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**Belgrave, Jeffrey Denis**

THE IMPACT OF PSYCHOANALYSIS ON SOME TRADITIONAL CHRISTIAN  
MORAL VALUES

*City University of New York*

PH.D. 1983

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THE IMPACT OF PSYCHOANALYSIS  
ON  
SOME TRADITIONAL CHRISTIAN MORAL VALUES  
by  
Jeffrey D. Belgrave

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in  
Psychology in partial fulfillment of the requirements  
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1983

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This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Psychology in satisfaction of the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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Abstract

THE IMPACT OF PSYCHOANALYSIS ON SOME TRADITIONAL  
CHRISTIAN MORAL VALUES

by

Jeffrey D. Belgrave

Advisor: Professor Paul Wachtel

The central thesis of this study is that there value orientations in the psychoanalytic system which have relevance for morality and that some of these are antithetical to traditional Christian moral Values as propounded by the Roman Catholic religion.

The value orientation of psychoanalysis is described as rationalistic, naturalistic, humanistic and individualistic. The reaction of Roman Catholic churchmen to this orientation is outlined. It is argued that basic conflicts arise from the confrontation between the "supernaturalistic" approach of traditional Roman Catholic morality and the "materialistic" approach of Freudian psychoanalysis. Specific issues of conflict in the areas of sexuality, aggression, altruism, the meaning of fantasies and freedom of choice of moral values are pointed out. Theoretical suggestions at a resolution of the conflict are also presented.

Finally, some data is provided which lends support to the thesis and which describes the nature of the conflict and the efforts at resolution in the lives of some individuals who have had an intimate experience of both systems.

## Acknowledgments

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This study owes its origin, in a special way, to close members of my family and intimate friends who have shared with me, and assisted me in, a search for meaningful values and who, in different ways, have had an impact on shaping my personal value system. The study owes its completion to the willing subjects who generously agreed to participate in this inquiry and to a number of people who helped put me in contact with them.

To you all, I owe a profound debt of gratitude.

In memory of my mother  
and  
for my wife, Kris.

"In the meantime, there is slight discomfort at times at having to be a pioneer - even though there are thousands of us pioneers out there. You have to do it a little bit on your own - a lot on your own".

Transcript of subject interview describing his effort to restructure his Christian moral value system on the basis of his psychoanalytic experience.

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## INTRODUCTION

There is a mood gaining current popularity in American society. Some interpret it as a move towards conservatism while others see it as a reaction to the liberalism of recent decades. In any event, the mood is expressed in a serious questioning of some more recent attitudes and trends and a call for a return to more traditional values, including, and perhaps especially, more traditional moral values. This trend is perhaps nowhere better exemplified than by the movement which describes itself as the "moral majority" and which argues for a return to the absolute moral norms of fundamental Christianity. The adherents of this movement attack many of the modern sciences which, they say, have helped to undermine the traditional moral approach. The science of psychology, in general, and psychoanalysis in particular, have been indicted by many for contributing to moral decline; and there has been a growing clamor for a better understanding of psychology's role in reference to, and its impact on, traditional moral values.

Very soon after its development as a theory and a therapy, it was clear that psychoanalysis was intimately involved with some of the most important values in human life. From its modest beginnings as a form of treatment for mental illness, it developed into a theory about the nature of man and a therapy which, at least in part, sought to help individuals whose values posed a problem for them.

As a modern science, psychoanalysis has investigated and proposed a view of man's nature which cannot but have an impact on the values of society. Its investigation of man's basic "instincts", conscience, guilt, underlying motivation for human behavior, to name only a few

areas, has direct relevance for morality.

As a form of therapy, the moral implications of the psychoanalytic process become even more obvious, since it involves the interaction between two people which is often specifically intended to modify the value system or behavior of one of them. It has been argued that moral values cannot but be influenced during this process.

It may be useful, at this juncture, to discuss the issue of terminology. Many psychoanalysts will argue that since neither in theory or in practice does psychoanalysis imply connotations of right or wrong, good or bad, as regards human behavior, its activity lies outside the realm of morality. However, there is no doubt that psychoanalysis encourages or discourages certain forms of conduct in the name of "health" or "improved human functioning", conduct which from another point of view may receive an evaluation of good or bad, right or wrong. It is necessary, therefore, before proceeding further, to clarify the meaning of the major terms which will be used in this paper.

Milton Rokeach (1973) has made an extensive study of "The Nature of Human Values" and can be considered one of the authorities on the subject. He describes the term "value" as follows: "an enduring prescriptive or proscriptive belief that a specific mode of behavior or end state of existence is preferred to an opposite mode or end state (p. 25). He further describes the concept of "moral values" explaining that it is narrower than the general concept of values. He says: "moral values refer mainly to modes of behavior and do not necessarily include values that concern end states of existence"(p. 8). Furthermore, moral values "have an interpersonal focus which, when violated, arouse pangs of conscience or feelings of guilt for wrong-doing" (p. 8). Using these

admittedly broad "definitions" of Rokeach, I will argue, in this paper, that psychoanalysis has certain values and that some of these come into conflict with some traditional moral values in Christianity.

Some authors (cf. Fromm, 1946; May, 1962; Wheelis, 1958; London, 1964; Rieff, 1966; Lowe, 1976) maintain not only that psychoanalysis has an impact on moral values but also that in the present climate of a breakdown of traditional values many people look to the "science of psychoanalysis" for help in finding values which would make for a happier, more fulfilled life. Lowe (1976) contends that "men have been seeking out counselors or psychotherapists as a source of moral direction" (p. 9). He further argues that "although the therapist does not usually consider himself a moralist, he is, however, one of the few whose moral authority the typical modern man can still accept" (p. 9). It is noteworthy that Bergin (1980), in contrast, argues that many people are now disenchanted with psychology for having failed, like the other sciences, to provide the good life.

As already noted, there are those (cf. Mowrer, 1961; Gemelli, 1955; Sheen, 1955) who argue that psychoanalysis has contributed to the decline of traditional moral values. Freud (1928) had anticipated this accusation. He wrote: "Now we see, they will say, where psychoanalysis leads to . The mask has fallen; it leads to a denial of God and of a moral ideal, as we always suspected" (p. 36). Feuer (1945) in one of the earliest works to explore the relationship between psychology and values stated in more explicit terms: "There is still considerable fear in some quarters of the influence of psychology in general and of psychoanalysis in particular on just that field that concerns us here - the field of values. It is felt that psychoanalysts in their attempts to understand

the motivation underlying values ethical, religious, or aesthetic are in danger of destroying those very values, or that they are indeed actively seeking to destroy them" (p. 10).

The debate has been given new impetus in recent times, by questioning within the field of psychology itself. Thus Campbell (1975) in his presidential address to the American Psychological Association expressed real concerns about what he called the basic presumptions of psychology and their effect on traditional values. "Psychology", he said, "may be contributing to the undermining of the retention of what may be extremely valuable social-evolutionary inhibitory systems which we do not yet fully understand" (p.1120). Using social-cultural evolutionary theory he argued that, from a scientific point of view, traditional moral norms have been evolved and tested through generations of human history and as such might be regarded as better tested than psychological theories which are in opposition to them. He is especially concerned that the individual perspective of psychology runs counter to the altruistic orientation of traditional norms. This theme has been expressed by other authors, in particular Mowrer (1961), Lasch (1978) and Hogan (1977) who argues that: "the dominant temper of American psychology is wedded to an individual perspective" (p. 534) and that this "both reflects and contributes to a general erosion of confidence in civilization" (p. 539). Vitz (1977) deplores the message of what he calls the "self-theorists" who promote "selfism" to the detriment of religious values.

The issue is an extremely important one. There is need to continue working to understand and assess the relevance of psychoanalysis for moral values. If, as some authors (e.g. Fine, 1977; Hartmann, 1960)

have maintained, psychoanalysis has identified certain values which are important for, or other values which are detrimental to, the individual's or society's well-being, these must be clearly articulated. If, on the other hand, there are implicit value-laden attitudes and orientations in psychoanalysis which have not been specifically stated or fully researched, these must likewise be identified and articulated.

#### Scope of the Study:

Within the large area of the relationship between psychology and traditional values, I propose to limit my scope to a study of the impact of the psychoanalytic system on some traditional Roman Catholic Christian moral values.

The psychoanalytic position has been chosen because, on the one hand, it offers one of the most clearly articulated and theoretically organized therapeutic systems and also because it has had a profound influence on the whole field of psychotherapy. However, the psychoanalytic system is one of great complexity and diversity. Freud's position on some issues is not always clear and as a result many of his followers, who consider themselves orthodox interpreters of his theories, offer divergent views. Furthermore, psychoanalytic thought has undergone modifications at the hands of his followers, some claiming to be remaining true to his spirit, others challenging his theories and findings. It will not be possible to represent all the conflicting views represented in the literature. Nor is it necessary.

I will attempt to articulate in this essay, a view of psychoanalytic theory which finds support in the writings of Freud and which is represented in the writings of some of his followers who consider themselves orthodox and whose views are widely accepted in the psycho-

analytic community, even if these views may be contested by other equally prominent authors in the same community. Of special significance in this context are the views of a small number of reputable psychoanalytic writers, in the Freudian tradition, who have attempted to confront the issue of the relationship between psychoanalysis and religion or between psychoanalysis and values in general.

The views of a few non-Freudian psychoanalytic authors who have written widely on the issue of values will also be presented especially insofar as they provide a useful contrast with the Freudian position. Some non-analytic authors who take issue with the psychoanalytic position, as they understand it, will also be presented.

One cannot help but note that the variety of conflicting views that are available in the psychoanalytic system, and the many different interpretations which can be attributed to the writings of Freud, already suggest the extent to which values pervade the system. A system which is solidly based on empirical evidence would offer much less opportunity for individual opinion and interpretation.

In attempting to articulate the moral values in the Christian religion, a similar difficulty is encountered. Christian values are broad, diffuse and often contradictory. There are divergent teachings not only among Christian Churches, but even within the different Churches themselves. For the sake of clarity and specificity, I propose to focus on some of the traditional (official) moral teachings of the Roman Catholic Church. The Roman Catholic religion has made a concerted effort to articulate a detailed and comprehensive system of moral theology and to inculcate all believers with this teaching. This official Catholic position can be found in the teachings of Church councils and papal pronouncements; and even though often challenged, or flagrantly ignored, has had

a significant impact on the lives of practising believers.

After the trauma of the Reformation, the Council of Trent (1545-1563) not only articulated the Roman Catholic position on many contested issues, but also made it obligatory for every diocese to erect a seminary for the purpose of educating clergy in the Church's teaching. Subsequent directives from Rome further specified the type of training the clergy should receive and in 1914 the Congregation of Seminaries and Universities was established to oversee seminary training throughout the world. Uniform methods and curricula were eventually mandated and a few standard text-books, based on the theology of St. Thomas Aquinas were used in most Catholic seminaries and universities. In the courses on moral theology, text-books by Prummer, 1915, Noldin, 1922, and Tanguerey, 1922, all in the Latin language, were widely used. English language moral theology texts by Davis, 1936 and Ford & Kelly, 1958, were also held in high repute and their teaching received the official sanction of the Roman Catholic authorities. There was no substantial disagreement between the teaching represented in these various texts except on a few "disputed questions". The official position on questions of morals and dogma was also disseminated to believers by means of official "catechisms" which were used in Roman Catholic schools and churches. It is to be noted, too, that all books which were used for teaching doctrinal or moral issues were required to have the approval of church authorities in the form of an "imprimatur". The official position was thus widely taught, clearly understood and for a long time perhaps even generally accepted by a great many Roman Catholics. Not until the Second Vatican Council (1982) did official church teaching and policy meet with outspoken challenge. No clear new moral teaching

has replaced the traditional one, however, and the official position still heavily favors the traditional approach.

The official Roman Catholic position has much in common with some fundamentalist Christian churches especially as regards belief in an absolute standard of moral norms, a stress on the importance of self-control and renunciation of basic impulses, particularly of a sexual or aggressive nature, and an emphasis on altruism. When some authors lament the decline of traditional moral values, one often gets the impression that these are among the issues to which they are referring.

After articulating the official Roman Catholic position on these issues, I will attempt to demonstrate, from a theoretical point of view, the kind of impact which some widely-held psychoanalytic values are likely to have on these Christian values.

A study of a number of subjects who have had intimate experience of both systems will be made so as to illustrate and further explicate the nature of the conflict in values between the two systems and to ascertain what type of synthesis, if any, has been achieved in the lives of these subjects.

A concluding comment may be called for at this point. The dispute between psychoanalysis and religion has had a somewhat bitter history. Positions tend very easily to become polarized either to the one extreme that psychoanalysis is an enemy of religion or to the other extreme that psychoanalysis and religion are highly compatible and mutually supporting. In this atmosphere, it has been very difficult to make any effort to tease out the realistic impact of psychoanalysis on religious or moral values. However, many authors, even within the psychoanalytic community (Redlich, 1960; Ramzy, 1972; Campbell, 1975) stress the importance and necessity of such research.

Partly because of the complexity of the issue but surely more so because of the intensity of the emotions involved, so little research has been done in the area that one almost does not know where to begin. It seems a reasonable hypothesis that there are areas of compatibility and incompatibility between psychoanalysis and traditional moral values. It may well be that the areas of compatibility are more extensive and even more significant than the areas of incompatibility. Some authors have suggested this. However, the areas of compatibility are not the focus of this particular study. Neither will this study attempt to present a complete catalogue of the areas of incompatibility. I have chosen to concentrate on a few areas of incompatibility for a number of reasons. Firstly, there is sufficient justification in the literature to examine these specific issues. Secondly, it seems that it might be more important for the therapist, as well as the patient, to know about the impact of values which are at variance than about those which are similar. Finally, it was necessary for the investigator to maintain some reasonable boundaries on the inquiry and to carve out a small, somewhat manageable area of research, in the hope of arriving at some relevant data on the issue.

Footnotes

<sup>1</sup>  
It is noteworthy that a very recent decree from Roman Catholic authorities (October 1981) has called for a more careful assessment of the orthodoxy of professors in Seminaries and a stricter adherence to the teaching of traditional beliefs.

## CHAPTER 1

### PSYCHOANALYSIS AND MORAL VALUES

#### Part 1. Moral Values and Psychoanalytic Theory

Three types of arguments have been offered concerning the relationship between psychoanalysis and moral values. The classical psychoanalytic position, enunciated by Freud himself, has been that a) since psychoanalysis is a science, its theory is value-free and b) in their practice, psychoanalysts can maintain a "therapeutic neutrality" which enables them to avoid the intrusion of values into the process.

The second argument is that psychoanalysis can make a positive contribution to the issue of relevant moral values. This position is argued by many orthodox analysts such as Flugel, Brierley, Hartmann, Eissler, Ramzy, Fine, as well as neo-Freudians such as Fromm.

The third argument posits a negative impact of psychoanalysis on moral values. This position has been put forward mainly by non-analysts (or former analysts) such as Mowrer, London, Bergin, Campbell, and especially by a number of churchmen such as Sheen, Gemelli, and Allers.

In this chapter, reviewing the works of Freud and some of the above-mentioned authors, I will attempt to articulate some moral implications of psychoanalytic theory and practice and in later chapters I will compare these positions with some traditional moral values of the Roman Catholic religion.

Reuben Fine (1977) has commented that "It is a striking fact that there is anything but unanimity among psychoanalysts on even the most basic points" (p. 16). He describes in detail the repeated attempts and consistent failure of the American Psychoanalytic Association to

arrive even at a "modicum of agreement on definitions of psychoanalysis" (p. 14). The dispute within various factions within the psychoanalytic community continues unabated since Freud's day and the question of orthodoxy remains an unresolved one. If there is such disagreement even on basic issues, we obviously cannot expect anything approaching agreement on such a highly controversial issue as moral values in psychoanalysis. As a matter of fact, not many psychoanalytic authors have even addressed the issue. Among these, however, there do seem to be some general trends in their discussion of the issue.

Fine (1977) states the obvious when he says: "The role which Freud plays in the history of psychoanalysis is so enormous that any investigation must necessarily begin with a detailed examination of his views" (p. 13). But he immediately goes on to note that on the issue of whether psychoanalysis embraces a philosophical position Freud "has expressed sharply contradictory opinions at different times" (p. 13). It is widely acknowledged that Freud's writings are filled with inconsistencies and contradictions. Holt (1972) gives an excellent appraisal of the problems one encounters in reading Freud, and suggests some important precautions to readers not to take individual statements at face value. He maintains that Freud was influenced by two distinct philosophical traditions, Naturphilosophie and Physicalistic physiology. Other authors, including Fine (1977) also note two distinct trends in Freud. Says Fine (1977) "there are two Freuds, one the narrow technician who saw psychoanalysis as the psychology of the id, the other the reflective philosopher who recognized that psychoanalysis is a general psychology which touches upon all human concerns" (p. 13). A complete exploration of this issue is beyond the scope of this paper but it seems

that Holt and Fine are referring to the same basic duality in Freud's writings because both refer to an earlier and a later period in his writings. The issue is of relevance for the relationship between psychoanalysis and moral values because it is mainly in his later writings that Freud discussed moral issues. In the postscript to his "Autobiographical Study", he remarked on a significant change which had come about in his writings during the previous decade. He says: "My interest, after making a long detour through the natural sciences, medicine and psychotherapy, returned to the cultural problems which had fascinated me long before, when I was a youth scarcely old enough for thinking" (1925, p. 133). It is important to note that it is precisely these later writings which have stirred up the most controversy among his followers. There is little doubt, though, that the views he expressed in these writings have had an impact on the psychoanalytic community and, to some extent, on the society in general, where psychoanalysis prospers.

As already noted, Freud maintained that psychoanalysis does not include any specific value orientation. In his paper, "A Philosophy of Life", he stated: "As a specialist science, a branch of psychology - a depth psychology or psychology of the unconscious - it is quite unfit to construct a Weltanschauung of its own; it must accept the scientific one" (1933, p. 158). It must be noted that in this context Freud had given his own definition of "Weltanschauung" as "an intellectual construction which solves all the problems of our existence uniformly on the basis of one over-riding hypothesis which, accordingly, leaves no question unanswered and in which everything that interests us finds its fixed place" (p. 158). This is clearly an extremely specific definition and it has been argued by Fine (1977) that this statement of Freud cannot be taken

to mean that he rejected the consideration by psychoanalysis of all value-related questions. However, there is no doubt that Freud rejected metaphysical speculation in favor of the scientific enterprise. He was clearly interested in ethical issues but he wanted to study them scientifically by means of psychoanalysis. There are two aspects to this endeavour to which Freud did not seem to pay much attention. Firstly, there are certain values in the "scientific Weltanschauung", as Ramzy (1972) points out. Secondly, Freud, so intent on divorcing psychoanalysis from philosophy and metaphysics paid little attention, or at least did not acknowledge in his writings, links with previous philosophical traditions which others have noted. Thus, Zilboorg (1962) comments: "It is extremely curious that Freud, who delved so deeply into the human mind and whose method of study of the individual was so strictly historical, never seems to have been interested in the origin and history of his own ideas on the unconscious, repression and the instinctual drives. He never made a study of Herbart, Shopenhauer or Nietzsche who in many respects anticipated certain of the concepts which he created and developed in the course of his own work" (p. 20). We will discuss aspects of some philosophical traditions which appear to have had an influence on Freud's writings. We will consider them under the headings: Rationalism, Humanism, Naturalism and Individualism.

#### 1. Rationalism

Reason and logic have a central place in Freud's theory. On the one hand, in his personality theory, the ego has a central synthesising role. On the other hand, when he discusses ethical issues, he posits a crucial role for reason in the search for meaningful human values. In his book, "The Future of an Illusion", after arguing at length for the

need to find a rational basis for ethical prescriptions to replace the religious basis, he responds to an apparent contradiction in his theory. He places the following argument in the mouth of a critic. "On the one hand you admit that men cannot be guided through their intelligence, they are ruled by their passions and their instinctual demands. But on the other hand you propose to replace the affective basis of their obedience to civilization by a rational one" (1928, p. 46). This question, and Freud's response to it, sheds much light on the role that he attributes to reason in his system. He spends most of the final chapters of his book replying to his fictitious questioner. His first argument is that even if, in fact, men tend to allow their passions to control their reason, this does not seem to be an inevitable situation. "It is true", he says, "that men are like this, but have you asked yourself whether they must be like this, whether their innermost nature necessitates it?" (p. 47). He then goes on to argue that: "The voice of the intellect is a soft one, but it does not rest till it has gained a hearing. Finally, after a countless succession of rebuffs, it succeeds. This is one of the few points on which one may be optimistic about the future of mankind..... The primacy of the intellect lies, it is true, in a distant, distant future but probably not in an infinitely distant one" (p. 53). It is in this discussion that he states quite clearly that "the psychological ideal" is "the primacy of intelligence" (p. 48). There can be no doubt that Freud argued for a rational basis for ethical norms. In "A Philosophy of Life", he says: "The ethical commands to which religion seeks to lend its weight require some other foundations instead, for human society cannot do without them and it is dangerous to link up obedience to them with religious belief" (p. 230). For Freud, this "other foundation" is clearly a rational-scientific one.

Very many authors, philosophers, psychoanalysts and religionists have commented on the influence of rationalism on Freud's theory. Rieff (1959), Gedo and Pollock (1975), Yankelovich and Barret (1970), Kaplan (1957) are among those who have cited the influence of the "Enlightenment" on Freud's thinking. Yankelovich and Barret (1970) maintain: "In one general respect the opposing tendencies of Freud's mind fit his historical situation. Freud belongs very much to his time and place. What was the significance of the particular juncture in which Freud arrived?..... the nineteenth century was the continuation of the rationalism of the Enlightenment while our century by contrast...can no longer continue in the supreme confidence that rational consciousness is the absolute center of the human personality. In laying bare the darker side of man Freud is, of course, a leading if not the leading pioneer. Yet it is paradoxical that in doing so he employs the theoretical framework of a reductive rationalism that belongs to nineteenth century positivism" (p. 18). Kaplan (1957) makes a similar point. "Freud is a rationalist, following in the Jewish tradition of Maimonides, Spinoza and Einstein..... His best hope for the future is that the intellect- the scientific spirit, reason - should in time establish a dictatorship over the human mind..... This rational ideal Freud holds out for everyone....Freud remains confident that the voice of the intellect, though it speaks softly will persist till it is heard and heard by all" (p. 226). Rieff (1959) speaks of psychoanalysis as "the last great formulation of nineteenth century secularism" (p. 256) And Herberg (1957) also maintains that both in his view of the self and in his view of society, Freud "permits a strong element of rationalism to creep in" (p. 154).

Psychoanalysts Ramzy, Fine and Frenkel-Brunswik make a similar

observation. Says Fine (1975) "The dominant influence in Freud's thought as in that of most scholars of his day was the implicit faith in the scientific method and the scientific spirit. Let science attack the problems that beset mankind and they will disappear was the virtually universal belief" (p. 4). And later (1977): "In 'The Future of an Illusion'.... (Freud) took the rationalist position going back to the Deists and the philosophers of the French Revolution that religion is an irrational adherence to authority, now further clarified as the authority of parents, and that it was destined to disappear as mankind became more mature" (p. 9).

Outler (1954) a religionist, is a little more polemical but nonetheless makes the same argument that Freud stood in the tradition of the eighteenth century rationalists who "undertook to refashion the Christian dream of the city of God in heaven into a program for a heavenly city for man here on earth. Their passionate aim and hope was the achievement of a good society for men and by men ordered by reason and energized by the ideals of liberty, equality and fraternity" (p. 39).

There is thus some measure of agreement on the "rationalistic" orientation in Freud's thought. But it has also been noted that Freud's rationalism is not the unbridled faith in reason of the eighteenth century rationalists. He stressed the unconscious forces at work within the human personality which limited the effectiveness of reason. Fromm (1950) whose evaluation of Freud's contribution is not always accepted in Freudian circles probably accurately sums up Freud's position, on this issue, in a manner that is likely to satisfy even orthodox Freudians. He says: "Then came Freud, the last great representative of the rationalism of the Enlightenment, the first to demonstrate its limitations.

He dared to interrupt the songs of triumph of mere intellect. He showed that reason is the most valuable and the most specifically human power of man and yet it is subject to the distorting effect of passions and that only the understanding of man's passions can free his reason to function properly" (p. 6).

Heinz Hartmann in his (1964) essay "On Rational and Irrational Action" elaborates on this very point. "Rational action", he says is often used to refer to behavior which favors the adjustment of the individual. When the term "rational" is used in this way, however, it cannot be taken to refer to ego processes alone. Behavior which advances the cause of adjustment of the individual must involve the balancing of the three systems: ego, id and superego. The task of achieving this is accomplished by what Hartmann calls the "organizing function of the ego", and he maintains that this function is actually part of what philosophers traditionally refer to when they speak of "reason". Hartmann insists that some irrational aspects of man's functioning must be taken into consideration in the search for authentic human values. Like Freud, however, Hartmann's stress is still on man's ability to derive meaningful values without the help of religion.

## 2. Humanism

"Rationalism" and "humanism" are closely related but distinct concepts and they both have very wide connotations. As with "rationalism", it will thus be necessary to indicate very specifically what is meant when we speak of a humanistic trend in Freud's writings. With rationalism, too, humanism was a strong philosophical trend in the eighteenth century Enlightenment. Outler (1954) summarizes what he calls the "humanistic credo":

- "1. Man is not natively depraved
2. The end of life is life itself; the good life on earth instead of the beatific life after death.
3. Man is capable, guided solely by the light of reason and experience, of perfecting the good life on earth.
4. The first and essential condition of the good life on earth is the freeing of men's minds from the bonds of ignorance and superstition (largely due to the benighted bond between Christianity and political tyranny)" (p. 39).

It is quite clear that Freud did not subscribe completely to this humanistic credo. In fact, his theory directly contradicts one of the basic principles of the humanistic position - that man is basically good and self-actualizing. But there are other aspects of humanism that are represented in Freud's writings: his contention with religion for impeding human development by attempting to hinder the progress of science, his stress on the importance of working to improve man's lot on earth without reference to religious "illusions", his rejection of notions of an after-life in favor of attempts at providing an improved life on earth. And while it is true that Freud remained pessimistic about the possibility of much success in man's effort to provide the good life there is little doubt that he felt that whatever advances could be made would have to be made by man himself without assistance from supernatural forces. He argues that men, "by withdrawing their expectations from the other world and concentrating all their liberated energies into their life on earth, ... will probably succeed in achieving

a state of things in which life will become tolerable for everyone and civilization no longer oppressive to anyone" (1928, p. 50). And later, in response to a fictitious critic, he says: "You would have the state of bliss begin directly after death; you expect the impossible from it and you will not surrender the claims of the individual. Our God, logos, will fulfill whichever of these wishes nature outside us allows, but he will do it very gradually, only in the unforeseeable future and for a new generation of men" (p. 54).

Psychoanalyst Brierley (1945, 1951) argues that there are, indeed, humanistic values in psychoanalysis which, however, are very different from the old humanistic values. She maintains that psychoanalysis is infused with the values of "neo-humanistic realism". "One of the main differences between psychoanalytic and older types of humanism", she says, "is that the former is based upon a more balanced appreciation of the nature of human instinctual endowment. The failure of the older humanism.....can be ascribed in part to its over-optimistic belief in the essential goodness of man. Neo-humanism recognized that man is both malevolent and benevolent and that his vices and virtues are alike derived from what it is advisable to think of as ineradicable primary instincts. These instincts are neither moral or immoral but amoral or pre-moral" (1951, p. 165). She continues: "A second cause of the failure of the earlier humanism was its over-estimation of reason both in regard to its reliability and its provision of incentives to action" (p. 169). Hartmann (1960) says that even though psychoanalysis has no value system of its own, its findings are most compatible with humanistic philosophies. Holt (1972) has made a valuable contribution to the study of humanistic element in Freud's writings. In his paper "Freud's

Mechanistic and Humanistic Images of Man", he argues that "there remains a pervasive unresolved conflict within all of Freud's writings between (these) two antithetical images of Man" (p. 6). The mechanistic image of man, he says, is based on "the mid-nineteenth century grasp of physics and chemistry", while the humanistic image "comprised a rich and cohesive body of assumptions about the nature of human beings which functioned in Freud's mind as a corrective antagonist of his mechanistic writings" (p. 6). Holt contends that there are assumptions about the nature of man in both of these images and he goes on to evaluate them. The basic thrust of his paper is that "humanism biases one in a humanitarian way, while mechanism has a dehumanizing bias" (p. 15). The article is intended to encourage a recognition of the humanistic values in Freud's writings. Even though Holt stresses the positive aspects of the humanistic image and does not address the issue of the conflict between the humanistic image of man and the religious image, his affirmation of this largely unacknowledged humanistic element in Freud's writings, with its many assumptions about the nature of man, is of great significance. Outler (1954), Bergin (1980) and Lowe (1959, 1976) have pointed out the conflict between the humanism of the psychoanalytic system and religious values. Their views will be discussed in greater detail later.

### 3. Naturalism

Another philosophical trend of the Enlightenment, closely related to and over-lapping the concepts of rationalism and humanism, is the concept of naturalism. Rather than attempting to define the various meanings of this term in philosophy, we will, once again, focus on the aspects of this trend that can be found in Freud's writings. There are

three such identifiable aspects. Firstly, man is seen as a part of nature to the exclusion of a spiritual dimension. Secondly, moral values are assumed to have developed among men in response to their own personal and social needs. Thus, he argues: "Since it is an awkward task to separate what God himself has demanded from what can be traced to the authority of an all-powerful parliament or a high judiciary, it would be an undoubted advantage if we were to leave God out altogether and honestly admit the purely human origin of all the regulations and precepts of civilization" (1928, p. 41). Thirdly, Freud's naturalism is seen in his view about the nature of happiness as the satisfaction of basic human drives. In this context, authentic values are assumed to be those which optimize this satisfaction. "What we call happiness", he says, "comes from the (preferably sudden) satisfaction of needs which have been dammed up to a high degree" (1930, p. 23).

Many authors (Outler, 1954; Lowe, 1959, 1976; Herbert, 1957; Kaplan, 1957; Bergin, 1980) have described Freud's approach as naturalistic. Says Kaplan: "Man's place in nature - this is the preoccupation of the religious philosophies; and it is here that Freud's naturalistic temper is most marked. There is no need to make room for faith conceived as a relation to the supernatural. Lacking in an object, faith is not a relation at all, but a condition in the faithful" (p. 226). Feuer (1955) who argues that a universal ethic can be derived from psychoanalysis, also quite clearly favors a naturalistic approach. He writes: "Authentic cultural values are those which promote the maximal satisfaction of the underlying biological drives; they are an expression of the individual own choices based on an awareness of his basic drives" (p. 120).

It is especially Freud's theory of needs which has had an impact on

moral values. Says Lowe: "Freud's theory of needs has caused moral controversy because his moral beliefs exemplify a naturalistic system of ethics. He judges whatever meets the needs of man's physiological nature as good" (p. 82).

Holt (1972) maintains that Freud's theory of needs is intricately connected with his mechanistic image of man. The model that Freud uses is that of a machine which, when in a state of excitation, contains a certain quantum of energy which requires discharge so that the organism may return to the original state of quiescence. Freud's libido theory with its emphasis on energy and its discharge has great relevance for values. There is no doubt that a misunderstanding of this theory has led to misconceptions about psychoanalysis or has inclined others to draw extreme conclusions not intended by Freud or advocated by authentic psychoanalysis. Some sides of the debate are represented by the following quotations. Mowrer (1961), a well-known critic of psychoanalysis says: "Psychoanalysis has always had (at least tacitly) a "value system", one in which "adult genital sexuality" (capacity for lusty heterosexual orgasm) and unencumbered "assertiveness" (which often eventuates as frank hostility and aggressiveness) occupy positions of supreme importance" (p.v.). Weiss (1952) argues that the notion that psychoanalysis frees individuals from repression so that they may satisfy instinctual demands, mainly of a sexual nature, is a misconception. Kaplan (1957) makes a similar point. She says: "In part, the fears for morality also stems from another vulgarization of Freud, that the aim of analysis is to encourage the libido to express itself in libertinism. In fact, analysis aims at the resolution of unconscious conflict; and it is explicit in the theory that such conflict is not resolved by supporting one side or the other" (p. 221).

Even though Freud's theory does not endorse libertinism or "frank hostility and aggressiveness", there seems little doubt that a legitimate inference from his theory is that it encouraged a freer expression of those instinctual drives that were countenanced by the society of his day. In his paper "On Sexual Morality and Modern Nervousness", he makes the connection between excessively harsh sexual norms and neurotic disorder and argues that the repression of the sexual drive can be dysfunctional. And speaking of aggression, he writes: "When the super-ego is established, considerable amounts of the aggressive instinct are fixated in the interior of the ego and function there self-destructively. This is one of the dangers to health by which human beings are faced on their path to cultural development. Holding back aggressiveness is in general unhealthy and leads to illness" (1954, p. 7). In this context, commenting on Freud's theory, Holt (1972) says: "The emphasis on energy and its discharge can lead to a false expectation that aggression has to be vented and to an overvaluation of what can be accomplished by catharsis" (p. 14). So that even when we strip away the excesses of some of his foes, Freud's theory still retains a significant impact on moral values pertaining to sex and aggression.

#### 4. Individualism

Another motif of the Enlightenment (going hand in hand with the three previously-mentioned philosophical trends) was its pre-occupation with the rights of the individual. Freud was an heir of this trend as well. It is clear that in his theory, the individual with this intrapsychic conflict is of central importance. Individual autonomy is highly valued in his system. Furthermore, especially in his book, "Civilization and its Discontents", there is the clear implication that

the individual in society finds himself pitted against restrictive and oppressive norms which, even though necessary for the well-being of the society as a whole, most often do not serve the good of the individual. Society (including religion) attempts to limit man's satisfactions often with disastrous results for the individual himself. "Our civilization", Freud says, "is generally speaking founded on the suppression of instincts" (1924, p. 82). Later (1928), he wrote: "It seems rather that every civilization must be built up on coercion and renunciation of instinct" (p. 7). And again (1930): "...it is impossible to overlook the extent to which civilization is built upon the renunciation of instinct, how much it presupposes precisely the non-satisfaction (by suppression, repression or some other means?) of powerful instincts" (p. 44).

Gregory Zilboorg (1943) takes issue with Freud on this point. "Freud", he says, "a profound humanist and libertarian, looked on the world only from the point of view of the individual..... He found that two leviathans stood in the path of the individual; nature which had to be conquered and civilization which was always a source of discomfort" (p.300). He goes on to argue that for Freud: "Anything that threatened the autonomy of the individual, he treated with skepticism, suspicion and even contempt..... Freud was so careful not to judge man that he left the question of values to be answered by the healthy individual himself; consequently, he betrayed a methodological weakness in his estimation of the values of civilization and religion in their proper perspective. One almost senses in Freud, reverberations of the eighteenth century" (p. 302). Pattison (1968) makes an almost identical point: "Preoccupied as he was with the vicissitudes of intrapsychic development, Freud foresaw but did not develop either a theoretical or a

practical concept of man as a social organism. Man was conceptualized as an individual complete in himself and only secondarily related to other discrete individuals. Society and its morality were consequently viewed as external elements to be tolerated as ineluctable burdens" (p. 190). London (1964), Campbell (1975) and Wachtel (1981) have all commented on the individualistic orientation of psychoanalysis. Says Wachtel: "Psychoanalysis has always been a highly individualistic point of view. Philosophically, it has strong elements of the romantic sense of the opposition between the individual and the social order" (p. 37). He goes on: "The individualism in psychoanalysis is methodological as well. The unit of study for Freud and most later analysts was the individual; not.....the individual in his context" (p. 37). Wachtel argues that the stress placed on autonomy and differentiation further reinforce the individual orientation of psychoanalysis.

