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REDISCOVERING *BOSEI*

The Transformation of Western Ideas in Japan

by

Masami Tamagawa

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Sociology in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City University of New York

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Abstract

REDISCOVERING *BOSEI*: THE TRANSFORMATION OF WESTERN IDEAS IN JAPAN

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Japanese gender discrimination is deeply embedded in its socio-cultural structure and ideology. So issues stemming from gender discrimination may sometimes not appear to be explicitly sexist or problematic. Japanese feminists, too, can possibly be bound by them, and may fail to see that they really are the causes of Japanese gender discrimination. In modern Japanese feminist history, there have been a number of cases in which Japanese feminists tried their best to improve the conditions of Japanese women, often by co-opting Western feminist ideas. In some respects, they were successful; their seemingly “feminist” activities, however, paradoxically resulted in the perpetuation of the structure and ideology of Japanese gender discrimination. In particular, *bosei* a Japanese gender ideology has been taken for granted even by Japanese feminists, and very few Japanese feminists have so far approached and examined it as a social construct.

This dissertation explores a genealogy of *bosei* as a socially constructed idea, and examines how it was first invented and has since then been repeatedly legitimated and reinforced by Japanese feminist intellectuals, thus becoming a powerful ideological means to confine Japanese women to their supposedly “traditional” gender roles.

In particular, this dissertation examines the feminist writings by Fukuzawa Yukichi, Hiratsuka Raichō, Takamure Itsue, Aoki Yayoi and Ueno Chizuko. Co-opting

John Stuart Mill's *Subjection of Women*, Fukuzawa helped establish the foundation of Japanese women's "modern" gender roles as "Good Wives, Wise Mothers" in Meiji Japan. In the 1910s, Hiratsuka co-opted Ellen Key's maternalism, and became the nation's first *bosei* advocate, thereby helping constitute the two pillars of the ideal "traditional" Japanese womanhood. During World War II, Takamure became *the* feminist war ideologue by incorporating *bosei*-ism into the nation's imperial expansionism. The early 1980s witnessed a rediscovery of *bosei* by Aoki in the guise of ecofeminism. Finally, this dissertation explores Ueno's Marxist feminist writing and offers an explanation for her popularity since the mid-1980s.

Further, this dissertation unmaskes the close relation between the nation's nationalism and gender ideology, by demonstrating how *bosei* was originally constituted and reconstituted in the course of the Japanese nationalist movement, connoting Japanese women's patriotic character.

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- CHAPTER 1 -

**INTRODUCTION: “Good Wives, Wise Mothers,” *Bosei*-ism,
and Japanese Feminist Scholarship**

Introduction

Under the dominance of the Japanese patriarchal system, contemporary Japanese women suffer from persistent social inequality. The leading feminist, Ueno Chizuko, has pointed out the limitations placed on Japanese women in the work force. Because of social structural changes after World War II, Japanese women began increasingly to join the nation's work force. According to Ueno, however, this increase merely reflected the presence of two types of working women in Japan: short-term workers who eventually leave the work force when they marry, become pregnant, or have children; and part-time workers who return to the job market as “middle-aged women” after their children have left home (Ueno 1985, 1990).¹

Japanese gender inequality is explained by a set of beliefs and slogans about women's place in society. These ideas have formed and developed over the last century or so, and constitute Japan's ideology of gender relations. This ideology changes over time, but certain notions are very widespread and persistent. “Good Wives, Wise Mothers” (*ryōsai, kenbo*) and *bosei*-ism are central parts of this ideology. It should be noted that, although Japanese gender ideology, including “Good Wives, Wise Mothers” and *bosei*-ism, defines and guarantees Japanese women's position in society, Japanese

¹ Ueno's theory is supported by Tanaka Shigeto's empirical study. Tanaka shows that the number of part-time women workers continued to increase after the 1960s, comprising approximately 10 percent of Japan's women in 1990, while the proportion of full-time Japanese women workers fluctuated between 26 and 30 percent in the same time period (Tanaka 1996, 151-61).

gender ideology invariably restricts Japanese women from fully participating in that society. Tracing the origins and modifications of these ideas is the central task of this dissertation.

“Good Wives, Wise Mothers” normatively defines Japanese women’s gender roles, and designates that “Family is a woman’s proper sphere and that a woman’s natural vocation is the education of her children” (Sievers 1981, 602; Tachi 1984, 185-209). Despite its general recognition as an expression of “traditional” Japanese women’s gender roles today, the phrase “Good Wives, Wise Mothers” was originally a borrowing from a classic nineteenth-century Western model, particularly Victorian ethics. Under the Meiji government’s modernization policy, the social norms of “Good Wives, Wise Mothers” were imposed from above as an effort to modernize Japanese gender relations, at least, in appearance. It should be noted, however, that the notion of “Good Wives, Wise Mothers” is inherently patriarchal and stresses women’s supportive roles (Tachi 1984, 1986-91; Takamura 1972).

The term *bosei* literally means an instinctive “maternal” nature (Nakajima 1984, 235-63). Compared to “Good Wives, Wise Mothers,” although it also connotes Japanese women’s supportive role, *bosei* is more psychologically bound, and has become part of the inner identity of altruistic Japanese women. Ohinata Masami, one of the few Japanese feminists who critically examined *bosei* as a gender ideology, aptly describes that “the spirit of motherhood [*bosei*] in Japan which led women to sacrifice themselves joyfully for the sake of their children was without parallel” (Ohinata 1995, 203). The concept of *bosei* is well expressed in such phrases like “nothing surpasses a mother’s love” and

“women have an innate ability to raise children” (Ohinata 1995, 204). As I will discuss below, *bosei* was originally constituted and reconstituted in the course of the Japanese nationalist movement, and connotes Japanese women’s nationalistic, particularly patriotic, character, as well as their maternal role.

Paradoxically, Japanese feminist scholarship is partly responsible for the creation and perpetuation of both “Good Wives, Wise Mothers” and *bosei* ideologies. Co-opting John Stuart Mill’s *Subjection of Women*, Fukuzawa Yukichi (1835-1901) helped establish the foundation of Japanese women’s “modern” gender roles as “Good Wives, Wise Mothers” in Meiji Japan (1868-1912). In the 1910s, Hiratsuka Raichō (1886-1971) co-opted Ellen Key’s maternalism, and became the nation’s first *bosei* advocate, thereby helping constitute the two pillars of the ideal “traditional” Japanese womanhood. The term *bosei* was coined during the impassioned *Bosei*-Debate between Hiratsuka and Yosano Akiko (1878-1942), a prominent poet and social critic (Mackie 2003, 45-72; Nishikawa 1993, 239-85; Sievers 1983, 163-88). During World War II, Takamure Itsue (1894-1964) became *the* feminist war ideologue by incorporating *bosei*-ism into the nation’s imperial expansionism (Nakajima 1984, 235-263; Yamashita 1988). And, the early 1980s witnessed a rediscovery of *bosei* by Aoki Yayoi (1927-) in the guise of ecofeminism (Ehara 1985, 15; Sakurai 1990; Ueno 1986 [1985]). As Sandra Buckley aptly explains, Aoki’s conservative return to a nation’s historical past “essentially led the [Japanese] feminist movement back full cycle, yet again, to the ‘motherhood debate’” (Buckley 1994, 181).

Gender discrimination in Japan is deeply embedded in its socio-cultural structure and ideology. So issues stemming from gender discrimination may sometimes not appear to be explicitly sexist or problematic. Japanese feminists, too, can possibly be profoundly bound by them, and may fail to see that they really are the causes of Japanese gender discrimination. In modern Japanese feminist history, there have been a number of cases in which Japanese feminists tried their best to improve the conditions of Japanese women, often by co-opting Western feminist ideas. In some respects, they were successful; their seemingly “feminist” activities, however, paradoxically resulted in the perpetuation of the structure and ideology of gender discrimination in Japan. In particular, *bosei* a Japanese gender ideology has been taken for granted even by Japanese feminists, and very few Japanese feminists have so far approached and examined it as a social construct.

This dissertation explores a genealogy of *bosei* as a socially constructed idea, and examines the ways in which it was first invented and has since then been repeatedly legitimated and reinforced by Japanese feminist intellectuals, thus becoming a powerful ideological means to confine Japanese women to their supposedly “traditional” gender roles.

Western feminist ideas have played an important role in the development of Japanese gender ideologies. This dissertation will also explore how Western ideas of women’s roles have been absorbed into Japanese society, and demonstrate that when Western feminist ideas are imported, interpreted and applied by Japanese “feminist” intellectuals, they quickly become loaded with Japanese ruling class ideologies.

In order to offer an explanation for this paradoxical consequence of Japanese feminist scholarship, I will examine the close relationship between feminist discourse and nationalism. This relationship, as I will show, has a strong influence on the formation of feminist discourse, and *vice versa*, but this has so far been overlooked. Nationalism has typically been regarded as an exclusively patriarchal concept (West 1997, xi-xxxvi). So, the ways in which women participate in nationalist activities have not received sufficient attention. Nor have the ways in which women's gender roles are defined as "national subjects" been explored enough. Through the chapters that follow, I will demonstrate that the designation of women's roles consists of one of the key components of nationalism. Furthermore, women are not passive bystanders, but play a central role in defining their nationalistic roles as gendered subjects.

Sociological Concepts and Social Inequality in Japan

In this section, I will introduce a variety of sociological concepts that will prove important in our discussion of gender ideology in Japan. Notions of class conflicts, ideology, and nationalism discussed below are conceptual building blocks for our later analyses of gender ideologies in Japan.

Systems or functional theory (Durkheim 1947 [1912]; Parsons 1951) premises that social arrangements—including gender roles—are made, not by chance, but for some meaningful reasons related to the society's functional efficacy. Each interdependent part of society, for example, the majority and minority, or men and women, performs some function toward the "stability and equilibrium" of the system. One of the most criticized aspects of system theory is its implication of political conservatism, including an

acceptance of the current sexual division of labor as functional, necessary, and natural (Dahrendorf 1958; Gouldner 1970).

By contrast, class theory premises that many social arrangements are tilted in favor of the ruling class, which possesses power to exercise control over the rest of society (Dahrendorf 1959; Marx 1978 [e.g.1859]; Mills 1956). Unlike systems theory, social conflict is seen as a natural aspect of society, because of the inevitability of conflicting interests among groups, resulting from an unequal distribution of wealth and power. One of the strengths of class theory is its ability to explain the causes of a seemingly harmonious society by the notion of a dominant “ideology,” which, according to Karl Marx, refers to the political as well as cultural systems determined by the ruling class (Marx 1978 [e.g. 1859]).

According to class theory, the reason that distorted images of a harmonious, egalitarian Japanese society have come to dominate is that the ruling class possess the ideological capital to influence the ways people define Japanese society (Sugimoto 1997). That is, the ruling class has the political means but also other indirect means to influence the masses through the educational system, the legal system, and the mass media (Althusser 1971). Without maintaining the current system the ruling class could no longer maintain its privileged position in the society. Therefore, to teach the masses the meaning of Japanese society, for example, “What is Japan?” “What is Japanese culture?” “Who are Japanese women” *etc.* through ideological means constitutes one of the most important activities of the ruling class. And such efforts by the ruling class help maintain and perpetuate social inequality in contemporary Japanese society.

Louis Althusser's (1971) differentiation of consensus by coercion ("State Apparatus") and consensus by ideology ("Ideological State Apparatus") and Antonio Gramsci's (1971) conceptualizations of the state as "coercion plus hegemony," which is equivalent to Althusser's SA and ISA, are also relevant for the analysis of the ruling class ideology in contemporary Japanese society.

Nevertheless, class theory, like other sociological theories developed in the West, has a decisive drawback. Class theory, which emphasizes the role of "conflict" between groups and classes *in* societies, is often devoid of insight into international factors (Rex 1970) including westernization, which, for my study, has a major sociopolitical significance to Japanese domestic affairs. Even when the notion of westernization is incorporated, class theory discloses its Euro-centricity and examines westernization only as a progressive transformation force, not as a problematic one (Avineri 1969; Dirlik 1994; Said 1979).

Westernization, Nationalism, and Democracy

Japanese westernization is generally characterized by two historical milestones of sociopolitical change: the Meiji Restoration of 1868 and the military defeat of 1945 (Smith 1998, xx; Wakabayashi 1998, 1). The first two decades of the Meiji are called "Civilization and Enlightenment" (*bunmei kaika*), when the ideas of European liberal thinkers, such as John Stuart Mill and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, were introduced by Japanese "enlightenment" (*keimo*) scholars (Pyle 1998, 100). On the other hand, 1945 is marked by the adoption of "democracy à l'américaine" and elements of Western liberal thought, including the liberation of women and freedom of speech, were imposed under

U.S. occupation (Barshay 1998, 279-307; Smith 1998). As a result, according to Wakabayashi, “most Japanese would refuse to live by the pre-1945 imperial ethos. Thus, democracy, individual freedom, egalitarianism, pacifism, and the rule of law to uphold basic human rights can be violated only by devious means and over public protest” in contemporary Japanese society (Wakabayashi 1998, 1).

Contrary to the popular “official” image of a successful process of westernization, like Wakabayashi’s, Japan today is a country where the ruling class manipulates the popular democratic images of Japanese society (Sugimoto 1997), as exemplified by the popular notion of Japan as “one-class society” (De Roy 1979) and a “land of equality” (Tominaga 1982). In fact, Japanese society is a class society (Ōhashi 1971; SSM III—The Social Stratification and Mobility Project of the Japanese Sociological Association 1995; Sugimoto 1997) and consists of many subgroups (De Vos and Wagatsuma 1966; Weiner 1997; Miyajima 1997; Murphy-Shigematsu 1993; Ōnuma 1992; Sugimoto 1997).

The notion of Japanese “egalitarianism” is a myth (Ishikawa 1994; Tachibanaki and Yagi 1994). According to a Gini index study—a measurement of income inequality—conducted by Toshiaki Tachibanaki and Tadashi Yagi in 1994, Japan’s income inequality is one of the highest among advanced nations (Tachibanaki and Yagi 1994). Also, Keiko Shimono (1991 and 1992) and Masako Ozawa (1989) suggest that Japan is a class society based on land ownership.² Other scholars have given attention to the issue of the reproduction of class and examined the Japanese education system (Inui 1990; SSM III 1995). They find that opportunities for higher education are restricted to

² Ozawa’s study of consumer behavior revealed that, compared to those who have major assets, the life styles of those who do not have such property assets are rather restricted to keep up their ordinary life styles (Ozawa 1989).

the sons and daughters of the higher class and claim that the notion of “examination hell,” a metaphor for meritocracy, erroneously characterizes the nature of the Japanese education system (Inui 1990).

Some theorists of nationalism argue that the development of nationalism itself is a process of westernization (Kohn 1944; Gellner 1964; Smith 1981; Chatterjee 1986). And so attention must now be directed to the ways in which the development of nationalism in the East is problematized, in order further to explore some of the reasons for the contrast between the undemocratic realities of contemporary Japanese society and its popular “official” image of Japanese westernization and classlessness.

A number of theorists of nationalism have pointed to the contradictory nature of the relationship between nationalism and democracy in the East (Kohn 1944, 1955, 1962; Plamenatz 1976; Gellner 1964; Smith 1981; Guha 1974; Chatterjee 1986, 1993). According to Hans Kohn and John Plamenatz, the “liberal dilemma” (Chatterjee 1986, 3) is the most notable characteristic of the development of nationalism in the East. In the West nationalism is a vehicle for individual freedom (Chatterjee 1986, 3; Kohn 1955).³ But, this is not the case in Asian nations. Kohn and Plamenatz see circumstantial factors, for example, “conditions unpropitious to freedom” (Plamenatz 1976, 27), liable for the development of an “evil” nationalism, which, according to Kohn, is opposed to “good” nationalism (Wolf 1976, 651-672). Ernest Gellner and A.D. Smith take a similar position arguing that nationalisms that generate such problems are “special” (Gellner 1964) or

³ Likewise, Western feminists generally discuss “feminist nationalism” as a vehicle of women’s freedom, for example, *Feminist Nationalism* (1997), edited by Lois A. West.

“deviant” cases (Smith 1981), which can be empirically contrasted with the authentic or ideal type of nationalism observed in Europe.

Although these scholars correctly point out the contradictory consequences of nationalism in the East, there are strong reasons to be skeptical of such Eurocentric or, more specifically, “liberal-rationalistic” approaches presented by Kohn, Plamenatz, Gellner and Smith. The “sociological” explanations that take the conditions of empirically observable external facts for the development of good (normal) or bad (special) nationalism are devoid of insight into the social as well as the political processes involved in the development of nationalism (Chatterjee 1986, 1-35).

Theories of nationalism reviewed above share a pessimistic view: There is no possibility of the development of “true” Western democracy in the East, because the necessary preconditions are not found there. Although it might well be supported by empirical studies, this hypothetical statement should not be regarded as conclusive. The fact that domestic sociopolitical affairs are closely related to the process of westernization (westernization as a political process) must be taken into consideration. And, pertinent questions must be addressed, such as, what are the meanings of “advanced” Western ideas in Eastern societies, and what is the role of intellectuals involved in the process.

Western Ideas and Japanese Nationalism

There have been various scholarly attempts to explore the intricate relationship between Western ideas and the formation of modern Japanese thought. In *Science in Translation: Movement of Knowledge through Cultures and Time* (2000), Scott L. Montgomery challenges the belief that the transfer of scientific works is simply mechanical and

therefore has little historical importance. Montgomery's study insightfully shows the development of extreme eugenicist, often racist, thought in early twentieth-century Japan, as a result of the introduction of Herbert Spencer's social Darwinism before Charles Darwin's *Origin of Species* became available to the Japanese (Montgomery 2000, 232-5).

Douglas R. Howland's *Translating the West: Language and Political Reason in Nineteenth-Century Japan* (2002) similarly explores the development of modern Japanese political thought, focusing on the transfer of notions of "liberty," "rights," and "society" to Japan in early Meiji. Unlike Montgomery, Howland, seeks to challenge "the widespread assumption of semantic transparency" (Howland 2002, 6) and examines Japanese translations of Western ideas as they were pragmatically used in Japanese political debate from the perspective of semiotics. Howland shows that in the face of Western imperial advancement to East Asia, even progressive intellectuals, including Fukuzawa, came to define "liberty," "rights," and "society" in ways distinctively different from their original Western meanings, and did so in a way that favored the state over the people (Howland 2002, 94-182).⁴

Sakai Naoki's *Translation and Subjectivity: On "Japan" and Cultural Nationalism* (1997) explores the construction of the Japanese as a national subject with Western ideas. According to Sakai, this is a consequence of the "problematic of translation" (the transfer of Western ideas to Japan), by which internal diversity in Japan is repressed in favor of "national" homogeneity and unity. Sakai calls this problematic "cofigurations"—the presumed oppositions between Japan and the West in terms of, for

⁴ A more detailed account of the transfer of these Western concepts to Japan will be provided in Chapter 4.

example, collectivity/individuality and tradition/modernity, that have persisted in the ways intellectuals articulate ideas about Japan. In his analysis of Watsuji Tetsurō (1889-1960), a prominent Japanese cultural anthropologist, Sakai finds a strong influence of Karl Marx and Martin Heidegger on Watsuji's anthropological theory of Japanese cultural unity reified by the Emperor, and concludes that Watsuji's theory really is a contraposition of Western cultural theory (Sakai 1997, 72-116). In addition, Sakai suggests that Watsuji's anthropological Japanese cultural theory became the intellectual framework for *nihonjinron* (theories of the Japanese) (Sakai 1997, 115).⁵

All these percipient studies illustrate some of unexpected, often paradoxical, consequences of the transfer of Western ideas to Japan. However, they have limitations. Although it appropriately points out some unexpected consequences of the accidents of book circulation, Montgomery's study does not pay sufficient attention to the choices made by Japanese intellectuals. Pertinent questions must be addressed, such as: What Western ideas were co-opted by Japanese intellectuals and why? Howland's study examined the ways in which the meanings of Western democratic ideas changed in the Japanese context. Yet, through the total absence of more democratic voices in his analysis, Howland's study erroneously leads us to consider the Japanese incapable of understanding Western democratic ideas at all in Meiji Japan. Who were these particular intellectuals, who imported Western political ideas, and whose interests did they represent? In this regard, Sakai's study valuably pays attention to Japanese internal diversity, which was repressed in favor of "national" unity. However, Sakai's somehow static "cofiguration" by which he sees the formation of the Japanese "national" subject as

⁵ *Nihonjinron* will be discussed in detail in Chapter 7.

an inevitable consequence of the transfer of Western ideas to Japan, is questionable. Isn't it just as important to consider the diverse interpretations of Western ideas by the Japanese as to consider internal diversity in Japan? Whose interpretation gained the upper hand and why?

The Co-optation of Western Ideas as a Political Process

Ranajit Guha's discourse analysis of "vanguard" intellectuals in 19th century India, which sheds light on the "dilemma" of Indian anti-colonial criticism, offers an exemplary analysis of the transfer of Western ideas as a political process (Guha 1974). According to Guha, Indian nationalist critics of British colonialism "challenged" the unequal international structural relations. However, simultaneously, the criticism resulted in a further subjugation of the colonized. The reason, according to Guha, is that the Indians' criticism of the British was constructed exclusively within a European "liberal rational" framework of thought. "There was an abiding faith in the rationality and impartiality of English law and in the good intentions of the colonial administration taken as a whole" (Chatterjee 1986, 26). Therefore, as a consequence, anti-colonial criticism itself, at the subconscious level, taught the colonized masses the power of the colonial European culture and its "acceptance" as an intellectual premise (Guha 1974, 1-46).

Guha also pointed out a larger sociopolitical consequence of this. As a consequence of the anti-colonial criticism by "vanguard" intellectuals in 19th century India, its potential for an anti-colonial new national-popular consciousness was diverted to

an immense hinterland of compromise and reformism into which to retreat from a direct contest for power with the colonial masters...And, thus, "improvement,"

that characteristic ideological gift of nineteenth-century British capitalism, is made to pre-empt and replace the urge for a revolutionary transformation of society. (Guha 1974, 11).

Guha's analysis insightfully demonstrates some of the contradictory consequences of the transfer of Western ideas to the East by shedding light on the ways in which middle class intellectuals were involved in this as colonial government's collaborators (Chatterjee 1986, 26).

Partha Chatterjee proposes that the intricate relationships between three core dimensions of the problem of political process, namely, "thought," "culture" and "power," be meticulously examined (Chatterjee 1986, 26-28). A study of so-called illiberal nationalism should ask the following interrelated questions: (a) Whether or not Western "thought" and "culture," when they are "implanted" in the East, maintain their original meanings; (b) If "implanted" Western thought signifies something different than it does in the West, what is the implication of the power relationship between the West and the East involved in the change? (c) Then, what is the implication of domestic power relationship? (d) What is the role of vanguard intellectuals involved in the overall process (Chatterjee 1986, 26-27)?

Reinventing *Bosei* with Western Ideas

Gramsci conceptualizes the state as "coercion plus hegemony," where the term "hegemony" indicates the dominance of one social class over others. Gramsci's "hegemony" connotes the dominant class's ability to justify or legitimate its own way of seeing the world as common sense, thereby eliciting active consent (Gramsci 1971). This

insight of Gramsci allows us to see the ideologies of “Good Wives, Wise Mothers” and *bosei* as the Japanese dominant class’s hegemonic expressions.

Gramsci further notes that common sense is continually transforming itself, so he conceptualizes hegemony as a site of struggle. John Fiske, a British cultural studies theorist, explains:

Consent must be constantly won and rewon, for people’s material social experience constantly reminds them of the disadvantages of subordination and thus poses a threat to the dominant class....Hegemony...posits a constant contradiction between ideology and the social experience of the subordinate that makes this interface into an inevitable site of ideological struggle. (Fiske 1992, 291)

Since the inception of the nation’s westernization, Japanese intellectuals have been aggressively co-opting Western ideas. As “advanced” Western feminist ideas become available, some necessarily wonder if “traditional” Japanese gender relations are just. The nation’s “traditional” gender relations become a site of struggle. The social norm of “Good Wives, Wise Mothers” could have been appropriately criticized by liberal feminism in Japan as early as the late nineteenth century.

In this regard, Gramsci’s theory of power struggle by “domination plus intellectual-moral leadership” (Gramsci 1971, 5-23) correctly directs us to a meticulous examination of the activities of middle-class, or “deputy” intellectuals in Gramsci’s term (Gramsci 1971, 12), who validate ruling class ideologies as common sense.⁶ In the face of increasing popular demand to “modernize,” westernize, or democratize the nation’s gender relations, the Japanese ruling class needs able middle-class intellectuals who can justify “traditional” Japanese gender relations. Because of the international imbalance in

⁶ This is similar to what Paul Attewell calls “tensions from outside the theory,” by which academics are pressured toward intellectual conformity (Attewell 1984, 21-3).

power between the West and the East and its tacit, though paradoxical, collaboration in it, the Japanese ruling class also needs “vanguard” intellectuals who can manipulate the most “advanced” Western feminist ideas, to invalidate competing alternative positive gender roles, and theoretically justify “traditional” Japanese gender relations.

The transfer of Western democratic ideas to Japan does not guarantee democratization of Japanese social relations. Nor does the transfer of Western ideas to Japan guarantee the formation of a Japanese “national” subject as an antithesis to Western counterparts as Sakai claims. Rather, Western ideas are manipulated as a means to theoretically substantiate Japanese conservative social relations. In this framework, the formation of a Japanese “national” subject is contingent on the latent political interest of Japanese middle-class intellectuals who import, interpret, and apply Western ideas. Throughout the nation’s modern history, the more Japanese gender relations have become subject to westernization, the more firmly they have been justified through these processes. This is one of the mechanisms behind the repeated invention of *bosei* and Japanese “illiberal” nationalism.

Before going further, I would like to pull these various ideas together in order to see if the basic formulation of the question is correct. There are four key factors involved in this analysis: (1)westernization, (2)social inequality, (3)middle-class intellectuals and (4)ruling class ideologies. (1)Westernization includes the importation and dispersion of *rational* Western ideas including social theories and philosophies (Barshay 1998, Pyle 1998; Wakabayashi 1998). (2)Social inequality in presumably democratic societies mostly derives from institutional discrimination which anonymously and covertly denies

marginal populations full participation in social activities as well as full access to social resources. It trades upon *irrational*, “traditional” barriers, such as tacitly understood assumptions and principles (Brooks 1990; Feagin and Vera 1995; Rothenberg 1992).

(3) Supposedly, “vanguard” or *avant-garde* intellectuals are those whose positive knowledge will permit them effectively to provide guidance for the development of society (Saint-Simon 1964); nevertheless, they can also “betray” their supposed vocation to serve specific sociopolitical interests often unconsciously (Benjamin 1968, 220-238; Benda 1955 [1927]). Middle-class intellectuals are those who are privileged in two reciprocal ways: (a) They possess immediate means to access social resources; (b) they also possess immediate means to influence others, including colleagues as well as students (Mills 1956).

(4) Ruling class ideologies are conservative belief systems that function to obscure from the masses the “real” nature of the relationship between the ruling strata and the masses (Althusser 1971; Gramsci 1971; Marx 1978 [e.g.1859]). In Japan, current ruling class ideologies represent the ideas of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) whose political dominance has persisted for well over five decades without having been seriously threatened (Allison 1993, 123-144).

Each of these four factors has its own significance. However, for this study, the relationships between these four factors have more prominence than the meanings of the factors themselves. First, Japanese middle-class intellectuals as a social group have been among the most significant vehicles of Japanese westernization throughout modern Japanese history (Pyle 1998; Wakabayashi 1998). Japanese middle-class intellectuals always have preferential access to “advanced” Western ideas as well as the power to

influence others. Second, the ruling class are always eager to preserve the ideologies that work for them, even if the same ideologies result in depriving some of the basic rights of the marginal populations (Althusser 1971; Gramsci 1971; Marx 1978 [e.g.1859]). Third, Japanese middle-class intellectuals with *rational*, democratic Western ideas must criticize the *irrationality* of Japanese social inequality *as well as* ruling class ideologies, in order to secure the basic rights of the marginal populations who tend to lack any means to influence the mainstream politics (Wolferen 1995).

Fourth, in contrast, if Japanese middle-class intellectuals are *hegemonized* and at the subconscious level become an ally of the ruling class, they inevitably fail to see that ruling class ideologies, in fact, legitimate Japanese social inequality. As a consequence, in the sociopolitical criticism given by Japanese middle-class intellectuals, ruling class assumptions and principles are not addressed as problematic. Instead, they are legitimated and celebrated as part of the uniqueness of Japanese culture (Olson 1992, Scalapino 1964; Wolferen 1995; 113-152), by exploiting the symbolic power of Western ideas.

Drawing on the rationale provided above, this dissertation explores the paradoxical relationship between gender inequality and “feminist” sociopolitical criticism by Japanese “feminist” intellectuals, focusing on the importation of Western feminist thought and the invention or reinvention of *bosei*. I will demonstrate that when Western feminist ideas are imported, interpreted and applied by Japanese “feminist” intellectuals, they quickly become loaded with Japanese ruling class ideologies. Contemporary Japanese “feminist” intellectuals use Western feminist ideas in their “feminist” sociopolitical criticism, in order seemingly to improve gender relations in Japan.

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Wives, Wise Mothers” (*ryōsai, kenbo*) (Mackie 1997, 22-41). Unlike the enlightened policies of the early Meiji period, under these conditions, Japanese women’s role in the government’s nation-building efforts involved that of being mothers responsible for bearing the nation’s future soldiers (Ohinata 1995, 200).

In the 1910s, the term *bosei* was invented with its emphasis on an idealistic motherly love and devotion, considered indispensable to a child’s development and education (Ohinata 1988, 1995). One of the reasons behind this development was a reactionary response to the liberalism increasingly espoused during the prosperous period of the Taisho democracy (1912 – 1926) following World War I. Also, with the nation’s further industrialization and subsequent economic demands for women to enter the labor force, many women advanced into the workplace and aspired to become economically independent (Kawashima 1995, 272-5; Ohinata 1995, 2004). In return, caring for their children, supposedly a woman’s distinct responsibility, was handed over to commercial caretakers such as nursemaids, wet nurses, etc. This new circumstance provoked a public outcry and many concerned Japanese conservatives called for a reinstatement of Japanese women’s motherhood responsibility in the name of “motherly lover” (Ohinata 1995, 200-2).

This is also the time when the nation’s overpopulation began to concern some people, as the country approached fifty-six million in 1920 from just thirty-five million at the beginning of the Meiji period. Those concerned called for an improvement in the quality, rather than the quantity, of the Japanese race (Ogino 1994, 71) and Japanese women were further pressured to excel in childbearing.

From the late 1930s to 1945, particularly during the time between the Sino-Japanese War of 1937 and the nation's defeat in 1945, there could be observed another development with regard to the nation's motherhood ideology. One of the dominant themes throughout these war years was that of "Mothers for a country at war." In conjunction, the government launched its "Have More Babies! Prosper!" policy and the Patriotic Women's Association (*Aikoku jidō kyōkai*) proclaimed "Mothers, return to your homes." Furthermore, Japanese women's war contribution was defined exclusively as being patriotic mothers who gave birth to the "emperor's babies" and "will raise the boys and girls of the empire" (Ohinata 1995, 202-3). In this context, for example, Takamura Itsue, the feminist war ideologue, argued that,

The Emperor's will is the mother's will. The mother's will is the Emperor's will. And it is our sacred duty, in "the spirit of universal brotherhood, desiring to have all the corners of the world under one roof (*hakko ichiu*)" to see that this one will of mother and emperor extend beyond Japan, beyond Asia, and to the whole world. (Kano 1979, in Ohinata 1995, 203)

After the war, especially until the early 1970s, when the nation experienced rapid economic growth, the family was expected to play a key role in the reproduction of energy. With the government's manpower policy, the nation's economic growth was given top priority. On the one hand, Japanese men were expected to devote themselves to the workplace, while on the other, women were expected to make the family an oasis where men could rest and recuperate from a day's hard work (Ohinata 1995, 203).

From around the mid-1970s, the Japanese government announced a series of policies in line with the notion of a "Japanese style welfare society." With the nation's economic growth slowing, however, the main purpose of these policies was to cut down

on government expenditures towards children and care of the elderly. At that time, the government announced a policy for “strengthening the family’s foundation.” Accordingly, the family, especially mothers, was assumed responsible for the welfare of children and elders (Ohinata 1995, 203).

In 1975, the United Nations proclaimed the International Year of Women and many Japanese women began to question their assumed place and role in Japanese society. There were many Japanese women who explored new possibilities. However, with the government’s further welfare budget reductions in the 1980s, a general trend toward conservatism became conspicuous and many people once again came to support the idea that women ought to take care of children and the elderly (Ohinata 1995, 203-4).

An Overview

Through a close reading of Japanese feminist works, this study will explore the ways in which Japanese women’s “traditional” roles, particularly *bosei*, have been repeatedly reinvented using various Western feminist ideas from the inception of Japanese westernization to the present. In order to demonstrate the relationship between Japanese nationalism and feminist discourse, Japanese contemporary history will be divided into five periods, based on the development of Japanese *bosei*-ism and nationalism.

For each historical period the work of a representative feminist, whose feminism has contributed to the perpetuation of *bosei* ideology, will be examined. They are Fukuzawa Yukichi, Hiratsuka Raichō, Takamure Itsue, and Aoki Yayoi. Their evaluations vary, for example, from time to time. However, they are certainly representative feminist figures in Japanese history. In addition, I will review some of the

significant events regarding *bosei* after World War II to the 1970s as well as Marxist feminism by Ueno Chizuko (1948-), who “appropriated the voice of Japanese feminism” in the 1990s (Buckley 1997, 272).

In Chapter 2 I will offer a brief historical overview, and introduce some of the main currents of modern Japanese feminist movement from 1868 to 1945, including “enlightenment” feminism, Popular Rights movement and women’s rights, socialist feminism, *Seitōsha* feminism, anarchist feminism, and *bosei*-ism.

Chapter 3 will introduce the development of Japanese feminism after 1945. Following Japan’s defeat in World War II in 1945, efforts to improve the conditions of Japanese women were initiated by the Allied Occupation. I will examine some of the consequences of the Allied intervention from 1945 to the 1970s, focusing on the conditions of Japanese women during the rapid industrialization up to the 1970s and the Japanese Women’s Rights Movements in the 1970s. In this context, I will also examine how the technique of “consciousness-raising” was co-opted by Tanaka Mitsu (1943-) one of the prominent Japanese Women’s Rights activists. In addition, this chapter addresses and illustrates some of the key problems of contemporary Japanese feminism, including the perpetuation and the diversification of *bosei* ideology.

In Chapter 4 I will examine Fukuzawa’s co-optation of J.S. Mill’s *Subjection of Women* in Meiji Japan. Fukuzawa was an enlightenment scholar and government official who helped to westernize Japan at its inception. I will demonstrate how Mill’s liberal feminist theory was used to motivate Japanese women to support the nation’s westernization/industrialization policy as “Good Wives, Wise Mothers.” Through this

case study I hope to identify the close relationship between class relations and nationalism and to highlight the class origin of contemporary Japanese nationalism, including how the nation's first contemporary nationalism was purposefully created and widely disseminated to protect the old ruling class interests from Western powers.

In Chapter 5 I will examine how Hiratsuka misappropriated Key's maternalism in the 1910s, and further theoretically substantiate the norms of "Good Wives, Wise Mothers." Hiratsuka's time was characterized by Japanism, a reactionary nationalism that turned Japanese attention to a search for their inner cultural identity. In this context, from a social constructionist perspective, I will investigate how Hiratsuka paradoxically transformed the social norms behind this slogan into a more powerful, psychologically bound Japanese women's identity (*bosei*), and became an advocate of state protection of motherhood for the improvement of the Japanese race.

In Chapter 6 Takamure's new *bosei*-ism will be examined. Inheriting Hiratsuka's *bosei*-ism, Takamure incorporated *jinen*, the Japanese Buddhist conception of nature, into the formulation of her new *bosei*-ism. *Jinen* defined the uniqueness and superiority of Japanese culture/morality among her contemporaries, and became the theoretical justification for the Japanism nationalism movement and later the nation's ultra-nationalistic expansionism. During World War II, Takamure became *the* feminist ideologue, offering a theoretical justification for Japanese women's active participation in the nation's war efforts through an examination of sacred Shinto documents. Takamure's scholarly interest in altruistic, often sacrificial, ancient Japanese matriarchy is noteworthy in this regard. Through an examination of Takamure's new *bosei*-ism, I will explore how

Japanese women's altruistic, often patriotic, roles have become defined in religious terms, thereby becoming an indispensable part of the images of "traditional" ideal Japanese womanhood at the deepest levels. The ways in which European Buddhist Studies, Fredrik Nietzsche's "overcoming," and Charles Darwin's "natural selection" affected the development of the Japanism nationalism and, indirectly, Takamure's new *bosei*-ism will also be discussed.

In Chapter 7 I will examine Aoki Yayoi's (1927-) ecofeminism, which became popular in the early 1980s in the course of *nihonjinron* (theories of the Japanese people) popularity. *Nihonjinron* contends that the uniqueness of Japanese culture was the secret source of Japanese economic success, and exhibits signs of cultural nationalism and triumph. I will examine Aoki's ecofeminism in the context of *nihonjinron*. Specifically, I will analyze whether Aoki's ecofeminism shares any characteristics with *nihonjinron*. Also, I will examine Aoki's high regard for Takamure's new *bosei*-ism, and consider whether Aoki's ecofeminism resulted in reinventing *bosei*-ism. The chapter also reviews important events, such as U.S.-Japan trade friction and the International Women's Year of 1975, that have affected the formulation of Aoki's ecofeminism.

In Chapter 8 I will examine Ueno's Marxist feminism, focusing on her remarkable popularity and the commercialization of Japanese feminism in the postindustrial information-centered Japanese society of the mid-1980s to the 1990s. I will explore reasons for her popularity and examine how Ueno has successfully co-opted various constituents of Japanese society, including young impatient college students, Japanese mainstream academia, and conservatives. I will also closely examine Ueno's

views on Japanese women's roles, and whether Ueno's Marxist feminism has resulted in affirming the Japanese "traditional" gender relations.

Chapter 9 moves back to my theoretical concerns and uses the substantive chapters to reflect on nationalism, Western theory, and gender relations.

- CHAPTER 2 -

**AN HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF MODERN JAPANESE
FEMINIST MOVEMENT: 1868 - 1945**

Introduction

Japanese gender discrimination is deeply embedded in its socio-cultural structure and ideology, and so issues stemming from this discrimination may sometimes not appear to be explicitly sexist or problematic. Japanese feminists, too, can possibly be profoundly bound by them, and may fail to see that they really are the causes of Japanese gender discrimination. In modern Japanese feminist history, there have been a number of cases in which Japanese feminists tried their best to improve the conditions of women in their nation, often by citing or manipulating Western feminist ideas. In some respects, they were successful; their seemingly “feminist” activities, however, paradoxically resulted in the perpetuation of the structure and ideology of Japanese gender discrimination.

Pre-1945 modern Japanese feminism was particularly challenging in this regard, because of the nation’s strong ethnic nationalism, especially during World War II. In the beginning of Meiji Japan (1868-1912), the nation’s first modern gender norms of “Good Wives, Wise Mothers” (*ryōsai kenbo*) were established, in an attempt to modernize Japanese gender relations (see Chapter 4). Japanese patriotic maternalism (*bosei*-ism) was born during a heated feminist debate in the 1910s (see Chapter 5). *Bosei*-ism was later transformed into anarchist *bosei*-ism, and then ultranationalistic *bosei*-ism by a Japanese feminist; it became one of the most powerful ideological means by which to mobilize Japanese women during World War II (see Chapter 6).

Following World War II, Japanese feminism seems to have enormously aligned itself with democracy, mainly because of the U.S. Occupation's reform initiatives. Also, after WWII, the nation's wartime nationalism was officially denounced, and no Japanese feminist would possibly buy into it; indeed, post-1945 Japanese feminism had ceased to be explicitly nationalist. However, *bosei*-ism—which had a lack of explicit nationalistic implications—quietly survived, and in that respect, post-1945 Japanese feminism is not much different from pre-1945 Japanese feminism. In the early 1970s, *bosei*-ism was accidentally rediscovered and further internalized by a Japanese Women's Liberation movement scholar activist.¹ Also, in the course of *nihonjinron* (theory of the Japanese) intellectual nationalism of the late 1970s and early 1980s, an attempt to reinstate *bosei*-ism was made by a Japanese feminist (see Chapter 7). Furthermore, in the mid-1980s, there was a perplexing instance in which a Japanese feminist, who openly denounced *bosei*-ism, highly praised Japanese women's patriotic contributions as mothers (see Chapter 8).

In this chapter, I will offer a brief review of pre-1945 Japanese feminist history, focusing on the close relationship between *bosei*-ism and nationalism. I in particular show that the development of *bosei*-ism is closely related to Japanese interests in Social Darwinism and the subsequent development of Japanese ethnic nationalism, and that *bosei* is a very patriotic concept. Then, in Chapter 3, I will show how *bosei*-ism survived after 1945, examining some of the key feminist events regarding Japanese gender relations—including the U.S. Occupation's gender reforms and the Japanese Women's Liberation Movement. Lastly, I will offer an analysis of how the meaning of *bosei* has

¹ Chapter 3 briefly discusses this issue.

been reconstructed and expanded upon by Japanese intellectuals, including the emergence of some *bosei* academic fields (for example, *bosei* nursing (*bosei kango-gaku*) and *bosei* psychology (*bosei shinri-gaku*)).

Enlightenment Feminism

The nation's first modern feminist efforts were made by the Meiji Six Society (*Meiroku sha*) members, in the beginning of Meiji Japan (1868-1912). One of the primary concerns of the Meiji Six Society was the modernization/westernization/industrialization of Japan. The members were elite men, mostly "enlightenment" intellectuals, who studied in the West around the time of the Meiji Restoration (1868). *The Meiji Six Journal* (*Meiroku zasshi*) was the society's journal, one of the first modern scholarly journals in Japan. For the journal, a number of Meiji Six Society intellectuals wrote essays on Japanese gender relations, along with some key political topics. Mori Arinori (1847-1889), a founding member,² wrote "On Wives and Concubines" (*Saishō-ron*); Nakamura Masanao (1832-1891), another founding member,³ wrote "Creating Good Mothers" (*Zenryō naru haha wo tsukuru setsu*); Fukuzawa Yukichi (1835-1901)⁴ wrote "On Equal Numbers of Men and Women" (*Danjo dōsū-ron*); Tsuda Mamichi (1829-1903), a law scholar, offered "On the Abolition of Concubinage" (*Haishō-ron*); and there were other contributions as well (Braisted 1976; Ōgoshi 1996, 99-100; Sievers 1983, 10-25).

² Mori became Minister for Education in 1885.

³ Nakamura was originally a Confucian scholar. He is well known as the translator of Samuel Smiles' *Self-help* and John Stuart Mill's *On Liberty*. He later became a professor at Tokyo Imperial University and the first president at Tokyo Women's Teachers' School (which later became Ochanomizu Women's University).

⁴ Fukuzawa is a liberal thinker. He is the subject of Chapter 4, and I will discuss his feminist views in detail there.

Compared to the gender ethos in Tokugawa feudal Japan (1603-1868), where gender relations had never received serious scholarly attention, the Meiji Six Society members' efforts to change Japanese gender relations were historically significant (Blacker 1964, 89; Fujiwara 1988, x; Hane 1984, 97; Sievers 1983, 25). However, Meiji Six Society members hardly believed in gender equality; rather, as government elite intellectuals, they were primarily interested in defending the nation's independence and later in joining the Western imperial powers. Through their studies and experiences in the West, they believed that one of the secrets of Western strength was the incorporation of women into nation-building efforts, or the exploitation of women's labor. They believed that women's active participation was one of the requisites of the nation's development. Ultimately, Meiji Six Society members were less concerned with the improvement of Japanese women's conditions, including women's rights, than with the co-optation of women as national subjects (Ōgoshi 1996, 100-1).

Basic education was offered to girls so that they would become highly productive laborers in light industry. More important to this dissertation project is the fact that the government slogan of "Good Wives, Wise Mothers" was first advocated by Nakamura, widely disseminated, and effectively imposed various domestic responsibilities upon women as new, Western and modern, gender norms. In addition, coupled with the government slogan of "Family State" (*Kazoku kokka*),⁵ Japanese women were expected to excel as "Good Wives, [and] Wise Mothers" for the good of the nation. Japanese

⁵ Around this time, the Meiji government launched a number of slogans, including "Wealthy Nation, Strong Army" (*Fukoku kyōhei*) and "Leave Asia, Join Europe" (*Datsua, nyūdō*).

modern gender ideology was especially nationalistic from the very beginning of its development (Tachi 1984).

Among Meiji Six Society members, Fukuzawa's contribution to the establishment of the nation's first modern women's movement is well worth mentioning. Dissatisfied with the other members' overly nationalistic stance, young Fukuzawa left the Meiji Six Society and established his own. Thereafter, throughout his life, Fukuzawa paid continuous attention to women's issues. Co-opting John Stuart Mill's (1806-1873) *The Subjection of Women* (1869), one of the earliest liberal feminist works, Fukuzawa wrote intensively on the subject matter, and encouraged later generations of Japanese feminists—including Yamakawa Kikue (1890-1980), who later led the nation's socialist feminism—to do the same. Particularly, his advocacy of universal education, unheard of at that time, needs to be rightly credited (Fujiwara 1988, x). However, as I will demonstrate in detail in Chapter 4, later in his life Fukuzawa's feminist writings became explicitly nationalistic; quite unexpectedly, Fukuzawa came to support the government slogan of “Good Wives, Wise Mothers.” I will demonstrate in Chapter 4 how, while manipulating Mill's liberal feminist ideas, Fukuzawa was able to support the “Good Wives, Wise Mothers” patriarchal gender norms.

Fukuzawa and Social Darwinism

Some of the Western feminist works translated into Japanese around this time include Mill's *The Subjection of Women* (1869); Mrs. Sheldon Amos's (Sarah Maclardie Bunting, -1908) *Difference of Sex, as a Topic of Jurisprudence and Legislation* (1870) in 1878; *Essays and Lectures on Social and Political Subjects* (1872) by Millicent Garrett Fawcett (1847-1929), an English writer, in 1883; and *The Woman Question in Europe: A Series of*

Original Questions (1884), edited by Theodore Stanton (1851-1925) in 1887.⁶ Meiji intellectuals, including Fukuzawa, were familiar with the development of Western feminism, including women's rights as well as suffragist movements, and so it is self-evident that they would come to bear on Japanese feminist developments.⁷

Fukuzawa was a scholar with varying interests. Besides a number of articles and books on women's issues, including "The Equal Number of Men and Women" in 1875 and "A Critique of *The Greater Learning for Women*" in 1899, he, as one of the leading intellectuals of the time, wrote on various topics; in the process, he often introduced new Western ideas, and led his countrymen and women throughout the beginning of the nation's westernization efforts.⁸

One of the prominent characteristics of the time was the advent of Social Darwinism and ideas surrounding eugenics. Meiji Japanese intellectuals, including Fukuzawa, were deeply interested in and influenced by Social Darwinist ideas. As early as 1874, Aoikawa Nobuchika, a Shinto priest, advocated the superiority of Shintoism and Buddhism over Christianity within the framework of Social Darwinism. In 1883, Ariga Nagao (1860-1921), one of the first Japanese sociologists, wrote *On Social Revolution*, introducing Herbert Spencer's (1820-1903) work. In 1884, Spencer's *Social Statics* (1851) was introduced to a Japanese audience in translation. Yet, Charles Darwin's (1809-1882) *Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection* (1859), the primary text for Social

⁶ Fawcett was deeply influenced by Mill's speech on women's rights, and became his loyal supporter. She joined the London Suffrage Committee in 1868 (*Women in World History: A Biographical Encyclopedia* 5: 437-443). Stanton, son of American suffragist Elizabeth Cady Stanton, introduced the women's movements in Europe in the 18th and 19th centuries (*Women in World History* 14: 707-714).

⁷ Refer to Appendix A: Japanese Appropriation of Western Feminist Ideas, Chart A1 – An Historical Overview.

⁸ Fukuzawa is well known for his *Encouragement of Learning* (*Gakumon no susume*) (1872-1876) and *An Outline of a Theory of Civilization* (*Bunmei-ron no gairyaku*) (1875).

Darwinism, was not translated into Japanese until 1909. There was, therefore, some confusion and misunderstanding with regard to Japanese understandings of Social Darwinist ideas (Montgomery 2000, 232-5).

Meiji intellectuals somewhat falsely interpreted Social Darwinist ideas, and were convinced of the improvement of the Japanese race as a means for national prosperity. In 1884, Takahashi Yoshio (1863-1937), the author of *On the Improvement of the Japanese Race* (*Nihonjinshu kairyō-ron*), recommended interracial marriages between Japanese nationals and Europeans—in order, according to Takahashi, to improve the Japanese race. In 1887, Yamagawa Teizaburō (1858-1940) wrote *The Selection in Relation to Sex* (*Danjo tōta-ron*), based on Darwin's *The Descent of Man and the Selection in Relation to Sex* (1871).

In addition, Katō Hiroyuki (1836-1916), a Meiji Six Society member,⁹ published *A New Theory on Human Rights* (*Jinken shin-ron*) in 1882, and showed his support of Social Darwinist ideas.¹⁰ Douglas R. Howland, the author of *Translating the West: Language and Political Reason in Nineteenth-Century Japan*, succinctly explains Katō's *New Theory*.

Katō applied the law of evolution to social forms and nations in order to explain the rise of civilization as the rise of the state, which proceeds from a chieftain and his followers to progressively more integrated forms of community with an acknowledged leader. Inevitably the leader of the state sees that it is in his interest to prevent arbitrary treatment among his people by granting certain rights and obligations to all. Katō utterly ignored the term *minken* [people's rights] and returned instead to *jinken*, human rights, which he redefined as “acquired rights” (*tokuyū kenri*). This was perhaps Katō's most important point, for he thus rephrased the gradualist approach to people's rights as a scientific and

⁹ Katō later became the first president of the Tokyo Imperial University.

¹⁰ A number of scholars on Meiji intellectualism have observed that the liberal, often radical, atmosphere of the early Meiji was taken over by conservatism. The advent of eugenics ideas and the subsequent development of Japanese ethnic nationalism explain this shift in part.

evolutionary proposition. The joint development of the state and civilization required that the intelligence and ability of the people reach levels comparable to those of Japan's competitors; only then could the Japanese state advance by granting the people's rights. (Howland 2000, 136-7)

Katō originally was an advocate of Popular Rights. His *New Theory* summarizes well the intellectual circumstances of the time.¹¹

In 1875, Fukuzawa wrote "The Power of Education"; the title, however, is somewhat misleading. He did not write the article to encourage people to pursue education. Quite to the contrary, he *discouraged* people of the lower classes from pursuing education, arguing that the "power of education" was limited to developing natural talents, which only samurai-class people had. In this regard, Fukuzawa also wrote "The Power of Heredity" in 1882, making mention of *Hereditary Genius* by Francis Galton (1822-1911), an English anthropologist, and further exposing his own class bias.¹² Similarly, Fukuzawa looked down on lower-class women and recommended that they work in brothels overseas to earn money for the nation (Fukuzawa 1966 [1896], 362-4).

Fukuzawa's feminist thought was also heavily influenced by the same intellectual circumstances of the time. Under these circumstances, Japanese women's conditions hardly improved. Fukuzawa's feminism inadvertently helped transform women into gendered national subjects – subjects who selflessly contributed to the nation's modernization efforts (Mackie 1997). Chapter 4 discusses that while manipulating Mill's

¹¹ B.T. Wakabayashi explains Meiji intellectual circumstances as "liberalism in its nineteenth-century laissez-faire sense—coupled with big doses of Social Darwinism." He continues: "They cast off the shackles of inherited status and demanded freedom for themselves and for Japan to demonstrate ability and to pursue material gain in open competition" (Wakabayashi 1998, 5).

¹² Galton is well known for his pioneering studies in human intelligence.

liberal feminist ideas, Fukuzawa supported the state gender ideology of “Good Wives, Wise Mothers,” and transformed women into national subjects.¹³

Transformation of Women into Gendered National Subjects

In addition to the slogan of “Good Wives, Wise Mothers” and the Meiji Six Society members’ adoption of it, the Meiji government launched a series of gender-specific initiatives to effectively transform Japanese women into gendered national subjects.

Like elite men intellectuals who were sent to the West to absorb advanced technologies and knowledge, a number of Japanese women were sent to the U.S.¹⁴ However, unlike their male counterparts, they were sent to American homes as “students of American home life for ten years” to become better “Good Wives and Wise Mothers” (Jayawardena 1986, 231).

Cynthia Fuchs Epstein, the author of *Deceptive Distinction*, argues, “Women were—and are—kept in place by laws.” Epstein continues, “Law is an important legitimator of social practice and contributes to [the] establishment of the norms—that is, it defines what is permitted and what is deviant” (Epstein 1988, 121). The Meiji government imposed its ideal gender distinctions by means of law; although it established the Fundamental Code of Education (*Gaku sei*) and four years of compulsory education

¹³ Cynthia Fuchs Epstein points out the limitation of Mill’s liberal feminist theory in the Western context, and explains the gap between theory and practice.

Among modern philosophers, John Stuart Mill (1869) stands out as a supporter of the equality of women and as one who understood the causes of their observably different behavior and presumed different nature. Mill recognized what most modern social scientists missed until the 1970s—and some still miss: how biases prevent the formulation of objective descriptions of women’s behavior and motivations. (Epstein 1988, 3)

Given that Mill’s liberal feminist ideas were not well recognized until recently in modern history in the West and that Western feminist ideas are very varied and are disputed within the West, Fukuzawa’s limitations in applying Mill’s feminist ideas to Japanese gender relations in Meiji Japan is understandable.

¹⁴ Tsuda Umeko (1864-1929), who later established the first women’s college in Japan, was among them. She was only six years old.

for both girls and boys became required as early as 1872, the government launched the Education Act (*Kyōiku rei*) in 1880 and prohibited coeducation beyond elementary school, formally excluding women from public middle schools. Furthermore, in 1899, the Girls' High School Law (*Kōtō jogakkō rei*) was issued to officially transform young girls into "Good Wives, Wise Mothers" through gender-specific education. Sharon H. Nolte and Sally Ann Hastings, in "The Meiji State Policy toward Women, 1890-1910," explain the nationalistic meaning of the "Good Wives, Wise Mothers" education:

At a time when the eyes of the nation were on its fighting men, representatives of the military did not hesitate to praise feminine responsibilities. Speaking to the students of the Tokyo Girls' Higher School in Mita, Vice-Admiral Kamimura said that their studying to become wise mothers or good wives was equally as valuable to the nation as was his fighting on the sea. (Nolte and Hastings 1991, 159)

In addition, Meiji Six member Nishimura Shigeki (1828-1902), who edited *Women's Model* (*Onna kagami*) in 1887 for the Imperial Household Agency (*Kunaichō*), delivered a speech on "Women's Education" in 1889.

In 1898, the Meiji Civil Code (*Meiji minpō*) was promulgated and the Japanese patriarchal household "ie" system became law. Further, concerned about the "bad" influence of politically active women, the government issued the Meeting and Political Organization Law (*Shūkai oyobi seijikessha hō*) in 1890, which formally restricted all women's political activities. Further, in 1900 the Police Security Regulations (*Chian keisatsu hō*) was issued, and Article 5 specifically prohibited women from joining political organizations (Jayawardena 1986; Mackie 1997; Nolte and Hastings 1991).

At the same time, reflecting national interests in eugenics and the improvement of the Japanese race, the government came to regulate midwives. In 1874, midwives became required to obtain a license from the government, making midwifery a public profession.

Furthermore, in 1880 abortion was defined as a criminal offense, and in 1892, Sasagawa Misu (1855-1918), who wrote “Thirteen Warnings for Midwives” (*Sanba jyūsan kai*) contended the importance of midwifery was round in its relationship to the “Wealthy Nation, Strong Army” government propaganda. Finally, in 1899 the Midwife Regulation (*Sanba kisoku*) was promulgated, officially making midwife a national profession (Yanagihara 2003).

The nation’s first modern feminist initiative by “enlightenment” intellectuals did not bring much substantial change to the nation’s traditional gender relations. The “Good Wives, Wise Mothers” norms really were expressions of the state gender ideology, which continued to constrain Japanese women’s activities by confining them to the private sphere. Further—and paradoxically—because of the “feminist” efforts made by these “enlightenment” intellectuals, particularly Fukuzawa, the state gender ideology became widely disseminated as a “new” Japanese gender ethos, and successfully incorporated women into the nation’s modernization efforts.

From a different perspective, however, the state gender ideology was indicative of progress, in that it gave women nationalistic meanings of domestic duties. Women as “Good Wives, Wise Mothers” were now regarded “equally as valuable to the nation as was his fighting on the sea” (Nolte and Hastings 1991, 159). Fukuzawa probably did not see the contradiction inherent in the state gender ideology, as was the case with many of his contemporaries. Rather, he truly believed that the incorporation of women into nation-building efforts was simply progress. In the end, Fukuzawa’s “feminist” efforts had larger consequences: the government slogan of “Good Wives, Wise Mothers” had become

Japan's modern gender norm, and continues to powerfully affect the lives of Japanese women well over a century later.

Popular Rights Movement and Women's Rights

There were Japanese intellectuals who saw the exploitive nature of the Meiji government's nation-building initiatives. Japan's Popular Rights movement was born in 1874, and some male Popular Rights movement activists asserted women's rights. Doi Kōka (1847-1918), for example, wrote *On Civilization: The Greater Learning for Women* (*Kinse onna daigaku*) in 1876, and it is one of the nation's first modern democratic feminist works. Also, Ueki Emori (1857-1892) wrote "Regarding Equal Rights between Men and Women" (*Danjo dōken ni tsukite no koto*) in 1879 (Mackie 2003, 19). Unlike Fukuzawa's overly nationalistic "feminist" writing, Doi and Ueki truly believed in democracy and gender equality, and advocated equal rights between men and women.

