is it possible to restrict suffering and harm to oneself as Gandhi avers? Not unless he denies his own rigorous definitions of violence and non-violence that constitute harm and suffering by material injury of whatever grossness or subtlety of level, and by abridgment of freedom and detracting from judgments of self-worth. If these are still acceptable and still measured by the objective and unchanging or absolute standard of the soul's perception, affections, moral career, and spiritual evolution, then Gandhi's stipulative definition of coercion fails. The force that communicates itself, whether generated by directing suffering against oneself or others, as an externally impinging factor as far as the "wrong doer" is concerned. Its presence to his practical reasoning is a constraining factor, either restraining or compelling him. If it is argued that in satyā-

graha the actually impelling force comes from within the wrong doer and therefore constitutes a moral force, the reply is that this is not the autonomous response or direction of soul force but only the reactive response of moral consciousness or practical consciousness under pressure of the satyāgrahi's forceful constraint. On the side of the satyāgrahi the stipulative element of the binding nature of all forceful or violent relations and interactions is evident. In consonance with Gandhi's definition it may be recommended that coercive force has been used when the resulting transaction satisfies the statement, "the coercer is coerced." In that case there is no need to elaborate the concepts and application of "violence", "force", or "harm". In the language of the Gita, the reformer, attached to his ideology and his reform, is caught and compelled by the reactions of prakṛti to his personalized actions upon it; even the moral or pure ideology, praxis, and program of reform actions, is gunically constituted (of sattva and rajas), not gunātita (independent of gunic action and reaction), so its actions will bind by reaction and the coercer will be coerced by attachment to his own ideas and efforts at purity. The standard under which he propagates his forces will be external to the svadharma of all others.

Gandhi's confusion of the ideal with the real may lead him to ascribe moral properties as constitutive of forces in the way the ideology dichotomizes them. But his advaitic and scientific positions do not warrant this arbitrary ascription.

Gandhi assumes the sure and superior position of correction of the wrong doer and the necessity that the "erring friend" will see that his error is beyond question. Error is determined beforehand by the penitent ideologically, so reference to it and actions on its basis will constitute coercion even if possibly it is redeemable by the benefit it will bring to the wrong doer if he is in fact influenced to change his ways and does in fact make amends for a real wrong. But this would put Gandhi's analysis in line with that of common sense justification allowing wholly evil coercion to be somewhat redeemable by its beneficent use and results. There seems to be no warrant for setting off the pressure generated by satyāgraha from that covered by the ordinary term "coercion" in its ordinary use.

Gandhi tries to give his analysis and distinction substance by setting his fasts in opposition to hunger strikes. He wants to bring out the difference between penitential and purificatory fasting and self-starvation for personal gain to emphasise that the difference lies wholly in the motive and that the central essential factor in the analysis is selfish vs. unselfish intent. Again, the moral point of view is supposed to separate categories of substantially differentiable forces and not merely to make indifferent and adventitious ascriptions.

Of course, it is not to be denied that fasts can really be coercive. Such are fasts to attain a selfish object. A fast undertaken to wring money from a person or for fulfilling some such personal end would amount to the exercise of coercion or undue influence. I would unhesitatingly advocate resistance to such undue influence...And if

it is argued that the dividing line between a selfish and an unselfish end is often very thin, I would urge that a person who regards the end of a fast to be selfish or otherwise base should resolutely refuse to yield to it, even though the refusal may result in the death of the fasting person.¹

Such advice looks very harsh. A fast is a terrible weapon because if it is wrong, the supposed wrong doer who is in fact right is defenseless against it, or forced to watch the beloved die, or to use counter-force and force-feed them. Nothing in the dialectic of these considerations can be considered innocent of coercive force.

In wider terms and in terms of principle, the benefit believed by the satyāgrahi to be conferred by his action is always the product of a comparatively limited understanding of the opponents factual existence and state, and the total situation, and the ideal itself under which the benefit is formulated is necessarily narrow and constraining as a logically generalizing and mentally reductive mechanism. The arbitrary element in the benefit must be significant and the Truth captured and insisted upon by the satyāgraha limited and constraining, while the insistence is forceful and compelling.

In sum, in satyāgraha it is the intent to propagate Truth and Good, and this propagation constitutes an inevitably coercive force; the very posture of ideology and programmatic reform, of self-assertion of right is coercive, and in the usual and most essential sense of the term. As such it cannot help but draw the reaction that Gandhi ascribes to violent interaction as its hallmark. The coercer is himself invariably

¹ Ibid., p. 318, (H, 9/9/33, p.4).

coerced. Truth as Freedom, the avowed aim of satyāgraha, cannot be realized or advance by methods of action built on essentially coercive principles that are applied with essentially coercive intent. The good intent does not compensate for the bad effects. Much more is involved compared to which the dynamics of the conscious intent are of very small order and consequence.¹

The following section is a "Summary, Assessment, and Application", of Gandhi's philosophy of non-violence as it has been presented in this critical exposition and evaluation.

¹N.B. - In the theory of karma factual or material liability and ethical responsibility include a component of the degree of self-consciousness of the factors involved, but that is more a conditioning than determining component in the total complex outcome. Gandhi takes note of this in insisting on the course of self-purification required for generating the efficacy that his satyāgraha does show. The difficulty for his analysis is that intent on propagating his ideology, constraining all use of force, the concepts of force and coercion are left at the level of categorical difference defined by the dichotomy violence/non-violence, while the whole (and Gandhi's loving personal application of it) operates at the advaitic level of metaphysical oneness and spiritually informed or divine love, where non-violence is not the imposing ideational form constraining all use of force, but the spontaneous result of any force used in service of that divine element.

Section V: Assessment, Summary, and Application

It remains to pull together the elements of the exposition and critical analysis of Gandhi's philosophy of non-violent action, and to examine its application in the present world situation in terms of the debate it was generated to foreclose. It is suggested that while Gandhi's empirical claim fails and he does not foreclose the debate over the justifiability of violence, his work may play a large role in averting large scale violence and even nuclear conflict, if it is adapted (1) on the personal level as an objective method of moral self-culture and sensitizing, basic to all other search and struggle for Truth and Justice; and (2) on the social level as a technique and tactic on a par and in conjunction with all other empirical methods that may naturally present themselves to a plural world struggling towards Justice, Freedom, and Peace as but it can by all means that present themselves as feasible and promising to a world not so nearly ideal as Gandhi's methods would require were they to unmodified and solitarily hold the field and advance the struggle.

A. Summary: Analysis, Assessment, Application

In assessing the validity and application of an ideal a clear and objective perception is wanted. Categories must not be confused or used to restrict reality a priori to any

ideal element. Judgment must be provisional and experimental since the conceptual apparatus is meant to generalize and to infer from particulars, and the growth of empirical consciousness is inconstant and progressively restricting and advancing through particulars.

Any mental formulation ab initio forces on understanding a limited and single appertured view of reality; and action based on that understanding in terms of that mental conceptual structure, must be coercive to the degree attention is focussed on the possession and propagation of that formation or view, or ideal, as the legitimate standard for reality to match.

Gandhi thus sets an a priori limit on Truth and categorical analysis by insisting that action on the ideal of non-violence is the only means to realize Truth, and that non-violence is equivalent to Truth at the limit.

Gandhi claims to have discovered non-violence in his search for Truth, while truthfulness came to him naturally. But his ideal of Truth is also an a priori formation--he assumes the moral necessity of making outer conformity to the ideal the realization and criterion of it. Satyāgrahic non-violent exact conduct constitutes that realization and criterion. His empirical claim is its ideological expression and logical outcome.

According to the analysis presented in this paper, Gandhi's methods have a definite power, scope, and viability. It has great utility in raising issues of reform and redress, defining claims, and defusing conflict. It greatly refines

the last resort criterion in material terms. It offers a set of new procedures to extend every benefit to latent good and reason in the opponent, and it gives a new weaponry (in some cases more powerful than physical violence) for meeting the limiting case of incorrigible evil. Gandhi's methods are nevertheless wrong in ascribing to soul-force a radical latitude and potency warranted only by ideological presumptions, and in making his empirical claim absolute and definitive of his philosophy and methods of non-violence. The radical nature of this claim based on that ideological position detracts from the valid core of his analysis and application, both in moral and practical terms.

If the analysis given heretofore is correct, then a definite type of necessity and limiting case satyāgraha may prove to be a viable substitute (sometimes no less coercive) for physical violence, but where violence (or forceful satyāgraha) is justifiable it is also required. Where non-violence is not a priori known to be always the right and practical means and violence is not known a priori to be always a wrong and inadmissible means, then there is need to ask where, when, how, for what purposes, and with what concomitants in mind, either force ought to be used. What is morally required is a reasonable assessment in place of doctrinal a priorism.

The present world situation is morally extremely complex. Even such a standout case as South Africa cannot be summarily addressed. Today behind every just claim against an oppressor there is a partisan self-interest which itself brings incipient

injustice into consideration. All interactions have a history and a future that are a morass of partially justified claims and counter-claims with no discernible beginning and no clear end. Truth of the claims of justice are not absolutely clear on any side, and the price paid for direct action of a severe sort, non-violent or violent, is too great. In either case equally great consideration and care both as to method and strategy, and as to how most generously and objectively fulfill the last resort criterion--to give every benefit of doubt to the extent of non-violent strategies to clarify that limit, to manifest that it has been reached, and still make effort to elicit latent good and the possibility of inspiring reasonable response.