The issue at stake here is that the individual perspective of psychoanalysis runs counter to other positions which stress either the good of society as a whole over the good of the individual or encourage the importance of being other-directed rather than self-directed. One aspect of this issue will be discussed in greater detail in the second part of this chapter when we look specifically at the individualistic orientation of Freud's theory of therapeutic technique. From the standpoint of his general theory, however, few would disagree with Brierley (1951): "It seems quite evident, theoretically that the relation between individual and group should be one of mutual give and take. An egocentric life of self-expression devoted to purely individual aims is as far from the optimum balance of interests as the opposite extreme in which personal life submerged in the pursuance of group welfare. Neither isolationary

individualism nor person-ignoring collectivism are genuinely life promoting" (p. 279). The issue is one of emphasis. And there seems little doubt that the psychoanalytic emphasis on individual growth is opposed to other systems (e.g. Christianity) which place their emphasis elsewhere.

#### Summary

It is indeed very striking that only specific aspects of the various philosophical trends which we have discussed have made their way into Freud's theory. Freud probably would have argued that this is because his theory is based on the results of scientific research rather than on sterile speculation. Brierley (1951) and Hartmann (1960, 1964) make this argument at least as regards the rationalism and humanism in Freud's theory. Fortunately, it is not necessary, for the purposes of our present research, to resolve the issue of the origins of these trends in the theory. I have attempted, in this chapter, to demonstrate the presence of these trends in the theory and to indicate that there is much agreement among a variety of authors (including psychoanalysts) on this point. Even though there has undoubtedly been gross misrepresentation of Freud's position on precisely the issues discussed, the fact remains that even when his true meaning is ascertained (insofar as this is possible), the impact of his theory on moral values is inescapable.

While it is true that his research has highlighted the importance of irrational factors in the human personality, he did also argue for a rational basis for moral norms. Even though he did not accept the humanistic position that man is basically good and self-actualizing (representing instead a constant battle in man between life forces and death forces) he nonetheless saw man as the ultimate norm for the derivation of values, excluding any basis for such values outside the human

realm. And even though he certainly did not encourage libertinism, his stress on the rights of the individual and his naturalistic orientation favored a fuller expression of the sexual and aggressive instinct. These emphases, we will later see in more detail, are different from, and in conflict with, the emphases of traditional Roman Catholic morality.

## Part II. Moral Values and Psychoanalytic Practice

In the previous section, I have attempted to demonstrate that there are subtle value orientations in psychoanalytic theory. The impact of these orientations is felt as the theory becomes disseminated through the society from the literature to the popular understanding of the nature of man and what ails him. Fine (1975) notes: "In comparing the civilization of today with that which existed sixty years ago, it is possible to trace a large number of consequences of the Freudian revolution in child-rearing and in human relations, especially in those countries, of which the United States and England are the foremost, where psychoanalysis has had its greatest influence. Apart from a much freer attitude toward sexuality itself, today's civilized world is familiar with such practices as natural childbirth, the laying-in plan, breast feeding, late toilet-training, a more permissive attitude toward aggression, the relaxation of the traditional tyrannical discipline of children, greater tolerance and the acceptance of sexual needs at all ages, the encouragement of fantasy productions, the greater acceptance of the body in all aspects.....and many other attitudes and phenomena which are attributable either directly or indirectly to Freud. Freud thought of himself as a scientist, not a revolutionary, yet his impact on the course of civilization has been enormous" (p. 75).

Perhaps the most powerful manner in which Freud's theory has had an impact has been through the practice of psychoanalysts and the various psychotherapies which have been influenced by it. It has been customary for psychoanalysis to maintain that, by means of therapeutic neutrality, values can be prevented from intruding into the process of treatment. Psychoanalysis, it was argued, helps the patient to explore and clarify

his value system and come to accept a more mature set of values which help improve his psychological functioning. The analyst, by becoming aware of his own values - his countertransference reactions, in particular - can avoid imposing his values and morals on the patient and can even avoid influencing him one way or the other as he makes his value choice.

It is difficult to find any recent authors who hold that this is, in fact, possible. The thrust of the literature (cf. an excellent review by Kessel and McBrearty, 1967; and Beutler, 1979) seems to support the contention that it is not possible for the analyst to be completely neutral. Even Glover (1955) in his well-known book "The Technique of Psychoanalysis" acknowledges that "the idea of the analyst's complete neutrality under ordinary analytic conditions is something of a myth" (p. 12). The major arguments are as follows.

Firstly, it is argued that values are involved in the analyst's view of mental illness, the goals he sets for treatment, the decision that is made about termination. Weiss (1952), Guntrip (1957) and Ramzy (1972) all argue that since the psychoanalyst deals with the whole person and not just with isolated parts, values, of necessity become involved in the process. Wachtel (1981a) describes how psychoanalysis evolved away from its original focus as a cure for specific symptoms and embraced the broader goal of change in personality. It follows that values became much more involved in the process. He says: "The evolution I have depicted suggests a shift from an enterprise concerned mainly with symptoms or specific and identifiable distresses to one concerned mainly with the quality of the person's life and its underlying structure (not just in the sense of identifying underlying conflicts or fantasies but

also, more abstractly, with the degree of freedom and autonomy which can be found at the root of the person's actions and apparent choices). It is thus, in a sense, a shift from a (primarily) therapeutic to a (primarily) philosophical undertaking" (1981a, p. 28).

One of the expressed goals of the psychoanalytic process is "super-ego modification". Freud laid the groundwork for this therapeutic approach. "In our research into, and therapy of, a neurosis", he says, "we are led to make two reproaches against the super-ego of the individual. In the severity of its commands and prohibitions it troubles itself too little about the happiness of the ego in that it takes insufficient account of the resistances against obeying them - of the instinctual strength of the id (in the first place), and of the difficulties presented by the real external environment (in the second). Consequently, we are very often obliged, for therapeutic purposes, to oppose the super-ego and we endeavour to lower its demands" (1930, p. 90). Glover's comments about the therapeutic process are similar. "The first stage would be one of relaxing the archaic severities and watchfulness of the super-ego, the second, the analysis of super-ego development and structure .....(1955), p. 13). Brierley, too, makes the same point. "The degree of ego-invigoration will be proportionate to the degree of super-ego modification and to the establishment of permissive rather than prohibitive relations between self and conscience" (1945, p. 110). Lowenstein (1966) further elaborates on the process, noting the connection with moral values. He says: ".....a brief note on the interrelations that obtain between ego and super-ego as a result of the psychoanalytic process.

"We do not expect the super-ego's functions and demands to become

replaced by those of the ego. However, the psychoanalytic treatment leads often to an increased influence of the ego in areas pertaining to the superego, as is also often the case in the domain of instinctual drives.....The analysand is expected to become aware of the unconscious demands of the superego, to trace them with his conscious moral code..... The action of his ego then may be to allow more gratification than certain unconscious super-ego demands would permit; or the ego may recognize the wisdom of effacing itself and letting some super-ego exigencies prevail" (p. 312). It thus often happens in the process of analysis that super-ego demands are examined, are considered to be unduly harsh, and the patient is encouraged to make conscious choices with regard to his moral values.

This issue has stirred up controversy in that the relaxation of super-ego demands and the diminution of guilt feelings which often result from analytic treatment have been seen by some as contributing to a weakening of moral standards. <sup>1</sup> Mowrer (1961) has spearheaded the attack on psychoanalysis for its weakening of super-ego prohibitions. He takes issue with what he sees as Freud's view that, "...neurosis stems from a 'too severe super-ego' which is the product of too strenuous socialization of the individual at the hands of harsh, unloving parents and an irrational society" (p. 48). Even though Mowrer's critics have accused him of advocating a strengthening of the super-ego, he has made his position very clear. He says, "...never did I hold that it was the aim of therapy to strengthen or increase the severity of conscience, although this has been a common misperception. All I had said was that perhaps the neurotic's great need was to have his conscience released, just as Freud had conjectured that it was certain repressed instincts that were

clamoring for free access to consciousness and a greater share in the control of behavior" (p. 27).

In other words, Mowrer maintained that an aspect of neurosis lay in the repression not of the instincts, but of the conscience. Jourard's (1958) comments on the issue seem very appropriate. "Clinical experience", he says, "suggests that neither Freud or Mowrer is wholly correct or wholly incorrect. Rather I have found that some neurotic patients do indeed have a conscience that is too strict; in order to remain guilt-free, they must refrain from all pleasurable activities, including those which society condones. Other patients may be found with the make-up which Mowrer has regarded as nuclear to all neurosis - they repress conscience so they can break social taboos without conscious guilt" (p. 366).

Whatever position one takes on the issue, it is difficult to see how it can reasonably be maintained that the process of psychotherapy (including psychoanalysis) does not have an impact on moral values. Indeed, the very goal (expressed by Lowenstein) of greater ego-control already implies the value that the individual has the right to examine and even question his moral code and to make conscious choices about it and this runs counter to positions which maintain that the individual should blindly accept and comply with a moral code which is handed down to him. The question of whether psychoanalysis weakens or strengthens moral values is a separate issue which we will consider in more detail later.

The second argument against the possibility of 'neutrality' is that the therapist is really unable to conceal his own values from the patient. The issues he chooses to respond to, or ignore, his tone of voice, his unconscious body language all speak very loudly to the patient who is carefully listening for such communication from him.

In recognition of the impossibility of "complete neutrality", many analysts stress the goal of "minimal intrusion". In other words, neutrality is seen as an ideal which should be approximated to (by the analyst's dealing with his counter-transference reactions), but never perfectly achieved. In this context, some authors have stressed that it is important that the analyst be aware that some of his values will inevitably be transmitted in the process of therapy. Thus, Wachtel (1981) says: "In principle, most psychotherapists claim to not make value choices regarding their patients, but rather to strive for a "neutrality" that enables the patient to make the choices according to his values. In practice, however, this rarely occurs to anywhere near the degree that is posited; rather the therapist's influence is often the greater for being covert and denied by both parties" (p. 42).

In spite of whatever efforts at neutrality made by the therapist, it has been argued that the patient, in the course of treatment, develops a new super-ego which is patterned after the super-ego of the therapist. This is an issue of considerable controversy. Glover (1955) and Hartmann (1960) stress that the identification of the patient with the analyst is only a temporary phase; and that in a successful analysis, this is eventually replaced by the patient making his own free choices. But after prolonged intimate contact between patient and analyst, to what extent is it possible for the patient to leave without incorporating at least some of the values of the analyst?

It has been pointed out that some patients seek psychotherapy precisely in order to find new values to replace those which they consider unsatisfactory; and this undoubtedly also applies to moral values.

Psychotherapists in our society are perceived as having liberal views on many issues, or at least to be open to liberal views. Some patients may thus seek out psychotherapy with the covert intention of finding support for a change to more liberal values. (At present, one can only speculate as to how widespread this might be!) . But even if they do not, the therapist's role is a very powerful one, especially in the transference, and it is likely that his patients will strive to emulate him. Thus, Wolberg (1953) argues: "No matter how passive the therapist may believe himself to be, and no matter how objective he remains in an attempt to permit the patient to develop his own sense of values, there is an inevitable incorporation within the patient of a new super-ego patterned after the therapist as he is perceived by the patient. There is almost inevitably an acceptance by the patient of many of the values of the therapist as they are communicated in the interpretation or through direct suggestion or as they are deduced by the patient from his association with the therapist" (p. 569).

If one accepts that values are communicated in the course of therapy, as seems highly likely, there is the further complicated question as to the nature of the values which are communicated. To what extent are they the "personal" values of the therapist, the "analytic" values inherent in the psychoanalytic system, or values which the patient, (accurately or inaccurately) perceives the therapist to have? A number of analysts (Ramzy, Fine, Schafer, Brierly, Frenkel-Brunswik, Guntrip, to mention a few) maintain that there are definite values in the psychoanalytic system. Their views will be presented in greater detail in the next

part of this chapter. Ramzy (1972) has pointed out that before candidates are accepted for analytic training they are carefully screened not only to assess their intellectual ability, but also to determine whether they possess certain values. Their receptivity to the values in the psychoanalytic system is probably assessed, and in the course of training, the trainees no doubt incorporate these values. Guntrip (1957) sees the process in a very similar manner but speaks of "maturity" as the value which both patient and therapist must accept. He says: "It is an outstanding tribute to the sincerity and sense of responsibility of psychoanalysts that they have made on themselves the exceptionally exacting demand that they should undergo a very long personal analysis before they subject their patients to the process. Undoubtedly values of the utmost importance are here implied.

"The psychoanalyst undergoes his training analysis not merely to acquire technical competence in the use of the method, but in order to increase his maturity as a human being.....Evidently, then, the practice of psychoanalysis for psychotherapeutic purposes rests on the acceptance of maturity of personality as a value....." (p. 162). Of course, it needs to be noted that psychoanalysis itself defines what this "maturity" is, and that there is likely to be a great deal of value judgments in this definition. Fine (1977) actually describes what he calls the "analytic ideal" as the values implicit in psychoanalysis. The analyst, he says, as a result of his own analysis incorporates these values which he communicates to his patients. "What happens then is that the well-trained analyst, now much closer to the analytic ideal, uses the techniques of analysis, especially transference-resistance interpretations, to teach the patient how to come closer to the analytic

ideal. Those who agree with the analyst in advance about the analytic ideal do best in this process and may require little more than interpretation. Those who are difficult must first become convinced in their own minds as the result of analytic work that the analytic ideal is an acceptable goal for them. Once they have reached this conviction, techniques step in to show them the way" (p. 45).

Wachtel (1979) has added some important considerations to the issue of the communication of values in therapy. He comments on the study by Truax and Carkhuff which demonstrated that during the course of Rogerian therapy the therapist had unwittingly reinforced certain values in the patient. Wachtel argues that the values which were reinforced were those relating to improvement in psychological functioning. This is relevant to our discussion because the Rogerian's attempt at a neutrality is at least as stringent as the psychoanalyst's. And, in fact, Wachtel's comments seem to parallel an argument by Hartmann (1960) that the psychoanalyst should strive to actualize the "health values" of the patient. Taken together with the comments of Guntrip and Fine, this represents some measure of agreement that at least some of the values which are communicated to the patient during the process of treatment are values inherent in the therapist's psychotherapeutic system.

Wachtel goes on to argue, though, that there are some issues about which the therapist should attempt to remain neutral, but other instances (for example, when he is convinced that the patient's decision can be harmful) when he should communicate his opinion, even though this often involves a value judgment. Wachtel suggests that the therapist's previous neutrality will even pave the way for the situation in which he decides to communicate his opinion. This view, of course, moves the

discussion into the whole new realm of the therapeutic utility of communicating values to the patient, a view which finds some support in the psychotherapeutic community but would probably be rejected by most orthodox analysts. Arguments in favor of the communication of values have been expressed by Frank (1974) who sees the essence of the therapy process as "interpersonal persuasion", and by Ellis whose rational-emotive therapy is aimed at replacing the patient's dysfunctional value system with a "healthier" one. Passing reference must also be made to the iconoclastic Szasz (1978) who claims that the whole of psychotherapy is nothing more than "secular ethics". This debate obviously extends far beyond the boundaries of the present study.

To get back to the question of therapeutic neutrality, it has been previously noted that a certain value is already implied in the espousal of a position of neutrality, namely that the patient has the right to make his own choices in matters pertaining to his life, including morality. Ramzy (1972) has pointed out that one value which is almost a prerequisite for acceptance into an analytic training program is the applicant's ability to be flexible as regards moral issues, and there is good reason for this since he is likely to work with patients with a wide variety of moral norms. London (1964) makes a similar point but in much stronger terms. He says: "It is apparent that so-called moral neutrality in the psychotherapist is as much a moral position as any more blatant. It is from the therapist's side a libertarian position, regardless of how the client sees it.....Some of the concepts that serve to legitimize and popularize moral neutrality are "democracy", self-realization" and "self-actualization". All these concepts are oriented towards people's freedom to do as they please" (p. 14).

Actually, there are two separate issues involved when we consider the impact of the therapist's neutrality on the patient's moral values. It is relevant, in the first place, to the debate between moral absolutism and moral relativism; and, in the second place, to the question what constitutes the most effective method for promoting moral behavior.

As regards the first issue, it is not possible, in this paper, to explore the complex philosophical arguments involved. This debate has been going on for many years and is of such a nature that no solution is likely to be arrived at that will satisfy all the disputants. To present the debate very briefly, however, the question is whether there are absolute moral norms which are universally binding as opposed to relative norms which leave most (or all) of the decision-making process up to the individual. Psychologists who have attempted to deal with the issue of values in psychotherapy have been drawn into the debate. Most analysts, and probably most psychologists in general, reject the concept of absolute moral norms. Says Weiss (1952): "Moral absoluteness is incompatible with constructive psychoanalytic therapy"(p. 45). Hartmann (1960) also rejects the concept of absolute norms and describes his position on morals as "relative". He stresses though, that "relative" does not mean "arbitrary" since he considers the individual to be bound by his moral values. Fromm (1947) discusses the question in great detail and make a distinction between absolute norms which he says has no place in morality but should be reserved for theology, and universally binding norms, which are, however, still not absolute. Except for an interesting paper by Schroeder (1944) entitled "The Attitude of One Amoral Psychologist", it is difficult to find any psychotherapists who would commit themselves to complete relativism. Most try to maintain

some middle ground of accepting certain general norms while at the same time leaving great room for individual decision. The matter is further complicated by the fact that the therapist, while holding to general norms for himself may accept a broader range of values in his patients. Thus Roman et al (1978) in a survey of therapists found that not only did they hold a liberal view towards sex in their own life, but also that they were accepting of even more liberal sexual behavior in their patients. In spite of the complexity of the issue, however, certain elements seem clear. The position of moral absolutism which is preached by some Christian religions (and which, I will later argue, represents the traditional Roman Catholic approach) seems irreconcilable with the psychoanalytic method. And even if the extreme of moral absolutism does not completely represent the traditional Roman Catholic position, it is at least true to say that Roman Catholic morality leans in this direction whereas the psychoanalytic approach inclines one in the opposite direction, thus creating a conflict, if not in principle, at least in practice. So, in general, the analyst, in contrast to the religionist, is likely to be much more accepting of a broader range of moral values.

It has been argued that the values of the therapist (personal as well as "analytic") are communicated to the patient during the course of therapy. At first glance, this does not seem consistent with the argument that therapists as a whole tend to be flexible on the issue of values. The question of exactly what values are communicated in the course of therapy is a very complex one. However, it is possible that the most important value which is communicated in this context is that the patient is free to choose whatever values he wants. It is likely that no therapist can be completely relative in his stance. There are

likely to be some values that he cannot tolerate even in others. If there are values that the therapist strongly rejects, the patient will probably not feel free to incorporate these values. Wile (1977) suggests that many an impasse in therapy and some premature terminations may be due to a clash in values between therapist and patient. It is possible that there is a range of values acceptable to the therapist and within this range the patient will feel free to choose.

The position of "therapeutic neutrality" is also relevant to the debate on the issue of an effective methodology for promoting moral behavior. It has been argued that the moralizing approach, usually associated with religion, has been ineffective and that psychoanalysis encourages the development of a more personal and consequently more meaningful morality. This issue will be discussed in detail in a later chapter when we compare the moral implications of psychoanalysis with the traditional Roman Catholic approach.

The psychoanalytic approach to therapy with its goals (which include super-ego modification) and its method (particularly its stance of "neutrality") highlights the individualistic approach to values which was discussed in the first part of this chapter. Wachtel (1981a) makes a note of this. "In psychoanalysis specifically our individualism is echoed in the hesitancy to offer direct assistance, the emphasis on change strictly from within, the view that change brought about by changes in the person's objective life circumstances are superficial and unimportant, and even in the emphasis on a strictly intrapsychic framework which treats the person as a discrete unit rather than as part of a social context" (p. 24). Wachtel also points to the danger that this individual perspective may be carried to extremes. "Social

conformism," he says, "is indeed prevalent in our culture and the danger is real that therapists can become agents of superficial (and potentially harmful) social adjustment, can make people "fit" for roles imposed upon them. But psychotherapy, and in many respects especially psychoanalysis, can also play into an equal and opposite danger in our society - that posed by an excess or miscarriage of individualism, in which the individual's expression of his own inclinations and pursuit of his personal pleasures is not tempered by a concern with the welfare of others or by a recognition that successful mastery of life's difficulties requires a continuing mutual support and assistance among people" (p. 23).

Philip Rieff in his (1962) article "The Analytic Attitude" and later in his book "Triumph of the Therapeutic" makes a piercing analysis of the relationship between psychoanalysis and the individualistic perspective in modern day society. He argues that the world has seen a decay of what he calls "positive communities" (in particular, Christianity) from which people drew strength and direction and which were also a source of communal controls. In this situation of decay, psychoanalysis has developed as a "negative community", with its credo, the "analytic attitude" which amounts to an individualistic, perpetual self-scrutiny. "Psychoanalysis became", he says, "a negative community bound together, as are intellectuals in general, by the analytic attitude. Others could be taught what Freud knew for himself - that there is no longer characteristically, in our culture, an effective community surrounding the individual, softening life often at the expense of stifling it and organizing life often at the cost of making it rigid. Psychoanalysis supplied an individual and secular substitute for communal and religious vocation. Where nothing can be taken for granted and the stupidity of social life no longer saves,

every man must become something of a genius about himself" (1962, p. 23).

Donald Campbell (1975) in a provocative paper which generated extensive commentaries (*American Psychologist*, May 1976) also argued that psychology, in general, has, in fact, tended to advocate extreme individualism. He contends that, in all cultures, altruistic norms have been developed as an antidote to man's basic selfishness and he sees modern psychology and psychiatry as undermining this process in today's society. Even though he admits that traditional norms may be outdated, he feels that this needs to be proven before they can be rejected.

In response to Campbell, many commentators stressed the need for a balance between altruism and individualism rather than the promulgation of a morality favoring extreme altruistic norms. Thus, for example, Messick argues that: "The difference between Campbell's position and the one he attacks is not so much a difference in the facts that are assumed as it is a difference in the standards employed for making the moral judgment, with Campbell focussing mainly on the well-being of society and those he accuses, I presume, focussing on the well-being of the individual. The teaching of psychology, as least as it pertains to human beings living in groups must recognize the validity of both these standards" (p.369). Cohen goes a little further. "The break with traditional moral systems", he says, "is a function of rapid social change and the need for some means of mobilizing or freeing people to take advantage of the new modes of life available under industrialization. Where Professor Campbell can help us as well as others is to look for models of morality that enhance adaptation within these new systems of social and economic organization..... It is the time now, not simply to look to tradition- a good first step- but to the issues that

made all of us break with tradition, including psychology, and ask what morality, new and old, can aid us in the days ahead"(p. 373).

This is the task to which the present study is addressing itself.

### Empirical Research

Kessel & McBrearty (1967) and Beutler (1979) present reviews of the empirical research on values and psychotherapy. Not much research has been done in this area because of the difficulty of assessing values. Furthermore, the reviews lump together the research on all the various forms of psychotherapy. Even though most of the results can be considered at this stage to be no more than tentative, there are definite trends which may be summarized as follows:

1. The patient's values change in the course of therapy.
2. To some extent, these changes are associated with the degree to which the therapy is viewed as successful, especially by the therapist.
3. Patients tend to acquire the specific values and attitudes of the therapist.

Beutler adds that there is some ambiguity on the question of whether some values may be more influential or therapeutic than others. He adds that, "much research needs to be done relative to clarifying what beliefs do change, what values or beliefs are most conducive to therapeutic growth when they do change, and the role of attitude and belief compatibility in influencing outcome" (p. 439).

There is no known empirical study on the impact of psychoanalysis or psychoanalytic psychotherapy on moral values. In fact, the literature does not provide any empirical study on the relationship between psycho-

analysis and values in general; and there is only one piece of research on the impact of psychotherapy on the moral values which are the focus of this paper. Rosenthal (1955) studied changes in moral values centering around sex aggression and authority because he felt that these issues are commonly involved in patients' conflicts. He found that the patients who improved tended to revise these moral values in the direction of their therapists', while the moral values of those who did not improve tended to become less like their therapists'. Even though the therapy in question was not specifically psychoanalytic, the results of this research are consistent with the foregoing theoretical arguments on the issue.

#### Summary

In this section, adducing support from the literature, I have argued that:

- 1) The psychoanalytic goal of super-ego modification has an impact upon the patient's value system.  
In spite of even strict efforts at "therapeutic neutrality", values are communicated from therapist to patient in the course of psychoanalytic treatment. I have discussed the possible nature of the values which are communicated, suggesting that they are likely to be a combination of "analytic values" as well as the personal values of the therapist.
- 3) The very position of "therapeutic neutrality" is tinged with a value orientation since it leans toward the individual's right to decide values of his choice and

away from inflexible, dogmatic positions.

4. The nature of the psychoanalytic process, with its stress on autonomy and differentiation, further highlights the individualistic orientation discussed in the first part of this chapter.

Finally, the meagre research which is presently available has been reported.

### Part III. A Review of Post-Freudian Literature

Even though Freud himself, especially in his early days, took the position of rejecting efforts to apply psychoanalysis to moral problems, there has been a consistent trend among some notable analysts to do so. Putnam and Pfister, in their correspondence with Freud raised the issue, Pfister, in particular, pointing out some similarities between psychoanalytic thought and Christian religion. As has already been noted, the majority of psychoanalytic authors who have addressed the issue have argued that the impact of psychoanalysis on moral values has been a beneficial one. They have tended to point out the congruence of psychoanalysis with some traditional values and even the optimizing of these values by psychoanalysis. Where they admit to a conflict between psychoanalysis and traditional values they see the psychoanalytic approach as more "integrative".

In reviewing the arguments of these authors, I will note the values which they describe as implicit in psychoanalysis and point out trends with regard to the specific values which they report. The comments of some influential non-analytic authors will also be briefly mentioned. In a later chapter I will discuss the conflict between psychoanalysis and Roman Catholic moral values.

J. C. Flugel, in his well-known work "Man, Morals and Society", published in 1945, was the first psychoanalyst to treat the subject in great detail, and his work has never been paralleled by any member of the psychoanalytic community. He first set out to refute the argument that since psychology is a science, it has no concern with values. He presents the following arguments:

1. Psychology differs from other sciences such as physics and chemistry in that it deals with mental life. Since values are an aspect of mental life, psychology is involved with values.

2. We need to distinguish between pure and applied science. Pure science is concerned with things as they are, that is, knowledge for its own sake. Applied science seeks to use this knowledge for the attainment of certain ends which are assumed to be desirable and which therefore imply certain values. For example, the applied science of medicine assumes that "health" and "life" are values to be maintained.

3. We must distinguish between instrumental values and intrinsic values, the former being concerned with means to an end whereas the latter are concerned with the ends themselves, for example, ultimate Truth, Goodness and Beauty. Psychology is obviously concerned with instrumental values, but the distinction between instrumental and intrinsic values is nearly always relative. There is a hierarchy of values. Thus, Flugel notes: "When it is objected that psychology can have no concern with values, it is of course meant that it is not in a position to state what are intrinsic values... But in view of the relative fluctuating position of intrinsic and instrumental values it is hardly possible to say exactly at what point in the hierarchy of values its influence must cease"(p. 14).

Flugel goes on to argue that psychoanalysis has had a definite impact on conventional morality and he outlines eight general tendencies toward moral progress which grow out of psychoanalytic principles:

- 1) from egocentricity to sociality,
- 2) from unconscious to conscious,
- 3) from autism to realism,
- 4) from moral inhibition to spontaneous goodness,
- 5) from aggression to tolerance and love,
- 6) from fear to security,
- 7) from heteronomy to autonomy and
- 8) from oretic or moral judgment to psychological or cognitive judgment

In general, Flugel's position seems to be that psychoanalysis can place moral values on a more meaningful foundation than that of conventional morality, although the goals of these values - suppression of aggression and the encouragement of love for others - appear practically identical with those of Christianity.

In the same year (1945) Marjorie Brierley published a lengthy article "Further Notes on the Implication of Psychoanalysis: Metapsychology and Personology" which was elaborated into her (1951) book "Trends in Psychology", in which she treated the issue of values in psychoanalysis. She argued that: "The Lebensanschauung implicit in psychoanalysis is neo-realistic humanism. This outlook on life emerges from psychoanalytic theory and practice and is intrinsic to it" (1945, p. 159). Her arguments against what she called the "older humanism" and her description of the neo-humanistic orientation in psychoanalysis have already been noted. Brierley, however, goes on to describe the "integrative values" which, she argues, are inherent in psychoanalysis. These include:

- 1) libidinal control in relation to libidinal capacity and libidination,
- 2) domestication of aggression or its use for preventative and auxiliary purposes
- 3) identification and object love and
- 4) sublimation, the pilot function of ideals.

Thus, it seems that, like Flugel, Brierley sees the values deriving from psychoanalysis as having goals very similar to those of traditional values, namely, libidinal control, domestication of aggression, object love, sublimation, but she stresses that the approach of psychoanalysis is different in that it takes into account libidinal capacity and the use of aggression for auxiliary purposes. She argues that the traditional approach failed to appreciate sufficiently the role of the instinctual life in human functioning and, as a result, has not been fully successful. Psychoanalysis, she maintains, can help provide a more balanced view. "One of the first tasks of modern man", she says, "is the revision of his attitude towards his primary instincts..... It is not desirable that we should react from the despising of our instincts to their worship but it is eminently desirable that we should recognize them for what they are - the dynamo of our psychosocial life. It is because humanity has not yet attained or regained a genuinely realistic attitude towards instinct that it has never achieved any stable civilization" (p. 110).

Else Frenkel-Brunswik (1954) also addressed the issue of the impact of psychoanalysis on moral values. She acknowledges the moral implications of psychoanalysis and stresses their congruence with traditional values. She explains: "As far as both the goals and the effective means

of execution of ethics are concerned, psychoanalysis lays stress on the importance of consciousness, integration and maturity. If we recall for a moment all that is considered an essential ingredient of maturity in psychoanalysis such as rationality, the overcoming of aggression, the development of cooperativeness, the ability to love and work and the courage openly to face inside and outside threats which oppose these characteristics, we readily see that we are confronted with standards which are certainly not lower than those expounded in the traditional system of ethics" (p. 334). Where Frenkel-Brunswik seems to differ from Brierley and Flugel is that she sees a similarity between psychoanalysis and moral values, both as regards the goals and the means of attaining these goals. Brierley, in particular, stressed the need for different means to attain a similar goal.

Allan Wheelis (1958) described and interpreted what he sees as a decline in the sense of values in modern society. Giving no indication of familiarity with Flugel's prior work, he proposed his own distinction between "instrumental" and "institutional" values. Instrumental values, he explained, "derive from tool-using, observation and experimentation and hence are temporal, matter-of-fact and secular" (p. 179). Institutional values, on the other hand, "derive from the activities associated with myth, mores and status. They claim absolute status and immunity to change but are, in fact, relative to the culture that supports them" (p. 179). He goes on to argue that institutional values (among which religious values are included) are undermined by the progress of science which, however, does not necessarily replace them with new ones. This creates what he calls a "no man's land" in the field of values. "Psychoanalysts", he says, "are keenly aware of this no-man's land; for patients apply to them for values which analysis cannot provide.....Whatever

values one has lost which derived from religion, patriotism, mores, and a traditional way of life, these values, the patient assumes, are replaceable by new and better values devised by scientific psychology. These expectations cannot be met. They derive only in part from exaggerated claims made by psychoanalysis; in larger part they derive from the wishful thinking of those who suffer and are confused" (p. 188).

Wheelis, while maintaining that psychoanalysis will not fill the gap made vacant by the decline of institutional values, also clearly indicates that as psychoanalysis participates in the progress of science, it will help in the development of some instrumental values. Wheelis' argument, then, is not so different from that of Flugel who had distinguished between "intrinsic" and "instrumental" values, but leaves the same unanswered question as to the precise boundary between "instrumental" and "institutional" values. Some critics of psychoanalysis also argue that psychoanalysis itself has become institutionalized and that there are values associated with its myths, mores and status. However, many analysts would probably agree with Wheelis' contention that while psychoanalysis does not provide ultimate values (that is, has no *Weltanschauung*), it may provide data which can be of relevance in the search for other values. What Wheelis does not spell out is the particular contribution of psychoanalysis to the issue.

Heinz Hartmann, in his book "Psychoanalysis and Moral Values" (1960), made a major contribution to the discussion. In attempting to clarify Freud's position on the issue, he stresses the importance of distinguishing between a number of different aspects, "first, his actual and 'lived' moral conduct; second the moral evaluations and judgments on general problems of ethics, which he formulated as a private person; third his psychoanalytic studies of moral behavior; fourth his opinions about the

necessity of moral conduct; and finally his thoughts about the possible relationships between psychoanalytic findings and theories and what in German one calls "Weltanschauungen" (p. 13).

The conceptual distinction between these last four aspects, though a useful one, is not easy to maintain in practice when one examines the writings of Freud. As already noted, we face the problem that some of his followers have relegated to the level of "Freud's private opinion", some of his theories with which they are not comfortable. Nonetheless, following upon this distinction, Hartmann comes to the conclusion that: "It is very much apparent that "ethics" in the strict sense, in contrast to the psychological study of moral behavior, was not a field very close to Freud's heart.... He had no urge to go deeper into the question of the "validity" of moral feelings or judgments. He never fully identified himself with any moral system, and even less did he attempt to develop one himself..... About the necessity of moral codes, however, he repeatedly and clearly expressed his opinion. He realized the integrative function that such codes and standards have for the individual" (p. 15). Hartmann goes on to acknowledge that Freud's theory has had an impact on moral values. He says that "the actual impact of his work as to moral questions has been considerable, in some respects revolutionary" (p. 19).

In discussing this impact, Hartmann argues that Freud was not an iconoclast as far as values are concerned but that he sought to establish moral values on a non-religious basis. He contends that Freud adhered to the basic principles of the "partly Greco-Roman, partly Judeo-Christian" values in society but derived from these principles different practical applications. While admitting to the impact of Freud's theories on moral values, Hartmann stresses that psychoanalysis does not provide a

Weltanschauung, even though some people look to it for this. At the same time, it is true to say that psychoanalytic findings are more compatible with some philosophies of life than others. He says that "there is a selective affinity of different "philosophies of life" with respect to the data uncovered by analysis. Some philosophies will find it easier than others to make use of the picture of man it presents. Every strictly dogmatic attitude, every taboo against psychological insight, and particularly against objective studies of instinctual matters will limit readiness to learn from psychoanalysis. On the other hand, that humanistic philosophies seem to find it easier to integrate analytic findings with their teachings has been repeatedly stated" (p. 62).

Hartmann goes on to discuss the impact of psychoanalytic therapy and makes a distinction between "health" values and "moral" values. The analyst, he says, is primarily involved with "health" values and must keep himself aware of the distinction between his moral code and his professional code. In the course of therapy, he must effect a "compartmentalization of codes" by means of which he "keeps his other values in abeyance and concentrates on the realization of one category of values only, health values" (p. 55). Hartmann suggests that analysis can make contributions to the clarification and organization in the framework of given moral codes, but does not advance any code of its own. As proof of the latter, he adduces the fact that people who have been in analysis and share the same professional code do not necessarily share the same moral code; but he admits to finding "commonalities" in those affected by analysis, namely 1) a less stringent attitude toward sexuality and 2) a higher valuation of self-knowledge, facing reality and intellectual integrity.

Hartmann also notes that psychoanalysis is sometimes seen as supporting the individual's self-interest when it comes into conflict with his moral codes; and that this position is sometimes represented as a healthy one. He argues that this is a misrepresentation of psychoanalysis and he goes on to bewail the fact that morals on the whole are being seen as a "burdensome relic of the past" and being rejected by many- an attitude which does not contribute to healthy functioning.

Hartmann has represented the immense complexity of the issue under discussion and certainly offered some clarification. While admitting to an impact of psychoanalytic theory on moral values in general, he appears to differ from Flugel, Brierley and Frenkel-Brunswik who hold that certain moral values are implicit in the theory. However, Hartmann admits to certain "commonalities" shared by analysts. These, it would seem, undoubtedly derive at least in part, from the theory and practice of psychoanalysis. They may not constitute a moral code but they do seem to constitute at least the vague outlines of some sort of pattern. It is especially noteworthy that these outlines are not too different from the outlines of Flugel, Brierley and Frenkel-Brunswik.