There were also some notable Japanese women who asserted women's rights around this time. As early as 1878, Kusunose Kita (1833-1920), a woman of 45 years who had been obliged to assume the property and tax liabilities of her husband at his death, demanded the right to vote. She wrote to the authorities:

We women who are heads of households must respond to the demands of the government just as other ordinary heads of households, but because we are women, we do not enjoy equal rights. We have the rights neither to vote for district council representatives nor to act as legal guarantors in matters of property, even though we hold legal instruments for that purpose...My rights, compared with those of male heads of households, are totally ignored. Most reprehensible of all, the only equality I share with men who are heads of their households is the onerous duty of paying taxes. (cited in Sievers 1983, 29)

Kusunose correctly questioned the unfairness with regard to tax liabilities and voting rights. The letter later became much publicized, invoking wider public attention to the

issue, and Kusunose became known as the “grandma of civil rights” (*Minken bāsan*) (Mackie 2003, 19-20).

Kishida Toshiko (1861-1901) was an active female member of the Popular Rights movement. She delivered a public speech on democracy from a feminist perspective, “The Way of Women” (*Fujin no michi*), in Osaka in 1882. After the first public speech, Kishida gained popularity and was invited to give speeches at public meetings all over the nation. Her 1883 speech “A Girl in a Box” (*Hakoiri musume*) was particularly well received. She demanded equal educational opportunities, so that women could be economically independent. Speaking on the traditional argument of women’s “inferiority,” Kishida bravely contended that “Accepting the right of those with superior force to dominate those who were weaker, whether man over woman or western nation over Asian nation, was an argument of savagery, not civilization” (Sievers 1983, 39). “A Girl in a Box” is apparently “one of the earliest attacks on Japan’s family systems by a woman” (Sievers 1983, 41).¹⁵

Kishida’s democratic thought had been influenced by the French socialist Jean Jaurès (1859-1914), and Kishida was well acquainted with the women’s suffrage movements in the West. Unlike the Meiji Six intellectuals’ support of “Good Wives, Wise Mothers”—which confined women to the private sphere—Kishida strongly demanded equal rights between men and women. Compared to Fukuzawa’s position, Kishida’s demand of equal rights between men and women was much more liberal and progressive. However, like Fukuzawa whose feminist ideas were greatly compromised by

¹⁵ The Reform Society, the Japanese branch of the Women’s Christian Temperance Union, was established in 1886 by Yajima Kajiko (1832-1925). Throughout these years, the Reform Society was active in criticizing the state prostitution system (Ōgoshi 1996, 102).

his nationalistic dispositions, Kishida's feminist thought was also affected by Social Darwinist ideas, and it seems that Kishida also believed in Japan's nationalism. With regard to women's equal rights, Kishida said that the "exclusion of women from the tasks of nation-building was irrational, and to the extent that such exclusion meant a continuation of 'respecting men and despising women,' unethical as well" (Sievers 1983, 35). As with Fukuzawa, Kishida's case is well suggestive of one of the fundamental problems of Japanese feminism.

Socialist Feminism

In the 1910s, Japanese feminist intellectuals became increasingly interested in socialist feminism. *Women and Economics: A Study of the Economic Relations between Men and Women as a Factor in Social Revolution* (1899) by Charlotte Perkins Gilman (1860-1935), an American "human feminist," and *Woman and Labor* (1911) by Olive Schreiner (1855-1920), a South African feminist, became available in translation to a Japanese audience in 1911 and 1917 respectively.¹⁶ Further, in the 1920s and 1930s, a number of Western socialist feminist works were translated into Japanese, including "Communism and the Family" (1920) by Alexandra Kollontai (1872-1952), a Russian socialist feminist, and *The Intelligent Woman's Guide to Socialism and Capitalism* (1928) by Bernard Shaw (1856-1950), an Irish playwright and Fabian Society member.¹⁷

¹⁶ In a series of articles published between 1912 and 1914, Elley Key, "a female feminist," and Gilman were involved in a heated debate regarding the definition of feminism. Key opposed the American emphasis on women's right to work outside the home, and attacked Gilman and Shreiner by name. In response, Gilman noted that "what is now so generally called feminism is not only a thing quite outside of the Suffrage question, but also a movement in more than one general direction." Gilman called Key "a female feminist, while calling herself "a human feminist" (Gilman 1913, in Cott 1987, 48).

¹⁷ The Fabian Society is a leftist political think-tank.

Socialist feminism was first introduced to a Japanese audience by male socialists in the 1900s. Sakai Toshihiko (1871-1933), who was originally a Popular Rights supporter, paid serious attention to women's issues, and encouraged Japanese women to join the Commoners' Club (*hiemin-sha*), a socialist organization.¹⁸ Sakai wrote extensively on women and socialism, and argued that women's oppression was inherent to the social, political, and economic relations in a capitalist society, rather than a phenomenon between men and women at the individual level (Ōgoshi 1996, 102-3).¹⁹

Fukuda Hideko (1865-1927) was one of the first Japanese female socialist feminists. Like Sakai, Fukuda first joined the Popular Rights movement, but was greatly disappointed by the members' indifference to gender issues. Fukuda became an active member of the Commoners' Club, and later participated in a campaign for the revision of Article 5 of the Police Security Regulations (Mackie 2003, 32-34; Sievers 1983, 122). In 1906, Fukuda started the nation's first socialist feminist newspaper, *Women of the World* (*Sekai Fujin*) (1907-9). Fukuda argued that "When we look at the society's situation, almost everything oppresses women's natural talents. Therefore, the socialist women's movement must now be initiated by women themselves" (Ōgoshi 1996, 103). Similarly yet more determinedly, Kamikawa Matsuko (1885-1936) wrote for *Women of the World*, declaring that

we leave the superficial so-called religious morals and call for women's unconditional emancipation from a socialist perspective. Our hope is an unconditional emancipation by abolishing the unsightly system... In the long run, our efforts are made to obtain freedom. [Our goals] are at independence and self-

¹⁸ Sakai later founded the Japan Socialist Party in 1906 and the Japan Communist Party in 1922.

¹⁹ Similarly, Kōtoku Shūsui (1871-1911), a Commoners' Club founding member, wrote in *Complete Morning Report* (*Yorozu chohou*), a socialist newspaper, in 1902, "If I were asked what the first requirement of the women's movement is, I would reply that it is for women to learn about socialism" (Sievers 1983, 131).

support. Unless we maintain our rights and freedom, never we eat for men. Even if we starve and fall, never we submit to men” (cited in Ōgoshi 1996, 103).

This is such a strong socialist feminist statement.

The early Japanese socialist feminist movement had some critical limitations. Socialist feminism as a slogan – or an abstract concept – does not offer how it can actually be used to examine real social problems. Also, because of the tacit class reductionism inherent to socialism, early Japanese social feminists failed to clearly see the convergences and divergences between class problems and gender problems, and could not bring any substantial changes to the conditions of Japanese women. In 1909, after meeting with increasing economic difficulties and police harassment, *Women of the World* was closed down by the state. Such was the first phase of socialist feminism in Japan (Sievers 1983, 132).

Yamakawa Kikue (1890-1980) was one of the few Japanese feminists keenly aware of the weaknesses of socialist feminism at the beginning of Japanese feminist history. Supported by her firm understanding of the theory, Yamakawa offered a fine criticism at the *Bosei* Protection Debate (1918-1919) between Hiratsuka Raichō (1886-1971) and Yosano Akiko (1878-1924).²⁰ Hiratsuka was a *bosei* supporter who demanded state protection of motherhood. Yosano, on the other hand, was a renowned poet who supported individual freedom based on economic independence, and she strongly opposed Hiratsuka’s *bosei*-ist position. Yamakawa pinpointed their problems and insightfully pointed out that Yosano’s position was a reflection of her bourgeois class bias, and that she failed to see the real economic meanings behind women’s domestic

²⁰ I will offer a more elaborate description of the debate later in this chapter and also in Chapter 5, in which I examine the construction of *bosei*-ism.

labor and of those numerous women who had no choice but to be ruthlessly exploited as cheap factory laborers. Yamakawa also criticized Hiratsuka's position, saying that it was a revisionist attempt to cover capitalism's harsh exploitation of women laborers, and that it does so by insisting that women's unique rights and the state protection of them were constricting the issues as women's issues (Yamakawa 1990 [1918], 61-83).

In 1921, frustrated by the dominant idea of male supremacy and economic reductionism then prevalent among men socialist members, Yamakawa established the nation's first socialist women's organization, the Red Wave Society (*Sekiran kai*); this development ushered in the second phase of Japanese socialist feminism. In 1923, she translated August Bebel's *Women and Socialism*, and thus introduced the author's socialist feminist ideas to a Japanese audience. Additionally, in 1925 Yamakawa wrote an essay, "On Women's Special Demands," and demanded the following:

1. Abolition of the National Registration System
2. Abolish any law that regards women as incompetents regardless of marital status, and make marital/divorce rights equal between men and women
3. Make occupational and educational rights equal among Japanese men, women and colonial citizens
4. Enforcement of a standard living wage, regardless of ethnicity and gender
5. Establishment of a wage principle for Japanese men, women and colonial citizens, regardless of occupation
6. Offer working women with a baby a resting room and at least a 30-minute break every 3 hours
7. Prohibit the dismissal of women on the basis of marriage, pregnancy, or giving birth
8. Abolish state-regulated prostitution (Yamakawa 1925, in Ōgoshi 1996, 105-6)

Given the time-based and other limitations that Yamakawa faced, these demands are very insightful. Unlike Japan's earlier socialist feminists, Yamakawa put these demands in

concrete, pragmatic terms. Also, Yamakawa's non-nationalistic stance and her concerns for the rights of the nation's colonial citizens were well ahead of the time.²¹

Yamakawa's socialist feminism was criticized by Japanese anarchist feminists, including Takamure Itsue (1894-1964), who inherited Hiratsuka's *bosei*-ism and established an anarchist *bosei*-ism (Ōgoshi 1996, 106-7).²² Takamure pointed out and criticized the forcible state system inherent to socialism. After a heated debate with Takamure, Yamakawa wrote an essay entitled "An Examination of Feminism" (*Feminizumu no kentō*) in 1928, offering a timely criticism of *bosei*-ists, including Hiratsuka and Takamure. According to Yamakawa, both Hiratsuka and Takamure naively believed—and dichotomously categorized—women as pacifists. Particularly, given that Takamure later transformed her anarchist *bosei*-ism into an ultranational *bosei*-ism, Yamakawa's criticism of Takamure's support of the nation's imperial advancement was such an insight. Yamakawa's criticism disclosed another instance of the problematic relation between feminism and nationalism, one of the key problems of *bosei*-ism (Yamakawa 1928, in Ōgoshi 1996, 106-7). While advocating world peace, *bosei*-ists approved of the thoughtless conduct of Japanese imperialists in China. Their support of the Japanese imperial invasion was an unforgivable international crime, as much as their assumption of *bosei*-ists as pacifists was hypocritical. *Bosei*-ists, under the name of "women," helped in the exploitation and plundering of those 400 million neighbors.²³

²¹ However, Yamakawa understood male supremacy and biases only as expressions of an outdated feudal ideology. So, with regard to the domination of women at the individual level, Yamakawa's position was not so helpful, in that it had to wait for men's conscious and voluntary changes (Ōgoshi 1996, 105-6).

²² I examine Takamure's new *bosei*-ism in Chapter 6. I will also discuss Takamure's anarchism and *bosei*-ism later in this chapter.

²³ The Manchurian Incident took place in 1931, and the Japanese imperial colonization of the Manchurians continued until 1945.

Seitōsha Feminism

The new woman; I am a new woman...

The new woman curses yesterday.

The new woman is not satisfied with the life of the kind of woman who is made ignorant, made a slave, made a piece of meat by male selfishness.

The new woman seeks to destroy the old morality and laws constructed out of male selfishness, but day by day attempts to create a new kingdom, where a new religion, a new morality and new laws are carried out...

Truly the creation of this new kingdom is the mission of women. (Hiratsuka in 1913, translation in Reich and Fukuda 1976, 288)

Hiratsuka wrote “I am a new woman” in 1913.²⁴ It well portrays *Seitō* as a new women’s movement, by women with diverse interests. Like “enlightenment” feminism and socialist feminism in Japan, *Seitōsha* (*Seitō Society*) feminism began as a criticism of the nation’s traditional gender relations. However, unlike “enlightenment” feminism or socialist feminism, *Seitōsha* feminism was initiated by women, was more woman-centered, and paid attention to the deeply-felt conflict between women’s sexual and reproductive realities and women’s internal selves (Mackie 2003, 45-72; Ōgoshi 1996, 107-113; Sievers 1983, 163-188).

In 1911, Yosano provoked women’s initiatives by saying in the *Taiyō* (a literary journal), “Even if the solutions to women’s problems are offered by men, unless women themselves wake up, the right solutions to these problems will never be reached.” Many concerned and motivated women responded to Yosano’s calling, formed a *Seitō* literary circle, and began exploring a new Japanese feminism, asking “Who are we?” *Seitōsha* feminism called for a reconstruction of the meaning of women, by women (Ōgoshi 1996,

²⁴ The root of “new woman” is found in the West. Tsubouchi Shōyō, Professor of Literature at Waseda University, lectured on “The New Woman in Western Theatre,” and introduced Ibsen’s Nora, Sudermann’s Magda, and Shaw’s Vivie in 1911 (Mackie 2003, 45).

108). *Seitō* was named after the Bluestockings, an informal literary club that flourished in the second half of eighteenth-century London.

Hiratsuka was one of the founding members of *Seitō*. Hiratsuka particularly contributed to *Seitōsha*'s exploration of women's self and love/sexual freedom. In 1911, Hiratsuka wrote for the inaugural issue of the journal *Seitō*, reflecting upon the sun goddess of Japanese mythology.

In the beginning woman was the sun.
 An authentic person.
 Today, she is the moon.
 Living through others
 Reflecting the brilliance of others...
 And now, Bluestocking, a journal created for the first time with the brain and hands of today's Japanese women, raises its voice. (Hiratsuka 1911, translation in Sievers 1983, 163)

Hiratsuka literary existed as a luminous figure like the sun, was always at the center of the feminist community, and helped young, inexperienced Japanese feminists articulate their feminist ideas.

Yosano's contribution to the same issue referred to the enormous potential of a dormant volcano.

The day the mountains move has come.
 I speak but no one believes me.
 For a time the mountains have been asleep,
 But long ago they all danced with fire,
 It does not matter if you believe this,
 My friends, as long as you believe:
 All the sleeping women
 Are now awake and moving. (Yosano 1911, translation in Rodd 1991, 180)

These thoughts by Hiratsuka and Yosano reflect their differing feminist positions, which later led them to the *Bosei*-Protection Debate.

Seitōsha feminism called for women's self-awakening, and attached importance to the establishment of a women's network, similar to the consciousness-raising technique widely used by American radical feminists (Ōgoshi 1996, 109). *Seitōsha* feminists shared their private sufferings—including love, sexuality, marriage, divorce, and so forth—and encouraged, and often criticized each other. Particularly, their perspectives on love and sexuality bravely challenged the patriarchal norms. *Seitōsha* feminists, however, often disclosed their own deception, that they were not completely free from their own internalized gender norms of traditional Japanese society. Their confessions were self-ripping one, and have a strong impact on even today's readers.

Among the several provocative women's issues discussed, *Seitōsha* feminists had different perspectives from one another, especially on the topics of women's chastity, abortion, prostitution, and *bosei*. While discussing, they discovered the Japanese *ie* system's "double bind," which demands women's chastity and prohibits abortion, while concurrently giving tacit consent to the state prostitution system and forcing women to submit themselves to men's sexual desires. However, although these feminists discussed very interesting, often pressing, feminist topics, unfortunately most of the debates did not fully develop. As I will demonstrate below on a case-by-case basis, this stagnation was due in part to limitations set by the time. *Seitōsha* feminists learned some intriguing new Western feminist ideas, but could not suitably apply them to the Japanese contexts, and also possibly could not fully digest their meanings because they would not completely understand the contexts that produced these thoughts. What is probably more crucial is the role that Hiratsuka played in each debate. Reflecting the nationalistic circumstance of

the time, Hiratsuka's nationalistic position seemed believable and even convincing to the other *Seitōsha* members, and led the debates in a certain direction.

At the chastity debate, Ikuta Hanayo (1888-1970), a poet and novelist, raised an insightful question, which is still relevant to today's issues of sexual harassment.²⁵ According to Ikuta, women's labor in a male-centered society necessarily connotes women's sexual crisis. Ikuta raised "the issue of the choices women must often make in order to survive—trading their chastity in order to feed themselves and other family members." Unfortunately, her analysis of women's sexual crises at work in a patriarchal society did not lead to additional discussion of the violation of women's rights at work. Instead, it was taken by Yasuda Satsuki (1883-1933) as an issue of women's sexual rights.²⁶ Yasuda argued, "I would prefer suicide to sacrificing my own chastity." Both of these perspectives are indeed very important feminist topics; nevertheless, both Ikuta and Yasuda eventually subscribed to Hiratsuka's position. Hiratsuka concluded the debate by demanding state control of sexual morality. Regrettably, the debate did not experience any further development, and their perspectives were never discussed fully (Mackie 2003, 50; Ōgoshi 1996, 110).

The discussion at the chastity debate brought forward another important feminist topic. In addition to the assertion of women's sexual rights, Yasuda raised an important question regarding women's reproductive authority, by offering a fictional confession by a woman who was accused of the crime of abortion.²⁷ Itō Noe (1895-1923), an anarchist

²⁵ Ikuta wrote "On Hunger and Chastity" (*Taberu koto to teisō to*) for the journal *Kankyō* (Reverberation) in September 1914.

²⁶ Yasuda wrote "Survival and Chastity" (*Ikiru koto to teisō to*) for *Seitō* in December 1914.

²⁷ Yasuda wrote "To a Man from a Woman in the Prison" (*Gokuchū no onna yori otoko ni*) for *Seitō* in June 1915.

feminist, fiercely opposed Yasuda's pioneering pro-choice position, and insisted instead on a pro-life position.²⁸ The significance of Yasuda's assertion is really about the issue of state control of women's reproductive rights and sexuality. Yet, Itō was somewhat misguided, and praised the primitive form of life in a historical past, in support of a pro-life position. These women were discussing one of the most important feminist topics for the first time in Japanese feminist history; regrettably, their perspectives never meshed with one another. Later, Hiratsuka—relying on Key's feminist theory—joined the debate and suggested that women's reproductive rights meet state interests.²⁹ The debate ended prematurely, affirming state control of women's reproductive rights and sexuality (Mackie 2003, 50; Ōgoshi 1996, 110-1).

Seitōsha feminists also engaged in a heated discussion on prostitution. As with the preceding debates at *Seitōsha*, Itō was involved in this debate as well. In December 1915, Itō wrote an essay and criticized the Reform Society's anti-prostitution movement, arguing that it was aligned with the chastity-salvation ideology of 19th-century Christianity, and that it unjustly looked down on human sexual desire.³⁰ In response, Yamakawa (then Aoyama) pointed out that Itō's belief in the naturalness of sexual desire was, indeed, an expression of patriarchy's phallus-centric ideology. Yamakawa then suggested that they should instead criticize the state prostitution system as a product of the nation's feudalistic culture, and additionally pointed out that the prostitution problem

²⁸ Itō wrote "A Private Letter to Nogami Yae" (*Shishin – Nogami Yae-san he*) for *Seitō* in June 1915. She also wrote "Miscellaneous Thoughts on Chastity" (*Teisō ni tsuite no zakkan*) for *Seitō* in February 1915.

²⁹ Hiratsuka wrote "The Conflict between Life as an 'Individual' and Life as a 'Woman'" (*Kojin to shite no seikatsu to sei to shite no seikatsu tonō aida no sōtō nitsuite*) for *Seitō* in September 1915.

³⁰ Itō wrote "Japanese Women's Public Enterprise that is Insolent, Intolerant and Inconsistent" (*Gōmankiryō nishite futetteinaru nihon fujin no kōkyōjigyō*) for *Seitō* in December 1915.

was not just about women's sexual exploitation, but that it is a class issue based on private property, class inequality, and the subjection of women.³¹ Hiratsuka interjected with her perspective in the prostitution debate: she acknowledged that the abolition of the state prostitution system had some merit; however, she opposed the idea of formal monogamous marital relations, insisting instead on free sexual love (Mackie 2003, 50; Ōgoshi 1996, 111).

Hiratsuka was one of the founding members of *Seitōsha*, led the other members, and had a strong influence on the group's direction. While rebelling against the *ie* family system and the government slogan of “Good Wives, Wise Mothers,” Hiratsuka's main problem was her naïve belief in nationalism, which was also a stumbling block for both Fukuzawa and Kishida. Hiratsuka did not seem to realize that the *ie* family system and the government slogan were closely related to Japan's nationalism. The *ie* family system and the government slogan really were expressions of Japanese nationalism, and because of this oversight, Hiratsuka established *bosei*-ism. Like Fukuzawa, Hiratsuka thought that women belonged to the private sphere, and that women should exercise their natural talents there. Unlike Kishida, Hiratsuka did not believe in equal rights between men and women. The rationale Hiratsuka gave was love.³² Hiratsuka originally opposed the government slogan of “Good Wives, Wise Mothers” and led the vanguard of *Seitōsha* feminism—yet, quite paradoxically, Hiratsuka ended up supporting that slogan. Further, Hiratsuka transformed the social norms behind the government slogan into a more

³¹ Yamakawa wrote “Ask Ms. Itō Noe about Japanese Women's Public Enterprise” (*Nihon fujin no kōkyōjigyō ni tsuite Itō Noe shi ni kiku*) for *Seitō* in January 1916.

³² Of husband, family, and nation.

psychologically-bound and powerful ideological means to impose Japanese patriarchal norms on women. Chapter 5 will discuss this development in detail.

Anarchist Feminism

Itō translated Emma Goldman's (1869-1940) *Tragedy of Women's Emancipation* (1913) in 1914, and thus introduced anarchist feminism to a Japanese audience. Itō was impressed by Goldman's anarchist feminist conviction and passion, and wrote *Pauper's Honor* (*Kojiki no meiyo*) in 1920, one of the nation's first anarchist feminist works. One of her main concerns was the natural fulfillment of life, and she fiercely opposed state intervention of any kind (Itō 1920).

Takamure inherited Itō's extremely life-centered anarchist feminism. In 1930, Takamure launched *Women's Battle Line* (*Fujin sensen*), the nation's first anarchist feminist journal, and started a feminist anarchism-Bolshevism (*Ana-boru*) debate with Yamakawa. One of the reasons Takamure objected to Marxist feminism was because of its non-voluntary system. Takamure correctly pointed out that both the proletarian and bourgeois feminist movements aimed to transform women into men, in a male-centered society. It was by this means that the despotic male-centered family system would be preserved. Moreover, women's sexual freedoms and reproductive rights issues would be neglected as private matters. Takamure rejected capitalism and socialism, as well as bourgeois feminism and socialist feminism, as expressions of the production-centered ideology of the modern world. She proposed to establish a female-centered autonomous society, based on the idea of reproductive nature. Hence, she proposed that, instead of transforming women into men in a production-centered society, men needed to be transformed into women in a reproduction-centered society. Further, Takamure rejected

the family and state as the bases of a male production-centered system, and advocated the realization of anarchic “free love” in a reproduction-centered society (Kano 1980; Ōgoshi 1996, 115-6; Yamashita 1988).

Takamure’s criticism of production-centered patriarchy was very insightful. However, one of the problems with Takamure’s position is the essentialist distinction between production-centered and reproduction-centered principles. Takamure failed to see that they were not mutually exclusive categories, and reductively assigned production and reproductive principles as “male” and “female” characteristics, respectively.

It has been asserted that the modern nation-state will do anything to exploit women—for example, by officially encouraging and plausibly recognizing women’s reproductive contributions, including *bosei*, to national causes (Ōgoshi 1996, 116). Here, what should be emphasized is not their oversight. Instead, we should learn from these cases the effectiveness of Japanese nationalist ideology. As I will show in Chapter 6, Takamure contended that Japanese nationalism is a paternal kind of nationalism based on *bosei*-ism, compared to the forcible patriarchal male-centered nationalism of the West—and so, it was asserted, Japanese nationalism was superior to its Western counterpart. So it was, too, with Japanese feminism. Takamure’s logic is somewhat convincing. However, the belief itself is part and parcel of Japanese nationalism; it was a means to solicit women’s participation in the nation’s imperial warfare initiatives. Japanese nationalism really is as compelling and destructive as its Western counterparts.

It is the dexterity of Japanese nationalism since the Meiji era that makes women its central constituents. As an anarchist feminist, Takamure decidedly rejected the modern nation-state from the very beginning, and probably had never undertaken a

thorough analysis of the complex ruling structure of the state. That is why Takamure was somewhat surprisingly vulnerable to Japanese imperial nationalist ideology. Moreover, she became the feminist ideologue during World War II.³³

Bosei-ism

Hiratsuka was the first advocate of *bosei-ism*. In a debate with Yosano in 1918, which is now called the “*Bosei-Protection Debate*,” Hiratsuka’s maternalistic position was named by Yosano as “*bosei-ism*” (*bosei shugi*).

Hiratsuka’s original concern was to save women and children from capitalism’s merciless exploitation. Co-opting Ellen Key’s maternalism, Hiratsuka’s *bosei-ism* was a reformist idea. Like Key, Hiratsuka believed that the state was responsible for the welfare of its citizens. Yosano criticized Hiratsuka’s position, saying that the state should not interfere with reproduction and childrearing, because they belong to the private sphere.³⁴ In response, Hiratsuka argued that a mother is the source of life, and therefore a woman, as a mother, goes beyond its private existence and to become a national existence. Hiratsuka insisted on the protection of motherhood, on account of its nationalistic implications.³⁵ Yamakawa, who joined the debate later, pointed out the exploitation of

³³ Yagi Akiko (1895-1983) was another Japanese anarchist feminist. Unlike Takamure, Yagi joined a farmer’s movement and eventually went over to Manchuria to assist the farmers there. However, despite her sincere desire to help Manchurian farmers, Yagi’s effort resulted in supporting the Japan’s colonization project (Ōgoshi 1996, 117).

³⁴ Yosano wrote, “Being Based on the Principle of Women’s Occupational Independence” (*Joshi no shokugyō-teki dokuritsu wo gensoku to seyo*) in January 1918, “Women’s Thorough Independence” (*Joshi no tetteishita dokuritsu*) in March 1918, “Response to Hiratsuka, Yamakawa and Yamada” (*Hiratsuka Yamakawa Yamada sanjoshi ni kotafu*) for *Taiyo* in November 1918, and “A Debate between Hiratsuka and Me” (*Hiratsuka-san to watashi no ronsō*) for *Taiyo* in January 1919.

³⁵ Hiratsuka wrote, “Is the Assertion of *Bosei* Protection an Expression of State Dependency?” (*Bosei-hogo no shuchō ha irashugi ka*) for Women’s Review (*Fujin Kōron*) in May 1918.

women in a capitalist society, and argued that the exploitive system was the cause of both women's economic dependence and the deprivation of *bosei* (Nishikawa 1993, 239-75).³⁶

Key's maternalism, as a counter-principle to the then-dominant production-centered male principle, was a reproduction-centered female principle that gained popularity among Scandinavian and German feminists in the 19th century (Ellis 1911, xiii). However, it could not develop theoretically powerful enough to seriously challenge the production-centered system, and paradoxically became its supplementary system. In fact, as ethnic nationalism gained power, it became manipulated as an indispensable ideological means for the reproduction of a privileged ethnicity (Ōgoshi 1996, 119). The reproduction-centered position, which is supposedly a woman-centered logic, does not necessarily lead to ethnic nationalism. Rather, it is normally discovered and reaffirmed in the reproductive process in which women becomes pregnant, gives birth, and nurses and raises a baby. Therefore, the logic is characteristically universal and well surpasses ethnocentrism or nationalism. However, Japanese nationalism in the 20th century skillfully incorporated the reproduction-centered position, and reformulated it as a means to co-opt women into its war efforts.

One of the key problems with Hiratsuka's position is that, unlike Key who demanded state responsibilities but not citizens' selfless contributions, Hiratsuka believed in Japanese ethnic nationalism and falsely insisted on women's nationalistic contributions,

³⁶ Yamakawa wrote, "Evaluating a Women's Theory that Betrays Women" (*Fujin wo uragiru fujin-ron wo hyousu*) and "Bosei Protection and Economic Independence: A Debate between Yosano and Hirakawa" (*Bosei-hogo to keizai-teki dokuritsu: Yosano, Hiratsuka nishi no ronsou*). The assertions of these essays represent three different, then-dominant positions regarding *bosei*. Yosano's assertion is based on individualism, Hiratsuka's on species (Japanese race), and Yamakawa's on class relations; in a different perspective, Yosano's and Yamakawa's assertions are production-centered, whereas Hiratsuka's is reproduction-centered.

thereby further positioning women as gendered national subjects. Inherited by Takamure, Hiratsuka's *bosei*-ism was first transformed into an anarchist *bosei*-ism in the 1920s. During World War II, Takamure again transformed it into an ultranationalistic *bosei*-ism. Chapter 6 identifies the religious origins of Japanese ultranationalism in the Japanism (*Nihon-shugi*) movement, and comparatively examines how Takamure was influenced by nationalist developments, and how her ultranationalistic *bosei*-ism was defined in religious terms.

Interestingly, most Western feminist works introduced to the Japanese audience from the 1910s to 1940s fit within this framework.³⁷ One of the most important concepts in *bosei*-ism is love, and Hiratsuka translated Key's *Love and Marriage* (1911) in 1914. Also, reflecting the Japanese intellectual interest in love and evolution theory, *The Evolution of Love* (1913) by Emil Lucka (1872-1942), a German historian of sexual love, was translated in 1916. Then, in 1922, *Feminism and Sex-extinction* (1920) by Arabella Kenealy, an Irish barrister and author, became available in Japanese. Since then, the works of Edward Carpenter (1844-1929), an English poet and writer, have been translated—namely, *The Drama of Love and Death* (1912) and *Love's Coming-of-age: A Series of Papers on the Relations of the Sexes*, which became available in Japanese in 1918 and 1921 respectively. Finally, *The Natural Philosophy of Love* (1903) by Remy de Gourmont (1858-1915), a French poet and philosopher, was translated into Japanese in 1926.

³⁷ Refer to Appendix A: Japanese Appropriation of Western Feminist Ideas, Chart A1 – An Historical Overview. For this analysis, I used the Women's Problem Library Catalog (*Josei mondai tosho mokuroku*) at Nara Women's University as well as Japan's National Diet Library Online Public Access Catalog (NDL-OPAC) (*Kokuritsu kokkai toshokan zōsho sakuin*).

Also particularly relevant to Takamura's interest in matriarchy, in 1927 *The Prehistory of Marriage and Family* (1912) by Wilhelm Carl Curow Heinrich, a German historian, became available in translation. Also, *Mother Right: A Study of the Religious and Juridical Aspects of Gynecocracy in the Ancient World* (1861) by Johan Jakob Bachofen (1815-1887), a German cultural theorist, and *The Mothers: The Matriarchal Theory of Social Origins* (1931) by Robert Briffault (1876-1848), a French novelist, social anthropologist and surgeon, were translated into Japanese in 1938 and 1940 respectively.

From 1933 to the end of World War II, a number of Western works on motherhood were published in translation. *Save the Mothers* (1930) by Estelle Sylvia Pankhurst (1882-1960), a suffragette and international socialist, in which the author advocates state protection of motherhood, was translated into Japanese. In the following year, *Mother's Songs, Games, and Stories* by Friedrich Fröbel (1782-1852), the German educationalist best known as the progenitor of the kindergarten system, became available in Japanese. In addition, in 1939 *The Mothers: A Study of the Origins of Sentiments and Institutions* (1927) by Briffault was translated into Japanese. At around the same time, Western feminist works on womanhood and ethnic nationalism were introduced to a Japanese audience: *The Life of Nazi Women* (1940) by Ann Marie Kiefer, *Italian Women and Fascism* (1941) by The Italian Embassy in Japan, *Fascism Mother* (1936) by Maria Luisa Fiumi, and *Unknown Army—Mobilization of Women during War* (1920) by Marie Elizabeth Lüders (1878-?) of Germany.

As “*Bosei* Publications: Books and Articles, Chart B1: An Historical Overview” shows,³⁸ since the invention of *bosei* in 1918, *bosei*-ism as an intellectual discourse has been slowly but thoroughly developing, from those years to the present day. As for books from this movement, some of the earliest *bosei* books include *Bosei-centered Education* (*Bosei chūshin kyouiku*) by the Education Counseling Center (*Kyouiku soudan-jo*) in 1932, and *Bosei Studies in Practice* (*Bosei-gaku no jissai*) by Kagoyama Kogyū in 1932. The latter is one of the earliest publications to use the term “*Bosei* Studies,” and probably marks the emergence of *bosei* as a new academic field. The first peak years, from 1933 to 1945, are well explained by the military influence, and mainly focus on topics around *bosei*-based education. In 1937, *Glorifying Bosei and Bosei Worshipping* (*Bosei sanbi to bosei sūhai*) by Kaga Toyohiko was published. In 1939, as Japan prepared to enter World War II, readers also found *Sublime Bosei* (*Sūkou-teki bosei*) by Rei Retsubun and *Japanese Women’s Moral Philosophy: Bosei is Strong* (*Nihon-fujin no michi: bosei wa tsuyoshi*) by Watanabe Motomu.

Needless to say, these *bosei* books were written in order to solicit women’s cooperation in the nation’s war efforts. As Japan entered the war, more *bosei* books were published. In 1942, Ifukube Toshiko wrote *History of Bosei* (*Bosei no rekishi*).³⁹ Also, *Protection of Bosei* (*Bosei no hogo*) was published by the Imperial Rule Assistance Association (*Taisei yokusan-kai*), which replaced the political parties under the New Political Order (*Shin taisei*) in 1944.

³⁸ Refer to Appendix B. For this analysis of *bosei* publications, I used the Journal Article Index (*Zasshi kiji sakuin*) database in Japan’s National Diet Library Online Public Access Catalog (NDL-OPAC) (*Kokuritsu kokkai toshokan zōsho sakuin*).

³⁹ Like Takamura, Ifukube was originally an anarchist feminist.

Modern feminism began as an objection to women's confinement in the private sphere, and asserted their advancement into the public sphere within the framework of the public-private dichotomy of the modern world. Modern feminism demanded women's suffrage, and it also demanded not only women's participation in nation-building efforts, and but official recognition of it. As I have reviewed above, in Japanese feminist history, even Kishida—who was originally a Popular Right activist and later a socialist feminist—came to argue that the exclusion of women from nation-building efforts was an expression of gender discrimination (Sievers 1983, 35). Also, as the cases of Hiratsuka and Takamure show, the demand for recognition of women's nation-building efforts often led feminists to a search for a nationalistic meaning of “reproductive labor.” Needless to say, under such circumstances, modern feminists were extremely vulnerable to the traps of nationalism, and modern feminists have necessarily come to face some fundamental contradictions between feminist goals and nationalistic goals.

- CHAPTER 3 -

AN HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF MODERN JAPANESE FEMINIST MOVEMENT: After 1945

The Allied Occupation's Intervention: *de jure* Emancipation and *de facto* Perpetuation of *Bosei*-ism

Japanese feminists in pre-war Japan were by and large co-opted by the nation's nationalism and did not bring about substantial improvements in the condition of Japanese women. Following Japan's defeat in World War II in 1945, efforts to improve the condition of Japanese women were, to a large extent, initiated by the Allies, in practice, the U.S., Occupation. This chapter sheds light on some of the consequences of the Allied intervention, tracing events from 1945 to the 1970s, focusing on the conditions of Japanese women during the rapid industrialization up to the 1970s and the Japanese Women's Rights Movements in the 1970s.

Without question, the Allied intervention made a significant contribution to the improvement of Japanese women's condition after World War II. Yet, there are some drawbacks to the intervention as well. One of the major drawbacks is that, since the Allied reform plans were by and large compulsorily imposed and accepted unconditionally, Japanese feminist scholarship failed to critically examine its active participation in the nation's war efforts. After World War II, as I will show, some pro-war feminists, including Takamure Itsue and Hiratsuka Raichō, became ad hoc peace advocates, while maintaining their feminist principle *bosei*-ism. Moreover, both used *bosei*-ism as their feminist ideology for peace, thus helping extend the ideology of *bosei*-ism to post-war Japan.

The price paid by Japanese women was quite high. In the 1960s, as the government launched its manpower policy, Japanese women were further exploited as a secondary labor class, whose primary responsibility was at home. Also, Japanese feminist scholarship itself paid a high price by its continuing involvement with the ideology of *bosei*-ism during Japanese Women's Liberation Movements of the 1970s. As I will show below, Tanaka Mitsu, one of the leading Japanese Women's Rights activists, co-opted the "consciousness-raising" technique from the U.S. and paradoxically reinforced the *bosei*-ism ideology.

The Allied Occupation and *de jure* Emancipation of Japanese Women

In October 1945, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, General Douglas MacArthur of the United States, ordered the Japanese government to initiate five basic social reforms, one of which was the legal guarantee of Japanese women's human rights. The Japanese government had no option but to accept the Allied Occupation's reform plans. The intervention significantly contributed to the improvement of the condition of Japanese women and brought Japanese women *de jure* equality for the first time in modern Japanese history. The Japanese Constitution, drafted under the guidance of the Allied Powers and proclaimed in 1946, explicitly requires that fundamental human rights be respected. For example, Article 14 states, "All people are equal under the law and that there would be no discrimination in political, economic, or social relations because of race, creed, sex, social status, or family origin." For another example, Article 24 provides, "Marriage would be based only on the consent of both sexes" (Kaneko 1995, 10-11).

In more specific terms, the Allied Occupation contributed to granting Japanese women enfranchisement and equal educational opportunity. Under a subsequent amendment of the election law, by the end of 1945 women's suffrage was approved. In following year, in Japan's first national general election, thirty-nine women were elected (Kaneko 1995, 10-11). With regard to women's education, a United States Education Mission visited Japan in 1946 and recommended to General MacArthur that Japan's education not discriminate against women and be democratized, including being freed from ultranationalistic as well as militaristic influences (Hara 1995, 102-103). The Education Mission's recommendations were well received by General MacArthur and were well reflected in the new Japanese Constitution. Article 26 states that "All boys and girls have the basic right to receive education;" and that "Parents are responsible to make sure that their children receive such education." The Fundamental Education Law (*Kyōiku kihon hō*) of 1947 defines basic educational rights in more detail, such as nine years of compulsory education for both boys and girls and the extension of coeducation to all levels (Hara 1995, 103)

One of the most significant *de jure* changes made in this regard was the abolition of the *ie* (family) system. The *ie* system was a legalized form of "Good Wives, Wise Mothers" and defined women as the lowest-ranking constituents of Japanese patriarchal family since Meiji Japan. With the new Constitution, the government conceived the need to revise the Civil Code and to set up the Judiciary and Legislative Council. One of the council members, Kawasaki Natsu argued from her experience as a personal affairs counselor, "I have received as many as 70,000 letters, 90 percent of which were from

women. These letters pointed out women's miserable lives. Some suffered because of economic problems, others because of family troubles. All these problems derived from the *ie* system" (cited in Kaneko 1995, 11). Kawasaki insisted that council members take women's suffering seriously. In 1947, a revised Civil Code was issued. Japanese women *de jure* became free from the *ie* system.

The Allied Occupation also helped bring gender equality in other areas. In 1946, a United States Labor Inspection team insisted that a special unit to protect women and minors be established under Japan's Ministry of Labor. When the Ministry of Labor was established in 1947, the Bureau of Women and Minors was also set up for the first time in Japanese history. Yamakawa Kikue, a socialist feminist, who had been an active critic of the ruling class since Hiratsuka's time, became the first chief of the bureau. Also, in 1946, General MacArthur submitted "a note regarding the abolition of prostitution," and warned the Japanese government that prostitution was against democratic ideas, such as human rights and individual freedom. Although a proposal to make prostitution illegal was repeatedly rejected in the Diet, in 1956 the Prostitution Prevention Law was enacted as a result of persistent efforts made, particularly, by assemblywomen (Nakata *et al.* 1995, 114-126).

Continuing *Bosei*-ism: The Price of the Intervention

There is no question that the Allied Occupation's reform plans contributed significantly to securing Japanese women's legal rights and to guaranteeing their constitutional, civil and educational equality. Japanese women had been deprived of such rights and of equality under the Meiji Constitution of 1889 and the Meiji Civil Code of 1898. Without

this Allied Occupation's intervention, the improvement of Japanese women's conditions would not have been possible to the same degree in such a short time period.

However, there are drawbacks to such an intervention as well. Takamure, for example, enthusiastically supported the Japan's militaristic expansionist policy from a nationalistic stance on maternity (*bosei*-ism) during World War II. As an influential Japanese feminist, Takamure agitated and encouraged Japanese women to actively support Japanese imperialistic efforts. In that sense, Takamure bore some responsibility for the nation's ultranationalism. In other words, Takamure was not a victim but a participant in the nation's ultranationalism.¹ After World War II, in contrast, Takamure abruptly became a proponent of the nation's democratization policy:

I understand what I have been searching for since my childhood is not justice but mostly love. Justice is a concept and love is a representation. Justice is uncertain. 'What justice is' changes with time and the individual. It is uncertain. 'To the world where all can live in peace and cooperation,' this is my love. (cited in Ōgoshi, 1996, p.125)

One sees hardly any regret in Takamure's statement. Instead, Takamure assumes that, given the circumstances, her activities during World War II are justifiable. Moreover, some of Takamure's key concepts that constituted the foundation of her nationalistic stance on *bosei*-ism, such as "love" and "cooperation," are still emphasized. This time, however, Takamure believes that Western democracy as justice would help fulfill her goals.

Also, Hiratsuka, who helped provide a theoretical justification for Japanese *bosei*-ism using Ellen Key's work, failed to perceive herself as a participant in Japanese ultranationalism. Instead, like Takamure, Hiratsuka considered herself a victim.

¹ Refer to Chapter 6.

Hiratsuka says, “Now, a big sun arises from the bottom of the hearts of emancipated Japanese women. Look, the day has come” (cited in Ōgoshi 1996, 125). Hiratsuka also viewed women as the chief contributors to world peace. In 1911, Hiratsuka said, “In the beginning woman was the sun...” Comparing these statements, we can observe that Hiratsuka’s nationalistic ideological stance on maternity has hardly changed.

Japanese feminist scholarship’s failure to critically assess the active roles played by *bosei* feminists as war ideologues during World War II resulted in the perception of women as victims, not participants, in war atrocities. Such tendencies are well reflected in the Mother Movements (*Hahaoya undō*), the dominant strand of post-war anti-war movements, which became prominent around 1955. There were two underlying anti-war principles behind the movements. One of them was “No More Hiroshimas.”² In this principle, there is no regret for the war atrocities the Japanese inflicted, especially on South East Asian peoples. Rather, “No More Hiroshimas” is a reflection of the distorted view that the Japanese are victims of war atrocities, stressing the tragedies caused by the atomic bombing on Hiroshima. The other principle was “Women, who bear and rear a life, protect it” (Kanai 1992, 166-7). Needless to say, this is an expression of Japanese *bosei*-ism, which had been justified by Western ideas repeatedly since Meiji Japan. Japanese feminist scholarship’s failure to see that Hiratsuka’s *bosei*-ism and Takamure’s new *bosei*-ism are in fact manifestations of the government slogan “Good Wives, Wise Mothers” resulted in *de facto* perpetuation of the ideology. Japanese women were later to pay a rather high price for such neglect.

² Interestingly, “No More Hiroshimas” is phrased in English in these movements.

Rapid Industrialization of the 1970s and Women as “non-Permanent Regular Workers”

With the Japan's rapid industrialization through the 1970s, the industrial emphasis shifted from primary industries to tertiary industries. With this industrial structural change, the demand for female labor increased dramatically. The number of employed women increased to 10.96 million in 1970 from 5.31 million in 1955. Yet, even the increase in this female workforce did not improve women's status. Traditional images of Japanese women still continued to operate and influence the status of women workers (Tanaka 1995, 343-4). Women's place and role were normatively defined as being in the home, and women workers were subject to unequal payment and promotion. Also they were expected to retire after marriage and childbirth.

After 1960, with severe labor shortages, the government launched a manpower policy that encouraged middle-aged women to enter this workforce to promote economic growth. Subsequently, an increasing number of married women after childrearing began to be hired. However, they were mostly hired as part-timers or “non-permanent regular workers.” The category “non-permanent regular workers,” which was applicable mainly to married female labor, was a new category designed to differentiate these women from permanent regular workers, who were mostly men. Although “non-permanent regular workers” were required to work same hours as permanent regular workers, “non-permanent regular workers” were not treated equally in terms of payment, promotion or benefits. Also, with plenty of married women who wished to work, the pressure was not on the women's side. The ratio of the average female wage to the

average male wage remained unchanged at 0.50 during this period (Kawashima 1995, 275-7).

From Meiji Japan to 1945, young uneducated female labor in light industries had been exploited to support Japanese industrialization policy. From 1945 to the 1970s, the Japanese exploitation of female labor continued. This time, however, young uneducated female labor was merely replaced with married women. Furthermore, despite the fact that more women were working outside the home for pay, the role of women in the family remained unchanged. Working women's lives became even harder, because they "bore the double burden of paid employment and household chores" (Tanaka, 1995, p.344).

The Japanese Women's Liberation Movement and the Legacy of *Bosei*

Japanese feminist scholarship's failure to examine the ideological nature of *bosei*-ism resulted not only in its perpetuation as a social norm but also in further internalization of it. *Bosei* ideology operated so pervasively that even some of the most progressive Japanese Women's Liberation Movements activists came to discover it as the inner-feminine maternal identity.³

The Japanese Women's Liberation Movement (*Ūman ribu*) was initially started as a result of women participants' disturbing experience in New Left Movements. In the late 1960s, the New Left Movements were launched by motivated young workers and students who were unhappy with Japan's sluggish progress toward democracy and disarmament. Many of them were women. However, many of the women participants

³ Joyce Gelb's *Gender Policies in Japan and the United States* indicates some of the major differences between women's movements in Japan and the United States. For example, Gelb argues, Women in the Japanese feminist movement have developed some unique agenda issues in comparison with some of their U.S. counterparts. These include efforts to challenge offensive male Japanese sexual practices including sex tourism and pornography. (Gelb 2003, 29)

soon found that men participants discriminated against their women counterparts by assigning them housekeeping tasks and excluding them from decision-making positions. They also found out that they were deeply affected by their internalized conventional gender roles. Many of the female participants married promising men activists and supported them from behind as wife and later the family as a mother (Ōgoshi 1996, 127-8). They were deeply disturbed by their own internalized conventional gender roles.

Many small study groups were formed by young, unknown women from around the beginning of the 1970s. In August 1971, the First Women's Liberation Study-Work Camp was held, centered around the Group Fighting Women (*Gurūpu tatakau onna*). In September 1972, the Shinjuku Women's Liberation Center (*Shinjuku ūman-ribu sentā*) was opened in Tokyo (Tanaka 1995, 347). One of the main objectives of the Japanese Women's Liberation Movement was to establish their own subjective identity, as the antithesis to the identity imposed by the Japanese patriarchal system. Tanaka Mitsu (1943-), a representative figure of the movement, talked about the meaning of women's sexuality in 1970.

For men, women exist separately in two images: maternal tenderness = mother, or sexual desire management machine = toilet. Since men and women are interdependent, women's sexual piteousness is men's sexual piteousness, and it is the symbol of contemporary society's piteousness. If a close examination and a subsequent clarification of this piteousness—women's sexual piteousness—leads to women's emancipation, it begins from you taking a threatening attitude. Because men's perception of women as mother or toilet exists as a bipolar perception that derives from the negative consciousness of sex that presupposes sex as filthy. When we know that mother and toilet are raccoons in the same den, it is essentially the same thing regardless of how we are seen, and women take a threatening attitude against men and authority. (cited in Ōgoshi 1996, 130)

Tanaka correctly points out that the Japanese patriarchal system despises women's sexuality as filthy and, simultaneously, exploits it. Tanaka's objective was a recovery of women's sexuality. Tanaka believed that it would lead to the formation of women's positive subjective identity.

Confirmation of Inner-feminine Maternal Identity through Consciousness-raising

"Consciousness-raising" was used as a means to identify women's "inner feminine consciousness," which women had internalized from society's expectations and, consequently, helped perpetuate conservative images of women (Tanaka 1995, 345). The "consciousness-raising" technique was originally used by U.S. Women's Rights activists in the 1960s to "raise" their "consciousness" of oppression, in order to prepare them for a fight against their internalized patriarchal ideology.

Although the "consciousness-raising" technique was a Western import, the Japanese counterpart was different in some respects. In the United States, for example, information collected through numerous "consciousness-raising" group meetings later became a basis for political action, as exemplified by the slogan "the personal is the political" (Hanisch 1970). In Japan, "consciousness-raising" led Japanese feminists deep into a search for feminine identity, rather than to the criticism of patriarchal system. Interestingly, even Tanaka, who had keen insights into patriarchal systems that oppress women's sexuality, did not envision changing male-dominated sociopolitical structures. Rather, Tanaka identified *bosei* as feminine identity and inadvertently became an advocate of *bosei*-ism:

My intuition that feminine wholeness has a self-fixation by which it continues to proliferate and persist in nature within myself is connected to the intuition that a

reinstatement of the thinking uterus is a unification of nature's life force and myself. That is, when encountering human beings and nature, women are always fresh and have a possibility of coming to life. The source is the uterus's nature, its fear and its life force. (Ōgoshi 1996, 134-5)

Tanaka concludes that the uterus's nature is the basis for women's subjective identity.

Although there are some theoretical differences between them, both Tanaka and Takamura seem to agree that nature is the determining factor. In Takamura's new *bosei-ism, jinen*, the Japanese Buddhist conception of nature, everything under the sun including men, women, love, labor, etc. is subject to *jinen*'s spontaneous change. In Tanaka's view women are further immersed in nature because of their internal nature as uterus.

Post-war Japanese feminism: Practice and Theory

The Allied Occupation's gender reforms were carried out from a liberal feminist perspective. The Allies tried to modernize Japanese gender relations, and eliminated Japanese traditional gender barriers including the *ie* system, so that women could participate in the activities that they were formally excluded before 1945.

Well over three decades after the gender reforms, why have Japanese gender relations progressed so little? More specifically, why did even Tanaka somewhat surprisingly come to confirm the root of *bosei-ism* in uterus?

Speaking of the discrepancies between practice and theory, Cynthia Fuchs Epstein, the author of *Deceptive Distinctions*, notes the persistence of essentialist claims like Jean-Jacques Rousseau's, despite feminist theoretical advancement including John Stuart Mill's liberal feminism:

Mill discounted the notion that characteristics attributed to women, such as unselfishness and restraint, were fundamental to their “nature.” He explained women’s tendency to be dependent or passive, for example, not as the manifestation of a female trait but as the consequence of circumstances that encouraged women to act and feel dependent. Instead of focusing on social conditions and situations that may have affected women’s behavior, some social scientists well into the mid-twentieth century still echoed Rousseau’s claim that women have a kind of intellectual different from and inferior to that of men and lack the capacity for abstract reasoning and creativity.⁴ (Epstein 1988, 3-4)

Like those Western social scientists of the mid-twentieth century who uncritically bought into Rousseau’s biased claim, post-1945 Japanese feminist scholarship seems not to have gained much insight into *bosei*-ism. As I discussed above, one of the reasons was that the reforms were imposed by the Allied authority. Therefore, the Japanese feminist scholarship after 1945 failed to critically examine how and why Japanese feminists became co-opted by the imperialist government and actively participated in the nation’s war efforts.

Also, the tradition of *bosei*-ism has been continuously sustained and sometimes reinforced through different venues. Epstein insightfully explains bias on gender issues and rediscovery of gender distinctions by social scientists.

Scientific analysis of gender distinctions has removed the old blinders from scholars but given them new ones....Bias on gender issues in the social sciences stems not only from ideological and epistemological perspectives about the nature of the division of society by sex but also from the analytical problems and social structures of the social sciences themselves. (Epstein 1988, 17)

Because of the bias,

They [scientists] have tended to find support and justification for gender distinctions and inequality rather than to locate the sources of these distinctions

⁴ “Reason in women is a practical reason, which enables them easily to discover how to arrive at a given conclusion, but which does not enable them to reach the conclusion themselves; the search for abstract and speculative truths, for principles, for axioms in science, everything that involves the generalization of ideas, is not within a woman’s province (Rousseau [1762], in Okin, 1979:131)” (Epstein 1988, 4).

and understand their dynamics. In this sense, scientists have also active agents perpetuating distinctions based on mainstream cultural viewpoints. (Epstein 1988, 4)

From around 1970, with an increasing number of married women advanced to the workplace, a revival of *bosei*-protection debate is clearly observed.⁵ For example, in the early 1970s, the number of articles on *bosei* in the contexts of “labor relations and economics” has increased dramatically.⁶ There were 21, 13, and 23 articles concerning *bosei*-protection published in 1970, 1972, and 1974, respectively. Like Hiratsuka who strongly advocated the protection of *bosei* from the capitalist exploitation of women in the beginning of the twentieth century, these articles typically advocate the protection of *bosei* in the same context. For example, the journal *Labor and Farmer Movement's* (*Rōdō nōmin undō*) 1970 *Special Edition* is titled *Fight against Destruction of Bosei* (*Bosei hakai tonō tataikai*). This special edition carries more than 15 articles, and addresses the issue from various perspectives. In 1973, the journal *Wages and Social Security* (*Chingin to Shakai-hoshō*) issued *Special Edition: Today's Bosei-Protection Demand and Equality Demand* (*Konnichi no bosei-hogo yōkyū to byōdō yōkyū*).⁷

As I noted above, Japanese Women's Liberation movement was born in the early 1970s. Japanese Women's Liberation activists intensively criticized patriarchy. Yet, my survey of *bosei* publications reveals that very few critically examined *bosei* around

⁵ Japanese feminist interest in *bosei*-protection is consistent throughout from the early twentieth century to the present. Although the number of *bosei*-protection articles remained low throughout from the 1980s to mid-1990s, *bosei*-protection in the context of “women and work” is one of the main themes of Japanese feminism.

⁶ Refer to Appendix B: *Bosei* Publications, Chart B3 – *Bosei* Articles (Labor Relations and Economics).

⁷ Toward the end of the twentieth century, another increased interest in *bosei*-protection is observed. This perhaps means that *bosei*-protection as a scholarly topic has well been established among Japanese labor relations scholars as well as economists.

this time period and well into the early 1980s. This finding implies that *bosei* as a Japanese women's characteristic had been taken for granted. Moreover, *bosei* probably had not been understood as one of the main causes of gender discrimination in Japan yet. This is one of the reasons for Tanaka's somewhat puzzling finding, despite her persistent criticism of Japanese patriarchy.

Diversification of *Bosei* Ideology

From the late 1970s, with the advent of Women's Studies in Japan, the term *bosei* has been co-opted by (social) scientists, and *bosei* has been rediscovered from various perspectives, for example, feminism,⁸ psychology, sociology, religion, literature, animal sciences *etc.* (Ohinata 1995, 209).⁹

As for *bosei* psychology, one of the major contributions is Kawai Hayao's (1928-), a clinical psychologist, *Pathology of Bosei Society Japan (Bosei shakai nihon no byōri)* (1976).¹⁰ Kawai defined Japan as a *bosei* society and examined psychological problems in contemporary Japanese, such as truancy and anthropophobia, from a social psychological perspective. Beside *Pathology of Bosei Society Japan*, Kawai wrote "Forever-Boys of *Bosei* Society Japan" (*Bosei shakai nihon no eien no shōnen-tachi*) in 1975 and "Filipinos' *Bosei* Principle—Filipinos and Japanese" (*Firipin-jin no bousei genri—firipin-jin to nihon-jin*) in 1978 for *Chūō Kōron* a popular magazine, among others. Since then, *bosei* society as a cause of psychological problems gained currency

⁸ This is one of the main topics of this dissertation. I will discuss it in detail in the following chapters.

⁹ Refer to Appendix B: Charts B2-11.

¹⁰ Kawai is Professor Emeritus at Kyoto University and president of International Japan Culture Research Center since 1995. In addition, he was elected Secretary of the Agency of Cultural Affairs in 2002.

and understand their dynamics. In this sense, scientists have also active agents perpetuating distinctions based on mainstream cultural viewpoints. (Epstein 1988, 4)

From around 1970, with an increasing number of married women advanced to the workplace, a revival of *bosei*-protection debate is clearly observed.⁵ For example, in the early 1970s, the number of articles on *bosei* in the contexts of “labor relations and economics” has increased dramatically.⁶ There were 21, 13, and 23 articles concerning *bosei*-protection published in 1970, 1972, and 1974, respectively. Like Hiratsuka who strongly advocated the protection of *bosei* from the capitalist exploitation of women in the beginning of the twentieth century, these articles typically advocate the protection of *bosei* in the same context. For example, the journal *Labor and Farmer Movement's* (*Rōdō nōmin undō*) 1970 *Special Edition* is titled *Fight against Destruction of Bosei* (*Bosei hakai tonō tataikai*). This special edition carries more than 15 articles, and addresses the issue from various perspectives. In 1973, the journal *Wages and Social Security* (*Chingin to Shakai-hoshō*) issued *Special Edition: Today's Bosei-Protection Demand and Equality Demand* (*Konnichi no bosei-hogo yōkyū to byōdō yōkyū*).⁷

As I noted above, Japanese Women's Liberation movement was born in the early 1970s. Japanese Women's Liberation activists intensively criticized patriarchy. Yet, my survey of *bosei* publications reveals that very few critically examined *bosei* around

⁵ Japanese feminist interest in *bosei*-protection is consistent throughout from the early twentieth century to the present. Although the number of *bosei*-protection articles remained low throughout from the 1980s to mid-1990s, *bosei*-protection in the context of “women and work” is one of the main themes of Japanese feminism.

⁶ Refer to Appendix B: *Bosei* Publications, Chart B3 – *Bosei* Articles (Labor Relations and Economics).

⁷ Toward the end of the twentieth century, another increased interest in *bosei*-protection is observed. This perhaps means that *bosei*-protection as a scholarly topic has well been established among Japanese labor relations scholars as well as economists.

repeatedly explained from various religious traditions, including Japanese Buddhism (1954 & 1992), Indian Buddhism (1980), Confucianism (1992 & 1993), Christian Holy Mother (1995), among others. In addition, some Japanese religious scholars used *bosei*, in order to classify world religions, for example, *bosei* religion vs. *fusei* (patriarchal) religion (1987).