Even in South Africa, one cannot say a priori they will never respond, or that the oppressed are perfectly free from taint against others; at least they will have malice in the heart to the extent they do not satisfy Gandhi's criteria of non-violence. Whatever justification there is then for direct action to alleviate an unjust situation or redress an acknowledged wrong, that evil will remain. Gandhi is correct in maintaining the severity of his ideal to keep moral perception clear, whatever may be the decision on morally justifiable action. Appeals and methods on a wide spectrum are required to give that assessment of necessity. Materially demonstrated content. Injustice and harm cannot be wished away or their effects undone, but short of war, sincere will to make amends and reparation of some sort, exciting in the abused party benevolence and forgiveness sufficient to cancel claims, and to de facto re-define

the "justice" sought and acceptable in flexible human terms of effort and sincerity rather than moral and absolute or mathematical ones.

The problem of non-violence is not peace as Gandhi argues, but justice. Because of his overemphasis on the external aspect of the moral (by the prescription for the moral convertibility of substance and appearance, ends and means), Gandhi makes life the highest value. This places a premium on a symptom rather than the causes of distemper. Besides, there are things one would die for. Gandhi many times undertook a fast unto death, and judged, as the essence of ahimsā and Satyāgraha, the voluntary choice of dignified death as the only answer to the insolent inhumane demand for submission and servility.¹ It is part of everyone's experience and moral inheritance, that there are things valued without which life would be more than meaningless, but a burden or a positive evil.²

Gandhi writes against superficial pacifist programs for denying conscription, or that merely call for disarmament.³

¹Kripalani, I:131, pp. 38-39, ("The Fiery Ordeal", YI 1938).

²It is a separate question whether one can at the critical moment live up to one's values and self-expectations; but on the other hand, it is a nearly universal human experience that often men respond as moral heroes and nobly, even cheerfully, suffer or die for values they never consciously cultivated or reflected on.

³N.V.:I, pp. 114-16; "To refuse to render military service when the particular time arrives is to do the thing after all the time for combating the evil is practically gone. Military service is only a symptom of the disease which is deeper. I suggest to you that those who are not on the register of military

Satyāgrahic non-violence is conceived as a practical moral instrument, and so aims at achieving tangible, predictable, moral empirical results, and must therefore look for real causes. Gandhi writes,

I have already pointed out in these pages to fellow war-resisters in the West are participants in war, even in peacetime inasmuch as they pay for the preparations that are being made for it and otherwise sustain government whose main occupation is such preparation...all activity for stopping war must prove fruitless so long as the causes of war are not understood and radically dealt with. Is not the prime cause of modern wars the inhuman race for exploitation of the so called weaker races of the earth.¹

And it has been noted above that Gandhi considers justice to be the condition of non-violence,² and it is the point of his identifying non-violence with its radical claim and prescription of exact conduct, that he believes non-violence to be the condition of peace which in turn is the aim and ultimate value. The terrorism that was rife in his time, and that is going on more widespread today, has its roots in territorial, ethnic,

service are equally participating in the crime if they support the State otherwise. He or she who suggests a State organized in the military way--whether directly or indirectly--participates in the sin. Each man, old or young, takes part in the sin by contributing to the maintenance of the State by paying taxes. That is why I said to myself during the war that, so long as I ate wheat supported by the army whilst I was doing everything short of being a soldier, it was best for me to enlist in the army and be shot; otherwise I should retire to the mountains and eat food given by nature. Therefore all those who want to stop military service can do so by withdrawing all cooperation. Refusal of military service is much more superficial than non-cooperation with the whole system which supports the State. But then one's opposition becomes so swift and so effective that you run the risk of not only being marched to jail, but of being thrown into the streets." (YI, 31/12/31).

¹N.V.:I, p. 94, (YI, 9/5/29).

²Ibid., p. 283; "(see) the lot of the most cultured and inoffensive people like the Danes and the Norwegians. This war

and economic domination, oppression, and exploitation. Gandhi noted that what are colonialism and neo-colonialism, but armed robbery,¹ and peace treaties concluded after conflict rising out of opposition to it nothing but a documenting of the split of the spoils. Such war aims and endeavour, such victory and treaty, only sowed the seed for future uprisings by the still oppressed, and among the victors a growing competition and malice.² Such treaties and adjustments of claim, as in World War I, are legitimized by might³ and not by right; they only create a Hitler and lead to a World War II. Gandhi called exploitation the "essence of violence",⁴ and called the peace

is showing the futility of violence. Supposing Hitler becomes victorious over the Allies, he will never subjugate England and France. It will mean another war. Supposing the Allies are victorious, the world will fare no better. They will be more polite but not less ruthless, unless they learn the lesson of non-violence during the war and unless they shed the gains they have made through violence. The first condition of non-violence is justice all round in every department of life." (Sevagram, 30/4/40: H, 4/5/40)

¹N.V.:II, p. 143; "War is a respectable term for goondaism practiced on a mass or national scale." (New Delhi, 9/9/46; H, 15/9/46).

²Ibid., I, p.233; "During the War of 1914-18 the declared war aims were the preservation of democracy, self-determination, and the freedom of small nations, and yet the very governments which solemnly proclaimed these aims entered into secret treaties embodying imperialist designs for the carving up of the Ottoman Empire...While stating that they did not want any acquisition of territory, the victorious Powers added largely to their colonial domains. The present European war itself signifies the abject failure of the Treaty of Versailles and of its makers, who broke their pledged word and imposed an imperialist peace on the defeated nations." (Working Committee's Manifesto, Wardha, 14/9/39).

³Ibid., 230; "...proof that the law of the jungle is still a great force in human affairs." (Sevagram, 11/9/39, H, 16/9/39).

⁴N.V., II, p. 157; "I have no doubt...that unless big nations shed their desire of exploitation and the spirit of

of the grave.¹ He considered mass rioting in resurgent India better than the morally stagnant, debilitating, and unnatural condition that prevailed in its recent colonial period.

Peace is a definite state and thus fits a dichotomous analysis, but justice is almost by definition a matter of balances. Unless categorically and ideologically bound to prescribed means, in the question of justice one is free to ask "which means"? Which of violent or non-violent means will in the given case be most likely to overwhelm evil, undermine it or actively defuse it (e.g., massive retribution, a possible, even no unlikely strategy for restoring the U.S. and USSR to justice after histories of exploitive aggrandizement). If the resultant really is justice, then the oppression half of the problem of peace is solved.

violence of which war is the natural expression and atom bomb the inevitable consequence, there is no hope for peace in the world." (Sodepur, 30/10/46; H, 10/11/46); also, p.227; "Peace through superior violence inevitably led to the atom bomb and all it stood for." (H, 30/3/47). Esp. see N.V., I, p. 258; "exploitation is the essence of violence," (Seva. 29/10/39; H, 4/11/39).

¹Ibid., p. 233; "...a sort of peace seemed to have been established in the Punjab through military occupation. That peace was the peace of the grave. The people were silently preparing for an open and deadlier fight...It was his firm conviction that the peace established with the aid of the military or the police would be no peace. True peace would only come when at least one side, if not both, adopted the true bravery that non-violence gave." (H, 6/4/47); also, p. 230-31; "When the Sepoy War was quelled by means of superior arms, outwardly things quieted down but the hatred against an imposed rule went deep underground, with the result that we are even today reaping the harvest of what was then sown...Similarly, but in a worse manner, if the Punjab quietened down by reason of superior force used against the people of the Punjab, the seed of further quarrel and bitterness between brothers and sisters that the Hindus and the Muslims were would go still deeper." (H, 30/3/47).

It is Gandhi's overemphasis on the outer form of action and resultant that leads him to reversing the formula and making the question of justice an absolute moral question answerable only in terms of complete non-violence, viz. the means of totally peaceful exact conduct of satyāgraha. He makes peace the condition of justice rather than justice the condition of peace; and he makes justice the empirically absolute and unrealizable term and peace the relative and graspable one. From this standpoint he addresses the limiting case, i.e., the last resort and necessity arguments and the criteria of common sense, to arrive at the confused equation of "two wrongs don't make a right" with "two violences don't make peace". If justice is worth dying for then killing for it is a greater value than peace. Non-violence in terms of the larger reality and resultant, and not only in terms of the immediate appearance of action and interaction in their local definition as "peace", must be a calculable and relative quantity.

In the question of achieving justice the problem of means cannot be decided simply by inspection and injunction that its immediate quality be peaceful. The ideal may be that peace which is the mutual expression of justice that has vital roots in an awake fellow-feeling and which needs only pure non-violent means to correct discovered disbalances. But the ideal does not exist in a vacuum. It is represented by an "aim in the situation", i.e., the practical is to be done morally. The ideal is in no way meant to be pure in the isolated way that Gandhi takes it. Its only limited realization is not a defect; but this is what a "moral" ideal is in complex reality.

What does one do in the given complex political reality if one is struggling towards the ideal of peace and non-violence? Gandhi makes of the maxim "Render unto Caesar what is Caesar's", a pacifist's weapon of non-violence, viz., give to surfeit in order to disarm him. Unless one is attached to his ideological interpretation as non-violent non-co-operation, this maxim is a counsel of pure practical non-resistance. One tactically maintains a low profile and gives what is required to reach the balance represented by common sense and the prima facie criteria, so life can go on non-violently until that limit is reached. Complicity with evil through compromise with the State is not the simple good or evil thing that Gandhi asserts (see above, fn. #3, pp. 230-31). and it does not unconditionally obligate all to dissociate and non-co-operate. To Gandhi the ever active evil principle requires ever active striving against it. But it is precisely this direct engagement upon which evil thrives and which would drain all but the staunchest ideological non-violentist.