Hartmann's distinction between health values and moral values, though a useful concept, is not without serious flaws which have been noted by other analysts (cf. Ramzy, 1972). It is difficult to see how such a distinction can be rigidly maintained either in theory or in practice. One man's health values are another man's moral values. Hartmann, by the way, acknowledges that some patients attempt to incorporate the psychoanalytic method as a "philosophy of life". This, he says, will be worked through in the course of the analysis, and will come to an end. "But with some patients it does not". Furthermore, he notes that "many other people who have not been in analysis themselves...adopt

these technical codes in the place of moral principles" (p. 74).

Hartmann is, in fact, attesting to the widespread nature of the impact of psychoanalysis on moral values.

To underscore the continuing effort to explore the issue of values in psychoanalysis, J. Masserman compiled a number of articles in his (1960) book, "Psychoanalysis and Human Values". In one of the articles, Redlich distinguishes between psychoanalysis as a theory and a therapy, and argues that while, as a theory, it does not have a *Weltanschauung* it can provide data in areas originally thought to be the domain of religion, ethics or metaphysics. As a therapy, he continues, psychoanalysis is concerned with values and is influenced by values. "In all analytic therapies", he says, "the goal of objectivity is spurious and needs to be replaced by an acknowledged awareness of values". (p. 95). Finally, he encourages empirical enquiries into the value of psychoanalysis.

David Shakow, in a presentation to the Third Annual Scientific Conference of the Council of Psychoanalytic Therapy (1965), commented on "some moral aspects of psychoanalysis". He argues that, "it is the growth of ego psychology which has resulted with an increasing concern with the problems of values and an increasing awareness within psychoanalysis itself of its implications for moral problems" (p. 342). He says that "the psychoanalytic system embodies principles that carry with them clear implications for moral conduct" (p. 355). He goes on to suggest that: "Freud's emphasis on the full use of reason, on the development of the potentialities of individual man and on the working through of irrational origins of conduct has laid the essential foundation for a personal ethics. It remains to build upon this foundation, to develop a rational ethics, a faith suitable for scientists" (p. 346).

Kurt Eissler (1965) also expressed the conviction that psychoanalysis could provide the basis for an ethical system, "better suited to our times than contained in the old religious texts" (p. 280). He argues that "in psychoanalysis, the germs of new ethical systems that promise to go far beyond the Christian system are already contained. In order to be ethical, one must know man, and he who knows most about man has thereby the securest foundation for being ethical..... Only on the basis of psychoanalytic insight can an ethics adequate to our times be written" (p. 280).

Roy Schafer, in his well-known paper, "The Psychoanalytic Vision of Reality" (1970) also makes reference to the issue of values in psychoanalysis. He says, "it seems to follow that as a system of observations, methods and hypotheses, psychoanalysis leans toward certain values and away from others. It leans towards values that support the recognition of the depth of the inner world, complexity, ambiguity, conflict, the ubiquity of the demonic and of suffering, the frequent impenetration of victory and defeat, unremitting questioning of absolute and the like..... Any system of thought that denied or opposed these values would be an enemy of psychoanalysis" (p. 225). Again, values implicit in psychoanalysis are presented in a very general manner with the clear indication that no exhaustive list is intended. Quite clearly there is the acknowledgement of a value orientation which can come into conflict with other value orientations.

Another attempt to compile the views of some psychoanalytic authors on the issue was made by S. C. Post in his book "Moral Values and the Superego Concept in Psychoanalysis" (1972). Contributions by Ramzy and Bieber are particularly relevant to the aspects of the issue discussed in this paper. Some of Ramzy's comments have already been noted. He

argues that there are values implicit in psychoanalytic theory, practice and training. He says that as a science psychoanalysis shares the values of other sciences, for example, love of truth, a rationalistic, positivistic approach to life. In its practice and training it embraces values such as intellectual ability, honesty, integrity and concern for others as well as what he calls the "values of healers". As already noted, he takes issue with Hartmann's distinction between health values and moral values, as well as with the concept of analytic neutrality. He says: "Whatever these health values may be, whether they are new wine in old bottles or old wine in new bottles, whether they overlap, supercede or transcend what is more commonly referred to as moral values, is not our concern at this point. Health values are still values by definition and in the analytic situation the doctor represents by function these values which he tries to help the patient acquire. In this respect alone he should not remain neutral even if he could" (p. 219). He maintains, like many of the authors previously cited, that even though psychoanalysis is not concerned with such ultimate questions as supreme good, meaning in life, human destiny, it is still in a position to offer contributions to the building of a "science of ethics". He notes that: "In spite of the fact that psychoanalytic literature, theoretical and clinical is replete with matters pertaining directly or indirectly to moral and other values and although the analyst's every day work involves him - whether he likes it or not, as a scientist - in forming value judgments on the patient's way of life and on his dealing with himself and others, there have been only a few attempts to deal with the subject" (p. 207). But, "to continue clinging to the untenable pretense that it is ethically and morally neutral, psychoanalysis debars itself from contributing what

no other science can contribute toward a better understanding of human values" (p. 224).

Irving Bieber likewise argues that psychoanalysis can provide a scientific reference for evolving new sophisticated ethical systems and for testing old ones.

Reuben Fine (1977), like Shakow, argues that the shift in psychoanalysis from "id" psychology to "ego" psychology has brought the issue of values into prominence. He suggests that while it is true that Freud contended that values play no role in the psychoanalytic process, he adopted this position "because he was dealing primarily with the maladjustment neurosis where return to ordinary social living is an achievement per se. With the adjustment neurosis, however, it is entirely different" (p. 42). Fine's point is very well taken. There has indeed been a shift in analytic patient population since Freud's day. Many who now seek therapy are already relatively well adjusted and seek therapy in order to improve their level of functioning. With these patients, value issues play a much more significant role. As a matter of fact Fine goes so far as to say that: "In the treatment of the adjustment neuroses, psychoanalysis cannot do without a value system, whether it wants to or not" (p. 59). Fine attempts to articulate the values in psychoanalysis which he describes as "the analytic ideal". He says: "Values must be stated even if they cannot be demonstrated to be best beyond the shadow of a doubt. The statement of the analytic ideal presents the values inherent in psychoanalysis" (p. 25). "This ideal states that man can find happiness if he loves rather than hates, has pleasure, sexual gratification, has a feeling life, yet one guided by reason, an adequate role in the family, a sense of identity, works, is creative, has a role

in the social order, is able to communicate and is reasonably free from psychiatric symptoms" (p. 19). As already noted, Fine contends that in the process of psychoanalysis the patient incorporates the values of the "analytic ideal" from the analyst.

### Summary

This survey of the views of psychoanalytic authors provides much agreement on the issue of moral values and psychoanalysis. There is general agreement that psychoanalysis cannot provide a Weltanschauung - a comprehensive philosophy of life which includes answers to ultimate questions - but that as a scientific theory it does have an impact on moral values by providing data as to the nature of the human person as well as the efficacy of these values in human life. Some authors have suggested that psychoanalysis has already uncovered some important moral values. These are expressed in very general terms and although it cannot be suggested that there are any clear trends, the following values are mentioned by more than one author: rationality, self-knowledge, love and co-operativeness, ability to cope with the basic instincts of sex and aggression, and a shunning of absolutes. Most authors stress that the values derived from or by psychoanalysis are not contradictory to traditional values. Hartmann says that psychoanalysis holds to the same basic principles (not clearly spelled out by him) but derives different applications from these principles. Flugel and Brierley state that psychoanalysis embraces goals which are basically similar to the goals of traditional morality but suggests different means by which these goals may be obtained. Eissler and Shakow argue that psychoanalysis contains the germ of a superior moral system.

As far as psychoanalytic treatment is concerned, many of the authors acknowledge that values play a part in the process and a few (Fine, Ramzy) hold that "psychoanalytic values" are communicated by the analyst to the patient during the course of treatment.

#### Neo-Freudian and Other Authors

The writings of Erich Fromm have particular relevance for the issue under discussion. He has written extensively on the problem of moral values in today's society and his views have made an impact. As a psychoanalyst who departed from the orthodox fold and embraced humanistic psychology, his criticisms of psychoanalysis need to be noted. His theories also provide an important point of contrast with Freudian theories. Furthermore, he is a representative of the humanistic psychology movement and his position with regard to moral issues shares much in common with other notable psychologists in the humanistic school.

Many of Fromm's books deal with moral issues, especially in the wide context of society, but for the purposes of our investigation, four of his books are of particular relevance: *Man for Himself* (1947), *Psychoanalysis and Religion* (1950), *Sigmund Freud's Mission* (1959) and *The Crisis of Psychoanalysis* (1970). No attempt will be made to present Fromm's views in any detail. A few of his major themes are our main concern. In "Man for Himself" and later in "Psychoanalysis and Religion", Fromm set out to lay the foundation for the development of a new "humanistic ethics". He rejects both the "authoritarian ethics" of organized religion and the other extreme, "ethical relativism". He argues that a viable system of ethics can be developed from a better understanding of a man's nature supplied by psychoanalysis. He criticizes psychoanalysis, however, for doing little more than "debunking" traditional

morality, and argues for a new humanistic ethics based on the conviction that "the sources of norms for ethical conduct are to be found in man's nature itself, that moral norms are based upon man's inherent qualities and that their violation results in mental and emotional disintegration" (p. 17). The "inherent qualities" to which Fromm refers are what the humanists perceive as man's basic goodness and drive toward self-actualization. As Fromm says: "The position taken by humanistic ethics (is) that man is able to know what is good and to act accordingly on the strength of his natural potentialities and of his reason..."(p. 212). He goes on to elaborate: "Humanistic ethics, in contrast to authoritarian ethics may likewise be distinguished by formal and material criteria. Formally, it is based on the principle that only man himself can determine the criterion for virtue and sin and not an authority transcending him. Materially, it is based on the principle that "good" is what is good for man and "evil", what is detrimental to man; the sole criterion of ethical value being man's welfare" (1947 , p. 22).

From these basic premises, Fromm proceeds to analyse what he sees as certain dysfunctional trends in society, and derives conclusions about more suitable moral orientations, but it is the basic premises that both highlight humanistic theory and provide a useful contrast with Freudian thinking. Herberg (1957) accurately compares the two: "... where Freud is dualistic, Fromm is harmonic; where Freud is somber, even pessimistic, Fromm exhibits an amazing confidence in the possibilities of human progress..." (p. 151). He goes on: "To Fromm, man is not divided against himself in the very structure of the psyche, but is essentially unified, intact and perfect. The imperfections and distortions of human nature, Fromm traces to the corrupting effects of culture....." (p. 152).

In spite of these differences, however, it is important to note once more that Freud and Fromm share similar views on the criterion for virtue and on man's ability to know and do good on the strength of his "natural potentialities".

Frederick Weiss, in a paper presented before the association for the advancement of Psychoanalysis (1952) while arguing that morals are important for psychotherapy, presents views which seem quite similar to Fromm's. Echoing Fromm's distinction between authoritarian and humanistic ethics, he stresses that: Healthy moral values cannot be heteronomous. They cannot be derived from automatic compliance with the code of an external authority" (p. 41). And later, "...the non-conformance of the healthy person is based on.....the positive striving for genuine moral values such as truthfulness, freedom and respect, for the growth and self-realization of the individual" (p. 42).

It seems that Weiss, too, shares the humanistic position in his stress on self-realization and man's basic inclination to good. He argues against Freud's view which, he claims, saw morality as a "negative, self-restricting force imposed on human nature" (p. 44). He further suggests that Freud's depiction of human nature referred to Victorian man - "not, as he believed, of universal healthy human nature, but of split, unhealthy man" (p. 44).

Harry Guntrip (1957) also expressed agreement with some of Fromm's views. He, too, rejects both ethical absolutism and ethical relativism and argues that with the help of psychoanalytic investigation, some basic moral values can be arrived at. He says: "A rigorous psychoanalytical investigation between mature and immature types of personality and character can provide us with an objective means of establishing.... some basis moral values: (p. 177). As previously noted, Guntrip contends

that since psychoanalysis seeks to bring people to maturity, values are central to the process and are, in fact, transmitted to the patient during the course of treatment. For Guntrip, maturity entails the possession of moral values. He therefore defines moral values as follows: "Moral values are our perception of and our loyalty to those qualities of mature personality that are necessary if we are to sustain constructive and not destructive human relationships" (p. 178).

Even though some of Fromm's views have found support among some members of the psychoanalytic community, on one position he stands virtually alone, namely, his contention in his book, "Sigmund Freud's Mission", that "Freud's aim was to found a movement for the ethical liberation of man, a new secular and scientific religion for an elite which was to guide mankind" (p. 105). He argues that Freud had messianic pretension, a view that was also presented by David Bakan (1958) who maintains that psychoanalysis is a secularization of Jewish mysticism. Robert Waelder (1963), representing the viewpoint of a majority of analysts, in a scathing criticism describes Fromm's book as "historical fiction".

In response to Fromm, Vitz (1977) launched an impassioned attack on the "self-theorists (Fromm, May, Rogers, Maslow) whom he accused of not acknowledging the evil side of man and using the term "self-actualization" as a cover for "self-indulgence". He claims that they undermine the traditional values of society which aim at controlling man's evil inclination. Vitz also expresses concern that these authors have removed God from the center of the universe and replaced him with man. It is thus clear that Vitz is not only arguing the issue of moral values but of religious values in general. He seems to posit a

connection between moral values and belief in God, a bond which all psychoanalytic authors, Freudian as well as non-Freudian, seem eager to sever.

But Vitz is not the only author in psychology who calls for a return to religious values. Bergin (1980) claims that there two broad classes of values dominant in psychotherapy at present and that both exclude religious values:

1. Clinical pragmatism, espoused by psychiatrists, nurses and the behavior therapists who see their role as the implementation of the values of the dominant social system; and
2. Humanistic idealism, practised by clinicians such as Fromm, Rogers, May who stress goals such as autonomy, independence, human dignity, self-worth and self actualization.

Bergin suggests that a new approach in psychology is needed, an approach which he terms "theistic realism", which would include religious values.

The views of Bergin generated responses from many humanists, including Albert Ellis, and the lively debate which developed between the two authors attests to the relevance as well as the emotionality of the issue under consideration. Ellis (1980) argued that dogmatic religion has contra-therapeutic effects and stressed that moral values should be separated from religion, a point with which Bergin, in reprise, seemed to agree, and to which we will return in the next chapter.

## Footnotes

1

For the purpose of maintaining some limits on the present inquiry, the issue of guilt, with its very extensive literature, will not be treated in any detail or depth. A reasonably satisfactory resolution of part of the debate appears to have been arrived at in the distinction that has been made between neurotic guilt and real guilt. Within the framework of this distinction, it is argued that the therapist's task is to help free the patient only from neurotic guilt. Of course, it can be contended that the decision as to what constitutes "neurotic" guilt is itself clouded by value judgments. But it is here that we must leave the issue.

CHAPTER II  
THE CONFLICT BETWEEN FREUDIAN PSYCHOANALYSIS  
AND ROMAN CATHOLIC MORALITY

Part I. The Writings of Sigmund Freud

The polemic between psychoanalysis and the Roman Catholic religion began with the writings of Sigmund Freud. Freud, an acknowledged atheist, made analyses of religion which, he said, were based on psychoanalytic research but which were clearly unacceptable to the Church. Some of his psychological theories, and three of his books in particular - Totem and Taboo (1913), The Future of an Illusion (1927) and Moses and Monotheism (1939) - can readily be identified as the major sources of the polemical debate.

Two aspects of Freud's theories posed especial problems for many religionists - and his psychosexual theories and his theory of psychic determinism. Those who took issue with Freud on these points saw him as placing excessive stress on the role of sex in human life and in over-valuing genital sexual intercourse to the detriment of other aspects of healthy human functioning, and of denying the freedom of the will, thus undermining the basis for morality, namely human responsibility and culpability.

Freud's particular views on religion also provided sources of conflict. He described religion as an illusion (1927), and argued that belief in god satisfied the wish for an omnipotent father. At one point in his writings he seems to suggest that his analysis makes no judgment as regards any possible reality underlying these beliefs. "Of the reality value of most of them", he says, "we cannot judge; just as they cannot be proved, so they cannot be refuted." (1928, p. 31). However, the main thrust of his work certainly leaves one with

the impression that he was convinced that religion was nothing more than an illusion. This conviction becomes clearer in some of his other works. Freud also expressed the conviction that religion was dying out and would eventually be replaced by science which would create a better world for man. (Note quotation in Chapter 1, page 19). The reason for the polemical tone of Freud's writings is also very clear. He sees religion as a powerful threat to the progress of science. "Of the three forces which can dispute the position of science", he says, "religion alone is really a serious enemy" (1933, p. 219). For Freud, there is a very important issue at stake here. He expressed concern that morality is based on religion which, in his view, is on its way out. He sought a firmer, natural, rather than supernatural, basis for morality. He says: "The ethical commands to which religion seeks to lend its weight require some other foundation instead for human society cannot do without them and it is dangerous to link up obedience to them with religious belief. If one attempts to assign to religion its place in man's evolution, it seems not so much to be a lasting acquisition, as a parallel to the neurosis which the civilized individual must pass through on his way from childhood to maturity" (1933, p. 230). The implication is clear. For Freud, progress in the realm of morality involves a relinquishing of the attachment to religious illusions. It is important to note that Freud anticipated and rejected the contention of religionists that science and religion are two distinct spheres each possessing a legitimate autonomy of its own. "It is inadmissible to declare", he says, "that science is one field of human intellectual activity and that religion and philosophy are others, at least as valuable and that science has no business to interfere with the other two, that they all

have an equal claim to truth and that everyone is free to choose whence he shall draw his convictions and in what he shall place his beliefs. Such an attitude is considered particularly respectable, tolerant, broad minded and free from narrow prejudices. Unfortunately, it is not tenable; it shares all the pernicious qualities of an entirely unscientific Weltanschauung and in practice comes to much the same thing. The bare fact is that truth cannot be tolerant and cannot admit compromise or limitations, that scientific research looks on the whole field of human activity as its own, and must adopt an uncompromisingly critical attitude towards any other power that seeks to usurp any part of its province" (1933, p. 219).

Freud then sets out to make a scientific (psychoanalytic) study of religion. He extends the analysis of the individual psyche to that of religion, positing an oedipal conflict early in man's history when men lived in primal hordes. According to his reconstruction, the horde was dominated by a fierce and powerful male - the father - who kept all the women for himself and dealt savagely with any of his sons who might challenge his leadership. In time, the sons banded together and murdered the father, consuming his flesh in order to incorporate his power. Filled with remorse at their deed and also hoping to prevent a repetition of the situation which gave rise to it, the sons renounced the rewards of their murder, incestuous relationships with their mothers and sisters. Thus was born the earliest taboo out of which developed society, morality, art and religion. Says Freud: "I want to state the conclusion that the beginnings of religion, ethics, society and art meet in the oedipus complex. This is in entire accord with the findings of psychoanalysis" (1913, p. 202).

It must be noted that Freud went to great lengths to stress that his theories do not give a full explanation of the phenomenon of religion. "The reader need not fear", he says' "that psychoanalysis which first revealed the regular over-determination of psychic acts and formations will be tempted to derive anything so complicated as religion from a single source" (1930, p. 130).

Noting the similarity between certain forms of religious ritual and symptoms of compulsive neurosis, Freud maintained that "the obsessional neurosis is a private religious system and religion is a universal neurosis" (1907, p. 126). He specifically comments that this conclusion will not find favorable reception from the Catholic Church. "Psychoanalytic research", he says, "is...the subject of suspicious attention from Catholicism. I do not maintain that this suspicion is unmerited. If our research leads us to a result that reduces religion to the status of a neurosis of mankind and explains its grandiose powers in the same way as we should a neurotic obsession in our individual patients, then we may be sure we shall incur in this country the greatest resentment of the powers that be" (1939, p. 68).

The vast majority of religious writers, and even some psychoanalysts, take Freud's statement that religion is a universal neurosis at face value and take issue with this conclusion. Eissler argues however that Freud only meant that religion is like a neurosis; and this is supported by Freud's statement that "religious phenomena are to be understood only on the model of the neurotic symptoms of the individual" (1939, p. 71).

The contradictions in Freud's writings already alluded to become particularly evident in his comments on religion. This may be due less

to changes in his views on the matter than to his stated hesitancy about revealing his true convictions for fear that psychoanalysis might become an object of persecution. The general tenor of his writings, however, seems to leave little doubt that he was convinced that, "psychoanalytic investigation of the individual teaches with especial emphasis that God is in every case modelled after the father.....and that God at bottom is nothing but an exalted father" (1913, p. 190). Religion, for him, was therefore best explained as an immature clinging to the father in projected form and that individuals and society would be better off if this illusion were relinquished.

Psychoanalytic authors both favorable and unfavorable to religion have sought to find an explanation for Freud's theories on religion through an analysis of his personality and his childhood experiences. These issues do not concern us here. How Freud arrived at his theories has no relevance for our inquiry. What is clear is that he was aware of a conflict between his theories and the Catholic religion. It is very significant to note, whatever interpretation one may give to it, that Freud kept up a long friendship and lively correspondence with Otto Pfister, a Protestant minister. He expressed his amazement at Pfister's apparent ability to reconcile psychoanalysis with religion. "That you should be such a convinced analyst and at the same time a clerical gentleman is one of the contradictions that make life so interesting" (1963, p. 142). It is clear that Freud could not understand how Pfister resolved this "contradiction".

## Part II: The Response of Roman Catholic Authors

The Roman Catholic Church reacted very unfavorably to what they understood to be the teachings of Freud and the theories and practice of psychoanalysis, raising objections on many issues not all of which are relevant to our inquiry. In this section, the viewpoints of some influential Roman Catholic authors and churchmen, particularly those who have addressed the issue of the conflict between psychoanalysis and moral values, will be presented. I will attempt to describe how their arguments fit into the basic framework of traditional Catholic morality. I will also argue that even though the reaction of the Catholic Church towards psychoanalysis has mellowed in recent years and the bitter polemic has been silenced, some basic issues of conflict remain unresolved.

A review of Catholic authors shows a noteworthy consistency of approach in responding to psychoanalysis. The first explanation for this may be that most authors were trained in the same basic method of argumentation derived from Scholastic philosophy and follow the Scholastic dictum: "Qui bene distinguat, bene disputat". (He who distinguishes well, argues well.) Their comments follow a fixed pattern of distinguishing between different aspects of psychoanalysis and evaluating each aspect separately. A second explanation may be that there is a lack of originality in the writings of many authors. Many appeared to be painfully ignorant of the psychoanalytic theories which they were attacking and there may have been a tendency to fall back on a few prior publications by influential Catholics who were thought to have had greater familiarity with these theories. Certainly, after Pope Pius XII issued his statement on psychoanalysis in 1952, most succeeding authors

tended to stress that their comments were in line with the views expressed by the Pope and were attempts at further clarification of his teachings.

At this point, it is important to note that for most Catholic authors, the issue of the impact of psychoanalysis on Catholic faith is more fundamental than its impact on Catholic morality. Catholics distinguish between faith and morals, faith having to do with belief in God and the acceptance of certain dogmas, and morals having to do with how men should live. To the Catholic mind, however, these two are intricately connected, and the comments of many authors with regard to morality are often situated within a more general discussion of the impact of psychoanalysis on faith.

In discussing the issue, Catholic authors tend to make the following basic distinctions:

1. They distinguish between psychoanalysis in general and Freudian psychoanalysis in particular. They often take great pains to stress that their criticisms are directed not at psychoanalysis as a whole but at that branch which maintains the teachings of Freud.
2. They stress that their criticisms of Freudian psychoanalysis apply only to certain aspects of Freud's teachings which they find repugnant, and that if these theories were eliminated, psychoanalysis would be more acceptable.
3. They distinguish between Freud's philosophy and psychoanalysis. Most authors maintain that underlying Freudianism there is a philosophy which is hostile to Catholic philosophy. They discuss whether this philosophy is essential

to psychoanalysis or not. Connected with this is the question as to whether the philosophy was simply Freud's personal views which do not spring from psychoanalytic research and which are incidental to (and perhaps even irrelevant to) his theory as a whole.

4. Finally, Catholic authors identify certain aspects of Freudian psychoanalytic practice which they see as having possible harmful effects on Catholic faith and morality.

In 1940, Rudolf Allers, Catholic psychologist, launched a fierce attack on Freudian psychoanalysis which he described a "Successful Error". His writings take on a polemical tone so characteristic of some religious writers who view a theory as a threat and who feel that the best form of defence is a forceful attack directed at neutralizing, if not eliminating the potential harmful effects of this error on Catholic "souls". His book aims in a general way to disprove the validity of most of Freud's theories and some aspects of his criticisms have relevance for moral issues.

Allers continually maintains that Freudian philosophy cannot be separated from psychoanalysis without destroying the entire system. Therefore the whole of Freudian psychoanalysis, theory and practice, is to be rejected by Catholics since the philosophy is anti-Christian. Firstly, he argues, Freudian psychoanalysis is based on a materialistic philosophy. "We have called Freud's philosophy materialistic; it is indeed an unmitigated materialism. None of his axioms, and none of the leading methodological principles can in fact be maintained unless it is against a background of absolute materialistic philosophy", he claims. (p. 92) Furthermore, "Naturalism and materialism are necessarily antagonistic to religion. A mental attitude which introduces

transmundane, immaterial factors, which holds a notion like that of a spiritual soul, which believes in revelation, appears to the materialistic mind as unintelligible, strange and dangerous. Such a mentality is the very opposite of materialism; ..... Psychoanalysis is profoundly materialistic and cannot hold any other philosophy. Materialism is its very basis. Were the follower of Freud to abandon his materialistic creed, he would have to give up being a psychoanalyst... There are some who imagine that they can believe in the truth of religion and the truth of psychoanalysis without becoming guilty of self-contradiction. They imagine this either because they do not know enough of both sides or because their mind is of a kind to put up with contradictions, or perhaps because they are not critical enough to be aware of them" (p. 197, italics mine). Allers almost seems to be re-echoing Freud's comment to Pfister about the basic contradiction between psychoanalysis and religion and he offers an interesting explanation as to how some individuals manage to reconcile the two. We will discuss the issue of possible modes of reconciliation in a later section. For the present, however, we will continue to look at Allers' arguments about areas of conflict.

Allers maintains that connected with its materialism and naturalism, psychoanalysis has a deterministic orientation which leads to a rejection of "free will" and an abandonment of the concept of sin. He says: "There is a fundamental conception in the Christian religion which is not only neglected but simply denied by psychoanalysis. This is the conception of sin. Its philosophy is definitely deterministic and the notion of sin presupposes free will. Also there is no place for the notion of sin in this system because human behavior does not depend, according to the principles of Freudian anthropology, on conscious but unconscious forces.

It is but a logical consequence that psychoanalysis interprets conscience not as an awareness of a conformity or non-conformity with eternal laws of morals or of values, but as the expression of a restored or a disturbed equilibrium of instinctual forces. Psychoanalysis necessarily sees in conscience merely a psychological phenomenon. Nor can this conception of human nature acknowledge anything like responsibility" (p. 206).

Allers rejects the theory of the pleasure principle which, he says, attempts to replace a morality based on values with a set of rules about living based on "the avoidance of unpleasantness, and ... the desire to gather in, as it were, a harvest of pleasure on rich as possible with a minimum of pain" (p. 102). He insists that even though it claims not to be concerned with moral values, psychoanalysis "can no more help being faced by moral problems than any other endeavour aiming at helping man.... There must be, therefore, a definite morality implied in the psychoanalytic world of ideas. These morals are, however, necessarily hedonistic and, by consequence, extremely subjectivistic" (p. 103). He goes on to elaborate on this "subjectivism" in psychoanalysis, maintaining that, "it can be shown that the psychoanalytical mentality is, when its last consequences are drawn from the implied ideas, of such a kind as to end in extreme subjectivism which abolishes in fact every possible objective existence, objective truth and, of course, objective value" (p. 103). He stresses that even though psychoanalysts as individuals may be moral people and may be concerned about moral values, there is a certain attitude to life deriving from psychoanalysis which can only be described as "infra-moral", Psychoanalysts usually feel offended", he says, "when they are told that their theory is incompatible with morals. They contend that they do not want anyone to lead an immoral life....

they point to their acknowledgment of moral values. They do so, but only because they cannot help being human besides being psychoanalysts. But they are right in objecting to the reproach of immorality. Their theory is in fact neither moral nor immoral. It is infra-moral; it moves on a level where such a thing as morals does not exist at all"(p. 111).

Allers takes the position that in psychoanalysis, theory and practice are inseparable, and therefore concludes: "Since I believe the philosophy to be utterly and demonstrably wrong, I believe also that to apply the method is dangerous" (p. vi). He gives as an example that even though the method of free association by itself may seem to have nothing to do with morals, once the analyst makes an interpretation of the data, he does so against the background of the erroneous psychoanalytic philosophy. He sees psychoanalysis as dangerous both to faith and morals. "Even a superficial acquaintance with psychoanalysis enables anyone to see the enormous gulf separating Christian morality from that implied in the Freudian conception of man.....

"A philosophy which denies free will, ignores the spirituality of the soul, identifies mental and bodily phenomena, knows of no other end than pleasure, is given to a confused but nevertheless obstinate subjectivism, is blind to the true nature of the human person - such a philosophy cannot have even one point in common with Christian thought. It is its perfect opposite" (p. 200).

Finally, Allers argues that even though the dangers to faith and morality which are posed by psychoanalysis are also shared by other systems such as "darwinism" and "liberalism", there is more of a threat from psychoanalysis because of the great influence exerted on the patient during the course of treatment. He concludes that, "The

naturalistic conception of human nature colors every statement on morals. True commandments, eternal laws do not exist according to this view. This mentality cannot but have a destructive influence on any person who holds different convictions. It is probable that a psychoanalytic treatment of such a person will either prove a failure if the convictions are strong enough and if the difference between them and those of the analyst is perceived with sufficient clearness; or else will lead to gradual undermining of the convictions which will give way under the continuous pressure of the hostile spirit of psychoanalysis" (p. 209).

Allers' book is a clear representation, on the one hand, of the early vehement reaction of Catholicism to Freudian psychoanalysis and also of the extreme end of the spectrum of Roman Catholic reaction in general. Allers' views, however, are of more than historical importance, for even though one may be tempted to dismiss them because of his obvious hostility, his misrepresentation of psychoanalysis, his outlandish generalizations and his tendency to push positions to their ridiculous extremes, in fact, some of the issues which he raises, find support among other, less polemical authors.

The cornerstone of his argument - that Freudian philosophy cannot be separated from psychoanalytic practice - is a crucial one. As already noted, for Catholic authors, this issue is critical to the discussion of any possible reconciliation between psychoanalysis and Roman Catholic religion, and will be discussed in detail as other views are presented. Allers' characterization of Freudian psychoanalytic philosophy as "materialistic", "naturalistic", "deterministic", "hedonistic", "subjectivistic" and "relativistic" is in accord with the views of many other authors, not all of them Catholic. (Some of these were discussed

in chapter one.) The specific nature of the impact of these orientations on morality, however, is an area of serious disagreement.

The "naturalistic" and "materialistic" view of life is clearly antagonistic to faith and is in conflict with the religious view concerning the basis for the derivation of moral norms. It is not immediately obvious, however, nor does Allers spell out, whether different practical moral consequences arise from these different bases. Allers' assertion that the rejection of free will and moral responsibility is a logical outcome of Freud's deterministic stance, is challenged by other authors (Zijboorg, 1943, Donceel, 1949) who present the complexity of the issue in a more effective manner. There is also much discussion (and disagreement) both as regards the so-called "hedonistic" approach to morality deriving from Freud's theory as well as of the conflict between the absolute, objective morality of religion and the subjectivistic, relativistic approach of psychoanalysis.

When Allers talks of the unavoidable impact of the analyst's philosophy on the patient, however, he is sounding an issue of debate which has remained alive and perhaps become even more intense in recent times. In this context, he appears to have very great difficulty resolving the conflict between his theoretical arguments concerning the negative impact of psychoanalysis on morality and the high moral standards maintained by some analysts. He suggests weakly that the moral values emerge because the analysts are also human beings. Convinced of the fundamental conflict between psychoanalysis and the Catholic religion, he is also challenged to come up with an explanation of the apparent ability of some individuals to reconcile the two in their lives. He goes a step further than Freud(who, as already noted, had also acknowledged the conflict) when he suggests that "their

mind is of the kind to put up with contradictions, or they may not be aware of them" (p. 197). As we continue the discussion of this issue we will have cause to return to this point.

Gregory Zilboorg was one such individual who was apparently able to reconcile his Catholic faith with his psychoanalytic profession. He wrote extensively (1943, 1958, 1962) on the issues of conflict and modes of possible reconciliation between the two. Zilboorg's basic contention is that science and religion are two distinct domains and that conflict arises only when one encroaches upon the other. This view, we have seen, was specifically rejected by Freud.

Zilboorg acknowledges that Freud was antagonistic to religion and that his atheistic convictions seeped into his writings. So many analysts, Zilboorg continues, have followed Freud's lead that atheism has mistakenly become identified with psychoanalytic theory. He insists that: "While it is true that a great number, if not the majority of Freudian analysts look upon atheism as an earmark of scientific superiority and upon religious worship as an atavism left over from primitive magic or animism, many recognize, even though not too pronouncedly, that being religious does not exclude one from practicing well the psychoanalytic profession" (1958, p. 39). Zilboorg goes on to say that even though Freud considered that his opposition to religion was based on his scientific theory, it was, in fact, nothing more than his personal opinion. If it is recognized as such, he says, then the conflict between religion and psychoanalysis is significantly diminished. Zilboorg thus dismissed most of Freud's writings about religion and morality not only as irrelevant to psychoanalysis, but also, he goes on to argue, as false and deriving from his personal conflicts. "The corpus of psychoanalytic

knowledge", he says, "does not require the obligatory inclusion of Freud's views on religion and ancillary matters. These are personal views of Freud, perhaps deeply personal, and bound up with his own intimate emotional life" (1958, p. 40). Zilboorg was well aware that his views were not in the mainstream of psychoanalytic thought and, in fact, his position was specifically rejected by psychoanalysts Day (1944) and Eissler (1965). Indeed, Zilboorg felt constrained to comment at the end of one of his articles that he found himself "disconsolate" in his "somewhat isolated position" (1944, p. 100).

Already at this time, however, some Catholics were having "Second Thoughts on Freud". Joseph Donceel, a Jesuit theologian, wrote what he must have considered an article favorable to psychoanalysis (1949). He reports three major objections which have been raised against Freud's system. "Philosophers have rejected his materialism, scientists have repudiated his unwarranted generalization, the normal civilized man has condemned his over-emphasis on sex, his pansexualism" (p. 469). From these "errors", he concludes, "derive Freud's condemnation of religion as a mere obsession, his denial of free will and responsibility, of sin and moral guilt." (p. 468).

But he goes on to argue that "there are in psychoanalysis quite a number of notions which, if well understood, can easily be integrated into the Christian concept of man" (p. 486). He describes how some aspects of the theories of psychic determinism, repression, the unconscious, the super-ego can be understood in such a way as to clarify Catholic teaching. There are valuable elements in psychoanalysis, he says, but these are generally connected with errors, exaggerations and distortions. He therefore concludes that: "The system as a whole in

its pure Freudian form, must be rejected. But as it is nowadays presented by some of Freud's successors or disciples it gradually becomes more acceptable. Lifted out of their materialistic context, pruned of their exaggerations, quite a number of the Freudian discoveries can be re-interpreted in a sense that fits them neatly into a Christian conception of man, not only as confirmations of what has been known before, but also as new and deeper insights into some aspects of human nature" (p. 484). Donceel clearly accepts the position that authentic Freudian theory has a negative impact on Catholic morality. His suggestion of a reconciliation based on a re-interpretation of Freud's theories so as to make them more amenable to Catholic teaching is very similar to Zilboorg's approach and starts with the same basic premise that Catholic teaching is correct and that scientific findings, if accurate, cannot be at variance with it.

In 1952, James Vanderveldt, Catholic priest and theologian, and Robert Odenwald, Catholic psychiatrist, collaborated on a book entitled "Psychiatry and Catholicism". In it the authors set out to attempt to reconcile some Catholic moral teachings with psychiatric theory and practice. Even though one of its authors is a psychiatrist, the book betrays poor familiarity with Freud's writings, and on the whole, can boast of very little original scholarship. It seems to have been intended for use as a sort of ready handbook for Catholics interested in the issues it discusses. Its importance, however, lies in the fact that it outlines in very clear fashion, Catholic thinking on the issues at that time. This is attested to by the enthusiastic endorsement it received from the Catholic hierarchy in the person of Cardinal O'Boyle, then bishop of New York.