There are 104 articles which use *bosei* as a literary criticism theme from 1954 to the present. The Japanese authors examined include: Tanizaki Junichiro (1954, 1969, 1988, 2000), Nosaka Akiyuki (1974), Inoue Hisashi (1974), Itsuki Hiroyuki (1976), Fukazawa Shichiro (1976), Mori Mari (1979), Sakaguchi Ango (1980), Endo Shusaku (1980), Oe Keizaburo (1980), Murasaki Shikibu (1995), Higuchi Ichiyo (1996), Ihara Saikaku (1996), Akutagawa Ryunosuke (1999), Mushanokoji Saneatsu (1999), Shimazaki Toson (2002), among others. The journal *Japanese Literature: Interpretation and Appreciation (Kokubun-gaku kaishaku to kanshō)* launched *Special Edition: Collapse of the Bosei Myth—Bosei and Literature (Bosei shinwa no hōkai—bosei to bungaku)* in 1980, and examined changes in *bosei* ideology as reflected in various Japanese literary traditions. Also, the journal *New Japanese Literature (Shin nihon bungaku)* issued *Special Edition: Evil Spirited and Bosei—Rereading Literature from Women's Perspective (Mashō to bosei—onna no me de bungaku wo yominaosu)* in 1992. Western authors were also examined, including: D.H. Lawrence (1970, 1973, 1974, 2000), Honoré de Balzac (1982, 1997), Romain Rolland (1988), James Joyce (1991), Toni Morrison (1995), Virginia Woolf (1998, 2000), William Faulkner (2000), John

Steinbeck (2002), among others. In addition, there are 15 more cultural studies articles which use *bosei* as an analytical theme, including theatre, film, and anime studies.

Not only Japanese social sciences and humanities co-opted *bosei* as an analytical tool. Interestingly, there are about 20 *bosei* articles published from 1976 to 2003 in animal sciences/agriculture journals. In 1979, the *Domestic Animal Breeding Studies* (*Kachiku hanshoku-gaku zasshi*) journal published two articles on mice's *bosei* behavior by Saito Toru and Takahashi Kazuaki. The authors observed changes in mice's *bosei* behavior from infancy to old age. This article represents one of the earliest attempts to use *bosei* in a non-human context. In 1980, Saito and Takahashi added another article on mice's *bosei* behavior during pregnancy. In 1984, Minami Tetsuhiro published an article on *bosei* behavior among crab-eating macaques in the *Animal Psychology Annual Report* (*dōbutsu shinri-gaku nenpō*). In 1995, three *bosei* articles were published in animal sciences: one on sheep's and two on cattle's *bosei*. Since then, some more *bosei* articles were published by domestic animal journals as well as animal psychology journals. These findings tell that *bosei* is not perceived as an expression of culture but as an expression of maternal nature by those Japanese scientists.

Toward the end of the twentieth century, the term *bosei* has become intensively used by health scientists, and the Japanese witnessed the emergence of two new health science fields: *bosei* health and *bosei* nursing.¹³ This is a medicalization of motherhood, which Barbara Katz Rothman explains in *Recreating Motherhood: Ideology and Technology in a Patriarchal Society* (1989). Rothman demonstrates that “the real needs of mother, father, and children have been swept aside in an attempt to reduce the complex

¹³ Refer to Appendix B: Charts B9-11.

process of human reproduction to a clinical event that can be controlled by medical technology.” As the charts show, in Japan it slowly happened in the mid-1970s, and from the late 1990s, with the advent of *bosei* health and *bosei* nursing,¹⁴ human reproduction in Japan has increasingly become controlled by health professionals and technology. And, more significant to the issue of rediscovering *bosei*, the ideology has now been transformed into a medical term. A majority of *bosei* books in the 1990s belong to these new *bosei* categories.

Beside the diversification of *bosei*, there is a proliferation of *bosei* vocabulary: *Bosei* instinct (*honnō*), *bosei* love (*ai*), *bosei* society (*shakai*), *bosei* principle (*genri*), pure (*junsui*) *bosei* vs. role (*yakuwari*) *bosei*, *bosei* psychology (*shinri-gaku*), *bosei* behavior (*kōdō*), *bosei*-deprivation (*hakudatsu*) syndrome, *bosei* sociology (*shakai-gaku*), restrictive (*sokubaku*) *bosei* vs. autonomous (*shutai*) *bosei*, *bosei* internal medicine (*naika*), *bosei* health (*eisei*), *bosei* nursing (*kango*), *bosei* dietetics (*ei-yō-gaku*), among others.

Despite these trends, the Japanese seem to be subject to constant fear of losing *bosei*. Beside *bosei*-protection articles, a majority of articles on *bosei* warns the endangerment of *bosei*. As early as 1968, two articles discuss “the loss of *bosei*” (*bosei sōshitsu*) and “degeneration of *bosei* instinct” (*bosei honnō no taika*). As mentioned above, the journal *Labor and Farmer Movement* published *Special Edition: Fight against Destruction of Bosei* (*Bosei hakai tonō tataikai*). In 1971, there is an article titled “Loss of

¹⁴ Although *bosei* health became widely used in the 1990s, there is a book titled *Bosei Health* in 1960. Japan Society of Maternal Health (*Nihon bosei eisei gakkai*) was established in 1959. Likewise, there are some *bosei* nursing books published in 1982. These books represent some of the earliest publications in these fields.

Bosei-love and How to Raise a Child” (*Bosei-ai sōshitsu to kodomo no sodate-kata*). In 1980, the journal *Japanese Literature: Interpretation and Appreciation* issued *Special Edition: Collapse of the Bosei Myth* (*Bosei shinwa no hōkai*). In 1981, *Lost Bosei-love* (*Ushinawareta bosei ai*) was written by Hirai Nobuo. In 1993, the journal *World* (*Sekai*) published “Extinction of *Bosei-love*” (*Bosei ai no shōmetsu*). In 1998, the popular journal *Aera* published “*Bosei* was an Illusion” (*Bosei wa gensō datta*). Also, in the same year, another popular journal *This is Yomiuri* published “The Real Reason Women don’t Bear a Child—Give Candid Advice to Feminism that Took Away *Bosei*” (*Onna ga kodomo wo umanai hontō no riyū—bosei wo ubatta feminizumu ni kugen suru*).

As I discussed above, Japanese co-optation of Western feminist works until 1945 was highly selective. Although a number of key Western liberal feminist works were translated into Japanese in the beginning of Meiji Japan, with the advent of *Seitō* feminism, particularly Hiratsuka’s *bosei-ism*, Japanese feminists became more interested in Western feminist works that specially deal with love and marriage. In the 1920s, however, there are more socialist and communist feminist works translated into Japanese than anything else. In the 1930s to 1945, in contrast, Japanese feminist scholarship was increasingly under the influence of the nation’s imperial expansionism, Western feminist works translated into Japanese during this time period are mostly regarding motherhood and matriarchy, which directly and indirectly praise women’s contributions to war efforts.

From 1945 and 1950, very few Western feminist works were translated into Japanese. Since the 1950s, a greater number of Western feminist works were translated.

In the 1950s and 1960s, 11 and 17 Western feminist works were introduced to a Japanese audience in translation, respectively. Unlike Japanese co-optation of Western feminist works before 1945, these Western feminist works address various feminist topics. Japanese co-optation of Western feminist works after 1945 is more balanced, or less selective, than before. Some of the key Western feminist works translated during this time period include: *The Second Sex* (1953) by Simone de Beauvoir in 1953 and *The Feminine Mystique* (1963) by Betty Friedan in 1965. *The Second Sex*, especially, was well received by the Japanese. It was one of the bestsellers in that year.

With the advent of the Japanese Women's Liberation Movement, there were more than 50 Western feminist works translated in the 1970s alone. One of the prominent characteristics of the 1970s is that many of the source works of the second wave of Western feminism, or radical feminism, were translated into Japanese.¹⁵ They are, in chronological order of Japanese translation: *The Captive Wife* (1966) by Hannah Gavron in 1970, *Notes from the First Year* (1968) by Shulamith Firestone and Anne Koedt, *The Dialectics of Sex* (1971) by Firestone and *The Power and Women and the Subversion of the Community* (1972) by Mariarosa Dalla Costa and Selma James in 1972, *Sexual Politics* (1970) by Kate Millett in 1973, *An Autobiography* (1974) by Angela Davis in 1974, *Psychoanalysis and Feminism* (1974) by Juliet Mitchell in 1977, *The Politics of Women's Liberation* (1975) by Jo Freeman in 1978, among others.

The 1980s and the Ecofeminism Debate

¹⁵ Refer to Appendix A.

In 1975, the International Women's Year was observed, and the United Nations ordered that any form of gender discrimination be abolished. And, the U.N. Decade for Women 1976-1985 was launched. The Japanese government had long been reluctant to make any changes. It had been indifferent to improving the conditions of women for a long time, despite Japanese women's significant contributions to nation-building efforts and their persistent demand for gender equality. This international demand prompted the Japanese government to make some substantial changes.¹⁶ In 1975, the government established the Headquarters for the Planning and Promotion of Policies to Women (*Sōrifu fujin mondai kikaku suishin honbu*). A national plan of action for U.N. Decade for Women was announced in 1977. In 1977, the National Women's Education Centre (*Kokuritsu fujin kyōiku kaikan*) was opened and the Japan Women's Studies Association (*Nihon josei-gaku kenkyūkai*) was inaugurated. Now, the Japanese women's movement was repossessed by elite women. And, in the same year, the Shinjuku Women's Liberation Center went out of operation.

In the 1980s, the Japanese witnessed some dramatic changes in the nation's gender relations. In 1980, Japanese government signed the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. The Japanese Supreme Court ruled that any differential treatment between men and women concerning retirement age is void under the Constitution. The nation's first bookstore specializing in women's books Shōkadō opened in Kyoto in 1982. Further, in 1985, the Equal Employment Opportunity Law (*Danjo koyō kikai kintō hō*) was passed in the Diet. Well

¹⁶ Joyce Gelb talks about the effectiveness of *gaiatsu* or external pressure in this context (Gelb 2003, 4).

reflecting this growing Japanese interest in feminist issues, Japanese interest in women's issues continued to grow dramatically. There were 118 Western feminist works translated into Japanese in the 1980s alone.¹⁷ These Western feminist works are quite diverse. To name a few: *The Sociology of Housework* (1974) by Ann Oakley, *Androgyny: Toward a New Theory of Sexuality* (1976) by June Singer, *About Chinese Women* (1977) by Julia Kristeva, *The Reproduction of Mothering: Psychoanalysis and the Sociology of Gender* (1978) by Nancy Chodorow, *The Church and the Second Sex* (1968) by Mary Daly, *Shadow Work* (1980) by Ivan Illich, *Woman and Sport: the Meaning of Gymnastics* (1984) by H.J. Medau and P.E. Nowacki, *Feminism and Materialism: Women and Modes of Production* (1978) by Annette Kuhn and AnnMarie Wolpe.

In sum, some of the prominent characteristics of the 1980s regarding Japanese gender relations include: *Bosei*-ism still remained as one of the dominant currents of Japanese feminism. Japanese society was divided between the conservatives and the liberals regarding the anticipated changes in the nation's gender relations. Feminism gained popularity. Women's Studies emerged as a new academic discipline. And, there was a greater demand for Western feminist works.

In 1983, Aoki Yayoi (1927-), a freelance social critic, wrote *The Universe of Feminism*, and declared the foundation of Japanese ecofeminism. In 1985, Ueno Chizuko (1948-), one of the leading feminists, wrote "Can Women Save the World?" and criticized Aoki's position. Speaking of *bosei*-ism, Aoki is an enthusiastic supporter, whereas Ueno is a determined critic. Aoki's argument revived Takamure's *bosei*-ism in

¹⁷ This trend continues to the 1990s. There are 130 Western feminist works translated in the 1990s. Refer to Appendix A: Chart A2 – Western Feminist Works Translated into Japanese by Decade.

the guise of ecofeminism, which was a new Western import and therefore did not carry the negative baggage of World War II that the Japanese definitely wanted to avoid at all costs. Aoki's strategy was to name Takamure's *bosei*-ism Japanese feminism, in order to appeal to the nation's conservatives. Against this background, Chapter 7 puts Aoki's ecofeminism in the context of *nihonjinron* (theory of the Japanese) intellectual nationalism, which was one of the dominant intellectual trends of the time, and examines her ecofeminism as an instance of Japanese nationalist feminism of the 1970s.

Ueno's criticism is extremely meaningful in that she really was one of the first Japanese feminists to openly criticize *bosei*-ism. As my survey of *bosei* publications revealed, there was virtually no Japanese feminist before Ueno who problematized it. Ueno's insight should be justly credited. During the ecofeminism debate, Ueno persistently advocated her liberal feminist position and powerfully criticized Aoki's conservative position. Japanese feminist scholarship seemed about to deconstruct and dismantle *bosei*-ism for the first time in Japanese feminist history. However, in an open debate between Ueno and Aoki in a 1985 "Symposium: Where Does Feminism Go?" (*Shinpojiumu: feminizumu wa doko he yuku*), surprisingly, both discovered that there were more similarities than differences between their positions. In the same year, despite her liberal feminist position in the debate, Ueno published *Capitalism and Domestic Labor* (*Shihon-sei to kajirōdō*) and declared her Marxist feminist position. In 1990, an expanded version *Patriarchy and Capitalism* (*Kafuchō-sei to shihon-sei*) was published. Chapter 8 closely examines Ueno's Marxist feminist theoretical position, focusing on *Patriarchy and Capitalism*. More importantly, this chapter seeks to explore why Ueno

and Aoki had more similarities than differences, and if Ueno's Marxist feminism is another instance of Japanese nationalist feminist. The findings of this chapter will show how powerful the ideology of *bosei* is, and call for a new feminist criticism which directly addresses the relationship between nationalism and feminism and the rediscovery of *bosei* by Japanese feminist scholarship

- CHAPTER 4 -

**FUKUZAWA YUKICHI AND JOHN S. MILL'S
SUBJECTION OF WOMEN: “Good Wives, Wise Mothers” as
the Foundation of “Modern” and “Traditional” Japanese
Women’s Gender Roles**

Introduction

In early Meiji Japan, scholarly efforts to improve the conditions of women were initiated for the first time in Japanese history. One of the first to speak for Japanese women was a man Fukuzawa Yukichi (1835-1901). Co-opting John Stuart Mill’s *Subjection of Women* (1869), one of the classical works of liberal feminism, Fukuzawa tirelessly criticized Confucianism as the cause of women’s subjugated status, and greatly contributed to the development of the nation’s first women’s movement. The Japanese socialist feminist Yamakawa Kikie (1890-1980) has said, “Fukuzawa’s feminist writings somehow made her feel as though a great weight had been lifted off her chest” (Fujiwara 1988, x).

However, many have noted, Fukuzawa’s feminist objectives were overshadowed by his class biases and nationalistic dispositions. Under the influence of the Meiji government’s overzealous industrialization policy, Fukuzawa was devoid of insight into widening class differences, and failed to sympathize with the ruthlessly exploited young women workers in light industry. Despite his continuing efforts for women, Fukuzawa later became explicitly nationalistic and inadvertently became an advocate of the government slogan “Good Wives, Wise Mothers” (*ryōsai kenbo*) for the improvement of the Japanese race.

This chapter explores Fukuzawa's "feminist" writings and examines how and why, in co-opting Mill's work, his "feminist" objectives were compromised. Particularly, I will explore Fukuzawa's "feminism" as a cultural practice and examine the ways in which the dominant ideologies of late 19th century Japan played a key role in determining its formation. In this regard, I also consider the ways in which Fukuzawa's "feminism" contributed to the Meiji government's hegemonic control over Japanese women by transforming them into gendered national subjects.

Fukuzawa Yukichi and "Good Wives, Wise Mothers"

Fukuzawa is one of the most prominent figures in Japanese modern history. Born in 1835, Fukuzawa was thirty-three years old, at the mid-point of his life, at the time of the Meiji Restoration of 1868. Fukuzawa lived through a time of upheaval when Japan evolved from the Tokugawa feudal despotism to the Meiji constitutional monarchy. He led his countrymen and women as one of the most influential "enlightenment" scholars of the time. Fukuzawa was from a lower-rank samurai family in Nakatsu, Kyushu (Nagai 1984, 5-48).

Fukuzawa was a prolific writer. His *Encouragement of Learning* (*Gakumon no susume*) (1872-1876) and *An Outline of a Theory of Civilization* (*Bunmei-ron no gairyaku*) (1874), among others, were widely read and are now regarded as Japanese classics.¹ In addition, Fukuzawa is known as the founder of Keio University, one of the most prestigious private universities in Japan (Nagai 1984, 5-48).

¹ *An Encouragement of Learning* was written with an extremely simple writing style to be read by a wider audience. It is reported that one out of every 160 persons bought a copy in the 1870s (Nagai 1984, 21).

Fukuzawa visited the West, including the United States, three times between 1860 and 1867.² Around the Meiji Restoration of 1868, the Japanese government sent its promising scholars to the West to absorb Western technology and knowledge. Fukuzawa was one of the government-sponsored scholars who experienced the West (Nagai 1984, 5-48). Upon his first observation of the West in San Francisco in 1860, Fukuzawa said that he and his companions were not the least surprised concerning scientific matters, but were “completely dumbfounded” about social matters (Fukuzawa 1978 [1898], 115-6; Fujiwara 1988, xiii). One of the “social matters” that Fukuzawa observed with complete surprise was Western women’s better social position.

Fukuzawa became concerned with the position of women in Japan. In his eyes, Japanese women were unfairly treated and Confucianism was responsible. In fact, in Fukuzawa’s time, Confucianism had a great influence in almost every sphere of Japanese social life. *The Greater Learning for Women (Onna daigaku)*, edited by Confucius scholar Kaibara Ekken (1630-1714), played a key role in maintaining the ideal images of Japanese women at this time. *The Greater Learning for Women* is one of the most popular abridged versions of *Four Books on Women (Onna shisō)*, a collection of Chinese Confucian manuals on women’s ethics and behavior. In *The Greater Learning for Women*, men were associated with heaven and women with earth in a male-dominated society. The ultimate goal of womanhood, according to *The Greater Learning for Women*,

² In 1860, when he was twenty-five years old, Fukuzawa joined a four-month envoy trip to the United States aboard the *Kanrin Maru*, a Japanese manned vessel, attending Kimura Settsu-no-kami the captain (*gunkan houkou*). Two years later, Fukuzawa accompanied the government’s delegation to Europe as a translator. Again, in 1867, when he was thirty-two years old, Fukuzawa went to the United States (Fukuzawa 1978 [1898]; Nagai 1984, 14-15).

is to master the virtues of gentleness, meekness, purity and cleanliness. Also, women were expected to serve and obey men and to do the housework (Fujiwara 1988, vii-xv).

On his return, Fukuzawa joined the Meiji Six Society (*Meirokeisha*).³ The participating intellectuals were mostly elite government officials and academics. Mori Arinori (1847-89), one of the leading members, later became the nation's first Minister of Education in 1888. Nakamura Masanao (1832-1891), another leading member, is known as the nation's first translator of John Stuart Mill's *On Liberty* and of Samuel Smiles' *Self-help*. The society's slogan was "Civilization and Enlightenment" (*Bunmei kaika*). Their primary concern was the survival of the nation in the face of the Western imperial advance toward the East. Meiji Six Society scholars were charged with the responsibility of explaining the reasons for Western success so that Japan could also join the West (Braisted 1976, xvii-xviii).

Meiji Six Society scholars conceded that "the low regard for women in Japan was a major contributor to its backwardness...If there was to be real reform in Japanese society, it must begin with the family—and women must be the center of change" (Sievers 1983, 18). In March 1875, Fukuzawa wrote "The Equal Numbers of Men and Women" (*Daijo dōsū-ron*) for the *Meiji Six Journal* (*Meiroke zasshi*), the journal for the Meiji Six Society. In this essay, Fukuzawa advocated the abolition of polygamy, which was a common practice, possibly under the influence of Confucian ideas (Fukuzawa 1976 [1875]). Support for "new" gender relations was also expressed by other members. From 1874 to 1875, the *Meiji Six Journal* published several essays regarding the position of

³ The *Meirokeisha* (Meiji Six Society) is an association of the leading scholars of the time. It was named for the year of its founding, the sixth year of the Meiji Era (1873) (Braisted 1976, xvii).

women in Meiji Japan. Mori wrote “On Wives and Concubines,” Nakamura “Creating Good Mothers” (Braisted 1976).

Under the Meiji government’s modernization policy, the social norms of “Good Wives, Wise Mothers” were first advocated by Nakamura (Sievers 1983, 22; Tachi 1984, 185-209) as an effort to modernize Japanese gender relations. As Meiji government propaganda, it was imposed from above to promote Japanese women’s active participation in the Meiji government’s nation-building efforts, targeting privileged-class women, and was inherently nationalistic (Sievers 1983, 22-5; Tachi 1984, 186-91; Takamura 1972).

Interestingly, despite his major contribution to the Meiji government’s modernization project, Fukuzawa held an anti-government position throughout his life. Meiji Japan was not a modern democratic state, despite its official claims. Meiji constitutionalism was for display, and the Meiji government was in fact dominated and controlled by the old ruling class (Irokawa 1967). Unlike most of the leading Meiji reformers, who were from elite families, Fukuzawa was from a lower-rank samurai family. Fukuzawa was critical of his fellow Meiji scholars’ government-centered stance, and positioned himself with the masses. Fukuzawa’s launching of Keio University, among his other private initiatives, is often seen as evidence of his courageous anti-government stance (Nagai 1984, 5-48).

Fukuzawa did not get on well with other members of the Meiji Six Society, who were exceedingly government-oriented. Fukuzawa left the Society and established his own, declaring that he would study for the masses, not for the state (Braisted 1976, xxiii-

xxiv; Nagai 1984,18-9).⁴ In fact, Fukuzawa declared that Keio Gijuku, which later became Keio University, would be a private school of Dutch Studies for the masses. Soon, Fukuzawa with his Keio followers began publishing the *Popular Journal (Minkan zasshi)*, their own journal, in 1874 (Braisted 1976, xxiii-xxiv).

After the Meiji Six Society, Fukuzawa actively borrowed from John Stuart Mill's *Subjection of Women* (1869), and wrote several essays on various women's issues, ranging from polygamy to childbearing, in an attempt to improve the conditions of women in Japan. On his own copy, Fukuzawa left 23 bookmarks. A careful examination of the bookmarks by a Japanese scholar indicates that Fukuzawa scrutinized Mill's work and applied Mill's ideas to his examination of gender relations in Meiji Japan (Anzai 1978, 58).

Chapter 1 of Mill's book is reflected in Fukuzawa's early writings (Sections 8, 13, 15 and 17 of *An Encouragement of Learning*), which he wrote sporadically from 1874 to 1876. In these works, Fukuzawa attempted to repudiate the validity of the Confucian *Greater Learning for Women*, which, according to Fukuzawa, was the philosophical foundation of gender inequality in Meiji Japan. Chapters 2, 3 and 4 of Mill's work are reflected in Fukuzawa's later writings, such as "On Japanese Women, Part 1 & 2" and "A Critique of The Greater Learning for Women."

In these essays, Fukuzawa persistently criticizes Confucianism, particularly *The Greater Learning for Women*, as responsible for the deprived conditions of women in Japan. In his widely read work *An Encouragement of Learning* in 1876, Fukuzawa calls

⁴ In Section 4 of *An Encouragement of Learning*, "The Duty of Scholars," Fukuzawa argued that "in Japan there is only a government, and as yet no people" (Fukuzawa 1988 [1874], 25).

Confucianism “foolish teachings.” Fukuzawa also wrote “On the Association of Men and Women (*Danjo kōsai ron*)” and denounced the *I Ching* as “an excuse for giving respect to men and for belittling women” (Fukuzawa 1988 [1886], 103-27). Later, after being frustrated with the nation’s sluggish progress toward better gender relations and the persistence of Confucian ideals on womanhood in Meiji Japan, Fukuzawa engaged in direct criticism of Confucianism and published “A Critique of *The Greater Learning for Women* (*Onna daigaku hyōron*)” (Fukuzawa 1988 [1899], 170-218), and offered “The New Greater Learning for Women (*Shin onna daigaku*)” as an alternative to *The Greater Learning for Women* in *Jiji-nippō* newspaper editorials in 1899 (Fukuzawa 1988 [1899], 219-44).⁵

Fukuzawa’s Limitations and the Women’s Liberation Movement

There is a school of scholars who praise highly Fukuzawa’s contribution to the development of the Japanese feminist movement (Blacker 1964; Fujiwara 1988, x; Hane 1984). For example, Mikiso Hane, a Japanese historian, says that “Fukuzawa was the first influential advocate of women’s rights in modern Japan and the most prominent and persistent champion of the movement to liberate Japanese women from the fetters of traditional ideas and practices” (Hane 1984, 96). Fukuzawa “fought for the improvement of women’s plight throughout his life...he was a true pioneer in the feminist movement in Japan” (Hane 1984, 97). Keiko Fujiwara, in her introduction to *Fukuzawa Yukichi on Japanese Women*, similarly praises Fukuzawa’s contribution: “It is Fukuzawa who is due the credit for launching a new era and arousing a general interest in women’s issues”

⁵ Fukuzawa owned this newspaper.

(Fujiwara 1988, x). Upon Fukuzawa's death in 1901 a great number of Japanese women gathered to pay tribute to his feminist contribution (Hane 1984, 110).

However, several scholars point out certain of Fukuzawa's limitations. Carmen Blacker, the author of *Japanese Enlightenment*, argues "Fukuzawa was concerned...solely to improve women's position within the sphere traditionally thought to be theirs" (Blacker 1964, 89). Fukuzawa's stance for the rights of women was hardly revolutionary; he did not call for votes for women, nor did he plead for women's higher education, and he put too much emphasis on women's roles at home (Blacker 1964, 89). In this regard, Fujiwara emphasizes class bias, and argues that "Fukuzawa's concerns addressed only middle-class women, and this limited his beliefs from having a truly universal quality" (Fujiwara 1988, xv).

One possible explanation for Fukuzawa's failure is the limitations set by his time. The Japanese did not follow the development of Western liberal thought. Jean-Jacques Rousseau's *Social Contract* (1762) was introduced to Japan only seven years after Mill's *On Liberty* became available in Japanese in 1871. So when he read Mill's work, Fukuzawa was not familiar with Rousseau's ideas, including his famous statement, "Man was born free but is everywhere in chains," in which Rousseau correctly points out that society is an oppressor, depriving the people of liberty (Pyle 1998, 100).

As B.T. Wakabayashi, the author of *Modern Japanese Thought*, and Douglas R. Howland, the author of *Translating the West*, point out, the Japanese scholars in Meiji Japan faced various concepts of Western liberalism all at once with the official opening of the nation in 1868 after over 200 years of a seclusion policy, and therefore a certain

confusion with regard to the meanings of new Western liberal ideas was inevitable (Howland 2002; Wakabayashi 1998). In fact, Japanese enlightenment scholars including Fukuzawa were not familiar with some of the key words of liberalism, including “liberty,” “rights” and “individual,” and struggled to translate them into Japanese. Fukuzawa was not able to understand the meaning of the word “rights,” because there was no Japanese vocabulary equivalent to it. Fukuzawa was aware of the importance of “rights,” but had trouble understanding its meaning. At one point Fukuzawa thought that “rights” meant “justice (*tsuugi*)” (Fukuzawa 1958, 392-3). In contrast, Nishi Amane (1829-1897), another influential Meiji Six Society scholar, translated the word “right” as “*ken*,” “*kenri*” or “*kengi*.” Each of these translated words includes “*ken*,” which means “power.” Although Fukuzawa thought that “moral righteousness” was the appropriate translation of the word “right,” the Japanese seem more comfortable with “*kenri*” for “right,” as translated by Nishi (Braisted 1976; Howland 2002, 122-152; Nishi 1962, 84-94), although “right” had exactly the opposite meaning to “power” in the history of Western thought.⁶

In my view, this circumstantial explanation is ideological and overlooks the fact that Meiji society in fact was an unwaveringly patriarchal and class society. Lower-class people, particularly women, were severely deprived of basic human rights in that period. With the Meiji government’s industrialization policy, Japanese women were mobilized as cheap laborers, mostly spinners and weavers, in light industry, so that the nation could

⁶ In *Leviathan*, Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) explained that “right” meant the liberty to do or not to do, while law decided and restricted either of the two (Hobbes 1651). By this well-known implication, “right” took the place of natural law, which it succeeded in the thinking of John Locke (1632-1704) and of Rousseau.

generate capital for the development of heavy industry (Kawashima 1995, 271-93; Nolte & Hasting 1991). It is estimated that by 1876 Japanese women constituted 60% of the nation's entire factory workforce (Sievers 1983, 54-86).⁷ Most of these women workers were migrant (*dekasegi*) workers from poor families in rural Japan, who had little choice but to send their young daughters into the textile factories (Kawashima 1995, 272-5). Widening class and regional differences after the Meiji Restoration made possible the exploitation of young women workers from poor rural families. Interestingly, Meiji leaders, including Fukuzawa, believed that civilization inevitably divides society into rich and poor. Wakabayashi says,

[M]en like Fukuzawa Yukichi insisted that the ever-widening schism between haves and have-nots reflected progress toward civilization. His main concern late in life was to keep the have-nots from destroying these goals that he had devoted his life to furthering. To that end, he argued for Meiji state leaders to exploit the opiate of religion, he urged the rich to aid charities, and he proposed ridding Japan of paupers through emigration. Above all, he argued against educating the illiterate poor for fear of what a little bit of learning would do to hungry rabble-rousers. (Wakabayashi 1998, 10)

The working conditions were extremely harsh. Workers were housed in poorly maintained factory-owned dormitories, under the supervision of factory management 24 hours a day, and were forced to work 15-hour shifts (Hunter 1993, 69-97; Kawashima 1995, 273-4; Sievers 1983, 65).⁸

There were indeed many Japanese intellectuals who understood liberal thought correctly and initiated the nation's first popular rights movement. A number of relevant events took place in the 1870s and 80s. Mill's *The Subjection of Women* and Herbert

⁷ Kawashima Yoko, a Japanese feminist scholar, adds, "Japanese agriculture, mostly small-sized family farming, was highly dependent on women labor" (Kawashima 1995, 272-3).

⁸ Janet Hunter's study investigates the high incidence of tuberculosis among the women workers (Hunter 1993).

Spencer's *Social Statics, or the Conditions Essential to Human Happiness*, were translated into Japanese in 1877 and 1879, respectively (Fujiwara 1988, viii).⁹ As for women's rights, as early as 1878 Kusunose Kita, who became later known as the "grandmother of civil rights" (*Minken bāsan*), demanded voting rights for women (Mackie 2003, 19-20). A campaign for gender equality was initiated by Doi Kōka and Ueki Emori in 1879. Ueki was a leading theorist and organizer of the popular-rights movement (*Jiyū minken undō*) (Fujiwara 1998, viii). Ueki's 1879 essay "Equality Between Sexes" (*Danjo dōken ni tsuite koto*) is one of the first published essays that advocates women's equal rights in Japan.

The nation's first women's liberation movement was also initiated by Japanese women activists in 1880. Kishida Toshiko (1861-1901) joined the Popular Rights Movements (*Jiyū minken undō*), which was developed as an opposition to Meiji government reforms that conspicuously favored the interests of the ruling class. From a feminist perspective, Kishida demanded equal educational opportunities for women so that women could become economically independent (Kaneko 1995, 3-4; Mackie 2003, 15-6; Sievers 1983, 26-7).¹⁰ Fukuda Hideko (1865-1927), who had been active in the Popular Rights Movements, was one of the women activists who was deeply frustrated by persistent gender biases within the movements. There was growing dissatisfaction with the practice of "women-despising" by the male members of the movements. Fukuda

⁹ Only sections pertinent to gender relations were translated. Spencer's *Social Statics* was the first Western work translated into Japanese regarding women's rights. In 1881, a chapter on women and a complete translation of the work were separately published. Sheldon Amos's *Differences of Sex* was also translated in 1878 (Sievers 1983, 16).

¹⁰ The Popular Rights Movements activists demanded that the ruling class not monopolize the political power, that all strata of the population share it, that political representation be the prerequisite for taxation, and that a Constitution, which would set up representative political bodies, needed to be established (Brown 1980; Sievers 1983, 26-7).

believed that the oppression of women was a problem inherent in capitalist production, became interested in socialism, and joined the Socialist Association. In 1907, Fukuda launched the *Women of the World (Sekai fujin)*, the nation's first socialist feminist journal (Mackie 2003, 257).¹¹ In the first issue, Fukuda stated its objective as follows: "When I look at the conditions currently prevailing in society, I see that as far as women are concerned, virtually everything is coercive and oppressive, making it imperative that we women rise up and forcefully develop our own social movement" (cited in Sievers 1983, 127). Japanese socialist women were determined to fight for women's rights, as Kamikawa Matsuko wrote for the journal, "We must not submit to men, even if we would starve to death" (Ōgoshi 1996, 103).

These women activists aimed at achieving democracy in Meiji Japan. Later, as the popular rights movement became influential, the Meiji government found it an encumbrance and severely controlled its activities. As early as 1876, Ueki was jailed for his anti-government remarks. In 1883, Kishida, who correctly pointed out that "accepting the right of those with superior force to dominate those who were weaker, whether man over woman or Western nation over Asian nation, was an argument for savagery, not civilization" (cited in Sievers 1983, 39), was arrested and jailed. In order to legally bind Japanese women to the social norms of "Good Wives, Wise Mothers," the Meiji government passed a Peace Preservation Law in 1890 and regulated and suppressed

¹¹ Fukuda was aware of socialism's deceptive rationalization that women's liberation comes only after economic liberation:

There is a general call for economic liberation, which is a good thing for us to be aware of...but calling for economic liberation fails to go beyond sloganeering in advocating women's liberation. As always, we must strike down today's classic discriminatory attitudes between men and women; without carrying out such a revolution in attitudes, is it likely that economic liberation can be accomplished? (cited in Sievers 1983, 132)

“subversive” activities. Article 5 of the Police Security Regulation was revised to include women among those ineligible to participate in politics.¹² Similarly, the Meiji Code of 1898 was drafted to protect the existing family system and to uphold traditional Japanese concepts of morality and filial piety (Kaneko 1995, 4; Mackie 1997; Nolte and Hastings 1991, 151-174). Around the turn of the century, as the nation prepared for imperial warfare against its neighbors, the state increased its vigilance and these movements were subject to repeated harassment by the police. Their journals were shut down. In 1909, the *Women of the World* was forced to close by the state (Sievers 1983, 137).

Kanno Suga’s (1881-1910) case shows the extremes of government intervention. Kanno was a reporter for a socialist newspaper and a member of the Osaka Women’s Reform Society. Arrested in the Red Flag incident in 1908, Kanno was involved in a scheme to assassinate the Meiji Emperor the following year, and again arrested. Of the 26 socialists arrested for the incident, 24, including Kanno, were executed (Sievers 1983, 139-162; Mackie 2003, 78). In this regard, Sharon Sievers offers a thorough review of the development of the feminist movement in Meiji Japan. Sievers’ analysis aptly pays attention to the ways in which the Meiji government ferociously interfered in the nation’s first feminist democratic movement (Sievers 1983, 163-88).

Meiji State Ideologies and Hegemony

¹² Dorothy Robins-Mowry aptly explains the Peace Preservation Law and Article Five:

This law was designed to control the Westernized democratic forces grown so dynamic in the first two decades of Meiji... Amended from time to time over the years, the Peace Preservation Laws served through World War II as the legal basis for police controls of social, economic, and political opposition to the government.

Article Five especially dealt with women. It prohibited women and minors from (1) joining political organizations, (2) holding and attending meetings where political speeches or lectures on what might be construed as political subjects were given, and (3) initiating such meetings. (Robins-Mowry 1983, 63-5)

These government programs and interferences were indeed powerful means to impose the social norms of “Good Wives, Wise Mothers” onto the masses. However, as Michel Foucault suggests, “Where there is power, there is resistance, and yet, or rather consequently, this resistance is never in a position of exteriority in relation to power.” Power and resistance always coexist (Foucault 1981, 95). The Meiji government would have faced more opposition if it had just oppressively imposed its ideal images of Japanese women with force, and *vice versa*.

There have been several scholarly attempts to explain the Meiji government’s successful ideological control of women. Nolte and Hastings’s article argues that it is “the cult of productivity” that was for the most part responsible for the gender construction in Meiji Japan. In their words:

State attention to women’s roles was a product of the sweeping political and social reforms of the Meiji Restoration of 1868. Inaugurating a thirty-year period of institutional reconstruction in the interest of industrialization and national power, the so-called Restoration initiated developmental processes that, by that time of World War I, made Japan the only non-Western nation in the ranks of the advanced industrial empire-builders. (Nolte and Hastings 1991, 151-2)

Fukuzawa was not an exception in this regard. Similarly, Ōgoshi Aiko and Vera Mackie explain that the ideology of the modern nation-state affected the nation’s gender relations from the late 19th century to 1945 (Ōgoshi 1997, 99-102), and that Japanese women became “gendered imperial subjects” (Mackie 1997, 22-41). Kumari Jayawardena sheds light on the development of Meiji nationalism and correctly points out that, “Japan, while emerging dramatically as an advanced capitalist nation, economically ahead of other countries of Asia and Africa, proved to be the most backward where women’s rights were concerned” (Jayawardena 1986, 253).

With the increasing availability of Western liberal feminist ideas and the subsequent rise of the Meiji women's liberation movement, many Meiji women began to question the moral foundation of traditional gender relations in Meiji Japan. In Gramsci's term, in order to advance "Good Wives, Wise Mothers" as new commonsensical gender relations, the Meiji government needed a middle-class intellectual, who was capable of reaching the masses, like Fukuzawa.¹³ By skillfully combining Mill's feminist ideas and Meiji state goals, Fukuzawa made an eclectic feminist theory which was acceptable to many, including conservatives, liberals, men and women, and participated in the process of Japanese "gendered moral hegemony" (Lorber 1994, 26).¹⁴

In the following examination of Fukuzawa's feminist writings, I will give particular attention to the ways in which Fukuzawa co-opted John Stuart Mill's *Subjection of Women*. In the original context, one of the main objectives of liberal feminism was to criticize the subjugated status of women in traditional patriarchal society. However, Fukuzawa rarely used feminist ideas as a means to criticize the Japanese patriarchal system. Instead, Fukuzawa used Mill's feminist ideas to motivate Japanese women to support the nation's modernization policy of "Good Wives, Wise Mothers." This chapter further shows that Fukuzawa manipulated feminist ideas as the theoretical justification to substantiate the ideology of women's "traditional" gender roles while replacing prevailing Confucian doctrines on women.

¹³ Refer to "Reinventing Bosei with Western Ideas" in Chapter 1, pages 13-5.

¹⁴ Braisted adds, "No other Japanese of the day spoke out more eloquently on behalf of achievement-oriented individualism as the source of true civilization and national strength (Braisted 1976, xxiv).

Fukuzawa and *The Subjection of Women* by John S. Mill¹⁵

In the following, I will demonstrate the ways in which Mill's work is reflected in Fukuzawa's work. First, I will show how Mill's work is reflected in the formulation of Fukuzawa's definition of the problematic. Second, I will show how Mill's work is reflected in Fukuzawa's identification of Confucianism as the cause of gender inequality in Meiji Japan. Also, I will show how Mill's positivist view, the falsification of existing theory with a counter-theory, encouraged Fukuzawa to write *The New Greater Learning for Women* as an alternative. In these works, Fukuzawa addresses women's issues in concrete terms, including women's property rights, suffrage and education. At the same time, in his later works, Fukuzawa constantly showed his politically conservative biases, including his strong emphasis on national goals over individual happiness, so his nationalistic stance becomes contradictory to his earlier democratic/liberal assertions. Further, I will discuss some of the implications of Fukuzawa's use of Mill's work.¹⁶

J.S. Mill and Fukuzawa's Early Writings: Fukuzawa's Formulation of the Problem and Identification of Confucianism as the Cause of Japanese Gender Inequality

Mill's Subjection of Women, Chapter 1: Unequal Rights between Men and Women as a Problem

Mill problematizes unequal rights between men and women in Chapter 1 of *The Subjection of Women*. Mill explains why he thinks unequal rights for men and women are

¹⁵ The following analysis of Fukuzawa's early writings includes Section 8: "Respect for the Independence of Others," which was originally published in April 1874 (Meiji 7), Section 13: "The Damage of Resentment" in December 1874, and Section 15: "Methodic Doubt and Selective Judgment" in July 1876 (Meiji 9). Fukuzawa's later writings used for the following analysis are: "On Japanese Women" of June 1885 (Meiji 18), "On Japanese Women, Part 2" of July 1885, "A Critique of *The Greater Learning for Women*" of June/July 1899 (Meiji 32) and "The New Greater Learning for Women" of June/July 1899.

¹⁶ The following analysis of Mill's influence on Fukuzawa's work is organized based on Mill's work. Fukuzawa's early writings on the subject, Sections 8, 13, 15 and 17 of *An Encouragement of Learning*, are directly related to Mill's Chapter 1. It seems that Fukuzawa wrote these sections as he read Chapter 1 of Mill's work in English from 1874 to 1876.

unjust, arguing that the persistent practice of unequal rights for men and women is not grounded on experience. Rather, the problem is the social system that sustains it. Mill argues, “the inequality of rights between men and women has no other source than the law of the strongest” (Mill 1912 [1869], 433) and continues,

[T]he opinion in favour of the present system, which entirely subordinates the weaker sex to the stronger, rests upon theory only; for there never has been trial made of any other: so that experience, in the sense in which it is vulgarly opposed to theory, cannot be pretended to have pronounced any verdict....[T]he adoption of this system of inequality never was the result of deliberation, or forethought, or any social ideas, or any notion whatever of what conduced to the benefit of humanity or the good order of society. It arises simply from the fact that from the very earliest twilight of human society, every woman (owing to the value attached to her by men, combined with her inferiority in muscular strength) was found in a state of bondage to some man. Laws and systems of polity always begin by recognizing the relations they find already existing between individuals....Those who had already been compelled to obedience became in this manner legally bound to it. (Mill 1912 [1869], 431-32)

Mill explains that present law has no “forethought” but merely confirms existing gender inequality. Under such a law, women, who have been compelled to obedience because of their inferior muscular strength in the primitive stage of human history, are inevitably bound to an inferior position legally. Mill is evidently supportive of the legal protection of equal rights for men and women.

Fukuzawa’s Formulation of the Problem

Following Mill’s example, Fukuzawa argues that unequal marital relations between husband and wife are unjust.

[T]hey [men and women] are both born as human beings. They are both indispensable for social life. Their capacities are about the same, but men are generally stronger than women. If a strong man fights a woman he will always win. In society, a person who steals by force or who puts another to shame is called criminal, and is punished. Why, then, is it that a man may openly put others

to shame within the family without even being reproached for it? (Fukuzawa 1969 [1874]a, 51-2)

Paraphrasing Mill, Fukuzawa argues that one person ruling another by virtue of muscular strength is unjust.¹⁷ Fukuzawa draws a parallel between a person who puts another to shame by force and a man who puts his wife to shame. Fukuzawa asks why only the former is legally punished while the latter is not.¹⁸

Identification of the Cause of Gender Problem in Japan

Then, analogous to Mill, Fukuzawa examines the Japanese systems that “legally” bind Japanese women to obedience.¹⁹ Fukuzawa mentions *The Greater Learning for Women* and denounces its principle of “triple obedience” for women: when young to obey her parents; when married to obey her husband; and when old to obey her children.

Fukuzawa says, “it is a teaching that sets up moral obligations between high and low, i.e. between men and women, on the basis of might makes right. For men are stronger than women” (Fukuzawa 1969 [1874]a, 52).²⁰

On another occasion, in Section 13 “The Damage of Resentment,” Fukuzawa further criticizes Confucius:

Confucius once sighed and said that it was difficult to deal with women and small-minded men. But now as I see it, I must say that this was a situation which Confucius himself brought about, and he himself is displaying this vice. For there is no principle in terms of which human nature can be different according to sex.

¹⁷ Fukuzawa also introduces Francis Wayland’s *Elements of Moral Science* as a theoretical foundation for the concept of “independence.”

¹⁸ Fukuzawa limits his discussion within the scope of marital relations, though Mill’s focus is equal rights between men and women. Although the difference seems less significant than the similarities between them in Fukuzawa’s early writings, in his later writings the difference appears more significant when Fukuzawa’s nationalistic interests surface as his primary objective.

¹⁹ Before the Meiji Constitution of 1889, a law of conduct equivalent to western constitution or civil code did not exist in Japan (reference).

²⁰ Fukuzawa also mentions Buddhist scripture’s saying “Women are full of sins” (Fukuzawa 1969 [1874], 52).

Again, when he spoke of small-minded men, did he mean inferior persons? The children of the lowly are not necessarily inferior, and needless to say, there are no innate distinctions between noble and inferior. But why, then was Confucius troubled only by women and small-minded people? This was because of Confucius taught that people in general were inferior. He thus bound the weak women and lowly people, and did not allow them any freedom of behavior. Therefore, a spirit of resentment was being created, and when it reached an extreme, even Confucius had to lament about it. (Fukuzawa 1969 [1874]b, 83)

Fukuzawa explains why Confucius's teaching should be reexamined, arguing that Confucius lived over two thousand years ago and that the teachings of two thousand years ago are not relevant in Meiji Japan:

The law of cause and effect is as clear as barley growing from barley seeds. Confucius may have had the reputation of being a sage, but he did not understand this principle. It was quite untrustworthy of him simply to complain about the stupidity of others without doing anything about it. Of course, since Confucius lived in an age of barbarism over two thousand years ago, he must have followed the custom of the time and knowingly resorted to the expedient of binding men to preserve lofty human sentiment in his own day. But if Confucius were a true sage whose wisdom provided insight for all times, he would not have been dissatisfied with the expedient teaching of that time. And therefore those who study Confucius in later times must deal with his thought selectively, by taking the ideas of his time into account. Those who would apply unchanged to Meiji Japan the teachings of two thousand years ago do not know the true value of things. (Fukuzawa 1969 [1874]b, 83)

Mill's influence is clearly observed in Fukuzawa's criticism of Confucianism as the system that has sustained gender inequality in Japan.

Methodological Positivism

Mill's work is mentioned for the first time by Fukuzawa in Section 15 "Methodic Doubt and Selective Judgment" of *An Encouragement of Learning*.²¹ Fukuzawa's underlying

²¹ Before this section, although he constantly paraphrases Mill's work, Fukuzawa does not cite the source. Fukuzawa presents new ideas as if they are his own.

principle of social change is expressed clearly in the section and it reflects of Mill's work:²²

Even today the reason that the great persons of the West lead people along the path to higher civilization is that their purpose is entirely to refute the once firm and irrefutable theories of the ancients, and to entertain doubts concerning practices about which common sense had never doubted before. For example, although it seems to be an almost natural human division of labor that the man should work outside the house and the woman keep order within it, [J.] Stuart Mill wrote a book on women which attempted to destroy this custom which had been fixed and immovable since time immemorial. Many English economists advocate the doctrine of *laissez faire*, and its adherents believe it to be a universal law of economics. But American scholars advocate protective tariff laws. In fact, each country proposes its own economic theory. For every theory gives rise to a counter-theory, and disputes between rival theories never cease. In contrast to this ferment of ideas, the people of Asia have uncritically believed in foolish teachings, have been bewitched by the gods and Buddhas, or have listened to the sayings of the so-called sages. They have not come under their influence only temporarily; they have been unable to escape from these ideas after thousands of generations. (Fukuzawa 1969 [1876], 93-4)

It is Fukuzawa's understanding that, in order to achieve gender equality in Meiji Japan, Confucian ideas on women must be refuted by a "counter theory." Fukuzawa says that "every theory gives rise to a counter theory," which is how he views his own publication of "The New Greater Learning for Women."²³

²² Positivist thought including Auguste Comte's (1798-1857) *Cours de philosophie positive* (1830-1842) was not known to the Japanese in Fukuzawa's time.

²³ There is another borrowing from Mill's Chapter 1 in Fukuzawa's work. Mill discusses the nature of gender differences in Paragraph 20 of Chapter 1. Mill argues that there are no natural moral and intellectual differences between men and women. Even obvious gender differences are eradicable, because they are artificial and can be eradicated when other conditions, for example, education, are set equal: [G]reat and apparently ineradicable the moral and intellectual differences between men and women might be, the evidence of there being natural differences could only be negative. Those only could be inferred to be natural which could not possibly be artificial—residuum, after deducing every characteristic of either sex which can admit of being explained from education or external circumstances. (Mill 1912 [1869], 453)

Fukuzawa agrees with Mill's notion that there is no natural difference between men and women. After reading Mill's above paragraph, Fukuzawa criticizes another Chinese philosophy. This time, Fukuzawa's criticism targets *I Ching*. Fukuzawa says as follows in "On the Association of Men and Women" of May/June 1886:

An Analysis of Fukuzawa's Early Feminist Writings: Confucianism as a Scapegoat

Fukuzawa tirelessly draws attention to Confucianism as an out-of-date system and as the cause of gender inequality. Throughout his early feminist writings, Fukuzawa criticizes not only *The Greater Learning for Women*, but also Confucianism in general including *I Ching*. Also, Fukuzawa brings Confucianism forward over and over again to explain various aspects of gender inequality in Meiji Japan.

However, there are other factors behind gender inequality that Fukuzawa pays little or no attention to. For example, Fukuzawa does not choose to talk about “laws and systems of polity” (Mill 1912 [1869]), 432), which according to Mill are the main cause of gender inequality. Although Fukuzawa fiercely accuses Confucianism as the “system” that perpetuates gender inequality in Japan, his criticism always stops short of seeing a possible connection between the social system and the “polity.”

Moreover, in Fukuzawa's criticism, Buddhism largely escapes being labeled as another system that is responsible for the nation's gender inequality. Buddhism's discrimination against women is infamous (Minamoto 1998). But, unlike Confucianism, Fukuzawa mentions this only in passing and avoids openly criticizing Buddhism. A possible reason for Fukuzawa's failure to criticize Buddhism is the close relation between the Buddhist establishment and the Meiji government. Buddhist establishments were

What is the idea behind the Chinese people's description of men as *yang* and women as *yin*? Because these two words are so abstraction in their meanings, it is impossible to know what is meant in applying them to the nature of men and women. Looking in books by Confucius scholars, we see that *yin* and *yang* are used in symbolizing toughness and pliability, intelligence and foolishness, light and darkness, implying that men are strong, wise, and full of light, but women are soft, foolish, and dark. This belief is often used as an excuse for giving respect to men and for belittling women. However, there is no basis for this and it has no importance in the eyes of intelligent men. (Fukuzawa 1988 [1886], 104)

This article was written in the same year Section 15 of *An Encouragement of Learning* was written. This article signifies the ending of his reading of Chapter 1 of Mill's *The Subjection of Women*.

protected under the Tokugawa regime's patronage for over 200 years. Also, the Meiji government is closely related to the old ruling class, so Fukuzawa could not criticize Buddhism, because he would also be challenge the Meiji ruling class.

As a result of these oversights, Fukuzawa's "feminist" criticism did not challenge the ruling class at all. The legacy of Tokugawa feudalism seems more responsible for the impoverished conditions of women in Meiji Japan than anything. In fact, the Tokugawa regime officially maintained a caste-like social ranking system and divided the population into the classes of warriors, farmers, artisans and tradesmen. The treatment of women under the Tokugawa regime may well be inferred: The class system was only applicable to men. Women were not treated as humans.²⁴ Also, the Tokugawa regime's seclusion policy was a reflection of the regime's fear of the influence of Western ideas, such as Christianity and democracy, that would potentially enlighten the oppressed masses and would lead eventually to the overthrow of the absolutist Tokugawa regime. Fukuzawa could not see that it was not Confucianism that defined the status of women in Meiji Japan. Rather, it was Tokugawa feudalism that defined it. Under the Tokugawa regime, Confucianism, especially *The Greater Learning for Women*, was used as an ideological justification for the maintenance of the patriarchal system. So Fukuzawa, unable to criticize the ruling class including the Buddhist establishment, chose Confucianism as a target.

²⁴ One of the Meiji government's slogans was "Women are also humans," in reaction to the earlier Tokugawa policy (Fukuzawa 1969 [1874], 51).

Individual Rights or National Interests?

While he blames Confucianism, Fukuzawa artfully drops one of Mill's main objectives: equal legal rights between men and women. As mentioned above, Fukuzawa does not choose to discuss the topic at all. Fukuzawa neither agrees nor disagrees with Mill's position. It looks as if Fukuzawa deliberately takes no notice of the topic. Instead, Fukuzawa evasively replaced "equal rights" with "better marital relations," including abolition of concubinage, as a possible goal.

The question then arises of whether Fukuzawa was really interested in improving the conditions of Japanese women. I believe that Fukuzawa was indeed interested in such a change, but with some reservations. First, Fukuzawa did not envision equal legal rights between men and women as an ultimate goal. Second, Fukuzawa was supportive of improving the conditions of Japanese women *as long as* such an improvement would contribute to the nation's interests. Taken as a whole, Fukuzawa did not welcome any social disturbances, for example, a women's rights movement, that would potentially interfere with the pursuit of the nation's interests, for example, a pressing need to industrialize a predominantly agrarian nation in order to compete with Western powers.

Also, Fukuzawa's determined criticism of Confucianism has some nationalistic implications, and is clearly in line with the Meiji government's westernization policy. Under the national slogan of "Leave Asia, Join Europe," the Japanese masses, including both men and women, were mobilized to participate in the nation's westernization efforts. Fukuzawa's criticism of Confucianism as the cause of gender inequality in Meiji Japan suggests that Japanese women were indeed included in the nation's westernization policy.

Throughout his early writings, Fukuzawa advocated westernization, particularly focusing on women's issues. Fukuzawa always implied that, after the nation's successful westernization, Japanese social conditions would be improved. Japanese women would be the beneficiaries of such a policy. "Leave Asia, Join Europe" for better gender relations!

Furthermore, Fukuzawa successfully gave the masses a moral reason for the nation's westernization, i.e. the preservation of a national polity through the nation's independence. And the nation's independence is only possible through the nation's westernization. That is, the way to preserve a national polity is through westernization. This sounds illogical; but this is what Fukuzawa argued. To do this, however, Fukuzawa needed to reinvent the meaning of "national polity."²⁵

In 1875, Fukuzawa wrote *An Outline of a Theory of Civilization* and redefined the Japanese national polity, borrowing John Stuart Mill's concept of "nationality" in *Representative Government* (1861). Fukuzawa asks, "What does the term national polity designate?" and offers a new meaning:

Let me put aside popular arguments for a moment and explain the term as I understand it. Polity means a framework or a format. It refers to a structure in which things are collected together, made one, and distinguished from other entities. Thus 'national polity' refers to the grouping together of a race of people of similar feelings, the creation of a distinction between fellow countrymen and foreigners, the fostering of more cordial and stronger bonds with one's countrymen than with foreigners. It is living under the same government, enjoying self-rule, and disliking the idea of being subject to foreign rule; it

²⁵ In the Tokugawa Era, the Mito School, a group of conservative scholars based in Mito, coined the term "*kokutai* (national polity)." Mito School scholars are known to have played an important role in the "Revere the Emperor, Expel the Barbarians" movement in the closing years of the Tokugawa regime. One of the goals of Mito scholars was to protect the essence of Japanese national polity from foreign influences. Fukuzawa, in favor of westernization, opposed the conservative Mito School's national polity. Instead, Fukuzawa preferred to use the term *seitai* (form of government) (Craig 1968, 116).

involves independence and responsibility for the welfare of one's own country. In Western countries it is called 'nationality.' (Fukuzawa 1973 [1875], 23)

One of the noteworthy characteristics of Fukuzawa's national polity is its emphasis on autonomy. National independence is prioritized over anything. If a nation loses its independence, it inevitably loses its national polity. Each nation has its unique national polity, although national polities are continuously changing, reflecting the progress of civilization. It is, Fukuzawa continues, therefore permissible that Japan be westernized as it moves to a higher level of civilization.²⁶

Democracy plays no part in Fukuzawa's view. In the words of the Japanese philosopher Maruyama Masao, "Japanese nationalists... knew next to nothing about the happy marriage of nationalism with *bourgeois* democracy and popular sovereignty as seen in classic Western nationalism" (Maruyama 1969, 143). The reason, Maruyama believes, is because

an awareness of equality in international affairs was totally absent. The advocates of expulsion viewed international relations from positions within the national hierarchy based on the supremacy of superiors over inferiors... In the absence of any higher normative standards with which to gauge international relations, power politics is bound to be the rule and yesterday's timid defensiveness will become today's unrestrained expansionism. (Maruyama 1969, 139-40)

²⁶ The western word Fukuzawa refers to is Mill's "nationality." Mill defines "nationality" as follows:

A PORTION of mankind may be said to constitute a Nationality if they are united among themselves by common sympathies which do not exist between them and any others—which make them co-operate with each other more willingly than with other people, desire to be under the same government, and desire that it should be government by themselves or a portion of themselves exclusively. This feeling of nationality may have been generated by various causes. Sometimes it is the effect of identity of race and descent. Community of language, and community of religion, greatly contribute to it. Geographical limits are one of its causes. But the strongest of all is identity of political antecedents; the possession of a national history, and consequent community of recollections; collective pride and humiliation, pleasure and regret, connected with the same incidents in the past. (Mill 1912 [1861], 380)

Mill discusses "nationality" within a framework of Jean-Jacques Rousseau's internationalism, under which national differences are accepted and embraced. Moreover, internationalists conceived of each other as participating in a common struggle, such as emancipation from old ruling classes.

Maruyama insightfully points out what is lacking in Fukuzawa's reformulation of the Japanese national polity.

Fukuzawa's Later Writing: Improvement of the Conditions of Japanese Women for the Improvement of the Japanese Race

By the time he finished reading Chapter 1 of Mill's work, it seems that Fukuzawa had already decided to write following four essays: "On Japanese Women," "On Japanese Women, Part 2," "A Critique of *The Greater Learning for Women*," and "The New Greater Learning." In the first two articles, "On Japanese Women, Part 1 & 2," Fukuzawa defines the conditions of Japanese women. In "A Critique of *The Greater Learning for Women*," Fukuzawa examines and criticizes *The Greater Learning for Women* as the most significant ideological source of gender inequality in Meiji Japan. In "The New Greater Learning for Women," Fukuzawa hopes to offer an alternative to *The Greater Learning for Women*.

What follows examines Fukuzawa's later works on women's issues. As in his earlier works, Mill remained a strong influence. Fukuzawa constantly paraphrases Mill's work. However, unlike Fukuzawa's early implicit nationalism, in these later works he explicitly reveals nationalistic as well as conservative biases. In fact, in these later writings Fukuzawa puts greater emphasis on the preservation of the national polity and the improvement of Japanese race than on the improvement of the conditions of women, although they are supposedly primarily feminist writings.