Gandhi equates action with evil on his absolute dichotomous standard of good and evil, and he arrives at a pervasive moral asceticism, insupportable by any but the most advanced of moral practitioners.

B. Operative Core

The operative core of all struggle for Truth and Justice is self-sacrifice and renunciation or self-purification.¹ But

¹Hingorani, ...Satyāgraha, p. 86, (YI, 4/3/30).

this needn't bear the puritan and ascetic interpretation that Gandhi gives them, vis-à-vis., self-infliction and self-suffering¹. His refined and forceful puritanism leads him to a wrong theory of karma, a fundamentally punitive and "miserly"² theory of reality that is sparse and ungiving. Though Gandhi believes in an all good, loving, and gracious God, his theory identifies divinity with law and law with punishment. In the logic of Gandhi's concepts God figures as a punitive meter of just deserts, and "just" has a hard negative tone³ in his usage. One must beware what one sows because one will have to reap its consequences, or one should not complain because one is only receiving the fruits of one's own actions. These are totally negative readings or moral and practical law connecting action and reaction, fruits and actions.

Contrary to this reading it may be asserted that desire and joy are not evil in themselves, unless one imports the whole ideological apparatus that equates action with evil and empirical existence with violence and pain. Discounting these as has been done in the foregoing analyses, only the ill will or gross negligence and gross dereliction of duty would constitute evil because of the needless harm they inflict and because they in fact produce more pain than joy. They are evil because they are self-defeating (against reason, common sense, and simple

¹Gandhi's interpretation is his own, but more generally also; Kher I, p.275; The principles of religion are one thing, and practices based on them are another. The principles are absolute and irrespective of space and time. Practices change with place and time." (YI, 13/5/26, p.176).

²Gandhi's entire translation in the practical sphere, of non-violence as non-exploitation rests on the proposition that,

delight). "Gross" is not to be defined by supererogation of puritan concern or a work ethic. Theologically the implication should be a God who is wrathful and punishes for mere existence in empirical form. This has its basis in Gandhi's moral ideological equation of violence with evil with empirical life existence (see Chapt. I, pp. 9-11)--one has the body out of desire and is therefore violent (all empirical existence being constituted by violent activity) with no necessity but that of possession of the body which is required to fulfil desire; embodied life is inherently selfish, therefore violent, therefore sinful; and being constantly in a state of sin one is constantly under penalty of punishment; i.e., the pain inherent in empirical life-existence, and constant liability to transmigrate to receive the fruits of one's actions and pay the penalty of sin. But the Upanishads (see above, fn. #1, p. 80.) which Gandhi claims to draw upon principally in developing his theory and concept make the basis of life, creation and the joy and bliss of existence. The abhiniveśa (tenacity to life survival, will to life) of Patañjali that Gandhi interprets as

"the Divine Law...gives to man from day to day his daily bread and no more" (Kripalani, p. 119, VIII:6; YM, 1935), exactly the opposite of the conception of God and reality as creative and abundant, full and gracious, in essence.

³That Gandhi's own life and practice is exactly the opposite does not affect the analysis. If anything it highlights the difficulties inherent in that theory as a representation of the state aimed at, and Gandhi's own state and experience.

a fundamental selfishness and violence, and thus the radical source of sin, points rather to empirical existence and embodiment being joyous and precious, or why would all so tenaciously refuse to give it up? The suffering aspect must not be the reality that really moves one. So Gandhi's analysis must put more emphasis and weight on suffering than the facts merit. Need the theory be accepted if the conclusion seems so plainly to contradict the facts? It is on such a strong theory that Gandhi believes violence can be ruled out even for extreme cases of evil and circumstances of imposing injustice. But can violence be absolutely ruled out on grounds of a theory that seems a priori invalid in its evaluation of life existence upon which its concepts, aims, and methods of non-violence are founded?

To common sense there seems nothing intrinsically wrong with enjoyment on the one hand, or killing, on the other. One may be called upon to renounce possessions and consumption in non-violent methods, to kill in violent methods, both in defense of justice, protection of the weak, and redress and reparation of wrong; and one may enjoy the fruits of a just life. The struggle needn't constantly be sought out and "Caesar" constantly challenged. Gandhi's negative valuation of life and the aim of life as its negation in a completely supra-empirical concept of liberation and salvation (mokṣa), and his negative conception of the conditions of spiritual growth as fundamentally a process of moral austerity, overemphasise evil and its evasion.

But does not the human respond more readily to joy? Rather than the call to suffering? Suffering of non-violence may make its deep appeal to the human moral consciousness, its nobility and dignity, but joy of existence (to be differentiated in this case from particular momentary sense enjoyments which may nevertheless be part of this more basic joy), of fullness of being and activity, even in the form of war and fight for "noble" causes", makes its effective appeal also. In many, this experience has been known to go deeper, and to sober and inspire even more than moral suffering. There is no a priori way to rule out either as the appropriate and effective inspiration in any given case. Only on the basis of such a disbalanced view as represented in Gandhi's empirical claim and de facto morally purist ideology, can one make sense of the proposition that it is not right to kill evil but it is right to kill yourself instead. Though Gandhi's aim is the salvation of all, this, his fundamental method of non-violence, must be seen defacto to counsel and achieve only personal purity and salvation

Thus a wrong theory of action (karma), of divine inspiration, and of liberation, leads to a wrong theory of moral and practical political responsibility and reform, and to the unbalanced methods of putatively practicable, but presently untenable, mass asceticism. The operative core, common to all struggle for Truth and Justice, viz., self-sacrifice and renunciation or self-purification and suffering, need not have the exclusively ascetic orientation and puritanistic basis

that Gandhi makes its prerequisite by the interpretation of non-violence through the absolute dichotomy of his ideology and exact conduct of his practice.

C. Truth and Practice

Gandhi is correct that in deriving and applying practical moral methods the first requisite is Truth--what exists and how it works. The objective analysis of reality must precede all ideology, praxis, and practice. But it is evident from the above that Gandhi does not realize in his ideology and methods the objective ideal of Truth that he sincerely avowed, and that is called for by the empirical nature of the ultimate aim of practical ethics. Practicability and practical efficacy are essential and not ancillary aspects of moral inquiry. Here it is asked how Gandhi's ideology and active inquiry answer to these criteria of Truth and practice? How far is it a valid (practical and scientific) translation of the moral principles of sacrifice and renunciation common to all struggle for Justice, as adumbrated in the previous two sections? It is asked where does his work actually stand in practice and in his own estimate, in preparation for examination in the next section, of how his work in fact structures the new debate on the justifiability and use of violence.

Inadequacy of Ideology: Existence has never been known to answer exclusively to any ideological dichotomy or idea. "Right" and "wrong", specified only in terms of such presumptive bases must fail to do justice to the reality to be acted upon.

Ab initio right and wrong, good and evil, must be a matter of balances, experiment, and progressively refined criteria and judgment. Both metaphysically ultimate and categorically relative specifications may be accepted provisionally and used as fixed points to test moral ideas, but they may not be given special status as absolutes, as invariably do their originators and proponents. This is a characteristic of ideological consciousness and of the ideological orientation towards action (praxis). If the ideal of objective Truth is to guide inquiry, then categorical realities having fixed status and implications within a given ideological framework must be respected and must be tested in their own right independently of the ideological parameters that are brought to interpret them. They must be examined as they function in experience, common sense, and ordinary reflective consciousness, if inquiry is to progressively realize Truth in the practical sphere.

Gandhi's ideology and methods of non-violence fail to respect categorical realities in this way, as does any ideology or patently dichotomous analysis and ideal. Gandhi fully acknowledges his failure to realize the true method of non-violence, and the full practical program he aspired to. His own failure as its originator and most accurate and intense practitant and investigator, are the best argument against the radical viability and practicability that he claimed for his ideology and praxis.

Gandhi's "practical idealism" of non-violence is an intense but limited investigation of the practical potential

of only one ideal conception. Any such ideology can open only one aperture on the moral reality and the nature of moral practical action, viz., their reaction under practice in accord with its leading ideal. Great as Gandhi's application was, it had these inherent limitations of the ideological inquiry, and it too fixed on its own terms and explored only the scope of its own practical concept. It must not be missed that the greatness of his philosophy and methods of non-violent action is largely the result of the greatness, the extensivity, of his application and exploration of it. Its proper study must be as much a matter of hagiography as of logical and technical investigation.

The vastness of Gandhi's efforts and results with an ideal having such close affinities with the general moral commitment to non-violence and aspiration to peace is itself a certificate of the work's value. Its failure in its extreme form and effort has the character of a success. In its extreme and absolute form, as embodied in his empirical claim, Gandhi's non-violence oversteps the limitations inherent in the dichotomy he operates from. Failure is assured by the self-limiting nature of the mode of analysis and experiment employed; it cannot possibly warrant such a claim.