The authors follow the stereotypic pattern of previous Catholic authors in distinguishing between the philosophical foundations, the theories and the practice of Freudianism. They conclude that the philosophical foundation of Freudianism is opposed to Catholicism because of its "atheism", "pansexualism" and "determinism". "The philosophical and theological assumptions of Freudian psychoanalysis are at direct variance with the Catholic doctrine. Hence Catholics take exception to the philosophy that gradually has been tacked on to the psychoanalytic therapeutic technique - if the term "philosophy" can be attributed to the often vague, fantastic and unscientific hypothetical and imaginal mental wanderings that characterize the doctrinal aspects of Freudian psychoanalysis about the nature of God and man. Orthodox Freudianism.....claim(s) a materialistic interpretation of man with complete disregard of the spiritual soul" (p. 156). They proceed to argue that many of Freud's theories have been influenced by his philosophy and consequently, must also be rejected. They claim that in psychoanalysis, many of the "concepts, hypotheses and theories are inextricably linked up with Freud's materialistic, deterministic and hedonistic philosophy and for that reason are unacceptable to Catholic patient and therapist alike" (p. 148). On this basis, they maintain that "a believer, regardless of whether he is a Catholic or a Protestant can never be a full-fledged Freudian - he may be an analyst but not an out and out Freudian" (p. 145).

The authors concede that not all psychoanalysts subscribe to Freud's philosophy and that, in fact, many openly repudiated his "pansexualism". As a result, the authors come to the conclusion, albeit very cautiously, that it may be possible to salvage some of the psychological theories by

separating them from their original philosophical bases. "There are certain authorities, Catholics as well as non-Catholics who feel that the psychoanalytic theories cannot be separated from their philosophical bases.....But there are also authorities, again Catholics as well as non-Catholics who believe that a separation is feasible.....The authors of this book...thoroughly repudiate...the analysts' philosophical and religious extravagances and also admit that it may be difficult to draw, in the Freudian system, the boundary line between philosophy and psychology but they believe that there are a number of psychological theories and concepts that can be separated from Freudian or other analytical philosophies even though they were first presented in the framework of these systems" (p. 150).

Finally, the authors discuss psychoanalytic practice and conclude that it can also be separated from its original philosophical basis. They argue that "there is no inconsistency in a Catholic psychiatrist's opposing and criticizing the doctrinal content of Freudian psychoanalysis while at the same time defending and using its therapeutic technique" (p. 157). Since they take the position that the philosophy and theory can be separated from the practice, they are able to come to a very different conclusion from Allers in response to the question of whether psychoanalysis is dangerous to the religious faith of the patient. They maintain: "It is not dangerous but actually an asset when it is administered by a psychiatrist who has his own two feet solidly on the bedrock of Christian philosophy, but it is dangerous, and very much so, when the psychiatrist is guided, not by the analytical technique, but also by the materialistic philosophy of human nature which Freud championed so ardently" (p. 158).

At this time, theologians of other Christian faiths were also addressing the issue of the relationship between psychoanalysis and religion. Their views will not be presented in any detail because the focus here is on the impact of psychoanalysis on Catholic morality. However, it is useful to note, albeit very briefly, that some Protestant authors recognize conflicts very similar to the ones expressed by their Catholic counterparts. Their analysis of the conflict, as well as some of their suggestions at its resolution, even though not necessarily acceptable to the Catholic Church because of differences in theological viewpoint, will also be presented.

Sanders (1949) in a book entitled, "Christianity After Freud" assessed the impact of psychoanalysis on the Christian religion. Situating the conflict in the debate between science and religion, he argues that the hostility is a historical accident and that had not the Church been antagonistic to science in the beginning this impasse need not have occurred. He recognizes that there is a materialistic philosophy underlying psychoanalysis but contends that this connection is not essential.

Roberts (1950) in "Psychotherapy and the Christian View of Man" expresses a similar position. He too sees a conflict between psychotherapy and Christianity as regards the nature of man. He argues that the psychotherapeutic profession has embraced "naturalistic humanism" and that Christianity can add an important dimension to the view of man which enhances the practice of psychotherapy. This position is later re-echoed by Bergin (1980) who argues for a therapeutic approach described by him as "theistic realism". Roberts outlines one of the basic conflicts: "If naturalistic humanism is right, man must look solely to himself for the furtherance of ethical principles and for communal

endeavors worthy of his loyalty; and the sooner finds this out the better. On the other hand, if Christianity is right, then human beatitude is dependent upon an alignment between man's own resources and divine power; and the sooner we learn this and come to terms with its implications the better" (p. 147).

In addressing the issue of psychotherapy's impact on morality, he argues that there have been two major moral trends in Christianity. One, he says, is based on the theory of Pelagius (4th - 5th cent.) that man is born free of hereditary guilt and therefore able to do good on the strength of his own will. This view was rejected as heretical by the early Church. The other position is that due to the transgression of the first parents, man is born already tainted with sin, is in need of redemption, and can do good only with the help of God. This view, with a variety of subtle variations, is now held as the official position by almost all Christian Churches. From the practical point of view, one approach lays greater stress on strength of will, while the other, on the need for redemption. Roberts argues that the Pelagian view, even though officially repudiated, continues to exert a very important influence on the moral approach of many Christians. He contends that it is this influence which underlies the moralistic approach of some Christians.

The distinction between morality and moralism is a very important one and has been discussed by other authors in the context of psychotherapy (cf. Guntrip, 1957). Roberts makes an excellent analysis of some of the dynamics involved in moralism. He points out, as Freud had previously done, that this approach does not take into consideration whether the individual is able to live up to the demands of the external

moral norms which are made obligatory upon him. It simply assumes that he is, and coerces him to exert conscientious effort to do so. As a result, external compliance may be achieved but at the expense of repression, projection and reaction formation of the negative feelings which the obligation arouses. Roberts connects this with the issue of freedom and responsibility arguing that the moralistic individual does not act freely and that his compliance is always at risk. He says: "Ethical standards are insecure so long as they can be enforced only through coercion and conflict-ridden consciousness" (p. 97). Psychotherapy, he goes on, frees up the individual to develop a more mature morality. Psychotherapy, he says, is opposed not to morality but to moralism. However, he makes the extremely important observation that in the process of being "freed up" through therapy, the individual may temporarily indulge in immoral behavior. He says: "Yet it must be recognized that, through no fault of theirs, psychoanalysts find it impossible to help people become aware of their previous bondage without running the risk of releasing rebellious forces. In the first seizures of rebellion the patient may burst into forms of immorality which do not adopt the style of life he will adopt when he has obtained integrity. Episodes of this sort should not blind us to the fact that analysis is aimed at a transformation of conscience, not an eradication of it" (p. 99). This is very reminiscent of Hartmann's comment that analytic patients go through a phase of "trying out" different moral codes (cf. Ch. 1, p. 55). We will see that from a Catholic point of view, if there is great risk even of temporary self-indulgence, the therapeutic process cannot be advocated.

Roberts also addressed the issue of possible rapprochement between

psychoanalysis and religion and concludes that: "So far as the present situation is concerned, we cannot look to Protestant Fundamentalism or to Roman Catholicism for a contribution because neither is disposed to rethink its theological position. The former tends to be suspicious of science in all forms, and the latter, while capable of granting a limited autonomy to both scientific and philosophical investigations espouses a view of theological truth which ostensibly puts it beyond the need for reformulation in the light of such inquiries" (p. 149). He suggests that authors of less rigid Protestant orientations who are in a better position to aid in such a rapprochement, have failed to do. Indeed, his position that "ultimately psychiatry cannot understand its own task a aright except within the framework of a Christian view of man and God" (p. 153), certainly appears to be a long way from any possible reconciliation.

The views of Albert Outler(1954), Protestant author, have already been extensively cited in the previous chapter. His contribution to the discussion of the conflict between psychoanalysis and religion can be briefly noted here. Even though, as we have seen, Outler argues that there is an anti-Christian philosophy underlying psychoanalysis, he also expresses the conviction that the philosophy can be separated from psychoanalytic practice in such a way as to enable religion and psychotherapy to become "allies".

When, within the Catholic Church, an issue is heatedly debated, the Pope, spiritual leader of the Church, often makes a pronouncement on the matter. When the issue deals with matters of faith, he may make his pronouncement "ex cathedra" which, according to Catholic belief, is guaranteed by God to be "infallible" and must be accepted by the whole

Church. This, however, he does very rarely. Most often he makes official statements which, though not considered infallible, carry great authoritative weight among Catholics. Few, if any, Catholic authors would directly challenge his statement or suggest that it contains errors. They would rather offer explanations, clarifications and interpretations of his teaching, carefully insisting that their views are in essential agreement with it. So, when a pronouncement is made, it highlights the fact that the issue is of importance affecting a large segment of the Church and while not putting an end to divergent views, serves to channel further discussion on the matter. More so than other Popes in recent times, Pope Pius XII was given to making many such pronouncements and two of his speeches have relevance to the issues discussed in this paper.

On September 14, 1952, in an address to the First International Congress on the Histopathology of the Nervous System, entitled "The Moral Limits of Medical Research and Treatment", Pius XII made reference to psychoanalysis. He says: "In order to rid himself of repression inhibitions or psychic complexes, man is not free to arouse in himself for therapeutic purposes each and every appetite of a sexual order which is being excited or has been excited in his being, appetites whose impure waves flood his unconscious or subconscious mind. He cannot make them the object of his thoughts and fully conscious desires with all the shocks and repercussions such a process entails. For a man and a Christian there is a law of integrity and personal purity, of self-respect, forbidding him to plunge so deeply into the world of sexual suggestions and tendencies. Here the "medical and psychotherapeutic interests of the patient" find a moral limit.

"It is not proved - it is, in fact, incorrect - that the pansexual method of a certain school of psychoanalysis is an indispensable integrating part of all psychotherapy which is serious and worthy of the name . . . . . ." (p. 308).

In a commentary appearing in "L'Osservatore Romano", the official organ of the Catholic Church, the following interpretation of the Pope's speech was published.

"These words of the Sovereign Pontiff offer an authoritative norm on the subject of psychoanalysis, which is much discussed today. The Holy Father is not treating of psychoanalysis in general, nor of the various forms and techniques proposed and tried during decades by competent scientists, including Catholics, but he is concerned with the "pansexual method of a certain school of psychoanalysis". Nor does he even treat of the nature and the therapeutic value of this method, but of the transgression of the ethical limit committed by it" (cf. Catholic Mind, 1953, 51, p. 298).

The reader is thus left to conclude as to the particular psychoanalytic school to which the Pope is referring. Can there be any doubt that Freudianism is the intended target?

The following year the Pope again took the opportunity to give a long discourse on issues in the relationship between psychiatry, morality and religion, when he received in a special audience participants in the Fifth International Congress of Psychotherapy and Clinical Psychology. He states his purpose as follows: "We intend to outline the fundamental attitude which is imposed upon the Christian psychologist and psychotherapist (sic).

This fundamental attitude can be summed up in the following formula: Psychotherapy and clinical psychology must always consider man 1) as a

psychic unit and totality, 2) as a structured unit in itself, 3) as a social unit, 4) as a transcendent unit, that is to say, a unit tending towards God" (p. 429).

The Pope then goes on to elaborate on these points. Firstly, he discusses man "as a psychic unit and totality". Here he stresses the importance of the soul. "What constitutes man is principally the soul ..... It is the soul which nature charges with the government of all man's energies....." (p. 429). The various psychic dynamisms, he says, are "in the soul". "They are energies of considerable intensity perhaps, but nature has entrusted their direction to the centerpost, to the spiritual soul endowed with intellect and will which is normally capable of governing these energies" (p. 429). He maintains that according to some psychological theories "the autonomy of free will is replaced by the heteronomy of instinctive dynamisms", but "that is not the way God fashioned man" (p. 429). The Pope thus stresses that man is governed by a spiritual principle, a soul, and not simply by a psychic apparatus. He also insists that part of this spiritual principle involves free will which gives man power over his instincts as well as responsibility for his actions.

Pius XII then discusses "man as a structured unit". Here he argues that whereas traditional ethics have been based on "homo ut sic" ("man in the abstract"), modern psychotherapy is based on "homo ut hic" ("man in the concrete"). Some argue, he says, that "between these two conceptions there opens an abyss impossible to surmount as long as traditional psychology and ethics do not change their positions" (p. 430). According to traditional ethics, there are "ontological and metaphysical laws of human nature" applicable to all men. The pope stresses that these laws are to be upheld. He rejects the developing "personalist

ethics" which seek to derive ethical norms on the basis of "man in the concrete", deviating from Christian morality. "The law of the structure of man in the concrete", he says, "is not to be invented but applied" (p. 430).

In a third section the Pope discusses "man as a social unit" and deals directly with the issue of sexuality in psychotherapy. He argues that "one should be slow to lower man in the concrete, together with his personal character to the level of the brute", implying, though not clearly stating, that some psychotherapeutic approaches do this by the over-emphasis on the importance of the sexual instinct.

He goes on to comment on the approach to dealing with inhibitions, and argues that "the trite principle that sexual troubles of the unconscious, as all other inhibitions of identical origin, can be suppressed only by their being brought to the level of consciousness is not valid if it is generalized without distinction". He goes on: "In truth, one cannot consider as licit, without further consideration, the evocation to the level of consciousness of all the representations, emotions and sexual experiences which lie dormant in the memory and the unconscious and which are thus actualized in the psychic", for "who would risk making the claim that this manner of treatment does not imply both immediate and future moral danger?" (p. 432).

The Pope next turns to what he calls "errors by excess". These consist, he says, "in emphasizing the exigency of a total surrender of the ego and of its personal affirmation" (p. 432). Under this heading, he discusses two issues.

Firstly, he maintains that "from certain psychological explanations, the thesis is formulated that the unconditional extroversion of the ego

constitutes the fundamental law of congenital altruism and its dynamic tendencies" (p. 432). He argues that this is a "logical, psychological and ethical error". He rejects the position that concern for self is a symptom of regression and stresses that according to Christian morality, love of neighbor is based on love of self.

It is not clear exactly what the Pope is referring to in this section. It is hardly likely that he is concerned that through the process of psychotherapy, patients might become too altruistic. The comment is all the more peculiar since the issue does not feature either in prior or subsequent literature, and, in fact, a number of authors criticize psychoanalysis for precisely the opposite fault, namely, endorsing "selfism" in its patients. However, even though the Pope's allusion is unclear, his point - that Catholicism recognizes the needs of the individual and teaches that love of self is the basis of love for others - is noteworthy since Catholicism itself is often accused of advocating extreme altruism.

The second "error by excess" noted by the Pope can only be understood in the context of Catholic religious practice. The Pope contends that "the use of psychoanalysis endangers the safeguarding of secrets", since its practice of drawing out unconscious elements and insisting on complete openness runs the risk that the patient may reveal information which should be kept confidential. "There are secrets", he says, "which must on no account be divulged, even to a doctor" (p. 432). The Pope is referring here especially to secrets which a priest receives in the practice of confession.

Finally, in discussing "man as a transcendental unit", the Pope comments on the issue of guilt. While acknowledging that "an irrational and even morbid sense of guilt .... not infrequently does exist", he

insists that the phenomenon of guilt "is also, if not principally, of a religious nature" (p. 434). Where real guilt exists, he says, religion has the appropriate cure.

The Pope then makes reference to an issue which can be understood only in the context of Catholic theology. "In the presence of material sin", he says, psychotherapy "cannot remain neutral" (p. 434). This distinction between material sin and formal sin has been used by some Catholic theologians in an attempt to resolve one aspect of the apparent conflict between psychotherapy and Catholicism. They argue that because of the patient's psychopathology, his outward behavior, though objectively sinful (that is, a material sin), may not have subjective culpability (that is, a formal sin). The Pope rejects this argument and stresses that even though psychotherapy may for the moment tolerate the inevitable, "it must know that God cannot justify such an action" (p. 434). "With still less reason can psychotherapy counsel a patient to commit a material sin on the ground that it would be without subjective guilt" (p. 434). The Pope concludes his allocution with an encouragement to psychotherapists to continue their research and practice.

It is immediately obvious that the issues raised by the Pope fall into roughly the same categories as those outlined by previous Catholic authors. What the Pope does, is to make authoritative statements on these issues.

He makes the same basic distinction between different schools of psychoanalysis and even though he does not cite Freud by name, some of the Pope's allusions are clear since the errors as he criticizes and the cautions he enjoins are almost identical to those raised by other authors in reference to Freudian psychoanalysis. However, his position is clear.

Psychoanalysis as a whole is not condemned, only certain aspects of its theory and practice.

Firstly, the Pope refers to a theory of "pansexualism", and in this context makes important points with regard to morality. Besides challenging this theory as an adequate basis for a general psychotherapeutic approach, he argues that there is a danger of allowing the emergence into consciousness of sexual fantasies and desires.

Secondly, he alludes to what other authors call the "materialistic" approach of Freudianism when he insists upon the acknowledgment of the soul, rather than the psyche, as the center of the human person.

Thirdly, in rejecting "personalist ethics", he alludes to the so-called "subjectivistic" and "individualistic" orientation of Freudian psychoanalysis.

Fourthly, when he stresses freedom of will and human responsibility, he seems to be referring to what authors have described as the "deterministic" viewpoint in psychoanalysis.

Finally, the Pope warns against certain dangers in the practice of psychoanalysis. He cautions the therapist against tolerating "sin" in the patient (by remaining "neutral") or worse yet, actually suggesting it, and he stresses the need to respect the patient's secrets.

In the years immediately following these comments by the Pope, Catholic authors focussed on the issues raised by him. Two highly influential authors made important contributions, Fulton J. Sheen in "Peace of Soul" (1954) and A. Gemelli in "Psychoanalysis Today". Sheen was a popular American bishop and Gemelli, an Italian psychiatrist.

Both authors make remarkably similar comments. Both stress that the Pope has not condemned psychoanalysis as such. Says Gemelli: "The Holy Father has not issued any condemnation of any particular system or

technique" (p. 148). And Sheen: "I repeat, there is no objection to psychoanalysis as such, as long as it remains a mere method and does not bring influences or ideas which are contrary to truth" (p. 81) Then they both proceed in sometimes veiled, sometimes direct manner to condemn Freudian psychoanalysis, implying that this system contains the errors condemned by Pius XII.

Sheen's book, as the name suggests, is a devotional treatise intended to help individuals find peace in their lives. A substantial portion of his book, however, is devoted to refuting what he perceives as the false claims of some trends in psychoanalysis to be able to help individuals find such peace. He compares many devotional practices in the Catholic Church (for example, confession) and their intended outcome (for example, release from guilt) with the psychoanalytic method. According to him, some schools of psychoanalysis see their method as replacing the traditional devotional practices. Thus, he says: "Our concern here is not with either psychiatry or the psychoanalytic method. both of which are valid in their spheres. We limit the discussion solely to that single psychoanalytic group who assert these things: Man is an animal; there is no personal responsibility and therefore no guilt; the the psychoanalytic method is a substitute for confession" (p. 112). Sheen does identify the "single psychoanalytic group" which maintains these positions, and, indeed, one would be hard pressed to find any such system. However, in the course of his book, it becomes an inescapable conclusion that he is, in fact, referring to Freudian psychoanalysis since there are a number of quotations, misquotations and allusions to Freud's writings.

Sheen rejects the psychoanalytic theory on sexuality which, he says,

"makes sex the most important instinct of life or attribute mental disorders exclusively to its repression" (p. 146). He condemns a "new philosophy" which affirms that "the repression of passions and instincts (is) wrong" (p. 161). "The new notion", he continues, says "that a man's id and his animal instincts ought to have free expression against the totems and taboos of the old superstitions of morality, God, religion." This psychology says: "Be expressive, Religion and morality are destroying your personality". According to this philosophy, "all restraint, authority and discipline (are) viewed as harmful to the character" (p. 161).

Sheen asserts that psychoanalytic theory and practice cannot be separated from its philosophy. He says: "Psychoanalysis (still using this name in the wide sense) cannot be wholly independent of a philosophical outlook on human nature. But a sound philosophy is not derived from the findings of psychoanalysis, rather the philosophical interpretation precedes the psychological theory and determines its particular aims" (p. 80).

Sheen's gross misrepresentations and distortions of Freud's writings overshadow those of other Catholic authors. Nevertheless, his book, like those of Allers and Vanderveldt, cannot be easily dismissed because it attests to the reaction of very highly reputable and influential authors to psychoanalysis.

Gemelli makes his attack on Freudian psychoanalysis from a much more informed position. He had trained as a psychiatrist under Kraepelin in Munich. Gemelli presents the views of Freud and Jung and rejects them both, accusing Freud of pansexualism, determinism and materialism. He presents the arguments of Pius XII and concludes that: "Such clear and incisive words as those should serve as a condemnation of much

psychoanalytic procedure" (p. 135). Then he states his own position: "I maintain that psychoanalysis as a means of therapy is not only a promoter of irresponsibility but an instrument whereby man is dehumanized" (p. 45).

At the same time some articles more favorable to psychoanalysis and also of more scholarly content appear in the literature. Three articles in Peter Flood's (1953) "New Problems in Medical Ethics" are relevant.<sup>1</sup> The authors present basically similar views. Tesson, Jesuit theologian, distinguishes between Freudian metaphysics, theory and therapy. The metaphysics, he says, is obsolete. The theory is in need of modification but some notions, for example, the superego, the ego of defences, are important for morality. As regards therapy, he stresses that if the analyst were to remain neutral during treatment there would be no conflict between Catholicism and psychoanalysis. However, he says that this neutrality does not hold good for all analysts and it is doubtful whether it holds good for any analyst, "when he is treating cases which involve deep human and spiritual values"(p. 101). He suggests by way of solution that, "...a moral or religious counsellor should, in his turn, deal with a person subjected to psychoanalytic treatment every time that this cure runs the risk of provoking for the believing subject profound repercussions in the moral or religious domain, or is likely to result in a real modification of the personality" (p. 101).

He goes on to discuss what judgment is demanded of the psychiatrist on actions contrary to moral law, for example, masturbation and homosexual practices. He concludes that it is sufficient if, from the point of view of the analyst, these actions are regarded as "indications of maladjustment, incidental to growth". Tesson insists that a satisfactory

psychological and moral synthesis can only be achieved by starting with "the doctrine which generations of philosophers, theologians and Christian spiritual writers have gradually developed from the teaching of the gospels and the data of reason" (p. 102). This teaching, however, is incomplete and "discoveries newly made can enrich it and can throw light on those regions of the human person which the doctrine up to now glimpsed only in a confused manner" (p. 102).

Tessons' comments, though surely very much more conciliatory than Sheen's or Gemelli's, are hardly adequate for reconciliation. His comments seem especially relevant for Catholic analysts who share the same moral view as the patient. He does not deal with the situation in which the analyst may not be willing to view as a psychological maladjustment what Catholicism views as contrary to moral law. Tessons, like other Catholic authors, also accepts the basic accuracy of Catholic teaching which can only be "completed", never corrected.

Nodet (1953) offers no new suggestions, only his personal experience. He says: "It cannot be denied that analytic therapy raises a moral problem. It causes a revival in the patient of seething infantile conflicts of sexuality and aggressiveness, which will reappear and express themselves in adult terms....."

"I do not wish to evade the difficulty, but I can only express a personal and sweeping conclusion by saying that I find no real contradiction between psychoanalytical treatment and the sincere desire of patient or analyst to remain faithful to strict Catholic morality" (p. 113).

Pasche (1953) attempts to allay the fears of Catholics regarding the impact of psychoanalytic treatment on morality. He says: "Morality

has nothing to fear from psychoanalysis, not even a new moral theory. We aim at giving liberty to the patient, by allowing him to become aware of his conflicts and to resolve them. When, in our opinion, he has been cured, he is at liberty to choose. He can opt for the genuine or the false. The mere idea of a mental hygiene which takes the place of moral responsibility nauseates us. Psychoanalysis is simply pre-morality; and there is no reason to raise an objection against it" (p. 121).

Other Catholic authors dealt with specific issues of conflict between psychoanalytic treatment and Catholic morality. The phenomenon of abreaction presented such an issue. The Pope had said that there was possibility of moral danger in the process whereby the patient was allowed to explore certain fantasies and "representations". From the viewpoint of Catholicism, moral culpability may be attached to such exploration. The Pope referred specifically to fantasies of a sexual nature but the same stricture applies to other fantasies (for example, of a violent nature) which Catholics find morally reprehensible.

Nuttin (1953, 1962), Catholic priest and psychologist, wrote a very popular book, "Psychoanalysis and Personality", in which he attempted to discuss points of contact between psychoanalysis and Christian philosophy. In discussing the morality of abreaction, he states the problem quite clearly: "All therapeutic methods consider that free expression, the discharge of emotional attitudes (both positive and negative) may be absolutely essential in the case of certain people. The question arises whether it is permissible to allow feelings which, from the moral point of view, man should endeavour to control, to manifest themselves freely in the course of treatment. It is certainly not permissible to rouse feelings or signs of hatred or any other immoral

emotion either in thought or word" (p. 168). He goes on. "We come here to a central problem upon which moralists and psychotherapists are often sharply divided. Whereas the therapist aims to liberate the patient, the moralist emphasizes effort and self-control.

"The moralist's attitude toward human behavior is closely connected with his sense of the value of effort. This is for him a necessary condition of the struggle against the impulsive tendencies and the establishment of an ideal of personality.....The moralist therefore considers any relaxing of psychic effort dangerous" (p. 163).

However, Nuttin proceeds to argue that moral rules do not apply to what happens in psychotherapy because therapy is a "special situation" outside of normal situations. This is especially so, he says, because in order to impute guilt to internal acts, there must be a pattern developed in which the person allows himself to be "inspired or guided" by these "inner or verbal actions". Without delving too deeply into his theological treatise, his position can be summed up as follows. The behavior which occurs in treatment is of a "technical character". Since it is not "real behavior", it is outside moral regulations.

In 1952, Andre Snoeck, Jesuit theologian, published an article<sup>2</sup> "Moral Reflections on Psychiatric Abreaction". Snoeck rejects Nuttin's arguments and presents his own even more elaborate discussion of the of the issue. He outlines the Catholic moral teaching which is rele- to the issue of abreaction. He says: "If the problem concerns an emotional release without further significance, without onward consequences, without scandal to the neighbor, without harm to others, even the most severe scholastic moralist will be able to see nothing more than a venial sin; a failure to control one's emotional life integrally.

But if the scene or conversation happens to have a deeper meaning and is the expression of genuine rancor (purely internal but still willed), of a true hatred, of an immoral desire, then Christian morality takes a serious view of the situation. In point of fact, it is not merely the external act that must be regulated; it is first and foremost the intention, the desire, the internal thought. Did not Christ say that a man who looks with lust at a woman has already committed adultery with her in his heart?" (p. 175). Snoeck thus points to two different issues. Firstly, there is the question of the failure on the part of the patient to exercise control over his thoughts of an "immoral" nature. This Snoeck views as at most a "small" (venial) sin. Secondly, there is the possibility that the patient may consciously take pleasure in the "immoral" thought. This would normally be a serious sin, but Snoeck discusses the question of imputability in the psychoanalytic situation. Snoeck suggests that since, in this case, the whole person is not acting, the patient is not reprehensible. He says that since, in the course of treatment, we are dealing with a person who is not in an integrated state, his actions do not carry the weight of complete moral responsibility. What, then, if as a result of treatment, the patient develops certain attitudes which carry over into his dealings with others in real life? Snoeck asks but does not answer the question as to whether the person is responsible but he stresses that the analyst has the responsibility to attempt to restrain the patient from acting "immorally". As a consequence, Snoeck says, "it is evident that great prudence will still be necessary before entering ourselves or sending someone else into treatment which can result in consequences with the gravity of an externally conscious act for which the individual is still responsible" (p. 189). One is left with the impression that even those theologians

who are trying hard to reconcile Catholic teaching with psychoanalysis, remain quite concerned about possible ill-effects of the treatment on the patient's moral system.

In 1958, J. Ford and G. Kelley, well-known and reputed American Catholic theologians, discussed the issue of Catholicism and psychoanalysis in their book, "Contemporary Moral Theology". They review the stormy history between these two systems and referring to previous papal pronouncements, they argue that the Pope neither condemned psychiatry in general nor psychoanalysis in particular, and that there is "no fundamental conflict between Catholicism and psychoanalysis" (p. 315). Like previous authors, they, too, go on to note that there are conflicts between catholicism and Freud's philosophy particularly because of its materialism, atheism, pansexualism and determinism. They say: "The sharper conflicts of modern times have not been between religion and psychiatry in general, but between religion and psychoanalysis in some of its manifestations. The reason is not far to seek.....apart from the misunderstandings it remains uncontrovertably true that Freud had views on religion, morality, human nature and human behavior which are radically opposed to the teachings of religion....Add to this the extreme emphasis on sex with which his name and that of psychoanalysis has been associated and it is not hard to understand the hostility..... Psychoanalysis was born and nurtured in an atmosphere of hostility of religion and traditional sexual morality; and though much of it nowadays has been purged of what is false and objectionable, it should cause no surprise that men of God and believers in God are still somewhat suspicious" (p. 319). Ford and Kelley argue that it is possible to accept Freud's psychology and therapy without adhering to his philosophy. They note that: "Materialism, atheism, determinism do not constitute all of

Freud's philosophy of man, but they are a very important part of it, and they naturally result in giving him a view of human nature, human destiny and human behavior which is fundamentally at variance with religious teachings. It is silly and futile to try, as some have done, to reconcile these ideas of Freud, considered at the philosophical level with Catholic teaching. Similar ideas permeate much psychoanalytical writing and some of Freud's contemporary followers share his philosophy. But others do not. It is possible to subscribe to much of the psychological theory of psychoanalysis and to make use of many psychoanalytical techniques without adhering to materialism, atheism or determinism at all" (p. 323).

Ford and Kelley discuss some of the moral dangers in psychotherapy. Firstly, some psychiatrists and psychoanalysts give advice contrary to moral law. Even though other professionals may also do so, they say, "the danger needs to be specifically pointed out in the case of psychotherapy because of the character of the sexual theories and materialistic views embraced by some psychotherapists and also because of the infiltration of existentialist morality into psychological circles" (p. 327). Secondly, they see dangers in the phenomenon of transference in that the therapist may exploit the therapeutic relationship in an unethical manner. Thirdly, they see the danger of moral crisis arising from the process of psychotherapy. They claim that, ".....in some cases moral crises may result from revealing to the patient (or helping him to discover) the unconscious sources of his conduct. His moral world may be turned upside down. The analyst helps him to take his mind apart but who is to put it together again? The Analyst? According to what principles? Ideally the Freudian analyst is almost a passive bystander.

But in practice he is often unable to, or does not, maintain a neutral attitude toward the moral values involved in the patient's behavior, past, present and future.....Despite the theory, the obvious fact is that one cannot spend endless hours in discussing the most intimate problems of one's life and conduct with another human being who, whether he wants to or not, must stand as a guide and mentor, without being influenced by that other's fundamental beliefs about human behavior and conduct" (p.330). Fourthly, they talk about the dangers of free association and of the phenomenon of abreaction. They begin by outlining the Catholic position on the matter: "It is immoral deliberately to reapprove unchaste actions that have been performed in the past. It is immoral deliberately to indulge the desire of unchaste acts. It is immoral deliberately to excite within oneself, or to acquiesce in, unchaste feelings or emotions. To do any of these things even for therapeutic purposes is forbidden by moral law" (p. 334). Ford and Kelley argue that even though it is not clear that "any of these things" is a necessary outcome of the process, there is the possibility, and consequently the danger, that they may take place in the process of free association or the experience of abreaction. They conclude, however, on a positive note, maintaining that "...the heated tone which formerly characterized discussions about psychoanalysis and religion is now becoming a thing of the past, and there are many evidences on both sides of a sincere desire for rapproachment" (p. 319).

Clearly efforts at rapproachment were being made, but bitterness nevertheless continued to exist. The life experience of two authors, Karl Stern and Paul Jury, which is reported in their writings, represents two opposing sides of the conflict.

Karl Stern was a Jewish convert to Catholicism who became a well-known psychiatrist arguing for the possibility of reconciliation between Catholicism and psychoanalysis. In reporting on his life, Stern makes the remarkable statement that his conversion to Catholicism occurred in the context of his analysis. He describes the process of his conversion in the book "A Pillar of Fire" in which he states: Among the numerous things which changed in my life during this time was an extraordinary fact: when I first lay down on the couch I was a convinced dialectic materialist, when I arose from the couch for the last time I was absolutely convinced of the primacy of the spirit" (p. 154). Unfortunately, he does not elaborate on the connection between his analysis and his conversion. However, he argues that there need not be a conflict between psychoanalysis and religion. He describes Freud's atheistic philosophy as a "tragic historical accident", re-echoing a previous comment by Sanders (1949). Stern contends that "(Freud's) philosophical statements are amateurish and contradictory and they can easily be separated from his psychology without doing harm to the latter" (p. 249). He suggests that if we take psychoanalysis and "lop" a few of the accidental ornaments off... you have a psychology that reaffirms and enriches the Christian idea of man" (p. 249). He elaborates on this same position in his later book, "The Third Revolution" (1954) and in an article entitled "Spiritual Aspects of Psychotherapy" (1955). In these writings he argues that the psychoanalytic stress on love is highly complementary with the Christian precept of charity. He discusses the issue of therapeutic neutrality and proposes that there are two different kinds of non-condemnation. The first, he says, is based on "scientific positivism - a view of the world which can admit of no

absolutes" (1955, p. 130). Christians do not accept this view of the world. "The Christian psychotherapist", he says, "acknowledges a hierarchy of moral values which is absolute and transcends everything that is of the natural order" (p. 130). The reason why the Christian is non-judgmental is because at the top of the hierarchy stands the "virtue of charity", which exhorts him not to pass judgment on the actions of others.

Stern is thus suggesting a way in which an analyst can hold to absolute moral values and yet maintain a non-judgmental, therapeutic neutrality. This does not appear to be in complete accord with the statements of Pius XII that the therapist cannot remain neutral in the presence of material sin. Even though Stern is correct in maintaining that a belief in absolute norms still does not permit a judgment of a particular individual's culpability, he does not deal with what is seen by Catholics as the therapist's responsibility to enlighten the patient when his actions are contrary to the objective norms. Furthermore, Stern admits to the huge difference between what he calls the positivist position that there are no absolutes, and the Christian position. These different positions will surely result in very different types of therapeutic neutrality, and, in fact, Eissler (1965) doubts that what Stern advocates is true therapeutic neutrality.

While psychoanalysis may have helped Stern to become a Catholic, the experience of analysis helped Paul Jury to leave the Catholic Church. Jury was a Jesuit priest who after twenty-five years of religious life became skeptical and uncertain of his faith. He discovered psychoanalysis and even translated some of Freud's writings into French. He was also psychoanalysed, and of this experience, he said: "It delivered me from

religious faith and eased many oppressive inhibitions, permitting me to be intellectually productive and to reconcile myself to the real world" (p. 13). Jury eventually became a Freudian psychoanalyst and practiced his profession while functioning as a Catholic priest. During this time he wrote his journals intending to publish them after leaving the Church. He died, still a priest, without doing so, and his papers were published posthumously as: "The Diary of a Psychoanalyst-Priest" (1965). In them we find the reflections of a man struggling with the issues of faith and religion, clearly embittered by many aspects of Church organization and regulation, in particular the precept of celibacy which he viewed as hypocritical. He condemns the Church for impeding genuine freedom of thought and growth by keeping its members trapped in narrow dogmatic teachings.