Needless to say, Mill did not embrace such conservative perspectives. As a consequence, in his later writings, Fukuzawa's arguments contradict his earlier writings.

Fukuzawa's theoretical integrity becomes questionable, though he skillfully connects Mill's liberalism with his own conservatism and tries his best to make his arguments plausible.

In the following section, I will demonstrate how some of the key arguments of Mill's work are distorted in Fukuzawa's later writings. For example, I will show how Fukuzawa uses Mill's notion that granting women property rights may improve their status. It is odd to find that Fukuzawa opposes women's education and advocates equal property rights rather than equal education as a means to improve the condition of women. Fukuzawa also manipulates Mill's notion that women should be entitled to file a divorce under the "absolutism of the head of a family." Fukuzawa generalizes the notion of "absolutism of the head of a family" to criticize persisting concubinage in Meiji Japan.

In addition, I will show how Fukuzawa uses Mill's notion of women's suffrage and occupational freedom in support of his nationalistic stance. Paraphrasing Mill, Fukuzawa says, "There is nothing in men's activities that women cannot do." Thus, Fukuzawa continues, women can contribute equally to the nation's cause. Here Fukuzawa substitutes the preservation of national polity and the improvement of the Japanese race as the rationale for gender equality while dismissing Mill's notion of individual happiness. Finally, I will offer a brief comparative analysis of Fukuzawa's images of gender relations and their Confucian counterparts and show that, although there are some minor differences, traditional Japanese gender relations were largely preserved, for example, by replacing the Confucian *Greater Learning for Women* with

Fukuzawa's "The *New* Greater Learning for Women" and the state slogan "Good Wives, Wise Mothers."

Property Rights

In Chapter 2 of *The Subjection of Women*, Mill writes about the marriage contract. Mill argues that under then-current law a wife had no property rights. In Mill's words, "She can acquire no property but for him; the instant it becomes hers, even if by inheritance, it becomes *ipso facto* his" (Mill 1912[1869], 462). Under such a condition, Mill continues, women are treated worse than Roman slaves, who were able to possess some personal belongings. Mill suggests that granting women property ownership may improve their status and gives some examples from the practices of English upper class:

The higher classes in this country have given an analogous advantage to their women, through special contracts setting aside the law, by conditions of pin-money, etc.: since parental feeling being stronger with fathers than the class feeling of their own sex, a father generally prefers his own daughter to a son-in-law who is a stranger to him. By means of settlements, the rich usually contrive to withdraw the whole or part of the inherited property of the wife from the absolute control of the husband: but they do not succeed in keeping it under her own control; the utmost they can do only prevents the husband from squandering it, at the same time debarring the rightful owner from its use. The property itself is out of the reach of both; and as to the income derived from it, the form of settlement most favourable to the wife (that called "to her separate use") only precludes the husband from receiving it instead of her: it must pass through her hands, but if he takes it from her by personal violence as soon as she receives it, he can neither be punished, nor compelled to restitution. (Mill 1912 [1869], 462)

These examples are illustrative of some of the possible ways to protect women under the laws of England. But, these cases are limited only to upper class women. For most cases, "wives are in general no better than slaves; but no slave is a slave to the same length, and in so full a sense of the word, as a wife is" (Mill 1912 [1869], 463).

Fukuzawa also write about Japanese women's property rights and states a problem, "No women in Japan possess any property" (Fukuzawa 1988[1885], 10). Then, Fukuzawa continues to discuss how granting women property rights positively affects their position:

I am told that in the West there are women who own land or head households; even a married woman may hold some property of her own and she does not allow her husband to take any liberties with her property. After all, power in human society is wealth; authority is engendered from wealth, and wealth is the springhead of authority. Therefore, it is not accidental that the women of the West possess authority. When they have authority, they have the liberty of disposing of their property according to their own free will. They are, therefore, independent personalities in their families or in their activities outside the home. (Fukuzawa 1988 [1885], 13-4)

Paraphrasing Mill's understanding of women's property rights, Fukuzawa relates women's wealth (property) to women's authority, and women's authority to women's independent activities inside and outside the home.²⁷

However, quite oddly, Fukuzawa continues to argue that he prefers equal property rights to equal education as a means of improving the condition of women, as if he has a strong objection to equal education for men and women. After rejecting Confucian and

²⁷ In this context, the impact of Confucianism is again examined. Fukuzawa explains the reason why Japanese women does not possess property rights and says that it is because in Confucianism women's position is low. Fukuzawa refers to an original Confucius saying and applies it to describe women's low status in Japan:

Confucius said, "Whenever there is work to be done, the young will take on its burden; whenever there is wine and food, the old will be the first to enjoy it." Borrowing this saying to describe men and women in Japan, "Whenever there is work to be done, women will take on its burden; whenever there is wine and food, men will be the first to enjoy it." (Fukuzawa 1988 [1885], 11)

The Confucius saying Fukuzawa is referring to originally means "When there is some work to do, younger members will offer their labors; when food is ready, they will offer it first to the elders" (Fukuzawa 1988 [1885], 11, fn.1). Fukuzawa's application should have been, "When there is some work to do, women will offer their labors; when food is ready, they will offer it first to men." To be sure, this is not a Confucius teaching. Furthermore, the difference seems apparent. In Fukuzawa's interpretation voracious Confucian men are added and the effect of Confucianism on the position of women is exaggerated.

Buddhist educations as not suitable, Fukuzawa continues also to criticize Western education that in his eyes treat men and women equally:

If school education is so useless to our purpose, what are we to depend upon for developing more vigor in our women? I do not endorse the education in Western countries unreservedly. Also, I am not satisfied with society outside the school in the West, such as the relation between men and women. (Fukuzawa 1988 [1885], 13)

Fukuzawa does not believe in the equality of education for men and women. In the end of the section, Fukuzawa concludes, “I will not depend on their [women’s] education in the school rooms” (Fukuzawa 1988 [1885], 14). This statement not only contradicts Fukuzawa’s earlier statement on gender differences but also implies that women need a different kind of education than men, education to become “Good Wives, Wise Mothers.”

Divorce by Women

In paragraph 3 of Chapter 2, Mill argues that, just as political absolutism is not excusable, “absolutism by the head of a family” should also not be excusable. In the following paragraph, Mill advocates women’s right to divorce:

The law, which till lately left even these atrocious extremes of domestic oppression practically unpunished, has within these few years made some feeble attempts to repress them. But its attempts have done little, and cannot be expected to do much, because it is contrary to reason and experience to suppose that there can be any real check to brutality, consistent with leaving the victim still in the power of the executioner. Until a conviction for personal violence, or at all events a repetition of it after a first conviction, entitles the woman *ipso facto* to a divorce, or at least to a judicial separation, the attempt to repress these "aggravated assaults" by legal penalties will break down for want of a prosecutor, or for want of a witness. (Mill 1912 [1869], 468)

Even in the West, women were not entitled to file for divorce in Mill’s time. Mill advocates that women should be able to file for divorce at their will under the

“absolutism of the head of a family.” Fukuzawa uses this argument instead as a justification to end concubinage in Meiji Japan:

When the husband is dissolute and has relations with another woman and brings her into the house where his legal family lives or keeps her secretly elsewhere, or if he is unkind and gives his wife no attention even though he lives with her—in such cases, the wife has the right to openly demand legal divorce in the court. (Fukuzawa 1988 [1885], 31)²⁸

Women’s Suffrage and Occupational Freedom

In Chapter 3, Mill discusses women’s suffrage and occupational freedom: “In the case of election to public trusts, it is the business of constitutional law to surround the right of suffrage with all needful securities and limitations; but whatever securities are sufficient in the case of the male sex, no others need be required in the case of women” (Mill 1912 [1869], 488). Mill continues:

With regard to the fitness of women, not only to participate in elections, but themselves to hold offices or practise professions involving important public responsibilities; I have already observed that this consideration is not essential to the practical question in dispute: since any woman, who succeeds in an open profession, proves by that very fact that she is qualified for it. (Mill 1912 [1869], 488)

²⁸ Fukuzawa finds *The Greater Learning for Women* as the source of the absolutism of Japanese family. Fukuzawa says, “In China, marriage is called *returning*.” A woman is returning home of her own when she marries. Fukuzawa explains the practice of divorce in Meiji Japan in relation to Confucianism: The sage of old taught that, once married, she must never leave her husband’s house. Should she forsake the “way,” and be divorced, shame shall cover her till her latest hour. With regard to this point, there are seven faults, which are termed “Seven Reasons for Divorce;” (i) A woman shall be divorced for disobedience to her father-in-law or mother-in-law. (ii) A woman shall be divorced if she fails to bear children....(iii) Lewdness is a reason for divorce. (iv) Jealousy is a reason for divorce. (v) Leprosy... is a reason for divorce. (vi) A woman shall be divorced, who, by talking overmuch and prattling disrespectfully, disturbs the harmony of kinsmen and brings trouble on her household. (vii) A woman shall be divorced who is addicted to stealing. Fukuzawa then refutes all these “seven reasons” by pointing out the irrationalities he finds in them. Then, Fukuzawa declares that “That notorious divorce announcement of three and a half lines is the thing of the past, and we must mark in our minds that we live in an entirely different world” (Fukuzawa 1988 [1899], 185).

Referring to this, Fukuzawa notes the developing women's suffrage movement in the West: "In recent years, a group of women has been advocating women's participating in politics, and this movement is said to be gaining power day by day" (Fukuzawa 1988 [1885], 14). Also, responding to the second part, Fukuzawa maintains,

The main difference between men and women is only in their reproductive organs. In this, too, the difference is only in their structure and function. It is impossible to say which is more important than the other... There is nothing in men's activities that women cannot do. (Fukuzawa 1988 [1885], 39)

Like Mill, Fukuzawa advocates occupational equality for men and women. Yet, at the same time, he transforms Mill's concern for women's voting rights and occupational freedom into a support for his nationalistic stance: "When it is said that without men a nation cannot exist nor household stand, it should also be declared that without women a nation cannot exist" (Fukuzawa 1988 [1885], 39)

Again, Fukuzawa brings up the *yin/yang* theory and repudiates its characterization of "men as *yang* (positive) and women *yin* (negative) (Fukuzawa 1988 [1885], 39).

Fukuzawa argues, "It was truly a misfortune for women to be thus made victims of the Confucian scholars' ignorance in science....[N]o one in this civilized world will take it seriously" (Fukuzawa 1988 [1885], 40). Thus, women contribute equally to the nation's cause.

The Rationale for Gender Equality

In Chapter 4, Mill asks what the advantage is to abolishing the inequality between men and women:

It is not, therefore, on this part of the subject, that the question is likely to be asked, *Cui bono*. We may be told that the evil would outweigh the good, but the reality of the good admits of no dispute. In regard, however, to the larger question,

the removal of women's disabilities — their recognition as the equals of men in all that belongs to citizenship — the opening to them of all honourable employments, and of the training and education which qualifies for those employments — there are many persons for whom it is not enough that the inequality has no just or legitimate defence; they require to be told what express advantage would be obtained by abolishing it. (Mill 1912 [1869], 522)

Mill explicitly states that it is individual happiness:

But it is not only through the sentiment of personal dignity, that the free direction and disposal of their own faculties is a source of individual happiness, and to be fettered and restricted in it, a source of unhappiness, to human beings, and not least to women. (Mill 1912 [1869], 544)

An examination of his copy of Mill's work shows that Fukuzawa had indeed read this last paragraph. But for Fukuzawa, the reason for abolishing gender inequality is the improvement of the Japanese race. On one occasion, in explaining the reason why he is committed to women's issues, Fukuzawa says that his "idea for the improvement of our race is to enliven our women's minds and encourage their physical vigor to grow with them, thus to obtain better health and physique for our posterity" (Fukuzawa 1988 [1885], 7). In another, Fukuzawa negates women's equal rights: "The basic purpose of my argument is not to side with women to contest their rights. My purpose is the improvement of the Japanese race" (Fukuzawa 1988 [1885], 36).

Further, in his 1899 essay "The New Greater Learning for Women," Fukuzawa makes a somewhat puzzling statement about women's role. He speaks as if he were a Confucian man:

All the million household chores around the kitchen are things that women should be familiar with....She should be taught all the skills from cooking rice and planning whole meals to carefully checking the seasoning. Even if she is not to perform all these tasks herself, she must realize the importance of familiarizing herself with them from her childhood, because a household cannot be managed with abstract concepts. (Fukuzawa 1988 [1899], 222)

On another occasion, Fukuzawa underlines women's "primary responsibility":

I have no intention of stopping women from going out; rather, I encourage them to take an interest in things outside the world. I want them to be active, but I do not want women to forget their primary responsibility in caring for children and to disport themselves in their pastimes. I shall never tolerate this. On this point, I find that many social customs in the West do not satisfy me. (Fukuzawa 1988 [1899], 234)

Fukuzawa says that if a woman neglects to learn how to raise a child, the child will be weak mentally and physically. It is women's responsibility to raise high-quality children for the improvement of the Japanese race.

Is Fukuzawa's "New Greater Learning for Women" Really New?: An Analysis of Fukuzawa's Later Writings

Fukuzawa's proposals envision some significant changes to the impoverished conditions of women in Meiji Japan. Fukuzawa proposed to grant property rights to women, which was not only unheard of but also simply unimaginable in the Tokugawa Era. Fukuzawa also made a contribution by advocating women's education, though conservatively.

However, under Fukuzawa's proposals, Japanese women would potentially feel more pressure than ever to confirm to the nation's traditional gender roles as gendered national subjects. The underlying principle behind Fukuzawa's seemingly committed feminist writings is not feminist but nationalistic. Fukuzawa maintains that Japanese women cannot be bystanders of the nation's westernization/industrialization efforts; it takes not only men but also women to build a strong nation. Japanese women cannot be merely passive participants in these efforts. Fukuzawa calls on Japanese women to become active participants in fields suitable for their "structure and function." In order actively to contribute to the nation's cause, Fukuzawa expects Japanese women to study

specifically household matters, including cooking and home economics. Fukuzawa expects Japanese women to bear and raise high-quality children for the improvement of the Japanese race. Here Japanese women have hardly become men's equals; rather, they are expected to actively perform traditional Japanese gender roles for national causes.

In his emphasis on national interests, Fukuzawa's position is far from Mill's. Mill's main concern is individual equality. Concubinage is mostly practiced in hierarchically structured societies and the concubine is often from a lower ranking family. It therefore has undemocratic implications. In contrast to Mill's, Fukuzawa's opposition reflects the "Good Wives, Wise Mothers" and "Enlightenment and Civilization" slogans, rather than a concern for equality between individuals. Fukuzawa was well aware of Western criticisms of polygamy as still practiced in Meiji Japan. Abolition of concubinage was seen as a token condition for Japan's civilized status. In Fukuzawa's argument, some of the most important concepts of Western liberalism, including the "individual" and "rights," are completely absent.

The actual influence of Fukuzawa's feminism was the double bind exploitation of Japanese women. I will discuss this in detail in next chapter.

- CHAPTER 5 -

HIRATSUKA RAICHŌ AND ELLEN'S KEY'S MATERNALISM: The Invention of *Bosei*

Introduction

Hiratsuka Raichō (1886-1971) is celebrated as one of the most prominent theorists in Japanese feminist history (Nishikawa 1993 [1985]). In the 1910s Hiratsuka saw that Japanese women's creative talents had been suppressed under the ideology of "Good Wives, Wise Mothers," and established *Seitōsha* a literary circle for the development of Japanese women's hidden literary talent. Later, after her discovery of the philosophy of maternalism popularized by the Swedish social thinker Ellen Key (1849-1926), Hiratsuka founded *bosei*-ism, a Japanese maternalism, which she identified as Japanese women's true inner identity. As a *bosei* advocate, Hiratsuka argued that *bosei* had been suppressed by the exploitation of Japanese women employed in light industry under the nation's aggressive industrialization policy and demanded state protection of its mothers. (Mackie 2003, 45-72; Nishikawa 1993, 239-85; Sievers 1983, 163-88). Today, Hiratsuka's *bosei*-ism is regarded as the Japanese equivalent to the first wave feminism in the West (Loveridge-Sanbonmatsu *et al.* 1995, 130-3) or as a Japanese forerunner of radical feminism (Ōgoshi 1996, 107-13), and continues to powerfully shape Japanese gender relations as well as Japanese feminist theories (Buckley 1994, 181; Ueno 1990).

On the face of it, Hiratsuka was successful in creating alternative roles for Japanese women. *Seitōsha* successfully inspired Japanese women all over the country, and became the nation's first intellectual hub for the Japanese women's movement. Also,

as a *bosei* advocate, Hiratsuka offered one of the first feminist criticisms of the industrial exploitation of Japanese women. However, Hiratsuka's use of Key in fact was a misappropriation that was caused by her class biases and nationalistic dispositions. Unlike Key's radical stance on female sexuality, Hiratsuka's stance was inherently conservative, and her feminist objectives were compromised, to the extent that, as Kumari Jayawardena the author of "The Challenge of Feminism in Japan" aptly describes, although "feminist consciousness developed to its highest level in Japan," it "proved to be one of the most backward where women's rights were concerned" (Jayawardena 1986, 253).

Like their explanations of Fukuzawa's nationalistic dispositions, Sharon H. Nolte and Sally Ann Hastings (1991), Ōgoshi Aiko (1996), Vera Mackie (2003), and Sharon Sievers (1983) all underlined some of the circumstantial factors as the causes of Hiratsuka's limitations. They offered insight into how Japanese state interference as well as ideologies constrained the nation's first feminist movement. However, they did not sufficiently explain the origin of *bosei*, including why and how it was constituted in the first place. Nor did they explain why *bosei* has been repeatedly reconstituted by Japanese feminists to become one of the key contemporary Japanese gender ideologies.

Social constructionism regards gender as socially constructed: Unlike sex, gender is not a biological distinction but a social institution, like culture, that members of society collectively constitute and reconstitute through interaction (Epstein 1988, 1970; Lorber 1994; Lorber & Farrell 1991; West & Zimmerman 1987). Social constructionists, thus,

believe that gender as a social institution is variously defined in different social and historical contexts.

However, most social constructionists agree that conventional patterns, once established, tend to be reinforced rather than challenged through these processes. Judith Lorber eloquently explains:

The gendered practices of everyday life reproduce a society's view of how women and men should act (Bourdieu [1980] 1990). Gendered social arrangements are justified by religion and cultural productions and backed up by law, but the most powerful means of sustaining the moral hegemony of the dominant gender ideology is that the process is made invisible; any possible alternatives are virtually unthinkable (Foucault 1972; Gramsci 1971). (Lorber 1994, 26)

Lorber offers insight into the “invisibility” of “the moral hegemony of the dominant gender ideology” and the inconceivability of alternative gender roles (Lorber 1994, 26).

Gendered norms and expectations are taken for granted as if they are destiny. And, in everyday life gender is reproduced constantly and imperceptibly as everyone “does gender” without being aware of it (West & Zimmerman 1987).

The work adults do as mothers and fathers and as low-level workers and high-level bosses, shapes women's and men's life experiences, and these experiences produce different feelings, consciousness, relationships, skills—ways of being that we call feminine or masculine. (Lorber 1994, 14)

All these socio-cultural practices constitute the social construction of gender. The paradox of gender as human nature—what we plausibly call feminine or masculine—is that it is a consequence of social relations. “Not biology, but culture, becomes destiny” (Butler 1990, 8).

Cynthia Fuchs Epstein in *Deceptive Distinctions* insightfully explains that feminist academics are not exceptions in this regard: “Not only have such polarities

become part of the common culture; they have been integrated into systems of scientific thought supposedly designed to be free of illogical distinctions” (Epstein 1988, 14).

Epstein continues,

Some feminist academics...argue that science constitutes a masculine mode of thought, reflecting the order to the “outside” structure of system and hierarchy. Defining “reason” and “logic” according to masculine/feminine opposites, such critics merely repeat what men, whose thinking they deplore, have traditionally propounded. (Epstein 1988, 14)

Following these social constructionists steps, this chapter explores the invention of *bosei*-ism by Hiratsuka as a cultural practice, and examines how “the dominant gender ideology” of early 20th century Japan, including the “Good Wives, Wise Mothers” government propaganda, “invisibly” constrained her feminist aspirations: Hiratsuka failed to conceive a positive alternative to the government propaganda. Instead, she paradoxically reconstructed it by transforming it to *bosei*-ism.

However, unlike Lorber’s analysis which focuses on the recreation of the dominant *gender* ideology, I will expand the concept of “culture” and examine Hiratsuka’s *bosei*-ism within the context of the dominant *gender*, *class*, and *nationalist* ideologies of the time. In addition to the government slogan of “Good Wives, Wise Mothers,” early 20th century Japan witnessed widening class differences and rising Japanism nationalist movement (Kitahara 1989; Satō 1998). With Japan’s advancement as one of the advanced industrial nations, the upper class enjoyed the privileges of the nation’s prosperity. However, this was possible only through a ruthless exploitation of the young women workers in light industry (Sievers 1983). This was also a time that Japanism a reactionary nationalist movement became increasingly popular among Japanese conservative intellectuals (Kitahara 1989).

In the following, I will examine the relation between the Japanese gender, class, and nationalist ideologies of the early 20th century and Hiratsuka's *bosei*-ism, and investigate how Hiratsuka's feminist writings were affected by such ideologies. Particular attention will be given to the ways in which Hiratsuka co-opted Key's maternalism and how her uncritical assessment of "Good Wives, Wise Mothers," lack of insight into the economic conditions of the exploited young women workers, and naïve belief in the Japanism nationalist movement made her a pro-eugenic "feminist" advocate for the improvement of the Japanese race. In this regard, I will also show that Hiratsuka's *bosei*-ism paradoxically collaborated in the process of the Japanese gendered moral hegemony, by supplementing the social norms of "Good Wives, Wise Mothers" with psychologically bound Japanese maternalism *bosei*-ism, thereby helping constitute the two pillars of the ideal "traditional" Japanese womanhood.

Background

The Double Bind Exploitation of Japanese Women

With the Meiji government's industrialization policy, exemplified by the government slogans of "Wealthy Country, Strong Army" (*fukoku kyōhei*), "Leave Asia, Join Europe" (*datsua nyūou*), and "Family State" (*kazoku kokka*), Japanese women became increasingly exploited not only at home but also in the workplace. At home, Japanese women as "Good Wives, Wise Mothers" were expected to excel in their domestic responsibilities by supporting their husbands and children. Outside the home, Japanese women were mobilized as cheap laborers, mostly spinners and weavers, in light industry, so that the nation could generate capital for the development of heavy industry

(Kawashima 1995, 271-93; Nolte & Hasting 1991). By 1876, Japanese women constituted 60 percent of the nation's entire factory workforce (Sievers 1983, 54-86).¹

Most of these women workers were migrant (*dekasegi*) workers from poor families in rural Japan, who had little choice but to send their young daughters into the textile factories (Kawashima 1995, 272-5). Widening class and regional differences after the Meiji Restoration made possible the exploitation of young women workers from poor rural families. Interestingly, Meiji leaders, including Fukuzawa Yukichi, believed that civilization inevitably divides society into rich and poor. The working conditions were extremely harsh. The workers were housed in poorly maintained factory-owned dormitories, under the supervision of factory management 24 hours a day, and were forced to work 15-hour shifts (Hunter 1993, 69-97; Kawashima 1995, 273-4; Sievers 1983, 65).²

The government's industrialization policy continued to burden Japanese women throughout these years. In 1894, 239,000 women working in 6,000 factories constituted 62 percent of the factory labor force, in 1907, 400,000 women working in 11,4000 factories constituted 60 percent of the factory labor force (Sievers 1983, 55-6).

The Japanism Movement

The Japanism movement is the nation's first contemporary cultural nationalism. It slowly but thoroughly developed starting in Meiji Japan, and became one of the dominant intellectual trends of the early 20th century, especially during World War II. *Seikyōsha*, a

¹ Kawashima Yoko, a Japanese feminist scholar, adds, "Japanese agriculture, mostly small-sized family farming, was highly dependent on women labor" (Kawashima 1995, 272-3).

² Janet Hunter's study investigates the high incidence of tuberculosis among the women workers (Hunter 1993).

cultural nationalist organization, founded primarily by Buddhist scholars in 1888, is the origin. Its journal *Nihonjin* (Japanese) typically praised Japanese traditional culture from various perspectives, including those of religion, ethics, arts and politics. One of its main positions advocated that the Japanese must maintain the essence of Japanese national culture.³

Japan was in the midst of an extreme Westernization project, so *Seikyōsha*'s inherently conservative perspective was not immediately welcomed. Yet, as some adverse effects of Westernization became evident, *Seikyōsha*'s effort began to be recognized and sympathized with by many, thus, establishing the foundation of the Japanism movement (Kitahara 1989, 63).⁴

One of the original objectives of the Japanism movement, including *Seikyōsha*, was to identify and position Japanese culture in international society. However, along with developments in international affairs, such as European imperial colonization of South Asian countries and Japanese emulation of it, Japanism developed as the ideological foundation for the nation's strength and Eastern identity (Kitahara 1989, 63; Satō 1998).

Hiratsuka and the *Seitō*

A group of women, most of whom came from the educated upper class, organized a literary circle for women, the Lady Writers Society (*Keisho bungakukai*) in 1907.

³ There are several recent scholarly publications on *Seikyōsha*, including Satō Yoshimaru's *Research on Meiji Nationalism* (1998) and Nakanome Tōru's *Research on Seikyōsha* (1993), among others.

⁴ According to Kitahara, Takayama Chōgyū, one of the most prominent figures of the Japanism movements, said "the extreme worship and imitation of foreign matters created a violent reaction in the minds of the Japanese. Japanism emerged in order to explain the position of Japan in the world" (Kitahara 1989, 63).

Subsequently, Hiratsuka Raichō (1886-1971), one of its chief members, took over the circle, founded the *Seitōsha* (Bluestocking) organization, and began publishing the journal *Seitō* in 1911 (Sievers 1983, 163-188; Yamazaki 1985, 116-137).⁵

Raichō is her pen name and her real name is Haru. Hiratsuka's father was the Vice-Minister of the Board of Audit and her mother was a housewife. Hiratsuka was the third child born to the couple. In 1908, Hiratsuka ran away with Morita Sōhei (1881-1949), a disciple of Natsume Soseki (1867-1916); their abortive suicide pact attracted nationwide media attention. In 1919, Hiratsuka founded the New Women's Association (*Shin fujin kai*) with Ichikawa Fusae, and began the nation's first women's suffrage movement. After World War II, Hiratsuka became a Diet member, and spent the rest of her life working on behalf of world peace and maternalism. "Seitō" is the Japanese translation of "bluestockings." The name is taken from an eighteenth century English women's literary club (Kobayashi 1987, 327-340).⁶

Although well aware of the condition of their working class counterparts and the development of feminist democratic movements in Japan, the society's members were not primarily interested in political issues. Their mission was to develop their artistic talents, which had been stifled under the principle of "Good Wives, Wise Mothers." In its first issue, Hiratsuka stated the purpose of the *Seitō*: "We must get up and develop the natural abilities God has given us... Our magazine *Seitō* is for use by the unknown writer. It shall be an organ for the dissemination of women's philosophy, literature and culture"

⁵ In the following examination of Hiratsuka's writings, I used Horiba Kiyoko (ed.) *An Anthology of Seitō Women Liberation Essays (Seitō josei kaihouron shu)* (1991) and Kobayashi Tomiko and Yoneda Sayoko (eds.) *An Anthology of Hiratsuka Raichō's Critical Essays (Hiratsuka raichō hyouron shu)* (1987).

⁶ The original meaning of "bluestocking" was a derogatory reference to an educated woman (Kobayashi 1987).

(Hiratsuka 1911, in Vavich 1967, 408-9). Hiratsuka saw that “the most barriers lie within ourselves” and encouraged Japanese women to develop “great hidden ability and genius” (Hiratsuka 1911, in Sievers 1983, 164).

In contrast to the progressivism of the women’s rights movement, Hiratsuka’s assertions reflect her rightist and conservative class biases. Hiratsuka’s explanations of gender inequality, based on upper-class women’s experience, focuses on women in the domestic sphere. Also, the kind of Japanese women’s “philosophy” Hiratsuka was interested in disseminating was implicitly nationalistic. Hiratsuka’s statement above refers to the sun goddess of Japanese mythology, Amaterasu Ōmikami, who is the original divinity of Japan’s imperial family. The women’s abilities to which Hiratsuka refers are unambiguously and unabashedly maternal. In the late eighteenth century, Motoori Norinaga, one of the most prominent Japanologists in the nation’s history, designated Amaterasu Ōmikami as the symbol of Japanese women’s motherly benevolence (Ōgoshi 1997, 135-163).

Hiratsuka and Ellen Key’s Maternalism

Hiratsuka’s conservative tendencies did not cause any serious problems in the *Seitōsha*’s early years. Also, Hiratsuka herself seemed unaware of any contradictions between these tendencies and her “feminist” objectives. However, once she discovered Ellen Key’s (1849-1926) work, Hiratsuka became interested in the sociopolitical issues regarding

women, and her class biases and problematic pro-nationalist stance on maternity became explicit.⁷

Hiratsuka's discovery of Key's work occurred accidentally as part of the *Seitō*'s activities. *Seitō* members were fascinated by Henrik Ibsen's play *A Doll's House*: one of the first issues of the journal was devoted entirely to articles discussing the play (Horiba 1991b, 32-3).⁸ The circle's interest in Ibsen led Hiratsuka to Key, who valued Ibsen's observation of gender differences. According to Key, "Ibsen frequently makes the masculine soul inorganic, definitive, finished, determined; the feminine soul, on the other hand, he often makes organic, growing, in evolution" (cited in Sievers 1983, 226).

In 1913, Hiratsuka translated Key's work for the *Seitō*. Hiratsuka confessed that she had never thought about women's issues from a sociological or ethical perspective, until she read Key's work. Hiratsuka was so impressed by Key that she decided to devote herself to women's issues. In 1915, Hiratsuka confirmed that, "It was Ellen Key's work [*Love and Marriage*] that taught me the importance of women's issues. I began to realize that I had never addressed the issue that a woman has to liberate herself as a woman" (Hiratsuka 1991 [1915], 282).

Henceforth Hiratsuka relied heavily on Key's writings, particularly her *Love and Marriage* (1970 [1911]) and *The Renaissance of Motherhood* (1970 [1914]) for her contributions to the *Seitō*. The reason for her identification with Key is Hiratsuka's belief in womanliness. As a privileged woman, Hiratsuka found the idea of women's participation in the labor market "unthinkable." Hiratsuka maintained that women were

⁷ Key's works include *The Century of the Child* (1909), *The Woman Movement* (1912), *The Younger Generation* (1914), and *War, Peace, and the Future* (1916).

⁸ The *Seitō* published six articles regarding Nora, Ibsen's heroine, in 1912.

intended for motherhood, and opposed liberal feminist claims, such as equality in the labor market. Also, the nation-state as an oppressive force was invisible for Hiratsuka. Influenced by the nation's nation-building efforts and the Japanism nationalist movement, Hiratsuka's stance became increasingly nationalistic, and found theoretical substantiation for her pro-nationalistic stance on maternity in Key's work. The more Hiratsuka followed in Key's footsteps and wrote on various sociopolitical issues regarding women, the more her problematic pro-nationalistic stance on maternity became. And, by emphasizing Japanese women's supportive roles in the domestic sphere, Hiratsuka turned unexpectedly into a *de facto* proponent of "Good Wives, Wise Mothers."

The following analysis of Hiratsuka's writings focuses on her discussions of birth control and love. I will show the ways in which Key's notion of birth control, which derives from her radically liberal stance on female sexuality, is used by Hiratsuka to justify the improvement of the Japanese race through eugenics. I will further show that, because of her lack of understanding of Key's libertarian notion of love, Hiratsuka inadvertently transforms the "Good Wives, Wise Mothers" ideology into a more powerful, psychologically bound Japanese maternalism (*bosei-ism*).

Key's Maternalism

Key takes a radical stance on female sexuality and links motherliness to heterosexual desire. Against the Victorian restrictions on female sexuality, which make women into sex slaves, Key is a radical advocate of sexual love. Key's position is summarized by Nancy F. Cott, the author of *The Grounding of Modern Feminism*:

Key romanticized female eroticism and, like most apostles of sexual liberation of the time, linked erotic life to bodily health and spiritual harmony. She claimed that women's true fulfillment was sex-specific, intrinsically bound to the nurturance expressed in maternity—just as nineteenth-century conventions had it—but she broke through the Victorian separation between motherhood and female eroticism and linked “motherliness” to heterosexual desire, itself sacred and self-validating. (Cott 1987, 46)

Further, Key renounces the notion of illegitimate birth and believes that the state is accountable for the welfare of its citizens, regardless of status, and uncompromisingly demanded state involvement in women's issues, for example, state subsidies for unwed mothers.⁹

On the other hand, birth control is one of the most essential elements of feminist programs. Key's ideas on sexuality are said to have significantly affected feminists like Margaret Sanger, the founder of the *Woman Rebel*, in the birth control movement of 1910s. Assisted by many of Key's ideas, feminists expressed women's desire to exercise their sexuality and to be in charge of their reproductive capacity without state interference (Cott 1987, 48).¹⁰

Hiratsuka's Misappropriation of Key's Ideas¹¹

Following in Key's steps, Hiratsuka advocates birth control and love. Also, Hiratsuka shows her belief in motherhood as women's vocation while denying her place in the labor market, by referring to Key's work. However, apparently influenced by the nationalist

⁹ Key's idea suggests a northern European welfare state. The Bund für Mutterschutz und Sexualreform, founded in 1904 in Leipzig, reflected many of Key's ideas. Also, Norwegian legislation of 1915 legalized the status of the children of unwed mothers, allowing the state to subsidize them (Cott 1987, 47).

¹⁰ Key has many interesting ideas not limited to love and birth control.

¹¹ For the following analysis of Hiratsuka's misappropriation of Key's work, I focused on her 1915 article “The Conflict between...,” because her nationalistic tendency is clearly observed. Hiratsuka began to cite Key's work as early as January 1913, and her misappropriation of it is not limited to this article.

sentiments of the time, Hiratsuka naively believed in the priority of the state over its citizens. Guided by this nationalist stance, Hiratsuka suggests that Japanese women stay home for love and fulfill their motherly responsibilities for the nation. Hiratsuka also demands that Japanese women fulfill their responsibilities as mothers for the improvement of the race. Key's position is significantly different from Hiratsuka's. Although she emphasizes the state's responsibilities, Key hardly maintains that women have an obligation to be the mothers for the nation.¹²

“Birth Control” for the Improvement of the Japanese Race

In a 1915 essay, paraphrasing Key's work, Hiratsuka talks about birth control. Hiratsuka argues that, “as long as there is a valid reason and it is done in the appropriate way, it is the right and the duty of civilized people” (Hiratsuka 1991 [1915], 286).

However, when she explains what she means by “valid reason,” Hiratsuka's position departs from Key's, becoming nationalistic and emphasizing women's role as *Japanese* patriotic mothers.¹³ According to Hiratsuka, birth control is acceptable only if childbirth would be harmful to the mother and detrimental to the future of the Japanese race. It is also acceptable should overpopulation cause the impoverishment and degeneration of Japanese citizens. Without a valid reason, however, birth control is “a hideous and tormenting act” (Hiratsuka 1991 [1915], 286). Birth control is even worse than abortion, Hiratsuka proudly advances, because giving birth is Japanese woman's mission for the race (Hiratsuka 1991 [1915], 288).

¹² Whereas Key's rationale was based on her belief that the state was responsible for the welfare of its citizens, Hiratsuka's nationalistic stance on maternity was a result of her naive national worshipping (Ōgoshi 1996, 119).

¹³ Although subtle, there are indeed substantial differences between Hiratsuka and Key, differences that did not occur to Hiratsuka.

Hiratsuka reveals her strong eugenic predisposition and class biases regarding abortion.

I imagine that among so-called liberated women in Europe and the United States there were not few cases of abortion, in order to pursue artistic life, scientific research, or social work, based on the conviction that it would improve one's spiritual life as an individual and contribute to civilization in some way, regardless of whether or not abortion is right and proper matter. I wonder if it is correct to conclude that abortion in general is an inexcusable crime unconditionally only because it is an unnatural thing that insults life. Rather, today's genuine civilization, because it respects life more than ever is not satisfied with natural perpetuation and proliferation, and puts pressure on the evolutionary progress of life for better quality, even if it results in a decrease in number. (Hiratsuka 1991 [1915], 290)

Hiratsuka argues that abortion in order to enable artistic and scientific activities that contribute to the improvement of civilization is permissible. Likewise, in the same context, Hiratsuka adds and argues in favor of abortion for the improvement of the Japanese race. Key also occasionally talks about the improvement of the race. However, Key refers to the human race, Hiratsuka to the Japanese race.

“Love” and Internalization of “Good Wives, Wise Mothers” Ideology

Mentioning Key's *The Renaissance of Motherhood*, Hiratsuka talks about love, and cites Robert Browning's line which she found in Key's work: “Womanliness means only motherhood; all love begins and ends there” (Hiratsuka 1991 [1915], 294).¹⁴ Combined with her nationalistic stance and her failure to understand what Key meant by sexual love, Hiratsuka's notion of love is contradictory and dangerously misleading.

¹⁴ Browning influenced many modern poets through his dramatic monologue. Browning's works include *Pippa Passes* (1841), *Sordello* (1840), *Men and Women* (1864), and *Dramatis Personae* (1864). The source of the original is not identified.

In the following citation, Hiratsuka contrasts Key's view on womanhood with that of Charlotte Perkins Gilman (1860-1935), an American socialist feminist, who advocated the socialization of childcare and education.

Feminists of Mrs. Gilman's faction argue that women's true liberation cannot be achieved unless women are liberated from today's miscellaneous housework, become economically independent, and leave childcare, education and cooking to specialists. By contrast, Ellen Key is trying to make these so-called liberated women discover the highest and most beautiful, unified harmonious women's true life in love, especially in motherhood, by bringing them back to the home. Her so-called "Greater Love" is what harmoniously unifies the dualistic conflict that lies at the bottom of human life. (Hiratsuka 1991 [1915], 294-5)

"The dualistic conflict" Hiratsuka mentions is the choice between life as an individual and life as a woman. Hiratsuka argues that love is the solution. Be a woman for love! Hiratsuka claims that "love...harmoniously unifies the dualistic conflict." However, unlike Key's libertarian love, Hiratsuka's love is ideological and falsifies the conflict. Compared to the widespread practice of arranged marriage, love has the flavor of liberalism. Simultaneously, it tacitly covers up the "Good Wives, Wise Mothers" ideology's intent of exploiting women's domestic responsibilities.¹⁵

Originally an advocate of the development of women's creative talents, Hiratsuka failed to understand that the government slogans including "Good Wives, Wise Mothers" and "Family State" were manifestations of Japanese nationalist interests, because she lacked insight into sociopolitical implications of women's issues. These government slogans were the ideological devices to exploit women's "creative talents" to facilitate the nation's industrialization. Hiratsuka's naive nationalism was supposedly justified by

¹⁵ Hiratsuka also implies that love means being a "Good Wives, Wife Mothers" for the nation's causes.

Key's work. As a result, Hiratsuka turned into an advocate of "Good Wives, Wise Mothers."

Hiratsuka promotes love as a more powerful incentive than the externally imposed ideology of "Good Wives, Wise Mothers." Instead of externally defining women's roles, love deliberately questions their role in women's identity. Because of love, women should not hesitate to devote their creative talents to becoming "Good Wives, Wise Mothers." Hiratsuka thus inadvertently transformed "Good Wives, Wise Mothers" into a more powerful, psychologically based Japanese patriotic maternalism (*bosei*-ism). This is the origin of *bosei*, which continues to shape Japanese gender relations today.

Fukuda Hideko's Challenge and the End of the *Seitōsha*

The dominance of Hiratsuka's pro-nationalist stance wavered as new members of the group began to engage in sociopolitical criticism. For example, Fukuda Hideko's 1913 essay "A Solution to the Women's Problem" challenged the status quo (Fukuda 1991 [1913]). Fukuda, a pioneer of the socialist women's movement, argues that women's liberation can only be achieved through the establishment of a communist society. Fukuda's article attracted the government's attention and the issue containing it was banned. Thereafter, the journal was harassed by the government on the grounds that it published ideas that opposed the principles of "Good Wives, Wise Mothers" (Horiba 1991a, 364-7; Sievers 1983, 178-9).

Fukuda's 1913 essay not only drew unfavorable government attention but also helped reinforce the divisions among the *Seitōsha*. For the original members, the new

members' positions, including Fukuda's socialist feminism, were too radical. On the other hand, to the new members, the original members were too conservative. For example, Fukuda publicly criticized Hiratsuka's opening statement for the *Seitō*. Fukuda says, "It would be wonderful if all women could see themselves as Raichō did when she said, 'I am the sun.' But this is not just woman's perception; it must be man's as well" (Sievers 1983, 178). In 1915, the editing and publishing responsibilities of the *Seitō* passed to Itō Noe, a younger member of the *Seitōsha*. And, in 1916, the *Seitōsha* published the final issue of the *Seitō* (Horiba 1991a. 365-6).

Bosei-Debate

In 1916, after the demise of the *Seitōsha*, Yosano Akiko (1878-1942), another founding member of *Seitōsha*, wrote an essay criticizing Hiratsuka's position and opening lengthy debate.¹⁶ The debate attracted wider public attention, partly due to Yosano's fame. Ironically, Yosano coined the term "*bosei*," and the debate was later appropriately named "*Bosei Debate*" (*Bosei ronsō*). The debate helped establish and disseminate Hiratsuka's maternalist position as "*bosei-ism*."

Yosano believed in economic independence as the only way for women's emancipation. Yosano correctly pointed out that Hiratsuka's schemes could only result in the perpetuation of women's subordination in the family. Hiratsuka defended her position, repeatedly citing Key.¹⁷ Hiratsuka says, "Ellen Key is *the* champion of women problem

¹⁶ Yosano's essays include "*Bosei-henchō o haisu*" [Abolish attaching too much importance to *bosei*] (February, 1916) and "*Joshi no shokuyugyō-teki dokuritsu o gensoku to seyo*" [Be based on the principle of women's occupational independence] (January, 1918). Yosano was a composer of *tanka* poetry, and was considered one of the leading figures of contemporary Japanese literature. Her *Midare-gami* was published in 1901.

¹⁷ Hiratsuka began to cite Key's *Century of Child* (1900) from around this time.

who argues, ‘Women as human beings, be true women’” (Hiratsuka 1987 [1916], 83).

Hiratsuka claims that for Key the women’s rights movements,

lack insights into women’s genuine talents and qualities; have forgotten to reevaluate women’s vocation as a race; failed to see perverse quality in gender equality that inevitably brings gender discrimination; and lack insight into male-made social systems and civilizations, thus, misallocating women’s liberation efforts. As a result, it is undeniable that, behind the so-called liberated women, lies danger for the citizens and the race. (Hiratsuka 1987 [1916], 84)

At best, Hiratsuka is impersonating Key. Again, Hiratsuka urges Japanese women to be true women.¹⁸

The debate continued for three years without any further development. Although Hiratsuka’s position was conspicuously pro-nationalistic, the debate was framed around whether or not the state should be involved in the protection of mothers and children. In fact, from a nationalist point of view, the debate was beneficial. Both Hiratsuka and Yosano overlooked the nation’s extreme industrialization policy that weighed so heavily on the shoulders of Japanese women. Japanese women had been exploited not only at home but also outside the home. Rapid growth of the nation’s light industry, the backbone of the nation’s industrialization, was only possible because of the ruthless exploitation of young, uneducated women from poor families in rural Japan. Hiratsuka’s stance would deceive Japanese wives into becoming domestic as well as sexual servants in the name of love. Yosano’s stance pushed Japanese women, most of whom did not have much choice but to work as cheap labor, into exploitation.

¹⁸ Also, in this context, Hiratsuka mentions Emma Goldman’s *The Tragedy of Women’s Liberation* to support her position. *The Tragedy of Women’s Liberation* is a socialist criticism of capitalism’s exploitation of women in the workplace. Although like Hiratsuka, Goldman opposes liberal feminism’s goal of opening the workplace to women, Goldman is certainly not a maternalist.

In September 1918, Yamakawa Kikue (1890-1980), a socialist feminist, joined the debate and helped end it by criticizing both Yosano and Hiratsuka. According to Yamakawa, Yosano's insistence on women's economic independence, reflects her bourgeois bias and her ignorance of the harsh working conditions of lower class women and of the meaning of reproductive work at home under capitalism. On the other hand, Hiratsuka's emphasis on the protection of mothers and children by the state is a revisionist stance and overlooks the problem of capitalist exploitation of labor (Yamakawa 1990 [1918], 61-83). Yamakawa's criticism is convincing, indeed. However, *bosei* as a Japanese women's "new" identity has already been instituted, stood on its own feet, and begun to permeate into the consciousness of a national audience.

Despite the fact that more than 60 percent of factory labor force was female toward the beginning of World War II, the conditions of women had not improved at all throughout the first half of the 20th century. Instead, the burden of the nation's overzealous industrialization policy weighed heavily on the shoulders of Japanese women. Needless to say, under the two pillars of the ideal Japanese womanhood, "Good Wives, Wise Mothers" and Hiratsuka's *bosei*-ism, Japanese women were further expected to excel in domestic responsibilities in the name of love.

Conclusion

Hiratsuka's enthusiastic introduction of Key's work had some unexpected consequences. Although she initially opposed the "Good Wives, Wise Mothers" government slogan, Hiratsuka came to support it. Second, Hiratsuka helped formulate and disseminate the

idea of *bosei*, which did not exist before her time. Ideologically, *bosei* is more powerful than the slogan, because it effectively labels women's very identity.

Third, the idea of *bosei* was inherited later by Takamure Itsue and became the ideological key to mobilizing Japanese women during World War II. Inheriting Hiratsuka's *bosei*-ism, Takamure incorporated *jinen* the Japanese Buddhist conception of nature into the formulation of her new *bosei*-ism. *Jinen* defined the uniqueness and superiority of Japanese culture/morality among her contemporary Japanism nationalists and became the theoretical justification for the nation's ultra-nationalistic expansionism (Yamashita 1988). Interestingly, Key's works were not initially well received in her native Scandinavia. Key's reputation was made in Germany, where eugenic ideas had catastrophic consequences (Ellis 1911, xiii). In Japan, as well, *bosei* became the womb of Japanese imperialistic expansionist madness.

- CHAPTER 6 -

**TAKAMURE ITSUE'S NEW *BOSEI*-ISM AND JAPANISM:
Redefining *Bosei* in Religious Terms**

Introduction

Religion is often seen by Western feminists as one of the key factors responsible for the oppression of and discrimination against women. This linkage between religion and patriarchy has never been embraced by Japanese feminists. In fact, “God the father,” a concept that is often manipulated to justify a patriarchal society, is absent in the Japanese situation. The Japanese religious situation is very different. Instead of a monotheistic authoritative absolute God, eight million deities are believed to exist in the context of Japanese eclectic religious practice (Okuda 1998, 9).

Because of this unique Japanese religious situation, the argument that religion has no influence on Japanese patriarchy is convincing. In the history of Japanese feminism, religion has long been exonerated from all responsibility for gender discrimination (Okuda 1998, 10). Even some Japanese conservative intellectuals have interpreted the Japanese religious situation in a favorable light and celebrated it as an example of the Japanese “post-modern” condition and as an alternative to the Western patriarchal system (Ōgoshi 1991a, 13).

Yet, Japan is hardly a non-religious society. Speaking of religion as a cultural system, Clifford Geertz writes, “Religious symbols and ceremonies form one part of the cultural ethos, and prescribe the deepest values held by society and the people in that society” (Geertz 1972 in Okuda 1998, 13). Various religious beliefs are well immersed in

everyday life and practiced often with no specific religious implications. As Okuda Akiko aptly describes, “Religion has not always functioned in the role of religion,” while deeply affecting the lives of the Japanese (Okuda 1998, 13). Needless to say, Japanese gender relations are not an exception.

In order to elucidate the relation between religion and women in Japan, this chapter explores Takamure Itsue’s (1894-1964) maternalism (*bosei-ism*).

Takamure and *Bosei-ism*

Born in 1894 in Kumamoto prefecture in Kyushu, or “the land of fire,” Takamure was a passionate woman scholar who was extremely interested in feminist theory and women’s issues.¹ In 1926, Takamure wrote *Genesis of Love (Ren’ai sousei)*, and introduced her *bosei-ism*. In 1930 Takamure began research on the marriage system in ancient Japan, and published *Research on the Matriarchal System (Bosei-sei no kenkyū)* in 1938 and *Women’s History (Josei no rekishi)* from 1954 to 1958, among others. Takamure is now regarded as a pioneer of Japanese women’s history, and is a strong influence over contemporary Japanese feminist scholarship (Kano and Horiba 1985; Nishikawa 1990).

Theoretically speaking, Takamure inherited Hiratsuka Raichō’s *bosei-ism*, a Japanese nationalistic stance on maternity. As discussed in the previous chapter, co-opting Ellen Key’s maternalism, Hiratsuka successfully established the foundations of the Japanese nationalistic stance on maternity by transforming the norms of the “Good Wives, Wise Mothers” ideology into a psychologically bound *bosei-ism* by incorporating the

¹ One of Takamure’s representative work is *Diary of a Woman from the Land of Fire: Autobiography of Takamure Itsue (Hi no kuni no onna no nikki: Takamure Itsue jiden)* (1965).

idea of love (Chapter 5). Takamure further indigenized this argument by incorporating the Japanese conception of nature, *jinen*.

Takamure is one of the most controversial figures in Japanese feminist history. During World War II, Takamure became the most influential feminist war ideologue by helping transform supposedly frail “Good Wives and Wise Mothers,” or sympathetic *bosei*-women, into war fanatics. Takamure’s explicit support of the nation’s imperialist expansionism during World War II is remembered as a regrettable episode that contemporary Japanese feminists avoid at all costs (Kano & Horiba 1985; Nishikawa 1982; Suzuki 1986). Japanese feminist scholarship by and large sees special wartime circumstances as the primary cause (Nishikawa 1982; Kano & Horiba 1985). Ōgoshi Aiko points out the nationalism’s ideological manipulation deceptively co-opted Japanese women by pressing for some of the feminist objectives as its priorities (Ōgoshi 1996, 116-7). Suzuki Yūko’s study offers an analysis of how Japanese feminists of various political orientations became co-opted during the war by the nation’s ultra-nationalism (Suzuki 1986), while Kanō Miyoko examines the development of the nation’s “grass-roots” fascism (Kanō 1987).

Takamure’s *Research on the Matriarchal System* (1938) offers evidence of the historical origin of Japanese maternalism through a close examination of sacred Shinto documents, and defines Japanese women’s sacrificial role as one of the conditions of the nation’s strength. This is evidently an effort to provide a theoretical justification for Japanese women’s active participation in the nation’s war efforts in the tradition of Shintoism (Yamashita 1988). Toward the end of the war, many Japanese women

frantically called themselves Amaterasu Ōmikami, the ancestral goddess of the Japanese Emperor, and wandered the Japanese streets (Nishikawa 1990, 166).²

Yet, Shinto was not the only religion practiced in Japan. Nor was it the only religion that affected Takamure's *bosei*-ism. Around the turn of the century, a new development in Japanese Buddhism defined *jinen*, the Japanese Buddhist conception of nature, as Japanese cultural identity. This new Japanese Buddhist development played a key role in determining the direction of the nation's wartime ultranational imperialist expansionism. And, Takamure's *bosei*-ism was also deeply affected by this. The following analysis explores the Buddhist roots of Takamure's *bosei*-ism, which were overshadowed by the dominance of Shinto and were therefore not easily observed, but which had a strong influence on the fundamental theoretical construct of it.³

Japanese Buddhism and Women as Fatalistic Mothers

There have been a number of scholarly attempts to explain the relation between Buddhism and women in Japan.⁴ According to Okano, Buddhist gender discrimination became institutionalized around the latter half of the tenth century in Japan. A possible reason for this practice was the Mahayana Sutras, in which women as the sinful sex was

² During World War II, Takamure became a chief contributor to the *Japanese Women (Nihon fujin)*, the journal of The Greater Japanese Women's Association (*Dai nihon fujin kai*), which was organized under Tōjō Hideki's military-controlled government in 1941 (Nishikawa 1990, 167-8; Ueno 1998, 51-2). The association had approximately 20 million members, most of the nation's eligible female population, and the *Japanese Women* was indeed one of the most influential journals of the time (Nishikawa 1990, 167-8; Ueno 1998, 51-2).

³ These Buddhist roots of Japanese *bosei*-ism are often overlooked. One of the reasons for this oversight is that, after the Meiji Restoration of 1868, when Shinto, the religion of the Japanese Emperor, became the nation's official religion, the Buddhist establishment in Japan lost its public standing. The Buddhist way of living was no longer regarded as a way of living but as a profession (Okano 1998, 30). Also, especially toward the end of World War II, Japanese culture was increasingly defined within the context of Shinto.

⁴ In the mid-sixth century, ascetic clerical Buddhism was introduced to ancient Japan, where native shamanism of fertility and regeneration prevailed (Okano 1998, 25.)

repeatedly mentioned (Okano 1998, 26; Nakano 1998). Like many religions in the world, Buddhism is inherently patriarchal.

Nakano Yūko points out some distinctively Japanese Buddhist ideas and practices that discriminated against women. The Five Hindrances of Women (*nyonin goshō*) disqualify women from becoming Buddha. From ancient times, there have been Buddhist ceremonies and rites, as well as religious facilities and sacred areas, that have barred women's participation. They are known as *nyonin kinsei* (women prohibited) or *nyonin kekkaï* (women excluded) (Nakano 1998, 65-9).

One of the reasons for Japanese Buddhism's expulsion of women is their supposed blood impurity. For example, in "The Pool of Blood Hell," a *wasan*, a poem chanted in praise of Buddhist doctrine and sutra at *ko* religious association gatherings, such a view is clearly observed (Nakano Y. 1998, 66-7).

Women have the impure water known as menstruation, which defiles the gods when they bathe. The weight of this sin and its retribution are immeasurable, and there is no place where this pollution may be cast away owing to its defilement, therefore it flows into hell and collects in a pool of blood. If a person is born a woman, be she a sovereign wrapped and brought up in brocade, a lady of noble birth or consort of a rich man, even the wife or daughter of a commoner, after death they will all fall into the Pool of Blood Hell and suffer. Then the bodhisattva Avalokitesvara will grant them salvation from this torment. (*Sotoshu Jinken Yogo Suishin Honbu* 1987 in Nakano Y. 1998, 67)

Nakano Y. also points out the widespread Japanese Buddhist essentialist designation of women as mothers. In some cases, women are altogether categorized as a species of mothers (Nakano Y. 1998, 78). Nakano eloquently explains Japanese "religious feeling about motherhood:"

In Japan there is a certain emotion and mystique surrounding motherhood. Many Japanese men have what could almost be called a kind of religious [Buddhist]

feeling about motherhood, or are caught up by the image. It is an image of 'magnanimous mother love,' 'all-embracing mother love' and the 'mother who gives birth to everything.' (Nakano Y. 1998, 78)

One of the distinctive characteristics of Japanese maternalism (*bosei-ism*) is its demand for women's selfless devotion to being a mother. At the same time, it is a fatalistic maternalism in which the ultimate goal of women as mothers is to bear and raise sons who later become monks. In order to accomplish this goal, women are compelled to excel as mothers and to devote themselves entirely to their sons. Only in this way will women be saved. This Japanese Buddhist maternalism will never challenge patriarchy. Rather, it functions merely as a supplementary system that quietly reinforces patriarchy.

In the following chapter, I will demonstrate the Buddhist roots of Takamure's *bosei-ism*. First, efforts will be made to identify the theoretical foundations of Takamure's *bosei-ism*. Secondly, I will demonstrate comparatively the ways in which Takamure shares them with the nation's ultranationalism, by focusing on the Buddhist roots of her *bosei-ism*. In particular, I will show that some of the key ideas of the nation's ultranationalism are Western imports. I will also show the ways in which they are reflected in Takamure's pre-war feminist work. Then, I will turn my attention to Takamure's *Research on the Matriarchal System*, and offer a new interpretation of this controversial work, by showing the ways in which Takamure justified the Buddhist roots of her *bosei-ism* with Shintoist terms.

The "Genesis" of New *Bosei-ism*

Takamure wrote *Genesis of Love (Ren'ai sousei)* in 1926. According to Takamure, concerns for the conditions of women evolved through the following four stages: (1)

women's rights movement (*joken shugi*), (2) maternalism or *bosei*-ism (*josei shugi*), (3) new women's rights movements (*shin joken shugi*), and (4) new maternalism or new *bosei*-ism (*shin josei shugi*). First, Takamure explains, the women's rights movements asserted equal rights between men and women within the existing social system.⁵ Secondly, maternalism emerged as a response to the negative consequences of the women's rights movements. In contrast to the women's rights movements' emphasis on equal rights, it asserted the preservation and state protection of women's uniqueness.⁶ Thirdly, the new women's rights movements asserted the emancipation of women through economic emancipation. Unlike the first women's rights movements, the new women's rights movements feminists asserted the transition from capitalism to socialism as the only way to emancipate women (Takamure 1996 [1926], 9 & 118).

Interestingly, Takamure also indicates the geographical location of each development, accordingly. Takamure points out that the first-stage feminism, or the women's rights movements, flourished in the United Kingdom and the United States. The development of the second-stage feminism, or maternalism, Takamure continues, was mostly seen in Scandinavian nations and Germany. Takamure also gives the Soviet Union as an example of the third-stage feminism, or the new women's rights movements (Takamure 1996 [1926], 9 & 118).

New *Bosei*-ism

⁵ Takamure mentions Mary Wollstonecraft's *Vindication of the Rights of Women* (1792) and J.S. Mill's *Subjection of Women* (1869) as representative works of the first-stage feminism.

⁶ One of the representative works of maternalism for Takamure is Ellen Key's *Love and Marriage* (1911). Also, Key's *Renaissance of Motherhood* (1914) seems to represent the second-stage feminism.