Gandhi's self-evaluations are significant on this point. The last two years of his life he tried to face incredible inter-religious and fraternal violence with his techniques of non-violence, in Noakhali, Calcutta, and Delhi. Without a study of historical records and first hand accounts it is hard to

grasp the magnitudes of the violence and to gauge the dimensions of his efforts and comparative success. His own assessment was failure of his technique and insufficiency of his own spiritual evolution and purity (innocence) measured in terms of ahimsā. Applied to the problem of criteria and mass application he writes,

that art of true self-defense by means of which man gained his life by losing it, had been mastered and exemplified in the history of individuals. The method had not been perfected for application by large masses of mankind and India's satyāgraha was a very imperfect experiment in that direction. Hence, during the Hindu-Muslim quarrel it proved a failure on the whole.¹

Gandhi did not, however, consider this failure to find the correct technique a failure of ideology, ideal, and praxis. He wrote,

'Hope for the future' I have never lost and never will, because it is embedded in my undying faith in non-violence. What has, however, clearly happened in my case is the discovery that in all probability there is a vital defect in my technique of the working of non-violence. There was no real appreciation of non-violence in the thirty years' struggle against British Raj. Therefore, the peace the masses maintained during that struggle of a generation with exemplary patience, had not come from within. The pent up fury found an outlet when British Raj, was gone. It naturally vented itself in communal violence which was never fully absent and which was kept under suppression by the British bayonet...this explanation seems to me to be all-sufficing and convincing. In it there is no room for failure of any hope. Failure of my technique of non-violence causes no loss of faith in non-violence itself. On the contrary, that faith is, if possible, strengthened by the discovery of a possible flaw in the technique.²

And in one of his last self-evaluations Gandhi wrote,

Whatever I have said does not refer in any way to the failure of Ahimsā, but it refers to my failure to recognize, until it was too late, that what I had mistaken for Ahimsā was not Ahimsā, but passive resistance of the weak, which can never

¹N.V.:II, p. 279, (Calcutta, 20/8/47; H, 31/8/47).

²Ibid., p. 344, (New Delhi, 11/11/47; H, 23/11/47).

be called Ahimsā even in the remotest sense. The internecine feud that is going on today in India is the direct outcome of the energy that was set free during the thirty years' action of the weak. Hence, the proper way to view the present outburst of violence throughout the world is to recognize that the technique of unconquerable non-violence of the strong has not been at all finally discovered as yet.¹

In spite of his extraordinary concept and enormous thought and work to give it substance, Gandhi could not help but find it to fail in the end because the claim he sought to vindicate was ab initio false; a limitless claim about limited reality is impossible to support. Empirical test of an ideology is completely circumscribed by presupposition; it provides a powerful tool for exploring a certain moral point of view and basis of action but it cannot test the interpretive framework that it presupposes in every self-evaluation through examination of results from that ideological standpoint and in terms of its founding and focusing dichotomies.

If Gandhi's own austerity (tapas) of ahimsā and asceticism of his satyāgraha way of life and social action could not succeed as projected, there seems little warrant to think that the mass application of his methods, in their ideological purity, is a tenable practical position.²

¹Ibid., pp. 316-17, (New Delhi 1/1/48; H, 11/1/48); see also, p. 314, (New Delhi 29/11/47; H, 7/12/47).

²It should be noted that paradoxically what Gandhi proposes as a metaphysically absolute and scientifically universal analysis and rule of life conduct turns out to be in fact only a practical recommendation of one way to go about in the world. Gandhi acknowledges that violence and evil have equal place in God's plan and that God kept him blinded to the violence in his own mass application of satyāgraha. He had "all along laboured under an illusion. But he was never sorry for it. He realized that if his vision were not covered by that illusion, India would never have reached the point which it had today." Ibid., pp. 279-80, (Calcutta, 20/8/47; H, 31/8/47). This is

It is concluded that as a general analysis of the working of moral consciousness and of the general commitment to non-violence in practical action, Gandhi's ahimsā and satyāgraha are a valid and important contribution to the philosophy and practice of non-violence, for its clarity, thoroughness, and range of real application and cases. However, the same clarity, intensity, and vigor in its ideological or absolute and universal application, respecting no limitations, render it invalid so far as these radical aspects are allowed to distort the theory and application as a whole. It fails on both logical and practical grounds to prove its empirical claim and to make good its absolute case against the justifiability of violence.

The critical question now becomes what is the role of his philosophy in that debate and what is its relevance for present moral-political practice, when it is recognized that the dichotomous analysis oversimplifies a vastly complex reality and without warrant postulates separate moral forces where experience seems rather to show a complex chemistry of moral qualities and properties characterizing an interplay of neutral forces.

tantamount to saying that in fact moral progress proceeds by means of violence as well as non-violence, only in his ignorance, it is better for man to follow only non-violence as a practical rule. This directly contradicts the absolute prescription and the proscriptive force of Gandhi's ideological claims and injunction.

Gandhi's basically sound and generally applicable analysis should be rendered a powerful practical aid once there is the requisite recognition of the origin and area of the inherent ideological invalidity of his philosophy and method. The practitant may assume that he is not wholly right even in the choice of the preferred non-violent side of the dichotomy, and that not ideal purity but the need and aim in the total situation and the total projected outcome, must determine the correct action. Correct action, is constituted simply by judicious and intelligent use of the forces at one's disposal. "Intelligent use" is that acknowledged by common sense, viz., balanced, objective, based on clear perception, reasonable, geared to the aim and given context, and independent of any a priori delimitations. but with adequate theoretic perspective, knowledge, and analysis of the components implicated in the problem to be solved.

D. New Debate

As has been shown previously (see above, pp. 55-62), the new debate on the justifiability and use of violence and practical uses of non-violence, is set by the two factors of the advent of nuclear arms and the advent of Gandhi's satyāgraha.

The atom bomb and the new generations of other mass destruction weaponry makes direct engagment with evil, and old methods of direct revolution on a popular scale obsolete. Local insurgency may go on but anything on a larger scale, or in strategic positions (e.g. Palestine and South Africa), has

direct implications for the nuclear powers. But for the balance and deterrent fear among them nuclear self-annihilation is the strong possibility of even minor misreadings of intent and resolve--or of a faulty surveillance system.

All conflict must be seen in the light of escalation to nuclear conflagration, mostly an unthinkable event. However, the magnitude and sui generis moral dimension of these powers and scenarios of such an escalation, raises the issues of peace and conflict with a new vividness and force. This debate is further sharpened by the contrast with Gandhi's non-violence, his own example against the British Raj and his work in South Africa, and efforts of proponents in various parts of the world notably Nehru in his non-allignment movement, Martin Luther King's human rights movements in the U.S., and various South African congresses in coalition campaigns against apartheid. His satyāgraha has been the chief resource in studies of non-violent social change, conflict resolution, and the new branch of sociology, peace science (Irenology). It may be found by future historians that his ideas of and faith in his practical non-violence have forestalled nuclear confrontation by the stark contrast they give to atomic warfare and the hope they offer to emerging peoples and nations who might otherwise have precipitously or more concertedly engaged colonial powers with violent means where the net effect might have been rapid nuclear escalation--weak peoples or sectors of larger nations also have then a means of engagement.

But it seems that violence cannot be ruled out in

in today's world where the current is so manifestly towards decolonization, self-determination, Freedom, and Self-development, and where rife injustice is no longer tolerable. The aim and moral thrust of historical and social forces seem to be always justice and freedom. There has been in this century a swelling refusal on the part of smaller nations to accept the oppressive debilitating peace of the status quo. The proclaimed aim is also evolution of a "family of nations" as an "organic unity", where only non-violent methods of adjusting contending claims or redress of wrong are entertained naturally and reasonably as between states within a nation.

But though the aim is an ideal community of nations, the starting place is a complex plurality of peoples, histories, and aspirations, and a conflicting array of claims rising out of the unchastened plurality that has not yet found its equilibrium. What will work to gain justice and freedom. There are many perceptions and claims none wholly true and none purely justified, yet all largely valid also. There are great bulwarks of historical inertia to overcome.

The question is not so much the final empirical form that the ideal may take but how best to struggle towards that ideal without destroying the conditions of its manifestation and operation by a choice of invalid means. What will work in a factually fractured plural world where this organic sense of co-operation is the exception, and then only within nation-states and not between them; when materialism is the ruling outlook, and its natural concomitants of greed and competi-

tion the de facto ruling international motives--for both haves and have-nots? What means can be used where the established oppressive and exploiting states have the monopoly on police technology and military power short of nuclear forces also?

The question must be what in such a world will move humanity, and each nation's humanity, towards the goals of justice and freedom? If there is no automatic universal non-violent method, always available and a priori guaranteed to succeed in realizing justice and freedom regardless of empirical circumstances as Gandhi claimed, and if the fight must progress somehow i.e. the world socio-economic situation is admittedly intolerable on any moral reading, then there must be some other way than either violent weaponry or Gandhian non-violence--the acceptance of plural methods without their homogenizing by any monolithic value system, adapted to specific situations and occasions. Violent methods must be equally acceptable where to their practitioners intelligent use seems warranted. Tolerance of all methods to advance the historical current is a natural corollary to the new debate on and analysis of the use of violence in a world constitutively complex in moral fact and plural in moral outlook and historical perception, and moral and practical presentiments.