If we accept the subjective reports of Stern and Jury as valid we are faced with two completely different outcomes of psychoanalytic treatment. How does the same, or similar, process lead one person towards faith and religion, and another person away from it? One obvious possibility is that the process may have been very different for the two subjects. A number of important variables, including the religious orientation of the respective analysts, are not available. The cases do appear to support the argument, however, that the process itself has no specific impact on religious faith and that the patient may use the process to arrive at whatever end-point he himself chooses. One would need to be extremely cautious in drawing this conclusion from this small sample, though, because a review of the literature suggests that Stern's experience of conversion through analysis is a highly unusual one. Nonetheless, the experience of both subjects appears to give strong support

to the thesis that analysis can have an impact on faith and morality, even if the precise nature of the impact needs further clarification.

A few months before his death in 1958, Pope Pius XII, in a discourse at the International Congress of Applied Psychology presented the Church's view on "Morality and Applied Psychology". Here the focus is less on moral issues involved in treatment and more on the issues involved in using human subjects in psychological experiments. As regards treatment, however, he simply repeats the general principles outlined in his prior statements. He stresses responsibility and freedom, arguing that "normal" man and even sometimes "abnormal" man is responsible for his actions. He repeats his caution with regard to the revealing of secrets during treatment and underscores the requirement that subjects give their consent before receiving treatment.

In 1961, the "Sacred Congregation", the body responsible for overseeing and giving directives regarding Roman Catholic clergy, issued a "monitum" (caution) which refers specifically to psychoanalysis. The "Sacred Congregation" notes that many dangerous opinions concerning sins against the "sixth commandment" and the imputability of human actions are being spread. It therefore issued the following decree:

1. That bishops, presidents of theological faculties, as well as rectors of seminaries and religious schools see to it that those who teach moral theology do so according to the traditional doctrine of the Church,
2. That ecclesiastical censors exert great caution in reviewing and judging books which treat the issue of the sixth commandment,
3. That clergy and religious are forbidden from practicing psychoanalysis without permission, and

4. That priests and religious of both sexes may not undergo psychoanalysis unless their bishop, for grave reason, permits it.

All Catholic commentators have noted that this is not a condemnation of psychoanalysis. What is significant in this decree, however, is that here again the Church makes a connection between psychoanalysis and "sins against the sixth commandment". In reading the document, one can sense the caution and concern about the possible dangers of psychoanalysis. If this document is no condemnation, it is no wholehearted acceptance either.

In 1962, Pope John XXIII launched the Second Vatican Council which was destined to shake up the Roman Catholic Church and have a serious impact on the relationship between the Church and other institutions. Pope John's stated aim was to "open the windows of the Church" to let in some fresh air. The outcome was a serious re-evaluation of the Church's doctrine and practice. One significant change was the development in the Catholic Church of a much more tolerant attitude toward other points of view. In its relationship with other Churches, the ecumenical movement gained official recognition and there were greater efforts at rapprochement. The Church's attitude towards science also underwent change. The movement towards acknowledging the importance and validity of scientific research and findings gained momentum and more genuine attention was paid to the data of new scientific discoveries and their relevance for the Church's beliefs and teachings. In fact, one of the documents issued by the Council stressed the importance of a "sufficient knowledge not only of theological principles, but also of secular scientific discoveries, especially psychology and sociology;

(a knowledge) of the sort that the faithful will in turn be brought to a greater purity and maturity in their life of faith" (Gaudium et Spes, No. 62, 1).

The Second Vatican Council certainly helped put an end to the bitter attacks by Catholic authors on psychoanalysis, but it does not seem that any serious effort was made to integrate "a sufficient knowledge" of the discoveries of psychoanalysis into Catholic teaching. It is true that the Church as a whole developed a much more sympathetic, and even appreciative, view of psychoanalysis. Priests and nuns submitted themselves for analysis and some even went on to become practising analysts. What is remarkable is that although representatives of other Christian Churches continued to make efforts to synthesize issues of psychoanalysis and religion, one is hard pressed to find in the literature similar efforts by Catholic analysts. It is almost as if Catholic analysts shied away from this challenging task. I will later speculate on possible reasons for this. Only one significant, post-Vatican Council study has been found - the book "Psychoanalysis and Catholicism" edited by Benjamin Wolman, which was published in 1976. It is interesting that in 1976 Wolman could say: "The sole purpose of this volume has been to start a frank and honest dialogue (italics mine). Psychoanalysis and Catholicism have been at odds with one another for a long time although both of them are most earnest schools of thought deeply concerned with a man's problems and his destiny. They disagree on almost every possible issue..... (p. 1).

Wolman does not acknowledge previous attempts at dialogue referred to in this study perhaps because he felt that they had not met with any significant degree of success. He notes however, that "at the present time we are witnessing a profound revolution within the Catholic Church.

Old issues are being re-evaluated, new issues "raised" (p. 2). At the same time he questions whether Freud's view of religion was an accurate one. Re-echoing the words of Pope John, he describes his work as "an effort to let in fresh air and let some stale ill-feelings out" (p. 3). The book deals with many aspects of the conflict between psychoanalysis and Catholicism, presenting the views mainly of Catholics knowledgeable in the field of psychoanalysis. Much of the discussion has no direct relevance for our present inquiry since it focusses on Freud's view of religion and theoretical points of contact between a spiritual view of the world and a psychoanalytic view.

In one paper, Leo Bartemaier, well-known Catholic psychiatrist, seems to agree with Zilboorg's and Stern's argument that Freud's atheism was accidental to psychoanalysis. He rejects Freud's conclusion that religion is an obsessional neurosis, maintaining that it is based on faulty reasoning. "The problem of the existence of God", he says, "is not a problem in psychology, but in metaphysics" (p. 11). As regards morality, Bartemaier acknowledges that: "Since, for Freud, moral injunctions and prohibitions were so often related to primitive taboos and had a primary utilitarian value, ministering to our personal comforts or preserving order in society, the notion of an objective, "natural" moral order was foreign to his thought" (p. 11). He thus states one aspect of the conflict between the Catholic and Freudian views of morality but offers no suggestion for reconciliation. In his paper, however, he does point to some areas of synchronicity between Freud and Thomas Aquinas especially as regards infantile sexuality, libido, and the unity of the human person.

Albert Ple, Catholic moral theologian, in another paper in Wolman's book argues that Freud and Thomas Aquinas had very divergent views on

the issue of morality. He says: "One must nevertheless admit that Freud's concept of morality is hardly acceptable for the disciple of Christ" (p. 97). However, almost by contradiction, he goes on to say that, "Freud's view can stimulate the reflection of Christian moralists", and that "psychoanalysis (can) even enrich the work of theologians at the same time fostering a healthy moral growth in Christians" (p. 97). Ple seems to argue that Freud's view of morality was a primitive one and that authentic Christian morality goes beyond it. According to Ple, Freud's morality is a "morality of law", that is, one based on law and "composed of prohibitions, restraint of the instincts and a source of obsessive guilt" (p. 103). Authentic Christian morality, he says, is based on love and mercy. Ple acknowledges that the "morality of law" approach has had, for a long time, a powerful influence on the Church's moral teaching. "At the beginning of the fifteenth century", he says, "the ethic of law and duty permeated Christianity, and even today, we are still the tributaries of this influence" (p. 104). Ple argues that true Christian morality, as found in the Bible and also in the writings of Thomas Aquinas, is based on love. He says: "The morality of St. Thomas is indeed radically opposed to the legalistic morality" (p. 105). He goes on: "... this conception of St. Thomas manifests with force... that one can be Catholic without adhering to a legalistic morality like that which prevailed for several centuries. It allows meaning to be recognized in and given to Freud's observations and his conception of morality, and at the same time it permits that along with the collaboration of his disciples a search be made as to how to devise a more authentically "human" morality that surpasses, without denying it, the primitive or neurotic determination analysed by Freud" (p. 108). In

other words, if both Christians and Freudians can move beyond the legalistic conception of morality rapproachment will be possible.

From our review of Freud's writings which have relevance for morality it can be concluded that Ple's evaluation of Freud's position as "legalistic" is an accurate one. It has been noted that, especially in "Civilization and its Discontents", Freud viewed morality as having developed in response to the needs of men living in society and as consisting of a set of restrictive norms designed to curb man's powerful instincts. We have also discussed Freud's ambivalence on the issue. At times, he gives the impression that because of the human condition these moral restrictions are necessary.<sup>4</sup> At other times, he rejects the religious approach to morality which, he maintained, is based on coercion, fear and "illusions", and he seems to advocate a new approach based on insight and knowledge.

Ple does not discuss psychoanalytic treatment, focussing instead on theoretical issues. His arguments, therefore complement those of Roberts (1950) who, as we noted, maintained that psychoanalytic treatment helps free patients from moralism and assists them in developing genuine moral values. Even if Freudians and Catholics were in agreement, however, that the legalistic approach to morality is to be rejected, there is certainly no agreement as regard what should replace it. It is here that a great deal of work remains to be done if true synthesis is to be achieved.

#### Summary:

The views of a number of prominent Catholic authors concerning the conflict between psychoanalysis and Catholicism, particularly as regards morality, have been presented in a historical context. In the period

prior to the Second Vatican Council, the view is generally expressed, even by the Pope, that psychoanalysis as a whole is not to be condemned but that certain psychoanalytic schools espouse theories which contain grave errors that must be rejected.

Almost all authors contend that there is a philosophy underlying Freudian psychoanalysis and that this philosophy is opposed to Catholic philosophy. A major debate centers around the question of whether this philosophy is essential to psychoanalysis or not. Those who see it as essential, for example, Allers and Sheen, condemn Freudianism outright. Others who see the philosophy as unessential, for example, Zilboorg and Stern, then proceed to evaluate specific aspects of the theory and practice. Most authors express the view that some aspects of the theory are false but that others can be quite "useful". These "useful" aspects are seen as helping to clarify or expand Catholic teaching but never to correct it. As regards psychoanalytic practice, specific dangers are pointed out.

After the Second Vatican Council, the polemic is toned down and many clergymen become actively involved in psychoanalysis. However, not much of an attempt is made by Catholic authors to develop a genuine synthesis, and many of the basic conflicts remain unresolved.

### Part III. The Reaction of Psychoanalytic Authors

The viewpoints of some Catholic psychoanalysts (Zilboorg, Stern) who argue for the possibility of rapprochement between psychoanalysis and Catholicism have already been presented. We will now present the views of other psychoanalytic authors who discuss the issue, including some who see much less favorable prospects for reconciliation.

Franklin Day, in an article in *Psychoanalytic Quarterly* (1944) entitled "The Future of Psychoanalysis and Religion" launched an attack on Zilboorg's position. Day takes issue with what he sees as Zilboorg's position that "there should be no difficulty in reconciling the conflict at present existing between psychoanalysis and the Roman Catholic Church for both believe the same thing and differ only in the terms in which their belief is couched" (p. 88). Day argues that: "The Church cannot accept.....much that is true in the scientific sense of the word and particularly the truths of analytic psychology, without first abandoning many of its essential tenets" (p. 88). This is because the Church considers itself to be already in possession of the truth and consequently is not open to discussion. He rejects the approach of accepting the analytic method while discarding its premises. He says: "The Church cannot accept psychoanalysis merely as a method of healing the sick without accepting the whole body of facts upon which that method is based. It does not seem likely that a council of the Church would swallow the analytic demonstration that the Mass is but survival of totemic feast, or that transubstantiation is no less a magic process than any other primitive rite. It is difficult to believe that the Church would or could abandon its traditionally narrow view of sex... in favor of the discoveries of psychoanalysis" (p. 89).

Day insists that there is a long catalogue of incompatibilities between the Church and psychoanalysis. In any case, he says "the business of psychoanalysis, which is a scientific discipline and not a philosophy, is not the attempt to reconcile the irreconcilable" (p. 90). Finally, he concludes that: "The ills of man and his world will not be cured by an abandonment or freedom of thought and of inquiry in favor of an impossible reconciliation between scientific thought and the dogmatic shackles of postulates needing no verification and no proof which are the essence of Thomism either in its old or in its new form" (p. 92). Day is thus pessimistic about the possibility of reconciliation primarily because of the Church's non-scientific approach to arriving at truth and its inflexible dogmatic attitude.

Racker (1956) is somewhat more conciliatory. He argues that Freud's position on religion, "is co-determined by his relationship with his father" (p. 98), and he goes on to deal with this issue in some detail. He also argues that it is the extraneous aspects of religion that Freud rejects, and not the core of religion which, Racker says, is love. "It is clear", he says, "that there has become entangled with religion a great deal that is entirely foreign to this essence, a great deal that was born of anxiety, of desire and even of hatred and which provokes, in consequence, a just rejection or anxiety and hatred" (p. 99). He concludes that Freud has cleansed religion and that which remains is still worthy of consideration.

Racker supports Freud's analysis of religion and offers a natural explanation for morality. "Cultural precepts", he says, "especially moral ones are, according to religion, of "divine" origin. Yet it is plain that they originate from man and have to do with his guilt feelings" (p. 111). Racker also presents natural, psychoanalytic explanations for

many of the phenomena believed by religionists to be supernatural.

Although Racker seems to think that his approach furthers the cause of reconciliation between religion and psychoanalysis, it is clear that his naturalistic explanations would hardly be acceptable to any reputable Catholic theologian.

Nathaniel Ross (1958) reviewed a number of books by religious authors, Protestant and Catholic, which offer suggestions for reconciliation between psychiatry and religion. Like Day, he argues that since religion appears committed to a set of preconceived beliefs, the attempts at reconciliation succeed only at the expense of the search for truth. He comes to the conclusion that ".it is taken for granted by Catholic writers that the "knowledge" arrived at by faith is by no means merely equivalent to that derived from scientific method, but constitutes an antecedent and superior body of truth in which scientific truth occupies the place of handmaiden, to be dismissed if her attentions prove embarrassing" (p. 521). He also presents what often appears as a typical psychoanalytic position that even though many people still need religion, men, in general, probably would be better off without it. He argues that since men can lead a moral life without belief in the supernatural and since there is no evidence that such belief increases man's level of morality, would he not be better off without it? He concludes: "We would be indeed foolish to deny that modern man still needs religion to sustain him in a world in which the forces of love constantly hang in the balance, assailed by powerful hates and fears which tear men asunder. Certainly we cannot deny the enormous social values and the integrating force that religion has brought to mankind, but it remains a serious question whether man would not ultimately breathe more freely and expand his potentialities to a far greater degree, if he became

capable of mastering his anxieties by giving up his illusions and courageously facing himself in a world in which he could love his fellow men for himself alone, and without the solace of thus finding favor in the eyes of a projected image of his parents" (p. 538).

The most thorough analysis, by a psychoanalyst, of the conflicts between psychoanalysis and Catholicism, was made by Kurt Eissler (1965) who devoted a huge section of his book, "Medical Orthodoxy and the Future of Psychoanalysis" to this issue. As previously noted, Freud acknowledged in a letter to Pfister (November 25, 1928) that he had written the book "Lay Analysis" to keep psychoanalysis out of the hands of physicians and "The Future of an Illusion" to protect it from priests. Eissler's book seems intended to underscore this issue and to warn against the dangers facing psychoanalysis from the medical profession and from the Church. Eissler sees religion in general, and the Catholic Church in particular, as one of the forces opposing psychoanalysis. He says: "One of the most powerful of the societal forces opposing psychoanalysis is the Catholic Church which would not hesitate to forbid psychoanalysis or to make its existence impossible in any other way, if the power situation permitted" (p. 247). He sees little hope of reconciliation especially because of the fundamental differences between the Church and psychoanalysis. He feels that the Churches see psychoanalysis as a threat to their dogmatic teachings. "My point is", he says, "that if psychoanalysis is incompatible with religion, it is so only in terms of the Churches: to an even greater degree than any other science, psychoanalysis is a threat to the established Churches and to dogma. That is why the Catholic Church is fundamentally opposed to psychoanalysis in the form in which Freud wanted his discoveries and his theories to be understood

and practise" (p. 275). He criticizes the books by Gemelli and Sheen, dismissing them on the grounds that their authors are badly mis-informed about psychoanalysis. For, he says, "if psychoanalysis really stood for what Sheen and Gemelli assert that it stands for, it would deserve rejection as a theory worthy of consideration" (p. 250).

He then takes issue with the writings of Zilboorg and Stern whom, he acknowledges, are much better acquainted with psychoanalysis. He rejects Zilboorg's contention that Freud did not really understand religion, as well as his attempts to analyze Freud's atheism. He also rejects Zilboorg's efforts to effect a reconciliation by discarding various aspects to Freud's theory which do not harmonize with Catholic belief. He says that, "any attempt by Zilboorg to prove that there is no dichotomy between science and faith .... would have struck Freud as an illusion" (p. 272).

Eissler reserves harshest criticism for Stern, saying that his work is far more "diabolical" than Gemelli and Sheen. Stern, he says, understands and presents psychoanalysis very accurately but then goes on to attempt to twist it to fit Catholic doctrine. As far as Stern is concerned, Eissler says, if only Freud had not written "The Future of an Illusion, Moses and Monotheism, Totem and Taboo, and possibly Civilization and its Discontents", he might have been recommended reading on Catholic campuses. The point is that Stern rejects the writings of Freud which are offensive to Catholicism.

Eissler notes that the Church's approach to the scientific endeavor has been firstly to attack those findings which challenge its doctrine and, if this fails, then to attempt some sort of compromise, often thereby limiting the scope of scientific inquiry. He sees the statements of Pope Pius XII as an attempt to place psychology and

psychotherapy in a "straight jacket". He says: "The ethical evaluation of man's conduct is squeezed into existing dogmatic categories, "personalistic ethics" is rejected and man is denied the right to make his own ethical decisions. The therapist's task, if anything, is to make himself a tool of the Catholic dogma" (p. 273).

Eissler deals at some length specifically with the issue of morality. "I am writing here upon an issue", he says, "which impresses me as being central to our times and which will certainly loom large in the history of ideas of our century: The question of the foundation and vindication of religion and the foundation and vindication of moral values" (p. 252). He points out the source of the conflict between the Church and psychoanalysis in the area of morality. "Psychoanalysis", he says, "is an empirical psychology and as such does not include among its primary functions that of deciding ethical questions even though it can contribute much to ethics secondarily....Directly, it can do little more than register the moral, ethical and religious values that it comes to observe in the subjects of its investigation, trace their history and ascertain their effects. However, in this pursuit it enters unavoidably into areas in which the Church demands full power of decision" (p. 251). Eissler completely accepts Freud's theory of the natural origin of morality. Furthermore, he argues that especially because of the relativism which the science of psychoanalysis has injected into the search for meaningful moral values and because of the increased responsibility which it engenders, it provides the basis for an ethical system superior to that of religion. Noting that psychoanalysis has been dubbed "unethical" by some of its critics because of its relativistic stance, he responds: "The element of relativism that science has introduced and

validated is sometimes played down as an escapist technique - the fact being, on the contrary, that it is the insistence upon a supernatural absoluteness of values, the insatiable longing for certainty, that is the direct expression of the pleasure principle.....For centuries, belief in the absolute truth of the written tradition had satisfied this need providing occidental man with a haven which had freed him from the disquieting feelings of responsibility of choice and doubt. It is one of the great pages in the history of the development of man's mind that he has learned to be strong enough to endure the burden of relativism" (p. 264). Furthermore, he says, the critics have "overlooked the fact the new microscopic method which permits the tracing of pregenital and aggressive minutiae, may in the future come to be recognized as having created the prerequisites for a true ethics; that faith may be misled; and that insights derived from the use of psychoanalytic theory are of superior effectiveness precisely because of the enlargement of responsibility that they necessitate" (p. 263). Eissler stresses Freud's position with regard to the future of religion. "The idea that religion is replaceable and should be replaced, and the intimation that what will replace it will be of a higher order than the original and therefore to be preferred (even though religion is adequate for whoever cannot do better) - all this adds up to a statement that is fundamentally in keeping with Freud's basic views" (p. 282). And in a comment very reminiscent of Freud he says he is convinced that most scientists, and consequentlyly most analysts, if they were completely honest, would acknowledge lack of faith in God. He appears to suspect that even many priests and ministers, ".are not really true believers, but practice their profession for purely ethical reasons" (p. 413).

Reuben Fine (1977) in similar vein maintains that: "In the course of time, the vast majority of analysts have rejected....all the religions and all previous philosophies. Such rejection has been neither arbitrary, nor unjustified as the history of psychoanalysis shows" (p. 44). And he goes on to make the amazing statement that: "No prominent analyst today could be said to believe that religion has any real value for mankind" (1979, p. 440). It is thus clear that in the dispute between psychoanalysis and Catholicism, exaggerations and generalizations were not confined to Catholic authors alone.

In spite of the many predictions of its demise, however, religion remains very much alive and some analysts (though none Freudian) have expressed greater interest in working toward some kind of synthesis. Three articles appearing in the *American Journal of Psychoanalysis* (1970) illustrate this trend. Apolito sees a more tolerant attitude developing between psychoanalysis and religion, spurred on mainly by changes in religion for which, he says, psychoanalysis should take some credit. Noting that psychoanalysis is often seen as dangerous to religious belief, he expresses the conviction that this fear is unfounded. He presents case histories to describe how religious issues can become entwined with psychopathology and he stresses that, even though analysts by and large fail to tackle religious issues because of the difficulties they present, a careful analysis is essential so as to sort out the threads of pathology enmeshed in the religious belief. In the end he repeats the standard psychoanalytic position that the analyst needs to be aware of his own attitudes and unresolved religious conflicts if he is to be able to deal effectively with religious issues in the treatment. Rubins, in a complementary article, describes how religion may influence a patient's

character development and how the patient may use religion as resistance to treatment. He presents case histories to illustrate how successful analysis lead to the emergence of the patient's true attitudes toward his beliefs. In contrast to Fine, he says: "I do not think that analysts generally are, or need to be, atheistic or agnostic..... I feel there is no reason why an analyst could not be devoutly religious and there are many such excellent ones, provided that he is aware of his religious beliefs and attitudes and that he has reasonably resolved any emotional conflicts connected with them" (p. 133).

Finally, Abraham Franzblau, in a discussion of Apolito's paper argues, like Zilboorg, that Freud's condemnation of religion was not universally valid since he was familiar only with "the narrow orthodoxies of his environment" (p. 124).

The positions presented by Apolito, Franzblau and Rubins are hardly reflective of the psychoanalytic community in general. In fact, the role that Rubins assigns to the analyst appears to come uncomfortably close to that of a spiritual director.

#### Summary:

A review of these psychoanalytic authors highlights some of the conflicts between Catholicism and psychoanalysis. There can be little doubt that many of them, particularly those in the classical psychoanalytic tradition, view the Church with as much skepticism and mistrust as the Church views psychoanalysis. They express cynicism as regards the possibility of a reconciliation between the two. Their repeated concern is that the search for truth will be shackled by the dogmas of Catholicism. They reject the attempts to create harmony between the two systems by discarding aspects of Freud's writings which

are at variance with Catholic teaching. Many maintain that even though atheism is not an official position of psychoanalysis, most analysts are, in fact, athiests.

In general, a majority of the authors reviewed see religion as useful for some who are not mature enough to live without it, but that it is on the decline and that eventually the world will be a better place without it. A minority express the desire for some sort of reconciliation between psychoanalysis and religion.

## Footnotes

1

These articles were published ten years earlier in French. It may be that psychoanalysis received a more favorable reception earlier in the Catholic Church in France than in the Church in English speaking countries. It is significant, however, that the articles appeared in English after the Pope's allocutions.

2

Even though Nuttin's book was first published in English in 1953, Snoeck was familiar with his arguments, perhaps in the original French.

3

This document appears only in the original latin. The translation was done by the author.

4

It is extremely interesting to note that those Churchmen who oppose the "new" approach to morality use the very same argument to support the need for a legalistic approach, namely that because of man's "fallen" condition, strict laws are necessary.

## CHAPTER III

## CONFRONTATION, SYNTHESIS OR STAND-OFF?

## Part 1. Summary of the Conflict between Freudian Psychoanalysis and Roman Catholic Morality

In the first chapter I presented arguments in support of the position that Freudian psychoanalysis has an impact on morality and that there are moral orientations implicit in the system's theory and practice. I identified these trends, described by many authors, as naturalism, rationalism, humanism and individualism.

In the second chapter, I reviewed the objections raised by Catholic authors to aspects of Freudian psychoanalysis and discussed their views of its impact on Catholic morality. These authors expressed concern about the atheism, materialism, determinism, pansexualism, subjectivism and relativism in psychoanalysis.

Even though the issues identified in Chapter I are not identical with those in Chapter II, it is immediately obvious that there is a high degree of correlation between them. They are, in fact, very similar issues, couched in different terms and presented from the standpoint of different world views. Thus, when Catholic authors speak of "materialism" and "atheism" in psychoanalysis, as far as the impact on morality is concerned, they are referring to practically the same issues discussed as the "naturalistic" "rationalistic" and "humanistic" orientations in psychoanalysis. Similarly, what is discussed as the "individualistic" orientation in psychoanalysis in Chapter I addresses the same basic issues that Catholic authors describe as "subjectivism" and "relativism". The Catholic authors who object to "pansexualism"

in psychoanalysis raise a number of issues as regards the practical applications of morality, highlighting what they see as the conflict between the position on sexual morality deriving from psychoanalysis and from the Christian position. I have decided not to pursue the discussion of the "determinism" in Freud's theory, in this study, partly because of the highly abstract nature of the debate involved and partly because this issue is not dealt with in recent literature.

We can now summarize the conflict between the moral orientation implicit in psychoanalysis and traditional Catholic morality, situating the conflict in the context of Catholic moral theology.

#### 1. Materialism vs. Supernaturalism

An excellent summary of one aspect of Catholic moral teaching is provided by Vanderveldt in his book which, as already noted, received the approval of the Catholic hierarchy as being free from doctrinal error. He says: "The Catholic moral system presupposes, as a basic condition, the existence of a personal God who created the world and rules it with infinite intelligence. This ruling is called the eternal law - the plan, exemplar and source of all law. God is the supreme lawgiver with regard to not only physical but also moral events; in other words, God has established not only a physical but also a moral order. This means that God has laid down a set of rules that form the standard by which a person's actions must be judged either morally right or wrong. God did not formulate these norms arbitrarily....they are the expression of God's eternal, infinite reason and therefore irrevocable and eternal. This ruling, as it exists in God's mind, is the objective norm of morality" (p. 16).

Vanderveldt goes on to explain how God's law can be known by man. "Granted that God from eternity has established the standard according to which rational beings should in time regulate their moral conduct, one naturally asks how he made the moral norms known to mankind. God promulgated this law by creating man after His own Image i.e. by giving man a rational nature. Because man is a creature endowed with reason, he participates in a finite analogical fashion in the divine reason. This participation enables the human mind to arrive at essentially the same ideas concerning good and evil as those which the divine mind expresses in the eternal law - with the proviso, however, that the human mind is not led astray by adverse influences..... God's eternal law as made known to man through his nature as a rational being is called the natural law.....(The) aptitude to recognize through experience the dictates of the moral order is the basis of human conscience..... Despite his rational nature man has proved himself capable of forming an erroneous conscience" (p. 17).

Vanderveldt goes on to explain that because of constitutional and environmental factors, variations and distortions of the natural law arose. He says that: "God therefore revealed his will by positive revelation. This revealed law is called the positive divine law. It comprises both a renewal and a supplement of the natural law.

"....He renewed and supplemented the positive divine law later in history once as the old law through Moses and once as the new law through Christ" (p. 18).

The following points in this outline need to be highlighted. There is a moral order containing moral norms for man's conduct which is derived from the very nature of man, that is, not arbitrarily commanded

by God. This order is called, in Catholic theology, the "natural law". Following Scholastic philosophy, it is argued that man's nature is fixed and immutable and that the moral norms deriving from his nature are consequently objective and absolute. According to Catholic teaching, each individual should be able to come to a knowledge of these immutable moral norms by the use of his reason alone<sup>1</sup>, but because of his "Fall" from grace due to the "original sin" of his first parents, his reason cannot be trusted to ascertain God's law accurately and he needs the help of special revelation. Only through revelation can the law be known with certainty and without error. There is a clear statement by Pope Pius XII to this effect. He says that in the acquisition of truth, "...the human mind is hampered not only by the impulses of the senses and the imagination but also by evil passions stemming from original sin. As a result, men readily persuade themselves....that what they do not wish to be true is false or at least doubtful.

"It is for this reason that divine revelation must be called morally necessary, so that those religious and moral truths which are not of their nature beyond the reach of reason may, in the present condition of the human race, be known with ease, with unswerving certitude and without any admixture of error" (*Humani Generis*, p. 35).

It is apparent that this religious approach runs into conflict with the naturalistic, rationalistic and humanistic orientations in psychoanalysis. The psychoanalytic approach as previously noted, leans in favor of a morality derived, not from religious faith, but from a better understanding of the human personality. It would seem from a theoretical point of view that the findings of psychoanalysis would not be in conflict with Catholic teaching since both are

supposedly derived from the "nature" of man. We have already noted that this is a classical Roman Catholic position. A problem does arise, however, in the practical realm since the moral implications deriving from psychoanalysis are by no means identical with Catholic morality. Furthermore, the Church claims that when conflict exists, revelation, as defined by the Church, is the final arbiter of the dispute, while psychoanalysis insists on the integrity of scientific research.

Also, there is no agreement on the "nature" of man from which moral values are supposedly derived. Catholic doctrine, based on Scholastic philosophy, favors a static view of human nature, while the scientific approach, favored by psychoanalysis, posits greater fluidity and change. This conflict was described by Pius XII as the difference between a morality based on "homo ut sic", man as he is, and "homo ut hic", man in the here and now. One practical implication of this difference in approach is that the Catholic Church teaches that morality is absolute and objective, while psychoanalysis sees morality as more subjective and relative. While it is true that modern Catholicism has relaxed its firm, objective moral position and many psychoanalysts argue for the need for at least some general guidelines, the difference in approach and orientation cannot be ignored, and, in fact, no satisfactory resolution of this conflict has been achieved. Thus, Weiss (1952) says: "Moral absoluteness is incompatible with constructive psychoanalytic therapy" (p. 45).

Conflict between the materialistic and the supernaturalistic approach to moral values is also evident on the issue of man's welfare. Although both systems are in agreement that man's welfare constitutes the basis for moral values, they disagree when it comes to a definition of what constitutes man's welfare. The Church's teaching of a spiritual

dimension to life and a life beyond death leads to the proposition that man's spiritual welfare takes precedence over his temporal welfare. Within this world-view, moral values are intended primarily to promote man's spiritual good. The materialistic approach of psychoanalysis, on the other hand, sees moral values as intended only to further man's life here on earth. In fact, many analysts, including Freud, argue that the search for meaningful values by which man can live on earth is impeded by the belief in the supernatural.

Some analysts also object to the religious teaching which attaches rewards and sanctions after death to the practice of moral values. According to the Freudian position, if the individual can reject these illusions of an after-life, he will be able to develop a much more mature moral system.

## 2. Conflicts in the Realm of Practical Morality

### a. Man's Instinctual Life

Earlier in this chapter I discussed the aspect of Catholic teaching which deals with the basis of morality and how moral values can be known. There is another aspect which deals with man's ability to comply with these norms. According to Catholic teaching as a result of the transgression of his first parents, not only is man's intellect "clouded" so that he needs God's help in finding the truth but his will is also impaired. His "passions" no longer acquiesce to rational control. He is "inclined to evil". On the one hand, he cannot live up to moral norms on the strength of his will alone. He needs the help of God's "grace".<sup>2</sup> On the other hand, he is constantly exposed to temptation and needs to be on his guard not to give in to it. He is encouraged to strengthen

his will by penance and mortification, and also to avoid situations of temptation both in thought and action. To relax one's control, or to put oneself in a situation of temptation is viewed, from this moral perspective, as reprehensible. This position is especially stressed with regard to sins in the areas of sexuality and aggression. Not only is the forbidden act sinful, but even the thoughts, feelings and fantasies which precede, accompany or follow it, if they are "indulged in".

The conflict between Freudian psychoanalysis and Christian morality on the issue of sexuality is notorious. I have already discussed some of the misrepresentations of psychoanalysis which have exacerbated the conflict. I will now attempt to evaluate, in a more accurate manner, the real conflict which exists.

It is not fortuitous that Freud based his theory of psychopathology on the issue of sexuality, which is, for Roman Catholics, an issue of central pre-occupation. It has been noted that he was convinced that the stringent sexual morality enforced by the Christian Churches, is detrimental to healthy functioning. And, even though the accusation of libertinism is not justified, Freudian psychoanalysis surely advocated a relaxing of these rigid norms. Freudian psychoanalysis and Christianity, it is true, have very similar goals as far as the instincts are concerned, namely the controlling or re-channeling of unacceptable sexual drives. The difference between the systems lies in A) what is considered unacceptable sexual behavior and B) what are considered effective means of controlling unacceptable behavior.

A) Even though Freud stated that he endorsed a freer approach to sexual expression than the norms of his day allowed, when one reads his writings, one is struck by the basically traditional position which

he took, especially as compared to modern standards. Thus Cole says: "Freud saw man as a totality, with sex as one part, perhaps the most important part of his nature. He proclaimed that sex was natural, that procreation was secondary to pleasure and he cautioned society against too severe restrictions on sexual instincts. But Freud was still a Victorian.....he was a rationalist who approved of the stern conscience, who sought to bring the irrational, primitive side of human nature under the disciplined control of reason" (p. 235).

He stressed that a genital sexuality is the norm and considered deviations from it in action and fantasy as psychopathological. The question has thus been raised that even if Freudian psychoanalysis may have been considered revolutionary in Freud's day, would it not be considered conservative by today's standards. A full exploration of this issue is beyond the scope of this paper but later in this chapter I will discuss some changes that have taken place in the profession of psychoanalysis, through the process of institutionalization, which some argue, have served to lessen the conflict with Christianity.

Nevertheless, since the traditional Catholic position on sexual morality has not been significantly modified, it remains in basic conflict with Freudian psychoanalysis both in its original and in its present-day manifestations.

Cole (1955) reviews Catholic teaching on sexuality, noting the highlights of this position. He says, "...the Bible, Augustine, Thomas Aquinas and the two papal encyclicals ...are the essential documents... and they reveal a harmony of outlook. The doctrine indeed develops but does not change. The authority of the Church is supreme. What Rome teaches about sex and marriage is binding on all men everywhere and what she teaches is that the only justification for sex of any kind, even of

thought, is marriage which is monogamous and lifelong. The primary purpose of sex is procreation. A secondary end is recognized in pleasure, which may be sought at the cost only of venial sin so long as it is pursued in such a way that the primary aim is not thwarted" (p. 141). A study on human sexuality commissioned by the Catholic Theological Society of America in 1972 came to essentially the same conclusion.<sup>4</sup> They report that: "Research into the origins of Christian attitudes toward sexuality tends to identify St. Augustine as the thinker whose teaching has largely prevailed into our own times" (p. 36). They continue: "Although sexuality of itself was recognized as good because of its creative function, the pleasure attached to sex was viewed as a consequence of original sin. The experience of sexual pleasure, therefore, even indeliberate, and even within marriage for the purpose of procreation was regarded somehow as tainted with sin" (p. 37).

Conflict between psychoanalysis and traditional Catholic morality on the issue of sexuality arises firstly because the approach of the analyst will tend to be more permissive than that of the religionist. The analyst will allow greater autonomy to the patient in making his decisions as regards the moral norms which he wishes to adopt. In the approach of the analyst there will be a diminished emphasis on universally binding objective norms. There is also conflict as to the meaning of specific forms of sexual behavior. Snoeck (1952) has accurately pointed out that there would be no conflict if behavior which is regarded by the Church as immoral, is viewed by psychoanalysis as abnormal. Church and psychoanalysis would thus be allied in efforts to eradicate these forms of behavior. This, however, is often not the

case. There are many areas where the rigidity of the Church's teaching would hardly be acceptable to the average analyst. Masturbation, premarital sexual relations and the use of contraceptives are obvious examples. Bieber (1972) argues that psychoanalysis has the responsibility to research aspects of sexual behavior as to their functional or dysfunctional effects on the individual. He says: "Psychoanalysis has evolved in a historical era during which a sexual revolution has been in progress, a change that has radically altered sexual moral values. The revolution is not yet over. New guidelines remain to be established and society looks to psychoanalysis for help in formulating a rationally based sexual ethic. There are many questions that need to be answered, such as, what is the psychoanalytic view on the subject of premarital and extramarital sexual relations and on what bases do such views rest? We must look to systematic methodologies for the gathering of reliable data on which to base moral precepts" (p. 248). He even suggests tentative conclusions from his own experience as a practising analyst. "I have found that young married people, under the age of 35, who had not engaged in premarital intercourse, tend much more to often suffer from neurotic difficulties than those who had premarital intercourse. I have also found that individuals of either sex who have had the advantage of higher education and are still virginal at the age of 22 or 23 are also more likely to have neurotic problems than are educated young people who have started intercourse by their early twenties. Thus, those who are unable to avail themselves of the advantages of a more liberal sexual ethic, for whatever reason, are more likely to have psychiatric problems" (p. 248).