Takamure introduces her *bosei*-ism as the fourth and most advanced stage of feminism. One of the most conspicuous characteristics of her *bosei*-ism is that Takamure does not identify it with any Western feminist ideas (Takamure 1996 [1926]).⁷

In fact, Takamure fiercely criticizes and rejects all hitherto developed Western feminisms, including Key's maternalism, as a "swift current within modern thought."⁸ Behind her rather harsh treatment of Western feminisms is Takamure's critical view of modernism. According to Takamure, feminism so far had been a discourse that was formulated within the discourse of modern rationalism. More specifically, according to Takamure, feminism so far had been merely an expression of the modern patriarchal imperative that divides women into prostitutes and virtuous mothers. Takamure argues that female-centered feminisms, like Key's maternalism, which try to see women exclusively as virtuous mothers, do not belong to women but to men. On the same ground, Takamure criticizes the women's rights movements as well as socialist feminist movements (the new women's rights movements) as examples of economic reductionism, asserting, "Women should not be the successful imitators of men" (Takamure 1996 [1926], 118-25).

In contrast, Takamure asserts that her *bosei*-ism is an attempt to depart from modern rationalism. Takamure explains that her *bosei*-ism is based on the idea of *jinen*,

⁷ This is in a sharp contrast to her Japanese predecessors, Fukuzawa and Hiratsuka, who co-opted and relied heavily on Western feminist ideas. And, although she inherited Hiratsuka's *bosei*-ism and, therefore, her new *bosei*-ism is a version of Key's maternalism, Takamure is rather critical of Key's stance (Takamure 1926, 76, 79, 80-117).

⁸ Like the post-modern feminism of Julia Kristeva, for example, one of Takamure's main aims is to depart from modern rationalism that has been promoted under male-dominated social systems. Some Japanese feminists argue that Takamure's position is similar to and a precursor of Western ecofeminism (Chapter 7).

the Japanese conception of nature, under which the metaphysical separation of subject/object is rejected. Takamure finds the emancipation of women only in the unification of subject/object, in particular, in the fusion of motherly instinct and labor. In the West, nature belongs to the objective world and is opposed to the subjective world (human consciousness). In Japanese traditional nature (*jinen*), in contrast, the opposition of subjectivity and objectivity is neutralized, so to speak; they are not separated, but united. That is, human consciousness is also part of nature, according to *jinen*.⁹ And, more important for Takamure's *bosei*-ism, under *jinen*, women would no longer be dichotomously divided into whores and virtuous mothers.

With her *bosei*-ism, Takamure unfolds some ambitious goals. In the beginning of *Genesis of Love*, after explaining the evolution of the concerns for women's conditions, Takamure explains the significance of her *bosei*-ism. Takamure says, "New *bosei*-ism is the first proposal by Japanese women to the world. I anticipate the activities of Japanese women [and] their intelligence" (Takamure 1996 [1926], 9 & 118). Takamure wishes her new *bosei*-ism to be a milestone in Japanese women's advancement to the world. Also, Takamure advocates the dissemination of new *bosei*-ism as the solution to the women's problems all over the world. Even in her pre-war work, Takamure's expressly nationalistic position is clearly observed.

"West" and "modern" or "westernization" and "modernization" are used interchangeably by Japanese intellectuals, although they are not identical terms at all.

⁹ For example, Takamure criticizes the Western individualistic subjective "I." Takamure argues, referring to Descartes' phrase "I think; therefore I am," "I" in the contemporary world has begun to signify "I" which coexists with others (universalistic "I"). The universalistic "I" is in us and we can perceive it. Takamure's view of the shift from the individualistic "I" to the universalistic "I" is a reflection of her fatalistic Buddhist worldview. Unlike progressive evolutionists, Takamure sees extinction in our future. In her words, "Individualistic instinct is gradually absorbed by universalistic instinct. Universalistic instinct itself also becomes extinct eventually, because it is truly universalistic" (Takamure 1926, 76-9).

Takamure's *Bosei*-ism as an Expression of Japanese Ultra-nationalism

In the following, I will offer an analysis of the relationship between Takamure's new *bosei*-ism and the nation's nationalism. As I demonstrated in previous chapters, Takamure's predecessors, Fukuzawa and Hiratsuka, used Western feminist theories to substantiate traditional Japanese gender relations. I also showed not only that the nation's traditional gender relations, namely, "Good Wives, Wise Mothers," escaped their "feminist" criticisms, but also that Western feminist theories, such as Mill's *Subjection of Women* and Key's *Love and Marriage*, were manipulated to preserve them. Further, the reason I offered is that both Fukuzawa and Hiratsuka's feminist goals are to a great extent circumscribed by the nation's nationalist ideology, which puts priority on national goals over individual goals.

Regarding Takamure, one of the most important factors is that she does not identify with any Western feminist theories. Another is that the character of Japanese nationalism itself had changed since Fukuzawa's time. In Fukuzawa's time, Japanese nationalism uncompromisingly and unambiguously demanded that Japanese women be active participants of the nation's westernization efforts. In contrast, Takamure was in the midst of the nation's changing national identity, namely, from extreme *pro*-Western to *anti*-Western, which eventually cumulated into the nation's ultra-nationalism during World War II.¹⁰

Takamure's theory is deeply affected by the nation's such changes. Like feminist theories by Fukuzawa and Hiratsuka, Takamure's theory is for the most part limited by

nationalist ideology. Yet, because of its changing nature, Takamure's feminist theory reflects more of the differences in the nation's nationalist ideology than previous cases.

As I will show, the development of the nation's anti-Western ultra-nationalism, including its imperial expansionism, before and during World War II, owes more to the co-optation of various Western ideas, including European Buddhist Studies, Friedrich Nietzsche's *Überwindung* (surpassing [of the modern]), and Charles Darwin's natural selection.¹¹ Also, as I will demonstrate below, European Buddhist Studies, particularly, had a great impact on the ways in which Japanism developed. Takamure's feminist theory is a product of such ideological moves, and is indirectly affected by the same Western theories, even though she explicitly distances her work from Western philosophies.¹² In this regard, I will show what Takamure's new *bosei*-ism and the nation's ultra-nationalism, including its imperial expansionist ideology, share ideologically as well as theoretically.

More important to feminist issues, I will also show the ways in which the nation's conservative ideology on women is preserved in Takamure's *bosei*-ism. In this regard, I will also examine Takamure's second claim that her *bosei*-ism is the solution to women's

¹⁰ For the development of Japanese nationalist thought, refer to Maruyama Masao "Nationalism in Japan: Its Theoretical Background and Prospects" in Ivan Morris (ed.) *Thought and Behavior in Modern Japanese Politics*. London, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1969.

¹¹ Just as Mill's *Subjection of Women* was manipulated to theoretically substantiate the nation's "traditional" gender relations, these theories were manipulated by Japanese intellectuals to theoretically substantiate the nation's nationalistic ideology. In addition, Takamure's work is heavily loaded with Western theories, including Sigmund Freud's psychoanalysis and Arthur Schopenhauer's pessimistic metaphysics.

¹² That is to say, Japanese nationalism, which is typically depicted as a non-Western, irrational idea, in fact is a synthetic product of various Western ideas. So is Takamure's new *bosei*-ism. Through Takamure's new *bosei*-ism, I will show how Japanese intellectuals manipulate Western ideas/theories to substantiate Japanese conservative nationalistic ideologies. Particularly, I will examine comparatively Takamure's new *bosei*-ism and the nation's imperial expansionist ideology, for example, its Greater East

problems all over the world. In particular, I will examine whether it would contribute to a better gender relations. Here, I will give special attention to the ways in which Takamure incorporates Darwin's natural selection into her theory.

The Japanism Movements¹³

Takamure's preoccupation with *jinen* is a reflection of the Japanism movement, the nation's first contemporary cultural nationalism and one of the dominant intellectual trends of her time, which slowly but thoroughly developed since Meiji Japan (1868-1912). In this section, I will first define the Japanism movements. The political origins of Japanism and the ways in which Buddhism was chosen as one of the core elements of Japanese ultra-nationalism during World War II will also be examined.¹⁴

***Seikyōsha* and the Origin of Contemporary Japanese Cultural Nationalism**

Seikyōsha is a cultural nationalist organization, founded primarily by Buddhist scholars in 1888. In the same year, it began publishing the journal *Nihonjin* (Japanese), which typically praised highly Japanese traditional culture from various perspectives, including those of religion, ethics, arts and politics. One of its main positions advocated that the Japanese must maintain the essence of Japanese national culture.¹⁵

Asia Co-prosperity Sphere project, and show the intricate relations between feminist theory, nationalistic ideology and Western thought in modern Japan.

¹³ Japanism in Japanese is *kokusui-shugi* or *nihon-shugi*.

¹⁴ It is generally believed that Japanism was a reactionary response to the nation's westernization, or an antithesis to the Meiji government's extreme westernization policy, and gradually developed in a search for Japanese cultural identity. This proposition explains the development of Japanese cultural nationalism as an inevitable consequence of the nation's westernization. A majority of the theories of nationalism seem to support it (Gellner 1983; Kohn 1955; Smith 1981). However, one of the pitfalls of this position is that it does not explain why Buddhism rather than, for example, Shintoism, was chosen. Here, as with the original installment of the nation's nationalism (Chapter 4), I discuss the domestic politics involved in the development of Japanese nationalism, namely, the advent of the Japanese Buddhist establishment, among others.

¹⁵ There are several recent scholarly publications on *Seikyōsha*, including Satō Yoshimasru's *Research on Meiji Nationalism* (1998) and Nakanome Tōru's *Research on Seikyōsha* (1993), among others.

Japan was in the midst of an extreme westernization project. *Seikyōsha's* inherently conservative perspective was for the most part not enthusiastically welcomed. Yet, as some adverse effects of westernization became evident, *Seikyōsha's* effort began to be recognized and sympathized with by many, thus, establishing the foundation of the Japanism movements (Kitahara 1989, 63).¹⁶

One of the original objectives of the Japanism movements, including *Seikyōsha*, was to identify and position Japanese culture in international society. However, along with developments in international affairs, such as European imperial colonization of South Asian countries and Japanese emulation of it, Japanism developed as the ideological foundation for the nation's strength and Eastern identity (Kitahara 1989, 63; Satō 1998).

As Japanism evolved, the nation's true cultural identity came to be defined exclusively within the framework of Buddhism. Also, the foundation of Eastern philosophy, paying attention to Buddhism, which could contribute to world peace, was explored. For example, a vision of Asian racial identity was advanced by Takayama Chogyū, a member of another Japanism organization The Greater Japanese Association (*Dai nihon kyōkai*), after the nation's dissatisfaction with Western interference with regard to the Japanese concession of the Liaotung peninsula after the Sino-Japanese War (1894-5). Takayama visualized a major racial confrontation in the future, culminating in a

¹⁶ According to Kitahara, Takayama Chōgyū, one of the most prominent figures of the Japanism movements, said "the extreme worship and imitation of foreign matters created a violent reaction in the minds of the Japanese. Japanism emerged in order to explain the position of Japan in the world" (Kitahara 1989, 63).

war between the Europeans and the Asians. The battleground of the racial war would be Japan, Takayama projected (Kitahara 1989, 63).¹⁷

European Buddhist Studies and Defining Buddhism as Eastern Identity

Japanese Buddhist establishments, which had been patronized by the Tokugawa regime for more than 200 years, lost power and influence after the Meiji Restoration, since Shintoism became the nation's official religion. Hoping to reinstate its former power, leaders of various Buddhist sects funded young priests and sent them to Europe, including England and Germany, to study "advanced" European Buddhist scholarship.¹⁸ It was only after the absorption of European Buddhist Studies that the Japanese began to identify exclusively with Buddhism by placing its core elements at the center of their culture, including *jinen* (Stone 1990).¹⁹ For example, on their return, the character of Japanese Buddhist studies changed significantly. Under the Tokugawa regime,

Buddhist studies in Japan were sectarian in orientation and indissolubly welded to Buddhist faith and practice, carried out within a circle of people who were themselves Buddhist and who all accepted the same body of scriptures as a faithful record of the Buddha's word.

Into this closed system now came the innovations of modern Western scholarship, with emphasis on historical studies and textual analysis and its demand for academic objectivity. (Stone 1990, 219)

¹⁷ These visions were presented and discussed among Japanese intellectuals well before World War II, and foretold the fate of the nation's ultra-nationalism. There are some other factors that further prompted the development of ultra-nationalism. For example, at the peace conference in Paris in 1919, where the League of Nations was contemplated, the Japanese proposal to ban racial discrimination was fiercely opposed by Commonwealth nations and was eventually rejected. For another, in 1924 the United States passed a law banning immigrants from Japan (Kitahara 1989, 69-71).

¹⁸ This is comparable to the trend among the old ruling class who sent their scholars to the West to absorb "advanced" Western knowledge around the Meiji Restoration, in order to preserve their privileged sociopolitical position. One of the most effective means they co-opted from the West in this regard was the installment of nationalism (Chapter 4).

¹⁹ One of the Japanese Buddhist priests who were sent to the West was Nanjō Bun'ya. Nanjō was sent to England and studied Sanskrit with F. Max Müller, one of the founders of the science of religion. Also, Watanabe Kaigyoku was sent to the University of Strasbourg (now the University of Kaiser Wilhelm II in France) from 1900 to 1910 to absorb the developments of Buddhist studies in Europe, including Comparative Religion.

Under the Tokugawa regime, Japanese Buddhists for centuries had arbitrary and adamantly dismissed the Pali scriptures as “*Hinayana*.” But, once they found the Pali texts highly valued by European Buddhist scholars, Japanese Buddhist scholars turned their attention to these scriptures, hoping that the European approach to Buddhism would give them the basis for more sociopolitical power (Stone 1990, 220).²⁰

This new approach to Buddhist studies not only affected Japanese Buddhist scholars but also had larger sociopolitical implications. Jackie Stone, a Buddhist historian, explains,

First, the new field of Buddhology emerged as an academic discipline independent of the Buddhist clergy and traditional sectarian Buddhist studies. Second, there was a complete absorption of modern Western methods, including philosophical and historical studies, textual analysis, and the interpretation of Buddhism in the light of such new disciplines as psychology, sociology, archaeology, and comparative religion. Third, there was a massive effort at integration and systematization, including the collating, editing, and translating of texts, attempts to systematize various Buddhist doctrines and developments within an overreaching framework, as well as a search for a single underlying truth in which the whole of Buddhism might be subsumed. (Stone 1990, 217-8)

The establishment of Buddhology helped modernize the religion at least in appearance. Secondly, Buddhist interpretations of Japanese psychology and society, for example, assigned a significant position to Buddhism in Japanese culture and society. Stone’s third point also has strong domestic as well as international political implications. Domestically, these Buddhist establishment’s efforts prompted various Buddhist sects to unite and to identify as Japanese Buddhism. Internationally, the advent of Buddhism

²⁰ One of the primary roles of the Buddhist scholars was to theoretically substantiate the Japanese Buddhist establishment’s sociopolitical aspirations with European Buddhist Studies.

prompted Japanese intellectuals to visualize a dichotomized worldview: Christian West vs. Buddhist East.²¹

In 1918, Watanabe wrote *Buddhist Studies in the West* (*Ōbei no bukkō*). In this work, Watanabe insisted on the importance of Buddhist scholarship in three respects. First, Buddhism is the foundation of Japan's unique identity. Second, in his words, "In terms of our awakening to [our role] in the development of Asia, what inducements are offered us by Western Buddhist studies!" (Watanabe in Stone 1990, 224). Third, through Buddhist scholarship, Japan would be able to contribute to the progress of the world, including the West. Takamura wrote her *Genesis of Love* in 1926, six years after Watanabe's *Buddhist Studies in the West*. Although their areas of specialization differ greatly, there are strong ideological parallels between them.

Nietzschean "Overcoming of the Modern" and Japanese Universalism

Inherent in the ultranationalistic vision of Japanism is the idea of "surpass the West." Like the Japanese incorporation of Buddhism as its core cultural element, the idea of "surpass the West" is also a Western import. It is Nietzsche's *Überwindung* (overcoming [of the modern]) that helped the Japanese develop the idea of "go beyond the West."²² Later,

²¹ As early as 1887, Inoue Enryō, an influential Buddhist scholar and one of the original members of *Seikyōsha*, said,

Buddhism is now our so-called strong point...Material commodities are an advantage of the West; scholarship is also one of their strong points. The only advantage we have is religion. The fine product of ours excels those of other countries; the fact that its good strain died out in India and China may be considered an unexpected blessing for our countries. If we continue to nurture it in Japan and disseminate it some day in foreign countries, we will not only add to the honor of our nation but will also infuse the spirit of our land into the hearts and minds of foreigners. I am convinced that the consequences will be considerable. (in Stone 1990, 218-9)

²² The origin of the word *chōetsu* is found in Nietzsche's *Thus Spake Zarathustra*. Nietzsche says, *Als Zarathustra in die Nächste Stadt kam, die an den Wäldern liegt, fand er daselbst viel Volk versammelt auf dem Markte: denn es war verheissen worden, das man einen Seiltänzer sehen solle. Und Zarathustra sprach also zum Volke:*

Nietzsche's complete works were translated and published by Ikuta Chōkō in 1929 (1882-1936), a philosopher, and *chōetsu* was defined as the translation of the German word *überwinden* (Tanizaki, "*Chōkoku*" *no go no ben*, in Yamashita 1988, 84).²³ Since then, the Japanese word *chōetsu* became widely used by Japanese intellectuals, including Takamura.²⁴ Particularly, from the mid-1920s, Ikuta became politically engaged and began advocating surpassing the modern/West. In 1924, Ikuta says, "We need to try rethinking everything from an Eastern perspective."²⁵ In the following year, Ikuta says,

The conquest of the modern may sound like a mere negation of modernism, since it originates from our disgusted feeling with everything modern. Yet, in fact, it does not necessarily mean a return [to a historical past] from modernism. Rather, it surpasses, therefore, conquers modernism." (Ikuta in Yamashita 1988, 84-92)

Ikuta finds *jinen* as the key concept that helps East accomplish the conquest of the modern (Ikuta in Yamashita 1988, 84-92).²⁶ Ikuta's position became one of the theoretical foundations for the support of World War II among Japanese intellectuals.

*Ich lehre euch den Übermenschen. Der Mensch ist Etwas, das überwunden werden soll.
Was habt ihr gethan, ihn zu überwinden?*

In English translation:

When Zarathustra arrived at the nearest town which adjoineth the forest, he found many people assembled in the market place; for it had been announced that a rope-dance would give a performance. And Zarathustra spake unto the people:

I teach you the superman. Man is something that is to be surpassed. What have ye done to surpass man? (Nietzsche (1988 [1891]), 6; tran. Thomas Common)

²³ The word *chōetsu* was a neologism (Yamashita 1988, 84).

²⁴ Japanese intellectuals seemed extremely interested in Nietzsche's *Überwindung*. In 1913, Watsuji Tetsurō (1889-1960), one of the most influential philosophers in Japanese history, retranslated the word *Überwindung* as *seifuku*. And, in 1919, Abe Jirō (1883-1959) used *chōkoku*, instead, in one of his philosophical works (Yamashita 1988, 84-92).

²⁵ Trying to validate the superiority of "Eastern perspective" using Nietzsche's idea was a contradictory effort. But, needless to say, Ikuta and other Japanese intellectuals of that time did not see the contradiction.

²⁶ Also, in 1921, Tobari Chikufū (1873-1955), a German literary critic, translated Nietzsche's work into Japanese, by closely comparing Zarathustra to Bodhisattva and *Übermensch* to Buddha. Later, Ikuta followed in Tabari's footsteps and asserted the validity of *jinen* philosophy. Ikuta also published *A biography of Buddha (Shason den)* in 1935 (Yamashita 1988, 84-92).

Reflecting this historical development of Japanism, the conquest of the modern by Eastern morality became one of the important themes among Japanese intellectuals toward the end of World War II. In 1942, a “legendary famous” discussion meeting, “Symposium—The Conquest of Modern,” was held among thirteen “first-class” intellectuals. Suzuki Shigetaka, an organizer and one of the discussants, describes what the conquest of the modern means. “As for politics, it is the conquest of democracy. As for economics, it is the conquest of capitalism. As for philosophy, it is the conquest of liberalism.” Suzuki continues, “In case of Japan, the conquest of the modern is a complex subject, because it overlaps with the subject of the conquest of European world domination” (Hiromatsu 1989, 18).²⁷

²⁷ In 1941, a roundtable meeting, “The Standpoint of World History and Japan,” was held to discuss the “relationship between historical development and the morality of a nation” (Sakai, 1989, p.110). Some of the discussants include Kōyama Iwao and Kōsaka Masaaki, young Kyoto School philosophers. It is interesting to see that, in a conversation between Kōyama and Kōsaka, the conquest of modern is discussed within the framework of the Hegelian dialectic. Kōyama says,

The subject of moral energy should be the nation... The nation is the key to every problem. Moral energy has nothing to do with individual or personal ethics, or the purity of blood. Both culturally and politically the nation is the center of moral energy. (cited in Sakai 1989, 110)

Kōsaka responds,

That is right. The folk in itself is meaningless. When the folk gains subjectively, it necessarily turns into a national folk. The folk without subjectivity or self-determination, that is, the folk that has not transformed itself into a nation is powerless. For instance, a folk like the ainu could not gain independence, and has eventually been absorbed into other folk [that has been transformed into] a nation. I wonder if the Jews would follow the same fate. I think the Subject of World History must be a national folk in this sense. (cited in Sakai 1989, 110)

Also, in another roundtable meeting, “Ethics and Historicity of Great East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere,” Kōsaka explains the meaning of the Sino-Japanese War and the Great East Asian War (World War II).

The Sino-Japanese War is also a war of morality. Now that we have entered the Great East Asian War, the war is much larger in scale now, namely, between the Oriental morality and the Occidental morality. Let me put it differently, the question is which morality will play a more important role in the World History in the future. (cited in Sakai 1989, 111)

Kōsaka sees the war between Japan and China within the framework of Hegelian dialectic. It was the war of Japanese morality and its Chinese counterpart. The Japanese conquered and subjugated the Chinese because of Japanese moral superiority. Now, the battleground has been moved to the Pacific. World War II is the war between Japanese morality, which represents Eastern morality, and Western morality. The war will decide the ultimate morality for all of humanity (Sakai 1989).

Takamure's theory must be understood within this context. Like her contemporary ultra-nationalists, who rationalized that Japan would help the West overcome the problems of modernity with the concept of *jinen*, Takamure's bosei-ism indirectly co-opted Nietzsche's *Übermensch* and envisioned that Japanese women would contribute to the world by helping the West overcome gender problems, which, according to Takamure, are really modern and Western. In that sense, Takamure's theory is unambiguously an expression of the nation's ultra-nationalism, or a feminist version of the nation's imperial expansionism.

In addition to her severe criticism of Western feminism as a modernist expression, Takamure explored the meaning of "conquest" within the framework of *jinen* in 1922.

I think modernists put too much emphasis on human beings. If human beings are part of *jinen*, God must be part of *jinen*, too. If the quest for wealth and beauty is natural, then conquest must be natural, too. The conquest does not derive from a pessimistic feeling or hatred, but from a disinterested feeling that is possible only through true objectivity. (Takamure 1922, in Yamashita 1988, 84)

Takamure's desire to go beyond modern is unambiguously expressed (Yamashita 1988, 232-7). Takamure also says, "the conquest must be natural, too." The "nature" Takamure refers to is *jinen*. What Takamure is asserting here, more precisely, is that the conquest of the modern must occur within the framework of *jinen*. Moreover, only Japan can do this, Takamure asserts.

As I showed above, Takamure presented her new bosei-ism as at once genuinely Japanese and the most advanced feminist theory. This reflects another significant development in Japanese nationalism, and signifies the shift from introverted Japanism to

extroverted ultra-nationalism or Japanese universalism. Now, Japanese nationalism demands that the Japanese conquer the world with the concept of *jinen*.

***Jinen* and Darwin's Natural Selection**

Next, I turn my attention to an examination of Takamure's theory as a feminist theory. In particular, I will examine the ways in which Takamure uses Darwin's concept of natural selection. I will show that, coupled with the concept of *jinen*, Takamure's incorporation of "natural selection" resulted in conservatively preserving existing gender inequality, by overshadowing sociopolitical advances made by Western feminists. Instead, Takamure opted for spontaneous change. Takamure argued that the fact that women are suffering is the condition for a spontaneous change. Takamure's rationale is that there will be "a harmonious unification of motherly instinct and labor" as a result of "natural selection." In the following, I will first explain some of the critical differences between *jinen* (Buddhist conception of nature) and *shizen* (Western nature), and, then, demonstrate the ways in which Takamure co-opted the idea of "natural selection" conservatively, by erroneously applying the concept of *jinen* to it.

Jinen* and *Shizen

Takamure insisted that "conquest must be natural." Takamure's "natural" has a specific connotation. The "natural" Takamure uses in this context is the adverb form of *jinen*. So is the "natural" of her "natural selection." Although the difference between *jinen* and *shizen* seemed not to matter much to Takamure, in fact, *shizen* greatly differs from *jinen*. And, *shizen* cannot be replaced with *jinen*, especially, when applied to "natural selection."

In the West, nature belongs to the objective world and is opposed to the subjective world. In the Japanese Buddhist conception of nature, under which the metaphysical separation of subject/object was never conceived, the opposition of subjectivity and objectivity is neutralized, rather, they are not separated, but united. Historically, *jinen* is older than *shizen*. *Shizen* was used as the translating word of the word “nature” beginning in Meiji Japan. However, it was not a newly coined word. It was used in the Chinese classics and in Japanese Buddhist literature as *jinen*.²⁸ Even after Meiji Japan, when *shizen* has been used to translate “nature,” *shizen* was used by many Japanese as a native word. That is, since Meiji Japan, in the Japanese word *shizen*, the new meaning of (Western) “nature” and the old traditional meaning of *jinen* have been coexisting together.²⁹

Takamure and Natural Selection

In *Genesis of Love*, in an attempt to refute Key’s insistence on state protection of children and mothers as a prerequisite for women’s employment, Takamure talks about the differences between natural selection and artificial selection. Takamure somewhat speciously explains, “Darwin divides the laws of selection into natural selection and artificial selection. Natural selection is a natural process of selection ... Artificial selection requires consciousness” (Takamure 1926, 100-1). The Japanese word Takamure uses for

²⁸ *Shizen* and *jinen* are written with exactly same Chinese characters but pronounced differently.

²⁹ Japanese confusion with the meaning of “nature” has a larger consequence. Since the 1870’s, natural selection (*shizen tōta*) was frequently used and became a phrase in fashion among Japanese intellectuals. Natural selection is one of the key concepts of Darwin’s evolution theory. In 1882, Katō Hiroyuki (1861-1916), the first president of Tokyo University, wrote *The New Theory of Human Rights (Jinken shinsetsu)*. Katō erroneously used the theory of natural selection to analyze society and history. Katō argued that Darwin’s evolution theory offers an insight into “the survival of the fittest” in society and history. He theorized that the fittest of society, “the superior citizen,” lead and rule “the inferior people” (Howland 2002, 136-7).

“natural” is *shizen-teki*, which is the adjectival form of “nature.” In Takamura’s usage, however, natural selection does not mean selection by nature, but spontaneous selection. As explained above, the Japanese traditional conception of nature signifies the unification of subject and object. Then, according to Takamura, natural selection means a spontaneous unification of object and subject.

Based on her understanding of natural selection, Takamura continues to criticize Key,

She [Key] thinks that today’s facts are eternal facts. She thinks that a woman’s vocation as a mother is an extremely difficult task that she must pursue with her whole body throughout her life. She also thinks that a woman’s life as a worker is a big event to which she must sacrifice her motherly instinct. As for today, I think, she is right. That is why we are suffering. Therefore, we know that there will be a society in which these two things unite with each other rationally.

Because motherly instinct and labor are parts of nature. (Takamura 1926, 103)

Takamura is saying that there will be a “harmonious unification of motherly instinct and labor” as a result of “natural selection.” Women are suffering. That is a condition for spontaneous change.

Needless to say, Takamura’s application of natural selection in this context is illogical and erroneous. However, for contemporary Japanese who did not notice the difference between *shizen* and *jinen*, Takamura’s use of “natural selection” might have been not only acceptable but sufficient. Moreover, from a nationalist point of view, Takamura’s belief in spontaneous change with regard to women’s issues must have been welcomed.³⁰ When she says, “the conquest must be natural,” Takamura means that the

³⁰ In addition to these Western theories, Marxism also significantly affected the ways in which Japanese ultra-nationalism was developed. Kita Ikki is a Japanese socialist whose thought was greatly influenced by Marxism. In 1919, Kita wrote *The Outline of the Principles for the Reform of the Nation*

conquest is part of *jinen* and is a spontaneous process. So is her solution for women's problems. "A harmonious unification of motherly instinct and labor" would also be a spontaneous process. Let it be.

Takamure as a Feminist War Ideologue

Research on the Matriarchal System

In July 1931, two months before the Manchurian Incident, Takamure withdrew from all her activities to her house in Setagaya, Tokyo, in order to write *Research on the Matriarchal System*, which later became her representative work (Kano & Horiba 1985,

(Nihon kaizō hō taimō) and offered a criticism of West-East Relations using Marxist terminology. Kita argued that there was a "class struggle" between the nations of the world, the part of "capitalists" occupied by Great Britain and the Soviet Union and the part of "proletariat" occupied by Japan. Therefore, according to Kita, it is a mission of Japan as a proletarian nation to wage a war against capitalist nations. Kita's work was enthusiastically read and worshiped as the Bible for the nation's reform by Japanese military officers. Also, the work is said to be responsible for the military 2.26 *coup d'état* of 1936 (Kitahara 1989, 70).

Following Kita's *Outline, The East Asian Alliance (Tōa renmei)* was organized among retired senior officers of the military and influenced strongly the military decision to invade Manchuria in 1931. The East Asian Alliance anticipated that the war between Japan and the Anglo-Saxons would take place, in order to unify the civilizations of the world. Also, in 1932 the Association for Understanding Order (*Meirin kai*) was organized. The Association states that one of its goals was "to promote the right and prestige of the nation and to realize the principle of the Great Asia." And, in 1938, the Japanese government declared the foundation of "The New Order in East Asia," reflecting the sentiments among scholars and political activists which had been expressed for decades. One of the main aims of this policy was to eradicate the Western imperial powers from East Asia. This policy was followed by a more detailed plan called "The Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere." In this version, not only East Asian countries but also Australia and New Zealand were included. Asian people were to be directed by the Japanese who were superior. Under the guidance of the Japanese, Asian people would be liberated from the menace of Western colonialism (Kitahara 1989, 65-76).

Needless to say, Kita was not the only Japanese who knew about Marxism. Marxism was first introduced to the Japanese in the first decade of the century. Immediately after, the Japanese Social Democratic Party was organized. The Japanese Communist Party was organized in 1922. Also, the first Japanese version of the *Communist Manifesto* appeared in 1904 and *Capital* in 1907 (Duus and Scheiner 1998, 155). However, the Japanese government executed severe political censorship. The Japanese Social Democratic Party was banned on the day it was founded. National-level mass arrests were carried out several times. In the 1930s, almost all Marxist scholars lost their university positions. In addition, Kita's work was also banned immediately after its publication (Kitahara 1989, 65-76).

One of the ultimate goals of Marxism is to achieve a classless society; yet, in Japan, since the Meiji Restoration, the ruling class joined Western expansionism and enjoyed their improved life conditions and prestige among world powers, while manipulating Marxism to substantiate the nation's ultranationalism. In the meantime, the Japanese masses were still hindered by persisting peasantry and unemployment. Also, the changes in working conditions and wages remained minimal with a massive reserve labor in rural Japan (Kitahara 1989, 65-76).

167). Manifestly, this work is an effort to provide evidence for the existence of a matriarchal society in ancient Japan. Takamure sees matriarchy as the root of human beings and the source of life. And, according to Takamure, the recovery of matriarchal society is the condition for gender equality.

One of the conspicuous characteristics of Takamure's *Research on the Matriarchal System* is her research subject. Takamure chose to scrutinize *New Family Name Records* (*Shin seishi roku*) that was supposedly recorded in the year 815 in Heian Japan (794-1192). *New Family Name Records* is a genealogy of selected 1,182 family names in Kyoto. The family names were divided into three categories based on their relations to the nation's imperial family, God or foreign powers. In Tokugawa Japan (1603-1868), Motoori Norinaga (1730-1801), one of the earliest Japanologists, studied these records and showed the genealogy of the Japanese, by deciphering the social functions of the multi-family names, which were commonly practiced by powerful families in ancient Japan. According to Motoori, it shows that each family was closely related to the Emperor's Family. So the Emperor's Family is the root of all Japanese families. Japan is a family state. Since then, *New Family Name Records* has been regarded as one of the historical artifacts that support the nation's family state ideology (Kano 1985, 167-221; Nishikawa 1982, 129-151; Yamashita 1988, 146).

Takamure's undertaking was a challenging endeavor indeed. Takamure's was going to argue for the existence of matriarchy in ancient Japan using the very text that has been regarded as the evidence for Emperor-centered Japanese patriarchal society. The Records is supposed to be one of the sacred books for Japanese nationalists. For example,

Takamure's contemporary, Tsuda Sayūkichi, who argued that the Records was not authentic but modified with intent to reinforce the idea of a family state, was imprisoned. During the Tokugawa Era, Mito intellectuals, who were proponents of the preservation of conservative national polity headed by Emperor, scrutinized the records for 250 years to complete the Greater Japanese History (1657-1906). In both Meiji (1868-1912) and Taisho (1912-1926) Japan, however, Japanese intellectuals did not pay much attention to the work, probably because of the extremity of the content. But, in the 1930s, when Takamure was undertaking her research on matriarchy in ancient Japan, the government was planning to republish the work as an anniversary event for the 2,600th national foundation day in 1940.

Based on her analysis of *New Family Name Records*, Takamure claims that she found the process by which the advent of patriarchy in ancient Japan concealed the matriarchal origin of ancient Japanese society. Arguably, one of Takamure's significant findings is the discovery of Japanese matriarchy's multi-ancestries phenomenon. Using *New Family Name Records* as evidence, Takamure argues that the phenomenon of multi-family names is the evidence of multi-ancestries (Nishikawa 1982, 139-44; Yamashita 1988, 158-65).³¹

³¹ Before Takamure, under the influence of Japanese mythology, the phenomenon of multi-family names was supposed to be a result of family branching, which was originally derived from the family of the Emperor. According to Takamure, out of 1,182 families more than 440 have multi-ancestries. When a daughter of a matriarchal family received a husband from a powerful family, her husband's family name is added on the top of the daughter's family name. This system is beneficial for both families. The social status of the daughter's family is improved. At the same time, the husband's family expands its influence over the daughter's family. This is why, Takamure argues, we find many multi-family names in ancient Japan. But, later, matriarchal society was replaced by Emperor-centered patriarchy and, subsequently, the daughter's family name was dropped. According to Takamure, the Records shows the struggle of the shift from matriarchy to patriarchy in Japanese history and supports the existence of matriarchy in ancient Japan (Takamure 1966 [1938]).

Takamure as an Ultra-nationalist

Research on the Matriarchal System inherited the nationalist attitudes of Takamure's preceding work, *Genesis of Love*, which shared theoretical foundations with the nation's ultra-nationalism. Takamure monolithically characterizes the modern as a product of male-dominated systems, and unfairly blames it as the cause of women's problems. For Takamure, patriarchy is an attribute of a Western society that is characterized by artificiality, homogeneity, knowledge, rationalism, capitalism and individualism, whereas matriarchy is a distinctive attribute of Japanese society that is characterized by *jinen*, diversity, affection, eastern agriculturalism, and communality. Therefore, according to Takamure, the conquest of the modern/West is the condition for gender equality (Takamure 1966 [1938]).³²

The reason why Takamure is in favor of the Japanese system is that “the lineages of different tribes and barbarians were all at once converted to that of the civilized tribe, thus replacing the slave system with the family system” (Takamure 1938, 637). Here, Takamure's triumph over the nation's family system and her reductionist categorization

³² Also, Takamure urges the creation of Japanese social science, induced from the materials found in Japan, as an alternative to the mere application of Western social science. However, despite her effort, *Research on the Matriarchal System* also indirectly relies on Western developments in the field of matriarchal studies including Johann Jakob Bachofen's *Das Mutterrecht* (1861), Lewis Henry Morgan's *Ancient Society* (1877) and Friedrich Engels' *The Origins of the Family, Private Property and the State* (1884).

In 1884, Ariga Nagao theorized the shift from matriarchy to patriarchy in ancient Japan, citing Morgan's work. In 1921, Ishikawa Sanshirō gave an interpretation of the Ama no Iwado Incident, a mythological episode, in which the authority of Amaterasu Ōmikami, the sun goddess of the imperial family, was attacked by Susanō no Mikoto, her brother, as a social revolution, in which matriarchy was replaced by patriarchy. Ishikawa saw a parallel between his case and Morgan's observation of the meeting of fifty Iroquois headmen of North America, where the shift from matriarchy to patriarchy was discussed. Also, in 1932, Watanabe Yoshimichi applied the theories by Morgan and Engels to his analysis of *thumatoi-kon*, in an attempt to locate Japanese history within the framework of world history. Takamure was familiar with their works (Nishikawa 1982, 133-4). Therefore, Takamure's research hypothesis is not

of colonial subjects as “barbarians” are explicitly observed. This is Takamura’s justification for the nation’s imperial colonization of neighboring nations in Asia.

Takamura continues, “Western civilization that is founded on the idea of the slave system is inferior to Japanese civilization that is founded on the idea of the family system” (Takamura 1938, 637).³³ Takamura’s dichotomous classification and juxtaposition of the slave system, which is an attribute of Western civilization, and the Japanese family system are comparable to the nation’s imperial government’s anticipated war between Western morality vs. Japanese morality.

Later, Takamura praises highly the Japanese emperor’s religion in the same context. For Takamura, Shintoism, which unites various ethnicities by marital relationships into one family, represents the ideal for the relief of human beings and the world’s greatest spirit. The familization of the world means the fusion and embracing of heterogeneous others by the spirit of harmony. Also, in 1943, Takamura wrote,

Japanese Shintoism pursues the position that regards blood as important and has stood up to liberate human beings from there with confidence and direction. Following the position, when it moves one step forward to unite the greater Eastern Asian tribes and, further, the sense of intimacy by blood has expanded to so-called world family, human beings will be saved. I think that the spirit of our country was built with the vision of this desirable future. Emperor Jimmu (BC660-BC585) advocated “Hakkō Ichiu (One World, One Family),” Emperor Takakura (1168-1180) “Shikai Ichiu (Four Seas, One Family)” and Emperor

free of Western influences. Takamura’s beliefs in the existence of matriarchy in ancient society and the shift from matriarchy to patriarchy are greatly influenced by Morgan and Engels’ view, though indirectly.

³³ Takamura also insists that the shift from matriarchy to patriarchy would not be possible without matriarchy’s contribution:

We also have to think about the sacrifice and support of matriarchy. All the matriarchy at that time was comprised of lower tribes, received patriarchy from outside, and always ruined themselves by embracing patriarchy. Of course, it was an inevitable consequence. But, because of that, we must bless the development of our country by support, rather than by fight...In our country, every tribe and naturalized individual, by the sacrifice and support of matriarchy, genealogically and legally together, became categorized into the Japanese Emperor or God lineage and, thus, was prompted to become one tribe. (Takamura 1966 [1938], 637-8)

Meiji (1868-1912) “Yomo no Umi Mina Harakara (Four Seas, All Brothers and Sisters).” They all are expressions of this spirit. (Takamure 1943; cited in Yamashita 1988, 178).

As World War II intensified, Takamure inevitably became one of the most influential war ideologues. *Research on the Matriarchal System* became the theoretical foundation for the support of Japanese anti-Western sentiments and ultra-nationalism, particularly, targeting Japanese women.

***Taoyame* as a Cultural Nationalist Version of “Good Wives, Wise Mothers”**

Toward the end of the war, Takamure’s focus shifted from matriarchy to holy war. In 1944, Takamure wrote an article titled “*Taoyame*,” which connotes “pliant women” in the *Tanka* poetry tradition, as opposed to *masurao*, which means “mannish women,” and further encouraged Japanese women to participate in the nation’s “holy war.” Takamure wrote,

Our “*taoyame*” live with the spirit of family, and eagerly hope for the familization of the world. But, our holy war is waged against those who obstruct our hope; it can be said that the war is positively women’s matter. There is a women’s will that encourages our children, husbands and brothers to fight until victory. During this current great holy war, we have stood up, not “although we are women,” but “because we are women.” We must not forget that this is the characteristic of Japanese women, who possess both tenderness and valiantness. (Takamure 1944; cited in Yamashita 1988, 177)

Takamure encourages Japanese women to contribute to the nation’s war efforts. But, she does not expect Japanese women to be equal to Japanese men. Instead, Takamure urges Japanese women to be “traditional” Japanese women, who are willing to receive foreign husbands for the development of the nation and to assist the spread of Japanese patriarchy to the world, like the courageous matriarchal women of ancient Japan. *Taoyame* is now defined as a Japanese cultural nationalist version of “Good Wives, Wise Mothers.”

Research on the Matriarchal System provides the same image of overly altruistic Japanese women. Takamure argued that the transition from matriarchy to patriarchy would never have been possible without the *self-sacrifice* of Japanese matriarchy. Also, according to Takamure, it is the *altruistic* nature of Japanese matriarchy that helped unite various ethnicities under Japanese family lineage. Takamure praises highly the Japanese women who warmly welcomed foreign husbands for the development of the nation. Without such an effort, Takamure continues, Japan would never have prospered as it did. Takamure concluded that the establishment of Japan as a family state had become possible only through the *contribution* of Japanese women.

Further, Takamure shows her support of Japanese patriarchy. In the conclusion chapter, Takamure says that the shift from matriarchy to patriarchy is an inevitable consequence, because matriarchy is a conservative exclusive social organization based on blood relationship, whereas patriarchy is a progressive inclusive social organization based on marital relationship (Takamure 1938, 637). The unification of Japan, according to Takamure, is a result of the development of patriarchy. Moreover, Takamure eulogizes the advent of patriarchy and says, “We are glad that the progressive attitude of Japanese patriarchy prompted marital relationship to so-called different tribes and barbarians, subdued them completely under its control, and unified the nation” (Takamure 1938, 637).

One hardly sees any differences between Takamure’s *taoyame* and the selfless roles of Japanese women assigned by Japanese traditional patriarchy. Like Hiratsuka’s *bosei* women and Fukuzawa’s “Good Wives and Wise Mothers,” *taoyame* exerts the same image of altruistic Japanese women, who devotedly yet quietly support their

husbands and children from behind, in order for the nation to succeed in the world. Needless to say, Takamure's effort, like Hiratsuka's and Fukuzawa's, does not help improve the conditions of Japanese women. On the contrary, by redefining the role of Japanese women in new terms, it only helps perpetuate unequal gender relations, including their traditional servitude roles.

Conclusion

Through this chapter, I examined the close relationship between Takamure's work and Japanese nationalism. Unlike Fukuzawa, Takamure wrote most of her representative works at a time when the meaning of the nation's nationalism was continually changing. My examination showed that Takamure's pre-war work well reflected the development of the nation's ultra-nationalism, specifically, from its adoption of *jinen* as an essence of the nation's culture to overcoming the West. Further, I showed how Takamure became *the* feminist war ideologue by providing a feminist justification for the nation's imperial expansionism toward the end of the World War II, for example, by advocating that Japanese patriarchy, which expanded its influence by marriage, was superior to Western patriarchy. Takamure's case exemplifies the intimate relationship between feminist discourse and nationalist ideology, in which feminist discourse is not only limited by but also subjected to changes in nationalist ideology.

Speaking of *bosei*, Takamure's contribution is her incorporation of religious elements to it. By incorporating *jinen*, Takamure substantiated the powerless conditions of Japanese women, and established the foundation of fatalistic mothers, who could do nothing but await a *jinen*'s spontaneous change. Also, by encouraging Japanese women's

participation into the nation's war efforts in Shinto terms, Takamure justified patriotic mothers, who would sacrifice their individual desires over national causes.

Unquestionably, religion is one of the most efficient ways to prescribe society's deepest values. It has been more than half a century since the end of World War II. Marilyn F. Nefsky aptly describes in *Stone Houses and Iron Bridges*, "The religion-cultural tradition of a people may be rectified, rearticulated, reformulated or manipulated; it may submerge and decline in power and meaning but it never dies completely" (Nefsky 1991, xvii). This is one of the reasons the Japanese feminist scholarship has come to fight a long battle against *bosei*-ism.

- CHAPTER 7 -

AOKI YAYOI'S ECOFEMINISM AND *NIHONJINRON*: A Rediscovery of *Bosei* and the Japanese Economic “Miracle”

Introduction

In the early 1980s Aoki Yayoi (1927-) appropriated Western ecofeminist ideas, and declared the foundation of Japanese ecofeminism. One of the main objectives of Western ecofeminism was to criticize patriarchal scientific and cultural systems. However, Aoki rarely used the feminist ideas to criticize Japanese patriarchy. Instead, she used ecofeminist ideas to recreate the ideology of Japanese women's “traditional” gender roles, particularly in championing Takamure Itsue's patriotic stand on maternity (*bosei*-ism).

Ueno Chizuko (1948-), one of the leading Japanese feminists, fiercely opposed Aoki's conservative return to the nation's historical past, and opened a heated public debate involving the whole of Japanese feminist scholarship. Later, the debate was named the “Ekofemi-Debate” or “Aoki-Ueno Debate,” and this is now considered one of the milestone events in Japanese feminist history (Sakurai 1990, 120-2; Sechiyama 1993, 32-5).

This chapter explores the theoretical formation of Aoki's ecofeminism. I will depart from the conventional view that regards Aoki's ecofeminism as an exclusively feminist phenomenon, for example, a conservative reactionary response to the further westernization of the nation's gender relations after the International Women's Year of 1975 (Ueno 1986, 86). Instead, I will situate Aoki's ecofeminism in the contexts of Japanese intellectual nationalism and co-optation of Western ideas.

Ecofeminism

Ecofeminism is an eclectic set of ideas. According to Karen Warren, “Ecological feminism has its root in the wide variety of feminisms” (Warren 1997).¹ Carolyn Merchant, sees four variants of ecofeminism: liberal, cultural, social, and socialist (Merchant 1980). Anti-colonial ecofeminism later emerged in an attempt to analyze Western capitalism, which imposes a hegemonic Western model of development or reason, in terms of its treatment of developing societies and the environment (Mies and Shiva 1993; Plumwood 1993).

One of the constants of all ecofeminist theories is the belief that the domination of nature is a feminist issue (Warren 1997). For example, when women protest nuclear waste, nuclear power plants, and pesticides as harmful to their children and living things, they are supported by ecofeminist ideas (Merchant 1992, 190-1).

Why are ecofeminists interested in the environment? Why do they regard the domination of nature as a feminist issue? Ecofeminists see that “nature has been feminized and women naturalized.” Therefore, they argue, in order to understand their respective oppressions, it is necessary to understand the ways in which women and nature are connected (Warren 1997). Further, Val Plumwood the author of *Feminism and the Mastery of Nature* sees similarities between androcentrism, eurocentrism and anthropocentrism, and aptly states a key ecofeminist position that “Western culture’s historical phases of ‘progress’ can be understood as phases of colonization of the various forms of ‘nature’ by ‘reason’” (Plumwood 1993).

¹ Rosemary Ruether and Mary Daly, for example, have communitarian socialist and radical feminist origins, respectively.

Western civilization is one of the main targets of ecofeminist criticism. For example, the “Ecofeminist Manifesto,” which was drafted in Sweden in 1980 by women from all over the world, advocates saving the earth from anti-natural, destructive Western civilization, which has been dominated by white men’s value systems. According to Ynestra King, who founded the Institute for Social Ecology in 1974 and helped spread ecofeminism in the United States:

The contemporary ecological crisis alone creates an imperative that feminists take seriously, but there are other reasons ecology is central to feminist philosophy and politics. The ecological crisis is related to the systems of hatred of all that is natural and female by the white, male western formulators of philosophy, technology, and death inventions. I contend that the systematic denigration of working-class people and people of color, women, and animals are all connected to the basic dualism that lies at the root of western civilization. (King 1989, 115)

King sees the ecological crisis and domination of some people by others, as features of Western civilization. The dualism King refers to is women = nature and men = culture. Ecofeminists advocate an ecological revolution based on nature-friendly feminine principles, as an alternative to Western civilization. Ecofeminists, particularly cultural ecofeminists, also believe that such a revolution would save both women and nature.

Another characteristic of ecofeminism is that, it is an activist movement, which can be “reproduced in different inflections and deployed in many different contexts” (Sturgeon 1997, 23). Noël Sturgeon, the author of *Ecofeminist Natures: Race, Gender, Feminist Theory and Political Action*, explains that “ecofeminists have been involved in environmental and feminist lobbying efforts... They have taken up a wide variety of issues, such as toxic waste, deforestation, military and nuclear weapon policies...” (Sturgeon 1997, 24). Ecofeminism represents a wide variety of pragmatic interests.

The Advent of Japanese Women's Studies and Aoki Yayoi's Ecofeminism

The International Women's Year of 1975 demanded that the Japanese government eliminate any form of discrimination against women. After the international petition, the Japanese government took certain actions to reduce the problem of gender discrimination (Fujieda & Fujimura-Fanselow 1995, 159-60; Tanaka 1995, 348). Joyce Gelb explains the Japanese feminist politics of "externality:"

Emerging international norms of gender equity and transnational feminist mobilization have been used by Japanese women's groups as a additional resource for their rights-based claims, creating a unique form of *kansetsu gaiatsu* (indirect external pressure) in an era of greater internationalization (*kokusaika*) with which to embarrass and challenge a reluctant Japanese government. (Gelb 2003, 4)

In November 1975, the Japanese government established the Headquarters for the Planning and Promotion of Policies Relating to Women (*Sourifu fujin-mondai kikaku-suishin-honbu*), in order to incorporate decisions made at the World Conference of the International Women's Year into national policy. Also, the Conference on Women's Problems for the International Women's Year (*Fujin-mondai kikaku-suishin-kaigi*), sponsored by the Japanese government, met in the same month (Tanaka 1995, 348).

With the Japanese government's endorsement, the women's movement in Japan began to gain social acceptance and political legitimacy (Tanaka 1995, 348). For example, following the launching of the National Women's Education Center (NWEC) (*Kokuritsu fujin-kyōiku kaikan*) by the Japanese government, many local governments established women's education centers (Tanaka 1995, 348). Japanese universities began to set up

Women's Studies programs (Fujieda & Fujimura-Fanselow 1995, 155-80). The Women's Studies Society of Japan (*Nihon josei-gaku kenkyū-kai*) was founded in 1979.

There are three main consequences of the advent of women's studies in Japan. First, Western feminist theories became increasingly available to a Japanese audience, and encouraged them to challenge traditional gender relations. An annual report by this NWEC represents one of the very few studies that have closely followed the development and the impact of Japanese women's studies at its inception. From the late 1970s to the early 1980s only a small number of institutions in Japan offered women's studies courses (Fujieda & Fujimura-Fanselow 1995, 161). In 1983 and 1984 about 7 and 9 percent, respectively, of the nation's over 1,000 universities and colleges offered women's studies courses (NWEC 1991 & 1994 in Fujieda & Fujimura-Fanselow 1995, 162). Mioko Fujieda and Kumiko Fujimura-Fanselow summarizes the impact of women's studies courses on women students: The courses have encouraged students to challenge the established, traditional image of sex roles and to provide a more realistic understanding of the nature of sexual discrimination that exists in contemporary society (Fujieda & Fujimura-Fanselow 1995, 165).

Second, the advent of Japanese women's studies and the threat of upcoming changes in Japanese gender relations resulted in a series of reactionary responses from conservatives. Ivan Illich's controversial anti-feminist works *Shadow Work* (1981) and *Gender* (1982) were introduced in translation to a Japanese audience in 1982 and 1984 respectively. Shinhyoron, a Tokyo-based conservative academic publisher, published the *Unplugging* series, which includes Aoki's *Universe of Feminism* (*Feminizumu no uchū*)

(1983) as well as *Economic Sex and Gender (Keizai sekkusu to jendā)* (1983)² edited by Yamamoto Tetsuji, and *Sex, Labor, and Turbulence of Marriage (Sekkusū, roudou, kekkon no funryū)* (1984) edited by Kabayama Kouichi and Yamamoto. Further, toward the enactment of the nation's first employment equality law in 1985 Hasegawa Michiyo, an influential Japanese conservative woman philosopher, wrote an essay "The Equal Employment Opportunity Law Destroys Cultural Ecology" (*Danjo-koyou-byoudou-hou ha bunka no seitai-kei wo hakaisuru*) for the journal *Chūoukouron* in 1984.

Soon, older, "academic feminists" moved to center stage (Buckley 1994, 172-83), and took over the Japanese women's movement. Whereas the first generation of the Japanese women's liberation movement (*wūman ribu*), born in the early 1970s, was often the target of media derision, the later Japanese women's movement or Japanese women's studies was treated with more respect. Needless to say, the radicalism of the earlier movement had largely disappeared. In contrast, Japanese women's studies operated conservatively within the traditional women categories: maternity, domesticity, and "women's work" (Fujieda & Fujimura-Fanselow 1995, 155-80).

Aoki is an upper-class intellectual who took advantage of the new women's movement. By the mid-1970s, Aoki had already earned a reputation as a freelance writer and social critic.³ In the early 1980s, Aoki began researching and writing on feminist issues. Sandra Buckley, the author of *Broken Silence: Voices of Japanese Feminism* (1997), describes Aoki as

² This volume includes Illich's "Vernacular Gender" (1981).

³ Aoki has various scholarly interests, including the rights of indigenous peoples, especially of the Hopi of the southwestern United States (Buckley 1997, 1).

one of the most widely known feminists in Japan. She has published extensively on topics ranging from the cultural construction of sexuality to abortion rights, new reproductive technologies, women in workforce, teenage sexuality, and women and the arts. She is in high demand as a public speaker on women's issues and as a university guest lecturer. (Buckley 1997, 1)

Aoki's publications of the early 1980s include: *The Universe of Feminism* (1983), *Women: A Myth of Gender* (1982), and *War and Women: An Antiwar Primer Based in Women's Logic* (1982)

In *The Universe of Feminism*, Aoki unambiguously declared her ecofeminist principles, and blamed modernism for all contemporary social problems. Aoki characterized modernism as the triumph of the masculine principle of the existing economy-centered power structures over the feminine principle. As a consequence of such a gender imbalance, Aoki argues, contemporary societies lack the sensitivity to care about nature and continue to destroy it. At the same time, those societies alienate women, whose reproductive functions place them closer to nature than men. In order to solve modern problems, Aoki calls for a reinstatement of the feminine principle (Aoki 1983 & 1986).

The *Ekofemi*-Debate and *Bosei*-ism

In the mid-1980s, Aoki engaged in a public debate with another Japanese feminist, Ueno Chizuko, in a confrontation that later became known as the "*Ekofemi*-Debate" or "Aoki-Ueno Debate." Ueno accused Aoki of manipulating an ecofeminist theoretical framework to promote a conservative notion of the "feminine principle," which Ueno and her supporters viewed as a risky, problematic essentialist move even if it was a strategy to undermine patriarchal institutions (Buckley 1997, 2; Sakurai 1990, 120-2; Sechiyama

1993, 32-5). In “Can Women Save the World?” Ueno attacked Aoki’s ecofeminism, saying that it was an expression of anti-modern reductionism. Ueno also pointed out that a reinstatement of the feminine principle had the potential to justify *bosei*-ism, the nationalist stance on maternity (Ueno 1986 [1984], 117-61).

Ueno’s criticism was not successful: her criticism was primarily focused on Ivan Illich’s nostalgic exaltation of the sexual division of labor in prehistorical society, which Aoki mentioned only in passing.⁴ Thus, her criticism of Aoki’s ecofeminism and ecofeminism in general, was misdirected. The association that Ueno and Japanese feminist scholars drew between Illich’s work and ecofeminism has contributed to the creation of extreme essentialist images of ecofeminism in Japan (Buckley 1997, 2-3; Sakurai 1990, 126-32; Sechiyama 1993, 33-4). For example, Ueno transformed Illich’s work and ecofeminism into metaphors of anti-modernization, and disparaged both as expressions of conservatism (Ueno 1986, 117-161).

The price paid for this misunderstanding was high. Ecofeminism might have become a theoretical foundation for critiques of Japan’s over-industrialization and its unfettered economic expansionism. In the 1970s and 1980s, Japanese economic imperialism had already begun to exploit the labor and the sexuality of South East Asian women and girls. In May 1985, the Women’s Studies Society of Japan convened a symposium, “Where Feminism is Going—The Feminine Principle and Ecology”

⁴ Contrary to Ueno’s criticism, Aoki referred to “the recovery of femininity in each individual” and assumed that the feminine principle can be found in men and women, but is not the essential characteristic of women. Very few ecofeminists cite Illich’s work. It is hard to claim that Illich’s idea is central to ecofeminism.

(*Feminizumu ha doko he yuku—josei-genri to ekoroji*), to put an end to the debate (Women's Studies Society of Japan 1985).

The feminist scholars Sakurai Yūko and Sechiyama Kaku see the “ecology boom” of the early 1980s as a reason for the rise of Japanese ecofeminism. Sakurai explains that since the “Oil Shock” of 1973, Japanese feminism has been closely related to the ecology movement. The Japanese women’s liberation movement of the 1970s was already interested in environmental problems. Tanaka Kazuko, author of “The New Feminist Movement in Japan, 1970-1990” explains that the Japanese Women’s liberation movement was critical of an “uncritical positive evaluation of science and technology, especially the prevailing logic of productivity” (Tanaka 1995, 346). Environmental activists

sought to challenge this prevailing cultural frame of mind, oriented toward creating high commercial demand and at the same time promoting discrimination against the less productive—the cultural mind-set that produced such environmental destruction and human tragedies as Minamata. (Tanaka 1995, 346)

“Minamata” is the name of the neurological disorder caused by the ingestion of mercury from fish that had been caught in Minamata Bay.⁵ The Seikatsu Club was a grassroots environmental group that formed as a response to the outbreak of Minamata disease. Mothers comprised the majority of the group’s membership (Ekins 1992, 131-4; Mies 1993, 259-62).⁶ Ehara Yumiko, a critic of Aoki’s ecofeminism, believes that the Seikatsu Club recruited Japanese women who were involved in environmental issues, and suggests

⁵ Joyce Gelb and Margarita Estevez-Abe argue that “the very first issue around which the movement mobilized housewives was contaminated milk,” citing Satō Yoshiyuki’s *Joseitachi no sseikatsusha undō* [Seikatsusha Movement by Women] (1995) (Gelb and Estevez-Abe 1998, 270).