This intelligent use of force, implies the same careful regard for Truth in both violence and in non-violence as Gandhi required for ahimsā and satyāgraha. By the previous analysis the truth would seem to be that non-violence is not the weapon of the strong in Gandhi's sense. That was the weapon

of a Gandhi. As a technique it must be regarded as a weapon of the empirically weak. Gandhi may have wielded that weapon with the extra-ordinary strength derived from his own spiritual resources but as a socio-political technique it is a strategic empirical instrument, the use of which has a component whose effective operation is a direct consequence of the degree of soul-force or moral strength brought to bear by the individual presiding over its use. Soul-force has its necessary place in the fight for justice. But in that instance it is not the universal spiritual weapon Gandhi conceived it to be. Gandhi must be considered the individual and initiatory force behind his techniques and campaigns. The forces released by use of the technique must be carefully distinguished from those conferred by the presiding practitant and also from those released by the method when used by such an individual-inspired force. It is the personal factor, the extra-ordinary access to supra-empirical force, and the will and wisdom to apply it in practical terms, that gave his methods the potency witnessed. Analysis of his methods and practice as such must be accurate, must proceed with this acknowledgement.¹

It is not the methods that were effective when applied under Gandhi's aegis, but his personal realization that is potent but which also had its patent limitations, since ultimately the categorical nature of empirical reality is

¹It is common knowledge that at the Calcutta and Delhi riots of 1947-48, Gandhi's mere presence had the electric and stilling effect that he had claimed was the final criterion of the active working of the force of ahimsā. "Enmity vanished in his neighborhood", and shooting stopped wherever he passed by. See Ibid., p. 327; (N.D. 8/12/47; H 14/12/47); pp. 199-200, (28/12/46, H26/1/47); p. 219, (H, 9/3/47). His presence stilled large crowds.

"limit" and unexpungable. It need not be denied that superior force can be drawn upon and brought to bear on empirical reality in manifestly moral and practical terms. But the ultimate limiting factor is always there in the nature of the medium through that which force must act to express the ideal of the agent of that force.

Analysis of Gandhi's methods, and practice meant to follow his lead, all fail to achieve his results because of inappropriate or inadequate empirical analysis. Empirical or scientific analysis generally fails to take into account the factor of personality and hagiography. The spiritual and moral facts cannot be discounted from the total problem any more than the empirical ones. Gandhi's work has given ample warrant for study in these directions.

What methods are finally enlisted is a matter of intelligent study and decision. Some advocates of violence claim it necessary to awaken the really oppressed from an inertia and irresponsive torpor. But violence also does not always work. Gandhi did awaken India with non-violent means. That India did not retain the impetus and momentum only verifies the importance of the presiding personality and his personal access to force and guiding judgment in the implementation of such methods for non-violent change. That the methods do work under given person-oriented conditions is a practical fact like any other. On the other hand, it is difficult to imagine non-violence, even with such as Gandhi leading, working today in South Africa, just as it was repeatedly questioned how a Gandhi could do anything to overcome the evil of a Hitler,

Localized conflict, however approached, exists against the background of the large nuclear dilemma and the pervasive materialistic value system and surging technological advance. Will unilateral disarmament solve that dilemma? No, because if the will is there, viz., the motive to dominate and accumulate, hegemony and greed, the arms will be rebuilt or surreptitiously built all along--cyclically dismantled in show of trust, and cyclically re-assembled in feigned peak. Murphy's law certainly has point and is certain of operation in a world so technological-sophisticated, so morally cavalier, and so politically irresponsible and unreflective. The cycles could not be perpetual and the breakthrough could come only by sincere change of heart, inevitable accident, or inevitable mis-calculation by perception governed by ill-will, mistrust and fear.

The moral climate is not such that unilateral show of trust and good faith could be met by its like. Among the super powers both sides do not make that move because each really does not want to give up its will to world-domination, material or ideological, the latter perhaps the more subversive whether by feigned democracy or feigned communism, feigned capitalism or feigned socialism, all abused in the interests of feigned nationalism. All sides recognize their image in the others and see through this feigning behaviour to the real intent and motive forces. Sincerity and Truth stand out in this climate, as did Gandhi's. A slight shift in the adversary posture is the more noticable.

Negotiation in such a climate and among such adversaries

is only a "gamble" to win without paying even the price of honest war.. Its mechanism is deceit and shrewdness, so its operative principles are untruth and violence. It is hard to understand how Gandhi could conceive the conversion of this willfully demonic (glorified and magnified ego in the guise of national interests) posturing and manipulating or gaming, through unilateral application of just the principle that all other sides hope to prey upon and delight in scheming to achieve. Where there is no real basis for moral regret there is no leverage for moral force, and unless possessed of Gandhi's faith in the force and truth of an opposing moral ideology there is no warrant for arguing in favor of unilateralism aside from naivete or deceit and ploy. Unilateralism would invite attack because the real will and motive is to win, not to settle justly and amicably. The chief cause of unrest and lack of peace is injustice and exploitation, i.e., taking without paying; of these, greed; of this, the materialist outlook and value system.

Gandhi was correct in his last assessments that the solution must lie with the individual. Only if greed is irradicated from the heart and mind can there be naturally that organic unity and family relations and feelings among masses and nations of men. Unilateralism is in that context not a principle, technique, or doctrine, but merely the natural opening move of one side in a negotiation of like-minded parties faithfully entering a mutual decision procedure. It is not a calculating gamble seeking unearned return at high risk.

It is a gesture of good will and surity. Without this change of heart, will, outlook, and values, nuclear disarmament talks can only be either endless unto exhaustion of all energy and resources, or end in mutual suicide. So long as material values and aspirations of aggrandizement and hegemony govern human relations, so long will "today's" local revolutionaries, as in the past, be tomorrow's reactionaries. The change of heart, outlook, and values itself requires recognition of a source of satisfaction and fulfillment that is independent of transient empirical conditions and necessarily limited and unpossessable materials. This is what Gandhi refers to as the necessity to recognize the permanent element in oneself, recognition of which itself is a delight and quenching that cannot be accomplished by the self-re-stimulating sense and mental life. The real peace, that which is substantive and effective, which creates that external climate in which negotiation and unilateralism become effective gestures and procedures, is an inner state and modulation of the subjective empirical being. Being itself fulfillment it does not seek and exploit, or harm for gain, but rather it gives because its reality is wider than that of empirical individuality and relative to empirical nature its nature and activity is abundance and accomodation. This feeling and fullness alone can create the true just conditions in which external peace is possible, and negotiation and unilateralism and disarmament meaningful. If the aim of all powers involved is external claim of right to possession and domination, there can be no justice,

no real peace. How to pursue that aim in the midst of unpeace and in the effort to surmount it is the question of the new debate.

On this reading, Gandhi's radical claim commends often pointless suicide. It cannot be the noble justified death or self-immolation that is ultimately justified by its practical efficacy. Without the actual efficacious resultant, the nobility must look like foolishness and the virtue like carelessness and bravado. Though as a personal act, if it is authentic it may lead to personal salvation in recognition of that permanent moral and spiritual self-identity. But as an element in the practical social ethic that Gandhi's claim is meant to realize, self-immolation of satyāgraha may often be a mistake, and often a positive harm therefore to the cause one wants to build up. Individual salvation correctly is not the point, but individual realization is necessarily the large and fundamental part of the solution. Social wisdom and practical accuracy are required rather than ideological commitment. Individual responsibility, decision, and action, are finally the point and the means. Means in a situation that is too complex ab initio to be comprehended in any ideology, praxis, or pragrammatic intent, much too rich to be accurately depicted the black and white, straight and angled, terms of dichotomy, must be determined in full cognizance of and humility to the fact that no simple rule or conceptual reduction can do justice to the reality faced and the action and commitment required.

Whichever method is decided on as the intelligent choice, the one according best with the historical current towards justice and liberty, the one matching the corrigibility or its lack in the opponent, the one respecting the state and history of the oppressed, as also that of the oppressor, who also has his point and his truth, the one that respects and builds on one's own evolutionary stage, spiritual status, socio-economic role, and present state--Gandhi is correct that mass methods have their dramatic appeal and large effects, but that their basis and purpose is always the individual's conversion, purification, training, preparation and growth. More generally, the basis of intelligent struggle, violent or non-violent, is the purification of one's own heart and mind of greed, anger, and hate, i.e., ego and desire, attachment and aversion, attraction and repulsion. This has its practical, as its spiritual and moral, bearing and aim.

The objectivity necessary to any practical endeavor, and more so to moral struggle, is impossible if clarity, balance, and authenticity are not there. The distorted and highly modulated subjective empirical states of greed, anger, and hate destroy inner peace and objectivity. Common to both violent and non-violent struggle are self-sacrifice and renunciation or purification as Gandhi said of Satyāgraha.¹ Especially, non-violent methods require the patience, non-possession, and willingness to suffer, not merely to convert the opponent as

¹N.V.:I, p. 115; 'In methods of non-violence, "The policy would vary with different countries, but sacrifice and self-denial are the essential points." (YI, 31/12/31).

Gandhi believed, as a spiritual principle, but simply to outlast the evil whose will is attached to desire and circumstance which are more transient and less sustaining than motivation by the higher ideals of justice and freedom that sustain the oppressed in his struggle. Sacrifice and renunciation are the operative factors in all struggle, material as well as moral and spiritual. What one wants determines the dimensions and particulars of what will be given up and what suffering sustained in favor of the objective to be gained.