Bieber's conclusions are not necessarily representative of the

views either of psychoanalysis or of a majority of psychoanalysts, but they highlight the fact that conclusions deriving from psychoanalytic research may run counter to traditional moral norms. Furthermore, it cannot be too greatly stressed that his very approach to the derivations of moral norms, through scientific investigation, is completely rejected by the Catholic Church which prefers to stress the handing down of moral norms under the guide of God's revelation.

B) From the Catholic point of view, the way to achieve instinctual control is by the careful avoidance of forbidden fantasies and the feelings associated with them, and by the purposeful renunciation of legitimate sexual pleasure. Psychoanalysis, on the other hand, encourages a full exploration of feelings and fantasies and the full enjoyment of legitimate pleasure. We have noted the many Catholic authors, including Pope Pius XII, who have addressed this issue. Not only do they acknowledge a difference of approach to the problem, but they even argue that aspects of the psychoanalytic approach, by permitting the indulgence in forbidden sexual fantasies and feelings, may be immoral in themselves and present the danger of sexual acting out. It may be possible to research scientifically the ways in which the exploration of feelings and fantasies might offer greater or lesser likelihood of eventual acting out. This would help clarify one aspect of the dispute. But the question of imputation of moral culpability to the process can only be decided within a moral framework. There has, so far, been no satisfactory resolution of this issue.

One non-Freudian analyst, Herbert Fingarette (1963), has addressed the issue directly and argues that the traditional moral view of imputing guilt to the evil wish is compatible with the psychoanalytic

approach. He says that, "...morally speaking, wishes count as acts so far as guilt is concerned" (p. 148), and that, "...from the psychoanalytic standpoint, the guilt associated with an evil wish is an important element tending to prevent the realization of that wish.... This is congruent with the (Christian) moral view that it is no moral excuse to have wished but not acted" (p. 150). Even though Fingarette quotes Freud in support of his position, he acknowledges that his view differs from that of the majority of analysts.

The difference of approach, between psychoanalysis and Catholicism, to dealing with instinctual control, applies as well to the aggressive instinct. Psychoanalysis stresses the value of awareness, exploration and constructive expression of aggressive feelings. The Catholic Church views this approach with suspicion. The Church is especially concerned about the exploration of angry, hostile feelings towards parents which is considered by analysts as a basic requirement of treatment. Says Frenkel-Brunswik (1954): "Most pre-psychoanalytic ethical systems assume that socialized behavior is largely dependent upon such inhibitory devices as the looking away from evil, or its denial, or the mastery of its most blatant overt manifestations through strength of will. From psychoanalysis we have learned about the inefficiency and dangers of these various forms of repression..." (p. 334). Flugel (1945) makes an almost identical comment: He says; "It is clear that there is a certain opposition also between the psychoanalytic method with its attempt to face and express (at least in words) all aspects of our nature, and these other methods which adopt the attitude of "Get thee behind me, Satan", which stress the supreme importance of moral control and which urge us to avoid all thoughts and temptations which might put this control in jeopardy" (p. 29).

## Part II. Man's Relationship with his Fellow Man

In the first chapter I discussed the individualistic orientation in psychoanalysis which lays stress on the individual and his needs and encourages autonomy, self expression and assertiveness. It was pointed out that some authors (e.g., Vitz, 1977) have even accused certain forms of psychotherapy (though not specifically psychoanalysis) with promoting "selfism". Campbell (1975) makes the sweeping statement that: "Psychology and psychiatry...not only describe man as selfishly motivated, but implicitly or explicitly teach that he ought to be so. They tend to see repression and inhibition of individual impulses as undesirable, and see all guilt as a dysfunctional neurotic blight created by cruel child-rearing and a needlessly repressive society. They further recommend that we accept our biological and psychological impulses as good and seek pleasure rather than enchain ourselves with duty" (p. 1104). Even though Campbell overstates the position of psychology and psychiatry and in so doing over-dramatizes their conflict with traditional morality, it seems undeniable that the individualistic orientation in psychoanalysis is contrary to viewpoints which lay greater stress on the individual's responsibility to his fellow-man, and on the welfare of society as a whole. There is clearly a very strong trend in Christian teaching which lays stress on submissiveness, humility, self-renunciation and altruism. Thus Storr (1960) comments that from the Christian point of view it is the less assertive person who receives commendation. He says: "To be compliant, to abrogate one's own wishes and to fit in with the desires of others even at one's own expense - how admirable, how unselfish, how "Christian"! It is difficult for those who have been raised in the odour of sanctity to

perceive that an undue submissiveness is as culpable as an undue assertiveness.." (p. 33). Guntrip (1957) who is familiar with both Christian teaching and psychoanalysis says: "One of the points at which our traditional moral values need to be corrected is the one-sidedness of self-denying and self-abnegating ideals...Psychoanalysis has enabled us to see the extreme danger of this denial of all rights to self" (p. 182).

It is very striking that in the midst of this debate, Catholic authors, as our review in the previous chapter shows, do not pay much attention to this issue. In fact, we have noted the enigmatic comment by Pius XII in which, responding to some perceived psychological position which maintains that concern for the self is a sign of regression, he argues that love of self is the basis for love of neighbor. Since it is not clear exactly what the Pope is referring to, the relevance of this comment for the present debate remains uncertain except insofar as it very clearly affirms that love of self is an important aspect of Christian teaching. However, the relative silence of Catholic authors on the issue is highly intriguing. In general, these authors do complain about what they see as the encouragement given by psychoanalysis to a freer satisfaction of instinctual needs, but they do not focus on the obvious connection noted by Campbell that an over-concern for self-gratification will have the effect of lessening man's concern for his neighbor. One reason for this may be the Catholic Church's notorious over-emphasis on issues of self-indulgence in instinctual gratification to the detriment of other perhaps more important issues such as man's relationship with his neighbor. Whatever the explanation, it seems reasonable to conclude that even though the level of conflict

between psychoanalysis and Catholic teaching on this issue has not been clearly articulated in the literature, some conflict does seem to exist and needs to be more accurately defined.

#### Towards a Resolution of the Conflict

There are different evaluations as to the source, and of the seriousness of the conflict between psychoanalysis and Catholic morality, and as a result, different types of suggestions for a resolution of the conflict have been offered.

The first major approach, offered by Catholic and psychoanalytic authors alike, denies that any real conflict exists and argues that any apparent conflict is due to a misrepresentation by one side, of the other's position. Authors on both sides argue that psychoanalysis, as a scientific enterprise, is in a domain distinct from religion and morality and that there need be no conflict between them as long as each maintain its legitimate boundaries. Psychoanalysts accuse religionists of misrepresenting and misunderstanding their position. Two authors, we have seen, even describe the long-standing conflict as a "historical accident", deriving from the initial over-reaction of Christianity to Freud's writings. Religionists, on the other hand, accuse psychoanalysts, and Freud in particular, with presenting a distorted view of religion. They further argue that some conflicts between psychoanalysis and religion arise because psychoanalysis has exceeded its boundaries and makes assertions in areas outside its jurisdiction. I have consistently argued, throughout this paper, that even though there have been exaggerations and misrepresentations on both sides, many issues of real conflict do, in fact, exist.

Some Catholics adopt the doctrinal position that there can be no real conflict between the two systems because the findings of science cannot possibly contradict revealed teaching since God is the author of the universe and its laws as well as of revelation and He cannot contradict Himself. Any apparent conflict is thus considered to be due either to a misinterpretation of the scientific discoveries or, less usually, to an incomplete (but never incorrect) representation by the Church of Divine Revelation. The approach of these authors to reconciliation with psychoanalysis is simply to identify those aspects of its theory and practice which are in conflict with Catholic teaching and consequently, in their view, erroneous. All that is then needed for reconciliation is that psychoanalysis acknowledge its error and make the necessary adjustments in its teaching.

It is obvious that this is hardly an adequate basis for reconciliation. It is undoubtedly true that much scientific research has eventually made an impact on Catholic teaching in spite of the Church's a priori position that it already possesses the truth. However, as Eissler (1965) has pointed out, modifications are grudgingly made, and on some issues, for example, the birth control issue, the official Church steadfastly refused to alter its position in spite of weighty evidence against it. Constant conflict with the scientific enterprise thus seems inevitable.

A variant to the approach of seeking reconciliation through a minimizing of the conflict lies in the argument that since Freud's day both the Catholic Church and psychoanalysis have undergone such profound changes that even if, in fact, there were conflicts in the early days of psychoanalysis, these no longer are relevant. Proponents of this

view point to the number of clergymen and religious who have embraced psychoanalysis. Also, they might note, recent literature does not reflect any ongoing conflict. This view needs to be appraised in some detail.

It is not possible to chronicle, in any depth, the tremendous changes which the Catholic Church has undergone in the recent decades since the Second Vatican Council, but a brief synopsis is necessary since some of the changes in the Church's policy and structure have had an impact on its relationship with psychoanalysis.

The theme of the Council was "aggiornamento", bringing the Church up to date, and very great emphasis was placed on establishing a dialogue with the modern world and, in particular, with other institutions interested in man's welfare. This gave impetus to the Ecumenical movement which worked toward dialogue with other religions and to the more general effort at dialogue with men of science. Moving away from its polemical position, which was a reaction to the perceived threat from other religious and from the "world", the Church began a search for its true identity and turned to its biblical foundation, rather than to the decrees of Councils and papal statements, in an attempt to clarify its teaching and make it more relevant to modern times. In the realm of morality, there was a movement away from the legalistic approach and greater emphasis placed on the central importance of love. We have noted Ple's comment in this regard. According to this view, true morality consists, not in obedience to an established set of precepts, but rather in the growth towards making oneself a more loving person. Views on morality were also affected by the gradual change among some theologians from a theology based on scholastic philosophy which

embodies the concept of a body-soul dualism and a static "natural law", to one more in tune with existential philosophy which takes into greater consideration the life-situation in which the individual finds himself.

There were also structural changes in the Church's organization. Attempts were made to move away from the centralized authority of the Pope and his advisors in Rome, to allowing greater autonomy to bishops in the management of their individual "churches". This encouraged (and perhaps, also derived from) an acknowledgment of the diversity of mankind, with the result that the inflexible dogmatic approach was attenuated. Church members felt themselves free to search for truth and meaning in their own lives rather than simply accept a few dogmatic postulates.

It is very important to re-iterate that all these "changes" were orientations within the Church, which received support from a significant number of theologians and churchmen, but never succeeded in replacing, or achieving equal prominence with, the older traditional teaching which continues to be maintained by the official Church hierarchy. Divergent views, it is true, are somewhat more tolerated and even partially integrated into the Church but the traditional teaching remains firm. In fact, since the end of the Vatican Council, Pope Paul VI and more recently his successor John Paul II, have been making systematic efforts to re-affirm the traditional teachings of the Church. There has been a developing reaction against what is seen as excessive laxity and departure from orthodoxy, and a call for a return to traditional doctrine. In the introduction to this paper, comments by the present Pope were noted.

It is not possible, at this stage, to fully assess the impact of

changes in the Catholic Church on its relationship with psychoanalysis. Psychoanalyst Apolito's (1970) comment seems accurate: "The rigidity of the established Church which until recently claimed jurisdiction over much of man's thinking and behavior is gone. Hostility and suspiciousness towards psychoanalysis which were particularly strong within the Catholic Church have decreased considerably. Not only has the Church become more interested in learning about psychoanalysis but many clergymen and formally religious people have turned toward psychoanalysis for personal help, for enlightenment of emotional problems which had previously been regarded as sins, and finally for a psychological framework from which to understand personality patterns and functions previously understood and explained on the basis of religious tenets" (p. 115). Perhaps the major impact has been the changes in the Church's attitude which now permits Catholics and even clergymen to avail themselves of psychoanalytic treatment and training without stricture. One would suspect that those Catholics who choose to embrace psychoanalysis, probably hold more liberal views as regards Church teaching since these are more compatible with psychoanalysis. It is even possible, as Apolito argues, that some of the more progressive trends on moral issues may be due, in part, to psychoanalytic research. There has, in fact, been some movement towards a greater acceptance by the Church of the results of psychological research. Thus, a diagnosis of mental illness now often replaces what was once described as diabolical possession. Similarly, alcoholism is less regarded as a form of moral depravity and is recognized as an addiction.

The Church's approach to dealing with novel scientific theories or discoveries is to adopt a "wait and see" attitude. Initially, there is vigorous resistance if the theory or discovery appears to conflict with traditional teaching. As the discovery gains wider acceptance

the resistance declines and there is a gradual integration into the Church's teaching. The impact of Darwin's theory of evolution on the Church's interpretation of the biblical stories of creation is a prime example. It may well be that as psychoanalytic theories and discoveries gain more general acceptance they will be more fully integrated into the Church's teaching.

While psychoanalytic authors such as Eissler (1960) see the Church's attitude as a hindrance to scientific progress, churchmen make the valid response that many psychological theories do not yet have the support of solid scientific evidence. We have noted Campbell's (1975) comment of the tendency among some psychologists to confuse theory with fact and to fail to recognize that up to the present time many psychological assumptions remain unproven. The search for truth can thus be advanced not only by the Church's attenuation of its inflexible dogmatism, but also by a more rigorously scientific approach among psychologists.

Certain developments in psychoanalysis have also helped diminish its conflict with the Church. Some of these developments are considered to lie outside the mainstream of orthodox psychoanalysis and thus will not be reviewed in this study. We have, for example, already noted the development of what has been derogatively described by orthodox analysts as the "neo-Fruedian" or "culturalist" school. Since they reject, or significantly modify, Freud's instinct theory, their position is perceived by some religious authors as being more compatible with Christianity. We have also already noted that the development of ego psychology in mainstream psychoanalysis has also permitted greater focus to be placed on the importance of moral values in healthy human functioning. Orthodox Freudianism, however, has also undergone other significant

changes, one aspect of which is described by Vardy (1973) and is of relevance to our inquiry. Vardy argues that psychoanalysis has developed from a radical underground minority in Europe to a privileged establishment institution in the United States. He suggests that in the process of becoming institutionalized, psychoanalysis has lost some of its ideals. Interestingly enough, he compares this process to what happened to Christianity. Describing the fate of psychoanalysis as "petrification due to institutionalization", he says: "This fate psychoanalysis has shared with many originally radical ideologies; when during their rise from minority and underground status to respectability, wealth and power, much of the original ideals were lost or corrupted. The same fate befell the Christian ideals of brotherhood in the institutions of the Church.

"The liberation from within and self-perfection have been the important ideals of psychoanalysis..... What psychoanalysis does need badly, to be saved from the dangers of its popular success, of its complacency, is a revival of some of its original ideals" (p. 51). Other authors, in similar vein, contend that psychoanalysis has strayed from its original ideals and they view the apparent "reconciliation" with religion as a regressive sign. These authors present the second major position with regard to the conflict between Freudian psychoanalysis and Catholicism—a position articulated by representatives on both sides of the issue - that the conflict between the two systems is real and deep and that there is little hope of genuine reconciliation between them. We have already discussed the views of Catholics such as Allers, Sheen and Gemelli, and psychoanalysts such as Eissler, Day and Shakow who share this position. Says Shakow (1965): "It is indeed difficult to understand how orthodox religion and Freudian notions can

be reconciled unless one possesses the ability to reconcile irreconcilables or to retain a religious structure while rejecting some of its more intrinsic qualities" (p. 338).

Jacob Taubes (1956), in a contribution to a Freud Centenary Memorial collection of essays, comments on the apparent reconciliation which has taken place. He says: "Freud had committed psychoanalytic theory to the premises of atheism..... (He) took the end of religion for granted and dared to prophesy that the abandoning of religion will have to take place with fateful inexorability of growth and that we are just now in the middle of this phase of the development. It must make us suspicious that within two decades of Freud's death psychoanalysis and religion now exhibit such marked signs of friendship" (p. 136). He goes on: "A revolutionary doctrine such as psychoanalysis could make its way into the general public only against the powerful resistance of current ideologies and established institutions. The resistance to the psychoanalytic method should not surprise the historian. What should astonish us is the rapid success which the analytic method achieved in recent decades. Did the resistance against psychoanalysis break down before the success of the therapeutic method or did the theory and practice of analysis undergo a change? Did psychoanalysis adapt its theories to the established ideologies? Did the post-Freudian development of psychoanalytic theory obscure its critical implications for the life of society? Does it now serve to reinforce our existing institutions?" (p. 135). Taubes poses some extremely challenging questions but does not answer them. It is obvious that these questions do not admit of easy answers. He proceeds to argue, though, that one of the reasons for the reconciliation has been the "collapse of socialist Messianism" in the West. He claims that theologians have embraced psychoanalysis

because they find in it "a secular version of the doctrine of original sin that helps to undercut the claims of Marxist chiliasm" (p. 137). Nevertheless, he argues, those religionists who embrace psychoanalysis, do so at the expense of genuine religious belief because there is a fundamental difference between the two systems as regards their position on original guilt. Whereas religion teaches the possibility of salvation through an atonement of guilt, Freud's position is that "guilt cannot be overcome but only acknowledged" (p. 138). In fact, Taubes continues, given the fundamental difference between the two, "the success of Freud's psychoanalysis thus indicates to the historian, if such indications were still necessary, that the West has entered into a post-Christian era" (p.142).

Rief (1966), sees the situation in a very similar manner. Rieff's complex analysis of the situation, previously noted, is worth repeating. His basic premise is that there have been two competing traditional theories as regards the individual's well-being. One theory stresses the individual's need for participation in a community. The other view stresses that he must learn to free himself from binding attachments to communal purposes so that he might more fully express his individuality. Rieff argues that: "A third view entered at this point: that there is no positive community now within which the individual can merge himself therapeutically. Freud adheres to the third view" (p. 71). He explains that: "The older therapeutic efforts can be ordered, as suggested, under "therapies of commitment". Such therapies of commitment were characteristic of positive communities. By positive communities are meant those that offer some sort of salvation to the individual through participant membership" (p. 71). Thus, religion offered salvation through participation in a salvific community. Freud, on the other hand,

say Rieff, rejects the notion of salvation and argues that the most man can do is to accept his sorry condition. Rieff maintains that:

"Religious man was born to be saved: psychological man is born to be pleased. The difference was established long ago when "I believe", the cry of the ascetic lost precedence to "one feels", the caveat of the therapeutic" (p. 25). He suggests that the recent "reconciliation" between religion and psychoanalysis may be due to the fact that both sides are losing sight of their ideals. He says that Freud is now being embraced by some religions because "in this way, with apparent safety, they can express now the unconscious ambivalence of their own religious rhetoric of "commitment". "Lacking confidence in their own inherited stock of insight the religious prefer to avoid argument in a wordy torrent of goodwill. Correlatively, in a weakening grasp of their own subject, psychoanalysts are more and more inclined to treat Freud's irreligion as if it were a personal aberration no more relevant to psychoanalysis than Freud's puritanism or his passion for cigars. Thus do the psychoanalytic and the religious talk merrily past one another making hash of two inherently antagonistic legacies" (p. 92, italics mine).

One Protestant religionist, Sanders (1949), situating the issue in the context of the more general conflict between science and religion makes a similar evaluation: "Now after a long period of controversy the state of affairs existing between the two parties grouped under the respective standards of Science and Religion has settled into an uneasy truce in which both sides would claim victory although neither seems certain in its own mind that the other has been defeated. Scientifically minded Churchmen and religious Scientists do periodically make efforts to reconcile the two adversaries, but unfortunately their work is hampered since the would-be personalities do not seem to realize that

not only has the struggle gone on too long for the opponents to be reconciled by a few carefully chosen words but also that the real disagreement between Religion and Science rests upon a difference of fundamental principles which logical arguments alone cannot resolve. The two parties, perhaps without realizing it, rest their cases upon contrary and irreconcilable presuppositions - Religion upon belief in God and in the complete dependence of man upon him; Science upon belief in Man and in human self-sufficiency. Neither of these beliefs can, it would appear, be absolutely proved or disapproved by rational arguments to the satisfaction of both parties so that it has come about that, while there are many who do not realize the present incompatibility of the two Philosophies, the Scientific and the Religious, the two parties now stand apart, each more or less indifferent to the other's existence but each claiming that its own position is the more rational" (p. 17).

It is clear that a great deal of controversy surrounds the relationship between psychoanalysis and the Catholic religion. It seems undeniable that very many issues remain unresolved. The polemic has died down but no satisfactory synthesis has been achieved. Attempts at resolution by Catholic authors are few and fall far short of what is necessary.<sup>5</sup> A situation of stand-off now seems to exist in which each side acknowledges the right of existence of the other with very little effort at genuine collaboration.

The crucial question remains whether or not the conflict is, in fact, resolvable, or whether the two systems represent two inherently antagonistic world views. At this time, there seems to be no compelling theoretical arguments to answer this question.

In light of this, the number of avowed Christians who have embraced the practice of psychoanalysis raises the interesting question: How do

they reconcile the conflict in their own lives? We have already noted the approach of some Christians who simply reject the postulates of analysis which they find difficult to reconcile with their belief. We have also noted the suggestion by Freud and Eissler that many Christian analysts maintain only superficial ties with Christianity but, in fact, have rejected many of its fundamental teachings. However, there is another approach, treated only briefly in the literature, which is far more intriguing. Two authors on different sides of the dispute describe this attempt at resolution in similar terms. Allers (1940), as we have seen, comments concerning those Christians who are able to reconcile psychoanalysis with their religious belief, that, "their mind is of a kind to put up with contradictions, or perhaps because they are not critical enough to be aware of them" (p. 197). This appears to be essentially similar to what Hartmann (1960) calls a "compartmentalization of codes". This method of dealing with conflict is not unfamiliar. On the one hand, from a dynamic point of view, it is a form of denial in which no attention is paid to issues of conflict. Individuals seem to be able to allow conflicting data to exist side by side in the psyche without any attempt at resolution, by avoiding reflection on the issue. This phenomena is familiar to religionists who have for centuries condemned the "Sunday Christian", the individual whose religious beliefs are circumscribed by specific religious practices which do not penetrate or have an impact on the rest of his life. The same phenomenon is apparent in individuals who profess a thoroughly scientific approach to life while maintaining a pocket of superstitious belief or practice in their life. It is not clear whether this method of dealing with conflict is possible for all individuals, or only for some, as Allers suggests.

Yet one cannot fail to be struck by the fact that, even as the number of prominent, practicing Catholic analysts has increased in recent years, the number of articles and books addressing issues of conflict by these dually-competent professionals has decreased. One would expect that these professionals who maintain ties with two deeply-committing and for a long time antagonistic traditions, would be in the forefront of the effort to arrive at some sort of synthesis. Instead, their writings, on the whole, tend to be of a strictly scientific genre and avoid issues of conflict, which seems to suggest that there is a compartmentalization of their religious belief and their scientific practice.

The results of the present empirical study will help to describe and clarify the nature of the conflict as experienced by some of these subjects as well as their efforts, if any, at arriving at a synthesis.

## Footnotes

1

Roman Catholic theology differs from Protestant theology on this point. The theology of Calvinism, for example, stresses that man's intellect has been so damaged by "original sin" that he cannot know God's law without the help of Revelation.

2

This issue has already been addressed in the previous chapter when discussing "moralism".

3

The "Arcanum" of Pope Leo XIII (1880) and "Casti Connubii" of Pope Pius XI (1930).

4

As a result of its inquiry, this Commission recommended a new approach to Roman Catholic sexual morality which does not weigh so heavily in favor of this traditional bias. It is extremely significant that the report of this Commission was rejected by the Roman Catholic hierarchy.

5

There are more concerted efforts by Protestant authors especially, perhaps, in those Churches which adopt a more flexible attitude towards dogma and morals.

CHAPTER IV  
DESCRIPTIVE DATA

1. Method

The field of psychoanalysis now includes among its practitioners a number of individuals who previously received training in Catholic moral theology, and whose lives had been dedicated both to practicing the moral values inherent in the system as well as to communicating these values to others. One would expect these individuals to have intimate experience of the Catholic version of Christian moral values.

Furthermore, since they have also undergone psychoanalytic psychotherapy and have been trained in the psychoanalytic system, their previously-held Christian values would have been confronted by the values of the psychoanalytic system in the process.

There is no known study of this population who, it would seem, are eminently suited to provide data from their own lives on the complex interaction between Christian values and the psychoanalytic system.

Using the method of semi-structured interviews, a study was undertaken on a group of subjects from this population to clarify whether and how this conflict in values is experienced, and what efforts of synthesis, if any, have been made.

Fine (1977) has noted that even the American Psychoanalytic Association could not agree on a definition of psychoanalysis. And even if such an agreement were in fact, arrived at, there would be no way of verifying whether what a particular analyst does in the privacy of his office meets the necessary requirements of the definition. Therefore, in the actual data-gathering process of this study, no attempt was made

either to ascertain in advance, or subsequently to demonstrate, that the subjects' therapeutic experience qualifies to be depicted as "Freudian psychoanalysis". The subjects chosen will all have experienced what they call psychoanalytic therapy, and their characterization of the orientation of their therapist will be reported. In this context, therefore, the term psychoanalysis has an admittedly broad connotation but remains within definable boundaries.

This broad-based approach was called for because of the dearth of prior research in the area, the complexity of the issues involved, the relatively small number of qualified subjects available and the confidential nature of the therapeutic process, even though it has obvious limitations as regards interpretation and generalization of the results of the inquiry. The results will not be able to provide the necessary evidence to "accept" or "reject" a hypothesis, in the strict sense. Their value will consist mainly in providing descriptive accounts of the kinds of issues discussed, and, insofar as the self-reports highlight some of these issues, they may provide illustrative evidence to support some of the theoretical conclusions arrived at in the paper. Also, it was hoped that the data, since they are of an exploratory nature, might suggest trends and perhaps even offer possible directions for future research.

The design will not permit the teasing out of fine distinctions. No definite conclusions will be able to be drawn about the relative impact of Freudian psychoanalysis as opposed to other forms of therapy or even of other scientific trends in general. As a matter of fact, the results will not be able to distinguish unequivocally between the relative effects of the psychoanalytic system on the subjects' values

as compared to the effect of other experiences in their lives. What we will have, in effect, are self-reports of a number of individuals, some of whom will have described their therapy as specifically Freudian, others not; some of whom may describe what they experience to have been the effect of the psychoanalytic system, while others may not be sure.

### Pilot Interviews

Three subjects with characteristics roughly similar to those of the subjects proposed for the study, were interviewed with a preliminary draft of a schedule of questions. The preliminary draft contained 36 questions (Schedule A).

Pilot Subject 1 was a former Roman Catholic priest who has received subsequent training in the social sciences but who has not had psychoanalytic psychotherapy. It was felt that he would be able to articulate the moral values in the Roman Catholic Church and thus provide a comparison with other pilot subjects.

Pilot Subject 2 received training in moral values in a Roman Catholic High School and College but never in a seminary. He has had three years of psychoanalytic psychotherapy and is presently enrolled (3rd year student) in a psychoanalytically-oriented doctoral program in clinical psychology.

Pilot Subject 3 had five years training, including courses in moral theology, in a Roman Catholic monastery, has had three years of psychoanalytic psychotherapy and is presently enrolled (1st year student) in a psychoanalytically-oriented doctoral program in clinical psychology.

In general, the schedule of questions used during the interview was found to be satisfactory for obtaining the required data. A number

of the original questions, however, which had been designed as follow-up questions to explore specific issues, were found to be redundant as subjects dealt spontaneously with the relevant issues when asked one or two general questions. A shortened version of the questionnaire was thus used in future interviews. The average length of time for the interview was between an hour and an hour and a half.

It is noteworthy that even though subject 2 did not have prior seminary training, his experience of traditional moral values as taught to him in his family and in Roman Catholic schools was essentially similar to that of both other subjects, and the impact of the psychoanalytic system on his moral values raised issues practically identical to those reported by subject 3. This strongly suggested that, if necessary, the pool of subjects need not be restricted to those who have had previous seminary training but might be expanded to include others who have had significant indoctrination in the Roman Catholic system of moral values.

The data obtained from the interviews of subjects #2 and #3 supported all the general hypotheses which were presented in the theoretical exposition of the conflict between traditional Roman Catholic values and the psychoanalytic system. All subjects readily acknowledged familiarity with the traditional Roman Catholic morality and described it in similar terms. They stressed its dogmatic stance and its preoccupation with law rather than individual well-being. Subjects #2 and #3 acknowledged the impact of psychoanalysis on their moral values and immediately identified the issues of sex and aggression as having been significantly affected. They also felt that they had had to revise their values as regards altruism. They also described their efforts to develop a new moral

approach which integrates their insights gained through therapy with what they consider to be basic Christian teachings. They expressed dissatisfaction with traditional Roman Catholic morality and experienced their new moral approach as more personally meaningful.

Subjects #2 and #3 commented that they had found the interview to be an extremely rewarding exercise for them. They felt that they had benefitted from the opportunity, seldom afforded them, to reflect on their moral values; and subject #2 even requested a transcript of the interview so that he might further reflect on some of the issues discussed. It was clear, during the course of the interview, that subjects occasionally became aware of moral positions in their lives which they had never previously articulated.

All this pointed to the importance of the issues raised in this study, the validity of this method of data gathering, and the relevance of the findings for a better understanding of the issues involved in the confrontation between Christian values and values inherent in the psychoanalysis system.

On the basis of these pilot interviews it was concluded that a much abbreviated version of the schedule of questions would be satisfactory, particularly in view of time constraints. Accordingly, a new schedule (Schedule B) was used in interviewing the test subjects.

### Selection of Subjects

Six universities in the New York area with psychoanalytically-oriented doctoral programs in clinical psychology and eleven psychoanalytic post-doctoral programs were contacted by mail (Appendix 1 and 2) and invited to provide names of present or former candidates who had previous training in a Roman Catholic Seminary. There were eight

responses to these letters and two subjects were suggested, but their places of residence (Florida and Massachusetts) made it difficult to arrange for a personal interview. Consequently, no subjects were obtained in this way. All twelve subjects who eventually participated in the study were obtained through personal references. These subjects were contacted by mail (Appendix 3, 4 and 5) and invited to participate. Of those who were recommended through personal references, only one declined to be interviewed.

The relative lack of enthusiasm in the responses from the institutes which were contacted, stood in sharp contrast to the genuine interest on the part of subjects who participated in the study. It may be that the controversy and ill-will which have been stirred up in the past on the issue of the relationship between psychoanalysis and religion may have given rise to an unwillingness, on some level, to become involved in a re-examination of the issue. Even though a number of practitioners in the field of psychoanalysis may be very interested in the issue, they may conceal their interest from the majority of their colleagues and reveal it only to someone whom they feel might be sympathetic to their point of view.

But there may be another issue involved here, as highlighted by the response of a few prominent clergymen-analysts whose assistance and advice were solicited on the issue. These contacts generated a great deal of good wishes but little by way of useful ideas. There was a strong impression that the phenomenon of "compartmentalization", referred to in the theoretical literature, might be at work here. Apparently, little or no effort had been made by them to effect a synthesis in their own life of their religious values and their psychoanalytic experience. The following response serves as an example:

"Dear Mr. Belgrave,

Thank you for your letter.... I am afraid I have little or no interest or knowledge in the areas about which you inquire. I have a vague recollection of a book on psychoanalysis and Catholic morality, I believe edited by a man named Cunningham, but that is only a vague recollection.

It would be a waste of your time, effort and money for us to arrange a conversation. I would think you would be much better off with someone who has worked in that area.....

I regret that I cannot be more responsive to your initiative."

### The Interview Process

The interview process was experienced by the interviewer as a genuinely pleasant exchange of ideas and feelings on a deep and sensitive issue. All the subjects talked very spontaneously and at great length and it was often a difficult task to maintain the focus and limit them to the specific issues under examination. There is no doubt that many issues - different ones for different subjects - might have been explored at greater length to some advantage but since all of the subjects were professional people, their time was very valuable and the interview had to be limited to the previously-agreed hour and a half. However, all subjects were offered the opportunity to respond to all the questions.

Even though all subjects were very forthright with their responses, three of them (Subjects #5, #10 and #12) were quite reticent when issues of their personal experience were explored. They preferred to remain on a theoretical level and present intellectual statements or positions on the issues. It is striking that, of all the subjects interviewed,

two of these three had had the greatest personal familiarity with Freudian psychoanalysis, and that all three maintained the classical Freudian position that there can be no real (as opposed to apparent) conflict between psychoanalysis and religion because they are in different realms.

There was great diversity in the subject population in terms of age, level of experience with Roman Catholicism, recency of contact with the Catholic Church and level of experience with psychoanalysis. There were also other differences. Some subjects were more articulate than others. Some had obviously given the matter very serious thought prior to the interview while others appeared to be reflecting on it for the first time, in a conscious manner as a result of the questions which were posed to them during the interview. Some appeared to be still in the throes of struggling with the issue while others gave the impression that while they were interested in the issue, it was not all that important in their life. In view of this diversity, any trends in the subjects' reports of their experiences would surely be highly significant, and there do, in fact, appear to be some remarkable commonalities.

- 1). All subjects but one (Subject #12) had extremely similar descriptions of traditional Roman Catholic morality.
- 2). No subject, with the possible exception of Subject #12 was presently practicing what he considered to be traditional Roman Catholic morality even though each had done so in varying degrees earlier in life.
- 3). Most subjects acknowledged some impact of their psychoanalytic experience as contributing to this change but few were able to articulate the precise nature of this

impact and all stressed that there were a number of influences involved.

- 4). Those subjects who discussed the nature of the impact pointed to the areas described in the theoretical literature as having been especially influenced, namely, morality as it pertains to sexuality, aggression, altruism and the meaning of fantasies.
- 5). A number of subjects viewed their present moral system as more authentically Christian than traditional Roman Catholic values and maintained that the moral system which might derive from an analysis would not be very different from authentic Christian moral values. These subjects thus resolved an acknowledged conflict between traditional Roman Catholic moral values and psychoanalysis by a rejection of the traditional norms.
- 6). Other subjects, however, reported that they still experience some degree of conflict between their present moral system and their analytic practice. These subjects acknowledged that they were either still in the process of working out some sort of resolution or that they simply never gave any thought to the conflict, the latter position suggestive of the phenomenon of compartmentalization.

## 2. Description of Subjects

The following identifying data is provided in order to give some general description of the subject population. For reasons of confidentiality this description will be kept to a minimum.

Subject #1 is a 42 year old white male who has spent seventeen years practising as a Roman Catholic priest. He still practises as a priest at present, describing himself as an "analyst/priest". He has been in analysis for seven years and is completing a doctorate in psychology.

Subject #2 is a 30 year old white male who spent five years in a Seminary but was never ordained. He describes himself as a believer and church-goer. He has had a year and a half of analytic therapy with an analyst whom he describes as "Sullivanian". He is presently enrolled in a doctoral program in psychology.

Subject #3 is a 32 year old white male who spent two years in a Seminary, fifteen years ago. He describes himself as an atheist. He has had four years of analytic therapy with an analyst whom he describes as "Freudian". He is presently enrolled in a doctoral program in psychology.

Subject #4 is a 52 year old hispanic male who has been a priest for twenty-four years. He is not now actively practising as a priest but describes himself as a believer and a church-goer. He spent one year in psychoanalytic treatment and is presently in psychotherapy with a therapist whom he describes as "psychodynamic". He has a Masters degree in social work and works as a therapist.

Subject #5 is a 43 year old black male who has been a priest for thirteen years. He still practises as a priest. He has been in analysis for many years with an analyst whom he describes as "Freudian". He has a doctorate in psychology, is presently studying at a psycho-analytic institute and works as an analyst.