⁶ Maria Mies says that the Seikatsu Club is an example of consumer liberation movement that was “started from women’s concerns and experiences,” and “is quite different from the petty NIMBYism (not in my backyard) of self-interested, atomized individuals (Mies 1993, 261-2).

that ecofeminist thought represents the “latent majority” of Japanese feminists (Ehara 1985, 15).

However, despite evidence of a partnership of feminism and environmentalism, Aoki was the only Japanese feminist who openly identified with ecofeminism. The participation of many feminists in the debate did not build any sort of consensus favoring Aoki’s ideas (Sakurai 1990, 122; Sechiyama 1993, 34). Nor were there new published works on ecofeminism after the mid-1980s, except a Japanese translation of *Breaking the Boundaries: Toward a Feminist Green Socialism* (1992) by Mary Mellor in 1993 (Sechiyama 1993, 34). After the *Ekofemi-Debate*, ecofeminism disappeared from the Japanese feminist scene (Sakurai 1990, 121-2; Sechiyama 1993, 34).

Needless to say, the debate suggests an additional problem. As I explained in Chapter 3, the debate shows that *bosei* remains one of the most contentious issues within Japanese feminism (Buckley 1994, 181). Through the nation’s modern history, the ideology of *bosei* has been repeatedly reinvented and reinforced with various Western ideas. In the early 1980s the debate “essentially led the [Japanese] feminist movement back full cycle, yet again, to the ‘motherhood debate’” (Buckley 1994, 181).

Nihonjinron

In the 1970s and 1980s, Japanese intellectuals devoted their expertise to theorizing about the unique nature of Japanese culture (Yoshino 1992; Mouer & Sugimoto 1986; Dale 1986; Kawamura, 1982; Befu 1980 & 1987). These theories are collectively called *nihonjinron*—literally, theories of the Japanese people—and are characterized by an emphasis on the “group model” (Sugimoto & Mouer 1982 & 1986; Dale 1986;

Kawamura 1982; Befu 1980 & 1987). Also, *nihonjinron* scholars contended that the uniqueness of Japanese culture was the secret of the country's economic success. *Nihonjinron* implicitly expresses cultural nationalism and triumph (Yoshino 1992).

Two of the leading proponents of *Nihonjinron* were Nakane Chie, a cultural anthropologist, and Doi Takeo, a Freudian psychologist. Nakane described the vertical structure of Japanese society (Nakane 1970). Doi wrote about self-indulgence (*amae*) as a core element of Japanese interpersonal relations (Doi 1971). According to Yoshino Kosaku, the author of *Cultural Nationalism in Contemporary Japan*, "Nakane's social structure theory has been supplemented by Doi's psychological theory, thereby constituting the two pillars of the 'group model'" (Yoshino 1992, 19).

Two critics of *nihonjinron*, Yoshino and Befu Harumi ascribed the resurgence of Japanese nationalism to two factors: the country's global economic success (Yoshino 1992) and a resistance to further westernization (Befu 1980).⁷ While Befu and Yoshino focus on the structure that gave rise to Japan's nationalism, Peter Dale points to the motives of these theorists (Dale 1986, 14). According to Dale, these theories appeared in the wake of the competition for the *nihonjinron* market, in which, for example, theories of Japanese culture became commodities. Theorists overstated the conservative elements of Japanese culture, in order to be successful in the *nihonjinron* industry. Therefore, *nihonjinron* is the "commercialised expression" of modern Japanese nationalism (Dale

⁷ As many theorists agree, nationalism is: (1) a consequence of modernization or westernization in non-Western nations (Gellner 1964; Nairn 1977; Hobsbawm 1983; Anderson 1991; Smith 1981); and (2) the result of an "uneven diffusion" of industrialization (Gellner 1964) or an "uneven development" of capitalism (Nairn 1977). In this theoretical framework, the changes that seized the East prompted them to define themselves in relation to the West. In Ernest Gellner's words, the development of intellectual nationalism is a "response" (1964) to the forces of modernization or westernization.

1986, 14). This theoretical formulation of Dale coincides with Thomas Nairn's insight into the "material interests" of intellectuals, which contributed to the development of populist nationalism (Nairn 1977).⁸

Befu, like Dale, notices that *nihonjinron* publications have become "mass consumption goods" in Japan (Befu 1987, 54-67). Befu contends that, unlike "ivory tower" scholarship, *nihonjinron* publications are not an exchange of scholarly opinions. For example, *nihonjinron* publications usually lack a literature review (Befu 1987, 56). Rather, the methodology that *nihonjinron* scholars adopt is colloquially known as "SPQR" (small profits and quick returns). Ross Mouer and Sugimoto Yoshio outlined some of the methodological problems of *nihonjinron*. According to Mouer and Sugimoto, some conspicuous methodological limitations of *nihonjinron* are: (1) a lack of rigorous, systematic sampling methods, and reliance upon anecdotal evidence; (2) an absence of operational definitions for research concepts, which often, invite linguistic reductionism and tautologies at a theoretical level (Mouer & Sugimoto 1986, 129-155).

Tessa Morris-Suzuki offers an analysis of the "re-invention" of Japanese gender relations within the framework of *nihonjinron*. According to Morris-Suzuki, *nihonjinron* is characterized by its "strong overtones of 'Japan as male'" and "profoundly gender biased" (Morris-Suzuki 1998, 127-130).

Nihonjinron scholars have been criticized for their cultural and conservative biases (Sugimoto 1997; Mouer & Sugimoto 1986; Kawamura 1983). Mouer and Sugimoto argue that the "consensus model" or "group model" explanations of the success of Japanese society benefit only the ruling establishment (Sugimoto 1997; Sugimoto &

⁸ This position is similar to Pierre Bourdieu's theory of cultural capital (Bourdieu 1973).

Mouer 1986). Kawamura Nozomu, along with Dale and Befu add that *nihonjinron*, which neglects classes, merely reflects the dominant ideology (Befu 1987; Dale 1986; Kawamura 1982).

Although *nihonjinron* critics correctly pointed out some of the key structural factors that gave rise to *nihonjinron* nationalism, the motives of *nihonjinron* intellectuals, and conservative biases inherent in *nihonjinron*, very few have paid sufficient attention to the fact that Japanese feminist intellectuals were also subject to these conditions and possibly participated in *nihonjinron* cultural nationalism by helping re-invent Japanese “traditional” gender relations. Also, though often overlooked, a *nihonjinron* theory typically co-opts a core Western theoretical framework and defines Japanese culture in terms of it (Sakai 1997, 72-116). The significance of the transfer of Western ideas has not been taken into consideration by *nihonjinron* critics. Nor has it been sufficiently explored.

In the following section, I will demonstrate how Aoki compares Western feminism with Japanese feminism. Here, I will show how Aoki reinterpreted Western theories. I will also discuss the difficulties with Aoki’s use of the theories of Norbert Elias, Herbert Marcuse, and Lévi-Strauss. In the conclusion, I will illustrate the similarities between Japanese ecofeminism and *nihonjinron*.

Aoki’s Ecofeminism as “Japanese Feminism”

In 1986, Aoki published *Feminism and Ecology*, a collection of essays.⁹ One of the characteristics of this collection is that theoretical discussion of ecofeminism is minimal,

⁹Aoki’s *Feminism and Ecology* (1986) contains the following articles: “The Reinstatement of Sensitivity and Physicality” (*Kansei to shintaisei no fukken no tameni*) (1983), “The Feminine Principle and Ecology” (*Josei genri to ekoroji*) (January 1985), “The Future of Feminism” (*Feminizumu no mirai*) (April 1985), “Feminism and A View of Civilization” (*Feminizumu to bunmeikan*) (1985), “History and

and Aoki relies upon the key concepts of ecofeminism, such as the “feminine principle.” Well-known ecofeminists, such as Françoise d’Eaubonne and Susan Griffin, are barely mentioned. Aoki does not situate herself in the theoretical literature, or identify her own political distinctiveness.

Instead, Aoki makes a conspicuous effort to identify ecofeminism as Japanese feminism and with Takamura’s *bosei*-ism. Aoki regards Takamura’s *Women’s History* (1954) as one of the most significant contributions to the field of Japanese women’s history, comparable to Simone de Beauvoir’s *Second Sex* in 1949. Comparing Takamura to de Beauvoir, Aoki points out “the problem of previous women’s history”:

The decisive difference [between de Beauvoir and Takamura] is that the former regards the female reproductive function negatively as ‘female humiliation,’ whereas the latter praises it highly as ‘maternity.’ Moreover, Takamura’s thesis that women’s problem cannot be solved without consideration of ‘maternity’ has not lost its great influence up to the present. I too am one who supports the direction [of Takamura]. (Aoki 1986, 35-6)

Aoki then explains her reasons for supporting Takamura:

The position that treats childbearing as a humiliation denies ‘nature’ within human beings and, simultaneously, obscures the fact that [human beings] including men are evaluated solely with regard to efficiency and are alienated from their total human existence in contemporary industrial society. Indeed, de Beauvoir meticulously demonstrates and provides insights into ‘what it means to be a woman for human beings’ in contemporary society. But the meaning of ‘being a woman’ is limited to contemporary European women, and historical as well as ethno-historical perspectives that could show how the meaning changes in different historical and regional cases are not much.

That is why women often try to discard their physical and psychological handicaps, which are caused by their devotion to reproduction = nature, and to become imitators of men who are advantaged in contemporary society. But it is not true that in history, or in every society on earth, ‘being a woman’ is always coded negatively. In this matter, Takamura’s research is very different [from de

Women” (*Rekishu to josei*) (February 1983) and “What Sexual Liberation is” (*Sei no kaihou to ha nanika*) (1984). My examination of Aoki’s work is focused on these articles, which represent her ecofeminist thought. In fact, beside these articles, there are very few ecofeminist writings by Aoki.

Beauvoir's], because it tries to find women's identity not in men but in matriarchal society in a historical past. (Aoki 1986, 36)

Takamure's research on matriarchal society in prehistoric Japan is highly praised as an alternative to "Western" feminism.¹⁰

Aoki's Criticism of American Feminism

In Aoki's ecofeminism, many Western feminist perspectives are reduced to liberal feminism. Aoki calls "modernist" feminism the antithesis to ecofeminism. When she uses "modern," Aoki implies "Western." Thus, Aoki's criticism of liberal feminism manifests her anti-Western stance. Throughout *Feminism and Ecology* Aoki cites Simone de Beauvoir and Shulamith Firestone as exponents of "modernist" feminism. In "The Future of Feminism" Aoki's understanding of de Beauvoir's *Second Sex* seems well presented:

Of course, the theme of de Beauvoir, who is well known for her phrase 'One is not born, but rather becomes, a woman' states clearly that women's problem is a product of culture. Considering that hitherto academic disciplines from philosophy to psychology had been dominated by popular biological determinism, this is an epoch-making event. Even I do not intend to undervalue its significance.

But, a blind alley of fatalism opens, which begins with the assumption of 'reproductive sex' as the 'humiliation of the female sex' and concludes that 'the decline of the value of women is an inevitable consequence of human history,' in which only 'human males' take the side of 'molding the future' in the process of 'the conquest of nature'...(Aoki 1986, 215-6)

Aoki then introduces Firestone as one of the representative figures of radical feminism, who inherited de Beauvoir's negative evaluation of the female sex:

Since the 1960s, so-called radical feminists have made various efforts to bypass the blind alley while inheriting and developing de Beauvoir's [work]. One of the representative figures is Shulamith Firestone. In her *The Dialectics of Sex* (1970),

¹⁰ Aoki does not acknowledge that Takamure's search for prehistorical matriarchal society in Japan was built upon previous Western research, such as Lewis H. Morgan's *Ancient Society*. Progressivism is the only problem Aoki finds in Takamure's new *bosei*-ism. Aoki argues that it was inevitable that Takamure believed in the evolution of social relations, because all her contemporaries did so (Aoki 1986, 48).

she on one hand advocates the development of the test-tube-baby and the artificial uterus, in order to emancipate women from the ‘humiliation of the female sex (= ‘savage pregnancy’). [On the other hand Firestone] recommends the removal of sexual taboos between adult and child and between mother and son, in order to realize sexual liberation. (Aoki 1986, 216)

Because of the extremism of Firestone’s position, Aoki rejects both de Beauvoir and Firestone altogether:

In case of American theorists of women’s emancipation up to the 1970s, especially Firestone, there is a logic with which I hardly agree. That is her way of thinking that female reproductive function is the ‘humiliation of the female sex’ and that ‘pregnancy is savage.’ This has been a theme since de Beauvoir’s *Second Sex*. I have been thinking that this way leads to the destruction of humanity not to the emancipation of women. (Aoki 1986, 160)

It is highly probable that by “American theorists of women’s emancipation up to the 1970s,” Aoki includes the antecedents of 1980s ecofeminism. Some of the extreme expressions in Firestone’s *Dialectics of Sex* are presented and her position is exaggerated. Moreover, Firestone’s work is treated as a conventional feminist work and is over-generalized to criticize all variants of American feminism.

Aoki also offers other criticisms of American feminism, citing Betty Friedan’s and the National Organization for Women’s support for women’s combat participation in the Gulf War of 1991: “Friedan’s position on the Gulf War, too, for me, merely reconfirms her logical consistency since the 1960s.” Aoki continues,

Because it considers modernization as the only way to emancipate women, modernist feminism has excluded consideration of the structures of discrimination and violence that modern society (= industrial society) connotes. There, women, who are ‘late-comer modernists,’ need only to catch up in order to ‘receive the benefits of modernity’ equally with men. Therefore, if it is for the military or nuclear power plant, it is an inevitable consequence that to open types of occupation and positions that have been predominantly occupied by men to women has become the strategic goal of ‘the equality of men and women.’ (Aoki 1994, ii)

Aoki equates modernist feminism with liberal feminism and with American feminism.

An Anti-Western Intellectual Who Uses Western Social Theories

As we have seen, an anti-Western and anti-U.S. tone characterizes Aoki's work.

Interestingly, Aoki supports her stance by citing well-known works of European social theory, which are rarely discussed in Western ecofeminist writings. Such works include *The Civilizing Process* (1978 [1939]) by Norbert Elias, *The Savage Mind* (1966 [1962]) by Claude Lévi-Strauss, and *Eros and Civilization* (1955) by Herbert Marcuse.¹¹ They are frequently discussed in her writings and provide some of her theoretical foundations. But, Aoki hardly ever explores these theories, in order to ground herself theoretically. Instead, Aoki uses some of their concepts as a means, without considering their contexts, to justify her anti-Western and anti-U.S. stance.

Western Civilization as the Cause of "Civilizational Difficulties:" Aoki's Manipulation of The Civilizing Process by Norbert Elias

In "The Feminine Principle and Ecology" Aoki says,

Because so-called modern society developed centered in Western Europe, non-Western European societies and cultures have been treated negatively as pre-modern or primitive (= uncivilized).

But, what is now happening in the societies that have been 'civilized' by such values? Even excluding the threat of nuclear war for the moment, environmental pollution that threatens human existence and various subsequent social pathologies are at work. For those who look this situation in the face, Norbert Elias's view that 'civilizing' engenders 'civilizational difficulties' sounds uncannily realistic. (Aoki 1986, 198)

Aoki's use of 'civilizational difficulties' in this context is a misuse of Elias' concept.

Although Aoki talks as if Elias is concerned with environmental pollution, it is hard to say that Elias was interested in ecology, and he never discusses environmental pollution.

¹¹ Aoki's exclusive use of European social theories suggests that her position is more anti-U.S. than anti-western.

Rather, the “civilizational difficulties” Elias explains are psychosocial factors of “civilized” society. As a sociologist, Elias was interested in finding a solution to one of the central dilemmas of contemporary sociology, the “apparent oppositions between action and structure, individual and society” (van Kriekon 1998, 3). The “civilizational difficulties” that Elias refers to are the results of the increasing demands for individual self-control within the civilizing process.

Aoki’s citation implies that Elias would agree with her anti-Western civilization stance and that “the fall of the feminine principle” is one of the civilizational difficulties. Elias discusses problems of Western civilization, but this does not mean that Elias prefers uncivilized to civilized society. Nor, does it mean that Elias longs for non-Western civilization as an alternative to Western civilization. Moreover, Elias does not discuss “the fall of the feminine principle” as a problem of the civilizing process, or of “civilizational difficulties.” Elias’ understanding of the relation between gender relations and civilization is stated in his “Changes in Attitude Toward Relations Between the Sexes.”

There is a liberation from one form of constraint that is oppressive or intolerable to another which is less burdensome. Thus the civilizing process, despite the transformation and increased constraint that it imposes on the emotions, goes hand in hand with liberations of the most diverse kinds. The form of marriage at the absolutist courts, symbolized by the same arrangement of living rooms and bedrooms for men and women in the mansions of the court aristocracy, is one of many examples of this. The woman was more free from external constraints than in feudal society. (Elias 1978 [1939], 185)

Contrary to Aoki’s belief, Elias indeed argues that women have become more liberated as a result of civilization. The “civilizational difficulties” Elias explains are psychological. Elias continues,

But the inner constraints which she had to impose on herself in accordance with the form of integration and the code of behavior of court society, and which stemmed from the same structural features of this society as her 'liberation,' had increased for women as for men in comparison to chivalrous society. (Elias 1978 [1939], 185)

In sum, Elias argues that the social structure that helped liberate women simultaneously gave them psychological "constraints" that is, "civilizational difficulties."¹²

Herbert Marcuse as Opponent of Logos-centered Western Civilization

According to Aoki, Marcuse offers an analysis of Western civilization's repression of Eros. In "The Future of Feminism" Aoki introduces Marcuse's work and says,

Of course, in Japan, although society has been modernized regardless of whether that is a good thing or not, there are many cases of gender discrimination because of the gap between [technological] modernization and the rest, including work facilities, legal measures and, especially, people's consciousness. In order to correct women's human rights violations and gender inequality, we must push for approaching and correcting them as strains of [technology-centered] modernization, rather than achieving the completion of modernization.

But, fundamentally, it is necessary to convert the way of thinking for which colonization and exploitation of the socially weak is an inevitable consequence of civilization. This is evidenced by the fact that there is no nation that has achieved modernization without colonial rule and exploitation of base labor. Moreover, this structure of exploitation has been transformed into the North-South problem of the present. Herbert Marcuse has attempted to analyze its background. (Aoki 1986, 229)

According to Aoki, Marcuse analyzes the causes of modernization problems. Aoki continues,

The cause is that the idea of logos = reason that has been consistently respected in Western European thought has repressed Eros, the life instinct (= internal nature). That is, the idea of logos = reason, that originally meant to order, categorize and rule, has become connected to technological rationality, and has engendered the thought that only "the power to dominate nature" coincides with

¹² Further, theoretically speaking, Elias's civilizing process is an attempt to historicize Freudian psychoanalysis, particularly Freud's *Civilization and its Discontents* (Elias 1978 [1938], 190), but not to refute the benefits of civilization altogether, as Aoki claims.

civilization. [Marcuse] raises the process which this thought permeates to the individual conscious level.

There, for the self, nature (= internal instinct and external environment) becomes a target to conquer. In this way, the self that has taken the role of fighting against and conquering nature has become essentially aggressive. Its ideas and behavior stand against the object and aim at conquering it. And, [according to Marcuse], this has become a precondition for self-preservation and development. (Aoki 1986, 229-30)

Aoki argues as if gender inequality in Japan and the North-South problem are caused by Western civilization. The solution to both problems is the reinstatement of “Eros-centered civilization:”

But, now, human beings, not only women but also men, must escape from ‘logos-centered civilization’...and bring back ‘Eros-centered civilization,’ which fills our intellect with sensibility, intuition and physicality. And, that is ‘the direction of reading the things that are offered by the environment and the world’ and ‘forming a friendly intimate relation between the environment and objects, and us.’ (Aoki 1986, 231)

Although Aoki uses quotation marks, the sources are not stated. It is questionable whether the quotes come from Marcuse’s work.

Contrary to Aoki’s belief, it is not Marcuse but Sigmund Freud who believed in the inherently antagonistic relationship between innate human drives and civilization. One of the main theses of *Civilization and Its Discontents* is that the development of civilization is linked to the renunciation of innate human drives, including the sexual. However, unlike Aoki, Freud does not see a utopia in pre-civilized society. In contrast, Freud believes that in pre-civilized societies most human activities are governed by the forces of nature. In pre-civilized societies, human beings enjoy neither their individual liberty nor their instinctual drives.

Nor does Marcuse believe in a return to a pre-civilized past. Marcuse’s purpose in *Eros and Civilization* is to refute Freud’s thesis of the inherent antagonism between

innate human drives and civilization. Marcuse argues that renunciation, and particularly repression, of primary drives need not be a precondition for the development of civilization. Like Elias, Marcuse tries to historicize Freudian psychoanalysis. Marcuse believes that dominant social relations, which require the renunciation of primary human drives, are historically specific and, therefore, changeable. Marcuse projects the development of civilization with no renunciation of primary human drives.¹³

A Quasi-linguistic Refutation of Civilization as the Cause of Gender Inequality: Aoki's Manipulation of Claude Lévi-Strauss' Work

Lévi-Strauss's works are used to denounce civilization. In "History and Women," Aoki claims that, for Lévi-Strauss,

the emergence of letters, although it helped enlighten people and correctly transmit acquired knowledge, does not function to improve human life conditions decisively. Rather, letters help disperse the ruler's will thoroughly, and make the centralization of power by law possible. (Aoki 1986, 27)¹⁴

Lévi-Strauss might have made such a statement, but Aoki uses this citation only to question whether or not literacy improves human life. Aoki compares the gendered third-person pronouns in European languages to their neutral counterparts in Navajo, Hopi and Japanese:

Interestingly, in European languages the pronoun that designates a human has a gender, he and she. But, as for the Navajo and Hopi North American Indian tribes there is no gender. In traditional Japanese a human is *hito* for both man and woman. (Aoki 1986, 28)

Here Aoki seems to be arguing that sexual domination is connected to the linguistic characteristics of European languages.

¹³ Although Aoki cites *Eros and Civilization* as if he did, Marcuse in fact does not advocate the reinstatement of Eros in civilization. Rather, it is more correct to say that Marcuse advocates the reinstatement of Eros in psychoanalysis (Marcuse 1955, 5).

¹⁴ Aoki does not cite the source of Lévi-Strauss' citation.

Aoki also uses Lévi-Strauss's work to make an anti-Western statement. In "Feminism and A View of Civilization" and "The Feminine Principle and Ecology" Lévi-Strauss's works are used to criticize Western civilization's understanding of nature. Aoki explains Western civilization's lack of "respect for life" as follows:

When we see non-Western societies as a whole, what is decisively different from our society? ... We can observe its concrete manifestation in the relation between humans and nature. About so-called pre-civilized societies, Claude Lévi-Strauss spoke in a talk as follows:

'... The essential difference between these [pre-civilized] societies and our present society is that in these societies there is an extremely great respect for life as a whole, including animal life and plant life, incomparable to our society.' (Aoki 1986, 60; Lévi-Strauss 1975)

In "The Feminine Principle and Ecology," referring to the "savage mind," Aoki describes the relationship between humans and nature in pre-civilized societies:

In pre-civilized societies where reverence for nature has not been lost, [humans] keenly sharpen their sensitivity by incessant contact with nature and maintain the ability to activate the 'savage mind,' while feeling the universe through their bodies. In such societies cosmic sexes (gender) can give a balance between both sexes, by preserving the meanings of biological sexual differences and social sexual differences that define actual gender relations. (Aoki 1986, 201)

Although its relevance to Lévi-Strauss' "savage mind" is questionable, Aoki chooses to make her point by referring to Lévi-Strauss' concept.

There is some ambiguity surrounding Aoki's understanding of the "savage mind." First, Lévi-Strauss was not interested in either finding or defining cultural differences between so-called pre-civilized societies and Western societies. Nor, was he content to see people of pre-civilized societies as exotic Others. On the contrary, Lévi-Strauss objected to such tendencies, then prevalent among anthropologists (Hénaff 1998, 112).

Marcel Hénaff, the author of *Claude Lévi-Strauss and the Making of Structural Anthropology* (1998), explains Lévi-Strauss's contribution to anthropology as follows.

“What he attempts to reach is a level of thought logically prior to the distinction between rational and irrational, between savage and domesticated, between natural and cultural (Hénaff 1998, 112). For Lévi-Strauss “ethnology is first of all psychology” (Lévi-Strauss 1962, 131). One of the Lévi-Strauss’ objectives was to investigate the “fundamental properties” of the mind, which are common across cultures. Thus, unlike Aoki’s usage, the “savage mind” Lévi-Strauss is interested in is more likely the “fundamental properties” of the mind.

Conclusion

Aoki’s Ecofeminism as *Nihonjinron*: Convergences

Although Aoki’s feminist writings have not yet been analyzed in terms of Japanese intellectual nationalism, there are, in fact, important parallels between *nihonjinron* and Aoki’s work.

First, like *nihonjinron*, Aoki’s assertions that Japanese *bosei*-ism is a precursor of Western ecofeminism and that the Japanese holistic conception of nature is *the* alternative to the Western objectification of nature express national triumph and cultural nationalism. Aoki exploits Western social and feminist theories, to justify her conservative political stance. In particular, Aoki bases her nationalistic stance on Japanese gender relations in the guise of ecofeminism.

Second, Aoki’s evocation of Japanese feminist history by reviving Takamure’s *bosei*-ism must be understood in this context. Aoki deliberately refers to Takamure whose new *bosei*-ism provided a theoretical justification for the nation’s anti-Western

imperial expansionism, in order to appeal to the nation's conservative right, which used economic nationalism to rehabilitate itself.

Third, Aoki's ecofeminism is characterized by its methodological weakness, like *nihonjinron*. Aoki's citation of Western theorists was not only strategically problematic but also erroneous: She misreads several Western theories so that they support Takamura's new *bosei*-ism. Also, Aoki's ecofeminism lacks a literature review and Aoki fails to introduce and locate her theoretical position in the field.

Divergences between Aoki's Ecofeminism and *Nihonjinron*

However, Aoki's ecofeminism and *nihonjinron* differ in several respects. First, Aoki's anti-Western and anti-U.S. position is not shared with *nihonjinron*. *Nihonjinron* gained popularity in the 1970s as a response to the international curiosity about the secrets of Japanese economic success. Two notable exponents of *nihonjinron*, Nakane's *Japanese Society* and Doi's *Anatomy of Dependence*, were published in 1970 and 1971, respectively. The focus of *nihonjinron* is to explain the cultural factors that have contributed to Japan's success, for example, the Japanese management style (Yoshino 1992).

In contrast, Aoki's major works *Feminism's Universe* and *Feminism and Ecology* were published in 1983 and 1986, respectively. These years witnessed Japan's growing international trade surpluses and subsequent trade disputes with the U.S. Japan's exports began to exceed its imports in 1981 and the Japanese trade surplus reached its peak in 1986.¹⁵ The U.S. accused Japan of unfair trade and business practices and demanded that

¹⁵ Japan's international trade surplus was 8.7 billion US dollars in 1981 and peaked in 1986 at 82.7 billion.

Japan eliminate its trade barriers. The Japanese believed that their economic success was a result of their superior products and that the criticism was unfounded. As a consequence, anti-U.S. sentiments spread among the Japanese and reached their highest level since World War II.

Second, compared to *nihonjinron*, Aoki's ecofeminism is characterized by its reliance on Western social theories. Aoki borrows from Western theories to accommodate the beliefs of educated readers who are already familiar with those theories. In order to strengthen her position, Aoki turns Western theories against Western civilization. However, Aoki's frequently distorts Western theories. Her citations are often partial and reductionist. In this regard, it seems reasonable to conclude that Aoki used Western theories and positions as a means to theoretically substantiate her anti-Western nationalism.

- CHAPTER 8 -

**UENO CHIZUKO'S MARXIST FEMINISM AND
POSTINDUSTRIAL JAPAN: The Commercialization of
Feminism and *Bosei***

Introduction

In the mid-1980s the Japanese feminist scene was unusually agitated by a debate about Aoki Yayohi's ecofeminism.¹ One of Aoki's key opponents was Ueno Chizuko (1948-). Ueno, then Assistant Professor of Sociology at a community college in Kyoto, skillfully publicized her criticism, and made her way into Japanese mainstream feminist academia. Since then, Ueno has written prolifically for a wide range of Japanese feminist readers, while occasionally making a conspicuous remark for a heated public feminist debate.² Ueno's doings typically drew media attention. By the late 1980s, Ueno had attained a celebrity feminist status, and was considered to be one of the leading feminists in Japan. Sandra Buckley, the author of *Broken Silence: Voices of Japanese Feminism* (1997), describes, Ueno is "probably the most internationally well known Japan's feminist...Her work and career have received continual media attention, and she is frequently called upon as a spokesperson for Japanese 'women' and 'feminists' both within Japan and internationally"(Buckley 1997, 272).

Ueno identifies with Marxist feminism, more specifically materialist feminism. Since her first encounter with it in the early 1980s, Ueno has studied, and enthusiastically

¹ Refer to Chapter 7.

² For example, in the late 1980s, Ueno became involved in the Agnes Debate (*Agnesu ronsō*), a highly publicized debate regarding Agnes Chen, a TV personality, who regularly went to work with her baby son. In support of Ms. Chen, Ueno wrote "Things working mothers have been deprived of" (*Hataraku haha ga ushinattekita mono*) for the *Asahi Shimbun Newspaper* in 1989.

introduced Marxist feminism to Japanese feminist readers. For example, in 1984 Ueno translated Annette Kuhn and AnnMarie Wolpe's *Feminism and Materialism* (1978), which helped Marxist feminism ideas spread widely among Japanese feminists.³

In 1985 Ueno published *Patriarchy and Domestic Labor: Problematic of Marxist Feminism*. *Patriarchy and Domestic Labor* sold well, and Marxist feminism has since been well incorporated into the Japanese feminist scene. From 1986 to 1988, Ueno wrote "Marxist Feminism—the Possibilities and Limitations," a series of short essays for the popular scholarly magazine *Science of Thought* (*Shisō no kagaku*). In 1990 Ueno published a revised version of the series as *Patriarchy and the Capitalist System: Horizon of Marxist Feminism*. *Patriarchy and the Capitalist System* is now considered one of the most important theoretical works in the history of Japanese feminism.

Ueno's prolific production is astonishing: she has published over a hundred books as well as numerous journal/magazine/newspaper articles from the early 1980s to present, not only about Marxist feminism but also various topics including nationalism, sociology of family, educational sociology, structuralism, feminist literary criticism, sexuality, and ecology, among others. Buckley talks about Ueno's books:

Ueno has published prolifically. Her books sell extremely well for academic publications, a fact that is often attributed to a combination of the high quality of her research, her choice of controversial topics, her ability to write in an

³ Ueno is not the only Marxist feminist in Japan. Nor is she the first Japanese scholar to introduce Marxist feminism to Japan. In the early 1980s, Marxist feminism was introduced mainly by economists, including Shinotsuka Eiko *Japan's Women's Labor* (*Nihon no joshi rōdō*) (1982), Takahashi Hisako *Changing Women's Labor* (*Kawariyuku fujin rōdō*) (1983), and Yashiro Naohiro *Economic Analysis of Women's Labor* (*Josei rōdō no keizai bunseki*) (1983). Unlike Ueno's, these Marxist feminist analyses are strictly empirical rather than theoretical. In addition, Takenaka Emiko's edition of *New Women's Labor Theory* (*Shin josh irōdō*) (1991) represents one of the few books on Marxist feminist theory. Also her *Theory of Women's Labor History after World War II* (*Sengo joshi rōdōshi ron*) (1989) introduces some of the important events regarding the development of Marxist feminism.

accessible prose style, and her frequent use of provocative images that appeal to a nonspecialist readership (Buckley 1997, 272).

Ueno is one of the most controversial contemporary Japanese feminists. Ueno has been criticized on various accounts. A number of Japanese feminists have questioned the theoretical integrity of Ueno's Marxist feminism (Kanai 1992, 212-42). Adachi Mariko, Ida Kumiko, and Sechiyama Kaku questioned the validity of one of the theoretical premises of Marxist feminism and asked if it was appropriate to see women's domestic labor as exploited labor (Adachi 1991; Ida 1990; Sechiyama 1991). Also, Ōgoshi Aiko, Mizuta Tamae, and Takenaka Emiko questioned whether Ueno's dual-systems theory is really a Marxist feminist theory (Ōgoshi 1991b; Mizuta 1991). Oda Motoko and Ōgoshi pointed out some of the problems of Ueno's excessive incorporation of various well-known social theories (Oda 1991; Ōgoshi 1991b). Secondly, some Japanese feminists expressed their concern about the commercialization of Japanese feminism (Kanai 1992, 212-42; Yamashita 1990). Ehara Yumiko pointed out that Ueno has attained a celebrity feminist status and appropriated the voice of the Japanese woman (Ehara 1990). Also, Ōgoshi criticized that Ueno has been co-opted by the establishment (Ōgoshi 1991b).

They all correctly pointed out some of the major problems of Ueno's theory and often Marxist feminist theory in general. However, very few studies have so far examined Ueno's text, in order to substantiate their points or paid attention to Ueno's conservative view on Japanese womanhood and her support of *bosei*.

In the following section, I will offer an analysis of Ueno's Marxist feminism, focusing in particular on her remarkable popularity. I argue that, despite her expressly materialist feminist position, there is neither a political position nor theoretical

consistency in her work. What stands out, instead, is her incorporation of a great variety of Western theories/positions to maximize the value of her work as an information commodity (Ōgoshi 1991b). Like a *bricolage*, Ueno's Marxist feminism is made of various unrelated elements (Oda 1991), used to symbolically represent her cultural capital.

I also argue that Ueno successfully co-opted various constituents of Japanese society as her reader: the liberals, the conservatives, the young, and the old, among others. Ueno's Marxist feminism is not just informative but entertaining (Ehara 1990). She skillfully presents Marxist feminism to Japanese feminist readers who want to be informed yet also want to have some fun. She has expanded her readership well beyond its original feminist audience, by creating an opportunity for public debate on topics otherwise disregarded by Japanese mainstream media and academia (Buckley 1997, 272). Further, though it sounds paradoxical, Ueno's Marxist feminism co-opts the conservative Japanese majority by expansively confirming their views.

In order to demonstrate these points, I will examine Ueno's two major works: *Patriarchy and Domestic Labor* and *Patriarchy and the Capitalist System*. Especially, I will examine closely one of Ueno's critical theoretical sections where she defines the "material foundation of sex domination," in order to demonstrate the ways in which her Marxist feminism has become an information commodity. Also, I will show the ways in which Ueno's work is structured like a reference book, consisting of numerous brief sections, each indexed conveniently, with occasional charts and illustrations.

As for Ueno's multiple appeals, first, I will demonstrate how Ueno fabricates friendliness, by skillfully interspersing popular expressions between her intricate and,

often, difficult Marxist feminist discussions. Second, I will show how Ueno positions herself as the center of attention, by openly challenging Japanese censorship laws and well-known Japanese Marxist and feminist scholars and becoming a controversial figure. Third, I will show how Ueno's Marxist feminism co-opts Japanese pro-capitalists, nationalists, and *bosei*-ists, often, by affirming their conservative views. In this regard, I will discuss some of the unexpected consequences of Ueno's strategy, and show how her Marxist feminism functions as a means to preserve the *status quo*.

I begin by reviewing some background factors. Needless to say, Ueno's popularity is a product of the timely combination of her skills and structural conditions. Structural conditions unique to her time must also be taken into consideration. Some of the most important factors, crucial in examining Ueno's feminism, are the enactment of the Equal Employment Opportunity Law of 1985, which contributed to greatly lifting Japanese interest in women's issues in Ueno's time, and the changing status of knowledge in postindustrial Japan. In addition, in order correctly to situate Ueno's theoretical position in the context of Marxist feminism in the West, I will describe Marxist feminism by briefly reviewing historically its rather intricate development.

The Equal Employment Opportunity Law of 1985

The 1975 International Women's Year unconditionally abolished discrimination against women.⁴ The United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women was ratified in 1985. These unprecedented international initiatives to protect women's human rights pressed the Japanese government to

⁴ Refer to Chapter 7.

guarantee gender equality under the law. To meet these international demands, the Japanese Diet enacted the Equal Employment Opportunity Law (EEOL) in 1985; the law was promulgated in the subsequent year (source).

The EEOL is perceived as one of the most important vehicles for improving the conditions of Japanese women, by promoting equality of employment opportunity. Young talented women were encouraged by the EEOL to compete with men and become professionals, rather than housewives or part-timers. Ueno describes the impact of the EEOL on women students, “The impression of the workplace the law gives to women students who have not yet begun working is of a place where women can work and compete as the equals of men” (Ueno 1994, 34).

Since this time, Japanese media has talked about the arrival of “Women’s Era” (*Onna no jidai*) frequently, referring to the impact of the EEOL. Interest in feminism and Women’s Studies significantly expanded to include the general population. An increasing number of Japanese universities and local community centers offered lectures on women’s issues (Fujimura-Fanselow & Kameda 1994, 60-1). To respond to the increased demand, many western feminist theories were translated and introduced to Japanese readers (Ōgoshi 1996, 139-40). By the mid- to late 1980s, Japanese feminists had become more familiar with feminism not as social movements exemplified by the radical political activism of the late 1960s and early 1970s, but as theoretical positions.

The Status of Knowledge in Postindustrial Japan

In *The Postmodern Condition* (1984) the French philosopher Jean-François Lyotard explains that in a high-level information society the status of knowledge has changed,

reflecting the changes in the “performativity” game of techno-science. “Performativity” is the term he coined for the new contemporary perception of efficiency, or “optimization of the global relationship between input and output” (Lyotard 1984, 11). In postindustrial societies the advent of computer technology and subsequent computerization of various aspects of society have transformed knowledge into an “informational commodity.” As an “informational commodity,” knowledge like a consumer product is to be exchanged and consumed, but not used for its own sake (commodification of knowledge).⁵

One of the most significant events regarding the status of knowledge in contemporary Japan was the unparalleled popularity and commercial success of Asada Akira’s book *Structure and Power: Beyond Semiotics* (*Kōzō to chikara: kigōron o koete*) in 1983. The book sold more than eighty thousand copies within weeks, without any special marketing arrangements, unprecedented of its kind. “Sales figures...surpassed anyone’s grandest expectations” (Ivy 1989, 26). Asada was frequently featured in the newspapers and the weekly magazines as the new “genius,” and was named “God of the young” by the popular magazine *Asahi Journal*. The Japanese media hastily announced the advent of “new academism” (Ivy 1989, 26).

As its title implies, the book is about poststructuralist thinkers, including Jacques Lacan, Georges Bataille, Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari. Like Lyotard’s *Postmodern Condition*, one of the main concerns of the book is the status of knowledge in post-industrial societies; it explores the ways in which capitalism has impacted on the

⁵ According to Lyotard, this shift signifies the end of the metanarratives, which compelled us to search for truth, to identify oneself and to create a prosperous future. The metanarratives were the predominant form of knowledge in modern/industrial societies. The end of the metanarratives simultaneously signifies the end of the modern (Lyotard 1984).

symbolically organized (traditional) knowledge. In explicating the advent of a new form of knowledge, Asada asks his readers, what they think of knowledge: Do *you* think of knowledge as a tool, or as a means for advancement, or as knowledge for its own sake? According to Asada, none of these choices matches the style or the sensibility of the young. Knowledge is a matter of style.

Whatever is said, the matter is a problem of style, and it's to be expected that your sensibility [*kansei*] would reject both styles [choices]. When we say "style" or "sensibility," it has a very frivolous ring. But there are many occasions in which a selection of style according to one's sensibility is much more trustworthy than a subjective decision made according to reason. In that sense, I believe in the sensibility of the times. (Asada 1983, 5; in Ivy 1989, 28)

The "subjective decision made according to reason" belongs to modernist knowledge. In contrast, the form of knowledge dominant in postmodern societies is based on sensibility. Asada advises his readers, trust sensibility than reason.

Playfulness (*asobi*) is another important characteristic that explains Asada's new knowledge. Marilyn Ivy, the author of "Critical Texts, Mass Artifacts: The Consumption of Knowledge in Postmodern Japan," explains Asada's playfulness:

What replaces these metanarratives is play, a kind of local engagement, and a ceaseless turn to the "outside" (*gaibu*). He urges his readers to play with knowledge. Knowledge is that which appears in the interstices of a dualistic choice, a line of escape to the outside, a chance of encounter. It is nomadic thought. From this description we can grasp the outlines of his conception of *chi*: Nietzschean "gay science," modulated through Deleuze and Guattari. (Ivy 1989, 28-9)

Chi is the term coined for the new status of knowledge. Asada demonstrates *chi*'s playfulness in his preface to *Structure and Power*. A preface is typically written to disclose what the text is about. Yet, as Derrida has shown, the contradiction of preface is that it is written *after* the text. Asada's preface is a revised version of an already

published article. It was written *before* the text. Asada named it “In Place of Preface” (Ivy 1989, 27). It is a subtle matter and can be dismissed as frivolous or insignificant. Yet, it is all about play. It matters.⁶

Asada also talks about the genius (in one sense himself) as a metaphor of the new status of knowledge. Asada explains that in a postindustrial society like Japan, a highly educated readership is eager to be informed and wants to be knowledgeable like the genius. In other words, there is a strong desire for knowledge. But, at the same time, it is superficial. Asada talks about the genius’s *tachiyomi* (reading in a bookstore), a metaphor for postmodern intellectual labor. According to Asada, the genius does not own a book. Nor does he read a book from cover to cover. At a bookstore or a library he picks up a book that somehow appeals to him. Then, he picks some parts of the book that somehow appeal to him.⁷

One of the consequences of these changes in the nature of communication and knowledge is that knowledge is consumed with feeling. In other words, the kind of knowledge which appeals to the young must reflect their sensibility. In postindustrial

⁶ Yamashita Etsuko’s article “Ueno Chizuko’s Feminism: Play” examines Ueno’s feminism in this context (Yamashita 1990).

⁷ Ivy sees a parallel between Asada and the copywriter Shigesato Itoi. Itoi is a star copywriter who was named the second God of the young only after Asada by the *Asahi Journal*.

Many of the new academic stars explicitly invoke the conjunction of *chi* with commercial copywriting; they claim to present *chi* in the same terms as copywriters present their copy. They assert and affirm a direct influence both from television commercials and the linguistic compression of advertisements in general. There is a parallel between the new academic who has turned *chi* into a commodity and who mediates between the university and the masses, and the copywriter who mediates between the capitalist and the consumer... This fascination with copywriters and advertising in general shows up in the immense popularity of books that purport to describe and predict market trends, yet another example of the masses’ specular self-reflection on their own condition. (Ivy 1989, 33)

The parallel between Asada and Itoi suggests the emergence of a new kind of communication: “communication as a form of knowledge-as-play.” According to Ivy, this is a postmodern phenomenon, resulting from the “commercialization of society” (Ivy 1989, 34).

Japan, one consumes knowledge, just as one buys clothes and CDs. Superficiality, such as style and appearance, determines all. If knowledge does not appeal to one's feelings, it is not regarded as knowledge.⁸

Marxist Feminism

Traditional Marxist Feminism

Marxism has engaged in a long intellectual battle against women's oppression since *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State* (1845), in which Friedrich Engels showed the historical changes of and defined the material conditions (economic relations) as the deciding factor for family relations. According to Engels, in the beginning of human history where the household was the center of production, there were not only matrilineal but also matriarchal societies, in which women's status was considerably higher than afterwards. In this context, contemporary women's problem is discussed mainly within the framework of the family relations and its relation to capitalism.

As often been pointed out, Marx employs a rather abstract concept of labor undifferentiated by gender. Therefore, Marxism is essentially a class theory, and lacks insight into gender-specific oppression. Traditionally, Marxists saw women's participation in labor movements as one of the necessary conditions for women's emancipation, because they believed that, in order to emancipate women, the proletariat

⁸ This condition of knowledge also reflects the production process of late capitalism itself. In late capitalism of hyperproductivity and replication, differences between products are minimal. In other words, much qualitative differences between products no longer exist. In order to sell, however, products to be sold must be presented symbolically. This is called "symbolic product differentiation." In the sphere of knowledge, the same logic applies. Qualitative differences between, for example, books, are no longer sufficient. In order to sell, a book must be written and presented symbolically to appeal to the sensibility of its potential readership (Asada 1984; in Ivy 1989, 37). Also, G. Deleuze and F. Guattari make a similar argument in *Anti-Oedipus, Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (1977).

must first be freed from the bourgeoisie. In other words, Marxists believe in the priority of class relations over gender relations (Tong 1998, 94-129).

There have been some revisionist attempts to correct these gender biases inherent in Marxism. For example, at the beginning of the 20th century, the Russian Alexandra Kollontai attempted to expand the scope of Marxism beyond production, by giving more attention to gender-specific oppression, for example, domestic life issues including sexual life. Kollontai was politically motivated, and tried to include women's issues theoretically and politically on the agendas of Communist State (Soviet Union) policies. However, Kollontai's view was not accepted by her male colleagues. In the 1920s the Communist State ordered the dissolution of the Soviet Union's Women's Section (Andermahr, Lovell & Wolkowitz, 1997, p.126).⁹

Contemporary Marxist Feminism

In the 1960s, well over 40 years after the unsuccessful first Marxist revisionist attempts, so-called second-wave feminists explored Marxist feminist possibilities, influenced by the revival of Marxism, which first became apparent in Europe. Some of the earliest second-wave Marxist feminists who made significant contributions include Margaret Benston, a Canadian feminist, and Mariarosa Dalla Costa and Selma James, Italian feminists. Benston insisted on the importance of the socialization of domestic labor. In "The Political Economy of Women's Liberation" (1969), Benston rightly pointed out that if women were introduced to the workplace without socializing domestic labor, such as cooking, cleaning, childrearing etc., women's oppressed conditions would merely worsen.

⁹ Emma Goldman is known as one of the earliest Marxist revisionists, though she is more often described as an anarchist feminist in the United States (Andermahr, Lovell & Wolkowitz 1997, 126).

On the other hand, Dalla Costa and James demanded that the state pay wages to housewives in *The Power of Women and the Subversion of the Community* (1972). Dalla Costa and James contended that domestic work was useful work, not in the colloquial sense but in Marx's terms, creating "use-" and "surplus-value." Capital profits from exploiting women's domestic work.

At the same time, some second-wave Marxist feminists saw critical theoretical pitfalls when Marxism was applied to women's issues: Marxism is inherently a theory of production, "Marxist categories are sex-blind," and Marxist theories fail to explain adequately why women instead of men are assigned to the home and men to the workplace (Hartmann 1981, 1-41). In Heidi Hartmann's words, Marxist categories

give no clues about why particular people fill particular places. They give no clues about why *women* are subordinate to *men* inside and outside the family and why it is not the other way around. *Marxist categories, like capital itself, are sex-blind.* The categories of Marxism cannot tell us who will fill the empty places. (Hartmann 1981, 1-41)

In order to include women's issues, some Marxist feminists adopted the term "reproduction," believing that childbirth could be included as a part of the reproduction of the relations of production. In other words, they attempted to synthesize Marxism and feminism, juxtaposing the relations of production in the workplace and the relations of reproduction at home (Barrett 1980, 19-29).¹⁰

What makes a Marxism-feminism theoretical synthesis complicated is the split between dual-systems theory and unified-systems theory. Dual-systems theorists argue that patriarchy and capitalism are separate systems of social relations representing

¹⁰ According to Barrett, such Marxist feminist attempt was hasty and selective (Barrett 1980, 19-20).

distinct sets of interest; however, when they intersect, patriarchy and capitalism oppress women in ferocious ways. In order to understand why women are oppressed, dual-systems theorists argue that patriarchy and capitalism need to be analyzed separately. And then the ways in which patriarchy and capitalism are interrelated need to be examined.¹¹

In contrast, unified-systems theorists maintain that “class,” which is a gender-blind category, is not adequate for the analysis of women’s oppression, and try to replace it with a more inclusive analytical category. For example, for Iris Young, the author of “Beyond the Unhappy Marriage: A Critique of the Dual Systems Theory,” Marxist feminism needs to implement the gendered category “division of labor” in order to transform Marxist feminist theory into a (contemporary) socialist feminist theory that accommodates insights from Marxist, radical and psychoanalytic feminisms.¹²

There are several other subtle yet significant differences among Marxist feminists. For example, there is another split between culturalists and materialists. Michele Barrett, in order to construct a unified, revised Marxist theory of women’s oppression, turned to ideology. In her *Women’s Oppression Today: Problems in Marxist Feminist Analysis* (1980), Barrett argues that psychoanalytic theory could provide insight into the material

¹¹ What makes dual-systems theory dreadfully complex is that there is no agreement as to patriarchy’s quality. Some dual-systems theorists see patriarchy as a material structure of reproduction/sexuality while others see it as a nonmaterial (i.e., ideological) structure. Hartmann represents the former and her work includes “The Unhappy Marriage of Marxism and Feminism” (1981). Juliet Mitchell is an exemplary figure of the latter and her work includes *Women’s Estate* (1971) and *Psychoanalysis and Feminism* (1974). One of the critical differences between Mitchell and Hartmann is that, whereas Mitchell understands the Oedipus complex as an ideological form of women’s oppression, Hartmann sees that it has a material basis (Tong 1989, 175-80).

¹² Alison Jaggar is another proponent of unified-systems theory. In her *Feminist Politics and Human Nature* (1983) Jaggar suggests to implement a core Marxist theory concept other than class. According to Jaggar, Marxist concept “alienation” will help us construct a unitary theoretical framework

conditions in which gendered consciousness is constructed. Also, according to Barrett, through various ideological apparatuses, such as the family, schools, and churches, gender roles including women's passivity are formed and perpetuated. In contrast, Christine Delphy contends that not only the sphere of production but also the sphere of reproduction is material, though she firmly maintains her dual-systems position.

From Unhappy Marriage to Divorce, and After

These feminist Marxist revisionist attempts seem to have been rather intricate. Toward the mid-1980s some serious theoretical problems began to surface. For example, Veronica Beechey found the dual-systems approach problematic. In Beechey's view, patriarchy is not confined to a separate sphere, i.e. the family, but is operative throughout the whole social formation, including the world of production, i.e. the workplace. Beechey contended that dual-systems theory, which inevitably fails to lead us to the construction of a unified social formation theory, is erroneous (Beechey 1979).

Unified-systems theories also began to reveal increasingly serious problems. For example, there have been a great variety of unified-systems attempts made by Marxist feminists, evidencing the serious compatibility problems between Marxism and feminism. No unified-systems theory seemed to satisfy everyone. Neither was there theoretical agreement among unified-systems theorists.

Furthermore, along with the whole academic shift from Althusserian structuralism to poststructuralism, by which the explanatory power of ideological theories has been almost completely replaced by the theories of subjectivity, for example, politics of

that powerfully incorporates diverse feminism traditions, including Marxist, radical, psychoanalytic and liberal feminisms (Tong 1989, 183-193).

difference, the frail synthesis around the concept of ideology, for example by Barrett, became less appealing and was eventually abandoned. By the mid-1980s, the unhappy marriage of Marxism and feminism was generally acknowledged to have ended in divorce. In other words, the problematic attempts to synthesize Marxism and feminism were finally given up (Barrett 1991).¹³

Still, there are some committed feminists who decided to remain Marxist feminists (Andermahr, Lovell & Wolkowitz 1997, 151-153). They strongly believe in the materiality of patriarchy, and they call themselves material feminists. Materialist feminists refuse to see patriarchy as either ideology or culture, and insist that, like the relations of production (under capitalism), the relations of reproduction (under patriarchy) have a material basis.

Ueno's Marxist Feminism

Ueno's Capitalism and Domestic Labor and Patriarchy and Capitalism

Ueno's Marxist feminism reflects this theoretically as well as politically

	Market	Family
Capitalism	1	2
Patriarchy	3	4
1. Socialist Feminism		
2&3. (neo) Marxist Feminism		
4. Radical Feminism		
Source: Ueno 1985, 19; adopted from Sokoloff 1980, 204		

complex, often confusing, background, but appears to some extent dogmatic. Ueno's Marxist feminism draws upon two western Marxist feminist works, which hardly are representative works of Marxist feminism: Natalie Sokoloff's dialectical analysis of capitalism and patriarchy and Delphy's dual systems materialist feminism.

¹³ Since then, various Marxist feminist revisionist attempts have been made. For example, in 1985 Donna Haraway wrote "A Manifesto for Cyborgs: Science, Technology and Socialist Feminism in the 1980s," in which she discusses "material-semiotic production" as one of the central theoretical concepts. For another, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, in her 1988 essay "Can the Subaltern Speak?" explains the

In *Capitalism and Domestic Labor* (1985), her first major Marxist feminist work, Ueno puts Sokoloff's *Between Money and Love* (1980) at the center and introduces Sokoloff's theory as *the* Marxist feminist theory:

One of the books I have ever been deeply influenced by and want to introduce to you is a book written by Natalie Sokoloff, an American Marxist feminist. The book is stylishly titled *Between Money and Love* and subtitled *The Dialectics of Women's Domestic Labor and Market Labor*.¹⁴ (Ueno 1985, 11)

Sokoloff's "stylish" book title is one the things that appeals to Ueno.

A few pages later, Ueno co-opts Sokoloff's chart (see above), and explains the overall significance of Marxist feminism. More specifically, according to Ueno, Sokoloff's chart explains that socialist feminism understood only the intersection by "market" and "capitalism"(1) and radical feminism discovered the intersection by "patriarchy" and "family"(4).

Next, Ueno pinpoints the remaining positions, and defines the significance of Marxist feminism. According to Ueno, the position 2 represents "capitalist patriarchy" whereas the position 3 represents "patriarchal capitalism." Paraphrasing Sokoloff, Ueno continues,

The discovery of these two positions (2 & 3) where 'market' and the 'family' relate each other 'dialectically' is the contribution of Marxist feminism. And, therefore, Marxist feminism is almost the only inclusive theory that helps [us] understand the position of women in capitalist societies. " (Ueno 1985, 19-20)¹⁵

subaltern, a person who occupies a subordinate or inferior position, as a space of difference, following Marx's *The Eighteenth Brumaire*.

¹⁴ Sokoloff is an American Marxist feminist who currently teaches at John Jay College of Criminal Justice of the City University of New York. *Between Money and Love: The Dialectics of Women's Home and Market Work* is a revised version of her dissertation for Ph.D. Program in Sociology at the Graduate School and University Center of the City University of New York and was published in 1980. *Between Money and Love* was published in Japanese in 1987.

¹⁵ Ueno also states that "[Marxist feminism] understands that there is a dialectical relations, that is, interrelations, between class domination and sex domination" (Ueno 1985, 12-3). The significance of Marxist feminism Ueno explains is misleading. Sokoloff explains her interpretation of the term dialectics.

As Sokoloff explicitly states, her “dialectical” analysis of capitalism and patriarchy is a preliminary attempt and is hardly a definitive Marxist feminist theory, although Ueno presents it as if it is.

In *Patriarchy and the Capitalist System*, Ueno shifts her emphasis from dialectics to dual systems materialism. *Patriarchy and the Capitalist System* consists of two major parts: Theory and Analysis. In the theory part, Ueno introduces and explains some the key Marxist, often materialist, feminist terms, such as “market,” “materialistic analysis of sex domination,” “domestic labor debates,” “material foundation of patriarchy” *etc.*, intensively citing Western Marxist feminist works.

In the theory section called “Dualism of Patriarchy and the Capitalist System,” Ueno declares her dual systems materialist feminist position by following Delphy.

[Feminism] does not simply apply Marxism to sexual domination, [but] ‘feminism *must* modify Marxism.’ If Marxism is useless for the analysis of women’s oppression, so Delphy continues, ‘[we] abandon Marxism. [But,] I would not shed even one tear for that.’¹⁶ (Ueno 1990, 28-9; citations are from Delphy 1980, 88)

Following in Delphy’s footsteps, Ueno take a rather extreme position. It seems that, like Delphy, Ueno would not mind if her Marxist feminist theory became no longer a Marxist theory.

Ueno’s Marxist Feminism as an Information Commodity

...this approach tells us not only that relations between the patriarchal capitalist at home and market are interconnected but also that they are forever in a state of flux and change. Contained within the dialectic are mutually reinforcing as well as conflicting relations between patriarchy and capitalism, as women and men create and recreate their daily lives. (Sokoloff 1980, 204)

Sokoloff adopts the term “dialectics” not within the context of Marxist dialectical materialism. At best, Sokoloff’s usage of the term is limited to “interconnected,” “mutually reinforcing” relations.

¹⁶ Delphy says, “Feminism *necessarily* modifies Marxism.”

One of the most conspicuous characteristics of Ueno's Marxist feminism is its intensive citations of various Western Marxist feminist works: Ueno introduces various Marxist feminist theories one after another.¹⁷ For example, in the short (two-page) yet critical theoretical section "Material Foundation of Sex Domination," Ueno cites Wally Seccombe (1986), Catherine MacKinnon (1982), Heidi Hartmann (1981), M. MacLeod & E. Saraga (1987) and Christine Delphy (1980). Paraphrasing Seccombe, Ueno begins, "Marxist feminism is... 'Marxist answer to feminist question' (Seccombe 1986, 190)" (Ueno 1990, 27).¹⁸ Ueno continues, misleadingly, "The reason why Marxist feminism is Marxist is that [Marxist feminists] think that [patriarchy] has a material basis" (Ueno 1990, 27).¹⁹ Also, "The reason why Marxist feminists think Marxism is still valuable is that," Ueno continues, citing MacKinnon, "'Marxism and feminism are theories of power and its distribution, namely, of inequality' (MacKinnon 1982, 2)" (Ueno 1990, 27-8).²⁰

¹⁷ Beside Marxist feminist theories, Ueno mentions a wide range of famous western theorists, including Thomas R. Malthus' *Essay on the Principle of Population* and Ferdinand Tönnies' *Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft* as well as Michel Foucault's *History of Sexuality* and Emmanuel Wallerstein's *Modern World System*. Ueno's incorporation of well-known Western social theories into her Marxist feminist work is not successful and often problematic. For example, although both Foucault and Marxist feminism talk about related topics, sexuality and reproduction respectively, they are discussed at distinctively different levels.

¹⁸ Seccombe's citation in Ueno is in English, preceded by Japanese translation. Ueno's citation of Seccombe is problematic in some accounts. For example, Seccombe argues that women's domestic labor reproduces the relations of production (dominant/subordinate) that is one of the ideological requisites of capitalism (Seccombe 1973, 3-24; Barrett 1980, 21-2 & 173-4). Here she points out the ideological nature of women's domestic labor.