The efficacy of Gandhi's non-violent non-co-operation and civil disobedience needn't be underestimated. In principle there is no reason why such large and complex state mechanisms such as the USSR and the US should not succumb if adequately paralyzed from within. But this is not a problem of soul-force. It is a problem of empirical reality and strategy. It may equally be said that without soul-force being active in the people such corporate renunciation is unlikely. What would replace the joys given up, and where would strength come from to sustain the suffering implied in the renunciation required by the methods whether used on spiritual principle or principles of empirical and practical strategy? This is a problem for experimental non-violence and historical and social studies of a deep and specific kind to find out what spiritual and moral resources may be tapped and how by a given population and in a given circumstance and historical context. Gandhi suggested the non-violent method to Europe¹ for "deliverance" of its masses

¹Ibid., pp. 33-34; Asked how the masses exploited by the ruling classes might use non-violent methods to attain justice,

from its own ruling classes. He gave scientific evidence of the potency of congregational chanting of the Name of Rāma--not a difficult efficacy to understand for gaining corporate strength and power considering the essential spiritual character exhibited in a far less refined form in the contemporary rock show. His advocacy of "simple living and high thinking" both for hygiene and health reasons as also strategic reasons to have one less point of leverage for the exploiting powers to gain power through, translates easily to the rising environmental movements for simplifying life, returning to natural foods, shelter, clothing and minimal furniture and technology independence. These are signs of a bloated material culture feeling the need to look deeper and to free itself of reliances that are not only unhealthy but mechanisms of mass subjugation on an unheard of scale and of terrible subtlety. Renunciation as mass non-consumerism would be a translation of Gandhi's non-co-operation and economic boycott. Choice of a consistent life routine based on values not susceptible to market pressures and marketing manipulations, adopted and sustained against consumer indoctrination, is itself a manner of spiritual or moral battle translating the principles of self-sacrifice, purification, and renunciation. But these are hardly felt as renunciation when there is recognition of the quality of material dependence, subserviance and supportless non-routine, that are "renounced" in

Gandhi relied; "Violence on the part of the masses will never remove the disease...sooner or later the European masses will have to take to non-violence, if they are to find their deliverance...someone has to make a beginning with a faith that will not flinch. I doubt not that the masses, even of Europe, will

adopting some healthier, saner, stronger, clearer, more life-giving modes and values of life.

The chief need is to realize the non-identity of evil and violence, the focal point of all questions of means in this debate, and to remember that the main problem is inner growth. The larger social methods must accord first with these demands. In these terms does non-violence of the extreme form represented in Gandhi's empirical claim interfere by requiring too much attention to outer purity and technique, de facto molding a heteronomous "goodness" as the aim rather than realization of self and spirit; Gandhi de facto never lost sight of this aim and requirement. The success of any of these means will not be the organization structures or corporate fashions they instigate, but the effect of these on the individual for substantially changing the vision and values effective in his way of living and relating. Any mass methods may at times be antagonistic to this aim if they prove to be only further "trends" and diversion." Only if the main aim is kept

respond, but what is more emergent in point of time is not so much a large experiment in non-violence as a precise grasp of the meaning of deliverance. From what will the masses be delivered? It will not do to have a vague generalization and to answer: 'from exploitation and degradation'. Is not the answer this that they want to occupy the status that capital does today? If so, it can be attained only by violence. But if they want to shun the evils of capital, in other words, if they would revise the viewpoint of capital, then they would strive to attain a juster distribution of the products of labour. This immediately takes us to contentment and simplicity, voluntarily adopted. Under the new outlook multiplicity of material wants will not be the aim of life, the aim will be rather their restriction consistently with comfort. We shall cease to think of getting what we can, but we shall decline to receive what all cannot get. It occurs to me that it ought not to be difficult to make a successful appeal to the masses of Europe in terms of economics, and a

clear can the main basis be worked towards, the individual, that strength of character and potency and clarity of love that are necessary to recognize the Truth of complex claims of justice, to graciously accomodate and adjust oneself to them in personal and corporate life, and, if necessary, to maintain them in the midst of the fight. Whether one has chosen the non-violent means of non-resistance or non-co-operation, or violent means of direct resistance or attack, it is necessary to see clearly in the midst of the fight when the opposite means may be required. Gandhi's sādhana of non-violence is one such preparation and cleansing of moral and practical consciousness. Its application in daily life and domestic¹ relations is the moral prerequisite for developing that non-retaliatory, non-hating moral consciousness and spiritual poise that is capable of sustaining love and Truth in either method.

fairly successful working of such an experiment must lead to immense and unconscious spiritual results. I do not believe that the spiritual law works on a field of its own. On the contrary, it expresses itself only through the ordinary activities of life. It thus affects the economic, the social and the political fields. If the masses of Europe can be persuaded to adopt the view I have suggested, it will be found that violence will be wholly unnecessary to attain the aim, and that they can easily come into their own by following out the obvious corollaries of non-violence. It may even be that what seems to me to be so natural and feasible for India may take longer to permeate the inert Indian masses than the active European masses. But I must reiterate my confession that all my argument is based on supposition and assumptions and must, therefore, be taken for what it is worth." (YI, 3/9/25)

¹ Ibid., p. 315; "Last week I wrote about three fields for the operation of Ahimsā. (against illegitimate constituted authority, to quell communal dissensions, and to meet external aggression), I propose to invite attention today to the fourth and the best field for the operation of non-violence. This is the family field, in a wider sense than the ordinary. The

When peace is in a substantial majority of hearts, then the organic unity of family life will be the natural mode of institutional and international interaction, and non-violence and public opinion will operate as Gandhi has prophesied, viz., as gentle loving prods to momentarily obstinate or blind but willing conscience and intent. He is in this sense more a visionary and forerunner of an ideal state. His work will likely be found to have greatly accelerated its advent and given its basic shape. But until then his methods and example must be objects of empirical study and of spiritual study, for how in fact they may best figure as weapons of the weak in the overall struggle for Justice.

The end sought is not open to much objection. The problem is of means and the route traveled to reach it. Gandhi's position is abundantly clear. It must be balanced.

For the present and for the purpose of this study, it is important to remember that the choice and use of means must

members of an institution should be regarded as a family. Non-violence between members of such families should be easy to practice. If that fails, it means that we have not developed the capacity for pure non-violence. For the love we have to practice towards our relatives and colleagues in our family or institution, we have to practice towards our foes, dacoits, etc. If we fail in one case, success in the other is a chimera.

We have generally assumed that, though it may not be possible to exercise non-violence in the domestic field, it is possible to do so in the political fields. This has proved a pure delusion. We have chosen to describe our methods adopted so far as non-violence, and thus caricatured non-violence itself. If non-violence it was, it was such poor stuff that it proved useless at the critical moment. The alphabet of Ahimsā is best learnt in the domestic school, and I can say from experience that, if we secure success there, we are sure to do so everywhere. For a non-violent person the whole world is one family." (Sevagram, 15/7/40; H. 21/7/40).

This last is a reiteration of the chief difficulty in Gandhian studies. His assumption that such a morally desirable

be objective and not prejudiced by ideological presentiments of any sort if that state is to be accurately and effectively pursued. It is necessary while acknowledging that violence is in itself always and positively wrong, nevertheless to propagate the injunction that if necessary, "Strike with open heart!" There should be pure tolerance which expresses itself in joy of plurality, even of vital and moral opposition, of all doing as they see fit and timely, with no condescending "allowance" and tacit moral judgment as is implicit in moral heteronymy. If use of, or non-obstruction of violence is believed necessary, it must not be denied because of one-sided

and seemingly unexceptional state of affairs exists--that success is easy "there" in the family, and, therefore, everywhere, if ex hypothesi all is one family. But it is not "easy" in the family, and the oneness in the world cannot be familial until it is an effective reality in the primary family. This is all a matter still to be evolved and not the "matter of fact" state of things, '...if only we would.' There appears to be an historical distance to be covered before that stage is a factual reality.

With regard to the path through that historical distance, the problem of means, Gandhi writes further; "I have not concentrated upon it [the question of developing pure ahimsā of the strong, the domestic and basic ahimsā], or given it the weight I might have. This was all right while I was devoting all my energy to forging means to give battle to the government. But it had the result of retarding the growth of pure Ahimsā of the strong. If we now want to advance further, we ought, at least for some time, to completely forget the idea of offering non-violent resistance to constituted authority. If non-violence in the domestic field is successfully achieved, we shall surely see the non-violence against constituted authority revived in its purified form, and it will be irresistible...those who may want to join the non-violent force of my conception should not entertain any immediate prospect of civil disobedience. They should understand that, so long as they have not realized Ahimsā in their own person in its pure form, there can be no civil disobedience for them." Ibid., p. 317, (Sevagram, 16/7/40; H, 21/7/40).

unexamined faith and rhetorically imposed force of moral ideology.

As Gandhi rightly insisted, fear too easily misuses this proscription for self-deception. But by parity of reasoning the only ideological character of this position can be seen, remembered and respectfully balanced. It may be that violence does not necessarily bring into the world more evil. It may be that Love, clarity, and Truth, non-hate and non-anger, can be maintained while force and violence are resorted to in both love and outrage, embraced as noble, moral, just and justified means. By parity of reasoning, so what if there is no historical precedent; it does not matter if it is more difficult of practice than even pure non-violence; by parity of reasoning is it not then more worthy to strive after and in fact morally called for. By parity of reasoning, what does it matter if good and right are always abused and the whole world stands against the choice of means--if conscience, duty, and unencumbered reason dictate it. All of Gandhi's arguments can be exactly countered by their opposite in parity of reasoning so far as they are at bottom rhetorical and expressive of moral preference.