Subject #6 is a 40 year old white male who spent three years in a Seminary twenty years ago but was never ordained. He describes himself as a believer and a church-goer. He spent three years in therapy with a therapist whom he describes as "psychoanalytic-existential". He has a doctorate in psychology and works as a therapist.

Subject #7 is a 53 year old white male who worked for nineteen years as a priest before leaving the priesthood ten years ago. He describes himself as a believer. He spent one year in analysis with a therapist whom he describes as "neo-Freudian". He studied at a psychoanalytic institute and is presently working as a therapist.

Subject #8 is a 41 year old white male who spent thirteen years in a Seminary which he left ten years ago before being ordained. He describes himself as a believer and church-goer. He spent five years in analytic therapy with an analyst whom he describes as an "orthodox Freudian". He has a doctorate in psychology and presently practises as a psychotherapist.

Subject #9 is a 31 year old white male who spent four years in a Seminary before leaving nine years ago. He describes himself as a non-believer. He spent six years in analytic therapy with an analyst whom he describes as "Sullivanian". He has a Masters degree in Social Work

which included an internship at a psychoanalytic institute. He presently practises psychotherapy.

Subject #10 is a 36 year old white male who spent five years in a Seminary about twenty years ago. He describes himself as a non-believer. He spent four years in therapy with an analyst whom he describes as "Sullivanian". He is presently enrolled in a doctoral program in psychology.

Subject #11 is a 44 year old white male who practised as a priest for ten years until ten years ago. He describes himself as a believer and as actively involved in the Church. He spent two and a half years in therapy with an analyst whom he describes as "Adlerian". He received a diploma from an Adlerian institute and presently practises as a psychotherapist.

Subject #12 is a 41 year old white male who practised as a priest for 13 years until three years ago. He describes himself as a believer. He spent three years in analysis with an analyst whom he describes as "Freudian". He studies for four years in a psychoanalytic institute, presently has a doctorate in psychology and practises as a psychotherapist.

### 3. Description of Traditional Roman Catholic Morality

The following reports from the subjects indicate some general lines of agreement in the description of traditional Roman Catholic morality. It is clear that their description also highlights aspects of traditional Catholic morality which are at variance with the approach of psychoanalysis, and provides support for the theoretical arguments that a conflict does, in fact, exist between the two approaches.

Subjects noted that traditional morality is based on a specific philosophy, the Aristotelian-Thomistic model, and one subject, in particular, maintained that the psychoanalytic approach is based on a different philosophy which is at variance with this model. This subject (#5) had actually studied existential philosophy instead of Thomistic philosophy. He says:

"If you look into the history, the philosophy of sciences as related to psychology, psychoanalysis and particularly some of Freud's questions in epistemology, the philosophical antecedents was the philosophy I studied, so that's why there was a greater accordance than if I had taken Thomistic philosophy.....There has been a notion that when you think of Roman Catholicism, and particularly the Roman Catholic priest, what comes to mind is Scholasticism and every one is very familiar with even Freud's papers which were against Scholasticism, but I came from a very different point."

Another subject (#7) noted this philosophical basis underlying traditional morality and goes on to describe the type of morality which derives from this approach. He says:

"It was largely a body of moral teaching that was already pre-determined... One would say it was deductive, rationally deductive, granting the pre-supposition of the magisterium and the teaching of moral theologians.. It was Aristotelian-Thomistic".

Another subject (#8) further clarifies this, explaining that traditional morality is based on a theory of "Natural Law". According to this theory, he says:

"You have such a nature, and this nature was made by God and God was the Formal Cause and the Final Cause and therefore in order to be faithful to God, you have to act in accordance with this nature".

It is clear that, within this system, only the Church has the authority to correctly interpret the "Natural Law", and consequently, the Church made statements about morality. Subjects described the Catholic Church's teaching on moral law as follows:

a. Strict, uncompromising, authoritarian.

Subject #2: "I think that the traditional morality is very authority-centered.....what is in the magisterium of the Church..."

Subject #4: "It was very uncompromising. It was very strict. It didn't fool around. It was very didactic, dogmatic.....It was very much interested in the preservation of society. It was very much into upholding of the family - the sexual morality was strongly slanted toward keeping married people married and keeping sex away from everything but marriage. It was strongly against pre-marital sex and extra-marital sex, strictly against abortion."

Subject #6: "It's based primarily in terms of a rather authoritarian, strict conscience, a heavily guilt-laden approach to moral behavior, a strict adherence to traditional Christian life in terms of respect for priests and nuns and attending church regularly, keeping in the forefront the idea of sin....."

Subject #9: "...Lots of emotions about that...very rigid, very doctrinaire, absolutes, total absolutes. Not much room for real thinking and for making decisions... making judgments on your own with your intellectual abilities and your emotions coming into play, but a real parent-child kind of relationship."

b. Dogmatic, based on hierarchical statements

Subject #1: "It was dogmatic. Morality was taught as a sophistication of do's and don'ts of the commandments"

Subject #5: "One is very much part of the group. One's identity rests upon being part of the group, in this case the group being good standing Roman Catholicism as defined by hierarchical statements as opposed to one's own personal system."

c. "Act-centered" rather than "person-centered"

Subject #2: "I think the big difference is.. the traditional thing seemed very act-centered, looking at the act, and the new approach being more intention or person-centered".

Subject #11: "Primarily, it appears to me that the traditional approach to morality is action-oriented. The values of the person do come into play but it is the action that is considered a sinful act. As a matter of fact, I would think that the terminology "sinful act" would be perhaps primary terminology in the expression of traditional Catholic theology."

Interviewer: "...Act oriented as opposed to...?"

Subject #11: "As opposed to a person in subjective circumstances making moral decisions. In other words if I can explain it a little more clearly, there is no room for a moral decision. The act is automatically sinful or automatically immoral..... The foundation for the traditional system is some kind of universal moral law that's known pretty much to every one....And that seems to be the underlying system to that tradition - a universal concept of morality".

d. Guilt-inducing

Subject #1: "(It was)... a morality based upon fear, repression of impulses and one that holds out the promise of a reward at some future date if the the drives can be sublimated in the present time. It's a morality that didn't want to take in the feelings of the people, want to stay away from those or to bury them.. I experienced it personally."

Subject #4: "It contributed to guilt. It was extremely difficult to reconcile the behavior of so many people, including my own behavior, with the strict norms."

Subject #6: "...a strict conscience, heavily guilt-laden approach to morality.

It is immediately obvious how these aspects of the traditional approach to morality run into conflict with the analytic approach, which is inductive rather than deductive, person-centered rather than act-centered and encourages individuals to make free choices rather than be unduly influenced by excessive guilt feelings.

Subjects were asked about their experience of attempting to practise these traditional norms in their life. Many described themselves as having initially accepted these values without question and later on revising them.

Subject #2: "I think actually for a very long time, and I'll say now for too long a time, I think I brought into the traditional system. I don't think I experienced enough discomfort with it, intellectually. The discomfort I experienced was more emotional knowing that it was just terribly easy to sin, but I didn't actually question till I was well into college whether the system was true or not. I took it for granted, sort of accepted it, and had to live with my own shortcomings within it. So the pains were emotional. Intellectually I opted for that. I said the stricter morality was on target and that everybody else was out of step."

Another subject described his experience as follows:

Subject #1: "In the very beginning I didn't question it (traditional Catholic morality). To question it would have been a healthy progressive step. It was to circumvent it in whatever way I needed, in whatever ways I did."

"The experience was between rebellion and guilt, oscillating, and each one of them took on very sophisticated nuances. I realize only through my analysis many years later that it was only a very sophisticated way of acting out the rebellion of the morality and then the guilt was entangled and energy absorbing."

One subject, however, felt that there was something positive in the traditional approach. His ambivalence on the issues stands out clearly.

Subject #4: "Prior to leaving the priesthood, the morality that I was brought up in gave me a good self-image, gave me strong norms for judging myself.

It was not wish-washy. It was clear-cut, black and white. I knew when I was right and when I was wrong. I had very strong goals of behavior to aim at. I was very harsh in judging myself in any kind of dishonesty or sexual acting-out, whether alone or with other people, homosexual or heterosexual. The norms I was given were extremely clear and uncompromising. As a result, I think it gave me a lot of stability. After I got out, or in the process of leaving, the moral theology contributed to a lot of confusion. It contributed to guilt. It was extremely difficult to reconcile the behavior of so many people, including my own, with the strict norms I'd been brought with, extremely difficult. In some ways it still is extremely difficult to relate the kind of.....really uncover my morality with the practical necessity of dealing with people".

A number of subjects indicated that the first revision of their traditional moral position became necessary when they were confronted with having to preach it or to apply it to people in their everyday life situation.

Subject #11: "Some of those values really began to be questioned when I was working and counseling with good people, with people who were morally good people who were really in a dilemma about something like birth control. Would their practice of birth control alienate them from the Church? I had to question whether this was a moral right they had to practise birth-control and in many instances I accepted that it was, even manipulating the standards and the legalism that was very much part of the tradition that I was part of, so that I could justify it in individual cases."

- Subject #1 notes that a problem arose in his counseling so that: "the morality was not adequate to the needs of the people, the needs of the parishioner. That's when I started doing some further reflections about the insufficiencies of it."
- Subject #7 describes a remarkably similar experience. "Abortion bothered me a lot. I was aware that each year in the community we were commanded to preach on abortion, and I became aware that probably down in the congregation there ten or eleven women who had had abortions and if I were to speak in the way the outline suggested I would certainly be, in a way, killing them. So I became aware of the need to say what I had to say in a way that you didn't have a double killing, killing the fetus and then the person. I became aware of how difficult it was for people who had had abortions to forgive themselves and that may have been the role of the priest rather than the other. And because I had met very few people who had had abortions who, in some way, were not feeling guilty about it, and at the same time their dilemma did not seem to be recognized by the official Church. It was as though it were much easier for those who were legislating rather than those who were contending with the ambiguities of the situation."

It is clear that these subjects experienced a conflict between a moral approach that focusses on the needs of the individual and traditional approach based on universal moral norms. It is surely significant that these subjects eventually rejected the traditional approach and also went on to embrace a profession which places greater focus on the individual. In doing so, some subjects also left the priesthood. One would obviously wonder what part this conflict over moral issues played in their decision in this matter.

The subjects' report of their reasons for leaving the priesthood can be divided into three categories.

Firstly, three subjects said that their major conflict lay in the issue of being perceived as a representative of Roman Catholic Church. It is clear that they experienced a conflict in their responsibility

to represent the Church's position on issues, particularly moral issues.

Thus, Subject #7 says:

"So I think largely I'll say it had to do with my sexuality, my wanting to be in an intimate relationship with a woman and generally speaking not wanting to have to account to different people by way of having to represent the Catholic traditional viewpoint".

Subject #8 says:

"What I recall as being negative, the image that comes to my mind was wearing that Roman collar and being perceived by people as a thorough-going representative of this Catholic institution - the Catholic Church. I felt that that would somehow curtail my madness or something. It would hold me back from doing things that I otherwise would want to do,.....something that might compromise this institution that I would be so thoroughly representing and therefore would prevent me from doing whatever".

And Subject #9:

"I came into contact with a lot of people with moral questions and there was always that bind in my mind. "I'm representing something and I'm not representing it as it is and I'm being taught it is. What am I doing to these people?" As much as I would try to deal with that, there was always that question: "This is what I'm taught and this is how I'm feeling and how do they come into play together?" And it was very confusing."

Secondly, closely tied in with the issue of being perceived as a representative of the "Catholic" position, five subjects (#2, #6, #7, #8 and #10) reported conflict over the curtailment of their autonomy. Interestingly, two subjects specifically mentioned the curtailment of their freedom to read whatever they wanted.

Subject #6: "I frankly became discontent. I felt very restricted. One of the problems was: my reading was very restricted. I sent my parents a list and they sent me back a whole stack of books. Well, they confiscated them. This started the

ball rolling. They locked them up in a little safe and said that after I finished my novitiate year that maybe they would allow me to read it. That, as I recall it was my first sense of dissatisfaction...Slowly but surely I just realized that this wasn't for me."

Subject #10: "The event that, in fact, precipitated my leaving was my being told that I wasn't allowed to read what I wanted to read, (and that) the kinds of things which I was reading - which was mostly existential philosophy - was dangerous, and what I'm talking about now is, dangerous to the development of Jesuit values."

The other subjects (#2, #7 and #8) referred to problems with the curtailment of their autonomy in more general terms.

But by far the most repeated reason for leaving the priesthood or seminary had to do with a rejection of celibacy. Five subjects (#2, #4, #7, #9, #12) talked about the issue and the comment by Subject #2 is representative of the views expressed. He says:

"If I had to pick a particular issue, I would say that the issue of celibacy was the thing that I said: "No. I do not believe in this anymore. I do not think it is a better way. I do not even think it is a good way to lead your life."

When these subjects' comment about the value of autonomy and their changed views on sexuality are put together with the report by many subjects that their exposure to psychoanalysis had an impact on their moral position in these areas<sup>1</sup>, and with the fact that these subjects eventually embraced the psychotherapeutic profession, it seems legitimate to conclude that they found the moral approach in their new profession much more compatible with their own.

What, then, of the undoubtedly large number of clergymen who retain their professional identity as priests while practising as therapists? Only two of the twelve subjects interviewed are now actively practising

as priests, yet they both describe their attempts at resolution of the conflict in remarkably similar terms which appear to fit Hartmann's description of "compartmentalization." When his patients bring up religious conflicts in analysis,

Subject #5 says: "Then I make a differential diagnosis - meaning: "Is the question something which is for someone in the mental health realm or for someone who is in the philosophical/theological realm. And if this is so, I usually refer out. I don't operate with two hats simultaneously. In other words, I do not try to simultaneously hopefully lead (my patient to) a more adaptive lifestyle and at the same time try to discern whether the particular elements of the lifestyle are good or bad." "In other words - this may make it clearer - I work professionally as an agnostic. As a psychologist, I work as an agnostic." "In my work, I do not say that there is a God or there's not a God." "I'm just trying to articulate what are the values that this particular person holds and to clarify them."

Subject #1 says something similar.

"A patient would say to me: "I wish I could tell you about my feelings about you but you are a priest." And I say: "In here I'm not. In here I'm the analyst."

Obviously, data from a larger sample of this particular population is necessary before generalizations can be made, but this data is surely suggestive of the approach to reconciling the conflict between the two roles.

It is essential to note that there was one dissenting viewpoint concerning the description of traditional Roman Catholic morality. Subject #12 insisted that the Church's position is not dogmatic, inflexible, strict or authoritarian. He says that there is a misunderstanding of the Church's position.

"In the Roman Catholic tradition, there has not been one definition about any moral precept,

ever. The Roman Catholic Church has defined things, for example, about the nature of Christ, his divine nature, his human nature. There were infallible definitions made. Not one single infallible definition ever has been made about any moral issue since the Church exists. There may be many reasons for that. One of the reasons is that in the Catholic Church one does not believe that Revelation addresses itself all that much to moral issues. For that reason the Church does not feel compelled to make infallible statements - which is not understood all that well in the United States but it's quite well understood in Europe. In Europe one does not take the moral teachings as serious as one takes them in the United States. The reason is that in Europe one understands very well the distinction between fallible and infallible teachings of the Church. The highest authoritative statement the Roman Catholic Church ever made about any moral issue is in the form of an encyclical which, by definition, is a fallible document. So the Church, in spite of what most people believe<sup>2</sup> has never said we are right about our moral opinions...the Church has never stated anything moral in an absolute fashion - that includes divorce, that includes abortion, that includes all the difficult issues of sexuality."

It is obvious that this subject had a totally different experience of traditional moral teaching from the other subjects interviewed. This may be partly explained by the fact that he was the only subject who was born, raised and did his theological studies in Europe. Subject #5 who also did part of his theological studies in Europe lends support to the position that "Catholic morality" is influenced by cultural and societal factors even though from his point of view, what is generally perceived as traditional Roman Catholic is an Irish version of morality. He first describes what he says is a "stereotype" of Roman Catholicism:

"....a rigid, dogmatic system of non-thinking belief, non-thinking adherence, where the questioning of authority is not allowed, where there is to be a tremendous amount of constraint on sexual expression, constraints on one's affective life."

Interviewer: "Has that stereotype any validity anywhere?"

Subject #5: "O yes. There was an Irish order that specialized in running seminaries, which has had worldwide influence. What they were promulgating was a particular type of Irish spirituality and that became identified as Roman Catholicism. And if you look at psychological papers, not theological papers, which deal with cross-cultural studies - Irish culture as opposed to Mediterranean culture - what they were promulgating was not so much different from secular Irish culture which unfortunately came to be seen as Catholicism on the universal level."

The issue is obviously a very complex one, involving theological disputes which go far beyond the scope of this paper. <sup>3</sup> All subjects, however, appear to be agreed, at least implicitly, on one point, namely that what is considered (even though, perhaps, mistakenly) by the majority of Catholics in the United States to be traditional Roman Catholic morality is as it has been described throughout this paper. One would need to be cautious, though, in generalizing the data from this research further afield.

It has been noted that some theoreticians have argued that even though there may have been conflicts between Freud's theory and Roman Catholic morality in the early 1900's, that situation no longer exists since both Freud's theory and Roman Catholic morality have changed significantly. Subjects were therefore asked whether, in their experience, traditional Roman Catholic morality had changed significantly in recent years. Almost every subject noted that the Second Vatican Council had an impact on Church teaching. However, many subjects expressed the view that the changes in the Church had either not been as far reaching as intended by the Council, had not been permanently established or had not filtered down to the masses of Catholics as a whole. In other words,

the Vatican Council had allowed new views to enter Church teaching but the official teaching remained very much the same. This is clearly expressed by Subject #7.

Interviewer: "Can you say something of your experience of the change in moral values since the Vatican Council."

Subject #7: "I would say that...there is more an emphasis on the process of the individual's coming to his or her own sense of sinfulness and the need for reconciliation."

Interviewer: "Do you think that the Church has moved in that way?"

Subject #7: "I don't think so. I think that the official Church, by its own teaching, should be committed to it but I don't think that the official Church has moved in that way."

Interviewer: "You think they are still very much in the traditional mold?"

Subject #7: "I think they are. I think they are being confirmed in that by John Paul II from Poland. I think that John Paul II, really, you might as well have an Irishman. In fact, you are better off having John Paul II from the point of view of conservatism...The Polish tradition is so conservative.... I think that this has lead to a re-instatement of the older Catholic moral traditions.... and that point of view seems to be supported by the fact that recently he has been asking for what, in effect, is an investigation of U. S. seminaries where there will be a uniformity of teaching and I expect a lot of people will lose their jobs who tend to take a more liberal or progressive point of view."

Subject #6 reports a very similar experience which he views, however, with mixed emotions.

Interviewer: "Do you think that the Church's moral position has changed?"

Subject #6: "I do. The whole ecumenical movement was very important in that regard. I think that was very much part of it. The birth control controversy, now, is for most Catholics, I think, less

of a struggle. Our new Pope, however, is again re-iterating some of the old traditional points of view.

Interviewer: "What do you make of that?"

Subject #6: "There is probably somewhat of a need for it, maybe to re-iterate and getting back to the basics. However, I think maybe people today can handle it better and maybe they will take it with reflection and not on blind faith. They will think for themselves and I think there is room for personal conscience even within the Catholic Church. My initial reaction was that it was regressive. My feelings about it now is, we all go through changes, I feel myself becoming more conservative, maybe feeling he has got a point but not as far as he is going. I think he is going now too far to the other side."

Subjects #8 and #9 talk about a conflict in their seminary training between the conservative/traditional viewpoint and more liberal positions. Subject #8 talks about two different "theological tracks" in his seminary training, with different students being assigned to different courses of study. The brighter students ("leapers") studied more liberal positions while the slower students ("creepers") received the more traditional/conservative training. He says:

"There were two tracks in my philosophy school. There were those that were taking the traditional stuff and then there were those that did a little better and got (more liberal views)."

Interviewer: "How did they make the decision as to who went into which track?"

Subject #8: "They had what in jargon was called "leapers" and "creepers". "Creepers" took courses that were the basis to get ordained to be priests. "Creepers" were taking the more traditional and the minimum just so they could pass the orals. We took more high-flown stuff."

This report dramatically describes what happened in the Catholic Church as a result of the Second Vatican Council. The traditional moral

viewpoint remained in place while other more liberal views were permitted to exist side by side without attempts at integration. When one realizes that, according to the arrangement described by Subject #8, those who studied the "more traditional stuff" would most likely go on to become pastors in parishes, directly responsible for passing on the moral teaching to the masses of Catholics, while those who received the "more liberal stuff" would go on to more scholarly pursuits like teaching or writing books, this explains a kind of splitting that has developed in the Catholic Church between a few intellectually-inclined churchmen with liberal views and a large number of pastors with traditional/conservative views. It also helps to clarify the apparent conflict between the experience of Subject #12 and that of the other subjects concerning traditional Roman Catholic morality.

The results of the study seem to indicate that the traditional/conservative moral teaching remains the official position of the Catholic Church, side by side with a more liberal view, which has gained acceptance since the Second Vatican Council, but which has not been fully integrated into the teaching.

#### 4. A Description of the Impact of Psychoanalysis on Roman Catholic Moral Values

Ten out of the twelve subjects interviewed (except Subjects #5 and #12) acknowledged some impact of psychoanalysis on their moral value system. Two subjects (#3 and #7) felt sure that there must have been some influence but were unable to give any specifics. The general thrust of the reports of the other subjects (except #4) was that the impact was beneficial even though some had mixed feelings about specific aspects of that impact.

There were some general trends in the subjects' reports about the nature of the impact and these were similar to the issues raised in the theoretical literature. The responses of the subjects will be presented in the framework of these theoretical issues and will be seen to both support as well as illustrate the kinds of conflicts described.

##### I. Materialism vs. Supernaturalism

One aspect of the impact which has been discussed in the theoretical literature is the basic difference in orientation between the Roman Catholic approach which lays stress on finding support in God's Revelation for the derivation and the promulgation of moral values, and the psychoanalytic approach which seeks a humanistic-rationalistic base for the derivation of values. Some subjects reported that the experience of psychoanalysis helped to move them in the direction of a more humanistic-rationalistic approach to values. Perhaps the most striking example is the report of Subject #1, still a Roman Catholic priest, who described the impact of analysis as follows:

"I seem to want to be more tenderly moral. Morality is like another level of competency. It's

another level of being the full human person and I find that a good analyst is very moral and a bad analyst is very immoral. I find that I don't need the Church's definition of morality. I find it very satisfactory to use the analytic models for morality. They are very supportive models and I desire to be moral in that way."

Interviewer: "Are there any specific aspects of your morality that have been affected, changed, reinforced?"

Subject #1: "If anything, the traditional morality has not been enforced. I feel like I can make a distinct decision whether I want to involve myself with a woman. I don't think it would be the morality that might stop me. I think it might be the -trying to have an overview of what would be - it's really the morality but it's not specific little rubrics of morality. It has to do with: "How does my personality unfold with an involvement with this person." And if I don't see it unfolding, "What am I doing?" What am I unconsciously doing? Why am I being destructive? Why am I destroying that person that way?" It's a healthier brand of morality."

There can be absolutely no doubt that this approach to morality has been heavily influenced by psychoanalysis and is, at the same time, very far from traditional Roman Catholic morality..

Subject #2 also sees the impact of the psychoanalytic system as making for a more humanistic approach and for a rejection of the more traditional absolutist approach.

Interviewer: "You have mentioned that there were some moral values that were challenged by the psychoanalytic system. How have you dealt with that challenge?"

Subject #2: "I experience that it is still settling. It hasn't jelled yet. But yes, I think I am developing a moral sense that's more based on the experience of what its like to be a person. Psychology and analysis studies the vicissitudes of being a man, of being human. My previous moral stuff didn't take that seriously at all. It just dealt with the external authority, with the absolutes, and I tried to walk in step with that, tried very strenuously to fall in line. And now, I'm irrevocably beyond that. There's no way I could or would choose to return to something like that."

The reports of these two subjects clearly illustrates the contrast between two approaches to morality, one based on "law", "rubrics", "tablets" and one based on the human experience.

#### VI. Conflicts in the Realm of Practical Morality

##### A. Freedom and autonomy vs. compliance with pre-established moral norms.

Subjects repeatedly stressed that psychoanalysis had the effect of helping to free them from adherence to rigid moral categories, allowing them to think for themselves, make decisions for themselves and acknowledge a variety of feelings. Subject #9, with some obvious difficulty reflects on the impact of psychoanalysis in the area of autonomy.

Interviewer: "Were there any values that were strengthened by your contact with the psychoanalytic system?"

Subject #9: "...the respect for the individual, and always keeping that a priority - acknowledging the fact that each individual has the right and responsibility of directing his or her own life. And you can say maybe it strengthened that value - but at the same time, the way I view what I learned in the Church, that's almost antithetical. You don't have that responsibility. You adhere to what is told to you by Rome, by the priests, by this, by that, whatever."

Subject #2, acknowledging the liberating value of a psychoanalysis, appears to struggle with another problem - a too wide permissibility that might arise from a misunderstanding of analysis.

Interviewer: "Are there are some values that have been strengthened (by analysis)?"

Subject #2: "I don't think it's an old value. I don't think I had the value before - of freedom and autonomy. I feel I discovered this as a new value through analysis. Then there are sort of reactionary

values. It sounds contradictory but I don't think it is and it probably betrays a lack of understanding of analysis. But if people use analysis to really do whatever they want, especially as that affects other people - I find that some old-time values like fidelity between people is something that is becoming stronger in me, in part in a dialectic with the idea of doing just what's good for me, taken to extremes. I don't think it's really antithetical to analysis." "Analysis makes you feel, hey, you don't have to be bound forever, and I guess analysis helped me to break a major commitment in my life in that I had been in final vows and that I tried to get out of that, but now that I am on the verge of getting married, if future analysis helped me to discover that this love was just transference - that raises a whole other question between complete self-determination and the fact that other people's lives are involved and that there is something to be said for hanging in there."

Subject #10 also talks about the problem of possible abuse of autonomy, but like the others, clearly struggles with a complex issue.

"I will take the analytic position to be ego-autonomy but I think the mistake a lot of people make is thinking of the ego against the world. I think sharing, communicating is what makes people thrive and grow. I think analytic theories - well I think it's interesting that most people who are in therapy have difficulty with sharing. They have difficulty with dependence and independence. And I think there is a period in the beginning of an analysis or of therapy where - well, I can speak for myself - where I was reluctant to - I couldn't get close to people because I didn't want to become dependent upon them and it wasn't until I was secure and strong enough in myself so that I knew I would not lose myself when I became close to someone, that I could then get close to people".

This subject is raising an issue that was discussed in the theoretical section under the heading "Individualism vs Altruism" and which will be discussed further later on in this chapter.

A number of subjects stressed the liberating experience of being able to "feel or think anything". Reflecting on the value of his analysis, Subject #7 says:

"The usefulness has been in the exploration of unconscious conflicts, or really exploring the issues of what I really thought and felt, without applying a moral perspective to that. In other words, that in that experience, there was nothing too horrendous or too awful or too frightening for one to think or feel or say - that I wasn't necessarily going to be found out to be a bad immoral or sinful person. In other words, that this was a validation of whatever were the fears, the dreams, the thoughts I might have had. It wasn't saying I might kill or maim or I would hurt somebody, but it was saying that whatever I thought or whatever I felt, it was all right."

And Subject #2 says about analysis,

"It just put me in touch with those real things, including some real feelings on my part. I think the experience of being able to think and feel and want anything, and to be more comfortable with that, was very important. It's made me more comfortable with myself."

Subject #7, in similar vein, clearly articulates his experience of the impact of analysis as giving permission to a spirit of questioning which is antithetical to the traditional Roman Catholic approach. He says:

"Basically, the most important thing really in the whole analytic thing is the whole questioning - that nothing was beyond questioning. That would be the single most important change - that in the moral area, nothing is beyond question. And it makes sense - that way of looking at it - not to accept an ultimate. That it isn't, "All right, it is established and therefore you have to deduce it."

## B. Sexuality and Aggression

Ten of the twelve subjects (except #5 and #12) acknowledged some impact of psychoanalysis on their moral values in the areas of

sexuality and aggression. The nature of the impact, as described by the subjects, can be summarized as follows:

- i) Movement from adherence to rigid moral directives to freer personal choice,
- ii) An increased ability to experience and acknowledge feelings and fantasies of a sexual or aggressive nature, and
- iii) Alleviation of excessive guilt feelings.

When one recalls that the traditional Roman Catholic approach to morality was described as authoritarian, dogmatic, act-centered and guilt-inducing, the impact of the psychoanalytic system is immediately obvious.

- i) Movement from rigid moral directives to freer personal choice.

Subject #9 was most outspoken on this issue.

Interviewer: "How has psychoanalysis affected your moral values in the area of sexuality?"

Subject #9: "Yes, that personally is a bone of contention that I've had. I think that that's a touchy nerve for the Church - sexuality. I think the Church deals with sexuality by covering it up, saying: "This means this, all the time." And I think that's absolutely incorrect and that sexuality can have a multitude of meanings and that the individual has to really decide what they are bringing to the situation. Anything that's harmful, destructive, to oneself or another, is not good, is wrong, morally wrong, ethically wrong, whatever, and not just on a physical level but on an emotional level. When you take sexuality into play, if two people engage in, let's say, a one night stand, both of them having some understanding that they want some sexual gratification from the other or they are attracted to the other and they both understand that, I can't see anything wrong with that. The Church would say, inherently because of the nature of the act, that's wrong, even though they may not

think it, know it feel it, whatever. I don't think so. It's like taking one frame out of a movie and saying; "This is what it means." You are taking it out of context. I don't think you can say that in things like premarital sex, homosexuality."

The views of this subject appeared to be much more permissive than those expressed by other subjects, but they are representative of the central theme of individual personal choice in matters of sexuality which was repeatedly mentioned. Subject #5, who did not acknowledge any impact of psychoanalysis on his personal moral code, comments on the conflict from a theoretical point of view. Describing the traditional moral position as "scholastic", he says:

"To take the extremes, the analytic and the scholastic. The scholastic would have it all laid out in detail - parameters of sexual activity and non-activity, almost decided beforehand. In what situations this is appropriate, in what situations this is not appropriate, what situations in which it is never appropriate, etc., while the analytic situation would not make that decision beforehand but would look at the situation as it evolved."

It is perhaps significant that six of the twelve subjects (#2, #6, #9, #10, #11, #12) spontaneously raised and dealt with the issue of abortion in this context of the tension between rigid moral norms and the individual's right to make his personal moral choice. Many subjects acknowledged the issue to be a complex one but none was prepared to adopt the position that abortion is always wrong - a position which was presented by them (except #12) as the traditional Roman Catholic position. Subject #2 presents one aspect of the struggle. He says:

"The one (issue) that I find myself struggling most with now, between more traditional values and therapeutic values would be the whole abortion question. The absolute value would be that you never could decide to have an abortion and I would not buy that

absolute value... I find myself more likely to listen to that in situations - to be influenced by that, to be rather traditional still but not nearly as traditional as I was."

Subject #11 makes an almost identical comment.

Interviewer: "Has your therapy affected your moral values in any way?"

Subject #11: "I think it has clarified a lot of things and maybe put a lot of my traditional background into a different perspective. I think I can understand options. I think I can understand the guilt that people experience. I think I can be much more accepting of people's choices rather than shun them because they don't conform to my values. I think a case in point is the abortion situation. The traditional Church position is that abortion is just about always wrong, and as a matter of fact, that position is being solidified right at this moment with the bishops meeting in Washington. They are formulating a position that they're going to submit to Congress for a constitutional amendment on abortion. By the same token, I've known people I've counseled who have gone through the decision to have an abortion and I think I've been able to do so by totally accepting them, their situation and their decision without injecting my own values on it. On the abortion question I'd say my values are traditional but open to change."

It is clear that these subjects are struggling with their own moral position as regards abortion and that this struggle is being affected by their therapeutic orientation.

- ii) An increased ability to experience and acknowledge feelings and fantasies in the areas of sexuality and aggression.

Subjects talked about the Roman Catholic approach which attaches culpability to certain thoughts, feelings and fantasies and thus recommends that they be pushed out of consciousness immediately. Some subjects saw this approach as giving rise to unhealthy defenses - repression, projection and reaction formation.

Interviewer: "Has psychoanalysis affected your moral values?"

Subject #2: "I think it has. I'm sure it has. Yes, very much and there are two primary aspects that Freud uncovered in terms of basic dynamics: the sexual and aggressive drives and I think that most of morality boils down - most of sort of micro-morality - the morality that we were raised with was not very social conscious, so when we say morality people think of sexuality. So if you want to take from the approach, I'd say it had a marked impact on me, on my own development from a very repressive kind of environment in terms of sexuality which really kept me very much in check for the first twenty-one, twenty-two years of my life. As I said, I didn't question a whole lot of that. I found it hard to live by but I didn't question it. I guess it has made me much more comfortable with sexuality, and much more understanding and indulgent - not excited, in the sense of being hot and bothered. My upbringing would have caused me to see sexuality as something alien - a very strict code of ethics. I grew up believing that you didn't do anything, and my experience has lead me in a different area with that and my experience has been very influenced by a healthy realism and the appreciation of sexuality complete with the enjoyment of it that came through analysis and through those values. I guess just realizing the basic normality - if you want to break it down, I guess it's the ability to think anything. I think that has been terrifically important - not to get hot and bothered about feeling or wanting or desiring anything - sort of Freud's idea that we are polymorphous-perverse - and that carries over into - clear reference in thinking that premarital sex and masturbation and contraception were just automatically wrong. And that just doesn't make sense. And I think the analytic values have helped me see that and also helped me see what kind of dynamics made the institution so repressive, so afraid. More and more I think of the fact that moral theology has been legislated by celibate men, for example. Part of it, I think, is the whole celibacy thing which has made the Church become more and more irrelevant to people's lives. And I think it's sort of like a control issue, a way of keeping people in line, controlling something that is so intimately part of their lives: sexuality and genital expression. I guess if you take up some real conservative Catholic or some conservative moral majority literature, you just see that this is like repressed, denied. I

guess that's part of it - seeing some of the major defense mechanisms within people and within the institution, that it's really reaction formation against their own sexuality, overcompensation, projection. And I think that same sort of thing would carry over to assertiveness and anger. We have grown up thinking that anger was bad. Now I've come to believe that not to be angry is bad."

Subject #7 talks about the powerful effect of the restriction of fantasies which is advocated by the Catholic Church as encouraging the defense of reaction formation and he sees psychoanalysis as having helped to free him up.

Interviewer: "Can you say something about how your moral value system may have been affected by psychoanalysis?"

Subject #7: "I think the number one for me would be taking the unconscious seriously in practice and understanding the unconscious in me. The first thing really is actually experiencing how the wishes and the fears became expressed in the dream material or in slips, and along with that becoming more aware of reaction formation, being aware that for many religious people, that underneath the goodness etc., there was the other side that would want to or wish to... that underneath the love there was hate. "Love your neighbor!" "Don't even have the desire!" So, naturally, if you can't have the thought and the desire, you've got to have the other."

iii) The alleviation of excessive guilt feelings.

Subject #1 also talks about experiencing the liberation of acknowledging sexual fantasies and, in this context, talks about an alleviation of guilt feelings.

Interviewer: "Can you say something about if and how the psycho-analytic system has had an effect on your values in the area of sexuality."

Subject: "It has, because I've been able to set aside the guilt which is judgmental and been able to attend to what part of my ego is being strengthened or damaged. It's a paradoxical liberating effect not to be oppressed with obeying the sexual morality laws. I've pursued relationships, encounters, to learn about myself in ways that I

would never have found had I been a blind obedient servant to the sexual morality. So, if I see an attractive woman, I can analyse: "Well, I see her. She's attractive. Maybe she might be nice in bed. But what do I notice that I find attractive about her?" That's analytical. Whereas the person who would be strictly out of an orthodox Catholic moral position would say: "Oh, I have a bad thought. I'd better put that bad thought away.", and would never go beyond the thought and wonder why the thought is there. That's one way I see the analytical influencing my morality."