¹⁹ In Ueno's "material basis" is in English, followed by Japanese translation. Ueno explains as if Marxism is reducible to materialism and as if Marxism and materialism are interchangeable terms. Contrary to her belief, a materialist is not necessarily a Marxist. Shulamith Firestone is a materialist and thinks that patriarchy has a material basis. However, Firestone does not believe the forces of production as the driving force of history, as Marx does. Therefore, Firestone is a materialist but not a Marxist.

²⁰ In Ueno's "power" and "inequality" are in English. MacKinnon's citation is from "Feminism, Marxism, Method and the State" (MacKinnon 1982, 2). MacKinnon is a feminist legal theorist and is interested in state politics, which, according to Marx, belongs to the superstructure not the material base.

Marxism and feminism are theories of power and its distribution: inequality. They provide accounts of how social arrangements of patterned disparity can be internally rational yet unjust. But their specificity is not incidental. In marxism [sic] to be deprived of one's work, in

The feminists Ueno cites are indeed Marxist feminists; yet, their perspectives vary greatly, and are not materialist at all, except Hartmann and Delphy.²¹ Nevertheless, Ueno simply disregards the subtle yet significant theoretical as well as political differences among these Marxist feminists, and introduces their key statements without paying attention to their original contexts, all in order seemingly to advance her materialist position.

However, for the *tachiyomi* readers, who are studious yet superficial, Ueno's work is informative, convenient, and fine: Ueno succinctly summarizes some of the key concepts of Marxist feminism and, at the same time, introduces one eye-catching phrase after another, often in their original English. Ueno's Marxist feminism is indeed a desirable information commodity for the *tachiyomi* readers.

Playful Marxist Feminism

(1) Popular Expressions: Fabrication of Friendliness

Ueno's Marxist feminism is not only informative but also entertaining. She skillfully incorporates various popular expressions in her Marxist feminist work. In fact, the combination of intricate Marxist feminist terminologies and popular, often slangy, expressions is such an effective strategy that it effectively eliminates the intimidation that Marxist feminism may produce for novice Japanese Marxist feminist readers. Ueno

feminism of one's sexuality, defines each one's conception of lack of power *per se*... They exist to argue, respectively, that the relations in which many work and few gain, in which some fuck and others get fucked, are the prime moment of politics. (MacKinnon 1982, 2-3)

²¹ Hartmann is critical of Marxist feminism, and calls herself a "socialist" feminist (Hartmann 1981).

makes Marxist feminism more accessible than ever before. Moreover, Ueno's writing style makes it enjoyable to read her work.²²

According to Ueno, when she first encountered the expression “reproduction of another human being” in Marx's *German Ideology*, Ueno was shocked and “scales dropped from her eyes” (*me kara uroko ga ochita*) (Ueno 1985, 23). Ueno thinks that Marxist feminism is a “cool” (*kakkoi*) theory (Ueno 1985, 38). According to Ueno, one of the premises of Marxist feminism is that capitalism and patriarchy are not “going hand in hand like good buddies” (*otete tsunaide nakayoku*) (Ueno 1985, 49). Ueno recommends that, in order to secure the high quality of Japanese society, society's reproduction costs be “snatched away” (*bundoru*) from “Da's” (*otōchan no*) company (Ueno 1985, 57), although the government is promoting ten-year childrearing as “recommended merchandise” (*osusume shōhin*) (Ueno 1985, 43).

Beside these, there are numerous instances in which Ueno effectively makes use of popular expressions. In the passage below, Ueno refers to Father and Mother with rather rural, unscholarly (uneducated, unsophisticated) terms *otōchan* and *okāchan* respectively.

The Oedipus complex is a mechanism that reproduces the reproductive system itself. That is, within the relation of Da (*otōchan*), Ma (*okāchan*) and a child it is an interpretative theory of repression that analyzes the mechanism of how a child becomes an adult who reproduces a patriarchal family structure in the next generation. (Ueno 1985, 17)

²² Some Ueno's book are entertainingly titled, for example, *Greater Research on Sexy Gal* (*Sekushī gyaru no dai kenkyū*) (1982), *Midnight Call* (*Middonaito kōru*) (1990), *Adam and Eve of the 1990s* (*1990-nendai no adamu to ibu*) (1991) and *A Theatre under the Skirt* (*Sukāto no shita no gekijō*) (1992).

In this case, Ueno effectively combines a difficult psychoanalytic term with popular expressions. After introducing “the Oedipus complex” and explaining how it works to reproduce patriarchal family structure, Ueno rearticulates the statement combining “*otōchan*” and “*okāchan*,” terms for father and mother.

Ueno also uses Kansai dialect to the same effect. Standard Tokyo colloquial Japanese is, in general, considered to be urban, sophisticated and formal, whereas dialects, including the Kansai dialect, are seen as being opposite.

The problem the United States will face is how the society maintains a good quality reproduction [system] while leaving it to laissez-faireism. As for West Germany that has been doing this same, the government feels crisis approaching, because [German] women have begun to say ‘no more’ (*mou akan*) and ‘we don’t like it any more’ (*mou iyaya*).

How about Japan? There is neither such a crisis feeling nor shit (*kuso*). It has been doing well without any efforts. (Ueno 1985, 64)

Also, Ueno occasionally mentions feces where its necessity is questionable. In above instance Ueno mentions feces in an idiomatic popular expression “There is neither X nor a shit,” where “X” is equivalent of feces and insignificant/uncountable. On another occasion, this time not figuratively, Ueno mentions excretion as one of human activities that people cannot do for others. “There are certain kinds of labor, such as eating a meal and taking a shit (*unko*) for which we cannot rely on others (Ueno 1985, 22-3). Ueno’s choice is “*unko wo suru*,” which is the equivalent of “taking a shit.”

Ueno’s seemingly unnecessary frequent mentioning of feces, along with other popular expressions, effectively vulgarizes her theory to the point where it is no longer necessary for her readership to be concerned with its difficulties. Ueno’s Marxist feminism is informative and friendly, and sometimes even vulgar.

At the same time, there is no doubt that Ueno's frequent mentioning of feces is idiosyncratic and to some extent problematic. What if some Japanese feminists doubt and openly question Ueno's professionalism? Quite contrary to our expectation, being problematic is not necessarily disadvantageous for Ueno. In the following examples, I will show that Ueno purposely induces a controversy, and becomes indeed a trouble maker. Yet, again, in these cases, too, she succeeds by becoming the center of attention.

(2) Polemical Expressions: Everybody is Afraid of Ueno

In 1988 Ueno published *Women's Play (Onna asobi)*, a collection of her newspaper/magazine articles. For the illustrations Ueno used Judy Chicago's "Dinner Party" series, in which provocative images of vaginas are presented. Ueno's *Women's Play* generated a public controversy not only among Japanese feminists but also arresting those who were concerned with Japan's antiquated strict censorship laws (Buckley 1997, 273).²³

Not only antiquated Japanese laws, but also her colleagues are openly challenged by Ueno. For example, when she received some comments on her journal series "Marxist feminism—Possibilities and Limitations" from Japanese Marxists and feminists, Ueno completely rejected their thoughtful comments and indiscriminately called them "ignorant." In particular, the entire Japanese feminist academia was accused of being incapable of criticizing Ueno's Marxist feminism properly. Ueno said, "I received criticism from two camps: One is from feminists and the other from Marxists. As for the former ...there is no one worthy to consider" (Ueno 1990, 130). Against Ehara Yumiko, who said honestly that Ueno's work is theoretically too complicated to understand, Ueno

boldly suggested, “[Ehara], who says it is ‘complicated’ and ‘not clear,’ had better say honestly ‘I am not capable of understanding it,’ instead of attributing [her problem] to my theory” (Ueno 1990, 131).

As for the Japanese Marxist camp, Ueno called Kawazoe Shōzō, a Japanese Marxist, who offered to clarify some Marxist terms, not only “ignorant” but also “criminal.” The topic is the ownership of domestic labor:

Like capitalism, by not inquiring into the ownership of domestic labor, he [Kawazoe] is participating in patriarchy. [Kawazoe says,] ‘Like this, family members become subjugated to a patriarch psychologically. The [patriarchy’s] ruling right is not for exploiting others’ labor. In contrast, it is based on the apportioning of things.’ As for this recognition, his ignorance on ‘family political science’ and optimistic posing [*gokuraku tombo buri*] are almost criminal. (Ueno 1990, 152)²⁴

Ueno’s polemical language is problematic. Regardless of whether she was right or not, Ueno offended the whole Japanese Marxist as well as feminist academia, including Ehara and Kawazoe.

Ueno and Ehara were invited to a feminist conference to openly discuss their disagreements.²⁵ In her defense, Ueno did not just defend her position. Instead, Ueno went on the offensive by calling Ehara a “culturalist.” Ehara responded by criticizing Ueno’s categorization “materialist” vs. “culturalist” as reductionist in “Criticizing Chizuko Ueno’s ‘Criticism of Culturalism’” (*Ueno chizuko-shi no “bunkashugi hihan” wo hihan suru*) (1991). Ueno responded to Ehara’s criticism in “A Letter to Yumiko Ehara” (*Ehara yumiko-san heno tegami*) (1991). The exchange between Ueno

²³ *Onna asobi* also means womanizing.

²⁴ Ueno calls Dalla Cost and James “Stalinists” and “ignorant” (Ueno 1990, 118 & 147-8). Ueno also calls Engels a liar (Ueno 1990, 16).

and Ehara was later remembered as one of the milestones of Japanese feminism and is now known as the Ehara-Ueno Debate.

Ueno's accusation of Kawazoe was later extended to include all men. Citing Delphy's phrase, Ueno defines "feminism's main enemy:"

Feminism is not merely humanism. It has proven how few men 'desire to be humanly equal to women' and the basis of the reason why. Against his [Kawazoe's] subjective wish that 'it is satisfactory if it is confirmed that women's struggle is a fight against capital and the state, not necessarily against patriarchy as the main enemy,' without reservation I declare that feminism's 'main enemy' (Delphy 1984) are men. (Ueno 1990, 156-7)

Ueno now calls Kawazoe an anti-feminist man. Paraphrasing Delphy, Ueno explains "quasi-feminist women" and "anti-feminist men:"

Only quasi-feminist women, who want to avoid any confrontation with men, and anti-feminist men, who want to make the feminist problem insignificant by avoiding any confrontation with women, want to believe naively that 'men and women can fight a joint struggle against a common enemy.' (Ueno 1990, 156-7)

Ueno's language was even stronger against feminist men. Ueno finds a parallel between Marxist economics and feminist men.

The feminist challenge is not only aimed at Marxism. The feminist challenge is [also] aimed at the concepts of production-dominated economics themselves and at 'Economics' that does not doubt its validity. The reason why feminist criticism turns Marxist economics at present is that Marxist economics shares with feminism this 'criticism of economics.' Feminism's merciless criticism of Marxism is aimed at the insufficiency of this 'criticism of economics.' This circumstance is similar to the paradoxical situation in which a man, who is in doubt of his masculinity approaches feminism, faces the most relentless denunciation at a feminist meeting. (Ueno 1990, 278-9)

Ueno's attack on "men as the main enemy" is odd. Most feminists focus on macro-level factors, such as the system and the structure of patriarchy, rather than on micro-level

²⁵ Refer to *Joseigaku nenpō 12-gō* [The Women's Studies Society of Japan Annual Report 12] (1991).

individual factors. In other words, it is commonly understood among contemporary feminists that feminism's enemy is patriarchy as a social system, but not men.

Here it is possible that Ueno is impersonating the radical stance of some Japanese women's liberation activists. Ueno's emotionally, rather than scholarly, committed stance may remind her readers of some of the extreme statements made by the movement activists, who often became the target of Japanese mainstream media mockery. Also, Ueno's complete rejection of men, feminist or not, sounds exaggerated, like the Japanese conservative media's stereotypical depiction of the movement activists' frustration and fury.

Ueno on Capitalism, the State and *Bosei*-ism

In the following examples, Ueno makes her Marxist feminism easy to swallow even for Japanese pro-capitalists, nationalists and *bosei*-ists, by confirming their conservative views. She adopted "a style of exposition that is very close to standard academic discourse and has little in common with Marxist-Leninist style" (Attewell 1984, 24).²⁶ At the same time, for that very reason, Ueno's Marxist feminist position is cast in doubt.

As I will demonstrate below, Ueno understands capitalism and the state, two key Marxist analytical concepts, dogmatically, and appears more like a proponent of Japanese national capitalism than a Marxist feminist. It is quite unexpected that, in between her seemingly Marxist feminist arguments, Ueno shows her explicit support of capitalism as a system that promotes gender equality. Her account of the state also puts her Marxist feminist position further in question. Her view that Japanese high quality childrearing by

²⁶ Paul Attewell discusses this in the context of American young academics' structural dependency. Ueno is subject to the same kind of structural situation and intellectual conformity.

individual mothers is the condition for a well-organized Japanese society makes her sound like a proud proponent of Japanese *bosei*-ism.

(1) Ueno's Capitalism

One of the critical factors dividing Marxist and liberal feminisms is their attitude toward capitalism. Needless to say, Marxism is critical of capitalism. So it is expected that Marxist feminism is also critical of capitalism. In contrast, unlike Marxist feminism, liberal feminism is not necessarily critical of capitalism.²⁷

In the following, Ueno talks about the relation between capitalism and patriarchy (Ueno's dialectics), and quite unexpectedly praises capitalism highly for promoting gender equality. Referring to her exchange with Heidi Hartmann, a renowned socialist feminist, Ueno examines some of the major changes during the 1980s in the relations between gender and economy.

Heidi Hartmann, who took a firm stand against Marxist feminism in *The Unhappy Marriage of Marxism and Feminism* in 1981, said 'Capitalism is emancipatory for women' in an exchange with me at the international conference 'Global Perspectives on Changing Sex-Roles' in November 1989.²⁸...American capitalism in past ten years made great progress in the direction of eliminating sex differences. It has become so, as a result of capitalism's rational behavior... (Ueno 1990, 301-2)

Few Marxist feminists agree with Ueno.

Ueno next talks about capitalism's influence on the condition of women in Japan. "Is capitalism emancipatory for women? For that question, my answer is yes and no" (Ueno 1990, 301-2). Ueno's view of capitalism in improving gender relations is stated in the following:

²⁷ As tokenism, Ueno gives a rather harsh evaluation of liberal feminism.

²⁸ Hartmann's original source is not identified.

The situation [=changes] that happened in the United States over the last 10 years [the 1980s] is now happening in Japan. Background factors include general labor scarcity resulting from a growing economy, especially scarcity of high quality labor (with higher education) for growing industrial sections. For those sections that disregard labor's gender differences, educational differences have now become larger than gender differences...

This situation becomes even clearer when we take a look at nations with larger racial and class differences, such as the United States. Women with higher education, that is, competitive women, have already overcome gender differences rather than racial and class factors. In the future in Japan, when we consider the possibility that various [demographic] factors including race and nationality will come foreword, the wall of job segregation for gender differences may fall apart before race and nationality differences. Companies that are involved in fierce international competition, cannot afford to question the 'gender' of high quality labor power. For companies, gender discrimination is getting highly costly by losing potential human resources... (Ueno 1990, 304-7)

Ueno declares, "now educational differences have become larger than gender differences" due to "the growing economy." Ueno argues that capitalism's globalization is also beneficial for women. Ueno explains that multinational corporations, which are subject to fierce international competition, cannot afford to question the gender of high quality labor and, therefore, cannot discriminate against women.²⁹ In addition, in another occasion, Ueno says, "Capitalism is about to organize a gender-free labor market." As far as above statements are concerned, Ueno does not sound like a Marxist feminist. Further, Ueno worries that if capitalism continues to eliminate gender inequality, women's "solidarity" will be destroyed. She asks, "What kind of 'solidarity' can we establish among women?" (Ueno 1990, 307). This is an expression of essentialism.³⁰

(2) Ueno's State

²⁹ How can it not be also true that Japanese multinational corporations cannot afford to question the race or nationality of high quality labor?

³⁰ It was possible only through Ueno's interpretation of "dialectics," which she conservatively defines as temporary adjustments. Therefore, Ueno's Marxist feminism is limited to a historical study of the temporary adjustments between capitalism and patriarchy. Needless to say, in this Ueno's framework, capitalism and patriarchy are conservatively defined as fixed entities.

Not only capitalism but also the state is exonerated by Ueno's Marxist feminist criticism.

In the following, Ueno explains that the state is a completely separate entity from

capitalism. She also argues as if her perspective is supported by Marx.

Marx knew that the state is a non-capital factor. Therefore, Marxist theory of the state exists. It [the state] does not get reduced to the theory of capitalism... The state does not behave rationally like capital. Because the state is an authority and it does not obey the rules of the market. (Ueno 1990, 274)

Ueno's explanation of the relation between capitalism and the state departs far from

Marx's dialectics. The following is Marx's famous "Preface" statement, in which he

unambiguously states the close relationship between the base and the super-structure of society.

In the social production of their social life, men enter into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will, relations of production which correspond to a definite state of development of their material production forces. The sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which rises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. (cited in Tucker 1978[1859], 4)

Marx argues that, although state politics seem independent from economic relations, the relation between them is dialectical, meaning that the former is in part a product of the latter (dialectical materialism).

With regard to the maintenance, or reproduction, of economic relations, which is mainly a product of this obscure relationship between the economic structure and the superstructure, intellectuals, as Antonio Gramsci correctly pointed out, are not exceptions. Hegemonized or "deputy," intellectuals plausibly justify the existing social relations, thus

contributing to the “reproduction” of the relations of production, while, for example, deceptively negating their opposition (Gramsci 1971, 5-23).

(3) Ueno on a Chinese “Stalinist” Sociologist

The following citation from Ueno’s 1985 work suggests the pervasiveness of Japanese capitalism’s hegemonic power. Ueno talks like a pro-capitalism ideologue, and introduces a Chinese sociologist from mainland China whom she met at a conference in the United States.

I met a sociologist from mainland China in the United States. She has four children and is pursuing sociology full-time. She raised her children leaving them at daycare...

When an American feminist asked her if she had ever felt sorry for her children by leaving them at daycare, what she said was ‘I think children would grow better when raised by a daycare professional than an amateur like me.’
(Ueno 1985, 61-2)

Commenting on the Chinese sociologist’s remark on socialized daycare, Ueno makes fun of her by exhibiting some exaggerated reactions, and says that it is a expression of Stalinism.

‘Children would grow better when raised by an expert.’ I was astonished. There, children are raised into [some specific] ways the government wants from its children. She very naively believes that children raised like that are better than individualistic children raised by individual families in individualistic ways. I thought it was [an expression] of Stalinism and stared at her for expressing such an opinion straightforwardly. Oh, I thought she was indeed such a person and that was why mainland China sent her to the United States with confidence. (Ueno 1985, 61-2)

Ueno’s comments on the Chinese sociologist seem problematic in two accounts. First, her perspective on Communist China seems to represent a stereotypical view. She sounds like an anti-communist ideologue. Second, as a feminist, Ueno should not be able to dismiss the importance of socialized daycare in such a simplistic manner. As many

feminists argue, socialized daycare is one of the few options that give women equal working opportunity with men.

(4) Ueno on Japanese Childrearing Quality Control

Ueno further affirms her anti-socialized daycare stance in the following. She first presents a critical view on the quality of American childrearing. Some of the “unfavorable consequences” of American childrearing, Ueno mentions, are rampant sex and drug problems. In contrast, she praises Japanese childrearing practice highly and calls it “Japanese childrearing QC” (Quality Control). Ueno also proudly says that Japanese childrearing QC is one of the necessary conditions for well-organized Japanese society.

American capitalism involved women in fierce competition in the labor market without assuming any burden of the reproduction costs...Japanese children are better trained than their American counterparts and are relatively better protected against the rampant spread of sex and drugs, due to [Japanese] standardization policy and control education. The QC of Japanese children plays an indispensable role in creating this well-organized society called Japan. (Ueno 1990, 268-9)

Ueno praises “the intensity and enthusiasm of...the individual mother” for Japanese “high quality” children and society. She continues,

However, it is difficult to maintain this high-level QC with socialized reproductive labor. It is true that socialist nations, such as the Soviet Union and China, supply nursery service from the stage of first socialization. But, communal childcare by a nursing specialist does not reach the intensity and enthusiasm...by the individual mother...An amateur mother is a better educator than any childcare specialist. (Ueno 1990, 268-9)

Ueno argues that, “An amateur mother is a better educator than any childcare specialist.”

Moreover, Ueno says that “the intensity and enthusiasm” of Japanese mothers’ childrearing is responsible for Japan’s accomplishments. This is nothing but an restatement of *bosei*-ism, the Japanese nationalistic stance on maternity, which

ideologically binds Japanese women to childrearing, seemingly, for in the Japanese interest, but in really in for the Japanese capitalist class interest, by helping to preserve secondary labor force in women.

Conclusion

Beside her Marxist feminism, Ueno is an extremely versatile scholar. Ueno became famous not only as a Marxist feminist but also as an expert on various topics. For each topic, Ueno wrote at least one book, each of which is thoroughly prepared, at least in terms of the quantity of information, and on any of which Ueno appears like an expert, as, for example, her Marxist feminist work. Ueno offers expert knowledge on many subject matters. Rather than a committed Marxist feminist, therefore, Ueno resembles a fellow traveler, who found Marxist feminism, including Marx and Freud, Sokoloff, and Delphy, appealing. Marxist feminism for Ueno is just one of many possible ways to increase her cultural capital.

Ueno's Marxist feminism is also versatile. Because of her intensive use and direct citations of Marxist feminist theories, her work becomes a valuable source of information (information commodity). Although her argument does not always make sense, the information Ueno offers is valuable, because she usually introduces new theoretical developments that were previously unavailable to most of her Japanese feminist readership. At the same time, Ueno presents complicated Marxist feminist ideas in a simplified way that makes her Marxist feminism convenient and accessible to *tachiyomi* readers who desire maximal gain through minimal effort. Ueno's frequent use of charts has the same effect. Instead of explaining verbally, Ueno effectively inserts charts that

help her readership understand some of the most complicated points visually. As a consequence, Ueno's work has become a desired commodity of the information-hungry yet-in-a-hurry *tachiyomi* readership of postindustrial Japan.

Ueno's Marxist feminism is not just informative but is also appealing in a number of ways. First, Ueno's use of popular expressions is effective in appealing to the sensitivity of the *tachiyomi* readers, who occasionally browse a book, looking for something interesting. Despite the seriousness of the topic, Ueno's work is playful, like a comic book, and fun to skim.

Ueno also successfully expands her readership by supporting Japanese conservative views, even at risk of her theoretical integrity. Ueno explains how capitalism is contributing to the improvement of the conditions of Japanese women, because Japanese capitalists cannot afford to discriminate against women, in order to compete globally. This is unquestionably a pro-capitalist statement.

There are also some cases in which Ueno sounds more like a proponent of the Japanese pro-nationalistic maternal stance. Ueno says, "the intensity and enthusiasm" of Japanese mothers' childrearing is responsible for Japanese accomplishments. This is obviously an expression of patriotic *bosei*-ism. Also, when she favors the "intensity and enthusiasm" of the Japanese individual mothers over socialized daycare, Ueno's remark has cast doubt on her feminist goals.

In conclusion, as I showed above, Ueno's Marxist feminism is composed of several positions. Because of that, Ueno's Marxist feminism has no position, because each position negates the other. As a pro-national, patriarchal, capitalist Marxist feminist,

Ueno has no position. And, what is most critical for a Marxist theory, Ueno's Marxist feminism lacks one of its key political characteristics: theory as praxis.

Who benefits when the nation's leading Marxist feminist affirms capitalism for promoting gender equality? Least likely to benefit are women laborers in the developing countries exploited by Japanese international corporations. Nor do Japanese working class nor working mothers benefit from Ueno's Marxist feminism. It is the Japanese patriarchal national capitalists who benefit the most.

- CHAPTER 9 -

***BOSEI AS AN EXPRESSION OF THE “MODERN” AND
“TRADITIONAL” JAPANESE WOMEN’S GENDER
ROLES: Class relations, Nationalism, Western Theory, and
Gender Relations***

Class Relations and Nationalism

It is generally believed that the presence of Western imperial powers and the prowess of their military technologies gave rise to Japanese nationalism at the beginning of the Meiji Era. Yet this plausible explanation forgets that Japan was not a homogeneous nation but was made up of various social groups, each of which had its own interests.

Antonio Gramsci, in discussing the relation between international relations and domestic (social) relations, poses a question: “Do international relations precede or follow (logically) fundamental social relations?” Gramsci says that it is the latter (Gramsci 1971, 176). It is domestic sociopolitical relations that define international relations. Gramsci explains how social relations affect international relations:

The more the immediate economic life of a nation is subordinated to international relations, the more a particular party will come to represent this situation and exploit it, with the aim of preventing rival parties from gaining the upper hand (Gramsci 1971, 176-7).

Gramsci’s insight leads us to reconsider the dynamics of the formulation of Japanese nationalism and poses some questions: How did Japanese social relations affect the development of Japanese nationalism? How did the ruling class represent and exploit the situation, in order to preserve its privileges? Why was Japanese nationalism so effective?

First, the Meiji government was made up of the old ruling classes. Needless to say, the old ruling class did not want to lose its privileges by becoming subordinate to a Western power through colonization. Also, it had a profound reason to keep the Western powers away from the masses. It did not want the Western powers to truly enlighten and possibly agitate the masses by transmitting Western democratic ideas to them, because it was afraid of losing the source of exploitation.

In order to prevent these potential threats from happening, the Meiji government effectively used nationalism. The meaning of the West including its “superior” civilization was instituted by ruling class intellectuals. The Meiji government defined the nation’s westernization as a pressing goal, and launched a series of westernization initiatives, exemplified by the government slogans of “Leave Asia, Join Europe” and “Civilization and Enlightenment.” A nationalist consciousness was effectively aroused by Fukuzawa, who was capable of persuading the masses with his writing style, among other things. Also, Fukuzawa gave the improvement of Japanese race as the moral reason from which every Japanese citizen would benefit. The Meiji government was successful in propagating “itself throughout society—bringing about not only a unison of economic and political aims, but also intellectual and moral unity, posing all the questions around which the struggle rages not on a corporate but on a ‘universal plane’” (Gramsci 1971, 181-2).

In this regard, I examined Fukuzawa’s co-optation of Mill’s *Subjection of Women*. Fukuzawa manipulated Mill’s feminist ideas to motivate Japanese women to support the nation’s westernization policy as “Good Wives, Wise Mothers,” thereby transforming

them into gendered national subjects, while suppressing more democratic feminist alternatives. In this context, I discussed the double bind exploitation of Japanese women. Thus, the Meiji government was successful in “creating the hegemony of a fundamental social group over a series of the subordinate groups” (Gramsci 1971, 182). In this context, Fukuzawa, whether intentionally or not, played the role of “deputy intellectual” (Gramsci 1971, 12), and disseminated Mill’s liberal feminist ideas, in order to facilitate the nation’s modernization efforts, particularly targeting women, which primarily benefited the ruling class.

The social relationship between the intellectuals and the world of production is not as direct as it is with the fundamental social groups but it, in varying degrees, “mediated” by the whole fabric of society and by the complex superstructures, of which the intellectuals are, precisely, the “functionaries”....The function in questions are precisely organizational and connective. The intellectuals are the dominant group’s “deputies” exercising the subaltern functions of social hegemony and political government. (Gramsci 1971, 12)

Though often overlooked, one of the primary reasons for the development of Japanese nationalism was to protect the old ruling class’s sociopolitical privileges in the name of “tradition.” This is the origin of Japanese “illiberal” nationalism. And, my examination of Fukuzawa’s manipulation of Mill’s ideas showed that intellectuals were deeply involved in this, and that from the beginning of modern Japanese nationalism women’s gender roles were defined in this context. And, the “Good Wives, Wise Mothers” is a modern version of the Japanese “traditional” gender relations.

“Postmodern” Contradictions?

Takamure manipulated various ideas in contradictory ways. In addition to incorporating Japanese Buddhist *jinen* as one of the key theoretical concepts of her *bosei*-ism,

Takamure justified it in Shintoist terms during World War II. Another conspicuous characteristic of Takamure's *bosei*-ism is her manipulation of various Western ideas. Like *jinen* and Shinto, Western ideas are used as a means to justify Takamure's nationalistic stand. In particular, I have shown how European Buddhist Studies and Fredrich Nietzsche's concept of the "conquest" greatly affected how the nation's nationalism developed from pro-Western nationalism to Japanism and to anti-Western ultra-nationalism. I have also examined Takamure's new *bosei*-ism in this context, and shown that her anti-Western ultranationalistic *bosei*-ism shared the same theoretical background.

Also, Takamure's position is inherently contradictory: she sometimes appears a committed feminist, but, at other times she appears a pro-patriarchy conservative nationalist. Interestingly, Takamure began her career as an anarchist feminist. Takamure saw that the nation-state was an organ of production-centered patriarchy and, thus, was the origin of women's subjugated status. Takamure advocated the establishment of an anarchic society, in which women's reproductive rights would be highly valued, and not only women but also men would participate in reproductive activities (Ōgoshi 1996, 114-7). Needless to say, this position sharply contradicts her wartime nationalist position.

So, is Takamure really a committed nationalist? No, she is not. Takamure's position is not as nationalist as one might believe. Takamure's reinterpretation of the *New Family Name Records* possibly undermines one of the sacred texts of the Japanese Emperor-centered patriarchal system. Takamure's findings are obviously inconsistent with some of the nationalist ideological expressions of ancient Japanese mythologies.

Also, Takamura's research findings show that the notion of a family state headed by the Emperor is a myth. Japanese racial homogeneity is also cast into doubt. Further, Takamura's study shows the ethnic traffic in Japan from ancient times. In addition, Japanese matriarchal families solicited husbands from powerful foreign families.

Do these contradictions exemplify Japanese post-modernity, as Western theorists often claim?¹ Speaking of Japanese eclectic religious practice, Marilyn F. Nefsky, the author of *Stone Houses and Iron Bridges: Tradition and the Place of Women in Contemporary Japan*, suggested that it is the ability of the Japanese to "compartmentize," which,

enables them to harmonize disparate aspects of their lives. They allot to each religion highly specified compartments of beliefs and behaviour which do not infringe on one another. In this way, they are able to harmonize elements that a Westerner would find intrinsically contradictory (Nefsky 1991, 33).

Several feminists have pointed to the manipulation and employment of religion by the ruling authorities for the purpose of legitimizing their power. Okano argues that Shinto "has been employed as a religion for preserving the status quo of the system, as well as Buddhism, Confucianism and new religions, which have all been integrated into society in a typically Japanese style and made to function for the preservation of the status quo" (Okano 1998, 18). As early as 604, Buddhist doctrine was manipulated by Prince Shotoku (*Shōtoku taishi*) in the Seventeen Article Constitution, in order to exhort the importance of *Wa* (harmony) (Ōgoshi 1991a, 73-5; Okano 1998, 26). Similarly, in the

¹ For example, Roland Barthes' *Empire of Signs* (1982 [1970]) is a milestone work on the subject. Also, there are two recent anthologies: *Postmodernism and Japan* (1989) Masamo Miyoshi and H.D. Harootunian (eds.), and *Japan: In Traditional and Postmodern Perspectives* (1995) Charles Wei-hsun Fu and Steven Heine (eds.), published by Duke University Press and State University of New York Press, respectively.

legal codes of ancient Japan (*Ritsuryo*), which developed around the mid-seventh century, Buddhism was integrated as a new religion. And, from the perspective of Buddhist doctrine, the status quo argued that the peace of the nation must be maintained through *Wa* (Okano 1998, 26). From these observations, Okano rightly concludes that “from the beginning, Buddhism’s evolution in Japan was slanted toward preserving the status quo and for the benefits it could give in this world, subjugating the issue of individual religious desires” (Okano 1998, 26).

Takamure advocated new *bosei*-ism, heavily relying on the concept of *jinen* in *Genesis of Love*. In contrast, in *Research on the Matriarchy System*, she celebrated the Japanese Emperor-centered patriarchal system. Also, earlier, in Meiji Japan, Fukuzawa attacked Confucianism as the source of gender inequality, and replaced it with “Good Wives, Wise Mothers.” But, in either case, the conditions of women hardly improved. This shows that religion is not the fundamental cause of gender inequality in Japan. Rather, the fact is that Buddhism, Shintoism and Confucianism had been used for the justification of Japanese women’s traditional roles.

Dilemmas of Western Social Theory in Japan: Aoki’s Ecofeminism as a Reinvention of *Bosei*-ism

In addition to exploring the works of Fukuzawa and Takamure, this dissertation has explored the ways in which various Western ideas were manipulated by Hiratsuka, Tanaka, Aoki, and Ueno, and has shown that Western ideas were manipulated to justify their conservative stances. These findings strongly imply the function of “advanced” Western ideas as “cultural capital” (Bourdieu 1973, 71-113) for Japanese “deputy” intellectuals. By manipulating “advanced” Western theories, “deputy” intellectuals

exercised substantial power over other social groups, expanded their access to preferential occupational positions, and ultimately legitimized their greater share of economic capital,² while helping the ruling class maintain its hegemony. This is the root problem of the co-option of Western ideas by Japanese intellectuals.

Aoki's misuse of Western social theories was one of the most apparent cases of Western theories being manipulated to justify a nationalist stand. One of the ecofeminist ideas Aoki appropriated was criticism of the dualism of Western civilization, by which progress can be understood only as phases of colonization. As I showed above, Aoki used ecofeminism to criticize Western civilization, particularly its handling of nature. However, Aoki rarely used Western social theory to evaluate the Japanese relationship with nature, including *jinen*, the Buddhist conception of nature, as a possible cause of gender discrimination or environmental problems or both.

By manipulating some aspects of ecofeminism, Aoki reinvented Takamure's new *bosei*-ism, which placed great emphasis on Japanese women's supportive, and often altruistic, roles during World War II. To justify her stand, Aoki represents Takamure as an exemplary ecofeminist. Aoki claims that there are commonalities between ecofeminism and *bosei*-ism. For example, pro-nature and anti-Western positions are shared by Takamure and some Western ecofeminists. But it is hardly true that Takamure's adoption of this stance qualifies her as a Japanese ecofeminist. Takamure's *bosei*-ism is rather an expression of Japanese nationalism. Takamure finds the essence of Japanese culture in the Buddhist conception of nature. Takamure's *bosei*-ism must be

² Paul Attewell provides insightful comments in the context of American interparadigmatic competition: "Behind this intellectual competition, of course, there is the competition of real people striving for fame and fortune or simply for a job at a prestigious university" (Attewell 1984, 22).

understood in this context. Moreover, Takamura's understanding of gender relations as part of *jinen* dismisses previous feminists' efforts. Under the concept of *jinen*, everything, including gender relations, must await *jinen*'s spontaneous change. Contrary to Aoki's belief, Takamura's position is anti-feminist. So is Aoki's ecofeminism. Like Takamura's *bosei*-ism, Aoki's ecofeminism is an expression of nationalism.

When Japanese intellectuals appropriate Western social criticism, it is often turned against Western social systems. Japanese "traditional" social systems not only escape such social criticism but are celebrated as alternative and superior. As a result, the conservative images of Japanese society are not only kept intact but also reinvented by "advanced" Western theory. Throughout Japan's modern history, its "traditional" culture has been continuously reinvented and redefined in relation to, and often as an alternative to, its Western counterpart. Under these circumstances, it is indeed a difficult task to engage Japanese sociopolitical criticism with Western social theory without insight into the way Japanese "traditional" culture is constructed.

In contrast, one of the most obscure cases in this regard is Ueno's manipulation of Marxist feminist ideas. Unlike in other writings, except Tanaka's co-option of "consciousness-raising" techniques, an explicit notion of nationalism is absent in Ueno's writings. Nor does Ueno offer a straightforward criticism of Western civilization like Aoki's. My close examination of Ueno's writings showed that the meanings of Marxist (feminist) terms were conservatively interpreted, and were used paradoxically to preserve the status quo. Capitalism was praised as a vehicle for promoting gender equality. The

state was exonerated from any responsibility. And, surprisingly, *bosei* was defined by Ueno as one of the conditions of Japanese success.

Needless to say, some of these problems of Ueno's Marxist feminism have been pointed out by Japanese intellectuals. However, since the advent of *chi* and Women's Studies in Japan, which has significantly expanded the Japanese feminist readership, Japanese feminism has become commercialized. And feminist books have become mere commodities. Japanese feminists' eager criticisms have paradoxically resulted in further popularization of Ueno as a celebrity feminist. These trends cannot be stopped. Rather, they will be accelerated with more technological advancements.

Social Consequences of *Bosei*-ism in the Present Time

Kanazaki Fumiko, a Japanese feminist, points out that, although more Japanese women seek independence and social participation in the present time than before, a majority of Japanese people harshly criticizes working mothers who leave their children at a day nursery. They are often criticized as "self-centered mothers" (*jiko chūshin no hahaoya*) or "mothers who lost their *bosei*-love" (*bosei wo ushinatta hahaoya*) (Kanazaki 1980).

Japanese mothers are under strong pressure to become a good mother. In this regard, Cynthia Fuchs Epstein insightfully explains,

Societies make it the responsibility of people from certain groups to be responsible for such social needs as food, shelter, child care, and leadership. Nowhere do they depend on "nature" to get the jobs done. The range of work that men and women do each society is stipulated by that society, and few individuals are permitted to choose outside the approved range. These assignments are justified on the basis of ideologies and popular cultural opinions that maintain the assignments are just and the arrangement is good... Violators are severely punished. (Epstein 1988, 10)

Ohinata Masami, one of the few Japanese feminists who have been studying *bosei*-ism since the 1980s, adds that Japanese tendency to highly value mothers' child-rearing role became part of the Child Welfare Law (*Jidō fukushi hō*) in 1951. Article 39, Clause 1 of the law defines that a day nursery is a facility that nurses infants and children whose guardians lack nursing ability (Ohinata 1994 [1988], 38).

Shibayama Emiko, a women's labor economist, identified the following eight changes in Japanese women workers since the mid-1970s.

1. The percentage of middle-aged and older women who work has increased to more than 30 percent.
2. The percentage of women in the labor force has increased to over 40 percent.
3. The percentage of women workers who are employees (as opposed to workers in family business and self-employed workers) now exceeds 70 percent.
4. The percentage of all employees who are women has now climbed to 40 percent.
5. The average age of women employees has risen to the mid thirties, and the number of employees who have been married (i.e., who are married, widowed, or divorced) has increased to 70 percent.
6. About 70 percent of women employees work in tertiary industries.
7. The number of women employees who are part-time workers has climbed to 20 percent, and their patterns of employment have become both diverse and unstable (for example, they are sent from site to site or used as temporary or day workers).
8. More women are employed in the field of high technology. (Shibayama 1987, in Ueno 1994, 23-4).

After the International Women's Year of 1975, Japanese gender relations underwent significant changes including the government efforts to reduce the problem of gender discrimination. Since then, more Japanese women have advanced into the workplace. Yet, the majority of the women workers are not "career women." Rather, they are middle-aged and older women who work for the unstable and low-paying sectors. The increase in the women's advancement into the workplace mainly reflects these changes. This really is not an improvement for Japanese women. Rather, it is more aptly called "a

marginalization of Japanese women's labor" (Ueno 1994, 24). Ueno Chizuko adds, "The working conditions awaiting the middle-aged and older women who returned to the workplace were terrible: unskilled positions at low wages with no job security" (Ueno 1994, 25).

One of the main reasons for this marginalization of Japanese women workers is the ideology of *bosei*. These middle-aged women who enter the workforce are workers who left the workforce to marry and have children and return to work. Very few Japanese women never stopped working, even when having or raising children. *Searching for a New Way of Life for Women* (1987) a study by the National Life Bureau of the Economic Planning Agency shows these trends very clearly. It examines the relationship between women's work and family life, and surveyed 655 women and categorized them into six different life patterns. These six patterns are:

Pattern 1: unmarried, no children, continue to work

Pattern 2: married, no children, continue to work

Pattern 3: married, have children, continue to work

Pattern 4: married, have children, quit work

Pattern 5: quit work to marry or have children, return to work after raising children

Pattern 6: married, have children, never worked (cited in Ueno 1994, 24)

There are only 21.7 percent of the women in Pattern 3: married, have children, continue to work. And, 57.2 percent the majority of women in their thirties are categorized either Pattern 4: married, have children, quit work or Pattern 5: quit work to marry or have children, return to work after raising children (Ueno 1994, 24).

In the beginning of the twenty first century, Japanese women are still expected to excel in childrearing. As Chart C: Japanese Women in the Workplace shows, working women in Japan continue to form an M-shaped employment pattern based on age groups.

It is predicted that the situation where women leave the workplace because of marriage, childbirth, or childrearing will not disappear completely very soon, although the M-shaped employment pattern is less pronounced in the most recent years than it was before. At the same time, an increasing number of Japanese women have advanced to the workplace. However, the working conditions are least favorable. When they return to the workplace after childrearing, Japanese women are expected to work for the unstable and low-paying sectors, which Japanese men are least likely to take. As a result, it is difficult to claim that the conditions for Japanese women have improved much since the International Women's Year of 1975.

In the context of the Meiji government's overzealous modernization policy, I showed how Japanese women were exploited as "Good Wives, Wise Mothers" at home and also as cheap laborers at the light industry, and discussed the double bind exploitation of Japanese women's labor.³ Although there are some variations time to time, these findings suggest that Japanese women of the present time, too, are subject to the same exploitative conditions. Needless to say, *bosei* ideology plays a key role in the maintenance of this exploitative system. This probably explains Japan's low birth rate, which is one of the lowest in the world, as a twenty-nine years old part-time worker wrote a letter to the *Yomiuri Newspaper* in 1990.

It is miserable for a grown-up woman to live without economic independence. So I decided that one child was enough for me. I don't want to spoil the life either of my child or myself... Why should women bear children for the aged and the state? Never, for anything! If they think they need more children, let them use the military budget or something for that. But it's a mistake to reproach women for the decline of the birthrate. I want to say to the state, "Stop exploiting women

³ Refer to Chapter 5.

forever! We won't be duped any more!" and live my life free from regret. (in Ogino 1994, 90)

How do the Japanese overcome these dilemmas of Western ideas in Japan? How do the Japanese finally recognize and leave behind these "traditional" Japanese characteristics as barriers to the establishment of a more democratic Japanese society? These are tough questions to answer. First and foremost, however, Japanese intellectuals must open their academia to *gaijin* (outside people or foreigners). In order to facilitate communication between Japanese and *gaijin* intellectuals, some development in multilingual communications technology is required. I hope it will happen in the near future.

While *bosei* has been rediscovered and diversified since the 1910s to the present, as Ohinata points out, very few Japanese feminists have so far critically examined *bosei*-ism (Ohinata 1994 [1988], 41-7). Japanese feminist scholarship needs to pay more attention to *bosei*-ism, deconstruct its meaning, and finally dismantle it. Also, Ōgoshi Aiko explains "the biggest task" for Japanese feminism: "The biggest task for Japanese feminism in the future is the incorporation of human rights into feminism in Japan" (Ōgoshi 1996, 155). Ōgoshi continues and says, "However, it cannot be done without an examination of how 'human rights' have become hollow and worthless in Japanese society and culture up to the present" (Ōgoshi 1996, 155). In order really to improve the conditions of Japanese women, Japanese feminist scholarship may begin examining if and how *bosei*-ism contributes to the violation of Japanese women's human rights. At the same time, the concept "human rights" is a Western import. As Ōgoshi suggests, the meaning of "human rights" has possibly changed in the Japanese, like the Western

feminist ideas I discussed above. A cross-cultural comparative analysis of the meanings of “human rights” may also be needed.

In the meantime, I hope that my criticism of Japanese co-optation of Western feminist ideas as a political process will contribute to our understanding of the paradoxical relationship between gender inequality and the westernization of Japanese feminism. In particular, I hope that my findings will help us understand why the improvement of Japanese women’s conditions is lagging, despite the nation’s successful images. Additionally, I hope that these chapters demonstrate the significant effects of Japanese capitalism and nationalism on Japanese feminism.

At a theoretical level, the proposed synthesis of post-colonial perspectives in this analysis of Japanese gender relations, which are presumably a domestic domain, appears to be novel and challenging. I hope to have proved it to be fully appropriate. I also hope to have provided a possible explanation of the mechanism of an ideological reproduction of the relation of production, which can be found in many capitalist societies.

Furthermore, at a more practical level, the findings will help to stage the redirection of Japanese society, where further social changes, including demographic diversity, are expected in the near future.

Appendix A: Japanese Appropriation of Western Feminist Works
Chart A1 – An Historical Overview

Year	Rediscovering <i>Bosei</i>	Key Events in Japanese (Feminist) History	Japanese Translations of Western (Feminist) Works	Notes
1867			<i>Principles of the Civil Code</i> (1802) by Jeremy Bentham (FRA).	Original in French.
1868		Meiji Restoration. Law prohibits midwives from prescribing medicine and from operating abortion is promulgated.		
1871		Meiji government sends five young girls to the U.S., including Tsuda Umeko.		They are sent to American homes.
1872	Fukuzawa Yukichi, <i>An Encouragement of Learning</i> .	Fundamental Code of Education is established.		Until 1876. It requires four years of compulsory education for both girls and boys.
1873		Lifting the ban on Christianity. Meiji Six Society is founded.		
1874		Japan's Popular Rights Movement is born. Tokyo Women's Teachers' School and Atomi Women's School are founded.		Until 1880s. They later become Ochanomizu Women's University and Atomi Gakuen Women's University respectively.
		Midwives are required to obtain license.		
		Hishikawa Nobuchika, "Kitagou-dan."		Shintoism and Buddhism over Christianity.

1875	Fukuzawa, "The Equal Number of Men and Women."			
	Fukuzawa, <i>An Outline of a Theory of Civilization</i> .			
	Fukuzawa, "The Power of Education."			Natural talent.
1876		Doi Kōka, <i>On Civilization: The Greater Learning for Women</i> .		
1877			<i>Principle of Population</i> (1798) by T.R. Malthus.	
1878		Kusunose Kita demands the right to vote.		
			<i>The Subjection of Women</i> (1869) by John Stuart Mill (GBR).	Liberal feminism.
			<i>Difference of Sex, as a Topic of Jurisprudence and Legislation</i> (1879) by Sheldon Amos (GBR).	Marriage law.
1879			<i>On Our Knowledge of the Phenomena of Organic Nature</i> (1862) by T.H. Huxley (GBR).	
1880		Education Act is established and abolishes coeducation beyond elementary school.		Women are formally excluded from public middle schools.
		Abortion is defined as a criminal offense.		Followed the French criminal law.
1881	Fukuzawa contends the superiority of the Samurai class people, mentioning Francis Galton's <i>Hereditary Genius</i> (1869).			<i>Jijikogoto</i>
1882	Fukuzawa, <i>The Power of Heredity</i> .			<i>Jijishinpo</i>
		Kato Hiroyuki, <i>A New Theory on Human Rights</i> .		

		Meiji Criminal Law is enacted.		Concubines lose their legal status and their children become considered illegitimate.
		Kishida Toshiko gives a speech "The Way for Women."		
1883		Kishida makes a speech "A Girl in a Box, or the Imperfection of Marriage."		
		The term "Eugenics" was coined by Francis Galton (GBR).		<i>Inquiries into Human Faculty and Its Development.</i>
		Ariga Nagao, <i>On Social Revolution.</i>		
			<i>Essays and Lectures on Social and Political Subjects</i> (1872) by Millicent Garrett Fawcett with Henry Fawcett (GBR).	Women's suffrage.
1884		Takahashi Yoshio, <i>On the Improvement of the Japanese Race.</i>		Fukuzawa's disciple; recommends inter-racial marriage with the European.
		Kishida writes "I Tell You, My Fellow Sisters" for a Liberal Party newspaper.		
			<i>Social Statics, or the Conditions Esssential to Human Happiness Specified, and the First of Them Developed</i> (1851) by Herbert Spencer (GBR).	Social Darwinism.
1885	Fukuzawa, "On Japanese Women."			
		Fukuda Hideko is involved in the Osaka Incident.		
1886	Fukuzawa, "On the Association of Men and Women."			

	Fukuzawa, <i>On Japanese Women</i> .		
	Iwamoto Zenji starts publishing <i>Women's Learning Journal</i> .		Nation's first women's studies journal.
	The Reform Society is founded by Yajima Kajiko.		Japan's branch of the Woman's Christian Temperance Union.
	The first labor strike, initiated by one hundred women workers at a silk mill.		
	Kato Hiroyuki criticizes Takahashi's race theory & Fukuzawa rebuts Kato's position.		In "On Japanese Women."
1887	Yamagata Teizaburo, <i>The Selection in Relation to Sex</i> .		Written based on Darwin's <i>The Descent of Man and the Selection in Relation to Sex</i> (1871).
	Nitta Keijiro, <i>On Revolution</i> .		
	Imperial Household Agency publishes <i>Women's Model</i> , ed. by Nishimura Shigeki.		Nishimura is a Meiji Six member.
		<i>The Woman Question in Europe: a Series of Original Essays</i> (1884) by Theodore Stanton (GBR).	Social & moral questions.
1889	Fukuzawa, "The New Greater Learning for Women."		
	Meiji Constitution is promulgated.		
	Nishimura Shigeki delivers a speech on "Women's Education."		
1890	Meeting and Political Organization Law is issued.		It restricts all women's political activities.
	Imperial Rescript on Education is promulgated.		
1892	Nagai Masanao writes <i>On</i>		

		<i>Women's Education.</i>		
		Ishikawa Chiyomatsu, <i>A New Theory on Revolution.</i>		Ishikawa earlier translated August Weismann's revolution theory.
		Sasagawa Misu, "Thirteen Warnings for Midwives."		Contends the importance of midwife in relation to "Wealthy Nation, Strong Army" propaganda.
1894		Sino-Japan War begins.		
		Miwada Masako writes <i>Women's Duties.</i>		Perhaps based on John Ruskin's (GBR) work. Original unidentified.
1896		Naruse Jinzou, writes <i>Women's Education.</i>		He later establishes Japan Women's University.
	Fukuzawa repeats his position on the improvement of the Japanese race.			In <i>Fukuou Hyakuwa.</i>
		Miyake Kiichi, <i>Darwin.</i>		
1898		Meiji Civil Code is promulgated.		Japan's patriarchal family (<i>ie</i>) system is formally established.
1899	Fukuzawa, "A Critique of <i>The Greater Learning for Women.</i> "			
		Girls' High School Law is issued.		To educate girls to become "good wives, wise mothers."
		Regulation of Midwives is promulgated.		Midwife become a national license.
		Jissen Women's School is founded.		It later becomes Jissen Women's University.
1900		Tsuda Umeko founds the Girls' English School.		It later becomes Tsuda College.
		Yoshioka Yayoi founds the		It later becomes Tokyo

	Tokyo Women's Medical School.*		Women's Medical University. *Hereafter, numerous women's higher educational institutions become established.
	Article 5 of the Police Security Regulations prohibits women from joining political organizations.		
1901	Women's Patriotic Society is formed.		
1902	Kotoku Shusui publishes <i>Socialism and Women</i> .		
1903	Hani Motoko starts <i>Home Companion</i> .		
		[On Late Marriage] by John William Ogle (GBR).	Original unidentified.
1904	Shimoda Jiro writes <i>Women's Education</i> .		
	Russo-Japanese War begins.		
1905	Commoners' Association petitions for a revision of Article 5.		
1906		<i>Higher Education of Women in Europe</i> (1890) by Helen Lange and L.R. Klemm.	
		<i>Sex and Character</i> (1903) by Otto Weininger (AUS).	Original in German. Sexual ethics.
1907	Fukuda Hideko starts <i>World Women</i> .		
	Girls entering school reaches 96 percent.		
1909		<i>The Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection, or the Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life</i>	Natural selection.

			(1859) by Charles Darwin (GBR).	
			<i>The Family</i> (1906) by Helen Bosanquet (GBR).	
1910		Yoshida Kumaji, <i>Research on Women</i> ; Yasube Ikuo, <i>Women's Ideal</i> ; Kawada Tsuguo, <i>Women Question</i> ; Uesugi Shinkichi, <i>Women Question</i> .		
		Annexation of Korea.		
			<i>History of European Morals from Augustus to Charlemagne</i> (1869) by William Edwards and Hartpole Lecky.	Ethics.
1911	Hiratsuka and other feminists establish <i>Seitōsha</i> and start <i>Seitō</i> .			
		Factory Law is enacted.		Tuberculosis epidemic. Limits hrs worked to 12 and requires 2 days off each month.
		Kanno Suga is hanged on the charge of attempted assassination of the Emperor Meiji.		
			<i>Women and Economics: a Study of the Economic Relation between Men and Women as a Factor in Social Evolution</i> (1899) by Charlotte Perkins Gilman (Stetson) (USA).	
			"The Relations of the Sexes" (1830s) by Leo Tolstoy (RUS).	Cited in Yosano. Sexual love as a sign of imperfection of humankind.
1912			<i>Woman in Transition</i> (1907) by Annette M.B. Meakin (GBR).	
			<i>The Education of Girls</i> (1713) by François de Salignac de La Mothe-Fénelon (FRA).	Original in French.

1913			<i>Man and Woman: a Study of Human Secondary Sexual Characters</i> (1894) by Havelock Ellis (GBR).	Gender characters.
1914		World War I begins.		
		Yomiuri Shimbun, a national newspaper, establishes a column for women.		
			<i>The Tragedy of Woman's Emancipation</i> (1913) by Emma Goldman (RUS/USA).	Anarchist feminism.
			<i>Love and Marriage</i> (1911) by Ellen Key (SWE).	Original in Swedish.
1915	Hiratsuka, "The Conflict between Life as an 'Individual' and Life as a 'Woman.'"			
			<i>The Sexual Question: a Scientific, Psychological, Hygienic and Sociological Study</i> (1906) by August Forel (GER).	Original in German; Sex
			"Woman: and Her Place in a Free Society" (1894) by Edward Carpenter (GBR).	An article in the author's <i>Love's coming-of-age</i> ; Homosexuality
1916	Hiratsuka, "Offer Yosano Akiko the Assertion of Maternity."			
	Yosano Akiko, "Reject <i>Bosei-favor</i> ."			
		<i>Women's Review</i> begins publishing.		
			<i>Crime, its Causes, and Remedies</i> (1899) by Cesare Lombroso (FRA).	Original in French; Criminology
			<i>The Evolution of Love</i> (1913) by Emil Lucka (GER).	Original in German.
			<i>Marriage and the Sex-problem</i> (1911) by Friedrich Wilhelm Foerster (GER).	Original in German.
			<i>Heredity and Environment in the Development of Men</i> (1915) by Edwin Grant Conklin (USA).	

			"The Gynaecocentric Theory" in <i>Pure Sociology</i> (1903) by Lester Frank Ward (USA).	
1917		<i>Friends of Housewives</i> begins publishing.		
			<i>Woman and Labor</i> (1911) by Olive Schreiner (SAF).	
1918			<i>War, Peace, and the Future: a Consideration of Nationalism and Internationalism, and of the Relation of Women of War</i> (1916) by Ellen Key (SWE).	Original in Swedish.
			<i>The Drama of Love and Death</i> (1912) by Edward Carpenter (GBR).	
		<i>Bosei</i> Protection Debate: Yosano, "Be Based on the Principle of Women's Occupational Independence" (Jan.), "Women's Thorough Independence" (Mar.), and "A Debate between Hiratsuka and Me" (Jun.).		
		Hiratsuka, "Is the Assertion of <i>Bosei</i> Protection an Expression of State Dependency" (Jul.)		
		Yamada Waka, "Advocate a Future Women's Question."		
		Yamakawa, "Evaluate a Women's Theory that Betrays Women" (Aug.) and " <i>Bosei</i> Protection and Economic Independence: a Debate between Yosano and Hiratsuka" (Sep.)		
1919			<i>The Renaissance of Motherhood</i> (1914) by Ellen Key (SWE).	Original in Swedish, trans. by Hiratsuka.
1920		Ito Noe, <i>Pauper's Honor</i> .		Anarchist feminism.

		Ichikawa Fusae, Hiratuska and others establish the New Women's Association.		Women suffragists.
		First Volume of <i>Report of the Japan Children's Association</i> is issued.		The name is later changed to <i>Children's Magazine</i> .
1921		Yamakawa Kikue founds Red Wave Society.		Next year it is renamed Youka Kai.
			<i>Love's Coming-of-age: a Series of Papers on the Relations of the Sexes</i> (1909) by Edward Carpenter (GBR).	
			<i>The Marriage Revolt</i> (1921) by William E. Carson (USA).	
1922	Takamure, Misōkyoku.			
			<i>Feminism and Sex-extinction</i> (1920) by Arabella Kenealy (GBR).	
			<i>Applied Eugenics</i> (1918) by Paul Popenoe and Roswell Hill Johnson (USA).	
1923		Great Kanto Earthquake.		
		Women's Suffrage Alliance is formed.		
		Japanese Communist Party becomes subject to increasing police harassment.		
		Peace Preservation Law is promulgated.		
			<i>The Women and Socialism</i> (1879) by August Bebel (GER) trans. by Yamakawa.	Original in German.
1926			<i>The Natural Philosophy of Love</i> (1903) by Remy de Gourmont (FRA).	Original in French.
	Takamure, <i>Genesis of Love</i> .			
1927			<i>The Woman</i> (1860) by Jules Michelet (FRA).	Original in French.
			<i>The Prehistory of Marriage and Family</i>	Original in German.

			(1912) by Heinrich Wilhelm Carl Curow (GER).	
			[Women's Liberation and Politics] by the German Communist Party.	Original unidentified. Communism.
			[To Women] by Vladimir Lenin and Clara Zetkin (RUS).	Original unidentified. Communism.
			"Communism and the Family" (1920) by Alexandra Kollontai (RUS).	Communism.
1928	Yamakawa, "An Examination of Feminism."			Criticism of <i>Bosei</i> -ists - Hiratsuka and Takamure.
	Love Debate between Yamakawa and Takamure.			
		Nation's first "universal" suffrage election is held.*		*Women were not included.
			[Revolution and Sex Life] (1922) by Geliman (RUS).	A report of a survey of 1600 students in Moscow after the revolution. Original and author not identified
1929			<i>The Intelligent Woman's Guide to Socialism and Capitalism</i> (1928) by Bernard Shaw (GBR).	The Fabian Society; Socialism
1930	Takamure starts <i>Women's Battle Line</i> .			Anarchist feminism.
			<i>The Socialist Woman's Guide to Intelligence: a Reply to Mr. Shaw</i> (1929) by Lilian Le Mesurier (GBR).	
			<i>The Labour of Women in the Evolution of the Economy</i> (1921) by Alexandra Kollontai (RUS).	First published as a pamphlet.
			[Marxism and Woman's Question] by Vladimir Lenin and David Borisovich Ryazanov (RUS).	Marxism. Criticism of Kollontai.
			By the Communist International	Communism.