If violence is not the believed decisive means, and opposing powers too large and unavoidable (nuclear force its all-embracing limit), the way may be pure non-resistance, pursuit of simple straight independent life, with no confrontation with "Caesar" or fear of guilt at complicity or default in obligation of love--but inheritance of the earth by meekness when

strategically the large powers have been left to destroy themselves by nuclear suicide, as inherent evil must in time.

The role one plays and advocates or propagates in the wider society must be a matter of individual free and responsible inquiry, self-examination, and responsible choice. The above argument is intended only to clarify the issues that must be faced in making that decision and in pursuing its implications in personal and social life by examining what is acknowledged to be the most intense and far ranging practical thought and experience in this area--Gandhi's advocacy of absolute non-violence and his mission against the justifiability of all violence. But Gandhi's ideal solution embodies the fullest aspiration of the general commitment to non-violence and must be a point of constant reference if also at times of certain and unregretting departure.

I would risk violence a thousand times than the emasculation of a whole race.¹

My nonviolence does not admit of running away from danger and leaving dear ones unprotected. Between violence and cowardly flight, I can only prefer violence to cowardice. I can no more preach non-violence to a coward than I can tempt a blind man to enjoy healthy scenes. Nonviolence is the summit of bravery.²

Nonviolence cannot be taught to a person who fears to die and has no power of resistance.³

¹Kripalani, IV:71, p. 93, (YI, 8/4/20).

²Ibid., IV:72, p. 93, (YI, 5/28/24).

³Ibid., IV:73, p. 93, (H, 7/20/35).

I do believe that, where there is only a choice between cowardice and violence, I would advise violence.¹

Finally, it should be reiterated that though the position argued for in the present paper is admittedly a re-assertion of the widely held common sense one of a general commitment to non-violence which nevertheless can and ought to be set aside when easily imaginable imperative overriding moral considerations require it, still it must again be recognized that Gandhi, by his absolute views and application, has shown the political importance and power of non-violence and its practical validity as no one else has. It must be reiterated that he is therefore a resource that should be a constant reference in self-reflection and in debate on these fundamental issues, and that he should be studied in a way that it most illumine that practical common sense position as it is relevant to both the daily life and the present world political situation of nuclear threat, emergent national pluralism, and the need of complex adjustment where justice has had no powerful international advocate and little local constituency.

It is thus important to see how Gandhi's methods and practical successes depended upon his metaphysical position; the limits of those views and methods, when and how they need to be modified for a wider practical outcome and a more realistic common sense political view and relevance.

To this purpose it has been necessary to see how inextricably Gandhi's ideological interpretation of his classical

¹Ibid., IV:76, p. 94, (M, II; YI, 8/11/20).

metaphysical roots and fundamental spiritual facts are bound up in his conception of non-violence, how these a priorisms directed and informed his empirical application of these ideas in the methods of satyāgraha, and how they affected his personal assessments of his practical success and of the viability of these methods. The common sense character of the conclusions of the present paper does not cancel the indebtedness to Gandhi's metaphysics and ethics, or even to his ideology, in reaching them. It does not cancel the relevance of these for the much richer and more sensitive application of these conclusions that is made possible and fostered by the study of Gandhi's investigations.

Footnote #4, Page 3:

The entire exposition of Gandhi's concept and methods that follows in Chapters I and II, can be profitably summarized in extended quotation on his notion and application of the non-empirical non-violent force of the soul (or, what is the same, power of God). Direct contrast with concepts and methods of non-violence based on empirical description of action as forms of behaviour calculated as tactics and strategy is basic to the present analysis. This basic contrast is thoroughly drawn out in Section II of this chapter. Gandhi writes that "there is an indefinable mysterious Power that pervades everything. I feel it, though I do not see it. It is this unseen Power which makes itself felt and yet defies all proof, because it is so unlike all that I perceive through my senses. It transcends the senses...I do dimly perceive that whilst everything around me is ever changing, ever dying, there is underlying all that change a living power that is changeless, that holds together, that creates, dissolves and recreates. That informing power or spirit is God. And since nothing else I see merely through the senses can or will persist, He alone is....And is this power benevolent or malevolent? I see it as purely benevolent. For I can see that in the midst of death life persists, in the midst of untruth truth persists, and in the midst of darkness light persists. Hence I gather that God is Life, Truth, Light. He is Love. He is the supreme Good....But He is no God who merely satisfies the intellect...God to be God must rule the heart and transform it. He must express Himself in every the smallest act of His votary. This can only be done through a definite realization more real than the five senses can ever produce. Sense perceptions can be, often are, false and deceptive, however real they may appear to us. Where there is realization outside the sense it is infallible. It is proved not by extraneous evidence but in the transformed conduct and character of those who have felt the real presence of God within....Such testimony is to be found in the experiences of an unbroken line of prophets and sages in all countries and climes. To reject this evidence is to deny oneself." Kher, I, pp. 5-6, (VI, 11/10/28, p. 340). This is Gandhi's basic characterization of the nature of the force of non-violence, and his chief argument and warrant for asserting its veracity. He further characterizes its spiritual aspect, likens it to empirical forces, and gives a spirituo-moral method for making it potent and operative in one; "The truth is that God is the force. He is the essence of life. He is pure and undefiled consciousness. He is eternal. And yet, strangely enough, all are not able to derive either benefit from or shelter in the all-pervading living presence. Electricity is a powerful force. Not all can benefit from it. It can only be produced by following certain laws. It is a lifeless force. Man can utilize it if he labours hard enough to acquire the knowledge, of its laws...The living force which we call God can similarly be found if we know and follow His law leading to the discovery of Him in us.....The law may, in one word, be termed brahmacharya (conduct leading to Brahma or God; used to connote celibacy as a specific practice) The

straight way to cultivate brahmacharya is Rāmanāma (see Kher I, pp. 166-224), I can say this from experience. Devotees and sages like Tulsidas have shown this royal path. No one need give undue importance to my own experience...the potency of Rāmanāma was brought vividly home to me in Uruli-Kanchan...that the orthodox aids to brahmacharya pale into insignificance before Rāmanāma, when this name is enthroned in the heart, Then and then only do we realize its transcendent beauty and power. In the vigilant search for this matchless and unfailing weapon we find that it is hard to differentiate between ends and means. Thus, the eleven rules of conduct are the means to enable us to reach God (see Kher Vol. II, Sec. I pp. 3-133). Of the eleven rules Truth is the means and God called Rāma is the end. Is it not equally true that Rāmanāma is the means and Truth is the end?...For proving the efficacy of Rāmanāma there are undoubted rules." (*Ibid.*, pp. 16-17; H, 22/6/47, p. 200). Rāmanāma is thus more than a prayer, itself an expression and means of the non-violent Power called God; Gandhi makes prayer a requirement of non-violent action, but writes that "the power we call God defies all description...What matters then whether one man worships God as a Person and another as Force?...One need only remember that God is the Force among all the forces. All other forces are material. But God is the vital force or spirit which is all-pervading, all-embracing and therefore beyond human ken," *Ibid.*, pp. 818-19, (H, 18/8/46, p. 267). Thus for Gandhi, access to a non-empirical force by means of remembrance and repetition of the Name of Rāma is the basis of individual practice of and growth in non-violence, but this force and practice is also the basis of his method of practical reform; non-violence becomes a supremely practical means because "religion deals with the science of the soul. Great as other forces of the world are, if there is such a thing as God, soul force is the greatest of all. We know as a matter of fact that the greater the force the finer it is. Hitherto electricity has held the field among the finer physical powers. And yet nobody has seen it except through its wonderful results. Scientific speculation dares to talk of a force finer even than that of electricity. But no instrument devised yet by man has been able to know anything positive of soul force or spiritual force. It is on that force that the true religious reformer has hitherto relied and never without hope fulfilled. It is that force which will finally govern the welfare of the Harijans and everyone else and confound the calculations of men however gifted they may be intellectually. The reformer who has entered upon the duty of ridding Hinduism of the disease of untouchability has to depend in everything he does on that force and nothing else," *Ibid.*, p. 50, (H, 22/8/36, p. 220). The method of satyāgraha, i.e., non-violent direct action by means of self-suffering, requires some such positive force and power to replace the brute force its use displaces; "But far be it from me to suggest that you should believe in the God that I believe in. May be your definition is different from mine, but your belief in that God must be your ultimate mainstay. It may be some Supreme Power or some Being even indefinable, but belief in it is indispensable. To bear all kinds