A strikingly large number of subjects (all except #5, #10 and #12) talked about the impact of analysis as having freed them up to acknowledge angry feelings. The report of subject #1 suggests that this issue may have been especially significant for this pool of subjects who had all been trained in the Seminary to avoid expressing angry feelings.

Interviewer: "In your own life, did you find the need to revise your approach to aggression."

Subject #1: "Well, yes. In the Catholic tradition, growing up, you never show aggression. "Peace at all cost. Just don't acknowledge your feelings." I remember somebody tore my shirt. Because he was angry at me, he grabbed my shirt and tore it. And I was furious. But I couldn't even let my fury out because the prefect in the Seminary said: "Don't you dare get angry. You are supposed to love him." I was in conflict. "How can I love him?" He tore my shirt!" But I guess I was never given the permission to be angry. So aggression is being worked on. An interesting thing about my analysis! I used to have this fantasy. I want to throw a glass of water or a cocktail or something in somebody's face. It used to be an impulse. And over three years, maybe four years of analysis, I eventually knew what was happening: that my aggression was being discharged through the talking cure of analysis and maybe a half-year has gone by when I even have a flicker that I might have an anger towards somebody, but before I came out East, I used to put a glass down at a cocktail party because of an angry, aggressive impulse.... Spiritual direction in the Seminary really never helped one to discharge or understand one's aggression. It was almost a constant sublimation. Well, you can hold your hand over pressurized water for so long, and you can't hold it anymore. And that's what I think was happening with me."

Subject #3 also talks about a change in this area as a result of analysis.

Interviewer: "In the area of aggression, has there been any change?"

Subject #3: "Yes, I can certainly relate to that. By comparison with ten years ago, I am enormously more willing to let myself be more angry and to feel more comfortable about that. It's not a measure of how comfortable I am, but where I was before. It's an enormous change to get just a small improvement. Many times I actually enjoy fighting. I never knew how to fight before."

Subject #4 also talks about an attenuation of guilt associated with angry feelings.

"The positive thing about psychoanalysis is that it helped me to be true to my own feelings. I still have a long way to go before I can really be satisfied with myself, but it has really helped me to be honest to myself in terms of really letting myself feel my own pain and not suppressing it and not running away from it. Letting it be and letting myself own my own pain, sorrow, anger, and living with it. It has helped me to not feel guilty for being angry. Somewhere, in the Catholic Church, or perhaps before that from my parents - but the two conspired, my parental training and my Catholic training - both somehow conspired in me to make me feel guilty for being angry. You're bad when you're mad. And psychoanalysis and psychotherapy have helped me - and I haven't totally conquered that yet - but they have helped me come a long way in not feeling so guilty for being angry."

Subject #9 makes an almost identical comment.

"My religious upbringing - one could always argue it was my interpretation but I don't know how much a four, five and six year old interprets - but what I felt I was getting and what came to me was that (anger) was bad and I had a great deal of difficulty being assertive, aggressive, angry.....Therapy has certainly changed my ideas about aggression. What I felt religion was saying was: "You're the peaceful person. Keep it all in. "You're the long-suffering person." That's destructive. So I think it has changed much in that way. It helped people to see that anger is not necessarily bad and there are ways of expressing it."

In the same vein, Subject #11 says,

"I'd say the Roman Catholic approach to aggression has been non-aggressive. It has been rather passive. In many ways, my upbringing has been very non-aggressive, very passive - the authority of the Church, the authority of the family, when I entered the Seminary, the authority of the Seminary, when I was in the ministry, it was the authority of the pastor and we used to use terms like blind obedience. You didn't have to function on any level except to do as you were told. You never had to make a decision. You were told when to go to bed, when to get up. You were told when to eat, when to pray, whatever. I think that's one thing that therapy has helped me with. It has helped me to be more assertive. It has helped me to see my passivity and it has helped me to be more assertive even to the point of being aggressive."

We thus see a consistent report among subjects that psychoanalysis and psychotherapy have not only helped them to experience the liberation of acknowledging sexual and aggressive feelings and fantasies but helped in the alleviation of the guilt associated with these feelings and fantasies.

#### C. Individualism vs. Altruism

Subjects were asked about the impact of psychoanalysis on their moral values in the area of altruism. The majority of subjects who acknowledged some impact felt that the Church had fostered an unhealthy form of altruism and experienced analysis as enabling them to become more aware of their own needs as well as some unconscious motives for their behavior. Some subjects pointed to a connection between the insistence on altruism in the Roman Catholic moral system and the strenuous discouragement of aggression. The comments of Subject #7 that the commandment to "love somebody" can give rise to a reaction formation defense, has already been noted. He elaborates further upon this.

Interviewer: "Can you say something about altruism in the traditional moral system and how psychoanalysis has had an impact on that."

Subject #7: "I would say that the traditional moral teaching on altruism neglected the selfish, competing, aggressive impulses of the individual. It assumed that man was redeemed from those nasty, aggressive competing impulses long before man had experienced them. In other words, that it was resolved by "grace" that the person could become a lover and in fact, that these impulses and so on were covered by "grace" and that if "in grace", the person would never be angry. Thus, "thou should not be angry". I am reaching for the fifth commandment, "thou shall not kill", which included the whole gamut of behavior along the continuum from killing, to being angry, right across to fighting. So, not to be angry included not to have angry feelings. So if the person felt angry, the thing to do was to not be angry or to forgive. No effective distinction was made between the feeling and the behavior, or the fantasy and the behavior."

Subject #1 makes a similar comment.

"In the Catholic viewpoint, altruism can be a very seriously misused word. It can be a cop-out for repressing one's anger, in doing a reaction formation, in just being a goody-goody. That's where priesthood has a lot of snares in it. Priests are not supposed to get angry because that's not what the image of the priest is."

Subject #2 also sees a problem with the way the Church preaches altruism.

"I think it's incredibly dangerous. I was, by nature, very big into it - very altruistic. Through analysis I've discovered what a lot of my motives were. I still find service a very important thing but I've become much more in touch with what my own needs are that are being served by it. And, at times, it gets in the way, that my service can be manipulative in serving my own needs. It's a trap."

Interviewer: "What do you mean?"

Subject #2: "The trap that you are using these other people to satisfy your own needs to be the giver, the helper."

Subject #8 also agrees that there has been impact by psychoanalysis but since he focusses on the positive aspect of the Church's teaching on altruism, he views the impact as negative.

Interviewer: "Has the psychoanalytic system had any impact on your altruism."

Subject #8: "I think it's done some damage to it. I don't know about me - perhaps in me, too. It's not supportive of altruism. What comes to mind is my class in the doctoral program. I was always out of place there, not only because I was a Jesuit and the oldest in my class, the only practising Catholic, perhaps the only practising person of any kind - the other, at least, were quiet about their religious practice. So, I was sort of out of place and I always felt that they were just into themselves, those other students. There was no outgoing quality to them. If I would say in a group like that, "I want to help the poor people in the neighborhood by providing some sort of services", I would be the only one in the class. It's not one of the priorities and if it's considered it would be analysed in terms of guilt or undoing or something else. This is my instinctive thought about altruism within the analytic milieu."

This comment is reminiscent of the previously quoted comment by subject <sup>4</sup>#10 which pointed to the danger of excessive individualism and perhaps even selfishness arising out of the analytic experience. Thus, while some subject stressed the dangers of excessive altruism as preached by the Roman Catholic Church, to which psychoanalysis has provided a much needed corrective influence, other subjects note the danger of the other extreme, namely an excessive individualism which can result from the analytic approach. There was clearly more variation in the subject's responses on this issue.

## 5. Attempts at Resolution of the Conflict

The previous section outlined the reports of many subjects of the conflict between traditional Roman Catholic morality and the psycho-analytic experience. All subjects who admitted to a conflict were asked to talk about their attempts at resolution.

The first aspect of the issue that becomes clear is that all subjects, except Subject #12, specifically acknowledged that they had moved away from what they understood to be traditional Roman Catholic morality. Not all were ready to make a specific connection between this process and their analytic experience and, as would be expected, many were not sure as to the precise factors involved in their transition. However, the point has already been made that, for these subjects, the de facto resolution between the Roman Catholic approach and the analytic approach to morality lay in a rejection of the former. Many of these subjects were not now experiencing any conflict in this area and, as a matter of fact, two subjects (#1 and #6) said that they had moved so far away from thinking of morality in traditional terms that they had difficulty responding to some questions of the interviewer. The comment of Subject #1 is significant.

Interviewer: "Do you have any questions on the interview itself?"

Subject #1: "I am surprised at my feeling that I'm so out of touch with what is Catholic morality. I did realize, except to start talking about it, I said: "I used to be there. It must have said something."

And Subject #6 makes a similar point.

Interviewer: "Would you say that you were exposed to the traditional Roman Catholic moral teaching?"

Subject #6: "Yes, I would say so."

Interviewer: "How would you describe it?"

Subject #6: "Basically.....it's a difficult question."

Interviewer: "What makes it difficult? Is it that you are so far removed from it?"

Subject #6: "Yes. I think so, yes. I haven't thought in terms of what traditional Roman Catholic moral teaching is."

Other subjects talked about having moved away from the traditional Roman Catholic approach but retaining what they consider to be the true essence of Christian moral teaching. Subject #9 says:

"I really think that my personal values are not very dissimilar at all from what one might distill from the New Testament - the Golden Rule - "Do unto others as you would have them do." - caring about people, not harming people, living your life in an altruistic kind of sense or a selfless way. To distill what I think I know from the Scriptures, in terms of the essence, in terms of the values that are there and what I personally feel and believe and try to live by, I don't think there's virtually a difference. Now, you might have a lot of people who dogmatically might dispute that, but essentially, I don't think there a difference."

Subject #6 has a very similar comment.

"There has been a change in my own personal adjustment to that issue (Roman Catholic morality). While I think I retain the essence or more of the spirit of that, I think there is less of an emotional component to it which, I think, was very much part of my experience as a Catholic at that time....now I can make decisions based on what has to be done in my own life and not to be worried about being tortured by guilt and things like that."

Interestingly, two subjects talk about having rejected traditional Roman Catholic morality but then later re-integrating some aspects into their moral code. A similar phenomenon is mentioned in the theoretical literature in connection with psychoanalytic treatment whereby patients, in an initial misunderstanding of the therapeutic process, over-indulge their new-found liberty and experiment with behavior which they previously would have shunned as morally abhorrent. Subject #3 reports on a similar type of experience in the area of sexuality.

Interviewer: "Has your experience of psychoanalysis had an effect on your values in the area of sexuality?"

Subject #3: "Hard to know what to say to that. I would say my values definitely changed in some ways, maybe in others, but whether it was the effect of psychoanalysis or the culture, it's hard to say. A kind of two step process, I think, and part of it has to do with psychoanalysis. I think the first step is a kind of bursting of repression so that, at least intellectually, if not behaviorally, I felt like, all right, I can have as much sex as I want and with whom I want. And the second step is the more conservative one - it's all right not to have sex. This second step, I think, had more to do with analysis. The first step has more to do with a fantasy of analysis that was unrealistic."

Subject #10 makes a similar point with regard to the altruism-individualism issue.

Interviewer: "Can you describe what you understood to be Roman Catholic values and how you experienced them?"

Subject #10: "They work! One of the things I discovered was that I rejected them all and slowly discovered that I was coming back to them. And they basically have to do with not giving yourself a position of priority. Now, that's very difficult to communicate, especially to people who are analytically trained because they immediately begin to suspect that what you are talking about is a weak ego who cannot stand on his own. And that's not what I'm talking about. What I am talking about is an ego that is strong enough to begin to take into his self the care and concern for other people. That's what I would take to be primarily Christian values."

Subject #6 also talks about a temporary impact of the psychoanalytic treatment on his Roman Catholic values.

Interviewer: "What would you say contributed to this change (in your values)."

Subject #6: "My own therapy was a major factor in that. My own therapist who was not a Catholic tried his best to point out to me - I think he may have gone a little overboard as I look back on it because I have since come around to making an adjustment - he pointed out this guilt, this scrupulous conscience, this problem with authority

in terms of the kind of super-respect for authority which went beyond the rational and maybe held me back a bit. And I thank him for that and I think I really grew a lot. But then there was a point in time when I wasn't practising my Catholicism at all, but since then I have gone back to a middle ground."

Some subjects who do not now hold traditional moral values nonetheless acknowledged some conflict between their present moral code and the orientation of psychoanalysis. Most of them appeared to ignore the conflict and, indeed, it was often only the probing questions of the interview which made the conflict conscious. The report of Subject #8 appears representative of the way the subjects have dealt with the problem.

Interviewer: "How do you resolve or deal with that conflict (altruism vs. individualism)?"

Subject #8: "I don't."

Interviewer: "You have just ignored the problem?"

Subject #8: "Pretty much. I didn't actively reject it when you proposed it and I think that was at least a minimal openness to looking at it. But it's something I don't talk about. I've dealt with it by not doing much about it at all."

Subject #2 describes in some detail (previously quoted in part) both the impact of psychoanalysis on his Roman Catholic values as well as the pain and struggle involved in attempting to integrate the two.

Interviewer: "You have mentioned that there were some moral values that were challenged by the psychoanalytic system. How have you dealt with that challenge?"

Subject #2: "I experience it as still settling. It hasn't jelled yet .....In the meantime there is slight discomfort at times at having to be a pioneer. Even though there are thousands of us pioneers out there, you have to do it a little bit on your own - a lot on your own. There are a lot of people who are kindred spirits but, as

a matter of fact, the institutional hierarchy of the magisterium of the Church would still say: "No! How dare you! you're not part of us." And I still want to be part of the worshipping community, so I have to live with the schizophrenia of saying: "I'll take that part of it but I have to take the other with a huge grain of salt. So I would say, yes, I am developing one that has more to do with my own experience, that listens to norms as a corrective kind of thing but has to make personal decisions. I think in the area of sexuality a lot of that has already jelled. I think that may have been the cutting edge. So many things I took as absolutes were very relative and had more to do so with being an Irish Catholic than even being just a Catholic. It's culture on top of religion. So, I would say, yes, a new norm is forming, and one of the other elements of the new norm that I feel is a challenge but that I haven't integrated enough yet is the more social awareness aspect of morality. I am aware that I think in those categories, yet I am finding it very hard to incarnate that sufficiently to appease that part of my super-ego. Maybe that's going to be the new form of altruism. A new one is forming and it has to do with some of these pivotal things of being comfortable with my own thoughts and feelings and activity. On the other hand, I guess it's a more positive view of human nature than I was raised with. Human nature was the enemy, and this cloak of religion was the thing that would cover human nature - much in Luther's man as a dung-heap covered by snow. "Grace" was the snow but underneath there was .....Man is a fallible, striving person whose truest nature is to continue the quest and to be open, open-ended and transcendent, but who lives a very ordinary life, making hard decisions, dealing with his own instincts, dealing with conflict between people. I guess you would call it more realistic and more complicated."

## 6. Other Issues

A number of other issues, not the direct focus of this study, emerged from the data.

### A. The Impact of Psychoanalysis on Belief

Some subjects described psychoanalysis as presenting challenges to their belief system.

Subject #2 says: "I don't know if this gets off the field but I would say the whole belief system is something that I'm re-thinking. I believe that it is possible to decide to believe after having discovered the elements of your own personal belief that may, in fact, be wishful thinking and looking for a father figure or projections or whatever. And certainly Freud and a lot of his followers, for whatever their personal reasons can have some hostility towards belief as somewhat regressive, somewhat reality-denial. I just don't think it is. My own experience certainly sends me searching very much into a transcendent person. So that's one that could be in potential conflict but I suppose it depends very much on the individual analyst. My own analyst happened to believe in God."

Subject #4 struggles with a similar issue. Referring to psychoanalysis, he says:

"It made a person dependent not on God but dependent on psychoanalysis for the rest of their lives and we have the phenomenon of people substituting psychoanalysis for religion, going on interminably in analysis. It has become their religion and their culture and their way of life. And it's not a very good substitute because it doesn't do what God and the Church does. At least they give you something to look forward to after you're dead. Psychoanalysis doesn't. It says nothing about immortality which is at the heart of the existential problem about man. Now I'm not blaming psychoanalysis for taking belief in immortality away from me. That's my own problem - how I deal with my own doubts about immortality and how I face the problem of death. And obviously, psychoanalysis has not given me any help at all with that problem."

It is important to note that this subject had a negative experience of his psychoanalytic treatment which may partly explain what sounds like antagonism towards psychoanalysis. Subject #7 discusses what he sees as a tendency towards reductionism in psychoanalysis. He says:

"Its reductionism in religious thinking is another example (of the impact of psychoanalysis). In other words, at its most blatant orthodox, it tends not to know what to do with the religious strivings or the spiritual strivings. At its best when it comes to sublimation it really is a poor explanation of the whole aesthetic. It very poorly understands those

and is in danger of ending up with a "nothing but...".

Subject #9 also comments on the issue.

"I think I was having difficulty before I ever went into therapy, believing. I think the therapy itself and dealing more and more and on deeper and deeper levels pushed it out of the window. There was no room for it. It became something useless, something you give up when you grow up."

This is an issue that would require a much more systematic gathering of data before any conclusions could be drawn as to the impact of psychoanalysis on Catholic belief. However, it is surely significant that a number of subjects raised the issue spontaneously.

#### B. Professional Identity Conflict

Some subjects talked about the difficulties which their former training as Roman Catholic priests posed for them in their present profession as therapists. Two of them (#1 and #4) report that the need and desire to help others, in particular the less fortunate, interfered with their ability to effectively practise their therapeutic profession. Subject #1, in discussing the issue of altruism, makes the following comment:

Interviewer: "So you have a different view of what it means to help someone."

Subject #1: "Yes. I don't even like to help people. I don't want to help them. I want to provide that most perfect dyad setting that allows them to go back to issues that were unresolved and to have another shot to look at those. And I know that this is a helpful way to be. But when I slip and say I want to help them, I am betraying the old part of me, the priest part of me that wants to help people, and my supervisor catches me sometimes. "You sound like you're preaching again."

Subject #4 makes an almost identical point but is even more distressed by his inability to overcome the need to help others. He says:

"I have this thing where I think I have got to help you and when people come in on a one to one level and just spew out all their problems, I feel guilty if I don't help them and I'm generally depressed because of all the people I have and all their problems that I'm not doing anything about. I feel guilty that I'm not doing anything about them. And I've been told over and over again in therapy and with my colleagues, etc. that it is not my responsibility to do something for these people, that I'm simply to be here to eventually help them to help themselves, but I feel depressed over all their problems."

Interviewer: "Where do you think that comes from?"

Subject #4: It has a lot to do with my previous profession and a lot to do with something that's previous to my going into the priesthood."

This subject goes on to talk about his need to communicate some "faith" to his patients and the inability of psychoanalysis to do this.

"Psychoanalysis seems to throw me onto myself and there's no substitute. It doesn't substitute faith in anything else - neither of faith in mankind or faith in God or faith in life. Maybe it's my own fault that I associate it that way but it's just my impression that psychoanalysis leaves you dead-ended. It sends you back to finding out where you got screwed up developmentally, the bad attitudes and bad feelings that you had because of your perceptions of your parents and the significant people in your life but then it doesn't give you any faith. It doesn't tell you everything is going to be O.K. I've been reprimanded at least three times by my supervisor here who heard me reassuring patients and saying, "You are going to be O.K. Don't worry." And she was saying to me, "It's antitherapeutic. It's bad. Don't do that. You have no right to say to anybody, "It's going to be O.K." But it's so much ingrained in me. It's what I learned as a priest for twenty-four years and in my nature that I have the need to believe that it's going to be O.K. Otherwise, life isn't worth living. I have to have some sort of faith in the graciousness of life itself."

Subject #8, on the other hand, sees his therapeutic profession as an extension of his priestly helping role. He says:

"Even in the Seminary, it was commented that I

was especially helpful to the down and outers. So I left the order and I'm a psychologist and I'm still doing it. So I haven't changed. My state of life has changed but I'm still sort of that."

It is very notable that some subjects used religious symbolism to describe aspects of their therapeutic work. One would therefore wonder about the influence of their previous profession on their work and the extent to which some of these factors may be operating on an unconscious level. Thus, Subject #8, in discussing the conflict between his former role as priest and his new role as analyst makes an interesting slip of the tongue.

"Maybe I do experience some conflict that I'm not acknowledging, between at least following my old religious approach and trying to act upon what I am preaching through my interpretations in the consulting room."

It is not clear to what extent this subject really sees himself as "preaching" through his interpretations but it highlights his conflict over his role identity. Subject #6 also uses the term "preaching" to describe an aspect of his therapeutic work. The context is a discussion of the change he has undergone in dealing with his own aggressive tendencies. He says:

"Psychology has had an impact on my handling of aggression and my point of view about it. And I think I have preached that, so to speak, in therapy with other people."

It is certainly all the more fascinating that both subjects used the term "preaching" to describe areas of their work as therapists which is at variance with their original approach as priests. One would wonder about some unconscious view of themselves as "preaching" a "new" gospel.

Subject #9 directly addresses the impact of his previous profession

and uses religious terminology to describe what he considers an important aspect of the therapeutic process.

Interviewer: "Were there any values that were strengthened by your contact with the psychoanalytic system?"

Subject #9: "If any, it might be the value that has to do with the worth of the individual - the individual's worth, the potential for growth, the need for forgiveness, if you want to talk about it in almost a religious sense - for one to be able to forgive oneself for things one does wrong, that caused pain to oneself or to others. I'm sure there has equally been a great influence on my treatment by my background in religion even though I might not want to readily acknowledge that."

One wonders to what extent this subject unconsciously sees himself as a vehicle for providing forgiveness for his patients, a carryover from his original priestly functions.

Finally, in a clear, direct statement, Subject #10 appears to equate the role of the priest with that of the analyst. He says:

"I think a good analyst has to nearly be a holy man. He has to be able to be as self-possessed as any description I know of enlightened men."

These issues would surely provide fruitful areas of future research.

## CONCLUSION

This thesis has explored an issue which is as complex as it is controversial. Yet it is of undeniably fundamental importance for the profession of psychotherapy. The central issue which has been focussed upon is the relationship between psychotherapy (taking psychoanalysis as its representative) and Christian moral values (taking Roman Catholic moral values as its representative). The rationale for choosing these representative positions, as well as the difficulties inherent in any attempt to accurately articulate them, have already been discussed. It is necessary, however, to respond to another criticism namely that both these viewpoints represent extreme positions, neither of which holds much sway in our present day so that an exploration of any conflict between them would be moot. It has been argued, citing theoretical literature, that both these approaches continue to have significant influence today. The reports of the subjects interviewed, provided support for this argument.

In the first part of the thesis, I presented theoretical arguments to show that even though the psychoanalytic approach claims to be neutral, it does, in fact, have an influence on the moral values of its followers. I went on to provide, from the theoretical literature, a description of the nature of the conflict which could be expected to arise in a confrontation between psychoanalysis and traditional Roman Catholic moral values.

The second part of the thesis presented the results of an empirical study which was intended to provide, on the one hand, some general confirmation of the conclusions arrived at in the theoretical section and,

on the other hand, a description of the way in which this conflict was experienced in real life as well as attempts which were made at resolution.

In spite of the limitations of the research method and the essentially descriptive nature of the study, it seems undeniable that the study provides ample support for a thesis that the psychoanalytic experience does indeed have an impact on traditional Roman Catholic moral values. There is also support for the contention that moral values in the areas of sexuality, aggression and altruism are affected by exposure to psychoanalysis. The nature of the impact was experienced basically as encouraging greater freedom of choice in moral matters, permitting a fuller acknowledgement and acceptance of thoughts, feelings and fantasies, and diminishing guilt feelings. All subjects experienced their "new" morality as more meaningful than their "old".

The fact that all the subjects in the study except one had rejected the traditional approach to moral values - and the one exception interpreted these values much more liberally - strongly suggests that there is an incompatibility between these values and the value orientation in psychoanalysis.

Some subjects reported conflict over their rejection of the official Roman Catholic teaching on morality. They appeared to resolve this conflict by viewing their present moral position as more authentically Christian and as retaining the true essence of the Christian approach. These subjects, and others, expressed the view that authentic Christian values and the values one would derive from an analysis are very similar in essence.

Some subjects who had rejected the bulk of the traditional Roman

Catholic moral teaching, nonetheless experienced conflict between their present value system (which retained certain aspects of Roman Catholic morality) and the psychoanalytic approach. These subjects appeared to ignore the problem and to use a form of "compartmentalization" to keep their Christian values and their "psychoanalytic values" strictly apart.

#### Directions for Future Research

The consistency in the reports of these subjects as to the effect of their analytic experience, even though this experience ranged from Freudian to Sullivanian and even included one Adlerian, suggests that the kinds of influence described probably hold true for a wide range of therapeutic approaches. Further research in this area may make it possible to more clearly articulate the precise nature of the impact of various psychotherapeutic approaches on different moral value systems.

The study also generated some data which suggests other directions for future research. A number of subjects commented on their need to review their belief system after exposure to psychoanalysis. This conflict between psychoanalysis and Christian belief has a long history but the debate has tended to remain on the theoretical level and has often degenerated into angry recriminations from both sides. Now that the polemic has largely abated, it may be possible to explore the issue in an empirical manner. That there seems to be an enormous reluctance to do so, perhaps out of fear of re-opening old wounds, makes the task all the more necessary.

A less controversial direction for possible future research would be an exploration of the manner in which former religious professionals take up their new role as psychotherapists. It has been noted that, in recent years, an increasingly large number of clergymen make this

transition. To what extent does this mean, as some have suggested, that psychotherapy is a new religion with psychotherapists as the new "high priests?" What are some of the specific role conflicts that these subjects experience and how do these affect their therapeutic practice? Research in this area would be helpful, not only to these professionals, but would also help to clarify the role of the psychotherapist in modern times.

In this context, a thorough study of the phenomenon of "compartmentalization" would be very valuable. What are the dynamics involved? How functional is this approach? Are certain types of subjects, rather than others, more likely to use this approach in an attempt to resolve an experienced conflict between their personal value system and values inherent in the psychotherapeutic profession?

All these issues concerning the relationship between religion and psychotherapy have largely been left in a corner to be pursued by a handful of individuals, perceived to be interested in esoteric questions. For a variety of reasons, upon which we can very easily speculate, there has been little support in the profession as a whole for a thorough scientific investigation of these issues. It is therefore important that their relevance for the mainstream of the profession be emphasized. Psychotherapy has taken up its position as a central factor in the life of modern man. Is it to replace religion? Are they to exist side by side with mutual respect but with benign indifference? Or will they be able to complement each other and to search together to discover the truth about man, who is he and what his real needs are? The search for a deeper understanding of man, as he evolves, is a never-ending one. And the task is the responsibility of all men. Success in this venture,

it would seem, can only be attained through a genuine collaboration among those who can find it possible to put aside age-old prejudices and have the courage to question what they have always believed.

## FOOTNOTES

1

This issue is discussed in greater detail later.

2

*Italics mine.*

3

This brings to mind a point raised in the theoretical section of this paper, that theologians in France apparently began making efforts at synthesis between psychoanalysis and Catholicism, long before their counterparts in English-speaking countries.

4

See p. 185.

APPENDIX

APPENDIX 1  
THE CITY COLLEGE  
OF  
THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK  
NEW YORK, N.Y. 10031

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL CENTER  
DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHOLOGY

(212) 690-6602, 3, 4

July 17, 1981

Dear.....,

I am a candidate for the Ph.D. degree in clinical psychology at the City University of New York and I am presently seeking subjects for my dissertation research.

The general purpose of my study is to explore the impact of the psychoanalytic system on traditional Roman Catholic moral values; and I am seeking subjects who have received training both in the psychoanalytic system and in moral theology.

Since I am focussing on the Roman Catholic system of moral values, I would appreciate if you could send me the names and addresses of any students in your program who have received previous training in a Roman Catholic seminary.

I am enclosing a letter of reference from my dissertation sponsor, Dr. Paul Wachtel.

Thanking you in advance for your kind help,

Sincerely yours,

*Jeffrey D. Belgrave*  
.....

Jeffrey D. Belgrave

THE CITY COLLEGE  
OF  
THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK  
NEW YORK, N.Y. 10031

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL CENTER  
DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHOLOGY

(212) 690-6602, 3, 4

June 24, 1981

To Whom It May Concern:

Jeffrey Belgrave is a student of mine in the Ph.D. Program in Clinical Psychology at City College. He is presently working on his dissertation, under my direction, on the topic of the interaction between traditional Christian values and the values embodied in psychoanalysis. In particular, he will be interviewing individuals who have trained for the priesthood or in other ways had extensive theological training and who subsequently underwent training in psychoanalysis or psychotherapy. He will be examining the value conflicts these individuals encountered and the ways in which they sought resolution. The study should be of value both as an examination of a group of individuals who have experienced an interesting challenge and growth experience and for the light it sheds on broader issues of the implicit values of the mental health professions and their relation to the larger social context.

This is a topic of great significance at the present time especially, and Jeff is someone uniquely qualified to carry it off. Jeff is himself a former Roman Catholic priest who has undergone training in a psychoanalytically oriented clinical psychology training program. Moreover, he is one of the ablest students our program has produced. He is as well an extremely responsible individual and someone who can be trusted to approach his interviews with potential subjects with tact and sensitivity.

Consequently, I am asking your assistance in our effort to locate potential subjects for this study. Jeff is writing to the heads of clinical psychology doctoral programs, psychiatric residency programs, and psychoanalytic training programs for the names of students or former students who might be suitable for his study. If you know of any such individuals, please be assured that Jeff's research has the enthusiastic endorsement of our faculty and that he is a man of integrity and maturity.

If you have any questions about Jeff's research, please feel free to contact me at the above number or address.

AN EQUAL OPPORTUNITY EMPLOYER

Sincerely,  
  
Paul L. Wachtel  
Prof. and Assoc. Director

THE CITY COLLEGE  
OF  
THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK  
NEW YORK, N.Y. 10031

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL CENTER  
DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHOLOGY

(212) 690-6602, 3, 4

July 17, 1981

Dear.....,

I am a former Roman Catholic priest, currently pursuing studies towards a Ph.D. degree in clinical psychology at the City University of New York. I am presently seeking subjects for my dissertation research, the general purpose of which is to explore the impact of the psychoanalytic system on Christian moral values.

You have been referred to me as someone whose previous training in a Roman Catholic seminary would provide you with special expertise in this matter. I would greatly appreciate it if you would consent to be interviewed by me in connection with this study. Needless to say, you can be assured of complete confidentiality. I am also enclosing a letter of reference from my dissertation sponsor, Dr. Paul Wachtel.

The interview will take no more than an hour and a half. I will accomodate myself to a time and place that is convenient to you.

Please return the enclosed card indicating whether or not you are willing to be interviewed. If you are willing, I will call you soon to set up a time and place for our meeting. I would also welcome the names and addresses of any other persons you might know who would be suitable subjects for this study.

Looking forward to meeting you,

Sincerely yours,

*Jeffrey D. Belgrave*  
.....

Jeffrey D. Belgrave

THE CITY COLLEGE  
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THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK  
NEW YORK, N.Y. 10031

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL CENTER  
DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHOLOGY

(212) 690-6602, 3, 4

July 3, 1981


To Whom It May It Concern:

Jeffrey Belgrave is a student in good standing in the Ph.D. Program in Clinical Psychology at City College. The project for which he is soliciting your cooperation has been approved by a committee of the faculty and will be a doctoral dissertation under my direction. Both Mr. Belgrave and the research he is conducting have my unqualified endorsement.

Your cooperation in the conduct of this research will be greatly appreciated.

If you have any questions about this project, feel free to call me at City College.

Sincerely,



Paul L. Wachtel, Ph.D.  
Professor and Associate Director

Dear Mr. Belgrave,

I am willing to be interviewed in connection  
with your study.

You can call me at .....  
(phone number)

on ..... at.....  
(date) (time)

to arrange a time and place for the interview.

Name.....

## SCHEDULE A

## Questionnaire

A. Background Information

1. Age
2. Are you now a Catholic priest?
3. How long have you been (were you) a Catholic priest?
4. When did you leave the Catholic priesthood?
5. Can you say in a few words what prompted your decision to leave the Catholic priesthood?

B. Experience of the Christian Moral System

6. What kind of training, if any, did you receive in moral theology?
7. How would you describe that approach to morality? (Would you describe it as the "traditional" approach in the Catholic Church?)
8. Can you say something of your experience of the practice of these teachings in your life?
9. Were there any aspects of this moral teaching that you questioned? Then? Previously (When)? Now? What were they?
10. Did you ever teach or preach these morals?
11. What aspects of this moral system were you able to teach or preach with the greatest conviction? With the least conviction?

C. Experience of the Psychoanalytic System

12. When did you first come into contact with the psychoanalytic system? What was the nature of this contact?
13. Have you been in psychoanalytic psychotherapy? How long?
14. Did you find your therapy useful? In what way?

15. How would you describe the orientation of your therapist?
16. Did you receive training in the psychoanalytic method?  
How long was your training?
17. What was the nature of your training?
18. What was the orientation of your training?
19. Do you practice psychoanalytic psychotherapy? How long?
20. How would you describe your orientation?
21. What is your present profession?
22. How did you come to choose your present profession?

D. The Impact of the Psychoanalytic System on the Christian Moral System

23. How has your contact with the psychoanalytic system affected your life?
24. How would you rate the following aspects of the system in terms of their impact on your life? Therapy-Training-Practice?
25. Has the influence of the psychoanalytic system affected the quality of your life? In what way?
26. Has the psychoanalytic system affected your moral values?
27. Are there some aspects which have been more affected than others? Which?
28. Are there some previously-held moral values which you have specifically rejected? Which?
29. Are there some that you have specifically retained? Which?
30. Are there some that you have specifically retained but reworked?
31. Are there some that have been strengthened by the influence of the psychoanalytic system?

32. In general, did you experience in your life a conflict between the Christian values which you were taught and values which you found in the psychoanalytic system?
33. How did you attempt to resolve this conflict?
34. Another general question which may be somewhat repetitive: Do you feel that your moral values now are different from the moral values that you were previously trained in and once held? If so, what part did the psychoanalytic system play in this change of values?
35. You have mentioned some areas that you felt have been affected by the psychoanalytic system. What about the following areas? Sex, Aggression, Altruism, Absolute moral norms, Sin, Original sin, Sins of thought, Guilt, Conscience, Obedience to authority.
36. Is there anything else you would like to add on the matter?

## SCHEDULE B

## Schedule of Questions

(to be used during the interview)

A. Background Information

1. Age
2. Are you now a Catholic Priest?
3. How long have you been (were you) a Catholic priest?
4. When did you leave the priesthood?
5. Can you say a few words as to what prompted your decision to leave the priesthood?

B. Experience of the Christian Moral System

6. What kind of training did you receive in moral theology?
7. Are you familiar with traditional Roman Catholic moral theology?
8. What would you say are the important features of the traditional approach?
9. Can you say something about what it was like to practice these teachings?
10. Were there aspects of this moral teaching that you questioned? Then? Now? What were they?

C. Experience of the Psychoanalytic System

11. Are you familiar with the psychoanalytic system? In what way?
12. Have you been in psychoanalytic psychotherapy or analysis?  
How long?
13. How would you describe the orientation of your analyst?
14. Did you find your therapy useful? In what way?

15. Did you receive training in the psychoanalytic system?
16. What is your present profession?
17. Can you say a few words about your transition from the field of religious ministry to psychotherapeutic practice?

D. The Impact of the Psychoanalytic System on the Christian Moral System

18. Has the psychoanalytic system had an impact on your value system?  
In what way?
19. Has the psychoanalytic system affected your moral values?  
In what way?
20. Are there some previously-held moral values which you have specifically rejected? Which?
21. Are there some which you have specifically retained?
22. Are there ways in which some have been retained but re-worked?
23. Are there some which have been strengthened by the influence of the psychoanalytic system?
24. I would now like to ask about some specific areas of moral values and I ask you to reflect on whether the psychoanalytic system has had an impact on your values in these areas:
  - a) sex
  - b) aggression
  - c) altruism
  - d) absolute moral norms
25. Is there anything else you would like to make on the matter?
26. Could you make a few comments about the interview process itself?
27. Are there any persons you know who might be suitable subjects for this study?

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