			(Comintern) (RUS).	
			<i>The Bankruptcy of Marriage</i> (1928) by V.F. Calverton (USA).	Anti-Stalinist left social critic; Praised marriage by love; the end of bourgeois family.
			<i>Companionate Marriage</i> (1927) by Benjamin Barr Lindsey with Wainwright Evans (USA).	Family court judge. Women suffrage
1931		Manchurian Incident.		
			[The Present Condition of International Women's Movement] (RUS).	Contains articles from the journal <i>Revolutionary Woman Worker</i> and a report from the Labor Union Women's Committee International Meeting.
			The Theory and Reality of Women's Suffrage (1920) by Joseph Barthélemy (FRA).	Original in French.
1932		Shanghai Incident.		
		Women's National Defense Association is established.		
		<i>Bosei Studies in Practice</i> by Kagoyama Kogyū.		
		<i>Bosei-centered Education</i> by Education Council Center.		
			<i>Woman in Soviet Russia</i> (1928) by Jessica Smith (RUS).	The author is an American socialist.
1933		<i>Various Faces of Bosei</i> by Ashikaga Joen.		
			<i>Save the Mothers</i> (1930) by Estelle Sylvia Pankhurst (GBR).	Advocated the state protection of motherhood.
1934		<i>Bosei-love Reader</i> , by Girls & Boys Education Association.		

			<i>Mother's Songs, Games, and Stories</i> (1844) by Friedrich Fröbel (GER).	Original in German.
1937		Promulgation of the Mother and Child Protection Law		
		<i>Glorifying Bosei and Bosei Worshipping</i> by Kagawa Toyohiko.		
		<i>Second Bosei</i> by Kaimoto Itsuki.		
			<i>Housewives Build a New World</i> (1935) by Emmy Freundlich (GER).	Corp. author: International Co-operative Women's Guild Reading. Original in German.
1938		National General Mobilization Law is promulgated.		
		Takamura, <i>Research on the Matriarchal System.</i>		
		<i>Bosei Reader</i> by Shimoda Jiro.		
			<i>Mother Right: a Study of the Religious and Juridical Aspects of Gynecocracy in the Ancient World</i> (1861) by Johann Jakob Bachofen (GER).	Original in German.
1939		World War II begins.		
		<i>Sublime Bosei</i> by Reiretsun.		
		<i>Bosei and Religion</i> by Fujikawa Yu		
		<i>Japanese Women's Moral Philosophy: Bosei is Strong</i> by Watanabe Motomu.		
			<i>The Mothers: a Study of the Origins of Sentiments and Institutions</i> (1927) by Robert Briffault (GBR).	
1940		Women's Suffrage League is disbanded.		
			<i>The Mothers: the Matriarchal Theory of</i>	

			<i>Social Origins</i> (1931) by Robert Briffault (GBR).	
			<i>The Life of Nazi Women</i> (1940) by Ann Marie Kiefer (GER).	The author is the wife of then German ambassador to Japan.
1941		Japan enters World War II.		
	<i>Longing for Bosei</i> by Oseki Iwaji.			
			<i>Italian Women and Fascism</i> (1941) by The Italian Embassy in Japan as.	Propaganda document. Praises the virtue of women in ancient Roma.
			<i>Fascist Mother</i> (1936) by Maria Luisa Fiumi (ITA).	Original in Italian.
1942	<i>Modern Bosei Studies</i> by Furuya Tsunatake.			
	<i>Instructions for Bosei</i> by Fukuda Hiroshi.			
	<i>Bosei and Education</i> by Kawashima Kiyokichi.			
	<i>Bosei Mobilization</i> by Takeda Toshihiko.			
	<i>Protection of Bosei</i> by Sato Tadashi.			
	<i>History of Bosei</i> by Ifukube Yoshiko.			
			<i>German Race Policy</i> (1937) by Rudolf Frercks (GER).	Original in German.
		Great Japan Women's Organization is established.		
			<i>Unknown Army—Mobilization of Women during War</i> (1920) by Marie Elizabeth Lüders (GER).	Original in German.
1943	<i>On Bosei Education</i> by Fukushima Masao.			
	<i>Bosei and Health Education</i> by			

	Hirose Ko. <i>Protection of Bosei</i> by Imperial Rule Assistance Association.			
1945		World War II ends.		
	<i>Structure of Nationalistic Bosei</i> by Mori Yasuko.			
		Ichikawa establishes Women's Committee on Postwar Countermeasures, and demands women's suffrage.		
1946		Japan's New Constitution is promulgated.		
	<i>On Bosei Education</i> by Fukushima Masao.			
			Articles on Eros by Ludwig Klages, J.J. Bachofen, and Emil Lucka (GER).	
1947		Japan's new Constitution is enacted.		Guarantees equal rights to both women and men.
		Japan's prewar family (<i>ie</i>) system is abolished.		
		First universal suffrage election is held.		39 women are elected to the House of Representative.
		Labor Standards Act stipulates the equal treatment of women.		Prohibits only differential treatment with respect to wages.
		Yamakawa becomes the first Director of the Bureau of Women and Children of the Ministry of Labor.		
1948		The Eugenic Protection Law is passed by the Diet.		Following Nazi Germany's Hereditary Disease Prevention Law.
		The Japan Housewives Association is founded.		

		The Children's Welfare Law is established.		
	<i>Bosei and Hygiene</i> by Oshima Masao.			
1949	<i>Flower and Bosei</i> by Takeuchi Teruyo.			
1950		Korean War begins.		
1951		Japan-US Security Treaty is signed.		
1952	<i>Bosei Hygiene and Instructions</i> by Kobayashi Toshimasa.			
	<i>Love, Marriage, and Bosei</i> by Taniguchi Masaharu.			
			<i>The Question of the Women</i> (1949) by Maurice Toesca (FRA).	Original in French.
1953	Takamure, <i>Research on Shouseikon</i> .			
	<i>Bosei Hygiene</i> by Segi Mitsuo.			
			<i>Hysteria, Reflex, and Instinct</i> (1960) by Ernst Kretschmer (GER).	Original in German.
			<i>Of Men and Women</i> (1941) by Pearl Buck (USA).	
		<i>The Second Sex</i> becomes a bestseller.	<i>The Second Sex</i> (1953) by Simone de Beauvoir (FRA).	Original in French. Radical feminism
1954	Takamure, <i>History of Women</i> .			Multi-volume, published also in 1955 and 58.
			<i>Women and Communism : Selections from the Writings of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin</i> (1950).	Communism.
			<i>The Natural Superiority of Women</i> (1953) by Ashley Montagu (GBR).	
			<i>Family Living</i> (1950) by Evelyn Millis Duval and Dora S. Lewis (USA).	
1955		First "Mother Movement"		"No More Hiroshimas."

		meeting is held.		Continues to the present.
		First World Conference against A & H Bombs is held in Hiroshima.		
			<i>Love and Nothing</i> (1951) by Roger Nimier (FRA).	Original in French.
1956			<i>The History of Human Marriage</i> (1891) by Edward Westermarck (FIN).	Darwinian.
		<i>Bosei and Pediatric Nutrition</i> by Saito Fumio.		
1957		Anti-prostitution Law is established.		
			<i>Ordinary Women</i> by Monica Felton.	Original not identified
1958		Nishiwaki Junko, <i>Women University Students</i> .		
		<i>Bosei Health</i> by Moriyama Yutaka.		
1959		<i>Bosei Psychology</i> by Muramatsu Isao.		
			<i>The Art of Loving</i> (1956) by Erich Fromm (GER).	
1960			<i>Child Welfare</i> (1957) by Marcel Lelong (FRA).	Original in French.
		<i>Bosei Health</i> by Atomi Kazuko.		
1961		<i>Bosei and Faith</i> by Kushimoto Kimi.		
			<i>Male and Female: a Study of the Sexes in a Changing World</i> (1949) by Margaret Mead (USA).	
			<i>A Short History of Women</i> (1927) by John Langdon-Davies (GBR).	
			<i>Memoirs of a Dutiful Daughter</i> (1959) by Simone de Beavoir (FRA).	Original in French.

1962		Teruoka Yasutaka, <i>Women Students Grow Space</i> ; Ikeda		
		Yasaburo, <i>On the Perils of University Women</i> .		
		Nakayama Masa is appointed the Minister of Health and Welfare.		
1963	Takamura, <i>History of Marriage in Japan</i> .			
			<i>Marriage and Morals</i> (1929) by Bertland Russell (GBR).	
		From around this time, increasing numbers of women's colleges and junior colleges are to be established.		
			<i>Force of Age: the Autobiography of Simone de Beauvoir</i> (1960) (FRA).	Original in French.
1964			<i>The Anatomy of Melancholy</i> (1621) by Robert Burton (GBR).	
1965		Seikatsu Club Seikyo is funded.		
		Maruyama Kunio, <i>Women's Junior Colleges</i> .		
			<i>The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State: Based on the Findings of L.H. Morgan in His Ancient Society</i> (1884) by Friedrich Engels (GER).	Original in German.
			<i>The Feminine Mystique</i> (1963) by Betty Friedan (USA).	Radical feminism. Liberal feminism.
			<i>Force of Circumstance: the Autobiography of Simone de Beauvoir</i> (1963) (FRA).	Original in French.
1966			<i>Tomorrow Women</i> (1965) by Evelyn Sullerot (FRA).	Original in French.
1967	<i>Bosei Health</i> by Hayashi Michiaki and Yamashita Akira.			

			<i>Marriage and Family Relations in the USSR</i> (1964) by Anatolii Georgievich Kharchev (RUS).	Original in Russian.
			<i>The Family</i> (1964) by William J. Goode (USA).	
1968			<i>The Family and Human Adaptation: Three Lectures</i> (1963) by Theodore Lidz (USA).	
			<i>Patterns in Comparative Religion</i> (1948) by Mircea Eliade (FRA).	Original in French.
1969	<i>Bosei's Mental Health</i> by Muramatsu Isao.			
	<i>Respect for Bosei</i> by Fukushima Masao.			
	<i>Bosei Dietetics</i> by Sawasaki Chiaki.			
			<i>Clara Zetkin: a Life Picture</i> (1957) by Luise Dornemann (GER).	Original in German.
			<i>Exploring the Base for Family Therapy: Papers</i> (1961) by Nathan Ward Ackerman, F.L. Beatman, and S.N. Sherman (eds.) (USA).	
1970		Tanaka Mitsu, "Emancipation from the Toilet."		
		Women demonstrators fill a street in Tokyo.		Many uman ribu groups are formed in the early 1970s.
		A teach-in "Protesting Sexual Discrimination" is held.		
		Nakane Chie becomes the first woman professor at Tokyo University.		
		"Fight against Bosei Destruction," <i>Labor and Farmer Movement</i> Special Edition.		

			<i>Conjoint Family Therapy: A Guide to Theory and Technique</i> (1964) by Virginia Satir (USA).	
			<i>Memoirs of Mary Wollstonecraft</i> (1927) by William Godwin (GBR).	
			<i>Life Styles of Educated Women</i> (1966) by Eli Ginzberg (USA).	Original source not confirmed
			<i>The Captive Wife</i> (1966) by Hannah Gavron (GBR).	Radical feminism
			<i>Female Sexuality</i> (1953) by Marie Bonaparte (FRA).	Original in French.
			<i>Psychodynamics of Family Life: Diagnosis and Treatment of Family Relationships</i> (1994) by Nathan Ward Ackerman (USA).	
			<i>Human Sexual Inadequacy</i> (1970) by William Masters and Virginia Johnson (USA).	Radical feminism.
1971		Nation's First Women's Liberation Study-Work Camp is held.		Group Fighting Women.
		<i>Bosei and Pediatric Dietetics</i> by Ando Suguru and Yamashita Yasumasa.		
		<i>Bosei Health Text</i> by Japan Bosei Health Society.		
			<i>Children in Care: the Development of the Service for Deprived Child</i> (1965) by Jean S. Heywood (GBR).	
			<i>Notes from the First Year</i> (1968) by Shulamyth Firestone and Anne Koedt (USA).	Radical feminism.
1972		"Symposium to Think about Bosei," <i>Monthly Socialist Party</i> Special Edition.		

		First Women's Liberation Convention is held.		
		A revision of the Eugenic Protection Law is proposed.		Aimed at prohibiting abortions for economic reasons.
		Second Women's Liberation Study-Work camp is held.		
		Shinjuku Women's Liberation Center is opened.		
			<i>The Coming of Age</i> (1972) by Simone de Beauvoir (FRA).	Original in French.
			<i>Society without the Father: a Contribution to Social Psychology</i> (1969) by Alexander Mitscherlich (GER).	Original in German.
			<i>Marriage, Past and Present</i> (1956) by Robert Briffault and Bronislaw Malinowski (USA).	Radical feminism.
			<i>The Dialectics of Sex</i> (1971) by Shulamith Firestone (USA).	Radical feminism.
			<i>The Power and Women and the Subversion of the Community</i> (1972) by Mariarosa Dalla Costa and Selma James (ITA).	Radical feminism.
1973		Oil Crisis.		
		<i>Working Women and Bosei Protection</i> by Shimazu Chiriyo.		
		<i>Challenging Bosei Loss</i> by Goto Sadatsugu.		
		"Modern Bosei," <i>World Special Edition</i> .		
		"Today's Bosei Protection Demand and Equality Demand," <i>Wages and Social Security Special Edition</i> .		
			<i>Women in Antiquity</i> (1956) by Charles	

			Theodore Seltman (GBR). <i>Amor and Psyche: the Psychic Development of the Feminine: a Commentary on the Tale by Apuleius</i> (1956) by Eric Neumann (GER).	Original in German.
			<i>Sexual Politics</i> (1970) by Kate Millet(t) (USA).	Radical feminism.
			<i>All Said and Done</i> (1972) by Simone de Beauvoir (FRA).	Original in French.
1974			<i>Problems of Women's Liberation: a Marxist Approach</i> (1969) by Evelyn Reed (USA).	Marxist.
			<i>An Autobiography</i> (1977) by Angela Davis (USA).	Radical feminism.
1975		International Women's Year is observed.		
		Headquarters for the Planning and Promotion of Policies to Women is established.		
		Advisory Council on Women is established.		
1976		Launching of the UN Decade for Women 1976-85.		
		<i>Collection of Japan Women Question Data</i> is published.		10 volumes (-1982).
		<i>Bosei Health Studies</i> by Tsuno Kiyoo and Honda Hiroshi.		
		<i>Pathology of Bosei Society Japan</i> by Kawai Hayao.		
		<i>Bosei Nursing</i> ed. by Matsumoto Seiichi.		
		<i>Research on Bosei-love</i> by Hirai Nobuo et al.		
		<i>Bosei</i> by Nishihara Toyoko.		
			<i>New Portuguese Letters/the Three Marias</i>	Original in Portuguese.

		(1972) by Maria Isabel Barreno, Maria Teresa Harta, and Maria Velho da Costa (POR).	
		<i>The Total Woman</i> (1973) by Marabel Morgan (USA).	Anti-feminist.
		<i>The Female Woman</i> (1973) by Ariana Stassinopoulos Huffington (GBR).	Anti-feminist.
		<i>Men in Groups</i> (1969) by Lionel Tiger (GBR).	
		<i>Unmarried Mothers</i> (1961) by Clark E. Vincent (USA).	
		<i>Man's World, Women's Place: a Study in Social Mythology</i> (1971) by Elizabeth Janeway (USA).	
		<i>Attachment</i> (1969-80) by John Bowlby (GBR).	Vol. 1 of <i>Attachment and loss</i> .
		<i>Women's Liberation in China</i> (1973) by Claudie Broyelle (FRA).	Original in French.
		<i>Women in America</i> (1974) by Edith Hoshino Atzbach (USA).	
		<i>The Female Eunuch</i> (1970) by Germaine Greer (USA).	Radical feminism.
1977		Shinjuku Women's Liberation Center goes out of operation.	
		A National Plan of Action for UN Decade for Women is announced.	
		National Women's Education Centre is opened.	
		Japan Women's Studies Association is inaugurated.	
		<i>New Bosei Dietetics</i> by Sawasaki Chiaki.	
		<i>The Major Woman: New Femininity, New Feminism</i> (1973) by Edgar Morin, Nicole	Original in French.

			Benoit, and Bernard Pailard (FRA).	
			<i>Daughters of the Promised Land: Women in American History</i> (1970) by Page Smith (USA).	
			<i>Sex and Fertility</i> (1969) by Clive Wood (GBR).	
			<i>Dubious Maternal Affection</i> (1968) by J.H. van den Berg (GER).	Original in German.
			<i>Separation: Anxiety and Anger</i> (1973) by John Bowlby (GBR).	
			<i>Woman: a Contemporary View</i> (1951) by F.J.J. Buytendijk (DUT).	Original in Dutch.
			<i>Psychoanalysis and Feminism</i> (1974) by Juliet Mitchell (USA).	Radical feminism.
1978	Yamakawa, "Bosei-favor is Old-fashioned."			
			<i>Love Match and Arranged Marriage: a Tokyo-Detroit Comparison</i> (1967) by Robert O. Blood (USA).	
			<i>The Politics of Women's Liberation</i> (1975) by Jo Freeman (USA).	Radical feminism.
			<i>Social Structure</i> (1960) by George Peter Murdock (USA).	
			<i>The Managerial Woman</i> (1977) by Margaret Hennig and Ann Jardim (USA).	
1979		First female news co-announcer appears on NHK.		
			<i>Fifteen Plus: School Leavers and the Outside World</i> (1970) by Rosamunde Blacker (GBR).	
			<i>The First Relationship: Infant and Mother</i> (1977) by Daniel Stern (USA).	
			<i>Mothering</i> (1977) by Rudolph Schaffer (USA).	
			<i>The Development of Sex Differences</i>	

		(1966) by Eleanor E. Maccoby (USA).	
		<i>The Small Difference and its Large Consequences: Women over Itself</i> (1975) by Alice Schwarzer (GER).	Original in German.
		<i>Single People and the Problem of the Celibacy</i> (1973) by Georges Mauco (FRA).	Original in French.
		<i>Sexual Signatures: on Being a Man or a Woman</i> (1975) by John Money and Patricia Tucker (USA).	
		<i>The Feminine Issue in Politics of the P.C.I. 1921-1963</i> (1972) by Nadia Spano and Flamma Camarlinghi (ITA).	Original in Italian.
		<i>Thus They Are</i> (1975) by Françoise Guienne (FRA).	Original in French.
		<i>I Know Why the Cages Bird Sings</i> (1969) by Maya Angelou (USA).	Radical feminism
		<i>It Changed My Life: Writings on the Women's Movement</i> (1976) by Betty Friedan (USA).	Radical feminism
		<i>Through the Flower: My Struggle as a Woman Artist</i> (1975) by Judy Chicago (USA).	Radical feminism.
		<i>Maternal Deprivation Reassessed</i> (1972) by Michael Ruther (GBR).	
1980	Japan signs the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women.		
	<i>Bosei Protection for Working Women</i> by Sato Masahiko.		
	<i>Uncover Bosei</i> by Kimura Eiichi.		
	<i>Bosei Myth</i> by Saruse Masahiro.		
	"Collapse of Bosei Myth," <i>Japanese Literature:</i>		

	<i>Interpretation and Appreciation</i> Special Edition.			
			<i>A Vindication of the Rights of Woman</i> with <i>Strictures on Political and Moral Subjects</i> (1792) by Mary Wollstonecraft (GBR).	Liberal feminism.
			<i>Feminism and Family Planning in Victorian England</i> (1964) by Joseph Ambrose and Olive Banks (GBR).	
			<i>Singles: However Live</i> (1978) by Hermann Schreiber (GER).	Original in German.
			<i>Capitalism: the Family and Personal Life</i> (1973) by Eli Zaretsky (USA).	
			<i>The Psychology of the Female</i> (1953) by Eric Neumann (GER).	Original in German.
			<i>The Eternal Feminine</i> (1971) by Henri de Lubac (FRA).	Original in French.
			<i>The Sociology of Housework</i> (1974) by Ann Oakley (USA).	Radical feminism.
1981		Supreme Court rules that any differential treatment between the sexes concerning retirement age is void under the Constitution.		
	<i>Lost Bosesi</i> by Hirai Nobuyoshi.			
			<i>Women in the Kibbutz</i> (1975) by Lionel Tiger and Joseph Shepher (ISR).	
			<i>The Role of the Father in Child Development</i> (1976) by Michael E. Lamb (USA).	
			<i>Behind Closed Doors: Violence in the American Family</i> (1980) by Murray Arnold Straus and Richard J. Gelles (USA).	
			<i>Androgyny: Toward a New Theory of Sexuality</i> (1976) by June Singer (USA).	

		<i>Family: Socialization and Interaction Process</i> (1955) by Talcott Parsons and Robert Freed Bales (USA).	
		<i>Work and Family Life: the Role of the Social Infrastructure in Eastern European Countries</i> (1980) by The International Labour Office.	
		<i>About Chinese Women</i> (1977) by Julia Kristeva (FRA).	Original in French.
		<i>Child Abuse</i> (1977) by Alfred White Franklin (GBR).	
		<i>The Reproduction of Mothering: Psychoanalysis and the Sociology of Gender</i> (1978) by Nancy Chodorow (USA).	
		<i>The Making & Breaking of Affectional Bonds</i> (1979) by John Bowlby (GBR).	
		<i>Loss: Sadness and Depression</i> (1980) by John Bowlby (GBR).	
		<i>Nurse</i> (1979) by Peggy Anderson (USA).	
		<i>With the Paddle of Feminism: First Journalists: 1830-1850</i> (1979) by Laure Adler (FRA).	Original in French.
		<i>The Church and the Second Sex</i> (1968) by Mary Daly (USA).	Radical feminism.
1982	Shōkadō opens in Kyoto.		First bookstore to specialize in women's books.
	<i>Bosei for Everyone</i> by Kosaka Yasumi.		
	<i>How to Learn Bosei</i> by Murakami Akira.		
	<i>Bosei Nursing</i> by Hara Ichiju.		
	<i>Harmful Bosei</i> by Arakawa Kazuyoshi.		

		<i>Notes to My Daughters</i> (1981) by Cathy Cash Spellman (USA).	
		<i>Women and Russia: Feminist Writings from the Soviet Union</i> (1984) by Tatyana Mamonova et al. (eds.).	Original in Russian. Various articles.
		<i>The Feminine Revolution of the Women</i> (1978) by Rius (MEX).	Original in Spanish.
		<i>Potatoes, Potatoes</i> (9167) by Anita Lobel (USA).	Recounts how a mother's love and potatoes ended the war.
		<i>Becoming Partners: Marriage and its Alternatives</i> (1972) by Carl R. Rogers (USA).	
		<i>The Great Mother: an Analysis of the Archetype</i> (1955) by Eric Neumann (GER).	Original in German.
		<i>The Feminine Character: History of an Ideology</i> (1971) by Viola Klein (GBR).	
		<i>Shadow-work</i> (1980) by Ivan Illich (USA).	
		<i>The Woman that Never Evolved</i> (1981) by Sarah Blaffer Hrdy (USA).	
		<i>The Hite Report on Male Sexuality</i> (1981) by Shere Hite (USA).	
		<i>Marriage, Dead or Alive</i> (1977) by Adolf Guggenbühl-Craig (GER).	Original in German.
		<i>Feminism with the Masculine</i> (1977) by Benoîte Groult (FRA).	Original in French.
		<i>The Cinderella Complex</i> (1981) by Colette Dowling (USA).	
		<i>The Women's Movement: Political, Socioeconomic, and Psychological Issues</i> (1979) by Barbara Sinclair (USA).	
		<i>Fashions in Makeup: from Ancient to Modern Times</i> (1972) by Richard Corson	

			(USA).	
			<i>He & She: How Children Develop Their Sex-role Identity</i> (1979) by Jeanne Brooks-Gunn and Wendy Schempp Mathews (USA).	
1983	Aoki, <i>The Universe of Feminism</i> .	National Women's Education Center initiates a periodic survey of courses on women's studies offered in institutions of higher education.		
			<i>Love and Power in the Peasant Family: Rural France in the Nineteenth Century</i> (1983) by Martine Segalen (FRA).	Original in French.
			<i>Women's Rights: Origins at Our Days</i> (1983) by Ney Bensadon (FRA).	Original in French.
			<i>The Fact Feminine</i> (1978) by Evelyn Sullerot and Odette Thibaut (FRA).	Original in French.
			<i>Defying Male Civilization: Women in the Spanish Civil War</i> (1995) by Mary Nash (SPA).	Original in Spanish.
			<i>Human Sex Differences: a Primatologist's Perspective</i> (1981) by Gary D. Mitchell (USA).	
			<i>The Young Child and His Body in Traditional Medicine</i> (1978) by Françoise Loux (FRA).	Original in French.
			<i>How to Love a Member of the Opposite Sex</i> (1976) by Colette Dowling (USA).	
			<i>Secrets in the Family</i> (1978) by Lily Pincus and Christopher Dare (GBR).	
			<i>Emancipation of the Woman in Africa and in the World: Texts and Documents</i> (1977) by Paul Désalmand (FRA).	Original in French.
			<i>Women of Crisis: Lives of Struggle and</i>	

			<i>Hope</i> (1978) by Robert Coles and Jane Hallowell Coles (USA).	
			<i>Women of Crisis II: Lives of Work and Dreams</i> (1980) by Robert Coles and Jane Hallowell (USA).	
1984			<i>Turning Points</i> (1979) by Ellen Goodman (USA).	
			<i>Up Against the Clock: Career Women Speak on the New Choice of Motherhood</i> (1979) by Marilyn Fabe and Norma Wickler (USA).	
			<i>Woman and Sport: the Meaning of the Gymnastic</i> (1984) by H.J. Medau and P.E. Nowacki (eds.) (GER).	Original in German.
			<i>Particular Passions: Talks with Women who Have Shaped Our Times</i> (1981) by Gaylen Moore (USA).	
			<i>Feminism and Materialism: Women and Modes of Production</i> (1978) by Annette Kuhn and AnnMarie Wolpe (eds.) (GBR).	
			<i>Dilemmas of Masculinity: A Study of College Youth</i> (1976) by Mirra Komarovsky (USA).	
			<i>Gender</i> (1982) by Ivan Illich (USA).	
			<i>Career and Motherhood: Struggles for a New Identity</i> (1979) by Alan Roland and Barbara Harris (USA).	
			<i>Everyday Life in France at the Golden Age of Capitalism: 1852-1879</i> (1976) by Pierre Guiral (FRA).	Original in French.
			<i>The Contentious Sisters: What Wants Feminist Theology?</i> (1981) by Elisabeth Gössmann (GER).	Original in German.
			<i>Men are Just Desserts</i> (1983) by Sonya Friedman (USA).	

			<i>In Necessity and Sorrow: life and Death in an Abortion Hospital</i> (1976) by Magda Denes (USA).	
			<i>Medieval Marriage: Two Models from Twelfth-century France</i> (1978) by Georges Duby (FRA).	Originally presented in French as lectures.
			<i>Meet Me in the Middle: on Becoming Human Together</i> (1973) by Charlotte H. Clinebell (USA).	
			<i>Women and Madness</i> (1972) by Phyllis Chesler (USA).	Radical feminism.
			<i>The Turning Point: Science, Society, and the Rising Culture</i> (1981) by Fritjof Capra (USA).	
			<i>Germany in the 18th Century</i> (1922) by Max von Boehn (GER).	Original in German.
			<i>Miserable and Glorious the Women of the XIX Century</i> (1980) by Jean-Paul Aron (FRA).	Original in French.
			<i>The Second Stage</i> (1981) by Betty Friedan (USA).	Radical feminism.
1985		Equal Employment Opportunity Law is passed in the Diet.		
		Japanese Diet ratifies the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women.		
		Ueno, "Can Women Save the World?"		
		Ueno, <i>Capitalism and Domestic Labor</i> .		
		Symposium "Where Does Feminism Go" is held.		
		<i>How to Make Good Use of Bosei in Politics</i> by Sakuragi Kengo.		

<i>Working Women's Work and Health-Bosei</i> by New Japanese Women's Association.			
<i>Women! Return to Bosei</i> by Sakuragi Kengo.			
		<i>Mirror Mirror: Images of Women Reflected in Popular Culture</i> (1977) by Kathryn Weibel (USA).	
		<i>Love and Marriage in Ancient France</i> (1981) by Martine Segalen (FRA).	Original in French.
		<i>The Mother: Archetypal Image in Fairly Tales</i> (1988) by Sibylle Birkhäuser-Oeri (GER).	Original in German.
		<i>Couples in Collusion</i> (1982) by Jürg Willi (GER).	Original in German.
		<i>Understanding Sexual Attacks</i> (1978) by D.J. West, C. Roy, and Florence L. Nichols (GBR).	
		<i>Conversations: Working Women Talk about Doing a "Man's Job"</i> (1977) by Terry Wetherby (USA).	
		<i>Women's Two Roles: Home and Work</i> (1956) by Alva Myrdal and Vida Klein (GBR).	
		<i>Women and Men as Leaders: in Business, Educational, Social Service Organizations</i> (1982) by Trudy Heller (USA).	
		<i>The Grand Domestic Revolution: a History of Feminist Designs for American Homes, Neighborhoods, and Cities</i> (1981) by Dolores Hayden (USA).	
		<i>Woman's Mysteries: Ancient and Modern</i> (1935) by M. Esther Harding (USA).	
		<i>Anorexia Nervosa: Let Me Be</i> (1980) by	

			Arthur Hamilton Crisp (USA).	
			<i>Death of Nature</i> (1980) by Carolyn Merchant (USA).	Radical feminism.
			<i>Simone de Beauvoir Today: Conversations 1972-1982</i> (1984) by Alice Schwarzer (FRA).	Original in French
1986	Aoki, <i>Feminism and Ecology</i> .			
	Aoki, <i>What is Bosei?</i>			
	Bosei and Nursing by Iriuchijima Akemi.			
	<i>Inquire Bosei</i> by Kagiya Akiko <i>et al.</i>			
		Doi Takako is appointed as leader of Japan Socialist Party.		
			<i>Parenting</i> (1977) by G. Ron Norton (USA).	
			<i>Literary Women: the Great Writers</i> (1976) by Ellen Moers (USA).	
			<i>Woman in Science</i> (1913) by H.J. Mozans (USA).	The author's real name J.A. Zahm
			<i>Women of Tomorrow</i> (1985) by Kathy Keeton (USA).	
			<i>The Phoenix Stirs, Japan: 1946-1951</i> by Carmen Johnson (USA).	Original unidentified.
			<i>Victorian Working Women: Portraits from Life</i> (1979) by Michael Hiley (GBR).	
			<i>Australian Women: Feminist Perspectives</i> (1981) Norma Grieve and Patricia Grimshaw (AUL).	
			<i>In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development</i> (1982) by Carol Gilligan (USA).	
			<i>Witch Hunting, Magic and the New Philosophy: an Introduction to Debates of</i>	

			<i>the Scientific Revolution, 1450-1750</i> (1980) by Brian Easlea (GBR).	
			<i>Ellen Swallow: the Woman Who Founded Ecology</i> (1973) by Robert Clarke (USA).	
			<i>Barriers between Women</i> (1980) by Paula J. Caplan (USA).	
			<i>Housewife</i> (1974) by Ann Oakley (USA).	Radical feminism.
			<i>Test-tube Women: What Future for Motherhood?</i> (1984) by Rita Arditti, Renate Klein, and Shelley Minden (USA).	
1987	<i>History of Bosei Health Movement</i> by Sakurai Kinue.			
	<i>Patriarchal Religion and Bosei Religion</i> by Matsumoto Megumi.			
			<i>Between Money and Love: the Dialectics of Women's Home and Market Work</i> (1980) by Natalie J. Sokoloff (USA).	
			<i>Reclaiming a Conversation: The Ideal of the Educated Woman</i> (1985) by Jane Roland Martin (USA).	
			<i>Man Made Language</i> (1980) by Dale Spender (GBR).	
			<i>Feminist Theorists: Three Centuries of Women's Intellectual Traditions</i> (1983) by Dale Spender (GBR).	
			<i>History of French Feminisms</i> (1978) by Jean Rabaut (FRA).	Original in French.
			<i>Breaking Out: Feminist Consciousness and Feminist Research</i> (1983) by Liz Stanley and Sue Wise (GBR).	
			<i>Roles in Transition: Report of an Investigation Made for the Advisory Council on Equality between Men and Women</i> (1978) by Rita Lijestrom (SWE).	
			<i>This Sex Which is Not One</i> (1977) by	Original in French.

			Luce Irigaray (FRA).	
			<i>The Sex Contract: the Evolution of Human Behavior</i> (1982) by Helen E. Fisher (USA).	
			<i>Feminist Theory: the Intellectual Traditions of American Feminism</i> (1985) by Josephine Donovan (USA).	
1988	Research on Bosei by Ohinata Masami.			
	Bosei Loss by Shimada Shozo and Kurokawa Shinji.			
	How to Learn Bosei Nursing by Murakami Akira.			
	Bosei by Hanta Susumu and Ohinata Masami.			
	Working Women's Bosei and Health by Marumoto Yuriko.			
	<i>Research on Japanese Monkey's Bosei Stress...</i> by Itoigawa Naosuke.			
				<i>Woman in Film Noir</i> (1980) by E. Ann Kaplan (GBR).
1989		Agnes Debate.		
		Ten-Year Strategy for Promoting Health and Welfare Services for the Elderly is issued by the Ministry of Health and Welfare.		So-called "Gold Plan."
		Sexual harassment survey "Poll of 10,000" is conducted.		
		Ms. Crayon House a women's bookstore is opened in Tokyo by Ochiai Keiko.		A noted novelist.
		<i>Bosei Nursing 1</i> by Kobayashi Takashi.		
		<i>Bosei Nursing 2</i> by Kobayashi		

Takuro.			
		<i>God and the Rhetoric of Sexuality</i> (1978) by Phyllis Tribble (USA).	
		<i>The Life and Death of Mary Wollstonecraft</i> (1974) by Claire Tomalin (GBR).	
		<i>Beyond the Fragments: Feminism and the Making of Socialism</i> (1979) by Hilary Wainwright, Sheila Rowbotham, and Lynne Segal (USA).	Socialism. First appeared as a pamphlet
		<i>The Reign of the Phallus: Sexual Politics in Ancient Athens</i> (1985) by Eva C. Keuls (USA).	
		<i>Anatomy and Destiny: a Cultural History of the Human Body</i> (1975) by Stephen Kern (USA).	
		<i>We: Understanding the Psychology of Romantic Love</i> (1983) by Robert A. Johnson (USA).	
		<i>When and Where I Enter: the Impact of Black Women on Race and Sex in America</i> (1984) by Paula Giddings (USA).	
		<i>Female Strategies</i> (1985) by Evelyn Shaw and Joan Darling (USA).	
		<i>Missing Beauty: a True Story of Murder and Obsession</i> (1988) by Teresa Carpenter (USA).	
		<i>To Educate to Two</i> (1976) by Véronique Corpet (FRA).	Original in French.
		<i>Life after Marriage: Love in an Age of Divorce</i> (1982) by Alfred Alvarez (GBR).	
		<i>On Lies, Secrets, and Silence: Selected Prose 1966-1978</i> (1979) by Adrienne Rich (USA).	Radical feminism.

		<i>Blood, Bread, and Poetry: Selected Prose 1979-1985</i> (1986) by Adrienne Rich (USA).	Radical feminism.
		<i>Intercourse</i> (1987) by Andrea Dworkin (USA).	Radical feminism.
1990	Ueno, <i>Patriarchy and the Capitalism.</i>		
	<i>Social Psychology of Bosei and Nursing Care</i> by Shindo Yukie and Wada Sayoko.		
	<i>Bosei</i> by Maehara Sumiko.		
		<i>Patriarchy and Socialist Revolution in China</i> (1983) by Judith Stacey (USA).	
		<i>Cold Feet: Why Men Don't Commit</i> (1988) by Sonya Rhodes and Marlin S. Potash (USA).	
		<i>Women Take Care: the Consequences of Caregiving in Today's Society</i> (1987) by Tish Sommers and Laurie Shields (USA).	
		<i>The New Feminist Criticism: Essays on Women, Literature, and Theory</i> (1985) by Elaine Showalter (USA).	
		<i>Crossing the Double-Cross: the Practice of Feminist Criticism</i> (1986) by Elizabeth A. Meese (USA).	
		<i>Language and Women's Place</i> (1975) by Robin Lakoff (USA).	
		<i>Women's Choices: the Philosophical Problems Facing Feminism</i> (1983) by May Midgley and Judith M. Hughes (USA).	
		<i>Eighteenth-century Woman: an Anthology</i> (1984) by Bridget Hill (GBR).	
		<i>Making a Difference: Feminist Literary Criticism</i> (1985) by Gayle Greene and	

			Coppelia Kahn (USA).	
			<i>Myths of Gender: Biological Theories about Women and Men</i> (1985) by Anne Fausto-Sterling (USA).	
			<i>In Memory of Her: a Feminist Theological Reconstruction of Christian Origins</i> (1983) by Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza (USA).	
			<i>Women in German History: from Bourgeois Emancipation to Sexual Liberation</i> (1986) by Ute Frevert (GER).	Original in German.
			<i>Womanword: What Japanese Words Say about Women</i> (1987) by Kittredge Cherry.	
			<i>Feminism and Linguistic Theory</i> (1985) by Deborah Cameron (GBR).	
1991		Child Care Leave Act is enacted.		
			<i>Bosei Nursing</i> by Shimazaki Chizu.	
			<i>From Bosei to Ability to Bring Up Next Generation</i> by Hara Hiroko and Tachi Kaoru.	
			<i>Decode Bosei</i> by Group Bosei Decoding Seminar.	
			<i>The Myth of Motherhood: a Historical View of the Maternal Instinct</i> (1981) by Elisabeth Badinter (FRA).	Original in French.
			<i>Women and Revolution: a Discussion of the Unhappy Marriage of Marxism and Feminism</i> (1981) by Lydia Sargent (USA).	
			<i>Encyclopedia of Feminism</i> (1986) by Lisa Tuttle (GBR).	
			<i>Men Let Love: the Craze after the Woman</i> (1988) by Wilfried Wieck (GER).	Original in German.

		<i>The Future of the City is Female: Woman Politics in the Municipality</i> (1987) by Elke Steg and Inga Jesinghaus (GER).	Original in German.
		<i>Women and Dualism: A Sociology of Knowledge Analysis</i> (1979) by Lynda M. Glennon (USA).	
		" <i>A Manifesto for Cyborg: Science, Technology, and Socialist Feminism in the 1980s</i> " (1985) by Donna Haraway (USA).	
		<i>The Work of Love: Unpaid Housework, Poverty and Sexual Violence at the Dawn of the 21st Century</i> (1978) by Giovanna Franca Dalla Costa (ITA).	Original in Italian.
		<i>Women for Hire: Prostitution and Sexuality in France after 1850</i> (1978) by Alain Corbin (FRA).	Original in French.
		<i>Women and Prostitution: a Social History</i> (1978) by Vern L. Bullough and Bonnie Bullough (USA).	Revised version of <i>Prostitution: an illustrated social history</i>
		<i>Goddesses in Everywoman: a New Psychology of Women</i> (1984) by Jean Shinoda Bolen (USA).	
		<i>Pornography: Men Possessing Women</i> (1981) by Andrea Dworkin (USA).	Radical feminism.
1992	<i>Bosei Sociology</i> by Funabashi Keiko and Tsutsumi Masae.		
	<i>Bosei Psychology</i> by Hanazawa Seiichi.		
	<i>Intergenerational Handing Down of Bosei Behavior by Japanese Monkey</i> by Itoigawa Naosuke.		
	"Evil Spirited and Bosei," <i>New Japanese Literature Special Edition</i> .		

		<i>The Opposite Sex: the End of the Gender Battle</i> (1989) by Elisabeth Badinter (FRA).	Original in French.
		<i>The Women who Knew Too Much: Hitchcock and Feminist Theory</i> (1988) by Tania Modleski (USA).	
		<i>Gender and Genius: Toward a Feminist Aesthetics</i> (1989) by Christine Battersby (GBR).	
		<i>Gender and the Politics of History</i> (1988) by Joan W. Scott (USA).	
		<i>Why the Birthrate has Declined?: the German Case</i> (1984) by Elisabeth Beck-Gernsheim (GER).	Original in German.
		<i>Medieval Prostitution</i> (1988) by Jacques Rossiaud (FRA).	Original in French.
		<i>Smart Girls, Gifted Women</i> (1985) by Barbara Kerr (USA).	
		<i>Birthrights: What Every Parent Should Know about Childbirth in Hospitals</i> (1984) by Sally Inch (GBR).	
		<i>Out of the Doll's House: the Story of Women in the Twentieth Century</i> (1988) by Angela Holdsworth (GBR).	
		<i>When Biology Became Destiny: Women in Weimar and Nazi Germany</i> (1984) by Renate Bridenthal <i>et al.</i> (eds.) (GER).	
		<i>When Ladies Go A-thieving: Middle-class Shoplifters in the Victorian Department Store</i> (1989) by Elaine S. Abelson (USA).	
		<i>Writing a Woman's Life</i> (1989) by Carolyn Heilbron (USA).	
		<i>The Demon Lover: On the Sexuality of Terrorism</i> (1989) by Robin Morgan (ed.) (USA).	

1993	<i>Bosei, Abundantly</i> by Kida Hiroshi.			
	<i>Bosei-ism Feminism in Modern Germany</i> by Himeoka Toshiko.			
			<i>A Literature of Their Own: British Women Novelists from Bronte to Lessing</i> (1977) by Elaine Showalter (USA).	
			<i>Feminist Experiences: the Women's Movement in Four Cultures</i> (1986) by Susan Bassnett (GBR).	
			<i>Unequal Work</i> (1987) by Veronica Beechey (GBR).	
			<i>Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and Law</i> (1987) by Catherine A. MacKinnon (USA).	
			<i>The European Family: Patriarchy to Partnership from the Middle Ages to the Present</i> (1977) by Michael Mitterauer (GER).	Original in German.
			<i>Je, Tu, Nous: Toward a Culture of Difference</i> (1990) by Luce Irigaray (FRA).	Original in French.
			<i>The Hosken Report: Genital and Sexual Mutilation of Females</i> (1979) by Fran P. Hosken.	
			<i>Families in Former Times: Kinship, Household, and Sexuality</i> (1984) by Jean Louis Flandrin (FRA).	Original in French.
			<i>The School of the Girls: Which Formation for Which Social Roles?</i> (1990) by Marie Duru-Bellat (FRA).	Original in French.
			<i>Love and Sexuality in the West</i> (1991) by Georges Duby and Philippe Ariès (FRA).	Original in French.
			<i>Gender and Power: Society, the Person and Sexual Politics</i> (1987) by Robert W.	

			Connell (AUL).	
			<i>The Laughter of Meduse</i> (1975-1986) by Helen Cixous (FRA).	Original in French.
			<i>Inspiring Influences: Tradition, Revision, and Afro-American Women's Novels</i> (1989) by Michael Awkward (USA).	
			<i>Homemakers: the Forgotten Workers</i> (1981) by Rae Andre (USA).	
			<i>Mercy</i> (1991) by Andrea Dworkin (USA).	
			<i>Surfacing</i> (1972) by Margaret Atwood (USA).	Radical feminism.
			<i>Stories of Love of the Provinces of France</i> (1955-1965) by Jacques-Henry Bauchy (FRA).	Original in French.
1994	<i>Bosei Civilization and Patriarchal Civilization</i> by Hasegawa Akira.			
	<i>Bosei Nursing Technology</i> by Kohara Ruriko and Oi Nobuko.			
	<i>Confucian Society and Bosei</i> by Shitami Takao.			
			<i>Ladies of the Leisure Class: the Bourgeoises of Northern France in the Nineteenth Century</i> (1981) by Bonnie G. Smith (USA).	
			<i>The German Men and Their Enemies: Carl Schmitt, a German Fate between Man Federation and Matriarchal Myth</i> (1991) by Nicolaus Sombart (GER).	Original in German.
			<i>Births: the Childbirth before the Age of the Private Clinic</i> (1982) by Mireille Laget (FRA).	Original in French.
			<i>Sexual Science: the Victorian Construction of Womanhood</i> (1989) by Cynthia Eagle Russett (GBR).	

		<i>A Woman Seeks Her Way</i> (1974) by Alice Cronquist Lyttkens (SWE).	Original in Swedish.
		<i>A Woman Finds a Companion</i> (1972) by Alice Cronquist Lyttkens (SWE).	Original in Swedish.
		<i>History of the Mothers of the Middle Ages at Our Days</i> (1982) by Yvonne Knibiehler and Catherine Fouquest (FRA).	Original in French.
		<i>The Nature of Loving: Patterns of Human Relations</i> (1986) by Verena Kast (GER).	Original in German.
		<i>Manhood in the Making: Cultural Concepts of Masculinity</i> (1990) by David Gilmore (GBR).	
		<i>The Resisting Reader: a Feminist Approach to American Fiction</i> (1978) by Judith Fetterley (USA).	
		<i>Japanese Women Artists of the Kinsei Era</i> (1988) by Patricia Fisher.	
		<i>Beauty Bound</i> (1985) by Rita Jackaway Freedman (USA).	
		<i>Women and War</i> (1987) by Jean Bethke Elshtain (USA).	
		<i>The Woman beneath the Skin: a Doctor's Patients in Eighteenth-century Germany</i> (1991) by Barbara Duden (GER).	Original in German.
		<i>Intimacy</i> (1990) by Hans Peter Duerr (GER).	Original in German.
		<i>Power and Beauty: Images of Women in Art</i> (1992) by Georges Duby (FRA).	Original in French.
		<i>Woman and Myth</i> (1982) by George Devereux (FRA).	Original in French.
		<i>Backlash</i> (198?) by Susan Faludi (USA).	Radical feminism
		<i>Radial Ecology: The Search for a Livable World</i> (1992) by Carolyn Merchant (USA).	

			<i>A History of Women in the West</i> (1991-1992) by Georges Duby and Michelle Perrot (FRA).	Original in French.
1995	<i>Japanese Feminism: Bosei</i> by Inoue Teruko.			
	<i>Bosei: Clinical Nursing Guide</i> by Ikenoue Katsu.			
			<i>The Child Question: Women between Child Desire and Independence</i> (1988) by Elisabeth Beck-Gernsheim (GER).	Original in German.
			<i>Une Femme de Libertés: Olympe de Gouges</i> (1981) by Olivier Blanc (FRA).	Original in French.
			<i>In Praise of Love: an Introduction to the Love-poetry of the Renaissance</i> (1958) by Maurice Jacques Valency (USA).	
			<i>Romantic Longings: Love in America, 1830-1980</i> (1991) by Steve Seidman (USA).	
			<i>Women: the Last Colony</i> (1983) by Maria Mies, Claudia von Werlhof, and Veronika Bennholdt-Thomsen (GER).	Original in German.
			<i>History of the Chinese Woman: 4000 Years of Being Able</i> (1986) by Charles Meyer.	Original in French.
			<i>Woman, Native, Other: Writing on Feminism and Postcolonialism</i> (1989) by Trinh Thi Minh-Ha (USA).	
			<i>Gender and Knowledge: Elements of a Postmodern Feminism</i> (1990) by Susan Heckman (GBR).	
			<i>A Women's History of Sex</i> (1987) by Harriett Gilbert (GBR).	
			<i>You Can be Free: an Easy-to-read Handbook for Abused Women</i> (1989) by Ginny NiCarthy and Sue Davidson	

		(USA).	
		<i>Maternity Moving: Women, the Re/production and Men of Science</i> (1986) by L Gavarini, M Le Coadic, and Anne-Marie de Vilaine (FRA).	Original in French.
		<i>Rape: The Politics of Consciousness</i> (1986) by Susan Griffin (USA).	
		<i>The God of the Witches</i> (1933) by Margaret Murray (USA).	
		<i>The Fountain of Age</i> (1993) by Betty Friedan (USA).	
1996	<i>Bosei Psychology and Sociology</i> by Takeya Yuji and Maehara Sumiko.		
	<i>Bosei Health Science</i> by Iwasaki Hirokazu.		
	<i>From Holy Bosei with Love</i> by Himenomiya Ami.		
		<i>Women's Work: the First 20,000 Years: Women, Cloth, and Society in Early Times</i> (1994) by Elizabeth Wayland Barber (USA).	
		<i>Juchitán, City of the Women: the Life in the Matriarchy</i> (1994) by Veronika Bennholdt-Thomsen (GER).	Original in German.
		<i>Failing at Fairness: How American Schools Cheat Girls</i> (1994) by Myra and David Dadker (USA).	
		<i>Recreating Motherhood: Ideology and Technology in a Patriarchal Society</i> (1989) by Barbara Katz Rothman (USA).	
		<i>Gender Planning and Development: Theory, Practice & Training</i> (1993) by Caroline Moser (GBR).	
		<i>Nationalism and Sexuality: Middle-class</i>	

			<i>Morality and Sexual Norms in Modern Europe</i> (1988) by George L. Mosse (USA).	
			<i>Single Mothers by Choice</i> (1994) by Jane Mattes (USA).	
			<i>Witches, Midwives, and Nurses: a History of Women Healers</i> (1973) by Barbara Ehrenreich and Deirdre English (USA).	
			<i>Close to Home: a Materialist Analysis of Women's Oppression</i> (1984) by Christine Delphy (FRA).	Original in French. Various articles edited by Diana Leonard
			<i>Women and History: Conference at Sorbonne, November 13-14, 1992</i> (1992) by Georges Duby and Michelle Perrot (FRA).	Original in French.
			<i>Taoism and Female Alchemy</i> (1990) by Catherine Despeaux (FRA).	Original in French.
			<i>The Sisterhood: the True Story of the Women Who Changed the World</i> (1988) by Marcia Cohen (USA).	
			<i>The Gospel According to Woman: Christianity's Creation of the Sex War in the West</i> (1986) by Karen Armstrong (GBR).	
1997	<i>Praise of Bosei</i> by Endo Reiko.			
	<i>Bosei</i> by Maruyama Tomoko.			
	<i>Bosei and Infants in Farming Village</i> by Hayashi Shunichi et al.			
	<i>Mechanisms of Filial Duty and Bosei</i> by Shitami Takao.			
	<i>The Golden Age of Bosei</i> by Saito Renako.			
	<i>21st Century is Bosei's Century</i> by Kakeno Azusa.			

	Shimane <i>Bosei</i> Health Society is established.		
			<i>Sex Discrimination in a Nutshell</i> (1991) by Claire Sherman Thomas (USA).
			<i>The Revenge of the Women: New Forms of Female Self Statement</i> (1996) by Ursula Richter (GER). Original in German.
			<i>The Descent of Woman</i> (1972) by Elaine Morgan (GBR).
			<i>Patriarchy and Accumulation on a World Scale</i> (1986) by Maria Mies (GER).
			<i>Feminist Theory: from Margin to Center</i> (1984) by bell hooks (USA).
			<i>Born for Liberty: a History of Women in America</i> (1989) by Sara Margaret Evans (USA).
			<i>The Woman as Good as the Man, or, the Equality of Both Sexes</i> (1673) by François Poulain de La Barre (FRA). Original in French.
			<i>Promoting Reproductive Rights: a Global Mandate</i> (1997) by Reed Boland (USA).
			<i>Women in the Material World</i> (1996) by Faith D'Alusio and Peter Menzel.
1998	<i>Miyazawa Kenji: Absurdity and Bosei</i> by Shimizu Tadashi.		
	<i>Bosei Protection</i> by Komada Tomie.		
	<i>Splendid Bosei</i> by Masuda Haruyo.		
	" <i>Fusei and Bosei</i> ," <i>Rehabilitation and Protection</i> Special Edition.		
			<i>The Divorce Culture</i> (1997) by Barbara Dafoe Whitehead (USA).
			<i>Demonic Males: Apes and the Origins of Human Violence</i> (1996) by Richard


			Wrangham and Dale Peterson (USA).	
			<i>Women's Lives: Themes and Variations in Gender Learning</i> (1994) by Bernice Lott (USA).	
			Dictionary of Feminist Theology (1991) by Elisabeth Gössmann (GER).	Original in German.
			<i>Introducing Contemporary Feminist Thought</i> (1997) by Mary Evans (GBR).	
			<i>Women and Violence</i> (1994), compiled by Miranda Davies (GBR).	
			<i>The Way We Never Were: American Families and the Nostalgic Trap</i> (1992) by Stephanie Coontz (USA).	
			<i>Femininity</i> (1984) by Susan Brownmiller (USA).	
			<i>Life and Death</i> (1997) by Andrea Dworkin (USA).	
			<i>Ceremony</i> (1977) by Leslie Silko (USA).	
1999	<i>Reinstatement of Bosei</i> by Hayashi Michio.			
	<i>Collapse of Bosei</i> by Hayashi Michio.			
	<i>Structure and Development of Bosei Consciousness</i> by Matsumura Keiko.			
			<i>The Dictionary of Feminist Theory</i> (1995) by Maggie Humm (USA).	
			<i>Tell Them Who I am: the Lives of Homeless Women</i> (1993) by Elliot Liebow (USA).	
			<i>Sexual Harrassment of Working Women</i> (1979) by Catherine A. MacKinnon (USA).	
			<i>The Last Time I Wore a Dress</i> (1997) by Daphne Scholinski and Jane Meredith	

			Adams (USA).	
			<i>Lost in Space: Probing Feminist Science Fiction and Beyond</i> (1993) by Marleen S. Barr (USA).	
			<i>Delivered Jocaste: Maternity and Representation of the Sexual Roles</i> (1991) by Francine Comte (FRA).	Original in French.
			<i>Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity</i> (1990) by Judith Butler (USA).	
			<i>Women, the Environment and Sustainable Development: Toward a Theoretical Synthesis</i> (1994) by Rosi Braidotti (NET).	
2000	<i>Trap of Bosei-love Myth</i> by Ohinata Masami.			
			<i>With Other Eyes: Looking at Race and Gender in Visual Culture</i> (1999) by Lisa Bloom (USA).	
			<i>Feminism and International Relations: Toward a Political Economy on Gender in Interstate and Non-governmental Institutions</i> (1994) by Sandra Whiteworth (GBR).	
			<i>Sexual Anarchy: Gender and Culture at the Fin de Siecle</i> (1990) by Elaine Showalter (USA).	
			<i>The Sexual Brain</i> (1993) by Simon Levay (USA).	
			<i>Women's American: Refocusing the Past</i> (1987) by Linda K. Kerber and Jane de Hart Mathews (USA).	
			<i>The Political Economy of Gender: Women and the Sexual Division of Labour in the Philippines</i> (1992) by Elizabeth Eviota.	

			<i>Historical Dictionary of Feminism</i> (1996) by Janet Boles (USA).	
			<i>A Concise Glossary of Feminist Theory</i> (1997) by Sonia Andermahr, Terry Lovell, and Carol Wolkowitz (GBR).	
2001	<i>Human Science of Bosei and Fusei</i> by Negayama Koichi.			
	<i>System that is Called Bosei-love</i> by Tama Yasuko.			
	<i>Kaneko Misuzu: Forever Bosei</i> by Poetry and Poetry Theory Association.			
	<i>Dismantling Bosei</i> by Okawa Naomi.			
			<i>Outsiders: Class, Gender and Nation</i> (1993) by Dorothy Thompson (GBR).	
			<i>Feminism and Geography: the Limits of Geographical Knowledge</i> (1993) by Gillian Rose (GBR).	
			<i>Textual Harassment: How to Suppress Women's Writing</i> (1983) by Joanna Russ (USA).	
2002	<i>Bosei's Revolt</i> by Betsuyaku Minoru.			
	<i>Nurturing Bosei</i> by Okamura Hiroyuki.			
	<i>Bosei Dependent Thought</i> by Shitami Takao.			
	<i>Fight against Bosei-love Myth</i> by Ohinata Masami.			
			<i>In Harm's Way: The Pornography Civil Rights Hearings</i> (1997) by Andrea Dworkin and Catherine Mackinnon (USA).	
2003	<i>Bosei-love Myth in Media</i> by			

Ohinata Masami.			
<i>Pride of Bosei</i> by Murayama Michiko.			
<i>Modern People and Bosei</i> by Matsuo Tsuneko and Takaishi Kyoko.			
		<i>Beyond Gender</i> (1997) by Betty Friedan (USA).	
		<i>Heartbreak</i> (2002) by Andrea Dworkin (USA).	

Chart A2 - Western Feminist Works Translated into Japanese by Decade



Appendix B: Bosei Publications: Books and Articles
Chart B1 - An Historical Overview




Chart B2 - Total Numbers of *Bosei* Articles by Discipline




Chart B3 - Bosei Articles




Chart B4 - Bosei Articles




Chart B5 - Bosei Articles




Chart B6 - Bosei Articles




Chart B7 - Bosei Articles




Chart B8 - Bosei Articles




Chart B9 - Medicalization of Bosei




Chart B10 - Medicalization of Bosei






Chart B11 - Medicalization of Bosei



Appendix C: Japanese Women in the Workforce - Chart



Appendix C: Japanese Women in the Workforce – Table

	Total	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-34	35-39	40-44	45-49	50-54	55-59	60-64	65 and Older
1975	45.7	21.7	66.2	42.6	43.9	54.0	59.9	61.5	57.8	48.8	38.0	15.3
1980	47.6	18.5	70.0	49.2	48.2	58.0	64.1	64.4	59.3	50.5	38.8	15.5
1985	48.7	16.6	71.9	54.1	50.6	60.0	67.9	68.1	61.0	51.0	38.5	15.5
1990	50.1	17.8	75.1	61.4	51.7	62.6	69.6	71.7	65.5	53.9	39.5	16.2
1995	50.0	16.0	74.1	66.4	53.7	60.5	69.5	71.3	67.1	57.0	39.7	15.6
2000	49.3	16.6	72.7	69.9	57.1	61.4	69.3	71.8	68.2	58.7	39.5	14.4
2003	48.3	16.6	69.4	73.4	60.3	63.1	70.3	72.5	68.1	58.9	39.4	13.0

Source: Japanese Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare, Annual Reports on Women's Labor (2004)

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