of tortures without a murmur of resentment is impossible for a human being without the strength that comes from God. Only in His strength we are strong. And only those who can cast their cares and fears on that Immeasurable Power have faith in God," Ibid., p. 54, (H, 3/6/39, p. 145 at p. 146). Thus faith is not an optional requirement and condition of Gandhi's non-violent force. The moral properties of that force and the role of faith in its quality and efficacy are co-implicates; "Non-violence in its positive aspect as benevolence (I do not use the word love as it has fallen into disrepute) is the greatest force because of the limitless scope it affords for self-suffering without causing or intending any physical or material injury to the wrong-doer. The object always is to evoke the best in him. Self-suffering is an appeal to his better nature, as retaliation is to his baser. To practice non-violence in mundane matters is to know its true value. It is to bring heaven upon earth," Ibid., p. 293, (H, 26/7/42, p. 248). According to Gandhi this force is a universal solvent, working constantly like physical forces but also accessible for every mundane purpose in exactly the same way; "Whether mankind will consciously follow the law of love I do not know. But that need not perturb us. The law will work, just as the law of gravitation will work whether we accept it or no. And just as a scientist will work wonders out of various applications of the laws of nature, even so a man who applies the law of love with scientific precision can work greater wonders. For the force of non-violence is infinitely more wonderful and subtle than the forces of nature, like for instance electricity...Only our explorations have not gone far enough and so it is not possible for every one to see all its workings," Ibid., p. 59, (YI, 1/10/31, p. 285 at p. 287). Such a force is necessary for leading mass non-violent actions; "All power comes from the preservation and sublimation of the vitality that is responsible for creation of life. If the vitality is husbanded instead of being dissipated, it is transmuted into creative energy of the highest order. This vitality is continuously even unconsciously dissipated by evil, or even rambling, disorderly, unwanted thoughts. And since thought is the root of all speech and action, the quality of the latter corresponds to that of the former. Hence perfectly controlled thought is itself power of the highest potency and can become self-acting. That seems to me to be the meaning of the silent prayer of the heart. If a man is after the image of God, He has but to will a thing in the limited sphere allotted to him and it becomes. Such a power is impossible in one who dissipates his energy in any way whatsoever, even as steam kept in a leaky pipe yields no power...in any one who has to organize vast masses of mankind for non-violent action the full control described by me has to be attempted and virtually achieved. This control is unattainable save by the grace of God...Once attained it is never lost. In that state vital energy is stored up without any chance of escaping by the innumerable outlets," Ibid., p. 85, (H, 23/7/38, p. 192). Thus according to Gandhi, the chief attribute of this force, moral, spiritual, and practical, is that "Ahimsā is a unifying force. It discovers unity in diversity," (*Italics mine*), both among the masses and co-workers, and between opponents; Ibid., p. 288, (H, 16/3/40, p. 41). Gandhi writes that "rivalry in

generating brute force is race suicide....Military force is inconsistent with soul-force. Frightfulness, exploitation of the weak, immoral gains, insatiable pursuit after enjoyments of the flesh are utterly inconsistent with soul-force.... History teaches one that those who have, no doubt, with honest motives, ousted the greedy by using brute force against them, have in their own turn become a prey to the disease of the conquered...we try to explore the possibilities of matching the brute force of the greedy exploiters and the life with soul-force," Ibid., p. 319, (YI, 6/5/26, p. 164). Gandhi writes that "as a matter of fact...in my scheme, love is presumed to be a more active and potent force than brute force. He who has not the love and remains passive is a coward. He is neither man nor brute...the writer obviously cannot realize, as I have done, the tremendous power that non-violent resistance has over one's adversary. Non-violent resistance is the resistance of one will against another. That resistance is possible only when it is freed from reliance on brute force," Ibid., p. 218. In the political sphere, Gandhi conceives satyāgraha as the means of applying soul-force, the force of non-violence for restoring "equilibrium" to forces overstepping their limits, as Caesar might usurp religious or truly national loyalties; Ibid., pp. 328-29, (H, 7/12/47, p. 452). The violence of a Hitler or Ghengis Khan might produce great visible effects for the moment, but the force of non-violence produces permanent and far larger effects though at the moment unnotable; "All miracles are due to the silent and effective working of invisible forces. Non-violence is the most invisible and most effective," Hingorani, ...Satyāgraha, p. 25, (H, 3/20/37). Such a seeming mundane method as civil disobedience is also conceived as a vehicle for this non-empirical force in the scheme of satyāgraha; "Civil Disobedience is the sovereign method of transmuting this undisciplined, life-destroying, latent energy into disciplined life-saving energy whose use ensures absolute success," Ibid., p. 61, (YI, 3/27/30). Gandhi thus conceives his methods of satyāgraha to be only another expression of this spiritual force when it is applied to the practical sphere; he assimilates to his practical methods the universality that he ascribes to this moral force; "Satvāgraha literally means insistence on Truth. This insistence arms the votary with matchless power. This power or force is connoted by the word Satyāgraha. Satyāgraha to be genuine, may be offered against one's wife or one's children, against rulers, against fellow citizens, even against the whole world. Such a universal force necessarily makes no distinction between kinsmen and strangers, young and old, man and woman, friend and foe. The force to be so applied can never be physical. There is no room for violence. The only force of universal application can, therefore, be that of Ahimsā or love. In other words, it is soul-force," Ibid., pp. 65-66, (YI, 2/27/30). He claims for it greater practical efficiency than all brute force; "It is a force that works silently and apparently slowly. In reality, there is no force in the world that is so direct or so swift in working," Ibid., p. 66, (YI, 6/4/25). In its most extensive application empirically Gandhi writes that this force as "Truth and Ahimsā must incarnate in Socialism. In order that they can, the votary must have a living faith in God. Mere

mechanical adherence to Truth and Ahimsā, is likely to break down at the critical moment. Hence have I said that Truth is God. This God is a living Force. Our life is of that Force. That Force resides in, but is not the body. He who denies the existence of that great Force, denies to himself the use of that inexhaustible Power and thus remains impotent...The Socialism of such takes them nowhere, what to say of the society in which they live...The fact is that it has always been a matter of strenuous research to know this great Force and its hidden possibilities. My claim is that in the pursuit of that search lies the discovery of Satyāgraha. It is not, however, claimed that all the Laws of Satyāgraha have been laid down or found. This I do say, fearlessly and firmly, that every worthy object can be achieved by the use of Satyāgraha. It is the highest and infallible means, the greatest force. Socialism will not be reached by any other means. Satyāgraha can rid society of all evils, political, economic and moral," Ibid., pp. 129-30, (H, 7/20/47). This in sum is the Force or Power that Gandhi considers to be "more positive than electricity", the force "at the center of non-violence" (above, Chapter I, p. 3, fn. 1), the "superiority over physical strength, however overwhelming" that Gandhi conceives to be "the core of Ahimsā...non-violence (that) can be exercised as well by individuals as by groups of them, yea, even by millions together," N.V. I, p. 263, (Sevagram, 1/1/40; H, 6/1/40). Thus "Ahimsā is not impotence. Ahimsā is not powerlessness....Ahimsā is an unconquerable power. We shrink from it as we are dazed by its over-powering lustre. Only very few of us can catch a glimpse of it. Ahimsā is the distinguishing characteristic of an untrammelled spirit. It is at the root of a number of other qualities--discrimination, detachment, penance, equability and knowledge. It is the way of the brave, not of shirkers," Hingorani, ...Love, p. 43, (VI, 12/2/26); and "Non-violence is the greatest force at the disposal of mankind. It is mightier than the mightiest weapon," Ibid., p. 59, (H, 7/20/35). But, according to Gandhi, not only is it a pointed force useful to a specific practical and moral purpose, but it is a radiant force acting on its own to produce far-reaching moral and spiritual effects; "Non-violence is like radium in its action. An infinitesimal quantity of it imbedded in a malignant growth, acts continuously, silently, and ceaselessly till it has transformed the whole mass of the diseased tissue into a healthy one. Similarly, even a little of true non-violence acts in a silent, subtle, unseen way and leavens the whole society," Ibid., p. 69, (H, 11/12/38). He writes that this "non-violence is an active force of the highest order. It is soul force or the power of Godhead within us. Imperfect man cannot grasp the whole of that Essence--he would not be able to bear its full blaze--but even an infinitesimal fraction of it, when it becomes active within us, can work wonders," Ibid., p. 68. Gandhi takes this pervasive even physical influence to be a criterion of true non-violence, or accession to soul-force and operation of the power of God in one; "he so affects his surroundings that even the snakes and other venomous reptiles do no harm. This is said to

to have been the experience of St. Francis of Assisi," Ibid., p. 13, (The Modern Review, Oct. 1916). This again merely expresses Gandhi's basic equation of the spiritual and the empirical as ultimately identical as merely two aspects of the same Indescribable Single Reality or Power; "just as there is identity of spirit, so is there identity of matter and in essence the two are inseparable. Spirit is matter rarefied to the utmost limit. Hence, whatever happens to the body must touch the spirit and whatever happens to one body must affect the whole matter and the whole spirit. It is within the experience of us all that often wrongdoers are touched by the loving acts of their friends and relatives...those whose love encircles the whole of life cannot but affect the whole creation by a supreme act of love," Kher I, p. 291, (H, 5/8/33, p.4); and "I have long believed that physical phenomena produce results both physical and spiritual. The converse I hold to be equally true...I have faith that our own sins have more force to ruin the structure than any mere physical phenomenon. There is an indissoluble marriage between matter and spirit. Our ignorance of the results of the union makes it a profound mystery and inspires awe in us, but it cannot undo them," Ibid., pp. 96, and 98, (H, 16/2/34, p. 4). The all-pervading character and ultimate superiority of this Force or Power, its self-active nature for moral and spiritual effects, is thus the basis of Gandhi's concept, methods, criteria and claims of non-violence as a universal and infallible practical means as well. It is the aim of this study to delineate and critically examine Gandhi's philosophy of non-violent action so conceived.

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